From aspirations to migration decisions:

A mixed methods study of Syrian refugees in Jordan



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Abstract

Despite the multitude of theories that aim to explain why people migrate and where they relocate, the migration decision-making process of potential migrants largely remains a black box. I outline a two-step framework of migration decision-making that incorporates insights from social psychology, centres on individual capacities for migration, and hypothesises that migration motivation arises from individual aspiration gaps, which are the difference between current needs satisfaction and life aspirations. Potential migrants who have established whether to migrate use heuristic rules to search, evaluate, and decide upon a migration destination. I empirically illustrate aspects of the framework in a mixed methods study of the migration decision-making of Syrian refugees in Jordan. I gathered novel data through a quantitative conjoint survey experiment of destination choice with 789 respondents, preceded by 29 semi-structured qualitative interviews. I found that migration motivation increased with the size of individual aspiration gaps. Smaller aspiration gaps were associated with the wish to stay in Jordan while larger ones with preferences for repatriation and resettlement. Overall, Syrian refugees aspired to citizenship and rights, employment, and education and were highly motivated to migrate to close their aspiration gaps. The conjoint results of stated destination choice suggest that migration destinations that restrict religious clothing, such as the hijab and burqa, destinations with a bad reputation, and destinations in France deterred Syrian refugees. In contrast, the absence of bans and destinations in Canada attracted them. The effects of religious bans, reputation, and the country a migration destination is located in exceed those of traditional migration drivers at the destination, such as migrant networks and employment. Lastly, I found evidence for the use of heuristics in destination choice, such as availability, few-reason decision-making, and prospect theory, as well as for the importance of framing effects.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The number of *potential migrants* worldwide — individuals who would like to migrate internationally if they had the chance to do so — has been rising and currently exceeds 750 million.[1] While undeniably a large number at ten per cent of the world's population and three times the current international migrant stock,[2] it might nevertheless be puzzling why the number is not higher given large structural imbalances between countries and continuing conflict and instability in several countries and regions. A supposedly much larger number of individuals might have good economic and non-economic reasons to migrate but do not state the wish to do so. Why not? Are they also potential migrants? Theoretical and empirical research has established that migration is driven by demographic, economic, environmental, human development, individual, politico-institutional, security-related, socio-cultural, and supranational factors.[3] The relative importance of different drivers of migration, however, remains

1. Neli Esipova, Anita Pugliese and Julie Ray, *More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could*, 10 December 2018, accessed 7 June 2019, `https://news.gallup.com/poll/245255/750-million-worldwide-migrate.aspx`.

2. United Nations, *International Migration Report 2017*, technical report (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017).

3. Mathias Czaika and Constantin Reinprecht, *Drivers of migration*, CrossMigration project report (2019); Silvia Migali et al., *International Migration Drivers: A quantitative assessment of the structural factors shaping migration* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018).

largely uncharted territory.[4] The process by which these transform into actual migration behaviour has received equally scant attention and the migration decision-making process has largely remained a black box. It has repeatedly been argued that some destination countries receive more migrants than others due to their generous migration policies[5] or due to the country's perception, rumours, or misinformation.[6] The salience of both has increased considerably since the European migration crisis in 2015 when a few countries, such as Germany, have received a disproportionately large number of asylum seekers.

In this thesis, I explore the migration decision-making process — the decisions whether to migrate and where to relocate — of potential migrants. My work not only feeds into ongoing research[7] and enriches the academic literature but is relevant to governments and policymakers that increasingly attempt to manage immigration.[8] I examine the following three research questions:

1. What motivates individuals to migrate, what role do life aspirations play, and who is a potential migrant?

4. Hein de Haas, 'The determinants of international migration: Conceptualizing policy, origin and destination effects', *IMI Working Paper Series*, no. 32 (2011).

5. Jennifer Fitzgerald, David Leblang and Jessica C. Teets, 'Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration', *World Politics* 66, no. 03 (2014): 406–445; Timothy J. Hatton and Joseph Moloney, 'Applications for asylum in the developed world: Modelling asylum claims by origin and destination', chap. 9 in *A Long Way to Go: Irregular Migration Patterns, Processes, Drivers and Decision-making*, ed. Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser (Acton: Australian National University Press, 2017).

6. Heaven Crawley and Jessica Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go: Policies, People and Perceptions Shaping Destination Preferences', *International Migration* 57, no. 1 (2019): 20–35; Marie McAuliffe and Dinuk Jayasuriya, 'Do asylum seekers and refugees choose destination countries? Evidence from large-scale surveys in Australia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka', *International Migration* 54, no. 4 (2016): 44–59.

7. The University of Amsterdam's ongoing research project SYRMAGINE, funded under the EU's Horizon 2020 framework, investigates how Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Turkey imagine potential European destination countries and how their imaginations affect their destination preferences ('Syrian Imaginations of Europe', accessed 19 January 2019, `https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/209783/factsheet/en`).

8. Jørgen Carling and Francis Collins, 'Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 6 (2018): 909–926; Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud, *The Politics of International Migration Management*, ed. Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

2. How do potential migrants search, evaluate, and decide upon potential migration destinations?

3. What are the aspirations, destination preferences, and destination choices of Syrian refugees in Jordan and how well does the revised migration decision-making framework explain them?

I develop a refined framework of migration decision-making that incorporates insights from academic disciplines as varied as social psychology, migration studies, economics, and political science. The framework is intentionally broad to be applicable to different types of migrants. It is based on (unfulfilled) individual needs and aspirations as the basis for the motivation to migrate. Aspiration gaps are the basis for migration intentions and behaviour but potential migrants are only able to migrate if they have the three capacities for migration: the capacities to aspire, realise, and decide. Accordingly there are three 'types' of potential migrants: migration aspirers, migration realisers, and migration deciders. Only the latter have the material and non-material resources to aspire and realise migration as well as the mental capacity to search, evaluate, and decide upon potential alternative migration options and destinations. This is the short answer to the first research question.

Within the refined migration decision-making framework, I outline the centrality of heuristic rules that guide search, evaluation, and decision-making of potential migration destinations. In contrast to a wide range of empirical evaluations of the drivers of migration, I engage with the cognitive process how potential migrants decide where to relocate. I borrow concepts of human decision-making common in social psychology that travel well across disciplines and enrich existing accounts of migration decision-making. I provide an extensive but not exhaustive set of heuristics that potential migrants likely employ to search, evaluate, and decide upon migration options. I further briefly discuss the types and properties of information that are useful to potential migrants when deciding whether to migrate and where to relocate.

I then empirically illustrate aspects of the migration decision-making framework in an inductive mixed methods evaluation of migration preferences and stated destination choices of Syrian refugees in Jordan. This is hence not a causal thesis and I do not engage in deductive theory testing. I gather novel qualitative and quantitative data obtained through interviews and surveys of Syrian refugees in Jordan. I find empirical evidence for some of the framework's predictions. Respondents who indicated a wish to stay in Jordan reported significantly lower aspiration gaps than those who wished to migrate to a third country or return to Syria. However, aspirations were heterogeneous and different 'types of aspires' could be distinguished by the importance placed on different life aspirations, such as family, career, and rights, as well as by demographic characteristics. I found evidence for a causal effect of a destination's characteristics on the probability that it was chosen in a conjoint experiment of migration destination choice. Syrian refugees in Jordan in my sample preferred destinations with faster access to the labour market and naturalisation as well as free housing. Surprisingly, having local contacts did not affect destination choice. I find evidence for a framing effect: destinations that highlighted the employment prospects of Syrians were significantly preferred to those that highlighted unemployment. Similarly, public attitudes in favour of immigration made destinations more attractive while the equivalent information framed in negative terms, opposition to immigration, resulted in those destinations being chosen less often. Whether or not destinations banned immigration from Muslim-majority countries or restricted religious symbols, such as the burqa, generally had the largest effect on destination choice. Lastly, the results confirmed the importance of a destination's reputation as well as the country the destination was located in. The most important characteristics why a destination was not chosen were its designation as a 'bad country for Syrians' or being located in France. On the contrary, destinations in Canada were the most likely to be chosen.

1.1 Context

There is widespread concern over and opposition to seemingly increasing international mobility, albeit with large variations across countries.[9] A third of people worldwide would like to reduce the levels of immigration to their countries.[10] In Europe, this proportion rises to more than 50 per cent. One might assume that politicians in representative democracies would follow suit and make migration policy more restrictive in accordance with voters' preferences. This, however, has largely not happened and migration policy is generally less restrictive than public opinion.[11] Brexit and Trump might be some of the results. The United Kingdom's (UK) decision to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016 has been attributed partly to antagonism and opposition to migration, particularly to freedom of movement and the European migration crisis.[12] Similarly, concerns over immigration were a central factor for people voting for Donald Trump in the United States of America (USA) in 2016.[13] While the future immigration system of the UK remains to be determined at the time of writing, President Trump has implemented and announced various arguably anti-immigrant policies including the 'Muslim ban', restrictions on immigration from Muslim-majority countries, and the promise to build a wall along the Mexican-US border. The effects of Brexit and 'Trumpian' policies remain to be seen, although early evidence indicates that both countries have become less attractive destinations for different groups of migrants.[14] This is true even for migrants that are not directly affected by such

9. European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer 469: Integration of immigrants in the European Union*, technical report (European Commission, 2018).

10. IOM, *How the World Views Migration*, technical report (Geneva: IOM, 2015).

11. Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda, 'From individual attitudes towards migrants to migration policy outcomes: Theory and evidence', *Economic Policy* 23, no. 56 (2008): 651–713.

12. Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo, 'Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2017): 450–464.

13. Marc Hooghe and Ruth Dassonneville, 'Explaining the Trump Vote: The Effect of Racist Resentment and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments', *PS: Political Science and Politics* 51, no. 3 (2018): 528–534.

14. Matthias Busse and Mikkel Barslund, *Is EU talent being chased away from th UK by Brexit?*, technical report (LSE, 2017), accessed 1 December 2018, `http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/`

policies.[15] It has been increasingly recognised that the *reputation* of a country is an important factor attracting or deterring potential migrants.[16] Migrants might hence not base their evaluation of potential destinations on available *information* but rather on a country's reputation. The reputation might further influence whether information about a certain country is believable or not. Policies restricting some forms of unwanted migration might ultimately have unintended consequences if they tarnish a country's reputation and hence potentially carry large economic costs.

Attempting to limit migration, policymakers have hence insisted that wrong information about potential destinations distorts migration flows. Some evidence supports this assertion. In one survey, around 90 per cent of Syrian asylum seekers in Germany indicated that they had heard that they would be given a house and free social benefits.[17] Information might hence be central to and a key variable in migration decision-making, at least for some migrants.[18] Migration is then at least in part motivated by (wrong) information about and imaginations of potential destinations.[19] Recognising the potential impact of information, states have increasingly been active providers of information through awareness or information campaigns (ICs) to restrict or discourage unwanted and unauthorised migration.[20] Their effectiveness, however,

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2017/09/01/eu-graduates-leaving-the-uk-brexit/; Kevin Murnane, *There Are Early Signs That Trump' s Views On Immigration Could Damage The US Economy*, August 2017, 1–8, accessed 16 January 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmurnane/2017/08/17/there-are-early-signs-that-trumps-views-on-immigration-could-damage-the-us-economy.

15. Raymond M. Duch et al., 'Where will the British Go? And Why?', *Social Science Quarterly* 100, no. 2 (2019): 480–493.

16. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'.

17. Carola Richter, Martin Emmer and Marlene Kunst, *Wie Geflüchtete Medien nutzen: Eine Expertise für den Mediendienst Integration*, technical report (Berlin: Mediendienst Integration, 2016).

18. Gordon F. De Jong and Robert W. Gardner, *Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries*, ed. Gordon F. De Jong and Robert W. Gardner (New York: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981).

19. Olubunmi O. Akintola and Olagoke Akintola, 'West Africans in the Informal Economy of South Africa: the Case of Low Skilled Nigerian Migrants', *Review of Black Political Economy* 42, no. 4 (2015): 379–398; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 'Do asylum seekers and refugees choose destination countries?'

20. Jørgen Carling and María Hernández-Carretero, 'Protecting Europe and Protecting Migrants? Strategies for Managing Unauthorised Migration from Africa', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2011): 42–58; Djamila Schans and Caitlin Optekamp, *Raising awareness, changing behavior? Combatting irregular migration through information campaigns*, technical report

is disputed.[21] ICs might not be effective if potential migrants consider a country's (positive) reputation as more important for their migration decisions as the (negative or discouraging) information provided. Potential migrants might not believe the information provided due to some of its properties or due to the lack of trustworthiness of the sender or carrier of the information.

As mentioned above, Gallup World Poll survey results suggest that there are over 750 million potential migrants.[22] However, their plans most often do not materialise and just over three per cent of those desiring to migrate are making preparations to relocate despite potential large economic gains from migration.[23] Potential migrants face material and non-material barriers. Material barriers include insufficient financial resources and lack of development; non-material barriers include migration policies restricting exit or entry, psychological resources, such as willpower, risk aversion, personality traits, cumulative immobility, and discrimination at the destination.[24] A distinction between the *aspiration* and *ability* to migrate has been proposed to distinguish between individuals who do not want to migrate and those who are not able to.[25] A large part of the 750 million might not have the ability to migrate and have therefore not started preparations, even if they aspire to migrate.

Another reason why people might ultimately not migrate even though they state

(The Hague: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum (WODC), Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016).

21. Jasper Tjaden, Sandra Morgenstern and Frank Laczko, *Evaluating the impact of information campaigns in the field of migration: A systematic review of the evidence, and practical guidance*, technical report (Geneva: IOM, 2018).

22. Esipova, Pugliese and Ray, *More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could.*

23. Frank Laczko, Jasper Tjaden and Daniel Auer, *Measuring Global Migration Potential, 2010-2015*, technical report (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2017).

24. Damarys Canache et al., 'Openness, extraversion and the intention to emigrate', *Journal of Research in Personality* 47, no. 4 (2013): 351–355; Thomas Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); Peter A. Fischer, Reiner Martin and Thomas Straubhaar, 'Should I stay or should I go', in *International Migration, Immobility and Development*, ed. Thomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann and Kristof Tamas (Oxford: Berg Press, 1997), 49–90; Douglas S. Massey et al., *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

25. Jørgen Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility: Theoretical reflections and Cape Verdean experiences', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28, no. 1 (2002): 5–42.

intentions to do so might be the *migration decision-making process* itself. Policy-makers and the public often assume that potential migrants and asylum seekers are well-informed about destination country characteristics and rationally decide where to relocate to.[26] Several studies of migration decision-making similarly assume that potential migrants rationally decide where to go based on the available information and 'try to obtain as much information as possible in order to make the best possible decision'.[27] However, too much information might result in cognitive overload and ultimately no migration decision.[28] *Heuristics*, strategies that aim to make decisions 'more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods' by ignoring part of the information,[29] might help to explain both why the majority does not migrate and why those who do migrate choose one country over another.

It hence seems that potential migrants' aspirations, information about potential destination countries, the destination's reputation, and the migration decision-making process itself might affect whether and where to potential migrants relocate.

1.2 Concepts and definitions

I provide the definition of 'migrant' that I use and justify why I generally do not distinguish between voluntary and forced migration, temporary and permanent migration, types of migrants, and forms of migration.

Migrant. A migrant in this thesis refers to somebody who leaves his or her current location and settles at a different location, for a variety of reasons. A potential migrant is somebody who has not yet migrated but might do so in the future. I follow Nicholas

26. Heaven Crawley, *Chance or Choice? Understanding Why Asylum Seekers Come to the UK*, technical report (Refugee Council, 2010).

27. Gil S. Epstein, 'Herd and network effects in migration decision-making', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 4 (2008): p.573.

28. Ellen Peters et al., 'More Is Not Always Better: Intuitions About Effective Public Policy Can Lead to Unintended Consequences', *Soc Issues Policy Rev* 7, no. 1 (2013): 1–29.

29. Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier, 'Heuristic decision making', *Annual Review of Psychology* 62 (2011): p.454.

van Hear and denote migrant as encompassing different types of transient people such as temporary and permanent labour migrants, students, tourists, internally displaced people, asylum seekers, and refugees.[30]

Forced and voluntary migration. Studies have generally distinguished between forced and voluntary migration and have argued that migration decision-making is only applicable to the latter, as refugees do not have agency over their migration decision.[31] Ascribing refugees any agency in their decision to migrate or where to relocate may 'undermine their case for refugee status' and international protection.[32] However, not everybody leaves their city, region, or country of origin/residence and is displaced by violence. In fact, all migrants, including refugees, generally exhibit (some) agency over whether, when, and where to migrate.[33] While acknowledging the underlying structural factors that facilitate or impede migration, I hold that all migrants have some agency.[34] The degree of agency, however, might differ for different groups of migrants and might vary both spatially and temporally.

Permanent and temporary migration. I do not distinguish between permanent and non-permanent or temporary migration. Permanent migration is not necessarily permanent in practice, due to changes in migration intentions and countries' migration policies, resulting in onward migration or return migration. It has been argued that the determinants of migration decisions may differ for first and repeated movers.[35] However, acknowledging that people have different motivations for migration is con-

30. Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities* (Abindgdon: Routledge, 1998).

31. Gordon F. De Jong and James T. Fawcett, 'Motivations for Migration: An Assessment and a Value-Expectancy Research Model', chap. 2 in *Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries*, ed. Gordon F. De Jong and Robert W. Gardner (New York: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981), 13–58.

32. Oliver Bakewell, 'Some Reflections on Structure and Agency in Migration Theory', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no. 10 (2010): p.1690.

33. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*; Van Hear, *New Diasporas*.

34. Anthony H. Richmond, *Global apartheid: refugees, racism, and the new world order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

35. Fred Arnold, 'Birds of passage no more - migration decision making among Filipino immigrants in Hawaii', *International Migration* XXV, no. 1 (March 1987): 41–61.

sistent with the argument that migration decisions might not be qualitatively different in a framework of migration as a potential response to satisfy life aspiration. There is no a priori reason why return migration should not be driven by the same factors as emigration.[36] Different migration drivers might weigh differently, depending on people's aspirations, their current needs satisfaction, and external circumstances.

International and internal migration. Similarly, I do not distinguish between international and internal migration for two reasons. First, factors identified to influence internal and international migration decision-making are 'very similar and differ predominantly in their relative weight'.[37] Second, globalisation, 'the widening, deepening and speeding up of world wide interconnectedness'[38] and the rise of information communication technologies resulted in a shrinking of the world[39] and diminishing importance of geographical distance.[40] This, might ultimately blur the line between internal and international migration decision-making,[41] particularly with regards to the role of information. Hence, international migration decision-making in the twenty-first century might not differ systematically from internal migration decision-making.[42]

36. Sonja Haug, 'Migration Networks and Migration Decision-Making', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 4 (2008): 585–605.

37. Mathias Czaika, 'Internal versus international migration and the role of multiple deprivation', *Asian Population Studies* 8, no. 2 (July 2012): p.125.

38. David Held et al., *Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p.2.

39. Scott Kirsch, 'The incredible shrinking world? Technology and the production of space', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13 (1995): 529–555.

40. Graeme Hugo, 'Indonesian Labour Migration to Malaysia: Trends and Policy Implications', *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 21, no. 1 (1993): 36–70.

41. Russell King and Ronald Skeldon, ''Mind the Gap!' Integrating Approaches to Internal and International Migration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no. 10 (2010): 1619–1646.

42. I acknowledge that international migration is restricted by migration policies whereas internal migration is less so, a notable exception being China's *hukou* system. It is hence imaginable that internal migration is chosen if international migration is not attainable.

1.3 Existing explanations for migration decisions

This thesis draws on a wide range of literature from anthropology over migration studies to social psychology. In this section, I summarise the relevant literature that I build upon for the theoretical migration decision-making framework (Chapter 2) and its empirical illustration (Chapters 4–6). The first part summarises the reasons why people migrate, the second presents different cognitive processes by which people decide whether to migrate and where to relocate, and the third discusses the role of information in migration decisions.

Migration drivers. Migration drivers are 'structural elements that enable and constrain the exercise of agency by social actors' and thereby make 'certain decisions, routes or destinations more likely and [bring] them within the orbit of people's capabilities.'[43] Migration drivers can broadly be grouped into demographic, economic, environmental, human development, individual, politico-institutional, security-related, socio-cultural, and supranational characteristics and processes that affect individual migration decisions and aggregate migration flows.[44] Migration drivers operate at the micro, meso, and macro levels. At the macro level, drivers are structural disparities between places (of actual and potential residence) that create a context in which migration becomes more likely. These incorporate both longstanding inequalities as well as cyclical or seasonal fluctuations. At the meso and micro level, migration drivers facilitate or constrain migration. At the meso and micro level, specific, often observable and identifiable, events or developments may trigger the decision to migrate. I refer

43. Nicholas Van Hear, Oliver Bakewell and Katy Long, 'Push-pull plus: reconsidering the drivers of migration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 6 (2018): p.928.

44. For comprehensive reviews see: Subrata Ghatak, Paul Levine and Stephen W. Price, 'Migration Theories and Evidence: An Assessment', *Journal of Economic Surveys* 10, no. 2 (1996): 159–198; Jessica Hagen-Zanker, 'Why do people migrate? A review of the theoretical literature', *MGSoG Working Paper*, no. 002 (2008); Russell King, 'Theories and Typologies of Migration: An Overview and A Primer', *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations* 3 (2012); Douglas S. Massey et al., 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review* 19, no. 3 (1993): 431–466; Migali et al., *International Migration Drivers*.

to this set of structural factors that have the power to affect migration decisions and enable and constrain migration as the *migration driver environment*. The extent to which potential migrants exercise their agency in this structural context environment reflects their individual capacities for migration (see Chapter 2).

A large number of studies has analysed the effect of different migration drivers on individual migration decisions and aggregate migration flows.[45] However, with the exception of economic drivers, which have frequently been found to be among the most salient, the relative importance of different migration drivers remains largely unknown. Migration drivers affect migration decision-making through their impact on both (unfulfilled) needs and life aspirations, which I describe in more detail in Chapter2. I investigate the importance of several migration drivers in migration decision-making both qualitatively and quantitatively through interviews and surveys with Syrian refugees in Jordan. I focus on drivers that operate at the destination to investigate what factors make certain destinations more likely to be chosen. To study the relative importance of different migration drivers, it is imperative to understand how these migration drivers enter into the migration decision-making processes of potential migrants.

Migration decision-making. This is the 'formation of an intention or disposition that results in a migration behaviour.'[46] It encompasses two main decisions: whether to move or stay and where to relocate to, which are not necessarily always distinct in practice.[47] In the absence of individual level data before *and* after migration, several empirical studies evaluate the impact of migration drivers on migration *intentions*. However, it is contested whether intentions are good determinants of future beha-

45. For a comprehensive review of empirical studies of the drivers of migration see: Czaika and Reinprecht, *Drivers of migration*.

46. De Jong and Gardner, *Migration Decision Making*, p.2.

47. Lawrence A. Brown and Eric G. Moore, 'The Intra-Urban Migration Process: A Perspective', *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 52, no. 1 (1970): 1–13.

viour. While several studies find that they are,[48] others conclude that while they might increase the probability of migration,[49] they are poor predictors of migration behaviour.[50] A recent analysis of Gallup World Poll data finds that aggregate emigration intentions are good proxies for flows between industrialised countries, particularly for North-North migration but emigration intentions only weakly explain migration from Africa to the industrialised North.[51] The latter could be due to barriers to migration, such as resource constraints or migration policies, short timeframes (potential migrants have not yet emigrated), surveys overstating individuals' true migration intentions, or incomplete information.

A variety of theories explain how potential migrants make migration decisions. The neoclassical or human capital model holds that a rational cost-benefit calculation underlies migration decision-making.[52] Potential migrants compare their utility at their current place with the expected utility at potential destinations. People will move to the place that gives them the highest expected utility. As costs and benefits might be unknown ex ante, individuals search for information about alternative destinations as long as the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. While intuitive, it

48. Mathew J. Creighton, 'The role of aspirations in domestic and international migration', *The Social Science Journal* 50 (2013): 79–88; Annekatrin Hoppe and Kaori Fujishiro, 'Anticipated job benefits, career aspiration, and generalized self-efficacy as predictors for migration decision-making', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 47 (2015): 13–27; Hendrik P. van Dalen and Kène Henkens, 'Explaining emigration intentions and behaviour in the Netherlands, 2005–10', *Population Studies* 67, no. 2 (2013): 225–241.

49. Haug, 'Migration Networks and Migration Decision-Making'.

50. Amelie Constant and Douglas S. Massey, 'Return Migration by German Guestworkers: Neoclassical versus New Economic Theories', *International Migration* 40, no. 4 (2002): 5–38; Sonja Haug, 'Bleiben oder Zurückkehren: zur Messung, Erklärung und Prognose der Rückkehr von Immigranten in Deutschland', *Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft* 26, no. 2 (2001): 231–270; Marek Kupiszewski, 'How trustworthy are forecasts of international migration between Poland and the European Union', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28, no. 4 (2002): 627–645.

51. Jasper Tjaden, Daniel Auer and Frank Laczko, 'Linking Migration Intentions with Flows: Evidence and Potential Use', *International Migration* 57, no. 1 (2018): 36–57.

52. George J. Borjas, 'Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants', *The American Economic Review* 77, no. 4 (1987): 531–553; Simone Bertoli, 'The informational structure of migration decision and migrants self-selection', *Economics Letters* 108, no. 1 (July 2010): 89–92; Larry A. Sjaastad, 'The Costs and Returns of Human Migration', *Journal of Political Economy* 70, no. 5 (1962): 80–93; Michael P. Todaro, 'A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries', *The American Economic Review* 59, no. 1 (1969): 138–148.

imposes an unreasonable burden on individual decision-makers, as they would have to continuously evaluate whether acquiring new information would be beneficial or not. I acknowledge the bounded rationality of human decision-making[53] and therefore doubt individuals' abilities to search for migration opportunities according to the described optimal stopping rule.[54] The neoclassical model was criticised for its exclusive focus on the individual as the unit of analysis. Revised models put the household or family at the centre of migration decision-making.[55] However, the basic structure of the neoclassical model, utility maximisation, remains. The model is further unable to explain why a majority of people do not migrate.[56]

The network theory of migration addresses some of these criticism and acknowledges the importance of structure and agency. Migration is a social product; an interplay of individual decisions by individual actors, economic and political factors, family and friends, and migration networks.[57] Social contacts, embedded in migration networks, represent information channels that influence migration decision-making. Networks determine whether migration takes place and influences the destination choice.[58] Individual decision-making (micro-level) is embedded in social contexts (meso-level) and influenced by underlying structural conditions (macro-level). While useful to analyse the perpetuation of migration,[59] it is unable to explain migration decision-making in the absence of networks.[60]

These theories have generally been tested ex post, i.e. after individuals migrated.

53. Reinhard Selten, 'Bounded Rationality', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 146, no. 4 (1990): 649–658.

54. George J. Stigler, 'The Economics of Information', *The Journal of Political Economy* 69, no. 3 (1961): 213–225.

55. Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, 'The New Economics of Labor Migration', *The American Economic Review* 75, no. 2 (1985): 173–178.

56. R. Paul Shaw, 'A Note on Cost-Return Calculations and Decisions to Migrate', *Population Studies* 28, no. 1 (1974): 167–169.

57. Monica Boyd, 'Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas', *International Migration Review* 23, no. 3 (1989): 638–670.

58. Haug, 'Migration Networks and Migration Decision-Making'.

59. Massey et al., 'Theories of International Migration'.

60. Hein de Haas, 'The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes: A Theoretical Inquiry', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no. 10 (2010): 1587–1617.

However, they suffer from several methodological shortcomings. When migrants justify why they relocated to a particular destination, the justification might differ from the actual migration drivers at the time (ex-post rationalisation). Migrants evaluate alternative options as less favourable after the decision to migrate was made and ignore information that might refute or doubt the decision to avoid cognitive dissonance.[61] Social conformity bias might lead migrants to respond in ways not to upset the norms surrounding migration. Ex ante evaluations test how well different migration theories explain migration intentions of potential migrants. In a lab experiment, Batista and McKenzie found evidence for income-maximisation according to the neoclassical model.[62] However, a substantial minority of respondents minimised costs rather than maximised income, contrary to theory. Overall, they concluded that one needs to move beyond classic migration theories to explain global migration patterns. Another shortcoming relates to studies' inability to establish the relative importance of different destination characteristics and their almost exclusive focus on monetary costs and benefits (i.e. incomes). An exception is Lagakos et al. who conducted a discrete choice experiment and found that non-monetary attributes of migration destinations, such as housing conditions, were more important than wages or unemployment probabilities.[63] My research connects to these choice experiments, as I focus on the importance of different non-monetary attributes of potential migration destinations.

Social and cognitive psychological models of migration decision-making have focused on ex ante perceptions of destinations and individuals' information processing strategies.[64] Information processing, predominantly absent from the classical theories

61. Jack W. Brehm, 'Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 52, no. 3 (1956): 384–389; Leon Festinger, *A theory of cognitive dissonance*, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

62. Catia Batista and David McKenzie, 'Testing Classic Theories of Migration in the Lab' (2018), accessed 1 September 2019, `http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/AMM_2019/batista_c2249.pdf`.

63. David Lagakos, Ahmed M. Mobarak and Michael E. Waugh, 'The Welfare Effects of Encouraging Rural-Urban Migration', *NBER Working Paper Series*, no. 24193 (2018).

64. Pasquale A. Pellegrini and A. Stewart Fotheringham, 'Modelling spatial choice: A review and synthesis in a migration context', *Progress in Human Geography* 26, no. 4 (2002): 487–510.

described above, has been addressed by Epstein's work on herd behaviour.[65] Herd behaviour means discounting or disregarding private information to follow the behaviour of others, which is rational given the assumption that others base their decisions on better information.

The above theories generally imply that individuals migrate if the underlying (economic) calculus is positive, they have access to networks, or follow the behaviours of others. They often do not establish how individuals decide whether to migrate in the first place. Further, they do not separate people's preferences from structural constraints and consequently are unable to distinguish between '*wanting* to migrate and *actually migrating.*'[66] Jørgen Carling distinguishes between the aspiration and ability to migrate to explain why not all of the currently 750 million that would like to migrate do so. He distinguishes between structural and individual factors such as age, gender, socioeconomic status, and one's migration history that enable or constrain migration. The interaction of these factors — the migration driver environment — shapes migration decision-making. The migration decision-making framework that I develop in Chapter 2 builds upon Carling's aspiration-ability model and extends it by adding heuristic strategies for search, evaluation, and decision.

Information and migration decisions. Information is often hypothesised to be a central factor in migration decision-making and information features in most of the theories discussed above. Given prior findings that potential migrants underestimate or overestimate the gains from migration,[67] carefully targeted interventions could 'improve the availability and accuracy of information so as to facilitate a more rational

65. Epstein, 'Herd and network effects in migration decision-making'.

66. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility', p.10, original emphasis.

67. Lídia Farré and Francesco Fasani, 'Media exposure and internal migration - evidence from Indonesia', *Journal of Development Economics* 102 (May 2013): 48–61; David McKenzie, John Gibson and Steven Stillman, 'A land of milk and honey with streets paved with gold: Do emigrants have over-optimistic expectations about incomes abroad?', *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 4141 (2007).

decision-making.'[68] Experimental approaches have increasingly been used to extract the causal impact of information on migration decisions. Random assignment to treatment and control groups ensures that individuals in either group do not differ, on average, on observable and unobservable characteristics. This circumvents the problem of endogenous selection of non-experimental studies, as individuals likely to migrate might be different than those likely not to migrate.[69] For instance, information acquisition is likely to be endogenous. Further, the experimental setting allows manipulating what information participants receive.[70] While some experimental studies concluded that information provision did not increase actual migration rates,[71] others confirmed its importance.[72] Some experimental studies evaluated stated preferences rather than actual migration behaviour. Barnett-Howell found that incomplete information explained low migration rates in a discrete choice migration game.[73] Baláž et al. studied stated destination preferences under differing information conditions and concluded that destination choice depended on pre-existing preferences and preferences constructed during decision-making, influenced by available information.[74] Bah and Batista

68. John Gibson et al., 'Information flows and migration: recent survey evidence from the South Pacific', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 19, no. 3 (2010): p.404.

69. David McKenzie, Steven Stillman and John Gibson, 'How Important is Selection? Experimental VS. Non-Experimental Measures of the Income Gains from Migration', *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8, no. 4 (2010): 913–945.

70. Yusaku Horiuchi, Imai Kosuke and Naoko Taniguchi, 'Designing and Analyzing Randomized Experiments: Application to a Japanese Election Survey Experiment', *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (2007): 669–687.

71. Emily A. Beam, 'Incomplete Information in Job Search: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines' (Job-market paper, University of Michigan, 2013); Emily A. Beam, David McKenzie and Dean Yang, 'Unilateral Facilitation Does Not Raise International Labor Migration from the Philippines', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 64, no. 2 (2016): 323–368; Gharad Bryan, Shyamal Chowdhury and Ahmed M. Mobarak, 'Underinvestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh', *Econometrica* 82, no. 5 (2014): 1671–1748.

72. Farré and Fasani, 'Media exposure and internal migration'; Martin Abraham and Natascha Nisic, 'A simple mobility game for couples' migration decisions and some quasi-experimental evidence', *Rationality and Society* 24, no. 2 (May 2012): 168.

73. Zack Barnett-Howell, 'Should I Stay or Should I Go: Microeconomic determinants of migration' (2017), accessed 1 September 2019, `https://aae.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/micromodel.pdf`.

74. Vladimir Baláž, Allan M. Williams and Elena Fifeková, 'Migration Decision Making as Complex Choice: Eliciting Decision Weights Under Conditions of Imperfect and Complex Information Through Experimental Methods', *Population, Space and Place* 22, no. 1 (2016): 36–53.

evaluated the effect of different combinations of risk and getting asylum in Europe on stated migration preferences of potential irregular migrants. They concluded that 'migration decisions of potential migrants actively respond to information about relevant facts regarding costs and benefits of migration.'[75] However, the studies generally subscribe to some version of the human capital model of migration in which people migrate after cost-benefit or utility-disutility considerations. This is arguably an overly simplistic view of human decision-making that ignores the role of social-psychological elements, such as heuristics.[76]

In this section, I have presented this thesis' theoretical background. Migration drivers form part of the reason why people are motivated to migrate. The migration decision-making process that I propose in this thesis uses established concepts from psychology and incorporates heuristic decision-making. My empirical evaluation of destination choice adds to the emerging literature of experimental approaches in migration studies and my research design allows me to concurrently test the importance of different destination characteristics.

1.4 Empirical approach

I briefly outline the research design, methods, and data; Chapter 3 offers a more extensive discussion of the empirical approach. I address the first two research questions by developing a refined theoretical framework of migration decision-making based on individual capacities for migration. For the third research question, I employ an inductive mixed methods research design. Exploratory qualitative interviews precede and inform quantitative conjoint survey experiments. The sample population for both the interviews and the survey was Syrian refugees in Jordan aged 18–50. Participants

75. Tijan L. Bah and Catia Batista, 'Understanding Willingness to Migrate Illegally: Evidence from a Lab in the Field Experiment', *NOVA Working Paper Series*, no. 1803 (2018): p.3.

76. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases', *Science* 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124–1131.

were recruited via Facebook, NGOs and organisations working with refugees, personal contacts, and snowballing.

Interviews. The semi-structured incentivised interviews aimed at extracting Syrian refugees' life aspiration, motivation to migrate, and relevant migration drivers and characteristics of destination countries. The focus was on respondents' capacities for migration. The interviews further investigated preferences for the three durable solutions — repatriation, integration, and resettlement. Migration is a high reflexivity topic where power relations between interviewer and interviewee need to be taken into account.[77] This is of particular importance for face-to-face interviews. To mitigate this issue, I worked with a female Jordanian research assistant who had experience with interviewing refugees. She was a valuable resource arranging and conducting the interviews, particularly to bridge the cultural gaps between me, the interviewer, and the interviewee, help build rapport, and to minimise power imbalances. I conducted 29 qualitative interviews in Jordan in August and September 2018. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. I used thematic analysis to analyse the transcribed interviews. Inductive thematic analysis was used to identify themes that do not derive from existing theoretical accounts and to answer how aspirations affect the motivation to migrate and the preferences for different durable solutions. Theoretical thematic analysis was used to fit participants' responses to themes identified by the migration literature. I followed an iterative process of coding and searching for themes and used NVivo 12 to code and analyse the data.

Survey. The main aim of the conjoint survey experiment was to unobtrusively elicit respondents' preferences for destination characteristics and destination countries. I examined stated preferences rather than real migration choices, the drawbacks of doing so are outlined in Section 1.7. The main benefit is that they are not limited to

77. Luis Sanchez-Ayala, 'Interviewing techniques for migrant minority groups', chap. 6 in *Handbook of Research Methods in Migration*, ed. Carlos Vargas-Silva (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 117–136.

examining the impact of a single piece of information, such as economic opportunities.[78] Rather, respondents are given various pieces of information and decide on the basis of the information most relevant to them.[79] Further, it has been argued that migration decisions are not necessarily (fully) rational. However, individuals might attempt to portray them as rational in face-to-face interviews, listing several reasons and (ex post) justifications for a decision. Similarly, they might not state their true destination preferences when asked directly in survey questions. Survey experiments can circumvent these problems. Individuals might choose destinations based on one or a few characteristics while disregarding others. These heuristic decision rules contradict the rational cost-benefit calculus that is often assumed to be central to migration decisions. In the conjoint experiment, respondents were repeatedly shown two stylised migration destinations and made choices which destination they prefer. The eight destination attributes were the same for the two destinations: local contacts (e.g. friends, family), social services (e.g. free healthcare), anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim laws (e.g. ban on hijab in schools), citizenship (minimum years until naturalisation), work permit (waiting time until full access to the labour market), employment (employment situation of Syrian refugees), public attitudes (anti-immigrant sentiment), and reputation (e.g. welcoming to foreigners). The attribute values were randomised; I chose attributes and attribute values in accordance with the literature on migration drivers, insights from the preceding qualitative interviews, and to represent characteristics of real destination countries preferred by Syrian refugees. Respondents were randomly assigned either to the conjoint described above or to a modified conjoint where the reputation was replaced with the attribute 'country' that designated the destination as being located in a named country. This allowed me to test whether some attributes' relative importance changed once countries were provided. Respondents might put

78. See, for instance: Beam, 'Incomplete Information in Job Search'.

79. Jens Hainmueller, Daniel J. Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto, 'Causal inference in conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments', *Political Analysis* 22, no. 1 (2014): 1–30.

a higher value on the country cue and ignore other, potentially contradictory cues. I collected 789 complete responses; 392 respondents were randomly assigned to the first conjoint and 397 to the second. They evaluated 3,945 destination pairs, or five choices per respondent. Secondary aims of the survey were to establish the associations between the size of aspiration gaps and (i) the motivation to migrate and (ii) preferences for durable solutions.

1.5 Main empirical findings

I summarise the main empirical findings of this thesis with regards to Syrian refugees' aspirations, destination preferences, and destination choice. This section's three main parts correspond to Chapters 4–6.

