Our weapons, our problem: arms exports, democracy and civil society in Brazil and the UK

Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes

University of Oxford
Department of Politics and International Relations
Green Templeton College



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Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes
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Abstract

When governments make decisions regarding exports of military equipment, they often look at humanitarian conditions in potential importers, considering the state of human rights or whether arms sales could multiply violence. However, why do governments care about 'distant strangers'? And why are these concerns present in some situations but not in others? I argue that their existence is dependent on the type of domestic political system: the more democratic a country is the more likely governments are to consider humanitarian aspects in decisions regarding arms exports. The causal mechanism is in part explained by activities conducted by norm entrepreneurs, whose emergence is facilitated by the existence of institutions commonly found in democratic countries, especially a system of checks and balances, contested elections, and political and civil liberties. When norm entrepreneurs, through domestic politics, organise campaigns targeting arms exports, governments are more likely to introduce or maintain humanitarian concerns in the decision-making. Domestic politics and norms-based campaigns can therefore shape arms export policies and practice.

Although the IR literature has looked at this topic, it has focused on the role of transnational advocacy networks and the creation of international regulations on arms control. This thesis has a different approach: it looks at this topic from the inside-out, demonstrating that the introduction of humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports occurred initially through domestic politics. The emergence of international regimes occurred later, reflecting the will of a few states and civil society groups, which sought to export their established norms to the international level, in a process that I call 'norm uploading'. In this 'second stage', civil society groups were more likely to combine efforts with governments to promote treaties regulating the arms trade.

This thesis adopts a mixed-method approach. Initially, it uses quantitative methods to test potential determinants of humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports, as well as to select cases for further analysis. Subsequently, studies are conducted on Brazil and the United Kingdom. In these countries, I initially look at the causal mechanism through which levels of democracy and civil society campaigns shape behaviour regarding arms exports. Next, I examine why and how the governments of these two countries sought to export their practices to the rest of the world or opted to join international regimes.

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5. Michele Candeloro (Apex-Brasil), 24 Apr 2017
6. Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 29 Mar 2017
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8. Ricardo Ayrosa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), interview via Skype, 25 Aug 2017
9. Rosauro Bernardo, Army captain (Imbel/Brazilian Army), 18 Apr 2017
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17. Michael Heseltine, interview via phone, 15 Aug 2018
18. Robert Hughes (MP, also member of the AAM), 19 Oct 2017
19. Interviewee 19 (civil servant, UK), 27 May 2017
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Civil society

Brazil

22. Adriana Abdenur (Instituto Igarapé), 11 Apr 2017
23. Antonio Rangel (Viva Rio), 10 Aug 2016

24. Daniel Mack (Instituto Sou da Paz), interview via Skype, 26 Sep 2017
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26. Jefferson Nascimento (Conectas Human Rights), 16 Sep 2016
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28. Nathan Thompson (Instituto Igarapé), 25 Aug 2016
29. Robert Muggah (Instituto Igarapé), 25 Aug 2016

UK

30. Ann Feltham (Campaign Against the Arms Trade), 26 Oct 2016
31. Christabel Gurney (Anti-Apartheid Movement), 30 Apr 2016
32. Martin Butcher (Oxfam), interview via Skype, 20 Jul 2017
33. Oliver Sprague (Amnesty), 28 Oct 2016
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Brazil

38. Carlos Pierantoni, admiral (Abimde), 12 Sep 2017
39. David Magalhães (academic, FAAP), 5 Sep 2016
40. Maura Curci (Fiesp), 22 Sep 2016
41. Paulo José Albuquerque Campos, Navy captain (Abimde), 12 Sep 2017
42. Roberto Godoy (journalist, *O Estado de São Paulo*), 15 Sep 2016
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Abbreviations

AAM	Anti-Apartheid Movement
ABIMDE	Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Materiais de Defesa e Segurança (*Brazilian Defence and Security Industry Association*)
AEB	Agência Espacial Brasileira (*Brazilian Space Agency*)
ASTROS	Artillery Saturation Rocket System
APEX	Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos (*Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency*)
APM	Antipersonnel landmine
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
ATTSC	Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee
BNDES	Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (*National Development Bank*, Brazil)
CAAT	Campaign Against the Arms Trade (UK)
CAMEX	Câmara de Comércio Exterior (*Foreign Trade Chamber*, Brazil)
CBC	Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (*Brazilian Cartridge Company*)
CLP	Constituency Labour Party
COCOM	Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
CSN	Conselho de Segurança Nacional (*National Security Council*, Brazil)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DESO	Defence Export Service Organisation (UK)
DDS	Divisão de Desarmamento e Tecnologias Sensíveis (*Department of Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies*, Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
DSO	Defence Sales Organisation (UK)
DPC	Departamento de Promoção Comercial (*Department of Trade Promotion*, Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
ENGESA	Engenheiros Especializados S/A (*Specialized Engineers*)
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FGV/CPDOC	Fundação Getúlio Vargas/Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil

FIESP	Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (*Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo*, Brazil)
FINEP	Agência Brasileira de Inovação (*Brazilian Innovation Agency*)
LPYS	Labour Party Young Socialists
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
MRE	Ministério das Relações Exteriores (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Brazil)
MTF	Margaret Thatcher Foundation
OAS	Organization of American States
RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEPROD	Secretaria de Produtos de Defesa (Department of Defence Products, Ministry of Defence, Brazil)
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TNA	The National Archives (UK)
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

In spite of asymmetrical access to expertise and limited problem-solving capacities, civil society also has the opportunity of mobilizing counter-knowledge and drawing on the pertinent forms of expertise to make *its own* translations.

– Jürgen Habermas, Between facts and norms

Introduction

During the Arab Spring, weapons used by security forces against demonstrators were mostly imported: Belgian rifles, Brazilian tear gas and Italian armoured cars were weapons of choice of various governments, including those in Bahrain, Egypt and Libya. One of the cases in which their use was revealed occurred when tear gas canisters were found in the streets of cities in the Middle East and North Africa, after being fired to disperse demonstrators. Pictures of the canisters were posted on social media and published in media outlets, disclosing companies and countries that had exported them. In Brazil, a picture of a Brazilian-manufactured canister found in Bahrain was published in the periodicals *Época* and *O Globo*, generating criticisms against the manufacturing company and the Brazilian government (Abou-Alsamh 2012; J. A. Lima and Yonaha 2011). Similar stories involving tear gas from other countries were reported, such as of that manufactured in South Korea, the UK and the US (Black, 2013; Morrison and Trew, 2011; BBC News, 2011; Smith, 2011).

As the tear gas had been supplied by democratic countries, sales were especially controversial. After all, if people in democracies have civil and political liberties, why do democratic countries sell weapons to those working to suppress those liberties? Moreover, is not it a contradiction to export weapons to authoritarian governments while preaching liberal values, such as human rights and the rule of law?

This illustrates a dilemma that governments face when making decisions on arms exports: should they sacrifice political and economic gains due to potential negative humanitarian impacts? Regardless of whether they should, governments do that. Humanitarian concerns have been incorporated into domestic and international laws

regulating arms transfers, as well as in state practice.[1] However, why do governments care about this, as it concerns negative effects on others? Should not they consider only strategic and economic factors, calculating whether exporting weapons is in *their* interest?

Formally, this thesis' research question is: *why are humanitarian criteria part of the decision-making on arms exports in certain situations but not in others?* My central claim is that government behaviour regarding arms exports is in part the result of domestic politics dynamics and norms-based campaigns conducted by civil society groups. Evidence collected and analysed for this research indicates that democratic countries export proportionally fewer weapons to places with poor humanitarian conditions and are more likely to join international treaties regulating arms transfers. Rather than resulting from purely intra-governmental decisions, however, the effect of democracy often depends on activities from norm entrepreneurs, usually organised in civil society organisations (CSOs). These groups frequently orchestrate domestic advocacy networks involving experts, journalists, other CSOs, political parties, religious-based groups, students, and even sectors of governments. The result of this is that decisions on arms exports are now at the intersection not only of strategic and economic factors but also of humanitarian aspects.

CSOs' activities lead to at least four types of change. First, changes in *policies*: humanitarian issues have been incorporated into domestic, regional and international legislation. Rules to export weapons have become stricter in various countries, a process that has been accompanied by an expansion in the number and types of players involved in the decision-making, including parliamentarians and sectors of the government specialised in humanitarian issues.

[1] In this thesis, the term *humanitarian* is equivalent to a broad understanding of human rights, including not only political and civil rights but also social and economic ones.

Second, changes in *behaviour*. Although formal rules are not always implemented or might not exist at all, various governments in practice look at humanitarian aspects when making decisions on arms exports. They check levels of political repression in potential customers before authorizing arms deals, as well as whether selling weapons might escalate conflicts. This change in behaviour is observed not only in governments but also in organisations indirectly involved with the arms trade, such as companies, cultural institutions and universities. Some of them stopped conducting activities related to the production and trade of weapons, such as investing in arms-manufacturing companies or hosting events in support of the arms trade.

Third, policies and practice on arms exports have become more *evidence-based*. Part of CSOs' activities is on doing research, producing information that government officials can use. This information concerns, for example, government support to the arms industry, negotiations of individual arms deals, public opinion attitudes, and the use of domestic-manufactured weapons abroad. CSOs can also provide technical support during negotiations of international treaties, as well as during their implementation.

Fourth, there have been *cognitive* changes. CSOs can shape perceptions on the appropriateness of using arms exports as a foreign policy tool. Segments of elites, as well as part of the public, have been persuaded that looking at humanitarian conditions in potential customers before exporting weapons is appropriate. This was done through the use of evidence and the construction of narratives that present arms exports to certain countries or exports of certain types of weapons as a morally wrong.

In addition, CSOs' activities have changed government behaviour in ways that humanitarian CSOs consider as negative. Companies and governments frequently create counter-narratives to contain CSOs' campaigns, fitting arms exports into stories of

development, national grandeur, national security, and east-west or north-south cleavages. In addition, they commonly stress the technological capacity of companies involved in the development, production and trade of weapons, or even their social or environmental responsibility. These are 'anti-taboo' narratives, aimed at preventing or removing a stigma that arms exports are an unscrupulous, heartless or irresponsible activity.

The net result of CSOs' activities is that the political salience of arms export decisions has been raised, becoming something that segments of elites or voters care about. Consequently, various governments have become more accountable when making decisions on arms exports: they have to explain why and how arms exports fit into a country's broader foreign policy goals, whether legal requirements are met, and whether arms deals could cause negative humanitarian impacts.

This is a remarkable finding because arms exports are a hard case for CSOs. Introducing changes in this area is challenging for them due to at least three reasons. The first is the absence of clear negative impacts on the population of arms exporting countries, with costs usually incurred by 'distant strangers'. Benefits of the arms trade are, on the other hand, concentrated on companies producing and selling weapons, as well as on a few government departments. Following James Q. Wilson's model, this gives strong incentives for arms exporters to mobilize in favour of loose arms export controls, while it gives little incentive for citizens in arms exporting countries to mobilize for a strict control (Wilson 1980). After all, why should they spend time and energy fighting against policies whose impacts are imposed on others? In addition, why to mobilize against policies that might be even positive for citizens of arms exporting countries, in the form of jobs, tax revenues and inflows of hard currency? The second reason is the secrecy of decisions on

arms exports. This is a problem for CSOs because there is a substantial information asymmetry in favour of governments and companies. The third reason is that CSOs need to build narratives to neutralize stories used by governments to justify arms exports, which frequently frame decisions in terms of national development, national interest or national security. It is rarely easy to argue against decisions based on the need to protect a country's security or promote its development, for example.

This thesis looks also at what happens *after* humanitarian concerns are introduced in the decision-making. As they are not introduced in all countries at the same time, this creates a problem for arms exporting countries adopting them. Humanitarian concerns may work in practice as a 'tax', putting some states into a disadvantaged position. If a government stops authorizing arms deals due to humanitarian factors, competitors might be happy to supply similar weapons. This would cause a loss for the arms exporting country, a benefit for competitors, and possibly no impact on the overall availability of weapons. I argue that, for this reason, once norms are adopted domestically, governments seek to spread them in order to 'level the playing field'. In addition, turning domestic into international norms can improve a government's image and prestige at a low cost. They become symbolic capital, which governments use to project an image of responsibility and good citizenship. Therefore, *adjustment costs* are central in decisions to join international regimes: the lower they are the more likely a state is to join them.

These conclusions are based on quantitative and qualitative analyses. A quantitative study (in chapter 3) demonstrates that preferences regarding arms exports vary across different types of domestic political systems. Democracies are more likely to have humanitarian concerns in their decision-making than non-democracies, even when

controlling for various other variables, including levels of development, economic growth and military expenditures in arms exporting countries.

Country studies on the UK and Brazil, covering the period 1960-2016 (in chapters 4-9), corroborate these findings and explain the causal mechanism linking democracy to humanitarian concerns in arms exports. Because of their foreign policy trajectories, both countries should be reticent to adopt humanitarian criteria in decisions on arms exports. As a declining power that is nonetheless frequently interested in playing power politics, the UK needs arms exports to keep its military industry viable and have leverage on other countries' policies. The more it declines the more arms sales gain importance. In Brazil, economic and strategic arguments to export weapons are strong, given the history of developmentalist thinking and focus on south-south ties. Therefore, in both countries arms sales play an important role in broader foreign policy projects. Yet, even under these circumstances, democratic institutions and activities conducted by CSOs shape what governments do. In the short-term, they tame governments' strategic behaviour. In the long-term, they create conditions for reshaping understandings on the legitimacy of using arms sales to pursue the national interest, and even on what the national interest is.

Also, looking at Brazil and the UK provides an opportunity to draw conclusions that can be generalized, as the decision-making can be compared across different contexts: democracy and non-democracy (Brazil during 1964-85); developed and developing country; declining and emerging power; European and Latin American country; and major and minor arms exporter.

Forty-five interviews were conducted, as well as an extensive research in archives from government departments, non-governmental organisations and personal documentation of politicians. In addition, I conducted observation sessions in meetings and

street demonstrations of the *Stop the Arms Fair* campaign in 2015, which targeted the DSEi, an arms exhibition in London. Observation sessions were conducted also in the arms exhibition itself, in 2015 and 2017. Using this evidence, I have identified the factors that governments consider when making decisions on arms exports, as well as why and how the weight of humanitarian concerns in the decision-making varies across time and space. I have looked, in particular, at the role of norm entrepreneurs, examining how they organise, the strategies they adopt, and how they interact with other actors. Special attention has been paid to the construction of narratives, in which CSOs frame arms sales as part of broader political agendas, usually democracy, human rights, inequality or fight against poverty.

Comparing these two countries shows that democratic institutions matter. The Brazilian government became more cautious when making decisions on arms exports during and after its redemocratization, despite no significant changes in systemic factors or other variables. This effect is in part explained by the fact that democratic institutions create an environment in which associations of citizens can flourish, making the emergence of norm entrepreneurs more likely. Indeed, various organisations dealing with the negative effects of the arms trade, such as Amnesty, Conectas, Igarapé, Oxfam, Saferworld, Sou da Paz or Viva Rio would either not exist or be weaker if democratic institutions were replaced by an authoritarian form of government.

Yet, the analytical separation between CSOs and governments in democratic regimes can be misleading: although government behaviour frequently changes due to pressures from civil society groups, CSOs are often insiders. A government might introduce a new policy not because of CSOs' direct pressures, for example, but because of connections that they have with political elites. As explored in chapters 4-6, the UK Labour

Party often represented interests or values defended by CSOs, turning their ideas into Labour policies, and later into government policies when in power.

Moreover, studying the UK and Brazil shows that both countries adopted humanitarian concerns *before* joining international treaties, and that the costs of adjusting to norms were critical in decisions to adopt them. Governments were more likely to join international agreements when they converged with norms they had already adopted. The case of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which was created after years of pressures from civil society groups and the engagement of a few governments, illustrates this. The ATT is considered by various CSOs, international organisations and some governments as a victory, but it did not emerge in a vacuum. In various countries and regions, norms and rules on arms export control had been introduced over previous decades, some of them with a content resembling the ATT. This suggests that international regulations depend on previous domestic or regional legislation rather than the other way around: if domestic norms coincide with proposed international norms, the latter are more likely to emerge. Therefore, international regulations are not the result of a neutral 'intelligent design'. This was recognised by Douglass North: 'Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules' (North 1990, 16).

In addition to providing evidence for testing the hypotheses (presented later in this introduction), comparing the UK and Brazil has generated two unanticipated findings. One of them is that, while most civil society groups in the UK dealing with arms exports are organised as grassroots movements, in Brazil they have limited penetration outside large metropolises (especially São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) and are composed mainly of intellectual elites. This suggests that different forms of organisation of civil society groups

might produce similar outcomes. A second finding is that CSOs' influence follows different routes in these two countries. While in the UK they have strong links with political parties (especially Labour), in Brazil there is no evidence that these links are significant, also indicating that similar outcomes might result from different causal mechanisms.

This introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 explores why the existence of humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports is a puzzle and offers potential explanations. Section 2 presents the argument of the thesis while section 3 introduces the hypotheses. Section 4 explains the method, and section 5 details the thesis' structure, which is divided into eleven chapters, including this introduction and the conclusions.

The puzzle: why do governments consider humanitarian aspects in decisions on arms exports?

Exports of weapons are in various ways similar to those of other goods and services: they can contribute to economic growth, employment generation and increase of foreign exchange inflows. Some of their attributes, however, are unique: arms can strengthen states, affect a balance of power and multiply levels of violence in a way that other goods cannot. On the one hand, this gives to exporters leverage on other countries' policies. On the other hand, arms transfers might attach exporters to undesirable conflicts, states or rebel groups. This makes the decision-making on arms transfers a complex process, as governments must strike a balance between costs and benefits spanning different issue-areas.

In addition, as weapons are aimed at killing or wounding human beings, exporting them raises moral concerns, which are frequently stressed by civil society groups, experts, some political parties, religious groups, sectors of governments, and international

organisations. From governments' point of view, this adds a layer of complexity in the decision-making, as they may have to strike a balance not only between strategic and economic factors but also between humanitarian aspects and everything else. The existence of these concerns is nonetheless puzzling because negative impacts are imposed on others rather than on countries exporting weapons. Moreover, as adopting humanitarian concerns may imply losing arms deals to competitors, states would have no incentives to adopt them. In the absence of a central authority regulating the arms trade, they would be giving up on accumulating wealth and influence through arms sales while others would keep doing that.

Potential explanations can be drawn from answers to a broader question: why do governments care about protecting peoples other than their own? There are at least two theoretically possible explanations: materialist and normative.[2] Materialist accounts, such as realism (and also Marxism), have a 'cynical' view, arguing that humanitarian norms are used instrumentally by states to further their interests (Wheeler 2004, 30–31). There would be no concern with 'distant strangers', and states would use humanitarian language only to disguise a strategic behaviour. Humanitarian norms would be 'ex post rationalizations of self-interest, […] tools of manipulation, used to dress up self-interest in more acceptable garb' (Elster 1989, 125). This perspective can be adapted into a potential explanation for the existence of humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports. If a materialist perspective is correct, governments use humanitarian language as an excuse to deny access to power and technology to weaker countries. They would refuse to export weapons in order to keep an unfair global power structure, in which some countries are

[2] This question is frequently addressed in the literature on humanitarian interventions. See: Ayoob (2002), Jakobsen (1996), Welsh (2004) and Wheeler (2000).

militarily powerful while others are not. Legalizing these concerns would reproduce and expand the power gap between the strong and the weak.

Under a normative approach, humanitarian norms exist because governments feel 'responsible not only for protecting human rights at home but also for defending them abroad' (Wheeler 2000, 39). Rather than a means to conceal ulterior motives, they aim at protecting people from human rights abuses, conflicts or other forms of violence. These norms would therefore have autonomy, being 'ex ante sources of action' (Elster 1989, 125). In their purest form, they meet two criteria suggested by Bhikhu Parekh: *i*) they are 'wholly or primarily guided by the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow-feeling, and in that sense disinterested'; and *ii*) are 'intended to address what is regarded as a violation of the minimum that is due to human beings' (Parekh 1997, 54). Adapting this into arms export policies, humanitarian concerns would not be an excuse to prevent others of having weapons: governments would worry about impacts of exported weapons on individuals abroad, especially on whether they afflict suffering, generate conflict or fuel poverty.

These two potential explanations are tested in this thesis using quantitative and qualitative methods. If a materialist explanation is correct, material factors should influence state positions on arms export control, reflecting the power of arms exporters or the security needs of arms importers. Variables such as military power, levels of arms exports or levels of arms imports should therefore be significant. However, if a normative explanation is correct, arms exports behaviour would be associated to rules, institutional arrangements or attitudes that reflect the power of norms. Variables such as domestic political systems, activities from civil society groups or public opinion attitudes should be significant.

As examined in the empirical part of the thesis, both material and normative factors are predictors of state behaviour. As the theoretical mechanism linking democracy to arms control has been less researched than others, this thesis explores the causal mechanism connecting democracy to arms export policies and practice. As explained in the next section, I argue that norm entrepreneurs play a critical role in translating the existence of democratic institutions into humanitarian concerns regarding arms exports.

The argument: explaining how state preferences on arms exports are formed

Why are humanitarian concerns considered in some decisions on arms exports but not in others? My central claim is that state preferences on arms exports are in part shaped through domestic politics and are based on norms introduced by civil society groups.

As evidence presented in this thesis indicates, the existence of humanitarian concerns depends on the type of polity: the more democratic a country is the more likely it is to have them. The causal mechanism is in part explained by activities from norm entrepreneurs, which are people 'interested in changing social norms' (Sunstein 1996), usually organised in civil society groups. These groups seek to draw attention to the fact that weapons are designed to kill, and that decisions on their exports are therefore a humanitarian issue. The role of what Sustein called norm entrepreneurs is not distinct from what Habermas called 'moral entrepreneurs', who 'generate public attention for supposedly neglected issues' (Habermas 2006, 416). By conducting various activities through domestic politics, they can introduce issues and move them from the 'periphery' to the 'political centre' (Habermas 1996, 381). This process is more likely to occur when democratic institutions are strong: 'a robust civil society can develop only in the context of

a liberal political culture and the corresponding patterns of socialization' (Habermas, 1996, p. 371). Norm entrepreneurs do this regardless of the anarchical nature of the international system, the international distribution of power, and the existence of international regulations. They might not even be aware of them.

How CSOs' activities are translated into policies depends, of course, on the political structure of each country. In the UK, humanitarian concerns in arms exports emerged due to interactions between CSOs and the Labour Party. In Brazil, they emerged after the country's redemocratization in 1985, being later reinforced by the work of CSOs. This occurred through direct contacts with government officials and parliamentarians rather than through political parties.

I also argue that international regimes emerged later, being in practice the codification of the domestic law of certain countries into international law: it was an inside-out rather than an outside-in process, what I call *norm uploading*. Although international regulations can of course change the behaviour of governments, they emerge initially as a reflection of a few states' will, after norms on arms exports were unilaterally adopted by them. Governments promote international regulations to obtain gains of symbolic capital and to 'level the playing field', preventing others of free-riding on their behaviour. Whether they are successful in doing this depends of course on various factors, such as the power of states proposing regulations, other countries' positions, and willingness to compromise. Explaining the reasons of this success is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, which focuses on how preferences are formed and how the domestic emergence of norms creates incentives for governments to spread them.

In summary, I argue that the emergence of humanitarian concerns on arms exports occurs in two stages. First, they are introduced through domestic politics, mainly due to

activities from CSOs. Second, once they become part of government decision-making, states have incentives to persuade others to adopt similar policies. In other words, they have incentives to 'upload' norms into the international level.

The central argument of this thesis is tested through six hypotheses, covering both domestic and international politics, which are presented in the next section.

Hypotheses

This thesis' central claim is that arms export policies and practice depend on dynamics of domestic politics, as well as on the elaboration and promotion of norms by civil society groups. This claim has been turned into six testable hypotheses, the first of which tests whether the type of polity shapes the state behaviour.

Hypothesis 1

The existence of humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports is dependent on the type of polity.

This hypothesis draws on democratic peace theory: if democracies are unlikely to fight against other democracies, they should prefer to export weapons to other democracies. Selling weapons to autocracies should be considered by them as normatively wrong or strategically risky, as they could be used against other democracies or even against the country exporting them. This behaviour should be reflected also in positions regarding international regulations on the arms trade, which democratic countries would be more likely to adopt.

I have tested whether democracies have a different behaviour from autocracies when making decisions on arms exports, what has been done in two ways: *i*) using quantitative methods (in chapter 3), and *ii*) comparing two democratic regimes (UK, Brazil since 1985) and an authoritarian regime (Brazil in the period 1964-85) (in chapters 4-9).

Although evidence indicates that democracies are more likely to export weapons to other democracies, it is nonetheless necessary to explain the causal mechanism. I argue that this is partially explained by activities from norm entrepreneurs, usually organised in civil society groups. They have introduced a norm through domestic politics: governments should look at humanitarian conditions when making decisions on arms exports.

Hypothesis 2

Decisions on arms exports are shaped through domestic politics, resulting in part from activities conducted by norm entrepreneurs, usually organised in civil society groups.

CSOs engage with governments to make them adopt stricter arms export policies, especially to states that violate – or are perceived as likely to violate – human rights, poor countries or places in conflict. Therefore, they propose certain norms and expect governments to follow them.[3]

Yet, as the state is a representative institution, changes in arms export policies and practice may not last long: they may be reversed when a new government takes office. Although evidence suggests that changes of government influence arms export behaviour, empirical evidence also shows that norms are frequently sticky. This idea is based on

[3] Norms are 'collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity' (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54).

Sikkink (2007), who argued that human rights issues have become a permanent part of US foreign policy.

Hypothesis 3

Once humanitarian concerns are introduced in the decision-making on arms exports, they become enshrined in government policies and practice.

These three hypotheses have focused on the role of democracy and CSOs' activities in the creation or maintenance of rules on arms exports. However, they do not explain why some states seek to persuade others to adopt humanitarian concerns. Canada, for example, was a proponent of the Ottawa Convention and of an initiative to ban arms sales to non-state actors (launched in 1998, eventually failing). Norway was active in the creation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the UK was one of the main promoters of the ATT. Why have they done this? This leads us to the fourth hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4

Once governments adopt humanitarian norms in arms exports, they have incentives to turn them into international law.

The insight for this hypothesis draws on Bromley (2008) and Erickson (2013). Bromley analysed how Spain and the Netherlands sought to make other EU states adopt standards on arms exports that were based on their own. With a similar approach, Erickson (2013, 213) argues that the implementation of EU rules on arms exports occurs mainly 'in members whose own identity is already grounded in normative power or where material interests are negligible'.

The four hypotheses presented so far look at states as *targets* of campaigns. The problem, however, is that they are based on two assumptions: states are unitary actors, and that governments and CSOs are always on different sides. Under this approach, governments would calculate a trade-off between negative impacts of CSOs' pressures and other costs/benefits. If benefits are large enough, governments would be less likely to change behaviour; if benefits are not substantial, costs of CSOs' criticism might outweigh benefits, making states more likely to change behaviour. This argument is powerful, but not enough. Although governments do these calculations, CSOs are frequently insiders, constituting and being constituted by other institutions, either outside or inside the state. The categories of civil society and state are analytically useful, but the idea of a dichotomy civil society *vs*. state is misleading, especially in democracies. As argued by Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 15), 'civil society in a democracy needs the support of a rule of law that guarantees to people their right of association, and needs the support of a state apparatus that will effectively impose legal sanctions on those who would illegally attempt to deny others that right'. This was examined also by DeMars (2005, p. 51), who argued that the role of CSOs varies according to the circumstances: they are 'wild cards', which can be played, captured or neutralized. Relations between governments and CSOs are therefore complex, varying according to the government, the CSO, the issue, the period and the level of analysis.

Furthermore, governments are usually controlled by political parties, whose leaders are pressured by party members or other forces in civil society. As argued by Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 10), the political society, where political parties are at the core, is 'informed, pressured and renewed by civil society'. These groups can pressure political

party leaders to adopt policies on arms export control, even if costs outweigh benefits under a rationalist approach.

Hypothesis 5

Sectors of governments and CSOs cooperate in the introduction of humanitarian concerns into the decision-making and in the creation of international agreements.

The final hypothesis concerns the extent to what institutions in the global south are influenced by ideas, norms and practices from the global north. This has been explored in the literature on diffusion, with empirical studies on human rights (Risse and Sikkink 1999), women's rights (True and Mintrom 2001), environmental policies (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; Tews, Busch, and Jörgens 2003; Busch, Jörgens, and Tews 2005), arms control (Stavrianakis 2010; 2012), among others. However, as governments and CSOs in developing countries frequently work with *domestic* arms control before dealing with arms exports, this might shape their positions on arms exports.

Hypothesis 6

The diffusion of norms on arms exports from 'northern' to 'southern' countries depends on previous policies and practices from local governments and CSOs.

This hypothesis draws on the work of Alison Brysk, who looked at indigenous rights movements in Latin America. Although they were influenced by what governments call 'outside agitators', diffused norms changed when in contact with local movements. Furthermore, diffusion from the 'north' occurred later. As emphasised by her, 'indigenous

international outreach was started by indigenous peoples themselves', existing at least since the 1920s (Brysk 2000, 125).

Hypothesis 1 is tested using quantitative methods, which is later corroborated through country studies on Brazil and the UK. These studies are also used to test the other five hypotheses.

The method: nested analysis, country studies and sources

As useful information is lost if only quantitative or qualitative methods are used, this research adopts a mixed-method approach. An exclusively quantitative research would miss the causal mechanism linking independent to dependent variables. Quantitative methods are well-suited, however, to achieve high external validity, as conclusions can be applied to many cases. On the other hand, using only qualitative methods produce conclusions less likely to be generalizable, although they are adequate to achieve construct validity. As both methods have different comparative advantages, their use is complementary (Sprinz 2004, 42–43).

The method adopted in this thesis is called nested analysis, as one or more cases are nested in another case (Lieberman 2005). In a nested analysis, regressions are run to explain the main potential causes of a phenomenon. If they are statistically significant, they either are investigated or remain in the model as control variables. Next, qualitative methods are applied to corroborate relationships found in the regressions, as well as to explain the causal mechanism. Cases are selected according to the proximity of predicted and observed values: typical cases – rather than deviant – should therefore be selected

(Lieberman 2005, 439).[4] In this section, these two stages (quantitative and qualitative) are detailed, followed by a description of the sources that have been used, and of why Brazil and the UK were selected as country studies.

Quantitative and qualitative stages

The phenomenon explained in this research (the dependent variable) is the *existence of humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports*, while the independent variables of interest are *levels of democracy* and *levels of activities from CSOs*. The association between democracy and humanitarian concerns in arms exports should theoretically assume one of these forms:

i) democracies having humanitarian concerns;
ii) democracies *not* having humanitarian concerns;
iii) non-democracies having humanitarian concerns; and
iv) non-democracies *not* having humanitarian concerns.

These combinations are in Table 1.1. Although both variables are in practice continuous, they are presented as binary for the sake of simplicity.

[4] The use of regression analysis to select case studies is also suggested by Seawright and Gerring (2008, pp. 299–300).

Table 1.1

Democracy and humanitarian concerns in arms exports

Is the country democratic?		*Are humanitarian concerns part of the decision-making?* Yes	No
	Yes	Situation 1 (UK; Brazil since 1985)	Situation 3 -
	No	Situation 2 -	Situation 4 (Brazil, 1964-85)

This thesis hypothesises that combinations in the upper-left and bottom-right squares are more likely to occur, which has been tested using quantitative and qualitative methods. In the quantitative part (chapter 3), I have specified models in which two proxies are used to measure the existence of humanitarian concerns in arms exports. The first proxy is the value of weapons that countries export to autocracies as a proportion of their total arms exports. This indicates the extent to which governments authorize arms sales to countries where they could be used to violate human rights. The second proxy is voting on UNGA resolutions and international treaties regulating arms transfers. This reveals state preferences on arms transfer control.

A potential problem of using only quantitative methods is the possibility of cross-country dependency. Instead of resulting from causal relations occurring separately, state behaviour concerning arms exports might result from learning or diffusion, which is called the Galton's problem. A country like Brazil, for example, might adopt humanitarian concerns due to influence from other states. Nevertheless, if a research is examining processes of learning or diffusion (as this thesis does), this is of course not a problem (George and Bennett 2005, 33).

Another problem is that, even if a causal relation exists, the conclusion lacks a causal mechanism, begging the question of *why* democratic institutions shape arms export behaviour. This thesis hypothesizes that the link between democracy and arms export policies is in part explained by activities from CSOs. The association between their activities and the existence of humanitarian concerns in arms exports should have one of these forms:

i) activities from CSOs are followed by a greater role for humanitarian concerns (CSOs may have changed the state behaviour);

ii) activities from CSOs are *not* followed by a greater role for humanitarian concerns (CSOs failed in changing the state behaviour);

iii) there are no activities from CSOs, but humanitarian concerns are assigned a greater role by the government (something else changed the state behaviour); and

iv) there are no activities from CSOs, and humanitarian concerns are absent from decisions on arms exports.

These combinations are in Table 1.2. Once more, although both variables are continuous, they are presented as binary. I argue that combinations in the upper-left and bottom-right squares are more likely to occur than the others. Also, I argue that the combination in the bottom-left square is more likely to occur than the one in the upper-right square. This is tested through a qualitative investigation of arms export policies and practice in Brazil and the UK. In the UK, CSOs' campaigns were followed by a change of government behaviour, while in Brazil there is evidence of three combinations of these variables.

Table 1.2

CSOs' activities and state positions regarding arms exports

		Are humanitarian concerns part of the decision-making?	
		Yes	No
Did CSOs seek to change the state behaviour on arms exports?	Yes	Situation 1 (UK; Brazil, since the late 1990s)	Situation 3 -
	No	Situation 2 (Brazil, between 1985 and the late 1990s)	Situation 4 (Brazil, 1964-85)

Quantitative methods were not used to test this hypothesis for three reasons. First, due to a lack of satisfactory ways to measure what CSOs do. Although some studies use CSOs' budgets or the number of CSOs as proxies for the strength of civil society (e.g., Boli and Thomas, 1997; Reimann, 2006), they incur a few biases. On the use of budgets, the problem is that costs of campaigns are not exogenous to the likelihood of governments changing behaviour. For example, if a CSO wants to stop arms exports from a country Y to a country X, the likelihood of Y to do this depends on how important the country X (the arms importer) is for Y. If country X is considered important by Y but not by a country Z (also exporting weapons to X), a CSO would need to spend more resources to change the behaviour of Y than of Z. Regarding the use of number of CSOs, the problem is to assume that CSOs' influence does not vary across organisations: Amnesty and Oxfam, for example, should be more able to influence governments than smaller NGOs. Another problem is that CSOs' campaigns usually target specific issues rather than the arms trade as a whole. As campaigns cover different issue-areas, they cannot be quantitatively compared. In the UK, for example, while some campaigns target arms exports to certain countries (such as South

Africa and Chile), others focus on topics, such as campaigns against arms exhibitions, to increase transparency, or to create international treaties.

Second, even if measuring their activities were possible, a quantitative model would assume that CSOs campaigned in some cases but not in others for random reasons. Yet, as CSOs might focus on campaigns that they perceive more likely to be successful, there might be an endogeneity problem. In the 1970s, a campaign in the UK against arms sales to Saudi Arabia, for example, was less likely to succeed than a campaign against Chile, as Saudi Arabia was strategically more important, and arms deals had a larger scale. This might have led CSOs not to choose Saudi Arabia as a target, due to the unlikelihood of the UK government stopping exports to Saudi Arabia.[5]

Third, CSOs activities might lead to the suspension of sales not only to countries targeted by campaigns but also to others. Governments might do this because of either an overall change of norms on arms exports or for instrumental reasons. On the latter, the mere expectation of pressures might lead them to adopt humanitarian concerns. For example, CSOs' pressures to stop arms sales to South Africa during the apartheid led the British government to anticipate potential pressures on sales to Rhodesia, leading the UK to suspend them. In another case, the arms embargo on Chile imposed in 1974 changed how the British government dealt with arms exports to other countries where human rights were also poor. How to isolate the effect of pressures from the effect of expectations of being pressured?

[5] This is similar to the difficulty of estimating the effect of electoral campaigns across different constituencies. Frequently, voters elect representatives from the same party over time in some constituencies (safe seats), while in others they elect representatives from different parties depending on the election (swing seats). As relatively more resources are allocated to swing constituencies, estimates of the effect of electoral campaigns on voters are biased.

During the archival research and interviews, I looked for information that could indicate CSOs' influence or a lack of it. If CSOs can influence state positions, some of the below-listed observable implications should be found in documents and interviews. Their absence would imply that other factors shaped the decision-making.

- *Government officials acknowledge that they consider campaigns of CSOs when making decisions on arms exports;*
- *CSOs' pressures are followed by changes in government positions on arms exports;*
- *Members of CSOs supporting restrictions on arms exports are nominated for positions in government;*
- *There are meetings between government officials and representatives of CSOs to discuss arms export policies;*
- *Government officials worry about consequences for their reputation or their countries' reputation if they act against demands from CSOs;*
- *CSOs manage to mobilize public opinion or important elites;*
- *Government officials use information provided by CSOs in their work;*
- *Government officials and CSOs use similar language in speeches;*
- *Governments allocate resources to CSOs dealing with arms exports.*

Other evidence would indicate a minor or no role for CSOs, such as:

- *Government officials do not consider arms transfers as relevant for national security, economic development or influence on other countries. Therefore, restricting them does not bring substantial costs;*
- *A state is pressured by other states to adopt a stricter control on arms exports. This implies that a state might adopt controls due to other states' pressures rather than CSOs'; and*
- *A state already has strict arms export controls. Even with no CSOs' activities, they are likely to keep controls strict.*

Sources

On the quantitative stage, this thesis uses data mainly from the following sources: Polity IV project, SIPRI, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank. On the qualitative stage, the research uses archival sources, interviews, as well as information collected in participant and non-participant observation sessions.

Regarding archives, on the CSOs side, documents from three groups in the UK were consulted: Anti-Apartheid Movement (Bodleian Library, Oxford), Campaign Against the Arms Trade (headquarters, London), and Oxfam (Bodleian). On the government side in the UK, consulted documents were from: Department of Trade and Industry (and its predecessors), FCO (and its predecessors), Ministry of Defence, and the Prime Minister's office, all located at The National Archives. I also consulted the personal archives of Barbara Castle (Bodleian), Harold Wilson (Bodleian) and Margaret Thatcher (online). In Brazil, documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were examined, deposited into its archives in Brasília.

Also, 45 people were interviewed: academics, government officials, journalists, members from arms-manufacturing companies (or their representatives), members from civil society organizations, military personnel and parliamentarians. Interviews were semi-structured, designed to explore their expertise and perceptions.[6] Interviewees were offered the opportunity to remain anonymous, an option made by 10 of them. On the CSOs

[6] There is a detailed list of interviewees at the end of this thesis.

side, 16 interviews were conducted: seven in the UK, eight in Brazil and one with a member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).[7] On the government side, 21 interviews were conducted. In the UK, I interviewed three officials from the FCO, a former MP, and Michael Heseltine. In Brazil, seventeen officials were interviewed, from various government ministries and agencies. Questions concerned the countries' position regarding arms transfers, the importance of exporting/importing weapons for the countries' security, perceptions about CSOs, the extent to what the official position is influenced by CSOs, the extent to what the government is influenced by other states, and personal views on arms exports.

Regarding companies or associations of companies, four interviews were conducted in Brazil. Questions concerned: their positions regarding arms export control, whether they pressure the government for a less strict control, and relations with CSOs. In addition, three journalists and one academic were interviewed in Brazil, as well as one academic in Switzerland.

A participant observation was conducted in 2015 in a meeting organised in London by the *Stop the Arms Fair* campaign, aimed at preparing activists and discussing ideas for a campaign against the DSEi, an arms exhibition in London. A non-participant observation was later conducted during demonstrations against the DSEi in 2015, as well as in two visits to the DSEi itself, in 2015 and 2017.

[7] Interviews with Brazilians were conducted in Portuguese and translated. The same is valid for documents from Brazilian organisations.

Why Brazil and the UK?

When selecting countries for in-depth analysis, preference was given to countries that export weapons regularly, allowing an analysis of the evolution of their arms export policies and practice. Also, as the independent variables of interest are democracy and CSOs' activities, there should be variation in them. Studies should therefore include democracies and non-democracies, as well as presence and absence of CSOs' activities.

Brazil and the UK meet these criteria. First, they are both exporters of weapons and have available data. Second, although only two countries are analysed, there are in practice three situations: *i*) the UK for the whole period (democratic); *ii*) Brazil in 1964-85 (authoritarian); and *iii*) Brazil after 1985 (democratic). Third, as the level of CSOs' activities varied, this allows within-case analysis. In Brazil, there were no CSOs' activities on arms exports during the military regime and for most of the period until the late 1990s. In the UK, although CSOs' campaigns were ubiquitous, the British government was pressured more in certain cases than in others: campaigns against arms exports to the apartheid regime in South Africa and the military regime in Chile, for example, were stronger than on the military regime in Argentina. Also, both countries fit into statistical models presented in chapter 3, according to which democracies are more likely than non-democracies to export weapons to autocracies.

Brazil is different from the UK in various aspects, which at a first sight might hinder the isolation of the independent variables of interest. Based on Mill's method of direct agreement, however, I argue that these differences are in fact necessary to infer what

determines the state behaviour.[8] They contribute to demonstrate that democracy and CSOs' activities play a role in arms export policies and practice even in countries with different characteristics, as summarized in Table 1.3.

Table 1.3

Mill's method of agreement: what explains the presence of humanitarian concerns in arms exports?

		Brazil (1964-1985)	Brazil (1985-2015)	UK (1960s on)
Dependent variable	Humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports	-	+	+
Independent variables of interest	Democratic country	-	+	+
	CSOs campaigning on arms exports	-	+	+
Other variables	Declining power	-	-	+
	Advanced democracy	-	-	+
	Long tradition of humanitarian CSOs	-	-	+
	Humanitarian CSOs organised as grassroots movements	-	-	+
	Links between humanitarian CSOs and political parties	-	-	+
	High level of domestic violence	-	+	-
	Developed country	-	-	+

On the *state* side, there are at least two differences. The first one is that the UK is a declining power while Brazil is an emerging one. This partially explains the different roles that arms exports play in each country: although strategic and economic aspects are observed in both, some aspects are unique or at least more relevant in one of them. Economic aspects are more relevant in Brazil, which also uses arms exports to reduce the technological gap with developed countries and reinforce its role of a large emerging

[8] Due to their well-documented weaknesses, the use of Mill's methods is only a starting point. Conclusions are based mainly on process-tracing, presented in chapters 4-9.

power. If in both countries, however, humanitarian concerns are present, this implies that different positions in the international system do not prevent the adoption of these concerns. The second difference is that Brazil is a recent democracy while the UK is an advanced one, which might affect the perception of government officials on the need to adopt humanitarian concerns in arms exports. Nevertheless, if these concerns are present in both countries, this means that they do not necessarily depend on how mature a democracy is.

On the *civil society* side, there are at least three differences. The first one is that, while in the UK humanitarian CSOs have campaigned for a stricter control on the arms trade at least since the 1960s, in Brazil this phenomenon is more recent. If CSOs have influence both in Brazil and the UK, however, this implies that a long history of activism might make less difference than one would assume. The second difference is that humanitarian CSOs in the UK are mostly organised as grassroots movements or can mobilize other grassroots movements (as in the cases of Amnesty and Oxfam), while in Brazil they are formed mainly by intellectual elites, based mostly in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Again, if in both countries CSOs are influential, the existence of grassroots movements is not a necessary condition. The third one is that humanitarian CSOs in the UK have strong links to political parties (mainly the Labour Party), while in Brazil they have weak or no such links, implying that such links are not a necessary condition for CSOs' influence.

Furthermore, Brazil and the UK have different levels of domestic violence and development, making it possible to isolate the effect of democracy and CSOs' pressures on arms export policies, controlling for these two variables.

A final point concerns the fact that, as a recent democracy, Brazil might be influenced by norms from advanced countries. Therefore, a 'second image' approach must be combined with a 'second-image reversed' approach. For this reason, in addition to exploring the role of arms exports in Brazil's foreign policy and the potential influence of CSOs, this thesis examines whether diffusion from 'northern' countries to Brazil is empirically observed. Although part of the literature has sought to demonstrate this phenomenon, little is said on whether this occurs regarding arms exports.

In the next paragraphs, specific reasons for choosing Brazil and the UK are explained in more detail. Exploring how decisions on arms exports are made in each of them aims at giving a contribution not only to the literature on civil society and arms exports but also to area studies.

United Kingdom

In addition to the abovementioned reasons for selecting these two countries, the UK is an important test case for at least three additional factors. First, it has been one of the top-five exporters of conventional weapons since the 1950s. Second, it has a long tradition of humanitarian CSOs, some of them campaigning for a stricter control on British arms exports. Third, the UK has not only signed/ratified but also promoted arms control treaties, such as the ATT.

A possible argument against studying the UK is that, as a member of the EEC/EU from 1973 on, it followed the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports (1998) and later the Council Common Position (2008). There are three reasons, however, why this is not a problem. The first is that, as the EU Code of Conduct became mandatory only in 2008, this thesis covers mainly a period in which EEC/EU rules were either non-existent or voluntary.

The second reason is that, although the EU has common rules, implementation varies (Bromley and Brzoska 2008). France and Sweden, for example, represent two different models: the French is based on export promotion, while the Swedish is based on export restriction (Béraud-Sudreau 2014, 1). The third one is that, as the UK was a major promoter of the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, analysing it is useful to test the hypothesis that domestic law on arms exports is later 'uploaded' into the international level.

Brazil

Besides exporting weapons and having CSOs campaigning on arms exports, Brazil has been selected because the literature pays little attention to arms export controls in developing countries. This is problematic for at least three reasons. The first one is that the argument that CSOs influence arms exports is less generalizable if developing countries are not part of the universe analysed. The second problem is that it is not possible to test whether norms are diffused from developed to developing nations. As demonstrated in chapters 9 and 10, control on arms exports in Brazil emerged as a topic among CSOs that had campaigned for a stricter *domestic* arms control. It was an inside-out process, in which they progressively adopted a broader approach to arms control. This puts into perspective ideas that 'southern' CSOs import agendas and practices from the 'north'. The third problem is that it is not possible to know whether CSOs in the global south have reasons to campaign against arms exports that are not observed in the global north.

Moreover, Brazil is especially puzzling for at least five additional reasons. First, it is among the top five exporters of SALW in the world, the only developing country in this

group.[9] Second, as Brazil has high levels of domestic violence, why do CSOs spend scarce resources to prevent impacts of Brazilian-manufactured weapons abroad? Third, the government led by the Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* – PT) (2003-2016) was less reticent to authorize arms exports than Labour governments in the UK. What explains this difference? Fourth, Brazil has not actively participated in the creation of international treaties on the arms trade, different from other large developing countries, such as Argentina, Mexico and major African nations. Fifth, analysing Brazil can be used to explore how arms exports fit into an emerging country's foreign policy. This is important because Brazil does not fit into a typical narrative of a powerful country fomenting wars and profiting from weapons sales to poor countries. Studying it demonstrates that tensions in the international arms trade go beyond the dualities north *vs*. south or powerful *vs*. non-powerful.

Thesis' structure

This thesis is divided into eleven chapters, including this introduction and the conclusions. Chapter 2 examines how the IR literature has looked at arms exports and the role of CSOs in foreign policy decision-making. Based on the state of the art in the literature, the chapter details the contribution of the thesis: a study on arms export policies and practices that focus on their domestic determinants and the role of norms. Also, it argues that combining analytical liberal and constructivist approaches is adequate to examine decision-making on arms exports. Chapter 3 tests hypothesis 1, presenting a quantitative study in which the main determinants of behaviour on arms exports are identified. The variable democracy is

[9] Source: Small Arms Survey; Mapping Arms Data (PRIO, Igarapé Institute).

isolated from other potential alternative explanations, and is demonstrated to be a significant predictor.

Chapters 4-9 analyse how state preferences on arms exports were formed in the UK and Brazil, arguing that they emerged domestically before governments engaged in interstate negotiations and bargaining. There are three chapters for each country. Chapter 4 is the first part of a study on the UK, exploring the role of arms exports in its foreign and defence policies, as well as how democratic institutions shape state behaviour. Chapter 5 demonstrates how CSOs influenced the government in the UK by comparing cases in which there were large organised movements against arms exports (South Africa and Chile) and those in which they were weaker (Saudi Arabia and Argentina). Other framings adopted by CSOs are also explored. Chapter 6 is the last part of the UK study, examining how the government sought to 'upload' its own norms into the international level.

Chapter 7 is the first part of the study on Brazil, exploring how arms exports fit into its foreign and defence policies, as well as the effects of redemocratization on its arms export behaviour. Chapter 8 examines the role of CSOs on this issue in Brazil and demonstrates their influence. Chapter 9 is the last part of the Brazil study, explaining why Brazil has joined international regulations on arms export control.

Chapter 10 explores whether the adoption of norms concerning arms exports is a case of north-south diffusion. It argues that, although this occurs, diffusion was limited and dependent on previous norms and practices from local actors.

Chapter 2 – Theorizing state preferences on arms exports

In the early 2015, a newspaper reported that Germany had halted arms exports to Saudi Arabia (Hellemann, Hollstein, and Özgenc 2015). Government officials neither confirmed nor denied the information, stressing the secrecy of decisions (Deutsche Welle 2015). A month later, the German government announced that it had authorized exports of a few types of weapons, not including heavy weapons, such as aircraft, submarines or tanks, though. What motivated this partial suspension of arms exports? Was it due to humanitarian concerns or strategic reasons?

This case illustrates that the decision-making on arms exports is a black box even in advanced democracies. Governments certainly consider economic and political benefits from arms deals, such as employment generation, inflow of hard currency, and influence on other countries' policies. They might also consider negative humanitarian impacts, such as the possibility of customers using weapons to repress opposition, escalate violence or commit violations of human rights. Yet, it is frequently hard to know the relative weight of these factors. To better understand what is within this black box, this thesis adopts a theoretical approach that combines constructivism and analytical liberalism. This contributes to demonstrate that domestic politics is the main arena where norm entrepreneurs – usually organised in civil society groups – elaborate and promote norms on arms exports. They achieve that through interactions with various actors, including experts, government officials, journalists, political parties, religious groups and trade unions. The material power of these entrepreneurs is limited, however, suggesting that a norms-based agenda can change the behaviour of governments and other actors.

An approach based only on norms, however, fails to account for two factors: *i*) norms are more likely to flourish in certain contexts, with democratic institutions providing a favourable environment for norm entrepreneurs; *ii*) changing norms can bring costs to governments, putting them in a disadvantaged position against other states, thereby giving them incentives to upload their norms into the international level in order to 'level the playing field'. This is why combining constructivist and analytical liberalism is adequate. On the one hand, state preferences result in part from the introduction of norms by norm entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the existence of democratic institutions creates an environment in which norm entrepreneurs are more likely to change government behaviour. Furthermore, once norms are introduced, governments act strategically on that basis.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part I explores the literature on arms exports and civil society organisations, stressing that it provides only limited answers to the question of why governments have humanitarian concerns regarding arms exports. Part II explains the theoretical approach, detailing why constructivist and analytical liberalism are combined to explain government behaviour on arms exports.

Part I – What does the literature tell us about government decision-making on arms exports?

Relatively little attention is paid in the IR literature to controls on conventional weapons. As shown in Table 2.1, between 1991 and 2016, of 777 articles about arms control and disarmament published in IR journals, 346 looked at nuclear weapons (45%). This may bias conclusions about the determinants of arms control in general due to at least two selection

biases. The first one is that decision-making in states possessing nuclear weapons is not representative of the whole population of states. The second one is that actors involved with nuclear weapons control are quantitatively and qualitatively different from those involved with conventional weapons: the latter includes virtually all states in the world, in addition to subnational governments, humanitarian organisations, private military companies, weapons-manufacturers and criminal groups.

Table 2.1

Articles in IR journals looking at disarmament and arms control, by type of weapon (1991-2016)

Weapons of mass destruction	
Nuclear	346
Missiles	70
Biological	30
Chemical	28
Radiological	2
Weapons of mass destruction (as a whole)	42
Conventional weapons	
Landmines, mines	12
Small arms, light weapons, SALW	11
Cyber, digital, artificial intelligence	9
Cluster munitions	5
Ships, vessels	5
Submarines	3
Aircraft, airplanes	2
Artillery	2
Tanks, armoured	2
Drones, UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles, lethal autonomous weapons systems	2
Aircraft carriers	0
MANPADs	0
Less lethal, non-lethal, tear gas	0
Conventional weapons/arms/guns (as a whole)	28

Source: Web of Science.

Note: Each row contains words used in the search. Articles containing only generic terms, such as *arms control* or *disarmament*, were not included in this table. As some articles cited more than one type of weapon, figures cannot be summed.

A lack of research on this topic also has policy implications. Conventional weapons are more easily accessed by state and non-state actors than WMD, in addition to impacting a larger number of countries and people. Although they are the main weapons used in civil wars, interstate wars, genocide and political repression, their proliferation is far less controlled than WMD's. In fact, even countries with limited or no capacity to develop weapons can build modern armies through the acquisition of foreign-manufactured weapons. They can also have access to maintenance and training to operate equipment, making them able to sustain standing military forces in the long term.

Besides being scarce, the literature is insufficient to explain why governments have humanitarian concerns when making decisions on arms exports. There are at least two gaps: *i*) the literature has not explained why some states adopt humanitarian concerns while others do not, even when facing similar structural constraints; and *ii*) it has not explained why, even in the same country, humanitarian concerns are more important for some administrations than others, also despite similar structural constraints.

This part of the chapter explores how the literature has looked at the decision-making on arms exports, with two types of model being analysed: one stressing the role of structures and the other stressing domestic politics. I demonstrate that discussions on the role of civil society in arms exports have been limited, as well as how this thesis fills this gap by looking at interactions between CSOs, governments and other groups through domestic politics.

As a summary of the factors that states consider when making decisions on arms exports, Figure 2.1 presents the means through which arms exports are used as policy tools, and Figure 2.2 presents negative externalities potentially resulting from arms exports. These factors are cited in the literature (examined in this chapter) and have been

empirically observed in Brazil and the UK (examined in chapters 4-9). They are categorized into two dimensions: political and economic. Although they are normally interdependent or overlapping, this separation is analytically helpful to clarify decision-making processes.

Figure 2.1

Potential goals of governments achieved through arms exports





Figure 2.2

Potential negative externalities of arms exports



Structural models of decisions on arms exports

The literature emphasising the role of structural factors on arms export decisions is found in the fields of political science and international relations, as well as in a subfield of economics known as economics of defence. The first subsection examines the use of arms exports as a foreign policy tool while the second one examines economic factors.

Political determinants of arms exports

An extensive part of the literature considers arms exports as an instrument to strengthen allies (Brzoska and Ohlson 1987; Catrina 1988, 13–14; Harkavy 1994, 20; Laurance 1992, 82; Pierre 1997, 15, 1982; Stohl and Grillot 2009, 18; Towle 1998, 9). As arms improve the capacity of allies to fight against common threats, the security of both importing and exporting countries is enhanced through the supply of weapons. This occurs due to an increase in their individual power and because combined military operations are more effective when allies share similar equipment (Pierre, 1982, p. 34, Catrina, 1988, p. 71. Stanley, 1972, p. 74-75). As evidence, arms transfers frequently occur in the form of grants or subsidised loans. During the cold war, for example, the US provided weapons in the form of military aid to NATO members, Israel, Japan and South Korea. The same was observed in arms transfers from the Soviet Union to Warsaw Pact members, Angola, Cuba and North Korea.

Why to use arms exports rather than other forms of support? As argued by Kolodziej (1979, p. 9), Catrina (1988, p. 71) and Stohl and Grillot (2009, p. 18), sending weapons is easier and less costly than troops. A similar view is in Yarhi-Milo et al. (2016), who argued

that the US government uses arms exports to alter local military balances, as part of offshore-balancing strategies. Decision-making on arms exports would thus follow a strategic logic rather than commercial interests or domestic politics (Yarhi-Milo et al. 2016, 136-137).

Arms exports can also be used to gain or keep leverage on other countries' policies (Laurance 1992, 95; Catrina 1988, 157), like a vector through which a state 'spread its tentacles across the globe' (Stanley and Pearton 1972, 17:72). Kissinger used sales of weapons to persuade the Israeli government to sign the 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement (Pierre 1982, 19). Snider (1979) demonstrated that selling weapons to countries in the Middle East increased influence of arms exporters. Arms can also be used to establish or keep connections with political and military elites in recipient countries. For example, the United States provided weapons to Latin American countries through assistance programs to gain or keep leverage on elites (Pierre 1982, 19). Soysa and Midford (2012, p. 853) argued that the US uses arms exports to maintain dominance and secure access to natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa.

Arms exporting countries might also be interested in gaining access to military and/or intelligence facilities in recipient countries (Catrina 1988, 71). The Soviet Union refurbished the Egyptian military after the 1967 War to gain access to naval facilities and air bases in Egypt. The United States also obtained similar rights in other countries in exchange for the provision of weapons, including Ethiopia, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines and Spain. US arms sales to Pakistan, for example, were used to secure base rights in Peshawar, a location considered strategic to US interests (Kemp 1970, 279–80; Pierre 1982, 19).

States might also be interested in weakening competitors. During the cold war, the US and the Soviet Union worried that not selling weapons to certain countries would lead them to buy weapons from adversaries (Brzoska and Ohlson 1987, 45; 54). And this in fact happened: in 1955, for example, Egypt and the Soviet Union signed an arms agreement after Britain, France and the US decided not to lift a partial arms embargo against Egypt. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union supplied weapons to Indonesia after the US refused to do it.

Support through arms exports has also a symbolic aspect: when exporting weapons, countries send a signal of support to the importing country and the rest of the world (Pierre 1982, 14; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper 2016, 91–92). Selling weapons endorses the group in power in a recipient country, while also demonstrates the modernity and independence of states importing and exporting weapons (Catrina 1988, 81; Eyre and Suchman 1996; Moravcsik 1991).

Nevertheless, sales of weapons can bring several costs for arms exporting countries. A current ally might become a future enemy, as occurred with Iran in the 1970s: after supplying weapons to the Shah's government, the US was threatened by its own weapons after the 1979 Revolution. The same occurred during the First Gulf War: Western countries fought against the Iraqi military, which had imported part of its weapons from the West. Also, exported weapons might be used for a purpose different from the one they were initially provided. In 1965, Pakistan used US weapons against India, leading to a joint US-UK embargo on both countries (Kemp 1970, 279). Weapons can also be re-transferred to other countries without prior consent from the exporting country, increasing uncertainty on how they might be used (Pierre 1982, 22–23; Catrina 1988, 115).

Other authors have emphasised the economic determinants of arms exports, which are explored in the next subsection.

Economic determinants of arms exports

Arms exports can bring economic benefits in the form of jobs, increase of foreign exchange inflows, and improvement of the balance of payments situation, similar to what is obtained with sales of other goods and services. Some economic benefits are, however, unique (or at least more relevant) to the arms trade: arms exports can be used as a gateway to sales of civilian goods or in exchange for natural resources, for example, something that became especially important after the first oil shock (Catrina, 1988, p. 71; Hartley, 2000, p. 415; Levine and Smith, 2003, p. 11).

The main economic reason is, however, the exploitation of economies of scale, which can amortize research costs of weapons development, thus reducing domestic procurement costs (Levine and Smith 1997, 346; Stohl and Grillot 2009; Levine and Smith 2003, 8; Hartley 2000, 448; Harkavy 1994, 15; Akerman and Seim 2014, 536; Catrina 1988, 71; Laurance 1992, 118; Pierre 1982, 24; Anderton 1995, 549–51). This is imperative especially for second-tier producers, such as France and the UK, whose industries might become unviable without exports (Pierre 1997, 158–59). As evidence, Snider (1987) found that arms exports contributed to lower military expenditures in France, the UK and West Germany.

The weight of this factor grew in relevance after the end of the cold war, when domestic procurement and arms imports shrank in NATO and former Warsaw Pact members, leading to a large overcapacity in the industry (Anderton 1995, 525–27). This

problem was dealt with in two ways: *i*) a consolidation of the defence sector; and *ii*) an expansion of export-oriented production. On the latter, as many countries were adopting similar policies, competition increased, making political factors less relevant in decisions to export weapons (Pierre and Conway-Lanz 1994; Brzoska 2004; Brito and Intriligator 1995, 150; Dunne 1995, 401; Anderton 1995; Spear 1994, 86; Stohl and Grillot 2009, 23–24; Towle 1998, 16). As evidence, Akerman and Seim (2014, p. 537) demonstrated that the type of polity in importing countries became less relevant in decisions on arms exports after the end of the cold war. In that context, relations that were previously unthinkable became normal, as observed in the various arms deals between Russia and China (Harkavy 1994, 25; Pierre 1997, 16).

The literature examined so far assumes, however, that domestic politics have little or no influence on the decision-making. A different part of the literature looks at the domestic determinants of decisions, which is explored in the next section.

Domestic politics models of decisions on arms exports

When stressing economic and political aspects, part of the literature assumes that government officials have a high level of autonomy: after doing cost-benefit calculations, they take decisions on arms exports policies or individual arms deals. Yet, there are at least two potential factors that make the decision-making more complex. First, the state is not unitary: different government agencies frequently disagree on decisions concerning arms exports. Second, decisions are influenced by activities from interest or lobbying groups, including weapons-manufacturers, civil society organizations, religious groups or political parties, which seek to make arms control policies either looser or stricter. This section

explores this problem, looking initially at inter-bureaucratic disputes and then at the idea of a military industrial-complex. This indicates that the regulation of arms exports is not immune from domestic politics, and that it can be influenced by activities from norm entrepreneurs.

Bureaucratic dynamics in arms export decisions

Resource allocation to the military depends in part on intra-bureaucratic dynamics, something that happens due to at least two factors. The first one is that budgetary allocation to the military usually change incrementally, being relatively independent of perceptions of external threats (Wildavsky 1964; Lindblom 1968; Treddenick 1985, 80). The second one is that allocation of resources depends on the domestic influence of the military vis-à-vis other government agencies. Treddenick (1985, pp. 79–80) criticized models assuming that military expenditures are based only on security considerations, arguing that the military is one among many agencies in the state bureaucracy, competing for resources to survive. Looney (1988, p. 4) used a similar argument, stressing that the amount of resources that the military obtains depends on how influential it is domestically. In countries where the military controls the state, for example, military expenditures aim at keeping them in power rather than fighting against external threats.

Bureaucratic dynamics have an impact also on arms exports, as external demand for weapons may influence the allocation of resources to the military, and even the role of the military itself. Arms exports reduce domestic pressures for cutting military expenditures since the military sector can be then presented as a producer of wealth. This might even lead the military to play the role of a showcase, in charge of promoting and testing equipment for potential international customers (Treddenick 1985, 79–80). As

evidence, in international arms deals, national military forces are frequently offered to provide training to the military of importing countries. They are also often present in international arms exhibitions, being presented by governments and companies as part of packages of equipment and services provided to potential customers.

