The Condition of Exile:

Ghanaian Exile Networks and Competing Nationalisms, 1957-1993

Harriet Aldrich

St Hugh's College, University of Oxford

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History Faculty

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For Tom, whose heart could easy power three of me

Short Abstract

This thesis provides an original analysis of the role of exile as an integral but neglected part of the historical and political landscape of post-independence Ghana. The prevalence of the nation-state as an analytical framework has led to the exclusion of exiles and other mobile individuals from conventional historical narratives, despite the significant impact which such transnational activists have had on the political development of Africa in general and Ghana in particular.

The thesis demonstrates that, through the creation of mobile networks of dissent, repeated waves of exiles affected and reshaped Ghanaian domestic politics, constituting a material challenge not only for the Ghanaian government itself, but also the governments of the countries they resided in. Exiles functioned as an externalised opposition, beyond successive governments' coercive reach, disrupting state security and troubling key diplomatic relationships. Being beyond Ghana's border did not prevent exiles from remaining active participants in Ghana's development. Despite their externality, many ideationally and emotionally never left home.

Archival sources from across Ghana, the US, and the UK, alongside interviews, have been employed to explore how exiles remained entwined with the politics of their nation of origin. Regardless of geographical distance from Ghana, the global space of exile provided an important venue for contestation of the nation. This thesis combines multiple approaches, embracing not only the insights of global and African history, but also combining political realism with the affective turn. This derives from this thesis' contention that the study of exile and its political impact is inseparable from its social and emotional dynamics. Emotion was central to how exiles perceived themselves in relation to their political aims and to Ghana as their home. Familial, social, and political ties defined these networks of resistance, ensuring their political impact spanned local, regional, and global spaces in unpredictable and entangled ways.

Long Abstract

Focusing on the political and social dynamics of Ghanaian exile activism in the period after independence, this thesis reintegrates transnational activism into the wider historical narrative of Ghana's political development. Successive Ghanaian governments, often intolerant of domestic opposition, generated waves of exiles as they discouraged and repressed political criticism and freedoms. Forced to flee for their own safety, the political engagement of these exiled activists with the nascent Ghanaian nation was, the thesis shows, undiminished by geographical distance. Rather than successfully silencing their critics, government leaders and officials only succeeded in externalising their opposition, placing them beyond the state's coercive reach.

Refusing to 'go quietly', politically active exiles formed mobile networks of dissent focused on the politics of their homeland. Utilising varied forms of resistance - from protests, to creating exile newspapers, to planning and executing militarised coup attempts - exiles significantly impacted and reshaped the Ghanaian political landscape. Exiles maintained complex transnational social, political, and intellectual connections, both with family and friends still in Ghana, and with emergent global Ghanaian diasporic communities. Alternative visions of Ghana and its future were imagined and developed collaboratively from beyond its national borders.

Exiles remained a real but under analysed political challenge for successive Ghanaian governments. The threat exiles posed, whether real or imagined, caused the Ghanaian state to expend significant political energy and resources on extraterritorial attempts to control them, thus impacting on evolving domestic security policy. This disrupted key diplomatic relationships, both with western countries and especially with neighbouring Togo and Côte d'Ivoire, where the looming presence of borderland Ghanaian exile communities caused major tensions. Beyond the easy reach of the state, Ghanaian exiles presented a threatening but unquantifiable challenge to successive

leaders' imaginations. This allowed politically active exiles to influence the domestic political scene in ways sometimes complementary to but often distinct from their domestic counterparts.

Often perceived and indeed accused by Ghanaian leaders of being agents of external influence or covert re-colonisation, exiles also presented significant problems to the governments of the countries that hosted them. Britain's (post-)colonial ties with Ghana made such allegations particularly troubling for its government. While British officials were unable to prevent prominent Ghanaian exiles from taking up UK residence, concerted efforts were made to minimise their diplomatic impact, sometimes setting new political precedents, and contravening legal protections in doing so. Exiles were also disruptive within the wider international landscape, as their inherent globality exposed them to evolving global intellectual currents which they sought to leverage to their own benefit. Actively engaging with an emerging discourse on global governance, human rights, and justice, exile pressure groups were able to capitalise on such themes and collaborate with non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International to exert pressure on or court favour with Western governments in a Cold War context. Exiles became the grit in the international oyster, disrupting relationships, leveraging global norms, and forcing governments to create new and diverse approaches to the realities of global exile politics.

Despite exile's ubiquity as a facet of the human experience, it has received little historiographical attention until recently. This omission is particularly striking within historiography on modern Africa, considering how common and influential forms of forced migration have been for individuals, nations, and movements across the continent. This thesis argues that the conceptual dominance of the Westphalian nation-state across the humanities and social sciences has caused transnational actors to be overlooked. Often utilised as both a subject of inquiry and a practical conceptual and methodological boundary delineating a project's scope, the hegemony of nation-focused historical analyses has only recently begun to be challenged, causing exiles to slip through the cracks.

Even those scholars who have engaged with exile within broader, nation-focused work, have often done so only through the paradigm of exit and return. A prominent activist's flight into exile from state persecution may be noted in passing, and/or the

triumphant return of a once exiled politician remarked upon, but the political impact of these individuals while *external* to the nation-state is rarely explored in any depth, and the broader networks built by such individuals in exile have received even less attention. Exiles have therefore had their exclusion compounded: forced to leave their nation of origin, they have subsequently been marginalised further by scholars who have omitted their significant contribution to 'national' histories.

By reinserting exile dynamics into wider Ghanaian political history, this thesis challenges established ideas of post-independence African politics as centring on internal dynamics within new nation-states. An emphasis on central state formation and the domestic sphere has occluded the salience of transnational dynamics and relegated exiles to the footnotes, preventing the integration of competing political visions generated beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Post-independence African politics, like its colonial-era antecedents, involved a mobile politics of dissent in which ideas and associations were produced in local, regional, and transnational spaces. Accordingly, a history of Ghana which omits the impact of figures and movements beyond the national boundary is inherently deficient, failing to capture the complex globality of Ghana's political development.

This argument has relevance for the practice of national history more widely. While the 'nation' is a valid area of historical enquiry, having had a vast conceptual impact on global contemporary history and politics, nation-focused research should nevertheless not be ideationally constrained by the real-world boundaries of its subject. Employing physical national boundaries to delineate the scope of nation-focused research is both practical and attractively simple, but it artificially severs the fluid transnational connections which have commonly been integral to the development of nation-states more generally. This thesis both argues and demonstrates that the practice of national history is also inherently a transnational and global project, necessitating the inclusion of exilic and diasporic communities.

While the arguments within this thesis have relevance and applicability to broad areas of historical enquiry, they are specifically illuminated through its exploration of Ghana. Even within the context of the African continent which has been so strongly shaped by transnational movement, Ghana's relationship with exiles and migration is noteworthy. Ghana's experience in this regard is continuous, from the slave trade to the

exiling of political figures, including Ashanti King Prempeh I, during the colonial era. This storied legacy formed the ideational context of many individuals whose experiences of post-independence exile are explored in this thesis. Ghana's central role in global Pan-Africanism also roots the nation in transnationality, home as it was to Kwame Nkrumah and other global Pan-Africanist thinkers and leaders in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Externality was crucial to these thinkers, providing the context in which they were able to imagine alternative political visions beyond the colony or nation.

The political turmoil of Ghana's post-independence period provided the conditions for new waves of political exiles. During the post-independence period, Ghana had three elected civilian governments, those of Kwame Nkrumah (1951-66), Dr Kofi Busia (1969-72), and Dr Hilla Liman (1979-81), all of which were ended by military coups. Ghana was for much of the 1970s and 1980s under the military rule of Acheampong and Akuffo, and subsequently Jerry Rawlings. During these periods, the unfolding of various purges, palace coups, and mutinies forced political actors from – or sympathetic to - the previous regime to flee into exile.

This study seeks to capture both the impact of Ghana's long historical roots of global migration, but also its immediate post-independence context of consecutive, overlapping waves of political instability, by utilising a chronological structure. This most effectively illuminates the ways in which successive exile movements both echoed and learned from the experiences of their predecessors. Most importantly, it is designed to preserve the dynamic contingency of exile, minimising the distortion of historical hindsight. It is important to avoid conceptualising the state of exile as a final destination: rather, the lived experience of exile was one of potential, its political impact bound up in exiles' present and future interaction with their home nation, including the possibility of return. This extended chronological approach aims to capture exile as an unresolved space of potentiality, rather than collapsing the exile experience into preconceived narratives of political failure or restitution with singular endpoints.

Exploring exile presents considerable methodological challenges. With the exception of social histories that extensively employ oral testimony, the main driver of research into the history of political ideas remains archival and textual. Yet exiles commonly leave only an ephemeral written trail, since their documentation and correspondence were often discarded or destroyed as they travelled for practical and

security reasons. However, some documents survive, often preserved in the personal papers of their correspondents or the files of international organisations. These documents are particularly crucial to the first half of the thesis, providing insight into the personal perspectives of the first generation of post-independence exiles whose deaths have placed them beyond the reach of oral history. Governmental archives are also crucial to creating an overarching conception of exile movement, as concerns about exile activity often generated a significant documentary trail through surveillance and inter-departmental discussion.

If we consider the nation as consisting of individuals and ideas both within and beyond its national boundaries, then the sources needed to illuminate its history must reflect this understanding. By thinking imaginatively about Ghana's history, our conception of what constitutes its 'national archives' immediately becomes broader and richer. This thesis therefore argues for and demonstrates the benefits of integrating 'African' and 'Global' historical approaches, employing documents collected from multiple archives across Ghana, the UK, and the USA, with supplementary evidence from archives in the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Australia. Methodologically, the wider focus on transnational individuals and networks within nation-focused histories, which this thesis encourages, necessitates a significantly broader methodological approach which integrates global archives.

Finally, this thesis places the lived experience of exile at the centre of its analysis. It argues that analysis of the political history of exiled individuals is impossible to disentangle from the personal, familial, and social. In order to access the internal and reflective lives of exiles and those effected by it, oral history has necessarily formed a key component of its methodological framing, with eleven interviews conducted for the project. Exiled politicians endured severe personal crises during their time abroad. Notwithstanding the trauma of leaving home unwillingly, many were separated from family and friends who remained in Ghana. Often economically impoverished and uncertain about their political and personal future, exiles' anxiety was compounded by the necessity of avoiding persecution by successor regimes which often sought to intimidate or extradite them. This thesis seeks to map the outcome of these emotions and disorientating experiences upon developing African political ideas and especially ideas of opposition: in short, the affective aspect of exile.

In this way, this thesis seeks to integrate traditionally distinct approaches to historical enquiry, namely the conventional barrier between 'realist' political histories that focus on areas such as security, economics, and policy; and historical approaches of affect and emotion which have normally been the preserve of social historians. In a broader context, this thesis calls for the integration of traditional macropolitical state histories with the micropolitical studies of transnational political/social movements, reflecting as they do individual sensibility, affect, and local allegiances.

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Table of Contents

Short Abstract i

Long Abstract ii

Acknowledgements viii

Table of Contents xi

Abbreviations xiv

Chapter 1 – Introduction 1

Research Design- Why Ghana? 7
A Chronological Approach 9
Defining Exile 11
Methods and Sources 12
Oral History 14
Archival Sources 16
Thesis Outline 21

Chapter 2 – Literature Review 24

Introduction 24
Ghana's National History and the "Big Man" 25
Ghanaian Exile Histories 30
Global Histories of Exile 33
Exile in African Cold War History 38
Colonial cities as a site of exile 41
Exiles, Development and Diaspora 44
Conclusion 46

Chapter 3 - Ghanaian Independence: The Condition for Exile (1950s-1962) 48

Introduction 48
The Political Landscape of Late Colonial Gold Coast 49
The relationship between Nkrumah and the UGCC 50
Federalist Opposition 52
Independence and Preventative Detention 54
Opposition in Exile - Kofi Busia 58
Exiled CPP Ministers 65
Courting Support 68
Togo as a Centre of Exile Politics 71
Invitations to Return 73
Conclusion 74

Chapter 4 - The Grit in the Oyster: Exile and the Reshaping of Nkrumah's Government (1962-1966) 76

Introduction 76
The Kulungugu Bombing 78
The Blame for Kulungugu 80
The Image of Busia and Gbedemah 82
Pamphlet Wars and the Battle for Public Opinion 83
Fear and Global Cold War Relations 87
Monitoring Exiles 89
Extradition and Diplomatic Disruptions 91
Extraterritorial and Extrajudicial Tactics 94
Exile Finances: Support or Lack of It 96
The Kulungugu Trial Evolves 99
The Global Cold War and Neo-Colonialism 101
Conclusion 103

Chapter 5 - CPP Exile: Departure and Return (1966-1972) 106

Introduction 106
The 1966 Coup 107
A New Landscape 111
Nkrumah's Flight to Guinea and the Ghana-Guinea Dispute 117
Nkrumahist Subversion from Exile 121
Surveillance, Detention and Abduction 125
Money 131
Busia, Gbedemah and the Spectrum of Exile 133
Kofi Busia: The Returned Exile Comes to Power 137
Conclusion 141

Chapter 6 - Return Undone: Exile Dynamics during the National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military Council (1972-79) 143

Introduction 143
The 1972 coup 144
Busia: Exile, Again 147
Overhauling the Economy and Consolidating Power 149
The July 1972 Failed Countercoup 151
Busia and Extradition, 1972 154
Wider Dynamics of Exile under the NRC 157
Economic Crisis and Exodus 160
The Unigov Referendum 1977-1978 164
The Afrifa Family Exile 165
Opposition to Unigov in Exile 167
Akuffo's Palace Coup 170
Conclusion 171

Chapter 7 - A New Wave of Exiles: The Rise of Jerry Rawlings (1979-86) 173

Introduction 173
Rawlings' Rise 174
Executions 176
Instability and the PNP Government 178
The Establishment of the PNDC 182
Public Tribunals 183
Intimidation of the Judiciary and the Murder of Three Judges 185
Unity in Exile 188
Militarised Countercoups and the Realities of Exile Unity 190
Regional Relations and Border Anxiety 196
Expulsions and Exile Security 199
Weaponising Family Ties 202
The Stigma of Exile 205
Conclusion 208

Chapter 8 - Civilian Opposition and the Decline of Authoritarian Rule: from the Provisional National Defence Council to Multi-Party Democracy (1983-92) 210

Introduction 210
Repression of the Press 211
Journalists in Exile: *Talking Drums* 214
The Challenge of Externality 217
The Challenge of Financial Precarity 219
The Umaru Dikko Affair 220
The End of a Chapter 224
Exploiting International Norms 225
Opposition Externalised: The GDM and CDG 232
The Purpose of Exile Groups 237
Economic Crisis, the IMF, and Enticement to Return 240
Return and After 246
Conclusion 248

Chapter 9 – Conclusion 250

Centring Exile 251
Power and Persecution 253
Global History and its Methods 255
Realism and Emotion 257
Multipolarity and African Agency 260
Flexible Citizens 262

Bibliography 264

Abbreviations

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (June 1979 – September 1979)
ANC	African National Congress
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CDDG	Convention of Democratic Defence for Ghana
CDG	Campaign for Democracy in Ghana
CPP	Convention Peoples Party (1948 – 1966)
CYO	Committee on Youth Organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
GBA	Ghana Bar Association
GCP	Ghana Congress Party
GDM	Ghana Democratic Movement
GPRL	George Padmore Research Library, Accra, Ghana
GRU	Ghanaian Refugee Union
GSA	Ghana Students' Association
GSG	Ghana Study Group of North America
HDA SBU	*Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhba bezpeky Ukraïny* (KGB Archive, Ukraine)
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRD	Information Research Deaprtment
JKFL	John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
JFM	June Fourth Movement

LBJL	Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library
MSRC	Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University
NAL	National Alliance of Liberals
NARA	US National Archives
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDM	New Democratic Movement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLC	National Liberation Council (1966 – 1969)
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NLMWT	National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council (1972 – 1975)
NREC	National Reconciliation Commission
NUGS	National Union of Ghana Students
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PDA	Preventative Detention Act (1958)
PMFJ	People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (1976 – 1978)
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council (1982 – 1992)
PNP	Peoples National Party (1979 – 1981)
PP	Progress Party (1969 – 1972)
PPP	People's Progress Party
PRAAD	Public Records and Archives Administration Department, Accra, Ghana
SIB	Special Investigation Board
SMC	Supreme Military Council (1976 – 1979)
SRC	Student Representative Council
TNA	UK National Archives
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention

Chapter 1:
Introduction

> History is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus ... even when the topic is nomads. What is lacking is Nomadology, the opposite of a history.
>
> Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus.*[1]

Exile is a central, recurring facet of the human experience. It has been a common theme in literature, poetry and memoir since the eras of classical Greek city states and Biblical narratives of exodus.[2] It is therefore striking how absent the direct study of exile has been in modern history in general and in an African context in particular. In political history, the phenomenon of exile arises frequently but also fleetingly, and is rarely granted specific attention, especially in scholarship pertaining to modern Africa. This dearth is largely due to the hegemony of the concept of the Westphalian nation-state, the dominant unit of analysis utilised in the humanities and social sciences. The resultant demarcation between 'foreign' and the 'domestic' has made historicising exile an awkward fit for nation-focused historical analyses, as exile is almost always transnational and mobile by definition.[3]

In nation-focused historiography, those who leave the geographical confines of the nation-state are commonly either relegated to the footnotes, or ignored until such time, if ever, that they return to the domestic sphere. This has led to a pervasive tendency

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[1] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (London: Continuum, 2003), p. 23.
[2] Sara Forsdyke, 'Exile, ostracism and the Athenian democracy,' *Classical Antiquity,* Vol.19, No.2 (2000): 232-263.
[3] Exceptions include instances such as the Soviet Union and Turkey, where exile within the nation state, for example to Siberia, was commonly enforced. See Jehanne Gheith and Katherine Jolluck, *Gulag voices: oral histories of Soviet incarceration and exile* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

within many historical works to treat exile as a form of pre- or post-history, a state of limbo or in which a political actor may exist before or after they become relevant to the historical narrative. In this way, exiles are often treated like actors entering or exiting the wings, 'off stage' until they enter the central story of the nation-state.

This border-defined approach reflects the ideas of Albert Hirschman, a political economist whose work on exile and protest was shaped by his personal experience assisting in the rescue of political refugees after the fall of France in 1940.[4] His work *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* provides an influential typology for how humans respond in difficult situations.[5] Hirschman argues that, when faced with problematic political circumstances, human behaviour is characterised by a choice between three options, which he characterises as 'exit', 'voice', and 'loyalty'. A repressed individual may leave their country, protest their repression, or evince loyalty to the regime. However, scholars have noted that when applied to the messy business of international mobility, this approach is overly simplistic and implies a certain 'methodological nationalism', since Hirschman's theory imposes rigid and inorganic categories on the choices individuals make.[6]

Exile activism directly disrupts Hirschman's formula: many political exiles achieved various forms of transnational status, exercising influence - even a menacing 'presence' - from beyond the national boundary in ways that combined 'exit' and 'voice'. Conversely, individuals who remained within the nation state were influenced by what was referred to in Ghana as a 'culture of silence', unable to express their opposition and occupying a liminal space between 'voice' and 'loyalty'. Thus the approaches influenced by Hirschman's rational choice categories of resistance lack nuance and omit key facets of political activism. This is especially true in an African context, considering the prominence of exile in the experience and development of many individuals, nations and movements that have shaped the continent's modern history.[7]

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[4] William Yardley, 'Albert Hirschman, Optimistic Economist, Dies at 97', *New York Times*, 24 December 2012.
[5] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
[6] B. Hoffmann, 'Bringing Hirschman Back In: "Exit", "Voice", and "Loyalty" in the Politics of Transnational Migration', *Latin Americanist*, Vol.54, No.2 (2010), pp. 57-58.
[7] For recent reinterpretations see Volker M. Heins, 'Can the refugee speak? Albert Hirschman and the changing meanings of exile,' *Thesis Eleven,* Vol.158, No.1 (2020): 42-57; Marcus Michaelsen, 'Exit and voice in a digital age: Iran's exiled activists and the authoritarian state,' *Globalizations,* Vol.15, No.2 (2018): 248-264.

This thesis identifies and explores a new space for the study of exile as an integral but neglected part of the historical and political landscape of post-independence Ghana. During the decades after independence, tens of thousands of exiles continued to interact with their nation of origin despite their physical estrangement from it. Repeated waves of exiles effected and reshaped domestic politics through the creation of their own mobile networks of dissent, focused on their homeland. In this way, they constituted a significant political challenge, not only for successive Ghanaian governments, but also the governments of the host countries they resided in. These interactions were multi-faceted and operated on multiple levels: socially, with family and friends who remained behind; politically, through direct action ranging from protests to attempted coups; and intellectually, imagining and conceptualising the nation of Ghana from beyond its national borders.

As this indicates, the impact of exile went beyond the political activities of individuals. The ideas and practices of exile were deeply disruptive of the political imaginary of successive Ghanaian governments and leaders. The fear of externalised opposition that lay beyond the coercive reach of the domestic state generated consistently high levels of concern and even occasional paranoia, reflecting the relative unknowability of exiled 'bogeymen'. Exiles and their threat, whether real or imagined, had a significant impact on the shape of domestic policy and security, while also significantly disrupting Ghana's foreign relations. By leveraging their status as external, global, and unquantifiable, politically-active exiles were able to effect the domestic political scene in a manner which was distinct from (though sometimes linked to) their counterparts who remained within the country.

In existing studies of Ghana's political history, exile has been notably absent. Even those scholars who have acknowledged the significance of certain exiled Ghanaian individuals have commonly done so through the binary paradigm of 'exit' and 'return'. Paul Nugent, one of the most important historians of modern Ghana, has commented on the cyclical nature of the political landscape, noting the 'regularity with which the same faces have recurred on the political stage'.[8] However, Nugent fails to fully incorporate transnational activism into these individuals' overarching narratives of Ghana. The

[8] Paul Nugent, *Big men, small boys and politics in Ghana: Power, ideology and the burden of history, 1982-94* (London: Francis Pinter, 1995), p. 7.

actions of exiled individuals do not feature significantly in his analysis of Ghanaian political history, except when they occur within the confines of the nation-state. The reluctance to assess the political impact of external actors who nevertheless continued to be intimately linked with the nation-state circumscribes our understanding of the Ghanaian political stage. In Ghana particularly, the failure to engage with the full effect of exile activism is especially problematic, as exile dynamics and latterly diaspora politics played a growing and enduring role in Ghana's development after independence.[9]

By analysing and incorporating these exile dynamics into Ghanaian political history, this thesis challenges established notions of post-independence African politics as centring on internal dynamics within new nation-states. The overwhelming intellectual focus on internal dynamics is perhaps not surprising, given that post-independence political discourse was strongly focused on re-asserting sovereignty and control in national form. This has however distracted attention from the important ways in which post-independence African politics, like its colonial-era antecedents, involved what I characterise as a mobile politics of dissent in which ideas and associations were generated in both local and transnational spaces and networks. Accordingly, a history of Ghana which fails to include the influence of exile dynamics beyond the national border is by definition incomplete, preventing a full understanding of the diversity and ideational complexity of a global Ghana.

This argument has broader implications for national histories. 'Nation' as a concept and category has shaped the way that individuals and cultures have viewed themselves and others for centuries. It is therefore unsurprising that work on the subject has been not only prolific, but also intellectually fruitful.[10] However, while 'nation' may be a valid area of historical enquiry, nation-focused research has centred overly on internal dynamics and actors, relegating individuals who exist beyond borders to the realm of 'foreign relations.' While utilising physical national boundaries is an undeniably practical way of delineating the scope of nation-focused research projects, this approach is wholly inadequate when analysing such a complex and fluid subject. By only focusing

[9] See Es'Kia Mphahlele, 'Africa in Exile', *Daedalus,* Vol. 111, No.2, (1982): 29-48.
[10] See for example Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); M. Larmer & B. Lecocq, 'Historicizing nationalism in Africa', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol.24, No.4 (2018): 893-917; T. Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001).

on events within the nation's geographical confines, such projects seek to illuminate the nation but are instead constricted by it. Contemporary historians have begun the process of deconstructing this nation-centric approach, with scholars such as Alessandro Iandolo creating transnational, region-focused histories of global African interactions.[11] Broader histories of knowledge flows, thinkers, and activists have also been a crucial part of the process of recontextualising nation, reconsidering key transnational African anti-colonial figures as more than simply 'nationalists', exploring their contemplation of other visions of sovereignty as they conceptualised the potential inherent in a post-colonial world.[12] This thesis is aligned with and contributes to this recent historiographical turn, and its ambition to reframe African history as embedded in transnational and global processes. Furthermore, this thesis maintains that the study of national history is by definition also a transnational and global project, necessitating the inclusion of exilic and diasporic communities.

Methodologically, this wider focus on transnational individuals necessitates in turn the identification and inclusion of transnational archives and sources. This thesis therefore argues for and demonstrates the benefits of integrating of 'African' and 'Global' historical approaches. While the practical challenges surrounding access to archives in Africa has been portrayed as the main motivator for what has been termed a 'shadow archive' approach, the inclusion of western and/or global archives for the study of African exile histories reflects the importance of transnational actors, dynamics, and ideas in national political development.[13] If we consider the nation as inherently osmotic, made up of individuals and ideas both within and beyond its national boundaries, then the sources needed to illuminate its history must reflect this understanding. By thinking imaginatively about Ghana's history, our conception of what constitutes its 'national archives' immediately becomes broader and richer.

This conception of an 'osmotic' nation also has implications for certain accepted conventions within Ghanaian political history. Ghanaian political development has been

[11] See for example Alessandro Iandolo, *Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, Mali* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022).
[12] See Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019)*;* Frank Gerits, *The Ideological Scramble for Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023)*;* Nana Osei-Opare, 'Ghana and Nkrumah Revisited: Lenin, State Capitalism, and Black Marxist Orbits'*, Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.65, No.2, (2023): 399-421.
[13] Kate Skinner, 'West Africa's First Coup: Neo-Colonial and Pan-African Projects in Togo's "Shadow Archives",' *African Studies Review,* Vol.63, No.2 (2020): 375-398.

overwhelmingly conceptualised as consisting of 'two traditions' originating in the first half of the twentieth century, one deriving from Nkrumahist ideologies, and another following the ideas of politicians such as Kofi Busia and J.B. Danquah.[14] Contemporary politics is frequently framed as replicating these cleavages, currently represented by the two dominant parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP).[15] However, the inclusion of Ghanaian diasporic and exile politics challenges this binary perception, as politicians from across Ghana's political spectrum collaborated on shared political projects and reimagined Ghana's future from beyond its borders. These shifting ideologies and allegiances defy easy categorisation into these traditions, and suggest a more complex and fluid political landscape that encourages scholars to reflect more critically on the intractability of this oft-accepted division.

The originality of this study also lies in its integration of traditionally distinct approaches to historical enquiry. Specifically, by focusing on exile, it seeks to unlock the conventional barrier that separates 'realist' political histories that focus on areas such as security, economics, policy, and foreign relations; and historical approaches of affect and emotion which have normally been the preserve of social historians.[16] A noteworthy inspiration for this approach is Carina Ray's work *Crossing the Color Line: Race, Sex, and the Contested Politics of Colonialism in Ghana*, which analyses the impact of interracial couples on the development of Britain and Ghana, mixing analysis of public and private, personal and political.[17] This thesis argues that analysis of the political impact of exiled individuals on their country of origin, and on the countries in which they took refuge, is impossible to disentangle from the lived experience of exile itself. The personal, familial, and social aspects of exile were, it shows, integral to the conceptualisation of these external networks of resistance and the motivations behind such political activity, central as they are to exiles self-perception and inseparable as they were in turn from their

[14] For more detail on the development of 'two traditions' within Ghanaian politics, see G.M. Bob-Milliar, 'Verandah Boys versus Reactionary Lawyers: Nationalist Activism in Ghana, 1946–1956,' *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.47, No.2 (2014): 287-318; see also the last two chapters of Kate Skinner's, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: literacy, politics and nationalism, 1914–2014* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[15] Kevin S. Fridy, 'The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarrelling Cocks: Disaggregating Partisanship in Ghana's Fourth Republic', *African Affairs*, Vol.106, No.423, (2007): 281–305.

[16] See for example Roland Burke, 'Flat affect? Revisiting emotion in the historiography of human rights,' *Journal of Human Rights* Vol.16, No.2 (2017): 123-141; Hosu Kim and Jamie Bianco, *The affective turn: Theorizing the social,* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

[17] Carina Ray, *Crossing the Color Line: Race, Sex, and the Contested Politics of Colonialism in Ghana* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2015).

political aims. In a broader context, this thesis calls for the integration of histories of the conventional macropolitics of the state and its political institutions with the micropolitics of subterranean and transnational political/social movements, reflecting as they do individual sensibility, affect, and local identities.[18]

Research Design- Why Ghana?

Through its exploration of Ghana, this thesis demonstrates the centrality of exile dynamics to wider African political history. While the whole continent has been shaped by episodes of both voluntary and involuntary transnational movement, Ghana provides a particularly powerful example and was therefore selected as the case study for this thesis. Firstly, Ghana has a remarkably rich history of political exile and broader legacies of forced migration during the colonial period. From the scars of the slave trade, to the Ashanti King Prempeh I's experience of exile under colonial rule, to the influential years abroad of celebrated anti-colonial activists, this historical legacy informed the ideational context of many individuals whose experiences of post-colonial exile are analysed in this thesis.[19] Ghana fostered a variety of globally connected Pan-Africanist philosophers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries whose ideas were formative for its later political thinkers, most notably Kwame Nkrumah. Externality proved particularly fruitful for the exploration and conceptualisation of Pan-Africanism, as it allowed for greater imagination and contemplation of political alternatives outside the spatial confines of the colony or nation.[20]

Secondly, exile is a condition generated by political upheaval. The study of its dynamics therefore centres on periods and locations of unrest, of which late twentieth-century Ghana was certainly a prime example. As has been observed by Astri Surhke, different forms of conflict or crisis generate particular types of entry and exit trajectories,

[18] For an exploration of how we might conceptualise/approach such multi-level dynamics within social movements, see Colin McFarlane, 'Translocal assemblages: space, power and social movements,' *Geoforum,* Vol.40, No.4 (2009): 561-567.

[19] Emmanuel Akyeampong, 'Christianity, modernity and the weight of tradition in the life of Asantehene Agyeman Prempeh I, c. 1888–1931,' *Africa,* Vol.69, No.2 (1999): 279-311; Stephanie Newell, *Literary Culture in Colonial Ghana: how to play the game of life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

[20] The literature on Pan-Africanism is vast, beginning perhaps with George Shepperson, 'Pan-Africanism and "Pan-Africanism": Some Historical Notes,' *Phylon,* Vol.23, No.4 (1962): 346-358. For a more comprehensive overview of the movement, see Hakim Adi, *Pan-Africanism: A History*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).

with civil disasters and protracted wars often sparking mass migration, while coup d'états and government suppression is more likely to produce 'a trickle of a few, highly politicized individuals.'[21] Ghana's post-colonial history, which in the period under examination saw three elected civilian governments, each culminating in military coups which were often followed by significant periods of military rule, certainly produced plenty of political exiles. This process was intensified by what Paul Nugent has called the dedication of successive regimes to 'the complete eradication of the legacy of its predecessor'.[22]

While a regional or comparative study across British and French post-colonial states was considered early in the development of the project, this was quickly rejected. While social science is often usefully comparative in its pursuit of instructive similarities and irregularities in similar cases, this often requires the sacrifice of deeper context and cultural specificity in its testing of general hypotheses. This project has taken a single-country approach more typical of historical research in order to prioritise the specificity of Ghana's cultural and political context. While multi-state comparison is perfectly possible within historical approaches, increasing the number of foci countries inevitably means less detail and evidentiary material per country and a more targeted selection of documents, so that even comparative history often requires the main thrust of the analysis to be selected before much study has been undertaken. Exile is inherently a space of potentiality, with the lives of exiles often taking unexpected directions, and it therefore felt important as a researcher to not pre-emptively select this project's exact areas of interest, but instead to allow these to emerge iteratively from the empirical evidence.

This more historical approach also allowed for the lived experience of individual exiles to be brought to the forefront of this study. While quantitative approaches from economics and social sciences can be instructive in certain contexts, the inescapable homogenisation and removal of the individual from the centre of such studies would undermine the aims of this project. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the lived experience of exile is crucial to understanding the political impact that exiled individuals were able to achieve, as well as the motivations behind their continued engagement. This

[21] Astri Suhrke, 'Overview: Refugees and World Politics', in Elizabeth G. Ferris (ed.), *Refugees and World Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 15.
[22] Paul Nugent*, Big men, small boys and politics in Ghana: power, ideology and the burden of history*, 1982-94 (London: Pinter, 1996), p. 6.

thesis benefits immensely from exploring personal narratives which illuminate the rationale behind the agitation of exiles, such as journalist Elizabeth Ohene's story of how anger at her exile during the 1980s fuelled the establishment of her own West Africa-focused newspaper (see Chapter 8). Weaving such individual stories together into a tapestry of collective experience allows for the exiles themselves to remain at the centre of the broader narrative of exile's role in Ghanaian political change.

A Chronological Approach

Ghana's long historical roots of global migration indicated early in this study's conception that Ghanaian exile is a subject perhaps best examined in the longue-durée. While this study cannot hope to cover the chronological breadth needed for such an exploration, it seeks to demonstrate some of this exile heritage through a chronological structure covering more than three decades. This is designed to most effectively capture both the similarities and differences between the repeated waves of exile generated by Ghana's ongoing political turmoil, and the ways in which successive exile movements both echoed and learned from the experiences of their predecessors. Key parallels were uncovered, such as the multiple instances wherein the experience of exile provided a unifying effect, creating unexpected alliances which initially overcame entrenched domestic divisions (see Chapters 3, 4, and 7). However, while exile initially united individuals through their mutual alienation and hatred for the incumbent Ghanaian government, it is notable that these coalitions invariably did not survive the post-exile return to the domestic sphere.

However, while this thesis has approached its subject matter from a chronological perspective, it is important not to allow this lens to flatten the dynamic contingency of exile. Just as Frederick Cooper has urged historians to eschew determinism when examining post-colonial legacies in Africa, it is similarly crucial when considering exile to reject a linear vision of history.[23] In order to reflect the reality of where, when and why individuals lived, without the distortion of historical hindsight, it is necessary to explore the ways in which exiles perceived themselves as political actors, and how they envisaged their present and future interaction with their home nation. There is otherwise a danger of conceptualising the state of exile as a final destination, neglecting the extensive

[23] Frederick Cooper, 'Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective', *Journal of African History*, Vol.49, No.2 (2008), p. 196.

ideational activity of exiles in imagining alternative nationalisms and political communities. African politics was always unpredictable and contingent – much of this contingency resting on imaginaries that encompassed onward destinations or envisaged returns. This extended chronological approach therefore attempts to capture the lived experience of exile as an unresolved space of potentiality, rather than collapsing the exile experience into preconceived narratives of political failure or restitution with singular endpoints.[24] Similarly, while it may be tempting to analytically bookend the exile experience by focusing on concrete moments such as return, the emotional and practical effects of exile did not simply disappear with its temporal ending. This study has therefore endeavoured to preserve continuities both within the personal lived experiences of individual exiles and within the longue-durée of exile in Ghana.

These attempts to preserve fluidity have been influenced by the work of cultural theorists Deleuze and Guattari. Using the term 'rhizomatic' or a 'mass of roots', they emphasise multipolar, tangled connectivity without a preoccupation with strict categorisation or end points to suggest how historians might approach a 'nomadology'- the history of mobile people.[25] They reject the hierarchical analytical structure rooted in nation-state political histories, using the idea of a rhizome to view history and culture as a map or wide array of influences with no specific genesis, for a rhizome has no beginning or end: 'it is always in the middle, between things.'[26] While being 'between things' has ordinarily been the dominant conceptualisation of the state of exile, instead these ideas encourage us to think of political activity as a whole as something tangled, osmotic, and 'in between', therefore neither foreign nor domestic, and most importantly not instrumental or linear. In the pursuit of a historical treatment of exile, this conceptual background helps provide this thesis with a framework with the elasticity to preserve exile's inherent potentiality.

[24] For an exploration of temporality/chronology in relation to experiences of exile, see Artemis Leontis, 'Primordial home, elusive home', *Thesis Eleven,* Vol.59, No.1 (1999): 1-16.
[25] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 6-8, 23, 25.
[26] Ibid., p.25.

Defining Exile

For the sake of clarity and achievability, historical analysis requires the imposition of some form of structure and delineation upon experiences which are often organic, osmotic, and indefinite. It is inevitable that some artificial boundaries must be placed on the concept of exile in this attempt to historicise it, and especially necessary to define exile as it relates to this study. Exile as a term is both capacious and richly evocative, encompassing a large range of ideas and experiences from across human history. It has commonly been utilised to describe various states of physical severance, dislocation, and exclusion from a homeland or place of origin, rooted in political, religious, ethnic, cultural, or social dynamics. However, exile also has a resonance beyond the purely physical. Literary theorists have extensively explored the theme of exile, approaching it as a facet of the human experience which encompasses not only geographical location, but also a state of mental isolation.[27] The complex, affective, and nuanced nature of the term was the reason for its selection as the terminological lens for this study over attendant and related terms such as refugee, émigré, or deportee. Sidestepping/avoiding the stronger definitional term 'refugee' allows for the project to encompass a broader spectrum of experience and probe the limits of the term 'exile', which is – as the thesis will show - variously self-ascribed, claimed, and/or rejected based on a range of personal and familial emotional responses, as well as political and social aims.[28]

The challenge for this study has therefore been to balance the need to ascribe a level of definitional rigour to the use of the word exile, while also preserving the 'rhizomatic' and contingent nature of exile as a space and experience. This thesis therefore defines political exile as a physical displacement, either voluntary or forced, which an individual pursues due to real or perceived threat from governmental authorities and because of real or perceived personal political opinions and affiliations. While this definition of exile potentially encompasses mental dislocation, the individuals which form the focus of this study have all experienced geographical displacement. In contrast to definitions utilised in other similar studies, such as the edited collection *Africa in Exile*, this study does not limit its focus only to those individuals who fled their

[27] Eldred Durosimi Jones and Marjorie Jones (eds.), *Exile and African Literature* (Trenton NJ: Africa World Press, 2000).
[28] Heléna Tóth, *An exiled generation: German and Hungarian refugees of revolution, 1848–1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 12-17. CANNOT FIND BOOK-EVEN ON WORLDCAT

homeland 'with specified political goals in mind'.[29] While that is a valid delineation, this thesis includes in its definition of exile those who fled the confines of the nation state without explicit goals of political activism, and instead places the onus on their actions prior to their flight. This inclusion endeavours to avoid the homogenising perception of these exiles as a uniformly politically engaged community. As is particularly explored in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis, the impact of political persecution could be profound; while some exiles responded to this trauma combatively, some instead chose to distance themselves not only physically but also mentally from Ghana and its politics.

Methods and Sources

Debates over the use of oral or archival sources have been a feature of African studies since it first rose to prominence in the 1960s. Such mid-century scholarship often favoured non-documentary sources, reflecting a concern that textual records, whether held locally, or in the former colonial metropole, were biased and distorted to the point of uselessness when attempting to access African voices and experiences.[30] While this perspective is valuable, and scepticism of state sources is methodologically crucial, attitudes have shifted over time and some contemporary historians have set about creatively re-reading the archives relating to post-colonial states 'against the grain', utilising it to explore complex issues of agency and subjectivity. While fascinating, these debates are too involved be explored in detail here.[31] Of more immediate importance, however, is that in more recent decades historians have had to confront the practical challenge of writing histories of postcolonial African politics in decades for which fewer and fewer witnesses are available. Africanists have therefore, as a matter of necessity, been rethinking these tensions between oral material and documentary sources and

[29] Nathan Riley Carpenter and Benjamin N. Lawrance, (eds.) *Africans in Exile: Mobility, Law and Identity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), p. 4.
[30] Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Antoinette Burton, *Dwelling in the archive: women writing house, home, and history in late colonial India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[31] Frederick Cooper, 'Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History,' *American Historical Review,* Vol.99, No.5 (1994), p. 28. The literature is considerable - see also Jeannette Bastian, 'Reading colonial records through an archival lens: the provenance of place, space and creation,' *Archival Science,* Vol.6, No.3 (2006): 267-284; Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, 'Settler colonialism and the archives of apprehension,' *Current Sociology* (2022) online; Tiffany Shellam and Joanna Cruickshank, 'Critical Archives: An introduction,' *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History,* Vol.20, No.2 (2019): 1-12.

often moving towards a revised position which carefully and critically utilises colonial and postcolonial archives. Nevertheless, significant philosophical tensions remain between African, global and international historians and this thesis sits across precisely these fault lines.[32]

Exploring African exile politics presents significant challenges in terms of sources which require a creative and flexible approach. Generally, the main mode of research into the contemporary history of elite political activities and ideas remains archival and textual, while oral testimony tends to be more extensively employed when exploring social histories of marginalised groups, or in efforts to recover subaltern voices.[33] Within this context, Ghana's political exiles present an interesting paradox as they are simultaneously elite, often well-educated and politically connected, while also marginalised due to their exile status.

As persecuted individuals, exiles commonly leave only an ephemeral documentary trail, since their correspondence was often discarded or destroyed *en route* for practical, or even security, reasons. Governmental records on such exile movements can also be sparse and dispersed, precisely because exiled individuals commonly attempted to keep a low profile in the face of extraterritorial threats from the regime from which they fled, as well as possible mistrust of their host government. Nevertheless, this does not mean that exiles left little written record behind them. Educated exiles were often prolific correspondents, their letters preserved in the personal papers of their friends or colleagues or the files of international organisations like the Ford Foundation or Amnesty International.[34] Concerns about exile activity also led to host governments investing significant resources into keeping track of politically prominent exiles on their soil, creating a significant paper trail that confounded exile attempts to evade the official net of surveillance. Documentary sources therefore exist but are often incomplete and dispersed in archives across the globe – details of which are, for this thesis, identified below. Government records also require careful analysis and critique, as they are often

[32] Jean Allman, 'Phantoms of the Archive: Kwame Nkrumah, a Nazi Pilot Named Hanna, and the Contingencies of Postcolonial History-Writing' *American Historical Review*, Vol.118, No.1 (2013): 104–129; Skinner, 'West Africa's First Coup', 375-398.

[33] Miranda Johnson, 'Honest acts and dangerous supplements: Indigenous oral history and historical practice in settler societies,' *Postcolonial Studies,* Vol.8, No.3 (2005): 261-276; Kevin Murphy, Jennifer L. Pierce, and Jason Ruiz, 'What makes queer oral history different,' *The Oral History Review* Vol.43, No.1 (2016): 1-24.

[34] For an example of such a cache of exile letters, see Poul Duedahl, 'Selling mankind: UNESCO and the invention of global history, 1945-1976,' *Journal of World History,* Vol.22, No.1 (2011), p 105.

generated from the perspective of surveillance. Their utility lies in illuminating governmental attitudes towards exiles and their broader political and diplomatic impact, but provide comparatively little information on the motivations, experiences, and perspectives of exiles themselves.

Oral History

In contrast, oral history provides significant opportunities to explore personal stories of exile. While sometimes criticised for dependence on fallible human memory, it is unique in its ability to facilitate reflections on the emotional impact and legacy of exile experiences.[35] However, as we move further from historical events, interviews with surviving individuals become increasingly difficult, as old age and death cut off avenues for investigation. Memoir and previously conducted interviews go some way to plugging this gap, but it presents methodological limitations since they are often slightly at a tangent to the questions which one might wish to ask. It also presents challenges of resource and time explored more thoroughly below. This thesis has therefore taken a blended approach to sources, utilising oral and archival methods to create a fuller analytical picture of both the political impact of exiles and their lived experience. While the record surrounding exile is elusive, it is still possible to build a coherent picture of exile as a critical facet of Ghanaian political evolution, and how it might therefore be conceptualised as a crucial facet of the wider African historical landscape.

This thesis utilises oral history as a key component of its methodological framing, not simply as a way to ameliorate the limits of the written record. This is rooted in this thesis' contention that the study of exile is inseparable from the study of affect and emotion, something which oral history is particularly adept at capturing. As Paul Thompson has argued, oral histories allow us to access individual and collective consciousness and investigate communities that are detached from formal

[35] The literature on this debate is vast, but key examples include: Donald Ritchie, *Doing oral history* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Jan Vansina, *Oral tradition: A study in historical methodology* (New York: Transaction); Alistair Thomson, 'Four paradigm transformations in oral history,' *The Oral History Review,* Vol.34 No.1 (2007): 49-70; Ronald Grele, 'Movement without aim: Methodological and theoretical problems in oral history,' in Robert Perks and Alastair Thomson (eds.) *The oral history reader* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 52-66.

organisations.[36] In this way, oral history provides a crucial means of accessing the internal and reflective lives of exiles and their networks. Oral history is therefore employed, alongside some ethnographic and anthropological approaches such as life history, to ensure that this thesis centres on the individuals themselves, rather than simply considering the political lives of exiles as separate to their lived experience.

While insights gleaned from my oral interviews enhance the entire thesis, they have particular value to the later chapters which explore exile experiences in the 1980s during Jerry Rawlings' period of political dominance. Interviews with politically engaged exiles such as journalist Elizabeth Ohene shed light on both the practical challenges and emotional toll of establishing the *Talking Drums* West African political magazine in exile, creating an insightful interplay with the physical archives of the publication found in the Senate House Library in London (see Chapter 8). An active dialogue with surviving exiles also allowed for the exploration of attitudes towards the term 'exile' from their personal perspective. Of particular interest here was my interview with law academic Samuel Gyandoh with whom I explored his feelings of exile 'stigma': this led him to actively avoid any association with the term for both emotional and practical reasons (see Chapter 7).

Eleven oral interviews were conducted for this study. The original project design envisaged the collection of more testimonials from a wider selection of individuals, but the COVID-19 pandemic curtailed these efforts. The pandemic thus compounded the difficulties of time and resource constraints already inherent to the practice of oral history. While the possibility of conducting further interviews by phone and video call was considered, I decided that it would not be ethical to ask interviewees to engage with deeply emotional issues relating to personal and familial exile in an environment in which I could not be confident of my ability to adequately support them. Bespoke approaches to interviewees and their needs post-interview can also be complex and emotionally taxing. Although ethically and professionally indispensable, these laborious processes reduce how many people can be accessed, raising questions of selection bias. The selection of interviewees for this project skews towards journalists, as media professionals were both easier to contact and more willing to discuss their experiences on the record. While I was able to conduct interviews with individuals from different professional backgrounds, such as security, business, and academia, initial contact was provided through each

[36] Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), p.7.

interviewee's family members and friends, with whom I had developed relationships over the course of my research.

However, while inefficient, this more organic approach had significant benefits. Firstly, being vouched for by a trusted relation allowed for the easier development of trust and rapport with the interviewee. Secondly, the presence of a family member in the interview allowed the interviewee to feel safe and supported while exploring difficult, sometimes traumatic topics. Thirdly, in voicing their experiences in the presence of a loved one, the interview became a dialogue between multiple engaged individuals, taking the interview in unexpected, fruitful directions as younger relatives asked questions and gained insight into their own family history. Not only was this of significant value to the study, it was also an immense privilege to be a part of this process.

In this way, my approach to interviews owes more to bespoke oral history than more structured approaches found within the social sciences. In general, I followed a semi-structured approach, developing 'interview plans' which not only mapped key areas of discussion and potential questions, but were also designed to put my interviewees at ease by following a broadly chronological, 'life-story' structure. While I identified key themes for each interview, questions were left open in an effort to not influence interviewee responses and to allow space for elaboration on subjects interviewees judged important. The primary aim was to ensure interviewee comfort and security, something of paramount importance when discussing sensitive matters relating to personal or familial experiences, or to sensitive entanglements with law or government. Though many in social science contend that varying questions in a series of interviews weakens validity and reliability, qualitative research necessitates an intuitive and self-reflective approach in which all parties are able to contribute to the 'dialogue'. [37]

Archival Sources

As previously stated, much writing on the nature of the 'national' archive is strongly critical of its utility to historians of Africa, due to its vexed relationship to the postcolonial state. For Achille Mbembe, one of the leading theorists of the postcolonial archive, it

[37] Alessandro Portelli, 'Living Voices: The Oral History Interview as Dialogue and Experience', *The Oral History Review,* Vol.45, No.2 (2018): 239-248.

unavoidably perpetuates elements of the colonial state in withholding, destroying, and manipulating records.[38] Concern surrounding the postcolonial archive has been such that Sandhya Shetty and Elizabeth Bellamy have described it as akin to a cultural melancholia.[39] However, while a critical eye is self-evidently vital when engaging with such imperfect repositories, it is not necessary to reject these sources outright. In fact, this apparent unreliability simply encourages a different approach, one which does not rely on single archives, but instead creates a dialogue between a wide range of material: archival and oral, government and personal, media and memoir. This 'magpie' approach has been the guiding principle of this study, rooted in both a healthy scepticism of the classification, and manipulation inherent in governmentality, but also in the striking elusiveness of exiles in the archival landscape.

With regards to Ghana's Public Records Office, multiple instances of regime change, military rule, economic adversity and a desperately underfunded civil service means that records have been neglected more than they have been manipulated. Instead of Mbembe's fears of a fearsome postcolonial presence, in Ghana one is often left with the impression of absence. As Jean Allman eloquently observes, 'for Ghana the bottom line is the same: many official state records, through wilful destruction or as a result of negligence or deterioration, have been lost forever'. 'Others' she adds, 'have never made it out of a department or ministry and into the state archiving process at all.'[40] As such, much archival material has been shaped in a less intentional manner by the postcolonial state, which has often been incapable of or uninterested in archives as a 'technology of rule.' While I found material of great value to the project in Ghana's Public Records Office and at the George Padmore Library, where the records of Nkrumah's Bureau of African Affairs are kept, I was similarly struck by these absences. Published and bound documents such as government pamphlets and books of cabinet minutes are plentiful, international correspondence survives in part, but internal communications between ministers, civil servants and officials is nowhere to be found, making attempts to view the inner workings of the Ghanaian state highly difficult. For all these reasons, Allman exhorts

[38] Achille Mbembe, 'The Power of the Archive and Its Limits,' in C. Hamilton et al., *Refiguring the Archive* (London: Springer 2002) pp. 19–26.
[39] Sandhya Shetty and Elizabeth Jane Bellamy, "Postcolonialism's Archive Fever," *Diacritics,* Vol.30, No.1 (2000), p,44; For a survey of the wider issues see Omnia El-Shakry, '"History without documents": the vexed archives of decolonization in the Middle East,' *American Historical Review,* Vol.120, No.3 (2015): 920-34.
[40] Allman, 'Phantoms of the Archive', pp. 127-9.

us to think 'more critically and imaginatively' about the documentary record with which the continent's postcolonial/national histories can and will be written. Historians of Africa, she suggests, must now turn to what some have described as a vast 'shadow archive' on other continents, perhaps indicating the convergence of African, global, and international history, something which this study has conceptually welcomed. [41]

Identifying such a shadow archive is comparatively simple for historians of Ghana. In terms of density of documentation, Ghana's history has been the accidental beneficiary of its prominence within the Cold War as it affected the global south. Because of its importance, geographically, economically, and historically, many Western and Eastern countries established diplomatic relations after independence and opened other stations across the region in neighbouring countries like Togo and Cote d'Ivoire. The extension of the Cold War into policy areas including culture, economics and development ensured that these embassies and missions were tasked with reporting on every aspect of life in Ghana. The British High Commission presided over a complex range of activities which extended to defence attachés, cultural workers and employed or engaged with a vast array of people dealing with educational outreach and overseas aid across Ghana. Their files often preserve original Ghanaian government documents not available in Accra.[42]

However, while the elegantly crafted minutes of mandarins, temptingly accessible in the UK National Archives, offer seemingly sagacious comments on Ghanaian politics, obvious dangers lurk for a British doctoral student seeking to research Ghana through their eyes. Nonetheless, as Kate Skinner has argued, 'it is possible to read "western" embassy records from other angles.'[43] While the use of western records in isolation is problematic, when used critically as part of a tapestry of overlapping oral and archival sources, the richness of communication across the African continent opens up revealing possibilities for scholars pursuing pan-African and especially transnational projects.

While to historians of Ghana the shadow archive may seem a mere boon, for historians of exiles and dissidents it is indispensable, as it is here that traces of exile

[41] Allman, 'Phantoms of the Archive', pp. 106, 127-9; See also Skinner, 'West Africa's First Coup'; El-Shakry, '"History without documents,"' 920-934; Jordanna Bailkin, 'Where Did the Empire Go? Archives and Decolonization in Britain,' *The American Historical Review* Vol.120, No.3 (2015): 884-99.
[42] See for example: TNA, BW/93/27, LGAC.22/SF/Vol.IV/12, G.T. Oddoye (Principal Secretary) to Seager, 'Training Requirements of Local Government', 19 May 1974.
[43] Skinner, 'West Africa's First Coup,' p. 379.

networks can most reliably be found. Information on exiles is unevenly distributed and messy - but also more plentiful than was initially thought. As exiles are by definition transnational actors, records of their movements and exploits are scattered among a myriad of global repositories. In relation to foreign state archives, coups and the resulting governmental transitions meant that exiles commonly engaged directly with foreign bureaucracies as they sought asylum and protection, generating as a result volumes of government papers. Exiles also actively sought engagement with diplomatic embassies and officials to weaponize their relations with western governments against their enemies at home. Even exiles who had no desire to attract governmental attention appear in the state papers of security officials tasked with monitoring potential dissidents. These interactions are extensively recorded in the UK National Archives (TNA), the US National Archives (NARA), and various presidential libraries across the US, and these state documents are utilised extensively throughout this study. They not only illuminate western governmental attitudes towards the exiles they hosted but can also enable us to build a broader picture of exile experience and their personal interactions with the state. While careful and critical reading is required, these documents contain vivid illustrations of Ghanaian exile agency and show how they used international governments to further their own agendas, from securing personal refuge to undermining the then Ghanaian government.

However, global archives extend far beyond those curated by states. The personal voices of exiles are preserved across various global archives of NGO repositories and personal papers. Of particular value to this study are the personal papers of Nkrumah which are held at Howard University. Not only do these documents provide direct insight into Nkrumah's experiences in exile, they also allow for the exploration of the lives of his wider exile network through the hundreds of letters written to Nkrumah and preserved in this collection (see Chapter 5). Also of significance is the personal correspondence between Sir Edward Spears and opposition leader and later Ghanaian Prime Minister Kofi Busia, held at Churchill College, Cambridge, which provides insight into Busia's guilt surrounding the impact of his political career on his children (Chapter 3). Exile experiences are also preserved in various NGO archives, such as the papers of the Committee for the Protection of Journalists housed at Columbia University, which contain the letters of Ghanaian journalists exiled under Rawlings in the 1980s (see Chapter 8).

Researching mobile individuals thus requires a mobile approach to research. However, adopting this broader, multi-archival methodology does not only have value to explicitly transnational scholarship. This thesis maintains that the practice of national history is – or should always be - also a transnational and global project, and rethinking these conceptual boundaries has strong methodological implications. The overwhelming focus on internal dynamics in studies of African nations has in turn limited our research strategies in ways that fail to acknowledge the interconnected and fluid nature of information. While Skinner and Allman have rightly argued for the usage of the shadow archive to ameliorate the national archival record, the inherent globality of Africa in general and Ghana in particular calls for a more imaginative approach to archives which is not simply driven by necessity. By expanding these boundaries, scholars can gain access to a far richer archive than previously imagined.

However, there is a practical caveat to this methodological optimism. This global, multi-archival approach places a significant resource burden on the researcher, both in terms of time and money, not to mention the environmental consequences of the required travel. Research funding for globetrotting archival visits is difficult to obtain and is often the preserve of well-funded Western institutions. There is a danger of creating a methodological standard which can only be met by a tiny proportion of privileged scholars, to the detriment of talented academics in resource-poor institutions, and especially scholars in Africa and across the global south. While archival digitisation programmes have improved access in recent years, they are unable to progress fast enough to have a significant short-term impact. Nevertheless, while there may be no perfect solution to this problem, it may be partially solved by abandoning the conventionally isolationist research methods adopted by many historians and instead develop collaborative archival practice. This thesis benefitted greatly from the contributions of several people who obtained documents from archives beyond the geographical scope of my research trips, most notably the Carter Library in Georgia, USA, and the Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhba bezpeky Ukraïny (HDA SBU), otherwise known as the KGB archive in Ukraine.[44] By co-operating with researchers around the globe, it may be possible open up the global shadow archive in a meaningful way.

[44] My thanks go to Thom Lloyd, Scarlett Mansfield, and Tom Johnson, who helped with obtaining documents from global archives and translations for this thesis.

Thesis Outline

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first two chapters serve to ground the thesis, the first being this introductory chapter exploring the arguments and methodology employed, and the second a literature review which engages with the historiographical landscape surrounding this study. Having accepted that an exhaustive exploration of the literature surrounding exile and Ghanaian political history is not achievable within the limits of this thesis, this chapter provides an exploration of the specific scholarship which has influenced this study. It will examine how exile has been underemphasised by previous political histories of Ghana, and how this has impoverished such accounts by disregarding opposition mobilisation external to the domestic sphere. It will also consider how exile has been explored in other geographical and methodological contexts.

The main chronological sweep of the thesis begins in Chapter 3, which serves to establish Ghana's immediate post-independence context under the government of Kwame Nkrumah. Tracing Nkrumah's increasing authoritarianism, symbolised in the implementation of the 1958 Preventative Detention Act (which permitted government critics to be imprisoned without trial), this chapter establishes exile as a key part of Ghana's political landscape almost from its inception. It focuses on the formation of exile networks consisting of mobile global individuals derived from across Ghana's political spectrum, but united by their desire to counteract the perceived tyranny of the Nkrumah government.

Chapter 4 encompasses the latter half of Nkrumah's time in power (1962-66), beginning with the infamous Kulungugu bombing. A watershed moment in Nkrumah's rule, this assassination attempt marked his descent into increasing paranoia regarding exiled activists who were operating beyond the spatial reach of his governmental apparatus. The chapter assesses the profound impact of exiles on the national government, an impact that fuelled increasingly repressive measures and prompted extra-territorial interventions. In this way the impact of exile was felt across the international political scene, as diplomatic relationships were undermined, and various host nations came under increased pressure from the Ghanaian state to extradite and repress exile voices.

Chapter 5 focuses on the period following Nkrumah's 1966 overthrow, tracing his subsequent exile and that of his associates. However, rather than focusing on Nkrumah's personal experience of exile, this chapter uses Nkrumah's personal papers and the letters he received from supporters in exile to reframe this period of exile experience as an analysis of the wider CPP network. The chapter begins to consider the ramifications of return for exiles, as those who had fled Nkrumah's regime now returned to Ghana. In doing so it explores the impact of exile 'status' in politicians' attempts to regain political prominence within the nation state.

Chapter 6 covers the six-year period following the overthrow of Kofi Busia's civilian government in 1972. It explores how Busia's exilic presence haunted the nascent military regime and how his life in Britain troubled Anglo-Ghanaian relations. The chapter also explores the liminal space between economic migrant and political exile, as Ghana's national economy declined, and the Ghanaian diaspora ballooned in size. This increase in the externalised population gave exile opposition movements more weight, with new associations emerging to leverage that power. This increasingly politicised diaspora would form the basis for the globalized Ghanaian political landscape of the late twentieth century and beyond.

The final two substantive chapters explore exile experiences under Jerry Rawlings, who rose to political prominence in a 1979 military coup and who would dominate the next two decades of Ghanaian politics. Chapter 7 covers the unprecedented wave of exiles created by Rawlings' two successive coups in 1979 and 1981 and the political violence which followed. It then focuses on the experiences of exiled soldiers and their attempts, fraught with uneasy compromise and dysfunction, to topple the Rawlings regime during the 1980s. This chapter also explores themes of emotional trauma caused by violence and the weaponising of exile family ties by the state, alongside the perception of a growing international 'stigma' of exile which undermined the label's personal legitimacy.

Chapter 8 examines civilian resistance to the Rawlings regime, exploring the activism of exiled Ghanaian journalists and the creation of a wider West African exile public through print. It also reflects on how these activities overlapped with proliferating exile political groups established during this period, aimed at undermining Rawlings' government. It explores the diversity of exile activism, considering both groups which

focused on returning to Ghana, and those that chose to support their members through fostering permanent externality. This chapter also considers themes of return, questioning the possibility of an 'end' to the exile experience.

Finally, the conclusion will establish the importance of the interventions of this thesis to the wider scholarship on Ghanaian and African political history in general, making the case for the necessity of exile dynamics as an indispensable facet of Ghana's political history.

Chapter 2:

Literature Review

Introduction

Having achieved independence in 1957, Ghana served as a pathfinder, both positive and negative, for possible post-colonial political and social trajectories. As other African nations followed Ghana to independence, the hopes and subsequent fears of anti-imperialists, Pan-Africanists, African socialists, development experts, and international donors, came to be reflected in an unusually rich and vibrant literature on Ghana's national history, as well as in other disciplines. Ghana's prominence within African and wider global history, especially in a postcolonial context, has engendered a huge and complex body of work that reflects successive waves of interpretation and debate. Similarly, literature on the enduring and universal phenomenon of exile covers instances from ancient Greece to Tsarist Russia, and disciplinary approaches ranging from literary theory to psychological analysis. This thesis is therefore situated at the nexus between several different bodies of scholarship, only a fraction of which can be analysed here. This chapter will discuss the most relevant themes in existing literature, in order to effectively situate the specific original contribution of this thesis.

Personalised rule has dominated the historical narrative within African political history and has often provided the lens through which Ghanaian political practice has been viewed.[1] The concept of the "big man", whose political power is derived from – among other elements – social networks, religious performativity, generosity, and conspicuous consumption, has been used to explain the prominence of political clientelism and ethnicity and the relative marginality of ideology and institutions in

[1] One example of such work is Robert Jackson and Carl Rosenberg's, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

Ghana and more widely.[2] Indeed, the "big-man - small-boy" phenomenon, often characterized by a perceived relationship between wealth and virtue, has become the dominant/hegemonic narrative of national-level politics, typified by the many biographies of Nkrumah or Rawlings that place these two men at the centre of the country's political history.[3]

Unquestionably, these leaders have shaped both the history and historiography of Ghanaian politics. However, this emphasis within the literature on the personal role of these towering figures has distorted the landscape of Ghana's historical writing. While certainly not the only theme addressed in this rich body of work, the emphasis by historians on the individual agency of leaders (rather than structural and/or societal factors), reinforced by a methodological nationalism which over-emphasises domestic dynamics, has tended to deflect attention from a much wider set of relevant actors, many of whom experienced exile.[4] This study therefore stands in contrast to these works in its focus on such actors and the role of exile as a site of opposition and a place where important and influential ideas about Ghana's future were consistently generated. Accordingly, this chapter begins by examining the waves of Ghana's political history, but then moves geographically and methodologically further afield, drawing insights from historically informed anthropology, literary studies, and political science, all of which have often been more ambitious in addressing the drivers of political change, including transnationalism and exile.

Ghana's National History and the "Big Man"

Kwame Nkrumah remains an iconic and polarising figure in both historical studies and Ghanaian and African political culture. Except Nelson Mandela, no other modern African leader has produced a greater output of personalised scholarship. Nkrumah's symbolic position and central role in African liberation has generated a significant biographical industry (much of it overtly partisan), reflected in several bodies of overlapping historical

[2] Jeffrey W. Paller, 'Informal institutions and personal rule in urban Ghana,' *African Studies Review,* Vol.57, No.3 (2014): 123-142.

[3] For a detailed breakdown of this literature, see the following section.

[4] Key exceptions to this leader-focused scholarly approach are Jean Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); and Kate Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: literacy, politics and nationalism, 1914–2014* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); both are discussed later in this chapter.

approaches and perspectives.[5] The first commonly frames Nkrumah as a successful pioneer, forging the path to independence. The second depicts him as a thoughtful advocate of African socialism. The third focuses on Nkrumah the Pan-Africanist, emphasising the importance of Pan-Africanist thinking in shaping his political thought and actions and his influence on the continent as a whole. Often in contradiction to these three strands, the fourth outlines a narrative of political failure which focuses on Nkrumah's growing paranoia while in office, increasing domestic oppression and legacy of economic stagnation.[6] The nature of his overthrow, via the 1966 coup, has unsurprisingly impacted subsequent assessments of his rule, but the increasingly critical tone of Nkrumah-focused historiography also reflects a broader shift away from the optimism which characterised much initial post-independence Africanist scholarship, reflecting in turn economic decline and the relative failure of the initial promise of self-rule.[7]

In contrast, more recent work on Ghana under Nkrumah has provided a far more complex reflection of the period as a whole and Nkrumah's leadership in particular. Such studies have encompassed opposition to Nkrumah as well as broader regional and ethnic politics during the 1960s.[8] However, as Jeffrey Ahlman suggests, even as efforts are made to widen the study of Ghana's political and cultural milieu of the early independence period, we are always 'living with Nkrumahism'.[9] The long shadow cast by Nkrumah over both Ghanaian politics and historical accounts has meant that, by extension, Ghanaian political history has struggled to overcome the limitations of 'big men' studies and a contingent fixation on the central domestic nation-state. Ahlman, however, provides a balanced and helpfully complex analysis of early-postcolonial Ghana as both an exciting

[5] For an in-depth survey of the literature and debates see Ama Biney, 'Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual Biography', Ph.D., SOAS, 2007, pp. 1-19.

[6] Examples include: Jeffrey S. Ahlman, *Kwame Nkrumah: Visions of Liberation* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2021), D. Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: A Political Kingdom in the Third World* (New York: St Martins, 1989); Kofi B. Hadjor, *Nkrumah and Ghana*, (London, Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1988); Bankole Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah From Cradle to Grave* (London: Dorset Press, 1981); J. Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: A Biography* (London: Panaf, 1999); B. Davidson, *Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah* (London: Allen Lane, 1973); D. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah* (London: Sphere, 1990).

[7] Disillusionment was swift, see: H. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1966); T. Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of An African Dictatorship* (New York: Africana, 1970).

[8] Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine*; Jeffrey S. Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism: Nation, State, and Pan-Africanism in Ghana* (Athens: Ohio University Press 2017); R. Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-1960* (Athens: Ohio University Press 2000).

[9] Jeffrey S. Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism*.

site of international and pan-African experimentation, and of increasing internal repression, such as the implementation of the Preventive Detention Act (discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis). Methodologically, Alhman follows in the pioneering footsteps of Jean Allman and Kate Skinner in demonstrating that it is possible to recover a more sophisticated view of Ghanaian (and, by extension, African) political and philosophical ideas by adopting an inclusive concept of what constitutes the archive, encompassing a wide range of sources such as US national security files in presidential libraries, Foreign Office records in the UK National Archives, personal papers such as those of Nkrumah held at Howard University, and a wide range of published material such as newspapers.[10]

However, it is with the work of scholars like Allman and Skinner that we truly begin to move beyond the shadow of Nkrumah and the dominance of narratives preoccupied with the foundation of the Ghanaian nation-state. While not alone in deviating from this fixation, both have been influential not only in their approach to utilising global sources, but also in their investigation of Ghanaian history through a focus on non-dominant political movements and individuals. Allman's monograph *The Quills of the Porcupine* traces political opposition to the idea of a centralised proto-Ghanaian national identity in the form of the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which argued at various times either for a federal constitution or independence for the region of Asante.[11] More recently, Skinner's *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland* similarly explores alternative historical perspectives through its focus on the predominantly Ewe secessionist movement which aimed to reunite Togoland, which occupies territory on both sides of the Ghana-Togo border.[12] This thesis consciously follows in their post-nationalist footsteps, focusing on movements and individuals which offered competing visions of the nation and contributed to Ghana's political development through dissent. Skinner's work is further explored below, due to her direct engagement with exile.

It is tempting to dismiss much of the wider Nkrumah-focused literature because of its 'great man' tendencies and its methodological nationalism. While both critiques largely hold true for many histories of Ghana which (often by default) foreground

[10] See Kate Skinner's review in *The American Historical Review*, Vol.124, No.4 (2019), pp. 1560-61.
[11] Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine*, p. ix.
[12] Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland*. See also K. Skinner, 'A Different Kind of Union: An Assassination, Diplomatic Recognition, and Competing Visions of African Unity in Ghana-Togo Relations, 1956–1963,' in Matteo Grilli, Frank Gerits (eds.) *Visions of African Unity: New Perspectives on the History of Pan-Africanism and African Unification Projects* (London: Palgrave, 2020), pp. 23-47.

Nkrumah, some more overtly biographical studies overcome this problem. By following Nkrumah's personal international trajectory before and after his time in power, they indirectly demonstrate the centrality of transnational dynamics to Ghanaian history. Biographical studies of Nkrumah's considerable time in the United States as a student, as well as his six years in exile in Guinea, have bridged the historiographical gap between transnational/exile dynamics and Ghanaian political history more generally. Nkrumah's years in exile were most famously chronicled by his literary executor June Milne. In saving correspondence from his time in Guinea, Milne played a vital role in enabling later scholars to understand this period (explored in Chapter 5).[13] These works studying the last phase of Nkrumah's life underline the centrality of exile in Ghana's history; however, their biographical focus fails to contextualise his experience in the wider connectivity, diversity, and ubiquity of exile activism in Ghana. This thesis has therefore moved away from this emphasis on key leaders, instead seeking to explore networks of collaborative exile activity. This is not to dismiss the impact of significant individuals: in the case of Nkrumah, his very centrality has led to the establishment of a remarkable archive that also captures the voices of other Ghanaian exiles, now preserved at Howard University, and utilised extensively in this project.

This historiographical tendency to focus disproportionately on the figure of Nkrumah is nevertheless mirrored in the historiography on Rawlings. Ever since Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings and his 'small men' swept aside Ghana's military regime in June 1979, Rawlings has been identified as a singular figure in Ghana's political landscape. One of the earliest works assessing the Rawlings era was Kevin Shillington's account of the 1979 coup and the turmoil it unleashed for everyday Ghanaians. While based on an impressive number of interviews with a range of key figures, the resultant work has been characterised as a journalistic 'tribute' to Rawlings.[14] Shillington and other early scholars of the 1980s embraced the idea of the African strong man or saviour, arguing that it was Rawlings' character or "personality" that enabled what was often characterised as a

[13] June Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years His Life and Letters* (London: Panaf, 1990). See also Ama Biney, 'The Development of Kwame Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile, 1966–1972,' *The Journal of African History,* Vol.50, No.1 (2009): 81-100; Marika Sherwood, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad 1935-1947* (Accra: Freedom Publications, 1996), and AB Assensoh's memoir, *Kwame Nkrumah Six Years in Exile 1966-1972*, (Arthur Stockwell, 1978).

[14] Lynne Brydon review in *African Affairs* Vol.93, No.372 (1994): 450-451.

relatively successful politico-military experiment.[15] Partisan and hyper-focused on Rawlings' central figure, these works unintentionally demonstrate the ineffective nature of the leader as an analytical frame, failing to capture the structural and multi-actor realities of this period of unrest.

Paul Nugent's more academic text, *Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana*, provides welcome contrast. Nugent deploys a Gramscian focus on the ideas of 'ordinary people' to suggest that Rawlings' rise to power was driven by a breakdown in the post-independence social contract symbolised by growing popular discontent about corruption. This allowed Rawlings to promise that the new regime would re-establish the fundamental moral balance of Ghanaian society.[16] One of the most valuable elements of Nugent's approach is his forensic analysis of micropolitical issues over a decade. His analysis suggests that ideological difference was less important than the contestation of factions, leaders, programs, and images as they played out in localities well beyond Accra. This not only creates a view of the period which helpfully deconstructs and challenges a simple 'big man' narrative, but also influenced this thesis' approach to Ghanaian exile as encompassing local, regional, national, and international networks and allegiances. While the personality of the leader also figures in Nugent's account, utilised as it is to explain the paradox of a revolutionary regime that implemented neo-liberal economic policies, it is only one consideration within a far wider, richer study.[17]

The distorting effect of an overwhelming scholarly focus on domestic political leaders, and consequently internal political dynamics, is particularly significant when it comes to the phenomena of exile. Exiles have been neglected in this literature because of the application of a narrow nation-state lens to African political history. This has then been exacerbated by a focus on individual domestic leadership, which has occluded key actors and dynamics which unfolded beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Even those studies that escape this preoccupation with Ghana's leaders often fail to broaden their focus sufficiently to break free of these confines, omitting key transnational figures and influences on domestic politics as a result. For example, Ahlman's otherwise excellent

[15] Kevin Shillington, *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor* (London: Macmillan, 1992). See also Felix Kumah-Abiwu, 'Leadership Traits and Ghana's Foreign Policy: The Case of Jerry Rawlings' Foreign Economic Policy of the 1980s', *The Round Table*, Vol.105, No.3 (2016): 297-310; J. Adedeji, 'The legacy of J. J. Rawlings in Ghanaian politics, 1979–2000, *African Studies Quarterly*, Vol.5, No.2 (2001): 1–27.
[16] Nugent, *Big Men, Small Boys*.
[17] Kwame Ninsin, review of Nugent, *African Affairs,* Vol.96, No.383 (1997): 307-308.

