

Greek Declamation in Context

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D. Phil. in Classical Languages and Literature

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This thesis looks at the genre of Greek declamation in the second and third centuries of the Common Era. *Communis opinio* sees the genre as ‘nostalgic’, a chance for Greeks dissatisfied with their political powerlessness under Rome to ‘escape’ to the glorious classical past of a free Greece. I argue, by contrast, that despite its famous classicism of language and theme, Greek declamation remains firmly anchored in the present of the Roman empire, and has much to say to that present. The thesis explores in three sections three contemporary contexts in which to read the genre. Each section is made up of two chapters, the first of which examines the context in question and reconstructs the sort of reading process it requires, while the second illustrates and explores that reading process through extended examples. In the first section (chapters one and two), Greek declamation is read in the context of the extraordinary developments in rhetorical theory that were taking place in this period: I argue that the reading of declamation through rhetorical theory was more widespread than has hitherto been appreciated, and that the relationship between theory and practice in declamation should ultimately be seen as *dialogic*. In the second and third sections (chapters three to six), the genre is read in its contemporary context more broadly. In the second section (chapters three to four), I explore how we might read declamation as ‘mythology’, that is, as a sort of safe space for exploring major contemporary concerns. In the third section, I make the case for ‘metalepsis’ in declamation, which I define as *a breaking of the boundaries between a declamation and its immediate performance context*, used above all by declaimers to talk about themselves and their careers, and also frequently to make reference to their audience.

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Contents

Abbreviations and References	7
Note on Translations	10
Introduction	11
The Paradox of Practice	11
Greek Declamation in Context	12
The Importance of Declamation	15
Second- and Third-Century Greek Declamation	19
The Sources	22
Section I. Rhetoric	30
Chapter 1. Reading Rhetorically	34
1.1 The Rhetorical Revolution	34
1.1.1 Issue-Theory	36
1.1.2 Invention	42
1.1.3 Style	47
1.2. Reading Rhetorically	49
1.2.1 Rhetorical Framing	50
1.2.1.1 In Performance: <i>Prolaliai</i> and <i>Theoriai</i>	50
1.2.1.2 In Reading: <i>Prolegomena</i> and Hypotheses	57
1.2.2 Rhetorical Comment	61
1.2.2.1 Performance	62
1.2.2.2 Metarhetoric	62
1.2.2.3 Commentary	68
1.2.3 Other Paratexts	75
1.3. Conclusions	78
Chapter 2. Rhetorical Readings	81
1. Aristides' <i>On Peace with Sparta</i> (Or. 7): A Rhetorical Reading	82
2. Argumentation in Aristides' <i>Leuctran Orations</i> (Orr. 11–15) and Polemo's <i>Declamations</i> ...	90
3. Lucian's <i>Tyrannicida</i> : The Perversion of Issue-Theory	103
Conclusion	111
Section II. Mythology	113
Chapter 3. Reading Mythologically	115
Flight and Restoration?	115
'And Marathon in the Conclusion'?	121
'The Footsteps of Demosthenes'?	126
Greek Declamation: A New Survey	128

A Tale of Two Cities.....	136
‘Somehow It Is Always the Same’: <i>Exempla</i> and Exemplarity	145
Mythologies.....	150
Chapter 4. Mythological Readings.....	152
Aristides <i>Orations</i> 9–10	154
‘If They Ever Happened’	154
Philip, Persia, and Parthia	156
Philip the Despot	160
Rome and Macedon.....	164
Pollux’s <i>On the Islanders</i> (VS 593).....	179
‘Use the <i>Exemplum</i> !’	183
Conclusion.....	185
Section III. Metalepsis.....	186
Chapter 5. Reading Metaleptically	188
1. Compare and Contrast.....	195
2. Framing	196
3. Performance	201
4. Style.....	208
5. Conclusion.....	209
Chapter 6. Metaleptic Readings.....	210
1. Aristides	211
2. Hippodromus.....	212
3. Alexander	214
4. Heliodorus	216
5. Rufinus	217
6. Polemo.....	219
7. Conclusions	226
Appendix: Metaleptic Reading in Seneca’s <i>Controversiae</i>	234
Conclusion	236
Not the Dramatic Illusion	236
Where Next?.....	237
New Directions.....	239
Sideways	240
Forwards.....	243
Bibliography.....	249

Abbreviations and References

The abbreviations used for Greek and Latin texts are those of Liddell, H.G. and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*⁹ (Oxford, 1940) or Glare, P.G.W. (ed.), *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, 1982), or where those works fail, Hornblower, S., Spawforth, A., and E. Eidinow (edd.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*⁴ (Oxford, 2012). I list here the authors and texts most commonly cited in this thesis, along with a few departures from or additions to the abbreviations offered by the major reference works:

Anon. Seg. <i>Rh.</i>	‘Anonymous Seguerianus’, <i>Ars rhetorica</i>
Aps. <i>Rh.</i>	Apsines, <i>Ars rhetorica</i>
Aristid.	Aelius Aristides
Chor. <i>Decl.</i>	Choricius, <i>Declamations</i>
D. Cass.	Dio Cassius
D. Chrys.	Dio Chrysostom
DZ	Sopater, <i>Diairesis zētēmatōn</i>
Eunap. VS	Eunapius, <i>Vitae philosophorum et sophistarum</i>
Hermog. <i>Id.</i>	Hermogenes, <i>De ideis</i>
Hermog. <i>Stat.</i>	Hermogenes, <i>De statibus</i>
Him.	Himerius
Lib.	Libanius

Marc. Aur.	Marcus Aurelius, <i>Meditations</i>
Philostr. VS	Philostratus, <i>Vitae sophistarum</i>
Polem.	Polemo
PS	Rabe, H. 1931. <i>Prolegomenōn syllogē. Accedit Maximi libellus</i> De obiectionibus insolubilibus. Leipzig.
Ps.-Hermog. Inv.	Ps.-Hermogenes, <i>De inventione</i>
RG	Walz, C. 1832–6. <i>Rhetores graeci</i> . 9 vols. Stuttgart and Tübingen.
Sopat. Rh.	Sopater (GRS 967)
Syrian. In Hermog.	Syrianus, <i>In Hermogenem commentaria</i>

For reference works, I use the abbreviations of Hornblower, S., Spawforth, A., and E. Eidinow (edd.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*⁴ (Oxford, 2012), with the following additions:

BNP	Cancik, H., Schneider, H. and C.F. Salazar (edd.). 2002. <i>Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World</i> . 15 vols. Leiden.
GRS	Janiszewski, P., Stebnicka, K., and E. Szabat. 2015. <i>Prosopography of Greek Rhetors and Sophists of the Roman Empire</i> . Oxford.

Journal titles are abbreviated according to the conventions of *L'Année philologique*.

I cite Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata*, Hermogenes' *De statibus* and *De ideis*, Ps.-Hermogenes' *De inventione*, and Longinus' *Ars rhetorica* according to the editions of Patillon,¹ Syrianus' commentaries on the works of Hermogenes by page and line number in the edition of Rabe (Rabe 1892–3), Apsines' *Ars rhetorica* by page and line number in Spengel-Hammer (Spengel and Hammer, *Rhetores Graeci* 1884),² and Menander Rhetor by page and line number in Spengel (Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* 1853–6). I cite Himerius' declamations using the numbering of Colonna (Colonna 1951); I cite the Aristides scholia by the numbering of Dindorf's edition (Dindorf 1829). Of the two declamations of Polemo, the first, in favour of Cynegirus, is referred to as 'A', and the second, in favour of Callimachus, as 'B'.

Foerster-Richsteig's text of Choricus gives each of the Gazan's works two numbers: a number indicating position within the whole corpus (in Roman numerals) and a second number (in Arabic numerals) indicating their position among Choricus' works of the same genre (the three genres being declamations, *dialexeis*, and other speeches). Thus Choricus' declamation *Polydamas* is both number X within Choricus' works as a whole, and number 1 within his declamations. In this thesis, Choricus' *dialexeis*, declamations, and other speeches are cited by their Arabic numerals.

¹ Patillon, *Corpus rhetoricum* I 2008, Patillon, *Corpus rhetoricum* II 2009, Patillon, *Corpus Rhetoricum* IV 2012, Patillon, *Corpus rhetoricum* III 2012, Patillon and Brisson, Longin 2001.

² Patillon's edition of Apsines is not well-regarded by either Heath (Heath, Review of Patillon 2002) or Kennedy (G. Kennedy, Review of Patillon 2004).

Note on Translations

The language of declamations (and associated works of rhetorical theory) is frequently difficult, and for some of the works cited in this thesis there currently exist no published translations. For these reasons all Greek and Latin sources are quoted in English translation; translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. The Greek or Latin usually follows the translation in parentheses, though sometimes in the interests of improving readability it is banished to a footnote.¹ I have for the sake of ready comprehension sometimes added words to the English to which there is nothing explicitly corresponding in the original, particularly in the case of extracts from elliptical works of rhetorical theory. In rendering technical rhetorical terms, I have generally followed the translations in the glossary to Heath's edition of Hermogenes' *De statibus* (Heath, Issues 1995, 249–60), though for κεφάλαιον I prefer 'heading' to Heath's 'head'. Translation is certainly better than transliteration, as Heath's sample translation of Hermogenes' *De statibus* IV 1.1–5 with technical terms transliterated shows: 'the *diairesis* of *horos* is: *probolē*; *horos*; *anthorismos*; *sullogismos*; *gnōmē nomothetou*; *pēlikotēs*; *pros ti*; one of the *antitheseis* (in some cases); if this is relevant, *metalēpsis* and *antilēpsis* will be found to follow immediately; then *poiotēs* and *gnōmē*' (Heath, Issues 1995, 25 n. 72).

¹ When the the language of the original is particularly important, I reverse the procedure and quote the Greek first with an English translation following.

Introduction

The Paradox of Practice

So that I don't give myself over entirely to sorrow, I've taken up doing some *theseis*, so to speak, which are both political and pertinent to our times, both to divert my mind from my complaints, and to get some practice concerning the very point that is at issue.

ne me totum aegritudini dedam, sumpsi mihi quasdam tamquam θέσεις, quae et πολιτικά sunt et temporum horum, ut et abducam animum ab querelis et in eo ipso de quo agitur exercear.

(Cic. Att. 9.4.1)

I open, curiously enough, with a Roman, not a Greek. In the first few months of 49 BCE, with civil war having broken out between Caesar and Pompey, and Caesar speeding down the Italian peninsula, Cicero, having abandoned the capital, lingered around Formiae, sending a steady stream of agonized letters to his friend Atticus. Should he follow Pompey in leaving Italy for Greece? Or should he stay and surrender himself to Caesar? Would an unjust peace be better than civil war? On the 12th of March, in the letter cited above,¹ he imagined his tortured deliberations as the rhetorical exercise known as the *thesis* (θέσις),² undertaken, he says, 'both to divert my mind from my complaints, and to get some practice concerning the very point that is at issue' (*et abducam animum ab querelis et in eo ipso de quo agitur exercear*), a thought he repeats a short while later in the same letter.³ That co-ordination ('both... and...' (*et... et...*)) expresses a contradiction: rhetorical exercises allow Cicero both literally to 'lead away' (*abducam*) his mind from his cares and, at the same time,

¹ Text, English translation, and commentary in Shackleton Bailey (Shackleton Bailey 1968, 142–5, 366–7).

² The *thesis* was the penultimate in the sequence of progressively more difficult exercises known most commonly by their Greek name of *progymnasmata*, which together constituted the stage of Greco-Roman rhetorical education immediately preceding declamation. A *thesis* argued for or against a general proposition, such as 'whether one should marry' (εἰ γαμήτέον) (Lib. *Prog.* 13.1). See Ernesti (Ernesti 1795, 155–57), Lausberg (Lausberg 1998, 497–8), and Gibson's introduction to the *theseis* in his translation of Lib. *Prog.* (Gibson 2008, 509).

³ 'by practising these questions... I both take my mind off my troubles for a while and think about something useful' (*in his ego me consultationibus exercens... et abduco parumper animum a molestiis et τῶν προῶρων τι delibero*) (3).

to exercise himself *in the very questions with which he is concerned*. Such is the paradox of practice. While it is supposed to prepare one for some future real-world application of one's skills, it is also by its very nature divorced from real life: practice can be *both* practical *and* escapist.

Greek Declamation in Context

Et partout il y a une absence marquée d'intérêt pour la vie contemporaine...
(Reardon 1971, 3–4)

Declamation, of course, was a major form of practice in the ancient world.

A declamation was a rhetorical exercise, specifically what is sometimes called an 'imaginary speech': not a real speech composed for real situations and real audiences, but rather fiction—fictitious speeches for fictitious situations and fictitious narratees.⁴ About half of the time that fiction was historical: thus, for example, the declaimer Libanius composed—almost eight hundred years after the trial—a defence speech for Socrates (Lib. *Decl.* 1). The other half of the genre, though set loosely in the historical past of classical Athens, is pure fiction, involving characters without name, and typical scenarios featured issues like international relations, civil strife, or personal crimes.⁵ A declamation in this latter category is referred to as a *plasma* (πλάσμα).

The paradox of practice corresponds to the two ways in which we may approach Greek declamation. On the one hand, existing scholarship has much to say about the genre's escapism, and its supposed use in lightening the cares of down-trodden Greeks under Roman rule (cf. pp. 115–18 below): this is apparently (in Schmitz's characterization of the view)

⁴ For Greek declamation generally, the fundamental monograph is Russell (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983). Other accounts of the genre are to be found in Reardon (Reardon 1971, 104–114), Bowie (Bowie, *Greeks and Their Past* 1970, 4–10), Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *The Sophists as Declaimers* 1974), Anderson (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 55–64), Swain (S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* 1996, 90–6), and Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 10–15, 112–27, 198–205).

⁵ For a survey of the genre's characteristic interests, see below pp. 128–36.

‘eine weltabgewandte Literatur’ (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 18). But what on the other hand has so far received much less emphasis—a gap that this thesis seeks to remedy—is the second half of Cicero’s formulation: *id ipsum*, the potential real-world reference and relevance of Greek declamation, and (to a lesser extent) the rhetorical training that it provided. For despite the genre’s famous classicism of language⁶ and theme, I argue that it also remained firmly anchored in the present, and had much to say to that present. The thesis explores in three sections three contemporary contexts in which we might read Greek declamation, and reconstructs the modes of listening and reading appropriate to each. Each section is made up of two chapters, the first of which reconstructs a given context and the modes of consumption that it entails, and the second of which illustrates and explores those modes of consumption through extended examples. There are thus six chapters in total, followed by a conclusion in which I look at the broader implications of what has been said in the preceding six chapters.

Section I presents the mode of reading for which the direct ancient evidence is richest: what I call ‘rhetorical reading’, the consumption of declamation through the lens of rhetorical theory, which was undergoing extraordinary developments in this period.⁷ I conclude that the relationship between rhetorical theory and declamatory practice was more profoundly *dialogic* than has hitherto been appreciated: that declamation not only uses theory, but more importantly also frequently extends, modifies, splices, tests, critiques, disregards, or even parodies it.

⁶ Like much Greek imperial literature, many declamations were written in an archaising and Atticising *Kunstsprache*. Schmid is the fundamental work on Atticism (Schmid 1887–96); see also Reardon (Reardon 1971, 81–96), Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 45–51), Anderson (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 86–100), Swain (S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* 1996, 43–64), Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 67–96), and Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 41–56).

⁷ See below, pp. 34–49.

Section II looks at declamation's historical context more broadly, arguing on the grounds of close similarities between the real life worries of imperial Greeks and the recurrent themes of Greek declamation that the genre offered audiences a sort of safe space for exploring major contemporary concerns.

Section III builds on section II. In this section, I argue on the basis of a detailed examination of the framing, performative dimension, and style of declamation that the genre created a relatively weak dramatic illusion, and that a declaimer could therefore use the genre to speak to the contemporary world more directly, and to make specific, unequivocal allusions to his immediate performance context, and in particular to himself and his audience.

Other approaches are possible. In recent times, Schmitz has argued that declamation was one of many vehicles for a literary language and culture that reflected and maintained the privileged position of Greek elites (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997); Whitmarsh's 2005 *libellus* takes a similar line.⁸ This may well be, yet (a failing it shares with the escapism theory), this approach offers no real account of why such material was delivered in the form of a declamation, rather than only in non-declamatory epideictic speeches such as, for example, Aelius Aristides' *Panathenaic Oration* (Or. 1). Furthermore, it cannot account for individual declamations: it cannot really explain why this scenario was preferred to that, or why a given scenario was developed in this way rather than that. Like so many others who have written on declamation, Schmitz and Whitmarsh seem almost allergic to reading the texts of surviving declamations in real detail.⁹

⁸ 'they were gathering as members of the educated elite, parading and exercising their status' (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 3).

⁹ Schmitz seems so unfamiliar with Aristides' Leuctran declamations, the masterpieces among his surviving declamations and highly regarded in antiquity (below, p. 93), that he incorrectly states that they are set *before* ('vor') the battle of Leuctra (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 113). Whitmarsh does have a chapter called 'Reading Sophistic Texts', but gives as much space to the non-declamatory productions of Dio Chrysostom, Lucian, and Plutarch as he does to real declamations.

A second road not taken is psychoanalytic criticism. Such an approach to the genre is tempting: Greek declamation frequently touches on many of the sorts of fundamental human stories—murder, adultery, war—that have inspired psychoanalytic readings of other literature,¹⁰ and scholars have in fact gestured in this direction for Greek declamation,¹¹ though, in contrast to Latin declamation,¹² the suggestion has not been pursued with any great vigour.¹³ Still, the second section of this thesis, ‘Mythology’, in which there is talk here and there of ‘semi-’ or ‘sub-conscious’ readings, at times touches on a psychoanalytic approach, and this would certainly be a possible avenue for future research.¹⁴

The Importance of Declamation

The question of how to read declamation ‘really, really matters’.¹⁵ To start with, the genre has a more-or-less continuous history in Greek of about seventeen hundred years, stretching from the Hellenistic period¹⁶ to the fall of Byzantium,¹⁷ and those seventeen hundred years have left abundant surviving remains: I count at least one hundred and eight Greek declamations surviving in full or in large part,¹⁸ as well as hundreds of fragments, and

¹⁰ Russell notes similarities between typical Greek declamation scenarios and famous Greek myths (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 29, 31).

¹¹ Russell suggested that Greek declamation is revealing of Greeks’ ‘characteristic fantasies’, and suggests more specifically that scenarios involving parent-child conflict might have had ‘some sort of cathartic effect’ (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 22, 31); Pernot in reviewing Russell made similar remarks (‘peut-être cathartique’) (Pernot, *Review of Russell* 1985, 193). Penella has suggested the ‘moral and psycho-social functions of declamation’ as a possible avenue for future research into Libanius’ declamations (Penella, *Libanius* 2014, 126–7).

¹² For psychoanalytic approaches to Latin declamation, see above all Gunderson (Gunderson 2003).

¹³ Lauwers’ work is perhaps the most advanced in this area: he divines narcissism in Polemo, and sees this as a product of the sophistic culture of the time (Lauwers 2015).

¹⁴ A less common approach, exemplified by Boulanger’s reading of Aristides’ *Leuctran Orations* (Orr, 11–15) is to see (some) declamations as presenting a sort of sophisticated historical analysis in narrative form: ‘témoignant non seulement d’une connaissance approfondie de l’histoire hellénique du IV^e siècle, mais aussi d’une compréhension très exacte des événements’ (Boulanger 1923, 288).

¹⁵ As Goldhill says of rhetorical theory (Goldhill, *Review of Webb* 2009.10.03).

¹⁶ The earliest texts we have that are thought to be (parts of) declamations are P. Hibeh 15 and P. Berol. 9781, which both date to the third century BCE (Lasserre 1979, 159–61, Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 4).

¹⁷ For Byzantine declamation, see Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 320–1).

¹⁸ I sketch briefly the sources for second- and third-century and late antique declamation below. For the Byzantine period we have thirteen declamations by George Pachymeres, two by George of Cyprus, one by Nicephorus Basilices, and others by Thomas Magister and others (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 320–1).

roughly five hundred unique titles¹⁹ mentioned in about three thousand citations (Patillon, Apsinès 2001, xci–cii). This mass of declamation is matched by an equally striking mass of rhetorical theory offering guidance in how to declaim: there are eighty theoretical works on rhetoric of various kinds in the nine volumes and 6,965 pages of Walz’s gargantuan *Rhetores Graeci* (1832–6), and of these only a handful can be firmly dated to before the second century CE (Heath, Menander 2004, 3).²⁰

But it is not just declamation’s longevity and survival in abundance that make this question so pressing. As an important part of ancient education,²¹ declamation was also part of the basic world view of the elite.²² Furthermore, declamation also became a major cultural phenomenon in its own right.²³ Astonishingly, in the imperial period, even after their formal education had finished, members of the male elite would throughout their lives gather periodically in council chambers or theatres or other public venues in cities all over the Greek east (and several in the west also) to hear declamations, from Arelate to Antioch.²⁴ There were plenty of declaimers to choose from: there are over a thousand entries in Janiszewski, Stebnicka, and Szabat’s recent *Prosopography of Greek Rhetors and Sophists*

¹⁹ These are obviously too numerous to cite in full: the figure is derived from an unpublished catalogue of declamation titles shared with me by Malcolm Heath.

²⁰ Of course, not all of these texts are directed solely at declaimers, but declaimers are certainly among the primary audience(s) for most of them, not least the key Hermogenic texts and their commentaries.

²¹ On declamation in Greek education, see Marrou (Marrou 1965, 303–7) and Cribiore (Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind* 2005, 231–8). Marrou calls declamation ‘le trait le plus caractéristique de l’enseignement de la rhétorique hellénistique’ (Marrou 1965, 303). On declamation in Roman education, see Wilkins (Wilkins 1905, 83–88), Gwynn (Gwynn 1926, 158–73, 200–18), Bonner (Bonner 1977, 277–87; 309–27). On declamation in both traditions, see Clarke (Clarke, *Higher Education* 1971, 39–45).

²² ‘Le mouvement oratoire qu’est la Deuxième Sophistique domine la vie intellectuelle et artistique, voire la vie sociale et politique de l’époque’ (Reardon 1971, 115); ‘[r]hetorical training was a universal given within the literate élite, and remained a basic presupposition of social, political, and cultural activity’ (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 7).

²³ On declamation as a cultural phenomenon, see Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 50–1); on the development out of school exercises, see Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 70).

²⁴ One can get a sense of declamation’s geographical range from Puech (Puech 2002, 17–23), from the table prepared by Bowie (Bowie, *Geography of the Second Sophistic* 2004, 76–81), and from browsing the pages of *GRS*. Bowie notes a striking lack of regional variation in sophistic practice.

of the Roman Empire (2015),²⁵ twenty-seven declaimers mentioned in the *Suda*,²⁶ and ten in Photius' *Bibliotheca*,²⁷ including the emperor Hadrian himself.²⁸ The most successful of these declaimers became superstars, travelling all over the Mediterranean, and performing before vast audiences: Aelius Aristides describes a council chamber so packed for one of his declamations that all he could see everywhere was heads (Aristid. *Or.* 51.32); even Roman emperors, too, sometimes came along (Philostr. *VS* 582–3).²⁹ The sums declaimers commanded could be astronomical: Herodes Atticus is said to have once paid a quarter of a million drachmas for a single performance (Philostr. *VS* 538). The epigraphic and numismatic record also provides evidence of the cultural importance of declamation. From the time of Trajan, we suddenly find the term 'sophist' (σοφιστής) used approbatively (Puech 2002, 6); we even have an inscription commemorating the sophist Lollianus as 'excellent in declamations' (μελέτησί τε ἄριστον).³⁰ In short, Philostratus' vivid picture of declamation as one of the most important cultural phenomena of the times in which he lived is in essence correct.

²⁵ Obviously not all of these figures declaimed themselves, though many did: even of those who did not, a great number supported declamation through the production of rhetorical theory (cf. Section I).

²⁶ s.vv. Ἀδριανός (α 528), Ἀριστοκλῆς (α 3918), Ἀσπασίος (α 4203), Βημάρχιος (β 259), Ἐπιφάνιος (ε 2741), Εὐστέφιος (ε 3750), Γαϊανός (γ 9), Γενέθλιος (γ 132), Γυμνάσιος (γ 481), Ἰμέριος (ι 348), Κεφαλίων ἢ Κεφάλων (κ 1449), Λιβάνιος (λ 486), Μητροφάνης (μ 1010), Νικόλαος (ν 394), Νικόλαος (ν 395), Ὀνάσιμος (ο 327), Οὐλπιανός (ο 912), Φιλόστρατος (φ 421), Φιλόστρατος (φ 422), Φιλόστρατος (φ 423), Παῦλος (π 809), Πολυδεύκης (π 1951), Ποσειδώνιος (π 2108), Πρίσκοι (π 2301), Σαραπίων (σ 115), Σεκοῦνδος (σ 189), Σιρίκιος (σ 475).

²⁷ Aelius Aristides (*codd.* 246–48), Himerius (*codd.* 165, 243), the emperor Hadrian (*cod.* 100), Lucian (*cod.* 128), Libanius (*cod.* 90), Palladius (*GRS* 770) (*cod.* 132), Aphthonius (*GRS* 96) (*cod.* 133), Eusebius (*GRS* 366) (*cod.* 134), Maximus of Alexandria (*GRS* 677) (*cod.* 135).

²⁸ Photius apparently read some declamations of Hadrian (*cod.* 100), which he describes as 'distinguished by their moderation in language, and not unpleasant' (εἰς τὸ μέτριον τοῦ λόγου ἀνηγμέναι καὶ οὐκ ἀηδεῖς).

²⁹ The size of audiences is debated, and the evidence (as so often with ancient numbers) far from straightforward. Most of the sources, to be sure, have an interest in presenting audiences as as large as possible (thus Philostratus and Aristides), but equally the difficulty of some declamations need not have been an obstacle to popularity: the difficulty of understanding sixteenth-century English does not stop modern productions of Shakespeare from regularly drawing large crowds. See Reardon (Reardon 1971, 93), Pernot (Pernot, *L'éloge* 1993, I.445–6), Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 160–68) and, more sceptically, Nesselrath's review of Schmitz (Nesselrath, *Review of Schmitz* 1998.6.18).

³⁰ On the epigraphic and numismatic evidence, see Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 14–17). On Lollianus, see Puech (Puech 2002, 327–9). Such evidence goes a long way towards refuting Brunt's famous dismissal of the Second Sophistic as a mere 'bubble' (Brunt, *Bubble* 1994).

Such an important genre naturally had extensive influence on other literature of the time (though it is difficult and ultimately unhelpful to try to separate the contribution of declamation specifically from that of the whole range of rhetorical theory and practice). In Reardon's seminal study, rhetoric is one of the major literary currents of this period, and he devotes chapters to 'la création rhétorique' (the creative use of rhetorical forms) and 'la rhétorique appliquée' (the use of rhetoric in other genres).³¹ In particular, there is much that the connoisseur of declamation would recognise in the Greek novel, in imperial historiography,³² and in imperial epistolography,³³ as well of course as in the 'real', or perhaps more neutrally, 'non-declamatory' oratory of the time (below, pp. 145–50).³⁴

Yet for all that, declamation remains a severely neglected genre: this neglect seems all the more regrettable when one considers the progress that has been made elsewhere in studying Greek imperial literature, which indeed has been a real growth area in Classical Studies since the 1970s. The Greek novel, for example, which was almost as long-lived as declamation, but less prestigious, and which survives in distinctly smaller quantities, has rightly become a major field of study in the last fifty years,³⁵ as have key Greek imperial writers such as

³¹ Reardon (Reardon 1971, 155–231). On the influence of rhetoric, see also Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 42–9) (rather negative) and Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 74–89). For other general literary histories of the period, see Anderson (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993), and, for both Greek and Latin, Dihle (Dihle 1989). For briefer accounts, see Bowie (Bowie, *Literature and Sophistic* 2000) and Lightfoot (Lightfoot, *Romanized Greeks and Hellenized Romans: Later Greek Literature* 2000).

³² Reardon (Reardon 1971, 207–19), Anderson (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 105–114).

³³ See Reardon (Reardon 1971, 180–4), Rosenmeyer (Rosenmeyer 2001, 259–60) and, with Alciphron as a case study, Anderson (Anderson, *Pepaideumenos in Action* 1989, 113–15). Engagement with rhetorical theory in Rosenmeyer's book is limited, however: for deeper engagement, see Vicente Sánchez and Guast on Philostr. *Ep.* (Vicente Sánchez 2011, Guast, Philostratus' 'Letters' 2012).

³⁴ For rhetoric's influence on poetry, see Norden (Norden 1898, 883–9).

³⁵ A huge topic: for orientation, see Bowie and Harrison (Bowie and Harrison, *The Romance of the Novel* 1993), Swain (S. Swain, *Greek Novel* 1999), Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *The Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel* 2008).

Lucian,³⁶ Dio Chrysostom,³⁷ Pausanias,³⁸ Plutarch,³⁹ and Philostratus.⁴⁰ Latin declamation, too, is relatively well-studied.⁴¹ It is time, then, for Greek declamation too to come in from the cold.

Second- and Third-Century Greek Declamation

This thesis confines itself to Greek declamation, for several reasons. First, the neglect of Greek declamation in scholarship is much more serious than the neglect of Latin declamation (cf. p. 19 n. 41 above). Second, for all the connections between Greek and Latin declamation, most ancient sources do retain a clear sense of a distinction between the two: while modern criticism is probably right that Seneca the Elder shows no particular prejudice against Greek declaimers as a whole, in his *Controversiae* he nonetheless works with a fairly clear distinction between Roman and Greek;⁴² on the Greek side, Philostratus mentions no Latin declaimers at all. A third reason is to be found in the state of our sources. Those available for second- and third-century Greek declamation are, as we are about to see, relatively coherent and manageable in number. To include Latin declamation, however, would not only make this thesis impossibly long, but also loosen its focus: the declamations covered by Seneca the Elder run from the thirties BCE to the reign of Tiberius, and so are

³⁶ Baldwin (Baldwin 1973), Anderson (Anderson, Lucian: Theme and Variation 1976), Hall (J. Hall 1981), Bracht Branham (Bracht Branham 1989), Billault (Billault, Lucien 1994), Bartley (Bartley 2009).

³⁷ See Jones (Jones, Dio Chrysostom 1978), Desideri (Desideri 1978), Moles (Moles, The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom 1978), Swain (S. Swain, Dio Chrysostom 2000).

³⁸ Habicht (Habicht 1985), Musti and Bingen (Musti and Bingen 1996), Arafat (Arafat 1996), Alcock, Cherry, and Elsner (Alcock, Cherry and Elsner 2001), Hutton (Hutton 2005), and Pretzler (Pretzler 2007).

³⁹ Jones (Jones, Plutarch 1971), Russell (Russell, Plutarch 1973), Scardigli (Scardigli 1995), Swain (S. Swain, Hellenism and Empire 1996, 135–86), Mossman and Bowie (Mossman and Bowie 1997), Duff (Duff 1999), Pelling (Pelling 2002), Stadter (Stadter 2015).

⁴⁰ Anderson (Anderson, Philostratus 1986), Flinterman (Flinterman, Power, Paideia and Pythagoreanism 1995), Billault (Billault, L'univers de Philostrate 2000), Bowie and Elsner (Bowie and Elsner, Philostratus 2009).

⁴¹ A selection of recent studies: Richlin (Richlin 1997), Bloomer (Bloomer, Schooling in Persona 1997), Bloomer (Bloomer, History of Declamation 1998), Connolly (Connolly, Mastering Corruption: Constructions of Identity in Roman Oratory 1998), Kaster (Kaster 2001), Imber (Imber, Practised Speech 2001), Gunderson (Gunderson 2003), Habinek (Habinek 2005), Dugan (Dugan 2007), Corbeill (Corbeill 2007).

⁴² On Greek declaimers in the *Controv.*, see Fairweather (Fairweather 1981, 23–6). Sussman sees Seneca as more jingoistic (Sussman 1978, 90–1).

about a century before most of the Greek declamations covered in this thesis, while the *Declamationes maiores* attributed to Quintilian are later; only the *Declamationes minores* are from the right period (Winterbottom, *The 'Minor Declamations' Ascribed to Quintilian* 1984, xv–xvi). Furthermore, there seem to me to be differences in the modes of reading that the two *corpora* require. Both respond well to mythological reading, to be sure,⁴³ but the relative scarcity of information about the contexts in which surviving Latin declamations were performed makes it hard to gauge how metaleptic they might have been (though I discuss a few attractive cases at the end of chapter six, pp. 234–35); as for rhetorical theory (the subject of section I of this thesis), Latin theory seems to have been behind Greek, and to have been less important in reading and writing declamations.⁴⁴

More specifically, this thesis focuses principally on Greek declamation of the second and third centuries. This might at first surprise: the period constitutes neither the beginning nor the end of the genre's story, and of the hundred or so declamations that have survived in full, only twenty-three are products of the second or third century. But there are good reasons to focus on this period. It is the first period for which we have sufficient evidence for a general study to be possible: the Hellenistic evidence is simply too scanty.⁴⁵ Furthermore, it

⁴³ Some examples of 'mythological' readings of Latin declamations: Connolly (Connolly, *Mastering Corruption: Constructions of Identity in Roman Oratory* 1998), Packman (Packman 1999), Kaster (Kaster 2001), Casamento (Casamento 2004), Vesley (Vesley 2003), Lentano (Lentano 2005), Bernstein (Bernstein, *Bodies, Substances, and Kinship* 2007), Pasetti (Pasetti 2007), Imber (Imber, *Life without Father* 2008), Wilson (M. Wilson 2008), Berstein (Bernstein, *Adoptees and Exposed Children* 2009), Breij (Breij 2011), Bernstein (Bernstein, *Torture* 2012), Bernstein (Bernstein, *Ethics, Identity, and Community* 2013).

⁴⁴ The revolution in Greek rhetorical theory in the second century (see below, pp. 34–49) seems not to have been matched by comparable developments on the Latin side: Heath offers a nice demonstration of the superiority of Hermogenean issue-theory to the issue-theory used not only by the rather earlier *Controv.* of Seneca but also in the 'minor declamations' attributed to Quintilian (Heath, Menander 2004, 10–16). As for the stylistic *ideai*, there is again nothing of comparable sophistication on the Latin side. The best evidence for the application of theory to declamation in Latin is to be found in the 'minor declamations', though even these are less theoretical than Greek works like the *Diaresis zētēmatōn*. To some extent, though, the assumption of less use of theory in writing and reading Roman declamation (rather like the assumption of less metalepsis) is an argument from silence: it is not known whether many of the sorts of paratexts that facilitated the rhetorical reading of Greek declamation (pp. 49–78 below) never existed for Latin texts, or have simply been lost.

⁴⁵ We hear of Hellenistic declamation (VS 510–11, Plb. 12.25a5, 12.25k8, Quint. 2.4.41, perhaps Demetr. *Eloc.* 238, the Greek declaimers mentioned in Sen. *Suas.*), but outside of a few fragmentary papyri (in addition to those cited in p. 15 n. 16 above, cf. P. Lond. Lit. 138, P. Yale II 105), we have no surviving texts. The most

is a formative period in the history of the genre, in three ways. First, the star second-century declaimer Aelius Aristides enters the canon of Greek rhetoric in this era, creating expectations about what declaimers and declamation should look like.⁴⁶ Secondly, this is also a formative period in the rhetorical theory of declamation: most surviving theoretical works from later centuries are commentaries on or epitomes of works written in this period, above all the works of Hermogenes. Finally, Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum*, the indispensable starting-point for this period, and the concept of the 'Second Sophistic' that it propounds, have been key in determining ancient and modern ideas of declamation and sophistry.⁴⁷ These centuries also represent a (tolerably) coherent unit of analysis.⁴⁸ The politics and culture of empire and *polis* remain broadly stable and similar throughout this period, before the transformations wrought by the military, political, and economic troubles of the mid-third century, the transition to the dominate, and the rise of Christianity. The sources bring a degree of coherence to my argument also: for much of the period and most of the declaimers we will consider we face the same questions about how to use the evidence of Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum*, and most of the surviving declamations and the key theoretical works of Hermogenes date to within about a hundred years of one another (for declaimers' dates, see below). Finally, in terms of the scholarly landscape, this is the most

convenient account of the early history of Greek declamation is to be found in Fairweather (Fairweather 1981, 104–15).

⁴⁶ An indication of the importance of Aristides in the tradition can be found in the *index rerum et auctorum* of Walz's *Rhetores Graeci* (Walz 1832–6), in which Aristides makes a real splash, while later declaimers, even Libanius, cause barely a ripple; the rhetorician Longinus bestows a very high compliment on Aristides when he describes him as, like Demosthenes, an orator who does not always abide by the rules of rhetoric but often himself *becomes* rhetoric (τέχνη) (fr. 50.5). There is also a revealing remark in Hermogenes, who on citing Aristides and Demosthenes in a discussion of the stylistic category of 'sincerity' (ἀλήθεια) says rather defensively that he is *not* suggesting that Aristides is better than Demosthenes: 'for I would be mad, if I were to say this' (μαινοίμην γὰρ ἂν, εἰ τοῦτο λέγοιμι) (II 7.6.6–7): that Hermogenes feels the need to defend against such a supposition suggests that it was in no way inconceivable. (The words of Aristides cited, it should be noted, come from a declamation (Aristid. *Or.* 5.40)).

⁴⁷ Norman, writing about Libanius, describes the VS as 'the manual of sophistic deportment' (Norman 1953).

⁴⁸ See Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 33–4) and Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 3 n. 1). This is of course also the period that Reardon selected for his landmark study (Reardon 1971, IX).

neglected period in the history of this neglected genre.⁴⁹ Declaimers and declamations from Late Antiquity have been and continue to be studied much more intensively. Libanius *Declamations* 9–10 have been the subject of a recent commentary by Johansson (Johansson 2006), who is now preparing a commentary on *Declamations* 19–23,⁵⁰ and there has also been a smattering of studies of the Antiochean's declamations,⁵¹ while Cribiore has devoted a monograph to his school (Cribiore, *School of Libanius* 2007); Choricus' *Declamations* are slowly being edited, translated, commented on, and analysed by the 'L'École de Gaza' research group under the direction of Eugenio Amato at the University of Nantes,⁵² and have also been worked on by a number of other scholars;⁵³ finally, even the six fragmentary declamations of Himerius have not been completely unstudied.⁵⁴

The Sources

I now survey the sources for second- and third-century declamation, as well as the major sources for later declamation. For authors not covered here, key biographical and bibliographical information will usually be given in a footnote when the author is first

⁴⁹ The survey of sources below notes the few commentaries or other studies that exist for declamations of this period.

⁵⁰ <http://sprak.gu.se/english/research/research-projects/externally-funded/libanius-declamations-17-23>.

⁵¹ Feraboli (Feraboli, *Uno spunto lisiano* 1980–1981), Schouler (Schouler, *Tradition hellénique* 1984, 27–34, 139–221 passim), García Soler (García Soler, *Reflejos de la comedia* 1990), García Soler (García Soler, *Duskolos* 1991–92), Hawley (Hawley 1995), Schouler (Schouler, *Retour* 2006), Penella (Penella, *Himerius' Orations to His Students* 2008), García Soler (García Soler, *Ecos clásicos* 2014), Penella (Penella, *Libanius* 2014).

⁵² <http://ecoledegaza.fr/>. Lupi's commentary on Chor. *Decl.* 4 has already been published (Lupi, *Milziade* 2010), preceded by an article on the same text (Lupi, *Uso del passato* 2009); Lupi has also published on *Decl.* 3 (Lupi, *Essere uomini* 2014) and *Decll.* 5–6 (Lupi, *Two Laws* 2015). Deroma and Manzione, who are preparing commentaries on *Decl.* 10 and *Decl.* 12 respectively, have already published some preliminary findings (Deroma 2014, Manzione 2014). Tomassi has published a series of studies of *Decl.* 7 (Tomassi, *Continuità e innovazione* 2014, Tomassi, *Pratica Declamatoria* 2015, Tomassi, *Tyrants and Tyrannicides* 2015).

⁵³ Feraboli (Feraboli, *Note a Coricio, 'Orazione' XVII* 1976), Kapitanffy (Kapitanffy 1994), Schouler (Schouler, *Chorikios déclamateur* 2005), Webb (Webb, *Rhetorical and Theatrical Fictions* 2006), Schouler (Schouler, *Retour* 2006), Lupi (Lupi, *Rappresentazione retorica* 2010), Penella (Penella, *Cross-dressing* 2013), Greco (Greco 2013).

⁵⁴ See Penella (Penella, *Himerius' Orations to His Students* 2008) and Nardiello (Nardiello 2012).

mentioned, though for almost all the figures touched on in this thesis such information can also be checked conveniently in *GRS*.

Twenty-three declamations from this period have survived in full, all written in the second century, the work of six authors. There is no way to date any of these texts within the careers of their authors, though for speculations about the position of Lucian's *Tyrannicida* within Lucian's biography, see Guast (Guast, Lucian and Declamation forthcoming).

Aelius Aristides (117–c. 180/7)

We have twelve declamations (Aristid. *Orr.* 5–16)⁵⁵ from the hand of Aelius Aristides, an orator well-regarded in his own time and still more highly regarded in Late Antiquity and Byzantium.⁵⁶ *Orations* 5 and 6 are a pair of declamations for and against sending reinforcements to Athens' famous Sicilian expedition during the Peloponnesian War.⁵⁷ *Oration* 7 argues that Athens should accept the Spartan offer of peace after the events at Sphacteria in 425 BCE; *Oration* 8 is a speech by a Spartan against the destruction of Athens after her final defeat in 404. *Orations* 9 and 10 are two attempts at the same scenario: Demosthenes' attempt to persuade the Thebans to join Athens in resisting Philip immediately prior to the Battle of Chaeronea. *Orations* 11–15 represent Athenian deliberations after the Battle of Leuctra, and the individual speeches make arguments in favour of allying with Sparta, in favour of allying with Thebes, and in favour of neutrality.

⁵⁵ Text in Lenz and Behr (Lenz and Behr, P. Aelii Aristidis opera quae exstant omnia 1976–); translations in Behr (Behr, Complete Works 1981–86). Discussion (mostly paraphrase) in Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 271–93).

⁵⁶ For Aristides' reputation among his contemporaries, see the complimentary remarks of Galen preserved in Arabic (Schröder 1934, 33) and Philostratus' account of his life (not totally positive, but definitely respectful) (Philostr. *VS* 581–585). For other testimonia, and Aristides' later reputation, see *RE* II.1 (1895) Aristeides 24 col. 892.

⁵⁷ Text, French translation, and commentary in Pernot (Pernot, Discours Siciliens 1981).

Oration 16 is a rare mythological declamation based on *Iliad* 9, in which the speaker attempts to persuade Achilles to accept Agamemnon's gifts and return to battle.

Lucian (c. 115/125–180/190)

We have four declamations by the satirical essayist Lucian (*Phal.* 1, *Phal.* 2, *Tyr.*, and *Abd.*).⁵⁸ In the *Tyrannicida*, a man claims the reward given to tyrannicides after his killing of a tyrant's son drove the tyrant to suicide. In the *Abdicatus*, a man trained as a doctor opposes his father's attempt to disown him after he refuses to treat his step-mother. In *Phalaris* 1, the notorious tyrant of Acragas seeks to persuade the Delphians to accept the bronze bull he has sent as an offering. In *Phalaris* 2, which follows on from *Phalaris* 1, an ordinary citizen of Delphi speaks in favour of Phalaris' plea. This last pair of texts is frequently referred to as declamations, yet in truth they are very unusual in both their subject matter and their presentation,⁵⁹ and so should probably be regarded as being on the periphery of the genre.

Polemo (c. 88/9–140/4)

We have a pair of declamations by the famous rhetor, politician, and physiognomist Polemo of Laodicea, in which the fathers of two fighters killed at Marathon, Cynegirus and

⁵⁸ Text in Macleod (Macleod 1972–87); English translations in the Loeb Classical Library (Harmon, Vol. 1 1913, Harmon, Vol. 5 1936). There are brief readings of *Phal.* 1 in Anderson (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 63), and of *Phal.* 1 and 2 in Reardon (Reardon 1971, 111) and Bompaigne (Bompaigne 1958, 265–7), of *Tyr.* and *Abd.* in Bompaigne (Bompaigne 1958, 242–6), and of *Tyr.* (in terms of rhetorical theory) in Heath (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 175–8). There are, of course, fictitious speeches in other Lucianic works, such as the *Bis Acc.*, but these can hardly be considered declamations.

⁵⁹ To the best of my knowledge, these are the only declamations about Phalaris in either Greek or Latin; even declamations set outside the fifth and fourth centuries BCE are rare. It is also to the best of my knowledge unparalleled for a declamation to be set within a frame narrative (Phalaris' words in *Phal.* 1 are relayed by ambassadors).

Callimachus, each argues that it was their son who fought most bravely of all those who died in the battle, and that they therefore have the right to deliver the eulogy over the dead.⁶⁰

Herodes Atticus (c. 101–77)

A short text conventionally known as the *Peri polīteias* is attributed to the famously wealthy rhetor and politician Herodes Atticus.⁶¹ In this text, set in the fifth century BCE, the speaker attempts to persuade the people of Larissa to join Sparta against the Macedonian king Archelaus. Though some have doubted the attribution to Herodes, and others have even argued that it is a genuine text of the fifth century, it seems likely that this is in fact a declamation of Herodes.⁶² It is, however, a very unusual declamation, for it is both *recherché* in its subject matter and much shorter than the works of Aristides, Lucian, and Polemo.⁶³

Hadrian of Tyre (c. 112–92)

We have a short two-page declamation attributed to the famous rhetor Hadrian of Tyre.⁶⁴ The manuscripts describe the scenario as follows: ‘efforts to put to death a woman convicted of witchcraft by burning result in failure. Another woman promises to burn the woman, and

⁶⁰ Reader offers a text, very literal translation, and commentary (Reader 1996), but that text is problematic (Stefec, *Überlieferung* 2013, 113–14), and much of the commentary aimed at beginners. Stefec’s new Oxford Classical Text is to be preferred (Stefec, *Flavii Philostrati vitas sophistarum: Ad quas accedunt Polemonis Laodicensis declamationes quae exstant duae* 2016), though this reached me too late for me to take account of it. Brief discussions in Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 92–4), Reardon (Reardon 1971, 107–9), Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 200–5), Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Resistance is Futile?* 2012, 74–76).

⁶¹ Text and commentary in Albini (Albini 1968); text and Italian translation in Mariotta (Mariotta 2006). Brief discussion in Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 101–2).

⁶² The debate is summarized by Albini (Albini 1968, 11–23); the strongest argument in favour of a second-century date to my mind is the language of the piece. Albini disputes the attribution to Herodes on the grounds that neither the style nor the quality of the work are what we would expect from this famous sophist. But as Russell sensibly cautions with regards to this case, stylistic judgements are very subjective (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 111). In truth, as Schmitz says (of Herodes), ‘[r]ationale Gründe, ihm die Rede nicht zuzuschreiben, gibt es jedenfalls keine’ (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 113 n. 61): no manuscript attributes the speech to anyone else, and the style is not so far off the picture offered by the surviving testimonia on Herodes’ writings, as Wade-Gery details (ironically in the course of arguing that Critias—whose style Herodes imitated—is the real author) (Wade-Gery 1945, 26–30).

⁶³ ‘Les événements qui fournissent l’occasion du discours devaient être inconnus au public des salles de déclamation’ (Boulanger 1923, 102).

⁶⁴ Text in Hinck (Hinck 1873, 44–5). There are no commentaries.

succeeds in doing so. Hadrian the rhetor moves that this woman be burned also' (ἀλοῦσά τις φαρμακείας οὐχ οἷα τε ἦν καυθῆναι· ὑπέσχετό τις γυνή καύσειν αὐτήν καὶ ἔκαυσεν. ἀξιοῖ Ἀδριανὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ταύτην καῆναι). Our brief text must surely represent a sketch of a possible full treatment or an abbreviation of such a fuller treatment. There is no reason to doubt the attribution to Hadrian.

Lesbonax (perhaps second century)

Three odd texts.⁶⁵ In the first extremely short and surely incomplete piece an Athenian exhorts his fellow citizens to take vengeance on the Thebans for the destruction of Plataea in 427 BCE. Of the second, slightly longer piece, we can only say that it is an exhortation to battle: there is no indication of either time or place. The third piece, of a similar length to the second, is another exhortation to battle, probably set shortly after 413 BCE (Kiehr 1907, 7).

I do not give equal space to all of these texts. Brevity, unusual subject matter, possible lacunae, and questionable authenticity between them mean that the works of Herodes, Hadrian of Tyre, and Lesbonax, as well as Lucian's *Phalaris* 1 and 2 do not provide the best raw materials for illustrating and exploring the modes of reading that I reconstruct, and so accordingly they are not the subject of the extended readings presented in chapters 2, 4, and 6.⁶⁶

Outside of the declamations that survive in full from this period, we also have numerous titles and fragments. There are four major sources for these:

⁶⁵ Text with brief Latin commentary may be found in Kiehr (Kiehr 1907).

⁶⁶ Reardon in his survey of surviving second- and third-century declamation even places the titles and quotations of declamations that we find in Philostr. VS before the works of Lesbonax, which he banishes to a footnote, and the declamation of Hadrian of Tyre is not mentioned except in a footnote six pages later (Reardon 1971, 104–5, 110).

Philostratus (c. 160/70–the 240s), *Vitae sophistarum* (230s)⁶⁷

Philostratus' famous *Vitae sophistarum* offers biographies of most of the more important declaimers from the period c. 60 to 230 CE. It gives us about fifty declamation titles, including quotations from a number of them, as well as a wealth of valuable information about the culture that surrounded declamation, and in particular about the contexts in which declamations were performed.

Apsines (3rd century), *Ars rhetorica*⁶⁸

Better to focus on text here rather than author, for the attribution to Apsines is disputed.⁶⁹ This *Ars rhetorica* presents a fairly comprehensive survey of rhetorical theory, and therefore offers us a valuable window into the state of the art in the third century before the work of Hermogenes attained canonical status. The text gives us about ninety declamation titles, and through its discussions some idea of how they might have been treated.

Hermogenes (c. 160/1–230), *De statibus*⁷⁰

The rhetorician Hermogenes' *De statibus* is a textbook on 'division', a preliminary stage in preparing a speech in which a case was broken down into different steps of argument to follow (below, pp. 36–42). Though this work may not have met with immediate success, it eventually became canonical (p. 37 n. 7 below). This text offers the titles of about sixty

⁶⁷ Text in Stefec (Stefec, *Flavii Philostrati vitas sophistarum: Ad quas accedunt Polemonis Laodicensis declamationes quae exstant duae* 2016). This reached too late, however, for me to take account of it; I instead used the text and translation in Wright (Wright 1921). Commentary in Rothe and Civiletti (Rothe 1989, Civiletti 2002). On Philostratus as a source, see Reardon (Reardon 1971, 115–18) and Swain (S. Swain, *The Reliability of Philostratus's 'Lives of the Sophists'* 1991).

⁶⁸ Text and translation in Dilts and Kennedy (Dilts and Kennedy 1997); commentary in Patillon (Patillon, Apsinès 2001). Cf. p. 9 n. 2.

⁶⁹ For the debate, with references, see *GRS* no. 129.

⁷⁰ Text, French translation, and commentary in Patillon (Patillon, *Corpus rhetoricum* II 2009); English translation and commentary in Heath (Heath, *Issues* 1995).

declamation scenarios, and provides some information about how some of them might have been handled.

Ps.-Hermogenes, *De inventione*⁷¹

A rather odd work of disputed authorship which discusses the introduction, narrative, and proofs of a speech, and then closes with a chapter on style. Both authorship and date are disputed,⁷² but since it seems to contain a considerable amount of second- and/or third-century material, it is included here, with caution. The work gives the titles of about fifty declamation scenarios, together with some clues about how some of them might have been treated.

Since I regularly refer to later declamation in the course of the thesis, it may also be useful to survey here the surviving work from later centuries.

Libanius (314–93)

Rhetorician highly regarded both during his lifetime and all the way to the end of Byzantium (*RE* XII.2 (1925) Libanios coll. 2542–2544). Fifty-one declamations preserved in full.⁷³

⁷¹ Text, French translation, and commentary in Patillon (Patillon, *Corpus rhetoricum* III 2012); English translation and notes in Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *Invention and Method* 2005).

⁷² A helpful summary of the debate with bibliography can be found in Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *Invention and Method* 2005, xv–xvi). Heath ascribes the work to the third-century rhetorician Apsines (Heath, Apsines and Pseudo-Apsines 1998, Heath, Menander 2004, 53–60), while Patillon suggests Aspasius of Ravenna, another third-century figure (Patillon, *De inventione* 1997, 2079–83). Heath argues that the work traditionally attributed to Apsines knows the *Inv.*, while Rutherford argues that (the real) Hermogenes knew it (I. Rutherford, *Canons of Style* 1998, 105–13): if the former is true, then at least part of the work is securely third-century, while if the latter is true part of the work might even be from the second century. On the other hand, Kennedy presents strong arguments that the work was substantially rewritten at a later date, perhaps in part to fill a position in the Hermogenic corpus, since the author does not claim originality for much of the unusual theory that he deploys, and some of his most unusual terminology is found in the fourth-/fifth-century *Ars rhetorica* of Fortunatus.

⁷³ Text in Foerster (Foerster, *Libanii opera* 1903–27); for a list of translations, see Penella (Penella, *Libanius* 2014). For studies of Libanius' declamations, see p. 22 n. 51 above.

Himerius (c. 320–c. 396)

‘The leading political orator of his time’ (*GRS* no. 500). Extracts from six declamations preserved in Photius’ *Bibliotheca*.⁷⁴

Choricius (6th century)

One of the rhetors of the ‘school of Gaza’, the modern term for a group of rhetors active in sixth-century Gaza. Twelve declamations survive in full.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Text in Colonna (Colonna 1951); translation in Penella (Penella, Himerius 2007). For studies of Himerius’ declamations, see p. 22 n. 54 above.

⁷⁵ Text in Foerster and Richsteig (Foerster and Richsteig, *Choricii opera* 1929); translation in Penella (Penella, Choricius 2009). In addition to the biographical information in *GRS*, see Geiger (Geiger 2014, 18). For studies of Choricius’ declamations, see p. 22 n. 52 and p. 22 n. 53 above. For the ‘school of Gaza’, see Seitz (Seitz 1892), Downey (Downey, *Schools of Palestine* 1958), Glucker (Glucker 1987, 51–7), and Amato, Corcella, and Lauritzen (Amato, Corcella and Lauritzen, *L’École de Gaza* 2015). Geiger provides a useful prosopography of Greek ‘intellectuals’ in ancient Gaza in all periods, but in his subsequent study focuses on Ascalon rather than Gaza (Geiger 2014).

Section I. Rhetoric

The idea that a declamation could speak with nuance to the immediate context in which it was performed, or to a wider societal context (the arguments of sections II and III of this thesis) is still controversial, and faces *a priori* objections. By contrast, the idea that a declamation needs at least to some degree to be read in the context of rhetorical theory is widely accepted.¹ This section of the thesis seeks to advance our understanding of the relationship between rhetorical theory and declamatory practice in two respects:

(i) Existing studies are often quiet about the surely important question of *for whom* rhetoric was an important part of reading a declamation:² the implication seems to be that while rhetoric was an essential tool for composition, it was probably not part of the reading process for many, except rhetoricians, and perhaps diligent students. Russell's *Greek Declamation* is typical in this regard (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983). In this classic monograph, rhetorical theories go together with teachers in a chapter ('Teachers and theories', 40–73) that has little impact on the rest of the work (only two declamations analysed in terms of theory, 96–102 and 123–8). The first chapter of this thesis argues, however, on the basis of an examination of the available evidence for ancient audiences—particularly *theoriai*, *prolegomena*, and commentaries—that rhetoric was a vital part of the composition and

¹ Russell focuses mainly on issue-theory (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 40–73); Penella's introductory chapter on Libanius' declamations sees advertisement of a rhetor's skills and the provision of models for students as two key functions of these texts (Penella, *Libanius* 2014, 109). The few commentaries on declamations that exist usually include some analysis of the rhetorical theory deployed in the text studied (Pernot, *Discours Siciliens* 1981, 58–116, Johansson 2006, 21–64 *passim*; 135–283 *passim*; 284–5, Lupi, *Milziade* 2010, 37–51). (Pernot, nonetheless, wants to see declamations as fundamentally works of literature (Pernot, *Discours Siciliens* 1981, 15)). Reader in his commentary on Polemo, however, confines himself to figures (Reader 1996, 46), and Albini's 'esame retorico' of Herodes' *Peri políteias* only compares the text briefly and fairly non-technically to the rhetoric of the fifth and fourth centuries (Albini 1968, 16–19). Heath's translation of and commentary on Hermog. *Stat.* illustrates issue-theory's working in real declamations (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 156–230). Rhetorical theory is also reliably present in recent studies of Chorician declamations (Deroma 2014, Manzione 2014, Tomassi, *Continuità e innovazione* 2014, Tomassi, *Pratica Declamatoria* 2015). Berry and Heath's excellent reading of Luc. *Abd.* is perhaps closest to the sort of reading that I will ultimately be advocating here and in chapter 1, and practising in chapter 2 (Berry and Heath 1997, 409–14).

² Given the lack of a single or elegant word or phrase for consuming declamation, 'read' in this chapter of the thesis particularly will sometimes have to mean 'read and/or hear delivered'.

consumption of declamation not only for specialists, but also for a great number of those who read or listened to declamations, in continuance of course of practices that most of them would have learned at school.³ Of course, if we take seriously the sources which claim that audiences at declamations were very large, as I think we should (above, p. 17 n. 29), then not all those in attendance can have had the necessary rhetorical competence to process a declamation fully in this way, but as we shall see, the performance context imposed a *normative* expectation of rhetorical competence.

(ii) Existing readings of declamations through the lens of rhetorical theory—what I will call *rhetorical readings*—often consist largely of showing that a declaimer has indeed followed the steps prescribed by one or another handbooks, and (sometimes but not always) also showing that the result is a piece of persuasive speech. This is certainly valuable: given the criticisms levelled at rhetorical theory, both ancient and modern,⁴ the demonstration of the practical usefulness of its techniques, above all that furnished by Heath with regards to issue-theory, was a great step forward (Heath, *Issues* 1995). This section of the thesis does not dispute that conclusion. But in truth there are many moments when declamation does *not* follow theory. In past work, such non-conforming elements have not always been handled well. The most common response is silence. Such a response can be found in Johansson's edition of Libanius *Declamations* 9 and 10, one of whose major objectives is to assess the contribution to these texts of the theories set out in Pseudo-Hermogenes' *De inventione*. In his commentary on the argumentative section of *Declamation* 10, which does not follow the scheme laid out by the *De inventione*, Johansson simply notes the lack of fit without further

³ On the role of declamation in education, see above p. 16 n. 21. Many of the theoretical texts discussed in chapter one clearly originated in a classroom context (Heath, Menander 2004, 270–6).

⁴ For ancient criticisms, see Heath (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 12 n. 33, 23–4). Modern criticisms are (or were) almost too common to need citation: even Russell describes declamation theory as 'not to everyone's taste' (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 71).

comment.⁵ On other occasions, the lack of fit triggers more radical responses. Struggling to discern the scheme of the *De inventione* in the *prooimion* of *Declamation* 9, Johansson actually rephrases the text (albeit *exempli gratia* rather than as an emendation), showing us what the text would look like ‘if it were to follow Pseudo-Hermogenes’ scheme... and if I were to dare to rewrite it’ (Johansson 2006, 136–7). Similarly, Lupi’s assessment of Choricus *Declamation* 4 as showing ‘una stretta aderenza’ (my italics) (Lupi, Milziade 2010, 49) to the precepts of Hermogenes is exaggerated at best, and surely a symptom of the desire to make declamation follow the handbooks.⁶

In this section of the thesis, by contrast, I am not content simply to register declamations’ failures to follow theoretical precepts, or worse, to reanalyse or reimagine the text to make it fit. Rather, I look at the evidence for the messy intermediary business of trying to apply theory to real declamation scenarios (in the form of *theoriai*, *prolegomena*, and commentaries), and argue that while a large part of what declamation does with theory is indeed to follow it closely and exemplify it, declamation also frequently extends, modifies, splices, tests, critiques, disregards, or even parodies theory.⁷ Of course, even rhetorical handbooks were not nearly as inflexible in their teaching as they sometimes become in

⁵ ‘the rest of this antithesis does not follow Pseudo-Hermogenes’ pattern’; ‘the discussion is then further developed... not according to a strict Pseudo-Hermogenean pattern’; ‘[t]his antithesis does not follow Pseudo-Hermogenes’ pattern’; ‘[t]his antithesis does not follow Pseudo-Hermogenes’ pattern’; ‘[n]ot much from Pseudo-Hermogenes’ pattern can be detected’ (Johansson 2006, 249–51).

⁶ For example, her identification of the rhetorical elements of ‘counterplea’ and ‘objection’ (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 85–7) in this text is unconvincing. A counterplea in the case of Miltiades ought to be a claim that there is nothing inherently objectionable about giving up a siege. The objection would then find some element of the circumstances of that withdrawal which made the counterplea invalid: that Miltiades withdrew for the wrong reasons, or at the wrong time, or in the wrong way. I find it very hard to see either of these elements where Lupi wants to see them, in chapters 45–50 of the declamation,

⁷ This mode of reading has something in common with Baumgart’s (highly negative) view of Aristides’ art: ‘die „Eingeweihten“ [τετελεσμένοι cf. t. II. p. 391, 5 u. a. St.]... ihre Befriedigung suchten und fanden... in der sachverständigen Kritik der in der Form überwundenen Schwierigkeiten. So ist es erklärlich, dass da, wo wir nur ein hohles Phrasen-Gebäude erblicken, Jene mit immer gesteigerter Bewunderung Akt nahmen von der kunstreichen Verknüpfung der ἰδέαι und ῥήθη etc.’ (Baumgart 1874, 44). But Baumgart’s engagement with theory is limited, and he sees rhetorical reading as restricted to a small number of ‘Eingeweihten’. Also similar, though again with little grounding in rhetorical theory, and confined to questions of style, is Reardon’s famous view of declamation as an exercise in variation comparable to jazz music (Reardon 1971, 111–14). Compare also Bompaire’s conception of (again, stylistic) variation in sophistic literature as an ‘Art de la Fugue’ (Bompaire 1958, 113).

modern studies: flexibility had long been acknowledged to be a vital part of real speech-making, as Heath in particular is well aware.⁸ In short, writing a declamation using theory is a creative process: declamation is *in dialogue* with theory, and not simply sugar for its pill (Russell 1983, 40).

The first chapter in this section assembles and analyses the evidence for rhetoric as a part of the ancient reading (and therefore writing) of declamations in an attempt to substantiate both of these claims, viz. that rhetorical reading was both (i) a more pervasive and (ii) a more creative phenomenon than has hitherto been allowed. The second chapter then offers examples of how one might read declamations as being in such a dialogue with theory, thus elaborating on and documenting the second claim.

⁸ Heath (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 4 n. 6, 22 n. 63, Heath, *Menander* 2004, 234–7).

Chapter 1. Reading Rhetorically

μηδὲν δίχα τέχνης ποιεῖν (*Theoria* to Him. Or. 9 Colonna)¹

This first chapter assembles and analyses the evidence for the use of rhetorical theory in ancient reading (and therefore writing) of declamations, and seeks to show that this was both a more widespread and more creative phenomenon than has hitherto been allowed.

As this chapter uses a relatively complex hierarchy of headings and sub-headings, to guide the reader I present here a table of contents:

1.1. The Rhetorical Revolution

1.1.1 Issue-Theory

1.1.2 Invention

1.1.3 Style

1.2. Reading Rhetorically

1.2.1 Rhetorical Framing

1.2.1.1 In Performance: *Prolaliai* and *Theoriai*

1.2.1.2 In Reading: *Prolegomena* and Hypotheses

1.2.2 Rhetorical Comment

1.2.2.1 Performance

1.2.2.2 Metarhetoric

1.2.2.3 Commentary

1.2.3 Other Paratexts

1.3. Conclusions

1.1 The Rhetorical Revolution

But first, a perhaps unusually extended excursus, on Greek rhetorical theory in this period.

I have thought it necessary to present this material at length for two reasons. First, because it is not well-known to non-specialists, despite some coverage in handbooks.² Second (and

¹ Given the difficulty of translating τέχνη adequately into English here, I have left this quotation untranslated. For the context, see p. 55 below.

² E.g. the résumés given periodically in Kennedy's three-volume history of classical rhetoric (G. Kennedy, *Roman World* 1972, 614–41, G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 52–132).

here I hope my account will offer a positive advance on previous accounts) because it has not to my mind been sufficiently appreciated how novel, powerful, or subtle the rhetoric of the Greek imperial period was.³ That innovation, power, and subtlety is an important part of my argument, for they are in themselves good reason to believe that this theory would have been of interest to audiences beyond the schoolroom, and to believe that it could have been used in creative ways in the production and consumption of declamation. It is because of my belief in the power of these theories that in what follows I draw many examples from modern life.

The rhetorical revolution of the second and third centuries has not, generally speaking, received the recognition it deserves. There are perhaps two reasons for this. First, this innovation is at odds with the (perceived) archaizing character of the rest of Greek imperial literature: this period has traditionally been seen as one of imitation, even (today) as one of creative imitation, but not, generally, as one of outright innovation. This effect is no doubt exacerbated in the case of theorists by their consistent use of materials from the classical period, above all the speeches of Demosthenes. But working with old texts does not preclude coming up with new theories. A second reason must surely be rhetorical theory's own rhetoric, which for good didactic reasons sometimes presents itself as an unchanging and sometimes self-evident body of knowledge (Heath, Menander 2004, 6).

