ABSTRACT

France and Japan — 1850-1885: An Assessment of French Influence and Diplomacy

This thesis studies the encounter of France and Japan over a period of thirty-five years, during which Japanese influence on France was marginal, limited to artistic circles in Paris, whereas French influence in Japan was considerable.

By European standards Japan in the 1850s was a backward, feudal, and isolated country. Japan, unlike almost every other nation in Asia, was not colonised. Yet it would have seemed preposterous in the 1850s to imagine that Japan would become one of the world's major powers. However, following the opening of the country in 1854, Japan experiences a major transformation that touched every aspect of its society.

The forces that propelled Japan into the modern world were indigenous, nonetheless in this transformation, Western influence and models were significant determining factors. Although the Japanese government at one time or another employed foreign instructors from numerous countries (including Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Russia, Sweden, Austria, China, Korea and Canada), the four Western countries which were necessarily to have the greatest impact were Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States.

Two basic questions arise from the part played by France in Japan's transformation; namely, first, to what extent the impact of France affected Japanese policy (both before and and after the Restoration), either through officials representing France in Japan (chapters 2 and 4) or through enterprising individuals or groups acting in a private capacity (chapters 5, 6 and 7); and, secondly, why Japan sought direct French assistance in the development of some sectors of her industry

(chapter 8), her army (chapter 9) and her legal structure (chapter 10).

A third interesting question is the extent to which French influence in Japan reflected the degree of intensity of French diplomatic activity in the country. As will be seen, the period in which France can be said not only to have had the greatest influence in comparison with other years, but indeed the greatest influence in comparison with the other powers, was in the closing years of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The intense activity of Léon Roches, France's diplomatic representative at the time, has indeed led some historians to explain this period of Franco-Japanese relations in terms of an imperialist policy on the part of France in Japan under the aegis of Napoleon III. Chapters 1 and 2 (covering the period prior to the Restoration) and chapters 3 and 4 (looking at the period after the Restoration) indicate that there is a correlation between French influence and French diplomacy. (Yet (as chapters 5 to 10 and the Conclusion suggest) this correlation between influence and diplomacy provides only part of the answer to the question. The choice of Western models, influences or advisers by the Japanese government was not determined solely byits diplomatic or economic relations with Western countries. Japan chose and adapted those Western influences that seemed the most desirable in terms of her aims and ambitions.

This thesis is based on certain assumptions about the course of French foreign policy during the Second Empire and in the early years of the Third Republic. It is wrong, for example, to interprest French policy toward Japan as a reflection of the imperialism of Napoleon III. The error arises from a fundamental misunderstanding of the <u>modus operandi</u> of French imperialism and from studying Franco-Japanese relations outside the context of French foreign policy in general. Expansionism during the Second Empire, and in the first fifteen years or so of the

Third Republic, was rarely determined in Paris; although there are some exceptions, such as Napoleon III's Mexican adventure. For the most part the architects of French imperialism during the Second Empire and Third Republic were individuals, "men on the spot", or certain groups of individuals, such as the army or the missionaries. These individuals (men such as Garnier, Dupuis, Lyautey or Brazza), or the army and navy, acted independently and then presented their governments with faits accomplis. More often than not, various French governments, including that of Napoleon III, had to restrain the imperialists, rather than urge them on.

French governments had little interest in Japan and certainly evolved no imperial or colonial policy in regard to that country. Yet the activities of certain Frenchmen in Japan, diplomats (chapters 1 and 2), military officers (chapter 6) and missionaries (chapter 7), indicated on their part a desire to involve France more deeply in Japanese affairs and to resort to more forceful policies. So far as Frenchmen at home are concerned, interest in Japan (apart from a few academics and artists) was limited to those concerned with the silk industry and the missionaries. French sericulturalists tried to influence the French government in such matters as the trade in raw silk and silkworm eggs, and the opening of the interior of Japan to allow Frenchmen to penetrate the areas of sericulture. They opposed what was alleged to be an attempt by the Japanese government to monopolise the nation's silk export business; and French sericulturists generally urged a lowering of export duties. But there is no evidence to suggest that the French silk industry sought to persuade the government to adopt an imperial or colonial policy towards Japan. In terms of an official policy vis à vis Japan, this thesis would indicate that on the whole there was no such thing, except in a negative

sense, namely a desire to maintain the status quo and, above all, not to get involved in Japanese affairs if this were to culminate in costly military intervention. The policies of individual Frenchmen in Japan, however, add up to something completely different and form the main subject of this thesis.

Although the course of French imperialism and diplomacy outside Europe may have been diffuse, dependent more on activities by Frenchmen on the periphery than on decisions taken in Paris, there would seem to be one common thread linking Frenchmen abroad with their compatriots at home, namely a desire to extend French cultural influence throughout the world. What some historians have seen as a national obsession for prestige of grandeur, stemmed as much from culturalism as it did from nationalism. Concepts such as the mission civilisatrice or la France d'outremer were more than ideological justifications for crude economic imperialism. They were ends in themselves, eventhough they might secure economic, political or military advantages. In other words, without denying the link that existed between cultural imperialism and economic, political or military interests, those carrying out, or attempting to carry out, the mission civilisatrice did not necessarily perceive that other advantages might be gained. Thus although French missionaries (chapter 7) occasionally spoke of the political and commercial advantages for France should the Japanese be converted to Catholicism, and although the French military instructors in Japan (chapter 9) sometimes referred to the usefulness of their mission for reasons of strategy in the Far East, and even though originally the French management of the Yokosuka shipyard was seen as serving France's economic interests (chapter 8), the desire of all these groups to extend or simply to maintain their influence reflected the overwhelming preoccupation with the prestige and mission of France.

Belief in a cultural mission, however, too easily turns into cultural arrogance, which in turn can severely restrict vision and understanding. Many of the Frenchmen who appear in this thesis (especially in chapters 4 and 7) were indeed imprisoned within the attitudes that prevailed in Europe at the time, namely racial and cultural attitudes reflecting the theories of social Darwinism. The thesis does, however, provide two exceptions. The first, Charles de Montblanc (chapter 5), while recognising a useful role for European influence, had no hesitation, after a profound study of Japan's history, human and natural resources, in predicting a brilliant future for the country. The second is Gustave Boissonade (chapter 10) who sought to bring to Japan the light and experience of French civilisation in one particular area, namely law, all the while attempting to marry the cultural importation with the local needs and customs. The tenor of his works indicated a definite inclination to educate the Japanese, all the while displaying a sensitivity in respect to indigenous traditions, without necessarily approving of these <u>in toto</u>.

The attitudes of Frenchmen — official and non-official — provide a picture which can be fitted into the more general framework of the attitudes and policies of citizens of a major European power towards a non-European society. Secondly, and still within the larger framework, policies emerging as a result of mutual economic dependency (in the question of silk studied in chapter 1 and 3) provide an example of the influence of economic relations on diplomatic policies. Franco-Japanese relations during this period, it is suggested, tell us something about France in the period, and about various groups of Frenchmen as representativeof the society that nurtured them. Thirdly there emerges the response of Japan to Frenchmen, French policies, influence and institutions. One purpose of

this thesis is to illustrate the way the Japanese governments (before and after the Restoration) behaved in relation to Frenchmen both in and out of Japan. Thus we see not only the ambitions harboured by the governments or other institutions (e.g. the han as in chapter 5 or the army in chapter 9), but also the methods they used in dealing with Westerners; in this case Frenchmen. It will be argued at the end that in spite of mutual economic dependency, and despite certain French influences in a number of fields, no great rapprochement between the two countries was realised, even though there was at least one occasion (chapter 4) when an entente, or indeed alliance, could have been to the benefit of both.

That no substantial rapprochement was achieved was due, in part, to the ineffectiveness of the policies of Frenchmen in Japan and, in part also, to the fact that in some cases Japanese ambitions and needs were incompatible with French influence or desires.

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FRANCE AND JAPAN — 1850-1885:
AN ASSESSMENT OF FRENCH INFLUENCE AND DIPLOMACY

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List of Abbreviations

Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
CP = Correspondance Politique
CC = Correspondance Commerciale et Consulaire
CPC = Correspondance Politique des Consuls
M & D = Mémoires et Documents

Marine = Archives of the French Ministry of the Navy

Army = Archives of the Historical Department of the Army, Vincennes

BPP = British Parliamentary Papers

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CHAPTER 1.

Franco-Japanese Trade 1860-1868

The opening of Japan (1854), the expedition of a diplomatic mission under Baron Gros[1] in 1858 to conclude France's first treaty with Japan and the taking up of residence in the country of a French diplomatic agent the following year coincided with two significant developments in France. In the first place the establishment of the Second Empire (1852) witnessed a renewal of assertive and in some cases aggressive foreign policy both in Europe and in the Latin American, African and Asian continents. Secondly, in the same period the important French silk industry[2]

1. Following the murder of Chapdelaine and Napoleon III's decision to join the new British expedition in China, Baron Gros was appointed to join Elgin in order to represent France's interests. It was while Gros was in China, that the government, "...thought that... maybe he should attempt with success the opening of negotiations with Japan..." CP, vol. I 16 May 1857, "Projet d'Instruction pour le Japon à M. le Baron Gros." For details of the Gros mission to Japan, see de Chassiron, Notes Sur le Japon, la Chine et l'Inde and de Moges, Souvenirs d'Une Ambassade en Chine et au Japon.

2. Sericulture and the silk industry in general had been an important aspect of the French economy since the 14th century. From that time until the middle of the 19th century the French silk industry was entirely independent of foreign imports at every stage of production: growing the mulberry trees, breeding the silkworms, weaving and designing. Silk made Lyons the important commercial centre it was and provided the capital for the formation of financial institutions, notably the Credit Lyonnais. With production, weaving, trade, marketing (la bourse de la soie) and numerous ancillary services the silk industry in France was an important sector of employment. See J. Bouvier, Le Credit Lyonnais de 1863 a 1882: Les Annees de Formation d'Une Banque de Depots and P. Clerget, Les Industries de la Soie en France.

suffered what could have been a fatal set-back: an epidemic (the pébrine) among French silkworms which virtually brought to an end indigenous production of raw silk.[1] The silkworm disease affected all of Europe and parts of the Levant, in consequence the sources of raw silk in China and Japan (neither of which had been touched by the plague) became of primary importance for the French silk industry and therefore for the French economy as a whole.[2]

The period covered in this and the following chapter was one of military weakness, political confusion and confrontation and economic dislocation in Japan. In France, the situation was the reverse, military strength, political stability under a strong régime and economic expansion. In studying the nature and extent of Franco-Japanese trade, we will have to ask whether French policy in Japan was determined, as one source asserts, by 'the colonial aims of Napoleon III and his envoy'.[3] Another author states that, 'There is no evidence that France was bent on

1. Before 1800 French production of raw silk had never surpassed 100,000 kilogrammes of cocoons; from the very beginning of the 19th century it made rapid strides, reaching a peak in 1853 of 26 million kilogrammes. In 1856, as a result of the epidemic, the harvest of cocoons had fallen to 7½ million cocoons and by 1865 to 5½ millions. see P. Clerget, op. cit. p. 10/11
2. For France's participation in the second China war of 1859-60, see chapters XI, XII, XIV and XV in J.F. Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia.
3. E.H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, p. 46

transforming Japan into another Indochina, but her rulers clearly had economic and political aims there...' and that therefore, 'It is in terms of this unobtrusive and indirect economic imperialism that France's actions in Japan can best be explained'.[1] I believe that this and the following chapter will show that although French policy recognised the need for political conditions in Japan conducive to good trading relations, never in this period was the use of force for achieving these ends entertained in Paris, irrespective of the activities of the French agents which might have suggested an imperialist policy. French policy in Japan was neither colonial, nor imperialistic, unobtrusive or otherwise. The errors of interpretation that have arisen are a result of the assumption that the policies, intrigues or activities of French diplomatic agents in Japan necessarily reflected the official line in Paris.

In the first instance it should be noted that French policy in the Far East during this period consisted of an attempt to follow Britain's lead and to cooperate, rather than compete, with Britain. In his instructions Gros was told that,

1. M. Medzini, "Leon Roches in Japan, 1864-68", in Papers on Japan, Vol. II, August 1963, compiled by the East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, p. 183 and 196.

'The Government of the Emperor has for a long time been convinced that France cannot continue to remain behind those nations which have already sought to secure for their commerce access to a rich and populated country and that the moment has come for France to place herself on an equal footing with those powers which have preempted her in that direction.'[1] There was no intention on the part of France to attempt to monopolise the Japanese market, but that both Britain and France 'simply intend to demand similar concessions which they will be happy to see equally come to benefit other nations and the general commerce of the world'.[2] French commerce in the Far East, both in China and Japan, was never more than a fraction of Britain's, so it is important to note that in the 1840's and 50's British commerce harboured no great ambitions in Japan: 'Japan had not captured the imagination of the merchants as China had done, nor was there any general belief that Japan had unlimited sources of wealth waiting to be tapped by British enterprise.'[3] The motivations of Britain and France in joining the United States and the Netherlands in securing treaty relations

1. CP, Vol.I, 16 May 1857, "Projet d'Instruction pour le Japon à M. le Baron Gros"
2. ibid
3. W.G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, p.195

with Japan were not based on any expectations of great economic advantages. Indeed, the whole question of Japan both in London and Paris was of very secondary importance.[1]

Franco-Japanese Commercial Relations, 1859-1864

The first experience of trading with Japan seemed to confirm the lack of enthusiasm it had inspired in Britain and France. There was intense economic activity of a sort, but one which could not make any claims to permanence, namely transactions in gold - a very lucrative business on a short term basis due to Japan's disproportionate gold-silver ratio compared with the rest of the world.[2] Duchesne de Bellecourt, head of the first French diplomatic mission in Japan, complained that the Western merchants arriving from China were

> 'much more desirous to realise any sort of profit on a temporary speculation, than to establish firm and serious establishments. In any case this speculation is precarious; for the little security which is guaranteed to us in these regions, discourages many people, and if

1. 'It is a measure of Japan's unimportance that in 1846 the suppression of piracy in Borneo was numbered among the more important duties which prevented the China squadron from visiting Japan'. Beasley, op. cit., p.196 More important events such as the Crimean War (see P.E. Eckel, "The Crimean War and Japan", Journal of Asian Studies , vol. III, p. 109 -), The Indian Mutiny and the second China campaign were further to delay British overtures to Japan.
2. see Allen and Donnithorne, op. cit., p.199 ff. and J. McMaster, "The Japanese Goldrush of 1859", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XIX, p. 273 -

> this state of things continues, the foreign colony will see its number diminish considerably, which today counts approximately 120 people.' [1]

Of these only a handful were French, and not all of them represented French companies; one at least was working with a British firm, and another represented a Swiss firm.[2] Duchesne de Bellecourt promised, 'I will do my best to answer to the desires of our nationals; but I must regretfully reiterate, I fear that the hopes which brought them to Japan will not be completely realised.'[3]

Precarious and unrewarding as trade with Japan may have been to the Western powers in general in the years immediately following the opening of the country, it was particularly so for France, whose trade lagged far behind that of Britain, the United States and the Netherlands.[4] For the year 1860 whereas 52 British, 35 American and 14 Dutch ships entered Kanagawa, there were only 2 French vessels.[5] France could not be said to have any interest in the Japanese trade.

The situation, however, was to change dramatically. The first entry of Japanese silk on the European market was the arrival of 3,555 bales of silk in London in 1859.[6] The first

1. CP vol. II Duchesne de Bellecourt to Ministry, 24 March 1860
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
4. CC vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 16 August 1861
5. CC vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 1 September 1860
6. P. Clerget, op. cit., p. 59

...tch of Japanese silk, 'either because of the nature of the silk, or because of the clean handsome thread, gave rise to general admiration'[1] plus the very important fact that the silk was cheap. In time France became a very important buyer of everything connected with Japanese silk: cocoons, silkworm eggs, raw silk, silk waste and eventually finished silk materials.

The cause of this dramatic change was to be found in the devastation created in France and Italy by the pebrine, resulting in a catastrophic fall in production. French sericulturalists, aided by the Societe d'Acclimatisation, desperately sought to import silkworms from abroad to replace the ravaged European strains. However, to their great dismay, none of the silkworms so far imported had survived in the French climate.[2] Then an important event happened.

In a dispatch of September 1861, de Bellecourt was able to write:-

> 'I was very pleased in regard to... a consignment of Japanese silkworm eggs, which nourish themselves on oak leaves. The Société d'Acclimentation had made experiments on these grains, which resulted in a complete success and I am delighted by the congratulations I have received in this respect from the committee, although the praise which has been given to me is due in the greatest part to the

LA SÉRICULTURE, LE COMMERCE DES SOIES ET DES GRAINES ET L'INDUSTRIE DE LA SOIE AU JAPON

1. E. de Bavier, ~~op. cit.~~, p. 66
2. see Le Moniteur des Soies, 2 December 1865

> person who helped me in this discovery, M. Bourret, young French merchant established in Yokohama and a great expert in the matter of silks.'[1]

There can be no doubt that trade with Japan became vital for the French silk industry. In the pages that follow we will see how silk interests, as expressed in Le Moniteur des Soies of Lyons, responded to changing political and economic conditions in Japan. We will also note the commercial developments between the two countries illustrated by available statistics. All this will have to be borne in mind, however, when considering the important question whether the significant change in the commercial relations similarly affected political relations. What follows is the economic framework in which the political aspects of Franco-Japanese relations will be studied in chapter 2. And the question will be asked whether there is sufficient justification for the claim that following the successful experiments, 'overnight Japan became a most important country for France.'[2]

It should be noted that the trade in silkworm eggs and cocoons raised grave problems. M. Bourret, mentioned above and representative in Japan of the important Remi-Schmidt silk

1. CC vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 5 September 1861
2. M. Medzini, French Policy in Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime, p. 53

company of Lyons, attempted in December 1861 to export a certain quantity of silkworm eggs sold to him by a Japanese merchant: this cargo was seized by Japanese customs,

> 'on the pretext, not that the export was forbidden, but that the Japanese authorities had to be informed of the name of the native seller. The authorities of Kanagawa-Yokohama, no doubt, all the while avoiding having to pronounce themselves on the prohibition of exporting silkworm eggs, nevertheless wanted to render these exports impossible by meting out to native sellers the severest punishments...'[1]

De Bellecourt succeeded in getting the cargo freed from the customs after having protested that this action violated the treaties and demanded 5,000 mexican dollars for losses incurred.[2]

In a subsequent dispatch to Paris in January 1862, de Bellecourt included a letter from Bourret to himself where he listed ten obstacles which the Japanese Government was placing in the way of French commerce. He cited first of all, the penalty of death imposed on any native engaged in the export of cocoons and silkworm eggs, a matter of considerable importance in view of the fact that:

> 'It is only thanks to the import of dry cocoons into France that our silk industry has been able for the last ten years to palliate the insufficiency of the harvests of cocoons, and, in regard to silkworm eggs, since the same period, we are searching for a breed which will be

1. CC vol. I , de Bellecourt to Ministry, 31 December 1861
2. ibid

> able to regenerate the sick eggs of Europe and prevent the total loss of the silkworm in France. Now Japanese silkworm eggs seem to be able to resolve this serious problem, as a result of tests of acclimatisation carried out in 1860, and without any disadvantages Japan can easily contribute to lighten the burden of our French silk industry.'

Bourret then produced a number of figures to prove that the demands of the French industry would in no way cause any harm to Japan's sericulture.[1]

The fact of the matter was that the Japanese economy was suffering considerably, at least in the short term, because of its new trade relations. Thus as early as October 1860, Japanese officials had complained to Bellecourt,

> 'When our country entered into relations with the foreigners we concluded the treaties a bit too hastily. Japan was opened too abruptly;in view of the long isolation which had separated it from other nations, these treaties have resulted in major inconveniences. To begin with the foreign trade has brought a considerable increase in the prices of all things, which causes a great deal of discontent among the people, and we have not found that our commercial relations have brought us great profit; and yet the treaties had as their object reciprocal advantages.[2]

Such was indeed the case. Although Japan may not have experienced economic dislocations comparable to those in China resulting from the opium trade, the impact of foreign trade did cause serious difficulties. To begin with the speculation on the gold-silver ratio resulted in an outflow of specie. But apart

1. CC vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 20 January 1862, enclosure letter of Bourret to de Bellecourt, dated 13 January 1862
2. CP, vol.II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 11 October 1860, Proceedings of an interview with the Japanese Ministry on the subject of the delay of the opening of ports in 1862-63

from simply the speculation, trade too had damaging effects:

> 'The effect of the impact of the outside world was especially obvious in the relative prices of the period 1859-67. There was an enormous rise in the price of raw silk, egg cards, rice, tea, and, in general, articles for which foreign demand became keen. On the other hand, imports of cheap cotton textiles, yarn and other products of machine industry brought about a steep fall in the price of such goods. Naturally these changes caused economic dislocation. The silk-weaving trade suffered through the rise in price of its raw material, and the producers of cotton textiles were damaged by the influx of foreign goods.

For reasons both economic and political, the Shogunate dispatched an embassy to Europe in the early part of 1862. As with many of the subsequent Japanese missions, including the Iwakura mission ten years later, its precise object was not clear, apart from the desired delay of the opening of two ports and two cities, Hiogo, Niigata, Edo and Osaka. In Paris, the Japanese envoys received a memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, complaining in general terms that the Japanese were not faithfully carrying out the stipulations of the treaties and more specifically protesting against the Government for prohibiting Japanese merchants from selling dry cocoons and silkworm eggs directly to foreign traders.[2] The view that Japan had become "an important country for France", however,

1. G.C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, p.28
2. M & D, vol. I, 24 April 1862, Note addressed to the Japanese Envoys

seems difficult to sustain, when considering the dispatch from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to de Bellecourt in June, 1862, following the passage of the Japanese envoys:

> 'I saw Mr. Alcock on the occasion of his trip to Paris. The conversation I had with him confirmed for me once again, after everything you have written to me, that we cannot demand of Japan the strict and immediate execution of our treaties, without running the risk of a political rupture with this government, in other words without exposing ourselves to getting involved in all the difficulties and all the expenses of a far away expedition, the utility of which would probably be, in the final analysis, very debatable.'[1]

The Japanese mission to Europe of 1862 culminated in the London Protocol of 6 June 1862, which among other things, demanded a far greater flexibility on the part of Japan in regard to trade.[2] Britain, by far the greatest importer of Japanese silk goods, had joined France in seeking a considerable relaxation in the question of export of dry cocoons and silkworm eggs.[3] But the outcome of the mission in the short term by no means signalled an improvement either in political or economic

1. CC vol. II, Minister of Foreign Affairs to de Bellecourt, 10 June 1862
2. see Document 37, "The London Protocol, 6 June 1862" in W.G. Beasley, Select Documents..., p. 216/7
3. see numbers 4, 13, 21, 23-25, 27, 28 in "Correspondence Respecting Affairs in Japan, 19 April 1862 to 27 December 1862" in BPP, General Affairs, Japan, Vol. I. British trade had greatly improved by 1861, '...Britain's share in Japanese trade had amounted to a million sterling, and profits were large', see G. Fox, Britain and Japan 1858-1883 p.30

relations between the Western powers and Japan, the political questions obviously having a very considerable impact on commerce. Indeed in the years 1863 to 1865 the confrontations between the Western powers and Japan were intense with both some Japanese and some Europeans in Japan believing in the inevitability of an all out war.

In view of the importance of the Far East for the French silk industry, it is perhaps not surprising to note that the French newspaper which reported in the greatest detail the political, social and economic conditions and changes in Japan was Le Moniteur des Soies. Rarely did a week pass without some comment, or indeed lengthy article on some aspect of Japan. And so in early 1863 Le Moniteur des Soies, after commenting on the constant political turbulence in China, advised, 'Our foreign trade must ... force itself to make up the insufficiency of our own resources in raw silk, by intelligent purchases in foreign markets, notably in Japan, which produces not less than 135,000 bales (more than 4 million kilogrammes).'[1] By the summer of the same year, however, the newspaper was anxiously awaiting news from the Far East, in regard to the 'possibility of war with Japan;

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 14 March 1863

and noted the extent to which affairs in Japan, 'continue to completely absorb the attention of the world interested in the silk trade.'[1] It warned that the 'breaking down of relations with the Empire of Japan is of the greatest importance'[2]. Detailed accounts of the Japanese political scene, in so far as these were possible under the circumstances, tended to confirm, in the eyes of the silk industry, that 'The Japanese government, the Taikun is for us; our enemies are several powerful princes (daimios), whom the Taikun would be delighted to see us punish.'[3]

The importance of Japan to these silk interests, even compared to China, was crucial: 'It is assuredly relevant to note that in the short period of three and a half years since the opening of Japan to foreign trade, the export of silk from Kanagawa has progressed faster than that of all of China during the same period following the ratification of the treaty of Nanking in 1842'[4]. By the end of the year, again stressing the "capital importance" of Western-Japanese relations, Le Moniteur des Soies on the eventuality of war against Japan, noted:

'People who know Japan and its inhabitants believe that the allies will have a difficult task to fill which will demand much time and considerable force.'[5]

1. ibid., 1 August 1863
2. ibid., 29 August 1863
3. ibid., 19 September 1863
4. ibid., 3 October 1863
5. ibid., 28 November 1863

As far as the economic interests of French industry are concerned it is in this context that the situation following Roches' arrival in Japan must be seen. Roches, de Bellecourt's successor, arrived on the 27th of April, 1864. What we do know for certain prior to his arrival are two things. The first is that Japan certainly had become far more significant to French commerce and the French economy generally than was believed at the time of the Gros expedition. On the other hand, the available evidence suggests that, the significant change in the economic importance of Japan to France had not brought about any noticeable change in official French attitudes to Japan.

Franco-Japanese Commercial Relations, 1864-1868

At the time of Roches' arrival, the situation regarding trade with Japan was unsatisfactory. This in itself would have been of little interest had certain French industrial sectors, notably that of silk, not been dependent on Japan's potential supply of important raw materials. The situation was especially unsatisfactory because of the frustations to which it gave rise. The London Protocol of 6 June 1862 and the talks between officials in London and Paris with the Japanese mission in general had seemed to promise better conditions for the future. But in the short term these hopes were dashed. Yet conditions, especially after 1864, picked up very considerably.

The entry of foreign ships into Yokohama during the years 1863 to 1868 reveal the following:

Country	1863	1864	1865	1866	1867	1868
Britain	100	139	111	108	133	189
US	40	16	21	25	57	114
Netherlands	13	11	14	14	13	13
France	5	6	16	21	19	26

(1)

France's share, it will be seen, was modest in comparison with that of Great Britain and the United States. French commerce in the Far East in general, however, was very small in comparison to Britain's: The French merchant navy had far fewer vessels; and France had no equivalent to Hong Kong in the Eastern seas. Moreover, whereas the United States bought vast quantities of Japanese tea as well as silk, France's trade with Japan was almost exclusively limited to silk.

Leaving aside the comparison of French trade with that of Great Britain and the United States and concentrating on the changes in Franco-Japanese trade the following picture emerges. For the year 1863 out of a total of Japanese silk exports of almost 55 million francs (the total of Japan's exports for thatt year amounted to slightly over 65 millions), France bought silk directly (i.e. excluding Japanese silk bought by Frenchmen on the London market) to the value of 376,900 francs. ~~Out of a total of~~

1. CC vol. V, Outrey to Ministry, 12 April, 1869, enclosure, Movement of ships into Yokohama for years 1863 to 1868

Out of a total of almost 10 million francs of Western imports into Japan, France's share was 94,717 francs.[1] The following table shows the significant quantitative change for the years 1864-1868:

(in francs)	1864	1865	1867	1868
export	39,609,763	97,753,350	82,014,203	137,973,403
import	27,105,899	72,303,920	74,071,467	57,502,959
total trade	66,715,662	170,057,270	156,075,670	195,476,368
in Japan's favour	12,503,864	25,449,430	7,942,736	80,470,450

(N.B. The figures for 1866 are missing due to a fire). (2)

An important factor to notice is that in these years (and in the years covered under chapter 3), the balance of trade between Japan and France remained very much in Japan's favour. This is perhaps the most important difference between Franco-Japanese trade in the years following 1863 and the trade of the United States and Great Britain with Japan, for both consistently had an important balance of trade in their favour. France, therefore, provided Japan with an important source of foreign revenue.

The question that arises here, however, is why the year 1863 proved such an important turning point in Japan's external trade.

1. CC vol. III, Roches to Ministry, 26 August 1864: appendix Rapport Commercial pour l'Année 1863, by L. de Lapeyrouse
2. CC vol. V, Outrey to Ministry, 12 April 1869, Rapport Commercial by M. Cte. Tascher de la Pagerie. Note that in these figures, as well as others, there may be slight errors in arithmetic. I have checked a number of them, however, the margin of error remains small. Erroneous or not, they are the official figures.

In order to answer this question, brief attention has to be focussed on political developments in Japan, events which will be studied in greater detail in the following chapter. In fact the year 1863 proved a most important turning point in Japanese history for a number of reasons. It was the year that the Bakufu was supposed to carry out the Kyoto court order of expelling the barbarians from Japan. It was the year of Britain's expedition to Kagoshima, following the murder of Richardson by Satsuma samurai in September of the previous year. It was the year a French expedition bombarded Shimonoseki in order to punish the Choshu han for having fired on a French vessel in the straits of Shimonoseki. It was the year of the first Bakufu-Choshu war. The following year saw the joint allied naval expedition to bomb Shi onoseki and the year after that both the allied naval display at Osaka, resulting in the Mikado's ratification of the treaties, and the second Bakufu-Choshu war.

The political and diplomatic implications and consequences of these events will be looked at in the following chapter. There were, however, important commercial consequences. The ratification by the Mikado of the treaties in 1865 heralded an increasing 'normalisation' of all relations between Japan and the Western powers, the beginning of the demise of the Joi movement, and consequently necessarily improved conditions for trade. Furthermore, however, the Japanese government was

finding itself under increased financial pressure from the Western powers in the form of considerable indemnities being demanded as compensation for outrages committed against foreigners or their properties (the most onerous being the Shimonoseki indemnity). Similarly the wars between the Bakufu and Choshu and the general political disturbances, especially in the southern parts of the country, meant a great boom in the sale of Western arms, purchased by both han and Bakufu.

In order to pay the indemnities and for the arms, foreign exchange was essential; The item most in demand was silk, and as far as France was concerned, especially dry cocoons and silk-worm eggs. Political considerations overrode the anxieties that might normally have been felt as to the possible harmful effects of the trade on the present and future of Japanese sericulture. Finally, the Bakufu's limited programme of modernisation (namely the Yokosuka dockyards, the military and naval missions, the construction of a mint with all necessary equipment purchased from abroad, the sending of special missions and students to the West) also necessitated foreign exchange.

These political, military and industrial matters will be looked at in further detail in later chapters; it is important, however, to bear these Japanese developments in mind in order to place Roches' commercial activity and apparent commercial success during his period of residence in Japan in proper perspective. The importance of Roches' commercial activity must not be interpreted in terms of his 'opening' of trade with Japan, but

in his flair and ability in being able to take advantage of the new circumstances that arose.

In regard to the development and importance of the Japanese trade for the French silk industry, one of the first questions that arises is to what extent French commercial interests influenced French diplomacy. R. Sims has ~~been~~ pointed out that although 'one might well expect to find French diplomats in Japan being constantly under pressure from French merchants to defend or increase their privileges. In fact, there are remarkably few recorded instances of contacts between minister and traders and on at least some of these occasions consultation was clearly only a formality.'[1] This statement is true of all French diplomatic agents in Japan, with the exception of Roches. In the case of Roches, however, his contacts seem to have been especially with commercial sectors in France, rather than with French merchants in Japan. Indeed his relations with the latter were to become quite sour.

That Roches had France's commercial interests at heart cannot be doubted. For example, we learn from an article in Le Moniteur des Soies that, 'M. Leon Roches, the eminent man who succeeded, after only a few months, in reopening Japan to European commerce, left in January 1863, after a meeting with our chamber of commerce, a meeting in which the major subject for

1. R. Sims, "Characteristics of French Policy Towards Japan in the Later 19th Century," p.2.

discussion was the question of the hopes that were founded on the Japanese seeds and the need we have of obtaining them'.[1] Roches himself in his dispatches to Paris remarked, for instance, that 'in apparently preoccupying myself exclusively with political matters, in fact my only aim was to pave the way for the development of our trade in this country'. As far as his interest in the question of silk was concerned he pointed out that it was 'a Japanese product which has been the subject of numerous requests which a number of our big industrialists and several sericultural companies in the midi of France have addressed to me directly.' After having stressed the importance of Japanese silkworms for French sericulture Roches added, 'I have therefore been asked in the name of the interests I represent, to remedy the evil [referring to difficulty of exporting silkworms] and facilitate the shipment to France of the greatest number of silkworm eggcards that I am able to obtain. I could not remain deaf to this call'.[2]

The problem of the export of silkworm eggs from Japan was not unamiliar to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, who apart from his Cabinet responsibilities was also

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 14 January, 1865. The date, January 1863, must be wrong. Roches arrived in Japan in April 1864, and although the journey to Japan was long, it was not that long. He probably means simply that the meeting took place in January 1863.
2. CC vol. III, Roches to Ministry, 1 September 1864

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chairman of the Société d'Acclimatisation. At the time of the 1864 Iseda mission to Paris (see following chapter) he received at least one letter from a silk merchant asking him to intercede with the Japanese embassy on behalf of the silk industry to assure a free export of silkworm eggs.[1] Not that silkworm eggs were failing to reach France, but these could only be obtained by smuggling, which was both inconvenient and perilous, as described in an article in Le Moniteur des Soies:

> All the difficulties one had to go to and the considerable risks incurred in order to encourage the timid indigenous smugglers; one had to spend entire nights on the high seas while waiting for a fishing boat, coming with a watchword to meet you and to slip you a few cards obtained during the day; to give an advance to some courageous servant involving considerable sums without any sort of guarantee, in order to enable him to go inland, to the sericultural centres of the country, in order to get important portions; fool the custom's officials, and then stay for a long time without news and often losing hope of ever regaining the sums risked, etc...(sic).

Having said all that, however, the correspondent did not hesitate to add that it was well worth the risk and that he had managed to secure a cargo of considerable value.[2]

Roches, perfectly aware of the smuggling, decided that more direct means should be used and so he approached the Roju. He

1. M D vol. I, May 1864 (no date given), letter of M. Simon to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys
2. Le Moniteur des Soies, 7 January 1865

explained, among other things, the great interest the French Minister of Foreign Affairs himself took in these matters and how pleased he would be if a certain quantity of silkworm eggs could be sent to the Minister. Having made this personal request, however, he did not fail to point out to the Government that Frenchmen had the right to expect to buy and export silkworm eggs and cocoons. As to the silkworm eggs Roches hoped to obtain directly from the Roju, he decided that they should be sent directly to the Foreign Minister so that he might distribute them among the various companies and societies involved in the regeneration of the French silkworm races:

> 'I thought, Monsieur le Ministre, that in thus calling upon your kindly-disposed mediation, in this circumstance, I could, on the one hand, avoid the unpleasant interpretations to which I could have been subjected in taking care of an operation in the name of firms and companies which contacted me directly and that, on the other hand, I could calm the anxieties of Your Excellency which touch upon everything which bears relation to the interests of his country.'[1]

Roches' approach to the Roju proved successful and 12,500 silkworm egg cards were sent to France. In reply to Roches' dispatch, Drouyn de Lhuys thanked him for, 'The initiative which you have taken in this circumstance, which bears witness to your

1. CC vol. III, Roches to Ministry, 1 September 1864.

enlightened zeal in regard to the progress of our sericultural industry'. He asked Roches, however, in the future to treat directly with the Société d'Acclimatisation and not through the ministry.[1]

The reaction of silk interests was mixed. In the same article in Le Moniteur des Soies which had explained the necessary procedures for smuggling, the correspondent wrote:

> The most outstanding feat of which we must take account is the operation carried out by M. Leon Roche (sic) in the name of the French government. The initiative of the government in this enterprise is worthy of all praise and gratitude. Fearing that, as a result of the prohibition of this traffic by the Japanese authorities, we would no longer be able to obtain this regenerating seed, it decided to use its diplomatic force in order to obtain what merchants were unable to...

The correspondent, though again admitting that the government initiative was welcome, nevertheless insisted that the smuggling operations were reasonably successful in themselves, and that in any case the government must now cease engaging in trade as this was unfair competition with ordinary merchants.[2] The reservations expressed by this correspondent brought a reaction from a M. Duseigneur who explained that he was in frequent contact with Roches, that he constantly stressed to Roches the desperate dependence of the French sericultural industry on Japan and that the only hope was in the seeds which Roches would be able to procure. He went on to say, however that neither the government

1. CC Vol III, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Roches, 22 December 1864
2. Le Moniteur des Soies, 7 January 1865

nor the Société d'Acclimatisation intended to interfere with the merchants, nor to compete with them, but then added that Roches' initiative in the silk question had the approval of Emperor Napoleon III.[1]

The exchange of correspondence in regard to Roches' role in the silk trade continued in several issues of Le Moniteur des Soies and on a few occasions the controversy appeared in the pages of the national press. Roches was certainly working in close collaboration with the Société d'Acclimatisation,[2] it may be that he had vested interests in one or more of the silk companies and thus favoured some rather than others. Leaving aside this question, however, the important point to note is that in French sericultural circles there was a clear division of opinion between those who favoured opening the interior of Japan, in order that French merchants might gain direct access to Japanese sources of cocoons and silkworm eggs, and those who preferred to keep the interior closed to French merchants at least for the time being.

The debate between the two factions was to continue long

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 14 January 1865
2. see CC vol. IV, Roches to Ministry, 15 April 1865, in which Roches announced that he had been made an honorary member of the Société d'Acclimatisation

after Roches had left Japan, but because of Roches' heavy involvement in the silk question, it is not surprising that during his period of residence the debate should be more acute. Two articles from Le Moniteur des Soies well illustrate the divisions between the two groups.

The article representing the 'anti-opening' faction begins by stating that Roches' activity in the Japanese silk trade is evidence that the French government 'has at last decided to take into serious consideration the precarious situation of our sericultural industry so sorely tried since almost ten years ago! The author of this article then went on to contend that one of the main reasons why the Japanese silkworm eggs had not been touched by the pébrine was due to the meticulous care the Japanese took of their eggs and all activities related to their breeding. He warned that 'the day a European will set foot on Japanese soil in order to establish an industrial breeding station, on that day, if our indigenous strains are not yet reconstituted, on that day, we will be able to sound the death-knell of our sericultural industry'.[1] The basis of this argument was that European greed, resulting in mass production, leading to carelessness was at the root of the sericultural

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 28 January 1865

catastrophe. Japan, one of the last sources of life for French sericulture, must be protected from nefarious European practices and that in consequence Japanese sericultural districts must remain closed to Europeans.

One of the arguments on the side of the faction favouring immediate entry into Japanese sericultural districts was that apparently a certain amount of fraud was taking place in the shipment of eggs from Japan, namely that certain cartons contained a mixture of Japanese and Chinese eggs, the latter not conducive to regeneration of French worms. Thus the author of another article in Le Moniteur des Soies insisted that French merchants should not be limited to the treaty-ports, but should be able to 'go on their own to chose their cocoons or their eggs in those areas of highest quality production'. Pointing to the considerable diplomatic influence of France in Japan, thanks to the efforts of Roches, the author of the article continued, 'assured of the good intentions with which the actual minister is endowed, we can count on the fact that all his efforts will be engaged in opening for us the way to the sericultural provinces, as soon as we shall have succeeded in convincing him of the usefulness of our presence in those provinces, and it is precisely there that lies our greatest difficulty'. The reason,

explained the correspondent was that Roches was under the influence of the Société d'Acclimatisation, which is 'frankly hostile to our industrial breeding stations, to these great agglomorations of butterflies all the present evil is attributed;' therein lay the reason why Roches and the Société did not want to allow Europeans into the sericultural provinces, The article totally disagreed with this interpretation of the disease and called on all to put pressure on Roches to get him to see the light so that French merchants might be permitted to freely circulate within the Empire of Japan.[1]

Apart from the fact that in all likelihood Roches, despite 'the great influence of France", would not have succeeded in obtaining such permission even had he been in agreement with the merchants seeking the opening of the sericultural areas, there is another reason, which should throw some light on the nature of Roches' activity in the commercial field and his special relationship with Drouyn de Lhuys. Following the arrival of 15,000 cards of silkworm eggs offered by the Shogun to Napoleon III through the good offices of Roches[2] in 1865 and the lifting of the prohibition in regard to export of

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 14 December 1867
2. see CC, vol. IV, Roches to Ministry 11 September 1865

silkworm eggs[1], and in view of the fact that both the future promised an ever increasing trade in these goods, and that in the past there had been some disappointments, quite naturally the French Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works felt that the time had come for a much greater knowledge in France of the processes of Japanese sericulture and, - a matter of great importance - how to identify the origins and quality of the Japanese imports.

It was in these circumstances that in February, 1866 the Minister called upon the scholar and pioneer of Japanese studies in France, Léon de Rosny to carry out work which resulted in the Traité de l'Education des Vers A Soie au Japon par Sira-Kawa de Sendai, published in 1868. This work was carried out in Marseilles and was both extensive in coverage and intensive in detail. Rosny had a team of nine with whom to work and he was able to interview a number of Japanese agronomists passing through France.[2] The work included a long introduction by de Rosny, including a history of silk in all parts of the world, the translation regarding the breeding of silkworms, and finally

1. see CC vol. IV, Roches to Ministry 10 September 1865
2. Already in the Bakumatsu period, Japanese agronomists and people generally interested in the silk trade were occasionally making visits to the sericultural areas of France and more particularly to Lyons. Thus, for example, we learn that on the occasion of Prince Nimbu's visit to France, accompanied by the future industrialist, Shibusawa, 'On their way to Paris they stopped at Lyons and visited a silk spinning factory...' in K. Obata, An Interpretation of the Life of Viscount Shibusawa, p.45

a forty-page report to the Ministry, with numerous illustrations of Japanese seals used to denote the origin of cards of silkworm eggs and Kanji useful for the trade. Many of the findings and conclusions drawn by de Rosny and his team were later to be confirmed by the "Report of Mr. Adams, Secretary to Her Majesty's Legation in Japan on the Central Silk Districts of Japan".[1] In section IV of his report to the Ministry de Rosny summarised in seven pages 'some observations on sericulture in Japan obtained in my interviews which I have had on a number of occasions with Japanese agronomists, and which seem to be of such a nature as to deserve a useful role in this report.'[2] These observations confirmed the views of the Société d'Acclimatisation :

> 'The superiority of the art of sericulture in Japan is today generally admitted. This superiority, however, does not depend on the minute study of the physiology of the silkworm, nor on experiments or microscopic observations analogous to those which the disease of the European strains has provoked in the scientific centres of our countries. It arises uniquely from the wise conservation of principles taught to the breeders of Nippon by a long practice, and by the reasonable manner with which they undertake their breeding. An intelligent cultivation of the mulberry, utmost cleanliness at all times, a breeding not too extended and entrusted only to the care of the members of the peasant families, therein lies the principal secret of the sericultural art of Japan'.[3]

1. see BPP, General Affairs, Japan, Vol. 2, Pages 527 to 559
2. de Rosny, Traité de L'Education des Vers A Soie au Japon Par Sira-Kawa de Sendai, p.146
3. ibid, p. 146/7

Almost all sericultural work in Japan was carried out by women; and de Rosny described in some detail the meticulous standard of cleanliness that they maintained, including frequent change of clothes, constant cleaning of the tools, and indeed the precautions taken were such that women abstained during their periods of menstruation from all contact with silkworms and avoided all noise, to the extent of talking only in whispers.[1] De Rosny cited the authority of the Japanese agronomists, who appeared to be in agreement with the Société d'Acclimatisation's verdict on the causes of the European silkworm disease.[2] Commenting on the bad influence of Europeans on Japanese sericulture, and pointing out the fact that already in regions near the open ports there was evidence that the disease had reached the country, he concluded, 'When all the ports of Japan will be frequented by traders from the Occident, the brilliant successes of the indigenous sericulture will be no more than memories'.[3]

The first point that emerges from this is that, leaving aside the question whether or not Roches' own financial vested interests were involved, the 'interests' which Roches was representing were those of the Société d'Acclimatisation and those silk interests

1. ibid, p.148/9
2. ibid, p.147
3. ibid, p.151/2

associated with its views, which in turn were those of the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works, especially under Benic.

Despite de Rosny's work and the stated views of the Société d'Acclimatisation, however, French merchants continued to exert pressure on the government in its turn to put pressure on Roches to do his utmost to enable French merchants to seek free access to Japan's sericultural districts. From 1867 onwards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complied to a certain extent by passing on these requests to Roches.[1] By that time, however, Drouyn de Lhuys had been replaced by the Marquis de Moustiers as Foreign Minister, and the Marquis de Moustiers was not Chairman of the Société d'Acclimatisation as well as Foreign Minister, as Drouyn de Lhuys had been. This brings us to the second important point regarding the nature of Roches' commercial activities. It has been alleged, by Jansen for example[2] that Roches enjoyed the backing of Drouyn de Lhuys. Therein, it is suggested, lay the link between Napoleon III's 'imperialistic designs' on Japan and Roches. Again, however, in no instance can any evidence that I have seen in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay substantiate the

1. see CC vol. IV, Ministry to Roches, 15 July 1867 and CC vol.V, Ministry to Roches, 20 May 1868
2. see M.B. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration, p.318

view that Roches enjoyed Drouyn de Lhuys' support for his political as well as his commercial activities. True, on numerous occasions Drouyn de Lhuys praised Roches for his great achievements in the silk trade, but, as will be seen in the following chapter, this did not necessarily extend to Roches' political activities, to the extent that Drouyn de Lhuys was aware of them. Certainly he may have been pleased to see French influence develop in Japan, especially in view of the importance of Japan to the French silk industry, something obviously very dear to him. But, based on the available evidence, the connection begins and ends there, in matters relating to silk.

Having looked at the nature of Roches' activities in the silk trade, the next important aspect of his commercial policy concerns his role in the Société Générale d'Importation et d'Exportation dans l'Extrème Orient and its operations in Japan. Roches was accused both by contemporaries and historians of two offenses: attempting to establish a French government monopoly on Japanese trade and engaging - either personally or through his associates - in profitable and illegal commercial activities. The question of Roches' alleged financial irregularities is of

relatively little importance for our purposes and as such will be left aside.[1] The question of attempting to set up a French government monopoly on Japanese trade, however, is of far greater importance and if it can be proved that Roches was in fact making such an attempt under orders from his government, the view that France's actions during this period can best be explained 'in terms of this unobtrusive and indirect economic imperialism'[2] would indeed be fairly strongly substantiated.

Roches' involvement in the operations of the Compagnie Générale led in April 1867 to the Foreign Office making confidential enquiries in Paris following questions raised in the

1. R. Sims dismisses the allegations of Roches' supposed vested interests in the Compagnie Générale on the grounds of insufficient evidence. (French Policy Towards Japan, 1854-1894 p.99). At the time in fact it was not so much Roches himself who was suspected of irregularities as his assistant and interpreter, Mermet de Cachon. (see, for example, Le Siècle, 30 August 1865, reporting allegations having appeared in the Japan Herald.) The most serious accusations I have come across are found in a number of letters written by Chanoine, then chief of the French military mission in Japan, to a friend of his in the War Ministry, Colonel Colson. Chanoine alleged that Roches, Fleury-Herard and Coullet were engaged in suspicious commercial dealings, that they were deceiving the Japanese Government, and that they had tried to involve Chanoine, something which had caused him considerable embarassment and that Roches had been furious when Chanoine had refused. See Chanoine to Colson, 15 December 1867, in Army, Catalogue Générale des Manuscrits, no. 1672, Japon, 1856-70
2. M. Medziné, "Leon Roches in Japan..." p. 196

Commons by Laurence Oliphant.[1] The Foreign Office sent the French Foreign Ministry copies of a number of articles from the Japan Times' Overland Mail and the Japan Times of early 1867. One of these articles stated,

> 'it is impossible for us any longer to refrain from seriously reprobating the recent proceeding of H.E. Monsieur Leon Roches, as French Minister, and though we may be powerless to stop the evil of his indefatigable interference with the trade of this port (Yokohama), we shall at least have done our duty to our constituents, the merchants of Yokohama, by fully exposing it, by plain and simple argument, to the view of those with whom rests the responsibility as they alone hold the means of its cure. ... When a Minister, representative and plenipotentiary of a great power, assumes the direction of the largest tradal operations into which the Japanese have ever entered, threatens altogether to extinguish private trade then we emphatically call for the interference of his colleagues to stop him in his pernicious course.'[2]

In the consideration of Roches' commercial operations and ambitions and consequent transactions through the medium of the Compagnie Générale a number of factors need to be taken into consideration. In the first instance it should be noted that although in the 1860's France may have been the second power in the Far East politically and militarily, commercially she was of almost complete insignificance by comparison with Britain. The silk trade, albeit of such vital importance to France, was

1. see M & D vol III, 1864-1873, confidential letter of the British Ambassador in Paris to the French Foreign Minister, 18 April 1867
2. These articles are added as appendices to the above.

mainly carried out by Britain. The American commissioner at the Universal Exposition of Paris in 1867, for example, noted that,

> 'The English navy goes to China, Japan, Calcutta, Bombay, etc., to fetch the eggs, the cocoons, the silk, and its wastes, in form of fluff, in order to resell to its European neighbours and benefit of the transport, storage, brokerage, etc. Silk represents one of its principal articles of commerce; the transactions of England in the Far East reach nearly a million francs.'

The consequence of this lucrative trade on the home economy was not insignificant:

> 'In less than half a century, the United Kingdom, which does not produce a kilogramme of silk, has managed to run almost a million and a half spindles which throw silk, and nearly 11,000 mecanic looms which weave it and directly employ 50,000 workers, not including personnel employed in ribbon manufacture and silk hosiery.'[1]

France was handicapped in several respects by comparison with Britain in Far Eastern commercial ventures. As noted earlier, France's merchant navy was far inferior, furthermore French diplomatic agents did not have the pool of consular officials, secretaries and interpreters to draw from which British diplomats enjoyed. Nor, however, was French commerce able to boast of such dynamic commercial empires in the Far East

1. E.C. Cowdin, Exposition Universelle de 1867. Rapport sur la Soie, les Soieries, et le Materiel de Ces Industries, p.9 and 51

as the Scottish firm of Jardine, Matheson and Co, and numerous other concerns. The difficulty experienced by Frenchmen convinced of the importance of the Far Eastern trade was to persuade French industry to become involved.[1] In his commercial report for 1863 the Chancellor of the French legation, L. de Lapeyrouse, commented:

> 'It is truly regrettable to see France enter for so little, with her own ships, in the sustained effort that each nation seems to give to its commerce in Japan. Our capitalists are too timid in far away affairs and our navigation in these regions is completely lacking in activity.'[2]

Arriving in Japan, Roches found that in spite of the importance of the silk trade for France,

> 'It is on the market of London, in fact, that traders of Lyons go to buy the biggest quantity of this product which every day is more esteemed by our manufacturers. Since the greater part of silks produced in the whole world are fashioned by French manufacturers, why is the great market not in Lyons?'

The superiority of English trade compared to France's was a result 'either of the intelligence of the British merchants, or the immensity of the capital they have at their disposal'.[3]

1. see for example J. Dhasp, Le Japon Contemporain, p. 330
2. CC vol. III, Roches to Ministry, 26 August 1864, appendix, "Rapport Commercial Pour l'Annee 1863" by L. de Lapeyrouse
3. CC vol. III, Roches to Ministry, 1 September 1864

Roches insisted that certain preliminary steps had to be taken in order to alter this situation, for example one measure,

> 'which will be the most efficient in order to ensure the direct trade of silk between France and Japan will be the establishment of regular services of the Messageries Imperiales between Shanghai and the ports of this Empire which are open to foreigners. The day when a merchant will be able to embark his silks in Japan for the direct destination of Lyon', on that day our role in this branch of trade will take on a greater expansion.'[1]

Within a year regular services of the Messageries Imperiales were established.

Another measure Roches called for, but one which was never implemented by the Quai d'Orsay, was an increase in consular and diplomatic personnel in Japan:

> 'My compatriots complain, and with good reason, to have representing their interests and their daily affairs with the Japanese, neither consul, nor interpreters. They see all the other nationalities provided with a tutelary representation, whereas the French alone have none.'[2]

Finally in order to remedy the lack of French commercial enterprise in Japan, Roches proceeded to establish a French trading company in collaboration with his banker, Fleury-Herard, eventually named Japanese Honorary Consul in Paris, and Coullet of the Messageries Imperiales. The three worked closely together and with certain Bakufu officials, especially Oguri Tadamasa and Kurimoto Joun.

The beginning of Roches' involvement in these matters was

1. ibid
2. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 13 July 1867

the result of an approach by the Bakufu regarding its desire to set up a Mint, on the French model, in Japan.[1] In a letter to Fleury-Herard, Roches informed him that the Japanese government 'in accordance with the habit it has developed over the last six months, addressed itself to the Minister of France in order to resolve this important question.' It was necessary for all the equipment to be purchased in France, and for a skilful metallurgical director, and two assistants to be hired. Roches asked Fleury-Herard to act swiftly and to ensure that both men and machines were of the highest quality.[2] Following the Mint, the Bakufu sought Roches' help for the construction of a dockyard at Yokosuka and the training of Japan's embryonic modern army. All these requests involved a considerable amount of shipment of both people and goods from France to Japan.

It was in September 1865, five months after the original request for help in setting up the mint, that plans for the Société Generale were exposed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Roches explained to his Ministry that the Japanese government anxiously desired expansion of trade, but that it had three major obstacles to overcome, namely lack of experience, lack of credit and the suspiciousness of the natives:

'Now, it believes that these obstacles would soon disappear

1. CC vol. IV, Roches to Ministry, 14 April 1865
2. CC vol. IV, Roches to Fleury-Herard, 21 March 1865

if a powerful foreign company could form itself and establish, apart from its official activity, relations with an association of the same sort composed of Japanese subjects.' Quite naturally, Roches added, the Japanese government decided to approach him in regard to this question. In view of all these factors, Roches agreed to submit the proposals confidentially to his Minister.

The company's role, according to Roches, would be to find means to import successfully into Japan. French capitalists would be encouraged to become more efficient, especially those in the textile industry, and thus compete effectively not only with Great Britain, but also with Prussia and Switzerland. The company would enable France

> 'to secure two advantages: that of paying for part of the silks which we purchase other than in specie, and, then to increase the export of raw silks, since it will be in the interest of indigenous producers to sell it as such, as soon as our manufactured textiles (wool or cotton) will be able to replace the silk materials presently worn by the masses.'[1]

Roches pointed out

> 'the Japanese government, in favouring the creation of a powerful indigenous company and in manifesting its desire to see it associated with a French company offers us the means of assuring to France a large role in the commerce of this country. Soon we would see the Japanese silk which crosses France to go to London, flow to Lyons, its natural market place: on the other hand, the import into

1. CC vol. IV, Roches to Ministry, confidential, 17 September 1865

> this beautiful country of our industrial products would replace the export of metallic species which, up to this day, is our unique means of exchange with Japan.'

Roches added that of course neither government would intervene, but simply accord their 'bienveillance'; that other nations could do likewise; and that Fleury-Herard would take care of everything.[1]

The true measure of Roches' expectations, however, can be gauged from his comment that were the proposal to be accepted, 'Japan would be for us what China is for England, that is to say a French market.'[2]

The export-import figures cited earlier for the years 1865 and 1867 (see page 17) attest to the relative success of the Société Générale in balancing Franco-Japanese trade. Although both years show a slight balance in favour of Japan, this is nothing compared to 1868 which saw a ratio of more than 2 to 1 in Japan's favour, a ratio which was to remain fairly constant throughout the period covered by this thesis. Thus, brushing aside all other considerations the Société Générale made sound economic sense. The French imports to the Bakufu under the auspices of the Société Generale were generally of the same nature as Thomas Glover's (Nagasaki representative of

1. ibid
2. ibid

Jardine, Matheson & Co,) sales to Satsuma and Choshu; namely, arms, munitions, ships and all equipment and necessary paraphernalia for industrial projects, including mining, foundries, etc.[1]

Roches' proposal met with his government's approval. In no way, however, can this approval justify claims of French economic imperialism in Japan. In the first instance it must be noted that the initiative for the Société Générale in Japan came from Roches and not from the Government. The government agreed to it, no doubt, because it made sound economic sense. There is still no indication, however, that in official circles, Japan had become an important country for France. There is no evidence to suggest that the French government had changed its opinion since Thouvenel's dispatch to de Bellecourt in 1862 (see page 12), in other words that France might be prepared to become militarily involved in Japan in order to protect her economic interests there. Indeed, as will be seen in the following chapter, all evidence points to the contrary, that Japan continued to be considered unimportant in Paris, and that not only was military involvement excluded, but even political involvement on the part of its agents was frowned upon.

1. see G. Fox, op. cit., p. 173

Undoubtedly, as will be seen in detail in the following chapter, Roches was very committed to the Bakufu cause and its political survival. Yet an important question which arises is whether the initiative for this special relationship came primarily from Roches or from the Bakufu. As far as Bakufu officials were concerned,

> 'Their purpose was obvious. Good relations with one of the Powers could reduce the danger of isolation and provide Japan with information about the wider world, as well as a channel for the import of arms and other material requirements. It might also temper the hostility of the Powers in a period when the Bakufu's inability to execute treaties made it highly vulnerable.'[1]

It is a debatable point, indeed, whether Roches far from being an agent of French imperialism, may not simply have been an unwitting agent of Bakufu politics. In any case, within a brief space of time, Roches' political and commercial policies became resolutely fixed to the Bakufu sail. He accused British diplomats and British merchants of favouring the anti-Bakufu cause only because of their displeasure in seeing France gain the greater confidence and commerce of the official Japanese government.[2] He felt that the anti-Bakufu cause, if victorious, would plunge the country into a state of anarchy and jeopardise its very existence as an independent state, adding 'it is not, it seems to me, in the interests of France to see Japan disappear from

1. Sims, <u>French Policy</u>..., p. 89/90
2. CC vol. IV, Roches to Ministry, 1 March 1867

the number of independent states.'[1] Among the numerous reforms he advocated the Bakufu must carry out (see following chapter), he included the government's need to learn modern commercial practices, and it was in this spirit that the Société Générale was helping the Japanese government.[2]

The fall of the Bakufu caused grave alarm in French sericultural circles,[3] as it was believed in Lyons that the future of the industry's lucrative trade with Japan depended on the political survival of the Shogunate. For his part Roches' successor, Max Outrey, had considerable complaints of the commercial intrigues and financial difficulties which his predecessor had left as his legacy.[4]

1. ibid
2. ibid
3. see an article by Ulysse Pila in Le Moniteur des Soies, 2 January, 1869, where he predicted that the victory of the anti-Bakufu forces would result in a general bloodbath in the country, a return of aggressive xenophobia and the inevitability of a war between Japan and the Western powers within a year.
4. CP vol. XVII, Outrey to Ministry, 7 October 1868

With the overthrow of the Bakufu and his departure from Japan, it is true that Roches' dreams and grandiose schemes of a French commercial empire in Japan lay in ruins. His commercial ambitions, however, were never more than that, namely individual dreams and schemes. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Napoleon III harboured any colonial aims in Japan, nor that the French government ever shared Roches' enthusiasm in making Japan the China of France. French preoccupations lay elsewhere, in Mexico, North Africa, Indo-China and of course Europe. To interpret matters differently is to place far too much importance on the energy of the individual Frenchman and to fail to take account of the general picture and limitations of French economic imperialism during this period.

CHAPTER 2

French Diplomacy in the Bakumatsu Era

Of the two French diplomatic heads of mission in the Bakumatsu era, Duchesne de Bellecourt and Leon Roches, the latter has received far more attention.[1] This has partly to do with timing. Shortly after Roches' arrival, the political divisions in Japan between Tokugawa and anti-Tokugawa forces became far clearer to Western representatives, mainly because the two opposing groups sought the assistance of Western powers or Western individuals, whether officials or not. Because of Roches' clear commitment to the Tokugawa cause and because of the activities of a number of junior British diplomats, especially Ernest Satow, in support of the opposition, there has been a tendency to equate Britain with the forces behind the Restoration and France with the Bakufu: an equation which in turn gave rise to various interpretations, one being that both countries pursued their imperialist rivalries in Japan. In fact Britain and France were not, in this period, rivals in the Far East and in any case the equation is misleading if not fallacious.[2]

1. Both Western and Japanese writing on Roches has tended to rely heavily on Otsuka Takematsu's, "Fukkoku koshi Leon Roches no seisaku kodo ni tsuite," Shigaku Zasshi XLVI (1935)
2. see G. Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes, British Representative in Japan, 1865-1883 and Introduction to Sir Ernest Satow, A Diplomat in Japan (Oxford University Press Reprint 1968)

The view that Roches was acting in Japan as an imperialist agent of Napoleon III has been disproved.[1] This chapter, I believe, will show the extent to which the policies of the two French envoys were similar, that they were responding to different situations in Japan, that while de Bellecourt was eventually led to a policy of confrontation, Roches, because of changes in Japan, was able to follow a policy of intrigue.

Duchesne de Bellecourt and the Joi Challenge

In the early stages, at least, of Western diplomacy in Japan there was a marked tendency towards what may be termed a "Far Eastern policy". Many of the Western diplomats in Japan, including de Bellecourt, but excluding Roches, had had some previous experiences in China. It was expected that these posts would prove difficult, but it was also held that in all circumstances a firm attitude was called for. The differences, in terms of domestic politics, between China and Japan were not readily understood. In the case of Japan the apparent coexistence of two emperors (Taikun and Mikado) caused some confusion, although it had been decided that the former was temporal Emperor, the latter spiritual Emperor.

The French government as we have seen, had no great interest in Japan. Thus, de Bellecourt was told that his role

1. see R. Sims, French Policy Toward Japan 1850-1894

would be that of an observer.[1] As soon as he arrived, however, he complained of the slowness with which the Japanese government handled its foreign affairs and the intensity of feeling in Japan against the treaties.[2] A few days later he enunciated what he saw as the three basic principles by which Western diplomacy should be guided in Japan: 'the foreign representatives will triumph only in the persevering energy of their attitudes, by their solidarity and by the constant presence in Japan of forces sufficient to have their authority respected, even maybe their lives protected.'[3] These three principles, perseverance, solidarity among the Western powers and the need to impress the Japanese regularly with the force of Europe remained the basis of de Bellecourt's policy.

De Bellecourt's tenure of office in Japan, from 1859 to 1864, can be roughly divided into two parts. In the first three years, from September 1859 to approximately August 1863, his diplomacy can be characterised as a period of reflection, experience and very bitter frustration. For example, he often complained that he was surrounded by spies and that his freedom of movement was constantly curtailed by officials.[4] His attempts

1. CP vol. I, Ministry to de Bellecourt, 8 June 1859
2. CP vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 10 September 1859
3. CP Vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 16 September 1859
4. see for example, CP vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 30 September 1859

to understand the political situation in Japan met numerous obstacles, among them the fact that he was never able to meet Japanese other than those specifically sent to him by the Government.[1]

Unfortunately de Bellecourt did not leave any memoirs of his stay in Japan, nevertheless even from the rather dry pages of official dispatches, one can sense the feeling of isolation in an unfamiliar and obviously hostile environment.[2] In looking later at the eventual decisions leading to a more aggressive policy on the part of French diplomacy in Japan, despite the interdictions and remonstrances from Paris, it is suggested that the conditions in which de Bellecourt lived must have had a certain influence.

In order to understand the decisions that de Bellecourt was ultimately to take in his policy of confrontation with Japan, or at least certain parts of Japan, it is necessary to study de Bellecourt's appraisal of the political situation in the country, which was to determine his course of action. The

1. CP, vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 8 November 1859
2. Alcock, de Bellecourt's British colleague, gives some idea of what life in Japan was for the first diplomatic agents: 'Dear life! what could make it so, in such an exile as this -- in total isolation, under sentence of banishment without any definite term, -- utter banishment from all that enters into and constitutes existence in a civilised country?' Life in Japan was both 'dispiriting' and 'fossilising' R. Alcock, Capital of the Tycoon, vol. I, p.361-362

Mikado, de Bellecourt argued, 'never revealed his existence either to foreigners or to the Japanese people...', Shogunal rule had prevailed for the greater part of the previous eight centuries and besides it was the Shogun who had signed the treaties.[1] This did not mean that the political situation was clear, 'everything which happens around us is so contradictory, that we cannot know in any precise way, in which hands are the true government of Japan'. But his Russian colleagues' suggestion that the shogunal government might have outlived its usefulness, 'appears to me not exempt from dangers since it tends to deny to the sovereign who has ratified the treaties a part of his power.'[2]

The opposition to the Shogunate was labelled by de Bellecourt and his colleagues the "daimyo party". Resistance to the treaties, de Bellecourt believed, was firmly planted in the feudal classes, because

> 'they realise that they would be directly affected by the fusion of the Japanese people with the foreigners, a fusion from which a new class could emerge, rich and consequently aspiring to independence through the help of commercial freedom as directed by the treaties, and which one day would play an important role among the masses, which to date count for nothing in this country.' [3]

Having, so he thought, identified the hostile party, he wondered whether the Shogunal government 'really has the necessary

1. CP vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 16 September 1859
2. CP vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 23 February 1860
3. CP vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 1 June 1860

strength to triumph over the feudal party in case of dissent over the question of foreign affairs?' [1] By the end of 1860, however and after fifteen months of residence in Japan, having witnessed numerous assaults on foreigners or their property, he was no longer sure whether, 'The Japanese government is really completely powerless against the daimyo, or is it in connivance with them?' [2] By the spring of 1861 he was no wiser and complained: 'It is very difficult for us to know who are our friends and who are our enemies in this mosaic of quasi-independent principalities which make up the Empire of Japan.' [3]

By the summer of that year, however, he thought that the Shogunate itself was now slowly lifting the veil of secrecy in order to allow the Western powers to obtain some idea of the forces of opposition it was facing. [4] This took place on the eve of the departure of the first Japanese embassy to Europe. The discussions leading to the composition and purpose of the Embassy, both de Bellecourt and Alcock felt, had resulted in a minor breakthrough in terms of penetrating the intricacies of Japanese politics. In one of their meetings with the Bakufu officials, Alcock had suddenly asked that the session continue in confidence, namely excluding all ancillary personnel, which as far as the Japanese side was concerned consisted of the

1. ibid
2. CP vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 7 December 1860
3. CP vol. III, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 18 April 1861
4. CP vol. IV, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 31 July 1861

metsuke, or official spies. Alcock commented:

> 'The want of such an opportunity for confidential exchange of opinion and information I had always felt to be an insuperable obstacle to any steady progress with Japanese rulers. This was the first commencement of really confidential relations, and was not only a present benefit, but might prove the pivot on which all future intercourse between foreigners and Japanese would turn.'[1]

For his part de Bellecourt now believed:

> 'In fact one can say, I think, that in Japan there are three distinct parties presently in the field of foreign affairs. In the one we have rabid and powerful adversaries, in the other people better disposed toward us, but paralysed by the former, and the third party hesitates, tossed about by the other two, and prudently awaiting the outcome of events.'[2]

The hostile party was the "daimyo party" and all its efforts to weaken the position of the Western powers must be countered.[3] By no means, however, was de Bellecourt suggesting an alliance with the Bakufu at this stage. Despite the improvement in communication with the Bakufu, he remained suspicious.[4]

By June of 1862, six months after the departure of the Embassy, he warned his government that 'a great interior movement was taking place' in Japan, although he was as yet unable to chart the exact course that it was taking.[5] Previously he had

1. Alcock, op. cit., vol. II, . 189
2. CP vol. IV, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 19 November 1861
3. CP vol. IV, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 28 November 1861
4. CP vol. VI, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 22 June 1862
5. ibid

mentioned the activities within the Kyoto court in some of his dispatches, but these were summary and devoid of political analysis. By September, however, he wrote:

> 'It is more and more evident that the supreme power of the Mikado is being resurrected little by little, in view probably of opposing to the foreign powers an influence as dignified as that which proceeds from the traditional religious instruction of this country attached to its ancient customs...'[1]

By the beginning of 1863, therefore, the situation was becoming a bit clearer to de Bellecourt, at least as far as the forces behind the Mikado's cause were concerned. About the Bakufu, however, he continued to harbour grave doubts. After all he had now been in the country for more than three years and based on the record of those years he could hardly be expected suddenly to change his opinion of the treachery and basically hostile feelings of the government with which he had to deal. Added to this, as will be seen shortly, de Bellecourt believed that Japan was preparing for war with the Western powers. At the end of January 1863, he reported home:

> 'In summary, the state of affairs is becoming more and more precarious, and one has still to come back to this question of the good faith of the Government of the Taikun, hoping still to triumph over the blindness of the Mikado, or its secret connivance with the daimyo hostile to the foreigners, a connivance which would be hiding itself behind an impotence more fictitious than real.'[2]

By May 1863 the situation had deteriorated even more. The

1. CP. vol, VIII, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 28 September 1862
2. CP. vol. VIII, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 29, January 1863

Mikado's order for the expulsion of foreigners had been known to the foreign representatives for some time. There were rumours everywhere of a general massacre of foreigners. In September of the preceding year the Englishman, Richardson, had been murdered by samurai escorting the daimyo of Satsuma. The British bombardment of Kagoshima in reprisal was shortly to take place. At a conference of the representatives of Great Britain and France and the respective countries' admirals, Kuper and Jaurès, a very significant political step was taken. The diplomats and admirals reviewed the situation over the last few years and the increasing difficulties they had faced. Again stressing the need for common action, they concluded that only two alternatives existed:

> 'either to refuse to have anything more to do with the Government of the Taikun and to enter immediately into the phase of hostilities against all of them, Taikun and Daimyo, or to place the government unequivocally in the position of having to pronounce itself clearly in the question of foreign affairs and offering it total and immediate support against its opponents, whoever they may be, which force the government to break its word. If the government of the Taikun is faithful, if it wants to preserve peace with the outside world, it will accept this proposal and it will take with it the three quarters of the daimyo against the audacious minority which at the time being is activating the country against the foreigners.'[1]

Thus de Bellecourt and Alcock had now decided to immerse themselves in Japan's domestic politics and, for the time being, had decided to throw in their lot with the forces of the established government.

1. CP vol. VIII, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 3 May 1863

It will be recalled that de Bellecourt's instructions from the very beginning were that his role was that of an 'observer'. At no time did the spirit of these instructions from Paris change, the obvious implication of which was not to get France politically or militarily involve. De Bellecourt's own principles for diplomatic affairs in Japan were based, as we have seen, on those of perseverance, solidarity and the need for occasional displays of force. The form of solidarity that took place was mainly between de Bellecourt and Alcock, the few disagreements between them being only incidental and in no way undermining their basic united front.

The need for French naval protection in Japanese waters and the importance of impressing upon the Japanese the power of France formed a constant leitmotiv in de Bellecourt's correspondence: this included never failing to let Japanese government officials know of France's various exploits and victories throughout the world.[1]

1. see CP, vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 16 October 1859, and CP vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 22 May 1860, in which he expresses the hope that the Japanese Embassy going to the United States and possibly returning via Europe (which in the end it did not), should also stop in France to get a proper idea of France's power; CP vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry 22 September 1860 in which de Bellecourt tried to explain to Japanese officials the reasons for France's military activities in China, namely that these are necessary to counter the barbarity of nations wishing to remain isolated from the rest of the World, an unfortunate, albeit necessary function of the Western mission of civilisation and progress; CP vol. III, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 12 March 1861, once again stressing the desirability of Japanese going to France to get a proper appreciation of France's power, which so far seems to be lacking.

The Ministry in Paris also hoped that France's activities in China would sufficiently impress the Japanese with the determination of French policy in the Far East, so as to avoid having to do anything in Japan directly.[1] De Bellecourt's requests for naval displays, however, were not met unsympathetically in Paris. After two such requests in early 1860[2] and after the Minister of Foreign Affairs passed them on to the Minister of the Navy, the latter suggested that de Bellecourt simply get in touch directly with the admiral commanding the French fleet in China, when the need for such a force occured.[3] A question, however, that was always in de Bellecourt's mind was whether a simple, occasional, naval demonstration would in fact be sufficient. Alcock had already threatened the Japanese with war if the treaties were not properly carried out; in a memorandum to the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs at the end of 1859, Alcock reminded them that at a recent interview, he had explained, 'there were but two ways of settling affairs between nations: the one by reason, with Treaties and Diplomatic Agents for the instruments; the other war, where the instruments are fleets and armies. I stated, as the experience of all ages and nations, that where the one failed, the other inevitably followed sooner or later.'[4]

1. CP vol. II, Ministry to de Bellecourt, 10 March 1860
2. CP vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 30 January and 20 February 1860
3. CP vol. II, Minister of Navy to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11 May 1860
4. BPP, General Affairs, Japan, vol. 1 Alcock to Russell, 10 December 1859, Inclosure 1

In the event, Alcock was mildly rebuked by Lord John Russell for having threatened war. Russell suggested, 'Time and patience may remove many of the difficulties of which you complain.'[1]

Patience, difficult enough in the circumstances, however, was less a factor of importance than that of time. Both Alcock and de Bellecourt became fairly soon convinced that the Japanese were preparing for war against the Western powers. In November 1859 de Bellecourt had warned his government:

> 'Despite its natural defenses the Japanese government seems to be taking very clearly characterised military precautions. Does it wish to inspire the foreign agents with a certain idea of the strength and sentiments of independence of the country or does it expect in effect to have to one day repel a serious attack? Only the future will be able to answer this question...[2]

By September of the following year he wrote saying that in case the need for action arose, the French fleet should attack by sea in the direction of Osaka in order to interrupt communications between North and South.[3] In the course of the following years he continued to warn the Japanese government of the grave consequences it would incur if it continued to defy the just demands of the Western representatives in Japan in carrying out

1. BFP, General Affairs, Japan, vol I Russell to Alcock, 28 February 1860
2. CP vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 6 November 1859
3. CP vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 22 September 1860

its treaty obligations.[1] At the same time he continued to warn his own government of the bellicose intentions of the Japanese and how only a policy of force could succeed in altering that state of affairs.[2] Nevertheless relations between Japan and the western powers continued to deteriorate seriously, with numerous outrages, actual or attempted murders, resulting at one point in the western representatives (with the exception of the American) removing themselves from Edo to Yokohama.