Living with Nkrumahism only mentions Kofi Busia, exiled leader of the United Party (the CPP's main post-independence political rivals) and later Ghanaian prime minister, once.[18] As will be explored in this thesis, a key part of Ghana's political landscape existed beyond the boundaries of the nation-state in the realm of exile and diaspora. Failure to engage with the impact of these communities impoverishes historical studies of Ghana's political development.

Ghanaian Exile Histories

Nevertheless, while the role of exile in modern Ghanaian history has been understudied, it has not been entirely ignored. Kate Skinner's *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland,* mentioned above, provides the most important research contribution in this area. As part of her wider study of the predominantly Ewe movement to reunify former British and French Togoland, Skinner's work centres on the Ghana-Togo border region and on wider issues of political dissent and displacement. She examines a community of c. 6,000 political refugees who left Ghana between 1958 and 1961, and who remained across the border in French Togoland (from 1960, the Republic of Togo) until the 1966 coup. Skinner focuses on exile activity from the 1940s onwards, generated by the tension between successive Ghanaian governments and those whose visions of their own identity ran contrary to the re-conceptualisation of the colonial Gold Coast as the Ghanaian nation-state. This analysis highlights the importance of colonial border-making and policy in both generating and shaping patterns of opposition and demonstrates the considerable extent to which late-colonial dissent remained 'alive and well' following Ghanaian independence, albeit in new forms. Skinner also makes the telling methodological observation that the extent and form of exile activity is often not accurately identifiable from the central Ghanaian archives or indeed the archives of major external powers, which often had their own reasons for downplaying such phenomena.[19]

More widely, she argues that Africa's borders remained an area of post-colonial contingency, reflecting in reconstructed form older and enduring political issues and projects. The frequency with which these borders were officially 'closed' by states such as Ghana (something that was in practice hard to do effectively) illuminates their

[18] Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism*, p. 206.
[19] Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland,* pp. 168-207.

importance for the projection of a fragile nation-state authority.[20] Exile movements are just one aspect of the considerable political activity which took place across national borders, revealing the limits of the authority that post-colonial states exercised over their citizens. The repressive apparatus that Accra-based governments used to clamp down on their domestic opponents at the centre only increased the importance of these activities at the margins.

Despite Nkrumah's concerns about Ghanaian exiles abroad, throughout his period in office he nevertheless hosted and supported a range of exiles from other countries. In the 1960s, Accra was a base for transnational political activists, which Nkrumah promoted to advance the cause of radical, left-leaning, and anti-colonial movements. Meredith Terretta and Klaas van Walraven identify Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana as an important base for networks of, respectively, Cameroonian exiles and Sawaba activists from Niger.[21] Numerous studies have shown the importance of the Accra-based Bureau of African Affairs to radical and left-leaning anti-colonial activists in the 1960s, but there is evidence that these trends continued in the 1970s and 1980s.[22] While these exile communities within Ghana are not the main focus of this thesis, they do merit some attention, particularly in Chapter 5 which covers the aftermath of the 1966 coup which toppled Nkrumah, and the subsequent expulsion of these exiles from their refuge in Ghana. Despite its tangential relationship to this study, this new scholarship is crucial in demonstrating the importance of exiles not only to other struggles for independence but also to post-colonial struggles within new nations, arguments that are central to this thesis.

In considering the relevance of exile movements over the long durée, the 2018 edited volume *Africans in Exile* is of particular significance. Its editors and authors (including Skinner) collectively advance several key arguments. Firstly, the volume highlights that much scholarship in African Studies has tended to present displacement from one's homeland as an exceptional experience, whereas in reality forced mobility is

[20] Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland,* pp. 168-207.
[21] Meredith Terretta, 'Cameroonian nationalists go global: from forest maquis to a pan-African Accra,' *The Journal of African History,* Vol.51, No.2 (2010): 189-212; Klaas van Walraven, 'From Tamanrasset: the struggle of Sawaba and the Algerian connection, 1957–1966,' *The Journal of North African Studies* Vol.10 No.3-4 (2005): 507-528.
[22] Ibid. See also Toyin Falola, Niyi Afolabi (eds.) *Trans-Atlantic Migration: The Paradoxes of Exile* (London: Routledge, 2012).

a common occurrence in modern Africa, which thus demands specific attention from scholars of the continent's history. Drawing on the book's twenty essays covering two centuries, the editors advance the proposition that in Africa, 'exile is fundamental to any account of state power or critical rereading of colonial and postcolonial oppression'. While governments see exile as the erasure of a dissident from the political landscape, it has in fact commonly produced vigorous forms of resistance. Importantly for this thesis, they also reject the oft-romanticised characterisation of exile as a dignified and elite experience, associated with nobility and leaders.[23] As explored in this thesis, particularly in Chapters 5 and 7, exile for most Ghanaians was commonly one of diminished resources and emotional and financial hardship.

Probably the most significant study of Ghana's exiles in the later postcolonial period is George Bob-Milliar's perceptive essay on transnational political activism in the Ghanaian diaspora. Bob-Milliar emphasises, in providing a periodisation of Ghanaian exile, that West Africans were highly mobile well before the imposition of colonial borders. The Nkrumah period was defined by the Preventative Detention Act: this led many elite activists (like Busia) to Europe, while many ordinary Ghanaians went to neighbouring states like Togo, Burkina Faso or Cote d'Ivoire. Although the 1970s was arguably characterised by less overt state oppression, this, when combined with economic decline, provided multiple reasons for growing mobility. In contrast, the vast exodus generated by Rawlings' oppression during the 1980s should be understood as a different period altogether: at this time Ghana was one of the largest sources of emigrants and exiles on the African continent, second only to the Horn of Africa. This in turn generated new routes and destinations - including Italy, Germany, France, Sweden, Netherlands, Canada and the USA – and changed perceptions of exile, generating a Ghanaian diaspora on a truly global scale.[24]

Several scholars, including Bob-Milliar, have emphasised the significance of diaspora mobilisation after 1990. Exiles began to be viewed as an asset as well as a threat. Ghanaian diaspora mobilisation drew upon the legacy of mid-century socialist Pan-Africanism, though with a neoliberal focus from the 1990s. By the 2000s, this legacy

[23] Carpenter and Lawrance, (eds.) *Africans in Exile*, pp. 5-8.
[24] George M. Bob-Milliar, 'Transnational Political Activism in the Ghanaian Diaspora' in Joseph R. A. Ayee (ed.) *Politics, Governance, and Development in Ghana* (Lexington: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019) pp. 123-45.

merged with the global trend of recognising the role of the diaspora's contribution to national development, both in relation to African and Ghanaian diaspora mobilisation. Ghana's two currently dominant political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic party (NPP), both mobilize emigrant communities and have established branches in the diaspora. This also highlights Accra politicians' growing recognition of the need to develop diaspora-focused policies.[25] This body of work shows how diaspora mobilisation includes a performative element, in which government characterises a positive role for diaspora groups, seeing them as opportunities for the state to assert its sovereignty. Although framed as addressing a wider diaspora rather than simply 'exiles', the linkage is underlined by promises of political rights that seek to attract diaspora groups.[26] This thesis collectively emphasises that exile politics in Ghana is, as it has always been, indistinguishable from national politics.

Global Histories of Exile

Exiles may have been a relatively neglected subject within the history of Ghana, but elsewhere, the study of human mobility has grown substantially in recent years. This is partly because such 'mobility' is increasingly discussed in relationship to the concepts of "modernity" and "globalisation".[27] While these broad themes are relevant to this thesis, it is helpful to delineate a narrower category of analysis – the study of those whose mobility has been compelled to some degree. This encompasses not only exiles but also refugees, and it is the field of 'refugee studies' which has expanded most significantly, in parallel with the acceleration of forced migration. Sadly, since the creation of the UN Commissioner for Refugees in 1950, the global sum of refugees and forced migrants has soared into the tens of millions, and the study of the causes and consequences of this phenomenon has spawned specialist research centres, academic journals and international research organizations, mostly with a policy focus.[28] Although much work

[25] Bob-Milliar, 'Transnational Political Activism', pp. 126, 131-6, 140-141.
[26] Nauja Kleist, 'Flexible politics of belonging: diaspora mobilisation in Ghana,' *African Studies,* Vol.72 No.2 (2013): 285-306. See also G. Mohan, 'Making Neoliberal States of Development: The Ghanaian Diaspora and the Politics of Homelands', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol.26 (2008): 464–479.
[27] See for example Steve Hochstadt, *Mobility and modernity: migration in Germany, 1820-1989* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
[28] Richard Black, 'Fifty years of refugee studies: From theory to policy,' *International Migration Review,* Vol.35, No.1 (2001): 57-78; Liisa H. Malkki, 'Refugees and exile: From "refugee studies" to the national order of things,' *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol.24, No.1 (1995): 495-523.

on African refugees has been undertaken within the social sciences, there has also been an increase in historical studies, with a sharp division between them.[29] However, Lucy Mayblin's welcome recent inter-disciplinary study of *Asylum after Empire* focuses on the majority of asylum seekers who, since the end of the Cold War, originate from postcolonial countries outside Europe. The contemporary phenomenon of asylum seekers is thus not simply reflective of the global present but is shaped by a colonial past.[30]

In contrast, the term 'exile' is far more nebulous and elastic, having significance across a much wider timeframe and evoking historical experiences from expulsions from ancient Greek city states to twentieth century Russian émigrés. Often conceptualised as somewhat 'romantic' - even 'Byronic' – the word 'exile' has commonly been associated with a politicised, highly educated elite.[31] The study of exiles has therefore tended to be located within the humanities, in subjects like history, philosophy, and literature, and focused on the trajectory of individuals, their art, politics, and ideas. Rather than trace this vast and storied literature, I will focus on key works and themes of twentieth century experiences of exile that are most relevant to this study.

Porter and Barnard's work on Victorian-era exiles provided important context for this thesis, establishing the role of the liberal values in explaining twentieth century British governmental attitudes to political exiles.[32] To distinguish Britain from more authoritarian European states, 19th century British officials emphasised a moral liberal attitude towards foreign exiles, welcoming them as persecuted individuals.'[33] However, while Britain's robust policy of resisting extradition made London an attractive destination for exiles, this became a double-edged sword. Successive British governments struggled to reconcile this openness with allied states' requests for Britain to join international agreements that sought to police anarchist, activist, and other politicised

[29] See for example, Liisa Malkki, *Purity of Exile, Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). For historical overviews see Jesse Spohnholz, *Ruptured Lives Refugee Crises in Historical Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
[30] Lucy Mayblin, *Asylum after Empire, Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017).
[31] L. Roniger, 'Changing Cultural Landscapes under the Impact of Exile, Diasporas and Return Migration'. *Araucaria*, Vol.40, No.1 (2018), pp. 187-188.
[32] Bernard Porter and C.S. Barnard, *The refugee question in mid-Victorian politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
[33] Ibid. See also Liza Schuster, 'Asylum and the Lessons of History,' *Race & Class,* Vol.44, No.2 (2002): 40-56.

exile activity.[34] This desire to reconcile a self-conscious liberality with more pragmatic diplomatic goals is reflected clearly in the responses of the British government to the presence of various Ghanaian exiles across the period of focus of this thesis. This theme is particularly relevant to the experience of Kofi Busia, whose periods of exile both before and after his time as Ghanaian Prime Minister were spent largely in Britain (see Chapters 3,4, and 6). Differing responses to Busia's 1970s exile from the British Foreign and Home Offices resonate deeply with this deep-rooted conflict identified by Porter and Barnard for an earlier period.

The wider historiography of global exile in the twentieth century can be understood in three waves. The first reflects the impact of the two world wars and fascism in Europe, which led to the emigration of key thinkers from the continent. These works largely focus on exiles 'coming to America', implicitly suggesting a unidirectional flow of ideas and people which fails to capture the inherent disorder and multiplicity of the exile process.[35] More recent studies have argued that the exodus of artists and scholars cannot be viewed merely in terms of generalizations about intellectual trends but must encompass the experiences of individuals, their emotions, and experiences, probing the complexity of uprootedness and adjustment to a new environment.[36] In this we see a more affective approach to exile which has been influential in conceptualising this thesis.

The second wave of scholarship reflects the global impact of the Cold War. During this period, the lexicography of 'exile' and 'émigré' was supplemented by 'dissident', 'defector' and even 'escapee'. This underlined the way in which the weaponizing of mobile individuals and their deployment in an international conflict of ideas and culture transformed the role of the exile, especially in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, established in 1950. It also illuminated a divide between a 'collective' and 'individual' understanding of human rights by East and West respectively. Communist

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[34] Porter and Barnard, *The refugee question in mid-Victorian politics*; Schuster, 'Asylum and the Lessons of History,' *Race & Class,* pp. 46-51.

[35] Laura Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe, 1930-41* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968); Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, (eds.), *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); H. Stuart Hughes, *The Sea Change: The Migration of Social Thought, 1930-1945* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

[36] Anthony Heilbut, *Exiled in Paradise: German Refugee Artists and Intellectuals in America, from the 1930s to the Present* (New York: Viking, 1983); Lewis A. Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America: Their Impact and Their Experiences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

governments emphasised collective rights of the masses to social and economic progression as preeminent over Western-favoured guarantees of individual freedoms. As has been argued by Mike Oquaye, radical African governments like that of Jerry Rawlings rejected western diplomats' lectures on human rights and the treatment of opposition exiles, in responses couched in the discourse of social justice and collective rights which, they argued, was rooted in African understandings of civil liberties (see Chapter 8).[37] As human rights rhetoric gained international currency with the growing influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, exiles increasingly sought to harness these arguments to leverage international support.[38]

The third wave reflects the current boom in the cultural history of the Cold War. Recent work on informational and cultural organisations demonstrates the opportunities they offered for enterprising mobile citizen activists or dissidents. [39] While key Ghanaian exiles like Busia did interact with organisations like the Congress for Cultural Freedom, it is notable that much of this work strongly emphasises East-West dynamics at the expense of the 'Global South'.[40] Even work which acknowledges global south actors often unintentionally robs them of their personal agency, presenting them more as puppets of East and West rather than actors leveraging power for their own ends outside of this bipolarity.

In relation to this study, the most important development for Cold War historians has been the 'global turn', instigated by Odd Arne Westad.[41] Postcolonial states in late twentieth century Africa made increasing use of what Öztürk terms a 'repertoire of extraterritorial repression', linking exiles to their states of origin. [42] Exiles sought to influence domestic politics and in return, authoritarian regimes sought to curb their

[37] Mike Oquaye, 'Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the PNDC in Ghana, *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1995), pp. 557-8.
[38] Rosemary Foot, 'The Cold War and human rights' in Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad, *Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol.3 Endings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 445-65.
[39] Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who paid the piper? the CIA and the cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 2000); Nicholas Guilhot, *The democracy makers: Human rights and the politics of global order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Damion L. Thomas, *Globetrotting: African American Athletes and Cold War Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012).
[40] Megan Engle, 'The Congress for Cultural Freedom, modernization, and the cultural Cold War in Anglophone Africa, 1958-1967', Ph.D., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2014, pp. 99-100.
[41] Odd Arne Westad, *The global Cold War: Third World interventions and the making of our times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[42] Erdi Ahmet Öztürk, 'The repertoire of extraterritorial repression: Diasporas and home states,' *Migration Letters,* Vol.17 No.1 (2020): 59-69.

activities. This dynamic was also apparent in the experience of exiles fleeing from western nations to the Global South during the Cold War, as Caroline Schreiber's study of *Cold War Exiles in Mexico* explores. Her work confirms the ambiguity of western commitment to 'freedom', human rights, and democratic values, explored in Chapter 8 of this thesis, alongside the ambiguous elision of Cold War and neo-colonial practices.[43] The growing literature on Cold War exiles thus highlights an awkward contradiction for host states, offering asylum to underline their public commitment to freedom while expressing private official anxiety about hosting pernicious foreigners who imperilled relations with the states they had fled from. This idea runs throughout this thesis and is particularly illuminated in its explorations of UK governmental anxieties throughout the period under analysis.

Amongst more innovative recent work is *Exile, Diaspora, and Return,* an ambitious inter-disciplinary study of political exiles from the anti-communist military regimes of South America during the 1970s and 1980s – the so-called 'Condor Years'. Its authors analyse the circumstances that drove thousands from their home countries, the formation of exile communities and diaspora politics, and their contribution to democratisation in the late twentieth century.[44] Strongly reflecting the themes of this thesis, the most pertinent congruence is this study's contention that political exile prompts historians to rethink the centrality of territorially bounded conceptions of nation-states. Exiles retained their political voice, maintaining an ongoing relationship with their home country which effectively extended its practical boundaries. As with successive Ghanaian governments, these authoritarian South American governments did not curtail opposition by exiling it, but simply exported the problem beyond their territorial control and in doing so, unintentionally created transnational networks of politically active exiles.[45] While it is important not to homogenise the history of geographically distinct regions, the congruence between the findings of this study regarding Latin American exile dynamics and the findings of this thesis with regards to

[43] Caroline Schreiber, *Cold War Exiles in Mexico: U.S. Dissidents and the Culture of Critical Resistance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
[44] Luis Roniger, Leonardo Senkman, Saúl Sosnowski and Mario Sznajder, *Exile, Diaspora, and Return: Changing Cultural Landscapes in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)
[45] Ibid., pp. 12-23.

Ghanaian exile suggest that comparative work on exile across the Global South may bear significant fruit in future.

Exile in African Cold War History

More specifically, this thesis is also situated within the scholarship relating to Cold War-era exiles in Africa. While this topic has generated a substantial historiography, it has generally focused on the frontline states of the struggle against apartheid and related conflicts in southern Africa.[46] This literature has tended to reflect the contested nature of these events, and this is nowhere more visible than in the scholarship on the African National Congress (ANC) in exile. Orthodox narratives suggest that democracy was brought to South Africa by ANC exiles across southern Africa, who were forced to adopt guerrilla warfare as a liberation strategy because of their inability to pursue national domestic political reform.[47] However, growing access to the ANC's internal records and usage of a global 'shadow archives' has facilitated critical reassessment of its exile dimension. Stephen Ellis' book *External Mission*, a study of the ANC in exile, argues that external states were provided with critical leverage over the ANC because of its dependence on their patronage, changing the nature of politics in southern Africa.[48] Focusing on the ANC's frontline relationship with its Soviet bloc commanders and trainers, Ellis argues that the armed struggle itself was essentially performative rather than militarily effective: it enabled the ANC to maintain its international and domestic credibility, and important to the Soviet bloc as a projection of power, but was not in itself a challenge to South African government control.[49]

While Ellis' revisions are interesting, and his use of diverse archives commendable, it may be argued that his conclusions about the relative ineffectiveness of ANC efforts result from focusing on the 'wrong' exiles. Ellis' understandable focus on

[46] Chris Saunders, 'The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976–1990,' in Melvin Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 222–43.
[47] Martin Legassick, 'Myth and reality in the struggle against apartheid,' *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol.24, No.2 (1998): 443-458.
[48] Stephen Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990* (London: Hurst 2013). The earlier text was Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba (pseud) *Comrades against apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in exile* (London: James Currey, 1992).
[49] Tom Lodge, 'Clandestine Histories: The ANC in Exile', *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol.40, No.2 (2014) pp. 419-24.

Soviet influences in the ANC and its armed wing means that he pays little attention to the efforts of the ANC's activist penumbrae in London, Washington, Bonn, and Paris, who diligently worked to bring about Apartheid's demise by exercising political influence within global civic society and with western governments. There is a growing consensus that Apartheid's official end was brought about in significant part by forces in the wider world, in particular South Africa's inability to secure foreign bank loans after 1985 because of its increasing pariah status.[50] Therefore, the ANC's para-military links to Moscow, Prague or Havana were likely less effective than exilic efforts to leverage and weaponise global political norms against the South African Apartheid government. This resonates with the focus of this thesis: although it does explore militarised efforts by Ghanaian exiles to disrupt and topple existing governments through force (see for example Chapter 7), it places this in a more holistic context alongside multifaceted exile attempts to cultivate political capital on the international stage in a context of increasing adherence to global norms of liberal governance.

The debate over the nature of the ANC in exile is symptomatic of a wider phenomenon: Cold War-based attempts to educate, indoctrinate and weaponize African exiles. For example, both China and the Soviet bloc established universities that sought to manage and influence students from the global south, many of whom were political exiles. France created a similar institution, while the United States and Britain ran programmes which were engaged in promoting 'soft power' influence over African elites.[51] Moreover, recent work has shown that attempts to influence through scholarly institutions were also made by East and West Germany, Sweden, Cuba, Tanzania, Egypt, and indeed Ghana.[52] Higher education was just one of the infrastructural channels through which political influence, and exiles themselves, moved across Africa and the wider geopolitical landscape. A complex nexus of exiles, refugees, freedom fighters, academics, volunteers, students, journalists, and diplomats – many individuals occupying

[50] Anna Konieczna and Rob Skinner (eds.) *A Global History of Anti-apartheid: 'forward to Freedom' in South Africa* (London: Springer, 2019).
[51] Anton Tarradellas, 'Pan-African Networks, Cold War Politics, and Postcolonial Opportunities: The African Scholarship Program of American Universities, 1961–75', *Journal of African History* Vol.63, No.1 (2022): 75–90; Eric Burton, 'Decolonization, the Cold War, and Africans' routes to higher education overseas, 1957–65', *Journal of Global History*, Vol.15, No.1 (2020): 169-191.
[52] Eric Burton, Anne Dietrich, Immanuel Harisch, and Marcia Schenck, *Navigating Socialist Encounters: Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements between Africa and East Germany during the Cold War* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2021); Daniel Branch, 'Political Traffic: Kenyan Students in Eastern and Central Europe, 1958–69,' *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol.53, No.4 (2018): 811–31

more than one of these roles – interacted with their official hosts in unanticipated ways. External influence in movement politics was complex: as this body of work has matured, historians have tended to move away from the 'puppet-master' thesis of overwhelming American and Soviet influence, instead suggesting that exiles often exploited the Cold War for their own purposes and exercised more agency than originally thought.[53]

Overall, recent historical research shows that superpower plans to influence exiled liberation movements may have been imagined in ambitious ways, but rarely delivered. This was partly because these avenues of political exile were primarily managed by African interlocutors: for the Soviet Bloc for example, Nkrumah's Ghana was an important gatekeeper during the 1960s. Superpowers contributed funding, scholarships, and other kinds of assistance, but the leadership rivalries that played out between Accra, Moscow, Washington, and London meant they controlled neither the personalities nor their objectives.[54] Rather, as Hugh Wilford and Helen Laville have shown with their work on US fronts and foundations, those who were sponsored often took American money but refused to obey orders and instead charted their own independent course.[55]

Post-Cold War scholarship on the political mobilization of migrant networks has similarly emphasised diasporic agency within wider funding and resource dynamics. In Betts and Jones' exploration of the political leveraging of Zimbabwean and Rwandan diasporas, they examine available strategies for activists. They focus on what they term key 'animators'- allocators of financial, ideological, and networking resources which include host country actors, international organisations, and civil society bodies.[56] Despite this focus on external actors in a diaspora's political mobilisation, they – like their counterparts in Cold War histories of exile movements - reject the 'puppet-master'

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[53] See for example: Matteo Grilli, 'Nkrumah's Ghana and the Armed Struggle in Southern Africa (1961–1966),' *South Africa Historical Journal* Vol.70, No.1 (2018): 56–81; John Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare (1962–1976). Vol. 2 of The Angolan Revolution* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978); Natalia Telepneva, 'Mediators of Liberation: Eastern Bloc Officials, Mozambican Diplomacy, and the Origins of Soviet Support for Frelimo, 1958–1965,' *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol.43, No.1 (2017): 67–81; Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008).

[54] Andrew Ivaska, 'Leveraging Alternatives: Early FRELIMO, the Soviet Union, and the Infrastructure of African Political Exile,' *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East,* Vol.41, No.1 (2021): 11-26.

[55] Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, The British Left and Post-war American Hegemony,* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.301; Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, (eds.) *The US government, citizen groups and the cold war: The state-private network* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 2-8.

[56] A. Betts and W. Jones, *Mobilising the diaspora: how refugees challenge authoritarianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016), pp. 7-14, 27, 215-6.

thesis.[57] Self-interest was paramount in relationships between so-called 'external actors' and exiles, with governmental sponsorship only extended as long as exile goals aligned with their own. This thesis is located within this wider strand of scholarship which emphasises African agency within the Cold War paradigm and beyond. It argues that exiled Ghanaian political actors retained their own agendas separate to those of the global governments who chose to sponsor them, and that external actors frequently curtailed funding streams when exiles outlived their perceived usefulness.

Colonial cities as a site of exile

In parallel to writings on exile as mobility, a significant historical literature focuses on refugee or migrant communities in specific cities as intellectual hubs of exile and diaspora, with London and Paris drawing particular focus.[58] Historians Jennifer Boittin and Michael Goebel have both explored Paris-based exiles as anti-imperial thinkers while also analysing their engagement with wider political movements within the metropole.[59] Emphasising the importance of geographical specificity in migration experiences, Goebel's *Anti-Imperial Metropolis* maintains that the physical experience of exile played a key role in the political development of anti-imperialism, arguing that it was not only western intellectual currents, but also the everyday transcultural experience of life in the French capital which was central to the development of anti-colonial nationalism.[60] Similarly, Marc Matera's *Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century,* analyses London-based intellectual exchanges, political aspirations, social movements and cultural crosscurrents among West African, Afro-Caribbean, and

[57] Betts and Joens, *Mobilising the Diaspora*, pp. 14-27.

[58] London studies include: Marc Matera, *Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015); Susan D. Pennybacker, *From Scottsboro to Munich: Race and Political Culture in 1930s Britain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Minkah Makalani, *In the Cause of Freedom: Radical Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 1917–1939* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); David Killingray (ed.) *Africans in Britain* (London: Routledge 1995); Peter J. Aspinall & Martha J. Chinouya, *The African Diaspora Population in Britain: Migrant Identities and Experiences* (London: Palgrave 2016).

[59] Paris studies include: Jennifer Boittin, *Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-Imperialism and Feminism in Interwar Paris* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010); Michael Goebel, '"The capital of the men without a country": migrants and anticolonialism in interwar Paris,' *The American Historical Review* Vol.121, No.5 (2016): 1444-67; Tyler Stovall, *Paris and the Spirit of 1919: Consumer Struggles, Transnationalism and Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[60] Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

African American activists. Navigating the complex spatial dynamics of such movements in various London boroughs, Matera demonstrates that London was just as much a geographical crossroads of Black internationalism, colonial subjects, and their anti-imperial ideas as it was a centre of imperial power.[61] While focused on networks and transnational connections beyond a singular 'hub', this thesis nevertheless builds on such scholarship in its exploration of exilic connections forged in specific locations and cities. Of note here is the exploration of the relationship between Ghanaian journalist Elizabeth Ohene and Nigerian politician Umaru Dikko, whose collaboration was forged during their mutual exile in London (see Chapter 8).

Nevertheless, Matera's most valuable contribution is his attention to Black women as an essential element in sustaining the necessary physical spaces, networks, and artistic platforms for recreation, political dialogue, and cultural exchange in a Black London whose leadership was implicitly or explicitly gendered as male. He exemplifies a wave of studies that have explored places where critiques of colonialism jostled alongside the active pursuit of alternative political and cultural futures which encompassed not only empire, but also broader contested ideas of modernity and progress. In doing so, Matera shows that Black internationalist activism necessarily encompassed the public and private, the personal and political. His attention to emotion, feeling and personal experience is very much reflective of the affective turn, but as he notes, such dynamics are captured only fleetingly in the archives.[62] His careful consideration of the private lives of mobile individuals influenced this thesis' germination and the centrality of exiles' emotional lived experience in its conceptual underpinnings. Its acknowledgement of the difficulties of locating affect in written sources also influenced my resolve to incorporate oral history and media archives into my research strategy.

While influential and illuminating, the framing of this strand of scholarship around a single geographical location has significant drawbacks which this thesis seeks to resolve. These place-based studies struggle to capture the rounded experience of the exile 'on the move', as well as wider transnational networks of exiles which cross geographical as well as cultural boundaries. They fail to capture the trajectory of the itinerant exile, instead exploring the fixed place as an engine of ideas or a site of community building.

[61] Marc Matera, *Black London*.
[62] Ibid, in particular see pp. 144-198.

Moreover, many of these ambitious histories struggle to fully capture these liminal connections, which often lie beyond the capacity of the surviving written record. In contrast, this project aims to approach Ghana's relationship with exile from the inverse, not as a hub but as a nexus in a global community.

A contrasting approach to the 'metropolitan hub' is work which emphasises individual exiles and rootless mobility. Lyndsey Stonebridge's literary history, *Placeless People, Writing, Rights and Refugees*, makes the case for studying 'law and literature' and, implicitly, human geography in the cause of understanding both modern exile and refugees.[63] *Placeless People* argues that during the last century, refugees have been not only been generated by wars and specific crises, but also result from the modern state and its security apparatus of borders and boundaries.[64] Stonebridge explores these ideas through literary history, demonstrating the impact of the engine of placelessness on the relationship between states and refugees, and between rights and writing.[65]

When Stonebridge discusses the 'placeless condition' she is examining a relatively recent phenomenon, namely 'thinking and being between nation states.'[66] To be placeless is to exist without national citizenship and sovereignty, and thus without rights. While statelessness is mostly a normative concept, placelessness is a more fluid term, comparable to the term 'exile' in its ability to encompass a variety of psychological, legal, and identity-centred dislocations. Stonebridge's work builds on ideas of home and exile explored in literary theory and key works of postcolonial discourse, including those of Homi Bhabha and Edward Saïd.[67] Focusing on the lives and writing of figures like Hannah Arendt and Saïd himself, her account illustrates that a vast number of individuals were

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[63] Lyndsey Stonebridge, *Placeless People, Writing, Rights and Refugees* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). The geographical literature on placelessness is considerable, see: Susan Bibler Coutin, 'Illegality, borderlands, and the space of nonexistence' in Richard Perry and Bill Maurer, (eds.) *Globalization under construction: Governmentality, law, and identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 171-202.

[64] In international law, the definition of refugee emerged over the twentieth century to encompass an individual who has fled their own country due to a well-founded fear of serious human rights violations and persecution. Refugees have a right to international protection and if legally recognised as such, states have a duty to provide it. For more information on the legal definitions of refugee, see G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam (eds.), *The Refugee in International Law* (4th Edition), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[65] Stonebridge, *Placeless People*.

[66] Ibid., p.19.

[67] Key examples include: Homi Bhabha, *The world and the home* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Edward Saïd, 'Reflections on Exile', in *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 173-186; Jane Bryce, *The Post-Colonial Condition of African Literature* (Annual Selected Papers, No.6.) (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000); Eldred Durosimi Jones, Marjorie Jones, (eds.) *Exile and African Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

not ensconced in diasporic hubs and were instead 'rootless'.[68] However, while Stonebridge's emphasis on placelessness is useful in capturing this sense of exile mobility, this individual focus sacrifices extensive exploration of exile networks and community, presenting exile as a state of isolation. In contrast, this thesis has endeavoured to capture exile connectivity by exploring external Ghanaian activism and political thought in terms of networks, rather than highlighting the individual. While a feature of the whole thesis, this is particularly revealed in Chapter 5's emphasis on Nkrumah's exile networks, rather than Nkrumah's individual experience, demonstrated through correspondence with his followers to his place of exile in Guinea.

Exiles, Development and Diaspora

While this thesis does not engage with economic history directly, Ghana's economic decline over the second half of the twentieth century nevertheless had a constant and significant impact on Ghanaian migration patterns and exile dynamics. Ghana's significant international political economy literature reflects the fact that, by the early 1980s, the economy had declined drastically since independence and the country was effectively bankrupt. Among the many studies of this crucial period of collapse, the most interesting is *The Vampire State* by Jonathan Frimpong-Ansah, noted economist and former Governor of the Bank of Ghana.[69] Frimpong-Ansah's analysis benefits from examining this economic decline in long perspective instead of focusing solely on the drama of the 1980s – the so-called 'lost decade'. Instead, from independence he traces the impact of a series of predatory domestic and international partnerships, setting in train a long decline that was punctuated by emergency debt conferences from the early 1970s. For this thesis, this approach is useful in illustrating the ways in which plummeting living standards fuelled repeated waves of migrants and exiles who were often simultaneously fleeing political repression and instability, while also seeking to alleviate economic hardship and identify economic opportunity elsewhere.

In the latter half of this thesis, this elision of economic and political motivations for flight becomes increasingly apparent and conceptually important. As Ghana's

[68] Stonebridge, *Placeless People*, pp. 8-25.
[69] Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, *The Vampire State in Africa: The Political Economy of Decline* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1992).

economy deteriorated, much of Ghana's educated middle class left to both access economic opportunity and seek greater freedom of political expression (see Chapter 6). As Azarya and Chazan argued in their contemporaneous comparative study of Guinea and Ghana: 'In reality it is difficult to distinguish [political exile] from the brain drain because so many of the well-educated emigrants are also vocal in their opposition to their country's regime and would not feel safe returning home.'[70] Other studies of exile in the Global South have similarly rejected the use of binary distinctions to analytically distinguish between different forms of migrant, such as the previously cited investigation of Latin American exiles by Roniger et al.[71] They reject the distinction between 'voluntary' and 'forced' exile, since motivations for relocation are ordinarily complex. Even in attempts to distinguish between migrants through their 'vision' - characterising economic migrants as forward-looking and integration-focused, with exiles characterised as backward-looking temporary residents, these distinctions do not hold. Roniger convincingly demonstrates that the economic migrant is no less nostalgic, retaining past cultural links even as she socially integrates into her new environment. Economic success as a migrant may equally trigger an urge to return, accompanied by displays of conspicuous consumption.[72] Similarly, as explored in Chapter 8 of this thesis, while some Ghanaian exiles focused on 'homecoming' and return as an end goal, others sought comfort in permanent externality to ensure personal/psychological security away from their home nation which, regardless of regime change or democratisation, no longer represented in their minds a place of safety.

The fluidity of such categories is explored particularly effectively by Aihwa Ong in her study *Flexible Citizenship*. Taking an ethnographic approach to the global history of people of Chinese origin in the Asia-Pacific, she examines whether nation-states and their citizens are being transformed by global forces into flexible polities. Emphasising travel, communications, and mass media, she argues for a more positive view of the 'transnational public' and its ability to sustain several citizenships simultaneously. Ong suggests that previous studies have embraced a conventional Westphalian logic that views transnationality as necessarily problematic and detrimental to the nation-state.

[70] Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, 'Disengagement with the State: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and Guinea', *Comparative studies in Society and History,* Vol.29, No.1 (1987), p. 119.
[71]. Roniger, 'Changing Cultural Landscapes,' pp. 190-91; see also Roniger, Senkman, Sosnowski and Sznajder, *Exile, Diaspora, and Return,* pp.22-23.
[72] Ibid.

Instead, she argues that individuals have happily collected and combined multiple identities and coped creatively with the large-scale flow of people, images, and cultural forces across borders that began to accelerate in the 1970s.[73] Drawing on the widely used concept of an epistemic community, Ong captures the idea of civil society on the move. [74] She argues that through mediums such as newspapers and broadcasting - and latterly the internet - mobile educated migrants constitute significant epistemic communities contemplating and addressing the problems of their home countries, beyond their own borders.[75] Here Ong's work directly intersects with the heart of this thesis, which contends that some of the most important conversations about Ghana during the period under study were conducted by externalised citizens who were neither exiles nor emigrants in the typical conception of these terms; they were instead active participants in Ghana's polity who, while residing abroad, had ideationally and emotionally never really left home.

Conclusion

The depth of literature surrounding the general concepts explored in this thesis is only matched by the relative scarcity of literature investigating its specific topic of enquiry. Nevertheless, this project has benefitted hugely from being forged at the intersection of various bodies of scholarship, allowing it to reframe Ghanaian history in a way which is methodologically and conceptually impactful. Moving beyond a narrow focus on individual actors and central state formation helps eschew deterministic narratives and preserve the dynamism of Ghana's historical development, allowing for the imagination of the nation-state as porous and flexible. Similarly, conceptualising Ghanaian state and exile relations as multi-level (local, regional, national, global) and multi-polar allows for the exploration of complex historical realities which simultaneously preserve African agency. Influenced by geographically disparate approaches to exile, migration, and

[73] Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship. The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 1-26.

[74] The original idea of an "epistemic community" was developed by Peter Haas in the context of international environmental law, see, 'Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,' *International Organization,* Vol.46, No.1 (1992): 1-35. Nevertheless, it has proved attractive to scholars working on mobile citizens see, Alan Gamlen, 'Diaspora institutions and diaspora governance,' *International Migration Review,* Vol.48, No.1 (2014): 180-217.

[75] Aihwa Ong, 'On the edge of empires: Flexible citizenship among Chinese in diaspora,' *Positions,* Vol.1, No.3 (1993): 745-778.

diaspora, this thesis also seeks to capture the fluidity of the exile condition: less preoccupied with analytically truncating the exile experience for ease of analysis, but instead emphasising its multi-layered motivations, derived from its political and emotionally complexity. Approached in this way, the history of Ghanaian exile experience provides an opportunity to reformulate Ghanaian history as an osmotic polity, inextricable from diverse transnational networks of intellectual, cultural, and emotional engagement.

Chapter 3

Ghanaian Independence: Establishing the Conditions for Exile, 1948-1962

Introduction

As established in the previous chapter, historians analysing Ghana's path to independence have often overly focused on Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP), as Ghana's first leader and majority government.[1] Many accounts therefore unintentionally create deterministic visions of Ghanaian political development, presenting Nkrumah's eventual victory as almost inevitable and marginalising opposition voices. This critique has been most successfully advanced by Allman in her innovative monograph *The Quills of the Porcupine*, in which she traces the roots and trajectory of the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which challenged assertions of a centralised proto-Ghanaian national identity and argued instead for a federal constitution, or at times independence, for the region of Asante.[2] This preoccupation with the formation of the nation-state, and the way that it eclipsed dissent, mirrors the way in which literature on post-independence Ghana commonly omits exiled political actors by using Ghana's national borders to demarcate, implicitly or explicitly, the parameters of enquiry. Allman's ambition to recover alternative political visions and opposition voices in this earlier period has been pursued by other historians, notably Kate Skinner, and is strongly echoed in the approach of this thesis.[3]

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[1] To mention some representative titles: Ebenezer Obiri Addo, *Kwame Nkrumah: A case study of Religion and Politics in Ghana* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999); Harcourt Fuller, *Building the Ghanaian Nation-State: Kwame Nkrumah's Symbolic Nationalism*. (London: Springer, 2014); Hadjor, *Nkrumah and Ghana*; Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the Chiefs;* Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

[2] Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine,* p. ix.

[3] Kate Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: literacy, politics and nationalism, 1914–2014* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

To explore exile dynamics within post-independence Ghana, it is first important to briefly establish the context of independence. Political dissent in Ghana is characterised by continuity: many politicians and activists who opposed Nkrumah's vision for a centralised Ghanaian state later became key opposition figures in post-independence Ghana. As Nkrumah's intolerance of dissent became clearer, these leaders were the first to experience exile from an independent Ghana. However, as political activists maintained their opposition across colonial and post-colonial contexts, exile did not prove an insurmountable barrier to their continued political engagement.

The Political Landscape of Late Colonial Gold Coast

On 28 February 1948, about 2,000 demonstrators converged on the Christiansbourg Castle in Accra, the governor's personal residence. While ostensibly a protest centred on the slow distribution of war pensions, this demonstration was rooted in widespread problems in the urban economy. The resultant discontent temporarily united large sections of the population, including demobilised soldiers, market women and students. A thin line of African police officers blocked their path. Hopelessly outnumbered police deployed tear gas, causing the crowd to respond with stones. However, when ordered to fire at the protesters, the police refused. The British officer in command fired six times, leaving two dead.[4]

Simmering tension boiled over into intense civil unrest. For several days, the Gold Coast was beset by riots. Cars were burned, looting was widespread, and prisons were broken open. After several weeks of disorder, 29 people were reported dead, and 237 injured. British colonial anxiety was so strong that the Nigerian reinforcements summoned to support the Gold Coast military were only sent home five months later.[5] When the dust settled, the political landscape had changed irrevocably. While the British colonial government had permitted limited African participation in governance, this outburst of popular protest enabled nationalist parties, such as the United Gold Coast

[4] A.M. Israel, 'Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads: Protest and Politics in Post-War Ghana,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.30, No.2 (1992), pp. 364-5. For an examination of the impact of this event and narratives around independence on contemporary Ghanaian politics, see Edem Adotey, 'A Matter of Apostrophe? Founder's Day, Founders' Day, and Holiday Politics in Contemporary Ghana,' *Journal of West African History*, Vol.5, No.2 (2019): 113-39.

[5] Israel, 'Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads', pp. 365-6.

Convention (UGCC), to gain considerable new authority.[6] The UGCC had been established in 1947 with the aim of achieving independence through legal and constitutional means, and it appeared to be perfectly placed to dominate the central political space now created by the serious prospect of eventual independence.[7] However, this was to be derailed by the considerable impact of Kwame Nkrumah on the domestic political scene.

The relationship between Nkrumah and the UGCC

Famously talented and articulate, Nkrumah had been studying law and philosophy in London in the late 1940s but had been urged to return to Ghana by the UGCC. Previously, he studied at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania and was contemplating starting a doctorate. Instead, he moved to London, where he took courses at the LSE and also studied law. The impact of this international mobility on the development of Nkrumah's early political ideas has attracted significant scholarship.[8] In London, his politics was influenced by his association with George Padmore, the Trinidad-born champion of anti-colonialism. There, Nkrumah founded the West African National Secretariat, served as the Joint Secretary for the 1945 Fifth Pan-African Congress and increasingly mixed with communist-aligned and influenced groups.[9]

Nkrumah's relationship with the UGCC following his return to Accra in 1947, proved to be short lived. While the UGCC leadership were anti-colonial nationalists, most were highly educated lawyers, and their politics appealed to educated elites and conservatives with professional interests.[10] While Nkrumah may have also been an anti-colonial activist with legal training, he was far more radical and hungrier for rapid change. Like other anti-colonial nationalists, Nkrumah had formed links with the Communist Party of Great Britain and sought to implement a socialist vision of Ghanaian politics. However, it was intelligence gathered through these connections that made the British security service (MI5) confident that Nkrumah was in fact more of a nationalist than a

[6] Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 46-50.
[7] G.M. Bob-Milliar, 'Verandah Boys versus Reactionary Lawyers: Nationalist Activism in Ghana, 1946–1956,' *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.47, No.2 (2014), p. 288.
[8] Biney, *Kwame Nkrumah*, pp. 20-55. See also Marika Sherwood, 'Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years, 1945–47,' *Immigrants & Minorities,* Vol.12, No.3 (1993): 164-94; M. Sherwood, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad*.
[9] Lalbila Yoda, 'The Influence of the USA on the Political Ideas of Kwame Nkrumah,' *Round Table*, Vol.326 (1993): 187-198.
[10] Bob-Milliar, 'Verandah Boys', p. 288.

socialist or communist, a view of Nkrumah's politics which the British authorities maintained throughout the 1950s.[11] Both the British and the UGCC leadership seem to have underestimated his willingness to implement authoritarian government and repressive security policing.[12]

Certainly, senior UGCC figures like George 'Pa' Grant evinced worries about the young Nkrumah's radical politics and aggressive tactics and sought to limit his influence. Indeed, UGCC leaders spoke freely to local Special Branch police about their resentment of this firebrand. J.B. Danquah, one of the party's founders and a central political figure in the Gold Coast, told the police about these concerns, adding that 'Nkrumah is a bloody ass'. Indeed, UGCC leaders and the police apparently forged an improbable alliance, propelled by their shared distrust of this radical figure.[13]

By summer 1949, the UGCC leadership had stripped Nkrumah of meaningful authority and placed him in what they hoped was internal isolation. However, he responded by creating a new body, the UGCC's youth wing, called the Committee on Youth Organization (CYO). In reality, this had little contact with the UGCC leadership and functioned instead as Nkrumah's personal political organisation. In autumn 1949, he broke with the UGCC entirely and transformed the CYO into his own Convention People's Party (CPP).[14] In contrast to the UGCC's elite southern leadership and patient approach to constitutional change, Nkrumah's CPP demanded immediate self-government, and was dominated by less educated young men who called themselves 'Verandah Boys', a term which evoked their working-class roots and loyalties. As Bob-Milliar has eloquently observed: 'Two different political traditions with somewhat loose ideologies were now competing to end British colonial rule in Ghana.'[15]

In early 1950, the CPP led a programme of general strikes that effectively disrupted social and economic activities. The colonial government responded by

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[11] Calder Walton, *Empires of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire* (London: Collins, 2013), pp.226-31. See also P.M. McGarr, '"A Serious Menace to Security": British Intelligence, V.K. Krishna Menon and the Indian High Commission in London, 1947–52,' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol.38, No.3 (2010), pp. 453-54.

[12] Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, pp. 59-63.

[13] Chase Arnold, 'The "Cat's Paw of Dictatorship": State Security and Self-Rule in the Gold Coast, 1948 to 1957,' Ph.D., Berkeley, 2019, pp. 32-48.

[14] Ibid., pp. 39-43. See also Matteo Grilli, *Nkrumaism and African Nationalism Ghana's Pan-African Foreign Policy in the Age of Decolonization* (London: Palgrave, 2018), pp. 33-108.

[15] Bob-Milliar, 'Verandah Boys', p. 288.

declaring a state of emergency, and Nkrumah was arrested and jailed, which only succeeded in increasing his political standing. Spending over a year in prison, he nevertheless continued to direct the CPP. Scribbled orders on toilet paper were smuggled out of the prison to his friend and confidante Komla Gbedemah, who ran the CPP in Nkrumah's absence.[16]

In the legislative elections of February 1951, which were conceded by the colonial administration following the riots of 1948, the CPP scored a resounding win, largely achieved by focusing attention on more rural constituencies (neglected by their opponents) alongside energetic voter mobilisation, especially amongst women.[17] Nkrumah was asked to form a new government by Governor Charles Arden-Clarke and the following year, Nkrumah was granted the formal title of Prime Minister. While late colonial Gold Coast operated under this dual power structure, designed by the British to preserve a semblance of colonial authority while African leaders 'learned how to govern', Nkrumah's trajectory was nonetheless striking. In five short years, Nkrumah had moved from external semi-exile, via prison, to lead a country on the fast-track to independence.

Federalist Opposition

However, any sense of a smooth transition to an independent Ghana was upended in 1954. In the June 1954 elections, understood as the last major political landmark before the end of colonial rule, the CPP was again victorious, winning over 70 of the available 104 seats.[18] However, there was a significant fracturing of the political landscape, particularly rooted in regional disputes centred in Asante and campaigns for Togoland reunification.[19] Opposition to the CPP had hitherto been weak and fragmented with the decline of the UGCC; it and the National Democratic Party had variously joined with disaffected CPP figures to form the Ghana Congress Party (GCP) under Kofi Busia, which split again to form the Ghana Nationalist Party under Obetsebi Lamptey. Not only were these opposition coalitions unstable, but they also lacked focused leadership. For example, a week prior to the 1954 elections Kofi Busia embarked on a four-month lecture

[16] Biney, 'Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual Biography', Ph.D., p. 83; Davidson, *Black Star*, pp. 114-38.
[17] Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, pp. 231-2.
[18] For a detailed breakdown of the election results, see Bob-Milliar, 'Verandah Boys', pp. 302-312
[19] Ibid, p. 312.

tour of Europe and the United States, as he attempted to balance his duties as GCP leader and head of Sociology at the University College of the Gold Coast.[20]

The strongest sources of opposition were instead increasingly centred around ethnic, regional, and religious coalitions, such as the Muslim Association Party, the Togoland Congress Party, and the Northern People's Party.[21] However, it was the National Liberation Movement (NLM), formed in September 1954, that would become the CPP's most significant challenger. Established in Asante, the NLM demanded a federal constitution for the Gold Coast which would preserve Asante autonomy, rejecting Nkrumah's centralised nationalist vision. While immediately focused on Asante concerns, NLM leaders sought to broaden its appeal by cooperating with nationally recognised politicians like Kofi Busia and J.B. Danquah, who began speaking at NLM rallies across the Gold Coast.[22] The run up to independence saw significant violence and unrest, including attempts to bomb the houses of J.H. Asafu-Adjaye, the Ashanti Regional Chairman of the CPP, and Nkrumah himself. [23] Many pro-CPP Asante politicians lived in internal exile in Accra, unable to return to Asante for safety reasons. Nkrumah himself did not venture into Asante or indeed anywhere north of the Asante border until after independence.[24]

Rather than negotiate with Nkrumah on constitutional issues, the NLM instead directly appealed to the British colonial government for a further election before independence.[25] Busia was heavily involved in this campaign, and at London press conferences in 1955 and 1956, he issued urgent warnings about the autocratic tendencies and 'corruption' of the CPP. On behalf of the NLM and multiple regionally based opposition parties, Busia again requested a federal constitution.[26] He also lobbied Britain to embed the European Convention of Human Rights within Ghana's new constitution.[27] While the NLM successfully secured another election in 1956 that would supposedly

[20] Bob-Milliar, 'Verandah Boys', p. 306.
[21] Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine*, pp. 18-21.
[22] Ibid. p. 94.
[23] Asamoah, *The Political History of Ghana,* p. 31. While the NLM was alleged to have carried out these attacks, this has not been definitively proved.
[24] Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine*, p. 18.
[25] Ibid. p. 137.
[26] NARA-RG59, 745K.00/7-1155, Rutter to SoS, 11 July 1955. Also 'Grim Possibilities in Gold Coast: Dr Busia's warning', *Guardian*, 11 December 1956.
[27] In 1961 Busia continued to press this case in exile; A.A. Asare, *Truth Without Reconciliation: A Human Rights History of Ghana* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), p. 47.

settle the constitutional crisis, the CPP's majority was hardly touched.[28] While Busia's strident concerns about Nkrumah's potential authoritarianism had obvious political motivations, this did not mean that they were not legitimate. Following independence, opposition activism would become an increasingly risky occupation.

Independence and Preventative Detention

On 6 March 1957, Ghana declared independence.[29] At this point, few foreign observers considered Nkrumah to be either authoritarian or a communist.[30] Nonetheless, Nkrumah rapidly tightened his personal control over Ghana's opposition and domestic security. One of Nkrumah's first anti-opposition measures was to deport two leaders of the Muslim Association Party in Kumasi, as well as the head of the Zongo Volunteers. As Allman recounts, these individuals were 'deported under the newly passed Deportation Act of August, 1957, on the spurious grounds that they were not Ghanaian citizens', a status which made them easy targets for a government eager to suppress opposition.[31] This decision suggests, even at this early stage, the importance of externalisation and removal from the domestic sphere for Nkrumah's perception of national security. In this context, the NLM and a coalition of other smaller groups were forced to swiftly reconstitute themselves as the United Party (UP) under Busia's leadership ahead of a ban on regionally and religiously demarcated political parties.[32]

Nkrumah strengthened his internal security mechanisms in June 1958. The police Special Branch was now placed directly under the authority of the Prime Minister so that, in his words, he would be well-informed of events. Under Nkrumah, Special Branch became a tool for identifying potential threats to Nkrumah's power as well as for monitoring the army, from which such potential threats might rise. This was augmented by a new Presidential Detail Department and the President's Own Guard Regiment.[33]

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[28] Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine*, pp. 143-145, p. 152.
[29] For some early analysis of Ghana's fight for independence, see F.M. Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence, 1919-1957* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960); Richard Rathbone, ed., *British Documents on the End of Empire: Ghana, 2.vols.* (London: HMSO, 1992).
[30] TNA, CO/554/1162, Arden Clark to SoS Colonies, 17 April 1957; See also McGarr, '"A Serious Menace to Security", pp. 453-54.
[31] Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine,* p. 188.
[32] Ibid. p. 186.
[33] Ghana National Reconciliation Commission, 2004, Vol.1/4/1/5, 'The Special Branch'.

Some have interpreted these initiatives as early evidence of Nkrumah's pro-Soviet leanings.[34] However, others suggest that his approach to policing merely reflected Ghana's past experiences of colonial surveillance and detention, and indeed of other British colonies, since Nkrumah sought Nehru's advice in this sensitive area.[35] Indeed, many key Special Branch figures in this transitional period were British former colonial police officers.[36]

By far the most significant development in internal state security was the Preventative Detention Act (PDA) of autumn 1958. It permitted the incarceration without trial of individuals suspected of 'anti-government agitation' or 'terrorism' for up to five years, later extended to ten years. As Nkrumah explained: 'the object of the Preventative Detention Act is not to punish person for past offences, but to prevent future crimes against the state.'[37] In November 1958, this instrument was used to detain thirty-eight opposition figures for allegedly plotting to kill Nkrumah, a move which encapsulated this new, more overtly repressive security approach.

The following month, two leading MPs, R.R. Amponsah and Modesto Apaloo, were arrested, accused of planning to assassinate and topple Nkrumah.[38] Some have suggested that this coup was a fictional device used to justify these detentions, but as Ahlman has argued, the truth is likely more complex and may well mark the opposition's first substantive attempt to infiltrate the military, paving the way for the demise of the CPP a decade later.[39] In early 1959, a Commission of Enquiry into this plot was launched under a British judge. Taking testimony from almost a hundred witnesses, it sifted significant amounts of contradictory evidence and was far from a show trial.[40] Nkrumah's Special Branch officers hoped that the vast testimony would prove that the courts were no mere 'cypher'.[41] However, it was also key to Nkrumah's defence of the PDA, and he urged that

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[34] A.A. Mazrui, *On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship* (London: Longmans, 1967), p. 114.
[35] Avinash Paliwal, 'Colonial Sinews of Postcolonial Espionage-India and the Making of Ghana's External Intelligence Agency, 1958-61,' *The International History Review,* Vol.44, No.4 (2021), pp. 927-8.
[36] Arnold, 'Cat's Paw of Dictatorship,' p. 73.
[37] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/2/61, Cabinet Memo by the PM, 'Detention under the preventative detention act of Benjamin Awhaitey and John Kojo Mensah Antony', 5 June 1959.
[38] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/2/56, National Defence Council Minutes, 20 December 1958, 'Attempt to kill or capture the Prime Minister'.
[39] J.S. Ahlman, '"The Strange Case of Major Awhaitey": Conspiracy, Testimonial Evidence, and Narratives of Nation in Ghana's Postcolonial Democracy,' *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.50, No.2 (2017): 225-49.
[40] Ibid.
[41] PRAAD-Accra, RG/17/1/154, Assistant Commissioner, Special Branch to Nkrumah, 19 May 1959.

the report be made widely available ‘at a specially cheap price' to maximise its impact at home and abroad.[42]

The public spotlight shone on the case, coupled with the rise in the number of PDA detainees to forty, underlined the threat which this legislation posed to opposition activists. This case triggered Ghana’s first post-independence wave of political exiles. In response to alleged ‘acts of terror’ perpetrated by the opposition, Nkrumah granted himself further emergency powers, including preventing those detained from standing for parliament (as he himself had done while in detention in 1951).[43] This sweeping legislation, potentially encompassing all activism ranging from individual protest to orchestrated violence, made effective opposition an increasingly risky occupation. The UP was decimated due to the threat of imprisonment, its 32 MPs halving in number by 1960.[44] Many political figures felt obliged to leave Ghana for their own safety.

Nkrumah does not seem to have been initially alert to the potential threat posed by new exiles. Indeed, he continued his policy of deporting politically problematic non-Ghanaians and appears to have encouraged the departure of Ghanaian political opponents, either removing them from urban areas where they were potentially more influential, or deporting them abroad.[45] Nkrumah’s enthusiasm for the expulsion of awkward individuals was central to J.B. Danquah’s September 1960 complaint to the UN Secretary-General that in the preceding three years, steps had been taken ‘to deport and exile persons who are political opponents of the Party in power, or to banish others from their homes.'[46]

Instead, the CPP worried about internal threats from a range of sources. One was foreign embassies, treated as an intrusion of uncontrollable foreign space and influence within Ghana. This reflected a wider governmental preoccupation with cultural propaganda. Pamphlets were one key example, with police intercepting a reported

[42] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/2/56, Nkrumah memorandum, 'The Opposition Assassination plot', 10 January 1959.
[43] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/1/28, Cabinet minutes, item, 3 (iii) ‘Preventative Detention Act’, 20 January 1959; Ibid., ADM/13/2/57, Nkrumah memorandum, 'Disqualification of members of Parliament,' March 1959.
[44] C.E. Welch, ‘The Right of Association in Ghana and Tanzania’, *Journal of Modem African Studies*, Vol.16, No.4 (1978), p. 648.
[45] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/2/57, CM.116 (59), Minister of Interior memorandum, 'Deportation of Seven Persons from Accra,'; Ibid., ADM/13/2/64, CC.44 (50) Cabinet Minutes mins, Item.19 (vii) 'Deportation of 13 Persons from Kumasi', 18 September 1959; See also National Archives of Australia, A1838, 168/2/1, PART 1, Jamieson to Canberra, 'Deportations from Ghana’, 11 December 1958.
[46] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/2/75, Danquah to Secretary-General UN, Ref.No.518/P/60, 28 September 1960.

24,000 items a year. However, of particular concern were various embassies' provision of entertainment 'on a lavish scale, together with offers of 'free scholarships' and 'free passages' abroad.[47] The government instructed all embassies that offers of scholarships should be made not to individuals, 'but communicated to the Government through the Ministry of External Affairs,' a directive which also encompassed seminars, conferences and 'cultural visits.'[48] This was an early instance of overseas mobility being understood as problematic and requiring governmental control. Nkrumah facilitated the creation of a counter-espionage section of Special Branch to address this problem. While the team found only legitimate activity at the Israeli embassy, at its French counterpart, it 'operated with some success' and found significant activity of concern. In May 1959 it was even poised to embark on the widespread monitoring of foreign embassy telephones, with British help.[49]

The activities of the French which had so disturbed Nkrumah was their apparent sponsorship of Ghanaian double agents. In 1959, Nkrumah's security agencies issued a detention order that was of a 'particularly delicate nature'.[50] It focused on a Ghanaian employee of the Bureau of African Affairs, George Sampenne, who had supported George Padmore when he led a *Ghanaian Observer* delegation to Cotonou (in Dahomey) the previous summer. Sampenne fell under suspicion because he made statements which 'exposed' some of Nkrumah's plans and was also blamed for the arrest of pro-Nkrumah politicians from Senegal. Identified as an *agent provocateur* receiving considerable funds from the French embassy in Accra, he was sacked from his job with Padmore. He fled across the border to Lomé but was eventually deported back to Ghana by the Togolese government.[51]

However, Togo's president, Sylvanus Olympio, was unwilling to co-operate with Nkrumah in policing exiles. On 5 June 1959, Nkrumah wrote to Olympio, stating that the MP John Kojo Mensah Antony had fled to Togo to avoid detention. He warned that Antony

[47] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/2/58, Memo by Minister of External Affairs 'The security of Ghana relating to the establishment of foreign diplomatic mission in Accra,' March 1959.
[48] Ibid.
[49] PRAAD-Accra, RG/17/1/155, Special Branch memorandum SF.101 'Foreign Embassies: C.E. Section Special Branch', 27 May 1959.
[50] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/2/62, Minister of Interior (Inkumsah) memorandum, 'Detention of George Sampenne,' 11 July 1959.
[51] Ibid, Special Branch Report, PF.241, 'Georges Sampenne', 18 July 1959.

planned 'to assassinate me and to effect a coup d'état' and requested his return.[52] While Olympio assured Nkrumah that he would not permit exiles to use Togo 'as a base for plotting against a friendly government or Sister Nation,' he cautioned that he was awaiting 'necessary instructions from Paris' before deciding Antony's fate. He reminded Nkrumah of Togo's co-operation over the 'suspicious' George Sampenne.[53] Nkrumah was not placated and reiterated his desire to apprehend Antony.[54] Despite Nkrumah's concern about assassination plots originating from exiles in Togo, it would in fact be Olympio who was assassinated four years later in West Africa's first coup.[55] These high level exchanges between African leaders over fugitive individuals underline the increasing influence of exile flows upon regional relations in West Africa.

Opposition in Exile - Kofi Busia

Kofi Busia's trajectory provides a prime example of the marginalisation of exiles in Ghana's historiography. Despite being Nkrumah's leading political opponent after independence, he is granted only one line in a leading study of Nkrumahism.[56] Busia's early flight into exile, departing Ghana in December 1958, just months after the passage of the PDA, has resulted in his impact on Ghana's domestic politics being underemphasised. At the time, Busia's sudden departure prompted careful attention by government ministers, who presented his flight as reflecting guilt, rather than oppression. In 1959, Ashford Inkumsah, Nkrumah's interior minister asked: 'But what of Dr Busia? Why should the leader of the Opposition have fled the country unless he had a bad conscience? Did he fear that something more of his connection with the conspirators would come out?'[57] Whether 'conspiring' or not, Busia was certainly preternaturally politically active during his exile, gaining immediate assistance from the French and maintaining a considerable global mobility and profile.

[52] PRAAD-Accra, RG/17/1/154, Nkrumah to Olympio, 5 June 1959.
[53] Ibid, Olympio to Nkrumah, 14 June 1959.
[54] Ibid, Nkrumah to Olympio, 18 June 1959.
[55] Skinner, 'West Africa's First Coup', p. 376.
[56] Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism*, p. 206.
[57] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/2/63, Minister of Interior, 'Draft speech on the opening of the debate on the Granville Sharp Enquiry', May 1959.

Existing studies have, as noted, neglected the extent to which post-independence Ghanaian politics was a global matter. Indeed, many historical studies view political turmoil in Accra as engendered by neo-colonial forces, denying the agency of mobile Ghanaian opposition. There is however significant evidence of the ubiquity and influence of prominent exiles in the early post-independence period. Busia was a remarkably energetic global activist during his years in exile. A consistent presence on Ghana's francophone borders, he also visited France, the UK, the US, Holland, Nigeria, Mexico, Uganda, and the Republic of Congo.[58] This activity had real political impact. In late 1961, British officials in Côte d'Ivoire, noting that Busia had 'paid another visit', reported that 'his main object apparently [was] to create some sort of organisation amongst the Ghanaian refugees in the Ivory Coast'. This group included two former UP MPs, 'Messrs. R. B. Otchere and B. F. Kusi', who formed part of what amounted to a transnational network of resistance to Nkrumah.[59]

However, such resistance came at a high personal cost. In early 1957, Busia had been granted unpaid leave by his university employer to pursue his political career.[60] But thereafter, he lost any regular income and experienced considerable financial insecurity. In June 1957, writing to his friend Sir Edward Spears, an ex-British MP and then head of the Ashanti Goldmining Corporation, he explained that he would like to visit England and America to raise funds from individuals interested in preserving Ghanaian democracy. Nevertheless, he stated:

> I cannot raise the fare, for having given up my job at the college I am now impoverished, and am getting deeper and deeper into debt. I am ashamed to have to confess this. I am living at home… because I cannot afford to rent a house in Accra. The biggest pain to me is that by doing this, I have had to withdraw my children from the excellent school they were attending in Achimota. I think whatever I feel called upon to sacrifice, I have no right to interfere with my children's life-chances in this way. Sometimes I do feel depressed![61]

[58] TNA, DO/195/50, Chadwick to McIndoe, 26 April 1963.
[59] TNA, DO/195/50, Stratton (Abidjan) to (Keeble) Accra, 9 December 1961.
[60] NARA-RG59, 745K.00/1-1557, Accra to SoS, 15 January 1957.
[61] Churchill Archives, SPRS 3/1/168, Busia to General Spears, 3 June 1957.

In this letter, Busia is strikingly candid about his feelings of shame and guilt deriving not only from his debt, but also his inability to provide for his children and the impact that his personal convictions would have on their future. However, this emotional outpouring also reflected Busia's attempt to court Spears' help in contacting potential sponsors. Precisely because Spears was head of a business with strategic interests in Ghana, this request was received with horror and was strongly rebutted. While acknowledging Busia's 'difficulties', Spears replied that he was 'afraid that as you well know, it is absolutely impossible to do anything on the lines you request'.[62] Spears could not afford for Nkrumah to accuse him of helping political opposition, and Busia plunged further into debt over the next ten years.

At one point, Busia's financial position became so dire that he considered abandoning politics altogether. However, he was also concerned that Nkrumah would obstruct his return to academic life.[63] In July 1958, Busia asked Spears how he should proceed in the face of 'poor health, and inadequate financial means.'[64] His financial problems remained, and he was now recovering from a car accident which had required significant surgery in Geneva. While the scale of his burdens had evidently increased, this letter also illustrates Busia's awareness of Nkrumah's growing surveillance and authoritarianism. He states that he had purposefully written to Spears from Switzerland, as in Ghana he had 'reason not to trust the post'.[65]

Nevertheless, in October 1958, Busia told Spears that, despite these mounting impediments, he planned to remain politically active. While he was keenly aware of the difficulties, '…it has become increasingly clear to me that I must carry on in politics, whatever the personal cost to myself, until the present dangers subside or are averted.' He had now resigned his university position, leaving a financially stable and less physically demanding job that would have allowed him to better support his children. This illustrates the precarity of his position during his first twelve months of exile, something that he offset by deploying his global academic connections.[66]

[62] Churchill Archives, SPRS 3/1/168, Spears to Busia, 24 June 1957.
[63] Ibid., SPRS 3/1/204, Busia to Spear, 26 July 1958.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Churchill Archives, SPRS 3/1/204, Busia to Spear, 3 October 1958.

After his flight into exile in December 1958, Busia took up a position at the African Studies Centre at Leiden University and was subsequently appointed as supernumerary professor of 'sociology and culture studies of Africa' in 1960. Busia had studied at Oxford, was a visiting professor at Wageningen, and had already been appointed to a full professorship in sociology at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, positions which he held in tandem. He gave his inaugural address at Leiden on the Sociology and Culture of Africa in early 1960.[67] While he now seemed financially and geographically secure, Busia felt his isolation keenly. Samuel Gyandoh, a prominent Ghanaian law professor, met with Busia while he was living in Leiden and recalled that he 'took his exile very badly', and was bitter about his removal from the domestic political stage.[68]

However, Busia's commitment to activism would be further tested. Busia's outspoken criticism of Nkrumah and the CPP government had triggered protests from Nkrumah and begun to jeopardise Dutch-Ghanaian relations. The Ghanaian government strongly abraded the Dutch government, arguing that Busia was using the Netherlands as a platform for subversion. In 1960, at Nkrumah's instigation, the Attorney General of Ghana, Geoffrey Bing, and the Defence Minister, Kofi Baako, showed Dutch authorities a hefty file filled with intercepted letters from Busia to individuals in Ghana, mostly originating in The Hague and passing through Abidjan. Some were addressed to ministers thought to be privately critical of the government. The file convinced the Dutch government that Busia had been 'very actively involved with political questions during the time he was affiliated with Leiden University', in contravention of the protocols governing asylum there.[69]

In response, two years into his Netherlands residency, the Dutch government gave Busia an ultimatum. The Hague informed Busia that, while he would be allowed to remain, it was on the condition that he cease his involvement in Ghanaian domestic politics.[70] This left Busia having to contemplate resigning his chair, uprooting his family, and ultimately losing the safety he had acquired in the Netherlands, in order to pursue

[67] H.F. Vermeulen, 'Contingency and Continuity: Anthropology and other non-western studies in Leiden, 1922-2002,' *Nijmegen Studies in Development and Cultural Change,* Vol.39 (2002), p. 117; K.A. Busia, 'The Sociology and Culture of Africa,' (Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1960).
[68] Interview with Samuel Gyandoh II, 3 September 2018.
[69] National Archives of the Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2.05.118), File No.13390 Ghana (Busia) 1960-62, Report from Source 'Bron', December 1962. The letters mostly came from his home address, Lean van Poot 284 in The Hague.
[70] Ibid.

his political ambitions. However, by March 1960, Busia had come to a decision. In a letter to Viscount Alan Lennox-Boyd, a former British Colonial Secretary, he stated: 'In spite of the financial complications I think it my duty to give up my positions here, if I can only hold them by behaving as though I were completely indifferent and unconcerned with what is happening in Ghana, or in Africa generally, having already held a leading position in Ghana politics.'[71] When forced to choose, Busia prioritised his connection and sense of responsibility to his country over personal and familial concerns, something which would continue to plague his conscience for years.

While Busia was confiding in British officials, he was perhaps unaware of the discreet efforts that they had been making to discourage his presence in Britain. While extradition issues often made the headlines, simultaneous struggles over the nationality status of migrants and the nature of post-colonial citizenship, together with their political rights and allegiances in Ghana, were also a frequent occurrence. Problems with passports, citizenship and identification were a common experience for exiles and were the nexus at which the issues of international travel, political activism and post-colonial tensions met. Indeed, boundaries, borders, migration and mobility were central to Ghanaian politics, and to exile dynamics in general.[72]

At this point, Busia was experiencing difficulties with identification and travel due to his exile status. In 1960, while residing in the Netherlands, he applied for help from the Dutch and British authorities due to the imminent expiration of his Ghanaian passport, which 'under the circumstances' the Ghanaian government would not renew.[73] Busia was already linked to Britain through his status as a Commonwealth citizen; his situation was however complicated by the fact that his passport, issued in 1956 before Ghanaian independence, was British, despite the fact that was not a British citizen. His ambiguous status was troubling and British officials desired a speedy resolution. This urgency was underlined by a note to the Dominions Office penned by Lennox-Boyd: 'I am sorry to keep bothering you about Dr Busia's passport…Have you any news yet? He is almost in daily touch with us!!!'[74] Busia found himself in a legal limbo, in which he was not properly

[71] TNA, DO/35/9417, Busia to Lennox-Boyd, 24 March 1960.
[72] Ousman Kobo, '"We are citizens too": the politics of citizenship in independent Ghana,' *Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol.48, No.1 (2010), pp. 67-9.
[73] TNA, DO/195/20, Busia to Minister for Justice, den Hague, 6 December 1960.
[74] Ibid, Lennox-Boyd to Moreton, 19 November 1960.

affiliated to or supported by his country of origin, the country in which he resided, or the country which, as the former colonial power, had issued his passport.

The British response to Busia's request was not one he welcomed. Busia was informed that without gaining official British citizenship by residing in Britain for a year, and perhaps disowning his Ghanaian citizenship entirely, he could not be issued with a British passport. In order for Busia to exit his politically liminal state, he would be forced to renounce his Ghanaian citizenship and give up his dreams of return. Nevertheless, officials were doubtful that he would accept these terms, one stating: 'It appears that he may be reluctant to do this since he still cherishes the idea of returning to Ghana – some day.'[75] Busia's hesitation is further evidence of his desire to not only remain a Ghanaian political actor, but also to retain his national identity. Busia instead chose to travel on the expired document for two more years, risking his personal safety.

Busia's case presents a fascinating example of the uncertainty surrounding legality, citizenship, and the process of decolonisation. During these discussions surrounding Busia, the British government discovered a legal loophole in Ghanaian law that potentially allowed for dual citizenship with Commonwealth nations, meaning that Busia might not have been required to renounce his Ghanaian citizenship to obtain a British passport.[76] Ghana's 1957 Nationality and Citizenship Act allowed Ghanaian ministers to strip citizenship from individuals who acquired citizenship of another 'foreign' country, but excluded Commonwealth countries from the category of 'foreign' in a later section.[77] However, with Nkrumah's increasing weaponization of citizenship rules against opposition politicians of non-Ghanaian descent, alongside the 1962 repeal and replacement of the 1957 Act, widening the grounds for deprivation of citizenship, it seems unlikely that Busia would have succeeded in fighting this case.[78] Regardless of feasibility, what remains notable is the detachment which British officials cultivated

[75] TNA, DO/35/9417, Martin to Greenhill, 8 April 1960. Under the 1960 Ghanaian constitution Ghanaian citizenship was a requirement for holding the office of President, which may also have been a consideration for Busia.
[76] Ibid. Secretary of State to Lennox-Boyd (draft), 12 April 1960.
[77] Ibid. Dual citizenship was not explicitly legalised in Ghanaian law until 1996; Beth Elise Whitaker, 'The Politics of Home: Dual Citizenship and the African Diaspora', *International Migration Review*, Vol.45, No.4, p.769.
[78] Bronwen Manby, *Citizenship in Africa: The Law of Belonging*, (Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018) pp. 94-97; The struggle for citizenship and its contestation during and after decolonisation is a key theme in the literature. See Bronwen Manby, *Struggles for Citizenship in Africa*, (London: Zed Books, 2009); P. Nugent, D. Hammett, & S. Dorman (eds.), *Making Nations, Creating Strangers*, (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

towards Busia over this issue. One official warned that Busia should not 'be given any advice direct', and another that he should be given 'no positive encouragement to set up home in the United Kingdom'.[79] Intriguingly, this suggests that Britain chose not to inform Busia of their legal discovery.