The idea of a military-industrial complex

In 1961, Dwight Eisenhower stated that part of the military build-up in the US was the result of close relations between government, the military and arms-manufacturers, rather than systemic factors. This formed what he called a military-industrial complex, a collusion of actors that benefited from the development, production and use of weapons. If this is true, decisions to produce and export weapons would be based on corporatist interests rather than structural constraints.

Although a substantial part of the literature looking at this issue lacks analytical power and adopts a 'merchants-of-death rhetoric' (Treddenick 1985, 80), some authors provided good insights on how collusion – rather than the collective interest – drive the state behaviour. Adams et al. (1982) proposed the idea of an 'iron triangle' to analyse military procurement in the US, in which the three vertices are the Pentagon, the Congress and defence contractors. For them, although the US Congress increased its supervision of the military sector over time, it was drawn into previous practices rather than changed them. Similar versions of this argument are found in other studies. Kolodziej (1979) described the military-industrial complex in France as a 'government within the government'. Ikegami-Andersson (1992) analysed the cases of Sweden and Japan, concluding that the same happens there. In Brazil, Dagnino (2010) explored the emergence

of a policy network lobbying to raise the salience of military issues in the government agenda.

A similar idea can be applied to arms exports, which would be supported by governments due to collusion between companies and government. This might be driven, for example, by the need to keep production facilities operating when domestic procurement is low (Adams, D'Onofrio, and Sokoloff 1982, 199). Kurth (1973) pointed out that, during the Nixon administration, exports of Hercules C-130 aircraft were supported by the US government after the company Lockheed-Georgia phased out the production of the C-5A. Collusion is also suggested by the constant flow of professionals between government and private companies, illustrated by the metaphor of the 'revolving door' (Makkai and Braithwaite 1992). Military personnel and civil servants regulating arms exports frequently assume positions in private companies once they retire, which is problematic because they might be preparing their future careers in the private sector rather than regulating it (Silverstein and Burton-Rose 2000, 30).

The literature on *regulatory capture* also provides good insights. Cases of regulatory capture are observed in various areas, with a vast literature looking at it (Baker 2010; D. Carpenter and Moss 2013; Culpepper 2010; Hardy 2006; Laffont and Tirole 1991; R. G. Walker 1987).[1] The regulation of the production of weapons would be especially prone to capture due to the concentration of costs and diffusion of benefits (Culpepper 2010). Kurth (1973) demonstrated that low levels of congressional control were associated to a lack of opposition to military programmes in the United States. This was observed, for example, in the project to develop multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) in

[1] For a survey of the literature, see Dal Bó (2006).

the early 1960s: as information was classified, there was no need to build support among parliamentarians and the public.

Yet these approaches do not explain why there are domestic and international restrictions on arms transfers for *humanitarian* reasons. If states have economic incentives to export and the role of strategic factors became less relevant in the 1990s, why do governments look at humanitarian conditions in potential customers? Also, if intra-government dynamics or collusion is central in the decision-making, why do governments occasionally use humanitarian language when making decisions on arms exports? I claim that the answer lies in domestic politics, although not in the way that the literature on bureaucratic dynamics or the military-industrial complex has approached this topic: not only material forces but also norms play a role in explaining the state behaviour.

The contribution: connecting the literatures on democracy, civil society and arms exports

Although the literature analysed so far is invaluable to understand the role of weapons-manufacturers and bureaucracies, it does not question whether democracies have a different behaviour from non-democracies concerning arms exports, and whether norms introduced by CSOs can change state behaviour. This section argues that connecting the literatures on democracy, civil society and arms exports provides a broader picture of how domestic politics and norms shape arms export decisions.

Democracy, humanitarian concerns and arms exports

Do governments care about humanitarian conditions in countries interested in buying their weapons? Part of the literature has sought to answer this question and explain why this happens. Blanton (1999) analysed US arms exports in the period 1990-94, demonstrating that countries respecting human rights were more likely to receive US weapons. Later, Blanton (2005) expanded her findings, analysing the period 1981-2002. She concluded that, while during the cold war countries violating human rights were not less likely to receive US weapons, in the post-cold war human rights violators became less likely to receive them.

While Blanton's results suggest the integration of humanitarian principles into export decisions, most studies found different results. Yanik (2006) argued that, despite domestic and international legislation restricting arms exports, their interpretation is loose, providing flexibility to exporters. Hansen and Marsh (2015) showed a gap between policy and practice on human rights in EU countries, demonstrating how some of them in fact competed to export weapons to Libya in the period 2005-2010. Duquet (2014) argued that the Arab Spring did not lead to a stricter behaviour concerning arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa in the cases of Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands.

From a different angle, part of the literature has asked whether democracies discriminate in favour of other democracies when making decisions on arms exports. Soysa and Midford (2012) compared the US and China's behaviour, concluding that rhetoric and practice do not match: the US was more likely to export weapons to autocracies and human rights abusers than China. Perkins and Neumayer (2010) demonstrated that behaviour is

not constant across different democracies: France and the UK were more likely to sell weapons to autocracies than to democracies; the US did not discriminate against autocracies; and Germany was more likely to sell weapons to democracies. Erickson (2013) demonstrated a gap between EU policies and practice on arms transfers: in the period 1989-2004, levels of democracy and conflict in importing countries were not a significant factor in arms exports from EU countries. Akerman and Seim (2014) explored whether countries with similar polities are more likely to trade weapons, concluding that this happened in the cold war but not since its end.

Therefore, it is not clear from the literature whether humanitarian norms and democratic institutions shape decisions on arms exports. As demonstrated in this thesis, however, evidence suggests that democracies take humanitarian concerns more into account than non-democracies. I also argue that the causal mechanism is in part explained by activities conducted by CSOs.

CSOs in the emergence of international norms

Evidence suggests that CSOs played a central role in the emergence of various international norms, as in the cases of breast-milk substitutes, environmental protection, human rights and women's rights (Chandler 2004, 5–6; Korey 1999, 152). Are they able to change state behaviour regarding security issues? Under a realist approach, due to the anarchical nature of the international system, states would need to use all available means to maintain their security. As demands from CSOs could limit the range of available options, accepting them would not be in the state interest. However, the literature has

demonstrated that influence on security issues occurs, including on the use and trade of weapons.

One of the most cited cases is the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in 1865. The Red Cross was founded three years after the publication of *A Memory of Solferino*, by Henry Dunant, which contributed to the formation of a grassroots movement, culminating in the creation of the Red Cross. Since then, the Red Cross has played a major role in the evolution of international humanitarian law (Hutchinson 1997; Moorehead 1998; Forsythe 2005; Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan 2016; Forsythe 1977).

Mulligan (2013) and others have looked at the role of the anti-slavery movement in the creation of the *Brussels Conference Act* of 1890, a multilateral attempt to restrict the availability of weapons used in support of the slave trade (United States and et al 1968; Goldblat 2002, 22; Cooper, Neil 2011; Beachey 1962). According to Mulligan (2013), the treaty resulted from pressures of anti-slavery groups, especially in Britain, France and Germany. Also in the late 19th century, the use of certain weapons came to be perceived as intrinsically wrong, due in part to civil society campaigns (J. Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997). This was discussed during the *Hague Conference* of 1899, which banned two weapons whose use was perceived as morally problematic: projectiles spreading asphyxiating poisonous gases, and bullets which expand or flatten easily (Eyffinger 1999; Cooper 1991; Hucker 2015). The conference was attended by peace societies from Europe and the US, which used it to lobby and publicize their cause (Charnovitz 1996, 112).

Davies (2007) looked at the disarmament movement during the 1920s and 1930s, a period of mass mobilization in Western Europe and the United States. In 1931, a group of women's rights NGOs established the Peace and Disarmament Committee, representing

about 45 million women (Charnovitz 1996, 246). During that period, several books criticizing arms manufacturers and arms exports were published: *Traffic in Arms*, by Freda White (1932); *Death and Profits* (1932), by Seymour Waldman; *The Bloody Traffic* (1933), by Fenner Brockway; and *Merchants of Death* (1934), by H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen. In response to pressures, activists were included in official delegations: the trade union leader and disarmament activist Léon Jouhaux, in France; the suffragist Margery Corbett Ashby, in the UK; and the educator and peace activist Mary Emma Woolley, in the US. Governments also created plans to address these pressures: the Tardieu and Paul-Boncour plans, in France; the MacDonald Plan, in the UK; and the Hoover Plan, in the US (Davies 2007, 152-153). The process was centred in the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-34, which nonetheless did not achieve the activists' main goals.

A case frequently explored in the literature is the nuclear disarmament movement. Although its main goal (banning nuclear weapons) has not been achieved, this does not imply its lack of influence. Tannenwald (1999, p. 20) argues that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 because of a taboo rather than strategic reasons, which is due in part to the global antinuclear weapons movement. CSOs' influence was observed in other cases as well. In 1963, the Soviet Union, the UK and the US signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons not performed underground, which occurred in part due to pressures from CSOs, especially the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) (Cortright 2008, 17). Wittner (2009) argued that Gorbachev was influenced by contacts with antinuclear scientists, contributing to the introduction of a few policies: a reduction in the number of SS-20 missiles in Europe; the decision not to develop a Soviet SDI program; and the moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing. He also cited impacts on the Philippines: the constitution of 1987

declared the country to be nuclear-free, which happened in part due to the antinuclear movement's influence on Corazon Aquino (Wittner 2009, 183). Knopf (1998) showed that peace protests in the US were followed by more engagement of the US government in disarmament talks, exploring how this occurred during the administrations of Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan.

Since the end of the cold war, a few international treaties on arms control have been created, some of them following campaigns by CSOs. The UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons was created in 2001 due in part to the work of NGOs (Stavrianakis 2010, 6). The Ottawa Convention is a positive case of CSOs' influence, as most states have signed it, and even those which have not, have adopted its rules, especially on exports. Legislation in the European Union also resulted in part from CSOs' pressures, the same applying for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Bellal 2014, 464; Mack and Wood 2009, 4).

Other studies stress how CSOs shape foreign policy decisions through *domestic* politics, which is also the main focus of this thesis. Kaufmann and Pape (1999) examined the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade by Britain in the 19th century, arguing that Britain championed this cause because of domestic politics dynamics. Brysk (1993) demonstrated how CSOs in the United States shaped the position of Carter's administration on Argentina's military regime, especially concerning bilateral aid and multilateral lending. Klotz (1999) analysed how US policies on the South African apartheid regime were shaped by pressures from domestic anti-apartheid groups.[2] Although from a different angle, the literature on US foreign policy towards Israel has a similar approach, exploring how an

[2] Klotz (1999) also analysed the UK policy on the apartheid regime, arguing that domestic civil society pressures were not effective. As demonstrated in this thesis, however, documents from the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the British government suggest that this is not true.

association between civil society, companies and government explains the US support to Israel, including decisions on military assistance and arms transfers (Trice 1976; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Jackson 2015; Tivnan 1987).

What makes the influence of CSOs possible, however? The literature proposes a few variables that might explain their success, which can be grouped into three categories. First, issues would emerge because of their intrinsic characteristics, an argument emphasised by Keck and Sikkink (1998a). For them, the two most frequent types of adopted issues involve either 'bodily harm to vulnerable individuals' or 'legal equality of opportunity' (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, p. 27).

Second, success would depend on how an issue is framed. Price and Tannenwald (1996) argued that an international regime on chemical weapons emerged because this type of weapon was associated to the use of poison in warfare, a practice considered as taboo. This campaign was therefore successful because it framed issues into a category already perceived as negative. Price (1998) examined the case of landmines, reaching a similar conclusion: landmines were framed as harmful to civilians, and as there was a normative framework for protecting civilians in conflicts, using landmines was more easily accepted as negative.

Third, success would depend on the power of a few CSOs. Carpenter (2007a) argued that CSOs have different organizational capabilities, identities and perceptions, conditioning them to adopt certain issues. She stressed three factors: *i*) an organization may consider that an issue does not fit into the area it works; *ii*) a new issue can negatively impact efforts on other issues; and *iii*) the interpretation of a phenomenon may diverge across different organizations, hindering the formation of networks (R. C. Carpenter 2007b, 660–61). Therefore, issues are adopted because existing organizations choose to champion

them: powerful CSOs, such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch are gatekeepers, facilitating the emergence of some issues (Bob 2009; R. C. Carpenter 2010, 2007a, 114–16, 2007b).

In addition, part of the literature has looked at how *transnational* CSOs influence the state behaviour. When targeting other countries, they can follow two different routes: *i*) direct pressures on state officials, bureaucrats and parliamentarians; or *ii*) indirect pressures, through influence on public opinion, private companies, churches and local CSOs. Decisions to conduct these activities are based on their own initiative or on requests from CSOs in other countries, what Keck and Sikkink (1998b, pp. 12–13) call the 'boomerang pattern'. Although this literature has advanced the knowledge on the CSOs' role, it has overlooked the fact that international regulations are not created in a void: they are often based on national experiences that are later diffused to the rest of the world.


The literature looking at arms exports is therefore broad, covering different angles and theoretical approaches. While some stress structural constraints, others stress domestic politics. While some focus on strategic aspects, others look at economic, bureaucratic or normative elements. Choices to adopt one of these approaches depend in part on the type of question being asked and on the cases selected for analysis: a comparative study on great powers is more likely to stress strategic elements, while individual case studies might focus on intra-bureaucratic dynamics or lobby groups. In the next part, I explain why a combination of constructivism and analytical liberalism is helpful to provide an answer for this thesis' research question: why do governments have humanitarian concerns when making decisions on arms exports in some situations but not in others?

Part II – Theoretical approach: the role of norms and domestic politics dynamics on foreign policy decision-making

I claim in this thesis that humanitarian concerns in arms exports emerged domestically due to the work of norm entrepreneurs, usually (though not always) organised in civil society groups. Since CSOs' material power is limited in comparison to defence companies or governments, this indicates that norms and values exert influence on decisions regarding arms exports. Once governments adopted these norms, however, there are incentives for both governments and CSOs to seek to 'upload' them into the international level. Therefore, the baseline for international negotiations and bargaining is a set of preferences that emerged domestically. This model is different not only from models stressing the role of structural constraints but also from the 'boomerang pattern', as it focuses on CSOs' domestic activities. Yet, international norms can 'come back' (like a boomerang) if CSOs or other organisations monitor whether states live up to the norms they promoted. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3

A norms-based approach to the adoption of humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports



In this thesis, two theoretical approaches are combined to explain this process: constructivism and analytical liberalism. A constructivist approach is useful to understand the role of norms in the formation of state preferences, as well as how norms become enshrined in state policies. An analytical liberal approach is useful to understand the links between democratic institutions and foreign policy decisions, as well as how governments negotiate and bargain once preferences are formed. This combination draws from Moravcsik (2013), who adopted an inside-out approach to analyse the creation of the European Union. To understand bargaining on trade and investment, he argued, it was necessary to understand how preferences were formed domestically: domestic politics produced the baseline on which governments later conducted negotiations. Yet, I argue that, in addition, it is necessary to explore the role of norms rather than only of material

interests in order to understand why humanitarian concerns were incorporated into the decision-making.

In the next section, I initially explain what I mean by civil society. Next, I detail why a constructivist approach is useful to explain the emergence of humanitarian concerns in arms exports. Then, I explain why analytical liberalism is useful to understand the role of domestic politics, as well as a convergence towards similar norms.

What is civil society?

Civil society is a sphere outside the family, the market and the state. It is not, however, the mere sum of atomized individuals. Their organisation in associations is at civil society's core:

> Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. (Habermas 1996, 367).

These associations form what Habermas call 'the organizational substratum of the general public of citizens' (Habermas 1996, 367). A similar approach is in Howard (2003, p. 38), for whom civil society is composed of 'concrete organisations and groups of people'.

The analytical separation between civil society, family, the market and the state does not imply, however, that civil society is completely 'outside' the other spheres: CSOs constitute – and are constituted by – them. This dimension seems nonetheless to be overlooked in part of the IR literature, which has considered governments and CSOs as

actors that interact but do not permeate each other, a problem initially explored by Robert Cox (Cox 1981, 127).

This is overlooked also in part of the literature on civil society, which has considered CSOs as either a *counterweight* to states or a set of *non-political* institutions. As argued by Howard (2003, p. 38), part of the literature establishes a 'sharp analytic dichotomy between the state and civil society, with the two standing in a zero-sum relationship'. When looking at civil society as a *counterweight* to the state, this literature stresses its role as a space of resistance, especially against authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, not enough attention has been paid to the whole range of activities performed by CSOs and the multiple ways in which they interact with governments. Whether CSOs and governments are on opposite sides or on the same side depends on how they perceive each other and the incentives they have to cooperate. Anheier (2004, p. 7), for example, pointed out the extensive collaboration between government and CSOs in France, Germany, the UK and the US.

Regarding its *non-political* aspects, Putnam et al. (1994) argued that high levels of civic association in Italy were associated to high government performance. He did not explain, however, which causal mechanism connected non-political activities in civil society to high government performance. For Foley and Edwards (1996, p. 41), this was problematic because it excluded the *political* variable. For them, in Putnam's work, 'mechanisms by which such "microsocial" effects translate into "macropolitical" outcomes are weakly specified or contradictory or both'. Therefore, by not including social movements as part of civil society, for example, Putnam ignored a central factor in the creation and maintenance of stable societies.

Furthermore, part of the literature does not consider that boundaries between state and civil society are *i*) blurred and *ii*) non-static. Regarding the former, there is usually a grey zone between civil society and state, as argued by Shaw (1994): 'some institutions, like parties, straddle the border by definition; others, like schools, universities and mass media, fulfil functions which belong to civil society but are nevertheless incorporated juridically into the state' (Shaw, 1994, p. 659). Regarding the latter (non-static boundaries), issues that emerge in civil society, and which can be politically peripheral, may be later incorporated into the framework of states. This occurred, for example, with the women's rights movement, whose agenda is now seen as the 'normal pattern of things' in many leading states (Shaw 1994, 659). Habermas drew attention to how the labour movement joined 'universalist discourses of the bourgeois public sphere', thereby ceasing to be 'the other' (Habermas 1996, 374). This was also explored by Sikkink (2007, p. 209), who demonstrated how human rights became an integral part of US foreign policy. Therefore, what is within the state today might have been within civil society in t – 1, and vice-versa.

Yet, which organisations should be part of the category *civil society*? It seems to be clear that humanitarian CSOs – such as Amnesty, Oxfam or Viva Rio – should be included. Others, however, might be in a grey zone: how to categorize political parties, social movements and trade unions, for example? This thesis adopts the approach of Anheier (2004), for whom CSOs are:

> self-organized groups characterized by:
> - voluntary participation (which would exclude compulsory membership organization);
> - relative autonomy from family, market and state; and a
> - capacity for collective action to advance common interests (Anheier 2004, 23).

The term CSO is broader than the term non-governmental organisation (NGO), although it encompasses it. The category of CSO includes also advocacy networks, community groups, foundations, social movements and think-tanks. The decision of using CSO (rather than NGO) is based on the literature and on evidence collected in preliminary stages of this research. The literature has explored the effect of various forms of civic association on government performance. Putnam et al. (1994, p. 98), for example, analysed the role of 'sports clubs, cultural and recreational groups, community and social action organizations, educational and youth groups' on government performance in Italy. As abovementioned, his approach is nonetheless insufficient because it limits civil society to non-political organisations, reason why this thesis includes all organisations that meet the abovementioned three criteria of Anheier (2004).

Political parties are, however, excluded from the category of civil society. This is because they aim at controlling the state while CSOs do not, even though they frequently seek to shape government policies. The approach of Linz and Stepan (1996) and Howard (2003, p. 38) is useful here. They distinguish political society from civil society, with the former referring to 'elite politics, namely, political leadership and the competition for political power and office' (Howard 2003, 34–35). This distinction is important because this thesis examines how civil society engages with governments not only directly but also indirectly – through political parties, for example.

Also, this thesis follows the argument of Barnett (2011), who explores the long tradition of political activities conducted by humanitarian organisations. This diverges from a literature that portrays the end of the cold war as a turning point, allegedly marking the end of an *apolitical* humanitarianism. Under this perspective, the end of the cold war triggered an expansion not only in the number of humanitarian groups but also in the scope

of their agendas. As explored in this thesis, however, organisations such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Amnesty, Chile Solidarity Campaign and Oxfam, which existed during the cold war, were far from being apolitical: they actively sought to change the state behaviour, and in various cases they achieved that.

Finally, the definition of CSO includes what some call 'uncivil society', formed by organisations that have the three abovementioned characteristics, although they advance illiberal agendas (Anheier 2004, 28). They encourage, for example, chauvinism, climate change denial, disrespect for human rights, hatred against minorities or misogyny. Although evidence indicates that they were not relevant in cases explored in this thesis, they conduct activities related to arms exports in other countries. Regarding campaigns *against* restrictions on arms transfers, the most notorious organisation is the National Rifle Association (NRA), in the United States.

Norms and the social construction of preferences on arms exports

When making decisions on arms exports, governments consider the potential costs and benefits of restricting arms transfers. They are unlikely to authorize arms exports to potential adversaries, for example, because supplied weapons might be used against them. Likewise, they have little incentive to sell weapons that could produce a power imbalance against an ally. States often also look, however, at humanitarian conditions in countries interested in buying their weapons. Yet the weight of this factor in the decision-making – or even its presence – is not constant across time and space: humanitarian concerns have become part of the decision-making in some countries but not in others, and they are

stressed more by certain administrations, political parties and government departments than others. How to explain this variation?

A constructivist approach is useful to answer this question because it looks at the role of norms in the formation of state preferences. Based on this approach, this thesis problematizes how norms of appropriate behaviour emerged, why exports of certain weapons came to be perceived as illegitimate, and why governments worry about selling weapons that could deteriorate humanitarian conditions. I argue that preferences regarding arms exports are partially the result of norms-based campaigns conducted by CSOs rather than material factors.

Also, under a constructivist approach, social preferences result from patterns of interaction (Wendt 1992, 493), which is helpful for not assuming a priori that the state behaviour is determined by domestic or international politics. As demonstrated in this thesis, government preferences were formed in part due to dynamics of domestic politics. Ideas became norms at the domestic level before states sought to export them to the rest of the world. An emphasis on domestic politics diverges, however, from most of the constructivist IR literature on CSOs, which has focused on the role of transnational advocacy networks and on negotiations for the creation of international regulations. This has been a common approach at least since Price (1998), who analysed the creation of the Ottawa Convention from this angle. By demonstrating that CSOs can change international law, their work is invaluable, especially because evidence suggests that international norms constrain or enable states' policies and practice (Kratochwil 1984; Ruggie 2002; Hurd 1999; Bernauer 1995; Johnston 2014; R. O. Keohane 2005, 1993; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009). In an effort to conceptualize and empirically analyse the emergence of a global civil society, however, most of this literature has overlooked what happens before campaigns,

negotiations, treaties and norms become global. In other words, little attention has been paid to decision-making in individual countries, which implies at least three problems.

The first one is that it overlooks the fact that norm entrepreneurs seek to change the overall state behaviour rather than only positions on international regulations. As states are sovereign to decide on arms exports, CSOs seek to change their behaviour not only multilaterally but also unilaterally. The second problem is that the pathways through which CSOs influence governments have been undertheorized. CSOs can engage with governments in different ways: *i*) pressuring them from the outside; *ii*) using direct channels with formal government actors (bureaucrats, parliamentarians, political parties, for example); or *iii*) persuading elites. Part of the literature stresses the position of CSOs as outsiders (pressuring governments to change their behaviour), but in fact CSOs and governments frequently combine efforts. Some of the most-frequently cited transnational campaigns, such as those leading to the Ottawa Convention and Arms Trade Treaty, for example, were in part led by national governments. The third problem is that the literature has paid little attention to activities of CSOs targeting non-state actors. In the UK, CSOs have engaged with or pressured academics, churches, consumers, local governments, private companies, trade unions, universities, international organizations and other CSOs.

This is therefore a reinterpretation of an idea presented in Garcia (2011), who argued that 'there is little progress in international relations without progress in international law'. It is argued here that progress in international relations depends on the success of the introduction of norms through *domestic* politics.

There are, of course, alternative explanations. A potential one is in the literature on regime formation, stressing the shared interests of states in creating regimes (R. O. Keohane 2005, 1993; O. R. Young and Osherenko 1993; Osherenko and Young 1993;

Krasner 1983). Nevertheless, by adopting a functional perspective, this literature has overlooked the fact that norms are not necessarily created to fulfil the role of an optimizing mechanism (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1996, 195–96; R. O. Keohane 2005, 81; Elster 1989, 15).

A constructivist approach is nonetheless insufficient because it does not problematize the role of democratic institutions, as well as what happens *after* preferences are formed. In other words, constructivists tend not to look at what happens when preferences remain fixed, which is what occurs in the short-term. An analytical liberal approach is useful to examine this.

Domestic politics and the formation of state preferences on arms exports

States are representative institutions rather than actors. They are a 'critical "transmission belt" by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy' (Moravcsik 1997, 516). State preferences are therefore contingent on the preferences of those who are able to shape policies (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 13). In this way, as argued by Moravcsik (1997, p. 518), the state is 'constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors'. This is an inside-out perspective on how government preferences are formed: 'demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics'. The same applies to state preferences on foreign policy issues, which are 'causally independent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific interstate political interactions' (Moravcsik 1997, 519).

Another reason why an analytical liberal approach is adequate is because it problematizes whether the state behaviour is determined by its type of polity: the foreign policy of democracies and non-democracies are expected to be different, even if they have similar levels of coercive power. Distinct sets of preferences are produced because different types of regime have different processes to formulate policies.

These features of analytical liberalism are useful to deal with three characteristics of the topic analysed here. First, governments did not adopt controls on arms exports simultaneously, with some governments adopting them before others, as well as before the creation of international treaties. This occurred despite a collective action problem: adopting humanitarian concerns as a criterion to export weapons would be ineffective if others did not do the same, leading to the common justification that *if we do not sell arms, someone else will*. Why did certain states opt to take humanitarian concerns into account before others, however, as well as before the creation of international regulations? This thesis argues that the answer lies in domestic politics.

Second, CSOs seek to shape policies of governments not only directly but also indirectly, through political parties and various other groups. In the UK, CSOs have engaged with the Labour Party at least since the early 1960s, having introduced the topic of arms exports in the party's agenda. Once the Labour Party took office (in 1964, 1974 and 1997), it turned a party project into government policy, as it represented groups for which 'responsible' arms exports mattered. A liberal approach is adequate to explore this issue, as states are considered representative institutions rather than actors.

Third, positions on international treaties are partially determined by the adjustment costs of joining them. As Simmons (2009, p. 13) argued: 'polities participate most readily and enthusiastically in treaty regimes that reflect values consonant with their

own […]'. This implies that international treaties reflect preferences that emerged through domestic politics: they become international law after and because they were domestic law in 't – 1'. As she argued, 'the main domestic reason for making a treaty commitment is the expectation that it will be possible to comply at a reasonable cost' (Simmons 2009, 67). What matters is the gap between what a state does and what it would have to do after adopting certain regulations.

In the next subsections, I explain in more details why an analytical liberal approach is useful to understand the role of domestic politics, as well as how domestic norms can become international.

What links democracy to arms export policies and practice?

I argue that democracies are more likely to export weapons to other democracies, as well as more likely to join international arms transfer agreements containing humanitarian language. These arguments need, however, a theoretical explanation about the pathways through which democracy shapes decisions on arms exports. Potential causal mechanisms have been derived from democratic peace theory. Rosato (2003) analysed a few mechanisms that might explain why democracies are unlikely to fight against other democracies. First, democracy would have a normative effect: as elites are socialized into liberal values, they would have a peaceful approach to conflict resolution. Adapting this into arms export policies, government officials would exert restraint on arms sales to autocracies because they are perceived as less able to resolve conflicts peacefully, as well as more likely to use weapons to repress citizens. Second, governments might be constrained by the public's aversion to war against other democracies or to the use of

weapons to suppress liberties. In the case of arms exports, public opinion might pressure governments not to export weapons, leading to changes in the government behaviour. Third, constraints might come from civil society groups, which would oppose arms sales used to repress citizens or places in conflict. In this case, influence would therefore come neither from atomized individuals (the public opinion) nor liberal government officials but from organised groups.[3]

These explanations diverge on the *origin* of humanitarian concerns. They could come from: *i*) government officials; *ii*) the public; *iii*) or groups in civil society. There is also an additional potential explanation: policies might be caused by *iv*) a spillover effect from one or a few democracies to others. Democracies might emulate other democracies' behaviour or be pressured to adopt certain norms, regardless of concerns from government officials, the public or civil society groups.

Although these explanations are not mutually excludable, the role of organised civil society groups is critical. Based on the theorization of this topic introduced by Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*, empirical studies have demonstrated that vertical social structures produce poor government responsiveness. Putnam et al. (1994) demonstrated how the existence of civic associations affected government performance in Italy. Fukuyama (2001, 1995) argued that civic associations played a critical role in the democratization and development of Germany, Japan and the US. It is not the mere existence of democracy therefore that produces a civic society: democracy can co-exist

[3] There are three additional potential explanations in Rosato (2003), which however do not fit into the topic analysed here. Two of them are: *i*) *slow mobilization* in democracies; and *ii*) lack of *surprise attack* mechanisms, which would put democracies in disadvantage regarding the use of force; as they need authorization from different veto players, it is hard to conceal preparation for wars. However, as analysed by Risse-Kappen (1995, p. 123), these factors cannot explain why democracies fight against non-democracies. Also, in the idea of *iii*) *information* playing a role, it is stressed the stronger resolve of democracies in using force, making negotiated solutions between democracies more likely.

with atomistic individualism. This is especially valid for foreign policy issues due to their diffuse impact on nationals: individual benefits or costs from changes in foreign policy are usually so small that people have little incentive to mobilize (Owen 1994, 100). In fact, when arms are exported, impacts (either positive or negative) per capita on the exporting countries' population are rarely perceived by most citizens. Only groups affected by these deals or norm entrepreneurs are expected to be motivated to mobilize against or in favour of them.

From the domestic to the international: why do states want to 'upload' norms?

What I call here the 'second stage' of norms emergence is based on Moravcsik (2013), for whom the state behaves as a unitary actor once preferences are formed. In the case of arms exports, I argue that governments seek to 'upload' policies and practice to 'level the playing field' and enhance their symbolic capital. Similar ideas have been explored in previous research. Daniel Drezner, for example, examined what conditions international regulatory cooperation, arguing that governments look at the adjustment costs of joining agreements: the higher the costs the less likely they are to join them. This happens because domestic actors that would incur on losses due to an agreement have incentives to pressure national governments not to adopt it. This raises domestic political costs for governments to join it, thereby reducing the likelihood of its adoption (Drezner 2007, 5).

When great powers face low adjustment costs and others face severe adjustment costs, the former have incentives to promote these standards while the latter have incentives to resist them. According to Drezner, NGOs can be useful in this process as force

multipliers: 'If NGOs agree with the regulatory standard set by the core, the great powers will be happy to exploit the advocacy functions of NGOs and facilitate their role as proselytizers, promoting the merits of regulatory coordination to recalcitrant members of the periphery' (Drezner 2007, 5). As explored in chapter 6, the British government in fact considered NGOs as multipliers of influence in the case of the ATT.

The emergence of international regulations on economic activities seems to follow a similar path. Oona Hathaway argued that industries facing high adjustment costs due to open markets ask governments for protection, thereby reducing the likelihood of states adjusting to international standards (Hathaway 1998, 577). Simmons argued that international regulation of capital markets in the 1980s-1990s did not result from cooperation among states. Rather, it resulted from 'unilateral decisions imposed by the dominant financial centers on other jurisdictions' (Simmons 2001, 55). She also looked at international regulations during the interwar years, demonstrating that a lack of economic cooperation resulted from dynamics of domestic politics. Domestic constraints determined choices on protectionism and compliance with the gold exchange standard (Simmons 1997). Gerry Simpson addressed how international law is used by great powers to export norms. He argued that great powers have had a central position in all international legal regimes since 1815, based on the assumption of a cultural, material and legal superiority. This is what he calls a 'legalised hegemony' (Simpson 2004, 32:5).

Concluding remarks

Although the question driving this thesis has been explored in prior research, my approach is different, focusing on how norms emerge domestically. This is an inside-out approach,

analysing how *domestic* politics shape foreign policy. This approach is based on IR constructivist and analytical liberal literatures. Constructivism is helpful to understand how preferences on arms exports are socially constructed, which is essential to explain the introduction of humanitarian concerns into the decision-making. This is combined with an analytical liberal approach, which is essential to explain why democracy matters and why states behave as though they were unitary actors in bargains and negotiations.

This thesis seeks to contribute to the literatures on arms exports and civil society. The literature on arms exports has paid little attention to the work of CSOs, while the literature on CSOs has focused on global processes, overlooking what happens before norms go global. This literature has not considered that governments might be interested in exporting norms because they have already adopted some of them unilaterally. In addition, this research is a contribution to the literature on British and Brazilian foreign policies, showing how state preferences in democracies are formed in similar ways, regardless of differences in various other variables, including levels of development, forms of organisation of civil society groups, levels of maturity of democracy, and positions in the international system.

Chapter 3 – Why are there humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports? A quantitative analysis

Various governments publicly declare that humanitarian concerns are part of their decision-making on arms exports. This is observed, for example, in the arms export policies of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, the UK and the US, as well as in the European Union.[1] These countries have something in common: they are all democracies. As similar policies are not observed among non-democracies, is it possible to conclude that democratic countries are more likely to have humanitarian concerns when making decisions on arms exports?

Although this piece of evidence is a starting point, there are at least three reasons why more evidence is necessary. The first one is that, as normative commitments might not be implemented, the behaviour of democracies might in practice not differ from that of non-democracies. A second reason is that humanitarian concerns might not be made public through explicit policies and yet be part of the decision-making. For example, as analysed later in this thesis, humanitarian concerns were part of the decision-making in the UK before they were formalised in government policies. The third one is that humanitarian concerns may be expressed through different terminologies. In countries where the human rights agenda is often considered as a Western (or northern) construct, government officials are cautious to adopt its language. As observed in Brazil, however, this does not imply that these concerns are absent.

[1] Source: Ministère de la Défense (2016); Germany (2015, 2000); Italy (1990); South Africa (1996, p. 33); United Kingdom (1997, 2002, 2008); United States (1997); European Union (1998, 2008); Sweden (2016, p. 134); Poland (2017, p. 39).

While countries having policies and not implementing them would be false positives, countries not having policies but 'implementing' them would be false negatives, being therefore necessary to look at both policies and practice of governments. If *policies* of democracies differ from non-democracies but practices do not, democracies would be hypocritical, preaching liberal values while in practice behaving as other countries. In this case, domestic political systems would not shape the state behaviour. If both policies and practice from democracies differ from non-democracies, however, domestic politics might influence decisions on arms exports.

This chapter uses quantitative methods to test the hypothesis that the existence of humanitarian concerns in decisions regarding arms exports is dependent on the type of polity (H1). This is done through panel data analysis, OLS, logistic and probit regressions, through which possible determinants of state positions on arms exports are explored. Three proxies are used to measure the existence of humanitarian concerns in the decision-making, on which regressions are then run. The first proxy is an index measuring the extent to which governments authorize arms exports to countries at human rights risk, which I have called the *ACHR index*. The second proxy is state positions on UNGA resolutions concerning the arms trade. The third proxy is state positions on two legally-binding international treaties: the Ottawa Convention (1997) and the Arms Trade Treaty (2013). Evidence based on these analyses indicates that democracies have a different behaviour from non-democracies regarding arms transfers: they are less likely to export weapons to autocracies and more likely to join international regulations on arms transfers. My claim is not, however, that levels of democracy are necessarily more relevant than other factors. As indicated by the results of models presented in this chapter, other aspects also determine state positions.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 introduces the ACHR index, which is then used in a panel data analysis, demonstrating that democracies export proportionally fewer weapons to non-democracies. Next, section 2 uses state votes on UNGA resolutions as a proxy for state positions on the arms trade, while sections 3-4 do the same for two legally-binding international treaties: the Ottawa Convention and the Arms Trade Treaty.

Are democracies more likely to have humanitarian concerns in decisions on arms exports?

This chapter tests the first hypothesis: whether domestic political structures shape the state behaviour on arms exports. To test it, it is necessary initially to identify whether humanitarian concerns are present in the decision-making. One of the proxies that I use is the *proportion of weapons that a country exports to autocracies*: the higher it is, the less weight humanitarian concerns have in the decision-making. Although levels of democracy are not a direct measurement of humanitarian conditions, previous research has found a substantial and positive relationship between levels of democracy and respect for human rights (demonstrated in this section).

This section initially introduces the ACHR index, which is used in a panel data analysis, demonstrating that democracies have lower values of the index than non-democracies, thereby indicating a greater role for humanitarian concerns. This relationship is later corroborated using other proxies, as well as through studies on the UK and Brazil (chapters 4-9).

ACHR: an index to measure the proportion of weapons exported to countries at human rights risk

This index is composed of two variables: *i*) level of democracy; and *ii*) value of arms exports. Level of democracy is a proxy for the degree of respect for human rights. While this is not a direct indicator, various studies have found a substantial and positive relationship between them. Mitchell and McCormick (1988, pp. 490–491) found an association between high levels of democracy and low levels of torture and political imprisonment. Henderson (1991) found that democracy is a powerful predictor of levels of state repression. Poe and Tate (1994), as well as Poe et al. (1999), in two cross-national studies, found a significant and substantive relationship between democracy and respect for personal integrity. Davenport (1999) found that government repressive behaviour is less common in democracies, even in those countries that recently transitioned from authoritarianism. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) corroborated this relationship and revealed pertinent additional details: among the various elements of a democracy, political participation is more significant than other factors; and high levels of respect for human rights occur only at high levels of democracy. Rummel (1995) argued that level of democracy is a significant predictor for the occurrence of genocide, whereas economic development, levels of education, and ethnic, racial or religious differences are not. Similar results were found by Davenport (2007), who argued that democracies are less likely to commit politicides and genocide than non-democracies, generating what he calls a 'domestic democratic peace'.

Based on the association between democracy and human rights, the ACHR index uses levels of democracy as a proxy. The indicator is the Polity IV Score, which evaluates

democracy across three different dimensions: 'presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders'; 'existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive'; and 'guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation' (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Countries are coded on a scale from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy).[2]

The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database provides data for arms exports. In this dataset, arms transfers are priced in constant US dollars, based on their value rather than the sum of financial transactions. This is important since arms transfers frequently occur in the form of grants or sales below their real value, which is not captured in other datasets, such as the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT). Another limitation of the WMEAT is that it has only aggregated data on arms exports, not detailing transfers to individual countries.

The index is presented in equation (1), in which the extent to which a country *i* exports weapons to countries at human rights risk (ACHR), is given by

$$ACHR_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} X_j \left(10 - D_j\right)}{X_i \times 20} \quad , \qquad (1)$$

where:

- X_j is the value of arms transfers from country *i* to a country *j*;
- $(10 - D_j)$ is the distance between the level of democracy of an arms importing country *j* and the maximum possible level of democracy (+10) in the Polity IV Score;
- X_i is the total of arms transfers from country *i*; and

[2] An alternative measure of democracy is the Freedom in the World index, published since 1972, which examines liberties across 20 dimensions. As there is a high correlation with the Polity IV Score (corr = 0.90), however, results would be similar.

- 20 (in the denominator) is the difference between the maximum (+10) and minimum (-10) possible values in the Polity IV Score.

The value of the index for the UK in 2010 is calculated here as an example. Looking first at the numerator of equation (1), had the UK exported weapons only to countries scoring +10, the numerator (and the index itself) would be 0. However, the UK exported weapons to countries with scores ranging from -10 to +10: for example, it exported US$ 550 million in weapons to Saudi Arabia (score of -10), US$ 40 million to China (score of -7), US$ 23 million to Bangladesh (score of +5) and US$ 211 million to the US (score of +10).[3] To calculate the index, the value of UK arms transfers to each importing country is multiplied by the difference between the importer's democracy score and the maximum value of the score (+10). For the abovementioned countries, after converting values to US$ billion, results are: 11 (0.55 × 20) for Saudi Arabia, 0.68 for China, 0.12 for Bangladesh and 0 for the US. These values are summed, including also values for all the other countries that imported weapons from the UK in 2010. This results in a numerator of 12.47. Next, this is divided by a value representing a hypothetical situation in which a country exported weapons only to countries scoring -10. In this case, as the UK exported US$ 1.15 billion in weapons in 2010, the value is 23. The result of equation (1) is therefore 0.54, which indicates the extent to which the UK exported weapons to autocracies in 2010. That same year, scores of other countries were: 0.43 for France, 0.39 for Russia, 0.38 for China, 0.21 for the US and 0.10 for Germany.

The ACHR index is based on insights from two types of work. First, from research that has looked at the effects of differences between political regimes. They are mostly

[3] Values are in constant 1990 US$.

based on democratic peace theory, exploring the extent to which regime dissimilarity leads to conflict (Dixon 1994; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; B. Russett 1994). Concerning arms exports, Akerman and Seim (2014) explored whether countries with a similar polity are more likely to trade weapons, concluding that this happened in the cold war but not since its end. Nevertheless, their model does not give more weight to countries receiving more weapons. For example, a hypothetical transfer of US$ 500 million in arms from a democratic country *i* to a non-democratic country *j* would have the same weight of a transfer of US$ 100 million from the same country *i* to a democratic country *k*. They would annul each other, although more weapons would have been exported to a non-democratic country.

Second, from research looking at potential gaps between policies and practice on human rights.[4] On this literature, I draw primarily from works that have sought to measure this gap in the case of arms exports. Soysa and Midford (2012) compared the US and China's behaviour, concluding that the US is more likely to export weapons to autocracies and human rights abusers than China. However, some of their claims are not fully justified. They argue, for example, that 'Beijing shows restraint in its arms exports to authoritarians […] because China […] is not very dependent on arms sales' (Soysa and Midford 2012, 854). It is not possible to conclude this without looking at the decision-making on arms exports in China. Perhaps China would export more weapons to autocracies if it had the opportunity to do so.

[4] A list of studies measuring gaps between policies and practice on human rights is in Landman (2004, pp. 907–908)

Regression analysis

Values of the ACHR index have been calculated and used as part of a panel data model to test whether levels of democracy are associated to humanitarian concerns in arms exports. In the model, values of the index are the dependent variable while levels of democracy are the independent variable of interest. The period of analysis is 1960-2016, with this starting year being chosen for two reasons: *i*) data availability, as information before 1960 is scarce; and *ii*) because military industries destroyed during World War II had recovered by then, as in the cases of Czechoslovakia, France, Italy and West Germany.

All major arms exporting countries in the period have been included in the model. As some countries were created or split after the end of the cold war, I initially selected the 20 largest arms exporters that continually existed during the period 1960-2016.[5] Next, I added the three largest arms exporters that either were created or split during the period: Belarus, Czechoslovakia and Ukraine. Due to a general lack of data, North Korea was removed from the sample, totalling therefore 22 countries, which in the period 1960-2016 exported 98% of the total global arms trade.

The variable level of democracy was lagged in 3 years. This is important because values of the index are of the year when weapons are delivered, rather than when arms deal are authorized. Deliveries of weapons therefore reflect decisions taken in previous years. There are seven control variables. *First*, the proportion of weapons exported to autocracies depends, of course, on their demand: if demand is low, values of the index might be low for this reason. In the model, this variable is measured by the total amount

[5] Ordered according to the value of weapons exported in the period: United States, Soviet Union/Russia, France, United Kingdom, West Germany/Germany, China, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, Israel, Sweden, Spain, Canada, Poland, South Korea, Norway, Brazil, North Korea, Australia and South Africa.

of weapons imported by autocracies (countries scoring equal or below -5 in the Polity IV Score) in each year. *Second*, values of the index might depend on the market-share of arms exporting countries. Countries with a low market-share have fewer incentives to restrict exports for humanitarian reasons, as they risk losing an already small market. This variable is measured by the market-share in the global arms trade of a country in a given year. *Third*, it might depend on the military power of arms exporting countries: great powers depend less on foreign acquisitions to keep military industries viable, which might lead them to exert more restraint on arms exports. Others, however, might need to export weapons to keep industries in operation, having fewer incentives to adopt humanitarian concerns. This variable is measured by a country's military expenditures in a given year. *Fourth*, variation in the level of military expenditures might impact the state behaviour: decreasing military expenditures imply less domestic procurement, creating incentives to export more weapons. This variable is measured by the annual change in military expenditures. *Fifth*, it might depend on the overall condition of the economy in arms exporting countries: poor economic performance creates incentives to export more weapons. In the model, this is measured by economic growth rates. *Sixth*, as the effect of democracy could indirectly capture the effect of levels of development, it is necessary to control for it. I adopt the approach of Voeten (2000), who uses GDP per capita. *Seventh*, I controlled for potential effects of the cold war, which could bias the other covariants in at least two ways: *i*) the total amount of weapons imported during the cold war was higher than after its end; and *ii*) during the cold war, arms transfers frequently aimed at keeping or expanding spheres of influence to an extent not observed since its end.

As there is substantial short-term variation in variables 2 through 5, I use moving averages for the previous 3-year periods. For example, military expenditures for the UK in

2010 are the average of the period 2007-09. The following sources are used: for arms exports and military expenditures, data is from SIPRI; for GDP growth, data is from the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015), complemented with data from the World Bank for 2015-16; and for GDP per capita, data is from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt et al. 2018).

A panel data regression has been run, using random-effect estimators. Random effects have been chosen after running a Hausman test. I have opted not to run a robust regression (using the Huber-White sandwich estimator) due to the relatively small-*n* (22 countries) (Imbens and Kolesar 2016, 1). Although one of the variables was lagged, this does not affect the model's consistency, since the *t* is relatively large (57 years) (Baltagi 2008, 130). Results are in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1

Determinants of arms exports to autocracies: 1960-2016

DV: ACHR index	(1) *N* = 1039	(2) *N* = 931	(3) *N* = 931
Level of democracy in arms exporting country (3 year-lagged)	-0.020 *** (0.002)	-0.020 *** (0.002)	-0.020 *** (0.002)
Total arms imports by autocracies [1]	0.012 *** (0.001)	0.013 *** (0.001)	0.012 *** (0.001)
Market-share of arms exporting country	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Military expenditures of arms exporting country [2]			-0.001 (0.001)
Annual growth rate of military expenditures in arms exporting country			-0.001 (0.001)
Economic growth rate of arms exporting country		0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
GDP per capita of arms exporting country [3]		0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Cold war	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.027 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.026)
Intercept	0.367 (0.029)	0.346 (0.036)	0.342 (0.037)
Overall R^2	0.4457	0.3183	0.3168

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** ≤ .001.

Note: models 2 and 3 have few observations mainly because there is no data for Czechoslovakia.

[1] 1990 US$.

[2] 2015 US$.


[3] 2011 US$.

Results suggest that democracies export a lower proportion of weapons to autocracies. An additional unit of the Polity IV score decreases the expected value of the index by around 0.02. Therefore, increasing the level of democracy from 1 to 10 is expected to decrease the index by around 0.2. Results for the three models are similar: the effect of democracy is significant, and the value of the coefficient does not vary substantially. In addition to weapons imported by autocracies, no other variable was significant. As the variable of interest is level of democracy, its marginal effect was plotted (based on model

1). Results are in Graph 3.1, showing the predicted ranges of values of the index across all levels of the indicator.

Graph 3.1

Marginal effect of democracy on ACHR index's values



As observed in Graph 3.1, a country with a score of 10 in the Polity IV Score is expected to have an index value of around 0.3, while a country with a score of -10 is expected to have a value of around 0.7. A test of multicollinearity was run for all models, resulting in variance inflation factors (VIF) above 2.5 for some variables. This should not be a problem, however, as the variable of interest in model 1 had a VIF below that threshold (Goldberger 1991, chap. 23). Next, standardized Pearson residuals were calculated to identify possible outliers. Results indicate that no observation has residuals above 2 or below -2.

These results suggest that levels of democracy partially explain the state behaviour regarding arms exports. Decisions are therefore based not only on systemic pressures: domestic politics plays a role. This subsection has presented only initial evidence for this argument. The next sections measure the state behaviour on arms exports using different dependent variables, also testing whether levels of democracy play a role in the decision-making.

Are democracies more likely to support international regulations on arms transfers? An analysis of positions on UNGA resolutions

Comparing arms export policies from different countries is problematic not only because behaviour and policies may not match but also because humanitarian concerns might not be made public through explicit policies. This might happen because states prefer to make decisions on a case-by-case basis or due to a perceived Western (or northern) bias of the human rights agenda. This implies that some states might not use a *language* of human rights although in practice having a similar behaviour to countries using such language.

This problem can be partially solved by the analysis of state positions on international resolutions and treaties, whose texts are public and have a standardized language. This is the case of UNGA resolutions, on which votes reveal preferences in a way that can be easily measured and compared. As there is a limited range of possible votes/positions (favour, against, abstention, absence), and treaties have a standardized language, it is possible to turn them into a categorical variable and specify models to explain why states sign (or not) these resolutions.

In the period 2001-2015, ten resolutions on conventional weapons transfer control were voted in the UNGA, according to a dataset organised by Voeten (2013). Votes on these resolutions have been coded and turned into a dependent variable, and then included in the model presented in this section. The fact that resolutions have four potential categories of voting (favour, against, abstention, absence), however, raises the question of how abstentions and absences should be categorized. Abstentions indicate neutrality, case in which they should be classified in a third category, alongside positive (favour) and negative (against) votes. Since the mid-1960s, however, abstentions in the UNGA have been used to express opposition rather than neutrality (Voeten 2000, 193). For this reason, abstentions have been coded as negative votes. The case of absences is slightly more complex, as they could result from opposition to a resolution, lack of personnel to attend a voting session (especially for very small countries), or random reasons. As they are in practice equivalent to abstentions, part of the literature consider them as such (B. M. Russett 1966, 329–30). Voeten (2000, 193), however, considers them as missing data, an approach that has also been adopted here. Resolutions are listed in Table 3.2. As the resolution R/68/31 (on the Arms Trade Treaty) is analysed separately in section 4, it has been excluded from the analysis in this section.

There is at least one potential objection to using these resolutions as a proxy. As they are not legally binding, voting is costless, and therefore would not indicate state preferences. The fact that most resolutions are adopted without a vote would be additional evidence for that. Voted resolutions, however, are more controversial and politicized, thus indicating preferences (Hosli et al. 2010, 5; Peterson 2006, 74). In the case of the ATT, for example, voting not only occurred but also led to the creation of a legally-binding treaty.

Table 3.2

UNGA resolutions on arms control (2001-2015)

Resolution	Date	Description	Voting: yes–abstention–no
R/57/66	07 Nov 02	National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology	166-0-0
R/61/77	06 Dec 06	Transparency in armaments	158-21-0
R/63/69	02 Dec 08	Transparency in armaments	160-22-0
R/64/48	02 Dec 09	The Arms Trade Treaty	152-19-1
R/64/54	02 Dec 09	Transparency in armaments	153-23-0
R/66/39	02 Dec 11	Transparency in armaments	156-23-0
R/67/234	24 Dec 12	The Arms Trade Treaty	133-17-0
R/68/31	05 Dec 13	The Arms Trade Treaty	152-29-0
R/68/43	05 Dec 13	Transparency in armaments	154-28-0
R/68/44	05 Dec 13	National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology	177-4-0

The dependent variable is the state position on the abovementioned UNGA resolutions, while the independent variable of interest is the level of democracy in the country voting on these resolutions. There are five control variables. *First*, votes might depend on the market-share of arms exporting countries, for the same reason explained in section 2. Observations having a value of zero (country-years in which there were no arms exports) cannot be discarded, however, because the non-participation in the international arms market is likely to influence a state position on the arms trade. To deal with this, country-years have been coded into a ten-level scale, as presented in Table 3.3. Although this hinders a direct comparison between models presented in section 1 and in this section, this is necessary to deal with a sample including both exporters and non-exporters of weapons. *Second*, it is expected that the greater the imports the lower the

probability of a vote in favour of international arms transfer resolutions. Major importers of weapons are not expected to sign them because they would face stricter controls on arms imports, potentially harming their security. Countries have been coded into a ten-level scale, also shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3

Categories for exports and imports of weapons

Value of exports or imports (US$ 1990 million)	**Category**
Zero	0
0.01 – 9.9	1
10.0 – 19.9	2
20.0 – 39.9	3
40.0 – 79.9	4
80.0 – 159.9	5
160.0 – 319.9	6
320.0 – 639.9	7
640.0 – 1279.9	8
> 1279.9	9

Third, voting decisions might depend on the military power of arms exporting countries, as explained in section 2. There is a question, however, on how to deal with countries that do not maintain standing armies. These observations should not be discarded because the absence of standing armies is likely to influence a state position on the arms trade. Similar to what has been done for arms exports/imports, countries have been coded into a ten-level scale, as observed in Table 3.4. *Fourth*, as a stricter control on arms transfers might curb the inflow of guns from abroad, high levels of internal violence are expected to be associated to state support to international regulations on arms

transfers. Homicide rates are used to measure internal violence. Data have been converted into the logarithmic scale, as additional units have a stronger impact at lower levels of the indicator. *Fifth*, GDP per capita is a control variable, as levels of democracy might capture the effect of levels of development. Data has also been converted into the logarithmic scale.

Table 3.4

Categories for military expenditures (US$ 2015 million)

Military expenditures	Category
No standing military	0
0.01 – 0.24	1
0.25 – 0.49	2
0.50 – 0.99	3
1.00 – 1.99	4
2.00 – 3.99	5
4.00 – 7.99	6
8.00 – 15.99	7
16.00 – 31.99	8
> 31.99	9

The following sources have been used: for military expenditures, arms exports and arms imports, data is from Sipri; for homicide rates, data is from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); and for GDP per capita, data is from the World Bank.[6]

Panel data analysis has not been used because the content of resolutions is not constant across time. A vote on a resolution on transparency, for example, is not

[6] Data is from the World Bank (rather than the Maddison Project Database, as done in last section) because information is available for a larger number of countries. Data of the Maddison Project Database was adequate for the last section because the analysis covered a larger period and the sample of countries was smaller.

dependent on a voting on a resolution about national legislation on arms exports. Furthermore, panel data analysis would be problematic because resolutions on arms transfers are not voted at regular time intervals and there are multiple observations per year. Part of the literature suggests the use of interpolation as a solution for the first problem, which others show to have various drawbacks (Eckner 2012). Rather, I have opted to run a probit model with year-dummies. Results of the regression are presented in Table 3.5. A test of multicollinearity was run for all models, resulting in variance inflation factors above 2.5. As it happened for the model presented in the last section, however, the independent variable of interest had a VIF below this threshold.

Table 3.5

Determinants of state positions on UNGA resolutions on arms transfer control: 2001-2015

DV: voting on UNGA resolutions on arms transfer control	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Odds ratio (*n* = 1189)	Odds ratio (*n* = 1189)	Odds ratio (*n* = 846)
Level of democracy	0.127 *** (0.015)	0.128 *** (0.015)	0.136 *** (0.021)
Military expenditures (10 categories) [1]	-0.169 * (0.073)	-0.190 * (0.077)	-0.168 (0.093)
Arms exports (10 categories)	0.139 * (0.063)	0.139 * (0.058)	0.135 * (0.066)
Arms imports (10 categories)	-0.014 (0.063)	-0.008 (0.062)	-0.033 (0.074)
GDP per capita (logged)		0.051 (0.077)	0.107 (0.100)
Homicide rates (logged) [2]			-0.015 (0.085)
Intercept	1.544	1.115	0.574
McFadden's R^2	0.3397	0.3409	0.3513

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** ≤ .001.

1 Sovereign nations with no standing armies were coded as 0. Small or micro-states with standing armies but no data were coded as 1.

2 Some countries had a value of zero. As in a logarithmic scale this value is discarded, a value of 0.1 was assigned.


Model 1 has variables measuring only military power and participation in the arms international market, while models 2 and 3 include countries' characteristics. In model 1, an additional number in the Polity IV score increases by around 13% the odds of a state voting in favour of UNGA resolutions on arms transfer control. Also in model 1, military expenditures and arms exports were statistically significant. The direction of the effect was the one expected for military expenditures, although not for arms exports. Finally, arms imports and homicide rates were not statistically significant.

Although the effect of the variable of interest (democracy) may seem obvious, it is at odds with results presented in Voeten (2000). He found that, between 1991 and 1996, democracy did not have a significant effect on the likelihood of states signing UNGA resolutions on disarmament. He found, however, a significant effect of democracy on other issue areas, such as human rights and colonialism (Voeten 2000). It is worth to stress nonetheless that he had different objectives and used different statistical tools and control variables.

As the variable of interest is level of democracy, its marginal effect was plotted (based on model 2). Results are in Graph 3.2, showing the predicted probabilities of voting in favour of UNGA resolutions across all levels of the indicator.

Graph 3.2

Marginal effect of democracy on positions on UNGA resolutions



Standardized Pearson residuals were calculated to identify possible outliers. Results indicate that no observation had residuals above 2 or below -2.

As a potential criticism of these models, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) argued that the effect of democracy on human rights occurs only at high levels of the variable. In other words, countries that are not full democracies do not exhibit better human rights records than autocracies, which might potentially bias results presented in Table 3.5. For this reason, two other models have been specified, in which levels of democracy were rearranged into three categories: autocracy (-10 to -6), anocracy (-5 to +5), and democracy (+6 to +10). The same control variables used in models 1-3 are being used here. Results are in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6

Determinants of state positions on UNGA resolutions on arms transfer control: 2001-2015 (3 categories for levels of democracy)

DV: voting on UNGA resolutions on arms transfer control	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Odds ratio (*n* = 1189)	Odds ratio (*n* = 1189)	Odds ratio (*n* = 854)
Level of democracy	1.033 *** (0.136)	1.037 *** (0.139)	1.028 *** (0.183)
Military expenditures (10 categories)	-0.136 (0.072)	-0.160 * (0.074)	-0.118 (0.088)
Arms exports (10 categories)	0.161 ** (0.055)	0.160 ** (0.057)	0.149 * (0.065)
Arms imports (10 categories)	-0.037 (0.062)	-0.030 (0.061)	-0.080 (0.073)
GDP per capita (logged)		0.058 (0.075)	0.127 (0.091)
Homicide rates (logged)			-0.028 (0.085)
Intercept	0.383	-0.014	-0.543
McFadden's R^2	0.3299	0.3316	0.3317

Results are not substantially different from those presented in table 3.5: the independent variable of interest remained at the same level of statistical significance. In model 4, a hypothetical change from autocracy to anocracy would increase by 2 the odds of a state voting in favour of a UNGA resolution on arms transfer control. A test of multicollinearity was run for all models, resulting in variance inflation factors (VIF) above 2.5 for all variables. This should be considered and therefore results should be interpreted with caution.

Positions on legally-binding international treaties: the Ottawa Convention

To complement the analysis conducted in the last section, this and the next sections examine determinants of state positions on two international legally-binding treaties: the Ottawa Convention (1997) and the Arms Trade Treaty (2013). As they regulate conventional weapons, an association between democracy and state positions on these treaties would corroborate the hypothesis that democracy plays a role in positions on arms exports. This section explores determinants of positions on the Ottawa Convention while the next one does the same for the ATT.

The Ottawa Convention has been selected for theoretical, methodological and empirical reasons. Theoretically, the existence of this convention presents a few puzzles. The first one is that various states abdicated from conducting negotiations under the United Nations, accepting to do it in an *ad hoc* space, which was something that NGOs pushed to. The second one is that various countries that had produced and exported landmines joined the treaty – and some of them even promoted it. What incentives did they have to do that? And what caused their change of behaviour? The third puzzle is that some countries signing the convention were major allies from the United States, which nonetheless opposed the treaty: why did they opt to diverge from the US? Methodologically, votes on this convention reveal state preferences, and can be turned into a categorical variable. In addition, if similar determinants of voting behaviour on this treaty and on UNGA resolutions are found, this would suggest that the effect of democracy occurs in cases of both soft and hard law. Furthermore, when a single treaty is analysed across different countries, the variable *issue* is held constant, and focus can be on other

variables of interest. Empirically, analysing the process leading to the Ottawa Convention can help to better understand the possibilities and limits of CSOs' influence on disarmament and arms control. This could help CSOs, states and international organizations to improve strategies of pressure, negotiation and decision-making.

The process leading to the Ottawa Convention

The creation of the Ottawa Convention has been extensively analysed in the literature, reason why it is not examined in detail here.[7] The literature stresses the role of a transnational advocacy network, whose activities led to the creation of a universal treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. This network was created in 1993 by a group of six NGOs, which formed the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), an umbrella organisation that was later joined by various other groups – totalling around 600 in May 1996. The campaign gathered support from a few governments, celebrities, the pope and major media outlets, including *The Economist*, *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*.

Although various governments supported the campaign and most eventually joined the convention, the campaign was created by civil society groups: 'it was not states but civil society and international organizations that were the primary catalysts for identifying and politicizing the situation as a crisis issue on state agendas' (Price 1998, 621–24). Nevertheless, rather than merely pressuring states as outsiders, NGOs cooperated with

[7] The process leading to the Ottawa Convention is one of the most studied cases in the literature on transnational advocacy networks. See, for example: Anderson (2000); Cameron et al. (1998); Faulkner (2007); Krause (2014); Latham (2000); Long (2002); Matthew et al. (2006); Matthew and Rutherford (2003); Rutherford (2011, 1999, 2000); Short (1999); Tepe (2012); Wapner (2006); Wexler (2003); Williams and Goose (2005).

international organisations and governments in various occasions. In 1995, for example, they were part of the British and Australian delegations to a conference reviewing the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Also, the Canadian government was a major promoter of this 'unconventional diplomacy', in which states were not the only actors taking part in negotiations (Price 1998, 621–24).

The literature has also explored why a ban on landmines was adopted as an international norm while other issues were not. Price, for example, argued that a ban on landmines was possible because it resonated with already established norms concerning indiscriminate weapons, as well as weapons causing unnecessary suffering (Price 1998, 621–24). Nevertheless, little is said on the incentives that individual countries had to join the Convention, which is explored in this subsection and in country studies on Brazil and the UK.

Regression analysis

The model presented in this section is similar to the one presented in section 2. The dependent variable is the state position on the Ottawa Convention, as voted on the 3rd December 1997. States could vote in favour, against, to abstain or be absent. Votes against the convention and abstentions have been coded in the same category, while absences have been considered as missing values.

The independent variable of interest is level of democracy. There are four control variables, two of which were used in sections 1 and 2: military expenditures and GDP per capita, with military expenditures being the average for the previous 3-year periods (1994-96). In addition, the model controls for two other variables. First, for whether a country

had landmines planted in its territory: countries having landmines should be less likely to sign the treaty, as landmines were probably perceived by governments as militarily useful. Data from *The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, published annually by the ICBL and the Cluster Munition Coalition. Information from reports published between 2011 and 2016 were coded into a binary variable: 1 for countries that had landmines planted in their territories in 1997 and 0 for countries that had not. Second, the model controls for whether there had been domestic production of landmines at some point. This is relevant because countries with capacity to produce landmines would need to give up on doing that by signing the convention. It is therefore expected that countries that manufactured landmines at some point were less likely to sign the convention than others. Data is also based on *The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* and was coded in the same way: 1 for countries that manufactured landmines at some point and 0 for countries that never did it.