The many difficulties besetting European-Japanese relations resulted in the departure of the first Japanese embassy to Europe in January of 1862. By then, however, both camps in Japan had begun the purchase of arms from the west. This situation increased de Bellecourt's anxieties for the future; and his assessment of the present state of affairs in Japan and the future is summed up in one of his more important and longer dispatches in October 1862. This is an important period of policy formation, for it came during the Japanese embassy's presence in

1. see the following all in CP and all contained in dispatches by de Bellecourt to Ministry or in inclosures: vol. III, 30 January 1861, 16 February 1861, 1 March 1861, 15 March 1861
2. see the following all in CP and all contained in dispatches by de Bellecourt to Ministry or in inclosures: vol. II 8 December 1860, vol, III, 16 February 1861, 12 March 1861 vol. IV, 12 July 1861, 22 July 1861, 16 August 1861, 8 November 1861, 23 November 1861, vol. V, 22 March 1862, 3 May 1862 and 18 May 1862

Europe, after the Richardson murder and before de Bellecourt and Alcock were increasingly to act independently of Paris and London. This dispatch followed a visit of one of the members of the Ro,u who had made enquiries into the qualities of French artillery.

> This avidity to borrow from the Western powers all the material improvements which science has put in the service of our civilisation only indicates, the way I see it, in the Japanese one sole preoccupation, that is to place themselves as soon as possible on a good footing of defense or resistance, and not, as some people would have it, in order to assure themselves superiority in the case of internal crises, but rather in order to succeed as soon as possible in reaching a level which will give them a certain confidence in their own strength and permit them, at any given moment, to push back what they call the pretensions of the Occident against their Empire, their institutions, and their mores.
>
> I have said it often and I have often repeated it, if one talks to the Japanese of international law or the applications of the principles of morality or of legislation of the Occident, they answer invariably that these international or special laws do not concern Japan, which has its own customs, its own principles, and to which it must remain faithful. But speak to them of military improvements and you will see them enthuse at the idea of being able to appropriate for themselves a means of new armament which could be advantageous to them, whatever change in its application is needed to alter their customs or their habits.

And at the end, de Bellecourt warned

> Of course the Japanese are looking for arms, and when they will be sufficiently furnished with them, they will without a doubt look for enemies.[1]

1. CP. Vol. VII, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 10 October 1862

Nor did he believe that the political situation in Japan was improving. Despite assurances from the government that relations between the Taikun and the Mikado were far better,[1] he believed the Taikun's position was becoming weaker and he wondered whether the daimyo of Mito was not preparing a coup d'état.[2] In June 1863 he had obtained an official document in which it was announced that all civil servants having treated with the Western powers since 1853 would be punished.[3] War, he was certain, was imminent; it was a question of who would strike first and of when and how the attack should be carried out. In the light of all this he sent another long dispatch to Paris giving his opinion and that of the French admiral, Jaurès, on this matter:

> We have, Admiral Jaurès and I, seriously studied the problem in all its aspects, and despite our sincere desire to avoid all complications and our efforts to that end, we cannot prevent ourselves from concluding that a demonstration will in the end become necessary.
>
> It seems to me, therefore, that this pressure, if it becomes necessary, and I am of the opinion that everything indicates that it has been rendered urgent, will be carried out efficiently by the common and combined action of all the Powers having treaties with Japan.
>
> Indeed I would add that in my way of thinking, if this method were adopted, one should not forget to call on the various powers which do not have treaties with Japan but desire to obtain them to take part, for there is no reason why this country should not be open to all the nations of the Occidental world.

1. CP vol. VIII de Bellecourt to Ministry, 27 May 1863
2. CP vol. IX, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 3 June 1863
3. CP vol. IX, de Bellecourt to Ministry 11 June 1863

It seems to me that Italy, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Denmark, Turkey, even Egypt, Persia and the various states of South America, why even China which Japan in the past had wanted to conquer, should also have the right to entertain relations with Japan and that many of these nations would be in a position to provide maritime transportation, even if they cannot provide men; these contingents would render less onerous the efforts of the Great Powers and would give by its universal character a salutory lesson to the spirit of exclusiveness and vanity which Japan will only get rid of after a crisis which will force her to recognise the necessity of abandoning traditional contempt for foreigners.[1]

In the summer of 1863, therefore, both Jaurès and de Bellecourt became convinced of the need for direct military action. Jaurès agreed with de Bellecourt's appraisal of the situation in Japan and the inevitability of war,[2] although neither the Ministry of the Navy, nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris desired complications in Japan, both Jaurès and de Bellecourt were persuaded that the course of action they were advocating was the only one which would prove successful. Jaurès had written to his minister, 'There will be security for them (foreign residents) only when the Japanese will respect their nationality and fear the vengeance of Occidental Powers.'[3] Jaurès shared de Bellecourt's opinion in regard to the weakness of the Shogun[4] and earlier in the year had written that in case of war

1. CP vol. IX, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 13 June 1863
2. see Marine, B17, nos. 1 to 28
3. ibid, Jaures to Ministry of Navy, no. 11, 12 June 1863
4. ibid, Jaures to Ministry of Navy, no. 4, 4 May 1863

1,100 men would be sufficient.[1] Paris, however, remained unconvinced and the Ministry of the Navy kept urging Jaurès not to get involved.[2]

In the course of July of 1863 de Bellecourt and Jaurès, together with Alcock and the British admiral Kuper, were to become thoroughly immersed in Japan, both politically and militarily, and all with the alarm and disapproval of their governments. At the time Alcock was seeking the conditions for the settlement of the Richardson affair,[3] the Governor of Kanagawa asked de Bellecourt if he would agree to mediate and advise moderation on the part of Alcock. De Bellecourt replied by saying that all powers would unite in remaining in Japan by force, that he would not ally with Alcock immediately in his military operations, but for France to remain neutral certain conditions had to be met.[4]

The next day a most important and interesting meeting took place with Ogasawara Nagamichi. He informed de Bellecourt that

1. ibid, Jaurès to Ministry of Navy, no. 2, 20 February 1863
2. CP, vol. IX, Ministry of Navy to Jaures, ? July 1863 (the date on the document was illegible, but was probably between the 7th and 10th July)
3. see BPP, General Affairs, Japan, vol. I, correspondence between 19 September 1862 and 27 December 1862, and vol. II 1864 (3242) LXVI and 1864 (3303) LXVI, pps. 9-139
4. CP vol. IX, de Bellecourt to Ministry

he intended to pay the indemnity demanded by Alcock and that he also intended to carry out the Mikado's expulsion order. But in so doing he would demonstrate the impossibility of the execution of the order and even if necessary enter into combat with the Mikado, invoking the support of the foreign powers. Jaurès had taken command of the defense of Yokohama, and Ogasawara informed de Bellecourt that he not only approved of Jaurès' initiative, but was indeed pleased by it. Ogasawara then asked that de Bellecourt's letter to the government protesting against the expulsion order be in very strong language, and that all other heads of legation should do the same. De Bellecourt was mystified by all these procedures, which,

> 'certainly have no precedent in history. They are inspired by mysterious politics of which one cannot yet understand the intricate web. In any case this expulsion for which one asks pardon, against which one even offers arms is a most incomprehensible act. There are only two alternatives, either Japan is completely opened and the treaties, broken today, are restored, or it will be annihilated, partitioned if it resists.[1]

About ten days after his meeting with Ogasawara, de Bellecourt met Sakai Tadasuke, a fudai daimyo and at that time an acting <u>wakadoshiyori</u>. Sakai asked de Bellecourt if he was prepared to support the Shogun, de Bellecourt replied in the

1. CP vol. IX, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 24 June 1863

affir ative albeit with doubts and misgivings and sought, in exchange for his support, the opening of the ports, especially Hyogo and Osaka.[1] Sakai answered that were the Shogun to be successful in his politics, he would become all powerful and would give complete satisfaction to the foreigners and would open ports.[2]

Then, at the end of June and in the beginning of July, matters took a dramatic turn which on the surface at least seemed to justify de Bellecourt's belief that Japan was preparing for an all out war on the Western powers. At this time the Choshu han joi extremists had the greatest influence in Kyoto and were causing the Bakufu serious problems. They had managed to force the Bakufu to agree to a date when the expulsion of foreigners would begin. The Bakufu, therefore, found itself increasingly under fire from within and without. Militarily and politically it was not strong enough to withstand either its domestic or

1. the question of the delay in the opening of the "two cities and two ports", Edo, Osaka, Hiogo and Niigata, had been the main reason for the dispatch of the 1862 Japanese Embassy to Europe. Alcock and de Bellecourt both felt that their governments should not give in, but in exchange for some consessions, the two governments did in fact cede, believing that only war would succeed in obtaining the opening of the cities and ports, and not wishing to engage in war in Japan. see Beasley, Select Documents, documents nos. 35-38 and CP vol. IV, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 28 November 1861, explaining to the government why it should not give in. and CP vol. V, Ministry to de Bellecourt, 25 May 1862 explaining why it had decided to reach a compromise.
2. CP vol. IX, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 3 July 1863

foreign critics. This explains the strange diplomacy of Ogasawara. The Bakufu, under pressure, had agreed to begin the expulsion of the foreigners on 10 May 1863; 'they agreed to impossibilities merely to obtain a few days' reprieve: (It is also not inconceivable that they were waiting for Choshu to precipitate a crisis which would deflect the anger of the foreigners against that obstreperous han.)'[1] If this indeed had been the aim of the Bakufu, it could be said that in the short term they were definitely successful, in the long term, it could be argued, the events which were to follow in the Choshu han spelled the Shogunate's doom.[2]

Towards the end of June Choshu batteries had fired on an American merchant vessel, the Pembroke, as it was passing the Shimonoseki straits on its way from Yokohama to Shanghai. On 4 July a French ship, the Kien-Chang, was fired on. Jaurès decided to take immediate reprisals.[3] On the 17th of July, de Bellecourt informed the Bakufu of Jaurès' intention:

> 'Full of indignation at the news he received yesterday, and remembering that Your Excellencies had often declared that the Taikun was not in a position to force certain Princes to obedience, Admiral Jaures, who commands the forces of the Emperor in these seas, left immediately with the vessel of His Imperial Majesty the Semiramis in the direction of

1. A Craig, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration, p. 199
2. ibid, chaps. VII to IX and Conclusion
3. Marine, 817, no. 18, Jaurès to Ministry of Navy, 19 July 1863

> the State of the Prince of Nagato in order to obtain reparations form the unqualifiable attack directed against one of the ships of his Division.[1]

Jaurès carried out both sea and land operations.[2] His interest in Japan can be judged from his request that Yokohama, rather than Shanghai, be made the French naval headquarters.[3] Jaurès continued to believe in the inevitability of war with Japan, but he now slightly increased the number of men he felt would be necessary, from 1,100 to 1,500 to 2,000.[4]

At the very moment that de Bellecourt and Jaurès were enforcing their militant policy, the French Foreign Minister in Paris, Drouyn de Lhuys, was composing an angry letter to de Bellecourt. The letter began by concentrating on de Bellecourt's decision to ally himself with Alcock, perhaps genuinely believing that this was expected of him, as his instructions had always been to follow Britain's policy. Drouyn de Lhuys again stressed that France did not want to get involved in Japan. De Bellecourt should have limited himself to a naval display and should have gone no further than an expression of solidarity with Great Britain. He

1. CP vol. IX, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 16 July 1863, enclosure
2. Marine, 817, no. 19, Jaurès to Ministry of Navy, 24 July 1863
3. ibid, no. 20, 26 July 1863
4. ibid, no. 26, 30 October 1863

went on to say that he sought in vain to find what possible advantage could have accrued to France in thus voluntarily compromising her policy in a matter which was purely Britain's concern. He was furious not only with de Bellecourt, but also with Jaurès. Jaurès had earlier asked for French re-enforcements to be sent from Cochinchina, Drouyn de Lhuys exclaimed , 'it is indeed alarming that he [Jaurès] should have even dreamed of decreasing, even momentarily, our forces in Cochinchina at the risk of putting in peril interests which are certainly more real and better defined than those which we have in Japan.' Drouyn de Lhuys then expressed his considerable anger that de Bellecourt should have proposed French support to the Shogun and again severly urged de Bellecourt not to get involved in local politics. Force, he concluded, should only be used by France in case of defense.[1]

The following points emerge from this dispatch. In the first place it reasserted the view that France's basic policy towards Japan ever since the days of Gros had not changed. Under no circumstances was Paris willing to anticipate the possibility of committing itself militarily in response to events in Japan.

1. CP, vol. IX, Ministry to de Bellecourt, 18 July 1863

It also showed that the economic argument, at least in 1863, that France's policy changed because of her increased interests in the silk trade, does not apply. No French Foreign Minister - and there were no less than twenty-eight in the period covered by this thesis - took any particular interest in Japan. Drouyn de Lhuys is perhaps an exception, his interest, however, was limited to the trade in silkworm eggs, as President of the Société d'Acclimatisation. In spite of this interest, as shown in this dispatch, at no time was he prepared to risk military entanglements with Japan, nor did he wish his agents to get involved in Japanese politics. This invalidates the view that Roches had been sent by Paris to inaugurate a new French policy fashioned by Drouyn de Lhuys.[1] There is no indication that Drouyn de Lhuys' policy ~~were~~ ever changed in regard to Japan. Perhaps the main difference between de Bellecourt and Roches was that although de Bellecourt reported everything he said and did in a very voluminous correspondence with Paris, Roches preferred to keep most of his activities secret from home (almost eleven full volumes cover de Bellecourt's period of residence, against less than six for Roches'): thus the Quai d'Orsay knew a great deal

1. See M. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration, p. 316 and chapter VIII, "Leon Roches and the new French Policy" in M. Medzini, French Policy in Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime

about what de Bellecourt was up to and was thus able to comment and indeed express its anger or disappointment with him, when the need was felt.

In the three months following the French Shimonoseki expedition, de Bellecourt's dispatches to the Ministry centred on three issues. The first consisted of numerous dispatches justifying his and Jaurès' action in Shimonoseki, justifiable, that is in their results, of proving to the Japanese that they could not defeat the foreigners.[1] De Bellecourt stressed, 'what we have not been able to obtain after many years of persuasion, will in the end be ceded by fear and that an energetic attitude will be more profitable than all the concessions of a wise spirit of conciliation...'[2] Secondly, de Bellecourt explained the way in which he and his colleagues were putting increasing pressure on the Bakufu. De Bellecourt included in his dispatches to Paris copies of letters he had sent to the

1. see the following, all contained in CP and all in dispatches from de Bellecourt to the Ministry: vol. IX, 24 July 1863, 29 July 1863, 28 July 1863, vol. X, 20 August 1863 and 26 August 1863 which was ostensibly on Admiral Kuper's bombardment of Kagoshima, but in which de Bellecourt said that France's action has been far more successfully carried out. Kuper's action was heavily censured in some quarters in Britain; see, for example, the letter to The Times by Charles Buxton, MP, published on 4 November 1863.
2. CP vol. IX, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 29 July 1863

roju, and on one occasion to the Shogun himself[1], where he quite liberally used the threat of force.[2] Thirdly, de Bellecourt expressed qualified support for the Bakufu, but kept on insisting on its basic weakness.[3]

In the meantime, Jaurès received a letter from the Minister of the Navy; the Minister congratulated Jaurès on his apparently successful operation in Shimonoseki, but reiterated that France had no vital interests in Japan and that Japan should certainly not become the centre of the French fleet in the Far East. Jaurès was told to return to China immediately, leaving only one ship behind but with clear instructions to her captain not to get involved.[4] Jaurès left Japan in December of 1863[5], but not without having once again stated his conviction of the inevitability of a war with Japan.[6]

In Japan the situation was by no means improving. In October a French naval officer had been murdered[7] and in the

1. CP vol. X, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 8 August 1863
2. see the following all contained in CP and all in dispatches from de Bellecourt to Ministry: vol. IX, 23 July 1863, 26 July 1863, 29 July 1863, vol. X, 2 August 1863, 8 August 1863
3. see CP vol. IX 23 July 1863, vol. X, 23 October 1863 and 25 October 1863, de Bellecourt to Ministry
4. CP vol. X, Ministry of Navy to Jaurès, 26 September 1863
5. Marine, 817, no, 28, Jaurès to Ministry of Navy, 11 December 1863
6. ibid, no, 26, 30 October 1863
7. CP vol. X, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 14 October 1863

same month the Japanese government had announced that it was prepared to rescind the expulsion order on condition that foreigners left Yokohama and ceased trading in that part.[1] De Bellecourt returned to his earlier suspicions of the Bakufu and claimed that what it wanted was to impose conditions comparable to those the Dutch had had to put up with for two centuries in Dejima.[2] De Bellecourt also commented on the apparently successful negotiations taking place between Satsuma and Britain[3], although for his part he refused to believe in any change of policy on the part of Satsuma. There was simply a realisation in Satsuma that war with the West was for the time being premature.[4]

In Paris the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Navy after consultation agreed that under no circumstances should

1. CP vol. X, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 23 October and 25 October 1863
2. CP vol. X, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 31 October 1863
3. see E. Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, chap. VIII and especially p. 93. Grace Fox, in Britain and Japan asserts that following the bombardment of Kagoshima, Satsuma han adopted a pro-British policy (p. 116) and that Neale promised to help Satsuma purchase a warship in England. This is the same sort of initiative which Roches was to take with the Bakufu, i.e. facilitating by official intervention the purchase of arms in France.
4. CP vol. X, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 14 November 1863

France get involved in Japan, that China was of far greater importance.[1] When de Bellecourt asked the Foreign Ministry what reparations should be demanded of the Japanese government for the Camus (the naval officer) murder,[2] the Foreign Ministry sought the advice of the Navy. The question was whether France should follow Britain's example (i.e. the bombardment of Kagoshima, following the Richardson murder).[3] The Navy Minister answered in the negative on the grounds that French forces in Japan were insufficient:

> 'no doubt, we succeeded in our little exploit at Shimonoseki; but we must be under no illusion that if we wanted to obtain serious reparation, in case it was refused, we would have to increase our means of action and thereby all our expenses. Your Excellency knows that the government of the Emperor so far has wanted to avoid at all cost any cause which might force it into complications with Japan'[4]

The Minister of the Navy had written to Jaurès along similar lines.[5]

De Bellecourt, in the meantime, had announced that the Japanese government intended to send another embassy to Europe.

1. CP vol. X, Minister of Navy to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 12 November 1863 and Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Navy, 17 November 1863
2. CP vol. X, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 23 November 1863
3. CP vol. XI, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Navy, 18 February 1864
4. CP vol. XI, Minister of Navy to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 February 1864
5. CP vol. X, Ministry of Navy to Jaurès, 10 December 1863

He favoured such a course as it would give the Japanese the opportunity of apologising to the French government for the Camus murder; and the various difficulties about the present state of affairs would be elucidated in Paris.[1] Later he announced the composition of the embassy and that it was to be headed by Ikeda Nagaaki.[2] The Minister of Foreign Affairs was not at all pleased at the prospect of another Japanese mission[3] yet by that time there was nothing Paris could do to stop it. De Bellecourt especially warned his government to be careful, for he reiterated his belief that the Japanese government was determined to a pre-Perry, i.e. Dejima, state of affairs.[4]

De Bellecourt's years in Japan were coming to an end. In one of his last dispatches to Paris he declared that victory by the forces of the Mikado was unlikely. What he did not rule out, though he thought it improbable, was the overthrow of the present shogunal dynasty for a new shogunal dynasty. But what he stressed was needed for Japan and for the peaceful development of relations with the West was a strong Shogun.[5] De Bellecourt left ~~in May~~ in May 1864 after having spent a few weeks with his

1. CP vol. X, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 25 November & 23 December
2. CP vol. XI, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 28 January 1864
3. CP vol. XI, Ministry to de Bellecourt, 10 March 1864
4. CP vol. XI, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 16 February 1864
5. CP vol. XI, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 19 March 1864

successor, Léon Roches, helping him settle in.[1]

The interest of the French government during de Bellecourt's time as chief diplomatic agent was marginal, almost non-existent. Both Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Navy urged the diplomat and the admiral not to get involved in Japanese politics and above all not to compromise France in a situation which might lead to hostilities, which would be costly, lengthy and not worth the effort. De Bellecourt and Jaurès saw things differently, both believed in the efficiency of gunboat diplomacy and both acted increasingly independently of the government's instructions.

De Bellecourt and Jaurès, along with their British colleagues, Alcock and Kuper, by putting constant pressure on the Bakufu increasingly forced it into confrontation with its rivals. By using military means against Satsuma and Choshu, the latter were to recognise the impossibility of realising joi. In time they switched their emphasis from joi to sonno, a far more decisive weapon against the Bakufu.

Léon Roches, the Bakufu and the Sonno Challenge

Léon Roches is a far more notorious and controversial figure in Japanese history than his predecessor. For this there are essentially three reasons.

In the first place, Roches was obviously a far more colourful, indeed flamboyant, figure than de Bellecourt. Lord

1. CP vol. XI, Roches to Ministry, 15 May 1864

Redesdale described him as a 'handsome swashbuckler... far more a picturesque Spahi than a diplomatist', for whom he admitted that he had a 'kind of sneaking regard' and 'He was in private life a picturesque and rather fascinating personality'.[1] Aged 55 when he arrived in Japan (he died at the age of 92), he had an unorthodox background, was not a career diplomat, but had enjoyed a spectacular career especially in the Maghrib countries.[2]

The second reason was the change of the situation in Japan. De Bellecourt had had relatively few courses of action he could take. The Japanese political situation during most of his stay was hidden behind a veil of secrecy. By 1864/5, however, the situation changed dramatically. Both sides realised they could use foreigners, official and non-official (such as Glover or Montblanc), for their own ends. Foreigners could become involved in Japanese political affairs because both Tokugawa and anti-Tokugawa factions wanted them to become so involved at least to a certain extent.

The third reason has to do with the relationship between Roches and Alcock's successor, Parkes. De Bellecourt tended to

1. Lord Redesdale, Memories, vol. I, p.377
2. On Roches' career see, Alpinius, Quelques Pages sur Leon Roches, J. Caille, Une Mission de Leon Roches a Rabat en 1845, J. Gonnet, Deux Amis Grands Serviteurs de la France and by Roches himself, Trente Deux Ans a Travers l'Islam, 1832-1864; unfortunately none of these touch on his period in Japan.

follow Alcock's lead and seems to have been on friendly terms with him. With Alcock's departure, Roches became dean of the diplomatic corps. The assumed political rivalry between Roches and Parkes, as pointed out earlier, was more apparent than real. But their intense personal rivalry and jealousy adds a certain piquancy to a study of the period.

Roches, arriving in Japan, found that the government still insisted on the foreigners leaving Yokohama and that Choshu was continuing to impede foreign navigation. Roches explained the nature of the problem and the required solution:

> 'Moreover it is impossible not to recognise in these tactics [the Japanese government's] the spirit which seems to animate all the Oriental peoples when Europe seeks to develop its influence in their midst. Force which was necessary to ensure the execution of our treaties in the Mediterranean is also the only argument which makes them respected in China; with the Moslems it is religious fanantcism which seems to push us back; here, we find an obstacle not less serious in its sentiment of overexcited patriotism by the agents of the government and produced for the needs of the cause. In any case, if these resistances in the Oriental peoples have a different origin, their manner of manifesting themselves is identical; in reading the memoranda of the Japanese government or in listening to the objections formulated by its ministers, one could imagine oneself in Morocco.
>
> If there is everywhere a similarity in the obstacles posed in our direction, will we in order to surmount them here have to arrive at the use of rigorous measures which have proved successful elsewhere? I admit with regret, I fear that this solution will become inevitable and it is the Japanese government itself which provides me, having just arrived, the means to justify my apprehension.'[1]

1. CC vol. III, Roches to Ministry, 17 May 1864

These considerations were to serve as a justification for two decisions that Roches was to take along with his colleagues. One was to withstand at all costs the Japanese government's demand for the evacuation of Yokohama, including, Roches alleged to his Ministry, the Japanese threat of use of force,[1] and the allied decision to bombard Shimonoseki.[2]

As the preparations for the allied (Britain, France, United States and Netherlands) expedition against Shimonoseki was under way, in August 1864 Roches received the visit of Takemoto Masao, at that time Gaikoku bugyo. According to Roches, Takemoto told him that although the Shogunate would like to see Choshu punished, it could do so neither materially, nor morally. Takemoto went on, however, to tell Roches that Japan feared British ambitions in the east, that Britain might take advantage of the Shimonoseki expedition to seize a bit of territory, and could the Representative of France give some sort of guarantee that Britain would not in fact behave in accordance with the fears and anxieties of the Japanese government.[3] This interview, as reported by Roches,

1. see CP vol. XI, Roches to Ministry, 25 May 1864
2. see CP vol. XI, Roches to Ministry, 19 May 1864, the first mention of the proposed expedition, where Roches mainly exposes Alcock's views and ends up saying he agrees with Alcock.
3. CP. vol. XII, Roches to Ministry, 17 August 1864

gives further evidence to the view that in the first instance the Bakufu had approached Roches, rather than vice versa.[1]

Roches then was to insist on a number of occasions[2] that the Shimonoseki expedition, among other things, would have the salutory effect of strengthening the Bakufu. The return of the Ikeda mission and its agreement with the French government[3] briefly imperilled Roches' participation in the Shimonoseki expedition, but he was soon relieved to hear that the Bakufu refused to ratify the agreement[4], thus giving Roches the liberty, or so he felt, to rejoin the Western allies. With the return of the allied fleet from Shimonoseki, Roches congratulated himself and his colleagues on having chosen this line of action, so obviously crowned with success.[5] He asserted that it had

1. R. Sims, French Policy..., p.90
2. see CP vol. XII, Roches to Ministry, 17 and 26 August 1864
3. see Beasley, Select Documents ..., chap. 5 of Introduction and section VI of Documents
4. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 26 August 1864
5. see CP vol. XII, Roches to Ministry, 23 September 1864, where, among other things, Roches announces that the Bakufu has given up the idea of the foreign evacuation of Yokohama; and Roches to Ministry, 15 October 1864

enjoyed the Shogun's tacit approval,[1] and he insisted that it would strengthen the position of the Shogun and that all Western diplomatic activity must lend itself to that purpose.[2] He declared, furthermore, that the moment had come to insist on the Mikado ratifying the treaties.[3] Finally, Roches informed his Ministry that the allied powers were demanding an indemnity of 1[illegible] million francs from Choshu.[4] Thus by the end of the year 1864 Roches felt he had reason to be pleased with the course events had taken, that force against Choshu had been justified by the results, namely, the free navigation of the Shimonoseki straits and, or so he felt, the strengthening of the Shogunate against the forces of xenophobic anarchy.[5]

Before proceding further with Roches' activities in Japan a brief comment on the ill-fated Ikeda mission to Paris is called

1. CP vol. XII, Roches to Ministry, 17 and 26 August 1864
2. see CP vol. XII, Roches to Ministry, 17 and 30 August and 31 December 1864
3. see CP vol. XII, 30 August and 23 September 1864
4. CP vol. XII, Roches to Ministry, 21 October 1864. The Shimonoseki indemnity was to provide numerous dispatches for a number of years (it was not fully paid until 1874) and some dispute between France and Britain. The details of this question will not be gone into here. See M & D, vol III, part I.
5. CP vol. XII, Roches to Ministry, 31 October 1864. Roches was by no means alone in seeing the alternative to the Shogunate as the triumph of feudalism inevitably leading to anarchy which would seriously effect Western relations with Japan. See for example, A. Roussin, Une Campagne sur les Côtes du Japan, p.275

for. The mission was successful in getting France to agree to the sale of French warships and to the proposal that a hundred Japanese be sent to France to study naval science.[1] Otherwise Drouyn de Lhuys refused to discuss with the Japanese Embassy the possibility of the closure of Yokohama to foreign trade. Surprisingly, he then went on to point out that Franco-Japanese relations had by no means improved recently and added that if the Shogun was unable to quell the anti-foreign party by himself, France would be prepared to help him. At a later meeting, Drouyn de Lhuys compromised himself even further by stating that were a civil war to break out in Japan, as a result of the Shogun's refusal to execute the Mikado's expulsion order, all the treaty powers would join to help the Shogunate. If, however, the Shogunate let itself be led by the Mikado, Japan would have to face war with the Western powers.[2]

Given Drouyn de Lhuys' refusal to discuss the closure of Yokohama, the Ikeda mission announced that there was no point in going to London, as presumably the answer would be the same,[3] and that therefore they intended to return to Japan. Before leaving, however, a convention was drawn up between the French

1. M & D, vol. I, Note au Sujet de la Marine au Japon, May 1864
2. CP vol. XI, Ministry to Roches, 21 June 1864
3. The Foreign Office was kept in touch of proceedings in Paris with the Ikeda mission, albeit not always very satisfactorily. See BPP General Affairs, Japan, vol. II, correspondence of 20, 23 March, 20, 22 April, 12, 17 May, 2, 16 and 17 June 1864

Foreign Ministry and the Ikeda mission, the second article of which read:

> 'The Japanese Government engages also within the three months following the return of their Excellencies the Ambassadors, to put a stop to the hindrances met with at present by French vessels wishing to pass the Straits of Shimonoseki, and to maintain this passage free at all times; having recourse, if necessary, to employment of force, and, in case of need, acting in concert with the Commander of the French naval division.'[1]

Drouyn de Lhuys' negotiations with the Ikeda mission and eventual convention are difficult to explain. In a sense these might give weight to the argument that he had changed his policy in regard to Japan. For this argument to be sustained, however, consistency on the part of the Foreign minister was to be expected. Less than two months after the departure of the Ikeda mission, Drouyn informed the Minister of the Navy that Roches' instructions were to rely on force only in case of need to protect the mission; he also stressed that France had no desire to see Japan become another China.[2] Later, when Drouyn de Lhuys had heard of Roches' participation in the Choshu expedition, he sent him a dispatch expressing his annoyance in no uncertain terms. He told Roches that he had behaved 'in manifest contradiction of the instructions laid out by the Government of the Emperor to the commander of our fleet and to yourself.'[3] By the summer of the following year

1. In inclosure, Cowley to Russell, BFP General Affairs, Japan, vol. II, 26 June 1864
2. CP vol. XII, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Navy 19 August 1864
3. CP vol. XII, Ministry to Roches, 10 October 1864

and after numerous dispatches in which Roches congratulated himself on the good relations he enjoyed with the Shogunate and on the progress of the sale of French arms and equipment, Drouyn de Lhuys, though pleased with developments, still insisted on the need to maintain a cautious policy. He told Roches that he saw no difficulties in selling more arms to the Shogun's forces, that he agreed with him that it would be best for the interests of the Western powers to have the Shogun remain in power, but that he must make it clear to the Japanese government that France was not prepared to go any further, in other words that the Shogunate could not count on any direct assistance, including use of French troops, from France.[1]

Thus Drouyn de Lhuys' uncharacteristic language and behaviour at the time of the Ikeda mission remain something of a mystery. One possibility is that,

> 'Drouyn, dealing directly with representatives of the Bakufu for the first time, decided when confronted with their evasive and delaying tactics to force them into the open by an open threat. He now saw, perhaps for the first time, what Bellecourt had had to put up with for four years. It is also possible that he was acting in line with the widespread view that 'Orientals' were impressed by force.'[2]

1. CP vol. XIII, Ministry to Roches, 17 June 1865
2. Medzini, French Policy In..., p.63

What is certain is that he had no intention of following up his temporary aggressive line and what is more than likely is that he was relieved to learn that the 'Ikeda Convention' was not to be ratified by the Japanese government.

In Japan, Roches, following the success of the Shimonoseki expedition, increased his contacts and cooperation with the Bakufu. One of the pillars of Roches' policy in Japan was to provide the Shogunate with the foreign expertise it desired in pursuance of military and industrial projects.[1] Both the Shogunate and the han had been employing foreigners for some time.[2] Roches' realisation that Japan's dependence on foreign expertise could be turned to France's advantage, something that had not been grasped by Parkes[3], had significant results:

> 'In the last fifteen years of the Tokugawa period at least two hundred foreign technological and language instructors were hired, most by the central government (bakufu) and some by the regional domains (han). Of these, more than eighty were French, more than sixty were Dutch, about thirty were British, while Americans and Germans constituted the remainder'.[4]

The legacy of Roches' contribution to the embryonic moves toward modernisation was to outlive the overthrow of the Bakufu, in that

1. The Yokosuka dockyard and the military mission will be looked at in greater detail in Chapters 8 and 9
2. see H.J. Jones, "Bakumatsu Foreign Employees", Monumenta Nipponica, XXIX, no. 3
3. ibid, p.312/3
4. ibid, p.305

some of his projects were to continue after the Restoration under French auspices and, 'The bakumatsu experience in the hiring of foreigners, as in other aspects of policy, had pronounced effects on the new government which emerged with the Meiji Restoration in 1868'.[1]

The process began in 1865 when, shortly after the completion of the Shimonoseki expedition and the abandonment of the expulsion policy by the Bakufu, Roches was approached regarding the possibility of French cooperation in the building of an important dockyard by the Japanese government. Roches' explanation for the Japanese approach to France, rather than any other power, was: 'No doubt the disinterested policy of France, represented by agents whose firmness of principles does not exclude a refined courtesy, together with a certain similarity one can notice between our national character and that of Japan, must have predisposed the government of the Tycoun in favour of our country..'[2] Roches was of course aware that his predecessor had believed in the inevitability of war with Japan, that relations so far had certainly not been smooth and that in some quarters it may have seemed that arming Japan and helping the country to lay the

1. ibid.
2. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 16 January 1865

foundations for an industrial state was inviting trouble:

> But, some will say, is it prudent to provide the Japanese government with means of attack and defense which one day it might direct against us? To this question the answer is peremptory.
>
> If France does not do it, another Power will do it. The inconveniences for us will be the same, the advantages will be for the others. Now, these advantages, commercial, industrial and political are they not too evident for me to have to enumerate ?

He went on to talk of the Bakufu's preparations for an expedition against Choshu, including extensive purchase of French arms. He concluded his dispatch:

> Without being optimistic and bearing in mind the proverbial bad faith of the Orientals, I think I am right in asserting that, at least for the time being, the Government of the Taikun is animated towards us with pacific intentions and that it is on our loyal cooperation that it principally counts in order to demolish the opposition of the great feudatories of the Empire.[1]

Eventually in the closing years of the Bakumatsu era the question of foreign employees became a factor in the rivalry between Roches and his English and Prussian colleagues, Parkes and von Brandt.[2] There were obvious economic advantages to be gained.[3] and it was appreciated that the more compatriots a diplomat could count as Japanese government foreign employees, the greater the influence of the foreign country (especially in

1. ibid
2. Jones, op. cit., p.313-316 and 323/4
3. ibid. p.318

such sensitive areas as training the army or navy). Roches always insisted that Japanese requests for French expertise should be met [1] and in general Paris complied.[2] The engagement of French employees in Japan gave the French government prospects of exerting political influence, and gaining economic advantages, without in any way compromising France in case of civil war. Indeed on at least one occasion, the Foreign Minister, while congratulating Roches on the commercial advantages he had secured for France, urged him not to get too involved with any one party, namely the Bakufu, lest a change in government jeopardise the advantages gained.[3]

Roches' activities in securing Frenchmen as important foreign employees of the Japanese government and especially his work in founding a school formed a nucleus of the eventual development of French culture in Japan.[4] Roches constantly encouraged Japanese

1. see in CP, Roches' correspondence with Ministry, vol.XIII, 16 January, 28 February, 18 March, 14 April, 10 June, 26 September 1865; vol. XIV, 15 January, 15 February, 15 May, 21 July, 12 October 1866; vol.XV, 12 July 1867; vol.XVI 14 April and 25 May 1868
2. In September of 1865, for example, an agent of the Bakufu, Shibata, was in Paris and was introduced to the Foreign Ministers of War and the Navy; Shibata's mission was the purchase of arms and equipment. see CP vol. XIII, Ministry to Roches, 26 September 1865
3. CP vol. XV, Ministry to Roches, 18 May 1867
4. see Cent Ans d'Etudes Francaises au Japon, p. xi-xvii

students to go to France and no less a figure than Nakae Chomin had been initiated to French culture while serving as Roches' interpreter.[1]

The remainder of this chapter is primarily concerned with the question of Roches' committed pro-Bakufu policy and the reasons why he became to adopt this posture. But something must be said about the alleged political rivalry between Roches and his British counterpart, Sir Harry Parkes. We noted earlier that the two were certainly not on good personal terms. Redesdale commented, 'It is not too much to say that Parkes and Roches hated one another and were as jealous as a couple of women.'[2] The personalities of the two were bound to conflict in a circle as small as the diplomatic community in Edo, especially as they were both 'men who preferred to lead rather than follow'.[3]

1. Hijakata Kazuo, Nakae Chomin: Kindai Nippon no Shisoka, p.18 Roches was also to insist on the need for more Frenchmen to learn Japanese 'as indispensable conditions forthe development of our influence in Japan', CC vol. III, Roches to Ministry, 8 August 1864.
   The study of the Japanese language had been inaugurated in the School of Oriental Languages in Paris in 1863 and Napoleon III himself was present at the inaugural lecture by Léon de Rosny, who cited the very numerous reasons why Japanese was a most valuable language to learn; but apart from not knowing actually how many students took the course and how many graduated, the French government does not seem to have made much use of them. Nor did France develop the system of language officers as Britain did. French diplomatic agents in Japan tended to depend on missionaries for interpreters. see L. de Rosny, Discours Prononcé à L'Ouverture du Cours de Japonais à l'Ecole Imperiale et Speciale des Langues Orientales.
2. Redesdale, op. cit., vol I, p. 377
3. G. Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes..., p. 125

Furthermore what must have made Parkes vulnerable as a diplomat, particularly in his dealings with Roches, was the fact that he did not speak French[1]: and Parkes' explosive temper was proverbial.[2] The intense personal rivalry between the two, however, has led to the belief that it contained a political dimension -- the assumption being that Anglo-French rivalry was a factor in Far Eastern international relations at the time. But, as has been pointed out earlier, French policy in the Far East was to cooperate with Britain and not compete with her. As to British policy in Japan, 'The aim was to confront anti-foreign Japanese with a united front, and although from time to time Britain did see Russia and France as threats to her interests, these fears never changed her first objective of quiet solidarity with other European powers.'[3]

Not only was there no underlying Anglo-French rivalry in Japan, but the difference in the political attitudes of Roches and Parkes was essentially one of degree. Roches became completely committed to the cause of the Bakufu and as such was at times himself suspicious of the British, partly because Parkes' commitment never

1. Redesdale, op. cit., vol. I, p.376
2. Both Redesdale and Satow (A Diplomat in Japan) make frequent references to Parkes' ill temper.
3. G. Daniels, "The British Role in the Meiji Restoration", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 2, part 4, p.292/3

appeared to be more than lukewarm and partly because of the political intrigues which Parkes' subordinates, Satow and (to a lesser extent) Mitford, were carrying out with the Shogun's enemies.[1] Parkes did, on the whole support the Bakufu. For example, he offered to mediate in the Bakufu-Choshu war. His good friend, Glover, sold arms to both sides; and his correspondence with the Foreign Office bears witness to his preference for the Shogunate.[2] As late as October 1867, after more than two years in Japan and in spite of a number of meetings with Choshu and Satsuma representatives and despite the activities of Satow, Parkes was very far indeed from being convinced by the opposition:

> 'In October 1867 the British Minister returned from a trip to Mount Fuji, to find rumours of the Shogun's abdication circulating widely in Edo. He thought these stories were of doubtful authenticity, but the fear that the prospect of abdication stimulated, provoked him to record his true feelings towards the Shogun. At this stage he was appalled at the prospect of Yoshinobu resigning his authority for, conscious of the need for a strong man to 'prevent the flood of anarchy', he felt that it would be a misfortune for Japanese and foreigners if the Tycoon gave up his position',[3]

1. for Roches' views on British and especially Parkes', activities in Japan, see the following: CP vol. XIII, 20 February, 26 June 20 November and 30 December 1865; vol. XIV, 15 January, 28 February, 26 June, 21 July, 6 October 1866; vol. XV, 10 April, 8 May (in which Roches reported how shocked he was when Parkes had in an audience addressed the Shogun as 'altesse' instead of 'majesté'), 1867.
2. see works quoted by G. Daniels.
3. G. Daniels, "The British Role in ...", p.307

Parkes' attitude, reflects the view of most Europeans and indeed many Japanese at the time, namely, the fear that the alternative to the Shogunate would be 'a flood of anarchy'. The fact that Roches supported the Bakufu is not surprising; what is more interesting is why he committed himself so whole-heartedly to this position.

Roches' support of the Bakufu stemmed from what may be termed negative, rather than positive, reasons. In February 1865, at the time of the visit of the future director of the Yokosuka Arsenal, Verny, Roches told his ministry that he did not believe there was any risk to the security of Europeans in Japan in strengthening the Shogunate, because events had proved that the difficulties encountered by foreigners arose from the Shogun's weakness. The note from the roju asking for help in the construction of the arsenal, couched in a mixture of suitably exotic Oriental metaphor and expressing a determination to chose the path of progress and good relations with France, could not but please Roches' patriotic heart:

> 'If, as we firmly hope, the August Emperor of the French deigns to assist us in our enterprise which we place under his protection, France will be for us the elder brother who guides and assists his younger brother: the latter will recognise his services by his respect. Our arsenal will be one of the biggest wings which will shelter our two people in eternal friendship.' [1]

1. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 28 February 1865

In the spring of 1865 and until the collapse of the Shogunate (indeed even after the collapse, as shall be seen), Roches began assuming his role as its advisor. His first advice was that the Bakufu force the Mikado to ratify the treaties and take steps to suppress and indeed conquer Choshu.[1] In view of the fact, as we shall see, that Roches promised on several occasions, albeit in reasonably vague terms, French military assistance to the Shogunate, it is interesting to note that he asked for some reinforcement of French military strength at Yokohama at a time when the Shogunate was embarking on its first expedition against Choshu.[2] One can only speculate whether Roches ever had the intention of unilaterally committing available French troops to the Shogunate. When Bakufu-Choshu hostilities began, albeit severely condemning those foreigners selling arms to the Choshu side, he went no further than to sign a collective note, stating that the Western powers would remain neutral, but that the Bakufu had their moral support.[3].

By September of 1865, Roches' views on the Shogunate were still fairly much in line with those of Parkes. In other words, the Shogun was to be supported because he represented the sole

1. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 26 April 1865
2. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 12 June 1865
3. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 28 February 1865

guarantor of the treaties; a civil war in Japan would jeopardise the position the foreigners had acquired at considerable expense.[1] Roches, more accustomed to the dry heat of North Africa, had found the Japanese rainy season and summer very trying and had taken off to Atami in order to recover. His indisposition, however, was to result in an indication of a closer relationship with the Bakufu, as the Shogun had sent one of his own doctors to Roches. Reporting this to his Ministry in October, he also took the opportunity of mentioning that his personal relations with a number of high dignitaries of Edo were now well established and that he met some of them frequently. Not only that, added Roches, but on a number of occasions, the Roju had sent him people who still harboured grave suspicions in regard to foreigners, 'in order, these Ministers told me, to bring to their spirit the light which I had made shine in theirs'.[2]

Meanwhile in November 1865 the allied naval display at Osaka had taken place resulting in the Mikado's ratification of the 1858 treaties. Roches had believed that this action would give the Shogun, in Kyoto at the time, the necessary moral support in his dealings with the Mikado and that it might also avert the

1. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 10 September 1865
2. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 17 October 1865

possibility of a civil war.[1]

By the beginning of 1866, however, Roches would become further involved with the Bakufu and would find himself in a situation which at the very least could be described as 'ambiguous' in regard to the possibility of French assistance to the Bakufu. Again, however, we should note that the initiative was taken by the Bakufu and not by Roches. In January one of the Roju, Matsudaira Munehide[2], came to see Roches, 'in order to make a solemn call on the loyalty and frankness of which you have given us proof on so many occasions.' 'The Tycoon', Matsudaira went on, 'wanted to know for certain whether the powers signatories to the treaties recognised him as the sovereign of Japan and if he could count on their friendship and support.' Roches answered,

> 'His Majesty the Emperor does not recognise any other sovereign in Japan... than the one who has concluded and signed the treaties which link the two nations; this sovereign is the Taikun Iemochi. As long as he will ensure the faithful execution of the treaties and will show himself worthy by his actions of the confidence of His Majesty the Emperor, the Taikun will be able to count on the friendship and support of France.'[3]

Although later on in his despatch to the Ministry, Roches wrote in terms of 'pacific' assistance, if the conversation with Matsudaira Munehide was as he records it, there is no reason why Matsudaira should not have believed that if necessary France

1. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 31 October 1865
2. also known as Ikeda Munehide.
3. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 15 January 1866

might be called upon to assist the Shogun militarily. The truth is that Roches did not commit France either way.

Meanwhile, in his none too numerous dispatches to Paris, Roches was still talking mainly in terms of the catastrophe that would ensue should the Shogun be overthrown and his rivals gain power; the rivals are 'the Princes who ordered the assassination of Richardson and of so many other victims; who had our vessels fired upon, and who, finally, so vehemently urged our expulsion.'[1] Similarly on a number of occasions Roches stressed how valuable the coming military mission would be for the Shogunate.[2] And indeed military advice, if not assistance, to the Shogunate by the end of the summer of 1866 certainly seemed necessary, as Roches had sadly to admit that the Bakufu campaign in Choshu was not going at all well.[3]

1. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 15 March 1866. It is important to note that Roches' appraisal of the situation in Japan and the consequences of the shogunal overthrow was not shared by the French admiral commanding the East Asian fleet, Admiral Roze. In a dispatch to the Minister of the Navy, he wrote that all these internal troubles, for all the great perturbations they might cause the country, will have no effect on the situation of the Europeans. Obviously Roches and Roze did not enjoy the same communion of views that Jaurès and de Bellecourt had. Again it is interesting to speculate what could have happened had Roze been as certain of Roches' policy as Jaurès was of de Bellecourt's. see CP vol. XIV, Roze to Navy Ministry, 15 March 66
2. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 15 January, 15 February and 21 July 1866
3. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 10 September 1866

But with the increasing military difficulties of the Bakufu in the south-west an event of great importance to Japanese history generally, and to Roches'policy in particular, took place, namely the death of the shogun Iemochi and the succession of the last Shogun, Keiki. Keiki, the son of Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito, had been an active figure in Japanese politics for some time. He had been favoured for shogun eight years previously by a number of influential daimyo, including Shimazu Nariakira of Satsuma, but had failed mainly due to the opposition of the then very powerful Ii Naosuke.[1] However, his failure to become shogun did not by any means result in his disappearance from the scene. In 1862, indeed, he was made <u>shogun-kokenshoku</u>. He had been closely allied at one time with the views of the <u>kobu-gattai</u> group but he was a bitter opponent of Choshu joi extremism. By 1866 he was undoubtedly the strongest and most influential man in the Tokugawa camp; and in terms of personalities he was its only hope. How much Roches knew of Keiki's career and personality is not clear, no mention in Roches' dispatches being made of Keiki until September of 1866, the time of Iemochi's death. Nor is there any indication that Roches had ever met Keiki. Be that as it may he strongly favoured the appointment of Keiki as shogun.[2]

1. see Beasley, <u>Select Documents...</u>, p. 38ff
2. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 10 and 28 September and 8 October 1866

After Keiki became Shogun in October a special relationship grew up between him and Roches, and Roches himself was to become far more involved in shogunal affairs and far more outspoken in favour of the Shogun, especially, it appears, because of the confidence he placed in the new man. Again it should be noted that although Keiki was more intimately involved with Roches than with any other foreigner, he none the less won the confidence and admiration of most Europeans who met him. Redesdale described him as a 'handsome, proud noble'[1], as to Parkes still eight months after Keiki's accession to the shogunal throne, his 'belief in Yoshinobu's [Keiki's] good intentions and wisdom was so great that he declared: "I am quite disposed to give him all the support I can in whatever position he occupies"'.[2] Even Satow who urged 'Satsuma... not to miss the chance of making a revolution, for he feared the growing strength of the Shogun'[3], had to admit when Keiki fell that he was witnessing 'fallen greatness'.[4] Although Roches' respect for Keiki was by no means singular, the degree of it was considerably higher than most of his Western contemporaries in Japan.

Very shortly after Keiki became Shogun, he sent Roches a letter asking that its contents be transmitted to the French

1. Redesdale, op. cit., p. 418
2. J. Daniels, "The British Role in...", p. 305
3. Ibid
4. Satow, A Diplomat..., p. 299

Government. Part of the letter read: 'Tell it [the French Government] to provide us with arms, ships, munitions and the men all of which are indispensable to constitute a force capable of assuring the submission of the rebels and the proper functioning of our government'.[1] Whether the men he had in mind were limited to the military mission and the engineers at the Yokosuka arsenal or not, is not clear. Roches made no comment.

Towards the end of 1866, prize-giving day had come to the Franco-Japanese school; Roches made a speech which he ended by speaking of a dream in which he saw the Mikado blessing the Shogun and looking upon him with tenderness.[2] In December Roches was pleased to announce that the Shogun's brother, Minbu-Tayo, would be representing Japan at the Paris Universal Exposition the following year.[3] Mimbu-Tayo, apart from his official functions,

1. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 12 October 1866
2. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 17 November 1866
3. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 24 December 1866

was to spend some time studying in France.[1] This was something of a diplomatic success for Roches, never had so high a member of Japanese society set foot outside Japan to travel to the West.

In March 1867 Roches sent the Ministry a very long dispatch, roughly divided in two parts. The first consisted of a study of

1. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 14 February 1867. Everything was not to go smoothly for the young prince and his guardians, Kurimoto and Mukayama. The Satsuma han also decided to have its representation at the Paris Expositions, this will be seen in greater detail in the chapter dealing with Montblanc. Both Montblanc and Mermet were also carrying out anti-Bakufu propaganda in Paris, see M & D vol. I, May 1867, (i) "note au sujet de la reponse à faire aux plenipotentiares japonais au sujet du prince de Satsuma et de l'Exposition universelle." The Prince was also to cause a number of headaches. His schooling was entrusted to the care of a Lt. Col. Villette. The latter began by complaining that the Prince was little more than a playboy, taking off for places like Malta and more interested in distractions than in serious study. When finally Villette gained the upper hand and imposed a rigorous daily course of study, beginning at 7 a.m. and not ending before 10 p.m., the overthrow of the shogunate had taken place. Minbu-Tayo then became a political embarassment and a financial one as it was no longer clear who was going to foot the bill either for his studies, his expenses or his return home. Roches tried to urge him to stay in France, saying that his brother would soon be back at the head of the country. The Prince did not leave until October 1868 after having been wished God-speed by Napoleon and Empress Eugenie and to the considerable relief of those who had been responsible for him. Another interesting and perhaps revealing aspect of the Minbu-Tayo episode was that Mermet de Cachon, the missionary, had expected to be Minbu-Tayo's tutor and was furious to see his role usurped by the army. This may account for his suddenswitch from fervent pro-Bakufu to fervent anti-Bakufu. See Army, Catalogue General des Manuscripts no. 1672, Japon 1856-1870, section (e), 1867-68; cf. also M & D vol. I the completely contradictory memoranda of Mermet de Cachon of 18 February 1867 and 9 May 1867.

the attitudes and ambitions of the various Western powers in the Far East and Japan in particular. The second part was a study of the present situation in Japan and its needs for the future. Roches declared that Japan must transform itself, not by exciting the daimyo, but by consolidating the central power and establishing an army, a navy, and a viable financial system. The Shogun, he said was in favour of all these things, and was also eager to replace the system of aristocratic administration by a more flexible meritocratic one. France's role in all this, avowed Roches, was of fundamental importance. The Shogun was in desperate need of capital; thus Roches commended favourably a loan to the tune of 5 million Mexican dollars which the Japanese government was trying to secure from France and Great Britain. In the same dispatch he announced the death of the Mikado.[1]

In the early spring of 1867 Roches' association with the Bakufu in general and Keiki in particular became much closer. 'In the course of March 1867 Roches had a number of confidential meetings with Keiki.[2] The first meeting, said Roches, was the first time that Keiki had met a European face to face. In his

1. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 1 March 1867
2. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 10 April 1867 and Beasley, Select Documents...., p. 87

conversation one could feel a bit of timidity, but also a judicious spirit, avid to instruct itself, and open to advice.' Keiki told Roches in detail about the numerous reforms he wanted to bring about in Japan.[1]

In Paris, however, the efforts of Mermet and more particularly Montblanc in discrediting the Bakufu were having some results. The new foreign minister, de Moustier, wrote to Roches, congratulating him on the commercial advantages he was obtaining from Japan, but adding a word of caution:

> 'It is important today not to jeopardise them which would certainly happen if by excessive intervention in the internal affairs of the country and in involving ourselves in their struggles, we were to find ourselves one day faced by a hostile partly newly in power and intending to ask us to account for the support we would have given to their adversaries.'

He went on to say that he had information about a forthcoming rebellion against the government and that the result was by no means certain. In fact Moustier saw Britain's action in establishing a rapport with the daimyo as very sensible, for both commercial and political reasons.[2] In July 1867, supposedly just before he received the Ministry's dispatch, Roches announced that Kurimoto Juon was being sent by the

1. ibid.
2. CP vol. XV, Ministry to Roches, 18 May 1867

Bakufu to Europe in order to elucidate the Japanese political situation.[1] The following day he answered the Ministry's letter, dismissing the Ministry's apprehensions about the political situation and the alleged forthcoming rebellion:

> 'The armed rising of the daimyo supposedly due in the near future exists only in the hopes of certain people whose interests this would accomodate, and the surest means of bringing about this revolution in an empire which is consolidating itself would lie precisely in maintaining and nourishing its chances, in carrying out a two-faced policy, one the one hand with the government with which we are bound by the treaties and on the other with the daimyo who, from the point of view of these same treaties, are nothing to us, and regardless of what anyone may say, can do nothing for us beyond the authority of the Government of the Tycoon.'[2]

For all Roches' close ties with Keiki and his confidential sessions, he seems to have been completely unaware of what was going on around him in the summer and autumn months of 1867. There may be a number of explanations for this. To begin with, with the onset of the arduous Edo summer, Roches had once again taken himself off to the sea at Atami. Secondly, his complete and perhaps blind commitment to the Shogunate and the person of Keiki, his refusal to come into contact with representatives of

1. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 12 July 1867
2. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 13 July 1867: Roches was to become embarrassed, however, by a question which was to occupy a considerable amount of time and for a good number of years, after Roches' departure, was to arouse a considerable amount of passions: this was the Christain question which emerged in 1867. It will be dealt with in detail in the chapter on missionaries; suffice it to say here that Roches, though seeing the Shogun on the matter, took the line that nothing too rash should be done which might raise greater difficulties for the Shogun given the internal state of affairs.

the south-western han, his likely reluctance to listen to any foreigner on Japanese political matters, meant that he was only aware of the activities of one side. Even with these he may not have been completely familiar. Goto Shojiro's negotiations with Bakufu officials had been proceeding for some time[1], yet it would seem that the Bakufu officials never let Roches hear of the discussions taking place in Bakufu circles. It may be that Roches was deliberately kept in the dark, because 'Bakufu leaders like Oguri Tadamasa remained adamant in their insistence on the need for further French help, and the trip to France by Tokugawa Akitake [Minbu-Tayo] in the summer of 1867, followed by the mission of Kurimoto Joun, who arrived in Paris September 14, left little doubt of the reliance the shogunate placed on its French connection.'[2] It is not unlikely that the die hard pro-Bakufu partisans and the pro-French party among them (the shinfutsuha) feared that were Roches to get an inkling of the doubts which divided Bakufu circles and their own uncertainty about the future, Roches' resolve to stand by them till the bitter end might weaken.

Whatever the reason may have been, the 'surprising and so little expected' news of the Shogun's abdication reached Roches

1. see Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma..., chaps. VII and VIII
2. ibid. p.318

at Atami at the end of November. The news included a letter from Keiki explaining to Roches the reason for his abdication. Rochos immediately left for Edo. But his faith in Keiki does not appear to have been shaken:

> 'If, in abdicating, the Taikun had only obeyed to a pressure exerted by his enemies, the occasion was it not well chosen by them in order to push him aside forever from this power which they have so obstinately contested him ? On the contrary the prestige of the Taikun has increased for all the merit which he will have in the eyes of impartial people, for the nobility and dignity of his resolution.'

Roches then went on to suggest that the Shogun's abdication was a purely tactical manoeuvre; 'But, I repeat, we have every right to maintain total confidence in the wisdom and ability of the Taikun; the past is guarantor of the future.' France, he stated, must morally support the Taikun and then again he drew a picture of the alternative, of the reactionary and xenophobic nature of the imperial cause. Was Roches hoping to get the Ministry to commit itself and suggest that France intervene militarily on the Shogun's side ? The probability is that he cherished such hopes. But he was not to be very successful here. In concluding his study of the alternatives - Mikado or Shogun - and in painting the darkest possible picture in regard to the former, he ended by asking, 'between the Taikun and the Mikado, can the choice be doubted?.' In the margin of the dispatch some Quai d'Orsay

official wrote in pencil 'we do not have to chose'.[1]

Roches obviously did not have much influence in Paris. In being so enthusiastic about one party in a country which had only marginal importance for France he clearly appeared somewhat foolish. Secondly the British, unlike Roches, were apparently not alarmed enough to intervene militarily; and France's basic Japan policy of following Britain's lead had not faltered. Thirdly, a number of Frenchmen had been carrying on active propaganda in favour of the opposition and the French government had already tried at least to compromise in the question of rival Japanese pavilions at the Paris Exposition (see chapter 5.) Other influential Frenchmen, especially the Admiral of the China fleet, had said that regardless of the outcome the situation would not drastically change so far as foreigners were concerned. Moreover, Chanoine, head of the military mission, had written to the Ministry of War a number of letters seriously discrediting Roches.[2] Finally, Roches was not above suspicion in his own Ministry. On at least one occasion the Foreign Minister had asked him to account

1. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 28 November 1867
2. see Army, Catalogue Général des Manuscrits, Japon, no. 1672, (d), (e) and (f), especially the letters of Chanoine to Colson, notably one of 18 March 1868 where he says that Roches believed the Shogun to be much stronger than he was, but that this is inevitable when a diplomatic agent only sees the same individuals and on how much wiser Parkes had been.

for His alleged suspicious financial dealings.[1] These indeed form the subject of numerous pages of memoranda and newspaper cuttings in the Quai d'Orsay papers.[2] Roches was to enjoy no support whatever. Quite apart from the question of support from Paris (de Bellecourt had had no support for the French Shimonoseki expedition and Roches none for the allied Shimnoseki bombardment, both under Admiral Jaurès), Roches did not have the backing of the French navy or army in Japan. But had the situation in regard to Roches' influence on the French navy and army in the Far East been different, one cannot rule out the possibility that a Franco-Japanese war might have occurred, despite the complications (with Britain for example) that this would have raised.

The Shogun's letter to Roches explaining his resignation stated that Keiki had made a study of governmental systems throughout the world, especially those of Europe, that everywhere power seemed to be concentrated in the hands of one sovereign and not two, and that this indeed was the only viable system to unite all the sentiments of the people and the forces of the country. Further, Keiki, said, in order to ensure good relations with the Western powers it was necessary for Japan to have a form of

1. CP vol. XV, Ministry to Roches, 18 May 1867
2. see H & D vol. III

government which was in conformity with those of the ~~actions~~ NATIONS of the Western world. He thanked Roches for his support and advice and asked him to understand his decision.[1]

Roches chose to understand that decision in his own way. Just over a fortnight after receiving Keiki's letter he reported to Paris that while in no way underestimating the gravity of the situation, he had faith in a country which had at last found the able and firm hand which it needed to guide it - meaning Keiki.[2] And with that he took off for Osaka to begin his last ditch fight to ensure Keiki's political survival. In the beginning of January 1868 Roches had a number of meetings with Keiki and once more assured him of France's moral backing.[3] Unable to achieve much success or influence on the Japanese side, Roches then turned all his attention to leading the diplomatic corps and sermonising them at great length on the past, the present, the future and sundry factors relevant or irrelevant. Basically, though at very great length, he was asking his colleagues not to make any premature engagement with the supposed new government (eventhough representatives of the new government had come to see the foreign representatives to tell them that it intended

1. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 28 November 1867
2. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 15 December 1867
3. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 10 January 1868

to uphold the treaties) and suggested that the Shogun might yet return.

It is interesting to note that from Roches' memoranda to his colleagues he appeared to believe that it was most unlikely that the Shogunate would be replaced by a central government, but would divide itself into some sort of confederation of independent fiefs with which the powers would have to treat on an independent basis.[1] Whether he actually believed this or simply used the possibility as a way of persuading his colleagues one cannot tell. It is possible that his experience of the various clan and tribe rivalries in North Africa influenced his judgement, leading him to believe that the same kind of phenomenon would be seen in Japan. He was, it must be admitted, not completely off the mark, as han jealousy and solidarity were to remain an important feature in post-Restoration politics.

By February 1868 Parkes was convinced of the new government's goodwill, but Roches still managed to carry the rest of the diplomatic corps with him.[2] By the end of February, Roches had to admit that there was no longer a shogun, but after further meetings with Keiki, he remained convinced of the man's continuing important role in the country and wrote in eulogistic terms of Keiki's plans for reforms, including the suppression of

1. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 17 February 1868
2. C. Daniels, "The British Role in...", p.310

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feudalism and the granting of religious freedom and that Keiki was even contemplating sending some Buddhist monks to Europe to study Christianity.[1]

Then in early March a massacre took place which at first seemed to confirm all Roches' apprehensions over the future of Western-Japanese relations under the new system. Eleven French sailors were brutally murdered by samurai of the Tosa han at Sakai near Osaka.[2] All Roches' colleagues, including Parkes, quickly closed ranks behind Roches and the demands he was to make on the new Japanese government. These were: 1) that within three days of the receipt of his note the two Tosa commanders at Sakai and all those who participated in the murder of the French sailors were to be executed in the presence of the Japanese authorities, a detachment of the French navy, and the karo (chief retainers) of the daimyo of Tosa; 2) an indemnity of 50,000 dollars must be paid by the daimyo of Tosa to the families of the fallen Frenchmen; 3) the minister in charge of foreign affairs (in fact the Mikado's uncle, Prince Higashikuze) was to come aboard the French battleship, Venus (from whose crew the massacred were) and

1. cp vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 24 February 1868
2. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 11 March 1868

present to the Representatives of France and the Commander in charge of the naval fleet the excuses of his government; 4) the Daimyo of Tosa himself must call on the Venus to seek pardon for the inexcusable behaviour of his men; 5) for the time being Tosa samurai must be forbidden to carry arms or sojourn in the ports open to the foreigners.[1] The government moved with alacrity, and all Roches' conditions were met.[2]

1. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 15 March 1868
2. The execution of the guilty Tosa samurai was incomplete in that twenty were to be executed, but in fact only eleven were. Redesdale recounts how the French captain, present at the executions, described the scene: 'When the first condemned man came out he plunged the dirk into his stomach with such force that his entrails protruded; he held them up in his hand and began singing verses of hatred and revenge against the detested foreigners who were polluting the sacred soil of the Land of the Gods till death stopped his ghastly song. Those who came after him followed his example, and the whole spectacle was so gruesome that when eleven men had died - this being the number of the murdered victims - the Frenchmen could hold out no longer, and Captain du Petit Thouars prayed that the remaining nine be spared. His account of the scene to me was blood-curdling. Brave man that he was - one of the bravest - it nearly made him sick only to think of it, and his voice faltered as with difficulty he told his tale.' Redesdale, op. cit., vol. I, p.446. The account contained in du Petit Thouars' report to Roches differs; in it the captain explained that he called a halt to the executions because it was getting late and he desired to get himself and his crew back to their ship before the sea got rough. Roches, however, did not hesitate in using the saving of the remaining nine as proof to the Japanese government that France was strong enough to demand and obtain satisfaction for outrages committed against her nationals, but at the same time clement. CP vol. XVI Roches to Ministry, 15 March 1868.

His demands had been severe, but not unduly so, when one considers that a number of his compatriots were demanding far more severe reprisals, including the shelling of Sakai[1]. The speedy execution of Roches' demands meant that he had to resign himself to acknowledging the good will of the new government, at least for the time being, though still claiming that the future was by no means certain. He wrote to the Mikado to thank him for the speed and determination which his government showed in giving France proper satisfaction.[2]

Finally, at the invitation of Higashikuze, Roches agreed to be presented to the Mikado; Roches explained the ceremony to his ministry, stressed that he now accepted that the good will of the government could not be put in doubt, but repeated that he did not believe that the present coalition could last, that the Mikado was but a puppet whose aura had rallied discontented forces to him, but that in due time the daimyo would be fighting each other.[3] The military mission was recalled.[4] All Roches' work and hopes lay in ruins, or so it seemed.[5]

1. see chapter 7.
2. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 15 March 1868
3. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 1 April 1868
4. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 14 April and 25 May 1868
5. Satow claimed that Katsu Kaishu told him that Roches had strongly urged Keiki to armed resistance. cf. A Diplomat..., p.366

Roches had followed a very active pro-Bakufu policy. He sought to exert his influence in Japanese affairs as much as possible. He sought to strengthen the Bakufu by helping it in its military and industrial programmes. He tried to influence his ministry in Paris and his diplomatic colleagues in Japan to give the Bakufu unconditional support. He refused to have anything to do with the growing opposition from the south-west, seeing it as nothing more than the expression of xenophobic reaction. As far as Paris was concerned, however, his impact was minimal. Congratulated for having greatly improved the important silk trade, on a political and military basis he was consistently urged to follow a policy of moderation, as de Bellecourt had been. Indeed Paris' attitudes to both men was the same; that they should be 'observers' and not participants in the Japanese political scene. There is no evidence at all to suggest that France harboured any colonial or other sort of imperialist ambitions in Japan; on the contrary, there is not even any evidence to suggest that Japan had become 'an important country' for France in spite of the silk trade. As far as Roches was personally concerned, he was following an independent and forceful policy in Japan. De Bellecourt by the end of his term had also followed an independent policy, though his was more a policy of confrontation, while Roches' was one of cooperation

with one of the two Japanese sides in the battle for power. Even here, however, there is reason to believe that Roches was able to appear at least to exert as much influence as he did, because he was useful to the Bakufu. In fact this question in regard to Roches' role in the closing years of the Tokugawa shogunate, raises the general question of the impact of any individual foreigner in Japan.

In one sense the foreign presence was crucial in determining the development of Japan's internal political affairs; in another sense it was minimal. It was crucial in that it precipitated events. It was minimal in that the Restoration, the ideology behind it and the passions it aroused were entirely a Japanese affair. Neither side wanted foreign leadership. As Saigo wrote to Okubo, 'we Japanese would do our utmost in the cause of reforming Japan's political structure and that we had no cause to trouble foreigners with it.'[1] The foreign impact was important, no doubt, but individual foreigners were only marginally important and in the long term it is impossible to say whether Roches or Parkes were more influential in determining the course of events than Alcock, or de Bellecourt, or Harris.

1. see in Jansen, op cit., p.321

The same applies to Satow and Mitford. The foreign representatives could only have changed the course of events by resorting to war; and none of the powers was prepared to go so far, though undoubtedly limited gunboat diplomacy, especially in Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, had its effect. Similarly the social and political developments that followed the Restoration had far more to do with the demands and new conditions of an industrialising state, and perhaps with the exigencies of the unequal treaties, than with the influence of any particular foreign power or foreign individual. Certainly Britain had far more influence in Japan in the years following the Restoration than any other power. But in no way can the events in Japan in 1868 be construed as a 'British victory'; British influence was preponderant, but not exclusive.

Chapter 3

Franco-Japanese Trade, 1868-1885

Franco-Japanese commercial relations in the period under study continued to centre almost exclusively on silk, but for both countries silk trade and the silk industry had implications which went much further than the single industry. In chapter 1 we pointed out its importance for France in terms of employment and capital. In the '70s and '80s this continued to be the case. In 1880, for example, silken fabrics from Lyons alone represented almost 7% of France's total export trade (254.2 million francs out of a total of 3,500 million francs).[1] Similarly silkworm production never recovered from the pébrine of the 1850s; whereas production of silk cocoons in France prior to 1852 averaged over 25 million kilogrammes, production varied between 35 and 40% of that figure in the 1870s, reaching a catastrophic low of just over 2 millions in 1876.[2] The industry, therefore, desperately needed steady and reliable sources of raw materials. China was far and away France's greatest source of supplies, in 1875, for example, providing ⅓ of the raw silk consumed by Lyons (1.5 out of 4.5 million kilogrammes).[3] Undoubtedly France's

1. D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830-1914, p. 405
2. Moniteur des Soies, 22 June 1878
3. Fieldhouse, op. cit., p. 205

increased colonial activities in northern Indo-china, in Annam and Tongking, from the 1870s and accelerating in the early 1880s under Ferry, were very much linked with the expectations of the China trade:

> 'The really strong and almost universal hope, linking Lyons silk manufacturers with Bordeaux and Marseilles merchants and those few politicians concerned with the large-scale economic problems of French overseas trade, was that the Red River would give France a shorter, cheaper and above all monopolistic route to markets and sources of raw materials in southern China."[1]

Though China was the main source, Japan's importance was considerable. Yet French interest and diplomatic activity in Japan remained minimal, or purely negative, as exemplified by French opposition to any proposal for tariff revision. It could be said that 'France had no policy towards Japan, only relations with her.'[2] What was true of official lack of interest and activity, was also true of commercial interests; France during the whole of the period under study was one of Japan's two main sources of exports, the other being the United States, followed at some distance by China. France was responsible for about 25% of Japan's exports[3], yet as a Frenchman complained , 'As

1. ibid, p. 401
2. R. Sims," Characteristics of French Policy Towards Japan in the later 19th Century," p.1.
3. Japanese exports in 1883 by country of destination (in yen): the total was 37,921,044; US=13,247,907, GB=4,836,324, France=9,714,068, Germany=245,765, E. De Villaret, Dai Nippon p. 379.

consignor of silk, we only have one French merchant established in this country, and even then his transactions are of little importance.'[1]

Despite the obvious lack of French interest in the country, Japan was a very important trading partner of France. A consideration of this trade and the way it affected diplomacy, such as it was, will form the first part of this chapter. The silk trade had two major effects on Japan. The first is that the revenue obtained from silk was one of the few sources of revenue available. It was of considerable help to Japan in the development of heavy industries. Secondly, however, though Japan started, and throughout this period remained, principally as a source of raw materials for France, the Japanese set about learning the technology of European modern silk industry and before the end of the period had become one of France's competitors. A Frenchman played a role in helping Japan move into the field of the modern silk industry. The development of the Japanese silk industry and the consequences of the silk trade

1. E. Clavery, Les Etrangers au Japon et les Japonais à l'Etranger, p. 15; Clavery notes that in 1885 out of 6,807 foreigners in Japan, 4,540 of whom were Chinese, there were 1,200 British, 621 Americans, 313 Germans and 220 Frenchmen, a number of these being missionaries. Total French trade (import + export) with Japan for that year amounted to 8,366,250, Germany's was 2,827,582, in E. De Villaret, op. cit., p. 379-80.

on Japan's overall economic development will form the second section of this chapter.

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1. Trade and Diplomacy.