Despite this apparent discouragement, Busia informed Lennox-Boyd of his intention to move to Britain as soon as he could muster funds. He felt 'an inescapable responsibility and a duty to continue to do what I can for Ghana and for Africa', a task he could no longer do from Holland. Willing to sacrifice both his economic and social security on the altar of his political activism, Busia reported that he had 'not only spent all my own money in our political struggle, but even borrowed money as well, thus failing in my duty to my family of whom I now must think more seriously'. His willingness to move to a country where he had 'no job or home or place to go', whilst significantly indebted, reveals the seriousness of his commitment.[80] It is clear that while he was physically dislocated from Ghana, he was mentally consumed by it.

Despite this, Busia clearly remained committed to his family. In an interview, his daughter, Abena Busia, recalls her father's time in Mexico in 1960, where he was employed for six months after leaving the Netherlands to establish the Center for African Studies at El Colegio de Mexico. She observes that his efforts to balance his responsibilities as the 'Leader of the Opposition in exile', while also setting up a new African Studies Centre were 'extraordinary'.[81] Nevertheless, Abena Busia states that during their stay her father took the time to home-school his children. While Busia was continually willing to sacrifice family stability on the altar of his political activity, he also sought to minimise its effect on his children's futures. Unsurprisingly, Busia's intense schedule took a toll. He wrote to Spears: 'I have been very quiet, because I needed time to recover, not only phisically [sic], but mentally and spirituall [sic] too. I was quite exhausted.'[82] Busia nonetheless addressed a deep sense of isolation arising from exile by remaining highly mobile and visiting Ghana's border regions.[83]

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[79] TNA, DO/35/9417, Greenhill to Hunt, 1 April 1960; Ibid., Alec to Lennox-Boyd, 14 April 1960.
[80] Ibid. Busia to Lennox-Boyd, 24 March 1960.
[81] British Library Sound Archive, London, *The Women's Learning Partnership Oral History Project*, Interview with Abena Busia, conducted by Negar Esfandiary, 18 March 2016.
[82] Churchill Archives, SPRS 3/1/261, Busia to Spears, 7 March 1960.
[83] NARA-RG 59, 745j.00/10-2761, Hague to SoS, 27 October 1961.

In late 1961, Busia travelled frequently between Leiden, Paris, and New York, before settling at St Antony's College, Oxford. His main operational focus was France and the Francophone African states. Moving between Togo, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, he sought to achieve 'harmony' amongst different groups of Ghanaian exiles. He was therefore 'horrified' by the possibility of a rapprochement between Nkrumah and Togolese leader Olympio, fearing that they might agree to 'exchange Ghanaian refugee leaders for Togolese opposition leaders now in Ghana'. Concerned that the arrival of Eastern Bloc security advisers would make it harder for Nkrumah to compromise, Busia was 'deeply discouraged' and in need of more funds.[84]

Busia was remarkably adept at shopping in the global political supermarket for financial and political support, ultimately securing two long-term supporters in the form of Jean Foccart, long-term adviser to the Elysée Palace on African politics, and his long-time ally Félix Houphouët-Boigny, president of Côte d'Ivoire. Through their support, Busia continued to cultivate a domestic political voice during his decade in exile, through periodic releases of literature, specifically pamphlets smuggled into Ghana by associates, or radio broadcasts from Togo and Côte d'Ivoire made via French radio. Pamphlets with titles such as 'Ghanaians Will Be Free and Happy' were disseminated clandestinely, from Lagos, Nigeria.[85] Indeed, when Busia finally rose to power in October 1969 (see Chapter 5), Foccart expressed his joy at Busia's success to French president Georges Pompidou: 'I spoke effusively about Busia, his victory in the elections and all that we have done for him for so long.' Pompidou replied with equal happiness, recalling their discussion of Busia as early as in 1958.[86]

Exiled CPP Ministers

In Ghana, Nkrumah's fear of enemies abroad was growing. However, this was generated not only by his exilic opponents, but also by wider Cold War dynamics. In the 1960s, the Cold War became more global, involving many countries across Africa and Latin America.[87] The assassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in January

[84] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/3-2262, Lome to SoS, 22 March 1962.
[85] H.W. Mobley, *The Ghanaian's Image of the Missionary* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), p. 67.
[86] 2 September 1969, Jacques Foccart, *Dans les bottes du Général – III, 1969-1971* (Paris: Fayard/Jeunne Afrique, 1999).
[87] Westad, *The Global Cold War,* pp. 12-24.

1961 was highly impactful, both within a global Cold War context, and for Nkrumah in particular.[88] Nkrumah's personal and political closeness with Lumumba gave his death real significance, sending him into 'a fury'.[89] In March 1961, some allies of Nkrumah, including Komla Gbedemah, warned that this event had pushed Ghana further left and given new prominence to Nkrumah's pro-Soviet adviser and Attorney General, Geoffrey Bing.[90] The following month, the United States' disastrous exile-focused operation at Cuba's Bay of Pigs convinced many progressive Global South leaders that exiles could be weaponized by the CIA in coups d'état to overthrow their regimes.[91] Creating fertile ground for anxiety amongst Ghanaian security officials, Nkrumah began developing a 'known fear' of exiles.[92]

Within Ghana, Nkrumah's growing authoritarianism fuelled opposition even among his longstanding supporters. In autumn 1961, Komla Gbedemah, who had served as both Minister for Finance and of Health, became the first of Nkrumah's inner circle to flee into exile. Gbedemah had been Nkrumah's right-hand man throughout the decade preceding independence and was the first to welcome him out of prison. However, they began to clash once independence had been achieved. Politically, Gbedemah was on the conservative wing of the CPP, and acted as the go-between for Presidents Eisenhower and later Kennedy on the Volta Dam project.[93] In the years following independence, he kept US officials abreast of a 'serious but hidden rift' within the party, adding that he was prepared to 'step into Nkrumah's shoes at any time'. In the late 1950s, Washington found this an attractive prospect.[94] However, by May 1961, Gbedemah's transatlantic shuttling aroused suspicion.[95] He was therefore replaced as finance minister by Ferdinand Goka.[96]

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[88] For conflicting explanations see Ludo De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London: Verso 2001); Emmanuel Gerrard and Bruce Kuklick, *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

[89] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, (JFKL), President's Office Files, Countries/Ghana, Box.117B, file: Ghana-Nkrumah Visit', Briefing Paper 'Ghana-United States Relations,' 5 March 1961. See also ibid., Nkrumah, Speech, UN General Assembly 15th Session, 7 March 1961.

[90] JFKL, President's Office Files, Countries, Box.117B, File/Ghana.3/1/61-10/12/61, Russell memorandum for JFK, 'Interview with Finance Minister K. Gbedemah of Ghana,' 4 March 1961. Bing, a British MP until 1955 was considered to be a dedicated communist, TNA, KV/2/3814-9.

[91] Howard Jones, *The Bay of Pigs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[92] TNA, DO/195/50, Accra to Kampala, 24 April 1963.

[93] NARA-RG59, 845j.2614/2-2861, Memorandum: 'The Volta Project', 28 February 1961.

[94] NARA-RG59, 745K.00/2-2557, Accra to SoS, 25 February 1957.

[95] Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963, Vol. XXI, Africa (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995) Doc.223. Penfield to Bowles, 17 February 1961.

[96] NARA-RG59, 745j.56/5-1261, Accra to SoS, 12 May 1961.

In summer 1961, as Gbedemah's relations with Nkrumah cooled further, he spoke to US officials of his hope that he could displace him. On 7 September, Gbedemah told US ambassador Francis Russell: 'I would be sorry to have to do it but [the] country has had enough of Nkrumah's arrogance, whims and madness'.[97] Despite this tough talk, Russell privately judged Gbedemah to be an 'opportunist' who was weak, vain, and lazy.[98] While he thought he should be supported, Russell judged his chances of success at 'less than fifty per cent'.[99] Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, was more optimistic and on 10 September told the US Embassy that Ghanaian diplomats in Washington were happily predicting a coup and wanted this information passed to Gbedemah.[100]

From Accra, Russell warned Washington that Gbedemah was a poor bet, advising that he has 'almost always failed to follow through' and that, while he always stressed secrecy, he was in fact 'notably imprudent in the extent to which he voices his views'.[101] In fact, rather than anticipating his assumption of power, Gbedemah was preparing to go into exile. Although he claimed to be 'biding his time' until parliament reconvened in the autumn, he was already sounding out American sympathisers for support for an exilic campaign, asking for 'money, printing of campaign leaflets outside Ghana for distribution and publicity in world press'.[102]

On 14 September 1961, with Nkrumah abroad on a diplomatic visit to the USSR, railway workers went on strike in protest at an austerity budget. On his return, Nkrumah denounced this strike as a conspiracy and crushed the 'revolt', jailing everyone from journalists to market women. In the wake of these events, Gbedemah addressed parliament, criticising the PDA and new legislation that focused on sedition and public protests. He lambasted Nkrumah, asking: 'How many people are languishing in jail today detained under this Act?', while also condemning other CPP members for accruing excess wealth. Gbedemah subsequently resigned from government.[103] He fled into exile in Togo the same day, only hours ahead of a police raid of his home.[104]

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[97] JFKL, National Security Files (NSF), Box.99, Countries/Ghana, Russell to SoS, 7 September 1961.
[98] Ibid, Russell to SoS, 25 September 1961.
[99] Ibid, 27 September 1961.
[100] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/9-961, Rusk to Accra, 10 September 1961.
[101] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/9-2I61, Accra to Rusk 21 September 1961.
[102] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/9-2061, Accra to Rusk, 21 September 1961.
[103] Austin, *Politics in Ghana,* p. 46.
[104] O.Y. Asamoah, *The Political History of Ghana (1950-2013): The Experience of a Non-Conformist*, (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2014) p. 584.

Gbedemah had however expected a brief period of political stand-off to follow his speech and had not expected to be on the run so soon. President Olympio recalled that when Gbedemah presented himself in Togo he 'was hardly recognizable - being disguised as a fisherman in the old, soiled clothes worn by such persons' and explaining that he 'had to flee Ghana for his life', adding he had 'walked over the frontier through the 'bush''.[105] Olympio dished out a 'mild childing' regarding the 'accepted practice of political asylum'. He added that Gbedemah had been meeting with unidentified Nigerians on the border with Dahomey but was now returning to Lomé.[106]

Courting Support

Gbedemah experienced numerous problems as he sought to accrue allies in exile. He established links with 'Mr Grosse', a local representative of Maurice Tempelsman, a global diamond merchant who disliked Nkrumah because of long-standing disagreements over diamond production. However, local American diplomats hated the brash Tempelsman operation and warned Washington that 'Grosse actively associated with Gbedemah in his plans to unseat Nkrumah'. They warned that Grosse would behave 'with the irresponsibility and complete lack of discretion he has exhibited in the past'. [107] Officials in Washington were therefore keen that Tempelsman's representative did not return to Accra. Some authors have suggested that this points to a substantial CIA plot around Gbedemah, but the evidence for this is thin at best.[108]

In late 1961, Gbedemah remained a prominent exiled opposition figure, whose location was therefore of interest to both Nkrumah and various western governments. On 9 November he was finally located in Dahomey by US diplomats who noted he had done an 'excellent job covering his tracks', but had been discovered to again be meeting with 'certain Nigerians', before returning to Togo.[109] On 14 November, Rusk again requested information on Gbedemah's whereabouts, asking 'is [he] still in Togo?'

[105] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/11-2361, Jonathan Savi de Tore, conversation, 23 November 1961.
[106] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/10-2262, Lome to SoS, 27 October 1961.
[107] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/10-2761 and min, Accra to SoS, 27 October 1961.
[108] R.D. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp.184-5; B.S Rabinowitz, *Coups, Rivals, and the Modern State: Why Rural Coalitions Matter in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 120.
[109] NARA-RG59, 745j.00 11-961, Cotonou to SoS, 9 Nov 1961.

American diplomats then lost track of Gbedemah, but Rusk was eventually informed by Tempelsman that he was now in Hamburg. This exchange of knowledge suggests that Gbedemah had closer collaboration with private commercial interests than with the CIA, as has sometimes been suggested.[110] Meanwhile, British officials in London were dismissive of Gbedemah. In mid-November 1961, drawing on their police contacts, they warned that Gbedemah was 'no longer capable of being leader or wielding power' as he was 'burned'. British officials concluded: 'He is now a nonentity whose best years are behind him and is today living on bitterness he harbors for Nkrumah'.[111]

By mid-December 1961, Gbedemah was living in a suburb of Lomé, apparently 'growing a beard' but reportedly with significant funds, seemingly provided by Tempelsman. He told diplomats that he was chastened and that, while he was aware that his associates spoke 'rather grandiosely of future bombings, kidnappings and assassinations', he preferred to 'keep aloof'.[112] US diplomats reported that Mark Kofi, deputy manager of a Ghana-based supplies company, was now 'the ringleader of Gbedemah's associates' and frequently visited him in Lomé. But after remonstrations from the White House, the enthusiasm of his funder faded, and it was noted: 'Tempelsman wants no further involvement in Gbedemah's operations'.[113]

Certainly, by early 1962, the United States was thoroughly fed up with Gbedemah. It was reported that he made a 'hush hush' phone call from Germany to say he was coming to London and wanted to see US officials about 'an important matter'.[114] On 22 March 1962, he arrived at the Hotel Londoner under the cover name of "Awumee' and spoke with Joseph Wagner, First Secretary of the US embassy in London. Gbedemah explained that he had been to Zurich to meet with Tempelsman to 'obtain financial support'. Gbedemah's 'important matter' was simply a renewal of his requests for support, having spent £20,000 of his own money and 'funds [were] running out'. He explained that he not only needed money for the 'operations of agents', but also - and rather improbably - to

[110] NARA-RG59, 745j.00 11-961, Rusk to Lome, 14 Nov 1961. Also ibid, Rusk to London, 15 Nov 1961.
[111] JFKL, Box.99a, National Security Files, Countries/Ghana, London (Bruce) to SoS, 18 November 1961.
[112] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/12-1461, Accra to SoS 14 December 1961.
[113] Ibid.
[114] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/3-1662, London to SoS, 16 March 1962. On Tempelsman, see David N. Gibb, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 108-10, 172, 249.

buy the *Daily Graphic*, one of the only major newspapers not yet owned by the Ghanaian government.[115]

Exile-based opposition was nevertheless consolidating in this period. Gbedemah explained that he had met Busia in Paris in late December, and they were now 'co-operating fully', having scheduled a final strategy meeting in Lomé on 23 April. Together they planned to use pamphlets to attack Nkrumah's 'wild' spending, then to persuade all Ghana's exiles to return simultaneously and to criticise him in concert, and thus confront Nkrumah 'with [the] decision whether to arrest them all'.[116] Both British and American officials were horrified and dismissed these plans as infantile, since the military and police were in firm control. Dean Rusk confirmed that the US refused to fund Gbedemah, since there was little to be gained 'and risks are considerable', adding that further meetings 'should be discouraged'.[117]

Busia and Gbedemah's plans to collaborate via pamphlets built on their mutual familiarity with this form of political agitation. Throughout this period, Gbedemah had been writing and disseminating pamphlets in a manner similar to Busia, in an attempt to maintain his domestic influence, having them shipped across the border by any means necessary. In response, the CPP government launched a media campaign against Gbedemah, insisting that he had embezzled money and had worked with external forces to turn the workers' strike of 1961 into a coup.[118] In August 1962, Gbedemah issued a lengthy open letter attacking the vast spending envisaged by a new Seven-Year Development plan entitled 'Work and Happiness for All', and what he termed the gradual degeneration of 'the basic democracy we then had, into a totalitarian regime and a Police State.'[119] By October 1962, his political agitation became so significant that the British government alerted the Nkrumah administration to the sheer amount of his literature that was passing through Britain and into Ghana. The British High Commissioner, Sir

[115] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/3-2262, London to SoS, 22 March 1962. Also, ibid, 745j.00/1-2062, Paris to SoS, 20 January 1962. Nkrumah purchased the Daily Graphic in 1962: See Nate Plageman, '"Accra Is Changing, Isn't It?": Urban Infrastructure, Independence, and Nation in the Gold Coast's "Daily Graphic," 1954–57', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2010), p. 144.
[116] Ibid.
[117] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/3-2762, Rusk to Bruce, 'eyes only', 24 March 1962.
[118] K.T. Vieta, *Flagbearers of Ghana: Profiles of One Hundred Distinguished Ghanaians, Vol.1* (Accra: Ena Publishers, 1999) pp. 82-5.
[119] 'The Open letter to Dr Kwame Nkrumah, President of the republic', 29 September 1962, US Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 'Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws', (Washington: GPO, 1962), App.VII, pp. 124-37.

Geoffrey de Freitas, was tasked with notifying Nkrumah that 'a large number of pamphlets containing serious allegations against [Nkrumah]' had been sent by Gbedemah's associates by air from London and were now being distributed around Ghana.[120] While French radio in West Africa offered Gbedemah an additional platform from which to attack Nkrumah, as it had to Busia, Gbedemah does not appear to have sought French support.[121]

Meanwhile, while Ghana was an increasingly hostile space for Ghanaian opposition activists, Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist aspirations meant that Ghana was itself harbouring increasing numbers of exiles and liberation fighters from Africa and the wider world. Nkrumah's Bureau for African Affairs was particularly active in supporting liberation movements from across the continent, establishing training camps and fostering politically active exiles within Ghanaian territory.[122] Nkrumah also welcomed many left-leaning African Americans who were escaping political persecution and racism in the US, including Julian Mayfield, Maya Angelou, W. E. B. Dubois, and Shirley Graham. They were drawn by the positive possibilities of an African exile and their desire to help build a new nation that reflected Nkrumah's Pan-African vision. Ghana also provided a platform to attack US policy, much to the annoyance of American officials.[123] Nkrumah's provision of active support to politically sympathetic exiled global actors suggests his growing appreciation of the importance of transnational political dissent and subversion. However, while he may have desired to harness the potential of externalised campaigning and agitation, he was equally vulnerable to its threat.

Togo as a Centre of Exile Politics

While the departures of prominent politicians such as Busia and Gbedemah were reported by newspapers and monitored by police, such elites were not the only people affected by Nkrumah's suppression of opposition. After the imposition of the

[120] PRAAD-Accra, RG 17/1/74, de Freitas to Nkrumah, 8 October 1962.
[121] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 'Gbedemah Scores Nkrumah's 'Dictatorship', Cotonou/Dahomey Domestic Service in French, 1900 GMT 8 October 1962. 'Ghana' I5, Africa.
[122] For more information see Grilli, 'Nkrumah's Ghana and the Armed Struggle in Southern Africa,' pp.56-81; Terretta, 'Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global,' pp. 189-212.
[123] K.K. Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), pp. 152-6.

Preventative Detention Act, life for all Ghanaians opposed to the CPP was increasingly precarious. However, the effect of exile on individuals was clearly affected by their status, and for ordinary Ghanaians, distant relocation was often impossible. Most lacked the funds needed for inter-continental migration and were also keen to remain close to family and community. Togo, Ghana's eastern neighbour, therefore became a significant hub for exiles across the social spectrum. Togo offered shared cultural sensibilities and could be reached relatively easily and cheaply. By 1961, over 5,700 Ghanaians were living in Togo to escape arrest, while others were based in Côte d'Ivoire to the west. These populations formed a key part of the networks with which Gbedemah and Busia variously interacted.[124]

The flight of ordinary Ghanaians to Togo has been analysed by Kate Skinner, who explores the secessionist movement which sought to reunify Togoland, a territory occupied by the Ewe community but divided by the Ghana-Togo border. She documents the experience of eight men from the eastern Ghanaian villages of Dzolo-Dzave and Dzolo-Kpuita, who fled in March 1960. Their flight was a response to a police 'request' to be interviewed regarding allegations of a secessionist conspiracy. Since their fellow activist Moses Kofi Asase had been arrested just two days earlier, these men decided that flight was preferable to the likelihood of detention under the PDA. Notably, before they left, they posed together for a formal photograph dressed in *kente*, a cloth of high cultural value and often associated with chiefdom, only worn on significant occasions.[125] In this photograph, they held a sign which explicitly stated their reason for fleeing.[126] They clearly regarded this as a watershed and wanted the photo to serve as a record, or even memorial, of themselves in Ghana.

This group-based exodus from a rural region distant from Accra not only emphasises the extent to which those who fled were not solely political elites, but also underlines that the experience of exile was often collective rather than individual. While senior politicians such as Busia and Gbedemah have left the largest imprint in both official records and subsequent historiography, their globetrotting, individualistic trajectories were not typical of the wider exile experience. Those who fled were often connected

[124] Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom*, pp. 174-175.
[125] A.A. Mills, 'Nkrumah, Kente, and African Philosophy: Socio-Political Thought and Development in Ghana', Howard University M.A., 2009, p.11.
[126] Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom,* p. 178.

politically, emotionally, and practically, not only to each other but also to those they left behind. This connectivity is also reflected in their subsequent settlement patterns: Ghanaians were noted for residing *en masse* in specific Togolese towns, such as Kpalimé and Lomé. Comradery and collective action were key aspects of exile for many political activists, challenging the notion that it was conventionally a solitary experience.

In October 1961, an article in the Manchester *Guardian* contained a subdued description of the 'Forlorn Plotters' who had taken refuge in Lomé. It painted a rather pathetic picture of exile efforts to plot Nkrumah's overthrow, 'conducted from a shack in the back streets of this straggling little town, without funds, without organisation, and without help'.[127] In November 1961, British officials were monitoring the movements of this group, even reporting on some of their meetings in Lomé. Busia was allegedly present and spoke to five UP members, alongside some trade union leaders who had escaped a spate of arrests in Ghana the previous month. For now, they were not considered an imminent threat to Nkrumah, but this was the calm before the storm. One observer commented presciently that 'Lomé may become the centre of the only formidable opposition to President Nkrumah's Government'.[128]

Invitations to Return

By January 1962, Nkrumah was becoming aware of the extent to which this wider pattern of exile was a political problem. He told cabinet colleagues of 'reports reaching him' identifying large numbers of Ghanaians who 'for one reason or another, have fled to Togoland and other neighbouring countries and would be glad to return home'. The Cabinet therefore issued a statement 'inviting' these individuals to return. While not an explicit amnesty (the government referred to them as ''so-called' refugees') it was nonetheless a public acknowledgement of the large number of Ghanaians residing in Togo and elsewhere, having fled their country of origin[129]

At the end of May 1962, Nkrumah similarly asked Gbedemah to return to Ghana and seek 'reconciliation'. While some observers thought this reflected Nkrumah's

[127] David Holden, 'Exiles seek foreign support against Dr Nkrumah: Forlorn plotters in Togo haven', *Guardian,* 30 October 1961.
[128] TNA, DO/195/50, 'Ghanaian Opposition', approx. 2 November 1961.
[129] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/13/1/31, Cabinet Minutes, 26 January 1962.

isolation and gradual recognition that his cabinet lacked meaningful financial competence, others thought it was a trap. Either way, it showed a growing awareness of the significance of prominent Ghanaians outside of Ghana's borders, and the danger that exiled opposition could pose. The head of Ghana's counterintelligence, Anthony Deku, had recently visited London hoping to trace Gbedemah. Nkrumah was undoubtedly curious to know Gbedemah's location and hoped to hamper any 'clandestine activity'.[130]

During the summer of 1962, Gbedemah was mostly based in Zürich and Hamburg, seeking further funds from Tempelsman and other private commercial backers. Clearly the offer of return was enticing, as on 9 June, the text of 'reconciliation' letters that would have been exchanged with Nkrumah and published to facilitate his return and rehabilitation were being negotiated over the phone from Zurich.[131] However, Gbedemah's suspicion that this was simply an invitation to occupy a Ghanaian prison cell eventually won out. Instead of returning, Gbedemah continued to agitate from exile, meeting again with Busia in July, agreeing to wait for mounting economic problems in Ghana to crush Nkrumah.[132]

Conclusion

Prior to assuming power in Ghana, Nkrumah had significant experience of rubbing shoulders with diverse anti-colonial and dissenting activists in British and American transnational networks. That he seemingly underestimated the potential threat posed by external subversives early in his leadership is therefore surprising. Nevertheless, Nkrumah encouraged the externalisation of dissent not only through his imposition of the PDA, but also through the deportation of various political activists, a process which became a reoccurring issue in cabinet minutes of the period.[133] While Nkrumah did begin to reshape his security apparatus to deal with this externalised dissent, he had nonetheless engendered a pattern of exile opposition which would continue to vex his time in power.

[130] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/5-3062, Accra to SoS, 30 May 1962.
[131] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/7-562, Lome to SoS 6 July 1962.
[132] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/7-2562, Bruce London to SoS 25 July 1962.
[133] See for example, PRAAD-Accra, ADM13/1/28, CC.31(59), Cabinet Minutes, 7 July 1959, item V, 'Deportation of Ali Moshie'.

Insofar as the political activities of exiles during this period have been addressed, they have often been viewed through a bi-polar Cold War lens, not least by Nkrumah himself. Personally impacted by events in the Congo, he was inclined to see Western meddling everywhere. But even at this early stage, this Nkrumahist narrative was a distortion. The activities of Ghanaian exiles were driven primarily by their own political agendas, rather than being an extension of the schemes of Cold War governments. Furthermore, Ghanaian exiles such as Busia were taking advantage of a distinctly multipolar global landscape, cooperating more frequently with regional powers such as Togo and Côte d'Ivoire, or with France in a more intricate set of diplomatic dynamics.

This complex landscape was also one where exiles gained support from a range of non-state global networks, utilising personal connections and professional backgrounds to secure both personal financial security and political funding. Busia survived his first precarious year in exile because of a nebula of academic allies, moving between universities in Mexico, the Netherlands, and Britain. Gbedemah, in contrast, drew most of his apparent financial support from European trading consortia and private figures. Further emphasising the importance of connectivity in exile, Busia's concern for his family who shared his exile was both personally stressful and practically challenging, as he struggled to reconcile his political resolutions with his familial obligations.

Over the course of this period, Nkrumah had become increasingly aware of the potential threat posed by exiles and had tentatively begun to seek way of reducing their numbers by enticing externalised Ghanaians back home. However, as the next chapter shows, events in August 1962 would see Nkrumah's burgeoning concerns over exile dynamics reach new and unanticipated heights.

Chapter 4

The Grit in the Oyster: Exile and the Reshaping of Nkrumah's Government, 1962-66

Introduction

As the previous chapter illustrated, President Nkrumah was not initially significantly concerned by the threat posed by exiles. He even encouraged the departure of opponents and actively deported political actors with disputable Ghanaian citizenship.[1] However, rather than removing the problem of opposition, this approach simply displaced it. While domestic opposition voices were suppressed, political exiles were, once outside Ghana's borders, free to organise and criticise beyond the state's surveillance capabilities. Political exiles commonly exist outside of a national government's immediate spatial control, creating an elusive challenge that is difficult for the ruling elite to accurately assess.[2] Edward Soja suggests that such exiles undermine a government's 'spatial identity', engendering 'government hypochondria' as ideas of external subversion, beyond the reach of the state's coercive apparatus, are variously imagined.[3] Nkrumah's awareness of the particular threat posed by exiles grew with the intensification of the global Cold War, and by November 1961, Nkrumah was warning western countries against 'giving aid to "subversive" Ghanaian elements' abroad.[4]

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[1] 'Deportation of Bankole Timothy-PM Replies to the press,' *Daily Graphic*, 5 August 1957; Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine,* p. 188.
[2] Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-state* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), pp. 146, 161.
[3] Edward Soja, 'The Political Organization of Space' Paper 8, Washington: Commission on College Geography, 1971, pp.33-34, cited in C.P. Gasarasi, 'The effect of Africa's exiles/refugees upon inter-African state relations: conflict and cooperation--1958-1988', DPhil, Oxford University, 1988, p. 25.
[4] TNA, DO/195/50, Reuters report, 10 November 1961.

However, it was the Kulungugu bombing of August 1962 which crystallized for Nkrumah the danger of exile machinations and thus marked a turning point in his government's approach to dissent abroad. The investigations, legal processes, and political fallout following the bombing were substantial. Court proceedings against those accused continued until 1965, and the political impact overshadowed Nkrumah's presidency until its end in February 1966. Most importantly, blame for the bombing was laid at the door of Ghanaian political exiles and their foreign collaborators, justifying Nkrumah's increasing authoritarianism and utilisation of oppressive and extra-judicial tactics.[5]

This thesis demonstrates that this perceived exile threat was central to this shift in the attitude of Nkrumah's government, crystallizing as it did Nkrumah's sense of direct threat to his person and presidency. The lack of control over or detailed foreknowledge of exile activities shaped Nkrumah's increasingly authoritarian and ideologically driven rule; however, it also provided a convenient basis to justify and reinforce his own power. Nkrumah strived to control the narrative surrounding exiled opposition even as effective control over exiles themselves remained frustratingly illusive. As will be demonstrated below, the unquantifiable nature of the exile threat helped Nkrumah create a sinister image of foreign-based, and perhaps foreign-backed, actors involved in subversive activities. This chapter will contrast this view with the actual, more complex trajectory of leading exiles like Gbedemah and Busia.

Nkrumah's government pursued the extradition of external critics and utilised various extra-judicial tactics in an attempt to quash external dissent, significantly impacting the lives of Ghanaian exiles across the globe. However, while some exiles did fall foul of Nkrumah's increasing hostility, many adapted quickly and continued their agitation in the face of significant personal risk. Furthermore, the impact of exile and the increasingly hostile state response did not only affect exiles themselves. Foreign governments who were hosting exiles were forced to adapt to this altered diplomatic landscape, generating significant discussion and new policies relating to refugee status,

[5] Thompson has argued that the Kulungugu bombing was 'the primary cause of dislocation' in Nkrumah's administration and was a turning point in his implementation of foreign and domestic policy: Willard Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy Ideology, and the New State*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 269; see also Matteo Grilli, African liberation and unity in Nkrumah's Ghana: a study of the role of "PanAfrican Institutions" in the making of Ghana's foreign policy, 1957 – 1966, Ph.D., Leiden University, 2015-11-03, p. 195.

extradition, and the preservation of diplomatic relations. In this way, exile became the grit in the oyster of foreign relations, disrupting diplomatic interactions between exiles' home and host nations and forcing governments to generate new approaches to deal with their very existence.

The Kulungugu Bombing

On 1st August 1962, Nkrumah travelled by road to Upper Volta to sign trade agreements with its President Yameogo. On his return he toured some northern Ghana border towns, including Kulungugu. Here a local schoolgirl was to present him with a bouquet of flowers, but as Nkrumah stepped out of the car a grenade was thrown. Four people died, including two policemen, and fifty people were injured.[6] Nkrumah was taken to a nearby hospital at Bawku where he was treated for shrapnel wounds by German doctors. News of his injury was suppressed, but these same medics were intrigued to observe how Nkrumah carefully managed a media narrative of invincibility from his hospital bed.[7] Later, in a masterly radio speech, Nkrumah sympathised with the wounded, adding: 'The scars on their bodies shall serve to remind them for life of the monster that is imperialism and colonialism and the glory of sharing in the dangers of Africa's revolution and emancipation'.[8]

The Kulungugu bombing deeply affected Nkrumah. He often described the events of the day in detail; how close the bomb fell; the injured schoolgirl; how people fell on all sides. For one American visitor, he even rolled up his trousers to display a 'quite severe gash between the knees and ankles'.[9] The bombing would be similarly transformational for Nkrumah's presidency, both in terms of the event itself and the new era of instability and violence it heralded. It was followed by a second bombing outside his house in September and two further attacks elsewhere in Accra. Fifteen people were killed and

[6] George Padmore Research Library (GPRL), Accra, BAA.998, 'Nkrumah Escapes Death - Four Killed in Bomb Explosion', *Nigerian Morning Post*, 3 August 1962.
[7] Landricina, *Nkrumah*, pp. 76-77, 312-4.
[8] 'Our nation stands united - death can never extinguish the flame which I have lit,' *Ghana Times*, 15 August 1962.
[9] JFKL, NSF, Bruebeck files, Box.384, Ghana 9/62-11/62, 'A Report, Comments and Observations of Trip to Ghana, Sept 18-23, 1962, by Chad F. Calhoun', p. 18.

256 people were injured in these events, prompting Nkrumah to declare a state of emergency.[10]

These nearly successful assassination attempts occurred after a period of relative calm, throwing them into sharper relief. Ghanaian officials surrounding Nkrumah told American diplomats of his increasing emotional volatility, and by autumn 1962 some in Nkrumah's immediate circle worried that he was 'exhausted, harassed, distracted, and did not seem fully to grasp what was going on'.[11] Nkrumah withdrew substantially from public life, but still felt unsafe. Threatening letters were found throughout Flagstaff House, even on Nkrumah's bed, table and desk, declaring: 'Whatever you do, you can be certain that we shall kill you before the end of the year'. Unable to identify the source, Nkrumah even began to suspect his closest assistants, including the his long-serving Private Secretary Erica Powell.[12] While Ghanaian Special Branch eventually concluded that this was a campaign of destabilisation run by lower-level staff, it nevertheless appears to have been effective, as the US Embassy continued to receive reports from Nkrumah's residential staff that he checked on his Special Branch squad hourly and remained 'very jittery'.[13]

In neighbouring Togo, President Olympio reported that Nkrumah was 'infuriated' by his inability to find the perpetrators and was 'striking out blindly in all directions against his own minsters and friendly countries'. Togo's interior minister, Theodore Mally, advised American diplomats not to worry about the resulting instability: matters would be settled soon 'by the disappearance of Nkrumah from the political scene'. Mally explained that 'Ghana will take care of him'.[14] Sure enough, on 8 January 1963, yet another bomb at a CPP rally in Accra caused 128 injuries and five deaths – and further attacks and plots followed in 1964 and 1965.[15]

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[10] Rabinowitz, *Coups, Rivals and the Modern State,* pp. 118-29.

[11] JFKL, NSF, Box.100, File.Ghana/GENERAL. 9/62, Accra to SoS, 21 September 1962. The main source of this information was 'Mr Abbey', a senior Ghanaian Special Branch official who was briefing both Reuters and US Foreign Service officers.

[12] Erica Powell detailed her experience in her memoir: *Private Secretary (Female)/Gold Coast*, (New York: St Martin's, 1984).

[13] NARA-RG59, 745j.5/11-1662, Edmondson to DoS, 8 November 1962. Another source on Nkrumah's anxiety seems to have been Dr Amon Nikoi at the IMF who was married to the diplomat Gloria Nikoi. They often returned to Ghana and moved in inner circles, see Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL), National Security Files (NSF), Files of Ed Hamilton, Box.2, Haynes memo. 14 April 1965.

[14] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/9-2262, Lomé to SoS, 22 September 1962.

[15] NARA-RG59, 745g.00/1-1163, Accra to SoS, 12 January 1963.

The Blame for Kulungugu

In the days after the Kulungugu bombing, international messages of support for Nkrumah flooded in from many leaders, including Queen Elizabeth II and Nikita Khrushchev.[16] Meanwhile, on the streets of Accra, crowds protested this outrage. Marchers carried placards bearing slogans such as 'Bomb or No Bomb - Nkrumah Never Dies'. The Regional Commissioner for Tamale, Mumuni Bawumia, echoed this sentiment, telling the assembled crowds that 'Nkrumah is immortal'.[17] The public depiction of Nkrumah as having God-like attributes was designed to assert the longevity and stability of the regime. However, in private, it was accompanied by a panicked security response, with over fifty people detained on the day of the bombing itself. More arrests followed and many suspects fled into exile only hours ahead of the police.[18]

From the outset, exiles and 'neo-colonial' forces were consistently blamed for the bombing. The CPP headquarters trumpeted: 'Down with the cowardly plotters. Down with colonialist stooges. Forward with the party, forward with African Independence and unity'.[19] While Nkrumah controlled this broad narrative, Gerits has argued that Nkrumah's new Bureau of African Affairs director, AK Barden, treated Kulungugu as an opportunity to 'strengthen the independent position of Ghana in African Affairs', by emphasising the threat posed by neo-colonialist forces. [20] Nkrumah had ordered Barden to orchestrate the protests against the bombings and their particular messages. Barden then ensured international press coverage of these protests by asking every Bureau staff member to write an eye-catching slogan about the demonstration as a press release. These slogans were designed to be picked up by the international media, shaping coverage of the bombing by focusing attention on the protests. Moreover, while the government press reported crowds of 20,000 protesters, the reality was significantly more modest.[21]

[16] GPRL, BAA.998, 'This is a Villainous Attempt - Says Khrushchev', *Ghanaian Times*, 4 August 1962.
[17] Ibid., 'Nation Calls for Action', *Ghanaian Times*, 4 August 1962.
[18] Ibid., Accra Reuters extract.33, 4 August 1962.
[19] Ibid., 'Accra Bomb Bid Shocks Ghana', *Daily Graphic,* 3 August 1962.
[20] Frank Gerits, 'When the Bull Elephants Fight': Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957–66), *International History Review*, Vol.37, No.5 (2015), pp. 961-62.
[21] Ibid.

On 12 August 1963, the year-long investigation into Kulungugu resulted in five convictions for conspiracy to commit treason. It also pointed to the involvement of the UP in exile headquartered in Lomé, the capital of Togo.[22] A long roster of exiled activists were named in the trial as participants in the bombing, official newspapers reporting that not only had '[a]ll the accused persons…made statements admitting complicity in the offences…' but that '[f]rom these statements emerges a clear and comprehensive picture of the conspiracy to overthrow the government.'[23] The veracity of these confessions was dubious, as the accused repeatedly attempted to withdraw statements they claimed had been extracted through beatings.[24] However, their accuracy is for our purposes less important than the way in which the government shaped the public narrative of the bombing. The initial conspiracy was said to have originated in Ghana in 1961, in the house of Obetsebi Lamptey, one of the famous 'Big Six' founders of the UGCC. But soon after this, Lamptey moved his base of operations to Togo, where he would host meetings of the self-styled 'United Party in Exile'. [25]

Adotei Addo, one of the five accused of carrying out the bombing, 'confessed' and named many UP activists attending these meetings, including Kow Richardson, Yaw Manu, Adam Amandi, and Amponsah Dadzie. However, the presence of two rather more renowned – and ostensibly ideologically opposed - exile figures was also claimed: Busia and Gbedemah.[26] Busia and Gbedemah were both commonly cited as dangerous subversives, the *Ghana Times* stating for example that Busia was 'almost invariably involved' in such plots.[27] As we have seen (Chapter 3), Busia and Gbedemah were indeed both frequent visitors to Togo and Ivory Coast in 1961-62. Moreover, they were collaborating despite their political differences. Nkrumah had himself publicly stated that they were working together, marking a new development in the official exile subversion narrative. In this way, the Kulungugu treason trial reveals the extent to which domestic Ghanaian politics had become transnational, with external elements playing a central

[22] GPRL, BAA.999, 'The accused persons stand before you charged with offence connected with the most serious crime against the State known to the law, namely TREASON', *Evening News*, 15 March 1963.
[23] Ibid.
[24] 'It is not the duty of the State to assign counsel to persons accused of plotting against the State-Chief Justice', *Evening News*, 16 March 1963.
[25] GPRL, BAA.999, 'The accused persons stand before you charged with offence connected with the most serious crime against the State known to the law, namely TREASON', *Evening News*, 15 March 1963.
[26] Ibid.
[27] 'Treason Trial- Twelve jury-men sworn in', *Ghana Times*, 6 October 1964.

role. Public suspicion had been directed towards two exile figures, characterised as masterminds encouraging Western intervention in independent Ghana.

The Image of Busia and Gbedemah

The portrayal in the Ghanaian press of this apparent cooperation between these ideologically divided opponents of Nkrumah clearly illustrates the looming presence of exile in the political imagination of Ghana. Testimony in the treason trial explained the involvement of named prominent UP activists. However, the alleged participation of ex-CPP minister Gbedemah was a new development in the dominant narratives concerning exile politics in both Ghana and the West. In fact, in a *Guardian* (UK) article published a year earlier, it was claimed that Gbedemah had made 'no attempt to get in touch with the Lomé exiles'. He was instead presented as a lone figure who was heading to the United States to amass riches.[28] This reflects a more general trend within western media reporting, which consistently underestimated the connectivity of exiles and their continued political aspirations, in contrast to the Ghanaian media which steadily increased its emphasis on the insidious subversive nature of these exile networks.

In 1963, Adotei Addo's court testimony placed Busia and Gbedemah together at multiple high-level meetings of the UP in Exile in Lomé.[29] While the veracity of this testimony is difficult to establish, especially in relation to Kulungugu, Busia and Gbedemah did cooperate during this period. Decades later, Gbedemah himself described this episode of collaboration with Busia as a 'strange story,' acknowledging the improbability of their alliance, given their political differences.[30] However, the two men found common ground in their shared experience of persecution. Exile left them with a shared resentment of Nkrumah as the author of their lost political prestige and position, which also removed their ability to affect the political direction of Ghana through conventional political channels. Gbedemah recalled in 1979 that he and Busia 'got

[28] David Holden, Exiles seek foreign support against Dr Nkrumah: Forlorn plotters in Togo haven, *The Guardian,* 30 October 1961, p. 9.
[29] Coverage is patchy on this point, moving between actual sightings of Gbedemah in Lomé, to sightings of 'a man' sent by Gbedemah in other newspaper reports. GPRL, BAA.999, 'The accused persons stand before you charged with offence connected with the most serious crime against the State known to the law, namely TREASON', Evening News, 15 March 1963. Ibid, Adamafio was in Link with UP men, *Ghana Times*, 23 March 1963.
[30] 'K.A. Gbedema's [sic] Message to the Nation on Election Eve 1979', *Daily Graphic,* 14 June 1979, p. 10.

together in exile and made plans for when we could return home to work as one team for our country's good,' based on their shared resolve to fix the perceived mistakes of the Nkrumah government.[31] In this way, exile not only created connections through their mutual alienation but also changed their perspective – shaped by gazing from the outside into the domestic politics of Ghana. Their experience of exile allowed them to contemplate the establishment of a joint political party in Ghana, should Nkrumah be overthrown.[32]

The Kulungugu bombing trial was equally a turning point in the Ghanaian media framing of these two prominent figures; they were now presented as exiled partners in crime, creating the ultimate 'bogeymen' in the popular imagination. Most striking was the state-sponsored *Daily Graphic*'s evocation of an alternative malevolent future in which the Kulungugu plotters had prevailed: 'the plan was for Gbedemah and Busia to emerge as the new compromising leaders with Gbedemah as the senior partner in an unholy coalition of members of the United Party and Gbedemah's loyal associates'.[33] This illustrates how the state propaganda machine now imagined exile as a diabolic space from which existential threats to the regime were emerging. Given the importance of religious imagery in Ghanaian politics, the use of the word 'unholy' underlines the way in which this connection was presented as almost profane, or a reversal of the natural order.

Pamphlet Wars and the Battle for Public Opinion

Because Nkrumah and his exiled opponents could not engage with each other directly, the nature of their opposition unfolded in public. Exiled politicians were keen to maintain their domestic profile despite their physical distance, and the Ghanaian government in turn sought to publicly vilify and undermine these figures of dissent. Consequently, an energetic war of pamphlets took place between exiled politicians and the Ghanaian government. Journalist Razak El-Alawa recalls this dynamic vividly, stating that exiles like Busia and Gbedemah were 'smuggling in materials to their people here, but Nkrumah did everything possible to silence them.'[34] These set-piece productions were as elaborate as they were vituperative. In October 1962, Dr Marguerite Cartwright, a black American

[31] 'K.A. Gbedema's [sic] Message', *Daily Graphic.*
[32] Asamoah, *The Political History of Ghana,* pp. 51, 286.
[33] GPRL, BAA.440, Accra 'Gbedemah Headed Plot Against the Nation,' *Daily Graphic*, 20 November 1964.
[34] Razak El-Alawa Interview, 4 April 2019.

journalist with extensive contacts among Africans at the UN, explained that she had unexpectedly received 2,000 copies of a vitriolic pamphlet which had been penned by Gbedemah in August attacking Ghana's 'failed' socialism, entitled: 'It will not be a "work of happiness for all."' Cartwright added that as a friend of Nkrumah she was embarrassed and did not know what to do with them.[35] The Bureau of African Affairs claimed that Togo's commissioner of police was operating under Gbedemah's orders and personally oversaw the transportation of these propaganda leaflets to the border, but a significant number of them were apparently air-mailed from Zurich.[36]

In December 1962, Gbedemah revealed his latest plans to his amazed American confidants. He was now ready to distribute in Ghana a new pamphlet he had printed in Germany. This documented the financial disaster that Gbedemah believed Nkrumah was pushing Ghana towards. It also dwelt on Nkrumah's 'chicanery' and lust for absolute power. It alleged that Nkrumah had secretly murdered some of his cabinet colleagues, specifically Adamafio, Cofie-Crabbe and Ako Adjei, when they had in fact been imprisoned. Gbedemah believed that the pamphlet would either trigger a mass rising or perhaps cause Nkrumah to commit suicide. His US diplomatic interlocutors dismissed him as an idiot with too much money.[37] Busia, in contrast, was concentrating his efforts on a series of press conferences in London, of which Gbedemah was no less dismissive.[38]

The Ghanaian authorities regularly responded with their own propaganda materials, designed to project their message beyond Ghana's borders. Nkrumah's government ultimately issued a 28-page special pamphlet entitled: 'The truth about Komla Gbedemah' in both English and French.[39] Although the pamphlet is anonymous it is unlikely to have been issued without Nkrumah's explicit approval. It accused Gbedemah of planning the 1961 strike, the Kulungugu bombing and subsequent bombings in Accra. What is most striking are its personalised descriptions of how

[35] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/102262, UN mission to SoS, 22 October 1962. 'It will not be "Work and Happiness for All"!' An Open Letter, being also an appeal to Dr Kwame Nkrumah and comment on, and criticism of the proposed new 7-year Development Plan, ibid. K.A. Gbedemah (Ghana's Former Finance Minister) 29 September 1962.
[36] 'Togo a base for bomb crimes', *Ghanaian Times*, 24 December 1962.
[37] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/10-162, Lomé to SoS, 14 December 1962.
[38] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/10-162, Lomé to SoS, 14 December 1962.
[39] 'The Truth About Komla Gbedemah', undated. This seems to have been widely distributed since multiple copies of this pamphlet are extant in various archives, e.g. Tulane University, Amistad Research Center, American Committee on Africa records addendum (012-1), Research, 1949-1997, Countries, 1949, 1961-1989, Box.299, Ghana, 1953-86.

Gbedemah's 'sweet smile' would slip, to reveal his 'cunning and treachery, evil and contempt…' Similarly vivid language was applied to political exiles in general, with the claim: 'Once they are exposed, they flee abroad, where they throw off the mask: they send agents to their country, hatch plots, and commit other acts of terrorism.' Even more ominous was the ideological challenge that such individuals posed once abroad. The pamphlet states: 'A man's head is not a pawpaw fruit. One cannot break it to see the thoughts inside it.'[40] The emphasis in this imagery is on the unknowable thoughts of these individuals. Their plans and actions are presented as inscrutable, a shadowy threat that was all the more dangerous because of its unknowability. The global space of exile was conceptualised as Machiavellian, transnational, and ultimately unquantifiable.

The Ghanaian press elaborated on such representations in new and colourful ways. These included the assertion that the CIA had a hold on Gbedemah because it had kidnapped his mistress and taken her to Liberia. The now government-controlled *Daily Graphic* soberly informed its readers that this was the 'totality of the indisputable truth about the man'.[41] Gbedemah's supporters privately warned US officials that if Nkrumah did not repudiate this story, they would release a mass of new information about the president revealing his '[p]romiscuous sex life, shady business deals, the government's clandestine support for "rebels and so-called revolutionists", extortion and black magic practices.' [42] It is uncertain how much effect such pamphlets, rebuttals, and media stories had on the Ghanaian public's opinion of exiled figures, and US diplomatic observers were notably sceptical about their influence. These pamphlet debates nonetheless reveal the extent to which exiled political leaders were able to retain a domestic presence by such means, and they were certainly important enough to be continually addressed and attacked in the government press. While exiled political figures may have been physically distant from Ghana, they thus remained in the public consciousness.

Ghanaian exiles were also increasingly enmeshed in the wider Cold War battle of words that framed much political conflict in post-colonial Africa. In 1963, Kofi Baako, leader of Ghana's parliament, responded to the latest wave of clandestine opposition leaflets flooding into Accra, which falsely asserted that 300 Ghanaian soldiers were being

[40] 'The Truth About Komla Gbedemah'.
[41] NARA-RG59, POL.23-9, Ghana, Rebellion/coups, Accra to SoS, 10 December 1964, Accra.17, 12-10-64.
[42] Ibid.

trained in Cuba. Baako stated: 'Dr Busia, Gbedemah and their self-exiled friends in Lomé manufactured this big lie about Ghana, hoping they might gain financial and other support for their nefarious anti-African activities'. He went on to attack their appearance before the US Senate, where they had given lengthy joint testimony criticising Nkrumah's authoritarianism.[43] This appearance meant that Busia and Gbedemah were increasingly characterised as puppets of US influence rather than domestic political opponents.

The political battleground for both exiles and governments expanded considerably via their respective engagement with non-governmental organisations and associations. Universities, campaign groups, and NGOs became resources which exiles, and their rival governments, could utilise to fight proxy wars in a global context. Busia was already personally connected with the British university system through his position at St Antony's College in Oxford, but he was also busily directing the West London-based Ghana Students' Association (GSA). This group, composed of UK-based Ghanaian students with UP sympathies, competed vigorously with the pro-government Ghana Students Union (GSU), based in central London.[44] GSA membership was personally and politically dangerous, as outspoken opposition to the CPP could carry significant consequences even when conducted outside of Ghana. In an address to the GSA in 1964, Busia stated that 'people like you…are at the risk of forfeiting your scholarships, and being hunted and spied upon.'[45] Other international bodies were drawn into this conflict, including the London-based Committee of African Organisations, which represented around forty African political parties and student organisations. In 1961 it condemned what it perceived as Busia's attempts to create 'reactionary groups of African stooges to oppose the constitutional government of Ghana.'[46] While British officials felt this statement was rooted less in support for Nkrumah and more in a rejection of supposed 'imperialist plotting' in Africa and Busia's alleged connections with western 'neo-colonial' forces, it nevertheless demonstrates the way in which exile dynamics had taken Ghanaian domestic politics into a variety of international spaces. [47]

[43] NARA-RG59, 745j.5/1-363, Accra to SoS, 3 January 1963.
[44] NARA-RG59, POL.29 arrests/detentions, Dakar to SoS, 21 March 1965.
[45] Kofi Abrefa Busia, "Reflections On One-Party Government in Ghana", Speech given at Delegates Conference of the Ghana Students' Association of Britain and Ireland, London, 29 February 1964, http://home.koranteng.com/writings/reflections-one-party-rule.html
[46] TNA, DO/195/50, African Opposition to Dr Busia- Appeal for Boycott, CRO to Accra, 4 November 1961.
[47] Ibid.

Fear and Global Cold War Relations

By the time of the Kulungugu attack, Nkrumah's worldview had already been shaken by the violent death of his friend Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.[48] This was compounded by the untimely deaths of several other global figures over the following two years. 1961 saw the murder of Rafael Trujillo, ruler of the Dominican Republic, and the mysterious death of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations. In August 1962 a serious attempt had been made on the life of General de Gaulle of France, while November 1963 witnessed the death post-coup of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam. A month later, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. During this period, leaders all around the world, including Nkrumah, anxiously revised their security procedures and radically reduced their public visibility.

President Kennedy had been one of the few threads still tying Nkrumah to the West. His interest in and support for moderate African nationalism was noteworthy during his senatorial career, and his presidency generated hope among many African leaders for a more sympathetic American foreign policy towards independent Africa. In 1961 Nkrumah became the first African premier to visit the White House following Kennedy's election. Characterising nascent African states as the 'sleeping giant' within the landscape of the Cold War, Kennedy declared his commitment to aid and persuade African nations to trust and align themselves with the West, underwritten by the continued funding of the Volta Dam Project in Ghana, one of the key achievements of Nkrumah's time in office.[49] Two weeks after Kennedy's death, Barbara Ward, one of Nkrumah's economic advisors, visited him in his office. On his desk was a picture of the Kennedy family that he had received as a present from Jacqueline Kennedy. With tears in his eyes Nkrumah said, 'I have written her, and I have prayed for them both. Nothing shocked me so deeply as this.' [50]

However, beneath these expressions of sympathy there was increasing tension and suspicion developing between the US and Ghanaian governments. In the months

[48] The most authoritative account is De Witte*, The Assassination of Lumumba*. For a reinterpretation of the Nkrumah-Lumumba relationship see Sergey Mazov, 'A fragile alliance: the Congo crisis and Soviet-Ghanaian relations 1960-61,' *Twentieth Century Communism,* Vol.15, No.15 (2018): 11-34.
[49] On Kennedy and African leaders see P.E. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[50] Ibid, p. 229.

following the assassination, Chad Calhoun, the deputy at the US embassy, wrote a hand-delivered letter to Nkrumah assuring him of America's 'deep concern' about his 'personal safety, welfare and well-being'.[51] Nkrumah's reply, illustrative of a breakdown in trust, claimed that he had discerned a divergence between the positions of the State Department and the CIA, which 'is doing much harm to the image of the United States in Africa and elsewhere'. 'Very often', he added, 'the Embassy does not know what the CIA is doing and would disapprove of it if it did,' inferring that Nkrumah believed parts of the US government were undermining his leadership.[52] Calhoun's response to these concerns was to warn Nkrumah that the Eastern Bloc was trying to exploit and misrepresent various security incidents to create panic.

In this regard, there is evidence of Eastern Bloc document forgeries which seem to have influenced Ghana's leadership. In the 1960s, the British government often wrote to Nkrumah in detail about these documents, a typical example being a letter relating to British sympathies for South African Apartheid that they insisted was a Soviet smear.[53] However, this indignant refutation by British officials of Soviet propaganda was somewhat undermined by the fact that Ghana was equally a prime target for Britain's Information Research Department (IRD), a propaganda unit that planted anti-Soviet stories in the Ghanaian press.[54] While it is difficult to ascertain the IRD's effectiveness in influencing wider Ghanaian opinion, this British-produced anti-Soviet propaganda material did appear in a wide variety of outlets, including the *Legon Observer*, the university newspaper.[55] Clumsy propaganda tactics on both sides of the Cold War divide did little to improve trust.

1964 saw a deepening of the rift between Nkrumah and the West. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, focused on Vietnam and was less engaged with the needs of Africa. This shift is encapsulated Johnson's comment during a discussion with Averell Harriman concerning Ghana, during which he reportedly asked, "Tell me, Av, what's the

[51] Landricina, *Nkrumah*, p. 239.
[52] Ibid, pp. 239-40. See also NARA, 745j.11/1-863 Accra to Department of State, 8 January 1963.
[53] PRAAD-Accra, RG 17/1/74, Cabinet secretariat to Nkrumah, 29 July 1960. See also NARA-RG59, 745j.00/1-2062, Engle Accra to SoS, 4 January 1962.
[54] For more information on the IRD, see Rory Cormac, 'British "Black" Productions: Forgeries, Front Groups, and Propaganda, 1951-1977', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, No.24, Vol.3 (2021): 4-42.
[55] See for example TNA, FCO/168/6473.

goddam name of that place?"[56] The decline in American support and sympathy was detected by Nkrumah and many other African leaders, weakening trust. Towards the end of his presidency, Nkrumah believed that Johnson was working with exile figures to remove him, and they exchanged remarkably frank letters on the subject.[57] Nkrumah was especially upset that both Busia and Gbedemah had been allowed to appear before Congressional committees and attack him at length, claiming that afterwards one Los Angeles newspaper had 'recommended assassination'.[58]

Monitoring Exiles

Vulnerability and precarity are arguably inherent to the experience of political exile and were certainly characteristics of the Ghanaian exile experience during this period. Many exiles kept a low public profile as a result, which led some to completely disconnect from the realities and concerns of their home nation. The theme of self-preservation has been explored by historian Paul Nugent in the context of the Ghana-Togo border.[59] However, despite the risk arising from Nkrumah's increasing anxiety over assassination and the exile threat, a significant proportion of exiles continued to agitate from abroad. This often involved substantial international travel, something which resulted in them being closely monitored by the security forces of various interested states due to the potentially destabilising effect of their activities. Prominent exiles such as Gbedemah and Busia were consistently tracked by British authorities, to the extent that when in November 1963 a senior diplomat confessed that currently he did 'not know Dr Busia's exact movements', this was unusual enough to be remarked upon.[60]

This level of surveillance endangered exiles. In 1963, when publicly discussing a recent tour of Africa and Latin America, Busia 'refused to say where he would go next because "he was being threatened."'[61] This active monitoring was especially hazardous

[56] G. Bender, J. Coleman and R. Sklar, *African Crisis Areas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 279.
[57] LBJL, NSF, Special Heads of State Correspondence, Box.19, Nkrumah to Johnson, 26 February 1964; Ibid., Johnson to Nkrumah, 11 March 1964.
[58] Ibid. See also LBJL, NSF, Country File-Africa: Gambia Gabon-Ghana, Box.89, Mahoney to SoS, 2 March 1964.
[59] Paul Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists, and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo frontier: the life of the borderlands since 1914* (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), pp. 215-16.
[60] TNA, DO/195/50, Wenban-Smith to Martin, 6 November 1963.
[61] TNA, DO/195/50, 'Oppression' by Dr Nkrumah', *Daily Telegraph*, 1963.

to Busia given the precarity of his status as a 'protected refugee' of Britain. In 1963, a UK Foreign Office official reviewed its guidance regarding Ghanaian 'refugees.' 'Dr Busia does not, to my mind, fall into that category', he concluded, a judgement that had the potential to render him vulnerable to extradition requests from the Ghanaian authorities.[62] Although this was swiftly contradicted by another official, whose assertion that Busia was indeed covered by the guidelines was accepted by the wider Foreign Office, this exchange illustrates the fragility of refugee status. Such a position involved an inherent liminality, with an exile's status perpetually on a knife's edge between safety and danger, legitimacy and illegitimacy.

High-profile exiles were therefore largely reliant on the favor of foreign governments for their welfare. Far from being guaranteed, it was necessary for such exiles to continually assert their credibility and present themselves as trustworthy to continue receiving such support. Gbedemah in particular struggled to maintain this governmental goodwill. In one incident, Gbedemah's contacts at the US embassy in London reported that he had arrived at Scotland Yard demanding protection from menacing secret agents of Ghana sent 'to silence him'. However, these American officials tempered their report with significant skepticism, claiming that in their opinion Gbedemah had 'grown into full enjoyment of his role of conspirator and is somewhat lost in playacting'. A year before, his US associates had warned him that his hopes to visit London 'incognito' were completely laughable. Likewise, the British authorities had warned Gbedemah directly that his 'covert entry into and exit from the UK, to which HMG heretofore closed its eyes, must now cease'.[63] Gbedemah had clearly lost the sympathy of these key Western governments, making his attempts to generate financial, political, or personal support increasingly difficult.

Extradition and Diplomatic Disruptions

Nonetheless, Nkrumah's own externalisation of dissent had generated a significant exilic population which he now struggled to control. Brought into sharp relief by events at Kulungugu, Nkrumah's response was to become increasingly authoritarian and more

[62] TNA, DO/195/50, Memorandum from RL to Martin, 9 November 1963.
[63] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/10-1162, London to SoS, 11 October 1962.

inclined towards extra-judicial tactics.[64] Exiles could in this context serve as convenient neo-colonial bogeymen, and the narrative around exile was shaped to legitimise an intensification of internal political control. However, while this approach had some short-term utility, it did not address the fundamental problem of exile and the threat these unquantifiable actors posed to the state.

Nkrumah therefore attempted to exert control over exile activity beyond Ghana's borders. He utilised extradition requests extensively, focusing on specific political exiles who he believed were maneuvering against him. Nkrumah publicly called on Togo to extradite Busia along with other Ghanaian exiles, reflecting his anxiety over perceived attempts to set up a government-in-exile in Lomé.[65] During this period, Ghana's Special Branch - a secret service rather than a police force – periodically attempted to kidnap Togo-based exiles.[66] These dramatic activities increased tensions between the two countries. On 7 December 1962, Nkrumah not only accused Togo of supporting the alleged conspiracy but also threatened military 'reprisals' if exiles were not extradited. Amid rising tensions, French paratroopers were mobilized in Dakar, while Nigeria offered private military guarantees to Togo. However, this growing diplomatic crisis was overtaken by the military coup in Togo, during which Olympio was assassinated. While the origins and planning of the coup are still debated, contemporaneous suspicions did include allegations of Ghanaian involvement, reflecting the rising tensions between the neighbouring governments.[67]

While less acute, exile dynamics and the possibility of extradition requests also undermined relations between Britain and Ghana, as well as triggering panicked reassessments of Britain's wider refugee policy. In 1963, the above debates over Busia's refugee status took place in the shadow of London's awareness 'that Busia may at any moment be sought by the Ghana Government.'[68] Busia's considerable international travel while a politically active UK-based exile made a potential request for his extradition the

[64] Thompson suggests Kulungugu was a turning point in Nkrumah's administration. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy,* p.269; see also Grilli, 'African liberation and unity in Nkrumah's Ghana', PhD, p.195.
[65] Gasarasi, 'The effect of Africa's exiles/refugees', pp. 198-9.
[66] E.D. Accquaah, 'Readers Letters- Son pleads for mother's release', *The New African* 1992, p.4; D.E. Apter, 'Ghana's independence: triumph and paradox', *Transition,* Vol.98, No.1 (2008), pp. 6-22.
[67] For a detailed exploration of the differing accounts of the 1963 Togolese coup, see Skinner, 'West Africa's First Coup', pp.375-398. TNA, FO/371/187853, Paris to London, 14 January 1963; Lomé to London, 11 January 1963.
[68] TNA, DO/195/50, Chadwick to McIndoe, 26 April 1963.

subject of intense concern. When he visited Washington in 1963, Britain consulted the State Department in advance to discover its likely response to such a request, receiving a 'somewhat cautious reply'. Busia's alleged crimes straddled the line between 'political' and 'criminal' offences, and it was therefore uncertain which treaty was relevant to his case. Moreover, as Ghana was a relatively newly independent country, the US was still assessing its international legal duties through the prism of the 1931 Extradition Treaty between Britain and the US.[69]

Similarly, when Busia displayed 'a marked interest in travel to the Republic of Ireland' in 1965, London again quietly sought clarification on its extradition policy. British officials established that the Fugitive Offenders Act had not been invoked by a Commonwealth nation since 1949, and it was in 'open doubt' whether it would still be valid under the new Irish Republican constitution.[70] The recent independence of many nations meant there was a lack of established precedent, both for the former imperial power and for the international community as a whole. This meant that potential responses to any extradition request were varied and unpredictable, so exile travel to a new country was a significant gamble. International law surrounding exile was consistently being remade, so even when ostensibly in a safe harbour, there was the possibility that the political manoeuvrings of a seemingly unrelated country could change the rules of the game. Exiles were as a result not only a constant irritant in international relations but could impact wider diplomatic relationships through their troubling presence.[71]

Despite its resolution to 'ostentatiously steer clear' of Busia in public, the British government gave him and other exiles significant private assistance to ensure their safety.[72] While Britain insisted that '[n]o British assistance has ever been given to either Dr Busia or to Dr Gbedemah', diplomats admitted that information about possible extradition was passed 'unattributably' to Busia, as well as warnings 'conveyed to Dr Busia by [UK] Special Branch when there were fears for his safety'.[73] While these two positions seem inconsistent, it appears that the unpalatable prospect of having to

[69] TNA, DO/195/50, Letter from duBoulay, Washington Embassy, 6 May 1963.
[70] TNA, DO/195/259, Wool-Lewis to Harrison, 17 February 1965.
[71] Ibid., Dealing with Ghanaian ex-Ministers in exile, c.18 February 1965.
[72] TNA, DO/195/50, Accra to CRO, 24 October 1961.
[73] TNA, DO/195/259, 'Dealing with Ghanaian ex-Ministers in exile', c.18 February 1965.

adjudicate extradition proceedings, and the potential firestorm of media criticism that might result, was enough to make certain risks worthwhile. It was also clear that if the Ghanaian government sought Busia's return under the Fugitive Offenders Act, the Home Office would refuse to comply, given Britain's long tradition of political sanctuary, and several recent instances in which the Ghanaian authorities had violated judicial principles such as the right to a defence council.[74] Avoiding the possible diplomatic furore which a rejected extradition request could generate was clearly assessed as worth the potential accusations of neo-colonialism.

In a context in which Nkrumah's desire to apprehend these exiles was common knowledge, individuals travelling between jurisdictions risked capture, even without an official extradition request being launched. In May 1963, Busia visited Uganda. Even while Britain and the US were privately discussing their responses to possible extradition requests, the president of Uganda, Milton Obote, took a more proactive approach. It quickly became clear that Busia was not welcome in Uganda. His planned press conference was swiftly cancelled by the Ugandan Minister for Internal Affairs, citing Busia's provocative recent comments at the All Africa Church Conference that 'nowadays in Africa besides white oppressing black there is black oppressing black'. [75] However, it was noted that Rev. Andriamanjato, leader of the Malagasy Opposition, had made similar remarks at the same conference, and these had 'passed without comment'.[76]

Obote admired the 'illustrious' Nkrumah and considered him both a friend and ally, so Busia was putting his head in the lion's mouth.[77] Obote was aware that Busia planned to be in Uganda for little more than a week. Rather than wait for an extradition request from Ghana that might come too late, Obote messaged Nkrumah twice, informing him of Busia's presence in the country, as well as the Ugandan government's 'readiness to arrest and extradite him at Ghana's request'.[78] The second telegram was particularly detailed: it stated that 'Busia was lecturing in Makerere tonight 23rd' and stressed the 'urgency of extradition request as he might be leaving tomorrow'.[79] Busia was however warned about Obote's actions, and fled Uganda early, narrowly evading arrest. This open

[74] TNA, DO/195/50, Dr KA Busia, Commonwealth Office to RWN du Boulsy, Washington Embassy, 6 May 1963.
[75] Ibid., Foreign Office Extract, c.4 May 1963.
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] M.A. Obote, *Myths and Realities: Letter to a London Friend* (Kampala: Consolidated, 1968), pp. 2-3.
[78] TNA, DO/195/50, Busia, Accra to Kampala, CRO, 24 April 1963.
[79] Ibid.

attempt by Uganda to extradite Busia illustrates the vulnerability of exiles in the face of old and new national attitudes, and the high-risk nature of international exile activity. It is clear that Ghana's political reach did not necessarily stop at its geographical boundaries, but neither were exiles powerless to resist it.

This precarity contrasts markedly with Busia's treatment and behaviour in parts of francophone West Africa. Confident in Senegal's sympathetic government and support from France, in March 1965 Busia visited Dakar where he received preferential treatment from President Senghor with guards, chauffeurs and accommodation in the royal palace. He explained to US officials that Gbedemah lacked equivalent protection and so was constantly on the move between four countries, for fear of assassination. Nevertheless, Busia admitted that he himself held four passports.[80] Busia's standing with the French government was only able to protect him so much.

Extraterritorial and Extrajudicial Tactics

The Ghanaian government's attempts to control and capture uncooperative exiles were not confined to extradition attempts. One of Busia's close associates, Joseph Yaw Manu, a UP member accused of complicity in the Kulungugu bombing, initially evaded arrest for some months by remaining outside Ghana, largely in the Ivory Coast. However, on 7 November 1962 he was on a plane travelling between Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and Lomé in Togo. Although he had no intention of officially entering Ghana, his plane made a brief transit stop at Accra airport. News of his presence in Ghana was relayed by anonymous telephone call to the Minister of Defence, Kofi Baako, who raced with a police officer to arrest him. Yaw Manu was seized from the plane which, minutes from take-off, was recalled from the runway by the Minister himself.[81] The ability of an exile to evade capture, or not, could thus turn on small mishaps, emphasising the precarious nature of an exilic existence and the elusiveness of security.

While travel and proximity to Ghana's borders presented obvious dangers for exiles, avoiding these areas of elevated risk was not a guarantee of safety. On the night of 15 March 1963, a wealthy Lebanese trader, Joseph Haddad, was kidnapped in Lomé and

[80] NARA-RG59, POL.29 arrests/detentions, Dakar to SoS, 21 March 1965.
[81] GPRL, BAA.440, 'I Got Manu From Plane', *Daily Graphic*, 28 November 1964.

taken to Ghana. He was the main regional agent for trade with the Soviet Bloc, and had previously been an associate of Nkrumah, Botsio, and Gbedemah. While not an exile himself, the Togolese authorities believed Haddad was targeted by the Ghanaian authorities because of his connections to Gbedemah, which implicated him in the ongoing treason trials. He was lured from his house at midnight by a friend offering him a lucrative currency deal, but soon found himself being driven towards Ghana at high speed. Although he managed to escape as he neared the border, he was swiftly recaptured and 'forced across the border on foot by Ghanaian police who were waiting for him'. Haddad was then driven to Accra in a police van. This blatant territorial overreach 'greatly angered' the Togolese authorities and demonstrates the extremes to which the Ghanaian security forces were willing to go to crack down on perceived external plotting in the wake of Kulungugu.[82]

Periodically, Nkrumah also attempted to lure exiles back with offers of amnesty. The case of Emmanuel Obetsebi Lamptey, a lawyer and one of the UGCC " Big Six", provides a particularly stark illustration. Lamptey had originally left Ghana in 1961 when his friend and "Big Six" colleague J.B. Danquah warned him of their impending arrest under the Preventative Detention Act. While Lamptey escaped, Danquah was not so fortunate, and infamously languished in prison.[83] In 1962, when Nkrumah granted the amnesty to political exiles, Lamptey accepted. He returned to Ghana at the age of sixty-six to live quietly in a village some miles outside of Accra.[84]

However, following the fallout from the Kulungugu bombing, Lamptey was quickly located and arrested, along with his host who was indicted for treason and was sentenced to hang. Indeed, Lamptey was accused of being the chief architect of the Kulungugu bombing, while Yaw Manu was thought the go-between. Lamptey however never made it to trial, as he died in prison on 29 January 1963. His body was not released to his family and was instead buried without notice near the Densu River in Nsawam, near Accra. The fate of men such as Lamptey and Danquah certainly left a profound impression on Busia. In 1965, the Ghana government accused Busia, Gbedemah, and fellow exile Dr Taylor, of being involved in a more recent assassination attempt on Nkrumah.[85] When asked to

[82] TNA, FO/371/167534, Lomé to London, 23 March 1963.
[83] Fuller, *Building the Ghanaian Nation-State*, p. 162.
[84] PRAAD-Accra, ADM13/1/31, Cabinet Minutes, 26 January 1962.
[85] DO/195/259, CRO to Lagos, 18 February 1965.

appear before international jurists in Accra, Busia raised the case of Lamptey who, he recalled, had trusted promises of amnesty and had voluntarily returned to Ghana. For Busia, Lamptey's death in prison and the secret disposal of his body was 'presumably because as is widely believed, he was tortured to death'. Busia stated: '"With this, and the very recent example of Dr Danquah before me, [I will] not foolishly sign my own death warrant by agreeing to go to Ghana'.[86] Exile was difficult and expensive and therefore for many offers of amnesty were deeply enticing, but all knew this might be revoked when internal political dynamics changed.

Over time, Ghanaian exiles developed new skills with which to navigate the hazardous international landscape in which they operated. They were able to learn from mistakes made by their compatriots and disseminate information on how to cope with the ever shifting and often aggressive tactics of the Ghanaian government. Meanwhile, the Ghanaian authorities were constantly refining their articulation of the threat of external machinations to bolster domestic control by directing internal fears outwards. Simultaneously, governments hosting exiles were developing new policies and legislative approaches to exile which were necessary to balance the competing considerations inherent to an increasingly post-colonial world. In this way, exile was the grit in the oyster which forced multiple sets of actors to adapt, improvise and overcome.

