



Southern African Liberation and Great Power Intervention:
Towards a Theory of Revolution in an International Context

Michael Anthony McFaul

St. John's College, University of Oxford

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the D.Phil
in International Relations in the Faculty of Social Studies

Trinity Term, 1991

ABSTRACT

Southern African Liberation and Great Power Intervention: Towards a Theory of Revolution in an International Context

by Michael McFaul,

St. John's College, University of Oxford

D.Phil, International Relations, Faculty of Social Studies

Trinity Term, 1991

Whether welcomed, feared, or ignored, revolutions have been rare but pivotal disjunctures in the history of the modern world. No history of the states system would be complete without accounting for the transformative impact of revolutions on the security, diplomatic, and economic configurations of the modern international system. Similarly, no political history of most contemporary states would be complete without a discussion of "revolutionary moments" which recast their governments, economies, and societies.

In an attempt to understand revolutions in an international context, this dissertation adopts the method of structured, focus comparison to analyze two cases of revolutionary upheaval -- Angola and Zimbabwe -- within the context of the bi-polar, antagonistic international system. While both Angola and Zimbabwe (1) are located in southern Africa, (2) had agriculturally-based economies dominated by large settler communities, (3) became independent two decades later than most of Africa, (4) gained independence through protracted guerrilla wars, and (5) were not considered vital to either Soviet or American interests, nonetheless Angola experienced a revolutionary socio-economic transformation, but Zimbabwe did not.

To account for this variation, I look for differences in the international context of these two revolutions, specifically changes in foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. I argue that Angola experienced a revolution because both superpowers engaged in confrontational strategies of supporting and containing revolutionary movements. Zimbabwe did not experience a similar fate because the United States and its allies adopted a cooptive strategy toward the liberation movements, while the Soviet Union again adopted a confrontational strategy.

Drawing from these two cases, I conclude by assessing (1) the influence of cooptive versus confrontational power regarding revolutionary situations in general, and (2) the more universal properties of the dynamic between revolutions and the international system.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of John Vincent.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation grew out of a combination of intellectual interests in international relations and the Soviet Union, and political involvement with southern Africa. The former intellectual interests were first stimulated by Alex George, Alex Dallin, and Stephen Krasner, and later Adam Roberts, Lynn Eden, Peter Gellman, David Holloway, and John Vincent. For my political engagement, I am grateful especially to Brad Hightower, Kip Bobroff, Kumi Naidoo, SOSA and RSAA.

In writing this dissertation, I tried to grapple with three different geographical regions of the world. For teaching me about Africa, I am indebted to David Abernethy, Jocelyn Alexander, Gerald Bender, Michael Clough, Phyllis Ferguson, John Marcum, Bob Price, Stephen Stedman, and Terence Ranger. For teaching me about the Soviet Union, I thank Alexander Dallin, Appollon Davidson, David Holloway, and Sergei Markov. For teaching me about the United States, I thank the late night kitchen crowd at the Villa.

The initial intellectual inspiration for writing this dissertation came from many discussions with my supervisor, John Vincent. Before every meeting with John, I felt confused, frustrated, and unsure of my ideas. After every session with him, I came away stimulated, invigorated, and excited again. Revolutions, international system, and world order are difficult and complex subjects which do not fit easily into parsimonious theories or 400 page theses. Rather than steer me towards more manageable subjects, John encouraged me to keep with the big picture and the grand theories, even if my case studies were two small African states. In prompting me to seek partial answers for big questions rather than full answers for little questions, I am forever indebted to John.

If John Vincent kept my head in the clouds, Terence Ranger kept my feet on the ground. At times, the combination of supervisors from such different disciplines, one an international relations theorist and the other an African historian, made my research difficult. What looked to one supervisor as solid IR theory appeared to the other as poli sci mumbo jumbo. The dynamic between the two, however, kept me honest. I probably will never become an African historian, but I learned as much about my dissertation subject from them, and in the first instance, Terence Ranger, than from any other discipline. Hopefully, someday, the academy will learn to appreciate the benefits of such inter-disciplinary interaction.

I cannot think of a more pleasant place to write a dissertation than the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at Stanford University. Through generous support from the Center and the Ford Foundation, I spent two years at the Center where the bulk of this thesis was written. During the electric events of 1989-90, it was particularly rewarding to be in the company of Andy Bennet, Robert Darst, Lynn Eden, Jim Goldgeier, Robert Hammerton-Kelly, John Harvey, David Holloway, and Kim Zisk, for this bit of history. For all their support and

stimulation, I am grateful to Gerry Bowman, Helen Morales, Anca Rhuelen, Yvonne Brown, and Louis Tanguay at CISAC, and Karen Fung of the Hoover Institution.

In addition to CISAC and the Ford Foundation, I wish to thank the Rhodes Trust, the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the International Exchanges and Research Board (IREX), the Gilbert Murray Trust, Beit Trust, the Cyril Foster Fund, and St. John's College, Oxford for financial support.

Research for this dissertation has spanned four continents and several countries. In every place I did research, I was constantly amazed at how generous people can be under the most adverse circumstances. After all, a "graduate student" writing a "dissertation" (two words I hope to never hear again) has little to offer in return for the free information she or he seeks. I would especially like to thank those who spared the hour, the afternoon, or the day, during times of civil war, political crisis, or governmental collapse.

Landing in an unknown country with nothing but questions and traveller checks can be an unsettling experience. To those people who helped me find my way, thank you. In Zimbabwe, I am especially grateful to Patrick Bond, Colin and Agnes Darch, Phyllis Ferguson, Jonathan Moyo, Masipula Sithole, and Jose. In Angola, I want to thank Chico Vongole, Domingos Coelho, and Mike and Anna. In the Soviet Union, I am indebted to Tanya Krasnopevtseva, Vladimir Kuznetsov, and Lev Rytov.

I spent my final year of writing this dissertation in Moscow, a location which presented considerable, unexpected logistical problems. I, however, was fortunate to have friends all over the world who did me tremendous favors. I am especially grateful to Jocelyn Alexander, Arseny Berezin, Kip Bobroff, and Don and Gloria Norton for pulling through in a pinch.

Anyone who has written a dissertation, or who knows someone who has written a dissertation, knows what a lonely and long process it is. Friends who tolerated my whining, pretended to express interest in theories of revolution, and helped to distract me along way have been most important to completing this dissertation. In Oxford, Adam, Greg, Elizabeth, Jocelyn, Kip, Maurice, Mike, and Susan helped to keep me sane. In California and Montana, Cassio, Doug, Ed, John, Kyle, Peter, Shannon, and Steve helped to keep me insane. In Moscow, Irene, Joel, Nastya, Sergei, and Steve, helped me to forget the insanity of that country.

Wherever I was in the world, I always had the support -- both spiritually and logistically -- of my family. Pat, Chris, Shawn, and Tim never forgot about me, however, distant we were in space. Pat in particular performed heroic feats in solving my computer crises during collect calls from Moscow and Luanda. Most important, however, was the support given to me by my parents, Kip and Helen McFaul. Though they may not have always understood why it took so long to finish this "paper," they always believed in me. It was their phone calls and letters which inspired me to keep pushing on. It was their vacation plans for England which finally forced me to finish.

Without question, my greatest thanks goes to Donna Norton. It was our trip to Nigeria (for research on one of her theses) which sparked my interest in Africa. Ever since then, she has been a daily source of support, inspiration, and intellectual stimulation. Be it discussing the role of the "masses" in revolutions, persevering the daily countdown from 1400 pages to 400, or answering my calls from Moscow to meet me in London in three days, Donna always has been there. For all those Friday nights in the Center, sunny Saturdays in the library, and months of separation, this product is as much hers as it is mine. Ya tebya l'ublu.

Southern African Liberation and Great Power Intervention:
Towards a Theory of Revolution in an International Context

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One: Introduction: Towards a Theory of Revolution
in an International Context.....1

PHASE ONE: Origins of the Revolutionary Situation

Chapter Two: Soviet Policy Towards Revolutionary
Movements in Southern Africa.....39

Chapter Three: American Policy Towards
Revolutionary Situations in Southern Africa.....60

Chapter Four: The Development of the Revolutionary
Situation in Angola, 1961-1974.....78

 I. MPLA

 II. FNLA

 III. UNITA

 IV. Bi-Polarity and Revolutionary Angola

Chapter Five: The Revolutionary Situation in
Zimbabwe, 1961-1975.....118

 I. ZAPU

 II. ZANU

 III. Bi-Polarity and Revolutionary Zimbabwe

PHASE TWO: Crises Points in the Revolution

Chapter Six: Angola, 1974-1976.....141

 I. Soviet Foreign Policy

 II. American Foreign Policy

 III. The Angolan Civil War

Chapter Seven: Zimbabwe, 1976-1980.....188

 I. Soviet Foreign Policy

 II. American Foreign Policy

 III. The Zimbabwean Liberation War

PHASE THREE: Post-Revolutionary Regime Consolidation

Chapter Eight: Angola, 1976-1990.....250

 I. Soviet Policy: The Rise and Decline of "Socialist

Orientation"	
II. American Policy: From Cooptation to Confrontation	
III. The People's Republic of Angola	
A. MPLA as Revolutionary Vanguard	
B. The Demise of Revolutionary Transformation	
C. UNITA: From Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to Lockean Liberalism	
D. The Influence of the International System	
Chapter Nine: Zimbabwe, 1980-1990.....	315
I. Soviet Foreign Policy: Failed Cooption	
II. American Foreign Policy: Quiet Cooption	
III. Zimbabwe Under ZANU: The Revolution That Never Was	
Chapter Ten: Conclusion.....	356
Bibliography.....	385

Chapter One: Introduction

Towards a Theory of Revolution in an International Context

Whether welcomed, feared, or ignored, revolutions have been rare but important disjunctures in the history of the modern world. Ripple effects of revolutions have permeated both domestic societies and world politics, be it in altering state boundaries, changing the legitimizing principles of governance, or transforming the economic organization of individual states and/or world economic systems. No history of the modern world would be complete without accounting for the transformative impact of revolutions on the security, diplomatic, and economic configurations of the international system. Similarly, no political history of most contemporary states would be complete without a discussion of "revolutionary moments" which recast their governments, economies, and societies.

A central feature of the states system in the twentieth century has been the struggle between containing and propagating revolutions.¹ Beginning with the challenge of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Western capitalist system has had to cope with the specter of revolutionary movements and revolutionary situations which threatened

¹ The term "revolution" has been employed to describe phenomena varying from the change in French government at the end of the eighteenth century to the latest technology in dental hygiene. Irrespective of the uses and misuses of the term in the past, revolution as defined in this study connotes a distinct point in history: "a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development." (Sigmund Neumann, "The International Civil War", *World Politics*, I, #1, (April 1949), pp. 333-334.) This widely used definition seeks to distinguish revolution from coups, (a change in government) or transformative processes such as the "Industrial Revolution" (a change in the socio-economic organization). Moreover, in this definition, neither violence nor class conflict are considered necessary conditions. In choosing this definition, my purpose is not to engage in the philosophical debate about what constitutes a "real" revolution. Rather, I more modestly seek to use the term, revolution, to assign an operational definition to the phenomenon to be explained. On the importance of this definitional exercise for the scientific method, see Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).

the existing international order.² Given the rigid division in Europe after World War II, the arena for competition between capitalism and socialism gravitated towards states in the periphery.³ Be it Greece in 1940's, Hungary in the 1950's, Vietnam in the 1960's, Angola in the 1970's, or Afghanistan in the 1980's, all these so-called crises in internal stabilities precipitated responses from the international division of power, which therein constituted consequential moments in the history of the postwar international system.

Some of these peripheral states underwent revolutions. Others did not. Why? Why did China undergo a revolution, but India did not? Why did Cuba experience a revolution, but not Jamaica? Why did revolutionaries in Angola "succeed" in transforming their political and economic system, whereas revolutionaries in Zimbabwe did not?⁴

To explain under which conditions revolutionary situations in peripheral states yield revolutionary outcomes, revolution must be understood as a dynamic phenomenon interfacing national and international structures and societies. Revolutions do not occur in a vacuum nor are they always confined to state boundaries, but begin, happen, and end within the context of an international system. The actors and structures comprising the international system can create

² In this study, I have focused exclusively on revolutions aimed at creating so-called socialist (or at least socialist oriented) states. Other revolutions, of course, have resulted in transformations with different aims.

³ In the immediate aftermath of World War II, even countries such as France and Italy were threatened by revolutionary upheaval. However, with the exception of Portugal in 1975, and to a lesser extent the European student revolts in 1968, revolutionary situations did not arise in the developed world during the Cold War.

⁴ Success here only mean that Angola, unlike Zimbabwe, experienced a socio-economic transformation. In setting up this dichotomy of success and failure, I make no normative correlation between success and goodness, as this kind of correlation has done much to retard our theorizing about revolutions. Nor am I suggesting that Angola did not retain features of the ancien regime, or that Zimbabwe did not "succeed" in transforming aspects of Zimbabwean political, economic, and social organization. All I want to note initially is that Angola underwent a qualitatively different kind of transformation than Zimbabwe: one in which property rights and political governance were changed. In Zimbabwe, they did not transform the economic system, and only partially succeeded in changing the political system.

or exacerbate the societal conflicts which cause revolutionary situations. The international context then conditions and constrains the development of those revolutionary situations, their outcomes, and the compositions of the regimes which emerge upon their consolidation. Finally, the international system defines the environment within which a completed revolution must adapt or else seek to change. Conversely, revolutions can create international instability, exacerbate existing tensions, or even change fundamentally the structure of the international system.

Hypothesis Set One: A Systems Level of Analysis

The distributions of power and ideology within the international system of the postwar era bind the menu of revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes possible for peripheral states. The critical determinants for predicting global responses to revolutionary upheaval are (1) the number of great powers within the system, and (2) the degree of homogeneity among the great powers regarding ideas and values about domestic and international orders.

Regarding the latter, a system in which the great powers share a common set of ideas about internal governance and external behavior will act in concert to thwart anti-systemic challenges.⁵ In such a system, revolutions in the periphery are highly unlikely. Only a revolution within a great power can mobilize domestic resources significant enough to insulate the revolutionary process from international constraints, withstand the pressure of the global status quo, and succeed.⁶

If the great powers in the system do not share a common set of norms about the nature of domestic and international order, revolutions in the periphery are more likely. Ideological cleavages between the great powers create space, opportunity, and even material

⁵ The classic study of such a system is Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored*, (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1973). Kissinger distinguished between legitimate and revolutionary order; "An order whose structure is accepted by all major powers is 'legitimate'. An order containing a power which considers its structures oppressive is 'revolutionary'." (p. 145)

⁶ The two obvious examples in the modern states system are France in 1789 and Russia in 1917. Yet, even in these cases, the weight of the international system eventually "socialized" the revolutions back into the international system (France in 1815; Russia in 1990).

support for revolutionary situations and revolutionary movements.⁷ In such systems, states with antagonistic normative constructs can seek to promote their crusades and defeat the enterprises of their enemies by supporting revolutionary upheaval.

In the absence of ideological consensus, the probability of great power engagement in revolutionary situations is increased in a bipolar system.⁸ Different from a multipolar system, a bipolar antagonistic system intimates zero-sum outcomes for the two great powers regarding all changes within the system. Consequently, with every revolutionary situation, one great power will seek to preserve the status quo and defend against a revolutionary outcome, while the other will seek to promote a revolutionary outcome which resembles that state's internal organization and external disposition.⁹

Bipolarization within the international system will produce a commensurate bipolarization within a revolutionary situation. Within a given revolutionary situation, the status quo actor(s) will gravitate politically, economically, and militarily towards the *status*

⁷ On the difference between homogenous and heterogenous international systems, see Fred Halliday, "'The Sixth Great Power': on the Study of Revolution and International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, (1990), pp. 217-219.

⁸ Structural realists theorists would not add the qualification of "antagonistic", as great powers in a bipolar system are inherently antagonistic. (See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Relations*, Reading, MA; Addison Wesley, 1979.) I add the qualification because I can imagine a system in which the two powers might establish a cooperative condominium. More importantly, however, structural realist theories about bipolar systems offer rather weak explanations for why great powers are concerned with revolutions in peripheral places. If, in a bipolar world, alliances do not matter, why did the United States and the Soviet Union feel compelled to balance against each other in every Third World civil war?

⁹ As this dissertation deals with the bipolar system of the post war era, the status quo power quickly looks like the United States while revolutionary power resembles the Soviet Union. I deliberately avoided using actual states, however, for two reasons. First, in the bipolar system after World War II, the United States and Soviet Union often reversed roles regarding revolutionary situations. In Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, or Angola after 1985, the United States was the revisionist superpower, while the Soviet Union defended the status quo. Second, it is my contention that these hypotheses are not unique to the period between 1947 and 1990, but should be tested regarding other bipolar, antagonistic systems.

quo superpower. Commensurately, revolutionaries will be attracted to the revisionist superpower and its allies. The more protracted and polarized the situation becomes within the revolutionary situation, the more likely the revolutionaries will adopt the ideology and strategies of their revisionist mentor.

Hypothesis Set Two: The State Level of Analysis

A systemic level of analysis of the distribution of ideologies and resources within the international system explains why great powers become engaged in revolutions throughout the world, and why and how revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries are affected by these distributions. To explain how the international system influences the outcomes of revolutionary situations, however, requires a unit level of analysis of the strategies and policies of the great powers.¹⁰

Though a simplification, the range of strategies available to the great powers in dealing with revolutionary situations can be located on a continuum between two opposite approaches: cooption or confrontation.¹¹ Cooption implies that the great power uses non-

¹⁰ System versus unit levels of analysis corresponds to Kenneth Waltz's third and second images. (See, Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State, and War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). I do not consider these two levels of analysis to be dichotomous, but rather, complementary. As Alexander Wendt has pointed out, despite the neo-realist claim to a system-level of analysis, the "explanatory role of the states system is decidedly state - or agent-centric." (Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 342.) A system level of analysis defines the parameters within which a unit level of analysis is constrained, just as a unit level of analysis establishes the framework within which an individual level of analysis (Waltz's first image) must be understood. The choice of levels of analysis should be determined by the depth of empirical detail which the author wishes to explain. (See Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, p. 17). For discussions about levels of analysis, see Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92; or more recently, Deborah Larson, *Origins of Containment*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 18-22.

¹¹ Though not addressing the specific issue of revolution, others have used similar dichotomies but with different labels. John Lewis Gaddis uses "positive containment" versus "negative containment," Joseph Nye employs the labels soft co-optive power versus hard military power, while Antonio Gramsci in his

military means (economic, political, ideological) to capture and socialize revolutionary movements into that power's system of states.¹² Multilateral trading regimes, international finance arrangements, market mechanisms, international law, democratic ideas, and standardized models of government institutions are powerful tools of a cooptive strategy.¹³ This strategy is usually employed by a

discussions of hegemony most parsimoniously divided power into force and consent. See Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

¹² On socialization, see G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 3, (Summer 1990); Robert Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order*, (New York: Columbia, 1987), and Michael Mann, *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, John W. Meyer, and Jeanne G. Gobalet, "Maintaining National Boundaries in the World System: The Rise of Centralist Regimes," in John Meyer and Michael Hannan, eds, *National Development and the World System*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979); and F.S. Northedge, *The International Political System*, (London: Faber, 1976). Socialization does not imply necessarily that the "socialized" revolutionaries accept the norms and values of the great power, as sometimes revolutionaries choose unhappily to accept the conditions of the prevailing systemic power due to a lack of alternatives.

¹³ These examples, of course, are cooptive tools for a capitalist system. As discusses below, socialist cooptive tools have proven to be less effective. Whether codified as rules, "regimes" or institutions, such externally sponsored ideas and norms about the order of processes can influence if not determine domestic procedures and orders. On the power of international regimes, see Stephen Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," in Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1982) p. 366. On the conflict between liberal Western institutions and Third World interests, see Stephen Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Krasner demonstrates how Third World countries have attempted to change the international regimes set up by the Western industrialized world, but have failed. I build on Krasner's argument to show how Western liberal regimes can be used to coopt and trap Third World challengers into behavior patterns acceptable to the liberal international order. Analogously, before their collapse, Soviet sponsored-socialist regimes and institutions worked to first capture and then to isolate Third World states from Western capitalism. (See, for example, Michael

status quo power. Confrontation implies that the great power uses military means to either promote or defeat revolutionaries.¹⁴ Status quo powers can use force to squelch revolutionary movements; revisionist powers can use force to empower them.

In a bipolar antagonistic system, the availability of these two strategies produce four kinds of strategic interaction: (1) both the status quo power and the revolutionary power adopt cooptive strategies; (2) the status quo power adopts a cooptive strategy and the revolutionary power adopts a confrontational strategy; (3) the status quo power adopts a confrontational power and the revolutionary power adopts a cooptive strategy, or (4) both the status quo power and the revolutionary power adopt confrontational strategies.

McFaul, "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process: Soviet-Angolan Relations Under Gorbachev" *Journal of Southern Africa Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1990).) Beyond those "regimes" identified by scholars of international political economy, non-economic institutions and ideas can be powerful forces for ordering (or reordering) behavior in revolutionary transitions. Direct external sponsorship of political institutionalization can quell revolutionary zeal as can indirect cloning of state institutions by the revolutionaries seizing power. The very act of "entering the state house" by revolutionaries is already the first victory for the status quo. By accepting and sustaining the existence of the state, revolutionaries already have been coopted into the states system. If they also respect the functions and operations of the existing market and economy, their "revolution" has effectively ended. (These propositions have been derived from Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1968), Meyer and Hannan, *National Development and the World System*, and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

¹⁴ For anti-revolutionary powers, my "confrontational strategy" corresponds with Michael Shafer's definition of "counterinsurgency" doctrine. My definition of counterinsurgency doctrine would include both cooptive and confrontational means. Shafer demonstrates quite forcefully the failures of confrontational approaches to counterinsurgency, but his study does not evaluate "cooptive" strategies. (See Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Probabilities of Revolutionary Outcomes

	revisionist power (USSR)	
	cooptive	confrontational
SQ power (US)	I (Scenario 1) I I <u>Probability Lower</u> I	I (Scenario 2) I I <u>Probability Low</u>
coopt	I I I (Nasser's Egypt) I I I	I I I ZIMBABWE I I I
confront	I (Scenario 3) I I <u>Probability Lowest</u> I I (Grenada, Chile) I I	I (Scenario 4) I I <u>Probability High</u> I I ANGOLA I I

Scenario One: If the status quo power adopts a cooptive strategy, and the revisionist power adopts a cooptive strategy, the probability for a revolutionary outcome is low. If a revolutionary situation does not precipitate outside intervention, the inertia and resources of continuity create formidable barriers to revolutionary transformation. Peaceful defection is costly. Even the most radical movements lose their revolutionary zeal when they inherit functioning states and economies locked and reified within a larger international system. Only when the revisionist power and its "way of life" present overwhelmingly attractive alternatives, will states in revolutionary situations peacefully transform.

Egypt under Nasser is representative of this class of cases.¹⁵ Throughout the 1960s, Soviet leaders devoted substantial economic and military resources towards building ties with Egypt and promoting Arab socialism. At the time, Soviet doctrine posited that bourgeois nationalists such as Nasser with an anti-Western orientation, following a non-capitalist path of development and in close alliance with the Soviet Union, could lead their state to socialism without

¹⁵ Others would be Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, or Mali in the 1960s.

war.¹⁶ Such a transition, however, never happened. Frustrated with the military and economic shortcomings of his Soviet ally, Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat ordered all Soviet advisors to leave in 1972, and subsequently turned towards the West. By the signing of the Camp David peace accord in 1979, Egypt firmly reaffirmed its position within the Western capitalist system.¹⁷ There was no peaceful revolution.

Scenario Two: If status quo power adopts a cooptive strategy and the revisionist power adopts a confrontational strategy, the probability of a revolutionary outcome is still low. This scenario sounds intuitively dissonant. How can money defeat AK 47s? The answer follows from Scenario One; continuity has an inherent advantage over change in that known payoff structures are more attractive than unknown ones.¹⁸ If engaged tactfully, reinforcing and amending existing arrangements can countervail against even military challenges.

¹⁶ See General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's speech, in *XX S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza [14-25 Fevralya 1956 goda: Stenograficheskii Otchet*, (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1956); and Rotislav Ulyanovsky *Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations*, (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1974).

¹⁷ Since Camp David, Egypt has ranked in the top-ten of American aid recipients, receiving on average roughly \$3 billion per annum. See William Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986).

¹⁸ An intervening variable --"learning" --can be introduced here to assess the attractive momentum of the alternative. If recent past defections have produced positive payoffs, the probabilities for change become greater. On the other hand, poor examples from recent revolutionary experiences weaken the propensity for future revolutionary situations. Regarding revolutions, Soviet specialists used to call this phenomenon the world's correlation of forces. The equivalent American metaphor is "dominoes." For examples of both conceptions, Georgi Shakhnazarov, *Gryadushii Miroporyadok*, (Moskva: Polizdat, 1981); Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), and Jerome Slater, "Dominoes in Central America: Will They Fall? Does It Matter?" *International Security*, Vol 12, No. 2 (Fall 1987). In the discourse of learning theorists, this use of metaphor would be called "simple learning," not "complex learning."

These kinds of cases are rare; active confrontation by the revisionist power usually provokes a commensurate response from the status quo. Zimbabwe is one of the few. In the case of the Zimbabwean liberation war, the Soviet Union supported a confrontational solution to the war, while the United States and Great Britain after 1976, supported a negotiated settlement. Cooption prevailed; there was no revolutionary outcome in this highly revolutionary situation.¹⁹

Scenario Three: If the status quo power adopts a confrontational strategy and the revisionist power adopts a cooptive strategy, the status quo still has the advantage. In choosing to intervene, the status quo power has disrupted the old order, creating real opportunities for transformation in the political and economic structures of the states besieged. But, in this scenario, the revisionist power has failed to provide the revolutionaries with support to withstand the status quo power, a necessary condition for revolutionary change in peripheral states. As the only external power engaged, the status quo power is in the position to redefine the socio-economic organization of the state in question. This redefinition, of course, will parallel the old status quo. The rise and fall of marxism-leninism in Grenada is illustrative of this kind of situation. Under Maurice Bishop, Grenada was moving towards a socialist-orientation, facilitated by Soviet assistance and Cuban advisors. However, the American invasion in 1983 ended the socialist project in Grenada, and returned the island to the Western capitalist system of states.²⁰

Scenario Four: If status quo power adopts a confrontational strategy

¹⁹ Contrary to dialectic, marxist conceptions of history, revolutionary situations do not always lead to revolutionary outcomes. On the important distinction between "revolutionary situation" and "revolutionary outcome", See Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, (Addison-Wesley: Reading, MA, 1978), pp. 189-200; and Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), chapter 4.

²⁰ The American intervention actually deposed General Hudson Austin, a radical marxist-leninist who overthrew Maurice Bishop in a military coup in October 1983. The American intervention, however, not Austin's coup, marked the end of revolutionary transformation under way on the island.

and the revisionist power adopts a confrontational strategy, the probability of a revolutionary outcome is greater than the other three scenarios. As in Scenario Three, stability and continuity have been disrupted in this scenario. The situation is ripe for transformative change. But this time, both powers are engaged in seeking to influence the outcomes. In such polarized situations, revolutionaries have the greatest opportunity to succeed. Even if the status quo power overwhelms the resources of the revisionist power and its allies in the short run, the consequent polarization and dislocation of the existing state will create future opportunities for revolutionary upheaval.

Angola, the other case examined in this study, is representative of this class of cases, the only class in which revolutionary transformation is likely.²¹ Intervention by both the United States and the Soviet Union disrupted the transition to majority rule and polarized an essentially nationalist struggle for self-determination into a bi-polar battle between the forces of communism and capitalism. In this case, the communist resources outpaced those of the United States and the Western world. In the wake of this superpower conflict, a socialist state emerged in Angola.

Hypothesis Set Three: The Domestic Level of Analysis

Analysis of the international system and the strategies of the great powers as defined by the system can tell us a great deal about the outcomes of revolutionary situations. Adding a third set of hypotheses derived from examining the distribution of capabilities, actors, and ideas within the state besieged by a revolutionary situation can specify even further the set of probabilities inferred from a system and unit levels of analysis. First, the number of revolutionary movements and actors affects the autonomy of the revolutionaries. Divided insurgents are more prone to external manipulation than united or single movements. Second, the amount of domestic resources available for mobilization by both the regime under assault and the challenging revolutionaries conditions the relative impact of external forces. In general, the greater the level of

²¹ Other critical cases might be Cuba, Vietnam, or Ethiopia.

domestic resources, the lesser the influence of the external powers.²²

Method and Selection of Cases

To assess the strengths and weaknesses of these hypotheses, this study adopts the "method of structured, focus comparison" of two cases of revolutionary upheaval -- Angola and Zimbabwe.²³ The international system examined is the postwar configuration from 1947 to 1990 -- a system characterized by the preponderance of two global powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.²⁴ The research strategy is straightforward. The class of phenomena or dependent variable to be traced and explained is revolutionary outcomes; the independent variables which vary across cases will be the cooptive and confrontational strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union.

At this stage in theory development, these three sets of hypotheses at the systemic, state, and domestic level should be regarded as probable generalizations, and not scientific laws. The goal here is to suggest a "typological theory"²⁵ or a "rich, differentiated theory" which "in contrast to a general explanatory

²² Of course, this hypothesis also is conditioned by the way the great powers define national interests. Revolutionary situations in states of vital strategic importance to the great powers will attract more immediate attention than states that do not. However, the history of the twentieth century demonstrates that definitions of the strategic importance of a revolution are less important than the domestic resources of the revolutionary state. For instance, revolutions in China and Iran were much more strategic to the United States than Vietnam or Angola, but the United States intervened in the latter, not the former.

²³ This method of analysis adopted here draws heavily from Alexander George's "Case Studies and Theory Development", Paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, October 15-16, 1982. See also Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1975), VII, pp. 79-138.

²⁴ Recent changes in the international provide both a new international system and a new cases of revolution to test the theoretical assumptions of this study. The applicability of the hypotheses and conclusions of this thesis to these new phenomena is discussed in detail in the conclusion.

²⁵ See Paul Diesing, Patterns of Discovery in Social Sciences, (New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971).

theory, is cast in the form of contingent generalizations..."²⁶ Moreover, this research project is not a general examination of the concept of revolution.²⁷ Rather, this study examines a set of narrowly-defined case studies within the general class of revolution in an attempt to reformulate and redefine some of the properties or laws which comprise a theory of revolution.²⁸ This focused study of controlled comparison will not 'revolutionize' the theory of 'revolution', but it may provide some of the building blocks for the development of a better theory about revolution and the international system.²⁹

The Revolutions

Why study these two revolutionary situations? Why not study other revolutions in larger, more populous countries? Can these revolutions be compared? Do these two cases even represent instances

²⁶ Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 59.

²⁷ For reviews of the latest attempts at such a task, see Jack Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation", *World Politics*, Vol. XXXII, No 3 (April 1980); and Elbaki Hermassi, "Toward a Comparative Study of Revolutions", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April, 1976).

²⁸ On the distinction between laws and theories, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

²⁹ The term, "building blocks", has two different connotations as used here. In the first instance, this study adds to the literature two more case studies. The aim here is to contribute to the accumulation of cases of revolution for the development of more broadly-based, comparative studies. This is the conception of "building blocks" as discussed in H.S. Becker, "Social Observation and Case Studies" *International Encyclopedia of the Social Science*, Vol. 11, pp. 272-238, as cited in Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory Development in Political Science." At a second level the term, "building blocks", refers to the set of "laws" which when assembled successfully, "build" a theory. If "theories are collections or sets of laws pertaining to a particular behavior or phenomenon" (Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*) then the other aim of this project is to suggest or refine some of the laws governing the phenomenon of revolution in the international system which might enhance the explanatory power of a general theory of revolution. (It should be noted that Waltz himself does not use this method of theory building.)

of revolutionary situations or revolutionary outcomes?

Comparing Angola and Zimbabwe is particularly fruitful for several reasons. From the point of view of methodology, these two cases exhibit the necessary characteristics for rigorous comparison. First, if revolution is the genus, both of these cases are members of a smaller species, "revolutions of national liberation." This kind of revolutionary situation grew out of a response to European colonialism of the nineteenth century, and coalesced after the demise of the nineteenth century states system and the rise of the postwar bipolar system.

Second, both revolutionary situations developed within a distinct period in the history of decolonization; both began, evolved, and ended (in so far as they have ended) within the second historical wave of decolonization which unfolded at the conclusion of World War II. Though the method and development of colonial rule differed considerably in Angola and Rhodesia,³⁰ both were administered by European powers, and both movements of national liberation in Angola and Zimbabwe began their sustained, violent struggles in the early 1960's.³¹ The belated decolonization process in Angola, Zimbabwe and southern Africa generally further distinguishes these revolutions from other revolutions of national independence in Africa and the Third World. While most of the other European colonies in Africa and Asia won their independence in the 1960's, the intransigence of the

³⁰ The problem of proper names for places is a difficult one throughout this manuscript. To preserve the historical context, Rhodesia will be used when referring to the British, white Rhodesian, or international perspective. Zimbabwe will be used when referring to the black nationalist point of view or any other perspective which used Zimbabwe instead of Rhodesia. After 1980, of course, only Zimbabwe will be used. In the case of Angola, the term, Angola, will be used to describe both Portuguese Southwest Africa and the People's Republic of Angola. When necessary, a distinction will be made between the two.

³¹ For descriptions of the different strategies of British and Portuguese colonialism, see Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality*, (London:Heinemann, 1978), Clarence Gervase-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire*, (Manchester, 1985), A. M. Khazanov, *Ekspansiya Portugali v Afrike: i Bor'ba Afrikanskikh Narodov za Nezavisimost' XVI-XVIII vv.*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1976.) and Jane Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959). For Rhodesia see Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*, (London: James Currey, 1985) or Robin Palmer, *Land and Racial Discrimination in Zimbabwe*, (London: Heineman, 1977).

Portuguese and the white, Rhodesian settlers prolonged the liberation struggles in these colonies for two more decades.

Third, in space, both Angola and Zimbabwe are developing, agriculturally-based countries in the periphery of both world security and economic flows.³² Neither country could be considered vital to the economies or security of the great powers. In other words, the Soviet Union and the United States shared a low-interest symmetry with respect to this region of the world.³³

Fourth, the revolutionary movements in these two cases exemplified the same strategy of national liberation -- violent and protracted struggle.³⁴ Given the propensity for superpower involvement in any regional instability during the first forty years of the postwar order, this shared characteristic is especially important in assessing the overall contribution of the Soviet Union and the United States to the process and outcome of these two revolutions.

These common circumstances constitute clearly defined parameters for focused, structured comparison. Many potential independent

³² In this context, the term periphery denotes two different kinds of spaces. First, from the discourse of "structuralists", periphery locates these countries in contrast to "core" states of industrialized Western Europe and North America. (See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1971, pp. 81-94; and Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1974, pp. 387-415.) Second, from the discourse of balance-of-power theorists, periphery denotes those states which are "weak" relative to the "great" powers dominating the system. See Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Penguin Books, 1978) pp. 61-68.

³³ For a typology of Soviet and American symmetrical and asymmetrical interests, see Alexander George, "Crisis Prevention Reexamined" in Alexander George, *Managing the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); and James Schlesinger, "International Implications of Third World Conflict: An American Perspective" in Christoph Bertram, ed., *Third World Conflict and International Intervention*, (London: MacMillan for IISS, 1981).

³⁴ For typologies of liberation tactics, see Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea*, (New York: Citadel Press, 1969) and Basil Davidson, *The People's Cause: A History of Guerrillas in Africa*, (London: Longman Group, 1981).

variables (historical contexts, regional differences, variances in strategies) are controlled for in this study.³⁵ That this set of similar independent variables does not change over the two cases allows for a more focused and fruitful analysis of those variables which do vary.³⁶

From a methodological point of view, however, these cases also were chosen for their differences-- specifically their contrasting outcomes. First, the process by which the wars of national liberation ended differed considerably. The struggle in Angola culminated in an unrestricted conventional war between the divided national liberation movements which precipitated (or was precipitated by) a major crisis between the superpowers.³⁷ The transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, on the other hand, avoided conventional military conflict between the national liberation groups and did not trigger (or fall victim to) direct superpower intervention. Second, the post-revolutionary regimes which emerged from these two struggles appear to resemble each other in rhetoric but not form. While Angola experienced significant changes in both socio-economic and political structures and organizations after independence, the new regime in Zimbabwe has succeeded in transforming only (partially) the political organization, leaving the pre-revolutionary, socio-economic capitalist structures

³⁵ Several other differences in circumstances existed between these two cases. These differences are described in detail in the case studies, and then discussed as potential determinants of alternative explanations in the concluding chapter.

³⁶ Some would argue that this degree of similarity suggests that the cases lack independence from each other--a dilemma called Galtung's Problem. I, however, agree with Smelser that the question of independence does not apply to controlled case study comparison which do not seek correlations but explanations. Furthermore, those conditions which undercut the independence of these two case studies are the very same variables controlled for in this study. (See Neil Smelser, "The Methodology of Comparative Analysis," in Donald P. Warwick and Samuel Osherson, eds., *Comparative Research Methods*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. 213.)

³⁷ To say that the struggle "ended" here refers only to the national liberation movement against the Portuguese. War between two of the liberation movements still continues today.

intact.³⁸ Explaining these variances in outcome is the central question of this study.³⁹

The International System

Having narrowed the scope of analysis concerning the revolutions under question, we now must limit the set of independent variables to be analyzed.⁴⁰ As this is not a general study of revolutions, it is likewise not a general study of international systems. Rather this study focuses on the antagonistic, bi-polar system of the post World War II era, a system formed, dominated, and conditioned by two powers, the Soviet Union and the United States.⁴¹ After 1945, the United States emerged as the center of a global capitalist system and the

³⁸ These generalizations obviously will be more rigorously analyzed in the body of the thesis. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the basic principles of a market economy have been maintained domestically, but international investment is significantly below pre-independence levels. In Angola, despite the rhetoric of a "socialist orientation", cooperative ventures with foreign-based oil companies constitute the mainstay of the Angolan economy. In general terms, however, this observable difference between the Angolan and Zimbabwean outcomes suggests that Angola was a "successful" revolution, whereas Zimbabwe was not.

³⁹ The approach adopted here draws heavily from John Stuart Mill's "method of difference" from his *A System of Logic*, as explained in Smelser, "The Methodology of Comparative Analysis," and Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," pp. 7-13. To explain different outcomes in the dependent variable, Mill's 'method of difference' seeks to identify changes in the independent variables.

⁴⁰ According to Hedley Bull, an international system "is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave -- at least in some measure -- as parts of a whole." (Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, London: MacMillan, 1977, p. 10.) See also Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, and Robert Jervis, "System Theories and Diplomatic History," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Diplomacy*, (New York: Free Press, 1979).

⁴¹ For descriptions of other systems and their properties, see Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective*, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1963); and Alexander George and Gordon Craig, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

pillar of a Western alliance designed to defend that system.⁴² America's hegemonic role within this system demarcated new objectives and strategies with respect to anti-systemic, or revolutionary movements.⁴³ Whereas American foreign-policymakers sporadically defended anti-colonial, anti-imperialist causes at earlier moments in history, the mandate of defending the international capitalist system against communist expansion eclipsed other contradictory American foreign policy practices and concerns.⁴⁴ For the first several decades after World War II, the paramount American occupation -- economic, strategic, or ideological -- was to contain communism.⁴⁵ The Soviet Union also emerged from World War II as a great power, but for different reasons and with antithetical objectives to those of the United States. As an anti-capitalist project since 1917, the Soviet Union had coexisted uncomfortably as a "socialist" state within a world capitalist system. Soviet military victories in the Second World War eased Moscow's isolation by creating a series of satellite,

⁴² The capitalist world system referred to here perhaps should be labelled a "sub-system" so as to distinguish it from the "international system" which includes states from both the capitalist world system and the socialist system of states. (Of course, given the collapse of the latter, "international system" and "capitalist world system" quickly are becoming synonymous.) Nonetheless, however simplified, I will distinguish the sub-systems by adding the adjectives, "capitalist" or "socialist."

⁴³ For a survey, see Bernard Morris, *Communism, Revolution, and American Policy*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987).

⁴⁴ This characterization of American foreign policy contrasts sharply with the standard realist explanation for why the United States pursued "ideological" objectives. According to realist theorists, American hegemony freed American decision-makers from "specific strategic and economic concerns," and thereby allowed these leaders to pursue nonlogical, ideological objectives. (Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, pp. 14-17. My description assumes a perceived means-end calculation to American attempts to thwart communism even when immediate strategic and economic interests were not involved. Moreover, American foreign policymakers continued to pursue these so-called ideological goals after the decline of American hegemony.

⁴⁵ See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). Containment of communism and the preservation of capitalism are simply opposite sides of the same coin. However, it is sometimes useful to label the preservation of capitalism as the paramount objective and the containment of communism the grand strategy for achieving the paramount goal.

"anti-systemic" states in Eastern Europe and Asia. While all these states accepted the essential tenets of the international states system, they also sought to challenge the international capitalist order by creating an alternative "socialist division of labor" amongst themselves.⁴⁶ By promoting anti-systemic forces in states entrenched in the international capitalist world, Soviet leaders hoped to revise the very capitalist system the United States strived to maintain.⁴⁷ This essential conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, though manifested with varying intensities at different periods during the Cold War, defined the central characteristic of the

⁴⁶ For a detailed description of this basic tension in the Soviet Union, see Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973*, (New York: Praeger, 1974). For a set of theoretical discussions about the nature of this socialist states system, see Christopher Chase-Dunn, ed. *Socialist States in the World-System*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982). While sympathetic to the world-systems project, I reject the characterization of the socialist system of states presented by Wallerstein (1974), Frank (1977), Szymanski (1979) or Chase-Dunn (1982). Rather than identifying the Soviet Union as the core of a new socialist paradise destined to supercede the capitalist system (Szymanski), or as a semi-peripheral state in the world capitalist economy (the others), I consider the Soviet Union to have been the last "world-empire" in Asia and Europe, and a core state of a mini-world-system, constructed as an alternative to the capitalist division of labor. (In calling this system an alternative, I make no normative implication as it being better or worse than the capitalist division of labor.) The alternative having failed, the Soviet Union only now is moving towards occupying a semi-peripheral status.

In addition to Chase-Dunn's volume, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (September 1974), pp. 387-415; A. G. Frank, "Long Live Transideological Enterprise: The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor," *Review*, Vol. 1, 1977, pp. 91-140; and A. Szymanski, *Is the Red Flag Flying? The Political Economy of the USSR Today*, (London: Zed press, 1979). For systems-theoretical interpretation of the socialist states similar to my position, see D. Chirot, "World-Systems Theory," *Annual Review of Sociology*, No. 8, 1982.

⁴⁷ See Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, pp. 130-131; and *Istoriya Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, 1945-1985*, Vol. 2 (Moskva: Nauka, 1986), in passim. Again, this characterization challenges the neorealist explanation for why states pursue ideological objectives in that the Soviet Union was never a hegemon. Soviet leaders actively sought to project their vision of domestic and world society without occupying a hegemonic position within the international system. (See Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, p. 15).

international system for the first four decades after World War II.⁴⁸

These two states were not the only international forces influencing the course of the national liberation process in Angola and Zimbabwe. However, the focus of this study is limited to the superpower nexus because it is these two powers which (1) formed the center of the world configuration of power during the development of these two revolutions, and as a consequence (2) had the greatest capabilities and will to condition the course of revolutions occurring within the international system.⁴⁹ The roles of other states will be

⁴⁸ While drawing from both realism and marxism, this analytic description of the international system since 1945 makes several theoretical departures from both paradigms. Regarding realism, this characterization rejects the axiom that states seek to maximize national power. Rather, great powers such as the United States and Soviet Union endeavored to maximize the security, power, and wealth of their respective international (capitalist and "socialist") systems, a project which, at times, undermined the well-being of their individual states. Regarding marxism, this analysis rejects the instrumental marxist assumption that the state is the agent of the capitalist ruling class. Rather, as posited by structural marxists, the state can act against the individual interests of the ruling class to preserve the system in the long-term. However, this author also departs from structural marxism by arguing that all systemic hegemonies, not just capitalist ones, act according to a similar logic aimed at preserving or expanding their respective international systems.

⁴⁹ The methodological justification for this artificial simplification of reality can be expressed in two ways. First, and most importantly, I do not assume that other independent variables (i.e., other states) were not present, but I do suggest that American and Soviet foreign policy were "key" variables, rendering focus on their development theoretically fruitful. (On the definition and importance of "key" variables, see Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, September 1971, pp. 685-691.) Second, to further deal with the problem of 'many variables, small number of cases', I assume for the purposes of this study that those independent actors (variables) not examined in detail resemble the character of the two key variables which are discussed. As Alexander George writes, "the investigator can 'reduce the property-space of the analysis' by combining two or more variables that express essentially similar underlying characteristics." (George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," p. 5). For instance, though East Germany was involved in promoting the national liberation movement in Zimbabwe, I contend that the "underlying characteristics" of East German actions as they pertain to the questions addressed in this study are not sufficiently distinguishable from those of the Soviet Union to warrant specific identification and accountability. Given the level of analysis of this study, the United States may even serve

discussed only as they affect the triangular dynamic between southern Africa, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This framework of analysis does not presuppose that the actions of these other actors are controlled by one or the other superpower, but only suggests that the superpower relationship is a primary component in the international system as it relates to the process and outcomes of revolutions in the postwar era.⁵⁰

Neither is it assumed that other non-state, supranational actors, structures, and processes do not influence revolutionary processes and outcomes. The patterns of action and reaction between revolutions and the states system are abated, conditioned, and facilitated by a "world system" which subsumes them both.⁵¹ However, it is a central contention of this study that these non-state factors have been created, conditioned and regulated by the logic of Soviet and American rivalry during the first forty years after World War II.⁵² In other words, the United States and the Soviet Union anchored

as a metonymy for the Western capitalist world, while Soviet Union can serve a similar function for the socialist system of states. When dissonance arises between these metaphorical representations and historical reality (i.e., Cuban versus Soviet attitudes toward intervention in Angola or British and American policies regarding a settlement in Rhodesia), they are identified and discussed in the case studies.

⁵⁰ The superpower relationship is considered primary because it intervenes on the outcomes of revolutions in a number of ways. First and foremost, they involve themselves directly in revolutionary situations, from offering economic assistance to warring parties to direct military intervention. Second, they constrain (or encourage) the actions of other third parties which seek to influence the outcomes of revolutionary situations. Finally, the Soviet Union and the United States influence each other's involvement in revolutionary situations.

⁵¹ On transnational actors, processes, and regimes see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1977); Stephen Krasner, ed. *International Regimes*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Keohane and Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization*, Vol. 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 725-753. On world systems, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System -- Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

⁵² This formulation extends Wallerstein's theory to close the loop of action-reaction between the system and the state. While accepting Wallerstein's notion that states are derived from the structure, I also assert that the core states, once produced

global systems which were defined not only by the states within each system, but also by the modalities of governance and economy practiced in their respective systems.

In furthering delineating the properties of this international system in reference to others, a distinction must be made between international systems with a shared definition of legitimacy and a division of power lacking congruent assumptions about international behavior and/or governance at home.⁵³ The twentieth century, and especially the postwar order must be characterized as a balance which lacked a shared set of norms, rules, or procedures to regulate great power behavior.⁵⁴ In other words, no 'security regime' or

by this structure, then condition the reconstruction of new structures. This addition to Wallerstein resonates with many tenets from theories of hegemonic stability with two important distinctions. First, in this analysis, a great power is determined by its location in the world-system, and not only as a result of winning the last major war. (For the latter view, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 187. To his credit, however, Gilpin at least posits an explanation for the origins of a given balance of power, an undertaking which most realists avoid.) Second, the foreign policy of the hegemon is driven to preserve the system and its hegemonic position within that system. The foreign policy of a hegemon is not ideological simply because its unbridled power can now impose its beliefs on others. (For this line of argument, see Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, p. 15.)

⁵³ Kissinger called this the difference between a "legitimate" and "revolutionary" order. Hedley Bull distinguished between an anarchical society and an international society. See Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 145, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (London: Macmillan, 1977). or more recently Fred Halliday, "The Ends of Cold War," *New Left Review*, No. 180, (March/April 1990), pp. 5-23.

⁵⁴ The period in European history immediately preceding the French Revolution offers a case of "high" homogeneity concerning principles of international relations in sharp contrast to the U.S.-Soviet relationship from 1947 to 1990. (See, Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics*, chapter two.) The European Concert is also frequently cited as another homogenous balance, if not a return to the pre-1789 balance. See, for instance, Edward Gulik, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955); Kissinger, *A World Restored*, in passim, Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Alexander George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*, pp. 31-64. For a succinct comparison of the two systems, see Paul Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1986), pp. 1-26. For a comparison of other concerts, 1815-1854, 1919-1920, 1945-1946,

'international society' existed.⁵⁵

Alternative Explanations

International Relations Theory

Despite the tremendous impact of revolutions on international peace and security, little Western scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of revolution in an international context.⁵⁶ International relations literature is rich with historical accounts of the major revolutions of the twentieth century, yet surprisingly few works have been devoted to a systematic analysis of the international context affecting and being affected by these

see Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), p. 58.

⁵⁵ For a definition of "international society," see Bull *The Anarchical Society*. For a definition of regimes, see Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 1; and Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization*, 36 (Spring 1982). Jervis elsewhere has argued that a "concert" or security regime forms only in the wake of a major war against a hegemon. According to his analysis, "such a war undermines the assumptions of a balance of power system and alters the perceived payoffs in a way that facilitates cooperation." (Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," p. 58.) This study assumes a different approach, and posits that security concerts or regimes can form when the participant powers have a shared commitment to universal principles governing international behavior and domestic rule.

⁵⁶ Examples of this sparse literature include Kyung-won Kim, *Revolution and the International System*, (1970), James Rosenau, ed. *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, (1964), Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), Kissinger, *A World Restored*, chapter seven of Wight's, *Power Politics*, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Penguin Books, 1978); and Peter Calvert, *Revolution and International Politics*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984). Writers on imperialism at the turn of the century (Hobson, Kautsky, Lenin, Luxembourg) and contemporary Marxist-Leninist theorists also should be included as scholars who adopt an international perspective on revolution. Likewise, several Soviet theorists (and propagandists) on international relations have covered this topic extensively. See among others, V.L. Tiagunenkov, *Problemy Sovremenikh Natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh Revoliutsii* (1969), Boris Ponomarev, *Lenin i Mirovoi Revoliutsionii Protsess*, (1980), Rotislav Ulyanovsky, *Ocherki Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noi Borbi. Voprosi Teorii i Praktiki*, (1978).

revolutions.⁵⁷ The lack of discussion about revolution in international relations theory stems from the domination of realism in the literature.⁵⁸ Realism artificially divides security into the separate domains of the domestic and the international. As Hedley Bull observed,

In the present phase we are still accustomed to thinking of order in world politics as consisting of domestic order, or order within states, and international order, or order among them.⁵⁹

Having carved security into domestic and international spheres using the state as the membrane separating the two fields, realists then analyze only the external side of the state, treating it as a rational unitary actor seeking to maximize its power within the international arena.⁶⁰ Because of this artificial separation, revolution as a focus of inquiry rarely enters into the level of analysis of the international relations theorist. As Robert Gilpin writes,

In contrast to the emphasis placed here on the role of hegemonic war in changing the international system, it might be argued that

⁵⁷ For exceptions to the general statement, see Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, chapter 5; and Hermassi, "Toward a Comparative Study of Revolutions." On the relationship between international system and other "domestic" issues besides revolution, see Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 4, (Autumn 1978). Restated in the language used by Gourevitch, this study seeks to assess the influence of the international system on the formation of "regime type" and "coalition pattern" in Angola and Zimbabwe. (p. 883).

For some time, students of international political economy have been occupied with explaining the impact of world market forces, multinational companies, and neo-imperial powers on domestic economies. Few, however, have adopted a similar framework regarding issues of security.

⁵⁸ For a quick survey of realism's historical hegemony over the discourse of international relations theory, see Robert Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in Robert Keohane, ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

⁵⁹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (London: MacMillan, 1977) p. 23.

⁶⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," p. 7.

domestic revolution can change the international system. This is partly correct. It would be foolish to suggest, for example, that the great revolutions of the twentieth century (the Russian, Chinese, and perhaps Iranian) have not had a profound impact on world politics. However, the primary consequence of these social and political upheavals (at least the first two) has been to facilitate the mobilization of the society's resources for purposes of national power. In other words, the significance of these revolutions for world politics is that they have served to strengthen (or weaken) their respective states and thereby cause a redistribution of power in the system.⁶¹

Once placed within the black box of the nation state, the realist tradition in international relations no longer sees the need to explain or account for revolution, except in terms of how it effects the "national" power of the revolutionary state in question.

Though parsimonious, this account of revolution does not capture the total impact of revolutions in relation to the international system, nor offer an explanation regarding the impact of the international system on revolutions. First, as has been briefly illustrated above, revolutions do not take place in the vacuum of a black box, but in a global context which profoundly influences the conditions for, the process of, and the completion (or lack thereof) of so-called "domestic" revolutions. Second, the reorganization of resources and the subsequent change in the national power of a revolutionary state is hardly a trivial matter for those who look to the distribution of power within the system to make theoretical predictions about the state and the international system.⁶² Third, the reorganization of domestic resources is only one of many new conditions which have the potential to alter the international system after a revolution has occurred as international perceptions of the

⁶¹ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 203. See also Randolph Siverson, "War and Change in the International System," in Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander George, ed., *Change in the International System*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).

⁶² In fact, how Gilpin's definitional disclaimer differs from the assumed, more consequential role played by great power war is not apparent, as one could easily substitute the term 'hegemonic war' into Gilpin's dismissive definition about revolution and argue that the primary consequence of wars to the international system is that "they have served to strengthen (or weaken) their respective states and thereby cause a redistribution of power in the system." (Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 203).

revolutionary state are not guided solely by assessments of the new national power (as measured in classical terms) of the revolutionary state.⁶³ For instance, why did the Allied powers find it necessary to invade weak and feeble Bolshevik Russia if they were only assessing the threat of the revolutionary state based on its "national power"?⁶⁴

Similarly, the international implications of the Vietnam Revolution were much greater than the new "national power" attained by Vietnam would seem to justify in Gilpin's definition. Finally, how could a such an important "great power" relationship as U.S.-Soviet detente in the 1970's be toppled by a peripheral revolutionary upheaval in Angola?⁶⁵ Apparently, so-called domestic revolutions can trigger international instability and subsequent redistributions of power disproportionate to the new power configuration of the revolutionary state. Realism does not offer an explanation for the "irrational" responses of great powers to revolutions in peripheral if not inconsequential places.

⁶³ See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁶⁴ For a non-realist explanation of the intervention, see William Appleman Williams, "American Intervention in Russia: 1917-1920," in David Horowitz, ed. *Containment and Revolution*, (London: Anthony Band, 1967).

⁶⁵ As we are living through a fundamental restructuring of the world system, a kind of restructuring that has not taken place for over forty years, the rise and fall of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1989 may seem rather trivial. In historical context, however, these changes were interpreted as monumental. For instance, in describing one such shift, two cold war historians write, "The period from the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in July 1963 reflected a fundamental shift in the overall relations between the two major protagonists of the postwar period..." (P. Terrence Hopmann and Timothy D. King, "From Cold War to Detente: The Role of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Partial Test Ban Treaty," in Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander George, ed., *Change in the International System*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 163. Similarly, Soviet and American conflict in the Third World in the 1970s produced what many called the second cold war, a shift considered to be very consequential. See for instance, Strobe Talbott, "US-Soviet Relations: From Bad to Worse," *Foreign Affairs*, (America and the World, 1979) pp. 515-539; Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, (Thetford, Norfolk: Verso Press, 1983); Raymond Gartoff, *Detente and Confrontation* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985).

Comparative Politics

Looking from within, volumes have been written about revolution by political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists, but few have attempted to frame the phenomenon of revolution in an international context. These theories look to class divisions, political inefficiencies, or individual needs within a given state to explain revolutionary sources, processes, and outcomes.

One set of these theories about revolutions focuses on the individual as the unit of analysis. Typically psychologists and sociologists, these theorists contend that revolutions are caused by widespread societal "frustration".⁶⁶ According to Ted Gurr, this frustration is induced by "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities", or what he labels "relative deprivation".⁶⁷ At a certain level, frustration with conditions within a given society compels the "masses" to resort to "political violence" as a means of accomplishing desired changes in the existing society. Consequently inquiry concentrates on identifying the sources of cognitive attitudes which precipitate political violence as the manifestation of frustration.

Though frustration and political violence often exist as links in the chain leading to revolution, they are neither the first, the critical, nor the most obvious links. Why does frustration occur? Frustration is not the source of revolution, but a symptom of the sources. Though these theorists offer a wide range of possible roots for frustration, they cannot systematically identify which sources or what concentration of sources lead to "mass" frustration, and which do not.⁶⁸ For instance, Angolans and Zimbabweans experience

⁶⁶ See Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, ; Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systematic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," in Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted Gurr, eds. *Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1972); James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, February 1962.

⁶⁷ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 13.

⁶⁸ These analyses also assume that the masses matter, an assumption of serious contention within debates about revolutions. While not refuting empirically the importance of the masses, this study offers an explanation about the origins and outcomes of revolutions which does not require a measurement of the mood of the masses.

frustration about many things, but a certain confluence of frustration triggered by specific sources caused peoples in these countries to rebel. Moreover, having arrived at the point where mass frustration is apparent, these theorists have no way to quantify it, and thus cannot determine at what level of frustration compels the masses to rebel. If, for instance, colonialism was the principle source of frustration for Africans in southern Africa, why did Angolans and Zimbabweans wait until the 1960s to rekindle the armed struggle?⁶⁹ Moreover, when we reach the stage of "political violence", this theory does not explain how mass violence is translated into revolutionary processes. In the context of southern Africa, how did resistance evolve into guerrilla liberation movements? Finally, the theory's poor quantitative indicators offer little insight into why some revolutionary situations lead to revolutionary outcomes while others do not. Were Angolans more frustrated than Zimbabweans? If so, how would we know?

A second set of theories focuses on political groups within a given state as the unit of analysis.⁷⁰ These theorists posit that society is in constant tension, and therefore, the prospect of revolution is inherent everywhere, all the time. Borrowing from Clausewitz, these theorists contend that a revolutionary moment occurs when political competition is extended into extraordinary means-- violent upheaval. Revolution denotes a change in the instruments of political conflict, not a change in political conflict itself. Because these theorists perceive society to be in constant tension, they downplay the importance of isolating a root cause of

⁶⁹ Angolan history is rich with early accounts of rebellion from five centuries of Portuguese colonial rule. Likewise, the first major war between settlers and Africans in Zimbabwe occurred in 1896. The question I ask here, however, is why rebellion was not constant from the beginning of colonial rule until the end? Similarly, why did frustration with colonial rule not lead to independence sooner, as in the rest of Africa? (For accounts of these earlier rebellions, see T.O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7*, (London: Heinemann, 1967) and L. W. Henderson, *Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).

⁷⁰ See Peter Amman, "Revolution: A Redefinition," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 77, March 1962, pp. 36-53; Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, (Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

societal conflict.⁷¹ Instead, the critical condition for revolution is the "breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the states monopoly of power"⁷² and the creation of "multiple sovereignty".

The revolutionary moment arrives when previously acquiescent members of . . . [a] population find themselves confronted with strictly incompatible demands from an alternative body claiming control over the government -- and obey the alternative body.⁷³

The revolution is completed when one authority has succeeded in recapturing a monopoly on sovereignty. The focus of inquiry, then, for these theorists, is social groupings -- their resources, organization, and actions.

Several shortcomings quickly arise, however, when applying this theory to actual case studies. First, this kind of theory fails to account for conditions and the sources of the conditions which compel these groups to abandon accepted methods of pursuing their interests in favor of revolutionary means. To determine why some vote, serve, or suffer while others question, rebel, or war remains important for the understanding of revolutions regardless of whether it is a qualitative or quantitative distinction. Moreover, many groups which adopt revolutionary tactics never participated in the "normal" arena of domestic politics beforehand and therefore constitute a qualitatively different kind of group, not explained by this kind of theory. Almost all the guerrillas in Angola and Zimbabwe did not choose to leave the colonial political order as they had never participated in it. Third, "multiple sovereignty" has existed in instances of civil war or mafia-type social organizations in which the specter of revolution was not present. Fourth, with notable

⁷¹ For Huntington, the Western state's inability to cope with modernization or the Eastern state's desire to force modernization too fast are his sources of revolution. (Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 273.) "Modernization," however, encompasses everything, with no specificity as to which aspects of historical change trigger revolutions and which do not. Moreover, many states both 'Western' and 'Eastern' have managed to cope with "modernization" without experiencing revolutions.

⁷² Amman, "Revolution: A Redefinition", p. 38.

⁷³ Charles Tilly, "Revolution and Collective Action", in Greenstein and Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, , vol. 3, *Macropolitical Theory*, pp. 520-521.

exceptions, such theories provide little insight into the objectives and strategies of revolutionary actors.⁷⁴ Why, for instance, did the liberation movements in Angola and Zimbabwe opt for armed struggle rather than more non-violent strategies like in India? Finally, theory pitched at this level fails to explain why some revolutionary groups (as in Angola) succeed and others (as in Zimbabwe) do not.

The third group of theorists looks at the systemic level to posit a structural theory of revolution.⁷⁵ These theorists typically employ sociological analysis to discover structurally triggered contradictions which disrupt and challenge the "normal" operations of society. Marx defined these inherent contradictions as the clash between the forces of production and the relations of production.

At a certain stage in their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of productions, or -- what is but the legal expression of the same thing -- with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their⁷⁶ fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution.

In Marx's and marxist definitions, this period of social revolution is manifested by a struggle for hegemony between the oppressed class and the oppressor class -- in the modern era, between the capitalists and the proletariat. A revolution succeeds when the oppressed class overthrows the oppressor class, thereby creating a new mode of

⁷⁴ Huntington's typology of "Eastern and "Western" revolutions offers an explanation for different revolutionary strategies. "Western" revolutionaries rely upon urban-based mass insurrections, while "Eastern" revolutions employ peasant-based guerrillas warfare tactics. See Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p.

⁷⁵ Marx and Lenin were early structural theorists of revolution. Theda Skocpol's *State and Social Revolutions* is a more recent example. Structural theorists which do not focus exclusively on class conflict as the sole source of "dysfunction", include Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) and Mark Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974).

⁷⁶ Karl Marx, "Critique of Political Economy," reprinted in Lewis S. Freuer, *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 43-44.

production.⁷⁷

Unlike the first and second levels of analyses, this structural approach locates causes of revolution. The structural approach provides a possible explanation for the sources of "frustration" and its precipitant "political violence", and suggests a explanation for why groups adopt revolutionary tactics. This study draws upon these structural theories of revolution to demonstrate that the cause of revolutionary situations in Angola and Zimbabwe was the clash between the exploiting colonial rulers, and the exploited African subjects.⁷⁸

One of the greatest weaknesses of the structural approach, however, is its tendency to overestimate the structural causes of revolution to the neglect of human initiative. For ardent structuralists, revolutions are not made, they happen; they are

⁷⁷ Chalmers Johnson's functional approach to structural crises identifies the occurrence of "dysfunction" when the core-value orientations of a "society in a state of homeostatic equilibrium" become "dis-synchronized". In Johnson's formulation, resynchronization can occur in two ways. Either flexible, responsive authorities can adjust existing structures to reflect the new value orientation, thereby instituting evolutionary change, or inflexible authorities in place under the old value system fail to adapt, and a revolution occurs. The revolution is completed when value-environmental coordination has been successfully resynchronized. Johnson, then, differs from Marx not in his structural approach, but in the type (and possible scope) of structural dysfunction he identifies as the source of revolution. See Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, (London: University of London Press, 1966).

⁷⁸ I am not assuming that life in southern Africa before colonialism was peaceful or ordered, but rather that colonialism introduced a new disruption to which all African ethnic groups responded. Also, it should be remembered that neither the territorial entities of Angola or Zimbabwe existed prior to the arrival of colonialism, and therefore "Angolan" and "Zimbabwean" movements were a direct result of colonialism. On the colonial contributions to ethnic identity in Africa, see Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa," in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and David Birmingham and Terence Ranger, "Settlers and Liberators in the South," in Phyllis Martin and David Birmingham, eds., *History of Central Africa: Volume 2*, (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 336-408.

Moreover, I deliberately avoid calling this structurally induced revolutionary situation a "class" conflict as a narrowly defined class analysis (1) seeks to identify classes where they do not exist, and (2) fails to account for the multi-class character of African resistance. The broader terms "exploited" versus "exploiter" are less precise, but more accurate.

inevitable consequences in the progress of history.⁷⁹ Such deterministic analyses, however, cannot explain those historical moments which yielded unforeseen revolutionary consequences. For instance, any structural explanation for the Russian Revolution of 1917 had to be developed after the fact, as no one, including Lenin himself, predicted that tsarist Russia would be the first country to experience a so-called socialist revolution. Moreover, deterministic theories fail to explain why some countries, seemingly ready to explode, do not. Again, why did Angola experience revolution but Zimbabwe did not?⁸⁰

A second weakness in part related to this tendency towards determinism is an acceptance of a unilinear direction to history, in which revolutions are progressive and leading to some greater order. According to Marx and marxists, history can be divided into five stages, whereby movement from stage to stage is accomplished by revolutionary upheaval. This materialist conception of history is both empirically circumspect and normatively loaded. Was the French Revolution "necessary"? Was the Angolan Revolution "modernizing"? Was the Russian Revolution an inevitable stage in the "development" of that region of the world? Was the Iranian revolution "progressive"? The answer to these questions is one of empirical study and philosophical debate, not axiomatic truths.

⁷⁹ See Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon," in *Marx and Engels Selected Works*, Vol. 1, (NY: International Publishers) p. 638.

⁸⁰ Skocpol's definition of a social revolution "makes successful sociopolitical transformation -- *actual change* of state and class structures -- a part of a specification of what is to be called a social revolution, rather than leaving change contingent in the "definition" as many scholars do. The rationale is my belief that successful social revolutions probably emerge from different macro-structural and historical contexts than do either failed social revolutions or political transformations that are not accompanied by transformations of class relations." (Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 5) While concurring with Skocpol's general argument that there are "structural" reasons why some revolutions succeed and some do not, this study also considers those contingencies -- especially contingencies generated from the international system -- which may affect the process of revolutionary outcomes. If one accepts that Angola and Zimbabwe shared common 'macro-structural and historical contexts', then Skocpol's definition of a social revolution does not help us understand the variation in outcome in the Angolan and Zimbabwean revolutions.

A third common weakness in structural approaches, most importantly in marxist approaches, is the singular focus on class struggle as the only structurally induced conflict important for delineating the nature of revolutions. For Marx and Lenin, the conflict between "working class"/proletariat and the capitalists/imperialists provided the axis around which all revolutionary activity spun. Skocpol has replaced the proletariat with the peasantry to enrich her theory of revolution, but nonetheless remains committed to a class analysis.

Peasant revolts have been the crucial insurrectionary ingredient in virtually all actual (i.e., successful) social revolutions to date, and certainly in the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions.⁸¹

These theorists of revolution usually ignore political, religious, or ethnic conflicts as part of their analysis.

Finally, while these structural theorists do incorporate international influences into their theories, they limit the scope of their inquiry to two categories. First, Lenin and Skocpol identify a state's ability to co-exist with the intrusion of international capitalism as critical for understanding the causes of revolution.⁸² Second, Skocpol in particular brings in the international system to explain the "precipitants" of revolutions brought on by the state's ultimate inability to compete in the world economy or a great war. Given their proclivity towards predetermination, structuralists find it unnecessary to account for the influence of the international system on the process or outcome of revolutionary situations.⁸³

This study assumes a structural analysis as a starting point for understading the origins of the revolutionary situations in Angola

⁸¹ Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 112-113.

⁸² They do so, however, in slightly different ways. For Lenin, penetration by international capitalism of a local economy was inherently destabilizing. For Skocpol, intrusion of capital is only "revolutionary" if the state in question does not incorporate capitalist principles and integrate into the international capitalist system.

⁸³ Skocpol only brings the international system back in when explaining the strong and authoritarian post-revolutionary regimes produced by social revolutions. See Theda Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization," *World Politics*, Vol. XL, No. 2 (January 1988), pp. 148-168.

and Zimbabwe, but a structural analysis placed within an international context. Conflicts hatched from colonial structures constituted the bases of the revolutionary situations in both Angola and Zimbabwe. But these structures were not constructed internally, but evolved out of the interaction between the external (the colonials) and the internal (the Africans).⁸⁴ External factors were not simply the precipitants for revolutionary moments, but actually helped create the structural contradictions which created the revolutionary situations in the first place.

A structural analysis provides a starting point from which to identify the sources of revolutionary situations. This level of analysis, however, cannot explain revolutionary outcomes. If, for instance, relatively similar structural conditions were in place in Angola and Zimbabwe, but one former colony experienced a revolutionary outcome while the other did not, the explanation for this variance must not be situated at the structural level.⁸⁵ Revolutionary outcomes are best explained within the framework of the political-conflict theories in the context of an international system. Why some revolutionary movements emerge from revolutionary situations with a transformational agenda while others do not, requires an analysis of the kind of resources (both internal and external) employed to precipitate revolutionary or non-revolutionary outcomes. Contrary to structural arguments, the mix of actors, resources and strategies which precipitate revolutionary outcomes is not predetermined (though bound) by domestic and international structures. Rather, they have are historically contingent.

In selectively drawing upon these theories of revolution to explain the revolutionary processes in Angola and Zimbabwe, my aim is not to "test" different theoretical orientations. Rather, I seek to expand the explanatory power of these "internal" theories, by incorporating an "international" dimension into the analysis.

⁸⁴ Different from the political/conflict school then, a concrete historical event introduced a new matrix of structures within southern Africa which therein produced revolutionary situations.

⁸⁵ This movement from a structural level of analysis to the unit level parallels a similar move made when describing how to understand how international factors influence revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes.

The Empirical Framework

To further focus comparison, the Angolan and Zimbabwean revolutions will be divided into three distinct phases: (1) the origins and development of the national liberation movement, (2) the crisis or critical point in the revolution, and (3) the consolidation of the post-revolutionary regime. To generate a data base from which to compare the causal relationships between the revolutions in Angola and Zimbabwe and the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, a general set of questions will be asked of each case study at each of these three different phases.⁸⁶

Each section will begin with a description of Soviet attitudes, policies and actions regarding each case study.⁸⁷ This will be done by comparing tangible and identifiable aspects of foreign policy, such as arms transfers, economic aid, guerrilla training, diplomatic support in international organizations, and direct Soviet intervention with Soviet "stated" policy and positions.⁸⁸ Second,

⁸⁶ Though a set of general questions is asked of each case study, this does not mean that special questions relating to the idiosyncratic features of each case are taboo. Rather, this general set of questions helps to focus the analysis and assure the acquisition of comparable data from each of the cases. For further elaboration of the importance of a general set of questions in the case study method, see Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," in Lauren, *Diplomacy*, p. 62.

⁸⁷ The independent variables in this study, American and Soviet behavior have been derived from a structural theory of the international system described above. On the uses of theory to avoid the data limitations in the study of Soviet foreign policy, see Jack Snyder, "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy" *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 5 (Winter 1984-85) pp. 98-99.

⁸⁸ This two-phase approach towards analysis of Soviet foreign policy provides a more comprehensive understanding of Soviet behavior than those methods of analysis which focus solely on Soviet doctrinal statements or Soviet practices. Rajan Menon is misleading when he states that "Two complementary methods can be used to understand Soviet policy toward the Third World: analysis of Soviet behavior, and examination of Soviet writings." (Rajan Menon, *Soviet Power and the Third World*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 19.) In fact these two methods are not just complementary but symbiotic; one does not work effectively without the other. Moreover, this two-phase approach to understanding Soviet foreign policy has been supplemented by the author's interviews with those Soviet decision-makers responsible for policy in southern Africa for the time period under investigation in this study.

the same methodology will be adopted to analyze American perceptions, strategies, actions, and tactics. American attitudes towards the period and revolution in question are documented as are the instruments employed to accrue the desired outcome. Finally, the impact of Soviet and American strategies and tactics upon the course of two revolutionary situations will be assessed and analyzed. This impact will be measured by correlating specific Soviet and American overtures and actions to developments of the national liberation movements in three specific areas: (1) party statements and programmes, (2) military strategy, and (3) international contacts.⁸⁹ For instance, during the first phase, did Soviet training of guerrillas influence the military strategy of the guerrillas in battle? Or in the second phase, can a pattern or relationship be established between the level of Soviet material assistance and the extent to which marxism-leninism is embraced by the recipient group? Or in the third phase, did diplomatic and economic relations with the United States affect the economic and social organization of the new state?

Regarding the first phase, Chapter Two outlines Soviet policy and Chapter Three outlines American policy towards the national liberation movements in southern Africa. Chapters Four and Five then assess the influence of Soviet and American actions on the development of the national liberation movements in Angola and Zimbabwe respectively. In these chapters, I test the set of hypotheses at the systems level of analysis, demonstrating that the bipolar international system compelled revolutionary movements to seek alliances with revisionist powers, principally the Soviet Union, while the anti-revolutionary actors sought assistance from the leading status quo power, the United States. This polarization had demonstrated effects on the ideologies and strategies of the revolutionaries.

Chapters Six and Seven examine the turning points in both revolutionary situations. In these chapters, the second set of hypotheses is employed to explain the difference outcomes of the two revolutions. Chapter Five on Angola (1974-1976) fits Scenario Four;

⁸⁹ This data has been gathered through archival work in Angola, Portugal, the Soviet Union, the United States and Zimbabwe, and supplemented by over 150 interviews with political and military leaders of the guerrilla movements, and officials in the governments in Angola and Zimbabwe. See Appendix I.

the status quo power and the revisionist powers both employed confrontational strategies. These confrontational strategies over Angola fueled a conventional war between the divided liberation movements, disrupted the Angolan economic and political organizations and thereby created propitious conditions for revolution.

Chapter Seven on Zimbabwe (1976-1980) resembles Scenario Three; the *status quo* power adopted a cooptive strategy, while the revisionist power adopted a confrontational strategy. Learning from the negative experience in Angola, American foreign policymakers abandoned their confrontational approach, and focused on peaceful means for guaranteeing an outcome to the Zimbabwean revolutionary situation which favored Western interests.⁹⁰ Drawing from their positive experience in Angola, Soviet leaders attempted to replicate their Angolan strategy in Zimbabwe, rearming and retraining their Zimbabwean allies for the "impending" conventional war. The war, however, never reached the conventional stage, but was ended with a negotiated settlement. Both the absence of conventional war and the presence of a negotiated settlement had consequential implications for the design of the independent Zimbabwean state.

Chapters Eight and Nine outline the impact of these revolutionary outcomes and the resulting American and Soviet policies regarding the formation of the post-revolutionary regimes in Angola and Zimbabwe.⁹¹ Chapter Eight traces the rise and demise of the Soviet model of socialist orientation in Angola. Exorcised from the Western world in the aftermath of the civil war, the Angolan regime relied on Soviet and Cuban advice and resources to reconstruct the Angolan state and economy. This correlation of forces resulted in a real, if only temporary, socio-economic transformation in Angola. Gradually, however, the omnipresence of international capitalist system has pulled Angola back towards the Western orbit. Ironically,

⁹⁰ On the different aspects of learning, see Philip Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept," in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, (forthcoming). Note that in discussing Soviet learning, I argue that states and state leaders can learn the wrong lessons for dealing with future scenarios.

⁹¹ The third set of hypotheses will be explored in these chapters, though the relative weakness of both Angola and Zimbabwe in juxtaposition to the United States and the Soviet Union make these factors less important and not deterministic of outcomes.

in spite of American attempts to overthrow the Angolan regime by military force, Angola's revolution has been reversed by the more transparent power of the liberal economic regimes and practices formed and inspired by Western capitalism.⁹²

Chapter Nine on Zimbabwe chronicles the dissonance between the rhetoric and reality of Zimbabwe's socialist project. Despite declarations about the virtues and necessity of socialist revolution, the Zimbabwean government did not enact socio-economic transformations to the extent that the Angolans attempted. The lack of substantive, transformational changes in Zimbabwe resulted in large part from (1) the imposition of capitalist norms and principles (most importantly, the protection of private property) embedded within the constitution agreed upon at the peace settlement at Lancaster House, (2) the continuity in the government and economy during the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, (3) the complete absence of any role for socialist states in the development of the new Zimbabwean state, and finally (4) as in Angola, the powerful pull of the international capitalist system.

Drawing upon the case studies, the conclusion, Chapter Ten, attempts to identify general patterns of interaction between the processes and outcomes of the Angolan and Zimbabwean revolutions and the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the United States. To suggest an agenda for future research, other cases of revolutionary situations are discussed and tested briefly against the typology of outcomes suggested by the set of hypotheses outlined above. Finally, this chapter briefly explores the range of possible outcomes for revolutionary situations as the distribution of capabilities and norms within the international system changes.

⁹² See Michael McFaul, "Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1989/90).

CHAPTER TWO

Soviet Policy Towards Revolutionary Movements in Southern Africa Perceptions and Interests

As with all other movements of national liberation in the Third World, Soviet analysts placed conflict in southern Africa within the context of the global struggle between imperialism and the "world revolutionary process." The minority regimes in Angola and Zimbabwe were characterized as agents of imperialism, underwritten and defended by the West to protect capitalist interests in the region.¹ Regarding Ian Smith's regime;

If racism's handful of votaries in Southern Rhodesia had not enjoyed both the political patronage and the financial, economic, and military support of certain Western countries, they could not have withstood the onset of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for their national independence; this is clear beyond the shadow of the doubt.²

As for the Portuguese in Angola, Moscow asserted that the United States provided the bombs, planes, guns, and training essential to Portugal's war effort.³ Imperialism, according to the Soviet analysis, also sustained Portugal economically, by providing direct economic assistance to bankroll the Portuguese army, and establishing industries and infrastructure within Angola.⁴

If the minority regimes were the agents of imperialism in southern Africa, the national liberation movements were perceived as the vanguard of socialist interests in the region. To fulfill this role, Soviet statements outlined a rather specific ideological orientation which the African liberation forces needed to adopt. First, Soviet doctrine categorically denounced tribalism as a component of liberation ideology, as ethnic identities only split

¹ Korotayev, "Rhodesia: Behind the Salisbury Talks," *International Affairs*, No. 10, 1966, p. 93; *Pravda*, June 25, 1967, p. 6, in *CDSP*, Volume 19, No. #25. L. Korneyev, "South Africa: CIA Once Again," *International Affairs*, No. 9, 1968, p. 99.

² *Pravda*, March 8, 1970, p.4, reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP)*, Vol. 21, No. 10, p. 16.

³ L. Alexandrovich, "Poslednie Chasi Imperii Salazara", *Aziia i Afrika Segodnaya*, No. 1, 1962, p. 31; *Pravda*, November 4, 1965.

⁴ See *Pravda*, May 27, 1961, p. 1; and "Portugalskie Kolonii v Afrike", *Aziia i Afrika Segodnya*, No.7, 1965, p. 4.

progressive forces and promoted regressive thinking.⁵ Second, Soviet analysts argued that nationalism and its agent -- the "national bourgeoisie" -- were "inherently dual in character."⁶ Because the sharpest class struggle was between the "national masses and foreign monopoly capital," Soviet doctrine posited that the "national front embraces the working class, the peasantry, the national bourgeoisie and the democratic intelligentsia," in the first stage, the national democratic stage, of the liberation struggle.⁷ Eventually, however, Soviet theorists warned that the national bourgeoisie would defect. Before they did, Soviet theorists encouraged the "advanced elements" to "work inside it in order to isolate Right-wing elements in the leadership liable to collaborate with former colonial Power, and gradually win leadership of this party."⁸ Despite the virtual absence of "workers" in Angola or Zimbabwe,⁹ Soviet writers placed great emphasis on the importance of the working class as the "logical class to lead" the national liberation struggle in Africa.¹⁰ As for peasants, the majority class in both Angola and Zimbabwe, their

⁵ "Radio Moscow", May 19, 1970, in *Mizan Supplement A*, May/June 1970, p. 13.

⁶ "Program of the CPSU", *Pravda*, November 2, 1961, in the *CDSF*, Vol. XIII, No. 45, p. 13; G.S. Akopyan, "O Dvuch Tendentsiach Natsionalisma Ugnetchich i Razvivaushchichsya Natsii", *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1970, pp. 1-15.

⁷ Yu. Popov, "O Nekotorich Chertach Rabochevo Dvizhenie v Afrike", *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1961, p. 49; and "Program of the CPSU." (1961).

⁸ "Africa's Hopes and Anxieties", *International Affairs*, No. 11, 1963, pp. 44-45.

⁹ As ZAPU had historical connections to trade union movements in Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) and South Africa, Zimbabwe was considered an African country with a relatively strong proletariat. See Vasily Solodovnikov, *Neokolonializm: Teoriya i Praktika*, (Moscow: "Nauka", 1966), p. 281.

¹⁰ *Problemi Mira i Sotsialisma*. No. 5, 1971, p. 23; "The Upsurge of the Worker Movement in the Countries of Asia and Africa", *Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1962, pp. 103-111, in JPRS Translation, No. 13774, pp. 67-81; *Vsemirnoe Profsoyuznoe Dvizhenie*, No. 8, August 1961, pp. 15-16; "Profsoyuzi-Oplot Revolutsii", *Aziia i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 1, 1966, p. 7.

activity remained unorganized and ineffective until it merged with "leading elements" in the national liberation movement.¹¹

The peasantry in that part of the world is a mighty revolutionary force. But as a rule, it is a spontaneous force, with all the fluctuations stemming from all their contradictions in ideology and policy . . . The experience of the revolutionary movement in various parts of the world has shown that the most reliable path for the effective involvement of the peasantry and for genuine social progress is the creation of a stable alliance between it and the working class.¹²

Different, then, from the Chinese conception of national liberation, the Soviet theory treated the peasantry as an ally to be used, rather than as a base from which to build the entire struggle.¹³ This orientation had pronounced influences on the kinds of strategies and tactics of struggle advocated by Soviet advisors.

The Revolutionary Democrats

The absence of a sizable working class in countries such as Angola and Zimbabwe compelled Soviet theorists to develop an alternative construct for rationalizing revolutionary activity. Borrowing from their own revolutionary experience, Soviet thinkers championed the idea of "revolutionary democrats," progressive-minded people from all social classes, intent on forwarding the socialist transformation even in conditions not traditionally considered ripe for revolution. According to the Soviet model, these revolutionary democrats could overcome their objective conditions by adopting a comprehensive political programme to guide the revolution.¹⁴ While inherently nationalist at inception, this

¹¹ V. Katsman, *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1964, pp. 102-107; T. Timofeyev, "Scientific Socialism and Petty Bourgeois Ideology", *Pravda*, October 24, 1966, in *CDSP*, Vol. XVIII, No. 43, p. 6.

¹² Brezhnev, June 1969, p. 9; and I. Potemkhin, "On 'African Socialism'" *International Affairs*, No. 1, January 1963, p.75.

¹³ Katsman, "Krest'yanstvo Dvizhenie v Tropicheskoi Afrike Posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voini", *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1964, pp. 102-108.

¹⁴ See Y. Knayaziev, "Sem' Let Osvoboditel'noi Bor'bi, (Angola)", *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 5, 1968, pp. 119-123.

ideology of "revolutionary democracy" also incorporated "scientific socialism" both as a means of understanding the liberation struggle, and as a program for the future.¹⁵

The formation of their views is directly and indirectly affected by Marxist-Leninist ideology. The point is not simply that some revolutionary democrats have had the opportunity, at different times and in different conditions, to acquaint themselves with the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism. It is even more important that socialism has long since ceased to be merely a scientific system of views but has become a living and material force -- a social system that demonstrates its concrete achievements and indisputable superiority to capitalism.

It is therefore no accident that the socialist concepts of contemporary revolutionary democracy show more and more elements bringing its views nearer to scientific socialism. Moreover, the political [sic] of the struggle for national liberation and national construction constantly suggests to the revolutionary democrats the need for studying and creatively mastering the historical experience of building socialism in the USSR and the other socialist states.¹⁶

Armed with this ideological inclination and supported by the international socialist system of states, Soviet theorists maintained that even the least of the lesser developed countries could skip the capitalist stage of development and move directly towards building socialism.

In Angola, Soviet commentators unequivocally identified the MPLA as a "revolutionary-democratic" organization in the vanguard of the liberation struggle.¹⁷ As early as 1962, the MPLA received exclusive coverage in Soviet press coverage of the Angolan armed struggle, despite the fact that most of the rest of the world

¹⁵ See "The Supreme Internationalist Duty of a Socialist Country", *Pravda*, October 27, 1965, in *CDSF*, Vol. XVII, No. 33, p. 7.

¹⁶ V. Midtsev, *Izvestia*, May 17, 1966, p. 5, in *CDSF*, Vol. XVIII, No. 20, p. 21.

¹⁷ Pyotr Manchka, "Revolutsionii Avanguard Afriki", *Aziia i Afriki Segodnya*, No. 5, 1969, p.13; Khazanov's biography of Neto asserts that the MPLA was transformed into revolutionary-democratic organization in the early 1960's. Anatoly Khazanov, *Agostinho Neto*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 140.)

recognized Roberto's UPA as the leading movement.¹⁸ The MPLA was invited to attend the Khartoum (1967) and Rome (1970) conferences on national liberation in Africa, according the MPLA membership in the "authentic six" group of African liberation movements.¹⁹

Soviet leaders identified the MPLA as the leading national liberation movement because the MPLA had a "clear and definite program" based on "revolutionary nationalism" in the interest of workers,²⁰ as distinguished from "tribal" and regional agendas of other Angolan organizations.²¹ According the CPSU, "Socialism (Soviet-style, of course) determines in many respects ideological, political, and socio-economic platform (of the national liberation process in the Third World), as well as the trend of its development after the acquisition of state independence."²² To illustrate the MPLA's commitment to the USSR, Soviet journals frequently published speeches by Neto in which the Angolan leader praised Leninism as a "bright star" of revolutionary guidance, and Soviet assistance as instrumental to the conduct of the Angolan liberation struggle.²³

Soviet attitudes towards the FNLA developed along a different trajectory. In the early years of the armed struggle, Roberto's liberation movement was accepted as a legitimate revolutionary

¹⁸ "Angola's Nationalist Forces", *International Affairs*, No. 3, 1963, p. 116; Nikanorov, "Tri Fronta Lissabona" *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 12, 1971, pp. 9-10. It should be remembered that in 1963, the OAU recognized the FNLA but did not recognize the MPLA.

¹⁹ "International Conference in Support of the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies", *Afro-Asian Peoples*, (AAPS), Vol. 12, No. 3, 1970, p. 8.

²⁰ "Radio Moscow", 20 November 1965, *SWB*, SU/ 2022/A5/1.

²¹ On MPLA workerist orientation, see "K Sobitiyam v Angole i yuzhnom Vietname", *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 6, 1961, p. 5.

²² N.P. Ankeev and R. A. Ulyanovsky, "Programma Natsional'novo Vozrozhdeniya" *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1964, pp. 3-11.

²³ Neto, "Angola v Bor'be", *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 5, 1970 p. 9. See also Mario de Andrade, "Portugaliya-- ne Khozyain, a Okupant", *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 11, 1966, pp. 23-24; and Neto, "Samoe Vazhnoe Oruzhie", *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 1, 1967, pp. 30-31.

force. Though Roberto himself despised Soviet communism, his frustrations with Western assistance compelled him to entertain closer ties with Moscow, a development "evaluated positively" by the Soviet press.²⁴ After Roberto met with Soviet United Nations officials, GRAE, the FNLA's government in exile, joined the Soviet-backed Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization in March 1964.²⁵ The relationship, however, was short-lived. Soviet-FNLA relations quickly soured over different positions on the Congo crisis.²⁶ By May 1965, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization already had expelled GRAE.²⁷ Thereafter, Soviet accounts portrayed the FNLA as non-revolutionary, tribalist, and regionalist organization, lacking a clear programme.²⁸ Roberto was depicted as a CIA agent backed by the United States and China to debilitate the real liberation forces in Angola.²⁹

Soviet leaders had little contact with UNITA. From Moscow, UNITA was viewed as yet another "splittest" movement, which only weakened the liberation struggle. When Savimbi visited Moscow in 1964, his Soviet hosts advised him to unite with the MPLA.³⁰ UNITA, however, enjoyed a better rank than the FNLA. While UNITA

²⁴ *Pravda*, March 17, 1964, as quoted in John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), p. 133. See also, Y. Konovalov, "Problems of Liberation of the Last Colonies in Africa," *International Affairs*, No. 4, April 1964. A 1962 survey of the Angolan armed struggle recognized the importance of the UPA's insurgency. See L. Alexandrovich, "Poslednie Chasi Imperii Salazara", p. 31.

²⁵ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 132.

²⁶ See *Pravda*, December 16, 1964; and Daniel Kempton, *Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa: The National Liberation Movement Connection*, (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 66.

²⁷ MPLA, *Historia de Angola*, (Porto: Edicoes Afrontamento, 1965), p. 13.

²⁸ "Radio Moscow" March 22, 1967, in *SWB:Soviet Union*, 2424/A5/2.

²⁹ "Radio Peace and Progress", 13 September 1969, in *Mizan Supplement A*, No. 5, September/October 1969, p. 29; *Noveyshaya Istoriya Afriki*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1968), p. 500.

³⁰ John Marcum, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in Angola" *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 8, February 18, 1983, p. 5.

never received any recognition or assistance from the USSR, the organization escaped scathing criticism in the Soviet press in the years leading up to the Portuguese coup.³¹ As Savimbi at least espoused a socialist orientation, he was spared the full wrath of Soviet propaganda.

In Zimbabwe, Soviet commentators portrayed Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) as the leading, nationalist movement responsible for all resistance activity against the Rhodesian state.³² As the first, nationalist movement to organize in Zimbabwe, ZAPU established ties with the USSR before any other nationalist groups had formed, and then managed to sustain good relations throughout the entire revolutionary struggle. As a result of this early recognition, ZAPU increasingly participated in Soviet-sponsored international forums including, among others, the 1967 AAPS0 Conference in Khartoum, and the 1969 Alma Ata Symposium on revolutionary struggle.³³ Like the MPLA, an invitation to the Khartoum Conference gave ZAPU membership in the "authentic six."³⁴ Unlike the MPLA, ZAPU had real ties to the nascent working class forming in Zimbabwe in the early 1960s, as Nkomo and many of ZAPU's leaders had emerged from trade unions in Bulawayo. From the Soviet point of view, these ties to the workers made ZAPU Moscow's natural

³¹ This is the conclusion presented in Kempton, *Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa*, p. 66. This author's review of the Soviet literature on the liberation struggle in Angola before 1974 produced very few references to UNITA at all. It appears that the Soviet observers of African affairs did not consider UNITA to be a major player. Historical accounts of UNITA after the civil war, however, became very critical of UNITA's actions during this period. See, for instance, chapter three of Oleg Ignatyev, *Secret Weapon in Africa*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), titled "'Judas' Savimbi Exposed."

³² *Pravda*, August 27, 1967, p. 5; January 1, 1968, p. 1; March 18, p. 4; July 31, p. 5; May 14, 1969, p. 1; January 19, 1970, p. 1. or *Izvestiya*, August 27, 1967, p. 1.

³³ Nikolai Kosukhin, *Arena Bor'bi Idei -- Afrika*, (Moskva: "Misl'", 1985), p. 179-180.

³⁴ Rostislav Ulyanovsky, *Pravda*, March 20, 1969, p. 4, in *CDSP*, Vol.21, No. 12, p. 15. Other members of the authentic six included the MPLA, ANC, FRELIMO, SWAPO, and the PAIGC. The most significant movements not invited were UNITA, FNLA, PAC, SWANU, and ZANU.

ally.³⁵

Despite unequivocal endorsement of ZAPU, Soviet officials did not denounce ZANU categorically, as they did, for instance the FNLA in Angola or COREMO in Mozambique.³⁶ In 1965, for instance, an article in *International Affairs* recognized ZANU as "one of the main patriotic organizations in the country, while Radio Moscow acknowledged that ZANU activities were contributing to the liberation movement."³⁷ In 1970, ZANU youth even attended a Komsomol Congress in Moscow.³⁸ This more neutral disposition towards ZANU stemmed from Moscow's desire to facilitate the formation of a united front in Zimbabwe. According to Soviet sources, the ZAPU -ZANU split had been orchestrated by "outside" forces -- the Maoists who sought to undermine Soviet support for the national liberation struggle and the imperialists who wanted to weaken and destroy entirely the movement for independence.³⁹ Warning that tribalism, "a foreign reactionary weapon," constituted the chief obstacle to African independence", Soviet sources emphasized "how greatly the effectiveness of their liberation struggle would increase and what important defeats they could inflict on imperialism and reaction if the forces of progress were

³⁵ Author's interview with Eduard Samoilov, First Secretary, Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, (Moscow, December 7, 1990). During the liberation war, Samoilov was the Committee's chief liaison with ZAPU.

³⁶ See among many examples, Radio Moscow for Africa, October 27, 1967 (SWB, SU/1998/A5/2), Radio Moscow in Portuguese for Africa, April 27, 1967 (SWB, SU/2452/A5/1), or Vasily Solodovnikov, *Borba za Osvobozhdenie Portugalskich Kolonii v Afriki*, (Moskva:Nauka, 1975).

³⁷ Yu. Oganisyan, "Novie Rubezhi 'Starogo Kolonializma'," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 6, 1965, p. 45; *Radio Moscow*, October 21, 1965, SWB -- SU/1993/A5/2.

³⁸ *Komsomalskaya Pravda*, May 26, 1970, in *Mizan Lewsletter, Supplement A*, No. 3, May-June, 1970, p 19.

³⁹ See *Izvestiya*, November 17, 1967, p. 2, in *CDSP*, Vol. 19, No. 46, p. 16 and Nikomorov, *Izvestiya*, September 3, 1970, p. 4, in *CDSP*, Vol. 22, No. 35, p. 21. Ken Flower, the former Rhodesian Intelligence Chief confirmed that one of the tasks of his organization in the early 1960's was to perpetuate the ZANU-ZAPU split. See Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, 1964-1981* (London: Murray, 1987), p. 104.

to act in complete unity."⁴⁰ When ZANU and ZAPU did begin to negotiate a basis for cooperation, the Soviet press praised their efforts.⁴¹

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TACTICS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Negotiations was a tactic of liberation which Moscow supported in theory, but not in practice. While Moscow encouraged peaceful transitions to independence in the colonial world in the early 1960's,⁴² the Soviet line in southern Africa posited that "actual experience and the practice of the national-liberation movement has proved the untenability of the theory of non-violence."⁴³ Proposals for negotiated settlements were denounced as imperialist tactics of deception designed to impose neocolonial solutions on southern Africa.⁴⁴ By the late 1960s, Soviet theories about revolution advocated armed struggle as a legitimate if not necessary strategy for national liberation in southern Africa.

The struggle against South African racism is in many ways taking on a new character now, different from before. Previously, this struggle was an exclusively political character, when appeals were made from United Nations rostrums to world public opinion and to the states demanding that they boycott the racists. These forms of international political struggle will undoubtedly be continued and extended. However, it is perfectly obvious that the racist regimes in the South African Republic and Rhodesia will not capitulate without a struggle and the representatives of the African people

⁴⁰ Rotislav Ulyanovsky, *Pravda*, March 20, 1969, p. 4, in *CDSF*, Vol. 21, No. 12, p. 14. At the time, Ulyanovsky was Deputy Secretary of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU responsible for national liberation movements.

⁴¹ Vasily Solodovnikov, in Olav Stokke, ed., *Southern Africa: the UN-OAU Conference*, April 9-14, 1973, (Uppsala, 1973), Volume II, 1973, p. 65.

⁴² See Gleb Starushenko, "National Liberation Movement and the Struggle for Peace", *International Affairs*, No. 10, 1963, p. 5.

⁴³ Y. Dolgoplov, *Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'nie Voini Na Sovremmonoi Etape*, (Moscow: Voenizdat', 1977) pp. 19-20.

⁴⁴ See *Radio Moscow*, December 6 and 7, 1966, as cited in *Mizan Supplement A*, No. 1, January-February, 1967, p.5; *Pravda*, July 17, 1966, p. 5. ; August 23, 1966, p. 1; November 6, 1966 p. 5; October 10, 1966 p. 1, 1967; September 3, 1971, p. 1.

believe, it is⁴⁵ impossible to liquidate them by peaceful methods alone.

Soviet leaders were always careful in the definition and promotion of wars of national liberation as the requirements of peaceful coexistence made most wars irrational. Khrushchev warned that the so-called even "a small-scale imperialist war ... may develop into a world thermonuclear and missile war. We must, therefore, fight against both world war and against local wars."⁴⁶ However, national liberation wars were an exception; "such wars are not only justified, they are inevitable, for the colonialists do not freely bestow independence on the peoples. The peoples win freedom and independence only through struggle, including armed struggle."⁴⁷ From the Soviet perspective, peaceful coexistence actually created the favorable conditions for Soviet assistance to national liberation movements.⁴⁸

According to the Soviet theory of liberation warfare, the first stage was guerrilla war in the countryside. During this phase, the liberation forces were advised to carry out guerrilla strikes against the minority regimes as a method for mobilizing mass support. After a protracted period of weakening the enemy and strengthening the liberation forces, the war would move into the second stage, whereby territory would be controlled or "liberated" by the guerrillas. In this stage, the prototype of an independent

⁴⁵ Ulyanovsky, *Pravda*, March 20, 1969, p. 4, in *CDSP*, Vol. 21, No. 12, p. 14.

⁴⁶ N.S. Khrushchev, "For New Victories for the World Communist Movement", speech delivered on January 6, 1961, in *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1961, p. 13.

⁴⁷ *IBID*, p. 13. See also, N.S. Khrushchev, *Za Novie Pobedi Mirovovo Kommunisticheskogo Dvizhenie*, (Moskva: Gospolizdat, 1961), p. 31.

⁴⁸ "The National Liberation Movement Is an Integral Part of the World Revolutionary Process", *Kommunist*, No. 2, January, 1961, pp. 15-20, in the *CDSP*, Vol. XIV, No. 6, p. 4. See also, M. Turgen-zade (Chairman of the Soviet-Afro Asian Solidarity Committee) and L. Maksudov, (Chairman of the Soviet Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization), "Statement on Decisions of the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference", *Pravda*, March 23, 1963, in *Current Soviet Documents*, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 8, 1963, p. 24.

state would be set up in the liberated zones. In the final stage, the guerilla forces were to reorganize into conventional units.⁴⁹ This conventional army, armed with the commensurate heavy military hardware, would then seize the last outputs of colonial rule in the cities.

Soviet theorists placed less emphasis on the "politicization" process during the guerrilla stage of the struggle than their Chinese rivals, instead stressing the necessity of armed conflict as both an end and strategy.⁵⁰ According to the Soviet theory, the "masses" would become "politicized" as a consequence of the armed struggle.⁵¹ When the oppressed witnessed the armed struggle being waged on their behalf, they would rally to the cause of national liberation without being told explicitly to do so.⁵² To promote rapid development of the armed struggle, for instance in Zimbabwe, Soviet advisors recommended a series of high-profile military incursions into Rhodesia by an alliance of guerrilla forces from the ANC of South Africa and ZAPU which began in 1967 and ended in 1970. Though many supporters of the national liberation movement in Zimbabwe criticized the ZAPU-ANC alliance as an adventurous gamble which unnecessarily involved the South African security forces in the Rhodesian conflict, the Soviet Union praised the alliance as a progressive and effective organizational strategy 'upon which the success of the struggle for the destruction of the

⁴⁹ L. Tyagunenکو, . ed., *Vooruzhennaya Borb'a Narodov Afriki za Svobodu i Nezavisimost'*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1974). This book was a joint project between the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and the Institute of Africa of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

⁵⁰ The fallacies of the Chinese model are documented in A.C. Krasil'nikov, *KNR i Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie na Yuge Afrikanskogo Kontinenta (1960-1983 gg.)*, (Moskva: Institut Dal'nego Vostoka, 1984). This report is an internal document of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies. Unlike other Soviet academic organizations dealing with foreign policy, this institute has a dual affiliation with the Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

⁵¹ Author's interview with Vasily Solodovnikov, (Moscow, December 8, 1991). During the 1960s, Solodovnikov was head of the Institute of African Studies in Moscow. He later became Soviet Ambassador to Zambia, from where he orchestrated Soviet contacts with ZAPU.

⁵² Y. Alimov, *International Affairs*, No. 5, May 1968, p. 97.

bastion of racism, fascism, and colonialism depends.⁵³

The Soviet Role

If imperialism (and Chinese ultra-leftism) were the international forces seeking to arrest the southern African liberation movements, the Soviet Union and the socialist system of states (i.e., Eastern Europe) were their natural allies.⁵⁴ Soviet leaders embraced the cause of African national liberation as the frontline in the battle between the forces of capitalism and socialism.⁵⁵ Specific to the southern African context, Soviet observers predicted that the correlation of forces would shift in favor of the "progressives" should the Angolan nationalists succeed, thereby speeding the pace of liberation in Namibia, Rhodesia, and finally South Africa.

Why did Soviet leaders care? Several Western scholars attributed classical definitions of "national" interests in explaining Soviet policy; the "strategic" importance of Angolan, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwean, naval and air ports, the ability to monitor Western communications in the southern Atlantic, and the "economic" potential of these rich countries provided logical reasons for Soviet involvement.⁵⁶ Such limited definitions of Soviet interests, however, fail to capture the totality of Soviet policy towards liberation struggles. Soviet leader supported the Angolan and Zimbabwean national liberation movement not simply for trade or naval bases. After all, Moscow could have arranged trade and perhaps even military cooperation with Portugal in Angola or Ian Smith in Rhodesia without overthrowing these colonial regimes. Rather, Soviet leaders supported the national liberation struggles

⁵³ Tyagunenko, *Vooruzhennie Borba Narodov Afriki za Svobodu i Nezavisimost*, p. 306.

⁵⁴ Manchka, "Angola Budet Svobodnoi", p. 28. Manchka was the head of the Africa section of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

⁵⁵ Author's interview with Rostislav Ulyanovsky, former First Deputy Secretary, International Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU, (Moscow, March 7, 1991).

⁵⁶ Ian Grieg, *The Communist Challenge to Africa*, (Surrey, England: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 1977), p. 211; Richard Bissell, "Soviet Interests in Africa", in Warren Wienstein and Thomas Henriksen, eds., *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*, (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 4.

because they considered this process a natural and inevitable step in the development of a world socialist system. By assisting the Angolan and Zimbabwean insurgencies, socialist states were "playing an important part in spreading the ideas of socialism and revolutionary anti-colonial ideology."⁵⁷ Just as American leaders feared the "loss" of any one country to socialism as a momentum-building blow to the entire capitalist system, Soviet officials deigned a special meaning to every successful national liberation struggle as a victory for the world revolutionary process. Within this context, Khrushchev called support for liberation struggles a "sacred" duty of the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist world.⁵⁸

Because the world socialist system and the movements of national liberation were "natural allies" against the forces of imperialism, Soviet assistance was proclaimed as most important for the success of southern African revolutionaries.⁵⁹ First, in the Soviet analysis, the very existence of the Soviet Union and the growing strength of socialism helped to check imperialist aggression in southern Africa, and thereby make national liberation struggles possible.⁶⁰ As Khrushchev explained,

The Communist Parties, which guide themselves by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, have always been against the export of revolution. At the same time they fight resolutely against the imperialist export of counter-revolution. They consider it their internationalist duty to call on the peoples of all

⁵⁷ *Pravda*, April 22, 1965.

⁵⁸ Department of State Memorandum for Mr. Walt Rostow, "Talking Points on the Vienna Conversations", undated, Bowles Papers, box 300, Yale University, as cited in Thomas Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968*, (University of Missouri Press, St. Louis, Missouri, 1985), p. 77.

⁵⁹ See, for instance, "The Tasks of the Struggle Against Imperialism in the Modern Stage and the Unity of Action of the Communist and Workers Parties of All the Anti-Imperialist Forces," from the Congress of Communist and Workers Parties, 1969 (Moskva: Polizdat, 1969); or Brezhnev's speech on the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, November 3, 1967, in *Pravda*, November 4, 1967.

⁶⁰ "Program of the CPSU", *Pravda*, November 2, 1961, in the *CDSP*, Vol. XIII, No. 45, p. 12; Tyagunenko, *Vooruzhennaya Borb'a Narodov Afriki za Svobodu i Nezavisimost'*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1974), p. 407.

countries to unite, to rally all their internal forces, to act vigorously and relying in the might of the world socialist system, to prevent or firmly resist imperialist interference in the affairs of any people who have risen in revolution.⁶¹

Beginning with the October Revolution and continuing through the formation of the world socialist system, Soviet leaders pledged to construct an alternative structure of international relations independent of the world capitalist system.⁶² The 'space' carved out of the international capitalist system by the world socialist system created the "favorable conditions for the advance of the national liberation movement."⁶³

Second, the very existence of the "communist state system" pressured the West to respond to the needs of Africa. Soviet diplomatic prowess allegedly pressured Western states into adopting actions regarding Rhodesia that they otherwise would not have considered.