Aspirations. Through qualitative interviews I confirm many theoretical predictions of Chapter 2. Syrian refugees in Jordan had unfulfilled physiological, psychological, and self-actualisation needs. Their main life aspirations were related to safety, citizenship, education, and employment. I identified five broad 'types of aspirers' who shared common observable characteristics and who had different (sets of) aspirations: safety first, family person, careerist, opportunist, and formalist. For instance, formalists overwhelmingly aspired to legal rights and non-Syrian citizenship while careerists were mostly young, educated, and had relatively narrow self-actualisation needs related to their professional careers. A majority of respondents indicated to face considerable and potentially insurmountable barriers — mostly caused by (perceived) dependency on others — to achieving their aspired goals in Jordan. The main barriers mentioned included restricted rights and the absence of a path to citizenship, employment restrictions, financial hardship, and discrimination due to being a Syrian refugee. Their capacity to realise aspired change was restricted. Comparing their self-assessed status quo with their aspirations resulted in considerable aspiration gaps. I found evidence that larger aspiration gaps were associated with increased motivation

to change one's status quo. I further found evidence that respondents frequently adjusted their aspirations due to personal circumstances and characteristics, their levels of needs satisfaction, and external circumstances.

Destination preferences. I found qualitative and quantitative evidence that the size of Syrian refugees' aspiration gaps was associated with durable solution preferences. Small aspirations gaps were associated with local integration, as respondents believed they could realise their aspirations in Jordan. In contrast, those who faced considerable barriers to fulfil their life aspirations, and consequently larger aspiration gaps, wanted to leave Jordan, either to a third country or to Syria. I further found qualitative evidence that certain types of aspirers were associated with certain durable solutions. Of those who voiced preferences for repatriation, a few stressed that they would not voluntarily repatriate but that they felt forced to due so due to their worsening situation in Jordan and the meagre prospects for resettlement. Unsurprisingly, safety was the prerequisite to eventually return to Syria. A substantial minority insisted that they would not return to Syria, as they had lost their homes, did not have family or friends in Syria anymore, or were somewhat active in the political opposition to President Assad. In the interviews, Syrian refugees indicated that they were attracted by migration destinations where they had family, friends, or migrant networks, and by destinations that offered economic and education opportunities, citizenship, and rights. A few were attracted by social services and asylum and migration policies. They were deterred by xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes and by restrictions on religion and religious symbols. Such factors were closely linked to a country's reputation, which I found to be an ambiguous factor. Several respondents stated that they preferred certain countries because they were good countries in general or good countries for Syrian refugees in particular. Language and culture were ambiguous factors. The survey evidence partly confirms these findings. Citizenship and rights, followed by education, employment, asylum policies, and social services

were the most preferred destination characteristics. Interestingly, social contacts, language, and a country's reputation were deemed important by very few respondents only. Canada emerged as the preferred destination country, followed by the UK, the USA, Germany, and France. I qualitatively investigated the reasons why Syrian refugees in Jordan liked or disliked certain countries. While a majority of respondents liked the USA, President Trump's 'Muslim ban' decreased the country's attractiveness and respondents perceived that resettlement to the USA had become more difficult. Canada seemed almost universally liked due to its reputation as a good country for Syrians. Germany was popular with fewer respondents. While praised for accepting large numbers of refugees, its reputation was ambiguous. Respondents highlighted the high living costs and barriers to labour market access they had heard of. There was widespread opposition to relocating to France, as it was perceived as anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim due to its ban on religious symbols, such as the burqa. Turkey was seen as accessible and hence the most likely but not the most liked destination, in contrast to North American and Western European countries. A number of respondents highlighted that they would go to any country or to any country that fulfilled certain criteria, such as giving them rights and a path towards citizenship.

Destination choices. In line with the migration literature, I found that Syrian refugees in Jordan overwhelmingly rely on informal networks and social media in general and Facebook in particular to gather information about potential migration destinations. Through the conjoint experiment of migration destination choice, I found that Syrian refugees in Jordan chose migration destinations that offer free housing, do not have bans on religious clothing or restrictions on immigration of Muslims, and have fast procedures to gain citizenship and access to the labour market. Surprisingly and contrary to the literature, the presence or absence of social contacts and networks at the destination did not affect destination choices. Destinations where the labour market situation was portrayed in terms of the share of Syrians in employment were

chosen significantly more often than those that emphasised unemployment. The same was true with regards to the destination population's attitudes towards immigration of refugees or Muslims. This is evidence for framing effects. The reputation mattered but the effect is asymmetric. The negative effect of a bad reputation (destinations designated as bad countries for Syrians) trumped the positive effect of a good reputation (a good country for Syrians). The characteristic that made a destination the most likely to be chosen was the absence of bans on religious clothing or immigration from Muslim-majority countries. On the contrary, the characteristic with the single largest negative effect was the reputation as a bad country for Syrians. The main results of the alternate conjoint model where a destination's reputation was replaced by the country the destination is located in were very similar. Destinations in Canada were by far the most preferred. Being located in the UK or the USA did not significantly affect how often a destination was chosen while destinations in Germany and France received penalties, the latter a sizeable one. The positive and negative effect sizes of Canada and France trump all other destination characteristics. However, including the country name did not drastically reduce the relative importance of the other destination attributes, contrary to my theoretical conjectures. I generally found very few significant subgroup differences by gender and age. However, there was some indication that women were more deterred by religious restrictions on wearing the hijab and that young people disproportionately preferred destinations with free housing and free healthcare. Heuristics seem to have played some role in destination choice. I found qualitative evidence for the use of the availability, sunk cost, and path dependency. The recognition heuristic was hypothesised to be used by respondents in fast and frugal decisions. However, such decisions did not seem to be guided by the country the destination was located in but rather by the presence of bans on the hijab, which made destinations significantly less likely to be chosen. I found strong evidence for framing effects and prospect theory but mixed evidence for one or few-reason decision-making.

1.6 Contributions

I reflect upon the migration decision-making process of potential migrants to improve the understanding why some people migrate *and* why a majority does do not migrate. I make several contributions, which I discuss in more detail in Section 7.2 .

I offer an improved theoretical understanding of the decision-making process of potential migrants. I synthesise the migration literature with that on human motivation and behaviour, social and cognitive psychology, and decision-making. The migration decision-making framework centres on three central capacities of potential migrants, the capacities to aspire, realise, and decide. I show that aspiration gaps are the basis for the motivation to migrate.[80] I argue that heuristics are likely used to search, evaluate, and decide upon potential destinations. The destination choice is not rational in an economic sense and does not necessarily reflect detailed knowledge of alternative destinations. It is rather hypothesised to be fast and frugal and reflects real-life human decision-making.

I provide empirical evidence for different aspects of the migration decision-making framework using a mixed methods research design. I make a novel contribution by showing that the size of potential migrants' aspiration gaps is associated with migration motivation and durable solution preferences. Larger aspiration gaps were associated with preferences for resettlement and repatriation while smaller ones with local integration. I examine stated preferences for hypothetical migration destinations in a conjoint survey experiment to recover the causal effect of different destination characteristics on destination choice. To my knowledge, I provide the first quantitative account of the relative importance of destination characteristics and add to the growing experimental literature on migration decision-making. I further examine whether the effects of a destination's reputation and the country a migration destin-

80. Mathias Czaika and Marc Vothknecht, 'Migration and aspirations – are migrants trapped on a hedonic treadmill?', *IZA Journal of Migration* 3, no. 1 (2014).

ation is located in trump the effects of other destination characteristics. The finding that social networks did not influence destination choice runs contrary to a wide range of theoretical and empirical migration studies. I suggest that the mechanism how social networks affect destination choice is through a destination's reputation. This is compatible with both my and published evidence but warrants further evaluation. My empirical findings suggest that migration policies do matter, particularly when broadcasted via the media and social media, at least for stated destination choice with full information about two hypothetical migration destinations. Policymakers and politicians could hence alter the pattern of movement by making their respective countries more or less attractive to certain potential migrants.

1.7 Limitations

This thesis has several limitations, which I discuss in more detail in Section 7.3: the questions that I did not ask; the methods used and data collected and their implications for my findings; and my findings' temporal and spatial limitations.

Research questions. I examined stated migration and destination preferences but did not examine empirically whether, how, and when stated preferences translate into migration behaviour. Further, I left the questions how aspirations and aspiration gaps develop while on the move and how aspirations and aspiration gaps develop at the destination unanswered. While these would be interesting and valuable contributions, I did not address them due to practical concerns.

Methods, data, and target population. The purposive sample design aimed to present a range of different views from people of different ages on migration decision-making and preferences for destinations. RThis sample design is by definition not representative of the population of Syrian refugees in Jordan. I focused on a specific group of potential migrants: refugees. They had already migrated and might therefore be more likely to migrate in the future (either to a third country or return to their

country of former residence). They are hence not representative of potential migrants in general but of those who have already migrated and whose migration experience might induce onward movement. I examined stated preferences rather than actual migration choices. The most commonly mentioned drawback of such approach is that people might not necessarily do what they say they will do. However, I have highlighted above that a range of studies find that migration motivation or intentions are significantly associated with migration behaviour.

Findings. The empirical evaluation of migration decision-making of Syrian refugees in Jordan should be considered against the external circumstances and developments at the time. When I conducted the interviews, the border between Jordan and Syria was closed and a Syrian government offensive on rebel-held Idlib was expected. Repatriation to Syria was hence arguably rather difficult at the time, as repatriation carried the risk of not being able to reenter Jordan if the situation in Syria was worse than expected or took another downward turn. External developments further away also shaped respondents' destination country preferences. For instance, a sizeable minority mentioned the impact President Trump had on their preferences to resettle to the USA. The findings might not merely be limited temporally but also spatially. Several respondents highlighted the importance of the status quo for their life aspirations, which I also highlight in the theoretical framework. They evaluated their aspirations against their circumstances in Jordan. My findings might hence not generalise to Syrian refugees in Lebanon or Turkey that face other challenges than those in Jordan.

1.8 Thesis structure and overview of chapters

In the next chapter, I provide reflections on the migration decision-making process of potential migrants and develop a refined framework of migration decision-making that centres on three capacities for migration: the capacity to aspire, the capacity to realise, and the capacity to decide. I argue that migration motivation stems from the

difference between life aspirations and the status quo of current needs satisfaction, the aspiration gaps. Heuristic strategies guide the search, evaluation, and decision of potential migration options. I further briefly reflect on the role of information in migration decision-making, the notion of a potential migrant, and outline different types of potential migrants. The migration decision-making framework addresses the first and second research questions: What motivates individuals to migrate, what role do life aspirations play, and who is a potential migrant? How do potential migrants search, evaluate, and decide upon potential migration destinations? This concludes the theoretical part of this thesis.

The subsequent chapters address the third research question: What are the aspirations, destination preferences, and destination choices of Syrian refugees in Jordan and how well does the revised migration decision-making framework explain them? Chapter 3 outlines the methods and research design. It discusses the local context, Jordan, and the sample population, Syrian refugees. I outline the benefits and drawbacks of using an inductive mixed methods design of qualitative interviews and quantitative conjoint survey experiments. I reflect on positionality and research ethics. Lastly, I present summary statistics of the data gathered.

I present the empirical results in Chapters 4–6. All three chapters present both qualitative and quantitative evidence. Chapter 4 provides qualitative evidence from interviews, complemented by quantitative survey evidence with Syrian refugees in Jordan pertaining to life aspirations, current needs satisfactions, barriers to realise life aspirations, and aspiration gaps. I develop a typology of types of aspirers to guide the further analysis of aspirations and motivation for locational change, i.e. migration. I show that aspirations were frequently adjusted to external factors to avoid cognitive dissonance and that aspiration gaps were associated with the wish for locational change. I further present evidence on the relation between aspiration gaps and migration motivation. I evaluate the motivation for locational change in terms of preferences for the three durable solutions, repatriation, integration, and re-

settlement in Chapter 5. I further discuss preferences for destination characteristics and destination countries that I gathered from qualitative interviews and the quantitative survey. Chapter 6 discusses the migration destination choice. It presents the conjoint results and complements them with some qualitative interview insights and discusses the relative importance of different destination characteristics for migration destination choice, including the role of a destination's reputation and the country the destination is located in. I further outline the information sources that respondents used and illustrate the heuristics that respondents employed in destination choice.

In Chapter 7, I discuss the main results of this thesis and link them back to the research questions that I presented at the start of this chapter. I further outline the contributions I make, acknowledge this thesis' limitations, and provide suggestions for future research on migration decision-making. Lastly, I conclude. Appendix A provides additional materials pertaining to the interviews, such as an overview of participants, interview guides, and consent forms. Appendix B presents additional results and robustness checks pertaining to the survey and the conjoint experiment.

Chapter 2

Needs, Capacities, and Heuristics[1]

Having briefly outlined the wide array of potential migration drivers in Section 1.3, it might be surprising why not more people migrate to realise better income opportunities, or why not more (if not all) people living in a conflict area decide to flee, or do not flee at the same time, even if they could. As I already mentioned above, roughly 750 million people would like to migrate if they had the chance to do so.[2] Hence, globally 'only' one in ten people currently want to migrate. This is a surprisingly small number given the fact that a supposedly much bigger (but unknown) number of people would have good reasons to migrate internationally to realise economic and non-economic returns. In this chapter I reflect on the migration decision-making process of potential migrants and establish a framework of migration decision-making centred on individual capacities of migration. I argue that some of those 'should be' migrants may simply lack the capacity to aspire a better life beyond the immediate personal context and situation and the role migration may play in improving one's personal situation. I further argue that a majority of those wanting to migrate might lack any or both of the other two capacities: the capacity to realise and the capa-


1. This chapter draws heavily on a working paper with Mathias Czaika. An earlier version of the paper was presented under the title 'Migration drivers and decision-making' at the 10th DialogForum, Migration and (Dis-)Integration Processes, Danube University Krems, Austria, 17 September 2018.

2. Esipova, Pugliese and Ray, *More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could.*

city to decide and are hence involuntary immobile.[3] I do not only make a theoretical contribution to the growing literature on aspirations and migration decisions but also empirically illustrate aspects of the established framework through a mixed methods research design with Syrian refugees in Jordan in Chapters 4–6. The theory presented in this chapter is intentionally broad to apply to different groups of migrants (such as international and internal migrants) in different spatial and temporal contexts. In Section 3.3 I explain how the framework extends to the migration decision-making of Syrian refugees in Jordan.

In line with prior research, I envisage migration decision-making as consisting of two broad decisions, whether to migrate and where to relocate.[4] Figure 2.1 presents the simplified logical flow of the migration decision-making process. The decision whether to migrate consists of the aspiration to leave and the ability to do so.[5] The decision where to relocate involves the search for, evaluation of, and decision upon a migration destination.

Figure 2.1: Migration decision-making process: Overview



This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 shows how the interaction of individual (unfulfilled) needs, life aspirations, and the driver environment may generate the motivation for migration and potentially facilitate or constrain its realisation. In Section 2.2, I conceptualise migration as a function of an individual's personal needs and capacities for migration, which include the capacities to aspire, realise, and decide. I acknowledge the bounded rational characteristics of human decision-making

3. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility'.
4. Brown and Moore, 'The Intra-Urban Migration Process'.
5. Jørgen Carling and Karilyn Schewel, 'Revisiting aspiration and ability in international migration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 6 (2018): 945–963.

and define the gap between broader life aspirations and individuals' status quo as the motivational driver of personal locational change, i.e. migration. Section 2.3 presents simple heuristic search, evaluation, and decision rules that potential migrants may apply during the migration decision-making process. Section 2.4 outlines a vague typology of 'potential migrants' based on the concepts presented in this chapter. Section 2.5 reflects on and summarises the established framework.

2.1 Needs, motivation, and migration drivers

Any human behaviour or action can be explained with reference to some basic physiological needs (survival, hunger, sex) and intrinsic (interest or preference) and extrinsic (reward or punishment) motivation.[6] Extrinsic motivation can further be distinguished by the degree of internalisation.[7] Applied to the migration context, this results in five broad explanations why people are motivated to migrate. First, physiological need-based migration motivation is driven by unsatisfied basic physiological needs, e.g. hunger. Second, intrinsic migration motivation arises from the excitement enjoyed by the act of migration, without expecting any external rewards. Third, internalised extrinsic migration motivation; individuals internalise the necessity to migrate to achieve self-selected goals external to migration. Fourth, introjected extrinsic migration motivation arises from other people's expectations of one's behaviour, such as cultural norms. Fifth, fully extrinsic migration motivation denotes instances when people wish to migrate purely to receive external rewards or avoid punishment. Migration is a means to an end, except for individuals who exhibit fully intrinsic motivation

6. Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, 'Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being.', *The American Psychologist* 55, no. 1 (2000): 68–78; Carol Sansone and Judith M. Harackiewicz, *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation: The Search for Optimal Motivation and Performance* (San Diego: Elsevier Science, 2000).

7. Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, 'Motivation, Personality, and Development Within Embedded Social Contexts: An Overview of Self-Determination Theory', in *The Oxford Handbook of Human Motivation*, ed. Richard M. Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

and for those with fully introjected extrinsic motivation. However, behaviour (migration) is not driven by one form of motivation but a combination thereof.[8] In practice, individuals exhibit different forms of motivation to differing degrees. Extrinsic motivation, whether internalised, introjected or fully extrinsic, does not, however, explain the underlying factors that lead people to develop the motivation. Maslow's theory of human motivation is able to bridge the gap and can unify intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as well as motivation that stems from physiological needs.[9]

Maslow argued that human behaviour is motivated by unfulfilled physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualisation needs. 'Lower' needs hereby generally have to be (at least to a certain degree) satisfied before higher needs are pursued. However, the hierarchy of needs is not rigid but depends on individual characteristics and the context,[10] i.e. the migration driver environment. Further, behaviour is generally not motivated by one unfulfilled need but rather a mix of unfulfilled needs. Unfulfilled needs are necessary but not sufficient for the motivation to migrate. Maslow's hierarchy of needs already reflects motivation stemming from unfulfilled physiological needs and is further able to incorporate intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation to migrate corresponds to a self-actualisation need. Extrinsic motivation to migrate could stem from different individual needs, as the following example demonstrates. A person might aspire to study medicine at a good university, and migration might be a means to do so. The motivation to migrate might hence be internalised extrinsic but the underlying aspiration is an unfulfilled self-actualisation need. Another individual might be pushed by her family to study medicine abroad, as it is seen as something respectable with high expected economic (and reputational) returns. Her motivation to migrate is hence introjected extrinsic while her motivation

8. Deci and Ryan, 'Motivation, Personality, and Development Within Embedded Social Contexts: An Overview of Self-Determination Theory'.

9. Abraham H. Maslow, 'A theory of human motivation', *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–396.

10. Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).


to study medicine is driven by love and belonging needs and the wish not to disappoint her family. The same migration behaviour might follow from different degrees of extrinsic motivation. Ultimately, however, the underlying unfulfilled individual needs affect the motivation to migrate. A focus on individual needs hence seems promising to theorise and evaluate migration decision-making.

Migration serves as a purposive or instrumental action to satisfy some of those needs. The 'lower' needs can be characterised as deficiency needs. Deficiency needs motivate behaviour when they are unmet and the motivation intensity generally increases with the duration of the deprivation.[11] Once deficiency needs are met, at least to a certain extent, individuals can pursue growth needs, such as self-actualisation. The resulting motivation for behavioural change does not stem from deprivation but rather the wish to grow as a person and self-fulfilment.[12] Further, growth needs may increase once they are met, contrary to deficiency needs. Migration motivation comes with varying degrees of agency. Migration can be a means to an end — e.g. seeking economic gain (economic progress or stable employment), acquiring social rewards (family life or social status) or avoid punishment (safety or protection) — or an end in itself. In general, the 'lower' and the more 'basic' the unfulfilled needs, the less agency individuals are hypothesised to have over the migration decision.

Different migration drivers challenge a potential migrant's currently fulfilled individual needs or correspond to currently unfulfilled needs. This might ultimately result in migration. Figure 2.2 shows a diverse range of concrete examples of migration drivers and their relation to unfulfilled individual needs. The list of migration drivers is by no means exhaustive but is rather intended to showcase the wide array of structural factors that may affect or respond to individual needs and ultimately makes migration more or less likely. Further, as basic needs (physiological and safety) are prerequisites, at least to some extent, for all higher needs, drivers that threaten fulfil-

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

Figure 2.2: Migration drivers and their relation to unfulfilled individual needs




ment of basic needs also deprive a person of fulfilling higher needs. War and conflict, for instance, often do not only deprive security needs but in turn also physiological needs due to conflicts' effects on food and medical supplies. However, drivers that threaten fulfilment of higher needs or promise to address unfulfilled higher needs do not necessarily affect lower needs. In the next section, I address the link between these external drivers of migration and internal drivers of migration.

2.2 Capacities for migration

The external or contextual drivers potential migrants are usually exposed to become only effective in stimulating migration if they translate into the volition and motivational capacity of people to change personal life circumstances. 'Aspiration gaps', the difference between aspired and actual life circumstances, are the internal (i.e. cognitive) drivers activating an individual reflection and potentially a decision-making process on migration. However, aspiration gaps are not a sufficient precondition for migration to occur. Other material and immaterial resources are required to turn a

potential migrant into an actual migrant. In the following, I outline three of these fundamental capacities for migration: the capacity to aspire personal change, the capacity to realise personal change, and the capacity to decide personal change. Figure 2.3 displays how they relate to the migration decision-making process and the questions whether to migrate and where to relocate.

Figure 2.3: Migration decision-making process: Capacities



Individuals require the capacity to aspire and the capacity to realise to establish whether to migrate. To establish where to relocate, individuals require the capacity to decide to search for, evaluate, and decide upon a migration destination. The bullet points below the capacities in Figure 2.3 indicate intervening factors that constrain or facilitate migration. The migration decision-making process should not be understood as strictly sequential. For instance, potential migrants might have the capacity to realise migration but do not aspire to do so. Others might have the capacity to decide upon a migration destination but do not aspire to locational change. This sections explains each capacity and the intervening factors in more detail.

2.2.1 Capacity to aspire

Individuals across countries and cultures aspire to life satisfaction, wellbeing, or simply, the 'good life',[13] which is 'not a state to be obtained but an ongoing as-

13. Arjun Appadurai, 'The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition', chap. 3 in *Culture and Public Action: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue on Development Policy*, ed. Michael Walton and Vijayendra Rao (World Bank Publications, 2004), 59–84.

piration for something better that gives meaning to life's pursuits.'[14] Life aspirations are nurtured by material and non-material needs.[15] This includes the economic, social, and cultural factors identified above. In addition, various other factors may affect individuals' aspiration formation, ranging from an individual's personality, socialisation, education, access to information, media and networks, and eventually the migration experience itself. To be able to aspire a better life, individuals require the capacity to aspire.[16] This refers to the capacity to imagine a life better than the one an individual currently lives and it is nurtured by a person's economic, social, emotional, and cognitive resources.[17] Aspirations or the desire for a better life have been found to drive migration.[18] However, life aspirations do not only relate to and include one's own life but might also extend to one's family or ethnic-religious group.[19] Family (or household) members might also directly influence the aspirations of the 'chosen' migrant. One study of the aspirations of refugees found that 'in the process preceding the migration, family members sometimes explicitly "appointed" one or more aspirations [...], such as studying, obtaining residence documents, rendering it possible for the family to migrate, or sending remittances back home.'[20]

The difference between the life aspired to and the life one currently lives — the current need satisfaction — is the aspiration gap. Aspiration gaps are the basis for the motivation for personal and locational change. If aspiration gaps are very

14. Edward F. Fischer, *The Good Life: Aspiration, Dignity, and the Anthropology of Wellbeing* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014), p.2.

15. Maslow, 'A theory of human motivation'.

16. Appadurai, 'The Capacity to Aspire'.

17. Ralph R. Sell and Gordon F. De Jong, 'Toward a Motivational Theory of Migration Decision Making', *Journal of Population* 1, no. 4 (1978): 313–335; Shaw, 'A Note on Cost-Return Calculations and Decisions to Migrate'.

18. Ignacio Correa-Velez, Mariana Nardone and Katharine Knoetze, 'Leaving family behind: Understanding the irregular migration of unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors', in *A long way to go: Irregular Migration Patterns, Processes, Drivers and Decision-Making*, ed. Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser (Acton: Australian National University Press, 2017), 141–165; Çaglar Özden, Mathis Wagner and Michael Packard, *Moving for Prosperity* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018).

19. Czaika, 'Internal versus international migration and the role of multiple deprivation'.

20. Marianne Vervliet et al., 'The aspirations of Afghan unaccompanied refugee minors before departure and on arrival in the host country', *Childhood* 22, no. 3 (2015): p.337.

small, locational change will be deemed too costly, from both an economic and non-economic point of view. Individuals will likely try to meet their aspirations and close their aspiration gaps. Alternatively, they might adjust aspirations downwards to avoid the cognitive dissonance from a perpetual state of unfulfilled aspirations. Aspiration gaps might also be low due to a poverty trap when individuals are unable to aspire to a better life due to extreme poverty.[21] The motivation for locational change increases both with the size of the aspiration gap and the time the gap has persisted. Large aspiration gaps are associated with a high motivation for change. This large discrepancy between the current life and the life aspired to might lead some individuals to conclude that migration is one or the only means to reduce their aspiration gaps.

Aspirations for life satisfaction are not static but may change dynamically depending on external stimuli, often coming from comparisons of one's status quo with the life situation of 'relevant others' (i.e. peers).[22] Some individuals adjust to the changed conditions and might perhaps never migrate.[23] For others, migration is a means to meet aspired well-being and their notion of the 'good life'. However, paradoxically, aspirations are usually not the same after migration but adapted (usually upwards) through exposure to new, so far unknown lifestyles and environments at the new destination. New aspirations might emerge after migration[24] and migrants might be trapped on a so-called 'hedonic treadmill'[25] by which migrants may feel more deprived and unsatisfied in the new environment, even if the initial needs and aspirations have been met through migrating. The capacity to aspire is endogenous and may change as a consequence of (peer-) group interaction within and outside an individual's social

21. Patricio S. Dalton, Sayantan Ghosal and Anandi Mani, 'Poverty and Aspirations Failure', *Economic Journal* 126, no. 590 (2016): 165–188.

22. Czaika, 'Internal versus international migration and the role of multiple deprivation'.

23. Julian Wolpert, 'Behavioral aspects of the decision to migrate', *Papers of the Regional Science Association* 15, no. 1 (1965): 159–169.

24. Vervliet et al., 'The aspirations of Afghan unaccompanied refugee minors before departure and on arrival in the host country'.

25. Czaika and Vothknecht, 'Migration and aspirations'.

network, or exposure to other ways of living. People adapt their aspirations by incorporating (migration) experience of others through the influence of social comparisons. Thus, aspirations adapt not only to one's own experience but also to the achievements and state of wellbeing of others.[26] People generally find it easier to adapt their aspirations upwards and do so more rapidly than adapting downwards. Downward deviations seem to be perceived more persistently than upward adaptations.

Access and control over various kinds of resources including knowledge and information about 'good life' opportunities are other important sources for the formation of aspirations. People's awareness of social, economic and political opportunities may therefore increase one's capacity to aspire. The awareness depends on the available information on such opportunities. Information might affect the capacity to aspire migration by (i) altering the perception of the migration experience, (ii) affecting life aspirations and its link to migration, and (iii) altering the perception of the anticipated short-term and long-term costs and benefits of migration. However, in practice, it is a mix of all three. First, the perception of the (expected or actual) realities of migration has functional, cognitive-emotional aspects. Functional means whether migration is a means to an end (i.e. life aspiration, escape punishment) or an end in itself. Cognitive and emotional aspects refers to feelings associated with and characteristics of the migration journey, such as whether it is enjoyable or bothersome, safe or dangerous, necessity or choice, achievable or out of reach. However, these feelings are likely not binary in practice but need to exceed some personal threshold for migration to be considered a viable option. Second, information might affect life aspirations, as individuals learn of the standard of living and opportunities elsewhere. While this proposition is contrary to migration theory that states that goals and values are independent of information,[27] it seems reasonable to assume that goals and

26. Czaika, 'Internal versus international migration and the role of multiple deprivation'.
27. De Jong and Fawcett, 'Motivations for Migration'.

values can change; the hedonic treadmill is a prime example.[28] It further builds on findings that information transmitted through television and the internet can affect desires and aspirations to migrate[29] and ultimately migration behaviour.[30] Information might further affect how the link between life aspirations and migration is perceived, i.e. whether one might be able to fulfil one's life aspirations through migration. Third, information might affect how migration's costs and benefits are perceived.[31] The benefits can be in terms of internalised needs and goals related to life satisfaction or of external nature. It has been shown that information about the benefits of migration, such as economic opportunities, has the potential to affect migration behaviour.[32]

The capacity to aspire is necessary but not sufficient for migration to occur. While the aforementioned roughly 750 million people worldwide arguably have the capacity to aspire international migration and state the intention to do so, the global stock currently merely counts 258 million international migrants.[33] One reason for this discrepancy is their lack of the capacity to realise migration, i.e. they aspire to but do not have the ability to realise migration. Stated migration intentions might hence not result in migration behaviour due to a lack of the capacity to realise migration.

28. Czaika and Vothknecht, 'Migration and aspirations'.

29. Bertil Vilhelmson and Eva Thulin, 'Does the internet encourage people to move? Investigating Swedish young adults internal migration experiences and plans', *Geoforum* 47 (June 2013): 209–216; Eva Thulin and Bertil Vilhelmson, 'The Internet and Desire to Move: The Role of Virtual Practices in the Inspiration Phase of Migration', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 107, no. 3 (2016): 257–269.

30. Farré and Fasani, 'Media exposure and internal migration'; Martin Piotrowski, 'Mass Media and Rural Out-Migration in the Context of Social Change: Evidence from Nepal', *International Migration* 51, no. 3 (2013): 169–193.

31. John L. Goodman, 'Information, Uncertainty, and the Microeconomic Model of Migration Decision Making', chap. 5 in *Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries*, ed. Gordon F. De Jong and Robert W. Gardner (New York: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981), 130–148.

32. Farré and Fasani, 'Media exposure and internal migration'; Gibson et al., 'Information flows and migration'; Graeme Hugo, 'Information, exploitation and empowerment: the case of Indonesian overseas workers', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 12, no. 4 (2003): 439–466; McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 'A land of milk and honey with streets paved with gold'.

33. United Nations, *International Migration Report 2017*.

2.2.2 Capacity to realise

Individuals with the capacity to aspire who consider migration as one or their preferred means to reduce their aspiration gaps do not necessarily have the ability to migrate, at least not internationally. They need the capacity to realise aspired personal change, which relies on economic, social, emotional, and cognitive resources.[34] Individuals with these two capacities are able to establish whether to migrate. Individuals who aspire to a better life (and are aware of opportunities where migration might help to fulfil these aspirations) but who lack the capacity to realise migration due to the absence of material (e.g. money) and non-material (e.g. imaginations, social capital) resources, are involuntarily immobile.[35] Such individuals have aspiration gaps but are unable to close them via migration. The consequence is usually a sense of frustration or cognitive dissonance, which can be overcome in two ways. First, they adjust their aspirations downwards and accept the status quo, at least for the time being.[36] However, this often leads to an 'aspiration trap'.[37] Second, they work on increasing their capacities to realise migration. The capacity to realise and the capacity to aspire are mutually interdependent. Aspirations can stimulate behaviour and actions leading to an improvement in the capacity to realise migration, and, at the same time, aspirations are the consequence of migration experiences and outcomes.[38]

Information might affect the social, emotional, and cognitive aspects of the capacity to realise. This is related to the feelings associated with and perceived characteristics of the migration journey and the belief whether one has the potential to successfully manage a migration project. In practice, information might affect both the capacity to aspire and the capacity to realise. State-sponsored migration cam-

34. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility'; Hein de Haas, 'Migration and development: A theoretical perspective', *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (2010): 227–264.
35. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility'.
36. Wolpert, 'Behavioral aspects of the decision to migrate'.
37. Appadurai, 'The Capacity to Aspire'.
38. Czaika and Vothknecht, 'Migration and aspirations'.

paigns to attract or deter migrants are a good example. They might simultaneously affect the capacity to aspire by informing potential migrants of economic opportunities or emphasise the need to stay put and contribute to one's country's development and the capacity to realise by providing support with visas and recruitment or warning of the dangers of illegal migration.

The capacities to aspire and realise migration are necessary for the first step in the two step migration decision-making process (Figure 2.3). Potential migrants with these capacities are able to establish whether to migrate. The capacities to aspire and realise are mutually interdependent. Aspirations can stimulate behaviour leading to enhanced capacities for migration. At the same time, aspirations are expected to be endogenous; the goals aspired to are likely to change (normally, to increase) with the migration experience itself. Migration as an experience and exposure to a new driver environment can widen the aspirational gap and increase aspirations if, for instance, the returns to migration in terms of enhanced well-being are lower than expected, or if the migration experience coincides with a rising awareness of better life standards. The post-migration aspirational gap may grow wider if awareness about new life opportunities, combined, for instance, with still limited resources and feelings of relative deprivation, may have a negative effect on a migrants' level of well-being. Further migratory steps are then likely to follow. Being able to aspire and realise migration is, however, not sufficient for migration to occur. They might not migrate if they lack the capacity to search for, evaluate, and decide upon aspired and realisable migration.

2.2.3 Capacity to decide

Potential migrants who aspire to migrate and are able to realise such migration project will only migrate once they decide where to relocate, the second step in the migration decision-making process outlined above (Figure 2.3). This involves the search, eval-

uation, and the decision itself. A key aspect in migration decision-making processes is the search for a limited number of options. Neither all migration alternatives nor all consequences can be known, but at least one must be identified, investigated, and evaluated. Attention and time dedicated for information search affects the amount and quality of information available to the decision-maker. Particularly when recipients have no easy means to distinguish between true or false information, they will likely resort to judge the information quality based on the carrier, sender, as well as their own knowledge, experiences, and imaginations. Hagen-Zanker and Mallet nicely summarise the conditions under which effective or affective information will work best:

> For information to be acted on, it needs to come through particular channels and from particular sources (especially from those with whom a relationship of trust has already been established).[39]

Information search in the context of migration decision-making is multidimensional and involves collection and processing of information about available migration opportunities including information on potential destinations, possible entry routes, possible job opportunities, but also possible risks and uncertainties related to migration journeys and outcomes. Searching for all this information places high burdens on real-life decision-making of individuals with bounded rationality.[40] I hence conjecture that potential migrants apply heuristic rules in the migration decision-making process.[41] They use different heuristics for searching and evaluating information on potential destinations and deciding where to relocate (Section 2.3). The, often subconscious, choice

39. Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Richard Mallet, *Journeys to Europe: The role of policy in migrant decision-making*, technical report (ODI, 2016), p.32.

40. Reinhard Selten, 'Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality', *European Economic Review* 42 (1998): 413–436; Herbert A. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 69, no. 1 (1955): 99–118; Herbert A. Simon, 'Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science', *The American Economic Review* 49, no. 3 (1959): 253–283; Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd and ABC Research Group, *Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

41. Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group, *Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart*; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Choices, values, and frames', *American Psychologist* 39, no. 4 (1984): 341; Tversky and Kahneman, 'Judgment under Uncertainty'.

of heuristic depends on an individual's availability set, i.e. the heuristics available to her. Factors that affect the availability set include personality traits, socio-cultural background, and social learning. For instance, potential migrants who exhibit regret avoidance — they disproportionately regret negative outcomes that are the results of their own actions and decisions rather than negative outcomes resulting from inaction — might overwhelmingly accept the status quo rather than migrate.[42] Others will intuitively follow well-established and culturally-dependent decision rules such as imitating the successful or the majority.[43]

The individual capacity to decide varies with individual behavioural characteristics, such as the emotional and cognitive capacity to search for alternatives that provide higher anticipated life satisfaction, evaluate a limited set of potential migration destinations, and decide upon one such destination. Whereas the capacity to realise is more observable and largely independent of a particular destination, the capacity to decide is often influenced by cognitive practices of a potential migrant and available migration options. The capacity to decide is largely independent of the capacities to aspire and realise, whereas the latter two are mutually interdependent. The next section links the three capacities back to individual needs and discusses the link between needs and individual agency.

2.2.4 Capacities, needs, and agency

Individual needs and capacities are not distributed equally across individuals but vary spatially, temporally, and with individuals' monetary and non-monetary resources. The capacities to aspire, realise, and decide as well as aspirations themselves are need-dependent. Unfulfilled needs result in aspirations that lead to aspiration gaps and potentially the motivation to change behaviour and the status quo, i.e. migrate.


42. Mathias Czaika, 'Migration and Economic Prospects', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 1 (2015): 58–82.
43. Epstein, 'Herd and network effects in migration decision-making'.

I have argued that aspiration gaps are central to the motivation to change behaviour but have not dwelled much on the question how aspirations arise. While some long-term life goals and moral and ethical values might take years to evolve, other aspirations evolve and change arguably a lot quicker and in response to unfulfilled individual needs. Similar to the hierarchy of needs, there is a hierarchy of aspirations with lower aspirations corresponding to lower unmet needs. The aspiration gap is the difference between the status quo in terms of needs met and individual aspirations. Some examples might help to clarify how needs and aspirations work in practice. Imagine a country hit by temporary food shortages due to a natural disaster. As a result, some people's physiological needs will not be fully met and they aspire never to feel hunger again. Food aid might address this unmet need and fulfil people's aspirations. Some people, particularly during repeated or prolonged food shortages might develop higher aspirations, e.g. to be able to support one's family without relying on aid. Their aspiration gap grows, as does their motivation intensity to change their status quo. Migration might be one means to change one's status quo and fulfil some life aspirations. As mentioned above, life aspirations are not fixed and individuals frequently adjust them upwards or downwards. Imagine an individual who has sufficiently met her deficiency needs and is pursuing her dreams for affluence, her self-actualisation needs. Due to a large negative shock in her life, such as an economic downturn, she loses her job. With the duration of unemployment, her aspiration gap grows in size. She might at first be confident to find another high-paying job but over time might either adjust her aspirations with regards to her salary downwards or consider migration as an option to reduce her aspiration gap.

Individual agency generally increases the higher the unmet needs are in a hierarchy of needs according to Maslow. People whose basic needs are threatened, i.e. they face severe food shortages or widespread violence arguably enjoy much less agency in their decision whether to migrate than those who merely have unmet self-actualisation needs. The latter are in a comfortable position to consider alternatives and potentially

adjust their aspiration downwards to avoid cognitive dissonance. Individuals whose basic needs are unmet arguably neither have the option to adjust their aspirations downward nor sufficient time to consider their situation and potential alternatives. Potential migrants at the lowest level of the hierarchy of needs include forced migrants while those at the top migrate voluntarily. Figure 2.4 gives examples of aspirations that arise from different unfulfilled needs. They are not exhaustive but intend to clarify the relationship between needs and aspirations.