Exile Finances: Support or Lack of It

With the increase in awareness of exile-based subversion and the resulting intensification of extraterritorial threat by the Ghanaian government, stable financial backing was central to the ability of high-profile exiles to maintain their global presence while evading capture. It was a standing joke among US officials that Gbedemah would come to New York and plead for government money, claiming to be subsisting precariously on the generosity of friends. The next day American diplomats would run into him during his stay at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. They commented wryly that his friends 'must be damn generous.'[87] Nkrumah denounced Gbedemah as a tool of the CIA

[86] 'Ghana hits out at amnesty,' Llewellyn Chanter, *Daily Telegraph*, 18 February 1965.
[87] NARA-RG59, 745j.00/12-19-62, DoS Conversation, Gelet and Calhoun, 19 December 1962.

almost daily, to the discomfiture of Washington, but periodically also accused the British, the French, and even the West Germans for good measure.[88]

However, despite official Ghanaian claims, it seems that by the early 1960s Gbedemah was not favoured by the CIA either politically or financially. In fact, when the US government, prompted by the 1967 Ghanaian investigation into Gbedemah's finances, conducted a review into its connections with Gbedemah they were unable to establish any financial relationship whatsoever. 'After intensive investigation here,' it was reported, 'we have fully substantiated that no agency of USG contributed funds directly or indirectly to Gbedemah'. American officials established that the Belgian-American diamond merchant Maurice Tempelsman had initially funded Gbedemah because of a row with Nkrumah over mining, and he expected US authorities to join in sponsoring him. In 1961, Tempelsman had approached the State Department saying Gbedemah needed $100,000; however, '[n]o agency USG [of the US Government] would have anything to do with this and Tempelsman was so informed'. In May 1962, it was noted that Gbedemah had again asked for money, but '[h]e was refused'. Notably, he was even refused US help in distributing his colourful pamphlets. US officials emphasised that 'no direct or indirect aid was given to him by any agency', and again pointed to private backers.[89] The sources of Gbedemah's money during exile were decidedly unclear, and the 1967 investigation found that he was relieved when the Ghanaian government assured him that he would not need to 'reveal publicly' the 'names of friends in western countries who supported him while abroad'. In fact, Gbedemah himself seems to have been uncertain about the ultimate source of some of his funding.[90] This complex financial tangle, and Gbedemah's need to constantly solicit funds, illustrates the hazards of securing financial backing for political activity in exile. Even for a highly prominent exile, it often necessitated knitting together multiple funding sources of varying legitimacy, leaving exiles in constant precarity and vulnerable to accusations of acting in the interests of foreign actors.

By contrast, Busia's finances were significantly less complex, because he could rely on French and Ivorian backing. From 1958, the French had supported and funded Busia as a long-term investment. He was an attractive prospect for multiple reasons, not

[88] For accusations against West Germany, see Landricina, *Nkrumah*, pp. 359-61.
[89] LBJL, NSF, Country file Ghana, Box.90, Accra.3428, Vol.3/Fol.1, Washington to Accra, 19 May 1967.
[90] Ibid., Accra.3452, Vol.3/Fol.1, Accra to SoS, 22 May 1967.

least his obvious opposition to what the French saw as Nkrumah's dangerous mixture of Pan-Africanism and pro-Soviet rhetoric. While French officials had also courted Gbedemah, they felt Busia had more political potential and utility. French President General de Gaulle's powerful African affairs adviser, Jacques Foccart, claimed in a conversation with the President that Busia was 'a quite remarkable man and very Francophile'.[91] Despite residing in Oxford, Busia was notably less pro-British than many of his Ghanaian compatriots, which appealed to French officials who disliked Britain's policy of neutralism.[92] However, fostering Busia as a French ally while he resided mainly in Britain was not without risk. Foccart stated: 'It is obviously necessary that things remain extremely secret so that the English do not take umbrage'.[93]

The French were keen to cultivate links with Nigeria, Ghana, and indeed the Democratic Republic of Congo, as they had comparatively richer resources than most of francophone West Africa. Foccart sought to develop a relationship with Busia similar to that he enjoyed with President Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, Abidjan and Accra offered two radically opposed and competing models of post-colonialism, a contest that was watched intently by other countries such as Upper Volta.[94] Foccart had cultivated a strong bond with the Ivorian president, stating in his diary that he 'truly believe[d] we were like two brothers, on the same wave-length', meaning they 'discussed African problems without concealing anything from each other.'[95] Through his enthusiastic support of Busia in exile, Foccart hoped that Ghana, for many years an enemy of France's Africa policy, would move into the Ivorian, and therefore French, orbit, should Busia rise to domestic political prominence.

In 1966, Foccart described in his diary a conversation with de Gaulle in which he detailed his meetings with Busia and the aid which the Ivorians had extended to him on one of his trips to Abidjan. Busia was apparently using a false identity to protect himself while in the Ivory Coast but was nevertheless liaising frequently with Foccart and Houphouët-Boigny. While he was not staying directly with Houphouët-Boigny,

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[91] Entry for 14 March 1966, Jacques Foccart, *Tous les soirs avec de Gaulle, Journal de l'Elysée. Vol.I, 1965-1967* (Paris: Fayard/Jeunne Afrique,1997), pp. 372-3.
[92] For more information on British Cold War neutralism, see Ann Lane, 'Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960–62', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol.14, No.3 (2003): 151-74.
[93] Entry for 14 March 1966, Foccart, *Tous les soirs avec de Gaulle*, pp. 372-3.
[94] TNA, FO/371/177232, Lompolo Koné comments in Abidijan to London, 27 October 1964.
[95] Entry for 1 May 1968, Jacques Foccart, *Le Général En Mai, Journal De L'elysée. Vol.2, 1968-1969* (Paris: Fayard/Jeunne Afrique, 1998), p. 85.

'Houphouët was housing him…in another property where he was meeting him in secret.' Foccart stated that he himself also 'saw him clandestinely' but 'at the French Embassy in the middle of the night, to avoid any indiscretion.'[96] In this way, while secrecy was still paramount, Busia received significant financial and practical assistance which allowed him to sustain both himself and his globetrotting political activism. The French also played a crucial role in helping Busia to distribute his pamphlets. Prior to the 1965 legislative election, Busia disseminated protest material printed with his slogan: "'NO!' to Nkrumah." Because of the big 'NO!' printed on his literature, Foccart and his assistant Maurichéau-Beaupré took to calling Busia 'Dr No' in their diplomatic messages.[97]

The Kulungugu Trial Evolves

As the court case against the initial accused plotters progressed, the net of blame for the bomb plot was cast increasingly widely. Nkrumah accused no less than six of his remaining government ministers of plotting with exiles. From mid-1963, he insisted that Krobo Edusei, Ako Ajei, Kofi Asante Ofori-Atta, Kwaku Boateng, Cofie-Crabbe and Tawia Adamfio had been working with groups in Togo to assassinate him.[98] The accusations were clearly baseless and at the end of the year the Chief Justice of Ghana, Sir Arku Korsah, acquitted them all.[99] Nkrumah was so incensed that he promptly revoked the Chief Justice's appointment.[100] In a second trial, commencing in October 1964, Nkrumah himself handpicked a jury to ensure a conviction while his close ally Geoffrey Bing directed the pre-trial investigations.[101]

While it is impossible to establish definitively who was involved in the Kulungugu bomb plot and in what capacity, a growing consensus suggests that these ministers were innocent victims of an internal purge conducted by Nkrumah.[102] Adotei Addo, one of the

[96] Entry for 14 March 1966, Foccart, *Tous les soirs avec de Gaulle*, pp. 372-3.
[97] Jean-Pierre Bat, *Les réseaux Foccart: L'homme des affaires secretes* (Paris: Editions Nouveau-Monde, 2018), pp.256-9. Busia's "No!" pamphlet appeared in Accra in December 1964 and was published by the Ghana Students Association based in Acton, West London. Copy at NARA-RG59, POL.30 Defectors and Expellees, 1/1/64.
[98] GPRL, BAA.999, '6 ministers wanted to kill Osagyefo', *Evening News*, 23 March 1963.
[99] 'Ghana starts treason trial friday for 2 ex-ministers', *New York Times*, 4 August 1963; 'Nkrumah Ousts His Chief Justice', *New York Times*, 12 December 1963.
[100] GPRL, BAA.999, A Judgement from the Backward Looking Elite', *Ghanaian Times*, 18 December 1963.
[101] 'Treason Trial: Twelve jury-men sworn in,' *Ghana Times*, 6 October 1964.
[102] 'Judgement was messed up by outside influences', *Ghanaian Times*, 2 June 1965.

seven accused, provided bizarre testimony insisting that he saw the ministers attending exile meetings in Lomé, but adding that some were imposters and only 'bore close resemblance to the Ministers'. In the case of Krobo Edusei, Addo stated: 'Yes, the man resembled Krobo Edusei, but he was not the Krobo Edusei I know as a Cabinet Minister'.[103] The absurd notion of fake cabinet ministers attending meetings with Busia and Gbedemah in neighbouring Togo was emblematic of a regime that was losing touch with reality.[104]

On 18 February 1965, the jury found the ministers guilty, and several individuals received the death penalty 'without being provided with any Defence Counsel'.[105] The world's press attacked the verdicts, noting that key witnesses contradicted their earlier testimony, causing the judge to weep openly in court. The government responded by blaming exiles, asserting that Busia and Gbedemah had 'conspired with the condemned men' and should be handed over to join them on the gallows. The most vociferous figure was Ghana's High Commissioner in London, Kwesi Armah, who insisted 'Great Britain is harbouring would be saboteurs of Ghana' who should be extradited at once.[106]

A form of backstairs politics amongst former expatriates helped to defuse the situation. Britain approached Muhammad Ahmad Mahgoub, Sudan's foreign minister, who had been a close associate of Nkrumah in wartime London. Denouncing Nkrumah's behaviour as 'disgraceful', British diplomats in Khartoum privately warned that he was 'damaging in the eyes of the whole world the image of the new Africa'. At first Mahgoub 'merely muttered that it was an internal affair in Ghana'. However, he subsequently reported that he had sent a personal sealed letter to Nkrumah via the Ghanaian embassy, appealing for clemency.[107] These, alongside other entreaties, convinced Nkrumah to commute their sentences.

However, while this decision defused the worst of the international condemnation around this trial, it could not negate growing criticism of Nkrumah's ever-increasing authoritarianism. In 1964, Nkrumah held a referendum to amend the constitution to

[103] GPRL, BAA.999, 'Men I met were no ministers-Addo', *Daily Graphic*, 26 March 1963.
[104] TNA, DO/195/50, Busia to du Boulsy, 6 May 1963.
[105] NARA-RG59, 2-65, POL.29 arrests/detentions, Accra to SoS, 2 February 1965, enclosing Armah to Bottomley.
[106] Ibid.
[107] TNA, FO/371/184152, Khartoum to FCO, 13 February 1965.

make Ghana a one-party state and himself president for life. The referendum was highly suspect, with the Ghanaian government reporting a 91% turnout, and nearly 99% approval.[108] This, alongside the plight of prominent imprisoned politicians such as J.B. Danquah, were key weapons in the exile arsenal deployed against Nkrumah on the international stage. Busia made human rights abuses a central theme of his petitions to western organisations and governments. He stated in one speech to the GSA in London that he had appealed to both the Human Rights Society in the US and the International Commission of Jurists about the treatment of prisoners in Ghana.[109] A month after Danquah's death in custody in 1965, Busia privately sent Commonwealth leaders copies of letters smuggled out of Ghanaian prisons which described the harsh conditions in which eminent detainees like Danquah were held, arguing that these had contributed directly to his death.[110] While human rights-focused scholarship has generally suggested that the 1970s and 80s were the key period for the expansion of human rights rhetoric, Abena Ampofoa Asare has argued for a much earlier origin, stating that such scholars have overlooked 'the machinations of the Ghanaian opposition who deployed human rights, in earshot of the world, to question Kwame Nkrumah's capacity to lead'.[111] While human rights may not have been such a dominant paradigm within the international landscape of the 1960s as they were subsequently, Busia was certainly an early adopter of this vocabulary and employed it prodigiously, providing a blueprint upon which future exiled political activists could build.

The Global Cold War and Neo-Colonialism

As the former colonial power in Ghana, British fears of accusations of neo-colonialism were both obvious and well documented. However, this Anglocentric focus has obscured the extent to which the spectre of neo-colonialism haunted a wider set of western governments. In 1965 a plot featuring Lutz Herold, a West German reporter for *Der Spiegel*, not only provided Nkrumah with another example of collaboration between

[108] 'Ghana Voters Back Nkrumah Proposal For One-Party Rule', *The New York Times*, 26 January 1964, p. 3.
[109] Kofi Abrefa Busia, "Reflections On One-Party Government in Ghana", Speech given at Delegates Conference of the Ghana Students' Association of Britain and Ireland, London, 29 February 1964, http://home.koranteng.com/writings/reflections-one-party-rule.html
[110] NARA-RG59, POL.29 arrests/detentions, Accra.842, 3-23-65, Accra to SoS, 23 March 1965.
[111] Asare, *Truth Without Reconciliation*, pp. 46-48.

exiles and neo-colonial meddlers, but also solidified the latter's wider suspicions of the West. Herold was apprehended by Ghanaian police shortly after crossing into the country from Togo. They found in his wallet a letter from Kow Richardson, a key UP member implicated in the Kulungugu bombings, addressed to an associate in Accra. This associate was a journalist named Lovelace Johnson, a reporter for the *Daily Graphic*.[112]

The letter was clearly conspiratorial, but even more damning was the questionnaire attached to it. Lovelace Johnson was urged to 'Do [his] best!!' and complete the questionnaire to help 'the struggle'. It included questions such as 'If there should be isolated incidents would the people rise up spontaneously?' and 'What grievances should be fanned to arouse the people to act?'[113] These documents suggested that the UP was utilising its network of sympathisers to gauge the potential for mass unrest among ordinary Ghanaians.

It was not long before Busia was co-opted into this narrative of intrigue. Herold was charged with plotting with Busia and Richardson to overthrow the Ghana government by unlawful means.[114] Busia was alleged to have been attempting to source £300,000 from West German business leaders to fund coup attempts. Herold confessed to the crime and 'revealed' that the UP in Exile had hired some 500 mercenaries based in the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Chad, Gabon and Niger.[115] Herold apparently later confirmed much of the story privately to West German embassy officials, including Busia's tireless search for funds.[116]

In December 1965, Herold was sentenced to 40 years in prison, his crimes representing the perfect synthesis of exile subversion and meddling by the West.[117] West Germany's ambassador Hans-Georg Steltzer was deeply frustrated by these events, as they undermined his attempts to battle growing East German influence in West Africa. 'For all who fear the bogeymen of neo-colonialism' he lamented, 'Herold's behaviour is taken as proof that the Federal Republic, like the other capitalist countries, is promoting subversion in Africa in order to win back the colonial powers' predominant position'.[118]

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[112] 'Misprision of Treason Trial: Herold Refused to give out letter', *Evening News*, 19 November 1965.
[113] Traitor K. Richardson's letter to 'Daily Graphic News Head', *Evening News*, 11 November 1965.
[114] 'Herold was in league with Busia-Swanzy', *Daily Graphic*, 26 November 1965.
[115] '500 hired to carry out plot', *Ghanaian Times*, 25 November 1965.
[116] Landricina, *Nkrumah*, p. 358.
[117] 'Herold Jailed for 40 years', *Ghanaian Times*, 1 December 1965.
[118] TNA, DO/195/237, Accra to CRO, 24 November 1965.

Coinciding with the publication of Nkrumah's new book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, it illustrated the apparent convergence of the imperialist menace and an increasingly global Cold War.[119]

Conclusion

From 1962 onwards, Ghana faced increasingly severe austerity and Nkrumah struggled to realise his vision of a strong socialist Ghana, and a united Africa. Many other African leaders had withdrawn support for his Pan-Africanist project and found his interference increasingly frustrating.[120] Despite western aversion to Nkrumah, it was arguably western economic aid, focused on the Volta Dam, which allowed him to retain power into the second half of the 1960s. In March 1964, K.A. Akwawuah, President of the anti-Nkrumah Ghana Students Association in North America, stridently complained to the US State Department about this aid, arguing that suspending assistance would bring Nkrumah down. His interlocutors responded sheepishly that this observation was probably correct.[121] The USA had not funded Gbedemah or Busia and instead had backed Ghana's government, albeit with declining enthusiasm.

Nevertheless, although these exiles were both absent and not the subject of direct and substantial financial backing by foreign powers, their agitation and consistent engagement with domestic concerns made them impossible to ignore, shaping Ghanaian political realities to a remarkable degree. The Kulungugu trials dragged on for several years, dominating press coverage and colouring public and official attitudes towards opposition, something increasingly defined by a focus on exile and external subversion. Indeed, faced with a deteriorating economic situation, Nkrumah sought to deploy the exile threat narrative to distract from the existence of internal discontent and to unify domestic opinion against an externalised 'other'. However, beset by assassination and coup attempts that were all too real, this sense of threat presented by exile networks was also magnified and reimagined, triggering the implementation of repressive measures that created new enemies and drove more people into exile. As this chapter has shown,

[119] Landricina, *Nkrumah*, p.357.
[120] LBJL, NSF, Box.89, Ghana vol.1, INR Report, 'Nkrumah's Frustrations: An opening for the Communist World', 3 December 1963.
[121] LBJL, NSF, Country File-Ghana, Box.89, Conversation memo, Aawawuah and Narten, 23 March 1964.

the shared experience of exile and Nkrumah's oppression united previously divided opponents such as Busia and Gbedemah and crystallized their messaging as they harnessed a new language of human rights, deployed in an evolving international landscape.

Nkrumah's hostile actions towards exiles, including seizure and kidnap, posed a significant threat. However, over time, Ghanaian exiles developed new skills with which to navigate the hazardous international context. Meanwhile, the Ghanaian authorities constantly refined the ways in which they both defended themselves against and utilised the threat of external machinations, bolstering domestic control by directing internal fears outwards. Simultaneously, those states hosting exiles found themselves accused of complicity and/or neo-colonial machinations, disrupting diplomatic relationships and forcing their governments to develop new policies and legislative approaches to exile which were necessary to balance the competing considerations inherent to an increasingly post-colonial world. Exile became the grit in the oyster of Ghana's foreign relations, forcing both their home and host nations to confront a new kind of personal politics of externalised opposition.

Despite the consistent efforts of exiles during this period, by 1965 most western observers concluded that after many years of absence, the stock of exile leaders was 'low with most Ghanaians'. Nkrumah's overthrow would come from within, not from exiles.[122] While this assessment would prove accurate when Nkrumah was removed by an internal, army-led coup, exiles had nonetheless been central to destabilising and undermining his government. Nkrumah's growing obsession with the exile threat fuelled his authoritarianism, meaning that by July 1964 the exile community was being constantly replenished, and even Ghana's most senior civil servants were secretly seeking jobs abroad.[123] In 1965, H.A.A. Ankrah, a diplomat in Ghana's Ottawa High Commission, explained to US officials that his brother and brother-in-law were in prison, while his senior colleagues all hoped to leave government service and work in North America.[124] In late 1965, Nkrumah was even arresting senior police officers. In Ghana, important

[122] RG59-NARA, POL.23-9, Ghana/Rebellions/Coups, Accra.32, 7-15-65, Accra to SoS, 15 July 1965.
[123] NARA-RG59, POL.29, arrests/detentions, Accra to SoS, 16 July 1964.
[124] NARA-RG59, POL.17 Ghana-CA, Pol.Affairs/Rels., 8-9-65, Ottawa to SoS, 9 August 1965; Ibid., 12-1-65, Ottawa to SoS, 1 December 1965.

sections of the police and military were convinced that it was time for Nkrumah to be removed.

Chapter 5

Nkrumah and the CPP in Exile: Departure and Return, 1966-69

Introduction

On 24 February 1966, Kwame Nkrumah was ousted by a military coup and decamped to Guinea. This singular instance of exile has dominated the wider characterisation of exile in post-independence Ghanaian historical analysis, focusing on Nkrumah's post-presidential years through to his death in 1972. This reflects not only Nkrumah's dominance of Ghana's political landscape and the wider narrative of problematic decolonisation in Africa, but also his own extensive writings from exile on his ousting and on Africa's post-colonial experience. His reflections were recorded in several volumes, most famously *Dark Days in Ghana*, which examined both the coup and his relationship with the regime which replaced him.[1] Additional insight has been provided by his close confidante and literary executor, June Milne, who published both a biography and a collection of his letters.[2] Documents produced by Nkrumah and his household during his exile are held at Howard University in Washington D.C., affording historians a depth of evidence unique in terms of the wider Ghanaian exile experience, especially when deployed in conjunction with interviews and diplomatic archives, including recently available Eastern Bloc material.[3]

This corpus of material on Nkrumah's time in exile has been studied extensively by those wishing to understand his life, as well as the development of his political thought. Ama Biney's exploration of his ideological evolution is perhaps the most prominent

[1] Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968); Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: International Publishers, 1979).
[2] June Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years: His Life and Letters* (London: Panaf, 1990).
[3] Natalia Telepneva, 'Saving Ghana's revolution: the demise of Kwame Nkrumah and the evolution of Soviet policy in Africa, 1966–1972,' *Journal of Cold War Studies,* Vol.20, No.4 (2018): 4-25.

example, examining his daily experience in significant detail.[4] Biney concludes that Milne's work tends towards the 'deification' of Nkrumah.[5] However, even Biney's forensic exploration of the Pan-African icon in exile has arguably reinforced the familiar 'big man' distortion of Ghanaian historiography, eclipsing the experience of others. Therefore, this chapter seeks to both complement and challenge this body of literature by focusing on the experience of those who were exiled alongside Nkrumah, as well as his opponents.

More than a hundred Nkrumah loyalists joined their leader in Guinea, while similar numbers fled to London. As previously stated, a key challenge of historicising such individuals is the liminal nature of life in exile, usually resulting in the scattering and loss of documentary evidence. The unpredictable and precarious nature of exile means that such individuals often travelled lightly and secretively, destroying evidence of their movements and correspondence. In this respect, the letters written to Nkrumah by his supporters provide a remarkable window into their own social and political experience of exile. This chapter examines those who fled Ghana in 1966 without the advantage of Nkrumah's global reputation and elite position. This made their situation far more precarious, not least because of the efforts of the new regime to extradite or capture some of these figures. Indeed, the new government in Ghana found the issue of exiles no less frustrating and paranoia-inducing than its predecessors.

The 1966 Coup

On 24 February 1966, a plan to topple Nkrumah was set in motion. Known by its supporters as 'Operation Cold Chop', coup plans had been fermenting since September 1965 among the highest echelons of Ghana's army and police force. The key organiser was J.W.K. Harlley, Commissioner of Police, supported by Deputy Commissioner B.A. Yakubu, and Anthony Deku, head of the Criminal Investigation Department. In the army, individuals such as General J.A. Ankrah, Lieutenant-Colonel E.K. Kotoka, and Captain A.A.

[4] Biney, *The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*, pp.155-72. See also Tunde Adeleke, 'Exilic Pan-Africanism: Refocusing Kwame Nkrumah's Conakry Years, 1966–1971', *Vienna Journal of African Studies*, Vol.20, No. 38 (2020): 73-100; Ahmad Rahman, *The Regime Change of Kwame Nkrumah: Epic heroism in Africa and the diaspora* (New York: Springer, 2007).
[5] Biney, 'The Development of Kwame Nkrumah's Political Thought', p. 86.

Afrifa were central to securing Nkrumah's downfall.[6] Their shared motivation for this plot appears to have been Ghana's accelerating decline into chaos, but the trigger was Nkrumah's side-lining of the regular army and police force, in favour of his Presidential Own Guard Regiment and the Presidential Detail Department.[7] The Soviet ambassador had become Nkrumah's main adviser on this matter and senior police officers, who remained close to their British contacts, were further discomforted by news that they were to be sent to Moscow for training.[8]

The growth of this new security apparatus was viewed by the existing army and police as a threat to their position.[9] Nkrumah's direct control of these institutions was augmented after an assassination attempt by a police constable in 1964, after which Nkrumah dismissed several senior police officials. In April 1965, he implemented the Police Service Act, which gave him complete control over all police appointments and dismissals.[10] Conversely, in his work *Dark Days in Ghana*, written from exile, Nkrumah claimed that Harlley and Deku both felt personally threatened by an imminent enquiry into diamond smuggling and a key motivation for these two key coup plotters was avoiding imprisonment.[11]

The coup plotters struck while Nkrumah was in Peking conducting a peace mission related to the Vietnam War. Presidential overseas travel has historically provided opportunities for those looking to overthrow personalised regimes. Attacking Flagstaff House early in the morning, Lieutenant-Colonel Kotoka led a mostly bloodless coup, arresting multiple senior CPP members and seizing strategic positions around the capital. Chinese radio monitoring immediately picked up the morning broadcasts made by Kotoka proclaiming the overthrow of Nkrumah. However, Nkrumah's plane was still in flight, and landed in Peking while the result of the coup still hung in the balance. Nkrumah was greeted ceremonially but was later informed of the coup on arrival at his

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[6] Peter Barker*, Operation Cold Chop: The Inside Story* (Tema: Digibooks, 2010); A.C. Ocran, *A Myth is Broken: An Account of the Ghana Coup d'etat of 24th February, 1966* (London: Longmans, 1968).
[7] Sheena Greitens explores personal security in her comparative study, *Dictators and their secret police: coercive institutions and state violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
[8] Landricina*, Nkrumah*, pp. 92-3.
[9] Robert Dowse, 'Military and Police Rule', in Dennis Austin, Robin Luckham (eds.), *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972* (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 16.
[10] Biney, 'The Development of Kwame Nkrumah's Political Thought,' p. 82.
[11] Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana*, pp. 42-3, 104-5.

guesthouse.[12] Most accounts of Nkrumah's reaction emphasise his complete disbelief. He remained confident that his Presidential Guard would defend his authority with their superior weaponry, and it required re-affirmation by the Chinese leader Zhou Enlai for Nkrumah to fully accept that reports of the coup's success were genuine.[13]

Nkrumah's delusion included optimism about a successful return to Ghana. Kwesi Armah and Alex Quaison-Sackey, cabinet ministers who had travelled with him to Peking, were unable to convince Nkrumah that the ordinary citizens of Ghana would not rise up to support him.[14] Members of Nkrumah's entourage felt increasingly uncertain of their ability to return safely to their families in Ghana now that a new regime was in place. Nkrumah himself took steps to limit defections from his staff by ensuring his security team retained their passports.[15]

Only two officials were allowed to leave Peking. The first was Quaison-Sackey, who was sent to Addis Ababa to persuade an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Foreign Ministers' meeting to issue a statement supporting Nkrumah.[16] However, Quaison-Sackey diverted *en route* and instead returned to Accra, offering his services to the new government and submitting to preventative detention. The second was Dr Jonathan Bossman, who had been the designated Ghanaian High Commissioner to London prior to the ending of diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia in 1965. Bossman now flew to London with the remit of energising UK-based Ghanaian students to support Nkrumah. However, an interview he gave on arrival rather undermined this purpose. Asked whether Nkrumah could make a political comeback, Bossman replied: 'Well, from what I hear, since my travel back, I don't think he has enough support.'[17] The defection of such close aides and advisors in the face of possible exile demonstrated the cold reality of Nkrumah's defeat.

The eight military and police personnel who had masterminded the coup now formed a new government, named the National Liberation Council (NLC). Kotoka and

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[12] Barker, *Operation Cold Chop*, pp. 189-90.
[13] Dennis Austin, *Ghana Observed: Essays on the Politics of a West African Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976), p. 103.
[14] Barker, *Operation Cold Chop,* p. 191.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[16] Austin, *Ghana Observed*, p. 103.
[17] Aide of Dr. Nkrumah Arrives From Peking-Interviewed At Airport 1966, Reuters, British Pathé. https://www.britishpathe.com/video/VLVA58G378WUYLUQQCWVUF28ZY9VA-UK-LONDON-DR-BOSSMAN-AN-AIDE-OF-DR-NKRUMAH-ARRIVES-FROM-PEKING/query/Nkrumah

Harlley, as its most prominent members, seemed obvious choices for NLC leadership. Both however chose to remain the heads of the army and police respectively. The position instead fell to the popular General Ankrah, who had been forced into retirement by Nkrumah in 1965. Ankrah announced on Radio Ghana that the newly formed government had '…no ambition what-so-ever to rule this country indefinitely…', and instead planned to return Ghana to democratic rule.[18] He also sought 'to assure all the people of Ghana that it will not seek to antagonise any section of the population'.[19] Ankrah's early radio announcements were notably conciliatory, characterising the NLC as both temporary and benign. However, for prominent supporters of Nkrumah, trusting such platitudes carried significant risk.

The coup's Cold War implications has prompted much debate over the possibility of American involvement. President Johnson was certainly less indulgent of Nkrumah than his predecessor, reducing economic aid to Ghana.[20] Nevertheless, while possible American support for a coup had been discussed in Washington, US documents now available in the archives do not suggest active support. The president was assured by Robert Komer, aka 'Blowtorch Bob', a prominent National Security Council official and CIA officer, that 'we're not directly involved'.[21] Ankrah also emphasised that it was a local affair driven by senior military officers.[22] However, it is likely that at least some of the coup leaders had sought and received US encouragement. British officials noted in spring 1966 that 'the Americans are entitled to point out that their investment in Mr. Harley [sic] in Ghana paid off handsomely in the recent revolution'. They were, he reported, now claiming a major success.[23] In the ensuing competition for Harlley's favour, visiting British security officials found themselves rebuffed 'due to the success of pre-emptive bids made by the Americans'.[24] The new US ambassador, Franklin Williams, sought to guide Harlley towards the pro-Western Cold War camp and within a week of the coup

[18] NARA-RG59, Politics/Defense, POL.15, RG59-NARA, Accra to SoS, 28 February 1966.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans,* pp.96*,* Walton*, Empire of Secrets,* p. 232.
[21] FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol.XXIV, Africa, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Doc.253, Robert Komer memorandum.
[22] TNA, FCO/38/150, 'General Ankrah', 6 June 1967.
[23] TNA, FO/371/187877, Le Quesne minute, 'US Policy in Ghana and Kenya', 20 April 1966.
[24] Ibid., Accra to London, 'American Policy in Ghana', 7 April 1966.

d'état the new regime ousted 620 Soviet technicians.[25] The Cuban and Chinese embassies were quickly closed, and an active campaign followed against Nkrumahist exiles.

A New Landscape

The coup not only transformed Ghana's political environment but also created new forms of exile. Officials stationed outside Ghana at the time of the coup were faced with stark choices. Ghanaian diplomats were simultaneously vulnerable, isolated from the changing situation in Accra, yet, in comparison to their domestic counterparts, they enjoyed greater agency. Overseas embassy staff could at least consider whether to return home in the hope of clemency, join the exiled Nkrumahist network, or simply seek alternative employment abroad.

The staff of the Ghanaian embassy in Hungary were in particular turmoil in the wake of the coup, especially with regards to the position of their Ambassador H.B Kofi Marrah. Over lunch in a Budapest restaurant, his Second Secretary, Augustus Assani, explained to American officials that Marrah now had 'almost completely lost control over the Embassy…' as he faced the prospect of being recalled to Ghana. Marrah was fixated on the fate of the Ghanaian Ambassador to the USSR, who 'has been called to Accra, ostensibly for a "consultation", but had been arrested on arrival at the airport.'[26] Assani believed that Marrah would most likely flee to London 'rather than return to Ghana', choosing exile over an uncertain reception in his homeland. Assani displayed 'considerable nervousness' throughout the entire meal, looking 'constantly over his shoulder to see if he were being watched.' He even 'got up from the table abruptly and hurried off'; on his return, he explained that he thought he had seen a Ghanaian face 'peering into the dining room.'[27] Even though Assani thought he would most likely be reassigned within the Ghanaian foreign service, the anxiety surrounding the new military order affected even comparatively low-ranking officials.

The timing of the coup was particularly awkward for Michael Ameko, the Ghanaian Ambassador to Burundi. Having served in this position since 1964, he had been recalled

[25] Telepneva, 'Saving Ghana's Revolution', p. 7.
[26] NARA-RG59, Politics/Defense, POL.23-9, Budapest to SoS, 'Conversation with Ghanaian Diplomat', 30 March 1966.
[27] Ibid.

to Ghana on 15 January 1966, over a month before the coup. This apparently reflected his alleged refusal to carry out various Nkrumah government instructions which 'offended his "sense of morality and fairness"'. Believing he had irrevocably antagonized 'certain powerful "elements" in Ghana' and that he would be in danger if he returned there, he instead planned to live in exile.[28] Fleeing to Nairobi a fortnight before the coup, he contacted the US Embassy with a view to finding employment with an American firm. He had already sought the support of 'John Dumuoga [sic], extremely reliable self-exiled journalist', suggesting his desire to engage with the existing exile community for support and guidance.[29] However, the coup derailed these carefully laid plans. Despite having cut ties with the CPP, Ameko was, in the eyes of the new NLC government, indelibly linked with Nkrumah and therefore treated as a pariah. The unhappy Ameko had fallen into a temporal gap between the old government and the new and was perceived as disloyal by both. The unfortunate timing left him unable to become a credible anti-Nkrumah exile, yet equally incapable of joining the wave of Nkrumah's supporters now fleeing Ghana.

While Ghanaians abroad at the time of the coup were faced with both options and dilemmas, this was not true for the large community of radical exiles of other nationalities who had sought refuge in Ghana under the umbrella of Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism.[30] On 24 March 1966, Ankrah delivered a broadcast condemning Nkrumah's Bureau of African Affairs for running 'camps which served as breeding-grounds of subversion for the possible overthrow of the leaders of African States who would not submit to his own pet brand of Pan-Africanism'.[31] Ankrah's NLC, believing such camps had seriously undermined Ghana's relations with multiple African governments, was keen to 'retrieve our lost prestige', assuring neighbouring countries that Ghana would no longer harbour 'subversives'. This was clearly a priority: four days after the coup, the police swooped to

[28] NARA-RG59, Box.2237, POL-Political Affairs and Relations, Politics/Defense, Ghana-A, Nairobi to SoS, 10 February 1966.
[29] Ibid. It is likely that the spelling of the journalist's name is a typographical error on the part of the US official, and that this instead refers to John Winfred Kodzo Dumoga. Employed at the Nairobi Daily Nation, he was reportedly deported back to Ghana later in 1966. See 'Deportations from Kenya: The good, the bad and the ugly', *Nairobi Daily Nation*, 10 Feb 2018, https://nation.africa/kenya/news/deportations-from-kenya-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly--11842 [accessed 24/05/23].
[30] See Terretta, 'Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global,': 189-212.
[31] PRAAD-Accra, ADM/5/4/263, Broadcast by Ankrah, 24 March 1966. See also PRAAD-Accra, ADM/16/65, 'Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa: Documentary Evidence of Nkrumah's interference in the affairs of other states'.

detain Nigerien (SAWABA) and Ivorian (Sanwi) political refugees, while the Cameroonian resistance camp 'had been captured as a matter of priority' on the day of the coup itself.[32]

The fate of these rebels was unclear. It was uncertain whether they would be extradited back to their country of origin, or permitted to travel to another safe country. However, for high-profile exiles such as Samuel Ikoku and Ayo Adebanjo, two prominent left-wing political activists from Nigeria, escape to exile elsewhere was not an option. On 28 February, Ankrah publicly stated that individuals such as Ikoku and Adebanjo 'would have to go back to their country'.[33] This polite characterisation did not capture the brutal consequences of such a policy. Ikoku was tortured before his deportation and was eventually delivered in a canvas sack to Nigeria, where he was imprisoned.[34] The extradition of subversive exiles was therefore not simply used as a signal of good faith to Nigeria; this violence and humiliation also served to symbolise the overthrow of Nkrumah's regional influence and his patronage of a wider Pan-African movement of activist exiles.

After the 1966 ousting of Nkrumah, such exile dynamics became politically symbolic. Surrendering subversives to the kindred military regime in Nigeria signaled friendship, while protecting them would have been treated as an indication of enmity. In this spirit, Ankrah's government applied to Britain for the extradition of Kwesi Armah, Ghanaian High Commissioner in London during Nkrumah's rule, and later Minister for Trade. Armah had been with Nkrumah in China but had managed to detach himself and flee to London, arriving on 22 March 1966. Accra initiated extradition proceedings under the Fugitive Offenders Act, alleging theft, and within weeks he was in detention in London's Brixton prison. When Armah was released from British custody due to insufficient evidence, the Ghanaian authorities ensured he was rearrested on the same day on a separate charge of misappropriation of funds, a charge which British officials described as displaying 'the manifest attributes of a political vendetta'.[35] Although

[32] NARA-RG59, Politics/Defense, Box.2234, POL.15-1, Accra to SoS, 'Political Refugees in Ghana', 1 March 1966.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana*, pp. 232-3.
[35] TNA, DO/195/277, CRO memorandum for CPM meeting, 'The Possible Extradition of Mr Kwesi Armah', approx. November 1966.

Ankrah promised the British Labour Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, that '[w]e don't intend to hang him', this was not viewed as reassuring.[36]

Exile and asylum were already sensitive issues in UK-African relations because of the recent case of Chief Anthony Enahoro, successfully extradited from Britain in 1963 by Nigeria on charges of treason, using the same 'Fugitive Offender' legislation.[37] The matter had been addressed at prime ministerial level and the issue of whether Enahoro would face the death penalty had been debated in parliament. The decision by a Conservative Home Secretary to repatriate Enahoro caused exactly the kind of furore that civil servants disliked, and was publicly opposed by the Labour party opposition.[38] He was returned and imprisoned, only to be released three years later by a new Nigerian military government. The impact of the Enahoro case was reflected in the actions of the now Labour government, with Home Secretary Jenkins introducing new legislation to protect the rights of those seeking political asylum.[39] On 23 January 1967, the appeal court placed the matter in the hands of Jenkins who was 'unshakeable' in his decision not to return Armah.[40]

London expected Ghana to accept this decision quietly. But while Ghanaian diplomats in London had long known the likely outcome, they had not wanted to report the bad news to Accra, effectively leaving this unpleasant duty to the British. Upset and shocked by Britain's decision, Ankrah, Harlley, Kotoka, and Afrifa summoned the British High Commissioner, Harold Smedley, to meet them at Osu Castle. Visibly 'emotional', Ankrah told him this was 'a direct slap in the face for the NLC' and would have 'very grave effects' on relations between Britain and Ghana. Although the meeting was clearly designed to exert pressure, officials felt that the NLC leaders 'genuinely felt deeply about the decision'. While this partly reflected an upsurge of CPP exile activity outside Ghana, it was also personal: Armah had been taunting the Ghanaian leadership by 'boasting' that he would never be returned.[41]

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[36] TNA, DO/195/277, Gross, File Note, 9 August 1966.
[37] See TNA, HO/306/160, 'Extradition case: Chief Anthony Enahoro'.
[38] House of Commons debate, Vol.675: 10 April 1963, col.1289-90. See also Paul O'Higgins, 'The Enahoro Case,' *International and Comparative Law Quarterly,* Vol.12, No.4 (1963): 1364-78.
[39] TNA, FCO/38/157, Middleton memorandum, 'Armah', 18 January 1967.
[40] Ibid. Miles, 23 January 1967. TNA, FCO/38/160, Central Criminal Court judgement, 'Regina v. Kwesi Armah,' 14 March 1967.
[41] TNA, FCO/38/157, Accra to London (Flash), 25 January 1967; Accra to London (Immediate), 25 January 1967.

Harlley stated at the meeting that he could 'find no words to express his feelings of utter disgust over the Home Secretary's decision'. He then, 'speaking with deep emotion', expressed 'his disappointment with Britain for not having helped him overthrow Nkrumah.'[42] It became clear to Smedley that Armah, and exiles generally, were the 'largest' item in a catalogue of NLC grievances against London. Smedley explained in his report that the NLC leaders felt the Armah case 'confirmed the NLC in their belief that the Labour Government is covertly backing Nkrumah against themselves'; he warned, 'it will be very difficult to shake them on this'.[43] The fact that contemporaneously, Labour radicals like Lord Brockway were attending the London launch of Nkrumah's new book reinforced Ankrah's perception that the Labour government was secretly helping exiles engaged in the 'subversion of the government of Ghana'.[44]

Exiles were closely linked to Ghana's other largest grievance: overseas debt. In January 1967, Ankrah telephoned Downing Street with a private message for Prime Minister Wilson on this issue. He stated: 'Kwesi Armah is worth £1m sterling from misappropriated funds [from the Ghanaian state]. He has twelve houses in London and a hotel in Brighton. Armah is custodian of Nkrumah's money'. He added that, until Ghana got disclosure from Armah they were 'not able to get their hands on this money which would enable them to help repay their [national] debts.' By 'disclosure' he seems to have meant precise details of bank accounts and deposits. Ankrah argued that Ghana was now struggling to repay money that London had lent to Nkrumah to support his regime.[45] Speaking bluntly, Ankrah warned Wilson that Armah was 'their business' and not a matter for Britain. British officials subsequently conceded that Armah had 'displayed more than the usual rapacity even by Nkrumahist standards'.[46]

The Ghanaian authorities had hoped to put Armah before the ongoing Jiagge Commission, which was investigating assets allegedly stolen under Nkrumah. Each day the Commission hearings saw a 'fight for seats in the gallery', and in the absence of Armah,

[42] TNA, FCO/38/157, Accra to London (Flash), 25 January 1967; Accra to London (Immediate), 25 January 1967.
[43] Ibid. Smedley to London, 'Kwesi Armah', 28 January 1967.
[44] 'Ghana denial by Lord Brockway', *The Times*, 1 March 1967.
[45] TNA, FCO/38/157, Andrews to Mackilligin, 26 January 1967. See also Henry Addison, Ghana UK Sign Loan Agreement', *Ghanaian Times*, 22 August 1967.
[46] TNA, FCO/38/157, Accra to London, 18 February 1967.

the star of the show was the flamboyant Krobo Edusei, former Minister of the Interior.[47] Diplomats observed that the NLC 'could not bear to think of Armah getting away scot free with his loot', particularly as demands were then arriving from London for payment of huge costs incurred by the Ghana High Commission during Armah's time in office, including the shipment by air freight of a vast quantity of personal effects.[48] Meanwhile, Nkrumahists celebrated the trajectory of someone they called 'a London saint'.[49] However, even Armah's comparatively comfortable exile had its human cost; his family lived under house arrest for two years before they were allowed to join him in Britain.[50]

Remarkably, there are indications that British officials had deliberately strung along their Ghanaian counterparts for their own political benefit. Foreign Office diplomats had considered warning Ghana not to seek Armah's extradition, knowing it would not succeed. However, they realised this was unwise as they were 'embroiled with the Ghana government over Bing'.[51] As Nkrumah's long-serving Attorney General and key advisor, Geoffrey Bing was one of the masterminds behind Nkrumah's Pan-African aspirations. He was also a well-connected former British Labour MP. Bing had been arrested and imprisoned in Accra on the day of the coup, and to avoid any implicit bargaining surrounding his return to Britain in exchange for the deportation of Armah, British officials deliberately waited for the NLC to expel Bing before they began communications relating to Armah.[52] On 10 February 1967, Ankrah bitterly recounted the ways in which his regime had been 'helpful to Britain, especially the early restoration of Mr Bing as a gesture to the Labour government…despite the criminal charges lying against him.' He also sourly observed that 'Mr Jenkins and Kwesi Armah were friends'.[53]

This perhaps explains why Bing, Nkrumah's closest adviser and interrogator-in-chief during numerous security inquiries, was ultimately allowed to leave Ghana.[54] Bing claims that when he was initially arrested, he was beaten badly in the courtyard of the

[47] TNA, FCO/38/150, 'The Jiagge Commission', 27 May 1967. See also 'White paper on the report of the Jiagge Commission of Enquiry into the assets of specified persons,' WP.3/69, Government of Ghana, 1969; PRAAD, RG1/1/44, Hayron-Benjamin, Solicitor-General, 'List of properties belonging to Krobe Edusei', 13 April 1967.
[48] TNA, FC0/38/160, Accra to London, 18 February 1967.
[49] Kwame Kesse-Adu, 'Kwesi Armeah - a London saint?, Accra diary, *Pioneer*, 4 July 1967.
[50] Esther Armah, *Can I Be Me?* (London: iUniverse, 2006), p. 6.
[51] TNA, FCO/38/157, Accra to London, 18 February 1967.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid. Record of conversation with Ankrah, 10 February 1967.
[54] Rockefeller Archives, Ford Foundation, Wyzanski report, 'Ghana', pp. 8-11, 8 September 1960.

Central Police Station. After two months in James Fort Prison, he was allowed to depart for Britain.[55] From there he rushed out a memoir, defending Nkrumah's international standing by emphasising his contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle, and settling scores with figures like Yaw Manu, who had been seized in transit at Accra airport in 1963 while Bing was Attorney-General. Bing had interrogated him personally and Manu insisted that he had only confessed because his tea was drugged. However, Bing now claimed that Manu had offered to inform on his compatriots for a hefty fee.[56] Memories were long and in the following decades, the political landscape and contemporary historical narrative was shaped by hotly contested debates with and between exiles.

Nkrumah's Flight to Guinea and the Ghana-Guinea Dispute

In the days following the coup, it was a matter of urgency for Nkrumah that a safe location be found for him and his associates, which could offer them asylum for the foreseeable future, or at least until a countercoup could take place. Conakry, the capital of Guinea, offered several strategic advantages, being close enough to Ghana to provide a convenient platform for action, yet sufficiently distant to provide a degree of security from the new Ghanaian regime. Most important, however, was Nkrumah's personal connection to Guinea's president, Sékou Touré. Having created the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union in 1958 both to foster Pan-Africanist ideals, and as a challenge to de Gaulle's neo-colonial ambitions, Nkrumah could rely on a longstanding ally who shared his ideological vision.[57] Nkrumah arrived in Guinea on 2 March 1966 and one day later, Touré proclaimed Nkrumah as joint head of state of Guinea at a rally in his honour. Touré announced: 'The Ghanaian traitors have been mistaken in thinking that Nkrumah is simply a Ghanaian,' when he was instead 'a universal man.'[58] Nkrumah underlined this understanding a month after arriving in Guinea through his self-sponsored magazine *Africa and the World*, in the only interview he gave during his time in exile: 'As for Guinea, Sékou Touré and the people of Guinea share the same political ideals as I.' He continued: 'We are one people, one country. We are comrades and brothers. So far as we are concerned Guinea and

[55] Bing, *Reap the Whirlwind,* pp. 273, 372.
[56] Ibid., p. 249.
[57] Ghana and Guinea formed their union in 1958, with Mali joining in 1960.
[58] Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years*, p. 6.

Ghana are one.' Thus, Nkrumah rejected the very idea of his exile, asserting that as a Pan-Africanist he was 'at home anywhere in Africa'.[59]

Unsurprisingly, relations between Ghana and Guinea deteriorated markedly. Nkrumah's presence as an exile would have been damaging enough, but Touré's longstanding personal alliance with Nkrumah meant that he was willing to provide the toppled president with more than simple refuge. Nkrumah was given a residence in Conakry known as Villa Syli, which served as both his home and base of political operations. Touré ensured that this was well-equipped, allowing Nkrumah to continue his political life in Guinea with relative efficiency.[60] Nkrumah was explicit about using Guinea as a platform from which to launch a countercoup, something which Touré publicly endorsed. Not only did he pledge to militarily support Nkrumah's efforts to reinstate himself, but he also affirmed that following the coup, Guinea 'must consider itself in a state of war [with Ghana]'[61] Touré gave Nkrumah free reign to directly address the Ghanaian populace via Radio Conakry, enabling Nkrumah to retain a domestic presence in exile and to encourage resistance to the NLC. Seeking to reinforce his status as legitimate leader of Ghana, the Ghanaian national anthem was played at the culmination of each broadcast, six of which he made within two months of the coup.[62] Several broadcasts directly alluded to Nkrumah's plans for a countercoup, reassuring the Ghanaian populace that he would 'be with you sooner than [his] detractors expect' and that his 'coming to Accra will be obvious to you.'[63] Ankrah complained vociferously to the OAU Secretary General about these 'treasonable' broadcasts which, he argued, contravened OAU resolutions prohibiting 'subversion by radio.'[64]

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[59] Moorland-Spingarn Research Center (MSRC), Howard University, Nkrumah Papers, Box.154-17, Nkrumah Interview with Douglas Rogers of 'Africa and the World', 12 April 1966. Nkrumah reiterated this in his 1968 Message to the Black People of Britain, in which he stated that 'Every country and town in Africa is my home'; see K. Nkrumah, *The Struggle Continues* (London: Panaf, 1973), p. 14.

[60] Biney, 'The Development of Kwame Nkrumah's Political Thought', p. 85.

[61] *Africa Research Bulleti*n, III, 2, 1966, p.470; cited in W. A. E. Skurnik, 'Ghana and Guinea, 1966-A Case Study in Inter-African Relations', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.5, No.3 (1967), p. 374.

[62] PRAAD-Accra, ADM 5/4/380, 'The Ghana Case in the Ghana-Guinea Dispute- Through the Documents', Ankrah to Diallo-Telli, 27 April 1966; for the dates and content of Nkrumah's broadcasts, see *Voice from Conakry*, (Panaf Publications, 1967).

[63] Nkrumah Broadcast 20 March 1966, p. 11, printed in *Voice from Conakry*, Nkrumah Broadcast 10 April 1966, p. 25, ibid.

[64] PRAAD-Accra, ADM 5/4/380, 'The Ghana Case in the Ghana-Guinea Dispute- Through the Documents', Ankrah to Diallo-Telli, 27 April 1966.

While the NLC were displeased with this blatant challenge to their new regime, they were not overly concerned that these fighting words would translate into action. Kotoka dismissed Touré's claims of future military intervention as an 'empty threat,' especially as Guinean forces would have to travel through the Ivory Coast, 'whose forces are already guarding the border with Guinea'.[65] NLC concern over Nkrumah's multiple entreaties for the populace to rise in his support was also tempered by their conviction that the intense domestic hardships of Nkrumah's last years in office had sapped support for his presidency, even among die-hard CPP members. Nevertheless, these portentous statements of overtly subversive intent could not be entirely dismissed.

Despite such strident threats of military action, hostility between the two states instead centred on an escalating diplomatic furore focused on involuntary detention and claims of exile. In the days following Nkrumah's arrival in Conakry, the NLC suspended diplomatic relations with Guinea in protest at Touré's 'unfriendly acts'.[66] In retaliation, Guinea detained the Ghanaian embassy staff and their families, preventing their return to Accra. While they were released a month later following the intercession of UN Secretary General U Thant, the NLC remained deeply agitated about the presence in Guinea of Ghanaians in Nkrumah's orbit. Nkrumah had a significant entourage who, in the aftermath of the coup, had followed him to Guinea and joined him in exile. By the NLC's count, this retinue numbered around 100 Ghanaians, 70 of whom were security staff who had accompanied Nkrumah on his trip to Peking, and 28 of whom were students who had been studying in the USSR at the time of the coup. Significantly, these students had been repatriated to Guinea rather than Ghana, something which troubled the NLC. However, when the NLC questioned Soviet officials, they denied 'all knowledge as to how these students got to Conakry' and were generally uncooperative.[67] NLC scepticism over this denial was subsequently proved justifiable: KGB archives reveal that Soviet officials were in fact involved in planning the exit trajectories for various Ghanaians stranded in the USSR at the time of the coup. One such document states that the preference of the Soviets was to send these students to a 'friendly country'.[68]

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[65] 'Ghana General Derides Threat of Invasion', *The Times*, 12 March 1966, p. 7.
[66] PRAAD-Accra, ADM 5/4/380, 'The Ghana Case in the Ghana-Guinea Dispute- Through the Documents', N.A. Quao to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Conakry, 3 March 1966.
[67] Ibid, Aide Memoire: Ghanaian Refugees in the Republic of Guinea, 31 August 1966, p. 22.
[68] Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhba bezpeky Ukraïny (HDA SBU), f.16, op.1, spr.955, ark.155, Letter from V. Nikitchenko (Head of Ukrainian KGB) to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, 6 May 1966;

While the NLC accepted that a few fanatical followers might desire to stay with Nkrumah, they argued that many of this retinue were in fact were being held in Guinea 'against their will'.[69] The NLC called upon the international community, including the OAU, the UN Refugee Council, and the Red Cross, to pressure the Guinean government into releasing what they viewed not as voluntary exiles but as captive citizens. However, these organisations were largely reticent to get heavily involved, because these individuals occupied a liminal space between exile and captive which external organisations and governments could not easily ascertain. When approached, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees expressed that while he was happy to assist, this was 'not strictly a refugees problem as normally understood.' While the NLC sought to frame the issue as one concerning a group of refugees with an overarching goal of return, the High Commissioner felt it would be best if each case was 'dealt with individually.'[70] Assuming a blanket desire to return was imprudent, especially regarding the 70 security officials, some of whom were likely concerned about arrest by the new government should they set foot on Ghanaian soil.

This dispute spiralled into a major international incident. Frustrated at the lack of assistance from the international community and the uncooperativeness of the Guinean government, the NLC arrested 19 Guineans whose plane had made a short stop at Accra airport on its way to Lagos. Four of those detained were Guinean officials, including the Guinean foreign minister Louis Lansana Béavogui, all of whom had been on route to the OAU conference in Addis Ababa.[71] The Guinean response was swift and explosive. Rather than direct aggression towards Accra, Touré alleged that US imperialist puppeteering of the NLC was 'entirely responsible' for the arrests. He encouraged demonstrations outside the US Embassy in Conakry and briefly placed the newly arrived US Ambassador under house arrest.[72] Defusing hostilities between member countries was of paramount importance to the nascent OAU, and when initial intercessions failed, official missions

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Ibid., f.16, op.1, spr.955, ark.155, Letter from Nikitchenko to Central Committee, 6 May 1966. Translation by Thom Lloyd.

[69] '18 Guinean Officials and Minister Seized by Ghana at Airport', *The New York Times*, 30 October 1966, p. 1.

[70] PRAAD-Accra, ADM 5/4/380, 'The Ghana Case in the Ghana-Guinea Dispute,' Permanent Mission of Ghana, Geneva, 'Ghanaian Refugees in Conakry, Guinea-Meeting with Mr Jamieson, Director of Operations, UN High Commission for Refugees, Geneva', 16 September 1966, p. 29.

[71] '18 Guinean Officials and Minister Seized by Ghana at Airport', *The New York Times*, 30 October 1966, p. 1.

[72] 'Guinea Demands U.S. Act to Free Hostages Taken by Ghana: Situation 'Serious' News Conference Booklet' *Washington Post*, 2 November 1966, p. 14.

were sent to both Conakry and Accra. Ankrah rejected efforts to placate the NLC by interviewing the Ghanaians resident in Conakry and assuring them of their freedom to return. He stated that these statements were not freely made unless given on neutral ground.[73] It took an ad hoc meeting of OAU leaders on 5th November to defuse the situation sufficiently to allow for the return of the 19 captured Guineans. Meanwhile the majority of Nkrumah's Ghanaian entourage remained in Conakry.[74]

The NLC did not however stop campaigning for this group's return. Portraying them as captives not only undermined the notion that Nkrumah retained a solid base of loyal followers through which he could resume power, it also served to refute accusations of human rights abuses by the NLC from exiled Nkrumahists. Appeals to the International Committee of Jurists by Kwesi Armah in December 1967 raised the issue of detentions and abductions of CPP loyalists, utilising the discourse of the international human rights movement.[75] In return, the Ghanaian state conspicuously adopted the same language in its dispute with Guinea. In April 1968, President Tubman of Liberia facilitated the return of thirty-five of Nkrumah's security personnel from Guinea, bringing the total number of returnees to fifty; a similar number remained in Guinea. Ghana expressed its deep appreciation to Tubman, stating: 'This demonstration of characteristic African concern for human suffering has won the admiration of the Ghana government and will no doubt arouse a deep sense of gratitude in many Ghanaian homes to which the arrival of these citizens will restore father, brother, uncles and sons.'[76] Harlley hoped that, with a visibly shrinking exile base, Nkrumah 'might be persuaded to go to Cuba', reducing his physical proximity and therefore the sense of imminent threat he posed.[77]

Nkrumahist Subversion from Exile

Harlley's hopes were not realised, as Nkrumah remained steadfast in his determination to return. His correspondence constantly reaffirmed his imminent homecoming, his

[73] Skurnik, 'Ghana and Guinea, 1966,'pp. 369-372.
[74] Nine of the students had been permitted to return in the week preceding the arrest of the 19 Guineans, see '18 Guinean Officials and Minister Seized By Ghana at Airport', *New York Times*, 30 October 1966, p. 1 (contd p. 13).
[75] Ibid., 'Kwesi Armah', 29 December 1967.
[76] TNA,FCO/38/151, 'Statement by the Ghana Government on arrival in Ghana of 35 members of Nkrumah's Security Personnel in Guinea,' 23 April 1968.
[77] Ibid., Thomson (SLO) to Smedley, 22 April 1968.

boundless self-confidence implicit in the observation that a 'little suffering would make them realise the value of what I have done for them,' thus paving the way for his reinstatement. Nkrumah even referred to his time in Guinea as 'like a holiday' from which he would return refreshed.[78] However, this did not mean that he was not actively strategizing to achieve his goals. During his first few months of exile, Nkrumah established contact with covert groups of supporters, inside and outside Ghana. In April 1966, hinting at such clandestine activities in a letter to Christine Johnson, a friend from his time studying in the US, he asserted: 'I do not think it will be long until I am back in Ghana. Every preparation is being made to that end.'[79] He continued to project this sense of optimism in his letters until the end of the decade; despite multiple setbacks, he wrote in 1969 to author Reba Lewis that '[m]y exile is coming to an end and our return to Ghana is quite certain'.[80]

To lay the groundwork for his envisaged return, Nkrumah used print media in an effort to reinforce his influence within Ghana. Alongside his Radio Conakry broadcasts, Nkrumah issued pamphlets in a way which closely resembled Busia's exiled publications exile in the early 1960s (Chapter 3). One example was 'Ghana: The Way Out', published in May 1968, in which he urged his fellow Ghanaians to reject peaceful protest and instead forcibly remove the NLC from power.[81] The monthly magazine *Africa and the World*, published by London-based Panaf Publications and previously funded by Nkrumah's government via the Bureau of African Affairs, also contributed to these efforts. Now funded directly by Nkrumah, the magazine was a key platform for Nkrumah's political outlook. Douglas Rogers and John Marshment, its editor and publisher respectively, were among the first to visit Nkrumah in exile, and during their April 1966 trip they strategized with Nkrumah to 'get his voice heard in Ghana.' Milne later recalled that 'posters and "minimag" editions of the magazine' were quickly produced for the purpose of smuggling them into Ghana.[82] These efforts certainly worried the NLC; during Ankrah's October 1967 visit to London, his complaints centered on the threat of exiles and the subversive efforts of Panaf Publications in particular. Ankrah also bemoaned BBC appearances by

[78] MSRC, Box.154-2, Nkrumah to Naguib Bakhom, 13 October 1966.
[79] Ibid., Nkrumah to Christine Johnson, 12 April 1966.
[80] MSRC, Box.154-5, Nkrumah to Reba Lewis, 28 April 1969.
[81] A.B. Assensoh, 'Ghana: politics of betrayal,' *New African*, 1 March 2007, p. 54.
[82] Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years*, p. 13.

Bing and Armah, together with the activities of the UK-based Socialist Ghana Defence Committee, coordinated by Ekow Eshun. While he was assured by British officials that all this had 'minimal' influence and that meetings of the Committee were poorly attended, this did little to assuage his concerns.[83]

However, Nkrumah's plans for return went beyond simply maintaining his domestic voice. As Natalia Telepneva has shown using eastern bloc archives, between 1966 and 1968 Nkrumah's loyalists in exile and their sympathizers in Ghana made several attempts to prepare countercoups with the help of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Dubbed "Operation ALEX", this featured an incompetent effort by Czech intelligence to support Nkrumah loyalists in their attempts to launch a countercoup within Ghana. Within weeks of Nkrumah's overthrow, Leonid Brezhnev, the new leader of the Soviet Union, authorised sending a shipload of weapons to Conakry to aid Nkrumah's exiles. However, his Politburo colleague Aleksey Kosygin argued against the idea, and after further exhortation from the Soviet ambassador in Accra, Aleksey Voronin, who dismissed it as a madcap scheme, the shipment was withdrawn mid-voyage. In April 1967, Moscow's head of military intelligence Petr Ivashutin, reviewed the chances of Nkrumahist exiles successfully returning to power and judged Busia more likely to replace the NLC with a right-leaning democratic government. [84]

The Czechs had been supplying arms to Nkrumah since 1961 and had offered to help investigate the Kulungugu bombing of 1962.[85] After the 1966 coup, Czech secret services developed contact with sympathetic figures both inside and outside Ghana. However, their regional allies, including Amílcar Cabral who was leading the struggle against Portuguese rule in what would become Guinea-Bissau, warned them that although Nkrumah dreamed of restoration, he was now impotent, more a philosopher of Pan-Africanism than a credible politician. Nevertheless, in 1967 Prague backed Kofi Batsa, an Nkrumah ally who had previously edited the socialist newspaper *The Spark*, in his plans to stage a coup. However, Batsa's attempts to spawn an underground resistance movement to prepare the way for Nkrumah's return to Ghana were unsuccessful, and thereafter the Czech government became increasingly sceptical of Nkrumah's potential

[83] TNA, FCO/38/150, Tebbit memorandum, 'General Ankrah's Visit to Britain - the activities of Ghanian dissidents', 17 October 1967.
[84] Telepneva, 'Saving Ghana's Revolution', pp. 4, 8-15.
[85] Philip Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968,* (New York: Palgrave, 2016) pp. 74-7.

for a comeback and the political value of exiles. Instead, their focus shifted to working from inside the Ghanaian military.[86]

On 17 April 1967 an attempted coup codenamed 'Operation Guitar Boy' took place. This was a relatively amateur affair led by disaffected junior officers and local soldiers from Ghana's reconnaissance regiment and was easily defeated.[87] General Kotoka, one of the four senior NLC leaders, was the only resultant fatality. However, while the NLC retained power, the official security response was also remarkably shambolic. During the coup attempt, Ankrah's guards at Osu Castle ran low on ammunition and the attackers were eventually driven off with the help of local civilians using sticks and stones. Indeed, General Kotoka's death should have been easily avoided. Ankrah recounted privately that he had quickly warned his fellow NLC members of the coup, first ringing Kotoka, 'who was in bed with his mistress.' He was told to 'get out quickly', and as Ankrah later lamented: 'The General had delayed, however, and if he had taken his advice need not have died'. Another NLC council member replied to Ankrah's warning that 'if he was to die he preferred to die drunk rather than sober and did nothing but stay at home and drink'.[88] While this coup was successfully prevented, it nonetheless significantly amplified NLC fears of subversion and overthrow. The death of Kotoka, the senior military member of the NLC and a close friend of Harlley, destabilised the ruling group's dynamics. Widely regarded as a moderate voice within the leadership, historians have suggested that his death damaged the long-term viability of the NLC and contributed to its ultimate downfall.[89] Ankrah was increasingly lonely and isolated, forced to hide behind his security. While he had loved attending football and horse-racing events, British officials relayed that he was now 'compelled to watch these on TV'.[90]

Indeed, in its first year, the new administration had mostly been concerned with the activities of the upper echelons of the ousted Nkrumah government. Boye Moses, a top Nkrumah security aide, and other high-level officials who had fled into exile were

[86] Telepneva, 'Saving Ghana's Revolution', pp. 12-18.
[87] So-called because on seizing Broadcasting House, they played the popular hit song "Guitar Boy".
[88] TNA, FCO/38/150, 'General Ankrah', 6 June 1967.
[89] Frederick Pedler, *Main Currents of West African History 1940–1978* (London: Palgrave, 1979), pp. 137-43; Björn Hettne, 'Soldiers and politics: the case of Ghana,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.17, No.2 (1980): 173-93. See also L.H. Ofosu-Appiah, *The life of Lt.-General EK Kotoka: the hero of Ghana's 24th February revolution* (Accra: Waterville, 1972).
[90] TNA, FCO/38/150, 'General Ankrah', 6 June 1967.

monitored and captured, not only to answer for their supposed crimes during the previous administration, but also to prevent a counter coup. However, after "Operation Guitar Boy" the NLC diversified and intensified its extra-territorial efforts to monitor and arrest more exiled political actors.

Surveillance, Detention and Abduction

While Nkrumah's supporters awaited their leader's triumphant return, it was meanwhile necessary for them to adapt to the reality of exile and gauge their vulnerability in the face of the new Ghanaian regime. A month after the coup, Ankrah sought to reassure Ghanaians at home and abroad by stating categorically that the NLC did not intend 'to replace the sorrow of one set of family by the sorrow of another through the use of the preicious (sic) weapon of detention.' Those ministers who had been detained in the immediate aftermath of the coup would be investigated, to see if there were 'concrete criminal cases' against them. If there was proof that such individuals had been coerced into collaborating with Nkrumah 'under duress and against their conscience', they would be released. Ankrah went so far as to entreat the Ghanaian people to extend their traditional hospitality to these '"misguided sheep"'.[91] However, fear of the machinations of Nkrumah and the CPP in exile, together with their Eastern Bloc allies, undermined these resolutions. Significant effort was exerted to track down members of the former CPP government who were still collaborating with Nkrumah and who might pose a threat to the new regime. On 29 November 1966, the Ghanaian *Daily Graphic* newspaper ran the front-page headline 'Nkrumah and Three Others Wanted for Murder'. A reward of £10,000 was offered for their return to Ghana 'dead or alive'.[92] The 'three others' were Ambrose Yankey Sr., MA Mensah, and Boye Moses, who had all been members of Nkrumah's personal security detail.[93]

In a remarkable mirroring of the anxiety felt by opposition exiles during the previous decade (see Chapter 4), it was now the turn of Nkrumahists to be similarly vigilant. Abduction was a particular threat to Nkrumah and his entourage, something of

[91] NARA-RG59, Politics/Defense, Box.2234, POL 15-1, 1/1/66, Telegram from the American Embassy in Accra to the Secretary of State, 25 March 1966; TNA, FCO/38/143 'Ghana: The first year of the NLC', 10 April 1967.
[92] 'Nkrumah and Three Others Wanted for Murder', *Daily Graphic*, 29 November 1966.
[93] Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years*, p. 19.

which his security officers were acutely aware. Guinean naval ships patrolled the shoreline on which Nkrumah's villa was situated, searching for suspicious vessels. According to June Milne, fishing boats with Ghanaian crew members were searched 'on more than one occasion'.[94] His supporters were particularly concerned about the looming threat of abduction, with one ally going so far as to urge Nkrumah to return to Accra to stand trial, as it 'would be more dignified than waiting to be kidnapped and brought back unwillingly.'[95]

In January 1967, the NLC managed to kidnap Boye Moses, one of the three senior security officers for whom the substantial reward was offered. He was brought back to Accra and paraded through the streets in an iron cage to visible public delight, as the police motorcade took him to the Ussher Fort prison.[96] Moses had himself previously masterminded the kidnap of exiled politicians during the Nkrumah era, and so this turn of events had a particular piquancy for those who witnessed the triumphant display of his capture. Moses was held for three years without being brought to trial, a fact which the exiled CPP was quick to highlight. Kwesi Armah, safe in London, spoke out about Moses' continued imprisonment, stating that it was 'just another technique to deal with an opponent or one disliked by the NLC government.'[97] Tactics which had been routine under CPP rule were backfiring now that they were out of power, though Armah's statement lacked any appreciation of this irony.

While the NLC had largely focused on ensuring internal army loyalty over exilic machinations during its first year in power, during 1967 its awareness of subversive activities beyond Ghana's borders increased. On the day of Moses' recapture, the Ghanaian authorities claimed they had foiled a nascent CPP plot involving two army lieutenants and two former students of the disbanded Nkrumah Ideological Institute.[98] Defectors also presented evidence of the smuggling of arms and money from Guinea. Adolphus Martei, who surrendered himself on arriving in Ghana, provided evidentiary

[94] Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years*, pp. 19-20.
[95] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.154-1, Barbara Acquah to Kwame Nkrumah, 1 September 1966.
[96] Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), p. 117.
[97] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.154-40, Statement by Kwesi Armah Ghana's Former High Commissioner to the UK and Ex-Minister of Trade, 1 January 1969.
[98] TNA, FCO/38/147, Ghana Press Release No.7/1967 'Statement on attempted coup in Ghana', 24 January 1967.

detail including the claim that China, not Russia, was Nkrumah's main financial backer to the tune of $500,000.[99]

By late January 1967, the NLC was increasingly determined to clamp down on dissent at home and abroad. Choosing to make an example of a few, the NLC re-introduced military tribunals. It insisted there was 'overwhelming support of the people' for 'vengeance against rabid henchmen of the deposed President'. Emphasising past restraint, its press release continued:

> Regrettably a very small minority of former supporters of the banned C.P.P have ... been indulging in various acts of subversion and sabotage against the Government and people of Ghana, including the holding of secret meetings to plan confusion and assassination, dissemination of baseless and false rumours calculated to underline [sic] people's faith in the permanency of their newly-won freedom, encouragement of unreasonable strikes and smuggling of communications to and from Guinea'.[100]

Unsurprisingly, "Operation Guitar Boy", the failed coup of May 1967, further increased the NLC's fear of exiled Nkrumahists, and led them to widen their conception of security threat.

As a result of this attention, life for Nkrumah's global foot-soldiers became tougher with each passing year. In June 1969, exiled Ghanaian journalist A.B. Assensoh wrote to Nkrumah to acquaint him with this reality, explaining that '…the NLC Government of Ghana has started combing for all followers of Dr Nkrumah who were able to escape to nearby countries. This development started when the arch traitor, Kotoka, was killed.'[101] He noted that life as an exiled CPP supporter became significantly more precarious in the wake of this event, forcing exiles to reconsider how they operated to preserve their security, Assensoh told Nkrumah that he had moved from central Lagos to the suburbs 'because of possible arrest', a decision rooted in his experience.[102] In 1967, Assensoh had been arrested and nearly extradited from Liberia, after his frequent visits to Nkrumah in

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[99] TNA, FCO/38/147, Ghana Ministry of Information, 'Nkrumah's Subversive activities Against Ghana', 2 February 1967.
[100] Ibid., Ghana Press Release No.3.1967, 'Statement by the Government of Ghana on Subversion and Sabotage', 16 January 1967.
[101] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-1, Letter from A.B. Assensoh to Nkrumah, June 1969, p. 27.
[102] *Ibid*.

Guinea drew the attention of Ghanaian security officials. Assensoh had travelled to Liberia to accept the editorship of a cluster of publications owned by Charles Cecil Dennis Sr., including *The Listener*, the country's oldest paper. Ghanaian operatives had persuaded the Liberian authorities to arrest him and only intervention by Dennis, himself a prominent Liberian politician, saved him from extradition.[103]

Ghanaian journalists who were critical of the NLC were equally vulnerable to increased extra-territorial aggression. In 1969, 24-year-old journalist Emmanuel Babatunda Jenkins Harrison provided Nkrumah with a detailed account of his periodic detention by the NLC over the previous three years. Having worked as a reporter at the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation until the coup, Jenkins Harrison had subsequently travelled to Nairobi for a course in journalism. However, on his return to Ghana he was detained for nine weeks because of an article in which he had criticised the NLC. After his release Jenkins Harrison fled to Nigeria, but in June 1967, two months after Kotoka's assassination, he was 'arrested and abducted to Ghana', where he was placed 'in protective custody for 27 months.'[104]

This proactive abduction and detention of exiles had unintended consequences. It brought previously geographically dispersed exiles together under the same prison roof, unifying them with a shared grievance. Reflecting on his time in detention, Harrison explained to Nkrumah how the experience provided the 'opportunity of coming into contact with well tested fighters…' He had met Nkrumah loyalists in prison including Ekow Eshun and Boye Moses. In their company, Harrison clarified his political vision and his role as a 'revolutionary' going forward. Through this contact he '…became convinced that for the realization of the African dream, it is only the sacrifices of our whole lives, that will serve as recipe for our success.' More than two years of shared imprisonment turned detainees' disparate hopes for Nkrumah's return, and personal goals for the African continent, into what Jenkins Harrison characterised as 'a step further': as a result, these men now formed a 'cell, pledged and sacrificed to this end.'[105]

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[103] Assensoh, *Kwame Nkrumah: Six Years In Exile,* pp. 19-23.
[104] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.154-4, Jenkins Harrison to Nkrumah, undated, approx. September/November 1969, Lagos.
[105] Ibid.

Released in September 1969 following the repeal of the 1966 Protective Custody Decree, Jenkins Harrison and his group were free to realise this ambition. While Ghana's premier had stated on their release that he 'hoped the men would be rehabilitated and given the opportunity of taking their places as worthy citizens of the country,' very few remained in Ghana.[106] Jenkins Harrison himself returned to the relative safety of Lagos to continue his career as 'a revolutionary and journalist.'[107] Indeed, despite this apparent zeal, the efforts of supporters like Jenkins Harrison bore little fruit; June Milne has candidly described the cumulative disappointment of the many failed and aborted attempts to reinstate Nkrumah.[108]

Surprisingly, these attempts were often torpedoed by Nkrumahist sympathisers themselves. While the NLC was able to monitor exile subversion from their embassies across West Africa, this was not their key source of intelligence. Instead, Assensoh argues that the NLC successfully targeted the personal interests of some Nkrumahists to coopt them into its intelligence network. Even imprisoned CPP officials were not immune to such pressure: many of their families still lived in government-owned housing, and the freezing of bank accounts and threats of eviction were highly successful in ensuring covert cooperation.[109] Thus it was that information leaked by senior CPP leaders was used to locate and extradite such high-profile exiles as Ekow Eshun. Secretary of the CPP in London and coordinator of pro-Nkrumah activities across Europe, Eshun enjoyed relative safety in London. However, details of his planned trip to Cotonou to meet other CPP stalwarts in September 1967 were leaked by 'turncoats' inside Nkrumah's organization. He was arrested and extradited back to Ghana 'under heavy guard', where he was 'humiliated' and imprisoned.[110]

Assensoh's instructive analysis of the motivations and impact of double agents stems from having been one himself. In his memoir about Nkrumah's time in exile, he states:

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[106] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.154-4, *The Ghanaian Times* Extract, Front page, 5 September 1969.
[107] Ibid., Jenkins Harrison to Nkrumah, undated, approx. September/November 1969, Lagos.
[108] Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years*, p. 9.
[109] A.B Assensoh, 'Ghana: politics of betrayal,' *New African*, 1 March 2007, p. 55.
[110] Assensoh, *Kwame Nkrumah, Six Years In Exile,* pp. 15-17. See also A.B. Assensoh, 'Ghana: politics of betrayal,' *New African*.