The Soviet Union was the initiator of the adoption of such important United Nations documents as the Declaration on the granting of Independence to colonial countries and the Declaration on the liquidation of all forms of racial discrimination . . . Soviet representatives have repeatedly come out at the United Nations and in other international organizations for the adoption of effective measures in questions of applying strict sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, Portugal, and Southern Rhodesia.⁶⁴

Soviet writings went so far as to assert that Third World challenges to imperialism, such as the Suez Canal crisis, the Cuban Revolution, or the fight for southern Africa, "all depend for

⁶¹ From the 1961 meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, as quoted by N.S. Khrushchev, "For New Victories for the World Communist Movement", p. 22. See also Tyagunencko, ed., *Vooruzhennaya Borba Narodov Afriki za Svobodu i Nezavisimost'*, p. 407; and Starushenko, "National Liberation Movement and the Struggle for Peace", p. 6.

⁶² See for instance, Karen Brutents, *National Liberation Revolutions Today*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), Vol. I, pp. 61-65; or Andrei Gromyko and Boris Ponomarev, eds., *Istoriya Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, 1917-1985*, two volumes, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1986), Vol. II, pp. 262-264.

⁶³ Marushkin, *International Affairs*, No. 3, 1966, p. 53.

⁶⁴ Solodovnikov, in Stokke, *Southern Africa*, p. 64.

victory on the full support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries."⁶⁵

Third, the Soviet Union pledged political support to the liberation forces in Angola and Zimbabwe. Beginning with Khrushchev's solidarity statement with the MPLA in 1961, Soviet leaders persistently championed the cause of the liberation war at international forums, during CPSU congresses, and in Soviet publications.⁶⁶ In the United Nations, Soviet diplomats constantly worked to radicalize sanctions and chastise the Western powers. While rejecting moderate Western proposals as stop-gap measures, Soviet diplomats championed such policies as UN "moral material assistance" and OAU military intervention.⁶⁷ Moscow also pressured the OAU and its members to end relations with Great Britain, assist the liberation wars throughout southern Africa, and recognize ZAPU and the MPLA as the leading movements in their struggles.⁶⁸ In giving political support to these causes, Soviet statements stressed that the "successes of the national-liberation movement depend to an enormous extent on the victories of socialism, and in their turn they strengthen the position of socialism in the struggle against imperialism.... [Furthermore,] the peoples of Algeria, Laos, Angola, the Congo and many other countries that are struggling against imperialism see in the Soviet Union and the other socialist states a source of reliable support."⁶⁹ "Self-reliance" and "national forms of Marxism-

⁶⁵ Tingi Otegbey, *International Affairs*, #1, 1970, p. 30. See also the declarations of the 24th CPSU Congress, reprinted in *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 3, 1971, p. 4.

⁶⁶ See, for instance, Khrushchev, *Za Novie Pobedi Mirovovo Kommunisticheskogo Dvizhenie* p. 32; Brezhnev's May Day speech in *Izvestia*, May 2, 1969, p. 1; in *CDSP*, Vol. 21, No. 18, p. 6; and the 23rd and 24th CPSU Congress reports which affirm Soviet support for the Angolan and Zimbabwean liberation struggles.

⁶⁷ TASS press release, December 6, 1965. (SWB, SU/2032/A5/1); TASS, December 6, 1965. (SWB, SU/2032/A5/1); and *Pravda*, December 7, 1965, in *Mizan Lewsletter, Supplement A*, No. 1, January-February, 1966, p 13.

⁶⁸ *Radio Moscow*, December 10 & 22, 1965, in *Mizan Newsletter, Supplement A*, No. 1, January-February, 1966, p 13.

⁶⁹ Khrushchev, as cited in "The National Liberation Movement Is an Integral Part of the World Revolutionary Process", p. 3.

Leninism" were chided as a debilitating, anti-revolutionary ideologies.⁷⁰

From this political support flowed ideological guidance, a fourth form of Soviet assistance to the liberation struggle in southern Africa. As *Pravda* declared, "from the standpoint of ideology, world socialism,... is exerting its influence on the social content and ideals of the national liberation struggle."⁷¹ Moreover, the Soviet Union provided a socialist model to be emulated by revolutionary democrats in the Third World.⁷²

A fifth and most important source of Soviet support for the liberation struggle was material assistance. As Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CPSU, declared

In Angola and Mozambique in "Portuguese" Guinea and South Arabia patriots are fighting heroically against foreign enslaves and invaders. The resistance of the popular masses to the racist regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia is broadening. Our party and the Soviet people support that struggle actively, give and will continue to give tangible all-round assistance to the peoples who are fighting against foreign invaders for their freedom and independence.⁷³

Of all the forms of assistance rendered, Moscow's most important contribution was military assistance. As Western powers were unwilling to supply the nationalist forces military materials, the Soviet Union and the other communist countries were the only alternative sources of military hardware -- a vital necessity for the operation of an armed struggle.

In Angola, significant Soviet military assistance first began after Neto's visit to Moscow in 1964.⁷⁴ As the OAU did not

⁷⁰ See Boris Ponomarev, *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1969, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 17 April 1969, p. A13.

⁷¹ "The Supreme Internationalist Duty of a Socialist Country", *Pravda*, October 27, 1965, in *CDSP*, Vol. XVII, No. 33, p. 7.

⁷² See I. Shatalov, "V Edinom Revulutsionnom Potoke," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 9, 1967, p. 21.

⁷³ Leonid Brezhnev, speech at Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU, *Pravda*, March 29, 1966, in the *CDSP*, Vol. 18, No. 12, p.9.

⁷⁴ Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People*, (New York, Anchor Books, 1972), p. 235; Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, pp. 170-171; and author's interview with Lucio Lara, (Luanda,

recognize the MPLA in the early years of the armed struggle, the Soviet Union shipped weapons to the MPLA first through Conakry, Guinea, and later through Congo-Brazzaville.⁷⁵ These weapons were typical guerrilla fare -- AK-47's, mortars, and land mines. Weapons to fight a conventional war were never delivered to the MPLA before 1974. As to the quantity of assistance supplied, Western estimates range from \$54 million to \$63 million.⁷⁶ Some Western scholars have interpreted this low amount to mean that the Soviet Union took a cautious approach to promoting armed struggle in Angola.⁷⁷ However, as the following section on the MPLA discusses in detail, the erratic performance of the MPLA's fighting forces suggest that the guerrillas were not constrained by a lack of supplies.⁷⁸

Soviet military aid to ZAPU began around the same time. While Soviet press accounts implied that Soviet arms were not supplied to Zimbabwean guerrillas until after UDI,⁷⁹ Rhodesian intelligence first discovered Soviet-manufactured weapons inside the country in

August 1988). Mario Andrade first requested Soviet assistance in March 1961. Daniel Kempton argues that assistance began in 1961, but was then discontinued for two years during MPLA internal divisions -- a scenario similar to the 1973 cut in assistance. See Kempton, *Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa*, pp. 38-39.

⁷⁵ The Soviet Union had very cordial relations with Congo (Brazzaville) after Massamba-Debat took over at the close of 1965. (See "Joint Soviet-Congolese Communiqué", *Pravda*, August 1, 1965, p. 1., in *CDSP*, Vol. XVII, No. 34, pp. 20-21.)

⁷⁶ The \$54 million figure comes from Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988). p. 270. The \$63 million figure is an American government estimate quoted from Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 263.

⁷⁷ Joachim Krause, "Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa", in Craig Nation and Mark Kauppi, eds., *Soviet Impact in Africa*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Book, 1984), pp. 127-128.

⁷⁸ The exceptions, of course, were when the Soviet Union cut off aid entirely, as they did in 1963-64 and 1972-74. According to Lucio Lara, the second interruption especially had a devastating impact on the conduct of the war. (Author's interview with Lucio Lara, Luanda, August 1989).

⁷⁹ *Radio Moscow*, October 26, 1965. SWB -SU/1997/A5/1.

1963.⁸⁰ The extent of the Soviet assistance program became first apparent, however, in 1967, when the combined forces of the ANC and ZAPU crossed into Zimbabwe. In these series of military operations, several hundred ZAPU-ANC guerrillas were armed with Soviet-manufactured weapons. Once these campaigns ended in 1970, however, there was little visible sign of Soviet military involvement in the war until several years later. Western sources indicate that ZAPU progressively acquired more sophisticated weapons throughout the early 1970's, including the SA-7 missile, but these weapons were not deployed immediately inside Zimbabwe as ZAPU avoided major military operations until after 1976.⁸¹

In addition to hardware, the Soviet Union also trained MPLA and ZAPU military cadres.⁸² While Soviet instruction of Zimbabwean cadres in Africa began as early as 1962,⁸³ the first contingent to train in the Soviet Union arrived in March 1964 to receive a nine-

⁸⁰ John Day, *International Nationalism: The Extra-Territorial Relations of the Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 105. As discussed in the ZAPU section below, ZAPU leaders confirmed in interviews with the author that Soviet military assistance began before 1965.

⁸¹ In 1973, Anthony Wilkinson claimed that ZAPU had acquired recently the 122 mm rocket launchers and SA-7 ground-to-air missiles. (Anthony Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973: An Account and Assessment*, (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper No. 100, 1973, p. 26.). In his memoir of the war, Selous Scouts chief, Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly, noted that a 1974 raid into Zambia captured a Soviet communication system which represented a "major advance on the system of notes and letters" known to be used by ZAPU before. (Lt. Col. Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War* (Albeton, South Africa: Galso Publishing, 1982) p. 129.)

⁸² See, for instance, Solodovnikov's address to the International Conference of Support to the Nations of the Portuguese Countries, June 27-29, 1970, as cited in V. Solodovnikov, *Problemi Sovremmenoi Afriki*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1973), pp. 338-339; and "Radio Moscow" February 4, 1967, in *SWB*, SU/2385/A5/2. Two years earlier, Radio Moscow interviewed Pedro Ramiro, an Angola guerilla who was studying in Moscow and was chairman of the "Guerilla Club". ("Radio Moscow", June 21, 1970, in *Mizan Supplement A*, No. 4, July-August 1970, p. 20.) A TASS report from 1965 also claimed that Angolan students had entered an aviation training program. (TASS, 30 October 1965, in *SWB*, SU/2001/A5/4.)

⁸³ Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965) pp. 202-203. See also Flower, *Serving Secretly*, p. 102.

month course.⁸⁴ Thereafter, ZAPU sent groups of 50 to 100 each year to train in the Soviet Union. Training of Angolan soldiers abroad commenced in 1962 when a group of 200-300 MPLA cadres arrived in Ghana and Morocco.⁸⁵ In 1963, the MPLA leadership sent their first cadres to train in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.⁸⁶ By the end of 1967, one MPLA commander claimed that 2000 cadres had been trained outside of the country.⁸⁷ In addition to training in the Soviet Union, MPLA cadres received instruction from Cuban instructors delivered by Che Guevara during his tour of Africa in 1965.⁸⁸ Zimbabwean guerrillas trained with Soviet officers in Zambia, and then in Angola after 1976.

The training program consisted of both political education and military training.⁸⁹ ZAPU and MPLA cadres learned both how to fire an AK-47 and how to read Marx and Lenin. The few public accounts available which describe the content of Soviet military training, however, suggest that the aim of "communist

⁸⁴ Day, *International Nationalism*, p. 107; Author's interview with James Chikerema, ZAPU Vice-President at the time, (Harare, July 15, 1989). Chikerema spent a month in Moscow in 1964 arranging the training arrangements. Centers which trained Zimbabwean guerrillas included the Political and Intelligence School (Moscow), the Guerilla Warfare Training School (Simferopol), and Sabotage and Demolition School (somewhere in the Crimea).

⁸⁵ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, Vol. 1, p. 302.

⁸⁶ Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm*, p. 235; Author's interview with Paulo Jorge, (Luanda, August 23, 1988). Lucio Lara, however, asserted that significant numbers of military cadres did not begin training in the Soviet Union until 1967. (Author's interview, August 21, 1988).

⁸⁷ *Interview with Commander Sparticus Monimambu*, 21 March 1968, (Toronto: LSM Information Center, 1968) p. 19.

⁸⁸ See Juana Carrasco, "Internationalism: Che in Africa," *Cuba International*, (Havana) March 1989, pp. 15-19; William LeoGrande, "Soviet-Cuban Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," *Cuban Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1980, pp. 488-489. Che Guevara met with MPLA leaders in 1965 in Brazzaville. Thereafter, Che sent Cuban instructors to train MPLA guerrillas. The training program, however, ended in 1968, and was only revived in 1974. (Author's interview with Lucio Lara, Luanda, August 27, 1989).

⁸⁹ Author's interview with James Chikerema, ZAPU Vice-President at the time, (Harare, July 15, 1989), and several ZIPRA commanders who trained in the Soviet Union.

indoctrination" was secondary to learning military techniques.⁹⁰ In comparing Soviet and Chinese training programs, Rex Nhongo, a former ZAPU recruit who later joined and lead the ZANU army, recalled, "in the Soviet Union that had told us that the decisive factor of the war is the weapons. When I got to Urimbi, where there were Chinese instructors, I was told that the decisive factor was the people."⁹¹

This apparent emphasis on military means rather than political methods may help to explain in part why Soviet trained guerrillas engaged in such little military activity until as late as 1976. If the war would be decided through conventional military conflict, it was more important to train an effective conventional army than to engage in a protracted guerrilla war.

Besides weapons and military training, the Soviet Union also provided political, economic, informational assistance to the Zimbabwean national movements. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee bankrolled both MPLA and ZAPU external operations, provided ZAPU and MPLA leaders with international travel, and facilitated their contacts with other states and movements.⁹² Soviet educational institutions, including most notably Patrice Lumumba University, also provided education and training to Angolan and Zimbabwean patriots.⁹³ Soviet publications and radio programs also

⁹⁰ Rhodesian sources, however, assign a different set of priorities to Soviet training. See the account in the *Rhodesia Herald*, 13 August 1968, as cited in Kees Maxey *The Fight for Zimbabwe: the Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI* (London: Rex Collings, 1975) p. 9.

⁹¹ Interview of Rex Nhongo by David Martin, in *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, (London, Faber, 1981), p. 87. p. 88.

⁹² Author's interview with James Chikerema, ZAPU Vice-President at the time, (Harare, July 15, 1989); and Dmitri Zavgorodni, Head of the Africa Section, Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, (Moscow, November 14, 1990).

⁹³ Author's interviews with Vasily Solodovnikov, Moscow, (September 1989); Dmitri Zavgorodni, (Moscow, November 14, 1990), and Viacheslav Lizlov, Professor at Patrice Lumumba University, (Moscow, February 17, 1991).

disseminated about the national movements throughout the world.⁹⁴

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union never provided substantial military assistance to either the FNLA, UNITA or ZANU. In a world system divided between the forces of capitalism and the forces of communism, the FNLA and UNITA were on the wrong side. ZANU did receive some Soviet assistance indirectly, but the overwhelming bulk of the Soviet assistance was channeled to ZAPU and not ZANU.⁹⁵

Conclusion

Soviet foreign policymakers took a keen interest in fomenting revolutionary situations in both Angola and Zimbabwe. Once liberation forces had formed, creating conditions of "multiple sovereignty" in both territories,⁹⁶ Soviet leaders had allies with whom they could support and influence to carry out their internationalist duty of promoting socialism. The stakes were low. By training a few hundred guerrillas and providing arms, the Soviet Union was given a direct means of influencing outcomes of these revolutionary situations. As the following chapters explain, these initial acts of socialist solidarity lead to even greater Soviet involvement in promoting revolutionary outcomes during the critical moments of transition in both countries.

⁹⁴ Beginning in 1967, special programs were devoted to the Zimbabwean war, on which ZAPU leaders frequently appeared. See Radio Moscow, January 1, 1967, (SWB, SU/2356/A5/2).

⁹⁵ The Soviet allocated some resources to the OAU Liberation Committee, which in turn, provided ZANU with Soviet equipment. This type of assistance, however, represented a small fraction of the Soviet program.

⁹⁶ See Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, chapter nine.

CHAPTER THREE

American Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1960-1974

American foreign policy toward southern Africa in the 1960s was conditioned by the overriding global objective of containing communism. As Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, succinctly declared in 1964, "The first concern of our foreign policy must be, and is, to prevent expansion of the Communist empires."¹ With specific reference to Africa, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, stated bluntly, our primary objective in Africa is to "block communist penetration" in Africa.² Defined in specific economic or security requirements, Africa was not vital to U.S. national interests. No African country posed a security threat to the United States, American trade with the entire continent was minuscule, and shipping routes and strategic minerals associated with Africa were useful, but not critical.³ However, if American objectives were defined in systemic terms, and not strictly national interests, Africa mattered. If the world was divided between into two systems, capitalist and socialist, the United States accepted a global commitment to maintain the constitution of the capitalist system of states, even in Africa.

In Africa, the simple divide between communism and capitalism was complicated by the process of decolonization. As former colonial possessions of capitalist states made the transition to independent rule, they ran the risk of falling under the sway of anti-capitalist, anti-Western forces. According to American policymakers, nationalist movements seeking self-determination in

¹ Secretary of State Dean Rusk, *Department of State Bulletin*, (hereafter abbreviated as *DOSB*) October 12, 1964, p. 499.

² G. Mennen Williams, *DOSB*, March 9, 1965, p.353. A similar view is presented in a 1962 State Department document entitled, "Africa: Department of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations," quoted in David Dickson, *United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa*, (New York: Lanham, 1985), p. 23.

³ Dickson, *United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. 14.

Africa provided an entre for Soviet expansion.⁴

As American Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned, "the Communists' threat to African freedom remains a problem for those who love freedom. They still have ample opportunities for fishing in troubled waters in those areas of Africa where important issues remain to be resolved."⁵ While not a colonial power engaged in the process of decolonization, the United States was neither a neutral observer. In an age when every shift in the perceived balance of forces between communism and capitalism was considered threatening to the national security of the United States and the international security of the world market economy, even peripheral states such as Angola and Zimbabwe were defined to be within the sphere of American interests. Failure to deter meant certain communist subjugation of the entire continent.⁶

There have too many examples in recent history of the ability of communism to subvert new-found freedom, and Africa's emergent freedom is a fragrant temptation. The Communists' opportunities for making something of that temptation stand, for the most part, in direct proportion to the inability or failure of the West to fulfill its responsibilities there.⁷

As Britain, Belgium, Portugal, or France had neither the resources nor political distance (they were, after all, the enemies in colonial Africa) to counter Soviet inducements, American statesmen such as Wayne Fredericks argued that the United States had to step in;

There can be no doubt about the necessity for the U.S. to prevent Communist penetration for subversion through providing new nations an alternative source of aid to the still-

⁴ G. Mennen Williams, *DOSB*, June 3, 1963, p. 881; See also the citations from the Department of State Policy Planning Council, "Problems for Southern Africa", 6 May 1963, quoted in Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, p. 99.

⁵ Rusk, *DOSB*, October 12, 1964, p. 502.

⁶ For a general discussion of this line of strategic thinking, see Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior."

⁷ Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, *Department of State Press Release*, no. 21, January 11, 1963, p. 4.

suspected former colonial metropolises.⁸

The logic of American assistance to Africa, then, was that of the Marshall Plan. If a fraction of American wealth could be "redistributed" to Africa for the development of Western-oriented, liberal regimes, the international capitalist system as a whole would benefit in the long run. G. Mennon Williams even extended the logic to link American security to African assistance programs.

One way to head off such a challenge to American security (communism) is to see that our aid programs in Africa, and elsewhere, serve not only the outlets for American generosity and our instinctive desire to help other people help themselves, but also as a hardheaded method of assuring the freedom and future security of the United States.⁹

Thus, the "internal" development of political and economic systems in newly-independent African states became inextricably linked to the security of the United States, the Western powers, and the international system as a whole.

In southern Africa, the American maintenance mandate was further complicated by the clash between American liberal ideals and Portuguese, Rhodesian, and South African resolute resistance to majority rule. In general, the Kennedy Administration purported a positive relationship between democratic governments and stable, market-friendly, states.¹⁰ According to Kennedy's top official on Africa, "The best way to stop communism is to eliminate the conditions in which it flourishes -- conditions not only of poverty, illness, illiteracy, and malnutrition but also if lack of

⁸ J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, July 18, 1963, *Department of State Press Release*, No. 390, July 18, 1963, p. 1.

⁹ G. Mennen Williams, *Department of State Press Release*, No. 52, January 25, 1963, p. 3.

¹⁰ Kennedy's attitudes towards decolonization crystallized during the Senate's 1957 debate on Algeria, a debate in which he firmly sided against the French and for Algerian self-determination. Kennedy's team, however, were not all as enthusiastic about Third World independence as the President. For details on the splits, see Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, chapter four, and David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, (New York: Random House, 1972).

self-expression and self-government."¹¹ Yet, how could the United States espouse this position on self-determination and at the same time maintain an alliance with Portugal and close relations with South Africa and Rhodesia? This contradiction plagued American foreign policy towards southern Africa for the next two decades. How each Administration handled this contradiction defined the strategies of American policy in the region.

American Foreign Policy Towards Angola

The rhetoric and personnel of the Kennedy Administration demarcated a new direction in American policy towards Angola. As Kennedy recognized that Portugal could not govern Angola forever, he initiated a two-pronged strategy whereby the United States would pressure Portugal to reform its colonial rule while also nurturing better relations with the Angolan liberation movement(s). This strategy, it was believed, would protect American interests in Angola in the long run without damaging its relationship with Portugal.

To initiate this new strategy, the new Administration sided against its NATO ally and voted for a United Nations resolution condemning Portuguese colonialism after armed conflict erupted in Angola in February 1961.¹² A month later, the United States supported a follow up resolution which called on Portugal to accept a "declaration of independence" for Angola.¹³ Accompanying these votes of condemnation, Kennedy decreased American military assistance to Portugal in 1961 from \$25 to \$3 million, and warned of future cancellations if NATO weapons were used in Portugal's African wars.¹⁴ In June 1962, a State Department Task Force on the Portuguese Territories even recommended that the United States cut

¹¹ Williams, *DOSB*, June 3, 1963, p. 881.

¹² See the statement by U.S. Representative Yost on June 9, 1961 in *American Foreign Policy, 1961: Current Documents*, (Washington:GPO, 1963), p. 886.

¹³ See the supporting statement by Stevenson on March 15, 1961 in *American Foreign Policy, 1961: Current Documents*, p. 884.

¹⁴ See the statement made by U.S. Representative Stevenson, before the U.N. General Assembly, January 25, 1962, in *American Foreign Policy 1962: Basic Documents*, p. 945; and William Minter, *King's Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa*, (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p.159.

off arms sales to Portugal and draw up contingency plans in the event that United States lost basing rights on the Portuguese Azores islands.¹⁵ Finally, as a positive inducement for change, the United States earmarked \$70 million in economic assistance to Portugal, including credits for developing business ventures between Portugal and Angola after independence.¹⁶ The United States also resisted calls of international economic sanctions against Portugal in the belief that a healthy Portuguese economy was a key precondition for the decolonization of Portuguese colonies in Africa.¹⁷

Regarding the Angolan nationalists, the United States quietly established contacts with the UPA (later called the FNLA) in March of 1961 based on the following rationale;

Throughout the southern part of Africa there are a number of movements directed toward racial accommodation and self-government. These movements seek Western assistance and do not desire a commitment from the Communist world.... However, if hopes for achieving legitimate demands for racial and political equality through such peaceful methods are disappointed and the question becomes one of survival for these political movements, any compunctions they might have about accepting Communist aid could be expected to disappear.... Unless there is a discernable movement toward more progressive policies in those parts of southern Africa not enjoying majority rule, and unless there appears to be vigorous leadership from the West to accomplish such progress, there is a good possibility that Western influence could be replaced by that of the Communists.¹⁸

Though the State Department considered funding both the MPLA and the UPA, only Roberto's organization was finally approached for

¹⁵ See Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, pp. 78-79. The facilities were constructed by the United States but were built on Portuguese territory.

¹⁶ Statement by Jonathan Bingham, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, November 29, 1963, in *DOSB*, January 21, 1963, p. 105.

¹⁷ See George Martelli, "The Issues Internationalized", David Abshire and Michael Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 382.

¹⁸ Williams, *DOSB*, June 3, 1963, p. 881.

three reasons.¹⁹ First, American intelligence had concluded that the UPA was a genuine nationalist party, "free from any Communist association."²⁰ Second, at the time, most American observers believed that Roberto's UPA was the dominant liberation organization.²¹ Finally, the major base of operations for the Central Intelligence Agency in the region was Zaire, the host country to the UPA/FNLA until 1976.

After initial consultations, the CIA began to supply Roberto with food stuffs, clothing, and modicum of financial assistance.²² In return for this assistance, American foreign policymakers hoped to promote liberal values and peaceful methods of struggle.²³ Roberto did modify his organization's rhetoric regarding socialism, but could not renounce the armed struggle.²⁴ This fundamental disagreement on the strategy of liberation strained and eventually destroyed relations between the UPA/FNLA and the United States. In announcing that the FNLA had received assistance from the Chinese, Roberto shocked his Western backers when he declared that "only

¹⁹ See John Marcum, "Bipolar Dependency: Angola", in Michael Clough, ed., *Reassessing the Soviet Challenge in Africa*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, No. 25, 1982). p. 16.

²⁰ James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa*, (New York: Penguin, 1962), p. 218.

²¹ See Gerald Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of a Failure", in Rene Lemarchand, ed., *American Policy in Southern Africa*, (New York: University Press of America, 1981), p. 66; and George Houser, *No One Can Sop the Rain: Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle*, (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989). Often forgotten, the UPA/FNLA was recognized by the OAU at the time as the only legitimate liberation movement.

²² The financial assistance never exceeded \$20,000 in a given year. See "CIA's Secret War in Angola", *Intelligence Report*, vol. 1 December 1975, p.1; and Daniel Papp, "Angola, National Liberation, and the Soviet Union", *Parameters*, Journal of the US War College, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1978, p. 28. Another boost for U.S. assistance to the UPA came after Robert Kennedy met Eduardo Mondlane in 1961. See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *Robert Kennedy and his Times*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1965,) p, 562.

²³ See John Bartlow Martin, *Adlai Stevenson and the World*, (New York: Doubleday Books, 1977), pp.617-618.

²⁴ See the following section on the FNLA.

communists can give us what we need."²⁵ As a final attempt to win back Roberto's favor, G. Mennon Williams drafted an "Action Memo" in 1964 which called for U.S. mediation "to prevent the nationalists from mortgaging their future to the Communists and from reaching stage where they will no longer be disposed to negotiate moderate and evolutionary settlement."²⁶ His Memo proposed that United States supply massive assistance to the "nationalists" on the condition that they adopt non-violent forms of protest. The plan, however, was rejected, marking the last serious attempt by the United States to work directly with liberation movements in southern Africa.²⁷

NATO: Ties That Bind

As an member of NATO, Salazar considered these American contacts with the FNLA to be a flagrant and unacceptable violation of Portuguese sovereignty. To deter further American contact with the liberation movements, Portuguese lobbyists launched an aggressive campaign in the United States which claimed that the Kennedy Administration was warming up to communists at the expense of America's longstanding anti-communist ally, Portugal.²⁸ Salazar also threatened to terminate American access to naval and air facilities on the Azores islands.

These threats reverberated in Washington. As early as March 1961, Secretary of State Rusk warned that the United States "must not risk offending traditional allies if it wanted to be an effective power in a changing world."²⁹ His Policy and Planning Staff concluded that the diplomatic offensive against Portugal had been ineffective and recommended against employing further

²⁵ *New York Times*, 4 January 1964, p. 15.

²⁶ Quoted from Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, p.115.

²⁷ Until 1975, the United States maintained minimal contact with the liberation movements. See the testimony of Alfonso Arenales, Deputy Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, July 14, 1975, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *US Policy Toward Southern Africa*, June-July 1975, (Washington : GPO, 1976) p. 246.

²⁸ Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation*, p. 74.

²⁹ Dean Rusk, "Coping with a World Plunged in Revolution", *Business Week*, March 25, 1961, pp. 104-109.

pressure.³⁰ For Rusk and others focused on the Soviet threat, NATO's coherency was a greater priority than decolonization in Angola.

These pro-NATO forces within the Administration gained considerable momentum after the Berlin crisis in 1961 during which the United States used the Azores Islands as a staging ground for troop deployments in Germany. In the summer of 1961, a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the bases were essential to the American defense of Berlin.³¹ Soon thereafter, National Security Action Memorandum No. 60 outlined a new American strategy for dealing with Portugal which advocated the "quiet approach" for pressuring Portugal to relinquish its colonies.³² Thereafter, American U.N. representatives refused to meet with Roberto's delegation, and began to vote against Security Council resolutions which condemned Portuguese colonialism.³³ Kennedy's new look in Africa was over. When push came to shove, Portugal's strategic islands and its membership in NATO were more important to American policymakers than fostering good relations with future Angolan leaders.

The American policy degenerated into a holding pattern of uneasy complacency regarding the Angolan liberation war, a course which continued throughout the Johnson Administration. Especially as the Vietnam war escalated, the United States was in no position to condemn allies fighting colonial wars. In times of war, American military planners and Portuguese politicians could easily make the case that the Azores Islands were crucial to American security requirements.³⁴ Politically, the United States needed

³⁰ See Bundy to Johnson, "Additional Guidance Relating to the Portuguese Territories:", 28 July 1961, NSF: Africa, box 2, Kennedy Library, as cited in *IBID*, p. 83.

³¹ See Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 562.

³² Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited*, p. 161.

³³ See Martelli, "The Issues Internationalized", pp. 367-385.

³⁴ David D. Newsom, *Diplomacy and the American Democracy*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 91. Moreover, the closing of Suez Canal in 1967 further underscored the strategic importance of Portugal's colonies in southern Africa, as more than 200,000 ships were forced to sail around the African

support for its intervention in Vietnam, and Portugal was one of the few countries which backed the American war without question. Faced with overwhelming problems both in Southeast Asia and Southeast America, Africa became a low priority for the Johnson Administration.³⁵

American Policy towards Rhodesia: 1965-1968

Ian Smith's declaration of Rhodesian independence in 1965, however, forced southern African liberation on the American agenda again. The American response attempted to construct a "middle-of-the-road" policy in response to the crisis.

American foreign policy of support for a measured response to end the rebellion and bring about majority rule in Southern Rhodesia steers a course between those who advocate the use of force and those who advocate a hands-off policy. It is a narrow course, and not without perils, but the only one which offers promise. To use force now would bring immediately the disruption and chaos we seek to avoid. To do nothing, would end in the same result.³⁶

The principle advantage of such an approach was that American policymakers could respond to critics on either side of the American political spectrum and to both sides of the Rhodesian conflict. By attempting to appease everyone, however, American policy satisfied no one.

In reply to UDI, President Johnson proclaimed that the United States "will not support policies abroad which are based on the rule of minorities or the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law".³⁷ At no time under the Johnson Administration did the United States consider recognition of the white regime in Rhodesia. "Any other policy would deny our own democratic heritage

continent between June 5 and August 1, 1967 See Abshire and Samuels, *Portuguese Africa*, p. 434.

³⁵ See Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 17.

³⁶ "Background Paper", Bureau of International Organization Affairs, *DOSB*, March 6, 1967, p. 376.

³⁷ President Johnson, as cited in *Department of State Bulletin*, April 24, 1967, p. 647.

and the struggle for equal rights both at home and abroad."³⁸ The Johnson Administration even blamed Smith, not the national liberation movements, for threatening Western interests and offering opportunities for communist expansion in the region. As G. Mennen Williams explained,

Let me close with a comment on the claim of the Smith regime that it is a bulwark against communism in Africa. We disagree. We believe the regime's policies are designed to perpetuate minority rule. If those are left unchallenged and unchecked, they would create exactly the kind of situation in which the Communists could greatly extend their influence in Southern Rhodesia and which would encourage the Communists to renew theirs elsewhere in Africa. . . .

We know of no Communist threat to Southern Rhodesia at present, but we fear one may develop if the colony continues on its present course.³⁹

Beyond simple condemnation, Johnson agreed to support a British proposal for a series of selective sanctions in 1966, including (1) a voluntary oil embargo, (2) a comprehensive ban of military exports, (3) licensing restrictions which "cut off virtually all American exports of consequence", and (4) a suspension of Rhodesian sugar quotas for 1965 (retroactively) and 1966.⁴⁰ Additionally, American Commerce officials persuaded importers of Rhodesian asbestos and lithium to find other suppliers, informed American companies that the United States' recognized the legal authority of the British Government to take actions banning trade in Southern Rhodesia, and discouraged private travel. Because Zambian energy supplies were threatened by a Rhodesian oil embargo, the United States also agreed to cooperate in a massive airlift of oil to Zambia, which lasted for four months until other supply routes had been established.⁴¹

³⁸ "Background Paper", Bureau of International Organization Affairs, March 6, 1967, p. 376. See also Vice President Hubert Humphrey's speeches during his tour to Africa in 1968.

³⁹ See G. Mennen Williams, "The Crisis in Southern Rhodesia", *DOSB*, February 21, 1966, p. 270.

⁴⁰ See press release, *DOSB*, January 3, 1966, p. 27; G. Mennen Williams, "The Crisis in Southern Rhodesia", *DOSB*, February 21, 1966, p. 267.

⁴¹ See *DOSB*, May 16, 1966, p. 783. American assistance to Zambia, however, stopped short of answering Kaunda's request for

The failure of negotiations between Wilson and Smith in 1968 provoked U.N. Resolution No. 253 which called for a mandatory ban of all trade with Rhodesia except for medical and humanitarian goods. By Executive Order No. 11322, the United States agreed to comply with this resolution, the first mandatory economic sanctions program ever adopted by the United Nations.⁴² Johnson maintained that "the cumulative effect of the sanctions -- and the aroused international opinion which produced them -- will persuade the Rhodesian regime to *return* to Constitutional rule."⁴³ Sanctions were even promoted as an effective weapon against "blocking communist influence."⁴⁴

In taking these measures, American policymakers proclaimed that they were following "a moderate but responsible" policy, commensurate with and appropriate to the seriousness of the situation.⁴⁵ However, "we (the Johnson Administration) are not committed to going beyond the present program nor do we see any present need to do so."⁴⁶ With the exception of the Beira oil tanker incident in 1966, the United States opposed all "radical" U.N. resolutions which called for the use of force.⁴⁷ Nor was the United States prepared to supercede its NATO ally Great Britain, and initiate diplomatic proposals for an end to the Rhodesian conflict. Rather, "the United States fully backs the British

American troops to protect Zambian borders and supply lines.

⁴² See *DOSB*, March 6, 1967, p. 377. This first executive order covered most goods, the remainder of which were banned by Executive Order 11419 on July 29, 1968.

⁴³ President Johnson, "Letter to Congress on United States activities in the United Nations", p. 60. Italics added.

⁴⁴ Goldberg, *DOSB*, January 23, 1967. See also *The Washington Post*, January 8, 1967, p. 6.

⁴⁵ President Johnson, "Letter to Congress on United States Activities in the United Nations", November 15, 1967. *DOSB*, January 8, 1968, p. 60.

⁴⁶ Joseph Palmer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, *DOSB*, April 24, 1967, p. 647.

⁴⁷ See Representative Anderson, U.S. Mission at the UN, November 5, 1965, in *DOSB*, December 6, 1965, pp. 909-910.

Government in its actions."⁴⁸ Because Johnson and his staff had more pressing concerns, they were content to follow rather than lead on this crisis. Finally, the Johnson Administration refused to recognize the national liberation movements. Though neither ZANU nor ZAPU earned the vituperative label of "communist," a distinction their counterparts in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic were accorded at the time, American officials were still suspicious of their intentions and critical of their means.⁴⁹

The Nixon Administration: Constructive Engagement, Take One

There was nothing fundamentally new about Nixon's perception of American interests in Africa, and southern Africa in particular. Like his predecessors, Nixon sought to maintain the African continent in the capitalist world order, a task which meant, most importantly, keeping the Soviets out. As Kissinger maintained, "To foreclose Soviet opportunities is ...the essence of the West's responsibility. It is up to us to define the limits of Soviet aims."⁵⁰ Of the potential areas of "communist exploitation," the Nixon Administration identified southern Africa as the most vulnerable region on the continent.⁵¹

These general assumptions about American foreign policy in Africa were conditioned by several new nuances introduced by the Nixon Administration. First, the Nixon Administration expressed confidence that communism had failed to attract allies or believers on the continent; the transition to independence for most of the continent had been achieved without one country "defecting" to the Soviet orbit.⁵² Second, the new Administration purported the

⁴⁸ G. Mennen Williams, "U.S. Outlines Interests in Southern Rhodesia", *DOSB*, January 3, 1966, p. 15; and Williams, "The Crisis in Southern Rhodesia", *DOSB*, February 21, 1966, p. 265.

⁴⁹ See U.S. statements before the U.N. Committee of 24 and the General Assembly in *DOSB*, June 28, 1965, pp. 1063 & 1065.

⁵⁰ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 119.

⁵¹ See the statement made by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer, April 20, 1967, in *American Foreign Policy 1967: Current Documents*, p. 237.

⁵² *IBID.*

notion that the ideological struggle was waning.⁵³ Despite Nixon's reputation as a staunch anti-communist before assuming office, the new Administration downplayed the communist threat to the African continent as a result of the successes of U.S.-Soviet detente.⁵⁴ As such, Kissinger placed greater emphasis on defining interests, not ideas, an approach with significant consequences for American policy in southern Africa. Third, the new Administration avoided policies which interfered with the internal affairs of other nations. Be it human rights violations in the Soviet Union, Nicaragua or Rhodesia, the Nixon Administration preferred to conduct foreign policy on a state-to-state level. Finally, American exhaustion in Vietnam demanded a new strategy -- the Nixon Doctrine -- for securing the world capitalist system, a strategy in which local powers would be called upon to play more active roles in maintaining local stability. In Africa, this strategy assigned a greater role to the European powers, a category which extended to include South Africa and Rhodesia. Finally, the Nixon Administration's list of geographical priorities place Africa squarely in the bottom. The requirements for pursuing detente with the Soviet Union and China, peace in the Middle East, and war in Indochina left little time for Africa.⁵⁵

The Nixon Strategy

However consistent with the basic tenets of containment, these perceptual breaks with the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations resulted in a different strategy for dealing with minority rule in southern African. As outlined in Option 2 of National Security Study Memorandum 39, the Nixon Administration gradually moved towards improving relations with Portugal,

⁵³ See Under Secretary Elliot Richardson, "The Altered Shape of the World", *DOSB*, July 14, 1969, p. 28.

⁵⁴ See, for instance, Nixon's annual reports on foreign policy to Congress in which there is a noticeable absence of ideological rhetoric concerning the security problems of the African continent.

⁵⁵ See, for instance, the two glib sentences devoted to Africa in President Nixon, "A Redefinition of the United States Role in the World", February 25, 1971, in *United States Foreign Policy: Report of the Secretary of State*, (Washington: GPO, March 1972), p. 421.

Rhodesia, and South Africa.⁵⁶ As Option 2 of NSSM 39 stated, "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them".⁵⁷ From this premise, the Nixon Administration concluded that American interests were best served by constructively engaging the colonial regimes, rather than feuding with them. "We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies . . ."⁵⁸ Similarly, Roger Morris, National Security Council staffer for African affairs at the time, recalled;

Rather than loudly spurning the whites while quietly dealing with them, such a policy would openly foster contacts with the isolated minorities, lifting their siege mentality and encouraging internal moderates...⁵⁹

Concomitant with this attitudinal shift regarding white regimes was a declining interest in black liberation movements. Under the Johnson Administration these movements garnered little recognition and only a modicum of legitimacy. Under Nixon, they were spurned entirely.⁶⁰ Because NSSM 39 predicted that white rule in Rhodesia and Angola would remain unchallenged for several decades, the Nixon Administration saw no reason to constructively engage the liberation movements.

Angola

The implications of this new strategy for Angola were pronounced. Regarding Angola, Nixon quietly assured Portugal that his government "would stop 'lecturing' Lisbon on its African

⁵⁶ *National Security Study Memorandum 39 (secret), The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa*, edited and introduced by Mohammed El-Khawas, (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill, 1976), p. 93.

⁵⁷ *IBID.* p. 105.

⁵⁸ *IBID.*, pp. 105-106.

⁵⁹ Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, p. 110.

⁶⁰ See *New York Times*, March 15, 1970; and the remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom, as quoted in George Houser, "U.S. Policy and Southern Africa", in Frederick Arkhurst, ed., *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 116-117.

difficulties, adding that the United States valued highly Portugal's cooperation in providing the Azores base."⁶¹ The new Administration thus vetoed U.N. resolutions condemning Portugal, claiming that such denunciations tend "to push the Government of Portugal toward the very racist regimes of southern Africa which it has been condemned for collaborating with."⁶² This political support was accompanied by increased economic assistance, relaxed limitations on Export-Import loans, a hushed approbation of sanction violations, and promotion of foreign investment both in Portugal and Angola.⁶³ The Nixon government also quietly supplied Portugal with ever increasing levels of military assistance, relaxed the definitions of "non-lethal, dual-use equipment" which allowed American firms to increase sales of planes and helicopters to Portugal, and trained Portuguese officers in American counterinsurgency strategy.⁶⁴ While between 1962-1968, U.S. sales of aircraft to Portugal totalled only \$150,000, the sum between 1969-1972 was over \$14 million.⁶⁵

As for relations with the liberation movements, the Nixon Administration heeded Portugal's advise and curtailed contacts with

⁶¹ Roger Morris, "The Proxy War in Angola: Pathology of a Blunder," *The New Republic*, January 31, 1976, p.

⁶² Seymour Finger, statement before the Committee IV of the U.N. General Assembly, November 14, 1969, in *DOSB*, December 29, 1969, p. 641.

⁶³ Edgar Lockwood, "National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the Future of US Policy Toward Southern Africa", *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion*, vol. 4, Fall 1974, p. 67; Minter, *King Solomon's Mine Revisited*, p. 234; and Bender, "Kissinger in Angola", p. 70.

⁶⁴ Between 1966 and 1970, Portugal purchased 5 Boeing 707's, three 727's, and four 747's. Perhaps most absurdly, these new definitions of dual-use also allowed American firms to export napalm to Portugal, a product with highly dubious commercial use in Portugal. Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited*, p. 235; Bender, "Kissinger in Angola", p. 70; "National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the Future of US Policy Toward Southern Africa", p. 67; and Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, p. 119.

⁶⁵ Lockwood, "National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the Future of US Policy Toward Southern Africa", p. 67.

the FNLA.⁶⁶ According to Nixon, these ties were terminated because the United States rejected "violence as an acceptable formula for human progress."⁶⁷ While relations with Lisbon improved under Nixon despite Portuguese violence against Africans, relations with the liberation movements ground to a complete halt.

Rhodesia

Regarding Rhodesia, the United States cast its first veto ever in the Security Council in opposing a resolution which condemned the United Kingdom for *not* using force against the Smith regime, and required all nations to sever communications with Rhodesia.⁶⁸ Because the Nixon team believed, or professed to believe, that peaceful change could come about only through the acquiescence of the white authorities, and that "isolation leads to radicalization", the American strategy consisted of policies which sought to open, not close, further communicative links with the Smith regime.⁶⁹ To expand "communications," Kissinger recommended a relaxation in the enforcement of economic sanctions.⁷⁰ Consequently, Export-import figures for 1971 indicated that \$807,000 worth of Rhodesian goods were imported into the U.S. and \$652,000 in U.S. goods found their way into Rhodesia, while American tourists to Rhodesia contributed \$16 million to Rhodesian GNP.⁷¹ In September of 1973, three Boeing 720 jetliners were delivered to Rhodesia to serve the Salisbury-Johannesburg route.⁷²

⁶⁶ After 1969, the CIA ended all direct military assistance to the FNLA. Roberto, however, still received a small retainer. See Leslie Gelb, "U.S., Soviet, China Reported Aiding Portugal, Angola," *New York Times*, September 25, 1975.

⁶⁷ President Nixon, *DOSB*, June 4, 1973, p. 797.

⁶⁸ Ambassador Yost, March 17, 1970, in *DOSB*, April 13, 1970, pp. 504-505.

⁶⁹ Newsom, *DOSB*, April 16, 1973, p. 460; *National Security Study Memorandum 39*, p. 106.

⁷⁰ *IBID.* p. 25.

⁷¹ See Houser, "U.S. Policy and Southern Africa", p. 106; and Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

⁷² See *The Washington Post*, December 16, 1973.

The Rhodesian Information Office (RIO), a propaganda front for the Smith regime whose existence was once threatened by the Johnson Administration, now operated freely out of Washington expanding its budget four times between 1969 and 1973.⁷³ In Rhodesia, American investments were no longer discouraged but tacitly permitted.⁷⁴

The greatest reversal, however, was the passage of the Byrd Amendment in November of 1971 which effectively legalized American importation of Rhodesian chrome ore, and thereby abrogated America's commitment to U.N sanctions. Proponents of the repeal argued that the present sanctions (1) denied the United States a "Free World" supply of chromium ore, (2) damaged the American economy, and (3) were ineffective.⁷⁵ While opponents of the repeal made several attempts to block the amendment,⁷⁶ Nixon refused to

⁷³ See United States Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Implications for U.S. International Legal Obligations of the Presence of the Rhodesian Information Office in the U.S.*, hearings, 93rd, 1st session, May 15, 17, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973).

⁷⁴ Newsom, *DOSB*, October 12, 1970, p. 423.

⁷⁵ See the testimony of L.G. Bliss, Board member of Foote Mineral Company, and former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Importation of Rhodesian Chrome*, hearings, July 7, 8, 1971, (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 49-50; According to their reasoning, the restrictions of the U.N. mandatory sanctions program forced the United States to buy most of its chromium supplies from its principal enemy, the Soviet Union, thereby compromising American security. Similar arguments were made by representatives from the ferroalloy industry, the Department of Defense, and "interested" lobbyists at hearings before the United States Congress, House on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, *Rhodesia and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), and before the same's Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, *Sanctions as an Instrumentality of the United Nations. Rhodesia as a Case Study*, 92nd, second session, June 13, 15, 17, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972).

⁷⁶ With regard to national security, these statesmen pointed out that (1) only 10% of American chromium consumption was being used for military purposes, and (2) the United States had vast excess stockpiles of chrome ore, and (3) the Soviet Union always had been the leading supplier to the American market. They also stressed the severe political consequences of the legislation to American international prestige and credibility, especially on the African continent. See David Newsom, in *Importation of Rhodesian Chrome*, pp. 8-24; and *US Policy Toward Southern Africa*, (June-July 1975), p. 185.

intervene on their behalf. ⁷⁷ Instead, Nixon allowed the Amendment to pass, clearly signalling the new orientation of American policy toward Rhodesia. Despite international outrage as expressed at the United Nations, the Nixon Administration remained committed to improving "communication" between the United States and the Rhodesian regime.

Conclusion

Busy with Vietnam, U.S.-Soviet detente, the Middle East, and normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, neither the Angolan or Rhodesian crises figured prominently on the American foreign policy agenda. The sinister appearance of U.S. policy may have originated out of neglect as much as rational self-interest. The message to southern Africa and the rest of the world, however, was very clear. Claiming an inability to influence the situation and a concern for U.S. interests, the Nixon Administration tolerated if not supported the existing state of affairs in southern Africa. For the first fifteen years of the liberation wars in Angola and Zimbabwe, American foreign policy did little if anything to alter the status quo in the region.

⁷⁷ "Backgrounder: The Rhodesian Chrome Question", U.S. Information Service, U.S. Embassy, London, November 19, 1971. The White House and the State Department stood on opposite sides of the debate over the Byrd Amendment. For the most detailed study of these bureaucratic divisions, see Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Development of a Revolutionary Situation in Angola, 1961-1974

Struggle against colonialism had a history of centuries, not decades, in Angola before the armed struggle erupted again in 1961. The international context for this last and ultimately successful uprising, however, had changed fundamentally after World War II. Whereas all great powers in the nineteenth century balance accepted and practiced colonial expansion in Africa, the two superpowers which emerged after World War II held different positions regarding the existing colonial African estates, and diametrically opposed ideas about the methods and goals of change on the African continent. This ideological heterogeneity in the world's balance of power provided the national liberation movements with an ideology of opposition with which to reinvigorate the anti-colonial struggle, and the means with which to realize these new revolutionary aims. Socialist pamphlets and the AK-47 transformed the liberation process in southern Africa from peaceful resistance movements against minority rule into national liberation wars of international significance.

In Angola, splits in the liberation movement into three main organizations provided opportunities for external forces to influence developments in the revolutionary situation within the Portuguese colony. Soviet efforts to promote socialist revolutionaries, and the lack of American initiatives to coopt or contain liberation leaders produced ideologies and strategies of opposition by the liberation movements which were influenced directly and pivotally by outside forces.

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, the MPLA

Ideology as a Framework of Analysis

Of all three liberation movements, the MPLA was considered the most radical. Whereas many other liberation movements evolved towards more radical critics as their struggle progressed, leading MPLA figures such as Lucio Lara, Mario de Andrade, and Viriato da Cruz already had embraced Marxism-Leninism as a method of analysis of Portuguese fascism and imperialism in the late 1950s and early

1960s.¹ An urban focus informed the MPLA's radical analysis. "Finding it impossible to build an organization among the rural masses in their first phase, nationalists mainly influenced urban masses and cultured minorities."² As such, the MPLA leadership included significant numbers of mesticos, assimilados, and even some white Portuguese from Angolan urban centers.³ Moreover, because the despotic Portuguese colonial system forced many of the MPLA's leadership into early exile, these revolutionaries were much more conversant about Stalinism, Maoism, or Trotskyism than about the political aspirations of the Angolan peasants.⁴

In their official publications, the MPLA championed "class analysis" as the means by which to understand the Angolan struggle.⁵ MPLA documents stressed the necessity of understanding the tension between the mode of production and the relations of production as the essence of Angola's internal turmoil.⁶ In the Angolan colony, this class conflict was abstracted to portray a clash between the Portuguese settlers and indigenous Angolans.⁷

¹ See Mario de Andrade, "Freedom Shall Come to Angola, Too", *Pravda*, September 6, 1961. Reprinted in Ronald Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Colonies*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press 1972), p. 195.

² Mario de Andrade, *Tribuna Socialista* (Paris), February-March 1963, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Colonies*, p. 191.

³ The MPLA leadership also was dominated by one ethnic group, the Mbundu.

⁴ Michael Samuels, "The Nationalist Parties", in Abshire and Samuels, *Portuguese Africa*, p. 391.

⁵ John Marcum, "The Anguish of Angola: On Becoming Independent in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century," Presidential Address, African Studies Association, (San Francisco: October 29, 1975), p. 13.

⁶ "Quais sao as Caratersticas Da Nossa Propaganda?", de *Angola Combatante*, emissao Radiofonica do MPLA, 1973, reprinted in *Textos e Documentos do MPLA*, (Lisboa: edicoes, Mario da Fonte, 1974), p. 86.

⁷ As Lucio Lara explained, Angola did not have the clearly defined classes of Europe, so Marxism had to be revised to apply to the African situation. (Author's interview with Lucio Lara, Luanda, August 21, 1988).

The MPLA critique placed particular emphasis on economic, not political or racial domination.⁸

True to the Marxist-Leninist critique, MPLA programs described economic exploitation in Angola as a manifestation of an international imperialism for which Portugal was simply an administrative agent. According to an MPLA report in 1969, "It is evident to everyone that underdeveloped little Portugal would never be able to wage three colonial wars without massive support from the imperialist powers."⁹ In return for supporting these wars, the imperialist powers were granted unlimited access to Angola's natural resources, while the Portuguese "timidly invested in farming."¹⁰ These international links meant that the MPLA's enemy was not just Portugal, but "imperialism -- and particularly the leader of the imperialists, the Americans. They are the greatest enemy of the people of the world."¹¹

While a marxist analysis linked Portuguese capitalists to American neo-imperialists, it also linked Angola's progressive forces to "a global struggle by Humanity to bring an end to the exploitation of man by man."¹² Located in the context of the "world balance of forces,"¹³ the war in Vietnam, the 'victory' of the revolution in Cuba, and the defeat of colonialism in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali all contributed to the success of the MPLA's

⁸ MPLA, *First National Conference*, December 1962, p. 9.

⁹ "Report of the MPLA to the U.N. Committee on Decolonization", released in Lusaka, May 1969, in Harvey and Barnett, *The Revolution in Angola*, p.234.

¹⁰ MPLA, *First National Conference*, December 1962, p. 10.

¹¹ Interview with Commander Sparticus Monimambu, 21 March 1968, in Harvey and Barnett, *The Revolution in Angola*, p. 27.

¹² Neto, 6 June 1968, in Harvey and Barnett, *The Revolution in Angola*, p. 31. Not everyone within the MPLA was happy with this strict division of the world. In an interview with the author, MPLA member Ismael Gaspar Martins explained that he and others preferred relations with all external powers, but the Cold War "forced" them to turn to the East. (Author's interview with Ismael Gaspar Martins, former Angolan Minister of Finance, Luanda, August 23, 1988.)

¹³ Mario de Andrade and Marc Oliver, *The War in Angola*, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), p. 115.

struggle in Angola.¹⁴

This emphasis on a class analysis and the world revolutionary process left no "theoretical" room for ethnic or racial analyses.¹⁵ As the MPLA Steering Committee proclaimed in 1972, "We are not against the white man because he is white. We are against racist and colonialist whites."¹⁶ The declared enemy was exploitation. Neto warned that if MPLA cadres did not develop their political ideas beyond simple racial ideas, Angolan independence would be devoured by neocolonialism.¹⁷

The MPLA Political Programme

At the first MPLA Congress in December 1962, the liberation movement drafted the minimum and maximum plans for the future. The Minimum Plan outlined a broad program for achieving independence. It called for a "common front in the fight for independence and an alliance with the world's progressive forces."¹⁸ Its objectives were confined to liberal notions of anti-colonialism and national self-determination. The Maximum plan delineated more concrete ideas about democracy, nationalism, and socialism, but fell well short of espousing democratic centralism or proletarian dictatorship.¹⁹ The Maximum plan did call for state planning of the economy and "foreign commerce," but did not advocate foreign capital expropriation or state ownership of the means of production. Regarding agrarian reform, the plan called for the "nationalization of land belonging to adversaries of the popular movement for complete, immediate independence for Angola...", along with a

¹⁴ See the interview by Aquino de Braganca with MPLA leader Iko Carriera, April 25, 1971 as reprinted in Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *The African Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements*, vol. 3, (London: Zed Press, 1982), pp. 27-28.

¹⁵ See Mario de Andrade, as quoted in de Braganca and Wallerstein, ed., *The African Reader*, vol. 3, pp. 30-32.

¹⁶ MPLA Steering Committee, February 6, 1972, p. 7.

¹⁷ *IBID.*

¹⁸ MPLA, *First National Conference*, p. 14.

¹⁹ MPLA, Maximum Plan, reprinted in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, pp. 228-235.

comprehensive "definition of the limits of private rural property..", and "distribution of land to landless peasants and from those who do have sufficient land." Importantly, however, the plan did not advocate state ownership of agricultural lands nor collectivization.

While no other major MPLA programme was produced again until after independence, the central focus of MPLA propaganda remained nationalism; the ancillary theme was socialism. As MPLA statements posited a two-stage theory of revolutionary transformation, they could avoid discussing sensitive questions about socialist orientation until after independence. While threats of nationalization periodically appeared in MPLA statements with particular reference, ironically, to the oil industry, Neto and other senior MPLA leaders avoided definitive statements about property rights.²⁰ As Neto reassured in 1974, "After independence, the Portuguese living in Africa can remain...They will not lose their economic interests and there will be no violence."²¹ If nationalization was an MPLA objective, it was not clearly articulated during the first phase of the liberation struggle.

Commensurate with this ambiguity about socialist ideals was a repeated denial of any "communist" influence within the MPLA. When accused by the Western press of fostering ties with the Soviet Union and other East European countries, MPLA leader Mario de Andrade replied that "we are not pro-Communist."²² At the MPLA Eastern Conference in 1968, Neto emphasized that MPLA was a "nationalist organization," with no predetermined proclivity to any system.²³ Similarly, the Comite Director affirmed in 1971 that the MPLA "is not a communist movement," but rather a mass movement

²⁰ See Alfonso Mbinda, MPLA Department of External Relations, letter to the Gulf Oil Boycott Coalition, November 7, 1973, and *MPLA War Communique*, 17 April 1974, in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 8-5 and 8-6.

²¹ Interview with Agostinho Neto, *Le Monde*, May 5-6, 1974, quoted in Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas, *Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War*, (London: Pathfinder Press, 1976), p.67.

²² *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1962.

²³ Harvey and Barnett, *The Revolution in Angola*, p. 47.

with many different ideological currents, classes, and religions.²⁴ Even on the eve of independence, President Neto was vehement in his denunciation of the communist label.

MPLA is not a Marxist-Leninist organization. Also, our leadership is not Marxist-Leninist. Some of us have read Marx and Lenin, but we don't consider ourselves Marxist-Leninists. We are a large organization with various shades of opinion and different types of groups united solely under the flag of liberation. As a heterogenous organization, it contains both Marxist and other points of view. But it is true that many people in the world consider the MPLA as a movement linked to Moscow. Again, I say this is untrue. The image exists only in the imagination of outsiders.²⁵

Finally, unlike other liberation movements, the MPLA did not become a vanguard, Marxist-Leninist party until after independence.²⁶ While a 1968 MPLA resolution called for the formation of a vanguard party, it was rejected in favor of maintaining a "movement of the masses."²⁷

The MPLA's early proclivity towards Marxism, then, should not be overplayed.²⁸ Even at the time of the Portuguese coup, the MPLA as a liberation movement was hardly unequivocal in its endorsement of socialism. Rather, the MPLA was a united front subsuming

²⁴ "Declaracao do Comite Diretor do MPLA", 1971, in *Textos do MPLA*, pp.81-82.

²⁵ Interview with Agostinho Neto, *Africascope* (Lagos), August 1975.

²⁶ The MPLA's historical development differs, for instance, with ZANU which proclaimed to be a vanguard, marxist-leninist party in 1977, three years before independence.

²⁷ *Interview with Daniel Chipenda*, by Don Barnett, Lusaka, 28 August 1969, (Liberation Support Movement, LSM Information Center), pp. 13-14, from the "Africa Subject Collection", box 10-2, Hoover Archives. For discussions about the distinction between a party and a movement, see Neto, 1969, in *Textos do MPLA*, 1974, p. 42.

²⁸ Western writers on Angola point out that the organization was created when the Communist Party of Angola joined forces with two other nationalist groups. Yet, they often fail to note that this communist party had only three members at the time.

liberal democrats as well as radical marxist-leninists.²⁹ As John Marcum reported in 1976, "Not all of them are communists. They certainly are nationalists, and they have their own interests."³⁰ In reflecting on the MPLA's composition, Lucio Lara also admitted that no consensus existed concerning the future organization of Angolan state and society in 1974.³¹ The honorary President of the MPLA, Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, was in fact vehemently anti-communist.³² As a mass movement seeking to attract Angolan nationalists of all ideological persuasions, the MPLA accepted into its ranks anyone who opposed Portuguese colonialism,³³ be they communists, liberals, or conservatives.

Strategies of Liberation

Negotiations

In June 1960, the MPLA submitted to Portugal a proposal for the peaceful transition to Angolan independence.³⁴ The Portuguese unequivocal refusal made it apparent that the process of decolonization in Portuguese-controlled territories would be far more painful and protracted than in other African countries. The MPLA's first turn to violent methods in 1961, however, still sought to precipitate negotiations.³⁵ As part of this strategy, the MPLA

²⁹ Author's interviews with Paulo Jorge (August 23, 1988), Lucio Lara, (August 1988), and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (August 1989).

³⁰ John Marcum, on *Meet the Press*, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 4, 1976, p.5.

³¹ Author's interview with Lucio Lara, Luanda, August 1988.

³² Author's interview with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, (Luanda, August 25, 1989). Father Joaquim (a Catholic priest at the time) considered himself a "liberal," but not a socialist, and certainly not a communist. Unfortunately, we have no surveys of political attitudes of MPLA members before (or after) independence.

³³ Author's interview with Lucio Lara, Luanda, August 21, 1988.

³⁴ See Mario de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz, "Appeal to the United Nations", September 13, 1960, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 236.

³⁵ See Mario de Andrade, Tribuna Socialista (Paris), February-March 1963, in *IBID*, p. 190.

also tried to instigate international pressure to force the Portuguese to negotiate, claiming that "one year of economic boycott would stop the war."³⁶

Unlike liberation movements in Rhodesia or South Africa, the MPLA eventually gave up on negotiations altogether, and instead insisted that only armed conflict would lead the Angolan independence. Negotiations became portrayed as a "tactic of the enemy," employed only when violence was not sufficient.³⁷ MPLA leaders rejected all Portuguese reforms as neo-imperialist plots, designed to establish a facade of independence in Angola controlled through a handful of African puppets in the service of world capitalism.³⁸ While MPLA leaders continued to make references to the desirability of a political settlement, they had little faith in Portugal's commitment.³⁹

Armed Struggle

In these circumstances, the MPLA became one of the first liberation movements in all of Africa to advocate armed struggle as a strategy for liberation. The MPLA Manifesto declared in 1956 that "the Angolan people can free themselves only through revolutionary struggle."⁴⁰ This cry took on a violent form on February 4, 1961, a day now recognized as the beginning of the Angolan liberation war, when MPLA militants stormed a Luandan

³⁶ "Report of the MPLA to the U.N. Committee on Decolonization", released in Lusaka, May 1969, in Harvey and Barnett, *The Revolution in Angola*, p.236.

³⁷ "Extracto da declaracao de principios do MPLA a reniao do executoria do accordo de unificacao, assinado em 13 de Decemebro de 1972 pelo MPLA e pelo FNLA", in *Textos e Documentos do MPLA*.

³⁸ "Mensagem do Presidente do MPLA, Camarada Agostinho Neto, ao povo Angolano e a todos os militantes do MPLA, 1 September 1973, in *Textos e Documentos do MPLA*, p. 103; Neto, "Conferencia de Imprensa do Dr. Agostinho Neto", July 10, 1963, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 219.

³⁹ See, for instance, Agostinho Neto, Message to the Angolan People, *MPLA Bulletin*, # 3-4, 1972.

⁴⁰ "Manifesto of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, Luanda, December 1956, in Mario de Andrade and Marc Oliver, *The War in Angola*, p. 53.

prison to free political prisoners.⁴¹ Though the altercation had no tangible conclusion, the event gained international attention and propelled the issue of Angolan independence onto the United Nations agenda. The MPLA also claimed that their actions in Luanda sparked the more widespread peasant uprisings in northern Angola in March 1961.⁴²

Like many other guerrilla movements, the MPLA initial military strategy aimed to extend the war throughout the entire Angolan countryside.⁴³ The first front was opened in 1964 in Cabinda, a northern enclave physically separated from the rest of Angola's territory. The second, "Northern" Front was established inside the country in the Dembos hills just north of Luanda in 1965, and the third or Eastern Front was opened in 1967 just west of the Angola-Zambian border.⁴⁴ By 1968, the MPLA had established an internal base in Eastern Front,⁴⁵ and by 1972, the movement had opened several military bases and operational centers inside the country including Angola d'Hoje, Hanoi I, and Hanoi II. In extending military operations to several areas in Angola, Commander Spartacus Monimambu explained that the MPLA sought "to generalize the struggle inside Angola in order to force a dispersal of Portuguese troops. You know, according to the laws of guerrilla war, we can't afford a concentration of enemy forces. We must make them disperse

⁴¹ Though the immediate objective was to release the prisoners, the real purpose of the assault was to muster international recognition. Because a group of foreign journalists were in Luanda at this time to cover the arrival of the pirated ship, the Santa Maria, the MPLA wanted to seize the opportunity for worldwide attention.

⁴² See Mario de Andrade, Statement of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola", *The Liberator*, Vol II, No. 2, February 1962, (In Wallerstein collection, reel 1).

⁴³ In 1961, the MPLA had hoped that urban uprising would be sufficient to spark a national movement to quickly oust the Portuguese. After that failed, however, the MPLA leadership decided that they must win over the countryside first.

⁴⁴ Interview with Daniel Chipenda, member Comite Diretor, August 29, 1969, in Barnett and Harvey, *The Revolution in Angola*, p. 251.

⁴⁵ MPLA, *Angola in Arms*, February 1968, p. 4.

so that we can attack them in small groups."⁴⁶ As the MPLA guerrillas had only rudimentary weapons and limited training, the liberation army carried out ambushes, laid anti-personnel mines, and occasionally attacked Portuguese barracks without engaging in positional warfare.⁴⁷

According to MPLA strategy, however, the widespread and dispersed guerrilla attacks constituted only the first stage of the liberation process. The second stage would be positional warfare. In preparation, the MPLA decided to create a regular army in 1968.⁴⁸ As Daniel Chipenda explained a year later,

We believe it is important at this point to further generalize the struggle in Angola and force an increasing dispersal of Portuguese troops. After achieving this, it will be easier to organize regular units and mobile warfare in those regions where conditions are favorable. We will also be able to defend our base areas and prevent the Portuguese from reoccupying positions we have destroyed.⁴⁹

By the early 1970s, Paulo Jorge claimed that this move to conventional warfare already had produced tangible results.

In 1970 the MPLA began to develop a new phase of military activities -- the transition from small guerrilla detachments and the tactics dictated by the size of these units to larger units which we call esquadros or squadrons capable of employing the tactics of mobil warfare. Because of our success in employing this new formation, the Portuguese were not able to launch an offensive in the dry season of 1971.... Our squadrons contain artillery sections and we were able to significantly of [sic] firepower by employing such weapons as cannon, rockets, mortars, and bazookas... The new methods of combat, new tactics, that we are able to employ with the 150-man squadrons⁵⁰ were not possible with small scale guerrilla detachments.

⁴⁶ Interview with Commander Spartacus Monimambu (1968), p.8.

⁴⁷ See Kufa, Chefo do Grupo, MPLA, in Harvey and Barnett, *The Revolution in Angola*, p.225; interview with MPLA President Agostinho Neto, 21 September 1971, over Radio Tanzania, (Tanzania: MPLA departamento de informacao a propaganda), from the "Africa Subject Collection", box 10-1, Hoover Archives.

⁴⁸ Harvey and Barnett, *The Revolution in Angola*, p. 45.

⁴⁹ Chipenda, 28 August 1969, in *IBID*, p. 253.

⁵⁰ Paulo Jorge, 1973, p. 5.

Despite Jorge's assessment, the MPLA's move towards conventional tactics was premature. Armed with air cover and conventionally trained troops (Portugal was a member of NATO), Portugal launched major offensive against MPLA positions in central and east Angola in 1972. By 1974, the MPLA's military presence inside the country had been virtually eliminated.

Accompanying these acts of war, the MPLA placed a premium on politicizing the Angolan people. Initially, the MPLA "put more emphasis on the military than on the political side of the struggle."⁵¹ As most MPLA leaders were urban intellectuals, they believed that political provocations in major cities could spark a national revolution. When this failed in 1961, the MPLA eventually fled to the countryside where they learned to pitch their revolutionary message to peasants.⁵² The MPLA method of politicization usually separated political and military operations. The MPLA sent in political commissars and directors of centers for revolutionary instruction, not guerrilla commanders, as a "prelude ... to new combat fronts."⁵³ Within each guerrilla unit, the MPLA adopted the Soviet system of attaching political "commissars,"⁵⁴ or 'estagiarios' "who, in addition to primarily military training in guerilla warfare receive also political training especially based upon the revolution program of the MPLA."⁵⁵ According to one of the MPLA's leading commanders, Daniel Chipenda, these estagiarios constituted the basis for a future vanguard party.⁵⁶

To institutionalize their political control in the countryside, the MPLA developed a system of political cells, or *poder popular*, whereby local action committees would assume decision-making authority for a given region. These cells were responsible

⁵¹ Chipenda, 28 August 1969, (Liberation Support Movement, LSM Information Center), p. 8.

⁵² See Agostinho Neto, "Samoe Vazhnoe Oruzhie", *Aziia i Afrika Segodnaya*, No. 1, 1967, p. 31.

⁵³ Lucio Lara, *Angola in Arms*, V.1, No.3, 1970, p. 2.

⁵⁴ Neto described this system in detail in Agostinho Neto, "Samoe Vazhnoe Oruzhie", p. 31.

⁵⁵ MPLA, *Angola in Arms*, v. 1, no. 5, 1967, p. 6.

⁵⁶ Chipenda, 28 August 1969, p. 13

for setting up collective farms, "people's stores", and centers for revolutionary education.⁵⁷ When fully in control of territory, a series of people's power cells in a given region constituted a "liberated" zone. By 1968, the MPLA claimed to control 80,000 square kilometers with a population of more than 40,000.⁵⁸ According to MPLA leaders, these "counter-societies" in the liberated areas would serve as models for new political structures in an independent Angola.⁵⁹ The MPLA also established a clandestine network of political cells within Angola cities to "maintain the people's insurrectional spirit and to develop the underground fight in the urban areas."⁶⁰

II. Frente de Nacional para Libertacao de Angola, FNLA

Ideology

Of all three Angolan liberation movements, the Frente de Nacional para Libertacao de Angola, FNLA, had the least systematic or "scientific" analysis of the nature of their struggle, and the most ambiguous plan for a future independent Angola. Though Holden Roberto flirted with the lexicons of "scientific socialism" and "liberal democracy", his struggle was not between the capitalists and the proletariat, but between white Europeans and black Africans; his vanguard was not the "working masses", but the Kikongo; his future state was not a socialist utopia, but the reconstitution of the Congo empire.

As with all other liberation movements in southern Africa, the FNLA recognized "colonial exploitation" as the central evil to be fought. FNLA statements called Portuguese colonialism in Angola "a slave economy," for the benefit of a number of individuals" working

⁵⁷ Interview with Commander Sparticus Monimambu, (1968), p.21.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Barnett and Harvey, *The Revolution in Angola*, pp. 4-5. A year later, the MPLA claimed to have extended the liberated area to 10,000 square kilometers. See, "MPLA--Leader of the Angolan People," *Afro-Asian Peoples* (Egypt) Vol. XI, No. 1, May 1969, p. 34.

⁵⁹ Andrade and Oliver, *The War in Angola*, p. 110. In 1971, Neto was more explicit when he claimed that the MPLA was building "socialism" in these liberated zones. See "Neto Addresses Africa 2000," *Africa 2000*, Vol. 1, nos. 6-7, October 1971, p. 3.

⁶⁰ MPLA, *First National Conference*, p. 21.

"hand in hand with the big companies and the colonials..."⁶¹ The FNLA analysis of "imperialism", however, rarely ventured beyond these slogans. The FNLA analyses focused more on the Portuguese method of subjugation and oppression, than the international capitalist structure within which they served.⁶² In a letter to the United Nations Roberto even cited NATO's principles of "democracy, of individual freedom, and of the rule of law" to underscore Portugal's evils.⁶³

Nor did the FNLA use a rigorous class analysis to analyze their struggle. Roberto's organization recognized the primacy of the peasants in the national liberation struggle simply because they were the majority within Angola. Though he had never lived among the Angolan peasantry himself, Roberto cited the FNLA's affinity with the peasantry to distinguish his liberation movement from the urban, working class orientation of the MPLA.⁶⁴ Moreover, in lieu of class analysis, the FNLA identified racism as the essence of the Angolan conflict. As Roberto explained, "There is nothing equivocal about Portuguese colonialism; on the contrary, it is characterized by exceptional simplicity. The Negro must submit without a murmur to the law of the Christian white man."⁶⁵ FNLA statements used racist terminology not only to attack the Portuguese, but also to denounce the MPLA, criticizing the organization for relying on "half-castes and

⁶¹ Holden Roberto, "Press Statement", March 15, 1961, in, Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 71.

⁶² See, for instance, the analysis in *A Voz da Nacional Angolana*, 13 July 1961, pp. 1,2,8, in Ronald Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: documentary ephemera through 1965*, microfilm, reel 3, hereafter referred to as the *Chilcote Collection*; and "O Imperialismo", in FNLA, *Supintrep No. 24: Estrutura Militar do ELNA, Estrutura Civil, Doutrinação Política*, (Luanda: 10 September 1968), pp. 59-60, from the Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 59-1. This FNLA document was classified Top Secret.

⁶³ Roberto, "Memorandum to the United Nations", October 1960, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 68.

⁶⁴ See GRAE, "Glimpses of the Angolan Nationalist Movement", December 11, 1962, *IBID.*, p. 150.

⁶⁵ Roberto, statement to the 33rd Meeting of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, Leopoldville, 9 August 1962, p. 3, in *Wallerstein Collection*, reel 1).

assimilados" for its leadership.⁶⁶

The FNLA's internal operations also reflected the preeminence of racism in Roberto's thinking. Roberto's original aspiration was to reconstruct the Congo Kingdom, a goal independent and antithetical to Angolan state independence. Even after the FNLA broadened its mandate to become a national rather than regional movement, Roberto still relied almost exclusively on his extended family to staff top FNLA positions, while the majority of FNLA members belonged to the same ethnic group -- the Kikongo.⁶⁷ Roberto's tribalism eventually purged the FNLA of several key non-Kikongo leaders, including Jose Kalundugo, Chief of the FNLA Army, Jonas Savimbi, the foreign minister of the FNLA's government in exile, the GRAE, and Immanuel Konzika, Vice-President of the PDA (Partido Democratica de Angola) and Education Secretary in GRAE.⁶⁸

FNLA Programme

Commensurate with its simple analysis of the conflict, the FNLA offered a elementary program for the future. After Roberto's outmoded quest for a new Congo nation was abandoned, the FNLA programme for independence consisted for two central goals -- Pan-Africanism and democracy.⁶⁹ Regarding Pan-Africanism, the FNLA declared that an independent Angola would "participate in world government" and help to build a "United States of Africa."⁷⁰ As an ideology based on

⁶⁶ FNLA, statement to the Conference of the Chief States and Chief of Governments of the Union Africaine et Malgache, September 1962, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 151.

⁶⁷ See Jose Kalundungu, Head of the Angolan National Liberation Army Staff, (ALNA), and Jose J. Lياهوca, Ex-Director of the Relief Service for Angolan Refugees (SARA), "Press Statement", no date, in *Wallerstein Collection*, reel 1).

⁶⁸ Though Kikongo, Konzika was expelled for failing to support Roberto's "excellency." (Author's interview with Immanuel Konzika, Luanda, August 23, 1989.)

⁶⁹ "Memorandum from the Union of Populations of Angola to the Honorable Delegates of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Situation in Angola," 1961, p.1, in *Wallerstein Collection*, reel 1.

⁷⁰ UPA, "Struggle for Independence", (Leopoldville ?, 1960), pp. 56-57; GRAE, Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Struggle of the Angolan People and GRAE: The Birth of the Nation*, (February 1972), p. 10. Roberto met Kwame Nkrumah at the first All African Peoples'

ethnicity and geography, Pan-Africanism complemented the FNLA's racial analysis of the liberation struggle.

Democracy was trickier. FNLA rhetoric turned all the right phrases, calling for the establishment of a "democratic regime that will permit each individual, regardless of sex, to develop his personality and contribute to the development and productivity of the Angolan nation."⁷¹ Likewise, the FNLA government in exile -- GRAE -- asserted that once in power, it would establish a "democratic and representative regime" whereby "the power will be exercised by the people for the people."⁷² Roberto frequently cited the American experience as a model for his liberation movement, declaring to the Americans that "our ideals are your ideals, our hopes are the same that you had once for yourselves."⁷³ Despite these pledges to liberal democracy, however, FNLA internal documents warned against the evils of "multi-party" democracy, as such systems offered foreign powers the opportunity to divide and weaken the struggle.⁷⁴ Moreover, neither the FNLA nor the GRAE ever held elections. The official model of government may have been the United States, but the practice still resembled the Congo Kingdom.

Regarding economic and social policy, the FNLA promised a wide-range of reforms, couched in liberal language but tinged with socialist ideals.⁷⁵ The FNLA Programme of March 1962 demanded "independence under a democratic system based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, agrarian reform, planned economy,

Conference in Accra in 1959 and immediately became committed to the man and the movement.

⁷¹ UPA, "Struggle for Independence", 1960, p. 58.

⁷² *IBID*, p. 110; and FNLA, *Supintrep No. 24*, p. 40.

⁷³ Roberto, quoted in Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution I*, p. 224. Retrospectively, Roberto claimed that he learned the spirit of the American Revolution through his contacts as a child with American missionaries. (Roberto, *Struggle for Freedom*, 1986, p. 24.)

⁷⁴ FNLA, *Supintrep No. 24*, p. 41. This document also declared that there is only one form of democracy. (p. 42.)

⁷⁵ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, I*, pp. 223-224.

industrialization, and diplomatic non-alignment."⁷⁶ A GRAE document three years later even called for "economic democracy, led by the working class ..." ⁷⁷ Similarly, a FNLA training handbook discussed "agrarian reform, development of cooperatives, and nationalization" as possible policy prescriptions for addressing the inequalities of Portuguese colonialism.⁷⁸

Out of context, these radical proclamations might create an image of the FNLA as a communist-oriented movement. A closer evaluation of FNLA statements and actions, however, reveals a rather different inclination.⁷⁹ Regarding economic policy, FNLA documents underscored the sharp distinction between "social democracy" and socialism or communism.⁸⁰ Under the FNLA, the state would neither interfere with property rights of individuals nor impede the development and productive capacities of the "Angolan bourgeoisie."⁸¹ Roberto, in fact, abhorred "communism" and feared its backers.⁸² In a letter addressed to the American public in 1961, Roberto stated that "We have never had any aid from any communist country and there are no communists among us."⁸³ Roberto considered "ideology" to be foreign and divisive.

..the great majority of those brother Africans who fight for the liberty of their country have no ideology save that of human dignity.... It [Africa] knows no ideology other than patriotism

⁷⁶ FNLA, "Convention" (Leopoldville, March 27, 1962), quoted here from *IBID*, p. 246.

⁷⁷ GRAE, "La revolution angolaise dans le contexte africain et extra-africain", March 15, 1965, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 169.

⁷⁸ FNLA, *Supintrep No. 24*, p. 43.

⁷⁹ This is demonstrated most persuasively in Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, vols. I and II.

⁸⁰ FNLA, *Supintrep No. 24*, p. 43.

⁸¹ *IBID*. p. 45.

⁸² Author's interview with Immanuel Konzika, Luanda, August 1989 and private conversations with John Marcum. The CIA also reached a similar conclusion. See Duffy, *Portugal in Africa*, p. 218.

⁸³ Holden Roberto, unpublished letter to the *Reader's Digest*, December 8, 1961. Extracts published as Appendix D-2 in Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, I, pp. 344-345.

-- and it is this which the West calls nationalism.

Let all who want to safeguard their friendship with the peoples of Africa -- with the people of Angola -- know that we are determined to be not only Africans but also masters of our own destiny and lands, and that we will not allow ourselves to be seduced by any foreign propaganda. We are Angolans, and this means that we are no more Communist than we are Portuguese.⁸⁴

To avoid all credos other than nationalism, Roberto "reserved all considerations of ideology, and in an operational sense, political education, for sometime after Angolan independence."⁸⁵ When asked to define the FNLA's ideological orientation in 1973, Roberto replied that "Our people today are engaged in an action wich [sic] requires such wisdom that we do not have the right to disturb and divert them from their essential and most immediate objective which is the struggle for national liberation."⁸⁶

Strategies of Liberation

Like many other African national liberation movements, the FNLA inaugurated its struggle for Angolan independence by adopting peaceful methods of resistance. A 1961 UPA document declared that "all the problems which are posed to mankind must find their solution in a peaceful exchange of points of view."⁸⁷ In pledging its commitment to "pacific and democratic means," the FNLA called upon the Portuguese to do the same.⁸⁸

The Portuguese did not respond. Roberto, therefore, declared that "the way of armed struggle has been imposed upon us,"⁸⁹ and took up arms in March 1961. Initially, these FNLA-inspired peasant revolts

⁸⁴ UPA, *A Voz da Nacao Angolana*, September 30, 1960, pp. 1,7, Chilcote Collection, reel 3.

⁸⁵ Interview with Holden Roberto, *Continent 2000*, (Paris and Kinshasa), No. 12, September 1970, p. 18.

⁸⁶ FNLA, *Actuality*, September, 1973, p. 5.

⁸⁷ Memorandum from the Union of Populations of Angola to the Honorable Delegates of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Situation in Angola, (1961), p.9, in *Wallerstein Collection*, reel 1.

⁸⁸ *IBID.*

⁸⁹ Roberto, speech at the Non-aligned Nations Conference, Cairo, October 1964, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 90.

were designed to shock the Western world and thereby precipitate a speedy end to Portuguese rule in Angola.⁹⁰ As the timing of the revolt coincided with Roberto's appearance at the United Nations, he hoped the news of the "war" would spark a decisive response from the United Nations.⁹¹

When the United Nations did not intervene, Roberto revised his initial formula for quick independence, drawing from the ideas of his close friend, Franz Fanon, and the Algerian experience.⁹² In accordance with Fanon's theory of liberation struggle, Roberto began to think of armed struggle as the key catalyst for revolutionary change, both as a means of weakening the enemy and mobilizing the masses.⁹³ Whereas other liberation movements (in Angola and the region) devoted considerable resources to "politicizing the masses," the FNLA argued that the peasants will be awakened "in the course of the armed struggle."⁹⁴ The FNLA army adopted the military tactics of guerrilla warfare -- smaller units, sabotage, hit-and-run tactics, etc.⁹⁵ -- but failed to conduct a specific strategy or disseminate a

⁹⁰ See Minter, *King's Solomon's Mines Revisited*, p. 155. This tactic proved to be effective in British and French African colonies.

⁹¹ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, I, p. 138. Roberto even claimed that he ordered his army "to slow down its military operations in order to create an atmosphere propitious for detente and understanding" between the liberation movement and Portugal.

⁹² See Holden Roberto, "On the First Anniversary of the Revolution", March 15, 1962, in *Angola Calling*, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 74; and Azinna Nwafor, "The Liberation of Angola," *Monthly Review*, February 1976, p. 11.

⁹³ See Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, (New York: Grover Press, 1963), p. 107.

⁹⁴ FNLA, statement to the Conference of the Chief States and Chief of Governments of the Union Africaine et Malgache, p. 151; FNLA, "Press Review", 11 December 1962, p. 4. (In Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 9).

⁹⁵ For a description of these guerrilla tactics, see FNLA, "Report on the Military Activities of the Angolan National Liberation Army," June-December, 1969, p. 2, in *Wallerstein Collection*, reel 1.

particular political programme.⁹⁶

The FNLA's paramount priority was to build up the army.⁹⁷ The first cadres were sent to be trained by the Algerian Liberation Army at the end of 1961.⁹⁸ By 1969, the FNLA claimed to have in the field "three big patrol units operate in three fronts which constitute the areas of action of the ELNA [the FNLA army]."⁹⁹ FNLA military reports cite 1970 and 1973 as years in which their units made significant advances.¹⁰⁰ Though difficult to assess accurately, most Western analysts have concurred that the FNLA was the major fighting-force confronting the Portuguese on the eve of the Portuguese coup.¹⁰¹

Consistent with this focus on the military, the FNLA had a most elaborate military organization, structured along conventional command structures.¹⁰² According to the FNLA "plan of action" elaborated in 1968 by ELNA Chief of Staff, Eugenio Antonio Augusto, the third phase of FNLA strategy called for the regrouping of FNLA guerrillas into battalions, regiments (1200 men) and brigades (5000 men).¹⁰³ Like the MPLA, then, the FNLA envisioned a conventional stage to their liberation struggle.

III. Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola, UNITA

Ideology

⁹⁶ *Supintrep No. 24*, p. 13. For instance, this military instruction handbook told FNLA cadres to refrain from espousing a particular ideology when talking with the peasantry. Rather, they were instructed to listen to all ideas and simply respond by proclaiming the FNLA's commitment to pluralism. (p. 31.)

⁹⁷ GRAE, Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Struggle of the Angolan People and GRAE*, (1972).

⁹⁸ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, I, p. 158.

⁹⁹ "Report on the Military Activities of the Angolan National Liberation Army," June-December, 1969, p. 2.

¹⁰⁰ See GRAE, *Actualities*, no. 1, 1970; and GRAE, "Thirteen Years of Struggle", *Actuality*, no. 4, May 1973, p. 5.

¹⁰¹ Charles Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War", *Orbis*, Vol. 20, No.3, Fall 1976, p. 671.

¹⁰² For details, see FNLA, *Supintrep No. 24*.

¹⁰³ *IBID.*, p. 11.

From its inception, UNITA represented an amalgam of juxtaposed ideologies ranging from the most extreme forms of Maoism to the most militant articulations of "negritude". As the latecomer to the liberation movement, UNITA struggled, largely unsuccessfully, to gain credibility abroad. In seeking recognition, Savimbi's organization demonstrated extreme flexibility in adapting disparate ideological orientations to appease foreign supporters. At home, however, UNITA recognized its one ideological advantage over the other two liberation movements -- Ovimbundu ethnic identity -- and subsequently remained committed to this cause.

UNITA's World Outlook

As Savimbi founded UNITA as a result of his falling out with Holden Roberto, UNITA ideology was defined antithetically to that of the FNLA. In resigning from the FNLA in July 1964, Savimbi labelled Roberto a tribalist and an American puppet, consequently adopting an anti-American disposition and anti-tribalist rhetoric.¹⁰⁴ While Portugal was still the immediate foe, UNITA publications recognized Portugal's dependence on the United States and NATO as a key element to colonialism's resilience in Angola.¹⁰⁵ NATO supplied the Portuguese with weapons to fight the war, while multinationals operating in Angola financed Portugal's presence there.¹⁰⁶ Recognizing imperialism's international web of internal and external linkages encompassing Angola, UNITA appealed to all anti-imperialist forces around the world to unite as "the struggle against imperialism is one and indivisible."¹⁰⁷ In placing their struggle in the context of a greater international battle against imperialism, UNITA

¹⁰⁴ See Jonas Savimbi, "Where is the Revolution?", (MPLA: Algiers, 1964?), in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 156.

¹⁰⁵ UNITA, *Kwacha-Angola*, (London), 1970, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ UNITA, Orgao de Informacao e Propaganda, *Kwacha-Angola*, no. 5, December 1966, p. 1; and Jorge Sangumba, UNITA Foreign Secretary, letter to Gulf Boycott Coalition, 3 May 1973, (London), in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 8-5.

¹⁰⁷ UNITA *Information Bulletin*, no. 9, 1972, pp. 7-8, printed in *African Contemporary Record*, 1972-1973, p. C29. See also UNITA, Information Dept., 20 September 1973, in *UNITA Bulletin*, no. 1, 1974, p. 5; in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-5.

demonstrated an "internationalist" orientation absent from the FNLA's political doctrine. UNITA even acknowledged the "profound value and scope of the struggle all Black brothers in the Americas," and appealed to Angolans and African-Americans to combine their struggle.¹⁰⁸

Complementing this perspective on international imperialism, UNITA defined its struggle at home using class analysis and the "dialectics and historical materialism."¹⁰⁹ According to UNITA rhetoric, class analysis had to replace tribalist approaches to the liberation struggle put forth by the FNLA.¹¹⁰ In the UNITA analysis, Western imperialists cooperated closely with the Angolan bourgeoisie to suppress the Angolan masses.¹¹¹ While UNITA's actual class composition consisted almost entirely of peasants, UNITA's Third Congress concluded that "the cadres and the people must pay special attention to the nature of the class struggle in the struggle for national liberation of Angolan ... [in] order to maintain the leadership of the struggle in the hands of the *proletariat* of Angola."¹¹² In comparison with his former organization, Savimbi's UNITA sounded militantly marxist.

In sharp contrast to these strands of marxism, internationalism, and anti-tribalism, however, UNITA simultaneously preached a very parochial outlook towards the liberation struggle. While identifying world imperialism as the real enemy of the Angolan people in one statement, another would declare that "We are not concerned with nobody else but the Portuguese whom so far we take as our only

¹⁰⁸ UNITA, *Armed Struggle in Angola*, May 1973, p. 3, in the Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-5.

¹⁰⁹ *IBID*, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ See Jonas Savimbi, "Where is the Revolution?", p. 159.

¹¹¹ UNITA Central Committee, "The Programme of UNITA", *Angola - Seventh Year*, (UNITA, 1968), p. 26.

¹¹² "Final Communique of the Third Congress of UNITA", (13-19, August 1973), in *UNITA Bulletin*, no. 1, 1974, p.7. Emphasis added by the author. Similarly, a UNITA war communique from 1971 began by pledging FALA's "solidarity with the working class." UNITA, "Special Guerrilla Communique from the High Command of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola," (London) April-May 1971, p.1.

enemy."¹¹³ Moreover, while Savimbi blamed Roberto for exacerbating ethnic divisions, UNITA consciously became an Ovimbundu organization. If, as Savimbi argued, the MPLA represented the Mbundu and mesticos, and the FNLA was comprised of only Bakongo, UNITA must give voice to the "majority" of Angolans, the Ovimbundu.¹¹⁴ Savimbi criticized the MPLA's attacks on the authority of African chiefs as a revolutionary strategy antithetical to mass mobilization, arguing that "anyone who alienated the peasantry from their deep spiritual convictions would also divide the force available to fight colonial domination"¹¹⁵ Complementing this emphasis on tribal identity, UNITA warned whites and "their stupid mulattos" that "their days of living in Angola are numbered."¹¹⁶

UNITA's Programme

For Savimbi, "the importance of correct ideology cannot be over-emphasized."¹¹⁷ Consequently, UNITA enunciated a comprehensive set of objectives in 1968. The essence of the plan was nationalist populism; in an independent Angola, UNITA promised to empower black Angolans at the expense of the existing system.¹¹⁸ U N I T A doctrine also asserted that Angolan nationalism would be most manifestly expressed within a "democracy," however vaguely defined, which would "incorporate everyone from the sincere chief who dislikes the odious Portuguese colonial system up to the most enlightened

¹¹³ UNITA, *Kwacha -Angola*, (Cairo) November 1968, p. 2.

¹¹⁴ See Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 166. This group also included the Chokwe, Ovambo, and other ethnic groups in the south.

¹¹⁵ Savimbi, as quoted in Fred Bridgeland, *Jonas Savimbi*, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Co, 1986), pp. 68 & 83. See also W. Martin James III, "The UNITA Insurgency in Angola", (Ph.D. dissertation; Catholic University, 1986), p. 46.

¹¹⁶ UNITA, *Orgao de Informacao e Propaganda*, *Kwacha-Angola*, no. 5, December 1966, p. 2.

¹¹⁷ Central Committee of UNITA, statement, (Freelands of Angola: February 1973), in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-5.

¹¹⁸ "Statement Addressed to the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity", in *Kwacha-Angola*, (London), No.1, January 1969, p. 9.

revolutionary..."¹¹⁹ Yet the manner in which popular will should be expressed was through "democratic centralism" in a "people's democracy."¹²⁰ In embracing these leninist conceptions of democracy, UNITA rejected Western "liberalism" which embodied archaic formulas promoting "neo-colonialism".¹²¹ As a tactic of national liberation, however, Savimbi did encourage elections.¹²² As the self-proclaimed representative of the largest ethnic group in Angola, Savimbi must have been confident that a popular election would give him an advantage over the two rival liberation movements.

Regarding the economic organization of Angola, UNITA's plan echoed socialist ideas in an African context.¹²³ UNITA publications advocated the formation of a classless society in which the exploitation of human labor would be abolished.¹²⁴ In place of exploitation, UNITA proposed communalism and peasant collectives.¹²⁵ UNITA's Third Congress reported on the agricultural success of the cooperatives, while a 1973 report counted "120 cooperative operating in the liberated areas."¹²⁶ Leon Dash, a reporter for the *Washington Post* who visited Angola in 1973, confirmed UNITA's claims, writing that "UNITA has organized its population into a commune-like society:

¹¹⁹ Savimbi, (1965), as quoted in Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 68

¹²⁰ UNITA Third Party Congress, proceedings in *UNITA Bulletin*, no. 1, 1974, p. 15.

¹²¹ UNITA, *War Information Bulletin*, February-March 1972, in the Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-5.

¹²² Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 78. For a detailed description of a UNITA form of election, see Malik Chaka, "Angola's Daring People Win More Freedom," *Zambia Daily Mail*, October 30, 1973.

¹²³ For an overview of UNITA's program, see Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 195.

¹²⁴ Interview with Mr. Sangumba, UNITA educator, by Leon Dash, *Washington Post*, December 26, 1973, p. 15; and *UNITA Bulletin*, no. 1, 1974, p. 15.

¹²⁵ UNITA, Information Department, 20 September 1973, in *UNITA Bulletin*, no. 1, 1974, p. 4.

¹²⁶ "Final Communique of the Third Congress of UNITA", p. 8; UNITA, *Armed Struggle in Angola*, p. 4.

farms are cultivated cooperatively, and families share in the resulting harvest according to their needs."¹²⁷

As UNITA never operated in urban areas, the organization's position on industrial nationalization was more ambiguous. As a general proposition, UNITA promoted "a planned economy in order to develop fully all the resources, human and material potentialities which guarantees the construction of socialism in Angola."¹²⁸

How could UNITA promote the reorganization of society along socialist precepts and at the same time respect ethnic tradition and local custom? Savimbi explained these apparent contradictions as the Africanization of marxism-leninism.¹²⁹ While important to create "a revolutionary Party, armed with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism", this organization nonetheless had to base "its correct strategy and policies and tactics on the concrete conditions of the struggle and on the concrete daily experiences of the oppressed masses."¹³⁰ Savimbi chided the "European" brands of socialism championed by his rivals, and instead posited a "'practical ideology' grounded in local experience."¹³¹ As for communism and its disciples, Savimbi praised Mao as "the brilliant Thinker of oppressed people" and his philosophy was accepted as a practical guide for revolutionary development in Angola.¹³² As the following section on strategy discusses, however, this bond with Mao developed out of necessity, not ideological affinity.

UNITA Strategy

¹²⁷ Leon Dash, *Washington Post*, December 24, 1973, p. 6.

¹²⁸ "Final Communique of the Third Congress of UNITA", pp. 14-15.

¹²⁹ See *UNITA Information Bulletin*, no. 9, 7-8, 1972.

¹³⁰ *IBID*

¹³¹ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 195. See also the speech by Tony Fernandes, UNITA Minister of Information, on March 16, 1976 in which he chides the MPLA for being "dominated ideologically by external forces"... (*Support the Second Anti-Colonial Struggle of the Angolan People*, (Toronto, Canada: Norman Bethune Institute, 1976), p. 23.

¹³² *Kwacha-Angola*, (London), #6, January 1971; Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 195.

Like many other aspects of UNITA's policy, the organization's stated position on negotiation and cooperation with the Portuguese contradicted UNITA practice. Officially, UNITA believed that negotiations were dangerous to the liberation struggle.

UNITA is, therefore, convinced without illusions that the only way for the oppressed African masses of Angola to eradicate colonialism and imperialist relations is through revolutionary armed struggle... any other 'magic' formula engineered and cooked up in any African and European capital aimed at solving the problem of colonialism in Angola is nothing but a hand skilled in the art of political manipulation and deception used to turn the liberation forces away from the scene of confrontation and the fix their gazes upon remote pastures.¹³³

Letters between Savimbi and Portuguese military commanders, however, reveal that Savimbi saw real value in colluding with the enemy.¹³⁴ This rapprochement eventually led to a secret cease fire between UNITA and the Portuguese military command in southern Angola. This extraordinary level of complicity between a liberation movement and a colonial power suggests that Savimbi believed he could maneuver a favorable position for his organization in a Portuguese-directed transition to independence.

Despite these quiet contacts with the Portuguese, UNITA affirmed publicly that armed struggle was the only means to win Angolan independence.¹³⁵ Only a year after the creation of the organization, UNITA launched its first attack on December 4, 1966.¹³⁶ By 1974, UNITA had developed the most sophisticated methods of guerrilla warfare of all the liberation movements.

UNITA strategy of armed struggle consisted of three objectives: (1) the escalation of the armed struggle to an ever-increasing intensity, (2) the political mobilization of the entire nation and (3)

¹³³ UNITA *Information Bulletin*, no. 9, 1972, pp. 7-8.

¹³⁴ Jonas Savimbi, letter to the Angolan authorities, January or February 1972. Printed in *Expresso*, November 1979, and William Minter, ed., *Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier*, (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1988). p. 57.

¹³⁵ UNITA, *Kwacha -Angola*, (Cairo) November 1968, p.5.

¹³⁶ Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 71.

national reconstruction in the liberated areas.¹³⁷ Regarding the first objective, UNITA's most distinguishing characteristic was to fight the war from inside Angola.¹³⁸ In chastising his rival liberation movements, Savimbi argued that a "revolution in Angola cannot be led by telepathy, from the safety of neighboring countries."¹³⁹ Making virtue out of necessity, Savimbi also championed the Chinese doctrine of "self reliance."¹⁴⁰ As UNITA had no significant allies abroad until after independence, Savimbi lost nothing in asserting that "the development of the Angolan struggle must not depend on the contingent and uncertain nature of outside assistance."¹⁴¹ While Savimbi would not have refused any outside assistance, he took pride in UNITA's ability to conduct the war by using military equipment captured from the Portuguese.¹⁴²

Given UNITA's local orientation, Savimbi considered mobilization of peasant support to be the "essence" of the struggle.¹⁴³ Fashioned after China's experience,¹⁴⁴ UNITA's first task was to convince the peasants of the necessity of the liberation war -- politicization.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁷ "Statement Addressed to the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity", in *Kwacha-Angola*, (London), No.1, January 1969, p. 9.

¹³⁸ See Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, pp. 167-168.

¹³⁹ UNITA, *Kwacha-Angola*, (London), No.1, January 1969, p.1.

¹⁴⁰ UNITA Central Committee, statement, (Freelands of Angola: February 1973).

¹⁴¹ "Final Communique of the Third Congress of UNITA", p. 7.

¹⁴² UNITA, Orgao de Informacao e Propaganda, *Kwacha-Angola*, no. 5, December 1966, p. 1; Sitte, *The Observer*, April 9, 1972.

¹⁴³ "Manifesto Angolana", signed by the founding members of UNITA, in Brazzaville, 11 December 1964, in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-5. See also "Mensagem do Presidente da UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, aos Quadros e Militantes da UNITA no Exterior," (Angola, May 1971, mimeo), p. 2.

¹⁴⁴ See Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 78.

¹⁴⁵ During an interview with Leon Dash, Savimbi explained that over half the peasants had never had contact with the Portuguese and therefore see no reason to fight. Accordingly, mobilization in Angola would be more difficult than in other African countries. See Dash, "Black Roots in Angola," *Washington*

According to UNITA, a

liberation war must be people's war -- fought by the people, and for the people. Small disorganized freedom fighter groups will never defeat the armies of oppression alone. UNITA realizes this, and has already embarked on the long and difficult work of mobilising the people by example and political education."¹⁴⁶

A politicized peasantry then created propitious conditions for an effective guerrilla campaign.¹⁴⁷ "Although the Portuguese have used and still using superior weapons supplied by NATO, we have shown them that who decides the war is not superior weapons but the masses in the country."¹⁴⁸ UNITA's perspective on the relationship between war and politics, then, was different than either the FNLA or the MPLA. Whereas the MPLA separated political commissars from military commanders, and the FNLA's army had little if any political education, Savimbi considered the guerrillas to be the agent of UNITA's ideology.¹⁴⁹ As such, UNITA needed to "build, within the country, a trained and politically aware liberation army capable of mobilizing the popular masses ..."¹⁵⁰ In reprovving the situation in northern Angola, Savimbi declared that "the guerilla army should live and progress into the interior with total support of the population. By its undisciplined acts, a politically unaware army only increases the terror of the people."¹⁵¹ A politically trained army then served "not only as fighting instrument, but as an instrument for production and mobilization as well."¹⁵²

A final aspect of UNITA's mobilization strategy was the undivided

Post, December 26, 1973, p. 15; and UNITA, *Discurso de Orientacao Politica e Ideologica da UNITA*, (London: UNITA Office, June-July 1972), pp. 4-5.

¹⁴⁶UNITA, *Kwacha-Angola*, (London), No.1, January 1969, p. 7.

¹⁴⁷ UNITA Central Committee, *Angola - Seventh Year*, p. 24.

¹⁴⁸ UNITA, *Orgao de Informacao e Propaganda, Kwacha-Angola*, no. 5, December 1966, p. 1.

¹⁴⁹ UNITA, *Armed Struggle in Angola*, p. 4.

¹⁵⁰ Jonas Savimbi, "Where is the Revolution?", p. 160.

¹⁵¹ *IBID*, p. 160.

¹⁵² UNITA, *Armed Struggle in Angola*, p. 5.

focus on the peasantry as the target for politicization.

The contemporary history of revolutionary struggles supports Mao's thesis that the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside would be the crucial practical importance. UNITA was the first movement in Angola to correctly analyze the concrete conditions prevailing in that country. Thus it recognized that the peasantry would represent the backbone of the revolutionary movement although in alliance with the small percentage of civil servants and intellectuals. The emphasis which the organization gave to the peasantry was not to imply that the level of political consciousness among that group was advanced, for indeed it was not. Whereas the peasants in Angola are more politically naive than the urban population, they are also more reliable when mobilised. The program of the party is first presented to them. Party cadres enter the villages, live with the local population, in order to grasp the real existing problems.... The decision (to concentrate on the peasantry) enabled UNITA to avoid the cost in human lives which many revolutionary groups paid due to their incorrect strategy of trying to launch a revolution in a rural country from an urban base.¹⁵³

In keeping with the Chinese theory of guerrilla war, UNITA recognized that the ultimate aim of guerrilla war in the countryside was to surround the cities.¹⁵⁴ Until that time, however, UNITA refrained from developing cells within urban areas, and, unlike the FNLA and MPLA, did not attempt to construct a trade union movement or a conventional army.

The third and final component of UNITA's strategy was to rebuild the liberated territories into functioning communities.¹⁵⁵ According to UNITA official publications, the liberation war entered a new phase when UNITA consolidated their basis "with the object of effectively protecting our people and structures."¹⁵⁶ Within these liberated areas UNITA set up cells responsible for governing territory and disseminating UNITA's political programme.

The Central Committee of UNITA is fully functioning inside Angola in one of its military Bases for two consecutive years. In the bases we have schools, clinics, and agricultural cooperatives. In the academic year of 1969-70 we have had 300 pupils who have done with success the grades A and B. Our clinics have given

¹⁵³ *IBID*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵⁴ See Leon Dash, *Washington Post*, December 24, 1973, p. 7; and Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 195.

¹⁵⁵ UNITA, *War Information Bulletin*, February-March 1972.

¹⁵⁶ UNITA, *The Armed Struggle in Angola*, p. 2.

medical care to more than 20,000 patients, soldiers and civilians
...¹⁵⁷

These areas then would serve as the nucleus and model of social organization for an independent Angola.

With limited military resources, UNITA confined its operations to classic forms of guerrilla warfare - hit and run, ambushes, attacks on white farmers, and sabotage of the Benguela railway system,¹⁵⁸ While UNITA soldiers engaged the Portuguese in "battles where hundreds of our brave men of F.A.L.A. are called for the last sacrifice," UNITA lacked the conventional firepower to reorganize into a conventional army.¹⁵⁹ Instead, the last stage in UNITA's war would arrive when the peasants and guerrillas could choke off the cities controlled by the Portuguese.¹⁶⁰

IV. Bi-Polarity and Revolutionary Angola

International Sources of MPLA Ideology

Soviet Union

As the above discussion of MPLA ideology clearly portends, Soviet and MPLA leaders shared many ideas about both the state of the world and the recipe for improving it. Beginning from initial contacts in

¹⁵⁷ UNITA, *Kwacha-Angola*, (London), 1970, p. 10. For journalists' account of these liberated zones confirming these UNITA claims, see Sitte, *The Observer*, April 9, 1972, p. 35; Leon Dash, *Washington Post*, December 23, 1973; and Malik Chaka, "Angola's Daring People Win More Freedom," *Zambia Daily Mail*, October 30, 1973.

¹⁵⁸ UNITA, *Kwacha-Angola*, (Cairo) November 1968, p. 4; and Steve Valentine, "The Liberated Countryside", *Times of Zambia*, 12 September 1969.

¹⁵⁹ UNITA, *War Information Bulletin*, February-March 1972. In 1969, a reporter touring UNITA's areas estimated that over half the guerrillas were armed with only bows and arrows Steve Valentine, "The Liberated Countryside", *Times of Zambia*, 12 September 1969.

¹⁶⁰ See Leon Dash, *Washington Post*, December 24, 1973, p. 7.