Figure 2.4: Life aspirations arising from unfulfilled individual needs



The capacities to aspire and realise migration rely on an individual's economic, social, emotional, and cognitive resources,[44] her position in the needs hierarchy, and the size of her aspiration gap. If aspiration gaps are too large, it might seem unfeasible to fulfil one's aspirations, resulting in cognitive dissonance. This is more likely to happen to people who are at low levels of the needs hierarchy and (continue to) maintain high aspirations. They might further also encounter insufficient monetary and non-monetary resources to realise migration. People who have met most or all of their deficiency needs are less likely to have very large aspiration gaps and likely have sufficient monetary and non-monetary resources to work on their growth needs.

44. Sell and De Jong, 'Toward a Motivational Theory of Migration Decision Making'; Shaw, 'A Note on Cost-Return Calculations and Decisions to Migrate'.

The degree of individual agency and the position on the needs hierarchy also influence the heuristics availability set to search for alternatives and decide migration. Some heuristics are arguably not available to everybody, such as those living in absolute poverty that are concerned with survival rather than esteem or self-actualisation. To use the heuristic 'imitate the majority', individuals might need sufficient monetary resources. To 'imitate the successful', individuals need role models to follow. The following section presents a range of heuristics that might be part of an individual's heuristic availability set.

2.3 Heuristics in migration decision-making

To appreciate the complexities of migration destination choice, it is important to understand its economic and psychological underpinnings.[45] While a wide range of studies has investigated the economic reasons for destination choice, such as employment, income, and social services (see Section 1.3 above), the psychological underpinnings have received much less attention. In this section, I outline heuristic decision-making for destination choice. Although heuristic decision-making has received relatively little attention in the migration literature, it is widely used in psychology[46] and has been applied to other fields, such as political science.[47] Heuristics are 'methods for arriving at satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of computation', which are often used unconsciously or automatically.[48] This means that decisions are not necessarily made

45. Pellegrini and Fotheringham, 'Modelling spatial choice'.

46. Galen V. Bodenhausen and Robert S. Wyer, 'Effects of Stereotypes on Decision Making and Information-Processing Strategies', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 48, no. 2 (1985): 267–282; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 'Heuristic decision making'; Anuj K. Shah and Daniel M. Oppenheimer, 'Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction Framework', *Psychological Bulletin* 134, no. 2 (2008): 207–222; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability', *Cognitive Psychology* 5 (1973): 207–232; Tversky and Kahneman, 'Judgment under Uncertainty'.

47. Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, 'Heuristics in Political Decision Making', *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (2001): 951–971.

48. Herbert A. Simon, 'Invariants of Human Behavior', *Annual Review of Psychology* 41 (1990): p.11.

on the basis of a full evaluation of all relevant factors due to imperfect information, uncertainty, or bounded rationality.[49] In short, heuristics are strategies that aim to make decisions 'more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods' by ignoring part of the information.[50] The use of heuristics might, in practice, not necessarily result in worse decisions but in better ones for some people and worse ones for others.[51] Better and worse is defined as closer to people's preferences under full information and perfect information processing. Decisions in this context not only refer to where to relocate but also which potential destinations are considered in the first place. Although the distinctions between heuristic search, evaluation, and decision strategies are not clear cut and some heuristics are used for more than one task, I broadly define information seeking, satisficing, availability, and hierarchical search as heuristic search strategies. I define prospect theory and framing, status quo bias and endowment effect, and regret avoidance as heuristics that guide the evaluation of migration options. Lastly, recognition, one-reason (or few-reason) decision-making, imitation, affect, exploration/exploitation, and public commitments and sunk costs are heuristics used to decide upon a migration destination. Loss aversion, regret avoidance, and ex-post rationalisation help to explain why potential migrants decide not to migrate and/or rationalise prior inferior decisions.

2.3.1 Search for migration opportunities

The search for (a limited number of) migration opportunities is central to the subsequent evaluation of migration options and the decision to migrate to a certain destination or to stay put. Potential migrants might employ different search heuristics.

49. Selten, 'Bounded Rationality'.
50. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 'Heuristic decision making', p.454.
51. Lau and Redlawsk, 'Heuristics in Political Decision Making'; Gerd Gigerenzer, *Simply Rational: Decision Making in the Real World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group, *Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart*.

Information seeking. Information about available potential destinations, i.e. the awareness space[52] and the destinations' characteristics is central to establish a pool of potential destinations.[53] Search might be guided by accurate, factual, and objective representations of conditions at potential destinations; by imaginations, expectations, and perceptions thereof;[54] or both. Information can affect search behaviour through its impact on imaginations, expectations, and perceptions.[55] Microeconomic theory states that individuals will 'try to obtain as much information as possible in order to make the best possible decision.'[56] However, increasing the quantity of information does not necessarily result in better decisions but possibly the opposite.[57] Too much information can result in cognitive overload, a poor decision, or ultimately, no decision.[58] The question therefore arises when to stop information search. The optimal stopping rule states that one should search for information as long as the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs.[59] While intuitive, this requires continuous calculations of costs and benefits of acquiring more information, thereby presenting an unreasonable burden on decision-makers. Satisficing, availability, and hierarchical search are simple heuristics that guide information search (and its stopping).

52. Brown and Moore, 'The Intra-Urban Migration Process'.

53. Wolpert, 'Behavioral aspects of the decision to migrate'.

54. Gerald Haberkorn, 'The Migration Decision-Making Process: Some Social-Psychological Considerations', chap. 9 in *Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries*, ed. Gordon F. De Jong and Robert W. Gardner (New York: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981), 252–280; Maddy Thompson, 'Migration decision-making: A geographical imaginations approach', *Area* 49, no. 1 (2017): 77–84.

55. McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 'A land of milk and honey with streets paved with gold'; Zala Volcic and Karmen Erjavec, ''I want to leave Slovenia for a sunny, relaxed and open Australia': imagining Australia in Slovenia', *Media International Australia* 149 (November 2013): 56–66.

56. Epstein, 'Herd and network effects in migration decision-making', p.573.

57. Benjamin Scheibehenne, Rainer Greifeneder and Peter M. Todd, 'Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload', *Journal of Consumer Research* 37, no. October (2010): 409–425.

58. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 'Heuristic decision making'; Kevin Lane Keller and Richard Staelin, 'Effects of Quality and Quantity on Decision Effectiveness', *Journal of Consumer Research* 14, no. 2 (1987): 200–213; Peters et al., 'More Is Not Always Better'.

59. Stigler, 'The Economics of Information'.

Satisficing. Satisficing implies that the search process for potential destinations is stopped as soon as a satisfactory option is found.[60] An option is satisfactory if its expected outcome promises to reach or surpass a certain minimum threshold, which is usually less than the aspired level. The aim is generally not to maximise potential benefits of migration. The search may be stopped only until a certain number of options or alternatives have been identified. Satisficing as a search rule specifies the conditions under which search for information is both triggered and stopped. It allows for the possibility that after a certain search period no option satisfies the aspired life satisfaction or promises to sufficiently reduce aspiration gaps. The decision-maker decides to stop the search process and to remain at the status quo. This usually leads to a 'downward shift' in aspirations in order to reduce frustration as a consequence of an aspiration gap and cognitive dissonance.

Availability. Information search can be external (e.g. friends, books, internet) but also internal (a person's memory). Availability refers to the ease by which, for instance, potential migration destinations and their characteristics can be retrieved from memory, i.e. from past information.[61] Recently acquired information is generally considered more relevant and can be retrieved more easily. A country, for instance, that is repeatedly in the news will be more available, and hence, more easily recalled by potential migrants. The news do not have to, and often will not, be related to migration; sport events, such as a football world cup, or politics, such as an international summit, might suffice to temporarily increase the availability of certain countries or places. Historical (colonial) and cultural ties make some countries also more likely to be available when potential migrants reflect about migrating. Available countries will generally be more likely considered as potential destinations than those that cannot easily be retrieved from memory.

60. Selten, 'Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality'; Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice'.

61. Tversky and Kahneman, 'Judgment under Uncertainty'; Tversky and Kahneman, 'Availability'.

Hierarchical search. Search for and selection between potential destinations is likely to be hierarchical or sequential and follows two stages.[62] Individuals first exclude potential destinations that are outside the achievable opportunity set (conjunctive rule). Afterwards, they evaluate each alternative in terms of its best attribute (disjunctive rule). For instance, individuals might select in the first stage according to geographic location and evaluate the remaining destinations according to one or more cues, such as education and employment opportunities. Different migration drivers might weigh differently at different stages in a multi-stage model of destination choice. For instance, someone escaping conflict might select nearby safe countries in the first stage of the search. Having mapped the potential destination countries that are safe and where migration is worth aspiring and realisable, the individual might put more emphasis on other aspects, such as economic needs.

The number of potential destinations that have been identified in a search-and-stop process are usually not equally attractive and are evaluated, ordered, and transformed into a personalised 'destination hierarchy'. The next subsection outlines different heuristic strategies to do so.

2.3.2 Evaluation of migration options

Editing and evaluation of available migration options consists of a (cognitive) assessment of the anticipated challenges and expected consequences of (a few) identified migration options. While this might sound at first like an economic cost-benefit or utility-disutility calculation, it is not. Editing involves certain heuristics to organise, reformulate, and select information on the migration options to be considered in the decision phase. The editing phase involves some cognitive processes of simplification, detection of dominance, and cancellation of information about certain cues and

62. A. Stewart Fotheringham, 'Modelling hierarchical destination choice', *Environment and Planning* 18, no. 3 (1986): 401–418.

alternative migration options.

Prospect theory and framing. According to prospect theory,[63] the editing phase involves a coding operation that compares and converts perceived (or expected) absolute outcomes into relative, i.e. reference-dependent outcomes in terms of gains or losses relative to a reference point. Contrary to (reference-independent) expected utility theory, the choice between some alternatives or outcomes is often framed rather as (relative) gains or losses depending on a point of reference. While reference-independent behavioural models of (absolute) expected utility are based on linear probabilities, i.e. the assessment of an outcome does not depend on the status quo or any other reference point, Kahneman and Tversky suggest that people would even reverse their valuation of options depending on whether respective outcomes are framed in terms of gains or losses.[64] This implies, for instance, that most people would react more strongly to an increase in the unemployment rate from ten per cent to 20 per cent than an equivalent decrease of the employment rate from 90 per cent to 80 per cent. Both are effectively the same. This framing effect transferred into the context of migration decision-making implies that a potential migrant who evaluates the option of leaving her current country for another country, and who therefore assesses future employment prospects, is more likely to decide to leave if an objectively deteriorating economic situation in the home country is framed negatively as the probability of not finding (or losing) a job increasing from 10 to 20 per cent, than as the probability of finding (or keeping) a job declining from 90 to 80 per cent. Evidence shows that these framing effects do indeed affect individual migration decisions and migration flows.[65] Therefore, and contrary to assumptions of reference-independent expected

63. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–291; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106, no. 4 (1991): 1039–1061.

64. Kahneman and Tversky, 'Prospect Theory'.

65. Czaika, 'Migration and Economic Prospects'.

utility theory, the way information is framed or presented does influence the evaluation of migration options, and thus, the behavioural action or inaction. People often repackage information and assess expected outcomes rather as gains or losses by referring to the status quo as the reference point instead of focusing on absolute (expected) outcomes.[66]

As outlined in Section 1.3, migration research has identified a wide range of drivers of migration. However, studying migration often ignores the question why people do not migrate despite promising prospects and opportunities. The fact that the global stock of international migrants is surprisingly constant at about three per cent of the world's population suggests that despite massive inequalities, the overwhelming majority of the world's population keep on living permanently in their home countries.[67] This seems to challenge most existing theories of migration. Status quo bias, endowment effect, and regret avoidance may provide explanations for immobility.

Status quo bias and endowment effect. A status quo bias is a strong preference for the context and situation in which people currently live in. Further, people usually value what they have higher than what they could have, even if both has objectively the same value. This phenomenon is called endowment effect. These common effects could be explained by three theories.[68] First, decision-makers acknowledge transition costs incurred by moving away from the status quo. This makes any change in personal circumstances per se less attractive, in particular when a locational change is involved. Transition costs may hereby go beyond some financial, socio-economic, or psychological costs of migration. Therefore, even in the absence of (or with minor) economic and non-economic migration costs, discomfort with additional uncertainty

66. Jonathan Mercer, 'Prospect Theory and Political Science', *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2005): 1–21.

67. Mathias Czaika and Hein De Haas, 'The globalization of migration: Has the world become more migratory?', *International Migration Review* 48, no. 2 (2014): 283–323; IOM, *World Migration Report 2018* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2017).

68. William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, 'Status quo bias in decision making', *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 1, no. 1 (1988): 7–59.

about migration outcomes may lead to status quo inertia. As a second reason for a strong preference for the status quo, Kahneman and Tversky provide experimental evidence that in people's decision-making, losses weigh more than equal-sized gains.[69] In the context of migration: if the status quo in needs satisfaction is the relevant reference point for assessing migration options, people place more importance on potential losses than on 'similar-sized' potential gains, which as a result may keep them in their status quo at the current place of residence.[70] This cognitive bias leads to a behaviour where people value what they have more highly than what they could have, even if the latter is related to a smaller risk of failure. Therefore, the likelihood for migration for people with migration aspirations and good prospects for realising significant gains from migration is assumed to be smaller than the likelihood for not-migrating when facing equal-sized losses. A third reason for a status quo bias is the role of *sunk costs*. Sunk costs are costs that have already been incurred and cannot be recovered. An individual with migration aspirations may hereby not migrate — or once she migrated, does not return — because of past investments. Such investments include housing, social networks, or a business as well as investments in non-transferable skills and knowledge such as language, some type of specific education, and on-the-job training. The more effort an individual has invested into the status quo, the less likely is a subsequent self-determined change in the personal situation. Therefore, the longer someone has spent in a certain job, profession, company, country, or any other socio-cultural context, the less likely it is that the person will be motivated to choose a change in place and/or role or position even if it would be 'objectively' beneficial. Similarly, once potential migrants have invested monetary and non-monetary resources in migration preparation (e.g. information search, visas), they might continue with their migration plans, even if better opportunities at the

69. Kahneman and Tversky, 'Prospect Theory'; Tversky and Kahneman, 'Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice'.

70. Richard Thaler, 'Toward a positive theory of consumer choice', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 1 (1980): 39–60.

place of current residence emerge or the situation at the destination deteriorates.

Regret avoidance. Finally, individuals often feel stronger regret about negative outcomes that are the result of their actions than they do about similar negative consequences resulting from inaction.[71] The propensity to avoid regret implies that potential migrants tend to decide against the risks of migration, even if the overall prospects seem poorer if they were to stay than if they were to leave. Regret avoidance can therefore be another reason for immobility and a relatively low migration propensity despite availability of migratory options.

Having evaluated different migration options, potential migrants employ heuristic rules to decide upon one preferred migration destination.

2.3.3 Decision strategies

Fully rational decision-making presumes that in situations where a decision between several options has to be made, a decision-maker possessing complete information opts for the alternative that allows realising the highest level of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility.[72] However, decision-making of human beings does usually not fulfil these conditions but is rather characterised by limited or bounded rationality, which includes the limited (cognitive) capacity to process information (computational power), limited time to search for information, and endogenous needs, preferences, and risk attitudes. Another feature of decision-making of human beings is that optional choices are greatly simplified. This means that people apply 'rationales' (or heuristics) which make sense individually but are often rather situational than general. For instance, and as already discussed, satisficing as a search heuristic implies that people seek for satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. But there are other heuristics

71. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'The Psychology of Preferences', *Scientific American* 246, no. 1 (1982): 160–173.

72. John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).

which potential migrants apply when deciding upon a migration destination. In the following I provide a selection of such heuristic descision strategies.

Recognition. The recognition heuristic states that individuals value options they recognise higher than those they do not recognise. They often prefer the recognised option even if strong contradictory cues are present.[73] Migration decision-makers relying on the recognition heuristic overwhelmingly consider countries or cities available to them, i.e. which they can easily and quickly retrieve from memory. These can be countries or places they have travelled to or heard of before. As alluded to above, they might ignore information that contradicts their imaginations, expectations, and beliefs. For instance, a positive image of a destination country as welcoming and providing opportunities to increase life satisfaction — the reputation or brand of a nation[74] — might result in the rejection of contradictory cues, such as rising xenophobia and economic difficulties. The recognition heuristic is often part of the evaluation of and ultimately decision-making between potential destinations. Facing the choice between a place visited or heard of before, and one never heard of, decision makers will likely choose the former. An exception might be adventure seekers — those who see migration as an end in itself — who might prefer unknown places. If individuals recognise several of the alternative migration options, they will use the fluency heuristic and select the one that was recognised faster.[75]

One-reason decision-making. If a potential migrant has identified several satisfying migration options, she might choose the best of these options according to a subjective evaluation of the destination's characteristics. In one-reason decision-making, only a single piece of information is used to make a choice. Individuals hence

73. Gigerenzer, *Simply Rational: Decision Making in the Real World.*

74. Simon Anholt, 'Competitive Identity: A new model for the brand management of nations, cities and regions', *Policy & Practice: A Development Education Review*, no. 4 (2007): 3–13; Peter van Ham, 'The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation', *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 5 (2001): 2–6.

75. Gigerenzer, *Simply Rational: Decision Making in the Real World.*

reduce the number of evaluated cues per migration option to one. They do so to simplify the decision-making process by making it quick and frugal.[76] For instance, people who flee conflict, war, and violence might only or overwhelmingly care about safety and evaluate potential destinations according to this cue. They eliminate countries that do not exceed a threshold of safety needs. They might then settle for a country following the satisficing, availability, or recognition heuristic or re-evaluate the remaining potential destinations according to a different cue. This procedure is a hierarchical search. A variant of one-reason decision-making is few-reason decision-making. Individuals disregard a majority of destination cues and focus on a few cues that they attribute subjective importance to.

Imitation. People frequently imitate the majority and engage in 'herd behaviour' if information search is costly, time-consuming, and the environment is only changing slowly. Individuals observe 'relevant others' in their peer group and try to imitate their (migration) behaviour according to the rationale 'they can't be all wrong'. Imitation of 'the successful' (according to the rationale 'I can do the same') is a variant thereof. Both heuristics imply discounting private information in expectation that others base their decisions on more or better quality information.[77] Such decisions require little time and knowledge and thereby reduce the need for direct information gathering.[78]

Affect. The affect heuristic states that feelings and emotions influence decisions and that people decide differently when facing affect-rich outcomes, i.e. outcomes rich in emotion.[79] Leaving one's place of residence and relocating in another city, region, or country arguably falls in the latter category. Psychological research has confirmed that individuals do not maximise expected outcomes according to economic

76. Shah and Oppenheimer, 'Heuristics Made Easy'.
77. Epstein, 'Herd and network effects in migration decision-making'.
78. Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group, *Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.*
79. Paul Slovic et al., 'Affect, Risk, and Decision Making', *Health Psychology* 24, no. 4 (2005): S35–40.

rationality when facing risky and affect-rich outcomes.[80] Emotions can further act as a quick decision mechanism.[81] Individuals often replace information about something by affect for it. For instance, if people like something, they generally perceive the associated risks as low and the benefits as high. In contrast, for things they dislike, they tend to perceive the risks as high and the benefits as low. The question 'What do I think about a certain migration destination?' is replaced and emotionalised by 'Do I like the country?' The decision is not taken on the basis of an evaluation of information in favour and against the particular destination but on the basis of emotions. If potential migrants like the destination country in question, they will evaluate this option more favourably and might ultimately decide to move there.

Exploration/exploitation. Individuals decide differently depending on the time available for such decision. The exploration/exploitation tradeoff states that individuals will explore multiple options and choose the one that they believe will be best only if they have sufficient time and resources to do so.[82] For quick decisions, individuals either choose the first good option via heuristics such as satisficing, availability, or imitation or they may exploit options they are certain about. The latter might be moving to a known destination or simply do nothing and stay put. Individual and environmental factors affect whether individuals explore or exploit options. The former include cognitive resources, the latter the cost of information.

Public commitments and sunk costs. People often stick to a decision due to prior public commitments and sunk costs even if it might not be ideal (anymore) to do so. Announcing to migrate or not to migrate puts pressure on individuals to commit to

80. Renata S. Suter et al., 'The Neural Basis of Risky Choice with Affective Outcomes', *PLoS ONE* 10, no. 4 (2015): e0122475.

81. Timothy Ketelaar and Adam S. Goodie, 'The Satisficing Role of Emotions in Decision Making', *Psykhe* 7, no. 1 (1998): 63–77.

82. Katja Mehlhorn et al., 'Unpacking the exploration-exploitation tradeoff: A synthesis of human and animal literatures', *Decision* 2, no. 3 (2015): 191–215.

the decision, especially when the commitment was made public.[83] For instance, people may have told or even promised their parents, their boss or friends to migrate and feel obliged to stick to this commitment. Although sunk costs should not be factored into decision-making according to rational choice theory, people often do not ignore costs that have already been incurred and cannot be recovered (contrary to prospective costs). When people have invested or put effort into things like assets, housing, and non-transferable skills, they are often reluctant to pull out because of the resulting (perceived) loss. They do so even if continued refusal to stay, leave, or return will lead to even bigger losses. This explains why some deterrence or deportation policies are rather ineffective, as many irregular migrants have 'risked their lives to get here'.[84]

Ex-post rationalisation. When rationalising prior (sometimes inferior) decisions, people actively seek for reasons and information that confirms their decision. This is ex-post rationalisation. They also regard alternative options as less favourable after the decision is made.[85] Information that will refute or doubt the decision is ignored in order to avoid cognitive dissonance resulting in the rationale 'it was the right thing to do'.[86] An example could be that new information about the chosen destination or migration route emerged or that migration policies changed.

2.4 Potential migrants

In principle, every human — at least every adult — is a potential migrant, embedded in the migration driver environment. Depending on the type of migration considered (local, regional, internal, international), some end up moving while others stay put.

83. Frank Kalter, 'Partnerschaft und Migration: zur theoretischen Erklärung eines empirischen Effekts', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie: KZfSS* 50, no. 2 (1998): 283–309.


84. Richard Black, Michael Collyer and Will Somerville, *Pay-to-Go Schemes and Other Noncoercive Return Programs: Is Scale Possible?*, technical report (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011).

85. Brehm, 'Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives'.

86. Festinger, *A theory of cognitive dissonance*.

I argue that some potential migrants who stay put might lack all or some of the capacities to aspire, realise, and decide. Figure 2.5 displays a stylised typology of potential migrants. Individual A (Figure 2.5) lacks all three capacities for migration and is therefore unable to migrate. However, she might be content at her current place, have her basic needs satisfied, and believe that she can fulfil her life aspirations at her current location.

Figure 2.5: A typology of potential migrants



However, there is a significant group of *migration aspirers* who wish for a better life and consider (international) migration as one, the main, or the only option to overcome the discrepancy between their life aspirations and the status quo (their aspiration gaps). As I have mentioned repeatedly, the size of this group of potential international migrants worldwide has been estimated at around 750 million.[87] They have the capacity to aspire to a better life and the intention to migrate internationally in pursuit of a better life, if they had the chance to do so. This group of people tends to be less educated, unsatisfied with their current household income and is disproportionately clustered in low income countries and sub-Saharan Africa.[88] In fact, the Gallup survey finds that on average 18 per cent of people in low income countries report aspirations or intentions to migrate.[89] In addition, a larger but unknown num-

87. Esipova, Pugliese and Ray, *More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could.*
88. Silvia Migali and Marco Scipioni, *A global analysis of intentions to migrate*, European Commission JCR Technical Report 111207 (2018).
89. Ibid.

ber likely aspires to move within their regions or countries to close their aspiration gaps. Based on actual migration data, a significant number of migration aspirers do indeed end up migrating internally or internationally, but the majority does not relocate. Based on survey data, merely a very small proportion of migration aspirers — five per cent in low income countries — are making plans to relocate within the next year.[90] The other 95 per cent who aspire to but do not (yet) make plans might lack the capacity to realise their aspirations (Individual B, Figure 2.5). Migration aspires that are unable to turn their aspirations into migration behaviour have three options. First, adjust their aspirations downwards to avoid cognitive dissonance and as a result settle for a more achievable migration option, such as relocate internally rather than internationally. Second, work on increasing their capacity to realise migration to make the desired form of migration or destination achievable. Third, adjust their aspirations downwards, stay put, and try to fulfil their life aspirations at their current location.

Migration realisers are individuals that have the monetary and non-monetary resources necessary to accomplish a migration project. However, not all migration realisers are migration aspirers (Individual C, Figure 2.5). They might have the resources to realise migration but are satisfied at their current location and hence do not aspire (international) migration. However, even if they possess the capacities to aspire and realise (Individual D, Figure 2.5), a majority might ultimately never migrate for two main reasons. First, there could be a mismatch between their aspirations and their capacity to realise. For instance, they might aspire to migrate internationally but might only have the capacity to realise internal migration, as they lack travel documents or are unable to get a visa. Their aspiration to migrate internationally does not intersect with their limited capacity to realise. Second, individuals who have the capacity to aspire and realise migration to a certain destination might not have

90. Migali and Scipioni, *A global analysis of intentions to migrate.*

the capacity to ultimately decide on a migration project. They might hence plan international migration but have not started preparations, as they cannot decide where and when to relocate. While 18 per cent of people in low income countries intend to migrate, merely five per cent thereof plan to do so within the next 12 months, and less than two per cent have started preparing their move.[91] Many people from developed countries arguably could realise migration to other countries that offer better opportunities, but de facto never migrate internationally. The fact that merely three per cent of European Union citizens live in another EU member state despite freedom of movement and significant spatial opportunity differentials within the EU is one example for such voluntary immobility.[92] They could simply lack aspirations to migrate internationally (Individual C, Figure 2.5) or lack the capacities to decide upon cross-border migration (Individual D, Figure 2.5).

Individuals with the capacity to decide are *migration deciders*. They have the mental capacity to search, evaluate, and decide upon potential alternative migration options and destinations. However, not all migration deciders necessarily aspire to or are able to realise migration. Migration deciders who also have the capacities to aspire and realise migration (Individual E, Figure 2.5) have the monetary and non-monetary resources to aspire a better life and are able to realise it through migration. They will stop being potential migrants and will become actual migrants if the right opportunities come up.

2.5 Reflection and summary

In conclusion, people with the intention to migrate may be identified as 'potential migrants', as the Gallup poll does. However, people with sufficient capacity to aspire

91. Ibid.

92. Eurostat, *People in the EU - statistics on origin of residents*, 2018, accessed 2 September 2018, `https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=People_in_the_EU_-_statistics_on_origin_of_residents`.

will never be able to migrate if they do not have the capacity to realise migration. They might be migration aspirers but will not become actual migrants. Potential migrants who have the capacity to realise migration but do not aspire to do so or cannot decide where and when to relocate are migration realisers but will also not become actual migrants. Migration deciders have the capacity to search, evaluate, and decide upon a migration option. However, not all migration deciders aspire to or are able to realise migration. Even individuals with all three capacities for migration may not migrate if the right opportunities do not come up. At the same time, if these capacities for migration are absent, migration is not a self-determined, voluntary decision.

Furthermore, when locational and functional change in a person's personal circumstances is realised, all three capacities may change endogenously. This implies that both the aspiration and the ability for migration are not static, but rather adjust dynamically to new life situations and locations. A widening aspiration window, i.e. the awareness about new and interesting migration opportunities, may increase the capacity to aspire but not necessarily the capacity to realise new opportunities. Social inequality and feelings of relative deprivation negatively affect non-migrants' and migrants' well-being and needs satisfaction alike. Further migratory steps are likely to follow. Aspiration gaps, i.e. a mismatch between aspired and actual life situations, work as internal (motivational) drivers to achieve improvement and progress in personal circumstances and prospects.

Psychological research shows that aspirations, which result in motivation to change behaviour, can be an inherited or acquired character trait, often formed at an early age, but is also a product of a stimulating social environment. Thus, many factors may affect people's aspiration formation, ranging from individual personality, socialisation, education, to access to information and networks, and eventually the migration experience itself. People's awareness of social, economic, and political opportunities elsewhere, transmitted through modern mass media, the internet, or social networks may therefore increase (life) aspirations. The question arises whether individuals,

driven by the power of strong aspirations, work on their capacities to realise and decide to overcome their involuntary immobility,[93] or whether individuals rather adjust their aspirations downwards to avoid continued unhappiness and cognitive dissonance due to unfulfilled aspirations ('aspiration trap').

This chapter provided answers to this thesis' first two research questions. First, what motivates individuals to migrate, what role do life aspirations play, and who is a potential migrant? I have argued that behavioural motivation arises from individual aspiration gaps that exist in the context of the migration driver environment (Section 2.1). An aspiration gap is the difference between the life aspired to (life aspirations) and the current needs satisfaction. Every human being is in principle a potential migrant (Section 2.4). Depending on their capacities for migration (Section 2.2), some will become actual migrants if the right opportunities come up. Not every potential migrant aspires to the same level of needs satisfaction nor has the exact same individual needs, resulting in different aspirational gaps and hence different motivation intensity for migration for people with the same level of needs satisfaction. Second, how do potential migrants search, evaluate, and decide upon potential migration destinations? I have discussed a range of heuristic strategies to search, evaluate, and decide upon potential migration destinations in Section 2.3. Heuristic strategies used predominantly for search for migration opportunities include satisficing, availability, and hierarchical search. Prospect theory, framing, status quo bias, endowment effect, and regret avoidance are heuristics to evaluate migration options. They are further able to explain why people do not migrate, even if they might aspire to do so. Recognition, one-reason (or few-reason) decision-making, imitation, affect, exploration/exploitation, public commitments, sunk costs, and ex-post rationalisation are heuristic strategies used to decide where to relocate. Information about potential destinations and their characteristics is central to search, evaluation, and decision.

93. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility'.

I do not test the entire migration decision-making framework outlined in this chapter but rather illustrate aspects of it in a mixed methods study of Syrian refugees in Jordan in Chapters 4–6. Chapter 4 establishes how life aspirations, current need satisfaction, and aspiration gaps transform into the motivation to migrate. In short, how do potential migrants establish whether to migrate. Chapter 5 presents the destination preferences of Syrian refugees. These form the basis for the subsequent evaluation of migration options or the starting point for a further search for additional migration opportunities. Chapter 6 briefly evaluates how Syrian refugees acquire information about potential migration opportunities. Its main focus is on stated destination choices. In particular, I evaluate how prior preferences, destination characteristics, and heuristic rules affect such choices. In short, how do potential migrants establish where to relocate. I do not test all heuristics that might form part of an individual's heuristic availability set but rather illustrate the following heuristic evaluation and decision strategies: recognition, one-reason (or few-reason) decision-making, framing, and prospect theory. The following chapter explains the methods and data used; Section 3.3 in particular outlines the aspects of the migration decision-framework that I chose to illustrate and discusses how the general framework applies to Syrian refugees in Jordan.

Chapter 3

Empirical Approach

In this chapter, I discuss the empirical approach used to evaluate the third research question: 'What are the aspirations, destination preferences, and destination choices of Syrian refugees in Jordan and how well does the revised migration decision-making framework explain them?' I empirically illustrate aspects of the migration decision-making framework in Chapters 4–6. A wide variety of research methods has been used to study migration from different methodological points of view.[1] The most important methods include qualitative interviews and quantitative surveys to investigate past migration behaviour and theorise future behaviour. Relatively recently, experimental methods have entered migration research.[2] Consensus in the migration literature seems to have emerged favouring multi-methods interdisciplinary research to overcome disciplinary boundaries and enhance understanding of migration and migration decision-making.[3]

1. For an overview see: Carlos Vargas-Silva, *Handbook of Research Methods in Migration*, ed. Carlos Vargas-Silva (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).

2. David McKenzie and Dean Yang, 'Experimental approaches in migration studies', chap. 12 in *Handbook of Research Methods in Migration*, ed. Carlos Vargas-Silva (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).

3. Christina Boswell, 'European Values and the Asylum Crisis', *International Affairs* 76, no. 3 (2000): 537–557; Stephen Castles, 'Understanding the relationship between methodology and methods', chap. 1 in *Handbook of Research Methods in Migration*, ed. Carlos Vargas-Silva (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 7–25; King, 'Theories and Typologies of Migration'.

In Section 3.1, I discuss methodological shortcomings of prior research on migration decision-making and show how my research improves upon them. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the sample population, Syrian refugees in Jordan, and the temporal and spatial context in which I conducted my fieldwork. In Section 3.3, I discuss how the migration decision-making framework established in Chapter 2 applies to Syrian refugees in Jordan, highlight the aspects of the framework that I illustrate, and discuss the generalisability of any findings. In Section 3.4, I describe the research design and methods of the empirical evaluation and present descriptive statistics of the data. I address positionality and research ethics in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 summarises.

3.1 Methodological challenges

Despite evaluating different groups of migrants in different countries, studies of migration decision-making generally share four shortcomings. First, they often interview or survey migrants in the destination country, i.e. once they relocated[4] or once they returned to their place of origin.[5] This is problematic, as it might extract migrants' post-hoc reflections on their migration histories and the role of information and destination characteristics therein.[6] Further, the focus on migrants in destination countries excludes the majority of people who do not migrate, whether by choice or because

4. See, for instance: Maureen Benson-Rea and Stephen Rawlinson, 'Highly skilled and business migrants: information processes and settlement outcomes', *International Migration* 41, no. 2 (2003): 59–79; Jurga Bučaite-Vilke, Vikinta Rosinaite and Etsuo Yoshino, 'Experience of Lithuanian migrants: The social construction of networks and identities', *Filosofija, Sociologija* 22, no. 4 (2011): 510–522; Yolanda Covington-Ward, '"Back Home, People Say America is Heaven": Pre-Migration Expectations and Post-Migration Adjustment for Liberians in Pittsburgh', *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 2017, Khalid Koser, 'Information and Repatriation: The Case of Mozambican Refugees in Malawi', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 10, no. 1 (1997): 1–17; McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 'A land of milk and honey with streets paved with gold'.

5. See, for instance: Hugo, 'Information, exploitation and empowerment'; Ellen Prusinski, '"Because It is Our Fate": Migration Narratives and Coping Strategies among Indonesian Migrant Women Workers', *Asian Journal of Social Science* 44, nos. 4-5 (2016): 485–515.

6. De Jong and Fawcett, 'Motivations for Migration'; James P. Smith and Duncan Thomas, 'Remembrances of things past: Test-retest reliability of retrospective migration histories', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A: Statistics in Society* 166, no. 1 (2003): 23–49.

they do not have the ability to migrate.[7] It remains unclear whether the latter do not migrate due to material or non-material barriers including imperfect information, lack of information, or wrong information, motivational differences, or other observable or unobservable individual or destination characteristics. Second, the focus on destination countries might mask the impact of the culture and society at the origin or place of current residence on migration decision-making.[8] In some cultural and societal context, migration has become a 'rite of passage'.[9] While drivers of migration might have been present initially, the expectation to migrate persists over time even in the absence of these drivers. The migration motivation is hence grounded in the local culture (introjected extrinsic); information about and imaginations of destinations might, however, affect the destination choice. Other cultural aspects, such as the belief in sorcery, might affect the role of information, as only certain information is trusted.[10] Third, studies that confirm the importance of information in migration decision-making are generally unable to distinguish between the relative importance of different characteristics of information, such as content and quantity.[11] Fourth, studies of migration decision-making generally build on expected utility theory and rational decision-making following the weighted additive rule[12] and fail to account for social-psychological factors, such as heuristics, in decision-making.[13]

Some studies have focused on potential migrants in origin countries, addressing the first two shortcomings. Through interviews and ethnographic research, Alpes studied the role of information for potential migrants in Cameroon and concluded

7. Gordon F. De Jong, Andrea G. Johnson and Kerry Richter, 'Determinants of migration values and expectations in rural Thailand', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 5, no. 4 (1996): 399–416.
8. Prusinski, 'Because It is Our Fate'.
9. Massey et al., 'Theories of International Migration'.
10. Maybritt J. Alpes, 'Bushfalling at all cost: The economy of migratory knowledge in Anglophone Cameroon', *African Diaspora* 5, no. 1 (2012): 90–115.
11. McKenzie and Yang, 'Experimental approaches in migration studies'.
12. Shah and Oppenheimer, 'Heuristics Made Easy'.
13. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 'Heuristic decision making'; Tversky and Kahneman, 'Judgment under Uncertainty'.

that information had little influence on migration decision-making.[14] Migration had become a rite of passage; information provided was generally mistrusted; and failure blamed on bad luck or sorcery. Gibson et al. surveyed Pacific Islanders to extract knowledge of migration opportunities in New Zealand and found that information gaps were the most important reason people did not apply to seasonal employment schemes, despite large migration networks.[15] Somerville and Walsworth surveyed Indian students planning to emigrate to determine which information sources they used and what role information played in the migration decision.[16] They found that potential migrants consulted available information mostly through networks to settle on a destination country. Volcic and Erjavec interviewed Slovenians to learn about their imaginations of Australia.[17] Information played a key part in forming imaginations, which they expected to influence migration behaviour. They concluded that Slovenians had an overly positive image of Australia, consistently highlighting positive aspects and understating negative ones. However, these studies did not distinguish between the impact of different characteristics of information and did not explicitly address the role of heuristics.

I focus on potential migrants in their current country of residence to alleviate the first two shortcomings. While my target population has already migrated from Syria to Jordan, they are potential migrants with regards to future moves. I am able to control the quality and quantity of information provided in my evaluation of stated migration destination preferences, alleviating the third shortcoming. Lastly, my theoretical framework is not built on expected utility theory and puts heuristics at its centre. The empirical evaluation is designed with heuristic decision-making in mind. Before discussing the research design, I outline the context of my fieldwork.

14. Alpes, 'Bushfalling at all cost'.

15. Gibson et al., 'Information flows and migration'.

16. Kara Somerville and Scott Walsworth, 'Information sources and knowledge transfer to future migrants: A study of university students in India', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 24, no. 1 (2015): 28–50.

17. Volcic and Erjavec, ''I want to leave Slovenia for a sunny, relaxed and open Australia''.

3.2 Population and local context

I focus on Syrian refugees, as they have been at the centre of the public discourse and interest, discussions on migration policy, and currently constitute the largest group of refugees worldwide. More than five million Syrians have left their country, predominantly to Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011.[18] A minority of the five million managed to migrate to Europe and Syrians accounted for almost 30 per cent, or more than 300,000, of the asylum applications in the EU in both 2015 and 2016.[19] Three quarters of all Syrian asylum applications in 2016 were recorded in Germany. These figures suggest that Germany was disproportionately popular with Syrian asylum seekers. Information about and imaginations of Germany might have played a significant role in the destination choice of Syrians.[20] A focus on Syrians is hence relevant to policy and adds to the growing literature, particularly since 2015, on migration decision-making and destination choice of Syrian refugees.

At the end of the previous section, I stated that I focus on potential migrants at their current residence before they might migrate further. I do not, however, examine why Syrians left Syria and how they decided where to relocate. I examine the secondary movement of Syrians who have settled in another country where they have been granted (or are eligible to be granted) refugees status or any other status as a person protected under international law. Unlike the generic potential migrants that I outlined in Chapter 2 who generally have two options, stay or migrate, Syrian refugees in Jordan have three main options: stay, migrate (or resettle), and return to Syria. These are the durable solutions. I nevertheless expect the migration decision-making framework established in Chapter 2 to extend to the decision-making of Syrian refugees. I do not formally test the entire framework but illustrate different aspects.