In truth, it would hardly be going too far to say that, when it comes to rhetorical theory, the second and third centuries CE *are* the classical era. Of the eighty theoretical works on rhetoric of various kinds in the nine volumes and 6,965 pages of Walz's gargantuan *Rhetores Graeci*, only a handful can be firmly dated to before the second century CE, and for most of these

³ Heath shows the way here (Heath, Issues 1995, Heath, Menander 2004), though the sort of scepticism expressed by Russell ('easy to dismiss it as arid and pointless' (Russell, Greek Declamation 1983, 40)) is still often heard. That rhetoric was novel, powerful, or subtle does not of course exclude the fact that it also has some impractical elements, as well as its own self-promoting rhetoric.

some special reason for their survival may be posited, such as the famous name that preserved the Aristotelian *Rhetoric* and pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander* (Heath, Menander 2004, 3). Moreover, the theoretical works written after the second and third centuries (and all the way until the end of the Byzantine era) are almost invariably commentaries on or epitomes of works from the second and third centuries CE, and above all the works of (Ps.-)Hermogenes (G. Kennedy, Christian Emperors 1983, 54);⁴ indeed, the genre of commentary on a rhetorical work is an innovation of the third century (Heath, Menander 2004, 69). In the reading of classical authors too the new rhetoric came to predominate: the extant scholia on Demosthenes cannot be shown to cite any rhetorician from before the second century CE (Heath, Menander 2004, 4).

What can have happened to trigger such a wholesale rejection of old theoretical work for new? In what follows I try to answer this question, surveying the three areas of greatest innovation in this period: issue-theory, invention, and the theory of style.

1.1.1 Issue-Theory

The most fundamental theoretical innovation in this period concerns the theory of ‘issues’.⁵ ‘Issue’ (στάσις) is the technical rhetorical term for the key point on which a case turns: the most important first step in rhetorical analysis therefore is to identify the issue. Suppose (to use a modern example) the manager of a football team objects to his female team doctor running onto the pitch during a game to treat an injury that he views as trivial, and denounces the doctor as a ‘filha da puta’. The doctor then sues him for harassment and sex

⁴ Hermogenes seems to have lived from roughly 160/1 to 230 CE: for a basic introduction to his life and works, see GRS no. 481. Of the five works attributed to him, only the *Stat.* and *Id.* are considered genuine: *Inv.*, *Meth.*, and *Prog.* are very likely spurious. For the date of the *Inv.*, see above, p. 28 n. 72.

⁵ For this exposition of issue-theory I am most indebted to Heath (Heath, Issues 1995, Heath, Menander 2004, 3–44). Other accounts can be found in Kennedy (G. Kennedy, Christian Emperors 1983, 73–86), Russell (Russell, Greek Declamation 1983, 40–73), Lindberg (Lindberg 1997, 1988–2005), and, in greater depth, Patillon (Patillon, Théorie du discours 1988, 41–99).

discrimination.⁶ The manager might simply deny having said these words: in this case the issue is ‘conjecture’ (στοχασμός), and the two sides will examine the evidence as to whether or not the alleged action actually occurred. On the other hand, it might be conceded that the words were said, but disputed whether they actually constituted ‘harassment’ or ‘sex discrimination’: the issue is now ‘definition’ (ὅρος), and the two sides will offer competing accounts of what harassment and sex discrimination are. Or the manager could be bolder and concede both that the words were said *and* that they fit the definition of harassment and sex discrimination, but claim that despite the harm done, he had an overriding right to act as he did, in this case, for instance, by invoking the right of free speech: the issue then would be ‘counterplea’ (ἀντίληψις). Or he could concede again both that the words were said and that they fit the definition of harassment and sex discrimination, but this time try to mitigate the action somehow: the issue now would be ‘counterposition’ (ἀντίθεσις), which has various sub-species. For example, he could argue that he had been provoked by the doctor’s misjudgement (‘counteraccusation’, ἀντέγκλημα), or transfer responsibility to some external factor, such as stress or grief (‘mitigation’, συγγνώμη). And so on: in Hermogenes’ system, which becomes canonical, there were thirteen different issues.⁷ Furthermore, in what seems to have been an advance on Hellenistic rhetoric, there are recognized sub-species of many of these issues, for example ‘counterdescriptive definition’ (ὅρος ἀντονομάζων), in which rather than disputing the appropriateness of a single classification of an act, the defence and prosecution each put forward their own definition of what happened (Hermog. *Stat.* IV 15.3–

⁶ I allude of course to the famous dispute between Jose Mourinho, the manager of Chelsea football club, and Eva Carneiro, the team doctor. Mourinho was angry because a player receiving medical attention has to leave the field for the next phase of play. See Siddique, H. and R. Booth (2016) ‘Eva Carneiro settles constructive dismissal claim with Chelsea’, *The Guardian*, 7 June.

⁷ In the period covered by Philostr. *VS*, audiences may well have been more familiar with Minucian’s (2nd–3rd century) work on issue-theory, for Minucian enjoyed ancient commentary before Hermogenes. (For Minucian, see *GRS* no. 713). As his work does not survive, however, and does not seem likely to have been radically different from that of Hermogenes, even for this earlier period it makes more sense to follow modern scholarly tradition and take as our point of reference Hermogenes’ extant *Stat.*, which became canonical from the third century onwards (Heath, Menander 2004, 32–3, G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 75–9). For bibliography on Hermog. *Stat.*, see p. 28 n. 70.

16.7). Issue-theory, in short, offers a diagnostic framework that enables one to see quickly to the heart of the case and so focus one's energies where they will be most effective.

Now issue-theory is not in itself new (it was a Hellenistic invention, associated above all with the name of Hermagoras (Heath, Menander 2004, 9–18)), but in this period it achieves unprecedented importance. Prior to the second century, issue-theory's impact on actual speeches or declamations seems to have been limited (Heath, Menander 2004, 9–18). The practical utility of Quintilian's account of, for instance, the issue of 'definition', seems rather modest,⁸ and it is perhaps indicative of the relative importance of the issues in Quintilian that their treatment is scattered throughout the treatise: the issues themselves are enumerated in 3.6, but practical guidance for building a case around an issue does not come until 7.3, where it is punctuated by frequent cross-reference to the more general techniques of argument (invention) covered in book 5. The earliest surviving treatment of the issue of definition, that found in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (II.17), is starker still: a mere 121 words, about half of which is examples of competing definitions, and no strategy is offered beyond simply giving a definition favourable to one's case and then attacking the opponent's definition using the *iuris partes*, a list of six sources from which one might argue for a law.

In Hermogenes' system, by contrast, the issue is key. For Hermogenes does more than simply define each issue and offer a list of topics from which one might draw arguments. He also offers for each issue an ordered 'division' (διαίρεσις) of the issue into 'headings' of

⁸ He begins by discussing definitions in a rather philosophical way (one of his examples is 'what a god is' (*quid sit deus*) (7.3.5)), and indeed he tells us that 'some indeed entirely reject this subtle form of argument, modelled as it is on the methods of dialectic, and regard it as acute verbal sophistry for use in debate rather than as likely to be a significant contribution to the business of the orator' (Russell) (*quibusdam ne placuit quidem omnino subtilis haec et ad morem dialecticorum formata conclusio, ut disputationibus potius arguta verborum cavillatrix quam in oratoris officio multum allatura momenti*) (7.3.14). In terms of structuring a speech, all that Quintilian offers for this issue is: 'its order is fixed: the definition, and then whether the thing in question fits that definition... we need to establish our own definition as valid, and ruin our opponent's' (*eius certus ordo est: quid sit, an hoc sit... et nostra confirmanda est et adversae partis destruenda finitio*) (7.3.19).

argument (κεφάλαια), and this is in fact the heart of his treatise, which may well have originally been called *On Division* (περὶ διαιρέσεως) rather than *On Issues* (περὶ στάσεων) (Heath, Issues 1995, 20 n. 59, 61–2). Unlike the simple lists of topics found in pre-Hermogenean issue-theory, a division presents headings of argument in a specific order. Though the order is not fixed and may be adapted to meet the needs of a particular case,⁹ it is not random: rather, it constitutes the order most likely to be useful in the greatest number of situations, something that must have been a very useful starting point for a beginning student or *ex tempore* speaker.¹⁰ For example, in Hermogenes' division of counterposition (a plea of mitigating circumstances of some kind) after the counterposition itself comes a further claim that the defendant actually had the right to act as he did. Thus the weaker claim prepares the way for the stronger (Heath, Issues 1995, 123, 128). Such subtleties in arrangement are not always obvious on a first reading, and Heath attributes his discovery of many of them to his experience of actually having taught Hermogenean issue-theory to undergraduates (Heath, Issues 1995, vi). Doubtless at a range of almost 2000 years some such subtleties are forever lost to us, but we can see enough to understand something of what was at stake in the order of the headings. A further strength of Hermogenes' *divisions* over mere topic lists is that they are *dialogic* (Heath, Issues 1995, 21–22): the division includes the moves of both prosecution and defence, so that anyone using Hermogenes' textbook will be unable to avoid considering possible objections. For example, in the division of conjecture, after the prosecution has narrated what happened in an effort to prove the defendant's guilt (*Stat.* III.10), the defendant will argue that the actions he took were not in themselves illegal (III.12), to which the prosecution will have ready the rejoinder that while

⁹ A great many ancient authorities make this point (Heath, Issues 1995, 22 n. 63).

¹⁰ Russell does not see this: to him, ancient commentators' perpetual interest in why Hermogenes put things in a particular order is a symptom of their concern for the arrangement of their own material over 'any utility which the system might offer either for the potential speaker or for the reader of Demosthenes' (Russell, Greek Declamation 1983, 42).

the act in question may not in general terms be objectionable, it was in the particular circumstances (III.13–15). Finally, the division also serves as a template for the speech itself (Heath, Menander 2004, 16). As such, Hermogenes' divisions start to encroach somewhat on the territory of arrangement. For example, the division of definition starts with a presentation of the facts (προβολή) (*Stat.* IV.2) that serves a similar role to that of the narration in the usual four or five part structure of a speech; divisions also often end with headings that involve the amplification of the established facts, such as the 'common quality' (κοινή ποιότης) (*Stat.* III.25–7) in the division of conjecture, which as Hermogenes says, is effectively an epilogue (III.25.1–2).¹¹

But perhaps the greatest strength of Hermogenes' system is the way that it solves one of the major problems with issue-theory. While the obvious advantage of identifying the issue is that one can thereby quickly direct one's attention to the really important aspects of the case, on the other hand, the diagnosis of a case as having a certain issue can unhelpfully foreclose the possibility of other treatments. A man kills a eunuch he finds in bed with his wife (*Stat.* IV.9.3–4): should he take the issue as one of definition, and argue that being in bed with another man's wife in itself constitutes adultery, whether one is a eunuch or not? Or should he adopt a less risky strategy and concede that his action was murder, but invoke some mitigating circumstance (a counterposition)—by claiming, for instance, that his victim provoked the crime (the counterposition of counteraccusation), or claiming some beneficial effect, in this case, for example, that his killing will benefit the city by deterring would-be adulterers (the counterposition of counterstatement)? Or, if he does decide to use the issue of definition and make the claim that the eunuch's behaviour was adultery, why not go

¹¹ Sopater's work on division, the *Diareseis zētēmatōn*, which offers worked examples of cases divided into headings of argument, strays still further into this territory, frequently offering hints on how one might go about constructing a *prooimion*, narrative, and epilogue for a given case (Russell, Greek Declamation 1983, 45). For Sopater, see *GRS* no. 967.

further and use a ‘counterplea’ to argue that he had the right to act as he did in killing the eunuch? Even if one thinks that the issue is most naturally one of definition, the speaker’s case might be stronger if he also avails himself of the possibilities for defence provided by the other issues. Hermogenes’ system cleverly avoids this problem by including in the division of each issue some of the other issues as (optional) secondary arguments.¹² So it is in his handling of the case of a man who killed a eunuch as an adulterer: though Hermogenes does indeed diagnose the issue as fundamentally one of definition, his division of this issue nonetheless makes space for the suggestion that the eunuch provoked the man (a counteraccusation). The argument from definition, if successful, would clear the defendant on its own, but in case it does not, the counteraccusation can work to mitigate the crime.¹³ Though not every issue includes every other issue in its division, the divisions of most issues incorporate a number of closely allied issues that might be of use. So again, for example, the division of conjecture (the issue in which it is denied outright that a given act took place) includes among its headings counterplea, the claim that one had the right to act as one did. The argumentation in such cases is: ‘I did not kill the man, but even if I had, I would have had the right to do so’. Thus in Hermogenes the diagnosis of a case as having one sort of issue never closes off the possibility of using the argumentative resources offered by other issues.

Second-century rhetoric thus transforms issue-theory. The issue of a case, previously a simple pointer to a list of topics for the sort of case in question, is now key: it directs one’s attention to the most important aspects of a case, breaks down the steps of argument that one will need to follow in the most natural order, provides insight into the opponent’s likely

¹² Kennedy, failing to see this, describes the reliance on a single issue for a given case that he sees in Hermog. *Stat.* as ‘unwise’ (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 86).

¹³ Oddly, Hermogenes does not cover what might to us seem an obvious defence: that the accused was simply unaware that the man he had found in bed with his wife was a eunuch. This would make the issue conjecture, as the debate would now centre on whether the accused was truly ignorant of this fact or not.

countermoves, and suggests some of what should be in the narration and epilogue of the speech, all the while remaining open to the possibility that arguments from another issue may prove a useful supplement. This is a subtle and powerful technology.

1.1.2 Invention

Identifying the issue of a case and dividing it into the appropriate headings of argument only gets you so far, however: a full speech will still need detailed supporting arguments for those headings. For example, the theory tells us that when rejecting an opponent's claim that he had an overriding right to act as he did (a counterplea), we should look for some aspect of his action that invalidates the invoked right in this instance (Hermog. *Stat.* V.11.2–3): but where are we to find one? Greek imperial rhetoric offers powerful tools for this stage of preparing a case also: here I will outline the core of the system presented by Pseudo-Hermogenes' *De inventione* (III.6–7, 11–12). This system seems to have been innovative, for it differs from other accounts of argumentation in Greek imperial rhetoric, which seem more to follow what came before (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 87), but it came to form part of the standard Byzantine rhetorical corpus, which suggests that it was popular.¹⁴ For the author of this treatise, an argument in support of a heading is called an *epicheireme* (ἐπιχείρημα), an unusual use of this term;¹⁵ *epicheiremes* are then in turn supported by another argument called an 'elaboration' (ἐργασία) (III.6–7). The structure of a speech's argumentation can thus be analysed as follows:

¹⁴ For Byzantine rhetorical *corpora*, see Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 54); the standard corpus is reconstructed meticulously by Patillon's 5-volume *Belles Lettres* series (Patillon 2008–14).

¹⁵ On the history of the term 'epicheireme', see Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *Invention and Method* 2005, 85–7), or, at slightly greater length, Meador (Meador 1964, 54–7).




Figure 1: The structure of argumentation in the *De inventione*

Epicheiremes are invented by means of six ‘elements of circumstance’ (περιστάσεις): place (τόπος), time (χρόνος), manner (τρόπος), person (πρόσωπον), cause (αίτία), and act (πρᾶγμα), a kind of ancient ‘Who? What? When? Where? Why?’ This is a powerful and practical system: by way of illustration, consider a modern example, the heated British debate over intervention in Iraq in 2003, one of the most contentious public debates in the UK in recent years. As this debate was concerned with a future action, it would be diagnosed as having the ‘practical’ (πραγματικός) issue (Hermog. *Stat.* VII). The division of this issue is relatively straightforward: the headings are ‘law’ (τὸ νομικόν), ‘justice’ (τὸ δίκαιον), ‘advantage’ (τὸ συμφέρον), ‘possibility’ (τὸ δυνατόν), ‘honour’ (τὸ ἔνδοξον), and ‘consequence’ (τὸ ἐκβησόμενον). To start with perhaps the most important heading, ‘advantage’, one could use the elements of circumstance to produce epicheiremes as follows:

- from place: that Iraqi weapons could reach British bases in Cyprus
- from time: that given the rise of Islamist terrorism, it was especially important to disarm Iraq now, lest its irresponsible rulers allow their weapons to fall into the wrong hands
- from manner: that modern weaponry would result in a minimum of civilian casualties, thereby reducing the odium incurred in prosecuting the war

And so on. Taking the other side, however, opponents argued (using the same three elements of circumstance):

- from place: that Iraq was far from Britain and that its weapons of mass destruction consequently posed no realistic threat
- from time: that given the rise of Islamist terrorism, the country's armed forces could not afford to divert resources from the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
- from manner: from the civilian deaths that are inevitable in the course of any war, which would increase rather than decrease the risk of retaliatory terrorism against Britain

One would then work through all the headings in this manner and see what epicheiremes each of the elements of circumstance could provide. Thus, for the heading of justice, one could argue 'from person' that having failed to remove Saddam Hussein after the first Gulf War, Britain was in part responsible for Iraq's sufferings under his rule, or equally, that, as a former imperial power that had once ruled Iraq, Britain least of all should be violating the sovereignty of other countries.

Once one has assembled a list of useful epicheiremes, one then finds 'elaborations' (ἐργασίαι) to support them: such elaborations are derived from comparison (ἀπὸ παραβολῆς), from example (ἀπὸ παραδείγματος), from a lesser (ἀπὸ μικροτέρου), from a greater (ἀπὸ μείζονος), from an equal (ἀπὸ ἴσου), or from an opposite (ἀπὸ ἐναντίου). So, for example, we could devise elaborations for our three arguments against intervention under the heading of advantage as follows:

- Our argument from place was that Iraq was far from Britain and that its weapons of mass destruction consequently posed no realistic threat. Using elaborations, we could add: *no one is losing much sleep over Russia, which is both closer (elaboration 'from a greater') and has vastly more ('from a greater') in the way of weapons of mass destruction, nor Syria, which is a similar ('from an equal') distance from us, also ruled by a dictator, and also has weapons of mass destruction.*

- The argument from time was that given the rise of Islamist terrorism, the country's armed forces could not afford to divert resources from the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Elaborating this argument, we could say: *had this question arisen when we were at peace (from an opposite), intervention might have been feasible, but not now.*
- From manner, we argued that civilians would inevitably be killed in the course of the war, thereby increasing not decreasing the risk of retaliatory terrorism in Britain. Elaborating this argument, we could say: *war in Afghanistan has already increased the threat of terrorism in Britain (from an example), and the US suffered the 11 September attacks at a time when it had neither bombed nor invaded any Middle Eastern country for years (from the lesser).*

Again, one continues through all the epicheiremes trying to find elaborations for each. At a level below elaborations come what in this work's idiosyncratic terminology are called 'enthymemes' (ἐνθυμήματα),¹⁶ and finally 'epenthymemes' (ἐπενθυμήματα) (*Inv.* III.11–12).

Of course, even an untrained speaker could probably in the course of time come up with many of these arguments without using theory. But the speaker who divides his case into headings, and who finds epicheiremes for his headings, elaborations for his epicheiremes, enthymemes for his elaborations, and epenthymemes for his enthymemes, will in a very short space of time have access to a surfeit of diverse arguments from which to choose, or, in a really difficult case, still at least have canvassed almost every possible argumentative move. Indeed, one wonders how often speakers needed to go down to the level of enthymeme or epenthymeme: some of these lower categories are perhaps for effect, and

¹⁶ Kennedy provides another convenient brief history of the term (G. Kennedy, *Invention and Method* 2005, 101).

indeed the account of epenthymeme is very brief (*Inv.* III.12).¹⁷ The appeal of such argumentative abundance is obvious, and in his account of argumentation the author of the *De Inventione* on several occasions departs from the generally austere tone of a rhetorical handbook to celebrate the power of this system: ‘the abundance of thoughts and epicheiremes is past telling’ (ἡ εὐπορία τῶν νοημάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἀμύθητος) (III.4.4.2–3), he says; twice we are promised that the method will lead us ‘to countless possibilities’ (εἰς ἄπειρον) (III.4.4.8–9, 4.5.5). Nor is the *De inventione* the only Greek imperial handbook to cover argumentation: there is an equivalent though more traditional section in the Anonymus Seguerianus (171–181),¹⁸ and we even have a stand-alone *Peri epicheirēmatōn* by one Minucian,¹⁹ a brief work whose austere cataloguing of no fewer than thirty-five sources of argument makes much more sense in the light of the excitement and promise apparent in the *De inventione*. Indeed, invention is so important to Greek imperial rhetoric that for Hermogenes, it has actually become an important part of style. Among his stylistic categories (on which see below), the one that ‘the rhetor’ (ὁ ῥήτωρ) (that is, Demosthenes, the cynosure of the *De ideis*) is said most often to deploy is ‘abundance’ (περιβολή) (*Id.* I 11.36.2–3). Now of the thoughts characteristic of abundance, Hermogenes says:

and generally speaking, if you want to amplify each detail, you can find many enthymemes and examples and things that are defined and undefined. For one can create abundance not only from the techniques already mentioned, but also by getting proofs from everywhere, such as from what is similar, what is opposite, from the *genus*, from the *species*, from the whole, from the part, and from the greater, the same, and the lesser.

¹⁷ It is notable that in ancient commentaries on declamation (on which see below) we only ever find reference to epicheiremes or enthymemes.

¹⁸ Text and translation in Dilts and Kennedy (Dilts and Kennedy 1997); text and French translation in Patillon (Patillon, Séguier 2005). Kennedy and Dilts cautiously date the work to the end of the second century or near the beginning of the third (Dilts and Kennedy 1997, x–xv); Patillon prefers the first half of the third century (Patillon, Séguier 2005, xvii–xxv).

¹⁹ Spengel-Hammer *RG* I.340–51; translation in Meador (Meador 1964). The dating (contemporary with Hermogenes or 250–300) depends on which of the attested Minucians one ascribes this work to: the candidates, their respective claims, and relevant bibliography can be conveniently surveyed in *GRS* nos. 713–4.

(καὶ ὅλως καθ' ἕκαστον ἐθέλων αὖξιν εὖροις ἂν πολλὰ καὶ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ παραδείγματα καὶ ὠρισμένα καὶ ἀόριστα· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀπὸ τῶν προειρημένων περιβάλλοι τις ἂν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν πανταχόθεν, οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ γένους, τοῦ εἴδους, τοῦ ὅλου, <τοῦ μέρους,> ἔτι ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος, ἴσου, ἐλάττονος) (I 11.13.1–8).

Enthymemes and examples; the greater, the equal, and the less: we are clearly in the domain of invention. Not for the first time, Hermogenes is (productively) straying beyond his stated topic into another department of rhetoric, as he freely admits:

But perhaps these are not actually additional details, but rather proofs—I mean the enthymemes and examples that come from these techniques. But this would need a discussion of proofs.

(ταῦτα δὲ ἴσως οὐδὲ προσλήψεις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ πίστεις μᾶλλον, τὰ διὰ τούτων ἐνθυμήματα λέγω καὶ παραδείγματα γινόμενα, καὶ δεῖται λόγου τοῦ περὶ πίστεων) (I 11.13.8–11).

1.1.3 Style

Finally, this period sees the rise of *idea* (ιδέα) theory in the study of style. An *idea* is a stylistic quality, such as ‘rapidity’ (γοργότης (Hermog. *Id.* II.1)) or ‘solemnity’ (σεμνότης (Hermog. *Id.* I.6)). Hermogenes’ system recognized twenty such stylistic *ideai*; other writers to treat the topic were the two authors of the works on style attributed to Aristides, as well as the author of Pseudo-Hermogenes’ *De inventione*;²⁰ there were clearly other works on the topic now lost (Heath, Menander 2004, 45–8). Though Hermogenes’ system does not seem to have become important until later (G. Kennedy, Christian Emperors 1983, 102–3),²¹ we will take it as our example since it represents the longest and most sophisticated surviving treatment.

²⁰ The best text of the *Id.* is that of Patillon, with commentary and French translation (Patillon, *Corpus Rhetoricum* IV 2012); an English translation is provided by Wooten (Wooten, *De ideis* 1987). Studies by Lindberg (Lindberg 1997, 2005–2053) and Patillon (Patillon, *Théorie du discours* 1988, 101–300). Text and French translation of Ps.-Aristid.’s treatises can be found in Patillon (Patillon, *Discours politique* 2002, Patillon, *Discours simple* 2002); English translation of the second treatise in Rutherford (I. Rutherford, *Canons of Style* 1998, 124–153). Patillon dates both treatises to the second century.

²¹ Though there is in fact one attested instance of Hermog. *Id.* being used directly to read a declamation, in a scholion to Aristid. 5 (Pernot, *Discours Siciliens* 1981, 260–2).

This theory of *ideai*, though far from easy, offers clear advantages over earlier approaches to style, such as the simpler division into a grand, middle, and simple style (Wooten, *De ideis* 1987, 131–7, Wooten, *Style of Demosthenes* 1989). A system with twenty types of style is simply more sensitive to nuance than one that works with only three: the result is that whereas other ancient critics tend to quote very long examples when exemplifying styles and often speak as if a speech only has one style, Hermogenes identifies his types of style in extracts often as short as a single phrase; indeed, sometimes a single phrase is said by Hermogenes to show the characteristics of multiple styles. Thus the famous oath in Demosthenes' *De corona*, οὔ, μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων ('no, by our ancestors who were first to brave the danger at Marathon') (18.208), is characterized by Hermogenes as having 'brilliance' (λαμπρότητα) and 'grandeur' (μέγεθος) but not 'simplicity' (ἀφέλειαν), and as doing more than just revealing 'character' (ἦθος) (II 3.16.1–8).²² Also new is the weight Hermogenes places on content in determining style: thus, for example, a statement about the gods is likely to be solemn (I 5.6.1.1–4), while thoughts that give pleasure are likely to be sweet (II 4.1). (Hermogenes in fact places the characteristic thoughts at the start of his account of each style). Such an approach productively blurs the sometimes limiting distinction between form and content that was more traditional in ancient rhetoric. But the greatest advance is Hermogenes' consistent focus on the *effect* of the different styles and stylistic features that he describes. Hermogenes' category of 'subtlety' (δριμύτης) (II 5), for example, can be used to appear clever to one's audience, while the category of 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) (I 2.1–4.19) is used to ensure that one's audience is clear about what one is saying. Hermogenes' *idea*-theory, then, represents a striking advance on previous ancient work in this area: the rhetorician is not totally

²² There is not space here to set out the meanings of these four terms in Hermogenes' system, but readers who are interested will find Hermogenes' own text the best guide (see the bibliography listed under p. 47 n. 20, above).

exaggerating when he claims that there is no one ‘to this day who seems to have yet given an accurate treatment of these topics’ (ὅστις πρὸ ἡμῶν... εἰς τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν ἀκριβὲς τι περὶ τούτων πραγματευσάμενος φαίνεται) (*Id.* I 1.13.1–4).

1.2. Reading Rhetorically

The second and third centuries, then, saw an explosion of innovative, powerful, and creative rhetorical theorizing: it is *prima facie* to be expected that such striking material would have made a deep impression on many students and have remained with them as a mode of reading for declamations in later life, and, equally, that those who declaimed would explore this material creatively and test it to its limits. I now turn to the explicit evidence for both points, looking at the various paratexts that preceded or accompanied declamations; as we shall see, the process of consuming a declamation was shot through with theory from start to finish.²³ These paratexts both reflect the sophisticated deployment of rhetorical theory by authors and audiences and at the same time would have worked to maintain it. For some categories of paratext, where there are no surviving examples from the second and third centuries, we will have to look at later examples instead, but as will be seen, there are good reasons to believe that these later examples had second- and third-century antecedents.

To help guide the reader through the complicated discussion that follows, I present here a table of contents for this section of this chapter:

1.2.1 Rhetorical Framing

1.2.1.1 In Performance: *Prolaliai* and *Theoriai*

1.2.1.2 In Reading: *Prolegomena* and Hypotheses

1.2.2 Rhetorical Comment

1.2.2.1 Performance

²³ While we would wish above all for evidence from the Philostratean period, in practice many of the testimonia for such rhetorical reading come from late antique sources. But given the extreme conservatism of the genre, particularly in matters theoretical, such practices can be projected back to the Philostratean period with reasonable confidence.

1.2.2.2 Metarhetoric

1.2.2.3 Commentary

1.2.3 Other Paratexts

1.2.1 Rhetorical Framing

However one consumed a declamation, a rhetorical preface of some sort was usually available. I will first examine two sorts of preface that could be present both in a live performance and in a written text (*prolaliai* and *theoriai*), and then go on to consider two other sorts of preface only available to those reading a text (*prolegomena* and hypotheses). All these prefaces push rhetorical reading to a greater or lesser degree.

1.2.1.1 In Performance: *Prolaliai* and *Theoriai*

Declamation performances seem often to have been preceded by short talks from the author *in propria persona*. These talks, foregrounded by their position before the declamation itself, offer a valuable insight into how declaimers wanted their works to be read; that they were preserved (when paratextual material is always at risk of being lost) suggests that many ancient readers thought them worth reading. Such prefaces come in two forms: the *prolalia* and the (*pro-*)*theoria* (προ-θεωρία). In our texts, declamations can have one or both or neither. How common either species was in performance is ultimately unknown, though Russell describes the *prolalia* as ‘a regular feature of sophistic exhibition’ (Russell, Greek Declamation 1983, 77), and it is very possible that the declamations that today lack either sort of preface originally had *prolaliai* or *theoriai* now lost.

The less familiar but more rhetorical of the two is the *theoria*. The Greek term *theoria* is less general than our ‘theory’, however: it refers specifically to preliminary reflection on a given topic (LSJ s.v.), in this case preliminary rhetorical reflection.²⁴ Though in Greek we have

²⁴ The term has a long and complex history: Nightingale analyses the shift in the meaning of the term in Plato from religious pilgrimage to philosophical practice (Nightingale 2004).

only later examples of this form, we are probably safe in inferring the existence of *theoriai* for the second and third centuries also, given that these centuries had essentially the same rhetorical interests as later centuries; the existence of an equivalent form in Latin, the *sermo*, both before our period (in the *Controversiae* of Seneca) and at roughly the same time (in the *Minor Declamations* attributed to Quintilian) adds weight to this case.²⁵

Many *theoriai* loosely represent the very first stages prescribed by rhetorical theory for approaching a case, the so-called *noēsis* (νόησις),²⁶ which properly ends in the identification of the issue, but is preceded by questions such as what the given case's main 'mode' (εἶδος) of persuasion will be (logical, ethical, or emotional) and what 'class' (τρόπος) of subject-matter it represents (e.g. honourable, dishonourable, paradoxical, hard to follow, etc.). This sort of *theoria* is exemplified by that prefixed to Libanius' *Declamation 6*:

The raw material [ὕλη, a rhetorical term (Lausberg 1998, s.v.)] of a political declamation scenario [ὑποθέσεων, a technical rhetorical term] is differently disposed each time, and changes according to the nature of the circumstances [τῶν πραγμάτων, semi-technical (Lausberg 1998, s.v.)]; it therefore needs a skilled [τεχνίτου, 'one who does or handles a thing by the rules of art' (LSJ s.v. II), i.e. the art of rhetoric (ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη)] rhetor for the *theoria*. After he has first considered this, he will then apply appropriate *ideai* to the words... Well now, our present problem has raw material [τὴν ὕλην] that is emotional [παθητικὴν, i.e. its dominant 'mode' (εἶδος) of persuasion will be emotion (πάθος)], but a stylistic *idea* [τὴν ιδέαν] that is vehement [καταφορικὴν, rhetorical term (Ernesti 1795, s.v.)]...

(Ἡ τῶν πολιτικῶν ὑποθέσεων ὕλη ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχουσα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν ἀμειβομένη τεχνίτου πρὸς θεωρίαν δεῖται τοῦ ῥήτορος. ὃς καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἐπισκεψάμενος πρεπόντως ἀρμόσει τὰς τῶν λόγων ιδέας... τὸ τοίνυν προκείμενον ἡμῖν ζήτημα παθητικὴν μὲν ἔχει τὴν ὕλην, καταφορικὴν δὲ τὴν ιδέαν) (Libanius, *Theoria* to *Declamation 6*, 1–2)

²⁵ *Theoriai* are preserved for Libanius *Decl.* 3, 4, 6, 12, 24, 25, 34, 40, 43, 45, 46, and 49, in fragments for Himerius *Orr.* 1 and 3, and in full for all of Choricus' extant declamations bar the eleventh, though any of the four fragments printed as chapters 1–4 in Foerster's text could be from the missing *theoria* (Penella, Choricus 2009, 222 n. 3). On the form, see Penella (Penella, Choricus 2009, 15–16).

²⁶ References in Heath (Heath, *Invention* 1997, 91 n. 7).

A second, very similar sort of *noēsis* involved investigating the *persons* and *acts* involved in the case²⁷ to see what resources of argument they offered. Such an assessment almost always forms at least part of the *theoriai* to Choricus' declamations. These *theoriai* generally seem to show less by way of technical rhetorical terminology than *theoriai* concerned with mode and class. By way of an example, consider the *theoria* to Choricus *Decl.* 1, whose scenario is as follows:

After the death of Hector, Achilles, who has fallen in love with Polyxena, sends an embassy to the Trojans offering an alliance in return for marriage. When the Trojans deliberate, Polydamas advises them to accept the offer; Priam speaks in opposition. Let us take the part of Polydamas.

(Μετὰ τὴν Ἑκτορος τελευτὴν ἐρασθεὶς Ἀχιλλεὺς τῆς Πολυξένης πρεσβεύεται πρὸς τοὺς Τρῶας μισθὸν ἐπαγγελλόμενος τοῦ γάμου τὴν συμμαχίαν. βουλευομένων τῶν Τρώων παραινεῖ δέχεσθαι Πολυδάμας ἀντιλέγοντος Πριάμου. μελετῶμεν τὸν Πολυδάμαντα.) (Chor. *Decl.* 1 (hypothesis))

In the *theoria* that follows, Choricus suggests that Polydamas should remind the Trojans (his audience) of the disastrous consequences that followed when Hector disregarded his advice about Achilles, though given his audience (and especially his opponent, Priam), he should be tactful and attribute Hector's death to misfortune. He should also be mindful that his opponent is both his father and his king. Achilles' character, too, is important: Polydamas will need to stress his strength while suppressing his reputation for savagery. This is clearly an analysis in terms of persons and acts.

But the theory in *theoriai* can be of any sort. The *theoria* which precedes Libanius *Declamation* 49 is one such preface, and a prime example of the sort of sophistication that rhetorical composition and reading could achieve (Heath, Menander 2004, 238 n. 42). In the complicated scenario of this declamation, a man's wife and his blind son accuse one another

²⁷ References in Heath (Heath, *Invention* 1997, 91 n. 9).

of his murder after the man is found stabbed in his bed; the son speaks.²⁸ Libanius in the *theoria* identifies this case as having the issue of conjecture, specifically what he calls a ‘counteraccusatory’ (ἀντεγκληματικός) (1) conjecture. In such conjectures, one has to both defend oneself and at the same time accuse one’s opponent. Such scenarios, Libanius tells us, caused difficulties as regards division (διαίρεσεως) (i.e. of the issue into headings), arrangement (τάξεως) ‘and the other aspects of structure’ (τῆς ἄλλης οἰκονομίας) (1). Indeed, he reports an inquiry conducted by ‘those who have written an *Art of Division*’ (οἱ τὰς διαιρετικὰς τέχνας συγγράψαντες) (2) into the best arrangement of speeches in such cases: should one deliver the speeches for the defence and prosecution sequentially, or should one set out the arguments for the defence and prosecution for each heading in turn? The former is good ‘debating’ style, but can cause confusion, while the latter is clear but tedious; according to Libanius, the rhetoricians eventually came down on the side of the former. Libanius, however, claims to have found a way to have the best of both worlds, ‘as the coming speech will demonstrate easily’ (ῥαδίως δηλώσει προΐων ὁ λόγος) (4). Now this is a very revealing discussion. Rather than laying down rules to follow *ex cathedra*, here we find that theorists are not unanimous, and that, to Libanius’ mind at least, they have ultimately failed to find the best solution. Furthermore, Libanius’ declamation is not simply going to follow the rhetoricians’ precepts, but rather *depart from them and do something*

²⁸ The full scenario is as follows: ‘A man saved his own father from a fire. Though he tried to save his mother as well, he failed to do so and furthermore lost his sight. His father brought in a second wife over him, and she showed to his father poison bound up in the boy’s clothing. And when his father asked where the poison had come from, his son made no reply. After this the father yielded his estate to his wife in his will, and left his son disinherited. And after there had been a disturbance in the house during the night, many people rushed to the spot and found the father recently killed, his son’s sword lying beside him, the son’s step-mother sleeping beside her husband, and the son himself, blind, standing on the threshold of the house in which he was living on his own. The blind son and his step-mother bring accusations against one another.’ (Διέσωσέ τις ἐμπρησμοῦ γενομένου τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα. πειρώμενος σώζειν καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοῦ σώσαι διήμαρτε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς προσάπλωσεν. ἐπεισήγαγεν αὐτῷ μητρυνῖαν ὁ πατήρ. αὕτη δεδεμένον φάρμακον ἐν τοῖς ἱματίοις τοῦ παιδὸς ἔδειξε τῷ πατρί. καὶ πυνθανομένου τοῦ πατρὸς πόθεν εἶη τὸ φάρμακον οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο. μετὰ ταῦτα γράφων διαθήκην τῇ μὲν γυναικὶ τὸν κλῆρον εἵασεν, ἀποκληρονόμον δὲ τὸν παῖδα κατέλιπε. καὶ νυκτὸς θορύβου γενομένου κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ πολλῶν συνελθόντων εὗρηται ὁ μὲν πατήρ νεοσφαγῆς, τὸ δὲ ξίφος τοῦ παιδὸς παρακείμενον, ἡ δὲ μητρὶς παρακαθεύδουσα, ὁ δὲ τυφλὸς ἐστὼς ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐδοῦ τῆς οἰκίας ἐν ᾗ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἔμενεν. ἀντεγκαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλοισι ὁ τυφλὸς καὶ ἡ μητρὶς) (Libanius *Declamation* 49 (Hypothesis)).

better; as such, it will ultimately constitute *a contribution to theory in its own right*. This represents a very different model of the relationship between theory and practice to that often imagined in ancient and modern scholarship: the relationship here would be well characterized as a *dialogue*.

The more familiar of the two kinds of text that were prefaced to declamation performances is the *prolalia*.²⁹ These texts are informal introductions to a declamation, often comparing the performer's own position to that of a character in a short narrative he relays. Though these were not generally explicitly concerned with rhetorical theory, they often include aesthetic concerns, which are sometimes phrased in more or less technical rhetorical language: Lucian's *Zeuxis*, for example, invites the audience to pay close attention to the coming performance's 'good vocabulary, conformity to the ancient canon, penetration of intellect, power of perception, Attic grace, good construction, and general competence' (Kilburn) (ὀνομάτων δὲ ἄρα καλῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀρχαῖον κανόνα συγκεκλιμένων ἢ νοῦ ὀξέος ἢ περινοίας τινὸς ἢ χάριτος Ἀττικῆς ἢ ἀρμονίας ἢ τέχνης τῆς ἐφ' ἅπασιν) (*Zeux.* 2).

In what contexts did these prefaces precede declamations? They were obviously present in at least some of written copies of these texts, but were they always present in performance?

²⁹ From our period, the only surviving *prolaliai* are those of Lucian: *Bacch.*, *Herc.*, *Electr.*, *Dips.*, *Herod.*, *Zeux.*, *Harm.*, *Scyth.*, and probably *Prom. Es* and *Dom.* (Pernot, L'éloge 1993, 550). We do not know that these preceded declamations, but given Lucian's obvious and avowed background in rhetoric, his ability to produce declamations (*Tyr.*, *Abd. Phal.* 1, *Phal.* 2) (including, very probably, after his alleged turn away from rhetoric (Guast, Lucian and Declamation forthcoming)), and the clearly prefatory function of his *prolaliai*, it is likely that they give some flavour of the genre. (Choricius, a more conventional declaimer, is quite happy to reuse two motifs found in Lucianic *prolaliai* in his fifth *prolalia*: first the gathering of the most learned critics into one place to hear the speaker (Chor. *Dialexis* 5.2; Luc. *Herod.*, *Harm.*), and second, an analogy between the speaker and a musician (Chor. *Dialexis* 5.3; Luc. *Harm.*)). Whether a given *lalia* or *dialexis* of Himerius was a stand-alone piece or a prelude to a longer work is not always obvious (Penella, Himerius 2007, 9–10), but Himerius *Orr.* 38 and 46 look likely to have preceded declamations. Of the 25 *prolaliai* that we have for Choricius (conventionally known as *dialexeis*), 5–6, 8–17, and 20–25 are known to have been preliminary to a declamation. For problems of classification, a survey of the relevant ancient theoretical texts, and a catalogue, see Pernot (Pernot, L'éloge 1993, 546–568); see also Schmid (Schmid 1887–96, I.35–6), Stock (Stock 1911), Mras (Mras 1940), Anderson (Anderson, *Prolaliae* 1977), Bracht Branham (Bracht Branham 1989), Nesselrath (Nesselrath, *Lucian's Introductions* 1995) Anderson (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 53–55).

One might be tempted to see *theoriai* in particular as purely didactic prefaces of a sort that would not have been used in a public declamation performance. Even if that were true, however, it would still mean that almost all members of the literary elite who attended such public performances would be familiar with such prefaces from their rhetorical education. But what evidence we have suggests that it was not exceptional to hear a rhetorical *theoria* outside of a purely educational context. In one case we have clear evidence: it looks likely that Libanius *Declamation* 46, which has a fairly theoretical *theoria*, was performed outside of the schoolroom (Penella, Libanius 2014, 109). For the *theoriai* to Choricus' declamations, the *prolaliai* which we know to have been delivered on the same occasion also sometimes give a clue as to the sort of context in which they were performed. Most commonly there seem to be both students *and* a wider audience (*Dialexis* 5, 16, 17); sometimes Choricus refers to his 'friends' (φιλότης) (12.5, 16.1, 17.1, 19.2); reference is also made to 'these wise men' (οἷδε... οἱ σοφοί) (6.4) who have ordered Choricus to declaim (6.4); only *Dialexis* 10 might be delivered to students alone. Finally, it is also notable that in the works of Himerius we have rhetorical *theoriai* for other genres which we know to have been performed outside of the schoolroom, both an *epithalamium* and a propemptic (going-away) speech (Him. 9–10): even these lighter and very public genres, then, could be preceded by discussion of epicheiremes and enthymemes and stylistic *ideai* (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 147–8). As Himerius himself says, 'the knowledgeable person should do nothing, even in cases such as these, without reference to the art [of rhetoric]' (Penella) (χρή τὸν ἐπιστήμονα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις μηδὲν δίχα τέχνης ποιεῖν) (Him. 9). So the case for *theoriai* being present outside the schoolroom seems strong.

These prefaces also give some hints as to the rhetorical competence of their audiences, though their evidence on this point must be used with real caution. Choricus' citation of Plato in *Dialexis* 8 implicitly casts his audience as the 'few men good at listening to

speeches’ (ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι δεινοὶ λόγων ἀκούειν) rather than ‘the mass of inexperienced auditors from the agora’ (πολλῶν ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἀπειροκάλων ἀκροατῶν) (4). In *Dialexis* 5 he describes his efforts to gather an audience of men who are ‘knowledgeable about speeches’ (ἐπιστήμονας λόγων) (2); the analogy he draws with the practice of the poet Terpander, who apparently required those who wanted to hear him perform first to prove their own skill with the lyre, would even suggest that an active competence in rhetoric was required on the part of his audience (3). Of course, it flatters Choricus that his audience appears to be so erudite: we should not discount the possibility that less well-educated auditors might also have been present. Still, even if they were, Choricus’ confident rhetoric could have shamed them into silence: the normative expectation is clearly that the audience will be learned. Libanius twice in his *theoriai* distinguishes two different constituencies in his audience, drawing an opposition between on the one hand what ‘is available for all to see’ (κεῖται παντὸς ἰδεῖν) (*Theoria* to *Decl.* 46, 2) or ‘immediately... clear in advance’ (αὐτόθεν... πρόδηλον) (*Theoria* to *Decl.* 49, 1) and on the other hand what is ‘not easy to see’ (οὐ πρόχειρον ἰδεῖν) (*Theoria* to *Decl.* 46, 2) or what ‘appears much more obvious to those who know how to discern it more accurately’ (πολλῷ δὲ φανερώτερον καταφαίνεται τοῖς ἀκριβέστερον αὐτὸ καθορᾶν δυναμένοις) (*Theoria* to *Decl.* 49, 1). But again, we should be aware of the *theoria*’s own rhetoric. Libanius’ distinction between more and less well-informed sections of his audience is, as in Choricus, surely a stimulus to audience members to respond to his declamation in the most erudite way possible, so as to avoid being classed among the less well-informed: such a presentation does not prove that large numbers of listeners without rhetorical training were present. Furthermore, in each case even the less expert section of Libanius’ audience is nonetheless assessing the declamation scenario in rhetorical terms, discerning ‘the difficulty of the problem’ (τὸ δυσχερὲς τοῦ ζητήματος) (*Theoria* to *Decl.* 49, 1) or ‘the fact that this problem depends on emotion’ (τοῦτι δὲ τὸ ζητημάτιον ὅτι μὲν ἐν πάθειν) (*Theoria*

to *Decl.* 46, 2). The overall impression we get from these texts regarding the audience's rhetorical competence is that (normatively) it was very high.

At the start of a declamation performance, then, prefatory remarks of various sorts primed an audience with rhetorical knowledge or at the very least rhetorical pretensions to approach the coming speech as a piece of persuasion, and gave them a start in processing what they heard through the lens of theory. In particular, they show and promote a critical and open approach to theory: in contrast to the monolithic presentation of rhetorical handbooks, here theory's polyphony is acknowledged, as are its limitations, and declamations are seen as capable of contributing to the on-going refinement of rhetoric.

1.2.1.2 In Reading: *Prolegomena* and Hypotheses

Those reading a declamation on the other hand were probably also often pushed towards rhetorical reading by the paratextual materials that preceded declamations in manuscripts. Though this section focuses on two paratexts that would only have been present in written texts (*prolegomena* and hypotheses), *prolaliai* and *theoriai* would of course also often have been present, as they are in our manuscripts. We cannot be sure who read this material. Teachers would have read them, obviously, and therefore (at least indirectly) their students—that is, the vast majority of those who consumed declamations. How much attention those who had finished their education gave to this preliminary material when reading Aristides later in life is unclear, but at the very least it was there for them if they wanted it, and their willingness to listen to *theoriai* in public performances suggests that some at least would have taken an interest.

Prolegomena survive only for Aristides.³⁰ As with two other paratexts considered below, hypotheses and scholia, which also survive only for Aristides, the question arises as to whether other declaimers and their declamations enjoyed such treatment: Aristides, after all, is said by Philostratus to have been ‘the sophist most skilled in his art [i.e. the art of rhetoric (ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη)]’ (τεχνικώτατος σοφιστῶν) (VS 585). But while Aristides clearly attracted the most (theoretical) attention, there is sufficient evidence to show that other declaimers were also approached in this way. The fairly obscure Nicostratus (*GRS* 744), a Macedonian orator of the second century CE, attracted a stylistic study by the mid third-century or later Metrophanes (*Suda* μ 1010) (*GRS* 706) and was cited in technical rhetorical works by Hermogenes (*Id.* II 3.21.5–6, II 12.13–14) and Menander Rhetor (390) (*GRS* 696). Elsewhere, Menander Rhetor in one breath (386.29–387.2) encourages imitation of Callinicus (*GRS* 549), Aristides, Polemo, and Hadrian of Tyre (*GRS* 434): no obvious distinction in this theorist between the dense argumentation of an Aristides and the exuberance shown in Polemo and Hadrian’s surviving declamations. Polemo indeed is cited in the even more technical *Diaireseis zētēmatōn* three times, first as a good example of someone who diffuses a persuasive πάθος throughout his speeches, not restricting it to the argumentative portion of the speech (*RG* VIII.58), second, similarly, as someone who tends to transition to his argument with πάθος (VIII.147), and finally as an example of when it is better to use a ‘narrative’ (διήγησις) rather than a ‘statement’ (κατάστασις) (VIII.3). So the survival of theoretical paratexts for Aristides alone is probably to be attributed to his unrivalled later stature: other declaimers were certainly at least approached in the same theoretical way as Aristides, and perhaps enjoyed similar treatments now lost.

³⁰ For the text, see Lenz (Lenz, *Prolegomena* 1959); for discussion see Lenz (Lenz, *Prolegomena* 1959) and Milazzo (Milazzo 2009). Behr’s discussion is confined to biographical aspects (Behr, *Sacred Tales* 1968).

The provenance of the Aristides *prolegomena* is somewhat murky. They are attributed to a Sopater: Gloeckner wants to identify this Sopater with the author of the commentary to Hermogenes' *De statibus* that appears in volume V of Walz's *Rhetores Graeci* (1–211) (*RE* IIIA 1 col. 1004), which Heath dates to the fourth century (Heath, *Scholia to Hermogenes* 2003, 13). Innes and Winterbottom, however, claim that linguistic resemblances make it 'certain' that this Sopater is to be identified with the author of the *Diaireseis zētēmatōn* (Innes and Winterbottom 1988, 13 n. 3), whom they suggest lived in the late fourth century (Innes and Winterbottom 1988, 1).³¹ Certainty is impossible, but on either view, we are dealing with an essentially fourth century text. A reference to earlier work (possibly *prolegomena*) on Aristides by the critic Longinus (C^a 1 Lenz),³² however, means that our *prolegomena* have their roots in the third century.

The Aristides *prolegomena* are particularly valuable for our purposes in this chapter since Sopater's final sentence makes it clear that its contents are preliminary to reading: they end 'but now it is time to proceed to an actual examination of the texts' (ἀλλ' ὥρα λοιπὸν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τῶν ἐδαφίων ἐλθεῖν ἐξέτασιν) (C^a 9 Lenz). That such a paratext was copied with manuscripts of Aristides suggests that it was of value to more than just its author; that the text varies so greatly in extant manuscripts strongly suggests that the *prolegomena* were not just copied a great many times, but also frequently edited (Lenz, *Prolegomena* 1959, 2).

The most important part of the *prolegomena* for our purposes is the text that appears in Lenz as C^a, which addresses questions of rhetoric,³³ and deploys a strongly rhetorical mode of reading. Assessing Aristides' work as a whole, Sopater begins by comparing Aristides twice

³¹ On the whole question of the Sopaters see *GRS* no. 967.

³² 'Longinus and all the critics have already said many things by way of preface/before me [about Aristides' works]' (ἤδη μὲν Λογγίνος καὶ πάντες οἱ κριτικοὶ πολλὰ προειρήκασιν) (C^a 1 Lenz). For Longinus, see *GRS* no. 632. For Aristides in Longinus' critical works, see Heath (Heath, *Sublimity* 1999, 16–17).

³³ Readers should be aware that C^a seems to be a reworking of the text known as C, and that many citations from C^a therefore also exist in a slightly different form in C. Readers looking for the text of C will need to know that Lenz prints it as chapters 17–20 of B in the belief that it was originally the final portion of B.

to Demosthenes (1, 2), the gold standard of the rhetorical treatises, and then moves on to cover most of the expected areas of rhetoric. In terms of invention, Aristides is judged to be ‘inventive’ (γόνιμος) and ‘rich in enthymemes’ (ἐνθυμηματικός) (1); in terms of arrangement, he is said to be ‘most persuasive’ (πιθανώτατος) (3); in terms of style, he is ‘authoritative, sound, classical, and clear in respect of diction’ (τὴν δὲ λέξιν κύριος ἀσφαλῆς ἀρχαῖος σαφής) (7). These are all key concerns of contemporary rhetoric, expressed with appropriate technical vocabulary. But, as ever, what is most important about this mini-treatise for our purposes is its open attitude to theory. Aristides is praised for two techniques of arrangement: first, ‘eschewing consistency with what has been said before in his replies to objections’ (τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν προειπόντων ἐν οἷς ἀντιλέγει πολλάκις ἀναιρῶν) and second ‘contending against what has been said in second place as if it had been said first’ (τοῖς δευτέροις ὡς πρώτοις μαχόμενος) (3).³⁴ Sopater here does not confine himself to named techniques found in manuals: where terminology fails, he simply describes what he sees in non-technical language. This is instructive for modern rhetorical readings of declamations: it is relatively easy for scholars to test a declamation against known rhetorical patterns, but in so doing, we should be careful not to miss just as impressive persuasive feats to which the handbooks have given no name. Furthermore, as in the *theoria* to Libanius’ *Declamation* 49, the author of this work is open to the possibility of learning theory from practice. Towards the end of the treatise we read that one can ‘draw as much as one wants from his epicheiremes in abundance’ (ἀρύεσθαι τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων παρ’ αὐτοῦ δαψιλέστερον πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν ὅσα τις καὶ βούλεται) (8). And, in a remarkable moment, Aristides is heralded as an ‘inventor of new figures’ (καινῶν σχημάτων εὕρετής) (6), and it

³⁴ The example given of this phenomenon on this occasion, however, comes from Aristides’ speeches against Plato (4–5).

is alleged as an example of this that he invented the figure of chiasmus. This is obviously not true,³⁵ but it is a striking example of a declaimer seen as *contributing* to theory.

We have only one hypothesis to any declamation that gives more than a bare account of the fictitious scenario, but there are likely to have been fuller hypotheses of this sort to Aristides' other declamations (just as there are for non-declamatory works in Aristides' corpus) and probably for other declaimers also (above, p. 58). The hypothesis in question is that to Aristides' Leuctran declamations,³⁶ and the mode of reading is again technical: we hear that the works are greatly admired for their intensity and their epicheiremes (θαυμάζονται δὲ πάνυ ἐπὶ τε τῇ δεινότητι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχειρήμασιν).³⁷

Those reading a declamation, then, may often have had even more by way of theoretical preliminaries than those attending a live declamation performance, and these texts show further evidence for an open attitude to theory.

1.2.2 Rhetorical Comment

After such theoretical preliminaries, it was natural for theory to be at the forefront of an audience's mind as they listened to or read a declamation, and there are abundant examples of audiences as well as authors commenting in various ways on a declamation's rhetoric during its performance: this comment is both evidence for and would have furthered rhetorical reading of the declamation. Once again we shall move from performative paratexts to those present only in written texts.

³⁵ Even if Sopater took the two anonymous treatises on rhetoric traditionally attributed to Aristides as genuine, neither contains any reference to chiasmus.

³⁶ I cannot find anything on the provenance of this hypothesis: Behr attributes it to 'some grammarian' (Behr, Complete Works 1981–86, I.491).

³⁷ 'Intensity' (δεινότης) is a contemporary buzzword, albeit a rather vague one; for Hermogenes in the *Id.*, it is the perfect combination of all his other types of style (*Id.* II 9.1).

1.2.2.1 Performance

A performance of declamation in the imperial period was a lively event, with many declaimers deploying a range of exuberant body language, and audiences expressing their opinion of what they were hearing with responses of their own. This performative dimension of declamation will be considered fully in chapter 5, but relevant here is the fact that a significant proportion of this behaviour was a direct response to the rhetoric being performed. Polemo famously smiled as he rounded off his periods to show that he did so with ease (Philostr. VS 537), while Pseudo-Hermogenes describes audience members leaping to their feet when a performer managed his third figure in the same sentence (*Inv.* IV 4.25.3–8); in Eunapius we hear of audience members ‘murmuring and sighing’ (μυκηθμοῦ καὶ στόνου) as Prohaeresius rounds off every period of a declamatory prooimion ‘with a sonorous phrase’ (Wright) (κατὰ τὸν κρότον) (Eunap. VS 489). Hermogenes in his discussion of stylistic ‘beauty’ (κάλλος) in his *De ideis* also reports Isocrates’ statement that the figure of *parisōsis* and other such stylistic devices make the audience cheer and applaud: presumably he thinks the same holds true for his time also (*Id.* I 12.7.6–8). As our sources do not generally record in great detail precisely what aspect of a declamation caused a given audience response (if indeed they knew), it may well be that many of the recorded audience responses that we will consider in chapter 5 were also responses to technical aspects of rhetoric.³⁸

1.2.2.2 Metarhetoric³⁹

There are some occasions, however, when rhetorical commentary on a declamation is verbal, written into the text of the declamation itself, a phenomenon we might call ‘meta-rhetoric’.

³⁸ In an extraordinary case on the Latin side, we hear of a declaimer being interrupted mid-declimation to be told about possible epigrams that he had missed (Sen. *Controv.* 1 pr. 22).

³⁹ On this phenomenon in Latin declamation and Gorgias, see Winterbottom (Winterbottom, *Declamation, Greek and Latin* 1983, 68–70).

We have an explicit account of this phenomenon in Aristides, who, prior to an unexpectedly theoretical discussion of (his) blending of different stylistic qualities, says:

I say that even a man who is perfectly without guile and courteous sometimes has to make a remark in passing on account of his words themselves, and that if he does not, some things too good to miss will escape most people

(φημί γὰρ αὐτῶν εἵνεκα τῶν λόγων συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκην πολλάκις παραφθέγγεσθαι τὸν γε δὴ καθαρῶς ἀπλοῦν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκφεύγειν ἔστιν ἂ τῶν κρειττόνων ἢ λαθεῖν) (*Or.* 28.119)

Of course, to some degree this was only a continuation of the practice of the schoolroom: several texts, and above all Sopater's *Diaireseis zētēmatōn*, frequently switch between the voice of the rhetorician expounding his material and the imagined voice of the speaker in a declamation. Somewhat surprisingly, Hermogenes seems to believe that this phenomenon even occurred in classical times, and that, for example, when Demosthenes describes Aeschines' words as 'solemn' (σεμνός), he is essentially referring to the stylistic *idea* of 'solemnity' (σεμνότης) (*Id.* I 6.23); this is not the only instance of the phenomenon (I. Rutherford, *Canons of Style* 1998, 32). For Hermogenes to find it natural to imagine classical authors practising what we might call 'metarhetoric' in this way, one assumes that it must have been very common in Hermogenes' own time. Metarhetoric would obviously be a stimulus to rhetorical reading however one consumed declamation, and given that the examples we are about to consider involve fairly basic terms of rhetorical theory, probably operative for most audiences.

The clearest instances of metarhetoric can be found in Lucian's declamation *Tyrannicida*. The most glaring instance is the words ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐς τέλος ('from beginning to end') (14) (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 178), used by the speaker of a narrative passage (14–18). This phrase clearly evokes one of the headings in Hermogenes' canonical divisions, specifically τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλος (conventionally translated 'sequence of events'), that is, a narration of what

happened (with appropriate rhetorical slanting) (*Stat.* III.10–11).⁴⁰ As (*inter alia*) the first heading in the division of the first issue (conjecture) in Hermogenes,⁴¹ this term must have been particularly familiar to those who had been through a rhetorical education. Technical too, though a little less glaring, is the speaker's indignant rejection of the thought that his action might be 'incomplete' (ἀτελής) (9) (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 177): in Hermogenes, incomplete (ἀτελής) actions, somehow deficient instances of a given crime, are the ones about which the issue of definition arises (*Stat.* II.2). Three times the speaker also refers to the allegation that his deed was lacking in some respect: though the vocabulary he uses (ἐνδεῖν ('to be lacking') (10, 11, 14)) is not found in Hermogenes, this is precisely Hermogenes' conception of incomplete actions, and the unusual abstraction with which the idea is stated here brings it close to metarhetoric.

The most extensive attested metarhetoric, however, is found in Polemo's declamations. The scenario for the pair of speeches is this: it is imagined that there is a custom that the funeral oration over the dead after a battle should be given by the father of the best fighter. The fathers of two Greek casualties at Marathon, Cynegirus and Callimachus (the latter of whom had led the Athenian army), make the case for their respective sons. Cynegirus had died when his hands were cut off as he clung to an escaping Persian ship; Callimachus had been killed by enemy projectiles but his body somehow remained upright, even in death. In both speeches the two fathers seem to make explicit reference to the rhetoric that their opponents have used or will use. The key words are σχῆμα ('figure') and στάσις ('stance'). When Cynegirus' father uses the word σχῆμα ('appearance') to disparage Callimachus' death

⁴⁰ What we know of the chronology makes it unlikely (though not, as usually thought, impossible) that Lucian knew Hermogenes' work (see Guast (*Guast, Lucian and Declamation* forthcoming)), but even if he did not, he is clearly still using theory from the same tradition as Hermogenes (Heath, *Menander* 2004, 176).

⁴¹ The issue of Lucian's declamation is clearly 'definition', not 'conjecture', but there is nothing to stop the headings of one issue being used in another, and indeed the heading 'presentation' (προβολή) in definition is said by Hermogenes to be the same as τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους (*Stat.* IV.2.1–2).

(contrasted with his own son's ἔργα ('deeds')), the sense of this word often blurs with that of the rhetorical σχῆμα, i.e. a rhetorical 'figure'. Callimachus' death, he claims, is only the σχῆμα ζῶντος ἐν νεκρῷ (A7): literally, 'the *appearance* of a living man in a dead body', but also, metarhetorically, the '*figure* "living man in a dead body"'. In the same chapter Callimachus' achievement is derided as the mere semblance of a στάσις—a semblance of 'standing', in that Callimachus was not so much standing as unable to fall. But στάσις is also of course the technical rhetorical term for a speech's 'issue': with this sense of the word, the accusation is that Callimachus has only the appearance of a case to argue. This is not quite how Hermogenes would talk about 'issues', but the metaphor of a rhetorical στάσις as the stance that one takes up in a speech accords with what Quintilian considers to have been the first use of this term (3.6.3), in Aeschines, where the metaphor is that of a boxer's stance (3.206). A second cluster of rather rhetorical sounding words comes in chapters 26–27. In chapter 26, Cynegirus' father goes as far as to dismiss Callimachus' feat as a παράδοξος στάσις ('paradoxical act of standing'). παράδοξος ('paradoxical') is a technical rhetorical term, referring to one of the classifications of the subject matter of a speech (along with reputable, disreputable, etc.) (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 257). When paired with the word στάσις, the rhetorical meanings of both words come to the fore: Callimachus' στάσις, his argumentative 'stance', is paradoxical. Callimachus' achievement is then attacked again as a σχῆμα μόνον (26) and a σχῆμα κενόν (27): non-technically, as 'just an appearance' and 'an empty appearance [i.e. of e.g. virtue]', and, rhetorically, as 'just a [rhetorical] figure' and 'an empty [rhetorical] figure'. A στάσις ἐπὶ τοσούτοις ἐρείσμασι should not be marvelled at, says Cynegirus' father (27): that is, 'an act of standing based on such supports' should not be marvelled at, and, rhetorically, 'an argumentative stance based on such grounds' should not be marvelled at. But Callimachus' father fights back with his own meta-rhetoric, and cleverly reuses the technical terms that his opponent had used against him. In

his view, it is Callimachus' death that was the ἔργον ('deed'), in contrast with the ἐπίδειξις ('[oratorical] display') of Cynegirus (B29; cf. B33); to him, it is Cynegirus' death that was an ἀπόρου ('futile') (B33) or μανικοῦ ('deranged') σχήματος ('figure') (B35), with σχῆμα having both senses as it did in the earlier speech. Though at the narratorial level, such metarhetoric is an attempt to rob one's opponent's rhetoric of its force, at the authorial level, by making explicit the rhetorical techniques that he is using, Polemo invites us to join him in stepping outside these declamations' dramatic fiction and considering the scenario from the standpoint of rhetorical theory, and in admiring his rhetorical achievements.⁴²

Finally, rhetorical commentary sometimes seems to be written not just into the words of the declamation but even into its very style. Some declaimers, as is well known, wrote in a florid style full of figures, exemplified most clearly by the surviving declamations of Polemo or Himerius (Norden 1898, 407–10). Innes and Winterbottom count among key characteristics of this style exclamations, particularly multiple successive exclamations, long lists (especially in the form of *isocola*, that is, in clauses of equal or nearly equal length), and a predilection for saying the same thing twice with minor variation (Innes and Winterbottom 1988, 10). The following passage from Polemo's declamation in the person of Callimachus' father illustrates this style clearly:⁴³

ὦ φυτὸν Μαραθώνιον. ὦ δῆμων βεβαιότερε καὶ νήσων λαμπρότερε· τοῖς βαρβάροις Ἑρέτρια μὲν ἡρπασμένη πλεῖ καὶ Νάξος αὐτανδρος ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐτέθη, Καλλίμαχος δὲ ἀκίνητός ἐστι, τῶν ὁρῶν στασιμώτερος καὶ τῶν σκοπέλων βεβαιώτερος. καὶ γῇ μὲν ἐσείσθη πολλάκις καὶ νήσους ὅλας εἶδον ἄνθρωποι φερομένας, τὸν δὲ ἕνα νεκρὸν ὁ τοσοῦτος οὐ διέσεισε πόλεμος. ὦ τεῖχος Ἀττικῆς ἀρετῆς· ὦ μέγιστον τῶν Μαραθωνίων θαυμάτων καὶ θειότατον· ὦ τῶν ἐκεῖ φασμάτων ἐξαίρετον.