> In order to guarantee my personal safety, I was compelled to accept the role of a 'double agent', collaborating with the NLC in one way or another. It was very difficult for me to play that role squarely and genuinely but, as circumstances dictated, I had no choice and was not to blame. Even men and women who fed fat on Nkrumah's magnanimity and sheer friendship had cause to change colour like the proverbial chameleon.[111]

Persuaded to turn informant by the head of Special Branch Charles Kwashie Mawuenyegah, Assensoh was struck by the effectiveness of the NLC's tactics: 'His office had a copy of every letter I brought from Nkrumah to his CPP associates in Ghana', without him having supplied any of them.[112] Assensoh recalled a diplomat boasting: 'Even when Nkrumah coughs in Guinea, we know it and why so.'[113]

General accounts of exiles and the national state during the second half of the twentieth century have often analysed exile through the conceptual prism of 'loyalty'- to nation, people, and ideals.[114] Assensoh's account instead frames the experience of exile as a battle for resource in a context of scarcity and insecurity. Exiled Nkrumahists lived precarious lives, and self-preservation was paramount. Many were both personally and financially insecure, making them easy targets for manipulation by intelligence operatives. Assensoh himself had a complex relationship with his status as a double agent. While loyal to Nkrumahist principles, the cold political reality was defined both by his need to secure his personal safety and by Nkrumah's swiftly declining domestic reputation. He remained a Nkrumahist at heart, but was forced to conclude that, though his deposed leader remained revered on the world stage, 'he was worth nothing back in Ghana'.[115]

For many, professing loyalty to Nkrumah was equally a function of financial precarity. June Milne states that one of the most dispiriting aspects of the disillusionment surrounding Nkrumah's return was how frequently 'those who visited Nkrumah claiming to be working for his reinstatement in Ghana asked for cash.'[116] In fact, Jenkins Harrison's

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[111] Assensoh, *Kwame Nkrumah: Six Years In Exile,* p. 17.
[112] Ibid.
[113] A.B. Assensoh, 'Ghana: politics of betrayal,' *New African*, 1 March 2007, p. 55.
[114] A key example of this framing is Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty*. See in particular pp. 3-17.
[115] Assensoh, *Kwame Nkrumah: Six Years In Exile,* pp. 19-23.
[116] Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years*, pp. 9-10.

claims to revolutionary fervor can be contextualised by the fact that his 1969 letter to Nkrumah sought financial aid: 'Since I came out of prison' he explained, 'things have been very difficult for me, financially, at least…' He requested that Nkrumah provide him with funds to study journalism and guerrilla warfare tactics in Cuba, China, or the GDR.[117] In this way, the line between loyalty and self-interest for exiles was unavoidably blurred. Unfortunately for impoverished exiles, Nkrumah now had little largesse to dispense.

Money

Financial difficulties were a significant unifying factor for many exiled Nkrumah supporters. While this does not in itself distinguish their experience from those exiled in the previous decade, the particular dynamics of money and patronage were altered significantly by Nkrumah's international prominence. Providing the centripetal force for the CPP exile community, he generated expectation and was the target of numerous requests for financial support. Nkrumah was himself financing individuals and projects around the world, for example the above-mentioned magazine *Africa and the World*, which he funded from what he described as 'my own pocket money' at a cost of over $10,000 a month.[118] Exiles therefore looked overwhelmingly to Nkrumah to relieve their suffering not only through his return but also through financial aid.

Exile offered some political safety, but often at the cost of financial hardship. Amma Serwah, who had previously worked at Flagstaff House, the Ghanaian seat of government, wrote to Nkrumah of her family's struggles in London. She was unable to work because two of her children were not yet of school age and she had suffered the loss of one of her twin daughters, who died soon after birth in 1967. While the remaining children were 'doing fine', it was impossible for her to support them as 'there is no money'. The concluding sentence of her letter expresses not only her dire situation, but also the extent to which she was reliant on Nkrumah to end her suffering: 'Nana your daughter is dying of hunger therefore your immediate return to power is my daily

[117] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.154-4, Jenkins Harrison to Nkrumah, undated, approx. September/November 1969, Lagos.

[118] Ibid., Box.154-8, Kwame Nkrumah to Pat Sloan, 18 September 1968. There was contemporary speculation about Nkrumah's funds, with some assuming he had 'vast sums deposited in Swiss banks' (Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years,* p. 10). While this was denied by Milne, he did initially receive funds from Guinea and other sympathetic governments, together with publishing income.

prayers'.[119] A common motif is Nkrumah as a central, quasi-Messianic figure whose restoration would liberate his followers from suffering in exile.

However, Nkrumah was unable to help even his close personal allies. Regina Asamany, Minister of Labour and Social Welfare under Nkrumah, was in consistent contact with him during her exile in London, a continuation of their close friendship in Ghana. However, as she experienced financial difficulties in 1970, her missives became increasingly urgent and distressed. Having borrowed money and mortgaged her property in Kpando to fund her flight into exile, she now faced her family home being repossessed. About to lose this last foothold in Ghana, she wrote several times pleading for aid:

> I am really sorry to write again to bother you, but I feel so much depressed that I cannot help it. As I have already written, today is 7th August and the house is going to be sold only on the 15th. The house is the only property I have got left in this world and when I loose it [sic] I will die, so Nana kindly put your eyes on God and have sympathy on me, and help me. Even if you can't get the £300 for me Any amount at all I get I can send it to my father to go and beg so that I am given a little bit of time to pay the Rest. Nana I beg you in the name of the Almighty God, save me.[120]

While Asamany and Nkrumah had shared a lively correspondence up to that point, Nkrumah does not appear to have replied to these urgent entreaties. Indeed, the wording of her initial letter suggests she was aware that such a request would not be received well, asking him to:

> …not get crossed with me when I ask for a help [sic], I know the difficulties facing you now, and I ought not to have asked you for any help at the moment, but the circumstances are beyond my control that I cannot refrain from asking you to do me this favour'.[121]

Asamany's desperation to preserve her foothold in Ghanaian society outweighed her embarrassment and concern at angering Nkrumah.

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[119] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.154-8, Amma Serwah to Kwame Nkrumah, 30 March 1968.
[120] Ibid., Box.154-1, Regina Asamany to Kwame Nkrumah, 7 August 1970.
[121] Ibid., 23 July 1970.

Such outspoken requests reflected not only close friendships, but also the abrupt termination of a vast system of political patronage that Nkrumah was quite unable to sustain in exile. One particularly direct missive came from TE Korankye, a CPP supporter living in London who explained: 'Although a lot of the CPP boys are suffering, yet mine is harsh and severe.'[122] His allowance having been cancelled by the NLC government, he was facing eviction and being cut off by his gas and electric companies. Korankye wrote: 'Considering the weather by this time of the year, I shall be grateful if you will be kind enough to arrange with the President of Guinea to send me a draft of £2000 to clear up these debts.'[123] Korankye received a scathing reply from June Milne. She found his 'letter so impudent and childish that I dare not show it to the President.' Instead, she encouraged him to rethink his approach, and to 'discuss the more important question of how to free our dear Ghana from the clutches of neo-colonialism and its NLC stooges' in any future correspondence.[124]

This abrupt dismissal of Korankye's personal financial difficulties reflects not only the immense volume of requests which flooded Nkrumah's offices, but also the fundamental mismatch in priorities between Nkrumah and the exile community orbiting him. The existence of his inner circle at Villa Syli was markedly different from that of the supporters with whom he ostensibly shared exile status. Guinea ensured Nkrumah's comfort, making it possible for him to spend his time writing papers and monographs exploring his Pan-African vision and future plans. By contrast, the vast majority of his contemporaries were experiencing a far more precarious existence, the grittier side of this revolutionary struggle. The disjuncture between the increasingly ideological focus of Nkrumah and the material struggles of the exile community at large led to growing resentment.

Busia, Gbedemah and the Spectrum of Exile

While the February 1966 coup had created a new wave of exiles, it had also facilitated the return of others. In an early radio address, Ankrah invited 'all Ghanaian refugees now outside Ghana who suffered in diverse ways at the hand of the old regime to return home

[122] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.154-5, TE Korankye to Kwame Nkrumah, 5 October 1967.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid., Box.154-5, June Milne to TE Korankye, October 1967.

to help in our task of nation building on sounder democratic lines.'[125] However, this process of return was not without controversy. While there was celebration among the ranks of those who had opposed Nkrumah, there were gradations in the ways in which exiles were welcomed back. Significant resentment remained towards former CPP leaders who had fled only after several years of working with Nkrumah. Komla Gbedemah was the most prominent of these ambiguous figures, and he was criticised by those who saw his flamboyant and triumphal return as an exercise in bad taste. On his arrival in Ghana in July 1966, Gbedemah was carried 'shoulder-high by an "enthusiastic" crowd' before being taken to a 'VIP lounge' by limousine.[126] In a letter to the *Legon Observer*, Ghana's university paper, Accra resident Emmanuel Agbohle noted that while he was happy to see the return of several exiled sons, his hand was 'too numb yet to extend for a handshake' to Gbedemah.[127]

Thereafter, contemporary observers frequently remarked on the dissonance between Gbedemah's long service as Nkrumah's right-hand man, and his belated claim to opposition status. The global affairs magazine *The World Today* noted that his 'record as an astute political organizer for the CPP, and a Minister for a decade, could not be erased by protestations of loyalty' to the new government.[128] Mistrust was rife, and it had not gone unnoticed that Nkrumah's last Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kojo Botsio, was one of those who had publicly greeted Gbedemah on his return.[129] While it is perhaps unsurprising that Botsio and Gbedemah would be allies, having both fallen from favour with Nkrumah with the marginalisation of the pro-Western arm of the CPP, this public display of comradeship did not help Gbedemah blend into the new political landscape.[130] His ties to his previous CPP colleagues were a reminder that Gbedemah's trajectory was distinct to that of longstanding exiles and detainees such as Kofi Busia. Agbohle's letter underlined Gbedemah's role in the rise of Nkrumah. While acknowledging that Gbedemah

[125] NARA-RG59, Politics/Defense, POL.15-1, Accra to SoS, 28 February 1966.
[126] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.2, Emmanuel Agbohle, 'The Return of Mr Gbedemah', Letters Page, *Legon Observer*, 22 July 1966, Vol.1, No.2, pp. 10-11
[127] *Ibid.*
[128] J.A. Craig, 'Ghana's General Election,' *The World Today,* Vol.25, No.10 (1969), p. 429.
[129] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.2, Emmanuel Agbohle, 'The Return of Mr Gbedemah', Letters Page, *Legon Observer*, 22 July 1966, Vol.1, No.2 pp. 10-11
[130] 'Gbedemah and Botsio to lose seats as MPs', *Ghanaian Times*, 17 January 1962.

had never been a '"gaping" sycophant', he had utilised his skill as an orator to defend an administration that he would later decry as dictatorial and corrupt from exile: [131]

> When Mr Gbedemah escaped in 1961, was it not because Nkrumah had made it plain that Ghana was too small for the two of them? Or is Mr Gbedemah saying that his last (passionate) and impotent speech against the smothering of our freedom, when Nkrumah asked for the Special Criminal Court, should absolve him for ever from any responsibility he might share with his ex-colleagues? Has he ever stopped to wonder what other Ghanaians thought of that late and useless anguished echo of what non-CPP fellow Ghanaians had been saying for years before him?[132]

For Agbohle, the lack of humility in accepting a hero's welcome cast doubt on the sincerity of Gbedemah's later opposition. Many saw his exile as the result of personal rivalry, which Gbedemah retrospectively cloaked in the discourse of freedom which had hitherto been the preserve of earlier opponents of Nkrumah's rule. As Mark Israel has suggested, while commonly characterised as an objective or bureaucratic category, in reality the status of exile is often subjective, encompassing a wide range of experiences that can 'be deployed to suit particular goals'.[133] In this respect, Gbedemah was accused by his contemporaries of utilising the symbolism of exile in an instrumental way to claim the moral high ground, obfuscating what many perceived as simple rivalry between two CPP stalwarts.

This illuminates a key conceptual discussion within the historiography concerning the moral value of different exile experiences. Agbohle asks in his letter: '…what claim does Mr Gbedemah have to a "V.I.P." treatment which other Ghanaians, who had returned months earlier after the coup from years of self-imposed, more honourable exile, did not have?'[134] His use of the term 'honourable exile' to distinguish Gbedemah's experience from that of other Ghanaians makes explicit the underlying moral judgement central to divisions and resentment within the wider Ghanaian exile network. Gbedemah was not only perceived as having experienced a 'lesser' exile, he was also criticised for cynically

[131] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.2, Emmanuel Agbohle, 'The Return of Mr Gbedemah', Letters Page, *Legon Observer*, 22 July 1966, Vol.1, No.2 pp. 10-11.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Mark Israel, *South African Political Exile in the United Kingdom* (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 7.
[134] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.2, Emmanuel Agbohle, 'The Return of Mr Gbedemah', Letters Page, *Legon Observer*, 22 July 1966, Vol.1, No.2, pp. 10-11.

donning the cloak of political principle to present his own exile experience as morally equivalent to that of others who had truly 'sacrificed'.

Accordingly, there was an emerging moral spectrum of oppositional activity. Agbohle identified a cohort of exiles whom he deemed more worthy of praise, including Emmanual Obetsebi-Lamptey, Kow Richardson, and Kofi Busia. However, he particularly invoked the opposition icon 'the great Dr Danquah' who (see Chapter 4) had shunned any form of exile due to the strength of his political convictions and had died in Nkrumah's Preventative Detention as a result. Agbohle scornfully points out that the regime under which Danquah died was that which Gbedemah had 'defended "in good faith."'[135] Gbedemah, Botsio and other ex-CPP leaders, who had arguably simply fallen out of favour with Nkrumah in his final phase of paranoia, rather than having ideologically opposed him, could not share the exalted status of those who were always on the 'right side of history'.

In October 1968, Ankrah publicly signalled an orderly transition to civilian rule, but privately the NLC was fragmenting.[136] Kotoka's death had destabilised the regime, and behind the scenes arguments about money and leaders' personal lives raged as the economy deteriorated.[137] On 2 April 1969, the elderly Ankrah handed over to his fellow NLC leader, Akwasi Afrifa. With the anticipated return of democratic elections, many observers criticised the prospect of ex-CPP returned exiles returning to power by the ballot box. Certainly, Ankrah, Afrifa, and many of their NLC colleagues favoured Busia, precisely because they felt his exile had been honourable and, for this reason, allowed him some influence over the drafting of a new constitution, as well as appointing him chairman of two key NLC committees.[138]

Meanwhile, mutual promises made in exile to co-operate on return (see Chapter 4) were forgotten. Indeed, Busia ensured that Gbedemah was disqualified from office by

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[135] MSRC, Nkrumah Papers, Box.2, Emmanuel Agbohle, 'The Return of Mr Gbedemah', *Legon Observer*, pp. 10-11. This vision of Danquah as tragic hero who died for his moral principles and for Ghana still resonates, see 'Akufo-Addo speaks on 50th anniversary of J.B. Danquah's death', *GhanaWeb*, 2 February 2015, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-speaks-on-50th-anniversary-of-J-B-Danquah-s-death-344890

[136] BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), MW/2913/B/1, Accra Home Service, 'General Ankrah's broadcast on return to civilian rule', 28 October 1969.

[137] TNA, FCO/38/143, 'Note for the file', 30 March 1967.

[138] Rockefeller Archives, New York, Smock to Bundy, 'Briefing information for Ghana Visit', 16 March 1970; A. Danso-Boafo, (1981), 'The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia', Howard University Ph.D., p. 302.

the numerous inquiries into the past misdemeanours of the CPP.[139] The moral evaluation of different forms of opposition was clearly not just an academic exercise but was also weaponised through public inquiries. These investigated the personal assets of leading CPP figures, a form of purgatory through which exiles like Gbedemah had to pass to achieve absolution. To his surprise, Gbedemah was cleared by the electoral exemptions commissions and was free to run against Busia for the Ghanaian presidency when the ban on political activities was lifted on 1 May 1969. Gbedemah launched a new party, the National Alliance of Liberals.[140] Busia responded with a lavish 82-page election pamphlet celebrating his exalted status that showcased the 'Great Historical and Prophetic Statements issued by Professor K.A. Busia while in Exile'.[141]

The complex relationship between death, detention, exile and 'honour' was therefore central to the expression of political ideas and visions for the future of Ghana. Typically, the characterisation of exile as 'voluntary' was often used to denigrate individuals who had fled Nkrumah's preventative detention. The CPP regime had deliberately depicted exile as a form of cowardice, a state into which a guilty individual fled to avoid detention and personal sacrifice. This created an implicit comparison to the fate of individuals like Danquah, who refused to leave and were imprisoned, and indeed died, for their political beliefs. While Agbohle himself refers to exile as 'self-imposed', he nevertheless presents it as a positive form of moral abstention when compared to the continued collaboration of Gbedemah.[142] In microcosm, this is an example of how the varying perceptions of exile meant that its depiction could be adapted in different periods to reflect specific personal allegiances. In 1969 this was shifting yet again.

Kofi Busia: The Returned Exile Comes to Power

Busia won a comfortable majority in the autumn election of 1969. Although he had 'returned' from exile with the fall of Nkrumah, he had still maintained a globality that was

[139] TNA, FCO/38/144, N.L.C.223, Ankrah, 'Elections and Public Office Disqualification Decree, 1968'. See also Republic of Ghana, Parts I and II, 'Commission of Inquiry into Electoral and Local Government Reform', Accra 1967, ibid.

[140] TNA, FCO/65/78, Afrifa, NLC Decree/347, 'Political parties amendment decree,' 30 April 1969.

[141] TNA, FCO/65/87, *The Courage and Foresight of Busia: Great Historical and Prophetic Statements issued by Professor K.A Busia while in Exile*, compiled by HK Akyeampong (Accra: George Boakie, 1969).

[142] MSRC, William Abraham Papers, Box.2, Emmanuel Agbohle, 'The Return of Mr Gbedemah', Letters Page, *The Legon Observer*, 22 July 1966, Vol.1, No.2, pp. 10-11.

not dissimilar to his previous exilic existence. Despite holding several positions within the NLC, his wife and family remained in Oxford, and he retained a 'firm base' at St Antony's College while also devoting himself to 'constant travel', typically to the United Nations in New York.[143] Busia's electoral victory owed much to his extensive involvement in governmental affairs during the preceding year. For example, as director of the NLC's Centre for Civic Education, the body responsible for a nationwide programme of 'de-Nkrumahization', Busia had the opportunity to travel widely across Ghana, offsetting his unavoidably episodic presence hitherto and giving him considerable exposure as a leader at a time when political activity remained banned.[144] His apparently 'limitless political funds' were also a significant asset in his success.[145]

By 24 October 1969, British officials had finally uncovered the secret of Busia's long-term support. They reported that his visits to London were often followed by sojourns in Paris, adding that French were now 'in a strong position' to exert influence over Busia since 'as we know...they gave him substantial financial help before the elections and for many years previously'.[146] In France, President Pompidou's adviser on Africa, Jacques Foccart, celebrated Busia's election with his friend the Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny, having both backed him 'for years and years'. Foccart noted that 'the crushing victory of Busia is a source of extraordinary joy' for the Ivorian president, who now referred to him as 'his asset'.[147] On 29 April 1970, Busia departed for an eleven-day state visit to Ivory Coast and upon his return extolled the country as 'a model for Ghana's development policies.'[148]

The unfolding experience of exile during this period had therefore resulted in clear winners and losers, not only in Ghana but internationally. In aligning with the French, Busia was collaborating with a regionally influential power on the rise. In the late 1960s, French prestige amongst the states of West Africa was increasing, underlined by Mali's decision to re-enter the Franc zone and placatory utterances even from the die-hard anti-

[143] TNA, FCO/38/148, Smedley memo, 'Call on Dr. Busia - 21 September' 22 September 1967. See also Ibid., Busia to Thomas, 11 April 1967.
[144] A. Danso-Boafo, 'The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia,' Ph.D., Howard University, 1981, p. 302.
[145] TNA, FCO/65/85, Accra to London, 16 May 1969.
[146] TNA, FCO/65/292/1, FCO to Youde (Downing Street), draft, 'Dr Busia's Visit', 24 October 1969. The information source is redacted. Gbedemah was reportedly funded by the Union Trading Company, a Swiss conglomerate, TNA, FCO/65/89, Accra to London, 7 June 1969.
[147] 13 September 1969, Foccart, *Dans les bottes du Général*, p. 113.
[148] Ford Foundation, Accra Office, Annual Report, FY70, August 1970, p. 7, Rockefeller Archives, New York.

imperial radical Touré of Guinea.[149] As Busia became prime minister, London worried that he might follow the Ivory Coast and the French in backing Biafran secession. By the late 1960s, the Nigerian conflict loomed large on the West African scene.[150]

Busia used his new power to terminate the comradeship of exile. Shortly after the election Gbedemah wrote to him evoking their four-year cooperation abroad and suggested that they should meet immediately to pursue their joint vision for Ghana. However, Busia allegedly dismissed him due to his now very busy schedule, stating that perhaps they could meet on his return from his foreign tour.[151] Indeed, Gbedemah, despite having led the National Liberal Alliance to win twenty-nine parliamentary seats, was further marginalised by a Supreme Court decision which barred former CPP members accused of financial misdemeanours from sitting in parliament. Exile had provided a unifying but ultimately unsustainable discursive space, allowing ideas of collaboration to thrive without the need to actually implement joint policy. On these exiles' return to Ghana, these dreams of bipartisanship did not survive the cold domestic political reality.

Meanwhile in Conakry, Nkrumah's personal prestige was gradually diminishing as his hundred-strong entourage ebbed away and returned home. While meeting the Tanzanian premier Julius Nyerere during the latter's West African tour, Nkrumah asserted that he now wanted to lead the forces of liberation for South Africa. Nyerere privately remarked that he hoped that Nkrumah did not want to lead them from Dar es Salaam. Later, Nyerere reported to the Egyptian leader Nasser that Nkrumah was preparing a text on guerrilla warfare. Nasser replied tartly that it was 'easy to write a book about it'.[152] Increasingly Nkrumah was an author in exile rather than a president in waiting.

By the time Busia assumed power, four years into Nkrumah's exile, much of the impetus for the latter's return had dissipated. Repeated disappointments and his declining health from September 1970 took a toll on Nkrumah's energetic optimism, and

[149] TNA, FCO/38/17, Paris to London, 28 October 1967.
[150] UN Archives, New York, File.S-0889-0009, Comments by Kyame Kesse-Adu, Editor, *Pioneer*, U-Thant press conference, Accra, 9 January 1970.
[151] Asamoah, *The Political History of Ghana,* pp. 177, 286.
[152] TNA, FCO/38/146, 'President Nyerere's African Tour', 11 March 1968.

Nkrumahist exiles failed to mount any major initiatives during this period.[153] Therefore, while the NLC's surveillance networks were maintained, the active pursuit of exiles was not a high priority for Busia's government.

However, anxieties about Nkrumahist subversion still lingered, and the Busia government sought to repress potential dissidents. Those with links to Nkrumah who risked return, such as journalist A.B. Assensoh, were targeted by security services. Having narrowly escaped extradition by the NLC from Liberia in 1968, Assensoh decided in 1971 to 'test the magnitude of the hatred the Ghana Government and the security forces had for [him]' by slipping back into Ghana through the Ivory Coast. Under the democratic Busia government, he felt secure enough to take up the post of sub-editor at *The Pioneer* in Kumasi. However, despite his protestations that by this time he had 'nothing to do with Nkrumah', his previous association meant that he was continually harassed by Ghana Special Branch, who spent 'large sums of money…on obnoxious "informants" and "agents" among my friends', something he described as an 'interesting but bitter experience'.[154]

Busia was also notably intolerant of criticism in general. Journalists who critiqued government policies suffered retaliation: Cameron Duodu was forced to resign from his editorship of the *Daily Graphic* for criticising Busia's policy of 'dialogue' with the South African apartheid state, and Assensoh had his passport confiscated in retaliation for unfavourable articles penned at *The Pioneer*.[155] Accusations of being an 'Nkrumahist' also provided a way for Busia's government to undermine and counter legitimate opposition. As Goldsworthy reflects: 'Dissident unionists, restive bureaucrats, protesting students, critical editors: all these found themselves accused of harbouring sympathies, or even plotting a restoration.'[156] Just as Busia's alliance with Gbedemah did not survive their respective return from exile, Busia's liberal democratic credentials, which he had cultivated while abroad, did not wholly survive his ascension to domestic political office.

However, Busia's ability to deploy Nkrumah's legacy to tar opponents was itself reflective of Nkrumah's still threatening presence on Ghana's political scene. The

[153] Adeleke, 'Exilic Pan-Africanism', *Vienna Journal of African Studies*, p. 95-96.
[154] Assensoh, *Kwame Nkrumah: Six Years In Exile,* pp. 23-4.
[155] Danso-Boafo, 'The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia,' p.222; Assensoh, *Kwame Nkrumah: Six Years In Exile,* pp. 23.
[156] D. Goldsworthy, 'Ghana's Second Republic: A Post-Mortem', *African Affairs*, Vol.72, No.286 (1973), p. 22.

continued popularity of his image was of particular concern. Deployed by opposition parties such as the People's Progress Party (PPP), led by Nkrumah's ex-minister JF Hansen, the PPP were able to sell over two thousand photographs of Nkrumah at a 1971 Kumasi rally. In response, the government amended the Criminal Code to outlaw 'direct or indirect' references to Nkrumah and the CPP and criminalised the act of displaying photographs or effigies of Nkrumah, as well as CPP symbols and slogans.[157] Despite Nkrumah's physical distance and worsening health in exile, even his image negatively impacted Busia's sense of political security.

Nevertheless, Nkrumah's most potent lingering challenge to the new Busia government was his administration's legacy of chronic debt. For Gbedemah, despair at the CPP government's economic mismanagement had been a major motive for his departure into exile and the basis for his criticism of Nkrumah from abroad. In 1970, sharp falls in the cocoa price added to already difficult budgetary problems.[158] Ghana was at this time almost unique among African countries in having transitioned peacefully and voluntarily from military to civilian democratic government. The Busia government, despite some blunders, was pro-western and moderate and may have consequently expected support from western governments, but this was not forthcoming.[159] Downing Street was advised by the Treasury that 'no further offer of assistance be made at the present time' and that instead Busia 'should be urged strongly to go to the IMF'.[160] The military men had escaped these economic problems just in time and by 1971, Busia was becoming painfully aware of the financial crisis he had inherited.[161]

Conclusion

Nkrumah's fall from power dramatically reconfigured Ghana's political landscape. Those associated with CPP politics were forced to make stark choices about their future security, and those who chose flight over imprisonment often struggled, financially and

[157] D. Goldsworthy, 'Ghana's Second Republic', p.22.
[158] J.H. Mensah, 'Ghana's Greatest Economic Problem', *Daily Graphic*, 29 April 1970. See also Rockefeller Archives, Ford Foundation, 'Economic Planning Advisory Programme in Ghana, 1967-71: An Appraisal', July 1973, p. 11,
[159] TNA, OD/30/385, Paris to London, 'Ghana Debt', 19 June 1970.
[160] TNA, T/317/1551, Stevens memo., 'Ghana Debt', 3 November 1971.
[161] TNA, OD/30/307, Busia to Heath, 24 July 1971.

emotionally, with the precarity of an exilic existence. The extent of this hardship has been obscured by an overconcentration in existing studies on Nkrumah, his iconic status and prolific writing amplifying his voice over those of his supporters. As the NLC became increasingly aggressive in its attitude towards Nkrumahist exiles, those who lacked the state-level protection and patronage which Nkrumah enjoyed were forced to adapt to avoid the extraterritorial reach of the new Ghanaian government, in ways which mirrored the experience of those exiled under Nkrumah in the previous decade.

The dynamics of return from exile also created a more complex political ecology in Ghana. Politicians such as Busia and Gbedemah had to navigate an evolving political space in which the characterisation and contestation of their exile identity was central. Moral connotations and value-judgements were placed upon their divergent experiences, affecting their integration back into domestic politics in 1969. The imagined similarities and sense of shared purpose only survived within the spatial reality of exile when Nkrumah provided a unifying opposing force. Upon return, the pressures and realities of domestic politics quickly collapsed such fragile alliances. In this way, return was not only difficult in terms of the Ghanaian public reception, but it also affected the networks of cooperation which had existed within the spatial construct of exile. Nevertheless, while Busia was able to achieve his dreams of return to the domestic political stage in Ghana, his period of respite from exile was not to last.

Chapter 6:

Return Undone: Exile Dynamics during the National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military Council, 1972-79

Introduction

In the 1970s Ghana's underlying economic problems came home to roost. Long-standing issues were exacerbated by rising oil prices and global economic turbulence. The developmentalist rhetoric of Nkrumah and his successors had obscured the failure of the country's expanded post-independence state bureaucracy to deliver economic growth. Ghana could not pay its international debts, and the Busia government's economic reform efforts, designed to appease the international community, provided key motivation for the successful military coup mounted by Colonel IK Acheampong in January 1972. In the short term, this military coup generated another wave of political exiles, including Busia, who was in London at the time of the coup. During his second exile, Busia remained focused on realising a further political return, again leaning heavily on French support. His activity in exile proved a significant concern to the military regime, and for a year Busia's possible extradition was centre-stage in Anglo-Ghanaian relations. Significant numbers of exiles were also later generated in the wake of the 'Unigov' referendum, which proposed a hybrid form of civilian-military government via which the military regime sought to cling onto power through the back door. Hostility to this concept was strong both domestically and in the Ghanaian diaspora, but the post-referendum government crackdown ensured that effective opposition could only be conducted outside Ghana's borders.

In the interviews conducted for this project, this period was characterised as the least relevant in terms of the wider history of exile dynamics. This assessment is borne out by this period's smaller waves of political exiles, compared to those that occurred before and since. The unanticipated military coup of 1972 allowed the newly formed

National Redemption Council (NRC) to detain the vast majority of Progress Party (PP) government and district officials before they could flee. Ailing exile leaders such as Busia and Nkrumah no longer provided such threatening political opposition, and the NRC regime, while undemocratic and repressive, was not particularly extreme.

It was rather the economic crisis, which spiralled out of the NRC's control after 1974, that resulted in significant flight and migration, as large swathes of the country's educated middle class fled Ghana, further undermining key sectors of the economy. The motives of these individuals were commonly mixed, combining a sense of political oppression with declining economic opportunity and fears for the future. Few of them self-identified as 'exiles', preferring to describe themselves as travelling abroad for the purposes of business or education.[1] While the term 'exile' therefore does not fully encapsulate such individuals, their migration still forms a crucial part of the story of Ghanaian exile politics. This exodus arguably built the foundations of more globalized Ghanaian polity, beginning a fundamental shift in the centre of gravity for future political parties that would ultimately be created and financed beyond the country's borders.

The 1972 coup

From the moment of independence through to the late 1960s, Ghana helped set the pace and character of political development in Africa.[2] However, Ghana quickly developed serious systemic economic problems. The large agricultural sector, which centred on cash crops such as cocoa, was taxed heavily to fund a ballooning developmental state and a complex network of political patronage. By the mid-1970s this economic strategy had devastated the cocoa industry, which was the backbone of Ghana's economy.[3] The combination of clientelist politics and statist development policies adopted during the first two decades of independence had the unintended effect of turning the commodity markets and bureaucracy they subsidised into an extension of factionalised networks of patronage, something which Jonathan Frimpong-Ansah, a Governor of the Bank of Ghana,

[1] Naomi Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).
[2] David E. Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 335-8.
[3] Frimpong-Ansah, *The Vampire State in Africa,* pp. 141-7. See also Tony Killick, *Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana* (London: Heinemann, 1978).

has characterised as the 'vampire state'.[4] Naomi Chazan has argued persuasively that this approach was fundamental to Ghana's political culture, meaning that the subsequent privatization and plundering of state resources by successive regimes continued regardless of whether the government was democratic or authoritarian. Each new government promised an end to corruption but did not change the underlying substructure.[5]

In 1971, these existing problems were exacerbated by plunging commodity prices, which radically increased the cost of managing Ghana's foreign debt. Busia's PP government instituted austerity measures, including tax increases, fuel prices hikes, and the abolition of free medical care and university education, which triggered a series of strikes. In December, as the economy continued to spiral downwards, Busia devalued Ghana's currency (the cedi) by approximately half.[6] The urban middle class found its purchasing power greatly reduced, and for many this signalled that Busia had lost control of the economy.[7]

On 13 January 1972, Busia's government was overthrown in Ghana's second military coup. Despite the unpopularity of its austerity measures, this event was still somewhat unexpected, given the strong support the military had given Busia when he rose to power just two years prior. To strengthen his position, Busia had swiftly altered the military's command structure and conducted a targeted purge of potentially disloyal officers.[8] Accordingly, he professed complete confidence in the army's trustworthiness in interviews with the western press.[9] Relying on this misplaced sense of security, in January 1972 Busia departed for Britain for medical treatment. As he stepped off the

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[4] Frimpong-Ansah, *The Vampire State in Africa.* The breadth of scholarship on the Ghanaian economy is vast, and often politicised, especially works written in the 1960s and 70s. For a more comprehensive perspective see Ernest Aryeetey and Ravi Kanbur (eds), *The Economy of Ghana Sixty Years After Independence*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Lindsay Whitfield, *Economies After Colonialism: Ghana and the Struggle for Power,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[5] Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian politics*. See also Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, 'Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and Guinea,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.29, No.1 (1987): 106-131.

[6] Isaac Bissue, 'The Devaluation of the New Cedi: Whose Responsibility? *The Legon Observer*, Vol.VI, No.27, 31 December 1971- 13 January 1972. See also TNA, OD 30/209, Reid memo, 'Devaluation of the Cedi', 4 January 1972.

[7] Singh, *Seizing Power,* pp. 137-8.

[8] Victor T. Le Vine, 'Autopsy on a Regime: Ghana's Civilian Interregnum 1969-72,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.25, No.1 (1987): 169-178.

[9] PRAAD-Accra, ADM5/4/339, 'Evening Interview on CBS Network in New York' in *Dr Busia in Europe and America*, undated, published approx. 1970, p. 33.

plane in London, the military, led by Colonel IK Acheampong, assumed control.[10] The coup met little resistance and there were no casualties, reflecting both the PP Government's unpopularity and Acheampong's positive reputation within the military as Commander of the Accra Brigade, despite his apparent lack of charisma.[11]

Acheampong's radio announcement of the military takeover also declared the withdrawal of the constitution, dissolution of parliament, and banning of all political parties.[12] He justified this in relation to Busia's supposed 'hypocrisy' in continuing the corruption and economic mismanagement which characterised the Nkrumah regime, and ultimately the resultant economic crisis. While Acheampong later insisted that the coup was '*not* staged for the selfish ends of the Armed Forces', in his first broadcast he was perhaps unintentionally honest in citing as a major motivation Busia's purging of the armed forces and police, alongside cuts to their benefits and privileges.[13]

As news of Busia's ousting was relayed internationally, it reached Nkrumah in his Guinea-based exile. With barely contained glee, Nkrumah sent Busia a letter to his London address three days after the coup, wishing him 'Godspeed as you make your well-deserved exit from the political arena in Ghana.' Recalling his unexpected use of Conakry Radio to encourage Ghanaians to vote for Busia in the 1969 elections, Nkrumah here clarified that this was not due to his belief in Busia's competence: 'My reason for exhorting them to vote for you was that I knew that being a political weakling, you would sooner or later expose your shortcomings.'[14] Revelling in the striking similarity in the reasons cited by military officers to justify both coups against their respective governments, Nkrumah, underlining his sense of justice in the fall of his rival, admonished Busia that 'those who sow a wind reap a whirlwind'.[15]

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[10] In 1969, Accra's International Airport was renamed Kotoka International Airport, in honour of Lieutenant General Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka (1926–1967), a member of the National Liberation Council who was killed in an abortive coup attempt at that location.
[11] Singh, *Seizing power*, p. 146.
[12] PRAAD-Accra, ADM5/4/354, 'First Announcement of the Coup by Colonel IK Acheampong, 13th January 1972', in *Good Tidings of Redemption-Official Statements made by Colonel IK Acheampong*, 9 February 1972, p. 1.
[13] Ibid, 'First Radio and Television Broadcast by Colonel IK Acheampong', and 'First Press Conference Given by the Chairman of the NRC on 17th January 1972', in *Good Tidings of Redemption,* 9 February 1972, p. 2 and p. 6.
[14] MSRC, Nkrumah papers, Box.154-27, 'A Letter of Consolation to Dr. Kofi A. Busia on the Coup in Ghana,' *Black Scholar*, Vol. 3, No. 9 (1972), pp. 23-26.
[15] Ibid.

Due to the unanticipated nature of Acheampong's coup, relatively few of Busia's ministers escaped. About 1,400 Progress Party members were initially placed into preventative detention and, mirroring the aftermath of the 1966 coup, boards of inquiry were established to probe the alleged misdeeds of ousted government officials, most notably the Assets Committee, led by Justice Taylor.[16] Exile dynamics now flipped for a second time, leading to the return of exiled Nkrumahists such as John Tettegah, who had been Secretary-General of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) during the Nkrumah period. However, this was not simply an organic result of Busia's overthrow; the NRC purposely co-opted Busia's political rivals as a way to legitimise the new military regime. Tettegah, returning to Ghana from exile in Cairo, had within a month accepted the NRC's invitation to lead the Greater Accra Regional branch of the Ghana Industrial and Commercial Workers Union.[17] The prominent figure of Komla Gbedemah, who had been snubbed by Busia on his return to Ghana (Chapter 5), was also now brought into the fold. Gbedemah was appointed by the NRC as a roving ambassador, as was Joe Appiah, another former Nkrumahist who had been an outspoken critic of Busia as leader of an opposition party in the curtailed parliament.[18]

However, while some of Nkrumah's supporters enjoyed a revival under the new NRC, any hopes of Nkrumah's personal return were cut short by his declining health. In his letter to Busia, Nkrumah resolutely stated his belief that he would return to Ghana 'someday in-the-not too distant future to help rebuild the nation from the ruins and chaos [Busia] left behind'. In fact, he would die in a Bucharest Hospital in April 1972.[19]

Busia: Exile, Again

While Busia's trip to London had provided the perfect conditions for a quiet coup, his continued freedom abroad and his experience of exiled opposition made him a global irritant to the nascent NRC as he had been to Nkrumah. The new head of Ghana's state

[16] Editorial 'The Political Detainees,' *The Legon Observer*, 12 April-4 May 1972. See also TNA, FCO/65/1109, Cole to Stark, 'Political Detainees', 4 March 1972.
[17] *West Africa*, 28 April 1972, p. 534.
[18] B. Martin Tsamenyi, 'Regime Failure and The Political Legitimacy Of Governments In Ghana: The Case Of The Acheampong Regime, 1972-1979, Australian National University PhD thesis, November 1983, p. 120. Gbedemah would be terminated from his position for unstipulated reasons within 4 months.
[19] MSRC, Nkrumah papers, Box.154-27, 'A Letter of Consolation' *Black Scholar*, p. 26.

security told British officials in March 1972 that the Acheampong government was keeping strict surveillance on the Côte d'Ivoire border, where Busia had recently been spotted.[20] Indeed, on 14 January 1972, only days after the coup, Busia had travelled from London to Côte d'Ivoire to monitor events from close quarters and to visit his ally Houphouët-Boigny, the Ivorian president.[21] Busia's sudden excursion was sponsored by Jean Foccart, the long-serving chief adviser to successive French presidents on Africa, and he was accompanied by three members of 'the French SIS.' To the dismay of the British, these French officers updated Busia on events in Ghana by providing him with copies of recent British High Commission telex messages sent from Accra to London. The British noted that Busia 'was also in touch with [the] local CIA Representative'.[22] Busia met first with Houphouët-Boigny, and then with his own friend, Dr Claude Ennin, who was serving as Ghana's ambassador in Abidjan. Ennin's nephew Edward Moore was Acheampong's new Attorney-General, and so he enjoyed a direct personal line to the new government in Accra.[23]

While Houphouët-Boigny and Foccart had been closely allied with Busia, the latter's failing health was conspicuous, and both were frustrated by his apparent self-delusion about his prospects.[24] Despite their friendship, Houphouët-Boigny in particular nurtured a low opinion of Busia as a political operator. During the visit, Houphouët-Boigny asked Busia for an appraisal of Acheampong's character, to which Busia replied that had never met him. Houphouët-Boigny was aghast at this admission, responding: 'What kind of Prime Minister are you, if you don't even know you own local brigade commander?'[25] Busia nonetheless focused on drumming up international support for his reinstatement, visiting Paris multiple times in the weeks following his ousting on the pretext of seeing medical specialists. Likely hoping to capitalise on previous French willingness to offer him financial assistance, Busia prioritised this over a planned meeting with the British Prime Minister at Chequers.[26] An editorial in the Ghanaian government-

[20] TNA, FCO/65/1109, Mackilligin, 'Visit to Kumasi', 10 March 1972.
[21] TNA, FCO/65/1112, Busia to Heath (PM), 16 January 1972.
[22] Ibid., Abidjan to London, 18 January 1972. 'SIS' refers to the British Secret Intelligence Service. Here they were alluding to the French agency: Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage (SDECE)
[23] Ibid., Murray (Abidjan) to London, 15 January 1972. See also diary entries for 13-15 January 1972, *Jacques Foccart, La France pompidolienne: Journal de l'Elysée – IV, 1971-1972* (Paris: Fayard/Jeunne Afrique, 2000), pp. 189-192.
[24] *Jacques Foccart, – IV, 1971-1972,* diary entries for 19 January 1972, p.197 and 31 January 1972, p. 210.
[25] TNA, FCO/65/1109, MacKilligin, 'Visit to Kumasi', 10 March 1972.
[26] TNA, FCO/65/1112, Wilson to Grattan, 'Dr Busia', 24 January 1972.

controlled *Daily Graphic* described Busia as the 'darling errand boy' of various countries yet to recognise the NRC government, portraying him as inclined to 'roam the world's capitals' chasing after illusory assistance.[27]

Once back in London, Busia held a press conference to respond to Acheampong's coup announcement and personal accusations. Busia's opening salvo mirrored Acheampong's, accusing him of luxurious living. He argued that Acheampong was protecting the collective interests of military officers, who were highly paid and pampered. Busia had tried to grasp the economic nettle by devaluing the cedi and accepting some IMF-inspired austerity, and he portrayed the coup as a self-serving reaction by the army to the trimming of their benefits, characterising the military as Ghana's most 'powerful trade union'.[28] However, Busia might have also added another factor: the increasing politicisation of the military. The 1966 coup had disrupted the institutional structure of Ghana's army, with forced retirements and factional promotions generating anger and disorder in the command structure. In particular, the role of General Akwasi Afrifa, who had been central to the first coup in 1966, altered the thinking of his fellow officers about involvement in politics.

Overhauling the Economy and Consolidating Power

Further movement into exile was partly propelled by Acheampong's new measures. He styled his new military government as 'The National Redemption Council' (NRC), drawing on both religious and military inspiration. NRC propaganda following the coup promised to "redeem" Ghanaian society by injecting a more martial spirit, emphasising obedience, solidarity, patriotism, and public morality. Martial lexicon was also heavily employed, with Acheampong placing the economy on a 'war footing'. Initiatives were given military characterisations, such as 'Operation Feed Yourself' which encouraged self-sufficiency.[29]

[27] 'Recognition for the N.R.C. Government', *Daily Graphic*, 28 January 1972.
[28] Osman Al-Hassan, 'Politicized Soldiers: Military Intervention in the Politics of Ghana, 1966-1993,' Ph.D. Washington State University, 2004, p. 191. See also J.I. Herbst, *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 22-25.
[29] Maxwell Owusu, 'Economic Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the Military: Ghana's National Redemption Council,' *Africa Today*, Vol.22, No.1 (1975), p. 31, 33, 49.

Military units were employed to enforce regulations and set new conventions for behaviour in public life.

Rather than focusing on broader systemic issues, the NRC largely blamed individual malfeasance for Ghana's economic problems. Therefore, the focus was on the everyday economy and 'enforcement' of rules related to markets, hoarding, and the supply of key commodities such as fuel. However, a lack of economic expertise within the military meant that such regulations and price controls were often arbitrary, which allowed some military personnel to enrich themselves. Reinforcing its message of personal responsibility, the NRC created severe penalties for economic crimes.[30]

The government bureaucracy formed an early target in the drive against waste and indiscipline. Surprise audits were introduced to combat inefficiency, however these mostly consisted of military officers arriving early at government departments to punish tardy staff with humiliating military drills.[31] Compounding this, educated urban populations were unimpressed by the NRC's unsophisticated policy towards labour redistribution, as individuals reporting to urban employment centres could be suddenly transported to help harvest in rural areas.

Ghana was also struggling with significant international debt. The NRC's solution was to repudiate debt repayments, a decision justified by arguing that Ghana's economic crisis was caused by Nkrumah's vast overspending, which had been facilitated by overseas powers. The NRC declared publicly on 5 February 1972 that it would not honour the recent medium-term debt agreement nor pay the moratorium interest due. Advanced contracts with British firms worth £22m were also repudiated, despite warnings from the IMF about the consequences. While the claim that overseas powers had encouraged Ghana to incur debts had some merit, creditors closed ranks and agreed not to negotiate bilaterally, while export guarantees were withdrawn.[32] In short, the NRC was engaged in an economic game of 'chicken' with Britain and other creditors where many of its exiles were based.

[30] Owusu, 'Economic Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the Military', pp. 38-49.
[31] Mensah Adinkrah, 'Political coercion in military-dominated regimes: A subcultural Interpretation', Ph.D. Washington University, 1988, p. 58.
[32] TNA, OD/30/379, 'Ghana' Report of ECGD meeting, 21 April 1972. See also ibid. Ghana High Commissioner, brief for PM, June 1972.

The July 1972 Failed Countercoup

After the economy, the NRC's most pressing concern was the exiled Busia. Some NRC leaders proposed attracting him back to Ghana on the basis that he was much less dangerous 'inside the country than in exile abroad'.[33] They considered offering Busia amnesty and safe conduct on the condition that he played no further part in the Ghana's political life. Acheampong himself was open to the idea and thought he might make a good university vice chancellor. A related issue was the fate of the incarcerated General Afrifa, a key member of the NLC who had transferred power to Busia in 1969 and was briefly head of state during the PP government. Again, the plan was to release him if he would live quietly.[34] However, the trajectory of the Taylor Assets Committee probing misappropriation by the previous government complicated matters somewhat. Damaging evidence was given by Joe Appiah, an NRC emissary, who explained that he broke with Busia years previously when he refused to account for money he had collected for detainees while in exile during the Nkrumah period. The clear implication was that Busia had 'salted away' the donations for himself.[35] Regardless of these accusations, the NRC was still considering formulating a deal with Busia.

However, these plans relied on Busia agreeing to withdraw from Ghanaian politics, something that his political tenacity in his first exile suggested was unlikely. As Busia continued to globetrot in search of funds for a countercoup, his wife, Naa Busia, remained with the family in Oxford. She expressed their shared position in a private letter to the Busia's family friend Max Yergan. Calling the situation in Ghana a 'tragedy,' she stated: 'We have faith that we shall soon be back'.[36]

British officials sought to keep informed about Busia's plans, as his and his family's residence in Britain continued to affect official relations with Ghana. In an effort to clarify Busia's intentions, the British arranged a meeting with George Ofosu-Amaah, Busia's head of Special Branch, who had been recently released from preventative detention. Previously a University of Ghana law lecturer, he had studied in Britain and had been a much-valued longstanding informant of the British High Commission. On 28 April 1972,

[33] TNA, FCO/65/1110, Mohamed Sibidow (NRC), conversation with MacKilligin, 12 June 1972.
[34] Ibid.
[35] TNA, FCO/65/1110, Carter to Taylor, 'Political Round Up', 7 July 1972.
[36] MSRC, Max Yergan Papers, Box.203-6, Naa Busia to Max Yergan, 11 July 1972. Yergan was an African American sociologist and staunch anti-communist.

his friend Elizabeth Ohene, a *Ghana Times* journalist, brought Ofosu-Amaah to a discrete meeting with George Webb, a British official. It became apparent to Webb that Busia would find little domestic support for re-establishing his government: Ofosu-Amaah and his fellow PP ministers now seemed to hate Busia, because he had done nothing to assist them in captivity. Moreover, they believed his general 'flabbiness' had permitted, if not encouraged, the coup.[37] Nevertheless, Ofosu-Amaah was still in touch with Busia. He revealed that Busia would soon make an attempt to regain power 'and would do this with active French assistance' solicited from allies like Jacques Foccart and his deputy, Jean Maurichеau-Beaupre. Asked about the French motive for aiding Busia, Ofosu-Amaah attributed it simply to the status of Foccart and his team as 'open and unashamed activists in their neo-colonial position in West Africa'.[38]

Rumours of a countercoup had indeed been swirling and were finally realised on 16 July.[39] Details of this attempted coup were murky, but a firefight broke out at one of Ghana's main mitary compounds, with soldiers surrounding Acheampong's temporary residence. While some believed it was another 'Sergeant's Plot' by a military faction, Acheampong himself blamed Busia, promising to swiftly reveal the facts of this 'dastardly attempt on the administration by Busia and his clique.'[40] Ghana's state-owned weekly *Spectator* magazine announced that Busia had now taken his place alongside Al Capone as a man of violence and a 'terrorist'.[41] The NRC then used this averted coup to clamp down hard on potential dissent, both internal and external.

On 19 July, the NRC issued a 'Subversion Decree' which enforced execution by firing squad for anyone convicted of attempting to overthrow the government, and that all such cases would be tried by military tribunal with no possibility of appeal.[42] The decree itself contained a markedly broad definition of subversion, with more obviously subversive acts such as sabotage, sedition, inciting invasion, and illegal possession of arms or explosives, listed alongside smuggling, armed robbery, and the theft of

[37] TNA, FCO/65/1109, Ofosu-Amah, conversation with George Webb, 28 April 1972. Ohene was simultaneously quizzed by Webb's wife about the Ghanaian press scene.
[38] TNA, FCO/65/1109, Ofusu-Amaah, conversation with George Webb, 28 April 1972.
[39] PRAAD-Accra, ADM5/4/362, 'Ghana: Major Events of 1972', undated, estimated 1973, p. 7.
[40] Thomas A. Johnson, 'Ghana Rulers Decree Death for Participants in Any Coup Attempt', *New York Times*, 20 July 1972.
[41] 'Violence - That's Busia's Cup of Tea', *Weekly Spectator*, 29 July 1972.
[42] Johnson, 'Ghana Rulers Decree Death…', *New York Times*, 20 July 1972.

automobiles and communications equipment. Notably, the decree stated that all Ghanaian citizens, whether in Ghana or abroad, were subject to its jurisdiction.[43]

In the wake of the July coup attempt, a dozen suspects were arrested, many of whom were PP members, and NRC leader Colonel Benni warned that their punishment would be severe in order to deter others.[44] In early August a military tribunal was created to prosecute the nine accused.[45] These included both Busia's former press secretary Emil W. K. Adzima and George K. A. Ofosu-Amaah, who had been, as noted, Busia's head of Special Branch. At the trial dozens of witnesses provided multiple conflicting explanations of the foiled coup, including the notion that it was merely a ploy to extort money from pro-Busia elements. However, some observers at the tribunal thought it more likely that a few gullible soldiers had been used by the government to set a trap for known Busia sympathisers, before a more co-ordinated threat backed by Côte d'Ivoire could establish itself. While certainly a highly political event, it was not simply a show trial; much of the evidence proved discomforting for the Acheampong government, some of which concerned the private lives of senior figures.[46] In mid-November, eight of those accused, including Ofosu-Amaah, were sentenced to death.[47] While these sentences would eventually be commuted to life imprisonment after much behind-the-scenes pressure, it was nevertheless clear that the possible rapprochement between Busia and the NRC discussed in early 1972 was no longer feasible.

Busia and Extradition, 1972

Having publicly blamed Busia for the attempted counter coup in July 1972, the NRC's cognizance and suspicion of exile opposition only increased. This placed a strain on key diplomatic relationships, something illustrated vividly by the 17 August meeting between Joe Appiah, Acheampong's 'roving ambassador' and the British High Commissioner, Robert Stanley. Appiah repeatedly accused the British government of actively supporting

[43] Johnson, 'Ghana Rulers Decree Death…'.
[44] TNA, FCO/65/1110, Blaikley to McQuiggan, 'The Alleged Attempted Coup and Public Reaction', 21 July 1972.
[45] PRAAD, ADM5/4/362, 'Ghana: Major Events of 1972', undated, estimated 1973, p. 8.
[46] 'Magnanimity and mercy Sir! *Pioneer*, 15 November 1972. See also TNA, FCO/65/1112, NDC, 'Statement of the Verdict of the Military Tribunal,' and Carter to Taylor, 'Subversion Trial', 13 October 1972.
[47] Reuters report, 'Ghana: Trial of Nine Men for Plotting to Overthrow Government', 16 November 1972, https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/195151, [accessed 08/01/22].

Busia's activities and spoke of his likely 'extradition' for subversion and 'treason'.[48] Stanley warned that Ghana's chances of successfully extraditing Busia were low, which only angered Appiah further. The exchange became increasingly heated and wide-ranging, encompassing the incendiary topic of Acheampong's suspension of debt repayments to Britain. Subsequently, Stanley stated in his report that he had had to 'restrain the temptation to kick [Appiah] out of the house.'[49] Busia's British exile was inflaming already troubled Anglo-Ghanaian relations.

On 26 August 1972, the NRC issued an arrest warrant for Busia, claiming he was guilty of conspiracy to commit subversion and preparing to overthrow the Ghanaian government. They cancelled his passport together with that of his wife and put a price of £20,000 on his head. They even provided the full address of his Oxford home in the *Daily Graphic*.[50] Moreover, the NRC despatched Appiah to London to persuade Britain to extradite Busia, so that he could be tried alongside his alleged co-conspirators at the forthcoming military tribunal. Having already made arrangements for Busia's safety while in Britain, in the face of the NRC's increased hostility, London's Special Branch now reviewed and strengthened these procedures with him.[51]

While the Ghanaian Attorney-General's opening speech at the treason trial limited accusations of foreign involvement in the failed counter coup to France and Côte d'Ivoire, privately the NRC firmly believed that Britain was actively backing Busia.[52] Rooted in part in Britain's apparent distaste for their overthrow of a democratic regime, these beliefs mostly reflected the NRC's belief that London was 'planning severe revenge' for Ghana's debt repudiation and Acheampong's dramatic 'We won't pay' statement of 5 February 1972.[53]

As tensions surrounding Busia and his political activities increased, British diplomats in Paris were asked to establish the exact nature of Busia's relations with Foccart and the French secret services. It quickly became apparent that French diplomats

[48] TNA, FCO/65/1110, Joe Appiah, conversation with Stanley, 17 August 1972.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ghana Police Special Notice, *The Daily Graphic*, 31 August 1972. The address given was Dadwen, Brighthampton Road, Standlake, Oxfordshire. See also TNA, FCO/65/1108, Colonel I.K. Acheampong, 'Passports (Cancellation) Decree, 1972', 21 August 1971.
[51] TNA, FCO/65/1110, Smith (Special Branch) to Wilson (FCO) 345/69/68, 10 August 1972.
[52] 'French Embassy Involved - Staged plot to overthrow the NRC', *The Palaver*, 10-16 August 1972.
[53] TNA, FCO/65/1110, Acheampong, conversation with Stanley 22 August 1972. See also ibid. 'Treason Trial' Blaikely to Wilson, 11 August 1972 and Ling minute 'Ghana', 31 August 1972.

at the Quai d'Orsay were 'unaware of what M. Foccart's services are up to,' and that the French relationship with Busia was less a government policy than Foccart's pet project. As Ivorian president Houphouët-Boigny had first backed Busia with Foccart's approval, French diplomats regarded it as 'an Ivorian operation'. As for Foccart's motivation, they observed that he had 'always devoted a good deal of effort to the cultivating of African politicians in exile,' but that it was specifically driven by regional concerns, desiring a Ghanaian regime that was oriented towards francophone West Africa due to Foccart's apparent 'positive phobia' of Nigeria. Either way, British officials thought that the press exposure of alleged French involvement in the coup had been painful for Paris, diminishing the likelihood of further collaboration.[54] Foccart's diary shows he had in fact written Busia off on account of his poor health, comparing him to wartime de Gaulle, issuing pompous meaningless edicts from Britain.[55] By late autumn 1972, London noted with some relief that '[i]t would seem [the French] have decided to extend no more help to Dr Busia after the last coup attempt and subsequent events in Ghana'.[56]

The turmoil of exile politics alarmed the UK Foreign Office, whose officials judged relations with the new regime 'in danger of deteriorating seriously,' because the NRC believed 'unreasonably' that Britain was supporting Busia.[57] Officials worried about adverse consequences for 'British commercial interest worth £200m' and the fate of the protracted loan negotiations. With pressure from Appiah, officials pondered what their position would be 'if Ghana produced evidence of his subversion' and asked themselves, if there was firm evidence, whether they should tell Busia to 'desist from these activities or move elsewhere.' Meanwhile, their main strategy was to dissuade the NRC from formally seeking Busia's extradition. The West African Department of the Foreign Office asked the Home Office to provide background on other foreign exiles so they could at least show Appiah that Busia was not getting special treatment, adding: 'Do we have any idea of the number of exiles at present living in Britain?'[58] The Home Office replied that the 'question of exiles living here is a very large one' and despaired of putting a number on it.[59]

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[54] TNA, FCO/65/1110, 'The French and Dr Busia', Renwick (Paris) to Wilson, 25 August 1972.
[55] Diary entry for 22 March 1972, *Foccart, La France pompidolienne,* p. 289.
[56] Ibid. Wilton minute, 'Dr Busia', 11 October 1972.
[57] TNA, FCO/65/1108, Downing (FCO) to Ross (HO), 'Dr Busia', 31 August 1972.
[58] Ibid.
[59] TNA, FCO/65/1108, Ross (HO) to Downing (FCO), 'Dr Busia', 1 September 1972.

Although support for Busia was waning, he refused to simply retire in exile. He still had enough friends and resources to cause trouble, and his travels in late 1972 seemed to British officials to be 'designed to further some ill-conceived conspiracy'. Accordingly, they urged the Home Office that, rather than 'seeking ways to facilitate his travel, we think it is in HMG's interest to impede him', asking if it was possible to make his continued residence in Britain conditional on an understanding that his 'political activities should be dropped'.[60] These discussions strongly mirrored Busia's experience of exile in the early 1960s. In fact, his original decision to settle in Britain in 1961 was in part motivated by the Dutch government placing the same conditions on his continued residence in the Netherlands (see Chapter 3).

However, the British Foreign Office was preoccupied with different exilic parallels, namely the resemblance between the Busia situation and the Kwesi Armah case of the late 1960s (see Chapter 4). Armah had been Nkrumah's High Commissioner in London and successor governments had tried but failed to extradite him in long court battles. Busia was a Commonwealth citizen (rather than an asylum seeker) and was legally resident in Britain. Nevertheless, he was clearly an unwelcome guest. Diplomats wondered hopefully whether Britain was actually obliged to let Busia return if he left the country temporarily and also expressed vexation that immigration authorities were, in their view, being 'unduly preferential to Dr Busia'.[61]

While British diplomats saw Busia as a problem, the Home Office was more willing to support him. Busia had a large network in Britain: not only was he a fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford, but Sir Edward Lancelot Mallalieu, deputy speaker of the House of Commons, was a close friend.[62] Busia's friends in Westminster and London legal circles were successful in exerting significant pressure on the Home Office. On 20 October dismayed Foreign Office officials discovered that the Home Office had issued Busia with a travel document 'without consulting us' that allowed him unrestricted travel. Compounding this, his friend Lancelot Mallalieu was lobbying for him to be given a British passport. They complained that the Home Office had 'slipped up' badly.[63] Ultimately,

[60] TNA, FCO/65/1108, Royle (FO) to Lane (HO) (draft), 19 October 1972.
[61] Ibid., Taylor minute 'Dr Busia', 4 September 1972.
[62] Ibid., Downing (FCO) to Ross (HO), 'Dr Busia', 31 August. See also See TNA, PREM 13/344, 'GHANA. Political prisoners in Ghana: Lance Mallalieu MP sent Prime Minister letter from Doctor Busia of Ghana', March 1965.
[63] TNA, FCO/65/1108, Anderson to Smedley, 'Dr Busia', 20 October 1972.

Busia did not in fact want a British passport. As Busia told Foccart, he still believed he would realise his triumphant return to power in Ghana.[64]

The Busia case challenged Britain's long established tradition of toleration for political exiles. Diplomats were amazed and exasperated that conditions could not be imposed on Busia. Unless exiles were recruiting mercenaries or amassing firearms, they were advised, 'it is not an offence in the UK to plot the overthrow of a foreign or Commonwealth government'.[65] On 1 December 1972 the Home Office bluntly stated that 'Dr Busia is not subject to conditions and it is not open to us to impose any,' nor did they think it right to make travel dependent on restricting his political activity. 'We have accepted Dr Busia as a permanent resident of this country', stating firmly that there was 'no alternative'. This, they explained, reflected procedures relating to refugees and exiles dating from the First World War.[66]

'We cannot get rid of him' the diplomats lamented throughout the autumn of 1972, adding that his 'presence here is a significant liability for HMGs present interests in Ghana'.[67] The NRC made increasingly improbable accusations regarding Busia's subversion. Appiah for example asserted that Busia had been involved in an aircraft hi-jacking. Meanwhile, the Ghanaian press stoked the flames with headlines like 'Surrender Busia Britain!'[68] By December, after months of failed efforts, British diplomats furiously complained about the burden of 'impracticable legislations'. Racism is evident in their complaint that such regulations seemed to exclude 'those that we should most welcome, e.g., Australians, Canadian and New Zealanders' while preventing them from 'excluding people who we do not welcome'. [69] Regardless, their specific pursuit of constraints on Busia's freedom in exile was finally abandoned.

Wider Dynamics of Exile under the NRC

While the coup had led to the preventative detention of more than a thousand individuals, the NRC were not interested in incarcerating this disparate group for an extended period.

[64] Entry for 22 October 1972, Foccart, *La France pompidolienne,* p. 557.
[65] TNA, FCO/65/1108, Minute by Anderson (Legal Adviser), 4 October 1972.
[66] Ibid. Prosser (HO) to Ling (FO), B.136800/4, 1 December 1972.
[67] Ibid. Ling minute 'Ghana', 13 October 1972.
[68] 'Surrender Busia, Britain!' *Weekly Spectator*, 30 September 1972.
[69] TNA, FCO/65/1108, McGuiggan minute, 'Dr Busia' immigration status', 5 December 1972.

In April 1972, the Inspector-General of Police asked regional and divisional commanders to submit the names of those who could 'be released without undue jeopardy to national Security,' specifically 'party activists, village or town and district officials of the proscribed Progress Party.'[70] By March 1973 only about twenty individuals remained in preventative detention, including eleven former cabinet ministers.[71] This reduction likely reflected a new confidence that Busia and the PP represented a diminishing threat to regime security.

However, the military government's ban on politics did not mean the absence of wider political opposition beyond the PP. While some Nkrumahists returned to Ghana after the downfall of Busia and chose to collaborate with the NRC, this did not represent an NRC endorsement of Nkrumah's politics nor was there any intention to return to a civilian socialist government. While the NRC were willing to bury the hatchet with Nkrumah's allies, for example normalising relations with Guinea before Nkrumah's death, this was on the explicit understanding that Guinea 'no longer considers Nkrumah as President of Ghana or indeed as co-President of Guinea.'[72]

Nkrumahists in Ghana launched an underwhelming coup effort in 1973, seeking to bribe the commander of the Accra brigade, Acheampong's previous position. However, they were quickly neutralised; government informants outnumbered the conspirators, who were swiftly put on trial.[73] Some existing Nkrumahist groups abroad remained active from exile, for example the 'Convention of Democratic Defence for Ghana' (CDDG), which characterised itself as a left-wing progressive movement for enforcing democratic rights in Ghana. Based notionally in Nicosia and led by Dr Mabel Ammah Prempeh, the group was originally established in opposition to what it called 'that arch-fascist Kofi Busia and his useless puppet government.' During Busia's time in power, they had spent significant time lobbying NGOs about their imminent 'unwarranted physical liquidation' at the hands of Busia's friends in the 'global Western Intelligence Services', copying in countless

[70] PRAAD-Accra, National Redemption Council Agenda, 4th April-30th May 1972, 'Persons in Protective Custody,' letter from JH Cobbins GM, Inspector-General of Police Ghana, 15th April 1972.
[71] TNA, FCO/65/1301, MacKilligin to McQuiggan, 'Political Detainees', 8 March 1973.
[72] PRAAD-Accra, National Redemption Council Agenda, 4th April-30th May 1972, Interview with the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, undated.
[73] TNA, FCO/65/1474, 'Ghana: Annual Review for 1973', 2 January 1974.

embassies and delegations.[74] Following the 1972 coup, the CDDG's remained active, placing its members at risk of extradition to Ghana. French-backed security forces in Côte d'Ivoire took a dim view of their activities, leading to the alleged victimisation of key CDDG figure Prince Konina Yankson. He claimed to have visited Côte d'Ivoire on CDDG business in February 1973 but was arrested and beaten at the police headquarters, before being ejected from the territory. The Ivorian police responded to Yankson's protests about his 'bestial' conditions by threatening to hand him over to the Ghanaian embassy 'for subsequent repatriation or extradition, in order to go and face charges in Ghana'.[75] Yankson's complaint to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees about his treatment, which related his experiences in considerable detail including police badge numbers, is a fascinating example of how exiled Ghanaians sought to harness the global civil rights movement and international law. Although some of these detailed missives were designed to coincide with visits by Houphouët-Boigny to the UN in New York and Geneva, there is no evidence that they resulted in action.

The Togoland irredentist movement also saw a major resurgence in the early 1970s with the establishment of the National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland (NMLWT or Tolimo). Prominent Ghanaian-Ewe leaders such as Kofi Dumoga had gone into exile in 1972 with the overthrow of Busia, and established NWLWT with the aim of using international pressure to bring the Ghanaian government to the negotiating table, addressing protests to the OAU and UN.[76] NMLWT's largely Ewe membership generally campaigned from exile in Togo, but were also active in Brussels, Paris, and London.[77]

In July 1973, rising discontent was further inflamed by an NRC announcement that prominent Ewe chiefs had been arrested and stood accused of a secessionist conspiracy. Tensions rose yet further in 1975, when the NMLWT announced its intention of taking Ghanaian diplomats hostage unless Ghana released incarcerated NMLWT activists.[78] After another secessionist coup plot was uncovered in late 1975, Acheampong attempted

[74] TNA, FCO/65/1109, Yankson to UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 30 October 1971. See also Yankson to PM Edward Heath, 4 January 1972.
[75] UN file S-0904, Box.62, File 35, SGKW, 'Ivory Coast', 16 Feb 1972-16 Oct 1973, Yankson to UN Secretary General, 3 May 1973, enclosing Yankson to the General Director, Ivory Coast Police, 27 April 1973.
[76] D. Brown, 'Borderline Politics in Ghana: The National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland,' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.18 No.4, (1980), pp. 589-591.
[77] TNA, FCO/65/1261, 'NRC and Western Togoland', National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland Newsletter, Vol.1, No.4, 16 December 1972.
[78] Brown, 'Borderline Politics in Ghana', p. 590.

to neutralise the NLMWT by offering them a complete amnesty on condition they ended their secessionist activism by 1 December 1975, later extended to 3 March 1976.[79] However, it is unclear how many accepted this offer. Once the amnesty was rescinded, the NMWLT was swiftly banned, the death penalty introduced for advocating secession, and a wide-ranging crackdown on the movement, called 'Operation Counterpoint', was launched.[80]

Much NMLWT literature was produced by exiles and was often targeted to arrive at embassies at the time of summit meetings between Acheampong and Togolese president Eyadema. Both leaders were disturbed by subversives living in each other's respective territories: Acheampong wanted Togoland irredentists restrained, and Eyadema was concerned about the activities of political figures allied to ex-Togolese President Olympio, who were in exile in Ghana. However, it is possible to overstate the importance of this dynamic: as economic conditions deteriorated, confrontations on the border often centred more on cocoa smuggling than exiled subversives.[81]

Economic Crisis and Exodus

In its first two years, the Acheampong government achieved modest economic progress, although this was largely the result of rising commodity prices rather than its efforts to make civil servants more productive by making them do push-ups in car parks.[82] Ghana weathered the 1973 global oil crisis, which quickly led to a tripling in its oil import bill, better than many countries.[83] June 1974 saw the completion after three years of Ghana's longstanding debt negotiations in London. The resulting agreement was favourable, writing off 63% of Ghana's outstanding debt and allowing generous rescheduling. UK government officials were concerned that it was 'highly concessionary', and uncomfortable with the precedent it set, noted privately that it was tantamount to accepting 'the right which the Ghana Government have asserted to repudiate, on grounds

[79] Gasarasi, 'The effect of Africa's exiles/refugees', pp. 200-1.
[80] Brown, 'Borderline Politics in Ghana', pp. 590-591.
[81] TNA, FCO/65/1425, National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland to Ekangaki, Sec. Gen. OAU, 'Arrests and Detentions of Citizens of Western Togoland, Ref No. NLMWT/P.I./73, 10 March 1973. See also Brown (Lome) to Wilson, 'Togo/Ghana Relations', 3 April 1973 and 20 December 1973.
[82] TNA, BW 93/20, Kumasi Regional Directorate, Annual Report 1972/3, May 1973.
[83] TNA, OD/30/463, Colonel I.K. Acheampong, 'NRC Budget Proposals of the Fiscal Year 1974-5', Ministry of Finance, 23 August 1974, pp. 2-5.

of corruption, certain contracts (all British)…'[84] Nonetheless, following the agreement, some capital aid was provided and fresh loans alleviated immediate economic pressure.[85] However, from 1973 urban populations experienced both rising prices and repeated shortages of consumer goods, affecting everything from corned beef from to car parts. This was compounded by the NRC's withdrawal of price subsidies on essential goods.[86]

By 1975 Ghana was struggling economically. Commodity prices had fallen, the rice harvest was poor, and oil costs were high. The country's underlying economic problem was an unrealistically overvalued and unconvertible currency, uneven import controls and a consequently thriving black market.[87] Successive governments had over-taxed the cocoa industry to fund 'development', leading many farmers to farm other crops or simply switch to subsistence farming.[88] Production of cocoa, Ghana's most important export, fell to 10% of that in the 1960s. Timber output, which was Ghana's second most important export, also fell by around 90 per cent.[89] To plug the financial gap, the Acheampong government resorted to new international borrowing, enabled by credit facilities restored in 1974. However, strong monetary expansion and new domestic liquidity, combined with acute supply shortages and negative economic growth, resulted in soaring prices. Inflation had only been 5% in 1970 but soared to 100% by 1977.[90]

By October 1975, with support for his government declining and feeling personally dissatisfied with its cumbersome structure, Acheampong launched what was effectively an internal coup to consolidate his rule and remove certain mid-ranking officers. Working with the head of Ghana's military, General Laurence Okia, three majors were side-lined, and the government renamed the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The NRC was reduced to an advisory body.[91] Acheampong ensured that virtually all key government positions were held by his fellow Akan by 1975, and the consequent

[84] TNA, OD/30/463, 'Prospect of Economic Co-operation Between Britain and Ghana after a debt settlement', 5 June 1974.
[85] TNA, T/317/2147, 'Policy on Ghana debt: arrangements for fourth debt conference following the coup (1973-75)'.
[86] Tsamenyi, 'Regime Failure,' p. 137.
[87] TNA, OD/30/464, Felli, Ghana Min. of Economic Planning, to Hart, MEA/EAD, 8 January 1975. See also 'Capital Aid to Ghana', 21 January 1975.
[88] Frimpong-Ansah, *The Vampire State in Africa*, pp.141-47.
[89] Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics*, pp. 154, 178.
[90] Frimpong-Ansah, *The Vampire State in Africa*, p. 169.
[91] Singh, *Seizing power,* pp. 88-94. Singh conducted almost 300 hours of interviews with coup participants, the majority focused on Ghana.

exclusion of Ewe army officers fuelled opposition. Attempts were made to assassinate Acheampong in 1975 and 1976, and by June 1976 another treason trial was under way, with eight defendants accused of plotting to kill the entire SMC save for its one Ewe member. The lead conspirator, Brigadier Katta, escaped into exile in Lomé, Togo, and the SMC offered 20,000 cedis for his capture and return.[92]

As the economy declined, Acheampong's government became increasingly intolerant of resultant domestic criticism. The 1973 Newspaper Licensing Decree gave the government control over independent papers, including the power to suspend their publishing licenses and their journalists were subject to arbitrary arrest. In October 1975 respected reporters Adolphus Patterson and Kwame Kesse-Adu were detained without charge for six months for allegedly supplying information about the economy to the foreign press.[93] This crackdown was extended to former PP ministers. J.H. Mensah, Finance Minister under Busia, was tried for sedition and imprisoned for eight years in 1975 for circulating pamphlets which criticised the regime's economic policies.[94] The courts were defanged in favour of military tribunals, with the power to overturn Supreme Court decisions, and after a long war of legal attrition Acheampong dismissed the Supreme Court Chief Justice in 1977.[95] It became increasingly clear that Acheampong had no intention of handing over to a civilian government or making meaningful political reforms. Speaking to foreign journalists in 1975, Acheampong stated that, due to the uphill battle facing the newly formed SMC, 'it would be premature to think of handing over power now.'[96]

This increasing repression of domestic opposition and the rapidly deteriorating economy fuelled an exodus of Ghana's educated middle classes, often termed a 'brain drain'. Many emigrated to neighbouring West African countries with more stable economies, especially after the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. Nigeria was a particularly popular destination for teachers, university professors, and engineers, and between 1975 and 1981, Ghana lost an

[92] TNA, FCO/65/1752, MacDermott to Fean 'Military Tribunal', 8 June 1976.
[93] Adinkrah, 'Political coercion in military-dominated regimes', p. 60.
[94] David Watts, 'Prisoners of Conscience- Ghana- Joseph Henry Mensah,' *The Times*, 7th Feb 1977.
[95] Chazan, *Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics*, pp. 57-63.
[96] Tsamenyi, 'Regime Failure,' p. 171.

estimated 14,000 qualified teachers.[97] These individuals did not entirely sever their connection to Ghana, but instead took advantage of often favourable unofficial exchange rates, converting their wages into cedis at four times the official rate and sending money home to support their struggling families.[98] As the economy spiralled downwards, the desire to emigrate for better opportunities intensified. However, the Ghanaian state's insolvency even made the process of leaving difficult. One passenger aircraft bound for Britain with many fleeing doctors and lawyers on board found itself stranded in Libya, where refuelling facilities were refused unless payment was made in cash.[99]

These individuals did not see themselves as 'exiles'; few even used the term migrant, instead framing their departure as travelling for business or study. However, as Azarya and Chazan argued, 'In reality it is difficult to distinguish [exile] from the brain drain because so many of the well-educated emigrants are also vocal in their opposition to their country's regime and would not feel safe returning home.'[100] Although driven overseas primarily by economic exigency, once abroad many engaged with and were mobilised by opposition groups, becoming integral parts of these transnational networks of dissent.[101] The distinction between 'political exile' and 'economic migrant' was therefore increasingly blurred, even for contemporary observers. In 1977, the Ghanaian High Commissioner to London refuted the characterisation by the UK *Sunday Times* of plane passengers arriving in London from Ghana as 'refugees', calling this assertion 'ludicrous.'[102]

This refutation occurred in the wake of a major strike demanding a return to civilian rule organised by the Association for Recognised Professional Bodies, which represented all doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers and bankers.[103] In response,

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[97]John Anarfi, Stephen Kwankye, Ofuso-mensah Ababio, and Richmond Tiemoko, 'Migration from and to Ghana: A Background Paper,' December 2003, Issued by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, p. 7-9.