1960,¹⁶¹ this ideological affinity helped to maintain intimate political ties between the Soviet Union and the MPLA throughout the Angolan independence struggle. MPLA President Agostinho Neto first visited Moscow in 1964, returned to the Soviet Union for 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, and reappeared for the 24th Congress in 1971.¹⁶² As already discussed in the Soviet section above, the MPLA was the unquestioned "authentic" leader of the Angolan liberation movement from the Soviet viewpoint.

Ironically, however, these intimate political contacts had only a marginal impact on the development of the MPLA's ideological orientation. First, MPLA programmes before independence are not resolute in their espousal of socialist orientation. Rather, vague principles about socialism were juxtaposed with reassurances about the protection of private property. Second, in so much as MPLA statements and leaders reflected a socialist or communist outlook, this disposition had developed even before contact with Soviet officials.¹⁶³ Contacts with the Soviet Union simply reinforced the position and legitimacy of the MPLA's leftist orientation.

Shared ideological orientation, however, did help to sustain relations under tough conditions. When the rest of the world promenaded Roberto's FNLA as the sole, legitimate Angolan movement, the Soviet Union did not abandon the MPLA. While this Soviet stance undoubtedly was influenced by an absence of ties with the FNLA at the time, ideology must have strengthened those initial contacts, not

¹⁶¹ See Pieter Lessing *Africa's Red Harvest*, (London, 1962), p. 18. The MPLA first established formal contacts with the Soviet Union during the organization's brief tenure in Conakry, Guinea in 1960. Before this date, however, several senior MPLA figures had established contacts with Soviet officials through the Portuguese Communist Party in Lisbon.

¹⁶² MPLA, *Angola in Arms*, February 1968, p. 4. According to James Chikerema, ZAPU's acting president and Neto's housemate in Dar es Salaam during this time, Neto developed much more intimate relations with his Soviet contacts than any other African liberation leader. Chikerema claimed that Neto was a full member of the CPSU Central Committee, whereas he and others of his stature were only given the rank of observers. (Author's interview with James Chikerema, Harare, Zimbabwe, July 1989.)

¹⁶³ Paulo Jorge attributed contacts with the Portuguese Communist Party in the 1950s and cadres training the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s as the principle and complementary sources of the MPLA's "socialist" ideas. (Author's interview with Paulo Jorge, Luanda, August 23, 1988.)

least because of Roberto's public disdain for communism. Ideological affinity also overcame personal divisions in reuniting Neto's faction of the MPLA with the Soviet Union after the splits between the Eastern Revolt and the Revolt Active in 1972-73.¹⁶⁴

The United States

Despite several campaigns in the 1960's the MPLA never managed to establish relations with the United States government. Having tried to influence American policy with little success, the MPLA leadership quickly identified the United States as the enemy and refrained from trying to lobby the 'imperialist hegemon.'¹⁶⁵ The MPLA did succeed in nurturing ties with several support groups within the United States, but these sources of support never constituted a significant contribution to the MPLA struggle. Without contacts, the United States had no positive influence on the development of MPLA ideology. However, similar to the pattern with many other liberation movements, the negative stance taken by the United States towards the MPLA helped to push the liberation movement further into the Soviet camp.¹⁶⁶ As John Marcum's has concluded, "From the MPLA's vantage point, its socialist option was determined by Western hostility as by Soviet blandishments."¹⁶⁷ In an international system rigidly divided between capitalism and anti-capitalism, the Soviet Union and its allies were the only countries willing to assist the MPLA in a struggle against a capitalist power.

External Influences on MPLA Military Strategy

Soviet Union

However modest, Soviet military assistance had a direct influence over the course of the MPLA's military struggle inside Angola. While courting other sources, MPLA leaders nonetheless recognized that the supply of Soviet weapons was indispensable to the growth of guerrilla

¹⁶⁴ These divisions are discussed in greater detail in the following section.

¹⁶⁵ Author's interview with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, MPLA Honorary President, (Luanda, August 25, 1985). de Andrade was a persistent advocate of courting the United States, but the Americans did little to help him.

¹⁶⁶ Marcum, "Bipolar Dependency: Angola", p. 15.

¹⁶⁷ *IBID*, p. 15.

operations.¹⁶⁸ For instance, the infusion of Soviet weapons beginning in 1964 provided the MPLA with the firepower to open the Eastern Front in 1968, the largest and most serious challenge to Portuguese rule up to that time. Though the actual extent of the MPLA's reach is difficult to assess, the MPLA appeared to overtake its rival, the FNLA, as the leading military insurgence in the late 1960's.¹⁶⁹ Likewise, suspensions of Soviet aid in 1973 help to eliminate the MPLA's military presence.¹⁷⁰ While internal divisions accounted for the large part of this paralysis, MPLA leaders also cite the lack of supplies as a critical cause of its military weakness at the time of the Portuguese coup.

Soviet support for the MPLA's armed struggle also appears to have influenced the manner in which the MPLA fought and agitated. Regarding politicization, the MPLA adopted the Soviet practice of creating political cells within military units. The commissars were assigned the task of politicizing, while guerrillas the task of fighting. Regarding military tactics, the MPLA accepted the Soviet theory of "stages" of revolutionary warfare whereby the the guerrilla war would inevitably evolve into a conventional war. As noted above, the MPLA military command began to make preparations for this transition as early as 1968. Brief flirtations with positional tactics thereafter proved disastrous for the poorly-armed and small MPLA units. As the following section on Zimbabwe's discusses, such premature moves towards fighting a conventional war had similar negative consequences for ZAPU.

¹⁶⁸ See MPLA, August 1969, p. 19; Luiz Azevedo, MPLA Executive Committee, *Pravda*, April 11, 1965; Neto as quoted in *International Affairs*, (Moscow) No.5, 1968, p. 100; Mario de Andrade, "Portugalia-- ne Khozyain, a Okupant", *Aziia i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 11, 1966, p. 24; and Agostinho Neto, "Samoe Vazhnoe Oruzhie", *Aziia i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 1, 1967, pp. 30-31. Basil Davidson estimated that the Soviet Union provided 70 to 80 % of all MPLA weapons in 1970. See Basil Davidson, *Walking 300 Miles with Guerrillas Through the Bush of Eastern Angola*, (Pasadena, CA: Munger Africana Library Notes, 1971), p. 8.

¹⁶⁹ On the eighth anniversary of the armed struggle, Neto claimed that the MPLA guerrillas were operating in 9 of Angola's 15 provinces. (See *Angola in Arms*, February 4, 1969, as cited in Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *The African Reader*, vol. 3, p. 145.)

¹⁷⁰ See Daniel Kempton, *Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa*, p. 40.

External Influences on FNLA Ideology

Soviet Union

The story of Soviet-FNLA relations is a short one. Roberto never trusted Moscow, and Moscow did not consider the FNLA a legitimate liberation movement. In 1964, during an internal rift within the MPLA, the Soviet Union considered aiding Roberto's organization, but the overture was quickly withdrawn. A GRAE communique later denied that the Soviet Union had never supported its movement, and accused the Soviet government of ignoring OAU recommendations by supporting the MPLA.¹⁷¹ Given Moscow's patronage of the MPLA, opportunities for rapprochement between the FNLA and the USSR never arose again.

The Soviet Union did play a role in the development of FNLA ideology; it served as the enemy, the model to be avoided. While many other liberation movements construed an "ideology of opposition" in reference to the United States and international capitalism, the FNLA highlighted the evils of the Soviet Union and international communism as unifying concept for its ideology. In this respect, international bi-polarity forced even the anti-ideological Roberto to take sides.

The United States

As already discussed, the FNLA was the only liberation movement in southern Africa which the United States directly supported, albeit for only a short time and with small amounts of assistance. The relationship was founded on a shared disdain for "communism" and support for decolonization. In the first years of the American assistance program, the United States appeared to influence the FNLA's ideological orientation dramatically. Roberto paid "ringing tribute" to the American vote in the United Nations censuring Portugal as testimony to America's new commitment to democracy and decolonization in Africa.¹⁷² Moreover, Roberto not only identified the United States as a model for future independent African states, he chastised the alternative socialist model as alien and subversive. Finally, the content of FNLA doctrines resonated with American liberal values,

¹⁷¹ GRAE, "La revolution angolaise dans le contexte africain et extra-africain", March 15, 1965, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, pp. 168-169.

¹⁷² *Courrier d'Afrique*, March 25-26, 1961, as cited in Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, I, p. 182.

while sharply critical of "Soviet-style" communism. That Roberto detested ideologies in general is, in itself, an "ideology" which the United States supported and promoted.¹⁷³

The FNLA's praise for the American way, however, faded commensurate to the decline of American assistance to the movement. As covert assistance to the FNLA was reduced to a CIA retainer fee of \$100,000 under Johnson, and then cut altogether under the Nixon, Roberto became increasingly critical of the United States.

I came to the conclusion that the Western countries are hypocritical. They help our enemies. While paying lip service to self-determination, the US supplies its North Atlantic treaty's ally, Portugal, with the arms that are used to kill us.¹⁷⁴

To pressure the United States to reconsider the suspension of aid to the FNLA, Roberto threatened to turn to the communists to "give us what we need,"¹⁷⁵ flirting briefly with the Soviet Union in 1964, and China in 1973.¹⁷⁶ Neither embrace, however, fundamentally altered the FNLA's ideological disposition. While China eventually became the FNLA principle source of military assistance, Roberto never pledged allegiance to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and only paid lip service to Third World, anti-imperialist solidarity while in Beijing.¹⁷⁷ Even

¹⁷³ In the American lexicon, communism was an ideology, while capitalism was simply the 'natural' system of economic organization.

¹⁷⁴ *New York Times*, January 4, 1964.

¹⁷⁵ *IBID*, p. 15.

¹⁷⁶ FNLA, *Angola, FNLA/Events*, No. 6, March 1974, pp. 44-45. (In Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 9). First contacts were made in 1964, when Roberto was searching for a new suppliers to replace the United States. See *New China New Agency*, 10 June 1966, in *Mizan Supplement*, No. 4, July-August 1966, p. 20.

¹⁷⁷ For such iterations, see Roberto, in *Angola, FNLA/Events*, May 1974, p. 23; *Le Monde*, 26 December 1973, in *African Contemporary Record*, 1973-1974, p. B519. The FNLA-Chinese relationship revived because President Mobutu of Zaire, the FNLA's chief ally in Africa and Roberto's family relation, began to court Beijing in 1973. In that same year, Roberto travelled to Beijing for the first year, returning to Africa with pledges for military training and assistance. After the Portuguese coup, however, just one year later, FNLA-Chinese relations quickly faded, as discussed in the following chapter. On the Mobutu-Chinese-FNLA

though he despised the hypocrisy of American foreign policy, Roberto still touted the ideals of Western liberal democracies, and never ruled out the possibility of improved relations with the United States in the future.¹⁷⁸

FNLA Military Strategy

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union played a defining role in the articulation of FNLA's military strategy. As the Soviet Union never developed a relationship with the FNLA, the Soviet theory of liberation warfare never reached the FNLA military. Unlike other liberation movements without contact with the Soviet Union, however, the FNLA did see the necessity of building a conventional army. In the early 1960s, American CIA officers, lead by Bernardt Manhertz, trained and even commanded FNLA forces.¹⁷⁹ Ideas about positional warfare may have arrived through these military instructors.

As already noted, Roberto's military ideas came from Fanon and Algeria.¹⁸⁰ Because this strategy focused on the importance of sustained violence, Roberto had no objection from pursuing all sources of potential support.¹⁸¹ These "non-African" sources of aid, however, had little affect on Roberto's military campaign. Though China became a major supplier of weapons to the FNLA, the FNLA military did not adopt Mao's strategy guerrilla warfare.¹⁸² As the following chapter

connection, see testimony of John Marcum in "Hearings: U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa", July 1975, p. 91; and *African Contemporary Record*, 1973-74, p. B515.

¹⁷⁸ GRAE, May 1973, p. 25.

¹⁷⁹ See Jose Kalundungo, Chief of the General Staff of the Exercito de Libertacao Nacional de Angola, (ELNA), resignation statement, October 2, 1964, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 162; and Savimbi's resignation statement, in *IBID.*, p. 159.

¹⁸⁰ See Holden Roberto, speech at the U.N. Fourth Committee, November 27, 1962, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 80.

¹⁸¹ GRAE, "La revolution angolaise dans le contexte africain et extra-africain", March 15, 1965, in Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, p. 170.

¹⁸² It is important to note that the FNLA's rapprochement with China occurred in the wake of the Kinkuzu rebellion. As such, the FNLA had few fighting guerrillas of any type, Maoist or otherwise. Had the liberation war persisted more than one

demonstrates, Roberto believed that a strong army was all that was necessary to achieve independence. He was right; he just had the wrong army.

UNITA: Self-Reliance or International Isolation?

True to the doctrine of "self reliance", UNITA claimed to be non-aligned and discouraged the involvement of any alliances or blocs in Angola.¹⁸³ Without developed relations with either the United States or the Soviet Union, Savimbi lost nothing in condemning American imperialism in Vietnam or Soviet imperialism in Czechoslovakia.¹⁸⁴ Instead, the UNITA leader warned of the dangers of introducing the U.S.-Soviet ideological struggle into Angola.¹⁸⁵ In his view, Angola could only win real freedom by an independent, internally-based liberation struggle.

Savimbi's commitment to non-alignment resulted more from geopolitical realities than moral righteousness. By the time UNITA entered the liberation struggle, international alliances with Angola's other liberation movements had already been set. Shortly after resigning from the FNLA, Savimbi did make a trip to Moscow and other Eastern European capitals to solicit support for his new cause, but "they were only interests in recruiting new members for [the] MPLA."¹⁸⁶ After this trip, Savimbi never had contact with Moscow again. Thus, the Soviet Union had no effect the development on UNITA ideology or military strategy during the liberation war. While UNITA adhered to the ideas of socialist internationalism,¹⁸⁷ the Soviet

more year, the FNLA might have become more Maoist.

¹⁸³ UNITA Central Committee, *Angola - Seventh Year*, p. 26.

¹⁸⁴ See Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 85.

¹⁸⁵ Savimbi, letter "To the Missionaries of the United Board of World Ministries, New York", September 21, 1965, in Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 166.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Mike Marshment, in "Kwacha--Angola" (UNITA), quoted in *IBID*, p. 134. See also Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 66.

¹⁸⁷ Savimbi wrote in 1971, "UNITA has its own philosophy, but it is very largely based in the revolutionary principles which have already triumphed in other parts of the World." Jonas Savimbi, "The Unpublished Letter to Le Monde Diplomatique, January 10, 1971 (Freelands of Angola), in Hoover Archives,

Union was not considered part of the socialist club.

UNITA, however, did find a cautious supporter in the East -- the People's Republic of China. In 1964, Savimbi visited Beijing where his reception was much warmer than in Moscow.¹⁸⁸ The following year, Savimbi returned to China to complete a training course in guerrilla warfare.¹⁸⁹ He later sent eleven other UNITA leaders to train at Nanking.¹⁹⁰ In 1967, China began to supply UNITA with small amounts of financial assistance and light weapons.¹⁹¹ This exposure to Chinese political philosophy and guerrilla strategy had a profound influence on UNITA. In pronouncing its socialist orientation, UNITA publications denounced the variety practiced in Eastern Europe, while championing Mao as the brilliant Thinker of oppressed people from whom UNITA gained political knowledge and ideological "correctness."¹⁹² As for the battlefield, Savimbi unabashedly pronounced that his organization followed the Chinese model of guerrilla warfare, learned during his training in China.¹⁹³ UNITA's Minister of Information, Tony Fernandes later recalled that "Our cadres greatly heed the lessons of peoples' revolutions, such as the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, bearing in mind the many similarities in the conditions, and also understanding the relations of the revolutionary fighter to

Africa Subject Collection, box 12-5.

¹⁸⁸ Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 66.

¹⁸⁹ UNITA, *Free Angola*, 1987, p. 12.

¹⁹⁰ Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 67.

¹⁹¹ *IBID*, p. 75. Because China had very cordial relations with Tanzania, Nyerere allowed the weapons to pass through his country, despite the fact that the MPLA maintained one of its most important bases in Dar es Salaam. From Tanzania, this assistance travelled through Zambia. Initially, Kenneth Kaunda supported UNITA and even allowed the organization to open an office in Lusaka. Kaunda and Savimbi had a falling out, however, over the issue of the Benguela railway; Savimbi wanted to sabotage it, while Kaunda wanted it to remain open. In an interview with Henry Hamadzidripi, former Finance Secretary and DARE member of ZANU, he recalled that in 1975 Kaunda pressured ZANU to recognize Savimbi and cooperate with him in Lusaka. (Author's interview, Harare, August 1988).

¹⁹² Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm*, p. 239.

¹⁹³ Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 97; Sitte, April 9, 1972, p.39.

the people being similar to this of a fish in water."¹⁹⁴ The Third UNITA Conference in 1973 singled out China for "continuous support for our struggle for national liberation."¹⁹⁵ At least in the realm of rhetoric, Chinese assistance to UNITA produced an identifiable allegiance to the Chinese way of thinking.

UNITA made no progress in establishing ties with the United States during the liberation war. As UNITA's foreign branches barely reached London, the organization had few resources for campaigns accross the Atlantic. Savimbi, however, expressed no ideological axiom against cooperation with the United States. In explaining his contacts with China, Savimbi retorted;

But what is true is that guerrillas train in communist countries because they could not train elsewhere. If Washington could today open an academy of freedom fighters, UNITA would be the first to send its members there. Since Western countries are not ready to help us we are forced to seek help from any willing country, he concluded.¹⁹⁶

Needless to say, Washington did not open up a training center and relations between UNITA and the United States never developed until after independence.

Just as Savimbi had no ideological qualm about cooperation with the United States, he likewise saw no harm in cooperating with the Portuguese -- the declared enemy of the liberation struggle. As noted above, an extensive collection of letters between UNITA representatives and Portuguese security agents detail an intimate relationship between UNITA and the Portuguese authorities in southern Angola beginning in 1971.¹⁹⁷ The arrangement began as an understanding regarding the harvesting of timber in eastern Angola between UNITA sector chief Edmindo Rocha and two Portuguese timber merchants, Zeca Oliveira and Antonio Duarte. UNITA agreed not to obstruct the timber operation in return for limited support from Portuguese businessmen. Upon learning of the details of these

¹⁹⁴ Speech by Tony Fernandes, March 12, 1976, in *Support the Second Anti-Colonial Struggle of the Angolan People*, p. 24.

¹⁹⁵ "Final Communique of the Third Congress of UNITA," p. 10.

¹⁹⁶ *IBID*, p. 6.

¹⁹⁷ Minter, *Operation Timber*, in passim.

contacts, the Portuguese secret police (DGS, formerly called PIDE) approached UNITA regarding more intimate cooperation in their mutual fight against the MPLA and UPA. While these contacts had no public impact on UNITA's declared ideology or military strategy -- UNITA vehemently denied the allegations of cooperation¹⁹⁸ -- UNITA's collaboration with the Portuguese secret police raises serious doubts about Savimbi's genuine commitment to any ideology or military strategy. Savimbi's proclivity for political and military expediency over ideological or moral purity became even more apparent after the Portuguese coup, as detailed in the following chapter.

Conclusion

The balance of power in the world in the 1960s helped to divide the Angolan liberation movements into "communists" and "anti-communists," and to a lesser extent, into marxist-leninists and marxist-leninist-maoists. The internal struggle for Angolan independence became internationalized into a "war of socialist revolution," or struggle for "democracy", or a plot of "communist subversion" depending on which side of the divide one stood. New terms for describing the revolutionary situation were also accompanied by new methods and means of fighting the war. If the United States and the Soviet Union were both capitalist, colonial powers in Africa, it is difficult to imagine that rifles, mortars, and military training courses would have been provided to the African liberation forces.

While the revolutionary situation had been reshaped by the new international bi-polarity, a revolutionary outcome, let alone the type of outcome, was not certain in 1974.¹⁹⁹ Contrary to marxist post facto analyses, there was nothing inevitable about the Angolan socialist project implemented by the MPLA after independence. If the

¹⁹⁸ See Jonas Savimbi, *Comunicacao ao Povo Angolano*, (Luanda: Nova Editorial Angolana, SARL, 1975?), p. 5.

¹⁹⁹ Theories of revolution of the political conflict are most useful at this stage of analyses of revolutions in that they systemize the landscape of a revolutionary situation without neglecting contingencies which may (or may not) precipitate a revolutionary outcome. (See, most importantly, Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, chapter nine). Structuralists, and first and foremost marxists, on the other hand, expose the greatest deficiencies of their argument at this stage of analysis in claiming inevitability of a revolutionary outcome. (See Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, chapter one).

post-revolutionary regime in Angola would have been decided by an election in 1974, UNITA most likely would have won. If the regime would have been determined by a local war in 1974, the FNLA most likely would have taken over. Neither of these two scenarios would have produced a "people's republic." Even the MPLA's ideological position at this point casts doubt about the organization's commitment to revolutionary change. In other words, despite external influences, little evidence exists which suggests that a revolutionary outcome -- that is a political and socio-economic transformation -- was preordained by ideologies or strategies developed by the national liberation movements from 1961 to 1974.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Revolutionary Situation in Zimbabwe, 1961-1975

Bi-polarity had no less an effect on Zimbabwe than Angola. The internationalization of the Zimbabwean national liberation movement, in fact, followed a very similar trajectory as the Angolan process. Both liberation movements adopted socialist rhetoric and received socialist weapons to execute their armed struggles, while the West did little to court the African nationalists or disengage from the white Rhodesian regime. The result was polarization of the revolutionary situation in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe African People's Union, ZAPU

Ideology

Both as a normative interpretation of events and as a programme for the future, the ideology of Nkomo's ZAPU organization during the 1960's can best be described as liberal nationalism. From the first generation of African nationalist leaders, Nkomo expressed a consistent commitment to "democracy", self-determination, and majority rule. Though his programme and outlook became blurred with intermittent fusions of foreign rhetoric and dissonant socialist discourse, the core of ZAPU's ideological orientation did not change significantly during the 1960s.

For Nkomo and his followers, the essence of the Zimbabwean struggle was clearly defined as "the contradiction between the aspirations of the African majority on the one hand and the privileges of the settle minority on the other hand."¹ In the 1960's, race and majority rule, not class or socialist orientation, were the critical issues.² While ZAPU leaders vigilantly rejected calls for a racial war, ZAPU nonetheless recognized that the "menacing nature of racism is that it transcends capitalistic motivations and becomes a downright insult to a human person even at equal levels of poverty and wealth."³ Given this set of

¹ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1967, p. 4. This publication was an official organ of ZAPU.

² See Joshua Nkomo. *Nkomo: The Story of My Life*, (London: Methuen, 1984), p. 78.

³ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1969, p. 9.

perceptions, ZAPU prescriptions for the future, when articulated, focused on the basic principles of "one man, one vote" and "majority rule" as the cornerstones of any future Zimbabwean state.⁴

Beyond these general objectives, ZAPU statements portended few radical changes in the existing Rhodesian socio-economic organization. For instance, ZAPU officials not only stressed the importance of preserving white participation in a post-war Zimbabwean economy, they also underscored the necessity of maintaining and promoting foreign investment.⁵ ZAPU statements did recognize Rhodesian economic inequalities as a critical problem, but the remedy was greater black ownership of the means of production -- and most critically, land -- not a transformation of property rights. ZAPU leaders did not characterize their struggle as a conflict between oppressor and oppressed classes, but as a battle for the "legally just" distribution of property rights *within* the existing system.⁶ Finally, regarding the international context of the Zimbabwean conflict, few ZAPU leaders in the early 1960's spoke of the evils of the "world capitalist system". On the contrary, they looked to Great Britain as their guarantor for a peaceful transition to majority rule, as had happened in other British colonies. Even after the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), ZAPU leaders still expressed the belief that Great Britain, the United States, and the United Nations would intervene on behalf of Africans against the Smith regime. As discussed below, the ZAPU strategy for most of the 1960's was to try to precipitate such "capitalist" intervention, not deter it.

The Origins of a "Socialist Orientation"

Traces of a more radical ideological orientation began to

⁴ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, 1969, p.2.

⁵ Chikerema, 1966, in Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, eds., *Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents*, (London: Rex Collings, 1979), p. 115.

⁶ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, June 1969.

pepper ZAPU statements as early as 1964.⁷ In 1965, *Zimbabwe Review* officially declared itself the "Vanguard Magazine" of the workers and peasants of Zimbabwe and began to refer to ZAPU officials as "comrades."⁸ The nationalist movement was no longer just a struggle for self-determination but a "national democratic revolution" -- a term borrowed from the Soviet lexicon of revolution.⁹ As the struggle came to be defined not only between white and black, but also between the "bourgeois" and "progressive," certain blacks now could be considered enemies of the "revolution".

The danger lies not so much in the economic strength they command -- which in reality they do not -- but in the acceptance of the system which has provoked the nation to revolt. . . . The danger of the bourgeois-like elements (among Africans) is in that they are of the nature of capitalists and consciously₁₀ or unconsciously work in the direction of the status quo.

These beginnings of a class analysis locally also infiltrated ZAPU's perception of Zimbabwe's place in the international division of labor. Whereas early ZAPU statements pleaded for the assistance and intervention of Great Britain and the Western powers, these same countries now were denounced as supporters of the Smith regime.¹¹ ZAPU propaganda eventually asserted that the Rhodesian government was only an agent of imperialism's reach into Zimbabwe.¹² The struggle, then, had to be waged not only against the small enclave of white settlers in Zimbabwe, but against "the whole ruthless system of the aggressive global strategy of

⁷ See John Day, *International Nationalism: the Extra-territorial Relations of Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1967 p. 95.

⁸ *IBID*, p. 95.

⁹ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1969.

¹⁰ "The Complex Enemy", *Zimbabwe Review* (Lusaka), Vol. 1, No. 4, October/November, 1969, in de Braganca and Wallerstein, *The African Reader*, Vol. 2, p. 97-8.

¹¹ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 1967, in *IBID*. p.17.

¹² George Silundika, *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No.2, 1969, p.13.

international imperialism."¹³

Defining the Zimbabwean national liberation struggle in this international context introduced not only new enemies, but also new allies. ZAPU leaders began to stress the importance of perceiving their struggle as part of a broader struggle for national liberation in southern Africa and around the world.¹⁴ Both materially and spiritually, victories in neighboring African countries and throughout the Third World assisted the revolutionary struggle in Zimbabwe.¹⁵

The penetration of class analyses and internationalism into ZAPU's portrayal of the Zimbabwean liberation was accompanied by references to more radical, socialist prescriptions for the future. In 1969, *Zimbabwe Review* declared that "socialism must be the incontrovertible social formula and objective of the revolutionary struggles such as we are engaged in."¹⁶ The acquisition of political power was described as only the first aspect of the national liberation struggle.¹⁷ The revolution would be completed only when the "social relations of production" had been transformed.¹⁸

We in ZAPU see the need to replace the oppressive economic system that now prevails in our country with a completely different system which will genuinely benefit the masses of people living under it. . . . In our conception of the Zimbabwean revolution we recognize that the *economic base* must be changed in order to eliminate racism. In short both capitalism and racism must be eliminated as we establish a

¹³ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol 1., 1969.

¹⁴ See the speech by Stephen Nkomo at Khartoum Conference, 18-22 January 1969, in *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, 1969, p. 8.

¹⁵ See especially Owen Tshabangu, *The March 11 Movement in ZAPU -- Revolution within the Revolution in Zimbabwe*, (York: Tiger Papers Publications, (1972), 1979), p. 69.

¹⁶ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1969, p. 9.

¹⁷ ZAPU, *The Political Direction of Our Party*, (Lusaka: Directorate of the Political Commissariat, 14 September 1972), p. 266.

¹⁸ *IBID.*

socialist base in our country.¹⁹

According to these accounts, ZAPU had ceased to be a reformist organization and was now pursuing "a hard-line revolutionary struggle" for the "radical and total" liberation of the oppressed masses.²⁰ Even the taboo word, communism, appeared in ZAPU publications as a possible, albeit qualified, goal of the revolutionary struggle. As ZAPU's *Zimbabwe Review* declared, "If Communism means freedom, then we will fight for it. If capitalism means continued suppression, then we will oppose it vehemently."²¹

How could these radical statements be squared with the bourgeois liberalism outlined above? They were not. ZAPU's ideological development was neither linear nor homogenous. It would be wrong to characterize this radical trend as some kind of "natural" or "continuous" development from a previously more moderate position. This radical line surfaced and developed within ZAPU statements without undermining or transcending the older, more conservative stances. Nkomo, among others from the old guard, emphasized ZAPU's autonomy from any one ideological school or movement.

Do freedom-fighters support capitalism or communism? It is important to answer this question truthfully and succinctly.

Africans as a whole are neither capitalists nor Communists. They are basically communalists whose collective possession of land dates to times immemorial. But this does not mean to say they do not admire the good aspects of Communism or capitalism, if there are any.

Naturally, like anywhere else, there are now African capitalists just as there are African socialists. To pretend that all Africans belong to one ideological school of thought would be far from the truth. But to say that freedom-fighters are struggling because they are told so by people in the Eastern world is to assume very wrongly that the struggle began in Southern Africa after those participating in it

¹⁹ George Silundika, response to an interview question by Liberation Support Movement, published in 1974. Text reprinted in de Braganca and Wallerstein, *The African Reader*, Vol. 2, p. 99. Italics added.

²⁰ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1969, p. 7.

²¹ "Pet Ideas of Oppressors", *Zimbabwe Review*, 25 January 1969, in de Braganca and Wallerstein, *The African Reader*, Vol. 2, p. 97.

actively had first gone to the East for indoctrination.²²

ZAPU could not provide a consistent analysis of the Zimbabwean situation nor project a coherent programme for the future because a consensus on these ideological questions did not exist within the organization. Rather than try to outline a compatible set of objectives, ZAPU leaders preferred to defer the question until after independence. ZAPU thereby remained a mass movement with several ideological tendencies contained within it, rather developing into a vanguard party with one party line.²³ By evading tough questions about the future, ZAPU enjoyed a wide range of maneuverability when dealing with people and organizations of varying political perspectives both inside and outside of the country.

ZAPU Strategy

Commensurate with their moderate political goals at the time, the ZAPU strategy for liberation consisted of a series of non-violent actions of resistance in the years before Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). As former ZAPU member, Maurice Nyagumbo recalled, "the liberation movement assumed that since all other British colonies were in that period achieving independence through forcing the British Government to a constitutional table, settlement of the Rhodesian problem was most likely going to follow the same pattern."²⁴ Even after UDI, Nkomo and his followers still believed that the path to independence passed through London. The ZAPU strategy for the first two years after UDI consisted of a variety of measures aimed at inducing British intervention on their behalf.²⁵ To catalyze international pressure on Great Britain, Nkomo appeared at international forums

²² Nkomo, 1964, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, *Zimbabwe Independence Movements*, p. 102.

²³ This distinction is discussed in *Zimbabwe Review*, November 1967, p. 2.

²⁴ *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 2, January/ February, 1970. Nyagumbo, of course, was a leading figure in ZANU after the 1963 split.

²⁵ Author's interview with Joseph Msika, ZAPU Vice-President, (Harare, July 14, 1989).

such as the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and Commonwealth meetings, while inside Rhodesia, ZAPU coordinated strikes, mass demonstrations, and acts of sabotage.²⁶ At this stage, even military actions were undertaken not to defeat the enemy, but to force another power, Great Britain, into the struggle.²⁷

The strategy failed, delaying the development of a full-fledged guerrilla war in Rhodesia for several years. While preparations for guerrilla war began in 1963, ZAPU did not launch its first military campaign until 1967. By hesitating to embrace a military strategy for national liberation, ZAPU eventually lost its role as the leading revolutionary organization in Zimbabwe.

In 1962, ZAPU made several organizational and policy decisions aimed at creating a military option. First, Nkomo established external and internal wings of the movement.²⁸ Inside the country the new post of "Public Affairs", headed by Moton Malianga, was "responsible for recruiting men for military training abroad, as well as for the organization of sabotage operations."²⁹ The external wing, especially after Rhodesia banned ZAPU in 1962, was responsible for nurturing contacts with countries willing to provide military assistance.

For two years after UDI, Nkomo continued to train his soldiers abroad, but refrained from deploying them inside Zimbabwe. The first major ZAPU military campaign only was undertaken in July 1967, when a group of ZAPU and ANC (South Africa) soldiers crossed

²⁶ For a explanation of the importance and reasons for economic sabotage, see *Zimbabwe Review*, April 1967, p. 6. For a secondary account of these actions see Kees Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe: the Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI* (London: Rex Collings, 1975), pp. 19-20 & 85.

²⁷ Author's interview with John Nkomo, (Harare, July 12, 1989).

²⁸ Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965), p. 175.

²⁹ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p. 156; and author's interview with Moton Malianga, (Harare, July 28, 1989).

the Zambezi River to set up camp inside Rhodesia.³⁰ Unlike other liberation armies at the time, however, their *modus operandi*, was not "guerrilla warfare".³¹ First, the ANC-ZAPU soldiers travelled in large groups, easily detectable from the air. Second, the military ZAPU-ANC forces were not confined to "hit-and-run" attacks, "ambushes", "sabotage", or "night strikes." Rather, upon engaging enemy forces, ZAPU forces were to maintain their positions at all costs.³² As a joint statement by Oliver Tambo and James Chikerema declared, "It is the determination of these Combined Forces to fight the common enemy to the finish at any point in the encounter as they make their way to their respective fighting zones."³³ Finally, these guerrillas were not armed with a comprehensive "politicization" programme, nor did ZAPU leaders send out political cadres ahead of time to prepare the local populations for the guerrillas' arrival. At this point in the struggle, ZAPU leaders did not regard "politicization" of the peasantry an important objective.³⁴ According to *Zimbabwe Review*, "The political program of the ZAPU-ANC alliance is to arm the oppressed people (and to) develop the armed struggle to the point where the military administrative machine of the white supremacy is smashed. At that point the people will be free to construct society as they think

³⁰ ZANU launched its first guerilla assault in 1966 in what is now known as the "Battle of Sinoia". Apparently, ZAPU guerrillas had entered Rhodesia as early as 1964, but no fighting occurred until 1967. For accounts of these earlier incursions, see Nyagumbo, *With the People*, pp. 189- 190, and A.H. Rich, *Social, Ethnic and Regional Factors in the Development of the Zimbabwean Nationalist Movement, 1963-1980*, (Manchester: Ph. D. Thesis, May 1983), pp. 137-138.

³¹ For a fuller description of the ZAPU-ANC campaigns, see Michael Raeburn, *Black Fire: Narratives form Zimbabwean Guerrillas*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1978), pp. 131-181.

³² "Joint ANC- ZAPU Statement," 19 August 1967. Printed in *Zimbabwe Review*, August 1967, p. 1; and author's interview with James Chikerema, ZAPU Vice-President at the time, (Harare, July 15, 1989).

³³ Joint statement issued by Oliver Tambo and James Chikerema, 19 September 1967. Reprinted in *Guerilla Warfare*, ANC Pamphlet, (ANC Publications and Information Bureau, 1970).

³⁴ See J.K. Cilliers, *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 9.

fit in Zimbabwe and South Africa."³⁵ According to this scenario, the military campaign *was* the political program; "politicization" would develop naturally out of the armed struggle.³⁶

These early campaigns ended in total disaster. First, the peasants did not sympathize instantly with the guerrillas, but actually worked against them. One captured guerilla reported that "I was surprised to see the African villagers supported the present government and its operations to exterminate guerilla warfare."³⁷ Without local protection, these large guerilla units were easily detected by the Rhodesian security forces.³⁸ Second, the ZAPU-ANC contingents lacked the manpower or firepower to conduct positional warfare against the combined Rhodesian-South African forces.³⁹ South African and Rhodesian spotter planes and helicopters easily located and attacked the closely grouped units of the ZAPU-ANC alliance. As one guerilla explained in 1969,

Our only disadvantage in the field is lack of anti-aircraft guns which we could bring down the jet-bombers. It is obvious that the fascists rely more on air power than on anything else.⁴⁰

Finally, when Rhodesian and South African forces did encounter the nationalist on the ground, they overwhelmed them with artillery, tank, and superior military tactics.

By 1970, the campaign was completely abandoned. The utter disaster provoked a divisive debate about strategy which eventually

³⁵ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 1, 1969, p.6.

³⁶ *Zimbabwe Review*, November 1967, p.2.

³⁷ *Rhodesia Herald*, July 6, 1967. Cited in Rich, *Social, Ethnic and Regional Factors in the Development of the Zimbabwean Nationalist Movement*, p. 138.

³⁸ *IBID*, p. 138.

³⁹ For a comparison of the balance, see Wilkinson, 1973, p. 10; Cilliers, *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 9. The numerical benefits of combining ANC and ZAPU forces was greatly outweighed by the introduction of South African security forces into the conflict.

⁴⁰ Interview with a guerilla who fought in the ZAPU-ANC assaults, in *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 June 1969.

split the ZAPU leadership permanently.⁴¹ For two years thereafter, the ZAPU leadership was paralyzed by infighting, attempted coups, and lack of direction.⁴² James Chikerema, acting ZAPU President, and his loyal friend, George Nyandoro, left ZAPU to form FROLIZI, leaving the more militant J.Z. Moyo with greater responsibility for military affairs.

The result of this reshuffle was the creation of a new ZAPU military organization -- the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) -- complete with a restructured command structure and a new military strategy.⁴³ Recognizing the mistakes of the 1967 and 1968 campaigns, the new military leadership in 1972 stressed the "primary importance" of the political aspect" for ZIPRA militants.⁴⁴

Our guarantee for final victory in Zimbabwe is the revolutionary masses whose history and tradition is that of struggle and without which our army would be like a fish out of water. The masses are makers of our history and therefore, the soul and life of our revolutionary struggle. It in these realities that our army must be politicized in order to equip itself politically and militarily for a successful peoples revolution in Zimbabwe.⁴⁵

Thereafter, ZAPU military tactics also changed.

A new turn in the training came after the failure of the South African ANC came after the failure of the 1967 and 1968 ZANU/ANC joint raids into Rhodesia. These failures resulted in an extensive re-examination of the tactics employed and the somewhat ambitious objective they sought to obtain of infiltrating sabotage and guerilla groups into South Africa

⁴¹ The different opinions polarized around two of the central figures within the ZAPU command-- James Chikerema, ZAPU Vice-President and leader of the party-in-exile, and J.Z. Moyo, ZAPU's assistant defense chief. Nkomo was in jail at the time.

⁴² Author's interview with John Nkomo, ZAPU Publicity Secretary at the time, (Harare, July 12, 1989). Besides the Chikerema-Moyo split, the most serious crisis was the March 11 Movement. See Tshabangu, *The March 11 Movement in ZAPU* .

⁴³ *Interviews in Depth, Zimbabwe ZAPU 2 -- T.S. Silundika*, interview dates November 1972 and December 1973 (LSM Information Centre, Canada, 1974).

⁴⁴ *IBID.*

⁴⁵ ZAPU, *The Political Direction of Our Party*.

overland. The re-examination resulted first in the sending of a number of members of the ANC to Moscow for retraining in the techniques of underground work. The main emphasis in this retraining being the use of a cell system in which the identity of members of each cell was kept secret from the members of the others, and the employment of clandestine means of communication and intelligence work.⁴⁶

When ZIPRA soldiers carried out military operations, they no longer engaged in direct confrontation with the Rhodesian security forces.⁴⁷ Sabotage became their principal method of attack, the land mine their new primary weapon.⁴⁸

The mistakes incurred during the Wankie incursions from 1967-1970, however, had long-term consequences. While the military strategy may have changed in 1972, ZIPRA did not make its presence felt inside the country until 1976.⁴⁹ During the time of reevaluation and reorganization in 1970, ZAPU leaders rejected an offer from FRELIMO, ZAPU's ally in Mozambique, to establish bases in Tete province near the north-eastern border of Zimbabwe.⁵⁰ ZANU subsequently seized the opportunity and Tete Province eventually became ZANU's principle path of infiltration into Zimbabwe. This critical missed opportunity, coupled with the extended absence from the battlefield, marked the beginning of ZAPU's demise.

Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU

Ideology

Dissatisfied with Joshua Nkomo's leadership and frustrated with the lethargic pace of Zimbabwe's liberation, a handful of dissidents organized an alternative national movement -- ZANU --

⁴⁶ Grieg, *The Communist Challenge to Africa*, p. 141.

⁴⁷ Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe*, p. 104.

⁴⁸ Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 15.

⁴⁹ Cilliers, *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 11.

⁵⁰ According to Chikerema, ZAPU wanted to work out of Tete, but Nyerere refused them entrance. As Nyerere was close to China at the time, he preferred to work with ZANU. Until this time, relations between FRELIMO and ZAPU were very close, while relations between FRELIMO and ZANU hardly existed. (Author's interview with James Chikerema, Harare, July 15, 1989).

in August 1963.⁵¹ At the time of split, little distinguished the ideological agendas of the two movements. By breaching unity -- the ultimate sin in any liberation struggle -- the ZANU founders were pressed immediately to justify their actions. Threatened by the overwhelming popularity of Nkomo at the time (a condition now often forgotten) and charged as "splittests" and "opportunists" by other African leaders in the region, ZANU quickly moved to articulate a distinguishing programme and strategy for the future. In succeeding to formulate a comprehensive statement of principles and operational liberation strategy, ZANU quickly surpassed ZAPU in ideological coherency and eventually overtook ZAPU as the leading military force in the liberation war.

Soon after the split, ZANU became increasingly more radical than ZAPU. Staking no faith in British intervention, ZANU lambasted international imperialism as the ultimate enemy of the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle.⁵² In denouncing British Minister Harold Wilson meeting with Ian Smith in 1968, *Zimbabwe News*, an official organ of ZANU, declared "the deadliest of swords any one could ever dare to draw against is were in the hands of Harry Oppenheimer's friends in Wall Street, the City of London and other speculators of stolen wealth in the West."⁵³ ZANU's enemy was not just the Rhodesian farmer, but the "international monopoly capitalists who have for ages continued to exploit the Zimbabwean people through the racists settler reactionaries in Salisbury who are the local agents of these capitalists. A complete defeat of the present system as represented by the settler clique, means a defeat of the principals (international monopoly and finance capitalists.)"⁵⁴ As opposition to Zimbabwean liberation was not confined to Rhodesia's borders, support was also located at the global level.

⁵¹ For further discussion on the reasons for the split, see John Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*, (London, 1979), p. 112; Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p. 71; and Henry Slater, "The Politics of Frustration: The ZAPU-ZANU Split in Historical Perspective," *Kenya Historical Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1975.

⁵² *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 3, No. 20, October 26, 1968, p. 2.

⁵³ *IBID*, p. 1.

⁵⁴ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 8, No. 11, November 1974, p. 1.

ZANU views the problem of the colony of Rhodesia...as a product and part of a world-wide conflict between the forces of imperialism, capitalism, colonialism, and settlerism, on the one hand, and the progressive forces of national independence, socialism, self-determination and human equality on the other.⁵⁵

Paraphrasing Lenin's "weakest Link" notion, ZANU called on all 'progressive forces' to support revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as these "underdeveloped areas would provide revolutionary bases from revolutionaries [could] launch their attack on imperialism."⁵⁶

This international level of analysis of Zimbabwe's situation differs little from ZAPU's world outlook.⁵⁷ During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, ZANU ideology became more distinguished from ZAPU regarding (1) analysis of the Zimbabwean domestic situation, and (2) a program for the future. Regarding domestic affairs, ZANU quickly adopted a more rigid class analysis, downplaying racial and nationalist conflicts.

But we must be quick to point out that white racism is only a result of the irrationality of capitalism. Capitalism, to us has been⁵⁸ the major source of economic and political conflict.

Contrary to the ZAPU approach, ZANU propaganda claimed that class interests cut along racial ideologies.⁵⁹ ZANU analyses scrutinized and criticized social groups which ZAPU considered as allies; churches were agents of "western culture" which acted "in the interests of the white man who owns and controls the church and not in the interests of the black man who forms the vast majority of

⁵⁵ Mwenge #2, the document approved at the ZANU Second Party Congress, printed in Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, eds., *Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents*, (London: Rex Collings, 1979), p. 249.

⁵⁶ Herbert Chitepo, June 19, 1974, as cited in *IBID*, p. 287.

⁵⁷ ZAPU, however, may have adopted this level of analysis a few years later than ZANU.

⁵⁸ Herbert Chitepo, June 19, 1974, p. 288.

⁵⁹ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 3, No. 22, November 23, 1968, p. 2.

its membership."⁶⁰ Black entrepreneurs were also portrayed as perpetrators of the Rhodesian regime.⁶¹ Chiefs who cooperated with Smith were denounced, while even the peasantry -- the backbone of the ZANU movement -- was sometimes criticized as a conservative class.⁶² ZANU leaders recognized the obvious importance of race in the exploitative organization of Rhodesian society.⁶³ Yet class conflict manifested under capitalism was highlighted as the central cause of societal disharmony.

An unambiguous programme for "socialism" complimented this radical class analysis. Whereas ZAPU remained purposely ambiguous about its agenda for a future Zimbabwe, ZANU outlined a comprehensive program of social transformation. For instance, the 1963 ZANU Policy Statement stated that "All land shall belong to the Zimbabwe nation, and the Government shall merely be the trustee on behalf of the people."⁶⁴ As for agricultural production, "co-operative societies shall be established throughout the country."⁶⁵ ZANU's position regarding industrial development was less specific. Private property was to be encouraged as an "economic mainstay", while foreign investment was promoted. Yet, "all major industries that form the basis of the our main economy should be nationalized."⁶⁶ Central planning also was highlighted as a key to successful development of the Zimbabwean economy.

In outlining these ideas, ZANU leaders emphasized that they supported socialism, not communism. As ZANU President, Ndabaningi Sithole, declared at their first Party Congress,

Communism! What hypocrisy! They (the Rhodesian Front) cry Communism to uphold white supremacy! Any African who visits any communist country becomes, in their hysterical

⁶⁰ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 4, No 8, May 9, 1969, pp. 5-6.

⁶¹ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 8, No. 7, July 1974, p. 3; *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 1974, p.13.

⁶² *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 4, No. 9, June 3, 1969, p. 3.

⁶³ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 4, No. 9, June 3, 1969, p. 2.

⁶⁴ *ZANU Policy Statement*, August 21, 1963.

⁶⁵ *IBID.*

⁶⁶ *IBID*

machinations, a Communist. They might as well say that any African who visits England becomes an Englishman...

Let the entire world know that we are not going to be carbon copies of the West or the East. We believe it is impossible to transport what has been perfected [sic] in what set of circumstances and transplant it in an entirely new environment. This is why we are unwilling to be rubber-stamps of either American capitalism or Communism. We shall pursue our own ideology of socialism best suited to Zimbabwe conditions.⁶⁷

This said, ZANU nonetheless distinguished its brand of socialism from reformist conceptions or African versions popular on the continent at the time. By ZANU's Second Party Congress in 1972, the movement was clearly advocating a marxist-leninist conception of socialism.

All the means of production and distribution will be placed in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. The present capitalist economic system which benefits a few settlers in Africa, Britain, and America at the expense of the labouring masses will be abolished... A truly socialist, self-supporting economy will be established and organized on broad principles enunciated by Marxism-Leninism.⁶⁸

The Second Congress programme went on to assert that "there can be no private ownership of land and natural resources because they belong to the people as a whole."⁶⁹ ZANU's task, then, was not simply to transfer political and economic power into black hands, but to replace the capitalist system en toto with a new socialist order.

True to the theory of marxism-leninism, ZANU asserted that such a transformation only could be completed by the creation of a vanguard party. As early as 1972, ZANU was asserting that the "party is the vanguard of the revolution. It is the machinery through which the revolution is planned prosecuted and finally consolidated."⁷⁰ In accordance with this logic, ZANU leaders were

⁶⁷ *IBID.*, p. 81.

⁶⁸ *Mwenge #2* (1972), as cited in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, *Zimbabwe Independence Movements*, p. 257.

⁶⁹ *IBID.*, pp. 258-259.

⁷⁰ *IBID.*, p. 250. See also *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 8, No. 11, November 1974, p.1.

constantly preparing its organization to move from a "national political party to a revolutionary movement."⁷¹ By applying the principles of "Marxism-Leninism" and "scientific socialism" to Zimbabwe's objective conditions, ZANU statements asserted that the colonial capitalist state could be transformed into a state of socialist orientation.

ZANU Strategy and Tactics

Impatient with Nkomo's reformist methods, Sithole and the other founding members of ZANU emphasized the necessity of the need for more confrontational and decisive actions.⁷² "We are our own liberators" became ZANU's official rallying cry, as the "time for fine speeches has gone."⁷³ Especially after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, ZANU became very critical of all negotiations with either Ian Smith or the British. A summary of failed negotiations in 1888, 1959, 1962, and 1971 concluded that "only armed struggle, a violent and complete revolution will liberate Zimbabwe."⁷⁴ Quite different, then, from ZAPU's initial history, ZANU never undertook peaceful not violent acts to precipitate British intervention. ZANU hoped to defeat the Smith regime on their own.⁷⁵

According to Maurice Nyagumbo, ZANU first sent soldiers abroad for training in 1964.⁷⁶ ZANU guerrillas did not engage in military activities, however, until 1966 at the now famous "Battle of Sinoia." By most accounts, the official ZANU rendition excluded,

⁷¹ *IBID*, p. 251.

⁷² See the official ZANU interpretation of the 1963 split in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 1974, p. 1.

⁷³ Sithole at Inaugural Party Congress in Gwelo, May 1964, Quoted in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 1974, p.1.

⁷⁴ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol 8, No. 7, July 1974, p. 2. For denunciations of the Tiger talks in 1968, see *Zimbabwe News*, Vol 3, No. 18, September 28, 1968, p. 5; and *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 3, No. 22, November 23, 1968, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁵ See Sithole, Presidential Address, May 12-13, 1964, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, *Zimbabwe Independence Movements*, p. 80.

⁷⁶ Maurice Nyagumbo, *With the People*, (Salisbury, Graham Publishing House, 1980), p. 189.

this initial foray failed miserably.⁷⁷ ZANU could only claim victory for two reasons. First, Sinoia disproved the myth of white invincibility. By attacking white people, the ZANU guerrillas had demonstrated that armed struggle was a viable option. Second, Sinoia provided valuable lessons for military operations in Zimbabwe.

Most importantly, ZANU leaders learned from Sinoia the necessity of politicization. Mass support for the armed struggle could not be taken for granted, and military activity in and of itself did not mobilize people.

The [military] set-backs were mainly political and organizational. Chief among these is the continued presence in Zimbabwe of thousands of our people who are either completely indifferent to the liberation struggle or are outrightly unaware of what is going on. These people, needless to say, must be taken care [of] NOW if armed struggle is to take deeper root.⁷⁸

Soon after Sinoia, then, ZANU began organizing education campaigns in preparation for future military operations. As Herbert Chitepo recalled,

In those three difficult years [1969-1972] advanced units of ZANU secretly penetrated into Zimbabwe and carried out intensive practical political programmes. By the end of 1972, we had established political cells in many parts of the north-east of Zimbabwe, had recruited many peasants and workers for military training, for assisting in carrying weapons and supplies in reconnaissance and movement of the enemy.⁷⁹

ZANU defined the tasks of politicization in precise terms, emphasizing its importance to the revolutionary struggle to a much greater extent than did ZAPU. First, political cadres acquainted peasants in a given area with the reasons and objectives of the war. Then, guerrillas moved in, living and working with the local rural population. The guerrilla campaigns sought to accomplish four general directives; (1) establish a logistical and communications network for local ZANU military operations, (2)

⁷⁷ See Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁸ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 4, 1969, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Chitepo, June 19, 1974, pp. 289-290.

recruit new cadres for ZANLA, ZANU's army, (3) mobilize peasants into embarking on a "people's war" of mass participation, and (4) prepare the peasantry for post-revolutionary Zimbabwean society.⁸⁰ To what extent this carefully planned and loudly proclaimed campaign succeeded is the subject of considerable debate.⁸¹ Like ZAPU, the "quiet" politicization campaign may have simply been a euphemism for a 'quiet' military campaign. Yet, as the following chapter on ZANU in the 1970s demonstrates, this decision to devote time and resources to politicizing the peasantry had decisive consequences both for prosecuting the war and winning the election.

The second lesson learned from Sinoia concerned the modus vivendi of fighting a guerrilla war. After 1966, and especially after 1969 when ZANLA, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, was reorganized, ZANU guerrillas began to undertake only classical guerrilla operations. Mao's doctrine of guerrilla warfare formed the basis of the new ZANU strategy.⁸² The new formula consisted of (1) small units or cells instead of large, more easily detectable formation, (2) sabotage as the principle form of military action, (3) avoidance of direct combat with Rhodesian security forces, (4) night actions, (5) and, as mentioned above, political campaigning among the peasants. Assassination and terrorist attacks against the white community also were recognized as legitimate and effective tactics, including the foiled attempt to kill Ian Smith.⁸³ As the following chapter describes in detail, the new ZANU strategy did not become operational until 1972. By taking the decision to adopt guerrilla tactics, however, in 1968, ZANU's military offensives in 1972 were well prepared and more enduring than all previous engagements by either ZANU or ZAPU.

⁸⁰ See Mwenge #2, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, *Zimbabwe Independence Movements*, pp. 253-254; J.K. Cilliers, *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London: Croom Helm, 1985)., p. 10.

⁸¹ See Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*, and Kriger, "Struggles for Independence: Rural Conflicts in Zimbabwe's War of Liberation."

⁸² See Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p. 11.

⁸³ On the principle, see *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 4, 1969, p. 5. On the Smith assassination attempt, see Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p. 200.

IV. Bi-Polarity and Revolutionary Zimbabwe

The American Role

In the early years of the Zimbabwean independence struggle, American de facto neutrality did little to affect the ideological development of either liberation movement. Throughout the 1960s, ZAPU and to a lesser extent ZANU, tried to court American favor, suggesting that ideological cleavages with the capitalist superpower were not considered an impediment to relations.⁸⁴ Nkomo often travelled to the United States and both ZAPU and ZANU set up branches throughout North America.⁸⁵ Rather than denounce out of hand American foreign policy, ZANU President Sithole appealed to America's greatness to induce a more favorable U.S. position.

The action of the USA to resume chrome imports from Rhodesia under the present circumstances only goes to show that she cares more for metals than for justice and peace in southern Africa. If this deplorable behaviour was shown by a small and insignificant nation, perhaps it would be easy to overlook it, but not when it is shown by a *great leader nation* ! From the great we expect and even demand better behaviour and a much higher level of rationality than your country is presently showing. . . . But this is not what we expect from a leader superpower like your nation. We expect world leadership and not world bullyism.⁸⁶

However, as the United States moved closer to the Smith regime under the Nixon Administration, it became increasingly obvious that the United States was not prepared to intervene, morally or physically, on behalf of the liberation struggle. If American policy had any effect at all on the situation inside Rhodesia, it served to perpetuate white rule and thereby exacerbate and prolong tensions there. America's ambiguity regarding Rhodesia encouraged white Rhodesians to continue their struggle. American abstentions

⁸⁴ Author's interview with Joseph Msika, ZAPU Vice-President, (Harare, July 14, 1989).

⁸⁵ Author's interview with Trivafi Kangai, Trivafi, ZANU Representative in the US (Harare, July 28, 1988).

⁸⁶ This letter was smuggled out of the Salisbury jail and published in ZANU's *Zimbabwe News*, vol. 6, #10, October 1972. Reprinted in de Braganca and Wallerstein, *The African Liberation Reader* vol. 3, 1982, p. 78-9. Italics added.

on UN resolutions, hostility toward intervention, indifference to sanctions, and ultimately defiance of sanctions, helped to legitimate the Smith regime and sustain the Rhodesian economy. Even though the United States did not trade substantially with Rhodesia and until after 1971, American unwillingness to assist in enforcing the sanctions program encouraged U.S. allies to ignore the embargo, resulting in a booming Rhodesian economy throughout the 1960's and early 1970's.⁸⁷ With the possible exception of South Africa, which eventually abandoned Smith's regime in the search for a peaceful northern border, the United States was Rhodesia's most important international ally, *de facto* or otherwise.

This rapprochement with the Ian SMith regime served to catalyze the radicalization process within both liberation movements. Refusing to deal directly with either ZAPU or ZANU during this period, American policymakers limited their ability to influence the development and direction of these nationalist organizations. In the lexicons of both ZANU and ZAPU, the United States became increasingly identified as the enemy. Rejected by the West, both movements turned to the East.

Regarding strategy, neither ZANU after 1963 nor ZAPU after 1965 had the patience to accept America's recommendation that they limit their actions to peaceful means. After all, neither the United States nor Great Britain had demonstrated any real interest in solving the Rhodesian crisis in the immediate future. So to carry out an armed struggle, both ZANU and ZAPU turned to the communist countries for supplies and became increasingly disinterested in trying to court the United States or England. Though championing a foreign policy which espoused dialogue and encouraged negotiation, American foreign policymakers failed to "engage constructively" with the second interlocutor, the black nationalists. The American strategy thus resulted in a dialogue between the United States and Ian Smith's regime, rather than promoting discussion between the major parties involved in the struggle.

⁸⁷ See Ray Vicker, "Rhodesia: Booming Despite Sanctions", *The Wall Street Journal*, September 11, 1969.

The Soviet Role

Soviet policy capitalized on American inaction. In classic Cold War form, the Soviet Union supported the violent overthrow of a regime propped up and underwritten indirectly by the United States. The twist to this embroglio, however, was a lack of ideological content in the American position. American decision-makers could at least attempt to justify defenses of the "Free World" in Korea or Vietnam, but no country -- not even the United States -- recognized Rhodesia as part of the "Free World." The absence of moral cohesion in America's, *de facto* association with the Smith regime accentuated the "correct" policy followed by the Soviet Union. The superpowers once again were supporting opposite warring factions, the U.S. behind the existing power and the U.S.S.R. behind the revolutionary power.

For the most part, Soviet policy maintained a low level of involvement commensurate to American actions. Similar to their American counterparts, Soviet decision-makers articulated grand policy objectives and then pursued minimalist policies. They lobbied for intervention and revolutionary war, but promised only support for action, not action itself. They provided moderate amounts of material assistance to ZAPU, but refrained from supplying sophisticated weapons, military advisors, or proxy troops.

In the early years of the struggle, the affect of this assistance on ZAPU ideological development was minimal. Traces of the Soviet discourse began to appear in ZAPU publications in the late 1960s, but the liberation movement did not accept the whole package of Soviet-style socialist orientation as did other liberation movements at the time. ZAPU retained its essentially nationalist character with a socialist bent. In the bipolar international system, however, the liberation movement had little maneuverability. When forced into one camp or the other, ZAPU always lined up with the Soviet Union.

The role of Soviet assistance in ZAPU's strategic development, however, was more pronounced. First, however obvious, Soviet weapons and supplies gave ZAPU the means by which to conduct an armed struggle. Without Soviet arms, arms supplied at no cost to the liberation movement, ZAPU could not have initiated the war. More specifically, the first ZAPU military actions inside Rhodesia

were very characteristic of the Soviet modus vivendi of warfare: big units, alliance with the ANC army, positional warfare, direct confrontation with the enemy. It was as if the Soviet instructors had simply taken their World War II training manuals and changed the title to "War in Southern Africa." As the Wankie campaign demonstrated quite forcefully, the Zambezi was very different from the Russian steppe, and the ZAPU army did not resemble the Red Army in numbers or firepower. This direct export of Soviet military techniques to the African theater was very detrimental to ZAPU's military development. Only after a six year reprieve would the liberation movement return to the battlefield.

The Soviet Union did not have contacts with ZANU in the 1960s. As a "splinter", minority organization, ZANU had no opportunity to seek favor from the leader of the socialist world. ZANU, however, did find an ally in the Chinese. Soon after the founding of ZANU, Sithole travelled to Beijing where his opposition to a Soviet-backed movement won him instant recognition.⁸⁸ As early as 1964, the first group of ZANU guerrillas went to China to receive training.⁸⁹ By the end of the decade, Chinese instructors were training ZANU cadres in camps in Tanzania.

In these earlier years of ZANU existence, these contacts had a pronounced yet not overwhelming influence on ZANU ideology and military strategy. ZANU publications did not immediately adopt marxism-leninism-maoism rhetoric after Sithole's first trip to China. Rather, the movement towards the Chinese world view was gradual and constant, suggesting that its appearance was not merely to appease their sponsor, but rather a genuine adaptation of Chinese ideological principles.⁹⁰ The development of Chinese guerrilla techniques was more distinct and pronounced. The ZANU guerrillas who went into Sinoia had little training or preparation

⁸⁸ Author's interview with James Chikerema, ZAPU Vice-President at the time, (Harare, July 15, 1989). Chikerema and Sithole were in Beijing at the same time in 1964. According to him, ZANU eventually won the bid for Chinese support because ZAPU refused to break its ties with Moscow.

⁸⁹ This first group of eleven, including Josiah Tongogaro, then formed the nucleus of ZANLA. (Author's interview with Josiah Tungamirai, (Harare, July 21, 1989).

⁹⁰ This relationship is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven.

as their quick defeat demonstrated. ZANU's reorganization between 1969 and 1972, however, already incorporated many aspects of the Chinese philosophy of guerrilla war. As Chapter Seven discusses in greater detail, these changes in military strategy had profound positive consequences for ZANU's development.

I. Soviet Foreign Policy towards Angola

Soviet policy regarding the Angolan civil war can only be understood within the context of Soviet evaluations of the world's "correlation of forces" in the 1970s. Derived from Marx's materialist conception of history, the Soviet philosophy of correlation of forces posited that history had a unilinear trajectory towards socialism. As Brezhnev predicted,

The achievements of the October Revolution and the potentialities of socialism are today (1979) the surest guarantee of mankind's future progress...We are advancing towards the epoch when socialism, in some specific, historically determined form or another, will be the prevailing social system on earth, bringing with it peace, freedom,¹ equality, and well-being to the whole of working mankind.¹

From the Soviet perspective, this correlation of forces turned decisively in socialism's favor in the 1970s.² First, nuclear parity had forced the United States to acquiesce to detente with the Soviet Union, and thereby accept the permanence of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist systems.³ Second, this perceived shift in the correlation of forces not only guaranteed the immutability of the existing socialist system, but also provided a catalyst for socialism's development in other parts of the world. As Brezhnev concluded, "We can proudly say that at no time in human history has a political movement and ideological trend played such a tremendous transformative role as the international communist and working class movement."⁴ The alleged surging power of the socialist system deterred capitalist aggression and stimulated the outbreak of anti-imperialist

¹ Quoted in Boris Ponomarev, *Lenin and the World Revolutionary Process*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p. 468.

² See "Foreign Policy Programme of the 24th CPSU Congress and Radical Shifts in International Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 12, December 1975, pp. 20-68.

³ Georgi Shakhnazarov, "The Victory --the World Balance of Strength --Peaceful Coexistence," *New Times*, No. 19 (May 1975), p.1.

⁴ Leonid Brezhnev. *World Marxist Review*, No. 8, 1969, p.4.

revolutions throughout the Third World in the late 1960s and 1970s.⁵ As one Soviet analyst concluded, it "is quite clear that without the world socialist system the rapid collapse of colonialism would have been impossible."⁶ Contrary to the American notion of detente, then, Soviet leaders believed that detente provided a favorable international environment for class struggle and national liberation victories in the Third World.⁷

The policy of relaxation of tension pursued in the context of a change in alinement [sic] of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism created a general, more favorable background for fundamental changes in Portugal and in its overseas possessions.⁸

To further stimulate these new correlation of forces, Soviet doctrine declared that the defender of international socialism would assist the revolutionary movements seeking to revise the international order in the periphery.⁹ As Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, pledged,

Faithful to its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union

⁵ Boris Ponomarev, "The World Situation and the Revolutionary Process," *World Marxist Review*, No. 6, 1974. At the time, Ponomarev was head of the International Department of the CPSU.

⁶ E. Zhukov, "The Rise of the National Liberation Movement after the Second World War," *International Affairs*, No. 7, July 1975, pp. 15-16. See also Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's assessment of Indochina in, "Peace Programme in Action," *International Affairs*, No. 12, December 1975, p. 8.

⁷ See Genrikh Trofimenko, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," *International Affairs*, No. 10, October 1975, p. 38; and Coit Blacker, "The Kremlin and Detente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes and Expectations," in Alexander George, *Managing the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*, pp. 119-138.

⁸ V. Kudryavtsev, "Angola's Heavy Burden," *Izvestiya*, May 22, 1975, p. 2, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, June 5, 1975, p. H2. See also the message from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Government of the USSR to the governments of Africa on the occasion of African Independence Day, May 25, 1975, in *Minnisterstvo Inostrannikh Del, SSSR, SSSR i Strani Afriki, 1975-1976*, chast 2, (Moskva: Polizdat, 1985), pp. 57-58.

⁹ Author's interview with Karen Brutents, First Deputy, International Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU, (Moscow, March 28, 1991).

invariably takes the side of the peoples fighting for independence and social progress, against colonialism and neocolonialism, racism, and apartheid....In recent years our moral and material support has contributed essentially to the gaining of freedom by the peoples of Bangladesh, Guinea Bissau, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe Islands.¹⁰

In August 1975, the Red Army even declared its readiness to repeat its performance in Vietnam and render assistance to "peoples of the countries or the socialist community" who are "building and defending the gains of socialism" as this assistance has been "and remains to this day, the supreme obligation of the Soviet people and of their armed forces."¹¹ Soviet assistance to these national liberation movements would continue until the entire capitalist system collapsed.¹²

Finally, in accordance with this new reading on the "correlation of forces," Soviet theory and attitudes regarding the national liberation process became increasingly more focused during the 1970s.¹³ The failure of the "bourgeois nationalists" to develop socialism peacefully along the "non-capitalist path" in the 1960s precipitated a reformulation of the methods and agents of the national liberation struggle in the Third World. Instead of relying on single, charismatic leaders, Soviet theoreticians now placed greater emphasis on the need for a revolutionary party which

¹⁰ Andrei Gromyko, "Peace Programme in Action," *International Affairs*, No. 12, December 1975, p. 7.

¹¹ *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 17, (August 20) 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, September 18, 1975, p. A6.

¹² *Radio Moscow*, December 13, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, December 15, 1975, pp. H1-H2.

¹³ This trend has been observed and examined by several Western scholars. See most notably, Francis Fukuyama, "Soviet Strategy in the Third World", in Fukuyama and Korbonski, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World*; Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, R-3337-USDP, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, February 1986), Elizabeth Valkenier, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Assessments", *World Politics*, vol. XXXVIII, #3, April 1986, David Albright, "Vanguard Parties in the Third World and Soviet Foreign Policy" in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubins, eds., *The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World*, (New York: Praeger, 1983), and Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World*, (Washington: Brookings, 1986).

could institutionalize change. In order to succeed, these parties not only had to assume a vanguard role in the revolutionary process, but also adopt the tenets of marxism-leninism early on in the struggle. Such a "socialist orientation"¹⁴ --by Soviet definition an anti-Western and pro-Soviet orientation -- would thereby strengthen the ties between the national liberation movement and the international socialist system.¹⁵ This new brand of revolutionaries -- armed with the marxist-leninist theory of "scientific socialism", organized within a vanguard party structured along the lines of "democratic centralism", and closely allied to the Soviet Union -- was championed as the new agents of social transformation in the developing countries.

Soviet Perspective and Policies towards Angola

From this reading of the correlation of forces, Soviet leaders and publications in the 1970s optimistically predicted the spread of socialism in Africa, especially after the Portuguese coup in April 1974. Regarding Angola, Soviet commentators quickly reidentified the MPLA as the agent of revolutionary change there.¹⁶ Although the Soviet Union had severed all assistance to the liberation movement in 1973 as a response to internal divisions within the MPLA, Soviet press reports in 1974 once again lauded the organization as the only "legitimate" representative of the Angolan people.¹⁷ The MPLA was considered 'legitimate' for two reasons. First, Soviet officials considered the MPLA to be a socialist-

¹⁴ "Socialist orientation" distinguishes these types of revolutionaries from national democratic revolutionaries. Coined by Gleb Starushenko in 1967, the term was first used officially by Brezhnev in 1968 at the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. (Author's interview with Gleb Starushenko, Moscow, November 16, 1990).

¹⁵ See the documents of the XXIV Party Congress in *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 24, 1971, p. 7.

¹⁶ This optimism was also tied to Soviet optimism about the prospects for communist victory in Portugal. See the "CPSU Message to Portuguese Communist Party and Sympathizers," *TASS* in Russian,, May 15, 1974, in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, No. SU/4602/A1/1, part 1, May 17, 1974.

¹⁷ Oleg Ignatyev, "Angola v Predverii Peremen," *Novoe Vremya*, No. 46 (November 28, 1974), pp. 15-16.

oriented movement, armed with a "program of radical socio-economic transformations."¹⁸ As *Pravda* declared, "This movement has a well defined and clear cut program: to free the Angolan people from the bondage of foreign capital and to set up a democracy of the people and for the people, safeguarding social progress."¹⁹ Second, Soviet sources asserted that the MPLA contained the seeds of a marxist-leninist vanguard party, and shared many characteristics with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.²⁰ Soviet officials also reported that MPLA agreed with the Soviet principle that the "leading role in the implementation of the socioeconomic reforms must belong to the working class."²¹ Given this confluence of interests and ideas, Soviet leaders considered the MPLA to be the most promising agent for building socialism in Angola.

Soviet Attitudes Towards Unity and Negotiations

Despite favoring the MPLA, Soviet officials initially supported the Alvor Accord, the attempt by the new Portuguese government to negotiate a peaceful and orderly transfer of power to a coalition government of all three liberation movements. The Soviet government welcomed the guidelines for the transitional government agreed to at Alvor as an "important step along the path to decolonization" in Angola.²² Perhaps most indicative of the

¹⁸ A. Dzasakhov, "Angola's Hopes," *Pravda*, April 2, 1975, p.5, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, April 15, 1975, pp. H1-2. At the time, Dzasakhov was the head of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the principle Soviet agency for dealing with liberation movements.

¹⁹ *Pravda*, November 8, 1975, p. 5, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, November, 11, 1975, p. H3.

²⁰ V. Vydrin, "Angola Greet its Heroes," *New Times*, No. 10 (March 1975), p. 8; Sergei Kulik, "Angola: Freedom After Five Centuries of Slavery," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, November 12, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, November 17, 1975, p. H4.

²¹ Dzasakhov, "Angola's Hopes," pp. H1-2.

²² *Radio Moscow*, January 24, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, January 27, 1975, p. H1. For the official communique, see A. Kosygin, "Telegramma Predsedatelya Sovieta Ministrov SSSR Prezidentskoi kollegii perekhodnoro pravitel'stva Angoli po sluchayu obrazovaniya perekhodnoro pravitel'stva Angoli," February 21, 1975, in *Ministerstvo Inostrannix Del, SSSR, SSSR*

Soviet support for the transitional regime, Soviet publications suspended all criticism of both the FNLA and UNITA for the first three months of 1975. Even after fighting had erupted between the MPLA and the FNLA in the February and March 1975, the official Soviet position still supported the idea of a negotiated settlement when discussed for the last time in Nakura, Kenya in June 1975.²³

By the time of Nakura, however, Soviet commentaries already contained hints of the ultimate Soviet position on Angola. While praising attempts at unity, Soviet assessments also recognized the MPLA as "the leading progressive political organization of the Angolan people...."²⁴ While not denouncing the other two movements, the Soviet press portrayed Agostinho Neto as the leading political figure in Angola, and the MPLA as the movement with "the widest support of the Angolan people."²⁵

When fighting between the MPLA and FNLA recommenced in June 1975, Soviet officials once again began to criticize the FNLA and UNITA.²⁶ For the first time since the crisis began, TASS correspondent Sergei Kulik cited not only imperialism's hand but also ideological differences between the liberation movements as a major source of conflict.²⁷ The following month, *Radio Moscow* warned that Angolans must understand their civil strife as class

i Strani Afriki, 1975-1976, chast 2, (Moskva: Polizdat, 1985), p. 8.

²³ *Radio Moscow*, June 27, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, June 30, 1975, p. H3.

²⁴ Victor Sidenko, "The Nakuru Agreement," *New Times*, No. 16 (June 1975), p. 16.

²⁵ *Pravda*, May 30, 1975, p. 5, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, June 4, 1975, p. H1.

²⁶ Two other studies of Soviet policy in Angola discovered a similar change in Soviet press reports beginning in June 1975. See Jiri Valenta "Soviet Decision-Making on Angola," in David Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). p. 102; and Bruce Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-1980*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 153.

²⁷ Sergei Kulik, TASS, June 12, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, June 12, 1975, p. H1.

warfare.²⁸ Thereafter, the FNLA and UNITA were identified as "the voice of the rightwing trends in the country's political life," while the FNLA was proclaimed the nefarious instigator of the civil war.²⁹ As the conflict worsened, Roberto was denounced as a protege of the imperialists, who "torpedoed the work of the interim government in Angola" and offered South Africa a share of Angola's sovereignty in return for military assistance.³⁰ In September 1975, for the first time since the beginning of the civil war, UNITA also was denounced by Soviet officials as a South African marionette, and a former intimate collaborator with the Portuguese intelligence.³¹ Moreover, the Soviet press asserted that UNITA had invited South Africa into the war to carry out military missions which UNITA could not execute.³² While Soviet reports still affirmed the MPLA's desire for negotiations, the aggression of these reactionary forces provided a compelling rationale for greater Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war.

Soviet Military Involvement in the Angolan War

The record of Soviet military assistance to the MPLA during the time of transition suggests that Soviet decisionmakers saw a negotiated and peaceful transition to independence as only one possible outcome for Angola after the Portuguese coup. If a military scenario were to evolve, the Soviet leadership took precautionary steps to insure a Soviet role in the drama.

Ironically, only a year before the coup in Portugal, Moscow had discontinued all military assistance to the MPLA pending the

²⁸ *Radio Moscow*, to Africa, July 16, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, July 22, 1975, p. H1.

²⁹ A. Agaryshev, "Angola: Days of Concern and Alarm," *Pravda*, June 10, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, June 17, 1975, p. H2; and Yu. Gavrilov and V. Vinogradov, "Angola's Difficult Times," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, September 7, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, September 12, 1975, p. H1.

³⁰ B. Pilyatsin, "A Time of Alarm and Expectation," *Izvestiya*, July 19, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, July 24, 1975, p. H3.

³¹ "Uneasy Situation," *Izvestiya*, September 27, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, October 1, 1975, p. H1.

³² *Izvestiya*, November 27, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, December 1, 1975, p. H2.

settling of differences between the movements three warring factions -- the Revolt Active, the Eastern Revolt, and the Neto loyalists.³³ The divisions within the MPLA precipitated serious doubts within Moscow regarding the military effectiveness of their Angolan ally.³⁴ Several Western studies conclude that Moscow foreign policymakers were so disgruntled with Neto, that they actually began to supply one of the "splinter" groups, Daniel Chipenda's Eastern Revolt, in 1972 before the split between Chipenda and Neto became public.³⁵ Moscow's recognition of the MPLA's weakness may help explain why the Soviet Union so vehemently advocated a negotiated settlement in the early months of 1975.³⁶

Rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the MPLA began when Agostinho Neto visited Moscow in January 1973, but Soviet decisionmakers did not send military supplies again until August 1974.³⁷ Moscow still was waiting to see which faction would emerge to lead the MPLA.³⁸ MPLA congresses in Lusaka and again in

³³ Author's interview with Paulo Jorge, MPLA Secretary for Foreign Affairs at the time, (Luanda, August 22, 1989); Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas, *Angola*, p. 44; and Gerald Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and Western Anxieties", *Foreign Policy*, no. 31, summer 1978, p. 23.

³⁴ See Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of a Failure", p. 66; Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 221; and author's interviews with Angolan specialists at the Institute of Africa, (Moscow, November-December, 1990).

³⁵ See Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (July 1976), p. 749; Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p. 156; and John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, no. 3, (April 1976), pp. 111-112; Charles Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War", *Orbis*, vol. 20, no. 3, Fall 1976, p. 688.)

³⁶ According to Lucio Lara, second only to Neto in the MPLA hierarchy at the time, the only MPLA ally who believed in the MPLA at this time was Yugoslavia. Lara severely criticized the Soviet Union for failing to remain a faithful ally during these tumultuous times. (Author's interview with Lucio Lara, Luanda, August 27, 1989).

³⁷ Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p.162. No consensus, however, has ever been reached on this date.

³⁸ Author's interview with Alexander Krasil'nikov, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences (Moscow, February 26, 1991). At the time,

Brazzaville in 1974 helped to convince the Soviet observers that Neto's faction would retain the MPLA leadership. To help his own cause in Lisbon, Portuguese Communist Party leader, Alvaro Cunhal also advised the Soviets to start aiding the MPLA again.³⁹ Soviet analysts supported Cunhal's dual-front strategy.⁴⁰

Initial Soviet assistance, however, was not substantial.⁴¹ Though exact figures have never been released, Soviet aid in 1974 did not provide the MPLA with the means to win a civil war.⁴² More probably, this assistance was designed to protect the MPLA from quick defeat.⁴³ Even Kissinger concurred when he explained that Soviet aid at this point was "merely part of an effort to strengthen that group so it could complete militarily with the much stronger FNLA."⁴⁴ Having just emerged from devastating internal divisions, the MPLA had never been weaker than in 1974.

The Escalation of Soviet Involvement

In February 1975, a high level Soviet delegation headed by Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee Chairman, Alexander Dzasakhov,

Krasil'nikov worked with the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee regarding relations with national liberation movements in southern Africa.

³⁹ Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War," p. 688.

⁴⁰ See Yuri Gavrilov, "An Important Victory in the Struggle against Colonialism," *International Affairs*, (Moscow), No. 10 (October) 1974, p. 98.

⁴¹ Klinghoffer estimates that Soviet assistance at this time was less than even Chinese aid to the FNLA and UNITA during the same period. See Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War*, p. 22.

⁴² In addition to arms, the MPLA sent 250 cadres to train in the Soviet Union in December 1974. See Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p. 156; Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 253; and "Angola After Independence: Struggle for Supremacy," *Conflict Studies*, No. 64 (November 1975), p. 13.

⁴³ See Valenta "Soviet Decision-Making on Angola," p. 98.

⁴⁴ Henry Kissinger, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Angola*, Hearings, 94th Congress, second session, January 29, February 3, 4, 6, 1976. p. 52.

visited Luanda.⁴⁵ At this meeting the Soviet and MPLA delegations apparently discussed "material aid" and the "training of cadres for Angola in African, socialist and other countries."⁴⁶ Soon thereafter, the first substantial shipments of Soviet weapons earmarked for the MPLA arrived in Angola. In March, Soviet military assistance to the MPLA had reached a new qualitative level.⁴⁷ Initially, the two principal conduits for these weapons were Point Noire, Congo and Dar es Salaam.⁴⁸ By the summer, however, several reports claimed that the MPLA was receiving Soviet weapons directly.⁴⁹

In the spring, Cuban military advisors accompanied Soviet shipments of weapons to Angola. Fearing defeat in a civil war on a conventional scale, Agostinho Neto requested the Cuban advisors to retrain his guerrillas to fight a conventional war.⁵⁰ It appears that the first group of Cuban advisors, approximately 230 soldiers, arrived as early as May or June of 1975.⁵¹ A much larger contingent arrived in August 1975 after Neto had made another request for greater assistance on July 16, 1975. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, a confidant of Fidel Castro's, explained the nature of

⁴⁵ *Radio Moscow*, February 5, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, February 11, 1975, p. H2.

⁴⁶ Interview with Dzasakhov in *O'Seculo* (Lisbon), April 17, 1975, as cited by Jiri Valenta "Soviet Decision-Making on Angola," p. 100.

⁴⁷ Leslie Gelb, "U.S., Soviet, China Reported Aiding Portugal, Angola," *New York Times*, September 25, 1975; and Colin Legum, "The Role of the Big Powers," p. 19.

⁴⁸ In May, a Yugoslav ship entered Angola's port was turned away when the local authorities discovered its cargo consisted of Soviet weapons to be delivered to the MPLA. See "Toll in Angola Is Put at 250 as Clashes Go On," *New York Times*, May 3, 1975.

⁴⁹ The earliest reports of Soviet ships landing in Luanda was June, but dockings were never confirmed. See Thomas Johnson, "Fear and Hope Pervade Angola in Transition to Independence" *New York Times*, June 22, 1975.

⁵⁰ Author's interview with Lucio Lara, (Luanda, August 27, 1989.)

⁵¹ *New York Times*, January 12, 1976; and Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 170.

their mission.

[In response to Neto's request], they (the Cubans) decided to send at once (August 1975) a contingent of 480 specialists, who in the space of six months would set up four training centres and organize sixteen infantry battalions and twenty-five mortar⁵² batteries and anti-aircraft machine-gun emplacements.

Though Cuban artillerymen allegedly participated in military operations as early as May 1975, these skirmishes were deviations from the original assignment.⁵³ Because the MPLA guerrillas were not equipped to engage the more conventional units of the FNLA/Zairian armies, the primary Cuban mission at that time was retraining, not fighting.⁵⁴

Events, however, outpaced the MPLA's strategy for retooling (mentally and physically) their fighting forces. The Cuban advisors could not train the MPLA guerrillas fast enough to withstand the conventional FNLA and Zairian conventional assault from the north, let alone the advances of South African military columns which crossed into Angola on October 23, 1975.⁵⁵ Faced with impending defeat, Neto requested even further Cuban assistance. Castro appears to have responded in two stages. First, several hundred Cuban troops left from Havana for Luanda by ship on September 7, 1975, putting in at Angolan ports the first week in October.⁵⁶ Given the logistics of mobilizing for war,

⁵² Gabriel Garcia Marquez, "Operation Carlota," *New Left Review*, Nos. 101-102, February-April 1977, p. 124. These advisors set up training camps in Delatando, Benguela, Saurimo, and Cabinda.

⁵³ Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 126.

⁵⁴ Even CIA assessments at the time concluded that these first installations of Cuban military personnel did not alter the military balance inside Angola. See Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 170.

⁵⁵ Moscow made this same assessment. Author's interview with Rostislav Ulyanovsky, First Deputy Secretary, International Department, Central Committee of the CPSU, (Moscow, March 7, 1991).

⁵⁶ Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of a Failure," p. 90, and Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 57 (Fall 1978), p. 96; Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 125. Nathaniel Davis also cited this arrival date, though he asserts

Castro's decision to send conventional troops to Angola must have been made sometime in August.⁵⁷ Whether the decision was in August, July or September, however, is inconsequential. What is significant about this timetable is that the Cuban decision to intervene was taken after the FNLA began to push for a military victory, but well before the South Africans intervened. Subsequent rationales for the intervention which claim that Cuba was reacting to South African intervention are misleading and inaccurate.

Castro, however, did respond to the South African invasion with a second dispatch of soldiers when it became apparent that the MPLA might lose Luanda before independence.⁵⁸ Given the urgency of the situation, an air bridge was organized to replace the ships used in September. According to Marquez, the first contingent, 82 combat soldiers, arrived in Luanda by air on November 8th.⁵⁹ Though other accounts cite November 5 as the date of arrival, this new group nonetheless arrived after the South African invasion.⁶⁰

This latest stage in the operation was formidable. In the week from November 5th to the 11th, between two and three thousand

that the ships put in at Point Noire, not an Angolan port. See Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Fall 1978), p. 121. Ed Fugit claims that the Vietnam Heroica landed a month earlier. (Author's interview, Harare, August 2, 1989). Paulo Jorge, however, claims that this first Cuban combat troops arrived during the week of November. (Author's interview with Paulo Jorge, MPLA Secretary for Foreign Affairs at the time, (Luanda, August 22, 1989).

⁵⁷ See Legum, "The Role of the Big Powers," p. 21; Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," p. 96.

⁵⁸ Thus, Cuban leaders and sympathizers correctly assert that they were responding to a South African invasion. Emphasis on this stage of the Cuban assistance program, however, obscures the earlier involvement. For one such account, see Barbara Walters, "An Interview with Fidel Castro", *Foreign Policy*, No. 28, Fall 1977, p. 39.

⁵⁹ Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 128-129.

⁶⁰ Paulo Jorge, the future Foreign Minister of Angola and liaison with the Cubans, Sr. Peralta, Cuba's representative to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization conference in Luanda, and Fidel Castro all claim that the first Cuban troops arrived in Angola on November 5, 1975. (Author's interview with Paulo Jorge, Luanda, August 1988; Legum, "The Role of the Big Powers," p. 20; and Walters, "An Interview with Fidel Castro", p. 39, respectively.

Cuban troops poured into Angola.⁶¹ From November 7 to December 9, from 70 to 90 flights crossed the Luanda--Havana air bridge.⁶² These transport planes were supplemented by additional ships carrying an artillery regiment and mechanized battalion which left Havana on November 7 and arrived in Luanda three weeks later.⁶³ U.S. government officials estimated that Cuban troop strength had reach 5,000 by mid-December and 12,000 by February 1976.⁶⁴

The Socialist Intervention: Whose Decision?

Much speculation has surrounded the question of whether Cuba acted independently or on behalf of the Soviet Union in Angola? The official Cuban account emphasizes Cuban autonomy.

Cuba alone bears the responsibility for taking that decision. The USSR ...never requested that a single Cuban be sent to that country. The USSR is extraordinarily respectful and careful in its relations with Cuba. A decision of that nature could only be made by our own party.⁶⁵

Castro later affirmed that the USSR "never requested" Cuba to intervene; rather "Cuba's decision was made absolutely under its own responsibility."⁶⁶ In his detailed account of the operation,

⁶¹ Bender, "Kissinger in Angola" p. 93; Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 231; and "Cuba Is Said to Have Sent 3,000 To Aid Soviet-Backed Angolans," *New York Times*, November 21, 1975.

⁶² Porter, in *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, claims that 70 flights were made in this time period. (p. 166) Marquez maintains that 101 flights were made throughout the war. Petersen and Durch, "Angola Crisis Deployments," estimate the number to be 90. (p. 145)

⁶³ Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p. 166; Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 129.

⁶⁴ See David Binder, "Angola Reported Getting \$50 Million in U.S. Arms," *New York Times*, December 12, 1975; and Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975," p. 122.

⁶⁵ *Granma Weekly Review*, May 2, 1976, as cited in Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p. 169. For a history of Cuba's independent foreign policy, see Jorge Dominguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

⁶⁶ Speech by Fidel Castro, "Angola African Giron," Havana, April 19, 1976, in *Granma Weekly*, (Havana) May 2, 1976, as cited in Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of a Failure," p. 95.

Marquez asserts that Castro did not even notify Moscow of the Cuban expeditionary force until after the decision had been made.⁶⁷ Former intelligence officials from both the Soviet Union and the United States have corroborated that the idea to intervene originated in Havana, not Moscow.⁶⁸

That Castro responded to Neto's request independently, however, does not imply that the Cuban intervention was conducted without Soviet knowledge or support.⁶⁹ On the contrary, it was inconceivable and ultimately unfeasible for Castro to send his troops to Angola without Soviet acquiescence. Given Cuba's economic dependence of the Soviet Union and precarious security situation vis-a-vis the United States, Castro must have consulted the Kremlin before approving the Cuban expeditionary force.⁷⁰ Moreover, once the operation began the Cuban force needed weapons and transport vehicles from Moscow to complete the mission.⁷¹ The first decision to intervene, then, may have been made by Castro without Soviet nudging, but actualizing the decision required Soviet approval and collusion.

Moscow did just that. The Soviet decision to go all out in

⁶⁷ Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 128.

⁶⁸ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 172; and Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow*, (New York: Alfred Knopf) 1985, p. 272. Shevchenko at the time was a senior Soviet diplomat at the United Nations.

⁶⁹ Author's interview with Ulyanovsky (March 7, 1991).

⁷⁰ Had Soviet decisionmakers wanted to veto the plan, they had ample time and opportunity to do. As Marquez confirms, preparation for war in Cuba began at least a month before Cuban soldiers were sent to Angola. Moreover, the October shipment of troops took almost a full month to arrive. Finally, it appears that Moscow and Havana were in close contact during these months. Cuban Deputy Premier Rodriguez was in Moscow for a week in mid-September, while Cuban Vice-Minister Bravo visited in October. Bravo had met with Neto to receive the initial request for Cuban military assistance.

⁷¹ See Kempton, *Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa*, p. 42.) In addition to weapons and transport, Moscow may have underwritten Cuba's expenses in the war. On February 4, 1975 the Soviet Union and Cuba signed a trade exchange protocol which provided for 2 billion rubles worth of trade for that year. See *TASS*, February 4, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, February 6, 1975, p. H1, and *Newsweek*, December 25, 1975, p. 14.

support of an MPLA military victory must have been taken in the early fall of 1975, approximately the same time that Castro sent his first batch of combat troops.⁷² While Soviet press reports still denied any Soviet involvement in Angola as late as August 1975,⁷³ other sources reveal an escalation of Soviet weapons shipments in October which then increased manifold in November.⁷⁴

Soviet decision-makers wanted to render "all around assistance" to the MPLA after independence, but the spectre of an MPLA defeat in October triggered an earlier response.⁷⁵ The Soviet rationale for intervening earlier was helped considerably by South Africa's invasion in September, after which Moscow redefined the conflict not as "a civil war but a full scale intervention against the Angola people."⁷⁶

After recognition of the new Angolan state,⁷⁷ Soviet military

⁷² The Soviet theory of national liberation always had posited that the guerrilla war eventually leads to a conventional struggle. In this struggle, however, the MPLA was incapable of attaining a conventional potential quick enough to win the war. The use of Cuban conventional troops was a logical substitute.

⁷³ See B. Fomichev, "With an Alien Voice," *Izvestiya*, August 28, 1975, p. 3, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, September 2, 1975, p. H2. After victory, however, Soviet officials were quick to underscore their continuous assistance to the MPLA. See "Telegramma Predsedatelya Preidiyuma Verkhonoro Sovieta SSSR Presidenty Narodnoi Respublika Angola Agostinho Neto po sluchayu provozglasheniya nezavisimosti Angoli," November 12, 1976, in *SSSR i Strani Afriki*, chast 2, p. 90.

⁷⁴ Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p.163.

⁷⁵ According to Oleg Ignatyev, Soviet and MPLA officials contemplated a declaration of independence on November 5th so as to skirt the issue of international legality before the MPLA was defeated. The South African invasion, however, made them less worried about international backlash. See Ignatyev, *Secret Weapon in Angola*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 166. Ignatiev was a Soviet journalist in Angola at the time.

⁷⁶ Ignatyev, *Pravda*, October 30, 1975.

⁷⁷ Soviet representatives were present for the official independence ceremonies at midnight November 10, but formal recognition did not occur until November 17, 1975. Why Moscow delayed recognition for one week is unknown, though one has to speculate that the delay may have reflected Moscow's pessimism of MPLA victory at the time. See "Soobshenie ob ustanovlenii diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii mezhdru SSSR i Narodnoi Respublikoi

assistance increased dramatically.⁷⁸ During this period, the usual AK-47s, bazookas, and 25-mm recoilless rifles, were supplemented by T-34 and T-54 tanks, PT-76 amphibious tanks, 122mm "katyusha" rockets, helicopters, various heavy artillery pieces, SAM-7 missiles, armoured personnel carriers, BM-21 rocket launchers, and perhaps even MIG-17 fighters.⁷⁹ Whereas total Soviet aid until mid-November had been estimated at \$80 million, the total for the period between mid-November and mid-January 1976 grew to over \$90 million.⁸⁰ In addition to weapons and logistical support for the Cubans, the Soviet navy deployed a tank-landing ship, a guided-missile destroyer, and a tanker off the Angolan coast to protect Soviet and Cuban merchant vessels and deter any Western attacks from the sea.⁸¹ Finally, Soviet military advisors helped to organize MPLA military strategy and train MPLA troops. While reports about Soviet military advisors surfaced as early as August

Angola," November 17, 1975, in *SSSR i Strani Afriki*, chast 2, p. 103. pp. 91-92.

⁷⁸ See "Cuba Is Said to Have Sent 3,000 To Aid Soviet-Backed Angolans," *New York Times*, November 21, 1975; Michael Kaufman, "Angola Group Says Soviet-Backed Rivals Have Superior Arms," *New York Times*, November 24, 1975; and Kaufman, "Luanda's Armies Gain," *New York Times*, December 8, 1975.

⁷⁹ An inventory of these weapons is compiled in Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p.160. Though some sources report otherwise (*Africa Confidential* "The Return of the Great Powers," Vol. 16, No. 23, November 21, 1975, p. 4), the MIGs probably did not arrive into Angola until 1976. Several reports have confirmed that MIG 17s and MIG 21s arrived in the Congo in the fall of 1975, complete with Cuban and Algerian pilots, and Soviet instructors, and MPLA aviation students. (Michael Kaufman, "Angola Group Says Soviet-Backed Rivals Have Superior Arms," *New York Times*, November 24, 1975; and "Cuba Is Said to Have Sent 3,000 To Aid Soviet-Backed Angolans," *New York Times*, November 21, 1975; Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 135.) The first report of a MIG in operation, however, did not occur until March 13, 1976, when an F-27 plane unloading supplies to a UNITA base was shot at while on the ground at Cago Coutinho.

⁸⁰ *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Diplomacy?*, p. 87.

⁸¹ See Charles Petersen and William Durch, "Angolan Crisis Deployments (November 1975 to February 1976)", in *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, pp. 144-152; and *Radio Moscow*, October 27, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, October 29, 1975, p. H2.

1975, it appears that Soviet advisors did not arrive in Angola until after independence was declared.⁸² Estimates of their number range from 170 to 400.⁸³

The massive infusion of Cuban troops and Soviet weapons proved decisive in repelling the FNLA/Zairian assault from the north and the UNITA/South African strike from the south. Only two days after arriving (November 7), Cuban troops were involved in fighting as far away as Benguela.⁸⁴ In operating the 122mm rocket launchers, Cuban soldiers determined the outcome of the decisive battle at Quifandango against the FNLA on November 12. The campaign in the south continued for several weeks, but South Africa quickly refused to engage the Cuban soldiers without Western backing. Whereas the MPLA controlled but two or three provinces at the beginning of November, by the end of December virtually all of Angola was under their control.

Conclusion: Fighting for World Socialism

Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola represented one of the greatest military campaigns for the promotion of international socialism since the Red Army marched through Eastern Europe at the close of World War II. Though Soviet leaders initially considered a strategy of peaceful cooptation of the emerging state, a strategy imposed upon Moscow by the weakness of their Angolan ally, the failure of the Alvor Accord demanded a decisive commitment to a confrontational strategy. Most dramatically, this strategy entailed an open clash with the United States. Within the context of positive Soviet assessments of the world correlation of forces, the Soviet Union and Cuba boldly moved to support the spread of communism through armed conflict. While military and economic benefits of such a move were surely contemplated, the link between the MPLA, the Soviet Union, and Cuba was a shared commitment to revolutionary revision, not a common definition of "national

⁸² Klinghoffer *The Angolan War*, p. 26.

⁸³ See Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p.164; "Angola Unit Says It Holds Russians," *New York Times*, November 22, 1975; "Pretoria Defends Angola Incursion," *New York Times*, November 23, 1975.

⁸⁴ Michael Kaufman, "Angolan Uncertain about Cease-Fire," *New York Times*, November 4, 1975.

interest." In this case, revolutionary internationalism even meant fighting for a once estranged ally in distant Angola. In the short run, the confrontational strategy paid off.

II. American Foreign Policy towards Angola, 1974-1976

By 1974, the construction of Kissinger's new world order appeared almost complete. Under the modern-day Metternich, the Nixon Administration had attempted to devise a new strategy for dealing with America's declining role in world affairs: detente.⁸⁵ Kissinger's strategy was predicated on several tenets of classic realism. First, the United States was "to arrive at a conception of interests independent of threats, and then define threats in terms of interests."⁸⁶ Second, in defining these threats, Kissinger recommended that ideology be purged as a criterion. According to Kissinger, "[We] have no permanent enemies....we will judge other countries, including Communist countries ... on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic ideologies."⁸⁷ Finally, if states abided by these two axioms of realism in international politics, Kissinger concluded that all states should be able to maximize their mutual interests through cooperation, not confrontation.⁸⁸ With particular reference for the Soviet Union, Kissinger believed that the United States needed to construct a comprehensive set of intertwining relations whereby Soviet and American objectives could be achieved to the benefit of both superpowers. These linkages between the two countries also would deter foreign policies of unilateral advantage. Regarding regional conflicts, Kissinger and Nixon hoped the their strategy of detente would create a "code of conduct" or "rules of engagement" for

⁸⁵ For comprehensive accounts of detente, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, chapter nine, Robert Litwak, *Detente and the Nixon Doctrine*; Alexander George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*, and Raymond Gartoff, *Detente and Confrontation*.

⁸⁶ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 285.

⁸⁷ Quoted in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 284.

⁸⁸ For the first juxtaposition of these two terms, see the inaugural address by President Nixon, January 20, 1969, *Presidential Documents*, Vol. 5 (January 27, 1969), pp. 152-153.

regulating superpower rivalry.

By the end of 1975, the maelstrom of revolutionary activity in Portugal and southern Africa had all but destroyed Kissinger's detente.⁸⁹ Ironically, Kissinger's meticulously constructed strategy for regulating behavior between states was shattered ultimately by unregulated activity within states. Kissinger's own realist approach to international politics posited that events within states were of no consequence to the balance of power among states. Yet, the drama in Angola in 1975 revealed that global balances of power can be tilted by internal instabilities in small and far away countries. Moreover, the Angola civil war also revealed that the continued saliency of ideological divisions between the United States and the Soviet Union. As long as the two superpowers continued to hold antithetical visions for a permanent world order, they would continue to clash, even over revolutionary situations in peripheral countries.

American Interests in Angola

In 1974, almost all American foreign policymakers concurred that the United States had no vital interests in Angola. Strategically, Angola constituted the Western coastline of the Cape sea lanes used by oil tankers sailing from the Middle East.⁹⁰ Yet, the Soviet navy, let alone the Cuban or Angolan, had neither the capability nor the desire to disrupt Western oil supplies. Regarding economic interests, the United States in 1975 did have investments in the former Portuguese colony, but none of serious consequence. Cabinda Gulf Oil Company constituted 90% of all American investment in Angola, making its operations the "principal" interest of the United States in the region.⁹¹ As Kissinger himself concluded, "America's modest direct

⁸⁹ In a question and answer session in November 1975 in which Angola was a major focus, Kissinger asked that the word detente be dropped from the American lexicon. See *Press Release*, U.S. Department of State, No. 562-B, November 11, 1975, p. 3.

⁹⁰ See interview with Henry Kissinger, Phoenix, April 16, 1976, in *Department of State Bulletin* (DOSB), May 10, 1976, p. 605; and the statement by U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Daniel Moynihan, in "CIA's Secret War in Angola," *Intelligence Report*, (Washington) Vol. 1, No. 1, 1975, p. 8.

⁹¹ Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975," p. 113. At the time, this investment was valued at \$300 million. Moreover, over half of Cabinda's Gulf's production was imported by the United States during this period.

strategic and economic interests in Angola are not a central issue;"⁹² as the "United States has no national interest in Angola."⁹³

Only by moving beyond classic definitions of national interests and focusing instead on the American commitment to preserving the international capitalist structure can American foreign policy during the Angolan civil war be explained. Contrary to his own creed, Kissinger did not define American security interests in terms of state power, but in terms of systemic power. As an isolated event, a leftist government in Angola in no way altered the balance of power in the international system. However, if this change of government was seen as (1) accelerating the correlation of forces in favor of socialism and thereby adding momentum to future socialist victories elsewhere, then a socialist Angola was a threat. As Kissinger explained when describing his policy in Angola, "peace requires a sense of security which depends upon some form of equilibrium," maintained by linking regional power balances to the larger context of the balance of power between the superpowers.⁹⁴ In describing the regional balance in southern Africa, Kissinger remarked that "not only are the interests of the countries directly affected at stake, but also the interests of all nations in preserving global stability -- which is the precondition for all else mankind aspires to accomplish."⁹⁵

As already noted, Kissinger's first response for preserving global stability was detente, or positive containment. By interlinking the Soviet Union into a set of relations with the United States and the rest of the Western world, Kissinger hoped to give Soviet Union a stake in preserving the status quo. With respect to regional conflicts such as southern Africa or the Middle East,

⁹² Kissinger, statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in *DOSB*, February 16, 1976, p. 175.

⁹³ Kissinger, *Press Release*, U.S. Department of State, No. 562-B, November 11, 1975, p. 6.

⁹⁴ Henry Kissinger, statement, January 29, 1976, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Angola*, Hearings, 94th Congress, second session, January 29, February 3, 4, 6, 1976. (Hereafter referred to as *Angola: Hearings*, 1976).

⁹⁵ *IBID.*, p.6.

Kissinger wanted to insulate these areas from any attempt by the Soviet Union to change existing arrangements.⁹⁶

When this strategy did not alter Soviet behavior regarding the revolutionary situation in Angola, however, Kissinger argued that the United States should not "emasculate itself" in the face of Soviet aggression, but rather, resist Soviet expansionism by traditional means.⁹⁷ Kissinger adamantly believed that "security and progress in most parts of the world depend on some American commitment."⁹⁸ The United States therefore, "as the most cohesive country in the free world, as the strongest country in the free world, has an obligation" to defend the integrity of an entire international system, even if contrary to immediate national interests.⁹⁹ In Kissinger's estimate, the United States had to remain prepared to use force to preserve the balance.

When one great power tips the balance of forces decisively in a local conflict through its military intervention -- and meets no resistance -- an ominous precedent is set, of grave consequence even if the intervention occurs in a seemingly remote place.¹⁰⁰

If the United States failed to resist the Soviet expansion in Angola, Kissinger warned that radicals would sweep first through the rest of Southern Africa and then the Third World as a whole.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ For a statement about the American strategy to "insulate" Africa from "Great-Power conflicts", see the statement by William E. Schaefele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *News Release*, (Washington: Department of State) February 6, 1976, p. 1. As the United States and other Western powers already were involved in Africa, this insulation sought to preserve old Western commitments and keep out possible new Soviet interests in the continent.

⁹⁷ Kissinger, in *Angola: Hearings*, 1976, p. 7.

⁹⁸ Kissinger, News Conference, December 23, 1975, in *DOSB*, January 19, 1976, p. 71.

⁹⁹ Kissinger, *Angola: Hearings*, 1976, p. 47.

¹⁰⁰ Kissinger, February 3, 1976, in *DOSB*, February 23, 1976, p. 209.

¹⁰¹ The domino theory so crucial to rationalizing the American intervention in Vietnam appeared to be predicting socialist victories around the world in 1975. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia had just "fallen" under communist rule, while Portugal, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau appeared to be following

The American Strategy in Angola

American statesmen claimed to follow a strategy of responding to Soviet aggression throughout the Angolan civil war as the following dialogue between Congressman Les Aspin and CIA Director William Colby suggests.

Congressman Les Aspin: "And why are the Chinese backing the moderate group?"

Colby: "Because the Soviets are backing the MPLA is the simplest answer."

Aspin: "It sounds like that is why we are doing it."

Colby: "It is."¹⁰²

Similarly, Kissinger claimed that the crisis in Angola was not caused by warring factions within Angola, but by Soviet expansionary proclivities: "Let there be no mistake about it--the culprits in the tragedy that is now unfolding in Angola are the Soviet Union and its client state, Cuba."¹⁰³ According to the official American chronology of events, the United States became involved in the Angolan imbroglio only after Soviet assistance had already become evident.¹⁰⁴

Military action, however, was not the only "response" available. An alternative rejoinder to Soviet machinations would have been to promote a peaceful transition to majority rule through diplomacy. Throughout the crisis, the rhetorical position of the United States was to "favor a negotiated settlement among the three major

the same path. Most immediately, as the chapter on Zimbabwe describes, Kissinger assumed that a victory for radicals in Angola would lead to socialist victories in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. These falling dominoes then would jeopardize the stability of all of Africa. See Kissinger's testimony, in *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, Hearings, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements, and the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, March 5, 8, 19; May 12, 13, 21, 26 and 27, 1976. (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 185.

¹⁰² Pike Papers, p. 40, note 481, as cited in Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of a Failure," p. 105.

¹⁰³ *IBID*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁴ See the letter from President Ford to the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, January 27, 1976, in *DOSB*, February 16, 1976, p. 183.

groups..."¹⁰⁵ Subsequent disclosure of several sources close to the Angolan situation, however, reveal that Kissinger devoted little attention to seeking a diplomatic solution in the early stages of the crisis. Despite advise from both his Assistant Secretaries of State for African Affairs, Donald Easum and Nathaniel Davis,¹⁰⁶ Kissinger only began to promote the Alvor Accord in the fall of 1975, well after Angola was submerged in civil war.¹⁰⁷ The United States thus reacted to the Soviet confrontational strategy with a commensurate confrontational response.