⁴² A few further instances of metarhetoric can be found in Chor. *Decl.* 4, where the speaker's opponent is said to have 'invented a clever scenario' (ὑπόθεσιν εὔρε κεκομψευμένην), and 4.18, where the opponent's case is described as an 'assault' (καταδρομή), a technical term found in Sopat. Rh. *DZ* (Lupi, Milziade 2010, 138, 153).

⁴³ Boulanger's description is memorable: '[c]'est un feu roulant d'alliances de mots, de paronomases, d'anaphores, de chiasmes, d'apostrophes, de prosopopées' (Boulanger 1923, 93).

(O plant of Marathon! You were firmer than lands and more illustrious than islands! Eretria, snatched by the barbarians sets sail and Naxos was set among the ships, men and all, but Callimachus is unmoving, more stable than mountains and firmer than promontories. And the ground often shook and men saw whole islands being carried away, but one corpse such warfare did not shake. O wall of Attic virtue! O greatest and most holy of the Marathonian marvels! O best of the portents that were seen there!) (B54–55)

Now I suggest that such a highly artificial style naturally draws attention to the rhetoric that lies behind it. Reading the plain orations of Lysias, one could be forgiven for failing to notice the speaker's careful rhetoric, which indeed is precisely the point.⁴⁴ When one reads Polemo's declamations, however, which are so far removed from ordinary language, the rhetoric is so glaringly obvious that we could say that it calls attention to itself. This is not just a modern intuition, for Hermogenes seems to describe precisely this phenomenon in his account of the stylistic *idea* that he calls 'beauty' (κάλλος). This 'beauty' is rather reminiscent of Innes and Winterbottom's description of the exuberant declamatory style: beauty's figure *par excellence* is *parisosis* (essentially identical to *isocola* (*Id.* I 12.11.2–3)), and Hermogenes also recommends repetitions of various kinds (I 12.21–31), and, rhythmically, patterns that are very similar to metre (I 12.45.3–4), something else common in declamations of this period (Norden 1898, I.410–427 *passim*).⁴⁵ Of this style's characteristic figures, we hear that 'they make the adornment conspicuous and show the embellishment clearly' (ἐκπρεπῇ ποιεῖ τὸν κόσμον καὶ σαφῶς τὸ κεκαλλωπίσθαι ἐνδείκνυται) (I 12.11.1–2); of one figure it is said that 'the very contrived quality of the passage is obvious' (Wooten) (ἐκφανὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς γίνεται καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος) (I 12.29.1–2); of beauty's characteristic rhythms, we read that 'the care

⁴⁴ For an introduction to Lysias' style and its persuasive effects, see Carey (Carey 1989, 6–9). On the idea of concealing one's rhetoric, see Cronjé (Cronjé 1993).

⁴⁵ The idea that an artificial or inappropriate style can draw attention to itself is also found in Ps.-Longinus' *De sublimitate*. What this work calls the 'broken and agitated movement of language' (Roberts) (τὰ κατερρυθμισμένα τῶν λεγομένων), defined as the use of pyrrhics, trochees, and dichorees, is likened to 'little songs' (ᾠδάρια) that 'draw their hearer away from the point and compel attention to themselves' (Roberts) (τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφέλκει καὶ ἐφ' αὐτὰ βιάζεται) (*Subl.* 41.2). Heath has argued forcefully in favour of the traditional third-century dating of this work (Heath, *Sublimity* 1999).

taken over the passage and the embellishment here are obvious’ (ἡ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἐνταῦθα ἐκπρεπής) (308). This is rhetorical reading that it is hard to avoid.⁴⁶

1.2.2.3 Commentary

Those reading a declamation, on the other hand, could also consult the rhetorical readings of others in the form of commentaries, the remnants of which can be found in our scholia.⁴⁷

These commentaries are immensely valuable, for they represent our most detailed evidence for precisely how a declamation was read through theory, and the picture they present has notable differences from the more idealised version of theory found in handbooks.

But first we must address some preliminary questions. We have scholia in significant quantities only for Aristides’ Leuctran declamations (*Orr.* 11–15),⁴⁸ though again, it is quite possible that other authors enjoyed similar treatment (above, p. 58).⁴⁹ In antiquity, these commentaries were generally written on separate book rolls, but special signs could be used to indicate relevant notes in a commentary, and there were often some short and sometimes quite long notes in the margins of papyri; in a few cases text and commentary alternate in

⁴⁶ Contrast Hermogenes’ revealing remark on the *idea* of ‘decency’ (ἐπιείκεια): ‘someone who is quite unskilled in the rules of rhetoric would understand’ (Wooten) (ὁ κατὰ μικρὸν λόγου θεωρίας ἐπαίτων συναίσθοιτ’ ἄν) (*Id.* II 6.23.4–5). The implication seems to be that for some of the other nineteen of Hermogenes’ twenty types of style at least some knowledge of rhetorical theory is a prerequisite for reading.

⁴⁷ Unfortunately, we are entirely ignorant about the process of transference from commentaries to scholia, and it is possible that the scholiasts’ selection has made various aspects of rhetorical theory more or less prominent than they were in the commentaries from which they came: style, in particular, seems oddly neglected in our scholia. Still, distortions of this sort would not be fatal to our analysis, for the objectives of this chapter are (to reiterate) to show *that* theory was deployed extensively in the reading of declamations and to investigate *how* it was deployed: to some degree (though obviously not entirely) it is immaterial precisely *which* theory is deployed.

⁴⁸ For these scholia we must unfortunately rely on Dindorf’s deficient edition (Dindorf 1829). Dindorf simply reprints the collation of Reiske, who used only a small number of inferior manuscripts. Dindorf also prints two declamatory scholia in the apparatus to his edition of Aristides’ text (volume I, page 601, and volume II, page 584). Pernot prints six further scholia found in the manuscripts of the Sicilian declamations (Pernot, *Discours Siciliens* 1981, 260–5). The scholia are discussed in a monograph by Lenz (Lenz, *Aristeidesscholien* 1934), which includes several tantalizing *inedita* (13, 91, 94–5). Lenz’s attempts to identify the source of particular scholia seem to me unconvincing: Heath too doubts Lenz’s claimed identification of Menandrian material (Heath, *Menander* 2004, 122–5). The existing major studies of scholia do not cover Greek imperial rhetoric: Meijering and Nunlist are both mainly interested in scholia to archaic and classical poets, and neither gives much space to Greek imperial rhetorical theory (Meijering 1987, Nunlist 2011).

⁴⁹ Winterbottom mentions, without referencing, rhetorical scholia in Choricus *Declamation* 12 (Winterbottom, *Declamation, Greek and Latin* 1983, 74).

the same papyrus (N. Wilson 1984, 105–6). So it should not have been too difficult for an ancient reader of declamations to consult the available commentaries.⁵⁰ As with *prolegomena*, we have no direct evidence that commentaries were consulted by those not actively involved in the learning and teaching of rhetoric, though again, we should state that most of those attending a declamation performance would have been through a rhetorical education, and so to some degree would probably have internalized the sort of rhetorical reading processes exemplified by the extant commentaries, either directly or through a teacher.

But whose rhetorical readings? In the scholia to the Leuctran declamations, we only have two names: a rhetorician called Athanasius (445.22), who is perhaps to be dated to the end of the fourth century (*GRS* no. 187) and a Zosimus (447.8 and Lenz, *Aristeidesscholien* 1934, 13)), probably Zosimus of Ascalon, a teacher who worked c. 500 CE, which would put him in roughly the same milieu as Choricus.⁵¹ The Leuctran scholia also mention ‘some people’ (τινές) three times (407.7, 407.16, and Lenz, *Aristeidesscholien* 1934, 91). Among these anonymous commentators are likely to be (i) the third-century Menander Rhetor named elsewhere in the scholia (26.22, 53.34, 260.2), though he was not necessarily the author of a full commentary, (ii) Metrophanes, a third-century critic (*GRS* no. 705) to whom the *Suda* attributes a commentary on Aristides (μ 1009), though his name does not appear in the scholia anywhere, and (iii) the Sopater thought to be the author of the Aristides *prolegomena* (above, p. 59). A range of critics, then, was engaged with Aristides’

⁵⁰ Furthermore, if the two innovations that led to the standard Byzantine arrangement—copying entire commentaries into the margins of texts, and, where multiple commentaries existed, amalgamating their contents—are indeed to be dated to the fourth or fifth century, as Wilson maintains, despite some controversy on this point (N. Wilson 1984, 106–7), then readers of Libanius, Himerius, and Choricus at least would have had still easier access to the commentaries on their works

⁵¹ *GRS* no. 1098. There are, however, two other known Zosimoi, one to be placed in mid- to late fifth-century Gaza (*GRS* no. 1097), and a third perhaps to be placed in mid- to late fifth-century Alexandria (*GRS* no. 1096), though this third figure may in fact be identical with our Zosimus of Ascalon.

declamations throughout the imperial period, and the tradition of rhetorical commentary clearly goes back to at least the third century.

Reiske gave us 129 scholia. Over half of these are concerned with the usual exegetical business of identifying references and sources, but around fifty of them (and most of the interpretative comments) are concerned with rhetorical theory. Of these fifty, most include explicitly technical terms of contemporary rhetoric, some of them quite specialized, such as ἀνθυποφορά (430.8) (a reply to an imagined objection) or ἀντιπαράστασις (417.5) (a particular kind of refutation of an opponent's argument) (Ernesti 1795, s.vv.). Moreover, these scholia are clearly only fragments: any commentator who offered remarks as detailed as 'observe how appropriately he uses words—"slavery" in the case of the Thebans, but "destruction" in the case of the Spartans' (ὄρα πῶς οἰκείως ἐχρήσατο ταῖς λέξεσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν Θηβαίων δουλείαν, ἐπὶ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀναίρεσιν) (410.21) was presumably writing a commentary much more detailed than what we have (Lenz, *Aristeidesstudien* 1964, 90). We can get a sense of how detailed by comparing the scholia to Demosthenes, which are often very detailed, and which include the thoughts of a rhetorician known to have commented on Aristides, Menander Rhetor.⁵² It is clear then that these commentators were reading Aristides' declamations in detail using contemporary rhetorical theory. What can they tell us about the process of rhetorical reading?

One of the most striking things about our scholia is their relentless concern to *identify* rhetorical techniques. Thus, for example, an argument is identified as being taken 'from the heading of justice' (ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου) (408.3), or a reply to an objection is recognized to be making use of a counteraccusation (ἀνθυποφορά ἀντεγκληματική) (411.15). Now while some of this may be identification for identification's sake, rather as in the commentaries of

⁵² On the Demosthenes scholia and Menander Rhetor in particular see Heath (Heath, Menander 2004, 132–214).

a Lupi or a Johansson such a mode of analysis would soon have become unsatisfying, and in any case the identification of every single rhetorical technique used in a declamation would have made for impossibly lengthy commentaries. To understand the prominence of identification in rhetorical reading, we need to think more creatively about what purposes it could serve. First, it could teach, for to identify a use of a technique that one has been encouraging one's students to use implicitly gives those students a model to follow. This is never explicitly stated in the scholia we have, but perhaps it was too obvious to need stating in the work of a rhetorician. Sopater, whose commentaries may well lie behind some of our scholia, did say in his *prolegomena* that one could draw on Aristides' epicheiremes: when a commentary therefore identifies those epicheiremes (e.g. 437.20), it seems reasonable to assume that these passages were considered suitable for imitation. Menander Rhetor's work on Demosthenes, certainly, is rightly judged by Heath to have been 'didactic and practical in its orientation' (Heath, Menander 2004, ch. 6 abstract; cf. 201, 203). A second possible function of identification is to evaluate: to identify a technique, particularly an advanced technique, in a declamation is implicitly to praise the author for having managed to deploy the given technique successfully. Typically, that evaluation is implicit. When the speaker of the first *Leuctran Oration* says that 'destroying the Spartans' (τὸ... Λακεδαιμονίους ἀνελεῖν) would leave the Peloponnese and all the other Greeks open to the Thebans (11.11), the scholiast comments: 'the use of the name is suggestive [ἐμφαντικῶς, referring to the rhetorical technique of ἔμφασις] here, for if they [the Thebans] have conquered those [the Spartans] who are stronger [i.e. than the other Greeks], they will easily thereafter conquer the rest of the Greeks' (ἐμφαντικῶς ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα ἐνταῦθα· τῶν γὰρ ἰσχυροτέρων κρατήσαντες εὐχερῶς καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων κρατήσουσιν) (410.3). Explicitly, this is simply an identification of a technique and an explanation, but we are clearly meant to approve. Ultimately, of course, the didactic and evaluative functions of identification are

really two sides of the same coin, for to praise something is implicitly to recommend it for imitation, and to recommend it for imitation is implicitly to praise it.

But identification is not always so easy. The scholia also give us a good idea of the messiness of applying rhetorical theory to real declamations, a further valuable corrective to the *ex cathedra* presentation of rhetorical handbooks, and some of their modern commentators.⁵³ For example, there might sometimes be more than one plausible analysis of a single passage of a text. In Aristides' *Fifth Leuctran*, Zosimus identifies two headings in the same passage (the beginning of chapter 13 onwards) (Lenz, *Aristeidesscholien* 1934, 13), while another scholion, clearly in two minds about under which heading another passage falls, plumps for 'advantage' (τὸ συμφέρον), reasoning that 'the heading of the dishonourable is part of the heading of advantage' (τὸ γὰρ ἄδοξον μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος) (413.15). On the other hand, what is a single rhetorical feature in the handbooks might plausibly be identified in several different places in a text. For example, our scholia reveal that while Athanasius considered the epilogue of Aristides' second *Leuctran Oration* to start at chapter 67 (445.22), Zosimus placed it at chapter 72 (447.8). Even single comments may be part of a debate now lost: when we hear in the scholia to the *First Leuctran* that some considered the heading of 'advantage' (τὸ συμφέρον) to begin at chapter 2 (407.7), and that some saw the heading of 'legality' (τὸ νόμιμον) in chapter 5 (407.16), the implication is that others disagreed with these judgements, or at least that they were not self-evident.⁵⁴ Similar debates about headings can be seen in Menander Rhetor's commentary on Demosthenes: Menander argues that, *pace* the comments of an Alexander, a Dioscurus, and a Zeno, the orator's

⁵³ Not all handbooks are like this of course: messiness can also be observed in the Pseudo-Dionysian *On Mistakes in Declamation* (περὶ τῶν ἐν μελέταις πλημμελουμένων), a text which spends a lot of time trying to disentangle similar concepts such as, for example, 'conciseness' and 'inadequacy', and generally pleading for greater flexibility in applying rhetoric's rules (Russell, *Exetasis and Mistakes* 1979) (Heath, *Menander* 2004, 236).

⁵⁴ The scholion is reported as pertaining to chapter 4, but the heading of 'legality'/'custom' only fits chapter 5.

Fourth Philippic uses several headings other than simply that of ‘advantage’ (τὸ συμφέρον).⁵⁵ Sometimes, indeed, the handbooks’ categories were not just difficult but actually impossible to apply. Pseudo-Hermogenes boldly states that every *prooimion* must have a ‘proof’ (κατασκευή), that is, a proof of the speaker’s opening assessment of the state of the debate, itself called the *protasis* (πρότασις) ([Hermog.] *Inv.* I.5). But the scholia argue plausibly that neither the first nor the second Leuctran declamations have such a proof in their *prooimion*, in the second speech because the speaker’s assessment is generally agreed, in the first on the grounds that people tend to trust those who speak their own mind honestly, as the speaker in this case appears to do.⁵⁶ Furthermore, even when the commentators do find proofs, in the *prooimia* to the third and fourth Leuctran orations, they consider it worth comment (448.3, 457.2). Sometimes, however, it is not simply the case that it is unclear which of several different rhetorical terms should be used to describe a single element of a text: sometimes there seem to be no plausible candidates at all. But as we saw in the Aristides *prolegomena*, rhetorical reading continues in such a circumstance, and a given phenomenon is simply identified using non-technical language. Consider this scholion: ‘he’s being clever here, in that he speaks of the benefaction of the Phocians as if it had been performed by the Spartans’ (σοφίζεται· τὸ γὰρ τῶν Φωκέων εὐεργέτημα ὡς Λακεδαιμονίων λέγει) (425.8). No technical rhetorical terminology is used, nor is there any that could have been used: what the scholiast is describing is simply a subtle white lie. Or consider this one: “‘ὑπέστησαν” [‘undertook’] is well chosen, in order to show how difficult the task is’ (καλῶς τὸ ὑπέστησαν, ἵνα τὸ δυσχερὲς δείξῃ τοῦ πράγματος) (409.5). Rhetorical theories of style certainly stressed the need to use the right words for the right things, but neither the choice

⁵⁵ Another nice example of disagreement in the rhetorical analysis of classical orators is cited and discussed in Russell (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 42 n. 9).

⁵⁶ Dindorf/Reiske’s presentation of both scholia is problematic. The comment on the *prooimion* to the first Leuctran appears incorrectly as a scholion to the *prooimion* of the *Second Leuctran*, with the erroneous label 427.1; the comment on the *prooimion* to the *Second Leuctran* has been wrapped into the hypothesis for the declamation itself.

of ὑπέστησαν (‘undertook’) nor the scholiast’s comment necessarily either require or indeed deploy any particular piece of rhetorical theory. A similar willingness to recognise untheorized aspects of persuasion can be found in the scholia to Demosthenes’ speeches.⁵⁷

Ancient rhetorical readers, then, persisted in their efforts to read declamations using theory despite the inevitable difficulties. This is important, for it suggests that if we are to read declamations rhetorically as ancients read them, then we need to persist *even and especially when the theory breaks down*. But why did they show such persistence? I suspect the answer may be that even if there is ultimately disagreement on the final conclusions, or if the end results are *ad hoc*, or even negative, the very process of trying to identify is in itself valuable, for when it fails it alerts us to the fact that a declamation is doing something not readily comprehensible in terms of conventional rhetorical theory, and therefore interesting and worthy of praise (or blame) and imitation (or avoidance); it may be that it is precisely in that breakdown that the declaimer’s greatest rhetorical achievements may be to be found.⁵⁸ A more cynical yet perhaps no less valid answer would be to look to the professional rivalries of rhetoricians. Like all speeches, declamations present a challenge to handbooks, for they threaten to deploy techniques not covered in the handbook, or to break the handbook’s rules, or show them up as invalid. To identify known rhetorical techniques in the messiness of a real speech, then, may be a strategy for taming the declamation’s attempt to break free from or even surpass theory: it is notable that even very localized rhetorical strategies in Demosthenes are nonetheless grandly declared by Menander to be ‘principles’ (θεωρήματα) or ‘precepts’ (παραγγέλματα) (cf. p. 70 n. 52). Or, less defensively, a rhetorician might be

⁵⁷ Numerous examples in Heath (Heath, Menander 2004, 184–214, esp. 188–94).

⁵⁸ Russell, by contrast, seems to see disagreements less positively, e.g. ‘vagaries are apparent, and the truth is that most classical speeches admit of different interpretations from this point of view’ (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 42 n. 9). Of three possible ‘issues’ seen by ancient commentators in Lycurg. *Contra Leocratem*, Russell comments simply ‘[a]ll may be said to be right’.

drawn to moments in which theory breaks down because he sees them as opportunities for heroic, virtuoso explanations.

1.2.3 Other Paratexts

In both live performance and written text, then, declamations were preceded by rhetorical prefaces of various sorts and accompanied throughout by a variety of rhetorical commentaries: these practices are both indicators of rhetoric's centrality to the consumption of declamation and at the same time must have worked to sustain it. I conclude now with two other texts that further attest the importance of rhetoric in reading declamation. The most obvious is Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum*, whose survival and abundant citation in the *Suda* is probably in part to be attributed precisely to its attractiveness as a supplement to the declaimers' works. That it has not been widely noticed that Philostratus too brings rhetorical theory to bear in reading declamation is to be attributed to a number of factors: (i) Philostratus' keen interest in many other aspects of declaimers' literary production and lives, which often leaves declamation occupying a relatively small space within a given biography (ii) the relatively understated way in which Philostratus invokes theory (really an index of theory's pervasiveness, for only in a world where theoretical knowledge is a given could it be cited so casually) (iii) translators who either do not understand rhetorical terminology or at least suppress it to make things easier for their readers.

The case for rhetorical reading is clearest for Philostratus' account of Aristides. For Philostratus, as we have seen, Aristides is the 'the sophist most skilled in his art' (τεχνικώτατος σοφιστῶν) (VS 585); in particular, he is 'strong at preliminary theoretical reflection' (πολὺς ἐν θεωρήμασι) (VS 585), excellent in his 'creativity' (τὸ γόνιμον) (VS 582), and remembered as working out his speeches 'sententia by sententia' (νόημα ἐκ νοήματος) (VS 583). All these three terms are to a greater or lesser extent part of the technical

vocabulary of rhetoric. θεώρημα is a fairly obscure term which hovers between the rules of a theoretical body of knowledge (LSJ s.v. II b) and the (preliminary, theoretical) meditation involved in such an art (thus elsewhere in Philostratus' account of Aristides (VS 582)).⁵⁹ τὸ γόνιμον ('creativity') had been part of the vocabulary of poetics since Aristophanes (*Ra.* 96), but could appear in technical rhetorical literature too: it occurs in the *De sublimitate* (8.1), and Menander Rhetor describes fictitious hymns to the gods as γονιμώτατος ('most creative') (342). Νόημα is more technical (Ernesti 1795, s.v.): in Philostratus it should probably be taken in the sense of what in Latin is called a *sententia*, a striking expression of a thought. Philostratus, then, processes Aristides' literary output in terms of contemporary rhetorical theory, and moreover does so without apology. Furthermore, Philostratus' characterisation of Aristides' rhetoric as 'creative' (γόνιμος) accords with the verdict of Longinus and other critics reported by Sopater in his *prolegomena* to Aristides, where he is characterized precisely as γόνιμος. At the very least this suggests that Philostratus' account reflects rhetoricians' thinking on Aristides.⁶⁰ it may even mean that Philostratus' account contributed to later critical verdicts on the author.

But while such rhetorical reading is (as it may have been elsewhere) more prominent for Philostratus' biography of Aristides, it is not confined to him. When it comes to analysis of other sophists' styles, Rutherford has shown that Philostratus deploys many technical terms that we find in works on *idea* theory (I. Rutherford, *Canons of Style* 1998, 22–36, esp. 25–31). 'Abundance' (περιβολή), for example, one of the most fully described *ideai* in Hermogenes (*Id.* I 11), is an aesthetic term commonly found in Philostratus (e.g. VS 627,

⁵⁹ So the Anonymous Seguerianus, who takes θεώρημα as meaning a rule, for him something like an infallible rule, which in his opinion is more characteristic of an ἐπιστήμη (perhaps 'science') than a τέχνη like rhetoric (31). In the third-century Apsines (*GRS* 129), a θεώρημα is effectively the same as a *topos* (e.g. *Rh.* 1.4.1 Patillon).

⁶⁰ It seems possible for Philostratus to have encountered the thoughts of Longinus before the composition of the VS (perhaps directly, in the Athens of the 230s), but it is not a necessary supposition: Philostratus could of course be reflecting the thinking of earlier rhetoricians followed by Longinus. For the biographies of both figures see *GRS* (no.s 632 and 832).

594); the same may be said of ‘florescence’ (ἀκμή) (Hermog. *Id.* I 10) and ‘indignation’ (βαρύτης) (*Id.* II 8). It may even be true, as Rutherford suggests, that some of this terminology originated in the context of declamation performances. Philostratus also makes casual but clear reference to declamation scenarios that, to use the technical term, ‘lack issue’ (VS 595–6), i.e. are unarguable on account of some design flaw (Hermog. *Stat.* I.13–24), something rather obscured in Wright’s Loeb translation.⁶¹

A further incident in Eunapius reveals this author to have assumed a similar familiarity with theory also (VS 488–90). This incident, indeed, is particularly revealing given Eunapius’ oft-expressed contempt for theory (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 137). When the chair of rhetoric at Athens fell vacant after the death of the previous incumbent, the proconsul of Achaëa gathered candidates in Athens for a rhetorical contest. The proconsul, Eunapius tells us, was initially about to propose what is simply referred to as a ‘definition’ (ὅρον) for the candidates to declaim (i.e. a scenario whose issue was definition), then, on the suggestion of Prohaeresius, invited two experienced rhetoricians in the audience to propose one instead. Eunapius thus assumes not only that it is reasonable for a proconsul to have some familiarity with issue-theory, but also that the proconsul’s audience and his own will understand what a ‘definition’ is first time without further qualification.⁶²

So while rhetorical theory is the not the dominant lens through which Philostratus and Eunapius read declamation, through their casual deployment of rhetorical terminology,

⁶¹ ‘Ptolemy is sometimes accused of having failed to comprehend clearly his controversial themes so as to see where they were consistent and where not’ (κατηγοροῦσι δὲ τοῦ Πτολεμαίου τινὲς ὡς μὴ διορῶντος τὰς ὑποθέσεις, μηδὲ ὅπη ξυνεστᾶσί τε καὶ μή). On the technical rhetorical sense of συνίστημι, see Lausberg (Lausberg 1998, 45).

⁶² Curiously, the *second* time this term is used, Eunapius qualifies it as ‘*what is called* a “definition”’ (τὸν καλούμενον ὅρον). But given that καλούμενος (‘so-called’) is absent on the first mention of the term, and absent from subsequent references to ‘divisions’ (διαίρέσεις), it is perhaps to be taken as an apology for using technical language rather than a sign that the term would be unfamiliar to (some of) Eunapius’ readers. On καλούμενος (‘so-called’) in Eunapius, see Becker (Becker 2013, 224 with n. 456).

Philostratus and Eunapius reveal their own ability to process declamation in rhetorical terms, as well as their confidence in their audiences' ability to do the same.

1.3. Conclusions

Rhetorical reading, then, seems to be a more (i) pervasive and (ii) sophisticated procedure than has hitherto been appreciated. I will summarise these claims in turn:

(i) Rhetorical theory permeated the consumption of declamation. A declamation would be preceded by one or more of *prolegomena*, a *prolalia*, a *theoria*, and a hypothesis, all of which to a greater or lesser extent presented a rhetorical perspective on the coming declamation, while the declamation itself would have been accompanied throughout by rhetorical commentary, whether in the form of gestures or comments from author or audience in performance, or written commentary in the case of reading, or, in either context, by the metarhetoric and metarhetorical style inherent in some texts. While those who were not students would have had access to slightly fewer of the rhetorical paratexts, or perhaps paid them slightly less attention, a great number of them would have been exposed to these paratexts as students and so to some degree internalized their reading process and been able to reproduce those processes even in their absence.⁶³

(ii) Ancient rhetorical reading is not criticism-by-numbers. Rather, it is evaluative-didactic: one aims to evaluate a work's persuasion and also to learn something from it. This goes some way to explaining the prominence of the identification of techniques in our sources, particularly in the scholia: identification seems to be both a means of praising a declaimer's achievements and of pointing them out for imitation; as Sopater says, one can draw as much

⁶³ Pervasiveness should not be taken to imply uniformity of practice. There were obviously, as we have said, differences of emphasis: in Philostratus, it seems to be style that is uppermost, with issue-theory latent and surfacing only sporadically; in the *theoriai*, the theoretical concerns are principally those of the *noēsis*; in the Aristides paratexts, the emphasis is on issue-theory and invention.

as one wants from Aristides' epicheiremes (above, p. 60). Evaluation and learning, however, are not limited to aspects of a declamation which follow the rules to the letter or for which terminology already exists, as we have seen multiple times. Such a willingness to go beyond the theory should not be surprising: indeed, it is a commonplace of ancient rhetorical theory that the best authors not only go beyond the rules but sometimes even break them (e.g. Quint. 2.13); Aristides himself says as much (*Or.* 2.120). Indeed, in doing so, declaimers are very much of their time: just as other authors in this period frequently break generic boundaries, so too was breaking rhetorical rules probably in part a way of showing that one was both conversant with such rules and ultimately superior to them.⁶⁴ A declaimer's innovations might even, as Philostratus says of Aristides, 'teach us' (ἀναδιδάσκει ἡμᾶς) (VS 585) or—in Longinus' striking formulation—'become theory'.⁶⁵ we have seen this several times, from Libanius claiming that his declamation represents an advance in the theory of division (above, pp. 52–4), to theorists citing declamations to exemplify techniques they are describing (above, p. 21 n. 46), as they did also in this period for Demosthenes.⁶⁶ Aristides also became rhetoric in another sense, for two treatises on style were attributed to him: clearly the idea, however erroneous, that the declaimer also theorized was attractive, and to do so would not have been unusual.⁶⁷ To take declamations as didactic examples, of course,

⁶⁴ This is very much like Philagrus' response when asked in which ancient authority a barbaric word he had used was to be found: 'in Philagros' (παρὰ Φιλάγρῳ) (VS 579). As Schmitz superbly paraphrases, Philagrus is effectively saying '[i]ch weiß, daß ich zur Gruppe der πεπαιδευμένοι gehöre, kenne die Regeln eines solchen Streitgespräches und habe es daher nicht nötig, meine Zugehörigkeit durch Schulwissen zu legitimieren' (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 126).

⁶⁵ 'Demosthenes, who is very skilful in refutations, does not always abide by the art [of rhetoric], but often himself becomes the art [of rhetoric]. So too Aristides.' (Δημοσθένης δεινότατος ὢν ἐν ταῖς ἀντιθέσεσιν οὐκ ἂν τῇ τέχνῃ ἐμμένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς γίνεται τέχνη πολλάκις. ὡσαύτως καὶ Ἀριστείδης) (fr. 50.5).

⁶⁶ For example, in examining Dem. 19, Menander Rhetor argues that the heading of 'sequence of events', when concerned with something spoken, need not always be solved by 'letter and intent', and that the standard definition of the issue of 'incident conjecture' should be relaxed. On the basis of Isocrates he argues that there can in fact be a 'simple conjecture' even without acts to judge (Heath, *Menander* 2004, 194–204).

⁶⁷ The *Suda* records the combination of declamations and theoretical works for 16 figures (s.vv. Ἀδριανός, Ἀριστοκλῆς, Ἀσπάσιος, Ἐπιφάνιος, Γαϊανός, Γυμνάσιος, Λιβάνιος, Μητροφάνης, Νικόλαος, Νικόλαος, Ὀνάσιμος, Φιλόστρατος, Παῦλος, Πολυδεύκης, Ποσειδώνιος, Σιρίκιος).

would be natural: exemplification is a vital part of rhetorical teaching in this period,⁶⁸ from the one sentence examples in a text like Minucian's *Peri epicheirēmatōn* to the short but complete exercises included in a text like Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata*⁶⁹ and Sopater's *Diaireseis zētēmatōn*, which is made up almost entirely of worked examples. From a pedagogical point of view, full declamations simply stand at what we might call the 'exemplificatory' end of this spectrum, being pure example—or indeed, not quite at the end, or not for long, for as we have seen, they were rapidly surrounded with didactic paratexts. Needless to say, to move from declamatory example back to rhetorical theory is not unnatural: rhetorical practice was often *prior* to rhetorical theory, however much theory likes to present itself as fundamental; there had to have been a Demosthenes before one could speak 'like Demosthenes' (Δημοσθενικῶς) (Heath, Menander 2004, 235–6). In sum, the division between rhetorical theory and declamatory practice is not strict, nor is the direction of travel solely from theory to practice: ultimately, to read a declamation rhetorically means to bring it *into dialogue* with rhetorical theory.

⁶⁸ As Quintilian says (specifically of arrangement), there are some things which 'a writer cannot demonstrate except with a particular definite subject' (*scriptor demonstrare non possit nisi certa definitaque materia*) (7.10.7). For declamation as a teaching tool, see Winterbottom (Winterbottom, *Declamation*, Greek and Latin 1983, 70–5).

⁶⁹ For Aphthonius, see *GRS* no.s 93–96.

Chapter 2. Rhetorical Readings

This chapter offers extended ‘rhetorical readings’ of a selection of second- and third-century declamations. These readings are intended to illustrate and explore, by means of practical experiment, the rhetorical mode of reading set out in the previous chapter, and also to be a contribution to our understanding and appreciation of the works themselves. In chapter one, it was argued that the relationship between rhetorical theory and declamation should be seen ultimately as one of *dialogue*. Accordingly, each declamation examined in this chapter is set beside the relevant rhetorical theory,¹ and it is asked to what extent the work exemplifies, extends, conflates, or contradicts those theories, or indeed simply falls outside of them. Of course, there are as many readings as there are readers, particularly when one approaches works through a lens as dense and kaleidoscopic as that of Greek rhetorical theory, given the central role of declamation in education in this period,² and the central role of theory in learning to declaim,³ but I believe that the readings presented here, and the modes of reading that they represent, are very likely to have been shared by a good number of ancient readers.

I begin with Aristides’ *On Peace with Sparta* (Or. 7), looking closely at a selection of similarities and differences between its persuasive strategies and what the handbooks prescribe. I then consider the extraordinarily rich argumentation that we find in Aristides’ *Leuctran Orations* and surviving declamations of Polemo. Finally, I look at Lucian’s shrewd undermining of issue theory in his *Tyrannicida*.

¹ In what follows, I often have to cite works of rhetorical theory written *after* the declamations with which they are compared, but in such instances, we can nonetheless be reasonably sure that the theory expounded in the theoretical works cited (or something very like it) was around before the declamation was written (as, for example, in the case of the fairly traditional precepts on prooemia cited in the first section of this chapter). For the relative dating of Luc. *Tyr.* and Hermog. *Stat.*, see p. 64 n. 40.

² See above, p. 16 n. 21.

³ Many of the theoretical texts discussed in the previous chapter clearly originated in a classroom context (Heath, Menander 2004, 270–6).

1. Aristides' *On Peace with Sparta* (Or. 7): A Rhetorical Reading

The scenario is as follows. In 425 BCE, early in the Peloponnesian War, in the course of the fighting around Pylos, the Athenians managed to capture several hundred Spartan prisoners on the island of Sphacteria. The Spartans offered generous terms in an attempt to recover the prisoners: Aristides' declamation represents the speech of an unnamed Athenian urging the Athenians to accept the peace offered.⁴

The source for this episode is obviously Thucydides (4.2–20). In Thucydides, however, we hear the Spartan ambassadors making the case for peace (4.17–20). Aristides' choice to make this case from an Athenian perspective changes the rhetorical situation considerably. First, the speaker's motives now come under suspicion (why is an Athenian arguing for Sparta?), and second, an argument mentioned by Thucydides but not used by the Spartans themselves in his account (4.21) comes into play: that the Athenians have in some sense already made this decision, in that at an earlier stage in the war, after the plague, they had been eager to make peace with Sparta (2.69). It is no surprise that these two changes correspond to the most rhetorically salient features of the declamation: first, the carefully constructed prooemium, and second, Aristides' use of the argument from consistency, and it is on these two aspects that the following rhetorical reading of the declamation will focus in turn.

The speaker's case is difficult, as we have said. Sparta, Athens' old enemy, has been heavily defeated and against all expectation, as Thucydides memorably tells us.⁵ Furthermore, with the Spartan prisoners now serving as surety (Thuc. 4.41.1), Spartan incursions into Attica are finally at an end. At this juncture it might seem timid, foolish, or unpatriotic to give up

⁴ For brief discussion (largely paraphrase), see Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 279–80)

⁵ 'And this was the most unexpected thing that happened to the Greeks in the course of the war' (παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο) (4.40.1).

the Spartan prisoners or to try and restrain Athens either with talk of reconciliation or with worries about the future; the military success at Pylos might just as well serve as an argument for prosecuting the war with renewed vigour. Moreover, in the context of imperial Greek rhetorical theory, the speaker might be suspected of pro-Spartan leanings or even of having been bribed: Apsines comments on the ‘adverse factor’ (Dilts-Kennedy) (ἀντιπίπτον) which arises ‘whenever the audience suspect the reason that you have undertaken the accusation’ (ὅταν οἱ ἀκούοντες ὑποπτεύωσι τὴν αἰτίαν δι’ ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν κατηγορίαν ἦκεις) (226.4–6); Ps.-Hermogenes’ *De inventione* warns that those speaking in defence of someone will often face accusations of acting ‘out of favouritism or for profit’ (εὐνοίας ἢ κέρδους) (I 1.21).⁶ The Thucydidean context, too, makes the suspicion of bribery natural.⁷

Aristides’ long and carefully-constructed prooemium works hard to tackle these problems. The speech opens as follows: ‘First, Athenians, [we owe] great gratitude to the gods...’ (Πρῶτον μὲν, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, χάρις πολλὴ τοῖς θεοῖς...) (1). The handbooks tell us that one can lead in to a speech by making a comment on one’s audience, one’s opponent, oneself, or the subject itself: here Aristides is obviously using the subject itself (ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων (Anon. Seg. 7)). Alternatively, or perhaps more precisely, one could see Aristides as using a technique mentioned in Ps.-Hermogenes, that of opening by acknowledging the audience’s pre-existing feeling about the subject under discussion (I 1.5–8). The idea, it seems (never explicitly stated), is to ingratiate oneself with one’s audience by showing that one shares their enthusiasms. But in this declamation, Aristides has his opening serve two further rhetorical purposes. First, by expressing gratitude to the gods, his speaker quietly heads off

⁶ Compare also the prooemium to Aristid. *Or.* 11, where the Athenian speaker argues for alliance with Sparta, but insists that he wants neither side (Thebes or Sparta) to be more successful than is expedient for the city: ‘I do not choose the Spartans with a view to winning favour with them’ (οὐ πρὸς χάριν αἰροῦμαι Λακεδαιμονίους) paraphrases the scholion (mislabelled in Dindorf as a scholion to Aristid. 427.1), making explicit what the speaker has prudently left unsaid.

⁷ See for instance the accusations of bribery traded back and forth by Diodotus and Cleon in Thucydides’ Mytilenian debate (Thuc. 3.46–49).

the likely suspicion of disloyalty. Second, by attributing Athens' recent success at least in part to the aid of the gods, the speaker adumbrates a major argument of the speech: that if the war is pursued further, however valiantly the Athenians fight, success is not wholly within their control, but depends also on external factors, such as the will of the gods (e.g. 5–6, 13–14, 20). Finally, note how innocuous Aristides has made these ideas by putting them within a prayer, a formulaic form of opening a speech.

The opening sentence continues as follows:

...that those who were formerly bold and did not want to endure even the name of peace, though we often called on them to do so, have come here for peace.

(οἱ τοὺς μὲν πρότερον θρασυνομένους καὶ μηδ' ὄνομα εἰρήνης ἐθέλοντας ἀνασχέσθαι, πολλάκις ἡμῶν προκαλουμένων αὐτοὺς, ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης δεῦρ' ἦκειν) (1)

This brief résumé of the events at Sphacteria has been crafted with equal care, as comparison with Thucydides' account shows. For Thucydides, the main point of interest in the events at Sphacteria is seeing the once-mighty Spartan hoplites humbled: he has an Athenian ally ask sneeringly 'whether it was their finest men who had died' (εἰ οἱ τεθνεῶτες αὐτῶν καλοὶ κάγαθοί) (4.40.2),⁸ and he himself imagines the skirmish as a second Thermopylae (4.36.3), this time ending in (ignoble) surrender rather than (glorious) destruction. After such a triumph, it might seem perverse to argue for peace: success on the battlefield might more naturally argue for further military action. In Aristides' presentation, however, the main thing achieved at Sphacteria is to have brought the Spartans to the negotiating table: to rebuff their offer of peace would be to reject the hard-won fruits of Athens' victory. Furthermore, it is particularly shrewd to place this slanted presentation in the prooemium, for here it can masquerade as a mere functional recap of the situation to start the speech. Aristides has certainly made the most of his opening 'from the subject itself' (ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων).

⁸ I.e. that those who had surrendered had been the more cowardly portion of the Spartan troops.

Now theory reasonably prescribes that a prooemium let the audience know ‘what the speech is going to be about’ (περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι) so that they can follow the argument, and offers a number of techniques to achieve this, such as προέκθεσις, ἀνανέωσις, and μερισμός (perhaps ‘preliminary statement’, ‘reminder’, and ‘partition’ (Dilts-Kennedy)) (Anon. Seg. 10). But Aristides disregards this advice, and the true topic of this speech—peace with Sparta—is only faintly hinted at in the prooemium. In the first chapter, there is only a vague injunction to ‘guard against the Spartans’ stupidity and contentiousness, and abide by your own customs and habits’ (τὴν μὲν τούτων ἀγνωμοσύνην καὶ φιλονεικίαν φυλάξασθαι, τοῖς δ’ ὑμετέροις αὐτῶν ἤθεσι καὶ τρόποις ἐμμεῖναι), along with talk of an ‘opportunity’ (καιρός) offered by the victory ‘to deliberate afresh about Greek politics’ (ἐξ ἀρχῆς βουλευέσασθαι περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν) (1), instantly qualified with the words ‘in whatever way you are persuaded’ (ὅπως ἂν πείσησθε).⁹ Chapter 2 is fractionally clearer: the speaker introduces as an anonymous, ancient saying what must also surely be his own view that ‘it is not easy for those who meet with success to be sensible’ (οὐ ῥάδιον εὖ πράττοντας εὖ φρονεῖν) (2). Though the reference is to Athens’ present position, the speaker leaves it to the audience to make the connection for themselves. Next he cleverly distances himself from such a thought at the same time as reiterating it by saying that Athens, being so familiar with success, would be very unlikely to fall into this trap: as he urged in the opening chapter, Athens should stick to its habits. But of course, this caginess about the true nature of the speaker’s proposal makes good rhetorical sense. The argument for peace will be controversial, and an audience might reject it outright if it were stated clearly at the outset. By postponing a clear statement of his proposal, the speaker gives himself more time to prepare his audience in advance. A Menander Rhetor might have declared a ‘theoretical precept’ (θεώρημα) here: that normally

⁹ In its ostensible open-endedness this prooemium is similar to what the scholiast on Aristid. 11 calls a ‘aporetic’ (διαπορητικόν) prooemium (scholion mislabelled in Dindorf as 427.1).

one should give the audience a preview of one's argument at the beginning of a speech, except when that argument will be very controversial, in which case one should avoid revealing it until one has prepared the ground first.

The prooemium of this speech, then, makes use of rhetorical techniques, but its persuasive achievement is not limited to them: much of the persuasive force of the opening sentence alone is derived from elements not covered by rhetorical handbooks, and indeed ones that are perhaps too subtle and too specific to the case in hand ever to become part of theory. In its deliberate vagueness about the speaker's proposal, furthermore, it contradicts rhetorical precepts, but to great persuasive effect.

I turn now to the speech's argumentation. Since these speeches are debating what course of action to take in the future, the speech's issue is 'pragmatic' (the Greek imperial successor of the classical deliberative speech), as a hypothesis would no doubt have informed us, and the headings, which for this sort of speech are effectively mere sources of arguments, are law/custom, justice, advantage, consequence, possibility, and honour (Hermog. *Stat.* VII 1). Now a good portion of the speech certainly can be analysed in this way. The speaker makes most use of the headings of advantage and honour, arguing (i) that there is no guarantee that Athens would emerge victorious from further war, and that in any case the potential benefits of victory are outweighed by what would be at risk, and (ii) that to choose war when Sparta offers peace would incur odium and the charge of contentiousness from the rest of Greece. To this degree, Aristides follows theory, and both of these arguments, particularly the former, are to be found in the Spartans' speech in Thucydides (4.17–20). But a significant part of Aristides' arguments is not captured by this division. For one of the most pervasive sources of arguments in this speech—adumbrated in the prooemium, occupying first place in the argumentative portion of the speech (6–9), and repeated later (19–20) is the notion of

consistency: the speaker argues again and again that the decision to make peace with Sparta has already been made.¹⁰ This is potentially a powerful move, for if successful it forecloses the argument before it has begun, and denies the speaker's opponent debate.

The notion of consistency is first seen in the prooemium:

those who were formerly bold and did not want to endure even the name of peace, though we often called on them to do so, have come here for peace...

(τοὺς μὲν πρότερον θρασυνομένους καὶ μηδ' ὄνομα εἰρήνης ἐθέλοντας ἀνασχέσθαι, πολλάκις ἡμῶν προκαλουμένων αὐτοὺς, ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης δεῦρ' ἦκειν...) (1)

The idea of consistency is implicit here: as we have repeatedly called on the Spartans to accept peace in the past, now that they are willing to make peace, we should accede to that request. In this form, there is some precedent in the handbooks. Apsines describes what he calls a prooemium derived 'from what follows' (ἐξ ἀκολουθου), in which a speaker might say 'since you approved what was said a short while ago and regarded it as sensible, obviously you won't have a different opinion about what I have now stood up to say, since it follows from what was said earlier' (14);¹¹ Ps.-Hermogenes' *De inventione* describes a prooemium 'from opportunity' (ἀπὸ καιροῦ) in which, roughly speaking, the speaker again argues that the point of contention has in some sense already been decided (I 4). Finally, the argument from consistency in our prooemium has some similarities to the heading of 'exception' (παραγραφή), the first heading in Hermogenes' division of the issue of conjecture. In this heading the speaker calls into question the validity of the charge (*Stat.* III 2–3). Among the examples of the arguments used in this heading, Hermogenes mentions a prohibition on trying a man twice for the same offence: this is obviously similar to our

¹⁰ If this argument falls under any of the conventional headings, it falls under 'custom'/'law' (τὸ νόμιμον), but decisions of a few months or years ago are rather different from paradigm examples of this heading, such as the custom of burying the dead (Aps. *Rh.* 293.16–22).

¹¹ οἱ γὰρ τὰ μικρῶ πρόσθεν εἰρημένα προσειμένοι καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν κεκρικότες, ἀκόλουθα τούτοις ὄντα οἷς καὶ νῦν ἐρῶν ἀνέστην, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων ἐτέρως γνώσεσθε.

speaker's insistence that the same decision should not be taken twice, even if the issue here is not conjecture but the practical issue.

But such techniques—prooemia ‘from what follows’ or ‘from opportunity’, and ‘exceptions’—are only forceful ways of beginning a speech. Aristides, however, continues to deploy arguments about consistency after the prooemium: indeed, he devotes a significant portion of the argumentative section of his speech to this theme (6–9, 19–20). Now arguments from consistency in this portion of a speech are not totally without warrant in the handbooks, for Aristides' argumentation does come close to what Ps.-Hermogenes' *De inventione* calls ‘fictive epicheiremes’ (πλαστά) (III 13.20–31), which are essentially what we would call ‘counter-factuals’. Ps.-Hermogenes offers an example from a declamation concerning a hero's or tyrannicide's reward: ‘if I had asked for the reward back then, before I had done the good deed, would you not have given it to me?’ (159).¹² So in Aristides:

But now that you are in charge, how is it reasonable not to follow the policy which you would have followed from the start, if no one had hindered any part of it?

(νῦν δὲ πῶς εἰκὸς ἐφ' ὑμῖν γεγενημένων μὴ χρῆσθαι τούτοις, ἃ γ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἂν, εἰ μηδεὶς ἐκώλυσε μηδὲν, ἐπράξατε...;) (8)

But in Ps.-Hermogenes, a ‘fictive epicheireme’ is only an epicheireme, an elaboration of an argument, specifically one that is supposed to be tacked on to the heading ‘sequence of events’ (*Inv.* III 13.20–31): it is not envisaged as a major source of argumentation in its own right.

So while the argument from consistency that Aristides deploys throughout this speech has its origins in theorized moves—prooemia ‘from what follows’ and ‘from opportunity’, the heading of ‘exception’, and the ‘fictive epicheireme’—in this declamation, Aristides

¹² εἰ πρὶν ἢ ποιῆσαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἤτουν δωρεάν, οὐκ ἂν μοι ἔδοτε;

repurposes and blends what in the handbooks are small-scale, local tactics for different portions of the speech to create a powerful argument from consistency that pervades the whole work. Menander would have had much to say here.

So a rhetorical reading focused solely on identifying techniques described in handbooks would miss many of the ways in which a declamation like Aristides *Or.* 7 can supplement and advance rhetorical theory. For example, while Aristides' prooemium is in broad terms in accordance with theory in its attempt to project a favourable *ēthos*, much of the overall persuasive force of that prooemium comes from a number of clever details both too small and too specific to the case in hand to have ever been the subject of rhetorical theorizing, such as Aristides' carefully chosen opening words: we see here the truth of the thought that there are some things that a rhetor cannot demonstrate except by example (above, p. 80 n. 68). Or consider Aristides' use of consistency as a criterion in evaluating a proposed course of action. While a more conventional rhetorical reading might simply cite similar theoretical moves from the handbooks, or even distort the text or the handbooks in an attempt to make the one fit the other more closely, a more dialogic rhetorical reading recognises that Aristides' argument does not correspond exactly to anything in the handbooks, but that Aristides has rather intermingled and extended their techniques to produce something much more pervasive and powerful in this speech. And finally, a more dialogic mode of rhetorical reading means that it is not surprising or perplexing when Aristides' text flatly contradicts theoretical precepts: rather we can use the mismatch between theory and practice as a starting point for understanding more deeply the persuasive strategies of a given passage. Thus when Aristides is deliberately and (prudently) vague in his prooemium, it is precisely the departure from theory that marks this passage out as worthy of our attention. In short, what rhetoric offers declaimers in composing and their audiences in reading is not so much

a template into which to fit every speech as a toolkit on which they can selectively and creatively draw to meet the needs of the case at hand.

2. Argumentation in Aristides' *Leuctran Orations* (Orr. 11–15) and Polemo's *Declamations*

I focus now on argumentation in rhetorical reading. In chapter 1, we saw how the techniques of argumentation presented by issue-theory and invention in the Greek imperial period were a significant improvement on their predecessors, and offered powerful and easy-to-use methods for devising arguments of all kinds; we noted the reverence with which Ps.-Hermogenes spoke of the 'limitless abundance' (ἡ εὐπορία... ἀμύθητος) (*Inv.* III.4.4.2–3) his system offered, and the way in which techniques of invention were so important that they influenced even the style and stylistic theory of Greek imperial rhetoric (above, pp. 46–47). In particular, we saw that argumentation was an important part of reading a declaimer's works. The scholia to Aristides frequently note his use of epicheiremes or headings, or indeed debate which heading of several possibilities a particular passage is using; the prolegomena to Aristides' works present him to readers as 'rich in enthymemes' (ἐνθυμηματικός), and, more generally, as 'creative' (γόνιμος), and finish by describing him as 'giving more attention to thought than to diction' (τῆς λέξεως πλείονα διδοὺς ἐννοεῖν) (7).¹³ In short, argumentation was an exciting area in Greek imperial theorizing, and an important part of rhetorical reading.

It is argumentation, I argue, that is the key to understanding and appreciating the most extravagant of all declamatory productions, Aristides' five *Leuctran Orations* (Orr. 11–15), in which Spartan and Theban ambassadors each seek alliance with Athens after Thebes' crushing defeat of Sparta at the battle of Leuctra. The first speech argues in favour of alliance

¹³ Treatise C has a slightly easier formulation of this phrase, τῆς λέξεως πλείονα διδοὺς τῷ νοεῖν (20).

with Sparta, the second in favour of alliance with Thebes, the third in favour of alliance with Sparta again, and the fourth in favour of alliance with Thebes once more; a fifth and final speech then makes the case for alliance with neither side.¹⁴

In producing this sequence of speeches Aristides has departed significantly from the Xenophontic structuring of the episode (*HG* 6.4.19–20, 5.33–49).¹⁵ In Xenophon, the Thebans' case is reported in a single chapter, in indirect speech, and only one argument is really identifiable—that the Athenians have a chance to take vengeance on the Spartans for all the wrongs they have done them over the years. There are then twelve chapters of other events before we hear both the Spartan ambassadors and the ambassadors of their allies addressing the assembly (6.5.33–49). First to speak are five Spartans, named as Aracus, Ocyllus, Pharax, Etymocles, and Olontheus, whose arguments are described as all having been broadly similar and are reported together in indirect speech over the course of four chapters (6.5.33–36). The next chapter gives us the pro-Spartan views of one Cliteles, a Corinthian, given in direct speech (6.5.37); the final twelve chapters give the words of one Procles of Phlius, another pro-Spartan, again in direct speech (6.5.38–49). Out of this rather diverse material Aristides has produced a simplified and symmetrical structure. The politics has been simplified by banishing the ambassadors of the Spartans, their allies, and the Thebans, and instead making the five speakers all anonymous Athenians; the structure has been simplified by having all the speakers speak one after another in the course of a single debate; and the dispute has been made much less lop-sided by giving both sides two equal chances to speak, which necessitates a huge enlargement of the arguments in favour of Thebes.

¹⁴ For discussion (largely paraphrase), see Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 281–90).

¹⁵ For a detailed study of Aristides' sources for these declamations, see Burchardt (Burchardt 1895).

The effects of this simplification and restructuring are first, to minimise distractions and focus attention on the argumentation, and second, considerably to increase the argumentative challenge of this scenario for the composer. Speeches arguing for one side and then the other, or making the same case twice in different ways, are obviously both serious tests of one's rhetoric: this must be a major part of the reason for the popularity of both sorts of pairing in a period obsessed with rhetoric and argumentation.¹⁶ Of two speeches making the same case, the first should be so convincing and so exhaustive that the audience cannot imagine how it could be bettered, and then the second speech should proceed to do just that. When arguing for and against the same position, the first speech should present an argument so compelling that the audience cannot imagine how it could be opposed, and then the second speech, in a breath-taking volte-face, should use exactly the same data to make another equally or still more compelling argument. This is far from easy: if the bonds of argument in the first speech are not tight enough, both they and the escape will be unimpressive; if they are too tight, while they may be admired in their own right, escape in the second speech will either be impossible or will oblige the speaker to cheat by moving the rhetorical goalposts. We could refer to this phenomenon—both pairs of speeches for the same side and pairs of speeches for and then against a given position—as ‘rhetorical escapology’.

Aristides' *Leuctran Orations* constitute the most elaborate example of such rhetorical escapology in the whole of Greek literature, for we have *two* sets of arguments for and then against a proposition (*Orr.* 11 and 12, for Sparta and Thebes respectively, then the same

¹⁶ For paired declamations for and against a case, see Pernot (Pernot, *Discours Siciliens* 1981, 81–6). Examples are: Polemo's Marathonian declamations (discussed below), Aristides' two speeches *On Sending Reinforcements to Sicily I* and *On Sending Reinforcements to Sicily II* (*Orr.* 5–6), *Lib. Decl.* 7–8 and 9–10, and *Chor. Decl.* 1–2 and 5–6. Pairs of speeches making the same case are less common, but are represented elsewhere by Aristides' *To the Thebans I* and *To the Thebans II* (*Orr.* 9–10), and, later *Lib. Decl.* 3–4 and 19–20. There are also two episodes in Philostr. *VS* of speakers performing the same scenario twice in succession, though here the emphasis seems rather to be on stylistic variety (*VS* 571–4, 619) (Civiletti 2002, 548–49, 641–2).

again in *Orr.* 13 and 14), two pairs of speeches in which the same case is argued two different ways (thus *Orr.* 11 and 13 on behalf of the Spartans, and *Orr.* 12 and 14 on behalf of the Thebans), and finally, a closing speech in favour of neither side, a unique feature; thus in the course of these five speeches, Aristides ties himself up and escapes no fewer than four times.¹⁷ The ancient testimonia suggest that these speeches should probably be considered something of a masterwork. What is known by tradition as a hypothesis to these works, the only such piece to survive for any of Aristides' declamations, says that these speeches 'are greatly admired for their intensity and for their epicheiremes' (θαυμάζονται δὲ πάνυ ἐπὶ τῇ δεινότητι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχειρήμασιν) (2);¹⁸ they are also mentioned by a commentator on Hermogenes' *De statibus* in the same breath as Demosthenes and Thucydides, no mean feat for a Greek imperial speech (Walz *RG* 4.764.13–16), and in another scholion on the same work, they are cited as a paradigm example of a 'three-fold' (τριπλῆ) deliberative scenario (i.e. one in which three possible courses of action are debated) (Walz *RG* 4.765.26–766.3, 5.186.30–187.11). Their massive length too, both as a whole and in some cases individually, doubtless also contributed to their monumental status.

To enable ready comprehension of the invention in these five speeches, their arguments are set out below, with the headings in italics. The issue of these speeches is pragmatic, so the headings are once more law/custom, justice, advantage, possibility, consequence, and honour.¹⁹

¹⁷ 'une démonstration éclatante de sa virtuosité oratoire' (Boulanger 1923, 282). Antiphon's *Tetralogies* have two speeches for either side, but are much shorter and less fully worked out, and lack the final speech in favour of neither side.

¹⁸ Contrast the lukewarm praise of modern scholars, who talk, for instance, of Aristides' efforts 'pour varier le ton et soutenir l'intérêt', as if the audience's interest is liable to drop off at any moment (Boulanger 1923, 282). For δεινότης, see p. 61 n. 37 above.

¹⁹ Heath's analysis of the headings of argument in the *Fifth Leuctran* is very similar to mine (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 211–13).

First Leuctran (Or. 11)

(On Behalf of the Spartans)

- 1-4: Prooemium: balance Sparta against Thebes (*advantage*)
- 5: Athens' tradition of helping the weak (*custom*)
- 6-43: *Justice*:
 - Thebes guiltier (7-9)
 - Sparta punished enough (10-17)
 - Pity Sparta (18-21)
 - Permissible to break alliance with Thebes (22-35)
 - Thebes repaid (36-38)
 - Debt to Sparta (39-43)
- 44-46: *Honour* of saving Sparta
- 47-62: *Advantage*:
 - Sparta less dangerous (47-51)
 - Thebes more dangerous (52-59)
 - Against neutrality (60-62)
- 63-9: History of mutual aid between Sparta and Athens (*custom*)
- 70: Conclusion (*honour*)

Second Leuctran (Or. 12)

(On Behalf of the Thebans)

- 1-3: Prooemium: alliance already decided
- 4-6: *Honour* beckons
- 7-39: *Justice*:
 - Sparta not punished enough (7-18)
 - Thebes less guilty than Sparta (19-25)
 - Immoral to break the alliance (26-39)
- 40-52: Sparta more dangerous than Thebes (*advantage*)
- 53-4: Immoral to break alliance (*justice*)/foolish to throw away good position (*advantage*)
- 55-61: *Honour*:
 - *Honour* beckons (55-59)
 - Neutrality not *honourable* (60-61)
- 62-71: Sparta's crimes (*justice*); *honour* of being able to spare a defeated Sparta
- 72-3: Don't drive Thebes to Medism (*consequence*)
- 74: Conclusion

Third Leuctran (Or. 13)

(On Behalf of the Spartans)

- 1: Prooemium: keep open mind
- 2-7: Advantage more important than avenging Spartan crimes (*justice*)
- 8-9: Destruction of Sparta would be excessive (*honour*?) and unpopular (*advantage*)
- 10-11: Athenian generosity and Theban cruelty (*custom*)
- 12-25: *Consequence*:
 - Destroying Sparta would cause dissension at Athens (12)
 - Thebes won't call in Persia (13-18)
 - Vulnerability to Thebes without Sparta (19-20)
 - Risk Thebes will sack Sparta (21-22)
 - War with Thebes inevitable (23-25)
- 26-7: Sparta has suffered enough (*justice*)
- 28-34: *Honour*:
 - Shameful to be junior partner to Thebes (28-29)
 - Better to share power with Sparta alone (30-31)
 - Destruction of Sparta dishonourable (32-33)
 - Shameful for Sparta to get allies other than Athens (34)

Fourth Leuctran (Or. 14)

(On Behalf of the Thebans)

- 1-2: Prooemium:
 - Thebes has been kinder to us (*justice* and *advantage*) (1)
 - Wrong to change sides (*justice*) (2)
- 3-10: Sparta more to be feared than Thebes (*consequence*)
- 11-19: Spartan crimes (*justice*)
- 20-21: *Consequence*:
 - Sparta can survive defeat (20)
 - Thebes will let us decide Sparta's fate (21)
- 22-23: Don't change sides (*justice*)
- 24-27: *Honour*:
 - Thebes will make us equal partners, Sparta junior partners (24-25)
 - Shameful to ally with weaker party (26-27)
- 28-30: *Consequence*:
 - Sparta will not be sacked (28)
 - Risk Sparta would reject alliance (29-30)
- 31: Precedent for punishing even Athens' benefactors (*custom*)
- 32: Safer (*consequence*) and more *honourable* to side with Thebes
- 33: Conclusion

Fifth Leuctran (Or. 15)

(On Behalf of Neither Side)

- 1-5: Prooemium:
 - Awkward position of non-partisan speaker (1-3)
 - Partisanship of previous speakers (4-5)
- 6-10: Athens' *custom* of helping the weak:
 - Self-interest more important (6)
 - *Just* reason for intervention needed (7-8)
 - Impossible to decide who to help (9-10)
- 11-16: Neutrality punishes both Sparta and Thebes without damaging us (*advantage*)
- 17-26: *Justice*:
 - Kindnesses of either side dubious; both sides have harmed us (17-21)
 - Neutrality just reward for both sides (22-24)
 - Neutrality fulfils majority of both sides' desires (25-6)
- 27-28: Neutrality only logical position
- 29-32: Divide-and-conquer strategy *dishonourable* (29) and dangerous (*consequence*) (30-32)
- 33-42: *Advantage*:
 - Sparta will survive (33)
 - War risky (34-5)
 - Non-intervention allows time to rebuild (36-7)
 - Thebes and Sparta will not be concerned with us (38-42)
- 43-4: Conclusion

If we first compare the arguments in the two pairs of opposing speeches (*Orr.* 11–12, and 13–14), it becomes clear that Aristides has indeed not cheated or had to move the rhetorical goalposts, but that he manages to produce speeches of equal length and quality for either side using the same data. Thus, for example, the crushing defeat at Leuctra is said in the first speech to be sufficient punishment for the Spartans (11.10–17), and then in the second, not punishment enough (12.7–20); first Thebes (11.6–9), then Sparta (12.19–25) is said to have committed more crimes against Athens in the past; first Thebes (11.47–59), and then Sparta is said to be more dangerous to Athens (12.40–52); finally, we hear that Sparta should be preserved in case the Thebans call in the Persians (11.64), or that Athens should support Thebes precisely so that Thebes is not driven to resort to the King (12.72–3). The second pair of speeches (*Orr.* 13–14) shows similar symmetries: thus, for example, the second speaker in favour of Sparta argues that Athens would have to take the shameful position of a junior partner in an alliance with Thebes (13.28–29), while the second speaker in favour of Thebes argues that if Athens were to make an alliance with Sparta, Sparta would insist on a position of superiority (14.25).

This use of precisely the same data to make the case for and against a given proposition can be seen with even greater clarity in another contemporary example of rhetorical escapology, Polemo's two surviving declamations, in which the fathers of two soldiers killed at Marathon, Cynegirus and Callimachus, each make the case that their son's deeds were the greater.²⁰ The fathers both make use of the different ages of their sons: the youthful Cynegirus' achievements are said to be more impressive given his inexperience (A20) and

²⁰ Like Aristides, Polemo has shaped the traditional material available to him to produce an opposition that is stark but finely-balanced. From the whole host of heroes who distinguished themselves at Marathon (besides Cynegirus and Callimachus, Miltiades, Epizelus/Polyzelus, Echetlus, Sophanes, and Ameinias), Polemo has chosen an alliterative pair of heroes who both suffered spectacular mutilation, but made them polar opposites in age, status, and time of death in the battle. On Polemo's sources, see Hinck (Hinck 1873, 47–54) and Reader (Reader 1996, 30–40).

the greater number of years he lost (A20), while the older Callimachus' achievements are said to be greater precisely because older fighters are not as strong as younger fighters (B24). So too regarding the time of the deaths of the two heroes: Cynegirus, who died at the end of the battle, is praised for having fought the enemy until the bitter end rather than merely having repulsed them temporarily (A28), while the father of Callimachus, whose heroic death had come towards the beginning of the battle, states that turning the enemy is harder than pursuing them (B13, B25–8), suggesting that Callimachus' beginning made Cynegirus' end possible (B28–9), and indeed dismissing Cynegirus as a mere jealous imitator of Callimachus (B32, 38, 42). And so too regarding their relative rank: Cynegirus' achievements are all the greater because he volunteered to fight (A5, 18) and sought glory (A5) when he could have hung back (A19), in contrast to Callimachus, a general who was duty-bound (A5, 18; B6) to fight bravely (A19); or Callimachus' achievements are greater because as a general, it was he who was ultimately responsible for the victory (B17, 18), and indeed for Cynegirus' bravery (B23). And so on.²¹

This parallelism of argument in both declaimers is reinforced by frequent structural and even verbal parallels (the chart on p. 94 will be helpful once more). In Aristides, the first pair of speeches devote their first major argumentative sections to arguments from justice, both beginning with a consideration of whether Sparta has suffered enough and whether Thebes or Sparta has done more wrongs to Athens over the years; both then devote their second major argumentative sections to arguments from the heading of advantage, both of which begin with consideration of which of Sparta or Thebes poses greater danger to Athens. In Polemo, parallelism of structure is to be found not only in the argumentative section but throughout the two speeches, making the persuasive resources available in each still more

²¹ Reardon describes the pair of speeches as 'une seule longue antithèse poursuivie dans tous ses possibilités', but as we shall see, his allegation that this is done 'sans aucun souci de construction' is far off the mark (Reardon 1971, 109).

equally balanced. The first four chapters of both of his speeches are prooemia in which the merits of both sons are praised (A1–4, B1–4), before each father singles out his own son as the best of all who died (A4, B4). Both speeches then proceed to a narrative of similar length (A5–12, B10–15), in which the same elements recur: both sons come to Marathon eager for glory (A5, B6); both are said to have stood out in battle (A5, B7); both struggle for a long time (A10, B11); both sons curse nature as they die (A11, B11). The argumentative sections are both dominated by long *synkriseis* (A17–33; B23–50) that set out in a similar order the sort of parallel arguments we have already discussed; both speeches then end with a peroration (A34–49, B51–65) which in each speech largely consists of an extraordinarily lengthy exclamation (A34–37, B51–55) followed by an ekphrasis (A38–43, B56–61) made up of the sons’ respective accusations against the Persians (A38, 40, B56) and Persian responses led by Datis (A41–43, B60–1).