18. UNHCR, *Syria emergency*, 2019, accessed 30 October 2019, `https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html`.

19. Eurostat, *Asylum statistics*, 2017, accessed 8 August 2017, `http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum%7B%5C_%7Dstatistics`.

20. Richter, Emmer and Kunst, *Wie Geflüchtete Medien nutzen.*

I focus on Syrian refugees in Jordan for theoretical and practical reasons. Jordan has historically received and hosted a large number of migrants and refugees, particularly from Palestine and Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood uprisings in Syria in February 1982 led to between 5,000 and 10,000 deaths and forced Brotherhood supporters to leave Syria, some of which settled in Jordan.[21] Other Syrians moved to Jordan for family or economic reasons. While there is no reliable data on the number of Syrians who lived in Jordan prior to 2011, Jordanian officials have estimated the number at 750,000, which is likely an overstatement.[22] Nevertheless, a substantial number of Syrians settled in Jordan prior to 2011. In the wake of the influx of several hundred thousand Syrians, the Jordanian government mandated *all* Syrians in Jordan to register with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and receive an MoI card, regardless whether they had been in the country for decades or moved there after 2011.[23] The card gives them access to basic social services and is the basis to receive a work permit. The earlier movement of migrants and refugees from Syria to Jordan allows comparing and contrasting Syrian refugees who have lived in Jordan since the 1980s following the expulsion of the Muslim brotherhood with those that have only recently moved to Jordan. It is particularly interesting to evaluate whether, and if so, how the situation of the former changed since 2011. This has mostly been overlooked by the extensive literature on Syrian refugees.[24]

Jordan has received a large share of Syrian refugees since 2011. According to

21. Human Rights Watch, *A Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad's First Ten Years in Power*, technical report (16 July 2010), accessed 18 February 2019, `https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/07/16/wasted-decade/human-rights-syria-during-bashar-al-asads-first-ten-years-power`; Raphaël Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

22. André Bank, *Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Between Protection and Marginalisation*, GIGA Focus Middle East 3 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2016).

23. REACH, *Informing Refugees: Communication to and for Syrians in Jordan's Host Communities*, technical report (REACH, 2017).

24. While Bellamy et al. interview two Syrians who left Syria for Jordan in the wake of the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in 1982, they do not specifically examine whether their situation in Jordan changed since 2011 (Catherine Bellamy et al., *The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan: A study of refugee perspectives and their institutional environment in Turkey and Jordan*, technical report [London: Overseas Development Institute, 2017]).

UNHCR figures, Jordan officially hosted around 670,000 Syrian refugees at the time of my interviews in August and September 2018, third only to Turkey and Lebanon.[25] The majority of Syrians in Jordan live in host communities rather than refugee camps. The number of 670,000, however, is disputed. According to the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan hosts more than 1.3 million Syrian refugees, a figure which is frequently referred to in Jordanian news and public statements by officials.[26] This suggests that only half of all Syrians in Jordan have registered with the UNHCR. The inflow of 1.3 million Syrians amounts to an increase of Jordan's population equivalent to 18 per cent. Undeniably, this has put pressure on Jordan's already scarce resources and strained sectors, particularly the water supply (Jordan has one of the lowest levels of available water resources per capita), housing, education, healthcare, and the labour market.[27] A recent study, however, did not find adverse effects of Syrian refugees on labour market outcomes of Jordanians between 2010 and 2016.[28] Nevertheless, the inflow of Syrians has resulted in increasing tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities.[29] Jordan has not signed either the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. As a result, asylum seekers in Jordan do not enjoy the protection outlined in the two documents. Jordan has, however, a Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR (signed in 1998 and renewed in 2014) that gives the UNHCR the power to grant Syrians in Jordan a temporary six month residence permit. While the

25. UNHCR, *Registered Persons of Concern Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Jordan (September 2018)*, technical report (UNHCR, 2018), accessed 8 February 2019, `https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/66123.pdf`.

26. MOPIC, *Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis*, Annual Report (Amman: Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation, 2017).

27. Wa'ed Alshoubaki and Michael Harris, 'The impact of Syrian refugees on Jordan: A framework for analysis', *Journal of International Studies* 11, no. 2 (2018): 154–179; Khalid W. Al Wazani, *The Socio-Economic Implications of Syrian Refugees on Jordan*, technical report (Amman: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014).

28. Belal Fallah, Caroline Krafft and Jackline Wahba, 'The impact of refugees on employment and wages in Jordan', *Journal of Development Economics* 139 (2019): 203–216.

29. Bellamy et al., *The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan*; REACH, *Social Cohesion in Host Communities in Northern Jordan*, Assessment Report (REACH, 2015).

Jordanian government de facto has extended the permits without major restrictions (access to free healthcare being the exception), the 'revocable protection status' gives Jordan de jure the power to expel refugees after the six month period and leaves refugees 'in a permanent condition of uncertainty.'[30]

A focus on Syrian refugees in Jordan has the added benefit that all three durable solutions — repatriation, local integration, and resettlement — might be attainable, albeit to differing extents. Repatriation is relatively easy given the geographical proximity and the fact that Jordan and Syria share a land border. However, the border was closed between 2015 and October 2018, severely limiting the movement of people between the two countries.[31] Jordan's capital, Amman, is a major tourist destination in the region and offers economic opportunities. Jordan and Syria had a reciprocal labour cooperation agreement, which made it relatively straightforward for Syrians to work in Jordan.[32] Local integration might hence potentially be a viable alternative to repatriation and resettlement. Following the outbreak of civil war in Syria, Jordan initially largely restricted labour market access to Syrian refugees.[33] While work permits, tied to an employer and valid for one year, were available, access was severely restricted in practice due to high costs and bureaucratic hurdles. The result was that merely 1.7 per cent of work permits in 2014 were obtained by Syrians.[34] However, the Jordan Compact, a multilateral deal that brought together international humanitarian and development actors in 2016, promised improved access to legal employment for Syrian refugees, thereby improving their livelihoods in Jordan.[35] Particularly the system of

30. Bank, *Syrian Refugees in Jordan*, p.3.

31. Suleiman Al-Khalidi and Lisa Barrington, 'Jordan and Syria reopen Nassib border crossing', *Reuters*, 15 October 2018, accessed 20 February 2019, `https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-jordan/jordan-and-syria-reopen-nassib-border-crossing-idUSKCN1MP0L4`.

32. Mary A. Briggs, *Access to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan: A discussion paper on labour and refugee laws and policies*, technical report (Beirut: International Labour Organization, 2015).

33. Lorenza Errighi and Jorn Griesse, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Labour Market Implications in Jordan and Lebanon*, European Economy Discussion Paper 29 (Luxembourg: European Union, 2016).

34. Ibid.

35. Veronique Barbelet, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Dina Mansour-Ille, *The Jordan Compact: Lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts*, Policy briefing (London: Overseas Devel-

work permits has been simplified and the number of permits issued to Syrians has been steadily increasing since.[36] Nevertheless, the labour market situation for Syrians in Jordan remains difficult and legal employment is mostly restricted to certain sectors, such as agriculture, textiles, construction, and food.[37] Some commentators, however, are critical and doubt the ability of the Jordan Compact to benefit both Jordan and Syrian refugees by offering them decent and sustainable employment.[38] Resettlement is also available in theory, even though the number of people resettled and the current quotas are very low. In 2017, 4,989 refugees were resettled from Jordan, down from 21,000 (or five per cent of the Syrian population in Jordan) in 2016.[39] In 2018, the target quota for the resettlement of Syrian refugees from Jordan was 4,885.[40] Practically, Jordan provided a safe environment to do fieldwork and I already had connections with local NGOs from an internship with the NGO Kiron Open Higher Education in Amman in spring 2018.

The temporal context is paramount to interpret the findings, as '[m]igrants' thinking can change markedly and sometimes rapidly in the face of political, social, economic, environmental and other changes.'[41] I hence outline important developments that occurred shortly before my research or that had been ongoing. I conducted qualitative interviews in person with Syrian refugees in Jordan in August and September 2018. The following three developments are worth pointing out. First, the border between Syria and Jordan had still been closed, arguably aggravating repatriation,

opment Institute, 2018), accessed 20 February 2019, `https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/61932`.

36. Ibid.

37. Olga Sarrado and Charlie Dunmore, *New deal on work permits helps Syrian refugees in Jordan*, 13 October 2017, accessed 20 January 2019, `http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/10/59df254b4/new-deal-work-permits-helps-syrian-refugees-jordan.html`.

38. Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner, 'Making Refugees Work? The Politics of Integrating Syrian Refugees Into the Labor Market in Jordan', *Middle East Critique* 28 (2019): 65–95.

39. UNHCR, *Jordan*, Fact Sheet February (UNHCR, 2018), accessed 20 February 2019, `https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/62241`.

40. UNHCR, *Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees*, technical report (UNHCR, 2018), accessed 8 February 2019, `https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/66197.pdf`.

41. McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 'Do asylum seekers and refugees choose destination countries?', p.57.

particularly as reentry to Jordan had become difficult. Second, the Syrian government was preparing an offensive in Idlib, the last large rebel-held territory and Turkey had closed its border to Syria.[42] Repatriation, particularly to Idlib, might hence not have been a viable option due to safety risks. Third, the popular protests against the increase in income tax and the prices of fuel and bread in May and June 2018 still seemed to occupy people's minds.[43] The resulting cabinet reshuffle led some respondents to believe that the economic situation in Jordan might improve, which in turn will improve their livelihoods and might make local integration more attractive. When I conducted the online survey between May and July 2019, the border between Jordan and Syria had reopened and President Trump had announced that the USA would be withdrawing completely from Syria by mid-2019.[44] While the former arguably facilitates the eventual repatriation of Syrians, there remained considerable uncertainty over the North-West and North-East. Idlib had not been under the control of the Syrian government and the North-East remained under the control of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces that Turkey considers a terrorist group. The Jordanian Prime Minister Osama Al-Razzaz hence remarked in February 2019 that most Syrian refugees 'have no intention of going back any time soon.'[45]

The next section outlines how the theoretical migration decision-making framework (Chapter 2) applies to Syrian refugees in Jordan.

42. Arwa Ibrahim, 'Idlib: If an offensive takes place, it will be a bloodbath', *Aljazeera*, 1 September 2018, accessed 14 December 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/idlib-offensive-takes-place-bloodbath-180901184357969.html.

43. Aljazeera, 'Jordan protests: What you should know', *Aljazeera*, 4 June 2018, accessed 15 December 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/jordan-protests-180604052840527.html.

44. Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, 'Allies decline request to stay in Syria after U.S. troops withdraw', *Washington Post*, 20 February 2019, accessed 21 February 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/allies-say-they-wont-remain-in-syria-after-us-troops-withdraw/2019/02/20/62e503b2-3532-11e9-a400-e481bf264fdc_story.html.

45. Suleiman Al-Khalidi, 'Jordan's PM appeals for more aid as most Syrian refugees set to stay', *Reuters*, 20 February 2019, accessed 21 February 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-refugees/jordans-pm-appeals-for-more-aid-as-most-syrian-refugees-set-to-stay-idUKKCN1Q9290.

3.3 Theoretical framework and Syrian refugees

The migration decision-making framework that I established in Chapter 2 is intentionally broad to apply to different groups of migrants in different spatial and temporal contexts. In this section, I demonstrate how it applies to Syrian refugees in Jordan, highlight the specific aspects of the framework that I illustrate, and discuss the generalisability of any findings.

A potential migrant's motivation for locational change (Section 2.1) arises from unfulfilled needs and the gap between the life aspired to and the life currently lived. This applies to Syrian refugees in Jordan as much as to any other group of potential migrants. Similarly, Syrian refugees require the capacities to aspire, realise, and decide migration to become actual migrants (Section 2.2). I conjecture that they use heuristic rules to search, evaluate, and decide upon migration destination options (Section 2.3). Syrian refugees can be categorised as different types of potential migrants according to their capacities to aspire, realise, and decide migration (Section 2.4). However, and as I briefly outlined above, refugees who have left their country and (temporarily) settled in another country differ from other potential migrants. They do so in two ways. First, and maybe most importantly, they have already migrated once, albeit not voluntarily. They might hence be more likely to migrate in the future, as several studies have consistently shown that migration experience is a significant predictor of migration intentions and behaviour.[46] Second, refugees do not merely have a binary option between staying at their current place of residence and migration to another city, region, or country, but rather have three options: stay, migrate, and return; the durable solutions. These three options are nevertheless consistent with the framework

46. Christiane Timmerman et al., 'Imagining Europe from the Outside: The Role of Perceptions of Human Rights in Europe in Migration Aspirations in Turkey, Morocco, Senegal and Ukraine', chap. 9 in *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis*, ed. Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 220–247; Daniel Tsegai, 'Migration as a household decision: what are the roles of income differences? Insights from the Volta basin of Ghana', *European Journal of Development Research* 19, no. 2 (June 2007): 305–326.

outlined in Chapter 2. In the absence of laws requiring Syrian refugees to leave Jordan, the 'default option' of doing nothing is to remain in Jordan, at least for the time being. Individuals with small aspiration gaps will prefer to stay in Jordan. Those with larger aspiration gaps will either adjust their aspirations downwards, try to meet unfulfilled needs to decrease their aspiration gaps, or will be motivated to change behaviour, i.e. to leave Jordan. If they choose the latter, they have the option to return to Syria or migrate to a third country. Migration to a third country can occur via different channels, such as resettlement, family reunification, other legal migration channels, or irregular migration.

As alluded to above, I do not test the entire migration decision-making framework established in Chapter 2 but rather illustrate certain elements and aspects. The rationale is twofold. First, to focus the attention on a few aspects of the migration decision-making framework and show that it is consistent with migration motivation and stated migration destination choice of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Second, to encourage future research into migration decision-making by demonstrating the importance of heuristics. I do examine the two main steps of the framework that I presented in Figure 2.1 above: 'Whether to migrate?' and 'Where to relocate?' The first question includes the evaluation of Syrian refugees' needs and aspirations (see Chapter 4 for the results). As I explained above, the choice is between staying in Jordan (i.e. not migrate) and relocating back to Syria or to a third country (migrate). The destination choice, guided by prior preferences, happens in the second step (see Chapter 5 for preferences for durable solutions and destination preferences and Chapter 6 for the destination choice itself). I do not systematically evaluate the quality of the information that Syrian refugees indicate to have about migration destination. I do, however, investigate the sources (carriers) of information they use to extract information from and whether or not they are trusted (Section 6.2). I have presented a range of heuristic methods that guide search, evaluation, and decision of migration options. I focus on the latter two and particularly on heuristics that I

deemed most relevant for destination choice of Syrian refugees, which I identified from both the literature (see Section 3.4) and the qualitative interviews (see Chapter 5). I illustrate the use of the recognition heuristic, one-reason (or few-reason) decision-making, and framing and prospect theory in the empirical evaluation of migration destination choice of Syrian refugees in Jordan (see Chapter 6).

I chose to illustrate the migration decision-making framework with Syrian refugees in Jordan not merely due to public and academic interest but also as they are arguably a 'least likely' or 'extreme' case for my theory to work.[47] If I am able to demonstrate that the main aspects of the theory — unfulfilled needs and aspiration gaps as the basis for the motivation to migrate as well as heuristic rules for destination choice — hold for the migration decision-making process of refugees, it should also extend to other groups of migrants that have more agency in the choice of a migration destination.

3.4 Research design, methods, and data

I employed an inductive, multi-disciplinary, and mixed methods approach to provide answers to the third research question: 'What are the aspirations, destination preferences, and destination choices of Syrian refugees in Jordan and how well does the revised migration decision-making framework explain them?' The design allowed me to bridge gaps between different disciplinary and methodological approaches, which has been widely advocated for in migration research.[48] I subscribe to a critical realist ontology and positivist epistemology.[49] At varying points of the research process, I

47. John Gerring, 'Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?', *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 3 (2007): 231–253; Jason Seawright and John Gerring, 'Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options', *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008): 294–308.

48. Christina Boswell, 'Combining economics and sociology in migration theory', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 4 (May 2008): 549–566; Castles, 'Understanding the relationship between methodology and methods'; King, 'Theories and Typologies of Migration'.

49. Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis, eds., *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers* (London: SAGE Publications, 2003).

use both inductive and deductive methods. I aim to describe *how* individuals perceive their situation and the resulting implications for migration decision-making but I do not examine *why* individuals perceived their situations as they did.

The mixed methods approach allows me quantitatively illustrate phenomena identified through preceding qualitative interviews and ultimately to triangulate my findings. While qualitative interviews have been widely used in migration research, experimental methods and particularly quantitative conjoint experiments have only recently gained in importance.[50] However, I am not aware that they have been used with refugees. The research has received full research ethics approval (CUREC2) by the University of Oxford's Social Sciences and Humanities Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee under the reference numbers R55957/REC001 and R55957/REC002.

I worked with a local Jordanian research assistant to help with translations and with conducting the interviews. She signed a confidentiality agreement (see Figure A.3, Appendix, for the template) to guarantee the anonymity of the research participants and the integrity of the research data. I describe her involvement in the research process throughout this chapter and discuss the potential positive and negative consequences of working with a research assistant in Section 3.5 below. Before discussing the interview and survey methods, I describe the sample selection and participant recruitment.

3.4.1 Sample selection and participant recruitment

I drew the sample for the empirical evaluation from the population of Syrian refugees in Jordan. I did not aim for a representative sample but used purposive sampling to recruit those who were deemed most likely to be interested in migration *and* use the internet and social media to look for information about migration options. Facebook

50. See, for instance: Duch et al., 'Where will the British Go?'; Vargas-Silva, *Handbook of Research Methods in Migration*.

groups for Syrian refugees in Jordan hence seemed the most promising option. I focused on individuals aged 18–50, as they are the most likely to be actively involved in migration decisions. Individuals under the age of 18 generally migrate with their parents, people in old age follow their adult children. They are hence not hypothesised to be the main decision-making units. I complement the purposive sample design with snowball sampling.[51] For the interviews, I do this particularly to recruit Syrians who came to Jordan before 2011. For the online survey, I encouraged respondents to share the survey with family and friends to increase the sample size. I do not, however, track whether survey respondents were recruited directly or through snowballing. Purposive sampling accompanied by snowballing has been used frequently by prior research on migration decision-making.[52]

Interviews. For the qualitative interviews, I recruited participants both directly via a Facebook group for Syrian refugees in Jordan and indirectly through NGOs that serve Syrian refugees in Jordan. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides short descriptions of the organisations I collaborated with and the link to the Facebook group. The aim was to capture a range of different experiences from individuals in different age groups. Relying on a sample provided by just one NGO, for instance, risks portraying merely the experiences of beneficiaries of this one NGO, who might be better supported than the average Syrian refugee in Jordan. Further, the NGO might be selective in their decision who to ask whether they would like to participate in my research. On the other hand, relying merely on recruiting through Facebook might overwhelmingly attract young and technology savvy people that might not be too busy otherwise and

51. Tim Büthe et al., 'Qualitative & Multi-Method Research', *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 13, no. 1 (2015).

52. See, for instance: Adam Saltsman, 'Displaced Iraqis in Jordan: Formal and informal information flows, and migratory decisions in a context of uncertainty', *Refuge* 28, no. 1 (2012): 81–96; REACH, *Separated Families: who stays, who goes and why? Decision-making and its consequences for families separated by mixed migration*, technical report (REACH, 2017); Vaughan Robinson and Jeremy Segrott, *Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers*, Home Office Research Study 243 (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2002).

hence spend a considerable amount of time on Facebook. Through a combination of recruitment through Facebook and a number of NGOs, complemented by snowball sampling, I was able to capture a range of diverse experiences. It was made clear to respondents that participation was voluntary, not associated with any benefits or preferential treatment when recruitment was done via NGOs, and respondents would be compensated for their time and travel costs with five Jordanian Dinars (JOD) ($\sim$ £ 5.45), which was common practice for research with Syrian refugees in Jordan and reflected the high living costs, particularly in Amman. Furthermore, travel costs were non negligible, as public transport was not widely available and participants often had to rely on taxis. While participant recruitment was done via Facebook or NGOs, the main mode of communication to arrange interviews was by telephone and particularly through WhatsApp messages. Individuals who indicated to be interested in participating in the research — whether through seeing the advertisement on the Facebook group or being approached by NGOs they were beneficiaries of — sent a WhatsApp message to a phone number that was specifically reserved for my research. My research assistant handled the majority of the communication in Arabic. We sent individuals who indicated interest in participating an electronic copy of the participant information sheet (see Figures A.4–A.5, Appendix) and arranged a place and time that was convenient for them.

Survey. For the quantitative survey, I followed two distinct strategies to recruit Syrian refugees in Jordan. First, I recruited participants through personal networks, Facebook groups for Syrian refugees in Jordan, and snowballing. Quickly recognising that this strategy was not sufficient to achieve the required sample size to guarantee statistical power, I also recruited participants via paid Facebook advertisements. This is in line with recent research that uses Facebook and social media recruitment for hard-to-reach populations.[53] I was unable to specifically target Syrian refugees in

53. Rony Kayrouz et al., 'Facebook as an effective recruitment strategy for mental health research of hard to reach populations', *Internet Interventions* 4 (2016): 1–10; David B. King, Norm O'Rourke

Jordan, as Facebook did not offer the possibility to restrict the ads to people from a certain nationality. However, I used a variety of filters to target Arab-speaking people with interests related to Syria who are not from Jordan but live in Jordan and are between the ages of 18 and 50. Additionally, I targeted areas with a relatively high concentration of Syrians disproportionately more often. I chose not to incentivise the online survey for three reasons. First, non-incentivisation was in line with recommendations I received from NGOs who had conducted surveys with Syrian refugees in Jordan as well as with prior survey research, which was also not incentivised.[54] Second, online payment was still in its infancy in Jordan and a majority of respondents almost certainly did not have a bank account. Third, I was unable to fully restrict the targeted Facebook ads to Syrian refugees; adding a monetary incentive might have led individuals other than the target group to participate and thereby adding an additional bias to my data. Syrian refugees hence self-selected into my study. As I initially encountered very low participation rates, I posted a short animated recruitment video that explained my research and its anticipated benefits to potential respondents to encourage completion. Figure 3.1 shows screenshots of the video that I created using the Renderforest platform.[55] The video had subtitles and voiceover in Arabic, narrated by a Jordanian native Arabic speaker. The full video, alongside other replication material, is available on my GitHub page.[56] A link underneath the video took respondents directly to the Qualtrics survey.

While Facebook ads worked well to recruit the first few hundred respondents, the cost per completed survey (which averaged around £2) increased after around 300

and Anita De Longis, 'Social media recruitment and online data collection: A beginner's guide and best practices for accessing low-prevalence and hard-to-reach populations', *Canadian Psychology* 55, no. 4 (2014): 240–249.

54. See, for instance: Dylan R. J. Collins et al., 'Cardiovascular disease risk and prevention amongst Syrian refugees: mixed methods study of Médecins Sans Frontières programme in Jordan', *Conflict and Health* 11, no. 14 (2017); Shannon Doocy et al., 'Health service utilization and access to medicines among Syrian refugee children in Jordan', *International Journal of Health Planning and Management* 31 (2016): 97–112.

55. https://www.renderforest.com/, accessed 1 November 2019.

56. https://github.com/creinprecht/dphil, accessed 1 November 2019.

Figure 3.1: Screenshots of the survey recruitment video



respondents and it became apparent that I will not reach the required number of respondents to guarantee statistical power with my available budget. I hence used the services of Forsa[57], an online platform for scholarships, training opportunities, and study abroad for young people living in the Middle East and North Africa, to promote my study to visitors of their website. Through Forsa, I was also able to directly target Syrian refugees, as they had an e-mail list of Syrian refugees who lived in Jordan through which they advertised my study. To incentivise participation, participants could enter into an optional prize draw for one 70 JOD ($\sim$ £ 79.05) Amazon voucher. I posted the same promotional video and a short description of my study to encourage participation. The mix of different recruitment strategies — Facebook ads and Forsa — and non-incentivisation of responses in the former and incentivisation in the latter might lead to bias in my sample selection and the estimated results. While participants recruited through Forsa tended to be younger and completed the survey a little faster, there were generally no significant difference

57. https://www.for9a.com/en, accessed 1 November 2019.

in the estimated effects of different destination characteristics (Figures B.17–B.20, Appendix), alleviating the concern of additional bias.

Having explained that there are no significant differences between incentivised (Forsa) and non-incentivised (Facebook) responses, I briefly discuss the validity and treatment homogeneity. While I am not aware of a peer-reviewed study that compares the treatment effects of respondents sampled via Facebook ads and non-Facebook sampling, several studies contrast Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with lab-based experiments. While MTurk was not available for my target population, their insights might nevertheless be applicable to Facebook-based recruitment. They generally conclude that recruitment via MTurk leads to very similar treatment effects to lab-based experiments.[58] Mullinix et al. contrast MTurk with probability samples and conclude that 'results from convenience samples provide estimates of causal effects comparable to those found on population-based samples.'[59] Boas et al. contrast treatment effects of samples recruited via MTurk and Facebook with those of probability samples. They generally find small differences between Facebook and MTurk but caution that average treatment effects might differ, particularly for effects moderated by political partisanship.[60] I do not expect the latter effects and do not control for such. The fact that there are none or very few significant differences between the incentivised and non-incentivised part of my sample and for different subgroups by gender, age, and prior destination preferences (see Chapter 6 and Appendix B.5–B.6) suggests that there are homogeneous treatment effects. The non-representativeness and bias

58. Antonio A. Arechar, Simon Gächter and Lucas Molleman, 'Conducting Interactive Experiments Online', *IZA Discussion Paper*, no. 10517 (2017); Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber and Gabriel S. Lenz, 'Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon.com's mechanical turk', *Political Analysis* 20, no. 3 (2012): 351–368; Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler and Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, 'Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk', *Judgement and Decision Making* 5 (2010): 411–419.

59. Kevin J. Mullinix et al., 'The Generalizability of Survey Experiments', *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 2, no. 2 (2015): p.122.

60. Taylor C. Boas, Dino P. Christenson and David M. Glick, 'Recruiting large online samples in the United States and India: Facebook, Mechanical Turk, and Qualtrics', *Political Science Research and Methods* 8, no. 2 (2020): 232–250.

inherent to convenience samples is hence not a problem for my findings.

The characteristics of interview and survey respondents differ to due different sampling strategies and different aims of the two. The interviews aimed to inform the survey and portray a range of different experiences; the survey's main focus was migration decision-making and destination choice. Some diverging findings between the interview and survey samples (see Chapter 5) can hence be explained by different characteristics but arguably also by social desirability bias and the effect my Jordanian research assistant and I had on respondents when conducting interviews (see Section 3.5).

3.4.2 Qualitative interviews

Exploratory semi-structured qualitative interviews preceded and informed a quantitative survey. I used semi-structured interviews for two reasons. First, they gave the required structure to examine and test the hypothesis and conjectures raised in the migration decision-making framework (Chapter 2) and thereby allowed me to focus on issues that I — and the wider migration literature — deemed important. Second, they allowed me to retain the flexibility to follow up on issues the interviewees considered important but that I and/or the literature had overlooked.[61] The semi-structured approach further allowed me to adapt the wording of the questions after the first few interviews when I had the impression that a certain framing was better understood than another. In line with the positivist/realist epistemology I subscribe to, I follow the 'interview-data-as-resource' approach to interviewing.[62] While I acknowledge my positionality (see Section 3.5), I believe that the interview data largely reflects the interviewees' reality outside the interview.

61. Svend Brinkmann, 'Introduction to Qualitative Interviewing', chap. 1 in *Qualitative Interviewing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1–45; Daniel W. Turner, 'Qualitative Interview Design: A Practical Guide for Novice Investigators', *The Qualitative Report* 15, no. 3 (2010): 754–760.

62. Timothy John Rapley, 'The art(fulness) of open-ended interviewing: some considerations on analysing interviews', *Qualitative Research* 1, no. 3 (2001): 303–323.

Through face-to-face interviews, I aimed to understand how respondents' perceptions of their social contexts shape their material realities, aspiration gaps, and in turn their motivation to migrate and their preferences for the three durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement to a third country. The emphasis was on prospective questions, i.e. questions about the future, such as life aspirations. These were complemented by questions about the status quo to examine potential aspiration gaps. The interviews aimed at extracting respondents' life aspirations, aspiration gaps, motivation to migrate, and the relative importance of different migration drivers and characteristics of destination countries. The focus was on respondents' capacities for migration, which consist of the capacities to aspire, realise, and decide migration (see Chapter 2). The semi-structured interviews followed a question guide (see Figures A.1–A.2, Appendix) but allowed for flexibility to consider and react to respondents' answers to the questions. It particularly allowed to ask follow-up questions to examine interviewees' responses in more depth. Questions about the same issues and themes across interviews allowed for strong comparative analysis. The semi-structured approach nevertheless retains a degree of flexibility to investigate concepts that emerge during the interview. Migration is a high reflexivity topic where power relations between interviewer and interviewee need to be taken into account.[63] This is of particular importance for face-to-face interviews. To mitigate this issue, I worked with a female Jordanian research assistant who had experience with interviewing refugees. She was a valuable resource arranging and conducting the interviews, particularly to bridge the cultural gaps between me, the interviewer, and the interviewee, help build rapport, and to minimise power imbalances.

My research assistant and I conducted the interviews together in private rooms in cafes, community centres, and the premises of one NGO some participants were beneficiaries of. One interview was conducted in a public park. Two interviews were

63. Sanchez-Ayala, 'Interviewing techniques for migrant minority groups'.

conducted via Skype with participants that had previously agreed to do a face-to-face interview but were last-minute unable to come to the interview. Both of us were present at all interviews except one, which I conducted on my own. The respondents were given a hard copy of the participant information sheet before the interview and were asked whether they had any questions or concerns about the research. I collected written informed consent for all interviews except for the interviews done via Skype and for one interview with a visually impaired respondent where I audio recorded oral consent. Figures A.6–A.9 (Appendix) provide the consent form templates. I gave all respondents my contact details so they could reach out to me at a later stage if they had questions about the research or would like to withdraw their data (before it had been completely anonymised). As mentioned above, interviewees were compensated with 5 JOD ($\sim$ £ 5.45) for their time and travel costs. In addition, they were offered tea, coffee, and soft drinks as well as Austrian chocolates.

To mitigate the language barrier and allow respondents to give their account in their native language, my research assistant led the majority of interviews in Arabic. Instead of merely acting as a translator, she conducted the entire interview in Arabic and gave me a summary afterwards. I trained her before the first interview and after each of the first five interviews so that she internalised my research aims. The alternative, translating back and forth would have resulted in interviews that are much longer, hence a greater burden on respondents, frequently disrupted by translations, and not necessarily of better quality. However, I acknowledge that I therefore did not receive a direct account from my respondents but rather a translation thereof, which inevitably is, at least partly, shaped by my research assistant's experiences, values, and beliefs. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. My research assistant translated and transcribed the interviews that were done in Arabic. I led and transcribed interviews with three respondents who insisted to do the interviews in English. While this might introduce some bias due to the different language, power relations, differences in interviewing techniques and power relations, the interviewees insisted

to do the interview directly with me in Arabic to give me a direct account without an intermediary translator. The interviews that I conducted in English tended to be shorter and less detailed than accounts in Arabic. The transcription of both Arabic and English recordings followed denaturalism, i.e. the removal of idiosyncratic elements of speech, such as stutters, pauses, and non-verbal vocalisations (e.g. gestures, nodding).[64] Denaturalised transcription is consistent with my objective to study the informational content of respondents' accounts and their realities they describe. Involuntary vocalisations, such as laughter and crying were included in the transcripts to reflect the meaning of certain statements. While I generally ignored pauses between words or sentences, I did note substantial pauses of approximately more than ten seconds to reflect that respondents had to think about some of their answers or did not immediately know how to respond to some questions. I was present at all interviews to show interest in my respondents' accounts and to answer their questions. My research assistant was also present at all interviews, except the one that I conducted on my own, to mitigate any biases due to our status, nationality, gender, etc. Further, my outsider, or explicit third position status,[65] might have helped to build rapport (see Section 3.5).

I used thematic analysis, 'a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data',[66] to analyse the transcribed interviews. Thematic analysis allowed me to minimally organise my data to describe the phenomenon of interest, migration decision-making, in rich detail. I defined a theme as capturing 'something important in relation to the overall research question' and as repeated patterns of meaning that occur both across interviews and in the course of individual interviews.[67]

64. Daniel G. Oliver, Julianne M. Serovich and Tina L. Mason, 'Constraints and Opportunities with Interview Transcription: Towards Reflection in Qualitative Research', *Soc Forces* 84, no. 2 (2006): 1273–1289.

65. Jørgen Carling, Marta Bivand Erdal and Rojan Ezzati, 'Beyond the insider–outsider divide in migration research', *Migration Studies* 2, no. 1 (2014): 36–54.

66. Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, 'Using thematic analysis in psychology', *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3, no. 2006 (2006): p.79.

67. Ibid., p.82.

I focused on themes at the semantic level and organised, summarised, and interpreted the semantic content of interviews in the analysis. The thematic structure further allowed me to compare individual cases and groups (i.e. differences between groups of people).[68] I used inductive and theoretical thematic analysis for different aspects of the research question. Theoretical analysis was used to fit individual aspirations to Maslow's needs hierarchy and migration drivers identified by the literature and answer the question how needs and aspirations are related. Inductive analysis was used to identify new themes and to investigate how (different sets of) aspirations affect the motivation to migrate or the preferences for different durable solutions.

I followed an iterative process of coding and searching for themes[69] and used NVivo 12 to code and analyse the data. I initially created 59 different codes when reading and rereading the transcripts. Each code was on average associated to ten different interviews. The codes partly stem from the academic literature, the refined migration decision-making framework (Chapter 2), and were also identified inductively. I merged some of the initial 59 codes and iteratively consolidated the remaining 50 codes into seven broad themes, following a theoretical thematic analysis. Six of the themes correspond to central concepts in my theory of migration decision-making as well as the wider literature: aspirations, barriers, decision-making, destination characteristics, destination countries, and durable solutions. The seventh reflects experiences of Syrians who came to Jordan before 2011 and the changes they had felt since the Syrian civil war started in 2011. Within these broad themes, I used both inductive and theoretical analysis to come up with narrower themes describing the data. I exchanged both an initial list of themes and draft analyses with my Jordanian research assistant to ensure that I did not misinterpret the data and took the local and cultural context the data arose from into account.

68. Uwe Flick, *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*, 4th ed. (London: SAGE Publications, 2009).

69. Braun and Clarke, 'Using thematic analysis in psychology'.

The interviews were conducted face-to-face, audio recorded, and transcribed. No personal data was audio recorded. The only personal data collected was the respondent's name and signature on the consent form, which cannot be linked to the audio recording or transcript. For oral consent, which was taken for two interviews conducted via Skype and one face-to-face interview with a visually impaired respondent, the name of the respondent was not recorded. At the end of a day of interviews, I electronically transferred the audio recordings to an encrypted hard drive and deleted them from the voice recorder. Once I completed all interviews, I electronically transferred all audio recordings directly from the encrypted hard drive to my research assistant's laptop for transcription. Her laptop was password protected and her hard drive encrypted. The anonymised transcripts were then transferred to the main researcher as a password-protected zip file via Oxford's OxFile file exchange service. My research assistant securely deleted the audio recordings and the transcripts. I will keep a copy of the audio recordings and transcripts for the required minimum duration of three years on an encrypted hard drive. After that period, I will destroy the copies.

Each interview was assigned a unique code. Table A.2 (Appendix) provides a full list of interviews. It shows the date, location, and length of the interview and gives some descriptive information about the respondent. The first number of the code is the number of the interview, M or F denote the gender, followed by the respondent's age. 3F18, for instance, refers to the third interview conducted, which was with an 18-year old woman. I footnote these codes throughout this thesis when quoting respondents. In total, I conducted 29 interviews with Syrian refugees in Jordan (Amman and Irbid) in August and September 2018. Eight participants were recruited via the Facebook page for Syrian refugees in Jordan, twelve via three different NGOs, and the remaining nine via snowball sampling through other participants (five), contacts of my research assistant (two), and my contacts (two). Table A.1 in the Appendix provides a short overview of the Facebook group and NGOs used to recruit interview respondents. 22 of the respondents came to Jordan as refugees since the civil war started in 2011, the

other seven came to Jordan between 1982 and 2010. Some of the latter had to leave Syria for political reasons while others left for employment or educational reasons. The duration of the interviews ranged from 20 minutes to one hour, with an average duration of 38 minutes. I interviewed 13 women and 16 men aged 18 to 49, with an average age of 30 years. The proportion of women interviewed (45%) is well above other studies that often found it very difficult to recruit a roughly equal ratio of men and women.[70] Three interviews were conducted entirely in English, one in a mix of Arabic and English, and the remaining 25 in Arabic. Two thirds of participants had not participated in research before, alleviating the concern that my sample population might suffer from research fatigue.

3.4.3 Quantitative survey and conjoint experiment

The online survey built on insights gained from the interviews and adds a quantitative perspective to the interview findings. In particular, the interview findings on preferred destination countries, destination characteristics, and life aspirations informed and motivated the survey design. The five destination countries that are at the centre of the conjoint experiments were frequently mentioned in the interviews. I excluded Turkey when asking for respondents' preferred migration destination, as Turkey was referred to as the most likely but not most liked destination country in interviews. The list of destination characteristics that went into the survey and the conjoint experiment is further directly influenced by interview findings. For instance, my hypothesis that a destination's reputation matters was reinforced by the interview findings. Life aspirations that I would not have included in the survey had I not done the preceding interviews are 'dignity.' It further became clear that citizenship and rights are a central theme that I gave increased attention in the survey.

The survey focused on two main issues. First, to unobtrusively elicit respond-

70. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*

ents' preferences for various destination country characteristics and to quantify the importance of a migration destination's reputation and the country the destination is located in. I did so using conjoint survey experiments, which I describe in more detail below. Second, to establish the associations between the size of aspiration gaps and (i) the motivation to migrate and (ii) preferences for durable solutions. The motivation to test the first stems from both the theoretical migration decision-making framework (Chapter 2) and the interview findings (Chapter 4). The second stems overwhelmingly from interview findings (Chapter 5).

The survey had four main parts: demographics, life aspirations, migration motivation, and the conjoint experiment. It was available in English and Arabic. My research assistant translated the survey from English to Arabic and another native Arabic speaker translated it back to English to guarantee consistency. Arabic was the default language but respondents were able to switch to English, which around three per cent did. Respondents were presented with a consent form and had to confirm that they were 18 years or older and whether they consented to take part in the survey. If they did not consent, the survey ended. The consent forms and a full list of survey questions in both English and Arabic is available in Figure B.1 in the Appendix. Where meaningful, the order the answers were displayed in was randomised, represented by the symbol with the crossed arrows in Figure B.1. Exceptions were the options 'Prefer not to answer' and 'Don't know / Prefer not to answer', which were always displayed as the last option. The first survey block contained basic demographic questions, such as age and education. In the second survey block, I inquired about respondents' main life aspirations and how far they felt from their notion of a good life. The third part asked about migration motivation, preferences for the durable solutions, destination countries, and destination characteristics. The fourth part was the conjoint survey experiment. Before I outline the methods used, I discuss preference and choice models and explain why I used stated preferences in the conjoint experiment.