The United States Enters the War

To carry out this strategy, Kissinger decided to reestablish contact with Holden Roberto. On January 22, 1975, the 40 Committee (an advisory board on all intelligence matters) agreed to supply \$300,000 in covert assistance to FNLA.¹⁰⁸ In that same month, the United States also began to resupply President Mobutu with weapons, presumably to replace those weapons Mobutu had placed at the disposal of the FNLA.¹⁰⁹ Kissinger justified this initial delivery of money to the FNLA as a means to buy a stake in the Angola civil war and

¹⁰⁵ Kissinger, *Press Release*, U.S. Department of State, No. 562-B, November 11, 1975, p. 6.

¹⁰⁶ Easum had met with all three factions in October 1974. Davis' task force on Angola recommended developing relations with all three movements. In Angola, American Ambassador Killoran had opened dialogue with all three groups. (Author's interview with Senator Dick Clark, Washington, November 10, 1989, and Ed Fugit, Harare, August 2, 1989); and *The Village Voice*, February 20, 1976, p. 40.)

¹⁰⁷ See Kissinger, in *Angola: Hearings*, 1976, p. 8, where he asserts that "Since October, the United States "offered to stop all military supplies on our side, provided all other countries would do the same." See also Larry C. Napper, "The African Terrain and U.S.-Soviet Conflict," in George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*, p. 159.

¹⁰⁸ Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975," p. 110; Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 54. Stockwell cites a lesser figure of \$265,000, but also notes that the CIA already had begun to supply Holden Roberto with small amounts of assistance before this 40 Committee decision. Interestingly, the 40 Committee rejected a CIA request for \$100,000 for UNITA at this meeting.

¹⁰⁹ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 58.

bolster American relations with Roberto.¹¹⁰ Given the FNLA's relative strength at the time, the money appeared to be buying influence in the next Angolan government. In Kissinger's estimation, these funds were not meant to finance a war, but "to buy bicycles, paper clips, etc" for the FNLA's political campaign.¹¹¹

Roberto bought more than paper clips with his \$300,000 check. "Suddenly Roberto had all this money," one foreign service officer said, "and he began throwing it around for guns, uniforms and anything else he wanted. You can't hide that sort of thing in a poor country."¹¹² Undoubtedly, both the MPLA and the Soviet Union were also cognizant of the infusion of American funds.¹¹³ That this money came at the same time that the Alvor Accord was signed signalled an American commitment exclusively to the FNLA, irrespective of the peace process.

By the summer of 1975, thousands of Angolans already had died in fighting between the MPLA and the FNLA, while external backers for each liberation movement had all raised the stakes of continued involvement. As already described, the Soviet Union made a major move in the spring to rearm the MPLA. To bolster the FNLA, Zairian President Mobutu deployed into Angola a commando unit and an armored-car squadron in July, two paratroop companies in August, and two more battalions by October.¹¹⁴ At this stage, the prospect of a peaceful transition to majority rule in Angola was very remote.

Given this scenario, the 40 Committee approved an additional \$30 million to the covert operation in Angola on June 16, 1975.¹¹⁵ Of this sum, \$16 million was earmarked for weapons for the FNLA, and, for

¹¹⁰ See Roger Morris, "The Proxy War in Angola: Pathology of a Blunder," *The New Republic*, January 31, 1976, p. 20.

¹¹¹ Quoted in Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of a Failure," p. 76.

¹¹² Quoted in Morris, "The Proxy War in Angola," p. 21.

¹¹³ According to former NSC staffer, Roger Morris, "That the US subsidy was immediately registered by Soviet intelligence ... was never doubted in Washington." *IBID.*

¹¹⁴ David Binder, "Angola Reported Getting \$50 Million in U.S. Arms," *New York Times*, December 12, 1975.

¹¹⁵ Morris, "The Proxy War in Angola," p. 19.

the first time, UNITA.¹¹⁶ The first plane loads of American-supplied arms reached Angola by the end of July, and continued uninterrupted until October, when U.S. arms were reaching Angola at a rate of ten tons per day.¹¹⁷ In addition to these monies, the United States took several other steps to assist their Angolan allies. First, accompanying these arms shipments, the CIA sent advisors to train FNLA soldiers. Though official sources denied any involvement of American personnel,¹¹⁸ John Stockwell, the head of the CIA Angola Task Force at the time, later revealed that his organization had deployed 83 agents into the field to implement the covert operation.¹¹⁹ Additionally, the CIA supplied Roberto with a retired U.S. Army colonel to work with the FNLA command, and recruited mercenaries around the world to come fight in Angola.¹²⁰ Second, the United States also succeeded in convincing other Western allies to support the FNLA and UNITA, including material support from France and West Germany for the FNLA and \$50 million from Saudi Arabia for UNITA.¹²¹ Third, President Ford approved an additional \$19 million in military assistance, and over \$60 million in economic assistance to Zaire to compensate Mobutu for his aid to the FNLA.¹²² Fourth, to cripple the

¹¹⁶ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 59.

¹¹⁷ *IBID.*, p. 208.

¹¹⁸ See President Ford, News Conference, December 20, 1975, in *Department of State Bulletin*, January 19, 1976, p. 78; and David Binder, "Angola Reported Getting \$50 Million in U.S. Arms," *New York Times*, December 12, 1975.

¹¹⁹ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 162.

¹²⁰ For accounts of American mercenaries in Angola, see Jeanie Kasindorf, "The Making of a Mercenary," *New West*, (Beverly Hills) September 13, 1976, pp. 77-86; Ted Bell, "Mercenary for Jesus," *The Sacramento Bee*, August 26, 1976, P. A3; and "'Soldier of Fortune' Runs Out of Luck," *Palo Alto Times*, June 1, 1976, p. 28.

¹²¹ Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War*, p. 85.

¹²² See Leslie Gelb, "U.S., Soviet, China Reported Aiding Portugal, Angola," *New York Times*, September 25, 1975; David Ottaway, "U.S. Plans to Boost Arms Aid to Zaire," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1975; and "Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations." *Senate Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations FY 76*, (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 1467.

MPLA economically, the U.S. government ordered Cabinda Gulf to stop paying the MPLA royalties until a "legitimate" government had been established in Luanda.¹²³ This action cost the MPLA regime almost \$1.5 million a day.¹²⁴ Fifth, to disrupt the MPLA's supply of military assistance, the United States pressured several states to deny Cuban planes landing rights on their way to Africa. Sixth, the U.S. launched a vehement anti-MPLA and anti-Soviet campaign around the world including denunciations by U.N. Ambassador Moynihan regarding a new wave of "European" colonialism in Africa,¹²⁵ and a CIA-orchestrated dissemination of stories in papers throughout the world about MPLA atrocities.¹²⁶ Finally, as a show of force, the USS Independence was put on full alert near Angolan waters in November 1975.¹²⁷

At this stage in the war, President Ford still claimed that American strategy aimed to "stabilize the military situation," so as to "create the conditions for a negotiated settlement."¹²⁸ According to American officials, the Soviet escalation in the early summer tilted the military balance in favor of the MPLA, and thereby "destroyed Portugal's efforts... to establish a provisional government involving the three factions."¹²⁹ To correct this imbalance,

¹²³ After November 11, Cabinda Gulf immediately recognized the MPLA and reopened operations. The U.S. company has sustained very friendly relations with the Luanda government ever since.

¹²⁴ See Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War*, p. 86.

¹²⁵ U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Daniel P. Moynihan, statement to the General Assembly, December 8, 1975, in *DOSB*, January 19, 1976, p. 81. The FNLA and UNITA, of course, were also using "European" weapons.

¹²⁶ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, pp. 193-194.

¹²⁷ See David Martin, "American Warships Are "Off Angola", *The Observer* January 11, 1976; and Sean Gervassi, *Continuing Escalation in the Angola Crisis*, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁸ Letter from President Ford to the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, January 27, 1976, in *DOSB*, February 16, 1976, p. 183. See also Leslie Gelb, "U.S. Aides Tell Senators of Arms to Angola," *New York Times*, November 7, 1975.

¹²⁹ Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, *News Release*, (Washington: Department of State) February 6, 1976, p. 2.

Administration officials argued that the United States needed to expand American involvement.¹³⁰

American-South African Collusion?

The strategy of forcing a stalemate failed. Instead, the American assistance program prompted the MPLA to seek greater Soviet assistance and direct Cuban intervention.¹³¹ To keep pace with the MPLA's expanded conventional capability, the CIA entertained the idea of introducing C-47 helicopters -- the "flying gun platforms" used extensively in Vietnam -- and Redeye anti-aircraft missiles.¹³² The greatest obstacle to meeting the Soviet-Cuban-MPLA challenge, however, was not initially firepower, but manpower. Neither FNLA nor UNITA were trained in the use of sophisticated conventional weapons or the tactics of positional war. The only conventional forces in the region friendly to American interests were South African.

By far the most controversial aspect of the American assistance program centered around the question of whether the United States assisted or encouraged the South African Defense Forces to intervene in the Angolan war. Not surprisingly, the official answer from Kissinger was an unequivocal no; "We had no foreknowledge of South Africa's intentions, and in no way cooperated with it militarily."¹³³

Sources in South Africa intimated a different story. Perhaps most revealing was an interview with South African Prime Vorster in 1976.

Q. Would it be accurate to say that the U.S. solicited South Africa's help to turn the tide against the Russians and Cubans in Angola last fall?

Vorster. I do not want to comment on that. The U.S. Government can speak for itself. I am sure you will appreciate that I cannot violate the confidentiality of government-to-government communications. But if you are making the statement, I won't call you a liar.

¹³⁰ See the statements by Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and CIA Director William Colby in Leslie Gelb, "U.S. Aides Tell Senators of Arms to Angola," *New York Times*, November 7, 1975.

¹³¹ See the following section on the MPLA.

¹³² According to Stockwell, the CIA eventually traded Israel 50 Redeye missiles for 50 Soviet -made SA-7 Grail missiles so as to disguise the source of the anti-aircraft weapons. UNITA tried to use the missiles, but they all malfunctioned.

¹³³ Kissinger, in *Angola: Hearings*, 1976, p. 13.

Q. Would it also be accurate to say that you received a green light from Kissinger for a military operation in Angola and that at least six moderate Black African presidents had given you their blessings for the same operation?

Vorster,¹³⁴ If you say that on your own accord, I will not call you a liar.

South Africa obviously expected American support when they intervened on October 23, 1975 with estimated 2,000 troops and over 50 armored cars.¹³⁵ South African leaders assumed that they were doing their part to save the Western world from communism.¹³⁶ When the Western powers refrained from publicly condoning this show of force, South African leaders were conspicuously disappointed.¹³⁷

The hazy record of the intervention suggests that there were high level communications between the United States and the Soviet Union leading up to October.¹³⁸ According to Stockwell, the CIA actively cooperated with the their South African equivalent, BOSS, and welcomed a South African role in the war.

..without any memos being written at CIA headquarters saying "Let's coordinate with the South Africans," coordination was effected at all levels and the South Africans escalated their involvement in step with our own.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ *Newsweek*, May 17, 1976, p. 53.

¹³⁵ Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975," p. 121; John de St. Jorre, "South Africa: Up Against the World," *Foreign Policy*, No. 28, Fall 1977, p. 70. According to South African Defense Minister, P.W. Botha, South African troop strength grew to over 4,000 by November 11, 1975. (*Washington Post*, February 4, 1976).

¹³⁶ See Legum, "The Role of the Big Powers," p. 37.

¹³⁷ See Nicholas Ashford, "South Africa Appeals to Western Powers to Join Actively in 'Driving Soviet Union from Angola'" *The Times*, November 27, 1975.

¹³⁸ No evidence exists of actual military cooperation. According to Fugit, the South Africans requested American military assistance, in the first instance fuel, but the request was denied. (Author's interview, Harare, August 2, 1989).

¹³⁹ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 188; and author's interview with Senator Dick Clark, (Washington, November 10, 1989). State Department official Ed Mulcahy later testified that the United States often cooperated with BOSS on various aspects of intelligence. See Mulcahy's testimony in *Angola Hearings*, 1976,

By warning against the pitfalls of encouraging a South African intervention, Nathaniel Davis' Task Force Report also implied that American decisionmakers were fully cognizant of South Africa's plans. If the United States did not support the idea, there were plenty of opportunities to dissuade its South African ally not to intervene.

Capitulation

According to Stockwell's inside account, no one involved with the Angola project was particularly concerned about the political implications of the South African invasion in the fall of 1975.¹⁴⁰ At that time, the FNLA-Zairian offensive from the north and the UNITA-South Africa offensive from the south had pushed the MPLA out of almost all Angolan provinces. By the time of independence on November 11, 1975, the UNITA-South African forces were less than 200 kilometers from Luanda, while the FNLA had advanced to within a several kilometers of the city. If American foreign policymakers still hoped to facilitate a stalemate between the liberation forces, they had to either constrain their allies or assist the MPLA. They did neither.

The course of the war, however, rapidly changed in a matter of days. During this time, the infusion of regular Cuban troops and the massive Soviet airlift of conventional weapons began to make a difference in the field. Most importantly, as already noted, the newly-acquired Stalin Organ (122mm multiple rocket launchers) almost single-handedly defeated the FNLA at Quifandango. The north secured, FAPLA and the Cuban expeditionary force turned south, and within a matter of weeks, succeeded in halting the South African advance.

Frustrated by these reverses, the 40 Committee asked the CIA to prepare a new strategy which could win the Angolan war.¹⁴¹ The CIA responded with three options costing \$30, \$60, and \$100 million respectively.¹⁴² The CIA guaranteed that the most expensive plan would insure an FNLA/UNITA victory. At roughly the same time, Kissinger stepped up efforts to limit further external involvement in

p. 187.

¹⁴⁰ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 214.

¹⁴¹ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 21.

¹⁴² *IBID.* p. 21.

the war. According to his subsequent testimony, the Secretary of State contacted Soviet officials about negotiations first in October, twice again in November, and once again in December.¹⁴³ Publicly, President Ford declared that the United States was "working with all people, including the Soviet Union," to try and bring about a peaceful resolution to the Angolan civil war acceptable to all parties involved.¹⁴⁴

Both of these new tactics were too little, too late. First, regarding the "winning strategy" on the battlefield, the United States already had lost the contest for escalation dominance. While an assistance program of \$100 million during the summer might have precipitated an FNLA/UNITA victory, the FNLA and UNITA needed a much greater level of commitment to win in November 1975. As Senator John Tunney lamented in arguing against further U.S. involvement,

The United States cannot save a losing cause with money alone. We would have to supply aircraft, tanks, antiaircraft guns and missiles, helicopters and other weapons. Who is to fly them? There is no time for training programs, there are no allies ready to intervene with such equipment. We would have to send instructors and advisors and, in all probability, American troops in a pattern too reminiscent of Vietnam.¹⁴⁵

Whether the American allies could have won with greater firepower was made a moot point by Tunney and his colleague, Richard Clark.¹⁴⁶ Fearing another Vietnam quagmire, these senators introduced legislation to end all covert military assistance to any forces in

¹⁴³ Henry Kissinger, written responses to congressional questions, in *Angola: Hearings*, 1976, p. 52.

¹⁴⁴ President Ford, interview with Tom Brokaw, January 5, 1976, in *DOSB*, January 26, 1976, p. 100. See also, President Ford, News Conference, December 20, 1975, in *DOSB*, January 19, 1976, p. 77; and Kissinger, Press Conference, in *DOSB*, February 2, 1976, p. 129.

¹⁴⁵ Tunney, as quoted in Bender, "Kissinger in Angola," p. 104.

¹⁴⁶ Senator Clark was chairman of the Senate subcommittee on Africa at the time. After a fact-finding mission to southern Africa in August 1975, he became convinced that the American allies in Angola could not win, no matter how much assistance the United States provided. (Author's interview with Senator Clark, Washington, November 1989).

Angola.¹⁴⁷ On December 19, 1975 the Tunney Amendment passed, effectively ending the U.S. assistance program.¹⁴⁸

Second, regarding the belated attempt at fostering superpower cooperation, Kissinger had missed his chance. Kissinger claimed that the appeal made by the President on December 9 was effective in halting the Soviet airlift to Angola from December 9 until December 24. According to Kissinger's interpretation, only when the U.S. Senate voted to block further American assistance to their Angola allies did the Soviet Union resume its airlift."¹⁴⁹ Both Kissinger and Ford blamed the U.S. Congress for undermining their diplomatic efforts. As Ford chided,

The Senate decision to cut off additional funds for Angola is a deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends upon the United States. Ultimately, it will profoundly affect the security of our country as well.¹⁵⁰

Kissinger belatedly tried to introduce the Angolan issue at the Moscow summit in March 1976, but was firmly rebuffed. The war already been decided.

Conclusion

In the early stages of the Angolan crisis, the United States had the option of pursuing a cooption strategy regarding the Angolan revolutionaries. The Alvor Accord provided a framework for insuring

¹⁴⁷ The senators were doing their job in representing the popular will. A Lou Harris poll released on November 21, 1975 revealed that 72% of the people felt that the United States should avoid all guerrilla-type wars in the future. See "CIA's Secret War in Angola," *Intelligence Report*, (Washington) Vol. 1, No. 1, 1975, p. 6.

¹⁴⁸ After the legislation was passed, Kissinger threatened to ask for funds for an overt program which was not prohibited by either piece of legislation. The threat was an empty bluff, however, as Kissinger knew he could never win congressional support for such a proposal. See Kissinger, Press Conference, in *DOSB*, March 1, 1976, p. 266.

¹⁴⁹ Kissinger, *Angola: Hearings*, 1976, p. 10.

¹⁵⁰ President Ford, *Press Briefing*, December 19, 1975, in *DOSB*, January 19, 1976, p. 76. See also President Ford, Year-End Meeting with Reporters, December 31, 1975, in *DOSB*, January 26, 1976, p. 104. Kissinger declared that "We defeated ourselves" in Angola. See Kissinger, Press Conference, March 6, 1976, Atlanta, in *DOSB*, March 29, 1976, p. 386.

continuity during the transition to independence. Had the Accord been administered, open civil war between the three liberation movements might have been avoided. The economic system created under Portuguese colonialism also might have been preserved.

In this crisis, however, no authority tried to enforce the Accord. Portugal, in the grips of its own revolution, was in no position to regulate the transition. The United States, the only power capable of administering the Accord, paid little attention to the transition plan, and instead began to prepare its local ally for military confrontation.

Once the Soviet Union began escalating the stakes of military confrontation, however, the United States could not compete. Having just withdrawn from Vietnam, the United States, or at least the American Congress, was not prepared to enter into military conflict against another Third World liberation movement. In this confrontation between capitalism and communism, the AK-47 and the 122mm rocket launcher prevailed.

III. External Influences on the Angola Civil War

Angola has become the focal point of world political conflict in the 1970s in exactly the way Vietnam was in the 1960s and Spain in the 1930s. It is the story of a localized war which is nonetheless the meeting point of world forces. It is a long and extended war. Despite all the complexities and confusions, the sides are clear, and those who will not choose have thereby chosen. Its outcome will have a major effect not merely on its immediate neighbors, but on the political struggles everywhere.¹⁵¹

The impact of superpower intervention on the course of events in Angola from 1974 to 1976 was decisive. The MPLA and FNLA quickly determined that they could best achieve their interests through further armed struggle, not reconciliation. Given that no external power pushed for a peaceful transition, the situation rapidly deteriorated into civil war. He who had the biggest guns won.

The MPLA Strategy

Emerging from almost complete military defeat in 1972, and

¹⁵¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, "Luanda Is Madrid," *The Nation*, January 3-10, 1976, p. 1.

political disunity in 1973, the April coup in Portugal could not have come at a worse time for the MPLA. Given the level of disarray within the organization at the time, MPLA decisions and actions did not intimate a coherent strategy. Rather, the events of 1975 suggest that the MPLA was responding to conditions as they arose.

Negotiations

After the Portuguese coup, the MPLA declared that conditions were ripe for negotiation, and consequently supported the Alvor Accord in January 1975 and the follow on meeting at Nakuru, Kenya in June.¹⁵² Militarily weak and politically split, the MPLA was in no position to make a sole claim for the Angolan state in 1974. In signing the Nakuru Agreement, the MPLA declared that the "grave situation in which Angola finds itself must be necessarily be put above any political or ideological divergences" and that the movements "solemnly affirm their willingness to renounce the use of force as a means of solving problems."¹⁵³

Privately, however, the MPLA leadership was not optimistic about the prospects of a peaceful transition.¹⁵⁴ The long history of failed MPLA-FNLA unity agreements and intractable ideological cleavages between the two organizations made the likelihood of real cooperation at this stage remote.¹⁵⁵ Second, given Portugal's own evolving revolution, MPLA had little faith in Lisbon's ability to oversee a peaceful transition. Rather, radicals within the MPLA hoped that a communist victory in Portugal would insure a socialist victory for

¹⁵² *Radio Moscow* in Portuguese, May 13, 1974, in *SWB*, SU/4600/A5/1, part 1, May 15, 1974.

¹⁵³ Charles Mohr, "Accord Is Signed by Angola Rivals," *New York Times*, June 22, 1975. See also Neto's remarks, as cited in *TASS*, June 24, 1975, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, June 27, 1975, p. H3; and "Rival Angolan Groups Halt Fighting for Talks," *New York Times*, November 3, 1975.

¹⁵⁴ Already in March 1975, Neto told George Houser that the agreement would collapse. See Houser, *No One Can Stop the Rain*, p. 287.

¹⁵⁵ See *Southern African Committee* "Interview with the MPLA Delegation to the United Nations," and "Angola Leaders Try for Unity at Kenya Meeting," *New York Times*, January 4, 1975. The same could not be said for UNITA-MPLA relations. The MPLA did approach UNITA about a potential merger, but Savimbi logically held out for elections.

Angola as well. Finally, though difficult to document, MPLA leaders must have been anxious about the outcome of a democratic election.¹⁵⁶ If elections were free and fair, UNITA would have received a significant minority, and would have most likely outpaced the MPLA. As MPLA internal democracy was weak at best and non-existent at worst, it is hard to believe MPLA public statements praising the prospect of democratic elections.

The MPLA's real commitment to democracy was never tested in 1975. As early as February of 1975, FNLA cadres attacked MPLA offices, igniting Angola into civil war. Thereafter, questions about democratic elections became irrelevant.

The MPLA had begun to reorganize guerrillas into a conventional army, the Forças de Armadas de Popular Libertacao de Angola, FAPLA, beginning in August 1974.¹⁵⁷ The task was formidable. MPLA cadres had been trained to fight a guerrilla not conventional war, to strike and retreat not defend territory, to shoot AK-47's and set mines, not fire artillery guns or fly airplanes. According to one East European observer in Luanda at the time, 'the Popular Movement's soldiers were largely unprepared for more than guerrilla skirmishes...'¹⁵⁸

Their problems were exacerbated by the scarcity of any kind of soldier in 1974. After Portugal's 1972 assault, MPLA military operations had declined dramatically. Western sources estimated that the MPLA had only 1,500 soldiers in August 1974, compared to 10,000 for the FNLA.¹⁵⁹ The MPLA ranks grew to 6,000 by January 1975, but 2-3,000 of the best troops left when the MPLA commander, Daniel Chipenda, defected. To remedy this situation, the MPLA leadership took bold measures. First, the MPLA leadership convinced exiled Zairian gendarmes living in Angola that they shared a common interest

¹⁵⁶ With Daniel Chipenda's departure, the MPLA lost what little support the organization had among the Ovimbundu.

¹⁵⁷ Author's interview with Paulo Jorge, (Luanda, August 22, 1989), and Michael Kaufman, "Angolans in Luanda Try to Regroup," *New York Times*, November 6, 1975.

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in Michael Kaufman, "Angolan Uncertain about Cease-Fire," *New York Times*, November 4, 1975. This was confirmed by Lucio Lara, during an interview with the author, (Luanda, August 1989.) See also Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 126.

¹⁵⁹ Author's interview with Ed Fugit, (Harare, July 19, 1988) and Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War*, p. 15.

in defeating Mobutu and his allies, the FNLA.¹⁶⁰ These soldiers, numbering between 2,000 and 3,000, agreed and subsequently played an important role in sustaining MPLA forces during the initial stages of the war.¹⁶¹ Second, the MPLA leadership asked Castro to send Cuban military instructors to retrain MPLA guerrillas into conventional soldiers.¹⁶² As already described, approximately 230 Cuban advisors had reached Angola by the spring of 1975.¹⁶³ Finally, MPLA diplomats travelled the globe seeking military training and assistance.¹⁶⁴ Moscow quickly responded, as well as other countries from the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia, and even China.¹⁶⁵

Escalation and Foreign Intervention

A regimented army takes years to build, not weeks. The MPLA pool of cadres swelled to roughly 20,000 by August 1975,¹⁶⁶ but these untrained recruits were no match for the Zairian and FNLA battalions advancing from the north, and the South African columns approaching

¹⁶⁰ These soldiers had left Zaire after Tshombe's fall. Their unifying cause was the liberation of Katanga Province in southern Zaire.

¹⁶¹ According to Savimbi, these soldiers were decisive in the MPLA's early victories in the south. See Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 151; and Michael Kaufman, "Luanda's Armies Gain," *New York Times*, December 8, 1975.

¹⁶² See Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 124. In early 1975, an initial 150-200 MPLA cadres also travelled to Cuba for military training. (Author's interview with Lucio Lara, Luanda, August 21, 1988).

¹⁶³ Kaufman, "Angolan Uncertain about Cease-Fire," Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 126; author's interview Lucio Lara, Luanda, August 1989.

¹⁶⁴ Author's interview with Paulo Jorge (Luanda, August 22, 1989).

¹⁶⁵ See Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War," p. 689. An MPLA delegation visited Beijing from May 29-June 3, 1975 for high level discussions. They returned with Chinese blessings and some material assistance. China, however, subsequently decided to avoid entanglement in the Angola imbroglio. See Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p.176; Valenta "Soviet Decision-Making on Angola," p. 103 and fn 45, p. 257.

¹⁶⁶ This was the CIA's estimate. (Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 91.) The MPLA claimed 30,000. (See Michael Kaufman, "Luanda's Armies Gain," *New York Times*, December 8, 1975.)

from the south.¹⁶⁷ The situation had become so desperate that the MPLA and Cuban military command drew up plans to evacuate Luanda and relocate their headquarters to the north in Cabinda.¹⁶⁸ Facing impending defeat, Neto asked Cuba for combat troops and Castro responded in "fraternal solidarity." According to Marquez's account, the MPLA "had Soviet weapons, but lacked the personnel capable of handling them."¹⁶⁹ Without real soldiers to man the artillery guns or command the frontal assaults against the advancing battalions, the MPLA would have lost Luanda.

As already noted, the arrival of the Cuban troops proved decisive for the MPLA's defense of Luanda and subsequent control over other Angola provinces. In the north, the Cuban-manned 122mm rocket launchers almost single-handedly defeated the advancing FNLA-Zairian columns at the battle of Quifangongo.¹⁷⁰ A similar scenario unfolded later on the southern front. The rapid advance of the South African columns were first engaged by Cuban conventional troops arms again with Soviet missiles, tanks, and field artillery.¹⁷¹ Faced with growing public opposition around the world, American abandonment, growing numbers of Cuban troops, and sophisticated Soviet weapons, and greater logistical problems of maintaining supply lines an additional 200 miles from their Namibian base,¹⁷² South Africa decided to retreat

¹⁶⁷ Zaire also massed roughly 1,500 troops on the Cabindan border in preparation to conquer and annex the enclave on the eve of Angolan independence. See Michael Kaufman, "On Eve of Independence, Angola Faces More Strife," *New York Times*, November 10, 1975.

¹⁶⁸ Marquez, "Operation Carlota," p. 132.

¹⁶⁹ *IBID.* p. 124.

¹⁷⁰ Kaufman, "Angola Group Says Soviet-Backed Rivals Have Superior Arms," *New York Times*, November 24, 1975; Michael Kaufman, "Luanda's Armies Gain," *New York Times*, December 8, 1975.

¹⁷¹ Kaufman, "Angola Movement Claims Victory," *New York Times*, November 9, 1975.

¹⁷² The issue of supply lines was especially important for two reasons. First, just the greater distance presented obvious further complications. Second, the final 200 miles to Luanda would not be through Ovimbundu territory where South Africa and UNITA had little trouble maintaining supply lines, but instead through Mbundu lands, an ethnic group by and large supportive of the MPLA.

in December.

FNLA Strategy

Negotiations

The FNLA never displayed any real commitment to the transitional government or the notion of elections as a means of establishing a legitimate authority in post-colonial Angola. While the FNLA signed a ceasefire with Portugal as early as October 1974,¹⁷³ Roberto never believed that the colonials would hand over authority in a peaceful manner.¹⁷⁴ He also maintained not without reason that the new regime in Lisbon, the Movimento Forças de Armadas or MFA, favored the MPLA.¹⁷⁵ Consequently, he invested little faith in (or even lip service to) the Alvor Accord.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, provisions for free elections as outlined in the Alvor agreement worked against Roberto's aspirations. FNLA support rested almost exclusively on the Bakongo, a ethnic group which constituted less than 30% of Angola's population. Western forecasts in early 1975 predicted that "Mr. Savimbi and his National Union will win the most votes, but not the majority, and that Dr. Neto will come in second."¹⁷⁷ Like his counterparts in the MPLA, Roberto's own recognition of Angolan demographics must have influenced his decision to abandon peaceful methods. If the FNLA could not seize

¹⁷³ See Thomas Johnson, "Coalition Talks Likely in Angola," *New York Times*, October 14, 1974.

¹⁷⁴ See, for instance, "Voice of Free Angola," Kinshasa radio in Portuguese and vernaculars, May 3, 1974, in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, No. ME/4592/b/2, part 4, May 6, 1974.

¹⁷⁵ Several sources claim that the MFA supplied the MPLA with weapons. Without question, the temporary Angolan governor, Cunhal, was a firm ally of the MPLA. The situation changed, however, after the fall of the Concalves government in Portugal. The subsequent Angolan administrators were not as one-sided, while Mario Soares, the newly-elected Prime Minister, was openly critical of MPLA actions. See Thomas Johnson "Angola, Torn by Clashes, Drifting to Independence," *New York Times*, July 5, 1975; Kenneth Adelman, "Report from Angola," *Foreign Affairs*, p. 561.

¹⁷⁶ According to journalist present at the Alvor meetings, Roberto's disdain for the transitional government was already apparent even before the three movements left Portugal. (Author's interviews with British, American, and Australian journalists, Lisbon, March 1987.)

¹⁷⁷ Charles Mohr, "A Key Angolan Rebel Joins Rival Group," *New York Times*, February 24, 1975.

Luanda by the mandate of the ballot box, the movement would make a bid for power using military force.

The FNLA Military Offensives

In 1974, a military solution must have appeared very attractive for FNLA strategists. At the time, the FNLA army was overwhelmingly the strongest military force in Angola with troop numbers estimated from 5,000 to 30,000.¹⁷⁸ As one Western account assessed in late 1974,

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola... has emerged in recent years as this Portuguese colony's most powerful African force. It will probably have the biggest voice in deciding Angola's eventual independence and in naming its new leaders. The organization... has outstripped its two socialist rivals in the number of men under arms, in the amount of valuable land occupied and in making helpful friends.¹⁷⁹

The FNLA began preparations for civil war almost immediately after the coup in Portugal.¹⁸⁰ To prepare his troops, Roberto arranged for 112 Chinese military instructors to teach at his main base in Kinkuzu, Zaire, accompanied by 450 tons of weapons.¹⁸¹ In

¹⁷⁸ See "One Angola Group Is Still Fighting," *New York Times*, August 25, 1974. Portuguese intelligence counted 10,000. (Thomas Johnson, "One Rebel Group Gains in Angola," *New York Times*, November 24, 1974). The CIA estimated that the FNLA had 15,000 soldiers. (Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 91.)

¹⁷⁹ Thomas Johnson, "One Rebel Group Gains in Angola," *New York Times*, November 24, 1974. See also John Marcum, "Lessons from Angola," p. 410; and Charles Mohr, "A Key Angolan Rebel Joins Rival Group," *New York Times*, February 24, 1975.

¹⁸⁰ These preparations are documented comprehensively in Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, pp. 245-246.

¹⁸¹ Apparently, Mobutu was influential in bringing the advisors to Zaire. See Thomas Johnson, "One Rebel Group Gains in Angola," *New York Times*, November 24, 1974. Regarding the weapons see, *West Africa*, July 26, 1976, p. 1061; House Select Committee on Intelligence, *CIA: The Pike Report*, pp. 17-18; Marcum, "Lessons of Angola", p. 408; It is important to realize, however, that China at the time was supporting all three liberation movements. (Author's interview with Sun Kun, Research Fellow and head of Division of West Asia and Africa, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, and former foreign service officer in Tanzania at the time, Stanford, April 1989.) and testimony of Gerald Bender, June 16, 1975, in "Hearings: U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa", June-July 1975, p. 113.

August of 1974, Radio Kinshasa reported that the Romanian Government presented a "large quantity of military equipment and various other materials" to the FNLA.¹⁸² In January 1975, the United States decided to send funds to the movement, patronage as important for its moral and political message as for its financial impact.¹⁸³ Another windfall transpired in February when Chipenda announced that his 2,000 loyal and well-trained soldiers would be "integrated" in to the FNLA.¹⁸⁴ To further strengthen his army, Roberto recruited former Portuguese military officers to serve in his command structure.¹⁸⁵

Given this confluence of men, firepower, and international backing, FNLA moved into northern Angola in the fall of 1974, the FNLA's first sustained presence inside Angola since March 1961.¹⁸⁶ When fighting broke out in Luanda between FNLA and MPLA forces in February of the following year, Roberto confidently ordered a military column to march to Luanda to dislodge the MPLA.¹⁸⁷ The mission, however, failed to subdue the people's war launched by the MPLA, whereby thousands of MPLA volunteers were quickly armed to defend Luanda. The FNLA closed its offices in the Angolan capital in July.

The FNLA army retreated to the north and prepared for an even grander offensive. FNLA firepower was enhanced by the acquisition of 155-mm guns with 20-miles range, some Chinese-made Panhards, four 5.5-inch artillery guns supplied and manned by South Africans and two 130-mm guns supplied by North Korea.¹⁸⁸ In addition, the FNLA army was

¹⁸² *Radio Kinshasa*, August 28, 1974, in *SWB*, No. ME/4690, part 4, August 30, 1974.

¹⁸³ See Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 118.

¹⁸⁴ Charles Mohr, "A Key Angolan Rebel Joins Rival Group," *New York Times*, February 24, 1975.

¹⁸⁵ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 124.

¹⁸⁶ FNLA Representative to the UN, Paul Tuba, quoted in Thomas Johnson, "Angola Troubled over Guerrillas," *New York Times*, October 6, 1974.

¹⁸⁷ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p.258. For an assessment of Roberto's confidence at the time, see Houser, *No One Can Stop the Rain*, pp. 283-284.

¹⁸⁸ Michael Kaufman, "Angola Group Says Soviet-Backed Rivals Have Superior Arms," *New York Times*, November 24, 1975; "Zaire-Backed Faction in Angola Drives on the Capital from the North,"

strengthened by the addition of two full battalions supplied by Zaire.¹⁸⁹ At this stage in the war, Roberto was still confident of victory before independence on November 11, 1975.¹⁹⁰ Launched in September, the offensive moved with little resistance to Quifangongo, a village just outside of Luanda from where the 130-mm guns could reach targets in the capital. The guns, however, were never fired as the FNLA soldiers were demoralized by the superior firepower of the Stalin Organ.¹⁹¹ From Quifangongo, the FNLA retreated by to the Zairian border almost as fast as they had advanced.

As a final ploy, the FNLA and UNITA united to make their own declaration of independence on November 11, 1975.¹⁹² The declaration formalized a cooperative relationship which had begun months earlier in mutual opposition to the MPLA and mutual cooperation with South Africa.¹⁹³ No country recognized the new government, however, which subsequently collapsed within two months. In a dramatic turn of fate, the combined forces of UNITA and FNLA had gone from controlling an estimated 80% of Angolan territory in November 1975 to verging on defeat by December.¹⁹⁴

New York Times, September 1, 1975.

¹⁸⁹ See Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975," p. 121.

¹⁹⁰ Author's interview with Senator Dick Clark, (Washington, November 10, 1989). As Chairman of the Senate's Sub-committee on Africa, Clark flew to Ambriz, Angola to meet with Roberto in August 1975.

¹⁹¹ Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, p. 214.

¹⁹² See Michael Kaufman, "Angolan Uncertain about Cease-Fire," *New York Times*, November 4, 1975.

¹⁹³ According to an account by a South African commander, it was Daniel Chipenda who first approached South Africa about military assistance. Chipenda then met with South African military officers in August 1975 at M'pupu, near the Namibian border. In September, South Africa began training UNITA and FNLA soldiers, principally Chipenda's unit. Consequently, when the regular South African troops launched their offensive towards Luanda, both FNLA and UNITA cadres accompanied them. The relationship between Chipenda and South Africa is copiously documented by the commander of the battalion, Jan Breytenbach, in his *Forged in Battle*, (Cape Town, South Africa: Saayman and Weber, 1986).

¹⁹⁴ See Michael Kaufman, "Luanda's Armies Gain," *New York Times*, December 8, 1975.

The FNLA entered 1975 in the best position to win a civil war in large part because of outside assistance. FNLA entered 1976 defeated in large part because greater outside assistance on the opposing side. As one FNLA spokesman lamented, "While we can only buy weapons in parts on the open market and assemble them, the Russians bring shiploads of tanks, missiles and armored cars into Luanda,...., they have missiles, we do not, ...Meanwhile our friends in the West and Peking hesitate."¹⁹⁵

UNITA's Strategy

Of all three liberation movements, UNITA had the greatest stake in a successful and peaceful transition to democratic rule. While Savimbi's past did not demonstrate any strong proclivity for democracy, he assumed that a free and fair election would divide the electorate along ethnic lines giving his Ovimbundu-based organization the greatest percentage.¹⁹⁶ Consequently, UNITA's activities during the first months of the transitional period genuinely served to promote democracy and peace in Angola.¹⁹⁷ Regarding the other Angolan liberation movements, UNITA called upon the "FNLA and MPLA and all the Angolan patriots to patch up their differences and to unite as one force against all possible forces ready once again to manipulate our people and mortgage our destiny."¹⁹⁸ In pursuit of such unity,

¹⁹⁵ Demba Paka Ola, director of external affairs of FNLA as quoted in Michael Kaufman, "Angola Group Says Soviet-Backed Rivals Have Superior Arms," *New York Times*, November 24, 1975. As already mentioned, China pulled out in November to avoid a de facto alliance with South Africa. An official Chinese statement released at the United Nations on November 27, 1975, in *New York Times*, November 28, 1975.

¹⁹⁶ UNITA predicted that Savimbi would have won 55% of the vote; Western sources projected that UNITA would have won 45%. See UNITA, *The People's Struggle for Victory*, (Toronto: Norman Bethune Institute, February 1976), p. 5, and Charles Mohr, "In Angola's Political Maneuvering, A Moderate Gains Support," *New York Times*, April 24, 1975.

¹⁹⁷ See Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II, p. 247. For UNITA official account, see the speech by UNITA Minister of Information, Tony Fernandes, March 14, 1976, printed in *Support the Second Anti-Colonial Struggle of the Angolan People*, p. 29.

¹⁹⁸ UNITA, "Statement on the Military Coup D'etat in Portugal," UNITA delegation to the 23rd Session of the OAU Liberation Committee, Younde, Cameroon, May 7, 1974, p. 3, in

Savimbi signed a reconciliation agreement with the FNLA's Holden Roberto on November 25, 1974, and then met Neto the following month to discuss cooperation.¹⁹⁹ According to UNITA leaders, the Alvor accord represented "the fruition of UNITA's attempt to form an Angolan united front."²⁰⁰

When the government collapsed, UNITA accounts claim that Savimbi himself organized the Nakuru meeting in June 1975 in keeping UNITA in the "vanguard of the reconciliation process."²⁰¹ Western reports of this meeting in Kenya concurred that Savimbi was conciliatory throughout the negotiations while "Neto and Roberto worked out differences."²⁰²

During the early months of the transitional government, Savimbi also actively courted Angolan whites by downplaying UNITA's radical rhetoric and emphasizing their mutual interests in a peaceful transition.²⁰³ According to one reporter in Angola at the time, Savimbi emerged as "the main hope for the whites , who are flocking to join his National Union."²⁰⁴ Numbering over 300,000 at the time, and controlling most of Angola's economic power, Savimbi saw a potentially powerful ally in the white community, an ally, however, which would only be useful in a peaceful transition to independence. When the war threatened their way of life in Angola, they fled en

Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-5.

¹⁹⁹ See Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 113.

²⁰⁰ Speech by UNITA Minister of Information, Tony Fernandes, March 14, 1976, printed in *Support the Second Anti-Colonial Struggle of the Angolan People*, p. 28. For a similar statement by Savimbi at the time, see Savimbi, *Comunicacao ao Povo Angolano*, (Luanda: Nova Editorial Angolana, SARL, 1975?), p. 8.

²⁰¹ "Statement of the UNITA Delegation to the United Nations Presented to the Africa Group of the Fourth Committee on October 17, 1975," p. 6., in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-5.

²⁰² Charles Mohr, "Angola's Feuding Leaders Hear Unity Plea by Kenyatta at Talks" *New York Times*, June 17, 1975.

²⁰³ "Angola Unravelling?" *New York Times*, March 31, 1975.

²⁰⁴ Charles Mohr, "Strife Among 3 Liberation Groups Casts Doubt on Future of Angola," *New York Times*, April 21, 1975.

masse in one of the largest civilian airlifts ever.²⁰⁵

Armed Struggle and Civil War

Savimbi realized after Nakuru that "no one wanted elections. Neither the FNLA nor the MPLA could compete with us at the ballot box."²⁰⁶ This development presented dire consequences for UNITA's weak army. While UNITA claimed 3,000 guerrillas in 1974, Portuguese sources cited a figure closer to 500.²⁰⁷ Moreover, UNITA cadres were guerrillas ill-equipped for the conventional struggle unfolding. Finally, UNITA lacked firm sources of external support to underwrite an escalating conflict.

To correct for these deficiencies, UNITA received its first major infusion of weapons in February 1975, when a UNITA delegation in Beijing acquired 90 tons of weapons from their Chinese comrades.²⁰⁸ At this time, Tanzania's President Nyerere also agreed to train 120 UNITA soldiers, while Zambia's President, Kenneth Kaunda, provided logistical support for UNITA supply lines into Angola.²⁰⁹ By the summer of 1975, Western sources reported that French weapons were reaching UNITA via South Africa, while Chinese and possibly South African weapons flowed into UNITA camps via Zambia.²¹⁰ Finally, in July, the United States began to finance and arm UNITA.²¹¹

²⁰⁵ Michael Kaufman, "Angola Faction Sees Abundant and Multiracial Future," *New York Times*, September 26, 1975.

²⁰⁶ Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 124.

²⁰⁷ See Thomas Johnson, "One Rebel Group Gains in Angola," *New York Times*, November 24, 1974. Savimbi later admitted that he had grossly exaggerated his army's strength.

²⁰⁸ Speech by UNITA Foreign Minister, Jorge Sangumba, March 14, 1976, printed in *Support the Second Anti-Colonial Struggle of the Angolan People*, p. 40.

²⁰⁹ Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 118.

²¹⁰ See Thomas Johnson, "Angola, Torn by Clashes, Drifting to Independence," *New York Times*, July 5, 1975, and Michael Kaufman, "Angola Faction Sees Abundant and Multiracial Future," *New York Times*, September 26, 1975.

²¹¹ In addition, UNITA's final communique from Huambo commended Senegal, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Zambia, Morocco, UAR, Gabon, Uganda for their assistance. See "Communique from the Political Bureau and Central Committee and the High Command of

Despite these nascent international contacts, UNITA's military arsenal could not compete with either MPLA or FNLA armies and their respective allies. To strengthen his position, Savimbi made two critical decisions; he agreed to form an alliance with the FNLA and he asked for South African military assistance. The first decision may have strengthened UNITA's political credibility, but did little to change the military balance. The second decision radically altered the military balance, but dramatically tainted Savimbi's political legitimacy. The political albatross eventually proved to be greater than the military asset.

Though communications must have been established well before the summer of 1975, the first South African intervention into Angola occurred on August 8, 1975.²¹² These initial South African troops were instructed to defend the Cunene hydroelectric project and train UNITA and FNLA soldiers.²¹³ The larger combat units did not enter until October 23, 1975. Under the alleged command of Daniel Chipenda,²¹⁴ a mechanized force of 800-1,000 South African commandos, combined with several thousand FNLA and UNITA soldiers and moved swiftly towards Luanda.²¹⁵ These flying columns captured Mocamedes by October 29th, Benguela and Lobito by November 7th, and Novo Redondo by November 15th.²¹⁶

While initially denying any connection with South Africa, Savimbi

UNITA," printed in *Support the Second Anti-Colonial Struggle of the Angolan People*, p. 31.

²¹² The Anti-Apartheid Movement chronicle of South Africa's intervention dates the first incursion over a year earlier in June 1974, only two months after the Portuguese coup. See Anti-Apartheid Movement, *South Africa's Invasion of Angola: The Facts*, (London) December 3, 1975, p. 1.

²¹³ For a detailed account of this part of the war, see Breyetenbach, *Forged in Battle*, in passim.

²¹⁴ See New York Times, September 24, 1975.

²¹⁵ This arsenal included 24-36 Panhard EBR armored cars with 90 mm. guns, 30-40 Marmon-Herrington light armored cars with light m-guns, 200 M-113 armored personnel carriers and Unimog trucks, mortars, and M-41 Bulldog tanks. See Sean Gervassi, *Continuing Escalation in the Angola Crisis*, (New York: Africa Fund, March 1976, pp. 3-5.

²¹⁶ Michael Kaufman, "Luanda Is Shattered But Joyful," *New York Times*, November 15, 1975.

recognized that UNITA guerrillas could not engage a battalion of Cuban conventional troops without assistance from well-trained soldiers. As Savimbi candidly admitted, "I agree that we have some white troops -- not soldiers, but technicians -- working for us here doing things that we don't know how to do. I need people to fight armored cars which we cannot operate ourselves. The MPLA had the Russians with them. We had to address ourselves to people who could match them."²¹⁷ Savimbi, however, gravely miscalculated both South Africa's will to fight his war without Western backing and the consequences of an alliance with apartheid. As explained earlier, South Africa was unwilling to march into Luanda, a mission which would have incurred high casualties and widespread international condemnation, without unambiguous Western support. When the Clark Amendment passed in the United States in December, South Africa gradually began to withdraw.²¹⁸ Moreover, once the alliance between UNITA and South Africa was exposed, most African governments, including most importantly Nigeria, rushed to recognize the MPLA regime.²¹⁹ In trying to counter the Cuban and Soviet presence with equal firepower from abroad, Savimbi's alliance with South Africa in effect legitimized the socialist internationals. Though most African leaders feared the "spread of communism" into southern Africa, South Africa was unequivocally the greater foe.

As the South Africans began to retreat, it became apparent that UNITA was no match for the regular army units marching towards the UNITA capital, Huambo. In a final communication from Huambo, the UNITA Politburo began to "convert with the utmost speed UNITA's army into a guerrilla force"²²⁰ to undertake the following mission;

²¹⁷ Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 141.

²¹⁸ See David Martin, "American Warships Are 'Off Angola'", *The Observer* January 11, 1976; and Sean Gervassi, *Continuing Escalation in the Angola Crisis*, p. 5.

²¹⁹ See "No 'Pacem' in Angola," *New York Times*, December 4, 1975. Once details of the South African intervention were revealed 41 of the 46 African countries recognized the MPLA. See Gerald Bender, "Angola: Left, Right and Wrong," *Foreign Policy*, No. 43 (Summer 1981), p. 57.

²²⁰ "Communique from the Political Bureau and Central Committee and the High Command of UNITA," February 10, 1976, printed in UNITA, *Angola's National Liberation Struggle Through 1976*, pp. 8-

For our freedom and our country we are determined to continue fighting -- in the fields, in the mountains, and valleys, until such time as the Cuban and Russian invaders suffer from the same final fate as the former Portuguese colonisers in Angola.²²¹

The Communique also promised that "There will be no peace in Angola ! no economic development ! no railroad traffic ! no working harbors while the Luanda regime hangs on to power by means of Cuban soldiers and Russian armour and fighter planes."²²² UNITA had lost this latest battle, but they had not quit the war. Fourteen years later, Savimbi was still fighting.

Conclusion: Impact of the Superpowers

Once Angola had deteriorated into a conventional civil war with major external intervention, the combination of Cuban soldiers and Stalin Organs decided the war's outcome.²²³ American diplomats cite the lack of UNITA and FNLA sophisticated firepower coupled with the infusion of Cuban troops as the reasons for MPLA victory.²²⁴ Even leftists concurred that "the MPLA could not have prevailed or hope to be victorious over international reactionary forces sponsored by world imperialism without Soviet and fraternal socialist solidarity of the international revolutionary forces..."²²⁵ While the MPLA tried to play down the importance of Soviet arms and Cuban troops in their

9.

²²¹ *IBID.*, p. 32.

²²² Political Bureau of the Central Committee of UNITA, "The Final Communique of the River Cuanza Conference," (Cuanza, ANgola: May 7-10, 1976), reprinted in UNITA, *Angola's National Liberation Struggle Through 1976*, (Toronto, Canada: Norman Bethune Institute, 1977), p.13.

²²³ Michael Kaufman, "Luanda's Armies Gain," *New York Times*, December 8, 1975.

²²⁴ Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, *News Release*, (Washington: Department of State) February 6, 1976, p. 5. See also David Binder, "Cubans With Soviet Arms Said to Turn Angola Tide," *New York Times*, December 8, 1975.

²²⁵ Azinna Nwafor, "The Liberation of Angola," *Monthly Review*, February 1976, p. 11.

military victory,²²⁶ they would not have won the civil war without external assistance. The international component was decisive in determining the outcome of this revolutionary situation, laying the groundwork for the transformational political and socio-economic changes to come after independence.

²²⁶ See Dial Torgerson, "Angola Obscures Role of Cuba in Civil War," *Washington Post*, June 23, 1976.

I. Soviet Foreign Policy: A Replay of Angola?

Unlike other conflicts in the Third World, the Rhodesian situation fit very neatly into the Soviet Manichean conception of world conflict. As already explained, in the Soviet analysis, the struggle in Rhodesia was not between white and black, but between the forces of imperialism and socialism. Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front survived only because the West ignored international sanctions, traded and invested actively with Rhodesia, and provided the Rhodesian security forces with military hardware and mercenaries for the Rhodesian army.¹ As one Soviet publication summarized, "It is clear that without the support of imperialism the life of the regime would not be long."²

If American imperialism was the enemy, the national liberation movements, and first and foremost ZAPU, were the allies of socialism in this conflict. As discussed in the previous chapter on Rhodesia, Joshua Nkomo's faction and its assorted organizational affiliations (ANC, NDP, ZAPU, and Patriotic Front) enjoyed consistent Soviet support throughout the national liberation struggle. After MPLA and FRELIMO victories in Angola and Mozambique, however, the level of contacts between the Soviet Union and ZAPU increased dramatically. From 1976 until 1979, high-level ZAPU delegations travelled to Moscow almost once every six months.³

Tactics of National Liberation: Armed Struggle versus Negotiations

The success of the MPLA in the Angolan war confirmed the

¹ See for example, *Radio Moscow*, in English for Africa, 11 December 1972, (SWB, SU/4167/A5/2), *Pravda*, June 8, 1974. *Radio Peace and Progress*, June 5 and 7, 1976 (SWB, SU/5229/A5/1).

² *Soviet News*, August 8, 1978.

³ See *Pravda*, March 6, 1976. Cited here from *CDSP*, volume 19, #10, 1976, p. 19; TASS statement, March 5, 1977 (SWB, SU/5456/A5/1); *Pravda*, March 9, 1977, *Daily Telegraph*, March 3, 1977; TASS statement, 6 January 1978, (SWB, SU/5708/A5/1); and *Soviet News*, January 24, 1978; *Radio Moscow*, home service, 8 August 1978, (SWB, SU/5887/A5/3). *Radio Moscow*, home service, 21 November 1978, (SWB, SU/5976/A5/2). TASS, statement, 27 March 1979, (SWB, SU/6079/A5/1).

Soviet approach to national liberation; armed struggle carried out by a marxist-leninist vanguard produces a socialist oriented state. In urging their Zimbabwean allies to follow the examples of the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the PAIGC, Soviet strategists affirmed that armed struggle was the "principle weapon of the liberation movement," and the "only way to gain independence."⁴ By crushing the state and economic structures of the old regime, armed struggle also established the groundwork for building a new social order. To crush the state and defeat imperialism, Soviet decisionmakers saw the necessity of escalating the liberation war to a conventional scale.⁵ According to the Soviet theory of liberation struggle, there existed a continuum between the lower stage of guerilla stage and the higher, even ultimate stage of conventional war. Citing the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, a major Defense Ministry study on armed struggle in Africa stated that "one cannot conduct a prolonged contemporary war using guerilla methods against a strong and experienced opponent with the weapons of the latest word in technology. A conventional war is needed, military specialists are needed, conventional armed forces are needed."⁶ According to this view, the liberation wars in Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, and Angola all evolved from guerilla struggles to semi-conventional and conventional wars.⁷ From Moscow's vantage point, it seemed logical to assume that the Zimbabwean liberation struggle would end in the same way.⁸

⁴ *Radio Moscow*, 4 June 1973, (SWB,SU/4313/2); K. Uralov, "The Acute Problem of Southern Africa", *International Affairs*, No. 5, May 1977, p. 112.

⁵ Author's interviews with Rostislav Ulyanovsky, (Moscow, March 7, 1991) and Edward Samoilo (December 7, 1990).

⁶ *Voorzhennaya Bor'ba Narodov Afriki za Svobodu i Nezavisimost'*, p. 46. Quoting Che Guevara who said that the guerilla war is only one step in a general struggle to final victory, this study later explicitly states that "only the transformation of guerilla units into units of a conventional type and the bringing of crushing blows to the government army are capable of securing the final success to the performance of the insurgents.", (p. 55).

⁷ *IBID.*, pp. 54-55. See also N. Mel'nik, "V Bor'be za Nezavisimost'", *Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 11, 1984, p. 58.

⁸ Author's interview with a Soviet diplomat in Zimbabwe, July 1988. This Soviet official, in another part of Africa at the time, stressed that Soviet decisions about policy towards the liberation were made in Moscow, usually with very little information about the local conditions. Therefore, it was standard practice to draw upon experiences from one country to formulate

Negotiations

Because of this firm adherence to "armed struggle" as the preferred method of national liberation, Soviet officials were highly suspicious of American and British negotiation proposals as a means of attaining independence.⁹ In 1976, Moscow denounced Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" as concrete evidence of imperialist involvement in supporting the Smith regime.¹⁰ Soviet President Podgorny and Prime Minister Kosygin in their message to the Chairman of the OAU Summit Meeting in July (1976), warned that "the opponents of the national and social emancipation of peoples" had "not downed arms" but were "maneuvering, trying to revenge themselves for their defeat in Angola".¹¹ When Kissinger's Geneva Conference failed, Soviet press accounts celebrated the event as a victory for the forces of national liberation.¹²

Soviet attitudes toward negotiations remained equally skeptical of the fresh initiatives proposed by the American U.N. Ambassador, Andrew Young, and the British Foreign Minister, David Owen, calling the initiative "an attempt to legalize the Smith regime and maintain and strengthen racist domination".¹³ When Great Britain announced the opening of the Lancaster House conference in the fall of 1979, the Soviet press declared that "With this manoeuvre Britain and other Western countries are trying to impose a so-called settlement of the Rhodesian problem which would ensure international recognition of the puppet regime and consequently the removal of economic sanctions."¹⁴ Even after the Patriotic Front signed the Lancaster House agreement, Soviet officials initially refused to recognize the agreement or the elections, as evidence of ballot-stuffing and intimidation, "patently testify to close cooperation of the actions between the

policy towards another country in the same region, irrespective of divergent circumstances in the two places.

⁹ Diplomatic tactics were not always rejected as a form of liberation. See Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World*, chapter four.

¹⁰ *Izvestiya*, May 6, 1976.

¹¹ TASS, July 2, 1976, in *African Contemporary Record*, 1976-1977, p. A78.

¹² *Pravda*, January 5, 1977.

¹³ TASS statement, 21 April 1977, (SWB, SU/5494/A5/1).

¹⁴ *Radio Moscow*, home service, September 11, 1979, (SWB, SU/6217/A5/1), and *Soviet News*, August 14, 1979.

Tory Government, the Smith-Muzorewa clique and the Pretoria racists . . . The aim of their conspiracy is to frustrate by any means the holding of genuinely democratic elections in Rhodesia, and to prevent the formation of a free, democratic and independent African state in Zimbabwe."¹⁵ Though rhetorically committed to peaceful solutions, Soviet decisionmakers knew that a socialist-oriented state would not emerge from a Western-sponsored settlement plan.

The Soviet Role

Before the Lancaster House settlement, Moscow attempted to foster such a socialist-oriented outcome by (1) establishing the preconditions for waging the national liberation struggle, (2) providing an example of a revolution with an accompanying ideology, and (3) rendering direct material assistance to the national liberation forces.

This first role was an old standard. The Russian Revolution had altered the balance of international forces so as to allow for the development of revolutionary movements elsewhere.¹⁶ Because, "the imperialist' scope for aggression action is limited and localised thanks to the present might of the world socialist system . . . "¹⁷ revolutionary movements in peripheral places like Zimbabwe were able to develop. The victories in Angola and Mozambique not only attested to this interpretation of detente, but made "inevitable" the victory of the national liberation forces in Zimbabwe.

The People's Republic of Mozambique and the People's Republic of Angola are not simply two new progressive states in the south of Africa. They are today as it were the crest of the mighty anti-colonial, anti-racist wave. Is it not symbolic that your borders with Rhodesia and RSA have become not only inter-state but class borders? The wind of freedom blows from Mozambique and Angola, inspiring the patriots of all southern Africa.¹⁸

¹⁵ *Izvestiya*, January 2, 1980.

¹⁶ See Leonid Brezhnev, *World Marxist Review*, No. 8, 1969, p. 4; and author's interview with Rostislav Ulyanovsky (March 7, 1991).

¹⁷ R. Ulyanovsky, *Socialism and the Newly Developing Nations*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 9.

¹⁸ Soviet President Podgorny at a state dinner in Mozambique, March 29, 1977, cited in Morris Rothenburg, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power*, (Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980, p. 185-186. See also Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, *Our*

In the Soviet analysis, this potential emerged because the socialist system of states constrained imperialist aggression against the liberation movements.¹⁹

Second, Soviet observers claimed that the revolutionary experience and marxist-leninist ideology of the USSR provided the Zimbabwean revolutionaries with both a model and method for undertaking revolution change. According to Soviet theoreticians and policymakers alike, the Russian Revolution stood as a symbol and source of inspiration for all future revolutionaries, and and "brought home to the Africans the simple truth that imperialism can be defeated, reaction can be overcome, foreign intervention and counter-revolution can be beaten back and crushed."²⁰ While Soviet leaders warned that the Soviet model could not be transplanted *en toto* to the different conditions of the African terrain, they still emphasized that the Russian experience still offered many lessons to their revolutionary democratic comrades in Zimbabwe.²¹

Third and finally, Soviet leaders took concrete actions to escalate the revolutionary process in Zimbabwe by increasing material support to the national liberation struggle. As early as 1971, the final communique at the 24th CPSU Congress declared that, "The CPSU is invariably true to the Leninist principle of solidarity with the peoples fighting for national liberation and social emancipation. As in the past, the fighters against the

Course: Peace and Socialism, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1980), p. 12; and Rostislav Ulyanovsky, *National Liberation*, (Moscow: Progress, 1978), p. 235.

¹⁹ TASS statement, June 6, 1977.

²⁰ Gromyko, "Soviet Foreign Policy in Africa," *International Affairs*, No. 9, 1967, p. 24. See also B.G. Gafurov, "Velikii Oktyabr i Natsionalno-Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie", *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, #5, 1967, and A.A. Gromyko "The October Revolution and Africa's Destiny", *International Affairs* (Moscow), #9, 1972.

²¹ Author's interview with Ulyanovsky (March 7, 1991). Ulyanovsky, however, was quick to add that in his several dozen meetings with ZAPU's leadership during the liberation war, the CPSU never demanded that ZAPU adopt a socialist-orientation. (This was confirmed in an interview with Joshua Nkomo's Russian interpreter, who attended all of Nkomo's meetings while in Moscow. Moscow, March 9, 1991). Rather, Ulyanovsky stated that the Soviet leadership simply believed in the inevitability of the world revolutionary process whereby every country would eventually turn to socialism.

remaining colonial regimes can count on our full support."²² The new Soviet Constitution of 1977 even contained a new section on foreign policy which made support for liberation struggles a national obligation.²³ While in Africa in 1977, Soviet President Podgorny asserted that

Experience provides convincing evidence that success in the struggle against neocolonialism and imperialism can be achieved only if the liberated states strengthen their unity of action and develop close cooperation with the countries of the socialist commonwealth and interaction with all world's progressive forces.²⁴

Soviet pronouncements even asserted that a "lack of unity and close ties with the forces of socialism and the international communist and working-class movement" would lead to the defeat of the liberation struggle and "pave the way for the country's bourgeois-capitalist development."²⁵

Soviet-ZAPU Military Relations

While Soviet leaders disclaimed charges about the "export of revolution" to Africa, they boasted about their support to the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.²⁶ First and foremost, the Soviet Union supplied military hardware to ZIPRA guerrillas.²⁷ While accurate statistics still are not available, the quality and quantity of arms destined for ZAPU increased dramatically in 1976.²⁸ As early as February of 1976,

²² 24th Congress of the CPSU, (Moscow, 1971), p. 215. The 25th CPSU Congress cited the "liquidation" of the colonial system in southern Africa as "one of the most important international tasks" *Materiali XXV Sezda KPSS*, (Moskva: 1976), p. 26.

²³ Brezhnev, "For the Happiness of the Soviet People", March 2, 1979, reprinted in Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, p. 28.

²⁴ *Pravda*, March 31, 1977, p. 4.

²⁵ Ulyanovsky, *Socialism and the Newly Developing Nations*, p. 26. See also Colonel Malinovskii "Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noye Dvizheniye na Sovremenom Etap", *Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 24, December 1979, p. 33.

²⁶ See, for example, Brezhnev, "For the Happiness of the Soviet People", 28; Brezhnev's speech on Africa Liberation Day, issued by TASS, May 24, 1979, (SWB, SU/6126/A5/1).

²⁷ Col. Yuri Sverdlov, "Support and Assistance," *Soviet Military Review*, October 1987, p. 45.

²⁸ Author's interviews with Vasily Solodovnikov, Soviet Ambassador to Zambia at the time, (Moscow: September 1989).

"intelligence sources reported" the arrival of Soviet T54 and T34 tanks, SAM-7 missiles, and 122 millimeter rocket launchers in the Mozambican port of Beira, signalling what one reporter called "an all-out effort" to support nationalist military victory in Zimbabwe.²⁹ Similarly, the *New York Times* reported in the fall of 1976;

The Soviet Union is increasing military aid to Rhodesian guerrillas, according to U.S. intelligence reports.

Intelligence sources say a Soviet ship unloaded 18 heavy gunned armored vehicles and ammunition in Tanzania in recent days. Tanzania has served as a relay point for Soviet arms bound for the black Rhodesian guerrillas, the sources say.

This report followed an intelligence dispatch saying that a Tanzanian ship had delivered Soviet 122-millimeter multi-rocket launchers and armored vehicles to Mozambique, a staging area for guerilla attacks into white-ruled Rhodesia.³⁰

Reports in 1978 noted a significant increase in Soviet conventional weapons coming into southern Africa, including tanks, artillery guns, SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles.³¹ The Soviet Union, then, was preparing its ZAPU ally for the transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare.³² Though largely inappropriate for waging a guerrilla war, these weapons would have been decisive in an all-out conventional war. In describing the struggles in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, Rostislav Ulyanovsky, then a Deputy Secretary in the

²⁹ *The Daily Telegraph*, February 14, 1976.

³⁰ *New York Times*, November 18, 1976. *Daily Telegraph* reported that 18 Soviet armored cars had also been unloaded in Dar es Salaam on the same day. *The Daily Telegraph*, November 18, 1976.

³¹ *New York Times*, April 16, 1978; J.K. Cilliers, *Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 201; *Intelligence Digest*, May 16, 1979, p. 3; *Africa Research Bulletin*, April 1-30, 1978, p. 4831. The presence of SAM-7 missiles was disclosed when one was used to shoot down a Viscount civilian jet on September, 1978. Shortly thereafter, "intelligence" sources revealed that ZAPU had acquired 137 of these missiles from the Soviet Union. See *Rand Daily Mail*, (Johannesburg), 15 September 1978; and *The Daily Telegraph* 15 September 1978.

³² Author's interview with Edward Samoilov, (Moscow, December 7, 1990). See also Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, *Chimurenga: The War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980*, (Marshalltown, RSA: Sygma Books, 1982), p. 199.

International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, claimed that the infusion of Soviet assistance "enabled the freedom fighters ... to change over to a fundamentally new stage in the armed struggle -- offensive operations in capturing heavily fortified enemy strongholds."³³ In the final years of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, Soviet planners were gearing up ZIPRA for a similar capability.

These shipments of military hardware were accompanied by an infusion of Soviet, Cuban and East German advisors into southern Africa to train ZIPRA soldiers and assist in planning ZIPRA military strategy, while ZIPRA guerrillas continued to train to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.³⁴ After the MPLA victory in 1976, Angola became a major host for ZIPRA training centers run by Cuban military advisors.³⁵ By 1978, intelligence sources estimated that over 3000 East German advisors were stationed in Zambia, joining several hundred Cuban advisors already there.³⁶

These Soviet advisors played a direct role in organizing and planning ZIPRA strategy.³⁷ According to one account, "The Soviet Ambassador to Zambia, Vassily Solodovnikov, a senior K.G.B. official [sic], assigned a twelve-man Soviet advisory team to ZIPRA, headed by Colonel Vladimir Buchiyev" which was sent to Lusaka "to reorganize the ZPRA [sic] strategy."³⁸ The main

³³ Ulyanovsky, *National Liberation*, p. 346.

³⁴ See for instance the *Times*, 18 May 1977; *Daily Telegraph*, 22 May 1977; and author's interview with Ambassador Vasily Solodovnikov, (September 1989).

³⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, June 10, 1978; *Africa Research Bulletin*, January 1-31, 1978, p. 4721.

³⁶ See the *Sunday Telegraph*, July 1, 1979; the *Daily Telegraph*, May 28, 1979; the *Times*, January 19, 1978; *International Herald Tribune*, June 10, 1978; and *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, Hearing, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 95th, 2nd session, May 12, 1978, (Washington: GPO, 1978), p. 22.

³⁷ Author's interviews with Vasily Solodovnikov, (September 1989), and a ZAPU official who participated in ZAPU's War Council meetings, (Harare, July 1988). See also *The Guardian*, 19 January 1979; Cilliers, *Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 37; and Nkomo, *Nkomo*, pp. 176-177.

³⁸ M. Evans, *Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1971-1979*, Series No. 37, (Salisbury: Historical Association of Zimbabwe, 1981), p. 78. Whether or not a KGB official, Solodovnikov was in Lusaka at the time as the Soviet Ambassador to Zambia, and did have almost daily contact with the ZAPU leadership. (Author's interview with Vasily Solodovnikov, December 8, 1990,

Soviet contribution to ZIPRA military planning was the introduction of conventional contingencies.³⁹ According to Rhodesian intelligence sources, "they [the Soviet advisors] revamped the complete strategy of the ZIPRA war effort, emphasizing the need to go onto a conventional war footing, but in the meantime, making the maximum use of their existing guerilla-trained terrorists, to commence paving the way for entry into Rhodesia of conventional forces."⁴⁰

The Soviet assistance program was designed to bestow ZIPRA with a level of military sophistication capable of defeating the Rhodesian forces independently.⁴¹ However, if outside assistance was necessary, or if external armies (i.e. South Africa) became involved, Soviet statements implied that the socialist community would be prepared to render direct assistance.⁴² One such contingency was called the Vivo Plan.⁴³ Construed as a response to the internal settlement, the "Vivo Plan" called for the Patriotic Front to enter Zimbabwe in the north and declare independence as an alternative to "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia". As Martin and Johnson describe,

Vivo's plan was that Nkomo and Mugabe should be taken into one of the guerilla-controlled areas of Zimbabwe from Mozambique and, before Muzorewa was sworn in, should pronounce the formation of the Government of Zimbabwe headed by Nkomo with Mugabe as the number two man in charge of defence. Journalists would be taken into the country to record the ceremony and a substantial number of Socialist bloc, African and Caribbean countries, possibly as many as sixty, would recognize the Patriotic Front government within a matter of days thereby confronting Western countries with the dilemma that if they recognized Muzorewa they would be

Moscow,³⁹)

³⁹ This information is based largely on reports from the ZIPRA side of the relationship, described in further detail in the following section on ZAPU.

⁴⁰ Daly, *Selous Scouts*, p. 406. See also, Cilliers, *Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 191.

⁴¹ Interview by the author with a former ZIPRA commander, (Harare, July 1988).

⁴² President Podgorny's speech at a guest dinner with President Kenneth Kaunda, in Lusaka, March 29, 1977, in *Pravda*, March 30, 1977, p.4. Cited here from *CDSP*, Vol. XXIX, #12, p. ?. See also a similar speech given at a reception by President Julius Nyerere in Dar es Salaam, in *Pravda* March 24, 1977, in *CDSP*, Vol. XXIX, #12, p. 11.

⁴³ See for instance, *The International Herald Tribune*, January 13, 1977 or the *New York Times*, March 17, 1978.

declaring their opposition to the Patriotic Front and its supporters.⁴⁴

The inevitable conventional attack by Rhodesian forces would then be repelled by the "sovereign state of Zimbabwe" with the fraternal and legal assistance of Mozambique, Cuba and the Soviet Union.⁴⁵

The Vivo plan was never operationalized, but its formulation attests to the level of the Soviet commitment to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Other ZIPRA military contingencies involving conventional forces would have provided the opportunity, if necessary, for direct military involvement of Soviet and Cuban advisors.⁴⁶ Though never realized, the potential for another Soviet intervention in southern Africa was real.

Soviet-ZANU Military Relations

While Soviet official statements recognized the Patriotic Front as the leading revolutionary force in Zimbabwe and ZANU as a legitimate liberation movement, almost all Soviet military assistance was channelled through ZAPU. Though Soviet AK-47's did fall into ZANLA hands, and Soviet heavy artillery defended ZANU camps in Mozambique, this assistance was not earmarked by Moscow for ZANU.⁴⁷ Despite pleas from Robert Mugabe, Samora Machel and Julius Nyerere, Soviet decision-makers refrained from supporting two separate militias.⁴⁸ ZANU overtures to the Soviet

⁴⁴ Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p. 306.

⁴⁵ For the "legal" reasoning of such assistance, see Gleb Starushenko, "XXV s'ezd KPSS o Pressivnykh Izmeniyakh V Ozbodivshikhsya Stranakh i Povishenii Ikh Roli v Mirovom Razvitii", *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, no. 7, 1976.

⁴⁶ These contingencies are described in detail in the following section.

⁴⁷ Soviet weapons trickled into ZANU's hands through the OAU Liberation Committee. Likewise, Samora Machel gave ZANU Soviet weapons supplied to him. See "Can It Last", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 20, #12, June 6, 1979, p. 2, and "Nkomo's Isolation", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 20, #13, June 20, 1979, p.1.

⁴⁸ See Keith Somerville, "U.S.S.R. and Southern Africa Since 1976", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1984, p. 92.; and author's interviews with Jose Ramos Horta, (May 1988) a close associate of Machel's living in Maputo during the last years of the Rhodesian war; and Rostislav Ulyanovsky (March 7, 1991).

Union were answered with invitations from Moscow to join ZAPU.⁴⁹

As most accounts of the Zimbabwean liberation war depict ZANU as the more radical movement, and ZANLA as the more engaged fighting force, the paucity of military cooperation between the Soviet Union and ZANU was not related to ideology or military capability.⁵⁰ Though Soviet leaders unquestionably suffered from poor information in assessing the southern African terrain, their close relationship with Mozambique must have informed them about the development of the war in Rhodesia. The Soviet military "miscalculation" in backing ZAPU, however, stemmed from the Soviet theory of guerilla war. While ZANU may have been the dominant force in the guerilla war, the Soviet conception of the liberation war posited that the final victor would be the force which prevailed in the semi-conventional or conventional phase of the struggle, a conception which recently had been vindicated in the outcome of the Angolan liberation struggle.

Moreover, Angola also "proved" that the most popular movement had no mandate to rule. While UNITA stood the best chance of winning a popular election in Angola in 1975, the transition process to independence never offered the opportunity for popular elections. Rather, the government in Luanda was "chosen" on the conventional battlefield. Consequently, Moscow's backing of ZAPU despite its obvious minority status within Zimbabwe was not unreasonable. According to the logic of Angola, the ability to seize Salisbury was more important than the ability to win the "hearts and minds" of the Zimbabwean countryside. Finally, as already mentioned, the Soviet Union enjoyed a longstanding and stable relationship with ZAPU, rare among Soviet relations with other liberation movements.⁵¹ This relationship provided easy channels of communication and assistance which did not exist between the Soviet Union and

⁴⁹ Author's interview with Eduard Samoïlov, (December 7, 1990)

⁵⁰ Of course, ZANU relations with China greatly discredited the liberation movement from Moscow's vantage point. However, unlike other Chinese allies in the region at the time, Moscow only rarely denounced ZANU as ultra-leftists or maoists.

⁵¹ Author's interview with Vasily Solodovnikov, (September 1989).

ZANU.⁵² The inertia of this relationship created a tremendous inherent barrier to improved contacts with ZANU. While Soviet policymakers had no serious prejudices against ZANU, their network of contacts with ZAPU conditioned their activities in southern Africa, a situation which would have lasting consequences for Soviet policy regarding national liberation movements thereafter.

II. American Foreign Policy: From Confrontation to Cooption

The Kissinger Initiative, 1976

The Angolan debacle fundamentally altered American foreign policy towards Rhodesia. Learning from his experiences in Angola, Kissinger abandoned a confrontational strategy regarding the liberation movements and instead sought to coopt them into a peace settlement consistent with American interests in the region.⁵³

The basic definition of American interests in the region did not change from those outlined in NSSM 39; U.S. policymakers still sought to preserve the Western orientation of the Rhodesian state and save the country from becoming another domino of communist expansion in southern Africa.⁵⁴ As Kissinger warned, the "United States would not tolerate a future Soviet and Cuban venture in Africa."⁵⁵ Kissinger advised that the West had to impede not only an external communist threat to Rhodesia, but also the "radicalization" process taking place within the liberation movement. As he explained in July of 1976,

⁵² Moreover, the historical relationship between China and ZANU made direct communications between the Soviet Union and ZANU very difficult.

⁵³ See Kissinger's testimony in *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 198.

⁵⁴ On "dominoes", see Kissinger, August 2, 1976, in *DOSB*, August 23, 1976, p. 260. For a description of this approach to international politics, see Ross Gregory, "The Domino Theory" in Alexander DeConde, ed. *The Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribener's Sons, 1978). Despite the tremendous influence of this metaphor on American policymaking, scholarly work on the domino theory is sparse.

⁵⁵ Interview with Henry Kissinger, April 16, 1988, in *DOSB*, May 10, 1976, p. 605.

Events in Angola encouraged radicals to press for a military solution in Rhodesia. With radical influence on the rise and with immense outside military strength apparently behind the radicals, even moderate and responsible African leaders -- firm proponents of peaceful change -- began to conclude there was no alternative but to embrace the cause of violence.⁵⁶

Similar to his rhetoric regarding Angola, Kissinger argued that the consequences of this radicalization process would reach beyond Rhodesia, beyond southern Africa, and even beyond Africa.

Time is running out. If we can't get negotiations started in Rhodesia by the end of the year, it will be a bloody mess. At issue is not only the future of two African states in southern Africa but the potential evolution of all Africa with its profound impact on Europe and the Middle East.⁵⁷

The perceived escalating threat of "radicalization" and direct Soviet intervention imbued the Zimbabwean independence struggle with new importance for American statesmen. Whereas in 1974, Kissinger did not even know who Mugabe was, Rhodesia now emerged as a country vital to the security of the United States and the "free world" as a whole.⁵⁸ For the first time since the beginning of the Zimbabwean war, the United States became directly involved.

We came to the conclusion that the conditions in Africa -- of the United States play a more active role [sic] -- would lead inexorably to great-power involvement, to a major risk of war, or to the radicalization of the entire continent.

And we concluded that it was in the interest of peace, in the interest of security, and in the interest of the United States and in the interest of Africa that the United States make a major effort. Because otherwise we

⁵⁶ Kissinger, reports to Congress on his visits to Latin America, Western Europe, and Africa, June 17, 1976, *DOSB*, July 12, 1976, p. 46. Kissinger's assessment of the Soviet threat in Rhodesia was widespread at the time. See, for instance, "Poised between Peace and War", *Time*, October 11, 1976, p. 32, and John Marcum, "Forcing the Pace", *The Nation*, November 12, 1977.

⁵⁷ Kissinger as quoted in *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1976-77, p. A31.

⁵⁸ During his prepared remarks at a new conference on September 8, 1976, President Ford explicitly stated that the violent situation in Rhodesia might threaten the national security of the United States. See *DOSB*, September 27, 1976, p. 385.

saw only a deteriorating situation.⁵⁹

Retreating from past practices candidly recognized as shortsighted and negligent,⁶⁰ Kissinger sought to alter the alliance of forces in the conflict by undermining the so-called "natural" alliance between the Soviet Union and the national liberation movement. While asserting that "external intervention ... can only diminish African self-determination and undermine the integrity of the continent,"⁶¹ Kissinger sought to establish an American voice in the definition of the new Zimbabwean regime in place of the Soviets.⁶² To do so, Kissinger seized the initiative on a Rhodesian peace settlement. Though U.S. decision-makers recognized Great Britain as legally responsible for Rhodesia's fate, they also understood that London was neither prepared nor capable to launch a peace process in 1976. As British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland affirmed on the eve of Kissinger's first trip to Africa, "For the moment, the U.K. Government does not intend to take any further new initiative."⁶³ Kissinger did, in fact, use the peace proposal outlined by Prime Minister Callaghan as the basis for his initiative, but at this stage in the negotiation process, Kissinger clearly had assumed the leading role on behalf of the Western world.

I believe that a combination of factors has produced a situation where the United States, alone in the world, is in a position to make a contribution to avoiding a conflagration. We have this responsibility, which we did not seek.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Kissinger, news conference, August 31, 1976, in *DOSB*, September 20, 1976, p. 362.

⁶⁰ Statement of William Schaufele, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, in *U.S. Policy Toward Africa* (1976) p. 112.

⁶¹ Address by Secretary Kissinger, Monrovia, Liberia, April 30, 1976, in *DOSB*, May 31, 1976, p. 684.

⁶² Kissinger, news conference, April 26, 1976, in *DOSB*, May 31, 1976, p. 695. Upon his return from Africa, Kissinger declared that southern Africa has become "one of the most compelling problems of our time." See Kissinger, "The Challenges of Africa", August 31, 1976, in *IBID.*, September 20, 1976, p. 349.

⁶³ British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, in joint News Conference with Henry Kissinger, April 24, 1976, Waddington, England, in *DOSB* May 31, 1976, p. 689. See also Enoch Powell, 21 October 1976, quoted in *African Contemporary Record*, 1976-1977, p. A44.

⁶⁴ Kissinger, news conference, Lusaka, Zambia, September 17, 1976, in *DOSB*, October 25, 1976, p. 518.

Kissinger outlined the main components of the new American strategy toward Rhodesia in his celebrated speech in Lusaka on April 27, 1976. Most importantly, Kissinger declared that the white minority regime could no longer depend on the United States for support, as the United States now supported a quick transition to majority rule.⁶⁵ Kissinger's new approach to the Rhodesian conflict treated majority rule not only as a goal but as a strategy for achieving and maintaining other more salient U.S. interests--the containment of both Soviet expansion and local radicalism, and the formation of a black government in Zimbabwe friendly to free market enterprise.⁶⁶ Finally realizing that America's long-time allies in Rhodesia soon would lose the war, Kissinger wanted to disengage quietly from these parties and search for new friends in an independent Zimbabwe.

That Kissinger saw the necessity of a black government in an independent Zimbabwe did not imply a sweeping endorsement of the national liberation movements. On the contrary, Kissinger hoped to establish a moderate black government in Zimbabwe, friendly to both Western interests and white participation in the government and economy. As Kissinger explained during his second trip to Africa, it was an American aim "to provide moderate African leaders with an enlightened alternative to the grim prospects so rapidly taking place before them."⁶⁷ After leaving office, Kissinger was even more candid in his explanation of American policy; "We could meet the demand for majority rule, we never thought we could co-opt the ideological radicals; our goal was to isolate them."⁶⁸ In seeking this kind of negotiated settlement, American diplomats made assurances to whites in Rhodesia that American support for majority rule in Zimbabwe did not threaten their interests but rather insured them in the long run. According to Kissinger, "...the best hope for the white minorities in countries like Rhodesia and

⁶⁵ Kissinger, "United States Policy and Southern Africa", address made in Lusaka, April 27, 1976, in *DOSB*, May 31, 1976, pp. 674-5.

⁶⁶ Author's interview with two American diplomats working in the region at the time, (Harare, 1988 & 1989).

⁶⁷ Kissinger, June 17, 1976, *DOSB*, July 12, 1976, p. 46.

⁶⁸ Interview with Kissinger in the *Washington Post*, July 3, 1979. Quoted from David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), p. 236.

Namibia is a negotiated solution with moderate black leaders, before the radical elements take over perhaps supported by foreign powers."⁶⁹

To bring about a settlement of the Rhodesian conflict, Kissinger embarked upon a shuttle diplomacy mission analogous to his undertakings in the Middle East. First, Kissinger worked to convene a conference comprised of representatives from all the factions by providing in advance the terms of a settlement process.⁷⁰ Kissinger personally delivered his package to Ian Smith. To bring Smith on board, Kissinger solicited assistance from Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.⁷¹ Vorster responded by sending several blunt signals to the Smith regime. In May 1976, Vorster informed Smith that South Africa would not intervene to save the Smith regime. In June, South Africa cancelled all defense aid to Rhodesia which amounted to 50% of the total Rhodesian defense budget. In July, oil shipments to Rhodesia from South Africa were reduced and rail lines up to Rhodesia suddenly became congested. Finally in August, South Africa withdrew 40 helicopters from Rhodesia which Smith had no way of replacing. The message could not have been clearer; South Africa had given up on Rhodesia.⁷²

At Vorster's behest, Smith met with Kissinger on September 22nd in Johannesburg. Two days later, Ian Smith -- who only few months earlier declared that Africans would not come to power in Rhodesia in a thousand years -- delivered a dramatic speech over Rhodesian radio in which he accepted the principle of majority rule

⁶⁹ Kissinger, Questions and Answers, July 1, 1976, in *DOSB*, August 2, 1976, pp. 158-159.

⁷⁰ For the full list of terms, see Michael Clough, ed., *Changing Realities in Southern Africa*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1986). p. 22.

⁷¹ State Department Responses to Additional Written Questions Submitted by Congressman Diggs, in *Rhodesia: Implications for U.S. Policy*, Hearings, p.75. In soliciting Vorster's help, Kissinger emphasized his critical distinction between the legitimate white South African regime and the "colonial" white governments in Rhodesia and Namibia. Kissinger, news conference, August 31, 1976, in *DOSB*, September 20, 1976, p. 362.

⁷² For details on these actions, see the interview with Eschel Rhodie, South African Secretary for Information, *New York Times*, May 14, 1976; and *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1976-1977, p. A32.

in Rhodesia within two years.⁷³

Having gained Smith's agreement to his proposals, Kissinger began to court "moderate" black leaders and isolate the "radicals". He stated candidly that "We have a stake, however, in not having the whole continent become radical and move in a direction that is incompatible with Western interests."⁷⁴ He respected Bishop Muzorewa, the leader of the internal African National Council, and believed that he and others like him might share his vision of an independent Zimbabwe. If his proposed peace conference could commence with the blessing of the international community, a black Zimbabwean government might be able to take over which did not include the "radical" elements. As for ZAPU and ZANU, Kissinger did not even negotiate directly with them but communicated his proposals through the leaders of the Frontline States. He assumed that moderate elements in both organizations, would accept his plan. If they did not, a negotiated settlement could be pursued with other more moderate black Zimbabwean leaders, legitimated by the fact that the "radicals" had been offered a settlement providing majority rule and rejected it.⁷⁵ In the spring of 1976, Kissinger thought his strategy was working; "...Our active concern has increased the possibility that the moderate African leaders can take the lead away from "the men with guns" ...⁷⁶

The Geneva Conference and Kissinger's Exit

The Rhodesian Front, FROLIZI, the African National Council (ANC), and the Patriotic Front (comprised of ZAPU and ZANU) all met for the first time on October 25, 1976 in Geneva, fulfilling Kissinger's immediate aim of convening a peace conference.⁷⁷ This

⁷³ According to a senior minister in Smith's cabinet at the time, this meeting between Smith, Vorster, and Kissinger was pivotal in convincing Smith that he must compromise. (Author's interview, July 19, 1989).

⁷⁴ Kissinger, May 11, 1976, in *DOSB*, June 7, 1976, p. 727.

⁷⁵ Robert Price, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978), p. 44.

⁷⁶ Kissinger, Prepared Statement, in *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, (1976), p. 194.

⁷⁷ The Rhodesian Front was Ian Smith's organization. FROLIZI was created by former ZAPU leaders James Chikerema and George Nyandoro after their fallout with J.Z. Moyo. The African National Council, originally an internal wing of ZAPU, had become

convocation, however, was all Kissinger achieved. Ian Smith did not come to Geneva to negotiate.⁷⁸ Despite mounting pressures from South Africa and the escalation of military activity along the Mozambique border, Smith still was not convinced of his inevitable doom.⁷⁹ Rather, Rhodesian Front officials believed that a good showing at Geneva might be cause for lifting sanctions and thereby improve their chances of winning the war.⁸⁰ Neither did the Patriotic Front enthusiastically participate in the conference. As head of ZANU's delegation, Mugabe had agreed reluctantly to attend the conference only to please his Frontline state allies. As the following section discusses, ZANU at the time was in the midst of a leadership struggle and reconsolidation, and therefore not ready to negotiate. Nkomo was more optimistic. As the senior figure of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, he believed he could become the first black prime minister of Zimbabwe if an election were held in 1976. Yet, Nkomo also realized that any settlement without ZANU's participation would be meaningless. Both Muzorewa and James Chikerema, the FROLIZI leader, had high hopes for a settlement at Geneva, but their opinions mattered very little as neither commanded armies.

The conference was preordained to fail, and fail it did. The parties could not even agree on the format of the negotiations, let alone the substantive issues surrounding the transition to majority rule. By December, all parties had returned to Africa to continue the war.

The Carter Administration 1977-1980

Under the Carter Administration, "Africa, which was in many

independent under its moderate leader Bishop Muzorewa.

⁷⁸ See "Rhodesia Strategy Memorandum", in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, Vol. 2, p. 202.

⁷⁹ See Stephen Low, "The Zimbabwe Settlement, 1976-1979", in Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation: Theory and Practice*, (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 92. Low was an American diplomat who worked as the American liaison for Rhodesia during the Carter Administration.

⁸⁰ See, most candidly, Ted Sutton Pryce, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister, *Financial Times*, November 1, 1976. According to a Rhodesian General interviewed by the author, Western sanctions influenced the ability of the Rhodesian army to conduct the war. A shortage of aircraft was particularly difficult. (Author's interview, Harare, July 25, 1989).

ways in prior years peripheral to American global policy, has come on the center stage today."⁸¹ The appointments of Andrew Young as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Donald McHenry as Young's assistant, David Newsom as Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Richard Moose as the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and Anthony Lake as the Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, --all men with considerable experience and interest in Africa -- attested to the importance assigned to Africa.⁸² Above all else, the new Administration wanted to facilitate the resolution of conflicts in Rhodesia, Namibia, and even South Africa.⁸³

Like Kissinger's basic policy reversal in 1976, Carter's solution for dealing with the Rhodesian war was to foster a quick peaceful transition to democratic rule.⁸⁴ While the Carter team projected a more genuine commitment to human rights and democratic principles in southern Africa,⁸⁵ they also realized the tangible benefits for the United States and the Western world derived from peaceful transitions to majority rule in southern Africa.

If they are born in peace, the new governments of Namibia and Zimbabwe are most likely to be democratic, and to respect the rights of all their citizens, black and white. Our relations with such governments would be enhanced.

Continued violence offers opportunities for increased Soviet and Cuban involvement. We have made clear, in

⁸¹ David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, March 14, 1979, in *DOSB*, June 1979, p. 21.

⁸² In his memoirs, Brzezinski recalls his grave anxiety over this line up in the State Department. He considered these people to be too complacent towards communist expansion in Africa. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981*, (New York: Farrer, Straus, Giroux, 1985), prologue. For profiles of the new Africa team, see "Carter and Africa: Atlanta or Azania?" *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 18, No. 17, August 19, 1977, pp. 1-2.

⁸³ See Brzezinski's list of the top ten foreign policy priorities delivered to the President on April 30, 1977 in Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 53-55. Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, called these settlements "vital". (Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices*, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1983), p. 256.

⁸⁴ Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Statement at the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe, Maputo, May 19, 1979, *DOSB*, July 11, 1977, p. 56. See also Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 257.

⁸⁵ As Richard Moose recalled, we wanted to "do the right thing in Africa." (Author's interview with Richard Moose, Washington, November 8, 1989).

unmistakable terms, our views on this involvement anywhere in Africa. We must do all we can to head off a deepening outside military role in southern Africa.⁸⁶

Richard Moose even more bluntly professed that "We believe that over the long term our interests are best served by encouraging the emergence of leaders and governments reflecting the values of the western political tradition."⁸⁷ Such a democracy would deny further Soviet influence in the region, contain African radicalism, and hence accommodate American and Western interests.⁸⁸

Carter's major innovation to Kissinger's strategy was to formalize an intimate, cooperative relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom for dealing with the crisis, the Anglo-American Initiative. In the past, this relationship had either been total U.S. neglect with Great Britain alone in the hot seat, or total American involvement (Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy) independent of and irreverent towards British assistance. Now, both countries recognized the benefits of close cooperation.⁸⁹ According to Vance and others, the British "believed they could not mount (a serious peace process) without American political support..."⁹⁰ At the same time, the British were wary of

⁸⁶ Lake, "U.S. Policy in Southern Africa, April 25, 1978, *Current Policy*, Department of State, No. 18, April 1978, p. 2. A similar view was explained by Donald McHenry in an interview with the author (November 10, 1989).

⁸⁷ Moose, "The U.S. Role in Southern Africa", April 18, 1979, *DOSB*, October 1979, P. 21. See also Andrew Young, in *The Rhodesian Sanctions Bill*, p. 11.

⁸⁸ As Vance explained, "... our continued support for peaceful resolution of disputes and building closer ties is in itself a barrier to Soviet and Cuban designs." (Vance, in *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, May 12, 1978, p. 8.)

⁸⁹ According to Richard Moose, the British initially were reluctant partners; they "had to be dragged in." Moreover, throughout the next three years, the American diplomats never fully trusted the intentions of their British counterparts. Even at Lancaster House, the United States kept the pressure on Great Britain to opt for a universal settlement rather than an 'internal settlement.' (Author's interview with Richard Moose). This perspective was reaffirmed by Kingman Brewster, US Ambassador to London during the Carter Administration, in an interview with the author. (Oxford, June 16, 1988)

⁹⁰ Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 261; and author's interview with Donald McHenry, (Washington: November 10, 1989). Owen also recalls that Andrew Young initially doubted Britain's commitment to Zimbabwean independence. As such, he wanted American involvement

unleashing the Americans on Rhodesia, a former British colony for which Great Britain was ultimately responsible.⁹¹ The compromise was that British and American diplomats worked "shoulder to shoulder" on this crisis;⁹² as David Owen recalled, "...the US and the British were *both* in the driving seat, as partners."⁹³

The full details of the Anglo-American initiative were released September 1, 1977 as "Rhodesia: Settlement for a Proposal".⁹⁴ The proposal included seven major features: (1) The surrender of power by the illegal regime, (2) An orderly and peaceful transition to independence in the course of 1978; (3) free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage; (4) the establishment by the British Government of transitional administration; (5) a UN presence, including a UN force during the transition; (6) An Independence Constitution providing for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination, the protection of individual human rights and the independence of the judiciary; (7) A Development Fund to revive the economy of the country.⁹⁵ Within this framework British and American diplomats hoped to convince all parties struggling within and outside of Zimbabwe that a peaceful negotiation of independence offered advantages for all.

To facilitate the acceptance of the Anglo-American initiative, the United States adopted a number of accompanying tactical changes. First, the United States espoused a more hostile stance towards the minority regime in Rhodesia. Almost immediately after assuming office, the Carter Administration repealed the "Byrd Amendment," denounced Rhodesian raids into Zambia and Mozambique, and began to enforce more rigorously sanctions against the minority

to act as a check on the British "colonials". See David Owen, *Personally Speaking* to Kenneth Harris, (London: Pan Books, 1987) p.77.

⁹¹ Owen, *Personally Speaking*, p.77.

⁹² "News Conference by the Honorable Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, and British Foreign Secretary David Owen, London, August 12, 1977, *Department of State Press Release*, No. 389, August 13, 1977, p. 2.

⁹³ Owen, *Personally Speaking*, p. 79.

⁹⁴ See Document 378: "Rhodesia Proposals for a Settlement" (White Paper Comnd. 6919), September 9, 1977, in Baumhogger, *The Struggle for Independence*, Vol. II, pp. 417-422.

⁹⁵ "Text of Proposals", released in a joint press conference by Secretary of State Vance and British Foreign Minister David Owen, September 2, 1977, London, *DOSB*, October 3, 1977, p. 424.

regime, both at home and abroad.⁹⁶ Second, the Carter Administration established direct contacts with ZAPU and ZANU.⁹⁷ Unlike previous American administrations, the Carter team did not consider the national liberation leaders radical agents of Soviet aggression, but "pragmatists" struggling for national independence, equating the Zimbabwean struggle with the American historical experience, not the Soviet or Chinese.⁹⁸ Even American abhorrence to armed struggle was tempered slightly. The United States still rejected armed struggle as an legitimate method, but did recognize that "its final outcome is inevitable."⁹⁹

Finally, in addition to dealing with these wide range of actors involved in the contemporary Rhodesian conflict, American and British diplomats also took steps to insure good relations with the future Zimbabwean government. As an Appendix to the Anglo-American proposals, they made provisions for the "Zimbabwe Development Fund", an endowment of \$2 billion to be made available to the first Zimbabwean government for funding development

⁹⁶ Department Statement, "Rhodesian Raids", October 23, 1978, *DOSB*, December 1978, pp. 25-26; testimony of Stanley Sommerfield, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, in *United States Policy Toward Rhodesia*, pp. 13-62. For accounts of the effects of sanctions on the Rhodesian economy, see William Minter and Elizabeth Schmidt, "When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined", *African Affairs*, vol. 87, No. 347, April 1988.

⁹⁷ Young first met the Patriotic Front leaders in February of 1977. Three months later, Secretary Vance held discussions with Nkomo in London. Significant meetings between American, British and Patriotic Front officials occurred in January of 1978 in Malta, and again in Dar es Salaam in April.

⁹⁸ Department Statement May 24, 1978, *DOSB*, July 1978, p. 34. See also See David Newsom, October 18, 1979, *DOSB*, December 1979, pp. 31-32; Marshal Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs, "U.S.S.R.: An Overview of U.S.-Soviet Relations", *DOSB*, January 1978, p. 5. This issue of the nature of the Soviet threat divided the Carter Administration's team of foreign policy experts. The liberal internationalists, which included Carter (in the beginning), Vance, and Young, believed that the Soviet Union was a state that could be dealt with as a normal power. The traditional balance-of-power realists, lead by Zbigniew Brzezinski, considered the Soviet Union to be the principle enemy which should be guarded against at all times. In the wake of several Soviet interventions in the Third World, Brzezinski's line slowly gained salience in the White House. For articulations of both positions, see Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* and Vance, *Hard Choices*.

⁹⁹ Andrew Young, May 19, 1979, *DOSB*, July 11, 1977, p. 56.

projects. True to President Carter's commitment to "liberal internationalism", the Fund provided the West with a means to influence the evolution of the future Zimbabwean socio-economic organization without directly challenging the political aims of the national liberation movements.

The Anglo-American Initiative vs. Internal Settlement

Though the Anglo-American Initiative persisted for over two years, the peace plan never really got off the ground. First, the lack of clearly defined procedural priorities plagued the mediation effort. Initially the Western diplomats sought to arbitrate an acceptable constitution first to be followed by a ceasefire and a election, only to reverse this order by 1979.¹⁰⁰ Second, the American and British diplomats failed to obviate alternative strategies for the negotiating parties.¹⁰¹ For the Smith regime, the initiatives by the American and British "liberals" were deemed hostile to white Rhodesian interests. President Carter's acquiescence to a transitional army made up exclusively of Patriotic Front soldiers confirmed Smith's suspicion of Carter's naivete. From that point on, the Rhodesian government never seriously considered the Anglo-American proposals, and instead pursued their own "internal settlement."¹⁰² For the Patriotic Front, the Western proposal never offered a sufficiently attractive alternative to the armed struggle. The Patriotic Front demonstrated considerable interest in working out a settlement within the framework of the Anglo-American initiative, but only if their efforts were rewarded by compromises from the Rhodesian government.¹⁰³

The spectre of Smith's "internal settlement" -- an agreement between the Rhodesian Front and Bishop Muzorewa to create Rhodesia-

¹⁰⁰ For the first list of priorities, see Statement of William B. Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in *United States Policy Toward Rhodesia*, p. 3. For the second, see Richard Moose, March 7, 1979, *DOSB*, May 1979, p. 46.

¹⁰¹ See Low, "The Zimbabwe Settlement, 1976-1979", p. 93.

¹⁰² On March 3, 1978, Smith and Bishop Muzorewa announced the formation of a transitional government which would prepare Rhodesia for elections in 1979.

¹⁰³ Most importantly, the Patriotic Front agreed to relinquish their longstanding demand for a transitional government comprised of only Patriotic Front members.

Zimbabwe without ZAPU or ZANU participation -- raised a difficult question for American foreign policymakers. Should the United States work with Smith's internal settlement as the basis of a settlement, or reject these proposals and remain committed to the Anglo-American initiative? Though initially vague, Secretary Vance eventually made it clear that the internal settlement was not sufficient;

Ian Smith has made some concessions in the internal settlement; but they do not provide for an irreversible transfer of power to majority rule. In our judgement, without broader agreement among the parties, or international acceptance, there will be neither a ceasefire nor a lifting of sanctions.¹⁰⁴

Support for his position, however, was waning in London and Washington.¹⁰⁵ In the summer of 1978, the Senate passed a resolution calling for the lifting of sanctions once a majority-elected government had been installed.¹⁰⁶ Despite adamant opposition by the Patriotic Front, a group of Senators also extended an invitation to Smith and Muzorewa to visit the United States. Pressure for recognition then increased manifold after Bishop Muzorewa was elected Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in April 1979 in what most observed considered a free and fair election.¹⁰⁷

The Administration's response was cautious optimism.

... as the President recognized, there has been

¹⁰⁴ Vance, in *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, May 12, 1978, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ British Foreign Minister David Owen was prepared to merge the Anglo-American Initiative with the "internal settlement" provided that Joshua Nkomo came on board. See Minutes, *Meeting Between Dr. David Owen, Secretary of State for Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, President of ZANU*, Feb. 20-23, 1978 London, England. Transcripts released by Sithole. Crane Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA. In the United States, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was leaning towards working with the internal parties. See his journal entry in *Power and Principle*, pp. 140-141.

¹⁰⁶ The following month, the House passed a non-binding resolution approving the internal settlement. For details of American congressional activities, see Raymond Copson, *Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy*, (Washington: GPO, 1982).

¹⁰⁷ Author's interview with Richard Moose. According to Moose, the only reason for Carter's meeting with the Rhodesian delegation was to appease Congress.

encouraging progress in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. For the first time in the history of that country, whites have recognized the right of the black majority vote. For the first time, millions of black Rhodesians cast their ballots in a national election. There is a black Prime Minister -- Bishop Muzorewa -- and a degree of shared power.¹⁰⁸

To demonstrate moderate support for the regime, the United States discouraged the OAU from quickly rejecting the new government, and extended an invitation to the new prime minister to visit the United States. American diplomats used this visit, however, to persuade Muzorewa that an all-party conference had to be convened which included the Patriotic Front. According to one of Muzorewa's assistants who accompanied the entourage to Camp David, President Carter and Secretary of State Vance convinced Muzorewa that he would win again anyway, and assured him that the United States would then recognize the new government and lift sanctions.¹⁰⁹

Lancaster House

Ironically, new life was injected into the peace process with the election of Margaret Thatcher as the new Conservative Prime Minister of Great Britain.¹¹⁰ Subject to validating the elections, the new Prime Minister eagerly advocated recognition of the Muzorewa government.¹¹¹ She only delayed establishing diplomatic relations after a dramatic meeting of the Commonwealth in Lusaka and a last minute plea by the British Foreign Ministry for one more chance to resolve the conflict.¹¹² The appointment of Peter

¹⁰⁸ Vance, June 12, 1979, *DOSB*, August 1979, p. 27.

¹⁰⁹ Author's interview with a senior Muzorewa advisor, (Harare: August 1988). See also Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 298.

¹¹⁰ During the campaign, the Conservative Party promised to lift sanctions and recognize the internal settlement. See Miles Hudson, *Triumph or Tragedy*, (London: Hamish-Hamilton, 1981), chapter 7.

¹¹¹ According to Thatcher in 1979, "No-one questions that there is a majority of black Rhodesians in Parliament, a majority of black ministers in the Cabinet and a black Prime Minister. Now starting from that basis we believe that there is a possibility of getting some agreement forward. And I would say this very firmly. Unfortunately there's still terrorism operating. But we must make certain that the bullet does not beat the ballot." (*End of Empire: Rhodesia*, transcript, p. 17).

¹¹² In an interview with the author, the American Ambassador to Great Britain at the time, Kingman Brewster, explained that Thatcher delayed in recognizing Muzorewa's government only at Lord Carrington's behest (Interview, Oxford, May 1988). Carrington, her Foreign Secretary, later recalled that recognition of the internal

Carrington as the new British Foreign Minister changed the terms and tone of the negotiation considerably. Most importantly for the Americans, Carrington announced on July 10, 1979 that Rhodesia was the sole responsibility of Great Britain.¹¹³ In September, Carrington convened the Lancaster House peace conference on Zimbabwe. In December, the negotiations produced a final settlement between the internal parties and the Patriotic Front.¹¹⁴

Though peripheral on the whole, the American role at Lancaster was critical at several points during the negotiations. First, with regard to the composition of the transitional army, the United States "insisted that all parties be treated equally, despite British reservations concerning the incorporation of the Patriotic Front forces."¹¹⁵ According to Vance, "Our insistence that the same rules apply to all forces was a crucial element in Mugabe's willingness to accept a cease-fire and the concentration of ZANU military units under Commonwealth observation."¹¹⁶

Second, the United States provided a solution to the major impasse at the conference -- the land issue. As a provision in the new Constitution, the Patriotic Front demanded that land "occupied" by the white settlers be returned to the African peasants. Ian Smith, of course, insisted that Rhodesian farmers must be compensated for any land redistributed. In an informal agreement, American statesmen promised that the United States would provide the necessary funds to the new Zimbabwean government to compensate

settlement "would have been really disastrous....I think you would have found that the Soviet Union would have become infinitely more involved, and I think the Commonwealth would have broken up." (*End of Empire: Rhodesia*, transcript, p. 18).

¹¹³ Moose responded to Carrington's initiative favorably. See his statement on July 23, 1979, in *DOSB*, October 1979, p. 18. On the necessity of the new initiative being British, see Renwick, *The Rhodesian Settlement*, p. 12. Renwick, at the time, was one of Carrington's closest assistants.

¹¹⁴ For the complete text of the Lancaster House Agreements, see *Southern African Record*, No. 19, April 1980, pp. 1-32. For details on the negotiations, see Davidow, *A Peace in Southern Africa*, Stedman, "Peacemaking in Revolutionary Situations," Hudson, *Triumph or Tragedy* Flower, *Serving Secretly*, chapter 12; Colin Legum, "The Road to and From Lancaster House", *Africa Contemporary Record*, 79-80; and Verrier, *The Road to Zimbabwe, 1890-1980*, chapter 18.

¹¹⁵ Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 299.

¹¹⁶ *IBID.*

these white farmers.¹¹⁷ Without the arrangement, the talks would have failed.¹¹⁸

Finally, the American presence in the wings of Lancaster House reaffirmed the seriousness of the British commitment to find a genuine solution.¹¹⁹ American diplomats in London worked through their back channels with the Frontline States to reassure the Patriotic Front of British sincerity. At crucial moments when both Mugabe and Nkomo wanted to travel to the United States to strengthen their negotiating positions, the American Embassy in London denied them visas in order to maintain momentum at Lancaster House.