[98] TNA, FCO/65/1863, Mills to Heath, 'Ghana: A Poor State of Play', 17 February 1977. Research conducted by Ghanaian and diaspora scholars into contemporary Ghanaian migration patterns and the impact of remittances has flourished over the past two decades. For a key early work see Takyiwaa Manuh (ed), *At Home in the World: International Migration and Development in Contemporary Ghana and West Africa,* (Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2005).

[99] David Leitch, 'Ghana in chaos, say plane refugees', *Sunday Times*, 17 July 1977.

[100] Azarya and Chazan, 'Disengagement with the State,' p. 119.

[101] Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics*, pp. 156, 179.

[102] 'Ghana Account Ludicrous', Colonel SM Asante, *The Sunday Times*, 24 July 1977.

[103] TNA, FO 65/1863, 'Resolution Adopted by the National Executive of the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies', 23 June 1977.

Acheampong not only banned the organisation, but sent the military to occupy banks and hospitals.[104] Despite the High Commissioner's objection to the term 'refugee' , it is notable that some passengers 'spoke of unconfirmed reports of two leading doctors severely beaten and in critical condition,' and were reluctant to be quoted.[105] While the strike failed to secure its immediate aim, the military government did now promise to hand over Ghana to civilian rule within two years.

The Unigov Referendum 1977-1978

As the economy deteriorated, so did the legitimacy of Acheampong's military government. Demands from the Ghanaian public for Acheampong's departure and a return to civilian rule grew steadily louder, but he nonetheless sought to retain power.[106] In an effort to deflect rising popular discontent, Acheampong introduced the idea of Union Government (Unigov) to Ghanaian politics. Designed to remove the need for political parties, this novel concept involved a corporatist model of power sharing between civilians, military, and police. However, much of the populace was unconvinced by the extensive government promotion and endless radio advertising of the concept, instead viewing Unigov as an underhand method of prolonging military dictatorship.[107] By 1977, strikes and boycotts (see above) proliferated and were quickly repressed: opposition party leaders were regular targets of physical harassment by state security agents. All this formed a precursor to the next wave of exile.

Ultimately, Acheampong decided to make Unigov the subject of a national referendum, to be held on 30 March 1978. Opposition was orchestrated by three main bodies: the Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship, the Third Force, and the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ).[108] The PMFJ was the most prominent, its members were both eminent and politically diverse, including Lt General Afrifa, head of state during the PP government, and Komla Gbedemah, who led the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), which had been created to contest the 1969 elections. The government

[104] Singh, *Seizing power,* p. 98.
[105] David Leitch, 'Ghana in Chaos Say Plane Refugees', *The Sunday Times*, 17 July 1977.
[106] For example see TNA,FCO/65/1863, 'The Case Against the S.M.C.: Statement Issued by the Ghana Association of University Teachers (GAUT), 1 July 1977.
[107] BBC SWB, ME/5441/B/1, B. Africa, 'Ghana: Establishment of Military Advisory Council', GNA 1225 gmt.15 February 1977.
[108] Paul Nugent, *Africa Since Independence* (London: Red Globe, 2012, 2nd edition) p. 218.

openly sponsored pro-Unigov groups, denied permits for anti-Unigov demonstrations and sent plainclothes thugs to violently disrupt meetings.[109] Clashes between pro- and anti-Unigov groups at the PMFJ launch in Kumasi on 2 February were so fierce that Gbedemah sustained injuries.[110]

As the referendum loomed, those who sought to ensure a democratic, fair process came under increasing pressure. Rumours swirled of plans to assassinate officials, notably Electoral Commissioner I.K. Abban. His team went in to hiding for several days as the results of the referendum were announced by government operatives. [111] In the declared referendum results, 55% of the population had supposedly voted for Union government. However, voter fraud was manifestly evident. Ballots were taken away from the polling station and counted in barracks, and the Electoral Commissioner had been forced to flee from government troops.[112] With the commissioner's disappearance, the government proceeded to appoint a new, more compliant commissioner who doctored the results to cover up any repudiation of Unigov by the electorate.[113] However, while this was successful in pushing through the proposal, the obvious malpractice massively undermined the referendum's public legitimacy. As Paul Nugent has archly stated: 'The referendum itself underlined the cardinal principle that if one is going to rig a poll then one has to do it properly.'[114]

The Afrifa Family Exile

In the wake of the referendum, the SMC's repressive tactics forced effective opposition outside Ghana's borders. Within days, the SMC banned political parties, specifically demanding the dissolution of the PMFJ, the Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship, and the Third Force. Reflecting on the period of pre-referendum campaigning, Acheampong stated: 'Those days of leniency are past, we have shown too much magnanimity and that

[109] Singh, *Seizing Power,* p. 99.
[110] Obed Asamoah, p. 240.
[111] University of Sussex Archives, British Library of Development Studies Legacy Collection, Ghana - Box.204, Letter from IK Abban to General IK Acheampong, 1st April 1978; see also Hilary Miezah, *Elections in African Developing Democracies* (London: Palgrave, 2018), p .1.
[112] Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics,* pp. 240-62.
[113] Naomi Chazan and Victor T. Le Vine, 'Politics in a "Non-Political" System: The March 30, 1978 Referendum in Ghana', *African Studies Review*, Vol.22, No.1 (1979), p. 194.
[114] Nugent, *Africa Since Independence,* p. 218.

is enough.'[115] Many opposition activists, including Gbedemah and Victor Owusu, were imprisoned under the Preventative Detention Act, while some managed to flee abroad. However, the repressive attitude of the regime in the run up to the referendum had led key leaders of the anti-Unigov movement to make exit plans for themselves and their family. In late February 1978, shortly before the Unigov referendum, Lt General Afrifa, the former Ghanaian Head of State, spoke discretely to an official of the British High Commission in Accra. Afrifa claimed that because of his political campaigning with the PMFJ he and his family were the subject of an 'assassination committee' run by Acheampong. Afrifa did not want to leave Ghana himself, as he was surprisingly confident of victory in the referendum, but sought to send his family to safety in Britain until it was over. The Foreign Office were somewhat horrified by this request, concerned that the presence of Afrifa's family in the UK would fuel the same diplomatic difficulties as they had experienced with Busia.[116] UK-based officials concluded that they were likely to stay permanently and that Afrifa would join them in exile.[117] The ailing Busia was already writing to the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, on their behalf.[118]

While the Foreign Office reluctantly accepted Afrifa's request, they were surprised to receive no response. The date of the referendum passed and Afrifa did not contact the British. It was not until 18 May that the Foreign Office heard that Afrifa, his wife, seven children, and a maid were on their way to London via Lomé and Paris, with Afrifa travelling undercover using the name 'Kwesi Mensah'. On his arrival in Britain, Afrifa immediately contacted the wider Ghanaian exile community. British officials noted that he was accompanied by R.R. Amponsah, the former Minister of Education in the Busia government.[119]

Foreign Office officials were particularly concerned because they had just endured a similar episode with a former leader of Nigeria which had proved to be explosive.[120] In 1975, General Yakubu 'Jack' Gowon, the Nigerian premier, had fled to Britain after being

[115] Library of Congress, 'Political Parties Banned', *Ghana News*, Vol.7, 3/78, March 1978, (United States: Embassy of Ghana, 1978), p. 8.
[116] TNA, FCO/65/2036, Mills to London, 28 February 1978.
[117] Ibid., Holding to Graham, 'Ghana: General Afrifa's Family', 28 February 1978.
[118] Ibid., Busia to Callaghan, 11 May 78. Busia was writing from 95 Abingdon Rd, Standlake, Witney OX29 7QN.
[119] TNA, FCO/65/2036, Johnson to Mansfield, 'Ghana: Lt General Afrifa', 18 May 1978.
[120] TNA, FCO/65/2036, 'Ghana: Lt General Afrifa', also Olajide Aluko, 'Nigeria and Britain after Gowon,' *African Affairs*, Vol.76, No.304 (1977): 303-320; Claude S. Phillips, 'Nigeria's new political institutions, 1975–9,' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.18, No.1 (1980): 1-22.

overthrown in a coup.[121] Therefore, to head off any potential diplomatic debacles, the Foreign Office wanted Afrifa to renounce his political activism and, ideally, promise not to talk to the BBC. This was of particular concern because negative coverage on the BBC World Service, the shortwave broadcasts of which were targeted at listeners across West Africa, was a subject of constant frustration for Acheampong. The BBC was also warned against conducting any interviews with the ex-President.[122] The requested promise from Afrifa was obtained 'orally' via an intermediary, as officials were reluctant to be seen communicating directly with him as he was under surveillance from Ghanaian security.[123] However, the efficacy of this promise was in doubt; Foreign Office officials had previously extracted just such an assurance from Gowon, but it proved ineffective.

Despite the British Government's attempts to downplay Afrifa's presence, Ghana's High Commission swiftly complained that he was using Britain as a platform for 'subversive activities against the republic of Ghana' and that he would be 'commuting between Britain and other countries for the same purpose'. They even connected his presence in Britain with an arson attack on Ghana's consular office at Queen Anne's Gate on 28 May.[124] However, just as it appeared that the Foreign Office were set for another protracted exile-based furore, Afrifa returned to Ghana in November 1978. Keeping a low profile for a while, he was later elected to parliament on 18 June 1979.[125]

Opposition to Unigov in Exile

Afrifa was not the only PMFJ leader to successfully flee the post-referendum government crackdown. Jones Ofori-Atta, who had been deputy minister for Finance and Economic Planning in the Busia government, also escaped to London in the aftermath of the referendum. In a BBC interview, Ofori-Atta made explicit his intention of organising Ghanaian resistance to Unigov from abroad. He stated that 'there was enough material in Ghana for the formation of a resistance movement' and that the creation of such a

[121] In exile, Gowon seemed to have quietly settled into a life of exile, undertaking a Ph.D. in political science at the University of Warwick. However, a major diplomatic furore occurred when Gowon's successor, Brigadier Mutala Muhammed, was assassinated the following year.
[122] TNA, FCO/65/2036, Leahy to Johnson, 'Afrifa', 28 May 1978.
[123] Ibid. Johnson to Graham, 'Ghana: General Afrifa, 22 May 1978. and mins of 24 May.
[124] Ibid., Ghana High Commission, SMA/CON./LON, 30 May 1978.
[125] He was later executed on 26 June 1979 along with other former senior generals.

movement was one of the reasons that he had come to London.[126] In this way, he directly linked his exilic presence in a key metropole for Ghanaian migrants to his ability to organise effective Ghanaian domestic opposition. Ofori-Atta saw the potential to unite the PMFJ with the two other key anti-Unigov organisations into 'a coherent opposition' led from exile.[127] Ofori-Atta pointed to the corrupt nature of the poll and the country's parlous economic state as reasons why it was 'quite irresponsible for anyone with a stake in the future of the country to shut up, and he himself would not do so'.[128]

While Ofori-Atta identified London as a promising location from which to galvanise Ghanaians, Togo also figured strongly. British officials were clear that 'he and other leaders were in and out of Togo pretty often', mirroring previous exile dynamics which had placed Togo at the centre of Ghanaian exile-led enterprises.[129] While Ofori-Atta downplayed the possibility of such activity, stating that 'as far as he knew', there were no plans to mount a coup from Togo, his comments were somewhat vague.[130] Ofori-Atta claimed that Afrifa was 'at this moment living in Togo,' despite his equally prominent presence in London. Having been a key leader of the coup which toppled Nkrumah, Afrifa was the SMC's most feared exile opposition.[131] Since it was well-known that Acheampong and the SMC paid close attention to the British media, Ofori-Atta's BBC interview advanced two distinct but connected messages. On the one hand, he sought to reassure the West that opposition to the SMC was rooted in the principles of democracy and non-violence. On the other, his subtle nods towards Togo-based exile leadership could be interpreted by the SMC as an implicit threat.

While the post-referendum repression pushed domestic opposition groups into exile, the resultant political turmoil was also monitored by Ghanaians across the globe, encouraging existing Ghanaian diaspora to create their own opposition groups. Five days before the referendum, an inaugural meeting of the Ghana Study Group of North America (GSG) was held in Boston. While not explicitly an exile organisation, its membership consisted of US-based Ghanaians who desired the 'ultimate construction of a working-class socialist Society in our country and continent, based on Marxist-Leninist principles',

[126] TNA, FCO/65/2021, BBC Interview with Jones Aforri-Atta, 19 June 1978.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid.
[129] TNA, FCO/65/2021, Mellon to Griffiths-Jones, 20 June 1978.
[130] Ibid, BBC Interview with Jones Aforri-Atta, 19 June 1978.
[131] TNA, FCO/65/2036, Johnson to Mansfield, 'Ghana: Lt General Afrifa', 18 May 1978.

and who also condemned both the SMC's military dictatorship and its 'Union Government imposition' via a 'sham' referendum.[132] This self-defined 'group of Ghanaian patriots' was part of a proliferation in Ghanaian overseas opposition protest groups, which therefore recognised the need for co-operation:

> We realise also that given the nature of the oppressive conditions in Ghana, a variety of groups would form abroad with various objectives. Insofar as the various objectives may coincide for the most part, we would like to work with patriotic groups for the advancement of the most immediate aims, and possibly, for the advancement of our ultimate objectives as well. Hence, we urge all compatriots to co-operate with us, or to respond to our initiatives, in the cause of the struggle.[133]

This collaborative attitude was in evidence on 1 July 1978, when the GSG, alongside the Association of Ghanaians in North America and Concerned Citizens for Better Ghana, marched in Washington DC in a two-hour demonstration against the SMC. The protesters marched three miles from Columbia St to the White House, 'Shouting ans [sic] singing 'down with military dictatorship', 'oppose the SMC', and other slogans.' [134] According to the GSG newsletter, *Ogya*, after the protest these three organisations held a forum to discuss the political, economic, and social problems of Ghana, which 'was attended by many Ghanaians from different parts of the US.' Ghanaian groups abroad were thus united and energised by the attempted imposition of Unigov. The GSG stated that the 1 July demonstration 'was the first such protest march by Ghanaians in the US in several years'.[135] However, this was only a small part of the mounting domestic and international pressure on Acheampong and the SMC. Less than five days later, the SMC would force Acheampong's resignation.

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[132] Columbia University Archives, CLR James Papers, Series IV: Subject Files, 1952-1992, Sub-Series.3: General, 1957-1986, 'Editorial', and 'Resolutions from Inaugural Meeting,' *Ogya: The Ghana Study Group in North America*, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 1978, pp. 1-2.
[133] 'Editorial,' Ibid, p. 1.
[134] 'Ghanaians in US Protest', Ibid, pp. 7-8.
[135] Ibid.

Akuffo's Palace Coup

Following the Unigov referendum, Acheampong sought to retain his grip on power through various repressive tactics, as Ghana's political situation grew increasingly unstable. However, while Acheampong was resolute, many of his fellow officers were uncomfortable with the regime's direction. Some were concerned that Acheampong's style of military rule was doing irreparable damage to the army's reputation, and that it might benefit from exiting politics altogether.[136] Acheampong was notably vigilant about dissent within the lower ranks but was not prepared for the possibility that his fellow SMC officers would affect a palace coup. His removal on 3 July 1978, by the unanimous agreement of the military chiefs, therefore came as a significant shock. His 'resignation' was announced on 5 July, in favour of his deputy, General Akuffo, who had a reputation for being relatively incorrupt.[137] Acheampong's son now applied for entry into the UK, hoping to escape retribution in the immediate aftermath of his father's overthrow. [138] However it soon became apparent that the new Akuffo leadership was not interested in reprisals. Acheampong himself was allowed to go into 'honourable retirement' in his village of Iraboum, rather than being encouraged into exile where he might cause difficulties for the new SMC leaders.[139]

One unforeseen advantage of this change of leadership was the increased distance that it placed between the SMC members and the 1972 coup. In October 1978 Busia died after a long period of ill health, and the possibility of a state funeral for the former prime minister was far easier to entertain now that the SMC leadership were free of association with the coup that toppled his government. As part of an effort to soothe national tension and promote unity, Busia's body was flown home to Ghana. There was an official lying in state in Accra, followed by a memorial service, and finally a funeral in Wenchi, his hometown.[140]

Reflecting this desire to deescalate tensions, Akuffo immediately emphasised that he had 'no political ambition' and sought a smooth transition to a constitutional

[136] Singh, *Seizing Power,* p. 99.
[137] Library of Congress, 'General Acheampong Steps Down', *Ghana News*, Vol 7 6/73, June/July 1978, (United States: Embassy of Ghana, 1978), p. 1.
[138] TNA, FCO/65/2021, Mellon to FCO, 'Acheampong's Fate', 6 July 1978.
[139] Ibid, Mellon to Griffith-Jones, 11 July 1978.
[140] TNA, FCO/65/2020, Brasnett to Griffith-Jones, 'Funeral Ceremonies - Dr KA Busia', 29 September 1978, See also Ibid, Calder memo, 'Dr Busia's Funeral', 28 September 1978.

government, the date for which he set as 1 July 1979.[141] Akuffo was also swift to liberalise politically, releasing all those imprisoned in the aftermath of the referendum, and extending an unconditional offer of amnesty to all 'self-imposed exiles' who had not committed a criminal offence. [142] This was highly attractive to these more recent exiles: the amnesty offer came less than two months after their initial flight, meaning they were in the first steps of establishing life outside Ghana.

However, there was some scepticism from the diasporic Ghanaian community that this transition in leadership would result in concrete change. The GSG denounced the 'transitional national government' headed by Akuffo, deeming it a 'deceptive ploy' comparable to the Unigov proposal designed to keep the military in power.[143] Even contributors to the less radical *Afajato*, the publication of the Association of Ghanaians in North America, expressed their distaste at continued military rule. Johnson Boadu wrote: 'The rule of SMC is illegal whether the leader is Redeemer Acheampong or the "no-nonsense soldier's soldier" Akuffo. A bank robber and a chicken thief are all thieves, no less, no more; and they both must be treated with the contempt they deserve.'[144] Despite this well-founded suspicion, Akuffo held to his promised timeline of transition to civilian government, lifting the ban on political party activities on 1 January 1979 in preparation for the upcoming elections.[145] However, as Ghana braced itself for its first democratic election in seven years, a group of junior officers, angered that SMC corruption would go unpunished, were preparing a coup from below.

Conclusion

While exile was a less consistent dynamic in the Ghanaian political landscape of this complex period than previously, it was still a prominent factor in shaping political discourse and change. Busia's exilic presence was a legitimate concern for the nascent

[141] TNA, FCO/65/2020, '"I Have No Political Ambition"- Lt-General Akuffo', *Ghana News*, Vol 7 No 8, September 1978, p. 1.
[142] Library of Congress, 'Detainees Released' and 'Amnesty for Self-Imposed Exiles', *Ghana News*, Vol.7 6/73, June/July 1978, pp. 4-5.
[143] Columbia University Archives, CLR James Papers, Series.IV: Subject Files, 1952-1992, Sub-Series 3: General, 1957-1986, 'Acheampong's Resignation', *Ogya*, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 1978, p. 7.
[144] Ibid, Johnson Boadu, 'Long Overdue', *Afajato: publication of Association of Ghanaians in North America*, Vol 1 No 5, 1978, p. 7.
[145] Library of Congress, 'Ghana to Lift Ban on Political Activities', *Ghana News*, Vol.7 10/78, November/December 1978, p. 12.

NRC, further damaging already poor Anglo-Ghanaian relations. So troubling was Busia for the British government that his activities caused significant rifts between departments, Foreign Office officials feeling restrained both by Britain's asylum policies and by Busia's connections with the British elite. These dynamics would be echoed during Afrifa's briefer British exile in 1978.

The Unigov referendum was a particularly notable flashpoint for exile generation and activity. This sharp reversal in policy, from an ostensibly democratic referendum campaign with sanctioned political pressure groups, to mass arrests and blanket bans on political expression, forced into exile all effective opposition to the proposal. However, this external opposition was significantly greater than the PMFJ and other newly exiled organisations. The mushrooming of the diaspora during a decade of national economic decline gave exile opposition movements more weight, and new groups sprung up to leverage that power. While the members of these organisations often existed in a liminal space between exile and migrant, their status as 'external' was fundamental to their opposition. Ultimately, as subsequent chapters will show, this increasingly politicised diaspora would form the basis for the globalized Ghanaian political landscape of the late twentieth century and beyond.

Chapter 7

A New Wave of Exiles: The Rise of Jerry Rawlings, 1979-86

Introduction

Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings dominated Ghanaian political life throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and remains a deeply controversial figure in Ghana. His death in 2020 has prompted wide-ranging reassessments of his legacy.[1] His initial stint in power as head of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) lasted less than six months, but nonetheless reshaped the Ghanaian polity. Radical and populist, his military regime pledged to avenge the Ghanaian people against the corrupt individuals who had brought Ghana's economy to its knees. All living former heads of state were summarily executed, and men and women accused of '*kalabule*', or profiteering, faced unprecedented violence and retribution.[2] While the AFRC handed power to Hilla Limann's democratic civilian government in late 1979, just over two years later Rawlings again took power in a second military coup. Instituting the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), Rawlings now promised comprehensive revolution. Under this regime, the judiciary was side-lined, the press suppressed, and hundreds of civilians were executed, tortured, or simply disappeared.[3]

This extreme violence, disorder, and the resultant economic chaos caused unprecedented numbers of people from every sector of society to flee abroad. This was reflected in a sharp rise in refugee applications as the decade progressed. According to Amnesty International statistics, only thirteen Ghanaians sought political asylum in the

[1] Kojo Apeagyei, Gillian Asafu-Adjaye, 'What do different generations of Ghanaians make of Jerry Rawlings' legacy?', 24 November 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2020/11/24/what-do-different-generations-of-ghanaians-make-of-jerry-rawlings-legacy/ [accessed 01/09/22].
[2] Abena Ampofoa Asare, *Truth Without Reconciliation: A Human Rights History of Ghana*, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), pp. 61-63.
[3] Ibid.

UK in 1981. This rose to 407 in 1982, and to 689 in 1983.[4] As in previous eras analysed in earlier chapters, opposition coalesced in exile as dissent became functionally impossible within Ghana's borders. However, and in contrast to previous experience, extraordinary turbulence within the military also caused hundreds of soldiers from all ranks to flee abroad. Establishing exile communities throughout West Africa, most commonly in Togo, the presence of trained military personnel on Ghana's border was a major concern for the PNDC government. Coup attempts were numerous, and regional relations were adversely affected as exile dynamics generated mutual mistrust.

Due to Rawlings' lengthy time in power, and this period's importance to Ghanaian exile dynamics, analysis of it is divided here into two chronological chapters. This first will focus primarily on the first half of the 1980s, assessing the political sea change which Rawlings' rise induced in Ghana's political landscape, alongside the radical changes made to the judiciary and civil society and the exodus this inspired. It will also centre on exiled military opposition to Rawlings, considering the many coup attempts from exile, and the regional diplomatic discord this created.

Rawlings' Rise

Rawlings' first attempt to seize power was wholly unsuccessful. In fact, his coup attempt on 15 May 1979 was widely unwelcome, the *Daily Graphic* describing his bid for power as 'totally unwarranted and completely out of place'.[5] Akuffo was then in the process of returning Ghana to civilian rule and his relaxation of laws governing the formation of political parties had prompted renewed democratic participation and growing popular engagement. Not only was there little general appetite for a military coup, Rawlings' relative obscurity and junior rank made this initiative particularly surprising, as coups were usually the preserve of senior officers. Such was his obscurity, newspapers struggled to find photographs of Rawlings with which to break the news of his coup.[6]

[4] Columbia University Archives, Amnesty International of the USA, Inc: National Office Records 1966-2003, RG VII: Campaign and Country Files Series 3: Other Campaigns and Supporting Files, 1979-1995, Box.346, File: Refugee Campaign 1988, 'Refugees and asylum seekers in the UK: Statistics', 16 December 1987.
[5] Shillington, *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor*, p. 32.
[6] Interview with Elizabeth Ohene, 9 April 2019.

Rawlings' mutiny was quelled within the day, and he was quickly court martialled. However, at his trial, Rawlings' explanation of his intentions gained him some support from the wider populace. He argued that it had not been his intention to seize power to govern Ghana. He was instead attempting to carry out a 'house cleaning' exercise, to purge the military of those senior officers who had wielded power corruptly.[7] Rawlings framed Ghana's political division as 'no longer a question of the Akan against the Ewe, the Ga against the Northerner, but a question of THOSE WHO HAVE against those who HAVE NOT…', a message of unity for all Ghanaians against 'a very tiny minority of greedy, inhuman, selfish senior officers, politicians, businessmen and a bunch of bank managers and a bunch of cowardly Lebanese...'[8] His characterisation of Ghanaian economic problems as the fault of clientelism, together with foreign minorities, struck a chord with an irate public which had been experiencing the effects of economic decline for more than a decade.

Rawlings asserted that the only way to re-establish the credibility of the armed forces, tarnished by enduring corrupt military government, was to 'go the Ethiopian way'.[9] This was an expression of admiration for the Derg, the military government which had ruled Ethiopia since 1974 and presided over a period of exceptional political violence, known as the 'Red Terror'.[10] This call was received with enthusiasm by many junior officers, as well as sections of the wider public. While Akuffo was returning Ghana to civilian rule, he had resisted popular calls to prosecute his predecessor Acheampong and other senior officers for economic mismanagement, leaving Ghana's former rulers free to enjoy the benefits of their alleged corruption.[11] Rawlings' calls for a violent re-ordering converged with the public's desire to see these individuals appropriately punished, as well as for an end to the cycle of clientelism.

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[7] Jan Pieterse, 'Rawlings and the 1979 revolt in Ghana', *Race & Class,* Vol.23, No.4 (1982) pp. 252-253.
[8] Quoted in Kojo Yankah, *The Trial of JJ Rawlings: Echoes of the 31st December Revolution* (Tema: Ghana Publishing, 1986), pp. 17-18.
[9] Barbara Okeke, *June 4th: A Revolution Betrayed* (Enugu: Ikenga, 1982), p. 130.
[10] For more on Ethiopia, see Jacob Wiebel, 'The Ethiopian Red Terror,' *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), date of access 7 November 2020, https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2981/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-188; Pietro Toggia, 'The revolutionary endgame of political power: the genealogy of 'red terror' in Ethiopia', *African Identities*, Vol.10, No.3 (2012) pp. 265-80.
[11] Mike Ocquaye, *Politics in Ghana 1972-79* (Accra: Tornado, 1980), p. 123.

Rawlings' charisma helped garner him widespread popularity. The *Daily Graphic* ran the headline 'LEAVE MY MEN ALONE!...I'm Responsible for Everything', emphasising Rawlings' courage in claiming responsibility for the coup and protecting his fellow defendants.[12] This won him the affection of the junior ranks, and his statements in court precipitated wild cheering from the assembled military officers.[13] Accordingly, on 4 June 1979 sympathetic soldiers, led by Major Boakye Djan, successfully sprang Rawlings from prison, enabling him to take power.[14] Rawlings now became head of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), marking a dramatic new era in Ghanaian politics.[15]

Executions

While Rawlings had been able to secure support from the lower ranks of the military and had gained some public sympathy from his trial, public support for the AFRC was patchy. Among liberals, there was still significant resentment towards the AFRC for disrupting the long-awaited transition to civilian rule. While Rawlings did receive support from academics and student organisations who were enthused by his radical left political vision, Ghana's intelligentsia was by no means united in this regard. Moreover, although the economic pain of the preceding decade meant that his message of retribution resonated with young Ghanaians facing an unprecedented dearth of opportunity, many hesitated to back his revolutionary regime in the uncertain aftermath of the coup.[16]

Although this was Ghana's third military coup in sixteen years, the country had no history of executing its former leaders. Nevertheless, on 16 June 1979, Acheampong was executed by firing squad, followed by Akuffo, Afrifa, and four others ten days later. Rawlings' unprecedentedly lethal retribution against Ghana's former leaders crystallized opinion towards the new regime, both positive and negative. Elizabeth Ohene, a journalist at the *Graphic,* had attended the Rawlings court martial in a dual capacity as a reporter and as a supportive presence for Rawlings' wife, a personal friend. Although hearing first-hand his commitment to 'the Ethiopian way', she assumed Rawlings was either

[12] *Daily Graphic*, 31 May 1979, p. 1.
[13] Shillington, *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor*, p.43; Yankah, *The Trial of JJ Rawlings*, pp. 19-20.
[14] Major Boakye Djan would soon move into exile.
[15] Nugent, Paul, 'Nkrumah and Rawlings: Political Lives in Parallel?,' Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, Vol.12, No.1 (2009), p. 50.
[16] Zaya Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power* (London: Villiers, 1991), pp. 26-29.

exaggerating or ignorant of Ethiopia's reality, leaving her horrified by the executions.[17] International criticism was also swift, with Sonny Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth making it clear that Rawlings would not be welcome at the forthcoming heads of government meeting in Lusaka.[18]

However, for others, these executions only bolstered their support for the AFRC. Many viewed them as evidence of resolute leadership, indicating that the regime would keep its promises to defend the people. The AFRC thus gained broad short-term support by styling itself as an ethical arbiter and champion of the oppressed.[19] However, the increasing characterisation by Rawlings' supporters of any reproach as 'anti-revolutionary', had implications for domestic critics. Journalists such as Elizabeth Ohene were among the first to experience the resultant backlash. During the turbulent week following Acheampong's execution, Ohene was actually offered the editorship of the *Daily Graphic* by Rawlings, which she reluctantly accepted in a transitional capacity. However, this promotion significantly increased her profile and therefore her exposure to the hostility of Rawlings' radical followers.[20]

Because Akuffo, Afrifa, and the other four officers were executed on the day after her appointment, their violent deaths provided the subject of one of her first editorials. Entitled 'Stand Up And Be Counted', Ohene strongly criticised politicians, lawyers and other bastions of Ghanaian society for their 'ostrich behaviour', exhorting them to speak out about the actions of the new regime.[21] Ohene argued that 'our silence in the midst of the wrong doings make us accomplices'.[22] This repudiation of the second set of executions proved so incendiary that a group of Rawlings' supporters attacked the newsroom of the *Daily Graphic*. Ohene recalled the resultant wreckage, the walls covered in angry graffiti condemning the newspaper. Starkly visible among the various slogans were the words: 'E. Ohene must die'.[23]

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[17] Interview with Elizabeth Ohene, 9 April 2019.
[18] TNA, FCO/65/2179, du Boulay, 'Ghana: Message About Akuffo', 20 June 1979.
[19] Nugent, 'Nkrumah and Rawlings', p. 50.
[20] Interview with Elizabeth Ohene, 9 April 2019.
[21] Elizabeth Ohene, 'Stand Up and Be Counted', *Daily Graphic*, 27 June 1979.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Interview with Elizabeth Ohene, 9 April 2019. Graffiti stating 'E.Ohene must die' was faded but still legible on buildings near the Daily Graphic Offices in downtown Accra when Ohene returned for her father's funeral over ten years later.

A pattern of government-sponsored violence established itself and intensified in the following months. The AFRC displayed its radical credentials not through specific policies but by encouraging vicious public reprisals against those accused of profiteering and price-gouging, popularly known as '*kalabule*'. Brutal assaults were carried out on market women blamed for food shortages, culminating in the AFRC-ordained destruction of Accra's famous Makola market on 18 August 1979.[24] The AFRC's approach to 'justice' is suggestive of the work of sociologist Robert Johnson, who has noted that at times of political change, interlocking rituals of criminal punishment (e.g., arrest, detention, interrogation, and trial) are publicly performed so that citizens can see "justice done."[25] This performative justice could also be seen within the armed forces. In response to Rawlings' popular criticism of the ill-treatment of the lower ranks, some 207 senior officers were 'liquidated' and replaced with junior officers. Many of those who remained in their jobs were humiliated with punishments such as head shaving, sometimes using broken bottles.[26]

Despite the chaos and unrest, the AFRC allowed the transition to civilian rule to proceed as Akuffo had promised. Ghanaians went to the polls on 18 June 1979, only two days after Acheampong's death. While the turmoil substantially reduced voter turnout (only 35.3%) a new government was successfully elected.[27] Dr. Hilla Limann's People's National Party (PNP) won convincingly, and on 24 September, Rawlings handed over power to his civilian government. However, Limann would inherit an unenviable domestic situation, which boded ill for the longevity of democracy in Ghana.

Instability and the PNP Government

As Ghana transitioned to a civilian government for the first time in over a decade, the outlook was unfavourable. Ghana's economy was in crisis: between 1971 and 1982 its absolute GDP dropped by 12%, despite a population rise of more than 30%.[28] There were also serious concerns about re-establishing command within the army, with acrimonious

[24] Nugent, 'Nkrumah and Rawlings', p. 50.
[25] Robert Johnson, *Death Work: A Study of the Modern Execution Process*, 2nd ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1998), pp. 19-23.
[26] Paul Nugent, *Big Men, Small Boys, and Politics in Ghana*, p.30 [accessed via HathiTrust 22/03/21].
[27] Christopher McCarty, *Public Opinion in Ghana* (Washington: IFES, 1997), p. 6.
[28] D. Rimmer, *Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy 1950-1990* (New York: Pergamon/World Bank, 1992), p. 143.

divisions between senior and junior ranks. In 1980, Simon Baynham interviewed two army officers living in exile, both of whom described this moment as being characterised by 'extensive disorder and ill-discipline, with commanders reluctant to exercise their authority for fear of retribution from the enlisted ranks'.[29] Lt Colonel Ofosu-Appiah recalled in his memoirs that even those newly appointed revolutionary officers had to 'court favours from Other Ranks if they wanted to remain in their jobs.'[30] While the Rawlings' AFRC had held power for less than 100 days, its disruption to the army's conventional disciplinary structures proved to be enduring.

Despite the handover to civilian government, the political turmoil was such that during the summer of 1979 many Ghanaians anticipated further violence. Several high-profile Ghanaians either left the country or sent family members abroad for safety. By 24 July, not only was Afrifa's widow in London (granted an emergency visa by the Home Office), but so too were the wives of Major Boakye Djan and Rawlings himself. Amid the panic, other senior political figures had entered Britain 'on illegal Togolese passports.' British officials chose to turn a blind eye in the hope they would 'simply lie low' and return to Ghana when things stabilised.[31]

Accordingly, security officials such as KB Quantson, then head of the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI), were on high alert. Quantson later recalled that '…intelligence projections for the post-AFRC Government suggested strongly that there was likely to arise an acute security situation.'[32] The precarity of the new democratic government was also apparent to the general populace. In November 1979, Ohene captured the situation in another audacious editorial entitled 'The Coup Drill', in which she suggested that Ghanaians should devise a plan to resist the next military leader who 'seizes Broadcasting House and tells us he has come to save us.'[33] The societal turmoil engendered by Rawlings' initial rise to power had thus altered Ghanaian politics, with coups becoming an everyday feature of public discourse.

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[29] Simon Baynham, 'Divide et Impera: Civilian Control of the Military in Ghana's Second and Third Republics', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.23, No.4 (1985), p. 636.
[30] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline,* pp. 36-38.
[31] TNA, FCO/65/2181, Accra to London 24 July 1979.
[32] Quantson, *Security in the Hand of God*, p.132. Interview with Quantson, 28 August 2018.
[33] Elizabeth Ohene, 'The Coup Drill', *Daily Graphic,* 27 November 1979.

The Limann government was also constrained by the implicitly conditional nature of the AFRC's handover.[34] Rawlings and his fellow AFRC coup-makers had made their own amnesty a condition of the transition, leaving them free to engage in public life in a manner which destabilised governance. Most significantly, Rawlings insisted that the new civilian government must uphold the values of the revolution, something which Quantson felt was 'unrealistic, even foolhardy', since a democratic government constrained by legal due process could never replicate the zeal exemplified by the AFRC.[35] Nevertheless, addressing Limann in his handover speech, Rawlings made his position clear in stating: 'The whole nation is watching you.'[36] Limann's PNP government was therefore faced with the dual challenge of stabilising the armed forces and managing Ghana's swiftly declining economy, while being keenly aware that any unpopular moves could precipitate a coup. Historical precedent also played a role: while it was necessary to devalue the cedi to combat Ghana's rapid inflation, the PNP was acutely conscious that devaluation of the currency had sparked Busia's overthrow in 1972.[37]

During this crisis period, British officials worked closely with Limann's government. It quietly encouraged members of Rawlings' AFRC to spend time 'studying abroad', removing them from the domestic stage and diminishing the threat they posed to the nascent democratic government. As the political situation became more unstable, many needed little encouragement.[38] A key example was Rawlings' close friend and deputy, Major Kojo Boakye-Djan, who in July 1979 agreed to take up a UNDP Fellowship at the War Studies Department at Kings College London. He confessed that he was 'running scared' of an army that Limann had no hope of controlling, and he was 'prepared to accept a position anywhere out of Ghana'.[39] These efforts were so successful that by March 1980 Lance Corporal Owusu Boateng was the only remaining original AFRC member (other than Rawlings) still in Ghana.[40]

However, all efforts to tempt Rawlings abroad failed. Indeed, British intelligence reported that Rawlings was troubled by the exodus of his AFRC colleagues and 'regarded

[34] Baynham, 'Divide et Impera', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, p. 635.
[35] Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, p. 78. Interview with Quantson, 28 August 2018
[36] *Ghanaian Times*, 25 September 1979.
[37] Roger Gocking, *The History of Ghana* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005), p. 186.
[38] 'We did not Run Away', *Daily Graphic* 23 February 1980.
[39] TNA, FCO/65/2181, Accra to Dalton DI14a, 'Note of a meeting: 11 July 1979.
[40] TNA, FCO/65/2320, Note for the file, L/Cpl Owusu Boateng, 29 March 1980.

them as having deserted the ship.'[41] Despite this unprepossessing outlook, the extraction of Rawlings remained an elusive target for the combined forces of the Limann government and British Foreign Office, which hoped that physical distance would diminish the threat posed by his continued charismatic presence within the armed forces. Observers noted that, despite subtle hints to Rawlings that Libya 'was a wonderful and exciting country' to visit, and 'many offers of overseas courses of one sort or another,' he had 'insisted on staying put'.[42]

With most of the AFRC leadership coaxed abroad, Limann was able to bolster his position by dismissing numerous police, army, and air force commissioners who had served under the AFRC, including forcibly retiring Rawlings himself. Predictably, this led to widespread concerns among participants in the 1979 coup and subsequent revolutionary action that they would be persecuted, despite promises to the contrary. Quantson recalls one soldier comparing the response of pro-AFRC soldiers to this perceived threat to a cornered snake approached by a person with a stick. In these circumstances, the only options were to 'escape if it is possible or to attack…'[43] In February 1981, British officials observed that '[t]he loyalty and discipline of the armed forces at lower ranks is shaky', and that Rawlings remained the focus for 'opposition outside Parliament', especially among intellectuals and students who were keen to pursue a more radical form of politics.[44]

Experienced senior officers such as Lt Colonel Ofosu-Appiah were parachuted into this tinderbox, appointed by the Limann government to senior military positions in the hope of re-establishing army discipline. Ofosu-Appiah, appointed as the new commander of the 2nd Battalion of Infantry in Takoradi in February 1980, later recalled his anxiety as he became aware of junior soldiers' allegiance to Rawlings' June Fourth Movement (JFM).[45] Ofosu-Appiah infiltrated meetings using trusted operatives and discovered plans not only for the overthrow of the civilian government, but also for his own assassination.

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[41] TNA, FCO/65/2184, Accra to London, 'Rawlings', 6 December 1979.

[42] TNA, FCO/65/2321, Accra to London, 29 October 1980; FCO/65/2184, Accra to London, 'Rawlings', 6 December 1979.

[43] Quantson, *Security in the Hand of God*, p.139; Interview with KB Quantson, 28 August 2018.

[44] TNA, FCO/65/3122, Rogan to Brett-Rooks, 21 November 1984, Extract from the Ghana Papers for the 'Form at a Glance', February 1981, p. 4.

[45] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline*, p.39. For more information of the June Fourth Movement and other important radical organisations please see Adotey Bing, 'Popular participation versus people's power: Notes on politics and power struggles in Ghana', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.11, No.31 (1984): 91-104.

Ofosu-Appiah alerted the PNP government but was met only with inaction. Left feeling 'shattered and frightened,' Ofosu-Appiah's battalion nevertheless offered the only substantial resistance to Rawlings' third coup on 31st December 1981, followed by his unavoidable flight into exile.[46]

The Establishment of the PNDC

Rawlings' "second coming" differed in several key ways that made it far more controversial than his first. While he had claimed his first seizure of power to be temporary and simply 'house-cleaning', he now demanded 'nothing less than a revolution- something which will transform the social and economic order of the country.'[47] Rawlings' aims now encompassed the entire Ghanaian political elite, not simply the few bad actors whom he had accused in his first coup.[48] The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was established, parliament was dissolved, the constitution suspended, and all political parties banned. In contrast to the AFRC, PNDC membership was largely civilian, an effort to establish some form of legitimacy. This was sorely needed because, in contrast to his first coup's toppling of a military dictatorship, Rawlings had now violently overthrown a democratically elected civilian government that had ruled for less than two years.

Perhaps having learnt from Ghana's historical legacy of subversion from abroad, one of Rawlings' immediate aims was stifling the creation of exile opposition, both elite and mass. In a purge of the political class, Rawlings ordered all former members of Limann's PNP to report to the nearby police or army units. Some were merely registered, but a wider rolling programme of arrests unfolded, ranging from MPs to those suspected of black-market activity and subversive plots. Meanwhile, the PNDC government did its best to prevent prominent Ghanaians from fleeing into exile, most crucially deposed president Hilla Limann. A few days after the 31 December 1981 coup, Limann was arrested at a checkpoint while attempting to leave Ghana. He was subsequently detained at Akosombo prison for almost two years. He was only released in September 1983 on condition that his distinguished friend Alhaji Alhassan Bin Salih, a civil servant, stood

[46] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline*, pp. 56-8.
[47] Jon Kraus, 'Rawlings' Second Coming,' *Africa Report*, Vol.27, No.2, (Mar 1, 1982), p. 59.
[48] Paul Nugent, 'Nkrumah and Rawlings', p. 51.

surety for his release to ensure he did not leave Ghana. Thereafter, he was moved from 'protective custody' into what was effectively house arrest, observing what he described as 'constructive silence'.[49]

This backlash against elected officials accelerated what had already been considerable flight into exile among all professional groups, regardless of previous political persuasion. In an effort to prevent a mass exodus, more stringent exit permits were instituted for all people wishing to leave the country. These became increasingly difficult to obtain, with applicants required to go to Accra National Stadium and line up at dawn to apply. Ministry of Interior officials frequently ran out of the forms for applicants to complete. Some travellers, having dutifully obtained permits, found that when they reached Accra airport they were still refused permission to leave. The passport office near the airport was 'besieged daily by thousands of Ghanaians,' and Western embassies were 'flooded' with visa applications.[50] As in 1979, Rawlings threatened to put those who had fled on trial in absentia.[51] This focused effort to prevent potential exiles leaving indicated a new phase in Ghanaian approaches to dissent, demonstrating the enhanced role of exile in Ghanaian politics.

Public Tribunals

Ghana's judicial system presented a significant challenge to Rawlings' plans to revolutionise society, and therefore came under immediate attack. On 5 January 1982, within a week of his second successful military coup, Rawlings declared his intention to establish a public tribunal system. In a radio broadcast, Rawlings stated that 'the dispensation of Justice itself will be democratised'; public tribunals would circumvent what he described as the 'technical rules which, in the past, have perverted the course of justice and enabled criminals to go free'.[52] Legal protections such as appeals were regarded as an impediment to revolutionary progress, while the legal profession was

[49] A.K. Damwah, 'Dr. Hilla Limann 1934-1998: His Life And Times', Ph.D., University of Cape Coast, 2011, pp. 193-4.
[50] Pranay Gupte, 'Rawlings Tightens His Grip on Ghana After Coup', *New York Times*, 16 January 1982.
[51] BBC SWB, ME/6224/B/8, 'Trials in absentia of exiles from Ghana', 20 September 1979.
[52] Columbia University Archives, Committee for the Protection of Journalists, Box.65, 'The Public Tribunals', Amnesty International General Distribution Paper, 28 October 1984, p. 5. See also *Daily Graphic*, 7 January 1982.

continually accused of 'conservatism' and corruption, together with vestigial colonialism.[53] Having utilised temporary military-style tribunals known as the 'People's Revolutionary Courts' to effect 'house cleaning' exercises during the AFRC period, Rawlings now sought to solidify his control over the judicial system, presenting this as part of his 'Holy War' on corruption and anti-revolutionary thinking.[54]

According to the statute establishing these public tribunals, their purpose was to try public officials who had abused their positions. However, in practice, the PNDC could pursue any case through this system. The tribunal panels were not required to hold legal qualifications and were regulated by officials outside the official legal system.[55] Existing law courts were increasingly bypassed, even treated with open hostility; Ghanaian Chief Justice Apaloo stated that by the end of 1982, five courts had been forced to close due to intimidation.[56] There was no way to appeal a conviction by a public tribunal, and rarely did the accused have access to a legal defence counsel, because the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) boycotted tribunal proceedings entirely, asserting their unconstitutional nature.[57]

By May 1983, tribunals had been established in most of Ghana's larger cities and over 7,000 people were sentenced by tribunal in their first ten months of existence.[58] Public Tribunals were frequently used to target individuals, as they permitted conviction based on a single witness testimony.[59] Sentencing was also strikingly draconian. While Ghana's official legal system rarely imposed the death penalty, Public Tribunals could do so for crimes which were not capital offences in the country's legal code.[60] Amnesty International reported that from 1983-1985 public tribunals imposed the death penalty

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[53] Columbia University Archives, Committee for the Protection of Journalists, Box.65, Ghana 1984, The Public Tribunals in Ghana, Amnesty International External Publication, July 1984.
[54] J. Kandeh, *Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa* (New York: Palgrave, 2004), p. 72.
[55] Columbia University Archives, Amnesty International (USA): National Office Records 1966-2003, RG.VII: Campaign and Country Files Series.3: Other Campaigns and Supporting Files, 1979-1995, Box.322, File: Ghana 1985-1986, 'The Death Penalty in Ghana', September 1985, p. 2.
[56] Warwick Modern Records Centre, Amnesty International Files 1974-1993, MSS34/4/1/GH10, 'Amnesty International's Concerns in the Republic of Ghana, An Amnesty International Background Paper', July 1983, p. 3.
[57] Columbia University Archives, Committee for the Protection of Journalists Records, Box.65, 'The Public Tribunals', Amnesty International General Distribution Paper, 28 October 1984, p. 6.
[58] Ibid., p. 8.
[59] Human Rights Watch, Ghana-Revolutionary Injustice-Abuse of the Legal System under the PNDC Government, Vol.IV, No.1, 31 January 1992, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/g/ghana/ghana921.pdf [accessed 25/03/20].
[60] Columbia University Archives, Amnesty International (USA): National Office Records 1966-2003 (1974-1993), Box.322, The Death Penalty in Ghana, September 1985.

for offences which included 'treason, murder, armed robbery, smuggling, corruption and fraud'.[61] During the decade-long PNDC period in power, as many as 400 death sentences were passed, 118 of which were in absentia.[62] In this way, tribunal proceedings were intrinsically linked with both the creation and the persecution of exiles during this period.

Unsurprisingly, these developments were perceived by many of Rawlings' critics and rivals as a direct threat to their personal safety. As the PNDC tightened its grip, a new wave of Ghanaians fled into exile. By 1983, the UK branch of Amnesty International noted that Ghana had risen to the 7th most common country of origin for refugees, and the UK saw the number of Ghanaians seeking asylum multiply by more than 23 times compared to 1980.[63]

Intimidation of the Judiciary and the Murder of Three Judges

Alongside the imposition of the new tribunal system, the PNDC maintained a concerted intimidation campaign against the judiciary. The most infamous and tragic example of this was the abduction and murder of three High Court judges on 30 June 1982. Under the cover of darkness, Mr Justice K.A. Agyepong, Mrs Justice C. Koranteng-Addow and Mr Justice F. P. Sarkodie-Addo were each abducted from their homes and taken to the outskirts of Accra, where they were shot execution-style, and their bodies set alight.[64] This was widely believed to be retribution for their involvement in reversing decisions of the People's Revolutionary Courts made during Rawlings' first period in power. These reversals, carried out during Limann's democratic government, led Rawlings and his supporters to brand these judges as enemies of the revolution. Once Rawlings again seized power, they were targeted for reprisal.

In his detailed memoir, KB Quantson, then Director of Ghana's Bureau of National Intelligence, recalls his conviction that the killings were an 'inside job', involving 'high

[61] Ibid., Ghana 1985-1986, 'The Death Penalty in Ghana', September 1985, p. 2.
[62] Amnesty International, July 2000, GHANA: Briefing on the death penalty, AI Index: AFR 28/01/00.
[63] For the US figures see Columbia University Archives, Amnesty International (USA): National Office Records 1966-2003 (1974-1993), RG.VII: Campaign and Country Files Series.3: Other Campaigns and Supporting Files, 1979-1995, Box.346, Refugee Campaign 1996-1991, 'Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in the UK: Statistics', 16 December 1987.
[64] A retired army officer, Major Sam Acquah, was also killed alongside the three judges. 'Three Judges Murdered', *Ghana News*, Vol.11, No.7 (July 1982), p. 4.

level official complicity'. Less than a year after the coup, a curfew was still being enforced and military and police checkpoints were 'all over the place', meaning that on an operational level, the killers would have required government complicity to act.[65] Despite initial attempts by Rawlings to present the perpetrators as nebulous 'enemies of the people' who were attempting to damage the nation at large, it was soon obvious that government actors and/or approval was involved. This incident therefore came to symbolise the brutality of the new regime.[66]

The murders of these judges viscerally affected the middle class and is often referred to as the trigger point that led many more individuals to go into exile.[67] For Samuel Gyandoh, who was at that time Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Ghana, this event was highly significant. His position as a leading Ghanaian law professor, as well as a close colleague and friend of the murdered justices, left him particularly exposed. Shortly after the abduction of Justice Cecilia Koranteng-Addow, her son arrived at Gyandoh's house to warn him that this might be the first in a wider series of abductions of legal professionals. Friends with links to the PNDC administration warned Gyandoh that his name featured prominently on a list of future targets, and that he should leave Ghana immediately.[68] Quantson explains that the message behind the killing of the three judges was 'cold-bloodedly clear. Freeze or flee. Or face traceless disappearance.'[69]

Gyandoh had been reluctant to leave Ghana: his anxiety at the prospect of leaving a secure and prestigious job as well as his wife and three children, aged eight, six and two, was overwhelming. He also resented the fact that he was 'being hunted for the wrong reasons' as he had stringently maintained an apolitical stance throughout his career and therefore believed he posed a minimal threat to the regime. However, the deaths of his associates forced a rapid reassessment. Keeping his impending flight as secret as possible, Gyandoh involved only a few immediate family members, to ensure most friends and

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[65] Quantson, *Security in the Hand of God*, p. 169.

[66] 'Three Judges Murdered', *Ghana News*, Vol.11, No.7 (July 1982), p. 4. While individuals were convicted of the murders, including a PNDC MP, there has been scepticism of these proceedings and questions about authorisation still resonate. See Joy FM's documentary 'Who Killed the Judges?'; 'I didn't kill judges – Rawlings roars', *GhanaWeb*, 15 October 2018, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/I-didn-t-kill-judges-Rawlings-roars-692666 [accessed 26/03/20].

[67] Both Samuel Gyandoh and Elizabeth Ohene cited the murder of the judges as the primary motivation for their flight, while several others interviewed mentioned the incident as influential.

[68] Interview with Samuel Gyandoh II, 3 September 2018

[69] Quantson, *Security in the Hand of God*, p. 170.

family would neither be implicated in his escape nor unduly concerned. He was so successful in keeping his impending exile a secret that his father only found out about his departure by reading about it in the newspaper.[70]

The impact of the judges' murder would reverberate through the legal community for years, but even in the immediate aftermath it was clear that the legal landscape had radically changed and had become significantly more hazardous. While the government set up a Committee of Inquiry chaired by the Secretary for the Interior to investigate the killings, this lacked credibility. Eventually the government announced a Special Investigation Board (SIB) led by Mr. Justice Samuel Azu-Crabbe, a former Chief Justice.[71] Azu-Crabbe was painfully aware of the delicacy of his task. Quantson recalls warning him that to undertake this investigation, which was likely to implicate senior government officials, was effectively 'to be asked to sign your own death warrant'. Azu-Crabbe recalled his 'burning fear' that, should the investigation uncover undesirable information, the Commission members could be eliminated like the judges, allowing its report to be buried alongside them. Azu-Crabbe continued:

> That no matter the facts revealed there should be this conclusion. That Chairman Rawlings had nothing to do with the murders… If the investigation found the Chairman culpable to whom are you going to present the report? For what? To arrest and prosecute himself? He was the Revolution. It wasn't even a military coup. It was a Rawlings coup. He was the power: That was the reality.[72]

When the Commission reported privately to the Attorney-General nine months later, it did not blame Rawlings. However, it did directly implicate Captain Kojo Tsikata, the Security Advisor of the PNDC. Tsikata, an ardent Nkruhamist, had spent many years in exile in London but had returned and risen to control every security agency in Ghana.[73]

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[70] Interview with Samuel Gyandoh II, 3 September 2018. However, while Gyandoh's flight was clandestine, he still notified colleagues at the university to ensure that his teaching was covered.

[71] "31st December, 1982–6th January, 1993 (PNDC)-The Establishment of The Special Investigation Board (SIB)" (PDF). The Legal Profession (including the Judiciary) in The National Reconciliation Commission Report Vol.4, Ch.2. Ghana government. October 2004. pp. 98–104.

[72] Quantson, *Security in the Hand of God*, p. 176.

[73] Ibid., p. 177.

The final report recommended that nine people be charged with murder alongside Tsikata, a finding which did not please the PNDC.

Even before the SIB had reported, Azu-Crabbe and his team came under sustained attack from the *Ghanaian Times*, a PNDC-controlled newspaper. It alleged that materials handled by the SIB were circulating widely amongst Ghanaians in political exile and that the SIB was a tool of enemies of the revolution, based in Togo, Britain, and the Netherlands. It was these alleged interactions with the émigré community on which the PNDC focused its attacks. It also accused the SIB of colluding with western embassies, notably that of the United States. Thereafter, Tsikata and Crabbe engaged in vitriolic public exchanges in the media, with the latter accused of working with the CIA. On 21 June 1983, a mob attacked the Supreme Court buildings after a workers' demonstration and the judges had to flee for their lives.[74] Several prominent lawyers were also detained on suspicion of complicity in an alleged coup attempt, including the former head of the GBA and the head of the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies. Amnesty International nevertheless considered this to be retaliation for both bodies continued outspoken opposition.[75]

Unity in Exile

While students had initially provided one of Rawlings' strongest sources of support, by 1983 groups such as the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) were the focus of some of its most significant sources of opposition. In May 1983, nationwide demonstrations and lecture boycotts were held across university campuses calling for an end to political detentions and a return to civilian government, as well as protesting IMF and World Bank-proscribed austerity measures.[76] NUGS president Kweku Paintsil was arrested following these protests, and other leading members such as Hans Ojaba were sought by

[74] The National Reconciliation Commission Report, (Accra: Government of Ghana, 2004), pp. 98-104. https://hmcwordpress.humanities.mcmaster.ca/Truthcommissions/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Ghana.NRC_.Report-FULL.pdf [accessed 12/04/20].
[75] Columbia University Archives, Committee to Protect Journalists Box.65, Ghana 1984, The Public Tribunals in Ghana, Amnesty International External Publication, July 1984, p. 4.
[76] R.E. Van Gyampo, 'Student activism and democratic quality in Ghana's Fourth Republic', *Journal of Student Affairs in Africa*, Vol.1, Nos.1&2 (2013), p. 57.

the authorities for publishing 'seditious literature'.[77] However, not all Ghanaians were sympathetic to their cause, viewing this repression as payback for many students' initial support of the PNDC's harsh brutalities.[78]

Meanwhile, the resurgence of Rawlings had prompted Elizabeth Ohene to flee to London. From her position in exile, Elizabeth Ohene was increasingly aware of the changing political reality for students, as they arrived in London over the course of 1984 in growing numbers. Ohene had been editor of the *Daily Graphic* during the AFRC period when students had been a major source of the violent threats she had suffered. Having established the pioneering magazine *Talking Drums,* which offered an important voice for West African exiles, exiled Ghanaians would regularly contact Ohene at the magazine's London offices. Many of these same students, now victims of the Rawlings regime, contacted Ohene to apologise for their earlier actions.[79] Reminiscent of the last years of Nkrumah (see Chapter 4), exile again became a unifying space in which the shared suffering of disparate groups of dissidents reframed and removed domestic divisions.

This repeated experience of rapprochement in exile was in many ways a defining aspect of externalised opposition movements. As figures from across the political spectrum fell foul of the PNDC regime, the condition of exile provided a space in which the logic of everyday domestic political divisions was suspended and replaced with a single, unifying force: opposition to the government in power. Mirroring the uneasy alliance made by Busia and Gbedemah during the Nkrumah era, but on a much larger scale, in the early 1980s politicians and military officers from across the political spectrum began to cooperate in exile with the aim of toppling Rawlings and his PNDC government.

Lt Colonel Ofosu-Appiah provides a clear personal insight into the intricate realities of such cooperation in exile. Forced to flee Ghana in early 1982 after leading his battalion in resistance to Rawlings' second coup, his memoir details his efforts to connect

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[77] R.E. Van Gyampo, 'Student activism and democratic quality' p. 57.; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Ghana: 1. Information on the AMANFO group. 2. Information on the Free Press and the following persons: Hans Ojaba, Tommy Thompson, Mike Adjei, Kwasi Adusa Amankwa and Kwabena Poku. 3. Information on the New Democratic Party', 1 September 1989, GHA1940, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8937.html [accessed 25/04/21].

[78] C. Nunyonameh, *Politics and democracy in Ghana: Trends and issues* (Accra: Ghana Universities, 2012), pp. 8-10.

[79] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019. For a detailed exploration of Ohene's flight, exile experience, and the establishment of *Talking Drums*, see Chapter 8.

with other likeminded Ghanaian military personnel and politicians to mount armed resistance to the PNDC. His initial success in this regard reflects the superficial unity of an exiled existence. He describes multiple encounters with fellow exiles, in which their aims seemed fundamentally aligned; namely 'to return to Ghana by any means possible.' After one such conversation with a fellow exiled army officer in Liverpool, Ofosu-Appiah went so far as to state: 'The two of us could not have had a more identical objective.'[80]

However, the reality of 'by any means possible' necessitated significant compromise. As a long-serving senior officer, Ofosu-Appiah had strongly opposed, and had been placed at significant risk by, both the AFRC and PNDC governments. However, he now found it necessary to make alliances with those who had originally brought Rawlings to power and had even served in his earlier regime. Specifically, Ofosu-Appiah met with Major Boakye-Djan and Captain Baah-Achamfour, both of whom had been important in Rawlings' rise, but who were by 1982 both living in exile in London. Boakye Djan had been particularly close to Rawlings, having been best man at his wedding in 1977.[81] Ofosu-Appiah writes of their first exploratory meeting: 'Under normal circumstances, I would not have had anything to do with such Officers.' In his opinion, their treasonous role in the 1979 Rawlings coup made them 'only fit for the gallows'.[82] While he saw pragmatic cooperation within exiled opposition circles as imperative, he found this moral compromise 'very difficult to live with in [his] conscience'.[83] Nevertheless, the desperate objectives of exile necessitated compromise beyond what would have been possible in Ghana itself, inverting the logic of domestic political division.

Militarised Countercoups and the Realities of Exile Unity

Armed insurrection, whether from internal or external sources, was a constant challenge for successive Ghanaian governments. During his short time in power, Limann suffered nineteen coup attempts and later recalled that he had expected a coup every evening.[84]

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[80] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline*, p. 92.
[81] 'Why I saved Rawlings - Boakye Djan', *New African Magazine,* 21 January 2003, https://www.modernghana.com/news/30230/why-i-saved-rawling-boakye-djan.html
[82] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline*, p. 93.
[83] Ibid.
[84] K. Batsa, *The Spark: Times Behind Me: From Kwame Nkrumah to Hilla Limann* (London: Rex Collings, 1985), p. 113.

This threat did not abate during the PNDC era. Rawlings claimed that there were four separate attempts on his life in the first three months of 1982, as well as four independently verified coup attempts in the eight months between November 1982 and June 1983.[85] In the opinion of Zaya Yeebo, a founding member of the JFM who served as a PNDC government minister from 1981-82 until his resignation and exile, these attempted militarised countercoups were 'the most effective opposition' faced by the PNDC during its time in power.[86]

Particularly threatening were the groups of Ghanaian soldiers living just beyond Ghana's borders. In the aftermath of the 1981 coup, as loyalties within the military shifted, hundreds of soldiers had been arrested and even more sought refuge in Togo, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria.[87] These regional communities expanded throughout the 1980s, as soldiers who had always opposed Rawlings were incrementally joined by disenchanted Rawlings supporters. This was the experience of exiles like Braimah Issaka, a former military driver for Rawlings, who was imprisoned with numerous other soldiers as part of the intense security crackdown following the 1982 killing murder of three judges (see above). After eight months' incarceration he participated in a mass jail break alongside 200 soldiers who fled into exile across west Africa, many of whom joined the effort to overthrow the PNDC government.[88]

The most significant coup attempt against the PNDC government occurred on 19 June 1983 and was masterminded by Ghanaian soldiers based in Togo. Reportedly led by Lt. Col. Solomon Ekow Daniels, contemporary bulletins on Accra Radio claimed that the coup had been initiated by dissidents who had fled to Togo after two earlier coup attempts in November 1982 and February 1983. The Rawlings government meanwhile repeatedly claimed that the rebels were aided by western governments.[89] The fighting

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[85] TNA, FCO/65/2828, Mellon to FCO, 'Ramphal's Visit', 31 March 1982. 'Ghanaian army rebels stage fourth coup attempt in a year', *United Press International*, 19 June 1983, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/06/19/Ghanaian-army-rebels-stage-fourth-coup-attempt-in-a-year/2575424843200/ For an overview of major coup attempts against Rawlings see: Amnesty International, 'Ghana: Political Imprisonment and the Death Penalty', 18 December 1991, AI Index: AFR 28/03/91, Appendices A and B, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/200000/afr280031991en.pdf [accessed 21/03/21].

[86] Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*, p. 274.

[87] Jon Kraus, 'Revolution and the Military in Ghana', *Current History*, Vol.82, No.482 (March 1983), pp. 115-119, 131-132.

[88] Interview with Braimah Issaka by Kofi Adomah, 'Rawlings' Former Driver Recounts Prison Escape', 23 October 2018, https://m.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/social/201810/366052.php [accessed 28/03/21].

[89] Ed Blanche, 'Order "Search and Destroy" Operation Against Rebels', *Associated Press*, 21 June 1983.

lasted for several days and involved efforts to break some detainees out of jail in Accra, but the attempt had been suppressed by 21 June and the remaining dissidents were in retreat.

Poor living conditions were a driver of some of these rather desperate countercoups. Travelling regularly through Abidjan, Lomé, and Lagos in his efforts to coalesce anti-Rawlings forces for a viable counter-coup attempt, Ofosu-Appiah became aware of the exiled soldiers' poverty, writing: 'Simply put, their living conditions in Lomé were pathetic.' [90] Many exiled soldiers struggled to access support from the UN Refugee Council in Togo; some were refused financial support outright, and those who succeeded in pleading their case only received irregular and 'very meagre allowances'.[91] Observing that Ghanaian soldiers living in exile 'were all a depressed lot,' Ofosu-Appiah understood how their parlous existence underpinned their commitment to urgently return to Ghana by any means necessary.[92]

The PNDC committed substantial resources to monitoring and thwarting the significant threat posed by subversion from abroad. A London-based Ghanaian journalist with the *New African Magazine* explained that Ghana's Bureau of National Investigation was largely preoccupied with dissidents based in the West African region. Ghana, he reported to Canadian officials, had stationed surveillance teams in the capitals of its four closest neighbours: Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. Political exiles in these countries were 'too close to Ghana for the government's comfort', and they were therefore 'considered a threat equal to those remaining in Ghana.'[93] When Ofosu-Appiah first arrived in Lomé, he encountered a fellow senior officer, Air Vice-Marshal Ashley-Larson, the retired former Chief of Defence Staff, in an upscale hotel. However, after exchanging pleasantries, one of Ofosu-Appiah friends shepherded him away, explaining that Ashley-Larson and others 'often travelled to the neighbouring countries to gather information on the activities of the refugees for the PNDC Government.'[94] Indeed, the high number of plots successfully foiled by the PNDC led to a contemporary quasi-

[90] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline*, p. 88.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid, pp. 88, 97, 105.
[93] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Ghana: Information on whether the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) is waging war on Ghanaian exiles', 1 March 1994, GHA16885.E, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab813c.html [accessed 07/04/21].
[94] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline,* p. 86.

mythologisation of the Rawlings security apparatus, embodied by his chief of security, Kojo Tsikata, regarded as 'a man with supernatural powers', able to read the minds of plotters.[95] However, while some historical accounts have used the hyper-competency of the Ghanaian security services to explain the PNDC's longevity, ex-PNDC ministers such as Zaya Yeebo have been sceptical of such assessments and have instead pointed to exile disunity as the primary cause of plot failures. [96]

Despite Ofosu-Appiah's belief in the exile community's unified purpose, this idealistic view was quickly undermined by the reality of material, personal, and ideological divisions. Ordinary soldiers were fully aware of the class and financial divisions which existed within the wider exile community, and were particularly bitter about the exiled Ghanaian politicians and army officers who used their wealth to elevate their personal living conditions but who were 'unconcerned about [the ordinary soldiers'] plight'.[97] Moreover, many senior Ghanaian army officials, judges and politicians made their homes in London, extending this geographical and financial divide from the soldiers in West African exile.

This disunity within exile communities was widely reported by foreign governments monitoring the actions of communities within their borders. For example, while officers from the London Metropolitan police were aware that London was 'teeming with exiles from third world nations plotting the overthrow of their parent governments,' their response was muted. This was due to a belief not only that exiles tended to exaggerate 'both their ability to succeed and the time scale required', but also that opposition to the PNDC was 'fragmented and disorganised' at its core.[98] This is illustrated by the detached official response to the discovery of a potential plot involving the London-based exile General Joshua Hamidu. Previously Chief of Defence Staff in the Supreme Military Council during the 1970s, Hamidu was known to be actively plotting against the PNDC in exile. In fact, in 1983 a BBC reporter had confronted Hamidu with a copy of the signed letter he had allegedly written to the President of Liberia requesting assistance and weapons. Denouncing the incriminating letter as a forgery akin to the then

[95] Asamoah*, The Political History of Ghana,* p. 330.
[96] Zaya Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*, p.274; Baffour Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana, 1982-6: The Politics of the P.N.D.C.' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.25, No.4 (1987), p. 625.
[97] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline*, p. 88.
[98] TNA, FCO/65/3122, 'Ghana', Burton to Daly, 16 August 1984; Ibid, Harris to Rogan, 24 May 1984.

infamous Hitler diaries, Hamidu nevertheless conceded that he was willing to overthrow Rawlings using 'whatever means is available to me'.[99] In August 1984, it came to the attention of the British Foreign Office that Hamidu had made an oblique reference to a potential upcoming coup attempt in a letter to a close personal friend in the Metropolitan Police's Special Branch. Having detailed his distress at the suffering of his compatriots under the PNDC, Hamidu wrote: 'However, it is not going to be long now. In fact I left on the 29th July for Africa to see to some of the final arrangements.'[100] Despite concluding from this that 'Gen. Hamidu is privy to a possible coup attempt in Ghana likely to take place in the fairly near future,' the overall threat was judged to be minimal.[101] This was because, while there was a general desire amongst exiles to overthrow Rawlings, there was 'no unity amongst these groups… and each seem to be pursing their own separate path and be subject to common constraints such as lack of funds and weapons and also logistical support.'[102]

This assessment of the many exiled coup attempts proved fundamentally accurate. Their organisation was undermined by the lack of centralised leadership within exile circles, with personal and ideological loyalties preventing effective collaboration between groups. For example, individuals such as Sergeant Akata-Pore, a former Rawlings ally imprisoned since 1982 for subversion, enjoyed a significant personal following within Ghana, especially among soldiers of northern origin. When he was broken out of prison in a coup attempt (unrelated to that discussed above) in 1983 and fled into exile, he was followed by a significant number of his 'disciples' who travelled to Togo and Côte d'Ivoire, from where they conducted 'periodic but ineffectual raids'.[103] While such loyalism generated specific isolated actions, they equally made it difficult to plan collaborative action with other groups.

Interpersonal disagreements over seniority within groups were also rife. Ofosu-Appiah claims that Major Boakye Djan, based in London, sought to undermine his leadership of planned coup attempts on two occasions, contributing to their failure.