Preferences and choices. Two broad approaches for studying preferences exist: revealed preferences[71] and stated preferences.[72] The former observes real world choices or survey people after they made such choices; the latter studies hypothetical choices. The advantages of stated preferences are that they are easier to control, more flexible, and cheaper.[73] The downside is that people might not necessarily do what they say they would do.[74] Using revealed preferences to study the impact of information on migration decision-making is problematic, as it is generally not observed what information migrants had at the time of relocation and whether they used it make the decision whether and where to relocate. While post-migration surveys intend to examine this knowledge, they are prone to post-hoc reflections and rationalisations. Studies discussed above that provided information as one of their treatments to potential migrants and surveyed migration behaviour a couple of weeks or months later rely on revealed preferences models with the above-mentioned benefits and drawbacks.

Stated preference models are able to control many aspects of the information used to make decisions, such as what information is displayed, how long, and in what order.[75] They are generally administered through surveys. Participants rate or rank vignettes (e.g. profiles of potential destinations) or choose between hypothetical or altered real choices. In practice, both methods can be combined in the same research; participants rate vignettes and choose between them to increase estimation precision of the relative importance of different choice attributes. Such models have long been

71. Paul A. Samuelson, 'Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference', *Economica* 15, no. 60 (1948): 243–253.

72. Paul E. Green and Venkatachary Srinivasan, 'Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: Issues and Outlook', *Journal of Consumer Research* 5, no. 2 (1978): 103–123.

73. Eric P. Kroes and Robert J. Sheldon, 'Stated Preference Methods: An Introduction', *Journal of Transport Economics and Policy* 22, no. 1 (1988): 11–25.

74. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 'Causal inference in conjoint analysis'.

75. Jordan J. Louviere, 'Conjoint Analysis Modelling of Stated Preferences: A Review of Theory, Methods, Recent Developments and External Validity', *Journal of Transport Economics and Policy* 22, no. 1 (1988): 93–119.

used in marketing,[76] but have only relatively recently entered political science[77] and migration studies.[78] While the benefit of common survey experiments is their ability to establish causal relations, they cannot distinguish which component of the treatment led to the observed effects. Stated preference surveys using conjoint models are able to decompose treatment effects and 'identify the causal effects of various components of a treatment in survey experiments.'[79] Rather than focusing on one characteristic, such as the content of information — e.g. potential employment opportunities — conjoint models can simultaneously test for the impact of several pieces of information.

Migration conjoint survey experiment. The main aim of the conjoint survey experiment was to unobtrusively elicit respondents' preferences for destination characteristics and destination countries. I examined stated preferences rather than real migration choices. Respondents were given various pieces of information about potential migration destinations and decided on the basis of the information most relevant to them. It has been argued that migration decisions are not necessarily (fully) rational but that individuals might attempt to portray them as rational in face-to-face interviews, listing several reasons and ex post justifications for a decision. Survey experiments can circumvent this rationalisation.

Respondents were repeatedly (five times) shown two stylised migration destinations and made choices which destination they would like to relocate to. Figure 3.2 shows one sample conjoint table displayed to a respondent. The eight attributes were the same for the two destinations but the attribute values were randomised. The attributes used were employment (the proportion of Syrians employed after one year), work permit (the duration until Syrian refugees can work legally), citizenship

76. Philippe Cattin and Dick R. Wittink, 'Commercial Use of Conjoint Analysis: A Survey', *Journal of Marketing* 46 (1982): 44–53.

77. Horiuchi, Kosuke and Taniguchi, 'Designing and Analyzing Randomized Experiments'.

78. Jens Hainmueller and Daniel J. Hopkins, 'Public Attitudes Toward Immigration', *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, no. 1 (2014): 225–249.

79. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 'Causal inference in conjoint analysis', p.2.

(the duration after which refugees can apply for naturalisation), social services (e.g. healthcare, housing, support for refugees), laws (targeting migrants or Muslims), local contacts (e.g. family/friends), and public attitudes (support or opposition to migration and refugees). These seven attributes were displayed to all respondent. The eighth attribute differed. Half the respondents were randomly displayed the reputation of the migration destination (e.g. welcoming to foreigners), the other half the country the destination was located in (e.g. Canada, France). I explain the two conjoint treatments in more detail below and I present the conjoint conjectures in Section 6.3. I used a completely randomised conjoint design, i.e. all combinations of attribute values were equally possible. I did not use conditional randomisation. While this is arguably not a problem for the first conjoint, it might raise ethical concerns for the second variant where respondents were displayed destinations in named countries. However, I made clear before the conjoint part of the survey that the two migration destinations are hypothetical. A completely randomised design further allowed me to test whether the causal impact of religious bans, such as on the hijab in schools, changes with the destination country displayed, even though only one country displayed (France) actually had such restrictions in place. My conjoint design has received full ethics approval and was discussed extensively with my supervisor, who also did not feel that it creates unnecessary ethical issues.

I chose attributes and attribute values in accordance with the theory and empirical evidence on migration drivers and insights from the preceding qualitative interviews (see Chapter 5). They further reflect the average labour market outcomes of and public attitudes towards refugees in the five destination countries chosen as well as the countries' respective laws governing asylum seekers, such as eligibility for work permits and years of residency until naturalisation. I generally refer to data on refugees in general due to the lack of available data on the outcomes of Syrian refugees. The data sources used include the European Social Survey (ESS7-2014) and a Pew Research Center survey for a variety of variables on anti-immigrant attitudes and attitudes

Figure 3.2: Conjoint table displayed to participants



>>>

	Destination 1	Destination 2
Employment	3 in 4 Syrians unemployed after on year	Half of all Syrians unemployed after one year
Reputation	Bad country for Syrians	Has many well-known brands
Local contacts	No contacts	No contacts
Social services	Free healthcare	Generous support for refugees
Citizenship	After 3 years	After 5 years
Public attitudes	1 in 4 people support restricting immigation of Muslims	1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees
Laws	No bans	Ban on nikab and burka in public
Work permit	Immediately	Immediately

towards refugees, OECD reports on the labour market outcomes of refugees in Europe, and the OECD's International Migration Outlook 2018.[80]

The order the attributes were displayed in was randomised between respondents to avoid ordering effects. The order was not randomised within one survey to avoid confusing the participant. The number of attributes was chosen according to theoretical (which characteristics of migration destinations are hypothesised to matter) and practical considerations (limit the number of attributes to increase power and avoid cognitive dissonance by choices that become too difficult). Too few attributes

80. Philip Connor, *A majority of Europeans favor taking in refugees, but most disapprove of EU's handling of the issue*, 2018, accessed 24 September 2018, `http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/19/a-majority-of-europeans-favor-taking-in-refugees-but-most-disapprove-of-eus-handling-of-the-issue/`; Jean-Christophe Dumont et al., *How are refugees faring on the labour market in Europe?*, technical report (OECD and European Commission, 2016); OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2018* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018); OECD, *Finding Their Way: Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany*, technical report (OECD, 2017).

might lead to some omitted attributes being aliased, too many to information overload and inconsistent choices.[81] An example of the former would be, for instance, omitting information about social services and respondents then making inferences about them from other attribute levels displayed, such as public attitudes towards refugees. This would bias the estimated effect of public attitudes. Prior research suggests that around ten attributes are the maximum.[82] The eight attributes chosen are hence in line with the literature's suggestions. Some attribute values include the same information, once framed in positive terms (potential gains) and in negative ones (potential losses). For instance, one attribute value refers to employment, another to unemployment. This aims to test the effect of prospect theory and framing.[83] Table 3.1 shows the attributes and attribute values displayed for the two conjoint treatments. For the Arabic translations used, see Table B.2 (Appendix).

Half of all respondents were randomly assigned to conjoint treatment 1, the other half to conjoint treatment 2 (Table 3.1). The former were displayed the reputation of the country, the latter the name of the country itself. The reputation was chosen, as it has increasingly been recognised as a central factor in migration decisions of potential migrants.[84] In the qualitative interviews (see Chapter 5), several respondents remarked that they preferred to go to a certain country, as it was a 'good' country for Syrians or welcoming to refugees, migrants, or foreigners. Respondents reported to be deterred by 'bad' countries for Syrians. I hence included these attribute values in conjoint

81. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 'Causal inference in conjoint analysis'; Bryan K. Orme, 'Sample Size Issues for Conjoint Analysis', chap. 7 in *Getting Started with Conjoint Analysis: Strategies for Product Design and Pricing Research,* 2nd (Madison, Wis.: Research Publishers LLC, 2010), 57–66.

82. Naoki Egami and Imai Kosuke, 'Causal Interaction in Factorial Experiments: Application to Conjoint Analysis', *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 114, no. 526 (2019): 529–540; Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 'Causal inference in conjoint analysis'.

83. Kahneman and Tversky, 'Prospect Theory'; Kahneman and Tversky, 'Choices, values, and frames'.

84. McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 'Do asylum seekers and refugees choose destination countries?'; Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'; Eiko R. Thielemann, 'Why Asylum Policy Harmonisation Undermines Refugee Burden-Sharing', *European Journal of Migration and Law* 6 (2004): 47–65.

treatment 1. I further included a neutral attribute, 'has many well-known brands' as a reference category.

Table 3.1: Migration conjoint experiment treatments

	Conjoint 1	**Conjoint 2**
Employment		
1 in 4 Syrians employed after one year	Yes	Yes
3 in 4 Syrians unemployed after one year	Yes	Yes
Half of all Syrians employed after one year	Yes	Yes
Half of all Syrians unemployed after one year	Yes	Yes
Work permit		
Immediately	Yes	Yes
After 3 months	Yes	Yes
After 12 months	Yes	Yes
Citizenship		
After 3 years	Yes	Yes
After 5 years	Yes	Yes
After 8 years	Yes	Yes
Social services		
Free healthcare	Yes	Yes
Generous support for refugees	Yes	Yes
Free housing	Yes	Yes
No minimum wage	Yes	Yes
Laws		
Ban on niqab and burqa in public	Yes	Yes
Ban on hijab in schools	Yes	Yes
Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	Yes	Yes
No religious bans	Yes	Yes
Local contacts		
Family	Yes	Yes
No contacts	Yes	Yes
Other Syrians	Yes	Yes
Friends	Yes	Yes
Public attitudes		
1 in 4 people support restricting immigration of Muslims	Yes	Yes
3 in 4 people support taking in refugees	Yes	Yes
1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	Yes	Yes
Half the population supports restricting immigration of Muslims	Yes	Yes

Table 3.1 (Cont.): Migration conjoint experiment treatments

	Conjoint 1	Conjoint 2
Reputation		
Good country for Syrians	Yes	No
Bad country for Syrians	Yes	No
Welcoming to foreigners	Yes	No
Has many well-known brands	Yes	No
Country		
United States of America (USA)	No	Yes
United Kingdom (UK)	No	Yes
Canada	No	Yes
France	No	Yes
Germany	No	Yes

As the attribute values were randomised, the conjoint design allowed me to test whether some attributes' relative importance increased or decreased for certain named countries. The hypothesised causal link is the country's inferred reputation as well as perceptions and feelings associated with the country. For instance, if respondents have a positive image of Canada in general and as a preferred potential migration destination in particular, respondents might put a higher value on this cue. Further, they might ignore other, potentially stronger and contradictory cues once they see Canada. This allowed me to test the recognition heuristic[85] and the importance of a country's brand[86] or reputation on stated migration preferences. I hence expected the explanatory power of the other seven attributes to decrease once the country name is displayed. However, there might be reasons why respondents select a named migration destination other than the attributes displayed. Education opportunities might be one. I chose not to include education opportunities, as they were mostly only relevant for young respondents with at least a Bachelor's degree in the interviews that preceded the survey. It is imaginable, that some countries, such as the UK and

85. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 'Heuristic decision making'.
86. Anholt, 'Competitive Identity'; van Ham, 'The Rise of the Brand State'.


USA, were partly chosen due to their good universities or reputation for tertiary education.[87] While this might be particularly true for young and highly educated individuals, I do not find evidence that these subgroups disproportionately prefer the two countries (see Sections 6.4 and 6.5) and hence conclude that omitting education as a destination attribute did not bias the results.

The survey responses were collected online via Qualtrics on University of Oxford Nuffield College CESS (Centre for Experimental Social Science) facilities. The survey was pre-tested in May 2019 and responses were collected between May and July 2019. The data was analysed with R in July 2019. An anonymous weblink was shared with respondents and informed consent was collected at the start of the survey. No personal information (including respondents' IP addresses) was collected. I collected the source used to recruit the participant, i.e. personal networks, Facebook ads, or Forsa. The fully anonymous data was downloaded from the CESS Qualtrics server, stored on my encrypted laptop, and analysed with R. A copy of the data remains on the server. For the survey distributed via Forsa, respondents could voluntarily enter their e-mail address in a separate form to participate in the prize draw upon completion of the main survey. The survey containing the respondents' e-mail addresses remained on the CESS Qualtrics server until August 2019, when a winner was randomly determined and contacted by e-mail. All e-mail addresses were deleted thereafter.

In total, I collected 1,450 complete and partial responses. Removing those that dropped out at the consent form (27.7%), potentially as they did not qualify for the study or due to the required length of the consent form, those that declined to consent (0.006%), and those that dropped out during other parts of the survey (17.2%) leaves 789 complete responses. Complete responses are those where respondents completed the survey, particularly the conjoint element. Figure 3.3 shows that six of ten complete responses were incentivised via the prize draw and collected through Forsa while

87. Natthawut Srikatanyoo and Juergen Gnoth, 'Country image and international tertiary education', *Journal of Brand Management* 10, no. 2 (2002): 139–146.

Figure 3.3: Survey distribution




the rest were not incentivised and collected through paid Facebook advertisements and snowballing through personal networks. The median completion time was 9.5 minutes. 392 people were randomly assigned to the first conjoint and 397 to the second. Table 3.2 describes the subjects and Figure 3.4 shows their age distribution. One in four respondents was female, four in ten had children, six in ten were below 30 years of age, about three in ten between 30 and 39 years old, and the rest older than 40. Migration motivation was very high but the migration likelihood was considerably lower (both were self-assessed on a 1–5 scale). Life satisfaction was mid-range (3.37 on a 1–7 scale). The number of observations for demographics and migration-related variables in Table 3.2 is smaller than the number of complete responses (789) because respondents had the option to select 'Prefer not to answer', which I do not display in the summary table. Full distribution plots are available in the Appendix, Figures B.3–B.7. The Appendix further shows that conjoint attribute randomisation was successful (Table B.1) and displays balance tests (Tables B.9–B.2). As men, older, and more educated people were in some instances more likely to see certain conjoint values, I control for age, gender, having children, and education in all regression models.

The results, however, do not differ significantly for models with and without controls. Using controls decreases the number of complete responses to 766 (380 for conjoint 1 and 386 for conjoint 2).

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of conjoint subjects

Variable	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	N
Female	0.26	0.44	0	1	779
Children	0.38	0.48	0	1	768
Life satisfaction	3.37	1.88	1	7	770
Aspiration gap	4.88	1.66	1	7	789
Migration motivation	4.44	0.96	1	5	784
Migration likelihood	2.81	1.39	1	5	711

Figure 3.4: Age distribution of subjects



3.5 Positionality and research ethics

Positionality affects research from the outset, the choice of research topic and research questions over the choice of methods to the dissemination of the findings.[88] I chose

88. Carling, Erdal and Ezzati, 'Beyond the insider–outsider divide in migration research'.

the research topic and questions both out of personal interest — I have worked on different issues in migration studies for six years in my undergraduate, Master's, and DPhil in three universities in the United States and the United Kingdom — and for the advancement of academic knowledge. Undeniably, and applicable to most, if not all (migration) research, there is a secondary purpose to my research. The choice of methodology and methods is not only influenced by the research questions asked (primary purpose of research) but also the eventual use the research is put to (secondary purpose of research) as well as different types of reflexivity.[89] The primary purpose involves the choice of qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods, as relevant to the research questions. I discuss the methods chosen in the following section. The secondary purpose relates to intended audiences and what the research aims to achieve, other than simply answering the research question. The intended audience of my research is both academics and policymakers. I aim to add to migration research by showing how heuristic strategies might be used to search for, evaluate, and decide upon migration options (Chapter 2). However, and as briefly outlined in the introductory chapter, my research is relevant to migration policymakers. Showing what destination characteristics affect migration decision-making could help to implement policies to make destination countries less attractive to refugees. However, my insights could potentially also be used to attract labour migrants. While the secondary aim of my research is not to develop a blueprint for migration deterrence, I acknowledge that my findings might be used to further such a purpose.

Reflexivity is the repeated acknowledgement of the researcher's role, or positionality, particularly in qualitative research, as somewhat active in constructing social meaning.[90] Migration in particular is a high reflexivity area where power relations

89. Anna Schmidt, '"I know what you're doing", reflexivity and methods in Refugee Studies', *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (2007): 82–99.

90. Brian Bourke, 'Positionality: Reflecting on the research process', *The Qualitative Report* 19, no. 33 (2014): 1–9.

between researcher and research subjects need to be taken into account.[91] This is of particular importance for face-to-face interviews. To mitigate power imbalances between myself and my interviewees, I worked with a female Jordanian research assistant. She was a valuable resource arranging and conducting the interviews, particularly to bridge the cultural gaps between me, the interviewer, and the interviewee, and help build rapport. We both had different 'outsider' statuses, albeit both different from the classical definition as 'a member of the majority population in the country of settlement.'[92] My research assistant is arguably closer to the typical outsider as a Jordanian citizen who grew up in Amman. However, her cultural knowledge and linguistic proficiency gave her the edge of an insider and helped to access and recruit informants and to understand cultural nuances that I might not have picked up. Her Palestinian descent was further helpful. While we did not make this explicit during the interview, some respondents asked her about her background, as a large proportion of Jordanian citizens are of Palestinian descent. She is a refugee herself and not an archetype of the local population, which alleviated the concern of social desirability bias, i.e. that interviewees might overstate positive aspects related to Jordan and local integration. I, a White researcher from the West, am an outsider in two ways; first, an outsider to the local context, Jordan, and second, to the population of interest, Syrian refugees. However, there are arguably also benefits from occupying an explicit third position[93] as a sort of double outsider in terms of rapport, particularly as being an 'insider' might actually increase awareness of social divisions between interviewer and interviewee.[94] Further, my presence at all interviews (and leading some interviews with respondents who spoke English) encouraged some informants to explain beliefs that might be taken for granted by people who regularly work with refugees in Jordan

91. Sanchez-Ayala, 'Interviewing techniques for migrant minority groups'.
92. Carling, Erdal and Ezzati, 'Beyond the insider–outsider divide in migration research'.
93. Ibid.
94. Deianira Ganga and Sam Scott, 'Cultural "Insiders" and the Issue of Positionality in Qualitative Migration Research: Moving "Across" and Moving "Along" Researcher-Participant Divides', *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 7, no. 3 (2006).

or for members of the Syrian refugee community.[95] Several respondents specifically mentioned during the interviews that they wanted me to understand a certain issue, regardless whether I led the interview in English or whether my research assistant led it in Arabic. I believe that the combination of me occupying an explicit third position and my research assistant who, while being an outsider, is very accustomed with the local culture and is fluent in Arabic helped build rapport. Having a local female research assistant particularly helped recruiting and interviewing female Syrians interviewees, which arguably might have been difficult on my own or with a male research assistant. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that there were undoubtedly power imbalances remaining that might have affected the responses we got.

I have already argued above that I ascribe all migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, some agency in their decisions whether, when, and where to migrate. I believe that refugees' 'voices are valuable and indispensable in understanding processes of human migration.'[96] The situations and experiences of Syrian refugees in Jordan are hence central to their migration decision-making. I acknowledge multiple potential ethical issues that might arise from conducting research with refugees, which I tried to alleviate from the outset. I made it clear when recruiting respondents and conducting the interviews that participation in the research did not affect the chances of being resettled or, in the case for respondents recruited via local NGOs, the treatment they receive as beneficiaries of said NGOs. I further made it clear that participation did not increase one's chances to be admitted to the University of Oxford or any university in the UK or beyond. Informed consent was obtained by participants for both the interviews and the online survey.

I acknowledge the possibility of trauma, as I interview refugees who might talk about their uncomfortable and disturbing experiences. While my questions did not

95. Carling, Erdal and Ezzati, 'Beyond the insider–outsider divide in migration research'.

96. Pauline Maillet, Alison Mountz and Keegan Williams, 'Researching migration and enforcement in obscured places: practical, ethical and methodological challenges to fieldwork', *Social and Cultural Geography* 19, no. 7 (2016): p.934.

aim to extract such information but rather to extract migration motivation (relative to the status quo in Jordan), life aspirations, and migration drivers, I could not preclude that such information might come up in interviews. Indeed, a majority of interview respondents talked about their experiences in Syria, often to justify why they cannot imagine to return. One woman was noticeably distressed during the interview and started crying when asked whether she could imagine to return to Syria. My research assistant, who conducted the interview in question in Arabic, interrupted the interview, offered the interviewee another glass of water and tissues, and offered to stop the interview. After a few minutes, however, the woman insisted to continue the interview. We continued but avoided questions about returning to Syria. While we made sure to stress that interviewees could stop the interview at any point, all interviewees who started the interview also completed it. The fact that merely one respondent showed visible signs of distress stands in stark contrast to prior research. For instance, Crawley reported that a majority of asylum seekers interviewed in the UK were very stressed, anxious, and depressed and several asked for breaks to compose themselves during interviews.[97] The fact that I conducted interviews in an environment respondents were used to — they had lived in Jordan for several years and had become accustomed to their situations — arguably played a role why I did not encounter the difficulties that Crawley described.

3.6 Summary

In this chapter, I have described the mixed methods approach that I used to examine the migration decision-making process of Syrian refugees in Jordan. I conducted 29 semi-structured qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey involving conjoint experiments with 789 Syrian refugees in Jordan between summer 2018 and summer

97. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*

2019. I focused on Syrians in Jordan for theoretical and practical reasons. Following the arrival of a large number of Syrian refugees in Europe since 2015, the migration decision-making processes of Syrian refugees has received considerable attention from academics, the public, and policymakers alike. Practically, Jordan provided a safe environment to conduct fieldwork.

The following three chapters present the empirical results. Chapter 4 shows how unfulfilled needs and life aspiration lead to aspiration gaps. Aspiration gaps in turn lead to the motivation to change behaviour, which could result in repatriation or relocation (Chapter 5). Chapter 5 further presents respondents' prior destination preferences, which guide the destination choice. I examine destination choices in Chapter 6. In particular, I focus on the role of a destination's reputation, the country the destination is located in, and heuristic decision rules.

Chapter 4

Aspiring to Leave

Having described the research design, sample selection, method of analysis, and the local context in Chapter 3, this chapter mainly presents findings of a thematic analysis of 29 qualitative interviews conducted with Syrian refugees in Jordan in August and September 2018. Where appropriate, I add findings from the quantitative survey on life aspirations and aspiration gaps. The main aim of the semi-structured interviews was to illustrate certain aspects of the migration decision-making framework outlined in Chapter 2. The framework centres around three capacities to migrate: the capacities to aspire, realise, and decide. This chapter focuses on the first two; to aspire migration and the ability to migrate. Chapters 5 and 6 present qualitative interview findings and quantitative survey results pertaining to the capacity to decide migration. In particular, they discuss respondents' destination preferences and choices.

The findings presented in this chapter strengthen the following hypotheses and assumptions, which I described in more detail in Chapter 2: life aspirations (partly) arise from unfulfilled needs; aspiration gaps are a main factor influencing the motivation to change behaviour, i.e. to migrate; and aspirations can be and are adjusted upwards or downwards. The findings are, however, to be considered in the spatial and temporal context, which I discussed in more detail in Section 3.2. Table A.2 (Appendix) provides a full list of interviews. It shows the interview's date, loca-

tion, and duration. It further gives some descriptive information about respondents. Each respondent was assigned a unique code, which I footnote when quoting respondents. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 shows that almost all respondents had aspirations that arose form unfulfilled physiological, psychological, and self-actualisation needs and that such aspirations were fluid and dependent on the temporal and spatial context. However, the majority indicated to face considerable and potentially insurmountable barriers to achieving their aspired goals in Jordan. Their capacity to realise aspired change was restricted (Section 4.2). Comparing their self-assessed status quo with their life aspirations resulted in considerable aspiration gaps. Lastly, the motivation to change one's status quo increased with the size of one's aspiration gap (Section 4.3). I summarise the findings in Section 4.4.

4.1 Needs and life aspirations

Following Maslow, I have argued in Chapter 2 that human motivation stems from unfulfilled physiological, psychological, and self-actualisation needs.[1] A need is unfulfilled if its level of fulfilment is considerably below the aspired level of needs-fulfilment. Lower needs generally have to be at least fulfilled to a certain threshold before individuals pursue higher needs. The hierarchy of needs is not rigid but varies with individuals and the context (migration drivers). In addition, I have argued that aspirations are need-dependent, e.g. individuals whose physiological needs are satisfied will likely have higher aspirations (in terms of needs to be fulfilled) than those who have not yet fulfilled such needs. Aspirations further depend on the individual's reference group, the 'relevant others'. In the following, I contrast the above theoretical predictions with the interview data. The analysis is overwhelmingly based on responses to questions about what the interviewees considered a 'good life' and to questions

1. Maslow, 'A theory of human motivation'.

Table 4.1: Life aspirations of Syrian refugees in Jordan (interviews)

	Frequency	**Proportion** (n = 29)
Work, career	22	76%
Education	16	55%
Safety, security, stability	15	52%
Family	14	48%
Dignity, independence	9	31%
Citizenship	8	28%
Basic necessities (food, health)	5	17%
Travel, freedom of movement	4	14%
Property	4	14%
Rights, rule of law	3	10%

about their ambitions and goals in life. Table 4.1 displays the main categories of life aspirations that emerged, all of which can be mapped using Maslow's hierarchy of needs (see Figure 2.4 above). Some respondents had a wide range of aspirations:

> The good life is when you find a job, freedom, an ability to travel when you want and go back to the country where you work. ... And when people respect each other, where there is no racism, they won't hurt you because of the religion of your family or your colour or your nationality.[2]

Others, however, had a narrower set of aspirations. They did not mind 'where we live and what we do for work and in what country, what's important is to be safe, that's what a good life is.'[3] The following gives a short overview of aspirations arising from different unfulfilled individual needs before discussing them in more detail in the next subsection.

Physiological needs. They give rise to aspirations for basic necessities, such as food and a minimum level of health and healthcare, which were highlighted by several interviewees. One woman in her early thirties insisted that 'a good life for me does not have to do with having a lavish house or lavish lifestyle. I need to have my basic needs

2. 17M26.
3. 14F35.

met.'[4] A father of four remarked that his ambition was to provide his family with 'the basic necessities of life, which they don't have.'[5] The latter quote indicates that individual aspirations do not necessarily merely reflect individual needs but might also cover needs of family members. I discuss this in more detail below.

Safety needs. Half the respondents stressed that the basis for a good life — and for the pursuit of higher aspirations — is safety, security, and stability. Several people responded to questions about their perception of a good life in light of their experiences of war and displacement: 'a good life is to not have war'[6] and to be 'away from the bombing and destruction.'[7] Others distinguished between safety and security;[8] the former meaning to be free from physical harm, the latter to be free from financial and psychological distress and at peace socially. Safety aspirations hence arose from safety needs, security aspirations partly from safety and esteem needs. Work aspirations also partly arose from safety and physiological needs of others. One young man noted: '[My] ambition is simply to find work',[9] so he could support his family and meet their basic needs. Owning property to avoid discrimination from landlords and to feel settled was another safety aspiration mentioned repeatedly. Rights and the rule of law were further mentioned by a minority as their aspiration of a good life. Safety needs should hence not be understood primarily in physiological terms but rather as related to human security more generally.[10] The need for safety and security as the primary need of refugees has been highlighted by recent research.[11]

4. 26F32.
5. 2M36.
6. 7M28.
7. 14F35.
8. While I acknowledge that some languages do not have different words for safety and security, respondents did distinguish between these two concepts in the interviews.
9. 6M23.
10. Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, 'Rethinking Human Security', *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 5 (2001): 585–610.
11. Angeliki Dimitriadi, 'In Search of Asylum: Afghan Migrants in Greece', *European Journal of Migration and Law* 19, no. 1 (2017): 57–76.

Love and belonging needs. These included aspirations to be close to or live with family, relatives, and friends and to support them, which were highlighted by half of all respondents. They also included to live in one's home country and to be free to practice one's religion. A young man asserted: 'for me personally, I like family, so a good life is one where I am close to my family and relatives.'[12] Another man insisted that his biggest wish was to return to Syria: 'Syria is heaven, it's for simple people but there is a spirit, the walls there speak to each other, the homeland is dear.'[13]

Esteem needs. Dignity and independence were recurring themes in interviews with Syrian refugees in Jordan: 'To live is to live without needing others, to live in dignity, this is the most important thing.'[14] Recognition by the community and by others was another central theme. A father of three aspired not be 'perceived as a failure by my daughters.'[15] Respondents further aspired to non-Syrian citizenship, as they expected that it would give them independence and recognition as part of a community. Half of all interviewees reported aspirations related to esteem needs.

Self-actualisation needs. The vast majority of interviewees reported educational and professional aspirations. The aspirations voiced varied considerable from the more general, such as to continue schooling, start or continue to study or to find work in one's field to the more specific, such as to do a PhD in English in the United States, work as a physicist in CERN, or become a judge.

The above overview demonstrates that the Syrian refugees interviewed had a multitude of aspirations, the majority of which arose from unfulfilled individual needs. However, some individuals had aspirations that stemmed from unfulfilled needs of their children or other family members. For instance, one woman remarked that she was unable to buy her daughters what they asked for, such as clothes and colouring

12. 10M25.
13. 19M49.
14. 5M37.
15. 28M41.

books, and that they asked for specific dishes she could not afford to make. Even though they did not suffer from absolute deprivation, the family might be better described as relatively deprived in comparison to the daughters' relevant reference group, which were their Jordanian classmates. Another mother highlighted that her children compared their current life situation and needs satisfaction with that of their classmates. Relative rather than absolute deprivation of oneself or one's kin might hence give rise to aspirations to change one's status quo.[16] Further, not merely individual unfulfilled needs but also unfulfilled collective needs might give rise to aspirations.


Having examined life aspirations through qualitative interviews, I enquired respondents' main life aspiration in the quantitative survey. Figure 4.1 displays the results. While interviewees typically mentioned more than one life aspiration during the interviews, the survey response was restricted to one choice. This resulted in safety, security, and stability being the most important life aspiration for a quarter of all respondents, closely followed by citizenship and education. Merely one respondent mentioned that they did not have aspirations for themselves and less than ten per cent each reported that family and dignity were their most important life aspirations.

My findings are in line with and add to the literature on the aspirations of Syrian refugees. Researching Syrians in Turkey and Lebanon, Van Heelsum summarised their minimum aspirations as 'safety, enough food, shelter and medical care, but in the near future they also need the right to work, a real house and education for their children. In the long run, a form of citizenship is necessary.'[17] While half of all interviewees indicated that safety was their main aspiration or at least one of their aspirations, the other half did not aspire to safety, or at least did not say so. Similarly, while safety, security, and stability was the main life aspiration for a quarter of all survey respondents, three quarters had other aspirations that they considered to be

16. Czaika, 'Internal versus international migration and the role of multiple deprivation'.

17. Anja van Heelsum, 'Why migration will continue: Aspirations and capabilities of Syrians and Ethiopians with different educational backgrounds', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39, no. 8 (2016): p.1304.

Figure 4.1: Life aspirations of Syrian refugees in Jordan (survey)



more important. I provide two potential explanations that centre around individuals' levels of needs fulfilment. First, depending on observable and unobservable individual characteristics, some individuals placed more weight on safety than others, resulting in different sets of aspirations that are typical of different 'types of aspirers'. Second, they might already have felt safe and had adjusted their aspiration upwards. I discuss the former in the next section, the latter in Section 4.3.1.

4.1.1 Types of aspirers

Analysing individuals' patterns of aspirations and grouping life aspirations by individual observable characteristics, such as age, education, and gender results in the following five broad types of aspires: safety first, family person, careerist, opportunist, and formalist. While this typology emerged inductively from analysing interview responses, I add a quantitative perspective with the data gathered through the survey at the end of this section.

Safety first. This is potentially the most obvious type when thinking of the population interviewed, refugees. Individuals in this category were overwhelmingly or only

concerned with their safety, mostly referring to physical safety with some also highlighting the broader term of security. Having fled their countries after experiencing war and destruction, a substantial minority of respondents stated that 'safety is the most important thing'[18] and that a good life was 'all about safety and security.'[19] Safety concerns equally affected men and women of all ages interviewed. While being outside the scope of this research, it seemed that those most directly affected by the war and violence — for instance, they reported that their houses and neighbourhoods were destroyed — were the most concerned with safety. They might also have different personality traits, such as risk aversion, which warrants future research.

Family person. Several respondents defined their aspirations not as stemming from their own unfulfilled needs but entirely or overwhelmingly in terms of their children's or family's needs. While one mother insisted that finding work was the most important thing at the moment, it became clear that work was a means to support her family rather than a life aspiration in its own: 'There is definitely no goal for me. When you have children your main goal is the lives of your children. There is nothing that I look forward to for myself, only for my children.'[20] Another two mothers, although initially voicing some aspirations related to self-actualisation — both dreamt to go to university — quickly focused on their children: '[M]y ambition now is to be able to provide my son with the life I wanted but couldn't live';[21] '[M]y focus is now on the future of my children.'[22] Two of the six fathers interviewed showed similar altruistic aspirations: 'I don't have ambitions anymore, I have ambitions for my children now';[23] 'My ambition is only to attempt to have a happy family, that's it. To provide them the basic necessities of life, which they don't have.'[24] The focus on their children

18. 14F35.
19. 22M22.
20. 27F37.
21. 3F18.
22. 25F27.
23. 19M49.
24. 2M36.

and lack of personal ambition partly seemed to stem from their age and forgone past opportunities: '[T]he train has passed.'[25] However, some younger people also exhibited altruistic aspirations. A 24-year old mentioned that if his educational plans would not materialise within the next year, he would support his younger brother:

> I don't want him to live the life I'm living, so even if I have to work day and night so that he can study then I will do so ... you have to adapt to the life you're living and work hard for yourself and for others ... I have to support him so he doesn't go through what I'm going through.[26]

The size of their aspiration gaps mostly depended on the difference between their children's (or family's) current needs satisfaction and their aspirations for the lives of their children or family members. However, not everybody defined their aspirations purely or overwhelmingly in terms of their family. The aspirations of some respondents related to earning money to support their families. A young man mentioned: 'I want to study further to develop my career and be able to help them more.'[27] Reflecting on the cost of his medical studies in Jordan, another said he would 'try and give back to my family, for the money they have paid for me to be here.'[28] A third one stated that 'I hope to have money to finance all my relatives in Syria and here in Jordan. I want to give them enough money to have good health and good lives.'[29] All three statements are from educated unmarried men in their 20s. While women seemed to sacrifice their aspirations and careers for their families, men's careers were both a means to an end as well as ends in themselves. This gendered division of labour might partly stem from and reflect traditional family roles in Syria and Jordan.

Careerist. Careerists were young and educated people with at least a bachelor's degree. Their life aspirations stemmed mostly from self-actualisation needs and were expressed primarily in terms of clear professional and educational goals. They of-

25. 2M36.
26. 29M24.
27. 10M25.
28. 18M26.
29. 7M28.

ten already expressed such aspirations as linked to particular destination countries, universities, or employers. Having almost finished her master's degree, one woman wanted to 'purse a PhD overseas, work as a lecturer at a prestigious university, publish my papers in prestigious journals.'[30] Another shared that his dream was to work at CERN in Geneva: 'I would like to work there, it's my dream, but I can't work there if I don't do the master's and the PhD.'[31] Two Syrian doctors' aspirations overwhelmingly evolved around their future medical specialisations. One stated: 'I care more about job than about the family and religion. I am a professional person.'[32]

Opportunists. While careerists had clear aspirations for their near and far future, opportunists stressed that the future could not be known and/or planned and therefore one has to and should adapt to their current situation. This might be a somewhat voluntary choice:

> One always has ambitions but it all depends on what is available, so I would accept something that is different because I know that work is not always available. When I do have plans they usually get cancelled and I forget about them because there aren't many opportunities.[33]

However, it might be involuntary due to their situations and they might resent their lack of aspirations. Several people could not imagine their life in a year's time or more nor did they have medium to long-term aspirations: 'I can't have plans that much long term, circumstances change very quickly';[34] and 'refugees cannot know their future, even the one in one month'.[35] Asked where he saw himself in a year's time, one man responded: 'I can't see my tomorrow. I have no guarantee where I will be tomorrow.'[36] One woman answered the same question as follows: '[T]his is a

30. 26F32.
31. 23M20.
32. 17M26.
33. 6M23.
34. 4M23.
35. 7M28.
36. 28M41.

hard question because it requires that I imagine things. Can I skip this question?'[37] While some respondents stated to have options, for instance with regards to their educational and career aspirations, others would take the first option that presented itself or that they heard about.

Formalist. Formalists primarily aspired to legal rights and they generally considered non-Syrian citizenship as the basis for the pursuit of higher aspirations:

> In my opinion, a good life is one where I have access to and enjoy all my rights. For example the right to work, the right to ownership, the right to mobility, to be safe, to have a legal standing, such as a citizenship. You have a citizenship so you have full rights in the country you are in.[38]

Other statements highlighted the importance of acquiring non-Syrian citizenship: 'Most importantly, I am Syrian, I need to have a nationality, a passport, a citizenship. I need that'[39]; and 'the citizenship is the most important thing which will enable my mobility in the future, to be free.'[40] Rights and citizenship seemed more important to men than to women. This might be due to the fact that citizenship in Syria and Jordan is generally passed on through the paternal rather than the maternal line and that men seemed more concerned with employment and therefore disproportionately experience legal restrictions and societal discrimination.

This broad typology does not imply that individuals that are close to one 'ideal type' do not have other aspirations than the ones outlined above but that some aspirations are more characteristic for some people than for others. Also, individuals' aspirations might be characteristic of more than one type. For instance, some might be opportunists and formalists; they might not have specific aspirations regarding education and their career and take advantage of upcoming opportunities in the short and medium term but aspire to their formal rights in the long term.

37. 27F37.
38. 6M23.
39. 26F32.
40. 28M41.