More remarkable than the structural parallels, however, are the verbal parallels. Thus in Polemo both sons are said to have set their sights on ‘great deeds’ (μεγάλων ἔργων/ἔργα μεγάλα) (A5, B6); both struggled ‘for a long time’ (πολὺν μὲν οὖν χρόνον) (A11, B11); one father says ‘these things make the victory mine, because of these things it is more just that the speech belong to me’ (ταῦτα ἐμὸν ποιεῖ τὸ νῖκος, διὰ ταῦτα ἐμοὶ τὸν λόγον προσήκειν μᾶλλον δίκαιον) (A12), while his rival responds ‘these things send me up to the grave, these things yield the funeral speech to me’ (ταῦτ’ ἐμὲ ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον ἀναβιβάζει, ταῦτ’ ἐμοὶ τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον παραδίδωσιν) (B15). In the *Leuctran Orations*, meanwhile, besides verbal parallels, we find elaborate sailing imagery running through the collection. In the first speech, the speaker compares the proposed shift in allegiance from Thebes to Sparta to the work of a helmsman, who of necessity frequently changes his course to follow the prevailing wind (11.26). In the second speech, the speaker responds that while it may be permissible for a helmsman to change his course in a storm, to do so in fair weather is culpable (12.38).

The image of the first speech then finds a reply in the fourth, where the Athenians are exhorted to hold fast to their course and not ‘in the manner of sailors, always to be changing sides and shifting to the lighter one’ (Behr) (τὸ τῶν πλεόντων μεταστρέψαι πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω διατοιχοῦντας αἰεὶ) (14.22). The effect of all these structural and verbal parallels is obviously to highlight the declaimer’s achievement. Not only can he make the same data argue for both sides, but he can even make the same structure and the very same words argue both ways.²² we might call such pairs of speeches ‘rhetorical palindromes’.

I turn now to look at the rhetorical problem of making the same case twice. The figure on page 93 above will again be helpful. The challenge, as we have said, is to produce a speech so convincing and so exhaustive that the audience cannot imagine how it could be improved, and then to produce a second speech that does precisely that. This Aristides achieves by varying the sources of his arguments between the two pairs of opposed speeches. The first two speeches are principally concerned above all with arguments from the heading of ‘justice’, with advantage or consequence much less prominent, and other headings barely registering. By contrast, Aristides’ second pair of speeches gives much less space to the heading of justice, and instead concentrates on advantage and consequence (in practice barely distinguishable from one another (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 134)). It is this change of headings that allows Aristides to pull off his escape. The first pair of speeches feel as if they are giving their subject a fairly thorough examination, but by focusing mainly on justice and reserving the headings of ‘advantage’ and ‘consequence’ for later, there is still an abundance of fresh material for the second pair of speeches.²³

²² The hugely exuberant rhetorical style of Polemo’s declamations, which sharpens the contrast between the positions of the two speakers, is of course another element that highlights Polemo’s rhetorical achievement (though Aristides clearly did not feel the need to avail himself of it).

²³ Contrast Boulanger, who says that the second speech for the Spartans (*Or.* 13) ‘qui n’est qu’une « deutérologie », reprend, sans les renouveler beaucoup, la plupart des arguments du premier orateur’ (Boulanger 1923, 285).

Furthermore, not only do the sources of argument vary, but the debate becomes more complicated over the course of the five speeches. For example, among its arguments about justice, the *First Leuctran* (the first speech in favour of the Spartans) (*Or.* 11) sought relatively straightforwardly to excuse former Spartan crimes, alleging, for example, that when the Spartan general Phoebidas had seized the Theban Cadmeia in 382 BCE, he had done so without the support of the majority of Spartans (11.10), to which the *Second Leuctran* (the first speech in favour of the Thebans) (*Or.* 12) had responded that ‘in my eyes, the name of Phoebidas means the Spartans’ (τὸ δὲ Φοιβίδας ἔστι μοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι) (12.2). In the *Third Leuctran*, however, (the second speech in favour of the Spartans) (*Or.* 13) the speaker gives up trying to excuse Sparta’s past behaviour, conceding the heading of justice to his opponents, and arguing pragmatically that advantage is more important: ‘for we will not be considering whether the Thebans are going to destroy the Spartans justly, but rather fearing that they will unjustly be able to do the same to us’ (οὐ γὰρ εἰ δικαίως ἐκείνους ἀναιρήσουσι, τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα, ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτόν τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀδίκως ποιῆσαι δυνήσονται, τοῦτο φοβησόμεθα) (13.3).²⁴ Finally, in the *Fourth Leuctran* (the second speech in favour of the Thebans) (*Or.* 14), the speaker first resorts to a hypothetical to revive the Cadmeia example (what if it had been the Athenian Acropolis that the Spartans had seized? (14.19)), then abandons the example entirely, and points out that the Athenians had been inclining towards the Thebans even before the Spartan attack (14.23).

Indeed, by the time we reach the *Fourth Leuctran*, the argumentation is becoming so complex that the very foundations of rhetorical argument are starting to look uncertain. For example, the speaker claims that the future (in terms of theory, arguments falling under the headings of advantage or consequence) cannot be used for argument on account of its

²⁴ This argument does in fact appear very briefly in the first speech in favour of Sparta (11.6), but the speaker quickly drops the idea and turns to an attempt to show that Thebes’ past offences against Athens are worse than those committed by Sparta (11.7–9).

uncertainty (14.3; cf. 14.11), and so instead draws arguments from the past, though noting that if the previous speaker's insistence that the multitude of crimes on both sides makes the past irrelevant is taken seriously, argumentation of *any* kind will be impossible (14.12). Or if the argument from Athens' tradition of helping the weak is taken seriously, after Sparta has been given aid against Thebes, presumably Athens will have to help Thebes once more, and then Sparta again, *ad infinitum* (14.22). We are reaching argumentative *aporia*, and this *aporia* is reflected in an increasingly tangled (if not to say) paralysing style. Consider the following indigestible period:

θαυμάζω δ' εἴ τις τὸ μὲν φίλους καὶ συμμάχους ἡμῖν εἶναι Θηβαίους φοβεῖται νομίζων ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐχθροὺς καὶ πολεμίους καταστῆναι συμφέρον κρίνει, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν πολεμοῦντας δέδοικεν αὐτοὺς, ἐφ' ὑμᾶς δ' ὅπως ἥξουσιν διαπράττεται, καὶ φυλάττεσθαι μὲν κελεύει μὴ ποθ' ὕστερον ὑμῖν πολεμήσωσιν, ἤδη δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καταστῆναι προτρέπει, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν κελεύει θαρρεῖν κοινωνοῖς ἐπὶ Θηβαίους, ὧν ἐλάττους αὐτοὺς φησιν εἶναι, Θηβαίοις δ' ἐπὶ τούτους οὐκ ἔα θαρρεῖν, ὥσπερ τὰς τῶν ἀσθενεστάτων συμμαχίας μάλιστ' ὠφελοῦσας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς τῶν οἴους εἶναι Θηβαίους φασὶν οὗτοι

(And I find it remarkable if someone fears our having the Thebans as friends and allies in the belief that they are strong, but judges that their enmity and hostility are expedient, and if he fears them at war with the Lacedaemonians, but bends his efforts so that they will attack you, and tells you to be on your guard that they do not later go to war with you, but exhorts you to enter into this state, and tells you to be confident in the partnership of the Lacedaemonians against the Thebans when he admits that the Lacedaemonians are weaker than the Thebans, but does not let you be confident in the partnership of the Thebans against the Lacedaemonians, as if the alliances with the weakest people were the most helpful, and not those with the people such as they claim the Thebans to be.) (Behr) (14.3)

There is nothing this difficult elsewhere in Aristides' declamations, or indeed in the whole of surviving second- and third-century declamation. As the speaker says with a hint of metarhetoric, 'where will it end?' (τί ἔσται πέρας;) (14.22). What we are witnessing here is more than conventional rhetorical escapology: Aristides has not just produced (good) arguments for two opposing sides, twice; his arguments have also become so complex and pushed down so far into the foundations of argument that debate is becoming impossible. Aristides has argued himself into the ground.

The *Leuctran Orations* finally close with what, as we have said, is a unique feature in Greek rhetorical escapology, a short speech in favour of neither side. It should be difficult: having devoted two lengthy speeches to each side (a total of 104 chapters in favour of Sparta, and 107 in favour of Thebes), how can Aristides in the 44 chapters of this closing speech possibly produce arguments at least as good or ideally better in favour of neutrality? The answer lies precisely in the argumentative and stylistic paralysis of the *Fourth Leuctran*: when every datum has been argued for both sides and when every conceivable argument from every heading has been tried, and *aporia* still results, neutrality starts to look the best option.²⁵

Accordingly the *Fifth Leuctran* concisely evokes the range of arguments made on either side in the previous four speeches, and then quickly deflates them all; this rapid recapitulation of the arguments of the previous speeches also offers a further chance to admire Aristides' *invention* thus far (which indeed looks all the more impressive when all the arguments are presented together at once). So, for example, the fifth speech recalls how (15.18), as we have heard earlier, the Thebans had been Medizers (11.63, 64), but the Spartans had also allowed the King to treat the Ionian Greeks as he saw fit in the peace of Antalcidas (11.19–21, 12.11); how (15.19) the Spartans voted to preserve Athens in 404 (11.7, 39, 41, 43, 68; 12.62), but the Thebans ignored the Spartan request for help against Athens in 403 (12.24); how Athens should maintain its old custom of helping those in need, both to help Sparta now that it is vulnerable to Thebes (11.5, 13.10), and to help Thebes in its just war of resistance against Spartan hegemony (12.39). As the fifth speech says (on the last point, but with obvious relevance for all of them), 'this argument is common to both sides' (κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἐστὶ τοῦτο) (15.8): neutrality is the only solution.

²⁵ Cf. Boulanger: 'ce conflit d'opinions a singulièrement facilité la besogne du partisan de la neutralité absolue... tous les éléments du débat son entre ses mains... nul effort d'invention n'est désormais nécessaire' (Boulanger 1923, 286).

Aristides highlights his rhetorical achievement in this speech with his style and with metarhetorical comments. In contrast to the difficult syntax of the previous four speeches, and particularly the last pair (*Orr.* 13–14), this speech is full of easy contrasts in which the arguments made by either side are presented as equipollent mirror images of one another, both to be rejected in favour of neutrality. If we are going to exonerate those who have wronged us, we should not exonerate ‘one side, but not the other, but both sides alike’ (οὐ δῆπου τοῖς μέν, τοῖς δ’ οὐ, ἀλλ’ ἀμφοτέροις ὁμοίως) (15.9); we cannot ‘help the former, because it necessary to help the latter also, nor help the latter, because help was owed to the former also’ (μήτε τούτοις βοηθεῖν, ὅτι καὶ κακείοις ἔδει, μήτε ἐκείοις, ὅτι καὶ τούτοις ὀφείλετο) (15.10); that the speaker’s suspicions are reasonable has been confirmed ‘as regards the Spartans, by those who spoke on behalf of the Thebans, and as regards the Thebans, by those who spoke on behalf of the Spartans’ (περὶ μὲν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ τοῖς Θηβαίοις συναγορεύοντες, περὶ δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων οἱ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις) (15.15). After the tortured hypotheticals of the *Fourth Leuctran* in particular, this stylistic resolution clearly mirrors the argumentative resolution in this speech. Furthermore, a whole series of metarhetorical comments, in which one can hear the voice of Aristides underneath that of the speaker, also work to highlight Aristides’ achievement in this speech. ‘It is hard to examine clearly what is to your advantage’ (ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἔργον τὸ συμφέρον ὑμῖν καθαρῶς ἐξετάσαι), the speaker begins wryly (15.1), after the longest series of deliberative speeches known in the whole of Greek literature. ‘I praise both sets of speakers for having invented many amazing arguments’ (ἐπαινῶ δὲ τοὺς ῥήτορας ἀμφοτέρους, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εὕροντες) (15.4), Aristides continues, speaking of arguments that he has devised (notice the metarhetorical use of εὕρισκω (‘I find’) in its technical sense of ‘invent’). Metarhetorical comments then parade the easy resolution of this final speech: ‘together they [the previous speakers] have taught me what opinion I should express about them... by following what

has been said by them, I could see what is best’ (ἐδίδαξαν με κοινῇ τί χρὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποφίνασθαι... τοῖς γε ὑπὸ τούτων εἰρημένοις ἀκολουθῶν ἔχειν ἂν κατιδεῖν τὸ κράτιστον) (15.4), ‘so my speech is nothing other than a reading, as it were, by some clerk who has put together the words of each side in turn and made one speech out of two’ (οὐδὲν οὖν ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐμὸς λόγος ἢ ὥσπερ τινὸς ἀντιγραφέως ἀνάγνωσις συντεθεικότος ἐξῆς τὴν ἐκατέρων ῥῆσιν καὶ μίαν ἐκ δυοῖν πεποιηκότος) (15.28).

Aristides’ *Leuctran Orations*, then, are an obvious product of the contemporary fascination with argumentation. They seem designed not so much to persuade their fictitious audience as to demonstrate to their real audience—via an elaborate network of structural and verbal symmetries—the extraordinary versatility and sophistication of Aristides’ argumentative techniques.

3. Lucian’s *Tyrannicida*: The Perversion of Issue-Theory²⁶

Lucian’s *Tyrannicida*, by contrast, seems less interested in reaching new rhetorical heights than in undermining the art. Though a declamation on tyranny is entirely conventional,²⁷ and though Lucian handles his material according to the rules of rhetoric,²⁸ and, in particular, according to the appropriate Hermogenean division of the correct issue (see below), and writes his declamation in the expected style, by deliberately straining too hard to follow

²⁶ Many of the ideas set out in this section of this chapter are explored more fully in Guast (Guast, Lucian and Declamation forthcoming).

²⁷ Elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus declamations are characterized as ‘denunciations of tyrants and encomia of war heroes’ (τυράννων κατηγορίας καὶ ἀριστέων ἐπαίνους) (*Bis Acc.* 32), typically featuring ‘war-heroes or tyrant-killers or poor men or famers’ (ἀριστέων ἢ τυραννοκτόνων ἢ πενήτων ἢ γεωργῶν) (*Salt.* 65); Philostratus says that his Second Sophistic ‘sketched poor men and rich men and war-heroes and tyrants’ (τοὺς πένητας ὑπετυπώσατο καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ τοὺς ἀριστεάς καὶ τοὺς τυράννους) (*Philostr.* VS 481). Cf. also Juv. 7.150–4, where tyrannicide is described as ‘rehashed cabbage’ (Braund) (*crambe repetita*), and it is said that such material ‘kills teachers’ (*occidit magistros*). On the place of tyrants in sophistic rhetoric, see Malosse (Malosse 2006).

²⁸ Heath (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 175–8); a much briefer rhetorical analysis in Bompaigne (Bompaigne 1958, 245–6). Reardon judges that ‘Lucien les [i.e. the *Abd.* as well as the *Tyr.*] traite tout à fait d’après les règles traditionnelles du genre’ (Reardon 1971, 110).

rhetorical precepts, Lucian produces a declamation that fails to persuade, and indeed comes close to parody.²⁹

The scenario is as follows. A man sets off for the acropolis intending to assassinate the tyrant currently in power in his city. He fails to find the tyrant, but does find the tyrant's son, whom he kills instead. When the tyrant discovers his son's dead body, in his grief he takes the sword left in his son's body by the man and kills himself. The man now claims the customary reward given to tyrannicides.

The issue is 'definition', for the question of whether the speaker deserves the prize depends on how we define 'tyrannicide'. The division of the issue in this declamation is, as we have said, very much in agreement with that presented in Hermogenes (*Stat.* IV).³⁰ At the heart of Lucian's speech we find the key steps in Hermogenes' division of the issue: a (narrower) definition of the act in question given by the opponent that excludes what has been done (9–11 *passim*, e.g. 'you did not kill the tyrant'),³¹ a 'counterdefinition' (ἀνθορισμός) (implicit *passim* in 10, particularly in the rhetorical questions, e.g. 'did I not slay?'),³² in which the speaker puts forward a broader definition of tyrannicide that would include what he has done, an 'assimilation' (συλλογισμός), i.e. an attempt to show that the counterdefinition captures all significant features of the act in question ('but what difference is there between doing away with someone oneself and being the cause of the death?'),³³ an appeal to the legislator's intention ('the legislator had only this in view: freedom, democracy, and escape from evils'),³⁴ and the heading of 'importance', in which it is shown that what the speaker

²⁹ The notion that there might be humour in this work is entertained briefly by e.g. Longo (Longo 1976–93, 2.197), Karavas (Karavas 2005, 194), and Tomassi (Tomassi, *Tyrants and Tyrannicides* 2015, 254, Tomassi, *Practica Declamatoria* 2015, 359). Cf. also p. 105 n. 36 below.

³⁰ On the relative chronology of Lucian and Hermogenes, see above, p. 64 n. 40.

³¹ Οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐφόνευσας τὸν τύραννον (11).

³² οὐκ ἐφόνευσας; (10).

³³ διαφέρει δέ... τί ἢ αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν ἢ τοῦ θανάτου παρασχεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν; (11).

³⁴ τοῦτο μόνον ὁ νομοθέτης εἶδεν, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν (11).

did was more important than what he did not do (he intended to kill a tyrant (14), he acted on that intention (15), he killed (16), and the tyrant died (17)). The style employed, too, shows some of the elements we associate with the showier end of Greek declamation, for example in Polemo's surviving declamations or many of the fragments preserved in Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum* (cf. above, pp. 66–68): there are, for instance, frequent *isocola*, for example in the list of the son's crimes in chapter 5, or the questions in chapter 10, as well as an insistent antithesis between one and two running through the work.³⁵

So the sort of conventional rhetorical reading often practised by modern scholars (above, pp. 31–3), being mainly concerned to register a text's adherence to rhetorical precepts, would straightforwardly consider Lucian's *Tyrannicida* a quite typical declamatory production.³⁶ But as we have been arguing throughout this section of the thesis, ancient rhetorical readers did not read solely or even principally with a view to identifying instances of known techniques, but rather to assess the persuasive achievement of a work as a whole. When such an assessment is undertaken, as we are about to see, it becomes clear that the rules have been followed just a little too literally. The result is a shrewd and witty parody. On several occasions in what follows useful *comparanda* will be provided by Choricus' treatment of the same scenario (Chor. *Decl.* 7), which seems to lack Lucian's parodic touches.

As we have said, and as issue-theory prescribes, Lucian's speaker is concerned above all in this declamation with definition: he needs to show that driving a tyrant to suicide through having killed his son is to all intents and purposes the same as tyrannicide. Accordingly, he

³⁵ 'two tyrants... in one day' (δύο τυράννους, μιᾶς ἡμέρας) (1); 'one reward for both killings' (μίαν... ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις δωρεάν) (1); 'having done away with two villains with a single blow' (πληγῇ μιᾷ δύο πονηροὺς ἀποσκευασάμενος) (1); 'not a single tyranny and one slavery... nor the desire of one master... but two tyrants instead of one... and two sets of crimes' (ἀπληγὴν... τυραννίδα καὶ μίαν δουλείαν... οὐδὲ ἐνός... ἐπιθυμίαν δεσπότητος... ἀλλὰ... δύο ἀνθ' ἐνός τυράννους... καὶ... διττὰ... ἀδικήματα) (4).

³⁶ Though Heath in fact seems to be aware of the comic elements in the text, alluding to 'many tongue-in-cheek moments' (Berry and Heath 1997, 414).

works with two less literal definitions of tyrannicide, either of which would entitle him to the reward: first, he suggests that the tyrant's son was so tyrannical that his killing was effectively tyrannicide; second, he tries to show that the causal connection between what he did and the tyrant's death was so close that he effectively killed the tyrant. I will examine these in turn.³⁷

The right act, the wrong victim: to make what he did do as close to tyrannicide as possible, the speaker should play up the tyrannical qualities of the son and make him as much of a tyrant as his father. Choricus does: his speaker talks of having overthrown 'two masters' (δύο... δεσπότας) (7.1), 'two tyrants' (δύο... τυράννων) (7.7), and 'two tyrannies' (δύο... τυραννίδας) (7.89). It might also make sense to play down the tyrant's own tyrannical qualities, so that his son seems the more obvious target, and this Choricus also does, at least in relative terms: 'the son was worse than the one who begot him' (τοῦ τεκόντος ἐφύετο χείρων ὁ παῖς) (7.2) he says, arguing that to be born to tyranny is worse than to come to it later in life; 'so of the two evils the city endured, the greater was ended by me, the lesser through me' (δυεῖν ἄρα τῇ πόλει δεινῶν τὸ μέγα μὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ καταλέλυσται, τὸ δὲ βραχὺ δι' ἐμοῦ) (7.3). Now the Chorician treatment brings out by contrast the exaggerated quality of the *Tyrannicida*. In outline, the same strategy is followed. Lucian's speaker stresses the son's crimes in what feels very much like a commonplace (κοινὸς τόπος) against a tyrant (5), with classic elements such as torture, confiscations, exile, and rape, and talks repeatedly of two tyrants rather than one;³⁸ he claims that the sins of the son (4) were worse than those of his father, and at chapter 16 we hear 'he was the tyrant's son, or rather he was a more difficult tyrant' (υἱὸς ἦν τυράννου, μᾶλλον δὲ τύραννος χαλεπώτερος). But in what will become a

³⁷ A fairly obvious argument absent in Lucian but present in Choricus (11) is that while the speaker lacked the *actus reus* of a tyrannicide, he nonetheless very definitely had the *mens rea*.

³⁸ Commonplaces against tyrants are illustrated by Lib. *Progymnasmata* 7.4 and Aphth. *Prog.* VII.3–11. For the classic qualities of a tyrant, see Lanza (Lanza 1977), and, on the tyrant in Latin declamation, see Tabacco (Tabacco 1985).

pattern, he goes rather too far in mitigating the crimes of the tyrant himself. ‘He wasn’t tyrannical at all himself’ (οὐ πάνυ τυραννικὸς αὐτός) (4), the would-be tyrannicide says of his tyrant; the tyrant, we hear, ‘was wholly tyrannized’ (ὅλως ἐτυραννεῖτο) (4) by his son; trying to make the most of his victory over the tyrant’s bodyguards, the speaker finds himself arguing ‘of course, it’s not the tyrant himself who is mighty and hard to catch and hard to overcome’ (οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτός γε ὁ τύραννος μέγα καὶ δυσάλωτον καὶ δυσκατέργαστον ἐστίν) (15). The strategy is good, but the execution is terrible: in particular, what tips these claims over the line into absurdity is the adverbial modifiers ‘not at all’ (οὐ πάνυ), ‘wholly’ (ὅλως), and ‘of course’ (δὴ), as well as the paradoxical use of the τυρανν- root to describe how untyrannical the tyrant was. (Paradoxes of this sort are of course typical of Greek imperial rhetorical style, but here the right style actually weakens the argument). If the tyrant was not in fact a tyrant *in any sense*, why on earth did the speaker set out to kill him? Why would it even matter that the tyrant had subsequently committed suicide? The theory is entirely correct in directing the speaker to play down the tyrant’s crimes, to be sure, but Lucian’s would-be tyrannicide has gone too far and played them down to the point of insignificance.

The fact that the tyrant did not die by the speaker’s hand is identified by Choricus in his *protheoria* as a particular weakness of his case (*Protheoria* to *Decl.* 7, chapter 6): in Lucian’s paradoxical formulation, the would-be tyrannicide has to claim ‘I killed the tyrant by slaying someone else’ (τὸν τύραννον ἀπέκτεινα ἐτέρῳ φόνῳ) (17). Choricus’ speaker works hard to show that the tyrant’s suicide followed closely and plausibly from his killing of the tyrant’s son: chapters 52–71 of his text are given over to this argument, and it is seeded earlier in the piece through references to the tyrant’s devotion to his only son (4, 15, 26). The speaker of Lucian’s work, by contrast, makes a much bolder claim about the inevitability of the tyrant’s death, and offers much less support for it. He claims that he deliberately did not kill the tyrant because he knew that what he had done thus far would

inevitably lead to the tyrant's death: 'I prophesied exactly what was going to happen in every respect' (πάντως τὸ ἐσόμενον αὐτὸ προεμαντεύομην) (13); 'I knew that he was going to die at once' (εὐθύς ἠπιστάμην τεθνηξόμενον αὐτόν) (18). Again, it is the adverbs—'in every way' (πάντως), 'immediately' (εὐθύς)—that tip this over the line into implausibility; the choice of the rather poetic verb προμαντεύομαι ('I prophesy') (13) too, instead of something more prosaic like προοράω ('I foresee') or προνοέω ('I anticipate') only heightens the implausibility of this claim. Contrast Choricus' treatment: his speaker goes no further than to say that the tyrant's suicide was 'not out of harmony with what had been done by me' (τοῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γενομένοις οὐκ ἀνάρμοστον) (58).

The supporting arguments that he offers in support of this implausible claim are also much weaker than those offered by Choricus. One of his arguments is sensible, and is found in Choricus: that the tyrant's love for his son made his suicide more likely (Chor. *Decl.* 7.52–72; Luc. *Tyr.* 18, with hints at 9 and 11). On the other hand, the *Tyrannicida* omits the plausible suggestion, present in Choricus (7.17, 27, 68–70), that the tyrant might have feared that he would be next, and sought to forestall his assassination by taking his own life first. Moreover, he leans heavily on an unlikely narrative of the tyrant's suicide. According to the speaker, at the moment of his death, the tyrant conveniently framed himself as being the victim of tyrannicide, crying out in a splendidly polysyllabic utterance 'τετυραννοκτονήμεθα' ('we are the victims of tyrannicide!') (20), and, in a final apostrophe to the sword with which he was going to stab himself, 'commit tyrannicide!' (τυραννοκτόνησον) (21).³⁹ This is highly implausible, to be sure (and in any case the speaker was not present to hear the tyrant's last words (20)); but it is also the logical conclusion of the speaker's straining too hard to make his actions fit the definition of tyrannicide.

³⁹ The idea of the tyrant as a tyrannicide also occurs in chapter 8, in the speaker's voice (ἐτυραννοκτόνησεν ('he [the tyrant] committed tyrannicide')).

In addition to making his actions fit the definition of tyrannicide, the speaker of Lucian's piece also concludes with the more daring claim that what happened to the tyrant was in truth a better result than conventional tyrannicide: in Hermogenes' division, this is the heading that Heath translates as 'relative importance' (πρός τι), in which it is argued what was done is relatively more important than what was left undone (Hermog. *Stat.* IV 8). In Choricus, this idea surfaces only briefly: it is suggested that what happened was better because it is more painful to kill oneself having seen one's own son killed than simply to be killed (23), and because with both father and son dead the tyranny is definitely over (25–26; 55). Both of these arguments appear in Lucian also.⁴⁰ But once again a good rhetorical move is pushed too far. It is claimed that what happened was the *best possible* outcome. Lucian's speaker claims that 'I accomplished it in the best possible way' (ὥς ἐνῆν ἄριστα διεπραξάμην) (17), and later adds the extraordinary suggestion that what happened was 'more glorious by reason of its novelty' (λαμπρότερόν ἐστι τῇ καινότητι) (22), as if anyone living under tyranny would worry about the aesthetic merits of different means of tyrannicide!⁴¹

One further aspect of Lucian's declamation that highlights the work's straining for theoretical correctness is the almost unprecedentedly explicit metarhetorical comments.⁴² On one occasion, the speaker indignantly rejects the suggestion that his action might be ἀτελῆ ('incomplete') (9), using precisely the term that Hermogenes uses to describe actions which fall under the issue of definition (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 177). Three times the speaker also refers to the allegation that his deed was lacking in some respect (10, 11, 14): though

⁴⁰ A more painful death: *Tyr.* 1, 17–18 (where it is implausibly claimed that for the tyrant to have been killed by the would-be tyrannicide would have been 'his fondest prayer' (Harmon) (εὐκταϊότατον... αὐτῷ) (17)), 20 (where with implausible convenience the tyrant is made to say that being allowed to live to see his son dead is worse than being killed straightaway). End of tyranny: 3, 6, 16.

⁴¹ Cf. also 'most paradoxical' (παραδοξότατον) (1), and 'I made an innovation in the manner of the deaths of the villains' (τὸν τρόπον ἐκαινοτόμησα τῆς τῶν πονηρῶν τελευτῆς) (2). For sophistry's characteristic interest in novelty, see Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 36–7).

⁴² Cf. pp. 63–64 above.

the term he uses (ἐνδεῖν) is not found in Hermogenes, this conception of the issue of definition as arising when an act is deficient in some respect is eminently Hermogenean (*Stat.* II 2), and the unusual abstraction with which it is stated here makes it effectively metarhetorical. Still more glaring is the speaker's offer of an account of what happened ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐς τέλος ('from beginning to end') (14) (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 178). This metarhetoric deliberately lifts the curtain and lets us see the laborious efforts being made to follow the rules correctly: the fact that the end result is nonetheless ridiculous perhaps suggests that rhetoric's divisions do not guarantee—and may actually end up impeding—persuasive speech-making. The theatrical metaphor running through the work too, which casts the speaker as the director of the action, creates a similar sense of contrivance (Guast, *Lucian and Declamation* forthcoming).

Satire on rhetoric, of course, is far from unparalleled in Lucian's oeuvre. The most sustained such satire is to be found in Lucian's *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, but there are similar complaints in many other places in the corpus, particularly in the *Piscator*, *Pseudologista*, and *Lexiphanes*. More specifically, this kind of humour—producing work that follows the rules yet but ultimately turns out to be fatally off-key—can be seen in other Lucianic works (Guast, *Lucian and Declamation* forthcoming). The closest parallel to the *Tyrannicida* in Lucian is perhaps the *Hippias*, a by-the-rules encomium of a bathhouse that culminates bathetically in praise of, among other things, its two toilets: 'let no one suppose that I have taken a minor work as my subject, and that I purpose to dress it up with my eloquence' (μὴ με ὑπολάβῃ τις μικρὸν ἔργον προθέμενον), says the speaker with delicious disingenuousness (*Hipp.* 8). The *Muscae Encomium* shows a similar sort of humour, though its perversion of rhetoric is much more obvious, and much more pervasive. Similar in mode, though obviously not concerned with rhetoric, is the *De syria dea*, which hovers in critics' judgements between parody, pastiche, satire, and mimicry (Lightfoot, Lucian, 'On the Syrian

Goddess' 2003, 197–9), though there is not space to go into that much-debated work here. Such a mode of humour also has something in common with the various hoaxes that we know that Lucian perpetuated (Guast, *Lucian and Declamation* forthcoming). While I do not think that the *Tyrannicida* was meant as a hoax *per se*, the nature of these reported hoaxes—following the rules yet producing something subtly but fatally flawed—is very similar to the game that Lucian is playing in the *Tyrannicida*. These sorts of attacks are quieter but potentially even more potent than the outrageous incongruities of more obvious satire: the audience, who barely noticed as the work slipped imperceptibly into parody, suddenly find themselves stranded in absurdity, and as they wonder how a work that began in such a conventional fashion can have reached such a point, are made to realise the absurdity latent in the genre. Carried through effectively, such a lesson can fatally destabilize the audience's ability to distinguish between reality and parody, and in future call even the most conventional performance into question.⁴³ Indeed, it is perhaps no accident that this declamation seems so utterly conventional: by choosing such a common theme, developing the argumentation according to the traditional divisions, and adopting a typically declamatory style, with numerous figures and elaborate theatrical imagery, this work can take aim, by a kind of synecdoche, at the declamatory genre as a whole; indeed, the satire may be particularly powerful for having initially lured the audience into the false expectation that this will be an entirely conventional declamation.

Conclusion

This section of the thesis has advocated a more reflective and critical mode of rhetorically reading declamations. While many modern rhetorical readers have been content simply to register a text's use of rhetorical theory, in chapter 1 we showed that the relationship between

⁴³ The phenomenon I am describing therefore has more than a little in common with contemporary 'mockumentaries' such as *The Office* or *In the Thick of It*.

theory and practice in the Greek imperial world was much more dynamic and dialogic: that as well as merely exemplifying, declamation also frequently extends, modifies, splices, tests, critiques, disregards, or even parodies theory. In this chapter, we have seen the fruits of such *critical rhetorical reading*. We understand better why Aristides was so highly regarded as a declaimer and by theorists in particular: because of his dialogic relationship with theory—his ability intelligently to extend, conflate, selectively ignore, and ultimately advance the art of rhetoric. An awareness in particular of contemporary innovations in argumentation and the high status that this department of rhetoric enjoyed helps us to understand Aristides' achievement in testing invention to its limits in his monumental *Leuctran Orations*. Finally, by assessing not only Lucian's debt to rhetorical theory but also the effectiveness of the arguments produced thereby, we were able to detect a knowing perversion of issue theory in his *Tyrannicida*.

Section II. Mythology

‘[I]l problema della attualità della declamazione non sia stato trattato tanto quanto come avrebbe dovuto’ (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 211)

So Greek declamation was not totally immersed in the past: one major contemporary context within which the genre was read was the innovative rhetorical theorizing of its time. This next section of the thesis reads declamation in its contemporary context more broadly, focusing again on the second and third centuries. I refer to this more wide-ranging, allusive mode of reading as ‘mythology’, drawing inspiration from Mary Beard’s 1993 article on Latin declamation, which suggested that for Romans, declamation functioned as a kind of ‘myth’, which Beard defines as ‘a fictional world of “traditional tales” for negotiating, and re-negotiating, the fundamental rules of Roman society’ (Beard 1993, 56).¹ Chapter 3 (‘Reading Mythologically’) lays the foundations. Traditionally, especially in the Anglophone world, and particularly for works of the second and third centuries, declamation been seen as above all as ‘nostalgic’ or ‘escapist’, that is, as an attempt to escape the present and/or in some way relive or revive the past. By contrast, this chapter argues that the genre is neither as deeply immersed in the classical past nor as distant from the the real life concerns of imperial Greeks as is usually assumed.² Accordingly, the genre can offer precisely the sort of safe space for exploring major contemporary concerns that Beard envisions for Roman declamation.

The idea that Greek imperial literature far removed from contemporary life in time, space, or subject matter can nonetheless have profound contemporary relevance has been

¹ Whitmarsh was the first to suggest the usefulness of Beard’s article for reading Greek declamation (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 70–3).

² There is perhaps a parallel here with the history of scholarship on Atticism. Schmid had argued that the Attic *Kunstsprache* of Greek imperial literature was a sign of dead literature: Reardon showed that the Atticism of this period was neither as purely Attic nor as far removed from everyday speech as Schmid claims (Reardon 1971, 81–96).

increasingly accepted in recent years. Many scholars have explored the various contemporary resonances of the Greek novels;³ Kemezis has analysed Dio Cassius' account of the rise of Augustus as a 'commentary on the Severan period' (Kemezis 2014, 91); Smith has demonstrated how even a work on animals like Aelian's *De natura animalium* can offer thoughtful reflections on Severan Rome.⁴

Chapter 4 ('Mythological Readings') then offers an illustrative selection of readings of Greek declamation in the mythological mode.

³ Alvares (Alvares, *Egyptian Unrest* 2001), Alvares (Alvares, *Political and Ideological Dimensions* 2001–2002), Connors (Connors 2002), Schwartz (Schwartz 2003), Alvares (Alvares, *Coming of Age* 2007), Smith (Smith, *Romance of Empire* 2007, 10–13, 82–3 n. 57, 90–2, 134–40), Jolowicz (Jolowicz 2015).

⁴ Smith (Smith, *Man and Animal* 2014, 67–99; 159–65; 170–76; 215–48).

Chapter 3. Reading Mythologically

What was the relationship between Greek declamation and the wider political and cultural context in which it thrived? Traditionally, scholars have seen the genre as an ‘escape’ from the unsatisfactory conditions of life in the Greek east to a more glamorous classical past. But this cannot be the whole story, for multiple reasons. Such a view unfairly plays down the very real rhetorical and other opportunities available to Greeks in the second and third centuries (of which declaimers regularly availed themselves), relies on misleading generalizations about the declamatory corpus, and gives us a simplistic genre that is at odds with the sophistication of other earlier and contemporary Greek literature. A fair survey of the genre as a whole reveals a previously underappreciated *presentist* streak in declamation, and suggests that in reality, imperial Greeks saw in these stories a range of telling similarities with their own lives, especially in matters of virtue and vice, and often in quite creative and unexpected ways. The genre therefore offered a safe space in which to reflect deeply on some of the most pressing issues of the age: in short, Greek declamation was the mythology of imperial Greece.

Flight and Restoration?

The prevalent view of Greek declamation, particularly in the Anglophone world, and particularly for declamation of the second and third centuries—the traditional ‘Second Sophistic’—is that the genre is a prime example, if not *the* prime example, of the escapism and nostalgia that is thought to have gripped imperial Greeks in this period.¹ In 1950, Perry wrote of Greek imperial literature:

¹ The notion is not exclusively Anglophone: cf. e.g. Boulanger (‘le besoin d’affirmer devant leurs maîtres romains la vitalité du génie de leur race’) (Boulanger 1923, 56–7), Marrou (‘ce ne sont que tyrans, pirates, rapt, viols, fils déshérités dans des conditions invraisemblables... tournait délibérément le dos au réel’) (Marrou 1965, 304), Nicosia (Nicosia 1994, 74), Flinterman (Flinterman, *De tweede sofistiek* 1996), Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 42–3), Bost-Pouderon (Bost-Pouderon 2010, 99), Amato and Sauterel (Amato and Sauterel,

This Hellenistic soul is profoundly uninterested in the realities of here and now. It looks outward and away from society as it is, seeking its satisfactions in the form of escapes into what is far off in time, space or possibility, or in what is purely personal and apart from the normal activities of the contemporary world—which world seemed to offer to most men no worthy theater for the exercise of their energies, hopes, and ambitions... They were talking to each other rather than to the world at large. (Perry 1950, 296).

Bowie picked up this note in 1970, suggesting that this period's archaism of subject matter might have been a 'flight from the present' (Bowie, *Greeks and Their Past* 1970, 28). But he also saw this flight as having implications for that present. '[T]o reassure themselves that Greece had a claim comparable to that of Rome', he wrote, 'they [the Greeks] began to dwell more and more, in their political and cultural activities, on the political greatness of the past' (40); he further suggested some may have hoped that 'a cultural resurgence would somehow bring with it a restoration of political power and independence' (23). Kennedy too views this archaism more positively, saying (with oddly coy litotes) that the scenarios of Greek declamation were 'not inconsistent' with the 'fundamental cultural message' found more widely in the epideictic literature of this period of 'the continued value of Hellenism' (G. Kennedy, *The Sophists as Declaimers* 1974, 20; cf. also 22). Russell's *Greek Declamation* (1983) also blended ideas of flight with Greek pride: Russell claims that 'one of the major purposes of the educational process of which *meletē* formed a part was the preservation of a sense of pride in the Hellenistic inheritance, a sort of Hellenic patriotism', yet also that '[t]he rhetors seem to have lived largely in the past, in a world whose glitter made the present relatively unimportant and insignificant... In general, the concentration on the past must

Les déclamations de Lesbonax 2010, 47). Of course, the idea that declamation is divorced from life does have some ancient antecedents (Petr. 1; Tac. *Dial.* 35; Quint. *Inst.* 2.10.5). For more innovative readings of these declamations in their context, see Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 57–73 passim (but oddly thin on actual declamations)) Asirvatham (Asirvatham, *His Son's Father?* 2010), Oudot (Oudot 2010, esp. 146–7), and Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Resistance is Futile?* 2012, 74–6). 'Mythological' reading is more common in recent scholarship on Choricus of Gaza: see e.g. Lupi (Lupi, *Usò del passato* 2009, Lupi, *Essere uomini* 2014, Lupi, *Milziade* 2010, 69–88, Lupi, *Two Laws* 2015), Manzione (Manzione 2014), Tomassi (Tomassi, *Continuità e innovazione* 2014), Tomassi (Tomassi, *Tyrants and Tyrannicides* 2015). For Latin declamation, this mode of reading is well-established: see p. 20 n. 43 above.

have been pure escapism' (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 108–9). By 1993 Anderson could say '[i]t is a familiarly accepted phenomenon that in the Early Empire the Greek world looked back with nostalgic self-awareness to the classical era, and that it did so as a reaction against the political impotence of the present' (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 101).² Finally, in 1996, Swain directed attention once more to the cultural, saying that those who declaimed 'strove collectively to maintain the glory of their culture and Greekness' (S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* 1996, 91).

Now these views are not identical, but they are similar enough for us to be able to speak of a loose scholarly *communis opinio*: that Greek declamation's archaism of subject matter reflects and furthers a high estimation of the cultural and political achievements of the past, and a low estimation of the cultural or political circumstances of the present.³ In its more common, pessimistic version, the focus is predominantly on the problems of the present, and the movement *away* from it ('flight', Bowie; 'escape', Perry), with less said about the past; the rather less common, more optimistic version focuses on the glories of the past and moves from them *towards* the present ('restoration', Bowie). Of course, this view did not arise out of nothing. There are imperial Greeks who describe contemporary politics as trivial: Dio Chrysostom describes the policy aims of Nicomedia and Nicaea as mere 'vainglory' (κενόδοξα) (*Or.* 38.38); to Aristides, the leading cities of Asia are fighting over a 'shadow'

² Though Anderson says that 'some modification' of this 'authentic enough' and 'partly true' account is called for, in what follows he seems to offer none.

³ Dissenting voices: (1) Bowersock, all the way back in 1969, who rejected the idea that 'the sophists were eaten up by nostalgia for the old times' or that they were 'affirming the independence and greatness of the Greeks against the Romans' (Bowersock 1969, 15), though as Bowie noted, he offered no positive account of archaism in this period (Bowie, *Greeks and Their Past* 1970, 3 n.1) (2) Schmitz: 'Why would audiences listen to these lucubrations that were so "profoundly uninterested in the here and now" (Perry)? Do we have to assume that a whole society was infatuated with the ivory tower and revelled in nostalgia for the past? For obvious reasons this interpretation is not satisfactory' (Schmitz, *Performing History* 1998, 74) (though Schmitz nowhere states these 'obvious reasons', and the history of scholarship on declamation would suggest that they are anything but obvious). Schmitz prefers to see declamation as having a social function (cf. above, p. 14). Yet even Schmitz is capable of remarks in accordance with the *communis opinio* such as 'this sort of national pride compensated for the political irrelevance of Greek cities in the Roman empire' (Schmitz, *Performing History* 1998, 85).

(σκιᾶς) (*Or.* 23.63);⁴ Plutarch says that ‘fortune has left no prize available’ for men of his time (μηδὲν ἐν μέσῳ τῆς τύχης ἄθλον ὑπολελοιπυῖας) (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 824E; cf. also 824C).⁵

Yet both the ancient advocates of this view and their modern successors in truth are offering a one-sided picture. While there were obvious restrictions on the freedom of action of Greek elites in comparison with the classical past, to characterise the second and third centuries as offering ‘no worthy theatre’ (Perry) for the energies of its leading men is grossly distorted.⁶ Despite the *pax romana* (and its ideology), this period like all others had plenty of pressing issues. Physical violence, as ever in the ancient world, remained a constant threat. In 161, the Parthians invaded Syria, inflicting heavy defeats on Roman armies (Magie 1950, 660–63); in 170, the Costoboci overran Greece (Magie 1950, 664–5); in 175, Avidius Cassius, the legate of Syria, rebelled against Marcus Aurelius and briefly even had control of Egypt (Birley 1988, 183–9).⁷ Civic life, too, remained lively: Smyrna was destroyed by an earthquake in 178;⁸ there were spectacular Christian martyrdoms, such as that of Polycarp, perhaps c. 155, even if this tale has been embroidered in the telling;⁹ in Prusa, the suspicion that Dio Chrysostom might be manipulating the price of grain led an angry mob to his door, who would, according to Dio, but for a sudden panic, have burnt his house down and stoned

⁴ This quotation and the previous one both in fact form part of extended treatments of this topic: see D. Chrys. *Or.* 38.22–end (*passim*) and Aristid. *Or.* 23.59–64.

⁵ For other expressions of this idea, cf. Aristid. *Orr.* 22.8, 23.51, 25.15.

⁶ Bowie is certainly aware of the issues facing imperial Greek cities, but thinks nonetheless (that Greeks thought) that they were ‘ultimately petty’ (Bowie, *Greeks and Their Past* 1970, 6, 18). Boulanger too combines a catalogue of the oratorical opportunities available in this period with talk of ‘la plus chère des illusions: celle d’un vie politique’ (Boulanger 1923, 54–56).

⁷ Contrast Russell: ‘for most of the time when the rhetors were composing and teaching these exercises, real Greek cities were locally at peace; the only wars that might affect them were conducted by the Roman power, either against barbarian enemies or when it was at loggerheads with itself’ (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 23). Nothing strictly untrue, here, but misleading nonetheless: ‘against barbarian enemies’ sounds like it refers to wars of conquest in the east, but includes the sack of Eleusis by the Costoboci and the overrunning of Syria by the Parthians; ‘at loggerheads with itself’ sounds like it refers to distant civil wars, but includes such events as Severus’ destruction of Byzantium after it had sided with Pescennius Niger.

⁸ For the earthquake (and Aristides’ response) see Aristid. *Orr.* 18–20 and 21.6–13; for its date, see Behr (Behr, *Sacred Tales* 1968, 112 n. 68).

⁹ For a brief précis of the debate over dating, see Edwards (*OCD*⁴ s.v. ‘Polycarp’). On the literary shaping of the surviving *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, see Moss (Moss 2010).

him to death (*Or.* 46). There were major cultural and social changes going on too: Romanization (however we understand that contested term),¹⁰ an intensification of interest in *paideia* (Whitmarsh, *Roman Empire* 2001, 5–9), new social mobility,¹¹ and the rise of Christianity and other new religions. Moreover, it is clear that those who declaimed regularly used their eloquence to intervene in contemporary politics.¹² Aristides worked tirelessly to support Smyrna, delivering speeches on its behalf both in 171 after a raid (*Or.* 22) and also, and at length, after the earthquake of 178 (*Or.* 18–21),¹³ and Philostratus attributes the rebuilding of Smyrna to his efforts (VS 582);¹⁴ Herodes Atticus opposed Avidius Cassius' rebellion with the celebrated one-word letter ἐμάνης ('you've gone mad') (VS 563). Indeed, in Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum*, the very source of the traditional conception of the 'Second Sophistic', we frequently find speakers described—in what almost seems to be a formula—as good at both declamation and real oratory,¹⁵ or, twice, too legalistic for declamation and too declamatory for real oratory (VS 569, 606); sometimes, indeed, it is difficult to tell whether a speech is an exercise or a real oration.

¹⁰ A huge field: start with e.g. Merryweather and Prag (Merryweather and Prag 2003), Schörner (Schörner 2005), or Wallace-Hadrill (Wallace-Hadrill 2008). For the east specifically, see Woolf (Woolf, *Staying Greek* 1994), Hoff and Rotroff (Hoff and Rotroff 1997), and Meyer (Meyer 2007).

¹¹ Start with Saller (Saller 2000, 834–8); for the spread of citizenship, see Sherwin-White (Sherwin-White 1973).

¹² Kennedy's account of speech-making opportunities in Late Antiquity would generally speaking be valid for our period also (though Kennedy too largely subscribes to the narrative of decline, despite the mass of opportunities he cites) (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 1–23). On declaimers' involvement in real legal suits, see Russell (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 12–13), Heath (Heath, *Issues* 1995, 12) and Nicosia (Nicosia 1994, 90–2).

¹³ In the view of Boulanger, Aristides' response to the earthquake represented 'le point culminant de sa carrière et la gloire de sa vie', comparable to Cicero's response to the Catilinarian conspiracy (Boulanger 1923, 153).

¹⁴ These are revealing interventions, for elsewhere Aristides makes a thinly-veiled reference to himself as 'someone who cannot appear before the people with ease, nor engage in disputes about politics, when he sees that political arrangements are different [compared to the free past of classical Greece]' (τις... οἷος... εἰς μὲν δῆμους ῥαδίως μὴ εἰσιέναι, μηδὲ περὶ πολιτείας ἀμφισβητεῖν ὁρῶν ἐτέρως ἔχοντα τὰ πράγματα) (Aristid. *Or.* 2.430). That such a man can in fact engage in contemporary politics in such a fashion suggests that ancient instantiations of the escapism thesis should not be accepted without question, and represent perhaps only the gloomier end of imperial Greeks' range of feelings about the rhetorical opportunities available to them.

¹⁵ VS 511, 516, 567, 600. The pairing is also found in an inscription commemorating the sophist Lollianus: see Puech (Puech 2002, no. 149).

If we return to the ancient sources, it is clear that their negative assessments of present political opportunities should not be taken at face value. Such utterances are almost always found in the context of exhortations to concord, as they are in the three examples cited above, a context in which it obviously makes sense to play down the importance of whatever is in dispute. The line of reasoning is thus: ‘what position of leadership, what glory is there for those who emerge victorious from such disputes?’ (τίς γὰρ ἡγεμονία, τίς δόξα τοῖς περιγενομένοις;) (Plut. *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 824E). Moreover, in some places we find much more positive assessments of the opportunities for rhetoric. ‘Even if not only all of the mistakes of private citizens, but also even if all wars should be gone from humankind, rhetoric’s affairs would not be in trouble, nor would its power decline, as if it had been pulled out by the root’,¹⁶ judges Aristides, and among oratory’s offices he cites the promotion of concord, the adornment of cities, making proposals, going on embassies, and, generally speaking, ‘ever setting in order whatever is at hand’ (ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν συντιθεμένη) (*Or.* 2.401); elsewhere he lists adorning national festivals, honouring the gods, advising cities, consoling the bereaved, stopping *stasis*, and exhorting the young (*Or.* 3.672; cf. also 2.411). In short, ‘work remains for oratory as long as men have dealings with one another privately and publicly’ (Behr) (ἕως ἄν ᾗ τὸ χρῆσθαι καὶ καθ’ αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, τὰ ἔργα τῇ ῥητορικῇ σώζεται) (*Or.* 2.402).¹⁷ Plutarch is more sombre, but still provides evidence for continued opportunities for important rhetorical interventions. Decisions about war and peace may be a thing of the past, Plutarch says, but there still remain public lawsuits and embassies to the emperor, both of which require ‘an ardent man with both boldness and intelligence’ (ἀνδρὸς διαπύρου καὶ θάρσος ἅμα καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντος)

¹⁶ ῥητορικῇ δὲ οὐ μόνον εἰ καὶ πάντα τὰ τῶν ιδιωτῶν ἀμαρτήματα, ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ πόλεμοι πάντες ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀπέλθοιεν, οὐκ ἄπορα τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲ πέπτωκεν αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις ὥσπερ ρίζης ὑφαιρεθείσης (*Or.* 2.411).

¹⁷ In his *Panegyric in Cyzicus*, Aristides also offers several extremely upbeat assessments of the felicity of his age: ‘these are the best and most perfect times that ever were’ (οἱ τε καιροὶ τῶν πρόποτε ἄριστοι καὶ τελεώτατοι) (*Or.* 27.1: cf. 27.22, 27.40).

(*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 805B); Plutarch later concedes that the task of promoting concord also still remains for the statesman, and goes on to describe this as ‘not inferior to any good thing’ (μηδενὸς ἔλαττον... τῶν ἀγαθῶν) (824D).

So it is distorted to say (as Perry does) that the contemporary world offered Greek elites ‘no worthy theatre’ for action, and the abundant evidence for their involvement in contemporary politics as well as their own words suggest that they did not regularly share such an assessment. Given this, the idea of declamation as a principally ‘escapist’ genre looks *prima facie* unlikely. But now it is time to turn to the declamatory corpus itself.

‘And Marathon in the Conclusion’?¹⁸

If a characterization of the genre as an attempt to escape to or revive the sure glories of the past were accurate, what would we expect to find there? Plenty of Marathon, to be sure, along with Salamis and Thermopylae and almost anything else from the Persian wars; some highlights from the fifth century (reworkings of Pericles’ funeral oration, perhaps Sphacteria); and from the fourth century, thunderous affirmations of Athenian culture and independence in the face of Macedon. Anderson’s account rather suggests that this is what we find: of Himerius *Oration* 5, a declamation in which Themistocles opposes the reparations offered by Xerxes to forestall a punitive expedition by the Greeks against Persia, he writes ‘[t]he subject itself is fairly typical: it represents a recreation of what was now regarded as a climax of Greek, and particularly Athenian history: the “finest hours” of independent city states against overwhelming barbarian odds’ (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 62).¹⁹

¹⁸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ὁ Μαραθῶν (Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 18).

¹⁹ For Boulanger, scenarios based on the Persian wars are ‘les plus goûtés de tous’ (Boulanger 1923, 54); Marrou calls them ‘les plus débattus’ (Marrou 1965, 305); Bowie heads his account of declamation’s favourite topics with Scopelian’s Persian scenarios (Bowie, *Greeks and Their Past* 1970, 7); Reardon says that in his declamations on the battle of Marathon, Polemo was treating ‘le mode de sons temps’ (Reardon 1971, 107). Cf. also Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 43) and Oudot (Oudot 2010, esp. 143–5). Schmitz follows the same line,

Yet a fair survey of the c. 281 known declamations from the first to third centuries²⁰ reveals a rather more complicated picture.²¹ To start with the alleged cliché of the Persian wars: I count only 15 titles, or about 5% of the total, concerned anything more than tangentially with Persia.²² There is no easy way to explain away such a low percentage of Persian scenarios.²³ Even if we look at sources in which historical scenarios dominate, the overall percentage of Persian scenarios is barely higher. About 83% of Philostratus' scenarios are historical, yet even he only shows 8% of Persian scenarios (4 out of 48).²⁴

Furthermore, if the escapism thesis is correct, we need not just any scenario on the Persian wars, but really declamations that might plausibly have celebrated Greece's achievements.

failing in the space of a page to notice the discrepancy between his characterization of the genre's characteristic interests and his list of surviving declamations (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 113). For Schmitz, the scenarios have to have been clichéd to permit close comparison of different declaimers' talents, something vital to his view of sophistic as a medium for status competition (cf. above, p. 14).

²⁰ Deciding which declamations to include in such a survey poses some issues. The chronological boundaries of this thesis straightforwardly catch the independently preserved declamations of Aristides, Lucian, Polemo, Herodes Atticus, Lesbonax, and Hadrian of Tyre, and all the numerous titles mentioned in Philostr. *VS*, *Aps. Rh.*, and Hermog. *Stat.* I also include the few first-century titles that Philostr. *VS* offers, since these obviously belong to the same world as their second- and third-century counterparts. The dating of [Hermog.] *Inv.* poses a problem, but it seems likely that the work includes at least some second- and third-century material (cf. p. 28 n. 72 above); accordingly, its titles are included here, with some caution.

²¹ Contrast Schmitz: 'der Themenkreis dieser Deklamationen war recht beschränkt' (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 113).

²² *Aps. Rh.* 218.16–17 (=225.15–17), 219.9–10, 225.20, 237.7–11, 246.3–5 (=255.16–18), 323.10–11 (=305.11–18); Aristid. *Or.* 28.6; Hermog. *Stat.* I 23.4–5 (a defective scenario, for Mardonius died before the Persian fugitives reached home, as Hermogenes notes, though he says that such scenarios were nonetheless in use (*Stat.* I 23.5–8)), II 4.7–8; Philostr. *VS* 513, 519, 575 (x2); Polem. *Declamationes*.

²³ Heath has plausibly suggested that rhetoricians teaching the basics of declamation would strip out the specifics of a historical scenario to produce an easier to manage *plasma* (Heath, Menander 2004, 251–3), but it would be hard to point to any *plasmata* that could have come from Persian scenarios: I do not know of any in which rivers or seas are bridged, or islands trenched.

²⁴ Spawforth calculates on the basis of Russell's figures that 12% of known historical declamations took the Persian wars as their theme (Spawforth, *Symbol of Unity?* 1994, 244). Where else might we look for the missing Persian scenarios? Well, there are some fictitious historical *meletai* that involve situations that feel more at home in the Persian wars, such as the scenarios in which Demosthenes proposes to cut through the Chersonese to stop Philip's attacks (*Aps. Rh.* 226.19–20 (=233.18–19, 255.10–11); [Hermog.] *Inv.* III 3.10.1–2 (=III 6.12.1–3, III 11.2), but even if the central concept was lifted from the tradition of the Persian wars, and even if the Demosthenic version in some way evoked that history, whether implicitly or explicitly, the fact remains that the motif has been resited in the Demosthenic period: the most obvious interpretation of this fact would be a lessening of interest in Persian scenarios. Furthermore, if we are open to the possibility of (aspects of) Persian scenarios lurking elsewhere, to be fair, we ought equally to be open to the possibility that material from other periods is lurking in the explicitly Persian scenarios. Consider, for instance, the scenario in which it is debated whether to allow the Persian dead at Marathon to be buried. This is not part of the tradition, and the motif of refusal of burial is in fact more at home in a context like the battle of Delium (reported at Thuc. 4.97–101). It might turn out that for every Persian motif identified in a non-Persian scenario we would find a corresponding non-Persian motif in a Persian scenario.

Some almost certainly did: debating a second invasion of Greece (Philostr. VS 575) certainly looks like an obvious opportunity to exalt Greek bravery in the Herodotean mode; contemplating burial for the Persian dead at Marathon (Hermog. *Stat.* II 4.7–8) offers the possibility of adding clemency to martial achievements. But others on the face of it look less obviously patriotic. What about ‘during the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans and the Athenians send messengers to the King asking for money. He gives money to both sides. When they have returned, someone among the Greeks thinks it right to launch a campaign against the King’?²⁵ (The Greeks in this scenario seem to believe that the King is seeking to sow discord among them: compare a similar scenario at Aps. *Rh.* 255.16–17). Or what are we to make of ‘after the Persian wars, someone thinks it right to undertake an expedition against those who Medized’ (μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ ἀξιοῖ τις ἐπὶ τοὺς μηδίσαντας στρατεύειν) (Aps. *Rh.* 219.9–10)? Of all the things to celebrate about Greece’s long history with Persia, disunity²⁶ and treason²⁷ are not obvious choices. Of course, it is not impossible that these scenarios could have been used to glorify the past in some way, but it is unlikely to have been in a straightforward fashion. Estelle Oudot has examined references to the Persian wars outside of declamation and comes to a still stronger conclusion: in these other texts, Oudot concludes, the Persian wars are never crudely pro-Hellenic (Oudot 2010).

Plainly jingoistic scenarios on the Persian wars, then, represent only a small minority of the declamation scenarios from this period known to us. But what about the evidence of Lucian or Plutarch on this point?²⁸ The bad teacher of rhetoric in Lucian’s *Rhetorum praeceptor*

²⁵ ἐν τῷ Πελοποννησιακῷ πολέμῳ ἔπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ βασιλέα περὶ χρημάτων. ἔδωκεν ἑκατέροις· ἐπανελθόντων αὐτῶν ἀξιοῖ τις ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐπὶ βασιλέα στρατεύειν (Aps. *Rh.* 237.7–11).

²⁶ Cf. also Aps. *Rh.* 246.3–5 (=255.16–18).

²⁷ Cf. also Aps. *Rh.* 323.10–11 (cf. 305.11–18).

²⁸ That Persian scenarios were particularly associated with certain declaimers (Ptolemy of Naucratis, Philostr. VS 595 and Prohaeresius, Eunap. VS 494) does not prove that such scenarios were very common: on the contrary, such comments might suggest that Persian themes were relatively unusual, for if everyone were doing them, it would be strange to associate them with particular declaimers.

urges the would-be sophist to ‘cap everything with references to Marathon and Cynegirus’ (Wright) (ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ὁ Μαραθῶν καὶ ὁ Κυνέγειρος) (*Rh. Pr.* 18), and in Lucian’s *Zeus tragoedus*, when Heracles proposes to destroy the *Stoa Poikilē*, Zeus objects on the grounds that without the stoa’s depiction of the battle of Marathon, orators would be ‘robbed of their greatest source of material for speeches’ (τὴν μεγίστην εἰς τοὺς λόγους ὑπόθεσιν ἀφηρημένοι) (*JTr.* 32). Meanwhile in a famous passage of Plutarch’s *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, we hear: ‘Marathon, the Eurymedon, Plataea, and all the other examples which make the common folk vainly to swell with pride and kick up their heels should be left to the schools of the sophists’ (τὸν δὲ Μαραθῶνα καὶ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα καὶ τὰς Πλαταιάς, καὶ ὅσα τῶν παραδειγμάτων οἶδεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ φρυάττεσθαι διακενῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἀπολιπόντας ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τῶν σοφιστῶν) (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 814C).

The first thing to remember is that by no means all such thumbnail sketches of declamation mention Persia. Lucian himself elsewhere characterizes declamation as ‘denunciations of tyrants and encomia of war-heroes’ (τυράννων κατηγορίας καὶ ἀριστέων ἐπαίνους ἐκφυγόντα) (*Bis Acc.* 32), and on another occasion refers to the characters of declamation as ‘war-heroes or tyrant-killers or poor men or famers’ (ἀριστέων ἢ τυραννοκτόνων ἢ πενήτων ἢ γεωργῶν) (*Salt.* 65); Philostratus too says that his Second Sophistic sketched ‘poor men and rich men and war-heroes and tyrants’ (τοὺς πένητας ὑπετυπώσατο καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ τοὺς ἀριστεὰς καὶ τοὺς τυράννους) (*VS* 481).²⁹

More importantly, the passages that mention the sophists’ use of the Persian wars obviously need to be read in context. Plutarch in the *Praecepta reipublicae gerendae* is actually talking about non-declamatory oratory, and his argument is as follows. Many *exempla* used in non-

²⁹ He does go on to mention ‘declamation scenarios which involve named persons, offered to us by history’ (τὰς ἐς ὄνομα ὑποθέσεις, ἐφ’ ἃς ἡ ἱστορία ἄγει), into which category Persian scenarios would fall, but he does not give any examples.

declamatory oratory are in truth unsuitable to the political circumstances in which imperial Greeks find themselves: as such, they should be relegated to the schools of sophists, a domain (in his view) safely divorced from the real world. The Persian wars are cited, therefore, not because they are typical of declamation (and in any case, the schools of sophists were not solely concerned with declamation), but rather because they exemplify (again, as Plutarch sees it) the gap between past and present. This is evidence that sophistic oratory included references to the Persian wars, but that of course is not disputed: what this passage does not offer, however, is any real indication of the frequency of declamations centered on this history.

The Lucianic passages, meanwhile, are obviously comic. Zeus' comments on the *Stoa Poikilē* and the bad teacher of rhetoric's injunction should not necessarily be taken any more seriously than the latter's Atticizing advice to use words like ἀποστλεγγίσασθαι, εἰληθερεῖσθαι, προνόμιον, or ἀκροκνεφές ('destrigillation', 'insolation', 'hansel', and 'crepuscule') (Wright) (17), none of which in fact are to be found in extant declamations.³⁰ These are comic attacks on rhetoric: it makes perfect sense in such a context to portray the discipline as obsessed with a single topic. It is easy to understand why tendentious passages such as these, and tendentious readings of others (such as that from Plutarch) have become so prominent in modern accounts, for they fit the traditional view of the culture of this period, and of course are much more accessible than the declamation titles themselves, which are often found in difficult and diverse sources.³¹

³⁰ The bad teacher of rhetoric does not actually seem to be advocating full declamations on the Persian wars: rather, Marathon and Cynegirus are to be ἐπὶ πᾶσι, a term which means something like 'in the conclusion'; presumably this means that these *exempla* are to be invoked in every peroration. (For ἐπὶ πᾶσιν meaning 'in the conclusion', see Wright (Wright 1921, 569)). Similarly, Salamis and Artemisium and Plataea are to be πυκνά ('close-packed', 'frequent')—woven, it would seem, into the texture of the declamation, rather than forming its primary subject matter.