[99] TNA, FCO/65/3122, Transcript of General Hamidu BBC Interview-August 1983, attached to 'Lieutenant General Joshua Hamidu', Rogan to Burton, 23 August 1984.
[100] Ibid., Hamidu to an unnamed Metropolitan police officer, attached to 'Ghana', Burton to Daly, 16 August 1984.
[101] Ibid., 'Lieutenant General Joshua Hamidu', Rogan to Burton, 23 August 1984.
[102] Ibid.
[103] 'Ghana: Enemy on the Loose', *Economist*, 9 June 1984.

Boakye Djan stridently asserted that his previous position as Rawlings' second-in-command in the AFRC meant it was 'just appropriate that he became the leader of any group that overthrew Flt Lt Rawlings.'[104] This was particularly disruptive of efforts to win the support of West African governments. Approaching the Nigerian Government in 1982 and the Ivorian Government in 1983 separately to Ofosu-Appiah, Boakye Djan claimed as his own leadership of the exiled Ghanaian forces.[105] The fissiparous nature of Ghanaian exiled opposition caused the Ivorian government to lose faith in this grouping and withdraw support completely.[106] Similarly, British intelligence rightly judged that in any coup attempt, General Hamidu would perceive himself as a senior figure and be unwilling to compromise with other exiled officers.[107] Indeed, while Ofosu-Appiah was energetically colluding with figures from all parts of Ghana's political spectrum, he was never able to persuade them to meet in the same room.[108]

Compounding these problems, some exiled politicians sought to ensure that their involvement in toppling Rawlings would enable their assent to power. Their primary role was to secure financial backing for the coup, but this led to the presumption that he who 'pays the piper calls the tune'. Figures from both political traditions, namely Nkrumahists and those following the Danquah-Busia tradition, expected to be installed as the next leadership and at the expense of the other ideological side, and with little to no civil consultation.[109] For example, Ofosu-Appiah blames the failure of his second coup attempt in 1984 on the influence of Ghanaian politicians who, 'for their own selfish reasons', persuaded Corporal Giwa, a junior officer, to pre-emptively stage the carefully planned coup days ahead of schedule.[110] The resulting attempt was unsuccessful, and led to the capture and execution of several men, including Giwa himself.[111]

Factional disputes at every level ensured that the ambition of the Ghanaian exile community to overthrow the PNDC government could not be effectively channelled into

[104] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline,* p. 136.
[105] Ibid, pp. 109-110.
[106] Ibid.
[107] TNA, FCO/65/3122, 'Lieutenant General Joshua Hamidu', Rogan to Burton, 23 August 1984.
[108] Ofosu-Appiah, *Allegiance vs Indiscipline*, p. 106.
[109] Ibid., p. 104.
[110] Ibid. p. 137
[111] 'Ghana Reports Defeat of an Attempted Coup', *New York Times*, 26 March 1984, p.3; Amnesty International, 'Ghana: Political Imprisonment and the Death Penalty', 18 December 1991, AI Index: AFR 28/03/91, pp. 52, 59-60. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/200000/afr280031991en.pdf [accessed 21/03/21].

unified action. Reflecting on a prospective coup in which he was involved, Braimah Issaka stated that he and his co-conspirators called off the attempt because '[w]e were so divided even in Togo, between the soldiers, and with that division, it wasn't possible to go to Ghana.'[112] The superficial bond provided by a common enemy proved insufficient to establish a unified movement around which exiles could rally, leading to uncoordinated plots which were easily identified and neutralised by the PNDC security services. It was this disunity, rather than PNDC impregnability and security proficiency, which enabled Rawlings to successfully retain power.

Regional Relations and Border Anxiety

As suggested above, the PNDC was increasingly unpopular with West African governments. Neighbouring countries worried that Rawlings' success and PNDC proselytization would encourage revolutionaries in their own countries, a fear which Rawlings' admiration for Gaddafi's Libya and Marxist-Leninist Angola only exacerbated.[113] Reminiscent of earlier concerns about Nkrumah's fostering of radical pan-African opposition groups (see Chapter 5), the PNDC was considered a destabilising force in the region.[114] The early truncation of Ghana's democratic revival by Rawlings was particularly unpopular with Nigeria's President Shaghari, whose democratic government had enjoyed close relations with the toppled Limann administration.[115] The influence of volatile exile dynamics only exacerbated these strained relations, as mutual governmental suspicion torpedoed attempts at rapprochement.

The presence of Ghanaian exile populations in West Africa countries undermined the PNDC's sense of security, as it had for the CPP government during the 1960s. Physically proximate enough to foment domestic subversion or even mount a coup, these exiles were nevertheless beyond the easy reach of the Ghanaian security apparatus.

[112] Interview with Braimah Issaka by Kofi Adomah, 'I plotted with Boakye-Djan, others to get rid of Rawlings - Braimah Issaka', *GhanaWeb*, 23 October 2018, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/I-plotted-with-Boakye-Djan-others-to-get-rid-of-Rawlings-Braimah-Issaka-694836

[113] E. Bossman Asare and Siaw Emmanuel, 'Understanding the dynamics of good neighbourliness under Rawlings and Kufuor,' *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.25, No.2 (2018), p. 208.

[114] Gararasi, 'The Effect of Africa's Exiles/Refugees', p.194; D. Chau, *Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania*, (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), pp. 80-93.

[115] A. Otoghile and N.O. Obakhedo, 'Nigeria-Ghana Relations from 1960 to 2010: Roots of Convergence and Points of Departure', *African Research Review*, Vol.5, No.6 (2011), p. 138.

Ghana's population in border villages were constantly urged by the authorities to be vigilant for 'strange people, and those carrying arms or crossing illegally, especially at night'. Those in coastal areas were asked to report 'suspicious ships, boats or canoes.' [116]

This governmental anxiety damaged Ghana's regional relationships, especially with its direct neighbours. During this period, Ghana-Togo relations were particularly poor. Togo's president Gnassingbé Eyadéma recalled that in early 1982 he had assured Rawlings that he would not aid or harbour anyone trying to destabilise Ghana, even pledging to expel them. However, he refused to hand over such actors to the security authorities in Accra. In 1983 Eyadéma claimed to have repeated this promise 'five times over the last eighteen months', but the PNDC remained suspicious, a deteriorating relationship which stood in contrast to his previous 'good entente' with Limann.[117] This distrust would be further exacerbated by the launching of several serious coup attempts from Togo, stoking PNDC suspicion that Togolese government figures were complicit in these efforts. In the aftermath of the June 1983 coup attempt (see above), PNDC Foreign Minister Dr Obed Asamoah complained publicly:

> In the light of the number of dissidents in Togo and the nature of their activities in furtherance of their objectives the Government of Ghana finds it difficult to believe that the Togolese Government is entirely ignorant of what is taking place on its soil.'[118]

Summoning the Togolese Ambassador to the Ministry to protest, Asamoah claimed that coup-mongering exiles were returning to Togo for refuge, and that he expected Togo to 'prevent the use of its territory for subversion against Ghana.[119] The PNDC utilised state agents to penetrate the Togolese embassy in Accra, and suspicion even led to the firing of the Ghanian Charges d'Affaires in Togo, as his attempts to promote positive bilateral relations called into question his 'loyalty to Ghana'. [120]

These diplomatic accusations serve to highlight how exile subversion undermined the Ghanaian state's sense of spatial and territorial authority. Its inability to effectively

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[116] 'Army Is Ever Ready', *Ghana News*, January 1983, Vol.12, No.1, p. 3.
[117] TNA, FCO/65/2953, Brett Rooks to London, 30 June 1983.
[118] 'Ghana protests to Togo Govt', *Ghana News*, July 1983, p. 1.
[119] BBC SWB, ME/7373/B/1, 30 June 1983, 'Government protest to Togo on sheltering dissidents',
[120] TNA, FCO/65/2953, 'Ghana/Togo', Rooks to Lance, 22 September 1983; Asamoah*, The Political History of Ghana*, p. 552.

combat subversion beyond Ghanaian borders was so destabilising that one senior official even threatened to violate Togo's sovereign territory. A few months after the June 1983 coup attempt, the PNDC Secretary for Information Joyce Aryee gave a speech at a durbar of chiefs near the Ghana-Togo border in which she warned dissidents that, should they again attempt to 'destabilize the revolution', the government would 'rout them,' and 'follow them across the border in hot pursuit.'[121] Unsurprisingly, the Togolese government felt that this 'amounted to a declaration of war,' further damaging relations.[122]

Spatial anxiety about the proximity of exile groups manifested in growing official preoccupation with Ghana's borders.[123] Episodic border openings and closures were deeply unpopular across the region, drawing threats of economic sanction from ECOWAS, and causing Togo to retaliate by closing its side of the border, refusing to reciprocate when Ghana lifted restrictions in June 1983.[124] While framed as anti-smuggling measures, it was clear that concerns about political exiles were key to these closures. Moments of relaxation were short-lived. British officials, responding to the news of Ghana and Togo's mutual agreement to reopen their border in June 1984, noted sceptically: 'But for how long?'[125]

The PNDC's relationship with Côte d'Ivoire on its western border was somewhat better. Positive relations between Rawlings and Ivorian president Houphouët-Boigny were engendered by Rawlings' December 1983 visit to Côte d'Ivoire. It appears that he was able to persuade Houphouët-Boigny to utilise his regional cachet to intercede with Togo on Ghana's behalf. The following month, Togolese authorities cracked down on Ghanaian exiles, intercepting a ship carrying arms for Lomé-based Ghanaian dissidents on 16 January 1984. Radio Nigeria even announced that Togo had threatened to arrest Ghanaian exiles holding meetings on its territory.[126] However, exile dynamics would soon undermine this apparent entente with Côte d'Ivoire. Later in 1984, a coup attempt launched from Ivorian territory triggered inflammatory accusations from Accra, whose

[121] 'Dissidents Warned', *Talking Drums*, 3 October 1983, p. 20.
[122] TNA, FCO/65/2953, 'Ghana/Togo', Teleletter from Rooks, 18 August 1983.
[123] Paul Nugent, *Boundaries, Communities and State-Making in West Africa: The Centrality of the Margins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 459.
[124] Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana, 1982-6', p. 638.
[125] TNA, FCO/65/3122, 'Ghana Borders,' Rooks to Rogan, 27 June 1984.
[126] TNA, FCO/65/3126, Abidjan to London, 25 January 1984.

officials claimed to have incontrovertible evidence that Ghanaian dissidents not only 'trained and planned in the Ivory Coast…with the aim of coming to overthrow the Government of Ghana,' but that these exiles also had 'the cooperation of certain elements in the Ivorian security forces.'[127] Ominously, Ghana warned that it reserved the right to take appropriate action to 'convince her neighbours of the necessity for friendly cooperation'.[128] Efforts to smooth ruffled diplomatic relations were undermined by ongoing turbulent regional exile politics which made stability elusive.

Expulsions and Exile Security

While West African nations sheltered large Ghanaian exile and diaspora populations, and their governments offered varying levels of support for exile initiatives during this period, exiles' continued security was heavily contingent on governmental and national goodwill which could be withdrawn at any time. Togo was generally a safe harbour for Ghanaian exiles during the 1980s; however this was not guaranteed, and such safety was withdrawn at certain key moments. In May 1986, following a visit from Asamoah, Togolese President Eyadéma made one of his periodic attempts to placate the PNDC's concerns about exile subversion on his territory. It was reported that Asamoah had demanded the expulsion of fifteen known opponents of the PNDC regime, eleven of whom were soldiers. As a result, dozens of PNDC opponents left or were expelled by the Togolese government.[129] The PNDC's surprise diplomatic success had created an unstable and hostile environment for Togo-based exiles, disrupting potential plots. In the aftermath of these expulsions, the Ghanaian authorities successfully captured one of their 'most wanted', Captain Edward Adjei Ampofo, a formed Ghanaian military officer with ties to Acheampong.[130] Having pre-empted the official expulsion order, Ampofo had entered Ghana to conduct a coup but was caught in the suburbs of Accra on 28 May

[127] TNA, FCO/65/3122, Dean, 'Our Telnos 103 and 106: Ghana Protests to Ivory Coast and Togo,' 30 March 1984.
[128] Ibid.
[129] 'Togo: The Exile Trade?', *Africa Confidential,* Vol.27, No.13 (18 June 1986), p. 5.
[130] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ghana: Information on Captain Adjei Edward Ampofo, 1983-1992, 1 February 1992, GHA10318, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acb730.html [accessed 11/06/21].

1986.[131] Regional exiles were thus at the mercy of fluctuations in the policy of host nations, and the ground could shift beneath their feet at any time.

Togo's dramatic policy shift towards Ghanaian exiles in 1986 can best be explained through a regional lens of exile dynamics and state anxiety. Specifically, contemporary reporting suggests that the 1986 expulsion was motivated by Togolese anxiety about the stockpiling of weaponry in Lomé for the use of Ghanaian exiles, especially in the aftermath of bombings in Lomé in 1985.[132] These concerns would prove to be well-founded: in September 1986, a major coup attempt against Eyadéma was launched from Ghanaian territory. Subsequently, a further 233 Ghanaians were expelled from Togo.[133] While possibly a retaliatory measure against the Ghanaian state for the harbouring of dissidents, it also represented a continuation of the Togolese government's attempts to distance itself from all regional subversion in a moment of high domestic instability. Ghana and its neighbours were gradually feeling their way towards a local arms control agreement governing what would, in subsequent decades, be described as the weaponization of migrants.[134]

However, these attempts at rapprochement were fragile and undermined by the ongoing mutual mistrust of the Ghanaian and Togolese governments. The presence of each other's exiles on their territory created what Obed Asamoah described as a 'veritable tinderbox in relations' in which 'accusations and counter-accusations of subversion' fundamentally undermined all attempts at positive relations.[135] Of particular concern to Eyadéma were the exiled sons of Togo's first Prime Minister, Sylvanus Olympio, Gilchrist and Bonito Olympio. Having played a significant role in Olympio's overthrow and assassination in 1963, Eyadéma viewed the presence of his sons across the border in Ghana as a major regional threat to his regime.[136] The brothers were identified by the

[131] 'Togo: The Exile Trade?', *Africa Confidential,* Vol.27, No.13, 18 June 1986, p. 5; Despite being sentenced to death in absentia for a separate coup attempt in 1983, Ampofo was instead imprisoned: Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Ghana: Information on Captain Adjei Edward Ampofo, 1983-1992', 1 February 1992, GHA10318, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6acb730.html [accessed 11/06/21].
[132] 'Togo: The Exile Trade?', *Africa Confidential,* Vol.27, No.13, 18 June 1986, p. 5;
[133] LaVerle Berry (ed.), *Ghana: A Country Study*, 3rd ed. (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress), pp. 258-9.
[134] K.M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
[135] Obed Asamoah, *The Political History of Ghana*, p. 552.
[136] Razak El-Alawa Interview, 4 April 2019; Asamoah*, The Political History of Ghana*, p. 552-553.

Togolese state as the ringleaders of the September 1986 coup attempt.[137] While the Togolese government fell short of directly implicating Accra in the plot, it was suggested that Ghanaian military personnel were involved, undermining attempts to deescalate tension over the exiles issue.[138]

Shifting attitudes towards Ghanaian populations abroad more generally had a significant impact on the wellbeing and safety of exiles. The expulsion of a million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 was a notable example of this increasingly hostile environment. During the 1970s, Nigeria's relative economic prosperity in comparison with Ghana, combined with the two countries' shared anglophone colonial background, resulted in a significant wave of Ghanaian economic migration to Nigeria.[139] Following Rawlings' 1981 coup, these economic factors also affected exiles such as prominent Ghanaian politician Emmanuel Adama Mahama, formerly senior presidential advisor to Hilla Limann. In early 1982, Mahama had initially fled Ghana to Côte d'Ivoire, but later claimed refugee status in Nigeria, where he hoped he could settle more permanently and establish himself in business.

However, during the early 1980s, Nigeria's oil rich economy suffered a downturn. In response, President Alhaji Shehu Shagari bolstered his political career by focusing on immigration. Within a year of arriving Mahama sensed a 'fast-spreading xenophobia' against the Ghanaian community, which was frequently scapegoated by the Nigerian government.[140] In January 1983, Shaghari abruptly announced the expulsion of all undocumented immigrants, most of whom were Ghanaian and who numbered at least one million.[141] Those without appropriate papers (the majority) were given four weeks to leave and suffered considerable difficulties on their journey due to the closed border

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[137] Richard Everett, 'Togo Says Attackers Trained In Burkina Faso, Ghana', *AP News*, 29 September 1986, https://apnews.com/article/5fc354eb351caa6eab1697a064ac3d73 [accessed 11/06/21].

[138] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Ghana: Information on attempts by the Ghanaian army to overthrow the government of Togo between 1986 and 1994, in particular attempts on 23 September 1994 and on 3 January 1994', 1 November 1995, GHA22337.E, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab9528.html [accessed 15/06/21].

[139] Lynne Brydon, 'Ghanaian Responses to the Nigerian Expulsions of 1983', *African Affairs*, Vol.84, No.337 (1985), p. 567.

[140] Mahama, *My First Coup d'Etat*, p. 157. See also Samuel Fury Childs Daly, 'Ghana Must Go: Nativism and the Politics of Expulsion in West Africa, 1969–1985,' *Past & Present*, 30 July 2022.

[141] Olajide Aluko, 'The Expulsion of Illegal Aliens from Nigeria: A Study in Nigeria's Decision-Making', *African Affairs*, Vol.84, No.337 (1985), pp. 539-60. This expulsion by the Shagari government was continued by his successor, General Muhammed Buhari, who overthrew Shaghari in a military coup in December 1983. Buhari expelled a further 12,000 undocumented immigrants in early 1984.

between Ghana and Togo.[142] While exiles who had applied and gained official refugee status, such as Mahama, were not legally affected by this action, the resulting atmosphere of hostility in the months preceding the expulsions was so intense that Mahama left before it was even implemented. This response was not unique, as many Ghanaians with correct documentation were afraid to remain in Nigeria because they feared xenophobic violence.[143]

However, this threat once again revealed the economic inequalities among exiles. Wealthy, politically connected exiles like Mahama were able to maintain their relative safety by leaving Nigeria for exile elsewhere: Mahama himself travelled to London to join his network of friends and political allies who had settled there in exile.[144] However, exiles with limited financial means had few options. The PNDC did organise mass transport for Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria to return home, but this was not an option for political exiles who feared possible reprisals. It was also an unattractive proposition for many Ghanaian migrants, many of whom had left to escape the country's continuing economic problems. This episode epitomised both the complexity and precarity of exile, as exiles' affairs were interwoven with wider diaspora concerns and socio-economic changes beyond their influence.

Weaponising Family Ties

While exile is sometimes framed as a solitary experience, this thesis has already demonstrated the extent to which exiled individuals remained connected to and engaged with a wide network of family and friends. Despite physical departure, personal ties within Ghana remained, unavoidably leaving loved ones vulnerable to possible state retribution. Personal connections with exiled Ghanaians were weaponised, in order to punish those beyond the reach of the Ghanaian state apparatus. Family members of prominent exiles were particularly vulnerable to state persecution, as can be seen in the case of the prominent Goka family and their experience after Rawlings' second rise to power. Headed by Ferdinand Koblavi Dra-Goka, who had succeeded Gbedemah as Finance Minister under Nkrumah in May 1961, the Goka family had four sons and a

[142] This deadline was later extended by a further four weeks, Daly, 'Ghana Must Go', pp. 18-24.
[143] Brydon, 'Ghanaian Responses to the Nigerian Expulsions of 1983', p. 572.
[144] Aluko, 'The Expulsion of Illegal Aliens from Nigeria', pp. 250, 260.

daughter.[145] In the early 1980s, the eldest three sons, Eric, Frank and Christian, were successful Ghanaian businessmen, while the youngest, Mawuli, aged 31, was an undergraduate student of law and economics at the London School of Economics.[146]

Having already criticised Rawlings' first coup in 1979, the three elder brothers, prominent figures on Accra's business and social scene, fled to Togo upon his second seizure of power in 1981. Mawuli, whose youth had precluded much political involvement, returned to Ghana during his university vacations because he felt that his student status made him unimportant to the regime. However, it soon became clear that this was a miscalculation. Officials searched the family home and detained Mawuli, taking him to the infamous Burma Camp army base. While his parents were able to intercede to gain his release, during his week-long detention he was subjected to vicious beatings. These affected his hearing and eyesight, causing him to suffer from migraines for several years.[147] To the Goka family, it was clear that, while Mawuli had thought himself beneath the notice of the new Rawlings government, his familial relationship to exiled regime critics had made him a legitimate target.

Upon graduation, Mawuli returned to live with members of his family in their Togolese exile. However, he risked travelling clandestinely to visit friends in Accra on several occasions, something his brother Christian observed with mounting anxiety.[148] During one such visit, Mawuli's whereabouts were reported to the authorities, which led to his arrest on 30th October 1985.[149] Christian Goka recalled the sinking feeling he experienced upon hearing the news of Mawuli's arrest, instinctively suspecting that this 'was it,' and that the regime 'would never spare him.'[150] This feeling of dread was compounded by news of the simultaneous arrest of his sister, Evelyn. Working in Accra as a nurse, she had been similarly convinced of her own insignificance to the PNDC. Christian was particularly concerned that there was no news of their arrest in the newspapers, prompting him to approach Amnesty International in London to highlight Mawuli's case. This, he hoped, would ensure it was publicised in the international media,

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[145] *Ghana Year Book,* (Accra: Graphic Corporation, 1962), p. 206.
[146] Christian Goka Interview, 26 April 2019.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid.
[149] The National Reconciliation Commission Report, (Accra: Government of Ghana, 2004), p. 139. https://hmcwordpress.humanities.mcmaster.ca/Truthcommissions/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Ghana.NRC_.Report-FULL.pdf [accessed 12/04/2020].
[150] Christian Goka Interview, 26 April 2019.

thereby preventing the Rawlings government from killing him quickly and clandestinely.[151]

In early 1986, all five siblings were accused of complicity in a coup attempt against the Rawlings government, which was allegedly organised by exiled Ghanaians living in Togo between 1984 and 1985.[152] While they were to be tried through the military tribunal system, Christian, Eric and Frank were still in exile, and thus beyond the reach of the Ghanaian courts. The government therefore tried them in absentia. While this offered them protection from the resulting sentences, they feared the state would exact retribution by punishing Mawuli and Evelyn simply for their familial connections. In May 1986, their concerns were vindicated when the tribunal announced that Mawuli would be sentenced to death, and Evelyn would be jailed for five years.[153] Their father attempted to intercede with Captain Kojo Tsikata, head of security, who replied that nothing could be done to save Mawuli.[154]

Mawuli was kept in Ussher Fort Prison, alongside the three other suspects in the alleged coup attempt. It is noteworthy that two of these, Kojo Kyeremeh Djan and Atta Boakye, were themselves the brother and nephew of another prominent exile, Major Boakye Djan.[155] As with the Goka family, Djan's remaining relatives in Ghana were effectively punished for their association with him. All four men were clandestinely interviewed while in detention by journalist Ben Ephson, an old school-friend of Mawuli who worked for *West Africa* magazine. They showed Ephson the scars resulting from the torture to which they had been subjected to extract confessions.[156] Ephson filed his report despite Mawuli's fear that, by publicly describing their abuse, Ephson would in turn suffer retribution from the regime. These concerns proved justified: Ephson was later arrested on 22 September 1987, when his wife was eight months pregnant, and imprisoned without trial for five months.[157] *West Africa* magazine printed the story, through which

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[151] Christian Goka Interview, 26 April 2019.
[152] 'Seven Executed in Ghana', *AP News*, 22 June 1986.
[153] 'Death Sentence Issued for Plot Against Government', *People's Daily Graphic*, 16 May 1986, p. 1. Eric was sentenced to death in absentia, and Christian and Frank were acquitted.
[154] Christian Goka Interview, 26 April 2019.
[155] Jon Kraus, 'Ghana's Shift from Radical Populism', *Current History*, Vol.86, No.520 (May 1987), p. 207.
[156] Gye Nyame Concord, 'NRC Report On "The Treason Trial Of 1986', *Modern Ghana*, 24 October 2004. https://www.modernghana.com/news/65269/1/nrc-report-on-the-treason-trial-of-1986.html
[157] Warwick Modern Records Centre, Amnesty International Files 1974-1993, MSS34/4/1/GH10, 'Ghana: Background to Case- Ben Ephson', 14 December 1987. Antoinette H. Condobrey, 'UP Close With Ben Ephson', *The Africa Report*, 18 January 2013 https://www.theafricareport.com/6164/up-close-with-ben-ephson/

Mawuli's family became fully aware of the extent of his suffering. In June 1986, it was announced that Mawuli and six others had been executed by firing squad.[158]

In a little over five years, the Goka family's existence had been irrevocably transformed. Of the five siblings, three were living in exile, one was serving a five-year prison sentence, and one had been killed. For their parents, this was an enormous blow, and Christian Goka stated that the anguish over these events was partially responsible for his mother's death in 1989 from a heart attack, aged sixty.[159] Her surviving children, in exile and in prison, could not attend her funeral in Ghana. In exile, the compounded trauma of these experiences left Christian unable to entertain any thoughts of his home country. The mention of his brother's name made him feel sick, and thoughts of Ghana were so painful that he became convinced he would never return.[160] Despite his efforts to avoid dwelling on painful memories, he was unable to escape daily reminders of his homeland. On one memorable occasion, Christian's sister-in-law came for a family visit at their London home. When accompanying her to return flight, Christian saw several Ghanaian government ministers walking through Heathrow airport. Being in the presence of these men upset Christian greatly, as he felt they were 'responsible for [his] misery', being not only the authors of his exile but also answerable for his brother's execution.[161] While the decision to go into exile had effectively protected Christian from personal physical harm, he nevertheless experienced significant emotional trauma, to the extent that he wished to mentally divorce himself from his earlier life and any idea of return.

The Stigma of Exile

Exile can be conceived of as a universal experience, connecting individuals from disparate cultures and times through their shared experience of displacement. However, this can obscure the ways in which the condition of exile is always culturally and temporally contingent. Crucially, international public and governmental attitudes towards exiles altered significantly over the twentieth century, as the world entered a new era of mass

[158] 'Seven Executed in Ghana', *AP News*, 22 June 1986.
[159] Christian Goka Interview 26 April 2019.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.

migration. German-Jewish theorist Hannah Arendt, herself an exile during World War II, wrote of this evolution in her 1944 article, 'Guests from No-Man's Land.' She argued that 'the word "exile", which once had an undertone of almost sacred awe, now provokes the idea of something simultaneously suspicious and unfortunate'.[162] The shift from individualised elite exile to mass expulsion, often based on identity, fundamentally altered how exiles were perceived.

By the 1980s the international environment into which Ghanaian exiles were fleeing had changed significantly. Not only had the attitudes of many (especially Western) governments become considerably more hostile, the public perception of exiles and refugees had also shifted with the emergence of a more public human rights rhetoric. Campaigns by NGOs such as Amnesty International emphasised the plight of those suffering displacement. Nineteenth century notions of the émigré as an honourable - even romantic – figure had been replaced with the exile a subject of pity. This was particularly true for refugees and exiles coming from Africa, with events such as Live Aid framing Africans as helpless and the objects of Western sentimentality.[163]

Accordingly, for Ghanaians fleeing the Rawlings regime in the 1980s, the label of 'exile' was increasingly one they perceived as undesirable. Samuel Gyandoh, a well-respected law professor at the University of Ghana, was especially aware of what he termed the 'stigma' of exile. In his interview with me, he explained that despite his urgent need to leave Ghana for his own safety, he avoided methods that would have branded him a refugee on arrival in the West. As an academic, he was able to call on international connections to aid his initial exit, but once abroad he did not apply for refugee status or any similar path which would have secured his right to remain. Such was his concern for his reputation and that of his children, he instead chose to take up consecutive temporary positions at various Western universities, suffering significant precarity.[164] Gyandoh described the stigma of exile as complex, involving the perception of being cowardly or 'running away' from danger, and extending to the idea that he and his children would be seen as objects of pity.

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[162] Hannah Arendt, 'Guests from No-Man's Land', *The Jewish Writings* (New York: Schocken, 2007, original publication 1944), p. 211

[163] On humanitarianism and perceptions of Africa, see: B. Everill and J. Kaplan (eds.), *The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[164] Interview with Samuel Gyandoh II, 3 September 2018.

Connected to this, the desire to self-identify with the term 'exile' commonly depended on its utility for the individual. Claiming exile status may have had considerable value for a politician, conveying upon him opposition credentials when lobbying for support from international governments or upon return to the domestic political scene. It was, however, less useful for other professions, such as an academic or businessman who might wish to convey a more settled overseas position. Gyandoh was particularly keen to reject notions of dependency which were increasingly associated with refugee or exile status.[165] He emphasised that he was perfectly capable of settling in the US voluntarily due to the quality of his academic work, gaining an H2 non-immigrant visa to take up a position at Temple University in the United States. This strategy ensured that the focus remained on his work and not his or his family's 'unfortunate' circumstances.[166]

This attitude is also reflected in the testimony of Boakye Agyarko. Having been a national coordinator for NUGS, Agyarko was arrested and shot in the wake of the Corporal Giwa's pre-emptive March 1984 coup. When a nurse found he was still alive in the camp morgue, he received secret life-saving surgery and fled to the US.[167] He later rose to be Vice President of the Bank of New York and was a key figure in the growth of Ghana's centre-right New Patriotic Party, which a decade later became the main opposition to Rawlings. Despite this dramatic exit from Ghana, Agyarko resisted the idea that he was a 'refugee' or an exile, pointing to the fact that he held green card status thought his extended period abroad.[168] These self-reflections resonate with Ludwig's work with Liberian communities in Staten Island, which illustrate a desire among exile communities to reject contingent stereotypes of refugees as passive and as economic burdens. Instead, they seek where possible to emphasise that they are agents in their own right, actively shaping their future.[169]

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[165] J. Gupte and L. Mehta, 'Disjunctures in Labelling Refugees and Oustees', in J. Moncrieffe and R. Eyben (eds.), *The Power of Labelling: How People are Categorized and Why It Matters* (London: Routledge, 2007).
[166] Interview with Samuel Gyandoh II, 3 September 2018.
[167] 'Boakye Agyarko's chilling story draws tears at vetting,' *GhanaWeb*, 26 January 2017, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Boakye-Agyarko-s-chilling-story-draws-tears-at-vetting-504087
[168] Ibid.; Edward Brenya and Thomas Brown, 'Consolidating for consolidation: technocrats, party building and democratic consolidation in Ghana,' *Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences Studies,* Vol.21, No.22 (2021): 247-62.
[169] B. Ludwig, '"Wiping the refugee dust from my feet": advantages and burdens of refugee status and the refugee label', *International Migration*, Vol.54, No.1 (2016), p.12.

Conclusion

Unprecedented numbers of exiles fled Ghana during the first six years of Rawlings' rise to political prominence. The violence unleashed within Ghanaian society, and the retribution suffered by those who criticised Rawlings' actions during the AFRC period, were not only powerful motivators for flight, but were highly traumatic even for those who were able to personally escape. High profile cases involving the executions of former heads of state and the judges' murders reverberated through exile and diasporic communities, while simultaneously, exiles remained keenly aware of the suffering which was and could be meted out against their loved ones who remained within Ghana's borders.

In a context where practicing domestic dissent became extremely hazardous, the role of exiles in opposing Rawlings' repressive and authoritarian nature of the state became increasingly important. The PNDC was aware of the threat posed by exile organisation and agitation from its earliest days and was materially concerned with preventing both exile and overseas political action. While this partly sought to prevent exacerbating the ongoing brain drain, it was mainly a response to the impact external opposition had had on previous Ghanaian governments. Thwarting countercoups from external militarised opposition was a constant strain on the PNDC's resources and damaged Ghana's regional diplomatic relations, as neighbouring governments were repeatedly accused of collusion with subversive elements.

Instructive comparisons in exile dynamics can be drawn between the Rawlings and Nkrumah periods. While the two Ghanaian leaders have already invited comparison by scholars like Paul Nugent, such studies have yet to include their approach to exile. As Nugent rightly suggests, while Rawlings and Nkrumah differ in important ways, they share key political orientations: both self-representing as defenders of the masses, as well as their behemothic presence in the Ghanaian historical landscape.[170] However, these shared characteristics likewise shaped exile dynamics in each period. Both men aligned themselves with radical movements and regimes, Nkrumah proactively supporting continent-wide independence movements and pan-African anti-imperialism, and Rawlings utilising unabashed revolutionary, anti-imperialist rhetoric combined with

[170] Nugent, 'Nkrumah and Rawlings: Political Lives in Parallel?'.

support for the Libyan and Angolan states. Consequently, both regimes were regionally unpopular, as West African governments viewed them as fomenting rebellion and instability. Exiles fleeing both regimes were therefore received sympathetically by neighbouring governments, which providing them with both sanctuary and relatively stable bases from which to launch coups. Beset by external subversion, both the CPP and PNDC governments were highly suspicious of their regional neighbours, causing a cyclical deterioration in diplomatic relations which was difficult to abate.

The exile community at large was also shaped by the looming presence of Nkrumah and Rawlings. Critical opponents who fled into exile early in both periods were quickly joined by former supporters of both leaders who had fallen out of favour or disagreed with the direction of the regime. Uneasy alliances were built by exiles who fled in the early days of Rawlings' rise, and those who had fled subsequent to their participation in the AFRC's and PNDC's coercive violence, exemplified in the attempted collaboration between Colonel Ofosu-Appiah and Major Boakye Djan. This has striking parallels to how Kofi Busia and Komla Gbedemah, two ideologically disparate politicians, found a united purpose through their mutual abhorrence of Nkrumah (see Chapter 4). In both cases, exile provided an ostensibly unifying space in which mutual alienation enabled unexpected connections, but which was unable to overcome existing political and personal divisions.

However, while continuities can be observed, exile experience by no means remained static. Changing migration patterns and political attitudes altered global, and particularly Western, perceptions of exiles and refugees. The connotations of exile had shifted, and some individuals felt that the label now involved a stigma that more hindered than helped their navigation of the international landscape. Exile experience was never a monolith, and individual responses towards forced migration and traumatic externality could vary between dedicated vocal political opposition to Rawlings and the PNDC, and stark retreat from Ghanaian social and political life as an act of both physical and mental self-preservation.

Chapter 8

Civilian Opposition and the Decline of Authoritarian Rule: from the Provisional National Defence Council to Multi-Party Democracy, 1983-92

Introduction

The political violence of the PNDC era created what has been characterised, even by Rawlings himself, as a 'culture of silence' in Ghana.[1] Freedom of expression was crushed; criticism of the regime often had brutal repercussions for both individuals and their wider networks and families, ranging from property seizure to arrest, execution, or simple 'disappearance'.[2] As established in Chapter 7, this elevated the importance of exile dissent, as open collective opposition could only be conducted from beyond Ghana's borders. This chapter will assess the growth and impact of exiled civilian resistance to Rawlings' government, focusing on the networks of journalists and politicians who sought to challenge the political power of the PNDC.

Through new independent Ghanaian-run newspapers and dissident political groups, exile dissent coalesced into organised collective opposition, and spaces were created for diasporic discussion. Exiled Ghanaian journalists strived to challenge self-serving narratives provided by the PNDC itself, or by western journalists whose inaccurate interpretations shaped Western governmental and public perceptions. Exile-led newspapers became crucial vectors for this dissent, marshalling exiled and diasporic voices, and pioneering a shift to an increasingly globalised Ghanaian and African identity which would only increase with the later advent of the digital age. Externality and the emergence of global Africa shaped the ideas of exiled political activists and informed their

[1] Baffour Ankomah, 'Ghana's culture of silence', *Index on Censorship*, Vol.16, No.10 (1987), p. 17.
[2] Oquaye, 'Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy,' pp. 556-57.

tactics, weaponizing international norms and the increasingly prominent rhetoric of human rights and liberal democracy.

While this chapter analyses how the activism of Ghanaian exiles often centred on their home country, it also explores how the often-traumatic experience of exile complicated their relationship with both ideas and realities of return. Rawlings' implementation of constitutional democracy in 1992, a process which would solidify over the rest of the 1990s, prompted contemplation of return which for many exiles was challenging, both practically and emotionally. While Ghana became ostensibly democratic, Rawlings remained in power, constituting a significant risk for many exiles who did not trust the promises of his new government. While many returned, some instead chose to establish themselves abroad permanently, illustrating the diversity of responses within the exile community.

Repression of the Press

Rawlings saw the Ghanaian press as playing a critical role in his revolution. On 5 January 1982, the front page of the state-owned *Daily Graphic* announced that the media would be the vanguard of a 'Holy War'.[3] Renaming the newspaper the *People's Daily Graphic*, Rawlings envisaged a new revolutionary media ostensibly in the hands of the masses, but reflecting the attitudes and values of the revolution.[4] Rawlings ushered in an era of media repression which contrasted sharply with the comparatively liberal approach of the preceding Limann government. This caught journalists off-guard; many had taken advantage of this brief period of democratisation to critique not only the incumbent government, but also Rawlings and his previous coup efforts. As the political landscape shifted beneath them, reprisals became a growing concern. Prominent vocal editors, such as Chris Asher of the *Palaver* and Prince Godwin, of the *Punch*, fled into exile within weeks of Rawlings' resumption of power.[5]

[3] *Daily Graphic*, 5 January 1982, p. 1.
[4] Kwadwo Anokwa, 'Press Performance Under Civilian and Military Regimes in Ghana: A Reassessment of Past and Present Knowledge', in Festus Eribo and William Jong-Ebot (eds.), *Press Freedom and Communication in Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1997), p. 19.
[5] Penaam, 'Ghana's military muzzle the press', *Index on Censorship*, Vol.12, No.1 (1983) p. 39.

The state-owned press was quickly brought to heel with the dismissal of the editors of the *Graphic* and the *Mirror*, the two leading papers in Ghana.[6] While a few such dismissals were hardly unusual for a newly installed Ghanaian government, Rawlings sought to change Ghana's media culture at its core. Not only were the new editors handpicked supporters of the new regime, they also had a vested interest in protecting the incumbent regime to retain their jobs.[7] Other *Graphic* journalists who had previously angered Rawlings and his supporters, such as Elizabeth Ohene, were sent on 'indefinite leave'.[8]

As for the private press, attempts to oppose or criticise the government were harshly repressed. As Jennifer Hasty has shown, by the end of the 1980s the private press had been 'either banned outright or harassed out of existence'.[9] An important tool was the Preventive Custody Law, which allowed anyone accused of endangering state security to be indefinitely detained without trial.[10] While ostensibly targeting individuals who were complicit in coup attempts, it was commonly used to imprison anyone criticising the revolution. Such was the opaqueness of its implementation, Amnesty International was unable to determine even the approximate number of people held under it.[11]

The Free Press was a newspaper notable its continuing independent and dissenting voice. However, in 1983, its editor John Kugblenu, lead journalist Mike Adjei, and publisher Tommy Thompson were detained without charge.[12] The government's denial that the arrests resulted from the paper 'expressing anti-PNDC opinions' was met with widespread scepticism by opposition activists and human rights organisations.[13]

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[6] Penaam, 'Ghana's military muzzle the press'. Aidoo's replacement, Kojo Yankah, was also dismissed the following year for publishing a conversation between Rawlings and Amartey Kwei, who was executed for complicity in the murder of the three judges.

[7] Ajoa Yeboah-Afari Interview, 24 August 2018.

[8] Penaam, 'Ghana's military muzzle the press', p.39. Other journalists sent on indefinite leave included Peregrino Peters and George Naykene.

[9] Jennifer Hasty, 'Performing power, composing culture: The state press in Ghana', *Ethnography*, Vol.7, No.1, (2006), p. 71.

[10] Jeff Haynes, 'Human Rights and Democracy in Ghana: The Record of the Rawlings' Regime', *African Affairs*, Vol.90, No.360 (1991), p. 415.

[11] Amnesty International AI Index: AFR 28/03/91 'GHANA Political imprisonment and the death penalty', 18 December 1991.

[12] Columbia University Archives, Committee to Protect Journalists Box.65, Ghana 1984, Africa Summaries, p. 5. July/August 1984.

[13] Ibid., Sackey, Director of the Castle Information Bureau to Graham-Yooll, 24 July 1984; Amnesty International, 'Health Concern/Legal Concern, Ghana: Thomas Quarshie Thompson (known as Tommy Thompson), publisher', 13 April 1984.

While Thompson was released on medical grounds in May 1983, Adjei and Kugblenu spent over a year in detention and were freed in July 1983. Adjei fled into exile, but Kugblenu died aged 49 just days after his release, illustrating the physical toll of detention.[14]

Kabral Blay-Amihere, a prominent journalist who attempted to re-establish the *Free Press* with Thompson in 1985, wrote of the horrified reactions of the latter's family and friends, who claimed he had a 'martyr's complex'.[15] Thompson was again detained after the newspaper published twenty more editions, and Blay-Amihere's struggle to find another publisher willing to run the same risks illustrates the effect of the repression of the *Free Press* on the wider newspaper industry. Despite one publisher admitting that the *Free Press* was the 'only paper he read', he refused to be involved, imploring Blay-Amihere to 'understand the situation'.[16] Blay Amihere later recalled that '[e]diting the *Free Press* was living next door to danger'.[17] The *Free Press* folded in 1986 after several more staff arrests.

However, not all press repression was so overt. Even journalists who towed the government line could become the focus of official ire for seemingly trivial offenses, a sensitivity which was exacerbated when reporting to an international audience. Ajoa Yeboah-Afari, a prominent Ghanaian journalist, told me of an incident which occurred while she was working as an Accra-based correspondent for the BBC. In the aftermath of a 1989 coup attempt allegedly spearheaded by Captain Quashigah, one of Rawlings' close associates, Yeboah-Afari was asked to prepare a BBC bulletin at short notice.[18] Despite her report closely adhering to the Ghana News Agency's official statement, a slight alteration by the BBC radio presenter led to a characterisation of 'several' high-ranked officers being arrested, rather than 'some'.[19] This substitution was interpreted by the

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[14] Mike Adjei, 'Last Days with John Kugblenu', *Index on Censorship*, 7/88. Tommy Thompson had been granted early release in May 1983 after suffering a stroke.
[15] Kabral Blay-Amihere, 'Ghana's Free Press', *Index on Censorship*, Vol.16, No.1 (1987), p.21; Interview with Kabral Blay-Amihere, 2 April 2019.
[16] Kabral Blay-Amihere, *I Spoke for Freedom: History and Politics of the Ghanaian Press* (Accra: Digibooks Ghana, 2015), p. 16.
[17] Kabral Blay-Amihere, *Tears for a Continent: An American Diary* (Accra: TransAfrika News, 1994), p. 6.
[18] Human Rights Watch, 'News from Africa Watch', 12 August 1991, p. 2. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/g/ghana/ghana918.pdf, [accessed 08/02/21].
[19] Ajoa Yeboah-Afari Interview, 24 August 2018; See also, Yeboah-Afari, 'Of the various forms of media intimidation (1); The Sledgehammer Tactic Still Rules!', *Graphic Online*, 24 May 2021; The Ghana News Agency, established by Nkrumah in 1957, is the official state-owned news agency.

government as an unpatriotic attempt to undermine Ghana on the international stage, supposedly by inflating the seriousness of the coup.

In response to this Friday bulletin, it was announced on Ghanaian radio that Yeboah-Afari and her BBC colleague Ben Ephson should report to Burma Camp at 9am on Monday morning. In what Yeboah-Afari terms 'psychological warfare', Radio Ghana broadcast the summons before each hourly news bulletin for the whole weekend.[20] These announcements reached Yeboah-Afari's extended family in her home region and abroad, instilling panic. Neither journalist suffered any personal repercussions; when they reported as ordered, officers at Burma Camp did not even know what their supposed offence was. However, this kind of public intimidation meant that independent domestic journalism was effectively quashed.

Journalists in Exile: *Talking Drums*

This hostile environment accordingly precipitated the flight of many journalists to escape retaliation or detention. Even those who simply wished to pursue independent writing were forced to move abroad. For those left behind, the secrecy necessary to evade the intelligence services meant that reporters would often discover that a colleague had fled with no notice and no explanation. Yeboah-Afari, who remained in Ghana throughout the Rawlings period, recalls that colleagues 'just vanished, and you didn't know why they felt they had to go'.[21] This knowledge vacuum, combined with the repressive atmosphere surrounding media production, inhibited discussion of these ex-colleagues and contributed to the domestic 'culture of silence'.[22]

One of the first journalists to leave Ghana was Elizabeth Ohene, who had in early January 1982 not only been placed on 'indefinite leave' from the *People's Daily Graphic* but was also ordered to report to Burma Camp. She decided that, instead of placing herself at the mercy of the new regime, she would capitalise on a pre-planned work trip to the

[20] Ajoa Yeboah-Afari Interview, 24 August 2018.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ankomah, 'Ghana's culture of silence', pp. 17-19.

Netherlands to remove herself and her eight-year-old son from potential danger. Unsure of her future trajectory, she left him in the care of her younger sister in France.[23]

Ohene's circumstances reflected the unpredictability of exile. The political situation in Ghana was volatile and she had no way of knowing if or when she might return. First in Switzerland and then in Britain, Ohene freelanced for the BBC while she considered her options. It was not until the killing of the three Supreme Court judges six months later (see Chapter 7) that Ohene understood she would not '...be going home in a hurry.'[24] These brutal killings, which for Ohene represented the violation of something 'sacred', constituted a seminal moment which crystallized the reality of her exile. It also marked her transition into a self-defined 'very angry woman', and the start of a period she characterises as fuelled by rage.[25] Her outrage at the desecration of a foundational societal and judicial norm compounded the anguish of her own personal experience of flight and persecution. These emotions underpinned her determination to continue engaging with Ghana's politics from afar. She decided to deploy her extensive experience to establish the magazine *Talking Drums*.

Founding a magazine in exile was a deeply ambitious undertaking. Established in summer of 1983, *Talking Drums* was made possible by the arrival in London of two of Ohene's close friends and colleagues from the *Graphic*, Ben Mensah and Kofi Akumanyi. Published through to 1986, the magazine had a relatively small circulation, estimated at 'less than 5,000', but was influential.[26] Focused on West Africa in general, it was envisaged as a platform which would foreground alternative voices and perspectives. In an early editorial, Ohene declared:

> We believe in undertaking the adventure of 'Talking Drums', that there is an urgent need to discuss the events that have convulsed the continent in a sober and calm manner. We believe that there are many voices that have not been heard and many sides to the arguments that have not been stated.[27]

[23] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] 'Pointers: Media: The Ibo States', *Africa Confidential*, Vol.25, No.17, 15 August 1984, p. 8.
[27] 'They Also Serve Who Make Their Voices Heard', *Talking Drums*, 12 September 1983, p. 4.

Ohene thus conceptualised the magazine as a 'voice for the voiceless'. While not explicitly an 'exile newsletter', exile perspectives featured prominently, as a group whose opinions were marginalised not just by their nations of origin, but also by the dominant political discourses in their host countries.[28]

Indeed, Ohene was fighting a war on two fronts. Firstly, as an exiled journalist, she was primarily preoccupied with refuting the narratives of state-controlled media in West Africa, particularly in Ghana. Secondly, the editorial team's exile meant that *Talking Drums* also operated in the context of the Western media, whose problematic portrayal of African politics they equally sought to challenge.[29] Ohene was a critic of left-wing journalists such as the *Guardian's* Victoria Brittain, whose outspoken support for the Rawlings government she found particularly offensive. Ohene perceived Brittain and many other Western commentators on Africa as indulging fantasies of socialist 'revolution' in other people's countries, without personal consequence and with little regard for on-the-ground reality.[30] The letters page of *Talking Drums* suggests this frustration was shared by the exile community, excited by a new publication which might 'counter the damage' done by Western correspondents with little investment in or knowledge of west Africa.[31]

The arrival of *Talking Drums* in the international media landscape had an immediate impact on the Ghanaian government. Reading an early edition, British officials concluded that it contained 'a number of features which the Ghanaian authorities will find embarrassing and irritating.'[32] A few weeks later, Valerie Sackey, Rawlings' Director of Information, raised *Talking Drums* in a conversation with British High Commission officials. First stating her personal respect for Ohene as a journalist, she nevertheless described Ohene's writing as 'innuendos and smears' She questioned Ohene's self-description as a political exile since '[n]o one had forced her to leave Ghana'.[33] British officials took this as evidence that *Talking Drums* had 'stung the government', and hoped that this might cause the PNDC to be more transparent, in which case 'Miss Ohene must

[28] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019.
[29] Ibid.
[30] 'Correspondents and Experts at Large', Elizabeth Ohene, *Talking Drums*, 12 September 1983, p. 6.
[31] 'Unacceptable Face of Journalism', James Okunor, *Talking Drums*, 19 September 1983, p. 5.
[32] TNA, FCO/65/2948, Lance memo. 'Talking Drums', 3 November 1983.
[33] Ibid., 'Meeting with Mrs Valerie Sackey', Brett Rooks, 21 November 1983

surely have scored a great hit.'[34] The impact of such concerted exile criticism was also reflected in an open letter to the British High Commissioner, published in the state-owned *People's Daily Graphic*. It complained that Britain had allowed ''dissidents' to publish their own papers etcetera openly making very uncomplimentary statements about some individual members of government.'[35] Having successfully cultivated a 'culture of silence' in Ghana, Ohene's impact on the domestic scene from exile was infuriating for the PNDC.[36]

The Challenge of Externality

Distance offered a degree of safety but also posed a challenge to Ohene's team of exiles in the practical process of weekly newsgathering. No longer able to investigate directly, the *Talking Drums* team established a network of Ghana-based collaborators, who provided access to details of news on the ground. Yeboah-Afari describes how such contacts would routinely mail Ghana's daily newspapers to Ohene, something which posed little risk if done clandestinely.[37] For Ohene, externality also provided an opportunity for moderate discussion. In the second issue of *Talking Drums*, she stated: 'It is quite possible that removed from the tensions and disasters of the region, the problems of the region can be discussed in a more reasonable atmosphere.'[38] While conventional journalistic wisdom venerated first-hand reporting, Ohene saw the value of distance for measured debate, even 'objectivity', away from the cauldron of domestic politics.

However, while aware of the potential of her writing as activism, Ohene was also self-critical in reflecting how exile could dull its authenticity. Ohene wrote candidly: 'Some might ask, how can you play the Talking Drums, an essentially African phenomenon, in London, the capital of colonialism? How indeed, can you sing the Lord's song in a strange land?'[39] Characterising London as a quasi-lion's den, a space of historical and contemporary (neo)colonial oppression, she emphasised her vulnerable and problematic position as she sought to remain true to her African identity in an inherently rootless and historically hostile space.

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[34] TNA, FCO/65/2948, 'Meeting with Mrs Valerie Sackey'.
[35] 'To the British High Commissioner in Ghana', *People's Daily Graphic*, 7 October 1983.
[36] Ankomah, 'Ghana's culture of silence,' pp. 17-19.
[37] Ajoa Yeboah-Afari Interview, 24 August 2018.
[38] *Talking Drums* (London), 12 September 1983
[39] 'They Also Serve Who Make Their Voices Heard', *Talking Drums*, 12 September 1983, p. 4.

Ohene thus conceived a vision of exile as one reliant on connectivity and collaboration. Citing a Ghanaian proverb, Ohene wrote: 'when a farmer is clearing a path in the forest, it is only somebody else who stands behind who can tell him that the path is veering to the left or right'. She stated that the magazine's founders were 'counting on the support' of readers to keep them on the straight and narrow.[40] Ohene, acknowledging the inherently dislocating nature of transnational exile, envisaged its antidote to be a discursive network of motivated individuals both outside and within Ghana. Drawing on Stephanie Newell and Emma Hunter's examinations of colonial and post-colonial newspaper publics in Africa, it may be argued that *Talking Drums* involved the conceptualisation and creation of a transnational public, linking contributors and readers across the globe in a discursive space.[41] The letters page of *Talking Drums* is particularly illustrative of its global reach: even in its first few issues, this included submissions from Britain, Germany, the United States, Nigeria, and Ghana itself.[42] Critical voices were conversing on a local, transregional, and global level.

Talking Drums was positioned as a space where those marginalised from the domestic or regional political conversation could reclaim a sense of agency. Readers were urged to engage with slogans such as 'Don't whisper in frustration, Get it off your chest! Write to TALKING DRUMS - Your message will go far and wide'.[43]. A message of empowerment can be found in early editorials. In October 1983, Ohene wrote that the magazine was not only for those who 'believe that dissenting voices need to be heard', but also for those 'who believe that there is a need to do something beyond grumbling or sighing in despair'.[44] Rather than 'whispering in frustration', Ohene encouraged readers into active engagement with west African politics within a wide network of exiled and marginalised voices.

Readers' responses also revealed a desire to re-establish cultural connectivity, for example in their requests for coverage of regional sporting events.[45] One reader, Yaw Owusu-Donkor, while appreciating Ohene's 'efforts to keep West Africans and their

[40] They Also Serve…', *Talking Drums*, p. 4.
[41] Derek Peterson, Emma Hunter and Stephanie Newell (eds.), *African Print Cultures: Newspapers and Their Publics in the Twentieth Century* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016).
[42] See letters pages from *Talking Drums*, 12 September 1983, 7 November 1983.
[43] Letters Page, *Talking Drums*, 12 September 1983, p. 6.
[44] *Talking Drums*, 3 October 1983, p. 4.
[45] 'More Sports Features', Ahmed Kolongo, *Talking Drums*, 19 September 1983, p. 5.

sympathizers both at home and abroad informed of events in the sub-region', begged her to 'give sports a chance'.[46] Owusu-Donkor emphasised how difficult it was for exiles and expatriates to remain engaged with the everyday, community-orientated aspects of domestic life, complaining that they heard 'little if not nothing about how favourite teams and sporting clubs are faring.'[47] Ohene accordingly asked exiled sports journalist Ebo Quansah to contribute to the magazine.[48]

The Challenge of Financial Precarity

While *Talking Drums* was successful in fostering a small but engaged readership, the pressures of producing a weekly magazine were significant. *Talking Drums* was the definition of a shoestring operation. While there were occasional contributions from emigrant and exiled west African writers, the burden fell mostly on the shoulders of Ohene, Mensah and Akumanyi, with typing provided by Mensah's wife. The lack of personnel meant that in order to produce enough content by deadline, Ohene would often write all night, using several different pen-names to imply a larger staff.[49] However, it was clear that Ohene was the dynamo behind the paper, British officials describing it as 'something of a one-man band'.[50] Ohene today acknowledges that this was a stressful time, observing that she and her colleagues were 'too busy, and too angry' to contemplate their situation.[51]

Despite having been editor of Ghana's most widely read newspaper, Ohene had little experience of the business side of newspaper operations, which made the initial launch highly challenging.[52] This was compounded by the uninspiring media landscape into which they were entering, where several established papers covering African current affairs were struggling financially.[53] Ohene frankly acknowledged the risk which *Talking Drums* represented:

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[46] 'Where do we get copies?', Yaw Owusu-Donkor, *Talking Drums*, 19 September 1983, p. 5.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ebo Quansah Interview, 9 April 2019
[49] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019
[50] TNA, FCO/65/2948, Lance memo. 'Talking Drums', 3 November 1983.
[51] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019.
[52] Ibid.
[53] 'Pointers: Media: The Ibo States', *Africa Confidential*, Vol.25, No.7, 15 August 1984, p. 8.

> We were told by those who know that only fools or totally mad people would undertake the type of venture we wanted to do. The reality of the marketplace has defeated all who have attempted this route before and you will go the way of all other fool-hardy predecessors. [54]

Ohene had assumed the paper would fold within months. However, an unexpected event in the ever-evolving exile landscape would provide the enterprise with much greater income. On 31 December 1983, Nigerian President Shehu Shagari was overthrown in a coup that triggered a wave of elite ex-politicians, who fled to London in early 1984.[55] *Talking Drums* caught the attention of these politically engaged, often wealthy, figures. Eager to find a platform from which they could disseminate their opinions on Nigerian domestic politics from exile, they began to buy advertisements, and later full pages, in *Talking Drums*. Ohene recalls the moment when one Nigerian exiled politician purchased four pages, funding the next several issues.[56] Yet this burgeoning relationship soon placed Ohene at the centre of one of the most infamous events to impact the London exile community during the 1980s.

The Umaru Dikko Affair

During the 1980s, London remained a key destination for exiles fleeing from across anglophone West Africa, reflecting the continuing post-colonial connection. Linguistically, integration was enabled by the use of English, and Britain ostensibly provided greater security than exile within Africa. However, in June 1984, this illusion of safety was shattered by the attempted abduction of Alhaji Umaru Dikko. Having served as Nigerian transport minister in the government of his brother-in-law, Shagari, he fled following the 1983 military coup. Thereafter, many former government ministers were accused of corruption, and Dikko was implicated in the embezzlement of millions of dollars from Nigeria's oil revenues. True or not, he was reputedly a billionaire with a lifestyle to match.[57]

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[54] The Silent Drums?, *Talking Drums*, 3 October 1983, p. 4.
[55] On the 1983 Buhari Coup, see Max Siollun, *Soldiers of Fortune: A History of Nigeria (1983-1993)* (Abuja: Cassava Republic, 2013).
[56] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019.
[57] J.E. Okolo, 'Nigerian politics and the Dikko kidnap affair,' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* Vol.9, No.4 (1987), p. 326.

Once in London, he quickly became a vocal critic of the new military government.[58] Dikko repeatedly attacked the new Nigerian government in the media. He also became an active supporter of *Talking Drums*, giving interviews to Ohene and even sponsoring the paper for a full year.[59] Dikko's partnership with *Talking Drums* might seem odd, as the 1980s London media landscape had several newspapers which focused specifically on Nigerian domestic politics. Typically, the *Concorde Weekly,* established around the same time as *Talking Drums,* reserved 60% of its space for Nigerian news. However, it was owned by Chief Moshood Abiola, a prominent Nigerian businessman who was 'an arch enemy of Umaru Dikko'.[60] *Talking Drums* therefore provided a useful political mouthpiece for Dikko, circumventing such difficult dynamics.

On 2 February 1984, Dikko was interviewed on the BBC World Service programme *Focus on Africa,* where he revealed a plan to remove the new Nigerian military government and restore constitutional government.[61] Nigeria now gave him the official status of 'Most Wanted', despite the many ex-ministers and prominent individuals exiled alongside him. Combined with his familial closeness with the former president and his luxurious life in exile, Dikko's public provocations made him a primary target.[62]

The plot to abduct Dikko was hatched by a team of Nigerian diplomats collaborating with Mossad-affiliated Israeli officers.[63] On 5 July 1984, Dikko left his house in Bayswater, west London, to attend a pre-arranged interview with Ohene. However, he was abducted a few paces from his house after a violent struggle and bundled into a van.[64] Elizabeth Hayes, Dikko's secretary, witnessed the abduction and phoned the police. Ohene arrived soon after, and together they placed a call which escalated the case to Scotland Yard's anti-terrorism C13 unit.[65]

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[58] Others included Chief Adisa Akinloye, Chairman of the ousted National Party of Nigeria and Senate leader Joseph Wayas.
[59] Elizabeth Ohene interview 9 April 2019.
[60] 'Pointers: Media: The Ibo States', *Africa Confidential*, Vol.25, No.17, 15 August 1984, p. 8.
[61] H.A. Amankwah, 'The Dikko Affair and Asylum in International Law,' *University of Ghana Law Journal*, Vol.16 (1985), p. 64
[62] Colin Galloway, 'The Dikko affair and British-Nigerian relations', *The Round Table*, Vol.78, No.311, (1989) pp. 323-324.
[63] Ismail Bello, A.I. Dutse and M.F. Othman, 'Comparative Analysis of Nigeria Foreign Policy Under Muhammadu Buhari Administration 1983-1985 and 2015-2017', *Asia Pacific Journal of Education, Arts and Sciences,* Vol.4, No.4 (2017), p. 45.
[64] Elizabeth Ohene Interview 9 April 2019.
[65] Okolo, 'Nigerian politics and the Dikko kidnap affair', p. 327.

Some hours later, at Stansted Airport, two wooden crates were waiting on the tarmac. The Nigerian diplomat Okun Edet, who accompanied these packages, sought to have them designated as diplomatic baggage, despite not having the required paperwork. Having received an 'All Ports Bulletin' from Scotland Yard stating that a Nigerian had been kidnapped and that there might be an attempt to smuggle him out of Britain, customs officers were suspicious of the minimal cargo and passengers on the plane, combined with a 'medical smell' emanating from one of the crates.[66] Once opened, they discovered inside an Israeli anaesthetist crouched beside an unconscious Dikko. Customs agent Christopher Morrow recalled that '[Dikko] had no shirt on, he had a heart monitor on him, and he had a tube in his throat to keep his airway open. … The Israeli anaesthetist was in there, clearly to keep him alive.'[67]

This audacious but foiled abduction caused a rupture in Anglo-Nigerian relations. Seventeen men were questioned and four arrested, while two Nigerian diplomats were expelled, triggering retaliatory action by Nigeria.[68] Diplomatic relations between the two countries were not reinstated for two years. For the African exile community, Dikko's experience was a powerful manifestation of their worst fears and so was widely discussed.[69] It justified exile fear concerning organised surveillance by their hostile home states while abroad, and the proximity of Dikko's abduction to his home in Bayswater, a place of apparent safety, was deeply troubling.

The Dikko affair thus had a direct effect on the daily behaviour of exiles. The exiled Ghanaian businessman Christian Goka cites this as a particularly worrying incident that influenced his own experience. Having travelled frequently between Togo, Nigeria, and Britain during his first years in exile, Goka's wife and children had settled in London and he was in the process of acquiring leave to remain. Due to his travel, however, his Ghanaian passport had quickly filled up and urgently needed replacing. This would mean interacting with the Ghanaian High Commission in London. Goka states that Dikko's abduction was forefront of his deliberations, making him reluctant to reapply for this

[66] Adeoye Akinsanya, 'The Dikko Affair and Anglo-Nigerian Relations', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol.34, No.3 (1985), p. 602.
[67] Alex Last, 'The foiled Nigerian kidnap plot', BBC World Service, 12 November 2012. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20211380
[68] Galloway, 'The Dikko affair and British-Nigerian relations', p. 324.
[69] Dikko's abduction was front page news of *Talking Drums* on many occasions. Examples include 'Where was Dikko going when kidnapped?' 16 July 1984; 'How Nigeria 'won' the Dikko kidnap affair', 23 July 1984; 'After the Kidnap Trial, Dikko says: 'I shall return'', 18 February 1985.

documentation, not only for fear of revealing his location, but because entering a Ghanaian diplomatic facility would leave him vulnerable to abuse, even kidnap.[70]

Dikko's abduction had an even more direct impact on Elizabeth Ohene. During the subsequent extensive investigation, the circumstances of his abduction created suspicion about her possible involvement. Ohene recalled that for a short time the British police 'thought I had sold him to the Nigerians'. As an exile whose own security was substantially reliant on the goodwill of the British government, the 'drama' surrounding the investigation was worrying.[71] Dikko and Ohene maintained their association, with Dikko continuing to actively sponsor *Talking Drums*. However, Ohene was unsettled by his reaction to the abduction: 'I would have been very angry, but if he was, he didn't show it. He was very calm about it. I kind of thought 'this is dangerous', anybody who goes through this and isn't validly angry must be a dangerous man.'[72]

While Dikko's calm reaction illustrates the varied responses of exiled individuals to threatening events, it may also reflect a deeper contrast in perspective. While Dikko and Ohene were unified by their exile experience, their backgrounds and careers gave them different outlooks. Dikko's career as a government minister may have given him deeper appreciation of the extra-judicial tactics employed by the state, ensuring his lack of surprise at his attempted abduction. By contrast, Ohene's background as a civilian journalist arguably contributed to her outrage at the reach of the state. Ohene explains that thereafter, she perceived Dikko as more calculated and deliberate, his cool response reinforcing her assessment of him as a ruthless political operator who had no illusions about the jeopardy inherent to the condition of exile.[73]

The End of a Chapter

While *Talking Drums* found temporary financial security through the support of prominent exiled figures such as Dikko, ultimately this was not sufficient. By 1986, *Talking Drums* had financially collapsed, a situation captured by Ohene's succinct description: 'Everyone who we could bankrupt we had bankrupted. Everybody we could

[70] Christian Goka Interview, 26 April 2019.
[71] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.

coax had been coaxed'.[74] Family and friends insistes that Ohene, Mensah and Akumanyi find 'real jobs', and pressed them to accept that 'we live here now'.[75]

Because all three had placed their lives on hold to prioritise the production of *Talking Drums*, the acceptance of prolonged exile as her new reality was something with which Ohene in particular struggled. Mensah and Akumanyi had both applied for refugee status upon entering Britain, consequently receiving council housing and a small stipend which helped them and their families to make ends meet.[76] In contrast, Ohene never applied for refugee status, preferring to maintain herself using her savings, small gifts of money from friends, and occasional freelance writing. Ohene recalls: 'I had a difficulty in my mind about signing up as a refugee, so I didn't. I never did in all the years I was there.'[77] Mirroring the experience of other professional exiles, such as Samuel Gyandoh (Chapter 7), Ohene struggled to identify as a 'refugee', choosing instead to remain in a liminal space, simultaneously accepting her inability to return home while rejecting the permanence which applying for recognised status suggested. Symbolic of this transience, during her first four years in London, Ohene never owned a winter coat, and never hung any pictures in her apartment. These items would have signalled that London 'was my home, and I didn't want to see it as my home.'[78]

Following the magazine's collapse, Ohene finally felt able to bring her son to live with her in London on a permanent basis. She began working for the BBC and would remain with the corporation for the next fourteen years. *Talking Drums* played a defining role in Ohene's life, both in terms of her emotional and political relationship with Ghana, but also in how she conceptualised her life in London. While exile has often been associated with isolation, this perception obscures the importance of the broader familial, social, and collegiate networks which were crucial spaces for Ghana's exiles. Ohene's experience illustrates the way in which personal and emotional relationships with the nature of exile develop and shift over time, shaping not only the lives of externalised individuals, but also those of their friends and family.

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[74] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Columbia University Archives, Committee to Protect Journalists, Box.65, Ghana 1984, Ben Mensah and Kofi Akumanyi to David Chiel, 17 February 1984.
[77] Elizabeth Ohene Interview, 9 April 2019.
[78] Ibid.

Exploiting International Norms

Due to the inherently transnational nature of exile experience, individual exiles and exile protest groups were often exposed to and engaged with changes in international policy and norms. Politically active exiles were certainly impacted by such changes, but were also able to utilise them to challenge the hostile governments from which they fled, and to appeal to host governments, often using the media to further their goals. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had been adopted in 1948, and the European Convention on Human Rights followed in 1953, it was in the 1970s that human rights rhetoric achieved significant public prominence. For example, usage of the terms 'civil rights' or 'human rights' in the *New York Times* tripled between 1975 and 1985.[79] While the discourse of human rights did not establish itself simultaneously around the world, or at the same speed, the transnational movement of exiles sensitised them to this framework of human rights, into which they could insert their own experience while leveraging these ideas within the broader international milieu of which they were a part.[80]

A parallel development was the rise of global NGOs such as Amnesty International, which monitored and publicised human rights abuses around the world, helping shape this new international climate centred on humanitarian ideas.[81] The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International in 1977 illustrated its growing relevance, and comparable organisations won the same prize over a dozen times in subsequent decades. In relation to Ghana's PNDC regime, Amnesty International actively monitored the creation of the public tribunals. Its collation and dissemination of information on the PNDC's repressive institutions threatened Ghana's reputation on the world stage. Clearly concerned about these efforts, the PNDC refused to allow Amnesty International to

[79] Neve Gordon and Nitza Berkovitch, 'Human Rights Discourse in Domestic Settings: How Does it Emerge?', *Political Studies*, Vol. 55, No.1 (2007) p. 246. It also rose in importance in government circles. The US Carter administration listed Limann's 'firm support for President Carter's human rights policy' as one of his key qualities: Jimmy Carter Library, National Security Affairs 15, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material, Box.15, Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski by Peter Tarnoff, 11 September 1980.

[80] Amanda Murdie and Tavishi Bhasin, 'Aiding and abetting: Human rights INGOs and domestic protest,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.55, No.2 (2011), pp. 163-91.

[81] Jessica Mathews, 'Power Shift: The Rise of Global Civil Society', *Foreign Affairs,* Vol.76, No.1 (1977): 50-66; Nitza Berkovitch and Neve Gordon, 'The political economy of transnational regimes: The case of human rights', *International Studies Quarterly* Vol.52, No.4 (2008), pp. 881-904.

observe tribunal proceedings until 1983.[82] The impact of human rights-focused NGOs like Amnesty International was explicitly acknowledged by G.E.K. Aikens, PNDC Minister for Justice and Attorney General. At the African session of the 1984 UN Congress on crime prevention, Aikens stated that the tribunals had 'sparked a furore and unleashed criticisms from local and international human rights institutions.' In direct response to accusations of human rights violations, the PNDC had introduced sweeping reforms 'which by every conceivable imagination had introduced generally acceptable changes'.[83] Amnesty International was sceptical about the effectiveness of these supposed reforms, as the post-reform tribunals still lacked an appeals process. Aikens' speech was nonetheless a clear demonstration of the impact of international criticism on Ghana's leaders.[84]

This increasing focus on human rights was given additional traction by the worsening economic situation in many African countries, making them vulnerable to the aid conditionalities of Western lenders.[85] During the 1980s, Western democracies increasingly made improved human rights a condition for financial and military aid, requiring at least rhetorical affirmation.[86] The last decade of the Cold War saw an activist US Congress attempt to impose a stronger human rights agenda on presidential foreign policy. During the 1980s, this affected lending to many African governments, although thereafter restrictions on human rights violators imposed by multilateral institutions including the UN and the World Bank were gradually backfilled by single country donors.[87] This link between financial aid and human rights protections was underlined at the first formal meeting in 1982 between the PNDC's Foreign Minister, Dr Obed Asamoah and Sir James Mellon, the British High Commissioner. Mellon explained: 'It

[82] Columbia University Archives, Committee for the Protection of Journalists Records, Box.65, 'The Public Tribunals', Amnesty International General Distribution Paper, 28 October 1984, p. 12.
[83] PRAAD-Accra, RG/8/2/847, 'Criminal Justice Processes and Perspectives in a Changing World, Speech by Hon G.E.K. Aikins, PNDC Secretary (Minister) for Justice and Attorney General Delivered to the African Session of the 7th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders Recently Held in Addis Ababa', *NKDMMD*, Vol.3, No.7, (April 1984), p. 2.
[84] Columbia University Archives, Committee for the Protection of Journalists Records, Box.65, 'The Public Tribunals', Amnesty International General Distribution Paper, 28 October 1984, p. 1.
[85] David Chandler, 'The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol.23, No.3 (2001), p. 678.
[86] On foreign policy and human rights, see D.P. Forsythe, 'Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Two Levels, Two Worlds', *Political Studies*, Vol.43, No.1 (1995), pp.111-130; R.S. Søndergaard, *Reagan, Congress, and Human Rights: Contesting Morality in US Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
[87] J.H. Lebovic and Erik Voeten, 'The cost of shame: International organizations and foreign aid in the punishing of human rights violators,' *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol.46, No.1 (2009): 79-97.

would be extremely difficult for Britain to help Ghana should the new regime take any action that suggested a disregard for human rights,' implying that funding was partly conditional on the new regime's future human rights record.[88] Because of Ghana's growing financial crisis, the PNDC came under significant pressure to accept international human rights conventions.

However, while the term 'human rights' has an implied universality, the particular conception which was being promoted within this 'international discourse' was decidedly liberal and Western, embracing ideas of inalienable individual rights to liberty and freedom of expression.[89] The PNDC, like many radical Pan-Africanist regimes, conceived of rights as inherently collective, tied to community and economic equality, rather than the individual. Asamoah's response to Mellon evoked this ideological tension: he replied that, while he 'accepted the importance of human rights…economic and social rights were also important and this new regime felt they had to be given a higher priority than the civil and political rights on which we had been accustomed to place emphasis.'[90]

These differing conceptions were a consistent theme in PNDC rebuttals of accusations of human rights violations. At a symposium held in Accra by Amnesty International in 1984, George Agyekum, Chairman of the Board of Public Tribunals, argued it was 'unreasonable to sacrifice the security of the people in the name of human rights,' justifying the necessary oppression of the few by reference to the rights of the collective ('the people').[91] This rhetoric was echoed by Asamoah in 1989 who, when questioned about PNDC's legislation sanctioning the indefinite detention of potential subversives, responded:

> …I think this kind of reserve power [PNDC Law 4] is necessary in the context we are in. What the PNDC is doing is in the interest of the country… Any people who want to derail this process have to be dealt with. By and large, having that kind of law serves a larger interest of the majority.[92]

[88] TNA, FCO/65/2828, Meeting between the PNDC Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the British High Commissioner, 11 March 1982.
[89] Oquaye, 'Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy,' pp. 557-8.
[90] TNA, FCO/65/2828, Meeting between the PNDC Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the British High Commissioner, 11 March 1982.
[91] 'People's Security First', *Daily Graphic*, 28 May 1984.
[92] 'Asamoah Defends Stable Regime', *New African*, December 1989, pp. 12-13.