I further investigated whether the above five types of aspires held up by employing the survey data and contrasting respondents' answers to the question about their most important aspiration for a good life (Figure 4.1) with demographic information. Table 4.2 presents descriptive variable means by main life aspiration. The results are generally in line with the interview findings. Women were significantly less likely than men to select citizenship. Parents seemed disproportionately concerned with safety, security, and stability as well as family, compared to those who did not have children. They were significantly less likely to select education, job / career, or dignity as their main life aspiration. Those aged 18 to 29 were most concerned with education and significantly less likely to aspire to safety of family. The better educated seemed to disproportionately have career and family aspirations while the less educated aspired to safety. I investigate the relationship between demographic characteristics and choice of main life aspiration in more detail in Table 4.3. I present logistic regression results of six separate regressions. The dependent variables are dummies with the value one if the life aspiration was chosen and zero otherwise, i.e. one of the other five life aspirations was chosen. The independent variables are either binary (e.g. female) or categorical variables (e.g. education). Table B.10 in the Appendix displays multinomial regression results, which are very similar to the separate regressions and hence not discussed. The results of the logistic regression are similar to the descriptive means. Women were significantly less likely than men to choose citizenship, compared to any of the other five life aspirations. Other than that, there were no significant gender differences. Younger respondents aspired disproportionately often to education and less so to job / career, relative to respondents aged 30 or older. As mentioned above, being a parent was associated with preferences for safety, security, and stability and family aspirations but decreased the likelihood that education was selected as the main life aspiration. The higher an individual's education level, the less likely that she aspires to education and the more likely that she aspires to career and jobs.

Table 4.2: Selected variable means, by main life aspiration (survey)

	Safety security stability	Citizenship	Education	Job career	Family	Dignity	Sample average
Female	0.24	0.16***	0.29	0.34*	0.29	0.33	0.26
Parent	0.49***	0.43	0.18***	0.25***	0.62***	0.21***	0.37
18–29	0.56**	0.59	0.85***	0.72*	0.38***	0.62	0.64
High school or less	0.38**	0.27	0.36	0.18***	0.25	0.23	0.30
Some college	0.21	0.22	0.32**	0.21	0.14**	0.27	0.23
Diploma / Bachelor's / Master's	0.42	0.51	0.32***	0.62***	0.62***	0.50	0.47
Observations	206	189	156	112	65	49	789

Note: two-tailed t-tests for difference to sample average: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.3: Predictors of main life aspiration, logit regressions (survey)

	Dependent variable:					
	Safety security stability	Citizenship	Education	Job / career	Family	Dignity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.036	−0.766***	0.299	0.369	0.303	0.097
	(0.198)	(0.223)	(0.214)	(0.227)	(0.307)	(0.333)
Parent	0.300***	0.115	−0.367***	−0.250*	0.416**	−0.678***
	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.137)	(0.143)	(0.174)	(0.225)
Age (Ref.: 30 or older)						
18–29	−0.071	−0.121	0.909***	0.243	−0.686**	−0.730*
	(0.218)	(0.222)	(0.290)	(0.279)	(0.345)	(0.380)
Education (Ref.: Some college)						
High school or less	0.397*	−0.220	0.135	−0.180	−0.051	−0.356
	(0.235)	(0.247)	(0.243)	(0.333)	(0.452)	(0.442)
Diploma / Bachelor's / Master's	−0.069	0.109	−0.709***	0.618**	0.537	−0.146
	(0.225)	(0.221)	(0.238)	(0.271)	(0.395)	(0.368)
Constant	−1.671***	−1.083***	−1.330***	−1.920***	−3.284***	−1.050*
	(0.367)	(0.366)	(0.435)	(0.462)	(0.619)	(0.610)
Observations	756	756	756	756	756	756
Log Likelihood	−419.399	−410.113	−343.190	−301.652	−194.876	−169.837
Akaike Inf. Crit.	850.797	832.226	698.380	615.304	401.752	351.673
McFadden's Pseudo-R^2	0.074	0.056	0.125	0.064	0.132	0.075

Note: two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The chi-squares of between 12.5 and 64.1 for models (1)–(6) in Table 4.3 with five degrees of freedom and the associated p-values of less than 0.05 for all six models indicate that the estimated models are better fits than empty models. The respective log likelihoods range from –170 to –419. McFadden's pseudo R^2 ranges from 0.06 to 0.13 for the six models. Demographic characteristics hence only explain a relatively small variation in main life aspiration.

This section has demonstrated that the vast majority of Syrian refugees interviewed had a range of life aspirations, albeit different 'types of aspirers' had different sets of aspirations for themselves and their families. The majority possessed the capacity to aspire (see Section 2.2.1), which relies on their economic, social, emotional, and cognitive resources.[41] However, a minority could not imagine their future and did not have aspirations anymore. Following the capacity for migration framework established in Chapter 2, merely having high or low life aspirations, in terms of their relation to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, does not give any indication of individuals' motivation to change behaviour, i.e. to migrate. Individuals close to fulfilling their aspirations might not be motivated to migrate but instead work towards fulfilling their aspirations. Those very far from their aspirations — and without the (perceived) means or ability to change their circumstances — might experience cognitive dissonance and similarly stay put. The next section discusses individuals' status quo and how their capacities to realise their aspirations affect their motivations to migrate.

4.2 Status quo and realising aspirations

Having outlined Syrian refugees' wide range of aspirations for a good life, this section turns to their capacity to realise aspired personal change (see Section 2.2.2 for a theoretical treatment). I discuss the material and non-material barriers that impede them

41. Sell and De Jong, 'Toward a Motivational Theory of Migration Decision Making'; Shaw, 'A Note on Cost-Return Calculations and Decisions to Migrate'.

from realising their aspirations. Reflecting on their current situation in Jordan, the majority of Syrian refugees interviewed reported considerable barriers that stopped them from meeting their needs and fulfilling their aspirations. My findings are generally in line with research on the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan that found that employment restrictions, financial hardship, and dependence on aid were the biggest barriers.[42] The following quote incorporates a number of the barriers reported:

> Although the financial situation is important to me but more important to me is being productive, it pains me to sit at home and receive aid when I have the ability to give and produce and work and benefit others, but I am not allowed to do that because I am considered a refugee and I received aid for nothing. This kills life itself. My soul is slowly dying while I am alive. Without work I am living on the margins.[43]

Dependence on others is the central theme that connects all barriers and is also a barrier in itself. Dependence was caused by a lack of rights, particularly regarding employment and citizenship, financial difficulties, and the negative stereotypes and hostility associated with being Syrian and being a refugee. I evaluate each in turn.

Dependency. Dependence on others was a central concern for many refugees. While dependence can be a result of other barriers, several interviewees referred to dependence (or the lack of independence) as *the* main barrier. Voicing his frustration, the father of an interviewee remarked rather biblically during one interview: 'I don't want to be given a fish, I want to be given a fishing rod and left alone to do my thing.'[44] The frustration with the support received partly stemmed from respondents' fears that support could be withdrawn at any time, fuelling their anxieties in already precarious situations. However, it also stemmed from their desires to contribute to and be a productive member of society.

42. Bellamy et al., *The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan.*
43. 20M37.
44. 3F18.

Rights and citizenship. The same people that aspired to rights as part of their imagination of a good life, the formalists (see Section 4.1.1), stated that the lack of rights is one of the biggest barriers they faced. Several people complained that they were not allowed to own property, such as a house and a car, and could not get a drivers license. This lack of rights led to a dependency on landlords for housing and taxis for transportation, in the absence of adequate public transport. Those that moved to Jordan decades ago complained that they did not in practice have access to Jordanian citizenship and the resulting rights as citizens albeit they would be legally entitled to citizenship. One man that moved to Jordan in the 1980s noted:

> I've been here for a long time in Jordan, I deserve the nationality legally, but for some reason, perhaps security reasons, they don't give the nationality to the people who deserve it. I do protest this very much, I just want to at least be able to work within my qualification of radiography.[45]

Citizenship in general was a central concern for many, not only those who came to Jordan before 2011. The longer people had lived without a pathway to (Jordanian) citizenship, the more frustrated they were with their lack of rights emanating from Syrian citizenship. Again, disproportionately many men mentioned the lack of rights and citizenship as a main barrier.

Employment restrictions. More than half of all respondents, and twice as many men as women, mentioned laws and regulations restricting employment of Syrian refugees in Jordan as the main barrier. Legal employment via work permits for refugees was mainly restricted to low-level jobs in the agriculture, construction, textile, and food sectors.[46] While there were work permits for higher-level jobs and for jobs in other sectors, the general consensus was that they were hard to get in practice and that Jordanian companies preferred to hire Jordanians, as it was easier and cheaper. Work permits were further tied to a specific employer. Once full-time em-

45. 9M35.
46. Sarrado and Dunmore, *New deal on work permits helps Syrian refugees in Jordan.*

ployment with that employer ends, permit holders cannot legally work for another employer, not even in the same field.[47] One means to work legally, although mostly only for the educated, are consulting or temporary contracts. Careerists generally did not approve of this unstable, temporary, and precarious working relationship:

> Even in work I don't feel that I'm stable, I'm always on temporary contracts, always on service contracts. The place where I'd be working could be comfortable and they would be holding on to me but I'd still feel that my situation is unstable professionally.[48]

Opportunists were more positive about the situation, emphasised that labour market difficulties were faced by Jordanians and Syrians alike, and insisted that Syrians would be able to secure employment and work permits by being active and hard-working:

> Even if there is no work within my major does that mean I sit down and do nothing? No. From the second I came to Jordan I didn't sit at home. I have always been working. Even my friends they say they are not finding work, I tell them that I'll help them find work, I get them a job in another field they refuse, they want to work in their field. So don't say there is no work. If there are no opportunities for example for you as an engineer then it's O.K., even Jordanian engineers are sitting in the cafes [NB meaning they are unemployed], you don't need to find work in your field, find any other field, in any organisation. Fine, you studied engineering and have worked hard on that and you want to be an engineer but even if you were Jordanian you wouldn't have found work, so this is not about you being Syrian. If you want to work within your field then work harder on yourself, do courses and training, when a Jordanian or a Syrian apply for the same job but the Syrian has higher qualifications then they will hire him for sure, they will fight with the Ministry of Labour for him. I swear. My organisation why did they hire a lawyer for me? Why [else] would they go through having these high costs?[49]

The above quote is from a young man with a university degree who I classified as an opportunist. Refugees who lack formal qualifications, however, will presumably face much higher hurdles and his advice might be primarily aimed at the young and educated. Employment restrictions forced respondents to take black market jobs and

47. Bellamy et al., *The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan.*
48. 1F29.
49. 10M25.

exposed them to exploitation. They lamented that they were sometimes not getting paid for the work they did and were left at the employer's mercy.

Financial hardship. Unsurprisingly, financial hardship was mentioned by the majority as a barrier to achieve life aspirations. The high cost of living and employment restrictions frequently resulted in dependence on the UNHCR and NGOs. To preserve (some) dignity, several respondents reported not to take full advantage of available services for Syrian refugees in Jordan. While this behaviour reduced dependence on organisations for support and partly fulfilled their esteem needs and aspirations with regards to dignity, it likely increased financial hardship and in turn safety and potentially also physiological needs. Absolute deprivation might hence increase. The high cost of tertiary education frequently interrupts education pathways and access to university becomes highly contingent upon securing a scholarship. Talking about her wish to pursue a bachelor's degree, a young woman noted: 'I can't afford it financially. I will wait for a scholarship, if I get one then I will continue towards a bachelor's degree, if I don't then I don't.'[50] Those unsuccessful to secure a scholarship lamented the years spent waiting. In the face of employment restrictions, the feeling of dependency grew over time. Money was not only an issue accessing education but also prevented some from getting their Syrian passport renewed, which could cost up to $800.[51] Costs to process visa applications and translating documents for those who sought to migrate to a third country on a work or study visa were also mentioned as barriers to achieve life aspirations.

Being Syrian and a refugee. Two thirds of interviewees mentioned that prejudices, discrimination, and the low reputation associated with being Syrian and a refugee were the biggest barriers they faced in Jordan. This echos reports that high-

50. 8F20.

51. The New Arab, 'Syrian passport now the world's most expensive', *The New Arab*, April 2017, accessed 10 December 2018, `https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/society/2017/4/5/syrian-passport-now-the-worlds-most-expensive`.

lighted significant tensions between Jordanians and Syrians.[52] While some discrimination stemmed from the legal context — i.e. employment restrictions and restricted rights with regards to owning property — other instances had to do with unequal treatment, resentment, condemnation, and racism by the community and civil society. Reflecting on their lives in Jordan, four Syrians remarked:

> We're satisfied with being here, but the community is not satisfied with us being here, although I don't want to generalise, but every day in the news all we hear is that they don't want refugees.[53]
>
> Jordanians are getting bored of us, they hate Syrians a lot now, to be honest, because we have become a burden on them, one they can't handle, so maybe they are right. They are right, they are already under pressure and we are burdening them even more, so they started to hate Syrians. Whenever there are any problems they blame Syrians.[54]
>
> [My siblings] stopped going to school because they were mistreated at school, they were bullied and hit and didn't want to continue. My father can't afford to get them clothes for school so they were bullying [them] for [their] clothes. ... When I first came here and went to school I was a good student, but they would bully me and say 'Syrian, Syrian', they would complain that I'm the first in class and they would throw rocks at me and if they hit me it would have opened my skull. The bullying I faced was hard.[55]
>
> For us here, even how we're viewed has some racism within it. People think that being Syrian is great, that UNHCR covers our rent, our health care, food coupons, etc., they think that we are living in heaven, so we are ostracised ... when you get on the bus, you hear things, they say Syrians took our money, Syrians increased our rent costs, Syrians are comfortable and have nothing to worry about. We started to hate the word 'Syrian'.[56]

While not everybody shared the above views and had experienced antagonism and racism, the majority reported that they had. Many lamented and had started to hate the term 'refugee', as it was frequently used in a negative and downgrading way. The words 'refugee' and 'Syrian' had become synonymous. This particularly

52. Bellamy et al., *The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan*; REACH, *Social Cohesion in Host Communities in Northern Jordan.*
53. 16F39.
54. 11F39.
55. 3F18.
56. 28M42.

worried Syrians who came to Jordan before 2011 and often did not consider themselves refugees. Contrasting how people in Jordan viewed him before and since 2011, one Syrian noted: 'There was some change in how they look to the Syrian people here because we were normal before, then we became refugees. Although I am not a refugee myself but when they know I am Syrian, they think I am a refugee.'[57]

Syrian refugees in Jordan face material and non-material barriers that hindered them to realise their aspirations. As a result, their capacity to realise aspired personal change was often severely restricted. The barriers included dependency, caused by a lack of rights, employment restrictions, and financial hardship, as well as antagonism and racism. Non-material barriers further included individual's cognitive and emotional skills, social capital, and imaginations. While these are harder to detect in interviews, some respondents stated that they could not even imagine how their lives would improve, given their current situation. While they did have some life aspirations, they did not currently possess the capacity to realise their aspirations. Their conception of a good life seemed too remote and unattainable to them.

While some barriers, such as the lack of rights, arguably affected all refugees equally in theory, they did not affect everyone equally in practice. Some people did not place as much importance on having formal rights due to personal characteristics or their current situation. For instance, those that secured employment contracts due to their skills, hard work, or luck might be financially more secure than others and hence did not care as much about formal rights. However, the basic financial security might enable them to seek the fulfilment of higher needs, such as formal rights. They hence adjusted their aspirations upwards. While the respondents generally did not face absolute deprivation, several felt strongly about their relative deprivation when compared to Jordanians. They felt collective relative deprivation[58] due to social com-

57. 17M26.

58. Mathias Czaika, 'Are unequal societies more migratory?', *Comparative Migration Studies* 1, no. 1 (2013): 97–122.

parisons across groups, i.e. with Jordanians rather than other Syrian refugees. Their aspirations to change their status quo arguably at least partly arose from collective relative deprivation rather than individual deprivation.

The differences between people's life aspirations (Section 4.1) and their current lives (this section) are their aspiration gaps. As set out in Chapter 2, aspiration gaps are the basis for the motivation to change behaviour, i.e. to migrate. The next section outlines the aspiration gaps of Syrian refugees in Jordan. It further discusses how and why aspirations were frequently adjusted.

4.3 Aspiration gaps


Having outlined the substantial barriers that hinder Syrian refugees to realise their aspirations in Jordan, it is not surprising that the vast majority reported substantial aspiration gaps, i.e. substantial differences between their status quo and the lives they aspired to. While four young Syrians reported that their lives in Jordan were 'very good', 'good' or close to their conception of a good life, the majority of interviewees stated that their current lives were 'very far' from their aspirations and perceptions of a good life. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of individual aspiration gaps from the survey results. The distribution is heavily skewed to the right with merely nine per cent of respondents reporting small aspiration gaps (1–2 on a 7-point scale) and 39 per cent reporting large aspiration gaps (6–7). Just over half report mid-sized aspiration gaps (3–5). The median is 5 and the mean 4.9.

I have argued in Section 2.2.1 above that the size of an individual's aspiration gap is central to any motivation to change behaviour, i.e. migrate. If there is no aspiration gap — individuals have fulfilled their life aspirations — or if the gap is small — i.e. people's status quo approximates their aspirations — people will likely not migrate voluntarily. A 25-year old remarked:

> My life is currently very good, I like it. I have work, I'm employed, I am

also starting a small project for myself, my parents are with me and we're all in good health, we are living well. I am satisfied with the life I am living now.[59]

Figure 4.2: Distribution of aspiration gaps (survey)



Asked whether he believed he could achieve his educational ambitions and life aspirations in Jordan, he replied: 'Yes, I see it happening in Jordan. Scholarships are available for Syrians abroad more than they are available in Jordan, but for me personally, for my family, I don't want to go abroad at all.'[60] Even though his educational aspirations were not fully met in Jordan, and might never be fully met — he mentioned later that if his family would not have had to flee Syria and his parents were financially better off, he would have liked to pursue a master's degree in the UK — he was happy with his situation. He adjusted his educational aspirations downwards and was aspiring to complete a master's in Jordan, which he regarded as an achievable aspiration. The other people who were (relatively) satisfied with their current lives reported to have secured education and employment opportunities in Jordan. They were disproportionately more likely to state that they planned or

59. 10M25.
60. 10M25.

could imagine to stay in Jordan as compared to return to Syria or migrate to a third country. I discuss this in more detail in Section 5.1.

At the opposite end of the spectrum were those with very large aspiration gaps, whose lives were very different to the ones they aspired to. In theory, I argued in Chapter 2 that very large aspiration gaps might lead to cognitive dissonance, as people become frustrated with the large difference between their current lives and their notions of a good life and their (perceived) inability to change their status quo for the better. People with very large aspiration gaps might hence not migrate. Many interviewees voiced their frustration, particularly those who regarded themselves as very far from a good life:

> Here we are frustrated because we are forced to take any work that is available. We have no space to think about ambitions, because we won't be able to implement whatever you dream of, God is generous but there's not much here.[61]

The respondent described a good life as to 'have received all your rights and to do your responsibilities'[62] but lamented his lack of rights, particularly with regard to employment, in Jordan. His aspiration gap was large and he did not seem to believe he had the ability to close it. He lacked the capacity to realise his aspirations, partly because they were framed in terms of legal rights. The inability to imagine their future was echoed by several people. Asked where she saw herself in a year's time, one woman answered: 'Only God knows. I don't know. If I get resettlement, I hope, Inshallah [NB Arabic for "God willing"], then I will leave. But otherwise I don't know.'[63] Asked about her future in five years, the same woman responded: 'Only God knows. I can't imagine. Been here six years, no goals, nothing fulfilled. I can't imagine anything.'[64] While she reported a range of life aspirations, she too seemed to

61. 5M37.
62. 5M37.
63. 11F39.
64. 11F39.

lack the capacity to realise her aspirations due to cognitive dissonance and frustration. However, the frustrated were not a homogeneous group. Some regretted that they had left Syria:

> It would have been better for me to stay in my country. It's much better in different ways, for example with regards to security.[65] Here we are refugees, what can we do? No matter what we do we will remain refugees. Refugees here can't work in any field they want, refugees can't be employed. I will now receive this diploma in civil engineering but then I will not be employed because I'm Syrian. There is no citizenship. While in your country you can study anything and then work in that field, in any field, it won't be a problem, but it's a problem here.[66]

Others lamented that they did not go to Turkey instead of Jordan, as they expected their lives to had been better in Turkey and their chances to go to Europe higher. Those with large aspiration gaps tended to resent the past and their decisions and actions rather than focus on reducing their aspiration gaps. Their answers implied passivity and limited agency; rather than actively looking for means to reduce their aspiration gaps in Jordan or finding opportunities to migrate to a third country, they stated that they were waiting for UNHCR's call and a resettlement offer. Resettlement was seen as the only option to meet their life aspirations. While a few people will indeed be resettled, the majority will not and might ultimately stay in Jordan. They are involuntary immobile.[67] Section 5.1.3 presents interviewees' preferences for resettlement. Other interviewees reported to be frustrated with their considerable aspiration gaps and therefore considered to return to Syria. While this might be an active and conscious decision, it might be indirectly forced as a result of their lack of alternatives. Return might be the last resort, which I discuss in Section 5.1.2. Aspiration gaps were often large, as individuals had not sufficiently fulfilled their physiological and safety needs. However, this is not to say that individuals with large

65. Again, security in this context denotes freedom from financial, psychological, and societal pressures as well as to possess certain rights and goes beyond the notion of physical safety.
66. 8F20.
67. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility'.

aspiration gaps will never migrate. They might do so, if they have the capacity to realise their aspired changes. In practice, however, those with very large aspiration gaps also reported high levels of frustration, hopelessness, and financial instability, indicating their restricted capacities to realise.

While I acknowledge that refugees are restricted in their options, particularly with regards to potential destination countries, several interviewees with mid-sized aspiration gaps mentioned that they did have options available to change their current situation and decrease the sizes of their aspiration gaps. While the options might be limited, they seemed to have considerably more agency than those with very large aspiration gaps. An opportunist elaborated: 'I have choices. I have scholarship choices. Through them I can move outside and if I lost all choices, I told you, I can go to Brazil. They give humanitarian visas for Syrian refugees.'[68] The literature has also increasingly recognised that refugees are not passive victims of external processes but do make choices, even though in a more constrained environment.[69] Individuals with mid-sized aspiration gaps also seemed more likely to turn down an option that they believed would not sufficiently reduce their aspiration gap. A careerist was offered a work opportunity in Australia but rejected it. She explained: 'It didn't really match my desires so I did not take it. It was quite far from my field, from science, so I preferred to wait for another better opportunity.'[70] She was actively considering to relocate to Turkey where she expected to be granted rights she did not have in Jordan and be able to fulfil aspirations she had been unable to fulfil. Two Syrian doctors made plans to close their aspiration gaps years ago, when they were still studying medicine in Jordan. Anticipating that the conflict in Syria would continue, one started to learn German and translated his documents to migrate to Germany on a visa for highly-skilled individuals upon graduation. The other started studying for the American

68. 7M28.

69. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 'Do asylum seekers and refugees choose destination countries?'; Van Hear, *New Diasporas*.


70. 1F29.

medical exams so that his qualifications would be recognised and he could migrate to the USA. Each took several intermediate steps to eventually close his aspiration gap. The individuals with mid-sized aspiration gaps interviewed largely seemed to have the capacity to realise their aspirations and voiced clear aspirations and intentions for the near and medium-term future. They had met their physiological and safety needs, seemed financially relatively stable, and focused on fulfilling their aspirations associated with higher unfulfilled needs. In my sample, they tended to be younger and more educated.

Having argued in theory and shown through interview data that unfulfilled needs are the basis for aspiration gaps, I turn to the survey data to further investigate the predictors of individual's aspiration gaps. Table B.11 (Appendix) shows regression results of demographic characteristics on individual aspiration gaps. Age was associated with lower aspiration gaps, although merely for those aged 50 or over. Parents on average reported a 0.45-point higher aspiration gap than people without children. One explanation might be that their aspiration gaps do not only reflect their unfulfilled needs but are the sum of their own and their children's unfulfilled needs. There was no significant difference between men and women. Syrian refugees who only recently migrated to Jordan reported significantly lower aspiration gaps than those who have lived in Jordan for a few years. Lastly, the highly educated reported lower aspiration gaps. I further use the survey data to investigate the relation between aspiration gaps, life satisfaction, and migration motivation. As expected, I find aspiration gaps and life satisfaction to be inversely correlated (Pearson's correlation coefficient = -0.37). Figure 4.3 displays mean aspiration gaps and 95 per cent confidence intervals at different levels of life satisfaction. People who indicated to be 'Extremely dissatisfied' on average reported an aspiration gap of 6.2 while those who indicate to be 'Extremely satisfied' reported an aspiration gap half that size.

Figure 4.4 displays first and second order bivariate linear relations between aspiration gap and migration motivation as well as average migration motivation and 95 per


Figure 4.3: Aspiration gap, by life satisfaction (survey)



cent confidence intervals at each aspiration gap size. Individual migration motivation is heavily skewed to the right with a median of 5 and a mean of 4.4 on a 5-point scale (see Figure B.6, Appendix). There is a significant positive linear relationship between aspiration gaps and migration motivation, which holds when controlling for demographic characteristics (see Table B.12, Appendix, for logistic and linear regression results). Larger aspiration gaps were associated with a higher motivation to migrate, all else equal. However, as the migration motivation is very high in my sample, the effect of larger aspiration gaps is miniscule. In the linear regression model ((3) in Table B.12), a one-point increase in the size of the aspiration gap is associated with a 0.125-point increase in the motivation to migrate. The effects of demographic variables are considerably larger. On average, men's migration motivation is 0.4-point higher than women's while those aged over the age of 40 report a 0.4–0.6-point lower migration motivation. The data further shows a small positive association between time since arriving in Jordan and the motivation to migrate, suggesting that the motivation to migrate increases with the time spent in Jordan.

My findings are in line with the literature, which concluded that higher life satisfac-

Figure 4.4: Migration motivation, by size of aspiration gap (survey)



tion or subjective well-being is associated with lower migration desires and migration motivation.[71] However, some of my findings on aspiration gaps and the different types of aspirers stand in contrast to Carling's aspiration-ability model.[72] For instance, I found that some age groups, such as young adults, are not consistently associated with one type of aspirer nor with a certain size of aspiration gap. Further, I found qualitative and some quantitative evidence that careerists, typically young and highly skilled, displayed mid-sized aspiration gaps that were associated with the motivation to change behaviour, i.e. migrate. They also seemed to have a higher capacity to realise potential migration plans. For instance, they had the chance, albeit small, to relocate to a third country via a work visa, an option less skilled Syrian refugees in Jordan arguably did not have. One Syrian doctor who had already contracted his visa to work in Germany at the time of the interview is a case in point. I found a negative effect of age on aspiration gaps and a further negative effect of age on migration motivation, controlling for aspiration gaps. Having children was positively associated with

71. Ruohong Cai et al., 'International migration desires related to subjective well-being', *IZA Journal of Migration* 3, no. 8 (2014); Vladimir Otrachshenko and Olga Popova, 'Life (dis)satisfaction and the intention to migrate: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe', *Journal of Socio-Economics* 48 (2014): 40–49.

72. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility'.

larger aspiration gaps but, controlling for aspiration gaps, had no independent effect on migration motivation. Contrary to my findings, Carling found that high educational attainment was associated with lower aspirations to migrate while the effect on the ability to migrate was indeterminate.[73] I found that the highly skilled had lower aspiration gaps and that lower aspiration gaps were associated with lower migration motivation. However, when controlling for aspiration gaps, educational level did not independently affect migration motivation. This difference between Carling's and my findings might be due to two factors. First, the context of the research and the type of potential migrants, natives in Cap Verde in the late 1990s and Syrian refugees in Jordan in 2018 and 2019. The fact that we both find that higher skill is associated with lower migration motivation might be partly due to Carling's definition of migration, which excludes migration for educational purposes. He argues that the highly-skilled are able to escape social norms around migration, as education enables a professional career in Cape Verde. Second, Carling focuses on aspirations to migrate and I focus on life aspirations. The former assumes a causal relationship between demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and aspirations to migrate. The latter assumes that the effect of such characteristics are mediated via aspiration gaps and aspiration gaps have a causal effect on the motivation to migrate.

The sizes of individuals' aspiration gaps and the capacities to realise their aspirations vary temporally and spatially. Individuals have two options to affect their motivation to change behaviour: work on their capacity to realise and adjust their aspirations. The former involves acquiring material and non-material resources to facilitate fulfilling one's aspirations; the latter is the subject of the next section.

73. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility', p.34.

4.3.1 Adjusting aspirations

Individuals frequently adjust their aspirations. They do so due to personal circumstances and characteristics, their levels of needs satisfaction, and external circumstances and events. Personal circumstances that often result in aspiration adjustments include age, marriage, and sickness. Depending on one's age, one likely has different educational, professional, and personal aspirations. While teenagers and those in their 20s might aspire to tertiary education, those in their 30s might increasingly aspire to get married, start a family, and achieve their professional goals. People generally adjust their aspirations upwards once they meet certain needs they aspired to, often in response to migration.[74] They might adjust their aspirations downwards if their basic needs are no longer met and to avoid cognitive dissonance in the face of large aspiration gaps and the perceived inability to fulfil their aspirations. This can also happen after migration, particularly if the new status quo does not meet the ex ante perceptions and expectations.[75] Personal characteristics, such as personality traits, might lead individuals to adjust their aspirations more or less frequently. External factors that affect aspirations include displacement, voluntary migration, and information by friends. For instance, people might adjust their aspirations upwards when they hear of new opportunities from friends who have already migrated. Refugees initially generally adjust them downwards when they have to leave their country and look for a safe haven.

Before people become refugees, they generally aspire to a wide range of personal, educational, and professional goals. Once they are forced to flee, they likely first and foremost aspire to physical safety and security. The fact that safety remained a central aspect of many Syrian refugees' life aspirations even after several years in Jordan reinforces this hypothesis. Depending on their situations in Jordan, Syrian

74. Czaika and Vothknecht, 'Migration and aspirations'; Vervliet et al., 'The aspirations of Afghan unaccompanied refugee minors before departure and on arrival in the host country'.
75. Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, *Journeys to Europe*.

refugees might expand their set of aspirations. Having found safety, they aspire to fulfil higher needs, such as financial security, stable employment, and education. Depending on their capacities to realise their aspirations and the sizes of their aspiration gaps, they might be motivated to realise their aspirations in Jordan or look for migration opportunities. The (perceived) inability to change one's status quo might lead some to adjust their aspirations downwards. Learning of new opportunities, some might adjust their aspirations upwards and make plans to migrate. I find qualitative evidence for all these behaviours.

More than a third of interviewees reported to have adjusted their aspirations as a result of being displaced and coming to Jordan. Asked about her aspirations and whether she believed she could achieve them in Jordan, a young woman remarked: 'Of course not! I was hoping to become a psychological counsellor. From when I was in Syria I had this ambition.'[76] Her aspirations changed and she aspired to find work that gave her independence. Reflecting on their reasons for leaving Syria for Jordan, a young woman highlighted the importance of safety and security: 'When I left Syria to Jordan I was eleven [years old], and we just had to get away from the bombing and the violence, so we came to Jordan, we didn't know about the situation here, we just wanted security.'[77] While some people settled quickly, others reported that it took them several years to feel settled and pursue higher aspirations. Several Syrians stated that they had adjusted their aspirations due to the reality of being displaced and the challenges they faced in Jordan: 'Perhaps my ambition would have been higher, my expectations of a good life would have been higher. Because of what happened in Syria, this definition of a good life has changed.'[78] Another young man's statement echoed this. He adjusted his aspirations to his new status quo:

> Of course everyone has ambitions for the best in life, I would like at 30 to

76. 15F21.
77. 3F18.
78. 6M23.

> have my own engineering related startup because I like home automation for example. But if I am to be as realistic as I can be within the current situation then I hope that I can have my family around me and to work within my field with a good income. Anything else will be extra, but this is what will make me feel comfortable. To me, this is good. If I get more, then I of course hope for more, but I won't be disappointed with this description of a good life.[79]

While he still had not fully abandoned his career aspirations, he stressed that one had to reassess one's ambitions to avoid frustration associated with large aspiration gaps. Similarly, a young man stressed that a failure to adjust one's aspirations and adapt to the new status quo leads to frustration and a preference for resettlement:

> I see people who from their first day here kept saying that they don't like it here, they don't want to adapt, they don't want to accept anyone saying 'people don't like us', 'it's not a good country', 'there is no work here', 'we want to leave', 'we came here to resettle somewhere else', 'houses aren't good', 'streets aren't clean', etc. They repeat these things. So I feel for me that one either adapts and accepts things and builds their life or they come here and do not want to have a life until they resettle somewhere else. Some people resettled then want to come back here, they didn't like it where they went.[80]

The man argued that one has to accept the new status quo and work from there to fulfil one's aspirations. To avoid the cognitive dissonance associated with large aspiration gaps, one should (temporarily) adjust one's aspirations to reflect the changed status quo. This behaviour of adjusting one's aspiration (temporarily) downwards is in line with Mallet et al.'s finding that some migrants accepted a 'good enough' life while others did not and aimed to move on.[81] While most people initially adjusted their aspirations downwards, some stated that their aspirations and expectations would increase again in the future:

> When one reaches a specific stage [of needs satisfaction] they start to look at other better things. The first thing would be that you're able to work,

79. 4M23.
80. 10M25.
81. Richard Mallett et al., *Journeys on hold: How policy influences the migration decisions of Eritreans in Ethiopia*, ODI Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2017).

> and when you work then you'll say can I start my own business or not, and so on.[82]

For instance, one man stated that he recently had more hope for achieving his dream of becoming a political analyst in Jordan after learning of new opportunities to become an entrepreneur. Another man stressed that his aspirations had adjusted upwards since he came to Jordan: 'When I first got here I didn't have ambitions on the kind of work I wanted, I just needed to work.'[83] He initially had needed to work to satisfy his basic needs but had since been able to meet them and was therefore able to adjust his aspirations upwards. Work was not merely a means to an end anymore and he stated that his ambition was to have his own clothes shop. One woman mentioned that Jordan had given her opportunities and aspirations she had not had before: 'If I was in Syria I might not be having the same ambitions. We didn't have the freedom to move around and participate in courses and workshops.'[84]

The majority said that they could not imagine leaving Syria before 2011. However, a few people saw their situation as a 'golden opportunity' for a better future for themselves and particularly for their children: 'Even if before the crisis we received an opportunity to go to the USA or Europe then I would probably do it.'[85] Some respondents hence saw displacement as an opportunity to fulfil their aspirations, whether in Jordan or through resettlement to a third country. Their aspiration gaps varied in sizes; the ones who aimed to stay tended to have smaller ones, the ones who aimed to be resettled mid-sized to large ones. Displacement and the reality of life in Jordan had convinced more people that migrating to a third country, usually through resettlement, was the only viable or their preferred option to fulfil their aspirations. Speaking about her sister who was resettled to the USA, one woman remarked: '[Her children] are doing very well . . . their English language is better,

82. 6M23.
83. 5M37.
84. 25F27.
85. 25F27.

academically they are better. Now they have interests, "I want to study, to become X," so even their interests have developed.'[86] Her assertion strengthens the hypothesis that aspirations are frequently adjusted upwards after voluntary migration.[87] Prior research suggests that (perceived) inescapable stagnation rather than aspiration gaps increases the motivation to relocate.[88] I found weak evidence at best. While it seemed that some respondents wished to relocate, as they did not believe they could fulfil their aspirations in Jordan, destitution played a central role in the wish to leave Jordan. Further, I would expect that respondents with high and clear aspirations, such as careerists, and respondents who were the best off (but had not fulfilled all their aspirations) would be most inclined to develop the motivation to migrate due to (perceived) inescapable stagnation. I did not find evidence for this behaviour.

To realise their aspirations, Syrian refugees in Jordan generally have three options with regards to their geographical location: local integration in Jordan, repatriation to Syria, and resettlement to a third country. I have so far repeatedly quoted people's preferences and aspirations for these 'durable solutions'. Qualitatively analysing people's aspiration gaps and preferences indicates that they are correlated. A young man summarised this nicely:

> If the person doesn't change or adapt then they will want to go back to Syria. This is the difference between a refugee who tells you that he's very happy and another who says they want to go back, although they're both in the same country, there's something there that no one understands.[89]

The next chapter explores interviewees' preferences for these durable solutions and their relation with aspiration gaps in more detail.

86. 25F27.
87. Czaika and Vothknecht, 'Migration and aspirations'.
88. María Hernández-Carretero and Jørgen Carling, 'Beyond "Kamikaze Migrants": Risk Taking in West African Boat Migration to Europe', *Human Organization* 71, no. 4 (2012): 407–416.
89. 6M23.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have used qualitative interview data, supported by quantitative survey data, to analyse the life aspirations of Syrian refugees in Jordan. I have done so to provide answers to the first part of the third research question: What are the *aspirations*, destination preferences, and destination choices of Syrian refugees in Jordan and how well does the revised migration decision-making framework explain them? I illustrated aspects of the migration decision-making framework established in Chapter 2. In particular, I evaluated the first step of the two-step migration process, the question whether to migrate (see Figure 2.1 above). I have outlined respondents' life aspirations and shown how unfulfilled physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualisation needs affect and give rise to a variety of life aspirations (Section 4.1). Depending on the set of aspirations and the relative importance of some aspirations versus others, one could distinguish between five broad 'types of aspirers': safety first, family person, careerist, opportunist, and formalist. Next, I have examined the barriers Syrian refugees reported to face in Jordan that prevented them from realising their aspirations (Section 4.2). The biggest barrier reported was dependency, which was caused by limited rights and the lack of a clear path to citizenship, employment restrictions, financial hardship, and discrimination and racism. The barriers severely constrained and limited respondents' capacities to realise their aspirations in Jordan.

Contrasting life aspirations with respondents' status quo revealed that the majority had aspiration gaps (Section 4.3). Depending on the size of their aspiration gap, they reported to be motivated to change behaviour to realise their aspirations. The survey findings partly support the theoretical conjectures and interview findings. Aspiration gaps were associated with the motivation to migrate. I confirmed the hypothesis that respondents adjusted aspirations downwards and upwards, depending on needs satisfaction, environmental factors, and personal characteristics. In line with the proposed theoretical framework, I found that respondents with small aspiration gaps

were generally more satisfied with their status quo and believed they could realise their aspirations in Jordan. Those with medium to large aspiration gaps, however, generally reported to face considerable to insurmountable barriers to realise their aspirations in Jordan. They were generally not very satisfied with their status quo and aimed to leave Jordan — either through resettlement to a third country or to repatriate to Syria. I found some qualitative evidence that those with mid-sized aspiration gaps reported to have more choices and a greater degree of voluntariness while those with very large aspiration gaps felt that they were almost forced to leave to a third country or back to Syria due to their unfulfilled needs in Jordan. In short, my results confirm the theoretical predictions of the migration decision-making framework.

The following chapter discusses respondents' preferences for the three durable solutions in more detail and examines the relation between aspiration gaps and durable solution preference. Determining where to relocate is the second step in the migration decision-making process outlined in Figure 2.1 as well as the second part of the third research question. The next chapter therefore explores the preferences of Syrian refugees with regards to potential migration destinations: the countries they preferred to relocate to and the reasons for doing so. It does so by drawing on both interview and survey data.