We noted at the end of chapter 1, that the outlook for the future in terms of Franco-Japanese trade seemed dismally gloomy both to Ulysse Pila in the Moniteur des Soies and to Max Outrey, Roches' successor, in his commercial report to Paris. In fact Japan's exports for the year 1868, despite the political troubles, reached over 15 million yens and was to average that figure for the next few years until 1873 when exports passed the 20 million mark; in 1876 exports reached over 27 millions, by 1881 the 1868 figure was doubled and by 1886 trebled, reaching nearly 50 millions.[1] The great bulk of this export was in silk and tea, the two commodities representing at times as much as 70% of Japan's total exports, never falling below 60%.[2] France's share has already been noted. Outrey assured his government as early as 1869 that he would not permit the Japanese government to revise duties on the export of silk which would be to the

1. Y. Kinosita, "The Past and Present of Japanese Commerce", in Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, p. 127 and 129
2. see A. Rouette, Chine et Japon: Notes politiques, commerciales, maritimes et militaires, p. 112-117.

detriment of France but would do everything within his power to improve the situation.[1]

Le Moniteur des Soies which continued throughout to keep a close interest in Japanese affairs was able to note in 1871 that Japan seemed fully engaged in a programme of useful reforms.[2] Views on the future of the Japanese economy and of the country in general varied greatly, from expressions of admiration to prophesies of complete financial disaster. Outrey in 1870 ridiculed Japan's intention to build railways.[3] His successor, Paul de Turenne, seemed to think that the least said about the Japanese economy the better; for the years 1871, 72 and 73 (period when de Turenne was charge) there are hardly more than three pages in the Correspondance Commerciale.[4] Berthemy, de Turenne's successor regretted that Paris took so little interest in Japan's commerce. On one occasion he sent Paris a copy of a commercial report published by the British legation to which he appended, 'This study deserves to be read in it its entirety; I would have been pleased indeed had I been able to transmit it to Your Excellency under the signature of an agent of your department'. Next to that passage a large question mark was traced in pencil by one of the Ministry officials. Berthemy

1. CC vol. V, Outrey to Ministry, 11 May 1869
2. Le Moniteur des Soies, 21 January 1871
3. CC vol. VI, Outrey to Ministry, 15 March 1870
4. see CC vol. VI

was pessimistic, noting that Japan was buying from abroad more than it was selling.[1]

Indeed the balance of trade for Japan had changed dramatically in the years after the Restoration. In the years 1864 to 1868 inclusive Japan had enjoyed a balance of trade that was comfortably in her favour.[2] In 1868 Japan had a favourable balance of payments of almost five million yen, in 1869 the balance was against her to the tune of almost eight millions, representing a loss of almost thirteen millions. In 1870 this figure leapt to almost 20 millions and in the years 1871 to 1875 the average was around 6½ millions against Japan, with the exception of the year 1876 when Japan had a 4 million credit in its balance of payments due to an abysmal harvest of silk cocoons in France and Italy.[3] In 1876 Berthemy's successor, de Saint-Quentin commenting on one of Japan's worse years, 1875 with an 11 million yen deficit, remarked that this was due to Japan's excessive spending on material for building railways and ships and of course arms and munitions orders. He concluded that the only salvation for Japan was for the country's economy to be run by foreigners with foreign capital.[4]

Le Moniteur des Soies, however, in an article entitled

1. CC vol. VI, Berthemy to Ministry, 17 May 1874
2. CC vol. V, Outrey to Ministry, 12 April 1869
3. Minosita, op. cit., p. 127
4. CC vol. VI, St. Quentin to Ministry, 15 July 1876

"L'Avenir du Japon" published in 1871, stated that it was 'difficult to find in the history of the world a nation which has advanced as rapidly as the Japanese people in the last thirty years.'(!) It went on to praise the great technical progress achieved in Japan and added 'all this is due to the initiative of the State.' 'The whole world', the article concluded, 'will profit from this startling metamorphosis, and the admiration which we feel for this remarkable people is not mixed with any sentiment of jealousy, even though we see perfectly well what era of unlimited prosperity it will witness in the future.'[1]

The role of the state in Japan's economic development has been the subject of numerous studies and is indeed one of the major characteristics of Japanese economic development. The emphasis of state participation varied, however, depending on the industry: 'As to the scope of government enterprises, its emphasis was in the field of heavy industry: mining, ship-building, railways, machinery, construction-related factories, as well as armament. Light industries such as silk and cotton spinning were also undertaken but to a lesser extent.[2] The absence of direct government sponsorship, however, did not

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 27 May 1871
2. J. Hirschmeier and T. Yui, The Development of Japanese Business 1600-1973, p.87

exclude more informal government interest, encouragement and a general guidance of economic and legal conditions. Mitsui had already become interested in the silk export business in the days of the Bakufu[1] and in the early post-Restoration years the friendship of Mitsui leader Masuda Takashi with Inoue Kaoru and the former's role in silk exports ensured continued government support.[2]

The admiration expressed in the article (in Le Moniteur des Soies) cited earlier and published in 1871 was certainly not echoed by 1873 in regard to government initiative in Japan's commerce; what some may have called initiative, others termed interference. Thus an article in Le Moniteur des Soies of 1873 entitled "Corporations Natives at Commerce Etranger au Japon" talked of the commercial corporations of Japanese merchants under the protection and control of the government: 'these corporations have become a power with which foreign commercial firms must take account of and whose importance becomes greater day after day.' Again stressing the links of the corporations with the government, the article continued,

1. see J. G. Roberts, Mitsui Three Centuries of Japanese Business, chap. 7.
2. Hirschmeier and Yui, op.cit, p. 136-137 and J Roberts, op. cit., p. 122-123

> 'If these corporations were simply private Commercial Associations or Joint-Stock Companies comparable to those which exist in Europe and in America, we would see only justice in their desire to take their place in the sun, and their attempts according to their means to develop business and industry. Indeed we would be more than delighted to see the spirit of association utilised in order to extend and increase the resources of the country. Foreign commerce would benefit from all this to a great extent given the facilities which the accumulation of native capital would give to activate transaction, as well as stimulating the extension of the resources and products of the interior. But this is not the sense in which these corporations have been founded and continue to be maintained.'

The article then looked at past history and explained that the first thing which struck foreigners when they first come to Japan was the 'debasement into which the merchants of the country were placed: that merchants could do nothing without permission from officials and that this state of affairs was deplorably bad for trade. The Europeans, perceiving that the merchants were in 'a state of subjugation and servile dependence', realised that their mission was to work for the liberation of the merchant class.

The article reminded its readers that the treaties had stipulated that there should be free intercourse between foreign and native merchants but that neither the pre-Restoration, nor the post-Restoration government ever observed these treaty stipulations; for example, government permission was needed before a merchant could reside in Yokohama. Returning to the corporations, the article declared:

'they were formed with a capital provided partly by the government, partly by Japanese merchants and finally by a very small number of foreign merchants.

Thanks to this organisation, trade at Yokohama has become a huge monopoly in the hands of the Japanese government. The Corporation of Yokohama exercises on all the operations an influence all the greater in that it has access to all the information in regard to the commerce in the interior. Thanks to the corporations of the various provinces, which exercise an action analogues to the one we see here on those under their jurisdiction, it can when it wants to stop, slow down or activate the demand for articles for both import and export. It is the Corporation which, to a certain extent, fixes the prices which its affiliated members can sell their products or buy those from abroad. It gives advances to the Japanese merchants on the goods they have to sell, it manages for the account of the government the products which the latter collects in species.

The article concluded by urging all foreigners to work together and fight the corporations; it regretted, however, that, 'It is unity we lack and it is our rivalries which will always leave us exposed to the attacks of the enemy.'[1] Indeed these corporations were not a source of worry to the French alone. Sir Harry Parkes had sent a copy of an article in the Japan Mail of 10 May 1873 as an enclosure in a dispatch of July of that year. This article was on lines identical with the one in Le Moniteur des Soies. It pointed out the way in which the government interfered in trade and the civilising mission of Europeans in emancipating the Merchant classes of Japan from bureaucratic rule. Like Le Moniteur des Soies, the Japan Mail called for

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 9 August 1873; the article had originally appeared in l'Echo du Japon.

united action by all foreign merchants, asking, 'Why, then, should our attitude towards them differ from that which they assume towards us ? Will it never be understood that to fight this enemy with success we must adopt his arms and his tactics against himself ?'[1] Parkes observed that the connection of the guilds, especially the Corporation of Yokohama, with the Japanese government 'show how disposed the present Japanese Government is to run all trade in the mould of monopoly, to restrict it according to the personal views of men who are in office for the moment, and to make commerce subservient to their own purposes.'[2]

Another problem for which the Japanese government was held responsible was its interference in the export of silkworm eggs. This question was raised in the official commercial correspondence[3] and Le Moniteur des Soies also took up the cause in an article spanning four issues in January 1874, entitled, "Effets de l'ingérence gouvernementale dans le commerce des graines de vers à soie au Japon". Among other things the article bitterly complained that the Japanese government was always seeking 'to

1. Japan Mail, 10 May 1873, enclosure no 4 in Parkes to Granville, 7 July 1873 in BPP, Commercial Reports, Japan vol 5
2. Parkes to Granville, 7 July 1873, "Review of the Import Trade of Japan, and of the Tea and Silk Season of 1872-73" in BPP ibid.
3. CC vol. VI, Berthemy to Ministry, 17 May 1874

find means to extract from the silk trade the maximum of possible favours for its own country; means which, as a necessary corollary, are translated into damages for the foreigners.' The author also complained that Japanese 'able to visit all of Italy and France (especially noting the peregrinations of Shibusawa) 'triumphantly travel through our countryside and our cities ... picking up in their instructive voyages a great quantity of data on the state and conditions of our country in relation to the precious merchandise which they possess and which we so much need.'[1] He added that there would be nothing wrong with this in the true spirit of free trade, but that in regard to the Japanese one should have 'placed a bandage over the eyes of people who ask nothing better than to see clearly into our affairs.'[2] The article also accused the Japanese government of wanting to limit the quantity for export in order to raise the prices of silk in the world markets.[3]

Two years later Le Moniteur des Soies was still complaining that the situation in Japan was intolerable and that life for foreigners in the treaty ports was very difficult:

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 3 January 1874
2. ibid, 10 January 1874
3. ibid, 17 January 1874

'there reigns in the present condition of foreigners in Japan a feeling of discomfort and unrest... [leading to] instability and insecurity in business. It is obvious that things cannot remain indefinitely as they are. Between Japan which does not want to open, and Europe which does not want to be excluded, it will be necessary one of these days to settle this question once and for all; and in a future no doubt still distant, we will arrive at a crisis. What will be its outcome ? No one can say; but, tragedy or comedy, the play can already be entitled: 'A door has to be either open or shut.' 1

Five years went by, however, and the situation, far from improving, deteriorated considerably. In October of 1881 Le Moniteur des Soies reported the formation of the Ki-ito-ni-Agukarijo (a deposit house for raw silk) with an association to which all native merchants and commissioners of silk would be asked to join with the object of centralising all the silks expedited from the interior of Yokohama.[2] The following month Le Moniteur des Soies reproduced an article from the Temps which explained that the Lyons Chamber of Commerce had written an official letter to the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce asking for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intervene and accusing the association of being a monopoly; the Temps added that the Japanese government was behind this and was using the association for its own profit.

1. ibid, 15 January 1876
2. Le Moniteur des Soies, 1 October 1881

The article again urged foreigners to band together and form their own monopoly to crush the Japanese monopoly. It concluded that the Japanese could not possibly win and that the Western governments would see to it, but that in the meantime the Japanese would do well to read La Fontaine's Poule aux Oeufs d'or.[1] Le Moniteur des Soies, however, also reproduced the translation of an article which had appeared in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung which criticised and ridiculed the Lyons Chamber of Commerce's attempt to get the French government to intervene. It gave three reasons for this: (1) no treaty article forbids the Japanese to form themselves into a monopoly if they so chose; (2) other nations do it, namely the cotton association of Liverpool and the fruit merchants' association of Chicago; (3) the French government has no right to interfere in Japan's internal economic affairs. The article concluded, 'France by an inconsidered act could in a short time lose the advantageous situation that it has had in Japan'.[2]

But the French government had not followed the German newspaper's advice. In mid-October 1881 de Roquette, then head of legation in Tokyo, had sent a dispatch to his ministry on the problems between native and foreign silk merchants. The situation

1. Ibid, 19 November 1881
2. Ibid, 3 December 1881

was so serious that all transactions had ceased. The Yokohama Corporation, which had the 66 principal Japanese merchants as members, had sought to pass a new regulation concerning the form of transactions between native and foreign merchants. Up till then European merchants would have the Japanese take out from their own godowns the silk which the Europeans thought would suit them and would have them inspected at their own domiciles. It was this practice that the indigenous sellers had sought to change. As the regulation now stood the silks would have to stay in their stores and the buyers would have to go there to chose the silks they desired, in order to take delivery of them. The European merchants had sought the intervention of their diplomats. De Roquette had gone to see the Foreign Ministry officials and asked them if the Japanese government was behind this. He was assured that this was not so,[1] Meanwhile the Quai d'Orsay had informed de Roquette of the complaint received by the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce from the Lyons Chamber of Commerce, (that the Yokohama association enjoyed a monopoly with the backing of the Japanese government.)[2] Three days later the Ministry sent de Roquette a telegram: 'Take instant measures with colleagues if possible to bring to end hoarding of silks contrary to treaties.'[3] It should be noted that telegrams between Tokyo and

1. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, de Roquette to Ministry, 14 October 1881
2. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, Ministry to de Roquette, 28 October 1881
3. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, Ministry to de Roquette, 31 October 1881

Paris were very rare, being positively discouraged by Paris on grounds of expense. The dispatch of a telegram, therefore, indicated the degree of seriousness that the French government attached to this matter.

De Roquette replied by telegram followed by a detailed dispatch explaining the situation. He had obtained a written statement from the Japanese government saying it had no connection with the current silk crisis. De Roquette went on to explain that the reason for the past practice was that the Japanese did not have appropriate facilities for the inspection of silk and that therefore it was carried out at the foreign merchant's premises. He admitted, however, that on a number of occasions the Europeans had been guilty of abuses to the detriment of the Japanese traders. The Japanese, therefore, in the course of July announced that they were going to form a company provided with sufficient capital to build inspection rooms and huge godowns, and that henceforth the Europeans would behave in Japan as in accordance with the custom in other countries, that those who wished to purchase silk would have to inspect it in the new godowns. The Western merchants, angry and upset, approached the dean of the diplomatic corps, Mr. Bingham, asking him to tell the Japanese government to stay out of this affair. The Japanese government gave assurances that it would take no

part in the confrontation. De Roquette added that this was the only thing the diplomats could do. The Europeans, he went on, claimed that the new Japanese facilities were simply not adequate.

De Roquette reported that when he received the telegram from Paris he immediately went to see Inoue (at that time Foreign Minister and, it will be remembered, closely associated with Mitsui). According to de Roquette, Inoue informed him that the present situation was far worse for Japan than for Europe. (At least in the short term this would have to be true given the amount that silk represented in Japan's export trade.) De Roquette was then approached by Shibusawa and Masuda, who said they would seek a compromise and offered to act as mediators in the dispute.

DE Roquette promised his Ministry a rapid solution to the crisis, but added:- 'In any case, French commerce does not have to worry about the outcome of the struggle. (underlined in original); the Japanese cannot consume their own silk; they will have to decide, in case of the improbable continuation of the dispute, to export the silk directly...' and he underlined the tremendous importance for Japan of the French market.[1] A few days later he was able to cable Paris that the silk commerce had

1. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, Roquette to Ministry, 7 November 1881

been reopened, that the Japanese had undertaken to build at their own expense a central market;[1] in a subsequent dispatch de Roquette reassured his government that the affair would not have had any unfortunate repercussions.[2] In commercial terms this was undoubtedly the case: 1881 saw an increase of almost 3 million yen in export figures as compared with 1880 and in 1882 an increase of over 6½ millions on the 1881 figure and an overall favourable balance of payments for Japan of over 8 million yen, the first time it had achieved such a favourable balance and the first time it had a credit in its balance of payments since 1869 with the single exception of 1876. The favourable balance was to continue until the end of our period.[3] France's purchases also increased from just over 5 million yen in 1880 to over 8 millions in 1881 and over 10 millions in 1882.[4]

Two points emerge from the outcome of the crisis just described. In the first place we see how very dependent Japan was on foreign markets for its silk. Very little flexibility existed for Japanese merchants in terms of regulating their own commerce; it was not the Japanese who could call the tune; and,

1. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, Roquette to Ministry, 19 November 1881
2. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, Roquette to Ministry, 22 November 1881
3. Kinoshita, op.cit., p. 127 and 130
4. E. de Villaret, op.cit.

as stated earlier, no doubt Inoue was being perfectly truthful when he said that a closure of the silk trade, even temporary, had far worse repercussions for Japan than for Europeans. Secondly, while it is clear that the French government was prepared to intervene when a crisis threatened to disturb the status quo; there was no sustained official French interest in Japan, no attempt to get to know the country any better or to extend relations with it. French reaction to any challenge to the status quo could be made even more explicit in a matter of far greater importance than the problem of the suitability or otherwise of native godowns; namely the thorny issue of treaty revision.

Treaty revision (a question that remained unresolved for 27 years, from the Iwakura mission in 1872 to the ratification in 1899 of the revised treaties of 1894) centred on two issues: the problem of tariffs and the problem of extra-territoriality. This chapter will look at tariffs, the following chapter at extra-territoriality, but these were not completely separate issues, although they may have seemed so to the Japanese; who tended to regard the matter of tariffs as purely economic, and the question of extra-territoriality as one affecting national honour. Extra-territoriality was indeed a highly emotional issue, much discussed by the population at large.[1] It could be

1. see F.C. Jones, Extraterritoriality in Japan: And the Diplomatic Relations Resulting in Its Abolition, 1853-1899

argued on the western side, however, that the extra-territoriality issue (the basic argument being that Japan had not yet reached a level of civilisation that would allow the fate of foreigners to be entrusted to Japanese judges) was used in order not to change the favourable tariff arangement guaranteed by the 1858 treaties.

The Franco-Japanese Treaty of 1858, like its counterparts, had included (article XX) a stipulation that the revision could take place, if one or the other power so wished, in 1872.[1] This was to lead to the unprecedented departure of so many influential members of the government in what has come to be called the Iwakura mission of 1872, the experiences and consequences of which were to have incalculable influences on the future course of Japanese history in the years that followed.[2] It was Ito Hirobumi who had first felt the need for the mission as he explained in letters he sent from Washington in March and April 1871. He said that there would have to come a time 'when we can determine our country's safety or danger, our people's prosperity or poverty, our honour or shame in foreign relations, our gain or loss in trade' and urged that 'those who are responsible for the great

1. H. Cordier, Le Premier Traité de la France avec le Japon, appendix
2. Among the articles or books dealing with the Iwakura Mission, one of the most interesting is N, Ike's article, "The Triumph of the Peace Party in Japan in 1873" (Journal of Asian Studies, vol. II, p. 286 -) where he explains how following the mission the government set about listing its priorities, including especially that of reform at home to precede expansion abroad.

affairs of state must not be caught unprepared.' Ito seems to have paid special attention to the question of tariffs and to have asked that the matter be examined in detail, 'not merely to accumulate revenue selfishly but to encourage production.' Ito was also apparently convinced of the need for protective tariffs.[1]

The general question of treaty revision had been occupying the minds of Japanese government officials for some time and as early as the autumn of 1870 a special bureau was established in the Foreign Ministry to look into the question of treaty revision (joyaku kaisei torishirabe gakari).[2] De Turenne, as charge d' affaires, had been able to warn his Ministry at the time of the mission's departure that among other things the mission would seek an increase in the present tariffs and that on the question of free circulation inside Japan (it will be remembered that this was something very much sought after by a number of French silk traders) the government would be ready to grant access to the interior in exchange for a renunciation by the foreign powers of the right of extraterritoriality.[3]

In the event, by the time the Iwakura mission reached France and after the series of unexpected turns the negotiations had taken

1. M. Mayo, "The Iwakura Embassy and the Unequal Treaties, 1871-1873", p. 70/1
2. ibid, p. 67
3. CP vol. XXI, de Turenne to Ministry, 10 December 1871

in the United States with President Grant and Secretary of State Fish[1], most of the discussions dealt with the Christian question,[2] with the exception of a lecture by the French Foreign minister on the need for civilised states to emancipate the merchant classes.[3] Commercial matters were not seriously discussed. However, the question of treaty revision was by no means buried, either permanently or temporarily. Indeed, following the return of the Iwakura mission, Berthemy, de Turenne's successor, and his colleagues apparently felt that in view of the government's desire to revise the treaties the time was ripe for them to ask for further concessions on interior travel and trade. Numerous dispatches were sent to Paris on this question, but the Japanese government was showing itself more than reluctant.[4] The Japanese government no doubt appreciated the extent to which foreign traders desired free access to the interior, but the government also realised that therein lay its only real bargaining power. In the course of the Iwakura mission a number of the delegates realised with some bitterness how much had to be done before Japan could reach industrial levels comparable with those of the Western powers.[5] Furthermore Japanese study of the international

1. see Mayo, op. cit.,
2. see chapter 7
3. M & D vol. 2, December 1872, minutes of the meetings between Remusat and the Iwakura embassy.
4. see Berthemy to Ministry in CP vol. XXIII, 12 August, 12 October, 1, 9 and 20 November, 1 and 28 December 1873; vol. XXIV, 19 January and 12 April 1874
5. see M. Mayo, "Rationality in the Meiji Restoration: the Iwakura Embassy", in B.S. Silberman and H.D. Harootunian, Modern Japanese Leadership

situation was not limited to an inspection of conditions in the Western countries; and so the Japanese government explained to the foreign representatives that Japan had no desire to become a state comparable to Egypt or Turkey.[1] Meanwhile, Berthemy was arguing that this passive policy vis à vis Japan was getting nowhere.[2] At the time of Japan's Formosan expedition and on the possibility of war between Japan and China, Berthemy suggested that such an outcome would not necessarily be a bad thing for France:

> 'It is important, furthermore, not to lose sight of the fact that a war between China and Japan, sufficiently prolonged to weaken the two adversaries, and terminated before one or the other could claim victory, could help the maritime powers avoid the necessity of having to undertake, in a more or less distant future, expensive expeditions, in order to preserve in the Far East a situation which every day becomes more difficult to maintain both in Peking and Edo.'[3]

Meanwhile the silk trade continued to prosper. After 1867 France's production of cocoons had stabilised somewhere between 8 and 10¼ millionkilogrammes per year, reaching a high in 1875 of 10,773,945.[4] One correspondent to Le Moniteur des Soies painted a very optimistic picture of the situation and the future in regard to French trade:

1. CP vol. XXIII, Berthemy to Ministry, 28 December 1873
2. CP vol. XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 8 May 1874
3. CP vol. XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 30 June 1874, note that official correspondence still talked in terms of Edo, although it had been rebaptised Tokyo over five years ago.
4. Le Moniteur des Soies, 22 June 1878

> '[Japan] is of all [the countries] of the Far East the one where the commercial and industrial aptitudes of our country seem to find their most fruitful use; there exists a special correlation between the needs of the two countries and the nature of the products of one another, and the Japanese have a special tendency to deal with our merchants rather than with our foreign rivals.'[1]

Although this picture of the situation in 1875 considerably embellished the reality, at no time since the early 1860s was Japan's role in the French economy felt as strongly as in 1876: production of silk cocoons in France fell from the 10,773,945 kilogrammes of 1875 to 2,387,369 in the following year.[2] It must be remembered also that in the early years of the Third Republic the silk industry was as important for France as it had been during the Second Empire, if not more so. In 1874 and 1875 export of silk goods represented more than 10% of France's total export figures.[3]

Then in August 1878 Le Moniteur des Soies published the first article indicating that in regard to the silk industry, Japan was possibly becoming something more than simply a source of raw materials:

> 'Since the last five or six years the Japanese have established a large number of steam spinning mills and thanks to their indefatigable patience they have already succeeded in producing silk equal to that of Italy, equal even to the best

1. ibid, 31 July 1875
2. ibid, 22 June 1878
3. ibid, 28 September 1875

> produced in the Cevennes. Raw silk spun at the factory of Hiphonmatzou (?), extra-classic merchandise, is all sold to American manufacturers and at prices comparable to what is more than arch-classical in Italy.'

And in conclusion the correspondent warned, 'In order to compete with this industrious people, we must produce better than they and at cheaper prices.'[1] It is obvious that for France in order to sell at cheap prices, she had to obtain the raw material at cheap prices. This was the nub of the tariff revision problem.

The figures for the fiscal year 1879 were telling the story characteristic of every year; French exports to Japan amounted to slightly more than 3 million yen, but imports from Japan to slightly over 6 millions; and France was buying in direct trade (i.e. not counting the Japanese silk bought by Frenchmen in London) more than 50% of Japan's silk exports.[2] And so it was that the question of tariff revision had once again reared its head. In the years 1877, '78 and '79 a number of dispatches touched on the Japanese government's proposed tariff revision,

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 17 August 1878
2. CC (Tokyo) vol. I, de Balloy to Ministry, 1 October 1879

the proposed and abortive London conference and the American Bingham treaty.[1] Vis à vis Japan the United States, like France, was very much a buyer rather than a seller and therefore saw no great inconvenience in the new tariff code, which basically was proposing that there be no duties on exports, but insisted on a very considerable increase in import duties. Great Britain, which enjoyed 50% or more of Japan's import trade and only took an average of about 18% of Japan's exports[2], could hardly be expected to feel enthusiastic about the proposed changes. France's position, however, at least a priori would seem to have been far more in tune with the American. A number of factors, however, were to influence French policy in siding with Britain. The American minister, Bingham[3], a former Senator from Ohio, seems to have

1. see de Geoffroy to Ministry, CP vol. XXVI, 16 October 1877 28 January 1878, Ministry to de Geoffroy 4 April 1878, de Geoffroy to Ministry 15 December 1878; CP vol. XXVII de Balloy to Ministry 12 March 1879 (where he complained of the pretentiousness of the Japanese and warned Paris that 'in the Orient all gracious concession is inevitably interpreted as a sign of weakness'), 30 May 1879 and 23 July 1879; also M & D vol. II, "note pour le ministre sur la question de la revision du traité avec le Japon" by de Geoffroy, 26 June 1879
2. see table p. 369 in G. Fox, Britain and Japan 1858-1883
3. Bingham, by all accounts a very colourful personality, was to be the hero of a highly romantic novel about Japan written by an American, Sidney McCall, entitled The Breath of the Gods and published in 1905

followed an independent policy.[1] Though it was true that France had nothing to lose in the new tariff convention, it had nothing to gain either. The French decided, therefore, to tow the British line, indeed de Balloy, new chargé d'affaires, urged that an alliance of France, Britain and Germany, (whose representatives were in agreement) would force Japan to capitulate and would compel the weaker nations having treaties with Japan to follow the triple line.[2] Finally, former minister de Geoffroy, back in Paris, urged that France should press for free travel and commerce in the interior of Japan in exchange for accepting the new tariffs. The Japanese, however, replied that the question of internal travel was linked to the problem of extraterritoriality and not to that of tariffs and that they had decided on this occasion not to go into that particular problem.[3] So once again a stalemate was reached. France's role could be said to be purely negative. Again one can only speculate what would have been the consequences if France had chosen to side with the United States (and, therefore, Japan) on this occasion; no doubt Britain would have vigorously protested.

1. de Balloy complained about Bingham constantly trying to ingratiate himself with the Japanese; CP vol. XXVII, de Balloy to Ministry, 30 May 1879 CP vol. XXVII, de Balloy to
2. CP vol. XXVII, de Balloy to Ministry, 30 May 1879
3. M & D vol. II, "note pour le ministre sur la question de...", 26 June 1879

The fact is that the situation in Europe made it far more important for France to remain on good terms with Britain than to try to please the Japanese. It was not to be the ~~first~~ last time that France would intervene against Japan because of French preoccupations with matters having little to do with France-Japanese relations.[1]

Undeterred, the Japanese government in the summer of 1880 presented the French representative, de Balloy, with a new proposed treaty of friendship between the two countries.[2] De Balloy's reception of the new proposals can be gauged by his warning to his ministry to beware of the 'narrow, mean, malevolent and cantankerous spirit' of the Japanese.[3] He also said that before any step was taken the French government should consult the Lyons Chamber of Commerce. He was not simply preoccupied with the silk trade and its existing condition, but about the future in general; thus, he told his ministry not to accept the Japanese proposal to forbid cabotage to foreigners

1. Fifteen years later France was to join Russia and Germany in the Triple Intervention of 1895 forcing Japan to give up her plan to occupy the Liaotung Peninsula. France had no particular interest in that part of the world, but its decision was taken so as not to alienate Russia and certainly not to allow a closer rapprochement between Germany and Russia to France's detriment in her European diplomacy. See G.F. Hudson, The Far East in World Politics, p. 76/7, 86-90
2. CC (Tokyo) I bis., de Balloy to Ministry, 7 July 1880
3. CC (Tokyo) vol. I bis, de Balloy to Ministry, 21 July 1880

(a practice common to all sovereign states) in case the Messageries Maritimes decided one day to take it up and that this measure was designed simply to favour the Mitsubishi company.[1] Le Moniteur des Soies meanwhile deplored Japan's attempts at protectionism, and rejected the argument by the Japanese that higher tariffs were needed to safeguard their economy. Le Moniteur des Soies urged once again that Japan be opened to foreign capital and foreign commerce and that the Japanese government realise that only by 'asking them [foreign merchants and capitalists] to reconstitute the riches of the country, the same assistance asked of our officers to put into operation the military forces of Japan', could the country hope to achieve economic progress. Le Moniteur des Soies warned the French government: 'not to abandon our various industries to the mercy of the blow which threatens them on the Japanese market.'[2] The French government predictably refused to accept the Japanese proposal.[3]

French trade with Japan in the beginning of the 1880s followed the same pattern of the '70s. For the financial year 1880-81 Japan's exports to France represented over 8 million Mexican dollars, whereas French exports to Japan amounted to

1. CC (Tokyo) vol. I bis, de Balloy to Ministry, 15 August 1880
2. Le Moniteur des Soies, 4 September 1880
3. CC (Tokyo) vol. II Roquette to Ministry, 21 January 1881

3½ millions.[1] More than two-thirds of France's imports to Japan, however, were in woollen muslins, and Roquette warned Paris that the Japanese had got so used to this product that they no longer considered it a luxury, that the Japanese were beginning to manufacture it themselves, and that France should beware of Japanese attempts to raise protective barriers for its own woollen industry. Furthermore, the Lyons Chamber of Commerce was now demanding either the total abolition of duties on Japanese silk exports, or at least, a very serious reduction. Roquette said that he certainly associated himself with this 'most rational' outlook. Finally he declared:

> 'the maintainance of an exceptional system with the Japanese is the only means, from an economic point of view, by which European commerce will be able to conserve the modest situation which it has achieved at the price of numerous sacrifices. To talk of equality of treatment between the European nations and Japan seems to me to be an anticipation for the future, which only the imagination of the Japanese can see as feasible today'.[2]

It was against this background that at the Tokyo Conference of 1882 yet another attempt was to be made by the Japanese to secure treaty revision. Roquette told his government that the Japanese intended to demand 12½% on woollen muslins, 25% on wines and articles de Paris and 3% on rice which France was exporting to Japan from Indochina.[3] Roquette's successor, Tricou, was no

1. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, Roquette to Ministry 10 October 1881
2. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, Roquette to Ministry, 5 January 1882
3. CC (Tokyo) vol. I bis, Roquette to Ministry, 30 March 1882

better disposed towards Japan's treaty ambitions. He complained that the Japanese were trying to favour their own industries to the exclusion of everybody else and that, 'From a people who, despite their good intentions, have only learned how to borrow the superficialities of European civilisation, such pretentions would be surprising, if one did not know of the childish vanity of the Japanese, which finds nothing surprising.'[1] The Tokyo conference was suddenly brought to an end within a month because of the intransigeance of the Western diplomats. Tricou told Paris not to worry about the ramifications of the sudden closure of the conference; on the contrary, the Western powers should congratulate themselves on not having given in. Tricou added, 'the dignitaries who made the revolution of 1868 try to borrow our instruments of civilisation only to be able to use them one day against civilisation and against us.'[2]

The tariff question continued to form a large part of the Tokyo-Paris correspondence. The main theme of the dispatches concerned efforts to secure the abolition of export duties on silk together with the need of the French representatives

1. CC (Tokyo) vol. II, Tricou to Ministry, 16 June 1882; Tricou had arrived the same month the dispatch was sent, but this did not prevent him from having become overnight an expert on Japanese childish vanity.
2. CC (Tokyo) vol. II bis, Tricou to Ministry, 19 July 1882

(now Sienkiewicz) to work in close collaboration with his British colleague.[1] Apart from that, Paris on one occasion had to inform Sienkiewicz that Hennessey & Cie, the cognac manufacturer, had produced evidence of Japanese fraudulent imitation, using Hennessy labels.[2]

Then in September 1884 Sienkiewicz had his assistant, de Lucy Fossarieu, prepare an analytical paper with tables to show the extent to which the Japanese customs revenue would be affected by the suppression of exit duties on silk. In his covering dispatch Sienkiewicz assured Paris that he would continue to demand the suppression of these duties; for this constituted the only advantage that France could hope to obtain from a revision of the treaties.

Lucy-Fossarieu chose to approach the study from two angles: (1) the extent to which France and the other powers would benefit from a suppression of export duties; (2) the loss that would result for the Japanese government.

France alone bought more than 50% of Japan's annual exports of silk and paid duties that averaged approximately 400,000 yen per annum. The suppression of these duties, therefore, would mean for France a reduction of 1½ to 2 million

1. CC (Tokyo) vol. III, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 7 June 1884 (telegramme) and 7 June 1884 (confidential dispatch); Ministry to Sienkiewicz, 9 June 1884 (confidential dispatch) and Sienkiewicz to Ministry 12 June 1884 in which he assured the ministry that he was working in close harmony with the new British representative, Plunkett, Parkes having left the previous year.
2. CC (Tokyo) vol. III, Ministry to Sienkiewicz, 8 July 1884

francs in duties paid to Japan. The advantage for the United States (approximately 33% of Japan's silk exports), Great Britain (about 14%) and Italy (1½%), though of less importance than to France, would nevertheless be considerable.

From the Japanese point of view the story was somewhat different. Taking the year 1883 (which offered no great variations with other years), custom duties to Japan *in toto* (i.e. both import and export) were of the order of 2,717,757 yen, those on exports being 1,324,699 yen of which silk represented 793,848 yen. So Lucy Fossarieu pointed out that the abolition of export duties on silk would reduce the total revenue from Japanese customs[14] almost 30%.

Lucy Fossarieu then pointed out that France's unilateral demand for the abolition of export duties on silk, according to the most-favoured nation clause, could well mean that another power would come along and demand the abolition of export duties on tea. Tea, after silk, constituted Japan's greatest item of export, bringing in 1883 278,499 yen in custom dues, i.e. over 20% of the total revenue obtained from export duties. The simultaneous suppression of export duties on silk and tea would virtually mean the end of revenue for the Japanese government from export duties. Even supposing for an instant that the foreign powers were to accept without question Japan's proposed revision of import duties, the increase of revenue from these would not replace the loss from the export duties. Lucy-Fossarieu added.

'Now Japan is not rich enough and her budgetary situation not prosperous enough for a loss of a million yen to leave her indifferent. Under these circumstances, if the ambitions of France are justified when demanding a suppression of the export duties on silks, the hesitations on the part of the Japanese government in acceeding to France's demands are not less comprehensible.'

The trade figures for Franco-Japanese commerce for 1882 and 1883, however, were even more remarkable than in the past; in 1883, for example, out of a total (i.e. imports + exports) of 11,578,886.95 yen, the export of silks to France represented 9,246,336.99. The value of French exports to Japan amounted therefore to little more than 1¾ million yen.[1]

One cannot very well understand why Sienkiewicz put Lucy-Fossarieu to all the trouble of producing the very extensive work he presented to the Ministry. From Sienkiewicz' covering note it seems fairly obvious that he would ignore all conclusions which were not in accordance with his way of thinking. Indeed in a dispatch two months after having sent Lucy-Fossarieu's report, Sienkiewicz again explained in considerable detail why the abolition of silk export duties was so important for France, and he stated that he would continue to press for abolition.[2]

1. CC (Tokyo) vol. IV, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 6 September 1884, containing Lucy-Fossarieu's impressive document complete with ten detailed tables.
2. CC (Tokyo) vol. IV, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 7 November 1884

Although France sent no fewer than ten chefs de mission to Japan in the seventeen years following the Restoration one can atlleast say that consistency prevailed in the matter of opposing all attempts by the Japanese government to revise the tariffs, ~~without in exchange~~ AND WHILE demanding the right for French merchants to travel and trade in the interior they insisted or the suppression of an important revenue for the Japanese government. This mode of behaviour in the context of economic relations between a European and non-European power in the nineteenth century is hardly surprising; and it paralleled the behaviour of the other powers with the exception of the United States at the time of Bingham. What one can ask is whether it was particularly intelligent. Apart from a few fairly vague references to the wines and articles de Paris and woollen muslins, there is no evidence to suggest that any French diplomat went to much trouble to discover the potentialities of the Japanese market for French goods, so as to narrow the gap in France's balance of payments with Japan. One good reason for that may well have been the rapid turnover in heads of mission. It is not inconceivable that had there been a French minister who had stayed longer - and had he been a person of some imagination - attempts might have been made to form, let us say, a special relationship with Mitsubishi or one or other of the rising Japanese businesses. Economic

advantage need not have altogether ruled out economic cooperation, but in the seventeen years after Roches' departure the prime concern of French Ministers in Tokyo was to reap the advantage without bothering, it would seem, to look into possibilities of cooperation.

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2. The development of the Japanese silk industry

China, as we have noted, was during our period the main supplier of raw silk to the West. Yet in time Japan became not only an important source of raw material, but a major competitor with the long established silk industries of France and Italy. The initiative shown by government and individual enterpreneurs alike in taking advantage of the demand in Europe for Japanese silk underlines the difference between China and Japan during the period covered by this thesis:

> '[In China] the export of silk provides another example of an ancient trade which was greatly expanded during the nineteenth century as a result of the initiative of foreigners, but later stagnated in the face of competition from elsewhere. The Western merchants succeeded up to a point in improving the quality of the Chinese product so as to render it acceptable in Western markets, and for a time they and the Chinese silk merchants and producers were rewarded by a large increase in the volume of trade. But the Westerners lacked the power to insist upon the drastic changes in methods and organisation that later became necessary if Chinese silk were to hold its own in competition with the well-organised Japanese trade, and there was no Chinese authority which could do what was required.'[1]

1. G.C. Allen & A.G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan, p. 60/1

By contrast with the Chinese example are two of the most important features in Japan's development of her silk trade and industry. In the first place there was native management of their own affairs, albeit with properly controlled foreign assistance and expertise and close government control of the industry. At the same time it is true that the Japanese government paid overriding attention to heavy industry and that the British model of industrialisation was reversed with heavy industry predating light industry,[1] the government nevertheless played a major role in two ways:

> The Government, by its system of regulation, also made an essential contribution. The point must be emphasized, for it furnished a clue to Japan's economic progress as a whole. There can be no doubt that the success of the Japanese silk industry and export trade during this and later periods depended closely on the fruitful co-operation among the State, the modern and the ancient sectors of the economy, just as the failure of the Chinese silk industry, in the face of Japanese competition, is largely attributable to its inability to provide for any such co-operation. The silk industry, wherever conducted, needed a wide dispersion of productive units; for the production of cocoons was essentially a small-scale peasant process. But if filament of a uniform quality suitable for use on power looms and knitting frames was to be provided, centralized control or supervision was realized through the official licensing of the egg-raisers and by the growth of large filature firms whose plants were scattered over the silk-raising districts and who were consequently able to remain in close touch with the cocoon producers.[2]

1. see H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, p. 126
2. G. C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, p. 69

Far from wanting to kill the goose that laid the golden egg, as suggested by the didactic Temps (see page 127), the Government strove to ensure the quality and uniformity of silk and to that end, in accordance with a decree of 1885, set up a Silk Conditioning House at Yokohama.[1] What Le Moniteur des Soies, the Lyons Chamber of Commerce and the French Foreign Ministry through its diplomats labelled government interference, was in fact the sine qua non not only of the development of the silk trade but also of the silk industry: 'Unlike the developing countries today, or Tsarist Russia, Japan was not able to help industry by a protective tariff on imports. It had to act more directly'.[2]

The pébrine in France and Italy had meant that demand for Japanese silk was intense. The demand, however, provided a stimulus for an ancient industry to modernise: 'The rise of the silk industry was the most conspicuous instance of the adaptation and growth of a traditional industry in response to foreign demand'.[3] Through modernisation the nature of Japan's silk exports was to change:

> Between 1868 and 1883 the output of raw silk grew from 278,000 kwan to 457,000 kwan, and exports from 175,000 kwan to 365,000 kwan. The export of eggs, which in the first three years of Meiji amounted in value to half that of the

1. Allen and Donnithorne, op. cit., p. 86
2. A. Maddison, Economic Growth in Japan and the USSR, p. 22
3. W.W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, p.27

raw silk export, declined absolutely as well as relatively in the later seventies; but there was still a fair export in 1880. After that year it fell rapidly and became insignificant by the end of the decade. Those peasants who had hitherto been concerned mainly with egg raising for export now turned to cocoon production. They were able to effect this transition because the foreign demand for Japanese silk continued to grow... From this time onwards the reeling process passed rapidly into the specialised reeling establishments, and machine reeling made a great advance.[1]

France, therefore, had in the first instance an indirect influence in the development of Japan's silk trade and silk industry in that French demand stimulated growth, modernisation and diversification. Frenchmen (and Italians), however, were to have a moredirect influence in the development of Japan's silk industry. The government had for some time sought to establish modern silk reeling mills. Shibusawa Eiichi had approached Charles de Bousquet, a former French military instructor and now assistant and interpreter in the French legation, whom Shibusawa had known in Bakumatsu days, with the aim of obtaining the necessary equipment and expertise from France. In 1872 Paul Brunat arrived in Japan and supervised operations at the model Tomioka silk reeling mill together with a team of male and female French silk reeling technicians, the necessary equipment being ordered from France. Brunat taught the Japanese the methods employed in the Lyons silk industry; and hundreds of Japanese girls were trained by Frenchwomen in

1. Allen, A Short Economic...., p.66

the art of silk reeling. The Tomioka mill was the first model, but eventually under Brunat's guidance all silk reeling manufacturers in the country were applying his methods. Brunat left Japan in December 1875, after less than three years, but his impact on Japan's silk industry was considerable.[1]

Five years after his departure, a correspondent to Le Moniteur des Soies writing on an exhibition of silks and cocoons at Yokohama, analysed the past and present of the silk industry in Japan, the role played by Frenchmen, and accurately prophesised the future:

> 'The Japanese knew well what an inexhaustible source of richness for their country the silk industry was. But it is only in the last few years that they understood that for this industry too it was necessary to borrow from those who had progressed faster than them, thanks to the improvements brought about in the Occident in the operation of transforming the cocoon into silk thread, that is to say spinning. They had given us the seed which allowed us to regenerate our sericulture threatened with death in the different countries of Europe because of the deplorable series of epidemics which raged among our worms; it was indeed just that in return for this immense service we should return it by bringing to their ingenious, but primitive instruments, the improvements which mechanisation has progressively given us and which the experience of our most competent producers consecrated. We owe them this justice and we render it to them fully and without reservations, in congratulating them with all our heart, that the work of improvement, or rather of complete transformation, has been for them neither long, nor difficult. They wanted to do it quickly, but they also

1. for the work of Brunat and other Frenchmen and women at the Tomioka mill I have obtained my information from Yoshida Mitsukuni, O-Yattoi Gaikokujin: Sangyo in the chapter entitled, "Tomioka no Seishi", pages 53-73

and especially wanted to do it well, and their first task in order to arrive at this result, was to establish, without regard to the expense, this superb model spinning-mill of Tomioka, which was established and managed for five years by one of our compatriots, a Frenchman. That was the starting point of the continuous progress which this noble industry has achieved in Japan. Able technicians were formed who later scattered all over the country. Then the encouragements coming from everywhere, thanks to the enlightened sollicitude of the government, large companies were constituted; the intelligent association of sources of capital contributed to the movement, developed in all its power and work was carried out so quickly and so well that in less than seven years more than seven hundred spinning mills, three hundred of which are operated by steam, on the model of the great establishments in Europe. Japan today posses 17,000 'bassines' producing annually four to five hundred thousand balls of silk, and able, without difficulty, to increase to a considerable extent this production ...
... Japan will one day succeed in placing itself among the nations which hold the first rank as silk producers.[1]

In 1893 the Tomioka mill was taken over by Mitsui from the government and became one of Mitsui's most profitable investments.[2]

Japan's silk industry did indeed reach the first ranking nations of silk production and surpassed them. France's role in this was crucial in one sense; the dearth of raw silk in France meant that demand for Japanese raw silk both in France and in other countries, including the United States and Britain, stimulated the development of the industry. This was the indirect influence mentioned earlier. The role that individual Frenchmen played in helping Japan develop its industry was more direct; but it was the Japanese government's initiative and its wise choice of foreign expertise, which made the development of

1. Le Moniteur des Soies, 24 January 1880
2. J. Roberts, Mitsui..., p.123

Japan's most successful industry (until the Second World War) possible.

The importance of the silk trade in Japan's general economic development in the Meiji era can hardly be exaggerated:

> 'Japan would necessarily have encountered far greater difficulties in carrying out quickly her programme of Westernization if this accident of nature had not created a large foreign demand for one of the few products which she was capable of producing for export in the early days of the modern era.'[1]

It was chiefly the revenue from silk (along with land tax) which permitted Japan to embark on her ambitious programme of Fukoku-kyohei. Throughout the whole of the period under study France contributed greatly to Japan's foreign exchange which in its turn permitted Japan to buy equipment from Britain, as well as developing her own, to move into shipbuilding, armaments and all the other heavy industry with which she propelled herself as a major industrial and military power.

1. G.C. Allen, A Short Economic..., p.38

Chapter 4.

French Diplomacy in Japan in the Early Meiji Era.

If France can be said to have had a considerable indirect influence on Japanese economic development, her influence on Japanese foreign policy and political development was so negligible as to be virtually non-existent. French political theory attracted the interest of a number of Japanese politicians and intellectuals, but this matter was not thanks to the activities of France's diplomats in Japan. Whatever French model Japan may have chosen for its educational system, for its police or ken (prefectural) arrangements, very rarely had they anything to do with French diplomats and hardly, if ever, found any mention in official dispatches. The important exception to this was the return of a French military mission in which all diplomats, with the exception of Tricou[1], took considerable interest and to a slightly lesser degree the continuation of French management of the Yokosuka arsenal. Indeed it is a characteristic of French diplomacy in Japan during this period, that the legation sought to maintain French influence where it had existed, i.e. the Roches legacy, but did not try in any significant way to seek new areas of possible French influence.

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres, I, 9, Bougouin to Munier, 6 January 1883 (confidential) in which he says that Tricou is not at all interested in the possibility of new military instructors to Japan: 'His opinion...[is] that our influence here [is] useless.'

France after 1871 was convulsed by internal political problems; and the major obsession of French foreign policy during most of this period was security against a possible future German attack.[1] Until the early 1880s there was no reason why Paris should have been particularly concerned with Japan. But, as has been noted on several occasions already, a distinction must be made between Paris and its diplomats abroad. It would seem that the primary purpose of diplomats in post, apart from the obvious one of seeking commercial advantages for their country and its industries, is twofold. In the first place they must garner as much intelligence as possible on as many facets as possible from all possible sources. For this ~~able~~ able purpose and linguistically competent assistants are vitally important. Yet no French head of mission in Tokyo was to follow Roches' plea for more interpreters and consuls trained in the Japanese language. No attempt seems to have been made to get in touch with any of the Japanese figures who acknowledged French influence in their political outlook or showed interest and scholarly competence in French culture. No mention in any dispatch is made of Nakae Chomin; and though Itagaki Taisuke visited the French legation, this on his own initiative. Secondly it would seem that the purpose of diplomats in not very important posts, such as Tokyo

1. see P. Renouvin, Histoire des Relations Internationales, vol. VI Le XIXe Siecle, II de 1871 a 1914, Livre premier and La Politique Exterieure de la IIIe Republique: de 1871 a 1914

(in French eyes), is to seek ways through individual initiative of improving relations; these to be kept as harmonious as possible, in case, by a sudden turn of events, the post should become important. Alliances between states are not made overnight. When France could have tried to secure Japanese help, after 1883, in its activities in China, one important reason for the failure that ensued lay in the fact that the ground had by no means been prepared.

Paris cannot be held completely responsible for this state of affairs, except perhaps in so far as there was the failure to maintain any semblance of permanence in the Tokyo Legation. The responsibility clearly lies with the individual ministers to Japan. Outrey informed a friend of his at the Quai that Japan was a mediocre country from every point of view.[1] In fact one can turn that inside out and suggest, judging from the evidence of their sojourn in Tokyo, that French heads of mission, with one or two exceptions, were themselves mediocre from every point of view. Roches may have displayed excessive zeal, lack of tact and errors of judgement. His successors showed a startling lack of imagination. Mainly for this reason French influence in Japan was peripheral and for the same reason, when a rapprochement was attempted in the course of the Franco-Chinese war, it failed.

1. CP vol. vol. XVI, Outrey to Saint Villier, 22 August 1868

French diplomacy in Japan had to face essentially three issues: the attempt to maintain French prestige, which was done primarily through the military mission; the question of the native Christians, which, like the military, will be dealt with separately; and finally the problem of treaty revision.

Outrey was perhaps one of the unhappiest French diplomats in Tokyo. Not only did he have to settle the financial obligations the Japanese government had entered into with Roches, including the indemnity for the massacre of French sailors in Sakai,[1] but also he had to account for the pro-Tokugawa policy of his predecessor.[2] To make matters far worse, a number of French soldiers and sailors, including one of the officers of the military mission, became involved in the fighting between imperial forces and the die-hard supporters of the Bakufu. As a result the Japanese government, following the example of the Western powers, sought an indemnity.[3] Furthermore, Outrey was saddled with the Christian question.[4]

By June 1870, after two years of residence in Tokyo, Outrey on at least one occasion was prepared to concede that Japan, unlike ~~its~~ her neighbours, was going in the direction of

1. see CP vol. XVI, Outrey to Ministry, 12 August 1868, CP vol. XVII, Outrey to Ministry, 7 October 1868; CC vol. V, Outrey to Ministry, 7 October 1868
2. see CP vol. XVI, Outrey to Saint Villier, 22 June 1868; CP vol. XVII, Outrey to Ministry, 30 September and 11 November 1868; CP vol. XVIII, Outrey to Ministry, 8 May 1869
3. see chapter 6
4. see chapter 7

change, avid to learn about European ideas, though determined to maintain her independence and to avoid falling under the exclusive influence of one country.[1] But the assumption of a necessary confrontation between Japan as an Asiatic country and France as a European power was obviously still firmly implanted when he reported to his ministry in the same year that events in Tientsin would certainly have a great influence on the policy of the Japanese government.[2] Why Outrey should have mentioned this incident as having a salutory effect on the policy of Japan is somewhat surprising; the Tientsin massacre which involved the murder of over a dozen Frenchmen, including one consular agent, was not followed by retaliatory measures because of the outbreak of the France-Prussian war.[3] It is probable that Outrey, having heard of the Tientsin massacre before learning of the conflict in Europe, simply assumed that France would retaliate with overwhelming force and that the inferences to be drawn would not be lost on the Japanese. Having learned of the outbreak of war between France and Prussia, however, and after having made the necessary arrangements with his Prussian colleague, Brandt, Outrey showed to what extent he saw the world in terms of separate civilisations and how even during the war between European states, the Asiatic was still the real enemy:

1. CP vol. XX, Outrey to Ministry, 4 June 1870
2. CP vol. XX, Outrey to Ministry, 22 July 1870
3. J.F. Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia, p. 278

> 'I have to bring to Your Excellency's attention the extreme importance there is to show to the Chinese, as well as to the Japanese, that even when at war, the European powers will always be ready to unite their action in order to protect the European interests of these two countries. The moral impact will be considerable I am certain'.[1]

In the months prior to Outrey's departure he again urged his government on several occasions not to entertain the Japanese request for the withdrawal of French forces in Yokohama.[2] It was consistent with what seems to have been his philosophy that he should have warned Paris that official Japanese approaches to China would probably result in a Sino-Japanese alliance against the Western powers. Outrey thus completely misread the true nature of Japanese policies in the Far East, especially with respect to Korea.[3] Finally, though admitting that Japan had embarked on an ambitious programme of modernisation, he predicted that the results would be chaotic, due to the lack of an overall plan on the part of the Japanese authorities, who borrowed indiscriminately from a variety of European countries. He remarked that Japan would become 'a veritable Tower of Babel'.[4]

Outrey went on furlough in October 1871, leaving as charge

1. CP vol. XX, Outrey to Ministry, 22 August 1870
2. see CP vol. XX, Outrey to Ministry, 24 December 1870; vol. XXI, Outrey to Ministry, 1 and 31 July and 18 September 1871
3. CP vol. XXI, Outrey to Ministry, 8 May and 3 June 1871; Japan and China even at this early date had far more matters which divided them than any which would untie them, the question of the Rykukyus and already the problem of Korea, see H. Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910.
4. CP vol. XXI, Outrey to Ministry, 27 August 1871

de Turenne, who had previously served briefly under Roches. Outrey did not return. De Turenne's period of office was unremarkable so far as Franco-Japanese relations were concerned. This may have been due, in part, to the fact that while he was in charge Iwakura and half the government were in the United States and Europe. Although he occasionally mentioned Korean affairs, he seemed not to be aware of the intensity of feeling aroused by the Seikan Ron (war with the Korea argument)[1], the outcome of which was to be of such major significance for Japanese history,[2] yet ever since the summer of 1872 there was in Tokyo a Franco-American, Legendre, who could have been of inestimable value to him but who seems to have had much closer contact with de Turenne's American colleague, de Long.[3] On

1. see F.F. Chien, The Opening of Korea, 1876-1885, H. Conroy, op.cit., chap. 1, R.F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922, chap.2, Inoue Kiyoshi, Nippon Teikokushugi no Keisei, p. 3-5 and M. Iwata, Okubo Toshimichi The Bismark of Japan, p. 163-173
2. the decision not to provoke Korea into war led to the resignation from government of Saigo Takamori, and others, including Itagaki Taisuke, when four years later Saigo and his followers challenged the survival of the Meiji government in the most critical civil war Japan had ever experienced since the beginning of the Tokugawa period; the departure of Saigo, however, allowed the more radical in internal affairs and more cautious in external affairs group to push through its numerous reforms; see Ike, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan, part two, and "The Triumph of the Peace Party in Japan in 1873" in Journal of Asian Studies, vol. II, p. 286 -; and Iwata, op.cit.
3. H. Conroy, op.cit., p.37

the Iwakura mission, de Turenne expressed confidence that during their trip to Europe they would recognise the great superiority of Western civilisation,[1] but he was alarmed when he heard the rumour that the Americans might be proposing an international conference in Europe to settle the treaty revision problem. This would be fatal, he thought; for it would give the Japanese the impression that they had joined the concert of civilised nations.[2]

At the very least de Turenne's attitude to the Japanese government was by no means openly hostile. His readiness to mediate in the complicated and disagreeable 'Maria Luz' case[3] between Japan and Peru, and the manner in which he carried out this task, could not fail to have been of help to the Japanese government facing its first international scandal. His seemingly amicable relations with the Japanese government were demonstrated when the Japanese government appealed to him for help - on, for

1. CP vol. XXI, de Turenne to Ministry, 22 December 1871
2. CP vol. XXI, de Turenne to Ministry, 22 May 1872
3. see CP vol. XXII, Ministry to de Turenne 3 January 1873, de Turenne to Ministry, 2 March, 12 and 28 May and 17 June 1873. The Maria Luz was a Peruvian ship which had to seek harbour in Japan due to problems encountered in a storm. It was discovered that the ship was full of Chinese coolies. The Japanese government refused to allow the coolies to be re-embarked and eventually the matter had to be taken to arbitration to the Tsar, Alexander II who in 1875 ruled in favour of Japan;

example, a programme for forming a new police force, or in the matter of railway construction and the compilation of new legal codes.[1] Compared with a number of his colleagues, de Turenne is a moderately outstanding figure; he was reasonably sympathetic to Japan; to put it no higher, we can say he was interested in the country. He had asked for permission to undertake a survey trip into the interior of the country,[2] but this was turned down by the Ministry.[3] Still, he was by no means immune from the prejudices of his day, as is witnessed by his reaction to a rumour of a multi-national conference in Europe on the question of treaty revision and by his anger at a supposed Italo-Japanese arrangement, whereby the Italians would forfeit extraterritoriality inside Japan if given freedom to travel; this was felt by de Turenne to be an abandonment of the sacred principle of Western solidarity.[4]

Berthemy succeeded de Turenne in June 1873. He can be said to have set the tone for his period of residence when he informed his Ministry that while most of his colleagues seemed impressed by

1. see CP vol. XXII de Turenne to Ministry, 20 January and 17 March 1873 and R. Sims, Characteristics of..., p.6 and French Policy Towards...., p.169
2. CP vol. XXI, de Turenne to Ministry, 4 March 1872
3. CP vol. XXI, ~~de Turenne to Ministry~~ MINISTRY DE TURENNE, 26 April 1872
4. CP vol. XXII, de Turenne to Ministry, 17 March 1873

Japan's progress he was inclined to disagree with them. He wrote: 'They have forgotten that progress, as it is generally understood, can be dangerous even for people of the superior races, and that it is fatal for the inferior races'.[1] There were three main issues he had to deal with. The first involved negotiations, including much correspondence, between the Japanese government and the foreign representatives on the question of travel inside Japan and whether or not extraterritorial rights should apply.[2] Berthemy was not prepared to compromise on this question. He maintained an inflexible position, namely that Europeans could under no circumstances be subjected to the same laws as the Japanese. Eventhough it appeared that the Americans were prepared to seek some kind of compromise with the Japanese, Berthemy was not impressed. He observed that doubtless the primitive and barbaric state of Japanese law was not of 'a nature to frighten the pioneers of California, the miners of Nevada and the cowboys of Texas. What do they care under which jurisdiction they find themselves, since normally they recognise none.'[3] Berthemy saw the Japanese government as 'weak and ignorant'[4] and he argued

1. CP vol. XXII, Berthemy to Ministry, 9 July 1873
2. see CP vol. XXII, Berthemy to Ministry, 22 and 27 July 1873; vol. XXIII, Ministry to Berthemy 7 August 1873, Berthemy to Ministry, 12 August, 12 October, 9 and 20 November, 1 and 28 December 1873; vol. XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 19 January, 12 April, 8 and 20 July, 18 August and 25 October 1874
3. CP vol. XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 12 April 1874
4. ibid

that a far firmer policy was needed on the part of the Western powers vis à vis Japan.[1]

It was during Berthemy's period that the Japanese Formosan expedition took place, and he kept his ministry informed on this question and on Sino-Japanese relations in general.[2] It was noted in the preceding chapter that it was Berthemy who had said that a war between Japan and China would be of benefit to the European powers, for since Japan and China would soon need disciplining, such a war would seriously weaken both. He had written this in June 1874 and three months later he was to repeat this view, stressing that Western interest lay in a Sino-Japanese stalemate, with both sides exhausted.[3]

The third problem he had to face was the withdrawal of the Anglo-French garrison from Yokohama. He felt this to be inevitable, though at one stage he suggested that France might ask for a pecuniary compensation for the withdrawal.[4] The Anglo-French troops in Yokohama had been there since Bakumatsu days, and the Japanese government felt that they constituted an affront to Japan's independence and sovereignty. ~~The Japanese~~

1. CP vol. XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 8 May 1874
2. see CP vol. XXIII, Berthemy to Ministry 3 and 20 August, 4 November 1873; vol. XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 15 February, 5 April, 1, 8, 19, 22 and 31 May, 30 June, 27 July, 10 August, 8 September, 10 and 25 October and 8 November, 1874.
3. CP vol. XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 24 August 1874
4. see CP vol. XXIII, Berthemy to Ministry, 24 November and 1 December 1873; CP vol. XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 8 February and 7 March 1874; vol. XXV, Berthemy to Ministry, 2 February 1875

The Japanese had long desired to see the troops depart. When Berthemy early in 1875 finally informed Terashima, then Foreign Minister, that the troops were being recalled, he reported, with some astonishment, that although 'Terashima no doubt welcomed the news of the departure of the troops with satisfaction; nevertheless it seemed to me that he saw this rather as the recognition on the part of the French and English governments of a right unrecognised since a long time to the detriment of Japan, rather than a measure for which he should have shown considerable gratitude.'[1] And so Berthemy left Japan, a country whose government he felt was a 'spoiled child'.[2]

Berthemy's successor was de Saint-Quentin, as chargé d'affaires he seems not to have been imbued with the spirit of arrogance which appears to have animated Berthemy. Indeed on one occasion he countermanded an order by the French captain of the fleet in Japanese waters who had demanded that a monument erected at Sakai to the executed assassins of the French sailors of the Venus be demolished. De Saint-Quentin, with the advice of Du Bousquet, now an advisor to the Japanese government, decided against this.[3] On the whole, however, his two years in Japan

1. CP vol. XXV, Berthemy to Ministry, 2 February 1875
2. CP vol. XXIII, Berthemy to Ministry, 9 November 1873
3. CP vol. XXV, de Saint-Quentin to Ministry, 27 November 1876

altered nothing and seem not to have left any impact either in Tokyo or Paris.

As to de Saint Quentin's successor, de Geofroy, his manner contrasts pleasantly with that of most of his predecesors and successors. One notices, immediately, in his first dispatch that he is the first to write from 'Tokio', instead of from 'Yeddo'; he wrote:

> 'I will take the opportunity of this occasion to remind the Ministry, that, by a decree of 15 September 1868 and which M. Outrey transmitted at that time, the Japanese government has replaced for its capital the name 'Yedo' by that of 'Tokio.' I have not been able to discover, in the correspondence of my predecessors, why the new official appellation has not been used by them. The Japanese are anxious that this should be so, however, and would be upset were they to know that we persisted in not recognising it. I can see no reason why we cannot afford them this little satisfaction.'[1]

Instead of summarily dismissing the Japanese government collectively as 'feeble and ignorant', he was at some pains, when writing to Paris, to assess their individual personalities. The Emperor Mutsu-hito (Meiji), 'Is a tall lad of about 25 years of age, with a pale complexion, and generally looking worn out and dull, whom his Ministers, some say, entertain carefully in the abuse of the pleasures of life and who, until now, does not seem to contemplate taking care of anything else.' Sanjo Sanetomi, the prime minister, is not reputed to be very

1. CP vol. XXVI, de Geofroy to Ministry, 24 June 1877

intelligent; de Geofroy observed he owed his position more to the activities and reputation of his father, than to either his own career or even his station in life (as kuge). Nevertheless he is surrounded (reported de Geofroy) by a brilliant cabinet. De Geofroy expressed great admiration for Iwakura, for Okubo, whom he had met in China at the time of the negotiations over the Formosan crisis, for Okuma and for Ito, 'cultured and discerning'.[1]

Another example of de Geofroy's attitude is provided by his reaction to problems over the French management and employees of the Yokosuka arsenal. De Geofroy's impartial assessment of the situation, where among other things, he mentioned the 'airs of domination which we tend to carry with us everywhere',[2] is uncharacteristic, at least in comparison with his predecessors and successors.

Moreover, de Geofroy is almost unique in having recognised that there could be two sides to the extraterritoriality argument and he stands out in marked contrast with the uncompromising attitude of his predecessors and successors. The extraterriorial judicial apparatus could be looked at in two ways.

1. ibid; on the occasion of Okubo's assassination, de Geofroy seemed genuinely saddened and again recalled how he had admired Okubo's 'quiet courage' in the face of the redoubtable Li Hung Chang, CP vol. XXVI, de Geofroy to Ministry, 19 May 1878
2. CP vol XXVI, de Geofroy to Ministry, 24 July 1877

It was undoubtedly a means of establishing a 'semi-colonial system'.[1] Yet given the presence of foreigners in East Asia the system was not without valid arguments in its favour. The judicial systems in countries like China and Japan were complex; in Japan laws tended to vary geographically, between han, and socially between samurai and commoner, or man and woman. Problems would have existed even if the foreigners had been able to read Japanese:

> 'As regards criminal justice, magistrates had a code to guide them, but this was never published as a whole, although notices about certain crimes were posted from time to time. In principle, there was no punishment without confession, and this often led to a suspect being rigorously interrogated. This criminal code, such as it was, could be changed without warning. This was in keeping with the fundamental Tokugawa attitude, derived from Confucianist precepts, that the people should not be instructed as to what the law might be, but should be content to do what they were told.'[2]

Torture was common, including flogging, pressing with stones and water torture[3]; and the various forms of the death penalty were barbaric by European standards.[4]

Although that description refers to the Tokugawa period, Japanese law in the early Meiji period was in a period of transition and many reports from Westerners alleged that torture and

1. M. Edwardes, The West in Asia 1850-1914, p. 25
2. C. Dunn, Everyday Life in Traditional Japan, p.11, cf, also p. 28-34
3. ibid, p. 32
4. ibid, p.33

other barbaric methods were still being resorted to, that justice tended to be interpreted in a very subjective manner.[1] Even if the civil and criminal codes in Japan had been up to European standards, the arguments in favour of the maintenance of extraterritoriality would not necessarily lose their force. Putting the commercial advantages aside (the consul in any given port was often a merchant himself and so under consular jurisdiction would be unlikely to pass judgement against his won colleagues and compatriots[2]), extraterritoriality was part of the ethos of the times.

It is not surprising, however, that the Japanese, especially once they had embarked on a series of fundamental legal reforms, should see the matter in a different light. For them extraterritoriality was a violation of Japanese sovereignty and carried suggestions of racial inferiority; 'The fact that Japan took this attitude, that she objected not to particular abuses, but to the whole principle of extraterritoriality made its abolition, not merely an official and diplomatic, but a popular

1. a number of letters and articles on this subject appeared in The Times including one on allegations of a woman having been boiled alive in Japan, 26 April 1869, and two on the common use of torture in Japan, 21 and 22 October 1879, C. Bousquet in his Le Japon de Nos Jours strongly criticised Japanese attitudes to law and justice and even more so in a series of articles in Echo du Japan entitled 'Le Droit Public et Prive' au Japon', beginning on 15 October 1875
2. see F.C. Jones, Extraterritoriality in Japan..., p.50 ff.

and national objective.'[1] What exarcebated feelings was not merely the principle lying behind the system, but the complexity of the system and the abuses it led to. The complexity was great. In the 1870s there were 18 treaty powers each with its consular courts. Problems arose, for example, in the case of misdemeanours by a sailor of one nationality when his ship belonged to another. Which consular court would claim jurisdiction ? Furthermore, offenses against Japanese regulations could be punished in the consular courts only according to the laws of the country to which the accused belonged.[2] It is not surprising in view of all this that, 'hostility to extraterritoriality, however, would scarcely have developed so widely and rapidly had the system worked in practice without friction and had the Japanese who came into contact with the consular courts been satisfied with the treatment they received.'[3]

De Geofroy on the question of treaty revision in general had counselled his government that 'our role in Japan should be to incline towards the impartiality and gracious condescension of the Americans, rather than associate ourselves with Prussian haughtiness or English selfishness...'[4]

1. F.C. Jones, op. cit., p.47
2. ibid, p. 58 ff
3. ibid, p. 48
4. CP vol. XXVI, de Geofroy to Ministry, 16 October 1877

Unfortunately Paris refused to listen and insisted on following Britain's lead.[1] Undeterred, however, de Geofroy, back in Paris after leaving Tokyo, produced a long memorandum for the Quai d'Orsay on the question of extraterritoriality. He pointed out that the extraterritorial system, which originally had been intended to make foreigners appear only at the consular tribunals of their nationality, had resulted in a situation in which there was an almost total exemption for foreigners from the operation of all Japanese laws, police regulations, local taxes and sundry other obligations towards the sovereign of the country. De Geofroy then argued that European inflexibility in refusing to discuss the problem of extra-territoriality could not logically be maintained and that it deserved to be thoroughly studied. The present and future relations of Western countries with Japan turned on this problem; 'It is clear that if we want to extend our commerce in that country, maintain establishments in the interior and exploit mines, it is indispensable that the conditions in which we will reside be settled.' He went on to contend that although great progress had been achieved in the reform of Japan's legal system since 1873, total Japanese jurisdiction was impossible. But so was the existing arrangement. He pointed out that the Americans had

1. CP vol. XXVI, Ministry to de Geofroy, 4 April 1878

been encouraging the Japanese to claim their unrecognised sovereign rights. De Geofroy argued that a compromise must be sought. On the question of jurisdiction, basically he was arguing for a clearer definition of legal responsibility and authority and one which would accord greater freedom to the Japanese in administering laws in their own country. He proposed for example, that consular jurisdiction apply only to certain specific cases, and that there be an exact definition of the competence of consular jurisdiction and close collaboration between the Western legations and Japanese officials in understanding and respecting Japanese laws.[1]

De Geofroy was by no means suggesting that the French should opt for total Japanese jurisdiction; nor were the Japanese demanding it at that time. What he was pleading for was flexibility, a spirit of compromise, a recognition on the part of Europeans that genuine grievances existed, that these should be remedied and that the whole problem be approached with an open mind and that, in place of arrogance and selfishness, proper communications between Japanese and foreigners should take place. De Geofroy failed, Paris conceded nothing and again simply urged that solidarity be established with Britain.

1. M & D vol. II, "note pour le ministre sur la question de la revision du traite avec le Japon", par M de Geofroy, 26 June 1879

With de Geofroy's departure early in 1879 the young de Balloy (34 years of age) took over as <u>charge d'affaires</u> The anti-Japanese <u>leitmotiv</u> returned: 'The Japanese are vanity personified and everywhere think they see attacks directed at their right of sovereignty. There results from this an extreme susceptibility which is translated into exaggerated and frequently puerile demands on their part'.[1] Any concession would be interpreted as a sign of weakness[2]. What was needed was an intransigeant bloc of France, Germany and Britain to prevent any compromise and at the same time force the other treaty countries to follow suit.[3] Part of the responsibility lay with the irresponsible Japanese press which was inciting popular emotions and national vanity.[4] The Government was only interested in pursuing the problem of treaty revision in order to divert the attention of the Japanese away from pressing internal problems.[5]

The next two ministers need not detain us. De Roquette, in Tokyo for just over a year, was more sympathetic with the Japanese than his predecessor had been, but he saw no reason to

1. CP vol. XXVII, de Balloy to Ministry, 12 March 1879
2. <u>ibid</u>
3. CP vol. XXVII, de Balloy to Ministry, 30 May 1879
4. <u>ibid</u>
5. CP vol. XXVII, de Balloy to Ministry, 23 July 1879

revise the treaties and remained deaf to Japanese requests on that subject. De Roquette was succeeded by Tricou, who apparently used to parade about in a self-designed uniform, detested the Japanese and was very rude to them.[1]

'It would probably not be too much to say that France neglected during the first decade and a half of the Meiji era, the opportunity to build up a position of good will and trust that might well have been useful later'.[2] It would seem that apart from de Geofroy the French diplomats were of very mediocre quality, showed a significant lack of imagination and interest in the country they were posted to, and were unable to rise above the prejudices of the time. This in turn made it impossible for them to recognise, far less admit, the changes taking place in Japan.

At a time when France's interests in the East were to coincide to a certain extent with those of Japan, it was too late to try to make up for fifteen years marked by neglect or by a negative and obstructive policy. Thus the last two years covered by this thesis present an interesting picture of two countries, France and Japan, uncomfortably and, in the event, vainly trying to cooperate on possible joint action against China.

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres, I, 9, Bougouin to Munier, 6 January 1883
2. Sims, 'French Policy Towards...', p.202

Unfortunately the details and background of the Franco-Chinese war cannot detain us here. Two points should be noted, however, as having some bearing on the pages to follow. In France there was considerable opposition, indeed hostility, to what was seen as Ferry's Tongkinese adventure. Ferry's colonial policy was to a great extent based on the influential works of Leroy-Beaulieu, while opposition to colonial adventures came from both the French left, with Clemenceau as principal spokesman, and from the right, with Paul Deroulède and such nationalistic groups as the Ligue des Patriotes: needless to say opposition to Ferry's policy from left and right was not based on the same premises. In Japan it could be said that the situation was the exact reverse. The Meiji oligarchy at the time favoured a cautious foreign policy, with emphasis on revision of the treaties and reforms at home rather than adventures abroad. The extreme right, however, in such groups as the Genyosha (founded in 1881) and the so-called Jiyuminkenundo, arguably on the left, favoured a far more positive Japanese policy in Asia.

It is in the context of France-Japanese relations over the previous fifteen years and in the setting of the relationship between foreign and internal policies in France and Japan that the

fumbled attempt at an alliance should be viewed.[1]

When news was received of the death of Commandant Rivière and his defeat in May 1883 the dispute between France and China intensified. In June the French charge, de Viel Castel, informed Paris that the Japanese government had asked whether it might send observers to follow French operations. This was not an extraordinary request. Over a dozen years previously Oyama Iwao had been sent as an observer to follow operations during the Franco-Prussian war and to report back.[2] Besides, by now French military instructors had been training the new Japanese army for over a decade, and it was natural that Japanese officers should wish to see their mentors' country at work. De Viel, as charge, however seems to have somewhat exaggerated the tenor of the Japanese request; 'it would not simply be as spectators, but side by side, as brothers in arms, that the Japanese are now considering following us in the struggle they see us already engaged in against the Celestial Empire'. De Viel Castel went on to assure his ministry that those members of the government who would show

1. I should add here that my appraisal and suggestions regarding the possible Franco-Japanese alliance have enormously benefited from Dr. Sims' pioneering work (see pages 202-244 in French Policy Towards...); my own treatment of the subject is in no ways meant to supplement Dr. Sims' work, but, I hope, to complement it.
2. Meiji Hyakunen, p. 58-61

hesitation because of possible redoubtable consequences would find themselves branded by unpopularity. The state of public opinion among all classes of Japanese society favoured a showdown with China. De Viel Castel added, however, that at least one of the concessions France would have to grant in exchange for a possible alliance would have to do with the question of treaty revision.[1]

Meanwhile in Paris, an English agent of the Japanese government, Frederick Marshall, was making inquiries at the Quai d'Orsay about operations in Tonking and a possible communion of interests between France and Japan.[2] In the beginning of July the Ministry asked de Viel Castel to send a report on what military and maritime ressources Japan could contribute to any possible joint military action.[3] In the meantime approval had been given for Captain Ikeda and Lieutenant Koizumi to act as observers during French operations in Tonking; Ikeda had previously studied at Saint-Cyr.[4]

The possibility of some sort of military alliance was brewing, thus it would be interesting to discover what sort of reaction there might have been outside government circles.