As the dependent variable is binary, a logistic regression was run to estimate the effect of explanatory variables. Results are presented in Table 3.7. The models indicate that democratic countries were more likely to sign the Ottawa Convention. Increasing the Polity IV score by one unit would increase by around 14% the likelihood of a state signing it. As expected, countries that had landmines planted in their territories were less likely to sign the treaty. Being a producer or former producer of landmines, however, did not influence a state position. The variables military expenditures and GDP per capita were not significant either, indicating that positions on the treaty did not depend on levels of military power or development.

Table 3.7

Determinants of state positions on the Ottawa Convention (1997)

DV: state vote on the Ottawa Convention	Model 1	Model 2
	Odds ratio (*n* = 148)	Odds ratio (*n* = 148)
Level of democracy (1997)	0.128 ** (0.043)	0.128 ** (0.043)
Landmines planted in the territory in 1997	-1.522 ** (0.483)	-1.512 ** (0.567)
Manufactured landmines at some point	-0.904 (0.751)	-0.902 (0.753)
Military expenditures (10 categories) [1, 2]	-0.214 (0.125)	-0.217 (0.161)
GDP per capita (logged) [3]		-0.008 (0.233)
Intercept	2.936	2.937
McFadden's R^2	0.2294	0.2294

Notes:

[1] Sovereign nations with no standing armies in 1997 were coded as'0. Small or micro-states with standing armies but no data were coded as 1.


[2] When data was inexistent, information is from the closest year. These were the cases of: Benin (1999), Bosnia & Herzegovina (2002), Congo (2001), Gabon (2000), Libya (1997), Macedonia (1996), Qatar (2002), the United Arab Emirates (1997) and Vietnam (1994). There is no data for Afghanistan, Cuba, Iraq, Liberia, North Korea, Somalia and Syria.

[3] When data for 1997 was inexistent, information is from the closest year. These were the cases of: Afghanistan (2002), Haiti (1998), Iraq (2000), Libya (1999), Maldives (2001), Qatar (2000), São Tomé and Príncipe (2000). There is not data for Jamaica, North Korea, Myanmar and Somalia.

As the variable of interest is level of democracy, its marginal effect was plotted (based on model 1). Results are in Graph 3.3, showing the predicted ranges of probabilities across all levels of the indicator.

Graph 3.3

Marginal effect of democracy on positions on the Ottawa Convention



A country with a score of +10 in the Polity IV Score had a probability between 85-97% of signing the convention, while a country with a score of -10 had a probability between 35-71% of doing it. A test of multicollinearity was run for all models, resulting in VIF above 2.5 for some variables. This should not be a problem, however, as the variable of interest had a VIF below that threshold (Goldberger 1991, chap. 23). Next, standardized Pearson residuals were calculated to identify possible outliers (using model 1), with results indicating that 12 observations have residuals above 2 or below -2. The Pregibon leverage of the model was plotted to check these outliers' leverage in the model. Although 14 countries have a high leverage (above twice the average hat-value, *i.e.*, 0.013), none of them are outliers. Results of the model are therefore not being biased by outliers.

Next section runs a similar model for the case of the ATT, a multilateral agreement aimed at regulating the international arms trade.

Positions on legally-binding international treaties: the Arms Trade Treaty

This section provides additional evidence for the argument that being a democracy shapes the behaviour of states on arms exports. This is done through an analysis of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a legally-binding international agreement aimed at regulating international arms transfers, which entered into force in December 2014. This treaty has been selected for theoretical, methodological, and empirical reasons. Theoretically, it presents three puzzles. The first one is that countries that regularly export weapons to authoritarian regimes, such as France, the UK and the US, have signed it. As the ATT has provisions limiting exports to countries in which human rights are violated, which incentives did they have to sign it? The second one is that joining the ATT increases uncertainty, as governments do not know in advance the countries to which they will not be able to export weapons in the future. This is different from arms embargoes or treaties banning specific types of weapons: on the former, states may adopt positions on a case-by-case basis, based on the degree to which their interests are affected; on the latter, states know in advance that they cannot export certain types of weapons but can keep an arms trade relationship with a certain country. The third puzzle is that the UK not only supported the treaty but was also one of its main promoters. In previous cases, such as the Ottawa Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions, mid-size states – such as Canada and Norway – promoted them. As the UK is a great power (though a declining one), this argument cannot explain its position.

Methodologically, the ATT reveals state preferences on the international regulation of the arms trade in a way that can be easily compared, as the treaty is equally valid for all states and votes can be turned into a categorical variable. Empirically, analysing it can help to better understand the possibilities and limits of CSOs' influence on disarmament and arms control.

The process leading to the ATT

The process leading to the ATT has been analysed in the academic literature, UN reports and policy papers.[8] As it has been less explored than the Ottawa process (in part because it is more recent), it is summarized here to provide context for the quantitative analysis of this chapter and qualitative studies in chapters 4-10.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the P-5 discussed potential ways of introducing a stricter control on the arms trade, since Iraq had used mainly imported weapons during the war. There was a consensus among the P-5 that governments should follow stricter principles and norms when making decisions on arms exports, which they made public in 1991 through the *Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers* (China et al. 1991). The EU did something similar, creating in 1991-92 a set of eight criteria to be applied on decisions concerning arms exports.

As a few CSOs considered these guidelines vague, they prepared in 1993 a proposal for a potential code of conduct on arms exports (Mack and Wood 2009, 3–4).[9] Later, in

[8] See, for example: Bromley et al. (2012); Dye (2009); Erickson (2007); Garcia (2011); Henderson (2017); Wood and Abdul-Rahim (2015).
[9] Also: interview with Rasha Abdul-Rahim, London, 12 Oct 2016.

1997, a group of 15 Nobel Peace Prize Laureates and 3 CSOs, led by the former president of Costa Rica, Óscar Arias, launched a proposal for a global arms trade code of conduct, known as the *Nobel Peace Laureates Code (NPL Code)*.[10] In 2001, that same group circulated the *Draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers*, which states and other actors were invited to consider during negotiations for the creation of regulations on arms transfers. While the NPL Code was signed by three CSOs, the Draft Framework was signed by eight, indicating the formation of a broader coalition. Furthermore, in comparison to the *Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers*, proposals were more detailed, including types of arms that should be regulated and giving more space to human rights as a criterion to transfer weapons.[11]

In parallel, after the EU Code of Conduct was approved in 1998, CSOs sought to extend the policy adopted by the EU to other countries (Stavrianakis 2010, 57). In that context, like-minded CSOs formed the Code Working Group, which circulated in 2000 a set of guidelines for international arms transfers, which they called the *Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers*. This group of CSOs elaborated and promoted this document as a proposal for a future treaty controlling arms transfers, reason why the group was renamed in 2002 as the ATT Steering Committee (ATTSC) (Mack and Wood 2009, 4). The ATTSC agreed that two CSOs – Amnesty and Oxfam – should build an international campaign to support the ATT, which was later joined by the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). In 2003, they launched the Control Arms Campaign, which became a hub for an advocacy network that was built over the following years (Dye 2009, 2).

[10] The CSOs were: American Friends Service Committee, Amnesty International, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

[11] The organizations that signed the Draft Convention (in addition to three original signatories) were: Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Friends Committee on National Legislation, Oxfam, Project Ploughshares, and Saferworld.

The ATTSC was created in part due to frustration with processes occurring under the UN. In 2001, the UN had organized a conference to discuss the illicit trade of SALW, whose main result was the Programme of Action (PoA). Under the PoA, states committed to implement legislation on the production and transfer of weapons, improve safety of arms deposits, control imports and exports, mark weapons to enable tracing, among others (United Nations 2001). However, PoA was not legally-binding and focused on activities already considered illicit: it did not seek to turn licit activities into illicit, such as arms exports to human rights violators.[12] Further frustration emerged in 2005, when the UNGA created the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), under the PoA. This was a system in which weapons should be marked and records archived, enabling a universal identification of weapons. States were not obliged to adopt the system, however, and ammunition was not included.

The Control Arms Campaign was therefore a spin-off of the PoA. It pressured and sought to persuade governments on the importance of a comprehensive and legally-binding treaty on arms transfers. In 2005, it published the document *Global principles for international arms transfers*, and in 2006 it sent the *Million Faces* petition to the UN, containing pictures of people supporting a stricter arms control. The campaign also provided a platform for people to talk about impacts of arms on their lives, whose reports were consolidated in the document *Voices from around the world: the people's consultation for an arms trade treaty*, published in 2007 (Mack and Wood 2009, 15). That same year, the campaign obtained support from a few political leaders, celebrities and journalists, including the Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the actress Helen Mirren,

[12] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 26 Sep 2017.

and the journalist Christiane Amanpour (Control Arms Campaign 2007). Seminars were also organized: in 2008, for example, IANSA, Oxfam and Saferworld organized a conference in Kenya, in which representatives from 20 African countries, regional organizations and other CSOs participated (US Embassy Nairobi 2008). When the campaign was launched, only three countries supported it (Costa Rica, Mali and Cambodia). In 2006, when a group of seven countries presented a resolution to the UNGA, 50 countries declared support to the treaty.

The process for creating the treaty started officially in 2006, when seven states presented a draft resolution at the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly, 2006).[13] The document was adopted by the UNGA in December 2006, which thus recognized a lack of common standards on international arms transfers. The UNGA then asked the Secretary-General to conduct two activities: *i*) consult positions of member-states on a potential treaty on arms transfers; and *ii*) create a group of governmental experts (GGE) to examine 'the feasibility, scope and draft parameters' of an arms trade treaty (United Nations General Assembly, 2006). The GGE was composed of government representatives from 28 countries, whose analyses ended up using three types of source: *i*) views of member states, which had already been sent to the secretary-general; *ii*) documents and papers from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research; and *iii*) papers from academics, such as Rachel Stohl (United Nations 2008, 11). The report had an overall negative approach, stressing the difficulty of creating a universal treaty and suggesting options other than a legally-binding instrument (United Nations 2008, 11).

[13] Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the UK.

In 2009, however, one more resolution was approved, which launched negotiations for the treaty. Between 2010 and 2012, there were four preparatory meetings, negotiating the draft text. This culminated in a conference in 2012, when there was no agreement. In April 2013, a new meeting was held, this time under the UNGA, when the treaty was approved.

The ATT as a combination of hard and soft law

The ATT is a legally-binding agreement, implying at a first sight that it is a case of hard law. As hard and soft law are ideal types, however, cases are in practice situated in a spectrum between two extreme points. Abbott et al. (2000) proposed eight possible degrees of 'hardness' in international law, based on three criteria: obligation, precision and delegation. Cases having high levels of these three variables are closer to the *hard law* ideal type, while cases with low levels of these variables are closer to the *anarchy* ideal type. The ATT is situated around the mid-point in this spectrum: although it is obligatory, it has 'softening devices', which reduce sovereignty costs associated to legally-binding treaties. This is observed in one of the ATT principles, according to which it is necessary to consider the 'legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional arms to exercise their right to self-defence and for peacekeeping operations'. Also, concerning settlement of disputes, Article 19 uses vague language, not giving details on how disputes should be addressed: 'States Parties shall consult and, by mutual consent, cooperate to pursue settlement of any dispute […] through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or other peaceful means.' Finally, the ATT does not delegate authority to international institutions.

These elements make the ATT a hybrid piece of legislation, with elements of both hard and soft law. This does not mean, however, that the treaty is not significant. There are two main reasons for that. First, hard law is usually preceded by soft law, as argued by Goldstein (2001). Therefore, changes usually occur incrementally rather than through ruptures (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006, 382; North 1993, 64). This does not imply, of course, that the ATT is necessarily a stage towards strict international controls on the arms trade. The regime can evolve in any direction: stronger or weaker. Second, a hard regime is not necessarily better than a soft one. As argued by Goldstein (2001), hard legalization is not necessarily the 'optimal form'.

Regression analysis

The model presented here is similar to the one used for the Ottawa Convention. The dependent variable is the state position on the ATT, based on votes on the UNGA resolution that created it in December 2013. The independent variable of interest is level of democracy. There are five independent variables, which are similar to those presented in the previous sections: *i*) levels of military expenditures (in ten categories); *ii*) levels of arms exports (also in ten categories); *iii*) levels of arms imports (also in ten categories); *iv*) GDP per capita, which is justified because levels of democracy could capture the effect of levels of development; and *v*) homicide rates, as countries with high levels of violence have incentives to join the treaty to curb the inflow of weapons from abroad. Variable 1 is measured using averages for the 3-year period before the treaty (2010-12). As the treaty implies a long-term commitment on arms transfer policies, I used averages for longer

periods for variables 2 and 3, covering 2002-2013. Data for GDP per capita and homicide rates have been converted into the logarithmic scale. Results are in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8

Determinants of state positions on the ATT

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Odds ratio (*n* = 145)	Odds ratio (*n* = 145)	Odds ratio (*n* = 145)
Level of democracy (2013)	1.261 *** (0.062)	1.269 *** (0.065)	1.268 *** (0.064)
Military expenditures (10 categories) [2]	0.508 ** (0.121)	0.477 ** (0.125)	0.481 ** (0.128)
Arms exports (10 categories)	1.267 (0.205)	1.261 (0.208)	1.256 (0.209)
Arms imports (10 categories)	1.365 (0.265)	1.373 (0.267)	1.361 (0.273)
GDP per capita (2013) (logged)		1.228 (0.388)	1.189 (0.439)
Homicide rates (2013) (logged)			0.949 (0.298)
Intercept	12.168	2.387	3.449
McFadden's R^2	0.3472	0.3506	0.3508

*** $p < .01$.

[1] Sovereign nations with no standing armies were coded as 0. Small or micro-states with standing armies but no data were coded as 1.

[2] When data was inexistent, information is from the closest year. These were the cases of: Djibouti (2009), Equatorial Guinea (2009), Gambia (2012), Guinea (2012), Mauritania (2012), Myanmar (2012), Sudan (2009), and Tajikistan (2012). There is no data for Eritrea, North Korea, Somalia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.


Two variables were statistically significant at a level of 5%: *level of democracy* and *military expenditures*. Their effect was also substantial. In model 1, an additional point in the Polity IV score increased by 23% the odds of a state signing the treaty. In the case of military expenditures, fewer units (in the logarithmic scale) would decrease the probability of a state signing the treaty. These models demonstrate that signing the ATT did not depend on GDP per capita, homicide rates, number of guns per capita, arms exports, or

arms imports. The effect of *level of democracy* and *military expenditures* was significant in all of them, although the effect of military expenditures slightly varied across the models.

A test of multicollinearity was run for model 1, resulting in a VIF above 2.5 for some variables. This should not be a problem, as the variable of interest had a VIF below that threshold (Goldberger 1991, chap. 23). As the variable of interest is level of democracy, its marginal effect on the likelihood of a state signing the ATT was plotted. Results are in Graph 3.4.

Graph 3.4

Marginal effect of democracy on the likelihood of a state signing the ATT



Next, standardized Pearson residuals and deviance residuals were calculated to identify possible outliers, with eight observations having residuals above 2 or below -2. The Pregibon leverage of the model was calculated to check if outliers have great leverage in

the model. Although 14 observations have high leverage (above twice the average hat-value, *i.e.*, 0.04), none of them are outliers.

Concluding remarks

This chapter has proposed a few models to explain why governments have humanitarian concerns when making decisions on arms exports. Among states' characteristics that could explain this behaviour, democracies take humanitarian conditions in importing countries more into account than non-democracies. As evidence, they are less likely to export weapons to autocracies and more likely to vote in favour of UNGA resolutions on arms transfer control. They were also more likely to vote in favour of two international treaties regulating conventional weapons: the Ottawa Convention and the ATT.

I do not claim that democracy is more relevant than other variables, let alone that it is the most important factor to explain governments' behaviour on arms exports. Models presented in this chapter indicate, for example, that an increase in demand for weapons by autocracies is expected to increase arms exports from democracies to autocracies. Also, positions on UNGA resolutions were determined by factors other than levels of democracy: low levels of military expenditures, for example, made states more likely to vote in favour of arms transfer control. In other cases, democracy was not the only predictor either: having landmines in the territory, for example, influenced voting in the Ottawa Convention, and countries with high levels of military expenditures were more likely to sign the ATT. What I argue is that democracy is one among other factors, and that this indicates that domestic politics matter.

Nevertheless, as in most purely statistical analysis, this conclusion is a black box (Goldthorpe 2001, 9). It is not possible to know why levels of democracy are associated to humanitarian concerns in the decision-making. It is therefore necessary to explain the causal mechanism linking this variable to the dependent variable. As governments in democracies are more accountable to the public, I have hypothesized that activities conducted by CSOs are a central part of this mechanism. However, it is not possible to estimate the influence of CSOs based only on the finding that democratic states are less likely to sell weapons to autocracies and more likely to sign arms transfer control treaties. Possible alternative explanations are: government officials in democratic countries embrace liberal values; the public opinion pressure the government to be stricter; or there is a diffusion of norms from other democracies. This is dealt with in chapters 4-10, in which qualitative (and some quantitative) evidence shows that CSOs play a critical role in the introduction of humanitarian concerns in arms exports. I start with a study on Britain and then move on to a study on Brazil.

Chapter 4 – Foreign policy, party politics and arms exports in the UK

For over a century, Britain has been facing a long decline in its position of great power, caused by the end of its empire and the emergence of other great powers. The more Britain lost power resources, however, the more arms exports gained importance: its arms industry remained one of the few instruments that Britain could use to gain or keep influence on other countries' policies.

Although the British government systematically uses arms sales to influence other countries' policies and obtain economic benefits, I argue that democratic institutions moderate the use of weapons for those purposes. They create conditions for the emergence of norm entrepreneurs, which criticize the strategic use of arms exports or the profit-driven nature of arms sales, especially to authoritarian regimes. Activities from norm entrepreneurs have raised the salience of arms exports in domestic politics, making elites and the public care about it. This created, however, a tension between the instrumental use of arms exports and normative pressures. Divergent positions on arms exports are defended by different groups, which can form networks to further their agendas. As evidence of its contentiousness in Britain's domestic politics, at least since the 1960s, Labour governments (1964-70, 1974-79, and 1997-2010) have taken humanitarian concerns more into account in decisions on arms exports than Conservatives or Conservative-led coalitions (1970-74, 1979-97, and 2010-), even when facing similar structural constraints.

This raises at least two additional questions, however. First, why has the Labour Party cared more about humanitarian conditions in countries interested in buying British weapons? Second, Conservatives kept policies introduced by Labour governments, such as

an arms embargo on South Africa (kept by Edward Heath) and a ban on arms sales to Chile that might be used for domestic repression (kept by Thatcher). How to explain this?

This chapter argues that democracy matters in decisions concerning arms exports, corroborating results found in chapter 3. Democratic institutions, such as freedom of association, freedom of speech, the rule of law and the existence of an independent legislature have in various occasions moderated the strategic behaviour of the government. In addition, these institutions created conditions for the contestation of the legitimacy of using arms sales to pursue the national interest, and even of what the national interest in fact is.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Sections 1-3 explore the role of arms exports in British foreign and defence policies, comparing positions of Labour and Conservatives in three periods: between post-World War II and the late 1970s; in the Thatcher period; and in the post-Cold War period. This is followed by section 4, in which differences between Labour and Conservatives are further explored in a quantitative study.

Arms exports and foreign policy in a post-imperial Britain (1946-79)

After World War II, Britain's position in the world was substantially different from the one it had after World War I. Although it attempted to resume its role of great power, it had fewer resources to do that (Krause 1995, 128). Arms exports gained relative importance for this reason, especially because the UK's military industry was kept almost intact in comparison to continental Europe's. In addition, Britain was favoured by the fact that the Soviet Union did not export weapons outside the Eastern Bloc until the mid-1950s (Gerner 1983, 11). This context allowed Britain to achieve a high participation in the international

arms market: in the period 1950-59, the UK transferred 21% of the total global, behind the US (35%) and the Soviet Union (34%). Moreover, as a large proportion of US and Soviet transfers were grants rather than sales (Brzoska and Ohlson 1987, 38), British participation in the market of *sold* weapons was even larger. This was stressed in a Ministry of Defence's report from 1959, sent to prime-minister Harold Macmillan (1957-63):

> Both the Russians and the Americans find it worth while to give away expensive armaments or to supply them at bargain prices either for the political influence which goes with such supplies or on the principle that you can afford to give away the razor if you are paid for the razor blades.[1]

Arms exports were considered important because they could serve at least three purposes: *i*) generate typical economic gains, such as employment and foreign currency earnings; *ii*) reduce domestic procurement costs of military equipment; and *iii*) give the UK an instrument to influence other countries' policies. The first two aspects were relevant because they would mitigate Britain's post-war military burden. As shown in Graph 4.1, military expenditures remained relatively high after World War II. While in 1931-38 they were on average 2.9% of the UK GDP, in 1949-56 they were 9% of it.[2] They were increased to particularly high levels after the outbreak of the Korean War, based on a perceived need to prepare the UK for a 'world military conflagration'.[3] In contrast, in 1906-13, military expenditures had been on average 3.1% of UK's GDP, similar to the percentage observed in the period 1922-29.

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
[1] The National Archives (TNA): PREM 11/2680. Ministry of Defence, Strategic Exports (Official) Committee, Promotion of Arms Sales, 8 Jan 1959.

[2] Military expenditures remain high in the aftermath of conflicts because of demobilization costs. For this reason, the first year-basis for comparison is 1922 for World War I and 1949 for World War II.

[3] TNA: CAB 129/86. Ministry of Defence, Defence: outline of future policy, 26 Mar 1957 There are four versions of this document, from 15 Mar, 26 Mar, 28 Mar and 30 Mar 1957. This reference is from the second version.

Graph 4.1

Military expenditures in the UK: 1900-89 (as a proportion of GDP)



Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), UK.

A combination of Britain's relative decline and high military expenditures generated concerns about potential social and economic consequences. In 1950, this was expressed in a Cabinet meeting, in which it was emphasised that the military budget for 1951-52 would 'force the Government to choose between a lower standard of living or longer dependence on United States aid'.[4] In 1957, the minister of defence expressed concern that 7% of the working force, as well as about half of qualified scientists and engineers working with R&D, were working for the military sector.[5]

[4] TNA: CAB 128/18. Cabinet, Interference with military supplies, Conclusions of a meeting, on 25 July 1950, p. 3.

[5] TNA: CAB 129/86. Ministry of Defence, Defence: outline of future policy, 30 Mar 1957, p. 3. There are four versions of this document. This reference is from the fourth version.

As the British government perceived the need to allocate substantial resources to its military, how could it solve this problem? Among the possible ways, efficiency could be increased. A plan for reorganizing the military industrial base and the military was then set forth in the document *Defence: outline of future policy*, published in March 1957, known as Sandys White Paper.[6] According to this document, a more efficient defence sector would contribute to mitigate UK's military burden.

Another way to achieve this was through arms exports. This would mitigate the burden by making the defence sector generate (rather than only consume) resources. This was examined in 1952 by the Board of Trade, which assigned importance to arms exports because they could increase inflows of foreign currency, improve the balance of payments situation, maintain the military industry, and strengthen the defence of allies.[7] A similar rationale was observed in 1959, when prime-minister Macmillan asked the Ministry of Defence to find ways to expand arms exports.[8] In response, the Ministry of Defence argued that: 'foreign orders […] reduce the unit cost of equipment to our own forces' and 'enable us to influence policy in some uncommitted parts of the world'.[9] This fit well into a context where Britain's power resources had become scarcer, especially after the Suez Crisis (Keohane, 2000, p. 7-8).

British arms exports reached a peak in the mid-1950s, however, decreasing from then on, as shown in Graphs 4.2 and 4.3.

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[6] TNA: CAB 129/86. Ministry of Defence, Defence: outline of future policy, Mar 1957.
NATO Archives, Reorganization of UK Armed Forces, Statement by the UK Permanent Representative at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 14 Feb 1957, p. 2.


[7] TNA: CAB 129/57. Cabinet, Report on export of arms (memo by the president of the Board of Trade), 17 Nov 1952, p. 1.

[8] TNA: PREM 11/2680. Ministry of Defence, letter to Philip de Zulueta, 28 Jan 1959.

[9] TNA: PREM 11/2680. Ministry of Defence, Strategic Exports (Official) Committee, Promotion of Arms Sales, 8 Jan 1959.

Graph 4.2

Arms exports: 1950-70, moving averages (million constant 1990 US$)




Source: Sipri.

This was due to competition from the French arms industry (by then recovered), as well as from the Soviet Union, which started exporting weapons outside the Eastern bloc (Phythian 2000, 3). British arms exports declined also in relative terms, from a level of about 25% of the total global in the early 1950s to between 5-8% during the 1960s (as shown in graph 4.3). Meanwhile, exports from the US and the Soviet Union were between 30-45%, while those from France increased from virtually zero to about 6-8%. Therefore, military expenditures were growing while arms exports were decreasing. For a power in decline, it was worrying that Britain was losing capacity to use arms exports as a foreign policy tool. Also, it was critical that its military industry might become too costly to maintain.

Graph 4.3

Arms exports as a proportion of the total global: 1950-70, moving averages for 3-year periods



Source: Sipri.

This context created incentives for the British government to expand *promotion* of arms exports. In 1965, the minister of defence for the Royal Air Force (RAF), Edward Shackleton (1964-67), met the head of the company Leyland Motors, Donald Stokes, to discuss this issue. Stokes later sent a report to the secretary of state for defence, Denis Healey (1964-70), giving advice on how to increase arms exports, in a document known as *Stokes Report*. He suggested that Britain should have an organisation devoted to promoting arms exports, which should adopt an aggressive commercial approach. According to him, this organisation should be headed by a person 'more orientated to sales rather than respect for orthodoxy' and that 'certain business is obtained in unorthodox ways'.[10] As

[10] TNA: DEFE 23/1. Donald Stokes, Some notes on the organisation of an export military equipment sales organisation, 1965, p. 2; 5.

evidence that his suggestions were influential, the government created the Defence Sales Organisation (DSO) and expressed interest in having Stokes as its first head.[11]

Although the British government promoted arms exports, it also created rules to restrict them. As part of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), created in the late 1940s, the UK did not export weapons to Comecon countries.[12] Also, it restricted exports to a few non-communist nations. In 1965, for example, exports of Rolls-Royce engines to Indonesia were suspended due to a perceived aggressive behaviour towards Malaysia and Singapore.[13] In 1974, ministers established a set of criteria for decisions on arms exports to the Middle East, including considerations on the long-term policies of importing states, the extent to which supplied equipment would increase their military capabilities, and effects of arms exports on other countries' policies.[14]

Humanitarian conditions in potential customers were introduced in the mid-1960s as a criterion in decisions on arms exports. They became part of the decision-making after a series of arms deals signed with South Africa during the governments of Macmillan (1957-63) and Alec Douglas-Home (1963-64), when the apartheid system was being strengthened. During the 1964 election campaign, the Labour Party promised to impose an arms embargo on South Africa if elected, which was indeed implemented once it took office in October 1964. This decision fit well into Labour Party's perception of how to reverse Britain's decline in a bipolar world: Britain should keep its rank of a great power by making concrete its claims of being a moral leader (Toye and Lawton 2007, 146).

[11] TNA: DEFE 23/1. Ministry of Defence, Proposal to appoint Sir Donald Stokes as super Salesman in the defence field.

[12] For an analysis of the CoCom, see: Yasuhara (1991), Førland (1991) and Mastanduno (1992).

[13] TNA: DEFE 23/1. Draft letter from the prime minister to the president of the Confederation of British Industry, 1965; Ministry of Defence, MO 26/9/1, Fokker friendship aircraft for Indonesia, 13 Sep 1965.

[14] TNA: FCO 49/813. FCO, Criteria for arms sales to the Middle East, Apr 1978.

Although the subsequent Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970-74) had a less strict interpretation of the embargo, the ban was maintained, despite pressures from companies and within the Conservative party to lift it. This suggests that the embargo had become enmeshed in British foreign policy, regardless of the party in power. Even though a Conservative government would probably have not imposed an embargo, it became costly to revert it. Something similar occurred in 1974, when the government of Harold Wilson imposed an arms embargo on Chile. Although Thatcher's government partially lifted it, it remained not authorizing exports of weapons that might be used for domestic repression. This indicates the existence of a taboo on arms sales to these countries, even if Conservatives had a more flexible approach.

There was, however, substantial disagreement on the role of human rights across different government departments, as revealed by FCO documents from the late 1970s. The FCO considered the 'human rights record of the customer country and the likelihood that the arms will be used for internal suppression', as well as the 'domestic reaction in the UK'.[15] An internal document suggests that the FCO was more cautious than the Ministries of Defence, Trade, Industry and the Treasury. In certain cases, the FCO could be 'isolated when foreign policy interests alone militate against sales' and was 'vulnerable to DSO's pressure tactics'. An FCO document describing the DSO said that 'the salesman's natural instinct will doubtless remain to promote [weapons] in those places where the going's good, and ask questions later'.[16]

The decision-making at that time is illustrated here by the cases of Iran and Libya in the 1970s. Iran was one of Britain's main customers, importing 16% of its arms transfers in

[15] TNA: FCO 46/1843. FCO, Sales of arms and riot control equipment to South America, 30 Mar 1978.
[16] TNA: FCO 49/861. FCO, Conventional arms transfer policy, Jun 1979, p. 12.

1970-79. Although there were political costs of selling weapons, benefits were perceived as high enough to outweigh them: the British government was interested in keeping the Shah's regime, was concerned that not exporting weapons might create a negative reaction in Iran, perceived Iran as 'strategically vital in the Middle East', and Iran was the largest market for the UK in Asia.[17] This explains why the British government authorized exports even of anti-riot equipment, including tear gas, a controversial product due to its use for domestic repression.[18] Humanitarian aspects were nonetheless considered, although they did not prevent sales during either Conservative or Labour governments. In the late 1970s, during a Labour government, exports of tear gas were maintained, although evidence also indicates that Iranian security forces exerted some level of restraint after pressures from the UK government. Also, sales of Fox armoured cars and electric shock sticks were not authorized. Concerning the latter, they were not authorized because 'opinion would see [them] as degrading weapons and which would attract public criticism',[19] as well as due to influence from a few MPs and peers, such as Stan Newens and Lord Brockway.[20] Humanitarian concerns had nonetheless less weight than in other cases, in part due to little domestic opposition to arms sales o Iran. In 1978, the FCO mentioned the 'need to take account of feeling in Britain', although it stressed that 'details of the supply of internal security equipment have appeared in the press but have aroused relatively little controversy'.[21]

[17] TNA: FCO 49/813. FCO, Seven questions on arms sales policy, 4 Sep 1978; FCO 8/3124. FCO, Arms sales to Iran, Call on Mr Judd by Mr Stanley Newens MP (supplementary points), 28 Nov 1978.
[18] TNA: FCO 49/813. FCO, Review of policy on the sale of anti-riot equipment, 1978, p. 5; DEFE 13/1320. FCO, Internal security equipment for Iran, prepared by W K Prendergast, 29 Nov 1978.
[19] TNA: DEFE 13/1320. FCO, Internal security equipment for Iran, prepared by W K Prendergast, 29 Nov 1978.
[20] TNA: FCO 8/3124. FCO, Arms sales to Iran, Call on Mr Judd by Mr Stanley Newens MP, 28 Nov 1978; FCO, Telegram n. 530, Lords question: defence sales, 3 Nov 1978, sent by David Owen; UK embassy in Iran, Telegram n. ZMC/Z8F OF 020400Z, sent by Anthony Parsons, Oct 1978.
[21] TNA: DEFE 13/1320. FCO, Internal security equipment for Iran, prepared by W K Prendergast, 29 Nov 1978.

On the case of Libya, the UK Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) was willing to sell weapons due to perceived economic benefits and to increase leverage on Libyan politics. As evidence, in the late 1970s, the UK government authorized a deal to sell 200 tank transporters, even after the US imposed an arms embargo on Libya. This decision was taken for two reasons: the government did not want to send an 'unfriendly signal' and worried about economic impacts on British Leyland, a defence company.[22] There was a balance, however, between this and potential negative impacts, especially reactions from Egypt and the US.[23] This explains why the UK government did not supply equipment that would increase Libyan offensive capabilities.

A characteristic of the decision-making was that decisions were made on a case-by-case basis. The application of humanitarian concerns, for example, was loose, with no legislation stating that they should always be considered. In a ministerial meeting in 1978, the lack of such guidelines was justified: 'circumstances varied too much from region to region, country to country, and indeed within a country from one time to another'.[24] A document from FCO's Defence Department, concerning arms sales to South America, stated that 'we should aim for very broad guidelines, based on the global criteria. Any more strictly defined policy is likely to be too negative (or too positive) and also too inflexible'.[25] This lack of precise guidelines was reversed only in the early 2000s, although the idea of a case-by-case assessment remains in the decision-making to this date (FCO 2014, 8).[26]

[22] TNA: FCO 49/813. FCO (Near East and North Africa Department), Tank transporters to Libya, 2 Aug 1978.
[23] TNA: FCO 49/813. FCO, Defence sales to Libya, Discussion by DOP, 3 May 1978.
[24] TNA: FCO 46/1843. FCO, Planning committee: defence sales, Apr 1978, p. 2.
[25] TNA: FCO 46/1843. FCO, Sales of arms and riot control equipment to South America, 30 Mar 1978, p. 3.
[26] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.

Arms exports during Thatcher's government (1979-90): recovering the role of Britain in the international arms market

Thatcher's government altered policies for the arms industry and arms exports. Her government partially opened the industry to foreign competition, abandoning a few protectionist policies, especially concerning national champions. Although a military industrial base was considered essential to keep British autonomy, it was argued that this should not be an excuse for inefficiency. As evidence, the government suspended the Nimrod project, under which aircraft would be produced by British Aerospace, procuring instead the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), from Boeing (Dunne and Macdonald 2002, 4). This was observed also in the episode known as Westland affair, which emerged because of financial problems faced by the British helicopter-manufacturer Westland. Thatcher argued that the company should solve its problems 'through the market': the government should neither support it through a bailout nor broker a deal for its acquisition.[27] This was opposed by the secretary of state for defence Michael Heseltine (1983-86), one of the 'wets', for whom the government should decide Westland's future. He argued that the government should broker the creation of a British-European consortium rather than allow Westland to be partially acquired by the American company Sikorsky, the Westland's main option. This position was built upon his previous experience as minister for aerospace in the early 1970s, when he led the rescue of Rolls-Royce after the company's collapse in 1971. After Thatcher's refusal to back his position, however, he resigned (Heseltine 2000).[28]

[27] Margaret Thatcher Foundation (MTF) Archives: PREM 19/1667. Cabinet, Document from Oliver Letwin and Peter Warry to the prime minister concerning the company Westland, 10 Jan 1986.

[28] Also, interview (via phone): Michael Heseltine, 15 Aug 2018. MTF: PREM 19/1667. MO 26/16/1E, Letter from Michael Heseltine explaining his resignation, Jan 1986.

Concerning arms exports, however, government support increased. With pressures to cut public expenditures, arms exports gained relevance as a tool to make the military sector generate resources. This was part of a directive issued in 1980 by the permanent under-secretary of state for defence, and addressed to the DSO head, Lester Suffield:

> Although there may well be political and strategic returns from Defence Sales the object is primarily to produce economic benefits by improving the UK balance of payments, providing employment and, where equipment is used by the UK forces as well as being exported, by reducing the unit costs of such equipment with benefit to the Defence Budget.[29]

This was observed also in a claim by sectors of the government that the UK should adopt an approach to arms sales similar to France's. Emphasis on economic aspects and sales promotion was interpreted as the main reason behind the larger participation of France in the international arms market.[30] Furthermore, British intelligence began to be used more to collect information on market opportunities for weapons-manufacturers than to monitor the use of British weapons by customers. Also, arms deals included more offset agreements, demonstrating a willingness to win contracts by offering more favourable terms than competitors (Phythian, 2000, p. 25-27).

The contrast between Thatcher's emphasis on market rules at the domestic level and her approach to arms exports reflects a certain perception of international politics. Conservatives tend to see foreign policy as a distinct realm, an environment where power politics has to be played (D. Keohane 2000, 6; Vickers 2011, 11–13). Based on this conception of international politics, Thatcher's government engaged in arms sales with

[29] MTF: PREM 19/0413. Ministry of Defence, Directive from Frank Cooper (PUS) to the Head of Defence Sales, 23 Oct 1980.
[30] MTF: PREM 19/0413. Ministry of Defence, French defence sales to the Middle East, Sep 1980.

various repressive regimes when this was perceived to bring economic benefits and leverage on other countries' policies. The importance of generating jobs and having influence in the decision-making of other governments has been stressed by Michael Heseltine, defence secretary (1983-86).[31]

Although this was similar to the behaviour of previous and subsequent Conservative governments, Thatcher introduced something new: a personal involvement in the promotion of arms exports and in competitions to win contracts (Phythian, 2000, p. 24). In 1981, she discussed potential sales of British weapons in at least eight state visits: a deal to sell 45 tanks to Saudi Arabia; a talk with the king of Jordan on sales of Tornado aircraft; a sale of 200 battle tanks and air defence equipment to Kuwait; a deal to sell light-combat aircraft and 200 helicopters to India; a deal of 260 Rapier missiles discussed in a state visit to Qatar; promotion of sales of 30 Hawk aircraft in a state visit to Dubai; a discussion on sales of 100 tanks to Oman; and pressures on the US government concerning sales of 170 Rapier missiles.[32] She was also involved in potential sales of Hawk aircraft to Abu Dhabi, expressing deep concerns about losing them.[33] Also, as evidence of economic interests, the British government was willing to export Canberra aircraft to Argentina in the early 1980s, in spite of its claims over the Falklands/Malvinas.[34]

A similar approach was adopted with South Africa, on which there was a UN mandatory arms embargo since 1977. Although the UK complied, the prime minister opted

[31] Interview (via phone): Michael Heseltine, 15 Aug 2018.

[32] MTF: PREM 19/0413. Ministry of Defence, MO 26-9/1A, Quarterly reports on major defence sales prospects, 6 Apr 1981, p. 1-11; 8 Jul 1981, p. 5-6; 28 Oct 1981, p. 5.

[33] MTF: PREM 19/0413. Ref: BO6346, document from R L Wade-Gery to the prime minister, OD: sale of HMS Invincible, 1 Dec 1981; Ministry of Defence, MO 26-9/1A, letter attaching a quarterly report on major defence sales prospects, 8 Jul 1981.

[34] MTF: PREM 19/0413. Ministry of Defence, MO 26-9/1A, Quarterly report on major defence sales prospects, 8 Jul 1981, p. 4.

to be less strict than the previous Labour government. As evidence, in 1980, the foreign secretary Peter Carrington (1979-82), one of the 'wets', proposed that arms exports to South Africa should be stricter, covering not only military equipment but also dual-use products. Thatcher disagreed, however, expressing concerns on losing potential orders, a position backed by the secretaries for trade, John Nott (1979-81), and defence, Francis Pym (1979-81).[35] The same happened with exports to countries in Latin America. In a meeting in 1981, attended by representatives from different ministries, the FCO was criticized for not authorising arms deals due to human rights concerns. An FCO's representative explained, however, that they had already adapted to the new guidelines, saying that 'the major restriction was now largely on security grounds'.[36] He explained that, although the FCO maintained human rights concerns at the beginning of Thatcher's government, the criterion had already been altered from *'could'* to *'is likely to be'* used to violate human rights. This introduced a more flexible approach and was welcomed by the departments of Defence, Trade, Industry, Treasury and the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD).[37]

In 1980, Thatcher attended the Farnborough exhibition, when the relative importance of economic aspects was reinforced. She emphasised that the Ministry of Defence should in certain cases acquire simpler weaponry if this implied expanding arms exports. She also said that:

> Export sales of British defence equipment will this year earn £1200 million in foreign currency. […] But […] it is not enough. The procurement budget of Government and the skills of our people, if used together to the best advantage, could bring the country far

[35] TNA: PREM 19/371. Cabinet, UN Embargo on provision of arms to South Africa, letter from John Nott to Lord Carrington, 27 Aug 1980.
[36] TNA: FCO 46/2782. DPS 087/12, Comments on a meeting of the Defence Sales Working Group, 21 Jul 1981.
[37] TNA: FCO 46/2782. DPS 087/12, Minutes of a meeting of the Defence Sales Working Group, 20 Jul 1981.

> larger sums, greater benefits both to our Armed Services and to our industries, and more jobs.[38]

In the arms deal that became known as al-Yamamah, government support was extensive. The secretary of state for defence, Michael Heseltine, visited Saudi Arabia a few times to promote sales of the Tornado aircraft (Heseltine 2000, 286–87). In April 1985, Thatcher visited Saudi Arabia with the same purpose, which resulted in the aircraft being included in the deal.[39] In August 1985, she sent a letter to prince Sultan (second deputy prime-minister of Saudi Arabia), reinforcing the British government's commitment to provide technical support during the whole period of the contract.[40] In September 1985, Raymond Lygo, British Aerospace's managing director, sent a note to the prime minister thanking for her support: 'just a short thank you note for all your good work on our behalf in Saudi. It is all most splendid news and could not have been achieved without your support. […].'[41] Two days later, the British government hosted a dinner to prince Sultan, attended by 15 guests, including Thatcher and representatives from British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce.[42] The deal was signed even after protests by a group of 51 members of the US Congress, from both the Republican and Democratic parties.[43]

[38] MTF: PREM 19/0413. Prime minister's speech at the Flying Display Dinner, 3 Sep 1980, p. 7-9.

[39] MTF: PREM 19/1446. Cabinet, letter from the Cabinet to the FCO, concerning a visit of Margaret Thatcher to Saudi Arabia, 2 Apr 1985.

[40] MTF: PREM 19/1446. Cabinet, letter from Thatcher to Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, expressing interest in selling fighter aircraft, 23 Aug 1985.

[41] MTF: PREM 19/1446. British Aerospace, letter from Raymond Ligo (British Aerospace's managing director) to Thatcher, 18 Sep 1985.


[42] MTF: PREM 19/1446. Cabinet, list of guests of dinner for Prince Sultan, 20 Sep 1985.

[43] MTF: PREM 19/1446. Congress of the United States, letter to Thatcher, expressing disapproval on sales of aircraft to Saudi Arabia, 9 Oct 1985.

Thatcher's approach to arms exports seems to have been successful, as they increased during her government. In the late 1980s, they reached the highest level since the late 1950s.

Graph 4.4

British arms exports, moving averages: 1970-2015 (million constant 1990 US$)



Source: Sipri.

Documents from the period reveal fewer humanitarian concerns. Thatcher's perception of groups defending a humanitarian agenda was negative, as observed in her comments about the Anti-Apartheid Movement, which she considered as 'heavily influenced by Communists or Communist sympathizers'.[44] Later, when Michael Heseltine

[44] TNA: FCO 105/1051. FCO (Southern African Department), The Anti-Apartheid Movement, containing comments by Margaret Thatcher, 27 Oct 1972.

was appointed defence secretary, his main task was to build a counter-narrative against the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. According to him:

> The CND was essentially directed at the Ministry of Defence when I was secretary of state. It was the subject of bitter controversy leading up to 1983 general election. And one of the reasons why Mrs. Thatcher put me in that position was to put me into the frontline in defence of government policy on that issue.[45]

The CND became a target for the Ministry of Defence, with Heseltine arguing that its purpose was to 'argue the cause of the Soviet Union at the expense of the free societies of the West'. He also sent a letter to Tory MPs and candidates, with 'biographical details of the communists, Marxists and socialists in the CND movement' (Heseltine, 2000, p. 244-247).

As analysed in chapter 5, however, some policies introduced by Labour governments remained, such as a ban on sales of weapons to Chile that could be used for domestic repression, and a full arms embargo on South Africa. In a Ministry of Defence's document from 1980, it was stressed that 'there may be military or political difficulties, human rights and arms control issues or broader security interests which argue against particular sales, and we give such considerations full weight'.[46] This indicates that, even for a government in which strategic and economic aspects had more relevance, certain preferences had become embedded in policies.

[45] Interview (via phone): Michael Heseltine, 15 Aug 2018.
[46] TNA: CAB 129/208. Cabinet, Defence in the 1980s – Statement on the defence estimates, vol. 1, p. 38.

Arms exports in the post-cold war era: between an 'ethical' foreign policy and the need to export weapons

After the First Gulf War, British policy on arms exports was severely criticized by the opposition. This occurred mainly because the UK had supplied dual-use products to Iraq over the 1980s, contributing to strengthen a country that later became its adversary. After the war, various parliamentarians (including a few Conservatives) wanted to know the extent to which the UK had contributed to arm Iraq. One of the deals with Iraq during the 1980s became symbolic. Executives from a company called Matrix Churchill were put on trial for supplying dual-use machines to Iraq. However, a junior minister in Thatcher's government revealed that the government had supported the company, generating a scandal known as the arms-to-Iraq affair and prompting an investigation conducted by Richard Scott, a Lord Justice of Appeal. During the investigations, additional controversies emerged when government officials sought to hide information, which was revealed by the president of the board of trade, Michael Heseltine.[47] As a result of the investigations, the Scott Report was published in 1996, criticizing the British arms export policy, especially the government's power to both set criteria on arms exports and check whether the criteria fit into its policy goals. Among the recommendations, it proposed a change in the legislation on arms exports, which dated from 1939.

This indicates that democratic institutions create pressures on governments to be more accountable in decisions on arms exports. The contestation of British policy on arms exports and the subsequent investigation was made possible by the existence of an independent Legislative and Judiciary, which worked as a check on the Executive. In

[47] Interview (via phone): Michael Heseltine, 15 Aug 2018.

addition, the Scott Report was central in shaping Labour's position on international arms transfers in the following years. After the report's publication, Robin Cook (then-shadow foreign secretary) led Labour's criticisms against British arms export policy, gaining notoriety for that (Gaskarth 2013). For him, the Tories had armed an enemy, and this had happened because of loose controls. Furthermore, the arms-to-Iraq affair and the Scott Report strengthened civil society groups working with arms exports, as they reinforced the arguments they defended: Britain should be more responsible and transparent concerning decisions on arms exports.

However, the Scott Report was published in a period when military expenditures in the UK were decreasing, creating incentives for companies and government to export more – rather than less. As it had happened before, British policy on arms exports was being pulled towards different directions by different groups. Yet Labour's victory in 1997 shaped Britain's behaviour on the arms trade in the following years.

Robin Cook and an 'ethical' behaviour on arms exports

During the 1997 elections campaign, Labour promised to introduce a principled foreign policy. Rather than realpolitik or geopolitics, emphasis should be on democracy, ethics, fight against poverty, multilateralism and values. This was how the UK would deliver its foreign policy objectives in a globalized world (P. Williams 2004, 921–22). A more responsible policy on arms exports fit well into this approach and reinforced Cook's credentials of a principled politician. As an MP in the 1970s, he had campaigned in favour of disarmament and against irresponsible arms exports, saying that an arms exhibition then run by the British Army was an 'arms bazaar' (Cook 1978, 1976). Also, Labour stressed in

its manifesto that transparency and accountability of decisions on arms exports would increase. Therefore, Robin Cook sought to draw a line between the arms export policy of previous governments and the one he was planning to implement (Gaskarth 2013).[48]

When in power, Labour sought to implement what it promised during the elections. In July 1997, two months after taking office, Robin Cook committed to base arms export decisions on human rights conditions in potential customers (Cook 1997). As additional evidence of the importance of this topic, the *Annual Report on Arms Export*s was introduced under his leadership, alongside annual reports concerning human rights and torture (Cook, 2002, p. 46).

About one year after taking office, however, Robin Cook faced what became known as the arms-to-Africa scandal. In May 1997, after Ahmad Kabbah was ousted from power in Sierra Leone, a British company imported 30 tonnes of weapons and ammunition from Bulgaria and sold them to Kabbah's supporters, with the approval of the British High Commissioner. This prompted an investigation by the Foreign Affairs Committee, whose report criticized the way the FCO handled the situation. This put arms trade control at the centre of FCO's agenda (Dickie, 2004, pp. 119–120). As a consequence, the FCO introduced a proposal to change British legislation: at least on paper, humanitarian criteria rather than strategic or economic interests should be the main factor guiding arms exports (Heins 2006, 53). Moreover, the new legislation gave a greater role to parliament to scrutinize arms exports (Lun 2016, 7). This was complimented even by CAAT, the most sceptical CSO in the UK dealing with this topic (CAAT 2006).

[48] Also, interview: Robert Parker, London, 10 Oct 2016.


Although this episode may have shown the limits of an 'ethical' foreign policy, it also demonstrated how democratic institutions shape state behaviour. FCO's activities were exposed to the public and scrutinized by parliament, which then introduced additional controls on arms exports. This would be unlikely to happen in an authoritarian government. Furthermore, evidence suggests that further changes in policy were implemented during Cook's period. As observed in Graph 4.5, there was a substantial decrease in weapons sold to autocracies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this graph, I use the index presented in chapter 3 (ACHR index) to demonstrate that the proportion of British weapons exported to authoritarian countries decreased during Blair's government, especially during Cook's period and for a few years after he resigned. Exports from France are used as a reference.

The value of the index for the UK increased from the early 1980s on, during a Conservative government, followed by a substantial decrease in the late 1990s. The fact that French exports increased indicates that there was demand for weapons by autocracies, which were not supplied by the UK, however.

Graph 4.5

British and French arms exports to autocracies: 1960-2016

(ACHR index, 3-year moving averages, previous and subsequent years)



Changes occurred also in how the government dealt with CSOs' campaigns. Robin Cook was aware that more transparency would strengthen CSOs, as they would have access to more information. Rather than being worried, he in fact wanted CSOs' pressures to increase because this would help to change the decision-making. When commenting on the publication of the annual report on arms exports, he argued that: 'the fact that ministers know the Annual Report will disclose all our decisions on arms exports obliges us to anticipate and take into account the likely criticism from NGOs when we make our decisions' (Cook, 2002, p. 48). He was therefore using CSOs' activities to bring pressure on sectors of the government from the outside. In addition to the annual report, the government introduced the FCO's Official Report, column 199W, and later the Export

Control Act, in 2002 (Cable 2014). Through these instruments, stricter criteria to assess whether a country could import British weapons were introduced.

A greater relevance for humanitarian concerns during Cook's period is consistent with information provided by diplomats. According to a senior diplomat at the FCO, the relevance of human rights decreased after Cook's resignation: 'There was more emphasis on human rights in the days of Robin Cook. This was probably the big issue in his term as foreign secretary. However, human rights are still important, although being number four or five [in a list of priorities at the FCO]'.[49] A retired British diplomat emphasised that there is a difference in decisions on arms exports depending on the party in power: 'The Labour Party has always been more cautious than the Tories. And this is clear right now [in a Conservative government]'.[50]

This does not imply that arms exports to perceived 'irresponsible' countries were suspended or that government support to arms exports decreased in absolute terms. In 2005, the Defence Industrial Strategy stressed that industrial capabilities should remain in the UK so it could 'maintain appropriate sovereignty and thereby protect our national security' (MoD 2005, 2). Furthermore, the government should support arms exports, especially through the Export Credits Guarantee Department, the Defence Export Services Organisation and by offering political support. National champions, such as Rolls-Royce, should be especially supported (MoD, 2005, p. 35; 88). What I argue is that the *relative* weight of humanitarian concerns increased vis-à-vis other factors.

[49] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.
[50] Interview: interviewee 21 (retired civil servant), London, 9 Jun 2017.

Arms exports in the post-New Labour period (2010-16)

After Labour's defeat in 2010, *promotion* of arms exports gained relevance in government's agenda. In June 2010, the defence equipment minister, Peter Luff, said that

> There will be a very, very, very heavy ministerial commitment to the process. There is a sense that in the past we were rather embarrassed about exporting defence products. There is no such embarrassment in this government. (Stearman 2010).

A greater importance assigned to economic factors is indicated also by a document sent by the FCO to the House of Commons, prepared due to an inquiry at the Foreign Affairs Committee:

> The Government supports responsible exports from the UK defence and security sector, which make a major contribution to national prosperity. In the UK these businesses employ over 215,000 people (predominantly highly skilled), support a further 150,000, and provide 6,500 apprenticeships. In 2014, the sector as a whole had a collective turnover of over £30 billion, including defence and security export future orders worth £11.9bn. (FCO 2016).

In the same document, however, Vince Cable, secretary of state for Business, Innovation and Skills (2010-15), argued that economic factors were central only after the EU eight criteria were considered (Cable 2014). Yet, taking this at face value implies that the weight of humanitarian concerns in the decision-making does not change over time, which is not empirically observed. The FCO adopted guidelines introduced by new administrations, as occurred at the beginning of Thatcher and Blair governments. As additional evidence, UK arms exports to autocracies increased in the late 2000s, as

observed in Graph 4.5. Therefore, new governments managed to change some established practices.

This does not mean that humanitarian concerns disappeared. A senior diplomat stressed that the current system of licences for arms exports was introduced by Robin Cook, but kept by Conservatives.[51] This can be inferred also from government's reaction to the Arab Spring. According to a senior diplomat, the Arab Spring was a 'big wakeup call, reminding diplomats of how quickly things can change. Countries that had been reliable partners suddenly became risky'. The FCO did not know 'who was in charge' in various countries in the Middle East and North Africa, making it difficult to make reliable decisions.[52] Licences were either put on hold or cancelled: 158 licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa were revoked. On Bahrain, for example, exports of equipment that could be used for domestic repression were suspended, including 'tear gas, crowd control ammunition, body armour and radio communications equipment' (FCO 2014, 17). Rather than a temporary impact, the Arab Spring brought changes that may have remained, at least for a few years. As the memory of events persists, government officials remain more cautious when authorizing arms exports.[53]

Another senior diplomat cited also two other cases in which humanitarian concerns were being considered, potentially affecting decisions on arms exports: sales to Indonesia, which might use British weapons in West Papua; and sales to the Philippines, since the beginning of Rodrigo Duterte's government (2016-).[54]

[51] Interview: interviewee 19 (civil servant), London, 27 May 2017.
[52] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.
[53] Ibidem.
[54] Interview: interviewee 19 (civil servant), London, 27 May 2017.

The role of arms exports for a declining power: a quantitative comparison between Labour and Conservatives

Labour and Conservatives have different perspectives on the role of Britain in the world and on how its foreign policy should be conducted. Labour tends to see a congruity between domestic and foreign policies, emphasizing that shared values, democratic principles and universal norms should be in both (Vickers 2011, 11–13; P. Williams 2005, 23). This is how Britain's decline can be reversed: Britain can keep its position of great power by being a moral leader (Toye and Lawton 2007, 146). Conservatives tend to see domestic politics and foreign policy as separate domains, stressing the need to play power politics to protect the national interest. And they consider themselves as especially competent to deal with security issues and foreign policy, as they were in power during a substantial part of Britain's imperial period (Keohane, 2000, p. 5-6; Vickers, 2011, pp. 11–13).

This difference is observed in how Britain deals with its arms exports. Labour looks at arms exports as a continuation of domestic politics: if British citizens have political liberties, why should Britain provide weapons that might be used to prevent others of having these liberties? Labour's perception stems in part from anti-militarist and pacifist groups that compose the Labour movement, which perceive the arms production and trade as perpetuating violence and injustice. On the contrary, Conservatives assign less importance to humanitarian conditions, based on the abovementioned perception that domestic and foreign policies are essentially different realms (Vickers, 2011, pp. 11–13).

Although they have different policies, this is not necessarily reflected in a different behaviour. If structural constraints prevail, this would push both parties towards a similar

behaviour when in power. This possibility can be tested through quantitative methods. I have specified a model in which the dependent variable is the value of weapons that the UK exported to autocracies, while the independent variable of interest is the political party in power, coded as 0 for Conservatives and 1 for Labour.[55] As there is a gap between signatures of arms deals and delivery of weapons, the variable *political party in power* was lagged in two years. This is important because a government might have to authorize weapons deliveries due to contracts signed during previous governments.

There are six control variables. *First*, British arms exports to autocracies might depend on the overall demand of weapons by autocracies. In the model, this is controlled by the total amount of weapons imported by autocracies (countries scoring equal or below -5 in the polity IV index). *Second*, they might depend on autocracies' willingness to import weapons from democracies: if autocracies consider other autocracies as more reliable, as they impose fewer restrictions, they might prefer to import arms from them. This is controlled by the value of weapons that France and the US exported to autocracies, which alongside the UK supplied 38% of the total amount of weapons imported by autocracies in 1952-2016. If autocracies were willing to import weapons from France or the US, the democratic nature of the political system in the UK should not impact its arms sales to autocracies. *Third*, arms exports might depend on levels of military expenditures in the UK: low levels give the government incentives to export weapons to mitigate a decreasing domestic procurement. *Fourth*, arms exports might depend on the overall condition of the UK economy: poor economic performance creates incentives to export more weapons. This is controlled for economic growth rates. *Fifth*, British arms exports to autocracies

[55] In years of transition between parties, coding is based on the party in power for most of the year.

might have depended on the context of the cold war, for two reasons: arms imports during the cold war were higher than since its end; and arms transfers frequently aimed at keeping or expanding spheres of influence. *Sixth*, they might depend on the creation of the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, in 1998, which introduced common standards of behaviour that EU countries should adopt.[56]

There are two potential problems in the model, however. The first one is that arms imports by autocracies might occur in cycles, and peaks in arms acquisition might coincide with Conservative governments by chance. The second problem is that arms imports might depend on conflicts in which autocracies are engaged or in which they expect to engage, which could also coincide with Conservative governments by chance. Nevertheless, as the variable *arms imports by autocracies* aggregates all weapons acquired in a given year, the effect of these cycles on individual countries is cancelled out.

As positive serial correlation was found after running the Breusch-Godfrey test, a regression with Newey-West standard errors was run instead, with five lags (five years). Table 4.1 presents the results, indicating that Labour governments were less likely to export weapons to autocracies. As demonstrated in models 2 and 3, similar results were observed when controlling for economic performance, levels of military expenditures, the cold war and the creation of the EU Code of Conduct. As observed in model 4, the interaction between the context of the cold war and the political party in power was not significant.

[56] Variables 3, 4 and 6 were also lagged in 2 years due to a gap between decisions to authorize arms deals and delivery of equipment.

Table 4.1

Determinants of British arms exports to autocracies: 1952-2016

DV: arms exports to autocracies	(1) *N* = 65	(2) *N* = 65	(3) *N* = 65	(4) *N* = 65
Labour government (2 year-lagged)	-277.62 ** (92.62)	-230.76 * (93.56)	-285.89 ** (99.47)	-343.19 ** (141.76)
Arms imports by autocracies	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
French arms exports to autocracies	0.18 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.14)	0.01 (0.13)
US arms exports to autocracies	0.11 ** (0.03)	0.10 ** (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Military expenditures in the UK (2 year-lagged)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
Economic growth rates in the UK (2 year-lagged)		4.39 (17.96)	2.81 (20.44)	
Cold war			-196.87 (290.22)	-431.88 (255.73)
EU Code of Conduct/EU Common Position (2 year-lagged)			119.18 (140.23)	
Labour government # cold war				102.28 (217.77)
Intercept	245.20 (117.79)	-444.80 (356.53)	-194.91 (518.09)	-296.15 (113.66)

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** ≤ .001.

Were Labour governments less likely to export weapons only to autocracies? Or were they less likely to export weapons also to other democracies? This is tested in another time-series regression, in which the dependent variable is the total amount of weapons exported to countries scoring between 6 and 10 in the Polity IV score index. Results are presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2

Determinants of British arms exports to democracies: 1952-2016

DV: arms exports to democracies	(1) *N* = 65	(2) *N* = 65	(3) *N* = 65	(4) *N* = 65
Labour government (2 year-lagged)	-632.28 (391.37)	-854.40 (483.47)	-530.41 (329.00)	-190.49 (328.41)
Arms imports from democracies	-0.08 (0.08)	0.24 (0.14)	0.49 ** (0.18)	0.08 (0.08)
French arms exports to democracies	-0.77 (0.53)	-1.13 * (0.48)	-1.28 ** (0.44)	-0.86 (0.58)
US arms exports to democracies	0.07 (0.12)	0.21 (0.18)	-0.57 * (0.25)	-0.06 (0.12)
Military expenditures in the UK		-0.10 * (0.05)	-0.11 ** (0.03)	
Economic growth rates in the UK (2 year-lagged)		54.99 (50.42)	58.11 (41.57)	
Cold war			694.14 * (278.88)	1331.64 * (517.71)
EU Code of Conduct/EU Common Position (2 year-lagged)			-1143.54 (691.33)	
Labour government # cold war				-457.19 (476.42)
Intercept	2830.11 (1103.59)	6163.02 (2360.91)	5087.27 (1647.01)	806.22 (631.38)

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** ≤ .001.

As observed, Labour was not less likely to export weapons to other democracies than Conservatives, reinforcing the proposition that the type of polity in arms importing countries was more relevant in the decision-making during Labour than Conservative governments.

Concluding remarks

British policies and practice on arms exports are determined by various strategic and economic factors, such as potential leverage on other countries' policies, gains that other arms exporters might have if Britain exports fewer weapons, reactions from governments on which arms embargoes are imposed, and the extent to which Britain's military industry depends on arms exports. These factors do not explain, however, why humanitarian concerns are part of the decision-making and why the weight of these concerns varies across time and space. I argue that party politics in Britain is a missing variable: at least since the early 1960s, Labour and Conservatives have had different policies on this issue. When in power, they sought to implement policies that they pledged during election campaigns, even if structural constraints remained unchanged.

Yet this is a partial explanation: as argued in the next chapter, Labour's positions are in part the result of interactions between groups/individuals within the party and CSOs. Therefore, what the realist literature describes as the national interest was the result of domestic politics dynamics, an outcome produced by interactions between political parties and civil society groups. This does not imply that the state behaviour was unconstrained by systemic pressures. For example, although Labour governments were more favourable to a stricter arms export control, they honoured existing contracts, as in the cases of South Africa and Chile. What I argue is that humanitarian concerns played a greater role during Labour governments, rather that these concerns were the main factor in the decision-making.

This chapter has also shown that, once a stricter policy was introduced, it became costly to reverse it. They became embedded in the decision-making. This was observed

when changes introduced by Labour were maintained by Conservatives: the arms embargo against South Africa, maintained during the governments of Edward Heath (1970-74) and Thatcher (1979-90); the arms embargo against Chile, partially maintained during the government of Thatcher; the Export Control Act (2002), maintained during the coalition government led by Cameron (2010-15); and positions of Britain on antipersonnel landmines, cluster munitions, EU rules regarding arms exports and the ATT, all kept by the government led by Cameron.

An additional point is yet to be explored: what explains the variation in positions on arms exports to countries with equally poor human rights records? For example, although Harold Wilson's government imposed an arms embargo on Chile in March 1974, both his government and James Callaghan's had a different behaviour on Argentina: restrictions were introduced after a military coup in March 1976, but an embargo was not imposed. This occurred despite Argentina's military regime (1976-83) being as brutal and repressive as Chile's (1973-89), and even after the US government imposed an embargo on Argentina in 1979. I argue that the less a country was targeted by advocacy networks through specific campaigns, the less strict arms export policies were – holding constant levels of human rights abuses in the targeted country. This explains why arms exports to Argentina's military regime were never as strict as those to Chile. This is explored in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 – Domestic determinants of arms export control in the UK: norm entrepreneurs and political parties

When Harold Wilson took office in March 1974, his government imposed an arms embargo on Chile. However, his and the subsequent Labour government had a different attitude towards the military coup in Argentina, in March 1976. Although restrictions on arms sales were introduced, an arms embargo was not imposed, even though the regime in Argentina was as repressive as the one in Chile. What could explain this difference?