Chapter 5

Destination Preferences

Having shown in Chapter 4 that the majority of Syrian refugees interviewed and surveyed in Jordan had considerable aspiration gaps, this chapter turns to their options to change their status quo and decrease their aspiration gaps. Refugees generally have three main options, often termed 'durable solutions': (permanent) integration in their host country, (voluntary) repatriation to their country of origin, and resettlement to a third country. Employing qualitative interview data, I show that small aspiration gaps tended to be associated with a preference for local integration, mid-range aspiration gaps with resettlement, and very large aspiration gaps with return to Syria (Section 5.1). I found mixed evidence in the survey data. While small aspiration gaps were still associated with preferences for local integration, mid-range to large aspiration gaps were associated with both repatriation and resettlement. Next, I explore how Syrian refugees would choose a migration destination, if they could do so. Section 5.2 discusses a variety of destination characteristics, such as anti-immigrant sentiment, migrant networks, and economic opportunities that attract or deter Syrians. It further compares the findings with the literature on migration drivers. Section 5.3 explores respondents' destination country preferences. The qualitative data gives reasons why certain characteristics or countries were preferred but does not show the relative importance of different characteristics, which I evaluate in Chapter 6. The quantitative

survey results show that access to citizenship and rights, followed by education and employment opportunities, were considered the most important destination characteristic for my sample of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Section 5.4 summarises.

5.1 Durable solutions

Durable solutions are generally regarded as the three options available to refugees in (post-)conflict situations. The UNHCR defines a durable solution as one that:

> will leave a refugee or stateless person able to enjoy all their rights to the same extent as nationals. A comprehensive solution has legal, economic, social and cultural and political and civil dimensions, each of which needs to be addressed for a solution to be sustainable.[1]


Syrian refugees' preferences for the durable solutions have to be considered in the spatial and temporal context (see Section 3.2). When conducting the interviews, the Syrian government was preparing an offensive in Idlib, the last large rebel-held territory and Turkey had closed its border to Syria, as had Jordan. The results should hence been seen against these developments.

In the interviews, roughly one in three respondents stated that they hoped to return to Syria once it was safe to do so. In addition, some liked to return but said it was impossible at the time. Young men opposed mandatory conscription and individuals who were involved in opposition activities feared persecution. Another third of Syrians interviewed reported that they could not imagine to ever return to Syria. Around half said that they would like to resettle. A majority reported that they neither imagined nor aspired to permanently integrate in Jordan due to the wide range of barriers they faced (see Section 4.2). While the proportions are based on a qualitative sample of 29 people, the results are nevertheless surprising when compared to my survey results. Figure 5.1 shows that more than four in five survey respondents

1. UNHCR, 'Solutions for Refugees', chap. 7 in *The 10-Point Plan in Action, 2016 Update* (UNHCR, 2016), p.182.

preferred to resettle with merely one in 20 preferring to stay in Jordan or return to Syria, respectively. As the subject pool was not representative of Syrian refugees in Jordan, I do not claim that this distribution represents the preferences of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The difference in preferences between the interviews and survey might be due to the former's small sample size but also due to differing sampling strategies. For the interviews, I cooperated with NGOs and was interested why people wanted to leave Jordan while also capturing the reasons why some wanted to stay. My interviewees might hence arguably have been more diverse than the population of Syrian refugees in Jordan. For the survey, those most interested to migrate to a third country might have been more likely to self-select into participation than those indifferent or opposed to migration (see Section 3.4 for the sample selection). Social desirability bias due to the fact that the interviews were led by a Jordanian citizen might also partly explain why integration was more preferred than in anonymous surveys. I reflected on this issue in more detail in Chapter 3 above.

Figure 5.1: Preferences for durable solutions (survey)



How do these results compare to the literature? In 2018, UNHCR conducted a survey of Syrians refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, which found that

three quarters hoped to return to Syria one day (up from one half in 2017) while one fifth did not ever want to return.[2] However, the proportion of those hoping to return seems to have decreased since.[3] In February 2019, the Jordanian Prime Minister Osama Al-Razzaz weighed in on the debate and insisted that most Syrian refugees 'have no intention of going back any time soon.'[4] The UNHCR survey further indicated that around 15 per cent planned to stay in their host countries while merely five per cent planned to travel to a third country. A qualitative study of Syrian refugees' preferences for durable solutions in Turkey is more in line with my findings.[5] The study confirmed that safety was paramount for returning to Syria and that half of all respondents intended to do so. Surprisingly, the authors found that onward migration, such as resettlement, was the preferred option merely for a very small minority. Contrary to my findings, the authors found that a large majority of Syrian refugees wished to permanently integrate in their host country. The contrasting findings might partly be explained by the easier access to citizenship and the formal and informal labour market in Turkey compared to Jordan. Further, the preference for resettlement in my sample, particularly among survey respondents, arguably reflects self-selection. All surveys and qualitative assessments of durable solution preferences follow different sample strategies and none claims, to my knowledge, to be representative of the population in question. My findings with regards to preferred migration destination characteristics and preferred destination countries might hence not generalise to Syrian refugees in Jordan. In the following, I qualitatively explore the factors that affect Syrian refugees' preferences for durable solutions in Jordan, compare them to the literature, and show how aspiration gaps affect preferences. At the end of this section,

2. UNHCR, *Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees*.

3. UNHCR, *Forth Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees' Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria (RPIS): Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan (July 2018)*, technical report (Amman: UNHCR, 2018), p.14.

4. Al-Khalidi, 'Jordan's PM appeals for more aid as most Syrian refugees set to stay'.

5. Seefar, *Return, Stay, or Migrate? Understanding the Aspirations of Syrian Refugees in Turkey*, technical report (Seefar, 2018), accessed 1 September 2019, `https://seefar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Syrians-in-Turkey.pdf`.

I present quantitative survey evidence for durable solution preferences and compare them to the qualitative findings.

5.1.1 Local integration

A minority of five respondents mentioned that they were happy in Jordan, particularly when compared to the ongoing conflict in Syria. One lamented the popular discourse and perception that all Syrians wanted to return or resettle:

> There is always this general idea that all Syrians want is to be resettled. Or to go back to Syria. Or that they don't like it here. I don't know why this is happening. I like it here to be honest.[6]

Another man emphasised that 'staying here is a million times better than going back to Syria.'[7] While contrary to the findings of the UNHCR survey summarised above, these quotes are in line with findings of a 2018 poll reported by Jordanian Roya News, according to which a third of Syrians in Jordan did not intend to ever return while half of all Syrians intended to stay, as they felt welcomed by the host community.[8] Those who would like to stay emphasised their love for and sense of belonging in Jordan:

> [My daughters] love Jordan, they love it very much. My oldest daughters says that she's Jordanian, although neither of her parents are Jordanian, but that's it, she loves Jordan. They all love Jordan my daughters, I love it too. I have a belonging to Jordan, it's strange, I count it as if it's my country, but I hope that it will give me the opportunity to work. I don't have a problem to stay here, but I want to work. I am stable Alhamdulillah [NB Arabic for Praise to God] and everything is great, but I want to work.[9]

Employment restrictions were mentioned by several respondents as one of the main reasons why they might leave Jordan, even though they felt settled: 'I am stable

6. 10M25.
7. 5M37.
8. RN, 'Poll: Syrian refugees choose living in Jordan', *Roya News*, accessed 20 December 2018, `https://en.royanews.tv/news/16248/Poll--Syrian-refugees-choose-living-in-Jordan-over-Canada`.
9. 24F38.

in Jordan. Jordan is my country and I love it and I am very stable here and very happy here, apart from the issue of work. Otherwise I wouldn't think of going anywhere else.'[10] Expanding employment opportunities might hence entice more to stay, decreasing opportunities will likely increase the proportion of those who prefer repatriation or resettlement. The perception that Jordan offered safety and stability but potentially no future is in line with past reseach.[11] Respondents who preferred and intended to stay in Jordan tended to be happier with their status quo, stated that they were settled, had adapted to their new lives, and seemed convinced that they could realise their aspirations in Jordan. These aspirations were likely adjusted to align with the reality of life in Jordan. When asked whether he believed he could realise his aspirations in Jordan, one young man responded:

> I can't be sure where my ambitions would best be fulfilled because I haven't tried, but I feel that my ambitions fit within the context of Jordan, because I have developed these ambitions here based on what I see in Jordan. How do people develop their ambitions anyway? They do that by seeing the context around them and seeing the potential. So my ambitions would work here.[12]

Another man highlighted that adapting to one's new status quo and adjusting one's aspirations was central. Failure to do so would lead to frustration, considerable aspiration gaps and the preference to leave Jordan:

> I see people who from their first day here kept saying that they don't like it here, they don't want to adapt . . . One either adapts and accepts things and builds their life or they come here and do not want to have a life until they resettle somewhere else.[13]

Respondents who intended to stay in Jordan typically had relatively small aspiration

10. 20M37.
11. REACH, *Picking up the pieces: Realities of return and reintegration in North-East Syria*, technical report (REACH, 2018), accessed 1 September 2019, `https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/impact_initiatives_picking_up_the_pieces_-_realities_of_return_and_reintegration_in_north-east_syria_normal_0.pdf`.
12. 4M23.
13. 10M25.

gaps. Staying in Jordan was feasible and they could imagine and often aspired to a future in Jordan, particularly if they were able to find employment. People with small aspiration gaps also did not seem to be as concerned with or affected by antagonism and racism by the host community.

Some types of aspirers (see Section 4.1.1) were more likely to prefer local integration than others. Safety first aspirers were primarily concerned with safety and security and hence more willing to stay in Jordan as long as their situation remained safe, secure, and stable. Opportunists voiced preferences for local integration if they had encountered or hoped to encounter ways to reach their aspirations in Jordan. However, they were open to resettlement if the right opportunity would come up. Careerists often had specific career and educational plans they might not be able to fulfil in Jordan and hence preferred to relocate, at least temporarily. Formalists lamented the lack of rights and absence of a path to citizenship in Jordan and hence preferred to leave Jordan:

> For example if I'm in a country for four or five years, if the country gives me the citizenship and I become a citizen, I become a son of that country, from that country, I am treated like I am from there. But here if I stay for a million years I will never even think about having the citizenship.[14]

Some respondents regarded racism as the main issue preventing them from staying: 'Staying in Jordan is not an option, we are here now and we are satisfied with being here, but the community is not satisfied with us being here.'[15] While some respondents preferred to stay but might eventually (involuntarily) repatriate due to racism, their bad economic situation, or their lack of rights, others, however, hoped to repatriate as soon as possible.

14. 29M24.
15. 26F39.

5.1.2 Repatriation

Returns to Syria are voluntary if 'one is able to make an informed decision regarding whether or not their "home" meets their threshold for return.'[16] The threshold for return denotes one's minimum conditions that have to be met. The UNHCR states that 1,775 Syrians voluntarily returned from Jordan to Syria between January and August 2018, when I started conducting the interviews.[17] This figure is much lower than the more than 8,000 Syrians who returned in 2017 and might reflect worsening situations in parts of Syria and particularly the closure of the border between Jordan and Syria. However, the pace of return picked up since the border reopened in October 2018. The figure how many Syrian refugees have left Jordan since then is disputed and ranges from 3,800 and 5,700 between October and mid-December 2018[18] to more than 30,000 refugees between July and mid-December 2018.[19] The revised UNHCR figures for verified refugee returns from Jordan to Syria in 2018 is just over 8,000, the same level as in 2017.[20] For January to March/April 2019, the UNHCR had already verified more than 10,000 returns from Jordan to Syria.[21] The UNHCR survey found that the most important reasons for eventual return were the improved security situation, family reunification, and economic opportunities. Asked under what conditions she would repatriate, a young woman I interviewed responded:

> Safety and stability only. Once there is stability then you can go back, and you can start from zero, even if your house is destroyed. You work

16. REACH, *Picking up the pieces*, p.38.
17. UNHCR, *Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees.*
18. Stefano Severe, 'Syrian refugees are returning, but it is not time for us to disengage', *Jordan Times*, 12 December 2018, accessed 16 December 2018, `http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/stefano-severe/syrian-refugees-are-returning-it-not-time-us-disengage`; Petra, '5,703 Syrian refugees return home since borders reopening', *Jordan News Agency (Petra)*, 14 December 2018, accessed 16 December 2018, `http://www.petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp?ID=11944&lang=en&name=en_news`.
19. RMoD, 'Bulletin of the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring (December 10, 2018)', *Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation*, 10 December 2018, accessed 16 December 2018, `http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12207435`.
20. UNHCR, *Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees.*
21. Ibid.

> and you start from zero and build your life again. There are no other factors involved. Once there is stability everyone will go back, our family, and we still have family in Syria, and I will see my sister again and our other relatives. We will collaborate and support each other to rebuild our lives again.[22]

Several respondents echoed that safety was the most important condition. This is in line with the results of a survey by REACH that found that two thirds of Syrian repatriates stated that the improved safety situation had been the most important pull factor.[23] However, respondents arguably enjoyed physical safety, albeit not (financial) security in Jordan; repatriating merely because it is safe to do so seems contrary to the framework centred on life aspirations. This might be explained by two factors. First, survey respondents in REACH's study were only allowed to select the most important pull factor. Second, returnees might have lived in countries other than Jordan, such as Iraq, that arguably provided less safety. In the interviews that I conducted, safety was referred to as a prerequisite for return but not as a pull factor. The second most important pull factor for return in the REACH survey was nostalgia and homesickness, mentioned by 16 per cent. Similarly, the love for one's home country was mentioned repeatedly in the interviews as the main reason to repatriate:

> I love Syria very much, it's my country, so I don't have a problem to go back, but at the same time I want to find a good future for myself. If I feel that the job market there is better, that salaries get better, that there are investments and so on, then I'm not against the idea of going back. The economic situation is the most important to me.[24]

Even those who did not prefer to repatriate in the near future often reported a feeling of responsibility for their homeland, its rebuilding, and towards the Syrian people:

> I support building my country, in the future, I want to build it. I don't know how but I am a citizen of this country and must rebuild it, even if I go to a foreign country and live there I might work and study or anything

22. 8F20.
23. REACH, *Picking up the pieces*.
24. 4M23.

but in the future I will rebuild my country. That's the aim for everyone.[25]

Interestingly, Syrians who came to Jordan before 2011 seemed to have an even greater sense of responsibility. They might be more sympathetic to rebuilding Syria, as they had not been directly affected by the recent war:

> I always have an idea that I will definitely go back. At least I have a responsibility, as a Syrian, I have a responsibility towards my country, and I imagine that one day I will be strong enough and I will fulfil my responsibilities.[26]

Several young Syrians chose their university degree, such as civil engineering, as they anticipated economic opportunities from and wanted to contribute to the reconstruction of Syria once the war ends. A minority also stated that reuniting with family was a reason for repatriation.

Respondents who stated preferences for voluntary repatriation typically had medium to large aspiration gaps. Their aspirations to contribute to the rebuilding of Syria were framed in terms of both love and esteem needs. They stressed that repatriating was an option and that the precondition was safety and economic opportunities to cover their basic needs in Syria while pursuing higher needs and aspirations. Repatriation would be feasible as soon as these preconditions would be met but was arguably not feasible at the time of the interviews. Some opportunists with mid-sized aspiration gaps had adapted to life in Jordan and (temporarily) abandoned their aspirations to contribute to rebuilding Syria due to the prolonged nature of the conflict. However, when the security and economic situation in Syria improves, they reported that they might repatriate to contribute to the rebuilding and fulfil their aspirations.

There was some variation in preferences within families. Several respondents shared that their parents wished to repatriate while they preferred to stay in Jordan or resettle. Younger respondents often spent formative years in education in Jordan

25. 29M24.
26. 1F29.

and typically had most of their friends in Jordan. Their aspiration gaps were smaller than their parents', as they might not yet have had to worry about sustaining a family. Their status quo bias (see Section 2.3) might have been more pronounced, as they spent a larger part of their lives in Jordan, relative to their parents. The young had adapted to their new lives and adjusted their aspirations while the previous generation still compared their current lives to their past ones in Syria.

However, not everybody was pulled to Syria due to a feeling of belonging and the promise of future economic opportunities. A number of respondents reported that they were pushed back to Syria due to their situation in Jordan and the absence of promising legal migration pathways to third countries. In particular, they stated racism and antagonism by the host community, dependency and the lack of dignity, limited economic opportunities, the absence of a path to citizenship, and financial hardship as reasons to leave Jordan. Some stated that family members were already forced to return while others foresee that in the future:

> For now returning is voluntary but down the road they [NB the Jordanian government and international organisations] might have some conditions that force us to return. They will label it as voluntary but we will have certain limits and maybe then going back to Syria will be the 'easier choice.' ... I am sure they will not force us to go back but they will put us in a scenario in which we will be forced to. For example, my mother takes 6–7 medications, 70–90% of that is covered by the UNHCR, if and when they stop that support, and stop the food coupons, when they limit our activities, all of these will put us in a situation where one would have no option but to go to the desert.[27]

Other respondents shared the fear that support would incrementally be withdrawn, forcing them to go back to Syria. One woman held that the challenges Syrians faced while waiting to be resettled could eventually force them to repatriate, which she termed 'indirect forced migration'.[28] These findings are in line with prior research that generally concluded that a significant part of Syrian refugees felt that they were

27. 28M41.
28. 27F37.

involuntarily pushed to repatriate due to dwindling support and financial hardship in Jordan.[29] In a survey of refugees who had repatriated to Syria, 39 per cent and 25 per cent stated that the primary push factor was the lack of economic opportunities and the lack of basic services in their host countries, respectively.[30] Hence, almost two thirds seemed to be pushed back to Syria, compared to 17 per cent who reported that no factors in their host countries pushed them to repatriate.[31] Those who felt forced to repatriate typically had large aspiration gaps; their status quo fell considerably short of their aspirations. They often compared their current situation to their situation in Syria before they had to leave. Being familiar with living in Syria, they anticipated that life in Syria would be the same again once the conflict ends and would definitely be easier than their lives in Jordan.

Those who did not intend to ever return stressed that their houses and neighbourhoods were destroyed, they no longer had family and friends in Syria, and could not imagine that Syria would return to how it used to be due to widespread destruction and ongoing political conflict. They had nothing to go back to. One man asserted:

> [Even] if we want to imagine that tomorrow Syria will go back to how it was, then the answer would be no, I will not go back because all the people I know are dead. If I'm going to go I have to go to the cemetery and all day long, I'd be visiting people in the cemetery.[32]

Many interviewees, particularly men and those who were somewhat politically active, highlighted the political situation in Syria as central to their repatriation decision. Conscription and the reserve army were factors preventing men from repatriating. Those active in the opposition to President Assad and those whose families had to leave Syria for political reasons in the 1980s stated that it was not feasible to go back

29. Saskia Baas, 'The Real Reasons Why Syrians Return to Syria', *Refugees Deeply*, 6 March 2018, accessed 19 January 2019, `https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/community/2018/03/06/the-real-reasons-why-syrians-return-to-syria-2`; Bellamy et al., *The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan.*

30. REACH, *Picking up the pieces.*

31. Ibid.

32. 23M20.

to Syria, as they would face political persecution. One man who came to Jordan as a teenager and had lived there for thirty years explained:

> My preference was to go back to Syria when the situation settles there, but it doesn't seem that such a thing will happen, especially for me, because I participated somehow in the revolution by going to demonstrations at the Syrian embassy in Jordan, and by writing with my real name on Facebook, and writing articles. So considering this, I can't go back to Syria if the Assad regime continues to be victorious.[33]

The reasons for wanting to repatriate were a feeling of belonging in one's home country, particularly of enjoying the rights one's citizenship grants, having family and property there, and future economic opportunities. Their aspiration gaps were typically mid-range; they voluntary decide to repatriate if and when they choose. Some people felt they would be forced to return due to their worsening livelihood situation in Jordan. Their aspiration gaps were typically large and they were dependent on support. Political opposition and activism, conscription, and the security situation in Syria stopped people from repatriating voluntarily.

5.1.3 Resettlement

As mentioned above — and highlighted by a few respondents — the chance to be resettled is relatively small. In 2018, the target quota for the resettlement of Syrian refugees from Jordan was 4,885 and the target for 2019 is 5,010.[34] Given that the total number of Syrian refugees in Jordan is estimated at 1.3 million,[35] the target quota is equivalent to less than one per cent of the refugee population but the estimated proportion of Syrians who meet resettlement criteria and are in need of resettlement is ten per cent.[36] This section evaluates the reasons why, despite the very small chances of being resettled, half of all Syrians interviewed and more than eight in ten Syrians

33. 9M35.
34. UNHCR, *Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees.*
35. MOPIC, *Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis.*
36. UNHCR, *Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees.*

surveyed nevertheless stated they wanted to be resettled while only a minority actively opposed resettlement. In this context, resettlement also includes other legal pathways to third countries, such as humanitarian visas, academic scholarships, private sponsorship or work visas.[37] Prior studies found that limited access to rights and basic services and financial hardship due to high living costs were the main reasons Syrians wanted to resettle, particularly if repatriation was not a viable option.[38] I briefly explain the resettlement process before outlining the reasons respondents were in favour of or against resettlement.

Refugees are by design the passive party in resettlement. During annual case interviews, the UNHCR asks Syrian refugees in Jordan whether they would in principle be interested to be resettled, which a majority of respondents reported to affirm. Third countries provide the UNHCR with quotas and limited preferences for refugees they are willing to accept; UNHCR then matches countries with refugees and IOM assists in the actual resettlement process. Almost every Syrian interviewed referred to UNHCR and a minority also mentioned IOM, particularly those who had started their resettlement process. Some people seemed to accept that there is not much they could do and that they were the passive party in the resettlement process. Others, however, took initiative and applied for visas, albeit their chances seemed minuscule. After one man's visa application had been rejected by the Australian embassy because he did not have a sponsor, he applied for a visa at the French embassy:

> I applied twice and they rejected my application. They have a requirement which is a sponsor, and I don't have one. I still applied twice, I was there today and I applied for the third time, but I don't have very high expectations. ... What happens is that when people get rejected they give up and don't apply again, but a man at the door there told me to apply again, I might have a better chance. So I was rejected a week ago and I applied again today.[39]

37. UNHCR, *3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2018-2019 in response to the Syria Crisis. Regional Strategic Overview*, technical report (UNHCR, 2018).
38. Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, *Journeys to Europe*.
39. 5M37.

Even though he did not have very high expectations, he continued to try. He also stated that he would apply at any other embassy if that country sponsored refugees. The choice of the Australian and French embassies was due to limited options and because he had heard of these opportunities, not because he favoured Australia and France. In fact, he did not particularly like France due to restrictions on wearing the hijab. However, he insisted he would go to any country that accepted him. A young woman who also wanted to be resettled explained how she would make the decision whether to accept a resettlement offer:

> UNHCR will tell me the country and I will either agree or not. I will either agree or not based on the country and life there. Of course I would ask about life there, I'll ask if Syrian refugees can live well there, if the people there are good. I'll ask on Facebook, I'll ask for recommendations. Many Syrians who get resettlement offers ask such questions on Facebook.[40]

However, when asked whether there would be specific factors that made her decide not to go to a country offered, she replied: 'Honestly, I will go to any country that I get offered to go to.'[41] Several individuals who preferred resettlement responded similarly. They first insisted they would evaluate the country and then decide but then said they would never reject a resettlement offer and would go to any country. Others immediately stated that they would accept resettlement to any country, even those who had earlier voiced specific country preferences. A few individuals who at first insisted that they would go anywhere subsequently added some conditions, as exemplified by the following quote:

> Not anywhere in general but anywhere that respects me and gives me my rights. Mostly I was thinking about Australia. I applied to go to Australia, personally applied to the Australian embassy in Jordan, not through the UNHCR. I sent emails and applied and gave them all the documents. The application is online and you fill it and share your story. I applied but was refused.[42]

40. 3F18.
41. 3F18.
42. 20M37.

Several interviewees who preferred to be resettled highlighted that they expected to be able to enjoy their rights, particularly to be able to work and have a pathway to citizenship, which would enable them to be independent. This confirms prior studies.[43] Even though the chances of being resettled are minuscule, several respondents believed it was feasible and that they would eventually be contacted by the UNHCR. This belief might have been driven by the fact that the majority of those who preferred to be resettled had family, friends, or acquaintances who were resettled. In addition, several respondents reported that they had relatives or knew of people who irregularly migrated to Europe via a boat from Turkey or Libya and had since settled in Europe. However, respondents highlighted not to want to migrate irregularly. They stated to be afraid of the risks involved, which they seemed to be aware of: 'I saw multiple horror stories about refugees who go illegally to Europe and I am afraid to go illegally to Europe but I have better choices.'[44] To have better choices than potentially drowning in the sea in a perilous journey (and potentially never reaching one's preferred destination) was a common theme why respondents opposed irregular migration options. Irregular migration from Jordan to Europe arguably became a less realistic option and harder in practice due to the closed borders between Jordan and Syria as well as between Turkey and Syria at the time of the interviews and the refugee agreement between Turkey and the EU:

> I have three uncles who went to Sweden through the sea. At the time it was very easy and was cheap, not very expensive, but it was a tiring and risky journey, but they only cared about reaching there. While with the UNHCR the process was very long, they would have a meeting then another meeting in six months, then it would take them a year to send them to the embassy, at times they wouldn't send them to the embassy, so it is a long process, while going illegally is straightforward, I go to Turkey then to Greece then wherever I want to go.[45]

43. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'.
44. 7M28.
45. 10M25.

The quote demonstrates the feasibility of irregular migration and highlights the agency ('I go to ... wherever I want to go') that refugees seemed to have enjoyed when relocating irregularly to Europe in the wake of the 2015 'migration crisis'. I did not find qualitative evidence for the argument that migration had become the 'new normal' for Syrians and that everybody wanted to migrate.[46] The explanation might be that I conducted the interviews in Jordan while Hagen-Zanker and Mallet conducted them in European destination countries. The refugees interviewed might differ with regards to unobservable personal characteristics, such as risk-taking, and observable characteristics, such as their network. Those who had already migrated to Europe might be risk-takers and might have surrounded themselves with others who migrate while those who had not left the Middle East might be more risk-averse.

Syrians who preferred resettlement typically had medium to large aspiration gaps. Individuals with mid-sized gaps reported to have some choices, resettlement being one of them, and often actively tried to relocate to specific countries. Syrians with large aspiration gaps who preferred resettlement often did so to escape their dire current situation, they hardly mentioned specific destination countries, and wanted to leave as soon as and relocate wherever possible. Again, preferences for resettlement varied with people's aspirations and within families. Careerists often had well-defined preferences where to relocate and the types of visas available to them, opportunists seemed indifferent and would only take what they perceived to be a good opportunity, and formalists would resettle to any country that gave them rights and a path towards citizenship. Getting a resettlement offer could result in family conflict, as family members had different preferences with regards to resettlement. One young man wished to stay in Jordan: 'I am really hoping that we won't be contacted for resettlement. Because then it will have to be a family decision, we either all leave or we all stay.'[47]

46. Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, *Journeys to Europe*.
47. 10M25.

The majority of respondents reported to know Syrian refugees who rejected resettlement offers. Likewise, a minority of interviewees rejected their resettlement offers, as they preferred to stay in Jordan with their families and hoped to integrate or eventually repatriate. While repatriation was feasible for them, they did not like repatriation in general or the country offered by the UNHCR in particular. One man explained why he turned down an offer to resettle to the USA:

> I am not thinking about leaving Jordan, if I will leave Jordan it will be to Syria only. ... I anticipate that if we get resettled to Sweden or Canada and that it will be better than here or Syria but my homeland is dear. ... Being here is at least close to Syria.[48]

Others justified their decisions to reject resettlement with not knowing anyone in the country, uncertainty how life would be in a foreign country and culture, and perceived xenophobia and negative attitudes towards refugees in certain countries. One young man told the story of this relatives:

> We have relatives who were registered with the UNHCR and they offered them resettlement to the UK, but he refused, may God offer him guidance [NB he laughs]. He refused because he has young children and he was afraid about that, and he doesn't know anyone in the UK. If they gave him an offer to the US he would have gone because he has relatives there, but an offer to the UK was not acceptable and the UNHCR of course went crazy, how can you not accept such an offer, and the UK is the hardest country to get an offer for. I would have accepted it for sure, because it's an opportunity, and I want to travel anyway.[49]

These findings are surprising given the public discourse that a majority of Syrian refugees wants to go to Europe or the West, if they had the chance to do so.

I employ novel survey data on respondents' preferences for durable solution to evaluate the above qualitative findings for integration, repatriation, and resettlement. Table 5.1 descriptively summarises the means of a number of demographic and migration-related individual-level variables, grouped by respondents' preferred dur-

48. 19M49.
49. 21M22.

able solution (columns 1–3). The table further shows whether the differences between group means are statistically significantly different from zero in the last three columns.

Table 5.1: Selected variable means, by preferred durable solution

	Resettlement	Repatriation	Integration			
		mean		*p(diff. in means)*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Life satisfaction	3.15	4.29	4.82	***	***	
Aspiration gap	5.01	4.56	3.95		***	*
Migration motivation	4.70	2.77	3.07	***	***	
Migration likelihood	2.91	2.16	2.35	***	***	
Female	0.23	0.39	0.47	**	***	
Children	0.38	0.50	0.34			
Life aspiration						
Safety / sec. / stab.	0.25	0.23	0.43		**	*
Citizenship	0.26	0.13	0.11	**	***	
Education	0.20	0.15	0.16			
Job / career	0.14	0.08	0.14			
Family	0.08	0.21	0.02	*	**	**
Dignity	0.05	0.18	0.14	**		
Time in Jordan						
$<$ 1 year	0.01	0.08	0.02			
1–4 years	0.07	0.23	0.11	**		
4–8 years	0.70	0.56	0.50		**	
$>$ 8 years	0.17	0.03	0.32	***	**	***
Education						
Less than high school	0.14	0.08	0.16			
High school	0.15	0.13	0.23			
Some college	0.24	0.21	0.18			
Diploma	0.14	0.13	0.09			
Bachelor's	0.29	0.36	0.23			
Master's	0.04	0.08	0.11			
Observations	669	39	44			

Note: two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Respondents who preferred resettlement (column 1) on average reported low to medium life satisfaction and medium to large aspiration gaps (3.15 and 5.01 on 7-point Likert scales). They reported a high migration motivation and medium migration

likelihood (4.7 and 2.91 on 5-point Likert scales). Their reported life satisfaction was significantly lower while their migration motivation and migration likelihood was significantly higher than those of respondents who preferred repatriation (column 2) or local integration (column 3). The latter reported the highest average life satisfaction and smallest aspiration gaps. Individuals with a preference for resettlement were less likely to be female and more likely to aspire to citizenship and rights compared to individuals who preferred any of the other two durable solutions. People who aspired to safety, security, and stability preferred to stay in Jordan while those whose main life aspiration was related to their family preferred to return to Syria, potentially to reunite with their families. Preferences for durable solutions varied with time spent in Jordan. Syrians who moved to Jordan less than four years ago were more likely to prefer to repatriate as compared to resettle. Resettlement seems to be the most popular choice for people who have lived in Jordan between four and eight years while those who came to Jordan before 2011 and had hence lived there for more than eight years predominately preferred to integrate in Jordan, followed by resettlement. Contrary to the qualitative evidence above, they did not seem to want to return to Syria. These findings are generally in line with the qualitative interview findings above. Resettlement was seen as the primary means to achieve one's aspirations with regards to rights, local integration to achieve safety, security, and stability, and repatriation resonated with people whose aspirations centred around family considerations.

There are merely a few significant differences — often only at the ten per cent level — between those who preferred to integrate in Jordan and those who preferred to repatriate to Syria, potentially partly due to the relatively small number of people who preferred these two options. Respondents in the latter group tended to have larger aspiration gaps and were significantly more likely to state 'family' as their main life aspiration and less likely to state 'safety / security / stability' as their main life aspiration. They were further less likely to have lived in Jordan for more than eight years. The large aspiration gaps of those who preferred repatriation might suggest

that they might cautiously be labelled as being closer to forced than to voluntary repatriation. However, their reported life satisfaction is significantly higher than for those who prefer resettlement, which might indicate that repatriation is voluntary. The evidence is hence ambiguous. There are no significant differences in education level between respondents who preferred different durable solutions. Similarly, life aspirations related to education and employment were not associated with durable solution preferences. These quantitative findings partly contradict the above qualitative findings that education level was associated with a preference for resettlement.

I investigate the determinants of individual durable solution preference and particularly the role of life aspirations in Table 5.2. I present logistic regression results of three separate regressions. The dependent variables are dummies with the value one if the durable solution was chosen and zero otherwise, i.e. one of the other two durable solutions was chosen. The independent variables are binary (e.g. female) or categorical (e.g. life aspiration). Model (1) in Table 5.2 displays logistic regression results of a preference for resettlement on individual life aspirations and demographic characteristics. The coefficients on main life aspiration are relative to the reference category, citizenship. Individuals whose main life aspiration was safety, security, or stability were less likely to choose resettlement as their preferred durable solution but more likely to prefer local integration (model (3)). Education and employment aspirations did not affect durable solution preference, relative to those who aspired to citizenship. I find weak evidence that individuals whose main life aspiration was related to family were slightly less likely to choose resettlement and slightly more likely to prefer repatriation. As expected, those whose main life aspiration was dignity, albeit a small group, preferred repatriation and integration over resettlement.

I have argued above that young Syrian refugees, i.e. those aged between 18 and 29, might have a stronger status quo bias, as they have spent larger parts of their lives in Jordan. The young therefore dislike repatriation and resettlement relative to local integration. However, the returns from resettlement are arguably the highest for

Table 5.2: Predictors of durable solution preference, logit regressions

	Dependent variable:		
	Resettlement	Repatriation	Integration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Life aspiration (Ref.: Citizenship)			
Safety / sec. / stab.	−0.719**	0.196	1.157**
	(0.348)	(0.594)	(0.529)
Education	−0.506	0.595	0.280
	(0.388)	(0.656)	(0.625)
Job / career	−0.471	−0.332	0.471
	(0.403)	(0.775)	(0.637)
Family	−0.828*	1.220*	−0.625
	(0.451)	(0.629)	(1.121)
Dignity	−1.324***	1.269*	1.458**
	(0.450)	(0.697)	(0.652)
Female	−0.989***	0.548	1.068***
	(0.231)	(0.385)	(0.340)
Parent	0.106	0.065	−0.021
	(0.147)	(0.234)	(0.221)
Age (Ref.: 30 or older)			
18–29	0.370	−0.965**	0.225
	(0.284)	(0.451)	(0.438)
Time in Jordan (Ref.: 1–4 years)			
< 1 year	−0.545	0.265	−0.388
	(0.586)	(0.797)	(1.156)
4–8 years	1.307***	−1.428***	−0.725
	(0.321)	(0.460)	(0.537)
> 8 years	1.335***	−3.197***	0.211
	(0.403)	(1.087)	(0.580)
Education (Ref.: Some college)			
Diploma / Degree	−0.047	0.121	0.140
	(0.285)	(0.463)	(0.459)
High school or less	−0.374	−0.174	0.768
	(0.312)	(0.562)	(0.475)
Constant	1.296**	−1.973**	−3.825***
	(0.591)	(0.894)	(0.975)
Observations	752	752	752
Log Likelihood	−285.901	−124.652	−148.005
Akaike Inf. Crit.	605.802	283.303	330.011
McFadden's Pseudo-R^2	0.146	0.197	0.128
Note:	two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

the young, which should result in them favouring resettlement over repatriation and integration. I find that the young dislike repatriation, relative to older respondents while there is no significant difference for resettlement and integration. Relative to men, women are more likely to choose local integration and less likely to choose resettlement. Being a parent does not significantly affect individuals' preferences for the durable solutions. Time spent in Jordan affects individual preferences in line with the interview findings. Table B.13 (Appendix) displays multinomial regression results, which are very similar. There are very few significant differences between integration and repatriation, possibly due to small sample sizes for these groups. Those whose main life aspiration was family prefer repatriation over resettlement those under the age of 30 and who have been more than 4 years in Jordan prefer resettlement over repatriation. The chi-squares of 64.7, 45.7, and 33.6 for models (1), (2), and (3) in Table 5.2 with 16 degrees of freedom and the associated p-values of less than 0.0001, 0.001, and 0.006 show that all three models are better fits than empty models. The respective log likelihoods are –286, –125, and –148. McFadden's pseudo R^2 ranges from 0.128 to 0.197 for the three models. Individual life aspirations, demographic characteristics, and time spent in Jordan hence partly explain durable solution preferences. Having outlined numerous reasons why respondents preferred resettlement to local integration and repatriation, I evaluate the migration destination characteristics that attracted Syrian refugees in the following section.

5.2 Destination characteristics

When asked about characteristics that made potential destination countries more or less attractive, Syrian refugees listed a variety of factors that attracted (pulled) or deterred them. Networks, education opportunities, rights, economic opportunities, social benefits, and some asylum policies attracted them, albeit to different extents, while xenophobia and restrictions on religious symbols deterred Syrians. The impacts

of a country's reputation, culture, and language were ambiguous and depended on the country and respondents' information and perceptions. This section explores the factors that made migration destinations more or less attractive using qualitative and quantitative evidence. I start with a short overview of the relevant recent literature.

The reasons why asylum seekers and refugees end up in one country and not another have been the subject of interest for both academics and policymakers alike. Evaluating the reasons why asylum seekers come to the UK, Robinson and Seegrott found that they were pushed by war, violence, and persecution from their countries of origin and that some people chose the UK due to family networks, colonial and historical ties between the UK and their origin countries, and the English language.[50] They further highlighted the importance of the migration industry for the eventual destination choice. Several other qualitative studies confirmed these findings for the UK.[51] Collyer found that weaker social ties became more important if migration to countries with strong ties was not attainable, for instance due to migration restrictions.[52] He further argued that political and economic factors at destinations played some role. Brekke and Five Aarset evaluated the pull factors in the Norwegian context and concluded that a triangular hierarchy of reasons — security (incl. human rights), future (i.e. access to labour markets, education, welfare), networks, asylum policy, and reputation — attracted asylum seekers.[53] They further confirmed the importance of conflict as the main push factor. Other authors took a quantitative approach and generally evaluated bilateral migration flows at the macro level. Barthel and Neumayer as well as Hatton confirmed war and violence as push factors, the importance of colonial and historical ties, and a common language as pull factors and found that

50. Robinson and Segrott, *Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers*.

51. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*; Kate Day and Paul White, 'Choice or circumstance: The UK as the location of asylum applications by Bosnian and Somali refugees', *GeoJournal* 55 (2001): 15–26.

52. Michael Collyer, 'When do social networks fail to explain migration? Accounting for the movement of Algerian asylum seeks to the UK', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 4 (2005): 699–718.