1. CP vol. XXIX, Viel Castel to Ministry, 13 June 1883
2. CP vil. XXIX, Ministry to Viel Castel, 12 and 21 June 1883; also Sims, French Policy...., p. 209
3. CP vol. XXIX, Ministry to Viel Castel, 6 July 1883
4. CP vol. XXIX, Viel Castel to Ministry, 10 July 1883

Unfortunately it is not possible to detect in the French press any reference to the tentative negotiations that were taking place. This absence of news and comment suggests that the negotiations were a closely guarded secret in Paris. Possibly there was a lack of interest. The first head of the military mission to Japan, Captain Chanoine (by now Colonel) refers to the prospects of an alliance in a book he wrote twenty years later.[1] The military dossiers on the possible alliance are to be found in the archives of the 2ème Bureau, presumably classified at the time as top secret.

As far as the Japanese are concerned there is no reason to believe that the government gave any indication whatever that talks were taking place; but as the events were much nearer home and probably of far greater public interest, the Press did not hesitate to speculate on developments and on what Japan's role should be. On the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of August the Mainichi Shinbum published a series of articles entitled 'The Policy of Japan in the Franco-Chinese Conflict.' Everyone was interested, commented the newspaper, in what was taking place between France and China, and the public was taking sides, some arguing that Japan should side with France, others that Japan should ally herself with China. Having pointed out that

1. see Chanoine, Documents Pour Servir a l'Histoire des Relations entre La France et Le Japon

Annam was an Oriental country, the newspaper declared: 'The partisans of a French alliance say that China is not strong enough to fight France, and that in joining China we would be exposing ourselves to grave complications. It is, of course, evident that France is stronger than China: but precisely because of this superiority, if we joined France we would be accused of an abuse of our arms'.

Supposing, however (the Mainichi suggested) that Japan did join France, what advantage would acrue to Japan ? France was an aggressive colonial power,

> 'At present the policy of France is directed, it would seem, towards the aggrandizement of her colonies; contrary to her role as a Republic, she throws herself in far away adventures, either in order to divert attention away from her internal problems, or for whatever other motive. If therefore she succeeded in achieving her ends in Annam and China, it is not at all possible that she would then take advantage of the occasion to put forward vis à vis our country, it its turn, unjustifiable pretensions. In any case her expansion in the Far East is a grave menace.'

The Mainichi, however, was no more in favour of an alliance with China. Those favouring an alliance with China, the newspaper commented, claimed that China was a sister country. But at present this was not the case, as China was very jealous of Japan. Japan, the Mainichi went on, must carefully consider what her policy must be, 'If we are permitted to establish a certain analogy between contemporary events and the history of the XVI century - our country finds itself actually in the situation which England occupied at the time of Charles V and Francis I...

France being at this moment in the position of Charles V, and China in that of Frances I.' Having looked at the problem in all its facets, the Hainichi came out strongly in favour of strict neutrality. It argued that the government must concentrate on the internal problems of the country: 'If Japan enters the conflict between France and China, she will have to renounce her work of pacific progress and resign herself to losing time, which is precious.'[1]

By September 1883, the French military attaché had prepared the information on Japan's military potential required by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War. The military attaché, Bougouin, had been seven years in Japan, having taken part in the second military mission. He saw a confrontation between China and Japan as inevitable. Nevertheless, he pointed out:

> 'the Japanese government, in view of the state of its finances and of the concessions which it has obtained from the Chinese government following the incidents in Formosa, the Loo-choos and Korea, seems unlikely to be the first in breaking the relations of temporary peace. I think therefore that Japan would see with great satisfaction all foreign enterprise which would weaken the forces of China, but which, nevertheless, apart from exceptional circumstances, would not be prepared to lend to another power effective military cooperation.'

1. found in CP vol. XXIX, Viel Castel to Ministry, 4 September 1883

In any case, Bougouin was not particularly enthusiastic about Japan's war potential, with the exception of a special corps, called a 'foot train', created for the service of campaign transport, which could provide 15,000 coolies (sic), and which would be very useful to any army operating in a country where communications were very difficult. The Japanese navy, he added, was negligible.[1]

Meanwhile the new French minister to Tokyo, Sienkiewicz, had arrived and it is difficult to imagine a greater contrast between de Viel Castel's possibly excessive enthusiasm and Sienkiewicz's lethargy.[2] It is doubtful whether the proposed alliance could ever have materialised, but whatever flicker of hope it may have had was effectively extinguished by Sienkiewicz. In a dispatch at the end of 1883 Sienkiewicz expressed pessimism about any possibility of a Franco-Japanese alliance and complained that 'in exchange for the very important concessions we have granted to Japan on the question of treaty revision, we have obtained nothing more than the terror with which the Ministers of the Mikado are inspired vis à vis the Chinese empire.'[3]

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres, I, 9, Bougouin to Viel Castel, 21 September 1883
2. see R. Sims, op. cit., p. 231 ff.
3. CP vol. XXIX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 7 November 1883

It should be noted that the Franco-Chinese war took place at a time when the Japanese army was terminating the engagements of French military advisors and, so it was feared by French officers and diplomats, apparently turning towards Germany. A matter of considerable annoyance to Sienkiewicz was the criticism which the Japanese officers, Ikeda and Koisumi, had apparently expressed with respect to the French operations they had witnessed.[1] Sienkiewicz, who very often complained of the growing influence of Germany in Japan,[2] lamented that this was to be blamed to a considerable extent on France's poor showing in Indo-China. Indeed he produced copies of two articles in the Jiji Shinpo of 9 and 10 November saying that the Japanese should discover much more about Germany, which was one of the most powerful nations on earth.[3]

Alliance or no alliance, towards the end of 1883 Japan was to find herself for the first time engaged in diplomatic negotiations along with the other major Western powers on the numerous issues confronting them over Franco-Chinese differences. The British decided to ask Japan to join the other neutral powers in a joint naval operation aimed at the protection of

1. ibid
2. see CP vol. XXIX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 21 November and 5 December 1883, and 29 January 1884; vol. XXI, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 17 April 1884, 2 May 1884
3. CP vol. XXIX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 5 December 1883

neutral subjects residing in China.[1] Japan's participation was seen as of particular importance if it were to send warships to Shanghai, where in any case a large number of Japanese were residing.[2] The reaction of the Japanese government, however, showed that Bougouin's impression that Japan would be reluctant to do anything that might jeopardise the peaceful relations she had with China, was not only accurate, but if anything underestimated Japan's passivity vis a vis China. The British charge, P. Le Poer Tranch wrote,

> 'In spite, however, of the desire shown by Mr. Inouye [Inoue] and by Mr. Ito to meet the wishes of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the proposed joint action for the protection of neutrals, I am of opinion that unless they learn that Japanese subjects at Shanghae are in great danger, or that war has actually been declared, the Japanese government will not dispatch vessels to the Chinese seas, for fear that such a step might be regarded as a menace against China.[3]

By April, however, the Japanese government had agreed to send Admiral Matsumura Junzo with two men of war to Shanghai.[4] The importance of Japan, albeit still marginal, in East Asian affairs was recognised for the first time.

1. see Pauncefote to Admiralty, FO 12 December 1883, no. 30 Le Poer Trench to Granville, Tokio 9 December 1883, Trench to Granville 14 December 1883 in BPP, China Diplomatic Affairs, vol. V.
2. Vice Admiral Willes to Secretary to Admiralty, Hong Kong 25 December 1883, inclosure in Admiralty to Pauncefote, 2 February 1884, BPP China Diplomatic Affairs, vol. V.
3. Trench to Granville, 25 January 1884, BPP. China, Diplomatic Affairs, vol. V.
4. Plunkett to Granville, 26 April 1884, BPP China, Diplomatic Affairs, vol. V.

France's desultory war with China continued through the spring and summer of 1884 with its occasional battles and numerous negotiations. The Japanese press kept a close eye on these and indeed on one occasion the Jiji Shinpo commented that the war might well be beneficial for China and prove by the force of arms that she must modernise.[1]

Then in September 1884 Sienkiewicz received a call from Itagaki and Goto. This visit deserves some attention. Itagaki had gone to France after the official announcement in 1881 that a Constitution would be promulgated in 1889. He had for some time claimed that the inspiration of his political philosophy came from France, notably from the works of Rousseau more concretely, the Social Contract. During his stay in France he apparently studied seriously, and in the course of his stay he had met Clemenceau and Victor Hugo. He returned to Japan laden with numerous works in English, French and German, including those of Spencer, Accolas and Hugo. He distributed them to his associates and suggested that they be translated.

His trip to Europe had included stops in Hong Kong, Saigon Singapore, Ceylon and Aden. During his visits in the European colonies he was struck by the difference between the principles upheld in Europe and the principles, or lack of them which Europeans demonstrated in their Asian colonies. England was the defender of liberty at home, but in Hong Kong was she not the

1. found in CP vol. XXX, Sienkiencz to Ministry, 1 May 1884

destroyer of liberty ? Similarly did Frenchmen extend 'liberty, equality, fraternity' to the Indo-chinese ? Itagaki noted that in Saigon the French had appropriated for themselves the most fertile part of the land.

He noticed in Europe that most people tended to group all Orientals together and seemed to believe that the further East one moved from Turkey, the more barbarian society became. This, felt Itagaki, obviously affected the question of treaty revision; in the first place because Europeans still considered Japan a barbaric country and secondly because they feared that were they to revise the treaties with Japan, they would have to revise all treaties with countries east of Suez. In order to achieve treaty revision, Itagaki believed that two steps were necessary; the first to carry out reforms to produce a first class modern government and secondly greatly to enlarge the military programme. He was convinced that if Japan could win one major naval battle, she would inevitably be recognised as a great power, and the treaties would be instantly revised.

Affairs in Itagaki's party, the Jiyuto, however, were going badly. There was a radical split between two opposing factions; and in October 1880 the party was officially dissolved. Before this, however, during the summer two Korean refugees, opponents to the pro-Chinese Korean monarchy, came to Japan and approached Fukuzawa Yukichi for help, who in turn introduced them to Goto Shojiro. Goto approached Itagaki and it is then that

Itagaki decided to get in touch with the French legation.[1]

Before the meeting between Sienkiewicz and Itagaki and Goto, it seems that Itagaki sent Sienkiewicz a memorandum in French on Korean affairs; Sienkiewicz claimed it was illegible. In any case the meeting took place on 9 September and lasted three hours. According to Sienkiewicz,

> 'The project of MM. Itagaki and Goto can be summarised in a few words: - Japan, having missed the occasion which presented itself in 1873 to dominate Korea, Chinese influence has not ceased to extend more and more over the country. The actual king of Korea and some of his ministers are hostile to China, but they lack strength. They should be provided with the necessary resources to purchase arms and set up a small army corps. France which has the same interests as Japan would provide the necessary funds (a million dollars) and at the same time would take in hand the total organisation of Korea. Such in general is the project.'[2]

A second interview took place between Itagaki, Goto and Sienkiewicz.[3] Sienkiewicz was instructed not to follow up the Itagaki-Goto proposal in any definite way, but not to lose all contact.[4]

Itagaki's initiative is indeed bizarre. It is not clear what he hoped to accomplish. This incident, with other, in Itagaki's

1. for the above four paragraphs on Itagaki a number of sources have been used, all to be found in the bibliography at the end, but special attention has been paid to C.E. Cody's unpublished thesis presented to the University of Washington, 'A Study of the Career of Itagaki Taisuke (1837-1919), A Leader of the Democratic Movement in Japan,' chapters 7 and 8
2. CP vol. XXX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 15 September 1884
3. CP vol. XXX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 27 September 1884
4. CP vol, XXX, Ministry to Sienkiewicz, 14 November 1884

career, fortifies the impression that he was more prone to spontaneous action, motivated by opportunism, than to reflection. It appears that he told Goto that he would introduce himself to the French legation on the pretext of having been introduced to Clemenceau.[1] Yet to use Clemenceau's name in favour of a military alliance in an area of the world where, according to Clemenceau, France should not be engaged in military operations is indeed paradoxical.

Meanwhile in October 1884 the Nichi Nichi Shinbun was reporting that France was committing atrocities in the war against China. The reason for this cruel behaviour, the Nichi Nichi alleged, was that the Chinese, being of an Oriental race, were considered inferior. In view of the fact that Europeans consider red Japan even more inferior than China, 'If we were in the place of China at war with France, we would be treated in an even more cruel fashion. Therefore, instead of laughing at what is happening to China, we should pity her; and think of what could happen to us one day'.[2]

If the press was reporting that Frenchmen in China were committing atrocities, the returned Japanese observers, Ikeda and Koizumé, were apparently giving lectures saying that French

1. Cody, op. cit. p. 188
2. The Nichi Nichi Shinbun of 24 October 1884 found in CP vol. XXX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 23 October 1884

military operations in South East Asia were militarily speaking very poor and that in any case the French army was not very effective.[1]

In the winter of 1884 matters became complicated in two ways. In the first place, France's naval and military operations in China came to include a naval blockade of Formosa. This the Japanese viewed with alarm. In December, however, a Sino-Japanese crisis loomed as a result of a coup carried out in Seoul. The details of the second Korean crisis need not detain us here[2], except to note that in the events that followed China and Japan were to come very close to war, with the matter being settled finally by negotiation between Ito and Li Hung Chang in March of 1885, in the so-called Li-Ito Convention.

But for a few months it seemed as though Japan and China might indeed come to blows, and so speculation on a Franco-Japanese alliance increased. The 2ème Bureau, the intelligence section of the Army, prepared a lengthy and very detailed document on the forces Japan had at its disposal and the contributions she could make to France in the event of an alliance.

1. CP vol. XXX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 20 November 1884
2. see H. Conroy, op. cit., chap. III, The First Korean Crisis is that of 1873.

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The document analysed the recent Japanese-Chinese relations over Korea and raised the question of war between the two. Japan alone did not stand a chance.

> 'The problem changes, however, if one is talking in terms of a war that China would have to sustain at the same time against Japan and another power. In the present circumstances of the France-Chinese conflicts, if a rupture were to take place between China and Japan as a result of affairs in Korea, a common entente of France and Japan would procure to the two countries very great advantages and would assure them success. In the case of a common action against China, Japan would benefit from the support of the French fleet and the experience of our officers for the conduct of operations; France would find in the Japanese expeditionary Corps a powerful auxiliary, which would permit her to reduce her troops of reenforcement to send from Europe, and would also profit from the Japanese ports and would find all the necessary supplies in rations, coal, munitions of war, horses, etc... The isolated action of Japan against China would also be advantageous for France; but from the military point it is inadmissible.
>
> In summary, in case of an eventual war of Japan against China; Japan under the present circumstances cannot undertake alone a campaign against Pekin; France would obtain great advantages in a common entente with Japan, whatever the conditions of this entente; but Japan would have every interest in offering France an effective alliance for a common action.'[1]

Similarly, in Japan, at least in some quarters, the possibility of a Franco-Japanese alliance now seemed more appealing. The Choya Shinbun in January 1885 pointed out that Japan needed money and would be able to borrow it from France.

1. Army, 2ème Bureau, Japon: Organisation de l'Armée, Guerre Franco-Chinoise, 1881-1904, dossier 8, 22 December 1884.

The newspaper felt that 'if the two nations conclude an alliance, it will be advantageous to both, and we do not doubt that France would hasten to accept our offer; we would thereby achieve our aim, we would divide Formosa between us and the indemnity we would obtain from China.'[1] The Jiji Shinpo, however, insisted that an alliance with France would not reap any great benefit for Japan, but that France would simply use Japan to achieve her own ends.[2]

As to all this Sienkiewicz remained most unenthusiastic.[3] In a meeting with General Miura, Director of the Military School, after his return from France where he had met with General Campenon, Sienkiewicz admitted that Miura had told him that in his opinion Japan should take advantage of the present circumstances to unite herself with France in order to settle once and for all the difficulties between the two Empires. Miura, however, added that although Japan wanted this alliance, the other powers would intervene against it. Sienkiewicz added that he felt that Japan's best course was to remain neutral for the time being. Curiously enough he did go on to say that he believed a war between China and Japan was inevitable, but that China, already far stronger

1. Choya Shinbun, 9 January 1885, in CP vol. XXXI, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 13 January 1885. It should be noted that the editor of Choya Shinbun, Narushima Ryuhoku, had been a member of the pro-French party in the Bakufu - see I. Scheiner, Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan, p.195 ft.26. Scheiner's source is A. Altman's Ph.D, dissertation (Princeton University, 1965) "The Emergence of the Press in Meiji Japan".
2. Jiji Shinpo, 10 January 1885, in ibid
3. Sims, op.cit. p.132

than Japan, would continue its programme of military modernisation and that in a few years time China would wipe Japan off the face of the globe.[1]

The alliance never came to anything. Meanwhile the Japanese press continued to comment on France's indecisive action in China. On 28 March France suffered a heavy defeat from Chinese forces at Lang-son and two days later the Ferry government fell, the two incidents being directly linked. By the beginning of April the new government under Henri Brisson was seeking an end to the war by negotiations, officially completed on 19 April. The Jiji Shinpo in its edition of 20th April commented:-

> 'the Chinese government, quite calm in Peking, did not feel the blows by the enemy any more than an elephant would worry about the sting of a wasp. It is no doubt that which discouraged the French government and decided it to seek peace without an indemnity and without a new acquisition of territory. Who among us can help feeling regret at seeing France having to experience such a great sense of shame!... What a humiliation for her to have embarked on a course of conquest, which she did not have the strength to complete.'

The article concluded that the tricolore had lost its former brilliance in the Orient.[2] On the following day the Jiji Shinpo went on to say, 'This shameful peace treaty will ruin France's influence in the Orient and will make her the laughing-stock of the Occident.'[3]

1. CP vol. XXXI, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 5 February 1885
2. Jiji Shinpo, 20 April 1885, in Army 2eme Bureau..., dossier no. 7, Articles de la presse japonaise sur le traite franco-chinois
3. Jiji Shinpo, 21 April 1885, in ibid

In the end the Franco-Japanese alliance 'became nothing more than one of history's might-have-beens'.[1] There is evidence that, at least at the end of 1884, the French army would have welcomed such an alliance. Yet Sienkiewicz, exerted no effort to secure it. Had the more enthusiastic Viel Castel remained as head of legation, the result perhaps might have been different, but not necessarily very substantially different. As has been pointed out, the record of Sienkiewicz' nine predecessors, with the exception of de Geofroy, hardly pointed towards anything resembling a relationship that might have culminated eventually in the two sides taking up arms side by side. That at least some members of the French army took Japan more seriously than the diplomats seems certain; and indeed one can well understand the exasperation of the French army commander of Tonking, Jamont, when he wrote in the year following the Franco-Chinese war, 'The French are really too silly. That they should squabble over internal matters, so be it, but to confide diplomatic affairs to braggarts, to charlatans, who are changed every three months, that is too much.'[2] The point need not be stressed further; France's diplomats in Japan during the period 1868 to 1883 were simply not the sort of people, by training or disposition, who could have played a role in formenting relations between the two countries. From what one can judge from

1. Sims, op. cit., p.244
2. Chanoine, op. cit., p. 167/8

their official dispatches, they were aloof and blinded by racial and cultural prejudice. None of them really took Japan seriously; and that perhaps is their greatest indictment. It is a little ironical that ten years after the events we have been studying, an English Member of Parliament with considerable knowledge of the Far East, Henry Norman, could still raise the question of a Franco-Japanese alliance in these terms: 'Against France and Japan combined we should be helpless in the Far East, except at the cost of a great war upon which no British statesman would embark'.[1] Yet the year he wrote his book was the year France joined Germany and Russia in the Triple Intervention. The preceding year had seen the departure of Sienkiewicz, who spent longer in Japan than any other French head of mission.[2]

It is probably true that militarily speaking a Franco-Japanese alliance against China would have made sense. Japan, by concentrating her efforts in Korea and North China, and France, by continuing her operations in South China would have placed the Middle Kingdom in great difficulties because of the need to fight on two widely separated fronts. Had such an alliance materialised, however, the reaction of the other powers would have had to be taken into account. Britain could not have been pleased at the

1. H. Norman, The People and Politics of the Far East, p.400
2. for the rest of Sienkiewicz' career in Japan, see Sims, op. cit., p. 244-373

prospect of Japan and France cooperating in an area still considered to be essentially Britain's sphere of influence. Germany, although eager for France to expend her energy far away from the Rhine, would not have welcomed the renewed energy resulting from excessive success. And Russia, with the Trans-Siberian Railway in prospect, could not have contemplated a Franco-Japanese alliance without considerable apprehension.

To my mind, however, the alliance could never have developed in any case: or had it been conceived in any significant sense, I would suggest that its offspring would have been stillborn. Despite Itagaki's flamboyant overtures, Japan was ready neither militarily, nor politically, nor even psychologically, for an alliance with France, or any other country for that matter, against China. It is true that many Japanese intellectuals talked in terms of Japan's civilising mission in East Asia, seeing their country's role as that of the promoter of the "westernisation" of both China and Korea. The perhaps slightly schizophrenic Japanese attitude towards Asia was already manifesting itself, as in Fukuzawa Yukichi's concept of "Shedding Asia". But would the Japanese, whether in intellectual circles or in government, have welcomed as a means to carrying out this civilising enterprise the alliance of a European country against China ? It would, in the first place, have been an unprecedented step. Eventually Japan did fight a war against

China, but on its own. By the time the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been secured, it was useful to Japan not against another Oriental nation, but against Russia. The only real occasion in which Japan joined the other Western powers against China was in the allied suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and even then not without numerous hesitations.[1] If we remember that even during the course of the Franco-Prussian war the French minister, Outrey, nevertheless felt that appearances of Western solidarity against Japan had to be maintained, it is not unreasonable to suppose that similar sentiments were felt by the Japanese. This would be the case even more so when one remembers what China had been to Japan for centuries:

> 'the model or object of emulation of Japan throughout most of its history.
>
> From the eighteenth century, it is true, scholars of national learning had denigrated China, insisting on the mystical supremacy of the Land of the Gods; and the scholars of Dutch learning, in their enthusiasm for European civilization, frequently criticized the lack of a scientific spirit in China, contrasting the accuracy of the Dutch medical books with the fantasies recorded by theChinese anatomists, or the 'spiritually' evoked scenes of the Chinese painters with the realism of European depictions. Nevertheless, Chinese cultural influences remained exceedingly strong in nineteenth-century Japan.

1. see I. Nish, "Japan's Indecision During the Boxer Disturbances", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXV, p.213 -; B. Nicolaevsky, "Russia, Japan, and the Pan-Asiatic Movement to 1925," Journal of Asian Studies, vol. VIII, p. 259-; and G. Totten, "Review Article: Japanese Imperialism and Aggression: Reconsiderations", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXII, p. 469-

> The Meiji Restoration, though ushering in an era of uncritical imitation of Western things, did not fundamentally alter the prestige of Chinese culture. The visits of the Emperor Meiji to Shinto shrines were recorded in classical Chinese on stone monuments, and the Confucian philosophy of the Tokugawa rulers, though modified, was not displaced by either a 'pure' Japanese or a Western system of thought.'[1]

Given Japan's reverential attitude towards China, to have joined any Western nation in military operations against China would necessarily have meant surmounting a psychological, indeed racial, hurdle of considerable magnitude.

As to France, Third Republic governments were weak. Indeed the Lang-son fiasco brought down the Ferry government. Could a weak government, pursuing a comparatively unpopular policy in the East, risk an alliance with a country like Japan ? To a certain extent this would depend on what sort of idea Frenchmen had of Japan. Needless to say Itagaki was quite right in saying that the majority of Frenchmen had no clear idea about Japan's geographical location and tended to believe that it was some sort of outgrowth of China. The picture of Japan in France was that of a beautiful, artistic country, with beautiful women, but not that of a growing military power.[2] Japan and Japanese themes were incorporated in the painting of the Impressionists,

1. D. Keene, Landscapes and Portraits: Appreciations of Japanese Culture, p. 259/60
2. see L. Schwarz, The imaginative interpretation of the Far East in Modern French Literature, 1800-1925

in some novels, poems and essays, and in music. Japan to those Frenchmen who knew about her was the country evoked in stories such as Judith Gautier's Le Dragon Imperial and Poèmś de la Libellule, Edouard Guimet's Promenades Japonaises and travelogue, Tokio-Nikko, d'Hervilly's La Belle Sainara, Aimé Hubert's Le Japon Illustré, A. Laurié's Autour d'un Lycée Japonais, O. Metra's Yedda, Legende Japonaise, Saint-Saens' operetta La Princesse Jaune. All the themes contained in these were to be encountered in Pierre Loti's very popular Madame Chrysanthème, which appeared two years after the end of the Franco-Chinese war. If anything it tended to confirm, existing prejudices.

Consuls

Consuls, individually or collectively, were not an important factor in determining Franco-Japanese relations or French influence in Japan. The role of these men was, in the sense of overall policy, completely negligible, in terms of daily routine, however, their role was essential. In the first place the consul can best be described as a factotum: as shall be seen shortly, the things he was called upon to do and the services he had to render were wide and varied. Secondly, the consul could be described as a lubricant; a consul was expected to perform services in order to facilitate transactions between France and Japan. The major raison d'être of a consul, however, was to be responsible to the French (and French protégé) community in his jurisdiction. This included such obligations as issuing passports, presiding over marriages, registering births, deaths, and, of great importance in the treaty ports, administering justice in terms of the clauses of extraterritoriality and in accordance with the regulations of consular jurisdiction. Beyond that how much an individual consul did or did not do depended on his own

initiative and the size of his staff.[1]

In view of what has been said on France's diplomatic interest in Japan (chapter 4), it is perhaps not surprising to find that the Quai was not very generous with its consuls -- the corps consulaire and corps diplomatique were both under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a memorandum in September of 1869, it was pointed out that 'our consular service in Japan is totally insufficient or, to be more precise, does not exist.' The memorandum further commented that whereas Great Britain, the United States, Prussia, Italy and the Netherlands had consuls or vice-consuls in Yokohama, Hiogo, Nagasaki, Hakodate and Osaka, France did not have a single consul appointed by official decree in any of the treaty ports. The memorandum urged the immediate creation of a consular post at Yokohama and made a request for three student interpreters, the latter being particularly important in view of 'the very considerable advantages offered in the big commercial houses to Europeans who know the Japanese language.'[2]

1. Vice-consuls, who will also be dealt with under this chapter, notably those of Nagasaki and Hakodate, had, apart from the question of rank, roughly the same duties as consuls, but not that of consular jurisdiction, which only a consul could administer.
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, "Note pour la Direction des Fonds", 9 September 1869, from Direction des Consulats et Affaires Commerciales

The question of interpreters is one that has been commented on on a number of occasions in the Thesis. An interesting initiative on the part of an honorary vice-consul (i.e. not an official appointed by decree) at Nagasaki, the medical doctor Dury, deserves mention. Dury was writing in April 1868, by which time he had already been residing in Nagasaki for some seven years. He was most sanguine in respect of the commercial future of Japan and urged that far more French merchants should come. In giving a somewhat detailed report on the trade and general condition of Nagasaki, he concluded by complaining of the lack of interpreters France had at her disposal in Japan: he added that French commerce was suffering accordingly. He urged that young Frenchmen be encouraged to come to Japan, and he proposed a four year course consisting of both language and business studies: 'after a few years, what powerful, practical auxiliaries for French commerce.' He added, for the sake of parents of these youths, that he would lodge them and look after them and that 'the great distance should not worry them, it no longer makes any difference today with these splendid ships of the Messageries...'[1]

His recommendations from Nagasaki having had no effect, he none the less did not lose heart. Finding himself in Paris in

1. CC-Nagasaki, Dury to Ministry, 14 April 1868

November of the same year, he again wrote to the Quai on the importance of interpreters. Dury had already founded a school for Japanese at Nagasaki, and had taken two of his best pupils, one aged 19, the other 15, with him to France, leaving them at a boarding school of Les Frères de la Doctrine Chrétienne at Marseilles. Furthermore, and while in France, on his own initiative he intended returning to Japan with two French youths, brothers, named Jean and Adolphe Hensel, 23 and 17 years of age respectively, both of whom could already speak English and German; the brothers, he added, were from a rich family whose parents would be covering all expenses. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to discover what became of these two young men.[1]

Requests for increased consular representation (throughout the period 1870-1885, France had only one consul, in Yokohama, with occasionally a vice-consul in Kobe, otherwise French interests were looked after by consuls of 'friendly' powers, usually British), and for more interpreters and more money for administering the consulate form a constant <u>leitmotiv</u> in the consular correspondence, not to mention the frequent complaints that consular correspondence remained unanswered in Paris.[2]

1. CC-Nagasaki, Dury to Ministry, Paris, 4 November 1868. The consular reports from Nagasaki end with a dispatch from Dury the following day, only to begin again in 1892 with the appointment of a M. Haneacker as vice-consul.
2. see, for example, CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau-Ministry, 1 August 1870, 9 September 1871, 30 April 1872; CC-Kobe, Jouslain-Ministry, ? August 1879 (no precise date given)

In July 1884 the consul at Yokohama, Lalande, brought to the Ministry's attention the growing importance of Kobe as a rival to Yokohama in terms of trade, and he supported a petition by the French residents of that city demanding consular representation[1] (there had only been a brief period of approximately eight months, in 1879, when France had a vice-consul in Kobe). In August of the following year, Lalande again made this request adding that there was a need for consular representation in Nagasaki and Hakodate as well as Kobe.[2]

Thus, by the end of our period, we find, not surprisingly, that the consular situation was very similar to the diplomatic. The turnover, however, was somewhat less. In Yokohama there were five consuls and one consular director ad interim in the period 1870-1885. The other treaty-ports were almost totally neglected.

When the French consuls and vice-consuls urged greater consular representation the inference was that more consuls and vice-consuls would mean more commerce. In other words, had there been more consuls, would more French merchants have come to Japan ?

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. III, Lalande to Ministry, 3 July 1884
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. III, Lalande to Ministry, 17 August 1885

This must remain a matter of speculation, though one is permitted to doubt whether increased consular representation alone would have made much difference. The problem of getting French merchants off to the Far East (as seen briefly in chapters 1 and 3) was more complicated than that. It is interesting to note in passing, however, that on some occasions at least, the consuls do not seem to have enjoyed the support of their compatriots. For example, the consul Jouslain complained in August 1883 that he was constantly being criticised by the French community and that only one resident-merchant, a M. Reynaud, was prepared to cooperate with the consulate and the legation in regard to commercial matters.[1]

Given the inadequacy of French consular representation in Japan, an investigation into their activities is nevertheless interesting, not in terms of the 'presence of France' in Japan, but as providing a more detailed picture of Frenchmen in Japan: in view of the fragmentary nature of the material, however, the picture is somewhat incomplete. Apart from the paper work (issuing passports, certificates and licenses of all sorts and keeping records) and the finances of the consulate -- which probably took up most of the consuls' time -- their activities can roughly be divided into two categories: commercial and personal.

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain-Ministry, 10 August 1883

Naturally, consuls, like diplomats, were expected to have French commercial interests at heart. Thus, Colleau, the first consul in Yokohama by decree, visited the Chambers of Commerce of Roubaix and Lyons before leaving for Japan.[1] In the course of our period, however, consular dispatches add very little to the general picture of Franco-Japanese trade. One finds some mention of Italian competition in the silk trade and some criticism of Italian methods.[2] The problem of fraud on the part of Japanese traders in silk is raised on one occasion.[3] And from time to time consuls complain that the Messageries boats are always late, an annoying situation, especially when compared to the punctuality of the P & O.[4] No annual report on the navigation of the port of Yokohama appears, however, until 1882.[5] On the question of silk, most of the reports deal with very short-term issues, simply indicating in which months the silk is appearing on the Yokohama market, together with a few comments on quality and prices.[6] In all this, however, there is far less material than what is to be

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, Paris 25 April 1870
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 13 July and 10 September 1872 and Plichon to Ministry, 25 August 1874
3. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 3 May 1872
4. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 13 July 1872, 14 January 1873, 31 January 1874
5. CC- Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 31 December 1882
6. see CC- Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 24 November 1871, 15 October 1872, 28 October 1872, 27 October 1873, 24 December 1873 and Plichon to Ministry, 26 October 1874

found in the commercial correspondence of Tokyo, where all commercial information was registered and collated, with comments on both short and long term provisions to be made, prognostics and so on. When occasionally consuls did comment on the general picture or future of Franco-Japanese trade, their observations tended to be fairly orthodox.

Thus, consul Colleau, commenting on the stagnating trade of 1873, remarked:

> I think we have made too many concessions to the Japanese government which takes advantage of them ... for the difficulties have become greater and greater with the authorities whose pretensions seem to know no limit. Encouraged both too much and too quickly, the Japanese believe themselves, with their so-called reforms, to have arrived at the level of the nations with which they are in relation and consequently claim to deal with them as one power with another. The changes that have taken place are only superficial, the essence has not changed, they still consider themselves very superior to Occidentals, whom they despise, as in the past, all the while seeking, with more or less intelligence, to take from them what they believe will be useful to their country.[1]

A familiar refrain, and an illustration that, not surprisingly, consuls were as much the victims of prejudice as their diplomatic compatriots. Colleau's successor as consul, Kraetzer, also made not unfamiliar accusations when attacking Japanese monopoly and government interference.[2]

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 28 July 1873
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Kraetzer to Ministry, 15 March and 4 December 1875

It is worth noticing that one pro-tempore vice-consul at Osaka, Lèques, in 1869, following a fairly lengthy commercial report on Osaka[1] and after having stressed the great potential of the Osaka market (given its population, its agglomeration of capital and financiers, and ready access to other centres, notably Kyoto, Sakai and Fushimi), concluded:

> one must especially take into consideration the fact that the Japanese are used to certain textiles, of certain sizes and at certain prices, and not to believe that in giving them better quality they will pay more. It is unfortunately our Utopia in France, we generally produce better quality, but consequently at dearer prices, but what happens? Let us compare our trade with that of England and that of Germany!!.

In fact he forecast a great future for German commerce in Osaka; which was especially worrying in view of the fact that both Germany and France were competing in the same market with the same type of goods, but Germany had the advantage because she was not only able to provide the goods, but could also meet Japanese demands in terms of quality, size and price[2].

Certainly a French vice-consul in Kobe (Kobe, rather than Osaka, became the main centre of foreign commerce of Western Japan) was able to note ten years later that there were far more German residents than French (54 to 12), twelve German firms to France's three, that only one of the French firms was

1. It must not be thought that these commercial reports on the treaty-ports are regular features. On the contrary they are quite exceptional, in our period one each appearing for Nagasaki, Osaka and Kobe, for the years 1867, 1868 and 1879 respectively. Hence one must again underline the necessarily fragmented picture that emerges.
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Leques to Ministry. 15 January 1869

directly importing French manufactures to Japan via Kobe, so that 'very much of our French merchandise is imported into Japan by foreign merchants of Hiogo-Kobe, notably by German firms.'[1]

The commercial information passed on by the consuls, even in respect to the trade at Yokohama, is fragmentary. The first detailed report for the foreign commerce of Yokohama appeared in July 1881, for the year 1880. This coincided with the arrival of the new consul, Jouslain; at the end of Jouslain's impressive document, he points out that the information contained within it was in fact furnished by de Bavier, head of the silk export firm of Bavier & Co, and also consul-general of Denmark and dean of the corps consulaire.[2] In the report of 1882, some idea of France's commercial standing in Yokohama in relation to the other powers can be seen from the following:

nationality	Residents	firms
Great Britain	1,098	106
United States	468	35
Germany	257	38
France (and protégés)	228	16
Russia	72	5
Portugal	60	0

1. CC-Kobe, Jouslain to Ministry, ? August 1879 (no precise date given)
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 27 July 1881; information for the report for 1881 (CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 6 May 1882) also had its information supplied by de Bavier.

Netherlands	45	5
Denmark	38	1
Switzerland	36	6
Italy	26	6
Austro-Hungary	21	4
Sweden	9	0
Belgium	8	0
Spain	6	0
China	3,545	230 [1]

(Note that the term 'firms' here can include anything from major import-export businesses to hotels, restaurants, hair-dressers or undertakers.)

Apart, however, from commercial reports, consuls did occasionally send to Paris reports on certain specific products or aspects of Japanese trade or the economy. We find reports on the growing Japanese tobacco industry and its exports[2], the availability of coal in the different treaty-ports[3], the export of fish oil from Hokkaido[4], the development of railways in the Japanese mainland[5] and in the island of Hokkaido[6] and finally on the creation of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, following the merger of Mitsubishi with Kyodo Unyu Kaisha.[7] The interest, let alone enthusiasm, which the consuls expected to find in Paris can be gauged from the fact that Jouslain, when vice-consul in Kobe, and following a report on the culture and export of Japanese tea, suggests he might send some samples and further notes, but he underlines that of course this would be at his own expense![8]

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 20 September 1883
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Kraetzer to Ministry, 20 May 1876
3. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Pierret to Ministry, 30 May 1879
4. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 8 September 1883
5. CC-Yokohama, vol. III, Lalande to Ministry, 25 July 1884
6. CC-Yokohama, vol. III, Lalande to Ministry, 15 December 1884
7. CC-Yokohama, vol. III, Lalande to Ministry, 9 October 1885
8. CC-Kobe, Jouslain to Ministry, August 1879

Both the"factotum"and "lubricant" characteristics of the consul, however, come to the fore in what can be termed his occasional services as 'go-between'. In 1874, for example, he had to help the agent of an arms manufacturing firm from France to settle questions following the bankruptcy of a Yokohama firm, Boern Co., to which it had shipped weapons.[1] In October 1875 the consul Kraetzer had to reply to an enquiry from Granier, Camoux & Fontaine: namely, whether it was true that Japanese sericulturists soaked their silkworm eggs in ice water for several days during the winter in order to fortify them. The answer was that such a practice took place only in the south, in the first few days of February, not in ice water but in water at normal outside temperature, and that in any event the practice was not recommended for France.[2] On another occasion the Ministry wrote to Kraetzer saying that the Minister of Finance desired to obtain several kilos of samples of the acorns of the different types of Japanese oak trees.[3]

The high-class glove manufacturers, Xavier Jouvin of Paris, had written directly to Kraetzer asking him to find a Yokohama firm prepared to act as agents for Jouvin in Japan; all firms approached by Kraetzer had declined, not surprisingly, according to Kraetzer, since the Japanese bought only cheap

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Ministry to Colleau, 12 March 1874
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Kraetzer to Ministry, 7 October 1875
3. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Ministry to Kraetzer, 29 July 1875

goods, being unable to afford luxury goods; hence there was no market for Jouvin gloves in this country.[1] More successful, however, was the request of Rigollot & Co. of Paris, who asked Kraetzer to find them a reputable Yokohama firm which would supply them with large quantities of vegetable glue. The business was accepted by E. Jubin & Co.[2] While the important Lyons firm of Louis Desgranet & Co was to be disappointed: they had written to consul Pierret asking whether direct links could not be established between the Japanese producers of silk and the consumption centres in France. Pierret explained that this was not feasible. In the first place, Japanese silk producers were too numerous and operated on too small a scale, on a day to day basis; secondly, the Japanese themselves were establishing agencies in Europe, for example, Okura Co. in London and Mitsui in Paris; both these organisations, however, were fronts for government operations, and the aim was to eliminate French importers.[3] On two occasions consul Jouslain sent samples of paper to Hachette & Co.[4] It also happened that the consul might be asked to arbitrate in disputes between firms in France and French firms in Yokohama.[5]

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Kraetzer to Ministry, 15 February 1876
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Kraetzer to Ministry, 18 December 1876
3. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Pierret to Ministry, 7 December 1877
4. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 28 July and 25 August, 1883
5. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Pierret to Ministry, 20 September and 18 November 1878

Consuls also occasionally sent to the Ministry publications on Japan, including of course commercial reports, but not excluding more erudite works, such as grammars and dictionaries.[1] In 1879 the archeologist Hinagawa Noritani entrusted Pierret with the shipment of old Japanese pottery to the Musée de la manufacture Nationale de Sèvres.[2] Jouslain, while serving as vice-consul in Kobe, had sent a report on the higher commercial school of that city; he had also met the prefect, Morioka Masazumi, who had expressed 'his desire to improve his school by borrowing from analogous schools in France that which might appear to him useful and assimilable'.[3] The consuls were also entrusted with looking after the French scientific missions in Japan and with responsibility for the shipment home of the fruits of their research. There was a substantial number of scientific missions. In 1883 there were six; two from the Ministry of Public Instruction, and one each from the Natural History Museum, the Academy of Medicine, the Beaux Arts, and the Ministry of Agriculture, which was represented by a specialist of viticulture, a certain M. Degron.[4]

Of all the sundry services rendered by consuls in Japan,

1. see CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 31 January 1883 and vol. III, Lalande to Ministry, 15 January 1885
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Pierret to Ministry, 14 October 1879
3. CC- Kobe, Jouslain to Ministry, 28 August 1879
4. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 31 May, 14 June and 20 August 1883

none perhaps can claim to have been as colourful as the story of the giant salamander. Jouslain had been entrusted with sending a live giant salamander to the Jardin des Plantes in Paris and in some detail explained to the Ministry the care he had had to take over packing and transport.[1] A few days later, however, he had to report the tragedy that the salamander had died en route between Yokohama and Hong Kong, probably as a result of shocks incurred during a storm. The corpse had been placed in spirits and would be sent on. It remained, however, to find another such specimen, which Jouslain was leaving in the hands of the Dutch scientist, Dr. Geerts; it was doubtful whether such a big and beautiful one could be easily found. In any case they would wait until February before sending it, a time when the seas are calmer.[2] Eventually not one, but two giant salamanders were sent.[3]

The major preoccupation of consuls, however, was people rather than goods. Again, however, the "factotum" feature must be stressed. The consul had to decide whether funds should be made available for the repatriation of bankrupt or destitute

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 10 September 1881
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 14 September 1881
3. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 28 July 1882 and 14 June 1883

Frenchmen.[1] The problem of shipwrecks -- what to do with the survivors and how to proceed with the burial of the dead -- was also an occasional consular nightmare.[2] Cholera, which frequently ravaged southern Japan in the early Meiji period, also gave work to the consuls in terms of enforcing sanitary regulations and at times imposing quarantine restrictions.[3] The marriages of Frenchmen could generally be dealt with by consuls as part of the general routine; at times, however, special considerations had to be taken into account, with certain difficulties arising. Such a case was that of DuBousquet (see p.345/6), who was acting at the time as advisor to the Japanese Government, but remained a French army officer. He wished to marry Miss Tanaka Hana. DuBousquet had to seek permission to marry from the Ministry of War and permission to be married at the consulate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The consul was able to inform the Quai that DuBousquet intended to resign his commission were his request to the Ministry of War turned down. The matter was complicated by the fact that DuBousquet had already two children by Miss Tanaka, to whom he was much attached and whose position he wanted to regularise.[4] The consul could also

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 15 October, 14 and 26 November 1870, 13 April 1871 and 5 January 1874. In 1881 a Société de Secours for unfortunate Frenchmen was set up by the Yokohama French community, see vol. III, Jouslain to Ministry, 15 February 1881
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 30 March and 14 April 1 874 and vol. III, Lalande to Ministry, 28 July and 9 August 1884
3. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 2 June and 9 November 1882
4. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Kraetzer to Ministry, 28 June 1875

recommend the awarding of the Legion d'Honneur.[1]

One of the prime functions of the consul in the treaty-ports, however, was to administer justice under the jurisdiction of his office recognised by the extraterritoriality clauses of the treaties. Also he had to report on cases of justice, for technical reasons falling not under his jurisdiction, but of relevance to Frenchmen or French interests. All these legal questions were frequent and demanded a great deal of paper work. In setting up the consulate in Yokohama in 1870, Colleau reported that not a week passed without some matter for litigation being submitted to the consulate.[2] Matters between Frenchmen, or between Frenchmen and Japanese, were comparatively straightforward, in that the question of jurisdiction did not arise: it was under French consular law that these matters had to be dealt with. In regard to the case of a Frenchman and a Japanese, one interesting episode merits brief mention.

A French navy deserter, Roslin d'Ivry by name, was accused of the homicide of a Japanese fisherman. According to Colleau, the Japanese government was very interested and wanted to know what punishment the criminal would receive.

> When it was pointed out to them that it was impossible to accede to such a demand, they answered, but the foreigners do so with us, why should we not do the same. After several days they finally understood that the foreigners

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Kraetzer to Ministry, 6 November 1876
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 1 August 1870

> have laws which fix the penalty according to the crime, whereas this is not the case in Japan, where punishment is administered in a most arbitrary manner.[1]

In fact Roslin d'Ivry was fined 6,500 francs by the court, a sum which he was to give the deceased's family. As a naval deserter, Roslin d'Ivry, not surprisingly, did not have this not inconsiderable sum with him. The consul, however, assured the Ministry that he was from a rich family, that the parents should be made to pay. He urged that the family should do so quickly as the Japanese government was taking a great interest in the matter.[2] Within a period of nine months the family had been found and the money paid. Colleau was certain that the moral impact of all this on the Japanese government and people would be very beneficial to the future of Franco-Japanese relations.[3]

As was pointed out in chapter 4 the mechanism of consular jurisdiction was complicated, especially where several different nationals were involved. This was often the case. For example in April 1875 a French bank was robbed of 60,000 Mexican dollars by the bank's accountant and chief clerk; but the former was Italian and the latter British. Thus although the harm had been done to a French firm on Japanese soil, in theory the Italian and British consular courts would deal with the matter. In the event the two committed suicide when apprehended.[4]

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. I. Colleau to Ministry, 9 November 1871
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 23 November 1871
3. CC-Yckohama, vol. I, Colleau to Ministry, 14 August 1872
4. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Kraetzer to Ministry, 20 April 1875

Very frequent in the treaty-ports — it was one of the greatest sources of consular headaches — were brawls between sailors of different nationalities, very often resulting in deaths.[1] One such brawl which raised countless problems of consular jurisdiction was between Manilan seamen (hence protégés of Spain) and French sailors; but the dead included one German and one British. This led to long memoranda from one consul to another and a final settlement where everyone seems to have been left unsatisfied.[2]

What is very surprising is that the consuls, responsible for administering justice under this cumbersome system, hardly ever commented on it. Nor did they as a rule comment on the matter of treaty revision. An important exception is Jouslain, who sent a lengthy report on the workings of consular jurisdiction in Yokohama; but here he deals entirely with small matters of legal detail and not with the broader problems of consular jurisdiction. In the same dispatch he includes a statistical table of matters having come before the consular court for Yokohama during the 1870s. It reveals the following:

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. I, Pierret to Ministry, 10 June 1877, 26 February 1879, 12 and 25 March 1879
2. CPC, Lahande to Ministry, 5 and 19 October 1884

Civil and Commercial matters:

year	cases between Frenchmen	cases between Frenchmen and other nationals (including Japanese)
1870	8	3
1871	16	15
1872	8	7
1873	9	5
1874	7	11
1875	8	5
1876	9	5
1877	6	3
1878	7	2
1879	10	10

Criminal affairs

Felonies: 1 in 1871 and 1 in 1875

Misdemeanours:

1870	1
1872	1
1877	2
1879	1

Of these, two were acquitted and three were sentenced to fines.[1]

Finally, the consuls were required to keep registers of the individual members of the community under their jurisdiction. Had these been anywhere near complete, an interesting picture of Frenchmen in the treaty-ports could have emerged. Again, however, given the very fragmentary nature of the material, only occasional glimpses appear, shapshots rather than documentaries.

Thus, for example, of the resident foreign population of

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 6 July 1881 Unfortunately no such figures are available for the 1880s

Nagasaki in 1868, we learn that there were 19 Frenchmen, compared with 20 Americans, 18 Prussians and other Germans, 2 Russians, 95 British, 22 Dutch, 4 Portuguese and 3 Swiss; we learn of the commercial activities of Frenchmen, mainly in the export-import trade but including a very prosperous baker by the name of Conort; and we learn that 'the French residing in Nagasaki are in situations which honour France. There is not a single café or tavern run by a Frenchman.'[1]

In Kobe in 1879 out of a total of 837 foreigners, of whom 60 were women and 62 children (which in itself gives some idea of the male-dominated societies which were the treaty-ports of Meiji Japan), there were only 12 Frenchmen, including 3 women, and 2 French protégés (a Turkish couple, Mr. and Mrs. G. Yanni, who had a shop selling general merchandise). There were three French import-export firms, but only one, Hecht Lilienthal, was of any commercial significance, while another Roulez, dealt exclusively in curios. There was a couple called Reymond, who ran an hotel; the baker, Conort, had moved from Nagasaki and settled in Kobe; a husband-wife-daughter-son-in-law (the last an Italian) team ran a restaurant. There were also of course missionaries and nuns.

1. CC-Nagasaki, Dury to Ministry, 14 April 1868
2. CC-Kobe, Jouslain to Ministry, ? Ausust 1879

In regard to Yokohama, perhaps one of the more noticeable facts is that the population of resident Frenchmen remained roughly the same. With 175 in 1871, the highest point seems to have been reached in 1876 with 244[1] and in 1883 slightly down again to 228[2]. From among the Frenchmen in Yokohama in 1882 there were: one painter, (the gifted Georges Bigot, whose drawings of Japanese life have achieved a certain lasting fame), three cooks, ten missionaries, one medical doctor, one employee of the Grand Hotel and one hairdresser.[3]

With the outbreak of war between France and China, and especially following the blockade of Formosa, the consul Lalande had to make arrangement for hospitalising wounded French soldiers.[4] But it was also at the time of the Franco-Chinese war that Lalande once again urged his Ministry to establish more consulates in Japan. He noted the importance not only of Kobe, but also of Nagasaki. A consular agent at the present moment of warfare would be most useful.

> It would become indispensable, however, the day when the Government of the Republic decides to annex to our colonial domain that magnificent possession: the island of Formosa.[5]

Although the consuls played small roles, this did not, it seems, prevent them from occasionally having rather grand designs.

1. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 6 July 1881
2. CC-Yokohama, vol. II, Jouslain to Ministry, 20 September 1883
3. CC-Yokohama, vol. III Jouslain to Ministry, 2 January 1 882
4. CC-Yokohama, vol. III, Lalande to Ministry, 11 March 1885
5. CPC, Lalande to Ministry, 5 December 1884

Part II

Chapter 5

Charles de Montblanc.[1]

De Montblanc was French, born in Paris on 12 May 1833. His father and mother were also French, but shortly after Charles' birth, they inherited the chateau of Ingelmunster in Western Flanders. Both Charles' brothers, Alberic and Ernest, were born in Belgium and opted for Belgian nationality; one was to become a Belgian senator, the other provincial councillor. Charles' titles, therefore, were Comte des Cantons de Montblanc, Baron d'Ingelmunster.

De Montblanc was wealthy and in his youth led the carefree life of the upper classes of his day. His interests as a young man were history, geography, languages, travel and the arts. His main field of study was oceanography. De Montblanc never officially married, though his amorous adventures became legendary[2]; he appeared in a novel, entitled Furansu O-masa,

1. I am very grateful to Mrs. M. de Langalerie-Robin, great grand-niece of Charles de Montblanc, for the information she kindly supplied me with on de Montblanc's life. She herself wrote an article, entitled, "Charles de Montblanc et la Restauration de Meiji" in Nichifutsu Bunka, no.24, p. 43-67
2. One of de Montblanc's nieces, then aged 97, confided to Mrs. de Langalerie-Robin that de Montblanc had secretly married one of the Shimazu princesses and that they had a son, who died however aged 12.

by Muramatsu Shofu, as a handsome Frenchman enjoying great success with women.

He travelled a great deal and at the age of twenty-four found himself in the Philippines. It was here that he first heard of Commodore Perry's visit and decided to visit Japan. How, when and why he came to Japan remains something of a mystery. It is alleged that he was on one of the four ships accompanying the Gros mission, ostensibly in charge of a scientific mission.[1] If so there is no official record either of his presence on board ship, or of his scientific mission or of the date of his arrival. What is known is that he left Japan in the autumn of 1861 (to return in 1867).[2]

Whether or not he was aboard one of the ships accompanying Gros, he clearly spent some time in Japan. For the numerous works he was to write between 1865 and 1868 attest to a considerable knowledge of Japanese political institutions, social mores and religious beliefs, which could not have been picked up second hand. During this first stay he resided at Nagasaki, but travelled in Kyushu and apparently visited

1. de Langalerie-Robin, op. cit., p. 43
2. CP vol. IV, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 16 October 1861

Kagoshima.[1] He studied Japanese with apparently significant success.[2] When time came for him to leave he insisted on taking with him his faithful man-servant and companion, Saito Kenjiro.[3] Saito, however, was stopped by the police and accused on two counts; the first of trying to leave the country and, second, of wearing a European suit of clothes. De Bellecourt pleaded, successfully, in favour of Saito, and so he was allowed to leave for Europe with de Montblanc.[4] He was one of the first Japanese to go to Europe at the time. Virtually nothing is known about Saito. Six years later, in 1867, he was still with de Montblanc in Europe and it may be that Saito was de Montblanc's instructor in Japanese affairs, including the language, and was perhaps the occasional translator of documents, and mentor on Japanese culture in general. This could account for the fairly detailed and, on the whole, accurate knowledge of Japan de Montblanc displayed in his works. De Montblanc never published anything about his own experiences in Japan, he never mentioned

1. personal correspondence of de Montblanc, quoted in de Langalerie-Robin, p.44
2. de Bassompierre, "Charles de Montblanc et la Restauration Japonaises de 1868, in Revue Generale Belge, 1953, p.4. De Bassompierre was Minister, head of the Belgian Legation in Tokyo, in the 1920s. He used a variety of sources for his article on Montblanc, including apparently archives in the Belgian Embassy in Tokyo, but also relied on conversations he had with Shibusawa Eiichi, who had known de Montblanc personally.
3. de Langalerie-Robin, p.46
4. CP vol. IV, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 10 October 1861.

any of his Japanese friends including Saito, by name,

De Montblanc's first book on Japan appeared in 1865. In this work, Le Japon, he complained that in Europe little attention was paid to Japan, and yet events in that country were of considerable interest from every point of view.[1] What made the whole problem of Japan of particular interest was that it was not a people 'lost in Oriental immobility, but a young, active, intelligent and courageous nation, which alone among those far-away countries presents elements for a future capable of a great destiny.'[2] The Japanese were determined to acquire knowledge and improve themselves; and they would not reject anyone who could help them in their desire to progress: "They have abuses to correct and cruelties to soften, but if they know how to take advantage of the new occidental element, which has dawned in their civilisation, they will find, in this new element, a powerful lever at the disposal of intelligent action."[3] De Montblanc well understood the origins of the Mikado[4], explained in some detail the various social classes in Japan, insisting that they were not castes, and that social mobility

1. C. de Montblanc, Le Japon, p.1.
2. ibid, p.3
3. ibid, p. 83/4
4. ibid, p. 17ff

existed to a certain degree[1]. He dwelt on the origins of Shinto, the relationship of Shinto to Buddhism and indeed the position of the Mikado in Japan in religious terms.[2] De Montblanc's knowledge of Japan was uncontestably advanced by Western standards of the time. Not many Western sources, indeed, would have been available to him. Of interest also is his faith in the future greatness of Japan, an unhesitating faith unique among Westerners at the time.

More convential, however, was his assessment of the future of the country and of the political situation of Japan as it affected foreigners. He did not, it is true, accept the belief then current in the West that in Japan there were two emperors, one spiritual, one temporal. He understood the origins of both Emperor and Shogun and he correctly explained their relative positions in the Japanese state.[3] He came down very strongly on the side of the Shogun and explained that those members of his government hostile to the West were people who represent anti-foreign sentiments in Japan, imposed on the Shogun by others, and not of his choosing.[4] When he was writing his book the ill-fated

1. ibid, p. 18ff
2. ibid, p. 18-25
3. ibid, p. 26
4. ibid, p. 6

Ikeda mission had returned to Japan and was disgraced. De Montblanc explained that this - 'is by no means condemnation of the Occidental alliance by the Shogun, but simply a proof that the Mikado and his policy have powerful followers, who, every day, will have to weaken in front of a frank union between the Western powers with the Shogun of Japan'.[1] He divided Japan into two camps: on one side was the Shogun, the spirit of innovation, and popular sympathies for Europe; on the other were the feudal forces intent on defending the old order by lining up behind the Mikado.[2] The Ikeda mission, de Montblanc assured his readers, was no vain endeavour, for in seeing the superiority of the West, the shogunal side would understand that it must assimilate all the forces of civilisation of the West in order to emerge as the triumphant party in Japan.[3]

As to the role of the West in the developments taking place in Japan, de Montblanc advocated in strong terms a policy of patience and understanding. He admitted that according to strict interpretation of the treaties, Japan was not fulfilling all her obligations, especially in regard to the opening of the ports. However, he reminded his readers of the circumstances in which Japan was opened, that the threat of the use of force only

1. ibid,
2. ibid, p. 11
3. ibid, p. 15/6

resulted in the opening of the doors in 1854, and that the wisest policy at present was to allow developments to take a natural course, without attempting to precipitate them.[1] He admitted that the Bakufu was weak, but assured his readers of its honesty and good intentions.[2] He again stressed the need for a policy of friendly persuasion on the part of the Western powers, emphasising that they must resort to force only in collaboration with the Shogun; the side of the Shogunate, he claimed would always be the side where the interests of Europe would be best served.[3] A policy of force on the part of the Western powers would result in all the Japanese uniting against the West and so this must be avoided at all costs. He concluded his book with these words:

> 'Sheltered by the shogunal alliance, the common interests will be brought closer together; commercial relations will bring industrial relations with the magnificent horizon of the mineral and agricultural riches of the country; two civilisations will then, across the immense seas and nations fallen asleep, be able to give each other a hand in full confidence and lend each other mutual help in the development of their societies.'[4]

De Montblanc's first work on Japan has received some attention essentially for one reason. As I pointed out above although

1. ibid., p. 97/8
2. ibid., p. 99
3. ibid., p. 100
4. ibid., p. 103. De Montblanc was keenly aware of the potential of the silk trade in Japan and referred to it in all his works. On Japan's mineral resources, he was a bit over-optimistic, alleging among other things that Japan was very rich in precious metals, including gold.

de Montblanc's confidence in Japan was never to be shaken, and although he remained a friend of the country, his political attitudes were to change drastically by the time of the publication of his next book, published in 1866, (although originally given as a lecture to the general assembly of the Société de Géographie in December of 1865). His first work on Japan, which we have just discussed, was to be his longest, comprising over a hundred pages. The others were either published lectures or articles for various reviews. Many of the themes elaborated in the first are repeated in the others, notably Japan's economic potential, the religious aspect, the social classes, in brief, everything was the same, with the important exception of the political message they contained, although he never recommended the West to adopt anything but a policy of peaceful persuasion vis à vis Japan.

The following hypothesis is suggested in regard to de Montblanc's publications. It seems that he returned to France laden with notes taken in the course of his first stay in Japan. With the help of his companion, Saito Kenjiro, he worked at his research and in time produced the work we have just looked at. This assumption would mean that the work took some time before completion, in all between two and three years, from the time of

his return to Europe to the publication of the book. Then in 1865 something happened. In the next three years he was able to continue drawing on the background study he had given of Japan and simply needed to alter the political direction. He could still say, as he had from the beginning, that Japan was a country with a great destiny, but substitute the new imperial forces for the Shogunate as the enlightened leaders of the new Japan. But why did he change sides ?

It has been suggested that at the time Shibata visited France with Roches' letters of introduction, de Montblanc offered his services and that these were refused[1] probably because Shibata had access to far higher personages, including the Ministers of War and the Navy.[2] There is a possibility that de Montblanc was upset at this rebuff by a shogunal official and thus turned his attention to the other camp. The occasion did present itself for making contact with Satsuma; for, in the same year that Shibata was buying arms for the Bakufu, a Satsuma delegation headed by Godai Tomoatsu was also in Europe, on a mission concerned with

1. de Longalerie-Robin, op. cit., p. 52
2. CP vol. XIII, Ministry to Roches, 26 September 1865

study and trade.[1] A further possibility, is that Godai and de Montblanc had known each other prior to Godai's trip to Europe. Godai and de Montblanc did reach an agreement which resulted in the forming of a joint Satsuma-Belgian company. It could be that during their time together in 1865, Godai acquainted de Montblanc with the changes that had occured in Japan since de Montblanc's departure four years earlier. After all the policy of Satsuma had radically changed during these four years. The very existence of the Satsuma delegation in Europe was a proof that this was so. De Montblanc could then have had a genuine change of heart and come to believe that the future of Japan and her good relations with the West no longer lay with the weak Bakufu, but with the progressive camp of men like Godai. A less generous interpretation might be that de Montblanc's support for the anti-Tokugawa line was the condition under which he would be allowed to become broker of Belgo-Satsuma trade. In any case this Godai-de Montblanc meeting bore fruit. Montblanc apparently suggested on this occasion that Satsuma should consider having a pavilion at the Paris Exposition two years later.[2]

1. See Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 244-249 on how the Satsuma European trip marked an important departure in Satsuma politics, both vis à vis the Bakufu and the West.
2. de Langalerie-Robin, op. cit., p.52

An examination of de Montblanc's new political message is of interest. It should be noted that throughout his subsequent works, as already indicated, he continued to refer in general terms to the new society that was dawning in Japan and to the great destiny to which the Japanese were called. On the question of the treaties, de Montblanc in December 1865 was explaining that the European powers enjoyed relations with only the part of Japan which happened to be governed by the Shogun. The Shogun was not the temporal emperor of Japan, but simply a prince, a temporary deputy of the Mikado. He argued that Japan did not form an empire under a central government, but was a feudal confederation under the Mikado. The Shogun, therefore, was incapable of extending western relations to other parts of Japan, as he had no authority on those parts, his juridisdiction being limited to his own territory. The shogunal government was unstable and seeking to strengthen its position. When the Shogun saw that the western powers were treating his government as the government of all Japan, he decided to use his position vis à vis the West as a means of weakening and overpowering his enemies. The Shogun, de Montblanc assured his audience, was the prime cause of the very superficial, indeed very bad, relations which had come to prevail between Japan and the West. The Shogunate was

responsible for raising the spectre of the terrible consequences that would follow for the West were the daimyo party to gain the ascendancy. While the Shogun, therefore, was doing all in his power to prevent the proper fruition of Japanese-Western relations, by claiming the exclusive right to manage these relations and setting up monopolies of trade, the daimyo were genuinely friendly to the West and as proof of this were sending missions and students abroad in order to broaden relations with the European powers and to learn more from the West.[1]

De Montblanc's exposé of the political reality in Japan - the new version which he put forward following his dealings with Godai - will be examined later. That he now fervently adopted the anti-Bakufu line can be seen, among other things, by a significant lack of impartiality in the importance he attached to daimyo attitudes and the West by contrast with those of the Bakufu. For one thing the daimyo were by no means alone in sending students to Europe; de Montblanc knew this as apparently at the time of Godai's visit, he had also met with Nishi Amane and Tsuda Masamichi.[2]

In a short entry on Japan in the Annuaire Encyclopedique de Montblanc further developed some of the themes broached in

1. C. de Montblanc, Considerations Générales Sur l'Etat Actuel du Japon
2. de Langalerie-Robin, op., cit., p.52

earlier works. He seems to have been genuinely concerned about the possibility of the West using force in Japan. This may have arisen from apparent Satsuma fears that France was contemplating joint action with the Bakufu.[1] Indeed if Satsuma genuinely believed that France might be contemplating such action, it was of great importance for them to have someone in France who would do everything in his power to prevent such action from taking place. Also if de Montblanc now genuinely believed in the righteousness of the anti-Bakufu cause with anything like the same degree of conviction he showed in his post-1865 works, it is understandable that he should dwell on this subject with some insistence.

In this article, therefore, he again stressed that Japan had much to offer the West, but that such benefits as might accrue could only be obtained by pursuing a peaceful policy. The Japanese, asserted de Montblanc, were extremely eager to develop ~~to~~ relations with the West, but the policy of the West itself had not always been helpful. The outrages against Westerners were at least partly motivated by Western provocation. The

1. according to Jansen this fear was indeed real and encouraged by Satow, whenever he felt that it was ebbing, see Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration, chap. VII

Portugese and Spanish in the seventeenth century were thrown out of Japan because of similar acts of provocation, argued de Montblanc, and because of excessive greed in their attitudes to Japan; they deserved what they got. As to the present, the situation had greatly improved with the ratification of the treaties by the Mikado. It was because the Western powers had only recognised the Shogun, that complications had arisen. There was only one emperor in Japan, namely the Mikado. The shogun was just another daimyo, temporarily appointed as the Mikado's deputy; but he could be disposed of at will. The reason why the Dutch had been confined to the island of Dejima for over two centuries and had been forbidden to visit other parts of Japan was simply because they too had succumbed to the error of only recognising the Shogun. The other fiefs of Japan could not have relations with the West as long as the Western powers linked the treaties to the Shogunate. The only course for the Western powers, declared de Montblanc, was to assure the Japanese that they had not come as conquerors intending to support a puppet and fraudulent régime, namely the Bakufu:

> 'It is impossible for us today to remain in the position we occupy in Japan. Action, therefore, is necessary, and the responsibility for these consequences will weigh on Europe, for Europe has the choice on the action which is to be produced. In this choice hesitation is not possible:

> we have to pronounce ourselves for legality [legitimacy], which is in our interest, as it is in the interest of Japan, or in favour of injustice and violence, in thwarting our interests and those of Japan'.[1]

These matters were to be pursued in two further works. In one of these de Montblanc stressed not only the commercial benefits of correct relations with Japan but also the opportunities of a better penetration of China by the West through Japan. He pointed out once again that the treaties were not treaties with the Empire of Japan but were limited to the territories of the Tokugawa shogunate. He then urged the Western powers to make treaties with the other fiefs just as they had done with one fief, namely the Tokugawa. The Shogunate was acting contrary to the Japanese political structure, namely the country's division in separate, equal and independent states. Were the West to enter an alliance with the Shogunate, it would inevitably lead to civil war and to Western military involvement in internal Japanese affairs.[2] In his last pre-Restoration work in Japan, he reiterated in greater detail his belief that Satsuma was the beacon of enlightment in Japan.[3]

1. C. de Montblanc, Le Japon en 1866
2. C. de Montblanc, Le Japon tel Qu'il Est.
3. C. de Montblanc, Le Japon, Ses Institutions, Ses Produits, Ses Relations Avec l'Europe.

De Montblanc's first book can be regarded as a scholarly work based on careful research. It reflects considerable knowledge of the history, customs, traditions, and political organisation of Japan. Yet the four works that were to follow this first study are undoubtedly tendentious. They are, indeed, little more than political tracts. As if forgetting what he wrote in his first book, de Montblanc makes the Shogun a bogey-figure, to be blamed for all the troubles that afflicted European-Japanese relations.

It is reasonable to believe ~~de Montblanc~~ - although hard evidence is lacking - that after his meeting with Godai in 1865, de Montblanc became Satsuma's French agent. Through de Montblanc Franco-Satsuma relations expanded to an extent which apparently 'made Satow question Satsuma's generally understood partiality for British views on Japan's domestic struggle.'[1] It is possible that Satsuma leaders were already displaying a characteristic which was to continue after the Meiji Restoration in an even more pronounced form, namely a determination not to depend exclusively on any one Western power. Further, we know that Satsuma wanted to limit the involvement of the Western powers in Japan's domestic struggles: it must NOT go beyond the supply of arms and expertise. Satsuma no doubt could not feel very comfortable about the prospect of people, either in Japan or the West,

1. C. Fox, Britain and Japan 1858-1883, p. 205

accepting the equations, Bakufu-France, Satsuma-Britain. It was important, therefore, to establish relations with other powers. Accordingly Satsuma visits to Europe in 1865 and later were not limited to Britain, but included Belgium, France and the United States. As official channels with France were closed because of Roches' uncompromising support of the Bakufu, unofficial channels would have to be found. There was all the more reason for some emphasis to be placed on relations with France, as France was the potential enemy of the anti-Tokugawa forces. For that reason Montblanc was approached; he represented Satsuma interests in Paris and Belgium and performed useful work of political propaganda. The spirit, if not the precise phraseology, of de Montblanc's four later works certainly gives the impression of having been inspired by some outside agency.

Further grounds for this suspicion may be found in the fact that there is a quite remarkable similarity with de Montblanc's views in the appreciation of the Japanese political scene to be found in another work of the same period, namely Ernest Satow's two contributions to the Japan Times of 16 March and 19 May 1866. Satow and de Montblanc could not have known each other in Japan, Satow having arrived the year after de Montblanc left. It is highly improbable that they corresponded. In all likelihood not

only did they not meet, they had probably never heard of each other until perhaps 1867, and in any case not before late 1866. Yet the comparison between de Montblanc's lecture at the Société de Géographie and Satow's articles reveals a remarkable identity of opinions between two Westerners, separated by thousands of miles, one in Europe, the other in Japan. Not only are the contents very similar, the very terms used are at times almost identical.

In de Montblanc's lecture he spoke of Japan as a feudal confederation and that once the West had recognised the Shogun as ruler of all Japan, the latter behaved as if this were indeed the case. Satow wrote:

> 'It must be borne in mind that the Tycoon, though claiming to conduct the government of Japan, is in reality, or was at the time when the first treaties were made, only the head of a Confederation of Princes, and to arrogate to himself the title of ruler in a country, of which only about half was subject to his jurisdiction, was a piece of extraordinary presumption on his part. It cannot, justly, be matter of wonder that the independent daimyo, already possessing many grounds for dissatisfaction with the Tycoon, should refuse their approval to measures in which they were not consulted. The natural consequence was a strongly manifested hostility on their part...'[1]

Satow also pointed out that the daimyo were now very keen to develop their relations with the West; but, like de Montblanc, he argued that there was one major impediment:

1. "Political Treatise by an Englishman", E.M. Satow, taken from Meiji Japan Through Contemporary Sources, p. 48/9

'So long, however, as we continue to have a treaty with the Tycoon only and not with Japan, this will never take place. At present the daimyo are not bound by the treaty, and have no interest in it whatsoever; they are only called on to acknowledge the existence of treaties with the Tycoon, and to abstain from obstructing their execution.

We gravely and seriously advocate a radical change. What we want is not a treaty with a single potentate, but one binding on and advantageous to every one in the country. We must give up the worn-out pretences of acknowledging the Tycoon to be sole ruler of Japan, and take into consideration the existence of the other co-ordinate powers. In other words we must supplement or replace our present treaties, by treaties with the Confederate daimyo of Japan.'[1]

Satow, like de Montblanc, argued that to enforce certain stipulations of the existing treaties, such as the opening of Hyogo, would lead to bloodshed: 'If we would avert such misfortunes, we must treat with the daimyo, for they are responsible rulers of the country equally with the Tycoon'.[2] Again like de Montblanc, Satow argued that the change he advocated would lessen the burden now placed on the Shogun, that the shogunate government itself would welcome such a move, and, again like de Montblanc, Satow argued that such a change would very much improve trading relations between Japan and the West.[3]

The important point in the writings of both Satow and de Montblanc, apart from the fact that both urged the same course of action, using the same arguments, is that both Satow and de Montblanc stressed in their works that Japan was a feudal

1. ibid, p. 50
2. ibid, p. 51
3. ibid, p. 53 and 60

confederation, or in the words of Satow a Confederation of Princes. It will be seen that in the words of both foreigners the emphasis is on the daimyo not necessarily on the Mikado. Montblanc declared: 'In fact Japan does not form an empire under a unique government. It is a feudal confederation having at its head the Teneshi or Mikado, around whom the great sovereign princes of their territories are grouped.' He was not advocating that the West should simply substitute Mikado for Shogun in its treaties and policy. He made the point even clearer in the following: 'These daimyo princes enjoy total sovereignty over their states. They have their army, their navy, their finances, their administration, their justice.'[1]

Satow explained the position in even more concrete terms:

> 'That the treaties at present in force are not destined to be permanent every one is by this time convinced. We HAVE lately seen the Tycoon acknowledge by his action that without the sanction of the Mikado they would never be carried out or be recognesed by the daimyo, and from this men have naturally and reasonably concluded the Mikado to be superior. A notion, however, has arisen out of this that a treaty with the Mikado would be a good thing. No doubt to a treaty made with the daimyo, the sanction of the titular Emperor would be necessary, or at least desirable, but he could not enter into a treaty himself, for he would be unable to enforce its observance.'