Conclusion

The strategy of cooption eventually worked in Zimbabwe. Instead of another internationalized conventional war, the United States and Great Britain managed to end the revolutionary challenge in Rhodesia before the old regime had been completely toppled.¹²⁰ As discussed below, the nature of this peace settlement had dramatic and perhaps unforeseen consequences for the revolutionary outcome -- or lack thereof -- in independent Zimbabwe.

¹¹⁷ Author's interviews with several ZAPU and ZANU officials present at Lancaster House, Ambassador Kingman Brewster, and Richard Moose. While the Patriotic Front claimed that the United States pledged billions, Brewster and Moose both stated categorically that an exact amount was never delineated. As Moose explained, that issue was "exquisitely hedged."

¹¹⁸ See the following sections on ZAPU and ZANU.

¹¹⁹ Author's interview with Kingman Brewster, US Ambassador to London during the Carter Administration, (Oxford, June 16, 1988). See also Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 299.

¹²⁰ Great Britain unquestionably played the leading role in negotiating the final settlement, though they could not have reached this final stage without American interventions during the years leading up to Lancaster House and during the negotiations themselves. My aim, however, is not to distinguish between the two countries' actions as both states were serving the same systemic ends. Just as Cuba and the Soviet Union worked in tandem to promote a revolutionary outcome in Angola, Great Britain and the United States had the shared anti-revolutionary agenda in Zimbabwe.

III. The Zimbabwean Liberation War, 1976-1980: Ending a Revolutionary Situation without a Revolution

A. ZAPU Ideology

By the late 1970s, almost all ZAPU descriptions of their struggle were framed in marxist terms. The central problem was no longer defined as racism or the suppression of nationalism, but capitalism and international imperialism. ZAPU statements called upon the Zimbabwean people to recognize the "oppressing class" - - as the capitalist class, not the white race.¹ As Nkomo constantly reemphasized, "We are not fighting the whites because they are white. We are fighting exploitation and oppression".² According to the ZAPU analysis, the "system" which the national liberation movement sought to destroy was "geared to benefit the settlers and international capitalism."³ This intimate relationship between the external and internal components of the world capitalist system compounded the obstacles which the national liberation movement had to overcome.⁴ To gain real independence, the Zimbabwean liberation struggle had to defeat not only the enemies in Salisbury, but the enemies in New York and London as well.⁵

While the ZAPU critique of their struggle became more sophisticated in the use of marxism-leninism, the movement deliberately avoided a clear and public articulation of a

¹ See Maclay Kanyangarara, "Class Struggle in Zimbabwe", *Zimbabwe News*, no. 2, 1978, pp. 11-13; Author's interview with Edward Ndlovu, senior ZAPU official, (Harare, August 2, 1988).

² *Zimbabwe Review*, (Cairo), October 4, 1976, p. 1, and Nkomo's remarks in *The Rhodesian Herald*, 4 December 1976.

³ "Declaration by the ANC-Zimbabwe on the Occasion of the ANC Congress, 28 September 1975, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle of Independence*, Vol. II, p. 43.

⁴ See Enos Malandu, Director of the National Political Commissariat, member of the Revolutionary Council, ZAPU-PF, *New World Review*, January-February 1979, p. 10; Edward Ndlovu, Deputy Secretary for Information, "The Struggle by the International Working Class and Its Establishment of Peace in the World", *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 7, Nos. 7-8, 1978, pp. 35-37.

⁵ Joshua Nkomo, "Down with Colonialism, Down with Fascism", (Lusaka: ZAPU Information and Publicity, March 1979), p. 24.

comprehensive socialist programme in a future Zimbabwe. While ZAPU pledged to "destroy the capitalists and drive them from our Fatherland,"⁶ Nkomo evaded answering probing questions about his vision for Zimbabwe.

Q. Would your policy be socialist policy (after independence)?

A. It would be Zimbabwean socialism, which is to say, a socialism following the pattern the pattern of our country. Western culture is not suitable for us without modification. We will borrow what works best with our system.

Q. Could you elaborate?

A. We want pragmatic socialism that harmonizes with our traditions and history. We say, for instance, that the land belongs to the people, and the government holds it in trust as the chiefs did. The individual owns the use the land. On the other hand, we find free enterprise is good for the people. We are likely to practice a sort of mixed economy. If the exploitation of our natural resources can be done by the government, we will do it. Otherwise we won't. We are keeping ourselves open.⁷

The 1980 ZAPU Patriotic Front Election Manifesto did not even mention socialism.⁸

More specifically, regarding the central question of property rights, ZAPU lambasted the white seizure of land from the Africans, but failed to outline a comprehensive plan for redistribution. In 1977, one ZAPU spokesman declared that "Gainfully used land will not be touched...We don't want to interfere with big farms."⁹ When asked if he planned to nationalize farms after independence, Nkomo replied, "No, we don't want to confiscate anything. The land belongs to the people. Anybody who chooses to be a Zimbabwean is

⁶ ZAPU, Publicity Bureau, "The Bulldog's Missing Teeth", paper II, January 28, 1973, (Hoover Archives: Africa Subject Collection, box 21-2).

⁷ Joshua Nkomo, interview, January 24, 1980, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle of Independence* Vol. 7, p. 1297.

⁸ Election Manifesto of the Patriotic Front/ZAPU, published January 16, 1980, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, Vol. 7, p. 1281-83.

⁹ Interview by Tony Hodges with Gordon Chinamano, ANCZ, the internal wing of ZAPU, August 1977, in *Zimbabwe Information Group*, (London), #5-6, December 1977-January 1978.

entitled to use the land like anybody else irrespective of the colour of his skin."¹⁰ During the Lancaster House negotiations, Nkomo supported the American notion of preserving the old system of property rights.

If the U.S. had not stepped in, it would have been very difficult to move on this question. The war is about land, and the British were protecting the settler element's right to keep the land themselves. But this does not mean we want to rob the white settlers of their land. The whites are an essential part of the country and therefore they must have some land as citizens.¹¹

In other words, equal distribution would not be pursued at the expense of the white land owners. Statements on the nationalization of industry were equally non-committal. ZAPU publications often mentioned the necessity of strengthening the position of the worker in the factory,¹² but ZAPU, as an organization, never advocated that the state nationalize big industries, nor propose that workers councils should run them.

ZAPU's organization and operation also resembled a nationalist, mass movement more than a marxist-leninist vanguard party. First, the movement made no claim to being a party, let alone a marxist-leninist one, before independence. As one former member of the ZAPU Revolutionary Council explained, ZAPU was comprised of people holding many different ideologies -- both capitalists and socialists.¹³ Any declaration about marxism-leninism would have accentuated divisions within the movement. Above all, Nkomo was the quintessential man of the people, a national figure who 'straddled all ideologies', both at home and

¹⁰ Interview with Joshua Nkomo, as quoted in *Zimbabwe Information Groups*, #5-6, December 1977-January 1978.

¹¹ Interview with Joshua Nkomo, October 29, 1979, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, Vol. 6, p. 1114.

¹² *The Zimbabwe Star*, June 12, 1976, p.2.

¹³ Author's interview with Cephass Msipa, ZAPU Central Committee, (Harare, July 27, 1988).

abroad.¹⁴ According to Willie Musarurwa, former ZAPU Secretary of Propaganda and Information, Nkomo could have breakfast in New York, lunch in London, and dinner in Moscow, all with great fanfare.¹⁵ As the 'darling' of both the East and West, and a national leader representing a wide variety of class interests, Nkomo had no incentive to spell out a clear ideological programme.

This characterization, however, only describes the sentiments of one faction within ZAPU. As an united front of different classes and ideologies, ZAPU's "ideological programme" varied depending on who presented it.¹⁶ The radical wing of ZAPU believed that they were fighting for a socialist revolution. As one of the leaders of this faction, Dumiso Dabengwa, recalled, we had a "blueprint for socialist state".¹⁷ Drafted by the ZAPU Revolutionary Council in 1977 this blueprint, the ZAPU "Ideological Concept," explicitly called for the destruction of capitalism and the development of socialism.

The Party is convinced that socialism is the better system of life and must therefore prevail and be the order of life in Zimbabwe. The Party conceives socialism as the seizure and retention by the people through their State of the basic means of production -- the land and all its natural resources, all industry, transport and communications, financial institutions/banks/, external and internal trade and social services.¹⁸

Supporters of the "Ideological Concept" also called for the

¹⁴ Author's interviews with a former member of the ZAPU Revolutionary Council, (Harare, July 13, 1989) and Nelson Moyo, former ZAPU Representative in Botswana, (Harare, August 1, 1988).

¹⁵ Author's interview with Willie Muzarurwa, former ZAPU Secretary for Information, (Harare, July 29, 1988).

¹⁶ For two attempts of pigeon-holing the ideological inclinations of ZAPU's leadership, one before independence and one after, see "Rhodesia: Russian Second Thoughts on ZAPU?", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 19, No. 21, October 20, 1978, p. 2; and "Zimbabwe: The PF Problem", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 22, No. 1, January 1, 1981, p. 4.

¹⁷ Author's interview with Dumiso Dabengwa, former ZAPU Chief of Intelligence, (Bulawayo, August 8, 1988).

¹⁸ "Zimbabwe African National People's Union: The Party's Ideology Concept", (1977?), p. 2, in the Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 21-3.

transformation of ZAPU into a marxist-leninist party and the adoption of "scientific socialism" as the guiding ideology of the party. J.Z. Moyo, the spiritual leader of this faction until his death in 1977, even rejected the idea of the "two-step" revolution whereby the national liberation movement seizes the state apparatus in order to use the power of the state to develop a socialist society.

Q: Couldn't you settle for a two step revolution, first get rid of colonialism, like in Kenya or Zambia, and then only work out the social problems?

Moyo: We are not discussing Kenya or Zambia. We are going to settle for the kind of independence which we are demanding here in Geneva and not for the kind which is tailored by the British or Americans. The theory of a two step revolution does not apply in all situations. If we are not careful and think along the lines of a two step revolution we will find ourselves in trouble because we have larger settler population backed by the British, the Americans and South Africa. What we want is the real thing now.¹⁹

Though difficult to generalize, the radical faction tended to be comprised of younger cadres,²⁰ from the military ranks who had been trained abroad.²¹ Still teenagers during the height of African nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, these cadres saw little utility in negotiations or compromise with the white regime.²² They also were suspicious of their own "bourgeois" leaders who showed little understanding of or sympathy for socialism. As one

¹⁹ "Interview with Jason Moyo" (Second Vice-President of ZAPU/ANC) in Geneva, December 1976, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, Vol. 2, p. 228.

²⁰ Author's interview with Isaac Nyathi, ZAPU Central Committee member, (Harare August 16, 1988).

²¹ Their undeclared leaders were ZAPU Vice-President J.Z. Moyo, ZIPRA Commander Alfred "Nikita" Mangwena and his deputy Lookout Masuku, ZIPRA Chief of Intelligence Dumiso Dabengwa, and political leaders Edward Ndlovu and George Silundika. In addition to the "Ideological Concept", many ideas of this "wing" were articulated in a publication called The Zimbabwe Worker, edited by Cain Mathema. (Information from author's interviews with several dozen ZAPU leaders.

²² Author's interview with Zephaia Moyo, former ZIPRA commander, (Bulawayo: August 8, 1988).

former ZIPRA commander recalled, "they wanted wealth; they were afraid of the socialist cadres".²³ Finally, many of ZAPU's intelligence officers, military commanders, and political commissars were trained in the Soviet Union where courses on marxism-leninism were an integral part of their training.²⁴ As one Soviet-trained officer stated, "We were more exposed to orthodox Marxism-Leninism; this exposure was a good thing; it made our ideology more consistent."²⁵ Another ZAPU official less optimistic about the utility of the Soviet training nonetheless admitted that the young people who studied in the Soviet Union were "proselytized"; "they were taught the Soviet system" and "the Soviet system was glorified".²⁶ These cadres returned to Africa with a very sophisticated understanding of marxism-leninism, both as a method and model.²⁷ As one former ZIPRA intelligence officer trained in the Soviet Union described, "our cadres who trained in the USSR developed a radical mind set; our cadres were indoctrinated with Soviet ideology."²⁸

Though sharp ideological differences between marxist-leninists and moderate nationalists existed within ZAPU, Nkomo managed to sustain coherency and unity within his organization. As the founder, father and leader of ZAPU, his greatest asset in

²³ *IBID.*

²⁴ Author's interviews with several ZIPRA officers who trained in the Soviet Union, Harare and Bulawayo, June-August 1988 & 1989).

²⁵ Author's interview with Nelson Moyo (1988).

²⁶ Author's interview with Musarurwa (1988).

²⁷ Interview with Zipra cadre who trained in the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, (Harare, July 1988). Many other former ZIPRA cadres interviewed by the author felt that they developed a greater understanding of their revolutionary struggle after training in the Soviet Union. They did not say that they became revolutionaries through their experiences in the Soviet Union. That transformation had occurred in Rhodesia. Rather, their training in the Soviet Union helped them to articulate their critique of the present situation and to formulate an alternative future. Perhaps most importantly, cadres who did not train in the Soviet Union sensed a transformation in ideological thinking in those that had. (This observation was mentioned to me in two separate interviews with former ZAPU Central Committee members.)

²⁸ Interview with Zephaia Moyo (1988).

maintaining unity was his unquestioned authority. Younger ZAPU leaders who might have disagreed with Nkomo's tactics and his vision of the future, still respected his leadership. Nkomo also demonstrated considerable flexibility in incorporating "leftist" ideas into the general ideological framework of ZAPU. One former ZAPU Revolutionary Council member attributed the general "radicalization" of ZAPU rhetoric as a consequence of Nkomo's appeasement strategy towards the more radical elements within ZAPU.²⁹

ZAPU Strategy

Regarding negotiations, one ZAPU leader summed, "If they were willing to talk, then we did."³⁰ Far more eager to negotiate than his ZANU counterparts, Nkomo saw negotiations as the preferred strategy for winning independence. In justifying his controversial bilateral meetings with Ian Smith in 1976, Nkomo argued that his organization "will leave no stone unturned in its determined effort to secure majority rule and justice for all."³¹ Not surprisingly, then, Nkomo went to the Geneva Conference in 1976 confident that negotiations could deliver Zimbabwean independence.³² Despite the lack of progress achieved at Geneva, Nkomo persistently explored all other channels of negotiations, including the Anglo-American initiative, and a brief flirtation with bilateral talks with Smith again in 1978.³³ During the Lancaster House negotiations, Nkomo

²⁹ Interview with former ZAPU cadre, who considered himself to be part of the leftist opposition, (Harare, August 7, 1988).

³⁰ Interview with Cephass Msipa (1988).

³¹ Joshua Nkomo, President of the ANC, *Zimbabwe Star*, organ of the ANC, November 22, 1975, p.2. The talks were controversial because Nkomo agreed to talk to the Smith regime directly, rather than working with the British.

³² See "Statement by the Patriotic Front on the Adjournment of the Geneva Conference", December 15, 1976, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, Vol. 2, p. 230. Given ZANU's relative disarray at the time, Nkomo must have been confident that he could win a popular election for the presidency.

³³ These talks ended when a ZIPRA ground-launched missile shot down a civilian jet. One former ZIPRA soldier claimed in an interview with the author that the Viscount plane was shot down at that time in order to disrupt the Nkomo-Smith negotiations as many ZIPRA commanders did not approve of the

demonstrated extreme flexibility in insuring a successful outcome. On the central problem of property rights in an independent Zimbabwe, Nkomo willfully accepted the American formula and encouraged his ZANU comrades to do the same.³⁴

Given Nkomo's predilection for negotiation and ZAPU's minimal participation in the liberation war from 1970 to 1976, many have concluded that ZAPU was not firmly committed to armed struggle as a strategy of liberation. This evaluation of ZIPRA's military strategy and operations is one of the greatest myths surrounding the Zimbabwean war. Many within ZAPU's ranks, in fact, supported neither the Lancaster House agreement nor any other peace accord short of complete military victory.³⁵ The relative inactivity of ZIPRA can be best explained not by scrutinizing ZIPRA cowardice, but by understanding the theory and plan behind the ZIPRA military strategy.

Unlike ZANU, ZIPRA developed both a guerilla and conventional component after 1976. ZIPRA recruits were sent to Moscow and other socialist countries to learn how to fly fighter aircraft, fire heavy artillery cannon and anti-aircraft missiles, and drive tanks.³⁶ Infantry received training in both conventional and guerrilla tactics,³⁷ making the ZIPRA army the most sophisticated national liberation army in African history.

negotiations.

³⁴ Nkomo, *Nkomo*, p. 196.

³⁵ Interview with Dabengwa (1988). Dabengwa was not opposed to the concept of negotiation, but he did not consider the strategy of negotiation effective unless accompanied by pressure from the battlefield.

³⁶ Author's interviews with several ZIPRA officers who trained outside of Africa. See also interview the with Joshua Nkomo, *Newsweek*, March 20, 1978; Cilliers, *Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia*, p.37; and Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *Chimurenga*, p. 92.

³⁷ Author's interviews with several ZIPRA commanders. (Harare: 1988 and 1989.) See also Barbara Cole, *The Elite*, 1984, p. 378. According to the Selous Scout chief, The final assessment [based on reconnaissance] was that only a small number of ZIPRA terrorists were receiving basic training... and the majority, by appearance, uniforms, bearing, manner of weapon carrying, type of training they were undergoing...were conventionally-trained soldiers, rather than guerrillas. (Daly, *Selous Scouts*, p. 336-337).

Regarding guerilla warfare, ZIPRA leaders asserted that their strategy entailed a more comprehensive, long-term approach. Contrary to conventional stereotypes, ZAPU did engage in politicization of the masses. But ZAPU used a network of political commissars, not guerrillas, to educate the Zimbabwean people about their struggle.³⁸ These commissars established secretive, tightly-knit, hierarchical political cells directly controlled by ZAPU's political wing.³⁹ The Party, not the military, was in firm control of the politicization process.⁴⁰

According to the theory, this network of political cells provided contact points for guerilla entering the country. Once inside the country, these ZIPRA guerilla adopted the classical guerilla *modus operandi*. After a major review of tactics and strategy in 1976, ZIPRA guerrillas abandoned their past practice of engaging the enemy forces directly, and instead concentrated on debilitating specific Rhodesian economic and military enterprises through hit-and-run attacks, night ambushes on Rhodesian barracks, and sabotage operations against fuel storage facilities, railroads, and military equipment.⁴¹

According to the ZIPRA strategy, the guerilla struggle would eventually liberate zones within Rhodesia where the ZIPRA forces would be in firm control of territory. Furthermore, Nkomo called upon the Revolutionary Council to "a) organize administrative units, b) run agricultural, educational and health projects and c) generally harmonize the consolidation of the liberated and controlled areas."⁴² This guerrilla phase then established the

³⁸ See Joseph Msika, *Zimbabwe Review*, vol. 8, January-March, 1979, p. 6.

³⁹ Interview with Nelson Moyo (1988). Retrospectively, Moyo acknowledges that ZAPU's politicization campaign might have been too hierarchical and secretive to be effective.

⁴⁰ Interview with Dabengwa (1988).

⁴¹ Interview with Zephias Moyo (1988). Moyo, a former officer in the Rhodesian Security Forces, claims that his defection had a major influence on the development of this new strategy.

⁴² Nkomo, April 3, 1979, *Zimbabwe Review*, April 1979, p. 5.

preconditions for conventional war.⁴³ According to "Operation Ground Zero", ZIPRA would first overtake the airfields at Kariba and Victoria Falls.⁴⁴ Second, ZIPRA tank battalions would cross the Zambezi River and smash through the Rhodesian defense perimeter on the Zambian-Rhodesian border.⁴⁵ These areas would then serve as a launching pad for further guerrilla activity deeper into Rhodesian territory.⁴⁶ After the guerrilla struggle in the frontline had reached a critical stage, ZIPRA would then advance its conventional forces. This two-phase assault would continue until ZIPRA forces were able to attack Salisbury, a position ZIPRA hoped to be in by the end of 1980.⁴⁷ In his memoirs, Nkomo recounted the strategy;

Behind the scenes (of Lancaster) a time-bomb was ticking away and nobody but myself and senior Zapu colleagues knew of its nature. A year previously, Zapu and Zipra, in the closest secrecy, had decided that the war must be ended, the agony could not be allowed to drag on. We had set in motion what we called the 'turning point' strategy, for a transformation of the war from a guerilla operation into a full-scale conflict in which we would match the Smith's regime's armour and air cover with armour and air cover of our own. We had requested the Soviet Union to accelerate the training of our air crews in that country, and to make available sophisticated modern aircraft which could strike on equal terms against the

⁴³ Author's interview with Joseph Msika, ZAPU General-Secretary, (Harare, July 14, 1989).

⁴⁴ Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa (1988). See also the interview with a ZAPU official in Stedman, "Peacemaking in Revolutionary Situation," p. 283.

⁴⁵ According to several ZAPU officials interviewed, one of their greatest tactical mistakes was underestimating the difficulty of crossing the Zambezi River with heavy artillery. Having realized this important natural asset, the Rhodesian security forces bombed all bridges which crossed the river.

⁴⁶ According to John Nkomo, an additional impetus for moving inside was that ZIPRA's welcome in Zambia was quickly waning. Rhodesian aerial bombings into Zambia hastened the timetable for crossing the Zambezi. (Author's interview with John Nkomo, senior ZAPU official, (Harare, July 12, 1989).

⁴⁷ Interview with Isaac Nyathi (1988). This forecast was shared by some Western observers at the time. See Xan Smiley, *New York Review*, October 26, 1978, p. 24. Others ZAPU leaders such as Ariston Chambati, thought the conventional stage would take much longer to implement. (Author's interview with Ariston Chambati, former ZAPU Central Committee member and Secretary of Information and Intelligence, (Harare, July 26, 1988).

Rhodesian strategic air installations, communications and fuel supplies. We had also asked them to speed up the delivery of tanks, armoured cars and personnel carriers, and to intensify the training of their crews in the USSR.

Without air cover we knew we could not conduct successful operations against the Rhodesian army. Our plan was therefore to mount a lightning ground strike across the Zambezi in order to seize the airfield at Victoria Falls and at Makuti, using armoured vehicles and amphibian transports. The airfields, once acquired, would enable our aircraft to fly in and operate freely from our own soil, putting us on a level with Smith's armed forces.⁴⁸

As one former ZIPRA leader said, "every past national liberation struggle had ended in a conventional struggle. Our approach was more far-sighted than ZANU's."⁴⁹ In these final years of the struggle, ZIPRA's numbers swelled to include over 20,000 soldiers, of which an estimated 9,000 had training in conventional tactics.⁵⁰ In 1978 and again in 1979, ZIPRA soldiers shot down two Viscount jets demonstrating their capacity to use the sophisticated Soviet-designed SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles.⁵¹ By 1979, ZIPRA soldiers were operating Soviet-made tanks just a few miles from the Rhodesian border, while more advanced tanks were on their way to Zambia via Tanzania. Most ominously in 1979, 16 MiG 21 jets had been promised to ZIPRA from the Soviet Union to provide what one ZAPU leader called, the "missing link" in the construction of ZIPRA's conventional capability.⁵² Soviet military advisors also were on hand in Lusaka to help plan the conventional offensive, while several hundred Cuban advisors worked closely with the ZIPRA

⁴⁸ Nkomo, *Nkomo*, pp. 196-197.

⁴⁹ Author's interview with Cain Mathema, editor of Zimbabwe Worker, and ZAPU cadre trained in the Soviet Union, (Harare, July 26, 1988).

⁵⁰ The Guardian 29 January 1979. This was also the Rhodesian intelligence estimate. See Flower, *Serving Secretly*, p. 221.

⁵¹ See *Zambia Daily Mail*, February 14, 1979, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, p. 807.

⁵² Interviews with Isaac Nyathi, Zephias Moyo, Ariston Chambati, and Dumiso Dabengwa. In his autobiography, Nkomo also mentions that ZIPRA had Soviet-trained pilots and ground crews. (Nkomo, *Nkomo*, p. 175).

forces both in Zambia and Angola.⁵³ Perhaps the most conclusive evidence of ZIPRA's conventional strategy was the military response of the Rhodesian forces. One study estimated that ZIPRA's conventional potential massed in Zambia compelled the security forces to spend approximately "70 percent of their training time on standard warfare tactics during the last two years of the conflict."⁵⁴

Whether the ZAPU political leadership intended to use this massive military force is the subject of considerable controversy. Encouraged by recent events in Angola, military officials asserted that the plan was designed to be operationalized. Even many political leaders believed that "a conventional war was inevitable."⁵⁵ On the other hand, Nkomo and others later asserted that the buildup was only part of a plan to increase ZAPU's leverage in bringing about a negotiated solution. Though Nkomo threatened to use sophisticated Soviet weapons,⁵⁶ he was never serious about the actual prospects of a full-scale conventional confrontation with the Rhodesian forces. Above all, Nkomo wanted to limit casualties and avoid bloodshed, including his own. As he later recalled regarding the prospects of invasion, "I thought to myself this is crazy. Why would I want to get myself killed?"⁵⁷ Nkomo also claims that "the real purpose of this advanced training (plane and tank crews) was to provide qualified men to take over the Zimbabwean armed forces after independence, if we were attacked by South Africa, which seemed quite possible."⁵⁸ Nkomo's

⁵³ See Section I of this chapter.

⁵⁴ James Burton "Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia", *Military Review*, vol. 59, no. 3, (March 1979), p. 7. This characterization was confirmed in the author's interview with a former senior minister in Ian Smith's government (Harare, August 1988) and a former general in the Rhodesian army, (Harare, July 25, 1989).

⁵⁵ Interview with Cephass Msipa (1988).

⁵⁶ *Radio Lusaka*, April 15, 1979, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, p. 862.

⁵⁷ Interview with Joshua Nkomo by Stephen Stedman, 1987. Cited in Stedman, "Peacemaking in Revolutionary Situations," p. 254.

⁵⁸ Nkomo, *Nkomo*, p. 175; and author's interview with Eduard Ndlovu (1988).

maneuverability on this question should not be overstated, however. As one former ZAPU leader said, ZIPRA considered going ahead with the invasion "even if Nkomo did not agree".⁵⁹

The decision to invade was never made. The settlement at Lancaster House preempted any real plans for a conventional invasion. As many ZIPRA commanders felt betrayed by the Lancaster House agreement, rumors at the time asserted that radical officers were planning a military invasion irrespective of the machinations in London.⁶⁰ Senior ZIPRA commanders, however, adamantly deny such claims.⁶¹ According to one ZIPRA officer, the "young hotheads who considered Lancaster a sellout" did talk about it, but the idea was never seriously considered by the ZAPU leadership.⁶² Another ZAPU official recalled that "at Lancaster, there was some question as to which side of the Zambezi to put the ZIPRA tanks", but this was for "leverage purposes, not plans for a coup."⁶³ Part of the ZIPRA forces did remain in Zambia after the settlement, but only as a contingency option if the Rhodesian regime reneged on the ceasefire.

Soviet and American Influences on ZAPU

⁵⁹ Author's interview with Willie Musarurwa (1988). Musarurwa also speculated that Nkomo used this swelling impatience among the young radical military leader to pressure Great Britain to negotiate effectively. As Nkomo was reported to say during the Lancaster House talks, "If we don't negotiate now, the younger radicals will go ahead without me."

⁶⁰ In recounting this very tense period, ZAPU Minister of Propaganda and Information, Willie Muzarurwa said that he went before the ZAPU Revolutionary Council on 26 December 1979, "to convince them that it was not a sellout." After much haggling, they accepted his interpretation.

This rumor was confirmed to the author as fact by several low-ranking ZIPRA cadres. One cited Dumiso Dabengwa as the leader of the putsch idea. This same ZIPRA soldier, himself opposed to the idea, claimed that Nkomo reprimanded these coup advocates. Dabengwa denied these allegations. Whether warranted or not, Rhodesian military commanders also feared a military coup by ZIPRA forces. (Author's interview with a former general in the Rhodesian army, (Harare, July 25, 1989).

⁶¹ Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa (1988).

⁶² Interviews with Cephas Msipa, Willie Musarurwa, Dumiso Dabengwa, (1988) and Walter Mbambo, former ZAPU guerrilla, (Harare, July 18, 1988).

⁶³ Author's interview with a ZAPU delegate to the Lancaster talks, (Harare, July 25 1988).

Ideology

There is a strong resemblance between the lexicon of Soviet and ZAPU analyses of the liberation war in the final phase of the struggle. Soviet-style terminology such the "lumpen proletariat", the "world revolutionary process", or the "natural alliance" between the national liberation movement and the socialist system of states appeared frequently in ZAPU publications. Similarly, ZAPU leaders and publications often referred to Soviet heroes as revolutionary inspirations and to the Soviet Union as a model for future state development.

The similar orientation of the Soviet and ZAPU outlook is readily apparent. Less obvious is how and why there is such a similarity.⁶⁴ At a very general level, it is the nature of all struggles against the Western world to adopt an "ideology of opposition". Marxism-Leninism provided a comprehensive, convincing, and convenient "ideology of opposition," not least because adoption of this ideology accessed much needed military assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. More concretely, however, it appears that those ZAPU cadres who came in direct contact with the Soviet philosophy through training in the Soviet Union or cooperation with Soviet advisors in Zambia and Angola were the same cadres who most vocally espoused the Soviet ideological interpretations.⁶⁵ This relationship, however, should not be overplayed; the struggle in Zimbabwe was first understood by all as a Zimbabwean struggle with very little relation to "communism" or "capitalism". The presence of Zimbabwean soldiers in Moscow was more a consequence of whom they were fighting rather than why they were fighting.

Despite a shared lexicon for describing the liberation struggle, Soviet and ZAPU doctrinal statements did not share a common vision of the future. ZAPU did not commit to the Soviet

⁶⁴ Speculation about the nature of the relationship in no way obviates the strong evidence of a correlation. A useful analogy is the relationship between smoking and cancer. Though we still know very little about the direct connection between the smoking and cancer, we have convincing evidence of a strong correlation.

⁶⁵ Author's interview with Joseph Msika, ZAPU General-Secretary, (Harare, July 14, 1989); and John Nkomo, ZAPU Publicity and Information Secretary, (Harare, July 12, 1989).

socialist model for the future, nor even transform its organization into a marxist-leninist vanguard party. Radicals within ZAPU candidly insisted that they were fighting for a socialist revolution, but ZAPU official statements on the future were more ambiguous. Soviet connections obviously influenced the development of ZAPU ideology in the last years of the struggle, particularly with regard to their analysis of the struggle, but the Soviet Union neither defined nor constrained the development of ZAPU ideology. Nor did they condition their assistance on adoption of "correct" ideological vision by ZAPU.⁶⁶ If ZAPU incorporated parts of Soviet ideology into their definition of the liberation struggle, it was a consequence of the relationship with the Soviet Union, not a precondition.

The United States

Because the United States refused to deal directly with ZAPU, the U.S. government had few mechanisms to influence the ideological development of ZAPU. While ZAPU maintained cordial relations with many non-governmental organizations in the United States, the federal government refused direct contacts or assistance with ZAPU. The following remarks by Nkomo best encapsulate ZAPU's dilemma of struggling for national independence in bi-polar world:

For years we in the liberation movement have approached the West for assistance and received almost nothing. Today the Patriotic Front gets equipment, supplies, and scholarships from Eastern Europe, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and China. We have no foreign advisors, but we do send our people to those countries for training. The Western governments and newspapers are extremely upset by our relations with the socialist countries. Not long ago, a Western ambassador in Lusaka came to my office, angry because he had seen a group of our young militants board an Aeroflot plane. "Nkomo," he said, "what are you doing sending plane loads of your people for indoctrination?" So I asked him in return "What are you doing? Give us scholarships; send us your Pan American or TWA planes to pick up our people." Do they just expect us to just sit around and do nothing? We have given the West a chance to show what they can do..... While the West is busy complaining about the Cubans and the Soviets, the Cubans and the Soviets are busy doing things. So we tell the West, "It's up to you, just don't weep afterwards."⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Author's interview with Joseph Msika, (1989).

⁶⁷ Nkomo, "Down with Colonialism, Down with Fascism," pp.24-25.

ZAPU's verbal hostility towards the United States and the Western world in general developed because of their different political allegiances, and not their ideological discrepancies. ZAPU criticized the United States for helping to maintain the Smith regime, but the liberation movement did not articulate a general disdain for liberal democracy or even Western capitalism. Nkomo, in fact, respected property rights, supported the free market system, and believed in Western forms of democracy. While the ZIPRA command was dominated by radical marxists, ZAPU's politicians proved to be moderate nationalists. The direct ideological influence of the United States on the development of ZAPU ideology was negligible, but the indirect and pervasive force of Western liberalism penetrated even this "anti-imperialist" movement.

ZAPU Strategy

Soviet theories of national liberation warfare were explicitly reflected in ZIPRA military strategy. The idea that the guerilla struggle would eventually develop into a conventional conflict is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Soviet approach. Moreover, ZAPU could not have undertaken its conventional buildup without Soviet weapons, logistical assistance, and training.⁶⁸ As one senior ZAPU official recalled, 'they knew a lot more about conventional warfare than we did.'⁶⁹

This strategy has to be understood in the immediate historical and regional context of the time. Only three years earlier, the Soviet Union and Cuba had provided decisive assistance to the MPLA in Angola. With Soviet and Cuban assistance, the MPLA had been transformed over one year from a marginally successful guerilla movement to a semi-conventional army. In the final outcome, externally-supplied conventional warfare capabilities determined the outcome of the Angolan liberation struggle. Soviet and ZAPU leaders had no reason to believe that the Zimbabwean situation would be any different. To avoid calling on Cuban troops, ZAPU

⁶⁸ The abundance of ZAPU praise for Soviet assistance was one manifestation of the relationship. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1978-79, p. 996, and Joshua Nkomo, "Nash Otvjet -- Usilenie Borb'i" *Aziia i Afrika Segodnaya*, No. 4, 1979, p. 24.

⁶⁹ Author's interview with John Nkomo, (Harare, July 13, 1989).

leaders wanted to develop their own regular units.⁷⁰ Though several commanders claimed that they had to adopt their training in the Soviet Union to fit the conditions of the African bush, none dismissed the general utility of their Soviet training. As one ZAPU official explained when describing the Soviet role in their military struggle, "The way you are trained effects the way you fight; they definitely had an influence on strategy."⁷¹ Besides training programs, Soviet advisors in Lusaka participated directly in the formulation of ZIPRA strategy.⁷² Undoubtedly, political decisions were taken by ZAPU leaders without reference to their Soviet allies.⁷³ Yet Soviet military advice was readily available and seriously considered in the development of ZIPRA military strategies.⁷⁴ Similar to Angola, ZIPRA's *modus vivendi* at the time provided a potential role for Cuban troops and Soviet advisors in the event of an internationalized war.

This convergence of Soviet and ZAPU attitudes towards military struggle and unity sharply contrasted with their conflicting opinions regarding negotiations with the Smith regime. As discussed earlier, Soviet official statements denounced any form of peace settlement as a neo-colonialist plot to derail the revolution. Despite the objections from his most important ally, Nkomo persistently explored all possible negotiation opportunities.

United States

⁷⁰ *IBID.* John Nkomo also pointed out that ZAPU expected South Africa to enter the war, once it became conventional, as they did in Angola.

⁷¹ Interview with Ariston Chambati (1988).

⁷² Cilliers, *Counter-insurgency in Zimbabwe*, p. 37; interviews with Zephias Moyo and Dabengwa (1988). According to Dabengwa, the Soviet Union only offered military assistance and training until 1977. From 1978 to 1979, however, Soviet and Cuban military advisors were present at ZIPRA Headquarters in Lusaka.

⁷³ Interview with Dabengwa (1988).

⁷⁴ This is not to say that Soviet military advisors formulated ZIPRA military strategy. They were merely present at ZIPRA Headquarters, participated in meetings on strategy, and offered their advice at such occasions. Final decisions about strategy, however, were made by ZIPRA commanders, not Soviet officers. (This information is based on interviews with Dumiso Dabengwa and Eduard Ndlovu.)

It is no coincidence that this issue over which ZAPU and the Soviet Union disagreed is the very area where the United States exerted the most influence over the development of ZAPU strategy. Though ZAPU denounced Henry Kissinger's diatribes against armed struggle and Andrew Young's lectures on the lessons of Martin Luther King's non-violent struggle, ZAPU leaders did appreciate American sudden support for majority rule in March 1976.⁷⁵ Thereafter, Nkomo consistently cooperated with the United States and Great Britain in seeking a negotiated settlement. The American intervention, including most prominently the American land buy-out plan put forth at Lancaster, helped to encourage ZAPU leaders to seek a peace settlement, rather than a military victory.⁷⁶ By lobbying for a settlement when it did, the United States helped to prevent the liberation war from reaching a conventional stage, a stage which would have had a resolutely different affect on the outcome of the national liberation struggle.

B. ZANU: 1976-1980

Ideology

Following almost three years of division, internal power struggles, and realignments,⁷⁷ ZANU emerged in 1977 united and armed with the most comprehensive and sophisticated ideology of all the Zimbabwean liberation movements.⁷⁸ The ZANU lexicon was dominated by marxist-leninist discourse. Whereas ZAPU statements

⁷⁵ *The Zimbabwe Star*, July 3, 1976, p.2.

⁷⁶ Author's interview with Joseph Msika, (1989). Msika also pointed out that the Frontline States were convinced by the Americans that the settlement was fair, creating increased pressure on the Patriotic Front to agree.

⁷⁷ For accounts of this very volatile period see T.O. Ranger, "The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the Revival of ZANU," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (October 1980); David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Chitepo Assassination*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985), and Masipula Sithole, *Zimbabwe Struggles within the Struggle* (Salisbury: Rujeko Press, 1979.)

⁷⁸ That Mugabe emerged as ZANU's leader served to radicalize ZANU's ideology, as Mugabe espoused a more militant brand of marxism-leninism than Sithole or Chitepo. (Author's interview with Simbi Mubako, senior ZANU leader, Harare, July 26, 1989).

often had both marxist and nationalist phrases and analyses, ZANU pronouncements tended to be more rigorous in their application of marxism-leninism both as a framework for analysis and as a model for the future.

Class struggle was isolated as the essence of the Zimbabwean conflict. As Kumbari Kangai exclaimed, "Our struggle is not a racial struggle but a revolutionary armed struggle."⁷⁹ According to ZANU's class analysis, the peasantry formed the basis of the revolution; everyone else was suspect. *Zimbabwe News* warned "Zimbabwe's feudal Lords" that there would be "no room for reactionary bourgeoisie in socialist Zimbabwe."⁸⁰ ZANU promised that after independence "the compradorial elements will not be given the opportunity to become the new exploiters."⁸¹

Consistent with this militant class analysis, ZANU defined the Zimbabwean liberation struggle as part of an international battle against the forces of imperialism.⁸² According to the liberation movement, "The settler bourgeois class has, alongside multinational corporations and by reliance on international finance, set up secondary industries in urban areas which have facilitated the further exploitation of African labour."⁸³ Consequently, ZANU doctrine declared that "a revolutionary movement like ours is definitely on a collision course with capitalist countries, especially NATO powers."⁸⁴ ZANU's struggle was characterized as part of a world revolutionary struggle, "linked with the just

⁷⁹ Speech by "Comrade" Kumbarai Kangai, member of the ZANU Central Committee, 13 May 1977 in London, in *Revolutionary Zimbabwe*, journal of the Zimbabwe Solidarity Front, no. 7, 1977?, p. 34.

⁸⁰ *Zimbabwe News*, July-December, 1977, p. 44

⁸¹ "Political Education in ZANU: Abridged Commissariat Lectures", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January-February 1978, p. 59.

⁸² See *Mwenge 2, ZANU Political Programme*, (Seattle: Seattle Workers Publication, March 1977, p. 6.

⁸³ Speech delivered by Robert Mugabe at the Lisbon anti-apartheid conference, in *Zimbabwe News*, May/June 1977, p. 15.

⁸⁴ "Political Education in ZANU: Abridged Commissariat Lectures," p. 59.

struggles being waged by peoples all over the world against racism, capitalism and imperialism."⁸⁵ In this Manichean world, "we [ZANU] are in solidarity with many socialist and progressive organizations around the world. that is why the socialist and progressive states support us. [sic] That is also why we are imperialism's principal enemy in Zimbabwe."⁸⁶

Though more militant, the essence of this analysis closely resembled ZAPU's. ZANU ideology differed from ZAPU's, however, in its definition of a future model for Zimbabwe.⁸⁷ Unlike Nkomo, Mugabe considered the development of a comprehensive programme to be essential both for the advancement of the liberation struggle and for the future of an independent Zimbabwe.⁸⁸ While ZANU, like ZAPU, recognized the value of national democratic front of all classes in the first phase of liberation,⁸⁹ ZANU deemed it necessary to have a clear plan for asserting the agenda of the workers and peasants in the second phase.⁹⁰ To prepare for this transformation, ZANU articulated a revolutionary programme for an independent Zimbabwe which would "overthrow the present socio-economic system in Zimbabwe"⁹¹ and "replace it with a socialist

⁸⁵ Herbert Chitepo at Sixth Pan African Congress in Dar es Salaam in 1974, in *Zimbabwe News*, March/April 1977, p. 4.

⁸⁶ "The ZANU Idea", speech delivered by "Comrade" Eddison J.M. Zvobgo, Deputy Secretary of Publicity and Information, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 2, July-August 1979, p.10.

⁸⁷ This distinction is based on an analysis of official statements and actions, and not necessarily a reflection of individual beliefs. On the contrary, many ZANU leaders paid lip service to the marxist rhetoric despite official statements, while many ZAPU leaders held much more radical views than were allowed to published as official ZAPU declarations.

⁸⁸ Interview with Robert Mugabe, 21 January 1976, *Revolutionary Zimbabwe*, p. 7.

⁸⁹ "Political Education in ZANU: Abridged Commissariat Lectures", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January-February 1978, p. 55.

⁹⁰ "ZANU in a Nutshell", *Zimbabwe News*, July-December, 1977, p. 46; Mugabe, speech in Addis Ababa, September 17, 1978, in Mugabe, *Our War of Liberation*, (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1983), p. 177.

⁹¹ Zvogbo, "The ZANU Idea", p. 10.

society."⁹²

To accompany this end, ZANU outlined a set of specific policies. On the question of property rights, ZANU declared that

The main economic objectives of ZANU are to create a self-supporting socialist economy in which all the means of production and distribution will be fully in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. The present capitalist economic system which benefits a few settlers in Rhodesia and other foreign countries like South Africa, Britain, United States, West Germany etc. will be abolished.⁹³

To implement this reorganization, ZANU advocated a major interventionary role for the state modelled after other command economies in the socialist world.

Therefore, the control of the Zimbabwe economy from the beginning of independence period is a central objective of ZANU. Consequently the major means of production will be nationalised in the interests of the workers and peasants. A self reliant socialist economy will be created as the surest guarantee against external domination. Rapid industrialization will be encouraged and basic industries will be developed to facilitate technological and scientific advancement. In this development Zimbabwe will call upon the assistance of friendly socialist countries that have had similar experiences of development.⁹⁴

ZANU promised that "workers will own directly or indirectly the factories for which they work."⁹⁵ On the question of land, ZANU repeatedly stated "No person has [the] right of private ownership of land and minerals. . . . The needs of the peasants should be assessed accurately and the land of Zimbabwe made available to them for use on cooperatives."⁹⁶ Unlike ZAPU, ZANU wanted not only to nationalize white farmer property, but to organize these farms

⁹² "Political Commissariat Lecture Series: Liberation war is a vast school for the masses", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 2, May-June 1978, p. 60.

⁹³ "ZANU in a Nutshell", p. 46.

⁹⁴ "Political Education in ZANU," p. 57.

⁹⁵ "ZANU in a Nutshell", p. 46. See also Mugabe, "The Real Meaning of Solidarity", September 17, 1978, in Mugabe, *Our War of Liberation*, p. 177.

⁹⁶ "Political Education in ZANU," p. 57.

along socialist principles.⁹⁷ To demonstrate their resolve, ZANU claimed to have established "collective farms", "collective villages", and "cooperative farms in accordance with the policy of the Party" in ZANU liberated zones.⁹⁸

To carry out this detailed socialist programme, ZANU became a marxist-leninist vanguard party in 1977.⁹⁹ Whereas ZAPU planned to become a party after independence, and other African vanguard parties had waited until after independence to transform their liberation movements into parties (i.e., MPLA and FRELIMO), ZANU made the transition before independence. In becoming a marxist-leninist party, ZANU no longer accepted a multi-class composition for the liberation movement.¹⁰⁰ The new party also accepted the principle of "democratic centralism," and one-party rule as the means by which to govern.¹⁰¹

ZANU Strategy

As already noted, ZANU was much more suspicious of negotiations than ZAPU. ZANU viewed negotiations as a strategy "aimed at sabotaging the Zimbabwe Revolution spearheaded by ZANU."¹⁰² ZANU also blamed Nkomo and the Frontline states for "forcing" ZANU into negotiations.¹⁰³ The ZANU political leadership

⁹⁷ "Comrade President Robert Mugabe Appeals for Humanitarian Assistance for the Liberated Areas in Zimbabwe", (Maputo: ZANU Central Committee, 1979), p.6.

⁹⁸ "Comrade President Robert Mugabe Appeals for Humanitarian Assistance for the Liberated Areas in Zimbabwe," p.6.

⁹⁹ See *Mwenge 2, ZANU Political Programme*.

¹⁰⁰ See Robert Mugabe's explanation in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January-February 1978, p. 24; and in *Newsweek*, March 20, 1978.

¹⁰¹ See *African Contemporary Record*, 1977-78, p. B1037.

¹⁰² See Robert Mugabe, "Comrade Mugabe Lays the Line at Historic Chimoio Central Committee Meeting", *Zimbabwe News*, July-December, 1977, p. 9.

¹⁰³ For a denunciation of the frontline pressure, see Interview with Robert Mugabe, 21 January 1976, *Revolutionary Zimbabwe*, No. 3, 1976, p. 2. For a denunciation of Nkomo, see "The Mgagao Declaration by the Zimbabwe Freedom Fighters", (October 1975), in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, Vol.

did agree to participate in the Geneva Conference, but their purpose in attending was not negotiation.¹⁰⁴ As one top ZANU official stated very candidly, "If we did not come to the Geneva Conference then the imperialists would have succeeded in their schemes; they would have succeeded in foisting a black puppet regime in Zimbabwe. So we came here for the purpose of trying to foil this imperialist manoeuvre..."¹⁰⁵ As the organization was still in the process of consolidation after the two-year imbroglio of paralyzing splits, assassinations, and detentions, ZANU was in no position to end the war and face popular elections.¹⁰⁶

The Anglo-American proposals were considered to be more of the same. ZANU propaganda warned that the people of Zimbabwe had to guard against being "hoodwinked" by the neo-colonialist maneuvers of the Anglo-American proposals.¹⁰⁷ While ZANU left the Malta meeting in 1978 (the first organized under the rubric of the Anglo-American initiative) convinced that the "American delegation appeared to be the more serious of the two,"¹⁰⁸ all goodwill dissipated by the second meeting in Dar-es-Salaam. Mugabe left the meeting "fully convinced that the Anglo-Americans are seeking a

2., p. 27.

¹⁰⁴ Author's interviews with Moton Malianga, ZANU senior official, (Harare, July 13, 1989), and Kumbirai Kangai, senior ZANU leader, (Harare, July 17, 1989).

¹⁰⁵ Interview with "Comrade" Gumbo at the Geneva Conference, December 18- 19-20, 1976, *Revolutionary Zimbabwe*, No. 6, 1977?, p. 52.

¹⁰⁶ According to Gordon Chavanduka, General Secretary of the UANC at the time, UANC polls inside the country indicated that they would have easily won an election in 1977. (Author's interview, Harare, July 14, 1989).

¹⁰⁷ "Political Commissariat Lecture Series: Liberation war is a vast school for the masses", p. 60.; T. Lockwood, "American Foreign Policy: We See Africa As an Open Field Maneuver ", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 2, May-June 1978, p. 54.

¹⁰⁸ "Malta-Conference and Beyond", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January- February 1978, p. 25

method of giving full support to the fascist regime in the country."¹⁰⁹

ZANU leaders came to the Lancaster House conference again extremely pessimistic.¹¹⁰ Regarding Lord Carrington's proposal for the transitional period, Mugabe remarked;

It is clear that the British government adamantly refuses to accept any of my delegation's arguments or proposals, no matter how rational. This causes concern if not real frustration. We are beginning to wonder what purpose the Conference is meant to serve if it is not meant to lead to the capitulation of the Patriotic Front...¹¹¹

Despite these denunciations and several threats to walk out of the negotiations, the conference succeeded in producing a solution to the armed conflict. Most important for a settlement, Mugabe departed from stated ZANU policy, and accepted the British and American conception of land redistribution through government buy-outs rather than state seizure.¹¹² Like ZAPU, ZANU was under extreme pressure to reach a settlement; Mozambique was on the verge of collapse from the exhausting war, while Britain's threat to recognize Muzorewa's government also loomed in the corridors of Lancaster.¹¹³ Moreover, if the struggle escalated to a

¹⁰⁹ President Mugabe's Radio Address to the Nation on Malta II Conference, 17 April 1978, in *Revolutionary Zimbabwe*, No. 9, 1978?, p. 30.

¹¹⁰ "A Statement of the Basic Political Position of the Patriotic Front", issued by "Comrade" Robert Mugabe, 18 August 1979, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 2, July-August 1979, p. 35.

¹¹¹ *Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London: Conference Papers and Summaries of Proceedings*, Minutes 24th Plenary, (United Kingdom, 1979). Cited here from Stedman, "Peacemaking in Revolutionary Situations," p. 289.

¹¹² See Davidow, *A Peace in Southern Africa*, p. 62. According to Moton Malianga, this was the most difficult and controversial compromise. (Author's interview with Moton Malianga, 1989).

¹¹³ In a last minute intervention, Samora Machel informed Mugabe that he had arranged for a quiet house on the beach for Mugabe to write his memoirs if he did not return to southern Africa with a settlement. Similarly, Fernando Honwana, Machel's envoy at the Lancaster House talks recounted that "I eventually had to convey a message to the Patriotic Front that we the Mozambique Government did not feel that there were any issues at stake, at that stage in the conference, which would justify the breaking of the conference. That we were not willing to accept

conventional war, ZANU's comparative advantage vis-a-vis ZAPU would wane rapidly. Finally, the United States offered a face-saving compromise to the land question. As one ZANU delegate to the conference remarked, "With the United States offer of aid we had something we could sell to the people. The Front Line States told us, 'You have a promise from the United States; if you feel like you have something to sell to the electorate, then take it.'"¹¹⁴ Based on surveys completed in 1978, ZANU knew that they would win a free and fair election.¹¹⁵ Given the external pressures to end the war and the complications of future negotiations if a recognized black government in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe was in place, ZANU decided to postpone its full political and economic agenda and opt for peace and the more immediate goal of majority rule. As Mugabe lamented,

Yes, even as I signed the document, I was not a happy man at all. I felt we had been cheated to some extent, that we agreed to a deal which would to some extent rob us of victory we had hoped we would achieve in the field.¹¹⁶

Military Struggle

Before the Lancaster House accords, ZANU's military operations

the blame for the conference breaking on such minor issues. And I think it was a way of assuring Mugabe and Nkomo that they could take the plunge. But if they did not take the plunge, then things were going to be as they had been before." (Interview with Honwana in transcript for *End of Empire: Rhodesia*, Granada Television documentary, issued July 1, 1985, transmitted July 15, 1985, p. 29.)

¹¹⁴ Interview by Steve Stedman with Simbi Mubako, 1987. In Stedman, "Peacemaking in Revolutionary Situations," , p. 275. Mubako confirmed the importance of American intervention in an interview with this author, (Harare, July 26, 1989).

¹¹⁵ Author's interviews with Deputy Foreign Minister Ndanga, former ZANU Representative in the United States, (Harare, July 25, 1988); and Kumbirai Kangai, senior ZANU leader, (Harare, July 17, 1989). According to Kangai ZANU intelligence predicted they would win 55 rather than the 57 seats they actually acquired in 1980. This information, however, was not shared by ZAPU, Muzorewa, or Ian Smith. They all believed that their three parties would gain enough seats to form a coalition government which excluded ZANU. (Author's interview with Chris Anderson, Minister in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government, Harare, July 19, 1989).

¹¹⁶ Interview with Robert Mugabe, 21 December 1979, in *End of Empire: Rhodesia*, transcript, p. 29.

accounted for the bulk of the guerilla fighting forces.¹¹⁷ While ZAPU devoted significant time and manpower to the preparation and planning of the future conventional war, ZANU's army, ZANLA, deployed most of its cadres in the bush. Several factors account for these different approaches to the military struggle.

First, because ZANLA's leaders were trained in China instead of the Soviet Union, ZANU "adopted the Maoist strategy of getting control of the rural areas before attacking the cities."¹¹⁸ ZANU's military strategy was heavily influenced by the Chinese model of rural guerilla warfare.¹¹⁹ Like the Chinese revolutionaries, ZANU's strategy "has always been to begin by gaining control of the rural areas where the majority of the African people live, and then proceeding in stages, as the war qualitatively transforms, to move to operations into urban areas."¹²⁰ The objective was "to isolate the cities and cut them off, not attack them."¹²¹ This done, the white regime would capitulate.

To seize the countryside, ZANU believed that garnering peasant support was the primary task of the liberation movement. Consequently, ZANU devoted considerably more attention to "politicizing" the peasantry than ZAPU. As Mugabe explained, using

¹¹⁷ Daly, *Selous Scouts*, p. 392.

¹¹⁸ Josiah M. Tongogara, *Our Struggle for Liberation*, interviews with Nathan Shamuyarira, December 1979, (Harare: Mambo Press, 1984), p. 20; and "War Review", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 2, July-August 1979, p. 16. Chinese instructors also trained ZANLA recruits in Tanzania. (Author's interview with Perrence Shiri, ZANLA Commander, (Harare, July 21, 1989).

¹¹⁹ Author's interview with Henry Hamadziripi, ZANU Secretary of Treasury, DARE Revolutionary Council, (Harare, August 14, 1988). See also interview with Robert Mugabe, in *End of Empire: Rhodesia*, transcript, p. 10.

¹²⁰ Robert Mugabe, speech at the 5th Pan-African Youth Movement, Brazzaville, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 2, July-August 1979, p. 26. See also, ZANU Publicity and Information Department, "Tour Feasibility Survey", January 23, 1979, p. 4. (Hoover Archives: Africa Subject Collection, box 21-7).

¹²¹ Interview with ZANLA guerrillas leaders as quoted in Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *Chimurenga*, p. 86; and author's interview with Josiah Tungamirai, ZANLA's Political Commissar, and present Commander of the Zimbabwean Air Force, (Harare, July 21, 1989).

one of Mao's most famous metaphors,

The basic power of any revolutionary struggle is the *People*. struggle which enjoys the full support of the struggling masses can never fail, no matter how protracted....

As we move amongst them, like fish in water, let us constantly bear in mind that this massive water maintains its smooth kindness to the fish in feeding, hiding and facilitating their sometimes sleek and gentle, but often swift tactical movements.¹²²

Whereas ZAPU had party structures to conduct political work and ZIPRA units to carry out military operations, ZANLA guerrillas did both.¹²³

... ZANLA has evolved into a patriotic army, manned by a well-trained cadres who have, firstly a political role of educating workers and peasants, and secondly, a military role of defending the people against the forces of repression. When they work in Zimbabwe villages and factories, the accent is on political education so that the basis of the war of liberation can be properly understood.¹²⁴

A second difference between ZANU and ZAPU was ZANU's emphasis on rapid, mass mobilization. ZANU wanted to extend the areas of military struggle so as to overextend the Rhodesian army.¹²⁵ This strategy required a shorter training period for new cadres so that they could return to the countryside as soon as possible.¹²⁶

¹²² Robert Mugabe, "New Year's Message, 1978", in Mugabe, *Our War of Liberation*, p. 17; and *Mwenge 2, ZANU Political Programme*, p. 8. This metaphor was repeated by Perrence Shiri, ZANLA Commander of Tete Province, in an interview with the author, (1989).

¹²³ See Maurice Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p. 235.

¹²⁴ N.S. Shamuyarira, "Sworn enemies of ZANU puzzled and baffled", *Zimbabwe News*, July-December, 1977, p. 4. See also "Political Commissariat Lecture Series: Liberation war is a vast school for the masses", p. 59; interview with "Comrade" Edgar Tekere, 26 August, 1976, in *Revolutionary Zimbabwe*, No. 4, 1976, p. 1; and Tekere, "The State of the Party", *Zimbabwe News*, July-December, 1977, p. 7.

¹²⁵ Robert Mugabe, "Fight Hard, Fighter, Fight Hardest", *Zimbabwe News*, July-December, 1977, p. 42.

¹²⁶ Author's interview with Josiah Tungamirai, (1989). According to another ZANLA Commander, Perrence Shiri, one implication of this strategy was that fewer and fewer ZANLA recruits trained abroad as the war progressed.

Third, ZAPU and ZANU had different attitudes towards the potential for conventional war. Whereas ZAPU saw conventional war inevitable, ZANU commanders talked about the construction of "liberated zones" as the "prelude to final victory" without the necessity of positional battles.¹²⁷ ZANU's lack of attention devoted to conventional warfare, however, stemmed in large part from ZANLA's lack of capacity to fight a sophisticated, mechanized war. This inability arose from materials constraints, not opposing doctrines.¹²⁸ In 1979, ZANU Vice President Simon Muzenda informed the OAU that their "need for more sophisticated weapons to counter the military strength of the Muzorewa-Smith fascist forces which continue to receive assistance from apartheid South Africa."¹²⁹ These requests, however, were never answered. By the late stages of the liberation struggle, China was unwilling to provide ZANU with the necessary materials to escalate the war qualitatively.¹³⁰ ZANU approached the Soviet Union on several occasions to secure advanced weaponry but was consistently denied. ZANU did acquire some Soviet weapons through third parties,¹³¹ but ZANLA never

¹²⁷ Tongogara, *Our Struggle for Liberation*, pp. 14-15. In Josiah Tungumirai's characterization, ZANU believed that the one who wins the masses, wins the war whereas ZAPU (in his estimation) believed that the one who has the hardware, wins the war. (Author's interview with Josiah Tungamirai (1989).

¹²⁸ *IBID.*

¹²⁹ ZANU Vice President Simon Muzenda at OAU Liberation Committee meeting in Dar es Salaam, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 1, January-June, 1979, p. 45.

¹³⁰ Author's interview with Qin, Yin, Research Fellow, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, and former Chinese diplomat in Africa, (Stanford, CA: March 22, 1989) Allegedly, Rugare Gumbo, one of the senior ZANU leaders accused of planning a coup against Mugabe, was upset with the lack of munitions coming from China and therefore wanted to improve relations with Moscow. Some even purport that the Soviet Union supported his coup attempt. See "Rhodesia: War Within War?", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 19, No. 12, June 9, 1978, p. 3.

¹³¹ In Mozambique, FRELIMO transferred large quantities of Soviet weapons to ZANU, and in Zambia, ZANU purchased Soviet weapons earmarked for ZAPU and SWAPO. (Author's interviews with a Soviet diplomat formerly stationed in Maputo, (Luanda, August 1988); Henry Hamadziripi, ZANU Secretary of Treasury stationed in Lusaka, (Harare, July 1988); and Kumbirai Kangai, senior ZANU leader, in Maputo at the time, (Harare, July 17, 1989).

developed a conventional war potential: no tanks, no ground-to-air missiles, and no planes.¹³² Without sophisticated weaponry, ZANU could not defeat the Rhodesian conventional forces in battle. But with numbers and tenacity, ZANU could exhaust the economy, crush the myth of white invincibility, overextend the Rhodesian military, and make Rhodesia ungovernable.

Soviet and American Influences on ZANU

Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States played a direct role in influencing the development of ZANU ideology or military strategy during the final years of the liberation struggle. Indirectly, however, both powers exerted pressure on ZANU both by their actions and inactions.

Soviet Union

While ZANU espoused a radical brand of marxism-leninism -- much more radical than ZAPU -- their international source of inspiration was China, not the Soviet Union. China remained the principal weapons supplier to ZANU throughout the war.¹³³ Unlike other liberation movements with ties to China, however, ZANU did not enunciate major ideological disagreements with the Soviet Union, but instead recognized the Soviet Union as a world revolutionary force which had a direct impact on the situation in southern Africa.

Certainly after the visits of Dr. Castro and Podgorny, the situation in Southern Africa can never remain the same again. Southern Africa can never be the same imperialist playground

¹³² By 1979, a handful of senior ZANLA officers underwent retraining in conventional tactics. ZANLA Commander Perrence Shiri, for instance, lead a ZANLA contingent to Romania to learn how to use field artillery. (Author's interview with Perrence Shiri (1989).

¹³³ Interview with Josiah Tongagara, Secretary for Defense, *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 2, May-June 1978, p. 17. After the death of Mao, the failure of Chinese allies in Angola, and the reorientation of FRELIMO toward the Soviet Union, the Chinese were reluctant to become involved further in southern Africa. As domestic reforms took the greatest priority, China eventually became a minor actor in southern African politics. See Daniel S. Papp, "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa", in Robert Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failures*, p. 92.

that it has been known to be. Sooner or later great changes are bound to take place, for Dr. Castro and Podgorny are no ordinary tourists that these countries are used to entertain. [sic] These men are makers of history not only in their own countries but also in the world at large. These are men of action -- true revolutionary fighters who back their words with concrete material and logistical support. To us freedom fighters, Dr. Castro and Podgorny brought with them a breath of fresh air, and raised the hopes of millions of exploited, oppressed and suffocated masses of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.¹³⁴

Mugabe even upheld certain aspects of socialism in the Soviet Union as examples to be emulated by a future Zimbabwe.¹³⁵ From ZANU's point of view, ideological differences should not have hindered relations. On the contrary, ideological similarities should have buttressed this "natural alliance".

In the last years of the struggle, ZANU eagerly pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba not least for reasons of military necessity.¹³⁶ First, according to one ZANU estimate, the Soviet Union controlled a majority votes in the OAU, thereby blocking this source as a supply for increasing ZANU military hardware needs.¹³⁷ Second, ZANLA wanted to obtain sophisticated weaponry which China could not supply.¹³⁸ Third, ZANU realized that Soviet assistance capabilities were much greater than China's in the event of an escalating war. Though ZANU officials expressed concern about the prospect of Zimbabwe becoming the next battleground for superpower rivalry, the message from the Angolan war was that Soviet assistance in the crunch could be decisive. The lesson from Angola about Chinese aid was the exact opposite, as

¹³⁴ "The Scramble for Africa", *Zimbabwe News*, March/April 1977, p. 1.

¹³⁵ Mugabe, speech, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 1., January-June, 1979, p. 18.

¹³⁶ See Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost Its Way?*, p.104 and fn 137.

¹³⁷ Author's interview with Henry Hamadziripi, (1988); and Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *Chimurenga*, p. 99.

¹³⁸ Author's interview with Richard Hove, former ZANU Secretary for External Relations, Harare, July 31, 1989). See also Sithole, *Zimbabwe Struggles within the Struggle*, p. 124.

Chinese supplies to the FNLA and UNITA could not keep pace with Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA.¹³⁹ If a similar type of conflict developed in Zimbabwe, ZANU preferred to benefit from, rather than oppose, Soviet involvement.¹⁴⁰ Finally, ZANU's closest ally, FRELIMO in Mozambique had gradually moved closer to the Soviet Union and away from China.¹⁴¹ As ZANU was based in Mozambique, this "Sovietization" had a ripple effect within the Zimbabwean liberation movement.¹⁴²

Both Samora Machel and Julius Nyerere urged Moscow and Cuba to supply ZANU. In 1978, Mugabe visited Havana where with received pledges from Castro for assistance in training guerrillas.¹⁴³ Apparently, Castro finally recognized that ZANU was the more powerful revolutionary force.¹⁴⁴ The Soviet leadership, however, expressed little interest in ZANU overtures.¹⁴⁵ In 1977, Soviet

¹³⁹ Author's interview with Henry Hamadziripi (1988).

¹⁴⁰ Author's interview with Simbi Mubako, (1989). As Mubako pointed out, until ZANU's victory, no liberation movement had succeeded without Moscow's backing.

¹⁴¹ See "Zimbabwe Rhodesia: What Next?" *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 20, No. 9, April 25, 1979, p. 4.

¹⁴² Sithole, *Zimbabwe Struggles within the Struggle*, p. 124. Writing before the Lancaster House settlement, Sithole saw the "Sovietization" of ZANU as inevitable. Moreover, within ZANU a movement called "Vashomba" or the "workers" led by Sam Geza believed that ZANU should adopt a more Soviet, workerist approach to socialism. This faction, however, was a small minority. Another group, headed by Henry Hamadziripi and Rugare Gumbo were alleged supporters of a greater orientation towards the Soviet Union. This group, a rival to Mugabe's leadership, was detained in 1978 and held in Mozambican prisons until the end of the war. (Author's interviews with Henry Hamadziripi and Simbi Mubako; and author's conversation with Sister Janice McLaughlin, Harare, August 10, 1989.

¹⁴³ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 2, July-August 1979, p. 33; *Africa Research Bulletin*, January 1-31, 1978, p. 4721. Nkomo was furious about this rapprochement between Cuba and ZANU. See *New African*, No. 141, May 1979, p. 35.

¹⁴⁴ Author's interview with Richard Hove, (1989); and "Rhodesia: Russian Second Thoughts on ZAPU?", *Africa Confidential*, Vol.19, No.21, October 20, 1978, p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ Author's interview with Trivafi Kangai, ZANU representative in the United States, 1977-1979. (Harare, July 28, 1988).

Deputy Foreign Minister Aliev met with Mugabe in Mozambique, the highest level meeting ever arranged between ZANU and the Soviet Union. After listening to ZANU's requests for weapons, Aliev advised ZANU to join ZAPU.¹⁴⁶ Despite this setback, Mugabe kept insisting that "we maintain friendly links and hope to obtain material support from the Soviet Union. At present it supports ZAPU with weapons and goods, but we hope to show that ours is the truly progressive socialist party."¹⁴⁷ As late as May 1979, Mugabe still claimed that ZANU was making progress in improving relations with Moscow with the hope of receiving weapons in the near future.¹⁴⁸

Contrary, then, to Soviet statements at the time, the USSR had several opportunities to improve relations with ZANU. While ZANU resisted Soviet calls for unification with ZAPU under Nkomo's leadership, the liberation movement did not oppose relations with the USSR; Moscow was the reluctant partner.¹⁴⁹ ZANU statements suggest that had Moscow initiated a different policy toward ZANU, ZANU military strategy would have changed considerably. With a conventional potential, ZANU's position regarding the necessity of a settlement at Lancaster might have been very different.

United States

Though numerous American support groups contributed material

¹⁴⁶ According to the Zimbabwean Deputy Foreign Minister Ndanga (who was also the first Zimbabwean Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.), Aliev and Mugabe met once again in Moscow during a transit stop by Mugabe on his way to Pyongyang. At this meeting, Aliev explained Soviet mistakes in Zimbabwe due to poor information. Mugabe responded, 'No, you just did not believe me.' (Author's interview, Harare, July 25, 1988).

¹⁴⁷ *De Volkskrant* (Amsterdam), January 10, 1979. Cited in Rothenburg, *The USSR and Africa*, p. 169. See also *Daily Telegraph*, February 8, 1979.

¹⁴⁸ *The Guardian* (London), May 16, 1979. A similar report appeared in *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), May 4, 1979, cited Rothenburg, *The USSR and Africa*, p. 169.

¹⁴⁹ According to one account, the Soviets even tried to interrupt the transfer of Soviet weapons to ZANU via the Mozambican army. When Machel was reprimanded by a Soviet diplomat in Maputo for giving weapons to ZANU, he simply showed the Soviet official the door. That was the end of the matter. (Author's interview with Godwin Matatu, Zimbabwean journalist based in Maputo at the time, Harare, June 25, 1988).

and financial assistance to ZANU,¹⁵⁰ the United States government condoned neither ZANU's ideology nor military strategy. As such, American direct influence on ZANU's development was minimal. On the contrary, the United States symbolized the enemy around which much of ZANU's ideology was defined.¹⁵¹

Indirectly, however, the United States played an instrumental role in influencing crucial strategic and tactical decisions made by ZANU. While not altering ZANU's ideology or strategy, the United States did render aspects of ZANU's plans ineffective or unobtainable.¹⁵² Most importantly at the Lancaster House negotiations, the United States induced amendment of ZANU's political programme. For the past three years, ZANU had emphatically renounced the American land buy-out plan as a neo-imperialist trap, declaring that "We would have nothing to do with it.... To us it seems as if its purpose is to bind Zimbabwe politically and economically and it could therefore compromise our independence,"¹⁵³ and "create favourable conditions for capitalist-exploitation of the resources of a young independent Zimbabwe."¹⁵⁴ Yet, as described earlier, Mugabe's delegation finally acquiesced to the American plan. As the following chapter explores in detail, this compromise had long-standing consequences for the development of the ZANU political programme in an independent Zimbabwe.

In terms of strategy, the United States played a significant

¹⁵⁰ In 1978, ZANU had 10 branches, 27 units and "scores of support committees" in the United States. *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 2, May-June 1978, p. 4. According to the ZANU General Secretary in the U.S. during the war, support groups in the United States contributed more to the liberation struggle than similar groups in the United Kingdom. Author's interview with Trifavi Kangai, ZANU Representative to the U.N. and in the U.S. reaffirmed this description. (1988).

¹⁵¹ In the dialectic sense, then, the existence of the United States might have been very important to the formation of ZANU ideology and strategy.

¹⁵² According to Richard Hove, 'it was no secret that they (the Americans) wanted to keep us out.' (Author's interview with Richard Hove, 1989).

¹⁵³ "Black Nationalists would reject the West's Trust Fund", *New York Times*, November 5, 1976.'

¹⁵⁴ "The Scramble for Africa", *Zimbabwe News*, March/April 1977, p. 2.

role in persuading ZANU to negotiate. While fearing an internationalization of the Zimbabwean conflict, ZANU recognized that the United States could play a significant role (for better or worse) in the resolution of the crisis due to Great Britain's "lack of power to effect change in Zimbabwe."¹⁵⁵ While lambasting the Kissinger plan as a "neo-colonial solution", ZANU approvingly cited American pressure on Great Britain as the force which instigated the Geneva conference.¹⁵⁶ Likewise, ZANU berated the general aims of the Anglo-American proposals, but praised the American leadership for keeping their British counterparts honest and engaged.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, after Margaret Thatcher's election in Great Britain in 1979, ZANU called upon American "realism" to continue to push for negotiations.¹⁵⁸ Threatened with British and American congressional inclinations to recognize Muzorewa's government, ZANU adopted an even more conciliatory attitude toward the Carter Administration's attempts at working with the Patriotic Front.¹⁵⁹ If either the United States or Great Britain had recognized the "internal settlement", ZANU's international position would have been undermined considerably.¹⁶⁰

While ZANU persistently denounced the British and American

¹⁵⁵ "The Scramble for Africa", p. 1.

¹⁵⁶ "Interview with Robert Mugabe in Geneva", *Zambia Daily Mail*, November 22, 1976, in Baumhogger, ed., *The Struggle for Independence*, Vol. 2, p. 209.

¹⁵⁷ See "Malta-Conference and beyond", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January-February 1978, p. 25.

¹⁵⁸ ZANU Vice President Simon Muzenda at OAU Liberation Committee meeting in Dar es Salaam, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (January-June, 1979), p. 46.

¹⁵⁹ "US Manoeuvres to Recognize Muzorewa-Smith Regime", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 11, No. 1, January-June, 1979, p. 50-52. Similarly, ZANU's *Voice of Zimbabwe* (Maputo, June 13, 1979, p. 9) reported that the "United States, with its experience of defeat by the people of south east Asia...has avoided taking the careless attitude of the British..."

¹⁶⁰ This view was shared by the Muzorewa government. According to a Minister in Muzorewa's government, the greatest factor for the government's failure was lack of international recognition. (Author's interview with Chris Anderson, Harare, July 19, 1989).

conception of national independence, in the end, they agreed to it. ZANU agreed to accept political independence first, and work for economic independence later. As one ZANU representative recalled, "We made a lot of compromises; Mugabe gave in, simply to end war; (at that time) socialism was not one of the goals."¹⁶¹ Most importantly ZANU accepted the American land buyout plan as an alternative to confiscation or nationalization.¹⁶² In accepting these compromises, ZANU leaders realized that they were accepting a kind of "neo-colonialist" solution which they had vehemently denounced for so long.¹⁶³ True to many earlier ZANU projections, the American involvement in ending the national liberation struggle served to constrain ZANU's ability to complete a socialist revolution.

¹⁶¹ Author's interview with a ZANU official at the Lancaster House conference (Harare, 1988).

¹⁶² After independence, several ZANU leaders claimed that the United States refused to honor their role of the plan. (Author's interview with Kumbirai Kangai, 1989). After the American offer was made at Lancaster House by American Ambassador Kingman Brewster, Mugabe and Nkomo publicly claimed that the Americans offered billions of dollars for resettlement. According to Ambassador Brewster and Jeffrey Davidow (U.S. observer in Salisbury at the time), Nkomo and Mugabe grossly exaggerated the aid offer as a face-saving way to stay at the conference. (Author's interviews with Brewster and Davidow).

¹⁶³ Subsequent government and ZANU(PF) statements refer to the agreement in such language. See the following chapter.

I. Soviet Policy: The Rise and Decline of "Socialist Orientation"
Soviet Attitudes and Interests

In the mid-1970s, Soviet perspectives about socialism's ascendancy and growth in the world were euphoric.¹ Detente between Moscow and Washington had ordained the USSR with de jure superpower status, a position which was portrayed by several Soviet leaders as a catalyst for the "world revolutionary process" in the Third World, and a weigh station for the Soviet Union on the way to international hegemony.² According to the two leading figures in the International Department of the CPSU, "The capitalist system is historically doomed,"³ while "world socialism is invincible."⁴ The socialist world was not only secure, but growing.

The victory of the revolution (October Revolution) and the entire course of world development in the next sixty years proved irrefutable that history follows the path foreseen by Marx and Lenin. The influence of Marxism-Leninism on the direction, forms,⁵ and rate of social progress is steadily growing stronger.⁵

According to Soviet leaders, victories by Third World national liberation movements spawned the most significant growth period for socialism since World War II.⁶ One senior figure in the International Department even declared that "Lenin's prediction that most of the world's population would inevitably join the struggle against exploitation in any form, for economic, social,

¹ Author's interview with Karen Brutents, First Deputy, International Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU, (Moscow, March 28, 1991).

² See Rotislav Ulyanovsky, *National Liberation: Essays on Theory and Practice*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978) pp. 192-195.

³ Ponomarev, "International Significance of the 25th CPSU Congress," p. 296.

⁴ Ulyanovsky, *National Liberation*, p. 193.

⁵ Ponomarev, *Lenin and the World Revolutionary Process*, p. 377.

⁶ *IBID.*, p. 336.

and spiritual emancipation, has come true."⁷ With specific reference to Angola, the 25th CPSU Party Congress noted that the MPLA's victory in Angola was further confirmation of the inevitable march towards world socialism.⁸

States of Socialist Orientation

In the Soviet lexicon, the triumph of the "progressive forces" in Angola represented a qualitatively higher stage of socialism's development than the national liberation victories in the 1960s.⁹ According to the Soviet typology, the new governments in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia were distinguished from their "national democratic" predecessors in Ghana, Egypt, and Mali of a decade earlier in their resolve "to come closer to scientific socialism,"¹⁰ a conviction constituted by their (1) adherence Marxist-Leninist principles, (2) commitment to organizing vanguard parties, (3) adoption of the non-capitalist path of development, and (4) close alignment with the Soviet Union and the socialist community of states. Called states of socialist orientation, the 26th CPSU Congress highlighted the importance of their growth for the development of the world revolutionary process.

Comrades! One of the most important results of the Party's international activity during the period under review is an appreciable expansion of cooperation with countries that have been liberated from colonial oppression.....[Regarding the states of socialist orientation] there numbers have increased. The development of these countries along a progressive path is

⁷ Pyotr Manchka, *Problems of Africa Today*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), p. 5. Manchka was in charge of Africa for the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

⁸ *Documents and Resolutions: The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1976) p. 16. For a comprehensive account of revolutionary upheavals during this period, see Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, (Thetford, Norfolk: Verso, 1983), chapter 4.

⁹ See N.D. Kosukhin, *Arena Bor'bi Idei -- Afrika*, (Moskva: "Misl", 1985), p. 86; Anatoly Gromyko, *Africa: Progress, Problems, Prospects*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), pp. 29-30.

¹⁰ R.A. Ulyanovsky, "National and Revolutionary Democracy: Evolution Paths," in *Africa in Soviet Studies: Annual 1986*, (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), p. 20. This article first appeared in *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 2 (1984).

not identical, of course, and it proceeds in complex conditions. But the main lines are similar. They include the gradual elimination of the positions of the imperialist monopolies, the local grande bourgeoisie and the feudal elements, the restrictions of the activity on foreign capital. They include the securing by the people of the commanding heights of the economy, the transition onto the planned development of productive forces, and the encouragement of the cooperative movement in the countryside. They include the heightening role of the working masses in public life and the gradual strengthening of the governmental apparatus with the national cadres loyal to the people. They include the anti-imperialist nature of these countries' foreign policy.¹¹

In an attempt to quantify the impact of these states on the correlation of forces, the Institute of African Studies calculated that the zone of socialist orientation in Africa and Asia comprised over 12 million square kilometers and 150 million people by the end of the decade.¹²

The Two-Stage Revolution

For Angola to build a socialist state and society, Soviet policymakers and theorists prescribed a rigorous set of guidelines to be followed. First, the MPLA leadership had to realize that Angola lacked the material base to build socialism immediately. To advance from its "pre-capitalist social formations (tribal, semi-feudal and feudal) towards socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage in which many peoples in the world have lived, or are living," Angola had to adopt a socialist orientation.¹³ This transitional phase incorporated several different kinds of production relations, including "state, state-capitalist, foreign capitalist, private-capitalist, cooperative, and small-scale

¹¹ *Documents and Resolutions: The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1981) pp. 16-17. See also *Ministerstvo Inostrannich Del SSSR, SSSR v Bor'be Protiv Kolonializma i Neokolonializma, dokumenti i materialy, 1960-March 1986, tom 2*, (Moskva: Politizdat, 1986), p.6.

¹² *African Countries' Foreign Policy*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), p. 51.

¹³ Georgy Mirsky, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie: Nekotorye Voprosy Differentsiatsii", *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 6, June 1978. p. 150; and *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Theory and Tactics of Revolutionary Parties*, p. 325.

commodity sectors."¹⁴ Yet, the "main part of the state's economic function is to create the material and technical preconditions for socialism, new relations of production."¹⁵ In accordance with this formula, Soviet leaders advised Angola to restrict foreign investment, eradicate domestic free enterprise, private property, and market mechanisms, and replace them with state ownership of industry, cooperatives in agricultural production, and central planning coordinating all economic activities.¹⁶

To carry out these revolutionary transformations, Soviet leaders stressed to their Angolan allies the necessity of developing a correct ideology--scientific socialism as informed by marxism-leninism.¹⁷ In the Soviet analysis, Angola had to reject "African socialism" and "black self-consciousness" as ideologies of the petty bourgeoisie.¹⁸ Rather, the MPLA had to learn and propagate the brand of marxism-leninism nurtured in the Soviet Union, a task which Soviet leaders praised the MPLA leadership for accomplishing.¹⁹

Finally, the development of socialism in Angola required the formation of a vanguard party.

¹⁴ *IBID.*, p. 16; and author's interview with Gleb Starushenko, the author of the concept, socialist orientation. (Moscow, November 16, 1991).

¹⁵ V. Chirkin and Yu. Yudin, *A Socialist-Oriented State* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), pp. 32-33.

¹⁶ Ponomarev, *Lenin and the World Revolutionary Process*, p.441; *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Theory and Tactics of Revolutionary Parties*, p. 337; Karen Brutents, *The Newly Free Countries in the Seventies*, pp. 77-78; *Afrika: Problemi Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1982), p. 18; Kosukhin *Revolutionary Democracy in Africa*, p. 105; Chirkin and Yudin, *A Socialist-Oriented State*, p. 39; N.I. Gavrilov, "Sovetskii Soyuz i Afrikanskii Strani Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii," in *Leninskaya Politika Mira i Bezopastnosti Narodov*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1982), p. 154; and V.P. Maslennikov, *Cooperatsiya v Stranach Azii i Afriki*, (Moskva: Ekonomika, 1988), pp. 107-115.

¹⁷ See *The Ideology of African Revolutionary Democracy*, (Moscow: "Social Sciences Today", 1984) *in passim*, especially the articles by Gromyko, Kosukhin, and Starushenko.

¹⁸ Manchka, *Problems of Africa Today*, pp. 143 & 148.

¹⁹ N.D. Kosukhin, *Arena Bor'bi Idei -- Afrika*, pp. 92 & 97.

The social-oriented countries' experience of party and state development show that the transformation of the revolutionary-democratic party into a vanguard organisation is an essential condition to become a genuinely leading force in society and the state.²⁰

Similar to their own plight in 1917, CPSU officials concluded that Angola's lack of objective factors for building socialism could only be overcome by inordinate subjective will, as concentrated in a vanguard party. To be successful, the MPLA had to reject "bourgeois" forms of governance such as a multi-party system, and instead adhere to strict principles of democratic centralism.²¹ The party then would become the leading agent for socialist transformation by seizing total control of the state.²² According to the Soviet strategy, "state power is used for the purpose of implementing the most important social transformations, as a tool for developing the new social order" in a socialist-oriented state.²³

The Imperialist Challenge

In the Manichean world divided between socialism and capitalism, Soviet leaders discerned a real threat to these states of socialist orientation from the West.²⁴ Soviet commentators warned that the imperialists sought to crush those states which adopted scientific socialism, and acknowledged that an alliance between imperialism and right-wing nationalists can reverse a state's socialist-orientation.²⁵ In addition to military force, Soviet commentators pointed out that American priests, peace corps volunteers, doctors, teachers, and journalists, in addition to transnational corporations, EEC assistance, and the World Bank, all

²⁰ Chirkin and Yudin, *A Socialist-Oriented State*, p. 158.

²¹ O.V. Martishin, *Afrikanskaya Revolutsionnaya Demokratiya*, (Moskva: Polizdat, 1981), p. 214.

²² *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Theory and Tactics of Revolutionary Parties*, pp. 334-335.

²³ Chirkin and Yudin, *A Socialist-Oriented State*, p. 28; Brutents, *The Newly Free Countries in the Seventies*, p. 76.

²⁴ *Documents and Resolutions: The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 19.

²⁵ E. Dolgoplov, *As Guerras de Libertacao Nacional Etapa Actual*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 125.

conspired to return those states of socialist orientation into "the orbit of the world capitalist economy...."²⁶ Because of the American humiliation during the Angolan civil war, the People's Republic of Angola was a primary target.²⁷

The Soviet Role in Assisting Socialist Development in Angola

In the Soviet analysis, Angola's only hope in this struggle against imperialist aggression was to forge an intimate alliance with the socialist world. Because these newly-formed states were vulnerable to imperialist aggression and inexperienced in the ways of socialist practice, close cooperation with the socialist states was considered a prerequisite for their survival and success.²⁸ First, in the Soviet analysis, Moscow's attainment of superpower status acted as a deterrent to Western aggression in southern Africa and the Third World as a whole.²⁹ As Karen Brutents of the International Department of the CPSU explained, "the indirect assistance of the socialist countries is almost as important as their direct aid. Its impact far exceeds the purely economic sphere. The very existence of the world socialist system and its link with the newly emergent state have a tremendous influence on imperialism's policy in the former colonial and semi-colonial world..."³⁰ In reference to Angola and Ethiopia, the 26th CPSU Congress declared that "We are against the export of revolution, and we cannot agree to any export of counterrevolution either."³¹

Second, Soviet leaders claimed that the USSR offered to Angola a model for emulation. Quoting Lenin, Pyotr Manchka, the sector

²⁶ Evgeny Tarabrin, "Problems of Africa in the 1980s," in *The USSR and Africa*, (Moscow, "Social Sciences Today", 1983), p. 32.

²⁷ Boris Asoyan, *Apartheid -- the White Man's Burden*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), pp. 124-126.

²⁸ Ulyanovsky, *National Liberation*, p. 382.

²⁹ Brutents, *The Newly Free Countries in the Seventies*, p. 242; Anatoly Gromyko, "The October Revolution and the Destiny of Africa," in *The USSR and Africa*, (Moscow, "Social Sciences Today", 1983), p. 20.

³⁰ *IBID.*, p. 272.

³¹ *Documents and Resolutions: The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 18.

head for Africa in the International Department proclaimed that "...it is the Russian model that reveals to all countries [in southern Africa] something -- and something highly significant -- of their near and inevitable future."³² In describing the ways in which Angola (and Mozambique) have been assisted by the Soviet Union, another major study on southern Africa gave "special meaning" to the "rich experience of the socialist development" of the Soviet Union as a guide for these young African countries.³³

Third, and most importantly, as prescribed in the new Soviet Constitution of 1977, Soviet citizens had an "internationalist duty" to support for the development of socialism in countries like Angola.³⁴ This constitutional mandate resulted in Soviet penetration of every sector of the Angolan state and society.

The Party

Since the signing of the first party-to-party agreement between the CPSU and the MPLA in 1976, Soviet leaders asserted that these links enabled MPLA leaders to gain a first hand knowledge about the operations of the CPSU. As one commentator proclaimed,

The CPSU's experience is of great benefit to the revolutionary parties in transforming social and economic life in the developing countries....By way of example, in the agreement on co-operation between the CPSU and the MPLA inter-party cooperation is regarded as a vital basis for Soviet-Angola relations.³⁵

Contacts arranged through the exchange of delegations and the training of cadres and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism provided critical conduits for transferring the Soviet party model to Angola.³⁶

³² Manchka, *Problems of Africa Today*, p. 21.

³³ Gromyko, ed., *Krisis na Yuge Afriki*, p. 236.

³⁴ See *Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1977), chapter 4.

³⁵ Kosukhin *Revolutionary Democracy in Africa*, p. 73.

³⁶ See *Istoriya Mezhdunarodnich Otnoshenii i Vneshnei Politiki SSSR*, tom 3, p. 388; and author's interview with lecturers from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee has acted as a central clearing house for such party-to-party contacts. For an exhaustive review of the Solidarity Committee's activities, see A.S. Dzasokhov, *Edinstvo i Vzaimodeistvie Antiimperialisticheskich Natsional'no-*

The Economy

Almost immediately after independence, the USSR and the People's Republic of Angola (the country name itself an import from Eastern Europe) signed a series of long-term agreements including a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which guaranteed close cooperation between the two countries in economic matters.³⁷ The most consequential type of assistance was advise. Given their experiences at managing and operating large enterprises run by the state, Soviet advisors working in Angola instilled a particular philosophy about socialist bureaucracies and planned economies. Soviet advisors worked in almost every ministry, bureau, and major project initiated in Angola after 1976.³⁸ Soviet specialists reorganized the financial and banking system, set up the Ministry of Planning, oversaw the formation of state and cooperative farms, and virtually ran, with the Cubans, the construction industry.³⁹ Soviet advisors also pressed for total nationalization of the oil industry, but their recommendation was rejected by Neto. Soviet technicians also played major roles in managing shipbuilding, the fishing industry, and training Angolans both in Angola and in the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ To complete these numerous tasks, American sources

Osvoboditel'nich Sil, (Moskva: Nauka, 1986).

³⁷ The text of the agreement can be found in Ministerstvo Inostrannich Del SSR, *SSSR i Strani Afriki*, 1975-1976, chast 2, (Moskva: Polizdat, 1985), pp. 154-161.

³⁸ Author's interview with Alexander Smirnov, Counsellor in Soviet Embassy in Angola, (Luanda, August 23, 1988.) For an overview, see Fituni, *Narodnaya Respublika Angola*, pp. 157-163.

³⁹ Author's interview with a senior official in the Ministry of Planning, (Luanda, August 1988); Gromyko, ed., *Krisis na Yuge Afriki*, p. 232.

⁴⁰ Fituni, *Narodnaya Respublika Angola*, pp. 157-158, and Rubinstein, "Soviet-African Trade Relations," in *The USSR and Africa*, (1983), p. 83. Rubinstein singled out Soviet assistance in the agricultural sector as a most important part of Soviet assistance to Angola. Soviet advisors were most involved in the production of cotton on abandoned Portuguese plantations transformed into state farms. In reorganizing these plantations, Uzbek farmers were brought in to share their experiences in farming cotton in the Soviet Union. (See "Sovetsko-Angol'skoe Kommyunike," June 1, 1976, in Ministerstvo Inostrannich Del SSR, *SSSR i Strani Afriki*, 1975-1976, chast 2, (Moskva: Polizdat, 1985), p. 167.) An estimated 300 Angolans travel to the Soviet Union each year for higher education, while another 1,200 study

estimated that 2,760 Soviet and East European specialists and approximately 8,500 Cubans were working in Angola by the end of the 1970s.⁴¹

Soviet aid and investment was not as pervasive as this technical and administrative assistance, reaching only \$115 by 1979.⁴² In January 1982, Angola and the Soviet Union signed a major economic agreement which pledged approximately \$2 billion in economic assistance.⁴³ By 1984, however, Angola had received only and estimated \$560 million in Soviet economic credits and grants since independence.⁴⁴ What was granted was concentrated in large-scale enterprises run by the state.⁴⁵ Consistent with the Soviet notion of socialist development, Soviet analysts explicitly emphasized these kinds of projects so as to strengthen the state sector and stimulate "the development of the working class."⁴⁶

in Cuba. Within Angola, the Soviet Union opened three study centers for learning about mechanized agriculture, while East Germans, Soviets, Vietnamese, and Cubans also dominate the faculties at all institutes of higher education within Angola. Cuban teachers account for approximately half of all secondary teachers in Angola. (Author's interview with Papetela, the Angolan Minister of Education, Luanda August 1989.)

⁴¹ See David Newsom, statement before the House Subcommittee on Africa, October 18, 1979, *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1979, p. 31; and Daniel Papp, *Soviet Policies toward the Developing Countries of the World: The Dilemmas of Power and Presence*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, December 1986) p. 291.

⁴² Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1954-1979*, (Washington, D.C.: National Foreign Assessment Center, 1980) p. 18.

⁴³ See David Albright, *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s*, p. 81; Daniel Papp, *Soviet Policies toward the Developing Countries of the World*, p. 299.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Warsaw Pact Aid to Non-Communist LDCs*, (Washington: GPO, 1986), p. 12.

⁴⁵ An example is the \$400 million contract for the joint production between Angola, Brazil, and the Soviet Union of the Kapanda hydroelectric complex, the largest enterprise ever initiated in Angola. See David Albright, *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s*, The Washington Papers No. 101, (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 33.

⁴⁶ Gromyko, *Africa: Progress, Problems, Prospects*, p. 158; Institut Istoriya SSSR, *Internatsionalizm Sovetskogo Naroda*, p. 449.

Trade between the Soviet Union and states of socialist orientation was heralded as another means by which these developing states could be weaned from the capitalist stranglehold. Yet, trade with the Soviet Union never amounted to more than 10% of total Angolan trade.

Angolan Imports:⁴⁷

<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>
5.3	69.2	47.8	52.4	69.1	107.0	61

Exports:

<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>
14.4	10.4	9.6	11.8	15.8	8.1	3.4

Moreover, as these figures demonstrate, Angolan imports of Soviet goods -- comprised principally of airplanes, trucks, tractors, and heavy machinery --- quickly outpaced Soviet imports from Angola.⁴⁸ These persistent trade imbalances have resulted in an Angolan debt to the Soviet Union estimated at \$2.7 billion, hardly a positive contribution to socialist development in Angola.⁴⁹

The Military

The Angolan government could not have instituted any of these reforms without staying in power. Unquestionably, Moscow's greatest contribution to the MPLA has been military assistance. As the 26th CPSU Congress stated,

Together with other fraternal countries, we also help to strengthen the defense capability of liberated states if they ask us that we do so. This was the case, for example, in Angola and Ethiopia. Attempts were made to do away with the peoples revolutions in these countries by encouraging internal counterrevolution or outside aggression. We are against the export of revolution, and we also cannot agree to the export

⁴⁷ From Fituni, *Narodnaya Respublika Angola*, pp. 155-156.

⁴⁸ Grigori Rubinstein, "Soviet-African Trade Relations," in *The USSR and Africa*, (1983), p. 83; Itemizations can be found in *Vneshnie Ekonomicheskie Svyazi SSSR*.

⁴⁹ Author's interview with Nikolai Krainov, Executive Secretary, Soviet Part of Intergovernmental Soviet-Angolan Commission for Economic, Techno-Scientific Cooperation and Trade, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, (Moscow, September 18, 1989).

of counterrevolution.⁵⁰

To thwart these "counterrevolutions", the government-to-government Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Angola bound the Soviet Union to Angola's defense.⁵¹ According to Western estimates, these treaty commitments resulted in roughly 20,300 communist military personnel deployed in Angola by 1978, including 1,300 from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and 19,000 from Cuba.⁵² Almost ten years later, the estimates for Soviet advisors alone had risen to 900, supplemented by an additional 800 East European advisors and roughly 50,000 Cuban soldiers.⁵³ These advisors have been accompanied by an estimated \$500 million in arms between 1975-1979, a figure that rose to \$4 billion by 1988.⁵⁴ Several hundred FAPLA officers also have trained in the Soviet Union. As the following section discusses in detail, these East European and Cuban soldiers have been vital for the defense of the MPLA in Angola.

The Demise of the World Socialist System

The Construction and Deconstruction of the Theory of "States of Socialist Orientation"

In the late 1970s, Soviet theorists increasingly recognized

⁵⁰ Leonid Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy", *Pravda*, February 24, 1981, in *CDSP*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8, pp. 7-8. See also *Ministerstvo Inostrannich Del SSSR, SSSR v Bor'be Protiv Kolonializma i Neokolonializma, dokumenti i materiali, 1960-March 1986, tom 2, (Moskva: Politizdat, 1986), p. 6.*

⁵¹ "Dogovor o Druzhbe i Sotrudnichestve mezhdu SSSR i Narodnoi Respublikoi Angola," (October 8, 1976), *Ministerstvo Inostrannich Del SSR, SSSR i Strani Afriki, 1975-1976, chast 2, (Moskva: Polizdat, 1985), pp. 215-218.*

⁵² David Newsom, statement before the House Subcommittee on Africa, October 18, 1979, *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1979, p.30.

⁵³ See Kempton, *Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa*, p. 85.

⁵⁴ Papp, *Soviet Policies toward the Developing Countries of the World*, p. 291. For the period between 1978 and 1982, ACDA estimated that Soviet weapons to Angola totalled \$950 million. See US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982,*

the difficulties in transplanting their model of socialism to the radically different conditions of Angola, Cuba, or Vietnam.⁵⁵ These writers also admitted that they had underestimated the pervasiveness of capitalism internationally and the resilience of market mechanisms domestically in these Third World countries.⁵⁶ Moreover, they warned that overzealous declarations about "socialism" and "unwarranted haste in implementing radical reforms" could undermine the already weak domestic support for socialist development in the Third World.⁵⁷

These apprehensions about "socialist-oriented" states evolved to an outright rejection of the model by most Soviet analysts and diplomats during the Gorbachev era.⁵⁸ Critics cite the absence of necessary objective conditions for the development of socialism as the central reason for the model's "rich history of failure."⁵⁹ Because Brezhnev's Soviet Union sought to advance international socialism, "We considered it our duty to do all in our power to impede the development of capitalism in the emergent

⁵⁵ See, for instance, Karen Brutents, *National Liberation Movements Today*, part II, (Progress: Moscow, 1977), Georgii Kim, "Razvivaiushchiesia Strany: Usilenie Sotsial'no-klassovoi Differentsiatsii", *Aziia i Afrika Segodnia*, No. 11, 1981; and Nodari Simoniya, "The Present Stage of the Liberation Struggle", *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 3, 1981. For Western assessments, see Hough *The Struggle for the Third World*, 156-169; and Francis Fukuyama, "Soviet Strategy in the Third World," (1987); *Moscow's Post Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, R-3337-USDP (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, February 1986); Elizabeth Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, (New York: Praeger, 1983).

⁵⁶ See N. V. Zagladin, ed. *Vneshnepoliticheskaya Strategiya KPSS i Novoe Politicheskoe Mishlenie v Yadernii Vek*, (Moskva: Polizdat, 1988), p. 315.

⁵⁷ Ulyanovsky, *National Liberation*, p. 382; and V. Chirkin and Yu. Yudin, *A Socialist-Oriented State*, pp. 33-34.

⁵⁸ Gorbachev's extraordinary speech at the United Nations on December 7, 1988 did not mention once this category of states. See *Pravda*, December 8, 1988; Georgy Mirsky, "K Voprosu o Vybore Puti i Orientatsii Razvivaiushchiksia Stran," *MEMO*, No. 5, 1987, p. 78; and Igor Zevelev and Alexei Kara-Murza, "The Destiny of Socialism and the Afro-Asian World, *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 3 (May/June 1989), p. 2.

⁵⁹ Alexei Kiva, "Sotsialisticheskaya Orientatsiya: Ozhidaniya i Real'nost'" , *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 6, 1988, p. 50

countries and impose upon them our model under the banner of anti-imperialist struggle."⁶⁰ As most of the features incorporated into the model were borrowed from the Soviet Union's own system, they had little relevance to the local conditions and requirements of these new states.⁶¹ The result was not only a failure to develop socialism, but failure to develop at all.

To corrects these errors, Soviet analysts now recommend that socialist-oriented states abandon rigid socialist principles and vanguardism, adopt market economy principles and reintegrate (or integrate further) into the international capitalist division of labor.

Market exchanges should stimulate the development of productive forces, establish a balance between demand and supply, and narrow disproportions in the multi-structural socio-economic society of a transitional period. The experience of several socialist-oriented countries, including "second-generation" ones (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and others) has shown that disregard of the laws of commodity-money relations may cause a slump in labor productivity, disproportions in trade and curtailment of production, which can be very dangerous to a national-democratic revolution.⁶²

In short, Soviet foreign policymakers are recommending the socialist-oriented states stop orienting towards socialism.⁶³

Calling a spade a spade we must admit that the development of capitalist relations is historically progressive for all its drawbacks. Attempts to prevent it where there is no alternative will merely prolong the

⁶⁰ Kolosovsky, "Risk Zones in the Third World," p. 42.

⁶¹ Igor Belikov and Inko Razpopov, "The Fate of and Idea," *New Times*, No. 25, June 20-26, 1989, p. 31; Kiva, "Developing Countries, Socialism, Capitalism," p. 5. The origins of this kind of thinking can be found in Nodariya Simoniya, "Leninskaya Ideya Revolutsionno-demokraticeskoi Diktatury i Nekapitalisticheskaya Put' Razvitiya," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, (1968).

⁶² Vladimir Lee and Georgy Mirsky, "Socialist Orientation and New Political Thinking", *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 4, 1988, p. 64.

⁶³ Author's interview with officials in the Ministry of External Economic Relations, Moscow, September 1989.

existing backwardness.⁶⁴

The most fundamental challenge to the concept of states of socialist orientation, however, is the Soviet Union's own internal reassessment. If, for instance, collectivization destroyed Soviet agriculture, why should it be tried again in Angola?⁶⁵ Perestroika in the Soviet Union also is shrinking the resources available for assisting and subsidizing socialist-oriented countries in the Third World.⁶⁶ Given the Soviet Union's own economic and political crises, both CPSU officials and the Soviet Supreme Soviet (and, soon thereafter, the Russian Supreme Soviet) have warned that the Soviet Union can no longer be counted on to assist the Third World.⁶⁷

New Thinking and Regional Conflicts

Since 1985, Soviet policymakers have rarely mentioned the "world revolutionary process" in their analyses of regional conflicts.⁶⁸ Soviet leaders now assert that "the contest between the two systems (capitalism and socialism) today is not the decisive contradiction in international relations,"⁶⁹ nor is

⁶⁴ Kiva, "Developing Countries, Socialism, and Capitalism," p. 61.

⁶⁵ See Igor Zevelev and Alexei Kara-Murza, "The Destiny of Socialism and the Afro-Asian World, *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 3 (May/June 1989), p. 3.

⁶⁶ See M.S. Gorbachev, "For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Humanity", *Pravda*, February 17, 1987. Quoted in *Reprints from the Soviet Press*, V. XLIX, No. 6, November 1987, p. 9.

⁶⁷ Author's interview with Sergei Tsyplakov, Head of Sector, Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, (March 27, 1991). See the opinion survey of Soviet foreign policymakers in A. Melville and A. Nikitin, "Sovetskie Eksperti o Mirovoi Politike," *SSHA* (Moscow) No. 6, (June 1989), p. 16. Even several of the striking committees which formed in summer of 1989, listed the end of aid to the Third World as one of their demands. See Ludmilla Thorne, "What Soviet Miners Want," *Freedom at Issue*, (New York) March-April 1990, pp. 25-29.

⁶⁸ See Sylvia Woodby, *Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy*, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1989).

⁶⁹ Kovalev, "Soviet Foreign Policy Priorities," p. 35.

class struggle the essence of all civil strife.⁷⁰ Moreover, when class interests and class struggle do arise, Gorbachev has argued that they are nonetheless secondary to "human interests" and "universal values."⁷¹ This new approach to international politics suggests an entirely new agenda for Soviet policy in the Third World.

Most importantly, "deideologization" means that superpower competition no longer dominates Soviet policy toward regional conflicts. Yevgeny Primakov, a principle advisor to Gorbachev on foreign affairs, has noted that "since April 1985, special attention has been drawn to the need to stop regarding regional conflicts solely through the prism of confrontation between the USSR and the USA or between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO."⁷² If superpower competition could be extricated from regional conflicts, the severity of these local conflicts could be drastically reduced.⁷³

This new approach to regional conflict has had a profound affect on Soviet policy towards Angola. Since 1986, Soviet authorities consistently expressed a real interest in expediting a settlement on Angola and Namibia.⁷⁴ First, Soviet diplomats quietly yet persistently prompted their Angolan allies to be more flexible. While Soviet diplomats are the first to recognize that Angola initiated serious negotiation proposals well before Soviet

⁷⁰ Kozyrev and Shumikhin, "East and West in the Third World," p.71.

⁷¹ *Pravda*, December 8, 1988.

⁷² Yevgeni Primakov, "USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts," *International Affairs*, No. 6, June 1988, p. 6.

⁷³ See Victor Kremenyuk, "Soviet-US Relations and Regional Conflicts," *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 3 (May/June 1989), pp. 42-43; and Genrikh Trofimenko, "Towards a New Quality of Soviet-American Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 12, (December 1988), p. 23.

⁷⁴ Author's interview with Chester Crocker (April 18, 1989). See also Alexei Vassiliev, Deputy Director of the Africa Institute, "B Poiskach Regionalnich Alternativ", *Moskovskie Novosti*, No. 32, August 7, 1988, p. 3.

"new thinking",⁷⁵ they nonetheless take credit for "softening" some of Angola's negotiating positions through a series of informal discussions over the course of three years.⁷⁶ More indirectly, the political atmosphere created by Soviet new thinking on regional conflicts helped to undermine the advocates of war within the MPLA while strengthening the position of those favoring a political settlement.⁷⁷

During the quadripartite negotiations between Angola, Cuba, South Africa, with the United States mediating, Soviet diplomats played an indispensable role in securing a final agreement. Rather than insisting on co-hosting the negotiations, the Soviet Union quietly and deliberately accepted a background role. Nonetheless, Soviet observers attended every round of negotiations, offering subtle prodding throughout the talks to insure a final settlement.⁷⁸ Departing from past Soviet intransigence regarding South Africa's involvement in a peace negotiation, Gorbachev recognized the necessity of "accounting for the interests of all those who have been drawn into the conflict."⁷⁹ Perhaps the greatest confirmation of the Soviet role came from Chester Crocker who praised the "hard work and professional dedication of Soviet officials", exclaiming that "it has been a case study of superpower

⁷⁵ See Anatoly Adamishin, "Changes and Hopes," *New Times*, No. 1 (1989), p. 11. This point was reaffirmed to the author during interviews with Soviet officials who have been directly involved in these negotiations (Moscow, September 1989 and Luanda, August 1989). The early Angolan proposals can be found in "Declaracao Conjunta Angolano-Cubano," *Jornal de Angola*, February 7, 1982, p.1, and "Letter from Jose Eduardo dos Santos to the General Secretary of the UN," November 17, 1984, printed as *ANGOP Special Document*, No. 38, November 25, 1984.