³¹ In truth, I suspect that a large part of the attraction of Persian scenarios was not so much the opportunity to celebrate Greek glories as an excuse to experience the guilty pleasures of taking on an arrogant and bombastic persona for a while, something that would no doubt have appealed to a number of Philostratus' sophists at least (Spawforth, *Symbol of Unity?* 1994, 245). For transfer between a declaimer's fictitious character and his extra-

‘The Footsteps of Demosthenes’?³²

So the prominence of Persian scenarios in declamation has certainly been overstated. In fact, the role of history in declamation generally has been overstated. Here our picture may have been distorted somewhat by the prominence of the meticulous Aristides in later tradition and among our surviving texts (Webb, *Greek Past* 2006, 31–2).³³ In reality, Aristides’ careful recreation of historical detail was probably exceptional.³⁴ The declamations of Lesbonax, by contrast, such as they are, are almost utterly devoid of historical data: a small detail gives the first one away as concerned with avenging the Plataeans; of the second we cannot say more than that it is an exhortation to battle against Sparta; the third is just an exhortation to battle against an unspecified enemy. The same is true of the declamation attributed to Herodes, for while it does contain some flashes of detail on fifth-century Larissa, whole sections go without any sort of anchoring information at all. Polemo’s declamations on Cynegirus and Callimachus show greater historical contextualization, but even their history is ultimately superficial: not unjustly did Reardon conclude that Polemo ‘n’apporte pas une seule donnée historique’ (Reardon 1971, 109).³⁵

Furthermore, what history there is in declamation is often rather inglorious. No fewer than three times (in three different sources) are Athenian tributaries forced to sell their children to pay their taxes;³⁶ elsewhere, the Athenians are twice tried for the cannibalism that their

declamatory persona, see section III of this thesis. For the potential pro-Roman significance of declamations on the Persian wars, see below, pp. 157–59.

³² τὰ Δημοσθένους ἔχγη (Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 9).

³³ ‘[N]o attempt was made to preserve historicity... Declamation not only did not teach law, it did not teach history either’ (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 81).

³⁴ Boulanger speaks of ‘une connaissance approfondie de l’histoire hellénique’ (Boulanger 1923, 288), an opinion enthusiastically endorsed by Reardon (Reardon 1971, 105).

³⁵ Cf. Schmid (Schmid 1887–96, I.65 n. 30); Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 201). Schmitz also shows how Polemo’s declamations assume the cultural background not of fifth-century Athens but of imperial Greece (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 201–5). Even Aristides’ concern for historical accuracy is not so strong: in his *Oration 7*, set in 425 BCE, Plato’s *Republic* is cited (7.28) about fifty years before it was written (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 204)!

³⁶ VS 593; Aps. *Rh.* 261.20–22; [Hermog.] *Inv.* I 5.8.2–3.

siege forced on the inhabitants of Potidaea,³⁷ and the rash decision to execute the ten generals after the battle of Arginusae is explored from various angles.³⁸ ‘Escapism’ or ‘nostalgia’ look unlikely to exhaust the possible range of meanings in texts like these. Furthermore, once we venture outside of declamations set during the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, or the struggle against Macedon, escapism seems still less prominent. Why did the sophist Antiochus declaim defending the Cretan claim to the tomb of Zeus (VS 569), and why did Apollonius of Athens seek, in the person of Callias, to dissuade the Athenians from cremating their dead (VS 601–2)?³⁹ Why did Aristides devote five celebrated (cf. above p. 93) declamations to Athenian deliberations after the Thebans had beaten the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra (Orr. 11–15)? Why on earth are there six declamations in which different peoples consider migration,⁴⁰ or three on the closely-related⁴¹ topic of Scythian nomadism?⁴²

Finally, it should be recalled that not all declamations are in fact historical. About half of known declamation titles for this period are *plasmata*, which of course cannot have explicit historical content. We might wonder whether the *plasmata* in educational texts skew our picture here, since it has been suggested that in public performance historical scenarios were more common.⁴³ They are certainly more common in Philostratus’ *Vitae sophistarum* and Aristides’ surviving declamations, but there are reasons for caution: of Libanius’ 51 declamations, only 25 are historical, and of Choricus’ 16, only one is historical. Moreover, we surely lose something if we exclude educational texts, for education is an ideological

³⁷ Aps. *Rh.* 230.4–5; [Hermog.] *Inv.* II 5.4.2–3.

³⁸ Aps. *Rh.* 288.10–15, 293.16–17, 326.23; VS 584; Hermog. *Id.* I 6.7.4–11.

³⁹ This scenario is so unusual that Rothe assumes it was invented by Apollonius (Rothe 1989, 193).

⁴⁰ VS 620; Aps. *Rh.* 255.7–8; [Hermog.] *Inv.* II 2.1.4–5, 5–6, 7–8, 8–9.

⁴¹ The relation is particularly clear in the case of the sophist Alexander Clay-Plato, who at VS 572 argues that the Scythians should abandon living in cities and return to their former nomadic way of life, and then at 575 is heard arguing that those who have bad health in the plains should migrate to the mountains.

⁴² Aps. *Rh.* 228.10–11 (=230.6, 233.17–18, 247.17–19, 253.3–4); VS 572, 620.

⁴³ See Bowie (Bowie, *Greeks and Their Past* 1970, 8–9) and Swain (S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* 1996, 95).

vehicle *par excellence*: these are the very scenarios on which so many of the Greek elites would have been raised.

So: only about half of known declamations from this period were historical, and not all of these offer obvious space for escapism; even in those that do, that escapism would often have been significantly undermined by a paucity of historical detail. This is not to say that there were no declamations that offered escapist pleasure, or indeed that scenarios that evoked less attractive aspects of the past, or evoked the past only superficially, did not have an escapist dimension: but it looks increasingly likely that accounts of declamation as *primarily* ‘escapist’ or ‘nostalgic’ are significant oversimplifications. In truth, they had always seemed a little reductive. Greek culture had produced sophisticated and profound literature for hundreds of years, and, in the imperial period, such self-aware figures as Lucian or the Greek novelists, whose richness has been profitably explored in recent decades:⁴⁴ it is highly implausible that this period’s most prestigious genre will be able to be explained largely as a celebration of the past at the expense of the present.⁴⁵

Greek Declamation: A New Survey

Before we can draw conclusions about declamation’s relation to its context, we clearly need a more accurate picture of the declamatory corpus itself: too many of the traditional assumptions have turned out to be faulty. There are two problems. First, because of a failure to quantify, the traditional picture has become distorted by selection bias and subjectivity.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Cf. above p. 18 n. 35 and p. 19 n. 36.

⁴⁵ The idea that Greek history and literature effectively stopped after colonization, indeed, looks more than a little like (lingering) nineteenth-century imperialism.

⁴⁶ Statistics, of course, also require interpretation, and the numbers available to us must be distorted by factors known and unknown. For example, in his work defending a remark he made in passing, Aristides says ‘if ever I play the part of Demosthenes, or Miltiades, or Themistocles, or Aristides, my namesake...’ (ἂν μὲν Δημοσθένη, ἢ Μιλτιάδην, ἢ Θεμιστοκλέα, ἢ τὸν ὁμώνυμον ὑποκρίνωμαι) (Aristid. Or. 28.6). This clearly means that Aristides has performed these roles more than once, and indeed that he probably continued to perform them after writing these words: but are we to imagine that Aristides performed the role of Demosthenes ten times, or a hundred?

Second, while some categorization will always be necessary, as no one can hold in his or her mind the entire declamatory corpus at once, chronological categorization is clearly too blunt an instrument. Not only does it miss perhaps half of all known declamations, but it is too broad-brush really to be useful. A pair of declamations like ‘When Alexander is in India, Demosthenes advises that it is time to act’ (Behr) (Ἀλεξάνδρου... ἐν Ἰνδοῖς ὄντος συμβουλεύει Δημοσθένης ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν) (Aristid. *Or.* 50.18) and Meidias objecting to being tried by Demosthenes for a second time (Aps. *Rh.* 221.17–22) are both from the Demosthenic period, but they are likely to have had as many points of difference as they had similarities.⁴⁷ A *thematic* analysis of declamation, by contrast, is more sensitive to the texture of the genre, as we shall see, and offers a more accurate picture of the genre as a whole.

A quantitative thematic survey of Greek declamation follows.⁴⁸ It is designed to give in a brief compass a reasonably accurate sense of the relative frequency of different sorts of topics in declamation. Accordingly, the categories used are not mutually exclusive, and in fact quite a number of titles appear in more than one category. The twelve categories, ranging in size from fifty-five titles for the largest to seven for the smallest, capture about 90% of the declamations known in this period; the remaining 10% evade easy classification. The fact that for most of these categories we find declamations from a variety of sources and set in a variety of historical periods gives us reasonable confidence that they represent genuine trends rather than statistical anomalies.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ For these scenarios, see Kohl (Kohl 1915, no.s 267 and 320).

⁴⁸ The closest survey to that offered here is that of Patillon (Patillon, Apsinès 2001, xci–cii), which does quantify but which is relatively brief and has a much wider chronological range than our survey (Patillon, Apsinès 2001, xcii n. 4); see also Swain (S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* 1996, 92–96). Russell’s picture of ‘sophistopolis’ is only concerned with *plasmata* and does not quantify (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 21–39). Later in the same work, Russell breaks down historical scenarios by period (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 107).

⁴⁹ On problems of dating, see p. 122 n. 20. A *specific declamation*—i.e. a specific performance and/or textual instantiation of a given scenario—is counted only once, no matter how many times it occurs in our sources. Equally, if the same scenario is mentioned more than once *in the same source* or is attempted more than once

1) Personal Conflicts: 55 titles. The most common subject for declamations is what we may call ‘personal conflicts’, crimes or offences or quarrels that largely take place between a small number of people *qua* private individuals, and which lack partly or entirely a public dimension:

- Seventeen scenarios concern adultery. Most are concerned with the degree of proof required to make a charge stick (e.g. a coward charges his wife with adultery when his son distinguishes himself in battle (Hermog. *Stat.* III 2.10–11)) and/or the precise definition of adultery (e.g. whether a eunuch can be said to have committed adultery (Hermog. *Stat.* IV 9.3–11)).
 - A sub-grouping of six concerns adultery within families, e.g. a man is rumoured to be sleeping with his son’s wife; the son argues for acquittal on grounds of insanity (Aps. *Rh.* 331.1–3).
- Fourteen scenarios concern murder. The principal questions are:
 - What quantity or quality of evidence is required to convict a person of murder (seven scenarios)? E.g.: a man constantly undergoes ritual purification for homicide. He is charged with murder (Aps. *Rh.* 226.17–18).
 - Can murder ever be justified (four scenarios)? E.g.: A (triple-)hero kills his son for prostitution and is prosecuted for murder (Aps. *Rh.* 235.17–18).⁵⁰
 - What degree of blame attaches to those who have committed murder accidentally (three scenarios)? E.g.: it is permissible to brand adulterers; someone kills an

by the same author, it is counted only once. If, however, the same scenario is mentioned more than once in different sources and/or is attempted more than once by different authors, each occurrence is counted separately. When deciding whether two scenarios are the same, I ignore minor differences of wording. To avoid an inundation of lengthy footnotes, I only give full references for categories represented by five declamations or fewer.

⁵⁰ Other instances: Hermog. *Stat.* III 43.3–9, VI.3.4–5; [Hermog.] *Inv.* I 1.27.4–6; Aps. *Rh.* 235.17–18.

adulterer while branding him, and is charged with homicide (Hermog. *Stat.* XI 13.2–3).⁵¹

- Twelve scenarios concern conflict between fathers and sons (significant overlap here with scenarios involving adultery); in legal terms, the principal question addressed is the circumstances under which a father can reasonably disown his son, e.g. a farmer disinherits his son for studying philosophy (Hermog. *Stat.* II 5.8–9).
- The fourth largest group (nine scenarios), showing significant overlap with the third, concerns immorality among the young, most often for prostitution,⁵² but also more generally for dissolute living (Hermog. *Stat.* I 11.2–3).

There are also penny numbers of smaller crimes: incest (e.g. [Hermog.] *Inv.* III 13.3.1–4),⁵³ fraternal quarrels (Aps. *Rh.* 234.15–17), old age ([Hermog.] *Inv.* I 2.4.4–7), rape (VS 569), wicked stepmothers (Luc. *Abd.*), etc.

2) International Relations: 50 titles. By this term I understand all relations between two *poleis* or between a *polis* and a foreign state (Macedon, Persia, and once, Lydia).⁵⁴ Thirty-six fairly straight-forward scenarios concern war and peace, e.g. a speech in favour of sending reinforcements to those in Sicily (Aristid. *Or.* 5), or one regarding a possible Lydian alliance with Sparta, ([Hermog.] *Inv.* II 4.3.1–4). Of the remaining fourteen, some seem to show a sense of Panhellenic consciousness: someone proposes a war against Medizers (Aps. *Rh.* 219.9–10), or the Arcadians are attacked for being mercenaries (VS 522), or the Spartans are charged with wrongs against the Greeks for buying Theban prisoners from Alexander and slaughtering them before the trophy at Leuctra ([Hermog.] *Inv.* III 10.11.2–5); in a more conciliatory mode, there are proposals to remove trophies erected to mark victories over

⁵¹ Other instances: Hermog. *Stat.* XI 13.2–3; [Hermog.] *Inv.* I 1.10.1–3 (=II 7.26.1–3), I 1.18.2–6.

⁵² Aps. *Rh.* 235.17–18; Hermog. *Stat.* I 5.14 (=III 14.5–6), VI 4.4–5.

⁵³ For the suggestion of incest, see Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *Invention and Method* 2005, 7 n. 8).

⁵⁴ Lydia: [Hermog.] *Inv.* II 4.3.1–4.

fellow Greeks.⁵⁵ Other scenarios consider international obligations towards refugees, exiles, and prisoners-of-war.⁵⁶ There are also disputes over symbolic capital. The Athenians and Spartans argue over who should have first place in a procession (Hermog. *Id.* II 10.27.6–7), or squabble over a golden crown sent by the Persian king ‘to the best city’ (τῇ ἀρίστῃ τῶν πόλεων) (Aps. *Rh.* 246.4–5 (=255.16–18)); Alcibiades offends the Eleans when after his victory in the chariot race at the Olympics he says that he comes from ‘the best city’ ([Hermog.] *Inv.* II 4.5.1–4); in a rather unusual scenario, the Cretans press their claim that they have the real tomb of Zeus (VS 570).

3) Misconduct in Public Life: 44 titles. An unexpected category, but a distinct one: there is in fact almost no overlap with the next category (‘civil strife’).

- First, treachery, corruption, and bribery (twelve scenarios): Themistocles on trial for helping Persia,⁵⁷ or Pericles suspected of treason because Archidamus did not burn his crops when invading Attica ([Hermog.] *Inv.* III 6.5.6–7); Demosthenes swears that he did not take the bribe of fifty talents (VS 538, 542), or Archidamus denies having taken bribes from Pericles (Hermog. *Stat.* I 10.1–3).
- The great mass of these scenarios, however, is concerned not with deliberate wrongdoing but rather with error or failure:
 - Military (eleven scenarios): Demosthenes denounces himself after Chaeronea (VS 542), or Mardonius (ahistorically) defends his advice to the Persian King after the battle of Plataea (Hermog. *Stat.* I 23.4–5).
 - Oratorical (seven): Demosthenes is prosecuted for breaking down in a speech before Philip (VS 626); a charge is brought against Isocrates for keeping silence,

⁵⁵ Aps. *Rh.* 219.16–18; Philostr. VS 538–9.

⁵⁶ E.g. VS 595–6; [Hermog.] *Inv.* I 1.22.1–5, III 10.11.2–5.

⁵⁷ Aps. *Rh.* 305.13–18, 323.10–11.

then, when he promises to speak, he is charged again for proposing that Athens give up its naval empire (Aps. *Rh.* 222.13–15).

- Diplomatic (eight): Aeschines acts in a tragedy at Philip's court and is crowned victor; on his return, he is prosecuted by Demosthenes for false embassy ([Hermog.] *Inv.* I 1.13.4–7); Demades goes on an embassy to Philip, and when asked what sort of place Athens is, draws an image of it on the table; on his return home he is indicted for hubris ([Hermog.] *Inv.* I 2.7.4–7). Significant overlap here with the category of embassies (category 8).

4) Civil Strife: 41 titles. Seventeen scenarios involving tyrants, a figure which climbs to twenty-one if we accept the tyrannical implications of Demosthenes ignoring the law that requires a declaration of war to be debated over three days and then being offered a bodyguard.⁵⁸ The chief questions are:

- What sort of evidence suffices to prove an accusation of aiming at tyranny (nine scenarios): the possession of a thousand suits of armour (Hermog. *Stat.* III 23.5–7), looking at the acropolis with tears in one's eyes,⁵⁹ or tyrannical ancestors ([Hermog.] *Inv.* I 2.10.2–4)?
- How far should one go to get rid of a tyrant (four scenarios)? Call in Sparta (Aps. *Rh.* 310.16–18)? Offer the tyrant immunity in return for his abdication (VS 569)? Violate the right of sanctuary (Hermog. *Stat.* I 22.3–5)? Swap thirty tyrants for one (Aps. *Rh.* 243.19–244.1 (=327.15–17))?
- What acts meet the definition of tyrannicide exactly (two scenarios)?

⁵⁸ Aps. *Rh.* 219.1–3, 245.4–7; Hermog. *Stat.* VII 2.3–5; VS 588–89.

⁵⁹ Hermog. *Stat.* III 19.2–4, III 22.4–7; Aps. *Rh.* 243.13–15, 273.12–14.

Another large and sometimes overlapping group is formed by the ten scenarios that involve quarrels between rich and poor. Five times the rich man names the death of his poor enemy as the price for some service.⁶⁰

Among historical scenarios there are four that concern the rivalry of Cleon with either Nicias or Alcibiades.⁶¹

5) Religion: 19 titles. Eight scenarios involve festivals: six involve the Eleusinian mysteries, two the Olympics.⁶² Are there any circumstances in which one should change any aspect of these festivals: when the Persians invade, is it permissible to hold initiations into the mysteries at sea ([Hermog.] *Inv.* III 6.20.2–3)? Would it be wrong in a financial crisis to charge a fee for initiation?⁶³ How Greek does one have to be to secure admission to the mysteries (Luc. *Pseudol.* 5)? The remaining half deals with impieties of various kinds. There are three on death: whether the Persian dead at Marathon should be buried (Hermog. *Stat.* II 4.7–8); Callias' attempt to dissuade the Athenians from burning their dead (VS 601); and a motion to rescind the law permitting embalming after someone has sex with a corpse ([Hermog.] *Inv.* I 2.11.2–3). The others are very diverse, ranging from alleged temple-robbery (Hermog. *Stat.* II 2.9–12 (=IV 15.5–7)) to the impiety of a brothel keeper naming his girls after the Muses ([Hermog.] *Inv.* I 2.8.2–4)

6) Warfare: 17 titles. As opposed to our second category ('international relations'), this category is concerned solely with the conduct of war; as such, there is very little overlap between the two categories. A major concern is the lengths to which one can or should go to defeat an enemy. In a crisis, is it permissible to ignore the law forbidding an alien to mount the walls (Hermog. *Stat.* II 10.7–9)? Can it be justified to burn one's own ships to stop troops

⁶⁰ Aps. *Rh.* 315.11–13, 319.3–16, 330.12–15; [Hermog.] *Inv.* I 1.18.2–6, IV 13.3.2–5.

⁶¹ Hermog. *Stat.* I 23.2–3; Aps. *Rh.* 242.3–5, 5–8, 9–11.

⁶² Aps. *Rh.* 235.4–5; [Hermog.] *Inv.* II 4.5.1–4.

⁶³ Aps. *Rh.* 247.7–8, 249.3–4, 254.4, 271.23.

from deserting (*Aps. Rh.* 271.5–7)? In a siege, would it be right to kill the old as militarily useless and a drain on resources?⁶⁴

7) Civic Honours: 14 titles. Most of these scenarios (eight) concern the rewards due a hero. Is no reward too large, even a life?⁶⁵

8) Embassies: 13 titles. There is strong overlap here (nine titles) with the sub-category of ‘diplomatic failure’ in category 3 (‘Misconduct in Public Life’): this is a case of two different ways of conceiving of what is largely the same body of material. There are four additions, however (even in *Sophistopolis*, not all embassies fail). There are two new *plasmata*, both concerned with abuses during an ambassador’s absence (his daughter is raped (*Hermog. Stat.* IV 18.1–5), or a law is passed to his disadvantage (*Hermog. Stat.* VIII 2.3–9)); a historical declamation whose outcome is unspecified (the Athenians and Spartans compete to win the support of Persia (*Aps. Rh.* 237.7–11)); finally, a rare mythological declamation, Aristides’ *Embassy to Achilles* (*Or.* 16).

9) Migration and Nomadism: 10 titles. There are seven declamations in which various peoples consider migration, and three on Scythian nomadism, a closely related topic.⁶⁶

10) Construction: 9 titles. The famous scenario against the fortification of Sparta (*VS* 514 and 583), along with two Persian scenarios: Xerxes’ canal through Athos (*Aps. Rh.* 225.20), and the question of bridging the Danube (*VS* 575). At Athens, we have Conon offered the same honours as the tyrannicides for building the Long Walls (*Aps. Rh.* 252.1–3), and a proposal to sell the fleet to pay for the rebuilding of the city (*Aps. Rh.* 220.16–19); we also find Demosthenes proposing a canal through the Chersonese isthmus to slow Philip’s

⁶⁴ [*Hermog.*] *Inv.* I 2.4.4–7; *Anon. Seg.* 141.

⁶⁵ *Aps. Rh.* 315.11–13; [*Hermog.*] *Inv.* I 2.4.4–7; *Anon. Seg.* 141.

⁶⁶ See p. 127 n. 42. For the relationship to more general migration scenarios, see p. 127 n. 41.

advance,⁶⁷ while Philip himself appears as a potential builder in the scenario in which he offers to rebuild Greek cities if the Greeks will give up their intention to make war against him (Aps. *Rh.* 239.11–13, 245.16–18).

11) Public finances and Empire: 7 titles each. There are four speeches on the islands that make up the Athenian empire. In three of them, the islanders are forced to sell their children to pay their taxes;⁶⁸ in one, the Athenians in a financial crisis consider selling the islands (VS 527). If we put these together with the two scenarios on exemptions (the case of Leptines (VS 527; Aps. *Rh.* 252.16–17)) and Aristogeiton’s proposal to charge a fee for initiation into the mysteries, we have a category of public finances, with seven titles. Alternatively, these scenarios on the islands could be grouped with those in which the Athenians are in various ways urged to give up their naval empire,⁶⁹ forming a category of ‘empire’.

A Tale of Two Cities

For this is not the reason that we are always declaiming—so that we might never say anything useful. No: it is the man who has the ability and the courage to say what is necessary who makes clear that even his declamation he has not performed in vain or at random.

(οὐ γὰρ ὅπως μηδέποτ’ εἰπωμεν τῶν χρησίμων μηδέν, διὰ τοῦτ’ ἀεὶ μελετῶμεν, ἀλλ’ ὅστις τὰ δέοντα λέγειν ἔχει τε καὶ θαρρεῖ, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ καὶ τὴν μελέτην δεικνὺς ὡς οὐχὶ μάτην οὐδ’ εἰκῇ πεποιήται) (Aristid. *Or.* 23.4)

This thematic analysis has been highly revealing.⁷⁰ *Stasis*, rivalries with neighbours, embassies to foreign powers, disputes over honours and building projects: Sophistopolis

⁶⁷ In two sources: [Hermog.] *Inv.* III 3.10.1–2 (=III 6.12.1–3, III 11.2) and Aps. *Rh.* 226.9–10 (=233.18–19, 255.10–11).

⁶⁸ Aps. *Rh.* 261.20–22; [Hermog.] *Inv.* I 5.8.2–3; VS 593.

⁶⁹ VS 538, 584; Aps. *Rh.* 220.16–19.

⁷⁰ The role of Byzantium in shaping our picture of this aspect of antiquity is, as ever, murky. But I do not think that Byzantium will have been as influential as Kaldellis has shown it was in the shaping of our picture of ancient historiography (Kaldellis 2012), for the rhetorical handbooks that preserve our declamation titles were probably selected more for their didactic usefulness than for the content of their brief examples.

clearly has more than a few points of contact with the average Greek imperial city.⁷¹ In fact, as will now be seen, almost every sort of declamation turns out to mirror important aspects of civic life in the Greek east. I will survey these different aspects in turn. I should be clear that at this stage I am not arguing that any of these declamations allude directly to contemporary life: such possibilities will rather be addressed in Section III of this thesis.

The *polis* rivalry of declamation ('International Relations', above) is certainly more than matched by the famous quarrels of this period.⁷² The Bithynian rivalries—between Nicomedia and Nicaea, Prusa and Apamea—are abundantly documented in the speeches of Dio Chrysostom; in Asia, there was equally lively competition between Ephesus and Smyrna. The scenarios about peace⁷³ and, in particular, about taking down trophies erected over Greeks⁷⁴ chime nicely with the numerous exhortations to concord found in the literature of this period;⁷⁵ concord as an ideal is also attested epigraphically and numismatically (Magie 1950, 638–9). A particular source of dispute was titles: Nicomedians and Nicaeans fought over the designation 'first' (πρῶτοι) (D. Chrys. *Or.* 38.28), Ephesus and Smyrna over the title 'the first and greatest metropolis in Asia' (ἡ πρώτη καὶ μεγίστη μητρόπολις τῆς Ἀσίας). Such disputes find particularly close parallels in declamations: Athens and Sparta fight over first place in a procession (Hermog. *Id.* II 10.27.6–7), while Alcibiades' description of Athens as 'the best' (ἡ ἀρίστη) ([Hermog.] *Inv.* II 4.5.1–4) at Olympia is a potential *casus belli*.

⁷¹ Hints of this in Webb: 'In declamation the past is reshaped according to the needs of the present. The declaimers' version of history is peopled with gifted orators, in the image of the Imperial sophists, ideal models who lend the authority of the past to the activities of the present' (Webb, *Greek Past* 2006, 45).

⁷² On this phenomenon, see D. Chrys. 34.48, 34.51, D. Cass. 52.37.10, Philostr. *VS* 539–40, and Magie (Magie 1950, 1496, 1500–1) and Behr (Behr, *Complete Works* 1981–86, 105). War between cities I discuss below.

⁷³ [Hermog.] *Inv.* II 4.8.1–3, II 4.10.1–2, IV 13.2.2–5; Aps. *Rh.* 233.9–11, 330.6–9; Aristid. *Orr.* 7, 8.

⁷⁴ Aps. *Rh.* 219.16–18; Philostr. *VS* 538–9.

⁷⁵ E.g. D. Chrys. *Orr.* 38, 40; Aristid. *Or.* 23.

As in declamation, if all goes well within cities, there are honours. Dio Chrysostom provides examples of the sorts of services for which a politician could win honours (in this case, a statue):

Well, each and every one of these men has paid a price for having a statue of himself, and not a small one at that—some have paid with brilliant generalships, defending the city, others with embassies, others with trophies won from the enemy, some others with money too, perhaps.

οὐκοῦν ἅπαντες οὗτοι δεδώκασι τιμὴν ἕκαστος τῆς εἰκόνης τῆς ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ταύτην οὐδὲ μετρίαν, οἱ μὲν στρατηγίας λαμπρὰς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πρεσβείας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τρόπαια ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, οἱ δὲ τινες καὶ χρήματα ἴσως (*Or.* 31.59)

Embassies, military triumphs, financial contributions: these are precisely the same services that elites perform for the city in declamation. Of course, in real life honours were as controversial as they are in declamation: Plutarch rejects statues as crude material rewards, and would prefer crowns, inscriptions, or decrees (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 820A–F). On the matter of titles, Dio Chrysostom reveals particularly close parallels with real life in one of his addresses to the people of Prusa when he says: ‘is it not you who often praise us all day long, calling some of us “champions”, others “Olympian”, still others “saviours”, and others “foster-fathers”?’ (οὐχ ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ πολλάκις ἐπαινοῦντες ἡμᾶς δι’ ὅλης τῆς ἡμέρας, τοὺς μὲν ἀριστεῖς λέγοντες, τοὺς δὲ Ὀλυμπίους, τοὺς δὲ σωτῆρας, τοὺς δὲ τροφείας;) (*Or.* 48.10).

In declamation leaders frequently save the city from enemies internal or external, or provide food in a time of famine,⁷⁶ and ‘Olympian’ (Ὀλύμπιος) is precisely Pericles’ contested title in declamation ([Hermog.] *Inv.* I 1.17.2–4), while ‘champion’ (ἀριστεύς) is the *vox propria* for a military hero in the genre (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 24–5).

⁷⁶ Aps. *Rh.* 232.9–11, 330.12–14; [Hermog.] *Inv.* IV 13.3.2–5.

Yet just as in Sophistopolis so too in real life there are frequent conflicts (Magie 1950, 600). Polemo suppressed what is explicitly presented by Philostratus in terms of *stasis* (ἄστασίαστον, ἐστασίαζεν) at Smyrna (VS 531); Proclus of Naucratis fled from the *stasis* that afflicted his home town (VS 603). Dio Chrysostom's speeches provide ample evidence of conflict within Prusa,⁷⁷ and he and Aristides are both moved to deliver exhortations to concord within cities.⁷⁸ And just as it would have been controversial for the Athenians of declamation to call in Sparta to rid themselves of the Thirty (Aps. *Rh.* 310.16–18), so too was resorting to Roman authorities to solve internal problems,⁷⁹ as Herodes and the Athenians ended up doing (Kennell 1997).

The corruption, treachery, and failure that we find in declamation, or perhaps more precisely the accusations of such, are a natural concomitant of such a lively internal politics. Herodes was accused before the emperor of trying to corrupt the governors of Greece (VS 561); Polemo was accused of having embezzled the greater part of 250,000 drachmae (VS 533); Philostratus records with admiration Quirinus' steadfast refusal to enrich himself as *advocatus fisci* (VS 621). Dio Chrysostom provides evidence for further accusations of misconduct: he claims to have been accused of persuading the proconsul to torture, exile, and kill the people (*Or.* 43.11), all indeed classic crimes of the rhetorical tyrant;⁸⁰ Dio himself, like a Rich Man in a declamation, is accused of suppressing democracy (*Or.* 43.12),⁸¹ and has to reject the idea that he has been profiteering in a time of grain shortage (*Or.* 46.8–9), a slightly more prosaic incarnation of the sort of opportunism shown by the

⁷⁷ E.g. *Orr.* 43, 45, 46, 47, 48.

⁷⁸ D. Chrys. *Or.* 39; Aristid. *Or.* 24. Cf. Plut. *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 824D.

⁷⁹ Plut. *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 814E–816A.

⁸⁰ See e.g. Luc. *Tyr.* 5; Lib. *Prog.* 7.4.10–14. For this 'affair of the "wicked governor"', see Jones (Jones, Dio Chrysostom 1978, 102–3).

⁸¹ For the rich aiming at tyranny in declamation, see Hermog. *Stat.* III 9.3–5 (=III 12.5–6), III 17.3–6, III 18.4–5 (=III 23.5–7); Aps. *Rh.* 222.6–8.

Rich Man in declamation, who often takes advantage of a food crisis to do away with a political rival.⁸² On ambassadorial failure, see below.

The embassies of declamation and their associated controversies are mirrored by real life.⁸³ Scopelian apparently managed to persuade Domitian to rescind his edict that all vines in Asia should be pulled up and that no more should be planted, with such success that penalties were now threatened for those who did not plant vines (VS 520); Polemo secured ten million drachma from Hadrian for construction projects (VS 531), and his ambassadorial activity was also celebrated epigraphically (Puech 2002, no. 209); Aristides persuaded Marcus to contribute to the rebuilding of Smyrna after the earthquake of 178 (VS 582); Dio Chrysostom claims that his grandfather enjoyed such intimacy with the emperor that, had he lived a little longer, he might have secured a grant of freedom for Prusa (*Or.* 44.5). And just as many declamations are concerned with failed or false embassies, so do we find Dio Chrysostom mounting a vigorous defence of his conduct in the face of claims that while the envoys sent from other cities to congratulate Trajan on his accession secured enormous benefits, his own delegation had come away with nothing (40.13–15). Plutarch too is concerned that those who go on embassies actually have the necessary oratorical skills (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 812E, 819C), and even suggests nominating inappropriate ambassadors as a way to stop ‘inopportune’ (ἀκαίρως) embassies (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 819A).⁸⁴ Even the ambassadors’ expense claims that form the subject of the declamation at Hermog. *Stat.* II 8.7–10 are a concern in the real world too: Pliny and Trajan both sound horrified at the expenses granted to ambassadors from Byzantium on quite routine missions (Plin. *Epp.*

⁸² Aps. *Rh.* 330.12–15; Hermog. *Inv.* I 1.18.2–6, IV 13.3.2–5.

⁸³ A summary of the sources including other cases not covered here can be found in Bowersock (Bowersock 1969, 43–7).

⁸⁴ For a declamation obviously alluding to a real world embassy, see p.215–16 below.

10.43–44), and Vespasian limited embassies sent to him to three members (Magie 1950, 596).

Finally, the construction projects of declamation were a major source of controversy in real life too, as is well known. The problems in Nicaea are well-documented in the letters of Pliny and the speeches of Dio Chrysostom,⁸⁵ and Philostratus provides evidence for numerous other large-scale building projects in the Greek east.⁸⁶ Two sorts of building are echoed particularly in declamation. First, walls: besides declamations on the fortification of Sparta (VS 514 and 583) or the Long Walls of Athens (Aps. *Rh.* 252.1–3) we might set Dio Chrysostom's wish to equip Prusa with walls (*Or.* 45.13), or Ps.-Aristides' laments for the destruction of Rhodes' walls in an earthquake, which he sees as having been a source of great pride for the city (*Or.* 25.7–9; cf. 42, 48–49), or Aristides himself advising the cities of Asia not to value walls and other buildings over good sense (*Or.* 23.68–69); among the punishments inflicted on Byzantium by Severus after its surrender was the loss of its walls (D. Cass. 75.15.4). A particularly clear example of the potential polyvalency of declamation's subject matter is to be found in Aristides' discussion of walls in his *Regarding Rome* (*Or.* 26.79–84), where the vast and distant perimeter of the empire is contrasted favourably with the ostentation of Babylon's walls, and the Spartans' stubborn refusal to build walls at all. Walls, like so much else in declamation, are good to think with. A second sort of declamatory construction project with a contemporary resonance was the digging of a canal. Next to all these canals that we find Xerxes digging in declamation (Aps. *Rh.* 225.20) or Demosthenes proposing,⁸⁷ we may set Nero's failed attempt to breach the isthmus of Corinth,⁸⁸ and Herodes' desire to do the same (VS 551–2);⁸⁹ Philostratus actually

⁸⁵ Pl. *Epp.* 10.23, 70, 81; D. Chrys. *Orr.* 45, 47, 48. Cf. Plut. *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 819A.

⁸⁶ VS 511, 549–551, 568, 605, 613.

⁸⁷ [Hermog.] *Inv.* III 3.10.1–2, III 6.12.1–3, III 11.2 and Aps. *Rh.* 226.9–10, 233.18–19, 255.10–11.

⁸⁸ J. *BJ* 3.10.10; Suet. *Nero* 19.2; D. Cass. 62.16; Philostr. VA 4.24, *Nero* 2–3.

⁸⁹ This coincidence is noted by Anderson also (Anderson, Philostratus 1986, 33) and Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 511).

explicitly links Nero's project to that of the Persian king (*Nero* 2). The bridging of seas, too, finds a parallel in Caligula's famous bridge of boats across the Bay of Naples, and in some sources the emperor explicitly connects this project with Xerxes' bridging of the Hellespont (Bridges 2015, 171–3).

But what about declamation's wars, tyrants, or interpersonal conflicts? Even these find ready resonances in contemporary life: first, each was more common than has typically been appreciated; secondly, and still more importantly, the discourses of war, tyranny, and personal crimes were extremely prevalent in this period (as in so many). Of course, part of the reason that these discourses were so prevalent was probably precisely their prominence in declamation: declatory and extra-declamatory discourses probably influenced one another reciprocally. I will examine each of these three areas in turn.⁹⁰

The idea that there were no wars in the Greek east in this period is to a considerable degree part of pro-Roman discourse: in reality, as we have said (p. 118), in this period cities were still sacked, and could indeed be involved in the struggle for the imperial throne itself.⁹¹ Some cities still had armed forces of some sort, and there is reasonably plentiful evidence for small-scale but fierce skirmishes over territory between neighbouring cities (MacMullen 1967, 187 n. 26). The *discourse* of war, moreover, was fundamental. We may not see fit to dignify much that happened in the time of Dio Chrysostom with the name of 'war', yet Dio himself certainly did: recall that among the titles he describes the people offering their leaders is that of 'champion' (ἀριστεύς), and among the benefactions for which one may win

⁹⁰ There is a parallel here with scholarship on Latin love elegy in the 1970s, when Griffin persuasively argued both that the genre was not so divorced from real life as had been imagined, and that in any case any reasonably long-lasting literary current will eventually start to exert influence on the world around it.

⁹¹ Dio Cassius indeed records that the Byzantines resorted in desperation to cannibalism after years of living under siege (D. Cass. 75.12.5–6); compare the declamation scenario in which the Athenians are charged for driving the Potideans to this extremity (Aps. *Rh.* 230.4–5; [Hermog.] *Inv.* II 5.4.1–2). For the potential unifying power of declamations on the Persian wars in the face of the Parthian threat, see Spawforth (Spawforth, *Symbol of Unity?* 1994, 244).

a statue, ‘brilliant generalships’ (στρατηγίας λαμπράς) and ‘trophies won from the enemy’ (τρόπαια ἀπὸ τῶν πολέμιων) (*Or.* 31.59); urging concord with Apameia before the Prusans, he says that ‘peace is better than war’ (εἰρήνην κρείττων πολέμου) (40.26). So too in Plutarch, who talks of a statesman being crowned for his success as a general (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 804E), and worries about unsuitable men commanding armies (812E). Presumably most of this is metaphor, since, as Plutarch himself says elsewhere, the leadership of wars is no longer part of a *polis*’ business (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 805B). But the very fact that both he and Dio Chrysostom use such terms so frequently (and only rarely apologise for them) makes it clear that war was a metaphor imperial Greeks lived by. Indeed, the metaphor was embedded in title of ‘general’ (στρατηγός), still used to refer to important magistrates of various sorts in many cities (Magie 1950, 643–5). War, of course, was a major part of imperial imagery too, despite the *pax romana*: favoured Greek cities enjoyed the title of ‘ally’ (σύμμαχος) of Rome (Magie 1950, 637).

Tyranny, too, was both reality and discourse. First, as Russell reminds us, ‘local tyrannies were as liable to arise in Hellenistic or even Roman times as in the classical period... Tyranny was not a special phenomenon of a particular phase in Greek history, but something always likely to recur’ (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 32); second, as with war, the *discourse* of tyranny was widespread.⁹² The emperor, naturally, was often cast as a tyrant;⁹³ the governor, too, as the local representative of Roman power, could be a tyrant (D. Chrys.

⁹² For the figure of the tyrant in contemporary discourse, see Kennell (Kennell 1997) and Mestre and Gómez (Mestre and Gómez 2009).

⁹³ Nero (Philostr. *VA* 5.10, 27; [Luc.] *Nero* 6), Domitian (Plut. *De fraterno amore* 487A; D. Chrys. *Orr.* 40.12, 50.8; Philostr. *VS* 488, *VA passim*), Commodus (Hdn. *passim* esp. 1.3.1, 1.4.3, 1.16.1), Commodus (D. Cass. 74.2.1–2; Hdn. 2.1.3, 2.1.8, 2.2.5, 2.3.1, 2.3.8, 2.3.10, 2.4.2, 2.4.7, 2.6.5), Caracalla (D. Cass. 79.17.4; Philostr. *VS* 625; Hdn. 3.2.9, 5.1.5), Maximinus (Hdn. 7.1.1, 7.1.4, 7.3.1, 7.4.1, 7.5.5, 7.7.7, 7.10.2, 8.3.5, 8.5.9).

Or. 38.36, 43.11); Greek politicians were also so figured,⁹⁴ as were soldiers (D. Cass. 77.17.2–3), and even the people.⁹⁵

Finally, even the personal and family problems of Greek declamation find a similar range of correspondences. How much of what we hear on these topics is true we cannot say (though Russell rightly reminds us that truth can be stranger than fiction) (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 13)), but even where we are dealing with mere rumour, once again, the alignment between declamation and discourse is just as significant. Salacious episodes abound. The sophist Hadrian was accused of murder (VS 587–88); the mother of the sophist Hermocrates of Phocaea is alleged to have had a love affair with a slave after the death of her husband (VS 610); Herodes' father's fortunes were restored through the discovery of buried treasure (VS 547–8) (on the 'romanzesco' character of this event, see Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 505–6)); Proclus of Naucratis was devoted to a mistress after his wife's death (VS 603–4); Herodes was accused of murdering his wife Regilla (VS 555–6) and (partially) disinherited his son Atticus for his dissolute lifestyle (VS 558), as happens to many sons in declamation.⁹⁶ It is perhaps not so surprising, then, that Polemo encouraged severity against 'adulterers and temple-robbers and murderers' (μοιχοὺς καὶ ἱεροσύλους καὶ σφαγέας) (VS 532).⁹⁷ The most declamation-like episode of all is that which attaches to the sophist Scopelian (VS 516–518),⁹⁸ who resented the concubine his father took up with after his mother's death and was accused by the concubine of being in love with her; this concubine

⁹⁴ Hipparchus (VS 547) (taking ἐπι τυραννικαῖς αἰτίαις as 'on charges of aspiring to tyranny': for an alternative reading, see Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 504)); Herodes (VS 559); Dio Chrysostom (D. Chrys. *Or.* 47.18, 47.24–5, and, negatively, 44.3).

⁹⁵ D. Chrys. *Orr.* 32.26, 32.28, 38.35.

⁹⁶ There are three scenarios involving disinheritance in Hermog. *Stat.* (II.5.8–9, II.12.6–10 (=X.6.2–5), III.9.3–5 (= III.12.5–6)), as well as one defective scenario, I.21.2–3), and four in [Hermog.] *Inv.* (I.1.14.1–6, IV.13.14.1–5, IV.13.16.3–6, IV.13.18.3–6). For a surviving example, see Luc. *Abd.*

⁹⁷ For murderers and adulterers in declamation, see above (p. 130). Temple-robbers occur only once, but in a text that was to become canonical and as an example of one of the more important *staseis* (Hermog. *Stat.* II 2.9–12 (=IV 15.5–7)).

⁹⁸ On this episode, see Campanile (Campanile 1999, 271–3).

then prevailed upon a slave of Scopelian's father to allege that Scopelian had encouraged him to poison his master; Scopelian's father consequently disowned his son and made his slave his heir. The extraordinarily literary quality of this tale is explicitly acknowledged by Philostratus ('as if in a drama' (ὥσπερ ἐν δράματι)): ⁹⁹ among its obviously declamatory elements are (attempted) murder, poisoning, and disownment, ¹⁰⁰ and the concubine in this scenario is functionally the same as the step-mother of declamation, who often comes into conflict with her husband's children by his previous marriage; ¹⁰¹ the scenario's very complexity, too, is typical of declamations involving conflicts within families. ¹⁰²

'Somehow It Is Always the Same': ¹⁰³ *Exempla* and Exemplarity

Consider carefully what has gone before, and the many changes of dynasties. It's possible to foresee what is going to happen, too, for it will look like the present in every way, and it is not possible to depart from the rhythm of what is happening now.

Τὰ προγεγονότα ἀναθεωρεῖν, τὰς τοσαύτας τῶν ἡγεμονιῶν μεταβολάς, ἔξεστι καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα προεφορᾶν· ὁμοειδῆ γὰρ πάντως ἔσται καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐκβῆναι τοῦ ρυθμοῦ τῶν νῦν γινομένων (Marc. Aur. 7.49) ¹⁰⁴

So almost every sort of declamation mirrors important aspects of life and discourse in the Greek east. But what did declaimers and their audiences make of such contemporary resonances? While we lack direct ancient answers to this question, what we can do is look at how the raw materials of Greek declamation—classical history, and the tyrants, wars, and strife of Sophistopolis—are used in other literature of the period, particularly 'real' political oratory. ¹⁰⁵ The most fundamental use of this material is to provide *exempla* to follow or

⁹⁹ Drama of course was acknowledged as a significant resource for declaimers, e.g. VS 590, 620.

¹⁰⁰ Poisoning: Hermog. *Stat.* III 4.2–8, III 39.3–5. For murder, see pp. 130–31; for disownment, p. 131.

¹⁰¹ Hermog. *Stat.* III 39.3–5 (where a husband's concubine and new wife bring charges against one another) and III 45.3–5.

¹⁰² Cf. Campanile: 'le peripezie di Scopeliano potrebbero anche essere considerate il pezzo di bravura di una declamazione sofistica' (Campanile 1999, 273).

¹⁰³ αἰεί πως ταῦτόν ἐστιν (Aristid. *Or.* 23.41).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. 10.27, cited below (p. 148 n. 111 and pp. 149–50).

¹⁰⁵ It may be noticed that the declamatory material deployed in the examples that follow is more often that found in scenarios with a definite historical setting than in *plasmata* (though by no means always: we will see Aristides talking about *stasis* in fairly abstract terms and Pseudo-Aristides comparing the earthquake at Rhodes to the capture or sack of a city). But this is to be expected: all other things being equal, it would seem more effective when seeking to persuade to cite a specific example rather than the abstract case. But each specific

avoid.¹⁰⁶ As Aristides says: ‘there is this benefit to be gained from a knowledge of the past—using the most well-known examples for the present’ (ἔστι δὴ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τοῦτ’ ἀπολαύειν, παραδείγμασι τοῖς γνωριμωτάτοις χρωμένους εἰς τὰ παρόντα) (Aristid. *Or.* 24.23). So, for example, both Dio Chrysostom¹⁰⁷ and Aristides tell different audiences that just as Athens and Sparta met with difficulties when occupied with internal *stasis*, but prospered when unified, so they too should avoid strife and imitate Athens and Sparta at their best.¹⁰⁸ Or, at a Panhellenic level, Aristides directs his audience to Athens and Sparta once more: when the two leading cities of Greece were at peace with one another, they and indeed all Greece benefited, but when they were divided, all of Greece suffered (Aristid. *Or.* 23.42–51). This last example is particularly suggestive for our inquiry, for the language Aristides uses to describe Athens and Sparta’s triumph over Persia is very similar to that used in declamations on the same topic. Consider the following:

And when all mankind, more or less, combined against the Greeks, so that the sea was filled with triremes, and the land with infantry, and the anticipation of suffering was regarded as a gain, because the sufferings themselves were not yet present, they were not at a loss about what to do, but though they were hearing that the land and the sea had changed into one another, and though they heard that the sun was being concealed by arrows, and that the rivers were failing the invaders’ thirst, and whole nations and cities were being used up for the reckoning of the King’s dinner...

(καὶ συστάντων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀπάντων ὥς εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε τὴν μὲν θάλατταν ἐμπλησθῆναι τριήρων, τὴν δὲ γῆν πεζῶν, εἶναι δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῶν κακῶν ἐν κέρδους μέρει τῷ μὴ αὐτὰ γέ πω παρεῖναι, οὐκ ἠπόρησαν ὃ τι χρήσονται,

example instantiates an abstract type (and movement between the two categories of declamation was not uncommon, as has been mentioned (above, p. 122 n. 23): accordingly, the ways in which the specific cases are used should also tell us something about the ways in which the abstract cases might have been thought about. The metaphorical uses of the terms ‘war’ and ‘tyranny’ discussed above (pp. 142–4) also offer evidence for how abstract types were used.

¹⁰⁶ For other contemporary expressions of this idea, see D. Chrys. *Orr.* 18.9–10, 55.12–22, and Plut. *Aem.* 1.1–2. The idea has a long history, of course, stretching back as far as Thucydides’ conception of history (1.22). Even Plutarch’s *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* falls into this paradigm, for while Plutarch’s selection of exempla is somewhat idiosyncratic—the amnesty after the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens rather than the Battle of Plataea—the way in which he uses the past is not: ‘for even now by trying to emulate these deeds it is possible to become like one’s ancestors’ (ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἔξεστι ζηλοῦντας ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τοῖς προγόνους) (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 814B). For the sophistication with which ancient audiences could treat *exempla* (on the Roman side), see Langlands (Langlands 2011); for the slipperiness of *exempla*, see Goldhill (Goldhill, Exemplarity 1994).

¹⁰⁷ On Dio Chrysostom’s use of history in his speeches, see Bost-Pouderon (Bost-Pouderon 2010, esp. 105–9).

¹⁰⁸ D. Chrys. *Orr.* 38.25, 44.11; Aristid. *Or.* 24.24–6.

ἀλλὰ ἀκούοντες μὲν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀκούοντες δὲ ἥλιον κρυπτόμενον τοῖς τοξεύμασι, καὶ ποταμοὺς ἐπιλείποντας πίνουσι τοῖς ἐπιούσι, καὶ ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις ὅλας ἀναλISCOμένας εἰς δείπνου λόγον τῷ βασιλεῖ) (*Or.* 23.43)

Rivers drunk dry, land and sea mixed together, the sun's light blocked by the mass of Persian arrows: this is the hyperbolic language of Polemo's surviving declamations, or Himerius' *Themistocles Against the Persian King* (*Or.* 5).¹⁰⁹ So not only do we find declamatory materials, but even declamatory language and style—so in effect, a miniature declamation—being used in support of a point made in contemporary politics.

Of course, no *exemplum* is ever identical to its real-world target: there will always need to be some amount of *translation* of classical history into contemporary terms. Contemporary political oratory actually provides extraordinarily clear evidence not only for ancient authors' and audiences' awareness of this problem but also for the ways in which such translation was effected. Having introduced the figure of Epaminondas when speaking to the Prusans, Dio says: 'in those days these things were possible, but now times are different, apart from the business of goodwill and zeal, which are always and forever similar' (τότε μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἦν δυνατά, νῦν δ' ἕτεροι γεγονάσιν οἱ καιροί, πλὴν τά γε τῆς εὐνοίας καὶ τῆς προθυμίας ἀεὶ ποτε ὅμοια) (*Or.* 43.4). Before introducing his *exempla* in his speech to the cities of Asia on concord, Aristides says 'even if the situations are not similar, and times are not quite alike, good sense at least is somehow always the same' (καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὅμοια τὰ πράγματα μηδ' οἱ καιροὶ παραπλήσιοι, τό γε εὖ φρονεῖν ἀεὶ πῶς ταυτόν ἐστιν) (23.41); later in the same speech, he says 'but if someone considers these [examples] absurd, on the grounds that there is no war now, he fails to realise that he is talking nonsense' (εἰ δ' ὅτι

¹⁰⁹ Mixing land and sea: Polem. *Decl.* A 36 ('a sea battle on land for the first time' (πρῶτον... ναυμαχίαν ἐν γῇ)); Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 18; Him. *Or.* 5.3, 5.4. Innumerable arrows: the fate of Callimachus in Polem. *Decl.* B, propped up even in death by the mass of arrows with which he had been hit; Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 18; Him. *Or.* 5.3, 5.4. Drinking rivers dry: Him. *Or.* 5.4, 5.6. Covering the land with soldiers: Him. *Or.* 5.6. Generally resource-hungry: Him. *Or.* 5.6. Reardon speculated that Aristides would have treated a Marathonian scenario quite differently from how Polemo treats such material in his surviving declamations (Reardon 1971, 109): this passage suggests otherwise.

μηδεὶς νῦν πόλεμος, φλυαρίαν τις ἡγεῖται ταῦτα, αὐτὸς ἀγνοεῖ ληρῶν) (23.53), and replies that *stasis* ‘always does harm, by its nature, and that harm happens in accordance with the times’ (βλάπτειν... ἀεὶ πέφυκεν, ἡ δὲ βλάβη πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς ἀπαντα) (23.54), an argument he develops at length (23.53–58). In his speech to the Rhodians on concord, he counters a very similar objection in a very similar way (24.30): ‘let none of you be unafraid on the grounds that times have changed; no, consider this charge that is common to all *stasis*—that it always deprives men of the goods that they enjoy, by its nature’ (μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν ἀδείᾳ ποιείσθω τὸ τοὺς καιροὺς ἐτέρους εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο κοινὸν ἐνθυμείσθω κατὰ πάσης στάσεως, ὅτι τῶν παρόντων ἀγαθῶν ἀεὶ πέφυκεν ἀποστερεῖν) (24.30). These four statements all propose a remarkably similar approach to the problem of translation. The *καιροί* (‘the times’, ‘opportunities’) or *πράγματα* (‘circumstances’, ‘situations’) may differ, but what abides is virtue and vice: ‘goodwill’, ‘zeal’, ‘good sense’, and *stasis*¹¹⁰ (εὐνοία, προθυμία, τὸ εὖ φρονεῖν, στάσις).¹¹¹

A second major use of this material that we can identify in political oratory is not to support or argue against a specific course of action, but rather to *rescale* a contemporary issue. The speech on the earthquake in Rhodes provides good examples of this, both of scaling up and of scaling down. At first, the failure of classical history to provide any real parallels for what the Rhodians have suffered is said to accentuate the Rhodians’ grief:

You should also think about ancient history. Truly, it would be obtuse to compare your experiences with anyone else’s. For as I have said, a similar case from history, the only thing that could lighten your misfortunes, is not to be found in the present situation.

¹¹⁰ *Stasis*, a political problem, might seem the odd one out here, but evidence for the Greeks’ moralizing approach to this problem is provided *inter alia* by these speeches themselves, where the antonym of *stasis* is effectively the ‘concord’ (ὁμόνοια) that Aristides urges.

¹¹¹ The emperor Marcus was less specific: for him, ‘all those things [in the past] were such as they are in the present, only through different agents’ (πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τοιαῦτα ἦν, μόνον δι’ ἐτέρων) (Marc. Aur. 10.27).

(Ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν. ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀναίσθητον τὰ ὑμέτερα ἀντεξετάζειν τοῖς ὄντινωνοῦν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἶπον τὸ μόνον τὰς συμφορὰς ἐπικουφίζον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι, παράδειγμα) ([Aristid.] 25.57)

Yet only a couple of chapters later the writer has changed his tune: now he lists indignities that Rhodes has *not* suffered, making the city's suffering seem a little more bearable by comparison:

This seems to have turned out to be actually very bearable. For your city has not been destroyed following its capture in war, nor has it been seen to be defeated by other men, nor has anyone erected a trophy over it, nor will anyone decorate his temples with your offerings.

(κινδυνεύει τοῦτο καὶ ἀνεκτότατον συμβεβηκέναι. οὐ γὰρ πολέμῳ ληφθεῖσα ὑμῶν ἡ πόλις οἴχεται οὐδ' ἀνδρῶν χείρων φανεῖσα, οὐδ' ἔστησεν ἀπ' αὐτῆς τρόπαιον οὐδεὶς, οὐδ' ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀναθημάτων τὰ παρ' αὐτῷ τις ἱερὰ κοσμήσει) ([Aristid.] 25.59)¹¹²

It is also clear that imperial Greeks were sometimes quite imaginative in their use of declamatory material. For example, in his speech *To Plato: In Defence of the Four*, Aristides makes reference to the battle of Thermopylae (Or. 3.141). But he sees the battle not, as we might expect, as the triumph of manly, free Greeks triumphing over effete, servile barbarians, but rather—astonishingly—as contributing almost nothing to the struggle against Persia, and so uses it as a foil to what he sees as the much greater achievements of Cimon, whose career is cited as part of a wider argument in favour of rhetoric. This is not the only surprising use to which declamatory material is put. For example, Marcus Aurelius, meditating on the cyclical nature of history, implicitly compares his court to that of Hadrian, Antoninus, Philip, Alexander, and Croesus (10.27): while the first two comparisons were

¹¹² Some other examples of classical history used to rescale in Greek imperial literature: the sophist Quirinus was as upright as Aristides the Just (Philostr. VS 621); Dio Chrysostom condemns the Athenians of his day by comparison with the glory of Classical Athens (Or. 31.117), and uses examples taken from classical Athens and Sparta when addressing the town council of Prusa because he judges his audience 'worthy of such comparisons' (τοιούτων παραδειγμάτων... ἀξίους) (Or. 50.2); Favorinus manages simultaneously to elevate himself and downplay the harm his enemies have done him by comparing the casting down of his statue at Athens with the Socrates' fate (VS 490); Aristides describes the sack of Troy and the loss of the Sicilian expedition as 'child's play' (παιδιά) in comparison with the damage done to Smyrna by an earthquake (Or. 18.7).

reasonably predictable, the last two were less so. And in Gregory of Nazianzus, the battle of Salamis is cited as a parallel to the courage shown by Basil of Caesarea in facing persecution as a Christian (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 235)! It is clear, then, that declamation's raw materials are highly polyvalent: accordingly, when declamations are read 'mythologically' in the next chapter, we should try to think broadly and creatively about a range of possible interpretations for each text.¹¹³

So imperial Greeks' use of the raw materials of Greek declamation—classical history, and the tyrants, wars, and strife of Sophistopolis—was highly sophisticated: they saw in this material a range of suggestive similarities and differences to their own lives, especially in matters of virtue and vice, and often in quite creative and unexpected ways. It is overwhelmingly likely therefore that when the same material was presented in the form of declamation (sometimes, as we have seen, in the very same language), it would have prompted similar sorts of reflections.

Mythologies

But there is a difference. In real political oratory, the *exemplum* is always interpreted for the audience: Aristides or Dio Chrysostom cite this material to address a definite problem, and to push a definite solution. A declamation, by contrast, stands alone, uninterpreted: it is in effect pure *exemplum*. This must be a major part of the appeal of declamation: a chance to bring one's own concerns to this material, the common currency of Greek imperial discourse, and to decide on its significance for oneself. Such open-endedness also allows a genre to appeal to a great range of audiences, for it can potentially address different questions for different audience members, and suggest different or even mutually-contradictory solutions to those different audience members. What we are moving towards, therefore, is a

¹¹³ Similarly, Chaplin has shown that characters in Livy frequently draw very different conclusions from the same *exemplum* (Chaplin 2000).

model of reading this genre rather like that proposed by Mary Beard in her 1993 article on Roman declamation. In this article, Beard suggested that for Romans, declamation fulfilled the role of ‘myth’: by this term Beard variously means ‘a fictional world of “traditional tales” for negotiating, and re-negotiating, the fundamental rules of Roman society’; ‘a focus for the re-presentation and constant re-resolution of central Roman/human conflicts’; and ‘an arena for learning, practising and recollecting what it is to be and think Roman’ (Beard 1993, 56).¹¹⁴ This definition suits the mode of reading Greek declamation that we are moving towards very well: a genre capable of stimulating deep and open-minded reflection on the pressing issues of the day.¹¹⁵

In the next chapter, we will see this reflection in action.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 71–73).

¹¹⁵ Cf. Webb: ‘sophistic performance was a safe zone for experimenting with the forms of the past’ (Webb, *Greek Past* 2006, 44). Very broadly speaking, my approach has some similarities to that of modern anthropological work on mythology, which has moved from the functionalist approach of a Durkheim or the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss to a conception of myth as a ‘powerful means of thinking, and making sense of the world’ (Rapport 2014, 314); Beard’s article, too, is informed by the anthropological tradition. Generally, however, I have preferred modelling the mythological reading of declamation on analogous ancient reading methods (i.e. the reading of *exempla* in non-declamatory oratory, pp. 145–50) to using the *a priori* constructs of anthropological theory.

Chapter 4. Mythological Readings

‘A space of debate, not a consensus’ (Lavan, *Slaves to Rome* 2013)

This chapter offers extended readings of a small selection of declamations in order to illustrate and explore the ‘mythological’ mode of reading set out in the previous chapter. I begin with and will devote most attention to Aristides’ *Orations* 9 and 10. The subject matter of these two declamations, and the discourses that they incarnate, are reasonably typical of Greek declamation,¹ and so our conclusions about these texts should be suggestive for the genre more widely. After this will follow a shorter discussion of a fragment of Pollux’s *On the Islanders* preserved in Philostratus (VS 593), since the discourses present in this fragment overlap with Aristides *Orations* 9 and 10 to a significant degree; this example will also illustrate the potential richness of even small fragments of declamations.

Our discussion of these texts will enumerate a range of possible reactions that audiences might have experienced, from the most immediate and straightforward to those requiring more reflection and subtlety. I do not believe that the responses I outline were necessarily mutually exclusive: indeed, I consider it likely (not to say axiomatic) that most audiences, and indeed most individual audience members, will have had multiple reactions to these texts, reconsidering their position during or after the performance or in the various re-readings and re-performances that the texts surely enjoyed,² or even holding contradictory positions simultaneously. In particular, I consider it quite possible for many audience members to have been capable of both the more ‘Greek’ and the more ‘Roman’ of the

¹ Their subject matter (see below, p. 154), international relations, is a common theme in declamation (see above, pp. 131–2), and the setting is the Demosthenic period, as often.

² For evidence of the afterlives of declamations, see Philostr. VS 512, 521, 523, 539, 574, 579, 599, 612, 620, 621. Dio Chrysostom vividly imagines a rather chaotic afterlife for his non-declamatory speeches (D. Chrys. *Or.* 42.4–5).

responses I describe,³ and indeed likely, especially among the elites, given ever-growing Greek access to Roman citizenship and political offices, and, on the other hand, Roman elites' extensive participation in Greek culture:⁴ Wallace-Hadrill's models of 'bilingualism' and 'code-switching' would be very apt here (Wallace-Hadrill 2008). One need look no further for a reader capable of such code-switching than one of the few audience members of Aristides' declamations known to us by name, the emperor Marcus himself (VS 582–3).⁵ I should declare at the outset that I also do not envisage that all audience members would always have been fully conscious of the reactions I ascribe to them. Many would have been: indeed, my reconstructions are to a significant degree based on the testimonia of ancient writers who are conscious of and explicit about their reactions to similar material in other contexts. But some audience members, I imagine, would only have been semi-conscious of their reactions, filled with a strong but somewhat nebulous sense that this material was fascinating, and important, but only fleetingly explicit and specific about why they felt this way. (Equally, I do not imagine that Aristides necessarily consciously sought all the reactions his texts provoked). Aristides' argumentative strategies are not in themselves the ultimate object of study in this chapter, as they were in the 'rhetorical readings' offered in chapter 2, though of course they are not irrelevant even in a 'mythological' reading. In particular, I do not compare and contrast the two speeches' different approaches to the same rhetorical scenario, as was done in chapter 2.

³ Throughout this chapter, quotation marks around the words 'Greek' and 'Roman' may be taken as a fairly sure sign that I am using the words to refer to socially-constructed identities rather than any objective classification.

⁴ Greek and Roman identities in this period are an enormous topic: see e.g. Woolf (Woolf, *Staying Greek* 1994); Swain (S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* 1996); Woolf (Woolf, *Provincial Civilization* 1998); Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Roman Empire* 2001); Spawforth (Spawforth, *Augustan Cultural Revolution* 2012); Madsen & Rees (Madsen and Rees, *Double Vision* 2014). For citizenship, see Sherwin-White (Sherwin-White 1973); for senators from the Greek east, see Eck (Eck 2000, 218–19).

⁵ On the evidence for imperial attitudes to sophistic culture (official patronage versus private reservations), see Rutherford (R. Rutherford 1989, 80–9). On declamation audiences, see Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 160–70) and Korenjak (Korenjak 2000, 41–65).

Aristides *Orations* 9–10

These declamations are set in 338 BCE, and represent two attempts at declaiming the same scenario.⁶ With Philip having in various ways subdued all the other major Greek powers, Athens remained the only serious impediment to total Macedonian domination of Greece. As a prelude to a march through Boeotia to Athens, Philip had seized Elatea in Phocis, a dramatic high point in Demosthenes' own presentation of the events (18.168ff.), and one picked up in several declamation scenarios.⁷ Athens hurriedly sent an embassy to Thebes, officially Philip's ally, under the leadership of Demosthenes, to seek an alliance or, failing that, at least assurances that Thebes would not join a Macedonian attack on Athens: it is the words of this embassy that Aristides' speeches represent. Demosthenes prevailed, and the result was the disaster at Chaeronea. These declamations, therefore, are set at one of the most critical moments of the struggle with Philip. Aristides' declamations devote the bulk of their argumentation to (i) suggesting sinister motives for Philip's past behaviour and future plans and (ii) attempts to reconcile Thebes to her old enemy Athens.⁸ Demosthenes' speeches are naturally important sources for the arguments and indeed language that we find in these declamations,⁹ but as we shall see, their meaning is quite different in the context of the second-century Roman empire.

'If They Ever Happened'¹⁰

The simplest and indeed most traditional 'mythological' reading of Aristides' texts would be to say that there is no contemporary resonance for the events of 338 BCE in Aristides' own time. As we hear in Lucian, why go on about all this 'in peace time, when Philip is not

⁶ References to the relevant historical sources are provided by Kohl (Kohl 1915, 57–8).

⁷ Hermog. *Stat.* VII 2.3–5 (=Aps. *Rh.* 245.4–7); Philostr. *VS* 589 (≈Aps. *Rh.* 219.1–3).

⁸ For brief discussion (largely paraphrase) see Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 290–1).

⁹ Particularly important are the *Philippics* (especially the second), the *Olynthiacs*, and *On the Crown* (Boulanger 1923, 290–1).