1. C. de Montblanc, Considerations Generales..., p.9

This passage certainly does not reflect the views of the more ardent Sonno militants, obviously it recognises the Mikado as head of Japan, but head of a confederation of daimyo , not much more than primus inter pares. Satow explained that what the Western powers should seek is 'the substitution of a more equitable and comprehensive convention with the Mikado and the Confederated daimyo of Japan...'[1] This emphasis by both men on the confederation argument owed a great deal to Satsuma influence. When the Satsuma delegation was touring Europe, 'the officials... inspected factories and military establishments, organised the purchase of weapons and machinery, and even engaged in diplomatic discussions with the governments of Britain and France. Indeed, they behaved almost as if their domain was an independent state, arranging among other things for the inclusion of a separate Satsuma exhibit at the Paris Exposition of 1867'.[2] According to de Montblanc's brother, Alberic, when Charles returned to Japan in October 1867 and landed in Nagasaki Satsuma officials were waiting for him, as it was Satsuma who had asked him to return. 'These officials told him that his pamphlet on Japan had been translated into Japanese and that it had been decided that it formulated so clearly the issue of the times that that

1. Satow in Meiji Japan Through..., p.51 and 53
2. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 247

formula had been adopted by the partisans of legality as it distinctly and entirely posed the question, and they thanked him for the support which he had shown for the legal order.' Later, according to his brother, de Montblanc was received in princely fashion by the daimyo of Satsuma, who, among other things, gave de Montblanc his sword which is still to be found at the chateau of Engelmunster.[1]

Less than a month after his arrival in Japan de Montblanc received the following letter written in French by a certain Komura Soshi:

> 'I am writing to you this letter in order to be represented among the first whom you will see running towards you and crying: Victory ! The preparations have been long, but the programme has been faithfully followed according to the legal base, revealed in your writings and sustained by your actions. The Japanese confederation under the presidency (sic) of His Majesty the Mikado is today free of all illusion. ... His Majesty the Mikado will convoke all the daimyo to Kyoto in order to form a sovereign chamber. This chamber will have to pronounce on all questions of general interest. The problem of the foreigners is accepted in the name of the Mikado on the basis already existing in the states of Kwanto. The foreign alliance will be extended to the other states and be formulated according to a more liberal base. His Majesty the Mikado will have the resolutions of the federal chamber made known by decrees and proclamations...'[2]

1. Quoted from Bassompierre, op. cit p.5.
2. taken from M. Courant, "Les Clans Japonais Sous Les Tokugawa" in Conferences Faites au Musée Guimet, no. 15, 25 March 1903, p. 76/7

So Satow and de Montblanc were not reflecting the sonno movement as it was understood by those who advocated the imperial cause. The two foreigners expressed the views of the federalists, whose number came chiefly from Satsuma and who wanted 'to maintain the feudal organisation, to simplify it simply by putting into the hands of the Emperor all the powers which had been in the hands of the Shogun, to make of Japan a federal empire.'[1] To E. H. Norman the federal movement was to lead eventually to Saigo's rebellion in 1877:

> 'his [Saigo's] policy can be interpreted partly as a crystallization of the samurai discontent and partly as a typical feudal particularist movement in which loyalty to the clan clashed with loyalty to the central government. It is interesting to note that Shimazu of Satsuma always felt suspicion and hostility toward his retainer Okubo, the staunch advocate of centralized government, and regarded with benevolence the old fashioned loyalty to his other retainer, Saigo. What Saigo and his lord Shimazu expected from the Restoration was probably a federation of clans under the aegis of the Emperor with Satsuma as the center of gravity.'[2]

I would suggest that de Montblanc was to Satsuma, what Roches was to the Bakufu. As the Bakufu had sought out Roches in the first instance, Satsuma discovered de Montblanc and either by persuasion or remuneration converted him to their cause. As

1. Courant, op. cit., p. 76
2. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, p. 89, fn 98

with Roches this does not mean that the initiative always came from the Japanese side; it is possible, for example, that it was indeed de Montblanc who first suggested that Satsuma be represented at the Paris Exposition and that Satsuma agreed because this was very much in keeping with its new policy of extending relations with the West and gaining recognition. As for de Montblanc's pamphlets, it was probably useful for the anti-Bakufu forces to be able to translate works of sympathetic foreigners, such as de Montblanc and Satow, to show to the pro-Western Japanese that the action the anti-Bakufu movement was advocating met with Western approval.

Perhaps de Montblanc's greatest service to Satsuma, in terms of gaining international recognition, was securing Satsuma's representation at the Universal Paris Exposition.[1] We have seen that in the course of the Godai mission to Europe in 1865, it was decided that Satsuma would be represented at the Paris Exposition of 1867. Roches on his side invited the

1. In the French pavilion at the Osaka Expo of 1970 there was a section devoted to Montblanc and entitled, "Le Comte de Montblanc et la Première Participation Japonaise à Une Exposition Universelle." Among the Montblanc memento were: a portrait of Charles de Montblanc; the armorial bearings of the Montblanc family; a plate emblazoned with the de Montblanc arms offered by Satsuma in gratitude for services rendered at the Exposition; the sword of Prince Shimazu bearing his arms offered to Montblanc on his return to Japan in October 1867; an autograph manuscript of de Montblanc's of 16 October 1866, beginning with the words, "Japan forms a confederation of states..."; exercise sheets used by de Montblanc in studying his Kanji; etc... see Exposition Universelle d'Osaka 1970, Section Francaise, Rencontres Franco-Japonaises, p. 14 to 16

Shogunal government to participate and suggested to the Shogun that one of his relatives might well go as Japanese representative.[1] The choice was Prince Minbu of Mito, the Shogun's brother, who sailed off with his retinue in early 1867, arriving in April in Marseilles, where they were met by Fleury-Herard and a 21 gun salute. Minbu was received by Napoleon III;

> 'Beginning with this introduction Prince Minbu's status as a royal visitor to France became widely known. Invitations from Emperor Napoleon III to theatre parties and from high Government officials to brilliant balls followed one after another. The Prince and his party were dazzled and intoxicated by the magic of the material civilization.'[2]

Despite the princely reception of the Shogun's brother and the numerous official functions to which he and his suite were invited, they were to be presented with a very serious problem in the shape of a rival Japanese delegation. At the beginning of 1867 Satsuma's second mission arrived in Europe, this time as representatives of the Kingdom of the Ryukyu islands, to participate in the International Exposition. Montblanc was waiting for the Satsuma delegation, headed by Iwashita Masahira, in Marseilles in February. Iwashita carried with him a letter of credentials

1. K. Obata, An Interpretation of the Life of Viscount Shibusawa, p. 37 and CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 24 December 1866
2. Obata, op. cit., p. 45

establishing his plenipotentiary powers, an official letter making de Montblanc Commisioner General of the Satsuma-Ryukyu pavilion at the Exposition and a letter from his sovereign to the King of the Belgians. De Montblanc then wrote to Baron Lambermont, secretary general of the Exposition, informing him of the arrival of the mission. Baron Lambermont replied that the envoy of the King of the Ryukyu islands could be assured of a warm welcome.

The French government, however, finding itself faced with two Japanese delegations and following protestations lodged by Mukayama, chief guardian of Prince Minbu[1], asked the two sides to get together and solve their problems by negotiation. De Montblanc, as Satsuma-Ryukyu representative, met Tanabe, Bakufu representative. It was decided that a conference would be held at the house of Jean de Lesseps, who was supposed to be acting as Commissioner General for the Japanese pavilion. Those present were Iwashita, Montblanc and Matsudaira on the Satsuma side, Lesseps, Tanabe and his interpreter Yamanouchi on the Tokugawa side. Fleury-Herard was not present claiming that it was Sunday and therefore not a working day. A certain Donnat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was arbitrator.

1. CP. vol. XV, Ministry to Roches, 18 May 1867

Montblanc argued that Satsuma had every right to have a pavilion distinct from that of the Shogunate. Finally, however, a compromise was reached, but a compromise which very much favoured Satsuma. There would be a single Japanese pavilion, but one on which the Satsuma armorial bearings would figure side by side with those of the Tokugawa, and would have the same dimensions. Thus there was one pavilion, with two distinct sections, and a recognition of equality between Satsuma and Tokugawa. Needless to say the Bakufu was furious with the compromise that had been reached; Tanabe was recalled, and, it seems, was thrown into prison for some time.[1]

It is difficult to understand why Tanabe gave in so easily. Several factors no doubt contributed to this diplomatic defeat for the Bakufu. Fleury-Herard's absence on such a crucial occasion is difficult to understand. The Shogunate representatives must also have been very surprised not to see the French governmen. take action in their favour, in view of the very close links between Roches and the Bakufu. De Lesseps must have been a minor figure in the discussions, not having any knowledge or interest in Japan; he was the son of Ferdinand de Lesseps, and Roches probably suggested de Lesseps simply because of the prestige he thought his name would lend to the Japanese (i.e. Shogunal) pavilion. If the discussion was mainly

1. Bassompierre, op. cit., p.7 and de Langalerie-Robin, op. cit., p. 51-55

between Montblanc and Tanabe, as is likely, and in French, as seems certain, since the French Foreign Ministry arbitrator designate could not understand Japanese, de Montblanc definitely had a very great advantage over his opponent. The significance of the Paris Exposition saga cannot be underestimated. Satsuma had been recognised in international eyes as co-equal with the Tokugawa shogunate; Prince Shimazu had every reason to be grateful to de Montblanc; through him Satsuma had gained international recognition and respectability.

Indeed the French press was quick to perceive the significance of the arrangements made at the Japanese pavilion. For La Liberte of 26 April 1867 this arrangement was 'irrefutable proof that the Tenkun is not Emperor of Japan, but simply, as the Taishu of Satsuma and the other Kokushu daimyo, an independent prince, sovereign only in his estates, the equal and not the superior of the other daimyo.'[1] In La France of 1 May, Mermet de Cachon, a very recent convert to the Satsuma cause, wrote an article in roughly the same terms and concluded by congratulating the daimyo of Satsuma for having taken the initiative; 'we have seen how he has affirmed and fortified at the Universal Exposition his rights

1. taken from C, de Montblanc, Le Japon, Ses Institutions..,p.38

as independent sovereign.'[1]

The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this question, opting for one of strict neutrality, deserves some attention. From the beginning of 1867 the Ministry received two memoranda on the Ryukyu islands and one note from Fleury-Herard refuting de Monthlanc's interpretationsof events in Japan, particularly his view of what constituted the legal order.[2] In May 1867 a note was drafted for the Ministry on what answer should be given to the Japanese plenipotentiaries on the subject of the Prince of Satsuma at the International Exposition. The

1. taken from ibid, p. 40. Mermet's conversation to a pro-Satsuma position is difficult to understand. It is known that he felt very disappointed and frustrated that the tutoring of Prince Minbu should be in the hands of the army, rather than his. (Cf. Army, Catalogue Général des Manuscripts, section (e)). This in itself, however, hardly seems sufficient cause for such a sudden change. The note for the Ministry says that Mermet should not be trusted as he contradicts himself often depending on where he sees his personal interest lying. (Mermet, it will be recalled was one of the first missionaries in Japan and at one time Roches' interpreter and principal of the French school at Yokohama.)
2. see H & D, vol. I, 1857, nos. (b), (c), and (g)

Tanabe-Montblanc conference had taken place in April; the fact that the note for the Ministry was written in May suggests that the Shogunal representatives probably attempted a rear-guard action to have the Tanabe-Montblanc compromise nullified.[1] The author of the memorandum suggested that it would be in the interest of France not to engage herself too deeply on the side of the Shogun as it appeared that he was on the point of being overthrown. His brother's visit to France, according to the memorandum, was aimed at obtaining moral support for the tottering régime. The author proposed that the Ministry simply wait until events took a more concrete form or that Roches provide it with further details. In the meantime the present arrangement was satisfactory in that France had told the Shogunal representatives that she did not recognise Satsuma as an independent principality and that its representatives had not been officially received.[2] It should also be remembered (from chapter 2) that it was at this time that the Ministry had written to Roches telling him formally not to become too involved in Japanese internal politics in case the Bakufu was overthrown, and adding that information the

1. We know that Mukayama protested; as the dispatch informing Roches of Mukayama's complaints is dated 18 May, (CP vol. XV, Ministry to Roches), it is probable that they were indeed made after the Tanabe-Montblanc conference which was held on Sunday, 21 April.
2. M & D. vol. I, May (no date) 1867, "note au sujet de la réponse à faire aux plenipotentiaires japonais au sujet du prince de Satsuma et de l'Exposition Universelle"

Ministry had gathered seemed to indicate that the consequences of a change of government would not necessarily be as catastrophic as Roches seemed to believe.[1]

Obviously the propaganda by de Montblanc was showing results. The Bakufu, understandably, was worried. It had decided in April that Kurimoto would eventually go to Europe to discuss various matters with the governments of the treaty powers.[2] With the news of Tanabe's disastrous failure, however, the matter took on greater urgency. Roches sent his Ministry a letter he had received from the Roju about the delegation of the Prince of Satsuma in Paris and its claim that the Prince was also King of the Ryukyus. The Roju stated categorically that Satsuma had no claims on the Ryukyus and that the daimyo had the right to send their products to the Exposition, but only through the official channels adopted by Bakufu officials. The roju also complained bitterly against those daimyo who were trying to establish relations with foreign powers. Finally it announced that a mission would soon be leaving for Europe to explain the true and legal order of the Japanese empire.[3] The Ministry met the Japanese delegation in October of 1867[4] and received early the following

1. see CP vol. XV, Ministry to Roches, 18 May 1867
2. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 16 April 1867
3. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 25 June and 12 July 1867
4. M & D vol. I 1867, (h), "Conférence avec Envoyés Japonais", 9 October 1867

year a memorandum written by Kurimoto and translated by Hermet de Cachon on the political situation in Japan; Kurimoto warned the French government not to be tricked by the tales of certain daimyo. In his turn Kurimoto produced a number of documents including one on the constitution of Japan in historical perspective, a history of the Ryukyu islands, and an explanation regarding the relations between Shogun and daimyo, namely that all daimyo, though owners of their fiefs, were vassals of the Shogun.[1]

Kurimoto's mission was not to be of much avail. In the meantime Montblanc was in Japan and causing further trouble for both the Bakufu and Roches. In September Roches heard of the arrival in Shanghai of a mission composed of French engineers and military instructors, recruited by the agents of the Prince of Satsuma and with the cooperation of de Montblanc. The Japanese government, it seems, was furious. Roches went to Osaka and entertained the Shogun aboard the French vessel La Guerrière and assured him that the French government had nothing to do with this mission.[2] By November the mission was in Kagoshima, and Roches learned that de Montblanc was to be in charge of the reorganisation of the army and navy of Satsuma.

1. [illegible] D vol. I, 1868 (b), "Note sur les Rapports du Japon avec les Pays Etrangers", by Kurimoto, translated by Hermet de Cachon
2. CP vol. XVm Roches to Ministry, 9 September 1867

He again assured the Takufu that this was a purely private undertaking, despite the fact that de Montblanc claimed that he not only had the approval, but also the encouragement, of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Roches told the Ministry that although de Montblanc was now in Nagasaki, there was a faction in the Satsuma camp that wanted nothing to do with de Montblanc or his mission.[1] Of course Roches probably felt particularly annoyed at having Frenchmen drill the "enemy"; in view of his own military mission which was training the Bakufu's army. De Montblanc's men were frauds, he claimed: 'Under the

1. What Roches says in regard to Montblanc not being popular with all Satsuma men is borne out by one or two sources. Beasley, in The Meiji Restoration, (p. 247) says that personal difficulties between Montblanc and Godai emerged following Godai's return to Japan in March 1866, i.e. after Satsuma's first mission. I.P. Hall, in Mori Arinori, states that Mori, Samejima, Yoshida, Hatekeyama and Matsumura sent a memorial to the Satsuma government on 10 July 1867 warning it that de Montblanc was not to be trusted (p.100). de Montblanc, however, seems to have enjoyed the confidence of Shimazu; after all Shimazu did give him his sword. De Montblanc, as we shall see, was asked to perform important services for the government after the Meiji Restoration, which must be due to his Satsuma contacts, as he had none with Choshu, and according to Bassompierre (op.cit.) in his conversation with Shibusawa about Montblanc, Satsuma men rarely failed to pay a visit to Ingelmunster when in Europe until de Montblanc's death in 1894. Crown Prince Hirohito, in June 1921, apparently mentioned de Montblanc specially in a toast he delivered when in Brussels (Bassompierre, op. cit., p. 12)

uniforms and titles of generals and colonels which he has liberally conferred on them, it is only too easy to recognise the non-commissioned officer and the foremen mecanics whom he has enrolled, and it is not without grief that I hear of the comments made on people, who, after all, I cannot forget are Frenchmen.'[1] The de Montblanc military mission was unable to achieve much as events in Kyoto and Osaka became far more important and their results more imminent than any long term reorganisation of the Satsuma army.[2] Indeed in early November, the Shogun tendered his resignation.

De Montblanc, who had apparently joined the Satsuma contigent at Kyoto,[3] was to provide services for Roches, who in turn recognised the value of these. In March 1868 - a time when Roches still believed that all was not lost for the shogunal cause, although he had begun to have doubts-he acknowledged the help he was getting from de Montblanc, whose information about the new government was particularly valuable, thanks to his 'intimate relations' with the men in power over part of Japan, and that due

1. Cf. vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 12 November 1867
2. E.L. Presseisen, Before Aggression. Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army, p. 15
3. On 10 November 1867, 'Montblanc left Nagasaki to join Prince Shimazu who had asked him to come to his side in the Kyoto region, where he was residing, in proximity of the imperial court. From that moment on, as military councilor, he was not to leave Shimazu's side until the restoration of the Emperor.' de Langalerie-Robin, op.cit., p.62

to the circumstances, he was 'able in his own way to serve the interest of France and thus maintain a certain amount of French influence, albeit unofficial, but which can be useful'.[1] Within a few weeks, however, Roches accepted the invitation of Prince Higashikuze to travel to Kyoto and to be introduced to the Emperor. Again Roches brought to his ministry's attention, in most complimentary language, the very helpful cooperation he had received from de Montblanc during his stay in Kyoto.[2]

Exactly what de Montblanc was engaged in from April 1868 to the autumn of 1869 is not absolutely clear. His brother maintained that he was of great service to the new government in many ways, including the translating of texts, and advice on various matters of state.[3] Whether or not this was the case, he does seem to have been involved in some commercial transactions with Godai and in collaboration with Glover. In any case in October 1869 Outrey told his Ministry that the Japanese Government desired Fleury-Herard to be relieved of his functions and to be replaced by de Montblanc who was to take on the duties

1. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 2 March 1868
2. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 1 April 1868; de Montblanc was to get an honourable mention from Roches on one more occasion, very shortly before the latter's departure from Japan, CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 29 May 1868
3. in Bassompierre, op.cit.,p.11/12

of Japanese chargé d'affaires. Outrey was not very enthusiastic. He said that Montblanc was intelligent and full of good intentions, but that regardless of what he might imagine, he would never really be able to enjoy the total confidence of the Japanese government; he would be representing neither the spirit, nor the ideas, nor the feelings of the Japanese.[1]

De Montblanc's activities for the new Japanese government in Paris were short-lived. On his return in the spring of 1870, he began by searching for an appropriate residence for the Japanese legation; and on behalf of the Japanese government he bought the former residence of Prince Antoine Bonaparte at 15 rue Leonie and 17 and 19 rue Chaptal.[2] That was about the only function he was able to carry out. The Franco-Prussian war broke out, though thanks to his position he was able to claim diplomatic immunity and thus avoided any molestation from the Prussians. By the following year he was replaced by the new and first Japanese head of legation, Samejima. Montblanc's activities after that were confined mainly to the academic sphere. He becamepresident of the Société Française d'Etudeqs Japonaises.

1. CP vol. XIX, Outrey to Ministry, 29 October 1869
see also M & D vol. I, 1869, (a), January 1869 "Note au Sujet de M. de Montblanc qui demande si le Gouvernement de l'Emperour serait disposé à l'admettre comme agent politique duø Mikado". and 1870 (a) "Note pour le ministre au Sujet de Montblanc".
2. de Langalerie-Robin, <u>op. cit., p. 65</u>

following de Rosny. In 1879 he translated into French extracts from the Kiu-o Dan wa.

In a sense there can be no doubt that Outrey was right in saying that Montblanc, a Frenchman, could not adequately represent the spirit, ideas or sentiments of the Japanese people. Nor is there any reason to suggest that he should have been. Throughout the last years of the Bakufu and into the early years of Meiji, it was clear that though the Japanese had decided to rely on Western help, they were nevertheless determined to manage their own affairs. There could be no place for de Montblanc as a Japanese diplomat; the very thought was absurd, unless his functions were restricted to a brief period of transition. De Montblanc's role in the drama that led up to the Restoration was, no doubt, negligible; as was that of all other foreigners, regarded as individuals. The most important legacy of de Montblanc must be his writings. Although the first book he published was his only scholarly work (with the exception of his translation of the Kiu-o Dan wa), the others, despite their political bias, also attest to a deep understanding and warm affection so far as Japan was concerned, and a remarkable prescience on the part of the author. His belief in the great future of Japan made him virtually unique in Europe at that time. His knowledge of the language and

customs of the country made him beyond question unique in France. The great pity seems to be that the French government should not have appreciated the talent they had at their disposal. The government failed to make use of de Montblanc in a positive way in order to ~~receive~~ SECURE stable and friendly relations with Japan. He had been listened to, had his books been carefully read and his predictions on Japan's future taken seriously, it is conceivable that France might have developed a far more intelligent policy in Japan, and by extension, in the whole of the Far East.

Chapter 6.

Jules Brunet and the Japanese Civil War of 1868-69

The Meiji Restoration is often cited as an example of a bloodless revolution. Indeed if compared with major upheavals in other countries -- such as the American war of Independence, the French, Russian or Chinese Revolutions -- the death toll in Japan was slight. Perhaps one of the most important factors here was the short time span of the Civil War. From the battles of Toba and Fushimi in late January 1868 to the surrender of Hakodate in the summer of 1869 only eighteen months had elapsed. Another reason might be that despite the fighting which was more or less continuous throughout 1868, at no time was the whole country up in arms. Again if one associates the guillotine with the French Revolution and thinks of the executions which followed the Russian and Chinese revolutions,in Japan in 1868 there were no political trials, the Tokugawa were neither hanged, nor beheaded, nor even requested to commit seppuku. On the contrary many anti-government (i.e. Meiji government) officers and bureaucrats were quickly reenlisted in the forces of the new government.

This having been said, it is possible that the armed conflict in Japan during 1868 and 1869 has been underestimated. Charles Sheldon in his study of the civil war states 'one can reach

conjectural totals of something like 10,000 dead and 12,000 wounded' and adds that, 'Perhaps the civil war should no longer be characterised as bloodless'.[1] It should also be noted that the conflict was not simply a question of a clash between the supporters of the old régime and those of the new.

Sheldon divides the antagonists between the buryoku tobaku-ha, the faction favouring bringing down the Bakufu by military force and the kōgi seitai-ha, the faction advocating a political structure based on consultation, consisting of an alignment of moderate and conservative forces.[2] As to the latter group,

> 'They felt that a moderate solution, along the lines of the Tosa Memorial, on the basis of which Yoshinobu had decided to resign as Shogun, and which had seemed certain of attainment earlier, had been overturned by what they considered the self-centred and megalomaniac actions of Satsuma and Choshu. They could see no disloyalty to the Emperor in insisting that the new dispensation be an effective, centralised alliance of domains under the Emperor. The monopoly of patriotism asserted by the Okubo clique [the buryoku tobaku-ha] raised resentments which long outlived the civil war.'[3]

The consequences of the civil war, needless to say, were of great importance. In the first place the 'moderate' faction lost; as a result Japan was ruled by more or less the same men almost uninterruptedly for the rest of the century, and indeed until the first world war. Feudalism was abolished and a tightly

1. C.D. Sheldon, "The Politics of the Civil War of 1868", in W.G. Beasley (ed.), Modern Japan: Aspects of History, Literature and Society, p. 48
2. ibid, p. 27
3. ibid, p. 50

knit centralised government, run by an oligarchy almost exclusively from the two former han of Satsuma and Choshu, pushed through its reforms and ruled in all matters, both civil and military. Sheldon further states that 'the challenges and opportunities offered to the government during the day-to-day hostilities created patterns which did much to determine the kind of central government which emerged, and the options open to that government.'[1] One of these patterns, Sheldon suggests, is that, 'Military men like Saigo and Yamagata strode to the centre of the stage during the war, and the necessary military emphasis in the first year of the new government left its stamp on modern Japan'.[2]

This short summary of some of the points brought out by Sheldon hardly does justice to his work, which covers far more ground. For our purposes in this chapter, however, only one more point raised by Sheldon, requires discussion:

> 'Okubo and other leaders, fully aware of the basic weakness and narrow base of the new government, took the war very seriously indeed. The nature of the war, in which both sides were striving to 'modernise', spurred on the search for new military and political methods and solutions, mostly suggested by Western experience, and the fear of foreign aid or intervention on behalf of the 'rebels', made this search all the more pressing.'[3]

For a number of Frenchmen did actively intervene, the most prominent of whom was Jules Brunet.

1. Ibid, p. 28
2. Ibid, p. 51
3. Ibid, p. 28

Roches, as we know, had also been instrumental in getting the French government to send to Japan a military mission to help reorganise the new Bakufu army. Roches' pro-Bakufu policy had been uncompromising all along, and it was feared in some quarters that France would come militarily to the rescue of the Bakufu. It was quite natural to suppose that the French army officers in Japan were close associates of Roches. In view of all this it could in fact seem to be a correct conjecture, as Otsuka Takematsu suggests, that Brunet had acted in accordance with Roches' policy and desires.[1] Was Brunet's activity and that of his French companions, part of a French plot to intervene in Japanese affairs in order to ensure continued French preponderent influence in Japan ?

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Jules Brunet was born in Belfort in 1838. He had studied at the Ecole Polytechnique and later at the Ecole d'Application at Metz. He had served for two years in the Mexican campaign, in which he had earned the légion d'honneur for his courage and devotion. He had come with the military mission as artillery-lieutenant, being promoted to Captain in the course of his stay in Japan. He was apparently very popular with his students and he developed a great attachment for Japan and, like many others,

1. Otsuka Takematsu, Bakumatsu Gaikoshi, p. 372. Otsuka does accept, however, that there was no link between Outrey and Brunet, p. 371

including de Montblanc, he discerned in the Japanese a great difference from the other Asiatic people, especially in the talent of the Japanese for learning quickly and efficiently.[1]

The military officers took their mission seriously. The Minister of War, Randon, had written to Captain Chanoine at the time of his appointment as head of mission, 'The object of this mission, as you know, is to provide, so far as the customs and degree of civilisation of the country permit, the cooperation of our administrative and military experience to the organisation and instruction of the Japanese army.' In the same letter of instructions to Chanoine, however, he warned the French officers not to become involved in internal politics.[2] The mission arrived in Japan early in 1867. In September of that year Chanoine was sent a letter from his opposite number in Egypt, Colonel Mirchier (head of the military mission in Cairo). Mirchier congratulated Chanoine on all the good work which, he had heard, the mission had already been able to accomplish. He added: 'Of course as you say the important point is the perseverance of this Government (i.e. the Bakufu) which alone can make your efforts efficient'.[3] The members of the mission

1. Nakahashi Kunitaro, O-Yattoxi Gaikokujin - Gunji, p.172
2. Minister of War, Randon, to Chanoine, 3 November, 1866 in Chanoine, Documents Pour Servir à l'Histoire des Relations entre la France et le Japon
3. Mirchier to Chanoine, 2 September 1867, in ibid.

greatly favoured the Shogunate in opposition to the anti-Bakufu forces. However, the instructions of the ministry, not to become involved, remained firm.

By the beginning of 1868 as Paris started hearing of the events in Japan, the letters from the Ministry to Chanoine counselled extreme prudence.[1] In one of these letters from Paris, Chanoine was as usual told to manoeuvre gently in these troubled waters; and the correspondent added that the replacement of Roches by Outrey should substantially improve things, as Roches was accused of having pursued his diplomacy in Japan very recklessly.[2] Later the Minister of War, Niel, in a letter to Chanoine, stressed that the important thing was to maintain French influence, regardless of which side emerged victorious in Japan. He told Chanoine that he must 'conserve a policy which will be important, not just in terms of French influence, but as you will understand, to the highest interests of civilisation.'[3] What exactly Niel meant by that he does not make clear. He probably feared that a Western policy opposing one side, were that side to be victorious, it might result in the

1. Colson to Chanoine, 4 February 1868, Niel to Chanoine, 11 February and 15 April 1868, in Chanoine, op. cit.
2. Estouvelles, chef du cabinet de la correspondance generale au cabinet du Ministre de la Guerre, to Chanoine, 18 March 1868, in Chanoine, op. cit.
3. Ministre of War, Niel, to Chanoine, 3 September 1868 in Chanoine, op. cit.

victors reverting to an anti-foreign policy, and hence to the detriment of civilisation in the Far East. In a word, then, the Ministry of War in Paris was by no means attached to a pro-Bakufu policy; Brunet's action can only be explained in terms of individual initiative.

When hostilities broke out in Japan, the military mission received orders inviting the members of the mission in no uncertain terms to obey strictly the regulations governing the conduct of neutral powers, as the Western powers in Japan had become. Chanoine and his personnel were told to go to Yokohama and stay there under the protection of the French fleet. The mission was told that any kind of military cooperation would be a breach of the terms of neutrality. They were also warned that 'any infraction of neutrality on the part of French subjects or protegés, could expose them to losing the protection of the Government of His Imperial Majesty and could deprive them of rights and privileges accorded to them by the Franco-Japanese treaty.'[1] In other words any Frenchman disobeying these orders risked losing the protection of French extra-territorial jurisdiction. The instructions regarding neutrality had been issued by Gustave Brin, chargé d'affairs while Roches was

1. Brin, chargé d'affaires ad interim, to Chanoine, 9 February 1868 in Chanoine, op. cit.

resting in Atami. On his return, however, Roches confirmed Brin's instructions both in respect of adhering to the regulations of neutrality and in having the military mission quartered in Yokohama.[1] It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that Brunet was acting neither with the encouragement nor the approval of Paris. Neither was he acting with the approval or encouragement of France's diplomats in Japan.

In May, 1868, however, Roches had warned Paris that the members of the military mission were strongly in favour of the former government and that 'the adherents of the Taikun who fervently hope for the triumph of their cause are still counting on the cooperation of our military mission.'[2] With the passage of time and after the one-day battle of Ueno in Edo had been fought and lost by the anti-new government forces, military activity moved to northern Japan. It will be remembered that the Satsuma-Choshu daimyo and their allies were refered to as the Princes, or simply men of the South. Now Japan's politics became geographically divided, with the anti-government forces referred to as the Princes of the North. In September 1868 the 'Princes of the North' issued a manifesto to the foreign representatives. Commenting on this manifesto, Outrey wrote that the new government was only listening to

1. Roches to Chanoine, 2 March 1868 in Chanoine, op. cit.
2. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 25 May 1868

Parkes and saw all other representatives as partisans of the old régime;

> 'But in regard to the men of the North, I am certain that they have very marked sympathies for everything which concerns France, and if the occasion presented itself, I think they would give us unequivocal proof of this. These tendencies certainly have existed for a long time. They go back to the time when Sir Harry Parkes, with his anxious and jealous spirit, began his incessant intrigues against the Shogunate; but today they are much more accentuated, and it would not take a great effort on our part for them to be openly manifested.'[1]

This is a rather curious dispatch from Outrey, given his generally negative, not to say exceedingly cautious, policy in Japan. In view of events which were to follow, one must assume that this dispatch was no more than it appeared to be, that it was simply an assessment of the situation as Outrey saw it, that it did not contain a hint that action on the part of France might be called for.

With the mission sequestred in Yokohama, however, it appears that contact with their former students had not ceased: 'everyday the officers and non-commissioned officers of the French mission were assailed with pleas on the part of their former troops who begged them not to abandon them in the moment of danger'. The officers of the mission were also very upset to have been told by the new government that their work in Japan was over and that

1. CP vol. XVII, Outrey to Ministry, 30 September 1868

they had to return to France.[1] By September the mission was on the eve of departure; however, they received a letter again inviting them to join the confederation of the North. Outrey knew that Brunet was strongly tempted to join in the action and he repeatedly warned him that any such project was insane. It would compromise the policy of reserve and circumspection which Outrey had tried to pursue since his arrival in Japan: The aim of this policy was to dissipate the suspicions aroused by the ardour with which Roches had supported the Shogunate.[2] However, Brunet managed to slip away from Outrey's attention on the occasion of a party at the Italian legation. Brunet announced that he had to visit Yokosuka in order to see Leonce Verny, director of the arsenal. But at Yokosuka he embarked on one of Enomoto's ships, which had been sent there for repairs. This happened on 2 October. [3]

By mid-November, following the decisive victory over Aizu and the capture of Wakamatsu castle by the Imperial Army under Saigo on 6 November, the various northern domains surrendered. Although some hostilities continued until January 1869 in the Tohoku district, fighting had, by and large, ceased on Honshu,

1. M & D, vol. III, "Historique de la conduite de M. Brunet," 11 October 1869
2. CP vol. XVII, Outrey to Ministry, 12 November 1868
3. E.L. Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army, p. 18

and attention was now focussed on Hokkaido(or Yeso as it was then called).[1] In a dispatch in mid-December, Outrey reported the capture of Hakodate by the Northern troops; Outrey stated that this event had 'for us, acquired an extremely serious situation, if, as is pretty well certain, the expedition was commanded by French officers.'[2] In fact, although at one time the French contingent in Hokkaido amounted to ten men, Brunet was throughout the only officer.

Outrey was greatly embarassed by this state of affairs. In February 1869 the Enomoto government approached Outrey and Parkes, explaining that they wanted to set up an independent republic in Hokkaido. They had no desire to continue war with the Tokyo government. They simply wanted to be left alone. Parkes and Outrey were asked to act as arbitrators; but both refused and opted for a policy of non-intervention.[3] Outrey also believed that certain acts of aggression committed against Frenchmen in May 1869 were Japanese expressions of revenge for Brunet's activities in the North.[4] His policy throughout this incident was as far as possible to disassociate France officially from Brunet.

1. Sheldon, op. cit., p.48
2. CP vol. XVII, Outrey to Ministry, 16 December 1868
3. CP vol. XVIII, Outrey to Ministry, 12 February 1869
4. CP vol. XVIII, Outrey to Ministry, 8 May 1869

Meanwhile in Hakkaido Brunet seems to have harboured great ambitions and, indeed, illusions, as a result of the active help he was giving Emomoto. It appears that Brunet wrote a number of letters to Chanoine. I have only been able to find one of these. The Brunet affair receives very little mention in Chanoine's book and it has not been possible to find very much in the archives of the Ministry of War. Fortunately a section of the third volume of Mémoires et Documents in the Quai d'Orsay archives is entirely devoted to the Brunet affair and his French accomplices. Although even that section is far from extensive, it does contain a few letters and memoranda which are revealing and permit some reconstruction of Brunet's ambitions in Hokkaido and of the degree of support he enjoyed.

One of the most interesting and revealing documents in this archive is a letter from Brunet to Chanoine in late March 1869, namely after a period of approximately four months out of the nine which he spent in Hokkaido(from October 1868 to July 1869).

In this letter Brunet recounts the brilliant military success culminating in the taking of Hakodate and Matsumae. He repeats the claims of Enomoto's government to the foreign representatives that all that is desired is to be allowed to colonise Hokkaido and live there in peace. He also mentions the approach by the Enomoto government to the French and British representatives asking for Anglo-French arbitration. Brunet

claims that Outrey 'has wisely chosen to maintain his role, in officially disapproving of my conduct, but fundamentally it was inadmissible for him not to recognise the possibility, slight as it may have been, of advantages to come, of the considerable magnitude for France.' (Underlining as in original text).

On the Japanese participating in the Hokkaido adventure

> 'of all the people working for us actually in Yezo, there are 3,000 combatants, all the others being employed in the civil administration and internal surveillance of the very numerous peasants. Of these 3,000 combatants, half are direct students of the French military mission; the rest, recruited among the Tokugawa volunteers, have been formed according to our methods with the help of these same students.'

He asserts that for them it is the men of the south who are the 'implacable ennemy'. The Shogun had refused to have anything to do with the Enomoto cause and his followers; Brunet was bitter about this and exclaimed, 'Oh, if this ninny of a Shogun had only understood us better.' One of the interesting features of this letter is the extent to which Brunet obviously identified himself with the Hokkaido group, for throughout his letter he never wrote in terms of 'them', but of 'us'.

After giving some details on the eight Frenchmen who had joined him (four of the non-commissioned officers of the mission, two ensigns from the Navy having abandoned ship to join Brunet,

a certain Clateau having come from Hong Kong and a certain Pradier, formerly non-commissioned officer with the zouaves, what the last two were doing in Japan is not clear, presumably they were mercenaries operating in the Far East), he described the military installations in Hakodate and the secondary base of Matsumae, and he stressed repeatedly how important he himself has been in the realisation of such a success in Hokkaido. Brunet is happy:

> 'I assure you that my heart is overflowing with joy at the moment I am writing to you; I feel that this French nucleus which you have left me is hardening under my hands*: I feel that I am liked, that my entourage is liked, that our dear France is liked; that our chief the Emperor Napoleon is venerated and his name is spread abroad as that of a protector in whom one can place one's hopes. You can imagine how easy French propaganda is for me among the 400,000 bourgeois (sic) and peasants inhabiting my (sic) island; I am all powerful; I am obeyed on a sign, my acts always being in accordance with my words. But these 400,000 individuals are in constant contact with the rest of Nippon; the worst that can happen to me is to have to spend another six months or a year in Yezo, preaching my doctrines of French civilisation and from here having them infiltrate into Nippon.'

Apart from foreseeing an immediate future of six months to a year converting Japan to French civilisation via Hokkaido, Brunet claimed to be confident that his mission would meet with unadulterate

N.B. Brunet's letter is at times fairly hard to understand. It is a very long letter, but in all probability written hastily. The construction of it is difficult to follow and in some instances certain passages obscure.

* 'je sens que ce noyau français que vous m'avez laissé se durçit sous mes mains' does not mean any more than the attempt at translating it above; literally 'noyau' means the stone of a fruit; what I imagine Brunet means here is that the Japanese army officers trained by Chanoine and his men from the nucleus of France's succeeding in making them even more committed to

France.

success.

He predicted that the Imperial armies could be defeated, that a peace settlement would follow, and that then all would work together to develop Japan along the path of civilisation under France's tutelage. The entire country, he asserted, was in determined opposition to Satsuma; so that apart from the 10,000 men he felt he would soon have at his disposal, success would be guaranteed, as there was bound to be in the near future a general uprising against Satsuma and in sympathy with the Hokkaido group.[1]

With the benefit of hindsight Brunet can be fairly readily dismissed as a rather pompous crank. His opinion of his role in Hokkaido (he added in his letter that neither Enomoto nor Matsudaira Taro ever took a decision without having first consulted him and that in Hokkaido he was in charge of everything) was clearly greatly exaggerated, though perhaps not without some value. According to Presseisen,

> 'Enomoto had occupied the city of Hakodate... and with the aid of Brunet fortified the area. Frenchmen trained troops, surveyed the city and the coast, and did their best to strengthen the defence establishments. Their pay was very modest: 250 ichibugin (about 83 dollars) a month.'[2]

But it is only fair to consider Brunet's activities in Hokkaido, ~~sust~~ in the context of his time. He was a young (just over 30)

1. H & D vol. Brunet to Chanoine, 28 March 1869, from Matsumae
2. Presseisen, op. cit., p.19

and supposedly brilliant and courageous officer. Indeed his Hokkaido escapade was not to hinder his career, culminating with his appointment as a general.[1] Although Brunet had not acted with the approval of the French Ministry of War, he had gone against the spirit of its instructions to Chanoine. But he had not directly disobeyed superior orders. He had in all likelihood acted with Chanoine's approval, if not outright encouragement.[2] Acts of individual initiative by French officers in non-European countries were not necessarily exceptional. Brunet could well have believed that the French army might decide to follow his lead. Although it is unlikely that Napoleon III's name was venerated, and although it is unclear whether Enomoto himself believed or hoped that France might come to the rescue,

1. Brunet was not, contrary to what is sometimes believed, court-martialled anddischarged from the army (e.g. Presseisen, op. cit., p. 21); after returning from Hokkaido he fought in the Franco-Prussian war, was made prisoner, released and participated in the crushing of the Commune; afterwards he was ordinance officer for the Ministry of the war in 1871, and served as military attaché in both Austria and Italy. In 1891, at the age of 53, he was made general. Although his career cannot be described as 'spectular', it was not an undistinguished one. see Dictionnaire de biographie française, vol. VII, Paris 1959
2. I would agree with Presseisen's view that 'There is little doubt that Chanoine knew beforehand of Brunet's intentions and approved them. For more than a month he refrained from notifying the French minister of the flight of the two men [Brunet and Cazeneuve, the non-commissioned officer who accompanied him from the very beginning]...' op. cit. p.18

Brunet probably led him to believe that France would, or at least might well, support their cause. On the French side, since Chanoine was the link in the chain between Brunet and the Ministry of War and any possible military assistance, it is important to study Chanoine's reaction to Brunet's endeavour. Fortunately there is again one document which reveals what this attitude was.

Chanoine had not joined Brunet. Chanoine was head of mission and directly responsible to the Minister of War. Both ministers, Randon and Niel, had made it clear to him that he was not to get involved politically. Had he joined the anti-government forces this would clearly have been a case of disobedience to his minister and he would most likely have faced a court-martial. He could always argue, that Brunet might not have been clearly aware of the orders Chanoine had received from Paris. So although Chanoine did not, and could not, act with Brunet, he might well have supported him and believed that his best course, rather than to resort to disobedient and independent action, was to bring pressure on Paris to follow Brunet's lead.

As far as one can judge, this is exactly the course Chanoine adopted. In a letter in April 1869, Chanoine argued that Brunet's activities could only be useful for Outrey; 'it could be for him an unhoped for occasion to put our relations with Japan back onto a suitable footing, he could become the arbitrator

of the external relations of the country, thus wiping out the failure of his predecessor.' Following this letter he appended a lengthy document written by himself, entitled "Relations Actuelles de l'Europe avec les Nations de l'Extrême-Orient": the main thrust of his argument was that France had lost over and over again the opportunity of obtaining a position of preponderance, or even of importance, because of hesitation. He looked at the history of European-East Asian relations since the Opium war and noted the opportunities that had been missed; it was not even a question, he argued, of sharing East Asia with Britain, as the latter would always seek the lion's share, 'The English are always disposed in Asia to accept the French as <u>auxiliaries</u> [underlined in text], but not as allies.'[1]

Chanoine had had considerable experience in East Asia, having taken part in the Anglo-French expedition in China of 1858-60. He had published a book on the China expedition,[2] and had been the highest ranking army officer to have been in Japan.

1. This is a letter found in M & D, vol. III; it is addressed to a General, but the name is missing; it could be Colson, a friend of Chanoine's in the ministry to whom he addressed numerous letters from Japan and who seems to have had ready access to both Ministers, Randon and Niel. Written in April 1869, but bears no precise date.
2. see C. Chanoine, <u>Examen Critique et Refutation d'une Relation de l'Expedition de Chine</u>, 1864

He was, therefore, something of an East Asia expert in the army. Chanoine's case and arguments against it were later submitted in the form of a memorandum to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chanoine wanted the French government to support Brunet's action in Japan and to allow other French officers to join him. The memorandum, however, pointed out that this would be 'contrary to the policy of solidarity and cooperation which we have followed in Japan for the last three years.'* Chanoine suggested the French 'take possession indirectly of the island of Yeso, perhaps even of a greater part of the Japanese territory.' The memorandum further commented on Chanoine's suggestion of French armed intervention, pointing out, 'we must not conceal the fact that the adventure begun by M. le Capitaine Brunet, ... if it is conducted with ~~the~~ ability would succeed in tipping the balance of the civil war in Japan and that our officers transformed into daimyos could at one time become the ajudicators and even the masters of the Empire'. For a number of reasons, however, Chanoine's project could not be accepted:

* I have no idea what the 'three' years refers to. France's policy of solidarity and cooperation with the other Western powers, and especially Britain, in Japan had been formulated at the time of the Gros mission and was never officially abandoned. The 'three' is presumably simply an error.

> 'If we allowed things to develop in the terms suggested above, we would quite naturally have to expect the energetic protests of the Powers, especially England. It is unnecessary to add that it would also mean breaking relations with the government of the Mikado which we have just recognised. We feel therefore that the government of the Emperor can do nothing which could imply the appearance of any form of approval to the enterprise of M. le Capitaine Brunet.'[1]

Pressure from certain quarters, however, continued to be exerted in favour of following up Brunet's enterprise. In June of 1869 a letter was received at the ministry from one of the former instructors of the military mission. According to this letter Brunet was in charge of everything in Hokkaido and the 'Japanese chaps (bonshommes) are marionettes which he manipulates with great talent.' The author of the latter claimed that Brunet 'has achieved a veritable '89 in this good old Japan, election of chiefs and ranks given according to merit and not according to birth, these are fabulous things for that country, and Brunet has succeeded very well, given the seriousness of his position'. The correspondent was quite sanguine about the survival of the Hokkaido republic; 'they are invulnerable in their island of Yeso, the expedition of 6,000 men from the South will be thrown back into the sea and dispersed like dust.' There was only one thing to fear, namely,

1. M & D vol. III, memorandum for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April (no date) 1869

that Brunet might be 'carried away by opinion to try an attack on the island of Nipon [i.e. Honshu] before having sufficient forces and ressources.' He concluded: 'I hope that they will succeed in restoring to French influence the position it enjoyed at the time of the Taikun.'[1]

As we pointed out earlier, however, Brunet received no support at all from Outrey. In July the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent the Minister of War a note on the Brunet affair and its consequences. He suggested that the massacre of French sailors in Sakai was a reprisal against the part played by Frenchmen in prolonging the civil war in the north. The note from the Minister [redacted], however, went on to forecast greater problems ahead. Brunet's intention, apparently, would be 'to take the offensive and attack the main island of Nippon, rally the discontented daimyo of the North and to re-ignite the civil war against the Mikado.' What was particularly worrying the Minister of Foreign Affairs was that the French army had still done nothing to indicate that it intended to discipline Brunet: 'the Japanese have therefore concluded that the government of the

1. M & D vol. III, an extract of a letter written from Pau on 22 June 1869 submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author of the letter is unnamed. There is simply a note stating that he was one of the instructors of the military mission.

Emperor indirectly favoured the enterprise of M. Brunet.' This state of affairs was making Outrey's position very difficult and arousing the anger and suspicion not only of the Japanese government, but of the other Western powers as well; 'this situation could become very serious indeed and requires the immediate attention of the government of the Emperor.'[1] The Minister of War's reply was very evasive; he merely pointed out that sometime ago Brunet had asked for leave of absence for three years from the French army and that this would now be accepted, and that therefore the French government should no longer feel embarrased.[2] Although there is no evidence that the French ministry of War ever directly supported Brunet's action, there is no evidence either that it condemned it. The Ministry's attitude might best be described as one of 'wait and see'.

When this exchange was taking place between the two ministries, the Hokkaido episode had come to an end. By the middle of May the government began its campaign against Enomoto in earnest, and by early June the imperial forces were well on their way to victory. In July Enomoto surrendered. Brunet's

1. M & D vol. III, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of War, 5 July 1869
2. M & D vol. III, Minister of War to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 July 1869

action at the end does not seem to have been worthy of a supposedly courageous officer. On the afternoon of 9 June he and his French companions, with the exception of the naval ensign, Collache, deserted Enomoto's army and sought refuge aboard the 'Coetlogon' the French ship, anchored at Hakodate.[1] Parkes wrote to his wife:

> 'They deserted Enomoto on the evening of a severe defeat, which does not say much for their prowess. After instigating the Japanese to revolt, and countenancing them so long as they could do so without risk, they leave them on the first appearance of danger. This has added to the discredit they had already acquired, and will not improve the French reputation in Japan.'[2]

Outrey obtained the release of Collache and hurriedly sent the other nine Frenchmen to Saigon, thence to France, informing his ministry that the Japanese government wanted to know what disciplinary measures the French government intended to take.[3] In the event, the naval ensigns, Collache and Nicol, were given dishonourable discharges from the navy.[4] The Minister of War

1. M & D vol. III, "Historique de la Conduite de M. Brunet, 11 October 1869
2. Parkes to Lady Parkes, 25 June 1869 in Dickins and Lane-Poole The Life of Sir Harry Parkes p. 120/1
3. CP vol. XVIII, Outrey to Ministry, 1 July 1869
4. M & D vol. III, Minister of Navy to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 September 1869

informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that by an imperial decision of 15 October Captain Brunet had been put on the inactive list.[1] However, he was back on active service the following year with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.

Brunet's explanation of his sudden departure from Enomoto's side is contained in a letter to his Minister from Saigon. He declared:

> 'We had gone to the North of Japan in order to help the seeds sown by our military mission bear fruit, and even to develop numerous fruits formed under our eyes in Edo; the conquest of an island, isolated from the Japanese empire by a fairly large strait, served my projects well in the beginning, but the mistakes committed in spite of my advice by our indigenous friends necessarily brought about a fatal and sudden reversal.'[2]

It is possible that Brunet hoped the French army might come to his rescue, especially if he was assured of the support of Chanoine and if the latter had told him of his endeavours in Paris to secure, at least, a substantial reinforcement of the French military in Hokkaide. But French support was unlikely for a number of reasons. In the first place, the French diplomatic representative, Outrey, was unreservedly opposed to Brunet's

1. M & D vol. III, Minister of War to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 October 1869
2. Army, catalogue Général Des Manuscrits, no. 1672 (g) Brunet to Ministry, 20 July 1869

action. Secondly Paris was aware that any support for Brunet would result in energetic opposition from Britain. Thirdly the Mexican fiasco was hardly two years old, troops were heavily committed in Indochine, and it was unlikely that France would allow herself to get involved yet again in a distant adventure overseas.

Once Brunet had left Japan the affair was over so far as he and the French army were concerned. But Outrey found himself faced with a very delicate diplomatic problem. On 1st August 1869, less than a month after Enomoto's capitulation, Outrey informed Paris that

> 'the resentment of the Japanese against the French is not yet appeased. The victorious party [i.e. the government] is talking in terms of nothing less than claiming from the Government of the Emperor the reimbursement of all the expenses of the war against the island of Yezo. It persists in seeing M. Brunet and the French non-commissioned officers, the representatives of our army and, referring back to the preceding conflicts between Japan and Europe, it maintains quite boldly that, having been vanquished, France - like Japan after the expedition against Shinomoseki - must pay a war indemnity.'[1]

A month later Outrey sent another dispatch indicating demand for an indemnity had not been dropped. A letter he had received from the Japanese ministry of foreign affairs reminded him that the amount due to the military mission had been paid in full, but that a number of French officers, instead of returning to

1. CP vol. XIX, Outrey to Ministry, 1 August 1869

France, had fomented revolt; that Brunet and his companion led the Kerai of the Tokugawa and that it was their fault that thousands of men died, ten ships were sunk, and the Japanese government put to enormous expense. The letter insisted all this was the fault of the French government; 'In principle the desertion of these gentlemen is the responsibility of your government, and by deduction the fact that they were allowed to remain in this situation until the rebels were prepared to surrender is proof of gross negligence on the part of your government.'

This was language which a European head of mission in a non-European country was not accustomed to hear. Outrey made no serious effort to refute the Japanese arguments. In principle they were irrefutable. Outrey's claim that since the French officer and non-commissioned officers were not acting under French orders, France was absolved of all responsibility, could only be justified had France (and the other treaty powers) accorded the same interpretation to events in Japan. After all, neither Richardson's assassination, nor the Choshu attack on Western ships in the Shinonoseki straits had taken place under orders from the shogunal government. Outrey's advice to his ministry, however, was not based on reasoning of a quid pro quo nature. He insisted that the Japanese government's requests

should on no account be accepted: 'Any concession on the part of the Government of the Emperor would have the gravest consequences in Japan. It would be to accept the impossible role of the vanquished, and the insolence of the Japanese would know no bounds'. Outrey replied to the Japanese government in the strongest possible terms.[1]

The Japanese did not bring the matter up again, obviously realising that France would not concede an inch and that only force could make her do so, and that was unthinkable. Outrey, however, was not ready to forget what he saw as a great affront to France. In June 1870 during a visit from Terashima who approached him on the possibility of a new French military mission, Outrey took the opportunity of reviewing Franco-Japanese relations, pointing out how often France had given proof of her friendly disposition vis à vis Japan, and yet Japan had responded by displaying 'treacherous' behaviour over the Brunet affair. Terashima answered that it was best to forget a past that was disagreeable for all concerned. The Brunet affair should be considered as closed.[2] But Outrey was not prepared to forget the past and he managed to force the Japanese government to send him an official letter saying

1. CP vol. XIX, Outrey to Ministry, 4 September 1869
2. CP vol, XX, Outrey to Ministry, 4 June 1870

that in the Brunet affair the French government had behaved most correctly towards Japan.[1]

Brunet and his companions had been warned by their own representatives that if they did anything against the regulations governing the behaviour of neutrals, they risked losing the protection of France as stipulated in the extra-territoriality clauses of the Franco-Japanese treaty. There can be no shadow of doubt that Brunet and his companions flagrantly disregarded the neutrality regulations. In the event, not only did Brunet escape Japanese jurisdiction, he was not brought to trial in the consular court.

What for Brunet had been an Oriental adventure was for the Japanese a very serious matter indeed. In chapter 4 it was pointed out that a particularly injustice of the extra-territorial system in Japan lay in the extent to which Westerners took advantage of their extra-territorial status. It could be argued that there was no more flagrant abuse of extra-territoriality in Japan than the Brunet affair. Brunet fomented and took part in a revolt against the legitimate Japanese government, with which the French government had diplomatic relations. The Japanese knew that had Brunet acted in similar fashion in a

1. CP vol, XX, Outrey to Ministry, 1 October 1870

European country, he would not have been able to escape unscathed. The fact that Outrey in particular, and the French government in general, manifested such flagrant double standards represents one of the ugliest manifestations of Western arrogance in Japan during this period.

Chapter 7.

French Missionaries in Japan.

The legacy of the Portugese Jesuits and Spanish mendicant orders in Japan in the 16th and early 17th centuries was strongly felt both in Japan and among Catholic missionaries. In Japan the alien religion was suppressed and measures were taken to ensure that Japanese Christians did not survive, and that no European missionaries entered the country. Among Christian missionaries a determination to return to Japan never completely died down. Already in the 17th century, after the expulsion of missionaries and after the newly established Société des Missions Etrangères (1658) had been granted the exclusive right of missionary work in the Far East, on two occasions two bishops of the Société were appointed Apostolic Vicars to Japan (although they never set foot in the country).[1] Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, Japan remained little more than a distant memory. With the end of the French Revolution, the end of the Napoleonic wars and the onset of the Restoration, with increased naval activity in the Far East, the Société's interest in Japan revived.

1. A. Launay, Histoire Générale de la Société des Missions Etrangères, vol. III, p.202

Eventually the Société covered most of Asia and counted numerous missionaries.[1] The Société was also a powerful lobby in Paris, especially during the Second Empire. It will be recalled that Napoleon III's casus belli in joining the British in war against China was the murder of a member of the Société, Chapdelaine. The Société was French and its missionaries were French. Missionary nuns sent to the Far East, though not from the Société (which was exclusively male), were also French.

Japan can be said to have entered the Societée's web in 1632 when the Vatican, entrusting Korea to the Société as an apostolic vicariate, added the Ryukyu islands, 'in the hope that these dependent and not distant islands from Japan would be the door through which the Gospel would be re-introduced into this country'.[2] For another decade, however, both Japan and its southern door, the Ryukyus, remained unpenetrated and seemingly impenetrable. Then with Britain's victory over China in the Opium war, the outlook for the missionaries brightened very considerably: 'It was not only a new era in the relations between Europe and the Far East that the English guns inaugurated, they also opened the way for the preachers of the Gospel'.[3]

1. See appendix at the end of the chapter.
2. A. Launay, op. cit., p.202.
3. F. Marnas, La Religion de Jesus Ressuscitee au Japon Dans la Seconde Moitie du XIXe Siecle, p. 98

The chief of the Société in Macao, Libois, and his assistant, Forcade, saw in the Treaty of Nanking exceptionally favourable circumstances for carrying out the Ryukyu project, especially as both of them were on intimate terms with a number of French naval officers in the China seas, notably Admiral Cecile.[1] The interests of the missionaries and the navy converged; the missionaries sought to enter Japan via the Ryukyus; and the French navy, with the encouragement of Guizot, was interested in acquiring a base for its Far Eastern operations.[2] Leaving Macao on 4 April 1844, Captain Fornier-Duplan aboard the corvette Alcmène, left for the Ryukyus with Forcade and a Chinese assistant named Augustin Ko, arriving in Naha twenty-four days later. Fornier-Duplan informed the Okinawan mandarins that he had orders to leave Forcade and Ko on the island in order to learn the language. The mandarins pleaded with the French Captain not to carry out his orders, but to no avail. Fornier-Duplan left the two behind, warning the authorities that severe reprisals would follow were anything untoward to happen to either of them.[3]

1. Launay, Histoire Générale,.., p. 203
2. A. Bocher, Adventures d'Un Missionaire Francais aux Iles Liou-Tcheou (Japon) 1844-46, p.3 - 8.
3. A. Launay, op. cit., p.204

Forcade's period of residence in the Ryukyus has been described in several works.[1] It may suffice here to summarise briefly the events as they are recounted in these sources. As soon as the corvette had left, Forcade was told by the mandarins that in view of his importance, a special guard of honour was to be attached to his person. From that day onwards, Forcade and his assistant were virtual prisoners, albeit apparently well fed and well treated. Forcade's attempts at learning the language were rendered very difficult, given the ruses the authorities resorted to: his guard and his servants were constantly changed. Whenever he asked the Japanese word for an object he was told one thing one day, another the next. In a letter to his superior, Libois, dated 12 August 1845, he complained of the spies that surrounded him, his lack of freedom, and numerous other difficulties he had to face. He was incensed among other things because the Ryukyu authorities were treating his Chinese assistant and himself as equals, whereas Fornier-Duplan had made it perfectly clear to them that Ko was 'koo'of a very inferior rank to myself'

1. see A. Bocher, op.cit., H. Cordier, Les Francais aux Iles Lieou K'ieou. T. Forcade, Le Premier Missionaire Catholique du Japon au XIXe Siecle.
A. Launay, op. cit., F. Marnas, op. cit., and J.B. Piolet, La France Au Dehors: Les Missions Catholiques Francaises au XIXe Siecle.

Another difficulty was that the local authorities forbade him to wear native dress, although Libois' instructions had been that both he and Ko were to dress as natives did. But his greatest problem was with the language and how to find indigenous words which corresponded to Christian dogma. He begged Libois to find him works which the Jesuits must have written and which could simplify his task.[1]

Forcade and Ko were not visited by their fleet for two years. In May 1846, however, Captain Guerin appeared at Naha, soon followed by the French Admiral of the Far Eastern fleet, Cecile, bearing with him another missionary, Le Turdu. Cecile tried to extract a treaty of friendship and commerce with the Ryukyus, but without success. Forçade was supposed to stay on in Naha, however Cecile required his help for a mission he had decided to undertake in Nagasaki. Le Turdu was left alone in Okinawa, Cecile having been assured by the Naha authorities, after renewed insistence on his part, that the missionary would be well treated and that he would be helped in the learning of

1. Forcade to Libois, 12 August 1845, <u>In Annales de la Propagation de la Foi</u>, 1846
The problem of translating Christian dogma, terms, psalms, etc into Japanese faced all missionaries. Sir George Sansom wrote, "Most bafiling among the linguistic obstacles were the problems of selecting suitable equivalents for such words as God, Spirit, Soul, Atonement, Grace, Conscience, and notably, Logos; for literal renderings often produced ludicrous results."
<u>The Western World and Japan</u>, p. 474

the language. Cecile arrived with Forcade in Nagasaki on 29 July 1846 and after having met with a hostile welcome on the part of the Nagasaki authorities, sailed away on 31 July. Cecile's main purpose, in any case, was to visit Korea; where he intended to discover from the Korean authorities the reason for the beheading of the French missionary bishop, Imbert. It was during this trip that Forcade learned that Gregory XVI had elevated Japan to an Apostolic Vicariate in its own right and had named Forcade as chief (at the time aged 30) with the title of Bishop of Samos. Forcade was replaced by a certain Adnet, who joined Le Turdu in the Ryukyus.

Thus the Ryukyuan connection was established and for over a dozen years served as the missionary base of operation in preparation for the opening of Japan (there was also an English missionary in the Ryukyus, having arrived in 1846, a certain Dr. Bettelheim). In 1855 Guerin, now Admiral, came to Naha with two new missionaries, Mermet de Cachon and Girard, both of whom were to join Gros three years later and become the first French Missionaries to set foot on Japanese soil. Guerin extracted a treaty with the Ryukyus; however it was never ratified.

Prior to the departure of the (1858) Gros mission, two memoranda submitted to the French Foreign Ministry had argued that France should not raise the Christian question in her overtures to Japan.[1] Presumably, however, had this advice been followed there would have been a strong protest from the missionaries (and the church, an institution Napoleon III could not afford to ignore) who, after all, were the only Frenchmen really interested in opening Japan. The treaty concluded by Gros contained only one article touching upon the question of religion, article IV. It simply stated that French subjects would enjoy religious freedom and to that end were permitted to erect necessary buildings, churches, cemetaries, etc.[2] The French article on religion was practically the same as that of the other powers.

When de Bellecourt was about to take up his post, his instructions also touched upon the religious question. It was brought to his attention that under the treaties, French missionaries were not to penetrate into the interior of the country. The intentions of the government, he was told, were

1. M +D vol.I, "Extrait D'un Mémoire,.. de J.C. Delprat", November 1857 and "Observations Sur Le Christianisme", May 1857.
2. H. Cordier, Le Premier Traite de la France avec le Japon, p.280.

secular. A certain latitude, however, or at least ambiguity was given;

> 'If the government of the Emporer is resolved, in conformity with the conduct it has already followed in China, of in no way provoking Japan by Catholic propaganda, it cannot, however, envisage its indifference were it to succeed in reaching the heart of population having so far remained innacessible to the light and blessings of Christianity; above all it could not countenance abandoning the right of protecting the missionaries under any circumstances'.[1]

French policy in principle, therefore, was to follow a moderate line on the question of Christianity and to observe the treaty stipulations in regard to it, all the while keeping the options open in respect to possible interference regarding Japanese christians and the protection of missionaries even if the latter disobeyed the treaties by propagating the gospel or travelling beyond the treaty port limits.

The first two years for the missionaries were peaceful, albeit uneventful. Girard, as head of mission, remained in Yokohama and served as de Bellecourt's interpreter.[2] Mermet was established in Hakodate where he was occupied in teaching French.[3] Petitjean, having arrived in Japan in early

1. CP vol. I, Ministry to de Bellecourt, 8 June 1859.
2. CP vol. I, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 19 September 1859
3. CP vol. II, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 24 January 1860

November 1862, after having left the Ryukyus as France's last missionary there, quickly set off for Nagasaki.[1] When in 1862, however, it was announced that an Embassy was to leave Japan and visit France, Girard took it upon himself to write a memorandum to the Quai suggesting that Napoleon III might have a word or two with the Japanese ambassadors in regard to the Catholic religion. He asked that the Emperor point out to the Japanese that they were quite misled in their suspicions in regard to the role of missionaries and on the doctrine which they had brought to the country; that it would be to Japan's advantage to facilitate, rather than hinder, the work of the missionaries; finally that they abolish the custom of stamping on the cross.[2]

Indeed within less than a month after Girard had written this memorandum, the missionaries were to encounter their first major difficulty in Japan. Girard had established a chapel in Yokohama and apparently used to preach in Japanese; a number of curious peasants, merchants and even samurai had ventured into the chapel to listen to him, as a result of which thirty-six were arrested. De Bellecourt feared that this was an ill omen

1. J-B Chaillet, Monseigneur Petitjean (1829-1884) et la Resurrection Catholique du Japon au XIXe Siecle, p.81
2. in CP vol. V, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 21 January 1862

of even worse things to come.[1] In fact he soon learned that the Japanese authorities intended to have the arrested executed. In collaboration with Alcock he protested to the Governor of Kanagawa, saying that such persecutions were incompatible with the standards of civilised countries and that the consequences of such acts could only worsen Japan's situation vis à vis the Western powers. As the Embassy was shortly to leave for Europe, he suggested that the carrying out of the sentences be delayed thus giving the Embassy an opportunity of hearing for themselves the views of the European governments. Eventually a compromise was reached: the arrested would be released, if Girard refrained from preaching in Japanese. The governor of Kanagawa also asked de Bellecourt himself to prevent the Japanese from entering the chapel. As de Bellecourt explained to his minister, he found himself considerably embarassed in having to reconcile at the same time 'the duty which humanity imposes on me with the not less imperious duty of the prudence which is necessary to ensure the maintenance of our relations here, and of the dignity and future of the Christian religion in this country'.

1. CP vol. V, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 19 February 1862

With these difficulties having arisen it was all the more important, so Girard felt, that the Paris government take a strong stand on the question. Girard believed that the future for Christianity in Japan could be very bright, for 'the Japanese being very intelligent and having an admirable disposition for the Gospel will be easily converted...' but added that as long as the political structure remained as it was, 'each neophyte will soon become a martyr.' France, he urged, must take a lead in paving the way in Japan for bringing the people to Christianity; he added that were Japan to become Christian, trade would dramatically improve and France would be able to exert her influence.[1]

With Girard's renewed insistence on behalf of his work to the Foreign Ministry, de Bellecourt was asked to prepare a memorandum on the subject of Christianity in Japan. In a fairly lengthy piece, de Bellecourt developed a number of themes which he had already touched on on previous occasions.[2]

Christian teachings, he claimed, implied a moral emancipation of the individual which was diametrically opposed to the

1. M & D, vol. I, "mémoire relatif au retablissement de la religion chretienne au Japon", 1862 (no date)
2. see CP vol. V, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 26 February 1862 and vol. X, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 30 August 1863

constitutional base of the country, living as it did in a system of strict feudalism with the mass of the people reduced to bondage. Japan's whole system of government was based on a form of theology which strictly governed relationships within the state, those between Shogun and Mikado, Shogun and daimyo, in brief the whole fabric of society would be completely revolutionised were Christianity to enter into Japan. A Christian in the eyes of the Japanese authorities was ipso facto a revolutionary. The most dangerous of Christian teachings for the survival of Japanese feudalism was the one that stressed equality of men. De Bellecourt concluded that 'It is therefore evident that the Japanese government will forbid, as long as it is in its power the entry of ideas which are contrary in all aspects to both the conditions of its origin and to those of its current existence.[1]

At the time de Bellecourt was writing the situation in Japan was reaching a crisis, following the Richardson incident (seen in Chapter 2). As tension rose, Petitjean wondered whether the hour had not come for the West to act resolutely and for Japan to be punished. In a letter to a friend dated 14 April 1863, he discussed the rumours of a coming Anglo-Japanese war; perhaps once again English guns could pave the

1. M & D vol. I, January 1863, various documents on the religious question, including de Bellecourt's memorandum

way for the preaching of the Gospel; 'Despite an impunity of more than two centuries, Japan has a great debt to repay God for the torrents of Christian blood shed in the 17th century. Who knows whether the hour of punishment is not about to arrive!. Nevertheless may the Lord exempt our Japanese, having become our brothers, our parishoners, from the horrors of war, from the bloodshed'.[1] In another letter some six weeks later he explained that, '... 'if there is war, idolatry will at last give way to the holy faith'.[2] Although war did not take place, Petitjean's biographer wrote that Petitjean was nevertheless 'greatly rejoiced' by the projected Kagoshima expedition.[3]

In October 1863 another outrage against a Westerner took place, namely the murder of Lieutenant Camus. For Pettjean this was:

> ...another cause for war to add on to all the others. Seeing the Japanese act since a year ago, one has the impression that they are afraid to cross bayonette and sword with the soldiers of Europe. However, their provocations have excluded no one and right now they can boast of having with impunity shed the blood and sullied

1. in Chaillet, op. cit., p.84
2. in ibid, p.85
3. ibid, p.87

> the flags of England, France, America and Holland. Europe will not long put up with such shame, and no doubt by next spring there will be an expedition of retribution in Japan. If not that, then she must expect greater humiliations. We must wait for the accomplishment of the will of God![1]

The Shimonoseki expedition did take place, but did not bring about a noticeable change in the fortune of the missionaries. However, an important event did take place in March of the following year (1865). The Nagasaki catholic church had been inaugurated in February of that year. Hardly a month later Petitjean was approached by a number of Japanese and was then to discover that supposedly thousands of Christians (the famous Kakurei Kirishtan) were still following, albeit in hiding, the rites taught to their ancestors by the Portuguese missionaries. The joy and satisfaction which this discovery brought to the missionaries was no doubt great, yet in their enthusiasm for visiting their new parishoners they completely disregarded the treaties, travelling and preaching clandestinely in areas beyond the treaty port limits.[2]

The missionaries knew that Roches was gaining favour with the Shogun. They saw this as an opportunity that could be exploited to their advantage. Petitjean went to see Roches

1. ibid, p.91
2. ibid, p.170ff

in June 1866 when the latter happened to be at Nagasaki. Petitjean was apparently very cordially received by Roches who told him that the Shogun was in fact well disposed towards Christians and that in due time, when political circumstances permitted it, the situation would change markedly for the missionaries and their flock.[1] In fact the reverse came to be true. Starting in 1867 the so-called Urakami (after the valley they came from) Christians were imprisoned. The problem of the Urakami Christians was to plague Western-Japanese relations for six years, being resolved only in 1873 with the Iwakura mission. Although every Western power played a role in trying to bring pressure on the Japanese government to release the Christians and alter the laws in regard to religious freedom, here we will look almost exclusively at the French role in this matter and more specifically the relations between missionaries, diplomatic agents and Paris.

The Japanese authorities knew that the missionaries were clandestinely and illegally preaching and travelling into the interior. Had they stopped them there was nothing they could do except hand them back to the consular authorities. Thus although the missionaries were breaking the laws of Japan and

1. F. Marnas, op. cit., 669/70

were acting contrary to the stipulations of the treaties that their own country had entered into, they were immune from punishment. This provides another example of the abuse of extra-territoriality on the part of the Western powers. It is interesting to note that a missionary describing a special inaugural mass at the Nagasaki Church on 2 June 1866 described with satisfaction how, 'France trebly represented in her religious force, in her civilising power and in her martial valour, by a bishop, by a minister plenipontentiary and by an admiral...'[1] No doubt to the Japanese as well the three seemed inseparable; unable to make the missionaries respect the treaties, they turned their attention on the native Christians. In the events and years that were to follow the first arrests of the native Christians (April, 1867) considerable tension developed between the missionaries and the diplomatic agents. Beyond the protection of their lives, what was the nature of the committment of French diplomats to their missionary compatriots? For some, 'In Japan...the first duty of our diplomats is the protection of our missionaries and the sympathetic co-operation to their apostolic work.' In view of this for ministers and consuls, the French government 'should have chosen ... religious and energetic men'. Instead, too often the agents

1. F. Marnas, op.cit., vol. I, p.672

were 'n.i.' indifferent, or even frequently hostile to religion, some of scandalous morality, and who thus compromised by their examples the nation they represented and the religion they were supposed to belong to.'[1] For all the missionaries and their sympathisers who wrote about the arrests of the Urakami Christians and the role of the diplomats, none was to be the victim of greater and unrestrained criticism than Roches.[2]

Upon first hearing of the arrest of the Christians, Roches protested to the Japanese government and obtained the promise that they would be released.[3] After having visited the government, he addressed a letter to Petitjean in the following terms. He had found among the members of the Roju not a trace of religious fanaticism. They had agreed to the release of the prisoners. But given the proof of good will on the part of the Japanese government, Roches urged Petitjean to reciprocate, and that in any case, 'n.i.' the tenor of the treaties, the specific engagements France had entered into, the very interests of your mission for the future, impose upon us to moderate our zeal, through which the very results we so much wish to obtain would be put in peril.' He further reminded Petitjean that Japan had but recently been opened and was now going through a period of political upheavals. It was not the

1. L. Pagès, La Persecution des Chretiens au Japon et l'Ambassade Japonaise
2. see Chaillet, op. cit. p.199-212, Launay, op. cit., p.484-487
MARNAS, op cit, p669-674, PAGES, op cit, p1-20, PAOLET, op cit, p450-452
3. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 8 August 1867

time to embarass the Shogun with his compatriots, given that he was the guarantor of the treaties and was fighting for the maintenance of these treaties. The Japanese, Roches reminded petitjean, associated Christianity in their history with a period of particular troubles and bloodshed, it would be most unwise at this particular junction of the political crisis the country was going through to have Christianity intervene. The most opportune moment for revising this question, Roches suggested, would be at the time of the revision of the treaties due in 1872.[1]

Later Roches spoke to the Shogun personally about the Christians. He asked the Shogun to declare an amnesty in their favour and that on his side he would again urge the missionaries to obey the treaties. He also took the opportunity of talking to the Shogun about Christianity in general and assuring him that the fears of his compatriots in regard to the religion were unwarranted and that when peace was re-established he would seek once again to discuss the religious question with him.[2] After his meeting and in keeping with his promise to the Shogun, Roches once again wrote to Petitjean. He explained to Petitjean that he had obtained

1. Roches to Petitjean, 8 August 1867, taken from Pagès, op. cit., p. 8/9
2. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 9 September 1867

the release of the Christians, who normally and according to Japanese law were liable to the death penalty, and once again urged him not to precipitate matters. In a perhaps tactless, yet pointed conclusion he reminded the bishop (as Petitjean had since been appointed) that as a preacher of peace and meekness, he should not seek to bring about greater trouble into a country already facing severe problems which only time would settle. Roches hoped that Petitjean and his colleagues would not make themselves responsible for the bloodshed that would follow were they to persist in their unrestrained apostolic activity and interference in the internal affairs of Japan.[1] In a lengthy letter, Petitjean refuted Roches' appeals for moderation and insisted that their mission could not be constrained by the laws of men, as they were directed by the law of God. He rejected Roches' warning that were they to persist they would be held responsible for the bloodshed that would follow. The missionaries, claimed Petitjean, 'are the glory of France'. In the eyes of God, the Japanese persecutors would have to answer for their crimes.[2]

1. Roches to Petitjean, September (no date) 1867, in Pagès, op. cit. , p. 9/10
2. Petitjean to Roches, 12 October 1867 in Pagès, op. cit., p. 12-14.