I argue that, from the early 1960s on, humanitarian concerns in arms exports were introduced in the domestic political agenda in the UK by norm entrepreneurs, usually organised in CSOs. Through campaigns targeting the government, as well as the formation of advocacy networks involving the Labour Party and other groups, they raised the political salience of this topic in Britain's domestic politics. This explains why decisions on arms exports varied across countries with equally poor humanitarian conditions, even during the same Labour or Conservative governments: while there were civil society campaigns in the UK to isolate a few regimes (Chile and South Africa, for example), campaigns were weaker or inexistent for others (Argentina and Saudi Arabia, for example). This is an aspect that part of the IR literature has overlooked. By focusing on the activities of transnational advocacy networks and the creation of international regimes, little attention has been paid to domestic politics.

This chapter explores the role of CSOs in the introduction of humanitarian concerns into the decision-making in the UK. Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 (presented in the introduction) are tested through an analysis of CSOs activities, in particular of how advocacy networks were formed domestically and how the British government reacted to their activities.

The chapter is divided into seven sections, in addition to this introduction and concluding remarks. Section 1 explores the pathways through which CSOs influence governments and introduces the CSOs analysed in this chapter: Amnesty, Anti-Apartheid Movement, Campaign Against the Arms Trade, Chile Solidarity Campaign, Oxfam and Saferworld. Sections 2-7 examine how CSOs in the UK frame campaigns, also exploring the extent of their influence on arms export policies and practice. Five framings are examined: *i*) arms exports to 'irresponsible' regimes, *ii*) arms exports to poor countries, *iii*) lack of transparency, *iv*) arms brokering and arms fairs, and *v*) arms exports as an intrinsically immoral activity.

Naming and framing: CSOs, political parties and arms exports in the UK

There are at least three pathways through which CSOs' activities can change government behaviour.[1] *First*, through *pressures* on the state. In this case, CSOs behave as outsiders, targeting state institutions by denouncing them as irresponsible, secretive or warmongering. This is done through street demonstrations, research activities, preparation of policy briefs, publication of articles in the press, among others. Organisations like Amnesty and Oxfam, for example, have many members and supporters, who can be mobilized to pressure MPs and government officials. *Second*, through direct channels of communication with bureaucrats or politicians. In this case, CSOs behave as insiders, using personal connections or their expertise to shape policies and decisions. Their technical expertise, in particular, makes them attractive partners to work with. As an

[1] I thank Keith Krause for this idea.

example, the FCO regularly contacts Amnesty to ask whether they have information on potential misuses of British weapons.[2] Also, a treaty like the ATT required technical knowledge that an institution like Amnesty has.[3] *Third*, through the socialization of elites or the public. In this case, CSOs seek to persuade them on the importance of certain agendas. This has been observed in the UK in interactions between CSOs and political elites associated to the Labour Party, as well as in interactions with academics, religious leaders and government officials (especially diplomats). It is also observed in how CSOs seek to raise awareness among the public on the consequences of foreign policy decisions.

In the framings analysed in this chapter, these pathways are often pursued simultaneously: CSOs pressure governments from the outside, cooperate with sectors of the government, and seek to socialize elites and the public. The activities of six organisations are examined here. Their identities and strategies are analysed, as well as impacts of their activities on British arms export policies and practice.[4] They are briefly introduced in the next paragraphs.

Oxfam was founded in 1942, in Oxford, to relieve famine in Greece. Since its foundation, it has provided relief, especially in situations of emergency. Oxfam has campaigned against arms exports since the mid-1970s, stressing how they fuel poverty and undermine development. This topic was introduced in its agenda as part of a broader process that began in the 1950s, when Oxfam started to deal with structural causes of poverty, complementing its work of providing relief.

[2] Interviews: Rasha Abdul-Rahim, London, 12 Oct 2016; Robert Parker, London, 10 Oct 2016.
[3] Interview: Oliver Sprague, London, 28 Oct 2016.
[4] Other organisations in the UK also work with control on arms exports. Some of them are: Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), Article 36, British American Security Information Council, and Omega Research Foundation.

The *AAM* was founded in 1959 as the Boycott Movement, changing its name to AAM after the Sharpeville Massacre, in 1960. The AAM worked to isolate the apartheid regime until its end, in 1994. As part of its activities, it ran campaigns against arms sales, being the organisation that introduced the issue of arms exports in UK domestic politics in the post-World War II era.

Amnesty was founded in 1961 by Peter Benenson, aiming at drawing attention to human rights abuses, especially against prisoners of conscience. Amnesty has worked with arms trade issues since the early 1980s, stressing how they contribute to human rights abuses. It has been involved since then in various campaigns on arms exports, such as in the cases of Timor-Leste and Saudi Arabia, as well as in promoting the ATT.

The *Chile Solidarity Campaign* was founded in 1973 to provide support to members of the Chilean opposition, as well as to isolate Pinochet's regime. On arms exports, its approach was similar to AAM's, seeking to prevent Britain of selling weapons to Chile. It stressed that weapons could be used for internal repression and that they gave legitimacy to Pinochet's regime.

CAAT was created in 1974 as a network of pacifist organisations concerned with the growth in the arms trade after the Yom Kippur War, in which Britain had armed both sides of the conflict. Among the groups forming CAAT, some were church-based, such as Pax Christi and the Quakers, and some were not, such as the Peace Pledge Union.[5] CAAT's first major activity was to organise campaigns against arms fairs in the UK, which has been a major target since then. It is the most 'radical' of the groups examined in this thesis, considering the arms trade as intrinsically wrong.

[5] Interview: Ann Feltham, London, 26 Oct 2016.

Saferworld was founded in Bristol in 1989 as a think-tank, aimed at improving arms control and changing focus of security from states to human beings. After working with control on nuclear weapons, it started looking at conventional weapons. Saferworld has campaigned for a stricter control in the UK and the creation of international regulations on the arms trade. Saferworld is unique among the organisations analysed in this thesis for being less 'activist'. It provides technical expertise to governments and other non-state institutions: for example, it has supported the governments of Liberia and Zambia in the implementation of norms introduced by the ATT.[6]

These organisations frequently form or participate in advocacy networks, involving various types of groups and individuals, including experts, individual activists, journalists, students, other civil society groups and even government departments. Organisations like the AAM and the CSC were in practice orchestrators of advocacy networks, mobilising influence and skills from various types of sources. They therefore could multiply their force by increasing the number of individuals and groups involved, as well as by combining different comparative advantages. As an example of this, Amnesty is strongly student-based, Oxfam is better in conducting events in local communities and in relations with local MPs, while Saferworld focuses on technical work.[7]

Concerning the ways in which campaigns frame arms exports, an initial distinction should be made between two approaches. First, some campaigns consider control on arms transfers as an intermediary step to achieve a broader goal. In the UK, this is the case of five organisations analysed in this thesis. For the AAM, arms sales were part of a broader

[6] Interview: Robert Parker, London, 10 Oct 2016.
[7] Ibidem.

campaign to isolate South Africa in different spheres: trade, investment, culture, sports and arms, as explained by Christabel Gurney, former activist at the AAM.[8] The same applies to the Chile Solidarity Campaign, for which campaigns against arms exports were part of a strategy to isolate Pinochet's regime. This is also the case of Oxfam and Amnesty: their main goals are, respectively, to reduce poverty and improve human rights conditions, and arms exports are perceived as an obstacle to achieve that. The same applies to Saferworld, for which arms export control is an important way of preventing conflicts.

Second, other campaigns focus on the arms control or trade itself. In the UK, this is the case of CAAT, whose goal is the end of the arms trade, regardless of types of weapon or importing countries. This is also the case of campaigns against specific types of weapons, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. In all these cases, certain weapons are perceived to be so unacceptable that they should be banned.

In the next sections, campaigns organised by these groups are analysed, as well as reactions from the government. As these groups' goals frequently overlap, the division is based on how arms exports are framed rather than on different organisations.

'Stop arming them'. Campaigns on arms exports to irresponsible governments: South Africa, Chile, Argentina and Saudi Arabia

During the cold war, although strategic and economic aspects were the main elements guiding British arms exports, other issues were not absent, such as colonial/post-colonial

[8] Interview: Christabel Gurney, London, 30 Mar 2016.

struggles, development, human rights, poverty and racism. These issues had their political salience raised in Britain due to a combination of efforts from CSOs and the Labour Party.

The topic of arms exports was first dealt with in civil society by the AAM in the 1960s, being later adopted by other groups: in the 1970s, by the Chile Solidarity Campaign, CAAT and Oxfam; and in the 1980s-1990s by Amnesty and Saferworld. For all these groups, governments should not turn a blind eye to humanitarian conditions in importing countries.

Did these campaigns have any impact? If so, was this dependent on how strategic a country was for the UK? In other words, were campaigns successful only in countries with no strategic importance? Table 5.1 displays combinations of these two variables.

Table 5.1

Impacts of CSOs' lobbying on arms export policies, controlling for level of strategic importance and human rights conditions

	High strategic importance	Medium strategic importance	Low strategic importance
Strong lobby	Strong restrictions (apartheid regime in South Africa)	Strong restrictions (military regime in Chile)	Strong restrictions (?)
Medium lobby	Weak restrictions (Saudi Arabia)	Medium restrictions (military regime in Argentina)	Medium restrictions (?)
Weak lobby or no lobby	Weak restrictions (Shah's regime in Iran)	Weak restrictions (?)	Medium restrictions (Mobutu regime in Zaire; papa/baby doc regime in Haiti)

When a country was strategically important and lobbies were highly organised, the UK government adopted strong restrictions, as in the case of South Africa. Restrictions were weaker when the lobby was less strong, as in the cases of Iran during the Shah's

regime and Saudi Arabia. When a country had little or no strategic importance, lobbies were more influential: although lobbies against Saudi Arabia and Argentina were similarly organised, restrictions against Argentina were stronger.

In this section, arms exports to four countries are analysed, with variations in their strategic importance and levels of strength of the lobby in the UK: South Africa, Chile, Argentina and Saudi Arabia. As they all had poor human rights records, this variable is kept constant. The analysis demonstrates that organised lobbies may lead to strong restrictions even if a targeted country is of high strategic importance.

Arming South Africa's apartheid: Tories, CSOs and the Labour Party (1959-94)

Between the early 1960s and the end of the apartheid, Labour and Conservatives had different positions on whether the UK should sell weapons to South Africa. Those differences existed despite similar strategic and economic incentives to export weapons to the apartheid regime, indicating that the anti-apartheid struggle was a contentious issue in British *domesti*c politics. How did their different positions emerge? I argue that this happened due to the work of an advocacy network in the UK that campaigned against arms sales to South Africa, which had its hub in the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM). Over 35 years, the AAM built a large network of academics, churches, other CSOs, MPs, political parties, journalists, students and trade unions. The AAM turned the anti-apartheid struggle into a topic of high salience in British politics, making elites and voters care about it.

The AAM was created after Hendrik Verwoerd (1958-66) took office in South Africa, who combined an intensified version of the apartheid to a stronger military and police apparatuses. The case against selling arms to South Africa gained momentum in the UK

after the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, when 69 people were killed (Young, 1998, p. 63).[9] In 1961, the South African Peace Council, a CSO based in Johannesburg, expressed alarm on the build-up of the security apparatus in South Africa:

> the extension of training in the Active Citizen Force, the increase in the Defence Budget, the establishment of a police reserve on army lines, and setting up of huge new munitions plants […] are steps towards making South Africa what has been described as a "White" garrison state at the tip of Black Africa.[10]

As a reaction, the AAM pressured the British government to stop arms sales South Africa. It argued that arms deals signed with the apartheid regime in the early 1960s were strengthening and giving legitimacy to a radical version of an already segregationist system. This is a case of what Keck and Sikkink (1998b) call the 'boomerang pattern': blocked channels between civil society and government in South Africa were partially compensated by external pressures from foreign CSOs, international organisations and other governments.

The topic of arms exports was picked by the AAM because of a clear link between Britain and oppression in South Africa, evident after the use of British-made armoured cars in the Sharpeville Massacre. According to Christabel Gurney, activist at the AAM, the issue of arms sales was adopted because it was a 'very obvious thing to campaign on, since the South African regime was aggressively internally, keeping down opposition'. Arms exports were what she called a 'soft point' in the campaign.[11] The significance of this should not be

[9] Bodleian: MSS AAM 1548. Africa 1963, 12 Apr 1963.
[10] Bodleian: MSS AAM 1494. South African Peace Council, Statement on military preparations in South Africa, 8 Jan 1961.
[11] Interview: Christabel Gurney, London, 30 Mar 2016.

underestimated: the campaign against arms exports was the most important for the AAM in the early 1960s, as cited in its 1962/1963 annual report.[12]

As evidence that an advocacy network was being formed, the British Council of Churches published a document arguing that 64 governments had prohibited arms sales to South Africa after a UN resolution approved in 1963. This document was forwarded to Harold Wilson by David Ennals, who was not only secretary of the Labour Party's international department but also chair of the AAM.[13] Anti-apartheid campaigns were supported also by trade unions, which contributed indirectly to shape Labour's position on the apartheid, a point stressed by Robert Hughes, MP (1970-1997) and AAM's chair (1976-1995).[14] This may seem paradoxical, as fewer arms exports imply fewer jobs. Such impacts were considered of lesser relevance, however, suggesting that material interests were outweighed by other factors.

The AAM did more than pressuring the government as an outsider, however. In the early 1960s, it engaged with the Labour Party (at that time in opposition), which resulted in the Labour Party becoming itself part of the British movement against the apartheid. Labour had a crucial role in introducing the anti-apartheid struggle into the domestic political agenda. Its first action was to participate in a campaign to boycott South African goods in 1960, conducted alongside the then-Boycott Movement (later AAM).[15] Harold Wilson, MP and leader of the Labour Party, was personally involved in the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1962, he questioned the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, on the sale of tear gas

[12] Bodleian: MSS AAM 13. AAM, Annual report 1962-1963, Sep 1963.
[13] Bodleian: MS Wilson 887. British Council of Churches, Note on the international and British arms trade with South Africa, 11 Dec 1963; Labour Party, letter from David Ennals to Harold Wilson, 17 Dec 1963.
[14] Interview: Robert Hughes, London, 19 Oct 2017.
[15] Bodleian: MSS AAM 839. Labour Party, Africa year, Labour appeals to consumers to boycott South African goods, 1960.

to South Africa, alongside Barbara Castle, AAM's president.[16] Harold Wilson also participated in a famous rally organised by the AAM in London in 1963, when he gave a speech criticizing arms exports to South Africa, as well as pledging a ban if elected (Phythian 2000, 5).[17]

When Labour took office in 1964, it imposed an arms embargo, thereby fulfilling its campaign pledge. That decision was motivated by factors other than economic and strategic incentives, as these had not changed since the previous Conservative government. On economic factors, South Africa was in fact buying increasing amounts of British weapons, as seen in Graph 5.1.[18] As other customers were importing fewer weapons from Britain, there were incentives for the UK to keep selling them. That was especially true in the early 1960s, when there was a general nervousness in the Labour Party and among economists concerning British economic performance (Corthorn and Davis, 2007, pp. 160–162).


Besides economic benefits, South Africa's reaction to an arms embargo could not be ignored, due to at least three strategic factors: *i*) an agreement between the two countries for the use of the Simonstown Naval Base;[19] *ii*) the fact that the British protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland were surrounded or close to South African territory; and *iii*) the role of South Africa in the struggle against communism, which was a 'card that the South African government played very hard', according to

[16] Bodleian: MSS AAM 1548. Minutes of a meeting between Barbara Castle, Harold Wilson and the Lord Privy Seal (Edward Heath), 12 Feb 1962.
[17] Bodleian: MSS AAM 1498. Speech made by Harold Wilson at the anti-apartheid rally, Trafalgar Square, 17 Mar 1963.
[18] Among the contracts, the UK authorized exports of: 258 Saracen APCs, 3 Rothesay frigates, 6 Canberra bomber aircraft, 16 bomber aircraft Buccaneer, 60 Ferret APVs, and 4 Wasp ASW helicopters.
[19] Bodleian: MSS AAM 1548. Exchange of letters on defence matters between the governments of the UK and the Union of South Africa, June 1955, p. 12-13.

Robert Hughes, MP and AAM's chair.[20] The reaction from South Africa could be especially negative because the UK had been its main provider of weapons in the period 1950-64.

Graph 5.1

Arms exports to South Africa: 1950-68 (as a proportion of total British arms exports)



Note: During the 4-year period after 1964, weapons were delivered based on contracts signed before 1964, reason why the period 1965-68 is included.


Had the Conservative Party won the 1964 general elections, an embargo would probably not have been imposed, as the governments of Harold Macmillan (1957-63) and Alec Douglas-Home (1963-64) had signed a series of arms deals with South Africa. It is insufficient to conclude, however, that the embargo depended only on the political party in power, since Labour's position was the result of interactions between the AAM and people/groups within the party. Labour governments implemented anti-apartheid policies because they were elected to do that, as well as because the anti-apartheid struggle had been incorporated into its agenda. This puts into perspective the idea of *opposing* interests

[20] Interview: Robert Hughes, London, 19 Oct 2017; Bodleian: MSS AAM 1548. Africa 1963, edited by Charles Janson, 1963.

between CSOs and governments, indicating that CSOs' influence on state behaviour is more complex than some current models suggest. Part of the literature looking at this topic is based on an assumption that CSOs *target* governments (Bob 2005; R. C. Carpenter 2007a, 2007b; R. C. Carpenter and Jose 2012). Yet, CSOs can cooperate with governments or, alternatively, target other groups, which in turn might seek to change the state behaviour. In the case analysed here, the Labour Party was influenced by the AAM, which occurred through at least three different channels, represented in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1

AAM and the Labour Party (during Labour governments)



First, influence occurred through local constituencies and groups within the Labour Party sympathetic to the anti-apartheid struggle. According to Lord Robert Hughes, MP and chair of the AAM, most members of the AAM were also members of the Labour Party. And various CLPs had local anti-apartheid movements, 45 of which were formally members of

the AAM in 1968.[21] Some of these CLPs elected representatives that defended the anti-apartheid cause, thereby taking this agenda to the National Executive Committee (NEC), the House of Commons and eventually the British government. Robert Hughes, MP for Aberdeen North, not only chaired the AAM but also participated in local campaigns in his constituency.[22] There is also an extensive correspondence between the AAM and CLPs, showing various types of interaction: CLPs expressed to the AAM their disapproval of the South African government;[23] the AAM asked support from CLPs; CLPs asked support from the AAM;[24] the AAM criticized Labour MPs for having visited South Africa;[25] and CLPs donated money to the AAM.[26] Another link between the AAM and Labour was through the Labour Party Young Socialists (LPYS). The LPYS offered financial and political support to the AAM,[27] requested speakers from the AAM to attend LPYS meetings,[28] and requested material for campaigns.[29] In exchange, the AAM requested support from the LPYS to lobby the government against military collaboration with South Africa,[30] as well as the presence of LPYS members in anti-apartheid rallies.[31]

[21] Bodleian: MSS AAM 845. Billericay CLP, letter from Ethel de Keyser, Executive Secretary, 16 Aug 1968.
[22] Interview: Robert Hughes, London, 19 Oct 2017.
[23] Bodleian: MSS AAM 844. Stratford-upon-Avon CLP, letter from Diana Cash, Executive Secretary, 25 Feb 1986.
[24] Bodleian: MSS AAM 845. Billericay CLP, letter from Ethel de Keyser, Executive Secretary, 21 Jul 1968.
[25] Bodleian: MSS AAM 844. Central Dunbartonshire CLP, letters from Basil Manning, Executive Secretary, 12 Feb 1975; 17 Feb 1975.
[26] Bodleian: MSS AAM 844. Hampstead CLP, letter from E. Wistrich, Executive Secretary, 7 Oct 1961.
[27] Bodleian: MSS AAM 841. Prestonpans LPYS, letter from J. Cook, Acting Secretary, 30 Jul 1970.
[28] Bodleian: MSS AAM 841. Bicester LPYS, letter from Michael Stokes, 24 Oct 1967.
[29] Bodleian: MSS AAM 841. House of Commons (office of the leader of the opposition), Summary of recent international sanctions against South Africa, 1985.
[30] Bodleian: MSS AAM 841. AAM, letter from Alan Brooks, Organising Secretary, 28 Oct 1967.
[31] Bodleian: MSS AAM 839. AAM, Appeal to the Labour Party, Sep 1965; Labour Party, Britain, Portugal, NATO and Africa (notes by Frank Judd and others); AAM 841. AAM, letter from Alan Brooks, Organising Secretary, 28 Oct 1967.

Second, through contacts with the Labour leadership or MPs, including Barbara Castle, Robert Hughes, Eric Moonman, Frank Judd, Gerald Kaufman, Harold Wilson, Ian Mikardo, Joan Lestor, Judith Hart, Reg Prentice and Richard Wainwright. In 1964, for example, the AAM expressed concerns to the Labour Party on the Rivonia Trial, asking it to make representations to authorities and distribute leaflets among its members. The Labour Party replied saying that the issue had been raised by Barbara Castle in the House of Commons.[32] In 1988, a large music concert was organised at the Wembley Stadium, London: the *Free Mandela Concert*, with performances from Stevie Wonder, Sting, Tracy Chapman, among others. The concert was organised by Robert Hughes, Labour MP and AAM's chair.[33]

Third, when there was a Labour government, there was facilitated access and a higher likelihood of campaigns succeeding. However, as Labour governments did not meet all of CSOs' demands, the government remained being pressured by the AAM and anti-apartheid people/groups within the party. For example, although an arms embargo was imposed in 1964, there were discussions in 1967 about possibly relaxing it, after South Africa expressed interest in acquiring naval equipment. This caused a division in Cabinet: the foreign secretary, George Brown, and the minister of defence for equipment, Roy Mason, were in favour of making the embargo less strict, while Harold Wilson and Barbara Castle were against. As evidence that pressures to relax the embargo were strong, even the prime minister, who was an advocate of the embargo, expressed that sales might be done if they were presented as part of a package to face the economic crisis (Phythian,

[32] Bodleian: MSS AAM 839. AAM, letter from S. Abdul to the Labour Party General Secretary, 24 Apr 1964; Labour Party, letter from David Ennals to the AAM, 29 Apr 1964.
[33] Interview: Robert Hughes, London, 19 Oct 2017.

2000, p. 10-14). Those proposals were criticized both within the Labour Party and outside it, leading the government to keep the embargo as it was.

In 1970, when the Conservative prime minister Edward Heath (1970-74) took office, he planned to relax the embargo.[34] Conservatives argued that this was necessary because of legal obligations, trading interests, as well as to counter the Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean.[35] As a consequence, the AAM created the campaign *Stop Arms for Apartheid South Africa*, which received support from other organisations, such as the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace and the Movement for Colonial Freedom.[36] In November 1970, the Archbishop of Canterbury sent to the prime minister a letter subscribed by 100 Anglican bishops, expressing concerns on the possibility of arms being sold to South Africa, a letter that was supported by two million Methodists.[37] Pressures came also from the Labour and Liberal parties. Labour refuted the Conservative Party's points, arguing that legal obligations had finished, arms sales to South Africa could have negative impacts on trade with other nations, and not even NATO supported those arguments.[38] Dennis Healey, then-shadow foreign secretary (1970-72), argued that 'any relaxation of the arms ban would be opposed by the whole of the central band of opinion-formers, by the Churches, and (I should guess) by a strong majority of the young, in addition to both the opposition parties'.[39] In the case of the Liberal Party, the importance of this

[34] TNA: CAB 129/154. Prime minister's office, Arms sales to South Africa, report by the Working Party, 30 Dec 1970; TNA: PREM 15. Prime minister's office, Sale of arms to South Africa (DOP (70) 6), 13 Jul 1970.
[35] Bodleian: MS Wilson 1189. The Africa Bureau, Arms sales to South Africa, 20 Jul 1970; TNA: PREM 15. FCO, Telegram 193, Policies towards Southern Africa, sent by Alec Douglas-Home, 9 Jul 1970.
[36] Bodleian: MSS AAM 1494. No arms to South Africa (*ad hoc* planning group), letter to various groups aimed at organising a campaign, 16 Sep 1970; MSS AAM 779. AAM, letter from S. Abdul to Harold Wilson, 11 Nov 1967.
[37] Bodleian: MSS AAM 13. AAM, Annual report 1970-1971, p. 12-13.
[38] Bodleian: MS Wilson 1189. The Africa Bureau, Arms sales to South Africa, 20 Jul 1970.
[39] TNA: PREM 15. South Africa (letter from Dennis Healey to the British prime minister), 13 Jul 1970.

topic was also clear, as the president of the AAM, David Steel (1966-70), had been a Liberal MP since 1965.

Although Heath was in favour of exporting arms to South Africa, he made clear that restrictions would be kept. Weapons used for internal repression, for example, would not be authorized.[40] Also, the foreign secretary, Alec Douglas-Home (1970-74), insisted that the UK should export only 'equipment for maritime defence directly related to the security of the sea routes as provided for in the Simonstown agreements'.[41] They therefore partially kept a policy introduced by a Labour government, even with no mandatory international embargo, and even if other countries were exporting weapons to South Africa, especially France and Israel. Furthermore, arms exports to South Africa were in practice limited during Heath's government, with no substantial agreements being signed. This demonstrates that, although Conservatives were more willing to play power politics, it was costly to completely lift the embargo. The taboo of selling weapons to South Africa therefore remained in British foreign policy.

The AAM welcomed the return of the Labour Party to government in 1974.[42] In 1976, however, it sent a letter to the minister of state David Ennals (1974-76), expressing concerns that the arms embargo was being breached. The AAM stressed that, as non-military products were used by the South African military, their sales should also be banned. In 1976, the AAM sent a memorandum to the new prime minister, James

[40] Bodleian: MS Wilson 1189.
[41] TNA: PREM 15. FCO, Telegram 193, Policies towards Southern Africa, sent by Alec Douglas-Home to Gaborone, 9 Jul 1970.
[42] Bodleian: MSS AAM 780. AAM, Copy of memo to the RT HON. James Callaghan MP, 15 Mar 1974.

Callaghan (1976-79), with a list of cases in which the arms embargo was being breached,[43] citing the supply of tropospheric scatter systems by the company Marconi, used to maintain the occupation of Namibia.[44]

A problem of focusing on CSOs' perspective, however, is that they stressed what should change rather than what had been achieved. Although there was room for making arms sales stricter, the embargo remained and was enforced by Harold Wilson's and James Callaghan's governments. The taboo on arms sales to South Africa was embedded in a government policy and in Labour's policies. As evidence, the Labour conference of 1977 stated that a Labour government should 'support a UN mandatory arms embargo, seek to end any collaboration by NATO or NATO powers, and tighten up the existing arms embargo'.[45] Furthermore, the minister of state David Ennals (1974-76) had chaired the AAM in the period 1960-64. Also, during his time as foreign secretary, his younger brother, Martin Ennals, was chair of the AAM (1968-76) and secretary-general of Amnesty (1968-80).

During Thatcher's government, both the AAM and the Labour Party monitored the British government behaviour. As there was a UN mandatory arms embargo since 1977, the AAM sought to draw attention to cases in which it was violated. Violations were summarized in a survey published in 1985 by the AAM called *How Britain Arms Apartheid*. In 1987, it published another document called *Britain and the UN Arms Embargo: a Memorandum to the Commonwealth*, exposing cases in which Britain violated the

[43] That was happening in four ways: no definition of what 'military equipment' was; licensed production in South Africa; exports via a third country or the Channel Islands; and supply of technical information and know-how.

[44] Bodleian: MSS AAM 1497. AAM, letter from Abdul S. Minty to the prime-minister, forwarding the memo *The operation of the British arms embargo*, 29 Apr 1976.

[45] Bodleian: MSS AAM 848. Labour Party, Labour policy on Southern Africa, 1977.

embargo.[46] Regarding pressures from the Labour Party, the NEC presented in 1981 a manifesto to the party's conference on the situation in Southern Africa. One of the adopted statements concerned the need to make the embargo stricter, including 'not only technical knowledge and spares, but also equipment to enhance the regime's military capability'.[47] Correspondence between Labour politicians and the AAM indicates that they were in touch, exchanging information and obtaining support for the preparation of speeches or reports.[48] For example, in 1984, the office of the leader of the opposition asked the AAM to help with the preparation of reports on arms embargoes against South Africa.[49]

There was no serious violation of the embargo by Britain between the early 1980s and the end of the apartheid. Evidence suggests that activities of CSOs and Labour reduced the likelihood of the UK government breaching it. In 1982, the head of FCO's Southern African Department explained in a report sent to Thatcher that 'we remain under considerable pressure from the AAM's activities in the UK'. The fact that Thatcher added personal comments to the report indicates how this issue was a priority in her government. She expressed concerns, in particular, with the support from Liberal and Labour politicians to the AAM.[50]

Changes in the embargo were introduced only in 1990, after reforms introduced by the government of F. W. de Klerk, including the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela. The government kept the arms embargo, however, stating that it would

[46] Bodleian: MSS AAM 1495. World campaign against military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, Britain and the UN arms embargo: a memo to the Commonwealth, Oct 1987.
[47] Bodleian: MSS AAM 845. Labour Party, Labour policy on Southern Africa, 1985.
[48] Bodleian: MSS AAM 840. All documents in the folder.
[49] Bodleian: MSS AAM 840. Labour Party, Labour leader calls on government to 'comes clean on the coastguarder', 1984, p. 3-4.
[50] TNA: FCO 105/1051. FCO (Southern African Department), The Anti-Apartheid Movement, containing comments by Margaret Thatcher, 27 Oct 1972.

relax it only when a new constitution were introduced.[51] In 1993, because of profound changes in South African politics, campaigns against arms sales had become unnecessary. That year, the AAM criticized the British government for authorizing imports of vehicles manufactured by a South African company. Nevertheless, even the ANC was in favour.[52]

There are at least two potential alternative explanations for UK restrictions on arms sales to South Africa. First, as other African countries criticized Britain for providing weapons to South Africa,[53] restrictions might have been the result of these pressures rather than the AAM's. These pressures were indeed considered, as revealed in documents of the FCO and Ministry of Defence. However, although this probably influenced British government's decisions, it does not explain why policies from Labour and Conservatives were different. It does not explain either why the British government had humanitarian concerns even when these pressures were not present, as in the case of Chile, analysed in the next section.

Second, restrictions might have been caused by the role that South Africa played in British history. Supporting an oppressive regime in South Africa could easily bring accusations of post-colonial behaviour. Nevertheless, this does not explain why Britain adopted restrictions on arms exports to countries with which it had a different type of relationship, as in the case of Chile.

In summary, the AAM introduced the topic of arms exports to South Africa in UK's domestic political agenda. An embargo was introduced because of its activities and

[51] Bodleian: MSS AAM 779. Prime minister's office, letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury by John Major, 16 Aug 1991.
[52] Bodleian: MSS AAM 782. FCO, letter to Robert Hughes by Lynda Chalker, 30 Nov 1993.
[53] TNA: FCO 68/319. FCO (Commonwealth Coordination Department), Reaction of Commonwealth and other governments to decision to sell Wasp helicopters to South Africa, 2 Mar 1971.

because of its relations with the Labour Party, with the embargo remaining even under Conservative governments.

Arms to Chile: how CSOs and the Labour Party worked to isolate Pinochet's regime (1973-89)

In 1973, the commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army, Augusto Pinochet, led a military coup that overthrew the government of Salvador Allende (1970-73). During the coup, the Chilean military bombed the La Moneda Palace, culminating in the death of Allende. Attacks were carried out using British-manufactured Hawker Hunter jets, supplied under a series of arms deals signed between 1967 and 1970. This turned the Chile-UK military relationship into immediate controversy: should the UK maintain arms exports to Chile? An especially difficult choice concerned weapons that were yet to be delivered, due to contracts signed in previous years.

The Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970-74) recognized the new regime in Chile and did not impose an arms embargo. Six months after the coup, however, a Labour government took office, led by Harold Wilson (1974-76), who imposed an arms embargo on Chile. What explains this decision? This cannot be explained by structural constraints, since the systemic impact of a regime change in Chile was limited. Moreover, the coup implied the end of a socialist government, which should be in the interest of a NATO member. Pressures from other countries in Latin America can also not explain it, as many of them were also ruled by the military. Human rights conditions in Chile cannot be the only factor either, as the UK had a less strict arms export policy on countries with equally poor or even worse human rights records, such as Argentina and Zaire. I argue that

the policy on arms sales to Chile was shaped by domestic politics, in which the Chile Solidarity Campaign (CSC) and the Labour Party were key actors.

The CSC was formed in 1973 as a network of individuals and organisations opposing the Pinochet regime. It was organised as a grassroots movement, with strong connections to the Labour movement (Chile Solidarity Campaign 1983; A. Jones 2014). Similar to the case of the AAM, the CSC became the hub of an advocacy network, which included celebrities, churches, trade unions and Labour.

Although his government imposed an embargo, Harold Wilson honoured existing contracts, arguing that Britain might lose potential contracts with other countries, as well as that Chile might cut copper exports. This was a controversial decision even within the Labour Party: more than 100 Labour MPs signed a motion against the delivery of warships to Chile, the Labour Party's International Department called upon the government to reconsider the decision,[54] and various Labour constituencies also criticized it (A. Jones 2014, 129–30; Phythian 2000, 105; Wilkinson 1992). The decision of honouring contracts indicated, however, that the government was willing to incur on some of the costs of selling weapons to Chile in exchange for keeping the credibility of Britain as a reliable arms exporter. Pressures from outside and within the party were insufficient to change that.

Yet, it is important not to lose sight of what had been achieved: Chile was under an arms embargo that countries with similar or worse humanitarian conditions were not. In 1978, the British government did not authorize exports to Chile of Versatile Console Systems (used for naval communication, navigation and control), for example, while

[54] Bodleian: MS CASTLE 191. Labour Party International Department, letter received by the General Secretary from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Apr 1974.

authorized them to countries where human rights conditions were also poor, such as Argentina, Brazil, Iran and Saudi Arabia.[55] There was therefore a taboo on selling weapons to Chile that did not exist for most other countries.

As additional evidence of the role of domestic politics, the UK position changed after Thatcher took office in 1979. She restored diplomatic relations with Chile and lifted the embargo on weapons for external defence, which happened mainly because of economic interests. In July 1980, in a letter addressed to the prime minister, the company British Aerospace complained about the suspension of arms exports to Chile, requesting authorization to supply spare parts.[56] Either a coincidence or not, Thatcher responded to the company two weeks later saying that 'henceforth applications for arms exports to Chile will be treated in the normal way'.[57] Furthermore, a paper from the Ministry of Defence circulated in 1981 stressed that job generation in the UK should be more important than human rights: refusals of arms sales should be reduced and not be affected by what they considered as 'individual human rights incidents'.[58]

Labour MPs, trade unions, churches, NGOs and other governments (including the US government) criticized Thatcher's decision, with pressures remaining until the end of Pinochet's regime. Amnesty started to campaign against arms exports to Chile by that time, publishing in 1981 a paper called *The Repression Trade*, criticizing British policy on arms exports and using Chile as a case study (Amnesty International, 1981, p. iv). The shadow foreign secretary, Peter Shore, said in 1980 that 'the Government were utterly wrong to announce […] that arms would be supplied to Chile on normal terms' (Amnesty

[55] TNA: FCO 46/1843. TNA: FCO 46/1843. Ministry of Defence, Defence sales, sent by Antony Duff, 20 Mar 1978, p. 3-32.
[56] MTF: PREM 19/0158. British Aerospace, letter from A. H. C. Greenwood to the prime minister, 4 Jul 1980.
[57] Ibidem.
[58] TNA: FCO 46/2782. FCO, Defence sales working group: minutes of a meeting, 10 Feb 1981.

International 1981, 4). In 1981, Cardinal Basil Hume, who had wide popularity in Britain, addressed a letter to the foreign secretary, stating that he 'must seriously question the wisdom of lifting the embargo on arms sales imposed by the British Government in 1974' (Amnesty International 1981, 4).

Was this pressure effective? Evidence shows that the answer is positive. Although the embargo was partially lifted by Thatcher, the UK rarely supplied weapons used for internal repression, indicating that human rights concerns remained in the decision-making. In 1980, British ministers did not authorize sales of a 'helicopter-mounted television surveillance system' manufactured by Marconi, arguing that the 'commercial value of the sale would not outweigh the domestic criticism the sale was likely to arouse from the human rights lobby'.[59] In 1981, a document from the Defence Sales Working Group, established the previous year to discuss arms exports, expressed that human rights should be considered even if the policy on arms exports had changed:

> the FCO were reviewing the criteria on human rights. However, it should be borne in mind that in the last analysis Ministers had to defend their decisions in public and human rights issues were an emotive subject which aroused a great deal of public concern in this country.[60]

In 1981, the secretary of state for defence, John Nott, sent a letter to the foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, stressing the influence of the 'Chilean lobby'. He argued that, although Chile had a poor human rights record, it was not as bad as other countries' to which the UK sold weapons. He then argued why there were restrictions on Chile: 'the real

[59] TNA: FCO 46/3237. FCO (South America Department), Chile: sale of Heli Tele, 14 Dec 1982.
[60] TNA: FCO 46/3872. FCO, Minutes of a meeting of the defence sales working group, 10 Feb 1981, p. 3.

reason for our hesitancy is the vociferous public anti-Pinochet lobby in Britain'.[61] This suggests that, in the absence of a movement against Pinochet's regime, the British government would probably be less strict.

Thatcher's policy became slightly less strict during the Falklands/Malvinas War and in its aftermath, as the government sought to strengthen relations with Latin American countries.[62] Sales of certain types of weapons were temporarily authorized due to the Chilean support during the war. Before the war, the UK did not grant licences to export 105 mm tank gun ammunition, for example, while it did after the war started.[63] In another case, the Chilean government was interested in acquiring 7.62 mm machine guns and pods to equip aircraft. In May 1982, the FCO expressed that, after initially refusing clearance, it had changed its position 'given the helpful position adopted by the Chilean Government over the Falkland Islands situation'.[64] This does not imply, however, that human rights concerns disappeared, even in a situation in which the UK had the opportunity to support one of Argentina's main rivals. In the abovementioned case of machine guns and pods, the FCO took pressures from human rights groups into account, arguing that 'there must remain a risk that this sale would attract criticism from the anti-Chile lobby both within Parliament and the country if it were to become known'.[65] Furthermore, the British government did not supply small arms, grenades, antipersonnel landmines, tanks and armoured vehicles.[66] Concerning sales of tanks, the head of FCO's South America department expressed in August 1982 that

[61] TNA: FCO 7/3907. Ministry of Defence, MO 11/16, letter to Lord Carrington by John Nott, 20 Jul 1981.
[62] TNA: FCO 46/3237. FCO, Chile: supply of MDAF funded RAF equipment, 18 Oct 1982.
[63] TNA: FCO 46/3237. FCO (South America Department), Chile: arms sales, 25 Aug 1982, p. 4.
[64] TNA: FCO 7/4196. FCO (Defence department), Chile: sale of machine guns, 21 May 1982.
[65] TNA: FCO 46/3237. FCO, document from J E Holmes to A J Coles, on authorization of sales of machine guns to Chile, 25 May 1982.
[66] TNA: FCO 46/3237. FCO (South America Department), Chile: arms sales, 25 Aug 1982.

> The sale of tanks and armoured vehicles is […] a highly emotive issue as they are popularly seen as prime instruments of oppression. The Chileans have expressed their interest in the purchase of tanks and certain British companies would like to respond. I believe, however, that the sale of complete armoured vehicles would arouse such an outcry from the Chilean human rights lobby that it could jeopardise our efforts to improve relations.[67]

Another case also provides evidence for this. In December 1982, Marconi tried once more to sell the abovementioned helicopter-mounted surveillance systems. However, the head of FCO's South America department was against: 'I believe the sale of this particular equipment would still be likely to arouse vociferous complaint'.[68] In another document, he expressed that 'too marked a relaxation of our criteria [to export weapons to Chile] would provoke a strong reaction from the [Chilean] lobby'.[69]

The issue did not end even after Pinochet left the presidency. After a democratically-elected government took office, led by Patricio Aylwin (1990-94), Pinochet stayed as commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army, remaining in charge of weapons procurement. In 1991, he visited the UK after an invitation from Royal Ordnance, a company owned by British Aerospace, raising protests from Amnesty and George Foulkes, a Labour MP (Davison 1991; The Times 1991). These visits happened again over the following years.

In 1997, however, a Spanish judge launched a prosecution against Pinochet for crimes of torture and assassination of Spanish citizens, through which he was indicted and received an arrest order. At that time, the new Labour foreign minister, Robin Cook, was

[67] Ibidem.
[68] TNA: FCO 46/3237. FCO (South America Department), Chile: sale of Heli Tele, 14 Dec 1982.
[69] TNA: FCO 46/3237. FCO (South America Department), Chile: arms sales, 25 Aug 1982.

launching the 'ethical dimension' in British foreign policy (Baldwin and Bamber 1998; J. Burns 1997). This context favoured Pinochet's arrest in 1998 in a visit to the UK, despite his invitation by the UK Ministry of Defence and weapons-manufacturers. His arrest implied cancellations of imports of machine guns and tanks by the Chilean military, indicating that factors other than strategic and economic aspects were relevant in arms exports to Chile (Binyon, Wood, and Watson 1998; Sengupta and Boggan 1999).

In summary, British government's position depended on the party in power: Labour or Conservative. While the former imposed a full embargo, the latter limited the embargo to weapons that could be used for internal repression, a difference suggesting that arms sales to Chile were a contentious issue in British *domestic* politics. This occurred because an advocacy network, centred on the Chile Solidarity Campaign, raised the political salience of British policies on Chile. It was because of this network's activities that an embargo was imposed and partially kept until the end of Pinochet's regime.

As explored in the next subsection, this also explains why an arms embargo was not imposed on Argentina: there were advocacy networks against the regimes in Chile and South Africa that did not have an equivalent for Argentina. As an illustration, Sting composed a protest song against Pinochet in 1987 (*They Dance Alone*) and played at the *Free Mandela Concert* in 1988, but his attention was not drawn to the same extent to human rights issues in Argentina.

Arms to Argentina (1976-83): what explains the absence of an embargo?

Although there were restrictions on arms sales to Argentina, they were not as strict as those on Chile, against which there was an embargo. This is puzzling, as the military

regime in Argentina (1976-83) was not very different from Chile's in terms of political suppression and human rights violations, something that was acknowledged by the UK government. In 1979, Ted Rowlands, minister of state at the FCO, expressed that Britain was selling weapons to a 'nasty dictatorship' (Argentina), a regime whose human rights record was in fact worse than Chile's.[70]

A stricter position on Chile was observed during both Labour and Conservative governments. For Labour, the military coup in Chile caused a greater impact than the one in Argentina: when Harold Wilson took office in 1974, his government imposed an arms embargo against Chile, although the same did not happen after the coup in Argentina in March 1976. Among the weapons that his government exported to Argentina but not to Chile, there were: Type 42 destroyers, electronic warfare equipment, Seacat/Tigercat missiles and anti-aircraft missile systems.[71] Also, James Callaghan's government invited Argentine officials to attend the Royal Navy Equipment Exhibition in 1979 while it did not invite the Chileans.[72] During Thatcher's government, officials were aware that selling weapons to Argentina was a contradiction, since Britain was not selling similar weapons to Chile. However, they emphasised that, since the coup in March 1976, ministers had not sought to 'prevent negotiations with Argentines for the supply of defence equipment'.[73]

Besides human rights issues, the British government should be cautious when selling weapons to Argentina because of the Falklands/Malvinas. This was observed in a few cases, as when the UK government rejected exports of equipment that could be used

[70] TNA: FCO 7/3579. FCO, letter sent by Ted Rowlands to the secretary of state, on arms sales to Argentina, 5 Jan 1979.
[71] TNA: FCO 7/3579. FCO (South America Department), Arms sales to Argentina, 12 Dec 1978, p. 8.
[72] TNA: FCO 7/3579. FCO (South America Department), Royal Navy Equipment Exhibition, 2 Mar 1979.
[73] TNA: FCO 7/3579. FCO (South America Department), Arms sales to Argentina, 12 Dec 1978, p. 5.

to invade the islands, such as dock landing crafts and 20 mm guns to equip aircraft.[74] However, even if the UK government did not directly strengthen Argentina's capacity to invade the Falklands/Malvinas, it sold weapons that made the *regime* in Argentina stronger.

Therefore, despite similar political regimes in Chile and Argentina, as well as a territorial dispute between Argentina and the UK, both Labour and Conservative governments were more willing to sell weapons to Argentina than to Chile. These different positions are explained by the existence of an advocacy network in the UK to isolate Pinochet's regime, which did not have an equivalent for Argentina.[75] The behaviour of the British government depended, therefore, not only on the state of human rights of potential customers but also on the strength of groups campaigning for the government to isolate specific countries.

I do not claim that civil society opposition to arms sales to Argentina did not have any impact, as evidence shows that the British government took it into account. When rejecting exports of Protector pistols to Argentina in 1980, for example, the FCO expressed that they 'could not convincingly defend the sales of such equipment […] if we were challenged to do so by the human rights lobby'.[76] What I argue is that, as there was no specific and strong movement in the UK to isolate Argentina's military regime, the government was less strict.

In summary, although both Labour and Conservative governments adopted constraints on arms sales to Argentina, restrictions were not as strong as those against

[74] TNA: FCO 7/3579. FCO (South America Department), Argentina: dock landing ship, 16 Oct 1979; FCO (South America Department), Argentina: arms sales, 5 Dec 1979.
[75] Explaining why there was a movement in the first place goes beyond the scope of this thesis, however.
[76] TNA: FCO 7/3730. FCO (South America Department), Argentina: arms sales, 8 Dec 1980.

Chile. There was a taboo on selling weapons to Chile that did not exist for Argentina. As a civil society campaign on Argentina was not as strong as the one on Chile, impacts on arms export policies seemed to result from *targeted* campaigns.

Arms to Saudi Arabia (1975-2015): why is there no embargo?

Since the first oil crisis in 1973, Saudi Arabia has been an attractive market for weapons: its military expenditures averaged 12% of the GDP in 1988-2015 and there is almost no local production of weapons. In the period 1974-2015, Saudi Arabia acquired around 4% of the total global imports of weapons, mainly from Western countries. Of all its arms imports, the UK provided 17% during the period, behind only the US. From UK's point of view, Saudi Arabia is its second most important customer (after the US), having bought 13% of its external sales in this period. Some of the largest arms deals in history were signed between the UK and Saudi Arabia, such as al-Yamamah I and II, starting in 1985, and al-Salam, starting in 2007. Making it even more attractive, Saudi Arabia has stable relations with Western powers and plays a key role in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, due to Saudi Arabia's authoritarian regime, poor human rights conditions, lack of transparency, corruption, and involvement in external conflicts, arms deals are controversial. Sales of weapons have faced opposition from MPs, government officials, opposition leaders, religious groups, academics and CSOs. In the UK, four CSOs examined in this thesis have campaigned against them: Amnesty, CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld.

However, CSOs have not had achieved as much influence as on South Africa and Chile. In 1968, for example, the Labour government of Harold Wilson authorized exports

of weapons to Saudi Arabia that it would not export to South Africa, including 80 mortars, 3 million 7.62 ammo and 160,000 antipersonnel landmines.[77] In 1978, Labour refused to export weapons to Chile, although it approved almost all requests of sales to Saudi Arabia, including weapons that might be used for internal repression, such as Heckler & Koch MP5 9 mm submachine guns.[78] On al-Yamamah deals, about 500 pages of government documents have been consulted, with no mention of human rights in Saudi Arabia as a factor to be considered.[79] As additional evidence, in a meeting attended by ministries in 1981, concerns on human rights were expressed regarding sales to South America but nothing was said about Saudi Arabia.[80] This suggests that benefits were perceived to be so high that costs in terms of reputation did not have a significant effect. Moreover, campaigns against arms sales to Saudi Arabia were not as organised or huge as those against South Africa and Chile, implying that costs imposed on the government were lower.

Since the introduction of the Export Control Act (ECA) in 2002, the British government has been criticized for not implementing it regarding sales to Saudi Arabia. According to Saferworld, Saudi Arabia does not meet the criteria established by the British government to receive weapons: it is a 'major country of concern' for the FCO; arms exports generate regional instability; arms deals lack transparency; and they increase uncertainty, as it is hard to predict the regime's future (Saferworld, 2007, p. 10).

Campaigns gained momentum after Saudi Arabia intervened in the Yemeni Civil War (2015-+), in a coalition with other Arab countries and support from Western powers.

[77] TNA: FCO 8/782. Ministry of Defence, A/10/Clearance/2285, concerning arms sales to Saudi Arabia, 19 Jun 1968; FCO (Defence Supply Department), sent to the Ministry of Defence by D J S Murray, 21 Jun 1968.
[78] TNA: FCO 46/1843. Ministry of Defence, Defence sales, sent by Antony Duff, 20 Mar 1978, p. 3.
[79] TNA: FCO 8/2872; 8/2344; 8/3126; 8/3758. This includes letters exchanged between different government departments in the UK, as well as between the UK and other countries.
[80] TNA: FCO 46/2872. Defence Sales Working Group, Minutes of meeting, 10 Feb 1981, p. 4.

According to the spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, about 3,500 civilians had been killed and 6,300 injured by Saudi forces (Shamdasani 2016). Evidence shows that Saudi Arabia used British weapons, supplied both before and after the intervention, as confirmed by Michael Fallon, secretary of state for defence, in March 2016:

> The Royal Saudi Air Force are flying British-built aircraft in Yemen, and have been provided with precision-guided Paveway weapons. The [British] Government is satisfied that extant licences for Saudi Arabia are fully compliant with the UK's export licences criteria. No export licences for Saudi Arabia have been revoked in the last year (House of Commons 2016a).

The British government considered that the Saudi intervention should not bring any change to its policy on arms sales. In September 2016, the foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, argued that the UK would keep arms exports to Saudi Arabia because there was no evidence that international humanitarian law was being violated (Johnson 2016).

Four CSOs examined in this thesis (Amnesty, CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld) have been vocal in criticizing British support to Saudi operations in Yemen, especially the use of British weapons in the conflict and impacts on civilians. They have also argued that the use of military equipment in Yemen demonstrates that there is a fine line between equipment used for domestic repression and external aggression. Saferworld, for example, has been working on Yemen since 2010, with a permanent office in Sana'a (Saferworld 2018). Since the civil war started, it has pressured the government to stop arms sales to Saudi Arabia, which it does through lobbying of MPs and officials, through the press and doing research. Amnesty has focused on the links between arms transfers and serious human rights violations, having found 30 examples of violation of IHL, among which a series of strikes in May and July 2015 that resulted in deaths of 100 civilians (House of Commons 2016b, pt.

2). This information was used to lobby the government, targeting the FCO and the Ministry of Defence, as well as MPs.[81] Although the government disagreed with Amnesty's evidence, two committees in parliament pointed out that the government had used evidence from Amnesty in other cases (House of Commons 2016b, pt. 2). Also, an Amnesty's report demonstrating that British cluster bombs had been used in Yemen by Saudi Arabia was later proved to be true. This was confirmed in 2016 by the secretary of state for defence, Michael Fallon, who said that BL755 cluster munitions had been supplied in the 1980s. As evidence of CSO's influence, the British government asked the Saudi government to stop using British cluster bombs, which the Saudis accepted (House of Commons. International Development Committee 2016; P. Jones 2016). In 2015, a legal opinion from international legal experts – commissioned by Amnesty, Oxfam and Saferworld – stated that British arms exports to Saudi Arabia were illegal. According to them, the UK was breaching domestic, European and international law by not following the UK Consolidated Criteria on arms exports, the EU Common Position and the ATT (Sands QC, Clapham, and Ní Ghrálaigh 2015). Besides a potential impact on UK policies, there was an impact abroad: Austria, for example, suspended arms exports to Saudi Arabia based on this document.[82]

The absence of an embargo does not imply, however, lack of influence, since government and companies have adapted their narratives to contain CSOs' campaigns, although such adaptation would be of course considered as a failure from CSOs' point of view. By emphasising how arms sales to Saudi Arabia enhances Britain's security, the government is presenting a counter-narrative, which is expected to neutralise criticisms. CSOs' campaigns also create incentives for the use of intermediaries in deals involving

[81] Interviews: Ibidem; Patrick Wilcken, London, 12 Oct 2016.
[82] Interview: Rasha Abdul-Rahim, London, 12 Oct 2016.

Saudi Arabia. As potential evidence, an arms broker from a British security management company negotiated in 2016 the acquisition of artillery ammo manufactured by the Brazilian company Imbel, which would be later sent to Saudi Arabia.[83]

In summary, this case demonstrates that CSOs have had limited influence on arms exports to Saudi Arabia, which is due to two factors: the high strategic and economic importance of Saudi Arabia, combined with the fact that civil society campaigns were, for most of the period analysed here, not as large and targeted as those against South Africa or Chile. Explaining why a stronger civil society campaign did not emerge is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis, although it might be caused by transnational connections between the UK and arms importing countries, including communities of people living in the UK and a perception of shared values with activists in targeted countries.

'They shall beat their swords into ploughshares': Oxfam's work on arms exports and poverty

Campaigns against arms sales are framed according to the overall goal of groups organizing them. For the AAM, for example, stopping arms sales to South Africa was part of a campaign to isolate the apartheid regime, the same applying to the Chile Solidarity Campaign. Amnesty also frames arms exports in terms of its main agenda, focusing on human rights issues.

In another type of framing, impacts of arms exports on *poverty* and *development* are stressed. This topic was incorporated into Oxfam's agenda as part of a broader process that began in the late 1950s, when it started looking at structural causes of poverty, in

[83] Interview: Brazilian government official, Apr 2017.

addition to providing emergency relief. In Oxfam's 1959-60 report, its activities were described as 'feeding the hungry' and promoting 'freedom from hunger'.[84] Over the next years, Oxfam launched various campaigns based on this approach, including those for: a fairer trade (*Make Trade Fair*), debt relief, reducing costs of antiretroviral treatment for people with HIV/AIDS (*Cut the Cost*), increasing development aid (*00.7* campaign), ending domestic violence (*We Can*), reducing the use of biofuels, and climate change. These activities can be divided into what Oxfam calls 'emergency, development and campaigning' (Oxfam 2007, 6–7). It was as part of this approach that Oxfam started working with control on arms exports in 1976, when it formed the Committee on Poverty and the Arms Trade (COPAT) alongside eight other organisations. Its first action was to organise the campaign *Bombs for Breakfast*, stressing how the arms trade fuelled poverty.[85] It drew attention, in particular, to Britain's role in perpetuating poverty in the Third World through arms exports.

This topic gained importance in Oxfam's agenda in the 1980s, after the creation of the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) in the UK, in 1979. Dealing with the arms trade was a controversial question in Oxfam, however. In response to a letter explaining the reasons behind an Oxfam's grant to the WDC, Oxfam's director-general, Brian Walker, expressed disapproval:

> it is not correct […] to say that Oxfam has contributed £10,000 'towards the expenses of the Campaign Office in the United Kingdom during 1981'. OXFAM could not do that within the purposes of our charitable objectives. I was very careful to allocate the

[84] Bodleian: MS Oxfam COM/1/1/1/1. Oxfam, Annual report: 1959/60, 1960.
[85] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN 3/4. Oxfam, Oxfam 2000 campaign network: arms & poverty.

> money to Clause 3 of the WDC Constitution which ensures that our contribution should be spent towards promoting the interests of the Third World within the campaign.[86]

Oxfam should therefore keep focus on development issues, reason why connections between arms and poverty should be clear. In the discussion paper *Disarmament and development*, published in 1981 by Bill Yates, he sought to address this issue:

> The debate in Britain centres mainly on nuclear weapons; the danger of their being used in the Northern hemisphere; […]. These matters do not, at first sight, appear to be of even passing interest to a Kampuchean or Guatemalan peasant, to a sick child in the Yemen, or to a Refugee Somali nomad. […] nuclear weapons are only the tip – however fearful and threatening – of the armaments iceberg. It is their unseen effects, and the effects of the great underlying mass of conventional weapons and military forces, that have immediate and direct relevance to the poor.[87]

By the mid-1980s, Oxfam had campaigned on arms control for about ten years, targeting both Labour and Conservative governments. However, evidence seems to suggest that those efforts were not successful, as development did not play a role in decisions on arms sales. In the cases of South Africa and Chile, embargoes were imposed because of the apartheid regime and human rights violations. The same applies to at least five other countries, with official documentation indicating that poverty was not a factor for rejecting arms exports: Sudan in 1971, Kenya in 1977 and 1981, Angola in 1982, Mozambique in 1982, and Haiti in 1983.[88] Although the Export Credits Guarantee

[86] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN 4/1/3. Oxfam, Oxfam disarmament, by Brian W. Walker, sent to Bill Yates, 22 May 1981.
[87] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN 4/1/3. Oxfam, Disarmament and development: discussion paper on the current position, by Bill Yates, Jun 1981.
[88] The following folders have been consulted at The National Archives: FCO 39/934 (Defence sales to Sudan – 1971); FCO 31/2122 (Defence sales to Kenya – 1977); FCO 31/3183 (Defence sales to Kenya – 1981); FCO

Department (ECGD) did not support operations with some of these countries, this was based on credit ratings and credit limits established by the ECGD.[89] As additional evidence, an FCO document from 1978 contained eleven criteria to be considered when exporting weapons, none of them citing development or poverty.[90]

Oxfam nonetheless kept working with this framing. In the campaign *Ethiopia is hungry for change*, launched in the mid-1980s, it stressed that super powers sold weapons used in Ethiopia and neighbouring countries rather than worked to end the hostilities.[91] The campaign stressed five ways in which the problem of hunger could be addressed, one of which was to spend money on development rather than on arms production and trade.[92] The role of the arms trade in fuelling poverty was also explored in the *2000 Campaign Network*, stressing the links between UK policies and world poverty.[93]

In 1997, Oxfam launched the *Cut Conflict* campaign, in which negative effects of the arms trade were emphasised.[94] Oxfam argued that the eight criteria agreed by the EU Council of Ministers in 1998 should evolve into an EU Code of Conduct, in which levels of respect for human rights, economic situation, and existence of conflict in potential customers should be central. An internal document of Oxfam argued that this campaign was probably the most difficult it had ever organised, due to 'the complexity and

106/655 (Defence sales to Angola – 1982); FCO 106/725 (Defence sales to Mozambique – 1982); and FCO 99/1549 (Defence sales to Haiti – 1983).

[89] TNA: FCO 31/2122. Export Credit Guarantees Department, Kenya-Arms, 31 May 1977.

[90] TNA: FCO 46/1843. FCO, Sales of arms and riot control equipment to South America, 30 Mar 1978.

[91] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN 4/3/13. Oxfam, Ethiopia is hungry for change (leaflet), 1985.

[92] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN 3/4. Oxfam, Hungry for change: Oxfam's campaign for justice not hunger (leaflet), 1984.

[93] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN 3/4. Oxfam, Oxfam 2000 campaign network: you can do something about the British connections with Third World poverty (poster); Oxfam, Oxfam 2000 campaign network: for people who are concerned about the British connections with Third World poverty (leaflet);

[94] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN/5/3. Oxfam, Cut conflict campaign (media report), 1997, p. 3-6.

controversial nature of the issues involved, the deep fears and emotions they raise and the physical dangers which involvement in conflict relief – direct or through speaking up – implies for Oxfam staff, partners and volunteers.[95]

Nevertheless, it was only after Labour took office in 1997 that the government started considering poverty and development issues in decisions on arms exports. Why did that happen? As in the case of arms embargoes imposed on South Africa (1964) and Chile (1974), the position of Labour was formed *before* it took office. In the 1997 manifesto, Labour promised to adopt a stricter control on arms exports, as well as to increase development aid. Once it took office, it sought to implement it. The Overseas Development Administration was turned into the DFID, whose secretary became a Cabinet member. In addition, the DFID was assigned with the responsibility of ensuring that arms exports did not fuel poverty, thereby making this criterion part of the decision making. Also, the government abolished the Aid and Trade Provision, which conditioned provision of aid to sales of British products (including weapons). In the early 2000s, it asked a group at the University of Bradford to prepare a paper exploring links between conflict and poverty, later used by the DFID to argue in favour of responsible arms exports (House of Commons 2007, 54). The DFID engaged also with various CSOs, which helped it to build a framework to better understand the links between arms trade and poverty. In 2003, for example, it sponsored a workshop to discuss this problem, to which several CSOs were invited, including Oxfam, Saferworld and Viva Rio.

Evidence suggests that CSOs and the DFID share similar perceptions on the arms trade. CSOs argue, for example, that the DFID's role in the decision-making should be

[95] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN/5/3. Oxfam, Evaluation of the cut conflict campaign, 1998, p. 1.

greater. In 1999, in an inquiry conducted in Parliament, CSOs (Oxfam included) complained that only 10% of export licences received by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) were forwarded to the DFID (Dickie 2004, 152–53). CSOs also complained that, even when that happened, DFID's position was frequently ignored: in 2005, for example, BAE Systems requested a licence to export an air traffic control system to Tanzania, which the government authorized despite DFID's opposition (Stavrianakis 2010, 89–90; 123). The DFID is perceived by CSOs as 'their voice' in the government. According to Martin Butcher, from Oxfam: 'the DFID is very friendly to Oxfam. […]. [However], the DFID is only asked to give their input when criterion 8 [from the EU Common Position, concerning development issues] is in place. We would like them to be much more involved'.[96]

Overall, have Oxfam's activities been successful? This question is harder to answer than for cases analysed in other sections of this chapter because government responses are more visible when campaigns target specific countries. In these cases, governments can impose arms embargoes or ban sales of certain weapons. When campaigns are framed in terms of lack of transparency (analysed later in this chapter), responses are equally more visible, as the government can publish data or reports on arms exports.

Yet, some evidence might indicate potential impacts of Oxfam's campaigns. First, the DFID's role increased because of a policy introduced by the Labour Party, which was in part shaped by Oxfam. This remained after Labour left power, even though the DFID's role diminished. According to Robert Parker, from Saferworld:

> The environment is changing in the UK. All of that [DFID's work on poverty] is [being] subsumed under national security. The DFID has become more like in the US, where the USAID is about advancing national interests through development assistance.

[96] Interview (via Skype): Martin Butcher, 20 Sep 2017.

> About 5-6 years ago, DFID was using the language of peace building. Now it shifted away from that NGO language.

Second, impacts can be inferred from the number of refusals to export weapons based on criterion 8 of the EU Code of Conduct, which are a proxy to measure the weight of poverty concerns in the decision-making. However, it seems that this is not significant. In the period 2003-2015, only 2 refusals were based on criterion 8, out of 3,169.[97] In comparison, there were 435 refusals based on risks of weapons being used for domestic repression.