As the Cold War entered its last decade, Western governments began actively promoting liberal democracy as an ideal which was symbiotically entwined with human rights values, and which was increasingly linked to aid provision and restructuring. In this way, and in contrast to self-consciously impartial human rights organisations like Amnesty International, human rights, democratic practices, and neo-liberal economic reforms were increasingly bundled together by Western governments.[93]

US President Reagan's 1982 speech at Westminster underlines this elision. He argued that '[w]e must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. So states the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, among other things, guarantees free elections,' adding that this was central to 'the global campaign for democracy now gathering force.'[94] The increasing need to address these intertwined international norms was explicitly stated by British officials in Accra, who in 1984 informed PNDC Vice Chairman Justice Annan that 'it was important in the aid context to show that Ghana was developing a democratic system of government and protecting human rights'.[95]

Exiles were quick to take advantage of these rhetorical lynchpins in their efforts to undermine the PNDC. Externalised Ghanaians living in the diaspora utilised the human rights framework to articulate their opposition to the PNDC government from its inception. On 27 February 1982, the 'Ghana Citizens' Association' organised a demonstration outside the Ghana High Commission in London to protest the recent coup. Its campaign materials called for the support of '…all Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians who cherish democratic ideas and respect for fundamental human rights.'[96] The very names of the exile protest groups which sprang up following the coup framed their mission as one centred on democratic principles. Two prominent London-based opposition exile groups were known as the Ghana Democratic Movement (GDM), and the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana (CDG). In emphasising the fraternity of the revolutionary-socialist

[93] Stephen Hopgood, *Keepers of the flame. Understanding Amnesty International* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 59, 93. The inconsistent implementation of this advocacy by western governments is a crucial point of nuance. Key examples of this would be western support for Mobotu's regime in Zaire, and Reagan's tacit support for the South African Apartheid government.
[94] 'Text of Reagan's Address to Parliament on Promoting Democracy', *New York Times*, 9 June 1982.
[95] TNA, FCO/65/3122, Dean to Cary, 22 October 1984.
[96] TNA, FCO/65/2828, Demonstration Handout from Ghana Citizens Association, 27 February 1982, attached to Lance to Mellon, 'Demonstration in London', 3 March 1982.

PNDC to Libya, both used Cold War concerns to frame their advocacy of liberal freedoms.[97]

Exile movements achieved noteworthy success in forcing the PNDC into concessions on human rights norms. Key to this effectiveness was their engagement with Western media, notable in the activism of J.H. Mensah, prominent Ghanaian politician and GDM founder. In 1987 he accused the PNDC of 'sending death squads to hunt down their political opponents' in neighbouring African countries, in the weekly newspaper *The Voice*, the first newspaper specifically aimed at Afro-Caribbean Londoners.[98] Mensah thus deliberately exposed the Ghanaian state in front of a highly engaged and critical black and diasporic audience. Aman Cato, Ghanaian Deputy High Commissioner to Britain, was forced to refute his allegations in the same paper, and used human rights rhetoric to do so. He insisted: 'the Ghana Government is as concerned about the respect for human rights as anybody else and therefore is committed to ensuring that the rights and freedoms of Ghanaians both at home and abroad were not abused.'[99] Cato thus did not simply refute the accusation but affirmed the Ghanaian state's acceptance of human rights norms.

The success of Ghanaian exiles in finding a voice in the international media also reflected their geographical position. Many exiles had taken refuge in European and West African capitals, locations that were often hubs of international reporting. The BBC, for example, covered Ghana from Abidjan, meaning that exiles there provided a key news source. One British official observed that this inadvertently meant that BBC commentary 'tended to issue either from the regime's most committed opponents or from its most uncritical admirers.'[100] London-based correspondents of major news outlets often garnered sources from local exile communities, and prominent exile figures frequently gave interviews critical of the Ghanaian regime. These included Major Boakye Djan,

[97] TNA, FCO/65/2822, Kofi Batsa to Luce, CDG memo., 'Affairs in Ghana', 7 June 1982.
[98] PRAAD-Accra, RG8/2/847, 'Ghana's Envoy in London Denies Allegations', *Ghana News*, Vol.1, Nos.5/6, (1984), pp. 4-5.
[99] Ibid.
[100] TNA, FCO/65/2964, Burns to London, 'Meeting with PNDC Chairman: BBC', 26 October 1983.

leader of the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana (CDG – see below), who was a regular source for London-based publications such as *Africa Now*.[101]

Ghana's eloquent exiles were embraced by the international media. The PNDC regime reacted poorly to the resultant bad press, with critical reporting by the BBC World Service (which broadcast directly into Ghana) a particular sensitivity. Its platforming of notable exile leaders led PNDC Minister Paul Obeng to remonstrate with British officials about 'the BBC's "encouragement" of the regime's enemies in the UK'. In 1983, an open letter was published in the state-run *People's Daily Graphic*, complaining of the BBC's broadcasting of 'tirades…against the Government' from exiles such as General Hamidu and J.H. Mensah.[102] The BBC's supposed 'lack of objectivity' worried the regime, as it battled exiled opponents to control the international narrative about Ghana.[103]

The events surrounding the subversion trial of Kwame Pianim are a particularly clear illustration of this nexus of exiles, human rights organisations, and international media. A prominent economist, Pianim was accused of involvement in the November 1982 coup attempt and tried by Special Tribunal. While the five-man judging panel wanted to acquit due to lack of evidence, PNDC officials allegedly instructed them not only to find him guilty, but to sentence him to death. The only panel member who refused to acquiesce was Corporal Opoku Ware, who decided that the best way to avert Pianim's execution 'was to leave the country and alert the world to the pressures exerted on the panel.'[104] His flight into exile was then less an act of self-preservation as one of empowerment.

Arriving in Côte d'Ivoire, Ware contacted the resident BBC correspondent, as well as representatives of Amnesty International.[105] The *Ghana Warrior,* a covert domestic Ghanaian newspaper compiled by anonymous journalists calling themselves 'The League of Free Writers', described the ensuing public outcry which reverberated around the exile community and its linked international networks. News of Pianim's imminent execution

[101] 'We Don't Rule Out A Military Option - Interview with Major Boakye Djan', *Africa Now*, May 1983, pp. 96-98; TNA, FCO/65/2946, Brief on the Ghanaian Media attached to Brett Rooks to Lance, 'Ghanaian Media', 7 April 1983.
[102] TNA, FCO/65/2964, Burns, 'Meeting with PNDC Chairman: BBC', 26 October 1983; 'To the British High Commissioner in Ghana', *People's Daily Graphic,* 7 October 1983.
[103] Ibid, Brett Rooks to Lance, 'Ghana and the BBC', 11 October 1983.
[104] TNA, FCO/65/2948, 'BBC saves Pianim's life as new justice takes its toll', *Ghana Warrior*, No.1, c.September 1983, p. 5.
[105] Ibid., 'File Note: Ghanaian Refugees', Tesoriore (Abidjan), 7 November 1983.

was conveyed by evening reports on the BBC African Service, which highlighted the 'concern of sections of the Ghanaian community in London.'[106] The *Ghana Warrior* reported that Rawlings was apparently '[s]o shaken by the leakage' and resulting outcry, that he was forced to accept a lengthy 18-year prison sentence on Pianim.[107] Ware's flight into exile, resulting in a cacophonous international backlash, successfully limited this particular excess of the military regime.[108]

While exiles were able to use international media to illuminate the PNDC's authoritarianism and human rights violations, their direct appeals to Western governments were less successful. This was exemplified by the reaction of British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher to a 1985 letter of protest sent by the GDM following a spate of public executions. The GDM expressed its concerns using the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, emphasising Ghana's need for a 'general democratic political settlement to release the mass discontent which puts the regime in that state of constant fear in which the human rights of Ghanaians are so casually abused in the name of security'.[109] This missive was discussed at a high level by Thatcher's foreign affairs adviser, Charles Powell, and the Foreign Secretary's private secretary, Colin Budd. However, British official reaction was muted; while Budd acknowledged that these executions had 'raised eyebrows in the international community', he did not feel that Ghana merited international criticism when compared to the abuses of other African states.[110]

During the 1980s, Britain enjoyed considerable indirect influence over Ghana through the supply of credit.[111] However, notwithstanding the GDM's complaints, Britain had been largely placated by the PNDC's efforts to signal future democratic intentions. Having established the National Commission for Democracy in 1982, the PNDC promoted it to Western governments as a major step in restoring democratic processes.[112]

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[106] TNA, FCO/65/2948, 'BBC saves Pianim's life', *Ghana Warrior*, c.September 1983, p. 5.
[107] 'GHANA Releases of political prisoners and new arrests', Amnesty International, 16 December 1992, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/192000/afr280091992en.pdf [accessed 27/05/2021].
[108] TNA, FCO/65/2948, 'BBC saves Pianim's life', *Ghana Warrior*, c. September 1983, p. 5.
[109] TNA, JWH 014/1 Part A, Mensah to Thatcher, 18 June 1985.
[110] Ibid, Budd to Powell, 'Ghana Democratic Movement', 15 July 1985.
[111] See for example, Thatcher Foundation, 'Record of Talks Held at No.10 Downing Street between Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of Ghana on Wednesday 13 May at 1981 at 1200 hours.
[112] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Constitutional Democracy and the Fourth Republic', 1 November 1992, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7fb4.html [accessed 12/05/21].

However, it also rejected a rapid return to multi-party democracy, characterising previous constitutional governments as 'democracy by remote control.'[113] Instead, the Commission was tasked with collating opinions about what 'true democracy' might look like for Ghana. Budd commended the PNDC for being 'publicly - and we believe genuinely - committed to a return to democratic rule, even though this will not happen overnight and may not follow the Westminster pattern.'[114] During this period, Western governments were generally accepting of alternative forms of democracy and variations in political culture, but this tolerance often served the interests of regimes aiming to retain authoritarian control.

Britain remained generally supportive of the Commission despite being warned by the President of the Ghana Bar Association, J.K. Agyeman, that it was 'no more than a delaying tactic to permit the PNDC to remain in power'.[115] The PNDC was thus able to undermine GDM and the CDG's criticisms by performing what might be termed 'anticipatory democracy', despite a lack of real reform. Most importantly, the British were happy to overlook such warning signs because of the PNDC's 'determined, even courageous' commitment to IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes.[116] Not wishing to destabilise this economic liberalisation process, British officials were generally unwilling to engage with exile activists, let alone consider meaningful pressure for regime change in Ghana.

Opposition Externalised: The GDM and CDG

With the banning of parliamentary politics, organised opposition voices were necessarily restricted to the realm of exile. Political groups were established to channel the activism of Ghanaian exiles, two of the most prominent being the Ghana Democratic Movement (GDM) and the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana (CDG).[117] While the CDG was initially founded in Lagos in 1982, by the following year both groups had established their

[113] 'Search for True Democracy', *Daily Graphic*, 27 July 1984.
[114] TNA, JWH 014/1 Part A, Budd to Powell, 'Ghana Democratic Movement', 15 July 1985.
[115] TNA, FCO/65/2828, Brett Rooks, 'Ghana Bar Association', 6 July 1985.
[116] Ibid.
[117] For reasons of space and source availability this chapter focuses mostly on the GDM.

organisational base in London.[118] Following earlier patterns of Ghanaian exile, these organisations were notably global. By the end of the 1980s, the GDM was estimated to have over 5,000 members worldwide. While these were 'mostly in Europe', there was a sizable number in 'some African countries, as well as an estimated 500 members in Canada - principally in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver'.[119]

The CDG, under the direction of Major Boakye Djan, formerly a close ally of Rawlings during the AFRC period (see Chapter 7), openly boasted of its paramilitary capacity. In July 1983, Djan gave an interview to *The New African* which reported that an ordinary block of flats in a quiet London suburb was in fact 'the command headquarters of rebels plotting to overthrow the government of a turbulent Africans state.[120] 'The range of action available to us is obviously limitless', Boakye-Djan enthused, adding that 'we want to pressurize the PNDC into voluntarily handing over power to a democratically elected government without delay. But we will support all efforts to remove it by other means if we fail in our first objective'. He admitted to various difficulties, complaining about time spent 'flushing out' a spy in their midst and break-away factions which had unwisely tried to recruit British mercenaries. Boakye Djan even claimed that an assassin had been despatched by the PNDC who had been arrested by Special Branch and quickly expelled.[121] How much of this was true is unclear, but such dramatic language upset both the PNDC and his nervous British hosts.

The GDM in contrast was led largely by civilian politicians such as J.H. Mensah and focused on information campaigns and governmental lobbying. It exploited the wider currents of international affairs to discredit the PNDC, especially the growing rift between Libya and the West. On 17 April 1984, diplomats at the Libyan People's Bureau in London fired on anti-Gaddafi protestors in the street outside, killing policewoman Yvonne Fletcher and injuring others. A stand-off followed and the Bureau was closed. Weeks later, the GDM used contacts with the Foreign Office to suggest that since the Bureau had been shut down, radical Libyans had been using Ghana's High Commission as a base for their

[118] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Information regarding the Ghana Democratic Movement', [GHA5462], 7 June 1990, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1145310.html [accessed 18/11/20].
[119] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Information on the Ghana Democratic Movement, GDM', (follow-up to Response to Information Request GHA10317) [GHA10938], 13 May 1992, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1113559.html [accessed 18/11/20].
[120] The location was 5 Wingfield House, Oxford Road, Kilburn, NW6.
[121] TNA, FCO/65/2963, Tony Shipman, 'Ghana: The Boayke Factor', *New African*, July 1983, pp. 12-14

activities in London and even claiming that at the time of the shooting, eight Ghanaian officials had been inside the Libyan Bureau. The GDM underlined its substantial penetration of Ghana's High Commission by handing over copies of internal documents referring to the problem of 'information leakages'.[122] Thereafter, the GDM produced a range of leaflets addressing this issue, which focused on Kojo Tsikata, a veteran Nkrumahist who had been in charge of state security since 1982 and who was known to be sympathetic to Gaddafi. These warned: 'At home the Rawlings-Tsikata regime, which was imposed on Ghanaians through a Libyan-financed coup, is still trying to force our country into the mould of Ghaddafi's version of the class war, and thereby destroy our whole social structure.' The GDM declared it was determined to fight this 'by all the means at our disposal.'[123] Tsikata's radical politics and vocal anti-imperialism was an asset for dissident groups seeking to frame the Rawlings regime as untrustworthy and anti-Western. For example, in August 1985 the *Ghanaian Times* covered Tsikata's visit to Tehran where he declared that the people of Ghana 'hail Iran's struggle against the United States', a statement which the GDM sought to exploit.[124]

The GDM was explicitly envisaged as an umbrella organisation, led by experienced Ghanaian politicians from both main political parties at the time of Rawlings' second coup, the Peoples National Party and the Popular Front Party.[125] The group's chairman, J.H. Mensah, had held finance-related ministerial positions under both Nkrumah and Busia. Soon after the GDM's foundation. Mensah took out an advertisement in the third issue of *Talking Drums*, an initiative with which it shared a similar support base. Herein, Mensah emphasised the GDM's desired inclusivity:

> Our founding members represent the present-day successors of the two great strands in Ghana's politics: Dr Kwame Nkrumah's CPP and Prof. Busia's Progress Party. Together we speak for the overwhelming majority of the Ghanaian masses who, along with our political colleagues at home, are

[122] TNA, FCO/65/3128, Amankwaa, Ghana High Commission, 'General Meeting of the Workers Defence Committee, to be held on Friday, 24 February 1984 at 4.40 pm,' 22 February 1984; ibid. Leahy memo., 'Ghana/Libya', 31 May 1984.
[123] TNA, FCO/65/3128, GDM Press Statement, London, 23 May 1984.
[124] TNA, FCO/65/3457, Accra to London, 2 August 1985.
[125] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Information on the Ghana Democratic Movement, GDM', (follow-up to Response to Information Request GHA10317) [GHA10938], 13 May 1992, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1113559.html [accessed 18/11/20].

> muzzled and have their hands tied behind them. The GHANA DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT is open to all Ghanaians who are free to join, whether they belong to the founding parties, or to any other political party, or to no political party at all – provided only that they believe in democracy and are prepared to fight for it.[126]

The GDM sought to mobilise support for a return to civilian government across the political spectrum. However, it also sought to use Ghanaians' shared sense of alienation and – in many cases - their forced externalisation as exiles to flatten potentially divisive class and ethnic allegiances.[127] In its stated aims, the GDM resolved to 'promote unity and cooperation among Ghanaians of every social, political, and ethnic background'. Exile was thus treated as a space in which the divisions of the domestic political landscape could be set aside.[128]

However, the GDM was equally keen to ensure that this spirit of unity would not evaporate upon return. Joining the organisation meant, it asserted, agreeing to work together 'both in this period of struggle and also in the period of national reconstruction that will soon follow.'[129] The GDM was forging a new nationalism-in-exile, utilising externality to eliminate domestic divisions, so as to build upon this cooperation later. This conception of unity and nation-building seems to have struck a chord with readers of *Talking Drums.* The letters pages of subsequent issues included correspondents commending the GDM's resolve to submerge 'individualistic tendencies… for the general good' and praising its founders for putting aside their 'petty squabbles and jealousies… for the sake of our once beautiful Ghana.'[130]

However, while the framing of both the GDM and CDG foregrounded pro-democratic sentiment and nationalist unity, the implicit centripetal force shaping both groups was oppositional. As exile organisations, their support was clearly mobilised in relation to anti-Rawlings feeling, as many individuals had fled unprecedented violence and suffered deprivation in exile as a result of the PNDC government. Both the CDG and the GDM were unwavering in their attacks, describing the PNDC government as

[126] Advertisement Page for the Ghana Democratic Movement, *Talking Drums*, 19 September 1983, p. 24.
[127] Berry, *Ghana: A Country Study*, pp.260-261.
[128] Advertisement Page for the GDM, *Talking Drums*, 19 September 1983, p. 24.
[129] Ibid.
[130] 'Common Good', Letters Page, *Talking Drums*, 3 October 1983, p.5; 'Burying all Jealousies', Ibid.

respectively 'an instrument of terror' and a 'viper'.[131] Ridding Ghana of the Rawlings regime was the only way most GDM members could return home. The two groups sometimes claimed to be exploring 'all legitimate means' to restore constitutional government, while at other moments pledging to wage 'an all-out fight' for democracy.[132] However, what constituted 'legitimate' methods of restoring democracy was left purposefully vague.

Coup attempts remained frequent throughout the decade; Rawlings conceded publicly in 1986 that the amount of time he spent dealing with them was a 'personal disappointment'.[133] It was therefore unsurprising that the GDM often found itself accused of complicity in this subversion.[134] In 1985, the United States caught Mensah and two US-based GDM colleagues in a covert sting. All three – J.H. Mensah, John Andrews Boateng and Kwasi John Baidoo - were charged with violating the Arms Export Act, having allegedly conspired to 'purchase missiles and other weapons for a 100-member military force in the African nation' from an US federal agent posing as an arms dealer.[135] Mensah was carrying his GDM membership card on the day of his arrest, which cast suspicion on the wider organisation.[136]

However, the diplomatic community found the timing of these arrests deeply suspicious. It transpired that Sharon Scranage, a secretary at the CIA station in Accra, had leaked 'the names of virtually everyone working for the C.I.A. in the country' to her Ghanaian boyfriend, Michael Soussoudis, who was a relative of Rawlings.[137] This had allowed the Rawlings regime to close down a US government surveillance operation in Ghana, arresting eight of its agents. Many saw the action against the GDM members as placatory and part of a 'US deal to get its CIA spies back from Rawlings'.[138] Having successfully lured Soussoudis to Washington and arrested him, the US conducted a high-

[131] Berry, *Ghana: A Country Study*, pp.260-261; Advertisement Page for the GDM, *Talking Drums*, 19 September 1983, p. 24.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Interview with Flt-Lt Jerry Rawlings by M.A. Novivki, *Africa Report*, Vol.31, No.6 (1 November 1986), pp. 4-5.
[134] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: 'Information regarding the Ghana Democratic Movement' [GHA5462], 7 June 1990, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1145310.html [accessed 29/11/20].
[135] 'US Customs' investigation traps Ghanaians arming unit at home', *The Christian Monitor,* 10 December 1985.
[136] Ibid, for more detail on GDM membership cards, see Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ghana: 'Current information on the Ghana Democratic Movement, 1 May 1991', GHA8613, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab3c46.html [accessed 29/11/20].
[137] 'Officials Think Spying Led to Death of C.I.A. Informant in Ghana', *New York Times*, 13 July 1985.
[138] 'Intelligence Report – Ghana Deal', *Washington Times*, 23 December 1985.

profile prisoner swap with Ghana for the return of their arrested agents. However, observers noted that 'not all the alleged CIA assets were swapped for Soussoudis', leading to suspicions that 'the United States had agreed to mop up the exile movement, possibly as a favor to the Rawlings regime for having released some of the Ghanaian CIA assets or to gain the release of those remaining in his hands'.[139]

Mensah was subsequently acquitted in the US but his two friends, Boateng and Baidoo, were jailed. British diplomats had privately hoped that J.H. Mensah would also be convicted and imprisoned, leading to the loss of his exile status in Britain. British officials maintained that Mensah and his GDM partner, Dr De Graft Johnson, were not genuine exiles. Instead, they had allegedly resorted to a 'trick' by entering Britain with no qualifications for political asylum and then agitating vociferously for the Ghanaian government's downfall. On this UN lawyers vigorously disagreed with the British Home Office.[140] Either way, this incident illustrates the precarious existence of prominent exile activists, who risked being used as bargaining chips for governments engaging in a ruthless diplomatic trading of human beings.

This episode greatly irritated Rawlings, particularly because it involved his relative Soussoudis. When Mensah was acquitted, Rawlings complained that 'the big fish generally having ways of slipping out!', indicating that he saw the exiled Mensah as a major threat.[141] He was also displeased that the presiding US judge had 'applauded our opponents as 'freedom fighters!'[142] While the episode demonstrated Rawlings' ability to use effective domestic security mechanisms to disrupt his extraterritorial critics, it also underlined his lack of control over the resultant optics. The GDM, with its emphasis on democracy and freedom, was increasingly branded to appeal to Western values in the Thatcher-Reagan era.

The Purpose of Exile Groups

While the GDM was mainly a political group, its declared aims also included a more pastoral objective: 'to look after the welfare of Ghanaians now dispersed in many places

[139] 'Intelligence Report – Ghana Deal', *Washington Times*, 23 December 1985.
[140] Ibid. TNA, FCO/65/3443, Accra to London, 'Ghana Internal: Political Asylum', 17 July 1985.
[141] Interview with Flt-Lt Jerry Rawlings by M.A. Novivki, *Africa Report*, Vol.31, No.6 (1 November 1986), p. 8.
[142] Ibid.

of exile.'[143] This seemingly uncontroversial focus would prove its most divisive feature. As part of its efforts to support the Ghanaian exile community more broadly, the GDM provided support for refugee status applications. Not only was the Movement well placed to provide expert guidance to new refugees, this also provided valuable new recruits. A Ghanaian exile in Hamburg later explained how helping new refugees to enhance their asylum applications enabled him to recruit them to the GDM.[144] For many new refugees therefore, the GDM's appeal was both continued political engagement with Ghana and more tangible material benefits. Indeed, membership of an opposition organisation itself provided evidence of political persecution, strengthening applications for permanent asylum. The GDM's involvement in asylum processes thus proved symbiotic. This growing membership also increased GDM funds, since members paid £20 to join alongside a monthly fee of £5, although fees were waived for poorer applicants.[145]

However, Mensah's US Federal Court trial for arms smuggling indicated that questions were arising about the nature and legitimacy of the GDM's funding. During these proceedings the GDM was portrayed in two contrasting lights. Prosecutors alleged that through Mensah and his colleagues, the GDM had agreed to pay $200,000 for weapons, as well as any import duties and necessary bribes to Ghanaian customs to allow them to be brought into the country. In contrast, the men's defence council asserted that 'the movement did not have enough money to buy a single rifle'.[146] These drastically different characterisations contributed to growing scrutiny of the Movement's finances.

By the end of the 1980s, the GDM was suspected of asylum-claim irregularities. One British asylum officer stated that, '[t]he average immigration officer would look very closely at any Ghanaian who came and claimed asylum... and I wouldn't say we hold a lot of [Ghanaian refugee] organizations in high regard.'[147] In 1990, various growing pressures resulted in the fracturing of the GDM: one faction was led by J.H. Mensah and

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[143] Advertisement Page for the GDM, *Talking Drums*, 19 September 1983, p. 24.
[144] N.K.K. Kwatei, *From Asylum to Immigrant: My Years in Germany (1984-2010)* (Bloomington IN: Authorhouse, 2012), p. 52.
[145] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Information on the Ghana Democratic Movement, GDM (follow up to Response to Information Request GHA10317) [GHA10938], 13 May 1992 https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1113559.html [accessed 28/11/20].
[146] Second Mistrial Is Declared in Weapons-Conspiracy Case, *The New York Times*, 21 September 1986, Section 1, p. 44.
[147] Cynthia Hardy, 'Refugee Determination: Power and Resistance in Systems of Foucauldian Power', *Administration & Society*, Vol.35, No.4 (2003), p. 477.

Alex Asabere, and the second by Frimpong-Manso and Shanco Bruce, although both continued to use the GDM name.[148] In the aftermath of this schism, Mensah sought to distance himself from the 'taint of grave irregularities in connection with immigration matters', which he sought to associate solely with the rival wing of the organisation.[149] While Mensah claimed that *his* GDM was reformed and remained a legitimate exile campaign group, documents seized during a raid by the UK Immigration Service in October 1991 suggest a more complex picture.[150] While the London-based GDM was invested in the welfare of the wider exile community and in supporting refugees and their claims, its methods did not always accord with the British asylum system.

While the London-based GDM struggled to engage with immigration and refugee services, this was not the case for Ghanaian exile groups everywhere. Cynthia Hyde has explored Canadian exile groups, notably the Ghanaian Refugee Union (GRU), and explicitly contrasts their success with equivalent London-based groups, managing to increase acceptance rates for Ghanaian asylum seekers in Canada 'from less than 7% in 1987 and 1998 to more than 30% in 1990 and 1991'.[151] Using interviews with exiles, government officials, and NGO staff, Hyde demonstrates that this success was rooted in a distinct approach, working with rather than against the immigration and asylum systems.[152]

By comparing the trajectory of these two Ghanaian exile groups, a fundamental disparity in purpose becomes apparent. Both groups were invested in the welfare of exiled Ghanaians and actively engaged in the asylum process on their behalf. However, the GRU was focused on improving and preserving the lives of exiles outside Ghana, while the London-based GDM ultimately sought to enable their safe return. This is symbolised by the renaming of the GRU as the Ghanaian Canadian Association, broadening its membership to include all Ghanaians living in Canada, rather than recent refugees.[153] In

[148] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Information on the Ghana Democratic Movement, GDM (follow-up to Response to Information Request GHA10317) [GHA10938], 13. May 1992 https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1113559.html [accessed 28/11/20].
[149] Mensah to the Under-Secretary of State of the United Kingdom, 12 March 1990, cited in Ibid.
[150] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Information on the Ghana Democratic Movement, GDM (follow-up to Response to Information Request GHA10317) [GHA10938], 13 May 1992 https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1113559.html [accessed 28/11/20].
[151] Hardy, 'Refugee Determination,' p. 477.
[152] Ibid., pp. 479-480.
[153] Ibid., p. 481.

this way, these Ghanaians, who had arrived as refugees, began to produce a new identity: one which saw Ghana as a point of origin rather than the desired destination. In this way, exile can be seen to be a fluid and ambiguous identity, which is reflected in, but also served to destabilise, exile organisations with fixed political goals centred on Ghana itself. However, despite these differences it is arguable that the ultimate aim of both groups remained the same: both wanted to cease to live as 'exiles.' While the GDM wished to end members' exilic existence through return, the GRU hoped to escape exile through integration, envisaging an alternative Ghanaian community in a new Commonwealth space.

Economic Crisis, the IMF, and Enticement to Return

Ghana's political instability was partly rooted in its ongoing economic crisis, which from the 1970s had remained a chronic problem regardless of the political complexion of the regime in power. The PNDC government inherited huge economic problems and was therefore in dire need of financial assistance. As a strong anti-Western stance was central to its early rhetoric, the Rawlings government initially pursued radical egalitarian policies and sought financial aid from Libya, Cuba, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, sending two separate aid delegations in early 1982.[154] However, it quickly became apparent that these nations would not be able to provide the level of support Ghana required, and Rawlings began to denounce Marxism as a useless model for economic governance.[155] Abandoning its socialist roots, the PNDC turned to the West and began negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency credit as early as October 1982. While there was initial resistance to the IMF's conditions, which Dr Kwesi Botchwey, the PNDC's Secretary for Finance, described as 'unreasonable,' an agreement for an Economic Recovery Programme was nonetheless reached in February 1983.[156]

[154] Roger Gocking, *The History of Ghana*, (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), p. 193.
[155] J.C. Williams, 'New Africa in the World Coming to Harlem: A Retrospective Comparison of Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara,' *Journal of Pan African Studies,* Vol.7, No.7 (2014), pp. 7-12.
[156] Quentin Peel, 'Ghana renews IMF talks', *Financial Times*, 8 October 1982; K. Boafo-Arthur, 'Ghana: Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics of Continuity', *African Studies Review*, Vol.42, No.2 (1999) p. 46.

By implementing this unpopular IMF-World Bank austerity programme, Ghana received more than $600 million. The “corrective” economic measures included a 90% devaluation of the cedi - one of the most drastic devaluations ever implemented in Africa. However, it quickly became clear that another cost of the IMF programme was the creation of new sources of opposition. Left-wing intellectuals, students, and trade unionists, who had all provided crucial support for the PNDC in its early years, were now punished by the regime for voicing opposition to its abandonment of socialist principles. Both main intellectual socialist groups associated with the regime, the June Fourth Movement (JFM) and the New Democratic Movement (NDM), were jettisoned by the PNDC for their opposition. The JFM rejected Western collaboration and was sidelined in late 1982, and key members such as Chris Atim fled into exile. While the NDM filled the resulting political void, it suffered the same fate in 1985 once its members criticised the effects of the Economic Recovery Programme.[157] Mr Justice Annan, vice-chairman of the PNDC declared: 'We see these people as subversives. We have evidence of a substantial question of security with these former members of our process'. Citing 'ideological reasons’ for the split, Annan stated that many ‘couldn't agree with the IMF and World Bank policies.' Rawlings went so far as to call them ‘traitors.’[158]

The IMF’s recovery programme was to some extent dependent on the existence of local economic capacity. After years of middle-class flight due to the deteriorating economy, Ghana did not have the ability to absorb or manage the increased external resources now directed towards it. This exodus was so extreme that, as early as 1982, barely 350 of the 1,500 doctors trained by the government since independence were still practicing public medicine in Ghana.[159] Many of Ghana’s senior civil servants had been ostracised by the regime, significantly depleting the government’s access to expertise. In the short term, Ghana was flooded with IMF and World Bank personnel, hired consultants, and seconded bureaucrats from outside Ghana to plug this experience gap.[160]

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[157] Suweon Kim, ‘Mao’s new democracy and Ghana’s foreign policy change in 1983’, *African East Asian Affairs*, Issue 2, June 2014, pp. 51-54.
[158] Victoria Brittain, ‘Rising star of Africa – Economic reforms, underpinned by World Bank money, have made Ghana an example of the way forward in Africa’, *The Guardian*, 17 December 1988.
[159] Azarya and Chazan, ‘Disengagement with the State,’ p. 122.
[160] Ho Won Jeong, ‘The impact of the World Bank and the IMF on the political economy in Ghana’, Ph.D. Ohio State University, 1993, p. 125.

Nevertheless, Rawlings was 'acutely conscious' of the PNDC's 'urgent need to attract wider support, especially from qualified and better able Ghanaians.'[161]

By the mid-1980s, the Rawlings regime therefore had to confront the necessity of appealing to exiles to return. In 1984, the PNDC aimed 'quietly to encourage Ghanaian exiles with valuable skills to return home, offering them the opportunity to return with amnesty'.[162] Notably, the PNDC established the 'Special Committee on AFRC Convicts and Exiles', tasked with assessing the cases of those convicted and incarcerated under the AFRC, as well as those who had fled the country either post-conviction or pre-emptively. By 1984, prominent Ghanaian businessmen living in London were reported to be contemplating re-establishing themselves in Ghana.[163] In 1985, it was reported that the Special Committee had received over 112 applications from exiles who wished to return to Ghana to contest their case.[164] Others, however, remained hesitant. There was significant concern that returnees might be punished for contact with prominent opposition groups such as the CDG. *Africa Confidential* noted: 'Exiles are now often careful to distance themselves from opposition politics in order to improve their chances of a profitable resumption of business in Ghana.'[165]

The misgivings of politically prominent individuals were well-founded. Kwamean Ahwoi, responsible for the Special Committee assessing AFRC exiles, candidly told British officials that exile leaders like 'Boakye Djan and J.H. Mensah would have "serious problems" should they return.' In 1985, he rejected suggestions that these individuals had engaged only in 'vocal opposition', insisting that their links with various coup plots meant the PNDC government had to presume they were an ongoing security threat.[166]

In 1985, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Theophilus Kutin, a former air force officer who had served as Transport and Communications Minister in Acheampong's Supreme

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[161] TNA, FCO/65/3122, 'Ghana: Human Rights', Rogan to Rawsthorne, 24 July 1984.
[162] Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988: Reports Submitted to the Committee of Foreign Relations US Senate and Committee on Foreign Affairs US House of Representatives by the Department of State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 136.
[163] 'Pointers: Ghana: The Trading Fraternity', *Africa Confidential*, Vol.25, No.17, 15 August 1984, p. 8.
[164] 'More Petition Committee for Review of Cases' *People's Daily Graphic,* 20 June 1985. In a private conversation between British officials and Kwamean Ahwoi, Coordinator for Investigations and Vetting Tribunals, the number was cited as 50 exiles who had actually returned to appeal their cases, with a further 108 applications. TNA, JWH 014/1 Part A (1985), 'National Investigations Committee', Rooks to Maclean, 21 June 1985.
[165] 'Pointers: Ghana', *Africa Confidential*, 15 August 1984, p. 8.
[166] TNA, JWH 014/1 Part A (1985), 'National Investigations Committee', Rooks to Maclean, 21 June 1985.

Military Council (1976-7), accepted an offer of amnesty and returned to Ghana. While safe passage was in theory assured for those exiles who chose to return through this process, Kutin was in fact detained on arrival and held without trial, under PNDC Law 4, for five years.[167] Amnesty International asserted that this was due to official suspicion that he had 'contacts with government opponents in exile'.[168] Incidents such as these compounded the ongoing mistrust between the Ghanaian exile community and the PNDC, which they perceived as deploying the language of reconciliation and human rights internationally, only to renege on its promises. It is therefore unsurprising that only a 'limited' number of exiles were willing to take official assurances of safety at face value.[169]

This mistrust persisted throughout the 1980s, exemplified by the experience of Emmanuel Adama Mahama who had served as a minister under Nkrumah and subsequently as a senior presidential advisor to Hilla Limann. Mahama had fled Ghana in early 1982 and had been living in exile for eight years when he intimated to his son, John Mahama,that he 'wanted desperately to return to Ghana.'[170] John Mahama then requested a letter of safe passage for his father from the Ghanaian government, explaining that he was elderly, had no desire to involve himself in politics and simply wanted to be with his family. As John Mahama recounts, the nature of this request struck him as unique: letters of safe passage were usually sought from a new government which had overthrown the regime that was responsible for the individual's exile. However, for his father, the 'administration from which he was seeking the letter of safe passage was the same one from which he had fled'.[171] Despite EA Mahama's wish not 'to spend the rest of his years in a foreign country,' he was apprehensive at returning to PNDC jurisdiction.[172] Such a return represented for many exiles a high-stakes leap of faith rather than a calculated risk.

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[167] Kutin was released on 4th June 1990. Human Rights Watch, 'News From Africa Watch-Ghana', 12 August 1991, pp. 5-6. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/g/ghana/ghana918.pdf, [accessed 15/02/21].
[168] Amnesty International, London, 'Ghana: Political Imprisonment and the Death Penalty', 18 December 1991 (AI Index: AFR 28/03/91), (London: Amnesty International Publications) p. 37. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/200000/afr280031991en.pdf, [accessed 15/02/21].
[169] Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988: Reports Submitted to the Committee of Foreign Relations US Senate and Committee on Foreign Affairs US House of Representatives by the Department of State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 136.
[170] John Mahama would later serve as Ghana's president (2012-17). Mahama, *My First Coup d'Etat*, p. 307.
[171] Ibid. p. 308.
[172] Ibid.

EA Mahama's understandable suspicion was only increased by the qualified government response to his request. While safe passage was granted, he was required to report to 'a particular government office to formally notify them of his presence'. John Mahama recalls:

> It was this request that made Dad nervous and fed his doubt. In the past when he'd complied with a request to report himself somewhere or other, ostensibly for his "own safety", he had been arrested. He'd left Ghana to avoid another such request, and we soon discovered that it had been the right course of action. All of his colleagues who'd complied with that request had been detained. No amount of assurance could make Dad trust a military government enough to walk into a police station or government office and place himself at their mercy.[173]

This reticence apparently continued among the broader Ghanaian exile community even as the PNDC finally made concrete moves towards introducing multi-party democracy in 1991, in the context of the wider pro-democracy movement sweeping sub-Saharan Africa. A London-based Ghanaian journalist for the *New African Magazine* stated that, despite the declared change in governmental outlook and an imminent civilian regime, many exiles did 'not trust the government to be forgiving'.[174] Repeated offers of amnesty to exiles were now part of a specific return initiative, but included significant loopholes which could be used to prosecute them on return. For example, while the government's 1991 offer was superficially enticing, as it only excluded those who had been convicted of subversion or officially wanted for a criminal offence, Human Rights Watch pointed out that '[t]he legislative instrument granting the amnesty … does not prevent anyone from being declared wanted after returning from exile.'[175]

In 1992, Rawlings' PNDC embraced multi-party constitutional rule. As Nugent has argued, Rawlings chose to take the initiative on democratisation, rather than allowing

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[173] Mahama, *My First Coup d'Etat*,, p. 312.

[174] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Ghana: Information on whether there would be sanctions today for a person who escaped police custody in December 1991 for voicing her/his political opinion, whether amnesty would apply to such a person and whether there are any judicial sanctions today for having escaped police custody in 1991', 1 December 1994, GHA19161.E, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab0f14.html [accessed 09/04/21].

[175] Human Rights Watch, 'News From Africa Watch- Ghana', 12 August 1991, pp. 5-6. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/g/ghana/ghana918.pdf, [accessed 15/02/21].

international and domestic pressure to undermine his political control, or possibly interfere with vital flows of aid from the IMF/World Bank.[176] A referendum was held in April 1992 to adopt a new constitution, and the ban on the formation of political parties was lifted, leading to presidential and parliamentary elections in late 1992. This led to a proliferation of new political parties: the Busia/Danquah tradition coalesced into the New Patriotic Party (NPP), while the Nkrumahist tradition split several ways, one including a revised PNDC led by Rawlings and known as the National Democratic Congress (NDC).[177] Rawlings' NDC emerged victorious in a close election which did not reassure potential returning exiles, who continued to mistrust a Ghanaian government which, while ostensibly democratic, was still led by the authors of their persecution.

It would take considerably longer for many Ghanaians to trust the durability of constitutional democracy. While EA Mahama had resolved to remain in exile until Ghana had successfully returned to constitutional democratic rule, starting preparations to return in 1992, he did not set foot on Ghanaian soil until 1995.[178] EA Mahama's attitude was typical of the response from more politically active exiles who feared reprisals on return. This had a significant effect on the reopening of democratic politics in 1992, since prominent political figures such as J.H. Mensah did not feel safe to return from exile to contest the election. Mensah had been sentenced to death by the Special Military Tribunal under the PNDC and was therefore excluded from the amnesty offer.[179]

The new government struggled to assuage old exile fears. In 1994, two years after Ghana had officially established constitutional rule, Rawlings again extended an offer of amnesty. However, it retained the same slippery conditions as before, and still excluded those convicted of subversion under the PNDC.[180] The extent of the exile community's continued distrust finally prompted the government's amendment to the amnesty on 6 January 1995, which included all exiles except those charged with murder, rape, and drug

[176] Nugent, *Big men, small boys and politics in Ghana*, p. 202.
[177] Paul Nugent, 'Living in the past: urban, rural and ethnic themes in the 1992 and 1996 elections in Ghana,' *Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol.37, No.2 (1999), p. 29
[178] Mahama, *My First Coup d'Etat*, p. 312.
[179] Oquaye, 'Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy,'p. 565.
[180] UK Home Office, Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration & Nationality Directorate, 'Ghana Assessment 2000', p. 17. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/486a533d0.pdf, [accessed 01/04/21].

smuggling. Under these rules, J.H. Mensah was finally issued with a Ghanaian passport on 12 January 1995 and was able to return home for the first time in fourteen years.[181]

Return and After

For some exiles however, their mistrust of the Ghanaian government precluded all possibility of return. Colonel Annor Odjidja, head of military intelligence under Hilla Limann, had fled into exile swiftly after Rawlings' 1982 coup. In 2003, he reportedly told a fellow exile that he would continue living in the UK indefinitely rather than return, because 'Ghana is not worth dying for.' He continued: 'I don't trust politicians, and I have little confidence in the current administration.'[182] Despite the successful transition to democracy, and Rawlings himself having stepped down from official leadership positions in 2000, Odjidja could not envision a safe and secure life for himself in Ghana. He remained in Milton Keynes until his death in 2009.

Beyond practical considerations of security, the concept of return held a significant emotional complexity for many exiles, which complicated their homecoming. Christian Goka's traumatic loss of his brother Mawuli, arrested and executed by the PNDC while Christian was in exile (see Chapter 7), made thoughts of return, and of Ghana itself, incredibly painful.[183] After Ghana's transition to democracy in 1994, Christian's wife Theresa was cautiously hopeful about returning to Ghana to spend time with their aging parents and extended family. However, this provided a source of conflict in their marriage: Christian struggled to come to terms with his experiences, leading to a memorable family exchange in which he shouted: 'Look, I am never going back to Ghana!'[184] At the end of what he terms a 'two-year struggle', Christian Goka visited Ghana in April 1997 to attend a family wedding. He described the feeling of return as 'wonderful', especially as he was able to see his father for the first time in fifteen years.[185]

[181] UK Home Office, 'Country Information and Policy Unit'.
[182] 'Ghana is not worth dying for - Ex MI Boss', *GhanaWeb,* 25 June 2003, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghana-is-not-worth-dying-for-Ex-MI-Boss-38217 [accessed 03/06/22].
[183] Christian Goka Interview, 26 April 2019.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.

However, return should not be framed as the end of the emotional journey of exile. While Christian returned permanently to Ghana in 2000, he remained preoccupied by thoughts of his brother, and especially his desire to locate his body. While Christian had raised this question with various sympathetic officials over the years, none had offered concrete help. It was not until the establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission (NREC) in 2002, that Christian was able to seek acknowledgement and redress through official channels. The NREC was established by the NPP government, elected in 2000 in Ghana's first peaceful democratic transfer of power. The commission was tasked with establishing an official record of Ghana's history of political violence since independence, compiling a report from Ghanaian citizens' written and oral testimony, which was often also broadcast on television and radio.[186] It had no ability to punish alleged perpetrators, but was able to recommend reparations. While many were sceptical of its value, including Christian Goka himself, thousands of Ghanaians approached the commission with testimony of their suffering. While the NREC remains controversial in Ghana, it resulted in the preservation of what Abena Ampofoa Asare has termed a 'remarkable cacophony' of Ghanaian voices with immense historical significance.[187]

Through the NREC proceedings, Christian was able to not only testify to the suffering of his family but could also petition for the bodies of his brother Mawuli - and those executed alongside him - to be traced and exhumed. The NREC was able to identify their location and transferred custody of their bodies to their families in a ceremony in April 2004. Christian felt it important to speak at the resolution of what he termed 'eighteen long years of questions that have plagued our minds since our brothers lost their lives.' Acting as the spokesman for the six families at the ceremony, he stated that they now had 'the opportunity to place their remains in places that their families can identify as their final resting place.'[188] While the emotions arising from the NREC and the recovery of

[186] Asare, *Truth Without Reconciliation*, pp. 1-5.
[187] Ibid, p. 8. For the full report, see: The National Reconciliation Commission Report, (Accra: Government of Ghana, 2004), https://hmcwordpress.humanities.mcmaster.ca/Truthcommissions/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Ghana.NRC_.Report-FULL.pdf.
[188] Bodies of six executed under Rawlings handed to relatives, *The New Humanitarian,* 30 April 2004, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/217515 [accessed 15/11/22].

Mawuli's body were complex for the Goka family, Christian describes testifying as 'a very cathartic experience.'[189]

Christian Goka's relationship with exile and return is only one of many unique and diverse experiences of Ghanaian exile. Nevertheless, it clearly demonstrates the ways in which exile and its attendant emotions commonly continue to exert immense impact on individuals who have ostensibly 'returned'. In his short story *The Naked Song*, South African author Mandla Langa rejects the idea that exile is something from which one can 'return', instead positing that exile 'was not so much a geographical dislocation as a state of mind' which 'left one marked for life.'[190] This literary reflection is useful in our efforts to historicise exile as an experience, discouraging the historical impulse to neatly categorise – and in doing so artificially truncate – for ease of analysis, instead helpfully encouraging a framing that emphasises the continuity of lived experience.

Conclusion

Constrained as they were by the political, financial, and psychological challenges inherent to the condition of exile, it is striking how tirelessly many exiles toiled to maximise their challenge to the PNDC government. Journalists such as Ohene, Mensah, and Akumanyi created *Talking Drums* as a discursive space for Ghanaian and West African diasporic voices and explicitly encouraged vocal debate in a period when, particularly in Ghana, this was being brutally suppressed. Not only did the magazine often successfully irritate the Rawlings regime; its fuelling of political engagement within the Ghanaian exile community fed other related and overlapping networks, such as the Ghanaian exile political groups the GDM and CDG. These evolving and interconnected networks of externalised individuals were able to exercise considerable agency in their efforts to challenge the PNDC government.

However, exile activism was never monolithic. Externalised individuals and groups engaged in multiple directions, lobbying and engaging with intergovernmental organisations, NGOs, and their host governments with varying levels of success. The aims

[189] Christian Goka Interview, 26 April 2019.
[190] Mandla Langa, 'The Naked Song', in *The Naked Song and Other Stories,* (Claremont SA: David Phillip Published (Pty) Ltd, 1996), p. 71.

of exile engagement were also diverse. While the possibility of return was a powerful motivator for many, exiles at times sought security via permanent externality, shaping their own identity to aid their transition into different contexts and circumstances.

While historical enquiry requires some imposition of structure which will inevitably curtail and may distort, when historicising exile it is important to eschew the imposition of an 'ending' onto personal or collective experience. It is tempting to utilise the moment of return, or even the decision to emigrate permanently, as a bookend to the experience of exile. However, this thesis seeks to borrow from Deleuze and Guattari's concept of a more 'rhizomatic' history, in which continuity and connection is emphasised over attempts to create hierarchical or strict chronological order.[191] The effects of exile, both emotional and practical, did not cease to be felt with a change in geographical location or immigration status, nor even with Ghana's apparently permanent transition to multi-party democracy. While this is not to suggest that, for the individual, exile is necessarily personally defining, it is crucial to acknowledge the continuing impact of exile experience beyond any possible 'endpoint' which might be imposed analytically.

[191] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp.23-25.

Chapter 9:

Conclusion

This thesis was conceived of via a preoccupation with absence. In reading scholarship that focused explicitly or implicitly on the 'nation', I was struck by the simultaneous prevalence of exile and transnationality as an experience for African politicians and activists, alongside its glaring omission from the narratives which historians wove about modern Africa's changing political landscape. Where exile was briefly acknowledged, scholars generally noted moments of exit from and re-entry into the nation of significant individuals, while the actions, experiences, and political agitation they effected while externalised remained unrecognized.

Exile and transnationality have often been considered incompatible with traditional historical approaches, especially those which utilise the nation-state as an analytical framework. However, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's work *A Thousand Plateaus* directly addresses the problem of how we might know exiles as figures often located on the margin. They provide a positive contribution to what they called 'rhizomatic thought', which emphasises networks, and rejects the imposition of arbitrary hierarchies, beginnings, and endings onto historical experience. However, when considering the historiography of exiles, Deleuze and Guattari were epistemologically gloomy, observing that the difficulties of historicising exiles, refugees, and wanderers made the creation of convincing histories vanishingly rare. Even when historians attempted exile-focused scholarship, it commonly retained the vestigial imprint of the unitary state and failed to encompass the heterogeneity of exile. They lamented that the

long shadow of the state as a unit of analysis meant that researchers had 'never comprehended nomadism.'[1]

In contrast, this study offers a degree of methodological optimism regarding the potential for meaningful histories of exile and exiles. While unable to fully escape the structured and somewhat inorganic nature of historical analyses, this thesis has embraced this 'rhizomatic' approach in focusing on the lives, networks, and experiences of exile, and the multi-faceted impacts that these individuals have made politically, culturally, and socially in local, regional, and global spaces. It suggests that historians do not always have to 'see like a state' and that one of the best ways to avoid these problems is to step outside the boundaries of a single approach.[2] Accordingly, in examining Ghana's exiles, this thesis attempts to embrace not only the insights of both global history and African history, but also to combine political realism with ideas of emotion and the affective turn. Exiles, their macropolitical concerns and their micropolitical assemblages, offer a promising site to investigate how these things may intersect. Moreover, it suggests that the nature of exile is a messy journey without obvious endings and beginnings, rather than constituting a clearly defined analytical category, something that is richly illuminated by the Ghanaian experience in the second half of the twentieth century.[3]

Centring Exile

The key purpose of this thesis has been to recentre exile, retrieving it from the historical periphery. It has argued that experiences, ideas, and practices of exile are central to Ghana's political history, and indeed that of modern Africa as a whole.[4] Furthermore, it suggests that writing a national history is – or should always be - an inherently transnational and global project. The intellectual focus on internal dynamics which has coloured much existing scholarship on African nation-statehood is unsurprising, given that post-independence political discourse strongly focused on re-asserting sovereignty

[1] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp.24-6. See also C. Lundy, *History and Becoming: Deleuze's Philosophy of Creativity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), pp. 12-27.
[2] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
[3] For this reason, Hirschman's work, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, was put aside, since its categories proved overly rigid/deterministic.
[4] For a thoughtful political science analysis see Bob-Milliar, 'Transnational Political Activism', pp. 123-45.

and control in national form. This has however distracted attention from the important ways in which African politics involved a mobile politics of dissent, in which ideas and associations were generated in both local and transnational spaces and networks. Fundamentally, the nation was not the only arena of activity and certainly did not determine the boundaries of such activity, a contention which this thesis has placed at its analytical core.

In previous scholarship on late-colonial and post-colonial African political history, exile has merited attention most commonly as a key experience within the life of a leading individual. In a Ghanaian context, this is particularly true of historical analyses of Nkrumah, whose exile has been acknowledged as important to his intellectual and ideological evolution.[5] This focus on key leaders has reinforced the conceptualisation of exile as an individual experience, something which this thesis has sought to refute. In reality, Ghanaian exiles created and maintained myriad connections with their fellow exiles and diasporic compatriots, as well as with political actors from across the globe. These networks had real political impact, both on the Ghanaian government and on the governments of the countries in which they resided. While the available sources have skewed this thesis towards more elite exiles, this thesis has consciously moved beyond biographical approaches to individuals to encompass broader networks of exile, and to consider the development of a mobile style of Ghanaian politics that viewed, or was forced to accept, the world stage as a key site of struggle.

These exile-based connections changed the way in which Ghanaian politics worked. Exile often operated as a unifying space which could overcome established domestic divisions, fostering interactions and alliances between politically disparate individuals, and creating unexpected challenges for successive domestic governments. Unwilling externalisation created connections through mutual alienation and changing perspective. Gazing from the outside in fostered shared aims of return among formerly opposed actors, the most obvious example being that of Gbedemah and Busia (Chapters 3 and 4). This externalisation allowed for alternative ideas of the nation to be imagined, unconstrained by the confines of the nation-state and beyond the immediate reach of the Ghanaian security apparatus.

[5] Biney, 'Kwame Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile'; M. Sherwood, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad*.

This thesis therefore establishes the importance of exile dynamics, not only to Ghanaian but also to wider African political history. The vast numbers of exiles generated in the decades following independence did not cease their engagement with the politics of the nation-states they had left. Instead, these repeated waves of exiles formed global diasporic networks of resistance which affected and reshaped Ghanaian domestic politics. These constituted a significant political challenge not only for the Ghanaian authorities, but also the governments of the countries which hosted them. These mobile networks of dissent operated on multiple levels: socially, with family and friends who remained in Ghana; politically, through direct action ranging from protests to attempted coups; economically, as a struggle over resources with which to pursue activism and for personal survival in exile; and intellectually, imagining and conceptualising the nation of Ghana from beyond its national borders.

This thesis' reintegration of exiles and their strategies into Ghanaian political history contributes to the wave of recent scholarship which seeks to challenge established notions of post-independence African politics as centring on internal dynamics within new nation-states. In reality, post-independence African politics, like its colonial-era antecedents, was characterised by a mobile politics of dissent made up of overlapping diasporic networks at a local, regional, and global level. Studies which omit the influence of figures beyond the national boundary are by definition incomplete, denying us the richness and ideational complexity of what we might term a global Ghana.

Power and Persecution

The implications of such mobility had a significant impact on the everyday practice of power. As has been observed by Olusegun Obasanjo, who oversaw Nigeria's transition to representative democracy in the 1970s, there was little tolerance in postcolonial African politics for the concept of a 'loyal opposition', leading to the often-violent suppression of dissenting voices, creating instability and forcing large numbers of politicians and activists into exile.[6] This was by no means a purely Ghanaian or even West African phenomenon. During the second half of the twentieth century, repressive government

[6] Olusegun Obasanjo, *African Perspectives: Myths and Realities* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), p. 8. See also Adeolu Durotoye, 'Obasanjo's Personal Diplomacy, the Liberian Civil War and Charles Taylor's Asylum in Nigeria,' *International Affairs and Global Strategy,* Vol.36, No.1 (2015): 19-28.

action across the global south led to the outward movement of political and social activists, intellectuals, academics, and artists to other countries. Whether military or civilian, new administrations often initially assumed that, by forcing those aligned with opposition movements out of the country, their control of politics and domestic public spheres would be effectively assured. Yet, by enlarging a diaspora of co-nationals, authoritarian rulers tended to expand the range of what had been internal dissent and conflict, emboldening opposition forces to operate beyond their national borders where they enjoyed greater freedom of action. [7]

The refusal of Ghanaian exiles to 'go quietly' made them impossible for successive Ghanaian governments to ignore, and their political agitation shaped Ghanaian political reality to a remarkable degree. Exiles engaged in everything from concerted media and propaganda campaigns, to lobbying international organisations and major governments, to orchestrating coup and assassination attempts. Exiles, both individually and in organised form, therefore had significant impact on domestic security policy. Ghanaian security services were actively engaged with thwarting exile plots, and with locating wanted individuals abroad. Attempts to exert extraterritorial power were not only a significant concern for exiles themselves; they also jeopardised diplomatic relations with regional powers such as Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, undermining already fraught relationships. Personal missives between African leaders frequently referred to the hosting of troublesome exiles and demanded their detention and return.[8]

Beset by assassination and coup attempts, this sense of threat presented by exile networks was in turn magnified and imagined, while the fear of externalised opposition that lay beyond the coercive reach of the domestic state prompted consistent levels of concern and paranoia, their unquantifiable nature creating a form of exile 'bogeymen'. This thesis has in this respect explored how both the realities and unrealities of exile loomed large within the political imaginary of successive Ghanaian governments and leaders, creating increasing cycles of insecurity over time. Exile-engendered state paranoia triggered the implementation of further repressive measures, which in turn fuelled opposition and drove more people into exile. Successive Ghanaian regimes saw

[7] Roniger, 'Changing Cultural Landscapes,' pp. 185-208.
[8] See for example Nkrumah's complaints about Kow Richardson, follower of Busia, in his letter to Nnamdi Azikiwe, president of Nigeria, 31 March 1965, RG/17/1/298, PRAAD-Accra.

mobile enemies everywhere and reacted with fear.[9] However, this unknowability and externality also made exiles excellent scapegoats. Unable to easily counteract state-sponsored narratives, exiles were a useful avatar for regimes that wished to characterise opposition to the state as the preserve of outsiders and traitors. Because various Ghanaian governments were keen to pin the blame for instability on external forces rather than acknowledge internal dissent, it is sometimes difficult to definitively ascertain the culpability of exiles in coup attempts. It is however clear that exiles materially and ideationally shaped Ghana's political landscape. By leveraging their status as external, global, and in some respects unquantifiable, politically active exiles were able to impact the domestic political scene in a manner which was distinct from their counterparts who remained within the country.

Global History and its Methods

Precisely because of the global (as well as local) landscape in which African political change has unfolded, the writing of African history requires us to work across sub-disciplinary boundaries such as 'global history' and 'African studies', utilising in so doing sources scattered across both the continent and the wider world. During the last decade, African historians have been edging warily towards a closer relationship with archives held in colonial metropoles. Marco Wyss puts the problem eloquently in his recent comparative study of Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, observing that despite our best efforts to pursue multi-archival research we are inevitably confronted with what he calls the 'postcolonial paradox' of archives. While postcolonial studies called for a move away from Euro-centric and American-centric approaches, there is often an imbalance between the coverage and accessibility of extant bodies of Western and African sources. Moreover, given the growing temporal distance of events in the 1960s and 1970s, this balance can no longer be entirely corrected by oral history. In the spirit of Allman and Skinner and their endorsement of a 'shadow archive' approach, Wyss counsels a careful reading of the

[9] For an exploration of emotion, fear, and state security, see Mabel Berezin, 'Secure states: towards a political sociology of emotion,' *Sociological Review*, Vol.50, No.2 (2002): 33-52.

vast body of western sources to recover African agency, even if this approach is admittedly biased towards African elites.[10]

This thesis argues that, by rethinking the boundaries of Africa's recent political history, we can take this further. The idea of a global Ghana has broader implications for our methodologies and permits a more imaginative archival approach that is not driven by mere exigency. 'Nation' as a concept has shaped the ways in which individuals and cultures have viewed themselves and others for centuries, and it has unsurprisingly generated a deep vein of scholarship.[11] However, while 'nation' may be a valid area of historical enquiry, nation-focused research has focused overly on internal dynamics and actors, taking for granted the role of nation-state in the conceptualisation of nation-focused political conflict. This has not only relegated individuals and movements which exist beyond national boundaries to the realm of 'foreign relations,' but also constrained our archival strategies. While utilising physical national boundaries is an undeniably practical way of delineating the scope of a research project, this approach fails to recognise the nature of information flows. When only focusing on events within the nation's geographical confines, there is a danger that historical methods are also constricted. This thesis maintains that if the practice of national history is always to some extent a transnational and global project, necessitating the inclusion of an 'osmotic' nation, beyond its physical boundaries, then this may provide us with the keys to unlock a richer archive.

In other words, methodologically, the pursuit of rather elusive exilic individuals necessitates, in turn, the identification and inclusion of transnational archives and sources. We should view this as a welcome opportunity rather than a reason for anxious compromise. Combining 'African' and 'Global' historical approaches allows for the inclusion of transnational actors, dynamics, and ideas in analyses of national political development. While the practical challenges surrounding access to archives in Africa has been portrayed as the main reason for pursuing what has been termed a 'shadow archive' approach, the inclusion of global archives instead represents an opportunity.[12] If we

[10] Marco Wyss, *Postcolonial Security: Britain, France and West Africa's Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 19-21.
[11] See for example: Christian Jansen and Henning Borggräfe, *Nation–Nationalität–Nationalismus* (Berlin: Campus Verlag, 2020); John Breuilly, 'Modern empires and nation-states,' *Thesis Eleven,* Vol.139, No.1 (2017): 11-29.
[12] Skinner, 'West Africa's First Coup', pp. 375-9.

accept that the nation is inherently osmotic, made up of individuals and ideas within, beyond, and continuously moving through national boundaries, then the sources needed to illuminate its history should reflect this globality. By thinking imaginatively about Ghana's history, our conception of what constitutes its 'national archives' immediately expands.[13]

However, the bias noted by Wyss towards elite exile experience inherent in this methodological approach is a significant limitation of this thesis. While aiming to encompass broad networks and capture the lived experience of Ghanaian exile beyond key leaders and figures, the scope of the available sources has unavoidably limited this exploration. Governmental sources can be read against the grain, but historians struggle to use such documents to uncover the stories of those officials deemed unimportant and are therefore absent. This has skewed this project substantially towards the exploration of elite, educated exiles, who were monitored by governments, engaged with NGOs, or who were able to record their own story. A project which uncovers a more 'subaltern' Ghanaian exile experience, utilising significantly more oral history interviews, would be highly desirable in future, but is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Realism and Emotion

Exile can also serve to breach the conventional barrier between realist political history and histories of affect/emotion. The affective turn has been influential across the humanities and is of particular importance when considering the history of refugees, asylum seekers and exiles.[14] Experiences of forced migration cannot be separated from their inherent emotional significance for individuals and their families, and any analysis of exile's historical impact must incorporate the often traumatic and complex emotions inherent to this experience.[15] The methodological originality of this study therefore also lies in its integration of traditionally distinct approaches to historical enquiry. Specifically, by focusing on exile, it seeks to dissolve the conventional barrier between 'realist' political histories that focus on areas such as security, economics, policy, and foreign relations, and historical approaches of affect and emotion which have often been

[13] Skinner, 'West Africa's First Coup', pp. 375-9.; Allman, 'Phantoms of the Archive', pp. 104-9.
[14] Burke, 'Flat affect?', pp. 123-41.
[15] Susan Matt, *Homesickness: An American history* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 9-11.

the preserve of social historians. Global archives, especially private papers and oral history, are again important here, given the marked reluctance of Ghanaian politicians to engage in memoir writing.[16]

Indeed, this thesis argues that analysis of the political impact of exiled individuals on their country of origin, and on the countries in which they took refuge, is impossible to disentangle from the lived experience of exile itself. As the rich material from the Howard University archive underlines, the personal, familial, and social aspects of exile were integral to the conceptualisation of these external networks of resistance and the motivations behind such political activity, central as they are to illuminating how exiles perceived themselves in relation to their political aims and to Ghana as their home. The financial precarity of exile equally impacted the actions and effectiveness of collective exile plots. Assensoh's perceptive account of Nkrumah's exile explains the collapse of the Nkrumahist exile network as largely the result of harsh financial realities and declining familial ties. The NLC co-opted supposedly loyal Nkrumahist exiles into their surveillance network by exerting pressure over their property in Accra and the security of their families who remained in Ghana.[17] Assensoh's affirmations of ideological loyalty to Nkrumah, alongside acknowledgements of personal cooperation with the NLC's security services, reframes conceptions of exile actions – commonly understood through the prism of loyalty and betrayal – as instead a battle for personal and familial stability and resources. In a broader context, this thesis calls for the integration of histories of the conventional macropolitics of the state and its political institutions with the micropolitics of subterranean and transnational political/social movements, reflecting as they do individual sensibility, affect, and local allegiances.[18]

A key example of the importance of incorporating the study of emotion into realist historical narratives is illustrated by the spectrum of exile morality. The interaction of emotions, ethics, and the gritty business of electioneering in post-1966 Ghana was repeatedly underscored by the visceral and emotion-filled reactions of Accra-based citizens to the status claimed by those engaged in the business of exile and return (see

[16] This reluctance has been remarked upon by several observers, see for example: George Benneh, *My Time My Nation: The Autobiography of Prof George Benneh* (Accra: Winmat, 2016), p. ii.
[17] Assensoh, *Kwame Nkrumah: Six Years in Exile*, pp. 23-45.
[18] McFarlane, 'Translocal assemblages,' pp. 561-67; Paul Patton, 'What is Deleuzean Political Philosophy,' *Crítica Contemporánea. Revista de Teoría Política,* Vol.1, No.1 (2011): 115-177.

Chapter 5). This spectrum of morality was not unique to Ghana and is paralleled in studies of other national responses to exile and opposition, most notably that of the ANC and South Africa.[19] Just as Nelson Mandela has been eulogized in an Apartheid context, those who were imprisoned for their beliefs were often attributed the highest moral standing, compared to those who fled into exile, notwithstanding the distinct sacrifices associated with this latter process.[20] No matter the virtue attributed to a particular experience of exile, the experience of political detention was consistently considered morally superior, illustrated by the remarkable imprint that Danquah's imprisonment and death has left on the historical landscape of Ghana.[21]

The evocation of both ethics and emotion was also a central element in repeated attempts by successive governments to denigrate exile. Threatened by exile political manoeuvring, political leaders often sought to characterise exiles as cowardly and out of touch, undeserving of a legitimate voice following their 'abandonment' of the nation. For example, on 18 January 1972 Acheampong's new foreign minister, Major General N.A. Aferi, declared that 'nobody living outside Ghana is in a position to feel, or know better what Ghanaians or those who actually live there feel, know or want in matters of their survival'.[22] However, for exiles like Elizabeth Ohene, this distance and physical removal from the nation could be reframed paradoxically as beneficial (see Chapter 8). In her newspaper *Talking Drums,* she argued that rather than becoming divorced from West African concerns, debates among externalised West Africans facilitated by her newspaper benefitted from their removal from the pressure and white-hot temperature of the domestic sphere.

Fundamentally, the study of exile is inseparable from the study of affect due to the nature of the term itself. Commonly deployed in either a pejorative or exculpatory manner by states, media, and individuals alike, it is a label which is inherently tied to the emotions of the attributor. Lacking the rigorous legal definitions of related terms such as

[19] Israel, *South African Political Exile*, p. 47; M.E. Steyn, Terri Grant, '"A real bag of mixed emotions": Re-entry experiences of South African exiles', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol.31, No.3 (2007): 363-89.
[20] Bill Freund, 'The shadow of Nelson Mandela, 1918–2013,' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.41, No.140, (2014): 292-96.
[21] Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, Jr., 'Ghana: The Foolish Pride of Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata', *Accra Daily Mail*, 9 March 2006.
[22] TNA, FCO/65/1112, Republic of Ghana, Statement by Major General N.A. Aferi, 18 January 1972.

'refugee', exile is a status which has been both claimed and rejected by individuals to whom it might be ascribed, dependent on both its utility and the emotional relationship they have with their own externality. Individuals like Gbedemah actively claimed exile as a status to give themselves stronger opposition credentials upon return to the domestic political scene (see Chapter 5). In contrast, Samual Gyandoh worked to reject the apparent stigma of a term which he felt portrayed him as helpless and pitiable (see Chapter 7). The changing international landscape meant that by the 1980s, many Ghanaians were uncomfortable with the idea of exile or asylum and instead often claimed to be merely traveling for the purposes of work or study. The fluidity of exile as a term thus firmly roots its study in the realm of affect.

Multipolarity and African Agency

A global approach to Ghana's exiles also allows us to escape some of the constraints of period and its relationship with Cold War history. Although this field has done its level best to reinvent itself by embracing ideas of a 'global Cold War' or a 'cultural Cold War', a tendency to bipolarity still lingers.[23] Ghana did not become a Cold War battleground like Angola, Ethiopia or Mozambique, yet the activities and patterns of exile were never far away from Cold War politics and its professional practitioners. Nkrumah's firm belief that exiles were working with the CIA to bring about his demise is hardly surprising given the fate of his friend Patrice Lumumba, but his prolonged correspondence with two American presidents about this subject and his preoccupation with the potential actions of an uncontrolled CIA is nevertheless remarkable. This was not unique to Nkrumah, as in 1976 observers reported that Acheampong also nurtured 'an obsessive fear of the CIA'.[24]

Instead of a story of bipolar interventions, this thesis highlights a striking multipolarity and the centrality of African agency in shaping it. Diplomatic historians have largely viewed Ghana and its exiles either through an Anglophone lens or the Cold War lens of bipolarity. However, this framing does not reflect the complexity of the actual relationships which shaped the political alliances of the period. For example, the

[23] See Sara Lorenzini, *Global development: a Cold War history* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), pp. 1-19; Frank Gerits, 'An international approach to the cultural Cold War: public diplomacy towards Africa,' *Zeitenblicke* Vol.12, No.1 (2013): 1-17.
[24] TNA, FCO/65/1755, Accra to London, 25 June 1976.

influence of French officials in Ghanaian and West African politics has been overlooked, especially in France's sponsorship of Busia in exile (Chapters 3,4 and 6). Rather than a reflection of traditional East/West dynamics, Paris saw its activities with Busia as a countermove against Anglophone dominance. Patrick Reilly, Britain's ambassador in Paris reported:

> 'It is an open secret that one of the clandestine functions of the special department of African affairs run from the Elysée by M. Foccart is to operate against the "Anglo-Saxons" where this is necessary in the defence of French interests. This organisation is however, essentially directed against the United States.'[25]

Moreover, unlike the Americans, the French were much more anxious about the expansion of Chinese interests in Africa than about the Soviets. This concern was arguably well-founded, as Nkrumah's military training programmes for exiles under the auspices of the Bureau of African Affairs, and later his own activities in exile, were mostly funded by Beijing rather than Moscow.[26]

However, often overlooked in the historiographical preoccupation with a global Cold War lens are regional dynamics within West Africa, particularly the extent to which relations between Ghana, Upper Volta/Burkina Faso, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire shaped the political landscape. West African states nurtured their own independent approaches towards Ghana's exile politics, overlapping with crucial issues of ethnic politics and separatism as with the case of Togoland Liberation Movement (Tolimo).[27] While the French sponsored Busia, his strongest influence was Ivorian president Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The intricate regional diplomacies of exile were probably the most significant, and yet remain frustratingly opaque. This is partly due to the poor historical record, explained by Camille Alliali, Côte d'Ivoire's foreign minister, as arising from the common official attitude that regional dynamics were 'a family quarrel best kept out of the public eye'.[28] Nevertheless, further exploration of regional dynamics of exile would have greatly

[25] TNA, FCO/38/17, Reilly (Paris) to London, 27 October 1967.
[26] PRAAD-Accra, RG/16/65, Ghana Ministry of Information, 'Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa: Documentary evidence of Nkrumah's interference in the affairs of other African states,' 1966, pp. 8-13, 41, 60-61.
[27] TNA, FCO/65/2178, Awuma (Tolimo) to Akuffo (SRC), 'The Togoland Question and Ghana', 27 April 1979. Ethnic politics and separatism have been examined carefully by other authors and so were not emphasised in this thesis. For more detail, see Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland*.
[28] TNA, FO/371/177232, Abidjan to London, 27 October 1964.

benefitted this thesis, especially the utilisation of Togolese, Ivorian, and Nigerian archives. While beyond the resource parameters of the project, this would have also been beneficial in my attempts to access a less elite perspective on Ghanaian exile, particularly through a more granular exploration of Ghanaian exile communities in Togo. Nonetheless, it is hoped that by identifying the centrality of these regional dynamics they may be better understood through the completion of future, region-focused research studies.

Flexible Citizens

This thesis has sought to demonstrate that exiles are critical to the gradual emergence of a global Ghanaian polity. The interaction of exiles, migration, and globalisation is a hardly surprising conclusion, but globalisation remains a slippery term. The story of Ghana's exiles is partly about transnational connections between people, but at the same time, it is important not to succumb to globalist exaggerations and meta-narratives, for as demonstrated, territorial geography and regional relations continued to have importance for exiles alongside their explorations of this global space. The global provided a space not for the erasure or diminishing of the national, but instead an important venue for its contestation.

The study of Ghanaian exiles is therefore an important way to explore the undeniable impact of global movement and migration on African ideas, while not losing sight of the specificity of place and time, which is sometimes marginalised in globally focused projects. By tracing such developments through the lives of individuals and their networks, this study localises and regionalises globalism, emphasising the connections and disconnections inherent to the experience of exile and avoiding the sometimes-homogenizing effects of a global analytical lens. Ghanaian exile was as much a local and regional experience as it was a global one. Externalised individuals not only maintained connections to their country of birth, but often created various new and complex ties to the places in which they built their new lives, whether their stay in these countries was short or long term. As Aihwa Ong has argued in her study of Chinese migrants, transnational actors collect additional identities without vitiating old ones, creating what she terms 'flexible citizens' who are connected to myriad locations, rather than divorced

from them.[29] In this way, the global nature of the study of Ghanaian exiles does not occlude the study of Ghana's national history, but instead addresses the reality of its trajectory in the twentieth century, that of increased transnational connections and ultimately Ghana's emergence as an imaginative and vibrant global polity.

[29] Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, pp. 15-16.

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