⁷⁶ Author's interview with Vladillen Vasev, the Soviet foreign ministry official directly responsible for the negotiations from 1981 until 1988. (Moscow, September 19, 1989).

⁷⁷ Author's interview with MPLA Central Committee member, (Luanda, August 20, 1989).

⁷⁸ *Newsweek*, July 25, 1988; and author's interview with Soviet diplomats in Harare, July 28, 1989.

⁷⁹ *Pravda*, October 19, 1988, p. 1.

effort to support the resolution of regional conflicts."⁸⁰

Conclusion

Soviet leaders had a blueprint for Angola's revolutionary outcome, a plan designed to recreate the Soviet system in Africa. Massive Soviet assistance to the MPLA during the transition to independence bestowed Moscow with a special role in Angola's revolutionary transformation. For the first decade of relations between the two countries, Soviet advisors in Luanda and Moscow took advantage of this special relationship to encourage if not administer the development of a socialist state, Soviet-style, in Angola.

By 1988, however, the new regime in Moscow had reevaluated the model of socialist orientation, not only for Angola but for the Soviet Union as well. In recognizing the failures of the model, many Soviet leaders began to advise "socialist-oriented" states to abandon the project entirely. Lacking a new alternative orientation, Soviet leaders simply have advocated the development of market capitalism, the very "counterrevolutionary" model which they scorned only a decade earlier. In making such recommendations, Soviet policymakers have opted to refrain from assisting in further revolutionary transformations in Angola. For the next "revolutionary" phase in Angola, the commissars will come from Chevron Oil and the World Bank, not Moscow or Havana.

I. American Policy Towards Angola: From Passive Cooption to Vigorous Confrontation

The Ford Administration, 1976

Extremely bitter about their circumvented strategy regarding the Angolan civil war, the Ford Administration refused to recognize the new Angolan government. As Kissinger remarked in the spring of 1976, "I would not call any African country with which I am familiar as a government controlled from Moscow. I would have to

⁸⁰ Cited in Scott Kraft, "Cuba, Angola and S. Africa Sign Namibia Peace Pact", *Los Angeles Times*, December 14, 1988, p. 18. In an interview with the author, (April 18, 1989) Crocker also gave high praise to the Soviet diplomatic effort.

make an exception for the case of Angola ..."⁸¹ Consequently, the United States first opposed and then abstained on votes which admitted Angola into the United Nations.⁸² As of 1991, Angola remained one of the handful of countries in the world which the United States did not recognize.

The Carter Administration

Carter's team on Africa wanted to avoid viewing southern Africa through the East-West prism, a perspective which they believed caused the international conflict in Angola in the first place.⁸³ Consequently, instead of opposing the new regime in Luanda, Carter pledged to establish diplomatic relations.⁸⁴ In explaining this policy, Policy Planning Staff director, Anthony Lake, maintained that

this does not mean we are unconcerned about the presence of Cuban troops in Africa or the flow of Soviet arms there-- on the contrary. But I am convinced that we do more harm than good by dramatizing the East-West factor. Such dramatic excesses can make crises more dangerous; they can cut across the sense of African nationalism that is the surest barrier to external intervention...When we look at African questions as East-West rather than African in their essential character, we are prone to act more on the basis of abstract geopolitical theorizing than with due regard for local realities.⁸⁵

Andrew Young even asserted that the Cuban troops were playing a stabilizing, not expansionary role, in Angola, and thereby

⁸¹ Kissinger's testimony, in *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, Hearings, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements, and the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, March 5, 8, 19; May 12, 13, 21, 26 and 27, 1976. (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 218.

⁸² See the statement made in the UN Security Council by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, June 23, 1976, in *Department of State Bulletin*, July 19, 1976, pp. 99-100; and the Africa Fund, "Southern Africa: The U.S. Record at the U.N., 1976," *Southern Africa Perspectives* (New York) 1976, p. 3.

⁸³ David Newsom, Under Secretary of State, March 14, 1979, *DOSB*, June 1979, p. 20.

⁸⁴ *DOSB*, October 10, 1977, pp. 462-463. See also Andrew Young, as quoted in Gerald Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties," *Foreign Policy*, No. 31 (Summer 1978), p. 6.

⁸⁵ Anthony Lake, October 27, 1977, in *DOSB*, December 12, 1977, p. 844.

ironically served American interests in the region.⁸⁶

American and other Western corporations dealing with Angola realized the profitability of this irony. As already discussed in the previous chapter, Gulf Oil encountered little trouble in redirecting their royalty payments from Portugal to the new regime in Luanda. Since 1976, Cabinda Gulf, now a subsidiary of Chevron Oil, has maintained very cordial and cooperative relations with the Angolan government. Oil executives working in Angola have remarked that business in this "socialist state" is much easier than in most other Third World countries.⁸⁷ Moreover, socialist troops (Cuban and Angolan) have defended Chevron installations against UNITA and South African attacks underwritten by the United States government.⁸⁸ As a consequence of these lucrative business opportunities, Gulf and others became vocal supporters of Angolan recognition in the United States.⁸⁹

Recognizing these American interests in Angola, the Carter Administration initially took substantive steps towards normalizing relations with the new regime. One month after Carter's inauguration, Andrew Young met with Angolan President Agostinho Neto in Nigeria.⁹⁰ The following year Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose, travelled to Angola, while Donald McHenry actively cooperated with Angola in the context of the UN Contact Group on Namibia.⁹¹ The new Administration also lifted the U.S. veto on Angolan membership to the United Nations

⁸⁶ See Henry Jackson, *From Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960*, (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1982). p. 80.

⁸⁷ Author's interviews with executives of Cabinda Gulf, Conoco, Unical, and Fina, (Luanda, August 1988 and 1989).

⁸⁸ The ironies of this situation are striking; Cuban troops defending American companies against American-funded insurgents, while the royalties generated from the oil operations pay for Cuban salaries and Soviet weapons.

⁸⁹ For this list of corporate sponsors of recognition, see Gerald Bender, "Angola: Left, Right and Wrong," *Foreign Policy*, No. 43 (Summer 1981), p. 66.

⁹⁰ See Jackson, *From Congo to Soweto* p. 80.

⁹¹ See David Newsom, October 18, 1979, *DOSB*, December 1979, p. 32.

and helped to diffuse the Shaba crisis between Angola and Zaire.⁹² As late as 1979, many still believed that Carter planned to recognize the MPLA government and establish formal diplomatic relations.⁹³

The push for recognition, however, was halted due to a confluence of changing circumstances, both in the world and in the White House. First, and most importantly, U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World began to haunt even the Carter Administration. Accusations about Soviet behavior surrounding Shaba I and Shaba II followed by Soviet and Cuban intervention into Ethiopia kindled latent Cold War tendencies.⁹⁴ With Soviet-American detente in serious retreat again, Savimbi was invited to the United States in 1979, whereupon assistance to UNITA was considered again.⁹⁵ As it became politically expedient again "get tough" with communism, Angola was a weak and easy target.⁹⁶

Second, and related to the first, Carter had a real desire to see the Cubans leave Angola.

Carter was of two minds about Angola. His instinct was to work with the Angolans to help them reduce the insecurity problems that had caused the introduction of the Cubans into Angola and that now served to justify their retention. Our actions directed to reconciling the differences between Zaire and Angola at the time of the Shaba affair had served this very purpose. But politically Carter was sensitive to Cuban

⁹² Richard Moose, April 18, 1979, *DOSB*, October 1979, p. 21.

⁹³ See Douglas Wheeler, "It's Time to Recognize Angola", *Christian Science Monitor*, March 23, 1979; and Senator Paul Tsongas, "Of Angola", *New York Times*, March 28, 1979.

⁹⁴ Within the Administration, proclivities towards East-West analyses of regional issues were most forcefully articulated by Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. By 1978, after Ethiopia and the Shaba crises, Brzezinski had gained the President's ear in matters related to superpower relations. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, on "Meet the Press," May 28, 1978, in *DOSB*, July, 1978, p. 26; and Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties," p. 7.

⁹⁵ Author's conversation with Stansfield Turner, (Stanford, January 1989); William LeoGrande, *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980*, Policy Papers in International Affairs No. 13, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1980), p. 27;

⁹⁶ Author's interview with Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State during the Carter Administration, (Washington, November 9, 1989).

activities and the impact they would have at home if we appeared too soft in dealing with them. This led us to step back from the brink every time we came close to establishing diplomatic relations.⁹⁷

Eventually, Carter linked recognition to a Cuban troop withdrawal, a position which greatly complicated negotiations on recognition.

The Reagan Administration

Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 ushered in a new agenda for the United States in world affairs, radically departing from the principles and practices of the previous administration. According to the Reagan assessment, America's post-Vietnam paralysis had permitted Soviet penchants for expansion to result in a proliferation of radical regimes in the Third World.⁹⁸ To reverse this trend, the new administration vowed to "ensure that those who have a positive alternative to the Soviet model receive our support."⁹⁹ Although President Reagan never outlined a comprehensive set of policies that he personally referred to as a doctrine, this commitment to assist movements fighting "communist" regimes in the Third World succinctly defined the mandate of the Reagan Doctrine.¹⁰⁰ The primary aims of the Reagan Doctrine were to weaken the links between radical Third World regimes and the Soviet Union; undermine the stability of these Third World

⁹⁷ Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*, (New York, 1983), p. ?.

⁹⁸ For an elaboration, see "Freedom, Security, and Global Peace: Message of the President to the Congress", March 14, 1986, in Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents, March 17, 1986, pp. 356-364.

⁹⁹ Secretary of State George Shultz, statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 15, 1983, in DOSB, July 1983, p. 67.

¹⁰⁰ For the most comprehensive articulations of the Reagan Doctrine, see President Reagan's 1985 State of the Union address, reprinted in DOSB, April 1985, p. 9; Secretary Shultz's address to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, February 22, 1985, Current Policy, No. 659; and President Reagan's speech to the United Nations, October 24, 1985, reprinted in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1985 (Washington: GPO, 1986), pp. 12-18.

governments; and where possible, support or even execute their overthrow.¹⁰¹ No longer satisfied with a passive defense of a flawed status quo, the Reagan Doctrine declared that the United States had to go beyond containment, challenge the status quo, and actually "roll back" communism.¹⁰²

Though reticent to use direct military force,¹⁰³ the Reagan administration initiated a vigorous program for supporting the "freedom fighters".¹⁰⁴ As the president explained,

Thus, we have sought to advance the cause of freedom where opportunities exist to do so. Sometimes this means support for liberalization; sometimes support for liberation.

In regional conflicts, for example, we have elaborated a policy of helping anti-Communist insurgents in their battle to bring self-determination, independence and human rights to their own countries. This doctrine was first reflected in our decision to assist the people of Afghanistan in their fight against Soviet invasion and occupation. It was an important part of our decision to assist the people of Nicaragua in their battle to restore the integrity of their 1979 revolution and make the Sandanista government keep its promise of democratic rule. Our current efforts in Angola in support of

¹⁰¹ See President Reagan, DOSB, April 1988, p. 27.

¹⁰² On one level, President Reagan championed this policy as a reinvigorated global containment. To him, support for "freedom fighters" was "self-defense," (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, No. 6, 1985, p. 146) but a defense neither constrained by capabilities, nor guided by distinctions between vital and peripheral interests. Yet, on another level, Reagan's agenda sharply departed from the realist conception of containment by introducing "morality" and "ideals" as the bases for a new American foreign policy, an innovation sharply debated among political commentators throughout the Reagan tenure. Proponents of Reagan's approach included Charles Krauthammer, "Morality and the Reagan Doctrine," The New Republic September 8, 1986; Joshua Moravchik, "The Poverty of Realism," The New Republic, February 16, 1986; and Michael Ledeen, "Fighting Back," Commentary, August 1985. For critical assessments, see Robert Johnson, "Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Fall 1988); and Christopher Layne, "Requiem for the Reagan Doctrine." SAIS Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1988).

¹⁰³ See Caspar Weinburger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No.3 (Spring 1986). pp.13-14; and David H. Petraeus, "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era," (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1987).

¹⁰⁴ For estimates on the levels of support, see Raymond W. Copson and Richard P. Cronin, "The 'Reagan Doctrine' and Its Prospects," Survival, No. 29, (1987), p. 44.

freedom fighters constitute the most recent extension of this policy.¹⁰⁵

The Reagan Administration targeted states considered weak, and relatively unstable Soviet "puppets" which were already fighting anti-government insurgents and hence likely to be subverted by the United States at little cost and with negligible risk of instigating a superpower confrontation. Although none were vital to American national security, they were regarded as "weak links" in the socialist world.

Confronting Communism in Angola

In Angola, the tactics of the Reagan Doctrine ranged from non-recognition to direct support of military operations against the Angolan regime. Upon assuming office, President Reagan made it clear that he had no intention of recognizing the MPLA government.¹⁰⁶ Beyond withholding recognition, the Reagan administration sought to damage the Angolan economy by prohibiting U.S. exports purported to have a military use and constraining "Angola's ability to earn foreign currency and thus fund its war against UNITA..."¹⁰⁷

President Reagan accompanied these attacks on the "bad guys," with support for the "good guys." In his first year as president, Reagan publicly endorsed UNITA and urged Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment.¹⁰⁸ Although losing the legislative battle for repeal, the Reagan administration established high-level contacts with UNITA in December 1981, signaling Angola's new priority in

¹⁰⁵ President Reagan, DOSB, April 1986, p. 8.

¹⁰⁶ See Secretary of State Alexander Haig, testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs in January 1981, as cited in Bridgland, *Savimbi*, p. 303.

¹⁰⁷ State Department Deputy Spokesman Charles Redman, quoted in Gillian Gunn, "The Angolan Economy: A Status Report," CSIS Africa Notes, No. 58 (May 30, 1986), p. 4; Washington Notes on Africa, Spring 1986, p. 7.; Gerald Bender, "Washington's Quest for Enemies," in Richard Bloomfield, ed., Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique (Algonac, Mich.: Reference Publishers, 1988), pp. 200-201; and Platt's Oilgram, August 22, 1986.

¹⁰⁸ See Don Oberdorfer, "Reagan Urges Hill to End Ban on Aid to Angolan Rebels," Washington Post, March 20, 1981.

American foreign policy.¹⁰⁹

American support for UNITA began in earnest after the repeal of the Clark Amendment in July 1985.¹¹⁰ In January 1986, Savimbi triumphantly returned to Washington to meet with the secretaries of state and defense, key members of Congress, and the president. After Savimbi's visit, the Administration provided UNITA with \$15 million in assistance, consisting primarily of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.¹¹¹ In 1987 and 1988, the Reagan Administration gave another \$15 million per year, followed by an estimated \$40 million in 1989.¹¹²

This covert assistance program was augmented by support for

¹⁰⁹ See DOSB, January 1982, p. 34. Though the repeal failed, disclosures from the Iran-contra hearings indicate that the contras were not the only organization illegally funded by Oliver North's operation. See, for instance, Sanford Ungar and Arnold Kohen, "An Angola Angle to the Scandal?" New York Times, November 23, 1987, p. A23; and "Possible Violation or Circumvention of the Clark Amendment," Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 1, 1987. (Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1987).

¹¹⁰ The momentum of Ronald Reagan's election victory, growing dissatisfaction with Chester Crocker's negotiations with the Angolan government, and the need by conservatives to respond to the Anti-Apartheid Act created propitious conditions for the repeal of the Clark amendment in 1985. For a description of the curious congressional compromise which resulted in the passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 less than a year after the repeal of the Clark amendment, see Michael Sarbanes, "Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy."

Within the Reagan administration, however, it remains unclear who actually supported the Clark amendment's repeal. Constantine Menges claims in his memoirs, Inside the National Security Council, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1988). pp. 235-249, that he re-initiated the campaign for repeal against the will of his boss, NSC adviser McFarlane, and of Secretary of State Shultz. But both Secretary Shultz and Assistant Secretary Crocker assert that the Congressional initiative for the repeal of the Amendment was fully sanctioned and promoted by the State Department. (Author interviews with George Shultz, March 7, 1989 and Chester Crocker, April 18, 1989). Crocker maintained that the Clark Amendment repeal and the subsequent renewal of aid to Savimbi was a State Department initiative taken in response to the 1985 MPLA military offensive against Mavinga.

¹¹¹ SIPRI reported that 200 FIM-92A Stingers had been delivered in 1986. See SIPRI Yearbook 1986 (Stockholm: SIPRI 1987), p. 238.

¹¹² Harold Wolpe, "Seizing Southern African Opportunities," Foreign Policy, No. 73 (Winter 1988-89), p. 66.

UNITA's two most important allies in the region, South Africa and Zaire. Under the guise of "constructive engagement,"¹¹³ the United States improved diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa, tacitly sanctioning and circuitously subsidizing South African operations in Angola.¹¹⁴ As the host to the largest U.S. CIA operation in Africa, Zaire served as the logical conduit for American support to UNITA. Upgraded to accommodate joint U.S.-Zairian military maneuvers in 1987,¹¹⁵ Kamina air base in southern Zaire became the central supply route for American weapons bound for UNITA, as well as a CIA training facility for UNITA guerrillas.¹¹⁶ After the American assistance program began, numerous reports confirmed a growing UNITA presence in northern Angola.¹¹⁷

The Negotiation Track

¹¹³ For an outline of the strategy "constructive engagement," see Chester Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1980); and Crocker with William Lewis, "Missing Opportunities in Africa," Foreign Policy, No. 35, (Summer 1979).

¹¹⁴ In addition to improved economic relations, the United States abstained from and vetoed U.N. votes which condemned South Africa's interventions in Angola. See Colin Legum, The Battlefronts of Southern Africa, (New York: Africana Publishing, 1988). p. 181. Some sources claim that the assistance was not so indirect. David Keys reported that flights from Honduras were delivering U.S. weapons to Johannesburg. See his "U.S. Said to Resume Arms Flights to Angola Rebels," The Independent, March 23, 1987.

¹¹⁵ See International Herald Tribune, May 27, 1988, and Colin Legum, "U.S. Plan to Expand Its Interventionist Role in Southern Africa," Third World Reports, March 3, 1987, p.1.

¹¹⁶ See interview with Sebastiao Lameira, a UNITA supply officer captured in December 1987, in James Brooke, "Angolan Rebel Tells of Americans' Aid," International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1987 and "Angola Says U.S. Uses Zaire to Train Rebels," New York Times, May 26, 1988, p. A10.

¹¹⁷ UNITA established six bases near the Angolan-Zairian border, including the UNITA northern headquarters in Quimbele, Angola. Aid officials based in Luanda reported to the author in August 1988 that areas where they travelled in January had by August become off limits. For similar observations, see "Angola: Building a New Jamba," Africa Confidential, May 27, 1988, Vol. 29, No. 11, p. 1; "Angola: UNITA at the Crossroads," Africa Confidential, Vol. 29, No. 16, August 12, 1988, pp. 3-4; and James Brooke "Angola Charges that the U.S. Uses Six Zaire Bases to Train and Supply Rebels," New York Times, May 26, 1988, p. A6.

While one part of the Reagan Administration confronted the "communists" in Angola, Chester Crocker, Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, attempted to negotiate with the MPLA government. As the principal American diplomat for Africa, Chester Crocker publicly emphasized the necessity of a diplomatic solution to the wars in southern Africa.¹¹⁸ According to former NSC staffer Constantine Menges, a conservative critic of the State Department,

For years the State Department had pursued a policy of trying to "wean" Angola and Mozambique away from the Soviet bloc through economic aid, diplomatic contacts, and negotiations. The State Department even refused to classify Angola and Mozambique as communist: that would have prevented the United States from providing tens of millions of dollars in economic aid, such as credits and U.S. - backed loans.¹¹⁹

Crocker wanted to "constructively engage" not only South Africa, but all states in southern Africa.¹²⁰ His emphasis on the need for establishing "frameworks for negotiation" and for "decreasing tensions" sharply contrasted with the aggressive, interventionist rhetoric of Reagan Doctrine proponents. As Crocker said in October 1981, "We are not seeking the downfall of any African government. We have had useful discussions with the government of Angola, and we have continuing economic involvement there."¹²¹ This logic prompted Crocker to initiate a series of negotiations with the MPLA government in 1981 which, after seven difficult years of negotiation, culminated in the signing of the Tripartite Agreement

¹¹⁸ Mid-Term statement on the Reagan administration's Southern Africa policy, presented to the United States Congress House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa, by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Crocker, February 15, 1983. Reprinted in Southern African Record, (Braamfontein, South Africa) No. 31, (April 1983) p. 13.

¹¹⁹ Menges, Inside the National Security Council, pp.235-236.

¹²⁰ Chester Crocker, telephone interview with the author, March 16 1989.

¹²¹ Chester Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, address to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, October 5, 1981. Reprinted in Southern African Record, No. 27, June 1982, pp. 30-31.

by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa on December 22, 1988. ¹²²

How could American foreign policymakers support the "liberation" of Angola by UNITA while at the same time pursuing better relations with the alleged "communist" oppressors? Though initially debilitating to his negotiation approach, Crocker eventually adapted his strategy to use this contradiction to his advantage. In his opinion, American support for Savimbi should be used as a controlled means of leverage to pressure the Angolan government to negotiate, not as a declaration of war against the MPLA regime. Whereas conservative Republicans saw Savimbi as the Angolan liberator, and liberals considered him a South African stooge, Crocker wanted to use Savimbi as a "tool" within the broader framework of his negotiation strategy. So it would be an effective bargaining chip, Crocker wanted assistance to UNITA to be governed by the State Department, not Congress, and administered covertly.¹²³

Consequently, Crocker remained elusive about public support for UNITA. While he did "make clear our [U.S.] view that UNITA represents a significant and legitimate factor in Angolan politics,"¹²⁴ he did not express enthusiasm for increasing America's commitment to the rebel organization.

Should Washington change course and back UNITA outright, it is not obvious how this path would lead to reconciliation It could produce an escalation of conflict and it would probably rule out responding to frequent hints from the MPLA of a desire to reduce sharply its Soviet-Cuban ties.¹²⁵

After the repeal of the Clark Amendment and Savimbi's visit to Washington in January 1986, Crocker reaffirmed his support for the UNITA leader, but felt compelled "to categorically state here that

¹²² For a detailed chronology of the 1988 negotiations, see Gillian Gunn, "A Guide to the Intricacies of the Angola-Namibia Negotiations," CSIS Africa Notes, No. 90, September 8, 1988, pp. 1-16.

¹²³ Author's interview with Chester Crocker, April 18, 1989.

¹²⁴ Chester Crocker, August 29, 1981; text released by United States International Communication Agency, Pretoria, and reprinted in Southern African Record, No. 26, December 1981, p. 48.

¹²⁵ Chester Crocker, A U.S. Policy for the 80s (Braamfontein, S.A.: The Southern African Institute of International Affairs), May 1981, p. 9.

the basis and the goals of our policy remain unchanged: We seek a negotiated solution that will bring independence to Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola."¹²⁶ For Crocker, aid to Savimbi was one of several tactics in delicate bargaining process, not a new strategy for "rolling back" the Angolan government.

Conclusion

As a result of the failed strategy of confronting the "socialist" challenge in Angola in 1975, the United States played a marginal role in Angola's development for its first five years of independence. Given other priorities both in the region and the world, the United States did little, positively or negatively, to affect the course of the revolutionary outcome in Angola after 1976.

Under the Reagan Administration, however, the United States went from having no policy towards Angola to having two policies: a confrontational strategy aimed at exhausting if not defeating the socialist regime in Angola and a cooptive strategy, albeit a coercive one, aimed at returning Angola into the international capitalist orbit. These conflicting strategies produced an inconsistent and at times schizophrenic application of American policy in the region. Nonetheless, as discussed below, the policy had tangible affects on the course of the Angolan revolution.

¹²⁶ Chester Crocker, testimony in United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Angola: Options for American Foreign Policy*, Hearings, 99th Congress, second session, February 18, 1986, p. 5.

III. The People's Republic of Angola

A. The MPLA as a Revolutionary Vanguard

In our relations with the socialist countries, we have never felt any pressure concerning the policy we are to pursue."¹

Ideology: Programme

As the MPLA evolved from a national liberation movement to a ruling government, its commitment to socialism became more pronounced. In October 1976, the MPLA Politburo defined "socialism as the highest aim of our Revolution."² Similarly, the 1977 MPLA Central Committee report stated that "The fundamental question is: either socialism or capitalism. There is no other, third way. And it is this, comrades, that determines our strategy and revolutionary tactics."³

According to MPLA doctrine, this new emphasis on socialism resulted from the completion of the first stage of the revolution -- the defeat of colonialism -- and the initiation of the second stage -- the construction of a socialist society.⁴ Given Angola's poorly developed material base, MPLA doctrine further divided the second stage into two distinct periods.⁵ The first period, the "people's democratic revolution" -- would establish the "material and spiritual conditions" for entering the second stage of "Socialist Revolution."⁶ This periodization, however, still

¹ Neto, February 11, 1976, as quoted in K. Uralov, "Angola: The Triumph of the Right Cause," *International Affairs*, No. 5, May 1976, p. 55.

² "Declaration of the Political Bureau," in *Documents of the Plenary Meeting of the of MPLA Central Committee, October 23-29, 1976* (London: Mozambique, Angola, and Guine Information Centre, 1976), p. 4.

³ MPLA, *Central Committee Report, First Congress, December 4-10, 1977*, p. 25.

⁴ *IBID.*, p. 1.

⁵ *IBID.*, p. 30.

⁶ *Angola Special Congress: Report of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Worker's Party*, (1980) p. 30. The project for developing these material conditions on which socialism could be developed was initiated in 1977. See MPLA, "Constituicao do MPLA

allowed Angola to skip the capitalist stage of development as delineated by the Soviet theory of socialist orientation.

The nature of the revolutionary transformations that have been taking place in our country allows us to state that they come within the tasks defined for the initial period of transition to socialism, avoiding the phase of building capitalism.⁷

Measures such as the "expansion and consolidation of the socialist sector of the economy", the reduction in importance of the capitalist sector, and initiatives toward central planning made this jump over the capitalist stage of development possible.⁸

Strategies for Building Socialism

The Party

In 1974 and 1975, hundreds of MPLA Action Committees proliferated throughout urban and rural Angola. These were accompanied by an explosion of People's Neighborhood Committees in Luanda which mobilized an estimated 500,000 people during the civil war.⁹ While it may have faltered in the past, the MPLA was truly a mass movement at independence. Rather than continue to promote popular participation in the MPLA, however, the leadership took a decision in October 1976 to transform the MPLA from a movement into a vanguard party. Similar to other Leninist regimes, the MPLA submitted that Angola's socialist development needed a dictatorial vanguard party, "the essential instrument of action," without which "it is impossible to construct Socialism."¹⁰ Marxist theory

em Partido," *Relatorio do Comite Central Ao 1 Congresso do MPLA*, (Lisboa: edicoes Avante, 1978), p. 25. For an explicit articulation of the two stages, see also "Discurso Proferido pelo Camarada Presidente Jose Eduardo dos Santos no Encerramento do 1. Congresso da UNTA," April 16, 1984, in dos Santos, *Discursos*, (1984), p. 34.

⁷ *Angola Special Congress*, (1980) p. 30.

⁸ *IBID.*

⁹ See Jane Bergerol and Michael Wolfers, *Angola in the Frontline*, (London: Zed Press, 1986)., p. 161.

¹⁰ Speech by President dos Santos, March 31, 1986, in *ANGOP Document*, No. 14, (7 May 1986), p. 2; and "XVI Aniversario do Inicio da Luta Armada," February 5, 1977, in *Agostinho Neto: Textos Politicos Escolhidos*, (Luanda: Edicoes DIP, 1987), p. 195.

posited that such a dictatorship should be of the proletariat, a class which did not exist in Angola. As interim substitute, therefore, the MPLA "agreed" to represent the interests of the workers for them by forming the Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship, a organization which constituted the "embryonic form of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."¹¹ To strengthen its working class veneer, the MPLA was renamed the MPLA-Workers Party (Partido de Trabalho) of which "the working class must be the core of its social composition."¹² However, at this stage in the revolution, the party, not the worker, was supreme.¹³

While claiming to represent the interests of all toiling peoples, the formation of a vanguard party further concentrated power into the hands of a small elite. Like the soviets in Soviet Russia in 1917 and 1918, the local action committees, or "poder popular", which prospered in the transition to independence constituted not only a popular base for the MPLA movement, but also a grass roots alternative to the MPLA's primacy. The 1977 coup attempt by Nito Alvez demonstrated how these autonomous political entities might be manipulated against the interests of the Party.¹⁴ In response, the MPLA launched its "Rectification Program" which aimed to both purge the party of compromised elements of the petty bourgeoisie and transform the party into an elite and loyal small circle of revolutionary cadres.¹⁵ The rationale for decreasing MPLA membership was that "Party leaders must have revolutionary aptitudes which are different from those

¹¹ *Central Committee Report to the Second Congress of the MPLA-Workers' Party* (1985), p. 35.

¹² *Angola Special Congress*, (1980), p. 14.

¹³ President dos Santos stated as much in a speech on March 31, 1986, in *ANGOP Document*, No. 14, (7 May 1986), p. 5.

¹⁴ The MPLA Central Committee Report from the First Congress in 1977 concluded that "weak organisation and a lack of guidance in the politico-ideological work," combined with "a certain liberalism" regarding membership in the party "lead to the pernicious elements not being expelled in due time." *MPLA, Central Committee Report*, (1977), p. 10. On the coup itself, see David Birmingham, "The 27th of May: A Note on the Abortive Coup in Angola," *African Affairs*, Vol. 77 No. 309, (October 1978).

¹⁵ See Lenin's *The Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*.

required for a liberation movement."¹⁶ In a similar tightening of the MPLA's authority, all quasi-autonomous social organizations such as the poder popular and UNTA (National Trade Union of Angola) were reduced to transmission belts for the MPLA-PT.

Not surprisingly, the rise of the MPLA-PT as a vanguard party was accompanied by a commensurate decline in democratic processes. First, the MPLA outlawed other political parties. As for elections, the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the MPLA, declared that "elections should be held only where structures of the Movement (MPLA) are sufficiently strong and stable organisationally and politically and ideologically mature."¹⁷ Instead of practicing "bourgeois" democracy, the MPLA preferred Lenin's notion of "democratic centralism," which allegedly guaranteed "ideological unity" and insured control of the minority by the majority.¹⁸

Party-State Relations

If the MPLA- Worker's Party was the foreman of the socialist project in Angola, the state was to be its bulldozer. In the tradition of the Russian, Chinese, and most other Leninist movements of the twentieth century, the MPLA accepted Lenin's notion that the first step in building socialism was to capture the state, subordinating its functions to the rule of the Party, and empowering it to change the existing relations of production. As Angola's new Prime Minister declared in 1975, "As the executive State organ, the Government will need to subordinate all its activity to directives issued by our Movement's leading organs."¹⁹ Like Article VI of the Soviet Constitution (of 1977), Article II of the Angolan Constitution guaranteed "the leading role of the Party in the political, economic, and social direction of the State."²⁰

¹⁶ MPLA, *Central Committee Report*, (1977), p. 11; and M.R. Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy 1975-1985*, p. 35.

¹⁷ *IBID.*, p. 16.

¹⁸ *Angola Special Congress*, (1980) p. 19.

¹⁹ *Angola: 11 de Novembro de 1975: Documentos da Independencia*, (Luanda: Edicao do Ministerio da Informacao, 1975), p. 154.

²⁰ "Lei Constitucional da Republica Popular de Angola," in *Folhas de Legislacao da Republica Popular de Angola*, (Luanda, Ministerio das Financas da RPA, 1987), no page numbers. Article

By assigning all ministries to senior members of the MPLA, the MPLA would subordinate the state to an instrument of socialism.²¹

The Socialist Plan

Armed with a vanguard party in control of all major state institutions, the MPLA leadership embarked on an extensive program of socialist development. The rhetoric of the liberation movement became policy. First, the new regime declared that the relations of productions in Angola must be transformed;

Our Movement has given special importance to developing the productive forces and to the relations of production. This is correct, because socialism cannot be consolidated unless it is based in the mode of production, unless economic power lies in the hands of the workers and peasants, and unless the rules for the distribution of essential products are just.²²

Much of the new Angolan Constitution outlined similar transformative goals, such as the elimination of "exploitation of man by man" (Article I) and the "enlargement and consolidation of the relations of socialist production." (Article IX).²³

To orient the Angolan economy along socialist lines, the MPLA developed a National Plan "as the main instrument for running the economy."²⁴ In 1977, the Central Committee identified the "strengthening the centralised and planned supervision of economic and social development" as one of the central tasks of the MPLA, for only such a plan "will make it possible to expand and consolidate socialist production relations."²⁵ With little or no expertise in macro-economic management, the MPLA nonetheless attempted to include an ambitious array of economic activity to be

VI in the Soviet Constitution was repealed in February 1990.

²¹ *Central Committee Report to the Second Congress of the MPLA-Workers' Party* (1985), p. 16.

²² *Documents of the Plenary Meeting of the of MPLA Central Committee*, (1976) p. 6.

²³ "Lei Constitucional da Republica Popular de Angola," in *Folhas de Legislacao da Republica Popular de Angola*, no page numbers. See also *Angola: 11 de Novembro de 1975: Documentos da Independencia*, p. 127.

²⁴ "Speech by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the Opening of the Party's First National Conference," (1985) p. 14.

²⁵ *MPLA, Central Committee Report*, (1977) p. 31.

regulated by the National Plan, including prices, wages, finance, and property rights. A National Planning Commission was set up in 1976 (later reconstituted as the Ministry of Planning), while the Commission for Fixing and Controlling Prices followed in 1979.²⁶

Nationalization

According to the rubric of the National Plan, the most effective policy for transforming the relations of production in Angola was nationalization. In 1976, the MPLA Central Committee declared it imperative "to continue on the road to confiscation and nationalisation."²⁷ Like most other Leninist regimes at that time, these MPLA leaders believed that the expansion of the state sector was a means for transforming capitalist relations of production into socialist ones.²⁸

The nature of the transition to independence created propitious, if not necessary, conditions for an ambitious nationalization strategy.²⁹ First, several hundred plants, factories, and small businesses were left abandoned and destroyed by the fleeing Portuguese.³⁰ Lacking local owners, these factories were earmarked for state control. Second, as 300,000 of the 340,000 Portuguese settlers departed from Angola by 1976, the new government lost the trained personnel capable of running these industries.³¹ As President dos Santos later recalled,

²⁶ *Documents of the Plenary Meeting of the of MPLA Central Committee*, (1976) pp. 13-16.

²⁷ *IBID.*, p. 10.

²⁸ *MPLA, Central Committee Report*, (1977), pp. 31-32.

²⁹ As a former Angolan Minister of Finance stated, 'we were forced to nationalize because the industries and plantations were abandoned.' Author's interview with Ismael Gaspar Martins, former Angolan Minister of Finance, (Luanda, August 23, 1988).

³⁰ See "Discurso Proferido pelo Camarada Presidente Jose Eduardo dos Santos no Encerramento do 1. Congresso da UNTA," April 16, 1984, in dos Santos, *Discursos*, (1984), p. 31. A vivid description of the Portuguese departure is Ryszard Kapuscinski's *Another Day of Life*, (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1987).

³¹ Author's interview with Gaspar Martins, (1988); Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, pp. 228 and 236. According to Martins and Paulo Jorge, the MPLA appealed to the Portuguese to stay, but the civil war scared them away.

under the difficult conditions of the national liberation struggle, despite the consistent support of progressive organisations and countries, especially those of the socialist community, it was not possible to train sufficient numbers of cadres to fill the vacuum deliberately created by the reactionary forces which precipitated the departure from the country of the overwhelming majority of technicians and skilled workers who served under colonial administration.³²

The absolute dearth of trained cadres compelled the MPLA to turn to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Eastern bloc countries for assistance in running and managing many of the nationalized industries.³³ Schooled in planned, centralized economies, the technicians logically began to organize the factories and plants along the Soviet model. While the MPLA flirted with worker management schemes for major factories immediately after independence, these were aborted after the Alves coup.³⁴ Instead, a nomenklatura system of factory directors and enterprise managers was put in place to maintain state control over all major Angolan industries.

Finally, the logical resisters to a radical nationalization program -- industrialists, land owners, or the small businessmen (back of white) -- either left in 1976 or did not exist as an organized political force.³⁵ Because all forms of local capital

³² Speech by President dos Santos, October 26, 1987, in *ANGOP: Document*, No. 39, (26 November 1987), p. 1; and "Speech by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the Opening of the Party's First National Conference," January 14, 1985, in *Angola Information Bulletin*, No. 107 (February 18, 1985), p. 6. According to Ruth Neto, director of OMA and MPLA Central Committee member, 85% of the Angolan population is still illiterate. (Author's interview, Luanda, August 22, 1989).

³³ Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, p. 148; Keith Somerville, *Angola: Politics, Economics and Society*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1986), p. 142. This view was also expressed by Paulo Jorge and Roberto de Almeida in interviews with the author, (August 1988 & August 1989 respectively.) Both were members of the MPLA Politburo at the time.

³⁴ Alves' base of support was considered to be these workers' cooperatives and the trade unions.

³⁵ This point is made in Marcum, "Bipolar Dependency: The People's Republic of Angola," p. 19. Some leading members in the MPLA opposed nationalization, but they were demoted in the years of independence. For instance, Carlos Rocha Dilolwa, a reputed economist and longtime member of the MPLA, was dismissed in December 1977, apparently for supporting capitalist ideas about

accumulation were restricted to white folk under the Portuguese, their departure left the MPLA free to implement their economic agenda.³⁶ The only potential inhibitors of nationalization were foreign-owned companies, and most significantly of these, Gulf Oil. Rather than fight nationalization, however, Gulf executives unabashedly reversed allegiances and pursued a different strategy for protecting their very profitable investments in Angola. Even before the civil war ended, Gulf began to pay the MPLA royalties on oil sales from Angola, a gesture that endeared these American "imperialists" to the MPLA.³⁷ While the 1978 Oil Law made all hydro-carbon resources the property of the state, Gulf managed to settle on an arrangement with Sonangol, the Angolan oil parastatal, whereby Sonangol acquired 51% of the American firm, but refrained from intervening into the operations, distribution, or marketing of Gulf's product.³⁸

Other sectors of the private economy did not arrange such symbiotic relationships with the Angolan state. By 1977, the state owned shares in 80% of all industries including 61% of diamond production, 100% of textile production, 100% of sugar production, 85% of beer production, 100% of gravel production, 98.1% of metal packaging, and 80% in naval shipyards.³⁹ All banks, schools, health facilities, and legal firms also were seized by the state.⁴⁰

economic organization. (See Somerville, *Angola*, pp. 92-93.)

³⁶ Since then, the MPLA has recognized this development as a positive condition for the construction of socialism in Angola. See the "Speech by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the Opening of the Party's First National Conference," p. 2.

³⁷ See Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, p. 134.

³⁸ See John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3, April 1976, pp. 420-421. Since 1978, Sonangol has monopolized distribution within Angola, and according to Wolfers and Bergerol, markets independently almost half of all total Angolan exports. See Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, p. 136.

³⁹ MPLA, *Central Committee Report*, (1977), p. 30; A.M. Khazanov, "Angola", in *Istoriya Tropicheskoi i Yuzhnoi Afriki: 1918-1988*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1989), p. 271.

⁴⁰ On education, see "Lei da Nacionalizacao do Ensina," Lei No. 4/75 (December 9, 1975), in *Folhas de Legislacao da Republica Popular de Angola*, no page numbers; and *Documents of the Plenary*

Agriculture

Similar to the state of chaos in Angola's industrial organization, agriculture production had dwindled to a fraction of pre-independence levels in 1976. Production fell primarily because an estimated 6,250 large farms and plantations were abandoned by their Portuguese managers.⁴¹ Analogous to its industrial strategy, the MPLA dealt with these abandoned farms by nationalizing them, and then forming either state farms or co-operatives.⁴² Again, MPLA doctrine proclaimed that this policy would create socialist ideals, increase production, and limit the growth of a rural bourgeoisie.⁴³ By collectivizing and centralizing agricultural production into larger and larger "Production Unit Groupings," the MPLA hoped to 'turn peasants into proletarians.'⁴⁴ As dos Santos declared in 1985,

The experience of other peoples show that socialism triumphs in a given country when socialist production relations become predominant in both town and countryside. If socialist production relations triumph only in factories and enterprises in urban areas, the petty bourgeoisie and, later, the bourgeoisie will take the countryside, from where the development of capitalist relations will threaten the future of socialist relations."⁴⁵

Lacking experience in organizing such enterprises, the MPLA relied on Soviet technicians to manage the large state farms and train the

Meeting of the of MPLA Central Committee, (1976) p. 8. On health and banks, see "Acto Central das Comemoracoes Do 1. Aniversario da Independencia," November 11, 1976 (p. 145), and "XVI Aniversario do Inicio da Luta Armada," February 5, 1977, (p. 194) in Agostinho Neto, (1987).

⁴¹ M.R. Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy 1975-1985*, p. 15.

⁴² "Aviarios sob Controlo Estatal," Despacho No. 157/75 (December 5, 1976) and Despacho No. 6/76, (February 2, 1976), in *Folhas de Legislacao da Republica Popular de Angola*, no page numbers; and author's interview with an official in the Angolan Ministry of Agriculture, (Luanda, August 23, 1988).

⁴³ *Angola Special Congress, (1980) p. 48.*

⁴⁴ Lt. Colonel Petroff, Provisional Commissar in Huambo, host to Kala Agro-Industrial complex, the largest collective in Angola. As quoted in *Angola: Socialism at Birth*, p. 22.

⁴⁵ "Speech by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the Opening of the Party's First National Conference," p.4.

personnel, and Soviet combines and tractors to mechanize these farms. The result was the formation of an estimated 360 cooperatives employing 92,000 peasants by 1977; 2,500 cooperatives by 1986.⁴⁶

Foreign Economic Relations

The MPLA inherited a typical colonial economy whereby almost all exports were comprised of raw material exported to Western capitalist economies. Before independence oil accounted for 55.4% of total exports, followed by coffee at 23.2%, diamonds at 9.1%, sisal at 4.7% and cotton at 1.9%.⁴⁷ The United States was by far the largest importer, followed by Portugal, Great Britain, Holland, and West Germany.

To try to change this situation, the MPLA adopted the Soviet model and established a monopoly on foreign trade. The new government then embarked on a concerted policy to diversify trading partners, giving special "priority to the consolidation of economic ties with countries of the socialist camp."⁴⁸ A 1982 appraisal concluded that "The first five years of the existence of the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed in Moscow ... attest to the major revolutionary achievements of these preferential relations with our natural allies."⁴⁹ To nurture these relations, Angola set up joint commissions with several socialist countries to explore opportunities for economic cooperation and participated in COMECON with observer status.⁵⁰

B. The Demise of Socialism in Angola

The MPLA's attempt to construct socialism along Soviet lines suffered serious setbacks throughout the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s. With the exception of oil production, all major

⁴⁶ Khazanov, *Agostinho Neto*, p. 257; and author's interviews with Ministry of Agriculture officials, (Luanda, August 1988).

⁴⁷ M.R. Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy 1975-1985*, p. 15.

⁴⁸ Radio Luanda, February 5, 1982, as cited in Somerville, *Angola*, p. 179.

⁴⁹ Keith Somerville, "Angola: Client State or State of Socialist Orientation?" *Millenium Journal of International Studies* Vol. 13, No. 3 (winter 1984), p.303.

⁵⁰ *Angola Special Congress*, (1980) p. 62.

sectors of the Angolan economy were operating below pre-independence levels.⁵¹ Regarding industrial production, one Western study estimated that the 150 factories were operating at 30% capacity.⁵² In the countryside, only a few hundred of the 6,000 abandoned farms had been transformed into state-run institutions by 1986.⁵³ Most of the agricultural workers formerly employed on these plantations have returned to subsistence farming, resulting in an absolute paucity of agricultural production flowing into the cities.⁵⁴

The MPLA blamed the war with South Africa and UNITA as the principle cause of Angola's economic woes.⁵⁵ However, beginning in the mid-1980s the Angolan government also began to realize that responsibility for the economic chaos also had to be attributed to poor economic planning and mismanagement.⁵⁶ Regarding agricultural production, for instance, MPLA leaders recognized that their initial vigor for collectivization and "imported" socialist models failed to address the realities of Angola peasant life.⁵⁷ Only skyrocketing oil prices and increased production -- a combination that resulted in \$2 billion in annual revenues for

⁵¹ As an example, Angola exported 218,700 tons of coffee in 1973 but only 15,800 in 1986. For the most comprehensive assessments of these trends, see Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s and Angola: An Introductory Economic Review, 7283-ANG (New York: World Bank, July 29, 1988), Vol. II.

⁵² Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy 1975-1985*, p. 39.

⁵³ *IBID.*, p. 19.

⁵⁴ By 1989, all of Angola's major cities were dependent upon food imports for 90% of their food needs. (Author's interview with an official from Endiama, the Angolan parastatal responsible for food imports and distribution, Luanda, August 1989.) As one Ministry of Agriculture official joked, 'to measure food production in Angola, you must go to the ships in the harbor, not the countryside.' (Author's interview, Luanda, August 23, 1988).

⁵⁵ See, for instance, the MPLA statement, "A Aventura de Pretoria so Trara Pesadas Consequencias para a Preparia Africa do Sul," Jornal de Angola, February 4, 1988, p. 2,

⁵⁶ See "Speech by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the Opening of the Party's First National Conference," (1985) p. 13; and the speech by President dos Santos on Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese, FBIS-Africa, August 19, 1987, p. D1.

⁵⁷ See Marcum, "Bipolar Dependency," p. 21.

Angola by 1984 -- allowed the Luanda government to blunder along for so long.

To place Angola on a more productive development projection, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos tried to establish a more "pragmatic" policy. First, improved relations with the United States was considered a necessary precondition for revamping Angola's economy.⁵⁸ Former Angolan Minister of Foreign Trade Ismail Gaspar Martins exclaimed, "We are ready to dance [with the United States]. . . . We are ready for investment and for future discussion on practical ways of achieving it."⁵⁹ Second, the Angolan leadership slowly accepted market principles as the only means for revamping the economy and attracting foreign investment. The result was "SEF" (Saneamento de Economica e Financiero), a plan for economic and financial restructuring modelled after IMF structural adjustment recommendations.⁶⁰ By seeking to (1) improve capital flows between enterprises and banks, (2) create conditions for profitable foreign investment, (3) reform the present pricing system and devalue the currency (4) decollectivize agriculture, (5) return certain sectors of the economy to private ownership, (6) link wages to labor productivity, and (7) demand

⁵⁸ See the speech by President dos Santos to American and European businessmen in Luanda, June 13, 1986, printed in ANGOP News Bulletin, No. 36 (June 19, 1986), p. 1; and *Business International Conference with the Government of Angola*, (Geneva: Business International, May 1986), pp. 25-29.

⁵⁹ Quoted from Allister Sparks, "Lonely-heart Angolans Wait at Altar for Uncle Sam," The Observer, February 8, 1987; and address by Ismail Gaspar Martins, June 12, 1986, in ANGOP News Bulletin, No. 36 (June 19, 1986), p. 2. See also "In the Eye of the Storm, interview with Manuel Pacavira, Angola's Ambassador to the United Nations," Probe (New York), Vol. 1, No. 1 (June/July 1989), p. 32; and Dr. Joao Daves Ngingilu, "A Problema de Orientacao nos Países em Desenvolvimento," *Comercio: Externo*, V. 2, No. 8, (1988) pp. 3-7.

⁶⁰ According to Gaspar Martins and several other officials interviewed in the Ministries of Planning and Agriculture, discussions about SEF began in 1980. Martins asserts that SEF was delayed for several years because of (1) the war, (2) the political leadership did not accept it initially, and (3) in general, there was a low level of understanding about economics in the country. (Author's interview, Luanda, August 26, 1988).

that all state institutions balance their budgets,⁶¹ Angola's new economic program clearly aims to dismantle the command economy, stimulate the formation of markets, and attract new Western trade, investment and credit.⁶² In accordance with this new orientation, Angola joined the Lome Convention, engaged in greater cooperation with United Nations organizations, has hosted meetings with Western businessmen to attract foreign investment, and finally gained admission into the IMF in the fall of 1989.

Nagging Security Issues

As the festering UNITA guerrilla war gradually escalated into a full-scale conflict, MPLA leaders realized that Angola's economic development was inextricably linked to the construction of a

⁶¹ This list of objectives has been compiled from the following sources: speeches by the Minister of State for the Productive Sector, Pedro de Castro Van Dunem "Loy," in ANGOP News Bulletin, No. 97 (August 21, 1988), p. 4, and Comercio (Luanda), March 6, 1988, pp. 58-59; "Todo Comercio Retailista para os Privados No Grossista o Estado Perde o Monopolio" and "Comercio Externo com Nova Dinamica," in Jornal de Angola, August 21, 1988, pp. 1, 4; Angola/Sao Tome and Principe, No. 4 (1988), p. 10; Geri Augusto, "Angola's Home-Grown Reforms," Southern African Economist, Vol. 2, No. 3 (June/July 1989), pp. 15-17; "U.S. Opposes Angola in IMF," Development News--Daily Summary (World Bank), July 11, 1989, p. 1; "Nova Realidade Proporcionara Outra Mentalidade Aos Gestores do Estado," Comercio: Externo, V. 2, No. 8, (1988) p. 31; "Preocupacao Maior E o Abastecimento a Populacao," (interview with Dumilde Rangel, Minister of Commerce) Comercio: Externo, No. 9 (December 1988), p. 32; "Anunciada Desvalorizacao a 200% do Kuanza," Comercio: Externo (Luanda) No. 10, March/June 1989, p. 9; "A Recuperacao Que Se Exige," Jornal de Angola, August 26, 1989, p. 16, and "Agricultura: Estrategia de Desenvolvimento," Comercio: Externo, No. 9 (December 1988), p. 54.

⁶² Author's interview with Olga Lima, Head of Department, International Organizations, Angolan Foreign Ministry, (Luanda, August 25, 1988). See also "Agente Privado Abre Super-Mercado," Jornal de Angola, August 22, 1989, p. 3; "Angola Liberalizes Economy," Angola: Update (Washington), No. 2 (October 2, 1988), pp. 1, 4; "Angola: Diamond Fever," Africa Confidential, Vol. 30, No. 4 (February 17, 1989), pp. 1-2; James Brooke, "Angola Inches Toward Capitalism," New York Times, February 20, 1989, p. C6; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Angola to the United Nations, Press Release, No. 25, March 13, 1989, p. 1; Steve Askin, "Suddenly, The Business of Angola Is Business," Business Week, May 1, 1989, p. 21; and "Sensibilizar Autoridades Angolanas," Comercio: Exterior, No. 9 (December 1988), pp. 12-28.

lasting peace.⁶³ To end thirty years of war, the Angolan government first decided to deal with the United States and South Africa. While sensitive to the symbolism of linkage, the Angolan government tacitly recognized the relationship between Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops in February 1982.⁶⁴ Even after a near two-year hiatus in contacts following the repeal of the Clark Amendment, the Angolan government invited Crocker to return to his shuttle diplomacy in 1987.

Negotiating with South Africa proved more difficult, but feasible. In 1984, the two countries signed their first peace accord, the Lusaka Declaration.⁶⁵ The peace, however, lasted less than one year when South African commandos intervened on UNITA's behalf to save the Savimbi's organization from a major MPLA assault. These same actors replayed almost the exact same scenario in August 1987 when FAPLA, the MPLA army, sent 12-15,000 FAPLA troops towards Mavinga, a UNITA stronghold.⁶⁶ Once again, UNITA had to be rescued from defeat by the South African Defense Force (SADF), which launched a swift and fierce counter-assault.⁶⁷ Following the pattern of 1985, FAPLA forces once again retreated to Cuito Cuanavale, but this time UNITA and the SADF followed, laying siege to the MPLA provincial stronghold. FAPLA positioned over 18,000 troops in the village, supplemented by an additional 15,000

⁶³ In the late 1980s, Angola's defense budget was devouring half of the total government budget, while the war had taken over 500,000 lives, displaced another 1.5 million people, and caused an estimated \$12 billion damage in physical destruction. For a concise overview of the war's total human and economic destruction, see Children on the Frontline (New York: UNICEF, 1989).

⁶⁴ "Declaracao Conjunta Angolano-Cubano," issued on February 4, 1982 and published in Jornal de Angola, February 7, 1982, p. 7.

⁶⁵ See Jose Eduardo dos Santos *Sobre a Situacao na Africa Austral*, (Luanda: Escola Nacional do Partido, March 8, 1984), p.6.

⁶⁶ For details of these military battles, see Michael McFaul, "Rethinking the 'Reagan' Doctrine in Angola," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (Winter 1989/90).

⁶⁷ David Coetzee, "A Battle of Words and Weapons," Work in Progress (Braamfontein, South Africa), No. 52 (March 1988), p. 30.

Cuban troops.⁶⁸ At Cuito Cuanavale, Angola's newly developed air force, augmented by Cuban planes and pilots, proved decisive in checking the South African offensive.⁶⁹ Unable to take the city, UNITA and South Africa retreated in April. The final important confrontation took place on the Namibian border in June 1988 between Cuba forces and the SADF. Early in 1988, Castro had sent 400 tanks, two dozen MiG-23s and Mi-24 helicopters, and an estimated 8,500 Cuban troops from the elite 50th Division to challenge the South Africans directly.⁷⁰ This formidable expeditionary force moved quickly to the Namibian border, and on June 26, 1988 attacked the Calueque Dam on the Ruacane River, the main source of water and electricity for northern Namibia. The South African Defense Force could not respond to Cuban air superiority, candidly confirming "that the presence of the heavily-armed Cubans troops has altered the balance of power in the area."⁷¹

The battle at Mavinga, the successful defense of Cuito Cuanavale, and the Cuban presence on the Namibian border radically altered the balance of forces in southern Africa, increasing the desire for a settlement by all participants in the ensuing negotiations. For the MPLA, their second defeat in as many years at Mavinga made it clear that a conventional military solution against UNITA was not feasible as long as the SADF remained in Angola. Their decisive victory at Cuito Cuanavale, however, gave the struggling Angolan regime a much-needed boost, allowing the government to negotiate with confidence with both South Africa and UNITA.⁷² On December 22, 1988, Angola, Cuba, and Angola signed the Tripartite Agreement, ending South Africa occupation of Angola and Namibia in return for the withdrawal of Cuban military forces

⁶⁸ New York Times, July 28, 1988, p. A28.

⁶⁹ Bernard Trainor, "Proud South Africa Army Now Finds Its Reputation of Invincibility Fleeting," New York Times, August 24, 1988.

⁷⁰ See the Independent, December 14, 1987, and May 6, 1988.

⁷¹ The Star, June 22, 1988, p. 8. See also Peter Vale, "The Unlucky Years Between the Two Battles of Calueque," The Weekly Mail, July 1-7, 1988, p. 2.

⁷² Author's interview with Roberto Almeida, MPLA Politburo Member and Secretary for Ideology, (Luanda, August 1989).

from Angola.⁷³

C. UNITA: From Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to Lockean Liberalism

After 1976, UNITA's fight was still presented as a struggle against colonialism. All that had changed was the colonial power.⁷⁴ As UNITA politburo member, Ernesto Mulatto has described,

Angola has become a vast cemetery and concentration camp. Our dream of free elections and independence has become a nightmare of foreign occupation. Our country, twice the size of Texas, has become an armed camp, a huge base for Soviets and the Cubans to arm and train others for takeovers in neighboring countries."⁷⁵

What did change after 1976, however, was UNITA's alternative to colonial rule. Whereas in 1968, Savimbi espoused marxism-leninism-maoism as the path to freedom, in 1978, he championed market capitalism and Western democracy as the goals of Angolan liberation. UNITA claimed to struggle for "the right of the Angolan people to vote, to elect freely their governing institutions."⁷⁶ UNITA conceptions of democracy were portrayed as "pretty much like Western ideals."⁷⁷ Similarly Savimbi appealed to a group of black American journalists by stating that "All I want for Angola is what you have in America -- a system of democratic institutions with people living in harmony."⁷⁸

⁷³ See McFaul, "Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola," p. 99.

⁷⁴ Savimbi, as quoted in Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 253; and Savimbi, *Aos Amigos, Simpatizantes e Militantes da UNITA em Portugal*, (UNITA: Terra Livre, Angola, May 1978), p. 8.

⁷⁵ *A Conversation with Ernesto Mulato*, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 2, 1979), p. 3. At that time, Ernesto Mulato was a UNITA politburo member.

⁷⁶ Marco Vinicius and Maria Joao Saldanha, *Jonas Savimbi: Um Desafio a Ditadura Comunista em Angola*, (Lisboa: Edicoes Armasilde, July 1977), p. 201; and Edward Neilan and George Archibald, "Angola's Struggle like D.C. Home Rule Fight, Savimbi Says," *Washington Times*, February 3, 1986.

⁷⁷ Chitunda, "Angola: A Global Perspective and the Strategy for Success," p. 8.

⁷⁸ "Prepared Remarks of the Honorable Jonas Savimbi," luncheon with black journalists at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., February 2, 1986, (UNITA), p. 7, in Hoover

These pledges to a democratic principles contrast sharply with the absence of democracy practiced within UNITA party structures and in the "Freelands of Angola," UNITA's self-proclaimed liberated area inside Angola. In the "Freelands", Savimbi has been heralded as the immortal excellency, the unequivocal leader who no one can challenge.⁷⁹ UNITA has never held multi-candidate elections; the "government" in Jamba resembles a monarchy at best and a dictatorship at worst.⁸⁰ Recent statements issued by some of Savimbi's closest supporters have confirmed longstanding allegations that Savimbi tortured and murdered UNITA members who challenged his authoritarian rule.⁸¹

UNITA's statements and practices relating to the economy also contain incongruities. The basic commitment to socialism, one of the four principles enshrined on UNITA's emblem, has not withered. As Savimbi himself asserted;

We have a socialist position. If our battle was simply for the colonialist to abandon the country and we were to constitute the new capitalists, our struggle would have been of no use. Our struggle needs to have in view the liberation of the country and of the means of production.⁸²

This militant socialist language has been qualified over the years, however, to make UNITA's programme more palatable to the West. For

Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-4.

⁷⁹ See James, "The UNITA Insurgency in Angola," p. 306; and Edward Theberton, "The Cult of Jonas Savimbi", *The Spectator*, 21 November 1987.

⁸⁰ See "Angola: Machiavelli in Jamba", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 30, No. 8, April 14, 1989, p.6; "Angola: UNITA at the Crossroads", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 29, No. 16, August 12, 1988, pp. 3-4; Edward Therberton from Jamba, *The Spectator*, 21 November 1987; and John Marcum, "Human Rights Issues in the Angola War," testimony prepared for the Sub-Committee on Africa, House Foreign relations Committee Washington, April 12, 1989.

⁸¹ Fred Bridgland, the author of a very sympathetic biography of Savimbi, confirmed these abuses of power as did several former UNITA officials. See Craig Whitney, "A Onetime Backer of Savimbi Corroborates Torture Charges," *New York Times*, 12 March 1989, p. A12; *African Analysis*, No. 65, February 3, 1989, p. 4; and No. 68, March 17, 1989, p.1; and Jille Joliffe, "Unita Ranks Split on Eve of Meeting", *The Guardian*, May 2, 1988.

⁸² Savimbi as quoted in Vinicius and Saldanha, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 202.

instance, Savimbi gave the following rationale for UNITA's commitment to socialism when speaking to a Western journalists in 1983.

When we talk about socialism, we mean democratic socialism. Not the sort of policies carried out in Eastern Europe or China....There is no one single type of socialism. There is the one that exists in Luanda and which has only served to make our country, a potentially rich country, poor. And there is ours.

What we seek is a democratic socialism that makes man, rather than the system, as its basis. It must seek to help man live, not deprive him of his spirit and values.⁸³

UNITA's definition of democratic socialism envisages both "collective production" along with "co-ordinated" private and Angolan enterprise from which the product "would be justly shared in such a manner so as to enable each citizen to have a life of decency and dignity..."⁸⁴ To achieve this egalitarian objective, Article 42 (chapter 4) of UNITA's Constitution calls for the establishment of a planned economy within which foreign investment and individual interests must respect the "superior economic interests of the Angolan nation."⁸⁵ Regarding land, Article 41 calls for the return of land "confiscated and acquired through colonial and neo-colonial laws, to the peasants."⁸⁶ The state under UNITA also would be responsible for providing education, medical care, and "emancipation" for women.

In many respects, "The Freelands of Angola" practices a more militant form of socialism than the People's Republic of Angola. Prices are fixed, production is planned and managed by cooperatives, and money does not exist.⁸⁷ These socialist practices contrast sharply with an alternative theme present in many UNITA publications--vehement anti-socialism. Though a devoted Maoist during the first

⁸³ Edward Giradet, "Angola's Savimbi: Portrait of a Rebel," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 2, 1983. See also James, "The UNITA Insurgency in Angola," p. 298.

⁸⁴ "The Constitution of UNITA," reprinted in *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 97.

⁸⁵ *IBID.*, p. 99.

⁸⁶ *IBID.*

⁸⁷ "Final Communique on the Fourth Ordinary Congress of UNITA," Huambo, March 23-28, 1977, reprinted in *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 123. UNITA claims to be self-sufficient in agricultural production due to the success of their cooperatives. See Dohning and Breytenbach, *UNITA*, p. 15.

liberation struggle, Savimbi has consistently distanced himself from this past with respect to economic matters;

From Mao and the Communists, I learned how to fight and win a guerrilla war. I also learned how not to run an economy or nation. Collectivist agriculture does not work. Peasants must be able to own their own land, their own houses, and their own cattle. People must be free to practice their religions and to observe their tribal traditions.⁸⁸

In a similar vein, a publication commissioned by UNITA offers the following explanation for UNITA's break with its socialist past;

During the Portuguese colonial era, the movement's literature was full of revolutionary Maoist rhetoric, but this was more with a view of cultivating material assistance from Red China than a sincere reflection of UNITA's ideological beliefs -- Savimbi himself would be the first to admit that during the early years of its existence UNITA sometimes had to be pragmatic to survive.

In fact UNITA is quite definitely anti-communist (as its track record against the MPLA proves) both on the grounds that it doesn't work and that it is a foreign ideology which doesn't belong in Africa.⁸⁹

Consequently, UNITA's official economic policy now endorses the free market, private property, and foreign investment.⁹⁰ In direct contradiction with other egalitarian redistributive norms, UNITA's new Constitution asserts that an individual's free choice is the best guide to allocating resources.⁹¹ This freedom of individual initiative is considered particularly important in agricultural production where UNITA believes that "peasants, not the state, should own farm land."⁹²

As for industrial production, UNITA statements encourage capital accumulation by Angolan entrepreneurs and foreign investment. UNITA's most comprehensive economic statement outlined a foreign investment code which includes (1) Government's guarantees to foreign capital,

⁸⁸ Jonas Savimbi, "Angola: the Munich of Africa?"

⁸⁹ Dohning and Breytenbach, *UNITA*, p. 25.

⁹⁰ Edward Giradet, "Angola's Savimbi: Portrait of a Rebel."

⁹¹ "The Constitution of UNITA," reprinted in *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 101.

⁹² Jonas Savimbi, "The War Against Soviet Colonialism," *Policy Review*, No. 35, Winter 1986, p. 77.

especially in relation to repatriation and the earning of assets; (2) preferential investment sectors; (3) protection and guarantees of expatriate's rights; (4) incentives to encourage the investors to re-invest some of their earnings in the country; and (5) the investor's fiscal and legal obligations."⁹³ The one possible exception to this liberal foreign investment policy is UNITA's attitude towards those Western companies who presently do business with the MPLA. These companies, such as Gulf, Texaco, and Boeing run the risk of nationalization as punishment for their lack of UNITA support during the second war of liberation.⁹⁴

UNITA statements always accompany praise for free enterprise and the Western capitalist system with harsh denunciations of Soviet-style socialism.⁹⁵ UNITA documents emphatically assert that the "socio-economic misery that befell upon Angola under Soviet-Cuban occupation is far worse than under Portuguese colonial rule."⁹⁶ UNITA statements note with glee the disastrous levels of economic production in Angola since the MPLA assumption of power.⁹⁷ While holding the MPLA responsible, UNITA statements also cite Cuban and Soviet plunder of Angola's riches as another factor exacerbating the dismal economic situation in the country.⁹⁸

UNITA's Strategy for National Liberation

UNITA's methods for "liberating" Angola have not changed considerably in making the transition from fighting Portuguese colonialism to struggling against Soviet "imperialism" and MPLA subjugation. While espousing unity and negotiations as means to a "free Angola", Savimbi has considered the armed struggle to be the only effective method of change in Angola. What did change, however,

⁹³ UNITA, *National Economic Reconstruction in Angola: The Challenge and the Approach*, (Angola: May 1981), p. 15.

⁹⁴ *IBID.*, p. 6.

⁹⁵ See, for instance, Chitunda, "Angola: A Global Perspective and the Strategy for Success," p. 1.

⁹⁶ UNITA, *UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola*, p. 9.

⁹⁷ A Conversation with Ernesto Mulato, pp. 12-13; and Savimbi, "Angola: the Munich of Africa?"

⁹⁸ UNITA, *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 25.

was both the extent and technique for fighting the war, changes dramatically influenced by UNITA's new international alliances.

Negotiations with the MPLA

UNITA's propaganda has emphasized the absolute necessity of negotiations for a lasting peace in Angola.⁹⁹ In 1986, UNITA outlined a comprehensive plan for national reconciliation, which included the withdrawal of foreign troops, a ceasefire, a transitional government to include both UNITA and MPLA-PT members, a process in which the coalition would hand over authority to an elected government, and an impartial mediator to oversee the transition process.¹⁰⁰ When asked why UNITA continues to fight, Savimbi asserts that only armed struggle will force the MPLA to accept such a plan.¹⁰¹

Other declarations about negotiations, however, suggest that Savimbi may have had other goals in mind for his war. UNITA's best case scenario for an end to the civil war has been victory, not power-sharing. Savimbi has threatened that if UNITA does not share power, then UNITA "takes over the power."¹⁰² Similarly, at a high point in UNITA's war efforts in 1985, an official UNITA declaration warned that "If MPLA does not have the courage to negotiate, then they will have to witness the collapse of their regime."¹⁰³

Moreover, Savimbi severely criticized Crocker's negotiation strategy as UNITA was not invited to participate. When the American Assistant Secretary of State initiated a dialogue with the MPLA regime in 1982, Savimbi retorted that "It is a mistake now to make a compromise with the MPLA on how they will be in power...It is not the

⁹⁹ UNITA, "Declaration of the Central Committee of the Situation in Southern Africa," March 30, 1984, in *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 126.

¹⁰⁰ UNITA, "The Platform for National Reconciliation in Angola," (Jamba, Angola, August 31, 1986), in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-3.

¹⁰¹ See Edward Neilan, "Savimbi Says U.S. Arms Would Spur Negotiations," *The Washington Times*, February 7, 1986.

¹⁰² UNITA, "Declaration of the Central Committee of the Situation in Southern Africa," March 30, 1984, in *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 127.

¹⁰³ "Declaration of National Committee on Commemoration of the 19th Anniversary of UNITA Founding," March 13, 1985, in *IBID.*, p. 133.

business of a foreign power."¹⁰⁴ UNITA's reaction to the 1988 Tripartite Agreement was equally negative.¹⁰⁵ The end of South African aid as stipulated by the peace accords effectively eliminated UNITA's main source of military assistance, its rear base support, and its conventional war potential. Although UNITA had begun to set up a new operational base in northern Angola before the December 1988 settlement, supply-line complications, a potentially unfriendly local population, new and unknown terrain, and strained Angolan-Zairian relations hinder a permanent UNITA relocation there.

The peace settlement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, however, did create the necessary conditions for negotiations between UNITA and the MPLA. While the talks have had a series of starts and stops, it appears that Savimbi has not ruled out negotiations and elections as a strategy for attaining power.

Armed Struggle

UNITA's final communique in 1976, the Cuanza Manifesto, resolutely declared that the liberation movement would continue the armed struggle until Angola was finally liberated from all imperialist forces.¹⁰⁶ At the time, the declaration sounded like a parting cry from a bitter loser of a civil war. Fifteen years later, however, UNITA had grown from a defeated and demoralized military force to a sophisticated guerrilla and conventional army with tens of thousands of soldiers defending significant territorial holdings inside Angola.

In reconstituting a military potential, Savimbi initially adhered to Mao's principles of guerrilla war.¹⁰⁷ First, UNITA had to recapture the "hearts and minds" of the peasants, the great mass of the Angolan population.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, "Mass mobilization was

¹⁰⁴ Joseph Lelyfeld, "Angolan Factions Struggle Against Outside Forces," *New York Times*, November 16, 1982.

¹⁰⁵ UNITA, "Communique of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of UNITA," (Jamba, Angola: 2 February 1989).

¹⁰⁶ See Michael Kaufman, "Guerrillas in Angola Declare They Continue to Fight," *New York Times*, June 12, 1976.

¹⁰⁷ Savimbi, "The War Against Soviet Colonialism," p. 77.

¹⁰⁸ Jonas Savimbi, "Angola: the Munich of Africa?"

carried out with greater intensity and effectiveness."¹⁰⁹ After 1976, UNITA added three new rallying cries for mobilizing support. First, the Ovimbundu people had little representation in Luanda under the MPLA, and few national resources earmarked for their southern territories. Given this situation, UNITA has argued that the MPLA is a minority regime which does not represent the interests of the Ovimbundu people, the largest ethnic group in Angola.¹¹⁰ Second, UNITA capitalized on and helped exacerbate Angola's economic devastation to mobilize people against the MPLA's socialist economic orientation. With all economic indicators below pre-independence levels, calls for a new economic model resonated among Angola's poor. Third, UNITA called upon people to fight new foreign rulers, the Soviet Union and Cuba. White faces and abusive use of privileges by these European and American visitors made for easy icons of resentment.

To mobilize support and spread UNITA's message, Savimbi reconstituted his headquarters at the "end of the earth" in the outermost region of southeast Angola, and set up a state within a state, "The Freelands of Angola."¹¹¹ As already noted, within the "liberated zones" controlled by UNITA soldiers exist local governments, medical facilities, sanitary assistance, schools, and collective farms all operated by UNITA.¹¹² In these schools, UNITA purported to provide an education "free from foreign ideas" consistent

¹⁰⁹ UNITA, "We Strive for Peace and Majority Rule in Angola," July 7, 1979 (Freelands, Angola), p.2, in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-6.

¹¹⁰ See James, "The UNITA Insurgency in Angola," p. 234; and UNITA, *UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola*, p. 16.

¹¹¹ The first UNITA capital was established in 1979 to be followed by the founding of Jamba in 1981. UNITA claims a population of 10,000 in the capital. See Tala Skari, "Inside the Camps of Angola's Stubborn Rebels," *U.S. News and World Report*, October 1, 1984, p. 40.

¹¹² UNITA, *UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola*, p. 18. By the mid-1980s, UNITA claimed to operate 6,951 primary schools, employ 7,127 teachers and educate 224,811 students. UNITA had in operation 53 agricultural production centers claimed to farm 25,000 hectares, producing corn as the primary crop. See James, "The UNITA Insurgency in Angola," pp. 224-225.

with the "realities" of Angola.¹¹³ UNITA also uses LIMA, Liga da Mulher Angolana, to organize women, and JURA, Juventude Unida da Resistencia de Angola, to mobilize the youth.¹¹⁴

Though difficult to accurately assess, the extent of participation (mobilized by whichever means) in UNITA's government and war efforts appears to have expanded considerably since 1976. By 1983, UNITA claimed to have control or influence over two thirds of the country, with a rear support base, the "Freelands" which constituted one third of Angola.¹¹⁵ Within this territory, UNITA claimed to have 2,000 regular troops, 18,000 semi-regular, 20,000 compact guerrillas, and 35,000 dispersed guerrillas by 1984.¹¹⁶

Armed with a political program, popular support, and a growing army, UNITA restarted its guerrilla war almost immediately after the conventional battles of 1976. From 1976 to 1981, UNITA avoided "direct confrontation with the enemy's powerful regular forces,"¹¹⁷ but instead focused on economic sabotages, ambushes, kidnapping, mines, and other classical tactics of guerrilla war.¹¹⁸ Attacks on economic targets also served to discourage Western multinationals from operating in Angola until a "legitimate" government took over.¹¹⁹

¹¹³ UNITA, *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 51.

¹¹⁴ *IBID.*, pp. 45 & 49.

¹¹⁵ As early as 1978, UNITA claimed to have bases only 250 km from Luanda. See Jonas Savimbi, *Aos Amigos, Simpatizantes e Militantes da UNITA em Portugal*, p. 7. See also "Johannesburg home service in English," June 3, 1982, in *SWB*, part 4, The Middle East and Africa, ME/7043/B/4, June 4, 1982.

¹¹⁶ Dohning and Breytenbach, *UNITA*, p. 14; Fred Bridgland, "What if the Angolan Rebels Win?" *Washington Post*, May 29, 1983.

¹¹⁷ UNITA, *UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola*, p. 18.

¹¹⁸ Savimbi, as quoted in Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 228. For accounts of major UNITA kidnapping operations, see UNITA, "Special Communique of the General Staff of UNITA's Armed Forces" No. 15, March 26, 1983 (Freelands, Angola), p. 1, in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, box 12-6; Edward Girardet, "Hostages Tell of 700 Mile March with Angolan Rebels," *The Observer*, May 8, 1983.

¹¹⁹ "Pro-West Angola Rebels Warn Foreigners to Flee," *New York Times*, November 17, 1983, p. 3; UNITA, "Special Communique on the Benguela Railway Line (C.F.B.) in Angola," October 3, 1976, *Press Release*, (New York) October 24, 1976, p.1.; UNITA, Final Communique from the XII Annual Conference, June 12, 1979;

MPLA efforts to contain UNITA guerilla attacks failed emphatically throughout the 1980s, while UNITA's "Freelands" continued to expand. Eventually, the MPLA responded by attacking UNITA strongholds with increasing levels of firepower and conventional battalions. If UNITA wanted to continue to hold territory, part of the guerrilla army had to be retooled and retrained to fight positional warfare.

UNITA's military reorganization established four different categories of soldiers: the People's Defense Committees, the dispersed guerrillas, compact guerrillas, and regular, or semi-regular forces¹²⁰ The defense committees acted as local militias, mobilized to defend UNITA villages under attack. The dispersed guerrillas represented the front line of UNITA's assault, carrying out sabotage operations and gathering intelligence against enemy advances.¹²¹ Compact guerrilla units executed all major ambushes and sabotage projects. Finally, the last category organized into battalion size units, capable of operating anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, major artillery pieces, and tanks.

Savimbi preferred to fight a guerrilla war, but the changing military conditions compelled FALA, UNITA's army, to devout increasingly more recruits to the fourth category of fighting units as "a guerrilla army itself cannot defeat a regular army."¹²² Eventually, Savimbi believed his army would have to launch the so-called "generalized counter-offensive" whereby UNITA forces would attack and defeat the MPLA and Cuban armies.¹²³ To execute this phase of the war, the Fourth UNITA Congress called upon FALA to "accelerate the transformation of the guerrilla units into semi-

UNITA, "We Strive for Peace and Majority Rule in Angola," July 7, 1979 (Freelands, Angola), p. 2, in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, boxes 12-5 & 12-6.

¹²⁰ See UNITA, *UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola*, p. 21.

¹²¹ Dohning and Breytenbach, *UNITA*, p. 14.

¹²² Savimbi, as quoted in Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 253.

¹²³ UNITA, *UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola*, p. 25.

regular and regular units...¹²⁴ By 1979, the first semi-regular battalions were formed, and in 1981, the UNITA assembled their first brigades. By 1987, UNITA claimed to have over 50,000 conventional soldiers.

Armed with a conventional, offensive profile, FALA began to attack fortified FAPLA outposts. Captured villages and towns were not seized and simply abandoned, but seized and occupied.¹²⁵ UNITA still maintained that their primary military objective was to raise the costs of Russian and Cuban occupation.¹²⁶ But a series of UNITA victories in the 1980s inspired loftier military goals. According to Savimbi, "Against such an almighty adversary (the Cuban-Soviet-MPLA side), an outright military victory by UNITA could never be easy; but it is no longer impossible."¹²⁷ Similarly, Savimbi boasted that UNITA had the potential "for the first time in the modern era" to turn back the "inexorable world-wide advance of Soviet-sponsored Communism."¹²⁸

Victory for UNITA could only occur with substantial external assistance. While UNITA still championed the strategy of "self reliance," this new conventional stage of the war required both sophisticated equipment for UNITA soldiers, and military assistance from outside powers to perform those conventional military tasks beyond UNITA capabilities.

As a guerrilla movement fighting Soviet and Cuban soldiers, UNITA naturally turned to the other superpower for political, moral, and military assistance. To mobilize American support, UNITA warned of future Soviet and Cuban invasions of other southern Africa countries and beyond.¹²⁹ As Savimbi concluded regarding the Soviet presence

¹²⁴ "Final Communique on the Fourth Ordinary Congress of UNITA," Huambo, March 23-28, 1977, reprinted in *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 122.

¹²⁵ See Dohning and Breytenbach, *UNITA*, p. 45.

¹²⁶ Jonas Savimbi, "Angola: the Munich of Africa?"

¹²⁷ UNITA, *UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola*, p. 34.

¹²⁸ Dohning and Breytenbach, *UNITA*, p. 32.

¹²⁹ Chitunda, "Angola: A Global Perspective and the Strategy for Success," p. 3; and UNITA spokesman John G. Kakumba, *Bangkok Post*, August 7, 1979, in *SWB*, part 3, Far East, FE/6196/A5/2, August 17, 1979.

in Angola, "What is happening in Africa now will affect Europe dramatically in the next few years and will negatively alter the balance of power in the world."¹³⁰ To reverse this trend, Savimbi called on the "Free World" to support a UNITA victory, a victory which "will make a positive contribution towards geopolitical stability in the subcontinent."¹³¹ In their propaganda efforts, UNITA constantly has drew upon the parallels between the American experience and UNITA's own historical condition.

The similarities between our beginnings are striking. Two hundred years ago, American fought a guerrilla struggle on native soil against the most powerful nation on earth. Today, we are doing the same. Americans advocated a democratic system and won. We are advocating the same, and we, too, will win and change the policies of southern Africa forever.¹³²

Such historical analogies resonated with the Reagan Administration. During his trip to the United States in 1981, Savimbi was treated as a visiting head of state, meeting with President Reagan and all senior cabinet members. UNITA's legitimacy reached even greater heights after the repeal of the Clark Amendment.¹³³ This American political and material support for Savimbi's cause also helped UNITA acquire assistance from West European, Middle Eastern, and African governments.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ A Conversation with Ernesto Mulato, p. 8; Jonas Savimbi, "Open Letter to All Peoples of the World," September 25, 1975 (Freelands, Angola); and "Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, President of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), November 1981, p.3, in Hoover Archives, Africa Subject Collection, boxes, 12-3 and 12-6.

¹³¹ "Final Communique on the Fourth Ordinary Congress of UNITA," Huambo, March 23-28, 1977, reprinted in *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, p. 122.

¹³² A Conversation with Ernesto Mulato, p. 5.

¹³³ Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese, (UNITA radio) July 28, 1985, in SWB, part 4, The Middle East, Africa and Latin America, August 1, 1985, ME/8018/B/1.

¹³⁴ By 1984, UNITA claimed to have external assistance totalling over \$100 million from various European, African, and Arab countries. See Tala Skari, "Inside the Camps of Angola's

South Africa

While the South Africa Defense Force retreated from Angola in 1976, "communist" regimes in Angola and Mozambique quartering ANC and SWAPO guerrillas and Cuban and Russian military personnel prompted South Africa to intervene again in both countries by 1978. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha, repeatedly maintained that neighboring countries which harbored "anti-South African terrorists" will have to bear the consequences of their actions.¹³⁵ South Africa and UNITA thus had a mutual interest in fighting the Angolan government. From the very beginning of UNITA's second struggle of national liberation, South Africa provided the bulk of UNITA's military equipment, while also allowing other military materials to be transported via South African controlled territory. Moreover, the South African Defense Force frequently intervened into southern Angola to undertake commando raids on FAPLA, SWAPO, and ANC bases, and to execute sabotage operations against important economic targets. Most importantly, the SADF intervened on UNITA's behalf both in 1985 and 1987 to repel major FAPLA conventional offensives.¹³⁶ The 1987 invasion involved several thousand soldiers, large C-4 and C-5 artillery pieces, and South Africa's most sophisticated Mirage jet fighters. All sides of the battle agreed that UNITA would have been crushed without South African assistance.

D. The Influence of the International System on Angola's Revolutionary Outcome

The First Decade

Soviet Influences on the MPLA-PT

The relationship forged between the Soviet Union and the MPLA during the course of the civil war had a profound influence on the course of economic, social, and military organization in Angola after the war. While relations nearly evaporated in 1974, the tumultuous

Stubborn Rebels," *U.S. News and World Report*, October 1, 1984, p. 40.

¹³⁵ "Radio Johannesburg in English for abroad," April 24, 1979, in SWB, Middle East and Africa, part 4, April 26, 1979, p. ME/6101/B/2.

¹³⁶ UNITA Foreign Minister Jeremias Chitunda, as quoted on Radio Johannesburg in English for abroad, September 27, 1985, in SWB, part 4, The Middle East, Africa and Latin America, September 30, 1985, ME/8069/B/1.

transition to independence compelled the MPLA to rely almost exclusively on Soviet and Cuban assistance for gaining control of the Angolan state. As Neto acknowledged,

It was possible to transform colonial Angola into the People's Republic of Angola, an independent Republic, because of the dynamic contribution made by its people, its heroes and militants, and because of exceptional assistance from the socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cuba.¹³⁷

The Soviet role only grew after independence. In general terms, the MPLA turned the Soviet Union as model of socialist development to be emulated.¹³⁸ In asking "What is the Dictatorship of the Proletariat?", President dos Santos suggested that the MPLA must look at the experiences of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union, or the revolutions in Bulgaria [sic] and Cuba to understand its functioning.¹³⁹ Similarly, the 1980 MPLA Congress declared that the "identity of ideology...has played a very positive part as regards to the exchange of experience and the establishment of closer friendship and co-operation" between Angola and the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁰ True to this ideological affinity, the new MPLA regime adopted policies and practices from the Soviet experience. The leading role of the vanguard party, centralized planning, nationalization of industry, and collectivization of agriculture were all features adopted from the Soviet development model.

Moscow provided not only the model, but the technicians and staff to build it. Soviet, East European and Cuban advisors worked in almost every Angolan ministry and manned the managerial posts in

¹³⁷ *Documents of the Plenary Meeting of the of MPLA Central Committee*, (1976) p. 5.

¹³⁸ Author's interview with Roberto de Almeida, MPLA Politburo member and Secretary for Ideology, Luanda, August 24, 1989.

¹³⁹ "Speech by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the Opening of the Party's First National Conference," January 14, 1985, in *Angola Information Bulletin*, No. 107 (February 18, 1985), p. 2. See also "Encerramento Da 2. Conferencia Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos," October 18, 1976, in *Agostinho Neto*, p. 145.

¹⁴⁰ *Angola Special Congress*, (1980) p. 53.

several Angolan parastatals.¹⁴¹ While several thousand Cuban doctors and teachers provided the backbone for Angola's medical and educational systems, Soviet Uzbek farmers managed the collective farms.¹⁴² The level of foreign participation in the operations of the Angolan economy was so extensive that some observers concluded that Neto actually deferred to his Soviet and Cuban colleagues for all major economic decisions.¹⁴³

Perhaps more importantly than economic assistance, FAPLA received "inestimable support of the socialist community, in particular the Soviet Union and Cuba..."¹⁴⁴ Soviet military assistance combined with the presence of several thousand Cuban troops defended the young country against South African intervention, thereby providing the requisite security requirements for the building of a socialist-oriented state. Without this kind of assistance, the Angolan socialist project could not have survived.

The United States and Western Capitalism vs. the MPLA-PT

MPLA histories of Angola identify Portuguese colonialism, Western imperialism, and American aggression as the triumvirate of enemy forces which suppressed Angolan independence for decades, and then, during the Second War of Liberation, tried to foil an MPLA government

¹⁴¹ For the agreement, see *Izvestiya*, October 10, 1976. For an analysis of the Cuban involvement in the civilian sector, see Gerald Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties," *Foreign Policy*, No. 31 (Summer 1978), p. 8.

¹⁴² For a catalogue of the various projects to which Cuban workers have contributed, see *MPLA, Central Committee Report*, (1977), pp. 21-22. Among the major sectors mentioned, the MPLA Report stated that 254 Cuban specialists worked in coffee production, 418 (increased to 900 the following year) in health, 1,000 in construction, and 750 teachers in the "Che Guevera Brigade" destined for the Angolan secondary school system. See also Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties," p. 8 & 10; and Bender, "Comment: Past, Present, and Future Perspectives of Cuba in Angola," p. 46. On the Uzbeks, see M.R. Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy 1975-1985*, p. 39.

¹⁴³ Ian Hartford, "Who Really Pulls the Strings of Angola's Puppet Government?" *The Times*, June 9, 1976. However, as one Soviet observer of Angolan affairs joked, "the Angolans were lucky that the Cubans were their new colonizers and not the North Koreans. Otherwise, they would have really built socialism."

¹⁴⁴ *Central Committee Report to the Second Congress of the MPLA-Workers' Party* (1985), p. 40.

in the last hour.¹⁴⁵ MPLA attitudes towards these enemies, the United States in particular, did not change initially after independence. In the MPLA analysis, imperialism considered Angola's socialist project a challenge to "capitalist hegemony in Southern Africa."¹⁴⁶ As such, the "The aim (of imperialism) is to prevent our example from having a mobilising effect on the masses, on the workers and peasants of other countries."¹⁴⁷ That American statesmen during the Reagan years openly called for the overthrow of the Luanda regime affirmed these observations.

Despite denunciations of American aggression and imperialist exploitation, however, Angola did not leave the Western orbit in its foreign economic relations. Though trade with the United States and Western Europe was considered tainted, undesirable, and temporary, while trade with the socialist world was lauded as progressive, Angola nonetheless maintained the trading patterns established during its colonial years. Trade with the United States actually increased dramatically under the MPLA regime, rising from \$73 million worth of exports in 1970 to almost \$1 billion by 1984.¹⁴⁸ Despite an absence of diplomatic relations and American assistance to UNITA, the United States in the 1980s grew to be Angola's largest trading partner, while Angola ranked third on America's list of trading partners in Africa, only behind South Africa and Nigeria. In the 1980s, Western economies still comprised over 80% of all Angolan trade, while with the Eastern bloc still accounted for less than 10% of total trade. Thus, the MPLA's attempt at a revolutionary transformation in Angola never succeeded in escaping pre-independence linkages to the Western world.

UNITA

The externally induced revolution in Angola also did not succeed in extending to all of Angola. The number of MPLA-PT party cells, nationalized industries, collective farms, and marxist-leninist

¹⁴⁵ See *Angola: Socialism at Birth*, pp. 9-15.

¹⁴⁶ *Documents of the Plenary Meeting of the of MPLA Central Committee*, (1976) p. 20.

¹⁴⁷ *MPLA, Central Committee Report*, (1977), p. 27.

¹⁴⁸ IMF *International Financial Statistics*, as cited in *African Contemporary Record*, 1977-1978, p. C207; and IMF, *Directory of World Trade Yearbook 1985*, (Washington: 1985).

slogans abated the farther one travelled outside of Luanda. Upon reaching "the Freelands of Angola" -- UNITA's territory -- all signs of a Soviet-style revolutionary transformation disappeared. In failing to gain control of the entire country, the MPLA provided anti-revolutionary forces both within and outside of the country the chance to regroup, remobilize and eventually challenge the "socialist" regime in Luanda.

The above analysis of UNITA's ideological development, military progress, and external alliances demonstrates the incredible malleability of national liberation movements and their doctrines in adjusting and accommodating to the demands of the international division of power. In the late 1960s, Jonas Savimbi paraded himself as the most radical marxist-leninist-maoist fighting Portuguese imperialism and American neo-imperialism in Angola. In the late 1980s, the same Savimbi was championing bourgeois democratic values, and praising the value of foreign investment and free enterprise. UNITA's espousal of American ideals intensified commensurately with the improvement of ties between the United States and UNITA.

UNITA's military strategy was less affected by these enhanced associations with the United States and South Africa, though even the battlefield did not escape the influence of Western ideas. Savimbi's decision to organize conventional units did not result from his training in China. While UNITA's development of a conventional potential appears to be more of a response to FAPLA actions than an acceptance of South African or American advice, Savimbi nonetheless had other strategies than positional warfare from which to choose. In building a conventional army, Savimbi relied exclusively on South African and American support. As the early conventional clashes between FAPLA and FALA proved, UNITA would not have survived without this external assistance.

As UNITA moved closer to the United States and the West, anti-Soviet statements by UNITA leaders became increasingly more vile and frequent. Just as the "ideology of opposition" against Portuguese colonialism necessitated a heavily anti-capitalist flavor, the ideology of opposition against a Soviet supported state was construed from anti-socialist principles. While Savimbi could have continued his struggle against the MPLA by arguing that they did not represent true socialism as practiced and preached by his movement, he instead opted for abandoning the old discourse and adopting a new one --

liberal capitalism. In this way, the Soviet Union served to guide the development of UNITA's ideology by representing everything that UNITA was not.

A similar reactive relationship developed between UNITA's military strategy and the Soviet and Cuban military involvement in Angola. While often criticized by others for forcing inappropriate conventional military tactics to be executed in African "guerrilla" wars, the Soviet strategy in Angola actually compelled the UNITA insurgents to play by Soviet rules. In responding to FAPLA conventional offensives by deploying his own conventional units, Savimbi became trapped in an escalatory conventional war in which he could not attain the advantage.

The Force of the International System: The Second Decade

Socialist Reform Inside Angola

The direct relationship between Angolan economic reforms and Soviet domestic and foreign policy changes has been minor. As economic cooperation with the Soviet Union has never constituted more than a small fraction of the Angolan economy, changes in their economic relations have had little impact on Angola's more general reform programme. While Soviet advisors have not scripted a reform program for their Angolan allies, however, the speeches and ideas emanating from the Kremlin have had a rippling effect even as far as Luanda. First and most importantly, Soviet internal reforms have deflated the power of "hardliners" within the MPLA Central Committee.¹⁴⁹ It is difficult to argue forcefully for increased nationalization in Angola, when the rest of the socialist world is denouncing it. Second, the general "demystification" of the communist threat prompted by the Soviet Union's "perestroika" also has helped Angola to remove its stigma as an orthodox Soviet puppet, thereby contributing to Western interests in investment there.¹⁵⁰ Though difficult to measure, these atmospheric will be important for the long-term success of Angola's own rethinking about socialist

¹⁴⁹ Author's interviews with one politburo member and three central committee members of the MPLA, (Luanda, August 1989).

¹⁵⁰ At a presentation by the Angolan Minister of Petroleum in Houston in July 1989, over 100 firms were present.

orientation.¹⁵¹

In security matters, Soviet new thinking about regional conflict has undoubtedly affected Soviet-Angolan relations and the prospects for peace in southern Africa. While Soviet diplomats are the first to recognize that Angola initiated serious negotiation proposals well before Soviet "new thinking", they nonetheless take credit for "softening" some of Angola's negotiating positions through a series of informal discussions. More indirectly, the political atmosphere created by Soviet new thinking on regional conflicts has helped to strengthen the position of those MPLA leaders favoring a political settlement.¹⁵² Soviet diplomats also facilitated the process of negotiations, by (1) helping to convince the United States to "delink" the negotiations between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa from the issue of an internal settlement, (2) securing a role for Cuba as a co-partner in the negotiations as a way of allowing Castro to "save face," and (3) offering subtle prodding throughout the talks to insure a final settlement.¹⁵³ Soviet "new thinking" thus transformed a previous opponent of negotiations into a facilitator of peace and stability in Angola.

The long-term effect of this new position, however, will be to decrease Soviet involvement in Angola's internal politics altogether.¹⁵⁴ If no longer the model for socialist development nor the guarantor of Angolan security, the Soviet Union has little else to offer the MPLA regime. The Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola was surely a catalyst for revolutionary transformation in the country for the first decade of independence. Their absence from the country may well reverse most of these changes.

¹⁵¹ At the MPLA Party Congress in December 1990, the Central Committee approved a resolution calling for multi-party elections.

¹⁵² Author's interview with a MPLA Central Committee member, (Luanda, August 20, 1989).

¹⁵³ Author's interviews with a Vladillen Vasev, Soviet Foreign Ministry, (Moscow, September 19, 1989), Soviet academicians at the Institute of Africa Studies, Soviet Academy of Sciences, (Moscow, June 1988 and September 1989), and Soviet diplomats in Harare, July 28, 1989.

¹⁵⁴ For details, See Michael McFaul, "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process: Soviet-Angolan Relations Under Gorbachev," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (March 1990).

The American Role

Failures of Influence

The relationship between the course of Angola's revolution and American foreign policy resembles the causal-links identifiable in Soviet-Angolan relations. The direct impact of major U.S. foreign policy decisions has been minor. Developments in southern Africa over the last two years demonstrate that (1) the Reagan Doctrine has failed to achieve its ultimate objective of overthrowing the Angolan regime, and (2) the Tripartite Agreement resulted not from the U.S. assistance program to UNITA, but from the combined effect of Assistant Secretary Crocker's mediation efforts, the MPLA's eagerness to make peace with South Africa and improve relations with the United States, Soviet new thinking, and changes in the military balance of power in southern Africa.

The Reagan Doctrine failed to overthrow the Angolan government. Although the Angolans suffered tremendous losses during the last few years on the southern front, the MPLA shows no signs of capitulating. On the contrary, the victory at Cuito Cuanavale enhanced MPLA credibility at home, and strengthened the government's confidence during negotiations with South Africa. Most MPLA officials have realized that the war will not end until they deal with UNITA, but they do not feel threatened by a UNITA invasion of Luanda.

Likewise, the Tripartite Agreement was certainly not the kind of settlement that advocates of the Reagan Doctrine had in mind in their original conception of policy goals. Aside from the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the proposed settlement did not roll back the Luanda regime; it excluded the Reagan Doctrine's ally, UNITA; and it has provided for the assumption of power by a "leftist" organization in Namibia. Yet even if this settlement could be construed as an objective of the Reagan Doctrine, its development was not due to American assistance to Savimbi.

As described above, four developments created the conditions for progress in the negotiations between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa under American mediation to which the American assistance program to UNITA neither helped to establish the preconditions for a settlement, nor significantly influenced the decisive military events of 1987-88. The forces behind Crocker's negotiation strategy, Moscow's new thinking, and the MPLA's desire for peace with South Africa and improved relations with the United States already were in motion

before the American assistance program began. Negotiations were delayed, not hastened, by the application of the Reagan Doctrine in Angola. Finally, the important decisions precipitated by the changing military situation had little to do with UNITA's contribution to the war or interests in the peace.¹⁵⁵

Successes of Influence

The indirect, but more powerful tow of the international capitalist system, however, has eventually pulled Angola tightly back into its orbit. The weight of the internationalist capitalist system reduced to nil Angola's socialist challenge to it. Well before the confrontational "Reagan Doctrine", the cooptive power of Western financial assistance and investments already had begun to tame the MPLA's brand of socialism. Although U.S. military assistance to Savimbi exacerbated Luanda's economic woes,¹⁵⁶ dos Santos already in 1985 had concluded that "there were developments [in the international economy] over the years which limited the margin for

¹⁵⁵ Even at the battle of Mavinga where FAPLA suffered tremendous losses, the South Africans did the major damage. Moreover, the claim that the Cubans were forced to withdraw due to a strengthened UNITA also overestimates UNITA's military prowess and neglects the chronology of the Cuban deployment in Angola. The renewal of the American assistance program actually prompted an infusion of an additional 20,000 Cuban troops into Angola, withdrawn only after the ceasefire with South Africa had been signed.

¹⁵⁶ Reagan Doctrine proponents have argued that American assistance to UNITA has helped to destroy the Angolan economy thereby pressuring the Angolan government to negotiate with South Africa and UNITA. This argument is predicated on several false assumptions. First, the Angolan government demonstrated a willingness to seek a negotiated settlement before the United States became involved militarily. Compare, for instance, the striking similarities between the 1984 Angolan-Cuban peace proposal and the 1988 "Brazzaville Protocol." Second, this reasoning overestimates the real negative economic impact of American assistance to UNITA. Most economic destabilization in Angola was a result of South African assistance to UNITA (valued at \$200 million annually before the settlement, as compared to \$15 million from the United States), and direct South African military intervention (estimated to cost \$2 million per day). See "Angola: The War and The Prospects for Peace: Documents and Articles," Document 6.2 (Pretoria: South African Catholic Bishop's Office, June 1988); and "The Cost of 'Destabilisation'," SA Barometer (Johannesburg), Vol. 1, No. 4 (April 24, 1987), pp. 54-57.

manoeuvre on our economic policy."¹⁵⁷ This awareness of Angola's position in the world economy coupled with confessions of past mistakes in economic planning charted a reformist course for Angola from the beginning of the 1980s. In sum, the power of IMF credits, Chevron oil royalties, and the prospect of investments and economic assistance constituted the core external elements which precipitated the "roll back" of socialism in Angola.

UNITA

As the MPLA regime reorients towards the market and private ownership, UNITA's hegemonic hold on the United States and other Western countries will decline. If the battle between communism and capitalism is over, both in Angola and the world, the prominence of anti-communist liberation movements such as UNITA will rapidly wither.

UNITA, however, will not disappear if Western assistance is discontinued. In control of at least one-third of Angolan territory, UNITA can continue to destabilize the country indefinitely unless coopted into some national reconciliation agreement. Recognizing this stalemate, the MPLA has agreed to recognize UNITA, and hold multi-party elections. While the outcome of these negotiations is still uncertain, what is clear is the competition between the two organizations will no longer be cast as a struggle between capitalism and communism, West vs. East, or revolutionary vs. counterrevolutionary. Given the collapse of the socialist system of states, both sides in this political struggle will be courting the West.

¹⁵⁷ "Speech by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the Opening of the Party's First National Conference," (1985) p. 13.

I. Soviet Relations with Zimbabwe Since Independence: Failed Cooptation

The Lancaster House agreement and the subsequent election victory for ZANU effectively eclipsed Soviet influence in independent Zimbabwe. Though Soviet commentary eventually praised the settlement as a triumph for socialism,¹ bilateral relations between the socialist superpower and the newest edition to the "club" remained strained for most of the first ten years of Zimbabwe's existence. While the Americans established diplomatic relations the day after independence, the Soviet Union had to wait until the following year. Zimbabwe took five years to send an ambassador to Moscow.

In large part, this rocky start between the two countries was a direct consequence of Moscow's intimate ties to ZAPU. As Mugabe and ZANU struggled to establish their authority over their partner liberation movement, they remained wary of Soviet intentions in Zimbabwe. Before relations would improve, Soviet leaders had to overcome this historical stigma. A second and more fundamental barrier to the pursuit of Soviet interests in Zimbabwe, however, was the nature of the settlement itself. Because the Lancaster House agreement reaffirmed longstanding links between Zimbabwe and the West and protected property rights established under the Rhodesian regime, there was no room for a Soviet role in the development of Zimbabwe. Unlike Angola after independence, Zimbabwe neither required nor desired Soviet assistance in organizing the new state or economy. The large amounts of aid pledged by the West also obviated the need for assistance from the East. In short, Moscow had little to offer the new Zimbabwean government beyond the collected works of Marx and Lenin.²

Socialist Solidarity?

Left with little tangible return on its assistance provided to ZAPU during the war, the Soviet government initially was occupied

¹ N. Gavrilov, "The New Africa Emerging", *International Affairs*, No. 7, July 1980, p. 37.

² In fact, these books were given to Zimbabwe as a gift of socialist solidarity.

with "forgetting the past" and reversing its poor relations with ZANU after independence.³ This was done by highlighting the two countries' common interest in socialism. As both a method for improving relations and an end in itself, Soviet leaders in the early 1980s were keen to highlight the "socialist" character of the new Zimbabwean state. Soviet analyses frankly acknowledged that the capitalist legacy of "three hundred years of imperialist monopoly" on the Zimbabwean economy had not been significantly altered since independence.⁴ As the Director of the Institute of African Studies, Anatoly Gromyko, remarked, "Zimbabwe remains an appendage of the world capitalist economic system that is the cause of its backwardness."⁵ As such, the Zimbabwean regime was never accorded the "socialist-oriented" label.⁶ Yet, Zimbabwe did receive praise from Soviet politicians and press for its "socialist-like" actions.⁷ Most straightforwardly, Soviet commentators did not join the chorus of Western "progressives" who condemned the new state as a bourgeois, neo-colonial regime protecting capitalist interests. On the contrary, *Pravda* declared in 1980 that "with the birth of independent Zimbabwe the conditions have become established for a radical restructuring of the economic structure in southern Africa."⁸ Though careful to warn against

³ As one Soviet observer of southern Africa said bluntly, 'with our alliance with ZAPU, we made a mistake.' (Author's interview with Boris Asoyan, Moscow, October 25, 1990).

⁴ B. Korochantsev, "Zimbabwe: Peremeni Povsudi", *Asiia i Afrika Segodnia*, No. 6, 1986, p. 45; and author's interview with Soviet diplomats (Harare, June-August, 1988 & 1989) and Soviet specialists on Zimbabwe (Moscow, September 1989).

⁵ Gromyko, ed., *Africa: Progress, Problems, Prospects*, p.226.

⁶ Author's interview with Tatyana Krasnopevtseva, (Moscow, March 10, 1991). Dr. Krasnopevtseva is the leading scholar on Zimbabwe in the Soviet Union. For lists of the countries of socialist orientation, see Leonid Fituni, "Ekonomika Stran Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii: Sovremennii Etap", *Asiia i Afrika Segodnia*, No. 5, 1986, p. 21; and Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, pp. 83-84.

⁷ Though the academic literature on Zimbabwe does not accord the "states of socialist orientation" label to the state, many Soviet officials working in Zimbabwe often used the term to describe the government.

⁸ *Pravda*, 19 April 1980, p. 5; and Manchka, *Problems in Africa Today*, p. 246.

overly optimistic expectations,⁹ the Soviet press praised the new minimum wage laws, improvements in social benefits for the masses, the cooperative movement, the resettlement policy, new tax laws, increases in worker participation in industrial decisionmaking, and the government's decision to take control of key industries as indicators of socialist progress in Zimbabwe.¹⁰ A 1982 appraisal, in fact, grossly exaggerated the extent of socialist transformations in the new state, claiming that

The country is now ruled by the government of African majority pursuing a policy of economic and social reforms and nationalization. The government has taken control of banks and major enterprises, mines, and the export of chrome, copper, tin, and other minerals. The monopolies' activities have been heavily restricted.¹¹

Regarding the progressive nature of ZANU(PF), *Pravda* stated in 1985 that "the party headed by R. Mugabe pursues a course of progressive political and socio-economic transformations with the aim of building, in the future, a society free from the exploitation of man by man."¹² Despite criticism at home and abroad, Soviet statements defended ZANU's approach towards socialist development.

The West argues that Zimbabwe's Government show signs of pro-Western bias and defeatist moods. However, this is not so. The Zimbabwe patriots are committed to the ideals which underlay their 7-year fight for liberation.... The Government

⁹ In response to the workers riots in Bulawayo in 1980, Soviet commentators stressed that "we must appreciate that a much longer period is required to transform the economy of the country and to solve all the problems inherited from the imperialist regime....programs (of economic transformation) require money and time to be realized." *Radio Moscow* in Shona, 14 November 1980, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 15 November 1980, p. J3.

¹⁰ See S. Kulik, "Zimbabwe Treads a New Road", *International Affairs*, No. 4, 1982, p. 130, and *Pravda*, August 12, 1985, p. 4, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 32, p.22; and *Radio Moscow*, 30 November 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 2 December 1985, p. J1. For a complete survey of Zimbabwe's political-economy from a Soviet point of view, see chapter 6 of Gromyko, ed., *Krisis Na Yuge Afriki*.

¹¹ *Radio Moscow*, 17 March 1982, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 23 March 1982, p. J3. See also *Pravda*, 19 April 1981, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 23 April 1981, p. J2.