Roches' policy, therefore, can be summarised as advocating moderation in the religious question in order not to compromise the future, or indeed the present. The future of Christianity in Japan would depend on good example and persuasion, not force. We have here perhaps one of the rare examples where Parkes and Roches seem to have been in complete agreement. In a dispatch to Lord Stanley on the subject of the Christians, Parkes wrote that, 'M. Roches has even obtained the consent of the Gorojio (Roju) to their release, but that the prisoners themselves and their foreign pastors who are greatly excited would almost prefer the horrors of martyrdom to this leniency.'[1]

Between Roches and Petitjean there were essentially two differences on the Christian question. Roches was committed to the engagements that France had entered into in the treaties in respect of religious propaganda and travel restrictions imposed on all foreigners with the exception of diplomatic agents. Petitjean and his colleagues believed that they were solely responsible to a higher law and that the laws of nations could not and should not confine their activity. In carrying out their apostolic work, however, they expected to be able to rely on the force of the agents who were themselves responsible

1. Parkes to Stanley, 17 August 1867, copy given to Roches and sent to Ministry, see CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 16 August 1867

for the proper enforcement of the treaties on both sides.

The second difference was that of timing. As we noted earlier Petitjean desired war with Japan as he believed that this was the means whereby paganism in Japan would be replaced by Christianity. Roches' view was that for the future of Christianity in Japan nothing could be worse, especially during the present crisis, than to try to force events.

The impatience of the missionaries can perhaps best be illustrated by their reaction to the executions following the Sakai massacre. It will be remembered (chapter 2) that one French officer and ten sailors had been murdered by samurai from Tosa; among the conditions imposed by Roches was that the twenty found guilty be executed and ~~that~~ in the course of the executions the French naval commander, Dupetit-Thouars, had asked that they stop at eleven, thus saving the lives of nine. To one missionary writing on this episode, 'This indulgence, which would be justified by our sentiments of humanity and French temperment, could not produce on the Japanese the desired effect.' His view was that immediately after the murder, commander Dupetit-Thouars should have immediately opened fire on the whole city: 'this lesson would have been better understood and would have had better results.' [1]

1. Marnas, op. cit., vol. II, p. 104

In Petitjean's opinion, what he termed the 'ridiculous reparations' which followed the Sakai murders seriously damaged the prestige of France and thus severely limited the diplomatic muscle it could use in improving the situation for the missionaries. He very much regretted that the French minister had displayed such weakness; 'Nothing, especially in the Far East is as disastrous as half-measures.'[1]

In the meantime the Shogunate had fallen and the new government was established. Petitjean, who believed that this was the work of God, 'for those who set obstacles in his way are destroyed...',[2] was not however to see any modification in the Japanese attitude to missionaries and native Christians. The Meiji Government decreed that, 'The Christian creed is strictly prohibited. If one finds anybody suspected of the above, he is to report to the office concerned, and will be duly rewarded.'[3] And so the arrest of native Christians continued and the missionaries were not able to make any progress in their work. Indeed the years following the Restoration witnessed far more arrests and deportations.

The intensification of anti-Christian activities in Japan

1. Chaillet, op. cit., p. 241/2
2. ibid. p.232
3. "Notification of the Five Notice Boards, April 7, 1868" in Meiji Japan Through Contemporary Sources, vol. II, p.75

in the years immediately following the Restoration coincided with a time when the new government, and especially the Court party, Iwakura and Sanjo, had established Shinto as the state religion: 'The elevation of Shinto to the position of an official doctrine would fortify the throne and the court aristocracy, providing as it did a coherent theory of direct Imperial rule.'[1] In the consolidation of power under the Throne, "metaphysically" buttressed by the tenets of Shinto, Buddhism, as well as Christianity was out of favour.[2]

However, in view of the fact that the new government had made it a matter of policy that not only would it continue relations with the Western powers, but also, according to the fifth article of the Charter Oath, knowledge would be sought throughout the world, its anti-Christian activities were doomed to failure. Outrey, like his colleagues, followed Roches' example of seeking change by persuasion rather than force.[3] Apart from that, however, the Western powers, unanimous in their desire to see religious freedom granted in Japan, had two powerful weapons in their armoury. The first was to hint at possible compromises on treaty revision in return

1. Sanson, op. cit., p. 469
2. see Anesaki, History of Japanese Religion, p. 334-339 and Sanson, op. cit., p. 468-470
3. Outrey was consistent on this point and so advised his Ministry on numerous occasions, see for example, CP vol.XVI Outrey to Ministry, 7 July 1868, CP vol. vol. XVIII, Outrey to Ministry, 11 February 1869, CP vol. XIX, Outrey to Ministry, 22 January and 21 February 1870.

for religious freedom, the second to insist that religious freedom must be a precondition for helping Japan in its programme of modernisation. In June 1870, for example, Terashima had approached Outrey on the possibility of a second military mission. Outrey, though by no means ruling out the possibility, nevertheless asked Terashima whether, 'You believe that France will be willing to aid in the development of this force if it is to be used for persecutions which civilisation and humanity condemn.' Terashima assured Outrey that for the time being the government had had to give in to a powerful part of public opinion that was violently anti-Christian, but that when it considered itself strong enough to withstand this group, religious freedom would be granted. Although Outrey went on insisting on this point with Terashima, privately he confided to his ministry that he agreed with Terashima, namely that the Christian question would solve itself. It is interesting to note, however, that Outrey went further than that. He stated that Christianity was intimately linked with the progress of civilisation in Japan, and that inevitably its ideas and its doctrines would penetrate the country.[1]

For all Outrey's optimism, the persecutions of Christians

1. CP vol. XX, Outrey to Ministry, 4 June 1870

in Japan continued, and reaction to these in the West intensified. Outrey, though not vilified by the Catholic press to the same extent as Roches had been[1], was nonetheless also accused of following an anti-Christian policy[2]. According to one pamphlet on the persecution of Christians in Japan, Iwakura was one of those most responsible for the persecutions[3]. And so it was that in the course of Iwakura's visit to the West he was brought under great pressure to rescind the anti-Christian edicts.[4]

1. One of the apparently major reasons why Roches was attacked was that Catholics could not forgive him for having at one time embraced the Moslem faith, though he had later returned to Catholicism; see Pagès, op. cit, p. 5-19 where a number of times he explains Roches' alleged anti-Christian views by his Islamic past.
2. Pagès, op. cit., p. 20
3. ibid, p. 25-39; according to this account Iwakura's objections were basically two: in the first place nothing in the treaties suggested that the Western powers had the right to tell the Japanese government how they should or should not deal with their own nationals; secondly Christianity did provide grave dangers to the cohesion of the State as it would cause disunity among the people as it had in the past. It is not impossible that Iwakura was aware ofwhat was happening in China where France had demanded jurisdiction for indigenous Catholics and as a result Chinese criminals became Catholics in order to escape Chinese law and punishment. He did in fact complain to Remusat that the missionaries had given sanctuary to known Japanese criminals; Outrey, who was present at the meeting, said that he had heard similar rumours while in Japan, but his own investigation had shown there were no grounds to support them. see I & D, vol. II, "Compte rendu des conferences entre le Ministre et Iwakura", January 1873
4. For the British role in the Christian question, see G. Fox, Britain and Japan, 1858-1883, p. 480-500: see also M.Mayo, "The Iwakura Embassy and the Unequal Treaties, 1871-1873". A.Altman, "1960; Vol 43, pp. 54e Iwakura Embassy", Japan Quarterly,

In France a number of Catholic deputies had signed a petition demanding that the Foreign Minister take strong measures when meeting with Iwakura.[1] The Foreign Minister, Remusat, did tell Iwakura that France felt special interest in the fate of Catholics and that nothing would please her more than to see Japan adopt the principles of religious freedom practiced by civilised nations. Iwakura promised Remusat that the situation of Christians in Japan would be dramatically altered, as in any case Japan 'was seeking as much as possible to assimilate herself to the European states.'[2] The policy of persuasion with moderation adopted by the foreign representatives and inaugurated by Roches had paid off. Shortly after the return of the mission, de Turenne was able to send his Ministry the following telegramme: 'The Japanese Government has just abrogated the edicts against Christianity and is to proceed to the release of the Christians deported since 1870.'[3]

The consequences for Christians and Christian missionaries emanating from the experiences of the members of the Iwakura mission were another sign of the revolutionary change ~~in~~

1. AE D, vol. II, "Mémoire relatif aux garanties de liberté religieuse pour le Christianisme a demander au gouvernement japonais a l'occasion du renouvellement de nos traités" par les Deputes de l'Assemblee Nationale, March 1873
2. AE D, vol. II, "Compte rendu des Conferences entre le Ministre et Iwakura", January 1873
3. CP vol. XXII, de Turenne to Ministry, 24 February 1873

in attitudes that had occured among some members of the mission and were also an index of the determination with which the Meiji government sought a major improvement in its relations with the West. The members of the Iwakura mission

> ...were impressed by the importance of Christianity in Western life and saw clearly that they could not hope for good relations with Western states so long as Japanese subjects were denied religious freedom. Some leading men went further than that and asked whether it was possible to take over the civilisation of Western countries without adopting their religion, and within a year or two of the abortive Shinto revival we find more than one eminent thinker recommending the adoption of Christianity. Even in government circles the idea seems to have been seriously entertained, for it is on record that in 1873 members of the Japanese legation in Berlin inquired of Professor Gneist whether he thought that Japan should introduce Christianity as the state religion.[1]

The situation following 1873 was in theory at least far more favourable to the French missionaries:

> the year 1873...will also count -- our patriotism likes to underline it -- among those which France can proudly claim almost exclusive glory. A Frenchman was THE interpellator, M. de Richemont*, whose vibrant and indignant appeals had such repercussions in all the Catholic universe; another Frenchman, the Count of Turenne, who more than any other foreign representative

1. Sansom, op. cit., p. 471

* member of the chamber of deputies who organised and led the movement petitioning the Minister of Foreign Affairs to intercede with Iwakura on the religious question.

knew how to face the Japanese authorities with such noble energy**; and no less French, finally, this prelate and his priests who, in having beforehand shaped the souls of the captives, had given them the strength to oppose to the menaces and tortures their intransigeant loyalty of their convictions, and who, today, rebuilt, on those ancient ruins, a church, purified, rejuvenated and vivified in the blood of hundreds of martyrs. And it was not most touching symbolism that of the young Japanese officer? Baptised the 31st May 1873, this neophyte had fallen very ill almost immediately. On the eve of his death ... unable to either speak or to write, he made a sign to a Christian who was assisting him to hold his hand and drew these two characters: God! France! ... He died with this paper in his hand.[1]

Even with their new found freedom, the missionaries were not to baptise converts by the thousands. There are, of course, many reasons for this, some of which will be suggested at the end of this chapter, but one which may be cited now is made evident in the passage cited above.

To what extent the Japanese authorities and the Japanese people in general realised the close link which the missionaries established between their religion and their country is difficult to ascertain. One missionary historian was to note that one of the chief impediments to Christianity in Japan was the distrust the people had of doctrines coming from outside the

** there is no evidence that de Furme acted any differently from the other representatives.

1. Chaillet, op. cit., p. 333

the country.[1] Yet the missionaries seemed incapable of distinguishing between their apostolic mission and their blatant nationalism. The passage above would certainly have provided evidence to those Japanese who suspected that embracing the Christian faith also meant embracing a foreign power. Another missionary, giving a lecture in Lyon, after having exposed to his audience all the work carried out by Catholic missionaries in Japan, concluded that 'It is through these Frenchmen and Frenchwomen that France continues, as I see it, her role as a civilising power in the world. And I know, having been able to witness at first sight, that thanks to their good works, to the very confines of Asia, the name of France is loved and respected.'[2]

The attempts by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to gain freedom for missionaries to travel in the interior of Japan, as early as 1873, was resisted by the Japanese government.[3] Even if the Japanese authorities did not know the full extent of the equation the missionaries made between their faith and their nation, the mere suspicion of it would make it unlikely that the Japanese government would take

1. see Piolet, op. cit., p. 482-501
2. F. Marnas, "Conférence sur le Japon, faite à la Société de Géographie de Lyon." p 47/8
3. CP vol. XXIII, Ministry to Berthemy, 7 August 1873

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kindly to the idea of foreigners inside the country trying to convert Japanese nationals to Christianity and to attachment to France, at a time when the new government was eagerly trying to build up Japanese nationalism as an important pillar of its programme of Fukoku-kyohei. Anesaki, though writing about conditions after the first World War, nevertheless illustrates the situation in the early Meiji period;

> The missionaries ... are often too much representatives of their respective nationalities; they identify their own national manners, habits, even prejudices, with the Christian religion; ... Even Catholic missionaries often uphold their own nationalities, if not more than their Mother Church. This is the reason why there have appeared so many independents who alienated themselves from the Church, not because they lost faith in Christianity but because they saw in the churches rather an impediment to its true mission.[1]

With the lifting of the ban on Christianity, the French missions increased their forces in Japan. In 1873 the first nuns, the Religieuses du Saint-Enfant-Jesus, better known as the Dames de Saint-Maur, arrived. By 1877 there were ten nuns who opened schools and orphanages in Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe; in 1879 they established themselves in Osaka and in 1880 in Nagasaki. Another order of French nuns came the same year, Les Religieuses de Saint-Paul de Chartres, founding similar establishments in Hakodate. Japan was divided into two

1. Anesaki, op. cit., p. 405

apostolic vicariates, one for the north with its headquarters in Tokyo and a certain Osouf as bishop and one for the south with headquarters in Osaka and its bishop Petitjean, having moved from Nagasaki. (He remained in Japan until his death in 1885). According to the missionaries there were 20, 146 Japanese Catholics in 1879 and 30, 230 in 1884.[1]

It may be the work of the nuns that reaped the richest harvest in terms of converts. Kishimoto noted that :

> They ... achieved great success in aiding the poor and the weak. Catholics ... gained many friends among the farmers of Urakami and other members of the lower classes. These uneducated people had no real understanding of Christianity. Just because their thought processes were so simple, they immediately became Christians when they realized that the miracles of the missionaries resulted from benevolence rather than magic. And once converted, even without education they could understand the religious spirit reflected in the beauty of the Catholic churches and the magnificence of their ceremony.[2]

The missionaries themselves by the 1880's were optimistic about the future. Petitjean comparing the situation in Japan and in increasingly anti-clerical France wrote to a friend in mid-1882, 'Many neophytes, men as well as women, frequently take communion. At the last midnight mass, we had almost 2,000 people attending the ceremony, and the distribution of holy communion lasted a good hour. Only yesterday we were

1. Violet, op. cit., p.405
2. H. Kisimoto, Japanese Religion in the Meiji Era, p.211-212

still persecuted here, and today we are freer than in our Catholic France!'[1] One missionary estimated that by the mid-1800's the Japanese were spiritually prepared for the conversion of their country.[2] In the same period Catholic missionaries had published approximately fifty works in Japanese dealings with religious matters; they also published a review, 'where principal questions of theology, philosophy, history and the sciences are discussed, and which on top of that gives religious news of Catholicity.'[3] In this atmosphere of optimism it is interesting to note that one missionary saw in the evangelisation and conversion of Japan the road to the conversion of China and Korea:

> have no mistake about it, because of the new civilisation she is adopting, and the influence which this will inevitably give her with her neighbouring nations; because of her militant genius and her geographic situation, which call her to a powerful autonomy and to a great maritime expansion, Japan is actually the nation whose prompt evangelisation interests to the highest degree the destinies of Catholicism in the Far East.[4]

The missionaries seem not to have been the only French citizens to bask in optimism regarding the future of Christianity. In perhaps one of the more extraordinary dispatches ever sent

1. Chaillet, op. cit., p. 395
2. Barnas, La Religion de Jesus Ressuscitée...,p. 479-489
3. Piolet, op. cit., p. 479
4. P. Barnas, Païens et Catholiques en Extreme Orient, p.42

to a French diplomat to Paris, Sienkiewicz, in October 1885, gave his views on the "Christianisation " of Japan. Sienkiewicz began by affirming that 'there can be no doubt that this empire is destined to count among the Christian Powers', although this would not necessarily occur overnight. The lead in adopting Christianity would be taken by the Japanese government, but what had yet to be decided was whether it would opt for Catholicism, Protestatnism or the Orthodox Church. The first step would be for the Mikado to seek conversion to one of the Christian denominations, though it would not necessarily be the existing Mikado. The decision whether the Mikado was to become Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox would be taken by the Japanese government, a decision which 'they will be guided by exclusively political considerations.'

In his discussions with the Russian diplomatic chief of mission, the latter was of the opinion that neither protestantism -- as it had too many sects and would thus confuse a nation which showed such an overwhelming tendency towards uniformity -- nor Catholicism -- for fear of papist imperialism and the risk of the Pope becoming more important in the eyes of the Japanese than the Emperor -- would suit Japan. The Russian diplomat felt that, 'If the Japanese want to become Christians,

they only have one side to chose and that is to make themselves Orthodox. They would have their own Patriarch, would establish an autocephalic Church, and thus would benefit from the double advantage of becoming a Christian nation and at the same time avoiding all external complications.'

Sienkiewicz' British colleague, Plunkett, though apparently a fervent Catholic himself, felt that it was unthinkable for the Mikado to become Orthodox; nor would he become Catholic, however, not because of the Pope, but because of the French protectorate. The Mikado would become a Protestant.

For his part Sienkiewicz assured his Ministry that he would do all in his power to see that the Mikado became a Catholic. In the meantime he pointed out that the more Japanese Catholics there were, the greater Francés influence would be. But, he added, France should beware of Austria-Hungary as the latter might try to get the Protectorate.[1]

Such deliberations among Western diplomats in respect of the "Christianisation" of Japan should not necessarily be dismissed as nonsense simply because of the benefit of hindsight. In the 1870's and the 80's one of Japan's major aims was to be

1. Cr vol. XXXI, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 20 October 1885

accepted as an equal by the Western powers. We noted earlier the approach made to Gneist in Berlin in respect of the desireability of Japan's "Christianisation". In the Japanese leadership, therefore, similar deliberation and inquiries 'were prompted by a feeling that Japan as a Christian nation would be treated as an equal of other Christian nations.'[1] The Western diplomatic agents on their part believed that the form of Christianity chosen (Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox) would affect their respective nations' influence. For Sienkiewicz, in view of the fact that Catholic missionaries were French and that France had the protectorate over Japan, the Mikado's conversion to Catholicism -- and that of his subjects -- could greatly increase French influence.

Another important reason for the Japanese to look into the religious future of their country had to do with its ambitious programme of modernisation. Noticing how the whole culture of the West was so permeated by the Christian religion, 'many thinking Japanese reluctantly concluded that it was impossible to become modern without becoming Christian.'[2] Eventually, however,

> Escape from this dilemma was to be provided by Western

1. Sansom, op. cit., p. 471
2. W.S. Schwantes, "Christianity versus Science, a Conflict of Ideas in Meiji Japan", Journal of Asian Studies, 1952, vol. 12, p.123

through liberal, through new materialistic philosophies based upon science, and through the historical relativism of the higher Biblical criticism. The battle between science and theology, evolution and revelation, then raging in England and America was fought again in the Japanese press and lecture hall. This controversy involved intensively only a small minority of the Japanese people, principally students and intellectuals, and was definitely secondary to the broader conflict between conservative nationalism and all foreign religion. It was, however, a significant aspect of Japan's response to the West, of her process of acculturation.[1]

So as Christianity and Christian doctrines were being attacked in the West and the spirit of science seemed to be winning the battle since science was held by many Western intellectuals to be the force behind the matrix of modernising Western civilisation, it gained greater ascendancy in Japan at the expense of religion. Christianity did have an influence among a small, but by no means unimportant, number of intellectuals, some of whom were eventually to become the leaders of Japan's social democrutic and labour movements. But this influence was Protestant, not Catholic.[2] There are a number of reasons for this. One that has been suggested is since English as a language was more important in Japan

1. ibid.
2. A number of works have been written on the impact of Protestantism on Japan's social democratic movements; see for example, H. Miyata, Der Politische Auftrag des Protestantismus in Japan, F.G. Noehelfer, Kotoku Shusui Portrait of a Japanese Radical, I. Schreiner, Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan.

than French, Protestant missionaries (mainly Americans and Scots) had greater access to the rising new intelligentsia. Another reason may be that Catholicism at the time and especially in Japan under the Société des Missions Etrangères, did not provide the intellectual challenge offered by Protestant sects, notably Unitarianism. Another reason, cited by Kishimoto, was that the Catholics worked mainly among the poor and needy and did not, like the Protestants, penetrate the middle or upper classes.[1] Finally, another factor which operated against Christianity in general was the realisation on the part of some Japanese of the hypocrisy of Christians. Just as we noted in chapter 4 that Itagaki became disillusioned with Western political doctrines of freedom and equality after having visited European colonies in Asia, so Fukuzawa wrote, 'people say that foreigners are righteous, reasonable and deeply charitable, and probably the foreigners themselves are convinced of this. But the evidence of my own eyes tells me that it is rubbish.'[2]

And so the spirit of optimism was destined for disappointment. One of the missionaries listed the numerous obstacles which he and his colleagues faced in Japan. In the first instance, were the 'uniquely supernatural or moral obstacles, pantheism and the corruption of morals.' There

1. See Kishimoto, op. cit., p.212; p. 132
2. From C. Blacker, The Japanese Enlightenment: A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi p. 132

were also the obstacles put in their way by the opposition of the bonzes, greater perhaps in Japan than anywhere else, 'because they use against the missionaries modern weapons, schools, brochures, journals, newspapers, unbridled propaganda in the interior, and even to the exterior, as far as Catholic countries, in order to ruin more easily the credit of the apostolic workers.' Furthermore there was the esprit de corps which united Japanese villages, corporations, etc; one would not join Christianity for fear of ostracism from his peers. Then there was the racial vanity of the Japanese who believed it humiliating to accept religion coming from the outside which they would not be allowed to accomodate and model according to their own fashion. But worst of all was 'scepticism, fruit of the relations between Japan and Europe, and which threatens to invade everything.'

The missionary noted that:

Another obstacle which encounters the zeal of the apostolic workers is the fear inspired in the Japanese people of all religion having come from abroad. When the missionaries reappeared, after two centuries of absence, the government and the people dreaded to see the country soon conquered by a foreign sovereign of whom preachers of the Gospel were perhaps only the first envoys....The protection accorded in all the Orient by the European nations to missionaries... furnishes a facile occasion to excite against all religions having come from abroad the narrow and unenlightened patriotism of the masses, and creates a current of dislike against the preachers of the true religion.

The greatest obstacle, however, the missionary conceded came from Europe itself:

> Japan has not only taken from Europe her most perfected inventions, she has also borrowed from her the ideas which are current in the official and scientific spheres. Science, which has produced such marvellous results, has dazzled them; willingly they believed that which the doctors of our universities affirmed, whose lessons they were following: that science would give the explanation of all things. ...
>
> This scepticism has been introduced and propagated by the Japanese who the government had sent to the Universities of Germany, England, France and America. They learned in these schools to believe only in the positive notions of science. Having returned to their country, they propagated these ideas, and, thanks to the high positions which the majority of them enjoy, they have little by little impregnated their scepticism into the spirit of their compatriots. The press has been of great help to them to diffuse their ideas, or perhaps more exactly, those which they derived from the books of the Occident, for the assets of a Japanese writer being too poor to supply the innumberable publications which inundate this country, it is similar publications from old Europe which fournish the material which the editors season to the taste of their public.

No doubt one of the things that grieved the missionary most was that although the Japanese sought their sources in Germany and England, among the favourite authors of these Japanese thinkers were the missionary's own compatriots: 'J.J. Rouseau, Auguste Comte and his disciples, Renan and other writers of the same style'.

Finally the author complained of the competition coming from the numerous Protestant sects in Japan.

Having summarised again the obstacles in the way of the

missionaries, the author appealed to his readers by writing:-

> Catholicism has nothing which can inspire fears similar to the Russian schism, or that can be treated as an enemy of the social order such as Protestantism; it is universal and presents a danger to no country; if is the defender of legitimate authority in the family as in the State, because it teaches that all authority emanates from God.[1]

As we have seen in this chapter at least two of these statements are false. In the period covered by this thesis Catholicism in Japan was not universal but definitely and quite nationalistically French. Secondly it was, even in Japan, a potential danger given Petitjean's belief that war was necessary to substitute Christianity for idolatry. That Catholicism was the defender of 'legitimate authority' in the State was at least partly true, that is if the legitimate authority was conservative. The strong conservatism of the Catholic Church at the time could indeed have appealed to a certain extent to the Japanese authorities. As Kisimoto remarked, 'the Catholic Church, traditionally organized around the Pope and his hierarchy, contained elements consonant with conservative political power.' and that 'a Catholic's attitude toward his Pope was similar to the attitude the Japanese government wanted to inculcate with respect to the Emperor.'[2]

1. Piolet, op. cit., p. 482-500
2. Kisimoto, op. cit., p. 212

The point is, however, that by the end of the '80s the Japanese government had devised indigenous means to inculcate the people with respect to the Emperor; such documents as the Admonition to Soldiers and Sailors, the Preamble to the Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education served as pillars of the developing Tenno-sei. Neither the Pope nor Catholicism were necessary to the consolidation of the Emperor's power, in fact they were mutually exclusive. One of the more striking features of the late '80s and the '90s, to be seen in greater detail in the three chapters in Part III, was a concerted programme by the Japanese government to strengthen indigenous beliefs (through Shinto) and values (through Confucianism), all the while maintaining and developing the material, scientific and technological imports from the West. In spiritual matters, therefore, as far as the government was concerned, there was no room for Western influences.

As far as the broad mass of the people are concerned, conversions remained few. The reasons for this state of affairs are numerous, many of which could be put forward in purely speculative terms and needing to embrace various disciplines, including comparative religion and anthropology. One factor we noted was that the apparent victory of science over religion in Western intellectual circles was transplanted to Japan.

French Catholic missionaries in the first instance believed that their work was hindered by a repressive, pagan and backward government. As we saw they felt that the European powers should use force, as war might drive out paganism and usher in Catholicism. Failing the use of force, they urged their diplomats and the Foreign Minister himself to use strong diplomatic means to achieve religious freedom in Japan. Once this had been achieved, however, the reason for comparatively few results were felt by the missionaries to be on account of the excessive impact of Western modernity, i.e. science, in Japan. The successes they did achieve were as a result neither of force, nor of intellectual debate, but through good works in orphanages, hospitals and especially leper colonies. Leaving aside this area, however, as a measure of French influence, the Catholic penetration of Japan in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods must be deemed a failure. Whether it would have been more successful had, as at least some of the missionaries wished, France's policy in Japan been more forceful, had war been resorted to, and possible consequent colonisation or at least dismemberment of Japan, must remain a purely speculative question. All one can say is that the only part of Asia where French Catholic missionary work was successful (with converts to Catholicism eventually reaching approximately 10% of the population) was in Indochina.

Appendix.

I. Statistics of the Société des Missions Etrangères in Asia, 1862

Country	Bishops	Missionaries	Native priests	Christian Population
Pondichery	1	46	14	99,826
Burma	1	11	1	6,000
Siam	1	11	4	6,300
Indochina (a)	6	35	146	300,000 (approximately)
China (b)	7	56	92	86,000
Tibet	1	6	0	(no figures given)
Manchuria	1	10	0	6,000
Korea	2	8	0	19,748
Japan	1 (c)	4	0	(number unknown)

a) Indochina comprised all of Cochinchina, Tonkin and Cambodia
b) The missionaries were in five provinces of China, Yunnan, Szechwan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Kweichow
c) Not a bishop, but a superior

II STATISTICS OF THE SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS ETRANGÈRES IN ASIA, 1899

Country	Bishops	Missionaries	Native priests	Christians	Pagan population
Pondichery	1	88	34	217,562	7,500,000
Burma	2	48	12	30,958	7,100,000
Siam	1	39	12	22,000	7,000,000
Indochina (e)	6	218	274	447,164	18,575,000
China (f)	7	219	116	146,592	120,000,000g
Tibet	1	15	1	1,238	4,000,000
Manchuria	1	27	5	15,075	22,000,000
Korea	1	23	0	20,840	10,000,000h
Japan (i)	4	86	15	45,812(j)	36,249,000k

d) The term "pagan" is that used in the source for these figures. No indication is given of how these figures were arrived at; see (g), (h) and (k) below
(e) see (a) above
f) see (b) above
g) This presumably refers to the population in the five provinces listed in (b) above, at the time representing approximately ¼ of the total Chinese population
h) This would be approximately the total population of Korea at the time
i) The missionaries were in Hokodate, Tokio, Osaka and Nagasaki
j) Approximately two-thirds of these were from the Nagasaki area
k) The population of Japan at the time was slightly higher than that, just below or above the 40 millions mark.

The source for these figures are in A. Launay, Histoire Générale de la Société des Missions Etrangères, vol. III, pages 445-449 and 545-595

Converts

The missionaries had expected that in Japan they would make many converts. Prior to the lifting of the ban on Christianity, they spoke in terms of 'the iron arm which holds back the impulse of the masses towards the truth which we have brought to them.'[1] The optimism of the missionaries was partly based on the great successes achieved by their predecessors during the sixteenth century. However, they claimed, even at the time of the ban and before the Restoration, that the Japanese people had told them that they were desperately eager to learn about Christianity and desired to adore the true God.[2] Noting that the numerous Buddhist and Shinto sects could not fill the spiritual needs of the Japanese, especially in a time of transition, the missionaries expressed the confidence that, 'In this flood of errors which carries them, the Japanese will grasp with the greatest eagerness the branch of salvation which he can perceive, just as the drowning man hangs on to all the objects he encounters and which he believes will serve as a plank for his safety. Give us freedom and we will convert by the thousands.'[3]

1. Lettre Commune, 20 June 1863
2. Lettre Commune, 25 June 1864
3. Lettre Commune, 20 June 1863

Converts: Statistics

year	Christians		Baptisms**		Churches/Chapels	
	N	S*	N	S	N	S
1873	15000		120-197		27	
1874	15000		1151-46		33	
1875	15050		1402-477-120		21***	
1876	15501		1158-518-162		20	
1877	1235	16622	439-28-325	867-562-55	10	29
1878	2164	17380	669-25-365	1197-631-29	13	33
1879	2766	17380	622-72-237	1314-281-65	15	36
1880	3263	20646	576-79-172	1720-503-297	19	61
1881	3547	22086	383-81-195	842-841-353	21	59
1882	4094	23000	649-71-251	623-808-292	22	44
1883	4855	24359	676-146-309	649-807-327	23	53
1884	5574	24656	760-186-237	470-842-256	27	57
1885	6193	25178	860-158-369	544-816-261	33	59

*N=North Japan and S=South Japan; up till 1877, figures are for both North and South.
** Baptisms for 1873 and 1874 are given in the order of adult pagans and pagans' children; from 1875 to 1885 they are given in the order, adult pagans, Christians' children and pagans' children
*** Some rather surprising figures find no explanation in the documents. Why there should all of a sudden be twelve churches/chapels less in 1875 than in 1874 I do not know.

Year	Bishops		Missionaries		Native Priests		Catechists		Seminaries		Schools/Orphanages	
	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
1873	2		29		0		227		2(70)*		10(251)*	
1874	2		26		0		202		2(60)		13(258)	
1875	2		28		0		165		2(57)		10(225)	
1876	2		28		0		179		2(62)		14(565)	
1877	1	2	18	16	0	0	34	166	1(31)	1(20)	17(508)	6(275)
1878	1	2	19	17	0	0	37	175	1(15)	1(31)	19(733)	11(457)
1879	1	2	20	17	0	0	44	182	1(13)	2(37)	23(821)	20(861)
1880	1	2	21	19	0	0	38	-**	1(17)	2(44)	34(1698)	33(1461)
1881	1	2	22	21	0	0	40	162	1(11)	2(60)	30(1886)	44(1717)
1882	1	2	23	23	0	0	36	174	1(12)	2(76)	29(1783)	40(1700)
1883	1	2	24	24	0	3***	35	196	1(19)	1(70)+	31(1729)	54(1700)
1884	1	1	28	25	0	3	30	222	1(19)	1(60)	29(1809)	36(1522)
1885	1	1	30	27	0	3	37	235	1(14)	1(60)	26(1994)	37(1590)

* The figures in parentheses indicate the number of students;
** no figure is given for that year; *** the first three Japanese priests were all descendants of Christians, their parents had been kakure, the three as young boys had been in prison with their parents during the persecutions; + the Osaka seminary had to be closed down owing to lack of staff.
The sources for these figures are the Lettres Communes for those years, i.e. 1873-1885

As the figures indicate, and as we saw in Chapter 7, the expectations of the missionaries went unfulfilled. By 1885 in the whole of Japan there were just over 30,000 Catholics, namely somewhat less than 0.1% of the population. In the course of chapter 7 a number of reasons were put forward as to why the harvest was poor. Here we will try to discover who the converts were and how they were converted. Unfortunately the material one is dealing with is fragmentary. The archives of the Missions Etrangères are closed to the public. The information here is gathered from the Lettres Communes: yearly compilations which included reports from the various missions and extracts from the missionaries' letters to Paris.[1]

In looking at the figures, the most striking feature that emerges is the tremendous disproportion between North and South Japan; for 1877, 1235 catholics in the North, to the South's 16,622; and although the figures for the North practically quintupled by 1885, whereas those for the South increased by just 1½ fold, the difference remained very substantial, with 6193 for the North and 25,178 for the South. The South, it will

1. I am grateful to Fr Guennou and Fr. Prouvost for having given me permission to use the library of the Missions Etrangères and for having allowed me to consult the Lettres Communes which cannot be found elsewhere than at the Missions Etrangères in Paris.

be recalled, had its headquarters at Osaka and encompassed all southern Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku. Although no exact figures are available, one can safely assert that all but a small handful of the southern catholics were descendants of the kakure kirishtan, namely people coming from a small radius around Nagasaki, mainly the Urakami valley to the North and the islands mainly to the South.

As the kakure form a completely different category from the other Japanese converts, it seems best to deal with them first, although some of the comments to be made later, and in respect to methods of conversion, apply to both kakure and non-kakure. The kakure, it will be remembered, made their existence known to Petitjean in Nagasaki in 1865. Two years later the deportations and persecutions of these Christians began, lasting until 1873. The kakure were from generally poor, though not necessarily destitute backgrounds. Most were farmers, fishermen; and a few were miners. Most of them worked in their places of residence, though some of the poorer ones had to go off to the mainland to find employment, leaving the old, women and children behind.

The harsh persecutions of the late '60s and early '70s seem to have strengthened rather than weakened them in their faith. Of the first 800 families subjected to torture, only 100, it seems, apostasised.[1] Both at the time of the persecutions and afterwards we know that the kakure did a great deal of proselitising among their own number, i.e. other kakure not yet returned to the fold. The first catechists for the South, and the majority of the southern catechists of the South throughout our period (235 by 1885), devoted much effort to the tasks of discovering more kakure in the region and of convincing the recalcitrant to accept baptism from the French fathers. How far the kakure, catechists, christians and neophytes, attempted to proselitise among other Japanese I do not know. But certainly at the time of the persecutions their perseverance in the face of suffering, their martyrdom, doubtless served as an example both to kakure and non-kakure alike. In a letter published in Les Missions Catholiques one of the missionaries asking his readers to pray for the persecuted, wrote, 'Ask for their perseverance, it is not only to assure their salvation, it is also to prepare the salvation of many of their compatriots, which the spectacle of this perseverance impresses, touches and disposes in favour of a religion which inspires so

1. Lettre Commune, 25 July 1867

much heroism.'[1]

At least as far as the kakure are concerned, it is probably true that the perseverance of their co-religionists, and following their freedom, their zeal, helped to bring them back to the fold by the hundreds. From 1875 to 1883 more than a thousand were baptised each year; the Lettres Communes went into some detail on the 'continuing flow' of kakure returning to the true flock.[2] The missionaries believed that kakure should be found throughout Japan, though in fact these existed only in the Nagasaki area. Even then, however, it was impossible for them to have any clear idea of how many there might be; in 1880 when some 20,000 had already been converted, the missionaries wondered how many tens of thousands might still be just waiting to be saved.[3] The interesting thing of course is that a good many kakure refused to accept the ministry of the French missionaries; and this was a source of considerable irritation. For some reason the kakure population of Amakusa island was the most steadfast in its refusal, in spite of attempts by missionaries and catechists alike. In 1876 it appeared that a breakthrough had been achieved in Amakusa[4], but this proved not to be the case. In 1884 at the village of Oe, out of a population of 4,000

1. Les Missions Catholiques, 23 February 1872
2. Reports are given individually for numerous little villages and islets.
3. Lettre Commune, 1880; following 1873, the Lettres Communes were always dated 31 December
4. Lettre Commune, 1876

kakure, only 142 had joined the Church: 'The principal obstacle to their conversion comes from the baptisers and the prayer-leaders, institutions which, as we know, have continued to this day. Either through stubborness, or through fear of losing their influence or the small profits they secure, these baptisers make every effort to keep at a distance both missionary and religious practices.'[1]

The whole story of the kakure is remarkable. For the missionaries their existence was extremely fortunate, for, as we have noted, they formed the great bulk of their flock. It must be said, however, that their influence on the rest of the Japanese population, with the possible exception of immediate neighbours, was negligible, if not altogether non-existent. They were from uninfluential sectors of the population and were geographically remote. We must now turn our attention from the kakure and concentrate on the other Japanese converts; although, as pointed out above, some of the comments made on methods of conversion apply to both kakure and non-kakure.

Once the missionaries had had to renounce the use of war in achieving conditions necessary for conversion[2], what means did they have at their disposal for arousing, in the first instance, Japanese curiosity with regard to the Catholic faith?

1. Lettre Commune 1864
2. Both Girard and Mounicou at least echoed Petitjean's desire for war, see Lettre Commune, 20 June 1863; at the time of the Kuper expedition to Kagoshima, it was rumoured among the missionaries that Britain intended to annex the Ryukyus as a colony, a step which was to be welcomed for the missionaries would then have 'all possible liberty for the exercise of their ministry among the natives.' (Lettre Commune, 20 June 1863)

For curiosity, of course, was the first step on the road to conversion. One could suggest that there were five means for securing conversion, though these should not be seen in isolation, but as complementary one to the other. These are: 1) The curiosity generated by the building of churches and chapels; 2) The importance of the role of native catechists; 3) The role of orphanages, schools, and various other means which helped those in hardship; 4) Publications and lectures; 5) Consequences following the conversion of people influential either in the social or intellectual domain. In looking at the means of conversion and instances of success, some idea of who the converts were and why they were converted should emerge.

It will be recalled that following the opening of the church of Yokohama in 1862 the Bakufu had arrested a number of Japanese for having penetrated inside the church (p.275/6). Leaving the arrests aside, however, the missionaries wrote in terms of more than 10,000 Japanese who in just a few days following the opening of the 'modest chapel' showed such eagerness to visit it, asking explanations about each object in the church.[1] The Nagasaki church aroused similar interest[2]. It was of course responsible for the emergence of the first kakure in 1865. So a dozen years later when Osouf saw the erection of the church in Osaka, he hoped that it too might attract some still unknown kakure from the Kansai area.[3] In the same year he had urged that more churches

1. Lettre Commune, 20 June 1863
2. Lettre Commune, 20 July 1865
3. Lettre Commune, 1877

and chapels should be built, as these provided centres of interest[1]; the number of churches for Japan for 1877 almost doubled that of 1876, from 20 to 39. It was the services inside the buildings, no less than the buildings themselves, which attracted interest; and the missionaries frequently mention the importance they attach to the rituals (some of which apparently lasted three hours or more). Pomp and circumstance could help. The missionaries were more than delighted, therefore, when they had placed at their disposal the band of the Imperial Guard for the solemn mass inaugurating the new Gothic church of Tokyo.[2] Obviously such an event attracted wide attention; and Les Missions Catholiques commented that 'Certain Japanese newspapers of Tokyo wrote about the catholic celebration in most complimentary language, which can only favourably impress their readers and, so may God will, serve to extend his glory on these distant isles.'[3]

Needless to say, the French missionaries learned Japanese, and indeed a number of them congratulated themselves in speaking the language at least as well, if not better, than the natives.[4] Nevertheless, the most important, indeed the absolutely essential,

1. ibid; see also Lettre Commune of 31 December 1880 where it is stressed that the important thing is not just to build a church, but to build a beautiful church.
2. Lettre Commune, 1878
3. Les Missions Catholiques, 25 October 1878
4. On the occasion of a public lecture at Tokyo, the missionary Mugabure addressed the audience, as a result of which, 'These Japanese fellows seemed most surprised to see that one could speak their language with a spirit, an elegance and a purity of accent, difficult to find even among themselves.' Lettre Commune, 1884

auxiliaries of the missionaries were the Japanese catechists. These were men and women who were trained by the missionaries to go out, preach and teach the catechism. Their role was not just to bring in new converts, but also to keep in touch with the christians. There were three reasons why the catechists were of special importance. They could communicate with their compatriots, not just in terms of language, but in terms of dealing with the intricate web of Japanese society and social mores. They were significant in terms of numbers, swelling considerably the ranks of the missionaries. Thirdly, and of great importance, was the fact that the catechists had easy access to all parts of Japan; something which the missionaries did not enjoy.

The question of the catechists and propagation of the faith in the interior of Japan (i.e. beyond the limits of the treaty ports) being intimately linked, a few words must be said about what can be called the campaign in the interior. The missionaries had the right, from the establishment of the treaties, to build churches in the treaty ports. Following the lifting of the ban on Christianity they also had the right to preach to the Japanese. They often complained, however, that the treaty ports presented two problems: the first was that most of the Japanese were attracted to the ports in search of money rather than spiritual enrichment; secondly, that the foreigners in the treaty ports set a bad example by their behaviour.[1] Indeed Niigata, Hakodate

1. Lettres Communes, 1874 and 1884. According to Les Missions Catholiques, 'the Japanese of the interior are more gentle, more moral, better disposed than the inhabitants of the coast.' (18 September 1874)

and Nagoya were singled out as being especially difficult: in Niigata, 'the love of lucre and pleasures is traditional'[1]; in Hakodate conversions are so few that one wonders whether the cold climate 'freezes the souls of the inhabitants'[2]; while Nagoya 'is distinguished by its thirst for gold and its corruption' and practically all the girls are prostitutes.[3]

Following the lifting of the ban on Christianity the missionaries complained that the problems remained legion, not the least being the impossibility of travelling in the interior.[4] In the same year, however, the missionary Marin obtained a passport and carried out an extensive trip in the interior from Yokohama to Hakodate in the company of E. de Bavier.[5] Although forbidden to engage in any evangelical work, he did manage at least to convert one of his three guides; the latter was apparently of lower samurai stock, intended studying medicine, but died shortly after his conversion.[6] By 1876 Marin had been able to found a small catholic community in Numazu; and Arrivet, another missionary, had established a similar community in Sendai.[7] Whether these missionaries penetrated into the interior openly or surreptitiously is not absolutely clear. Passports for travel in the interior could of course be obtained.

1. Lettre Commune, 1878
2. Lettre Commune, 1882
3. Lettre Commune, 1884
4. Lettre Commune, 1874
5. Marin records his journey in a series of articles appearing almost every week in Les Missions Catholiques from 27 February to 18 September 1874
6. Les Missions Catholiques, 6 February 1874
7. Lettre Commune, 1876

Presumably the missionaries' travels depended on the good will of officials. Be that as it may, by 1878 one missionary was specifically in charge of internal travel in the North.[1] Although the missionaries were full of praise for the zeal of the northern neophytes and in the following year a second missionary had been detailed with internal northern travel,[2] there were problems concerning not only the task of conversion but also that of keeping the converted steadfast in their faith, and in behaviour according to the strict rules of their newly acquired religion. The missionary had to admit, and complain, that at times converts simply 'disappeared'.[3] The problem for them was to create a christian community in a non-christian environment:

> Besides the work of conversions, our brothers have to foster christian habits among the neophytes. Newly baptised, in a country where our holy religion, only a few years ago, was completely unknown or calumnied and cruelly persecuted; not having among them old christians, in the midst of whom and following whose example they could easily accustom themselves to religious practices, these neophytes, so fervent on the day of their baptism, would not delay in letting themselves go and succumb to the perils which surround them, if the missionaries, after having brought them the faith, were not extremely careful in completing their instruction, and inspiring within them fidelity and the attachment to the duties and practices of Christianity.[4]

In 1880 there were three itinerant missionaries[5] and the following year their number was increased to eight.[6] Two priests

1. Lettre Commune, 1878
2. Lettre Commune, 1879
3. see for example Lettre Commune of 1881
4. Lettre Commune, 1879
5. Lettre Commune, 1880
6. Lettre Commune, 1881

had also penetrated the interior by being employed as teachers of French, namely in Kyoto and Okayama[1], where in the former the missionary Villion was able to baptise 37 adults in 1881[2]. By 1881 the missionaries could claim that almost all the interior of Japan except Hokkaido had at least been visited.[3] By 1883 they were able to report that travel in the interior was relatively easy once the formalities had been completed.[4] Already in 1882 a missionary, Faurie, had begun to learn the Aino language with a view of penetrating the interior of Hokkaido.[5]

In all this the role of the catechists was of special importance; they were the scouts, the chief collaborators. They were also in most areas the precursors of the faith, opening up the way for the missionaries; especially in the early years the latter might just be able to make a quick trip in the interior to baptise those prepared by the catechists.[6] In 1876 three schools were established in Tokyo for the training of catechists 'of which the mission has such a great need.'[7] In 1880 a missionary complained that the harvest in one of the districts of southern Japan had been terrible, mainly because of the death of one catechist and the illness of two others.[8] Death, however,

1. Lettre Commune, 1880
2. Lettre Commune, 1881; Villion spent fifty years in Japan as a missionary, from 1873 to 1923
3. Lettre Commune, 1881
4. Lettre Commune, 1883
5. Lettre Commune, 1882
6. Lettre Commune, 1875
7. Lettre Commune, 1876
8. Lettre Commune 1880

was never as catastrophic for the mission as the desertion of a catechist: 'it is not only a signal of a halt in conversions, but also a great temptation and at times even a cause for the fall of those whom he had instructed.'[1] In 1885 the need for more catechists was still felt to be acute, 'if we possessed a greater number, we would infinitely multiply the number of conversions.'[2] By the end of the same year, however, the missionaries had some reason for rejoicing, as an English protestant missionary, by the name of Garrat, had been converted to Catholicism along with his catechist and both were now busy bringing their entire flock to the French priests.[3]

On the schools, oddly enough, very little indeed is said in the Lettres Communes. The figures are given, and occasionally references are made to the good work being done by the sisters in educating young girls; but apart from that there is very little. In the figures given for schools and pupils, there is no distinction in respect to school levels (nursery, primary or secondary) or to the age or sex of the pupils. Nor, unfortunately, is there even a sample curriculum from any of the schools. Similarly, apart from mentioning at times where schools are being opened (for example we know that a number were established in the Asakusa and Honjo areas of Tokyo, thus giving some idea of the background of the pupils), nothing is

1. Lettre Commune, 1884
2. Lettre Commune, 1885
3. Lettre Commune, 1885

known about the pupils, apart from an aggregate figure. There are no details about the kind of families they came from, or about how well they studied, how responsive they were to christian teaching, nor even about how long they tended to stay in the schools. One must hope that material will appear which will permit even a partial reconstruction of the catholic schools and their pupils during this period. For the time being, however, no further consideration can be given to this problem.

Far more material exists on what can be termed 'good works' in general, including orphanages, the care of the sick, and needle-work schools for indigent young women. Already in 1867 the missionaries had begun establishing orphanages, thanks to which 'we find everywhere the admiration and affection of the people'; these orphanages are 'powerful roots planted into the soil and they will blossom after the storm'.[1] In 1875 noting the beginning of a more rapid return to the fold on the part of some kakure, the missionaries remarked, 'this happy movement seems to have been encouraged by the charity and devotion which the missionaries were able to show at the time of a murderous epidemic of last year'.[2] Needless to say the missionaries often praised the work of the different orders of sisters. In 1877 the

1. Lettre Commune, 25 July 1867
2. Lettre Commune, 1875

Sisters of the Saint Enfant Jesus opened an asylum for old women and were able to convert 70 of them that same year.[1] And the same year an orphanage run by the same sisters 'surpassed all our hopes' so that the number of admissions had to be restricted.[2] 'The curing of bodies will prove a powerful means to procuring the salvation of the souls'[3], and so the sisters brought quite a few converts to the missionaries in this way. Thus in two Tokyo districts, Tsukiji and Ogawamachi, in one day, ten and twenty people respectively were baptised.[4] In Hakodate the Soeurs de Saint Paul de Chartres opened a 'pharmacy' for the sick:

> The sister in charge has a prodigious reputation; people come from all extremeties of the city in order to consult her. In ten days the number of sick presenting themselves daily has increased from 10 to 25. This gives the missionary the possibility of seeing them, instructing them or at least to help them in the hour of death; many have been baptised in this way.[5]

Hardships and illnesses helped not only to bring in new converts, but to keep the converted in line; in 1879 a missionary estimated that the recent cholera epidemic 'contributed in no small way in forcing the negligent and the laggards to look into themselves. I had the happiness of seeing a good number thus sincerely return to God.'[6]

1. Lettre Commune, 1877
2. Les Missions Catholiques, 21 December 1877
3. Lettre Commune, 1881
4. Lettre Commune, 1885
5. Les Missions Catholiques, 10 January 1879
6. Lettre Commune, 1879

It would appear, although no hard figures exist to prove it, that the large majority of the <u>non-kakure</u> Catholics were from the poorer, indeed probably in many cases destitute, classes of Japanese society, although there were some exceptions as we shall see. Tokyo seemed particularly rewarding to the missionaries. In 1875 'lectures were organised in two populous districts of the capital and it is consoling to see that everywhere the audience filled the lecture-rooms entirely and listened attentitively to the catechism'.[1] The two districts in fact were Asakusa and Honjo, the inhabitants of which found favourable mention on a number of occasions.[2] Of Honjo one of the missionaries wrote, 'it is in Tokyo the home for the disinherited of this world', he noted the number of Catholics (four schools were run by the missionaries and sisters in Honjo), and their devotion: 'they know the truth, poor souls, before the rationalists, the scientists and the rich of the right bank of the river'.[3]

Certainly a great deal of the efforts of the missionaries and the nuns was directed towards the task of bringing succour to the poor, the sick, the down-and-out; who were helped no doubt by the Catholic faith to face the tribulations of their life on earth with greater serenity. In a mining village a missionary

1. Lettre Commune, 1875
2. see Lettres Communes of 1881, 1882 and 1884
3. Lettre Commune, 1884

reports that the bosses 'would like all the workers to become christians, then they would no longer have to fear revolts, and have to have recourse, as last year, to the intervention of the police and arms in order to bring the mutineers back to reason.'[1]

A few examples of conversion are worth recording.

In the countryside near Nagasaki there is the story of a prostitute, whose daughter, raised by the sisters of the Sainte-Enfance, had been adopted into a christian family. The mother finding herself in her daughter's village, goes to visit her, but almost immediately falls ill. The following day her condition worsens considerably and the Christians teach her the principal truths of the religion. The poor woman then becomes conscious of her past and of the terrible future which awaits her, seized by fear she desperately implores to be baptised. The missionary is called at great haste, but judges that the woman is not sufficiently versed in Christian teaching to be baptised. She answers that if he thus persists, he will be casting her into hell, the doors of which she could already see opening beneath her feet. Thus the priest relented and as the baptismal water flowed on her forehead, she cried out, 'Thank-you! Good-bye! I am leaving for paradise' and an instant later she breathed her last.[2]

In Wakamatsu the family of a blind leper was baptised, the latter having been moved by the story of Job and following baptism apparently finding joy in his illness.[3]

1. Lettre Commune, 1879
2. Lettre Commune, 1883
3. Les Missions Catholiques, 14 September 1883

A prisoner, condemned to death, was fortunate to find among the wardens of his gaol in Chiba a number of Catholics. He was baptised and from that day 'was completely transformed. Till that day ... he had feared the last moment. Now he almost blesses the punishment of a crime he detests, he is calm and prays while waiting for the appointed day'. But, completely unexpectedly, he is pardoned and returns to his province where he 'shows much zeal' in preaching the Gospel.[1]

Several times the missionaries note conversions following miraculous cures. One of these cases is that of a certain Sakae, semi-skilled employee of a silk manufacturer; he had a serious accident at work, was brought home, having practically lost his right arm; but by the time the doctor arrived, even the bleeding had stopped. Thanks to the prayers of his wife, a neophyte, he completely regained the use of his arm and became a convert on the spot.[2]

In a village in Bingo province the baptism of a young man took place, but the missionary, Vasselon, subsequently discovered that he was an <u>eta</u>, 'which sufficed to keep at a distance those who up till now had shown certain inclinations towards conversion.'[3] In two villages near Sunagawa (just outside Tokyo), Ichibugata

1. Lettre Commune, 1884
2. Lettre Commune, 1885
3. Lettre Commune, 1883

and Haijima, almost entirely inhabited by **eta** having converted to Catholicism, the missionaries noted that they were 'always faithful to their religious obligations and often prove themselves to be more conscientious in their work and manners than those belonging to a superior class, who despise them.'[1]

No doubt Catholicism appealed more to the outsiders, the destitute, the ostracised; but of course conversion itself could bring about ostracism as well. In Numazu a rice merchant by the name of Kondo had become a convert to Catholicism; now, apparently resulting from the instigation of the local bonzes, not only would no one purchase his rice any more, in spite of its high quality and fair prices, but parents forbade their children to play with his children.[2] In a small village near Ise the owner of a small cotton mill was baptised with all his family. His fifteen female employees left him immediately, though eventually they returned.[3]

Lectures in villages and in cities were one of the means used by the missionaries to attract attention. Their success in renting convenient premises obviously depended on the good will of the residents and officials. In order to reach a wider audience, however, the missionaries increasingly stressed the

1. Lettre Commune, 1884
2. Les Missions Catholiques, 3 March 1876
3. Lettre Commune, 1883

importance of publications in Japanese. Already in 1879 Marin was working on a book in Japanese which would explain the difference between Catholicism, Protestantism and the Orthodox Church, as the situation must indeed have been confusing to the Japanese.[1] From 1881 to 1885 a bimonthly review appeared, edited by M. Cutter, entitled Kokyo Dampo (Catholic News) and from 1885 to 1889 another bi-monthly, edited by M. Ligneul, and entitled Tenchu no Dampei (The Soldier of God). In 1885 one missionary, Ligneul, was made specifically responsible for publications and was assisted by an editorial staff of three Japanese.[2] By 1885 the missionaries had published a dozen monographs, including catechisms, histories of the bible, explanations on the sacrament of the eucharist, books of prayers and guides to the christian way of life. Through publications it was hoped no doubt that a wider audience and perhaps a slightly higher class of people would be reached. For as rewarding and important as every conversion may have been, so far as making an impact was concerned -- and the missionaries recognised this -- a higher class of convert both socially and intellectually, was necessary; this for three reasons. In the first place, as we shall have an opportunity to illustrate, when a high-class person was converted, he tended to take his underlings with him. Secondly,

1. Lettre Commune, 1879
2. Lettre Commune, 1885

the missionaries were constantly bemoaning the competition offered by the Protestant heretics and the Russian schismatics, but as early as 1875 they had to admit that the Protestants were getting a better class of convert and thus had greater influence on the government.[1] Also they recognised that the attacks against Christian teachings were becoming increasingly sophisticated:

> We have to bring to your attention ... a new obstacle to the propagation of the Gospel; it is the unfortunate influence of so-called progress (sic), such as one understands it today. The governmental schools, as well as a number of private schools, opened by Japanese having studied in Europe, only promise the fruits of materialism, atheism and immorality. The press, which gives itself in the country a freedom which is already difficult to contain, promises nothing better and has already launched a campaign against our holy religion. Its action is even more powerful and pernicious, for often one would need volumes to victoriously refute, in front of the ignorance and the prejudices of the country, the hideous calumnies which are found in the articles of wicked newspapers.[2]

In 1877 Osouf was able to announce from Osaka that out of 17 converts, 'three will be able, thanks to their education, their position and their fervour, to render important services for the mission.'[3] Three years later great success was recorded at Sunagawa where there were 51 simultaneous conversions; 'the example was given by the local authorities. The mayor, several municipal councillors, a doctor, the chief of the post office all

1. Lettre Commune, 1875
2. ibid
3. Lettre Commune, 1877

embraced the religion.'[1] In the same year an important conversion took place at Nagasaki. A judge, by the name of Kamada, had been active in the persecution of Christians prior to the lifting of the ban on Christianity. Since then, however, his wife and parents-in-law had been converted and daily begged him to open his heart to the teachings of Christ. Finally he relented and one of the best pupils at the seminary was sent to instruct him. Kamada was convinced, was baptised and, not surprisingly, took the name Paul. He was unable to emulate his namesake further, however, as he died very shortly after his conversion.[2]

In a village south of Yokohama 230 baptisms were recorded: this phenomenon 'owes its origin to the conversion of a rich Japanese who had rendered great services to the inhabitants of his village.' As a result all the villagers felt a heavy debt of gratitude to him; 'his instructions and exhortations, joined to those of the missionaries who visited the village, encouraged a certain number of his protégés to embrace Christianity.'[3]

At Ise the missionary Villion was able to sow seeds which promised a rich harvest, 'thanks to the Napoleonic code';

1. Lettre Commune, 1880
2. Les Missions Catholiques, 2 July 1880
3. Lettre Commune, 1882

> The authors of our code no doubt had not foreseen such a result. It is in the study of our legislation, today in force in Japan, that the first neophytes of this province, coming mainly from among magistrates, learned to know and esteem the christian religion. After their baptism they promised to use their influence to propagate the faith among their fellow-citizens: "Yes", said one of them, judge at the court of the capital of the prefecture, "I want to read to them, comment, explain with all my strength, these sacred commandments, foundation of all laws, which alone can regenerate our country and make of Japan a great empire."[1]

One of the Ise judges, Komada, often accompanied Villion in his preaching; in his own city he had a sign placed on the door of his house which read, 'Propagation of Catholicism: who wishes to instruct himself, enter here.'[2]

In Wakamatsu the missionaries were able to convert the aged, but venerated, head of a distinguished local family. The old man, taking the name Jean-Baptiste, promised to call a family reunion to teach them the new path that he had chosen.[3]

One of the most rewarding catches seems to have been that of Louis Asakura in 1884, then aged 30:

> Thanks to his wealth, to his titles of former Councillor General and Inspector of Schools, but especially thanks to his irreproachable conduct and his love for religion, he enjoys among Christians a very preponderant influence. In front of the missionaries, he is the humblest, the most subdued of all Christians; he even seems timid. But see him involved in a religious discussion with pagans, Russian schismatics or Protestant heretics, he becomes another man: he has to fight until he has secured an uncontested victory, and that, not for the pleasure of winning, but out of love for truth. His adversaries have at times complained of the energy of his answers.

1. Lettre Commune, 1882
2. Lettre Commune, 1883
3. Les Missions Catholiques, 14 September 1883

In May he had organised a series of lectures for academics and government officials:

> They would consider it beneath their dignity to come to study religion at the mission. But they quite willingly will go to a reunion where science is discussed and where admission has to be paid. The theme of our programme is Progress Through Religion.[1]

On a purely intellectual sphere there was the welcome conversion of a scholar of the Chinese classics, Iwasaki, who, 'all the while praising the works of Japanese and Chinese philosophy, found their doctrine incomplete.'[2] Finally in Nagasaki a lawyer, Watanabe, embraced Catholicism and was of great help to all Catholics who found themselves unjustly victimised by officialdom.[3]

The main conclusion to be drawn is that converts to Catholicism during our period were almost exclusively from the poorer classes. The pattern of the sixteenth century, when daimyo and other high ranking members of Japanese society became converts, did not repeat itself. Conditions in Japan in the sixteenth century were very different indeed from those of the nineteenth. The only thing one can tentatively suggest is that part of the explanation for the conditions in the nineteenth century, including the initial hostility at least towards the

1. Lettre Commune, 1884
2. Lettre Commune, 1884

missionaries, can be found in the successes the missionaries' predecessors had enjoyed in the sixteenth century. The harvest was very far indeed from being as abundant as the missionaries had expected.

Part III

Chapter 8.

The Yokosuka Shipyard

Among the more remarkable achievements of Japan in the half century following Perry's visit was her emergence as one of the world's leading naval powers. The Western power most responsible for helping Japan to achieve this status was Britain. But the role of France was not without importance. Under the auspices of Oguri Tadamasa and Leon Roches, France was to participate in developing Japan's first major shipyard at Yokosuka, which in time became 'the most famous of Japanese naval shipyards' and would employ by 1881 not far from two thousand people, 'in one of the largest factories in Japan at the time.'[1] The creation and development of the Yokosuka shipyard, therefore, were relevant to Japan's naval development and to the nation's industrialisation as a whole, with ship-building as an important sector of the economy.

The development of Japan's naval strength is all the more spectacular when compared with the state of her navy at the time of Perry's visit. For a maritime country, in which, according to Admiral Yamamoto Gombei, 'it is but natural that its people should, from the necessities of life, cultivate a

1. E.H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, p. 120

seafaring habit and be early led to gain some knowledge of nautical affairs,'[1] Japan - when Perry arrived - had very primitive coastal defenses and no naval strength to speak of. Thanks to the ban on the construction of ships any larger than those needed for domestic trade, no building of large vessels was allowed. This ban was lifted in 1853 as several influential Japanese, prominent among them Mito Nariaki, had been urging for some time: The arrival of Perry, the presence of further Western fleets in and around Japanese waters, made a new naval policy imperative: 'Thus, the immediate stimulus for the introduction of modern shipbuilding, which dates from this measure, clearly came from the menace of foreign aggression.'[2]

In the years immediately following Perry's visit both the Bakufu and the han engaged in naval development with as much fervour as their resources allowed. By the time of the Restoration fourteen han had either repair or building facilities.[3] With the menace from abroad being temporarily supplanted by the dissensions within Japan, naval competition between han and Bakufu became more intense. Indeed Satsuma was buying warships from abroad, mainly through the good offices of Thomas Glover,[4]

1. Yamamoto Gombei, "The Japanese Navy", in S. Okuma, Fifty Years of New Japan, p.218
2. F.C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan p.7
3. Ibid. p.9
4. G. Fox, Britain and Japan 1858-1883, p.331-333

and was developing in Kagoshima its own naval industries. Bakufu activities in naval repair, in launching a naval training programme, were first developed in Nagasaki with Dutch help as early as 1855.[1] When anti-Tokugawa forces in the south gained strength and momentum, it was felt in official circles that further expansion in shipbuilding and repair was necessary and that such expansion should take place closer to Edo for obvious strategic reasons.[2] The Bakufu turned to France, and specifically to Roches; and thanks to his assistance an iron foundry at Yokohama and a shipyard at Yokosuka were to be built. In time the Yokohama Iron Foundry became the Yokohama Dock Company. As for the Yokosuka shipyard, this remained the principal ship-building yard of the Navy until the end of World War Two.[3]

The development of the Yokosuka shipyard is illustrative of early Japanese modernisation prior to the Restoration; most of its features were to continue during the first few decades following the Restoration. They displayed two important features which, as

1. H.J. Jones, "Bakumatsu Foreign Employees", in Monumenta Nipponica, vol. XXIX, p.307-311 and Seiho Arima, "The Western Influence of Japanese Military Science, Shipbuilding, and Navigation", in Monumenta Nipponica, vol. XIX, p.131-137
2. N. Umetani, The Role of Foreign Employees in the Meiji Era in Japan, p.24
3. S. Arima. op. cit., 137

T.C. Smith argues, were characteristic of the early history of modern industry in Japan:

> 'First, the earliest and most important industries developed during the Tokugawa period, such as iron, armaments, and shipbuilding, were strategic in character. Second, the urgency of developing the new industries and the absence of a capitalist class with traditions and experience in industrial undertakings precluded their development being left to private interests.'[1]

The Yokosuka shipyard was certainly strategic in character and it was to remain under Government management until the end of the Second World War. Another characteristic of Japan's response to the West is to be noted here: not content with buying Western warships which they continued to do for a long time, the Japanese proposed at an early stage to build their own.

The story of the Yokosuka shipyard is also illustrative of another important factor in late Tokugawa and early Meiji industrial and military development. T.C. Smith concludes his work on political change and industrial development in Japan with the statement that 'modern industry in Japan dates from the late Tokugawa period when, under threat of Western encroachment, the Tokugawa and leading han built Western-style shipyards, iron foundries and arsenals.'[2] Although the Western impact undoubtedly

1. Smith, op. cit., p.4
2. Smith, op. cit., p.101

stimulated military and industrial development in Japan, where it was quickly perceived that the two must be closely linked, it could be argued that the intensification of this development up to 1865 had more to do with internal divisions than with external threats. This can be seen from the use that was made of foreigners. In the early stages following Perry's visit, opposition to the treaties was evenly spread among both Bakufu and han. The attitudes of the two camps changed roughly at the same time. On the part of the Bakufu there was an increasing realisation of the hopelessness of opposing the West and of abrogating the treaties; and there was increasing alarm about what was happening in the south-Western han. On the part of the han the message of Western military superiority was driven home by the Kagoshima and Shimonoseki bombardments.

The impetus for developing industrial and military strength no doubt came from the Western menace, but until actual Western instructors were sought, such strength had perforce to remain primitive. The momentum for military and industrial advance progressed under the impetus of the changing political situation. Although the han were able to purchase Western arms, machinery, and ships through private Western enterprises and could hire through the same channel foreign technicians, the Bakufu as long

as it remained the government that was in treaty relationship with the Western powers, was to retain a monopoly of official Western technical aid. For all the sympathy certain members of the British legation may have felt with Satsuma, it would have been impossible for Britain to have sent naval instructors to Satsuma without having to break off relations with what was still the official government of Japan. It was mainly during the last three years of its existence that the Bakufu sought on an intensive scale Western help, as exemplified by the French military mission and construction of the Yokosuka shipyard, and the British naval mission. Despite the vast expense of these undertakings on the part of an impoverished treasury, it was felt to be necessary for political survival. For the han, on the other hand, realising the importance of official foreign help, it became much more necessary to secure political control as quickly as possible, rather than to try merely to compete with the Bakufu in military and industrial enterprises. Similarly the need to continue obtaining Western help, despite the vast expenses involved, was motivated by internal political considerations. It was only when the government felt reasonably secure that it could begin economising by repatriating an increasingly large number of expensive Western experts, namely in the late 1870s and early 80s.[1]

1. see Table III, "Foreigners Employed by the Government", Umetani, op. cit., p. 72

Thus in terms of timing at least it was perhaps internal dissensions in Japan rather than the menace of the West, that led to a substantial acceleration in military and industrial growth, which was increasingly dependent on foreign technical help. The Tokugawa attempt to monopolise major industrial developments of strategic importance with extensive aid from the West failed to assure its political survival. This may have been due among other things, to the fact that it started too late. But its programme was to be continued by the new central government.

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It was in January 1865 that Roches first told his Ministry of the Japanese request for help in building a shipyard. Roches had sought the advice of Admiral Jaurès who suggested that the Japanese government invite Leonce Verny, a young French engineer in his mid-twenties, to visit the country; Verny was at that time working at Ning-po in China. Verny was to suggest the site for the projected shipyard, the scale of the works to be undertaken, the figures for personnel and materials, and an approximate estimate of the costs involved. Once these recommendations had been made an envoy (Shibata) of the Taikun would leave for France to seek government support in Paris in the hiring of the required personnel and the purchase of necessary material. Roches added that it would then be up to the government to

decide whether it was prepared to send a number of its own naval engineers or whether the Japanese envoy should address himself to private industry.[1]

Little more than a month later, Roches was able to inform his Ministry that Verny's plan was completed and that the Japanese government was delighted with it. He explained that the site chosen for the new shipyard was Yokosuka: 'The bay of Yokosuka offering a certain ressemblance with the great port of Toulon in the Mediterannean, M. Verny judged that this site would be suitable to the establishment of our dockyard, which, compared to that of Toulon will be as a robust child in relation to a man in all his force.' Roches was insistent that the French government should undertake this project,[2] On his side Jaurès was also insisting that his Ministry agree to undertake the project under its own auspices.[3] Jaurès, as was pointed out in chapter 2, wanted Yokohama to be the base of the French Far Eastern fleet in place of Shanghai. Doubtless his insistence that the French navy, rather than private industry, participate directly in the project, was motivated by his own strategic ideas. In Umetani's words, 'the French saw Yokohama and Yokosuka on the Bay of Edo as the most favourable spots for the rest and

1. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 16 January 1865
2. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 28 February 1865
3. Marine, 838, Jaurès to Ministry, 10 January 1865 and J.Raoulx, "La Creation de l'Arsenal de Yokosuka", in La Revue Maritime, May 1939

repair of the French Far Eastern Fleet.'[1] However, Jaurès' request to make Yokohama his headquarters was turned down; and there is no evidence that the Yokosuka arsenal was used to any great extent by the French Fleet. Nevertheless, in 1865 French and Bakufu interests were to coincide, for 'While the Bakufu hoped to come into possession of modern naval power capable of dominating the han, France thought that the plan could further its influence in the Far East.'[2] In the summer of 1865 Shibata sailed to France, furnished with very detailed and extensive documents relating to necessary purchases and hiring of personnel.[3] The project was accepted by the two governments, and Verny began work in March 1866.[4]

The scale of the work involved - not to mention the fact that foreigners played a leading part - made it an operation without precedent in Japan's modern history. It was the country's first major modern industrial project, involving the preparing of the ground, the levelling of two hills, the deplacement of masses of earth and the excavating of docks.[5] French personnel

1. Umetani, op. cit., p.24
2. ibid
3. CP vol. XIII, Roches to Ministry, 10 June 1865
4. J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 595
5. Livre du Centenaire de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 1794-1894, vol II

included not only highly qualified engineers but also foremen and workers. Up to December 1868 some fifty-five Frenchmen were employed. By July 1866 the French employees with their families were settled in Yokohama with their own school and church, in what was eventually to be described as 'a little corner of their country'.[1] Jaures' successor, Admiral Roze, was impressed as early as the spring of 1866 by the progress of the work at Yokosuka. He wrote: 'One day Yokosuka will be the Toulon of Japan, while Yokohama will be her Marseilles.' Yet the idea of so many Frenchmen in Japan and of such different backgrounds did cause the Admiral some anxiety and he insisted that,

> 'one of the essential conditions is that the workers accompanying M. Verny be of tested morality. In this country where the inhabitants are of such gentle, polite and well disposed manners, it would be inappropriate indeed for the French to give an example of bad conduct and disorder. On the contrary it is indispensable that we show to these people, proud of their national traditions, those qualities most likely to make us appreciated and which can make us win their confidence. But in order to maintain this colony of workers in the line of duty, there are a few questions which M. Verny will have to address himself to. It would be a good idea to establish lecture halls, to create games and to furnish distractions on holidays and vacations in order to keep the workers so far as possible inside the official buildings while trying at the sage time to render their stay as enjoyable as possible.'[2]

1. J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 598 and 601
2. J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 597

Verny estimated that the construction of the Yokosuka dockyard would require four years at a cost of 2,400,000 Mexican dollars. Meanwhile, he urged that no time be lost in arranging for simple repairs to be carried out in Yokohama, and that such repair facilities should be available within a year.[1] Within a short time the installation at Yokohama included

> 'workshops for making wrought iron, machine models, steam boilers, sails, and ship fittings, and for casting iron. The machinery used in the shops was powered by steam. It was intended that at least part of the equipment required by the larger Yokosuka foundry would be produced at Yokohama and that such farm implements and household articles as could be made from iron would be manufactured for sale.'[2]

As will be seen, one of the more important aspects of the Yokosuka dockyard and its Yokohama extension was in the training given to Japanese. At the outset, experience in the use of modern machinery was to be obtained the hard way, for in the first few months of work,

> 'the medical service was by no means unemployed. The contact between Japanese and European machines did not take place without provoking numerous accidents, and many wounded had to seek the help of the surgeon (Dr. Savatier). The imprudence and unconcern of the Japanese were a perpetual danger, to the point where one had to renounce the use of blasting.'[3]

1. Revue Française du Japon, September 1894, p. 307/8
2. T.C. Smith, op. cit., p.8
3. J. Raoulx, op. cit. , p.600/1

The Yokosuka dockyard had not begun operating by the time the Shogun was overthrown. With the recall of the British naval mission and the French military mission following the outbreak of the civil war, Verny and Roches worried about what would happen to the projected dockyard. Roches argued that whereas the military mission could be described as 'a means of war', the Yokosuka arsenal on the other hand was 'still for a long time to come an industrial establishment useful to the country as to foreigners'.[1] Roches had obtained from the falling Bakufu that it mortgage the Yokosuka dockyard to France in exchange for heavy debts which it had incurred.