In summary, when this framing is used, influence seems to be limited. Although the link between the arms trade and development was adopted by the government in 1997, it is not as relevant as other aspects of the arms trade. A perception of limited influence was stressed by Keith Krause, for whom this framing is less powerful than the ones stressing human rights or humanitarian impacts.[98] This was also emphasised by Martin Butcher, from Oxfam, for whom 'development risks associated with arms licencing are very little taken into account in the UK. DFID's weight is not what it should be'.[99]

This does not imply that Oxfam as an organisation is not influential when campaigning for a stricter control on the arms trade. Oxfam has taken part in other campaigns, as in those criticizing the lack of transparency and the non-regulation of brokering activities, examined in the next sections.

[97] There is no data for 2006.
[98] Interview (via Skype): Keith Krause, 7 Feb 2017.
[99] Interview (via Skype): Martin Butcher, 20 Sep 2017.

Transparency in arms exports

In the late 1970s, an FCO's internal document acknowledged that British arms exports lacked transparency, lagging far behind levels of transparency found in the US. It also acknowledged that this should change: 'British arms sales are shrouded in too much secrecy. Publication of statistics by region would bring useful benefits while still protecting the customer'.[100]

Lack of transparency is a target for various CSOs' campaigns, which pressure the government to increase publicity of information on arms importing countries, types of weapons exported, financial value of transactions, among others. According to Patrick Wilcken, from Amnesty, 'UK arms exports are very untransparent. […] It reports about licencing decisions but not on actual deliveries, so it is very hard to know what they actually delivered and where'.[101]

Demanding transparency is frequently a first approach to areas in which CSOs have historically limited involvement. According to Robert Parker, from Saferworld: 'part of NGOs' work is on accountability and oversight, which tends to be where civil society can come in, as this is a place [arms exports] where it has not traditionally worked in'.[102] Dealing with transparency is therefore a strategic course of action to approach the issue of arms exports, adopting an angle in which CSOs have accumulated expertise.

The sector is indeed not as open to public scrutiny as other government areas. Documents on arms deals and arms export policies are almost always classified, with almost no information available before 1989. As additional evidence, officials interviewed

[100] TNA: FCO 49/861. FCO, Conventional arms transfer policy, 27 Jun 1979, p. 19-20.
[101] Interview: Patrick Wilcken, London, 12 Oct 2016.
[102] Interview: Robert Parker, London, 10 Oct 2016.

for this thesis agreed to talk as long as they were not identified, although it is important to stress that they demonstrated a critical approach to the issue of arms exports, recognizing the need to learn with past mistakes.

Nevertheless, although detailed information on current arms deals is scarce, the existence of democratic institutions is a check on government departments working with arms trade issues. In various occasions, MPs in Britain scrutinized the decision-making and pressured the Executive to increase transparency. As analysed in previous sections, discussions concerning arms deals with South Africa and Chile occurred in parliament, where MPs criticized the UK support to those regimes, as well as pointed out flaws in the Executive's justification for arms deals. In 1980, for example, although the Executive was willing to sell battle tanks to Chile, it gave up on doing that because it considered 'impossible to defend such a decision in Parliament'.[103]

Levels of transparency were increased after Labour took office in 1997. During the elections, the Labour Party promised to 'increase the transparency and accountability of decisions on export licences for arms'. This was done in reaction to the Scott Report, according to which a lack of government accountability had led Britain to sell weapons to Iraq. Once Labour took office, it sought to implement these changes, as part of what Labour called the 'ethical dimension' of Britain's foreign policy. Under the initiative of Robin Cook, the *Annual Report on Arms Exports* was created, containing information on British arms sales that was until then not available to the public.

CSOs contributed to shape Labour's position on this issue, which occurred before, during and after the period of Robin Cook as foreign secretary. Transparency was an old

[103] TNA: FCO 7/3907. FCO (South American Department), Conventional arms transfer policy, 30 Nov 1981.

agenda of CSOs, which Robin Cook had supported since the late 1970s, when he criticized the BAAE, an arms exhibition organised by the British Army. CSOs' influence was observed also in discussions on the content of the annual report. The need for reports to be published on a 'statutory basis', for example, was introduced after a suggestion made by Oxfam (Oakes and Youngs 2001, 28). In addition, evidence suggests that the amount of information in reports was in part also the result of Oxfam's campaigns.[104] Finally, even after Robin Cook (and later Blair) left the government, these practices remained, which is evidence of their stickiness.

Arms brokering and arms fairs

Arms brokering

In the late 1990s, when discussions about changing the UK legislation on arms exports were occurring, the activity of arms brokering was not regulated. Individuals connecting buyers to sellers of weapons in the UK did not need a licence, regardless of whether suppliers and customers were in the UK or abroad. Arms brokers, perceived by many as profiting from death and poverty, were therefore free to conduct activities without specific regulations.

This topic was introduced in the political agenda in the UK in the late 1990s by CSOs. At that time, as British weapons were not being exported in large scale to conflict zones or human rights violators, brokering was perceived by CSOs as the most problematic part of

[104] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN/5/3. Oxfam, Cut conflict campaign: media's report.

the market, according to Robert Parker, from Saferworld.[105] However, the UK Department of Trade and Industry was reluctant to regulate brokering, arguing that the government could control activities of companies in this area, but not of individuals.[106] As a reaction, CSOs argued that licences were common: if people needed them to watch TV, get married or have a pet, why not licences to broker arms deals? Amnesty organised campaigns across Britain, in which people were dressed up as different characters who needed a licence, such as a fisherman, a motorcyclist, a person getting married, someone watching TV and the one who did not need it: the arms broker. Those demonstrations became news in local newspapers, creating pressures on local MPs to take this issue to parliament. Also, as part of the campaign, Amnesty ran surveys, asking people about their opinion on the non-regulation of arms brokering, whose results were forwarded to local MPs. Some MPs wrote to ministers, who were then obliged to respond.[107]

Those campaigns led to the creation of a licence, which was done under the leadership of Stephen Byers, secretary of state for trade and industry (1998-2001). As evidence of CSOs' influence, he used the same language of Amnesty: in a Labour Party conference in 2000 he said that 'in this country you need a licence to marry, to go fishing or to drive a car; yet you don't need a licence to broker and traffic in arms. This cannot be right'. Therefore, not only the proposal but also the language itself was transmitted from CSOs to a government institution (G. Jones 2000; Oakes and Youngs 2001; Wintour 2000).

The need for a licence was introduced in 2002. Also, in the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report, details on the number of prosecutions in the UK for illicit brokering were

[105] Interview: Robert Parker, London, 10 Oct 2016.
[106] Ibidem.
[107] Ibidem.

introduced, as well as activities to improve control on brokering. As evidence of its embeddedness in policies, no proposals for cancelling these licences have been discussed since then, even during Conservative (or Conservative-led coalition) governments.

'Stop the arms fair': the case of the DSEi

CSOs conduct campaigns also against *promotion* of arms exports, especially against arms exhibitions, where military, security and policing equipment and services are showcased to potential customers. In the UK, the most important arms fair is the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi), where various types of conventional weapons and military services are exhibited.[108]

The DSEi is organised every two years in London, being the largest arms exhibition in the UK (perhaps in the world). The exhibition is attended by various actors: companies interested in exhibiting products/services or observe what other companies do; potential customers from armed forces, police and the private sector; governmental agencies promoting products from their domestic companies; members of CSOs (when allowed, which is rare); and researchers (like myself) interested in better understanding this world. The event is controversial, having been a target for CSOs, academics, the press, the local council (Newham), and the first mayor of London, Ken Livingstone (2000-08) (Saini 2007).

The DSEi traces its origins to the British Army Equipment Exhibition (BAAE) and the Royal Navy Equipment Exhibition (RNEE), firstly organised in respectively 1976 and 1977.

[108] Other exhibitions in the UK are: Farnborough International Airshow Trade, specialized in aeronautical products and services; International Armoured Vehicles, for land vehicles; Farnborough Security and Policing, for police equipment; and Defence Procurement, Research, Technology & Exportability (DPRTE), for military procurement.

They were held in alternate years until 1993, when they were merged into a single exhibition. Three editions were organised in that format, before the British government privatised the exhibition in the late 1990s. Until its privatisation, only British products and services were exhibited: it was a 'shop-window' for the British military industry, as emphasised by organisers (British Army 1980).

Since 1999, the fair is called DSEi, being run by private companies every other year, and exhibiting products/services from the whole world. In 2008, the exhibition was acquired by Clarion Events, the largest trade fair organiser in the UK, which has organised all editions since then. In 2015, 1,683 companies from 54 countries promoted products/services in the fair, which was attended by about 34,000 people and 1,000 delegations from 65 countries. There were also 42 national pavilions, organised by governments or national associations of companies, which had exhibitors from a same country displaying their products and services.[109]

The exhibition has been criticized by civil society groups since its first edition in 1976, then as BAAE. That year, CAAT ran a campaign, promoting fasts, street demonstrations and lobbying. The exhibition was criticized also in articles published in *The Sunday Telegraph*, *The Sunday Times* and *The New Statesman* (Clement 1976; Eglin 1976). Although the UK had a Labour government, the fair was condemned by 50 Labour MPs (Newsweek 1976). Robin Cook, then an MP, called the fair an 'arms bazaar', criticizing the fact that the UK provided development aid to poor nations while extracted resources from them through arms exports (Cook 1976). This article would 'haunt' him after he became foreign secretary in the late 1990s, when he endorsed the organisation of the exhibition.

[109] Source: DSEi, http://www.dsei.co.uk/Content/Exhibiting/15.

The fair remained a target for CSOs campaigns, which frame criticism in at least four ways: *i*) presence of countries with poor human rights records; *ii*) exhibition of illegal products; *iii*) support of the British government; and *iv*) support by cultural institutions. These framings are analysed in the next paragraphs. The 2015 edition of the fair is examined separately, as I attended preparatory meetings of the campaign, street demonstrations and the fair itself.

First, criticism is widespread concerning invitation of countries with poor human rights records. On the edition of 1978, Amnesty cited evidence of human rights violations in 27 countries attending the exhibition (Kennedy 1980). In 1980, Amnesty asked the secretary of defence to provide a list of countries represented at the exhibition, a request backed by about 150 MPs and the churches (Walker, 1980). In 1997, the government was criticized because its foreign secretary, Robin Cook, had condemned the fair in the past and pledged to veto arms exports that might be used for internal repression (Tieman and Parker 1997). The presence of delegations from certain countries was pointed out as especially contradictory, as in the cases of China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Indonesia, among which the latter was then conducting military campaigns in Timor-Leste (Gilligan 1997; Parry 1997; The Independent 1997). In 2003, the exhibition organiser, Spearhead, invited countries that had not been invited by the British government, some of them with poor human rights records, such as Israel, Morocco and Pakistan (Burrows 2001).[110] In 2013, a few months after that year's exhibition, experts from three CSOs (Saferworld, Amnesty International and Oxfam GB) were invited to a meeting organised by the Committees on Arms Export Controls in the British Parliament. The representative from Saferworld, Roy

[110] The list of countries invited by the British government to attend the DSEi 2015 is in: UKTI DSO (2015).

Isbister, emphasised that in the edition of 2013 ‘there were eight or nine countries on the Foreign Office’s human rights report list of the most problematic countries on human rights grounds’. He argued that, even if the UK did not provide weapons to them, the fair was an opportunity to meet representatives from other countries, which might be willing to provide them with weapons (Committees on Arms Export Controls 2013).

Second, criticism targets products and services exhibited at the fair, which has been considered especially problematic since the creation of the DSEi: as most exhibitors are non-UK companies, they might display weapons whose use or trade is illegal under British law. CAAT emphasised that, in 2003, although organisers asked exhibitors not to bring cluster munitions (Bowcott 2003), they were offered by the company Israel Military Industries Ltd (Press Association 2003). That same year, Amnesty argued that weapons offered at the exhibition could be used for torture and internal repression. In the 2005 edition, a report by Amnesty identified two violations of the British law in the fair: a company from Israel (Tar Ideal) promoted sales of prohibited items in the UK, such as stun guns, stun batons and leg-irons; and a representative from a South African company (Imperial Armour) talked to an undercover journalist about electro shock weapons it manufactured (Sprague 2014). In the abovementioned event in November 2013, organised by the Committees on Arms Export Controls, a representative from Amnesty, Oliver Sprague, expressed that it was not clear ‘whether the fair is able to operate within the law (Committees on Arms Export Controls 2013). He gave three suggestions: *i*) brochures distributed in the fair should be screened in advance, preventing exhibition of illegal products; *ii*) the agreement between government and exhibition organisers should be scrutinized, as they blamed each other when there were controversies; and *iii*) non-signatories of the ATT should not be allowed to display in the fair (Committees on Arms

Export Controls 2013). Amnesty did an 'ad attack' campaign in 2015, stressing the exhibition of illegal equipment in at least four previous editions of the DSEi (Amnesty International 2015). This gave the campaign positive attention, including citations in the *Metro* and *The Guardian*.[111]

Third, criticism targets support from the British government. The government was criticized by CAAT in 2003 for supporting the event with £250,000 (BBC News 2003b). In 2015, Amnesty stressed that the government supported the fair despite the exhibition of illegal equipment in previous editions (Amnesty International 2015).

Fourth, CSOs conduct campaigns against institutions renting out spaces for parallel events in support of the fair. These are usually meetings or dinners attended by companies' representatives or potential customers, which are spaces to network and facilitate deals. Between 2005 and 2011, the National Gallery (London) hosted a reception celebrating the first day of the DSEi, part of a deal with the Italian weapons-manufacturer Finmeccanica, which had sponsored the gallery with £30,000 (O'Reilly 2012). After a campaign called *Disarm the Gallery*, coordinated by CAAT, the sponsorship agreement was cancelled (CAAT 2015, 2012; O'Reilly 2012). A reception for the Farnborough International was held at the Natural History Museum (London), in 2012. After protests by CAAT, the museum declined the proposal of hosting the event in 2014. The Guildford Cathedral cancelled a reception in 2013 for the Security & Policing Fair after receiving a letter from CAAT (CAAT 2015).

In campaigns against the fair, various activities are conducted. Besides lobbying and research, CSOs organised street demonstrations in all editions between 2001 and 2017. Protests were organised under the umbrella campaigns *Disarm DSEi* (2001-2011) and *Stop*

[111] Interview: Rasha Abdul-Rahim, London, 12 Oct 2016.

the Arms Fair (2013-17), coordinated by CAAT and composed by various organisations. In 2001, for example, 300 people from CAAT staged peaceful protests near the ExCeL Centre, where the exhibition is hosted (BBC News 2001). Protests led to the arrest of 79 activists in 2003, when the home secretary, David Blunkett, authorized police officers to arrest activists using section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (BBC News 2003a; Press Association 2003).

DSEi 2015

In 2015, activities against the DSEi were organised under the *Stop the Arms Fair* campaign. They were mostly held during the week before the DSEi, near the ExCeL Centre, where the exhibition would take place. Activities were divided into five topics, one for each weekday. On Monday, the event *Stop arming Israel* was staged, denouncing atrocities committed by the Israeli government. It was stressed that the British company G4S was supplying security equipment used in prisons in Israel where Palestinians were jailed.[112] On Tuesday, the event *No faith in war* was organised, bringing together religious groups to protest against the fair. On Wednesday, the *Arms to renewables* event was held, in which a gap between military expenditures and investment on renewable energy was stressed. On Thursday, the event *Studying war no more* was organised, in which academics gave open-air lectures about the arms trade. Also, activists stressed the need to stop cooperation between universities and weapons-manufacturers.[113] On Friday, the campaign organised the event *Freedom of movement for people not weapons*, stressing a contradiction between the freedom of arms dealers to attend the fair and the difficult of refugees to settle down in the UK.

With these activities, the issue of arms trade was framed in five different ways, facilitating the creation of an advocacy network involving people and groups with different backgrounds, including religious organisations, environmental groups, academics, students and human rights groups.

[112] Stop the Arms Fair campaign, leaflet distributed in preparatory meeting, London, 22 Aug 2015.
[113] Statement made by an activist. Participant observation, preparatory meeting, London, 22 Aug 2015.

During demonstrations against the fair in 2015, a group of activists blocked a road in front of the Excel Centre, preventing a lorry carrying weapons to the DSEi of moving. Eight activists were forcefully removed and arrested. In their trial, they argued that blocking the road aimed at preventing greater crimes to be committed with British weapons. The judge of this case accepted the argument and acquitted all of them, arguing that there had been illegal activities in the fair in previous years and that the police had not investigated them properly (The Guardian 2016). This decision led British MPs to incorporate arms exhibitions into a broader investigation concerning the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, conducted by the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC).

This is a case in which an action by a small group led to something proportionally larger, demonstrating that even small campaigns can influence policies (Quinn 2016). The topic of *illegal activities in arms fairs* would probably not be included in the work of CAEC if those activists had not been arrested.

In summary, the organisation of arms exhibitions became a domestic politics issue in Britain after being introduced by CAAT in the mid-1970s. This issue has been supported by MPs (mainly from the Labour Party), religious groups and various CSOs. Campaigns have changed the behaviour of the government and of other organisations supporting the fair. Certain countries stopped being invited to the fair, for example. Also, discussions in parliament are a deterrent to the Executive and exhibition organisers, creating incentives for them not to invite certain countries or exhibit controversial products. In addition, many cultural institutions have declined to host events in support of the DSEi after being pressured by CSOs.

Is exporting weapons intrinsically wrong? CAAT and arms exports

A different way of framing campaigns is to emphasize the immoral nature of selling weapons. Under this approach, there is no *responsible* arms trade. This position was expressed, for example, in the book *The Arms Bazaar*, published in 1977, in which Anthony Sampson compared the arms trade to the slave trade. He asked the British government to take lead against the arms trade, as it once did against slavery (Sampson 1977). Churches also seem to espouse this position. In the Catholic Church, the Encyclical *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, from 1987, criticized the arms production and trade (Paul II 1987, pts 23–24). In theological terms, engaging in the arms trade is therefore a sin (Williamson and Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament 1992, 86–87).

The idea that there is no legitimate place for the arms trade is defended in the UK mainly by CAAT. As expressed in one of its leaflets, CAAT 'works for an end to all British arms sales and for the conversion of military industry to socially useful production'.[114] This does not prevent it, however, of emphasising certain aspects of the arms trade. In 1982-83, CAAT stressed that 75% of British arms exports were sold to poor countries, and that their debt problems were in part caused by arms purchases.[115] When contacting MPs, CAAT members also consider that some of them might oppose arms sales only to certain countries, or only certain activities related to the arms trade, such as subsidies to arms manufacturers. CAAT is nonetheless very happy to work with them.[116] This suggests that, although seeing the arms trade as intrinsically wrong, CAAT frames campaigns in ways that

[114] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN 4/3/13. CAAT, Bread not bombs! A briefing on the arms trade as an obstacle to disarmament and development (leaflet), May 1984.
[115] Bodleian: MS Oxfam CPN 4/3/13. CAAT, Major British arms sales: 1982 & 1983.
[116] Interview: Ann Feltham, 26 Oct 2016.

are not much different from other organisations. The difference is that, while CAAT looks at development or human rights through the lenses of the arms trade, other organisations such as Oxfam and Amnesty look at the arms trade through the lenses of development and human rights.

The perspective of completely banning the arms trade is adopted only by a minority, however. According to Keith Krause, regarding SALW exports, some people espoused that vision early on, especially those who had campaigned on nuclear disarmament. This was rejected by most NGOs, however, including all the IANSA, as this would lead them to lose credibility and support.[117] Amnesty, for example, does not oppose the arms trade *per se*, focusing on human rights violations associated to arms exports.[118]

Concluding remarks

Civil society groups in the UK have been working with arms exports at least since the 1960s, when the AAM started campaigning against arms sales to South Africa. Campaigns to stop arms exports to the apartheid regime were frequently organised *with* the Labour Party, which shared similar principles and ideas regarding the segregationist regime in South Africa. This symbiotic relationship between CSOs and Labour was observed also in other cases, such as in campaigns on arms sales to Chile, in initiatives for more transparency, and in initiatives stressing the effects of arms exports on poverty.

Due to their activities, the salience of arms exports in domestic politics have been increased, which led to the inclusion of humanitarian concerns in the decision-making.

[117] Interview (via Skype): Keith Krause, 7 Feb 2017.
[118] Interview: Patrick Wilcken, London, 12 Oct 2016.

Their activities caused changes in existing legal instruments and government policies, as well as in what governments do in practice. Also, CSOs achieved some success in changing perceptions of elites regarding the arms trade, persuading other groups to join their cause, as well as preventing cultural institutions of engaging with arms manufacturers.

In addition, once humanitarian norms were introduced in the decision-making, they remained even after changes of government, indicating their stickiness. Embargos on South Africa and Chile, for example, were kept by subsequent administrations, as well as attitudes towards arms sales to other human rights abusers. The same applies to norms on transparency and the role of parliament in scrutinizing arms exports. Although current norms are commonly taken for granted by officials and even activists, they exist because, in the past, groups organised to promote them, forming networks that managed to change what the government does and what is considered as appropriate behaviour. Such influence occurs despite strong incentives for the UK government to consider only strategic and economic aspects of arms exports. As a declining power, arms exports are one of the few resources that Britain maintained, being essential to keep its military industry viable and have leverage on other countries' policies.

Therefore, humanitarian concerns in the UK decision-making on arms exports were not introduced due to structural constraints. Rather, they were a product of domestic politics. Moreover, they did not emerge spontaneously as an automatic by-product of democratic institutions. Their emergence depended on activities from norm entrepreneurs, who conducted campaigns aimed at changing behaviour and attitudes of the government and of other organisations.

Chapter 6 – 'Uploading' norms: CSOs and the British government in the creation of international regulations on arms exports

During negotiations for the Arms Trade Treaty, CSOs and the government cooperated to promote the treaty and persuade other countries to join it, besides having discussions on what the content of the ATT should be. This interaction is puzzling because these same CSOs had pressured (and continue to pressure) the British government to be more 'responsible' when making decisions on arms exports. What could explain this? What incentives did they have to cooperate?

This chapter argues that this and other similar cases occurred because the adoption of regulations on arms transfers at the domestic level predated decisions to join international agreements. Rather than proposing international rules that would change its behaviour, the British government was interested in making other states adopt its norms. This aimed at achieving at least two goals. First, to 'level the playing field': as other arms exporters could free-ride on humanitarian concerns, Britain might lose arms deals while other suppliers would remain able to export weapons. Second, to improve its symbolic capital, presenting the UK as a responsible, liberal and modern country, while incurring almost no costs to achieve that.

The government's interest in the creation of international regulations does not prevent CSOs, of course, of having the same interest. From CSOs' point of view, in addition to preventing the free-rider problem, international treaties are considered important for at least two reasons. First, treaties are a benchmark that they can use to monitor governments. Second, treaties increase costs of defying a norm. Although states might not always comply with them, the likelihood of compliance is higher when states are part of a

formal regime. As government and CSOs shared a goal of spreading norms to the rest of the world, they had incentives to cooperate even if they had clashed domestically and were driven by different motives.

The type of relation between CSOs and governments – conflictive or cooperative – depends therefore on at least two variables. The first one is the level (domestic or international) at which CSOs seek to change norms. Although CSOs and governments might clash at the domestic level, they can cooperate at the international if this helps them to diffuse norms. The second is the government that is being targeted: while CSOs are an external source of pressure for governments not willing to sign, ratify or introduce treaties, there are incentives for CSOs and governments to cooperate in the case a government is interested in having international regulations.

This chapter tests hypotheses 4 and 5. Section 1 examines how the British government deals with a collective action problem regarding arms transfers. Sections 2-3 demonstrate that incentives to promote norms at the international level depend on existing norms at the domestic level. This is done through a comparison between four cases in which the UK opted to join international agreements and two in which it opted not to join them. The former cases are: *i*) arms embargoes approved at the UNSC; *ii*) the EU Code of Conduct and EU Common Position; *iii*) the Ottawa Convention; and *iv*) the ATT. The latter cases are: *i*) the UK initiative at the arms trade, in 1970; and *ii*) the UN Weaponry Convention, in the mid-1970s.

‘If we do not sell weapons, somebody else will’: a collective action problem from a great power’s perspective

Although humanitarian concerns have been part of its decision-making at least since the 1960s, the British government takes into account that other countries might export weapons that the UK is not willing to. When this happens, Britain loses lucrative arms deals and capacity to influence policies of arms importing countries while having little or no impact on their military capabilities. A lack of humanitarian concerns on arms transfers is caused in part by this collective action problem: if a state unilaterally adopted these concerns, others might free-ride and customers would not be prevented of importing weapons. Therefore, in the absence of international standards, states have little incentive to introduce humanitarian concerns in the decision-making.

This leads to the common rationale that ‘if we do not sell weapons, somebody else will’, frequently used as a justification to export weapons. In 1970, when the British government considered the idea of championing an international agreement regulating the arms trade, an FCO document argued that

> We make a great deal of money from arms exports. If we take an initiative in this field, some of the states to whom we supply arms at present might perhaps decide that we were becoming unreliable and move their business elsewhere. Our competitors would be quick to exploit such opportunities and the result could be considerable loss to this country, both commercially and in terms of political influence, particularly where armed forces control or dominate the governments of their countries.[1]

[1] TNA: FCO 66/208. FCO, The international trade in arms, sent to F. A. Warner (UK mission to the UN), 20 Feb 1970, p. 8.

A similar position was expressed in 1978, in a FCO memorandum: 'A unilateral self-imposed British ban would certainly change the composition to the detriment of British arms exports without any effect on overall arms sales'.[2] In 1979, a comprehensive paper was circulated within the FCO and Ministry of Defence, detailing British policy on arms transfers. The paper explained why unilateral restrictions on arms exports should be avoided:

> The difficulty about any unilateral action is that although it may conceivably encourage other suppliers to follow suit, it is far more likely to have no effect at all on the overall volume of arms transfers while at the same time imposing a heavy economic penalty on the supplier in question […]. Unilateral restraint on our part […] would achieve nothing other than to give the other suppliers a lucrative slice of extra business.[3]

This same document also stressed economic consequences of a hypothetical decision to export weapons only to allies: 'A decision to sell only to allies would carry a particularly heavy economic penalty. The figures for the past 6 years show that over 90% of all our sales have been to non-Alliance countries'.[4] Therefore, the government was reluctant to adopt unilateral restrictions because other states could free-ride.

This has been observed also in decisions on individual cases. In various situations, the government decided to export weapons because, otherwise, potential customers would buy them from other suppliers. During the Biafran War (1967-70), in which the UK supplied weapons to the Nigerian government, the FCO justified them by arguing that

[2] TNA: FCO 49/813. FCO, Arms sales policy, 4 Sep 1978, sent by B L Crowe, p. 4.
[3] TNA: FCO 49/861. FCO, Conventional arms transfer policy, 28 Mar 1979, section VIII, item 81.
[4] TNA: FCO 49/861. FCO, Conventional arms transfer policy, by Anthony Reeve (head of FCO's Arms Control and Disarmament Department), 28 Mar 1979, section VIII, item 81.

> If we are not prepared to supply the arms which the Nigerians require they will most probably turn to the Russians both for the supply of arms and for an army training team leading to the Nigerian Army becoming a completely Russian orientated force, as the Air Force already is.[5]

In 1981, when the FCO was considering whether to authorize sales of an aircraft carrier and aircraft to Argentina, it argued that not authorizing them would be ineffective because 'Argentina could buy ships and aircraft elsewhere'.[6] More recently, in a debate in the House of Commons, the foreign secretary Boris Johnson was questioned about arms sales to Saudi Arabia, which acquired 44% of Britain's arms exports in the period 2011-15.[7] He replied that: 'we would be vacating a space that would rapidly be filled by other Western countries who would happily supply arms with nothing like the same compunctions or criteria or respect for humanitarian law' (Peck 2016). The same rationale has been emphasised by Michael Heseltine, former defence secretary and president of the board of trade:

> The dilemma that every secretary of state faces is that it is a highly competitive world market, and that if we don't export arms (under tight controls), it won't make any difference in the availability of weapons for potential customers.[8]

Therefore, the British government frequently justifies arms exports on a pragmatic basis, arguing that it should not adopt humanitarian concerns unilaterally. However, the government has in practice introduced these concerns in its decision-making despite other countries' behaviour. Also, these concerns were introduced before the EU adopted

[5] TNA: FCO 66/208. FCO (West African Department), International arms trade, comments on a proposal of an UK initiative at the arms trade, 17 Feb 1970. For a study of UK's involvement in the Biafran War, see: Smith (2014).
[6] TNA: FCO 7/3874. FCO (South America Department), Argentina: aircraft carrier and Sea Harrier, 5 Aug 1981.
[7] Source: Sipri.
[8] Interview (via phone): Michael Heseltine, 15 Aug 2018.

common norms in 1998 and before other multilateral regulations emerged. The UK imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in 1964, for example, while other countries kept exporting weapons to the apartheid regime. The same happened with Chile, on which Britain imposed an embargo in 1974. Humanitarian concerns were also behind decisions not to export certain weapons to certain countries. The FCO refused clearance in 1980 to sell pistols and magazines to Argentina, arguing that: 'The pistols are designed to stun, confuse or temporarily disable an opponent. They clearly would have sinister potential in the human rights field'.[9]

Why did the UK put itself in this 'disadvantaged' position in the international arms market? Why did it make decisions on which other countries could free-ride? As argued here, norms are adopted domestically before the emergence of international regulations. These two processes were not independent: what occurred at the international level depended on previous decisions taken domestically.

The next sections explore this issue by looking at cases in which the British government either supported or rejected proposals to introduce international regulations on conventional weapons control. I demonstrate that cases in which the UK promoted or signed agreements had small adjustment costs, while cases in which the UK blocked or not signed agreements had perceived high adjustment costs.

[9] TNA: FCO 7/3730. FCO (South America Department), Argentina: arms sales, 8 Dec 1980.

Case studies of positive outcomes: arms embargoes, the Ottawa Convention, European Union norms and the ATT

There are at least two potential explanations for why Britain joined international treaties on arms control. The first one is that it was pressured to do so, either by other governments, CSOs or the private sector. If this is true, agreements were signed to appease the sources of pressure. The second one is that the UK joined them because this was perceived to be in its interest. If this is true, decisions to sign agreements were made autonomously, determined mainly by intra-government dynamics.

This section argues that, although various actors pressured the government to promote conventional weapons control treaties, the government was interested in creating international standards of behaviour, regardless of external pressures. These standards should be, however, like its own policies. The British government promoted the idea of humanitarian concerns in arms exports *after* and *because* it had already adopted them. Therefore, it wanted more than only solving a collective action problem: it sought to create a system in which international norms were based on its own.

This section and the next one look at how the British government behaved in the face of potential international control agreements on arms transfers. There are four cases in which the UK joined agreements and two in which it did not, demonstrating that adopting norms at the international level depended on norms previously adopted domestically.

Arms embargoes: 1946-2015

In the period 1946-2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed 25 mandatory arms embargoes. I argue that the UK voted in favour of them because adjustment costs were close to zero: in all cases, the UK either had adopted unilateral embargoes or was not a relevant supplier of weapons. As observed in Table 6.1, in the four-year periods before embargoes were imposed, the UK had exported a small amount of weapons or no weapons at all to countries or non-governmental forces targeted by the embargoes. The UK was in practice spreading its practices to the rest of the world through the UNSC, while preventing others of exporting weapons to these places.

Table 6.1

UNSC arms embargoes and UK arms exports (constant US$ 1990 million)

Target	UNSCR number	Entry into force	UK arms exports: targeted countries (previous 4 years)	UK arms exports: total (previous 4 years)
Southern Rhodesia	232	16 Dec 66	-	5,288
South Africa	418	4 Nov 77	35	9,857
Iraq	661	6 Aug 90	24	11,654
Yugoslavia (FRY)	713	25 Sep 91	92	11,553
Somalia	733	23 Jan 92	0	9,489
Libya	748	31 Mar 92	0	9,489
Liberia	788	19 Nov 92	0	9,489
Haiti	841	16 Jun 93	0	8,118
Angola (UNITA)	864	15 Sep 93	0	8,118
Rwanda *	918	17 May 94	0	5,990
Sierra Leone	1132	8 Oct 97	0	6,097
Yugoslavia (FRY) **	1160	31 Mar 98	0	2,386
Eritrea and Ethiopia	1298	17 May 00	2	6,827
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan	1333	19 Dec 00	0	6,827

Al-Qaeda, Taliban and associated individuals and entities	1390	16 Jan 02	0	5,779
Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGAF in Ituri, North and South Kivu)	1493	28 Jul 03	0	5,457
Sudan (Darfur region)	1556	30 Jul 04	0	4,834
Cote d'Ivoire	1572	15 Nov 04	2	4,834
Lebanon (NGAF)	1701	11 Aug 06	0	4,100
North Korea	1718	14 Oct 06	0	4,100
Iran	1737	23 Dec 06	0	4,100
Eritrea	1907	23 Dec 09	0	3,989
Libya	1970	26 Feb 11	0	4,142
Central African Republic	2127	5 Dec 13	0	4,124
Yemen (NGAF)	2216	14 Apr 15	0	5,078

Source: Sipri and Fruchart et al. (2007).
* Resolution adopted without a vote.
** As sanctions introduced by UNSCR 713 (1991) had been lifted only one year before, data is only for 1997, the only year when an embargo was not in place.
Notes:
1. NGAF = non-government armed forces.
2. To avoid double-counting, resolutions that maintained sanctions or converted full embargoes into NGAF embargoes are not listed. Two cases in which sanctions were lifted (Yugoslavia and Libya) and later reinstated are, however, discriminated. Two embargoes on Haiti are not discriminated separately, as the embargo was lifted in August 1993 and reinstated in October 1993.

As observed in the table, over the four-year periods before embargoes were voted, the UK sold weapons only to five countries on which embargoes were later imposed. In addition, arms exports to three of them (Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea and Ethiopia) were close to zero. In the other cases (Iraq, South Africa and Yugoslavia), exports were never above 0.8% of UK total exports.

As additional evidence, the UK government resisted in the early 1980s to initiatives that sought to impose a full embargo on dual-use equipment to South Africa. This is because the UK would have to change its behaviour, stopping sales of products that it was interested to keep exporting. It proposed instead to make marginal unilateral changes in

order to avoid an embargo, as explained by the foreign secretary, Lord Carrington (1979-82), in a letter to the secretary of state for defence:

> I do not advocate restrictiveness for its own sake, and I share your anxiety that we should do nothing that might needlessly lose us valuable exports. But there is already pressure at the UN […] to redefine or extend the existing arms embargo so as to preclude the export of all dual-purpose equipment to South Africa. Thus by being marginally more restrictive in border-line cases, we may hope […] to refrain from stimulating pressures for even greater restriction which would be binding on us in future cases.[10]

As observed, this proposed change would not bring substantial costs to the UK, aiming only at resisting to further pressures. This unilateral change was a tactical move, considering mainly the costs that the UK would incur if a full embargo were imposed on South Africa.

Antipersonnel landmines and the Ottawa Convention

The literature has analysed in depth the creation of the Ottawa Convention, in which a coalition of around 3,500 CSOs managed to persuade governments to create an international treaty banning antipersonnel landmines (APMs). Reus-Smit, for example, argued that various states signed the convention because they wanted to be seen as part of a 'club of responsible international citizens' (Reus-Smit 2004, 96:108). While enhancing its symbolic capital was one of the UK government's goals, this section argues that a group of governments opted to promote the Ottawa Convention in order to impose standards on

[10] MTF: PREM 19/371. Cabinet, FCS/80/130, UN Embargo on Provision of Arms to South Africa. From Lord Carrington to the secretary of state for defence, 28 Jul 1980.

others without substantially changing their own. Rather than joining a club, they were creating one, where the criteria to be part of was based on their practices. By joining the Ottawa Convention, the British government introduced only minor changes in its behaviour while making other countries adopt standards it already adopted.

Evidence indicates that restrictions on landmine exports existed in the UK at least since the late 1970s, even in the absence of international standards. An FCO document from 1978 cited that exports of various types of military equipment to Morocco had been authorized, but not landmines.[11] In 1994, three years before the Ottawa Convention was opened for signatures, the UK announced a moratorium on sales of non-self-destructing and non-self-neutralising APMs. This did not change its behaviour in practice, however, as the UK had not manufactured this type of landmines since 1982 (Bowers and Dodd 1998, 12). In 1995, the UK announced a moratorium on sales of APM for countries that had not signed the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC), as well as a ban on non-detectable APMs. Once more, there was no change in government behaviour, as the UK had not exported APMs since 1990 (ICBL and Cluster Munition Coalition 1999). A report from the Red Cross, published in January 1997, cited the UK as one of the countries supporting a global ban, but also stressed that the UK had already suspended the use of landmines by their military.[12] That same month, Diana, princess of Wales, travelled to Mozambique as part of a campaign to ban landmines. In August of the same year, she went to Bosnia also as part of the campaign, a few weeks before she died. Although this impacted the government's position, it reinforced rather than altered it.

[11] TNA: FCO 49/813. FCO (Near East and North Africa Department), Promotion of Arms Sales, Arms Sales Policy, 23 Aug 1978.

[12] The others were: Australia, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France and South Africa. Itamaraty's archives: folder controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). ICRC, Para uma proibição total das minas anti-pessoal, document circulated in Maputo, 17 Jan 1997, p. 5.

A possible counter-argument is that Britain signed the Ottawa Convention only because of a new Labour government. Evidence suggests, however, that the UK position was formed during the Conservative government of John Major. In 1996, David Davis, FCO minister (1994-97), expressed that: 'The UK will work actively towards a total, world-wide ban on anti-personnel mines. Should such a ban be agreed, we would give up our anti-personnel land mine capability, and would destroy our stocks accordingly' (House of Commons 1996, columns 28-29). David Davis also stressed, however, that the UK was already not producing or exporting landmines, as well as not using them operationally (House of Commons 1996, columns 28-29). In addition, the military use of landmines had decreased in importance over previous years, as argued in a letter signed by 15 US retired generals, addressed to Bill Clinton in 1996. The letter included General Norman Schwarzkopf, who had commanded the Allied forces in the Gulf War. As additional evidence, the UK Ministry of Defence had not acquired landmines since 1991 (ICBL and Cluster Munition Coalition 1999).

It is not claimed here that positions of Labour and Conservatives were identical, though. Evidence indicates that Labour was keener than Conservatives to support a universal ban on landmines: Britain joined the 'core group' of states promoting the ban only after Labour took office (Bowers and Dodd, 1998, p. 15).[13] The Conservative Party, however, also wanted a universal ban on landmines, as this would level the playing field and enhance UK's image at a low cost. Although signing the Ottawa Convention implied some adjustment costs, it was a small step in comparison to what already had been done domestically.

[13] The core group was initially formed by: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa and Switzerland.

According to an activist at the ICBL in the period 2002-06 (who later became a diplomat), although CSOs worked to persuade governments, this does not imply that governments were not interested in banning landmines. For a country like the UK, banning landmines was easy, allowing it to achieve a lot while incurring small costs. Some of the benefits were: enhancing its international image, having access to governments in Eastern Europe by offering demining assistance, and diverting attention from opposition to nuclear weapons. It is therefore not correct to simply say that CSOs pressured the government, which then decided to join the Ottawa Convention.[14]

Therefore, both CSOs and the government were interested in having a convention banning landmines, even though they were driven by different reasons. This was a low-hanging fruit, especially for the new Labour government, which could demonstrate its 'ethical' dimension in foreign policy at a low cost.[15]

The European Union Code of Conduct on arms exports

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, there were discussions on potential international standards on the arms trade among the P-5 and in the EEC. This aimed at preventing what had happened in Iraq: even with a very small production capability, Iraq had managed to build a large army by importing weapons.[16] As government proposals were perceived as patchy and not detailed, however, a group of CSOs proposed in 1993 a detailed code of conduct on arms exports, targeting EU countries (Wood and Abdul-Rahim 2015, 16).[17]

[14] Interview: interviewee 37 (former activist at ICBL), Oxford, 1 Mar 2017.
[15] Ibidem.
[16] Interview: Oliver Sprague, London, 28 Oct 2016.
[17] CAAT left the group in 1994, being replaced by the British American Security Information Council.

Among those CSOs, Saferworld was a major creator and promoter of common standards. To further its agenda, it engaged with the British government, foreign governments, international organisations, experts, as well as other CSOs. In 1992, Saferworld launched a report discussing potential common standards for arms exports in Europe, called *Arms and dual-use exports of the EC*. This aimed at solving a coordination problem, which frequently lead states to argue that 'if we don't sell, somebody else will' (Saferworld, 2016, p. 3). The British government championed this idea in 1997 and promoted it among other EU members, culminating in the creation of the EU Code of Conduct in 1998.

This happened in a context in which the new foreign secretary, Robin Cook, promised to introduce an 'ethical' dimension in British foreign policy, in which human rights should be at its core (Cook, 2002, p. 45). I argue that this occurred not only because of this context but also because adjustment costs were low. As changes in domestic and European legislation occurred almost simultaneously, it might seem hard to infer whether the UK domestic position on arms sales was formed before the UK government promoted standards at the EU level. There are at least four types of evidence suggesting that this occurred, however.

First, the EU Code of Conduct did not introduce substantial changes on policies and practices already adopted by the British government. Humanitarian concerns, for example, had been part of its decision-making at least since the 1960s. The same applies to some of the other eight criteria, such as concerns on regional peace and stability, national security of exporting state, and risk of technology being deviated. *Second*, weapons-manufacturers supported the Code, as it would 'level the playing field', giving incentives to the

government to think in the same terms.[18] *Third*, during negotiations for what would be the EU Common Position, approved in 2008, the UK proposed the introduction of norms that had become part of its domestic legislation after 1998, when the EU Code of Conduct was approved. This was the case of brokering, introduced in British policy in the early 2000s after campaigns from CSOs, and later promoted by the UK among other European countries. Arms brokering was introduced into European legislation through the Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP, and later became part of the EU Common Position on arms exports. *Fourth*, the importance attached to EU standards was maintained by the Conservative-led coalition government from 2010 on. Decision-making remained based on the eight criteria of the EU, as indicated by the permanence of a labour division in decisions concerning arms deals: criteria 1-6 are led by the FCO, criterion 7 is shared between the FCO and the MoD, and criterion 8 is not specific of any agency.[19] As additional evidence, in 2016, when FCO officials were asked in the House of Commons about the implications of Brexit for British arms export policy, they suggested that the UK would probably keep EU rules. They also showed pride in the UK's role in leading the creation of EU standards on this issue, even though the idea had been introduced by a Labour government (House of Commons 2016c).

The Arms Trade Treaty

The ATT was championed by the British government in both Labour and Conservative governments. Why did that happen? This is explored in this subsection, which

[18] Interviews (via Skype): Keith Krause, 7 Feb 2017; Martin Butcher, 20 Sep 2017.
[19] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.

argues that, although for different reasons, government and CSOs sought to export a domestic norm to the rest of the world.

The British government and the ATT: which incentives did it have to promote it?

To understand the UK position on the ATT is necessary to look at how domestic and European legislation had changed over previous years. For the UK, the step towards the ATT was not big because it did not introduce anything substantially new. The big step had been taken before, when changes were introduced at the domestic and EU levels. Promoting the ATT was therefore a low-cost action and would even benefit the UK, as it would allow it to project a positive image, as well as to 'level the playing field'.

The UK decided to support the ATT in 2003, under foreign secretary Jack Straw (2001-06), who changed the government's focus from the UN Programme of Action (PoA).[20] Although CSOs worked to persuade him, this does not imply that the government was not interested in having the treaty. One of the drivers was the need to improve the government's reputation, which was under strong pressure for its decision to support the US in the Iraq War.[21] Also, the decision was motivated by low adjustment costs of adhering to the ATT: according to a senior diplomat at the FCO, the UK would not do anything different from what it already did.[22] Patrick Wilcken, from Amnesty, argued that: 'The interest for a country like the UK to back the ATT was that it already had some standards'.[23]

[20] Interview (via Skype): Martin Butcher, 20 Sep 2017.
[21] Ibidem.
[22] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.
[23] Ibidem.

He described the ATT as a *symbol* of changes occurring since the 1990s: 'If you go back to the 1980s and 1980s, the arms trade was very unregulated, with everyone selling to anyone. Through the 1990s there was more pressure and a gradual improvement, and the ATT was the symbolic win for that'.[24]

This suggests that the UK decision of promoting the ATT depended on a process that started with domestic and regional legislation, and that evolved incrementally over previous years. According to another senior diplomat at the FCO, there are at least three groups of countries concerning arms export control: *i*) countries with a strict control (in which the UK is included); *ii*) countries with a moderate control; and *iii*) countries with a loose control. One of the reasons why the UK promoted the ATT was to bring countries in groups 2 and 3 closer to standards of group 1. This was perceived to be in the UK's interest because, according to the same diplomat, it is hard to follow a strict control when others do not.[25] This was also expressed by Alan Duncan, international development minister, who argued that the ATT would make other countries apply standards to arms exports that Britain already applied (Parker 2012). A similar position was expressed by a retired diplomat: 'As we were already imposing high standards, we thought it was time for the rest of the world to impose the same standards. It was also important for our industry because it would level the playing field'.[26] The same source argued that the UK's decision was based on self-interest: the UK wanted to make other countries do what it was already doing.

Low adjustment costs are suggested also by support from various stakeholders, including government agencies, trade unions and weapons-manufacturers.[27] Support from

[24] Interview: Patrick Wilcken, London, 12 Oct 2016.
[25] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.
[26] Interview: interviewee 21 (retired civil servant), London, 9 Jun 2017.
[27] Interview (via Skype): Martin Butcher, 20 Sep 2017.

companies was especially relevant, as the ATT might be a source of restrictions for them. For this reason, the FCO engaged with the industry to check whether companies considered the ATT as extra-cost. Nevertheless, what the FCO got back from the industry was that they welcomed the treaty because they were being undercut by 'rogue states'.[28] This was highlighted also by John Duncan, official at the FCO, who cited as evidence the unexpected convergence of positions between the FCO, Oxfam and Rolls-Royce (Duncan 2013). A retired British diplomat stressed that Rolls-Royce was very cooperative, having worked to persuade other companies that the ATT was in their interest.[29] Oliver Sprague, who was working at the Oxfam at the time, said that he and representatives from other CSOs had meetings with the big defence companies to persuade them on the importance of the ATT. It was actually surprisingly easy to do that, in part because a universal system of rules would make the companies' work easier.[30] Robert Parker, from Saferworld, stressed this same aspect: companies worried that a lack of regulations made people think that selling AK-47s to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, is equivalent to selling radar systems to a responsible country. Companies were interested in taking 'irresponsible' traders out of the market.[31]

The decision to support and promote the ATT was kept after 2010, when a Conservative-led coalition government took office, despite its looser approach to arms exports. In 2012, Alan Duncan, minister of state for International Development (2010-14), said that the UK would 'take a leading role' in UN sessions to create the ATT. He argued that it was 'scandalous that there is currently no international regulation of the arms trade'

[28] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.
[29] Interview: interviewee 21 (retired civil servant), London, 9 June 2017.
[30] Interview: Oliver Sprague, London, 28 Oct 2017.
[31] Interview: Robert Parker, London, 10 Oct 2016.

(Department for International Development 2012). This has been emphasized also by representatives from CSOs. According to Martin Butcher, from Oxfam:

> The government and big British arms companies – like BAE – saw the ATT as an opportunity to raise the level of controls in other countries, where they have very lax controls, and make more of a level playing field. […]. It is definitely designed to provide a sort of a legal regime that British companies can work in around the world, without being into disadvantage to Russian or Chinese companies, if these countries eventually join the treaty.[32]

It is worth stressing that the UK insisted to include brokering in the treaty's text (Parker 2012), something that sectors of the British government resisted to do domestically in the early 2000s. This suggests that, once a norm was introduced domestically, the British government had incentives to turn it into international law, even if the norm was originally introduced by CSOs. The idea of exporting norms is reflected also in the final content of the treaty. According to Martin Butcher, from Oxfam: 'In the end, the treaty did look very like a mixture of American and European legal practice'.[33]

Government-CSOs relations: which incentives did they have to cooperate?

British CSOs were largely involved in the creation of the ATT, pressuring or working alongside governments to make them join the treaty. Oxfam, for example, had a staff of 20 people working permanently with the ATT, including specialists in development and gender, more than what most governments had.[34] The idea that the UK government joined the treaty because it was pressured by CSOs is nonetheless misleading: government and

[32] Interview (via Skype): Martin Butcher, 20 Sep 2017.
[33] Ibidem.
[34] Ibidem.

CSOs were on the same side, both interested in having international regulations on arms transfers.

From the government's point of view, CSOs could be amplifiers. They could reach more people than the government, thereby making 'the voice of the British government stronger in the ATT negotiations'.[35] John Duncan, official at the FCO, said that: 'they can reach out to influence public debate, both domestically and internationally, in ways that government cannot, generating public support and building initial momentum to a high pitch' (Duncan 2013). A retired diplomat expressed that the FCO was 'hand in hand' with CSOs because both wanted higher standards in the international arms trade.[36] A senior diplomat stressed that the FCO insisted on three points concerning civil society: *i*) CSOs should be represented within the ATT structures; *ii*) meetings should be open so CSOs could attend them; and *iii*) CSOs should have speaking rights in meetings. The same diplomat emphasised that, when other governments argued that parts of the treaty should be changed or removed, the FCO contacted CSOs to check whether that would be acceptable.[37] As additional evidence, Anna McDonald, representing civil society, was part of a Whitehall team looking at the treaty.[38] There were therefore shared rather than opposite interests between government and CSOs.[39] According to Oliver Sprague, who was at Oxfam at the time:

> The reason why we were in the room is because there are incredibly serious human rights implications for the trade in weaponry coming wrong. The government might

[35] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.
[36] Interview: interviewee 21 (retired civil servant), London, 9 June 2017.
[37] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.
[38] Interview (via Skype): Martin Butcher, 20 Sep 2017.
[39] Interview: interviewee 20 (civil servant), London, 24 May 2017.

> have a slightly different reason for thinking why human rights violations are a problem. Our reason is because it is terrible and people suffer. Their reason might be slightly more Machiavellian. […]. But they still recognize it as a problem and something that needs to be rectified.[40]

For CSOs, having the British government as a champion made a huge difference because the UK is a major arms exporter, thereby giving credibility to the treaty process.[41] In summary, government and CSOs had incentives to cooperate despite a different motivation driving their actions: their goal was the same.

Case studies of negative outcomes: UK initiative at the arms trade and UN Convention on Weaponry

To demonstrate that positions on international regulations depend on domestic norms, it is necessary to look also at cases whose outcomes are negative. These are cases in which proposed international regulations differed from UK norms, and were rejected or blocked by the UK government. Two cases are analysed in this section: *i*) the UK initiative at the arms trade, in 1970; and *ii*) the UN Convention on Weaponry, in the mid-1970s.

UK initiative at the arms trade: 1970

In the early 1970s, there were discussions within the British government on whether the UK should propose an international treaty regulating arms transfers, which was intended to mark the 25th anniversary of the UN.[42] Although the UK eventually opted

[40] Interview (via Skype): Martin Butcher, 20 Sep 2017.
[41] Interview, Rasha Abdul-Rahim, London, 12 Oct 2016.
[42] TNA: FCO 66/208. FCO, Extract from minutes of meeting held in the Ambassador's Waiting Room (Main File DS 1/4), 16 Jan 1970.

not to do it, intra-government discussions shed light on why the government was initially interested in having international regulations in this area.[43]

Evidence suggests that improving its prestige was the main goal. In January 1970, Lord Chalfont, minister at the FCO, expressed that by proposing these regulations: 'We […] might acquire for our international disarmament reputation a much-needed refurbishment'.[44] In February 1970, an internal document at the FCO discussed who this proposal was supposed to impress: developing countries or 'bien-pensant spokesmen' in western countries, suggesting that the proposal would aim at improving Britain's reputation.[45]

Discussions also reveal, however, that the British government was not interested in adjusting its behaviour: a potential treaty should not be substantially different from current UK policies and practice. There were at least three concerns expressed by officials. *First*, they worried whether customers might look at the UK as an unreliable arms provider and, as a consequence, acquire weapons from other countries. *Second*, there were concerns regarding British arms imports, which could leave Britain short of necessary weapons. *Third*, more transparency in the arms production and trade would be unacceptable for the UK.[46]

[43] Although this had been proposed by other countries before, they had not gone beyond preliminary discussions. In 1968, Denmark proposed a resolution to create an arms transfer registration scheme, which failed in part due to opposition from India. TNA: FCO 66/208. FCO, The international arms trade, sent to the UK Mission at the UN, 20 Feb 1970; FCO, Record of a meeting held in the India Office Council Chamber to discuss a UK initiative on Regional Arms Limitation, 9 Apr 1970.

[44] TNA: FCO 66/208. FCO, The international arms trade, sent to Ronald Hope-Jones by Lord Chalfont, 27 Jan 1970.

[45] TNA: FCO 66/208. FCO, The international arms trade, sent by M F Cullis, 17 Feb 1970.

[46] TNA: FCO 66/208. FCO, FCO, The international arms trade, sent to the UK Mission at the UN, 20 Feb 1970.

As part of the same discussions, there were debates concerning potential international rules concerning levels of military expenditures. In part, this was considered by the UK only because the impact of such reductions on British arms exports would be marginal. Furthermore, this would affect mainly developing countries, given the rapid increase in their military expenditures over previous years (increase of 25% between 1967 and 1969).[47] These discussions indicate that government officials put emphasis on adjustment costs for the UK. The British government was interested in exporting its practices to the rest of the world rather than adapting to new standards: a potential treaty should change other countries' behaviour rather than its own.

The Prisoner's dilemma is used here to illustrate the UK perspective on this treaty, presented in table 6.2. If the UK and other countries signed this agreement, they would achieve a gain: they would create a more stable international environment and improve their prestige. If they defected (by not signing the agreement), they would still gain something: they could profit from arms exports and use arms sales to have leverage on other countries' policies. This should not be as great as benefits coming from a more stable international environment, however.

Table 6.2

A prisoner's dilemma model applied to the UK initiative at the arms trade (1970)

	Cooperate (sign agreement)	Defect (not sign agreement)
Cooperate (sign agreement)	2, 2	-1, 3
Defect (not sign agreement)	3, -1	1, 1

[47] TNA: FCO 66/208. FCO, UK disarmament initiative at United Nations, 1970, p. 4.

Yet there were strong incentives to defect because, if other countries defected and the UK did not, a stable environment would not be created and the UK would lose benefits from arms exports. In the case the UK proposed and signed the treaty, other countries would have fewer incentives to sign them, as there would be fewer competitors in the international arms market without the UK, opening more space for their arms exports.

UN Convention on Weaponry: mid-1970s

In the mid-1970s, the Swedish government proposed the creation of an international treaty prohibiting the use of weapons causing 'unnecessary suffering' or 'superfluous injury', as well as weapons having an 'indiscriminate effect'. The British government was one of the main adversaries of this proposal, seeking to block the initiative, alongside other NATO countries.[48] This was based on concerns that the UK would have to abdicate from using weapons considered relevant for its defence. Adjustment costs were therefore perceived to be against British interests.

After a conference to discuss this treaty in 1974, the UK Disarmament Delegation at Geneva sent a report to the foreign secretary James Callaghan, emphasising that they had achieved what the prime-minister (Harold Wilson) wanted. They said that technical aspects of weapons had been examined at the conference but 'without proceeding to any serious contemplation of prohibitions'. The absence of substantial agreements was

[48] TNA: FCO 66/682. FCO, Diplomatic conference on humanitarian law: First session, 20 February to 29 March: Weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects, 1970.

described as 'satisfactory'.[49] Opposition from the UK concerned limitations on three types of weapons: high-velocity rifles, cluster munitions and landmines. Banning rifles and ammunition of high muzzle velocity was opposed by the UK due to its possession and use. The Ministry of Defence argued in 1974 that: 'If this round [of ammunition] were banned, the British Army would be left with only the 9 mm SMG [submachine gun] and pistol as its basic weapons. This would be obviously unacceptable to us'. In the abovementioned report, the UK delegation to the 1974 conference expressed satisfaction that the 'debate on small calibre high velocity weapons became deadlocked in technicalities'.[50] The UK was also against banning cluster munitions, due to its use by the British military. Regarding impact on the Royal Air Force, it was argued that: 'The cluster bomb will become the mainstay of the RAF's conventional armament and we could not accept any restriction'. There were also concerns in the Royal Navy: 'Blast and fragmentation warheads are […] essential to the Naval concept of area and point defence against specific targets, and of Naval gunfire support for land forces'. After the conference in 1974, the UK Disarmament Delegation at Geneva expressed that the 'prohibitionists had not made their case against the kind of modern weapons actually in use'.[51] Banning landmines was also perceived to be against British interests, as they were 'important in NATO's operational plans, since it is expected that a series of mine obstacles would slow down an enemy thrust considerably'.[52]

David Ennals argued that any support to the Swedish initiative would be tactical, aimed at blocking more comprehensive initiatives, which is surprising giving his activism

[49] TNA: FCO 66/690. FCO (UK mission at the UN), Weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects: Conference of government experts, Lucerne, sent to James Callaghan, 21 Oct 1974.
[50] Ibidem.
[51] Ibidem.
[52] TNA: FCO 66/682. Ministry of Defence, Diplomatic conference on humanitarian law, 1974, a note by the Ministry of Defence, Feb 1974, p. 13-14.

against arms sales to South Africa and his position as former head of the AAM.[53] After the conference in 1974, the UK delegation argued that: 'We shall lose all credibility if we continue, however efficiently and cogently, merely to destroy the Swedish case. If on the other hand we can find some such initiative we shall be in a stronger position to work to deflect the whole course of the weapons review'.[54]

In summary, the UK was not willing to stop using certain weapons if this was perceived to be against its interests – regardless of their humanitarian impacts. In other words, the British government was not interested in adjusting its own behaviour through international law.

Concluding remarks

The UK adopted humanitarian concerns in arms exports regardless of what other countries were doing. Some of the cases in which this happened were: a ban on arms exports to Chile and South Africa; restrictions on arms exports that might be used for domestic repression; publication of information on arms exports; prohibiting delegations from certain countries to attend arms exhibitions in the UK; and regulation of brokering activities. These policies and practices emerged domestically due to activities conducted by CSOs.

Nevertheless, once norms became embedded in governmental policies, the British government sought to export them to the rest of the world. As they were already adopted by the UK, adjustment costs were low, while the government would be able to improve its

[53] TNA: FCO 66/690. FCO, Letter from David Ennals to William Rodgers, minister of defence, concerning a potential international ban on napalm, 21 Nov 1974, p. 23.
[54] TNA: FCO 66/690. FCO (UK mission at the UN), Weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects: Conference of government experts, sent to James Callaghan, 21 Oct 1974, p. 6.

symbolic capital and 'level the playing field'. This suggests that creating international regulations depends on previous practices adopted by governments, which seek to turn their domestic law into international law. In some cases, this was done in cooperation with CSOs, which were interested in having international standards on arms exports, even though for different reasons. When proposed international regulations brought substantial adjustment costs, the UK government's position was different: it found no incentives to adopt new norms, and therefore sought to block them.

Part of the literature, as well as policy-makers, interpret this as the reproduction of north-south relations, perpetuating the dominance of northern countries. Although this is not necessarily incorrect, it is important to consider whether diffusion from the 'north' is dependent on norms and practices from governments and CSOs in the 'south'. This issue is explored in chapter 10, after a study on Brazil.

Chapter 7 – Democracy, foreign policy and arms exports in Brazil

In Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty), foreign policy decisions are usually fitted into broader *development* policies. This is essential to understand Brazil's behaviour concerning arms exports, which are frequently considered by government officials as a tool to reduce the political and economic gap between Brazil and developed countries: for them, arms sales can contribute to increase production of wealth, expand inflows of hard currency, open foreign markets to sales of other products and services, expand the domestic military arms industry, develop new technologies, and project an image of modernity and strength.

From the late 1980s, however, humanitarian concerns were introduced in the decision-making on arms exports. For a country whose foreign policy is focused on development, this is puzzling: why would the Brazilian government sacrifice potential gains due to humanitarian preoccupations? I argue that Brazil's redemocratization changed its behaviour regarding arms exports. Humanitarian aspects became part of the decision-making, moderating the role of economic and strategic factors, as well as the influence from arms manufacturers and certain sectors of the government. Also, redemocratization contributed to change understandings of what the national interest is, as well as the potential routes to promote Brazil's development. Rather than through a developmentalist and authoritarian state, development could be achieved through the adoption of liberal norms and the integration of Brazil into a globalised economy. These changes occurred after the end of the military regime, and have expanded since the late 1990s, when CSOs in Brazil started dealing with this issue.

Yet, humanitarian norms in Brazil interact with its condition of a developing country and its position of an emerging power. The result of this interaction has been the adoption of various liberal norms in Brazil's foreign policy, which have nonetheless been accompanied by two features: a broader understanding of human rights (including not only civil and political liberties but also economic and social rights), and a critical attitude on Western powers' selectivity regarding enforcement of humanitarian norms.

This chapter tests the hypothesis that arms export policies and practice are determined by domestic political structures (H1), concluding that they are in part shaped by democratic institutions not only in advanced democracies but also in an emerging power. The chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 analyses arms exports during the military government in Brazil (1964-85), when it became a relatively important arms exporter. Section 2 does the same for the period since 1985, when Brazil's participation in the international arms market declined, but subsequently recovered. Although in both periods strategic and economic aspects were dominant, humanitarian concerns emerged during Brazil's redemocratization, corroborating the idea that democratic institutions shape arms export behaviour.

A 'golden age' of arms exports: decision-making during an authoritarian period (1964-1985)

Brazil was never a major producer or exporter of weapons: between 1951 and 2015, it exported 0.2% of the total global.[55] In the 1970s, however, the Brazilian arms industry became able not only to meet requirements of its armed forces but also to compete in a

[55] Source: Sipri.

few niches in the international market. Brazil became one of the largest arms exporters in the Third World, providing weapons used in major conflicts, such as the Colombian Civil War, the Chadian–Libyan conflict, the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and the 2011 Libyan Civil War.

This section explores what made this possible and how the Brazilian government sought to fit arms exports into broader foreign policy goals. I emphasise that only strategic and economic aspects were considered in arms export decisions during the country's military regime, with no evidence that humanitarian conditions in importing countries were taken into account.

Developmentalism and foreign policy in Brazil

The centrality of development issues in sources Brazil's foreign policy is based on a certain interpretation of the causes of underdevelopment, influenced by thinkers associated to the dependency theory. Rather than a stage towards development, underdevelopment would be the result of systemic factors: rich and poor countries play different roles in the international system, reproducing an order in which the rich remains rich and the poor remains poor. Economically, this would occur due to a deterioration in the terms of trade between primary products and manufactured goods, progressively enlarging the economic gap between industrialized and commodity-exporting nations. Politically, rich nations would use various power resources to maintain this structure, reproducing north-south inequalities and thereby 'keeping the natives in their place' (Cardoso 1989, 1973; Bresser-Pereira 2005; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Furtado 1964; Prebisch 1962, 1959).