¹² *Pravda*, 2 December 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 3 December 1985, p. J1.

in Zimbabwe is not considering nationalization now but it demands that foreign interests change dramatically their practices. It demands that profits be reinvested in Zimbabwe and foreign assets be kept in Zimbabwean banks. The difficulties Zimbabwe faces are understandable, but events prove that slogans of the jungle war period are still (in force).¹³

On many controversial domestic issues in Zimbabwe, Moscow sided with the ruling ZANU government, often at the expense of its former ally, ZAPU. On the first anniversary of independence, *Pravda* conspicuously downplayed the significance of ZAPU-ZANU tensions, and lauded the success of the new Zimbabwean government in maintaining a stable regime.¹⁴ Soviet commentary regarding ZAPU dissidents and their brutal repression was noticeably mute.¹⁵ When the Soviet government did comment on the violent clashes in Matabeleland, it sided with the government.¹⁶ *Izvestiya* even praised the notorious Fifth Brigade, the Zimbabwean army division responsible for hundreds of innocent deaths during raids through Matabeleland in 1982 and 1983.¹⁷

Finally, the Soviet Union was especially pleased with the "progressive, democratic orientation of Zimbabwe foreign policy".¹⁸ With few exceptions, Zimbabwe shared many UN votes with the USSR during the 1980s, including such controversial votes on the KAL 007 shootdown and the American invasion of Grenada.¹⁹

¹³ Radio Moscow, 30 September 1980, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 2 October 1980, p. J1.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, 19 April 1981, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 23 April 1981, p. J4.

¹⁵ See, for instance, the neutral position taken by Moscow regarding the arrest of Lookout Masuku, the former ZIPRA commander charged with planning a coup. *Radio Moscow*, 12 March 1982, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 23 March 1982, p. J4.

¹⁶ *TASS*, 27 March 1982, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 29 March 1982, p. J1.

¹⁷ *Izvestia*, April 19, 1983, p. 5, in *CDSF*, Vol. XXXV, No. 16, p.18.

¹⁸ Gromyko, ed., *Krisis Na Yuge Afriki*, p. 211.

¹⁹ See *Pravda*, September 15, 1983, p. 5, and Alexei Kiva, "National Liberation Movement: Present Stage" *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 4, 1985, p.3. For a summary of these UN votes see Slipchenko, *In Southern Africa*, chapter 6.

Soviet statements also applauded Zimbabwe's courageous denunciation of American policy toward South Africa.²⁰ Commenting on Mugabe's visit to Moscow in 1985, *Izvestiya* remarked that "the two countries' leaders confirmed the coincidence or similarity of the positions of the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe on the main international problems of the present day."²¹

Until 1987, Soviet commentary also aimed to court favor in Harare by lambasting Western imperialist machinations in southern Africa. Joining in ZANU's own criticism of the Lancaster House constitution since independence, Radio Moscow reported that

Britain and the United States have set barriers to hold back change. Their governments no longer recalled their too-much-to-be-true promises, and have allocated token sums of relief aid. ..Britain and the United States sized up the changes in the former colony with a yardstick that has been made law in the capitalist countries, what matters is taking office. Promise what you want and as much as you need -- only to forget it later.²²

A 1982 article in *International Affairs* even suggested that the Zimbabwean government should expropriate rather than buy land as the restrictions on nationalization outlined at the Lancaster House settlement were "foisted upon Zimbabwe."²³ Through the use of the IMF, the World Bank, and multinational corporations, Soviet analysts warned that the United States, Britain and South Africa still were attempting "to set up a puppet regime" in Zimbabwe "to bring to naught the successes achieved by Zimbabwe's patriots."²⁴ Particularly dangerous was American aid which, according to TASS, is used as "crude blackmail against independent African states in

²⁰ See Vladimir Shubin, "Socialist International and Southern Africa: New Departure?", *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 3, 1985, pp. 14-15. Shubin worked in the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and now heads of the Africa Sector of the International Department of the Central of the CPSU.

²¹ *Izvestiya*, 5 December 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 5 December 1985, p. J6.

²² Radio Moscow, 2 June 1980, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 3 June 1980, J3.

²³ Kulik, "Zimbabwe Treads a New Road", p. 129.

²⁴ Gromyko, ed., *Africa: Progress, Problems, Prospects*, p.227.

an effort to make them follow a policy suitable to the West."²⁵ The Soviet press also accused the West of (1) blocking the formation of a Zimbabwean national army, (2) fomenting domestic unrest, and (3) supporting South African raids into the new independent state.²⁶ As TASS concluded in 1982, "Zimbabwe has been added to the list of independent African countries against which the Reagan administration is pursuing a policy of undeclared war."²⁷

The Soviet Role in Assisting Zimbabwean Socialism

Despite the seemingly confluence of ideas about socialism both at home and abroad, tangible cooperative arrangements between the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe have remained minimal. Diplomatic relations formally were established between the two countries on February 18, 1981,²⁸ but relations did not improve significantly until after Mugabe's visit to Moscow in 1985.²⁹ By that time, General Secretary Gorbachev had succeeded Chernenko, allowing for a firm break with past Soviet allegiances in Zimbabwe.³⁰ During his visit, Mugabe remarked that he and Gorbachev were now "very much closer now in our ideas, assessments and evaluation of

²⁵ TASS, 22 December 1983, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 23 December 1983, p. ; and Leonid Fitnui, "Economic Crisis: Causes, Scope, Tendencies", *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 5, 1985, p. 16.

²⁶ Radio Moscow, 9 June 1980, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 10 June 1980, p. J1; and Soviet Government Statement, in *Pravda*, May 21, 1986, in *CDSP*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 20, p. 25.

²⁷ TASS, 7 April 1982, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 12 April 1982, p. J1.

²⁸ Sharaf Rashidov, alternate member of the CPSU, who represented USSR at the independence celebrations, arrived in Salisbury in April 1980 carrying a request from Prime Minister Kosygin and General Secretary Brezhnev to establish diplomatic relations immediately. The request was denied. See *Izvestia*, April 18, 1980.

²⁹ For an appraisal, see B. Korochantsev, "Zimbabwe: Peremeni Povsudi", p. 48.

³⁰ Author's interview with O. Ndanga, Zimbabwean Ambassador to Moscow at the time, (Harare: July 24, 1988).

issues."³¹ Since 1985, Mugabe has been to Moscow twice again, stating in his last visit that the past has been forgotten.³²

Parallel to the improvement in state-to-state relations has been growing contact on the party-to-party level. The 1984 ZANU(PF) Congress was attended by a high-level delegation from the CPSU,³³ while ZANU attended the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress.³⁴ During Mugabe's 1985 visit a Protocol on Party-to-Party relations was signed which established a framework for regular party exchanges.³⁵ In praising these party contacts, Mugabe noted that "our party has chosen Marxism-Leninism for its leading ideology for the construction of a new society; the historic experience of the CPSU is of abiding significance to us."³⁶ That ZANU(PF) members meet with the CPSU delegations on a regular basis elevates the Zimbabwean Party to a similar status as FRELIMO and the MPLA.

Beyond providing socialist inspiration, advice and a model for emulation³⁷ (that is, before the recent collapse of the Soviet system), Moscow has had few other instruments to build relations. Though shared ideas of Marxism-Leninism may have made the Soviet

³¹ Robert Mugabe, statement issued in a press conference in Moscow, TASS, 4 December 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 5 December 1985, p. J3.

³² Interview with Third Secretary of Soviet Embassy in Zimbabwe, (Harare: July 19, 1988).

³³ Politburo member Boris Ponomarev led the delegation. See *Pravda*, August 8, 1984, p. 4.

³⁴ See *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 17, No. 7, July 1986, p. 16.

³⁵ *Radio Moscow*, 3 December 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 4 December 1985, p. J2.

³⁶ TASS, 26 November 1986, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 4 December 1986, p. J1

³⁷ According to *Izvestiya*, "We feel close to and understand the socialist goals proclaimed by the ZANU-PF party at its second congress. It is obvious that Zimbabwe is also interested in our experience in socialist building and in the utilization of the fundamental advantages of socialism in our advance along the path of Great October." *Izvestiya*, 4 December 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 4 December 1985, p. J3. See the similar remarks made by Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov at a dinner for a visiting Zimbabwean delegation as reported on *Radio Moscow*, 2 December 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 3 December 1985, p. J5.

Union a "natural ally" of Zimbabwe,³⁸ the realities of the Zimbabwean economy have defined an ancillary role for the Soviet Union in the concrete development of the state. Compared with other African countries, Soviet bilateral assistance for Zimbabwe has been negligible. Different from any socialist leaning country in Africa, no major Soviet projects have been initiated in Zimbabwe.

Relations have improved since 1985, but on different terms than past Soviet assistance. In the short term, perestroika in the Soviet Union had a direct impact on the attitudes and structures of Soviet assistance to Zimbabwe. According to one Soviet official at the Soviet Trade Mission in Harare, past Soviet assistance programs were structured around political objectives; present programs aim at develop profitable economic ties.³⁹ This new orientation is reflected in recent Soviet structural reforms in the mechanisms for Soviet economic reactions abroad. First, in January 1989, the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry has been merged with the Soviet State Commission for Projects (the Soviet equivalent of U.S. AID), thereby closely linking Soviet aid projects with trade opportunities.⁴⁰ Even more dramatically, as of April 1989, Soviet enterprises have been allowed to conduct bilateral relations with foreign companies independent of the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry. These reforms at home have been accompanied by more aggressive negotiations for better trade arrangements with the Zimbabwean government. During Mugabe's visit to Moscow, pledges were made to expand economic relations, and agreements on economic and technical cooperation were signed.⁴¹ These agreements resulted in the

³⁸ Robert Mugabe, as quoted in Pyotr Manchka, *Problems in Africa Today*, p. 249.

³⁹ Author's interview with Lev Shulakov, Commercial Officer of the USSR Trade Representation in the Republic of Zimbabwe, (Harare, June 28, 1989).

⁴⁰ Author's interview with Valeri Selin, USSR Trade Representation in the Republic of Zimbabwe, (Harare, June 28, 1989). Much of the material in this paragraph is from the interviews with Selin and Shulakov.

⁴¹ See *Izvestiya*, 5 December 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 5 December 1985, p. J6. The first trade agreement between Zimbabwe and the Soviet Union was not signed until January 18, 1984, almost four years after independence.

opening of the Soviet Economic Mission in 1986, and the beginning of the Soviet-Zimbabwean Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific Cooperation, a commission charged with stimulating economic contacts between the two countries.⁴²

Thus far, these reforms and initiatives have produced more hope than actual trade. Soviet officials list canned meat, tea, maize, condensed milk, baby food, footwear, ready made suits, paints, batteries, and cables as products which Soviet contractors are eager to import, while Zimbabwe would like to acquire mining equipment and technology, tractors, machine tools, medical supplies, basic oils, and petrol from the Soviet Union. Two major impediments, however, still constrain the trade. First, the two countries have yet to find an effective mechanism for exchange. As both countries are short of hard currency, alternative arrangements to cash payments such as barter or counter trade must be devised. The second barrier is the saturation of the Zimbabwean economy with Western investment and Western products. Soviet trade officials recognize the difficulties in breaking into this market, but feel confident that several of their products (i.e., tractors) are competitive if allowed market entry.⁴³ In the field of joint-ventures, to date only one project has been negotiated, an agreement with Bonded Warehouse for the assembly of Soviet machinery tools.⁴⁴

Military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe may be a final area expanding relations in the future. In the early years of independence any contact with Soviet military personnel

⁴² See "Pact Signed with the Soviets", *Financial Gazette*, (Harare), June 3, 1989.

⁴³ Author's interviews with Lev Shulakov, (1989). and Alexander Lutov, Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, Zimbabwe, (Harare: July 28, 1989).

⁴⁴ In the works are joint-ventures for the production of the Soviet jeeps and tractors in Zimbabwe. Negotiations also have been initiated regarding the building of a macro-centers for eye and orthopedic surgery, two technologies for which the Soviet Union is world-renowned. Soviet officials have made bids for the reconstruction and retooling of Zisco steel, and a large hydroelectric plant on Lake Kariba. See Victor Sokolov, Counsellor of the USSR Embassy, Harare, "Soviet Foreign Policy: A Reply to Nabudere", *Southern Africa: Political and Economic Monthly*, No. 11, August 1988, p. 9; "Zim, USSR to Strengthen Trade and Economic Ties", *Financial Gazette*, June 9, 1989.

was deemed a threat to Zimbabwean national security as ZANU feared the possibility of military putsch by the more sophisticated and Soviet trained ZIPRA soldiers. Though ZIPRA boasted the only qualified black pilots in the new country, Mugabe's suspicion of these ZAPU cadres compelled him to employ white Rhodesian pilots in the Zimbabwean air force at the expense of the ZIPRA pilots. The discovery of ZIPRA caches of Soviet weapons in Matabeleland, and a personal letter from Dabengwa to Soviet General Secretary Andropov lamenting at the lack of socialist progress in Zimbabwe further fueled suspicions that ZIPRA was planning a Soviet-backed coup.

The new regime in Moscow and the reaffirmed prowess of ZANU(PF) after the 1985 elections created more propitious conditions for talks about military cooperation between the two countries. Though relations are still in their nascent stages, the Soviet Union has begun to train Zimbabwean pilots again, as well as more limited training of Zimbabwean infantry.⁴⁵ During Prime Minister Mugabe's visit to Moscow in 1985, Soviet and Zimbabwean leaders discussed plans for the purchase of Soviet weapons, including the sale of the highly-sophisticated MiG-29 to Zimbabwe.⁴⁶

Conclusion

In the first decade of independence, the Soviet Union failed to make a serious dent in international capital's economic hegemony in Zimbabwe. Rhetoric aside, the Soviet Union has played a marginal role in the socio-economic organization of Zimbabwe. Diplomatic relations, joint party conferences, and limited trade do not lead to revolutionary transformations. Soviet cooption of Zimbabwe never got started.

⁴⁵ Author's interview Colonel Nikolai Shestakov, Military and Air Attache, Embassy of the USSR, (Harare, September 1, 1988).

⁴⁶ See Paris AFP, 4 December 1985, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 5 December 1985, p. J1. Though the details of these discussions were not disclosed the company present at the meetings, including Mugabe, Defense Minister Ernest Kadungare and Security Minister Emmerson Munangagwa for the Zimbabwean delegation, and Soviet deputy defense minister, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev and Konstantine Katushev, head of the Soviet government's office which handles arms sales, indicate that arms transfers definitely were discussed.

Given the recent changes within the Soviet Union, past rationales for increased cooperation based on socialist solidarity now sound arcane. Ironically, under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union now espouses many capitalist principles and slogans but still possesses an intransigent socialist economy, while Zimbabwe's government employs socialist phrases, but still governs a capitalist economy. Under such circumstances, the Soviet Union is likely to play a very small role in promotion of either socialism or capitalism in Zimbabwe.

II. United States Policy Towards Zimbabwe Since Independence

The Lancaster House agreement contained all the requisite clauses to protect American and international capitalism's interests in an independent Zimbabwe. Most importantly, the accord protected property rights established under the Rhodesian regime. Though white farmers had expropriated more than half of all Zimbabwean land, and almost all of the top grade land by means of draconian and racist laws, these farmers were allowed under Lancaster to keep this land until they voluntarily decided to sell. Moreover, this same white minority was allocated 20% of the seats in parliament, although they represented less than 2 % of the population. Finally, international investments, the declared enemy of the new government only a year before, were protected from nationalization. If the new Zimbabwean government wanted to carry out its socialist program, it would have to break the terms of the peace settlement.

While surprised by ZANU's election victory,⁴⁷ Mugabe's plea for national reconciliation, pragmatism, and friendly relations with all countries helped to alleviate American fears concerning

⁴⁷ American foreign policymakers thought that a coalition of Nkomo, Smith, and Muzorewa would acquire enough seats in parliament to form a government, independent of the "radical" ZANU candidates. This idea was nurtured by Lord Soames' (the British transitional head of state in Zimbabwe) unstated ABM policy -- "anyone but Mugabe." Most white Rhodesians were shocked by Mugabe's resounding victory. See Richard Moose, "The New Situation in Zimbabwe", *Current Policy*, No. 155, March 27, 1980, (Washington: US State Department, p.1; and author's interview with a Chris Anderson, a former Minister in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe government, (Harare, July 19, 1989).

his socialist tendencies.⁴⁸ Though bilateral relations between the two countries have faced several strains, Zimbabwe's basic orientation toward Western markets, Western investment, and a Western-style market economy has remained intact, if not strengthened, since independence.

American Attitudes and Objectives

The premises of American policy towards Zimbabwe can be summed up in three principles: the promotion of (1) capitalism, (2) multi-party democracy, and (3) support for the United States regarding international issues. In pursuit of these interests, American diplomats have used a combination of lucrative incentives and debilitating rebuffs to influence the Zimbabwean polity. While American officials have been somewhat successful in fostering a friendly atmosphere in Zimbabwe for free enterprise, the latter two objectives have proven to be much more difficult to achieve.

Market Capitalism

Especially after Ronald Reagan's election, following just seven months after Mugabe's, the United States unabashedly proclaimed that the promotion of capitalism in Zimbabwe was one of its central foreign policy objectives in the region.⁴⁹

Zimbabwe will recover from present economic adversity if it maintains sound economic policies, works closely with the IMF during this time of adjustment, offers incentives to the private sector, provides favorably [sic] climate foreign investment, and manages its budget prudently...⁵⁰

⁴⁸ See Cyrus Vance, testimony, in *Aid to Zimbabwe*, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Congress, second session, September 23, 1980, (Washington: GPO, 1980), p. 8; and *The Impact of U.S. Foreign Policy in Seven African Countries*, report of a congressional study mission to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 1984, (Washington: GPO, 1984), p. 20.

⁴⁹ In an interview with George Shultz, the former Secretary of State stated that it was a general and primary policy objective to promote free markets and capitalist enterprise throughout the Third World. (Author's interview, Stanford: March 7, 1989).

⁵⁰ Frank Wisner, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, testimony, in *Zimbabwe: Four Years of Independence; An Assessment*, hearings, subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, second session, May 24, 1984, (Washington: GPO, 1984),

In promoting a capitalist-oriented economy in Zimbabwe, American policymakers stressed the particular importance of promoting and maintaining foreign investment in Zimbabwe, the strongest mechanism for linking the developing economy to the developed Western capitalist system.⁵¹ As Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Frank Wisner exclaimed in extolling the virtues of Heinz Corporation's investment in Zimbabwe,

...there is no better encouragement to needed foreign investors than the example of an existing and mutually beneficial arrangement. H.J. Heinz, which represents the largest new investment since Zimbabwe's independence, is such an example. We want to see more, and we are doing our part to encourage such investment.⁵²

The Heinz-Olivine project, however, has been the only major new American investment in Zimbabwe since independence, a major cause of concern for American policymakers. Zimbabwe's reluctance to adopt investment policies acceptable to the United States has been one of the leading sources of tension in bilateral relations. First, American diplomatic officials have criticized Zimbabwe's stringent remittance restrictions which allow foreign companies operating in Zimbabwe before independence to take out only 50% of their profits while companies which invested after independence have been allowed only 25%. According to U.S. government observers, this policy stifled foreign investment growth.⁵³ Second, American officials have reproached the government for

p. 17.

⁵¹ Author's interview with a senior official at US Agency for International Development, (Harare, July 21, 1988).

⁵² Frank Wisner, *Zimbabwe: Four Years of Independence*, p. 7.

⁵³ *IBID.*, p. 18. From the American prospective, Zimbabwe's policy toward investment does not enjoy widespread popularity either in the Party or society. While Finance Minister Chidzero is perceived as the leading force promoting increased investment, President Mugabe is seen as the reluctant socialist, being dragged into accepting the economic realities of the Zimbabwean economy. Mugabe's feelings are understandable. For years as a liberation leader, foreign companies operating in Rhodesia symbolized the organic relationship between the enemy minority regime and the Western world. Mugabe and other leftist members of ZANU(PF) have taken foreign investment to be one of the issues on which they would prove their progressive credentials. For a comprehensive discussion of these politics, see Jeffrey Herbst, "Policy Formation and Implementation in Zimbabwe", Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1988.

promoting the outflow of capital, particularly from South African companies. However politically correct, this capital drain forfeits jobs and must be paid for in foreign currency.⁵⁴ Third, American diplomats in Harare persistently urged Zimbabwe to develop a comprehensive investment code, and sign international agreements on investment guarantees such as OPIC.⁵⁵ Finally, American statesmen have cautioned the Zimbabwean government about excessive rhetorical statements about "socialism," arguing that such proclamations have "left doubts in the minds of investors" about the security of doing business in Zimbabwe.⁵⁶

The obvious flipside of promoting private enterprise and capitalist economy linked to the West is the containment of socialist proclivities of the Zimbabwean government. To deter the ascendance of "radical" elements both within and outside of the Zimbabwean government, U.S. policymakers have sought to promote sustained and stable economic growth, their consummate formula for minimizing socialist expansion. Immediately after independence, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance warned that if West failed to help Mugabe sustain growth levels, "others within his party critical of him for not having adopted Marxism more militantly will say 'Throw him out. Let us go the other route. Let us turn to the Soviet Union. Let us turn to the Eastern Bloc.'"⁵⁷ Ambassador Harriman struck a similar cautionary note;

A prosperous and successful Zimbabwe can have a very important influence and effect on that outcome [developments in southern Africa]. If Mr. Mugabe is not able to make a success of it, should he fail, which I don't like even to consider but one

⁵⁴ Author's interviews R.N. Brenchley, Senior Manager, Corporate Finance, Standard Chartered Merchant Bank Zimbabwe, (Harare, July 19, 1988), and Ed Fugit, (Harare: July 10, 1988).

⁵⁵ Author's interview the author with Gerry Galucci, First Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, (Harare, Zimbabwe, July 11, 1988). The Zimbabwean government eventually announced a new investment code in 1989, as discussed in the following section.

⁵⁶ Frank Wisner, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, in *Zimbabwe: Four Years of Independence*, p. 17. See also Colin Legum, "Zimbabwe's Socialism Frightens Off Foreign Investors, But Not H.J. Heinz", *Third World Reports*, No. DY.2., 5th October 1984.

⁵⁷ Vance, testimony, in *Aid to Zimbabwe* (1980), p.9.

has to look at the realities, there is no doubt that the Russians can and will move in.⁵⁸

American officials also considered Zimbabwe's economic growth to be an important engine for expansion in southern Africa as a whole.⁵⁹

Liberal Democracy

In addition to American economic interests in Zimbabwe, as a trading and investment partner, as a catalyst for growth in the region, the United States also has expressed interest in fostering democracy in Zimbabwe as a model for the region. As Richard Moose explained on the eve of Zimbabwean independence, "I think if we make this [Zimbabwean] system work, if we help make it work, there will be peace and stability in that area and that will contribute very importantly to a similar result in other countries nearby."⁶⁰ In a similar vein, Andrew Young hoped that South Africa would "learn the lesson of Zimbabwe," while Cyrus Vance added that progress in Zimbabwe "can have a positive effect in South Africa."⁶¹ American promotion of a multi-party democracy, however, has been at direct odds with ZANU's own declared objective of a one-party state. While American officials applauded the Unity Agreement signed between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU as an important step towards national reconciliation, they also positively though quietly acknowledged the formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, or ZUM, headed by former ZANU General Secretary Edgar Tekere, as a healthy step towards developing a multi-party system in Zimbabwe.⁶²

⁵⁸ Averill Harriman, testimony, in *IBID.* p. 7.

⁵⁹ Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, March 26, 1982, as quoted in *CSIS Africa Notes*, November 15, 1983, p. 7.

⁶⁰ Richard Moose, testimony, in *Results of the Recent Elections in Zimbabwe*, hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, March 27, 1980, (Washington: GPO, 1980), p. 36.

⁶¹ Cyrus Vance, in *Aid to Zimbabwe*, p. 15.

⁶² The Zimbabwean government has adopted an aggressive policy against the new party, including harassment of its leaders, banning the party's political rallies, and slandering party members in the media. As part of the slander campaign, the government has claimed that ZUM is funded by the CIA.

To promote pluralism more generally, the United States actively has promoted other forms of political organizations not controlled directly by the government or party such as independent trade unions, student groups, business organizations, and even cooperatives.⁶³ The United States also condemned the violent government attacks on "dissidents" in Matabeleland in the early years of Zimbabwe's existence,⁶⁴ and urged the Zimbabwean government not to silence the independent press in the wake of "Willowgate", a major scandal involving top-level Zimbabwean ministers in the illegal sale and purchase of imported automobiles.

International Issues

While relations between the United States and Zimbabwe have suffered due to different conceptions of democracy and human rights, the most damaging disagreements between the two countries have emerged in international forums. Though Zimbabwe may be economically dependent on the West, and politically constrained by the terms of the Lancaster House agreement, Zimbabwean leaders have maintained their freedom of expression in denouncing "American imperialism", "U.S. neocolonial aggression" and "capitalist terrorism". In the United Nations, Zimbabwe voted against the United States regarding the American invasion of Grenada, the American bombing of Libya, and the U.S. stance regarding sanctions against South Africa, while abstaining on a resolution censuring

Consequently, the United States government has been very careful in distinguishing between support for multi-party elections as a concept, and supporting ZUM as a party.

⁶³ Through a special program run by the United States Information Agency, eminent private individuals from Zimbabwe are sent to the United States to meet businessmen, politicians, and academics in the United States. The aim of the program, as discerned by two persons interviewed by the author who participated in the program, is to highlight the positive aspect of American society and to encourage business and private links between Americans and Zimbabweans.

⁶⁴ Vice-President George Bush discussed American concern for human rights violations during his visit to Zimbabwe in 1982. U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe Robert Keely delivered letter to the foreign affairs ministry with over 80 congressional signatures deploring the ethnic violence. (See "Civil Rights and Security Problems", in *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 23, No. 24, December 1, 1982, p. 3).

the Soviet shootdown of the Korean jetliner 007.⁶⁵ American diplomats also claimed that Zimbabwe used its position as the head of the Non-Aligned Movement to stoke anti-American rhetoric.⁶⁶ When Zimbabwe did not condemn the Soviet shootdown of the Korean jetliner, American assistance to Zimbabwe was cut from \$75 to \$45 million.⁶⁷ More dramatically, U.S. aid to Zimbabwe was terminated completely after a Zimbabwean diplomat denounced American policy toward South Africa during a July 4th celebration in Harare attended by former President Carter. While stubborn at first, Zimbabwean officials have responded to these American concerns. In sharp contrast to the 1986 fiasco, the 1988 July 4th celebration, coming only days after an American naval vessel shot down the Iranian Airbus, was observed by the Zimbabwean Foreign Ministry with praise for American democracy and a personal note of congratulations from President Mugabe to President Reagan.⁶⁸

Instruments of American Power

Since independence, America's greatest weapon for promoting free enterprise has been economic aid. Kissinger actually initiated this strategy as early as 1976, offering \$ 2 billion for the reconstruction of the new state and resettlement of whites in Zimbabwe and abroad. At Lancaster, the offer was amended to be used exclusively for buying farms from white owners for the resettlement of African farmers.⁶⁹

The Reagan Administration, however, refused to abide by these informal agreements, instead offering aid to those projects which

⁶⁵ Edward Girardet, "Zimbabwe:land of contradictions", *Christian Science Monitor*, September 8, 1986.

⁶⁶ *The Impact of U.S. Foreign Policy in Seven African Countries*, p. 20.

⁶⁷ See Sheila Rule, "Zimbabwe Says It 'Won't Be Moved'", *New York Times*, September 4, 1986; and Carol Lancaster, "U.S. Aid to Africa: Who Gets What, When and How", *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 25, March 31, 1984, p. 6.

⁶⁸ See "Mugabe Salutes US Leader", *The Herald*, July 5, 1988.

⁶⁹ Author's interview with Kingman Brewster, former American Ambassador to England during the negotiations of the Lancaster House agreement, (Oxford: June 16, 1988).

promoted capitalism in Zimbabwe.⁷⁰ As Chester Crocker explained, "We are fully aware that in Zimbabwe, as in other developing countries, the reputation of capitalism has suffered by association with colonialism. But the past need not be prolonged."⁷¹ Similarly, a U.S. AID report concluded that aid should be used

to stabilize a moderate Government by increasing its capacity to deal with immediate post-war problems. The assistance would help the government demonstrate its effectiveness to its own people. If, in the process the assistance could support the effort of the white-dominated bureaucracy and economy, and present a symbol of multiracial democracy for Southern Africa to follow, then these would be important secondary accomplishments.⁷²

Coded in the rhetoric of "moderation" and "stability", American policymakers wanted to insure that the self-proclaimed socialist government would be only that, proclamatory, without threatening private property rights.

This philosophy towards American assistance was reflected in the type of projects funded and the process by in which funds were provided. Of the \$250 million pledged by the United States at ZIMCORD, \$50 million was allotted for a commodity-import programme (CIP) which assisted the private sector in accessing needed import inputs.⁷³ As of 1989, ninety per cent of these funds have gone to the private sector.⁷⁴ Regarding this process, American

⁷⁰ Author's interview with Pamela Hussey, Deputy Director, Southern Africa Regional Programs, USAID, Harare, Zimbabwe, (July 22, 1988).

⁷¹ *The Impact of U.S. Foreign Policy on Seven African Countries*, pp. 24. Similarly, the Chief Executive Officer of Heinz Co. believes that "One of the unfortunate legacies of the colonial era is the mistrust with which African states view private enterprise." A.J.F. O'Reilly, "Africa and the Private Sector", *The Voice, SADCC/PTA*, (Harare), vol. 2, No. 1, March 1988, p.11.

⁷² U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Aid to Zimbabwe: An Evaluation*, AID Program Evaluation No. 9, August 1983, p. 2. Emphasis added.

⁷³ See Martin Rushmere, "Zimbabwe Survey", *African Business*, May 1982, p. 63.

⁷⁴ "Backgrounder: U.S.A.I.D. Program in Zimbabwe", U.S. AID Mission, Harare, Zimbabwe, May 4, 1989, p. 1. See also Caleb Rossiter, "The Conflict of Development and Diplomacy: American Assistance to Southern Africa, 1973-1981", (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell

officials have sought a role in Zimbabwe's macroeconomic planning in return for their disbursements of aid and loans.⁷⁵ On several occasions, American advisors have attended planning sessions at the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development. More directly, the World Bank has made "recommendations" to the Zimbabwean government regarding national economic planning which must be followed in order to receive loans from this lending institution. World Bank validation is also critical in acquiring loans from private institutions.

If communism's most fertile ground has been economic uncertainty, political instability, and a country governed by proclaimed marxist-leninists, aid from the West was considered a major prophylactic against the spread of these conditions.⁷⁶

Today, as 3 years ago, there are alternative paths among which Zimbabwe has a choice. Prime Minister Mugabe has chosen to build on a free democratic system and a mixed economy. In order for this formula to succeed, the West must now be willing to commit itself to Zimbabwe's economic rebuilding and expansion -- just as we earlier committed ourselves to help end the fighting.

If we do not join the others to meet Zimbabwe's needs, opportunists and ideologues, both within and outside that country, will claim their day. Should this occur, Zimbabwe's path will then parallel that of other African governments now seeking to restore their economies from the disastrous consequences of their experiment with the Marxist model....In sum, the best bet the Soviets have for a second chance in Zimbabwe would be the failure of the West to support the course on which the Government of Zimbabwe has embarked."⁷⁷

Similarly, the head of the American delegation to the first Zimbabwean independence day celebrations likened American assistance to Zimbabwe to that given to Greece and Turkey at the end of World War II, aid designed to bring these countries back into the Western, market-oriented community of nations.⁷⁸

Aid to Zimbabwe also was considered a "good investment" in the

University, 1983), pp. 307-310.

⁷⁵ Author's interview with Pamela Hussey, (1988).

⁷⁶ USAID/Zimbabwe -- Southern Africa Regional Program, "U.S. Interests in Southern Africa", (memo, no date).

⁷⁷ Cyrus Vance, in *Aid to Zimbabwe* pp. 3-4.

⁷⁸ Averill Harriman, in *IBID.* p. 9.

early years of independence. To complement the Reagan Administration's attitude towards assistance as a mechanism for improving private enterprise, American aid in the 1980s became increasingly performance oriented. As Zimbabwe boasted a relatively industrialized economy, a sound infrastructure and a considerable pool of trained personnel, money invested there yielded much higher returns than similar levels of investment in other less-developed African countries.⁷⁹ Underwriting infrastructure development and seed capital for local industries, rather than hunger or shelter projects, would then foster opportunities for increasing American investment into the country.⁸⁰ Additionally, the United States government has invested in Zimbabwe's long-term economic and social growth by funding major training and education programs, housing and agricultural projects, and medical assistance.⁸¹

These philosophies toward aid in bilateral relations with Zimbabwe also are reflected in American assistance programs for the Southern African Development Coordinating Committee, SADCC, to which the United States is a major contributor and Zimbabwe is a major recipient.⁸² A U.S. AID report on SADCC concluded that

In the long-run, the private sector, operating on free market principles, is the key to improved export performance. The United States firmly supports recent initiatives by SADCC to bring business organizations into the mainstream of economic planning..⁸³

⁷⁹ *IBID.* p. 10.

⁸⁰ Chester Crocker, "The Role of U.S. Private Sector in Zimbabwe", New York, 26 March 1982, as quoted in Lee Cokorinos and James H. Mittelman, "Reagan and the Pax Afrikaana", p. 570. The United States has on occasion, however, provided food to Zimbabwe under P.L. 480. See "Backgrounder: U.S.A.I.D. Program in Zimbabwe", U.S. AID Mission, Harare, Zimbabwe, May 4, 1989, p. 2.

⁸¹ See "Backgrounder: U.S.A.I.D. Program in Zimbabwe", U.S. AID Mission, Harare, Zimbabwe, May 4, 1989, in *passim*.

⁸² Between 1980-1986, the United States pledged \$74 million for SADCC projects. Author's interview Pamela Hussey, (1988).

⁸³ USAID/Zimbabwe -- Southern Africa Regional Program, "U.S. Interests in Southern Africa", (memo, no date), pp. 2-3.

In February 1987, U.S. A.I.D. Director McPherson announced the "Initiative for Economic Progress in Southern Africa," a program whereby the United States would provide \$93 million over several years to "support private sector-oriented economic policy reform in selected countries' [to] promote interregional and private investment; and support priority regional transportation projects."⁸⁴ In reporting on the success of this program, a government review reported that "The US has fashioned grants to encourage economic policy reforms to benefit the private sector and has sought to design mechanisms (such as a pre-financing revolving fund) for intraregional trade."⁸⁵

Trade and Foreign Investment

Despite the American philosophy towards aid, the initial outlays of U.S. assistance has resulted in few tangible economic returns for the American economy. By 1988, trade between Zimbabwe and the United States had risen to \$161 million, making the United States Zimbabwe's fourth leading trading partner after South Africa, Great Britain and West Germany.⁸⁶ Principle U.S. exports to Zimbabwe included aircraft, computers, farm equipment, synthetic fibers, and packaging materials while major imports are ferrochrome, nickel, coffee, sugar, textiles and clothing.⁸⁷ Roughly 45 American companies have direct investments in Zimbabwe worth \$150 million, but only \$22 million of this total has been invested since independence. The Heinz investment in Olivine Oils, an arrangement in which Heinz owns 51% and government owns 49%, represents \$20 million of this sum. Other potential investors still fear the lack of an OPIC agreement and severe remittances

⁸⁴"Southern Africa Progress Initiative", *Gist*, April 1987, p. 2.

⁸⁵ Southern African Development Coordination Conference", *Gist*, (US State Department), November 1987, p. 7.

⁸⁶ United States Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe, "Economic Trends Report for Zimbabwe", March 1989, (mimeo), p. 10. In 1983, the United States was the third leading trading partner, to be surpassed only recently by West Germany. See *Zimbabwe: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series, (Washington: GPO, 1983), p. 230.

⁸⁷ United States Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe, "Economic Trends Report for Zimbabwe", March 1989, (mimeo), p. 1.

restrictions.⁸⁸

Security Assistance

The United States neither stations troops in, sells arms to, or provides for the security of Zimbabwe.⁸⁹ Ironically, however, despite Zimbabwe's self-proclaimed marxist-leninist orientation, officers of the Zimbabwean National Army are trained by the British and the Americans, not the Soviets or Chinese.⁹⁰ Beginning in 1988, a limited number of Zimbabweans enrolled in U.S. military academies for four years of training.⁹¹ Though cooperation between the two countries probably will grow beyond training, that cordial relations even exist is recognized by American defense officials as a positive development.

CONCLUSION

Since independence, the United States has pursued a cooptive strategy for dealing with the "marxist-leninist" ZANU regime. Diplomatic relations, economic assistance and foreign investment are tools of cooption, not confrontation. The Reagan Administration did not hesitate to put a coercive twist on its constructive engagement of Zimbabwe, including most significantly the end of all economic assistance in 1986. These economic sanctions, however, were never designed to overthrow Mugabe's regime. Rather, they were employed to induce more "acceptable" behavior from the Zimbabwean regime. Already entrenched within the capitalist system by the terms of the Lancaster House agreement, overthrowing the Zimbabwean regime was not necessary.

III. Zimbabwe Under ZANU: The Revolution That Never Was

⁸⁸ *IBID.* p. 2.

⁸⁹ For a comprehensive review of Zimbabwe's national defense capabilities, see chapter five of *Zimbabwe: A Country Study*.

⁹⁰ The North Koreans also have been involved in training the National Army, though the activities of the infamous 5th Brigade trained by the North Koreans, have tainted military cooperation between the two countries since. Subsequently, the entire 5th Brigade was retrained by British officers.

⁹¹ See "Three Defence Force Men Leave for US Training", *The Sunday Mail*, July 31, 1988

Rhetoric and reality radically diverged in post-independence Zimbabwe. While the ruling party, ZANU(PF), has claimed to be guided by marxism-leninism and governed by the principles of democratic centralism in the pursuit of socialism, the Zimbabwean economy has remained capitalist oriented, white dominated, and heavily penetrated by multinational corporations. These contradictions have been formed and conditioned by the process by which the revolutionary situation in Zimbabwe ended. Mugabe did not build his government from scratch, but rather moved into the state structures erected by the Rhodesian state, and fortified by the nature of the transition to independence and the terms of the peace agreement. Maintenance of the ancien regime insured the continuation of capitalist practices guaranteed by state intervention. Continuity of state and economic structures during the transition to independence also preserved Zimbabwe's ties to the Western economic system. International capitalism, the most hated and despised enemy of the liberation movements in the 1970s, was now a force catered to in the 1980s.

ZANU Ideology and Objectives

Over the past decade, Prime Minister Mugabe (he became President in 1986) repeatedly identified the creation of a new socialist state guided by marxism-leninism as the overriding goal of the government and party.

Transformation is central to ZANU (PF) policy. It means substantive change from one state of affairs to another. It is the essence of the Leninist qualitative change as a result of the persistent, perpetual, inexorable clash of opposites until the preordained mutual annihilation of conflict occurs.⁹²

The first Zimbabwean government statement on economic policy, *Growth with Equity*, explicitly stated in its preamble that the plan "is directed towards the attainment of a socialist and egalitarian society to which the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe is committed."⁹³ This economic outline further cited the ownership

⁹² "The History of ZANU (PF)", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1983, p. 1.

⁹³ Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, *Growth with Equity: An Economic Policy Statement*, February 1981, p. 1.

of the means of production by the few and the foreign domination and control of major Zimbabwean assets as ills of the inherited state which had to be treated.⁹⁴ A follow-up economic programme, the *Transitional Development Plan*, declared that "the structure of property relationship has to be transformed in Zimbabwe in order to create the basis of a socialist order."⁹⁵ Finally, *The First Five Year-Plan National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, stated that "the fundamental goal and aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe is the establishment and development of a democratic, egalitarian and socialist society".⁹⁶ Statements committing Zimbabwe to the socialist path were reaffirmed at the Second ZANU(PF) Party Congress; "The central thrust and object of Government policy has been and remains the achievement of a socialist, egalitarian and fully democratic society in Zimbabwe. We seek to transform the inherited economy and the existing social relations of production in favour of oppressed masses of our workers and peasants."⁹⁷ The 1985 ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto also pledged to "reconstruct and restructure the national economy with the goal of bringing about the victory of socialism over capitalism and thereby ending the exploitation of man by man."⁹⁸ At least rhetorically, ZANU remained committed to building socialism in Zimbabwe after independence.

Plans, Mechanisms, and Tools for the Transformation to Socialism

The Vanguard Party

According to ZANU, the creation of a marxist-leninist party,

⁹⁴ *IBID.* pp. 2-3.

⁹⁵ *Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/3-194/5*, (Harare: Government Printer, November 1982), Vol. 1, p. 17.

⁹⁶ *The First Five Year-Plan: National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, Vol. I, (Harare: Government Printer, April 1986), p. 10.

⁹⁷ "ZANU(PF) Central Committee Report", Second Congress, presented by Robert Mugabe, 8th August 1984, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 1985, p. 24.

⁹⁸ "ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto, 1985", p. 7. For a content analysis of ZANU candidate's references to socialism during the elections, see Christine Sylvester, "Zimbabwe's 1985 Elections", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 1986, pp. 229-255.

which would "forge and sustain a permanent alliance between workers, peasant, progressive and patriotic forces," was central to achieving socialism in Zimbabwe.⁹⁹ In the tradition of other Leninist states, Zimbabwe's leaders promoted the "leading role of the Party" as the principle mechanism for insuring socialist development.¹⁰⁰ To construct a vanguard party, ZANU first had to "deepen its understanding of Marxism-Leninism."¹⁰¹ To this end, the Chitepo Ideological College was established for the training of a "vanguard contingent of cadres," and a "Leadership Code" was adopted to regulate anti-socialist practices.¹⁰² Second, the Party had to adhere to the principles of democratic centralism, "the fundamental tenet in the internal functioning and administration of the Party."¹⁰³ Finally, and most controversially, Zimbabwe had to become a one-party state. Though specifically forbidden by Article 21 of the Lancaster House Constitution,¹⁰⁴ Mugabe worked towards this objective for the first ten years after independence.¹⁰⁵ In rejecting a multi-party system as a "waste of taxpayer's money,"¹⁰⁶ Mugabe asserted that "Only when there is one Zimbabwe People with One Leader will

⁹⁹ "ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto, 1985", p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ *IBID.* p. 7. See also ZANU Resolutions, Second Congress, 8th August 1984, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 1985, p. 32.

¹⁰¹ "ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto, 1985", p. 7.

¹⁰² See ZANU Resolutions, Second Congress, 8th August 1984, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 1985, p. 32; and *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 1985, pp. 38-39.

¹⁰³ "ZANU Resolutions," Second Congress, p. 32.

¹⁰⁴ Under the Lancaster House agreement, the Constitution could not be amended until 1990.

¹⁰⁵ See the interview with Mugabe in "Survey on Zimbabwe", *Financial Times*, April 22, 1980. For a survey of ZANU statements in favor of a one-party state, see William Shaw, "Towards the One-Party State in Zimbabwe: A Study in African Political Thought", *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1986, pp. 373-394.

¹⁰⁶ Mugabe, interview with Australian Television, April 8, 1981. Reprinted in *Robert Gabriel Mugabe: Prime Minister of Zimbabwe*, pamphlet, (Harare, no date), p. 5.

a scientific re-organisation of society along socialist lines be possible."¹⁰⁷ The ZANU-ZAPU unity agreement in December 1987, the convincing victory of ZANU in the national elections in April 1990, and the expiration of the ten-year clause of the Lancaster House accords have created propitious conditions for realizing Mugabe's quest.¹⁰⁸ At a time when the entire world system is being transformed by the demands for multi-party democracies, Zimbabwe was one of the few states in the world (if not the only state) abandoning a multi-party system in favor of one-party rule.¹⁰⁹

Economic Planning

In addition to the vanguard party, a second major mechanism for the implementation of socialism in Zimbabwe is the national economic plan, a mechanism considered as a "direct necessity to transform the socio-economic conditions of the broad masses of the people."¹¹⁰ Like five-year plans in other socialist countries, the introduction to the first volume of the *First Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, stated that the "Plan was elaborated in line with the Economic Programme of the Central Committee of ZANU(PF)."¹¹¹ In theory, the plan was to guide government management of the economy with a socialist direction provided by the party.

As outlined by ZANU resolutions and the first five-year plan, "Government must intensify the socialisation of the economy

¹⁰⁷ Mugabe, "Preface: ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto", p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ The text of the ZANU-ZAPU unity agreement is in *Zimbabwe News*, special issue, December 1987, p. 44. In 1989, however, a third party called the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) was formed by former ZANU General Secretary, Edgar Tekere. Though most observers agree that the elections were not entirely fair, ZUM won less than five seats. Perhaps more importantly, however, voter turn-out dropped from over 90% in 1985 to near 50% in 1990.

¹⁰⁹ See Jeffrey Herbst, "The Fall of Afro-Marxism," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (1990) pp. 92-101.

¹¹⁰ "Planning for Socialist Zimbabwe," *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 19, No. 5, May 1988, p. 2.

¹¹¹ Republic of Zimbabwe, *First Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, Vol. I, (Harare: Government Printer, April 1986), p. 1.

through... State ownership of the means of production..."¹¹² Within several sectors of the Zimbabwean economy, the government has attempted to pursue these objectives to varying degrees of success. First, regarding agriculture, Prime Minister Mugabe identified state farms, cooperatives, state enterprises, and joint ventures between the state and private enterprise as ways to bring about a "socialist impact" in Zimbabwe.¹¹³ Similarly, Thesis Six of the ZANU(PF) Second Party Congress, stated that the Government should intensify its programme of large-scale state farming "as one arm of socialist agriculture", while encouraging co-operatives as the second.¹¹⁴ To establish "socialist" forms of agricultural production, the state's paramount task was to redistribute arable lands.¹¹⁵ Under the Land Tenure Act of 1969, and its predecessors, the Land Appointment Act (1930) and the Land Husbandry Act (1951), Rhodesian land was divided along racial lines, whereby more than half of the land was designated for Europeans (4% of the population), and the rest to the Africans (96% of the population). Moreover, most of the suitable land for intensive farming was earmarked for white settlers.¹¹⁶ To correct this inequitable distribution, the Zimbabwean government planned to resettle a total number of 162,000 peasant families over a three-year period.¹¹⁷ This resettlement scheme was championed by Zimbabwe's leadership as a first step in transforming the agricultural modes of production in Zimbabwe.

Regarding industry, uncompensated nationalization has never

¹¹² ZANU Resolutions, Second Congress, 8th August 1984, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 1985, p. 33. Not surprisingly, this list is almost identical to that outlined in *First Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, p. 10.

¹¹³ Interview with Robert Mugabe, *Moto*, Vol. 1, No. 4, August 1982, p. 7.

¹¹⁴ "ZANU Resolutions," Second Congress, p. 34.

¹¹⁵ Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, *ZIMCORD: Let's Build Together*, conference documentation, Zimbabwe conference on reconstruction and development, Salisbury, 23-27 March 1981, (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1981?), p. 2.

¹¹⁶ See Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*, (Harare, 1986), p. 5.

¹¹⁷ *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*, p. 125.

been attempted. Yet, ZANU leaders have stressed the importance of state involvement in the major national industries, both as a regulator and actor.¹¹⁸ In the first instance, the new Zimbabwean government placed strict controls on foreign currency allocations and foreign remittances of profits made in Zimbabwe, resulting in minimal investment by multinational corporations since independence.¹¹⁹ These measures, coupled with state investment and lucrative incentives for local investors, have been designed to localize ownership of foreign investments.¹²⁰ To strengthen the position of the worker, the Zimbabwean government instituted a minimum wage, encouraged the formation of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, ZCTU,¹²¹ and promoted the idea of workers participation in industrial decisions.¹²² More generally, the Government has increased public sector spending, particularly in education, as a means of undoing inherited inequalities from the

¹¹⁸ See "ZANU(PF) Central Committee Report", Second Congress, presented by Robert Mugabe, 8th August 1984, in *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 1985, p. 25.

¹¹⁹ Needless to say, almost all Westerners and Zimbabwean businessmen and bankers interviewed by the author see these restrictions as very damaging to Zimbabwe's economic growth. For official Western negative assessments of Zimbabwe's foreign investment practices, see the World Bank, *Zimbabwe: A Strategy for Sustained Growth*, Report No. 6981-ZIM, Southern Africa Department, Africa Department, November 9, 1987, p.44; and United States Agency for International Development (U.S. AID), *Zimbabwe: Country Development Strategy Statement*, FY 1987, (A.I.D.: Washington, D.C., February 1985), pp. 34-35.

¹²⁰ See *The First Five Year-Plan National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, p. 10. This strategy also was described in detail to the author in an interview with John Robertson, Manager, Economics Department, RAL Merchant Bank, (Harare, August 10, 1988).

¹²¹ See "Comrade" F.M.M. Shava, (former) ZANU(PF) Deputy Secretary for Administration and Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 18, No. 4, April 1987, p. 3.

¹²² See "The President's Speech on the Third Anniversary of Independence", *Policy Statement No. 10*, April 18, 1983, (Harare: Government Printer, April, 1983) p.6; and an interview with Labor Minister John Nkomo in *The Worker*, (Harare) May 1988, p. 2.

Rhodesian regime.¹²³

The government and Party also have invested directly in various sectors of the Zimbabwean economy as a method, according to the ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto in 1985, "to socialise the means of production for the benefit of the people..."¹²⁴ Speaking to the country's leading industrialists in 1986, President Mugabe reiterated his philosophy regarding the mix between public and private participation in the operation of the national economy.

An important element of the industrial restructuring policy in the Plan period and the 1990s will be the increasing role of public participation in the manufacturing sector. This will be achieved by Government taking share in new, or when necessary for strategic reasons, existing industries, direct investment through the Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe Limited and other parastatals and also through local authorities.¹²⁵

This policy has resulted in government investments in several major industries, including the Hwange Colliery Company (40% share), the MTD Group of Companies (100%), the Kamtativi Tin Mines (93%), ZISCO (Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company) (82%), CAPS Holding Ltd. (43%), and Olivine Ltd. (49%).¹²⁶ ZANU(PF) has invested independently in Zimbabwe National Holdings Corporation Limited, Woolworths, National Blankets, Catercraft, ZIDCO, and a property company called Ottawa Zimbabwe.¹²⁷ Mugabe also expanded government expenditures for parastatals, including the creation of the Minerals Marketing Board, the Zimbabwe Development Bank, the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO), the Zimbabwe Reinsurance

¹²³ By 1985, school enrollments had increased by 47 per cent. See the *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*, p. 169.

¹²⁴ "ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto, 1985", p. 14. See also Government of Zimbabwe, *Foreign Investment: Policy, Guidelines, and Procedures*, (Harare: Government Printer, September 1982), p. 1.

¹²⁵ "PM Opens CZI Annual Conference", (address by Prime Minister Mugabe, July 2, 1986), *Press Statement*, (Causeway: Department of Information, July 8, 1986, 446/86/PR/GR), p. 6.

¹²⁶ For details of these investments, see *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*.

¹²⁷ See "New Firm Set Up by Party", *The Chronicle*, August 2, 1988, p. 1; and "Nkala Rules Out Politics in ZANU(PF) Firm", *The Herald*, August 2, 1988.

Corporation, the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust. Finally, the government has cooperated with a number of private enterprises (both foreign and domestic) in joint ventures, pointing to joint ventures with socialist countries as a particularly effective means of increasing investment while at the same time "socializing" the Zimbabwean economy.¹²⁸

The Realities of Socialist Transformation ¹²⁹

A reading of party resolutions, government documents, and state programs might create an illusionary picture of a thriving socialist state and economy in Zimbabwe. Despite the pledges to transform the ownership of the means of production, redistribute the wealth, and elevate the status of the working classes, real changes in Zimbabwe's economic organization have been marginal. In agricultural production, 4,000 white farmers still own half of Zimbabwe's productive land, and the most fertile land at that. Because the Lancaster House Constitution limited redistribution of land to a voluntarily basis, only a fraction of the large commercial farms have been resettled by African peasants.¹³⁰ By the end of 1984, 2,478,692 hectares of land had been bought at a total cost of \$50,517,192. Of this, 2,040,068 hectares have been occupied by about 36,000 families, well short of the 162,000

¹²⁸ Interview with Robert Mugabe, *Moto*, Vol. 1, No. 4, August 1982, p. 7.

¹²⁹ This section is only a brief summary of several comprehensive surveys done of the Zimbabwean political-economy. See, for instance, Ibbo Mandaza, ed., *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986*, (CODESRIA: Dakar, Senegal, 1986); Colin Stoneman, ed. *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, (London: Macmillan, 1988), *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*, World Bank, *Zimbabwe: A Strategy for Sustained Growth*, (1987); and Herbst, "Policy Formation and Implementation in Zimbabwe."

¹³⁰ The impediments to redistribution under the Lancaster House provisions have been two-fold. First, the white farmer must agree to sell. Second, the government must pay. Neither has much inclination to act. Moreover, when farmers have sold their farms, recent disclosures indicate that government and party bureaucrats, not peasants, are purchasing them. For details, see Jocelyn Alexander, "The Unsettled Land: The Politics of Land Redistribution in Matabeleland, 1980-1990, *Journal of Southern Africa Studies*, (forthcoming).

targeted by the Government.¹³¹ Of this total, only 1 % had been purchased from the highest quality Sector I, while a full 70% of the land bought fell in Sectors III to V, the least suitable areas for production.¹³² The *First Five-Year National Development Plan* reported that roughly 42% of the total land under communal ownership occupies regions IV and V, the two most unsuitable classifications for farming.¹³³ The *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985* candidly concluded that

Despite the resettlement programme, agricultural production is still dominated by large scale commercial farmers, who own farms in the most productive regions of the country, and have access to more sophisticated methods of farming....At least 75 % of total agricultural production comes from commercial lands.¹³⁴

How to evaluate Zimbabwe's agricultural policy depends on what criteria are employed. Relative to the rest of Africa, Zimbabwe's agricultural production is a huge success. Zimbabwe exports surpluses of agricultural products, feeds its own country, and even provides food aid to Mozambique.¹³⁵ Since independence, peasant participation in agricultural marketing has increased dramatically.

¹³¹ *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*, p. 126; "The Prime Minister's New Year Message", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 1984, p. 1; *The First Five Year-Plan National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, p. 1; and Hasu Patel, "No Master, No Mortgage, No Sale: The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe", working paper, no. 2, (Nairobi: Center for Research, Documentation and University Exchanges, May 1987), p. 4.

¹³² *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*, p. 126.

¹³³ *First Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, p. 11. For a survey of the progress of the various resettlement schemes, see Jean Due, "Update on Land Resettlement in Zimbabwe", *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1986; Daniel Weiner, "Land and Agricultural Development", in Colin Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects*; and Sam Moyo, "The Land Question", in Ibbo Mandaza, ed., *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986*.

¹³⁴ *IBID.*, pp. 114-116. Moreover, commercial farms account for 90% of marketed surplus and 100% of agricultural export earnings, and 33% of formal national wage employment. See Clever Mumbengegwi, "Continuity and Change in Agricultural Policy", in Mandaza, ed., *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986*, p. 210.

¹³⁵ As a tribute to Zimbabwe's success, Robert Mugabe was awarded the Africa Prize for Leadership for the Sustainable End of Hunger in July 1988.

Aided by the fixed prices and guaranteed markets provided by the Daily Marketing Board, peasants and small farmers have increased their crop revenue ten-fold and now control 64% of the total marketed agricultural production, up from 10% in 1979.¹³⁶ Western yard sticks of "efficiency", "growth", and "production", and "profits" thus evaluate Zimbabwe's agricultural system very highly.¹³⁷ However, if other criteria are used, such as "equal distribution", "socialization", or "collectivization", Zimbabwe's record is rather poor.¹³⁸ Though the politicians have praised collectives, state farms, and resettlement ideas, the state still remains committed to preserving pre-independence relations of production.¹³⁹

Zimbabwe's record regarding the socialization of industry reveals a similar story. To date, no major enterprise has been nationalized. As noted above, the government owns a controlling share in several major companies, but even these businesses enjoy relative autonomy from direct state control.¹⁴⁰ The government's greatest mechanism for control over industry has been the foreign currency allocation system, which includes the remittances of profits regulations, and the restrictions on foreign investment. Unquestionably, these government policies have helped to deter new

¹³⁶ United States Government Memorandum, (US AID, Zimbabwe), to Ambassador Howard Walker, Senior Inspector, February 25, 1988, p. 2. See also Andrew Meldrum, "The Prize-Winning Peasant Farmers", *Africa Report*, September-October 1988, p. 41.

¹³⁷ Author's interview with an American expert on agricultural production currently working with the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture, (Harare, July 4, 1989).

¹³⁸ This is most apparent when speaking to angry peasants or ex-combatants struggling to survive on collective cooperatives. For printed criticisms of the government's lackluster attempts at land redistribution, see *Sunday Mail*, February 14, 1988, (cited here from Terence Ranger's, "Thirty-Seventh Review of the Zimbabwean Press, February 13th to April 8th 1988", Britain Zimbabwe Society, October 21, 1988, p. 4); and *The Chronicle*, (Bulawayo) July 3, 1989.

¹³⁹ On these continuities in the state regarding agriculture policy, see Michael Drinkwater, "Technical Development and Peasant Impoverishment: Land Use Policy in Zimbabwe's Midlands Province," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, January 1989, pp. 287-305.

¹⁴⁰ Olivine, for instance, though 51% of its shares are owned by the government, is run like a private company.

foreign investments,¹⁴¹ yet they have also locked in the division of wealth in place under Ian Smith's government. Of the 300 major foreign firms operating in Zimbabwe before independence, almost 80% remain.¹⁴²

Finally, Zimbabwean trade relations under ZANU-PF have not been interrupted, and have remained thoroughly tied to the Western capitalist system. Zimbabwean exports increased from \$645.4 million in 1979 to \$888.1 million in 1981, continuing to steadily rise throughout the 1980s. Likewise imports, increased from \$549.3 million in 1979 to \$1,017.7 in 1981.¹⁴³ Zimbabwe's major trading partners are still South Africa, Great Britain, the United States, and (West) Germany. In the list of countries traded with in 1984, not one socialist country appeared.¹⁴⁴

The End of the Socialist Project in Zimbabwe? Did It Ever Begin?

In the first decade since independence, government policy described these contradictions as necessary during the transition from capitalism to socialism. Perhaps learning from the economic problems of Mozambique and Angola, Mugabe cautioned that

In our application of Marxism in Zimbabwe, we cannot go by any blue-print anywhere else. It is not the application of Marxist principles in Russia, China, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Mozambique or Angola which is relevant. Their experiences are relevant. We would want to know how they succeeded and they failed. But the application of those principles to our society depends entirely on the objective conditions that obtain in our own society...¹⁴⁵

According to Mugabe's assessment of conditions in Zimbabwe,

¹⁴¹ See the World Bank, *Zimbabwe: A Strategy for Sustained Growth*, Vol. I, p, XV.

¹⁴² See Theresa Chimombe, "Foreign Capital", in Mandaza, *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition*, chapter 4; and author's interview with Moton Malianga, Deputy Minister of Finance, (Harare, July 13, 1989).

¹⁴³ *Statistical Yearbook of Zimbabwe, 1985*, (Harare, Zimbabwe: Central Statistical Office, 1985) p. 162.

¹⁴⁴ *IBID*, pp. 170-171.

¹⁴⁵ Mugabe, interview with Mr. Razumousky for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, September 19, 1980, in *Robert Gabriel Mugabe: Prime Minister of Zimbabwe*, pamphlet, (Harare, no date), p. 5. For this "learning" thesis, see also Alex Callinicos, *Southern Africa After Zimbabwe*, (Bristol: Pluto Press, 1981), p. 58.

"private enterprise cannot be overthrown overnight,"¹⁴⁶ but must play a positive role in Zimbabwe's development in the near future.¹⁴⁷ This brand of economic pragmatism is reflected most clearly in the policies drafted by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Bernard Chidzero. His national budget has not changed significantly over the last nine years, instead opting for "austere and virtual standstill" budgets.¹⁴⁸ His 1988 budget barely mentioned the word socialism, referring only once to the government goal of a "mixed economy with a socialist bent."¹⁴⁹ When asked in a 1988 interview to describe his ideology, Chidzero answered, "Well, I suppose realism, that's all."¹⁵⁰

Even the government's general reluctance to welcome foreign investment has subsided in the latter years of the 1980s. Most significantly, the Government of Zimbabwe published a long-awaited investment code, "The Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations", which has attracted much excitement, if not foreign capital.¹⁵¹ As part of the new government policy on foreign investment, the government established the Zimbabwe Investment Centre to serve as a single bureaucracy to handle all investment applications, signed several investment guarantees, including the convention of World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

¹⁴⁶ "Prime Minister Mugabe's official visit to the Soviet Union and Austria, December 1985", pamphlet, (Harare: Government Printer, January 1986), p. 2.

¹⁴⁷ Mugabe's opening address to the International Economic Resources Conference, September 1, 1980. Reprinted in *Robert Gabriel Mugabe: Prime Minister of Zimbabwe*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁸ See *Independent Zimbabwe, Fourth Anniversary of Independence Commemorative Issue*, (Harare: Government Printer, March 1984), p. 11.

¹⁴⁹ *The Financial Gazette*, August 5, 1988, p. 4.

¹⁵⁰ *Africa Report*, September-October 1988, p. 46.

¹⁵¹ Government of Zimbabwe, *The Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations*, April 1989. Chidzero first explained the policy at an investment seminar of the Confederation of British Industries, in London, on May 12, 1989, where the new document received wide praise. See "Planners Set Sights on Foreign Investors", *Africa Business*, June 1989, pp. 40-41. Not everyone in Zimbabwe is pleased with the new policy towards foreign investment. See for instance, "The 'Golden' Solution", *Moto*, No. 76, May 1989, pp. 4-5.

(MIGA) and OPIC¹⁵², and has hinted at the possibility of setting up special economic zones.¹⁵³ Though the details of these new programs have yet to be released, they signal a real commitment to catering to the interests of foreign investors.¹⁵⁴

A final area of policy which reflects the so-called "pragmatic" approach to socialist development is government's attitude towards organized labor and the collective cooperatives. Though Zimbabwe's leadership has championed the working class as the vanguard class of the socialist revolution, organized labor in Zimbabwe has been given little real support. The numerous strikes after independence were immediately quelled, and subsequently made illegal.¹⁵⁵ Reflecting the government's attitude towards strikes, then Minister for Labor, Kumburai Kangai stated that "I myself told them that the government is opposed to strikes and that they should negotiate through proper industrial channels."¹⁵⁶ As a result the number of strikes decreased from 297 in 1980, to only 94 in 1982, to only 1 reported by 1985.¹⁵⁷ The Government did encourage the formation of the ZCTU, but only if the union was controlled by the government.¹⁵⁸ In the fall of 1989, when the ZCTU supported the student protests, the ZCTU General Secretary was jailed and the independence of the union was effectively

¹⁵² Public address by the Zimbabwean High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Camden Town Hall, London, 17 June 1989.

¹⁵³ See "Planners Set Sights on Foreign Investors", *Africa Business*, June 1989, pp. 40-41

¹⁵⁴ See "Zimbabwe's Economy: Breaking Free?" *The Economist*, August 25, 1990, pp. 36-37.

¹⁵⁵ See "Zimbabweans Negotiate for More Labour Peace", *The Herald*, June 30, 1988. ZCTU lawyer Albert Musarurwa has argued that "the present law seriously weakens the working class." *IBID.*

¹⁵⁶ Quoted in Callinicos, *Southern Africa After Zimbabwe*, p. 60.

¹⁵⁷ See "Labour Events, 1980-1988," *Read On...*, (Harare), No. 2, 1988, pp. 19-21.

¹⁵⁸ "Editorial: Workers Still Struggling", *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 19, No. 5, May 1988, p. 2.

curtailed.¹⁵⁹

A similar government hostility towards the cooperatives has evolved since independence. These cooperatives, many of which are populated by ex-combatants, have received only small parcels of land from the government and few capital resources. Leaders in the cooperative movement have complained about an orchestrated resistance to their products in Zimbabwean markets.¹⁶⁰

Constraints from the International System

Why have so few structural changes in the economy been implemented since independence? Why is 50% of the productive land still owned by white farmers and over 60% of capital investment foreign owned?¹⁶¹ While part of answer undoubtedly is connected with the "pragmatism" of the Zimbabwean leadership, no socialist project, real or rhetorical, could have been implemented in Zimbabwe to the same extent as Angola, Cuba, Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union, due to the nature of the transition to independence. Because a settlement was reached before the collapse of Rhodesia, the new Zimbabwean government inherited a state and economy, accompanied by a constitution written to insure their viability. First, there would be no "one-man, one-vote" in Zimbabwe. The twenty seats allotted to the white population guaranteed that any radical socialist program would be resisted automatically by 20% of parliament. More subtly, these seats helped to convince a large segment of the Rhodesian capitalist class to stay in Zimbabwe, a phenomenon not experienced in either Mozambique or Angola.¹⁶²

Second, the basic form of the Rhodesian economy was passed on to Zimbabwe as provided by the terms of the Lancaster House settlement. The *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe* published in 1986

¹⁵⁹ See the interview with Cde. Nicholas Mudzengerere, acting General Secretary of ZCTU, *Read On...*, (Harare), No. 2, 1988, p. 9, and "New-look ZCTU on the Cards", *The Sunday Mail*, July 24, 1988.

¹⁶⁰ Those who work in relocating ex-combatants estimate that 60% are unemployed. (Author's conversations with several managers of agricultural cooperatives, Harare, summer 1988).

¹⁶¹ See D.G. Clarke, *Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe*, (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1980).

¹⁶² Almost 50% of the white population stayed, whereas more than 90% left in Angola.

very explicitly identified this inherited state:

The Lancaster House Constitution introduced extensive provisions on property rights, which made it almost impossible for Government to change existing ownership patterns without the availability of massive amounts of funds both in terms of local and foreign currencies, which are both scarce resources. The Constitution specifically ensured protection of property from compulsory acquisition without prompt compensation. In the case of land, in particular, the provisions of the Constitution compelled Government to acquire land only on willing-seller, willing-buyer basis, and thus imposing a constraint on the resettlement programme.¹⁶³

As the ten-year grace period of the Lancaster House Constitution ended in 1990, these constraints legally disappeared. However, ten years of local capital retrenchment fortified by continued integration in to the world capitalist system present serious barriers to any major restructuring of the economy along socialist lines. Given Zimbabwe's exponential population growth interfaced against zero growth rates, the government has little will or capacity to disrupt Zimbabwe's very fragile economy for the foreseeable future.

Third, the liberation movement in Zimbabwe assumed control of a state which was not undermined by the liberation struggle. The first election placed many black leaders in top ministerial positions, but left many of the less senior positions in the hands of former Rhodesian civil servants.¹⁶⁴ More importantly, the new Zimbabwean regime inherited a structurally strong state, developed under the conditions of UDI. Once the ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU ministers assumed control of their ministries, they soon realized

¹⁶³ *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*, p. 8. In less specific terms, the ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto claimed that the Lancaster House Constitution "had been designed to neutralize the political and military victories of the people of Zimbabwe and maintain the status quo." "ZANU(PF) Election Manifesto, 1985", p.9. In an interview with the author, Minister of Public Construction and now ZANU(PF) Vice-President, Joseph Msika, expressed a similar view of Lancaster, though with more optimism. He suggested that maybe the constraints of the settlement were a 'blessing in disguise.' (Author's interview with Joseph Msika, Harare, July 14, 1989).

¹⁶⁴ Michael Bratton, "Development in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 19, no. 3, September 1981, p. 452. See also Lionel Cliffe, "Zimbabwe's Political Inheritance", in Colin Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, (London: MacMillan, 1981), pp. 12-13.

the extensive power that came with these posts. Given this structure of power, the real arenas for decisions devolved from the party secretariats to the ministries, thereby weakening ZANU(PF)'s control over basic policy issues.¹⁶⁵ This arrangement created real incentives for these political leaders to reify the state, a tendency which preserved the status quo at the expense of transformative ideas.

A final and most constraining variable which strengthened both directly and indirectly all these other inhibitors to socialist development is the international capitalist system *en toto*. Most directly, two thirds of national productive capacity is owned by foreign firms.¹⁶⁶ As one observer noted,

...it is hard to find a sub-Saharan example in which the role of foreign investments has been so long established, as deeply integrated into the sectors producing the bulk of out-put, so strongly interconnected with settler capital and, in consequence, probably as difficult to foresee being quickly and successfully altered.¹⁶⁷

Zimbabwe's economic autonomy is also constrained by the channels through which it is linked to Western markets. As 80% of Zimbabwean exports are primary commodities, Zimbabwe's balance of payments have been seriously strained by a general trend of declining prices for these goods.¹⁶⁸ Finally, the direction of Zimbabwe's development is influenced by the sources of financial

¹⁶⁵ See Jeffrey Herbst, "Policy Formation and Implementation in Zimbabwe", The exact opposite tendency occurred in Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, or the Soviet Union.

¹⁶⁶ See *The First Five Year-Plan National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, p. 4; Colin Stoneman and Rob Davies, "The Economy: an overview", in Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, (London, 1981), p. 119; and Bratton, "Development in Zimbabwe", p. 457.

¹⁶⁷ Clarke, *Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe*, p. 168. Five years later, Michael Bratton wrote, "Capital ownership is divided about 90:10 between whites and blacks, and among whites about 70:30 between foreign and settler interests. Outside capital is dominant and substantial in every sector, particularly mining where foreign operations accounts for about 95 per cent of output value." (Bratton, "Development in Zimbabwe", p. 457).

¹⁶⁸ See the World Bank, *Zimbabwe: A Strategy for Sustained Growth*, vol. I, p. XXIV, 5, and 18.

assistance. As already detailed, the central objective of American assistance, until recently the largest outside donor, has been to steer Zimbabwe onto the capitalist path, linked to Western markets.¹⁶⁹ The World Bank, another major contributor to Zimbabwe, has a similar mission, euphemistically called "structural adjustment".¹⁷⁰ Finally, the IMF, though less involved, has conditioned its loans on the reduction of Zimbabwean government expenditures.¹⁷¹

American foreign policy, then, since independence has successfully aimed to reify capitalist structures within Zimbabwe so as to weave the state into the international capitalist system. While Zimbabwe and the United States have clashed over United Nations votes and sanctions against South Africa,¹⁷² the Zimbabwean has refrained from challenging either the basic structures of its own economy or its linkages to the world capitalist system.

The Dearth of Anti-Systemic Assistance from the Socialist World

As discussed in the preceding section on Soviet policy towards Zimbabwe, the socialist world did not and probably could not provide significant alternative resources for restructuring Zimbabwe along socialist lines. Those same capitalist structures

¹⁶⁹ Several other countries which pledged assistance to Zimbabwe have adopted similar strategies. (See Theresa Chimombe, "Foreign Capital," in Mandaza, ed., *Zimbabwe*). According to one U.S. AID official interviewed by the author, only the Scandinavian countries have been involved in large-scale projects of infrastructural development, which do not guarantee economic returns. (Harare, July 1988).

¹⁷⁰ This philosophy is clearly spelled out in the World Bank's *Zimbabwe: A Strategy for Sustained Growth*, in passim.

¹⁷¹ As a result, Zimbabwe has received little support from the IMF to offset its balance of payments problems. See Theresa Chimombe, "Foreign Capital" p. 138.

¹⁷² These tensions in such non-critical areas may be an indirect consequence of American successes in influencing the important areas of Zimbabwe's internal socio-economic organization and external integration into the world capitalist system. Still claiming to be guided by socialist principles developed during the liberation struggle, the rhetoric of international diplomacy may be the one area where Zimbabwe can afford to challenge "imperialism", "neocolonialism", and "American hegemony".

which preserved by the Western-orchestrated process of transition to independence also insulated and isolated Zimbabwe from the socialist system of states. Just as bombastic tirades against international capitalism do little to undermine its structure and power, praise for socialist systems and socialist-oriented countries can be pronounced without any relation to structural realities. Rhetoric may be the only currency Zimbabwe can afford to expend on fostering good relations with the Soviet Union or socialism in general. While military and economic relations have remained negligible, Zimbabwe's leaders have praised the Soviet Union for its international role as the leader of the socialist world, and a champion of "peace-loving initiatives."¹⁷³ Through inter-governmental and inter-party channels, bilateral relations between Moscow and Harare are also favorably assessed by Zimbabwe's foreign policymakers.¹⁷⁴ Finally, because these relations "are being constructed on a common ideological basis,"¹⁷⁵ Zimbabwe's leaders claim to look to the Soviet Union as a model of socialist development.¹⁷⁶ As Mugabe noted,

Cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries, chiefly the USSR, is exceptionally important for our young state, which is just setting out on the road of socialist development. The closer our relations with the Soviet Union, the more opportunities there are to adopt the USSR's valuable experience. It gives us deep satisfaction to point out that it is precisely in this direction that ties between us are developing. Moreover, we are genuinely pleased that the great Lenin's country holds in high regard our activities to achieve

¹⁷³ Prime Minister Mugabe, keynote address to the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, Harare, August/September 1986, in *Southern Africa Record*, No. 44, September 1986, p. 5. See also the speech by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe at the USSR Council of Ministers State Banquet in his honor, Moscow, 2 December 1985, in *Southern Africa Record*, No. 42, March 1986, p. 34.

¹⁷⁴ See *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 17, No. 7, July 1986, p. 16; and "Department of External Affairs, ZANU (PF)," *Zimbabwe News*, August 1988, p. 3; "Introducing the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, interview with Nathan Shamuyarira," p. 23.

¹⁷⁵ Vremya newscast, Moscow Domestic Television Service, 18 April 1983, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 19 April 1983, p. J1.

¹⁷⁶ Quoted by TASS, 27 April 1981, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 28 April 1981, p. J1.

the noble aims of socialist development.¹⁷⁷

Even these rhetorical linkages, however, are fast fading in the wake of "perestroika." The first signs of strain surfaced over Zimbabwe's suspicion of Soviet "new thinking" in foreign policy, new thinking which has included a quiet courtship with South Africa.¹⁷⁸ More serious disagreements erupted in 1989 when the Soviet model, which Mugabe praised in 1986, was shattered in Eastern Europe and is self-destructing in the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁹ In this new world, in which liberal internationalism is succeeding in recapturing even the pillar of the socialist world, the prospects for Zimbabwe's socialist project are remote.

¹⁷⁷ *Izvestiya*, 8 May 1982, p. 4, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, 13 May 1982, p. J1. See also the speech by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe at the USSR Council of Ministers State Banquet in his honor, Moscow, 2 December 1985, in *Southern Africa Record*, No. 42, March 1986, p. 34.

¹⁷⁸ In February 1991, Pretoria and Moscow signed an agreement to open up special missions through the Austrian embassies in their respective countries. For a short history of this rapprochement, see Philip Nel, *A Soviet Embassy in Pretoria?*, (Cape Town, SA: Talberg Publishers, 1990) and Ibbo Mandaza, "A Brief Review of Current US-Soviet Policy in Southern Africa," paper presented at the SAPES Trust Conference on *US-Soviet Policy in Southern Africa*, 11-15 March 1990, Nyanga, Zimbabwe. At this conference, at which the author was present, a prominent array of southern African academics and politicians expressed the outrage and dismay at the new directions in Soviet foreign policy.

¹⁷⁹ According to East European diplomats based in Harare, Mugabe summoned all East European ambassadors in November 1989 to express his deep regrets regarding the success of the CIA-instigated, counter-revolutionary coups in their countries.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

The revolutionary situations and outcomes in Angola and Zimbabwe were guided, constrained, and conditioned by the structure of the international system. Explanations which fail to account for the international influences on the revolutionary situations in these countries cannot explain the ideological orientation of the revolutionary movements, the differences in outcome between Angola and Zimbabwe, nor the development strategies of the post-revolutionary regimes in both countries.

Causes of Revolution

This project has been concerned with explaining under what conditions revolutionary situations develop into revolutionary outcomes. As such, the causes of revolutionary situations themselves have been assumed implicitly to be colonial conquest in southern Africa.¹ Colonial structures reliant on political subjugation and economic exploitation of African peoples fueled resistance, rebellion, and eventually revolutionary upheaval in these territories.² Almost as soon as the colonials arrived, opposing political entities claimed to be the sovereign authorities of a single territory: multiple sovereignty.³ Moreover, these opposing authorities -- African versus European -- had different relations to property and opposing conceptions of how these relations should be constituted.⁴ As in almost every other colony

¹ Earlier drafts of this dissertation contained a chapter on the causes of revolution, but space limitations required that this section be eliminated. For other kinds of cases, the original causes of revolutionary situations may be the most important and critical period. For cases of anti-colonialism, such as Angola and Zimbabwe, however, the causes are more obvious and thus less interesting.

² This structural explanation of the causes of revolutionary situations, then, concurs with other structural theories of revolution. See, for instance, Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, and Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*. However, because Skocpol's definition of social revolution makes a revolutionary outcome a necessary condition, she would not define Zimbabwe as a revolutionary situation.

³ See Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 190.

⁴ For some marxists, this condition might be sufficient to call these situations in southern Africa class-based conflicts. The term, class, however, conjures up notions of an organized

around the world, the structural contradictions introduced by colonial conquest made the territories of Angola and Zimbabwe ripe for revolution.

The International System and the Definition of Revolutionary Situations in Angola and Zimbabwe

While the causes of revolution might have been present before the turn of the century, they did not coagulate into revolutionary situations until after World War II. The change in the international system from a multipolar balance with shared norms about colonialism and core-periphery relations to a system dominated by two powers lacking shared creeds, provided the necessary international environment for the revolutionary situations in Angola and Zimbabwe to develop.⁵ So rigorously delineated, the existence of an antagonistic bipolar system served to polarize anti-colonial struggles into manifestations of the global battle between capitalism and communism.⁶ In the early

group of people with a common relationship to the means of production. Neither the Angolan nor Zimbabwean opposition movements were constituted from one such class. Moreover, class differentiation in Africa at the time was very fluid as more and more of the peasantry became captured into the capitalist economy while more and more former peasants moved into cities where they assumed a different relation to the means of production. This said, however, a more broader definition of class conflict limited to identifying the clash between those who own the means of production and those who do not, more accurately captures the class-conflict content of the southern African situation.

⁵ As noted in chapter one, this study seeks to explain how revolutionary situations lead to revolutionary outcomes. It is not a general study of the causes of revolution. However, in both cases examined, conflict between the colonizers and the colonized constituted the origins of these revolutionary situations. In these particular cases, then, even the sources of revolution were externally induced.

⁶ As noted in the introduction, the conception of the world as bi-polar does not accurately reflect the real divisions of power present after World War II. With respect to almost all indicators, the United States was a hegemonic power on a world order; the international capitalist system which it anchored likewise dwarfed the scale, resources, and production capacities of the "socialist international division of labor." A more correct metaphor for describing the situation might be to think of the international system as penetrated by capitalism, within which an anti-Western "hole" or anti-systemic "space" existed in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia. While these "socialist" states

years of the liberation struggles, neither Angolans nor Zimbabweans were inherently pro-socialist or anti-capitalist; they were anti-Portuguese, anti-colonial, or anti-white. From the earliest years of contact between European and African, Angolans and Zimbabweans fought the invaders not in name of some "ism", but in defense of their land. However, the nature of bipolarity forced the liberation movements to fall within one of two camps.⁷ Initially, every liberation movement in Angola and Zimbabwe attempted to develop ties with the United States. All, with the exception of the FNLA, were rebuffed.⁸ While these liberation movements initially practiced and preached a similar strategy and ideology which spearheaded the American Revolution, the international position of the United States had changed dramatically in two hundred years. As the leading economic power in a world capitalist system and the leading military power in an alliance in defense of that system, the United States had vested interests in preserving the status quo, and resisting forces of change, even if they erupted in countries peripheral to American national interests. Counterveiling American beliefs in anti-colonialism and self-

still existed within the confines of the international system, they were nonetheless isolated to varying degrees from international capitalism by autarkic economies, military alliances and communist institutional linkages. On the effects of homogeneity and heterogeneity on the international system, see Fred Halliday, "'The Sixth Great Power': on the Study of Revolution and International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, (1990), pp. 217-219.

⁷ For an overview of this phenomenon, see Shahram Chubin, "The Super-powers, Regional Conflicts and World Order," *Adelphi Papers*, 237, Spring 1989, pp. 74-93.

⁸ As Peter Calvert has noted, the Western acceptance of this notion that the national liberation movements were organically communist helped to promote marxist-oriented outcomes in these revolutionary situations. As Calvert writes, "The bipolar model of the world led Western policy-makers to internalize the Marxist assumptions, to assume that a real transformation of the world had taken place and that the only alternative to the existing world was indeed the long-predicted socialist revolution. By identifying all political change with revolution, and revolution with communism, they effectively succeeded in blocking necessary change and, in some cases -- notably in Indo-China and Portuguese Africa -- by identifying themselves with colonial oppression made the eventual triumph of Marxist regime possible." (Peter Calvert, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, pp. 16-17.

determination periodically challenged the East-West prism used for understanding these national liberation movements. But when these norms appeared to contradict the interests of the international capitalist structure, the American commitment to the system always prevailed. Not surprisingly, then, the national liberation movements eventually rejected the United States, Western liberal ideas about conflict resolution, and capitalism. All the liberation movements in these two case studies, including the FNLA which received nominal financial assistance from the United States in the 1960s, eventually identified the international capitalist system as the profiteer from colonialism in southern Africa. Their negative attitude toward the United States and its 'camp' was fomented by the recognition of the interdependent relationship between capitalism and colonialism.

This negative reaction to the Western divide of the bipolar world contrasted sharply with the positive response elicited by the "East." The history of socialist challenges to the international capitalist order offered a clear alternative path to the capitalist/colonial status quo. Socialism presented an "ideology of opposition" to these liberation struggles which needed coherency and direction to mobilize support at home and abroad.⁹ While neither liberation struggle in Angola or Zimbabwe began as challenges to international capitalism as such, the discourse of socialist internationalism defined their struggles as one of the three integrated fronts in the global assault towards world socialism.¹⁰

By the 1970's, UNITA, MPLA, ZANU, and ZAPU accepted this marxist-leninist conception of the world historical process. The extent of this acceptance varied according to local histories of the liberation movement and the type of contacts the liberation movement developed with external actors. As the oldest liberation movements in both Angola and Zimbabwe, the MPLA and ZAPU established early contacts with the Soviet Union and consequently

⁹ According to Bernard Brodie, "In order to oppose an idea effectively, one needs more than superior authority -- one needs in addition one or morer [sic] alternative ideas..." (Brodie, *War and Politics*, p. 14).

¹⁰ The other two fronts were the socialist states and workers' movements in Western industrial countries.

adopted several tenets unique to the Soviet theory of history and revolution, including most importantly an emphasis on the vanguard role of the working class, and an espousal of the non-capitalist path of development. Because of the Soviet strategy of supporting only one liberation movement per country, the FNLA and UNITA in Angola, and ZANU in Zimbabwe were unable to establish relations with the first socialist state. All, to varying degrees, turned to another anti-capitalist power, the People's Republic of China for assistance and guidance. In doing so, UNITA and ZANU adapted marxism-leninism to their peasant-based societies. The analytical differences between ZAPU and MPLA critiques of capitalism and colonialism and ZANU and UNITA appraisals, however, were minor. In the bipolar world of the post World War II, revolutionary movements in southern Africa quickly identified, and were quickly identified, with the "socialist" pole.

The socialist world also provided the revolutionary movements with the ability to act. Directly, the socialist system of states furnished a "strategy of opposition" --armed struggle. Military training and assistance provided by the socialist states provided ZAPU, MPLA, ZANU, and UNITA with the means to conduct armed struggles. Hundreds of Angolan and Zimbabwean guerrillas trained in military centers throughout the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, and Cuba, or with military advisors from socialist countries in sympathetic states such as Ghana, Egypt, or Zambia. Without this support, the guerrilla wars in Angola and Zimbabwe would not have begun.

As with ideology, this study has documented the differences in military strategy between those movements allied with the Soviet Union and those allied with China. Most importantly, in distinguishing the Soviet philosophy from the Chinese, Soviet military advisors taught that the liberation armies must begin by fighting guerrilla wars, but prepare eventually to transform the struggle into a conventional war. The kind of training and weapons rendered to ZAPU and the MPLA reflected this two-stage approach to revolutionary warfare. ZAPU's flirtations with positional warfare between 1967 and 1970, and the MPLA's brief experimentation with conventional tactics in 1972 were a direct consequence of Moscow's advice. ZANU and UNITA, on the other hand, practiced the Chinese method of guerrilla warfare which emphasized the necessity of first

seizing the countryside, both politically and militarily, and then surrounding and eventually strangling the cities. This strategy placed a higher premium on politicizing the peasantry, self-reliance, and avoiding positional combat.

The export of these revolutionary methods to southern Africa illustrate how the international context influenced the definition of the revolutionary situations in Angola and Zimbabwe. The embrace of the socialist methods for revolutionary struggle also reflect the rejection of Western methods for change. After the early 1960's all the liberation movements rejected negotiations as a method of liberation.

Indirectly, the very existence of the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth offered the "space" within the international system to allow these kinds of liberation struggles to take place.¹¹ While conflict within the states resulting from colonialism had erupted much earlier, previous balances of forces and ideologies in the international system offered the forces of liberation no external support or even an atmosphere in which to carry out a successful liberation war. Only after World War II -- after the transformation of the international system into an antagonistic bipolar world -- could liberation movements in the Third World begin to resist colonial subjugation.¹² Counterrevolutionary interventions by the United States were constrained and even prevented by the threat of direct superpower conflict.¹³

In sum, the international division between capitalist states and communist states permeated the revolutionary situations in

¹¹ On the idea of 'space' in the capitalist world economy, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 135.

¹² The "structure" then of the international system both enabled action and constrained its possibilities. This formulation corresponds to a transformative model of the 'structure-agent' relationship, rather than a positional model. For explication, see David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), p. 450.

¹³ Vietnam is the most obvious case where American counterrevolutionary strategies were constrained by fears of escalating the war into a direct superpower conflict. Cuba in 1961 is a case in which the United States actually refrained from intervening.

Angola and Zimbabwe. In combatting colonialism and the Western capitalist system more generally, Angolan and Zimbabwean revolutionaries gravitated towards socialist methods of analysis, socialist programmes for the future, and socialist strategies of opposition. However alien to the southern African condition, the ideas and strategies of marxism-leninism (and marxism-leninism-maoism) were superimposed over the revolutionary situations in Angola and Zimbabwe as a direct consequence of the bipolar international system.

The International System and the Definition of Revolutionary Outcomes in Angola and Zimbabwe

The dominant discourse of all the liberations movements was marxism, both as a theory for explaining history, and as a prescription for the future. Only the FNLA did not adopt a marxist perspective; but the FNLA did not develop a comprehensive ideology at all. Yet, the outcomes of the liberation struggles in Angola and Zimbabwe were fundamentally different. As demonstrated earlier, Angola under the leadership of the MPLA embarked upon a rigorous "socialist" programme for transforming the Angolan state and economy. At least in the first years of independence, the MPLA attempted to challenge past socio-economic structures as defined by Portuguese colonialism and conditioned by international capitalism and embark upon a social revolution. Zimbabwe under ZANU, however, did not undertake a radical and comprehensive transformational project after independence. While ZANU rhetoric trumpeted the virtues of socialism, ZANU practiced or at least capitulated to the principles of capitalism.

This divergence in outcomes resulted primarily from the different transitional processes experienced in Angola and Zimbabwe, processes influenced if not dictated by the foreign policies of the great powers.¹⁴

¹⁴ Explaining different outcomes thus requires dropping from a system level of analysis to a unit level of analysis. While the international system defines the menu of revolutionary outcomes, the component units of the system, in these cases the United States and the Soviet Union, actually influence the ultimate choice from this menu. See David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, *The International System*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

The Angolan Transition

In Angola, the influence of the great powers on the transition to independence was direct, obvious, and decisive. As the peaceful transitional arrangement, the Alvor Accord, broke down, all three liberation struggles sought external military assistance to help them achieve their political aspirations. In doing so, the Angolan war was transformed quickly from a guerrilla war between Portugal on the one hand and the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA on the other, to a conventional war between the MPLA and Cuba on the one hand and the FNLA, UNITA, South Africa, and Zaire on the other. In this new divide, the United States supplied military assistance to the FNLA/UNITA coalition while the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provided weapons to the MPLA and Cuba. The Cold War got hot in Angola. The Soviet-backed forces eventually gained the advantage in this war of escalation dominance and held it. The MPLA was installed in Luanda, the FNLA retreated and eventually dissolved, and UNITA returned to the bush to fight "the second war of liberation" against communist imperialism. Without question, the MPLA would not have come to power without Soviet assistance.

But an MPLA military takeover through the assistance of the Soviet Union and Cuba does not translate automatically into the development of a socialist-oriented state and economy in Angola.¹⁵ Angola's attempt at radical socio-economic transformation resulted as much from the West's rejection of the regime as from the MPLA's embrace of the Soviet way of economic and political organization. In March 1976, the MPLA government was weak, insecure, and inexperienced. The vast majority of the old state structures and economic institutions had been crushed, abandoned, or incapacitated as a result of the civil war.¹⁶ Most devastating to the economy, almost the entire capitalist and bureaucratic classes -- the Portuguese -- fled Angola in 1975, taking their capital and expertise with them while sabotaging that infrastructure which could not be removed. At the same time, the United States and the other Western powers refused to engage the new government with the usual economic structures available to (or forced upon) Third World

¹⁵ Many regimes have received Soviet military assistance without constructing socialist states.

¹⁶ Some of this destruction happened during the guerrilla phase of the war, but most occurred during 1975-1976.

countries. For instance, Angola was denied membership in the IMF for the first 13 years of independence. Moreover, the United States actively discouraged American multinationals from operating in the country, and eventually covertly supported a guerrilla insurgency aimed at overthrowing the MPLA government.¹⁷

The MPLA thus inherited a demolished state apparatus, a devastated economy, and a hostile disposition on the part of the capitalist powers. The menu of options presented by the international system left the MPLA one source of economic assistance and advice: the Soviet Union and its socialist allies. This turn to Moscow was facilitated by the ideological and practical ties developed between the MPLA and the Soviet Union during the national liberation war. As Chapter Eight documented, the result was a comprehensive attempt to transform the Angolan peripheral, capitalist-linked economy into a peoples' republic: the Soviet experiment performed in Africa. As the Soviet Union had been transformed from a backwards, agrarian economy to a world power using this model, the strategy had precedence and appeal.

Nothing was inevitable about Angola's socialist orientation in 1974. Given the balance of power between the three liberation movements at the time of the Portuguese coup in April 1974, few would have predicted an MPLA victory. An election would have given UNITA a dominant role in the government; a civil war without major external intervention would have propelled the FNLA into a position of authority. Yet, even an MPLA victory was no guarantee of a socialist transformation in independent Angola. First, had the MPLA come to power by means of the Alvor Accord, a much larger portion the old state and economy would have been preserved. The new Angolan government would not have started from scratch upon assuming power, but would have inherited a state and economy dominated by a Portuguese bourgeoisie.¹⁸ State appropriation of land and industries would not have been simply a process of cataloging abandoned property, but would have been resisted. Second, an MPLA empowered by a peaceful transition to independence

¹⁷ See McFaul, "Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola."

¹⁸ Unlike many other African states, the Portuguese living in Angola had come to stay. Many Portuguese who left in 1975 were already second and third generation Angolans. For details, see Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*.

would have had to compete not only with the Portuguese, but the FNLA and UNITA as well. The FNLA was openly hostile to socialism before independence; UNITA turned vehemently against socialism soon after 1976. A government run by some coalition of these forces would have been constrained in adopting a radical transformational agenda. Moreover, the very constitution of the MPLA likely would have been different as radicals and military leaders would not have assumed so easily a hegemonic position within the Party had the MPLA avoided the polarizing experience of the civil war. Third, the international system would have offered Angola a broader set of options had the MPLA come to power by peaceful means. Soviet collective-farm experts would have had to compete with U.S. A.I.D. advisors when counseling Angola's new Ministry of Agriculture. From several different aspects, then, the particular method of transition to independence in Angola determined many of the characteristics of the post-revolutionary regime.

The Zimbabwe Transition

Soviet and American foreign policymakers learned different lessons from their experiences in the Angolan civil war.¹⁹ For American foreign policymakers, U.S.-Soviet detente died in Angola. As it appeared in 1975, trade, arms control agreements, confidence building measures, or academic exchanges did little to constrain Soviet aggressive conduct in the Third World.

While retreating from constructive engagement as a strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union, American foreign policymakers began to embrace this approach for dealing with the guerrilla insurgency in Zimbabwe. In the wake of Angola, Kissinger learned the hard way that the United States had neither the means nor will to fight Soviet-backed guerrillas. Kissinger, therefore, sought to contain Soviet influence in Zimbabwe by different means, by seeking to negotiate a settlement on terms agreeable to Western interests before a total civil war broke out. His initiative in April 1976

¹⁹ As Dessler argues in his ontology of the transformative model of the structure-agent relationship, "structure is the outcome as well as the medium of action." (Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent Structure Debate?" p. 452.) In this instance, the "action" of the Angolan Revolution precipitated a nuanced change in the structure, thereby changing the "medium of action" for the Zimbabwean Revolution.

actively engaged the United States and later Great Britain in the process of conflict resolution in Zimbabwe. By 1979, the Western powers had managed to construct a settlement which all sides felt compelled to sign, even though the Lancaster House settlement actively blunted a socialist project in a future Zimbabwe. Most importantly, the agreement was signed before Zimbabwe reached the same level of military conflict witnessed in Angola in 1975.

Soviet leaders learned very different lessons from the Angolan civil war. That the MPLA moved from a guerrilla war to a conventional stage in 1975 vindicated Soviet theories about national liberation wars. The MPLA's only mistake was that its army was not prepared to undertake the necessary conventional military operations needed to seize the state. Cuba had to help. To avoid reliance on internationalists, Soviet advisors in Lusaka and Moscow encouraged Nkomo and his military leaders to prepare ZAPU cadres for a conventional war. After 1976, ZIPRA soldiers received training both in guerrilla and conventional warfare tactics, in preparation for making this conventional offensive a strictly African affair.²⁰ The ZIPRA command drafted both the "Turning Point" strategy to prepare for a conventional war, and an attack plan, "Ground Zero", for capturing Salisbury through conventional means. At the time of Lancaster House, ZAPU was negotiating the transit of MiG planes through Tanzania and Zambia. The strategy failed because it was never implemented. The Lancaster House agreement agreement was signed before the Zimbabwe war escalated to a conventional stage.

The timing and method of this transition to independence inhibited the potential for a revolutionary outcome in Zimbabwe. The new Zimbabwean government inherited an organized state and a productive capitalist economy thoroughly integrated into the world capitalist economy. Rather than destroying the ancien regime and creating a new political order, ZANU-PF simply occupied the old "state house." Twenty per cent of the old regime, in fact, still remained in parliament, while several key posts within the government, including the head of the army and the chief of

²⁰ In the event of another internationalized civil war, Cuban troops were stationed in Angola and Zambia.

intelligence did not even change.²¹ Continuity in the economy was even more striking; no nationalization, no collectivization, no redistribution of wealth.²² Whites continued to own and run the major sectors of the economy. Whereas Angola's economy plummeted after 1975, Zimbabwe's gross national income actually increased after independence.²³ Finally internationally, Zimbabwe was swallowed within the matrix of international financial institutions aimed at preserving the international capitalist division of labor. Western aid poured into the country, the World Bank and the IMF set up missions, and Zimbabwean trade continued to be integrally linked to the West. The anti-systemic forces of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle had been contained and coopted by a series of economic and political structures, including their own constitution, which above all protected private property rights established before independence. Rebellious dissenters to this cooptation strategy were either imprisoned or disenfranchised; a system of resource-poor cooperatives channeled the energies of these radical voices into tilling the soil rather than running the country. Other "true believers" were bought off by the lure of luxurious ministries or cushy public relations positions in foreign-owned firms. Internationally, Zimbabwe managed very weak contacts with "anti-systemic" or revolutionary forces. Most importantly, ZANU's poor relations with the Soviet Union during the war led to cool relations between Zimbabwe and the leader of the socialist world

²¹ Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture was given to a white farmer and the Ministry of Finance was given to a career United Nations officer.

²² The little land resettlement which did occur after independence was concentrated in those areas where the liberation war most destructive to Rhodesian property owners. In these areas, located in the northeast, many Rhodesian farmers fled or were killed during the war. Their abandoned farms were then the first to given to peasants after the war. In Matabeleland, where only six farmers were killed during the war, resettlement has been significantly slower, albeit other factors such as political instability and drought have also retarded the resettlement there. For details, see Jocelyn Alexander, "The Unsettled Land."

²³ In constant 1980 prices, Zimbabwean gross national income in 1981 was \$ 3,867 million, an increase from \$ 3,396 million in 1980 and \$2,921 million in 1979. See *Statistical Yearbook of Zimbabwe, 1985*, (Harare, Zimbabwe: Central Statistical Office, 1985) p. 78.

for the first several years after independence.²⁴ In Zimbabwe, a transformational project never got off the ground.

Confrontation versus Cooption

A different mix of strategies employed by the capitalist system and socialist system, then, provoked different outcomes to the revolutionary situations in Angola and Zimbabwe. In Angola, confrontational strategies by both the United States and the Soviet Union generated preconditions for a revolutionary outcome. The conventional war during 1975-76 fueled by international intervention destroyed the state and economic institutions of the Portuguese ancien regime, both by physical destruction of property and by scaring away the old ruling class.²⁵ The vacuum of power in Angola after independence left the MPLA with near total control over state and economic resources. Guided by the Cuban and Soviet advisors, they were free to attempt to build a state of socialist orientation.

The mix of capitalist and communist strategies towards the revolutionary situation in Zimbabwe, however, created a very different post-independence balance of forces. By following a cooptive strategy, the Western powers managed to negotiate a transition out of the revolutionary situation before the ancien regime was destroyed. The cooptive strategy created incentives for the revolutionary movements to participate in the Rhodesian state and economic structures before they had devastated the old institutions, principles, and properties. In ceding their monopoly on political control, the Rhodesian ruling class nonetheless preserved a state which still protected their old system of property rights, (and, as such, their privileged position within such a system). Whether deceived, coerced, naive, or cynical, the revolutionary challengers thus inherited a state and economic institutions not of their making and not fully under their control. Rather than building a new state and economy, they became the

²⁴ In 1980, after the Third plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping initiated radical comprehensive reforms. Thereafter, the People's Republic of China, ZANU's principle backer during the war, no longer actively promoted Maoist regimes in Africa.

²⁵ Conventional war is the most effective method of destroying state and economic institutions, though, theoretically, other methods are available.

nominal political leaders of a state and economy already built.

The Soviet confrontational strategy might have induced a revolutionary outcome in Zimbabwe had the conflict reached a sufficient level so as to displace and destroy the Rhodesian regime. The war, however, never escalated to such a height. Having gambled on this kind of outcome, the Soviet Union and the socialist system of states were closed out of playing any role in post-independence Zimbabwe.

The histories of the Angolan and Zimbabwean revolutionary situations suggests that the destruction of the former regime is a necessary condition for inducing a revolutionary outcome. Given the paucity of local resources which can be mobilized against the old state in such peripheral countries, international forces are decisive in helping to either preserve or smash the local regime. The only mix of strategies by the capitalist and socialist systems, however, which seems to have facilitated the destruction of the regime under revolutionary seige has been when both camps pursued confrontational strategies. As suggested in chapter one, cases in which both pursued cooptive strategies have favored the status quo, be it Soviet attempts at coopting India and Egypt in the 1960s or American attempts at coopting Poland or Czechoslovakia in the 1970s. As long as the preexisting state has not been toppled, chances for rapid political and socio-economic transformation are minimal.²⁶ Even more detrimental to revolutionary outcomes have been cases in which the status quo power employed a confrontational strategy while the revolutionary power confined its politics to cooptive means. Whether Hungary in 1956 or the Dominican Republic

²⁶ The "velvet" revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary which erupted in 1989 challenge this general proposition as neither the West nor East employed a confrontational strategy regarding these revolutionary situations. However, nor did they both employ cooptive strategies. One side, the Soviet Union, simply retreated. Perhaps, Gorbachev overestimated the cooptive power of the socialist system once the coercive mechanisms of maintaining the socialist bloc had been lifted. Or perhaps, the Soviet leadership was unwilling to bear the costs of another confrontational response. However, in all these states, the old states structures quickly collapsed without Soviet backing, thus creating a vacuum conducive for revolutionary transformation not unlike that produced in Angola in 1976. Of course, the East European revolutionaries had a different ideology of opposition (market capitalism and liberal democracy) and a different international patron (the capitalist system of states), thereby producing a different revolutionary outcome.

in 1965, Lenin's collected works or Radio Liberty broadcasts are no match for AK-47s or F-16s in the short run.

Cases like Zimbabwe, in which the revolutionary power employs a confrontational strategy and the status quo power employs a confrontational strategy, are the most complicated to predict. For instance, what if the Lancaster House accords ended without a settlement, and was quickly followed by the beginning of an internationalized conventional war? The conditions for a revolutionary outcome might have been met; status quo cooption might have failed. To predict outcomes under these set of conditions, two qualifications must be added. First, the earlier cooption is employed, the greater the chances of avoiding revolutionary outcomes. Second, cooption attempts which do not generate a settlement before the state under seige has been destroyed, fail.²⁷ While theoretically unsatisfying, elements of contingency and timing are present in this set of cases. However, compared with the other mix of strategies, we can at least state that the probability of revolutionary outcome for this category of cases is less than when both antagonistic superpowers pursued confrontational strategies, but greater than the other two mixes of strategies described above.

Theories of Revolution Revisited

The Individual

Theories of revolution which focus on the individual cannot explain the differences in outcome between Angola and Zimbabwe. Without question, people in both countries experienced "relative deprivation."²⁸ But to account for variation in outcomes, one would have to posit that people in Angola were more deprived than people in Zimbabwe. However circumstantial, many historians have assumed that Portuguese colonialism was more severe than British methods. But greater exploitation does not correlate with greater

²⁷ For instance, an American cooption strategy in Vietnam in 1971 would have failed as the South Vietnamese state was already destroyed. However, a cooption strategy in Vietnam in 1945 or even 1954 might have succeeded.

²⁸ See Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*.

deprivation, as deprivation is measured relative to expectations. Moreover, we have no way of establishing a threshold for when a certain amount of deprivation leads to revolution, and which level does not. Even if the hypothesis that Angolans were more relatively deprived than Zimbabweans were probable, we have no way to test it.

Second, this level of theory gives us no clue as to what kind of revolutionary outcome is to be expected. Assuming for the moment that the Angolans were more revolutionary because of a greater level of relative deprivation than Zimbabweans, why were they (and they being only the MPLA) marxist-leninist revolutionaries? To explain the kind of revolutionary outcome requires a different level of theory.

Another variety of theory focused on the individual might posit that the MPLA was more radical than ZANU, and thus proceeded towards a more revolutionary outcome. This argument, however, only looks convincing in hindsight. A comparison of MPLA ideological statements in 1974 with ZANU declarations in 1979 would have lead to the exact opposite prediction. ZANU, not the MPLA, was the liberation movement which declared itself a marxist-leninist vanguard party three years before independence. ZANU's Mwenge 2 program (1972) was much more explicit about the movements socialist intentions than any MPLA document produced before Angolan independence. Finally, in comparing individuals, one would be hardpressed to argue that Agostinho Neto or Lucio Lara, let alone Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, were more radical than Robert Mugabe or Edgar Tekere. While individual ideologies no doubt played a significant role in the devlopment trajectories of both countries, so too did the conditions within which these personal agendas were formed and implemented. To understand these larger forces requires a different level of theory.

Political Conflict Model

This level of theory is most useful in describing the actual balance of forces present in a revolutionary situation. In both Angola and Zimbabwe, revolutionary situations did not simply happen; they were organized by movements capable of amassing of resources to challenge the existing order. In the early 1960s, when the challengers to colonial authorities claimed to be the

legitimate authorities in Angola and Zimbabwe, a condition of multiple sovereignty emerged.²⁹ This condition only ended when a new, single political entity could once again claim sovereignty over the whole country.³⁰ The existence of multiply sovereignty may be the defining characteristic of a revolutionary situation.

Discovering multiple sovereignty, however, does not explain why it emerged, nor why some conditions of multiple sovereignty lead to revolutionary outcomes and some do not. Regarding the first question, structural contradictions generate multiple sovereignty; theories of revolution based on structural analyses thus offer the best approximation for why revolutionary situations occur. Regarding the second question, internal multiple sovereigns ally with external sovereigns to create a balance of forces wedded to the revolutionary situation which can be greater than the internal resources of the state under siege. Sizing up the opposing factions in a revolutionary situation thus must be done in an international context. As discerned from the two cases examined in this study, the threshold for a revolutionary outcome emerging out of a condition of multiply sovereignty is crossed when the revolutionary challengers (both internal and external) assemble sufficient resources to destroy the governmental and economic structures of the old regime. Revolutionary outcomes are avoided when the existing regime can end the condition of multiple sovereignty without ceding all power. In both outcomes, how external resources and interventions affect the balance of power between the old regime and the revolutionary challengers is critical to explaining variances in outcomes.

Structural Theories

Structural analyses, and most importantly marxist analyses, provide the most comprehensive explanation for the causes of revolutionary situations from within a given state and society.

²⁹ See Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 191.