This was a serious situation for the new government as the mortgage meant that the Yokosuka dockyard was French until it could be bought back by the Japanese. Thanks to a loan from the Oriental Bank, however, the Japanese government was able to repay the debt. Although there still seem to have been a few outstanding financial problems between the new government and Verny in the immediate post-Restoration period, the new government made no attempt to terminate the Yokosuka project.[2]

1. CP vol. XVI, Roches to Ministry, 25 May 1868
2. Livre du Centenaire del'Ecole Polytechnique and CP vol, XVII, Outrey to Ministry, 7 October 1868

Indeed the dockyard received the highest possible sanction when the Emperor Meiji paid a visit to Yokosuka on 1 January 1872, spending most of a day there in visiting the various establishments making up the dockyard; such as the workshops, forges, boiler works, foundry, assembly shop, ropery, sail-making shop, pulley-shop, and carpentry shop.[1] Dr. Savatier, the medical officer attached to the Yokosuka works, elated by the Emperors visit, exclaimed, in a letter to a friend: 'You cannot imagine the transfiguration Japan has experienced in two years. These people are advancing faster than we have in 200 years. In twenty years one will have greater reason to be proud of being Japanese than of being European. What we see is unbelievable.'[2]

The work carried out under the direction of Verny and his compatriots at Yokosuka introduced a number of industrial techniques and processes new to the Japanese.

> 'In order to appreciate the work accomplished, one has to remember what Japan was like when M.Verny was sent there. He was the first to bring to the country European industry in its various forms; before he arrived, the Japanese had no knowledge of mechanical work of wood and metals and only a very primitive idea of industrial manual work. He established the first manufacture of bricks and of

1. CP vol. XXI, de Turenne to Ministry, 8 January 1872 and J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 618
2. in J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 618

> hydraulic mortar, for which he used the mortar of Yashin and the pozzolona of Izu. This industry progressed rapidly in the country; as early as 1876 the majority of public buildings and even entire sections of the capital were built in bricks.'[1]

In 1873 the government established a white brick factory at Fukugawa.

The Yokosuka machine shops were 'well supplied with every modern appliance of machinery for successfully carrying out extensive engineering work.'[2] Between its opening in spring of 1871 and the end of 1875, 305 ships, 177 Japanese and 128 foreign, came in to be repaired. Shipbuilding started on a modest scale, with two tug-boats and a transport ship. The first modern warship built in its entirety in Japan was completed in 1875. Four years later the vessel was visiting the ports of Europe.[3]

However, it was clear that so long as Japan remained dependent on foreign management and expertise, self-reliance would be far from complete. Even before the Restoration,

> 'An important feature of the new foundries, and one that provided a precedent for the Meiji government, was the program of language and technical training established in conjunction with them. The objective of the program was clearly stated in the Draft Plan for the Yokusuka Shipyard: 'In order that the Japanese government may in

1. in J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 616
2. quoted from Smith, op. cit., p.48
3. Livre du Centenaire ..., and J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 630

> future years replace the Frenchmen in charge of shipbuilding with Japanese, a school will be established at the shipyard to train persons of talent as engineers and technicians.'[1]

Verny himself seems to have taken great interest in the educational or training side of the Yokosuka shipyard.[2] At Yokosuka there was a school for dockyard staff where the teachers were French engineers and foremen: mathematics, design, geometry and mecanics were taught. The students came mainly from artisanal families and from among the workers and foremen, as well as a few samurai who sought to improve their situation. There was another school, in the first instance exclusively for samurai, where in theory they were trained to become engineers. Needless to say, the dockyard itslef served as a schoolk, where Verny introduced technical teaching and the processes of European industry.[3] Several of the more brilliant students from Yokosuka were selected by examination to further their engineering studies in France, some entering the Ecole d'Application du Genie Maritime and others l'Ecole Centrale.[4]

1. Smith, op. cit., p.9
2. Revue Francaise du Japan, September 1894, p.316
3. J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 629/30 and Revue Francaise du Japon, p.316/7
4. Livre du Centenaire...,

There can be little doubt that the Yokosuka dockyard was an important mile-stone in Japan's industrial development.[1] The Yokosuka dockyard and the Tomioka Spinning Mill were probably France's greatest contribution to Japan's industrial development, both in very important sectors, shipbuilding and repair in heavy industry, and textiles in light industry. That a French team should be chosen for the latter is understandable; apart perhaps from the Italians, France had few competitors in the silk industry; and indeed it seems that the invitation and hiring of the team under Brunat was made entirely on Japanese initiative (French diplomats seem to have ignored Brunat, his team and the Tomioka Spinning Mill: there is no mention of any of them in the correspondence politique and only one or two occasional references in the correspondence commerciale). That a French team should have been selected for shipbuilding was not obvious; presumably the British, Americans, Dutch, even the Belgians could have been chosen for this task. The initiative for the dockyard was Japanese, principally Oguri's, but France was chosen because of Roches' active diplomacy.

After Roches, who obviously had a great interest in the dockyard, what did the Yokosuka enterprise represent for France ?

1. see K. Takahashi, O'Yattoi Gaikokujin: Gunji, p.79-123

A high official at the Navy Ministry in 1875 declared:

> 'The Mission at the head of which is M. Verny is a civilising mission, profitable to a people whose inclinations are fortunately turned towards us, profitable especially to France, who, thanks to it, sees her influence establish itself and extend to the advantage of her political, commercial and industrial interests. This mission, the members who compose it, have carried it out so far, to their honour and that of the country. It would be regrettable if we ourselves were to bring it to an end,... One must hope that this Mission will prolong itself in the interests of the country; and the Navy in particular must congratulate itself for having sent abroad Officers and Agents who bring it honour.'*1

However, the days of French management of the Yokosuka arsenal were coming to an end. Dr. Savatier, the surgeon attached to the dockyard, saw this mainly as the fault of French diplomats:

> 'The diplomacy of our Ministers will end up triumphant, and the day is not far when there will no longer be any Frenchmen in Japan. I fear that within two years everything will have passed into the hands of Englishmen or Americans, and then the Ministers we will have had in Japan will be able to rejoice! They will only have themselves to look after!'*2 *2

In 1876 Verny and Savatier were relieved of their posts, not without having been personally thanked and decorated by the Emperor. Management of the Yokosuka dockyard passed on to Japanese, a number of Frenchmen staying on as counsellors and instructors. For these too, however, the stay was short. In 1878 the two counsellors, Thibaudier and Dupont went back to France. The end,

1. in J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 630
2. ~~Takahashi, op. cit., p. 102-112; CP vol. XXV, St. Quentin to Ministry, 14 May 1876, CP vol. XXVI, de Geofroy to Ministry 7 May 1877 and 24 July 1877~~

2- IBID. p 631

after Verny's departure, seems not to have been without problems among the personnel, not only between French counsellors and Japanese management and workers, but also between two French civilian engineers, Sarda and François, and the French naval engineers.[1]

It was alleged that the measure taken to 'japanise' the dockyard was premature, in that 'the training of the Japanese technicians did not appear sufficient in order to ensure, under their own responsibility, a reasonable functioning of the services of the dockyard and the construction of ships'.[2] In fact the Japanese did go on having ships built abroad for many years and they did occasionally hire foreign experts; one of whom, as shall be seen, was a Frenchman. But perhaps one of the problems faced by the Japanese, apart from that of finances, is illustrated by the reaction of a French diplomat in Tokyo to possible Japanese hostilities with China in 1874 and the role of the dockyard. Berthemy, Minister at that time, wrote that in the event of war with China, he would have the Yokosuka arsenal neutralised: 'Maintaining this personnel at the service of the Japanese government would compromise our neutrality; its recall to France would become a necessity.'[3]

1. TAKAHASHI, op. cit., p 102-112; CP vol XXV, ST. QUENTIN TO MINISTRY, 14 MAY 1876, CP vol. XXVI, DE GEOFROY TO MINISTRY, 7 MAY AND 24 JULY 1877
1. J. Raoulx, op. cit., p. 631
2. CP vol, XXIV, Berthemy to Ministry, 8 September 1874

For this reason, as well as others of a financial or patriotic order, Japanese control of the dockyards was obviously essential. Japan could not risk having one of its important strategic industries suddenly neutralised at a time when ~~there~~ it would be most needed.

The Verny arrangement at the Yokosuka dockyard had to come to an end. A strategic industry of such importance could not remain under French management. But Japan's selective use of Western experts for her naval development, as in other fields, continued. So in October 1885 Sienkiewicz was approached about the possibility of inviting another French naval engineer, Louis Emile Bertin, to Japan.[1] When he was director of the Ecole du Genie Maritime at Cherbourg, Bertin had taught a number of Japanese students sent to him by Verny. Bertin duly came to Japan in 1886. He supervised the construction of a number of Japanese warships built according to an invention of his, le cloisonnement. Moreover he offered advice on administrative reorganisation to the Navy Ministry and suggested two new sites for dockyards, namely Sasebo and Kure. Some of the ships built according to his specifications were active in both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars.[2]

1. CP vol. XXXI, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 16 September 1885
2. Togari, Louis Emile Bertin: Son Role Dans la Creation de la Marine Japonaise

Chapter 9

The Military Missions

Japan's military history is interesting from two points of view. In the first place Japan's past history is replete with military glory and legends of famous warriors and numerous bloody battles. Although the court nobles during the Heian period considered themselves far more civilised than the rough, uncouth warriors, from the twelth century at least it was the military landlords who administered the country, with the court nobles and the Emperor dwindling into relatively impotent obscurity. Although the great rituals supposedly attached to the traditions of the way of the warrior (Bushido) may have been as much fiction as fact during the two and half centuries of the Pax Tokugawa, and granting that political and administrative developments were turning many samurai into bureaucrats rather than warriors, the prestige of the samurai did not diminish for all that. ~~All~~ necessary qualifications having been made, it remains true that Japan in the 1850s was a society still based on a military aristocracy. So despite the bureaucratisation of the samurai, or rather that percentage of samurai who were to count among the 'architects' of the new Japan,[1] the ideology or ethic of these men ostensibly remained

1. see R. Bendix, "Preconditions of Development: a Comparison of Japan and Germany", In R. Dore, ed., Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan .

one of a warrior-caste, not that of a meritocratic bureaucracy: 'The samurai might be bureaucrats rather than warriors, but they kept their status as feudal vassals. They could believe, with some justification, that they were obeyed as nobles rather than as officials.'[2] And since the twelth century national power was ostensibly in the hands of a military government (Bakufu) with a generalissimo (sei-i-tai-shogun) as head. Of the Japan which the Western powers encountered in the second half of the nineteenth century, the least that can be said is that this was a society in which military values were held paramount.

The second point, however, is that for all of Japan's military traditions, experience of actual warfare had been virtually limited to the homeland: the great encounter with the armada of Kublai Khan had been decided more by the elements than by actual fighting; and Hideyoshi's ill-fated conquest of Korea proved abortive. Japan was never engaged in a major war, defensive or offensive. Thus when great fears were expressed about the risk of an invasion from the Western powers, they arose partly from a dread of the unknown. From the end of the Napoleonic wars there was an ominous increase in the number of Western ships appearing in Japanese waters. Mito Nariaki and

1. J. Strayer, "The Tokugawa Period and Japanese Feudalism", in J. W. Hall and M.B. Jansen, eds., Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan p.10

many others urged a drastic reappraisal of Japan's coastal defences. Following the Opium war the need became even more urgent. One of the pioneers of Japanese military modernisation, Takashima Shuhan, warned the Shogunate that 'if [Japan] did not reform her weapons and art of war, [she] would fail to defend her own coasts from a foreign invasion, and that nothing was of greater importance to the empire than to make a radical change in its military system.'[1]

The comparison with China necessarily comes to mind. Two factors distinguish Japan: in the first place Japan seems to have been much more keenly aware of both the might and the danger of western military forces, and secondly the Japanese were much more up to date than the Chinese in matters of Western military technology and strategy, thanks to the Rangaku-Sha.[2] The measures taken in the '40s and '50s, however, would have been to little avail. The importance of Japan's confrontation with the west was not in the military but in the diplomatic field. Japan's leaders, in the face of what they saw as overwhelming Western superiority, opted for shrewd diplomacy

1. Yamagata Aritomo, "The Japanese Army", in Okuma, Fifty Years of New Japan, vol. I, p.199
2. see S. Arima, "The Western Influence on Japanese Military Science, Shipbuilding, and Navigation", in Monumenta Nipponica, vol. XIX, nos. 3-4, p.118-145

instead of military confrontation.

It will be remembered that at the time there was no national Japanese army. The Bakufu had an army as did each individual han. The Kyoto court had no military forces of its own. Prior to Perry's visit and ever increasingly afterwards a number of han embarked on programmes of military modernisation, however, 'It was the shogunate which made the most concerted and direct effort to organize and train troops along Western lines. In 1862 arrangements were made for the organization of Western trained infantry, cavalry and artillery units'.[1] De Bellecourt was alarmed by these military developments and saw in them evidence of Japan's intention to resist the Western powers' desire to secure the treaties; Japan he added was now looking for arms, soon she would be looking for enemies.[2] Certain historians have also tended to see the main motivation behind the Bakufu's military policy in the same light.[3]

As with the Yokosuka dockyard, however, the motivating factor was the internal crisis, rather than the external threat.

1. H. Kublin, "The 'Modern' Army of Early Meiji Japan", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. IX, p.24
2. CP vol. VII, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 10 October 1862
3. see for example E.L. Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army, p.23, who also quotes C. Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, in support of his view, cf. p.112

This is not to make light of the fear of Western invasion, which was undoubtedly present. But while the original impetus for military reforms came from the foreign threat, intensification of the military programme stemmed from internal dissensions:

> 'The south western clans saw in the new Western weapons a means of strengthening themselves in the coming struggle with the Tokugawa and in repelling the obnoxious foreigners. The Tokugawa, on the other hand, saw in Western firearms the instruments by which their waning political power could be extended. Efforts were thus made by both groups in the years immediately following to acquire the benefits of Western military skill'.[1]

Thus, the decision by the Bakufu to turn to the West for help in its military programme was primarily motivated by its need to acquire a military strength greater than that possessed by han, individually or collectively; in other words the Bakufu wanted a sort of police force. The same can be said of the military programme of the new Meiji government:

> 'Defense against the potential encroachments of foreign powers, however, was not the primary and immediate function of the new 'modern' army. This was rather the task of diplomacy. The leaders of the Restoration government did not suffer from the illusion that a military force, hurriedly organised, would be capable of withstanding successfully the inroads of a first or even second-rate Western power. ... The many references of the early Meiji statesmen to the course of aggression of the European powers in the Asiatic countries should, accordingly, not be construed solely and primarily as pleas for a defense force against the military juggernauts of the West. They should rather be analyzed

1. M. Kublin, op. cit., p.24

more specifically in relation to the political and military context of the emerging Restoration government. In this respect, it seems more likely that the apprehensions of foreign aggression constantly expressed by prominent individuals were designed to excite the fears of the Japanese people in order to win support for a national army and a military programme involving staggering expenditures.'[1]

The Bakufu tried to push through an ambitious programme of military westernisation, because the military and political strength of the han was growing rapidly and increasingly jeopardising the political future of the Bakufu.[2] Once the Bakufu was overthrown, the new government needed to continue and indeed greatly to expand the initial ambitious programme of the Bakufu, to quell peasant riots and - what was more important - to suppress samurai risings such as those of 1874, 76 and 77.[3] France played a role in strengthening the central government of Japan against internal disruption, not for one central government but for two central governments; namely, the Bakufu and the Meiji regime.

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1. ibid., p.21/22
2. for military modernising programmes carried out by the han, see A. Craig, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration and E.H. Norman, Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
3. N. Ike in "The Pattern of Railway Development in Japan," (Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XIV, p.217 -) states that the emphasis on railway construction in Japan was in the first instance geared more to strategic needs, rather than economic ones.

The First Military Mission

The Bakufu efforts at military modernisation in 1862 failed to reap the harvest that had been expected. Within three years 'because of their unsatisfactory performance against the Choshu conscript armies in 1864-1865, the shogunate decided to revise its military programme.'[1] One of the problems seems to have been that although the Bakufu was purchasing modern arms it did not necessarily have the technical expertise necessary for their effective use. De Bellecourt informed his Ministry that the future of the Japanese army and navy would leave very much to be desired as long as they continued to leave modern weaponry in such untrained and unable hands; the passion with which they desired to acquire the arms and the money they were ready to spend could not make up for their inability to use them effectively.[2] The head of the first military mission, Capitaine Chanoine, noted soon after his arrival that a great deal of war material was piled up pell-mell in warehouses; for though the Japanese owned the material, they did not know how to use it. He added that the most rudimentary industries needed for a modern army were lacking.[3]

1. H. Kublin, op. cit., p.25
2. CP vol. VIII, de Bellecourt to Ministry, 20 March 1863
3. Army, Catalogue Général des Manuscrits, Japon 1672, (f) correspondence du Capitaine Chanoine, 1867-68

The Bakufu felt constrained to seek the direct help of a foreign power in the modernisation of its army.[1] The British had been approached in the first instance, but had refused to comply.[2] The French were then asked and the Bakufu received a much warmer reception. The special relationship between some of the Bakufu officials, Kurimoto and Oguri especially, and Roches had already taken root. Also the 'French army, still basking in the glory of Solferino, was considered the élite of the world'.[3] Roches reported to Paris that 'in asking for military instructors the government of the Taikun is obeying an evident necessity, for the signatory of our treaties cannot ensure their complete execution except in being stronger than the Princes who oppose them and it is only in a regular army that he will be able to find this strength.[4] Neither Rochesnor any of those who favoured the mission spoke of it as being beneficial to trade; the term preferred both in Edo and in Paris was to talk of it in terms of the benefit to French influence in that part of the world. All the same, influence on the government in such a sensitive area as the

1. The term 'direct' here is used in contrast to the 'indirect' help Japanese military reformers had at their disposal, namely military manuals and treatises from all Western powers, many of which were studies in the Bansho Shirabesho
2. H.J. Jones, "Bakumatsu Foreign Employees", Monumenta Nipponica, vol. XXIX, p.314. Jones states that Parkes in the early stages was neither interested nor saw any advantage in supplying British technical expertise to the Japanese cf. p.307 and 312/3
3. H. Kublin, op. cit., p.25
4. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 15 January 1866

Building of a new army could only prove beneficial to trade. Drouyn de Lhuys, who, as we have seen, was the French Foreign Minister most interested in the silk industry, wrote to his colleague in the army about the proposed mission: 'As far as I am concerned I would have no objection for it [the mission] to receive a favourable welcome; from the point of view of the interests which are specially confided in me, I would see certain advantages if you could accede to it.'[1] It is difficult to imagine what these interests could be other than

1. Drouyn de Lhuys to Randon, Minister of War, 10 April 1866 in Chanoine, Documents Pour Servir a l'Histoire des Relations entre La France et le Japon

the silk trade; France had no other economic interests in Japan.[1]

1. Jones (in "Bakumatsu Foreign Employees") writes that, 'the single most conspicuous aspect of the employment of foreigners by the bakufu and the han was the rivalry and interplay of foreign powers, a reflection of their competition for trade'. (p.307) I would disagree with the use of the word 'conspicuous' as far as French evidence is concerned. Apart from the passage from the letter from Drouyn de Lhuys to Randon, vague enough as it is, there is never any mention of the benefits to trade in regard to either the mission, the Yokosuka dockyard, nor even the mint. This is not to say that the trade element is not the most important in determining the Western powers to accede to Japanese requests for foreign experts. Yet in theory competition for trade among the powers need not have existed at a diplomatic level, as equality in trading privileges was guaranteed by the most favoured nation clause. To a certain extent at least this competition for securing the Bakufu's (and later the Meiji Government's) favour in preferring employment of experts from one of the Western powers must have developed on its own momentum, based as much on national or personal rivalries not born necessarily exclusively or even primarily of economic competitiveness. Parkes' fury at Roches' 'coup' in getting the Bakufu to employ a French military mission, rather than a British one, and his decision to persuade the Bakufu to take on a British naval mission, as related by Mitford (Memories, vol. I, p.378) cannot have been motivated by considerations of trade. So although not denying that trade may have been essentially the most important aspect, it was not the most conspicuous. Indeed in the Bakumatsu and the Meiji period, as far as French archives are concerned, the most conspicuous aspect was that of prestige.

Finally the element of prestige was an important one.

Thus Roches supported with great enthusiasm the Bakufu's request, which he passed on to his ministry,[1] and on this occasion he did not even feel the need to assure his government, as he had in the matter of the Yokosuka dockyard request, that France did not have to fear that a modern, French trained Japanese army might one day turn against France. He passed on the number of men requested by the Japanese government; these were to include 9 officers, 8 petty officers and 18 other ranks, including trumpet, clarion and drum instructors. The chief of mission would be a senior staff officer, the others were to come from the artillery, the chasseurs de Vincennes, line infantry and cavalry.[2] The mission, nevertheless, turned out to be smaller than requested, but Roches was informed by Paris that this was only for the start, and that once things had developed, the number would be reconsidered.[3] Eventually the number was slightly increased, though never reaching the total originally requested, despite the fact that on numerous occasions, Chanoine, Roches and the Bakufu were to ask for more instructors.[4] Roches

1. CP vol. XIV, Roches to Ministry, 15 February 1866
2. ibid, and Drouyn de Lhuys to Randon, 10 April 1866 in Chanoine, op. cit.,
3. CP vol. XIV, Ministry to Roches, 15 May 1866
4. see Army, Japon, no. 1672, (f) Correspondance du Capitaine Chanoine and Chanoine, op. cit.,

told his ministry that the existing mission was only an experiment but that if it proved successful, eventually it would be called upon to deal with the entire army of the Bakufu.[1]

Chanoine, in his instructions, was told that the object of the mission was to bring to Japan,

> 'as much as the customs and the degree of civilisation of the country allow, the assistance of our administrative and military experience to the organisation and instruction of the Japanese army. ... I need not tell you that the system of organisation and military instruction which you will be called upon to apply to the troops of the Taikun, could in no way consist of slavishly copying that which is done in France, but to take advantage of the military aptitudes and customs of the country, all the while improving them by the introduction of the spirit of discipline and new knowledge which will allow them to gradually enter into the path of progress.'[2]

After the mission had arrived in Japan and begun work, the Minister of War, now Niel, stressed that Chanoine's principal task was to train Japanese instructors, choosing them well, so that they might be in a position to train other instructors, and thus hand on from one to another the practice of good traditions.[3] Niel also asked that the officers and petty-officers of the mission learn Japanese, for it is assuredly

1. Drouyn de Lhuys to Randon, 10 April 1766 in Chanoine, op. cit.,
2. Randon to Chanoine, 3 November 1866 in Chanoine, op. cit.
3. Niel to Chanoine, 19 November 1867 in Chanoine, op. cit.

the most efficient means in order to influence the natives and to exercise the moral authority which your position must make you seek.'[1]

Obviously the language was important for all instruction had to be carried out through the services of interpreters (trained at the Yokohama school)[2]; indeed the language barrier was one of the greatest obstacles the mission encountered; Roches while informing his Ministry in September 1867 that nine students had been selected to pursue their military education in France, stated that the most proficient in French had to stay behind, for their services as interpreters were indispensable to the French instructors.[3]

The mission which left France in November of 1866 and reached Japan early the following year numbered approximately half the total number requested by the Bakufu. The latter had asked for 35 men in all, 9 of whom would be officers. But the initial mission comprised 6 officers and 10 other ranks, eventually joined by another officer (an engineer, Jourdan) and two other ranks,[4] one of whom, Cazeneuve, was accompanying a number of horses from France to be presented

1. Niel to Chanoine, 12 December, 1867 in Chanoine, op.cit.
2. Presseisen, op. cit., p11
3. CP vol. XV, Roches to Ministry, 11 September 1867
4. Chanoine, op. cit.,

to the Shogun.[1] Apart from the men, Chanoine had brought with him from France a great deal of equipment, more than twelve tons of artillery and vehicles.[2] Although the mission arrived early in 1867 and was recalled in September 1868,[3] the actual full time work of the mission only lasted some six months. This was because there were difficulties at first in recruiting Japanese students and in the establishment of the necessary facilities. Furthermore, by the end of 1867 Japan's internal political problems were to hinder the mission's work. It is impossible, therefore, to assess in any significant way the impact of the mission in military terms.[4] Despite this, 'The troops it trained had fought well during the civil war,' and 'The French instructors, ... had in coming to the Far East established something of a precedent, and this was not forgotten.'[5] At the time there were no other Western military missions in the Far East and though France had a number in other parts of the world, notably in Egypt, the one in Japan was the biggest.[6]

1. J. Brunon, "Le Dernier Taikoun et la Mission Militaire Francaise De 1867 Au Japon", Vert Et Rouge, no.105, p.27
2. Presseisen, op. cit., p.10
3. CP vol. XVII, Outrey to Ministry, 12 September 1868
4. Jones, op. cit., p.319, N. Umetani, The Role of Foreign Employees in the Meiji Era in Japan, p.25
5. Presseisen, op. cit, p.22
6. Niel to Chanoine, 19 November 1867, in Chanoine op. cit., 'Of all the missions we have in foreign countries, it is the one with the most numerous personnel.'

With the outbreak of hostilities in Japan, Chanoine apparently cherished no illusions about the weakness of the Tokugawa army and tried to warn the Shogun of this fact.[1] The military mission, however, was recalled and already the French officers feared that, when they left, the French army might well be replaced by the Prussian,[2]

In spite of the weakness of the Tokugawa army, the new government, and especially those who favoured intense centralisation, realised that it too was desperately in need of a modern army:

> 'The weakness of the imperial position during these history making months is soberly attested to by the size and composition of the military force directly subordinate to the emperor - a motley group of about three hundred ronin and samurai recruited from the minor clans.
>
> In view of this situation the problem of organizing an imperial military force understandably received priority even while the Tokugawa armies were hammered into submission. The supporters of the Emperor realized that the imperial restoration would remain at best but a polite fiction unless feudal autonomy were superseded by governmental centralization. Moreover, this in turn would have the makings of an opera bouffe if the principle of supreme imperial authority were not reinforced with the real instruments of power.'[3]

1. Army, Japon. no.1672, (f), Chanoine to Colson, 15 February 1868
2. Army, Japon, no.1672, (f), Chanoine referred to the Prussian menace in several dispatches and private letters to Colson
3. Kublin, op. cit., p.26

Thus the Meiji government in desperate need of a modern and powerful military force was to turn to the West for help, for it was faced with a race against time because of the enemies lurking in corners of Japan, opposed either to the policies, personalities or geographical origins of the men in power. As in the case of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Meiji government sought foreign help to guarantee its survival against its enemies. Like the Tokugawa shogunate, the Meiji government turned to France for help, despite the French military fiasco of 1870/71.

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<u>The Second Military Mission</u>

If in the 1860s the French army was basking in the glory of Solferina, by the early 1870s it was wallowing in the ignominy of Sedan. Despite Francess defeat, in spite of Roches' close association with the overthrown Bakufu, and in spite of the Brunet affair, Japan again turned to France for the building of her army. Although, as will be shown later, a number of circumstances greatly facilitated the return of a French mission, rather than the engagement of a mission from another Western nation, events

appear to have been heavily influenced by three individuals, namely Omura Masujiro, Saigo Tsugumichi and Charles-Albert DuBousquet.[1]

Omura, of Choshu, a radical military reformer, wanted to abolish the concept of the samurai army. His goal was the creation of a national army on a combined professional and conscript basis, centrally controlled, in other words, free from the dominance of the han daimyo. After the Restoration he founded a military academy in Kyoto, which shortly afterwards moved to Osaka. Most of the instructors had been trained by the first French military mission. Although the han armies had experimented with various European systems, mainly French, Dutch and German, Omura favoured the French model. His strong and open espousal of universal conscription cost him his life; for he was to be assasinated by fanatical Choshu samurai in 1869. But his efforts were not in vain. Others, notably Yamada Akiyoshi, carried on his work after his death.[2]

1. DuBousquet is an interesting figure. He was one of the original members of the first military mission. He had taken part in the Anglo-French China expedition, and in

the course of his stay in China apparently became a 'distinguished sinologist'. When the mission was recalled to France, DuBousquet asked to stay behind, a request seconded by Outrey because of DeBousquet's proficiency in Japanese. He served both the French legation and the Japanese government. His talents, however, and his apparent devotion to his work seem to have received hardly any recompense from the Quai d'Orsay. For on returning to work for the French legation he was very badly paid. As we shall see, the various members of the military mission, both the first and the second, had few kind words to say about their diplomats, and the treatment meted out to DuBousquet by the Quai seems to have been one particularly serious source of discontent on the part of the officers. De Geoffroy seems to have been the only one who appreciated DuBousquet's worth. Among other things, DuBousquet had argued for a much more flexible French policy on treaty revision, albeit to no avail. He married a Japanese (apparently a daughter of a samurai converted to Catholicism) who bore him four children. DuBousquet died in Japan in 1882 after two years of illness. He is buried in Aoyama cemetary in Tokyo. (information on DuBousquet can be found in Chanoine, op.cit., in the army archives, in Umetani, op. cit., p.40-43 and in Meiji Hyakunen, p.61-65).

2. on Omura, see Kublin, op. cit., p.27-28, Yamagata Aritomo, in Okuma, op. cit., p.201-202 and Presseisen, op. cit., p.25-27, 33

In 1870 Yamagata Aritomo and Saigo Tsugumichi had toured Europe. Yamagata, had been particularly impressed by Prussia (and had made a bet with Saigo that Prussia would win the war[1]), whereas Saigo remained convinced of the superiority of the French system, at least as far as Japan was concerned. He appears to have remained a staunch supporter of French military thinking even in the 1880s, in spite of the growing influence of the pro-German faction in Japan. In any case Saigo and Yamagata were agreed that fundamental reforms were necessary in the military organisation of Japan and that European models had to be sought, as well as European instructors. Although more impressed by the Prussian system, Yamagata did not strongly oppose the invitation to France.[2]

The preference of Omura and Saigo for the French system, along with other circumstances in Japan at the time, without doubt heavily influenced the decision despite the Sedan fiasco to invite a French mission once again. The views of such high placed Restoration leaders clearly counted for a great deal; but no doubt the presence of DuBouquet in Tokyo was also a factor of some importance here, thanks to his command of the Japanese language and acquaintance with the

1. see R.F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1830-1922, p.53
2. see Kublin, op. cit., p.28/9 and Presseisen, op. cit., p.27-29

new military leaders. DuBouquet was in regular contact with the military leaders and proved to be influential in the conscription system eventually adopted by Japan. He produced papers on a number of military matters, notably one in February 1870 which 'exposed Japan's weakness and listed her military needs.'[1]

In the course of the debate whether or not to invite once more a French military mission, the turning point seems to have been Iwakura's change of heart about France of whose policy and motives linked to the activities of Roches and Brunet, he was understandably suspicious. In June 1870 Outrey was visited by Terashima, who told him of Iwakura's changed views and expressed for the first time officially, Japan's desire to see the return of a French military mission. Outrey, as we saw earlier, adverted to the Christian question and in one way and another did not give Terashima the impression that French agreement would be automatic. In his dispatch to Paris, however, he supported the request: Japan, she claimed, needed an army in order to assure order in the interior of the country, particularly because 'the Japanese people have an essentially belligerant instinct; in all the fiefs the military class

1. Pesseisen op. cit. p.33; for DuBousquet's contribution to the birth of the modern Japanese army, see J.B. Crowley, "From Closed Door to Empire: the Formation of the Meiji Military Establishment", in B.S, Silberman and H.D. Harootunian (eds.), Modern Japanese Leadership and Umetani op. cit., p.40-43

occupies the first rank and there is no doubt that they will always play an important role.'[1] Japanese continued receiving French military instruction. In 1870 twelve young Japanese had been sent to France to pursue their studies.[2]

All this, however, was prior to or contemperaneous with, the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, and not unnaturally the French were worried that the Japanese might opt for training from the victorious power. In June 1871 however, Outrey and Sanjo dined together; Sanjo agreed that Brandt, the Prussian/German representative, was lobbying for the Japanese to engage a German mission, but said that Iwakura had not changed his mind, that the government was still set on a French military mission: 'We know of the misfortunes which the war has inflicted on France, but this has in no way changed our opinion on the merits of the French army which showed such courage in the face of enemy troops superior in number.'[3]

Apart from the three individuals, Omura, Saigo and DuBousquet, and notwithstanding Sanjo's polite dinner conversation, there were other determining factors in the choice of France. Chanoine saw it as a mark of Japan's friendship and chivalry.[4]

1. CP vol. XX, Outrey to Ministry, 4 June 1870
2. CP vol. XX, Outrey to Ministry, 26 November 1870
3. CP vol. XXI, Outrey to Ministry, 5 June 1871
4. Chanoine, op. cit., p.83, see also Colonel Lebon, Les Origines de l'Armée Japonaise, p.23/4

In fact the main reasons are clear. In the first place there was the question of language; Japanese French speaking officers already existed and thanks to the Yokohama school there was a pool of interpreters. On the other hand, the German language was unknown. Secondly the Japanese army was familiar with the French system, whereas the German system was an unknown quantity.[1] Umetani suggests a third reason, namely that 'an international political factor was at work which deprived the Meiji Government of a free hand in choosing a mentor. While Japan desired withdrawal of the French and the English military forces stationed in Yokohama, the latter demanded in return that Japan develop her army on the French model and her navy on the English model.'[2]

The second French military mission arrived in July 1872 and again the mission was smaller than the number the Japanese had requested. The contracts were for a period of three years, these were renewed on a number of occasions, though by the end of the decade in ever decreasing numbers. The first head of mission was Charles-Antoine Marquerie, who had to leave shortly afterwards, due to ill health; he was replaced by Charles Munier.

1. see Kublin, op. cit., p. 28/9 and Presseisen, op.cit., p.27-29 and 33-40
2. Umetani, op. cit., p.40/41

The mission officially remained until July 1880, although afterwards several instructors remained and Japan went on sending students to be trained in France. Although Marquerie complained that initially there was considerable hostile reaction to the new mission, that they were seen as 'invaders, determined to change and upset everything'[1], the situation did improve and the mission was able to accomplish a good deal.

French influence on Japan's conscription system will be looked at shortly. Leaving that aside, however, the main accomplishments of the mission in the period 1872-76 were: (1) a school for officers and petty officers, (2) a gunnery school for the infantry; (3) a large military arsenal, with work-rooms for construction, manufacture of weapons, and a cartridge-factory; (4) a very large experimental range for artillery; (5) a gun-powder factory; (6) numerous large barracks; (7) from 1875 a large military school destined to provide officers for all branches of the service; (8) in 1874 a defence plan for Japan's coastline in case of war with China.[2] The military mission embraced the infantry, artillery, cavalry, the engineer corps and a special mission for the military

1. Marquerie to Chanoine, 23 September 1872, in Chanoine, op. cit.
2. Chanoine, op. cit

schools and the organisation of the army.[1] Thus French influence pervaded most areas of Japanese military administration and organisation. A veterinary school was attached to the mission[2], and Descharmes (who returned with the second mission) organised in 1873 a special mounted escort for the Emperor and three special cavalry garrison squadrons; he also established a dressage and remount school, comprising eventually some 400 horses, and a school for farriers.[3] French influence was also felt in such matters as army discipline, basic regulations, designation of rank and uniform and was still perceptible well after our period in matters such as music, fencing and gymnastics.[4]

The most important work of the mission, at least as far as the French were concerned, was the development of the Military Academy (shikan gakko). It took its first students, 155 of them, in 1875. The discipline in the school, modelled

1. ibid.
2. Army, Rapports et Lettres des Attachés Militaires, 1869-1895, Munier to Ministry, 24 March 1876
3. J. Brunon, "La Seconde Mission Militaire Francaise au Japon, 1872-76", Vert et Rouge, no. 106, p.32
4. Kublin, op. cit., p.33 and J.M. Griersin, The Armed Strength of Japan: at the end of the First World War, a French airman, Colonel Faure, was to come to Japan to help her air force; see Commandant Tetu, "Les Grandes Figures de l'Aeronautique: Les Japonais Elevent un Buste au General Faure", Revue de l'Aeronautique Militaire, no. 47, Sept-Oct. 1928, p.5-

on St. Cyr, was strict, reveille was at 5.45, the first class at 6.45 and lights out at 10.00. The curriculum included daily lessons in the French language, as well as mathematics, artillery drill, geography, physics and practical exercises. Entrance to the academy was by a competitive examination open to both civilians and military; expenses of the students were borne by the State. The course lasted two years for students entering the infantry or cavalry, and three years for those joining the more specialised services. Although intended to be a rough copy of St Cyr, a good deal of time had to be spent on language courses; but apparently what the French instructors found most lacking in their students was a knowledge of mathematics. There were both French and Japanese instructors, the more specialised military courses given during the second year were taught by French instructors through interpreters. General Soga was made Commandant of the Academy and among the more famous students was the Emperor's cousin, Prince Fushimi.[1] According to the French, at least, despite the initial difficulties, the Japanese were pleased with the Academy. Thus, Munier claimed that Yamagata

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., "Rapport de L'Ecole Militaire Pendant l'Annee 1875"

had expressed great enthusiasm for it[1]. When the mission's contracts were renewed at the end of 1875, Munier believed that this was principally due to the interest the Japanese army had in continuing the work of the Academy.[2]

Conscription was by no means unknown in earlier periods of Japanese history, before the days of the Tokugawa. But during the two and a half centuries of Tokugawa rule the bearing of arms had been limited in theory (though not always in practice) to the samurai class. This was seen by the samurai as an exclusive privilege, and proposals for the conscription of peasants and the eventual adoption of the system proved to be one of the most radical reforms of the early Meiji period, leading in time to the demise of the samurai as a class and of a society dominated by a military aristocracy. The effects of conscription were widespread and profound.[3] It could be argued that through conscription Japan moved from a military aristocratic society to what was, tout court, a military society, and that conscription and various other military ordinances,

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry, 8 March 1876
2. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry, 8 June 1876
3. see for example, T.R. Havens, Nishi Amane and Modern Japanese Thought, p.191: 'Among the many reform schemes and policy innovations of the early Meiji period, none was more far-reaching in its effects on Japanese national life than the Conscription Act (Choheirei) of 1873. ... the creation of a conscript army was probably the single most important event in the first decade after the restoration, inasmuch as it proved to be the vital hinge upon which the drive for national wealth and power turned.'

imperial rescripts - not to mention military education and training - had as one aim the democratisation, or devolution so to speak of the tenets of Bushido.[1] These considerations, however, lie outside the scope of this thesis, but because of alleged French influence on the conscription system (as the French themselves believed that they were the originators of the system)[2] some attention has to be given to the problem.

1. These were the views preached in books such as I. Nitobe's Bushido: the Soul of Japan, and K. Okakura's The Ideals of East, The Japanese Spirit and The Awakening of Japan. Doubtless they contained considerable exaggeration and Japanese society enjoyed far less homogeneity and military discipline than is often assumed, but that there were attempts by the government through military edicts and such instruments as the Imperial Rescript on Education to 'samuraise' the masses cannot be doubted. D. Keene points out that in the Sino-Japanese war the heroes were all from the humbler ranks: 'This emphasis on the achievement of unknown farm recruits, rather than on trained officers, the descendants of samurai, may have been accidental, but it may have been intended to bring home the lesson that universal military conscription had been the basis of Japanese success. The fact that humble soldiers could perform deeds of gallantry normally associated with the samurai proved that their virtues were shared by the entire Japanese people and not the property of professional soldiers.' D. Keene, Landscapes and Portraits, p.274
2. see Brunon, op. cit., Chanoine, op. cit., Lapeyrère, op. cit., and Lebon op. cit., all claim that the Japanese conscripted system was French in origin. LE JAPON MILITAIRE

Yamagata and Saigo had travelled in Europe in 1870 and on their return Yamagata argued in favour of the adoption of the German system of conscription, while Saigo argued for the system current in France. Itagaki, who had not been to Europe but who was at the time a councillor of state, favoured the British volunteer system. The work of drawing up the Conscription order was placed in the hands of Nishi Amane[1], though here again DuBousquet had had some influence.[2] As to the Conscription Law itself and the way in which it operated, Ogawa sees it as especially French[3], H. Norman finds both French and Swiss influences[4], whereas Kublin stresses the German[5], and Presseisen and Umetani agree that it is a combination of the two: 'though the Conscription Law of 1873 in part followed the Prussian code on military service, it adopted the French army system with regard to exemption, lottery

1. Havens, op. cit., p.86 and 191-194 and Presseisen, op.cit., p.30-33
2. 'It is beyond doubt that the French conscription system which Bousquet delineated in his Principles of the French Military System had a decisive influence on the Conscription Law of 1873.' Umetani, op. cit., p.43, see also Presseisen, op. cit., fn. 22, p.32
3. G. Ogawa, Conscription System in Japan, p.4-8
4. H. Norman, op. cit., p.45-47
5. Kublin, op. cit., p.31

and substitute fee.'[1] Whatever the system resembled, and accepting the Franco-German hybrid interpretation, the need for conscription, so its advocates declared, was based on internal conditions, for which foreign models were sought: 'The motive of instituting some sort of conscription system was thus internal, and not foreign. But, when we look at the content of the new system, we find it mainly Western. The content is certainly not a copy of our ancient system.'[2] Omura, Yamagata, Yamada, and others decided that Japan needed a conscription system; and they were impressed by what they had seen or learned about conditions abroad. Nevertheless the origins and consequences of the Japanese form of conscription were bound to be different. Thus

> 'unlike the origins of conscription in Europe which were of a democratic and revolutionary nature, and historically justified - in France at least - by the fact that it was required as the only means of national survival, in Japan conscription was autocratic in the manner of its establishment and counter-revolutionary in its design and effect. It was introduced without the slightest regard for public opinion and without there being any pressing necessity for it in terms of national defense against any likely aggression.3'

1. Umetani, op. cit., 43, see also Presseisen, op. cit., p.32
2. Ogawa, op. cit., p.7
3. Norman, op. cit., p.55-56

The Conscription system was born of local conditions; the system itself was foreign inspired, but that, in the final analysis, is perhaps only of marginal importance. As evidence of the 'westernisation' of Japan, it is of the same order of importance as the Constitution of 1889. The Constitution was Western, or German, in that it had many features in common with German practice; and its founder, Ito Hirobumi, had studied for two years in Germany and Austria under eminent German and Austrian professors of law, one of whom accompanied him on his return to Japan. But it was distinctively Japanese, born of local conditions and expressing indigenous beliefs in accordance with the views of the Meiji Oligarchy, especially in the Preamble, or perhaps exclusively in the Preamble. But that was sufficient to give it the mark of kokutai. So the Conscription Law must not be seen in isolation; it was the most radical reform of the early Meiji period, but its true significance for the future is appreciated when placed alongside documents which were to follow, such as The Admonition to Soldiers (Gunjin kunkai) of 1878 and the Imperial Prescript to Soldiers and Sailors (Gunjin chokuyu) of 1882, placing a distinctly Japanese mark on the army, its system of recruitment, education, and so on.

The French military mission had been working for just over four years when the fledgling Japanese army was to meet its first real test, namely the Satsuma rebellion of 1877. The outcome proved decisive for Japanese history, but it also brought about important changes in the army which were to effect adversely the position of the French mission. Initial French reaction to the Satsuma rebellion was relatively sanguine as far as the position of the mission was concerned. Munier wrote to Chanoine, 'the war was rather fortunate for us ... The Japanese have seen that they still had many things to learn and they understood that they would still need our lessons.'[1] The following month, however, Munier sent a long report to the Ministry on the course of the rebellion. In this he wrote:

> 'It is probable that the struggle will be long and desperate; the country of Satsuma is difficult, mountainous; roads are rare and in poor condition; the insurgents are numerous and brave; they have arms and munitions; they have a foundry and gunpowder factory in Kagoshima; they count among their ranks numerous discontented soldiers and officers who have deserted the regular army, and who can render service as most of them have followed our instruction. This insurrection has naturally created perturbation in our work. The instruction to troops is abolished <u>de facto</u>;

1. Munier to Chanoine, 2 January 1877, in Chanoine, <u>op. cit.</u> The date of this letter presents a problem as the Satsuma rebellion did not really break out until the following month. It may be that Chanoine made an error when transcribing the letter to his book or that Munier simply assumed that war would take place and the course it would take.

> the same is true of the school of marksmanship and gymanstics from which all the students (officers, petty-officers and buglers) have rejoined their respective regiments.'[1]

Eventually the government had to commit all the men it had at its disposal; roughly 33,750, including the reserves, volunteer samurai and military students from the academy and other schools.[2] Munier expressed admiration for the

> 'samurai of Satsuma [who] have shown themselves worthy of their old reputation', but he felt nevertheless that "In any case the final success seems only to be a question of time; for the feared defections not having taken place, the struggle is too unequal for it not to have a fatal conclusion for the rebels. The government has so far acted with great vigour and determination; the movements of troops have been effected with order and rapidity; the army is animated with a good spirit; the officers especially ask only to fight.[3]'

By May, however, with the fighting still going on, Munier became less optimistic. Despite his earlier belief that the end was in sight, he now admitted that it was not as near as he had thought. All was not perfect on the imperial side; he spoke of negligence and of orders badly given or badly executed.[4] The following month he noted that operations by the imperial side were making very slow progress, and he accused the imperial

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry 24 February 1877
2. Presseisen, op. cit., p.55
3. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry 14 March 1877
4. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry 14 May 1877

command of weakness and of a lack of entente among the generals; 'In any case it is difficult to see when this civil war will come to an end; a war in which the troops on both sides display a great deal of courage, but in which the command seems more energetic and intelligent among the rebels than among the generals of the imperial army.'[1]

In the end, of course, the imperial side was victorious, but at a great cost; and Munier admitted that it was a terrible blow to the army especially in terms of men.[2] Munier does not give any indication whether or not the Japanese military authorities made any comments to him on the performance of the imperial army or on the way that performance reflected the training they were receiving from the French. Nor did he comment on the matter himself. In a very real sense, however, the relatively poor performance of the imperial command during the rebellion was a victory for the increasingly large, active and outspoken pro-German faction in the army hierarchy:

> 'French influence waned rapidly...after the conclusion of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877. At this time Katsura who had for several years been military attache in Berlin and was, like Yamagata, a great admirer of the German military system, was very active in pressing for a change to German procedure and organisation'.[3]

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry 11 June 1877
2. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry 27 December 1877
3. Kublin, op. cit., fn. 42, p.33

The French officers had feared German rivalry and were aware of a pro-German faction in the hierarchy; this was one of the causes of alarm when Berthemy had threatened to neutralise the mission in 1874 in case of war with China, for they believed that were they to be repatriated, they would not be invited back, and that a German mission would be invited in their place. In the summer of 1877 Munier noted that one particularly unpleasant incident had arisen on the future of the mission, namely the return to Japan of Prince Kitashirakawa, the Emperor's uncle, from Germany, where he

> 'had spent several years... [and] where he had followed military courses, and where he served as officer in the regiment of the guards. It is possible that he will take the head of the party hostile to French military ideas, a serious party and one that includes many adherents in the Ministry of War. It is against this party that I have to struggle daily.'[1]

Munier's appraisal of the weakness of command in the imperial army during the Satsuma rebellion was shared by the Japanese military hierarchy:[2]

> 'The French military system had an inadequate command structure in the 19th century. Its officers did not equal the Germans in organizational talent, and its general staff (reorganized in 1874) remained without influence. Here was the root of the mission's trouble

1. Army, Rapports et Letures..., Munier to Ministry 23 July 1877
2. Presseisen, op. cit., p.56

> and the reason for its decline. The colonel [Munier] tried to compensate for it by lecturing on the duties of the French and German general staffs, but the Japanese had probably sensed the limits of the mission's usefulness.'[1]

Perhaps another problem lay in the fact that the French did not understand the aspirations and impatience of the Japanese - especially on the military front:

> 'The Frensh saw Japan as an "underdeveloped" country that must start from the bottom and needed years of tutoring. They taught the army basic tactics, but postponed strategy or command studies. This policy, which might have sufficed in quiet times and with more patient pupils, showed the mission's limitations. The Japanese wanted results and resented a long tutelage.'[2]

Thus it was that following the conclusion of the Satsuma rebellion, the Government instructed Kawakami Soroku and Katsura Taro to draw up a post mortem. The most important result of this operation as far as Japan was concerned was the setting up of an independent general staff, separate from the Minister of War and enjoying direct access to the Emperor, something which the War Minister did not enjoy, and the general staff became the sole advisor of the Emperor on the exercise of the 'right of supreme command'.[3] In the year immediately following the rebellion, therefore,

> 'The Meiji government carried out a thorough reorganization of its military system... Starting in 1878, when German

1. ibid.,
2. Presseisen, op. cit., p.67
3. see Crowley, op. cit., p.274/5, Hackett, op. cit., p.82/3 and Presseisen, op. cit., p.63

> influence began to replace French, the entire ~~military~~ military establishment was gradually overhauled. Military appropriations were enormously increased, the reserves were constantly built up, and the technical services were painstakingly developed. From these reforms, among many others, there gradually emerged the mighty war machine which knew no defeat until August 1945.'[1]

The reorganisation of the army general staff in accordance with German principles, and the independence of the supreme command, it has been argued, 'would later develop into the disunion and conflict between it and the Government, and then into dominance of the military over the civilian. It was in fact one of the prime causes that led Japan to the tragedy of the Pacific War.'[2]

Munier at first thought that the reorganisation of the army would benefit the mission; for, he argued, the high functionaries in the new administration were all Satsuma men who had always showed pro-French tendencies,[3] he was soon, however, to be disabused. Indeed his last few years in Japan were largely spent in trying to persuade the Japanese not to employ Germans.

In March 1879 Munier informed his Ministry that General Takashima was leaving with two officers to study the comparative merits of the German and French military systems, and that from the point of view of the continuation of French influence it was

1. Kublin, op. cit., p.41
2. Umetani, op. cit., p.42
3. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry, 30 December 1878

essential that he be given as warm a welcome as possible and that no efforts be spared to ensure that he obtain as high an opinion as possible of the power of France, and that comparisons between the military of France and Germany must not be to the former's disadvantage.[1] On the same day he sent a personal and confidential letter to a friend of his at the Ministry, stressing again the importance of Takashima's visit, but also wishing to give his correspondent a few hints about Takashima's character, which could not appear in official correspondence. He discussed the pro-German faction and explained that Takashima was being sent as a sort of arbitrator between the two factions. To impress him, however, according to Munier would be easy, for 'Takashima is as proud as a peacock, vain beyond all expression. Therein lies his sensitive cord. He belongs to a very great family of the province of Satsuma; and that is the reason for his trip. For he is very ignorant...'[2]

By the end of 1879 and the beginning of 1880, however, it was clear that the mission as such had come to an end, with only a few remaining instructors (in comparatively unimportant branches, such as gymnastics, veterinary, science and music),

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry, 21 March 1879
2. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier's private letter does not bear the name of the recipient; it begins, 'mon cher camarade', dated 21 March 1879

although some Japanese students were still going to France for military training.[1] In January of 1880 Munier reported that the departure of the mission was certain, and that he was not going to try to stay on: 'It would be exposing myself to an almost certain refusal, and thus compromising to our dignity.' He saw the departure of the mission as due essentially to Japanese vanity. In fact he had to leave prematurely, in May 1880, because of bad health, but he was personally thanked by the Emperor before his departure.[2] Of the mission officers, Bougouin stayed behind to become military attache and he saw it as his duty to continue pressing for French instructors to come to Japan, for Japanese students to go to France (with some success as the Emperor's adopted brother, Prince Kanin went to study at St. Cyr[3], and to do everything in his power to prevent

1. In 1886 there was more Japanese military students in France than in Germany: there were 10 in France, of whom 7 were officers, 1 veterinarian and 2 musicians; in Germany there were only 4, one officer, two military doctors (one of whom was Mori Ogai) and one 'student'. In Japan there were two German military instructors, both officers, whereas there were 3 French officers, 1 language teacher, one petty-officer and one musician. In the case of instructors in Japan, however, numbers are not particularly significant, as one of the German officers, Meckel, was by far the more important and influential, Army, Attachés Militaires: Japon, Organisation de l'Armée, Guerre Franco-Chinoise, 1881-1904, dossier no. 8, Extrait du Rapport Officiel du Ministere de la Guere.
2. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry, 25 January 1880
3. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Bougouin to Ministry, 30 September 1882

the spreading of German influence.

At the end of 1883 Sienkiewicz informed the Quai d'Orsay that the Japanese Government was requesting a number of military instructors from France, that the conditions of service were not particularly good when compared with those of the departed mission, but that nevertheless the French should agree, as Oyama had told him that were the French not to agree, another power, namely Germany would be approached[1].

In January 1884 Sienkiewicz informed his government that a Japanese military delegation under General Oyama was about to leave for Europe.[2] Both Bougouin and Sienkiewicz were to attach a great importance to this mission; they saw it as the last chance for French military influences to remain predominant in Japan. In the event they were right; it was the last chance, but France lost it. Nevertheless, Sienkiewicz did his best. He informed his government that all the great powers attached great importance to winning the confidence of the Japanese government: 'In the conflicts that will arise in the future in the Far East, Japan is called upon to play, thanks to the belligerant spirit of her population, a determining role.

1. CP vol. XXIX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 21 November 1883
2. CP vol. XXIX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 29 January 1884

Therein lies no doubt the explanation for the solicitations of which the government is at present the object.' Sienkiewicz went on to say that a war between China and Japan in the future was inevitable, but that for the time being the Japanese government considered that its army was not strong enough, but that in his opinion the conflict would take place in ten years time and that in the course of this period the Japanese government was determined to spare no expenses in fortifying, expanding, and modernising the army.

As to Oyama's own feelings on the matter, Sienkiewicz pointed out that the Germans were very active in trying to pursuade Oyama that German influence would be the most beneficial for Japan. At the same time the Italians and the Russians were also actively pressing their case. Oyama, Sienkiewicz felt, was still basically in favour of France, but it was up to France to take the matter seriously and above all not to take Japan for granted. The mission, he added, was due to leave in February, it would visit Italy and France, staying a month in each country, 4 to 5 months in Germany; it also intended to visit Austria, Turkey, Russia and Denmark, and possibly the United States.[1]

1. ibid.

Bougouin had written in the same terms to his Ministry[1], but he was less sanguine than Sienkiewicz on Oyama's French tendencies, and indeed in April he told Sienkiewicz that he had heard Oyama intended to engage in Germany an officer who would be both councillor to the General Staff and instructor at the School of War. Sienkiewicz instructed Bougouin to make representations among the most influential Japanese generals.[2] Bougouin went to see Generals Yamada and Yamagata claiming that if Japan were to hire officers other than French, the consequences would be bad for the army. The two generals, however, retorted that this was not necessarily the case, and that among other things it would benefit Japan to gain experience from officers from various countries employing different systems.[3]

In January Sienkiewicz was able to inform his Ministry of the expected arrival in Japan of the German officer. Although the Oyama mission had recruited four Frenchmen, these were instructors of fencing, music and gymnastics, and Sienkiewicz clearly perceived that with the arrival of the new German officer

1. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Bougouin to Ministry, 1 February 1884
2. CP vol. XXX, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 17 April 1884
3. Army Rapports et Lettres..., Bougouin to Ministry, 19 April 1884. A number of Italians were also recruited on the occasion of Oyama's trip.

Germany was bound to become the greatest European influence. In a word he realised that France had lost.[1] Sienkiewicz, nevertheless, called on General Oyama and asked him for an explanation. Oyama told him that personally he would have preferred a Frenchman, but that the government had decided otherwise. The main reason, according to Oyama, for taking a German rather than a Frenchman as councillor to the General Staff and Director of the War School, was that 'France being a very rich country can afford a very expensive military organisation, whereas Germany, a poor country, has a more economic organisation and one more in accordance with the feeble resources of Japan.'[2] This interview is more indicative of Oyama's tact than anything else.

German influence from 1885 onwards was predominant in the Japanese army, as far as Western influences were concerned. Yet for a few months before the Restoration and for some eight years afterwards, French influence and the French presence counted for a great deal. We have already discussed the reasons why France was invited to send a second mission after the Restoration and we shall soon be suggesting some reasons why Germany took over. But one question that has to be considered is why the Franch

1. CP vol. XXXI, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 3 January 1885
2. CP vol. XXXI, Sienkiewicz to Ministry, 4 February 1885

army was so keen on maintaining its presence in Japan, to the extent of losing a considerable amount of dignity, regardless of what Munier might have thought, in apparently on a number of occasions ėmploring the Japanese not to bring the mission to an end and virtually begging not to be replaced by another power. One reason, no doubt, had to do with professional pride. The members of the mission indicated on several occasions that their work was not finished, that their students still had a great deal to learn. Doubtless the French officers felt that were their work to be terminated before successful progress had been made, their competence would be questioned if the Japanese army (say in a war against China) were to become an object of ridicule.[1] Another reason clearly was related to the very intense sense of rivalry the Franch army felt vis à vis Germany. Replacement in Japan by German influence was undoubtedly yet another defeat for France and a victory for Germany. In terms of the interests of the French army there is no doubt that the presence of officers closely involved with the Japanese army meant that they were able to carry out useful intelligence exercises not just in connection with Japan, but also with respect to the whole of the Far East. Munier admitted as much to his Ministry on at least one occasion.[2]

1. see Munier to Chanoine, 23 June 1878, DuBousquet to Chanoine, 10 December 1879, in Chanoine, op. cit.
2. Army, Rapports et Lettres..., Munier to Ministry, 29 January 1877

What is interesting, however, is that the army does not seem to have enjoyed support from French diplomats, apart from Sienkiewicz and, to some extent, de Geoffroy. Indeed the whole of the conclusion of Chanoine's book is virtually a tirade against the Quai d'Orsay and its agents in Japan, basically accusing successive governments of not having realised the importance of Japan and of having failed miserably, as a result of this, in every area of its Far Eastern policy. Chanoine lays the blame for the substitution of German influence for French influence completely at the door of successive French governments and their foreign ministers; he adds that the army had always favoured an alliance with Japan, that it alone recognised the true value of the country, and indeed that he had opposed the participation of France in the Triple Intervention.[1]

Two points need to be made, however, about Chanoine. The first is that he was writing in 1904, his book went to print in 1907, and therefore long after replacement of French by German officers, and when of course Japan's military success justified the views he allegedly held. Neither Chanoine, nor any of the other French officers, ever indicated that the Japanese may have been right, that perhaps the German military system, for the

1. see Chanoine, op. cit. , "Conséquence de l'Oeuvre des Officiers Français au Japan".

ends the Japanese government had in mind, was preferable for Japan. French army officers were obviously very reluctant to find any fault in themselves, so the governments and diplomats proved convenient scapegoats.

Apart from the fact that many high-ranking Japanese officers no doubt believed that the German army was superior to the French. The German model was more suitable to Japan given the aims of the Japanese government - not just military aims, but social and political aims also. Indeed Meckel proved to be a great success![1]

A pro-German faction was not limited to the army. Pro-German feelings, in opposition to pro-French or pro-British, extended to a number of departments and especially to important individuals, notably Ito Hirobumi. Ito after all had spent two years in Germany prior to Oyama's departure from Europe and was allegedly modelling the Japanese constitution on the German. It may have been that the Genro felt that the diffuse borrowing from abroad had gone far enough and that a little more consistency was required, especially in such sensitive, related, fields as the Constitution and the army. The important point is that the

1. see Presseisen, <u>op. cit.</u>, p.108 and chapters III and IV

models were chosen in accordance with what the Japanese themselves desired. The preferences of Frenchmen or Germans did not come into the equation.

This raises the question of the depth of German influence, or indeed how profound French influence would have been had it been allowed to remain. Such influence was more superficial than real. In the Japanese Army and on the Meiji Constitution German influence was (as French influence would have been) a veneer, not a determining factor. Both the Army and the Constitution bore an essentially indigenous stamp. Germany was chosen as a model because the German model rather than the French fitted into the patterns that the civilian and military authorities in Japan wished to develop.

Chapter 10

Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarbie

In Japan's ambitious programme of Fukoku-kyohei (rich country-strong army) emphasis was placed on industrial and military developments; yet for a variety of reasons, some of them due to the changes taking place in Japanese society in the course of its industrialisation, others emanating from the 'intoxication' with Western things in the Bunmei-Kaika (Civilisation and Enlightenment) period and from pressure from the Western powers, a wide range of political and judicial reforms and innovations was carried out. Of these numerous innovations in Japanese society, 'One of the most interesting examples of the difficulties attending a fusion of cultures is provided by the history of the legal reforms that followed the Restoration.'[1] For the concept of law goes to the very heart of a society. One of Japan's first legal advisers, a Frenchman, declared:

> 'Of all the manifestations to which a people is led by the natural development of its faculties, none better reflects its genius, reveals more clearly its character than its legislation. It is there that each nation deposits the secret of its tendencies and its creative

1. G.B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, p.444

forces, the evolution of which constitutes either its greatness or its decadence."[1]

Japan had of course a legal system, the basic principles of which had been borrowed from China centuries earlier[2], but there were marked differences from European standards in the very approach to the concept of law. Japan's legal system and the execution of justice were felt by Europeans to be dramatically inferior to those of the West. Therein lay the principal reason for the claim that extra-territoriality was absolutely essential. In the first place it was held that

1. G. Bousquet, "Les Moeurs - Le Droit Public et Privé au Japon", Echo du Japon, 15 Octobre 1875
2. see Y. Noda, Introduction au Droit Japonais, Chapter I, "Aperçu Historique de Droit Japonais de l'Origine Jusqu'en 1868", p.29-48

torture was widespread in Japan[1] and that this was incompatible

1. on torture in Tokugawa Japan, see C.J. Dunn, Everyday Life in Traditional Japan, p. 30-34 and 144. It is claimed that Boissonade, the subject of this chapter, was responsible for the abolition of torture in Japan;
'One day - it was on the 15th April, 1875 - when busy with the preliminaries for the work of codification, he [Boissonade] heard groans in an adjoining apartment, and asked what they meant. An evasive answer was returned; but he persisted, and finally burst into the room whence the groans issued, to find a man stretched on the torture-boards with layers of heavy stones piled on his legs. Returning to his Japanese colleagues, he plainly told them that such horrors and civilised law could not coexist, that torture must cease or that he would resign. On the very next day he sent in a memorandum to the Minister of Justice, containing his resignation in the event of compliance being withheld. Some months elapsed, the translation of his memorandum was delayed, and many specious reasons were alleged by Japanese officialdom for the maintenance of a usage so ancient, which had moreover quite recently (25th August, 1874) been re-affirmed both in principle and in practice, provision having actually then been made afresh for monthly statistics on the subject! Nevertheless, Mr. Boissonade's unremitting efforts succeeded in interesting certain high officials in the cause, and torture was rendered illegal by a notification dated 10th June, 1876.'
B.H. Chamberlain, Japanese Things, p.182: see also Sansom, op. cit, fn. 1, p.445 and N. Umetani, The Role of Foreign Employees in the Meiji Era in Japan, p.36. The extent to which Boissanade was successful, however, was debatable. Europeans alleged that torture was still practiced in Japan, for example a letter to The Times, published on 21 October 1879, stated that, 'It is true that the law permitting this barbarous punishment has been abrogated and is no longer on the statute book. Unfortunately, like too many other laws in Japan, it exists only on paper; for residents are well aware that the practice, although perhaps, only exceptionally resorted to, is still secretly carried on by the Government.'

with the demands of civilised society; subjecting Europeans to Japanese jurisdiction risked exposing them to torture. The clause of extra-terrotoriality was perhaps the main factor responsible for Japan's legal reforms. However, before proceeding to this problem, it should be remarked that there were four major and profound differences in basic legal philosophy between Japan and the West, two of which were to continue posing problems for a long time.

The first problem encountered by Japanese jurisprudence in its efforts to assimilate Western law was the concept of rights, 'for the notion of rights is foreign to the jurisprudence that Japan borrowed from China in the seventh century and on which all her subsequent legislation was based. Indeed, not only in its laws but in its customs the social system of Japan was penetrated by the idea of duties to the exclusion of the idea of rights.'[1] The difficulty was not merely legal, philosophical or sociological. It was also linguistic. The term 'rights' had no equivalent in Japanese according to either law or custom; and so one of the pioneers of early Japanese legislation, Mitsukuri Rinsho, had to invent a Japanese term to describe this concept. After many difficulties

1. Sansom, op. cit., p.446

and attempts (the linguistic problems confronting him were by no means limited to the term 'rights'), he eventually invented the word kenri as 'rights', distinguishing it from gimu, 'obligations.'[1] This linguistic innovation did not, needless to say transform Japanese political and social attitudes overnight. Problems of the relationship of rights to duties plagued Japanese society and politics for decades to come. They included such questions as whether an individual under the Tenno-sei enjoyed rights, or simply privileges granted to him by the Emperor. The introduction of the concept of rights was in itself revolutionary and provides 'a distinct and undoubted case of the exertion of direct Western influence upon Japanese culture...'[2]

1. Noda, op. cit., p.52
2. Sansom, op. cit., p.446. Unquestionably the concept of rights was never fully established in Meiji Japan and was to experience practical extinction in the pre-war Showa period. The concept of rights as embodied in the Japanese Constitution of 1889 by no means makes these inviolate. Thus in the preamble is written, 'We now declare to respect and protect the security of the right and of the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the law'. (quoted from H.S. Quigley & J.E. Turner, The New Japan, p.416). Thus in this paragraph as in Chapter II of the Constitution, Rights and Duties of the Subjects, it is made clear that laws can be enacted which would override rights. The New Constitution of Japan makes the position governing fundamental rights unambiguous, guaranteeing that these should be both eternal and inviolate (see article 11, chapter III, Rights and Duties of the People), yet some legal experts have argued that in the liberated judicial system of post-war Japan, there has at times been a confusion regarding the distinction to be drawn between 'rights' and 'license'); see J.M. Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan.

A second revolutionary innovation in Japan's legal system was the publication of a code of law. In the past Japanese codes existed simply as guidelines for officials: 'In fact it may be said that during the Tokugawa period there was no general body of law that must be known to and followed by the citizen. It was his business to obey the orders of officials, whose actions were arbitrary except in so far as they were governed by administrative orders.'[1] This, however, did not present the same problems that the first or third hurdles were to cause. Although, as we shall see, there was considerable debate before the new codes were actually promulgated, with the exception of only a handful, it was accepted in the ruling circles that codification and publication were desirable.[2] Bousquet, the French legal expert referred to earlier, had indeed argued that legislation was a dynamic process and that whereas in the West, 'the perpetual movement of the spirit incessantly destroys at the same time as it creates', that one of the principal reasons for the stagnation of Asian societies, notably Japan, was that 'if some great men realised a powerful concept, it perpetuated itself because of the inertia of those who were subjected to it.'[3] Although the

1- G.B. SANSOM, op.cit, p.447

1. G.E. Boissonade, "Les Nouveaux Codes Japanais: Reponse Au Manifeste Des Legistes Et Aux Objections De La Diete", Revue Francaise Du Japon, August 1892, p.229-275
2. G. Bousquet, op. cit.

problems of relating change to tradition also remained a marked feature of Japanese society in the decades following the Meiji Restoration, the framers of the Constitution of 1889 were careful to make provisions for the alteration of laws, indeed of the Constitution itself, in the course of time so that publication of legal codes was accepted.

However, in the short term at least, the greatest incompatibility between Western legal tradition and Japanese social mores lay in the relationship of the individual to the family. Traditionally in Japanese society the unit was the family and not the individual, hence collective responsibility rather than individual responsibility before the law. This was a very real problem; here, however, it is sufficient to note that it transcended purely legal considerations, since it reflected the different religious traditions of European countries and of Japan and was therefore bound to raise not just problems of legal interpretation, but also emotional debate about the very fabric of Japanese society and tradition.

The fourth problem, which will be examined in more detail in passages dealing with the introduction of Western penal law to Japan, was that of equality before the law. It is not just that the Tokugawa period had for two and a half centuries drawn a clear legal distinction between samurai, peasants,

merchants, artisans and *eta*, but again that the Christian concept of egalitarianism was opposed to the Confucianist insistence on hierarchical order as a necessity for the preservation of harmony in society. In the Five Basic Relationships governing the relations of men and women within society, only one of these, friend and friend, were equal; all the others were based on a clear vertical line of hierarchical order. This concept obviously affected the basic assumptions of the Japanese family, such as questions of the headship of the family, relations between husband and wife, older brother and younger brother. These issues were indeed to be debated; and opposition was voiced to legal equality of samurai and heimin,[1] but not to the same extent as the first or third innovatory (indeed, revolutionary) aspects of Western law. As for samurai and heimin, the Meiji oligarchy had in any case already made it clear that defeudalisation would include the abolition of numerous samurai privileges.

There is a fifth, final major innovation that was brought through the introduction of Western law. It was not included in the general description of the first four as a 'very major and profound' difference, for although both adjectives could be applied to it, it was entirely compatible with the aims of the government and was to some extent covered by the second innovation,

1. Boissonade, "Les Nouveaux Codes Japonais...", p.271

namely publication. In the Tokugawa period, although there were certain national laws, considerable latitude was given to the everyday administration of law in each han. One of the aims and achievements of the new civil and penal codes was to establish a codified national legal system in detailed as well as general terms. The fact that the Japanese opted for the French national system here, just as they modelled their prefectural system on France, unlike the federal system of the United States or Switzerland, was very much in keeping with the great emphasis on centralisation which marked Japan's legal, political, financial and military reforms in the first decades of the Meiji period.

The problem of timing was of some importance. Bousquet, writing in 1875, urged the Japanese not to legislate in haste, but to undertake exhaustive and parallel studies of indigenous needs and French laws, with the final product realising an amalgalm of the two.

> 'Japan is losing her ancient customs, one must wait for her to have established new ones before making them the basis of laws; she has borrowed some foreign ideas, one has to give them time to penetrate and destroy indigenous prejudices still deep-rooted. One must, before the promulgation of a new law, create and propogate the absolute notion of law.'[1]

1. Bousquet, op. cit., (continued) 4 November 1875

Yet the vital element of time was something on which, in the government's views Japan could not depend. Certainly the changing structure of Japan's society and its industrialisation required that new laws be promulgated to keep abreastof new social, economic and political developments. But the forcing house of Japan's new legal system was external pressure and not internal need.

In 1870, Eto Shinpei, the first Minister of Justice, entrusted Mitsukuri Rinsho with the translation of the Napoleonic civil code and urged him to complete the work as quickly as possible. It appears that he went so far as to tell Minsukuri not to worry about the possibility of mistranslation.[1] The Iwakura mission appreciated the necessity for legal reforms in Japan before any headway could be made

1. Noda, op. cit., p.51

with the foreign powers on the question of extra-territoriality.[1] In 1872 Georges Bousquet was invited to teach at the Meiho Office, which later became the Hogakko (Law School), attached to the Ministry of Justice, and he contributed to the drafting

1. Shortly after the return of the Iwakura mission, negotiations between Iwakura and the foreign representatives were opened in view of the possibility of foreigners travelling in the interior of Japan. Iwakura argued at great length that were foreigners to travel inside the country they must conform to Japanese laws, noting among many other things that were it to be otherwise Japan would suffer the same fate as Turkey and Egypt, both of which had permitted foreigners to travel inside their territories under the extra-territorial system and as such had found their national sovereignty steadily and irreversibly eroded. The Western representatives argued that under no circumstances could their nationals be responsible before Japanese law as long as it preserved primitive and barbaric conditions. The discussions eventually reached a stalemate and the problem was only resolved twenty-six years later with the ratification of the new treaties in 1899. For the exchanges between Iwakura and the foreign representatives along with numerous documents attached by both sides, see CP vol. XXIII, Berthemy to Ministry, 28 December 1873.

of the initial Japanese civil code.[1] Although Eto's attempt to have the Napoleonic Codes translated and immediately accepted and promulgated as Japan's new civil code (in spite of possible mistranslations) proved abortive (Bousquet argued against it; and in any case Eto was beheaded in 1874). French civil and penal law was nevertheless adopted as the model.

There were two main reasons why the French code was almost immediately accepted, virtually to the exclusion of any other Western code. In the first place, the Napoleonic code 'was considered the most complete written law yet created in the world'.[2] Secondly, one principal alternative namely the British system of common law, was far too complicated to be understood and encorporated within a short period of time. Besides, the five Napoleonic codes had served as models for other countries.[3]

1. Umetani, op. cit., p.34 and M. Tomii, "The Development of Japanese Legal Institutions" in S. Okuma (ed.), Fifty Years of New Japan, p.244. Following Eto's death, however, work did go on and in 1878 a project for a civil code in three volumes and containing 1820 articles was presented to the government, which did not adopt it, however, in view of its slavish imitation of the French civil code; see Noda, op. cit., p.53
2. Umetani, op. cit., p.34
3. Noda, op. cit., p.51

Even though the progress of codification had to advance at a slower pace than Eto desired, the question of time was still important and no one failed to realise the implications of the legal reforms. In his Foreword to the Penal Code, Boissonade himself admits:

> 'The constant object of our efforts in the preparation of these Projects for the Penal Codes, as in that of the Project for the civil Code, is that the new Japan honour herself in the eyes of the peoples of the Occident by good penal and civil laws. It is only through these means that she will succeed in recovering full territorial jurisdiction which she now lacks.'[1]

Although, as we shall see, Boissonade went to great pains to take account of Japanese traditions as well as Western principles of jurisprudence, it is none the less clear that Japan's legal reform was carried out in haste and was influenced by external pressures rather than domestic inspiration. Thus Bousquet's advice could not be heeded, on the contrary, thanks to international pressure,

> 'the Japanese Government did not have enough time to wait for a modern Law to be born spontaneously, in the course of the gradual transformation of her social structure into a capitalist society. She was forced therefore without

1. G.E. Boissanade, Projet Revisé de Code Penal pour l'Empire du Japon, p.x

> waiting to bestow upon herself a modern juridical system, irrespective of the social state in which Japan happened to be.'[1]

The circumstances under which Boissonade worked for more than twenty years were needless to say exceptional; the work he produced, however, and the response to it by Japanese and Westerners alike provide one of the most fascinating illustrations of the complexities of the hectic transitory period through which Japan had to pass in becoming a 'modern' state and achieving requisite standards for the country to be judged 'civilised' by the international jury of the age; namely the Western powers.