Underdevelopment should be tackled through industrialization policies, with the state playing a central role, either directly or indirectly. This approach, which became known as developmentalism, was progressively introduced in Brazil's foreign policy over the first half of the 20th century, becoming clear during and after Juscelino Kubitschek's government (1955-60) (Cervo and Bueno 2002, 308; Hurrell 1986, 95–97; Lessa 1998a, 32–33). To tackle a perceived terms of trade deterioration, Kubitschek's government intensified a process of import substitution industrialization, although with an increased role for foreign private investment (Cardoso 1973, 146). Also, it coordinated with other Latin American countries to obtain support for development initiatives from the United States, a movement called Operation Pan America (*Operação Pan-americana* – OPA). This idea was promoted in the United States as the best way to avoid influence from the Soviet bloc: Kubitschek warned the US foreign secretary, John Foster Dulles (1953-59), that a lack of US support would lead Latin American countries to look for it in the Soviet Union and China (Hurrell 1986, 94–97). Although OPA's achievements were short of what it aimed at, the ideas behind it have been at the core of Brazilian foreign policy since then (Burges, 2009, p. 23; Cervo and Bueno, 2002, p. 308). OPA left a legacy also in the form of direct achievements, as in the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in 1959, and the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC), in 1960.

In the early 1960s, the concept of Independent Foreign Policy (*Política Externa Independent* – PEI) was introduced in the government of Jânio Quadros (1961) and maintained by João Goulart (1961-64), expanding upon Kubitschek's approach. The difference was that, while Kubitschek's policy focused on hemispheric issues, PEI was universal, seeking to disengage Brazil from the cold war (Cervo and Bueno 2002, 333–34; Hurrell 1986, 96; Lessa 1998a, 33). PEI was summarized by the minister of foreign affairs,

Araújo Castro (1963-64), in the idea of the three 'Ds': decolonization, development and disarmament. Emphasising decolonization was an innovation in comparison to Kubitschek's government, and so was the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which reflected a perception that the north-south divide was more important than the east-west.

As the Brazilian government also reaffirmed its position of a Western country, however, there was a tension between two foreign policy approaches: western (*ocidental*) *vs*. third-worldist (*terceiro-mundista*) (Burns, 1967, p. 204), which has been present in Brazil's foreign policy since then, although assuming different forms.

The perspective introduced by PEI was maintained during most of Brazil's military regime (1964-85), despite substantial ideological differences between the regime and previous governments. It was absent only during Castelo Branco's government (1964-67), who was part of a group of military officers known as *Sorbonne* (Skidmore 1973, 5, 1989, 7). During his government, more emphasis was given to the east-west divide, based on which Brazil suspended relations with Cuba, sent troops to support a US-led intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and supported the creation of a permanent inter-American force (Pinheiro 1995, 154–55; Hurrell 1986, 115–16). Castelo Branco's approach was not maintained by subsequent governments, especially during Geisel's period (1974-79). His policy of 'ecumenical and responsible pragmatism' (*pragmatismo responsável e ecumênico*) was closer to PEI than to Castelo Branco's foreign policy, even if PEI was associated to a perceived left-wing period in Brazilian history (Cervo and Bueno 2002, 393; Fonseca Jr 1990, 299–300; Spektor 2004).

When Brazilian arms exports soared in the mid-1970s, military and diplomatic elites sought to fit them into this perspective: they should be an instrument to promote Brazil's


development. During that period, government officials considered only strategic and economic aspects when making decisions on arms exports, with no evidence of humanitarian concerns in the decision-making. That fit well into military regime's policies: a combination of authoritarianism at the domestic level and search for autonomy at the international.

Arms exports and broad foreign policy goals

In the mid-1970s, Brazil became one of the largest arms exporters in the Third World, a position maintained until the late 1980s. Graph 7.1 shows the evolution of Brazilian arms exports in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the total global in the period 1966-2015.

Graph 7.1

Brazilian arms exports: 1966-2015 (million constant 2015 US$)



Note: Values are expressed in moving averages for 3 year-periods due to substantial short-term fluctuations.
Source: Sipri.

Although its overall participation in the market was never above 0.6%, Brazil was among the 15 largest arms exporters in the period 1974-85. Exports went from US$ 56 million in 1970-74 to US$ 970 million in 1975-80, reaching US$ 1.4 billion in 1981-85.[56] Three companies were the main source of Brazil's arms exports: Avibras, a private company, exporting mainly multiple launch rocket systems; Embraer, a state-owned company, exporting trainer and counter-insurgency aircraft; and Engesa, a private company, exporting mainly wheeled-armoured vehicles. They were all located in the region of São José dos Campos, about 100 km from São Paulo.

This growth is puzzling since Brazil was not a military power, not a globally influential country, not involved in external conflicts, and did not have an advanced industrial economy. What explains this increase? The root cause was the creation of institutions and policies aimed at expanding Brazil's arms industry. These were, among others: the Aerospace Technical Centre (*Centro Técnico Aerospacial* – CTA), created in 1950;[57] the Military Institute of Engineering (*Instituto Militar de Engenharia* – IME), in 1959; and the state-owned company Embraer, in 1969.[58] Expanding the arms industry gained special relevance in the late 1960s, when the US Congress introduced limitations to arms sales to Latin America (Hurrell, 1986, p. 115).

Although the government played a central role in Brazil's military industry expansion, some of Brazil's most exported military products were developed in cooperation with private companies. The armoured personnel carrier EE-11 Urutu was

[56] Constant 2015 US$.

[57] Until 1971, called the Aeronautics Technical Centre (*Centro Técnico de Aeronáutica*).

[58] Two institutions merged in 1959 to form the IME: School of Military Engineering (*Escola de Engenharia Militar*) and Military Institute of Technology (*Instituto Militar de Tecnologia*).

developed by the Brazilian Army and manufactured by Engesa. The multiple launch rocket system Astros II was developed by Avibras, with support from the Brazilian Army concerning design and evaluation (Amarante, 2013, pp. 12–13). This raises the question of who had the initiative to expand Brazil's participation in the international arms market: the government or companies. According to Roberto Godoy, journalist from *O Estado de São Paulo*, who has been covering Brazil's arms industry since the 1970s, the increase in exports was due to an effort from companies:

> During the first great period of the Brazilian defence industry (between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s), the government did not have a strategy [for exports] and, in addition, had a love-hate relationship with the industry. On the one hand, it was interested in the prestige and money provided by arms exports. On the other hand, some diplomats at Itamaraty perceived arms sales as a contradiction in Brazilian foreign policy, according to which conflicts should be solved through negotiation.[59]

According to this perspective, the government responded to companies' interest in exporting weapons rather than proactively encouraged them to export: it was a bottom-up process. Some evidence seems to support this. In a letter addressed to Brazil's president Emílio Médici (1969-74), the minister of Foreign Affairs, Mário Gibson Barbosa (1969-74), said that companies had asked for government support to export weapons.[60] This was confirmed by Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, former head of Itamaraty's Department of Trade Promotion (1971-84). According to him, 'exports of defence products started as a bottom-up process; there was no governmental decision to set a policy'.[61]

[59] Interview: Roberto Godoy, São Paulo, 15 Sep 2016.

[60] Itamaraty's archives. MRE, Exposição de Motivos nº 205, Exportação de armamento e equipamento militar, 25 May 1973, from Mário Gibson Barbosa to the president Emílio Médici. Available in Magalhães (2016).

[61] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.

Evidence also indicates, however, that the government was interested in supporting arms exports, even if it had not been the first-mover. Mário Gibson Barbosa argued in 1973 that:

> Support [from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is necessary because the transit with weapons for exhibition and testing requires diplomatic protection. Also, because contacts with buyers – usually the military or police forces from other countries – are often facilitated through an introduction by the local Brazilian Embassy.[62]

The government was willing to do more than merely control exports, being interested in using arms exports to achieve broader foreign policy goals, especially in terms of economic development. There were at least three ways in which arms could play this role. *First*, by helping to guarantee stable and cheap oil supplies, which was a central goal of Brazilian foreign policy in the 1970s due to a combination of a few circumstances: *i*) Brazil's dependence on oil imports; *ii*) a strong economic growth in the 1970s; and *iii*) the 1970s' energy crisis. Brazil was hit hard by the oil crisis: from 1973 to 1974, oil imports increased from 12% to 22% as a proportion of its total imports, contributing to an increase of 37% in Brazil's foreign debt from 1973 to 1974, as well as a decrease of 18% in its international reserves (Malan and Bonelli 1977, 38–39). In that context, arms exports were used as part of deals to import oil: they guaranteed a stable supply and contributed to save resources, as oil was cheaper than in the spot market.[63] The same practice would continue

[62] Itamaraty's archives. MRE, Exposição de Motivos nº 205, Exportação de armamento e equipamento militar, 25 May 1973, from Mário Gibson Barbosa to the president Emílio Médici. Available in Magalhães (2016).

[63] Interviews: Sérgio Florêncio, Brasilia, 22 and 24 Mar 2017; Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.

in the 1980s, with one additional factor: the early 1980s' debt crisis made arms exports an even more invaluable tool.

Second, arms exports could increase inflows of hard currency. This happened both directly and indirectly, as sales of weapons were used as a gateway to export other products and services to countries where Brazil's exports were limited. Increasing foreign currency earnings was considered important due to increasing costs of imported energy, which created balance of payments pressures. Arms exports were useful because, according to Flecha de Lima, 'they have strong political power, putting us in touch with important officials in importing countries'.[64] Sales of weapons therefore 'opened doors' that might have otherwise been closed. As evidence of a connection between military and civilian exports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded Engesa to conduct a survey (in secrecy) aimed at identifying companies that could export weapons, potential customers, as well as whether customers might be interested in importing civilian products. Staff from Engesa identified five potential customers: Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Portugal and Saudi Arabia, a conclusion based in part on trips to Gabon and Nigeria, whose governments expressed interested in acquiring not only weapons but also civilian products from Engesa and other companies.[65] Also, it was through arms exports that Brazil engaged for the first time in substantial relations with countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Brazilian arms exports were useful to gain access to government officials in that region, which became strategic for Brazil after the first oil shock.[66]

[64] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.

[65] Itamaraty archives (Brasília): folder Pré-PNEMEM (box nº 370). Engesa, Primeiro relato sobre viagem efetuada entre 5 e 21 de abril de 1973, from Engesa to the minister of foreign affairs, Mário Gibson Barbosa, 14 May 1973.

[66] For more details on Brazil's engagement in the Middle East during that period, see: Santana (2014).

This was part of broader institutional changes within Itamaraty, which reflected the need to export more. Until the early 1970s, the department in charge of promoting trade in Itamaraty (Department of Trade Promotion – DPC) lacked prestige and resources, being ironically called '*secos e molhados*' (loosely translated as 'grocery store'). A new diplomat in charge of the DPC, Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, changed its relative importance, however. He brought trade promotion to the forefront of Brazilian foreign policy, a task that had been assigned to him by the minister of foreign affairs, Mário Gibson Barbosa.[67]

Third, arms exports could be used to fund technologically advanced sectors, thereby reducing the gap with advanced countries. Flecha de Lima stressed how this occurred in the case of the company Avibras:

> We had a technological breakthrough. This process prompted, for example, the emergence of Avibras, much more sophisticated than the other companies. [...] ASTROS was the product that concerned industrialized countries the most, as it indicated that we had a technological capacity that they did not think Brazil could have. [...] It was an area of high technology and it was important for Brazil not to lose that historical opportunity.[68]

In that context, the Brazilian government created a new policy, aimed at fitting arms exports into broader foreign policy goals. In 1973-74, Mário Gibson Barbosa and Flecha de Lima argued that this was necessary to make the decision-making more comprehensive, including different sectors of the government. This was triggered by negotiations that private companies were conducting with foreign customers, especially a potential contract with Libya to supply 500 EE-9 Cascavel armoured cars, manufactured by Engesa, a private

[67] Interviews: Sérgio Florêncio, Brasília, 22 and 24 March 2017; Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.
[68] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasilia, 29 Mar 2017.

company.[69] Flecha de Lima emphasised that the decision to better control the sector was made after Engesa invited Libyan Army officers to Brazil in order to negotiate sales of weapons. According to him:

> We thought that this might generate problems and crises. [...]. Exports of war material had two dimensions: political and industrial. Engesa worked with vehicles that were not tanks but had offensive potential. So we had a meeting at Itamaraty with all ministers dealing with this issue. And we decided to create a policy on military equipment. [...]. We thought we had to better control this [...].[70]

Until then, decisions were taken within the Brazilian Army, based on a set of rules created by the Army itself.[71] When Engesa was negotiating arms exports, for example, the decision to authorize them was taken by an Army major in a military unit in São Paulo.[72] As large arms deals, however, would imply political consequences that Brazil had not faced until then, Mário Gibson Barbosa suggested the creation of a committee to propose a new policy. This was approved by João Figueiredo, secretary of the National Security Council (*Conselho de Segurança Nacional* – CSN) (1969-74), who forwarded it in December 1973 to the Brazilian president, Emílio Médici, who also approved it.[73] In 1974, the Inter-Ministerial Group on Arms Export Policy (*Grupo Interministerial sobre Política de Exportação de*

[69] Itamaraty's archives: folder Pré-PNEMEM (box 370). Libyan government (military procurement representative), letter to Engesa Paris, concerning sales of armoured cars, 27 Sep 1973; Engesa, Letter from José de Sá Neto to Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, concerning negotiations with Libya, 3 Dez 1973.

[70] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.

[71] The Brazilian Army was called Ministry of War until 1967 and Ministry of the Army in the period 1967-1999. In 1999, the Ministry of Defence was created.

[72] Itamaraty's archives: folder Pré-PNEMEM (box 370). Ministério do Exército, certificado de registro n. 573, authorizing Engesa to export weapons, 2 Aug 1973.

[73] The National Security Council was composed of all ministers, alongside the chiefs of the general staff in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Armed Forces. It had a permanent secretary, which during Geisel's government had a staff of around 130 people (Spektor 2004). Itamaraty's archives. CSN, Exposição de Motivos nº 083/73 DG/CSN, Exportação de armamento e equipamento militar, 10 Dec 1973, from João Baptista Figueiredo to the president Emílio Médici. Available in Magalhães (2016).

Armamentos) was created, assigned with the task of proposing a new policy. The group had representatives from 12 ministries and was chaired by Flecha de Lima, head of Itamaraty's DPC.[74]

The report prepared by the group – finished at the beginning of Geisel's government – stressed only positive aspects of arms exports, especially that it would make the military industry viable and reduce the technological gap between Brazil and traditional suppliers of weapons. There was emphasis also on the role of arms exports as a tool to reinforce Brazil's sovereignty:

> Exports of military equipment serve foreign policy's interests and can be a valuable instrument to reinforce national sovereignty. [...] They increase autonomy in the supply of equipment to the Brazilian military and, as a result, give Brazil more independence in relation to its traditional suppliers.[75]

That document set guidelines for decisions on arms exports, later detailed in the National Policy on Military Equipment Exports (*Política Nacional de Exportação de Material de Emprego Militar* – PNEMEM), which remains the Brazilian official policy to this date. Secondary and primary sources suggest that PNEMEM was the brainchild of Flecha de Lima (Tollefson 1991, 159), something that he also implied when interviewed.[76]

[74] Itamaraty's archives. Relatório final do grupo de trabalho interministerial sobre a PNEMEM, 8 Oct 1974. Available in Magalhães (2016).
[75] Ibidem.
[76] Flecha de Lima remained the most influential diplomat concerning Brazilian arms exports until the late 1980s. He stayed as head of the DPC until 1984, when he became secretary-general of Itamaraty.

Arms exports in the context of a 'responsible and ecumenical pragmatism'

During and after Geisel's government, arms exports fit well into Brazil's foreign policy. His government started a process of *abertura* (opening), meaning a progressive liberalization of the military regime, in contrast to the more intense levels of repression in the period 1968-74, known as 'years of lead' (*anos de chumbo*). In its external dimension, under the leadership of foreign minister Azeredo da Silveira (1974-79), the idea of 'responsible and ecumenical pragmatism' (*pragmatismo responsável e ecumênico*) was introduced. This sought to reinforce the third-worldist dimension of Brazil's foreign policy: Brazil's foreign affairs should be even more guided by pragmatic – rather than ideological – reasons.[77] This happened in a context in which the government of Richard Nixon (1970-74) had kept a low profile in relations with Latin America. In addition, Brazil was becoming isolated in the continent and had been hit hard by the oil shock. The new government thus perceived the need to change Brazil's foreign policy, which was in part done by further diversifying trade and political relations (Pinheiro 1995, 165–66).

This approach would be later strengthened due to an emphasis put by the Carter administration (1977-1981) on human rights issues. In 1977, reports about human rights conditions in countries receiving US aid were published for the first time, being very critical of the situation in Brazil. The Brazilian government reacted with fury, a sentiment later reinforced by meetings between the first lady Rosalyn Carter and human rights activists in Brazil (Skidmore 1989, 16).

[77] There is an extensive literature on Brazil's foreign policy during this period. See, among others: Fonseca Jr (1990); Lessa (1995, 1998a, 1998b, 2010); Ligiéro (2000); Lima and Moura (1982); Miyamoto (1985); Pinheiro (1995); Saraiva (1990); Spektor (2002). There is also an extensive literature looking at long-term trends of Brazilian foreign policy. See: Albuquerque (1996); Bandeira (1993); Camargo and Vásquez Ocampo (1988); Cervo (1994); Cervo and Bueno (2002); Ferreira (1986); Hurrell (1986); Moniz Bandeira (1987).

A change of approach was reflected in various decisions. In 1975, Brazil signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Germany, after the US government refused to supply sensitive nuclear technology to Brazil (Hurrell 1986, 275–76; Skidmore 1989, 16–17). In 1977, Brazil denounced a military aid agreement with the US that had been signed in 1952, a decision that implied a smaller role for US arms imports, indirectly removing a constraint on Brazil's military industry (Tollefson, 1991, pp. 34–35). A similar perspective was reflected in the decision to end Brazil's alignment with Portugal on colonial issues: Brazil recognised Angola's independence, an especially controversial decision because the MPLA was supported by the Soviet Union (Fonseca Jr 1990, 307).[78] Another evidence was in Brazil's support to the Palestinian cause: Brazil abandoned a position of equidistance that it had maintained since 1947, and authorized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to have a representative in Brasília, leading, which led Yasser Arafat to address a letter to Geisel thanking him for the support (Santana 2014, 58; Santos 2000).[79]

Arms exports to Arab countries, in particular, fit well into Geisel's policy. As some of them had a strong anti-American stance, engaging in arms deals meant demonstrating independence and pragmatism. Although a few sales produced tensions with western countries, a third-worldist approach prevailed. As observed in Table 7.1, among the top ten arms importers from Brazil in 1974-89, profiles are varied, including non-aligned countries, authoritarian regimes and countries closer to the Soviet Union than to the Western bloc. A third-worldist approach is observed also in criticisms against the behaviour of advanced

[78] Interview: Sérgio Florêncio, Brasilia, 22 and 24 Mar 2017.

[79] FGV/CPDOC: Arquivo Antônio Azeredo da Silveira – AAS mre rb 1974.02.06. Palestine Liberation Organisation, letter from Yasser Arafat to Ernesto Geisel, 1976.

democracies. According to Flecha de Lima, 'Americans flood the world with weapons, but when someone comes up with a new product they become resentful and suspicious'.[80]

Although there are advanced democracies and a NATO member in this table, exporting weapons to them was not perceived to be at odds with Brazil's foreign policy. A deal to sell aircraft to the UK, for example, was obtained in part because of Flecha de Lima's personal involvement.[81] This actually reinforced Brazil's emerging power foreign policy: Itamaraty stressed that, for the first time, a developing country had sold advanced weapons to a NATO member.[82]

Table 7.1

Brazil's arms exports: 1974-89

	Arms sales (million US$ 1990)	Proportion of total
Iraq	607	27.8%
Libya	398	18.2%
France	118	5.4%
Chile	104	4.8%
Colombia	102	4.7%
Cyprus	98	4.5%
Paraguay	94	4.3%
United Kingdom	83	3.8%
Argentina	72	3.3%
Egypt	66	3.0%
Other countries	447	20.4%
Total	2,187	-

Source: Sipri.
Note: a period after 1985 has been included because equipment delivered in the late 1980s was in part based on contracts signed before 1985.

[80] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.

[81] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Embraer VII. Embraer, Letter from Ozires Silva, CEO of Embraer, to Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, concerning a deal between Brazil and the UK, 22 Mar 1985; Circular telegráfica 13,609, Exportação de material de emprego militar (EMEM) (venda de aviões Tucano à Royal Air Force), from Itamaraty's secretary of state to Brazilian diplomatic missions, 22 Mar 1985.

[82] Ibidem.

A third-worldist approach was also observed in negotiations in which Brazil was willing to sell weapons but that did not result in arms deals. In 1979, the diplomat Georges Maciel visited the United Arab Emirates to investigate the possibility of increasing oil sales to Brazil. One of the questions he was asked concerned whether Brazil was willing to sell weapons, which would increase the likelihood of an oil agreement.[83] Another case was a potential deal with the PLO, which was interested in importing Brazilian armoured cars. Itamaraty expressed support and argued that a deal could be done through a third-country in the Middle East, as there were no restrictions on re-exports of Brazilian weapons (Folha de São Paulo 1979b).

As additional evidence, a third-worldist approach is indicated by Brazil's refusal to export weapons to the South African apartheid regime, even before the UNSC mandatory embargo in 1977.[84] Brazil's position was based on two arguments: *i*) a perceived incompatibility between Brazil's role of a third-world country and support to a segregationist regime; *ii*) and Brazil's interest in expanding relations with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.[85]

A third-worldist policy continued during Figueiredo's government (1979-85). His government sought to expand trade relations with the Soviet Union, refused to impose an embargo on agricultural exports to the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan, and did not show interest in re-establishing military links with the US (Hurrell, 1986, pp. 142–143).

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[83] FGV/CPDOC: Arquivo Antônio Azeredo da Silveira – AAS mre rb 1974.02.06. Brazilian Commission in Geneva, Petróleo: gestões para fornecimento adicional dos Emirados Árabes Unidos, telegram from George Álvares Maciel, 22 Feb 1979, p. 3-4.

[84] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – África do Sul, Suazilândia, Lesoto e Botsuana. Memo DNU/195, concerning arms embargo against South Africa, 11 Jul 1977.

[85] Ibidem.

These findings are partially at odds with previous research, which argued that the relative success of Brazil in exporting weapons was due to a commercial – rather than political – approach (Conca 1997; P. F. Jones 1992). As this literature has looked at arms exports without looking at other issue-areas in depth, however, it may have lost sight of the role of arms exports as a tool to achieve broader foreign policy goals. The use of arms exports as a political tool was observed in the relations between Brazil and its two main arms importers in the 1970s and 1980s: Libya and Iraq, which acquired 46% of Brazil's arms exports in the period 1974-89. The case of Iraq is briefly examined here.

Arms exports to Iraq: an expansion upon the previous experience with Libya

Iraq was Brazil's main customer for weapons in the 1980s and the biggest importer of Brazilian weapons to date. As in the case of Libya, military contracts were part of a broader relationship, in which Iraq exported oil while Brazil exported weapons, other manufactured products and infrastructure services.

Contacts were initially established between Engesa and the Iraqi government. Although Engesa was the first-mover, support from government was essential: in 1977, a representative from Engesa negotiated supplies of military vehicles to Iraq, but there was need for government guarantees, otherwise contracts could not be signed.[86] Also, deals to sell armoured cars facilitated exports of other military products. In 1979-88, Embraer exported 80 military aircraft, Avibras exported 67 multiple rocket launchers, and Taurus

[86] FGV/CPDOC: Arquivo Antônio Azeredo da Silveira – AAS mre rb 1974.02.06. MRE, Brazilian embassy in Baghdad, telegram from the ambassador to the Brazilian minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 Sep 1977.

exported 20,000 pistols and 20,000 submachine guns.[87] In exchange, Iraq committed to keep stable and relatively cheap supplies of oil.[88] These deals made Iraq the most important oil supplier to Brazil: its participation in Brazil's oil imports grew from 25% in 1975 to 53% in 1983 (Fares 2007, 142–43). Government support was fundamental, as argued by Flecha de Lima:

> The country receiving that contribution (arms sales) was expected to value it, which indeed happened. For example, a closer relation with Iraq was based on this. Arms sales allowed the strengthening of relations with Iraq in other areas. They provided us with oil and made concessions in that area. For example, they sold us oil on current account rather than in the spot market. This made us save resources.[89]

The Iraqi government indeed committed to diversify imports from Brazil.[90] As there was a large trade imbalance (in 1976, Iraq exported 20 times more to Brazil than imported from it), the Brazilian government asked Iraq to facilitate imports of Brazilian products and services.[91] According to a document from the Brazilian embassy in Bagdad, a visit by then-minister of Industry and Trade, Ângelo Calmon de Sá (1977-79), was essential to increase Brazil's exports.[92] In 1977, for example, the Brazilian construction company Mendes Júnior

[87] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Iraq VII. MRE, EMEM 257, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, authorizing exports of pistols and submachine guns to Iraq, 16 Oct 1984.
[88] Source: Sipri.
[89] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.
[90] Ibidem.
[91] FGV/CPDOC: Arquivo Antônio Azeredo da Silveira – AAS mre rb 1974.02.06. Letter from Ernesto Geisel to the president of Iraq, Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, concerning trade relations between the two countries, 20 Apr 1977.
[92] FGV/CPDOC: Arquivo Antônio Azeredo da Silveira – AAS mre rb 1974.02.06. MRE, Brazilian embassy in Baghdad, telegram to the Brazilian minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 Sep 1977.

was granted a contract to build the railway Baghdad-Akashat after negotiations involving Brazil's Ministry of Industry and Trade and Iraq's Ministry of Trade.[93]

Agreements to sell weapons and other goods/services to Iraq, while importing oil, is evidence of a third-worldist foreign policy. According to Flecha de Lima, this was recognized by Saddam Hussein, who once said to him that cooperation with Brazil was possible because it exported products that advanced economies manufactured, but without charging a political price for it.[94]

Additional evidence of Brazil's third-worldist policies is observed in how it conducted relations with Iran after the 1979 Revolution. As Brazil exported weapons to Iraq, the most senior diplomat at the Brazilian embassy in Iran, Sérgio Florêncio (1979-81), had to attend fortnight meetings at the Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those meetings were sensitive because Brazil wanted to keep a trade agreement with Iran that had been signed before the revolution, under which Iran would export oil and import soybeans, chicken and construction services. This agreement was at risk, however, because of arms exports to Iraq, as well as due to close relations that Brazil had had with the Shah's regime. In those meetings, Sérgio Florêncio stressed that, rather than being against the Iranian Revolution, arms sales to Iraq were part of a long tradition of autonomy in Brazilian foreign policy. That strategy somehow worked, as the agreement signed by the Shah's regime was not only kept but also expanded.[95] This was especially remarkable because, after the revolution, Iran adopted policies to substitute imports and decrease oil production (Traumann, 2016, p. 23).

[93] FGV/CPDOC: Arquivo Antônio Azeredo da Silveira – AAS mre rb 1974.02.06. Ibidem; Arquivo Antônio Azeredo da Silveira – AAS mre ag 1974.01.16. MRE, Realizações do Governo Geisel (1974-1979), 1979, p. 108.
[94] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.
[95] Interview: Sérgio Florêncio, Brasília, 22 and 24 Mar 2017.

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During the military regime, government officials were aware, however, of arms sales' political implications. Mário Gibson Barbosa emphasised that:

> One must consider whether the importing country is used as a basis for guerrilla movements [...]. Moreover, conflicts in which importing countries are involved should be considered. The interest – or adequacy – of Brazil in getting indirectly involved (by providing equipment for the parties in the conflict) must be considered.[96]

The same was stressed by Flecha de Lima, who cited a case in which the Brazilian government decided not to export vehicles to Honduras:

> A few years after the war between Honduras and El Salvador [1969], a deal to export 40 trucks to Honduras was vetoed by Itamaraty because it would disrupt a precarious strategic balance between the two countries. We did not want to be responsible for that. [...]. So we politicized arms sales a bit, which is natural because it is a product of great sensitivity.[97]

Flecha de Lima also expressed that trade promotion was frequently delegated to companies to prevent Brazil of being perceived as a warmonger. Although controls existed, and officials worried about Brazil's image, humanitarian conditions in importing countries were not part of the decision-making. In fact, for Flecha de Lima, 'human rights are an instrument that industrialized countries use to reinforce their dominance over developing countries'.[98]

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[96] Itamaraty's archives. MRE, Exposição de Motivos nº 205, Exportação de armamento e equipamento militar, 25 May 1973, from Mário Gibson Barbosa to the president Emílio Médici.
[97] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasilia, 29 Mar 2017.
[98] Ibidem.

However, arms exports to Iraq faced some criticism from parliamentarians due to a perceived immorality of profiting from conflicts, as well as potential damage to the national interest (Lenzi 1981, 6110; Mendonça Neto 1981, 6104; Krüger 1981, 6412–14). This was possible because an opposition existed in Brazil, both in civil society and in parliament.

In civil society, opposition to the military regime was central in the agenda of various groups, including the Church, the labour movement, the national association of lawyers (*Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil* – OAB), the press, women's movements, among others. This was possible because the Brazilian state was authoritarian but not totalitarian, creating a situation in which civil society had at least some degree of autonomy (Stepan and Van Oystaeyen, 1988, p. 4-5).

In parliament, a tamed opposition was allowed to exist, organised in the Brazilian Democratic Movement (*Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* – MDB). Although remaining authoritarian until 1985, a strengthened opposition in parliament, especially in the early 1980s, created conditions for the contestation of Brazil's arms export policies. In 1984, for example, the parliamentarian Flavio Bierrenbach proposed a ban on arms sales to places in conflict. He was especially critical of aircraft sales to Honduras, arguing that the deal indicated the 'fragility of Itamaraty, against the suspicious opportunism of other sectors of the government'.[99] His initiative was possible due to the existence of an opposition in parliament, especially after 1980, when multipartidarism was restored in Brazil.

There is no evidence of impact of these activities on Brazil's arms export policy, however. This was confirmed by Flecha de Lima, who argued that domestic criticism

[99] Itamaraty's archives: folder institucional III (1986-89). Câmara dos Deputados, Projeto de Lei do deputado Flavio Bierrenbach, Jun 1984.

against arms exports did not have any influence.[100] Nevertheless, at the minimum, the government had to present narratives in which the 'positive' side of arms exports was emphasised, such as the creation of jobs, inflows of hard currency and gains of prestige. In various interviews to the press in the late 1970s and early 1980s, officials had to explain Brazil's arms export policies to the public and why certain decisions were made. They had to justify why Brazil did not require end-user certificates from customers, for example.[101] Therefore, to some extent, arms exports were a contentious issue in domestic politics, which was due to the existence of some level of political and civil liberties, especially in the early 1980s. Although weak, there was an opposition in parliament, as well as a certain level of liberties in society.

Arms exports in a democratic period (1985-2015): from a decline to a boost in the Lula years

In the late 1970s, interest rates in Europe and the US rose, and oil prices soared, leading to a rapid increase in Brazil's foreign debt. This weakened the government's capacity to promote economic development and innovation, while also showed the limits of a third-worldist approach.

Although sales of weapons were important to compensate the need for hard currency, Brazilian arms exports decreased in the second half of the 1980s and over the 1990s. This was caused mainly by a global reduction in arms imports: a 37% decrease

[100] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasilia, 29 Mar 2017.

[101] Itamaraty's archives: folder institucional III (1986-89). This folder has transcriptions of press conferences and interviews of the minister of foreign affairs to the press. Press conferences, 16 Nov 1979, 7 Mar 1983, 5 Sep 1983; interviews to *Jornal do Brasil*, 3 Jun 1979, 13 Sep 1981; *O Globo*, 27 May 1979, 29 Nov 1983; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 17 Jun 1979, 29 Dec 1983; *Agence France-Presse*, 13 Jun 1979.

between 1981-1990 and 1991-2000. Brazil's arms exports were hit especially hard because importers of Brazilian weapons reduced acquisitions above the global average: Brazil's ten largest customers in 1981-1990 reduced their total arms imports by 60% in 1991-2000. Given its dependence on exports, Brazil's arms industry virtually collapsed in the early 1990s. Although estimations vary, at least 70% of the arms production was exported in the mid-1980s (Krause, 1995, p. 189), while other sources indicate proportions of 80% or even 95% (Tollefson, 1991, pp. 94–95). The three main weapons-manufacturers in Brazil were severely affected. Engesa and Avibras were impacted, in particular, by the interruption of arms sales to Iraq in 1987-1988, after the Iraqi government suspended payments of its debts to these companies in 1985.[102] Engesa, which exported 95% of its production in the mid-1980s (Moreira 1986), laid off 8,000 of its 9,000 employees between 1988 and 1990, remaining in operation only after a US$ 65 million loan provided by BNDES, which the company was unable to pay back (Tollefson, 1991, pp. 94–95). Engesa eventually went into bankruptcy after losing a competition to export tanks to Saudi Arabia. Avibras rearranged its production portfolio, partially converting it to the manufacture of civilian goods, such as communications equipment and vehicle parts. Yet its number of employees was reduced from 6,000 in 1987 to 800 in 1990 (Tollefson 1991, 94–95). Embraer also reallocated resources to the production of civilian items, mainly projects of regional jets, whose result would be the ERJ and E-Jet families.

Brazilian exports of SALW also decreased over the 1990s: in 1999, they were 52% lower than in 1990.[103] The largest SALW producer in Brazil, Forjas Taurus, adapted to the

[102] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Engesa IV. MRE (Departamento de Promoção Comercial), Brasil-Iraque: exportações de material de emprego militar brasileiro, May 1991.
[103] Source: AliceWeb, Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC), Brazil.

new circumstances by diversifying its production. Brazil remained, however, among the top-five SALW exporters in the world, in a context in which conflicts had become mainly domestic and were usually fought with SALW.

In addition to changes in the international context, there were also changes in Brazil's policies and in attitudes of government officials regarding arms exports, a topic explored in the next subsection.

Arms exports and Brazil's redemocratization

Brazil's redemocratization changed government's attitude on arms exports, a process that was later reinforced by the end of the cold war. As evidence, Brazil imposed in 1987 a partial arms embargo on Chile due to the repressive nature of Pinochet's regime, following a request from Brazil's ambassador to Chile.[104] This was more than a symbolic decision: Embraer and Engesa were negotiating arms deals with Chile and protested against Itamaraty's decision (Tollefson 1991, 251). Brazil lifted this suspension only in 1989, after the referendum held in Chile in 1988.[105] In another case, in 1989, the government did not authorize exports of cannon ammunition to Sri Lanka, based on a new policy at Itamaraty, which was 'discouraging exports of military equipment to countries with domestic political instability or conflictual regions'.[106] Later, Fernando Collor's government

[104] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Chile IX. MRE, EMEM, on arms exports to Chile, 1987; MRE, handwritten note about arms exports to Chile, based on request by Ronaldo Costa, Brazil's ambassador to Chile, 1987; Folder PNEMEM – Chile X. MRE, Memo DPG/016, arms exports to Chile, 3 Apr 1989; MRE, Memo DPG/060, arms exports to Chile, 28 Jun 1988.

[105] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Chile X. MRE, Memo DPG/016, arms exports to Chile, 3 Apr 1989.

[106] Itamaraty's archives: folder Institucional PNEMEM – Memorandas II. MRE, Memo DAOC-I/36. Sri Lanka, exportação de material de emprego militar, 20 Dec 1989.

(1990-92) further changed Brazil's approach to arms exports, becoming more cautious when making decisions.

This was part of a set of changes in Brazilian foreign policy, in which the developmentalist paradigm lost space to a liberal agenda (Spektor 2004; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2012, 80). This occurred in a context of changes in both the international and domestic contexts. Internationally, the idea of a third-worldist foreign policy lost much of its original meaning with the end of the cold war. Domestically, Brazil's model of industrialization, based on import substitution and a central role for the state, had exhausted its potential (Hirst and Pinheiro 1995, 5–6). Also, Brazil's democratization empowered a group of diplomats at Itamaraty defending a liberal agenda, including Celso Lafer and Marcos Azambuja, while it weakened a developmentalist group, of diplomats like Paulo Nogueira Batista (Casarões 2012).

Defence policies were altered too, with a lesser role for the military in Brazil's nuclear policy, as well as the introduction of a more flexible approach to non-proliferation regimes (Hirst and Pinheiro, 1995, pp. 5–6). The government reiterated its decision of not developing nuclear weapons (included in the 1988 Constitution), with president Collor symbolically covering a tunnel where nuclear tests were once planned to be conducted, in Serra do Cachimbo's Air Force Base (Brasil 1998). Also, it created with Argentina a regime of nuclear control, monitored by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Concerning arms exports, sales to countries that had imported Brazilian weapons in the past stopped being authorized, as observed in the abovementioned cases of Chile and Sri Lanka. As additional evidence, in the period 1990-91, the company Avibras was not

authorized to sell weapons to Cyprus, Libya, Myanmar and Syria;[107] Taurus could not export to Cyprus and Jordan;[108] Britanite could not export to Libya;[109] and CBC could not export to Lebanon and Mali.[110] This change was described by Flecha de Lima as 'shocking for various government officials', who perceived it to be against Brazil's interests.[111] This suggests that redemocratization in Brazil, as well as a broader trend of collapse of authoritarian regimes, played a role even in the absence of activities from domestic CSOs. Support to arms exports did not completely fade away, however. Collor supported potential exports of the Osório tank, manufactured by Engesa, by personally riding it and using this to promote its exports (Tollefson, 1991, pp. 94–95).

Also, redemocratization created new tensions in Brazil's foreign policy, as observed in a speech by foreign minister Celso Amorim (1993-94), at the UNGA 48th session (1993). On the one hand, he placed democracy at the core of Brazilian foreign policy: both development *and* democracy should guide Brazil's external actions. He also argued that foreign affairs should be based on ethical principles rather than only the national interest (Amorim, 1997, p. 20). On the other hand, he expressed concerns that liberal policies might be used as an excuse for interference in other countries' domestic affairs:

[107] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Avibras IV. MRE, EMEM 117, not authorizing exports of rockets to Syria, 8 Jun 1990; Avibras, C.066-GV/90, letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs on sales to Libya, 18 Jun 1990; Avibras, C.067-GV/90, letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs on sales to Myanmar, 18 Jun 1990. Folder PNEMEM – Avibras V. MRE, EMEM 116, not authorizing exports of rockets to Cyprus, 21 May 1991.

[108] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Taurus III (1991). MRE, EMEM 151, not authorizing exports of pistols and submachine guns to Cyprus, 12 Jun 1991; MRE, EMEM 154, not authorizing exports of pistols and submachine guns to Jordan, 24 Jun 1991.

[109] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Britanite (1981-91). MRE, Guia de transmissão de mensagem 141, not authorizing negotiations concerning landmines and grenades to Libya, 10 Jun 1991.

[110] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – CBC (1988-91). MRE, Telegrama 026 40143, not authorizing exports of ammunition to Lebanon, 21 Feb 1991; Folder PNEMEM – CBC II (1991). MRE, EMEM 099, not authorizing sales of ammunition to Mali, 23 Apr 1991.

[111] Interview: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.

> New concepts, some of them under a humanitarian or moral clothing, such as a supposed “droit d'ingérence” or “good governance”, alongside renewed versions of old practices such as eco-protectionism, have come to justify discriminatory acts against countries in the South. (Amorim 1997, 20).

Therefore, the relation between democracy and development is not always considered by Brazilian decision-makers as a positive-sum game. This is observed in the idea that development issues should not lose space in Brazil’s foreign policy to ‘new topics’, such as environment, human rights, migration and non-proliferation. Roberto Abdenur, a senior Brazilian diplomat, argued that: ‘the new agenda would necessarily be detrimental because, in addition to downgrading development issues, it would be a vector for interference from developed countries in domestic affairs of poor countries’ (Abdenur 1994, 41). This indicates that, although democracy changed Brazil’s foreign policy, the government kept emphasis on the importance of sovereignty, as well as a scepticism regarding the promotion of liberal values by advanced democracies. These tensions were observed again when Brazil managed to increase its participation in the international arms market during the Lula years, which is explored in the next subsection.

The Worker’s Party and a boost on the defence sector: a renewed version of ‘responsible and ecumenical pragmatism’

Lula’s foreign policy retook a few principles that had guided Brazil’s foreign policy until the mid-1980s, especially a greater importance assigned to developmentalist thinking and south-south ties. This resurgence was reinforced after the 2007-08 financial crisis, which seemed to indicate the success of an alternative economic and social model, different from deregulatory policies introduced in advanced countries (Cervo and Bueno

2002, 534). In 2009, Lula emphasised that the crisis had been created by 'white people with blue eyes, who seemed to know everything before the crisis, but now demonstrate to know nothing', thus implying that his government policies were correct while theirs' were wrong (Lula 2009).

This was observed in Brazil's behaviour regarding arms exports. Similar to what happened between the mid-1970s and late 1980s, the Brazilian government used them to diversify political and trade relations, as well as to increase Brazil's autonomy. South-south solidarity prevailed over other factors, such as democracy and humanitarian concerns.

A larger participation of Brazil in the international arms market occurred in a context of increase in the global demand for weapons, as well as of a renewed interest on the military sector in Brazil. Although the allocation of resources to the military decreased in Lula's first term (2003-06), his government reversed that in the second term, as observed in Graph 7.2. Spending on defence procurement grew 156% between 2003-06 and 2007-10, proportionally more than the total military budget, which grew 28%.


As additional evidence of a greater relevance assigned to the defence sector, Lula nominated Nelson Jobim to head the Ministry of Defence in 2007. Jobim was an experienced politician, who had been member of the Chamber of Deputies (1987-94), minister of Justice (1995-97), and head of Brazil's Supreme Court (2004-06). According to the Brazilian Army's commander, general Villas Bôas, Lula assigned to Nelson Jobim the task of increasing the salience of military issues in the political agenda (Villas Bôas 2015). As a minister, Jobim introduced changes in policies and institutional arrangements, in addition to creating or recovering large military projects.

Concerning government policies, guidelines were made public through a new National Defence Strategy (2008) and through the White Book on National Defence (2012).

They both stressed the importance of expanding Brazil's military industry and developing autonomous technology. Regarding institutional arrangements, the Ministry of Defence created in 2010 the Department of Defence Products (Seprod), to be in charge of supporting the arms industry and exports. Because of Seprod, the role of government officials in supporting arms exports were included in law, giving them formal powers to conduct activities of commercial intelligence and promotion of arms sales, for example.[112] Seprod is also the focal point for relations between the military and the arms industry, represented by a few industry bodies, especially the Brazilian Defence and Security Industry Association (Abimde) and the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (Comdefesa/Fiesp).

Graph 7.2

Military expenditures: Brazil (1995-2014), 1995=100, constant R$



Source: Brazil's Ministry of Defence.

[112] Interview: Flávio Basílio, London, 12 Sep 2017. This is the Law 13,341.

Regarding military projects, various were implemented or recovered, such as: the nuclear submarine project; the Integrated Border Monitoring System (Sisfron), a project to monitor Brazil's borders; the Blue Amazon Management System (SisGAAZ), to monitor Brazil's jurisdictional waters; Embraer KC-390, a military transport aircraft project; and Astros 2020, a project to develop a new multiple launch rocket system. This process drew the interest of major construction companies in Brazil, which all had close relations with government officials, especially Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Corrêa, OAS, Odebrecht and Queiroz Galvão.

Jobim also contributed to establish a closer relationship between the Ministry of Defence and Itamaraty. Informal channels of communication were institutionalized through the incorporation of military issues into Itamaraty's formal structure. According to a diplomat at Itamaraty, Jobim was important for creating this closer relationship, favoured by personal connections with Pinta Gama, then the main diplomat dealing with military issues at Itamaraty.[113] This led to the creation, in 2010, of a department at Itamaraty to deal with military issues: the Coordination of Defence Affairs (*Coordenação-Geral de Assuntos de Defesa* – CGDEF).[114] Since its creation, military personnel have been assigned to work there, providing it with expertise.[115]

Moreover, in the late 2000s, the Brazilian government increased its role as a promoter of arms exports. In addition to economic gains, arms exports were perceived as

[113] Interview: interviewee 12 (civil servant), Brasília, 27 Mar 2017.
[114] It was later turned into Department of Defence and Security Affairs (*Departamento de Assuntos de Defesa e Segurança* – DADEF).
[115] Interview: interviewee 12 (civil servant), Brasília, 27 Mar 2017.

essential to maintain a viable military industry.[116] According to Flávio Basílio, head of Seprod:

> If we cannot export defence products we cannot maintain our industrial capacity. It is a double vector: maintaining national sovereignty while, at the same time, maintaining capacity to develop technology and generate employment and income. These two vectors are inseparable.[117]

In addition to the Ministry of Defence, the military industry was supported by various other government agencies. Support was obtained in part through the work of Seprod, which became the hub of a network of different government agencies and private actors.[118] At Itamaraty, two departments are in charge of promoting arms exports: DADEF and Department of Trade Promotion (DPR). Both provide information to companies regarding potential markets, organise meetings between companies and governments, and help Brazilian missions abroad to do the same. According to a diplomat at the DADEF, the department looks at arms exports as a tool to make the defence industry in Brazil economically viable, enhancing Brazil's autonomy concerning the supply of weapons. For this reason, DADEF tends not to focus on human rights and disarmament when making decisions on arms exports. DADEF's staff follows potential market opportunities and the performance of Brazilian weapons-manufacturers abroad. In the early 2017, for example, there were concerns that the largest defence company in Brazil, Embraer, had not yet managed to export the KC-390, a military transport aircraft. This might have been caused

[116] Interview: Roberto Godoy, São Paulo, 15 Sep 2016.
[117] Interview: Flávio Basílio, London, 12 Sep 2017.
[118] On the formation of a network to support Brazil's military industry, see: (Dagnino, 2010).

by activities from Lockheed Martin and the US government, which were offering refurbishment projects for the aircraft Hercules at better-than-average conditions.[119]

Support is also provided by the Brazilian Innovation Agency (Finep). In the period 2012-14, the area of airspace and defence was a priority (FINEP 2013a, 40). Finep created a program called *Inova Aerodefesa*, supported by the National Development Bank (BNDES), the Ministry of Defence and the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB). Under this program, R$ 2.9 billion (US$ 1.3 billion at 2013 values) were provided to weapons-manufacturers as grants or loans for the period 2013-17. That was around 9% of total grants and loans offered to companies by Finep (FINEP 2013c), a proportion much higher than the participation of the arms industry in the Brazilian economy. Potential to export was one of the criteria for grants and loans to be conceded (FINEP 2013b).

The Foreign Trade Chamber (Camex), a collegiate to coordinate funding and export credit guarantees, also introduced policies to support arms exports. This was done after a request by Seprod, which was in turn based on suggestions from arms-manufacturing companies.[120] In the late 2000s, two types of bonds were introduced for the defence sector (although they were later expanded to other sectors): *performance bond*, in which an arms importing country receives a guarantee that a manufacturer effectively has capacity to produce; and *refunding bond*, in which a country funding a military project in Brazil receives a guarantee of refunding if the project is unsuccessful.[121] Also, the Ministry of Defence managed to gain a seat at Camex in 2017, allowing it to shape policies from the inside.

[119] Interview: interviewee 14 (civil servant), Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[120] Interviews: Raquel Abdalla, Brasilia, 28 Mar 2017; Flávio Basílio, London, 12 Sep 2017; Carlos Pierantoni, London, 12 Sep 2017.
[121] Interview: Diego Ceballos, Brasilia, 28 Mar 2017.

Camex's head, Marcela Carvalho (2017-), stressed in 2017 that there was a taboo concerning arms exports, and that this should change (Peccini 2017).

There was also expansion in activities of commercial diplomacy. As evidence, there is an agreement between the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (Apex-Brasil) and Abimde. According to Michele Candeloro, support from Apex is in the form mainly of trade promotion, through participation in fairs and exhibitions.[122] Based on an agreement between Apex and Abimde signed in 2006, the industry is supported to exhibit products and services in various arms fairs.[123] According to admiral Carlos Pierantoni, deputy-head of Abimde, the agreement is important especially in times of economic crisis: as Brazil faced a recession from the early 2014 on, domestic procurement was reduced, making exports the only way for companies to survive.[124] Furthermore, the presence of Brazilian government officials in fairs facilitates contacts with potential customers, as arms sales are almost always government-to-government. Indeed, in the Brazilian stand at the DSEi 2017 (visited as part of this thesis' fieldwork), there were not only companies but also government officials: the head of Seprod, Flávio Basílio; the head of Brazilian Navy's acquisition department (*Diretoria-Geral do Material da Marinha*), admiral Luiz Henrique Caroli; and the Brazilian ambassador to the UK, Eduardo dos Santos. Moreover, in 2012, Abimde and Apex-Brasil created the *Mostra BID-Brasil*, an annual arms exhibition in Brasília where Brazilian companies exhibit products and services to potential customers. This is a showcase for the Brazilian weapons industry, similar to the British Army Equipment

[122] Interview: Michele Candeloro, Brasília, 24 Apr 2017.
[123] Itamaraty's archives: folder Eurosatory 2005-06 (box 127, antecedentes). Abimde, Semana Abimde, n. 550, 15 Jul 2005.
[124] Interview: Carlos Pierantoni, London, 12 Sep 2017.

Exhibition (BAAE) and the Royal Navy Equipment Exhibition (RNEE), created in the UK in the mid-1970s.

Cooperation between industry bodies and government institutions indicates that they are on the same side. According to Maura Curci, the Ministry of Defence frequently waits for the industry's initiative in terms of new ideas. For example, Comdefesa/Fiesp proposed a tax exemption scheme for the arms industry, later approved by the National Congress.[125] According to Paulo Albuquerque, from Abimde, the Ministry of Defence is open to suggestions regarding support to defence companies, especially to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.[126] In practice, arms-manufacturing companies are considered as an extension of the military.[127] This implies that, once companies are labelled as *defence companies*, they are considered strategic, giving them a level of access to government officials that similar companies in other sectors would probably not have. Furthermore, the Brazilian government worried that industry bodies were not strong enough, as this would prevent the government of advancing its interests through them. If they were stronger, the defence establishment as a whole (including the Ministry of Defence and parts of Itamaraty) would be more able to further the agenda of strengthening the defence sector. Fiesp and Abimde would be more able to lobby parliamentarians and get in touch with potential customers abroad, for example.[128]

[125] Interview: Maura Curci, São Paulo, 25 Sep 2016. This was approved by Law 12,598, 22 Mar 2012. Regulated by Decree 8,122, 17 Oct 2013.
[126] Interview: Paulo Albuquerque, London, 12 Sep 2017.
[127] Interview: Rubens Valente, Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[128] Interview: interviewee 14 (civil servant), Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.

The Worker's Party and arms exports: south-south ties vs. humanitarian concerns

The PT-led government (2003-2016) was not reticent to authorize arms exports. With a few exceptions, it did not worry about whether Brazilian weapons could escalate conflicts, fuel poverty or contribute to human rights abuses. This is different from positions adopted by the UK Labour Party, in which discussions regarding the impacts of British arms exports have been occurring at least since the 1960s.

This suggests that south-south ties were considered more relevant than Brazil's condition of a large democracy. Lula's policy on arms exports was in this way not much different from the one introduced in Brazil in the mid-1970s: they were both driven by a perceived need to diversify trade and political relations. This attitude from the PT-led government is suggested by an increase in the allocation of resources to the defence sector, the creation of institutional arrangements to support arms exports, and the fact that it did not discourage exports to 'irresponsible' countries. The prevalence of south-south ties and developmentalist thinking over humanitarian concerns is also observed in positions of government officials and government agencies dealing with arms exports. According to Michele Candeloro, from Apex, the main markets for Brazilian weapons are countries in Latin America or those unable – or unwilling – to import products from major providers. Therefore, Brazil operates in these niches.[129] General Aderico Mattioli, with a more wide-ranging perspective, argued that there is a constant pressure from great powers to keep Brazil underdeveloped. For him, when a national defence project is about to be implemented, major exporters offer off-the-shelf weapons systems at below-market prices

[129] Interview: Michele Candeloro, Brasília, 24 Apr 2017.

to discourage domestic initiatives. These offers would be done not only to Brazil but also to potential customers of Brazilian weapons.[130]

A contradiction observed in other democracies, however, is also present in Brazil: why should it export weapons to places where they might be used to prevent people of having political and civil liberties? This became especially problematic with Lula as president. On the one hand, his government implemented policies to eliminate extreme poverty, reduce inequality and increase access to public services. Internationally, it promoted democracy and development through various instruments: sending specialists in elections to other countries, providing development aid, supporting public health initiatives abroad, and providing scholarships for foreign students (Cintra 2010). On the other hand, Brazil expanded relations with notorious autocratic regimes, engaging in oil imports, infrastructure projects and arms sales (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2013).

This tension was reflected in different attitudes to arms exports across different government ministries and even across different departments within Itamaraty. While Itamaraty's Department of Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies (DDS) stresses the importance of international law and human rights, Itamaraty's department in charge of defence issues (the DADEF) emphasises economic and political gains.[131] A diplomat at the DADEF, for example, argued that: 'keeping our autonomy is the most important thing. I will not stop exporting because other countries push us to do that. This is not disconnected from the rest of Brazilian foreign policy, which is based on national interest, primarily emphasizing development'.[132]

[130] Interview: Aderico Mattioli, Brasilia, 28 Mar 2017.
[131] Interview: interviewee 13 (civil servant), Brasilia, 31 Mar 2017.
[132] Interview: interviewee 12 (civil servant), Brasilia, 27 Mar 2017.

It was in this context that various groups pressured the government to better control the arms trade. An advocacy network composed of CSOs and others emerged in the late 2000s, becoming a counterforce to another network, which stressed the need to expand Brazil's arms industry and arms exports. Adding to pressures coming from a few diplomats at Itamaraty, they sought to show the limits and hypocrisy of Brazil's foreign policy under the Workers' Party. They stressed that Lula promoted Brazil as an inclusive and democratic nation while engaged in arms deals with repressive regimes. Even though their impact has been limited, campaigns have had some success, despite at least four factors that should make their influence unlikely. First, as abovementioned, the PT-led government did not seem to worry about humanitarian concerns regarding arms exports. Second, as Brazil has high levels of domestic violence, concerns on the use of Brazilian weapons abroad should be unimportant. Third, the number of people in CSOs in Brazil dealing with this issue is small: in the early 2016, there were two people at Viva Rio, two at Conectas, two at Sou da Paz and three at Igarapé. Fourth, arms exports fit well into Brazil's emerging power narratives: as most great powers export weapons, they should be perceived as a requirement to achieve great power status.

This issue is explored in more details in the next chapter, which looks at the role of CSOs in pressuring – or working alongside – the government to adopt a stricter control on its arms exports.

Concluding remarks

Brazilian policies and practice on arms exports are shaped by a variety of factors and pressures, just like it happens in other countries. Similar to what other countries do, the

Brazilian government uses arms exports to achieve broader foreign policy goals, especially in terms of potential economic and political benefits.

However, the position of Brazil as a Western country and, more recently, as a democracy produces a tension in decisions on arms exports. At least since the 1950s, its foreign policy has been marked by a dilemma, based on different ideas concerning Brazil's position and role in the world. As a major *emerging power*, with a strong sovereigntist tradition, government officials and experts consider that Brazil is similar to countries such as China, India, Mexico and South Africa. As part of this 'group', Brazil should contest the hegemony of 'northern' countries and the unfair nature of the international system. Brazil is also considered as a *Western* country, however, putting it alongside countries such as France, Germany, the UK and the US. As part of this 'group', Brazil should recognize the importance of liberal values and work to promote them. This duality is described by Celso Lafer, former minister of foreign affairs (2001-02), as a 'double insertion', something that would make Brazil's foreign relations unique. According to him, the country is part of 'the other West': although it has Western values, it shares similar positions with the Third World, especially regarding development.

This tension is observed in Brazil's policy and practice regarding arms exports. On the one hand, arms exports fit well into Brazil's self-perception of a third-world or emerging power. On the other hand, as a Western country, and since 1985 as a democracy, Brazil's policies should also embrace liberal values.

These identities have been used by elites to reinforce policies they want to introduce or maintain. Some elites stress the role of Brazil as a third-world or emerging power to justify arms exports to countries struggling to find weapons providers, such as

Iraq and Libya. Other elites, however, criticize arms exports based on a perceived need to make Brazil behave like a democracy.

Yet, evidence shows that democratic institutions changed Brazil's behaviour on arms exports. During the military regime, humanitarian concerns were not considered in the decision-making. They emerged only after the redemocratization, suggesting that domestic political structures explain the existence of these concerns. This occurred through direct and indirect causal mechanisms: directly, behaviour changed during the redemocratization, despite no activities from CSOs; indirectly, democratic institutions created conditions for civil society groups to flourish, which later raised the salience of arms export control through domestic politics in Brazil.

In summary, looking at arms exports shows that Brazil's foreign policy was structured around development issues in both authoritarian and democratic periods, while also exposes the limits of views focusing only on this dimension. Economic development issues were frequently in tension with other aspects, especially the condition of Brazil as a Western country and, after 1985, with the existence of democratic institutions. This tension resulted in a hybrid behaviour, in which the developmentalist thinking remained central but was moderated by various liberal norms, elaborated and promoted by groups and individuals both inside and outside the government.

Chapter 8 – Domestic determinants of arms export control in Brazil: norm entrepreneurs and foreign policy

During the redemocratization, the Brazilian government became more cautious when making decisions on arms exports, especially to authoritarian regimes or places in conflict. In addition to this immediate effect, Brazil's redemocratization created conditions for the emergence of groups in civil society that seek to influence the country's foreign affairs. These groups started dealing with arms export issues in the late 1990s, initially as part of a strategy to prevent gun violence in Brazil's two major cities: São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Later, they expanded the scope of their activities, dealing with impacts of Brazilian weapons not only on Brazil but also on other countries. This occurred due to a learning process among activists, who realized the transnational nature of the problem of arms control. This was the result of multiple interactions that they had with experts, government officials, international NGOs, international organisations and other civil society groups, a process that led to the formation of a domestic advocacy network, whose existence became clear in the late 2000s.

These CSOs achieved some success. They were behind, among other achievements, of the introduction of restrictions on arms exports to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the awareness of a few Brazilian diplomats about the humanitarian impacts of arms exports, and the ATT ratification process. Their influence follows a different route from that observed in the UK, however. Political parties are not a transmission belt for CSOs' normative agenda in Brazil, which is pushed instead through direct contacts with government officials and parliamentarians, as well as through the press and social media.

Also, they are not organised as grassroots movements: CSOs dealing with arms exports in Brazil have limited reach beyond large cities and are formed mainly by intellectual elites.

Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 are tested in this chapter through an analysis of CSOs' activities in Brazil, especially of how an advocacy network was formed domestically and how the government reacted to its activities. Three conclusions are drawn from testing these hypotheses. The first one is that CSOs can influence arms export policies even in a country with a strong sovereigntist tradition, recent history of democracy, and little tradition of humanitarian CSOs. The second is that norms introduced by CSOs have become embedded in policies and practices. As evidence, restrictions on sales to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean remained after being introduced in the early 2000s. Also, a few diplomats maintain concerns on the humanitarian impacts of Brazil's arms sales regardless of the political party in power. Furthermore, norms on transparency are followed even by reticent government sectors, especially the Ministry of Defence. The third is that CSOs cooperated with various sectors of the government. They frequently worked as insiders, using channels of communication with parliamentarians, diplomats and other members of the Executive. This implies that models in which CSOs are considered outsiders are insufficient to explain the complexity of relations between civil society groups and governments.

Studying the case of Brazil revealed two unanticipated patterns. First, there was a learning process regarding the problem of gun control. After starting with a local approach, CSOs realised the need to lobby also the federal government (rather than only local governments) and participate in campaigns to make international arms transfers stricter. Second, there is a clash of narratives between this advocacy network and another network, which seek to boost the defence sector in Brazil. While the former adopts a narrative that

certain arms exports are incompatible with Brazil's condition of a democratic country, the latter fits arms sales into narratives of development, security or Brazil's emerging power status.

This chapter is divided into five sections, followed by some concluding remarks. Section 1 explores how the topic of arms exports became an issue in domestic politics in Brazil, looking at the work of four Brazilian CSOs: Viva Rio, Instituto Sou da Paz, Conectas Human Rights, and Igarapé Institute. Sections 2-5 examine their work on Brazil's arms export policies, using four types of framing: *i*) re-exports of weapons to Brazil; *ii*) arms exports to countries in conflict or where human rights are violated; *iii*) transparency; and *iv*) arms exports as an intrinsically wrong activity.

CSOs and arms exports in Brazil: from the local to the global

The involvement of civil society groups in Brazil with arms trade issues started in the late 1980s, when trade unions and a few experts problematized the topic. Trade unions dealt with this issue after the end of the military regime, when the arms industry in Brazil went through a period of decline. Discussions occurred in the region of São José dos Campos, where the three largest weapons-manufacturers in Brazil (Avibras, Embraer and Engesa) were based. The issue was then framed in two ways. First, workers should be aware of the type of product that they manufactured and to whom weapons were sold (Apoio Sindical 1988a). Even though the economy of São José dos Campos was dependent on the sector, the production of weapons was criticized. Rather than a technology valley, as it is known in Brazil, the region was called a 'death valley' (Apoio Sindical 1988b). A trade union leader stressed that manufacturing weapons caused destruction and poverty, and contributed to

the death of workers in other countries. They were destructive even when not used, as resources spent on them could be used to build hospitals, sewage treatment or for food (Apoio Sindical 1988b). Second, arms production should be converted into the production of civilian goods, due to the instability of demand for weapons. It was emphasised that conversion was a UN recommendation and was defended by trade unions in other countries (Apoio Sindical 1988b).

Although trade unions discussed this topic, there is no evidence of influence on Brazil's policy. Yet this shows a similar characteristic of Brazil and the UK: the existence of a movement within trade unions criticizing the arms production and trade. As workers' jobs depend on companies manufacturing weapons, this is puzzling, especially in Brazil in the late 1980s, where wages were much lower than in the UK and where a social safety net was weak. This suggests that trade unions can look beyond the defence of workers' interests, becoming involved in various campaigns.

In the late 1980s, there were also discussions among academics. A few experts organised a symposium in 1987 about the Brazilian arms industry and exports. According to a report from Itamaraty about the symposium (unofficially attended by diplomats), one of its goals was to increase transparency.[1] The event's organisers stressed that there was no public data in Brazil, different from what happened in advanced democracies, such as France, the UK and the US.[2] However, government officials or representatives from the military who attended remained silent, indicating either disinterest or scepticism on discussions about this topic held outside government structures.

[1] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM-Institucional. I Seminário sobre indústria de material de emprego militar: apresentação introdutória. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DIPROC/054, 12 May 1987.
[2] Ibidem.

After being dealt with in the late 1980s, there is no evidence of discussions on Brazilian arms exports in civil society for a few years. This was probably caused by a combination of two factors: a severe political and economic crisis in the early 1990s, and a decrease in Brazil's participation in the international arms market.

This topic was addressed again in the late 1990s, when Viva Rio, a CSO based in Rio de Janeiro, raised concerns about the consequences of Brazilian arms exports to neighbouring countries. Legally exported weapons, it argued, were being re-exported to Brazil via the black market, fuelling violence in Brazil (Dreyfus et al., 2005, p. 103). This grew later into campaigns stressing the responsibility of Brazil towards 'distant strangers'. This gained momentum during Lula's second term (2007-2010), when policies to boost the military sector and support arms exports were expanded. Four CSOs in Brazil stand out as campaigners: Conectas, Igarapé Institute, Sou da Paz and Viva Rio. The latter two aimed originally at fighting against urban violence in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The former two have had an international approach to arms exports since their foundation. They are briefly described in the next paragraphs.