¹⁰ εἰ πώποτε ἐγένοντο (Aristid. *Or.* 26.70).

attacking nor Alexander giving orders' (ἐν εἰρήνῃ μήτε Φιλίππου ἐπιόντος μήτε Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπιτάττοντος) (*Rh. Pr.* 10)? One imagines that Plutarch might have felt the same: the grand events of the past, he maintains (his examples come from the Persian wars, but presumably he would have included the struggle against Macedon in the same category) are no longer relevant to the restricted freedoms of the imperial period (though his memorable picture of audiences vainly swelling with pride at hearing such tales retold suggests that many others did find in them something of relevance to the present) (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 814A–C). Yet even this denial of any similarity is not without significance for the present. As I suggested in the last chapter (pp. 148–9), a major function of the citation of classical history in non-declamatory oratory of this period is to *rescale* contemporary issues: if one sees no comparison between the grandeur of the classical period and the present day, then the effect is massively to scale down contemporary issues. This indeed is how classical history is presented and deployed in a number of places in Dio Chrysostom and even Aristides himself, where the triviality of the present in comparison with the past is put to use as an argument for concord, as it is in Plutarch (pp. 117–8, 120). A denial of continuity between past and present can also express regret that there are no longer opportunities for the sort of rhetoric that Aristides' scenario demands, an attested sentiment.¹¹ Epictetus, finally, redeploys this negative contrast between past and present for philosophical ends: for him, the contrast between the violence of the past and the peace of the present only serves to highlight the impossibility of escaping other evils, such as illness or bad emotions (*Diss.* 3.13.9–10). Even a negative comparison between declamation and life, then, can have a range of contemporary meanings.

There might also be something for a 'Roman' audience member in such a perspective. The idea that there is no connection between wars of the past and the peace of the present day

¹¹ e.g. Ps.-Longin. *Subl.* 41.1–4; Tac. *Dial.* 36–40; cf. Russell 1964, 185–7.

accords with the imperial ideology of *pax*, particularly that of the adoptive dynasty,¹² not least as evidenced by the praise heaped on Rome by Aristides himself in his *Regarding Rome*: ‘not even if wars have ever happened in the past are they still believed in’ (πόλεμοι δὲ οὐδ’ εἰ πώποτε ἐγένοντο ἔτι πιστεύονται) (26.70: cf. also 97).¹³ Perhaps there was also a certain *Schadenfreude* to be had in watching ‘Greeks’ lament what they saw as the limited freedoms of their age: after all, there might be something slightly disappointing about an opponent who seemed utterly untroubled by defeat.

Philip, Persia, and Parthia

The denial of any close similarities between declamation and life, and the interpretations that follow from that denial, represent a species of response that has often been privileged in scholarship, particularly in the Anglophone world. Such readings, however, would be available for most known declamations from this period (since almost all of them describe a world that shows significant differences from the second century) and offer no explanation of the range and diversity of Greek declamation, or of the texture of individual works. It was equally possible, as we said in the last chapter (pp. 136–45) for second-century Greeks to see close thematic parallels between their own time—and its discourses—and the world of declamation, and such a view allows much richer and more individuated readings of these works, with classical history in declamation offering a variety of lessons for present, as it frequently does in the non-declamatory oratory of the time (pp. 145–50). All one needs to know is how to translate between the two periods: what Dio Chrysostom and Aristides suggest (in remarkably similar formulations) is that while *καιροί* (‘the times’,

¹² For a full discussion of the legitimizing ideology of the adoptive dynasty (until Marcus) in contrast to the very different models presented by Commodus and his successors, see Kemezis (Kemezis 2014, 30–89).

¹³ Cf. Vell. 2.126.3.

‘opportunities’) or πράγματα (‘circumstances, situations’) may differ, what abides is virtue and vice.

With what contemporary issues, then, might Aristides *Oration*s 9 and 10 have resonated? These declamations are at their most basic level about war with foreign powers. Rome’s biggest rival, and, perhaps more importantly, the most prominent of Rome’s enemies in imperial discourse, not least because of the prestige that Alexander’s conquests had bestowed on campaigning in that part of the world, was Parthia, and Behr suggested (albeit very briefly) that behind Macedon may in some sense stand Parthia (Behr, *Complete Works* 1981–86, I. 487). A Parthian connection would make most sense, as Behr suggests, if these declamations were written around the time of Verus’ campaigns (162–66 BCE), which is certainly possible. But given that the eastern frontier had seen major campaigning at the end of Trajan’s reign (113–118), and was never entirely quiet, the parallel would probably have been available at most moments in Aristides’ career; in any case, continued trouble in the east (under Severus, 197–202, and frequently during the third century) might have been a factor in the selection and survival of these declamations out of all those composed by Aristides.¹⁴

Behr does not, however, specify in detail what might have led the reader to think of Parthia. This gap is filled by the work of Asirvatham (Asirvatham, *No Fervor* 2008, 211–16), who argues that Aristides has added barbaric elements to his depiction of Philip and the Macedonians that evoke the Persians, who in turn were very frequently seen as analogues for the Parthians in Roman discourse (R. M. Schneider 2007, 70–5, and nn. 91–2): for an example of a contemporary making such a connection, we might look at Polyaeus, who in the preface to his *Strategica* draws a parallel between war with Persia and war with Parthia,

¹⁴ A concise summary of Roman conflicts with Parthia and the Sassanians is offered by Schottky (*BNP* s.v. ‘Parthian and Persian wars’).

and anticipates ‘victory over Persians and Parthians’ (κατὰ Περσῶν καὶ Παρθαίων νίκην). Asirvatham does not list the ‘barbaric’ elements in Aristides’ picture of Philip, but they are plentiful. He is a ‘barbarous man, different in nature’ (βάρβαρον ἄνθρωπον καὶ φύσει κεχωρισμένον) (9.44);¹⁵ the war against him is compared twice to the Persian wars (9.4, 10.38), and once to the war against the Amazons (9.33), itself an analogue for the Persian wars in fifth-century discourse, notably on the Athenian acropolis (Hurwit 1999, 353 n. 53). Aristides also makes much of the idea of Philip as a ‘King’ (βασιλεύς), the most famous and characteristic of all Persian titles (see below, pp. 171–2). Furthermore, the most common image he uses of Philip’s aspiration—to impose slavery on Greece¹⁶—is of course a typical image of Persian power in Herodotus (Hunt 1998, 48–50) and Aeschylus (E. Hall 1996, s.v. ‘slavery’). That this declamation is in some sense thinking about more than just the war against Philip is suggested by a potentially metaleptic remark early on in the first of the two texts, that ‘the war against the barbarians and those who have long been ill-disposed towards us has been decreed by nature’ (τὸν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πάλαι κακόνους πόλεμον φύσει προειρηθῆσθαι) (9.24): in the fiction of the declamation such words can take us back from Philip to Persia, but in Aristides’ own world, they can move forward to Parthia.

So for the ‘Roman’—and, as indicated above, by this term I refer to anyone, who identified, however temporarily or partially, with the Roman state, its history and its interests—some of the appeal of this speech may have been the ennobling of Rome’s eastern conflicts by making them heirs to Greece’s glamorous struggle against Persia, albeit via Greece’s struggle against Philip. Spawforth has discussed how Parthia and Persia were commonly equated in Roman imperial propaganda (Spawforth, *Symbol of Unity?* 1994), and indeed has suggested that declamations on the Persian wars served precisely such a propagandistic

¹⁵ For Philip as a foreigner, albeit without specific Persian comparisons, see also 9.14 and 9.24.

¹⁶ 9.2, 15, 16, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46; 10.3, 34, 35, 36, 41, 42.

purpose (Spawforth, *Augustan Cultural Revolution* 2012). What would those with Greek identities have made of such an equation? Some, to be sure, might have bridled at the implied elevation of Rome's history to the level of that of classical Greece, and insisted on Greek primacy: somewhat before our period, Livy wrote about a Greek historian, perhaps Timagenes (Sordi 1982, 777–8), who liked to claim that Alexander would have been able to conquer Rome (9.18.6).¹⁷ But a more common 'Greek' attitude seems to have been to regard Greece and Rome as equals: this is exemplified by Plutarch's *Lives*, and also in Plutarch's balanced discussion of the possible outcome of a clash between Rome and Alexander (Plut. *De fortuna romanorum* 326A–C), as well as Pausanias' similarly judicious thoughts on a clash between Athens and Rome (1.11.7). To those holding such attitudes, the implied equation of Greece and Rome in the identification of Philip with Parthia would probably not have been too disagreeable. Even those who personally found this interpretation distasteful might nonetheless have found it useful on occasion: the Athenian hoplite general Tiberius Claudius Novius presumably did his standing with Roman officials no harm when he put up an honorific inscription on the Parthenon in 61/2 CE that implicitly identified Nero's Parthian war with the Persian wars (Spawforth, *Symbol of Unity?* 1994, 234–7).

But the fit between Philip and Parthia is not perfect. Images of Philip as a barbarian are not ubiquitous in these declamations, but rather surface only here and there, leaving much about the depiction of the Macedonian king that cannot be read in this way. Moreover, given that there were of course (some) declamations about the Persians, to make reference to the Parthians through a Persian Philip seems excessively circuitous; it also confuses the matter, for while Greece triumphed over Persia, Greek resistance to Philip was ultimately futile—decidedly not, one imagines, how most Romans imagined or hoped their efforts against

¹⁷ Though Philip and Alexander are obviously both Macedonians, in this case as so often Alexander is regarded as a fundamentally Greek figure.

Parthia would turn out. None of this *necessarily* matters: leaving the dramatic fiction to think about the present ultimately depends on the reader, and many readers do not need much in the way of suggestion from a text to read it in accordance with their pre-existing inclinations. Furthermore, the discrepancies between Rome's position vis-à-vis Parthia and Athens' position vis-à-vis Macedon might also open the door to less optimistic or even subversive conclusions. A Roman or indeed a Greek might be led by the ultimate defeat of Athens to consider how Rome might itself one day fall: Rome, after all, was the successor to Macedon in the popular 'sequence of five empires', all of which thus far had eventually fallen.¹⁸ As the emperor Marcus says, contemplating world history in his *Meditations*: 'consider mindfully the rest¹⁹ of the records of different times and of whole nations—consider how many after their struggles fell in a brief while and were dissolved into their elements' (ὁμοίως καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιγραφὰς χρόνων καὶ ὅλων ἐθνῶν ἐπιθεώρει καὶ βλέπε, πόσοι κατενταθέντες μετὰ μικρὸν ἔπεσον καὶ ἀνελύθησαν εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα) (4.32.2).

Philip the Despot

Still, the potential awkwardness of the identification of Philip with Parthia is certainly sufficient to open the door to readers with other inclinations to look for other referents for Macedon and its king. Let us consider the most frequent image in these two declamations (with no fewer than fourteen occurrences),²⁰ that of master (δεσπότης) and slave (δοῦλος), a widespread discourse in Greco-Roman culture in this period. One of its characteristic uses, and one with which Aristides and many in his audiences, as members of the empire's Greco-Roman elite, would have been familiar, is to characterize the relationship between emperor and senate under 'bad' emperors (Roller 2001, 214–17, 233–64). The Latin evidence for this image is naturally more extensive, but we find the discourse in Greek also: in Dio Cassius,

¹⁸ On the 'sequence of five empires', see below, pp. 165–66.

¹⁹ In the passage immediately preceding, Marcus has been talking about the time of Trajan.

²⁰ p. 158 n. 16 above.

we find it applied to Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, and Domitian,²¹ and Dio Chrysostom uses the image of Domitian also (D. Chrys. Or. 45.1), proud never to have spoken a ‘servile’ (ἀνελεύθερον) word to him (45.1).²²

Now in a popular reading of Tacitus’ *Agricola*, the slavery of the Britons in that work is regarded as in part a mirror for senatorial slavery: when the perspective shifts back to Rome at the end of the text, close parallels with the British narrative make it clear that ‘the Britons have been acting out the plight of the senatorial class under Domitian’ (Lavan, *Britain and Rome* 2011, 303); Lavan has also made similar suggestions concerning Florus and Dio Cassius (Lavan, *Enslavement of the Provinces* 2013, 145, 147).²³ I suggest that something similar may be going on in Aristides’ declamations: that the classical Athenians of these texts would, for some readers, be acting out the plight of the senatorial class under ‘bad’ emperors. For slavery is not the only hint of a ‘bad’ emperor in Philip’s conduct. The accusations made against Philip of deceit,²⁴ impiety,²⁵ greed,²⁶ and criminality (9.34) have parallels with the crimes of Caligula, Nero, or Domitian too numerous to need citing. The divine honours Philip receives are also resented (9.14):²⁷ that senators objected to divine honours for a living emperor is well-known.²⁸ The term τύραννος (‘tyrant’) too, though only used once of Philip in our declamations (9.44), was an even more common term used to describe ‘bad’ emperors than ‘master’ (δεσπότης):²⁹ for Herodian, indeed, the history of

²¹ D. Cass. 58.27.4, 62.24.2, 67.4.7, 67.13.4.

²² For the servile connotations of ἀνελεύθερος, see LSJ s.v.

²³ This sort of reading of the *Agr.* goes back at least as far as Liebeschuetz (Liebeschuetz 1966).

²⁴ 9.1, 13, 17, 18, 19, 28, 35, 36, 37, 40; 10.1, 5, 13, 29.

²⁵ 9.44, 10.14, 15.

²⁶ 9.11, 12, 17, 21, 33, 34, 37; 10.14, 15, 38.

²⁷ Cf. also the declamation scenario recorded at Aps. *Rh.* 221.2–5: ‘Demades proposed that Philip be regarded as a thirteenth god. Demosthenes spoke in opposition and was defeated. He proposes that a temple to Philip be established as well’ (ἔγραψεν ὁ Δημάδης τρισκαιδέκατον θεὸν νομίζειν τὸν Φίλιππον· ἀντιπὼν ὁ Δημοσθένης ἡττήθη· καὶ γράφει καὶ νεῶν ιδρύσασθαι Φιλίππῳ).

²⁸ Dio Cassius relates with obvious disgust how young men of leading Greek families were employed to sing the emperor Gaius’ praises at Miletus, and enjoys describing the mysterious laughter heard when Gaius tried to appropriate the statue of Olympian Zeus for himself (59.28.3–4).

²⁹ Above, p. 143 n. 93.

Rome's emperors was that of alternating 'kings' (βασιλεῖς) and 'tyrants' (τύραννοι) (Hdn. 1.1.3–4). An extended parallel between Philip in these declamations and Roman emperors more broadly can be found in the weather imagery that attaches to both. In a particularly florid passage in the first of these two declamations, Aristides imagines Philip's coming as like a whole array of bad weather. 'Like a whirlwind or a hurricane he has fallen upon us and is driving all headlong before him with his blazing storm' (ὥσπερ τυφῶς ἢ πρηστὴρ ἐμπεσὼν ἐλαύνει κατάκρας αἰγίδι λαμπρᾷ πάντα τὰ πράγματα) (36); he is like 'some other portent that has appeared, like those in the heavens, or such as appear when extraordinary earthquakes or winds prevail' (φάσματος μὲν ἄλλου του συμβάντος οἷα κατ' οὐρανὸν, ἢ σεισμῶν ἢ πνευμάτων ἔξω τοῦ μετρίου κατασχόντων) (37), or 'like one hidden in cloud' (ὥσπερ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένος) (37). So too with bad emperors. Pliny famously described himself as being scorched by the thunderbolts of Domitian as they landed all around him (*Ep.* 3.11.3); Dio Cassius, too, described Domitian's attacks as like a thunderbolt (77.1.1); Plutarch, in his *Ad principem ineredum*, imagines God as angry against those who imitate his 'thunder and lightning and sunbeams' (βροντὰς καὶ κεραυνοὺς καὶ ἀκτινοβολίας) rather than emulate his virtue, and opposes rulers who have themselves depicted holding thunderbolts or tridents (780F–781A).

The idea that such similarities could lead from Philip to reflection on contemporary 'bad' emperors is given greater plausibility by extended examples of Macedonian kings figured as 'bad' Roman emperors in Greek literature. In Philostratus' *Vita Apollonii*, at the opening of book seven, by way of a prelude to Apollonius' confrontation with Domitian, Philostratus gives a long list of other philosophers who have opposed tyrants, among whom are numbered Diogenes of Sinope, who rebuked Philip for the Battle of Chaeronea, Crates of Thebes, who scornfully rejected Alexander's offer to rebuild his city after destroying it, and Callisthenes of Olynthus, whose opposed Alexander's introduction of Persian court

ceremonial (7.2). These comparisons to Macedonians are continued in the narrative proper when Apollonius sets out a detailed comparison between a Syracusan sent by Domitian to trick him into a treasonous utterance and Philip's representative Python (attacked in our declamations (10.42), whom Apollonius describes as 'going on an embassy to the Greeks to secure their slavery' (πρεσβεύων παρὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὑπὲρ τῆς δουλείας αὐτῶν) (7.37). For Caracalla figured as Philip, see below (p. 168).

So given that there are a number of similarities between the description of Philip in these declamations and the typical image of the 'bad' emperor, and given furthermore that a confrontation with a Domitian or a Caracalla could be figured as a confrontation with Philip, I suggest that part of the fascination of declamations about Philip of this sort for some audience members (whether they were explicitly conscious of it or not) would have been their reflection of a pressing issue in contemporary life—that of 'bad' emperors. In particular, a declamation of this sort (and, one suspects, the numerous declamations concerned with tyranny (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 32–3)) could offer a chance to reaffirm opposition to despotism, something that could appeal to a number of interest groups. A senator or equestrian might approve because he considers it a denunciation of bad emperors, and as such a warning to the current emperor, or even a denunciation of him too; yet the emperor himself, and his court, against whom others might see this discourse as being directed, might have his own very good reasons for being seen to approve such performances, for each new imperial dynasty almost invariably sought to legitimise its rule at least in part by the claim to have replaced a 'master' (δεσπότης) or a 'tyrant' (τύραννος). He might even welcome the example, even if he did not see it as directed at himself: several of the emperor Marcus' *Meditations* reveal a concern to avoid tyrannical behaviour (R. Rutherford 1989, 65 n. 56). And even if the emperor did detect unwelcome criticism of himself, it was the mark of the non-tyrannical ruler to put up with παρηρησία ('free-

speaking'), an ability which Marcus was grateful to have been taught (1.6); in Roman terms, it was *civile* to listen.³⁰ Only a bad emperor—with a guilty conscience—would take umbrage, just as Caligula had banished Carrinas Secundus for a rhetorical exercise of some sort against tyrants, and Domitian had executed a sophist called Maternus for the same.³¹ Furthermore, each of the groups we have considered could gain something from the others' approval of this discourse. The emperor may see in the universal opprobrium heaped on the despot support for his own rule, while the senator may see in the emperor's approval of the performance an undertaking to avoid despotism. This is a major advantage of reflecting on contemporary concerns 'mythologically': because the referent of the 'myth' has to be supplied by the audience, divergent groups can supply the answer most amenable to themselves, and even imagine that such readings are shared by other groups also; thus even where opinions differ, a veneer of consensus—that great imperial virtue—can be maintained.

Rome and Macedon

I now explore a wider identification: not between Philip and the type of the 'bad' Roman emperor, but between Macedon and Rome more broadly. This might surprise,³² given the fairly negative picture of Macedon in these texts, and the pro-Roman sentiments expressed in many of Aristides' other works,³³ but Macedon is in fact very common as an analogue of

³⁰ For allowing free speech as the mark of a good emperor, cf. e.g. Tac. *Hist.* 1.2 and Plin. *Pan.* 2.3.

³¹ Carrinas Secunodus 'because as part of his practice he had delivered a speech against tyrants' (ὅτι λόγον τινὰ ἐν γυμνασίᾳ κατὰ τυράννων εἶπεν) (D. Cass. 59.20.6); Maternus 'because when practising he had said something against tyrants' (ὅτι κατὰ τυράννων εἶπέ τι ἀσκῶν) (D. Cass. 67.12.5). On these two episodes, see p. 210 n. 1 below. Compare Ahl's discussion of how the criticism of obscenity runs into the difficulty of betraying knowledge of obscenity (Ahl 1984, 185–6).

³² Whitmarsh sees nothing here, despite looking, though he remains receptive to the possibility of seeing Rome in declamation: 'the story of Demosthenes as proud defender of Greek freedom against foreign tyranny continued to resonate under the empire'; 'while the reader enjoys glorious narratives of Greece's military past, the gates to the realm of fantasy are open wide. Words like 'freedom', 'conquest', 'enslavement' are powerful, evocative terms, with a tendency to resist any safe compartmentalization in the ancient past' (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 68, 70).

³³ Most obviously in *Or.* 26, *Regarding Rome*, but elsewhere also: see Pernot (Pernot, Aelius Aristides and Rome 2008, 175).

Rome in this period. In this section of this chapter, moving progressively from the broadest scale down to the verbal level, I will (i) set out the parallels between (perceptions of) Rome and the sort of images of Macedon offered by these declamations, (ii) show evidence from outside the genre of Greeks and Romans noticing parallels of this kind between Rome and Macedon, and look at what they made of them, and (iii) consider what audiences would have made of the parallels offered by Aristides' declamations in particular. While the identification of Macedon with Rome probably offers more to those operating with a Greek identity, particularly those with less positive feelings towards Rome, there is also, as we shall see, much here too for those operating from a Roman perspective.

At the broadest level, Rome and Macedon were obviously parallel in being imperial powers; to Greek eyes, a further similarity between the two could be found in Rome's traditionally ambiguous position between Greek and barbarian. The continual, strategic redefinition of Macedon in classical sources as alternately Greek and barbarian is well-known (e.g. Hatzopoulos 2011, Engels 2010); for Rome's ambiguous status, one might think of Strabo's approval of Eratosthenes' grouping of the Romans among the 'civilized' (ἁστυεῖους) barbarians (1.4.9), or Dionysius of Halicarnassus' description of Latin as 'neither utterly barbarian nor completely Greek' (οὔτ' ἄκρως βάρβαρον οὔτ' ἀπηρτισμένως Ἑλλάδα) (*Ant. Rom.* 1.90.1). That there was an appreciation of the broad similarities between the two empires at the time is suggested by the existence in contemporary historiography of a theory of 'five empires', which saw Rome as the successor to Macedon in a sequence of world empires (with Macedon preceded in turn by Media, Persia, and Assyria).³⁴ This scheme is

³⁴ For the theory, see Swain (J. Swain 1940); for its down-dating to the second half of the first century BCE, see Mendels (Mendels 1981). In the imperial period, it can be found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 1.2–3), Strabo (Alonso-Núñez 1984), and Appian (*Praef.* 6–11, *Pun.* 132). Further back, but in the same vein, Polybius offers us the extraordinary scene in which Scipio weeps for Carthage, seeing in its destruction an echo of the fall of Troy, Assyria, Media, Persia, and Macedon, and a foreshadowing of Rome's own eventual destruction (38.22.1–3).

used twice by Aristides himself (1.335, 26.91), on the second occasion in particular briefly enough to suggest that it was well-known.

Such a connection between Rome and earlier empires was open to a wide range of interpretations. In its most familiar form, a distinction is drawn between the first four, inferior empires and the fifth, Rome, which is the best and will last forever (J. Swain 1940, 13–14). Thus in Aristides' own *Regarding Rome*, in which Rome's empire is 'the best in every way and the greatest' (τῆς πάντα ἀρίστης καὶ μεγίστης) (1.335). But there is sufficient evidence to suggest that this idea of a succession from Macedon to Rome could be understood very differently by those with less charitable views of Roman power. The historian Pompeius Trogus, whose work appeared under Augustus, seems to have presented four empires, ending with Rome, as all more or less terrible oppressors (J. Swain 1940, 16–18). Pausanias' narrative also suggests negative continuities between Macedon and Rome on a couple of occasions. When recording the slaughter of the Arcadians by Q. Caecilius Metellus at Chaeronea in 146 BCE in the disastrous Achaean War that led to the incorporation of Greece into the Roman empire, Pausanias explicitly remarks upon the parallel with Athens' battle against Macedon in the same place (7.15.6); he continues this parallel in his subsequent excursus on Greek treachery, in which he jumps from the final betrayal of Athens in the time of Philip all the way forward to the Achaean Callicrates, whom he sees as having betrayed the Achaean League to Rome (7.10.1–5).

Narrowing the focus slightly, we find the Roman emperor frequently figured as Philip; again, the connotations of this comparison in the different texts give us some idea of the range of possible responses to the figure of Philip in Aristides' declamations. I examine three examples.

Dio Chrysostom, speaking before his home town of Prusa, tells the story of how Aristotle used his position as the tutor of Alexander to prevail on Philip to resettle his home town of Stagira, which had been destroyed in war, but found his plans thwarted by mean-spirited locals, and ultimately came to regret his efforts (47.9). So too, Dio says, he now regrets his efforts to secure support from the emperor to rebuild Prusa, given the obstructionism of his political rivals. This first comparison is fairly neutral: it is true that the only reason Stagira needs resettling in the first place is of course because Philip himself had destroyed it (and enslaved its inhabitants), but this is left implicit, and has no obvious immediate parallel in Dio's situation.³⁵

Aristides' own use of the figure of Philip is somewhat cagier. Delivering a eulogy at the funeral of his teacher Alexander, Aristides compares his teacher's role in advising Roman emperors to Aristotle's association with Philip and Alexander (32.29). Indeed, Aristides seems particularly concerned to make this parallel as close as possible, for he surely mentions both Alexander and Philip so as to mirror the joint rule of Marcus and Verus. Intriguingly, he feels the need to clarify that while Aristotle's behaviour was 'not in the eyes of the Greeks beyond reproach in every respect' (οὐ παντάπασιν ἀναίτιος τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν) (29), given that he seemed to be associating with 'the opponents and enemies of the Greeks' (τοῖς ἀνταγωνισταῖς καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων) (29), his teacher Alexander, he says, worked with those who were benefactors of the Greeks. While this text, then, explicitly denies that the emperors (unlike the Macedonians) are enemies of the Greeks, the very fact that this suggestion had to be rejected hints that it was not necessarily straightforward to figure the emperor as Philip without introducing negative connotations.

³⁵ Dio's *Discourses on Kingship* (Orr, 1–4) of course figure Roman emperors as Alexander and Philip: for these, see Moles (Moles, *Kingship Orations* 1990). For Dio's attitude to Rome generally, see Moles (Moles, *Dio Chrysostom, Greece, and Rome* 1995).

But perhaps the most revealing example is to be found in Philostratus' account of the life of Heliodorus (VS 625–7) (discussed more fully below, pp. 216–17). After Heliodorus acting as an ambassador for the Celts had shown timidity before Caracalla, the emperor told him to declaim the title 'Demosthenes accused of cowardice after he has broken down in a speech before Philip' (ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐπὶ τοῦ Φιλίππου ἐκπεσὼν καὶ δειλίας φεύγων) (VS 626). This declamation clearly represents a kind of allegory for the situation in which Heliodorus found himself: he is the tongue-tied Demosthenes, and Caracalla is Philip; we thus have a first-hand account of Rome figured as Macedon *in a declamation*. The scenario is based on an incident which occurred in 346 BCE when, according to Aeschines, Demosthenes broke down while addressing Philip on an embassy at Pella.³⁶ That embassy had been sent to seek peace after the Athenians came to accept that they would be unlikely to recapture the cities that Philip had taken from them, and that any continuation of hostilities would be futile. Thus Caracalla is figured as Philip in a position of power over the Greeks, specifically on an occasion on which he was so frightening as to cause Greece's greatest orator to break down: in this instance the comparison of Roman and Macedonian clearly comes with overtones of menace.

So we have a good body of evidence for ancient audiences noticing the large-scale structural parallels between Rome and Macedon, and between the Roman emperor and Philip, and we have some idea of what they made of them: clearly the comparison is not always completely flattering to Rome, even in Aristides.³⁷ Thus at a high level, the simple fact of representing Macedon and Philip in these declamations would have provided raw materials for reflections on Rome and Roman imperialism, and quite possibly negative reflection.

³⁶ Aeschin. 2.34–5, 114; cf. Kohl (Kohl 1915, 68).

³⁷ The ambivalent note in these comparisons should be distinguished from the opposition to bad emperors discussed above: the present phenomenon seems to affect *all* emperors, both good and bad (Dio Chrysostom is writing about Trajan, and Aristides about Marcus; even Caracalla is not obviously playing the part of 'bad' emperor in his encounter with Heliodorus), and to be directed at Roman power more broadly.

Moving down to the textual and verbal level, we find frequent parallels between the activities of Philip (and associated imagery) and contemporary (perceptions of) Roman imperialism. The most frequent, indeed insistent image in these two declamations, as we have said, is that of master and slave.³⁸ Such imagery is very common in Greek assessments of Rome's empire in this period; indeed, it is perhaps even more common than the use of the image to describe the 'bad' emperors discussed above. For Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Rome had advanced 'by always enslaving everything that opposed her' (ἀεὶ πᾶν δουλουμένη τὸ ἀντίπαλον) (*Ant. Rom.* 1.3.4); the literary critic known today as Pseudo-Longinus, whether we date him to the first or the third century CE, discusses at length the view of an opponent who thought that the 'slavery' (δουλεία)³⁹ of the present age had led to a decline in rhetoric; Philostratus has Apollonius charge Vespasian with enslaving Greece by revoking Nero's grant of freedom (VA 5.41.1–4). Plutarch is a little more nuanced: in his view, the Greek statesman's leg is fettered, though his neck need not go under the yoke (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 814F). The image is frequent in Herodian too (2.9.12, 7.2.1). Indeed, according to Herodian, it was through infighting that the Greeks 'were easy for the Macedonians to capture, and became slaves to the Romans' (Μακεδόσιν εὐάλωτα καὶ Ῥωμαίοις δοῦλα γεγένηται) (3.2.8): this pairing is particularly suggestive, for it seems to hint that Greece's defeat by Macedon and her present subordinate position under Rome are part of the same phenomenon, as indeed Pausanias implies (cf. also above, p. 166). As Flaminius subdues the Macedonians, the Achaeans foresee that 'in place of Philip and his Macedonians, the Romans were coming to be their masters and to give orders to them and the whole of Greece' (ἀντὶ Φιλίππου καὶ Μακεδόνων Ῥωμαῖοι σφίσι τε ἤκοιεν καὶ τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ δεσπότηι προστάττειν) (7.8.2): the reference, of course, is to Philip V of

³⁸ p. 158 n. 16 above.

³⁹ 44.3, 44.5, 44.10.

Macedon, their opponent in the second Macedonian War, but left unspecified, ‘Philip and the Macedonians’ (Φιλίππου καὶ Μακεδόνων) could easily also suggest Philip II, Demosthenes’ enemy.⁴⁰

Second, like most tyrants (9.44), Philip in these declamations is frequently described as greedy.⁴¹ Now Roman greed was of course a common trope. At the battle of Pharsalus, Plutarch has some Greek onlookers (conveniently present at the battle without being involved in the fighting) meditate on the terrible damage that ‘greed’ (πλεονεξία) has done to the Roman state (*Pomp.* 70); Dio Chrysostom explicitly addressed Romans (*Or.* 13.29–37) on the topic of wealth and luxury, referring to the ‘mass of possessions which has all been gathered together from all sides into this one place, since luxury and greed reign’ (χρήματων... πλήθους, ἃ πάντα πανταχόθεν εἰς ἓνα τοῦτον ἤθροισται τὸν τόπον, τρυφῆς ἐπικρατούσης καὶ πλεονεξίας) (36). Somewhat earlier, Dionysius of Halicarnassus had lamented how Roman boundary stones now only had a ritual function: the Romans, Dionysius says, do not ‘separate what is theirs from the property of others; rather, the extent of their holdings is determined not by the law, but by a desire for all things, a distasteful attitude’ (ὀρίζουσί... ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τὰ οἰκεῖα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ὅρος τῶν κτήσεων οὐχ ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ’ ἡ πάντων ἐπιθυμία, πρᾶγμα οὐ καλόν) (*Rom. Ant.* 2.74.5). More specifically, Philip is said in these declamations to be even worse than a moneylender who sets very high interest rates, imagined as a tax-collector (9.11), and said to have seized Greece like a debtor in default (9.34). Such imagery is particularly evocative of Asia Minor’s

⁴⁰ This of course was an image with a long history: as far back as Polybius we find Rome’s aid to Greece in the Second Macedonian War being described as the precursor to a war with those same Romans in which defeat will mean slavery (9.37.7).

⁴¹ 9.10–13, 17, 21, 33, 34, 37; 10.14, 15, 38. It is true that Philip’s greed in Aristides is more territorial than material, but both can be described as πλεονεξία (e.g. 9.12, 17, 21, 10.14, 38), and the move from material greed to a spatial acquisitiveness is an easy metaphorical shift, and one practised by Aristides himself (e.g. 9.10–11, 34); indeed it is sometimes hard to tell whether a given accusation of greed is material or territorial (e.g. 9.33: earth and sea are being ‘plundered’ (ληστευομένη)), and to insist on the distinction would be to impute an implausibly academic fussiness to Aristides and his audience. Nor in fact is material greed entirely absent (e.g. 10.15: Philip is described as ‘carrying off’ (συλῶν) *inter alia* dedicatory offerings and money).

sufferings under Roman tax-collectors and money lenders,⁴² a story still told in the imperial period (e.g. Plut. *Luc.*, App. *Mith.*): Appian tells of how Mithridates had the republican general Manius Aquilius executed by drinking molten gold, an obviously symbolic fate (*Mith.* 21). Among the objects of Philip's acquisitiveness are sacred offerings and temples: a ready parallel is to hand here in Nero's confiscations from Athens, Delphi, Olympia, Thespieae, and Pergamum after the fire of 64, frequently mentioned in our sources (Griffin 1984, 211 n. 15).⁴³

Finally, Aristides' image of Philip recalls contemporary perceptions of Rome in numerous small details. Many of these would probably not have triggered thoughts of Rome on their own, but could readily have contributed to these declamations' wider, structural parallels between Rome and Macedon. Philip is a foreigner (9.14, 9.24), a barbarian,⁴⁴ or worse than an Amazon (9.33). So Romans were often cast as barbarians: Strabo considered them to be such, albeit civilized barbarians (above, p. 165), and Dionysius of Halicarnassus had to fight hard against such an idea;⁴⁵ further back, we find the idea expressed several times in Polybius.⁴⁶ Philip is a criminal: that early Romans were criminals was well-known, and an easy slander: Plutarch wrote about how Romulus had welcomed slaves, debtors, and murderers to his asylum (Plut. *Rom.* 9); earlier, Dionysius of Halicarnassus had had to reject as slander the idea that runaway slaves formed part of Rome's early population (1.4.2–3). Philip is also described, with quite some fanfare, as 'king' (10.5). It is the 'one word' (ένὸς ῥήματος), 'the first of all in his treaties and letters' (έν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῖς

⁴² For references to Roman money-lending in various periods, see Magie (Magie 1950, 166, 197, 209, 250–2, 258, 293, 318, 385, 404) and Mitchell (Mitchell 1993, 29–30, 154). For the depredations of governors more generally, see Brunt (Brunt, *Provincial Maladministration* 1961).

⁴³ Compare also Paus. 9.27.3–4 for a Greek statue stolen by Caligula, restored by Claudius, and then stolen a second time by Nero.

⁴⁴ 9.4, 24, 44.

⁴⁵ 1.4.2–3, 1.89.1, 7.70.1.

⁴⁶ 5.104.1, 9.37.6, 11.5.6–8, 18.22.8. On this point, see Champion (Champion 2004, General Index, s.v. 'Romans, as barbarian people').

συνθήκαις πρῶτον ἀπάντων), a word which ‘reveals to all’ (πρὸς ἅπαντας καὶ καταμηνύει) his intentions: to be ‘King of the Macedonians’ (βασιλεὺς Μακεδόνων), ‘King of this land’ (ταύτης... βασιλέα), ‘King of the Greeks’ (Βασιλεὺς Ἑλλήνων). Roman emperors were of course standardly designated ‘king’ in Greek (Mason 1974, s.v.), and Aristides’ claim in these declamations to unmask Philip as a would-be king has some similarity with Appian’s insistence in the preface to his history that Roman emperors really are kings (βασιλεῖς), despite their preference for other terms (6). Four times in these declamations Philip is a Spartan:⁴⁷ Rome’s esteem for and emulation of Sparta is well-known.⁴⁸ In particular, Philip is said to imitate Sparta’s ‘cleverness’ (δεινότητος) (28), and Aristides cites as an example of such cleverness Sparta’s claim during the Peloponnesian war to have been fighting for the freedom of the Greeks, contrasted with their subsequent turning on Corinth (29). Rome of course had twice famously proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks: first in 196 BCE,⁴⁹ and most recently during the reign of Nero,⁵⁰ a grant rapidly revoked by Vespasian, as several imperial Greek sources remind us,⁵¹ and Rome’s sack of Corinth in 146 BCE was still a chilling memory (Paus. 7.16.7–9).

Now one of Philip’s specific strategies in these declamations and others is ‘divide-and-rule’. By sowing dissent among the Greek cities, Philip can stop them from uniting against him and conquer them one by one.⁵² Dio Chrysostom alleges that the Roman governors of Bithynia pursue precisely this strategy, allying themselves now with Nicaea, now with Nicomedia (*Or.* 38.36): ‘do you not realise the tyrannical power which your dissension

⁴⁷ 9.39; 10.28–30.

⁴⁸ See Spawforth (Spawforth, *Augustan Cultural Revolution* 2012, 87–102).

⁴⁹ Polyb. 18.44; Plut. *Flam.* 10ff.

⁵⁰ Nero: *ILS* 8794.

⁵¹ Paus. 7.17.3–4; Philostr. *VA* 5.41.

⁵² 9.20, 22, 34, 37, 45; 10.26, 27, 31, 43. Cf. Aps. *Rh.* 255.20: ‘Philip has sent a garland to “the goddess” after the events at Olynthus’ (ἐπεμψε στέφανον Φίλιππος τῇ θεᾷ μετὰ Ὀλυνθον), an action explicitly interpreted by Apsines as an attempt to sow discord among the Greek cities. Aristides makes use of this same idea (that Greek infighting enabled the rise of Philip) when arguing for concord between the cities of Asia (*Or.* 23.61).

offers to your rulers?’ (οὐκ ἐπαισθάνεσθε τῆς τυραννίδος, ἣν ἡ στάσις ἡ ὑμετέρα δίδωσι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὑμῶν), he asks indignantly. In such an environment, unity is key, as we hear several times in these declamations,⁵³ and accordingly the traitor is a particularly reviled figure:⁵⁴ Philip’s ambassadors, including the notorious Python of Byzantium, are called ‘traitors to their own fatherlands... a shameful example for all the Greeks’ (προδόται τῶν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδων... αἰσχρὸν παράδειγμα πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλησιν) (9.45); such a gnomic utterance is easy to take as having wider significance outside the fiction of the declamation. So too in contemporary life: it is alleged that Dio conspired with the Roman governor of his province against his fellow citizens (43.11); Pausanias, in a passage mentioned above, makes explicit the parallel between Macedon and Rome when he describes treachery as a disease that has plagued Greece from the beginning, moving from the traitors of classical history (abundant, he says, in the time of Philip) to those Greeks whose betrayal led to the final subjugation of Greece to Rome (7.10.1–5).

There are thus enough parallels large and small between Aristides’ picture of Macedon and contemporary views of Rome, and moreover, enough instances of contemporaries explicitly comparing the two, to conclude that part of the appeal of these declamations for many audiences must have been the chance to reflect on Roman imperialism. And given that, as we have seen, comparisons between Macedon and Rome outside of declamation often reflect badly on Rome, so we should assume that many of the Roman parallels available in Aristides’ declamations were frequently read in a similar way. Some ‘Greeks’ probably responded to Demosthenes’ imagined call to freedom as Plutarch imagined his mob might on hearing of the great battles of the Persian wars, swelling with pride and becoming insolent (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 814C). The Athenians had ultimately lost, of course, but it

⁵³ 9.34; 10.31, 43.

⁵⁴ 9.45; 10.42. Python appears as a traitor in a declamation scenario at Aps. *Rh.* 231.17–18. The most obvious traitor in Greek declamation is of course Aeschines (e.g. VS 580).

was a loss glorious enough to, as Pseudo-Longinus says, ‘make one no less proud of the battle against Philip than one is of the victorious battles at Marathon and Salamis’ (μηδὲν ἔλαττον τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Φίλιππον ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ Μαραθῶνα καὶ Σαλαμῖνα νικητηρίοις παρίστασθαι φρονεῖν) (*Subl.* 16.2); Aristides, too, in his *Panathenaic Oration* (*Or.* 1) claims that Athens was the only city to resist Macedon, and says that ‘its end was the best of all peoples’ (Behr) (ἄριστα δὲ ἀπήλλαξεν τῶν ἄλλων) (335). Nor would this sort of response necessarily have been confined to the general population: all the authors we have mentioned who see parallels for Roman abuses in classical history could fairly be described as members of the social elite.

Oblique reservations about Rome are certainly not unique in Greek imperial writing, as is now being recognized.⁵⁵ In particular, they are not unique in Aristides. We mentioned above the rather revealing scene (32.29) in which Aristides described his former teacher Alexander’s association with the emperors as *not*, unlike that of Aristotle with Philip and Alexander, to which he compares it, an association with ‘the opponents and enemies of the Greeks’ (τοῖς ἀνταγωνισταῖς καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων). Pernot has noted several similar passages (Pernot, Aelius Aristides and Rome 2008): in a dream in the *Sacred Tales*, Aristides appears before the emperor but breaks court etiquette by refusing to kiss him (*Or.* 47.23; Pernot 2008 178–9),⁵⁶ while his encounter with Marcus in Philostratus’ *Vitae sophistarum* has, as Pernot sensitively perceives, ‘an air of detachment’ (Pernot, Aelius Aristides and Rome 2008, 182), with Aristides delaying his appearance before the emperor on the grounds that he was occupied with a ‘preliminary meditation’ (θεώρημα)⁵⁷

⁵⁵ See e.g. Woolf (Woolf, *Staying Greek* 1994, 125–6), Pernot (Pernot, Aelius Aristides and Rome 2008, 176–77), and Madsen (Madsen, *Patriotism and Ambitions* 2014).

⁵⁶ I do not find Pernot’s other examples from the *Sacred Tales* nearly so striking (Pernot, Aelius Aristides and Rome 2008, 179–81).

⁵⁷ For the various meanings of this difficult term, see above p. 76.

(VS 582).⁵⁸ Particularly interesting for our purposes is Aristides' use of the slavery metaphor that is so common in these declamations in his *Regarding Rome*. Officially, of course, it is denied that the provinces are Rome's slaves. 'You alone of all the rulers there have ever been rule men who are free' (μόνοι γὰρ τῶν πώποτε ἐλευθέρων ἄρχετε), we hear: governors are appointed 'not to be masters' (οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ δεσπότηας εἶναι), nor 'are the people, like a household, spoken of as belonging to so-and-so, to whomever they were given to serve' (Behr) (ὥσπερ οἶκος τοῦ δεῖνος ἀκούει τὸ ἔθνος, ὅτῳ παρεδόθη δουλεύειν) (26.36). Yet denials raise the spectre of their opposite, and 'you rule free men' (ἐλευθέρων ἄρχετε) is somewhat paradoxical here: is such a position really sustainable?⁵⁹ We find the slavery metaphor used elsewhere in the speech, with similarly ambiguous implications. We hear that the city of Rome has not built walls 'as if a master were to show himself afraid of his own slaves' (οἷον εἴ τις δεσπότης δεικνύοιτο τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δούλους φοβούμενος) (80). The comparison is negative, to be sure, but if we follow Aristides' train of thought here what makes the comparison negative is that Rome is not fearful of its subjects, and *not* (necessarily) that those subjects are not slaves. Later on in the speech, Aristides discusses the sequence of world empires (91): 'the others—those holding power before you—were masters and slaves of one another in turn... and Macedonians served Persians, Persians Medes, and Medes Assyrians' (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι οἱ πρὸ ὑμῶν δυναστεύσαντες δεσπόται καὶ δοῦλοι ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ μέρει γιγνόμενοι... καὶ ἐδούλευσαν Μακεδόνες Πέρσαις, Πέρσαι Μήδοις, Μῆδοι Σύροις). But what distinguishes Rome from previous empires here is not, as we might expect, and in accordance with chapter 36, that its empire is not slavery, but rather that 'you alone are natural rulers, one might say' (Behr) (μόνοι γὰρ ἐστε ὑμεῖς ἄρχοντες ὥς

⁵⁸ On sophists' cagey encounters with emperors, see also Flinterman, who stresses that not all encounters are like this (Flinterman, *Sophists and Emperors* 2004, 364–5), König (König 2014, 252–58), and Kemezis (Kemezis 2014, 221–24).

⁵⁹ Compare Pliny's paradox in his *Panegyricus*: 'you bid us to be free, and so we shall be' (*iubes esse liberos; erimus*) (67).

εἰπεῖν κατὰ φύσιν), though the verbal echo of chapter 36 here (μόνοι γὰρ ('you alone')) perhaps primed us to expect 'you rule free men' (ἐλευθέρων ἄρχετε) once more: there is nothing to suggest that the Roman empire differs from its predecessors in respect of slavery. In short, the speech officially denies that the Roman empire represents slavery, but also quietly takes it for granted. The anti-Roman readings available in these declamations, then, and in particular, the image of empire as slavery, are not unique in Aristides: rather, in his declamations Aristides seems to inflate what are the tiniest hints in his *Regarding Rome* into the dominant ideas and images. Such, it seems, is the freedom that declamation as a genre offers for free-thinking on sensitive subjects.

But the identification of Macedonian imperialism with Roman imperialism need not have been limited to those approaching these declamations from a 'Greek' perspective, nor necessarily have been solely negative. The dominant image of Macedonian power in these declamations, for example, that of enslavement, is in fact as common an image of Roman imperialism in more obviously 'Roman' sources as it is in 'Greek' sources. This point has been proved at length by Lavan in a series of articles and a monograph.⁶⁰ It is how Caesar, Cicero, Tacitus, and Pliny all talk about their empire (Lavan, *Slaves to Rome* 2013, 73–155); it is even how Jupiter talks, in *Aeneid* 1, in a passage generally neglected in favour of the more famous passage on book 6:

As the lustral cycles pass, there shall come an age / when the house of Assaracus will oppress Phthia and famous Mycenae / with slavery, and will be master in conquered Argos.

(*veniet lustris labentibus aetas, / cum domus Assaraci Phthiam clarasque Mycenae / servitio premet, ac victis dominabitur Argis*) (1.283–5. Cf. 280: 'Romans, masters of the world' (*Romanos rerum dominos*)).

⁶⁰ See Lavan (Lavan, *Rhetoric of Mastery* 2007), Lavan (Lavan, *Britain and Rome* 2011), Lavan (Lavan, *Florus and Dio* 2013), and Lavan (Lavan, *Slaves to Rome* 2013).

It would have been possible, therefore, for a Roman to see himself in Macedon in these texts, without sympathizing with the call to freedom available in Aristides. Quite the reverse: as Lavan says, ‘we should not be misled by our own conviction that slavery is morally unjustifiable into presuming that to describe an empire as enslavement is necessarily to condemn it’; such metaphors do not imply ‘condemnation of Roman rule or sympathy with Rome’s subjects’; ‘[o]n the contrary, they celebrate Roman success’ (Lavan, *Slaves to Rome* 2013, 74, 114). Thus a ‘Roman’ who recognised in Aristides’ images of slavery his own mastery over Greece might have taken grim pleasure in the idea. Indeed, if he detected Greek disquiet, it might well have brought him satisfaction: to borrow Hutton’s image, there is little pleasure in having tamed a lion if the lion does not occasionally roar to remind onlookers of the skill of its tamer.⁶¹ Equally, a Pliny might have seen an opportunity for posturing condescension. Seeking to persuade a friend to be a mild governor of Greece, he had written ‘in ill health, slaves and free men are no different, but the free men are treated more gently and more softly’ (*in adversa valetudine nihil servi ac liberi different, mollius tamen liberos clementiusque tractari*) (*Ep.* 8.24.5): at the same time as ostensibly pleading for better treatment for contemporary Greeks, he also manages to imply that their current position is indistinguishable from that of slaves. A Tacitus, on the other hand, might have seen Aristides’ declamations as a further *justification* of Roman mastery over the Greeks. As Lavan has nicely teased out (Lavan, *Britain and Rome* 2011), Tacitus’ *Agricola* presents slavery as maintained by slavish traits such as compliance, passivity, and silence, which slavery itself propagates. One lesson such a reader might draw from the restaging of Philip’s conquest of Greece, then, could be that if the Greeks had been enslaved hundreds of years

⁶¹ ‘The Romans may have derived some measure of self-validation from seeing the Greeks express an independent spirit in their literature. Having tamed a lion, after all, is a more satisfying accomplishment than having tamed a lapcat’ (Hutton 2005, 43).

ago, they must be all the more servile today; as Vespasian was alleged to have said, ‘Greece has unlearned freedom’ (ἀπομεμαθηκέναι... τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν) (Paus. 7.17.4).

But would a ‘Roman’ feel no discomfort on recognizing in Greece’s coming slavery to Philip his own dominion over the world? Perhaps not always. One should, Plutarch says, avoid forcing Romans to be ‘masters more than they would wish’ (μᾶλλον ἢ βούλονται δεσπότης) (*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 815A); Dio Chrysostom too says that it would be foolish to think that the Romans want to rule over ‘slaves’ (ἀνδραπόδων) (31.111). Yet slaves are what the Greeks of these declamations claim to be, and slavery is the predominant metaphor used of their imperial overlords. To go on and on about Greek enslavement in declamation, then, might seem a clever resistance strategy. While resistance is generally conceived of as openly contesting one’s subordinate position, a subtler strategy involves increasing still further the power of one’s superiors to the point that it becomes painful even to the superiors themselves. In modern terms, we might call such behaviour ‘passive-aggressive’. Such a strategy is effective because the impetus to change comes not from outside but rather from the imperialists themselves, and so is much more likely to be successful: as Demetrius says of a passage in Plato, ‘it appears much more forceful because the matter itself makes the forcefulness apparent, and the speaker does not need to spell it out’ (πολὺ δεινότερος ὁ λόγος δοκεῖ τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ ἐμφαίνοντος τὸ δεινόν, οὐχὶ τοῦ λέγοντος) (Demetr. *Eloc.* 288) (Ahl 1984, 176–9). If there were any context in which it might be safe for such an impetus for change to surface, declamation, written in another language and set hundreds of years ago, might well be a good candidate: is it not possible that a ‘Roman’, on seeing the familiar slavery metaphor applied so relentlessly by Aristides to the villainous Macedonians, with whom his empire was often identified, might subtly reconsider his attitudes and indeed behaviour towards non-Romans?

Pollux's *On the Islanders* (VS 593)

The above exploration of the discourses that are operative in Aristides' *Oration*s 9 and 10 helps us to understand more fully the fragment of Pollux's declamation 'the islanders who sell their offspring to pay the tribute' (τοὺς νησιώτας τοὺς τὰ γένη πιπράσκοντας ἐς τὴν ἀπαγωγὴν τῶν φόρων) (VS 593) preserved in Philostratus. This declamation scenario occurs three times in three different sources:⁶² it is thus one of the more common titles we know of and accordingly a good candidate to have had real significance for those who declaimed it and those who heard it declaimed. On the strength of the other instantiations of this scenario and another declamation on islands and islanders in which the tax-collecting authority is identified (VS 527), it may safely be assumed that the islanders of this scenario are subjects of classical Athens.⁶³

With what contemporary issues might this declamation resonate? The most natural contemporary point of reference for empire and (excessive) taxation is again obviously Rome,⁶⁴ and there is a strikingly direct parallel in Plutarch's *Lucullus*, where we hear that after the depredations of Roman tax collectors and money-lenders in Asia, the people were reduced to selling their children and even themselves into slavery (*Luc.* 20).⁶⁵ But is it plausible to figure Roman imperialists as Athenian? It is unusual, to be sure, but not totally unprecedented: in Philostratus, the incorruptibility of the sophist Quirinus as *advocatus fisci*

⁶² VS 593; Aps. *Rh.* 261.20–22; [Hermog.] *Inv.* I 5.8.2–3. Rothe connects to this scenario Aristides' declamation 'a truce is declined after the killing of offspring' (οἱ παραιτούμενοι τὰς σπονδὰς μετὰ τὸ κτεῖναι τὰ γένη) (VS 585), the islanders preferring to kill their children rather than sell them into slavery, but this seems speculative; Civiletti considers Aristides' scenario merely 'simile' (Rothe 1989, 148, Civiletti 2002, 595). The scenario is also discussed briefly in a fifteenth-century rhetorical text by Matthew Camariotes (*RG* 6.632.10–24). Even in the fifteenth century, such a scenario was not unconnected to contemporary concerns: Camariotes lived through the Turkish conquest of Byzantium, after which Mehmet is said to have sent four hundred Greek children to each of the three leading Muslim potentates of the time (Runciman 1965, 151 n. 1).

⁶³ It is impossible to know when precisely this declamation is supposed to be set. Rothe suggests during the struggle with Philip or c. 425 BCE (Rothe 1989, 148), but the date is not important for my reading.

⁶⁴ For Roman abuses and Greek complaints, see above, pp. 170–1 and p. 171 n. 42.

⁶⁵ Tacitus reports the same about the Frisians under the empire (*Ann.* 4.72.2): Rothe concludes 'dieses Thema in der Zeit der "zweiten Sophistik" deshalb beliebt war, da es ein aktuelles Problem berührte' (Rothe 1989, 149).

earns him a comparison to the fifth-century Athenian Aristides the Just, who returned to Athens from having arranged the tributes of the islands in the same shabby cloak in which he had departed (VS 621).⁶⁶

But in the fragment we have, it is Persian imperialists, not Athenian, that are in view. This fragment (said to be part of the conclusion) comes from a letter written to his father by one of the children, now a slave in Persia:

I am a slave to the King, having been given by a satrap as a gift, though I neither mount the Median horse nor take up the Persian bow. No, I do not even go out to war, or to hunt, like a man, but rather I sit in the women's quarters and wait on the King's courtesans. The King doesn't get angry about this because I'm a eunuch. But I'm well regarded among the courtesans because I can describe the Greek sea to them, and tell them the lovely stories of the Greeks—how the Eleians celebrate their festival, how the Delphians give oracles, and what the Athenians' altar of pity is. Write back to me father, and tell me when the Spartans celebrate the Hyacinthia, and when the Corinthians celebrate the Isthmian games, and the Delphians the Pythian games, and whether the Athenians still win their sea battles.

(δουλεύω βασιλεῖ δῶρον ἐκ σατράπου δοθείς, οὔτε δὲ ἵππον ἀναβαίνω Μηδικὸν οὔτε τόξον λαμβάνω Περσικόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπὶ πόλεμον ἢ θήραν, ὥς ἀνὴρ, ἐξέρχομαι, ἐν γυναικωνίτιδι δὲ κάθημαι καὶ τὰς βασιλέως θεραπεύω παλλακάς, καὶ βασιλεὺς οὐκ ὀργίζεται, εὐνοῦχος γάρ εἰμι. εὐδοκίμῳ δὲ παρ' αὐταῖς θάλατταν Ἑλληνικὴν διηγούμενος καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μυθολογῶν καλά, πῶς Ἡλεῖοι πανηγυρίζουσι, πῶς Δελφοὶ θεσπίζουσι, τίς ὁ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις Ἑλέου βωμός. ἀλλὰ καὶ σύ, πάτερ, μοι γράφε, πότε παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις Ὑακίνθια καὶ παρὰ Κορινθίοις Ἰσθμία καὶ παρὰ Δελφοῖς Πύθια καὶ εἰ νικῶσιν Ἀθηναῖοι ναυμαχοῦντες) (VS 593)

Now Persian imperialists in fact are readier analogues for Rome than Athenian.⁶⁷ Βασιλεύς ('king') was of course one of the standard designations for the Roman emperor in Greek literature of this period, as was 'satrap' (σατράπης) for proconsuls (Mason 1974, s.vv.). Pausanias says that the emperor Antoninus was called 'father of mankind' (πατὴρ ἀνθρώπων), a title that he explicitly reminds us was used of Cyrus (8.43.6); Marcus' deathbed speech in Herodian also owes much to Cyrus (1.4.2). But the analogy was not

⁶⁶ Smith works hard to find Rome in imperial literature that mentions Classical Athens, but to my mind pushes his material too far (Smith, *Romance of Empire* 2007, 43–49).

⁶⁷ Whitmarsh gestures in this direction: '[t]he imaginative leap from Rome to Persia was not hard to make... That Rome could be imagined, however fleetingly or subtly, as a Persia, gives an interesting new inflection to historical declamations' (Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic* 2005, 67).

always positive: Philostratus has Apollonius of Tyre figure Vespasian as a more successful Xerxes for taking away Greece's freedom (5.41.2), and in Plutarch's *De vitando aere alieno*, we hear Roman moneylenders described as bringing chains for Greece like the agents of Darius (829A–B); Josephus has Agrippa describe the empire's subjects as prostrating (προσκυνεῖν) themselves before Rome (*BJ* 2.366, 380), an act characteristic of the Persia court (LSJ s.v. I.2). The other discourses in this fragment, too, fit Rome fairly well: slavery, as we have seen, is used extensively by imperial writers to refer to the empire.

But to show that a reading is available is not the same thing as showing that it was likely or common: what makes a Roman reading likely in these declamations are rather the sustained parallels with Lucian's *De mercede conductis*. In this work, Lucian attacks Greek intellectuals who accept the patronage of great Romans: the imagined career of such an intellectual in a Roman household shows striking similarities to the career of the boy sold into Persian slavery in Pollux. Both were forced into the service of the imperial power by poverty (*Merc. cond.* 5–6); in both cases, their position is that of a slave, whether literally or metaphorically.⁶⁸ In both cases, that service is emasculating. Just as the islander is a eunuch who sits in the women's quarters with the king's concubines, so in Lucian we hear how Thesmopolis the Stoic sat uncomfortably next to beardless men with depilated legs and a man with rouged cheeks and underlined eyelids: 'if it had not been for repeated entreaties, he would have sat down with a hair-net on his head' (εἴ γε μὴ πολλὰ δεηθῆναι αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸν κεκρύφαλον ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ ἂν συγκαθίζεσθαι) (*Merc. cond.* 33). A particularly close parallel comes in the boy's role within the Persian court, serving up nuggets of *paideia* to his masters: this corresponds not only to the substance of what Lucian's intellectual does, but even its form. The boy describes facing a series of questions from his masters, on Olympia, on Delphi, and on the altar of pity at Athens; Lucian's intellectual faces a similar

⁶⁸ δουλεύω, Pollux; *Merc. cond. passim*, esp. 23–4.

grilling, which he refers to as an ‘examination... to see if you are learned in the arts’ (Harmon) (ἐξέτασις... εἰ οἶσθα τὰ μαθήματα) (*Merc. cond.* 11), facing questions like ‘who was the king of the Achaeans?’ (τίς ἦν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν;). Lucian’s intellectual comes up with the wrong answer (“‘they had a thousand ships”, you say’ (‘χίλιαι νῆες ἦσαν αὐτοῖς,’ λέγεις)); it may be that Pollux’s boy is not able to answer all his masters’ queries either, for the questions he sends to his father may be requests for information he has been asked for but does not know.⁶⁹ Furthermore, in addition to these parallels, the penniless intellectual of the *De merce conductis* comes even closer to Pollux’s Persian slave when Lucian starts to deploy Persian imagery describe the Roman household in which he is serving. The master of the house is imagined as the great king himself (*Merc. cond.* 9); if the hireling meets with success in the Roman household, Lucian tells him ‘you have captured Babylon’ (Βαβυλῶνα εἰληφας) (*Merc. cond.* 13). Persian imagery enjoys its most extended development in chapter 29, where it is said that at dinner with his master the hireling must behave ‘just as at Persian dinners’ (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Περσικοῖς δεῖπνοις), fearful that some aspect of his behaviour may displease the eunuchs, described as holding the Persian offices of ‘ears’ (ὦτα) and ‘eyes’ (ὀφθαλμοί) of the King.⁷⁰ This work is satire, to be sure, but even where it is not literally true on points of fact, it remains valuable evidence for the metaphors and discourses that could be used to think about the patronage of wealthy Romans, and the parallels with Pollux are striking.

It is clear, then, even from a fragment, that this declamation participated in contemporary discourses and offered abundant raw materials for thinking about Roman imperialism and Hellenic identity.

⁶⁹ Rothe seems to take it this way (Rothe 1989, 150).

⁷⁰ For ‘eyes’ (ὀφθαλμοί) and ‘ears’ (ὦτα) as part of the Persian king’s spy network, LSJ s.vv. ὀφθαλμός II and οὖς I. Even the bow that Lucian imagines metaphorically bent against the hireling may continue the Persian imagery, for the bow to the Greek mind was an oriental weapon (LSJ s.v. τόξον), as indeed in this fragment of Pollux.

‘Use the *Exemplum*!’⁷¹

Our discussion has considered some of the rich imagery in these three declamations, and suggested that a major reason for the texts’ popularity is to be found in these images’ ability (whether unconsciously, semi-consciously, or explicitly) to evoke and partake in a range of contemporary discourses. Different readers will doubtless prefer different readings, as indeed ancient audiences would have done. But that this represents a valid mode of reading for these texts is something strongly suggested by Aristides’ declamations themselves. Ahl, in his justly famous article on figured speech (Ahl 1984) suggests that the difficulties faced by Cassandra in being understood in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* mirror Aeschylus’ own labours to make his meaning(s) clear to his audience: Cassandra and Aeschylus both push the audience to ‘link myth and current events and show the dangers of assuming... that “repetitions” of familiar crimes cannot occur because the protagonists and circumstances are not identical’ (Ahl 1984, 181). So too in Aristides’ declamations, I suggest, does the fiction itself push certain modes of interpretation. First, both speeches talk repeatedly of exemplarity. The Thebans should use the example of the power that Athens and Thebes enjoyed when in the past they were united (10.38); they should avoid the example of Olynthus (9.9). Python’s treachery is a bad example for Greece (9.45); the Thebans are encouraged to join the Athenians in leaving a good example for their descendants (9.46). In such a thought-world, where past merges with present, a second shift—that from classical past to imperial present—is natural. Second, both speeches imagine a world in which interpretation is fraught with difficulty. Philip is a man with ‘secret intentions’ (τὰ ἀπόρρητα τῆς γνώμης), who works ‘by secret means’ (δι’ ἀπορρήτων), and who conceals the truth (συγκρύπτων... τᾷ ἀληθείᾳ) (10.5), and Aristides deploys a whole series of images, principally in the first of the two declamations, to stress Philip’s inscrutability. Like a wrestler, Philip

⁷¹ χρήσασθε τῷ παραδείγματι (Aristid. Or. 9.9).

avoids forecasting what techniques he is going to use and so avoids forewarning his opponent (9.18); the Greeks, in the grip, as it were, of a ‘dream’ (ὕπνος) or ‘laziness’ (ῥαθυμία), are unable to comprehend what is happening (9.34). Philip’s coming is like bad weather that *impairs perception*: ‘a mist or darkness has overtaken everything, as it were, and we cannot recognize either that man or ourselves’ (ὥσπερ ὁμίχλης ἢ ζόφου πάντα κατειληφότος οὐθ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὐτ’ ἐκεῖνον γινῶναι δυνάμεθα) (9.36). Philip is further a ‘portent’ (φάσμα) (9.37), of the sort which would send one to Delphi or Dodona in search of an interpretation; he is said to have put on Hades’ cap of invisibility (9.37); his plans must be apprehended piece-by-piece, as one fits a mosaic together (10.9); at the end, like a playwright, he will present an ‘unexpected conclusion’ (τὰ τέλη... παρ’ ἐλπίδας) (10.11). Amid such confusion, discernment becomes difficult: ‘we are not able to recognize either that man or ourselves’ (οὐθ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὐτ’ ἐκεῖνον γινῶναι δυνάμεθα) (9.36); as Aristides has Demosthenes say gnominically in urging the Thebans not to be misled by superficial differences between Olynthus and Thebes, ‘do not, if the names of the places are different, think that the business itself differs’ (μὴ γὰρ, εἰ τὰ ὀνόματα ἕτερα τῶν χωρίων, τὰ γε πράγματα ἡγεῖσθε διαφέρειν) (9.11). Within the fiction of the declamation, all these images and *sententiae* are an attempt to call the Thebans to their senses. Outside the fiction, however, they push the audience to think hard about the meaning of Philip’s conquest of Greece more broadly. They call the audience to look beyond ὀνόματα (‘words’) to πράγματα (‘facts’): to interpret the omens, forestall our opponent, remove Hades’ cap, finish the mosaic, anticipate the ending, and to try to recognise in the mist and darkness just who the ‘we’ (ἡμᾶς) of these declamations and Philip really are—in short, to use the *exemplum*, and to try out the range of contemporary meanings for these texts that we have been exploring.

Conclusion

This chapter, then, has illustrated and explored the ‘mythological’ mode of reading presented in the last. We have seen that while these declamations could permit ‘escapist’ readings, such readings are neither the most common nor the richest that these texts could support. Like many declamations, these texts also display a range of parallels to issues in contemporary life—from security and despotism to imperialism and Hellenic identity—, as well as parallels to contemporary discourses (in this case, to the discourse of slavery above all). We have seen that for an ancient reader imaginatively reinterpreting the classical past for his own day with a focus on virtue and vice (the process reconstructed in the last chapter), these texts offer a selection of suggestive examples to imitate or avoid, or to use in rescaling positive and negative aspects of the contemporary world. Finally, we have seen two techniques that are particularly useful in this operation: first, the use of imagery (both metaphor and similes) to connect classical past with imperial present, and second, the use of abstract, gnomic utterances capable of taking on extra meanings outside of the dramatic fiction.

Section III. Metalepsis

So a major part of the fascination of Greek declamation for contemporary audiences seems to have been its ability to explore issues of contemporary concern in an open-ended way. But given the existence of this looser interaction between text and context, we might wonder whether declamation ever also spoke to the contemporary world more directly, and whether declamations were ever used deliberately to make specific, unequivocal allusions to things outside their fiction. I believe that they were: I refer to this third mode of reading as ‘metalepsis’, the narratological term for a shift in narrative levels, in this case from art to life.