In academic terms Boissonade was one of the more distinguished foreign experts employed by the Meiji government. Born in 1825, the son of a famous hellenist, Jean-François Boissonade, he was Professor of Law at the University of Grenoble and lectured at the Sorbonne.[2] By 1873, when he sailed

1. Noda, op. cit., p.51. D.S. Landes has written in regard to the role of the state in Japan's industrialisation, 'It was the State that conceived modernization as a goal and industrialisation as a means, that gave birth to the new economy in haste and pushed it unrelentingly as an ambitious mother her child prodigy. And though the child grew and developed its own resources, it never overcame the deformity imposed by this forced nurture.' D.S. Landes, 'Japan and Europe - Contrasts in Industrialization, in W.W. Lockwood (ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, p.182

2. see Y. Noda, "Gustave Boissonade, comparatiste ignoré", Problemes Contemporains de Droit Compare, vol II p.235 - and J. Vaporeau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains (1888)

WITH THE SUBSTITUTION OF ONE OR TWO WORDS, THIS COMMENT WOULD ADMIRABLY SUMMARISE THE PROCESS OF LEGAL REFORM IN JAPAN AND ITS FORCED NURTURE

for Japan, he had published numerous works, including several on Islamic law, and was one of the pioneers in the field of comparative law. His connection with the Japanese seems to have owed nothing to the French Legation[1]; but to have arisen from the initiative of Sameshima Naonobu, the first Japanese Minister in Paris after de Montblanc.[2] Sameshima had arranged for Boissonade to lecture on law to certain visiting Japanese students, among them Imamura Waro, Kishira Kaneyoshi, Tsuruda Ko, Kawaji Toshinage, Inoue Ki, Namura Taizo and Iwashita Chojiro, all of whom eventually held important legal or political appointments.[3] Subsequently he was invited to Japan; and he

1. Indeed Boissonade is hardly ever mentioned in the Foreign Ministry correspondence.
2. Umetani, op. cit., p.35
3. G.E. Boissonade, "Notice Biographique sur Feu Imamura Waro", Revue Francaise du Japan, March 1894, p.90/91, fn.4

lived and worked there for over twenty years.[1] This chapter deals mainly with Boissonade's Projects for the penal and civil codes of Japan, but it should be noted that he was involved in other fields of activity, leaving aside his personal crusade for the abolition of torture. He was Professor at the Hogakko. This school came under the Ministry of Justice; it was later transferred to the Ministry of Education and eventually merged with the Law School of Tokyo Imperial University. Thus, Boissonade contributed to the education of some of Japan's first lawyers, among them Inoue Masakuza, Kurizuka Shogo, Kinoshita Hiroji, Isobe Shiro and Inoue Misao.[2] Secondly he proved to be of valuable

1. Why Boissonade decided to go to Japan is not known. Along with other figures such as de Montblanc, Brunat, Roches, it is a pity that none of the prominent French personalities in Japan wrote autobiographical works or essays on their stay in Japan, even though a number wrote about the country, or some aspects of it. For Boissonade's assessment of the major changes in Japan in the course of his twenty years there, see G.E. Boissonade, "Coup d'Oeil sur les Progrés du Japon Moderne", memoire lu à l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, in Revue Francaise du Japan, January 1896
2. Umetani, op. cit., p.35

assistance to Okubo Toshimichi during the latter's negotiations in Tientsin and later in Pekin on the Formosan question in 1874.[1] Finally, he intervened strongly in 1887 in the matter of the treaty revision proposed by Inoue Kowashi. This would have allowed a majority of foreign judges to preside over litigation between foreigners and Japanese nationals. Inoue's proposed revision was subsequently abandoned and Inoue himself was forced to resign. Although a number of factors were involved in the abandonment of the Inoue plan, Boissonade's

1. see M. Iwata, Okubo Toshimichi, The Bismarck of Japan, p. 200-224. In the negotiations in China, 'Okubo's aim was to prove that China had not exercised jurisdiction over this portion of Formosa. Hence he argued that a dependency could be considered worthy of that term only insofar as the country claiming it exercised authority therein by the establishment of an administrative system and military facilities.'(p.212) 'The outstanding feature of the first meeting was undoubtedly Okubo's well-reasoned argument based upon a law conceived in the West. This indicates his aptness as Boissonade's disciple, and also attests to the care with which the French legalist advised the Japanese envoy.' (p.213) Iwata further argues that the reason why Okubo was able to carry off this diplomatic coup and that the Chinese failed was that they did not have the use of Western legal expertise. (p.221/222)

intercession seems to have been of no little influence.[1]

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The Penal Code.

The projects for a Penal Code and a Code of Criminal Instruction prepared by Boissonade and his associates were presented to the Japanese government in 1877. These were translated into Japanese. A few modifications were demanded by the Government; and they were adopted in 1880 and went into force from 1 January 1882. The Penal Code was to be revised in 1908 and the Code of Criminal Instruction in 1890.[2]

1. see N. Ike, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan, p.183/4 and G. Uyehara, The Political Development of Japan, p. 102/103. Boissonade had a meeting with Inoue in which he very strongly argued against the terms of the proposed treaty revision (see "Stenographic Record of the Conversation on the Proposed Treaty Revision between Inoue Kowashi and Gustave Boissonade, May 10, 1887" in Meiji Japan through Contemporary Sources). Among other things, he told Inoue that the main reason for his dissatisfaction with the articles of the revision was that foreign judges were to be employed and that they were to form a majority: 'Can one believe that a trial in such a situation will be fair ? As it is a common human defect to tend to favour that side which is closer to one, the trial would therefore generally be disadvantageous for Japanese.' (p. 157)
2. Noda, op. cit., p. 53/54 and Tomii, op. cit., p.243/244

Boissonade realised that one of the most important objects of his work was to convince the Western powers that the standards of Japan's penal system were up to those of the West. Boissonade, who was himself very outspoken in opposing a perpetuation of the extra-territorial system, argued that his projected penal law was superior to the European model from which it was derived in that it was more precise and its logic more rigorous.[1] Furthermore, he pointed out that Japan had been able to take advantage of the experience of other countries to perfect her penal system and it was his hope that other Oriental nations would in the future use the Japanese penal code as a model for their own legal reforms.[2] The French penal code was used as the basic model mainly because of all the penal codes in the world the French displayed the greatest

1. Boissonade, Projet Revise de Code Penal pour l'Empire du Japon (hereafter PRCP), p.52. A compatriot of Boissonade's and fellow jurist agreed with this view and stated that not only was Boissonade's project in accordance with modern ideas, but that he had paid careful attention to the reforms taking place in Europe and the complaints of some jurists in regard to the old codes. J. Lefort, "La Reforme du Droit Penal au Japon", Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparée, 1880, vol. 12, p.226.
2. PRCP, p.6

clarity, wisdom and moderation; nevertheless, attention had also been paid to the penal codes or reforms of Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Egypt and the British penal code in India; close study moreover had been made of the Chinese penal code as it had been Japan's model for so long.[1] The new code in Japan, he added, was to be applicable to all residents in Japan, including foreigners; but obviously such provisions could not come into existence until the extra-territorial clauses had been repealed.[2]

In comparing Japan's former penal system with the new code and stressing that the latter was infinitely more moderate, especially in terms of punishments, Boissonade emphasised that with the modernisation of the nation's judicial, administrative and police systems, punishment could be more moderate, that this was one of the criteria of civilisation.[3] A just law was in

1. PRCP, p.6/7
2. PRCP, p.7
3. PRCP, p.8. Boissonade was later accused by a number of his Japanese critics, though especially in relation to his Project for a Civil Code, that instead of just presenting a code, he was also lecturing to the government and jurists responsible for codification. There is some justification for this accusation, nevertheless the 'lecturing' is interesting and instructive and that on political crimes, for example, very telling with the benefit of hindsight.

conformity with a just society; the State's obligation was not simply to punish evil, but to recompense good. The State of course must do everything in its power to protect and educate the citizens, the more schools the fewer prisons there would be. He placed strong emphasis on the need for moral and religious education (of what he called the universalist kind) for the people and especially for the lower orders; for the latter, if persuaded of the joys of an after life, would be more content to accept the hardships of their present existence.[1] Among the virtues of society he noted with satisfaction the importance in Japan of filial piety.[2] From his Introduction it is obvious that the tenour of Boissonade's approach was eminently conservative yet as we shall see he did incorporate certain legal principles which were revolutionary so far as Japan was concerned. Nevertheless he did try, as he claimed, to marry Occidental principles of law with Japanese society; indeed he

1. PRCP, p.15/16
2. PRCP, p. 16 fn (d)

paid considerable attention to penal sanctions to protect the Emperor and his family.[1] Political considerations in this context, however, are only of limited value. Needless to say Japanese society was conservative, the ruling circles aimed at keeping it as such, and had Boissonade been more adventurous and progressive, he would probably have been sent home. As we shall see, especially in regard to political penal legislation, he did propose one important and well argued progressive innovation, but this was not to meet with government approval.

Boissonade explained that his proposed penal system was based not just on the concept of absolute justice or on utilitarian doctrine, but on the association of the two concepts, that the magistrate in judging a crime must take into account whether it is both a mal moral and a mal social. His approach was governed by considerations of Justice and Utility.[2]

1. Boissonade comes out so strongly in favour of the Imperial system in Japan and expresses on a number of occasions such admiration for it, that he felt it necessary to assure his readers that in no way were they authorised to doubt of his firm attachment to the republican institutions of France. PRCP, p. 463, fn. (b)
2. Boissonade belonged to the neoclassical school of law. 'This school followed, in the main, the classical retaliatory doctrine of the De Maître and Kant, incorporating however, the social-defense idea of Beccaria and Bentham'. A.T. von Mehren, Law in Japan, p.15

The very fact that a penal code was published was revolutionary in Japan. With this innovation it was also made clear that no punishment could be meted out unless the action or omission was clearly defined in law (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and that no punishment could be given by an ex post facto law.[1] Punishment had to be guided by seven principles: (1) It must be personal; that is to say, it must directly affect only the guilty party and not his innocent family; this was a major revolutionary innovation in Japanese judicial practice. (2) It must be revocable and reparable, especially in cases of judicial error. (3) It must be remissible, in case of good conduct on the part of the condemned. This was not necessarily universal practice in Europe.[2] (4) It must be equal for all; this too was a revolutionary break with the practice of the Edo period. Boissonade stated that even though there existed inequalities in the class system, these could not be reflected in the application of penal laws, indeed that if greater severity were called for it should apply rather to the upper classes than the lower. He added that this concept of equality must nevertheless take into consideration such

1. see Mehren, op. cit., p.15
2. see Lefort, op. cit., p.224-227

questions as age, sex and health, but that these could be described as extenuating factors. (5) Punishment should be divisible and should reflect the principle of extenuating circumstances; in other words, the same crime committed by two different people need not incorporate the same degree of mal social and mal moral. (6) Punishment must be guided by the principle of the reform or correction of the individual, with the hope of making him a better citizen in future; this concept was a fairly recent development in European judicial thinking at that time. (7) Punishment must be exemplary, a deterrent to those inclined to commit similar crimes.[1] On the last principle Boissonade made it clear that he was not asking for public execution, but rather for open trials, and that due publicity be given in the press and other organs.[2] He explained at some length why physical punishment should be abandoned in Japan (with the exception of the death penalty, as we shall see shortly): and this was accepted by the Japanese government.[3] Again it should be noted that various forms of corporal punishment were still practised in Europe and that in those countries where it was not, the change had been recent. Finally Boissonade again stressed that in civilised society punishment

1. PRCP, p.102-104
2. PRCP, p.104
3. PRCP, p.106-107 and 115-116

must be seen not just in a negative sense, but in positive terms, and that magistrates must constantly bear in mind the hope of converting an evil man to the cause of moral and social good.[1]

On the question of the death penalty, Boissonade admitted that it obviously excluded a number of his guiding principles, namely the second, third and sixth. He noted that in certain European countries, namely Denmark, Holland, and Portugal, the death penalty had been abolished, that movements for the abolition of the death penalty were active in most other European countries, and that indeed the centralisation of the Italian penal code, despite unification of the country, was still being held up as Tuscany had abolished capital punishment, whereas other regions of Italy insisted on retaining it. Boissonade expressed the hope that Japan would eventually follow the example of the nations which had abolished capital punishment, but he accepted that for the time being it was likely that Japan would retain it. He added that in any case the question of the abolition of capital punishment was not really up to jurists, that in Europe the cause had been taken up by publicists, philosophers and poets, notably in France,

1. PRCP, p.110

by three Frenchmen, representative of each group and not unknown to Japanese, Charles Lucas, Jules Simon, and Victor Hugo.[1]

If Japan did not abolish capital punishment, however, the new penal code ensured that the crimes attracting this penalty were much fewer than in the past. The death penalty was now limited to premeditated murder, parricide, and brutal murder even when not premeditated (for example where the victim had been tortured before death or killed by poisoning, the latter crime being particularly reprehensible, because of the secrecy involved), murder by pirates, death following the destruction of communications (such as derailing a train or sinking a ship). The death penalty should also be considered in cases of arson or flooding, even if there were no fatal casualties. The last two considerations were especially applicable in the case of Japan in view of the prevalence of wooden buildings and the importance of rice paddies.[2] It should be noted here that Boissonade had strongly urged the government to abolish the death penalty for political crimes; but the government refused to accept this recommendation.[3]

1. PRCP, p.124-127
2. PRCP, p.110 and 127-130
3. PRCP, p.130 and 465 ff

Finally, after noting that the new codes forbade torture prior to execution[1], Boissonade dwelt on the comparative merits or demerits of decapitation and hanging[2]. He preferred the latter, especially because it allowed the corpse to remain intact, as a consolation to the family of the condemned man. He suggested that provision be made for soldiers or sailors to be executed by firing squad. He was firmly opposed to public execution on the grounds that it tended to turn into a festive occasion.[3] Only the Minister of Justice had the right to give the order for capital punishment to be carried out, and the Emperor had the right to commute the death sentence.[4] Pregnant

1. Boissonade opined that the Chinese methods of torture, though common in Japan in the past, were in "... profound disagreement with the natural gentleness of the Japanese people." PRCP, p.131
2. Boissonade was aware of methods of execution by electricity or gas, but refused to entertain the idea that sciences, such as physics or chemistry, be used to destroy man, as their main object was to preserve and conserve him. PRCP, p.133
3. PRCP, p.131-136
4. PRCP, p.136

women were not to be executed until afterrthe birth of the child.[1]

Boissonade drafted a chapter on crimes and offenses committed against the members of the Imperial family. This chapter deliberately excluded political crimes against tho Imperial family, which are cove_red in a separate chapter. It is interesting to note that the government's initial reaction was that the chapter should not exist; the very suggestion that a crime might be committed against their August Majesties was in itself dishonourable for the Emperor and for the nation. Boissonade, however, convinced them that such codification was necessary and drew a parallel with ancient Greece, where no provision was made for parricide as it had not occured at the time of the promulgation of the codes.[2] He went on to comment on the fact that all European states with monarchies, irrespective

1. The government decided that a pregnant woman should be executed only 100 days after the birth of the child. Boissonade wondered whether in fact, despite the appearance of being more benevolent, this measure was not in fact more cruel as the woman would have strongly developed maternal feelings and the separation from her infant would be all the more dramatic. He added, however, that he hoped that all pregnant women's death sentences would be commuted, PRCP, p.138/9
2. PRCP, p.428. The crimes against the Emperor and punishment to be meted out were even further elaborated and strengthened in the 1907 revision of the penal code. The 1946 revision, however, abolished the distinction between crimes against the Emperor and crimes against ordinary citizens; see Mehren, op. cit., p.17

of whether these were constitutional monarchies or not, incorporated more severe punishment for crimes against monarchs than ordinary individuals; such should be the case in Japan, particularly in view of the very special nature of the Japanese imperial institution, which had endured without interruption for more than twenty-five centuries.[1] Furthermore, the danger to the Emperor was now far greater than in the past, since he was far more accessible to the people, seeing that he no longer lived in permanent isolation in his palace but attended numerous private and public ceremonies. Were the code not to make provision for attacks on the Emperor and were some fanatic to commit such an offense, the magistrate would be reduced to treating such a crime as an ordinary one. It was certainly the case, he added, that he who committed, or tried to commit, an offense or crime against the Emperor was guilty of a greater mal moral and mal social, than in the case of an ordinary individual.[2] The basis on which murder of the Sovereign was to be judged was on the 'simple and true idea' that the Emperor was the father of all his subjects in common, thus an Emperor's murder was comparable with parricide

1. PRCP, p.427/8
2. PRCP, p.429

and in accordance with the punishment of parricide it was not necessary to prove premeditation on the part of the accused. Hence the death sentence was applicable.[1] The death sentence should not be prescribed, however, for kidnapping of the Emperor, Boissonade arguing here that if the death penalty in this case must diminish the chances of rescuing the Emperor alive, the kidnappers would have nothing to lose by murdering him.[2] The death penalty was applicable, however, in case of attempted murder, although Boissonade expressed the hope that on such occasions the Emperor would commute the sentence.[3]

We noted earlier that when Boissonade urged that the death penalty should not apply to political crimes (with exception of crimes against the Emperor[4]), this had not been accepted by the

1. PRCP, p.432
2. PRCP, p. 433/4
3. PRCP, p.438-440. Note that the provisions regarding the Japanese Emperor did not affect the situation of foreign monarchs, something which had obviously not been foreseen, so that the attempted assassin of the then Czarevitch Nicholas, despite pressure from the Government on the magistrate was not given the death penalty. It should also be noted that the present code was not in operation at the time of the trial and execution of Kotoku Shusui and his colleagues. They were dealt with under the provisions of the revised Penal Code of 1907.
4. see pages 462-466 in PRCP where political crimes against the Emperor are divided into four categories, with capital punishment not applicable to all.

government. In his chapter on crimes and offenses against the internal security of the state, he renewed his attack on the death penalty for political crimes. Boissonade stated that he and his colleagues were aware of the fact that when they were drafting the Project the question of political crimes was very relevant in view of the Satsuma rebellion then taking place. Nevertheless, Boissonade pressed for the abolition of capital punishment for the political crimes on the grounds that abolition was wise, equitable and logical.

It was wise because among other things the death penalty for political offenses was counter-productive; death penalty for political crimes increased tensions within the state, the desire for vengeance on the part of the associates of the executed criminal was bound to remain a constant source of anxiety. There was the possibility of retaliation, leading to further civil disorder. Executed political criminals became martyrs. New pretexts for revolt were provided, and the spirit of would-be revolutionaries strengthened and consolidated.[1] He contended indeed that the Japanese attitude to 'honourable death' made the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes even more necessary in that country than elsewhere.[2] The abolition of the death penalty for political crimes would be equitable, he argued, and he suggested reasons here which no

1. PRCP, p.455-458
2. PRCP, p.459

doubt carried small weight with the Meiji oligarchy. The motivations of political criminals, declared Boissonade, could be considered just and patriotic. Above all in the case of politics no single body, not even the State, could claim to be in possession of absolute or eternal truth.[1] Finally he argued that abolition was logical. For in the case of ordinary criminal offenses, the guilty could not be awarded the death penalty in case of an attempted crime, but only when the crime had been successful (with the exception of crimes related to the Imperial family); but a political crime could be considered successful only if the Government were overturned, in which case the problem no longer existed.[2] He pointed out that most European countries, following France's example, had abolished the death penalty for political crimes, eventhough the majority of these countries were monarchies or empires, like Japan and unlike France.[3] Despite Boissonade's entreaties the Japanese government kept the death penalty for political crimes in both the 1882 and 1907 codes.

On the question of public morality, Boissonade tended to be rather reticent in regard to Japanese conventions. Thus it is interesting to note that in his chapter on offenses against

1. PRCP, p.459-461
2. PRCP, p.461
3. PRCP, p.462

public morality and respect owed to religions, he is very strict on such things as gambling, but does not include a word on prostitution or the Yoshiwara system. Nor is he revolutionary in the matter of the status of woman in Japanese society. In a section dedicated to 'legal excuses and causes of justification for murder and voluntary violence', he raises the question of adultery. According to article 346 of his projected code, 'Murder and other violences, are excusable when they have been committed by a husband on his legitimate spouse or her complice, at the moment that he surprises them in the flagrant offence of adultery.'[1] There was, however, no quid pro quo for the wife in case her husband were discovered in similar circumstances. Boissonade explained that such was the case simply because of the risk that a wife committing adultery might find herself pregnant, whereas this obviously would not happen to the husband: 'This difference imposes a greater fidelity on the part of the wife, than on the part of the husband; it also explains a greater anger on the part of the deceived husband than the offended wife and the law can without injustice refuse to her the excuse of

1. PRCP, p. 900

murder when it can grant it to the husband'.[1] However, the double-standard on adultery was further re-enforced in another section of the project where, according to article 393, 'A legitimate wife guilty of adultery will be punished with imprisonment with forced labour for a period of three months to two years', with no provisions being made in case of the husband's adultery.[2]

Two further proposed innovations require a brief mention, one successful, the other unsuccessful. Boissonade's projected code contained a special section on suicide, taking into consideration the special place of suicide in the Japanese tradition. Attempted suicide would not be punishable by law on the grounds that it was the product of temporary insanity. This at least broke with the concept of suicide as a rational and indeed heroic act. However, the role of kaishaku (the assistant or beheader at a ritual seppuku) was made illegal: anyone who contributed intellectually or physically to a suicide was punishable by law.[3] But Boissonade was unsuccessful in

1. PRCP, p. 912
2. PRCP, p.1045; in the 1907 code the wife and lover were punishable at the husband's request, while the husband was still not punishable. 'The alternative for the legislators under the new Constitution of 1946 was either to make husband and wife both punishable (in view of the equality of sexes) or to abolish the offense of adultery altogether. After long debates, Diet, the latter alternative was chosen.' Mehren, op. cit., p.18
3. PRCP, p.955-959

persuading the Japanese government to accept the jury system, despite repeated attempts to convince the government, particularly at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution. Ito refused apparently on the grounds that the jury system was premature so far as Japan was concerned.[1]

The Boissonade penal code, accepted as law in 1882, was revised in 1907 with a much greater emphasis on German penal legislation then on French.[2] Nevertheless his code represented the first major innovation in Japanese penal legislation since the old system had been borrowed centuries earlier from China. Boissonade's project, his commentaries, and the reactions to these present in Japan an interesting, illustrative and indicative glimpse of the transformation of Japanese political society in the early decades following the Meiji Restoration.

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The Civil Code

Work on the civil code was undertaken by Boissonade and his team in March 1879 and was completed in April 1889, taking five years longer than Boissonade had expected.[3] The work

1. PRCP, p.439 and Mehren, op. cit., p.21
2. see Mehren, op. cit., p.17-21
3. Boissonade, Projet de Code Civil Pour l'Empire du Japan (hereafter PCC), vol. I, p.VIII

was under the supervision of Oki Takato in the first instance and was later supervised by Yamada Akiyoshi, who had a great interest in the project, and saw it to completion.[1] Boissonade was directly responsible for Book II (Property in General), part of Book III (Acquisition of Property), Book IV (Security of Obligations) and Book V (Evidence). Book I on Persons and the part of Book III dealing with matters of inheritance were written by Japanese jurists, for 'it was necessary to have a profound knowledge of the mores and secular customs of Japan in order to coordinate, modify and at the same time conserve the constitution of the Family and the right of Succession'.[2] The work done by the Japanese jurists, nevertheless, was under strong French influence.[3] The books were submitted to the Cabinet in 1889 and, after deliberation and modifications by the Genro-in and the Privy Council, were promulgated by Imperial ordinance in 1890, to go into effect in 1893. The codes, however, were never to become law. As they affected the very basis of Japanese social and economic life, not suprisingly they elicited great interest, eventually leading to a furious debate among politicians, jurists and intellectuals.

1. PCC, vol I, p.VI-VII
2. PCC, vol I, p. XIII
3. see Mehren, op. cit., p.27 and Noda, op. cit., p.54

In view of the fact that the Boissonade project was still-born and that the criticisms of it will shortly be examined in greater detail, the civil code will not be discussed at any length here, only some features and Boissonade's approach being commented on.

Before coming to Japan, Boissonade was a member of the positivist school of law; yet in his project and in his lectures he introduced the concept of natural law to Japan. As with his assimilation of Justice and Utility in the Penal Code, in the Civil Code, 'He considered that the system of positive law was, and ought to be, a reflection of natural law, which is in turn a universal idea of mankind and can be discovered by human reason. If there is any discrepancy between positive and natural law, the positive law was no law but a corruption of law.'[1] Boissonade's lectures on natural law were translated and published by his student, Toue Misao, under the title, Seiho Kogi (Lectures on the law of Nature).[2] The concept of natural law found a ready audience in Japan, as it was comparable with the Confucian T'ien Tao (Way of Heaven); similarly the distinction between natural law and positive law

1. Mehren, op. cit., p.28
2. Umetani, op. cit.,p.35

could conceivably be understood in terms of Confucianism, with positive law as Jen Tao (Way of Man).[1]

In the actual drafting of the code, Boissonade again explained that while he had used the French civil code as his model, in a number of instances he had improved on it, either where confusion might arise or where experience of some three-quarters of a century indicated that change was necessary.[2] He had also referred to the new Italian code (itself inspired from the French) and to a certain extent to the Belgian, but not to the new German code, partly because it had been only recently published (1874), thus allowing him insufficient time to study it in detail. Moreover, there were some divisions and debates among German jurists regarding the new code.[3]

Boissonade explained on several occasions that his code was not based just on the existing situation in Japan. The code had to take account of the rapid changes taking place in the country and could not aim merely at the solution of existing problems but must concern itself with problems that might arise in future, in the next ten years or more: such problems would arise from greater urbanisation, changes in architecture, (such

1. Mehren, op. cit., p.28, Umetani, op. cit., p.35 and see D. Howard Smith, Confucius, p.62-88
2. see e.g. PCC, vol. I, p.63 and 460
3. PCC, vol. I, p. XV-XVI

as more stone buildings) and the joint ownership of property.[1] At the same time he was careful to allow for the climatic and topographical characteristics of Japan, for example the frequency of fires and earthquakes and the way in which such indidents affected laws governing possession of land.[2] Similarly, the particular nature of Japan's agriculture and the paddy-fields meant a more conscientious and detailed regulation of laws regarding drainage and irrigation.[3] There was a special law regarding the kura (godown)[4] and special measures taken to protect unobstructed the outlook of a proprietor who built a house with one part of it specifically designed to secure a view of the sea, the country-side or Mount Fuji.[5]

Boissonade was criticised by some people for using the codes not merely for purposes of definition and classification but as an opportunity for lecturing to his readers. Certainly an important part of his commentary goes to considerable detail in explaining with great clarity and simplicity the use of legal language and the derivation of legal terminology. Although this applies to all four volumes, in the fourth he explains,

1. PCC, vol. I, p.103
2. see e.g. PCC, vol. I, p. 344 and 497/8
3. PCC vol, O, p.514
4. PCC, vol. I, p.190
5. PCC, vol. I, p.595

'the Law, we believe, must not just be written for the Magistrates who will be called upon to apply it, but also for the citizens who must be able to find therein their duties at the same time as their rights. The clearer the precepts of the Law...the fewer obscure or fallacious contracts there will be. Is it not better for the citizens to learn the law in the Law itself, than from judgements which condemn them or reject their suits for not having understood it ?'[1]

He insisted that it was essential for Japanese jurists to develop their own clear legal language and that this was a matter of absolute priority.[2]

Laws regulating land ownership were also patently of revolutionary importance with the abolition of feudalism and the transition to capitalist society.[3] He did mention, in passing, the socialist position in Europe, but added that in Japan the right of ownership would fall under the category of droit naturel, and that, given the changes taking place in Japan's economy and society and the necessary period of transition, it was wise not to be too politically adventurous.[4] Nevertheless, he was extremely critical of the Japanese law of primogeniture, which he had tried to eradicate, but which the government had insisted on keeping. He argued, among other things, that the

1. PCC, vol. IV, p.iv
2. PCC, vol, IV, p.v
3. PCC, vol. I, p.316-340
4. PCC, vol. I, p.74-81

law of primogeniture as practised in Japan was incompatible with the principle of equality before the law, and that in effect second and third sons, were rendered dejure and de facto, second class citizens.[1] Finally he spent some time dwelling on law and the concept of divinity. He had great praise for the universal concept of Divinity but advocated the strict separation of religion from law. In particular, he was concerned to insert an article which would have protected the citizen from being forced by the State to follow any particular creed, or attend any particular religious rite. The government, however, struck out the relevant article on the grounds that religious freedom was guaranteed by the Constitution.[2]

Thus after years of work Boissonade and his team gave Japan her first code of private law.[3] At the time of its completion Boissonade was 64 years of age. In the preface of the last volume of the Civil Code, he wrote: 'One often says that it is good to think of one's age, but that one must not talk about it. Nevertheless, we feel that eighteen years in Japan are beginning to weigh heavily on our shoulders in view of our mature age and a state of health that has always been weak.'

1. PCC, vol. II, p. iv-v
2. PCC, vol. II, p. 10-12
3. 'for the early codes such as these of Taiho (702), though remarkable documents, were not comprehensive, and the codes of later periods were concerned almost exclusively with feudal society.' Sansom, op. cit., p.445

In spite of all that, however, Boissonade assured his readers that never have we had more appetite or strength for work of the spirit.' The preparation of the codes had been for so long 'our only pleasure and our only field of activity. Moreover, it is with real regret that we see this work come to an end... One has the feeling of having a friend, a daily visitor, with whom we exchanged our thoughts, from the moment of awakening to the moment of rest and one feels how much we are going to miss these conversations in the future.'[1]

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The Rejection of Boissonade's Civil Code

In the government deliberations following the submission of the text Boissonade was not allowed to take part. Indeed from such discussions all the foreign jurists were excluded.[2] Although Boissonade had not himself drafted the Book on Persons or the section in Book III dealing with the question of inheritance, it was nevertheless alleged that his influence was strong. According to one source, Boissonade's influence in these matters meant that the proposed legislation was 'progressive', though once it had gone through the Genro-in, it

1. PCC, vol. IV, p. vi-vii (preface)
2. R. Ishii, Japanese Legislation in the Meiji Era, p.581

was considerably remoulded into a much more 'conservative' shape.[1] Despite this, it was principally the sections dealing with the family and all its corollaries, such as primogeniture, filial piety, the respective positions of husband and wife, and the alleged political implications thereof, which were to receive the greatest attention.

The issues raised, and the factions which were to emerge as a result, during the debate on Boissonade's Project are relatively difficult to disentangle; for, as so often happens when issues become 'heavily laden with emotional outpourings'[2], seemingly strange alliances were formed. In the purely academic sphere, it would appear that the two main factions (the pro-Boissonade Project, which favoured immediate enforcement of the Code, and the anti-Boissonade Project, which favoured postponement) were the 'French' school of Japanese jurists and the 'English' school. Yet it is difficult to determine whether the debate was conducted in a 'scientific spirit'[3] or was based more on gakubatsu (academic clique) politics, for 'the Japanese jurists in both government and private employment were converting the codes into a political issue through their

1. ibid, p. 582/3
2. ibid., p.587
3. Mehren, op. cit., p.30

factional devotion to French and English law.'[1] In the government sector, prior to the merging in 1885 of the Hogakko with the Law faculty at Tokyo University the former had been the preserve of the French school, the latter of the English; and, needless to say the factional division survived the merger. In the private universities Meiji Daigaku and Hosei Daigaku (as they were eventually to be called) taught mostly French law, whereas Chuo Daigaku (at that time appropriately called Igirisu Ho Gakko) insisted on the principles of English law.

> 'The high feeling produced between the two law factions stemmed from the fear of the English law supporters that the enforcement of the French oriented Old Civil Code would mean the triumph in Japan of the French natural law school and thus spell the doom of English law influence in Japan. Therefore the promulgation and enforcement of the Old Civil Code was a life and death matter to the English law faction.'[2]

1. Ishii, op. cit., p.584. Noda also feels that the academic debate was of secondary importance; see Noda, op. cit., p.54-60
2. Ishii, op. cit., p.585. The distinction here between the 'Old' and 'New' Civil Code is between Boissonade's project which was not promulgated, and the Civil code which was eventually made law in 1898.

The English Law School published a manifesto calling for the postponement of the promulgation of the codes,[1] but otherwise used the legal periodical, Hogaku Shinpo for its attacks, while the defense was taken up by the French faction in the Hochi Kyokai Zasshi.[2]

All this is not to say that there were no grounds for academic criticism of Boissonade's project. Indeed some of the French faction also favoured postponement. Tomii Masaaki, a member of the Franch faction, listed the following defects in

1. see Boissonade, "Les Nouveaux Codes Japonais. Reponse au Manifeste des Legistes et aux Objections de la Diète", Revue Francaise du Japon, August 1892, where pages 231-250 consist of Boissonade's objections to the Manifesto, much of which deals with detailed legal questions. In the preface to his Projet de Code Civil, which was going to print at a time when the debate had already begun (the debate took place at the very end of the '80s and until 1892 when the Diet voted overwhelmingly in favour of postponement), Boissonade also answered those who had stated that codification of the civil law was not necessary. He pointed out that the situation in Japan was entirely different from that of England which had a system of jurisprudence founded on authorised and respected precedents; this could not be the case in Japan. He added that the matter was all the more urgent in Japan in that the Western powers would not be prepared to revise the treaties if Japan did not have an intelligible and easily accessible civil code. PCC, Vol. I. p. xxiii-xxiv
2. Ishii, op. cit., p.586/7

the Boissonade project:

> '(1) it frequently violated Japanese folk ways and customs;
> (2) it was defective from legal theory stand point owing to exclusive reliance on French and Italian law and to the neglect of more recent and advanced legislation and theories;
> (3) it overlapped and clashed with the Old Commercial Code because neither of the two codes had been drafted by the same persons, and because German rather than French law had provided the orientation for the Old Commercial Code;
> (4) it had an extremely complicated text and contained many duplications, contradictions, and amissions, because each particular matter was covered by a specific provision instead of having provisions of a general nature;
> (5) it failed to observe the bounds of private and substantive law and hence contained innumerable provisions on public and procedural law;
> (6) it did not have the appearance of a code because of the unnecessary definitions, explanations, citations, etc , that littered up the text;
> (7) it was in general too much like a translation and it lacked clarity.'[1]

For all the academic debate, however, it would seem that far more important in the opposition of the Boissonade project was the 'general' undercurrent of ultranational reaction (that) had

1. Ishii, op. cit., p.588. Ishii writes that, 'These seven points, which were an accurate appraisal of the code, were particularly appropriate with respect to the portions drafted by M. Boissonade.' (p.588) Tomii himself in his article (in Okuma, op. cit., p.245) simply states that Boissonade's code was unsuitable to the popular customs of the country and lacked logical clearness. Boissonade refuted these points in his "Les Nouveaux Codes Japonais...", including the alleged incompatibility between a French civil code and a German commercial code (drafted by H. Roesler), stating basically that they are compatible as they deal with two different things and whatever danger of differences had been ironed out (p.250-255)

been building up against the Westernization of Japan'[1]. The chief spokesman of the ultranationalist group were Nishimura Shigeki, Miyake Setsurei and Tani Tateki[2], but with the academic debate going on at the same time, the result was 'an alliance between the political reactionaries and the (academic) faction that wanted the enforcement date of the codes postponed on the one hand and an alliance between progressives and the faction demanding immediate enforcement on the other.'[3]

Boissonade rejected the criticism of the excessive Westernisation of the codes as an expression of a 'patriotisme ombrageux'. He demonstrated that throughout history the great nations of the world had frequently borrowed from each other, that Roman law was based on Greek law which in turn had been inspired by Indian law, and that the main reason for the decadence of China was that she had remained closed for so long to the great developments in other parts of the world.[4] The Just and the Useful were not the monopoly of any one nation. By no means was Japan humiliating herself in borrowing from the West in maters of law; indeed, given the reception of Japan's projected and very modern laws in the West, it was not unlikely that some Western countries might also reform some aspects of their legislation following Japan's example.[5] He went on to observe:

1. Ishii, op. cit., p.583
2. ibid, p.583
3. ibid, p.584
4. PCC, vol. I, p.xxi-xxiii
5. Boissonade, "Les Nouveaux Codes Japonais..." p.263/4

'Japan does not feel humiliated in borrowing from the Occident her industry, her armaments, her applications of steam and electricity, her medicine and all her scientific discoveries ? Why should she blush in borrowing also many of the civil laws of the countries which have preceded her in the new order of things, ideas, and interests into which she has entered?'[1]

What the critics of Boissonade's project, however, concentrated on was the section dealing with Persons:

> 'To conservative minds, even the revised Books on Persons, which dealt with family relationships, and the work on the sequel of Appropriation, which defined succession, testamentary gift, and contractual property relations between husband and wife, were not conservative enough because they struck at the vital cord of the nation's life, namely the family system'.[2]

Kozumi Yatsukata in an article, "The Civil Code In and Loyalty and Filial Piety Out", spread alarm not only because the proposed civil code would seriously undermine the family system in Japan, held to be the very basis for the stability of the social structure, but also because loyalty to the Emperor would be lost.[3] Boissonade rejected these statements in considerable detail,[4] but to no avail.

The postponement faction won overwhelming victories both in the House of Peers and in the Lower House. The government then set up a Codes Investigation Committee in 1893, with Ito Hirobumi as Chairman, Saionji Kimmochi as vice-chairman, and

1. PCC, vol. I, p. xxiii
2. Umetani, op. cit., p.36/7
3. Noda, op. cit., p.55
4. see Boissonade, "Les Nouveaux Codes Japonais..."

the principal jurists being Hozumi Nobushige, Tomii Masaaki and Ume Kenjiro.[1] The result of the Committee's deliberations, the New Code presented in 1898, did pay far greater attention to 'local customs' and incorporated laws conserving important aspects of the family structure in Japan such as filial piety, primogeniture, and subservience of the wife to the husband.[2] However, it is interesting to note that in terms of the academic dispute, both sides, the French and the English, had lost, in that the

> 'arrangement of the new code became entirely German, adopting the Pandekten system rather than the institutional French system. Although its contents are of a composite nature, showing here and there the influence of French and English law as well as the native law, the influence of the first (1887) and second (1896) drafts of the German Civil Code is clearly dominant.'[3]

1. Ishii, op. cit., p.589. Of the three lawyers only Ume Kenjiro had been in favour of immediate enforcement. (see Mehren, op. cit., p.30)
2. Ishii, op. cit., p.590-592 and Tomii, op. cit., p.246. The parts relating to the family and inheritance law were to be revised following the setting up of a committee in 1919 in keeping with the spirit of junpu bizoku (gentle ways and beautiful customs), see Mehren, op. cit., p.31
3. Mehren, op. cit., p.30/31. By 1886 the Japanese government had a German legal advisor by the name of Techow. (Mehren p.73 fn.1) 'Although English, German and French Law continued to be taught at the Imperial University by foreign and Japanese professors, the predominance of German legal science continued down to the end of World War II.' (Mehren, p.31)

The final preference for a predominantly German rather than French system is not surprising and is in accordance with the points raised in the preceding chapter. The profound and real cause for the abandonment of the Boissonade Code was 'more political than legal'.[1] During the political debate that was to mark the first two decades of the Meiji period, in responding to the Okuma faction opposition group's use of English liberal and utilitarian political philosophy and to the Itagaki faction's French political philosophy, the government, through such spokesmen as Kato Hiroyuki, increasingly used counter arguments based on German political philosophy. At the same time the increasingly vocal and active nationalist groups influenced both government and public opinion.[2] The Meiji oligarchy, although intent on transforming Japan into a capitalist economy, 'in no way desired the development of a true bourgeois society.'[3]

Given the tendencies of the Meiji oligarchy towards an absolutist state and the strong undercurrents of nationalism, a veneer of Westernisation was necessary for a number of reasons, both internal and external; internal because of the legacies of

1. Noda, op. cit., p.56
2. Works consulted on Japanese politics in the Meiji period are listed in the bibliography.
3. Noda, op. cit., p.56

the bunmei-kaika period, external because of the unequal treaties and the general desire of government leaders and the public to be respected by the Western nations.

> 'For this reason, the absolutist character of the Prussian Empire was more attractive to the Japanese statesmen than the French republic. From that moment onwards the government increasingly accentuated its absolutist character. This political tendency was bound to be refelcted in the legal field. The decay of the influence of French law is but one aspect of it. It is not without reason that German law tended to occupy, instead of French law, a preponderant place in the Japanese legal world. Seen in this context, the true meaning of the failure of the Boissonade Code becomes more comprehensive. It is a significant fact that the year that the first attack against the code was launched coincides with that of the promulgation of the absolutist Constitution.'[1]

1. Noda, op. cit. p.57/8

Conclusion

Western influence in India was overwhelmingly British, in Indochina French and in the Philippines Spanish (and after 1898 American); during the period covered by this Thesis, China, in spite of constant hammering from the Western powers, remained to a remarkable extent impervious to Western influences. Japan was unique. By the 1880s the country displayed noticeable signs of British, French, German, American, and, to a lesser degree Russian influence. Traces of Dutch and Portuguese influence lingered on. Although the sense of a national identity remained very strong, currents flowing from the Western world touched every part of Japanese society and its institutions -- industry, the armed forces, central and local government, the legal system, politics, religion, art and literature.

In the context of that phenomenon essentially three questions have been raised in this Thesis; namely, first, the extent of French influence, taken in isolation and in comparison with the influence of other Western powers; secondly, the relationship between French influence and French policy towards Japan; thirdly, admitting its strongly eclectic character, the degree of penetration implied by Japan's choice of Western, especially French, models.

French influence in late Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan was more important and extensive that has generally been recognised. In chapters 3 and 4 a distinction was drawn between indirect and direct influence. As an illustration of indirect but decisive French influence, the fact that France was one of the few countries that bought far more from the Japanese than she sold provided Japan with an important source of foreign exchange and revenue (even allowing for the limitations on tariffs imposed by the unequal treaties). This was due to an accident of nature (the pebrine), yet had it not been for the silk trade, Japan's programme of industrialisation would have encountered far greater difficulties. The genius of the Japanese modernisers was demonstrated by the way in which they took advantage of this accident of nature. The revenue and foreign exchange acquired from the silk trade were used not only for subsidising heavy industry and the purchase of equipment and expertise from the West, but also for modernising the native silk industry, making it in time the world's foremost producer of manufactured silk. In this process a Frenchmen, Paul Brunat, can be said to have had a direct influence.

Frenchmen contributed directly to the creation of one of Japan's first major industrial enterprises, the Yokosuka ship-yard, to the development of Japan's modern army, to the codification of its first penal code, and to introducing the

Japanese to the concepts of Western civil law. The Meiji government borrowed indirectly from France in the creation of its national police force (modelled on the gendarmerie), in the establishment of ken-following the abolition of the han (thus choosing France's centralised prefectural system in preferance to the American state or Swiss canton system). Moreover, the Meiji government followed the example of France in establishing a centralised system of education.

Two other areas of French influence can be mentioned. The first was ephemeral; the second continues to this day. Fairly early on in the Meiji period Rousseau's Social Contract was translated and published in Japan, first in newspaper serials, later in book form. The Opposition jiyuminkenundo claimed in its political philosophy and tracts to have been inspired by the works of Rousseau and laid particular emphasis on the rousseauesque slogan that men were born free. The extent to which the jiyuminkenundo understood and incorporated 18th century French political philosophy is debatable. But Itagaki Taisuke, leader of the jiyuminkenundo, studied in France, while Ito was in Germany (in the early 1880s) and attended lectures given by the Sorbonne jurist, Emile Acollas. Itagaki met Victor Hugo and returned to Japan laden with the latter's work for translation, convinced by Hugo's suggestion that political novels would awaken the political conscience of the Japanese.

France's greatest impact, however, was in the cultural sphere. On Japanese literature, during the Meiji period, the French romantic and naturalist schools exerted considerable influence. Authors such as Jules Verne, Fenelon, Victor Hugo, Zola, and Maupassant, were avidly read and imitated by Japanese writers. In the Meiji era Kitamura Tokoku and Nagai Kafu (who survived into the post-war Showa period) are perhaps the most representative and best known. The tradition of French literary influence, however, survived long after the Meiji period. For example, Noma Hiroshi, Ishikawa Jun, Serizawa Kojiro, Ooka Shohei and Endo Shusaku either studied in France or were strongly influenced by French literature, and they acted as a bridge for Franco-Japanese cultural exchange through their translations of major French literary works. In painting, the yoga school was indebted to both France and Italy (Fontanesi, an Italian, taught in Japan); but two of the school's most famous painters, Leonard Fujita (who eventually spent most of his life in Paris) and Kuroda Seiki (who studied under Raphael Collin in France) were primarily under French influence. Finally, one of Meiji Japan's intellectual leaders, Nakae Chomin, learned French, studied in France and translated numerous French works.

In comparative terms, although French influence was predominant in the Bakumatsu period, in the years following the

Meiji Restoration it was superseded in government and non-governmental circles alike, by British and, later, German influence. There were far more British diplomats, traders and experts (engineers, doctors, teachers), than French. Moreover, English was adopted as the second language in Japan. As for Germany, Japanese government officials, as we have seen, found in the German constitutional, legal, and military systems, models far better fitted to their aims than the more democratic systems of France. This does not make French influence unimportant. It was important both in terms of the impact it made, albeit for a limited period, and for the reasons why this influence was replaced by that of Germany.

In the final analysis, however, France's maximum impact was on Japan's economic and cultural developments; and this impact was largely indirect.

The second question raised in the Thesis can be divided into two parts. In the first place one can ask to what extent France or Frenchmen influenced Japanese policy, both external and internal, and secondly to what extent France, or individual Frenchmen, influenced the French ingredients in Japan's selective Westernisation.

France, as one of the primary Western powers in Japan, contributed to the influence of the West in general in forcing Japan open, and indirectly, and in spite of Roches, in

precipitating the collapse of the Shogunate. Furthermore, as one of the powers enjoying extra-territorial rights, France played a role in compelling Japan to carry out important reforms.

As far as diplomacy is concerned, in the period covered by this Thesis there were two important French initiatives. Roches followed a 'politique personnelle' in wholeheartedly committing French diplomacy in Japan to the political survival of the Bakufu. He failed. The French Ministry of War and, to a lesser extent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted, albeit without great conviction or enthusiasm, to secure through official channels some sort of military alliance with Japan against China. This too failed. French diplomacy therefore can be labelled a failure in so far as it was designed to determine the internal and external policy of Japan.

Brunet's plans miscarried in two senses. He was unable to obtain French military support for himself and Enomoto in the Hokkaido redoubt; and he was fighting for the losing side in the civil war. The missionaries, it could perhaps be argued, succeeded in securing religious freedom in Japan. On the other hand, this success did not result from the far more positive policy on the part of France which, as was seen in chapter 7, they much desired. The Meiji government's decision to grant religious freedom in Japan came mainly in response to pressure on the Iwakura mission exerted by the Western powers, including

France; but in this matter France acted in concert with other powers. Contrary to the assertion of the French missionary, the granting of religious freedom in Japan was not a 'French victory'. De Montblanc, as was suggested in Chapter 5, rather than an influential figure in determining Japanese policy, seems to have been manipulated by Satsuma to influence French policy. The Meiji Restoration was no more the work of de Montblanc than it was the work of any other foreign individual or power. The forces that brought it about and the political ideology it espoused were entirely indigenous.

From what has been said it might appear that the degree of a specific Western nations' ~~notions~~ or individual's efforts was immaterial. This is far from being the case, however, when considering the second part of this question. The case rests on the impact of Roches' indefatigable activity. Roches' policy failed in the sense that the Shogunate was overthrown. Yet the legacy of his activities survived the Restoration.

Roches, more than any Frenchman, was responsible for expanding the silk trade and linking it directly with France. Although, as was argued in both chapters 1 and 2, the initiative for the Franco-Japanese rapprochement in the Bakumatsu era came from the Japanese side, Roches showed great ability in seizing the opportunities made available to him. The Tokugawa government decided that it needed a mint, a shipyard and a modern

army, and for these three requirements it approached Roches. Had Roches refused, or proved lukewarm, the Tokugawa government would have turned elsewhere. With the exception of Boissonade, who, as we saw, was hired independently of the French Foreign Ministry or Legation in Japan, France did not participate in any major industrial, military or political development in Japan after the Restoration, apart from those inherited from the Roches period. This in great part can be attributed to the lack of consistency of French diplomacy in Japan (namely the very rapid turnover of chiefs of mission and the lack of personnel, especially interpreters) and, as we have seen in chapter 4, to the generally negative and unimaginative attitudes of successive French Ministers, in Japan, the significant exception here being de Geoffroy.

One not unimportant example can be cited of a further difference between Roches and his successors. Roches had taken great interest in the introduction of the French language and French culture in Japan. The school he founded with Kurimoto was one of his proudest achievements. His successors seem to have had no interest whatever in perpetuating this aspect of <u>la mission civilisatrice</u>. Given the curiosity about France on the part of budding young Japanese artists and writers -- a phenomenon of which, to judge from the archives, French diplomats

were entirely ignorant -- an opportunity presented itself for positive, skilful and imaginative diplomacy. (Scholarships might have been offered for Japanese students to study at the Beaux Arts. Frenchmen prominent in the arts could have been invited to lecture in Japan).

Short of the use of force, which, as we have seen, France was never prepared to use in Japan, despite the pleas of Brunet, Chanoine, and the missionaries, there was no opportunity for France to determine Japanese internal or external policy. The cases of India, Indochina and the Phillipines are entirely different; force had been used to establish Western hegemony and force was used to maintain it. Japan, in spite of the unequal treaties, was a sovereign nation. Foreign powers could not determine Japanese policy, internal or external, but they could try to influence it.

As to the third fundamental question arising from the Thesis, this has been discussed in the concluding sections of chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10. In respect of religious matters neither Catholicism nor Protestantism, nor the Orthodox Church can be said to have had a profound impact on Japan. Japan's religious and ethical traditions, Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism, were firmly embedded in Japanese mores. Christianity counted a few converts and added a new dimension to the religious experience of the Japanese, but it could not

supplant the indigenous faiths. (Indeed, with the exception of the Philippines and, to a lesser extent Vietnam, and parts of Southern India, Christianity cannot be said to have made much impact in any Asian society -- a very different situation from African societies, where indigenous religions possessed neither the metaphysical sophistication not a firm, long-standing tradition with which to resist the inroads of Christianity and Islam.) In other words, however hard Sienkiewicz had tried, it is unlikely that the Mikado would have been converted to Catholicism.

The case of the Yokosuka shipyard illustrates the determination of the Japanese to take over management of their own affairs, even when the foreign experts considered that they were not yet ready for the task. Just as the Japanese were resolved that no foreign power or individual should dictate the country's internal and external policies, so, while they would continue to seek advice they were unprepared to allow any of their institutions or enterprises to be dependent on a foreign power or any group of foreign individuals. This can be attributed to Japanese nationalism, of a very constructive kind.

Japan's military and legal developments under Western tutelage illustrate the government's determination that Western models

must be made to fit the criteria and aims it had established, and not vice-versa. The Japanese process of selective borrowing from the West, therefore, rested firmly on what the government felt to be the nation's needs. This is not to suggest that selection was necessarily determined by any sort of preparatory blueprint. The demise, after the Satsuma rebellion, of French military influence provides an example of the pragmatic approach of the Japanese government. It was felt that the imperial army's main weakness in the Satsuma war was its command structure; this in turn was attributed to the weakness of the French model, whereas the German command structure appeared to be much more efficient.

But the limitations of French influence were in the last resort a consequence of the failure of French diplomacy. In certain areas perhaps French influence was doomed to fail; yet in others it could have been productive. If, for example, the advice of de Geofroy and Boissonade had been listened to in the vital matter of treaty-revision, if France had tried to take the initiative and influence the other European powers in a matter of such paramount importance to the government and people of Japan, French influence on Japanese internal and external policy would have been far more decisive.

Most Frenchmen in Japan failed to seize the opportunities available to them to develop a positive and fruitful Franco-Japanese relationship, beneficial to both sides. The French

government failed to take advantage of those Frenchmen who could have contributed to such a relationship, namely, de Montblanc, du Bousquet, de Geofroy and Boissonade.

The French government can be said to have steered an even course between those -- such as de Bellecourt, Jaurès, Brunet, Chanoine, Petitjean and (in a different way) Roches -- who favoured direct interference in Japanese affairs, and those who sought positive cooperation. It was a course that preserved a certain equilibrium. But it was one that led nowhere.

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de la Mazelière, V., Le Japon, Histoire et Civilisation, vol. V, Paris, 1910
Meiji Japan Through Contemporary Sources, 3 vols., compiled and published by The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, Tokyo, 1969
de Moges, Mis., Souvenirs d'Une Ambassade en Chine et Au Japon, En 1857 et 1858, Paris, 1860
Le Moniteur des Soies, 1862-1886, Lyons (one volume per year, first volume is for 1862); used extensively for Chapters I and III of this Thesis, in fact this weekly publication contained very numerous articles on Japan, by no means necessarily limited to the silk question.
de Montblgne, C. Considérations ~~xxxxxx~~ Générales Sur l'Etat Actuel du Japon, Paris, 1866
de Montblanc, C., Le Japon, Paris, 1865
de Montblanc, C., Le Japon en 1866, Paris 1866
de Montblanc, C., Le Japon, Ses Institutions, Ses Produits, Ses Relations avec l'Europe, Paris, 1867
de Montblanc, C., Le Japon Tel Qu'il Est, Paris, 1867
(of the works cited by de Montblanc above, only one, namely Le Japon is in fact a book; the others are articles or tracts having appeared in various reviews or encyclopedia, as they can all be obtained as independent works in the Bibliothèque Nationale, however, I have not listed the works in which they are to be found)
Mossman, S, New Japan, London, 1873

Noda, Y., Introduction au Droit Japonais, Paris 1966
Norman, H., The Peoples and Politics of the Far East, London, 1895
Norman, H., The Real Japan, 5th edition, London, 1908
(two very fascinating works on Japan and the Far East by an English ~~M~~ember of Parliament)

Okazaki, Y., Japanese Literature in the Meiji Era, Tokyo, 1955
Oliphant, L., Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857-58-59, Oxford University Reprint, Tokyo, 1969

Pagès, L. Le Japon et Ses Derniers Traités avec les Puissances Européennes, Paris, 1859
Pagès, L., La Persécution des Chrétiens du Japon et l'Ambassade Japonaise en Europe, Paris, 1873 (a tract made to coincide with the passage through Paris of the Iwakura Embassy in order to bring pressure on the French government and excite public opinion in regard to the persecutions of Christians in Japan. It contains a number of very bitter and personal attacks on Roches in particular, but does not hesitate in severely criticising French diplomats in Japan in general for not being good and militant enough Catholics.)
Permezel, L'Industrie Lyonnaise de la Soie; son Etat Actuel, son Avenir, Lyons, 1883

Piolet, J.B., La France au Dehors: Les Missions Catholiques Françaises au XIXé siècle, vol. III, Chine et Japon, Paris, 1902
Presseisen, E.L., Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army, Tucson, 1965

MMoulx, J., "Les Français au Japon: La Création de l'Arsenal de Yokosuka", La Revue Maritime, Paris, May 1939
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Redesdale, Lord (A.B. Mitford), Memories, 2 vols., London, 1915
Reid, E., Japan: Its History, Traditions and Religions, 2 vols., London, 1880 (a very pro-Japan English Member of Parliament and critic of Sir Harry Parkes whom he held mainly responsible for the delays in the revision of the unequal treaties)
Rein, J.J., Japan: Travels and Researches Undertaken at the Cost of the Prussian Government, (translated), London, 1894
Revue Française du Japon, September 1894, an anonymous article on the Yokosuka shipyard
Revue Militaire de l'Etranger, Paris, 172-1885 (very little on Japan)
Revue Orientale et Américaine, 9 vols., 1858-1863, published by the Société d'Ethnographie, contains numerous articles on a wide variety of subjects dealing with Japan
Revue Orientale, 2 vols., 1864-1865
Robert, A.,"Les Japonais et leur Ambassade", Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 September 1872
Rondit, A., Essai Sur le Commerce de la Soie en France, Lyons, 1883
de Rosny, L., La Civilisation Japonaise, Paris, 1883
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de Rosny, L., Etudes Asiatiques de Géographie et d'Histoire, Paris 1864
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de Rosny, L., Rapport à Son Excellence le Ministre d'Etat sur la Composition d'un Dictionnaire Japonais-Français-Anglais, Paris, 1862
de Rosny, L., Remarques sur Quelques Dictionnaires Japonais, et Sur la Nature des Explications qu'Ils Renferment, Paris, 1858
de Rosny, L., Traité de l'Education des Vers à Soie au Japon par Sira-Kawa de Sendai, Paris, 2nd. edition, 1870
(de Rosny was perhaps the pioneer of Japanese Studies in XIXth century France; the list given above represents only a percentage of his works, he appears to have been both erudite and prolific, writing not only on Japan, but on the languages, religions, traditions of many parts of Asia.)
Roussin, A., "Une Campagne Sur les Côtes du Japon, Paris, 1866
(on the Shimonoseki expedition)
Roussin, A., "Une Révolution au Japon", Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 April 1869

Satow, E., A Diplomat in Japan, Oxford University Press Reprint, Tokyo, 1968, with an introduction by G. Daniels
Sims, R., "Characteristics of French Policy Towards Japan in the Later Nineteenth Century", a seminar paper delivered to the Far East Centre in Michaelmas Term, 1969, (Oxford) and which the author was kind enough to send me a copy
Sims, R., "French Policy Towards Japan, 1854-1894", (unpublished) Ph.D. Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1969
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Togari, Capt., Louis Emile Bertin: Son Rôle dans la Création de la Marine Japonaise, Paris, 1935
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Umetani, N., The Role of Foreign Employees in the Meiji Era in Japan, Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo, 1971
Villaret, E., Dai Nippon, Paris 1889 (contains useful statistics, otherwise the text is of comparatively little interest.)

2. Secondary:
(A) Books in Western Languages

Akagi, R.H., Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936, Tokyo, 1936
Akamatsu, P., Meiji 1868 — Révolution et Contre-Révolution au Japon, Paris, 1968
Akita, G., Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967
Allen, G.C., A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 3rd. edition, London, 1972
Allen, G.C. and Donnithorne, A.G., Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development, London, 1954
Alpinius, Quelques Pages Sur Léon Roches, Grenoble, 1898
Anesaki, M., History of Japanese Religion, London, 1930
Baba, T., The Political Condition of Japan, Showing the Despotism and Incompetency of the Cabinet and the Aims of the Popular Parties, Philadelphia, 1868 (a political tract by one of the more colourful personalities of the Jiyuminkenundô)
Banno, J., China and the West, 1858-1861: the Origins of the Tsungli-Yamen, London, 1961 (in order to better appreciate Japan's economic and political response to the West, comparisons with the situation in China at the same time are very useful; in this bibliography only a few works dealing exclusively with China are mentioned, chosen for their particular relevance for comparative purposes; in this case notably the comparison between the origins of the Tsungli Yamen and the Bansho Shirabesho)

Barr, P., The Coming of the Barbarians, London, 1967
Barr, P., The Deer Cry Pavilion, London, 1968
(two interesting and enjoyable accounts of what life was like for the Westerners in the treaty ports of Japan in the Bakumatsu and early Meiji periods)
de Bary, Tsunoda, Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. II, New York, 1958
Beasley, W.G., Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, London, 1951
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Beasley, W.G., The Modern History of Japan, London, 1963
Beckman, G., The Modernization of China and Japan, New York, 1965
Bellah, R.N., Tokugawa Religion, New York, 1957
Berelhand, R., Histoire du Japon des Origines à Nos Jours, Paris 1904
Bérard, V., La Révolte de l'Asie, Paris, 1904
Bertin, M., Le Vieux Japon, Lyons, 1921
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Borton, H., Japan's Modern Century, New York, 1955
Bouvier, J., Le Crédit Lyonnais de 1863 à 1882; Les Années de Formation d'Une Banque de Dépots, Lyons,
Boxer, C.R., Christian Century in Japan, Oxford University Reprint, London, 1974
Brogan, D.W., The Development of Modern France, 1870-1939, London, 1940
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Brunschwig, H., Mythes et Réalités de l'Impérialisme Colonial Français, 1871-1914, Paris, 1960
Cady, J.F., The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia, New York, 1967 (revised edition);
Caille, J., Une Mission de Léon Roches à Rabat, Casablanca, 1947
Cheneaux, J., Peasant Revolts in China, 1840-1949, London, 1973
(when writing about peasant uprisings in Japan during the Edo period, it is important to remember the vast differences both in nature and extent from the seemingly endemic peasant revolts in China)
Chien, F.F., The Opening of Korea, 1876-1885,
Clapham, J.H., The Economic Development of France and Germany, Cambridge, 1936
Conroy, H., The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910, Philadelphia, 1960
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Earl, D., Emperor and Nation in Japan, Seattle, 1964
Eastman, E.S. and H.R., Throne and Mandarins: China's Search For a Policy During the Sino-French Controversy 1880-1885, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967
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Etiemble, Les Jésuites en Chine: La Querelle des Rites 1552-1773, Paris, 1966; the Jesuits in China during the period covered by this book tried too hard to accomodate Christian theology to Confucianist environment, partly as a result of which the order was banned.

Fairbank, J.K., Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854, Cambridge, Mass., 1953
Fairbank, J.K., Reischauer, E.O., Craig, A., East Asia The Modern Transformation, Tokyo, 1965
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Fieldhouse, D.K., Economics and Empire, 1830-1914, London, 1973
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Hamada, M., Meiji Western Paiting, Arts of Japan, vol. 6, New York, 1974 (for French influence in Japanese painting of the Western school; a number of these paintings can be seen at the Ohara Bijutsukan at Kurashiki and others at the Museum of Kagoshima, especially thèse of Kuroda Seiki)
Harootunian, H., Towards Restoration, Berkeley, 1970
Hirschmeier, J., The Origins of Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964
Hirschmeier, J., and Yui, T., The Development of Japanese Business, 1600-1973, London, 1975
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Jansen, M.B., Sakamoto Ryôma and the Meiji Restoration, Stanford, 1971
Jones, F.C., Extraterritoriality in Japan and the Diplomatic Relations Resulting in Its Abolition, 1853-1899, New Haven, 1931

Keene, D., The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830, Stanford, 1969
Keene, D., Landscapes and Portraits: Appreciations of Japanese Culture, London, 1972
Kiernan, V.G., The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to the Outside World in the Imperial Age, London, 1969
(a work I found both extremely useful and stimulating for an understanding of the workings of the European powers to the non-European world)
Kiernan, V.G., Marxism and Imperialism, London, 1974
Landes, D.S., Bankers and Pashas, London, 1958
Langer, W.L., European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890, New York, 1950
Latourette, K.S., Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, Vol. I, The 19th Century in Europe (1): Background and the Roman Catholic Phase, New York, 1958
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Latourette, K.S., A History of the Expansion of Christianity, vol. VI, The Great Century in Northern Africa and Asia, A.D. 1800-A.D. 1914, New York, 1971
Lebra, J., Okuma Shigenobu, Canberra, 1973
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Leroy-Beaulieu, P., De la Colonisation Chez les Peuples Modernes, Paris, 1874 (perhaps the 'gospel' of modern French imperialism)
Lévy, M., Histoire Economique et Sociale de la France depuis 1848, 3 vols., (polycopies), Paris, 1951-52
Lichteim, G., Imperialism, London, 1971
Lockwood, W.W., The Economic Development of Japan, Princeton, N.Y., 1968
Lockwood, W.W., (ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, Princeton, N.J., 1965

Maddison, A., Economic Growth in Japan and the USSR, London, 1969
Maki, J.M., Court and Constitution in Japan, Seattle, 1964
(although this book deals only with the post-Wrold War II legal situation in Japan, it is interesting to see some of the legal problems faced in Japan today, albeit in a very different political and social climate)
Maruyama, M., Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, Tokyo, 1974
McAleavy, H., The Modern History of China, London, 1967
McLaren, W.W., A Political History of Japan, London, 1916
(an optimistic account of the development of Japanese politics during the Meiji era)
Medzini, M., French Policy in Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Régime, Cambridge, 1971 (accepts the interpretation of Roches as an agent of French Imperialism under Napoleon III in Japan)

von Mehren, A.T., Law in Japan, Tokyo, 1964

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Neill, S., A History of Christian Missions, London, 1973
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Notehelfer, F.G., Kotoku Shusui, Portrait of a Japanese Radical, Cambridge, 1971

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Renouvin, P., La Politique Extérieure du Second Empire, (polycopies), Paris, 1950
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Roberts, J.G., Mitsui: Three Centuries of Japanese Business, Tokyo, 1973
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Sakamoto, M., The Fall of Shiroyama, Kagoshima, 1963
Sansom, G.B., A History of Japan, 3 vols., Tuttle, Tokyo, 1974
Sansom, G.B., The Western World and Japan, New York, 1950
Schefer, C., D'Une Guerre à l'Autre: Essai sur la Politique Extérieure de la Troisième République, 1871-1914, Paris, 1920
Scheiner, I., Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan, Berkeley, 1970 (very useful for comapring the impact of Catholicism and Protestantism in Japan)
Schwartz, W.L., The Imaginative Interpretation of the Far East in Modern French Literature, 1800-1925, Edinburgh and Paris, 1926 (both for the impact of Japan on French literary and artistic movements, but also touching on the more popular aspects of japonisme)

Sée, H., Histoire Economique de la France, vol. II, Les Temps Modernes, 1789-1914, Paris, 1942
Shibusawa, K., Japanese Life in the Meiji Era, Tokyo, 1958
Shibusawa, K., Japanese Society in the Meiji Era, Tokyo, 1958
Siemes, J., Herman Roesler and the Making of the Meiji State, Tokyo, 1966
Silberman, B.S. and Harootunian, H., (eds.), Modern Japanese Leadership, Tucson, 1966
Smith, T.C., The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, Stanford, 1959
Smith, T.C., Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880, Stanford, 1955
Storry, R., A History of Modern Japan, London, 1960
van Straelen, H., Yoshida Shoin: Forerunner of the Meiji Restoration Leiden, 1952

Thornton, A.P., Doctrines of Imperialism, New York, 1965
Thornton, A.P., The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies, London, 1966
Toussaint, F., Histoire du Japon, Paris, 1969
Tsukahira, T.G., Feudal Control in Tokugawa Japan: the Sankin Kotai System, Harvard, East Asian Monographs, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970

Uyehara, G., Political Development of Japan, Irish University Press Reprint, Shannon, 1972

Varley, H.P., The Samurai, London, 1974 (fascinating introduction to the martial values and thier history in pre-modern Japan)
Viallate, A., L'Impérialisme Economique et les Relations Internationales Pendant le Dernier Demi-Siècle, 1870-1920, Paris, 1923

Webb, H., The Imperial Institution in Nineteenth Century Japan, New York, 1968
Woodrfuff, W., Impact of Western Man: A Study of Europe's Role in the World Economy, 1750-1960, New York, 1966

Yanaga, C., Japan Since Perry, New York, 1949

Zisohka, A., Le Japon dans le Monde, Paris, 1934

(B) Articles in Western Languages

Altman, A., "Guido Verbeck and the Iwakura Embassy", Japan Quarterly, vol. 13, 1966, p. 54 -
Arima, S., "The Western Influence on Japanese Military Science, Shipbuilding and Navigation", Monumenta Nipponica, vol. XIX, 1964, p. 118 -

de Bassompierre, Baron, "Charles de Montblanc et la Restauration Japonaise en 1868", La Revue Générale de Belgique, 15 June, 1953
Bendix, R., "Preconditions of Development: A Comparison of Japan and Germany", R.P. Dore, (ed.), Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan

Broadbridge, S., "Economic and Social Trends in Tokugawa Japan", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 8, 1974, p. 347 -

Craig, A., "Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Philosophical Foundations of Meiji Nationalism", R.E. Ward, (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan, Princeton, N.J., 1973

Craig, A., "Science and Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan", M.B. Jansen, (ed.)., Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization Princeton, N.J., 1969

Crawcour, E.S., "Changes in Japanese Commerce in the Tokugawa Period", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXII, p. 387 -

Crawcour, E.S., "Documentary Sources of Tokugawa Economic and Social History", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XX, p. 343 -

Daniels, G., "The British Role in the Meiji Restoration: A Re-interpretive Note", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 2, 1968, p. 291 -

Eckel, P.E., "The Crimean War and Japan", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. III, p. 109 -

Fischer, E., "Rebellion Against the European Man in the Nineteenth Century", Journal of World History, vol. 2, p. 363 -
(a very interesting comparative analysis of reactions to the West in the non-European world with a number of perceptive insights into the situation in Japan in the Bakumatsu and early Meiji periods)

R.F. Hackett, "The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo", M.B. Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes ...
Hackett, R.F., "Nishi Amane: A Tokugawa-Meiji Bureaucrat", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XVIII

Havens, T.R., "Comte, Mill and the Thought of Nishi Amane in Meiji Japan", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXVIII, p. 321 -

Havnes, T.R., "Scholars and Politics in Nineteenth Century Japan", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 2, 1968, p. 315 -

Howes, J.F., "Japanese Christians and American Missionaries", M.B. Jansen, Changing Japanese Attitudes ...

Ike, N., "The Pattern of Railway Development in Japan", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XIV, p. 217 -

Ike, N., "The Triumph of the Peace Party in Japan in 1873", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. II, p. 286 -

Jones, H.J., "Bakumatsu Foreign Employees", Monumenta Nipponica, vol. XXIX

Kishimoto, H., "Modernization versus Westernization in the East", Journal of World History, vol. 7

de Langalerie-Robin, M., "Charles de Montblanc et la Restauration de Meiji", Nichifutsu Bunka, no. 24, 1969, p. 43 -

McMaster, J., "The Japanese Goldrush of 1859", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XIX, p. 273 -

Medzini, M., "Léon Roches in Japan, 1864-1868", Papers on Japan, vol. II, 1963, The East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University

Minear, R.H., "Nishi Amane and the Reception of Western Law in Japan", Monumenta Nipponica, vol. XXVIII, p. 151 -

Noda, Y., "Gustave Boissonade: Comparatiste Ignoré", Problèmes Contemporains de Droit Comparé, vol. II, Paris

Robert, J., "La Pensée Juridique Française au Japon", Nichifutsu Bunka, no. 24, 1969, p. 28 -

Rosenfield, J.M., " Western Style Paiting in the Early Meiji Period and Its Critics", D.H. Shively, Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture, Princeton, N.J., 1971

Schwantes, R.S., "Christianity versus Science: A Conflict of Ideas in Meiji Japan", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XII, p. 123 -

Sheldon, C.D., "The Politics of the Civil War of 1868", W.G. Beasley (ed.), Modern Japan: Aspects of History, Literature and Society, London, 1975

Shively, D.H., "The Japanization of the Middle Meiji", D.H. Shively (ed.)., Tradition and Modernization ..., (very valuable help for the writing of chapters 7 - 10 of this Thesis)

Smethhurst, R.J., "The Creation of the Imperial Military Reserve Association in Japan", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXX, p. 815 -

Soviak, E., "On the Nature of Western Progress: the Journal of the Iwakura Embassy", D.H. Shively, Tradition and Modernization ...

Sugiyama, C., "The Development of Economic Thought in Meiji Japan", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 2, 1968, p. 325 -

Tsurumi, E.P., "Meiji Primary School Language and Ethics Textbooks: Old Values for a New Society", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 8, 1974, p. 247 -

(B) Books and Articles in Japanese

Note: Although I have consulted the following, due to my limited knowledge of Japanese, by no means can I claim to have fully absorbed them, nor necessarily to have fully understood them. I am grateful to Professor T. Ezoe for having read a number of these works with me, and especially the article by Otsuka Takematsu.

Hanabusa Nagamichi, Meiji Gaikô-shi, Tokyo, 1966
Hagihara Nobutoshi, Baba Tatsui, Tokyo, 1967
Hagihara Nobutoshi, "Fukuzawa, Nakae, Baba", Chuo Koron, Tokyo, May 1968
Hijikata Kazuo, Nakae Chomin, Tokyo, 1968

Inoue Kiyoshi, Meiji Ishinron, Tokyo, 1972
Ishii Takashi, Meiji Ishin no Kokusaiteki Kankyô, Tokyo, 1957

Meiji Hyakunen, published by the N.H.K., Tokyo, 1969

Nippon Kindaishi Jiten, published by Kyoto Daigaku Bungakubu, Tokyo, 1973 (very useful for getting the bare facts on personalities in modern Japanese history)

Osatake Takeshi, Meiji Ishin, 4 vols., Tokyo, 1942-1948
Otsuka Takematsu, Bakumatsu Gaikôshi no Kenkyu, Tokyo, 1967 (reprinted edition)
Otsuka Takematsu, "Fukkoku kôshi Léon Roches no Seisaku kôdô ni tsuite", Shigaku Zasshi, XLVI, 1935 (seemingly the first to suggest that Léon Roches was responsible for following Napoleon III's imperialist policy in Japan. This work is cited by both Western and Japanese scholars in order to prop up the French imperialist intentions in Japan during the Bakumatsu period.)
Takahashi Kunitarô, O'Yattoi Gaikokujin - Gunji, Tokyo, 1968
Umetani Noboru, O'Yattoi Gaikokujin - Seiji, Hôsei, Tokyo, 1971
Yoshida Mitsukuni, O'Yattoi Gaikokujin - Sangyô, Tokyo, 1968

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