³⁰ In Angola, this condition was very short lived, as UNITA quickly regrouped to challenge the MLPA's sovereign authority. In this sense, the Angolan revolutionary outcome also precipitated another revolutionary situation. Zimbabwe had a similar problem of multiple sovereignty after independence which was ended with brutal military force by the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland.

In focusing on the inherent tension between the colonials as the exploiter class and the Africans as the exploited class, structural analyses isolate a starting point for revolutionary situations. However, most fail to account for those external factors which have the potential to transform internal class-conflicts into struggles not directly related to class constitutions. For instance, in Angola and Zimbabwe, the leaders of the peasant-based revolts against colonial landowners adopted the discourse of socialism to describe their struggle. Yet historically, not all peasant-based struggles adopted socialist aims. Classical marxist analyses, in fact, assign the peasantry no revolutionary role, especially in the move from capitalism to socialism.

Second, marxist analyses of revolutions assume that those revolutions which happen were inevitable. According to Skocpol,

this definition (of social revolution) makes successful sociopolitical transformation --actual change of state and class structures -- part of the specification of what is to be called a social revolution, rather than leaving change contingent on the definition of "revolution" as many other scholars do. The rationale is my belief that successful social revolutions probably emerge from different macro-structural and historical contexts than do either failed social revolutions or political transformations that are not accompanied by transformations of class relations.....my concept of social revolution necessarily highlights successful change as a basic defining feature.³¹

In southern Africa, this conception presumes that Angola's "macro-structural and historical context" was revolutionary, while Zimbabwe's was not. Differences undoubtedly are numerous. Regarding historical context, Angola was colonized by the Portuguese, Zimbabwe by the British. Moreover, the Portuguese had a presence in Angola for hundreds of years, not decades as in Zimbabwe. Second, the goals and methods of colonization were different. In the earlier centuries of colonization, Portugal exported slave labor from Angola, a trade which never reached Zimbabwe. Third, Angola was a Portuguese penal colony; Zimbabwe was

³¹ Skocpol. *States and Social Revolution*, p. 5. Though inconsistent, Marx, himself, was less deterministic. See, for instance, his discussion of the "accidents" and "chance" in world history in Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, (New York: 1940), p. 86.

colonized by aspiring farmers.³² Fourth, after slavery ended in the nineteenth century, Portuguese colonials organized an agricultural semi-proletariat to man their plantations through force and coercion. In Zimbabwe, an emerging African peasantry coexisted and competed with white farmers, captured by the market, but free from direct colonial subjugation.³³ Angolans were forced to become peasants; Zimbabweans chose the peasant option.

Such differences might be sufficient to conclude that Portuguese colonialism was more entrenched, more abusive, and thus created structural conditions for revolutionary transformations. Whereas Zimbabweans peasants perhaps only wanted the return of their land, Angolan peasants had become so alienated from their previous production practices as to agitate for a new revolutionary form of economic organization.³⁴ The almost immediate collapse of Portuguese control in 1975, however, suggests that the colonial system was not that pervasive. Unlike Zimbabwe, in fact, much of Angola was still not incorporated within the colonial-capitalist economy by 1975. Likewise, a smaller percentage of Africans worked in non-agricultural sectors of the economy. Zimbabwe probably had more rigorously defined class structures and class consciousness than Angola, despite the shorter time period of colonial rule in Zimbabwe. This macro-structural analysis would conclude that Zimbabwe should have experienced a revolutionary outcome, not Angola.

However, the reverse analysis of structural differences between Angola and Zimbabwe is equally non-compelling. An analysis of macro-structural conditions in the two former colonies could conclude that Angolans succeeded in implementing a radical outcome because (1) fewer colonials were there to resist, and (2)

³² See Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, chapter 3.

³³ See Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrillas War in Zimbabwe*, p. 25 and in passim. Of course, as competition became more fierce, colonial coercive methods eventually threatened the peasant option, thus creating the need for the national liberation war.

³⁴ Many leftist scholars on southern Africa expressed almost euphoric sympathy for such an interpretation of class struggle in Lusophone Africa at the time. See, for instance, Basil Davidson, *The People's Cause: A History of Guerrillas in Africa*, (London: Longman, 1981).

Portuguese colonialism was less entrenched than the Rhodesian system. In other words, the balance of forces between the colonized and the colonizers in Angola was more conducive to a revolutionary outcome than the balance in Zimbabwe.

The historical record, however, does not support such an interpretation. First, quantitatively, the 350,00-450,00 Portuguese living in Angola in 1974 represented a much larger percentage of the population than the 200,000 white settlers living in Rhodesia in 1979.³⁵ Moreover, as already noted, the Portuguese had been in Angola for over 400 years, while the Rhodesian settlers only arrived at the end of the nineteenth century. A much larger percentage of Rhodesians, however, remained in Zimbabwe after independence than did Portuguese in Angola after 1976. This crucial contrast -- the exodus of the Portuguese versus the more minimal emigration of Rhodesian colonials -- was a direct consequence of the Angolan civil war. As late as April 1975, a year after the Portuguese coup, less than 20,000 had left Angola.³⁶ The flight only began when it became clear that a peaceful transition was impossible. In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, a total exodus was avoided when it became clear that a peaceful transition was possible. Entrenchment of colonial structures was very much contingent on the method of transition to independence.

Thus, neither interpretation of the "macro-structural" differences in Angola and Zimbabwe can explain the divergent revolutionary outcomes. Only when these internal structures are interpreted within the historical context of their transitions to independence -- transitions heavily influenced by external forces -- can their relevance be fully appreciated.

Third, while perhaps correctly identifying class conflict as a source of revolutionary situations, marxists then wrongly assume that all revolutionary outcomes are the result of "class-based

³⁵ In 1969, 230,000 Europeans lived in Rhodesia, constituting 4.5% of the population. In 1982, 147,000 Europeans lived in Zimbabwe, constituting 2.0% of the population. See *Statistical Yearbook of Zimbabwe, 1985*, (Harare, Zimbabwe: Central Statistical Office, 1985) p. 15.

³⁶ Charles Mohr, "Strife Among 3 Liberation Groups Casts Doubt on Future of Angola," *New York Times*, April 21, 1975.

revolts from below."³⁷ In the cases of Angola and Zimbabwe, oppressed classes and first and foremost the peasantry, undoubtedly supported the national liberation movements. But their actual role in the revolutionary situations, much less the revolutionary outcomes is the subject of considerable controversy. In Angola, the "masses" had little to do with the civil war transition in 1975-76. After independence, they were the objects of socio-economic transformations initiated by the MPLA vanguard.³⁸ In Zimbabwe, the role of the peasantry in the liberation war is the subject a highly disputed historiographical debate.³⁹ Suffice to conclude that class-based revolt from below -- a necessary element for most marxist definitions of revolution -- is not readily present in these two cases.⁴⁰

Finally, marxist analyses of revolutionary outcomes assume a linear progression in history in which revolutions naturally lead to more advanced levels of social development. As Marx said, "revolutions are the locomotives of history." This notion of history suggests that revolutionary outcomes in capitalist-based economies like Angola and Zimbabwe must inevitably lead to a higher [sic] level of social development, socialism.⁴¹ Again, however, this conception cannot explain the variance in outcome between Angola and Zimbabwe. Was Zimbabwe not ready for socialism, whereas Angola was? Second, socialist revolutions, or more specifically,

³⁷ Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 4. Of course, Marx himself explained revolutions in similar terms.

³⁸ Though it is difficult to tell how they are organized (whether mobilized or terrorized), the Ovimbundu peasants under UNITA's control have had nothing to do with the MPLA's revolutionary project since 1976.

³⁹ The two sides of the debate are most elequently presented in Norma Kriger, "Struggles for Independence: Rural Conflicts in Zimbabwe's War of Liberation," (Johns Hopkins University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1985); and Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*, (London: James Currey, 1985).

⁴⁰ Again, marxists could argue that varying in the class-conflict content explains the variance in outcome fo these two cases. However, the extent of class mobilization was much greater in Zimbabwe than Angola.

⁴¹ As already mentioned, many socialist theories during the time of decolonization provided special caveats as to how Third World economies could make the direct transition to socialism without undergoing developed capitalism.

Leninist seizures of state power for the state expropriation of property, were not the natural next stage of world historical development. Rather, they were a historically specific form of government and economy which thrived in the twentieth century, but is now in rapid decline. Its manifestation in Angola was a consequence of this historically contingent phenomenon, and not some more general law of world development. The sooner we forget about these so-called stages of history, the better.

Rethinking the Independent Variable: System versus State Interests

The lack of international factors in theorizing about revolutions stems in part from the dominance of realism in our conceptions of the international system. Thinking of states as rational unitary actors seeking to maximize national interests provides a poor framework for understanding why external forces cared about internal revolutionary situations in such peripheral places as Angola and Zimbabwe. Only when states are defined in relation to their systems can their reactions to peripheral revolutions be understood.⁴² States have interests which are defined not only vis-a-vis other states, but also vis-a-vis the international system which they seek to preserve, expand, or destroy. In the international capitalist system, the United States and other major Western powers which benefit from this system have long-term interests in preserving its essential ingredients, including most importantly private property, free trade, and fluid capital flows.⁴³ Governments and economies which do not abide by

⁴² Like Wallerstein, I assume that a state's activity is determined by its position within a system. Unlike Wallerstein, however, I treat the Soviet Union and its former satellite of socialist states as "anti-systemic" or counter-systemic actors rather than as members of what Wallerstein calls the semi-periphery. As the socialist project collapses, however, these states may very well assume a position in the semi-periphery (or periphery) of the capitalist international system. (See Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System.")

⁴³ Such shared norms about internal order implies greater homogeneity than Hedley Bull's "international society," as Bull defined "international society" as a system with shared norms about relations between states, not within states. See Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.

these principles are either punished or banished from the system.⁴⁴ Revolutionary situations which threaten these norms, rules, and institutions of the international capitalist system must be either crushed or coopted.

In the former socialist system, the Soviet Union played a parallel role to the United States in preserving and expanding its system's organizing principles, including state ownership of the means of production, Party control of the state, and limited foreign capital intervention. Those capitalist states which challenged this system were designated as the enemy. Within the system, those revolutionary situations which challenged these principles had to be squashed.⁴⁵ Outside of the system, those revolutionary situations which challenged the capitalist system had to be supported.

These systemic interests pervade, cross, and ignore state boundaries. The artificial separation between the "domestic" and the "international", between security and economic objectives, distorts our understanding of how these systemic interests elicit state behavior which often contradicts so-called rational pursuits of national interests. For instance, regarding the system analyzed in this study, analytical cataloging of Soviet and American national interests does very little to illuminate their motivations for becoming involved with the revolutionary situations in southern Africa. What national interest was at stake for either the United States or the Soviet Union in Angola or Zimbabwe? Neither superpower had notable economic interests to promote or defend in either state.⁴⁶ Nor could Angola or Zimbabwe be considered vital

⁴⁴ As Keohane notes, "Once an open capitalist system has been established ...it is therefore likely to favor pro-capitalist governments and disadvantage socialist ones." Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 253.

⁴⁵ After 1968, this notion was codified as the Brezhnev Doctrine, a rationale for why the Soviet Union had to use force to passify "counterrevolutionary" elements.

⁴⁶ During the liberation war, Western leaders often asked Joshua Nkomo what kind of debts, political or economic, he was incurring by receiving Soviet support. When he replied, that the Soviet Union had demanded nothing, the Western officials would not believe him. They could not understand the Soviet policy because they only calculated Soviet interests through their

to either Soviet or American security interests. However, when perceived as the shifting frontline in the battle between the capitalist and socialist systems, these peripheral states assumed global significance.⁴⁷ Only when the United States is conceived as the pillar of the international capitalist system, and the Soviet Union is viewed as the former center of the international socialist system, can their concern for promoting or containing revolutionary causes which support their respective systems be understood.

Towards a Theory of Revolution in an International Context:
Generalized Hypotheses and an Agenda for Future Research

What more general conclusions about the typology of revolutionary theory can be derived from this study? First, regarding the category of revolutions in peripheral countries, the composition of the international system critically defines the ideologies and strategies available to revolutionaries in achieving their objective. The greater the heterogeneity among the great powers, the greater the opportunity for revolutionary outcomes. For instance, a bipolar system lacking shared norms about the international states system creates fertile conditions for producing revolutionary and counterrevolutionary outcomes. Post-revolutionary regimes will gravitate towards one or the other system. "Third way" revolutions are highly unlikely. As outlined in this study, the system in place after World War II offers a most

Western rubrics. While profits may be a primary consideration to capitalist states, the Soviet state and economy before perestroika placed little value on rational foreign economic relations. Almost all Soviet economic relations with all states of socialist orientation, in fact, were conducted at a loss for the USSR before perestroika. As Rostislav Ulyanovky, the former head of Third World relations for the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, told the author, 'we never in my thirty years of working for the Party thought about profits in our relations with other countries.'

⁴⁷ I emphasize "shifting" to underscore the importance of Soviet and American perceptions of changing correlation of forces. In and of themselves, the loss or gain of one small peripheral state from one system to the next was not important. However, when perceived as a "domino" in a series of revolutionary outcomes leading towards the eventual triumph of one system over another, internal instabilities in remote areas of the Third World had consequences for the security of the entire international system.

striking example of how these principles work. That almost every revolutionary challenge within the international capitalist world adopted marxist ideas and leninist strategies is not just coincidence. That all anti-systemic movements in the socialist system of states gravitated towards liberal, democratic ideals also confirms the importance of the bipolar system in defining the course of revolutionary activity.⁴⁸

To gain further universality, these theoretical propositions must be tested against other antagonistic, bipolar systems. For instance, regarding the balance of power and ideologies during and immediately after the French Revolution, this framework would predict that revolutionary upheavals throughout central and southern Europe would espouse the same ideals of the French Revolution, and be opposed by all the other great powers. Revolutionary movements with aims or strategies different from the French example and not opposed by the other great powers would weaken the explanatory power of this international level of analysis.

If a heterogenous system generates a window of opportunity for peripheral revolutions, does a homogenous system inhibit revolutions? Does the absence the antagonistic bi-polar system (the independent variable) produce a different menu of revolutionary outcomes (the dependent variable)?⁴⁹ The history of revolutions during the Concert of Europe suggests that anti-systemic movements in the periphery under such conditions stand

⁴⁸ A striking affirmation of the weight of this bipolarity is a comparison of the opposition, trade-union movements in Poland (Solidarity) and South Africa (COSATU). While both organizations claim(ed) to represent the basic needs of workers in their countries in struggle against the ruling class, the location of Poland in the "socialist world" induced an ideology of opposition which championed free market, capitalist principles whereas South Africa's location in the "capitalist world" induced an ideology of opposition espousing socialist ideas.

⁴⁹ On the importance of accounting for such covariation, see Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development", Paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, October 15-16, 1982.

little chance of survival.⁵⁰ Coordinated interventions by all major powers, be they confrontational or cooptive, in the defense of one system presented powerful obstacles to revolutionary challengers.

Since the collapse of communism, the newly emerging international system exhibits a similar high degree of shared norms between states, and an increasing proportion of homogeneity of regimes and economies within states.⁵¹ In this new world order, the Soviet Union no longer seeks to promote anti-capitalist regimes. On the contrary, "new political thinking" has promoted the reintegration of states of socialist orientation into the world capitalist system, including the Soviet Union itself. In such a homogenous system, conflict between great powers will diminish.⁵² As such, external intervention in revolutionary situations will be on one side only, that of the status quo.

The collapse of the socialist pole already has triggered revolutionary transformations in almost every former socialist state.⁵³ From Angola to Laos, former states of socialist orientation are gravitating back towards the very international capitalist system they originally sought to escape. Similarly, revolutionary situations which crystalized in the cold war context, such as in South Africa, Eritrea, or Palestine, now appear to have

⁵⁰ Before predicting outcomes based on the composition of the international system, a quantitative evaluation must be made regarding the "tightness" of both the shared norms and the alliance structure. If both are tight, the international system will serve as a strong deterrent to any revolutionary upheaval. However, if both are loose, the system may be indifferent to peripheral revolutions. As Kissinger noted in describing the Concert of Europe's ambivalence about intervention in Spain in 1820, "the difference in domestic structures between the constitutional states of the West and the autocratic Eastern powers made common action feasible only in case of an overriding danger." (Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 249.)

⁵¹ The features of this new system are detailed in Jim Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "The Mythical Metaphor of Multipolarity," (unpublished manuscript, October 1990).

⁵² See Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 17, Nos 3-4 (Summer/Fall 1983).

⁵³ In form and substance, revolutions and counterrevolutions are the same phenomena. See Calvert, *Revolution and Counterrevolution*.

lost their transformational potential. In South Africa, where socialism once seemed inevitable, the opposition forces now must rebuff the weight of the entire international system if they are to complete a social revolution there. Though the outcome is still uncertain, it appears that many former supporters of revolutionary transformation are now willing to opt for a settlement which will not threaten the existing capitalist state and economy. Similarly, in responding to the new world order, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), once a militant marxist-leninist guerrilla movement, now espouses free elections and a market economy as part of their "revolutionary" vision.⁵⁴ Other anti-systemic movements, such as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, which have not changed their ideological orientation, will have to fight not only the local military, but the United States marines, the IMF, and the entire international system to implement their revolutionary agenda.

The Future of Revolutions

The emerging homogenous international system, however, does not signal the end of all revolutionary upheaval. In certain circumstances, the entire international system can be bucked by major revolutions.

As noted in the introduction, the extent to which the international system intervenes upon a revolutionary situation varies inversely with the size of the country in revolution; the smaller the country, the greater the impact of the international system on the revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome.⁵⁵

Conversely, the larger the country, the less instrumental international factors are. For instance, during the Cold War, Soviet and American interventions were decisive in determining the outcomes of revolutionary situations in such small countries as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Hungary, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia,

⁵⁴ See Eritrean People's Liberation Movement, "National Democratic Program," (Washington, DC, March 19, 1987).

⁵⁵ This hypothesis concurs with the more general proposition that the influence of the international system on small states is greater than its influence on large states. See James Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, (Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

Angola, Zimbabwe, and Grenada. The role of the superpowers, however, was less prominent in the China or Iran.⁵⁶

Only one type of revolutionary situation can withstand the pervasive force of a homogenous international system: a revolution which unfolds in a country large enough to mobilize resources internally sufficient to insulate the revolutionary process from international constraints and interventions. This rare moment defines what others have called the "Great Revolutions" : the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and perhaps the twentieth century revolutions in China and Iran. At least in the first two instances, the revolution themselves then changed the international system. The anti-monarchical movement in France challenged the European order to such an extent that the entire constellation of European powers united to "contain" the French revolutionary project. Similarly, the Russian Revolution represented a direct assault on the world capitalist order around which the other world powers also united to contain. After the French Revolution, the international system only returned to equilibrium after the French revolutionaries had been defeated in war.⁵⁷ Similarly, the international system of the twentieth century is only now returning to a condition of greater homogeneity now that the Leninist regimes comprising the socialist system of states have crumbled. In the near future, even Russia and the other Soviet republics will be resocialized into the international capitalist system.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ The minimal influence of the new international system today on the revolutionary situation in the Soviet Union also conforms with this hypothesis.

⁵⁷ On the tendency towards equilibrium after revolutionary disruptions, see Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, chapter seven. It appears that the speed to which the revolutionary challenger returns to the fold of the international system varies proportionally with the size of the revolutionary state's resources. Crudely speaking, France challenged the system for 23 years; the Soviet Union managed to do so for 73 years. The smaller Iran appears to be returning to the international system after a decade of resistance.

⁵⁸ In both resocialization processes, however, the international system had changed as a consequence of the revolutionary challenge. While defeated in the short run, the French Revolution introduced ideas of constitutional democracy and individual liberties which subsequently were adapted and adopted by most of the great powers in the Western capitalist

The present trend towards homogeneity, however, is not the end of history. New conflicts will trigger new revolutionary situations, new revolutionary outcomes, and possibly even new balances of power and ideology within the international system. If we are to understand these inevitable disjunctures of world history, we must abandon our static divisions between domestic and international, between comparative politics and international relations theory, and instead seek to formulate models capable of capturing the dynamic between revolutions and the international system. Hopefully, this study has been one small step towards this greater project.

system. (See E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848*, (New York: Mentor Books, 1962), chapter one, and R.R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). The Soviet socialist challenge also triggered significant changes within the capitalist system which most likely will outlive the socialist system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERVIEWS

Anderson, Christopher, Zimbabwean Minister of State for Public Service, former Minister in Rhodesia, (Harare, July 19, 1989).

Asoyan, Boris, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Southern Africa; former Ambassador to Lesotho, (Moscow, September 20, 1989; October 25, 1990).

Avakov, Dr. Rachik, Chief of Department, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, (IMEMO), specialist in the Third World, (Moscow, September 15, 1989; November 5, 1990).

Belinchuk, Sergei, Chief of African Department, All-Union Market Research Institute, USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, (Moscow, September 1989).

Brenchley, R.N., Senior Manager, Corporate Finance, Standard Chartered Merchant Bank Zimbabwe, (Harare, July 19, 1988).

Brewster, Kingman, US Ambassador to London during the Carter Administration, (Oxford, June 16, 1988).

Brutents, Karen, First Deputy, International Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (Moscow, March 28, 1991).

Chambati, Ariston, ZAPU Central Committee, Secretary of Information and Intelligence, Zimbabwean Ambassador to West Germany, (Harare, July 26, 1988).

Chavanduka, Gordon, General Secretary of United African National Council (Muzorewa's organization), (Harare, July 14, 1989).

Chikerema, James, ZAPU Vice President, FROLIZI Chairman, (Harare, July 16, 1989).

Chufrin, Gennady, Deputy Director, Institute of Oriental Studies, Soviet Academy of Sciences, (Moscow, November 6, 1991).

Clark, Senator Dick, Chairman of Senate sub-Committee on Africa, author of Clark Amendment, (Washington, August 9, 1989).

Crocker, Chester, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1981-1988, (telephone interview, March 16, 1989; personal interview, April 19, 1989.)

Dabengwa, Dumiso, ZIPRA Chief of Intelligence, (Bulawayo August 8, 1988 and Harare 1989).

Davidow, Jeffrey, US Special Representative to Salisbury (during the transition), former Ambassador to Zambia, current Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, (Harare, August

2, 1989).

dos Santos, Carlos, First Secretary, Mozambique Embassy, Zimbabwe. (Harare, July, 1989)

de Almeida, Roberto, MPLA Politburo, Secretary for Ideology, (Luanda, August 24, 1989).

de Andrade, Joaquim Pinto, former Honorary President of the MPLA, leader of the Revolt Active, (Luanda, August 25 & 27, 1989).

Fonseca, Flavio, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister, (Luanda, August 28, 1989).

Fugit, Ed, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy in Zimbabwe, former political officer, American Embassy in Angola (1975), and Angola desk officer, US Department of State, (Harare, July 8 & 19, 1988; August 2, 1989).

Galkin, Alexander, Deputy-Rector, Institute of Social Sciences, Central Committee of the CPSU, (Moscow, November 1, 1990).

Galucci, Jerry, former First Political Officer, US Embassy in Zimbabwe, and Angolan Desk Officer, US Dept. of State, (Harare, July 11, 1988; September 1, 1988;).

Gromyko, Anatoly, Director, Institute of African Studies, (Moscow, December 13, 1990).

Hamadziripi, Henry, ZANU Secretary of Treasury, DARE Revolutionary Council, (Harare, August 14, 1988).

Hove, Richard, former ZANU Secretary for External Relations, Minister of Mines, (Harare, July 31, 1989).

Hussey, Pamela, Deputy Director, Southern African Regional Programs, U.S. Agency for International Development, Zimbabwe, (Harare, July 21, 1988).

Ivanov, Alexander Geogrivich, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SSSR, Angola Desk, (Moscow, September 11, 1989).

Jorge, Paulo, former MPLA Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, (Luanda, August 23, 1988 and August 19 & 22, 1989).

Kangai, Kumbirai, ZANU Central Committee, DARE member, Minister of Energy, (Harare, July 17, 1989)

Kangai, Trivafi, ZANU Representative in the US, Director of Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, (Harare, July 28, 1988).

Konzika, Immanuel, Vice-President of Partido Democratica de Angola (PDA), senior official in FNLA, (Luanda, August 22, 1989).

Kossikov, Sergei, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Angola, (Luanda, August 23, 25 & 28, 1989).

Krainov, Nikolai, Executive Secretary, Soviet Part of

Intergovernmental Soviet-Angolan Commission for Economic, Techno-Scientific Cooperation and Trade, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, (Moscow, September 18, 1989).

Krassilnikov, Dr. Alexander, Senior Researcher, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Soviet Academy of Sciences, and member of Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, (Moscow, February 27, 1991).

Kun, Sun, Head of Division of West Asia and Africa, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, former Chinese Embassy official in Dar es Salaam during the liberation struggles in Angola and Zimbabwe, (Stanford, 1989).

Lara, Lucio, former MPLA Politburo member, No. 2 in the MPLA for twenty years; First Secretary of the Angolan People's Assembly, (Luanda, August 21 & 23, 1988; and August 27, 1989).

Lima, Olga, Department Head, International Organizations, Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Luanda, August 25, 1988).

Lutov, Alexander, Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, Zimbabwe, (Harare, July 28, 1989).

Makan, Simon, ANC Representative to the Soviet Union, member of the ANC National Executive Committee, (Moscow, October 26, 1990).

Malianga, Moton, one of founding members of ZANU, former ZANU Treasurer, current Deputy Minister of Finance, (Harare, July 13, 1989).

Martins, Ismael Gaspar, former Angolan Minister of Finance, (Luanda, August 26, 1988).

Matatu, Godwin, journalist, close to ZANU, (Harare, July 25, 1988).

Mathema, Cain, editor of Zimbabwe Worker, ZAPU cadre trained in the Soviet Union, (Harare, July 26, 1988).

Mbambo, Walter, former ZAPU guerrilla, trained in the Soviet Union from 1963-1965, one of the first cadres to cross into Rhodesia, (Harare, July 18, 1988).

McClellan, General Alexander, Commander in Chief in Rhodesian and Zimbabwean armies, (Harare, July 25, 1989).

McHenry, Donald, US Representative and Deputy Representative to the United Nations, 1977-1980, (Washington, November 10, 1989).

Moose, Richard, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1977-1980, (Washington, November 8, 1989).

Moyo, Nelson, ZAPU Representative in Botswana, (Harare, August 1, 1988).

Moyo, Zephaya, ZIPRA Commander, (Bulawayo, August 8, 1988).

Msipa, Cephas, ZAPU Central Committee, (Harare, July 27, 1988).

Msika, Joseph, ZAPU Vice-President, Minister of Public Construction

and National Housing, (Harare, July 14, 1989).

Mubako. Simba, ZANU Legal Secretary, and Minister of National Supplies, (Harare, July 26, 1989).

Musarurwa, Willie, ZAPU Publicity Secretary, (Harare, July 29, 1988; Stanford, May 1989; Harare, July 1989).

Mutasa, Didymus, ZANU Secretary for Foreign Relations, Speaker of Parliament, (Harare, phone interview, August 8, 1988).

Ndanga, O., Zimbabwean Deputy Foreign Minister, first Zimbabwean Ambassador to the Soviet Union, (Harare, July 24, 1988).

Ndlovu, Eduard, senior ZAPU official, Deputy Minister of Energy, (Harare, August 2, 1988).

Neto, Ruth, Chairman of OMA, Organization of Angolan Women, and Central Committee member of the MPLA, (Luanda, August 23, 1989).

Nkomo, John, ZAPU Central Committee, Minister of Labor, (Harare, July 12 & 13, 1989)

Nyandoro, George, ZAPU Secretary of Treasury, co-founder of FROLIZI, (Harare, August 13, 1988 & July 16, 1989).

Nyathi, Isaac, ZAPU Central Committee, MP, Ambassador to Nigeria, (Harare, August 16, 1988).

Papetela, author, Angolan Minister of Education, (Luanda, August 25, 1988).

Poland, Peter, Principal Agricultural Economist, World Bank Mission in Zimbabwe, (Harare, August 1, 1988).

Pokrovskaja, Ekaterina, Research Staff, All-Union Market Research Institute, USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, (Moscow, September 1989).

Prokoviev, Yuri, Soviet Embassy in Angola, (Luanda, August 26, 1988)

Qin, Yin, Research Fellow, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, (Stanford, March 22, 1989).

Robertson, John, Manager, Economics Department, RAL Merchant Bank Limited, Zimbabwe, (Harare, August 8, 1988).

Samoilov, Eduard, Deputy Secretary for African Affairs, Soviet-Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, former Soviet liaison with ZAPU, (Moscow, December 7, 1991).

Sharma, Vijay, Manager Financial Services, Grindlays Bank, Zimbabwe, (Harare, July 18, 1988).

Shava, Frederick, ZANU Central Committee, ZANU Representative in Europe during the war, Minister of State, (Harare, September 2, 1989).

Shestakov, Col. Nikolai, Military and Air Attache, Soviet Embassy, Zimbabwe.

Shiri, Perrence, Air Commodore, Air Force of Zimbabwe, former ZANLA Commander, (Harare, July 21, 1989).

Shulakov, Lev, Commercial Officer, USSR Trade Representative, Zimbabwe, (Harare, June 28, 1989).

Shultz, George, US Secretary of State, 1982-1988, (Stanford, March 7, 1989).

Smirnov, Alexander, Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, Angola, (Luanda, August 23, 1988, & August 21, 1989).

Smith, Judge John, Minister of Justice for Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and Robert Mugabe, (Harare, July 29, 1988).

Snesar, Vladimir, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Zimbabwe.

Sokolov, Dr. Vladimir, Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, Zimbabwe, (Harare, September 1, 1989).

Solodovnikov, Vasili, Vice-President, Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, former Ambassador to Zambia (during Zimbabwe liberation war), and former Director of the Institute for African Studies, (Moscow, September 1989; December 5, 1991).

Starushenko, Gleb, Deputy Director, Institute for African Studies, Soviet Academy of Sciences, (Moscow, November 16, 1991).

Tungamirai, Air Marshal Josiah, former ZIPRA Commander, head of the Zimbabwe Air Force, (Harare, July 21, 1989).

Tsyplakov, Sergei, Head of Sector, Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, (March 27, 1991).

Valdez, Rafael, Senior Researcher, Department of Ethnology, Cuban Academy of Sciences, worked extensively in Angola, (Stanford, April 10, 1989).

Vasev, Vladillen, Secretary for East and Southern Africa, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1981-1988, (Crocker's counterpart during the Tripartite negotiations), (Moscow, September 13, 1989).

Vieira, Jose Luandino, author, Director of Angolan Writer's Union, (Luanda, August 21, 1989).

Ulyanovsky, Rostislav, former First Deputy Secretary, International Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU, (Moscow, March 7, 1991; March 27, 1991).

Veryomin, Yuri, Novosti Press Correspondent, (Harare, July 7, 1988).

Zavgorodni, Dmitri, Secretary for African Affairs, Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, (Moscow, November 14, 1991).

Zondo, Temba, ZAPU Central Committee, (Harare, August 2, 1988).

INTERVIEWS NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION

Correspondent, TASS, (Harare, July 22, 1988).

Ex-combatants, (ZIPRA and ZANLA), Zimbabwe Project, Harare, July 18, 1988.

Executive, Tiny Rowland.

Executive, Angolan Red Cross, (Luanda, August 25, 1988).

Official, Angolan Ministry of Agriculture, (Luanda, August 23, 1988; August 17, 1989).

Official, Angolan Foreign Trade Ministry, (Luanda, August 25, 1988).

Official, Angolan Ministry of Forestry, (Luanda, August 18, 1989)

Official, Angolan Ministry of Planning, (Luanda, August 23, 1988).

(former) Officer, Rhodesian Army, (Harare, July 26, 1988).

Officer, United Nations Development Project (UNDP),)Luanda, August 27, 1988).

Officer, United Nations High Commission of Refugees, (UNHCR), Luanda, August 27, 1988.

Vice-President, Gulf Oil, Luanda Angola, (Luanda, August 24, 1988).

INFORMATIONAL CONVERSATIONS¹

Askin, Steve, journalist, Harare.

Austin, Reginald, Dean of Law School, University of Zimbabwe, ZAPU Legal Secretary at Lancaster House negotiations.

Belyaev, Anatolii, Research Fellow, South African Sector, Institute of Africa, Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Bender, Gerald, Professor, University of Southern California.

Brickhill, Jeremy, former ZAPU Director of Research, (Oxford & London, 1989 & 1990).

Brickhill, Paul, owner, Grassroots Books, (Harare, summers of 1988 and 1989).

¹ Undated listings denotes several conversations over several years.

Clifton, Tim, First Secretary, British Embassy, Angola, (Luanda, August 1988).

Clough, Michael, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.

Cobbet, William, PLANACT, (Johannesburg, South Africa, March 1990).

Coelho, Domingos, Vice-President, Conoco, Luanda, Angola.

Darch, Agnes, Harare.

Darch, Colin, Senior Documentalist, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, Harare.

Davidson, Professor Apollon, Institute of World History, African Department, Moscow.

Demkina, Ludmilla, Research Fellow, Institute of African Studies, South African specialist.

Desai, Hardi, South African student activist at University of Zimbabwe. Deported in 1990).

Fituni, Leonid, Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Angolan specialist.

Frederickse, Julie, (Harare).

Gamboa, Elio, ANGOP, Angola News Agency, (Luanda).

Henningson, Colonel, Military Attache, US Embassy, Zimbabwe, (August 1988).

Hamadziripi, Rafael, leader of ZANU internal guerrilla movement.

Herbst, Jeffrey, Professor, Princeton University.

Horta, Jose Ramos, senior FRETILIN member, confidant of Samora Machel, (Oxford).

Inman, Mike, FINA (oil company) , Luanda.

Jaudim, Joao Manuel, military correspondent, Jornal de Angola, Luanda, Angola.

Joliffe, Jill, journalist, (meetings in Lisbon and Luanda).

Khazanov, Anatoly, Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, Angolan specialist.

Kirpsha, Alexander, Director, Soviet Cultural Centre, Harare.

Krasnopevtseva, Tatiana, Senior Researcher, Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Zimbabwe specialist.

Kokorev, Vladimir, Chief of Section, Institute of African Studies, Moscow, Angolan specialist, (meetings in Moscow, Harare, and Helsinki.)

Lavrov, Yuri, Associate Professor, Institute of Social Sciences, Central Committee of the CPSU, (Stanford, Fall 1989).

Lysenkov, Kirill, Lecturer, Moscow Institute of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Machel, Graca, widow of Samora Machel, (Stanford, Spring 1989).

Marcum, John, Professor, UC Santa Cruz.

Martin, David, journalist, Harare

Mbeki, Molitse, Cold Comfort Farm, Harare, Zimbabwe.

McLaughlin, Sister Janice, Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Association (ZIMOFA), (Harare, August 1989).

Moyo, Jonathan, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

Nkiwane, Professor, Department of Political & Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

Norland, Richard, Second Secretary, American Embassy, Moscow, (September 1990).

Othman, Haroub, Professor, University of Dar es Salaam, Advisor to President Julius Nyerere. Dr. Othman was a liaison between President Nyerere and the liberation movements based in Dar es Salaam during the 1960s and 1970s. (Harare, March 1990; and Moscow, May 1990.)

Patel, Hasu, Professor, Department of Political & Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

Pokrovsky, Andrei, Head of Southern African Countries Department, Institute for African Studies, Moscow.

Price, Robert, Professor, University of California, Berkeley.

Rytov, Lev, Researcher, Institute for African Studies, Moscow, South African specialist.

Saaw, Ana, Swedish Embassy, Luanda.

Saunders, Richard, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.

Shatalov, Sergei, Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies, economist.

Sherbakov, Nikolai, Head of Sector, International Relations, Institute of African and Asian Studies, Moscow State University.

Skubko, Yuri, Research Fellow, Southern African Countries Department, Institute for African Studies, Moscow.

Sithole, Masipula, Professor, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

Sulkoske, Bill, Manager, New Ventures, UNOCAL, Los Angeles.

Thompson, Carol, Professor, University of Southern California, (Harare).

Tikhomirov, Vladimir, Research Coordinator, Institute of African Studies, Moscow, South African specialist, (meetings in Oxford, Berkeley, Moscow, Harare, and Helsinki.)

Turner, Stansfield, former Director of CIA, (Stanford, 1989).

Vasilkov, Vitaly, Research Fellow, Institute of the USA and Canada.

Vidal-Hall, Judith, Assistant Editor, South, London.

Vongole, Chico, FRETILIN Embassy, Angola.

PRIMARY SOURCES

AAPSO, *Emergency International Solidarity Conference with the People of Angola, February 2-4, 1976*, (Cairo: Afro-Asian Publications, April 1976).

_____, *All Roads Lead to Luanda: In Solidarity with the Struggle of the Angolan People*, (Cairo, January 1976).

Afro-Asian Peoples (Egypt), 1970, 1969

"Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," *An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, U.S. Senate, November 20, 1975.

American Foreign Policy, 1961: Current Documents, (Washington:GPO, various years).

ANC, *Guerilla Warfare*, (ANC Publications and Information Bureau, 1970).

ANC, *Sechaba*.

Angola: Documentos da Independencia, (Lisboa, Jose-Fortunato Ulmeiro, August 1976).

Angola: 11 de Novembro de 1975: Documentos da Independencia, (Luanda: Edicao do Ministerio da Informacao, 1975),

Angola in Arms, various years.

Angola Information Bulletin, various years, (information published by the Angolan Ministry of Information.)

Angola: Socialism at Birth, (London: Angola, Mozambique and Guine Information Centre, 1980).

ANGOP, *Document*, various years, (speeches and documents of the MPLA)

ANGOP, *News Bulletin*, various years.

Biehl, Amy, "Transcript of interview with George Shultz," March 14, 1989.

Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1980).

_____, *Nuestro Rumbo: la Paz y el Socialismo*, (Moscow: Novosti, 1978).

_____, *World Marxist Review*, No. 8, 1969,

Caetano, Marcello, *The Only Road Open to Us Is to Defend Our Overseas Provinces*, speech broadcast of the Prime Minister, 15 January 1973, (Office of the Secretary of State for Information and Tourism, 1973).

Clark, Warren Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "Statement," before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, September 27, 1989, mimeo.

Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*, Regional Conflict Working Group, (Washington: Department of Defense, June 1988).

Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, *Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World*, Regional Conflict Working Group, (Washington: Department of Defense, May 1988)

"The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup," *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee of Foreign Affairs*, October 8, 9, 22, 1974.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *Materiali XXV Sezda KPSS*, (Moskva: 1976).

_____, *24th Congress of the CPSU*, (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1971).

_____, *XX S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza [14-25 Fevralya 1956 goda: Stenograficheskiy Otchet*, (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1956)

A Conversation with Ernesto Mulato, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 2, 1979),

de Andrade, Mario, and Marc Oliver, *The War in Angola*, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975)

Ekonomicheskoe Razvitie i Sotsial'nyi Progress. Natsional'noe Primirenje. Etnicheskie Problemi, (Mapt 1990 goda), materiali Sovetsko-Angol'skogo Seminara, (Institut Obshchestvennikh Nauk pri Ts K KPSS: Moskva, 1990).

El-Khawas, Mohamed and Barry Cohen, eds., *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Memorandum 39*, (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1976).

End of Empire: Rhodesia, Granada Television documentary, issued July 1, 1985, transmitted July 15, 1985.

Fernandes, Tony, UNITA Minister of Information, *Support the Second Anti-Colonial Struggle of the Angolan People*, (Toronto, Canada: Norman Bethune Institute, 1976).

FNLA, *Actuality*, September, 1973.

_____, *Supintrep No. 24: Estrutura Militar do ELNA, Estrutura Civil, Doutrinacao Politica*, (Luanda: 10 September 1968).

Fokeyev, G.V., ed., *Istoriya Mezhdunarodnikh Otnoshenei i Vneshnei Politiki SSSR: 1917-1987*, three volumes, (Moskva: "Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya," 1987).

"Foreign Policy Programme of the 24th CPSU Congress and Radical Shifts in International Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 12, December 1975,

FRELIMO, *Dokumenti Partii Frelimo*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1980).

Goncharov, L.V., ed., *Afrika v Tsifrakh*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1985).

Gorbachev, M.S., *Revol'utsionnoi Perestroike --Ideologi'u Obnovleniya*, February 18, 1988, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1988).

_____, *Oktyabr' i Perestroika: Revol'utsiya Prodolzhaet'sya*, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1987).

_____, *Perestroika i Novoe Mishlenie*, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1988).

_____, *Politicheskii Doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVII S'ezdu KPSS*, February 25, 1986, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1986).

Government of Zimbabwe, *The Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations*, April 1989.

_____, *Statistical Yearbook 1987*, (Harare, Government Printer, 1988).

_____, Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, *Socio-Economic Review of Zimbabwe, 1980-1985*, (Harare, 1986).

_____, *The First Five Year-Plan: National Development Plan, 1986-1990*, Vol. I, (Harare: Government Printer, April 1986).

_____, *Independent Zimbabwe, Fourth Anniversary of Independence Commemorative Issue*, (Harare: Government Printer, March 1984).

_____, *Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/3-194/5, Vol 1*, (Harare: Government Printer, November 1982).

_____, Ministry of Information, *Prime Minister Addresses Justice and Peace Commission*, 6 February 1982, (Harare: Government Printer, 1982)

_____, *Foreign Investment: Policy, Guidelines, and Procedures*, (Harare: Government Printer, September 1982).

_____, *Growth with Equity: An Economic Policy Statement*, (Harare: Government Printer, February 1981).

_____, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, *ZIMCORD: Let's Build Together*, conference documentation, Zimbabwe conference on reconstruction and development, Salisbury, 23-27 March 1981, (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1981?)

_____, Department of Information, "Press Statements," various years.

_____, *Parliamentary Debates*.

_____, Central Statistical Office, *Stats Flash*, various years.

GRAE, Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Struggle of the Angolan People and GRAE: The Birth of the Nation*, (February 1972).

_____, *G.R.A.E. Actualities*, 1970.

Fromyko, Andrei, and Boris Ponomarev, eds., *Istoriya Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, 1917-1985*, two volumes, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1986).

_____, *On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, (Moscow: Novosti, 1983).

_____, "Peace Programme in Action," *International Affairs*, No. 12, December 1975,

Hoover Institution Archives, Africa Subject Collection, (boxes of materials on all the major liberation movements in Angola and Zimbabwe).

_____, Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CPSU, *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Theory and Tactics of Revolutionary Parties*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985).

~~Interview with Commander Spartacus Monimambu~~, (Oakland; LSM Information Center, 1968).

~~Interviews in Depth, Zimbabwe ZAPU 2 -- T.S. Silundika~~, interview dates November 1972 and December 1973 (LSM Information Centre, Canada, 1974).

~~Jolliffe, Jill~~, "Interview with A. Kalinin, Soviet Ambassador to Angola," (1986).

Khrushchev, Nikita, *Za Novie Pobedi Mirovovo Kommunisticheskovo Dvishenie*, (Moskva: Gospolizdat, 1961).

A Luta do Povo Pela Unidade e Pelo Socialismo, speeches by MPLA leaders, (Lisboa: Avante, 1985).

LSM Information Centre, interviews with MPLA and ZAPU leaders, various years.

McGovern, Senator George, *Impression of Southern Africa*, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, December 1979, (Washington: GPO, 1979).

Meeting Between Dr. David Owen, Secretary of State for Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, President of ZANU, Minutes, February 20-23, 1978 London, England.

Ministerio das Financas da RPA, *Folhas de Legislacao da Republica Popular de Angola*, (Luanda, Ministerio das Financas da RPA, 1987).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portugal, *Portuguese Africa*, (Lisbon 1973).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR, *SSSR v Bor'be Protiv Kolonializma i Neokolonializma: 1960-mart 1986: Documenti i Materiali*, Toms 1 & 2, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1986).

_____, *SSSR i Strani Afriki: 1971-1974: Documenti i Materiali*, chast I, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1985).

_____, *SSSR i Strani Afriki: 1975-1976: Documenti i Materiali*, chast II, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1985).

_____, *Sbornik Deistiyushchikh Dogorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii, Zakluchennikh SSSR S inostrannimi Gosudarstbami*, Vipsuk XXXV, (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenie, 1981).

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, USSR, *Vneshnaya Ekonomicheskie Svyazi SSSR: Statisticheskii Sbornik*, (Moskva: "Finansi i Statistika"), various years.

_____, *Vneshnaya Torgovliya*, (Moskva: "Finansi i Statistika"), various years.

Ministry of Labor and Social Security, People's Republic of Angola, *Trabalho: Boletim*, various numbers.

Moyo, Jason Ziyapapa, and George Silundika, "Despite Intrigues, For the Unity of the Fighters," *World Marxist Review*, June 1976.

_____, "Observations on Our Struggle," (Lusaka, 1970).

Moyo, Temba, *The Organiser: The Story of Temba Moyo*, (Richmond: LSM, 1974).

MPLA-PT, *Circulos de Estudo*, various issues.

_____, *Desenvolvimento da Producao Material*, tese,

(Luanda, 1986).

_____, *Central Committee Report to the Second Congress of the MPLA-Workers' Party* (1985),

_____, *A Mao Criminosa dos Racistas Sul-Africanos Sobre Angola*, (press conference, May 28, 1985), (Luanda: DIP, 1985).

_____, *Documentos*, (from the First National Conference of the MPLA-Partido do Trabalho, January 14-19, 1985), (Luanda, 1985).

_____, *Angola Special Congress, Report of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Workers' Party*, December 17-23, 1980, (London: Mozambique, Angola, Guine Information Centre, 1982).

_____, *Relatorio do Comite Central Ao 1. Congresso do MPLA*, (Lisboa, Avante edicoes, May 1978).

_____, *Central Committee Report, First Congress*, December 4-10, 1977.

_____, *Documents from the MPLA Central Committee Meeting of October 23-29, 1976*, (London: Mozambique, Angola, Guine Information Centre, undated).

MPLA, *Historia de Angola*, (Porto: Edicoes Afrontamento, 1965).

_____, *First National Conference*, (December 1962).

_____, *MPLA Bulletin*, (various years).

_____, "MPLA Is the People," *MPLA Programme*, (London: Angolan Solidarity Committee, February 1976).

_____, *MPLA War Communique*, (various years).

Mugabe, Robert, "Struggle for Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*,

_____, *Selected Speeches*, (Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: Belmont Printers, 1983).

_____, *Our War of Liberation: Speeches, Articles, Interviews: 1976-1979*, (Harare, Mambo Press, 1983).

Muzorewa, Abel Tendekai, *Message to the People of Zimbabwe*, (London: Zambezi Press International, December 1975).

Neto, Agostinho, *Textos, Politicos, Escolhidos*, (Luanda: Departamento de Propaganda, 1987).

_____, *Sobre a Liberatacao Nacional*, (Luanda: Uniao dos Escritores Angolanos, 1985).

_____, *Speeches*, (Luanda: Lito-Pido, Department of Information and Propaganada, 1980).

Nkomo, Joshua, *Down with Colonialism, Down with Fascism*, (Lusaka: ZAPU Information and Publicity, March 1979).

"Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs," *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, February 19, 1975.

O.M.A., (Angolan Women's Organization), "Women from the People's Republic of Angola in the Struggle for Peace, Equality, and Development, (Praha: Council Meeting Women's International Democratic Federation, November 28-December 2, 1985).

Pedale, Pedro Maria Tonha, *Sobre a Politica de Clemencia e Harmonizacao Nacional*, (Luanda, Editorial Vanguarda, 1988).

People's Republic of Angola, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, "Press Releases," (1989-1990).

_____, *Folhas Legislacao*, (Luanda, 1987).

_____, *White Paper on Acts of Aggression by the Racist South African Regime against the Peoples Republic of Angola, 1975-1982*, (Shadowdean Ltd, undated).

_____, *Embaixada em Portugal, Guia do Trabalhador Estrangeiro*, (Lisboa, 1980).

_____, *Ministerio da Informacao, Angola: 11 de Novembro de 1975: Documentos da Independencia*, (Luanda, 1976).

Ponamarev, Boris, *Lenin and the World Revolutionary Process*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980).

Presidential Documents, various years.

"Prime Minister Mugabe's official visit to the Soviet Union and Austria, December 1985", pamphlet, (Harare: Government Printer, January 1986)

Roberto, Holden, *Struggle for Freedom*, 1986.

dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, *A Luta do Povo pelo Unidade e pelo Socialismo*, (Lisbon: Edicoes Avante, 1985).

_____, "Speech at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement", (Luanda, 1985), mimeo.

_____, *Discursos*, (Luanda: DIP, 1984).

_____, *Sobre a Situacao na Africa Austral*, (Luanda, 1984).

_____, *VII Cimeira do Movimento dos Paises Nao-Alinhados em Nova Delhi*, March 9, 1983, (Luanda: MPLA DIP, 1983).

_____, *Discursos*, (Luanda, 1983).

Savimbi, Jonas, *Por Um Futuro Melhor*, (Lisboa: Nova Nordica, 1986).

_____, "Prepared Remarks of the Honorable Jonas Savimbi," luncheon with black journalists at the Mayflower Hotel,

Washington, D.C., February 2, 1986.

_____, "The War Against Soviet Colonialism," *Policy Review*, No. 35, Winter 1986.

_____, *Angola: A Resistencia em Busca de uma Nova Nacao*, (Lisboa: Edicao de Agencia Portuguesa de Revistas, 1979).

_____, *Aos Amigos, Simpatizantes e Militantes da UNITA em Portugal*, (Lisboa: Edicao Selecta, 1978).

_____, "Open Letter to All Peoples of the World," September 25, 1975 (Freelands, Angola)

_____, *Comunicacao ao Povo Angolano*, (Luanda: Nova Editorial Angolana, SARL, 1975?)

_____, "Mensagem do President da UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, aos Quadros e Militantes da UNITA no Exterior," (Angola, May 1971, mimeo).

Shamuyarira, Nathan, (ZANU Secretary for Information), "Zimbabwe's Revolutionary Path," *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1987).

Sithole, Ndabanini, *We Are Our Own Liberators*, (Lusaka: ZANU, 1974).

Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Vestnik*.

Textos e Documentos do MPLA, (Lisboa, Maria da Fonte edicoes, 1974).

Tongogara, Josiah, *Our Struggle for Liberation*, (Harare: Mambo Press, 1984).

UNICEF, *Children on the Frontline*, (New York: UNICEF, 1989).

UNITA, "Communique of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of UNITA," (Jamba, Angola: 2 February 1989).

_____, "The Platform for National Reconciliation in Angola," (Jamba, Angola, August 31, 1986), mimeo.

_____, *UNITA: Identity of a Free Angola*, (Jamba, Angola: UNITA, 1985).

_____, *Angolan Road to National Recovery*, (Jamba, Angola: UNITA, 1984)

_____, *UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola*, (UNITA, 1984).

_____, "Special Communique of the General Staff of UNITA's Armed Forces" No. 15, March 26, 1983 (Freelands, Angola).

_____, *National Economic Reconstruction in Angola: The Challenge and the Approach*, (Angola: May 1981).

_____, "We Strive for Peace and Majority Rule in Angola," July 7, 1979 (Freelands, Angola).

_____, "Final Communique from the XII Annual Conference," June 12, 1979, (mimeo).

_____, Central Committee of UNITA, statement, (Freelands of Angola: February 1973).

_____, *Armed Struggle in Angola*, May 1973.

_____, *Discurso de Orientacao Politica e Ideologica da UNITA*, (London: UNITA Office, June-July 1972).

_____, Central Committee, "The Programme of UNITA", *Angola - Seventh Year*, (UNITA, 1968).

_____, "Manifesto Angolana", (Brazzaville, 11 December 1964).

_____, *The Platform for National Reconciliation in Angola and the Final Declaration of the VI Ordinary Congress of UNITA*, (undated).

_____, *War Information Bulletin*, (various years).

_____, *Kwacha Angola*, (Egypt).

U.S. Agency for International Development, "Backgrounder: U.S.A.I.D. Program in Zimbabwe", U.S.A.I.D. Mission, Harare, Zimbabwe, May 4, 1989.

_____, USAID/Zimbabwe -- Southern Africa Regional Program, "U.S. Interests in Southern Africa", (memo, no date).

_____, *Zimbabwe: Country Development Strategy Statement*, FY 1987, (A.I.D.: Washington, D.C., February 1985).

_____, *U.S. Aid to Zimbabwe: An Evaluation*, AID Program Evaluation No. 9, August 1983.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Possible Violations or Circumvention of the Clark Amendment*, Hearings, 100th Congress, first session, July 1, 1987.

_____, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Zimbabwe: Four Years of Independence; An Assessment*, Hearings, 98th Congress, second session, May 24, 1984.

_____, *The Impact of U.S. Foreign Policy in Seven African Countries*, report of a congressional study mission to Ethiopia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Algeria, and Morocco, August 6-25, 1983 and a staff study mission to Tunisia, August 24-27, 1983, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 1984, (Washington: GPO, 1984)

_____, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on

Africa, Results of the Recent Elections in Zimbabwe, Hearings, 96th Congress, second session, March 27, 1980.

_____, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Aid to Zimbabwe*, Hearings, 96th Congress, second session, September 23, 1980.

_____, Select Committee on Intelligence, *CIA: The Pike Report*,

_____, *Resources in Rhodesia: Implications for U.S. Policy*, Hearings, Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, April 13 & May 6, 1976, (Washington: GPO, 1976)

_____, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Implications for U.S. International Legal Obligations of the Presence of the Rhodesian Information Office in the U.S.*, hearings, 93rd, 1st session, May 15, 17, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973)

_____, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, *Rhodesia and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969).

_____, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, *Sanctions as an Instrumentality of the United Nations. Rhodesia as a Case Study*, 92nd, second session, June 13, 15, 17, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972).

United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Angola: Options for American Foreign Policy*, Hearings, 99th Congress, second session, February 18, 1986.

_____, *Aid to Zimbabwe*, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Congress, second session, September 23, 1980, (Washington: GPO, 1980).

_____, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Impressions of Southern Africa*, Report, December 1979.

_____, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *US Policy Toward Southern Africa*, 94th Congress, 1st Session, June 11, 13, 16; July 9, 10, 14, 23, 24, 28, and 29, 1975, (Washington: GPO, 1975).

_____, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Angola*, Hearings, 94th Congress, second session, January 29, February 3, 4, 6, 1976.

_____, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements, and the Committee on Foreign Relations. *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, Hearings, 94th Congress, 2nd session, March 5, 8, 19; May 12, 13, 21, 26 and 27, 1976. (Washington: GPO, 1976).

_____, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Importation of Rhodesian Chrome*, hearings, July 7, 8, 1971,

(Washington: GPO, 1971)

_____, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, *Importation of Rhodesian Chrome*, September 6, 1973, (Washington: GPO, 1973).

U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes: Angola*, (March 1985).

_____, *Current Policy*, various years.

_____, *Department of State Bulletin*, various years.

_____, *Gist*, various years.

_____, *Press Conference*, various years.

_____, *Department of State Press Release*, various years.

United States Policy Toward Angola - Update, September 17 & 30, 1980, (Washington D.C.:GPO, 1980),

United States Foreign Policy: Report of the Secretary of State, (Washington: GPO, various years).

Ushewokunze, Dr. Herbert, *An Agenda for Zimbabwe*, (Harare: College Press, 1984).

Velikaya Oktyabr'skaya Sotsialisticheskaya Revolyutsiya i Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie Narodov Azii, Afriki, i Latinskoi Ameriki, Mezhdunarodnaya Nauchnaya Konferentsiya, Baku 1967 (Moskva: "Nauka", 1969).

Visit M.S. Gorbacheva v Respublika Kuba, 2-5 April 1989, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1989).

Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents

Weinberger, Caspar, "U.S. Defense Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 64, (Spring 1986).

World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, (Washington: World Bank, 1989).

_____, *World Development Report 1988*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

_____, *Zimbabwe: A Strategy for Sustained Growth*, Report No. 6981-ZIM, Southern Africa Department, Africa Department, November 9, 1987.

_____, *Angola: An Introductory Economic Review*, 7283-ANG (New York: World Bank, July 29, 1988), Vol. II.

Zagladin, N.V., *Vneshnepoliticheskaya Strategiya KPSS i Novoe Politicheskoe Mishlenie v Yardenii Vek*, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1988).

ZANU-PF, *Election Manifesto 1985*, (Harare: Jongwe Publishers, 1985).

_____, *Zimbabwe News*, various years.

ZANU, "Comrade President Robert Mugabe Appeals for Humanitarian Assistance for the Liberated Areas in Zimbabwe", (Maputo: ZANU Central Committee, 1979)

_____, Publicity and Information Department, "Tour Feasibility Survey", January 23, 1979.

_____, *Mwenge 2*, ZANU Political Programme, (Seattle: Seattle Workers Publication, March 1977.

_____, *Mwenge No. 2: ZANU Political Programme*, (Lusaka, 1973).

_____, "The Magagao Document," (London: ZANU, 1976).

_____, *ZANU Policy Statement*, August 21, 1963.

ZAPU, *The Ideological Programme of ZAPU*, (Lusaka, 1978).

_____, (J.Z. Moyo), *Our Path to Liberation*, (Lusaka, 1976).

_____, *The Political Direction of Our Party*, (Lusaka: Directorate of the Political Commissariat, 14 September 1972).

_____, *Zimbabwe: History of a Struggle*, (Cairo: AAPSO, 1970).

_____, *The Ideological Concept*, (undated).

_____, Publicity Bureau, "The Bulldog's Missing Teeth", paper II, January 28, 1973.

_____, *Zimbabwe Review*, (various years).

DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS

African Contemporary Record,

Barnett, Don and Roy Harvey, *The Revolution in Angola: MPLA, Life Histories and Documents*, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1972).

Baumhogger, Goswin, ed., *The Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975-1980)*, volumes I-VIII, (Hamburg: Institute of African Studies, 1984).

Chilcote, Ronald, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972).

Chilcote, Ronald, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: documentary ephemera through 1965*, microfilm, (located at the Hoover Institution Library).

Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *The African Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements*, vols. 1-4, (London: Zed Press, 1982).

Deutschmann, David, ed., *Angola and Namibia: Changing the History of Africa*, (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1989).

Gierstad, O., *The People in Power*, (Oakland, CA: LSM Information Centre, 1976).

Minter, Willaim, ed., *Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier*, (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1988).

Nyangoni, Christopher, and Gideon Nyandoro, eds., *Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents*, (London: Rex Collings, 1979).

Wallerstein, Immanuel, microfilm collection of documents on national liberations in Africa.

Newspapers/Weekly Periodicals

Africa Analysis

African Business

African Concord (Lagos)

Africa Confidencial, (Lisbon)

Africa Confidential, (London)

African Contemporary Record.

Africa Events, (Dar es Salaam).

Africa News.

Africa Report.

Africa Research Bulletin, (Devon, England).

Africa South, (Harare).

African Business, (London).

African Communist. (South African Communist Party)

African Concord, (Lagos).

ANC News Briefing

Angola Update, (Washington).

The Christian Science Monitor.

The Chronicle, (Bulawayo).

Comercio: Externo (Luanda).
Congressional Quarterly.
Current Digest of the Soviet Press
Daily Telegraph, (London).
O Diario.
Economist, (London).
Financial Gazette, (Harare).
Financial Times, (London).
Focus, (Harare).
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (FBIS), Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa.
FROLIZI News, (London).
Granma Weekly Review, (Havana)
Herald, (Harare).
The Independent, (London)
Insight
International Herald Tribune.
Izvestiya, (Moscow).
Jane's Defense Weekly.
Jornal de Angola, (Luanda).
Los Angeles Times.
LSM News, (Oakland).
Mizan Supplement
Moscow News.
Moto, (Harare).
The National Review.
New African.
New Republic, (Washington)
New Times, (Moscow)
New York Times.

Novembro, (Luanda).
The Observer, (London).
Parade, (Harare).
Platt's Oilgram
Policy Review. (Washington)
Pravda., (Moscow)
Prize, (Harare).
Rand Daily Mail
Read On... (Harare).
Report on the USSR, (Munich)
Revista Internacional, (Lisbon).
Revista Militar, (Luanda).
Revolutionary Zimbabwe, (London).
SADCC Energia, (Luanda).
Sechaba, (official organ of the ANC)
Social Change and Development, (Harare).
South (London)
Southern Africa, (Harare).
Southern African Economist, (Harare).
Southern African Record, (Johannesburg)
SouthScan, (London).
Soviet News
The Spear, (London, ZAPU).
The Star, (Johannesburg).
Summary of World Broadcasts, (BBC), USSR.
The Sunday Mail, (Harare).
Third World Reports (London).
The Vanguard, (Harare).
The Voice: SADCC/PTA, (Harare).
The Voice of Zimbabwe transcripts, (London, ZANU).

The Washington Post

Washington Times

Weekly Mail, (Johannesburg).

Work in Progress. (Braamfontein).

The Worker, (Harare).

Zimbabwe Quarterly, (Harare).

Zimbabwe News, (ZANU).

Zimbabwe Review, (ZAPU).

Zimbabwe Pressespiegel, (Berlin).

Zimbabwe Worker, (Dar es Salaam).

MEMOIRS

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981*, (New York: Farer, Straus, Giroux, 1985)

Daly, Ron Reid. *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, As told to Peter Stiff. (Johannesburg: Galago, 1982).

Davis, Nathaniel, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (1978).

Flower, Ken, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981*, (London: John Murray, 1987).

Haig, Alexander, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy*, (New York: MacMillan, 1984).

Houser, George, *No One Can Stop the Rain: Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle*, (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989).

Kissinger, Henry, *The White House Years*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).

Marquez, Gabriel Garcia, "Operation Carlotta," *New Left Review*, Nos. 102-102, February-April 1977.

Menges, Constantine, *Inside the National Security Council*, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1988).

Morris, Roger, *Uncertain Greatness*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

Mutasa, Didymus, *Black Behind Bars*, (Harare: Longman Zimbabwe, 1983).

- Nkomo, Joshua, *Nkomo: The Story of My Life*, (London: Methuen, 1984).
- Nyagumbo, Maurice, *With the People*, (Salisbury: Graham Publishing House, 1980).
- Owen, David, *Personally Speaking to Kenneth Harris*, (London: Pan Books, 1987)
- Shevchenko, Arkady, *Breaking with Moscow*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985).
- Spiele, Tchiaku, *Diario de Um Guerrilheiro*, No. 43 (Luanda: Lavra & Oficina, 1982).
- Stockwell, John, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*, (New York: Norton, 1978).
- Tshabagu, Owen, *The March 11th Movement in ZAPU: Revolution within the Revolution in Zimbabwe*, (York, UK: Tiger Press, 1979).
- Vance, Cyrus, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*, (New York, 1983).

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Alexander, Jocelyn, "The Unsettled Land: The Politics of Land Redistribution in Matabeleland, 1980-1990, *Journal of Southern Africa Studies*, (forthcoming).
- Aluko, Olijide, and Timothy Shaw, eds., *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1986).
- Arbatov, Georgi, *The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973).
- ABECOR, *Angola: Country Report*, (London, Barclays) various years.
- Abernethy, David, "The Major Foreign Policy Positions of the Reagan Administration," *International Affairs Bulletin*, (Johannesburg), 1981.
- Abshire, David, and Michael Samuels, *Portuguese Africa*, (New York: Praeger, 1969).
- Adelman, Jonathan, ed., *Superpowers and Revolution*, (New York: Praeger, 1986).
- Africa in Soviet Studies: Annual*, (Moskva: "Nauka") various years.
- Africa 2000*
- Albright, David, *The USSR and Sub-Saharan African in the 1980s*, The Washington Papers, No. 101, (Washington: Praeger for CSIS, 1983).
- _____, "Vanguard Parties in the Third World and Soviet Foreign Policy" in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubins, eds., *The*

pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World, (New York: Praeger, 1983).

_____, ed., *Communism in Africa*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

Allison, Graham, *Essence of Decision*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

Amman, "Revolution: A Redefinition," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVII (1962).

"Angola After Independence: Struggle for Supremacy," *Conflict Studies*, No. 64 (November 1975)

Anti-Apartheid Movement, *South Africa's Invasion of Angola: The Facts*, (London) December 3, 1975.

Arkhurst, Frederick, ed., *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975)

Asoyan, Boris, *South Africa: What Lies Ahead?*, (Moscow: Novosti, 1989).

_____, *Apartheid -- "the White Man's Burden"*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988).

_____, *YUAR: Kakim Budet Zabtrashnii Den'?*, (Moskva: "Sovetskaya Rossiya", 1985).

Astrow, Andre, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost Its Way?*, (London: Zed Books, 1983).

Babu, A.M., *African Socialism or Socialist Africa?*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1981).

Badi, Sh. M., et. al., *Formirovanie Rabochego Klassa Stran Azii i Afriki*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1971).

Bailey, Jennifer and Torbjorn Knutsen, "Over the Hill? The Anatomy of Revolution at Fifty," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1989, pp. 421-431.

Banana, C.S., *Towards a Socialist Ethos*, (Harare: College Press, 1987).

Basmanov, M.I. and B.M. Leibzon, *The Revolutionary Vanguard: Battle of Ideologies*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977).

Bender, Gerald, "Beyond Autocracy in Africa: Changing External Factors," presented to seminar on "Governance in Africa," The Carter Center of Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, February 17, 1989, mimeo.

_____, "Peacemaking in Southern Africa: the Luanda-Pretoria Tug-of-War," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No.1 (January 1989).

_____, with Whitney Schneidman, "The Namibia Negotiation -- Multilateral Versus Bilateral Approaches to International

Mediation," (Pittsburgh: Pew Program in Case Teaching and Writings in International Affairs, No. 422, 1988).

_____, "The Eagle and the Bear in Angola," *Annals, AAPSS*, Vol. 489 (January 1987)

_____, with James Coleman, and Richard Sklar, eds., *African Crises Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

_____, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality*, (London: Heinemann, 1978)

_____, "Angola, the Cubans, and Western Anxieties", *Foreign Policy*, no. 31, summer 1978, p. 23.

_____, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of a Failure," in Rene Lemarchand, ed., *American Foreign Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and Stances*, (Washington: University Press of America, 1978).

Bergerol, Jane, and Michael Wolfers, *Angola in the Frontline*, (London: Zed Press, 1986).

Bhagavan, M.R., *Angola's Political Economy 1975-1985*, (Uppsala: Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1986).

Bialer, Seweryn, ed., *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).

Biehl, Amy, "Chester Crocker and the Negotiations for Namibian Independence," (Honor's thesis, Stanford University, May 1989).

Birmingham, David, "Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique 1880-1980," (unpublished manuscript) June 15, 1987.

_____, "The 27th of May: A Note on the Abortive Coup in Angola," *African Affairs*, Vol. 77 No. 309, (October 1978).

Bloomfield, Richard, ed. *Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy*, (New York: Reference Publications, 1988).

Boavida, Americo, *Angola: Cinco Seculos de Exploracao Portuguesa*, (Lisboa: Uniao dos Escritores Angolanos, 1981).

Bond, Patrick, "Riding the Waves of Uneven Prosperity," *Africa South*, (May/June 1990).

Boswell, Terry, ed., *Revolution in the Word-System*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).

Bratton, Michael, "The Comrades and the Countryside: The Politics of Agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe," *World Politics*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (January 1987).

_____, "Development in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 19, no. 3, September 1981,

Breslauer, George, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World

Policy," *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April 1987).

Breytenbach, Jan, *Forged in Battle*, (Cape Town: Sayman & Weber, 1986).

Bridgeland, Fred, *Jonas Savimbi*, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Co, 1986).

"Briefings on Angola," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 5, (January-April 1976).

Brinton, Crane, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

Brittain, Victoria, *Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths: South Africa's Crippling of a Continent*, (London: Faberr & Faber, 1988).

Bruckman, Daniel, ed., *Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives*, (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1977).

Brutents, Karen, *The Newly Free Countries in the Seventies*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983).

_____, *National Liberation Revolutions Today*, parts I & II, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977).

Bull, Hedley, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (London: Macmillan, 1977).

Burchett, Willaim *Southern Africa Stands Up: The Revolutions in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa*, (New York: Urizen Books, 1978).

Burton, James, "Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia", *Military Review*, vol. 59, no. 3, (March 1979)

Callinicos, Alex, *Southern Africa After Zimbabwe*, (London: Pluto Press, 1981).

Campbell, Kurt, *Soviet Policy towards South Africa*, (London: Macmillan, 1986).

Carrasco, "Che in Africa," *Cuba International*, March 1989.

Carter, Gwendolen and Patrick O.Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, (Bloomington: Indianan University Press, 1982).

Carver, Richard, *Zimbabwe: Break with the Past?*, Africa Watch Report, (London, October 1989).

Caute, David, *Under the Skin*, (London: Allen Lane, 1983).

_____, *Fanon*, (London: Collins, 1970).

Chase-Dunn, Christopher, ed. *Socialist States in the World-System*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982)

Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs *The International Department of the CC CPSU Under Dobrynin*, (Washington: US

Department of State, 1989).

Centre for Policy Studies, *South Africa at the End of the Eighties*, (Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 1989).

Chabal, Patrick, "People's War, State Formation and Revolution in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XXI (1983).

Chung, Fay and Emmanuel Ngaru, *Socialism, Education and Development: A Challenge to Zimbabwe*, (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985).

Churkin, V, and Yu. Yudin, *A Socialist-Oriented State*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983).

"CIA's Secret War in Angola," *Intelligence Report*, (Washington) Vol. 1, No. 1, 1975,

Cilliers, J.K., *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

Clarence-Smith, Gervase, "Class Structure and Class Struggles in Angola in the 1970s," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (1980)

Clarke, D.G., *Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe*, (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1980).

Clough, Michael, "Africa in the 1990s," *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 107, January 29, 1990.

_____, and Jeffrey Herbst, *South Africa's Changing Regional Strategy: Beyond Destabilization*, *Critical Issues*, No. 4, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 1989).

_____, ed., *Reassessing the Soviet Challenge in Africa*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, No. 25, 1982).

_____, ed., *Changing Realities in Southern Africa*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1986).

Coker, Christopher, *The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986).

Copson, Raymond W. and Richard Cronin, "The 'Reagan Doctrine' and its Prospects," *Survival*, No. 27, (1987).

Copson, Raymond, *Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy*, (Washington: GPO, 1982).

Cox, Robert, *Production, Power, and World Order*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

Crocker, Chester, "Southern Africa: Eight Years Later," *Foreign*

- Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Fall 1989).
- Darusenkov, O.T., *Kuba*, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1976).
- Davidow, Jeffrey, *A Peace in Southern Africa: the Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
- _____, "Zimbabwe: A Success," *Foreign Policy*, No. 115 (Winter 1982-3).
- Davidson, Appollon, ed., *Istoriya Tropicheskoi i Yuzhnoi Afriki: 1918-1988*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1989).
- Davidson, Basil, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People*, (New York, Anchor Books, 1972).
- _____, *Walking 300 Miles with Guerrillas Through the Bush of Eastern Angola*, (Pasadena, CA: Munger Africana Library Notes, 1971).
- Day, John, *International Nationalism: The Extra-Territorial Relations of the Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).
- Demkina, L.A., *Sotsial'naya Struktura Yuzhno-Afrikanskogo Obschestva*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1986).
- Demkina, L.A., T. I. Krasnopevtseva, T.I. Kravtsova, A. C. Prokrovski, eds, *Respublika Zimbabve* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985).
- de Oliveira, Mario Antonio Fernandes, et. al, *A Descolonizacao Portuguesa -- Aproximacao a um Estudo*, (Lisboa: Instituto Amara da Costa, 1982)
- Depelchin, Jacque, "Anti-communism and the Attempts to Re-write the Histories of National Liberation in Southern Africa," *Ufahamu*, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Fall 1987/88).
- Dickson, David, *United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa*, (New York: Lanham, 1985).
- Dohning, W. and Cloete Breytenbach, *UNITA*, (Kwacha UNITA Press, 1984).
- Dolgoplov, E., *As Guerras de Libertacao Nacional Na Etapa Actual*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986).
- Dominguez, Jorge I., *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
- _____, *Cuba: Order and Revolution*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1978), pp. 354-355.
- _____, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 57 (Fall 1978).
- Donaldson, Robert, *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures*, (Boulder: Westview, 1981).

- Dreyer, Ronald, *Namibia and Angola: The Search for Independence and Regional Security, (1966-1988)*, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 3 (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1988).
- Due, Jean, "Update on Land Resettlement in Zimbabwe", *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1986
- Duffy, James, *Portugal in Africa*, (New York, Penguin, 1963).
- Duncan, Raymond, ed., *Soviet Policy in the Third World*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).
- Dzakokhov, A.C., *Edinstvo i Vzaimodeistvie Antiimperialisticheskikh Hatsional'no-Osvoboditel'nikh Sil*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1986).
- Easum, Donald "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa," *Issue*, (Fall 1975).
- Ebinger, Charles, "External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War", *Orbis*, Vol. 20, No.3, Fall 1976,
- Eckstein, Harry, ed., *Internal War*, (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).
- Economist Intelligence Unit, *Angola*, EIU Country Report, various years.
- Evans, M. *Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1971-1979*, Series No. 37, (Salisbury: Historical Association of Zimbabwe, 1981)
- Falk, Pamela, "The U.S., U.S.S.R., Cuba, and South Africa in Angola, 1974-88: Part A: Negotiators' Nightmare, Diplomats' Dilemma, 1974-1980," (Pittsburgh: Pew Program in Case Teaching and Writings in International Affairs, No. 405, 1988).
- _____, "The U.S., U.S.S.R., Cuba, and South Africa in Angola, 1974-88: Part B: The Quagmire of Four-Party Negotiations," (Pittsburgh: Pew Program in Case Teaching and Writings in International Affairs, No. 429, 1988).
- _____, "Cuba in Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 65, (Summer 1987).
- Fanon, Frantz, *The Wretched of the Earth*, (New York: Grove Press, 1963).
- Fauve, Paul, "The Rise and Fall of Nito Alves," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 9 (1978).
- Faye, Jean Pierre, ed., *Portugal: The Revolution in the Labyrinth*, (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1976).
- Ferreira, Eduardo de Sousa, *Portuguese Colonialism*, (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1974).
- Fituni, Leonid, "Ekonomika Stran Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii: Sovremennii Etap", *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 5, 1986

- _____, "Economic Crisis: Causes, Scope, Tendencies", *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 5, 1985.
- _____, *Narodnaya Respublika Angola*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1985).
- _____, *Angola: Natureza Populacao Economica*, (Moscovo: Progresso, 1985).
- Fogel, Daniel, *Africa in Struggle*, (San Francisco: ISM Press, 1982).
- Frederikse, Julie, *None but Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1984).
- Freedom to Peoples in Southern Africa*, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1985).
- Freeman, Chas, "The Angola/Namibia Accords," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Summer 1989).
- Fukuyama, Francis, "Soviet Strategy in the Third World", in Fukuyama and Korbonski, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
- _____, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, R-3337-USDP, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, February 1986).
- _____, "The New Marxist-Leninist States and Internal Conflict in the Third World," in Uri Ra'anana, Fukuyama, Mark Falcoff, Sam Sarkesian, and Richard Shultz, *Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengthes, Vulnerabilities and U.S. Policy*, (Oxford: Pergaman-Brasaaey's, September 1985).
- Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)
- Gafurov, B.G., "Velikii Oktyabr i Natsionalno- Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie", *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, #5, 1967
- Gann, Lewis, and Thomas Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush*, (New York: Praeger, 1981)
- Gartoff, Raymond, *Detente and Confrontation*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986).
- Gavrilov, Nikolai, "Relations with Countries of Socialist Orientation in Tropical Africa," in *The USSR and Africa*, (1983).
- _____, "Sovetskii Soyuz i Afrikanskie Strani Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii," in *Leninskaya Politika Mira i Bezopastnosti Narodov*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1982).
- _____, "The New Africa Emerging", *International Affairs*, No. 7, July 1980.
- Gavrilov, Yuri, "An Important Victory in the Struggle against

Colonialism," *International Affairs*, (Moscow), No. 10 (October) 1974.

Gellman, Peter "Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism," *Review of International Studies*, No. 14, 1988,

Gelman, Harry, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984)

_____, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).

_____, "Case Studies and Theory Development", Paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, October 15-16, 1982.

_____ and Gordon Craig, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Golan, Galia, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

Goncharov, L. V., ed., *Transnatsional'nyi Monopoliticheskii Kapital i Afrika*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1989).

_____, ed., *Afrika Na Puti XXI Vek*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1989).

Gourevitch, Peter, "The Second Image Reversed: The international Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autumn 1978).

Gregory, Ross, "The Domino Theory" in Alexander DeConde, ed. *The Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribener's Sons, 1978)

Grieg, Ian, *The Communist Challenge to Africa*, (Surrey, England: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 1977).

Gromyko, Anatoly, ed., *Afrika: Politicheskoe i Sotsial'noe Razvitie v Usloviyakh Sotsialistcheskoi Orientatsii*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1988).²

_____, ed., *YuAR i Strani Yuzhnoafrikanskogo Regiona*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1987).

_____, *Afrika v Miroboi Politike*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1986).

_____, *Krisis Na Yuge Afriki*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1984).

² It should be noted that many of the books authored and edited by Anatoly Gromyko were written by other researchers in the Soviet Institute of African Studies.

_____, *Africa: Progress, Problems, Prospects*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983).

_____, *African Countries' Foreign Policy*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981).

_____, "The October Revolution and Africa's Destiny", *International Affairs* (Moscow), #9, 1972.

_____, "Soviet Foreign Policy in Africa," *International Affairs*, No. 9, 1967.

Guelke, Adrian, "Southern Africa and the Superpowers," *International Affairs*, (1981).

Guerra, Henrique, *Angola: Estrutura Economica e Classes Sociais*, (Luanda: Uniao dos Escritores Angolanos, 1985).

Guk, Yu. I., *Vneshnyaya Politika YuAR*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1973).

Gunn, Gillian, "A Guide to the Intracacies of the Angola-Namibian Negotiations," *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 90, September 8, 1988.

_____, "Cuba and Angola" *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 70, March 31, 1987.

_____, "The Angolan Economy: A Status Report" *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 58, May 30, 1986.

Gurtov, Melvin, *The United States Against the Third World*, (New York: Praeger, 1974).

Halberstam, David, *The Best and the Brightest*, (New York: Random House, 1972).

Halliday, Fred, "The Ends of Cold War," *New Left Review*, No. 180 (March/May 1990).

_____, "'The Sixth Great Power': on the Study of Revolution and International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, (1990)

_____, *Threat form the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa*, (London, Peguin Books, 1981).

Hanlon, Joseph, *Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, (London: Catholic Institute of International Relations, 1986).

Harsh, Ernest and Tony Thomas, *Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War*, (London: Pathfinder Press, 1976).

Heimer, Franz Wilhelm, *O Processo de Descolonizacao em Angola 1974-1976*, (Lisboa: E Regra do Jogo, 1980).

Herbst, Jeffrey, "The Fall of Afro-Marxism," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1990).

_____, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

_____, "Policy Formation and Implementation in Zimbabwe", Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1988.

Henriksen, Thomas, ed., *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981).

_____, "Portugal in Africa: Comparative Notes on Counterinsurgency," *Orbis*, Summer 1977.

Hobsbawm, Eric, *The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848*, (London: Mentor Book, 1982).

Tony Hodges, *Angola to the 1990's*, (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989).

Hodges, Tony and Colin Legum, *After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa*, (New York: Africana Publishing Co, 197?).

Hoffman, Erik P. and Frederic J. Fleron, eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, (New York: Aldine, 1980).

Hoffman, Stanley, *Gulliver's Troubles: or the Setting of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968).

Holsti, Ole, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 1989.

_____, with Randolph Siverson and Alexander George, eds., *Change in the International System*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).

Horelick, Arnold, ed., *U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

Hough, Jerry, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*, (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1986).

Hudson, Miles, *Triumph or Tragedy*, (London: Hamish-Hamilton, 1981),

Humbaraci, Arslan and Nicole Muchnik, *Portugal's African Wars: Angola, Guinea-Bissao, Mozambique*, (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1974).,

Ignatyev, Oleg, "Angola v Predverii Peremen," *Novoe Vremya*, No. 46 (November 28, 1974).

_____, *Secret Weapon in Africa*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977),

Ikenbery, G. John, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, No. 3, Fall 1989, pp. 375-400.

Institute of Military History, USSR Ministry of Defense and Institute of Africa, Soviet Acadmey of Sciences, *Vooryzhennaya*

- Narodov Afriki za Svobodu i Nezavisimost'*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1974).
- Institut Istorii SSSR, *Leninskaya Politika Mira i Bezopastnost' Narodov*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1982).
- Issues Before the 21st General Assembly*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 1966, No. 559).
- Jackson, Henry, *From Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960*, (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1982).
- James, Martin III, "The UNITA Insurgency in Angola," (Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1986).
- Jervis, Robert, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
- _____, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985).
- _____, "System Theories and Diplomatic History," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Diplomacy*, (New York: Free Press, 1979).
- Jika, *Reflexoes Sobre a Luta de Libertacao Nacional*, (Lisbon: Uniao dos Escritores Angolanos, 1979).
- Johnson, Chalmers, *Revolution and the Social System*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Studies, 1964).
- Johnson, Robert, "Misguided Morailty: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 103, No. 3 (1988).
- _____, "Exaggerating America's Stakes in Third World Conflicts," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1985-86).
- Jowitt, Kenneth, *Images of Detente and the Soviet Political Order*, Policy Papers in International Affairs, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1977).
- Kaplan, Lawrence, ed., *Revolution: A Comparative Study*, (New York: Random House, 1973).
- Kaplan, Stephen, ed., *Diplomacy of Power*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981).
- Kapuscinski, Ryszard, *Another Day of Life*, (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1987).
- Karpukhine, N.V. *Direccao No Sector de Energia Da RPA*, (Moskovo: Progresso, 1989).
- Katz, Mark, *Gorbachev's Military Policy in the Third World*, The CSIS Washington Papers, No. 140, (New York: Praeger, 1989).

- _____, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
- Katzenstein, Peter, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*, (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1978).
- Kaufman, Edy, *Superpowers and Their Sphere of Influence*, (London: Croom Helm, 1976).
- Khazanov, Anatoly, *Agostinho Neto*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986).
- Kiva, Alexei, "National Liberation Movement: Present Stage" *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 4, 1985
- Keohane, Robert, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)
- _____, *After Hegemony*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
- Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization*, Vol. 41 (Autumn 1987).
- _____, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1977).
- Kempton, Daniel *Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa: The National Liberation Movement Connection*, (New York: Praeger, 1989).
- Khazanov, A.M., "Angola", in *Istoriya Tropicheskoi i Yuzhnoi Afriki: 1918-1988*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1989).
- _____, *Krushenie Poslednei Kolonial'noi Imperii*, (Moskva: "Misl'", 1986).
- _____, *Agostinho Neto*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1985).
- _____, *Ekspansiya Portugalii v Afrike: i Bor'ba Afrikanskikh Narodov za Nezavisimost' XVI-XVIII vv.*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1976.)
- _____, *Osvoboditel'naya Bor'ba Narodov Vostochnoi Afriki*, (Moskva: "Sotsal'no-Ekonomicheskoi Literaturi", 1962).
- _____, *Politika Portugalii v Afrike i Azii*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1967).
- Kierman, Bernard P., *The United States, Communism, and the Emergent World*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972).
- Kim, G. and Kaufman, "Ob ideologicheskikh Tcheniyach v stranach 'tretevo mira'", *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1972,
- Kissinger, Henry, *A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age*, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964).

- Kitrinov, Robert, "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984.
- Klinghoffer, Arthur, *The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).
- Kokorev, V.B., T.L. Deich, V.A. Dement'ev, *SSSR-SSHA-Afrika: Balans Interesov*, (Moskva: Institut Afriki, 1989).
- Kokorev, Vladimir, and Anatoli Reznikovskiy, *Southern Africa: The Essence of the Conflict*, (Moscow: Novosti, 1988).
- Korbonski, Andrei, and Francis Fukuyama, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
- Korochantsev, B., "Zimbabwe: Peremeni Povsudi", *Asiya i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 6, 1986.
- Krasil'nikov, A.C. *KNR i Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie na Yuge Afrikanakogo Kontinenta (1960-1983 gg.)*, (Moskva: Institut Dal'nego Vostoka, internal document, 1984).
- _____, and Yu. Goryachev, *Na Ognennom Rybezhe*, (Moskva: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1982).
- Krasner, Stephen, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
- _____, ed. *International Regimes*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
- _____, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, Vol. 3, (April 1976).
- _____, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- Krasnopevtseva, Tatyana, *Zimbabwe: Proshloe i Nastoyascheye*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1988).
- Krauthammer, Charles, "Morality and the Reagan Doctrine," *The New Republic* September 8, 1986.
- Kruger, Norma "The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles within the Struggle," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January 1988).
- _____, "Struggles for Independence: Rural Conflicts in Zimbabwe's War of Liberation," (Johns Hopkins University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1985).
- Kosukhin, Nikolai, *Revolutionary Democracy in Africa*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985).
- _____, *Arena Bor'bi Idei -- Afrika*, (Moskva: "Mysl'", 1985).

- Kulik, S., "Zimbabwe Treads A New Road," *International Affairs*, (Moscow). No. 4, 1982.
- Kvashnin, Y. and G. Nikolayev, "Class Battles Under Detente," *International Affairs*, No. 8, August 1975,
- Lake, Anthony, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).
- Lan, David, *Guns and Rain: Guerrilla & Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985).
- Lancaster, Carole, "U.S. Aid to Africa: Who Gets What, When, and How," *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 25, March 31, 1984.
- Laren, Paul Gordon, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1979).
- Larson, Deborah, *Origins of Containment*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
- Layne, Christopher, "Requiem for the Reagan Doctrine," *SAIS Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1988).
- _____, "The Real Conservative Agenda," *Foreign Policy*, No. 61, (Winter 1985/86).
- Lee, Vl. F, *Eastern Societies: Revolution, Power, Progress*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1989).
- Ledeen, Michael, "Fighting Back," *Commentary*, August 1985.
- Legum, Colin, *The Battlefronts of Southern Africa*, (New York: Africana Publishing, 1988).
- _____, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (July 1976),
- _____, "A Letter to Liberals," *The New Republic*, January 31, 1976.
- Legvold, Robert, "The Super Rivals: Conflict in the Third World," *Foreign Affairs*, 1979.
- _____, *Soviet Policy in West Africa*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
- LeoGrande, William, *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1980).
- Lessing, Pieter, *Africa's Red Harvest*, (London, 1962),
- Libby, Ronald, "Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Rhodesian Settlement: A Loss of Impetus", *Orbis*, Volume 23, No. 1, Spring 1979.
- Lockwood, Edgar "National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the Future of US Policy Toward Southern Africa", *Issue: A Quarterly*

Journal of Africanist Opinion, vol. 4, Fall 1974

Lopatov, V.V., ed., et. al, *Razvitie Chastnogo Natsiol'nogo Predprinimatel'stava v Stranakh Tropicheckoi Afriki*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1987).

Low, Stephen, "The Zimbabwe Settlement, 1976-1979," in Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, (Boulder: Westview, 1985).

Luke, Timothy, "Angola and Mozambique: Institutionalizing Social Revolution in Africa," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 44 No. 3 (July 1982).

Lynch, Allen, *Gorbachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences*, (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989).

MacFarlane, S. Neil, *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation*, (London: Croom Helm, 1982).

Malinovskii, Colonel, "Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noye Dvizheniye na Sovremenom Etap", *Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 24, December 1979,

Manckha, Pyotr, *Problems of Africa Today*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983).

Mandaza, Ibbo, ed., *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986*, (Dakar: CODESRIA Books, 1986).

Marcum, John, "Human Rights Issues in the Angolan War," testimony prepared for the Sub-committee on Africa, House Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, April 12, 1989, mimeo.

_____, "Angola" *Survival*, Vol. 30, (January-February 1988).

_____, "UNITA: The Politics of Survival," *CSIS: Africa Notes*, December 20, 1985.

_____, "Angola: A Quarter Century of War" *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 37, December 21, 1984.

_____, "The Politics of Survival: UNITA in Angola" *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 8, February 18, 1983.

_____, *The Angolan Revolution*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978).

_____, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (April 1976).

_____, "The Anguish of Angola: On Becoming Independent in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century," Presidential Address, African Studies Association, (San Francisco: October 29, 1975),

_____, *The Angolan Revolution*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969).

- Marquez, Gabriel Garcia, "Operation Carlotta," *New Left Review*, February-April 1977, Nos. 101-102.
- Martin, David, and Phyllis Johnson, *The Chitepo Assassination*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985)
- _____, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1981).
- Martin, John B., *Adlai Stevenson and the World*, (New York: Doubleday Books, 1977)
- Martin, Roger, "Zimbabwe: A Status Report," *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 92, November 16, 1988.
- Masslennikov, V. P., *Kooperatsiya v Stranakh Azii i Afriki*, (Moskva: "Ekonomika", 1988).
- Maurer, John and Richard Porth, ed., *Military Intervention in the Third World*, (New York: Praeger, 1984).
- Maxey, Kees, *The Fight for Zimbabwe: the Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI* (London: Rex Collings, 1975)
- Meldrum, Andrew, "The Gbadolite Debacle," *Africa Report*, September-October, 1989.
- Melville, Andrei, *How We View Each Other: The Enemy Image and New Political Thinking*, (Moscow: Novosti, 1988).
- Meredith, Martin, *The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979*, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979)
- Meyer, John, and Michael Hannan, *National Development and World System*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979).
- Migdal, Joel, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
- Minter, William, *King's Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa*, (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
- _____, with Elizabeth Schmidt, "When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined", *African Affairs*, vol. 87, No. 347, April 1988.
- Mitchell, R. Judson, *Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982).
- _____, "A New Brezhnev Doctrine: The Restructuring of International Relations," *World Politics*,
- Moorcraft, Paul, and Peter McLaughlin, *Chimurenga: The War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980*, (Marshalltown, RSA: Sygma Books, 1982)
- Moore, Barrington, *Social Orgins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1967).

- "MPLA--Leader of the Angolan People," *Afro-Asian Peoples* (Egypt) Vol. XI, No. 1, May 1969,
- Munslow, Barry, ed., *Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism*, (London: Zed Books, 1986).
- _____, "Prospects for the Socialist Transition of Agriculture in Zimbabwe," *World Development*, 13 (January 1985).
- Morris, Roger, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).
- _____, "The Proxy War in Angola: Pathology of a Blunder," *The New Republic*, January 31, 1976.
- Moravchik, Joshua, "The Poverty of Realism," *The New Republic*, February 16, 1986.
- Murteira, Mario, "Desenvolvimento e Seguranca na Africa Austral: Os Casos de Angola e Mocambique," *Economia e Socialismo*, (Lisboa) Vol. 10, No. 68, (Janeiro-Marco 1986).
- Nel, Philip, *A Soviet Embassy in Pretoria?*, (Capetown: Tafelberg, 1990)
- Neumann, "The International Civil War", *World Politics*, I, #1, (April 1949)
- Newsom, David, *Diplomacy and the American Democracy*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
- Nixon, Richard, *The Real War*, (New York: Warner Books, 1980).
- Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968*, (St. Louis: University of Missouri Press, 1985).
- Norton, Donna, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Angolan Crisis: A Decision-making Study," (Ms.C. dissertation, London School of Economics, 1987).
- Noveyshaya Istoriya Afriki*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1968)
- Nwafor, Azinna, "The Liberation of Angola," *Monthly Review*, February 1976.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
- Okanla, Moussa, "The United Staes and Southern Africa, 1961-1976: A Test of Theories of Foreign Policy, dissertation, University of Michigan 1982.
- Osgood, Robert, *Containment, Soviet Behavior, and Grand Strategy, Policy Papers in International Affairs*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1981).
- Ottaway, Marina, and David Ottaway, *Afrocommunism*, (New York, 1981).

- Packenham, Robert, *Liberal America and the Third World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- Paige, Jeffrey, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*, (New York: Free Press, 1975).
- Palmer, Norman, "America in a Revolutionary World", *Orbis*, Vol. 20, Spring 1976.
- Palmer, Robin, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990," *African Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 335 (April 1990).
- Papp, Daniel, *Soviet Policies toward the Developing World during the 1980s* *The Dilemmas of Power and Presence*, (Washington: GPO, 1986).
- _____, *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985).
- _____, "Angola, National Liberation, and the Soviet Union," *Parameters*, Vol. VIII, No. 1. (1976).
- Patel, Hasu, "No Master, No Mortgage, No Sale: The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe", working paper, no. 2, (Nairobi: Center for Research, Documentation and University Exchanges, May 1987)
- Patraeus, David H., "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study in the Post-Vietnam Era," (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1987).
- Pepetela, Mayombe, (Luanda: Uniao dos Escritores Angolanos, 1985), first published in 1971.
- Pokrovsky, A.C., et al, *Respublika Zimbabve*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1985).
- Ponomarev, Boris, *Lenin and the World Revolutionaary Process*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980).
- Porter, Bruce, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-1980*, (Cambridge: Cambraidge University Press, 1984).
- Portuguese Colonies: Victory or Death*, (Havana: Tricontinental, 1971).
- Potemkin, I.I., *African Problems*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1968).
- Price, Robert, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy*, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978).
- Primakov, Ye. M., *The East after the Collapse of the Colonial System*, (Mosocw: Nauka, 1983).
- Processo Negocial para a Paz no Sudoeste de Africa*, (Luanda, Editorial Vanguarda, 1989).

- Putnam, Robert, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988).
- Raeburn, Michael, *Black Fire: Narratives form Zimbabwean Guerrillas*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1978).
- Randolph, R.H., *Dawn in Zimbabwe*, a report on the activities of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe for 1977-1981, (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1985).
- Ranger, Terence, "Bandits and Guerrillas: the Case of Zimbabwe," in Donald Crummey, ed., *Banditry and Social Protests in Africa*, (London, 1986).
- _____, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*, (London: James Currey, 1985).
- _____, "The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the Revival of ZANU," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (October 1980).
- Ray, Ellen, A. Schapp, K. van Meter, and L. Wolf, *Dirty Work: CIA in Africa*, (London: ZED Publishers, 1980).
- Renwick, Robin, *Economic Sanctions*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1981).
- Rich, A.M., *Social, Ethnic and Regional Factors in the Development of the Zimbabwean Nationalist Movement, 1963-1980*, (Manchester: Ph. D. Thesis, May 1983),
- Roque, Fatima, et. al., *Seis Portugueses em Terras da UNITA*, (Lisboa: Bertrand Editora, 1988).
- Rosecrance, Richard, *Action and Reaction in World Politics*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1963).
- Rosenfeld, Stephen, "The Guns of July," *Foreign Affairs*, (Spring 1986).
- Rossiter, Caleb Stewart, "The Conflict of Development and Diplomacy: American Assistance to Southern Africa, 1973-1981," (Ph.D. Dissertaion, Cornell University, 1983)
- Rothenburg, Morris, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power*, (Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980)
- Rotberg, Robert, ed., *Africa in the 1990s and Beyond*, (New York: World Peace Foundation, 1989).
- Roussos, Peter, *Zimbabwe: An Introduction to the Economics of Transformation*, (Harare: Baobab Books, 1988).
- Rubin, Jeffrey and Bert Brown, *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation*, (New York: Academic Press, 1975).
- Rui, Manuel, *Sim Comarada*, (Luanda: Uniao dos Escritores Angolanos,

1985).

de St. Jorre, John, "South Africa: Up Against the World," *Foreign Policy*, No. 28, Fall 1977.

Saivetz, Carol and Sylvia Woodby, *Soviet-Third World Relations*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

Samuels, Michael and Stephen M. Haykin, "The Anderson Plan: An American Attempt to Seduce Portugal Out of Africa", *Orbis*, Vol. 23, No. 3, fall 1979.

Saul, John, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*, (London, 1979).

"Angola and After," *Monthly Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1, May 1976.

Sarbanes, Michael, "Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy: United States Policy toward South Africa, 1984-1986," (senior thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public Policy and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1986)

Schlesinger, Arthur, *A Thousand Days*, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1965).

_____, *Robert Kennedy and his Times*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1965,).

Scott, Andrew, *The Revolution in Statecraft: Intervention in an Age of Interdependence*, (Durham, N.C.: Duke Press Studies, 1982).

Scott, Catherine, "Socialism and the 'Soft State' in Africa: an Analysis of Angola and Mozambique," *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1988).

Scott, James, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

Sedov, P.L., *Ekonomicheskii Ekstremizm i Razvivayushchiesya Strani*, (Moskva: Misl', 1989).

_____, *Razvivayushchiesya STRani i Sovietskii Soyuz*, (Moskva: Misl', 1981).

Seidman, Ann, *The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa*, (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985).

Seiler, John, ed., *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).

Selections from V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin on the National Colonial Question, (Calcutta: Calcutta Book House, 1970).

Shafer, D. Michael, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Shakhnazarov, Georgi, *The Coming World Order*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984).

- Shamuyarira, Nathan, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965).
- Shapiro, Leonard, "The International Department of the CPSU: key to Soviet policy," *International Journal*, Winter 1976-77.
- Shaw, William, "Towards the One-Party State in Zimbabwe: A Study in African Political Thought", *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1986.
- Sherstobitov, V.P., *Internatsionalism Sovetskogo Naroda*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1982).
- Shkunaev, B.G., ed., *Ob'edinennie Natsii Protiv Kolonializma i Rasizma Na Yuge Afriki*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1970).
- Shubin, Vladimir, *Sotsial-Demokratiya i Bor'ba Protiv Kolonializma i Apartheida*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1985).
- _____, (book appears under the pseudonym, Vladimir Bushin,) *Social Democracy in Southern Africa*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990).
- Shvetsep, V. Ya., *Sotsialisticheskii Internatsional*, (Moskva: "Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenie", 1988).
- Sidenko, Victor "The Intrigues of Angola's Enemies," *New Times*, No. 30 (July 1975).
- Sithole, Masipula, "Class and Factionalism in the Zimbabwe Nationalist Movement," *African Studies Review*, vol. 27, no. 1, March 1984.
- _____, *Zimbabwe Struggles within the Struggle* (Salisbury: Rujeko Press, 1979.)
- Skocpol, Theda, *States and Social Revolutions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)
- Slater, Henry, "The Politics of Frustration: The ZAPU-ZANU Split in Historical Perspective," *Kenya Historical Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1975.
- Slipchenko, Sergei, *Na Afrikanskom Yuge*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1986).
- Smiley, Ian, "Inside Angola," *The New York Review of Books*, February 17, 1983
- Smith, David and Colin Simpson, *Mugabe*, (Salisbury, Pioneer Head, 1981).
- Smith, Wayne, "A Trap in Angola," *Foreign Policy*, No. 62, (Spring 1986).
- Soames, Lord, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe," *International Affairs*, Vol. 56 No. 3 (Summer 1980).
- Sobre a Economica Angolana*, (Luanda, Editorial Vanguarda, 1989).

- Sobre a Political de Clemencia e Harmonizacao Nacional*, (Luanda, Editorial Vanguarda, 1989).
- Solarz, Stephen, "When to Intervene," *Foreign Policy*, No. 63, (Summer 1986).
- Solodovnikov, V.G., ed., *Bor'ba za Osvobozhdenie Portugal'skikh Kolonii v Afrike*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1975).
- Somerville, Keith, *Angola: Politics, Economics and Society*, (London: Lynn Reinner Publishers, 1986).
- _____, "Angola: Client State or State of Socialist Orientation?" *Millenium Journal of International Studies* Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1984).
- Spring, William, *The Long Fields: Zimbabwe Since Independence*, (Hants, England: Marshall Pickering Holdings LTD, 1986).
- Stanley Foundation, *U.S. Policy and Radical Regimes*, conference report, September 25-27, 1986.
- Starushenko, Gleb, "XXV s'ezd KPSS o Pressivnykh Izmeniyakh V Ozbodivshikhsya Stranakh i Povishenii Ikh Roli v Mirovom Razvitii", *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, no. 7, 1976
- _____, "National Liberation Movement and the Struggle for Peace", *International Affairs*, No. 10, 1963,
- Stedman, Stephen, "Peacemaking in Revolutionary Situations," (Ph.D. disseration, Stanford University, August 1988).
- Stoneman, Colin, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, (London: MacMillan, 1988).
- _____, ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, (London: MacMillan, 1981).
- Sverdlov, Col. Yuri, "Support and Assistance," *Soviet Military Review*, October 1987.
- Sylvester, Christine, "Zimbabwe's 1985 Elections", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 1986
- Tarabrin, E.A., ed., *USSR and Countries of Africa*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980).
- _____, *The New Scramble for Africa*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974).
- Thompson, Carol, *Challenge to Imperialism: The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985).
- Tikhomirov, B.I., *Partiya Aparteida*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1987).
- Trofimenko, Henry, and Pavel Podlesny, *USSR-US: Lessons of Peaceful Coexistence*, (Moscow: Novosti, 1988).

_____, "The Third World and U.S.-Soviet Competition," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 5 (Summer 1981).

_____, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," *International Affairs*, No. 10, October 1975, p. 38.

Troyanovsky, Mikhail, *Imperialism's Psychological Offensive Against the Frontline States*, (Moscow: Novosti, 1988).

Tucker, Robert, *The Inequality of Nations*, (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

Tyagunencko, L., *Vooruzhennaya Borb'a Narodov Afriki za Svobodu i Nezavisimost'*, (Moskva: Nauka, 1974).

Ulam, Adam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).

Ulyanovsky, Rotislav, *Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations*, (Moscow: Progress publishers, 1974).

_____, *National Liberation*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978).

UNICEF, *Children on the Frontline* (New York: UNICEF, 1989)

UNITA: *Organizao Nacionalista ou Instrumento a Soldo de Interesses Antiangolanos?*, (Luanda, Editorial Vanguarda, 1989).

Urnov, A.Yu., *Politika YuAR v Afrike*, (Moskva: "Nauka", 1982).

Utete, Botsio, *The Road to Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Settler Colonialism, National Liberation, and Foreign Intervention*, (Washington: University Press of America, 1978).

Vaky, Viron, "Positive Containment in Nicaragua," *Foreign Policy*, No. 68, (Fall 1987).

Valenta, Jiri and William Potter, ed., *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security*, (New York: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

Elizabeth Valkenier, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Assessments", *World Politics*, vol. XXXVIII, #3, April 1986.

_____, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983).

Van Evera, Stephen, "The Case Against Intervention," *The Atlantic*, Vol. 266, No. 1 (July 1990).

Venter, Al J., "The Angolan War: A Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare," *International Defense Review*, No. 6 (1990).

Vernon, Raymond and Debora Spar, *Beyond Globalism: Remaking American Foreign Economic Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

Vernon, Raymond, *Sovereignty at Bay*, (Basic Books, New York, 1971).

- Verrier, Anthony, *The Road to Zimbabwe: 1890-1980*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986).
- Vydrin, V., "Angola Greet its Heroes," *New Times*, No. 10 (March 1975),
- Vinicicus, Marco and Maria Joao Saldanha, *Jonas Savimbi: Um Desafio a Ditadura Comunista em Angola*, (Lisboa: Edicoes Armasilda, July 1977).
- Walker, R.B.J., *Culture, Ideology, and World Order*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
- Wall, Patrick, ed., *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World*, (London: Stacey International, 1977).
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, "Luanda Is Madrid," *The Nation*, January 3-10, 1976.
- _____, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1974, pp. 387-415.)
- _____, *The Modern World System -- Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
- Walters, Barbara, "An Interview with Fidel Castro," *Foreign Policy*, No. 28, Fall 1977.
- Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
- Watson, Adam, "System of States," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, (1990).
- Wienstein, Warren, and Thomas Henriksen, eds., *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*, (New York: Praeger, 1980).
- Wendt, Alexander, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987).
- Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, *U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa*, (Boston: South End Press, 1978).
- Whelan, Joseph, ed., *Soviet Policy and the United States Response in the Third World*, Report prepared by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, (Washington: GPO, 1981).
- Wolf, Eric, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
- Wolfe, Alan, *The Rise and Fall of the "Soviet Threat"* (Washington: Institute of Policy Studies, 1979).
- Wolpe, Harold, "Seizing Southern African Opportunities," *Foreign*

Policy, No. 73 (Winter 1988-89).

Woodby, Sylvia, *Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy*, (Boulder: Westview, 1989).

Young, Crawford, *Ideology and Development in Africa*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

Young, Tom, "The Politics of Development in Angola and Mozambique," *African Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 347 (April 1988).

Zhukov, Yuri, *SSSR-SSHA: Dogovora Dlinoyo v Sem'desayt Let*, (Moskva: "Polizdat", 1988)

Zhukov, ed., *The Great October Revolution and the National-Liberation Movement*, (report of an international scientific conference, in Baku 1977), (Moscow: Nauka, 1977).

Zhukov, E., "The Rise of the National Liberation Movement after the Second World War," *International Affairs*, No. 7, July 1975,

Zimbabwe: A Country Study, Area Handbook Series, (Washington: GPO, 1983)

Zimmerman, William, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1956-1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

Zmeev, B. M., *Politicheskaya Ideologiya v Stranakh Tropichestkoi Afriki*, (Leningrad: Leningradskii Universitet, 1988).