Viva Rio was founded in 1993 by a group of students and academics after two massacres in Rio: *i*) Candelária Massacre, in July 1993, when a group of police officers and civilians murdered eight homeless people (most of them children or teenagers) sleeping outside a church; and *ii*) Vigário Geral Massacre, in August 1993, when a group of about 35 police officers randomly executed 21 people in the neighbourhood of Vigário Geral. Viva Rio initially dealt with domestic arms control, broadening its scope over the following years. In the early 2000s, it was influential in the creation of an arms control law in Brazil, known as Disarmament Statute, approved in 2003. Regarding external actions, Viva Rio stressed the impact of weapons exported to Paraguay on levels of violence in Brazil, as

these weapons were reintroduced in Brazil via the black market. Also, Viva Rio is part of IANSA, having been accredited to sessions of the Preparatory Committee of the ATT Conference (PrepCom) and the July 2012 ATT Conference (United Nations 2012). It has also activities in Haiti, running a project created after an invitation by the Brazilian Army, which in 2004 started leading the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Minustah).[3]

Instituto Sou da Paz was founded as a campaign in São Paulo in 1997 by law students from the University of São Paulo, aiming at promoting a culture of peaceful resolution of disputes and encouraging people not to have guns (Instituto Sou da Paz, 2009, p. 36). That campaign was turned into a CSO in 1999. Initially, it organised street demonstrations claiming for peace, focusing later on the creation of the Disarmament Statute (Instituto Sou da Paz, 2009, p. 36). Regarding external actions, Sou da Paz is part of IANSA and was the most active Brazilian CSO in the process leading to the creation of the ATT.

Conectas was founded in São Paulo in 2001 and deals mainly with three issues: *i*) south-south cooperation; *ii*) foreign policy and human rights; and *iii*) justice (Conectas 2016). On foreign affairs, it promotes cooperation among countries in the global south and lobbies Brazilian institutions to have a stronger stance on human rights when conducting activities abroad. Also, it seeks to change government policies on arms control. Different from Viva Rio and Sou da Paz, Conectas started working with international arms control without working with domestic arms control.

Igarapé Institute is a hybrid of think-tank and CSO, similar to Saferworld in the UK. It was founded in 2011 in Rio de Janeiro and deals with security issues, sustainable

[3] Interview; Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 26 Aug 2016.

development and global networks (Instituto Igarapé 2015). Among its activities on security, it deals with policies on arms control, both domestic and external. In 2013, it created the Mapping Arms Data (MAD), a dataset showing international flows of small arms and ammunition.[4]

Do they have an impact on the government behaviour on arms exports? Although even members of CSOs see either little or no influence, evidence shows that this is not true. This incorrect evaluation is due in part to what is considered to be a success. This topic is explored in the next sections, looking at different ways in which CSOs frame arms exports as a problem.

The 'boomerang' of arms exports: the problem of SALW re-exports to Brazil

CSOs in Brazil argue that arms exports should be better controlled because weapons are sometimes re-exported to Brazil via the black market. This is the framing in which CSOs have the most influence, with policies in Brazil and neighbouring countries having changed because of their activities.

The problem of re-exports was initially discussed in 1985, when the secretary of the National Security Council, general Rubens Denis (1985-90), and the minister of Justice, Fernando Soares Lyra (1985-86), sent a letter to the Brazilian president expressing the need to better control arms exports. They suggested that Brazilian weapons should not be exported to neighbouring countries if the destination was close to the border.[5] There is no evidence, however, that changes were introduced.

[4] Available at: http://nisatapps.prio.org/armsglobe/index.php.

[5] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM – Universo II (box 665.16, antecedentes). Letter to the president of the republic, 29 May 1985.

This issue was dealt with again in the late 1990s by Viva Rio. Although Viva Rio started with a local approach to arms control, aimed at reducing gun violence in Rio, it progressively adopted a broader perspective. In 1999, when doing research on the origin of firearms confiscated by Rio's police, members of Viva Rio found that some of them had been manufactured in Brazil, later exported to Paraguay, and then reintroduced into Brazil (Folha de São Paulo 1999). As evidence of Viva Rio's influence, the Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) invited members from Viva Rio to discuss possible ways of addressing the problem of violence. Two representatives of Viva Rio (Antonio Rangel, a former chief of staff in a federal department, and Pablo Dreyfus, a researcher) stressed to Fernando Henrique that arms control had not only a domestic but also an international dimension. They argued that porous Brazilian borders facilitated the inflow of weapons from abroad, especially from Paraguay, and that exported weapons were being reintroduced into Brazil by criminals.[6] As a result, Fernando Henrique created a committee to discuss the problem with the Paraguayan government. The committee was headed by Pedro Parente, chief of staff of the presidency (*Casa Civil*), and composed by Euclides Scalco, head of *Itaipu Binacional* (a Brazilian-Paraguayan energy company), representatives from Sou da Paz and Viva Rio, among others. After discussions with officials in Paraguay, the Paraguayan government suspended for three years arms imports from Brazil.[7]

This puts into perspective models in which CSOs are outsiders, only *pressuring* governments to change their behaviour. Rather, relations between CSOs and governments

[6] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016. In 1996, the then-minister of Justice, Nelson Jobim, asked the US government to suspend exports of small arms to Paraguay, as they were being smuggled into Brazil. The US government suspended them based on that request.
[7] Ibidem.

can be either supplementary, complementary or adversarial, depending on the situation (D. R. Young 2000). They are in a continuum from completely adversarial to perfectly cooperative. In the case analysed here, relations were cooperative: there was a learning process for both Viva Rio and the government concerning how the arms trade fuelled violence. Moreover, the idea of working *with* rather than *against* governments is part of Viva Rio's identity since its foundation. Viva Rio sought to move beyond an opposition between 'right-wing' attitudes to public safety policies (pro-repression, pro-death penalty) and 'left-wing' attitudes (police perceived as a tool of the ruling class). It seeks, for example, to reform the police in Rio, turning it into a democratic force, rather than only criticizing it.[8]

This case also suggests that CSOs can succeed by coordinating diffuse interests or attitudes in situations in which people, individually, have little incentive to mobilise. Regarding arms control, incentives to mobilise are stronger for arms manufacturers and some government departments because benefits are concentrated on them, while costs are diffused throughout society. Following the typology of James Wilson (Wilson 1980), CSOs play the role of policy entrepreneurs. This was analysed by Daniel Cerqueira, researcher working with violence prevention at the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea), a government-led think tank in Brazil:

> Societies have diffuse interests. Regarding weapons, some people think that they are good while others think that they are bad. NGOs somehow manage to catalyse these perceptions. And they operate with organisation, doing lobbying in the Congress, campaigns, doing research. In Brazil, without NGOs, discussions on firearms would be very fragile. For example, a researcher from Unicamp [University of Campinas] and I had the idea of writing a manifesto of scientists and researchers on the issue of arms

[8] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.

> control. When members of Viva Rio and Sou da Paz joined us, they amplified that idea. They have a strong lobby in Congress and can mobilize several people within Congress.[9]

After members from the abovementioned committee (involving Viva Rio and others) went to Paraguay, researchers from Viva Rio remained in Paraguay to further investigate the problem, identifying how easy it was to buy Brazilian weapons and bring them back to Brazil. They found that 98% of documents presented in Paraguay as a requirement to buy weapons were counterfeited.[10] According to Ignacio Cano, former researcher at Viva Rio, Brazilian companies were aware of this, using exports to Paraguay to meet the domestic demand in Brazil for certain types of weapons:

> Brazilian companies were using exports to circumvent domestic law in Brazil. For example, 9 mm pistols could be used only by the armed forces. However, Brazilian-manufactured 9 mm pistols were found in Rio with criminals. Those weapons had been exported to neighbouring countries – mainly Paraguay – and later came back to Brazil.[11]

The realization of this problem led to changes in the Brazilian arms export policy. In 2000, the federal decree 3,658 created a 150%-tariff on arms exports to most Latin American and Caribbean countries, making them uneconomical.[12] Although there was no evidence of Brazilian weapons being re-exported from Central America and the Caribbean, they were also included in the decree. This indicates that the tariff was also motivated by potential impacts on other countries rather than only on Brazil. Furthermore, as

[9] Interview: Daniel Cerqueira, Rio de Janeiro, 25 Aug 2016.
[10] Ibidem.
[11] Interview: Ignacio Cano, Rio de Janeiro, 24 Aug 2016.
[12] This was later detailed by Resolution 17/CAMEX, 6 June 2001, which waived this tariff for exports to police forces and the military (Pimenta 2006, 214–15).The tariff is not applied to exports to Argentina, Chile and Ecuador.

counterfeited documents were used to buy weapons, another change was introduced: Brazilian customers in Paraguay would need to have documents validated at the local Brazilian consulate before being allowed to buy weapons.[13]

This issue was once more discussed in 2005-06, during investigations conducted by a parliamentary committee of inquiry (*Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito* – CPI), known as *CPI das Armas*, which focused on arms trafficking and criminal organizations. During the investigations, the secretary of public safety of Paraná (a state bordering Paraguay), Luiz Fernando Delazari, said that about 90% of weapons smuggled from Paraguay were Brazilian-manufactured, emphasising the involvement of senior police officers (Pimenta, 2006, p. 123). A representative from Rio de Janeiro's state police, colonel Gilson Pitta Lopes (who would later be its commander), estimated that 2/3 of weapons smuggled to Brazil came from Paraguay (Pimenta, 2006, p. 123). The CPI then asked Rio de Janeiro's police to trace the origin of about 10,000 weapons confiscated in the period 1997-2003. The result was that 86% of those weapons had been manufactured in Brazil, from which 11% had been smuggled from Paraguay (Pimenta, 2006, p. 123). Although figures diverged, it was possible for the CPI to conclude that buying weapons in Paraguay and bringing them back to Brazil was easy, with no effective control to prevent it (Pimenta, 2006, p. 123).

CPI das Armas' final reports were influenced by Viva Rio. Two people invited to talk during the CPI were Viva Rio's members. Also, a CPI's report cited that researchers from Viva Rio had investigated the problem again, concluding that the number of Brazilian weapons illegally sold in Paraguay had decreased since the early 2000s (Pimenta, 2006, p. 123). This contributed to the maintenance of the 150%-tariff on arms exports. Moreover,

[13] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.

Antonio Rangel and Pablo Dreyfus were the ghost-writers of one of the CPI's subcommittee reports, officially authored by Raul Jungmann, who chaired the subcommittee (and who later became minister of defence).[14]

CSOs influenced policies also on other countries. As abovementioned, Paraguay suspended arms imports from Brazil. Moreover, campaigns led to policy changes in Argentina, which occurred after a public destruction of guns in Rio de Janeiro in 2002. As some of those guns had been manufactured abroad (including in Argentina), Rio de Janeiro's state government invited representatives from foreign missions in Brazil to watch the gun destruction. The governor of Rio, Benedita da Silva (2002), formally asked them to investigate how those guns ended up with criminals in Brazil. In Argentina, a CPI was created by the National Congress to investigate it, finding that military personnel in Argentina had sold grenades and guns – supposed to be destroyed – to police officers in Brazil involved with the organized crime.[15]

This framing remains in CSOs' activities, focusing now on keeping the 150%-tariff on exports. The tariff remains despite pressures from Abimde, Comdefesa/Fiesp, individual companies and the Ministry of Defence, which lobby to suspend it. The Ministry of Defence started lobbying for this in 2001, arguing that the tariff damaged the Brazilian weapons industry. In 2006, it requested Camex to suspend it, which did not happen.[16] This tariff remained even after 2007, when Lula's government introduced a set of policies to support arms exports.

[14] Ibidem.
[15] Ibidem.
[16] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM 2006 (box 127). GT de avaliação da incidência do imposto de exportação sobre armas e munições, 20 Jul 2006.

As additional evidence of CSOs' influence, general Aderico Mattioli – described by other officials as influential on arms export issues – expressed concerns on CSOs' activities. According to him, the 150%-tariff was based on a decision by Camex, in which the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are members. These two ministries would be, according to him, influenced by NGOs, such as Viva Rio and Sou da Paz.[17] In 2010, the tariff was made more flexible through the Resolution 88/2010 (Camex), which suspended the tariff in the case of weapons and ammunition whose use is allowed in Brazil, and as long as they had marks to allow traceability.[18] Although this decision was a step back from CSOs' point of view, the fact that associations of companies and the Ministry of Defence kept lobbying for the elimination of the tariff implies that they were still unhappy with the policy.

Viva Rio engaged not only with the government but also with other actors, becoming the hub of a domestic advocacy network involving various sectors of society. It conducted large campaigns and frequently used the media to further its agenda. This was facilitated by its access to the largest mass media group in Brazil: *Organizações Globo* (called *Grupo Globo* since 2014). According to Antonio Rangel, this was possible because *Globo*'s head, the media mogul Roberto Marinho, 'hated two things: gambling and guns; although I have no idea why he did, this allowed us to promote our agenda'.[19] Campaigns to reduce the stock of weapons in Brazil and impose a stricter control on their trade were supported by various TV artists and, in 2003, featured in one of *Globo*'s soap operas, watched by a substantial part of Brazil's population.

[17] Interview: Aderico Mattioli, Brasília, 28 Mar 2017.

[18] Available at: http://www.camex.itamaraty.gov.br/component/content/article/62-resolucoes-da-camex/em-vigor/896-resolucao-n-88-de-14-de-dezembro-de-2010.

[19] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.

In summary, a relatively small CSO, in which an even smaller group worked with arms exports, changed a government policy, despite opposition from actors with far more resources. Also, this case demonstrates that CSOs can cooperate with some government departments but not with others. Although the 150%-tariff was created because of cooperative relations with the presidency and was kept because of good relations with a few parliamentarians, the Ministry of Defence sought to abolish it.

Moreover, this case indicates that a perceived lack of influence from CSOs in Brazil might be based on framings used in developed countries, where the need to control arms exports to countries in conflict or violating human rights is central. Yet the perception that CSOs in Brazil do not have influence when exports are framed in this way is inaccurate. As explored in the next section, CSOs can influence government behaviour also when using this framing.

Sales to 'irresponsible' governments: how an advocacy network was formed in Brazil

Some CSOs in Brazil stress that arms exports should be better controlled because customers might use them for domestic repression or to escalate conflicts. In this way, they emphasise the need to protect people in *other* nations from violence and arbitrariness from *their* governments. This is part of a broader perspective of humanitarian CSOs, according to which human rights should be an integral part of Brazilian foreign policy, and they should prevail over developmentalism and south-south ties.

A tension between human rights and developmentalism/south-south ties is present in the decision-making concerning various foreign policy issues. For example, in the 2000s, Brazil abstained on various resolutions regarding human rights in Iran, putting south-south

ties first, which was criticized by Conectas, a Brazilian human rights CSO. According to Sérgio Florêncio, Brazil's ambassador to UN institutions in Geneva (2006-09), Conectas was very active, attending meetings in Geneva and pressuring Brazil not to vote alongside human rights violators, such as Iran, Syria and Venezuela. As evidence of influence, Sérgio Florêncio said that he alluded to Conectas' pressures within Itamaraty when arguing that Brazil should not abstain regarding resolutions on human rights in Iran.[20]

Regarding arms exports, this framing was present in the creation of the 150%-tariff examined in the last subsection, introduced in 2000 due to activities from Viva Rio. Although this tariff's main goal was to prevent re-exports to Brazil, it was extended also to countries where there was no evidence of this problem, as those in Central America and the Caribbean. The tariff was extended to these countries for humanitarian reasons rather than because of a risk that weapons could be reintroduced into Brazil. This indicates that concerns about impacts on people in other countries also motivated Viva Rio's work.

What happened over the following years was the formation of an advocacy network, including CSOs, experts, independent activists, journalists and some sectors of the government. After 2007, when Brazil had a boost in its defence sector, this network expanded, seeking to draw attention to the negative consequences of that process, as well as to the hypocrisy of Lula's and Dilma Rousseff's administrations. This network was a counterweight to another network, analysed by Dagnino (2010), which advocated the need to boost the military sector in Brazil, including the need of policies regarding the production and trade of weapons.

[20] Interview: Sérgio Florêncio, Brasília, 22 and 24 Mar 2017.

The first CSO in Brazil to deal specifically with the negative impacts of Brazilian arms exports on other countries was Sou da Paz, around the mid-2000s. According to Natália Pollachi, from Sou da Paz:

> Sou da Paz realized there was need for more activism, and as we already dealt with this domestically, it was not hard to expand it into international campaigns. [...]. Furthermore, Sou da Paz had consolidated its position because of the Disarmament Statute of 2003. It was also a context in which international discussions on specific weapons (such as landmines and cluster munitions) was expanded into discussions on small arms and light weapons, a topic that was dealt with by Sou da Paz.[21]

Sou da Paz stresses that the decision-making on arms exports in Brazil is inadequate. According to Natália Pollachi, the Brazilian government's risk assessment considers only impacts on Brazil and neighbouring countries, something that should change.[22] This reflects a perspective that is different from the one examined in the last section, as it looks at the Brazilian government's responsibility towards *other* peoples.

Sou da Paz started dealing with arms exports *after* working with domestic arms control, as it happened also in the case of Viva Rio. Campaigns on gun control drew attention from organisations in other countries, especially during discussions on the Disarmament Statute (2003) and the Firearms and Ammunition Referendum (2005). Consequently, Sou da Paz was invited to various events, some of them under the UN Programme of Action (PoA) and the Control Arms Campaign. This allowed it to join a network of CSOs discussing how to improve control on international arms transfers.[23] The topic of arms control was therefore introduced from *within* Sou da Paz. Although there was

[21] Interview: Natália Pollachi, São Paulo, 5 Sep 2016.
[22] Ibidem.
[23] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 27 Sep 2017.

influence in the form of ideas, norms and practices from international organisations and 'northern' CSOs, this complemented rather than radically altered what it was already doing.

Igarapé Institute is also part of this network, seeking to promote a stricter control on Brazil's arms exports. According to Robert Muggah, Igarapé was founded when Brazil's voice on arms control had disappeared. According to him, that was caused mainly by the result of the Firearms and Ammunition Referendum (2005), in which Brazilian voters rejected a prohibition of domestic sales of weapons.[24] One of Igarapé's first initiatives was to create a platform to visualize international arms transfers, designed in partnership with Google and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). According to Muggah, that was done 'specifically to try to re-energize the role of Brazilian organisations in the global debate'.[25] This database is called Mapping Arms Data (MAD), showing international transfers of SALW and ammunition since 1992 (Instituto Igarapé 2014). Therefore, Igarapé Institute sought to reintroduce Brazil in international discussions by stressing that, through the arms trade, Brazil was both exporting and importing violence.

Members of Igarapé voiced concerns through the press as well. In an article for *El País*, Muggah stressed that Brazilian weapons were used by Saudi Arabia in Yemen (Muggah 2015). Later, in an article for *The New York Times*, Muggah and Nathan Thompson cited a case in which Forjas Taurus, a Brazilian weapons-manufacturer, sold weapons to a famous Yemeni arms trafficker, Fares Mohameed Mana'a (Muggah and Thompson 2016). According to an investigation by the Federal Police (*Polícia Federal*) and the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (*Ministério Público Federal*), contacts between Taurus and Mana'a

[24] Interview: Robert Muggah, Rio de Janeiro, 25 Aug 2016.
[25] Ibidem.

started in 2007. In one of the episodes involving the relationship, the Brazilian government authorized exports of 8,000 handguns to the government of Djibouti in 2013, which were later retransferred to Mana'a (Paraguassu 2016a; 2016b).

Two diplomats at the federal government, however, criticized Igarapé's comments on this case, stressing that no system can completely prevent arms trafficking. They argued that Itamaraty authorized the deal because there was an end-user certificate issued by Djibouti, on which there were no arms export restrictions. One of the diplomats argued that CSOs in Brazil frequently engage in speculation concerning arms exports, with almost no base on facts.[26] Yet, after this episode, the Brazilian government changed its policy on Djibouti, which from then on was considered not trustworthy.[27]

Conectas works with arms export issues as part of a broader aim to monitor humanitarian impacts of activities by Brazilian institutions abroad, both public and private.[28] Therefore, Conectas looks at arms exports from a foreign policy's point of view, different from Viva Rio and Sou da Paz, which started looking at Brazilian arms exports *after* working with domestic arms control.[29] Conectas started working with this in 2011 – with more emphasis from 2013 – in part because of the creation of the ATT. This implies that international treaties may not only be created because of CSOs' pressures but also lead to an increase in their activities. Simmons (2009, pp. 165–169) drew attention to this, showing that local membership in CSOs increased after ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).[30]

[26] Interview: interviewee 16 (civil servant), Brasília, 27 Mar 2017.
[27] Interviews with civil servants, Brasília: interviewee 12, 27 Mar 2017; interviewee 16, 27 Mar 2017.
[28] Interview: Jefferson Nascimento, São Paulo, 16 Sep 2016.
[29] Ibidem.
[30] This topic is explored further in the next chapter.

As evidence of more than just atomized groups campaigning, CSOs in Brazil work in coalitions. Conectas and four other CSOs (Igarapé, Sou da Paz, Dhesarme and Amnesty-Brazil) formed in May 2016 the Coalition for Responsible Arms Exports (*Coalizão pela Exportação Responsável de Armas*). They launched a popular petition to pressure the National Congress to ratify the ATT, arguing that this would restrict access to weapons to places in conflict or where human rights were violated (Instituto Sou da Paz 2016). They cited, in particular, that Brazilian weapons had been used in conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire and Yemen (Anistia Internacional 2016).

Under this framing, CSOs frequently use the press to further their agenda. Reports on the arms-trafficking case involving Taurus were published in *Época* (part of *Grupo Globo*), for example. Also, one of Rio de Janeiro's largest newspapers, *O Globo* (also part of *Grupo Globo*), has an editorial stance of support for a stricter national and international arms control.[31] All the other major media outlets in Brazil also adopt a critical approach on arms exports, regardless of having conservative or liberal editorial positions. This includes those affiliated to *Grupo Globo* (such as *Época* and *O Globo*), *BBC Brasil* (Idoeta 2018), *El País-Brasil* (Alessi 2018), *IstoÉ* (Caetano 2017), *Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil* (Oliveira and Goulart 2017), *O Estado de São Paulo* (Chade 2017), *R7* (Guerra 2012), and *Zero Hora* (Lopes 2018). Rather than a mere transmission belt for activists' agenda, however, investigative journalists created pressure on the Brazilian government to be more responsible. Although not necessarily aware of this, they are in practice part of the advocacy network created by the abovementioned CSOs. The irresponsibility of Brazil in selling weapons to places in conflict or authoritarian governments have been stressed by

[31] Interview: Robert Muggah, Rio de Janeiro, 25 Aug 2016.

Rubens Valente, from *Folha de São Paulo* (Valente 2012), Solano Nascimento, from *Correio Braziliense* (Nascimento 2010, 6), as well as in an extensive report published by *Agência Pública* (Viana and Santini 2012). Rubens Valente is one of the most prominent journalists covering this issue in Brazil, looking at Brazilian arms sales since the late 1990s. He argued that Brazil's hypocrisy did not start during the Lula or Dilma years. The government of Fernando Henrique exported cluster munitions to Zimbabwe, for example, while seeking to project Brazil as a liberal, modern and peaceful country.[32] Solano Nascimento sought to stress how Brazil fuelled conflicts, drawing attention to how this diverged from a common perception of Brazil as a peaceful country in its foreign relations.[33] The report by *Agência Pública* emphasised that the Brazilian government actively supported the arms production and trade, having authorized sales to authoritarian regimes, including those in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

What is the impact of activities conducted by these CSOs and the advocacy network they are part of? There is a common perception of lack of influence even among members of CSOs. For Antonio Rangel, from Viva Rio, his organization is not able to influence Brazilian arms export policy. This happens, according to him, because decisions on arms exports are in practice taken by the Brazilian military, with no influence even from other government departments:

> In theory, exports must be cleared by ministries dealing with economic issues and also by Itamaraty. [...] In practice, however, they do not have power. The Army sends the paperwork and others only endorse it. Although Itamaraty has an excellent staff, there are only newly-trained diplomats in the area of weapons. [...]. This is because they will not waste time with something that is controlled by the Army. [...] These are niches

[32] Interview: Rubens Valente, Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[33] Interview: Solano Nascimento, Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.

that remain under the Armed Forces' control, and that the civilians who have power do not change.[34]

Antonio Rangel argued also that economic aspects are dominant in decisions because of collusion between the Army and industry. He cited as evidence that the former head of the Brazilian Army's department in charge of controlling arms production joined the board of CBC – the largest ammo-manufacturer in Brazil – after retiring. For him, 'the sector in charge of controlling weapons is complicit to the arms and ammunition industry.'[35] Rubens Valente, investigative journalist from *Folha de São Paulo*, also argued that there is collusion between government sectors and defence companies, which use the 'protection of the national interest' as an excuse to keep information hidden from the public. He argued that a similar rationale was used by Petrobras, a state-owned company, in its relations with construction companies, a type of collusion that led to Operation Car Wash (*Operação Lava-Jato*), the largest corruption investigation in Brazil's history.[36] If this is true, control on arms exports in Brazil is in a situation of regulatory capture, in which the agency in charge of regulating a sector is controlled by an interest group. Furthermore, as this agency controls both the creation and implementation of policies, there would be no other veto players to check it.

The depiction of a complete control by the military, however, is not accurate. Evidence shows that Itamaraty is a veto player on decisions over arms deals, indirectly implying a larger space for CSOs' influence, as they have more access to diplomats than to the military. In Brazil, companies need Itamaraty's authorization to start negotiations with

[34] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.
[35] Ibidem.
[36] Interview: Rubens Valente, Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.

potential customers. As evidence of its veto power, some requests are not authorized. I have analysed documents from Itamaraty showing responses to companies' requests to negotiate. Itamaraty's position is either *yes* (authorizing an arms deal) or *no* (rejecting it), with usually a brief explanation in the case of a negative response. Two samples of documents have been consulted: replies to the company CBC in the period 1989-92; and replies to all companies in the period September 2011 – June 2012.[37] In the first sample, of 57 requests, exports were not authorized by Itamaraty in five: Cuba, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali and Israel. In the second sample, of 103 requests, negotiations were not authorized in eight: for the company Taurus, with Egypt, Libya, South Sudan and Yemen; for CBC, with Israel and Libya; and for the company AEQ, with Uganda. Negotiations were not authorized because customers were perceived by Itamaraty as either non-reliable or irresponsible (although this language was not used). Other cases of rejection were cited by Rosauro Bernardo, in charge of promoting and overseeing exports at Imbel, a state-owned arms-manufacturing company: sales to Sudan, for example, were vetoed by Itamaraty due to humanitarian concerns.[38] Furthermore, some requests were probably not made because companies predicted a negative response. As Taurus was not authorized to negotiate with Libya, for example, other companies probably did not try similar requests. Also, some requests were probably not made because of the 150%-tariff on exports.

A question remains, however: do CSOs have influence on arms exports to countries perceived as irresponsible? Evidence shows that they do, although to a limited extent. Among the ways in which influence happens, CSOs might alter strategic calculations of the

[37] Itamaraty's archives: PNEMEM, various folders. I am indebted to David Magalhães and Rubens Valente for helping with this.
[38] Interview: Rosauro Bernardo, Brasília, 18 Apr 2017

government, thereby influencing its behaviour. Although not formalised in publicly-available policies, issues regarding Brazil's reputation, image or prestige, as well as humanitarian concerns, are in practice considered in the decision-making. A Brazilian diplomat argued that Itamaraty's main concern is on potential impacts of arms deals on Brazil's image. Itamaraty does not want to have Brazil pointed out as irresponsible, providing weapons used to violate human rights or escalate conflicts.[39] As CSOs frequently denounce the irresponsibility of Brazil regarding arms exports, there is a deterrence effect on government's behaviour.

Influence has been observed also in individual arms transfer deals. One of the cases concerned Mozambique, to where the Brazilian Air Force decided in 2013 to donate three aircraft EMB-312 Tucano. In October 2013, however, the Mozambican National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* – Renamo) declared that it was retaking armed activities. Although Itamaraty expressed concerns on the situation in Mozambique, the Ministry of Defence asked the National Congress for authorization to transfer the aircraft. The CSO Conectas was informed of this by a Mozambican CSO, the Mozambican Human Rights League (*Liga Moçambicana de Direitos Humanos*).[40] Both organisations arranged meetings with Itamaraty and parliamentarians in Brasília to express that the transfer was not adequate. This led to a change in the process for authorizing it, whose final document included the following text:

> The Mozambican Human Rights League and Conectas have expressed concern that, given a lack of information on the use that might be made of aircraft donated by Brazil,

[39] Interview: interviewee 11, civil servant), Brasília, 29 Mar 2017.

[40] Interview: Jefferson Nascimento, São Paulo, 16 Sep 2016; (Asano and Nascimento, 2016); (Conectas and Liga Moçambicana de Direitos Humanos, 2013).

> their potential use in war could escalate a growing political and military tension in Mozambique. (Câmara dos Deputados 2013).

In the same document, it was said that the aircraft should 'be used exclusively for pilot instruction and training activities' (Câmara dos Deputados 2013), included because of CSOs' pressures.[41] Another case was cited by general Aderico Mattioli, who said that a contract to supply less lethal weapons to Bahrain was suspended because of their use to repress protesters, in spite of financial losses for Condor, the manufacturing company. According to him, this happened because of CSOs' campaigns, something that he saw as worrying.[42]

Changes have also been observed in how the government deals with campaigns. Although some government departments are critical of CSOs' work, others are willing to keep a dialogue, especially diplomats in some sectors of Itamaraty and parliamentarians. Even in the Ministry of Defence, these changes might be occurring. For example, when Rubens Valente, from *Folha de São Paulo*, requested information on arms sales, he was informed by the Ministry of Defence that requests from human rights CSOs were more likely to have a positive response than from the press.[43]

Rather than changing behaviour only for strategic reasons, cognitive changes also occur. Two diplomats at Itamaraty stressed that CSOs do an important work, especially in the National Congress, articulating an agenda that some diplomats at Itamaraty want to introduce but that, for institutional reasons, they cannot. Also, some diplomats are in

[41] The decision changed later: in 2017, the Chamber of Deputies suspended the transfer after a request by the Executive. Officially, the Brazilian Air Force expressed interest in keeping the aircraft, and use them for training (Ministério da Defesa 2016; Câmara dos Deputados 2017).
[42] Interview: Aderico Mattioli, Brasília, 28 Mar 2017.
[43] Interview: Rubens Valente, Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.

contact with CSOs and frequently share similar ideas about the appropriateness of Brazil's positions regarding arms exports.[44] One of these diplomats, for example, stressed that he rejected a request to export small arms to Rwanda in the mid-2000s when he remembered what Kofi Annan had once said: that SALW were the real weapons of mass destruction.[45] Rosauro Bernardo, from the arms-manufacturing company Imbel, expressed that Brazil should be more cautious when selling weapons to Egypt due to the situation of conflict in the country.[46]

Furthermore, CSOs' campaigns create incentives for governments and companies to be more secretive when negotiating arms deals. Although this is considered a failure from CSOs' point of view, it is an outcome of their activities. According to Maura Curci, from Comdefesa/Fiesp, the defence industry tends to be discreet because they do not want to draw attention from CSOs. Fiesp's president, Paulo Skaf (2004-), does not talk about this area in public, emphasizing Fiesp's activities in other sectors. This suggests that representatives of the arms industry take CSOs' activities into account.[47]

Their activities also create pressure on government departments and among companies to produce counter-narratives. These narratives emphasise positive impacts of arms exports on development and how they contribute to national security. This was pointed out by Ignacio Cano, an academic who worked at Viva Rio, for whom a 'nationalist' perspective regarding arms exports is the main factor behind the difficulty of CSOs in influencing the government.[48] Another possibility is to emphasize the 'benign'

[44] Interviews with civil servants, Brasília: interviewee 13, 31 Mar 2017; interviewee 15, 31 Mar 2017.
[45] Ibidem.
[46] Interview: Rosauro Bernardo, Brasília, 18 Apr 2017
[47] Interview: Maura Curci, São Paulo, 22 Sep 2016.
[48] Interview: Ignacio Cano, Rio de Janeiro, 24 Aug 2016.

characteristics of defence products. Michele Candeloro, from Apex, stressed that some defence items are used to protect lives, such as anti-drone systems, certain types of armour, police body cameras, and refugee shelters, all developed by Brazilian companies.[49] She cited a case in which a Brazilian company that exported less lethal products to a country in Africa provided training on use of force continuum.[50] Paulo Albuquerque, from Abimde, emphasised a study by the Institute of Economic Research Foundation (*Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas* – FIPE), a research institute in Brazil, showing the contribution of the military sector to Brazil's GDP.[51] Although there is not necessarily a link between CSOs' campaigns and these counter-narratives, stressing the 'positive' side of defence products is used to contain critics of arms exports.

In summary, CSOs have introduced this topic in Brazil, and have had some influence when arms are exported to 'irresponsible' countries. Also, CSOs and government worked together in a few cases. Conectas, for example, provided help to parliamentarians in the agreement to donate weapons to Mozambique, as well as during the ATT ratification process (examined in the next chapter). Furthermore, evidence suggests that humanitarian concerns have become embedded in some government departments, such as at Itamaraty's DDS.

Transparency in arms exports

CSOs and other actors in Brazil also criticize the government for its lack of transparency. They argue that information is either not public or misclassified, which they find

[49] This paragraph does not exercise value judgement on these narratives, as products considered by many as 'defence' items might indeed contribute to save lives in certain situations.
[50] Interview: Michele Candeloro, Brasília, 24 Apr 2017.
[51] Interview: Paulo Albuquerque, London, 12 Sep 2017. The study is available at: FIPE (2015).

problematic for at least two reasons. First, this prevents good assessments of the extent to which Brazilian weapons are re-exported to Brazil, as information on countries importing weapons from Brazil is not available. Second, it is not possible to evaluate the extent to which the behaviour of Brazil on arms exports is responsible.

Data manipulation is common practice at least since the 1970s. According to Roberto Godoy, journalist from *O Estado de São Paulo*, 'when Cascavel armoured-cars were exported to what some people would today call the axis of evil [Iraq and Libya], they were described as sales of nine tons of metal plates or 90 mm pipes, rather than weapons'.[52] In 1979, journalists from *Folha de São Paulo* witnessed 30 armoured cars manufactured by Engesa being loaded on ships in Santos, which were destined to Iraq, although they were officially classified generically as 'equipment' (Folha de São Paulo 1979c).[53] This problem was also pointed out in the late 1980s by academics, who stressed that data on arms exports was inexistent or manipulated. In a seminar in 1987, it was cited that exports of tanks were classified as transport equipment to not draw attention to the arms industry.[54] Also, it was argued that subsidies to the weapons industry were implemented with no evidence of economic benefits, and that decisions to create them were not transparent: 'an industrial sector, a government policy, cannot be controlled through secret instruments. Relations between the military, society and the armaments sector should be transparent'.[55]

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[52] Interview: Roberto Godoy, São Paulo, 15 Sep 2016.

[53] This practice is observed also in other countries. In the early 1980s, for example, Chile imported components for tanks from MOWAG, a Swiss company, which were officially registered as 'parts of transport motor vehicles'. Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM Chile. MRE, MSG OF 00727. Promoção comercial. Chile. Comércio de Material de Emprego Militar, 17 Aug 1984.

[54] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM-Institucional. A indústria de armamentos no Brasil, by Heitor Caulliraux and Domício Proença Júnior. DIPROC/054, Apr 1987.

[55] Ibidem.

However, this practice is adopted in certain situations because customers – rather than governments of arms exporting countries – want to keep secrecy. In 1979, after negotiating sales of tanks to Iraq, the Iraq's ambassador to Brazil said that negotiations had concerned sales of 'equipment, vehicles and machines'. A newspaper in Brazil later gave details about arms exports to Iraq, however, leading the Iraqi government to ask Brazil to be more discreet (Folha de São Paulo 1979a). As a result, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Saraiva Guerreiro (1979-85), asked the head of the National Security Council to meet representatives from all government agencies dealing with arms exports, in an effort to attend to Iraq's request.[56]

A lack of transparency is criticized by all Brazilian CSOs examined in this thesis. Antonio Rangel, from Viva Rio, criticized the fact that pistols and revolvers are commonly classified as hunting weapons, which makes Brazil look like a more responsible exporter than it is.[57] This was discovered by researchers at Viva Rio after they examined US government's data about imported weapons. They found that US imports of pistols and revolvers from Brazil equalled the declared value of hunting rifles exported by Brazil to the US.[58] This was cited in *CPI das Armas*' report, after the Brazilian Army admitted that pistols and revolvers were classified as hunting weapons (Jungmann 2006). Although secrecy in the abovementioned case of Iraq was motivated by a request from the importer, this of course did not happen with exports to the US, in which the decision to misclassify exports was made by the Brazilian government.

[56] Ibidem.
[57] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.
[58] Ibidem; Dreyfus et al. (2010, pp. 71–75).

Sou da Paz argues that Brazil is one of the least transparent countries in the world concerning arms exports (Instituto Sou da Paz 2014d). Also, it argues that a lack of transparency indicates that decisions to export weapons are based mainly on commercial factors, rather than humanitarian aspects (Instituto Sou da Paz 2014d). According to Natália Pollachi, from Sou da Paz, 'PNEMEM is secret […]. The arms export policy is not open, there is no clarity on which criteria are used to authorize arms exports'.[59]

Conectas is another CSO criticizing the Brazilian government, having cited that Brazil was the 43rd in levels of transparency in the world, behind countries like Russia and Pakistan. Moreover, it stresses that the Brazilian policy is based on secret legislation from 1974 (the PNEMEM), making hard to know which criteria are used by the government to make decisions on arms exports (Coalizão pela Exportação Responsável de Armas 2016).

Members of Igarapé Institute also criticize Brazil's lack of transparency, emphasising that Brazil is one of the least transparent countries in the world. In their words: 'Brazil's arms export policies are maddeningly non-transparent, lacking adequate oversight and mechanisms to ensure that the people who use the weapons comply with international law' (Muggah and Thompson 2016). In another press article, they stressed that, although changes were introduced in 1981, 1983, 1990 and 1993, none increased transparency (Muggah 2016).

Lack of transparency was also criticized by journalists in various reports in the press, including those by Rubens Valente (Valente 2012), Solano Nascimento (Nascimento 2010, 6) and *Agência Pública* (Viana and Santini 2012).

[59] Interview: Natália Pollachi, São Paulo, 5 Sep 2016.

Although they of course have a point, at least four types of evidence suggest that Brazil is not much less transparent than other countries, including the UK. *First*, hiding information is not done only in Brazil. The US government circulated a few guidelines in 1977 concerning arms sales, stressing that information on exports to six countries was classified: Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, which together received 32% of US arms transfers in the period 1972-76.[60] *Second*, there is more publicly available documentation in Brazil for the recent period (although not very well organised) than in the UK. During this research, it was possible to access documents from the early 2000s in Brazil, while in the UK the most recent equivalent documents are from the late 1980s. Information from arms deals signed in the early 2010s were sent to researchers and journalists in Brazil (which I had access to), something that would not happen in the UK.[61] *Third*, also during this research, the ease of access to decision-makers to conduct interviews was similar in both countries. They were equally open to talk, although emphasising that certain details could not be disclosed. *Fourth*, some Brazilian companies have detailed information in websites about their products and services, indirectly making them relatively transparent. According to an activist at Bahrain Watch, a London-based NGO, the Brazilian company Condor publicizes more information about its products than other manufacturers of less-lethal weapons, which helps Bahrain Watch to identify the tear gas it manufactures.[62]

Although it is not clear whether CSOs have an impact on levels of transparency in Brazil, the mere existence of democratic institutions has a positive effect. Even if the

[60] TNA: FCO 46/159. US policy and instructions on the disclosure of arms sales information, 10 Feb 1981, p. 2.
[61] Interviews: David Magalhães, São Paulo, 5 Sep 2016; Rubens Valente, Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[62] Participant observation session: point made by activist from Bahrain Watch, London, 10 Sep 2015.

government has little incentive to open arms exports to public scrutiny, the Ministry of Defence and Itamaraty must provide information when requested by parliamentarians or citizens, the latter due to the Freedom of Information Act, from 2011 (Law 12.527, known as *Lei de Acesso à Informação*). This was done a few times by Rubens Valente, journalist from *Folha de São Paulo*, who published various articles on this topic (Valente 2012).[63]

Is exporting weapons intrinsically wrong? Brazilian CSOs and the morality of exporting weapons

Brazilian CSOs do not see the arms trade as intrinsically problematic, as it happens in the case of CAAT in the UK. Antonio Rangel, from Viva Rio, argued that 'although it is not ideal that Brazil produces weapons, this is the reality'.[64] This perspective has also been shared by Ignacio Cano, who worked at Viva Rio. He said to be 'against arms sales to civilians, but that there is no reason to be against exports to a security force of a country that respects human rights'.[65] At Igarapé, a similar perspective is observed. Robert Muggah argues that 'there is a legitimate place for certain kinds of instruments in society. […]'.[66] The same is observed at Sou da Paz. According to Natália Pollachi: 'we do not defend that Brazil should stop producing weapons. We are not against weapons; we are against the lack of control on them'.[67]

This demonstrates that these CSOs are not against the production, trade and use of weapons. They emphasise the need to better *control* these activities, which includes: not

[63] Interview: Rubens Valente, Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[64] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.
[65] Interview: Ignacio Cano, Rio de Janeiro, 24 Aug 2016.
[66] Interview: Robert Muggah, Rio de Janeiro, 25 Aug 2016.
[67] Interview: Natália Pollachi, São Paulo, 5 Sep 2016.

exporting weapons that might be re-exported to Brazil; not exporting weapons to perceived irresponsible countries; being transparent; not supporting arms exports through tax exemptions or subsidies; and being aware that exporting weapons may contradict other aspects of Brazilian foreign policy.

Concluding remarks

Brazilian policies and practice on arms exports are shaped by a variety of factors and pressures. On the one hand, the Brazilian government uses arms exports to achieve broader foreign policy goals, considering potential political and economic benefits. On the other hand, humanitarian concerns are present in the decision-making, raising the question of why the government in Brazil cares about this issue.

This is in part explained by the democratic nature of the regime in Brazil, which is inferred by comparing its behaviour before and after 1985. Until the mid-1980s, there was no evidence of humanitarian concerns in the decision-making, while after the end of the military regime humanitarian concerns were progressively introduced. Although this happened even in the absence of CSOs working with this topic, the effect of democracy was magnified when CSOs started dealing with this issue in the late 1990s. They managed to increase the weight of humanitarian concerns in the decision-making and achieve a few other victories, especially a stricter control on SALW exports to countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean. From the mid-2000s on, when Brazil once more signed large arms deals, CSOs were a counterforce to government's initiatives of boosting the military sector and promoting arms exports.

Even though they are not organised as a grassroots movement and have little connection with political parties, CSOs managed to raise the political salience of this issue, indicating that there are multiple channels for CSOs' influence. Their influence also suggests that the combination of democratic institutions and CSOs' activities have an effect on arms export policies even in countries with medium levels of development and a recent history of authoritarianism. Although further cases should be explored to corroborate this, evidence suggests that arms exports are not a concern observed only in advanced democracies and CSOs in the global north.

Does democracy also explain the behaviour of the Brazilian government and Brazilian CSOs on international agreements? This topic is explored in the next chapter, in which I argue that Brazil has strong incentives to join international regimes when adjustment costs are low.

Chapter 9 – Why has Brazil joined international agreements on conventional weapons control?

Since its redemocratization in 1985, Brazil has joined most major international agreements on weapons and technology control, covering both weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional weapons.[68] In addition, it has signed various resolutions at the UNGA and the OAS recommending a stricter control on arms exports. This is puzzling for a country with a strong sovereigntist tradition, where international norms are commonly seen as either hypocritical or imposed by northern countries.

Government officials in Brazil frequently stress that, although rich countries preach liberal values, they support autocracies and use (or threaten to use) violence against the weak. Regarding arms exports, evidence suggests that they are not necessarily wrong: in the period 2011-15, of the total amount of weapons imported by autocracies or closed anocracies (countries scoring between -10 and -1 in the Polity IV score), 32% came from the US, 8% from France and 7% from the UK.[69] If advanced democracies are perceived to behave in this way, however, why did Brazil opt to tie its hands concerning arms transfers? Why should it be responsible if others are not? Furthermore, as Brazil depends on imported weapons to supply its military, it should have few incentives to join regimes that could prevent it of buying them, an argument that has been used by emerging countries to oppose international regulations. In 1965, for example, a proposal at the UNGA to create a register of arms trade transactions was rejected by Third World countries, the same

[68] The main agreements that Brazil has signed are the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR), in 1995; the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, in 1995; the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in 1995; the Chemical Weapons Convention, in 1996; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in 1996; the Ottawa Convention, in 1997; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in 1998; and the Arms Trade Treaty, in 2013.
[69] Source: Sipri.

happening with a Danish proposal in 1968 (Cannizzo 2013, 158; Legault and Fortmann 1991, 228).

Brazil's participation in these treaties is especially puzzling because its behaviour differs from other emerging powers'. Others have not joined some of the treaties that Brazil has joined, especially on conventional arms transfers. China, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Vietnam have not signed the Ottawa Convention, for example. These same countries have not signed the ATT, alongside Ethiopia, Indonesia and Venezuela. Why does Brazil have a different behaviour?

This question is answered in this chapter through testing hypotheses 4 and 5. I argue that, despite being an emerging power, the reasons leading Brazil to join conventional weapons treaties are not much different from those leading the UK to do it. In both countries, decisions were dependent on practices established before international regulations were created, which had emerged domestically in part because of their democratic regimes. There are at least three types of evidence for this: *i*) the Brazilian government introduced limitations to the use and trade of weapons before the emergence of international regulations; *ii*) opposition to international agreements was based more on procedures than content; and *iii*) the defence sector (military and weapons-manufacturers), usually resistant to external controls, did not oppose the creation of certain international regulations. Similarities are also found in the *processes* leading Brazil and the UK to join these treaties. In both countries, inter-bureaucratic disagreements were observed, especially between diplomats and the defence sector. Likewise, clashes between CSOs and government that occurred domestically were not observed at the international level.

This is demonstrated in this chapter through an analysis of how Brazil's positions on three major treaties were formed: the Ottawa Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the ATT. The position of Brazil on ammunition marking also sheds light on this issue.

Besides confirming the abovementioned points, empirical evidence suggests at least two additional ones. *First*, pressures from other governments were not as relevant as part of the literature suggests: norms on the use of landmines, as well as arms exports to countries perceived as irresponsible, were part of decision-making in Brazil before it joined international treaties. These treaties reinforced rather than radically altered Brazil's behaviour. *Second*, although Brazilian CSOs pressured the government to join international agreements, those decisions were not taken only because of CSOs. Although they played a role, the government had its own reasons to join them.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 explores the incentives for Brazil to use the argument that 'if we do not sell weapons, somebody else will'. Sections 2-3 explore the reasons why Brazil joined the Ottawa Convention and the ATT, as well as why it has not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It also explores how its position on ammunition marking was formed.

'If we do not sell weapons, somebody else will': a collective action problem from an emerging power's perspective

When making decisions on arms exports, the Brazilian government takes into account the behaviour of other governments: if others do not have concerns about humanitarian impacts of arms exports, Brazil would have few incentives to adopt them, otherwise it

might lose arms deals to competitors while having no impact on levels of global arms imports. This section explores how the Brazilian government deals with this problem, arguing that, on the one hand, the perception that major powers are hypocritical is central in Brazil's decision-making, reinforcing the idea that Brazil should export weapons because this is what great powers do. On the other hand, the Brazilian government in practice restrained arms exports even if other countries were not doing that.

Arms exports and Brazil's emerging power status

The fact that Brazil has never been a great power conditions its policies and practices on arms exports. The Brazilian government perceives the international arms trade as a reflection of an unfair global power structure. This perception has at least two components, used by government officials and arms-manufacturers to justify why Brazil should export weapons. *First*, northern countries are seen as hypocritical, preaching liberal values while selling weapons to autocracies in exchange of economic and political gains, as stressed by a senior diplomat in Brazil.[70] Why should Brazil's behaviour be different? As pointed out by another diplomat, 'we should not be naïve, ignoring the strategic reality of the world'.[71] Another senior diplomat argued that a responsible behaviour would not have any impact, as great powers would keep exporting weapons and customers would keep buying them.[72] At the end of the day, Brazil would be the loser: it would lose arms deals from which it could obtain economic and political gains, while having no impact on the global arms trade. A similar perception is observed among weapons-manufacturers. In

[70] Interview: interviewee 13 (civil servant), Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[71] Interview: interviewee 16 (civil servant), Brasília, 27 Mar 2017.
[72] Interview: interviewee 14 (civil servant), Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.

1985, Engesa's CEO, José Luiz Whitaker Ribeiro, argued that arms exporters had double standards, selling weapons while criticizing others for doing the same. The United States, for example, sold arms to Libya while pressured Brazil not to do it (Moreira 1986). This has also been stressed by Carlos Pierantoni, deputy-head of Abimde.[73]

Second, the arms trade reproduces an order in which power is unequally distributed. The international arms trade is perceived to reflect a global power structure, in which arms exports are used to extract financial resources from the global south, fuel conflicts from which northern countries benefit, and reproduce developing countries' dependency on technology. Great powers not only dominate the arms trade but also prevent others – such as Brazil – of increasing their participation. They do not want others to have what they have: a strong arms industry and leverage on other countries' policies. Therefore, not taking part in the international arms trade would not only be naïve but also contribute to reproduce an unfair global power distribution. The best course of action for Brazil is to be at least as aggressive as great powers are regarding arms exports. This would strengthen Brazil's military industry and contribute to reduce the technological gap, as well as power inequalities.

Some government officials go even further, arguing that Brazil cannot afford to be over-concerned on human rights. As an emerging country, Brazil is less capable of offering advantageous compensations to importers, such as transfer of technology, political support and development aid. Adopting humanitarian concerns would make Brazil even less competitive than it is. In practice, this is why Brazil is at the margins of the system, selling weapons to countries that struggle to find suppliers, like Libya and Zimbabwe.[74] If

[73] Interview: Carlos Pierantoni, London, 12 Sep 2017.
[74] Interview: interviewee 13 (civil servant), Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.

Brazil did not take these few opportunities, it would lose an already small share of the international arms market.

In summary, government officials and weapons-manufacturers share a narrative concerning the unfairness of the international system, and seek to fit arms exports against this background. This has been expressed in public declarations and interviews with government officials from different agencies, including the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They argue that Brazil has the legitimate right to take part in the international arms trade.

Brazil and the UK: not so different after all

Although the UK puts more emphasis on humanitarian and strategic aspects than Brazil, their *practice* on arms exports is in various ways similar: *i*) they both have institutional arrangements to support arms exports; *ii*) they justify arms exports based on the lack of comprehensive international law; and *iii*) have restrictions on arms exports even in the absence of international controls.

On the first point, there is an institutional arrangement in Brazil to promote arms exports and support companies, similar to what is observed in the UK. As explored in chapter 7, there is a network of institutions supporting the arms trade: Apex, BNDES, FINEP, Itamaraty, Ministry of Defence, among others. This suggests that different positions in the international system do not imply a qualitative difference on how governments support arms exports. There is a difference, of course, regarding the relevance of this topic in the government's agenda: in the UK, decisions on arms exports usually involve high-ranking

officials (including the prime-minister). Yet this seems to be due to the scale of operations in the UK.

On the second point, Brazil authorizes arms deals in order not to lose markets, a rationale similar to what is observed in the UK. A diplomat in Brazil indicated that there might be cases in which exports are authorized despite being controversial. For example, Avibras' exports of the Astros II system to Malaysia were crucial to maintain the company viable. This deal would probably have been authorized even if Malaysia was involved in a conflict, as it would be essential to maintain an important company and technology in Brazil.[75]

On the third point, Itamaraty is aware that, as Brazil does not have a strong military, it depends more on its soft power than other great or emerging powers. For this reason, it should be cautious regarding arms exports, as they could damage its reputation of a peaceful country.[76] This in part explains why Brazil has restrictions on certain arms exports even if other countries do not.

Next section explores Brazil's positions on two international agreements, arguing that arms control policies emerged regardless of international regulations. These came at a later stage and implied no substantial adjustment costs.

[75] Interview: interviewee 12 (civil servant), Brasília, 27 Mar 2017.
[76] Ibidem.

Case studies of positive outcomes: the Ottawa Convention, the ATT and ammunition marking

Brazil and the Ottawa Convention: banning what had been banned

In the mid-1990s, the Brazilian government was not active in promoting an international ban on antipersonnel landmines (APMs), either regionally (through the Organisation of American States) or globally. In fact, it opposed multilateral restrictions on the trade, production and use of APMs. This changed in 1996, when Brazil imposed a unilateral ban on landmine exports. In 1997, it adopted a full ban and joined the Ottawa Convention. What explains this change? I argue that, as Brazil had not exported landmines since the late 1980s and its domestic production was limited, it had incentives to join international agreements banning APMs' trade and use. Brazil could improve its reputation of a responsible country while not incurring on substantial adjustment costs.

From opposing to accepting an international ban on landmines

During early discussions of a ban on landmines, Brazil opposed it. In the mid-1990s, Brazilian officials argued that its controls on arms exports were adequate and that Brazil did not intend to ban exports of landmines, let alone their use.[77] In September 1995, in a conference to review the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Brazil said to be

[77] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, MSG OF 00816, 29 Jun 1995; MRE, MSG OF 00032, OEA. Anteprojeto de resolução, 26 Jan 1996; MRE, MSG OF 00039, Envio de informações ao SGONU, 29 Jan 1996.

against any 'intrusive mechanism'.[78] The same occurred in May 1996, when Brazil sought to neutralize a proposal of such mechanism, with support from China and non-aligned countries.[79] Also in May 1996, when a resolution to create a landmine-free zone in the Americas was discussed at the OAS, Brazil was the most critical country.[80]

This was due to at least four factors. *First and foremost,* because of the Brazilian military. Brazil's vote on the abovementioned OAS' resolution, for example, was based on security needs: the Brazilian Army stressed that landmines could be useful to prevent drug-dealers or guerrilla fighters of entering the Brazilian territory from Colombia, something that had occurred in 1991.[81] In April 1997, in a meeting with the Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, the Brazilian foreign minister stressed that, despite supporting demining, the Brazilian military might need to use landmines to defend the Amazonian borders.[82] Also, the military wanted to keep the right to use landmines to protect the infrastructure of the Amazon Surveillance System (*Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia* – SIVAM), from which a substantial part would be in sparsely populated areas.[83] According to Ricardo Ayrosa, a Brazilian diplomat who participated in the negotiations, the military in Brazil did not want to ban landmines, which required some work to persuade them. That was

[78] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, Relatório sobre Conferência de Revisão da Convenção sobre Certas Armas Convencionais, by José Viegas Filho, 20 Oct 1995.

[79] Itamaraty's archives: folder Marminca I (Jun 1995-Jun 1996). MRE, MSG OF 00199, 10 May 1996, Conferência de Revisão da Convenção sobre Certas Armas Convencionais. Relatório preliminar.

[80] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE (DDS), Explicação de voto na Resolução 'O Hemisfério Ocidental: Zona Livre de Minas Terrestres Antipessoais', 30 May 1996.

[81] In February 1991, around 40 FARC members attacked a military unit in Brazil, killing 3 people and stealing weapons and ammunition. Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, Comentário sobre a proposta de um "Compromisso de Brasília" na questão das minas terrestres anti-pessoal, 1997; MRE, Memo DDS/43/PARD, 28 Apr 1997.

[82] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, MSG OF 00345, Encontro com Chanceler Axworthy, 25 Apr 1997.

[83] Interview (via Skype): Ricardo Ayrosa, 25 Aug 2017.

important because, in practice, the military had a veto on Brazil's position.[84] José Viegas, the main Brazilian negotiator during the Ottawa process, summarized in May 1997 the main reason behind Brazil's reticence:

> we have not produced landmines, not exported them since at least 1989, and not laid APMs. We have declared a moratorium on exports for four years, and this can be renewed. The possibility of using landmines in conventional warfare is not envisaged. Our concern is that large stretches of our borders are sparsely populated and permeable to armed groups or drug traffickers, and the use of APMs in some areas might be necessary.[85]

Second, the Brazilian government prefers to negotiate through multilateral organisations rather than *ad hoc* forums. In May 1997, José Viegas indicated that Brazil preferred to negotiate at the Conference on Disarmament, as this would mean 'an unhurried and universal process'.[86] According to Ricardo Ayrosa, this was an important factor: 'the Ottawa process was innovative, outside the UN; and our initial position was to strengthen the protocol on landmines of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons'.[87]

Third, to a position in Brazilian foreign policy that conventional weapons disarmament should be preceded by WMD disarmament.[88] In 1995, in a summary of Brazil's position on landmines, Itamaraty argued that they 'still play a defence role in countries without the deterrent capacity provided by weapons of mass destruction. Brazil

[84] Ibidem.
[85] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 31332, 13 May 1997.
[86] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 00345, 13 May 1997.
[87] Interview (via Skype): Ricardo Ayrosa, 25 Aug 2017.
[88] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE (DDS), DDS/35/PARD, Re-exame da política brasileira, by Ricardo Ayrosa, 8 May 1996; MRE, Aviso 4/DDS/DOC-MRE-PARD, 30 Aug 1996.

does not endorse initiatives giving priority to the issue of conventional weapons'.[89] When a resolution on landmines was voted at the OAS in 1996, the Brazilian delegation argued that landmines were a 'legitimate instrument of self-defence for countries that do not have more sophisticated conventional substitutes or weapons of mass destruction'.

Fourth, because of concerns regarding 'intrusive mechanisms'. In a meeting to review the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1995, Brazil's delegation opposed any verification mechanism, with support from other Latin American delegations.[90] After a meeting to discuss landmine control in April 1997, José Viegas expressed that, should a landmine ban be approved, there would probably be no 'verification authority' – which was in Brazil's interest.[91]

These four elements indicate an *emerging power* perspective, based on a perception that great powers accumulate sophisticated weapons while denying to developing countries their right of defence. Brazil's position, however, changed over 1996-97, something that did not occur in other emerging countries, such as China, India and Russia. In the mid-1997, although Brazil still sought to introduce exceptions that would allow it to use landmines, it acknowledged that they were unlikely to be accepted.

José Viegas then argued that Brazil should support a complete ban, although it should persuade other South American countries to do the same,[92] which was done after a suggestion by senior military officers in Brazil.[93] As part of this effort, the diplomats José

[89] Itamaraty's archives: folder Marminca I (Jun 1995-Jun 1996). MRE, MSG OF 00816, 29 Jun 1995.
[90] Itamaraty's archives: folder Marminca I (Jun 1995-Jun 1996). Of 00085, Conferência de revisão da Convenção sobre Certas Armas Convencionais, 30 Sep 1995.
[91] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, MSG OF 00543, 25 Apr 1997.
[92] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 00262, Processo de Ottawa. Posição do Brasil, 10 Jul 1997.
[93] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 31332, Convenção de Proibição. Posição do Brasil, 13 May 1997.

Viegas and Ricardo Ayrosa had meetings in other Amazonian countries to articulate a single position on the Ottawa process. This was relevant since positions were not convergent: while Peru and Venezuela wanted to keep the right to use landmines, Bolivia and Colombia were in favour of a ban.[94] After achieving that, Brazil eventually joined the Ottawa Convention. Why did that change happen? This is explored in the next subsection.

Why did Brazil join the Ottawa Convention?

There are at least four potential explanations for Brazil's change of position on the Ottawa Convention: *i*) pressures from other countries; *ii*) fear of isolation; *iii*) pressures from CSOs; and *iv*) interest in increasing its symbolic capital at little cost. I argue that Brazil signed it because of a combination of the second, third and fourth factors; and that the fourth factor was crucial in the decision to join the Convention.

The *first* potential explanation was not empirically observed. As evidence, the US and the UK made a joint proposal in 1995 of a stricter control on antipersonnel landmines, called the Landmine Control Programme (LCP).[95] Brazil's position did not change, however, remaining unfavourable to such control until the mid-1996. Also, Brazil did not align to any other great power: it was not part of either the 'core group' defending a ban (as were France and the UK) or the group against it (as were China, India and Russia). In addition, Brazil did not want to introduce substantial exceptions to the use of landmines, as did the

[94] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 00831, Consultas com Peru, 21 Jun 1997; MRE, MSG OF 00829, Consultas com Venezuela, 21 Jun 1997; MRE, MSG OF 00830, Consultas com Colômbia, 21 Jun 1997; MRE, MSG OF 00280, Consultas com Bolívia, 1 Jul 1997.

[95] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). FCO, Of 041008Z, MIPT. Landmines. UK/US control programme, 4 Jul 1995.

US.[96] Brazil had a unique position, being in favour of restricting the use and trade of landmines, while keeping the right to use them in sparsely populated areas.[97]

The *second* explanation was observed in official documentation: diplomats were concerned that Brazil might become isolated. When a resolution was voted at the OAS in May 1996, Brazil voted in favour only to not be alone.[98] Also in May 1996, a document from Itamaraty stressed that Brazil should consider that other countries were adopting a ban, which might lead to a relative isolation of Brazil.[99] In November 1996, although Brazil was still against a complete ban, a Brazilian delegation participated in a conference on landmines because Itamaraty did not want Brazil to be isolated.[100]

The *third* explanation was also empirically observed. Although their relative influence is hard to isolate, CSOs and the press pressured the government to impose a ban on landmines. An internal document from Itamaraty suggested in May 1996 that Brazil should change its stance on landmines due to positions from other governments, NGOs and civil society.[101] Also in May 1996, the newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* criticized the fact that Brazil had opposed an OAS resolution banning landmines (O Estado de São Paulo 1996). The newspaper *Correio Braziliense* published a long report in October 1997 on the humanitarian impacts of landmines, stressing the central role played by the British government in the Ottawa process (Benitz, Oliveira, and Lannoy 1997). In the same month,

[96] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 00284, Encontro à margem com subsecretário McNamara. Avaliação, 28 Jun 1997.
[97] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 00262, 10 Jul 1997.
[98] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE (DDS), Explicação de voto na Resolução 'O Hemisfério Ocidental: Zona Livre de Minas Terrestres Antipessoais', 30 May 1996.
[99] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE (DDS), DDS/35/PARD, Minas terrestres. Re-exame da política brasileira, by Ricardo Ayrosa, 8 May 1996.
[100] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 00435, 7 Oct 1996.
[101] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE (DDS), DDS/35/PARD, Minas terrestres. Re-exame da política brasileira, by Ricardo Ayrosa, 8 May 1996.

the Justice and Peace Service (*Serviço Paz e Justiça*) in Rio Grande do Sul, which is part of a network of Latin American human rights NGOs founded by Adolfo Pérez Esquivel in 1974, sent a letter to the minister of foreign affairs, expressing concerns that Bill Clinton might pressure Brazil not to sign the Convention.[102] Activities from CSOs remained also after Brazil signed the Convention. In December 1998, the Catholic Youth Ministry (*Pastoral da Juventude*), in Porto Alegre, sent a petition to the Brazilian president, asking the government to do more regarding the problem of landmines, which was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[103]

The *fourth* potential explanation was empirically observed. Although there were pressures on the government to ban landmines, this does not imply its lack of interest in doing it. As Brazil had stopped exporting and producing landmines a few years before, banning them would enhance the country's prestige at no cost. This was observed in three moments: *i*) the decision to ban exports of landmines; *ii*) the decision to support a full ban; and *iii*) in the support to demining activities.