Chapter 5 lays the methodological groundwork. I argue on the basis of a detailed examination of the setting, performative dimension, and style of declamation that the genre created a relatively weak dramatic illusion, and that external reference was therefore unusually easy in this genre. Chapter 6 then presents a range of examples of this external reference in practice, which in turn reveal more about the processes involved. I conclude that this was an interaction between declamation and its context strictly local in scope: a *breaking of the boundaries between a declamation and its immediate performance context*, used above all by declaimers to talk about themselves and their own careers, and also frequently to make reference to their audience.

This section and the last should be mutually supporting, for potentially all of the close thematic parallels between declamation and life that we identified in the last section could also have been used for specific allusions; furthermore, the weakening of the dramatic illusion that we will see in chapter 5 should not only have facilitated the reference to a declamation’s immediate performance context that we describe in this section, but also helped to facilitate wider, ‘mythological’ reflections on declamation and life. Indeed, the

division between the two modes of reading should not be regarded as hard and fast: it may be better to think of a spectrum of external reference running from very specific (a metaleptic pole) to very general (a mythological pole), with numerous possibilities in between. The last section focused on one pole, while this section will focus on the other, but there will inevitably be marginal cases.

Chapter 5. Reading Metaleptically

‘Not long afterwards when the Argives were celebrating the Nemean games, Philopoemen happened to be present for the *kithara*-players’ competition. Pylades, who was a Megapolitan by descent and one of the most famous *kithara*-players of his time after his victory at the Pythian games, was at that point singing the *Persians* of Timotheus of Miletus. When he had begun the song with the line “having secured the great and glorious adornment of freedom for Greece”, the people of Greece looked towards Philopoemen and indicated by means of their applause that they took the song as referring to him.’

(μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολὺ ἀγόντων Νέμεια Ἀργείων ἔτυχε μὲν τῶν κιθαρωδῶν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὁ Φιλοποίμην παρών· Πυλάδου δὲ Μεγαλοπολίτου μὲν ἀνδρὸς γένος, κιθαρωδοῦ δὲ τῶν ἐφ’ αὐτοῦ δοκιμωτάτου καὶ ἀνηρημένου Πυθικὴν νίκην, τότε [δὲ] ἄδοντος Τιμοθέου νόμον τοῦ Μιλησίου Πέρσας καὶ καταρξαμένου τῆς ᾠδῆς ‘κλεινὸν ἐλευθερίας τεύχων μέγαν Ἑλλάδι κόσμον’, ἀπεῖδεν ἐς τὸν Φιλοποίμενα τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν καὶ ἐπεσημήναντο τῷ κρότῳ φέρειν ἐς ἐκεῖνον τὸ ῥῆμα.) (Paus. 8.50.3)

‘While he was on campaign, he put to death two distinguished men. He put to death Julius Crispus, a praetorian tribune, because in distress at the suffering caused by the war, he had let slip a line of the poet Maro, in which one of the soldiers fighting on Turnus’ side against Aeneas says in lamentation “in order that Turnus may marry Lavinia, we are dying needlessly and unheeded.”’

(ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐπολέμει, δύο ἄνδρας τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀπέκτεινεν, Ἰούλιον Κρίσπον χιλιαρχοῦντα τῶν δορυφόρων, ὅτι ἀχθесθεις τῇ τοῦ πολέμου κακώσει ἔπος τι τοῦ Μάρωνος τοῦ ποιητοῦ παρεφθέγγετο, ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆν στρατιώτης τις τῶν μετὰ Τοῦρνου τῷ Αἰνείᾳ ἀντιπολεμοῦτων ὁδυρόμενος καὶ λέγων ὅτι “ἵνα δὴ τὴν Λαουινίαν ὁ Τοῦρνος ἀγάγηται, ἡμεῖς ἐν οὐδενὶ λογῷ παραπολλύμεθα”) (D. Cass. 76.10.2)

‘Lollianus of Ephesus was the first holder of the chair of rhetoric at Athens, and he also led the Athenian people as Hoplite General. Formerly this office involved holding the levy and leading the Athenians out to war, but these days it is concerned with the food supply and the grain market. When there was an uproar in the bakeries, and the Athenians were starting to stone Lollianus, Pancrates the Cynic, who after these events pursued philosophy at the Isthmus of Corinth, came before the Athenians and said ‘it is words, not bread, that Lollianus sells’, and in this way so diverted the Athenians that they let go of the stones that were in their hands. And when a shipment of grain had arrived from Thessaly and there was no money in the treasury to pay for it, Lollianus told his students to make contributions, and a great deal of money was collected...’

When Lollianus was condemning Leptines for the law he had brought, after the Athenians had stopped receiving grain from Pontus, the climax of his speech was as follows: “the mouth of the Pontus has been barred by a law, and Athens’ food supply is being held back by a few syllables, and Leptines with his laws has caused as much harm as Lysander did with his ships.”’

(Λολλιανὸς δὲ ὁ Ἐφέσιος προὔστη μὲν τοῦ Ἀθήνησι θρόνου πρῶτος, προὔστη δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου στρατηγήσας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν, ἣ δὲ ἀρχὴ αὕτη πάλαι μὲν κατέλεγέ τε καὶ ἐξῆγεν ἐς τὰ πολέμια, νυνὶ δὲ τροφῶν ἐπιμελεῖται καὶ σίτου ἀγορᾶς. θορύβου δὲ καθεστηκότος παρὰ τὰ ἀρτοπώλια καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βάλλειν αὐτὸν ὀρμηκότων Παγκράτης ὁ κύων ὁ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν Ἰσθμῷ φιλοσοφήσας παρελθὼν ἐς τοὺς

Ἀθηναίους καὶ εἰπὼν „Λολλιανὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρτοπώλης, ἀλλὰ λογοπώλης“ διέχεεν οὕτω τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὥς μεθεῖναι τοὺς λίθους διὰ χειρὸς αὐτοῖς ὄντας. Σίτου δὲ ἐκ Θετταλίας ἐσπεπλευκότος καὶ χρημάτων δημοσίᾳ οὐκ ὄντων ἐπέτρεψεν ὁ Λολλιανὸς ἔρανον τοῖς αὐτοῦ γνωρίμοις, καὶ χρήματα συχνὰ ἠθροίσθη...

κατηγορῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ Λεπτίνου διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐφοίτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου σῖτος, ὧδε ἤκμασεν· „κέκλεισται τὸ στόμα τοῦ Πόντου νόμῳ καὶ τὰς Ἀθηναίων τροφὰς ὀλίγαι κωλύουσι συλλαβαί, καὶ ταῦτὸν δύναται Λύσανδρος ναυμαχῶν καὶ Λεπτίνης νομομαχῶν.“ (Philostr. VS 526, 527)

Above are three passages from the Greek literature of the imperial period, all written within a century of one another. The first is from what is generally called Pausanias' *Description of Greece*, composed c. 165–180 CE (Bowie, *Inspiration and Aspiration* 2001, 21–3); the second is from Dio Cassius' *Roman History*, composed roughly in the first third of the third century;¹ the last is from Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum*, whose dedication dates to 237–8 (Avotins 1978) or 242/3 CE (Jones, Philostratus and the Gordiani 2002). The first two extracts contain, and the third has been alleged to contain, a blurring of the boundaries between art and life, a special instance of what narratology calls *metalepsis*.² The first example is relatively straightforward. Pausanias narrates how, in the time of the Second Achaean League, the crowd at the Nemean games, on hearing the words ‘having secured the glorious adornment of freedom for Greece’ (κλεινὸν ἐλευθερίας τεύχων μέγαν Ἑλλάδι κόσμον), a line from Timotheus' *Persians*, promptly referred it to Philopoemen, who had recently led the Achaean League to victory over Sparta. In this case the author explicitly tells us that art was taken as referring to life: ‘they indicated by means of their applause that they took the song as referring to him’ (ἐπεσημήναντο τῷ κρότῳ φέρειν ἐς ἐκεῖνον τὸ ᾄσμα). The contemporary reference in the second example comes not during the course of an extended performance, but rather is found in a single quotation. Julius Crispus, a soldier taking part in Severus' campaign in Parthia in 198–200 CE, exasperated by the loss of life in

¹ For the complex debate on Dio Cassius' dates, start with Barnes (Barnes 1984).

² Metalepsis is defined canonically in its modern sense by Genette (Genette, *Narrative Discourse* 1983, 234–7), who subsequently explored the concept broadly in later work (Genette, *Métalepse* 2004). For an exploration of the narrative levels of Latin declamation, see Mal-Maeder (Mal-Maeder 2007, 41–64).

an unsuccessful assault on Hatra, lets slip a line of Vergil: ‘in order that Turnus may marry Lavinia, we are dying needlessly and unheeded’ (ἵνα δὴ τὴν Λαουινίαν ὁ Τοῦρνος ἀγάγηται, ἡμεῖς ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ παραπολλύμεθα). The allusion is clear, as Severus understands: like Turnus’ men, Crispus and the other soldiers are dying to fulfil their leader’s vain ambition.

Here, then, are two clear instances from our period of literature being used to refer or at least being understood to refer specifically and unambiguously to the world outside of the fiction. Two further details are notable in both cases. First, the jump from art to life is made on the basis of only fairly general similarities, particularly in the second case: Severus is not, unlike Turnus, attacking Hatra with a view to winning a wife. Second, such allusions do not seem to be restricted to the erudite, but are rather something deployed by first, the crowd at the Nemean games, and secondly, a soldier and an emperor not known for literary pursuits. These two details suggest that such references were not particularly difficult, and therefore unlikely to have been rare.

The third case, however, is less clear, and accordingly more controversial. The sophist Lollianus, Philostratus tells us, was by virtue of his office as hoplite general in charge of the food supply at Athens. In that role he faced at least one bread riot, and on another occasion had to raise money from his own students when there was no public money to pay for a shipment of grain from Thessaly. Very shortly after narrating these incidents, Philostratus tells us that Lollianus once delivered a declamation set in the Demosthenic period, in which he denounced the deleterious effects of Leptines’ law on Athens’ corn supply.³ Now while Philostratus is not, unlike Pausanias, explicit on the point, it is tempting to discern a contemporary reference here too, and to see in the grain crisis of Lollianus’ fictitious

³ Leptines’ bill (we do not know whether it was ever ratified) proposed abolishing all exemptions from liturgies. In Lollianus’ declamation, it is imagined that the law has been ratified, and that Leucon of Bosphorus, who had previously enjoyed such an exemption, has retaliated by stopping shipments of grain to Athens, as Demosthenes had warned might happen (Dem. 20.29–40). Cf. Kohl (Kohl 1915, 67).

declamation a reflection of the real-world problems he faced, and assume that Lollianus used this declamation to offer some sort of political comment. Yet while several scholars have noticed the coincidence between Lollianus' real-world occupation and his artistic output, they have generally remained cautious about seeing any intentional link between the two. Russell says (of this and other cases) that 'in default of clearer evidence, we should be sceptical' (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 108–9); Anderson follows Russell in saying that 'Lollianus does not actually seem to have used his rhetoric against Leptines in front of the real mob' (Anderson, *Philostratus* 1986, 63–4); the commentaries of Rothe and Civiletti say simply that the Leptines declamation might have been of particular interest to a man who was concerned with Athens' grain supply (Rothe 1989, 49, Civiletti 2002, 471). Only Pernot comes out in favour of a clear, deliberate link (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 222–5).

That there is a suggestive alignment in this case between life and art is not disputed. What seems to be harder to decide, however, is whether (in the absence of a definitive statement by the author) that alignment was likely to have been noticed, and exploited: a judgement either way runs the risk of seeming arbitrary, a matter of taste. Yet in reality, such judgements are not arbitrary at all, but depend rather on one's presuppositions about Greek declamation: they only look arbitrary when such presuppositions remain unstated. In truth, scepticism about Lollianus' case is surely a natural extension of traditional views of Greek declamation, a genre often regarded as 'escapist' or 'nostalgic' (above, pp. 115–18):⁴ if the genre is thought *a priori* to be divorced from the real world, in cases of doubt, scholars will naturally come down on the side of opposition to any contemporary relevance, as Russell, Anderson, and others do in this case. In narratological terms, we can model the traditional view as one in which the declaiming author is for all intents and purposes effaced by the

⁴ For further discussion of this attitude in scholarship, and some dissenting voices, see Pernot (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 209–11).

subject that he is playing, his audience is effaced by the imagined audience, and the only real concern of both parties is with the fiction. Bowie indeed goes as far as to say that ‘for the duration of his performance the sophist *was* Themistocles or Demosthenes advising the Athenians, and his audience in Nicomedia or Pergamum, Seleucia or Sidon, *were* fifth- or fourth-century Athenians’ (Bowie, *Literature and Sophistic* 2000, 902) (my italics), and Schmitz is capable of saying that ‘[i]n these speeches, the personality of the sophist would completely disappear behind the figure he was embodying’ (Schmitz, *Performing History* 1998, 78).⁵

The only scholar to favour a deliberate exploitation of the alignment between art and life in Lollianus’ case, Laurent Pernot, does so significantly in the context of a wider re-assessment of how a genre set in the past might nonetheless make specific reference to the present. Pernot’s starting point is the theory and practice of ‘figured speech’ (ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος). A figured speech is one that has a covert rhetorical purpose supplementary to (or even contradicting) its ostensible purpose, or to put it another way, figured speech is the art of saying one thing and meaning another.⁶ Now a declamation that makes reference to the world outside the fiction cannot of course literally be ‘figured’ in this sense. A figured declamation says one thing to make another thing understood *within the world of the fiction*. What Pernot is describing is figured declamation in a metaphorical sense: declamations that say one thing *within the world of the fiction* to make another thing understood *in the real world*. But I think Pernot is right to suggest that the existence of the former, literal sort of figured speech, and its popularity under the empire (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 215), make

⁵ Similarly for Anderson is the acme of declamatory achievement ‘a real sense of evocation’ (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 57).

⁶ For figured speech in general, see Pernot (Pernot, *Faux-semblants* 2008), and Schouler (Schouler, *Déguisement* 1986).

the second, metaphorical sort of figured speech much more likely, for both types involve a shifting from one set of referents to another.

Yet where Pernot's account seems to me incomplete is in explaining precisely *how* the jump from fiction to reality is effected. By way of illustration, let us consider the last of Pernot's alleged examples of contemporary reference in declamation, which is to be found in Aristides' first Sicilian declamation (*Or.* 5). The setting is the later stages of the Peloponnesian war, and the speaker is arguing in favour of reinforcing the Athenian troops campaigning in Sicily. Towards the end of the speech, we hear:

Just as in private homes it is difficult to employ one or two servants, but many servants are a foil against one another, so in an empire the number of the enslaved strengthens the power of those who have added them to it. For everyone fears each other in turn. So when Sicily is added to what we have here, it will be kept safe by means of these other possessions and will perfect our holdings here and will be, if the truth must be told, the bond of our empire. (Behr)

(ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις οἴκοις ἐνὶ μὲν καὶ δυοῖν οἰκέταιν χαλεπὸν χρήσασθαι, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κατὰ ἀλλήλων ὑπάρχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς δυναστείαις τὸ πλῆθος τῶν δεδουλωμένων βεβαιοῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς προσειληφόσι· πάντες γὰρ ἐν κύκλῳ δεδίασιν ἀλλήλους. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Σικελία τοῖς ἐνταῦθα ἡμῖν οὔσι προσγενομένη αὐτὴ τε διὰ τούτων σωθήσεται καὶ τὰνταῦθα ἀκριβώσῃ καὶ σύνδεσμος, εἰ χρὴ τάληθές εἰπεῖν, τῆς ἀρχῆς καθεστήξει) (*Or.* 5.39)

Pernot hears in this passage an unflattering reference to the Roman empire and to the classic imperial tactic of divide-and-rule. Is this credible? It is not impossible, and, as Pernot says, a reader familiar with Aristides' comparison of the Roman empire with that of Athens in his *Regarding Rome* (*Or.* 26), and the verbal parallels between that work and this declamation, might have heard something here. But we have just been through thirty-eight chapters of dense, epicheirematic Aristidean argumentation: is a brief reference to 'empire' (ἀρχή) really going to be enough to trigger a jump to the present for most readers? Even Pernot sounds a little unsure, conceding that 'nulla obblighi a riferire tale ragionamento alla situazione contemporanea' (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 228).

External reference might be possible in this passage (though it seems to me far from the most obvious case of external reference in Greek declamation), but *only* if we give a more detailed account of how one gets from the dramatic fiction to the world outside. This chapter provides such an account. I argue on the basis of an examination of a declamation's framing, performative dimension,⁷ and style that the genre rather than only sporadically reaching out to the world outside, as implied by Pernot's examples, in truth *permanently had one foot in the real world*.⁸ Accordingly, the sort of deliberate, specific, and unambiguous external reference with which we are concerned in this section of the thesis would have been relatively easy, perhaps even in the thirty-eighth chapter of an Aristidean declamation;⁹ the next chapter of the thesis, which offers examples of contemporary reference in declamation, will explore and illustrate the specific techniques used by declaimers to exploit this bi-location.¹⁰ I believe that the case for the persistence of the contemporary context in Greek declamation is much stronger than for other genres for which it has been vociferously claimed (most obviously Greek tragedy). There are, furthermore, strong similarities between metalepsis (and indeed mythology) in Greek declamation as described in this thesis and the 'theatricality' and 'doublespeak' seen in first-century Roman literary culture by Bartsch (Bartsch 1994). Whether these similarities are to be attributed to one literary culture influencing the other, or are merely the result of the two responding independently to the same pressures (or both) is not clear, but the rise of the principate, which Bartsch sees as

⁷ Accounts of the normal procedure for a declamation performance in Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 51–54), Russell (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 74–86), Anderson (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 53–61), Schmitz (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 198–200).

⁸ On narrative levels in Greek declamation, see Kemezis (Kemezis 2014, 204–5).

⁹ On the strength of dramatic illusion in Greek declamation, see Webb (Webb, *Greek Past* 2006, 32–43).

¹⁰ Other attempts to divine contemporary references in Greek declamation besides Pernot all concern later texts. For Libanius' *Declamations*, and especially for scholarly attempts to read Socrates in *Decl.* 1 as the emperor Julian, see Penella (Penella, Choricus 2009, 125). Manzione at times seems to take Choricus *Decl.* 12 as a fairly direct expression of Choricus' views ('Coricio insiste... egli dice... Possiamo affermare, allora, che Choricio è un pacifista, che deplora gli orrori della guerra...'; 'declamazione nella quale egli ritrae anche se stesso e la sua attività') (Manzione 2014, 196, 202). External reference is more commonly alleged for Latin declamation: see, for example, Schneider (C. Schneider 2005), and the examples discussed by Pernot (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 219–22).

fundamental in shaping the literary culture that she describes, was certainly influential on Greek declamation also, as we saw in the last chapter.

1. Compare and Contrast

In what follows, I periodically distinguish two different modes of metalepsis. In the first, which I shall call *contrastive* metalepsis, the metaleptic effect is created by the *contrast* between the context of the declamation and the imagined scenario. Thus, for example, Polemo famously smiled as he rounded off his periods to show that he did so with ease (VS 537): that smile, which clearly derives not from the fictitious subject but from the author, would have kept the audience aware of the author Polemo behind his fictitious subject, and thus raise the possibility that the ‘I’ of the declamation is sometimes both Polemo’s subject and Polemo himself. Such *contrastive metalepsis* functions by reminding us of the real world context in which the declamation is performed. As we shall see, Greek declamation seems to have been full of such contrastively metaleptic moments, which would have functioned in a general way to ensure that both actor and audience remained conscious of the world outside the fiction.

In my second category of metalepsis, however, *comparative metalepsis*, it is rather the *similarity* between the declamation’s context and the fictitious world it creates that causes the metaleptic effect. Thus, for example, when Alexander Clay-Plato is asked to give a declamation on the Scythians (VS 572), the similarity between the Scythian lifestyle and Alexander’s own unusually itinerant lifestyle makes it possible that other things said by the fictitious *narrator* in this declamation may also refer to its author, Alexander (cf. below, pp. 214–16). In comparative metalepsis, the real world and the fiction lie neatly on top of one another, so that the words of the declamation are equally significant in both contexts. Contrastive metalepsis, as we have said, works generally to keep the real-world context in view; it is to comparative metalepsis that we must look for more specific external reference.

Of course, there is always some relationship of similarity or difference between fiction and the real world context in which it is produced. This does not mean that metalepsis always occurs, or, more precisely, that it is always significant (for all performances involve metalepsis to some degree): rather, it only becomes significant when the differences or similarities between the fiction and the real world are unusual in quantity or quality, and so *salient*. This criterion guides the discussion that follows.

2. Framing

Declamations seem often to have begun not by shutting out reality but rather with a blurring of reality and fiction.

First, many declamations were *ex tempore* attempts at scenarios proposed by the speaker's audience. Though Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum* perhaps gives undue space and reverence to improvisation (Heath, Menander 2004, 251), even those who did not deliver the speech immediately after the scenario had been proposed nonetheless produced a finished product in what must have been a quicker time than most genres: even the meticulous Aristides is supposed to have said 'propose the scenario today, and hear it tomorrow' (τήμερον... πρόβαλε καὶ αὔριον ἀκροῶ) (VS 583). So declamation is a genre that has the potential to be tied more closely than most to the social context in which it is produced, and one that also has the potential to respond very quickly to whatever is going on in the world. So in these respects, it would clearly be a natural vehicle for talking about contemporary issues, and in the next chapter we will see clear examples of declamation scenarios emerging quite obviously from the contexts in which they are proposed.

Second, declamations were typically preceded by the two genres of preface that we considered in section I, the *prolalia* and the *theoria* (above, pp. 50–57).¹¹ The discussion of

¹¹ We know that some of Choricus' declamations actually had two *prolaliai*, one before each of the two halves of the performance, which had been split on account of the length of the text (Penella, Choricus 2009, 29–30).

rhetorical theory in these prefaces already contributes to some degree to metalepsis, for it diverts the audience's attention away from the fiction itself. But in this section of the thesis I want to consider the non-theoretical material in these prefaces, which formed the bulk of material in most *prolaliai*, and could on occasion form a substantial part of a *theoria*, though many *theoriai* were exclusively theoretical.

A *prolalia*, as we have seen, typically consisted of a short narrative, sometimes mythological, sometimes historical, sometimes personal, followed by what Lucian himself on one occasion terms a 'moral' (ἐπιμύθιον) in which he explains 'in what respect I resemble the story' (καθ' ὃ τι τῷ μύθῳ ἔοικα) (*Bacch.* 8). For example, in the *Dipsads*, Lucian says that his desire for his audience has been as great as that which men bitten by the poisonous dipsad snake feel for water (*Dips.* 9), while in *Zeuxis*, the reception of Lucian's works is compared to that of Zeuxis' works, admired more for novelty than technical excellence (*Zeux.* 1–7); Himerius and Choricus' *prolaliai* frequently use short narratives to talk about themselves in a very similar way. In these prefaces, then, the audience is explicitly guided to interpret the performer's storytelling as a sort of allegory about the performer himself: this would make it natural later to compare the dramatic fiction of the main performance to the declaimer's real life situation also.¹²

The metalepsis in Choricus' *prolaliai* and *theoriai*, however, (which are unlikely to have been especially innovative (Penella, Choricus 2009, 31–2)) is much more thoroughgoing, and for this reason they are well worth examining, even though they come considerably after our period. These prefaces encourage both comparative and contrastive metalepsis. When

(If Choricus' declamations were broken in two halves in this way, then it seems plausible that the longer declamations surviving from our period might sometimes have been treated similarly).

¹² This phenomenon is not confined to declamations, or indeed only to prefaces that appear separately in our manuscripts from the works which they preceded: Anderson judiciously includes a discussion of the opening vignette of Dio Chrysostom's *First Discourse on Kingship* in his discussion of *prolaliai* (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 53–5).

the character that he will be playing is in some way similar to himself, Choricus foregrounds the similarity: this would make it relatively easy in the declamation that followed to take the speaker's words as somehow those of Choricus himself. In the *theoria* to *Declamation* 12, justifying his choice to play the part of an orator rather than the general against whom the orator is contending, Choricus says: 'I—for I know how to give speeches, not how to make war—have fittingly chosen the one whose profession is the same as my own' (ἐγὼ δέ—ῥητορεύειν γὰρ οἶδα μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμεῖν—τὸν ὁμότεχνον ἐμαυτῷ δικαίως ἐξελεξάμην) (5).¹³ Similarly, in the *theoria* to *Declamation* 5, Choricus justifies his choice to play the part of the young war-hero in dispute with his father by reference to 'an old saying that people like others of their own age' (Penella) (ἥλικα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα) (6), adding 'I commend the father as a subject to elderly misers who share his characteristics' (τὸν μὲν οὖν πατέρα πρεσβύταις ἅμα καὶ φιλαργύροις ὑπόθεσιν ὡς ὁμοτρόποις αὐτῷ παραπέμπομαι).¹⁴

At other times, however, when there are significant contrasts between Choricus and his subject, the declaimer foregrounds these also. This reminder just before the dramatic illusion begins that the mask that Choricus is about to put on is different from his real self should make us receptive to any deliberate slip of that mask in the declamation that follows. For example, before taking on the part of the war-hero's miserly father (*Decl.* 6), Choricus says in the first *prolalia* to the declamation: 'so I ought to be old as well, and have a miserly character too. For the thing that a speech is imitating appears more clearly when the speaker is of the same age and disposition as the character he has devised for himself' (ὥστε μοι καὶ γήρως ἔδει τὰ νῦν καὶ ἅμα φιλοχρήματον εἶναι τὸ ἦθος· ἐναργεστέρα γὰρ ἢ τοῦ λόγου

¹³ On metalepsis in this declamation, see below pp. 246–7.

¹⁴ Penella suggests that an older Choricus might be making a wry joke here (Penella, Choricus 2009, 15–16): he might be, but there is no positive reason to think so. On this pair of declamations and their prefaces, see also Russell (Russell, Greek Declamation 1983, 82–4), who takes Choricus at his word.

φαίνεται μίμησις, ήνίκα ό λέγων ήλικιώτης έστι και όμότροπος, ότου αν έαυτῷ πλάσας τυγχάνοι) (*Dialexis* 12.4). We hear something very similar in the *theoria* to this declamation too, where Choricus explains that he has taken the part of the father ‘though I am neither a great lover of money by nature nor a father of children’ (οὔτε χρημάτων... σφόδρα πεφυκῶς έραστής οὔτε παίδων υπάρχων πατήρ) (6).

Two Chorician *prolaliai*, however, seem to celebrate the comprehensiveness of the declaimer’s *mimesis*. The first *prolalia* to *Declamation* 6 opens with a series of images of artists’ ability truly to become the subject that they are imitating: a dancer, Choricus says, ‘tries to persuade the audience, not that he is representing something, but that he actually is what he is representing’ (Penella) (πειρώμενον πείσαι τὸ θέατρον οὐχ ὅτι ἄρα μιμεῖται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι πέφυκε τοῦτο ὃ δὴ μιμεῖται) (*Dialexis* 12.1); the *Prolalia* to *Declamation* 9 similarly celebrates the verisimilitude of artistic creations. Yet paradoxically this valorization of the mimetic ideal is to some degree self-defeating, for by foregrounding *mimesis* in this way, and in particular, by stressing its difficulty (only one sculptor, for example, was able to capture Alexander’s likeness (*Dialexis* 21.1–2)), Choricus makes us conscious of its operation, and so to some degree robs it of its force. There is a similarity here with the rhetorical technique of *ekphrasis*, which paradoxically achieves great vividness through highly artificial and easily-recognisable techniques. Surveying the whole corpus of Choricus’ prefaces, we may say that they reveal, foreground, and propagate a whole range of reflections on the relationship between life and art, with the effect that the dramatic illusion of his declamations would have been anything but straightforward and total.

The prefaces to Libanius’ *Declamations*, of which we have only *theoriai*, generally show less concern with such questions. But the *theoria* to *Declamation* 25 is an extraordinary exception. The declamation scenario is ‘someone proposes the restoration of Lais from exile’ (γράφει τις Λαίδα πάλιν κατάγειν) (Lais was a famous courtesan; this scenario

imagines that she has been banished). The *theoria* begins thus: ‘my soul was pained and grieved to see such infamy coming on Corinth and men trying to persuade you to repent of what you had decided about Lais, and wanting to overturn your fine decisions’ (Ἔπαθον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ συνήλγησα τοσαύτην ἀδοξίαν Κορίνθῳ κατασκευαζομένην ὁρῶν καὶ πείσαι τινας ἐπιχειροῦντας ἐφ’ οἷς ἐγνώκασι περὶ Λαίδος μεταμελεῖσθαι καὶ λύειν ἐθέλοντας τὰ δεδογμένα καλῶς) (1). Who speaks here? We were expecting the sophist *in propria persona*, but uniquely for a *theoria*, he seems to be in character already. The opening words of the second sentence continue in character (‘I have therefore come forward to the speakers’ platform’) (παρῆλθον τοίνυν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα), but then shift metaleptically mid-sentence back to Libanius himself, who explains that he is ‘appearing to be a Corinthian just for the time of this oratorical display’ (Κορίνθιος εἶναι δοκῶν αὐτόν γε δὴ πού τὸν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως χρόνον) (2). This shifting of levels continues throughout the *theoria*, which blends in-character comments like ‘we will go through what Lais did to us’ (ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ πεπραγμένα Λαίδι καθ’ ἡμῶν ... διέξιμεν) (2) with the sort of out-of-character comments that we might normally expect in a *theoria*, such as ‘the heading of advantage counterbalances all these points on its own’ (πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις τὸ συμφέρον μόνον ἀντίρροπον) (3). The *theoria* to Libanius’ *Declamation* 25, then, pulls in two directions at once. On the one hand, Libanius seems to identify so strongly with his subject that he begins to take on his voice even in the *theoria*; on the other hand, the dramatic illusion so created in the *theoria* is repeatedly punctured, thus foregrounding the fictional status of the declamation. The overall effect of both is that we feel Libanius’ presence very strongly.

In the case of declamations reported to us second-hand in Philostratus, however, we have no *prolalia* or *theoria*. But in Philostratus’ transitions from his main account to declamations, art and life are similarly blurred. This is in fact true of Lollianus’ declamatory denunciation

of Leptines.¹⁵ The declamation is introduced in Philostratus with the following words: ‘for when condemning Leptines for the law he had brought, after the Athenians had stopped receiving grain from Pontus, the climax of his speech was as follows’ (κατηγορῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ Λεπτίνου διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐφοίτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου σῖτος, ὥδε ἤκμασεν) (VS 527). As this sentence literally reads, it is Lollianus who denounces Leptines, and not Demosthenes. The same is true of Lollianus’ next declamation: ‘and opposing the Athenians when, in a financial crisis, they were deliberating selling their islands, he puffed out the following’ (ἀντιλέγων δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀπορία χρημάτων βουλευομένοις πωλεῖν τὰς νήσους ὥδε ἔπνευσεν) (VS 527). In both cases, then, on the face of it it seems to be Lollianus who speaks, not his fictitious subject, and there is no explicit clue that these are declamations at all.¹⁶ Such a blurring of reality and fiction is of course characteristic of Philostratus’ work, particularly in his *Imagines*, where for instance a boy is urged to hold out his garment to catch the blood shed by Menoeceus in a painting (*Im.* 1.4), or the narrator affects not to know whether a bee in the depiction of Narcissus is real or painted (1.23), but the evidence of Lucian, Choricus, and Libanius suggests that it was a common way of thinking about declamation: perhaps indeed the blurring of reality and fiction in Philostratus’ *Imagines* is to be traced itself to declamatory practice.

3. Performance

Performance (and by this term I refer here to all non-textual aspects of a declamation) could also create metalepsis by both contrast and comparison.¹⁷ The evidence for metalepsis by comparison, where the performance is (saliently) similar to the fiction, is limited, but an

¹⁵ Webb makes the same point for Philostratus’ introduction to a declamation of Isaeus (Webb, *Greek Past* 2006, 33). Pernot notes verbal parallels between the declamation scenario and real life situation (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 225).

¹⁶ Wright’s Loeb translation, uncomfortable with this slick metalepsis, adds the introductory words ‘his theme was to’ on both occasions (Wright 1921, 121).

¹⁷ Performance (in all its various senses) has become a key concept in contemporary Classical Studies: for starting-points, see Goldhill (Goldhill, *Programme notes* 1999, esp. 10–20).

example would be the match between Marcus of Byzantium's (unusual) Doric accent and the accent that the speaker ought to have in the declamation 'the Spartan advising the Lacedaemonians not to admit those who had thrown away their arms at Sphacteria' (ὁ Σπαρτιάτης ὁ ξυμβουλευὼν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις μὴ παραδέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀπὸ Σφακτηρίας γυμνοὺς ἤκοντας) (VS 528). There is one case, however, where the body of the declaiming sophist and his imagined subject do seem to line up quite strongly, that of Polemo's Marathonian declamations, which I will discuss at length as an example in the next chapter (below, pp. 219–26).

The evidence for contrastive metalepsis in a declamation's performance is much more abundant. In the modern world, we are used to actors who typically do their utmost to conceal their own appearance and take on that of the characters they are playing, and to strict limits on when and how the audience may make its presence felt. In Greek declamation, by contrast, the continuing presence of both author and audience seems to have been felt much more strongly.¹⁸ This being so, contemporary reference would have been easier: if Lollianus still looked and sounded and behaved like Lollianus when he was declaiming, it would have been much easier to assume that his laments about Athens' grain shortage had relevance not only for the fifth century BCE but also for the second century CE.

I begin with a declaimer's appearance. Declaimers do not seem to have worn costumes or masks or used props or otherwise to have taken on the appearance of their subjects: on the contrary, their dress and voice generally seem to have remained what they were in everyday life (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 82). The famously scruffy Marcus of Byzantium was presumably scruffy whatever part he was playing (VS 529); Pausanias the sophist delivered

¹⁸ On performative aspects of sophistic performances, see Goulet (Goulet 2014, I.222–5) and Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 47–51). Webb also comments briefly on the performative dimension and its effect on the dramatic illusion (Webb, *Greek Past* 2006, 38).

his declamations with a thick Cappadocian accent (VS 594) that rarely if ever can have suited the character he was impersonating.¹⁹ Nor can these elements be dismissed as incidental to the performance: rather, there is abundant evidence that sophists and their audiences paid close attention to appearance.²⁰ Synesius imagines a sophist bathing and putting on fine clothes ‘in order that he too may be a fine sight’ (ἵνα καὶ θέαμα καλὸν ᾦ, *Dio* 12), and Philostratus frequently comments on the appearance of his sophists, and what their audiences made of them:²¹ in the case of Alexander Clay-Plato and Hermocrates, Philostratus explicitly states that an attractive appearance helped in their declamations (VS 572, 612), while in the case of Marcus of Byzantium and Hippodromus, an unattractive appearance is said to have been harmful to the performance, at least initially (VS 528–9, 618–9).²²

But the sophist retained more than just his own appearance and voice in declamation. The sophist’s body language also frequently reveals that at the same time as he is, for instance, trembling with barbarian arrogance (VS 519–20), the sophist is still very much physically present *qua* author.²³ Philagrus was so irritated when an audience member fell asleep that he struck the offender with his hand (VS 578), and on another occasion, when declaiming,

¹⁹ Can either of these mismatches be attributed to malice on the part of Philostratus or his sources? In the case of Pausanias, it is not improbable: Pausanias was apparently known as a ‘cook who spoiled expensive dishes with bad seasoning’ (μάγειρον πολυτελῆ ὅσα πονήρως ἀτρύοντα) (VS 594). But Philostratus certainly seems to regard Marcus highly, having him triumph in the face of the great Polemo’s contemptuous failure to recognize him (VS 529, a particularly embarrassing failure for the physiognomist), but Philostratus’ opening remark that the Greeks do not honour Marcus as he deserves suggests that some at least were ill-disposed towards him: perhaps it was from some such intermediate source that a tradition of Marcus’ scruffy appearance arose. Nonetheless, Philostratus’ evidence at the very least suggests that such a mismatch in appearance between sophist and his subject was not unthinkable.

²⁰ ‘[U]na società estremamente attenta ai linguaggi del corpo e dell’immagine... e che con questi linguaggi, intesi come segni di autorappresentazione, essa costruisce le sue identità ed elabora i suoi codici comportamentali’ (Civiletti 2002, 475; cf. 544–5); cf. also Russell (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 82). One of the most important aspects of a sophist’s performance was of course gender, a topic ably analysed by Gleason (Gleason, *Making Men* 1995).

²¹ e.g. VS 528–9, 570–2, 576, 612, 618–19, 623.

²² Lucian’s *Bad Teacher of Rhetoric*, albeit in a satirical work, also stresses the importance of a speaker’s appearance (*Rh. Pr.* 15–16, 20).

²³ Kemezis is therefore wrong, I think, to judge Alexander Clay-Plato’s stepping out of character during a declamation to demand attention from the emperor a ‘serious error’ (Kemezis 2014, 215).

he got so angry that he was unable to speak (VS 580). This anger does not seem likely to have come from the character that Philagrus was playing, for Philostratus describes the sophist as prone to anger right at the start of his biography, and specifically contrasts his inability to handle ‘his own anger’ (τὴν αὐτοῦ χολήν) with his facility in handling declamation themes (VS 578). Aristides, similarly, is said to have been unable to contain his anger at audiences who did not approve his performances (VS 582), and again, the reference is clearly to Aristides himself, not the characters he was playing. Scopelian is said to have made a habit of striking his thigh during declamations, ‘slowly stirring up both himself and his audience’ (ἑαυτὸν τε ὑπεγείρων καὶ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους) (VS 519; cf. Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 19): this too looks likely to have been outside the fiction. Polemo had the most extensive range of body language of all: we hear of him coming forward to declaim with a beaming smile, smiling as he rounded off periods, leaping up from his chair ‘when he came to the climax of his declamations’ (περὶ τὰς ἀκμὰς τῶν ὑποθέσεων), and stamping on the ground ‘at certain places in his declamation themes’ (ἐν τοῖς τῶν ὑποθέσεων χωρίοις) (VS 537). All these actions look likely to have come from Polemo himself, for they are entirely in keeping with the supremely confident character that he displays throughout Philostratus’ account.²⁴

I move now from author to audience. The evidence for their behaviour at declamation performances makes it clear that the dramatic fiction was regularly broken by audience interjections of all kinds:²⁵ under these circumstances, it would have been still harder to think of the declaimer as the person he was playing.²⁶ Interjections that can securely be

²⁴ For an extreme example of a declaimer’s assertive behaviour, albeit in a comic vein, consider Lucian’s *Bad Teacher of Rhetoric*, who recommends abusing audiences that do not applaud one’s performances, commanding anyone about to leave to sit down, and, in short, establishing a tyranny over the crowd (*Rh. Pr.* 19). Synesius, meanwhile, describes a sophist casually breaking off mid-declimation to ask for a flask so that he can gargle (*Dio* 12).

²⁵ Contrast Anderson, who seems to say that there was no ‘hissing and booing’ (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 59).

²⁶ For lively interaction between orator and audience more generally in this period, see Korenjak (Korenjak 2000, 68–95): it seems to have been so deeply-entrenched a habit that Christian preachers were sometimes applauded, much to John Chrysostom’s displeasure (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 245). Schmitz

placed in the context of a declamation include shouts (Aristid. *Or.* 51.33), gasps and murmurs (βόμβος (VS 572)), applause (κρότος (Lib. *Or.* 2.23)) groaning (στόνος (Eunap. VS 489)), acclamations and praise (εὐφημίας, ἐπαινέτας (Lib. *Or.* 2.23)) laughter (VS 579; Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 22), μυκηθμός ('lowing', 'bellowing' (Eunap. VS 489)), gestures (Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 22), leaping to one's feet ([Hermog.] *Inv.* IV 4.25.3–8; Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 22), general noise-making (θόρυβος (VS 579, Rothe 1989, 77, and Aristid. *Or.* 51.33)), frenzy (ἐνθουσιασμός (Aristid. *Or.* 51.33); ἐμεμήνεσαν (Eunap. VS 494)), violent demands that the declaimer perform for a second time (Aristid. *Or.* 51.40), and—negatively—late arrival (VS 571; Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 22), vulgarity (Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 22), faint smiling (Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 22), and leaving (because the speaker's voice has failed) (Chor. *Dialexis* 17.2); among the sort of responses that might disconcert the *ex tempore* speaker, Philostratus cites a scornful glance, slow applause, or even the wrong sort of applause (VS 614). In Eunapius' extraordinary account of Prohaeresius' triumph over his rivals at Athens, all who were present are said to have licked the declaimer's breast, kissed his feet and hands, and acclaimed him a god, or the image of Hermes, the god of eloquence (Eunap. VS 489)—and all this apparently *during* the declamation.²⁷ Not definitely from a declamation but certainly from the performance of a sophist are withholding applause (VS 582), sullenness (σκυθρωπὸν (Synesius *Dio* 12)), wagging one's head (περιδινῶν (Synesius *Dio* 12)), falling asleep (VS 578), and even telling the speaker 'what he should say, and for how long' (ἅττα ἐκείνῳ ῥητέον καὶ εἰς ὅσον)

hypotheses regular lengthy debates between declaimer and audience *after* a declamation performance, focused mainly on points of language, to my mind on relatively slim evidence (Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* 1997, 114–27). *Prolaliai* look to have been equally lively: Lucian in his *De domo* states that a heckler is actually trying to 'break up' his speech (διακόπτειν ἐπειράτο τὴν ῥῆσιν) (14), while Himerius stages a punchy dialogue with an interlocutor ('do you desire to see my speeches also? Has a sign of your agreement reached me? Yes, I obey...') (ἄρα ποθεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρους λόγους ἰδεῖν; ἄρ' ἤκει μοι παρὰ σοῦ τὸ σύνθημα; ναὶ πείθομαι) (*Or.* 46.7); Choricus anticipates an interruption in one of his *prolaliai* (*Dialexis* 10.5), and elsewhere comments on the audience's tolerance of his retelling of a story from Herodotus in the Attic dialect (*Dialexis* 16.4).

²⁷ Note the imperfect in the preceding sentence (ἀπήγγελλεν), plausibly translated by Wright as inchoative ('he began to declaim').

(Aristid. *Or.* 28.131), with which the speaker is said to have agreed!²⁸ One could even break the dramatic fiction entirely with one's interruptions: Hippodromus, newly-arrived in Smyrna, declaimed with such brilliance before the sophist Megistias that Megistias 'could not contain himself for admiration, and running up to him begged to know who he was' (ἐξέπεσεν ἑαυτοῦ ὑπὸ θαύματος καὶ προσδραμὼν αὐτῷ ἰκέτευε μαθεῖν, ὅστις εἴη) (VS 619); Alexander Clay-Plato was so impressed by Herodes' declamation on the Sicilian expedition that he interrupted the declamation to praise Herodes and so effectively ended the performance (VS 574); Aristides even imagines a performance being disrupted by men inviting the audience to the baths (*Or.* 33.27–9). Sometimes the pressure got so much that the sophist broke off his own performance, as happened to the sophist Severus (VS 614);²⁹ Philostratus' defence of such failures suggests that such an occurrence was by no means uncommon (VS 614).³⁰

Again, as with the declaimers' actions, most of this behaviour seems to be a response to the rhetoric, and something that is outside the fiction.³¹ That some of these audience responses, such as withholding applause, are in fact the absence of a response, suggests an expectation of frequent audience interjections, both verbal and non-verbal. When Prohaeresius asks that no applause be permitted during his declamation (Eunap. VS 489), it is an injunction by which the audience proves unable to abide; by way of a compliment to a dead student of his, Aristides says that he concentrated so hard on his teacher's declamations that he had no time

²⁸ Revealingly, Aristides characterizes his appearance before the governor's court in Pergamum as like an 'oratorical display' (ἐπίδειξις) on the grounds that those listening showed their enthusiasm (τὸ... ὀρμηκός) 'with their hands and voices' (χειρὶ καὶ φωνῇ) (*Or.* 50.91).

²⁹ Philostratus calls the speech an 'impromptu speech' (σχεδίου λόγου) (VS 614); the most likely candidate is a declamation.

³⁰ Latin declamation performances seem to have been similarly lively. Quintilian rails against allowing students to stand or leap to their feet and shout out praise, as if at the theatre (2.2.9–13); cf. also 8.5.13–14 on applause for *clausulae*. In Seneca we hear that declaimers are 'sustained by frequent applause' (*laudationibus crebris sustentur*), and cheers are said to greet their every gesture (*ad omen gestum plausus excipere*) (Sen. *Controv.* 9 pr. 2).

³¹ Russell briefly hints in this direction: 'the audience actually present is judging not the case but the performance' (Russell, 1983, 88).

to praise them (*Or.* 31.8): the implication is obviously that most students did praise their teacher's declamations. Note too the subtlety of audience responses: if the wrong sort of applause could upset a declaimer, then he must have been concentrating intensely on his audience's reaction. Of the student who listened to his declamations in silence, Aristides says that he nonetheless indicated his pleasure more subtly by his 'posture, nod, and beaming smile' (τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ νεύματι καὶ τῇ φαιδρότητι) (*Or.* 31.8); Synesius gives us a vivid picture of the sophist's anxieties in performance,³² describing him as disconcerted by both laughter and by sullen silence, and both by those who pay close attention and by those who wag their heads impatiently (*Dion* 12).

In the modern world, generally speaking, it is the dramatic illusion that is the ideal, with metalepsis of any kind regarded as secondary (and not indeed universally appreciated). And indeed, in Philostratus it sometimes seems like ancient audiences had the same ideal. Scopelian, we hear, was particularly good at acting the 'arrogance' (φρόνημα) and 'frivolousness' (κουφότητα) of barbarians, going as far as to shake when he spoke, 'as if in a Bacchic frenzy' (ὥσπερ βακχεύων) (*VS* 519–20); Herodes, declaiming on the Sicilian expedition before Alexander Clay-Plato, is said to have uttered his famous line 'Ah, Nicias, ah, father, so may you see Athens' (ναὶ Νικία, ναὶ πάτερ, οὕτως Ἀθήνας ἴδοις) (*VS* 574) with tears in his eyes; Rufus of Perinthus is said to have been able to act characters quite *unlike* himself, effacing his own personality in performance in favour of the part of he was playing (*VS* 597).³³ But the fact that Philostratus considers worthy of mention what to moderns sound like bread-and-butter acting skills suggests that he regarded such ability as unusual. In

³² The term used is ἐπίδειξις (12), which might be a declamation, but might also be one of the other genres practised by sophists. Still, the context is likely to have been similar, whatever the precise nature of the work performed.

³³ Lucian too says that the chief goal of declamation, like dancing, is 'resembling the characters in question' (τὸ εἰκέναι τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις) (*Salt.* 65).

reality, such comments on the dramatic illusion are rare (Korenjak 2000, 80, 81).³⁴ In truth, it seems that the performative features of a declamation derive at least as often not from the narrator and narrates of the fiction but rather from the real-world author and audience. In terms of performance, then, both author and audience are two aspects of the real world that seem to have been unusually and productively prominent during the time of a declamation's fiction.

4. Style

Finally, even a declaimer's style could have a metaleptic effect. Despite the enormous effort to reproduce the Attic Greek of classical Athens, it is notable that sophists did not generally attempt to imitate the specific style of their subject (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 109–110). Rather, sophists were known to have their own styles: Herodes modelled himself after Critias (VS 564), while Proclus of Naucratis showed elements of Hippias and Gorgias' styles (VS 604). Now if we had no evidence that audiences paid any particular attention to style, this need not be significant: some elements of the real world obviously persist during the time of any artistic performance. But of course we do know that style was one aspect of a declamation to which audiences paid particular attention: Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum* focuses especially on the stylistic dimension of the genre (Heath, Menander 2004, 307–8), and style of course was an area of particular growth in the explosion of rhetorical theory in the second and third centuries (above, pp. 47–49). Accordingly, the *contrast* between a sophist's personal style, consistent across his declamatory output, and the style appropriate to the fictitious subject of a given declamation, would have further revealed the hand of the author. In some cases, the discrepancy must have been glaring. If Polemo adopted anything like the exuberant style (cf. pp. 66–68, above) of his Marathonian declamations for his

³⁴ Contrast Civiletti: 'esprimere perfettamente le emozioni dei suoi protagonisti, sino al punto da immedesimarsi in essi' (Civiletti 2002, 46), and Schmitz and Bowie (above, p. 192).

Demosthenes ‘swearing that he had not received a bribe of fifty talents’ (Δημοσθένης ἐξομνύμενος ταλάντων πενήκοντα δωροδοκίαν) (VS 542–3), the hand of Polemo the sophist must have been clearly distinct from that of Demosthenes, and given that many other sophists wrote in a similar style (Norden 1898, 407–10), a style quite different from that typically found in the Attic orators, such striking mismatches must have been common: anyone who had read the classical orators (which means a great part of those consuming declamation) would have known that they did not generally indulge in cadences as poetic as Apollonius of Athens’ οὐ κατὰγει νεκρούς, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγει θεούς (‘it does not take corpses downwards, but leads the gods upwards’) (VS 602) (Rothe 1989, 193).

5. Conclusion

The setting, performative dimension, and style of declamation, then, all worked together to make declamation a genre that was well-grounded in its immediate context: a declamation’s dramatic fiction was continually interrupted in a range of different ways by both author and audience, pulling us back to the present and enabling the words spoken to operate simultaneously both within the fiction and in the real world. The end result is a genre in which deliberate, specific, and unambiguous reference to the world outside the fiction would have been unusually easy, and it is to instances of such external reference that the next chapter will be devoted.

Chapter 6. Metaleptic Readings

So the setting, performative dimension, and style of declamation all worked together to create a genre that was unusually open to metalepsis. I will now show several clear examples of this metaleptic potential being exploited by declaimers to make specific reference to the world outside the fiction.¹ The sort of detailed interaction between reality and fiction that I will be exploring is the product of comparative metalepsis, that is, of a salient alignment between the two, but it should not be forgotten that in many cases this would have been supported by the general contrastive metaleptic features of the genre: that what looks like a bone-dry declamation on the page would have been performed by a sophist who frequently looked and acted and sounded rather different from his fictitious subject, and before a lively audience that seemed more interested in evaluating his performance than in immersing themselves in the drama. I begin by considering four and a half fragmentary declamations about whose contexts we possess significant detail, before moving on to an extended reading of Polemo's extant pair of declamations for the Marathonian heroes Cynegirus and Callimachus; I then draw some provisional conclusions from these examples about the nature of such contemporary reference in Greek declamation. Finally, given the metaleptic

¹ Pernot offers several Greek examples, but I consider these both less secure and less rich than those that will be presented in this chapter (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007). His first two instances, both taken from Dio Cassius (59.20.6, 67.12.5), are rhetorical denunciations of tyrants which are taken by Caligula in the first instance and Domitian in the second as directed against themselves. But it is not certain in either case that the speech in question was actually a declamation, rather than a *progymnasma* (preliminary exercise), as Pernot concedes, however much overlap there was between the two forms. Furthermore, the emperors' readings in both cases are taken as indications of bad character: is it not precisely the point that only paranoid emperors like Caligula and Domitian would see in these texts allusions to themselves that are not really there? Pernot's answer, that it is the emperors' excessive response (exile, in one case, and the death penalty, in the other) that is at fault, while their reading of the rhetoric is sound, is not totally convincing. Pernot's third example is that of Lollianus (discussed above, pp. 190–92): this is probably his strongest case, especially in light of the verbal parallels between declamation and life that he identifies in the text of Philostratus. Still, as with all Pernot's examples, it is impossible to see any of the detail of how life and art interact in this case, in contrast to the more detailed interaction visible in the examples offered in this chapter. Pernot's fourth example, meanwhile, does not even concern a declamation, but rather involves Demosthenes' *Against Leptines* being used to refer to contemporary life (Philostr. VS 601): this cannot be considered more than suggestive. The final example Pernot cites is found in Aristides' first declamation on the Sicilian expedition: I have already given reasons for caution about this case above (p. 193).

potential of the genre, it is unlikely that contemporary reference was limited to these instances: I therefore end with an attempt to show that this phenomenon was very probably more common than can be discerned today.

1. Aristides

My first example is confirmed by explicit ancient comment. In the autumn of 145 CE, the declaimer Aristides, suffering from a terrible illness and having given up on rhetoric, was staying at the sanctuary in Pergamum, hoping for a cure.² Early in his stay, he was commanded by Asclepius in a dream to go to the Temple Stoa and declaim. Accordingly he went to the Stoa, and declaimed on a scenario suggested by a man called Maximus who chanced to enter at the critical moment. The scenario was ‘when Alexander is in India, Demosthenes advises that it is time to act’ (Behr) (Ἀλεξάνδρου... ἐν Ἰνδοῖς ὄντος συμβουλεύει Δημοσθένης ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν) (*Or.* 50.18). Aristides comments ‘so I immediately accepted the omen, both of Demosthenes speaking again and the fact that the words were about empire’ (εὐθύς μὲν οὖν ἔδεξάμην τὴν φήμην, τὸν Δημοσθένη τε αὖθις λέγοντα καὶ τοὺς λόγους ὄντας περὶ ἡγεμονίας) (50.18). That is to say, Aristides considers the parallel between the declamation proposed and his own situation as a message from the gods. Just as Demosthenes in this scenario returns to political life after relative anonymity in the years after his final triumph over Aeschines in 330 BCE, so now was Aristides about to declaim for the first time since giving up oratory after the onset of his illness, and just as Demosthenes was going to speak about ‘primacy’ (ἡγεμονίας)—specifically, Athens wresting back control of her own affairs from Macedon—so too was Aristides about to begin the process of recovering his own primacy in the field of oratory;³ such an identification

² For a reconstruction of this period of Aristides’ life, see Behr (Behr, *Sacred Tales* 1968, 23–60, 121–2).

³ For political imagery used of a declaimer’s standing, compare Philostr. *VS* 586, where the sophist Hadrian describes Herodes as ‘the king of words’ (τὸν βασιλέα τῶν λόγων), and the inscription on the statue dedicated to the sophist Prohaeresius at Rome: ‘Rome, the Queen of Cities, to the King of Words’ (Ἡ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΟΥΣΑ ΡΩΜΗ ΤΟΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΟΝΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ) (Eunap. *VS* 492).

with a famous figure of classical Greece was of course very common among sophists.⁴ This, then, is a clear if unusual example of a declamation used (by Asclepius, it seems) for external reference, and of an ancient reader well able to detect and interpret parallels between declamation and life.

2. Hippodromus

My second example is Hippodromus' declamation 'the magician who had resolved to die when he had been unable to kill another magician who had committed adultery' (τὸν μάγον τὸν ἀποθνήσκειν ἀξιοῦντα ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθη ἀποκτεῖναι μάγον μοιχόν) (Philostr. VS 619).⁵ This scenario is seen by Rothe as yet another example of 'die völlig unrealistischen, sogar absurden Rechtsfälle, über die in der Kaiserzeit deklamiert wurde' (Rothe 1989, 241). And at first glance, to be sure, the interest in such a theme would appear to be purely artistic: a chance for a dramatic *prosangelia* (an imaginary sort of case in which a man denounced himself and sought permission to die) (Russell, Exetasis and Mistakes 1979, 35–7), for parallelism and contrast between the two magicians, and for the paradox of the magician who couldn't do magic. Yet for this declamation, Philostratus' unusually full account of the context in which it was performed (VS 618–19) reveals a close connection between declamation and life. On arriving in Smyrna for the first time, Hippodromus enters the lesson of a distinguished local sophist ('a distinguished man' (τις... τῶν ἐπιφανῶν) (VS 618)) without explaining himself. Having thus secured the rhetor's attention, he at first refuses to state his business, waiting until he and Megistias are alone,⁶ and then proposes to declaim himself, even going as far as to demand (with obvious symbolism) that Megistias swap his

⁴ Reardon (Reardon 1971, 107 with n. 32), Webb (Webb, Greek Past 2006, 34–7).

⁵ A reconstruction of the full background to the scenario is attempted by Rothe (Rothe 1989, 241).

⁶ How long he waits depends on how we take διακωδονίσας (VS 619). If we follow LSJ (s.v. III), the verb means 'dismiss by the sound of a bell', and Megistias sends his students away immediately so as to be able to speak with Hippodromus; other authorities, however, take this verb as meaning 'test, examine', and believe that Megistias finishes his lesson first. Certainty is impossible (for the debate, see Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 639) and Rothe (Rothe 1989, 239), though for Megistias to calmly finish his teaching before speaking to the upstart would represent a deliciously prickly response to the intrusion on his lesson.

‘gown suited to public speaking’ (Wright) (δημηγορικὸν ἱμάτιον) (VS 619) for his own traveller’s cloak.⁷ This is obviously highly provocative behaviour. Megistias duly proposes ‘the magician who had resolved to die when he had been unable to kill another magician who had committed adultery’ (τὸν μάγον τὸν ἀποθνήσκειν ἀξιοῦντα ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθη ἀποκτεῖναι μάγον μοιχόν) (VS 619). Now this scenario, however fantastical, presents clear parallels with the present situation. In both the real world and the proposed fiction, we have two pairs of professionals, rhetoricians and magicians; the figuring of rhetoricians in terms of magicians is easier still when we recall that eloquence was often figured in terms of magic.⁸ In both the real world and the fiction the relative status of the two professionals is in question: one magician resists the other’s attempts to kill him, while Hippodromus, an unimpressive-looking newcomer in Smyrna (‘rather boorish to look at’ (ἀγροικότερος τε ὢν τὸ εἶδος) (VS 618)) seeks to win the respect of an established sophist. There might further be a pun involved in figuring Meg-istias as a μάγος (‘mag-ician’).⁹ But Megistias is doing more than simply using the present context as inspiration: there is also something rather aggressive about the scenario he has suggested. Hippodromus is being asked to play the part of the lesser of the two professionals, the magician who couldn’t kill his colleague, and who was so distressed by this that he wanted to die; Megistias casts himself as the other magician, impervious to his rival’s skills. Moreover, he has skilfully placed the upstart in a catch-22 situation: either he tries to meet the challenge, but in doing so has to play the part of a failed and suicidal professional, or he refuses this demeaning suggestion, but thereby fails the challenge. It is not surprising, then, that Hippodromus’ decision to declaim on the proposed

⁷ For the ἱμάτιον (*himation*) as the garment typically used by sophists for their performances, see Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 639–40).

⁸ For rhetoric as magic in this period as well as in Gorgias, see de Romilly (de Romilly 1975, 1–22, 81–5); see also Aristid. *Orr.* 2.412 and 34.26. For the popularity of magic and scenarios involving magic in this period, see Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 588). For another possible case of a rhetor figured as a magician, see below (p. 232).

⁹ For the sophistic fondness for nicknames, see Heath (Heath, Menander 2004, 40–1).

scenario is regarded by Megistias as a further sign of madness (VS 619). As it turns out, Hippodromus declaims so successfully that he wins the admiration of both Megistias and ‘the cultured men in Smyrna’ (τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σμύρναν πεπαιδευμένων) (VS 619). The one quotation that Philostratus gives from the declamation, and the one at which Megistias ‘could not contain himself for admiration’ (ἐξέπεσεν ἑαυτοῦ ὑπὸ θαύματος) (VS 619), is ‘but myself at least I can [kill]’ (ἀλλ’ ἑμαυτὸν γε δύναιμι): perhaps in his declamation Hippodromus adopted, or aimed to adopt,¹⁰ the specific strategy of abasing himself to such an extent that Megistias felt compelled to yield.¹¹ The theme ‘the magician who had resolved to die when he had been unable to kill another magician who had committed adultery’ (τὸν μάγον τὸν ἀποθνήσκειν ἀξιοῦντα ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθη ἀποκτεῖναι μάγον μοιχόν), then, turns out to figure the circumstance in which it was suggested, and functions as a sophisticated vehicle for the contestation of status between sophists.

3. Alexander

My third example is Alexander’s Scythian declamation (Philostr. VS 571–4). Alexander is one of the sophists about whose career Philostratus gives us a relatively large amount of information. One of the leitmotifs of that career in Philostratus seems to be travel. We hear that he practised in Antioch, Rome, Tarsus, and, ‘by Zeus’ (νῇ Δία), the whole of Egypt,¹² where he met the mysterious naked philosophers (VS 571); when he delivered his declamation on the Scythians he was making what Philostratus explicitly describes as one of his few visits to Athens, that centre of (Philostratean) sophistic activity. Even this visit, however, was a mere stop on the way to Pannonia, and the journey from the east (perhaps

¹⁰ Philostratus’ phrasing (ἀρξαμένου δὲ τῆς ὑποθέσεως καὶ εἰπόντος) leaves it unclear whether these were actually the very first words of Hippodromus’ attempted declamation. For scholars’ differing opinions and translations, see Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 641).

¹¹ Such a strategy would fit with Philostratus’ account of his modesty and decorous behaviour towards his seniors (VS 616–7).

¹² One ‘Alexander the Rhetor’ (Ἀλέξανδρος ῥήτωρ) turns up on a statue base of the second or third century from Memphis, dedicating the statue ‘to the most fertile Nile’ (Νίλωι γονιμωτάτῳ) (Puech 2002, 46–7). This is tantalizing, but as Puech rightly says, ‘la banalité du nom interdit toute tentative d’identification’.

from his home in Seleucia) to Athens is explicitly described as a long one; its length is also foregrounded by the tragic epigram he utters on arrival, ‘here let us bend the knee in rest’ (ἐνταῦθα... γόνυ κάμψωμεν) (VS 571), and his *prolalia* includes (along with an encomium of Athens) an apology for not having visited the city sooner. Even Herodes gets in the mood by arriving in an Arcadian hat, which Philostratus interprets as a sign that he had just arrived from a journey. It is hardly surprising, then, that the scenario proposed concerns travel: ‘a man encourages the Scythians to return to their former itinerant lifestyle after they fall ill living in cities’ (ὁ τοὺς Σκύθας ἐπανάγων ἐς τὴν προτέραν πλάνην, ἐπειδὴ πόλιν οἰκοῦντες νοσοῦσι) (VS 572).¹³ Given that this title puts Alexander in a position to praise the wandering lifestyle, it seems to be a friendly invitation for Alexander to valorize his own mode of life.¹⁴ Just as, as Alexander says in the course of his declamation, waters that keep on the move are sweeter (VS 573), so too, perhaps, is Alexander the better for his wandering lifestyle. The theme chosen for Herodes’ response, ‘the wounded in Sicily beg the departing Athenians to kill them with their own hands’ (οἱ ἐν Σικελίᾳ τρωθέντες ἦσαν αἰτοῦντες τοὺς ἀπανισταμένους ἐκεῖθεν Ἀθηναίους τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀποθνήσκειν) also seems to have relevance to the context, particularly the line quoted (described by Philostratus as ‘that oft-repeated line’ (τὸ θρυλούμενον ἐκεῖνο)), ‘Ah, Nicias, ah, father, so may you see Athens’ (ναὶ Νικία, ναὶ πάτερ, οὕτως Ἀθήνας ἴδοις): such words would have been very appropriate spoken before a declaimer who had only now, at long last, fulfilled the expectations of the

¹³ Quite a number of Alexander’s known declamations in fact seem to have some connection with travel. Besides his declamation advising those who live in the mountains to migrate to the plains (VS 575), presumably similar to his Scythian declamation, his declamation in favour of Darius bridging the Danube (VS 575), and even his declamation dissuading Xerxes from making a second expedition against Greece (VS 575) could easily have embraced ideas of migration (the quotations, particularly that from the latter declamation, would seem to suggest as much), and among the unplaced quotations from his oratory, it is notable that one is flowery praise of the land of Arabia (VS 575).

¹⁴ Anderson gets close to seeing metalepsis here: ‘such a subject,’ he says, ‘would have been particularly appropriate to anyone travelling to the northern frontier’ (Anderson, *Second Sophistic* 1993, 58). To figure oneself as a Scythian was of course far from unparalleled: Lucian sees a reflection of his itinerant career in stories about Scythians (*Scyth.*), and the probing questions about Greek culture asked by the character of ‘The Scythian’ in his *Anach.* and *Tox.* are also more than a little Lucianic.

Athenians and visited their city, and indeed it is notable that Alexander is said to have spoken up at this point, which seems to have been the end and therefore perhaps the climax of the declamation). Once again, declamation proves to be a sophisticated vehicle for social interaction among sophists, albeit less aggressively than in the case of Hippodromus and Megistias.¹⁵

4. Heliodorus

My fourth example involves the sophist Heliodorus (Philostr. VS 625–6) (discussed briefly above, p. 168). After his colleague on an embassy to the emperor Caracalla had fallen ill, he tried to postpone his suit, and an official had to bring him into court ‘against his will, dragging him by the beard’ (ἄκοντά τε καὶ τοῦ γενείου ἔλκων) (VS 626); his opening words to the emperor were a plea that he not harm his case by pleading alone. The emperor then unexpectedly called Heliodorus ‘such a man as I have not yet encountered, a discovery of my own times’ (οἷον οὐπω ἔγωκα, τῶν ἐμμαντοῦ καιρῶν εὕρημα), and shook his cloak at him (VS 626). At first, Philostratus says, Heliodorus thought that the emperor was mocking him (διαπτύοι (VS 626)), but in reality, this was a rather cryptic (perhaps deliberately cryptic) expression of approval, and Caracalla went on to grant Heliodorus equestrian status. Reassured by this happy turn of events, the sophist was then bold enough to invite the emperor to hear him declaim at some point. Perhaps he was too bold, and had missed the latent menace of the emperor’s odd behaviour,¹⁶ for the emperor replied that Heliodorus

¹⁵ Anderson (Anderson, Philostratus 1986, 49) notes structural similarities between Hippodromus’ visit to Smyrna and Alexander’s visit to Athens: the underlying pattern he summarises as ‘[t]he great man arrives in an unusual disguise: at first no one recognises him, least of all the eminent teacher he has come to visit. They engage in a conversation which soon reveals the visitor’s surprising virtuosity. Thereafter he engages in an astonishing display and is acclaimed accordingly’ (the element of disguise is transferred in the case of Alexander to Herodes). A further similarity that Anderson notes is that both sophists repeat their performance in different words. It may be, then, that metaleptic reference to their own position through the medium of declamation should be seen as a further element of this story-pattern. Odysseus, whose great revelation in *Od.* 22, as Anderson suggests, perhaps lies behind both of these scenes, is of course frequently spoken about in the *Od.* in figured language of various sorts.

¹⁶ ‘[S]i ha, infatti, l’impressione che soltanto la fortuna salvò Eliodoro dall’ira dell’imperatore’ (Civiletti 2002, 653).

should declaim immediately, and proposed the scenario ‘Demosthenes on trial for cowardice after he had broken down in a speech before Philip’ (ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐπὶ τοῦ Φιλίππου ἔκπεσόν καὶ δειλίας φεύγων) (VS 626).¹⁷ This title refers to an incident in 346 BCE, when, according to Aeschines, Demosthenes broke down while addressing Philip on an embassy at Pella.¹⁸ Read allegorically, this scenario is clearly another rather aggressive choice: the ambassador Heliodorus, who tried repeatedly to postpone his appearance before the emperor, is the orator Demosthenes accused of cowardice on his embassy. It is perhaps surprising to find Caracalla figured as Philip: while it was doubtless in a general sense ennobling to appear as a figure from classical history, in Greek literature Philip is generally a somewhat more ambivalent paradigm of monarchy than Alexander (Asirvatham, *His Son's Father?* 2010).¹⁹ We cannot know whether the ambiguity of this comparison simply escaped Caracalla, or whether the version of the title for the declamation that we have is the work of Philostratus (who seems to have witnessed this encounter in person).²⁰ If it is the latter, then it perhaps represents a small instance of subtle resistance to Roman power within a wider story about Greek powerlessness; a third attractive possibility is that Caracalla actually understood the connotations perfectly well, and welcomed them.

5. Rufinus

A fifth example, this time not of a declamation proper, but all the more telling for that. The sophist Rufinus, the bastard son of the sophist Apollonius of Naucratis, ‘having produced no genuine sophistry, or nothing from the heart’ (σοφιστεύσας οὐδὲν γόνιμον, οὐδὲ ἐκ καρδίας) (VS 599), Philostratus tells us, resorted instead simply to reusing his father’s

¹⁷ Such a change of temper on the part of the emperor is quite consistent with Philostratus’ image of Caracalla elsewhere (Civiletti 2002, 653).

¹⁸ Aeschin. 2.34–5, 114; cf. Kohl (Kohl 1915, 68).

¹⁹ A fair index of the difference in Greek attitudes to the two Macedonian kings may be seen in Libanius’ *Progymnasmata*, which feature Philip as the subject of a *psogos* (9.3), but Alexander as the founder of a city (12.27) or dispensing proverbial wisdom (3.1).

²⁰ NB ‘to us’ (ἡμῖν) (VS 626).

phrases and epigrams. When criticised for this practice, he responded ‘the laws allow me to use my inheritance’ (οἱ νόμοι... διδόασί μοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς πατράοις), imagining the dispute as a legal case. His critics, however, turned Rufinus’ legal imagery against him and responded: ‘they do, but only to those born in accordance with the laws’ (διδόασι μὲν... ἀλλὰ τοῖς κατὰ νόμους γεγονόσι). Now while in this case a real life incident is not, as in our previous examples, encoded in a full declamation, Rufinus’ brief exchange with his critics nonetheless essentially represents a declamation in miniature. First, it is centred around a question of inheritance, a very common topic in declamations (Russell, *Greek Declamation* 1983, 31–2). More tellingly, the argumentation deployed in this exchange is precisely that which one would expect to find if this were a real declamation. In terms of issue-theory, Rufinus’ response to the initial accusation makes the issue of the case a ‘counterplea’ (ἀντίληψις), the sort of case in which one defends one’s potentially culpable actions on the basis of an alleged absolute right to act as one did. So here Rufinus confesses to borrowing his father’s material, but maintains nonetheless that this was not forbidden, saying: ‘the laws allow me to use my inheritance’ (οἱ νόμοι... διδόασί μοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς πατράοις). Compare Hermogenes’ formulation of the counterplea: ‘it is allowed and no law has forbidden it’ (ἔξεστι καὶ οὐδεὶς κεκόλυκε νόμος) (Hermog. *Stat.* V.10). The prescribed response to a counterplea is an ‘objection’ (μετάληψις), and in this case Rufinus’ critics use the form of objection in which the prosecution tries to show that the counterplea does not apply in this instance: ‘they do allow this, but only to those born in accordance with the laws’ (διδόασι μὲν... ἀλλὰ τοῖς κατὰ νόμους γεγονόσι). Again, compare Hermogenes: ‘even if it is possible, still not under these conditions, nor like this’ (εἰ καὶ ἔξεστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοιαῦτα) (Hermog. *Stat.* V.11).²¹ That the circumstances of everyday life can so readily slide

²¹ The other form of objection is simply to dispute without qualification the alleged right (*Stat.* V.10). The similarity between Hermogenes’ prescription and the words spoken by Rufinus’ critics here even make it possible that this exchange was not only using the rhetorical theory appropriate to such a dispute, but actually echoing rhetoricians’ formulations.

into a declamatory scenario in casual conversation is particularly suggestive of how easy the metaleptic traffic between declamation and life could be.²²

6. Polemo

The two surviving declamations of Polemo offer a complementary perspective to that of the fragments we have examined so far. On the one hand, we lack any information about the specific context(s) in which these declamations were performed; on the other, this disadvantage is offset by the chance to examine the workings of metalepsis at a verbal level in a full text, rather than only in titles or fragments. It should also be remembered that we discerned (pp. 64–66) in these declamations a good deal of metarhetoric (reference to the rhetorical theory that a declaimer is using to shape a speech): given that both metarhetoric and self-reference involve some interruption of the dramatic illusion, the metarhetoric that we have seen and the self-reference that we are about to describe ought to have reinforced one another.

In these two declamations the fathers of two fighters killed at Marathon, Cynegirus and Callimachus, each argues that it was their son who fought most bravely of all those who died in the battle, and that they therefore have the right to deliver the eulogy over the dead. The most important aspect of the scenario of these declamations for our purposes in this chapter is the extraordinary manner of the deaths of the two heroes, Cynegirus killed when his hands were cut off as he clung to an escaping Persian ship, Callimachus killed by enemy projectiles but with his body somehow remaining upright, even in death. I suggest that the fates of these two fighters—who of course were chosen by Polemo from a number of traditional heroes of

²² Similar, and similarly suggestive, is Philagrus' complaint when charged with re-using old material in what was supposed to be an *ex tempore* declamation that he was being 'kept from what was his own' (τῶν ἑαυτοῦ εἰργόμενος) (VS 579). Given the explicitly legal metaphor subsequently used by Philostratus ('he did not evade conviction on a charge that was already believed' (οὐ διέφυγε τὴν ἤδη πεπιστευμένην αἰτίαν)), this defence sounds rather like a counterplea also. Rothe notes the similarity between the two passages (Rothe 1989, 77–8).

Marathon (cf. above p. 95 n. 20)—could easily have evoked the famous sufferings of Polemo himself, who fought and lost a lengthy battle against a wasting disease of the joints.²³ ‘With his joints hardening’ (λιθιώντων αὐτῷ τῶν ἄρθρων), Polemo famously wrote to Herodes Atticus saying metaphorically ‘I have no hands’ (χεῖρας οὐκ ἔχω) (VS 543), just as Cynegirus lost his hands. And just as Callimachus in these declamations is imagined as struggling to stay standing (B3, 11, 12, 14, 15, 38, 47, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60), so standing too must have been difficult for Polemo: in the same letter to Herodes, he said ‘I have no feet’ (πόδες οὐκ εἰσὶ μοι) (VS 543), and there is a memory in Philostratus that he had to be carried in a litter to his performances (VS 537); presumably his habit of standing for the high points of his speeches (VS 537) (and therefore remaining seated for the majority of the time) is to be traced to foot trouble also, for the usual procedure was to deliver the *prolalia* seated but to stand for the declamation itself.²⁴ Reader indeed considers the stress on the severed hands and upright corpse in Polemo’s version of the Marathon story to be uniquely Polemonian (Reader 1996, 39–40): a deliberate shaping of the story on Polemo’s part to bring it closer to his own sufferings could explain this observation.

Cynegirus and Callimachus both show spectacular endurance in the face of suffering. Such endurance is not something simply inherited from the tradition: on the contrary, Reader concludes his survey of Polemo’s sources by singling out such ‘bombast’ as one of the defining features of Polemo’s treatment of the material (Reader 1996, 40). This suggests that it was somehow meaningful: I propose that this was because it echoes Polemo’s own willing

²³ Compare den Dulk and Langford (den Dulk and Langford 2014, 221 n. 46), who say suggestively with reference to Polemo’s suicide that ‘[n]oble death was also a topic on which Polemo gave public discourses’.

²⁴ Connolly notes the pain that standing in performance must have caused Polemo (Connolly, *Reclaiming the Theatrical* 2001, 85). Philostratus also, however, in the same chapter refers to Polemo as sometimes stamping the ground during his speeches: presumably this habit dates from a time before his illness had begun to make standing difficult, or occurred only after Polemo had already stood up for a high point, in which case it would likely have been another instance of the sophist making a show of overcoming physical limitations (den Dulk and Langford 2014, 228). For the convention of standing for the declamation itself, see Clarke (Clarke, *Three Notes on Roman Education* 1968) and Vössing (Vössing 2003).

embrace of pain. Polemo urged his doctors when treating him to ‘dig and carve in the stone-quarries of Polemo’ (Wright) (ὀρύττειν καὶ τέμνειν τὰς Πολέμωνος λιθοτομίας) (VS 543),²⁵ while Callimachus taunts the Persians, saying ‘pelt me; do not hold back. Why are you not pelting me? I demand missiles’ (βάλλετε καὶ μὴ φείδεσθε. τί δ’ οὐ βάλλετε; ἐγὼ δέομαι βελῶν) (B56). Famously Polemo willingly chose to undergo the living death of being buried alive, still even then thinking of declaiming (‘give me a body and I will declaim’ (δότε μοι σῶμα καὶ μελετήσομαι) (VS 544)),²⁶ just as Callimachus even when pierced through with arrows went on ‘fighting without a soul’ (χωρὶς ψυχῆς μεμαχημένον), a ‘corpse stronger than death’ (νεκρὸν θανάτου κρείττονα) (B2; for the same insistent idea, cf. B1, 11, 12, 15, 47, 50, 52, 53, 55, 60); the same obstinate resistance to physical necessity can be found in Cynegirus too, who ‘rebuked his nature for being feeble, and demanded his hands back from it’ (ὥς ὀλίγη κατεμέμφετο τῇ φύσει καὶ χεῖρας ἀπήτει παρ’ αὐτῆς) (A11). Both Polemo and his subjects are also specifically concerned not to be seen to fail: ‘hurry, hurry—may the sun not see me silent’ (ἔπαγε, ἔπαγε, μὴ γὰρ ἴδοι με σιωπῶντα ἥλιος), cried Polemo as he was buried alive (VS 543); Callimachus stayed standing as the Persians were sailing away, ‘so that he might not fall in the presence of any witnesses’ (ὥς ἂν ἐπὶ μηδενὸς μάρτυρος ἄλλοτρίου πέσης) (B14). Of course, some of these elements of Polemo’s self-presentation must date from later than these declamations, not least those surrounding his death, but it seems plausible that that self-presentation in death continued his presentation of his battle with illness in life.

The probability of metalepsis increases when we consider more generally Polemo’s character and the times in which he lived. We have also already mentioned the widespread

²⁵ Anderson (supported enthusiastically by Civiletti (Civiletti 2002, 501)) suggests ‘perhaps he saw himself as giving orders to the Athenian prisoners in Syracuse’ (Anderson, Philostratus 1986, 70); if so, it would be another instance (albeit brief) of Polemo figuring himself as (suffering) characters from classical history, albeit outside of a declamation.

²⁶ There is a curious parallel here with the Latin declaimer Labienus, who committed suicide by having himself walled up inside his family tomb after his works were proscribed and burned (Sen. *Controv.* 10 pr. 7).

habit of comparing oneself to famous figures of classical history:²⁷ a sophist was probably particularly likely to do so, as a practitioner of that ‘egotistical and boastful craft’ (τέχνην φύλαυτόν τε καὶ ἀλαζόνα) (VS 616), especially the haughty Polemo, who was ‘so arrogant that he talked down to cities, to rulers without any hint of inferiority, and to gods from a position of equality’ (ὑπέρφρων... οὕτω... ὥς πόλεσι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ προὔχοντος, δυνασταῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὑφειμένου, θεοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου διαλέγεσθαι) (VS 535). Furthermore, making use of illness, and in particular, spectacular illness,²⁸ as part of one’s public identity was a common strategy in this period, and one used extensively by another, slightly later declaimer, Aristides, and, in a later century, Libanius.²⁹

If Polemo was making reference to his own illness in these speeches, then several striking opportunities to underline the message in performance become available.³⁰ Consider, for example, Cynegirus’ and Polemo’s hands.³¹ Right at the end of his speech, Cynegirus’ father utters the words ‘I stretch forth hands to you that are like those lying fallen on your behalf’ (χεῖρας ὑμῖν ὁμοίας προτείνω ταῖς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κειμέναις) (A49). Now while the point of comparison (ὁμοίας) is explained in what follows—Cynegirus’ father puts his hands on the tomb, as Cynegirus put his hands on a Persian ship—at the moment in the speech at which Cynegirus’ father says these words, that point of comparison is not yet clear: given that the speaker before their eyes famously had a wasting sickness of the joints, the audience might have been able to hear χεῖρας ὑμῖν ὁμοίας προτείνω ταῖς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κειμέναις as ‘I, [Polemo] stretch out hands to you that are similar to those [of Cynegirus] that fell on your behalf’—

²⁷ p. 212 n. 4.

²⁸ See Anderson for sophists’ ‘bizarre privations’ (Anderson, Philostratus 1986, 30–1).

²⁹ For conquering physical pain as an (alternative) strategy of self-presentation in this period, see Francis (Francis 1995). Aristides’ sufferings are narrated in his *Sacred Tales* (Orr. 47–52): on these, see Downie (Downie 2013). For Libanius, see Leppin (Leppin 2011, 428). Kennedy asserts that Libanius cultivated ‘hypochondria’ in imitation of Aristides (G. Kennedy, *Christian Emperors* 1983, 152).

³⁰ On theatricality in declamation, see Connolly (Connolly, *Reclaiming the Theatrical* 2001, esp. 85–6).

³¹ On the attention paid to hands in a rhetorical performance, see [Cic.] *Rhet. Her.* 3.15.26–27; Cic. *de Orat.* 3.220; Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.84–124.

similar not in their audacious seizure of disputed property, but rather in their state of health, Polemo's arthritic hands matching those lying amputated on the plain of Marathon. If Polemo were to have actually stretched out his hands at this moment or others during the performance, the double meaning would have been obvious; if Polemo's hands appeared visibly diseased, so much the better. The deictics in τοῦτο ἦν τὸ δόρυ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἡ Κυναγείρου δεξιὰ, τοῦτο δ᾿ ἄδεις τῶν θεῶν χεῖρες ἐλευθέριον σέλας φέρουσαι ('this—the right hand of Cynegirus—was the spear of Athena; this—the hands that brought the light of freedom—was the fire-brands of the gods') (A36) might also have offered a particularly appropriate moment for a gesture. These are perhaps the moments at which the identification of the two pairs of hands could have been most to the fore, but there are others: at A42 Cynegirus is described as 'giving up someone else's hand, as it were' (ὥσπερ ἄλλοτρίαν χεῖρα δίδους), in a clever reuse of this Isocratean formula; at A39 we hear the suggestive line 'if we had had such hands as you had' (εἰ τοιαύτας χεῖρας εἶχομεν οἷας σύ).

A second opportunity for underlining the identification of sophist and subject in performance concerns Callimachus' *aristeia*, which is so insistently presented in these speeches as a feat not just of not falling, but also of *standing*. Given that, as we have said, standing seems likely to have caused Polemo great pain, but that he nonetheless did so for the high points of his performances, there arises the tantalizing possibility that by bringing himself to stand for the high points (of which there are many) of these speeches, Polemo underwent and performed the sufferings of Callimachus before the very eyes of his audience, taking the fondness of sophists for identifying with famous figures from classical history to an extreme. If such an identification was made, then a line like Callimachus' reported last words to himself late in the second speech, 'stand unmoved, Callimachus' (σῆθι, Καλλίμαχε, ἀκίνητος) (B58), delivered by a barely standing Polemo, could have been positively

electric.³² Again, this sort of behaviour would not have been unprecedented. For making a show of overcoming physical impairments to declaim we could look to the career of Aristides, who proudly talks of the *panēguris* ('national assembly' (Behr)) (47.64) that came to his house to hear him speak when he was ill ('contending right from my bed' (αὐτόθεν ἐκ κλίνης τοὺς ἀγῶνας ποιουμένῳ) (47.64)), and who describes the breathing problems that he had to overcome at the start of a performance; Demosthenes, too, Polemo's idol³³ (and everyone else's) was believed to have had to overcome significant physical disadvantages to advance in his oratorical career (Plut. *Dem.* 4.4–5, 6.4–7.6, 11.1). For the idea that the orator's challenge is as great as that of his subjects, we might compare Aristides' claim in his *Panathenaic Oration* (*Or.* 1) that the rhetorical challenge of adequately describing the battle of Salamis is as great as the battle itself (*Or.* 1.152).

Such conspicuous points of similarity as these may have activated latent ambiguities in what had already been spoken, and prepared the way for ambiguities to come. Such potentially self-referential statements are found in both speeches. Of particular interest is the claim that Cynegirus' father makes to oratorical prowess in the peroration to the first speech; coming immediately before the return from the fiction to the real world, the peroration would be a particularly appropriate site for art-life metalepsis. Now though this claim makes some sense within the fiction, tradition does not remember Cynegirus' father as having been a particularly gifted speaker. So when we hear him say 'I have a tongue like that man's right hand' (ἔχω δὲ καὶ γλῶτταν οἷαν ἐκεῖνος δεξιάν), we might wonder whether this phrase does not better suit Polemo himself, who of course was a famous orator.³⁴ Cynegirus' father also

³² In bringing such suffering so graphically before the eyes of his audience, Polemo's performance might also have had something in common with the spectacle of Galen's gory vivisections, for which see Gleason (Gleason, Shock and Awe 2009).

³³ Polemo dedicated a statue to Demosthenes at Pergamum (*I. Pergamon Asklepieion* 33); Campanile speaks of 'quel rapporto quasi genetico... tra lui e il più celebre oratore del IV secolo' (Campanile 1999, 309)

³⁴ For the second phrase there is a *varia lectio* ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι; the choice between the two readings is, as Reader says, 'evenly balanced' (Reader 1996, 245). Reader plumps for σήματι ('tomb') as a slightly more accurate description of the situation, but σώματι ('body') would offer the productive ambiguity of 'more suitable for

states that ‘I am his father and the most famous of the great’ (αὐτοῦ πατήρ εἰμι καὶ τῶν μεγάλων ὀνομαστότατος) (A47): the first half of this is obviously unproblematic, but the second again is just as appropriate to Polemo, and the two halves together might even be read as a neat statement of the double identity of the speaking voice as both Euphorion and Polemo.

In the case of the speech for Callimachus, it is the repeated references to the hero with words from the πολεμ- (‘war’) root that stand out: these must surely be evocative of Polemo’s name, especially in performance, as indeed Callimachus’ own name is.³⁵ ‘Callimachus showed them that he was the Polem-arch’ (Καλλίμαχος ἔδειξεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι πολέμαρχος ἦν) (B7), his father declares at the start of his speech; towards the end of his speech, addressing his son, he cries out ‘O Polem-arch, dread image of the Polem-arch god’, a phrase all the more striking in the Greek for its polyptoton (ὦ πολέμαρχε πολεμάρχου θεοῦ δεινὸν εἶδωλον) (B52).³⁶ We also hear of Callimachus ‘putting on the garment of war [πολέμου]’ (ἐνδύς τὴν τοῦ πολέμου στολήν) (B52); this phrase is all the more suggestive when we recall that στολή could be used to refer to the garb of a sophist (e.g. VS 587, 623). A little further on Callimachus is described as having a second soul that is ‘warring [πολεμοῦσαν] and contesting’ (πολεμοῦσαν καὶ ἀγωνιζομένην) (B53); conceivably ἀγωνιζομένην (‘contesting’) here could also be heard as referring to the declamatory context, as often (Korenjak 2000, 195–99).

Overall, the evidence of Polemo’s declamations gives us an insight into how metalepsis might work on the verbal level, albeit only in one author. Two similar techniques can be

the speech *over* the body’ (LSJ s.v. ἐπὶ B.I.1.b) and ‘more suitable for the speech *on account of* [my] body’ (LSJ B.III.1).

³⁵ There is also an astonishing density of references to Callimachus’ status as Polemarch at A13–15 (six uses of πολέμαρχος, one of πολεμαρχέω).

³⁶ Generalship was one further point of similarity between Callimachus and Polemo, for Polemo too was in name at least a general, holding the office of *stratēgos* at Smyrna (*BMC* 14 277, no. 328, 333); for this office see Cadoux (Cadoux 1938, 194).

seen. First, use is made of words whose meaning is contextually dependent, particularly pronouns: ‘you’ (ὤμῖν, ὤμῳν, σύ), ‘similar’ (ὁμοίᾱς), ‘another’s’ (ἄλλοτρίαν). The full signification of such words depends on context: if metalepsis has made that context the second century CE, then contemporary reference becomes possible. Second, much use is made of what Grice famously called ‘implicature’, a technique in which an apparent breach of the normal rules of communication (that one should be clear, relevant, concise, etc.) provokes readers to seek out a deeper meaning from the context.³⁷ We have just seen a number of examples. The superabundance of words from the πολεμ- root is superficially odd; the reader might wonder why Polemo is seemingly so unimaginative as to keep using words from this root. This question can only be answered by a shift outside the fiction: only when we take into account the name of the author does this aspect of the text make sense. Similarly, the claim of Cynegirus’ father to be ‘the most famous of the great’ (τῶν μεγάλων ὀνομαστότατος) (A47) is not quite right in the world of the fiction: again, it is only a shift outside the fiction that makes full sense of this utterance. Implicatures of this sort suggest a previously unnoticed and potentially very important function of the much-maligned florid style of some Greek imperial rhetoric (above, pp. 66–68): it may be that the dense heaping up of figures in these texts is in part to be explained as the result of the addition of extra meanings of this sort to the fictional surface of a declamation.³⁸

7. Conclusions

So: we have five and a half probable instances of Greek declamations making clear and in

³⁷ ‘An implicature is a proposition emerging from something that is said, but not actually stated by the words uttered, nor logically derivable from them. It must therefore be a product of the relationship between utterance and context’ (Fowler 1996).

³⁸ For figures as a vehicle for extra meanings, compare Latro’s view reported in Seneca: ‘he said that the figures had not been invented for the sake of adornment but rather to help declaimers, so that that which would offend if it were stated openly might creep in secretly from the side’ (*schema negabat decoris causa inventum sed subsidii, ut quod aures offensurum esset, si palam diceretur, id oblique et furtim subreperet*) (Controv. 1 pr. 24). As the catchy title of chapter 6 of Robert Fowler’s *Linguistic Criticism* has it, ‘Extra structures, extra meaning’ (Fowler 1996, 92).

some cases fairly detailed reference to the world outside of its own fiction. Though this sample size is relatively small, we can already draw some provisional conclusions about external reference in declamation:

(i) First, we now have some idea of the specific techniques that can be used to effect metalepsis. The use of metaphor is clear. When Aristides is given a scenario about a literal empire (as he sees it: the word does not occur in the title itself), he detects a parallel with his metaphorical ‘empire’ of rhetoric. In the scenario proposed by Hippodromus to Megistias, the literal magicians of the declamation stand for metaphorical ‘magicians’, viz. the two orators. And in Polemo’s Marathonian declamations, Cynegirus’ literal loss of hands corresponds to Polemo’s metaphorical loss of hands. Puns seem also to play a role: Megistias (Μεγιστίας) is figured as a μάγος (‘mag-ician’), while Polemo’s name seems to be evoked by the very numerous words from the πολεμ- root in his Marathonian declamations. In those declamations, the chance to examine the text reveals further techniques that might be paralleled if we had more extant works: the use of body language to clinch an identification, the use of words whose meaning is dependent on context, not least pronouns, and the flouting of expectations (‘implicature’) to encourage audiences to step outside the fiction in their attempt to construe the speaker’s words correctly.

(ii) Secondly, in the examples we have considered, the objects of the external reference are quite different to those identified in previous studies. Pernot sees declaimers alluding to high politics, and their declamations as, for example, coded denunciations of the Roman emperor or even the whole Roman empire; similarly, the most commonly alleged instance of contemporary reference in Libanius has as its object the emperor Julian (cf. p. 194 n. 10). In our examples, by contrast, the external reference is much more localized, focusing on the declamation’s *immediate performance context*. In almost every case, the speaking subject of the declamation is taken as the author, and the declaimer’s real world audience is also often

figured by some part of the fiction. What is happening is a collapsing of the boundaries between fiction and life, but in a very focused way.

(iii) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we are also now in a position to draw some provisional conclusions about what purposes such contemporary allusions serve. Pernot's preferred model is figured speech (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 213–14). In Quintilian's formulation, quoted by Pernot, there are three reasons an orator might have recourse to figured speech: safety, propriety, and simply to show off his talents (*Inst.* 9.2.66). Discounting showing off, neither of the other two reasons can really be said to be in play in our examples. Safety is clearly not at issue in any of them. Neither Asclepius nor the emperor Caracalla nor the sophist Megistias nor Alexander Clay-Plato's audience have anything to fear from those to whom they propose suggestive declamation scenarios: on the contrary, in each case it is they that are in the position of power, and the aggressive suggestions of Caracalla and Megistias create danger for the speaker rather than ameliorating it. Indeed, given that the scenario for a declamation must frequently have been chosen by the party in a relatively more powerful position, opportunities for a weaker party to conceal in the medium of declamation criticisms that would be dangerous to state openly would generally have been limited to their particular interpretation of the scenario given to them.

The second traditional reason for resorting to figured speech, propriety, is conceivably operative in the case of Alexander Clay-Plato, in that the declamation scenario put to him may allow him to engage in self-praise without incurring the opprobrium of doing so directly.³⁹ At a superficial level, propriety might be thought to be operative in the scenarios proposed by Megistias and Caracalla too, in that their aggression is masked by being

³⁹ The propriety of self-praise was much discussed in this period. The two longest treatments of the question are Plutarch's *On Praising Oneself Inoffensively* (περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν ἀνεπιφθόνως) and Aristides' *Concerning a Remark in Passing* (Or. 38); see Rutherford (I. Rutherford, *Self-Praise* 1995).

encoded in fiction. But the figuring of that aggression is so transparent that in reality it seems all the more pointed for having been so flimsily disguised. Finally, in the cases of Polemo and Aristides, the translation of the declaimers' trials and tribulations to classical Athens is clearly not about modesty: on the contrary, what is happening is a dramatic ennobling of the present by means of the glory of the past.

Contemporary reference in Greek declamation, then, looks like a more nuanced and diverse phenomenon than has so far been realised. Still, there do seem to be some common characteristics in the examples we have looked at. Contemporary reference is used above all by the declaimer for self-reference, and, more dynamically, for delicate social negotiations; the effect of translating social struggles into a declamation and the classical past typically seems not to reduce danger but if anything to raise the stakes for all involved.

(iv) How common was such external reference? Given our limited information about the contexts in which the declamation represented by a given text or title was performed, the instances that we can discern today are probably only the tip of the iceberg. I now attempt to glimpse the underside of that iceberg, by examining a number of other suggestive alignments between the topics of declamations and lives of declaimers.⁴⁰ In view of the clear cases that we have examined above, it would seem quite likely that many of these alignments were put to use by declaimers for self-reference: doubtless with further research the self-reference in some of these cases could be upgraded from 'possible' to 'probable' or beyond.

We might start with Polemo, given his self-referential technique in his extant declamations. Philostratus records three declamations delivered by this sophist that centred around *prosangelia*, a case, as we said above, in which the speaker seeks permission to die (VS 542–

⁴⁰ Civiletti says, apropos of a declamation of Polemo, that the 'glorioso passato classico' 'non mancava certo di caratteri ed episodi da prendere a modello di un'esistenza continuamente in bilico tra realtà e finzione libresca' (Civiletti 2002, 493). Pernot also offers a few suggestions (Pernot, *Il non-detto* 2007, 219).

3):⁴¹ given the use that Polemo makes of his illness in his extant declamations on Marathon, it seems by no means implausible that these *prosangeliai* also made capital out of his illness, suffering, or coming death. Furthermore, if Polemo could make reference to his illness in declamation, then it seems likely that he could have made reference to other aspects of his life: indeed, it might have been hard to avoid self-reference in his ‘Demosthenes swearing that he had not received a bribe of fifty talents’ (Δημοσθένης ἐξομνύμενος ταλάντων πεντήκοντα δωροδοκίαν) (VS 538), given that he is recorded as having been accused of embezzling the greater part of quarter of a million drachmae (VS 533) (Anderson, Philostratus 1986, 34), and attacked for venality in contemporary epigram (Ammianus of Smyrna, *Greek Anthology* 11.180–1) (Civiletti 2002, 493).

Similarly suggestive cases can be found in Aristides. In his *Concerning a Remark in Passing* (Περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγγματος) (Or. 28), Aristides lists four characters from classical history that he has played in his declamations.⁴² Demosthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides the Just, the famously upright Athenian politician of the fifth century BCE (6). The first three names are unsurprising: Demosthenes features in countless declamation scenarios, and Miltiades and Themistocles are not uncommon.⁴³ But Aristides the Just is almost unheard of as a character in declamation: he features once in Hermogenes’ *De statibus*, and once in

⁴¹ ‘Xenophon resolved to die after Socrates’ death... Demosthenes bringing himself to trial after Chaeronea, and Demosthenes pretending to consider himself deserving of the death penalty after the Harpalus affair’ (ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὁ ἀξιῶν ἀποθνήσκειν ἐπὶ Σωκράτει... ὁ μετὰ Χαιρώνειαν προσάγων ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὁ δοκῶν θανάτου ἑαυτῷ τιμᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἀρπαλείοις). The third Demosthenic declamation that Philostratus mentions, ‘Demosthenes advising the Athenians to flee on their triremes as Philip approaches’ (ὁ ξυμβουλευὼν ἐπὶ τῶν τριῆρων φεύγειν ἐπὶ τῶν Φιλίππου) is also close to a *prosangelia*, for such a proposal would have incurred the death penalty, ‘Aeschines having ratified a law that anyone who made mention of the war should be killed’ (νόμον δὲ Αἰσχίνου κεκυρωκότος ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν πολέμου μνημονεύσαντα).

⁴² The term he uses is ὑποκρίνομαι: strictly, this verb does not necessarily refer solely to declamations, but might also include *prosopopoeiai*.

⁴³ Miltiades: Aps. *Rh.* 299.15–300.3 (=301.12–16, 310.9–16, 323.9–12); *RG* 4.720.1–3 (=Syrian. *In Hermog.* II.165.4–6), *RG* 5.76.1–2. Themistocles: Libanius *Decl.* 9–10; Himerius *Or.* 5; Apsines *Rh.* 220.16–19, 305.13–18 (=323.10–12); [Hermog.] *Inv.* III 6.20.2–11 (=Syrian. *In Hermog.* II.42.18–19; *RG* 4.185.20–5, 7.165.3–7); *RG* 4.102.4–15 (=4.122.27–123.2, 5.44.14–22, 7.24.21–25; *Prolegomenōn Syllogē* 211.24–212.1), *RG* 4.122.7–9, 4.567.10–12 (=Syrian. *In Hermog.* II.121.24–122.1), *RG* 5.44.11–14, 5.75.14–15, 8.389.17–18; Syrian. *In Hermog.* II.163.9–11.

the somewhat obscure *prolegomena* to this work, in both cases in scenarios that are said to be implausible, for they involve accusing this proverbially just character of theft.⁴⁴ So it is striking that Aelius Aristides mentions declamations he has delivered as Aristides the Just, especially in a list of characters that are meant to exemplify his declamatory activity. Given the examples of self-reference in declamation we have seen so far, we might wonder whether Aelius Aristides ever exploited the homonymy between himself and his fictitious subject in such declamations: he does after all explicitly draw attention to their shared name, referring to Aristides the Just as ‘homonymous’ (ὁμώνυμον). But the possibility that Aelius Aristides made reference to himself through the character of Aristides the Just is moved from possibility to probability by the use that he makes of his namesake elsewhere in his oeuvre. In his *On the Four* (ὕπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων) (Or. 3), he makes an explicit comparison between himself and his fifth-century namesake (ὁμώνυμον again), arguing that his pursuit of oratory is even purer than that of the fifth-century Athenian politician, as he refuses fees or the *sportulae* of patrons (3.99). Meanwhile in his *To Plato: In Defence of Oratory* (πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ Ῥητορικῆς) (Or. 2), in defending his own profession of oratory, he cites Aristides the Just as a clear example of an obviously good orator (346–361); the homonymy is obviously meant to be suggestive. So given the use that Aelius Aristides makes of Aristides the Just to talk about himself in his non-declamatory speeches, what more natural explanation for his extremely unusual declamations on this figure than that these too exploited the homonymy? A second possible case of metalepsis in Aristides concerns his lost declamation *Against Leptines* (Or. 4.3): given Aristides’ well-publicised fight for exemption from liturgies,⁴⁵ it would be very natural to hear in Demosthenes’ defence of

⁴⁴ Hermog. *Stat.* I 18.2–3; *Prolegomenōn Syllogē* 208.16–18. Another reason for Aristides the Just’s absence from declamation is probably the poverty of the historical tradition, which is largely limited to Plutarch’s rather thin *Life of Aristides*.

⁴⁵ See Boulanger (Boulanger 1923, 137–43), Behr (Behr, *Sacred Tales* 1968, 61–86 passim), Bowersock (Bowersock 1969, 36–40).

exemptions an echo of Aristides' own position; indeed, we know that Demosthenes' own speech was used in this way in the imperial period (p. 210 n. 1 above).

Finally, two further intriguing cases from the career of Hadrian of Tyre. Philostratus suggests that the belief that this sophist was a magician had arisen because of the frequency with which magic featured in his declamations (VS 590), that is, because some had taken Hadrian's declamations as somehow deriving from Hadrian's life. This would be an instance of a self-reference seen even when it had not been intended by the author (compare the referral of Timotheus' poetry to Philopoemen which we considered at the start of chapter 3): as such, it is highly suggestive of how frequent and easy such self-reference in declamation might have been. (This of course would be a second instance of oratory figured as magic, to be added to the case of Hippodromus and Megistias discussed above). A second instance is be found in Lucian, who records a declamation delivered at the Olympic Games and probably to be attributed to Hadrian of Tyre,⁴⁶ entitled 'Pythagoras prevented by one of the Athenians from taking part in the Eleusinian rites on the grounds that he is a barbarian, since he used to say that before this life he had once been Euphorbus' (ὁ Πυθαγόρας κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τινος Ἀθηναίου... μετέχειν τῆς Ἐλευσίνι τελετῆς ὡς βάρβαρος, ὅτι ἔλεγεν αὐτὸς ὁ Πυθαγόρας πρὸ τούτου ποτὲ καὶ Εὐφορβὸς γεγονέναι) (Luc. *Pseudol.* 5): the declaimer here would have been speaking in one major Panhellenic context (the Olympic games) in the persona of someone speaking in another (the Eleusinian rites). That such an alignment was used by the declaimer to make reference outside the declamation seems more likely when we recall that (according to Lucian) the declaimer had arranged in advance for this scenario to be selected by his audience when he offered them an apparently free choice: it looks as if the declaimer had explicitly sought out a scenario that aligned with his performance context. Furthermore, the fact that the declaimer thought that an audience might plausibly believe

⁴⁶ GRS no. 1123.

that such an alignment had arisen by accident suggests that such a situation could occur with relative ease.

In short, given that declamation seems to have been a genre unusually open to the blurring of boundaries between art and life (chapter 5), and given the clear cases we have seen in this chapter that show this metaleptic potential being exploited in practice, it seems highly likely that many of these further close parallels between the careers of declaimers and those of their declamatory subjects were used or understood to be used to effect self-reference, even if the full extent of that external reference and its nuances is now beyond recovery. Broader parallels between declamation and civic life in the Greek east were discussed in chapter 3: many of these might also have offered opportunities for external reference of the sort we have been discussing in this chapter.

Close reference to one's immediate performance context, then, emerges as a major, previously underappreciated function of Greek declamation, used typically to raise the stakes in talking about oneself or one's audience. This discovery should be significant not just for reading declamations and sophistic culture in our period, but also for the numerous occasions on which rhetoric and declamatory material is found in other contemporary genres, as well as for later declaimers such as Libanius, Himerius, and Choricus, as well as Latin declamation.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ I discuss metalepsis in Choricus' *Declamation* 12 (*The Orator*) below (pp. 246–47).

Appendix: Metaleptic Reading in Seneca's *Controversiae*

The Greek examples we have considered in this chapter are paralleled by two clear instances of art-life metalepsis in Seneca the Elder's *Controversiae*. Whether the presence of such immediate metalepsis between art and life in Latin declamation as well as Greek is to be ascribed to the similarity between the contexts in which they were performed⁴⁸ or a shared tradition (or both) is probably ultimately unknowable; nonetheless, the examples of the phenomenon in both literatures should be considered mutually supporting.

(i) Quintus Haterius, declaiming a scenario about a man suing for damages when he had been torn away from the graves of his three sons, burst into tears mid-declimation, reminded by his theme of the son he had lost (*Controv.* 4. pr. 6). This incident is described in the preface to book 4, and the declamation title in question is then the first of the scenarios for which epigrams are given in this book: it is natural therefore to understand these epigrams to be those of Haterius. If so, then Haterius exploits the similarity between his own position and that of his fictitious subject in detail. 'I believe that some will be surprised that I've come to the forum when I have only recently lost my sons' (*credo mirari aliquem, quod in forum amissis modo liberis veniam*), says his fictitious subject: his real world audience might be surprised that he has come forward to declaim in such a circumstance! Haterius' fictitious subject describes the paradoxical comfort to be found in lamentation: one wonders whether performing this declamation did not also serve as some sort of catharsis for Haterius himself. On the other hand, the fictitious father also repeatedly imagines himself as being prevented from weeping by the young man's intervention: in the real world too, though there was perhaps some comfort for Haterius in acting out his grief in this declamation, having to declaim must also to some degree have prevented him from grieving as he would have wished. Seneca's comment on Haterius' eventual breakdown in the performance is

⁴⁸ Some points of similarity were noted in chapter 5 (p. 206 n. 30).

revealing: after the breakdown, he says, Haterius (who seems to have continued to declaim) ‘spoke with so much more energy, and so much more pathos, that it was clear how great a part of genius grief can be’ (*tanto maiore impetu dixit, tanto miserabilius, ut apparet quam magna interim pars esset ingenii dolor*): the mingling of the declaimer’s real-world situation and that of the character he is declaiming is not felt to be an intrusion, but rather to have improved the declamation.

(ii) In a declamation about adopting a grandchild born of a prostitute (*Controv.* 2.4), it was felt to be rather incautious of Latro, performing before the emperor, to have uttered the words ‘now that man is by adoption being raised from the depths and inserted into the nobility’ (*iam iste ex imo per adoptionem nobilitati inseritur*) (*Controv.* 2.4.13), given that Augustus was at the time contemplating the adoption of the humble Agrippa’s grandsons. Two points are notable about this incident. First, the allusion to the present seems to have been unintended (Seneca calls it an *error* (*Controv.* 2.4.13)) and seen on the basis of a single phrase: this suggests an audience highly attuned to contemporary references. Second, the double meaning may have been highlighted by audience intervention. When Latro uttered his troubled phrase, Maecenas apparently indicated that the emperor was in a hurry and that Latro should bring his declamation to a swift conclusion: some, Seneca says, thought that he did this not to conceal the awkward parallel with contemporary developments in the imperial household, but rather to highlight it. If so, then this would be a nice example of the performative dimension of a declamation pulling the audience back to the real world, as discussed in chapter 5 (above, pp. 202–8), and as we have suggested for Polemo’s Marathon declamations.

Conclusion

Not the Dramatic Illusion

We began this thesis with Cicero and the paradox of practice: the idea that all practice is by its very nature both divorced from reality and, at the same time, also preparation for some future real-world application of one's skills (pp. 11–12). I argued that previous work on Greek declamation, particularly on declamation in the second and third centuries, which often characterizes the genre as fundamentally 'escapist' or 'nostalgic', has given far too much attention to the idea of declamation as something divorced from reality, and far too little to its potential real-world reference and relevance.

In this thesis, by contrast, I have put the real-world reference and relevance of Greek declamation centre stage, exploring its interactions with contemporary rhetorical theory (section I), with contemporary discourses of all kinds (section II), and with its immediate performance context (section III). It should be stressed that these three contexts and their associated modes of reading should not be seen as separate, but rather as overlapping and mutually reinforcing. To think about a declamation's rhetoric is necessarily to become conscious to some degree of the author who deployed that rhetoric; once one is conscious of the author, then it is all the easier for alignments between the author's own life and the dramatic scenario in which the author's fictitious narrator finds himself to trigger metaleptic readings of the narrator as the author; finally, once one has started noticing parallels between an author and his fictitious subject, it is a natural final step to widen one's perspective to think about parallels between the declamation's fiction and the contemporary world more broadly. Ultimately, indeed, we should see the three modes of reading as not just overlapping and mutually reinforcing, but actually as three manifestations of the same underlying

phenomenon: a focusing of attention on something other than a declamation's dramatic fiction.

Where Next?

It goes without saying that much remains to be done in the study of Greek declamation. First, the declamations themselves are, for the most part, in desperate need of editions, translations, and commentaries. Not only will such works facilitate further research generally, but commentary, with its close attention to the micro-level of the text, would be a particularly good vehicle for applying rhetorical reading to declamations, as well as for the historical contextualization of the texts. Many of the paratexts to declamation are also in need of such treatment. Given how much of interest there is even in Reiske's hasty collation of a few inferior manuscripts of the Aristides scholia, a proper critical edition of these scholia, including those never before published (whose full extent is unknown), would surely offer further invaluable insights into the process of ancient rhetorical reading (cf. above, pp. 68–75). A second *desideratum* must be a catalogue of declamation titles, ideally both Greek and Latin, and ideally for all periods; this catalogue would include any surviving fragments or discussions of the scenarios in ancient sources. Such a *Corpus declamationum*, by allowing scholars quickly to survey all the evidence for a given scenario, would speed up future work considerably. These projects would all be massive undertakings, obviously beyond the capabilities of one researcher or even one research group (though technology may speed things up to some degree), and will require large-scale, long-term collaboration, almost certainly internationally. On a smaller scale, much could be done to make the field more accessible to students. A volume on Greek declamation in the *Greece and Rome New Surveys in the Classics* series, for instance, would be welcome, as would an *Oxford Readings in Greek Declamation* or a *Cambridge Companion to Greek Declamation*; the entry in the *OCD*, too, needs to be expanded to embrace more than just purely technical aspects of the

genre. The result of all this work, for both students and researchers, will ultimately be to put Greek declamation back *in play*, readily available to all those interested in the classical world, to whom it offers such a rich store of material.

This thesis, too, has not been exhaustive: not every surviving second- and third-century declamation has been read according to each of the three modes of reading reconstructed. Of course, an exhaustive treatment of the corpus was never the goal: the readings in chapters 2, 4, and 6 were presented above all to exemplify and explore the modes of reading reconstructed in chapters 1, 3, and 5. In any case, some possible combinations of texts and modes of reading are obviously unpromising: I doubt, for instance, that a metaleptic approach to Lesbonax's surviving declamations will get us very far, given that we know literally nothing about the context in which they were produced, and next to nothing about their author (above, p. 26). But there are other promising combinations that remain to be explored. All of Aristides' declamations, I suspect, would be well worth reading with an eye to rhetorical theory, as would Lucian's, and the possibilities for mythological readings of Greek declamation must be virtually limitless. One declamatory discourse in urgent need of mythological treatment must be that of the tyrant, given its prominence in second- and third-century culture, and the declamatory tyrant offers an interesting counterpoint to the 'Good King' of the kingship literature of which Dio Chrysostom's *Discourses on Kingship* (Orr. 1–4) are perhaps this period's most well-known examples.¹ The conclusions of this thesis also need to be integrated into wider contexts. Rhetoric, for all its self-promoting discourse, was not the only component of ancient education, nor was it the only form of knowledge in the ancient world.² Our conclusions about rhetorical theory should be of interest to all those

¹ On tyranny as a theme for declamation, cf. p. 103 n. 27 and p. 133; for tyranny as a contemporary discourse, see pp. 143–4. The most up-to-date treatment of kingship literature in the imperial period is that of Whitmarsh (Whitmarsh, *Roman Empire* 2001, 181–246; for bibliography, see especially 181 n. 3).

² On ancient education and declamation's place within it, see the works cited above, p. 16 n. 21.

working on ancient grammar, lexicography, and philosophy, as well as ‘pseudo-scientific’ disciplines such as medicine, physiognomy, and astrology, and the study of declamation has the potential to be informed by these areas in turn.³ Our conclusions about the discourse of slavery in chapter 4, meanwhile, are a contribution to the story of relations between senate and emperor, and between Greek and Roman. My proposals about metalepsis in section III need to be integrated into our pictures of the declaimers concerned: we do not yet have a biography of Aelius Aristides, for example, that satisfactorily incorporates his declamatory activity into the wider story of his life.⁴ Finally, this thesis’ overall picture of declamation as a more presentist genre than has hitherto been appreciated contributes to the growing awareness of this phenomenon in Greek imperial literature (above, pp. 113–14).

New Directions

In the introduction to this thesis, I outlined what we might call the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ significance of an enquiry into second- and third-century Greek declamation (above pp.15–18): declamation is important ‘horizontally’, in that the rhetoric deployed in this genre spills over into a range of related genres, particularly history, the novel, and epistolography, and ‘vertically’, in that it continues after our period through Late Antiquity to the end of Byzantium. In this final section, then, I move sideways and then forwards to offer two preliminary soundings of what a knowledge of second- and third-century declamation and the modes of reading it entails can contribute to the reading of other genres and later declamation.

³ I intend to address this question in my post-doctoral work.

⁴ There is very little in the accounts of Baumgart (Baumgart 1874) or Swain (S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* 1996, 254–97); Boulanger’s chapter on Aristides’ declamations does not integrate Aristides’ declamation with Aristides’ life (Boulanger 1923, 271–93).

Sideways

First, let us consider the Greek novel, whose interaction with Greek declamation has long been recognised,⁵ specifically Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, the work of an otherwise unknown author of perhaps the late second or early third century.⁶ The episode we will look at is the 'Methymnaean Affair', a short and largely self-contained episode at the beginning of the second book (2.12–17). In this light-hearted incident, some rich young men from Methymna accuse the goatherd Daphnis of having lost them their ship. The Methymnaeans' hunting dogs had chased Daphnis' goats down to the sea, and the goats had promptly chewed through the willow cable with which the Methymnaeans' ship had been secured, allowing it to float away. The young men were naturally angered, and wanted to take Daphnis as recompense for their lost ship, but were persuaded to allow a sort of trial to take place, with the cowherd Philetas judging between the two sides. Now while the scenario is not typical declamatory material, this is nonetheless, like a declamation, a fictitious oratorical contest: we should therefore be on the lookout for the use of rhetorical theory, and be ready to deploy the techniques of rhetorical reading if we find it. As we shall see, both Daphnis and his Methymnaean opponents can be seen as using rhetorical theory,⁷ and this fact has implications for wider questions in the study of this novel as a whole. This episode has been briefly analysed in rhetorical terms by Fernández-Garrido, but that analysis is purely technical and not integrated into a wider account of the novel's key interests (Fernández-Garrido 2009, 469).

The Methymnaeans speak first. They are described as rich young men (2.12.1): as such, we would expect them to have received a rhetorical education, or presently to be undergoing

⁵ Above, p. 18.

⁶ Text in Reeve (Reeve 1994); commentary in Morgan (Morgan 2004). On dating, see Morgan (Morgan 2004, 1–2).

⁷ The whole episode, indeed, seems to represent a kind of rhetoricization of the song-contest so common in pastoral poetry.

such training. Yet their speech itself is very simple, and contains very little that one could analyse precisely in terms of rhetorical theory (2.15.2–3). But the text hints that speaking in this way may have been a deliberate rhetorical decision on the part of the young men, who could have produced something much more elaborate. They are said to have delivered ‘a clear and concise speech, since they had a cowherd for a judge’ (σαφῆ καὶ σύντομα, βουκόλον ἔχοντες δικαστήν) (2.15.1). To adapt one’s style to one’s audience in this way is good rhetorical practice, and to consider one’s audience was part of the process of *noēsis* that theory prescribed as the first step in preparing a case (above, p. 52); σαφής (‘clear’) and σύντομος (‘concise’) too both have technical rhetorical meanings.⁸ Still, the end result is a speech with almost nothing that would respond to a formal rhetorical analysis.

In Daphnis’ speech, by contrast, a great deal of rhetorical theory is visible. A rhetorician’s first step in any scenario is of course to determine the ‘issue’ (above, pp. 36–42). In this instance, as Daphnis cannot deny what has happened (which would make the issue ‘conjecture’), nor argue that he had some fundamental right to act as he did (which would make the issue ‘counter-plea’), the issue is ‘counter-position’, a plea of mitigating circumstances of some kind, of which there are four varieties. Daphnis first deploys the variety known as ‘counter-accusation’, in which one argues that one’s accuser is ultimately responsible for what happened: in this instance, Daphnis blames the Methymnaeans for not controlling their dogs, referring to them as ‘wretched hunters’ (κυνηγέται πονηροί) (2.16.2). Next he deploys a second variety of counter-position, that of ‘transference’, in which responsibility for what happened is transferred not to one’s accuser but to some third party. In this case, Daphnis transfers responsibility to the Methymnaeans’ dogs (2.16.2). Finally, Daphnis deploys a third species of counter-position, a ‘mitigation’, in which responsibility

⁸ σαφήνεια has a long history in Greek rhetoric as a desirable quality of both the narrative portion of a speech and of style more generally; the history of σύντομία (also a virtue of a narration) is a little shorter. See Ernesti and Lausberg (Ernesti 1795, s.v. σαφήνεια, σύντομον, Lausberg 1998, s.v. σαφήνεια, σαφής, σύντομία).

for what happened is transferred to an inanimate cause. In this case Daphnis attributes the action of his goats to hunger, claiming that they chewed through the willow cord because there was no food to eat on the beach (2.16.3). This is followed by a second ‘mitigation’: it wasn’t really Daphnis’ goats that were responsible for the loss of the Methymnaeans’ ship, but rather the weather that carried the boat out to sea (2.16.3). To create a ‘mitigation’ by blaming the weather is a common move: in Hermogenes’ work *De statibus*, the canonical example of ‘mitigation’ is the case of the failure of the Athenian generals to pick up the survivors after the battle of Arginusae, which is also blamed on the weather at sea (II 8.10–12); later in the same work Hermogenes lists a storm as one of two examples of the sort of external factor which one might use to exculpate oneself for a crime (VI 17).⁹ Daphnis ends his speech with a final dig at the Methymnaeans: who would believe that a boat holding such valuables would have been secured with only a willow shoot (2.16.3)? This functions as a final counter-accusation: the loss of the ships, Daphnis is suggesting, is really the fault of the young men, who secured it so poorly. Won over by Daphnis’ rhetoric, the cowherd Philetas duly acquits the herdsman, declaring with perhaps slightly naïve literalism that Daphnis was not to blame, nor his goats, but rather the sea and the wind, who needed others to judge them (ὥν ἄλλους εἶναι δικαστάς) (2.17.1).

Now the rhetorical theory visible in Daphnis’ speech (and largely absent from the Methymnaeans’ speech) has important ramifications for the reading of the novel, in particular for its reflections on town and country (Webb, *Rhetoric and the Novel* 2007, 533). The normative cultural expectations in an incident such as this would be that rich people like the Methymnaean young men would produce eloquent and persuasive speech, while the

⁹ Whether Hermogenes was writing before or after Longus is not necessarily very important: the basic types of issue are older than Hermogenes, and I cite the *De statibus* only as a conveniently non-fragmentary and reasonably contemporary exposition. Cf. Fernández-Garrido (Fernández-Garrido 2009, 456–7). Hermogenes’ example also appears at Aps. *Rh.* 293.12–22.

goatherd Daphnis would produce something rather simpler; the cowherd Philetas, too, would not be expected to appreciate or even comprehend eloquent or persuasive speech. But what happens totally confounds these expectations. Even though the Methymnaeans seem to have some rhetorical training, their presumptions about Philetas' abilities lead them to produce something very simple; Daphnis, meanwhile, despite his lowly status, nonetheless manages to produce some sharp Hermogenean rhetoric; finally, Philetas' judgement in favour of Daphnis makes clear that the simple speech that the Methymnaeans had so patronizingly assumed would be appropriate to him was quite misjudged, and that the tighter argumentation of Daphnis' speech, which he is fully able to appreciate, was much more apt.¹⁰ As such, this episode contributes to the novel's wider deconstruction of any easy town-country antithesis. Just as the unschooled Daphnis nonetheless seems to have made some progress in rhetoric on his own, so too are Daphnis and Chloe, despite their ignorance, still able to make some progress in erotic love through instinct alone (Morgan 2004, 10–11, Webb, *Rhetoric and the Novel* 2007, 533–4); and just as Daphnis' speech turns out to contain more artifice than that of his city-dwelling opponents, so (despite the traditional opposition between nature and art) does Longus' work frequently reveal that there is art in the countryside also (Morgan 2004, 14–15). In short, this case is a fine example of what formal rhetorical analysis can contribute to literary criticism, both at a micro- and a macro-level.

Forwards

Finally, let us move forwards to the very end of antiquity, or, to reframe the period more positively, to the beginning of the Middle Ages. Take the work of the declaimer Choricus, whose floruit may be placed in c. 500 CE, and who was a member of the so-called school of Gaza, a modern term for a group of rhetors active in sixth-century Gaza.¹¹ I look here

¹⁰ There almost seems to be a moral lesson here: that knowledge of the rhetorical principle of adapting one's speech to one's audience is useless without the social skills to gauge that audience correctly in the first place.

¹¹ For Choricus, his declamations, and the School of Gaza, see above p. 29 with n. 75.

specifically at his twelfth declamation, *The Orator*. The scenario is as follows. During a siege, an orator from the besieged city went out to speak to the enemy alone and persuaded them to lift the siege; he now claims the reward offered to a citizen who ‘has brought a war to a successful conclusion’ (τῷ κατορθώσαντι πόλεμον) (*Preface to Decl.* 12). He is opposed in this by a general of the city, who argues that such rewards should only be given to those who settle wars by arms, not by words. I will now consider what this declamation might offer to those reading rhetorically, metaleptically, and mythologically. Obviously there is not space here fully to contextualise and analyse every facet of this declamation: rather, what follows should be taken as a sounding that only suggests what a full analysis might confirm.

In terms of rhetoric, one of the most striking things about this declamation is the quantity and indeed quality not of the speaker’s arguments but of his opponent’s. For by my reckoning sixty-nine of this declamation’s hundred and twenty-three chapters (44–112) are given over to citing and dismissing what in rhetorical theory are known as *antitheseis* (ἀντιθέσεις)—(imagined) counter-arguments of one’s opponent. Now obviously the arguments of one’s opponents should not normally be allowed to go unanswered, and indeed it is standard practice in ancient rhetoric to give some time to countering them after having set out one’s own arguments (e.g. Aristotle *Rh.* 3.17.14). Yet to quote so many of the opponent’s arguments—indeed, to give them more space than one’s own arguments—does not seem prudent, and risks creating the impression that there is more to be said on the opponent’s side than one’s own. Furthermore, some of the opponent’s arguments that our orator cites are actually quite good. For example, in chapter 72, the orator addresses the objection that an enemy who has only been persuaded with words to break off his attack is much more likely to attack again at some future date than an enemy who has been defeated decisively in battle. This is a strong argument, and the orator of this scenario does himself no favours by quoting it directly: he would have done much better to counter it implicitly,

for example by subtly making it clear in the course of his narrative that a second attack was for whatever reason unlikely.

What seems to be happening is that the urge to demonstrate a general mastery of rhetoric and rhetorical theory has overcome the immediate rhetorical needs of the fictitious situation. By incorporating within his speech good arguments for the other side, Choricus seems to be doing in one speech what we have seen Polemo or Aristides do in two (above, pp. 90–103): first, parading one’s ability to find good arguments for any position, and then—a still greater achievement—overcoming those clever counter-arguments also.¹² In fact, many of Choricus’ declamations are structured like *The Orator*: after an introduction, narrative, and a setting out of the speaker’s own position, the speaker then proceeds to cite and reject a long string of really quite persuasive counter-arguments; we might call this part of a Chorician declamation an ‘*antithesis stack*’.¹³

That Choricus is indeed parading his own rhetorical abilities in the second half of this declamation is strongly suggested by the metarhetoric with which he introduces the imagined objections. What we may identify as the first antithesis is presented as follows: ‘Now, as regards what this man calls his undefeatable counterargument, by which he proclaims that the court will be mastered, and in the face of which he declares my skills to be weak and unreliable...’ (ἦν τοίνυν ἀήττητον οὗτος ἀντιλογία καλεῖ, δι’ ἧς ἐπαγγέλλεται χειροῦσθαι τὸ δικαστήριον, πρὸς ἣν ἀσθενῇ μοί φησι καὶ σαθρὰν εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην) (44). Such a comment both promotes the clever *antithesis* that Choricus has devised, and makes Choricus’ eventual achievement in overcoming it seem all the greater. Later on in the

¹² On the Latin side, Seneca actually seems to think that it is compulsory to include arguments for the other side in a declamation, going as far as to say that ‘nothing is more shameful than... not to rebut any arguments that one’s opponents might make’ (*nihil est autem turpius quam... non refellere si responderi potest*) (*Controv.* 10.5.12).

¹³ Compare, for example, Chor. *Decl.* 9 (*The Child-Killer*), which by my reckoning incorporates no fewer than six *antitheseis*, the first starting in chapter 70, and the last beginning in chapter 115.

speech, the metarhetorical comments seem to dramatize Choricus' wearing down of his opponent. 'Well now, perhaps he will make this overblown attack against me also' (Ἵσως τοίνυν καὶ περιττὴν ἡμῖν προσβολὴν ἐποίσει ταύτην) (56) we hear before one *antithesis*; 'well now, perhaps otherwise at a loss...' (Τάχα τοίνυν ἀπορήσας λοιπόν) (72) we hear before another.¹⁴ Just like a second- or third-century declamation, then, Choricus' *Orator* seems to have as one of its primary concerns the exploration of rhetorical techniques, and the parading of one's mastery of them.

As we have said, it is a short step from reflection on a declaimer's rhetorical achievement to reflection on the declaimer himself. In fact, as we shall see, *The Orator* positively cries out for a metaleptic reading, perhaps more so than any other extant Greek declamation, though given our lack of knowledge of the specific context in which it was performed, we can be surer that metalepsis took place than we can about the specific ends to which it was directed.

Given that the declamation's fictitious narrator and real author share the same profession, that of oratory, there is abundant metaleptic potential inherent in the scenario, and in his realisation of that scenario, Choricus exploits that metaleptic potential fully. It begins in the *prolalia* that we know to have been prefaced to the declamation (*Dialexis* 25). This *prolalia* reveals that the declamation was delivered in two halves, over two days, and that this text preceded the second performance. After some allusions to famous figures from classical literature who were criticised for leaving a speech unfinished, Choricus rounds off the *prolalia* with a joke: that while it might have been appropriate for a declaimer playing the part of the soldier to leave the speech unfinished, given that soldiers are not necessarily able speakers, for someone playing the part of an orator to do so would be quite out of character (*Dialexis* 25.3). In the *protheōria* that follows, Choricus again foregrounds the similarity

¹⁴ The repeated use of τοίνυν ('well then') to introduce these *antitheseis* might be thought by repetition to create a sense of inevitability about the orator's demolition of his opponent's arguments.

between himself and his fictitious subject.¹⁵ Explaining his decision to take the part of the orator in this scenario,¹⁶ he says ‘I—for I know how to give speeches, not how to make war—have fittingly chosen the one whose profession is the same as my own’ (ἐγὼ δέ—ῥητορεύειν γὰρ οἶδα μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμεῖν—τὸν ὁμότεχνον ἐμαυτῷ δικαίως ἐξελεξάμην) (5). Finally, he closes the *theōria* with a last metaleptic remark: ‘I would pray that the speech be seen as worthy of an orator’ (εὐξαίμην ἂν ῥήτορος ἄξιον ὀφθῆναι τὸν λόγον). This has a double sense: he prays both that the speech will be seen as a fitting and plausible speech for the fictitious orator to have delivered, and that it will be seen as a declamatory performance worthy of a real-life orator.

The payoff for these metaleptic preliminaries comes at the end of the declamation (which, as the moment before the dramatic fiction ends, is perhaps particularly open to metalepsis). Boldly declaring his choice of reward before it has been confirmed, the orator tells his opponent that he has chosen ‘that your sons attend my school and are educated as orators rather than soldiers’ (τοὺς ὑμετέρους υἱεῖς εἰς ἐμὴν φοιτῆσαι παλαίστραν καὶ ῥήτορας μᾶλλον ἢ στρατιώτας παιδεύεσθαι) (116); he goes on to say ‘and you, if you have any sense, and if you happen to have a son, will enrol him among my band’ (σύ τε ἂν σωφρονῆς, εἰ παῖς ὢν σοι τυγχάνει, τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἐγκαταλέξεις αὐτὸν θιασώταις) (117). Spoken by a man who teaches rhetoric, the metalepsis in such remarks is almost unavoidable. In short, Choricus uses metalepsis ingeniously to bind together the triumph of his fictitious orator with his own professional standing.

Finally, as we have said, it is one short last step from thinking about the relationship between a declamation’s fictitious narrator and its real-world author to thinking about the relationship

¹⁵ This was mentioned above (p. 198).

¹⁶ One wonders how much of a decision this really was: I doubt that many declaimers would have been able to resist the metaleptic temptations of playing the orator in a scenario like this.

between the declamation's fiction and real life more broadly. While there is obviously no space here to go into a detailed reconstruction of life in sixth-century Gaza or indeed of the sixth-century Byzantine empire, it is clear that war and rhetoric were as important and contentious in this period as they had ever been.¹⁷ Late Antiquity was distinctly more violent than the High Empire, and was rocked by both barbarian incursions (such as Attila's victories in the Balkans in the 440s, or the Sassanid king Kavadh's incursions in the early 500s) and struggles for the imperial throne (for example, the rise and fall of the courtier Aspar or the emperor Zeno's battle against various pretenders).¹⁸ While Gaza avoided the larger upheavals, Palestine's desert frontier was very difficult to defend, and Bedouin raids common (H. Kennedy 2000, 596). As for oratory, rhetorical education continued to enjoy prestige, but now found its position contested to some degree by Christianity (Browning 2000, 860–2, 866–8): as Choricus himself said, 'there was need of each sort of education—both the one that bestows eloquence, and the one that benefits the soul' (ἔδει δὲ ἑκατέρας παιδεύσεως, τῆς μὲν εὐγλωττίαν χαριζομένης, τῆς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ὠφελοῦσης) (*Or.* 2.9). In such a world, it is hard to imagine how one would not have found contemporary resonances in a declamation that compared benefits conferred on the state by generals and orators respectively.

Thus, at the beginning of the Middle Ages, perhaps seven hundred years after declamation began, and almost nine hundred years before it would end, do we find Greek declamation offering what declamation had always offered: a chance for deep and open-minded reflection on key issues in the contemporary world.

¹⁷ On Late Antique Gaza, see Downey (Downey, *Gaza in the Early Sixth Century* 1963), Glucker (Glucker 1987), Saliou (Saliou, *Gaza de 407 à 637* 2000), Saliou (Saliou, *Actes du colloque international de Poitiers* 2004), Saliou (Saliou, *Gaza dans l'Antiquité Tardive* 2007), Quintern (Quintern 2010).

¹⁸ On warfare in Late Antiquity, see Shaw (Shaw 1999), Whitby (Whitby, *The Army* 2000), and Whitby (Whitby, *Armies and Society* 2000).

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