In the first case (banning exports), there were no substantial adjustment costs, as Brazil was not exporting landmines: the Brazilian government declared that it had not exported them since 1989. Although evidence shows that Brazil was willing to export them as late as 1993,[104] there is no evidence of interest in exporting after that.[105] In May 1996,

[102] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1992/93/94/97/98 (box 105). SERPAJ Rio Grande do Sul, sent by Father Marcelo Guimarães, 13 Oct 1997.
[103] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). Grupo da Pastoral da Juventude em Busca da Paz/Escola Mãe de Deus, Abaixo-assinado sugerindo medidas a fim de resolver a trágica situação das minas terrestres, 10 Dec 1998.
[104] Itamaraty's archives: folder PNEMEM Líbia IV (1983/84). MRE, EMEM 167, authorizing donation of 100 landmines to Libya, 18 Jul 1985; Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 01752, Produção de minas, 22 Dec 1993.
[105] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). Exército Brasileiro, Memória 126 SAE-1, 10 Sep 1996.

the head of Itamaraty's Department of Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies (DDS) argued that, as Brazil had stopped exporting landmines, it would gain a political benefit from declaring a ban on something it was already not doing.[106] A Brazilian diplomat who participated in the negotiations concurred with this by saying that: 'from a commercial point of view, there would be no costs for Brazil to join the convention'.[107] Joining an international agreement banning landmines was therefore a small step, taking into account Brazil's previous behaviour. The Brazilian Army agreed with the export ban in September 1996, stressing that 'Brazil has not exported landmines for more than 10 years and [...] it will not do it in the foreseeable future'.[108] The same position was adopted by the Brazilian Navy and Air Force.[109] Furthermore, major producers or users of landmines had imposed a ban on exports, including all EU countries and the US, implying that they would not free-ride on Brazil's 'humanitarian concerns'.

In the second case, Brazil took a step further, becoming in favour of a full ban in 1996, which occurred because Brazil was not using landmines anyway. Brazil and Argentina signed a joint declaration banning the use of landmines in November 1996. This was inspired by a bilateral regime of control on nuclear material, which led to the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), in 1991. The minister of foreign affairs, Luiz Felipe Lampreia, expressed in October 1997 that Brazil was in favour of a full ban, alongside the rest of Latin America (Lampreia 1997).

[106] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, Despacho ao Memo DDS/35, 9 May 1996.
[107] Interview (via Skype): Ricardo Ayrosa, 25 Aug 2018.
[108] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). Exército Brasileiro, Memória 126 SAE-1, 10 Sep 1996.
[109] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). Ministério da Marinha, Telefax 281/13, 5 Sep 1996; Ministério da Aeronáutica, Aviso 003/CHGM/C-007, 4 Sep 1996.

This was different from its position the year before, when landmines were considered important to protect Brazil's borders.

In the third case, joining the Ottawa Process aimed at capitalizing on demining activities that Brazil had conducted over previous years.[110] Brazil had worked in demining efforts in Angola, Mozambique, Suriname and Central America, the latter through the Mine Clearance Assistance Mission in Central America (MARMINCA). In 1995, although being against a UK/US initiative to control landmines, the minister of foreign affairs, Luiz Felipe Lampreia, said to be in favour of a UK/US proposal to create an international fund to support demining.[111] Later, Brazil stressed the need to introduce demining as a central part of the Ottawa process, which was opposed by Switzerland and not actively defended by the US.[112]

A ban on landmines fit well into Cardoso's foreign policy, under which Brazil joined various arms control regimes in order to make it a more 'respectable' member of the international community. The interest in projecting a positive image has been observed in official documentation of the period. After being invited by the US government to participate in discussions on landmine control, the minister of foreign affairs argued in February 1995 that attending it 'would contribute to erase a wrong image about Brazil, which was seen in the past as a major exporter of landmines, even though its participation in this market was minimal and, nowadays, is inexistent'.[113] In August 1996, Marcos

[110] Interview (via Skype): Ricardo Ayrosa, 25 Aug 2018.

[111] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, Aviso 01/DPTS/MRE-PARD, 8 Feb 1995.

[112] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1997/1998 (box 103). MRE, MSG OF 00282, Proposta brasileira sobre cooperação para a destruição de minas e desenvolvimento de tecnologia de desminagem, 28 Jun 1997; MRE, MSG OF 31333, Minuta austríaca. Propostas brasileiras, 14 May 1997.

[113] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, Aviso 01/DPTS-MRE-PARD, sent by Luiz Felipe Lampreia to the chief of the General-staff of the Armed Forces, 8 Feb 1995.

Azambuja, who had been deputy-foreign minister (1990-92), stressed that Brazil should lead a ban on landmines for three reasons: *i*) they are cruel, killing innocent victims; *ii*) it would bring prestige to the Brazilian president; and *iii*) there would be no costs for either Brazil's security or military industry.[114]

In summary, the fact that Brazil had already stopped exporting and producing landmines was determinant to its decision of signing the Convention. It meant that Brazil could project a positive image at a low cost.

The Arms Trade Treaty

The Brazil's signature of the ATT is puzzling for at least three reasons. *First*, Brazil has a long sovereigntist tradition, based on which the ATT should be perceived as a tool to constrain emerging countries. *Second*, Brazil regularly exports weapons to autocracies and places in conflict, which might be hindered by an international treaty on arms transfer control. *Third*, the treaty could limit Brazil's imports of weapons. Why did Brazil put these aspects aside and joined the ATT?

The Brazilian government and the ATT

Evidence suggests that the Brazilian government has joined the ATT for at least three reasons. *First*, to project a positive image at a low cost, as the content of the ATT was not substantially different from what the Brazilian government was already doing. *Second*,

[114] Itamaraty's archives: Controle de minas 1994/95/96/97 (box 101). MRE, letter sent by Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, 6 Aug 1996.

sectors of the government were interested in using the ATT to introduce reforms in the national legislation on arms exports and lock them in. *Third*, due to pressures from CSOs, both domestic and international. The first two aspects are explored in this part, while the third is explored in next part. As documents from the period are mostly classified, information was collected in open sources and interviews with government officials and members of Brazilian CSOs.

Regarding the first aspect, the Brazilian government was driven to sign the ATT for a similar reason that led the UK to do the same: to enhance its symbolic capital at a low cost. The main evidence is that support to the ATT came from various sectors in Brazil, including those that frequently oppose restrictions on arms exports. In a meeting at the Chamber of Deputies in 2015 to discuss Brazil's position on the ATT, a representative from the Ministry of Defence expressed support to the treaty. He argued that 'the Arms Trade Treaty actually falls short of what Brazil already does, *de jure* and *de facto*' (Mattioli 2015, 22). This was stressed also by a diplomat who headed the Brazilian delegation during part of negotiations on the ATT. For him, as the PNEMEM (the Brazilian policy) and the ATT were similar, the ATT would not introduce substantial changes.[115] The same was expressed by Flávio Basílio, head of Seprod, the Ministry of Defence's department in charge of overseeing arms production and trade: 'Brazil will not do anything different from what it already does. [...]. On the contrary, there is even a positive impact in terms of signalling'.[116]

This aspect was also emphasised by Daniel Mack, from Sou da Paz, the Brazilian CSO that was involved the most with the creation of the ATT. For him: 'the government knew

[115] Interview: interviewee 14 (civil servant), Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[116] Interview: Flávio Basílio, London, 12 Sep 2017.

that the treaty was not very strong, it did not have teeth, and it would not really diminish the countries' autonomy on the arms trade'.[117] Support was observed also in the industry. According to admiral Carlos Pierantoni, deputy-head of Abimde, Brazil's rules are similar to the ATT.[118]

On the second aspect, evidence indicates that sectors of Itamaraty diverged from other parts of the government on what Brazil's position should be. For a group at Itamaraty (mainly at the DDS), the ATT would enshrine humanitarian concerns on Brazil's arms export policies. Without the ATT, although Itamaraty was consulted in decisions on arms exports, the final decision was made by the Ministry of Defence. With the ATT, Itamaraty becomes a veto player and have more space to reject requests to export. This occurs because the ATT introduced aspects that the PNEMEM does not have, such as human rights and oppression of minorities. Furthermore, as the ATT puts SALW under control, Itamaraty would have to be consulted before they are exported, which does not necessarily happen in the current system. In certain cases, only the Army's approval is necessary to export SALW. This is seen as negative by some in Itamaraty because 'the Army does not have much sensitivity on the political implications of arms exports'. According to a diplomat, sectors of Itamaraty must deal with the negative consequences of arms exports without having power to influence decisions to export.[119] A similar point was made by Daniel Mack, from Sou da Paz, who said that the Ministry of Justice was in favour of the ATT while the Ministry of Defence was more cautious. This would explain why Brazil was never one of the ATT's promoters, even if it had a constructive position on the treaty.[120]

[117] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 26 Sep 2017.
[118] Interview: Carlos Pierantoni, London, 12 Sep 2017.
[119] Interview: interviewee 15 (civil servant), Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[120] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 26 Sep 2017.

Inter-bureaucratic disagreement was also observed in attitudes towards CSOs. Depending on the government department, CSOs' activities are considered as either enablers or constraints. For a diplomat who headed the Brazilian delegation for most of the ATT negotiations, the Itamaraty's DDS has preferences closer to CSOs' than to other government agencies'. CSOs were considered helpful because they contributed to weaken the position of sectors that were more likely to authorize arms deals, including the Ministry of Defence, other departments in Itamaraty, and the *bancada da bala*, a group of parliamentarians advocating a looser domestic arms control.[121] Other sectors in the government, however, see CSOs as a constraint. At the DADEF (in Itamaraty), it was stressed that CSOs defend private interests while the government defends collective ones.[122]

Brazilian CSOs shaped Brazil's position on the ATT in two ways. First, they worked with foreign CSOs, other states and international organisations to influence the Brazilian position from the 'outside'. Second, they engaged with different sectors of the government to influence their positions from the 'inside'. This is equivalent to what, in military terminology, is called a 'pincer movement', creating pressure simultaneously on different points. These pathways are explored in the next subsections.

CSOs in Brazil and the ATT: pressures from the outside

The IR literature has looked at how CSOs bring pressures on national governments from abroad. In the case of the ATT, this has been empirically observed in Brazil. Brazilian CSOs used at least two channels to achieve that: *i*) the Control Arms Coalition, from which

[121] Interview: interviewee 13 (civil servant), Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.
[122] Interview: interviewee 12 (civil servant), Brasília, 27 Mar 2017.

Viva Rio and Sou da Paz were members; and *ii*) the Preparatory Committee for the Creation of the ATT, in which these two CSOs were delegates.

Viva Rio was invited to join the Control Arms Coalition and the Preparatory Committee due to its experience with domestic gun control. For Viva Rio, Brazil should join the ATT to curb arms inflows and prevent negative humanitarian impacts caused by Brazilian arms exports. Antonio Rangel, from Viva Rio, pointed out that 'under the treaty, it is prohibited to sell to countries such as Saudi Arabia or many others in that region' (Ciscati 2016). Antonio Rangel emphasised, however, that the participation of Viva Rio was symbolic, which was due to two reasons. First, its work with domestic gun control consumed almost all its resources and time, which became worse after one of its main researchers, Pablo Dreyfus, died in the Air France Flight 447, in 2009. Second, it became harder to obtain funding: the federal government stopped funding Viva Rio in 2013. Consequently, the group dealing with arms control was reduced from 13 to 3 people, preventing it of attending preparatory conferences for the ATT.[123]

Internationally, the CSO that worked the most to make Brazil sign the ATT was Sou da Paz. Because of its previous work for a stricter control on domestic arms trade, it was invited to join the Control Arms Coalition in 2003, becoming part of the ATT Steering Committee, alongside Viva Rio and 13 other CSOs (Instituto Sou da Paz 2005, 2009, 120–21). Due to the abovementioned difficulties of Viva Rio, Sou da Paz became the campaign's representative in Brazil.[124] Alongside other Latin American and African CSOs, Sou da Paz managed to take to the international level an agenda that it had developed in Brazil,

[123] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.
[124] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 27 Sep 2017.

emphasizing urban violence, something that 'was not very much in the radar of northern NGOs'.[125] This made the ATT more appealing in Brazil, where urban violence is a more serious problem than traditional conflicts.

By joining a global network, Brazilian CSOs brought pressures on the Brazilian government from the 'outside'. Also, this made Brazil more likely to join the treaty, as the salience of urban violence was raised in the final text of the treaty. The role of Brazilian CSOs went beyond their international activities, however. They pressured – and sometimes worked alongside – the Brazilian government to persuade it to sign and ratify the ATT.

CSOs in Brazil and the ATT: pressures from the inside

CSOs in Brazil conducted various activities to make the government sign and ratify the ATT. These were in the form of either pressures or cooperation, depending on the government sector they wanted to engage with. While parts of Itamaraty perceived CSOs as allies, other sectors of the government were sceptical or opposed any type of cooperation. This suggests that relations between CSOs and governments are more complex than what part of the literature suggests. Attitudes and ideas of sectors of the government and CSOs might be more similar than those shared by different sectors within the same government.

Domestically, CSOs engaged with the government both before and after it signed the ATT. Before its signature, activities were conducted mainly by Sou da Paz, which started a campaign in 2003 to draw attention to the treaty. One of its first activities was to organise the campaign *Million Faces*, collecting 50,000 pictures of people. Later, it organised

[125] Ibidem.

demonstrations and, in 2007, promoted events near a major park in São Paulo (Instituto Sou da Paz 2009, 119). Also in 2007, it conducted the abovementioned popular consultations, which were incorporated into one of Itamaraty's reports. In addition to conducting campaigns, Sou da Paz was in contact with government officials, knowing them individually and permanently talking about the importance of Brazil signing the treaty.[126]

The Brazilian government was pressured not only to join or enforce the ATT but also to be more active in promoting it. Marcello Baird, projects coordinator at Sou da Paz, said that 'Brazil, which aspires to have international prominence, has the duty to lead discussions on the reduction of armed conflicts in the world and be a role model by ratifying the treaty as soon as possible'. He compared the marginal role of Brazil to the active positions of Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay (Instituto Sou da Paz 2014c, 2014e).

After Brazil signed the ATT, other CSOs were also active in the ratification process. Before showing evidence of this, I briefly explain the ratification process in the next lines. The ATT had to be approved by four ministries, four parliamentary committees and a majority vote in both the lower and upper houses of the National Congress (Instituto Sou da Paz 2014a, 9), with therefore ten institutional veto players. The process started in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being followed by Justice, Defence, and the Presidential Chief of Staff. Later, it was forwarded to the Chamber of Deputies, where it needed to be approved by three committees, before being voted in the Chamber's floor. Once one committee in the Senate approved it, it was voted in the Senate's floor. The treaty was then forwarded to the President, who was expected to turn it into a decree, thereby internalizing the treaty.

[126] Ibidem.

Sou da Paz worked to make the Brazilian government ratify the ATT during the whole process. In March 2014, it reported that the ATT had finally been forwarded to the ministries of Justice and Defence, after waiting nine months to be translated (Instituto Sou da Paz 2014b). When the treaty went to Congress, Sou da Paz worked to speed up the process. Natália Pollachi, from Sou da Paz, explained what they did:

> We explained to parliamentarians what the ATT was, asking whether they found it interesting and wanted to defend it. In Congress, we talked to some people and asked whether they wanted to be rapporteurs [for the ratification process], and said that we would help them with technical inputs. We did not identify any resistance, but there was a risk of the project being forgotten – more than of it being rejected.[127]

Sou da Paz influenced the choice of the chair in one of the committees, as well as shaped the content of reports. According to Natália Pollachi,

> After being approved at the Executive, the ATT went to Congress, initially to the Chamber of Deputies' Foreign Relations Committee. We introduced the treaty to the committee's president, Eduardo Barbosa, who was willing to take on the role of rapporteur. Next, it went to the Security Committee and the Constitution and Justice Committee, where we did the same thing. We talked to some deputies, among whom Bruno Covas volunteered to be the rapporteur. We added technical inputs to the committee's report and sent it back to him. The report was presented with some of our inputs and was soon voted and approved.[128]

Conectas was also active in pressuring the government to ratify the ATT. Among the reasons for Brazil to join the treaty, it argued that Brazil is a major exporter of arms, that its arms might be used to violate human rights, and that exported weapons are sometimes re-exported to Brazil via the black market. Conectas initially questioned the Division of

[127] Interview: Natália Pollachi, São Paulo, 5 Sep 2016.
[128] Ibidem.

International Acts (DAI), at Itamaraty, on why it was 'taking so long' for the treaty to be forwarded to other ministries. However, according to Jefferson Nascimento, from Conectas, this happened because the treaty was not a priority rather than because of opposition.[129] This suggests that there were no significant forces against the treaty in Brazil: what CSOs did was to raise the political salience of the ratification process within the government.

In 2014, Conectas asked a few senators to question the Senate's speaker about the ATT ratification. In a meeting of the Senate's Foreign Relations and National Defence Committee (CRE), two senators asked questions on behalf of Conectas (Câmara dos Deputados 2014a). In November 2014, a draft law approving the treaty was sent to the Chamber of Deputies, where it was approved by the Foreign Relations and Defence Committee. Conectas spoke to the committee's head, Eduardo Barbosa, which may have led him to be the rapporteur for the ATT's ratification. Also, Eduardo Barbosa asked Conectas to provide subsidies on the treaty's content and clarify some of its points.[130]

In summary, the process leading to the signature and ratification of the ATT shows that Brazil adhered to an international norm that it had already adopted domestically. This also explains why the government cooperated with CSOs during the ratification process: there was no substantial mobilization against the treaty. Indeed, CSOs' pressures aimed at making the process quicker rather than to persuade elites on the importance of the treaty.

Ammunition marking

[129] Interview: Jefferson Nascimento, São Paulo, 16 Sep 2016.
[130] Ibidem. The representative from the military industry did not attend the event.

During discussions on whether Brazil should join the ATT, government officials considered that a practice that had been adopted in Brazil was stricter than the one prescribed in the ATT. Two civil servants at Itamaraty, as well as general Aderico Mattioli (from the Ministry of Defence), pointed out that ammunition marking is mandatory in Brazil while it is not in most other countries.[131] Although unsuccessfully, Brazilian diplomats sought to include ammunition marking in the ATT, indicating interest to export norms to the rest of the world. Ammunition marking was introduced in Brazil, however, because of activities from CSOs rather than due to the initiative of the government or companies. This is similar to the case of regulation of brokering activities in the UK, which were introduced because of civil society activities, although later it became a source of pride for the government.

In the early 2000s, when discussions on the Disarmament Statute were occurring in Brazil, Viva Rio defended the need to mark ammunition manufactured in the country. The reaction from CBC, the largest ammo-manufacturer in Brazil, was nonetheless negative: CBC's president, Antônio Marcos Moraes, derided the idea, arguing that marking ammunition was not possible due to technical difficulties. After reading the interview, however, an-ex employee of CBC provided to Antonio Rangel, from Viva Rio, a sample of cartridges manufactured by CBC in 1954. Those samples had been marked by CBC after a request by the Brazilian Army and Navy. Pictures of the cartridges were sent to Elio Gaspari, an influential journalist, who denounced how the arms industry manipulated information. He also reported that ammunition exported to Colombia was marked, due to a request from the Colombian government (Gaspari 2003). According to Antonio Rangel, this gave

[131] Interviews with civil servants, Brasília: interviewee 12, 27 Mar 2017; interviewee 16, 27 Mar 2017.

credibility to those defending the idea, which was eventually included in the Disarmament Statute.[132]

After this was introduced in the statute, it became a source of pride for both government and the arms industry, which use it as an example of responsible behaviour. In 2011, in a presentation given in parliament by the Arms and Ammunition Industry National Association (*Associação Nacional da Indústria de Armas e Munições* – Aniam), the 'good practices' of CBC on ammunition marking were stressed (ANIAM 2011). Also, in commercial pieces to promote ammunition, CBC argued that its marking system was 'unique and pioneer, allowing institutions to better control stocks' (CBC 2011).

In summary, Brazil sought to export a norm on ammunition marking, probably to improve its prestige at no cost. This norm, however, had been introduced due to activities from CSOs, which later cooperated with the National Congress to introduce them into the Disarmament Statute.

Case study of negative outcome: Convention on Cluster Munitions

In 2018, Brazil had not yet joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions, despite its participation in various other regimes, including the Ottawa Convention, the Arms Trade Treaty and other weapons control agreements. What explains this difference? This cannot be explained by structural constraints, as there were no substantial changes between 2008 (when the Convention was opened to signatures) and 2013 (when the same happened for the ATT). This cannot be explained by different political parties in power either, since a PT-led government opted to join the ATT but not the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

[132] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.

I argue that this difference is explained by the perceived adjustment costs that Brazil would have to incur by joining the Convention, concerning *commercial* and *security* aspects. On the *commercial* side, at least three Brazilian companies manufacture and export cluster munitions: Avibras, Ares and Target Engenharia (Câmara dos Deputados 2014, 7). The main company is Avibras, which produces cluster munitions as part of the Astros II, a weapons system that has been exported to Bahrain, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and that is also used by the Brazilian Army.[133] Stopping their production might lead Brazil to lose this market, one of the few niches in which it remains competitive. For Daniel Mack, from Sou da Paz, 'Brazil is one of the few countries that still export cluster munitions. There is therefore a commercial aspect, an economic pressure'.[134] In discussions in the National Congress, a representative from the Brazilian Army, general Gerson Menandro, stressed the economic benefits of maintaining production of this weapon:

> Regarding cluster munitions, it is necessary to emphasise the role of AVIBRAS, a national company located in São José dos Campos, which operates a productive chain of more than 100 companies, generating tens of thousands of jobs. […] This exported product [cluster munitions] […] generates jobs, hard-currency and a productive chain (Câmara dos Deputados 2014, 11; 19).

In addition, some officials in the government have argued that the Convention favours US and European companies, as it allows production of certain types of cluster munition that Brazilian companies do not have the technical capacity to manufacture.[135]

[133] Reports from Amnesty and Human Rights Watch documented that Brazilian-manufactured cluster munitions were used by Saudi Arabia in Yemen (Human Rights Watch 2016; Amnesty International 2017).
[134] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 26 Sep 2017.
[135] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 26 Sep 2017.

According to a Brazilian diplomat, a German weapons-manufacturer funded a civil society campaigns because it wanted to shape a definition of cluster munitions that suited it commercially.[136] General Menandro, from the Brazilian Army, expressed a similar position:

> The Convention on Cluster Munitions accepts the use of cluster munitions, as long as they meet some technical requirements. Coincidentally, the only country producing this type of cluster munition is a member of the Convention. Therefore, there is a large economic interest. [...]. We cannot be naive or amateur, thinking that there are not people, companies and countries rooting for us not to succeed in this area (Câmara dos Deputados 2014, 18; 20).

On *security* aspects, the Brazilian military considers cluster munitions as militarily useful. And as the military has the last word on whether to join the Convention, Brazil has not signed it.[137] General Menandro, from the Army, argued that 'the use of cluster saves resources, as thousands of conventional ammunitions are used to strike a very large area'. He also emphasized that the Astros is a 'great deterrence factor, based on which we are respected. It prevents us of getting involved in conflicts' (Câmara dos Deputados 2014, 19; 22).

A substantial production of cluster munitions in Brazil was emphasised by a few Army officers in a meeting in 2012 with Rubens Valente, journalist from *Folha de São Paulo*. They framed their importance in terms of security concerns, especially because they can be used to attack large forested areas, useful in a hypothetical case of guerrilla warfare in the Amazon. This would explain why the Brazilian military has no intention to give up on this technology.[138]

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[136] Interview: interviewee 12 (civil servant), Brasília, 27 Mar 2017.
[137] Interview (via Skype): Ricardo Ayrosa, 25 Aug 2017.
[138] Interview: Rubens Valente, Brasília, 31 Mar 2017.

Sectors within the government pointed out also that Brazil would prefer to negotiate this treaty at the UN rather than through an *ad hoc* forum.[139] Once more, general Menandro emphasised that 'negotiations outside the CCAC [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] […] weaken it. […]. An international instrument in the area of [arms] control must be universal, balanced and non-discriminatory, as the CCAC is'. This was probably not a determinant factor, however, as Brazil joined the Ottawa Convention, which was conducted in an *ad hoc* space (Câmara dos Deputados 2014, 17).

In summary, Brazil is not willing to incur on costs of stopping the production of cluster munitions or adapting their production to meet requirements from the Convention. Brazil did not join the Convention on Cluster Munitions for this reason, therefore keeping a behaviour that it had adopted before the convention was created. The government, however, had at least to present counter-narratives to contain criticisms, fitting the production and trade of cluster munitions into stories of national security, development or north-south cleavages.

Yet, taking into account findings of this and previous chapters, targeted campaigns from CSOs should be able to shape the government's position on cluster munitions, in a similar fashion to what happened in other cases. This would probably require the formation of a domestic advocacy network, as well as activities in various fronts, rather than a focus only on signing the Convention.

[139] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 26 Sep 2017.

Concluding remarks

For the Brazilian government, proposals to introduce international regulations are usually exogenous shocks, on which the Brazilian government is asked to take a position. I argue that these positions are dependent on the previous adoption of norms at the domestic level. When a proposed norm was similar to what Brazil was already doing, the government was happy to join it. But when norms were not similar, groups in Brazil organised against them, creating incentives for the government not to adopt them. This implies that perceived adjustment costs are central to explain why Brazil joined certain regimes but not others. Indeed, before Brazil signed the Ottawa Convention, the ATT, as well as UNGA and OAS resolutions, it had already adopted most of its norms: a ban on landmines and restrictions on the arms trade had been adopted by Brazilian institutions regardless of international regulations.

This does not imply that CSOs do not play a role in this process. Their work was essential, for example, to the creation of controls on arms exports to Latin American and Caribbean countries, in the suspension or non-authorizations of individual arms deals, in the ATT ratification process, and in the introduction of ammunition marking. Interactions between governments and CSOs are nonetheless complex, being either conflictive or cooperative depending on the government department and topic being discussed. While some sectors of the government were open to talk to CSOs and shared many of their views, others remained sceptical or refused to interact.

There is no evidence that either pressures from other countries or willingness to emulate them determined Brazil's positions. Although influence of 'northern' institutions

exists, it is empirically more limited than what the literature sometimes suggests. Diffusion from the north has a marginal impact, producing a few changes rather than radically altering what governments and CSOs in the south do. This topic is explored in more details in the next chapter.

Chapter 10 – Arms export policies in developing countries: diffused from the 'north' or home-grown?

Democracy might exert an effect on a country's arms export behaviour not only because of domestic politics but also because of external factors. Rather than being driven by government officials' liberal values, domestic public opinion or CSOs' activities, a democratic country's behaviour might follow that of other democracies. A country like Brazil, for example, might have joined international regimes due to pressures from other democracies or because it emulated their behaviour.

This argument has some validity. The UK government, for example, has sought to turn its policies on arms exports into international regulations. As examined in chapter 6, it voted in favour of international arms embargoes against countries that did not import its weapons and worked to make other countries adopt rules similar to its own. Also, it worked to block initiatives diverging from its practice on arms control: it opposed a Swedish initiative in the mid-1970s to ban certain types of weapons, and rejected proposals to impose arms embargoes against various countries, including Saudi Arabia. This could be interpreted as an imposition of norms, reproducing dominance over the 'global south', a proposition that is observed in part of the literature. This view is also commonplace among government officials in developing countries, as observed in archival sources and interviews conducted for this thesis.

Practices could also spread through emulation. If this is true, democracies in the 'south' would mirror the behaviour of those in the 'north'. In any case, behaviour would not depend on dynamics of domestic politics. And it would not depend either on an

abstract model of democratic behaviour. For democracies in developing countries, democracies in the 'north' are the model to be followed.

This chapter tests hypothesis 6, arguing that, although influence occurs through pressures and emulation, these processes are conditioned by policies and practices that evolved domestically. Although northern countries are frequently first-movers in the creation of international regulations, this does not imply that democracies in the global south follow them only *because* they come from the north.

Evidence collected in Brazil shows that policies and practice on arms exports emerged due to local dynamics. Also, evidence shows a rationalist approach in bargains and negotiations: when deciding on whether to join international agreements, the Brazilian government considered the adjustment costs of doing that.

This chapter explores two potential channels of norm diffusion, demonstrating that the north-south influence is not as compelling as part of the literature argues. Section 1 examines whether the spread of norms occurs from government to government, while section 2 does the same for diffusion among civil society groups.

Government-to-government relations: a channel of north-south diffusion?

A potential explanation for Brazil's policies and practice on arms exports is that they are the result of pressures from other governments to adopt certain norms. Evidence indicates that these pressures indeed occur: foreign governments have pressured Brazil to sign international agreements, such as the Ottawa Convention and the ATT. Also, it shows that Brazil decided to join these treaties in part because other countries were doing that,

suggesting a process of emulation. However, there at least four reasons why the proposition of a north-south flow of norms should be viewed with caution.

The first one is that, before international regulations on arms transfers were proposed, organisations in 'southern' countries had accumulated experience regarding *domestic* gun control. When norms on arms exports were introduced in their agenda, their experience then conditioned their work on arms export control. The agenda of arms exports fit into a previous (and more relevant) agenda: arms should be better controlled due to high levels of domestic violence. In Viva Rio, for example, arms exports were introduced after and because of its work with domestic gun control, with the need to control Brazilian arms transfers fitting mainly into its goal of reducing levels of violence in Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, the agenda of arms exports complemented rather than altered its agenda.

A second reason is that adjustment costs for Brazil to join certain treaties on arms exports were low. As examined in chapter 9, joining the Ottawa Convention and the ATT did not substantially change what Brazil was already doing. Regarding the ATT, five diplomats at Itamaraty stressed that the PNEMEM and ATT were similar, and that the ATT would not have a substantial impact on Brazil.[140] Joining these treaties was seen as an opportunity to project a positive image of the country at a low cost. Therefore, previous policies and practice of the Brazilian government gave it incentives to join these treaties.

A third aspect is that, rather than being a mere receiver of norms, Brazil also sought to spread them. In the Ottawa Convention process, Brazil engaged with other Amazonian countries to form a single position on the treaty. This was important because other

[140] Interviews with civil servants, Brasília: interviewee 12, 27 Mar 2017; interviewee 13, 31 Mar 2017; interviewee 14, 31 Mar 2017; interviewee 15, 31 Mar 2017; interviewee 16, 27 Mar 2017.

countries' borders in the Amazon region were also sparsely populated, giving them incentives to use landmines for their defence. According to a Brazilian diplomat who participated in those meetings, 'Brazil contacted these countries and expressed interest in signing the Ottawa Convention, which influenced domestic processes there. Brazil's position was used as an argument by them to persuade their national parliaments to join the treaty'.[141] Evidence is also found in the case of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which Brazil has not joined it. As Brazil was interested in producing and exporting this type of weapon, signing the treaty would impose adjustment costs that the government was not willing to incur. If external pressures or emulation explained Brazil's position, Brazil should have joined this convention. And even if it joins it in the future, it would still be necessary to explain why it took more time than with other treaties.

A fourth aspect is that, in order to conclude that external pressures or emulation determined Brazil's decision to join arms control treaties, it is necessary to assume that Brazil is aligned to other democracies. Evidence suggests the opposite, however. As analysed in this and previous chapters, while parts of the bureaucracy in Brazil have a strict sovereigntist approach to foreign affairs, others stress that Brazil is a democracy and should therefore behave like one. For the former, Brazil should make decisions based on interests rather than pressures from other democracies. For the latter, Brazil should adopt a democratic behaviour regardless of what other democracies do. For example, joining the Ottawa Convention or the ATT was perceived by some diplomats as compatible with Brazil's democratic values, even if the two largest democracies in the world (the US and India) were unfavourable or reticent to join them.

[141] Interview (via Skype): Ricardo Ayrosa, 25 Aug 2018.

In summary, even though the creation of international regulations on arms transfers was initiated in 'northern' countries, the Brazilian government joined them when it considered to be in its interest. Pressures and emulation may have played a role, but archival evidence and interviews indicate that a cost-benefit analysis was central in the decision-making. This is why Brazil joined the Ottawa Convention and the ATT but has resisted to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Channels of north-south diffusion: CSOs-to-CSOs

CSOs conduct activities that may result in diffusion of ideas and practices to other countries. This might occur either intentionally (through activities aimed at transferring them) or unintentionally (through emulation). Previous research suggests that diffusion indeed occurs through civil society channels, as in the cases of human rights (Risse and Sikkink 1999), women's rights (True and Mintrom 2001), and environmental policies (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; Tews, Busch, and Jörgens 2003; Busch, Jörgens, and Tews 2005). Would the same occur in the case of arms export control?

Stavrianakis (2010; 2012) argues that 'northern' institutions influence 'southern' CSOs, thereby reproducing a north-south divide, a proposition that members of CSOs have concurred with. According to Daniel Mack, from Sou da Paz, 'in the case of arms control and disarmament, norm establishment and norm entrepreneurship is almost always put on the table for the first time by civil society organizations of northern countries'.[142] Martin Butcher, from Oxfam, has expressed a similar position, arguing that this problem has led Oxfam to change its model: from one in which Western CSOs tell people in the rest of the

[142] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 26 Sep 2017.

world what to do, to a more bottom-up approach. This is being implemented through the establishment of Oxfam affiliates in the global south, such as in Brazil and South Africa.

This raises at least three empirical questions, however. First, through which channels such influence happens? Second, does this influence come only from 'northern' countries? Third, is this observed among Brazilian CSOs? I argue that, although CSOs are diffusers of norms, this does not imply that they reproduce north-south relations, since northern and southern CSOs are usually functionally different. When CSOs in 'southern' countries engage with others in the 'north', their agenda and previous institutional history condition how they incorporate new topics, norms and strategies.

There are at least four pathways through which 'northern' CSOs exert influence on 'southern' ones. *First*, through activists and researchers with experience in developed countries, who might bring different ideas and practices, and shape how local CSOs conduct their activities. This has been empirically observed in two CSOs examined in Brazil: Viva Rio and Igarapé. Viva Rio started with a local approach, working to reduce violence in Rio de Janeiro, but it progressively adopted a broader perspective on the problem of arms control. This happened in part because of the work of Pablo Dreyfus, who had experience at the Small Arms Survey. At Igarapé Institute, a global perspective was introduced since its foundation in 2011, as part of its staff also had experience in the Small Arms Survey.[143] However, concluding that they can shape what local NGOs do would imply that 'northern' activists do not adapt to local circumstances. In Viva Rio, Pablo Dreyfus conducted a research on arms re-exports to Brazil via the black market, a problem not found to the

[143] Interview: Nathan Thompson, Rio de Janeiro, 25 Aug 2016.

same extent in developed countries. In Igarapé, a similar pattern was observed: in discussions on arms transfer control, its members stress impacts on levels of violence in Brazil.

Second, influence might occur through funding. In Viva Rio, the main sources of funding for its project on arms control were the Rockefeller Foundation and the UK's DFID. Through funding, donors might be able to introduce their own agenda. According to Daniel Mack, however, this happens mainly in small countries:

> NGOs in small countries do not have independent funding. So, they need to look for funds. For example, they might ask the Norwegian government what they could fund, and then they would work on that issue. [...]. This creates some limitation on the choices they have.[144]

Although funding can lead to the adoption of practices by recipients, there at least two types of evidence suggesting that this process is conditioned by local dynamics. The first one is that CSOs frequently apply for funding to maintain projects rather than introduce something new. According to Antonio Rangel, Viva Rio did not have to introduce changes into its projects on arms control when it applied for funding from either the Rockefeller Foundation or the DFID.[145] The second one is that there is usually a negotiation between donors and recipients. According to Adriana Abdenur, academic and member of Igarapé, the model of a 'norms cascade' is too simplistic, as ignores the existence of negotiations. The idea of diffusion is problematic because it treats local actors as passive, mere recipients. She described how Igarapé approaches external funding in a certain case:

[144] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 26 Sep 2017.
[145] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.

> In one case, a government wanted Brazil to become a more robust actor in the area of peace and security in South America, through peacekeeping, mediation and peace-building. The normative theory usually says that there is a cascade, and that the strongest actors, through methods of persuasion – and sometimes coercion – push their standards. However, we have our own interests, which may come from the institution, the individual researcher or even from Itamaraty.[146]

Therefore, funding does not imply that CSOs' activities reproduce 'northern' norms, as this depends on interests of local CSOs, activists, researchers or the government. Adriana Abdenur cited an example in which this happened:

> Scandinavian countries and Britain want Brazil to work more in the area of women, peace and security. For Igarapé, it is a very interesting topic. One of the subthemes proposed by funders was sexual abuse by peacekeepers. We did not work with this but found it interesting. Before we started, however, we had an internal discussion on how to approach the topic. The UK, for example, wanted Brazil to host events on sexual abuse in the context of peace operations. We went to Itamaraty, had conversations with diplomats and found out that this was in Itamaraty's interest. That was because there were discussions at the UN about this and due to a good reputation of Brazil in this area. There is therefore a dialogue that influences the decision to participate in a project and how to do it.[147]

She also added that the UK was interested in hosting an event in Brazil on sexual abuse by peacekeepers, but that Igarapé wanted to add a perspective from the 'global south', incorporating China, India and Pakistan, major contributors of UN troops, which eventually occurred. Institutions in Brazil therefore have bargain power.[148]

Third, through information flows. As CSOs in developed countries have more resources to conduct research and disseminate information, the information produced by them is more likely to be used by 'southern' CSOs than vice-versa. And as there is a

[146] Interview: Adriana Abdenur, Rio de Janeiro, 11 Apr 2017.
[147] Ibidem.
[148] Ibidem.

mismatch between policy needs in different settings, CSOs in developing nations might uncritically 'import' policy recommendations and pressure local governments to adopt them. I argue, however, that 'southern' CSOs use knowledge produced by 'northern' CSOs in support of their own activities rather than to replace them. For example, Viva Rio conducted research in Brazil and Paraguay in the late 1990s and early 2000s, collecting information that was useful for the creation of the Disarmament Statute. When the statute was about to be voted in Brazil, however, groups campaigning against it stressed that crimes with firearms had increased in the UK after a stricter gun control law was introduced. Antonio Rangel, from Viva Rio, got in touch with Rebecca Peters, from IANSA, finding that data about the UK used in Brazil had been manipulated.

Fourth, influence occurs through learning. CSOs in Brazil might adopt practices established in other countries as a model or reference to what they should do in Brazil. Nathan Thompson, from Igarapé, suggested that the US system of arms export control could be a model for Brazil:

> I would like to be very critical on the United States, but it has very solid end-user compliance programs. One is in the US State Department, called the Blue Lantern. It does end-user licence checks for private arms dealers in the United States when they want to export, either to a government or to private buyers. The Blue Lantern programme reports to Congress every year.[149]

CSOs also learn from experiences of other CSOs, emulating them. Jefferson Nascimento, from Conectas, emphasised that attending the ATT conference in Cancún in 2015, for example, was important to learn from like-minded CSOs:

[149] Interview: Nathan Thompson, Rio de Janeiro, 25 Aug 2016.

> Conectas did not have much contact with foreign organizations working with this topic [arms exports]. That was the first time that we had contact with Amnesty International, for example. [...] And it was through those contacts that we organised a publication about the arms trade.[150]

Yet this shows that diffusion complements rather than replace local efforts. Contacts between Conectas and Amnesty happened when Brazilian arms exports were already part of Conectas' agenda.

Different institutions for different realities

A major aspect preventing diffusion is that problems in developed countries are – to put it simply – different. Domestic arms control is less problematic in most rich nations (except in the US, of course) because levels of violence are much lower than in Brazil. In certain cases, this has led to diffusion from the south rather than the north. The idea of public destruction of guns, for example, was based on the experience of South Africa. When a public destruction of guns was held in 2001 in Brazil, it therefore mirrored the experience of another 'southern' country.[151] Antonio Rangel emphasised that:

> Regarding research on weapons and arms control, we made more progress than rich countries because they do not have this problem. This problem is ours, [although] in part caused by them. [...] We reached the rock bottom and had to solve it. We had to create arms control campaigns, voluntary disarmament. Other countries, like Angola and Colombia, emulated us. We produced a lot of new information because we had to solve problems that had not been faced before. They either did not exist, were small or there was no information.[152]

[150] Interview: Jefferson Nascimento, São Paulo, 16 Sep 2016.
[151] Interview: Antonio Rangel, Rio de Janeiro, 10 Aug 2016.
[152] Ibidem.

As additional evidence, governments from other 'southern' countries invited Viva Rio to conduct disarmament campaigns due to its experience in Brazil. For example, after Evo Morales was elected president (2006) in Bolivia, the country's vice-president invited Viva Rio to contribute to the creation of arms control legislation in Bolivia. According to Antonio Rangel, Viva Rio contributed to that process due to both solidarity and self-interest, as the lack of control on arms in Bolivia had impacts on Brazil.[153]

This also occurred during ATT negotiations, in which Sou da Paz helped to coordinate a group of CSOs discussing the treaty. According to Daniel Mack, Sou da Paz and other CSOs from the south managed to introduce a 'southern' perspective into discussions on the ATT:

> Latin American and African organizations brought a perspective of armed violence in 'peaceful' situations. Brazil, for example, has had more deaths from armed violence than Syria. This type of violence was not very much in the radar of northern NGOs, which tend to look at the arms problem from a traditional conflict perspective.[154]

There was a process of persuasion of northern CSOs in part because they struggled to fit urban violence into a broader picture of violence as a whole.[155] Also, CSOs from Latin America and Africa sought to include control on ammunition, as well as the need to prevent diversion of weapons. On the latter, they argued that arms exported to governments were occasionally diverted to criminal organisations or terrorists.

In summary, evidence suggests that, although diffusion from 'northern' to 'southern' CSOs occurs, these processes are conditioned by local social and political

[153] Ibidem.
[154] Interview (via Skype): Daniel Mack, 10 Aug 2017.
[155] Ibidem.

settings, as well as the institutional history of CSOs. As examined, the two CSOs that introduced the topic of arms exports in the political agenda in Brazil (Viva Rio and Sou da Paz) had previously worked with domestic gun control. Their work on arms exports came later, complementing rather than radically altering their activities. Although the incorporation of this topic in their agenda occurred in part due to influence from 'northern' CSOs, a learning process was central. They realized that the problem of violence was more complex than initially thought.

Concluding remarks

Does it make sense to talk about a north-south diffusion of norms, rules and institutions? To some extent it does, as governments and other organisations from northern countries have more resources than equivalents in the south, as well as more preponderance in multilateral organisations. This gives them more channels to influence agendas of governments and civil society groups in developing countries. As analysed in this thesis, governments and CSOs from the north have sought to persuade the Brazilian government to change behaviour on arms export control. For example, the US and the UK proposed to the Brazilian government new practices on the use of landmines. In another case, the UK promoted the ATT among various other governments. However, evidence shows that decisions to join these treaties depended on perceived adjustment costs. If practices already adopted coincided with proposed international regulations, Brazil was more likely to join international agreements.

Therefore, democratic institutions in Brazil 'produced' certain policies, but not because they were diffused from advanced democracies. The effect of democracy was

observed initially in Brazil's redemocratization, when a set of liberal values was introduced in the decision-making on arms exports. This was present in decisions on arms exports to Chile and in the arms export policy of the early 1990s, when Brazil stopped supplying weapons to some of its previous customers. To assume that this occurred because of diffusion ignores that, during that period, major democracies were exporting weapons to regimes or groups whose human rights records were poor. The US was arming the *contras* in Nicaragua, for example, while the UK was selling defence weapons to Chile. Brazil sought to incorporate democratic principles in its foreign policy rather than practices from specific countries from the 'north'.

Moreover, democratic institutions allowed the emergence of domestic civil society groups that sought to change Brazil's government behaviour. These groups initially stressed the need to better control arms transfers to neighbouring countries, a topic that became part of their agenda because of high levels of violence in Brazil. This was therefore not an imported agenda from the north. Later, when Viva Rio and other CSOs started looking at impacts of Brazilian arms exports on other peoples, this complemented rather than altered their work. There is no evidence that foreign CSOs shaped what Brazilian CSOs did, although of course they interacted with foreign counterparts.

My claim is that diffusion occurs, and that both governments and CSOs from northern countries seek to do that. Arguing the opposite would ignore that governments and CSOs are frequently interested in changing the behaviour of other governments or CSOs. Nevertheless, this process resembles a negotiation rather than an imposition. I do not claim, however, that a similar pattern would be found in developing countries with fewer resources. Small and/or least developed countries are more likely to have policies and practices shaped by foreign actors, as their leverage is smaller.

Chapter 11 – Conclusions

Arms exports were *constructed* as a humanitarian issue, a process that occurred initially through domestic politics. They became an issue of humanitarian concern in various countries due in part to the existence of democratic institutions, which created favourable conditions for the emergence of norm entrepreneurs. Under these conditions, entrepreneurs organised in groups to promote the idea that humanitarian concerns should be part of governments' decision-making. Although the existence of transnational advocacy networks or proposals to establish international regulations certainly facilitated the work of domestic CSOs' campaigns, neither connections with those networks nor negotiations to create international treaties were necessary conditions for CSOs to start campaigning. If they considered the arms trade as problematic, they campaigned against it regardless.

Furthermore, CSOs are not necessarily aware of the complexity of the arms trade or of the many different factors that governments consider in the decision-making. The fact that a unilateral arms embargo may not reduce the global availability of weapons, for example, is not necessarily an issue of concern for CSOs. They have defended unilateral embargoes even if other countries could free-ride. As an illustration, when activists in Britain campaigned for a UK arms embargo against South Africa, they seldom considered whether this could lead South Africa to import weapons from other countries. And, even when they thought about this issue, they stressed that this could not justify selling arms to a segregationist regime. In another case, when CSOs in Brazil pressured the government to stop sales of anti-riot equipment to countries in the Middle East and North Africa in the early 2010s, they did not calculate whether other countries could free-ride.

The influence of these groups through domestic politics has occurred in at least four ways. First, government *policies* have changed, with humanitarian concerns being now formally part of the decision-making in various countries. In the UK, for example, democratic institutions created favourable conditions for the emergence of groups in civil society seeking to change government behaviour on arms exports. These groups formed advocacy networks, managing to turn arms exports into a contentious issue in Britain's domestic politics. In Brazil, the government started considering humanitarian aspects in decisions on arms exports after transitioning to a democratic regime, a process later reinforced by the work of CSOs.

Second, not only policies but also *practice* has changed. Because of targeted campaigns, the UK government stopped selling weapons to Chile and South Africa, for example, even if guidelines regarding arms sales to human rights violators were unclear, as they were until the 1990s. In Brazil, arms exports became stricter after the end of the military regime, with further restrictions being introduced in exports to Latin American and Caribbean countries after campaigns conducted by Viva Rio.

Third, CSOs' campaigns have led to an increase in the use of evidence in decisions. Based on research conducted by Viva Rio, for example, the Brazilian government introduced restrictions on arms sales to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the UK, CSOs have produced information that later changed government's positions, as in cases regarding the use of British weapons for domestic repression and breaches of embargoes.

Fourth, there have been cognitive changes among elites, both inside and outside governments. CSOs have persuaded diplomatic and intellectual elites through campaigns or direct channels of communication, leading them to believe that having humanitarian

concerns in decisions on arms exports is appropriate. In the UK, this was observed in declarations from members of the Labour Party, journalists and academics. In Brazil, this was observed in interviews with a few diplomats and journalists, as well as in the support that virtually all major media outlets give to CSOs dealing with arms control.

Once humanitarian concerns became part of the decision-making, it was a relatively small step for CSOs to persuade governments to join international agreements. Governments had incentives to seek to 'upload' their standards to the rest of the world so that international norms would resemble their own. From governments' point of view, this would 'level the playing field' and enhance their symbolic capital among domestic and international audiences. Brazil and the UK signed the Ottawa Convention and the ATT, for example, because and after they had adopted most of their provisions. When the content of a treaty did not resemble previously established policies, governments were reticent to sign them due to perceived adjustment costs.

These and other findings are detailed in the next sections, which also explore some of their policy implications for CSOs, governments and the international regulation of arms transfers.

The argument

My central claim is that norms introduced by civil society groups through domestic politics partially shape the way in which decisions on arms exports are made. It is true that governments use arms exports to obtain strategic and economic gains, calculating the extent to which arms sales improves security, gives them leverage on other countries' policies and reduces the costs of developing weapons. However, explaining government

behaviour based only on these factors fails to elucidate why, in various countries, humanitarian concerns are part of the decision-making. A materialist account would stress that these concerns are nothing but a language to disguise strategic behaviour. Yet this could not explain why humanitarian concerns are observed in some situations but not in others, even if structural constraints remain constant.

I argue that looking at domestic politics and the role of norms is necessary to explain this behaviour. As evidence presented in this thesis suggests, democracies export proportionally fewer weapons to autocracies and are more likely to join international agreements on arms export control. Yet this begs the question of what drives them to behave like that. Based on causal mechanisms drawn from democratic peace theory, I argue that norm entrepreneurs play a critical role in raising the salience of agendas. Organised in civil society groups, they 'play the game' in domestic politics to achieve what they want, navigating the system in ways that resemble what other groups do: they lobby government officials, conduct campaigns, and engage with various types of actors, including experts, foundations, other civil society groups, parliamentarians, political parties, private companies, religious groups, sectors of the government and universities. Through these activities, they form advocacy networks, which can raise the political salience of arms exports, and turning it into something that bureaucrats, elites, politicians or voters care about. Their eventual success depends, of course, on many factors, such as the resources they have, the extent to what other actors' interests converge with CSOs', the type of issue being championed, and the overall political and economic context. I do not claim that the existence of CSOs' campaigns or advocacy networks is sufficient or even necessary for an issue to emerge. What I argue is that the work of CSOs makes the emergence of issues more likely.

Therefore, state preferences are in part shaped through domestic politics, being dependent on domestic political systems and activities from norm entrepreneurs. This argument does not diminish the role of international politics, although it puts it into perspective: international bargaining and negotiations occur *after* preferences are formed rather than simultaneously. When government preferences bring costs that are not incurred by other governments, they have incentives to turn their norms into international law.

Major findings

Evidence collected for this research corroborates the six proposed hypotheses. Democracies prefer to export weapons to other democracies, indicating that arms export decisions depend in part on domestic political systems. The behaviour of democratically-elected governments is different, however, not because they are intrinsically more benevolent. Rather, it is the result of the existence of democratic institutions, especially a system of checks and balances, contested elections, and political and civil liberties.

These institutions facilitate the emergence of norm entrepreneurs, whose campaigns create pressure on governments to change behaviour. Activists can also persuade elites, leading them to believe that a status quo is not acceptable, and that changing social norms is therefore necessary. A consensus among elites can be turned into a political project that sectors of the government or political parties will seek to implement.

This implies that the separation between the categories of government and CSOs can be misleading, as CSOs are frequently insiders. In the UK, for example, Labour's position on arms exports was formed through interactions with civil society groups. Even more

important, it was formed when Labour was in opposition: a stricter arms export control was a campaign pledge turned into government policy when Labour was in power. Therefore, although Labour introduced a stricter control on arms exports, this happened because CSOs introduced this issue into the Labour Party in 't – 1'.

Once norms are introduced in the decision-making, they can be sticky, remaining even after groups that introduced them leave power. When this happens, governments and CSOs have incentives to combine forces to promote similar norms to the rest of the world. Although having different motivations, governments and CSOs share a goal of turning domestic norms into international law. This process should not be perceived, however, as a mechanistic flow of norms from the north to the south. The willingness of various African and Latin American countries to strengthen control on arms transfers indicates that norm diffusion is not a mere instrument to reproduce north-south inequalities.

In addition to testing these hypotheses, the research has revealed unanticipated patterns. One of them is that different forms of organisation of civil society groups can produce similar outcomes. In the UK, most organisations dealing with arms exports are organised as grassroots movements, with connections to churches, community groups, constituency labour parties and universities. Organisations like Amnesty, Anti-Apartheid Movement, Chile Solidarity Campaign and Oxfam were hubs, orchestrating actions and skills from various sources. In Brazil, on the contrary, CSOs dealing with arms exports have no features of a grassroots movement, being formed mainly by intellectual elites in large cities, especially Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Although they have also formed advocacy networks, these networks are also composed mainly by elites.

Another finding is that influence of civil society groups occurs through different channels. While in the UK political parties play a central role in turning new norms into government policies, CSOs' influence in Brazil occurs through direct contacts with bureaucrats (mainly diplomats) and parliamentarians. They work mainly with atomized officials, engaging directly with whoever has power in ministries, departments or parliamentary committees.

Theoretical implications

There are a few theoretically important findings in this thesis. First, the state behaviour concerning external sales of weapons – usually considered as a security issue – is shaped in part through domestic politics. Evidence presented in chapters 3, 4 and 6 indicates that humanitarian concerns in the decision-making on arms exports are more likely to exist in democratic governments. Yet, what explains this? I have argued that activities conducted by norm entrepreneurs make the presence of humanitarian concerns in the decision-making more likely. This argument goes beyond what is claimed in the literature about the role of political parties or inter-bureaucratic disputes on foreign policy decisions. Simmons (1997), for example, explored how political party preferences in Europe resulted in different foreign economic policies. Although her finding is important, it begs the question of where parties' preferences on foreign policy come from, as well as why policies introduced by certain parties remain after changes of government.

Second, civil society organisations can change the state behaviour even in hard cases, suggesting that they should be able to do the same in other areas. Decisions on arms exports were historically taken with little or no influence from civil society, whose limited

resources pale in comparison to strategic and economic interests from governments and companies. Even under such unfavourable circumstances, however, norm entrepreneurs managed to raise the political salience of arms exports. Although the literature has argued in similar terms concerning the chemical weapons ban and the non-use of nuclear weapons, my claim goes beyond: CSOs' activities can make states *unilaterally* change behaviour. This is a remarkable outcome because unilateral controls put states into a disadvantaged situation against others, while potentially having no impact on overall levels of armament in arms importing countries.

Third, this thesis has demonstrated that the emergence of international norms depends on previous domestic and regional practices. After adopting norms, governments have incentives to 'upload' them into the international level, thus creating international regimes based on their own standards. This implies that agreements with high adjustment costs are less likely to be approved, especially if costs are imposed on great powers.

Fourth, the fact that CSOs 'play the game' in *domestic* politics does not imply absence of transnational cooperation among them. I argue nonetheless that transnational links between norm entrepreneurs are not as 'thick' as part of the literature suggests. The AAM, for example, was mainly a British organisation, targeting the British government. Also, the AAM was a product of British society, which is suggested by its organisation as a grassroots movement and its links with Labour and the churches. The same applies to Viva Rio in Brazil. Its initiative against arms sales to Paraguay depended on the local circumstances in which Viva Rio operated. Although Viva Rio had links with a broader international movement of arms control, they had a complementary role on its agenda.

Policy implications for CSOs

The success of civil society campaigns for a stricter arms export control indicates that government policies and practice can change even in areas where states have almost absolute control. Although governments are likely to keep using arms exports to pursue strategic and economic objectives, humanitarian norms have been introduced into what was a 'new frontier' for CSOs. This has been achieved not only in advanced, stable democracies, but also in young democratic regimes. Therefore, a long and stable trajectory of democratic institutions does not seem to be a necessary condition for the existence of humanitarian concerns regarding arms exports.

Another implication is that, in addition to factors that are necessary to the success of almost any organisation, such as available resources, competence, and flexibility, evidence corroborates what is argued by (Keck and Sikkink 1998b, 27): issues involving bodily harm are more likely to emerge, especially when there is a convincing causal story. This explains why the UK imposed arms embargoes but not economic embargoes on South Africa and Chile. Weapons could cause bodily harm in ways that other forms of trade and investment cannot. In addition, there was a clear causal link between the manufacture of weapons, the authorization to export them, and levels of repression in importing countries. Also, this is probably why campaigns to stop arms sales to human rights violators were more successful than those targeting sales to poor countries: the connection between arms sales and poverty was not as clear as the connection between arms sales and violence. As an illustration, although Oxfam's main area of expertise is development, it achieved more success when it framed arms exports in terms of human rights.

Concerning lack of transparency, although high levels of secrecy hinder the work of CSOs, norm entrepreneurs found ways of getting around this problem: they push for more transparency, establish connections with government officials, obtain support from parliamentarians, and even send people to conflict zones to collect information. As pointed out in this thesis, government departments and parliamentarians may even use information obtained by CSOs to inform their decisions.

Another implication derives from the finding that CSOs dealing with arms exports in the UK and Brazil have different organisational structures. British CSOs are mainly locally-based, interacting with various types of community groups. Small and medium-sized towns frequently have local norm entrepreneurs and campaigns, which can be orchestrated by larger organisations. Saferworld is the only British CSO among those analysed in this thesis that resembles Brazilian CSOs dealing with arms exports. They are a hybrid of NGO and think-tank, composed by a blend of experts and activists, based mainly on large towns. Yet this does not seem to prevent their influence, suggesting that there is more than one channel for CSOs to change norms.

Also, when promoting international norms, CSOs should consider the extent to what similar norms are already followed domestically or regionally. This is because states consider adjustment costs, preferring agreements that do not require substantial change of behaviour. If costs are incurred mainly by medium or small countries, agreements might be made possible using side-payments, partially compensating for necessary adjustments. Agreements are less likely to be approved, however, if international norms imply costly changes to powerful countries.

Finally, although norms on arms exports can change, it is important not to lose sight of the strategic and economic benefits enjoyed by governments and companies. This

implies that campaigns targeting large arms deals or sales to countries considered strategic are less likely to succeed than campaigns focusing on small deals or non-strategic countries.

Policy implications for governments

Accountability has been brought to the area of arms exports. In various countries, governments are not anymore making decisions without explaining them to society. For example, in the mid-2010s, the Executive in the UK had its decision-making regarding arms sales to Saudi Arabia scrutinized by parliamentarians and the Supreme Court. In Brazil, something similar happened regarding arms exports to neighbouring countries: the Executive has become accountable and has been scrutinized by civil society groups and parliamentary inquiries.

Evidence indicates that this outcome is explained not only by structural constraints: arms export policies are in part shaped through interest-group politics, with various groups seeking to shape policies according to their preferences. While a substantial part of the literature has explored the influence of weapons manufacturers or those representing their interests, this thesis has focused on activities of CSOs. As other groups in society, they 'play the game' of politics to further their agenda, even if their goals are based on principles rather than material interests. This has important implications for governments. Rather than being insulated from other social forces, CSOs can cooperate with politicians and bureaucrats in both the formulation and implementation of policies. Concerning *policy formulation*, collaboration is observed in relations between CSOs and government departments, parliamentarians and political parties. In the UK, civil society groups have contributed to shape Labour's position on arms exports at least since the 1960s. Evidence

also shows that the UK position on the ATT was formed alongside CSOs, which were consulted by government departments before, during and after negotiations. In Brazil, they were essential for the establishment of controls on exports of weapons to neighbouring countries, as well as during the ATT ratification process, providing information to diplomats and parliamentarians. In these cases, CSOs acted more as partners of governments than external sources of pressure.

Concerning *policy implementation*, a similar pattern has been observed. In the UK, CSOs provide information to government departments, contributing to enforce government policies. As stressed in interviews with activists and government officials, members of CSOs go to places where government representatives do not go, collecting information that governments can use. In Brazil, CSOs contributed to parliamentary inquiries held in 2005, which examined arms export control to neighbouring countries. The information they provided contributed to keep a 150%-tariff on arms exports. Also, CSOs in Brazil are perceived as allies by a few diplomats, as it occurred during the ATT negotiations.

Collaboration can therefore occur at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, CSOs can provide legitimacy to government policies, provide evidence or mobilize different social groups. Internationally, governments and CSOs have incentives to cooperate if they share the goal of standardizing norms on arms transfers. For CSOs, this relation is important because they depend on governments to create international agreements, as well as because governments can use side-payments to change other states' behaviour. For governments, CSOs can be an invaluable asset, as they can increase the legitimacy of government proposals. Also, they contribute to solve a credible commitment problem: if a government's commitment is backed by CSOs, it would have

fewer incentives to cheat because this might be revealed by civil society groups. As CSOs are frequently perceived as neutral (monitoring the state behaviour and providing credible information), international agreements are more likely to emerge if they are backed by CSOs.

Policy implications for the international regulation of arms transfers

A substantial part of the IR literature has explored the extent to what international regulations change state behaviour. This thesis has had a different approach, looking at international regulations as a by-product of political changes at the domestic level. Preferences are formed domestically, resulting from interactions between groups inside and outside the state. And it is based on these preferences that governments engage in negotiations and bargaining with other states.

This finding has at least two implications for the international regulation of arms transfers. The first is that international agreements are less likely to emerge if they do not coincide with changes that occurred domestically, especially in powerful countries. Joining international treaties is usually a relatively small step for them, reflecting domestic changes that occurred in 't – 1' and a government's willingness to export norms to the rest of the world. Creating consensus domestically is therefore more than a detail in the emergence of international norms: it is a central part of it. This is because activities conducted by norm entrepreneurs in powerful countries make the emergence of international norms more likely in 't + 1'. This happens regardless of whether people conducting those activities (a local community group in the UK, for example) are aware of this.

The second is that the idea of a north-south diffusion of norms through international law can be misleading. In practice, regulations frequently emerge domestically, due to either idealistic or consequentialist reasons, and regardless of a country's level of development. For example, various African countries are interested in a stricter regulation of arms transfers to curb the illicit inflow of guns from abroad, while others (like the UK) are interested in exporting their own norms to 'level the playing field' or to enhance their symbolic capital.

Parting words

Decision-making on arms exports is dependent on dynamics of domestic politics. Structural constraints play a role, but governments' responses to systemic pressures are conditioned by their type of polity, the strength of lobbying activities from domestically-organised groups, and by whether norm entrepreneurs are successful in promoting their agendas.

Although norm entrepreneurs can be either inside or outside state institutions, their organisation in civil society groups plays a critical role in changing norms. *Change* is their 'business model': their success is measured by the extent to what they can introduce change, while other groups prosper from the status quo, including various government institutions. Yet, for the very reason that governments are good in reproducing social practices, government practices are sticky. Once introduced, norms are not easily removed, even if strategic incentives to export weapons increase. During the 1990s, for example, lower levels of military expenditures and a decrease in global arms imports created incentives for the UK to expand arms sales to authoritarian countries. As explored in chapter 4, however, the opposite occurred, with sales to authoritarian regimes

decreasing in importance. Therefore, if CSOs manage to change governments' behaviour, new practices can survive even after groups that once introduced them leave power.

This explains also why governments seek to promote norms internationally. When norms are sticky domestically, and there are costs not incurred by other states, they have incentives to change other states' behaviour. Enhancing their symbolic capital among domestic and international audiences is also an objective: at almost no cost, governments can promote themselves as innovative, modern and responsible. Of course, the capacity to effectively change norms at the international level depends on various factors, especially the power of states promoting norms. A small, non-influential country seeking to introduce a new norm is less likely to succeed than an established power, with a large diplomatic network and availability of resources, which can be used for side-payments. Changing the behaviour of influential countries through their domestic politics is therefore critical to change international norms.

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