53. Jan-Paul Brekke and Monica Five Aarset, *Why Norway? Understanding Asylum Destination*, technical report (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 2009).

strict migration policies deterred asylum seekers and deflected them to neighbouring countries.[54] Economic and political factors at both the origin and destination were also found to affect the number of asylum applications by a number of studies.[55] While the importance of a country's image, reputation, or perception has been highlighted as early as 1999,[56] it has received relatively little attention thereafter but has recently received increasing scholarly interest.[57]

5.2.1 Pull factors

In line with the theoretical migration literature and previous empirical studies, I found evidence of the importance of networks, employment and education opportunities, rights, culture and language, social services and benefits, and asylum policies. These migration drivers generally apply both to relocation to a third country and repatriation to Syria. I discuss the drivers in turn, in order of frequency they were mentioned in the interviews. I contrast the interview and survey findings at the end of this subsection. Interestingly, and in contrast to some recent findings,[58] countries' policies with regards to the ease of obtaining a (humanitarian) visa or refugee status and the ease of family reunification were merely named as important factors by a small minority. The perception of the importance of different destination country characteristics likely varies across individuals, time, and space.

54. Fabian Barthel and Eric Neumayer, 'Spatial Dependence in Asylum Migration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 7 (2015): 1131–1151; Timothy J. Hatton, 'Seeking asylum in Europe', *Economic Policy*, no. April (2004): 5–62.

55. Hatton and Moloney, 'Applications for asylum in the developed world'; Roel Jennissen and Leo Van Wissen, 'The distribution of asylum seekers over Northern and Western European countries, 1985-2005', *Genus - Journal of Population Sciences* 71, no. 1 (2015): 109–132; Migali et al., *International Migration Drivers*; Eiko R. Thielemann, 'The effectiveness of governments' attempts to control unwanted migration', in *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, ed. Christopher Parsons and T. Smeeding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 442–472.

56. Tetty Havinga and Anita Böcker, 'Country of asylum by choice or by chance: Asylum-seekers in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 43–61.

57. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 'Do asylum seekers and refugees choose destination countries?'

58. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'.

Family, friends, and networks. The majority of respondents mentioned that having family and friends in a potential destination country was important, as it would help them settle, integrate, and ultimately fulfil their aspirations. Some respondents mentioned that they aspired to reunite with their siblings and other relatives who mostly lived in Turkey, Europe, and North America, or stay together as a family. However, nobody mentioned official reunification programmes. Unsurprisingly, family persons were more likely to consider family and relatives as central than careerists and other types of aspirers. However, the subjective importance of having contacts in potential destination countries and staying together as a family might vary over time and change once an opportunity arises:

> At the beginning it was an important factor for us, to go somewhere where we have relatives or know people, but from peoples' experiences it seems that it's O.K. to not know anyone, that we can adapt and get used to the environment without having relatives there. This is based on the experiences I hear about. Although it's hard at the beginning but with time you develop relationships and friendships. But in general we prefer to have relatives there. I only have one cousin in the USA. I prefer to be with my family, but even if I get an opportunity to resettle alone I would go, I don't have a problem with that.[59]

A few people mentioned that they did not consider family, friends, and networks important. They stressed that they came to Jordan not knowing anybody; hence, they would also manage to go somewhere else where they did not know anybody.

Employment. Several Syrian refugees mentioned economic stability and work opportunities as important factors when considering potential destinations. They further stressed the importance of the right to work, which confirms prior research.[60] While work was a means to meet basic needs and sustain one's family, particularly for those with large aspiration gaps, careerists focused on specific industries and sectors they would like to work in. One young man said he wants to go to Switzerland to work at

59. 22M22.
60. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'.

CERN. Two junior doctors stressed that they chose a country to legally migrate to with their preferred medical specialisation in mind.

Education. Particularly respondents in their early 20s and those with children were attracted by good quality education in potential destination countries. For instance, the reputation of universities made the UK and the USA preferred countries:

> UK universities are well known and need no introduction, especially the top ones, I'm not speaking about just any university. There's a UK university, I can't remember its name, it recently opened a branch here and so I checked it and it's ranking, and in the UK it's ranked at 100, so no I'm not looking for such universities, the university I go to will be a respectable top university.[61]

Respondents further stressed the importance of free (and good quality) education, as education was free in Syria.

Citizenship and rights. Several respondents, particularly formalists, held that the ease of obtaining non-Syrian citizenship was the most important destination characteristic. Parents and family persons stressed that a citizenship would change their children's future and gave them opportunities they could not imagine in Jordan or Syria. One man stressed that his uncle relocated irregularly to Sweden despite doing well and having employment in Jordan so his children could get the Swedish citizenship. While the issue of citizenship and rights did not concern everybody equally, almost a third of respondents stressed the need of securing a citizenship. Some respondents already had some information about and preferred certain countries:

> The chances of getting a citizenship plays the biggest role. Everyone is looking to get a citizenship. France, for example, if I go and study for two years and then stay for another two years then I could get the citizenship or the passport. Then I can come back here or go anywhere, the options would be many. ... I can go to the UK for one year for the master's only, but if they tell me that I can get the citizenship if I stay there for four years then I'd stay there. Turkey now is the country that's most reasonable to go to for a citizenship, so I could go there ... Getting a citizenship makes

61. 21M22.

> mobility easy and makes work easy and if I want to start a business, or if I want to travel if I'm in one country and my parents are in another, I could also help my parents if I have a citizenship, to make them come to me, with some family reunification process.[62]

Citizenship and family reunification has been found to affect destination choices of Syrians who relocated to Europe.[63] Other respondents remarked that they would go to any country (which I explore in more detail in Section 5.3) that offered them a path towards citizenship:

> I won't care even if it's in Honolulu [NB Honolulu is used in the region as a very faraway place, to show that you'd go that far for something]. I'd just want my daughters to get a citizenship because they are honestly really struggling. They are treated in a different way, because of the citizenship issue.[64]

Social services, benefits, and state support. In line with recent research,[65] a minority wished to relocate to countries with free health insurance, support for refugees, and welfare services. This was particularly true for families and individuals with medical conditions, who reported to struggle financially to get good quality treatment and medication in Jordan. Other studies, however, found that the welfare system was hardly mentioned by refugees.[66] One respondent mentioned that his uncle migrated irregularly to Sweden to benefit from state support:

> [My] uncle left because he couldn't find work in Jordan and in Sweden the state gives them a salary, or so he thought, and they are giving him a salary, it's been five years. He didn't want to work, he wanted to get supported by the state, he's old anyway.[67]

However, the above was a minority view. The same respondent stressed that his other two uncles migrated to Sweden to get the citizenship for their children.


62. 21M22.
63. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'.
64. 24F38.
65. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'; Dimitriadi, 'In Search of Asylum'.
66. Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, *Journeys to Europe*.
67. 10M25.

Asylum and migration policies. I adopt a narrow view of asylum and migration policies as those that aim to directly restrict the movement of people and those that specifically target asylum seekers and refugees, such as the right to work. Merely a small minority stated preferences for countries with easy and quick family reunification policies. This stands in contrast with the assumptions of one respondent who stated that while he cared mostly about relocating to an English-speaking country, 'people look at easy procedures to [family] reunion. So if a country has easy procedures and gives asylum seekers permanent residency, they will leave to that country.'[68] Statements of a small minority imply that they preferred countries where one could start to work quickly, ideally without having to learn the language, integrate, and lose state support. The underlying idea is that they could remit as much money as possible to assist the family members who were still in Jordan or Syria.

I evaluated these pull factors in the quantitive survey and asked what respondents regarded as the single most important destination characteristic. Figure 5.2 displays the results. While social contacts, such as family and friends, where mentioned most frequently during the interviews, they were much less important when the choice was restricted to the most important destination characteristic. Citizenship and rights, followed by education and employment or career considerations trump the list. These were also deemed important in the qualitative interviews and citizenship emerges as an important destination characteristic in the conjoint experiment (Chapter 6). Asylum policies and social benefits came in fourth and fifth place with less than ten and five per cent, respectively. Language and culture and a good reputation was important for a small minority of respondents only. The latter finding is particularly interesting, as I find both qualitative and quantitative evidence for the effect of a destination's reputation in this chapter (Section 5.2.3), in Chapter 6, and as the destination country's reputation has recently received increasing academic attention.

68. 7M28.

Figure 5.2: Most important destination characteristics (survey)



5.2.2 Deterrence factors

Syrian refugees in Jordan reported that they would not like to relocate to countries where xenophobia and anti-immigrant or anti-refugee attitudes were widespread and religious symbols were restricted.

Xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes. Whether a country welcomed foreigners in general and refugees in particular was the main concern for the majority of respondents. Several insisted that they would not accept resettlement or choose to go to a country with widespread racism and anti-immigrant policies and attitudes, as they would be afraid. However, it seemed that respondents' perceptions of racism was closely linked to countries' reputations (see Section 5.2.3). A good reputation might mask or lead people to discount negative information regarding anti-refugee attitudes. For instance, Germany was generally perceived as welcoming while several respondents stated that anti-refugee attitudes were relatively widespread in the USA. Respondents were generally not aware of the rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in Germany, the repeated anti-immigrant protests in Saxony in August and September 2018 (during the time the interviews were conducted)

following the fatal stabbing of a German man by an Iraqi and a Syrian, and that the German public was deeply divided over Chancellor Merkel's decision to admit a large number of refugees since 2015.[69] Several respondents mentioned that anti-immigrant policies — particularly Donald Trump's 'Muslim ban', immigration restrictions for Muslim-majority countries — deterred them from relocating to the USA.

Not everybody was deterred by racism. Some respondents mentioned that even in countries with considerable hostility towards foreigners, there would be communities that welcomed refugees and that antagonism would cease over time, as people learned the language and integrated into their host communities. One man elaborated:

> There is no country in the world that doesn't have some people who welcome refugees and other people that don't want refugees. So why would we live in the community that doesn't want refugees? We will live among those who welcome refugees. . . . You think all of the USA welcomes refugees? Or Canada? Of course not. Even not the UK. So I will look for a specific area.[70]

He further insisted that by integrating he would be able to change the attitudes of others in his host community:

> If I prove to you that I'm a person with good intentions then I will change your ideas. If I help you with something, or if I say good morning, I will make you respect me not because you want to, but because you have to, and that's what will happen.[71]

Another man thought similarly: 'Do you believe there is one country on earth that hates foreigners can still be a country?'[72]

Restriction of religion. Around half the respondents talked about religion and restrictions on the wear of religious symbols, particularly the hijab, the Muslim head-

69. Sabine Siebold, 'Anti-immigrant protesters chant 'Resistance!' in German city after killing', *Reuters*, 20 August 2018, accessed 27 December 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-protests/anti-immigrant-protesters-chant-resistance-in-german-city-after-killing-idUSKCN1LF0O9.

70. 2M36.

71. 2M36.

72. 7M28.

scarf.[73] The majority stressed that they would avoid countries that restricted their religious freedom. Two women mentioned that some countries tried to change their Muslim habits, for example with regards to educating their children, which they opposed. Others mentioned that they would only go to countries where they had the ability to practice their daily lives in freedom. A minority did not consider religion an important factor. One young woman highlighted that relocating to a non-Islamic country might even be beneficial:

> Perhaps, if I go to another country, perhaps then people don't care what your religion is or say that it's shameful for a girl to work, then you will be free. Look at foreign countries, you see that girls come and go, they work, they do whatever they want and it's O.K., but here from a religious perspective and everything, they have limited girls, and put up barriers for them.[74]

The same woman stated that she would even take off her hijab, if that would be necessary to integrate. Other women responded in a similar vain, even though their clothing adjustments would be due to fear of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments in the host country. A woman remarked that she might take off her jilbaab and might wear a hat instead of her hijab. A man jokingly suggested that his wife might wear a wig instead of the hijab. Both were worried that being recognised as a Muslim would have negative consequences in certain countries.

5.2.3 Ambiguous factors

A country's reputation, culture, and language have the ability to attract or deter potential migrants. In contrast to the pull and deterrence factors discussed above, their effect was ambiguous and depended and varied both with the destination country and the potential migrant. For instance, some had clear preferences for English-speaking

73. To reiterate the descriptive statistics of Chapter 3, all but one respondent were Muslim. All Muslim women interviewed wore a hijab and some wore a jilbaab, a large and loose-fitting coat.
74. 3F18.

countries while others looked forward to learning a new language or did not speak English. Whether a country's reputation attracts or deters somebody depends not only on the country but also on the potential migrant's perception of the reputation and her personal characteristics and preferences.

Reputation. Several respondents preferred certain countries because they heard they were good countries in general or good countries for refugees or Syrians in particular, i.e. they welcomed refugees and treated them with respect and dignity. Some respondents used reputation almost synonymously with anti-immigrant attitudes while others talked about reputation more generally and not in terms of refugees. One respondent clarified what he meant by a country's reputation: countries that 'hate Muslims ... and don't allow for Muslims to act freely, this means that this country has [a] bad reputation for Muslim Syrians.'[75] Asked whether he thought it was about the religion, Islam, he responds: 'I am not talking about religion, it is about politics.'[76] While some mentioned specific destination characteristics, such as economic opportunities and social services that characterised a good country, others did not:

> They say that Canada is good, I hear from people who went there, that's what they said. While we were in the camp, many people were resettled to Canada and Germany and the US. Some people we stayed in touch with. Even the ones around us communicate with many people who travelled and they say that the best country is Canada. I don't know why.[77]

The above quote indicates that the reputation, image, or perception of a country might be the only or single most important destination characteristic, at least for some individuals. I further evaluate this hypothesis in Chapter 6 using novel quantitative conjoint survey data. The role of a country's reputation (or perceptions thereof) in attracting potential migrants is in line with Anholt's concept of place branding[78] and

75. 7M28.
76. 7M28.
77. 8F20.
78. Simon Anholt, 'Branding places and nations', chap. 14 in *Brands and Branding*, ed. Rita Clifton and John Simmons (London: Profile Books, 2003), 213–226.

highlighted by recent research with asylum seekers and refugees.[79] However, one young man questioned the stereotypes around good and bad countries:

> Lots of people say Sweden, Germany, and Canada welcome refugees but who says that? How would you know? Why do we generalise? I might go to France and people will accept me, or to Bulgaria or Norway or any other country and they could welcome me.[80]

The respondent discounted the importance of a country's reputation, as France was generally seen as relatively hostile to Syrian refugees, which I discuss in Section 5.3. Bulgaria and Norway were not mentioned by any other respondent, indicating that these were countries generally not considered by Syrians in Jordan, potentially as they did not have a positive reputation. The respondent, however, stressed that he could nevertheless be welcomed there, despite the absence of a large number of Syrians.

Language and culture. A third of respondents insisted that the language and culture of a potential destination country were not important factors. They liked learning new languages and looked forward to experiencing new cultures. A minority, however, stated that they would not go to a non-English speaking country. They spoke English or had started learning English and believed it would be easier to settle and work in an English-speaking country. Some respondents disliked certain cultures or aspects thereof and hence certain countries. For instance, one man stated he would not go to Korea as he did not like Korean food. Another did not like what he heard about life in Germany and therefore would not like to relocate there for cultural reasons. A third was attracted to the UK; he felt that he would like the lifestyle, 'the quietness, the clouds, the rain, the way people live.'[81] This is broadly in line

79. Brekke and Five Aarset, *Why Norway?*; Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'; Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, *Journeys to Europe*; Ilse Van Liempt and Judith Zijlstra, 'Smart(phone) travelling: understanding the use and impact of mobile technology on irregular migration journeys', *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies* 3, nos. 2-3 (2017): 174–191; Joris van Wijk, 'Luanda - Holanda: Irregular Migration from Angola to the Netherlands', *International Migration* 48, no. 2 (2010): 1–30.

80. 10M25.

81. 10M25.

with recent studies that found that some migrant groups preferred and relocated to destination countries with a certain language or culture, while others did not care about these destination characteristics.[82]

This section has qualitatively explored the characteristics that attracted or deterred Syrian refugees from potential migration destinations. Networks, education opportunities, rights, and economic opportunities attracted them while xenophobia and restrictions on religious symbols were deterrents. The impacts of a country's reputation, culture, and language were ambiguous in qualitative interview results and relatively less important for survey respondents. They largely depended on the country and people's preferences, information, and perceptions. Respondents preferred destinations that they expected would help them to (at least partly) fulfil their aspirations. Importantly, the destination's reputation seemed to be a central destination characteristic in interview findings but not in survey findings. The next section outlines the actual destination countries that Syrian refugees in Jordan reported to prefer and compares them with the destination characteristics discussed in this section.

5.3 Destination countries

Whereas the prior section discussed the characteristics of migration destinations, this section discusses the actual destination countries that Syrian refugees talked about in the interviews; both those that attracted them and those they stated to avoid. It is important to remember that while potential destinations occupy a central spot in the driver environment, 'they are present through the locally existing ideas and meanings attached to these places.'[83] In short, the perception, imagination, and reputation of a country matters. The section starts with a brief discussion on preferences versus

82. Daniel Robins, 'Imagining London: The role of the geographical imagination in migrant subjectivity and decision-making', *Area*, 2018, 1–8.
83. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility', p.17.

choices, gives an overview of the literature on destination preferences and choices of migrants in general and asylum seekers or refugees in particular, and explores the reasons why respondents in the interviews favoured or opposed certain countries. At the end of this section, I relate my qualitative findings back to the literature and compare them to the quantitative survey findings.

To reiterate, the interviews aimed at eliciting destination country preferences of Syrian refugees in Jordan. I did no observe whether individuals actually migrated. However, two respondents stayed in contact with me after the interviews and have since left Jordan. One relocated to Germany and the other one to Turkey. Both did so legally and in line with their stated preferences. While it is possible to speak of destination choices for these two, I use destination preferences throughout for two reasons. First, to reflect that a majority might not choose onward migration at all, their preferences hence never turn into choices. There are very limited opportunities for Syrian refugees in Jordan to legally migrate to a third country, particularly for the unskilled or low-skilled. Second, to reflect that eventual choices might be different from people's stated preferences due to a variety of factors including acquiring new information and learning of new opportunities between the interview and relocating. I generally did not evaluate how feasible some destination country preferences were versus other countries. The only difference being Turkey, which was seen as an accessible, feasible, and likely option even though by far not the most liked one.

Historically, the view has been that forced migrants, such as asylum seekers, do not have agency over their decision to migrate.[84] They were not ascribed to have choices in order to avoid undermining their legal case for refugee status and international protection.[85] A growing body of literature has evaluated whether asylum seekers and

84. Gordon F. De Jong and Sarah F. Harbison, 'Policy Intervention Considerations: The Relationship of Theoretical Models to Planning', chap. 10 in *Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries*, ed. Gordon F. De Jong and Robert W. Gardner (New York: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1981), 281–290.

85. Bakewell, 'Some Reflections on Structure and Agency in Migration Theory'.

refugees end up in a specific country by chance or by choice. The evidence undermines the dichotomy of chance or choice; refugees and other forced migrants exhibit some agency over whether, when, and where to relocate.[86] However, their set of possible choices is likely narrow and shaped by networks, personal characteristics, age, gender, socioeconomic status, and education.[87] The studies generally concluded that while some asylum seekers and refugees indicated to have chosen their destination country, others ended up in countries other than the ones the intended to go to or did not have specific country preferences when they started their migration journey.[88]

The studies quoted above further found that destination preferences were often broad, such as 'Europe' rather than a specific country. This was not the case in the interviews with Syrian refugees in Jordan. Respondents either listed specific countries or stated that they would go to any country or any country that satisfied certain criteria, such as giving them certain rights. Before I discuss potential destination countries mentioned in the interviews, in order of frequency they were mentioned, and contrast them with my survey findings, I briefly outline some statistics on where refugees in general and Syrian refugees in particular have been resettled or sought asylum. I do so, as the effect of networks or migrant stocks might make certain countries more attractive than others. Such countries (and larger countries in general) are likely to be in the Jordanian and Syrian news more often, arguably triggering the availability heuristic when individuals evaluate whether and where to relocate.

The USA has accepted the largest absolute number of refugees from 2000–2016,

86. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*; Dimitriadi, 'In Search of Asylum'; Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, *Journeys to Europe*; Havinga and Böcker, 'Country of asylum by choice or by chance'; Darren Middleton, *Why asylum seekers seek refuge in particular destination countries: an exploration of key determinants*, Global Migration Perspectives 34 (Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), 2005).

87. Van Hear, *New Diasporas*.

88. Alan Gilbert and Khalid Koser, 'Coming to the UK: What do asylum-seekers know about the UK before arrival?', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32, no. 7 (2006): 37–41; Khalid Koser, 'Social networks and the asylum cycle: the case of Iranians in the Netherlands', *The International Migration Review* 31, no. 3 (1997): 591–611.

followed by Canada, Australia, and the UK.[89] In 2016, the USA accepted close to 100,000 resettled refugees, Canada roughly half that figure, Australia a quarter, and the UK less than 10,000. Figures specifically for Syrian refugees paint a similar picture. From 2013 until May 2018, Canada admitted just over 76,000 Syrian refugees, followed by the USA (65,000), Germany (25,000), the UK (20,000), and Australia (16,000).[90] Germany has only recently become one of the countries receiving a larger number of resettled refugees. In addition, Syria was the main country of citizenship of asylum seekers in the European Union since 2013 and Syrians accounted for between twelve and 29 per cent of first time asylum applications between 2013 and 2018.[91] Germany received a disproportionately large share of asylum applications since 2015 and received relatively more asylum applications by Syrians: 36 per cent in 2015 and 27 per cent in 2018 compared to the EU28 averages of 29 and fourteen per cent, respectively. In the same time period, the UK received a much smaller number of first time asylum applications in both relative and absolute terms. The share of Syrians was also much lower and decreased from seven per cent in 2013 to two per cent in 2018. This might reflect the UK's geographic position and/or indicate that it has been less popular with Syrian refugees than other European countries.

United States of America. A majority of respondents mentioned the USA when asked about potential destination countries, two thirds of which preferred relocating to the USA and one third that opposed the country. Almost all of those who mentioned the USA had friends or relatives there who overwhelmingly said that they were living a good live and recommended resettlement to the USA. Even though I have outlined above that resettlement is not an active choice by refugees, relatives' recommendations to resettle should be seen as encouraging those still in Jordan to follow through the

89. IOM, *World Migration Report 2018*, p.35.

90. UNHCR, *Resettlement and Other Admission Pathways for Syrian Refugees*, technical report (UNHCR, 2018), accessed 12 December 2018, `https://www.unhcr.org/573dc82d4.pdf`.

91. Eurostat database, table migr_asyappctza, accessed 27 August 2019.

resettlement process once UNHCR reaches out. The USA was praised for being a liberal country that provided refugees with support, such as healthcare, offered good education, work opportunities, a comfortable life, and was a place where one could fulfil one's ambitions and aspirations. Respondents' preferences changed over time and reflect altered external circumstances. While one respondent mentioned that the situation for Syrians in the USA had improved, several people insisted it had deteriorated, particularly since Donald Trump became President. A junior doctor who graduated a year ago and was studying for the American medical exams to relocate to the USA explained:

> I really regret not having started [the American medical exams] earlier, I wouldn't have missed out on two years. I might have managed to get there before Trump. I would have graduated and left immediately.[92]

Several other respondents stressed that resettlement became harder or even stopped after President Trump assumed office:

> [W]e were contacted by the IOM for resettlement to the USA. They called us three years ago almost, and they did several interviews with us and we were very close to travelling up until Trump became president, then they stopped everything.[93]
>
> [S]omeone I know was contacted by the UNHCR, he went through the entire process and was at the stage where they just have to confirm the travel date and then at the last minute Trump became president and with the Muslim ban everything was put on pause and it's still on pause now. He even sold all his furniture and left his house and rented a furnished flat all in preparation for travel, then he had to rebuild his life all over again because he was hoping to travel soon and it didn't happen.[94]

This led some to conclude that resettlement to the USA was no longer possible: 'I don't like the USA but also I think Syrians aren't allowed to go there now.'[95] Others were indifferent about the USA, as they had received contradictory information:

92. 18M26.
93. 23M20.
94. 22M22.
95. 21M22.

> My brother is in the USA, maybe because he's my brother but till now he doesn't tell me that he is doing very good. Maybe he doesn't want to make me feel bad. I hear from others that he is doing well. I have another friend who went to the US in the same year. His situation is great. He posts on Facebook that they went to this place or that place, so he adapted.[96]

The above statement is surprising given that the network theory states and empirical work confirms that information transmitted through networks is often and overwhelmingly positive, i.e. highlighting the good aspects of life in destination countries while concealing or understating the negative aspects.[97]

A minority of respondents who mentioned the USA opposed relocating to the USA. The reasons given included limited initial support for refugees, racism, the fact that relatives and friends in the USA did not have a comfortable life, dislike of President Trump, and anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric. A young man who preferred to stay in Jordan rather than resettle stressed that he had heard that refugees struggle financially in the USA:

> I know many people who went to the USA and then kept saying please send us back to Jordan, because they had expectations that once they go there the state will give us money and pay rent and so on, and before they left they signed them on a paper that they will repay the cost of the [flight] ticket, and in the USA they only supported them financially for three months, so they were surprised. ... Send me back, they were saying.[98]

Three respondents reported to have rejected resettlement offers to the USA. A woman explained her reasons for rejecting resettlement offers to the USA twice: 'I don't like the US, I don't like Trump, I don't know why, because people don't like him [NB she laughs].'[99] When asked why another woman did not like the USA and hence rejected

96. 5M37.
97. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*; Khalid Koser and Charles Pinkerton, *The social networks of asylum seekers and the dissemination of information about countries of asylum*, technical report (London: Research Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office, 2002); Somerville and Walsworth, 'Information sources and knowledge transfer to future migrants'.
98. 10M25
99. 14F35.

her resettlement offer, she stated: 'From the news, so when [UNHCR] called us we refused. At the same time, the people who went there tell us that they aren't very comfortable.'[100] However, she did not know why her contacts in the USA were not comfortable and did not question their accounts.

Canada. The general consensus was that Canada was the best country, which was shared by almost every other respondent. Some specified why they thought so:

> [A]s far as I know Canada is good with regards to the economy, and are also good when it comes to personal freedoms, and they don't harass Muslims in general or Arabs in specific. There's a lot of freedom there in that regards.[101]

Several respondents highlighted the economic situation and that Canada welcomed refugees. In contrast to President Trump, Prime Minister Trudeau enjoyed a good reputation, which seemed to reflect well on his country:

> I don't know personally but what I hear is that Justin Trudeau is doing lots of things for Syrians, he is also very handsome [NB she laughs], and there are opportunities for work and education.[102]

However, a number of respondents could not give reasons why they preferred Canada. They generally relied on the judgement of others. Asked about a specific country she would like to go to, one woman answered:

> All the people who went to Canada say that it's the best country, from all aspects. They care about everything, life, education, well-being and prosperity. They care about the dignity of humans.'[103]

Inquiring what specifically Canada did to care about everything, she was unable to name tangible policies or destination characteristics. She reiterated the above: 'In general, when I ask, they say Canada is the best.'[104] Another woman answered

100. 16F39.
101. 20M37.
102. 24F38.
103. 11F38.
104. 11F38.

similarly: 'Many people who travelled [...] say that the best country is Canada. I don't know why.'[105] Merely two respondents stated that they would not like to go to Canada, as they did not like the country and also did not know anybody there. While Canada seemed to be the favourite destination, the respondents seemed to know very little about Canada in general and specific policies in particular. In contrast, respondents talked at length about the USA, Germany, and France.

Germany. Even though it is often assumed in the public discourse that a majority of Syrians want to move to Germany and the fact that Germany accepted a large number of Syrian refugees since 2015, merely a minority of respondents preferred to relocate to Germany. This highlights the chance aspect relative to the choice aspect where refugees relocate to. In terms of geography, the possibility to irregularly relocate to Germany and seek asylum is much higher than to migrate to Canada or the USA. The 'migration crisis' in 2015 arguably further increased the chance to make it to Germany, which had been highlighted by a small number of respondents, even though their top preferences might have been Canada or the USA. Several respondents reported that they knew people who went on a boat from Turkey to Greece and then on to Germany. One respondent's husband had received subsidiary protection in Germany. Asked for the reasons he went to Germany in 2015, she responded:

> [H]e was planning on going to the UK to be honest but his money finished when he reached Germany. To get to the UK people had to stay in Calais in France and some had to wait four, five, six months to enter the UK and they had to pay large amounts of money. So he wanted to go to the UK but wasn't able to do so financially.[106]

Again, this highlights the chance aspect, even though refugees do have limited choices. The respondents generally regarded Germany as welcoming, particularly as it accepted a large number of Syrian refugees. They further stressed the available education and work opportunities and that refugees were treated with dignity. Some liked the

105. 8F20.
106. 13F33.

German culture and stressed that Germany was one of the best countries in the world to live. However, not everybody liked Germany. Some recounted what their friends, who went by the sea to Germany, told them about life in Germany:

> [In] Germany I heard they put [refugees] in a camp, based on what people said, I don't personally know, and they kept them there for a long time and there were problems and some people wanted to come back. I hear this from people I haven't seen it myself so I don't believe all of it.[107]

A number of respondents highlighted that they had been told that even though the assistance in Germany was generous, it was not sufficient:

> [W]hatever money you make through work there you will spend on food and so on, you can't save one Euro. They limit Syrians to work specific hours only, you can't work more, and these barely cover the rent and food and cigarettes if the person smokes. So it is calculated and very limited.[108]

A woman whose husband had received subsidiary protection in Germany lamented that he was unable to go to the UK. She elaborated on the hardship he faced:

> In Germany they are very strict about work, you have to finish your language courses then work. He's been in Germany for three years and a half and hasn't finished the language courses, he's slow, and his health doesn't allow him to keep going so he needs to go to the hospital one or two days a week and can't commit to his language courses 100 per cent. They [NB the German authorities] were also slow, it took them a year and a half to sign him up for a language course in the first place. He was doing nothing in that period, just thinking about his bad luck. My brothers in the UK say work there is much easier, my sisters in Germany struggle with work. My sister's husband works in Germany illegally/unofficially, because if you work legally there they will stop giving you the monthly salary and the cost of rent, so it will end up that what you gain in salary you lost from the state. But he has five children. And if you want to work officially you need to speak German, and the state will stop supporting you. But the support of the state is higher than the salary he will make, and it's barely enough, so he can't afford to lose that money so he works unofficially. Even my husband now, you think the money they give him is enough? Whenever he needs to go to the hospital and he stays the night he has to pay €10 just for the bed, and then he has to pay around €5 for

107. 29M24.
108. 2M36.

> medication. So between the rent, the bills and all these things, and the fact that he is a smoker, his salary is barely enough. He doesn't even buy cigarette packs, he rolls cigarettes himself to save money.[109]

A minority of respondents highlighted that they did not want to learn another language and therefore disliked Germany. One man had heard a similar warning that life in Germany was not as good as often imagined:

> Even those who went to Germany went because they wanted to work there, not that they wanted to get to know a new culture, but then they would be surprised that they have to learn a new language and to get educated and then they analyse things and say that it didn't make sense for them, as they wasted two years just trying to settle in without being able to properly work. So some of them told others not to go. They thought that it's like the Gulf, you go there and save lots of money and come back, but it's not like that in Germany, you have to become a true German and learn the language.[110]

These quotes are surprising insofar as it was generally assumed that networks increase migration and the majority reported that having relatives and contacts in destinations countries would help them settle (see Section 5.2). They might reflect a growing scepticism among Syrians in Jordan that life in Germany in particular or in the West in general was not necessarily that much easier or better than their lives in Jordan. While they would be able to work legally in Germany, their lack of skills demanded by the German labour market and their language deficiencies might hold them back. In contrast, legal employment was severely restricted for Syrians in Jordan but there would not be a language or skills mismatch.

France. Respondents' views about France were mostly negative. Those who had a positive view of France had relatives there that were happy, stressed French educational opportunities, had studied the French language, and insisted that it was relatively easy to get the French citizenship. The main reason why people did not want to relocate to France was the restrictions on wearing religious symbols. The

109. 13F33.
110. 9M35.

hijab has been prohibited in public schools since 2004.[111] Another law that came into effect in 2011 prohibits women from wearing face veils in public places, i.e. basically anywhere outside women's homes.[112] Several respondents took issue with these laws that made France an unattractive destination:

> No one will pick France, because they have a position against Islam and Muslims.. . . if you find out that you're staying in a place that doesn't want you then why stay there in the first place?[113]
>
> I even thought about France but wearing a veil and going to France is not easy, also being a Syrian [there]. . . . My friend, she is living in France and she wears a hat [NB instead of the hijab] and she feels worried someone might recognise her as Muslim and maybe throw something at her or tell her something.[114]

However, one woman questioned the trustworthiness of the information about restrictions on religious clothing: 'I heard that in France you're not allowed to wear the hijab or that you pay a fine. But it's all talk and I didn't hear from someone I trust I can't really judge.'[115] These restrictions made France a country that was generally not perceived as welcoming to Syrian refugees. Some respondents mentioned that they would be afraid to be identified as Muslim women in France. While they might never be directly affected by the restrictions — unless the women interviewed changed from hijab to a niqab or burqa — they nevertheless worried and felt unsafe. The restrictions might convey the sense that Muslim women cannot fully participate in public life, making settlement and integration in France harder. This is effective information that has the potential to influence the recipient's behaviour. The information about the laws influenced respondents' preferences (and potentially future behaviour).

111. BBC, 'The Islamic veil across Europe', *BBC*, 31 May 2018, accessed 5 January 2019, `https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13038095`.
112. Matthew Weaver, 'Burqa bans, headscarves and veils: a timeline of legislation in the west', *The Guardian*, 31 May 2018, accessed 5 January 2019, `https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/headscarves-and-muslim-veil-ban-debate-timeline`.
113. 23M20.
114. 26F32.
115. 12F28.

United Kingdom. The respondents who mentioned the UK generally had a good perception of the country. They emphasised the good quality education, particularly the world-class universities and that it was a good country, which they liked. Even people who did not actively consider resettlement had a positive view of the UK:

> I hear the UK took a lot of people from Lebanon specifically. These people are settled and stable financially, they get a lot of support from the state and they work. The education they get is good, there is a focus on children's rights, there is good health insurance and people get good treatment if they are ill.[116]

In line with the above quote, the UK was generally associated with good education and free and good healthcare by those who mentioned the country.

Turkey. Turkey was a preferred destination for a minority of respondents. The reasons included geographical proximity and ease of access, the path to citizenship, cultural similarity, economic and educational opportunities, and networks. Respondents stressed that Turkey was accessible and a reasonable choice due to the ease of acquiring Turkish citizenship, which allowed travelling and would potentially open up new opportunities. A young woman who relocated to Turkey to join her fiancé since the interview explained:

> Turkey was an option for me because it was accessible. I don't want to go through the sea, some people did that and went to Europe, but I didn't want to do that. ... So if I got a good [employment or educational] opportunity before I would have taken it and left, but what was available more was Turkey. Before 2016 you didn't need a visa, after 2016 you need a visa and I was given one. I went there, I made friends and the environment was very suitable, then I met someone who understands me. It's not that I wanted Turkey specifically, but that's what happened.[117]

The quote emphasises the chance aspect in the decision where to relocate. She did not specifically want to relocate to Turkey but the opportunity arose and she took it. Rather than an end in itself, she saw it as a means to fulfil some of her life aspirations

116. 4M23.
117. 1F29.

with regards to employment and/or education. A few respondents highlighted that Turkey was the most likely although generally not the most preferred option:

> Honestly Turkey is the most probable, because I can afford to go and study in Turkey, it's not that expensive, it's cheaper than here maybe, actually for sure. It's also good to live in, and I have lots of family and friends there, so I won't have a problem there. But then I think why should I study in a regular university, I'd rather work and wait two to three years and then get a scholarship for a respectable university.[118]

Any country. As briefly discussed above, a number of respondents asserted that they would go to any country. Particularly those with very large aspiration gaps whose status quo barely met their basic needs voiced such preferences. Others would go to any country that satisfied some basic conditions:

> We'd go to countries that have human rights, countries that give you your rights, where the people are living comfortable, Sweden, the USA, Italy, these countries. They have rights for cats there, they will definitely have human rights. Canada, the UK. I don't mind. Any of these countries.[119]

Some respondents were convinced that they could reach their life aspirations anywhere, regardless where they went. They stressed that there were challenges in every country but that they could be overcome. If they were given the opportunity to prove themselves, the host community would accept them and they would be able to integrate. Even though a young man preferred to relocate to the UK or France to do his master's, he was open to other countries that gave him educational opportunities:

> I believe more in having an opportunity, and I would probably face challenges because there are challenges everywhere, and it won't really matter from one country to the other. . . . I also feel that being in a new country is an experience on it's own.[120]

This is the prime example of an opportunist. Even though he had preferences, he was open to adapt once he learned of or was able to relocate to a different country.

118. 21M22.
119. 3F18.
120. 21M22.

Another young man recounted when UNHCR contacted him about a scholarship to study in the Czech Republic even though he had not applied for one. In fact, he had not even heard of the Czech Republic before the UNHCR called him. The UNHCR wanted an answer to their offer immediately on the phone and he declined, as he was already studying in Jordan on a scholarship. Although later on the same day, he wanted to accept the scholarship: '[I] researched it online and I found out that the Czech Republic is within the EU and education there is good, so I thought that it might be a good idea.'[121] He contacted the UNHCR on the day after he rejected the offer to tell them he would like to be considered for the scholarship. Even though it ultimately did not work out and he continued to study in Jordan, he was open to the idea of accepting an opportunity he was previously unaware of once it presented itself. He did not want to go to any country by any means.

Other people wanted to relocate to any country possible. Asked whether he would relocate to any country if given the chance to do so, one man responded: 'Even if they offer me Cyprus I will go'.[122] Questioned why he said that he would *even* go to Cyprus, he explained: 'It's because Cyprus is considered to be a poor country, you know. It wants to get rid of the people it has, it doesn't want to add or receive more people or families.'[123] While Cyprus might be relatively poor with regards to other countries, such as the USA and Germany, and the fact that GDP per capita has only recovered to 2005 levels since its high point in 2008, its GDP per capita is nevertheless roughly six times that of Jordan, at the time of writing. The information was not very accurate and therefore objectively of limited relevance to his migration decision. However, as he had accepted the information, as he thought it to be believable, it is now relevant in his destination preferences. He further stated that 'maybe I can fulfil some part of my ambitions [in Cyprus]. Maybe they have freedom of expression there,

121. 4M23.
122. 2M36.
123. 2M36.


do they? Let's speak about the most basic things, can I get a driver's license and drive a car?'[124] He did not seem to be aware that Cyprus is in the European Union and in general seemed to know very little about the country.

Building on the interview insights, I asked survey respondents to imagine that they had the chance to resettle and inquired about their preferred destination country. I restricted the choice to five European and North American countries for theoretical and practical reasons. The five countries chosen feature in the top six desired destinations of potential migrants worldwide.[125] They also account for the majority of asylum applications and resettlement of Syrians and have repeatedly been referred to in the interviews. I restricted the number of countries to five also in light of power considerations for the conjoint survey experiment (see Section 3.4 for the conjoint design and Chapter 6 for results). Figure 5.3 displays the survey results. Canada was the preferred migration destination for more than four in ten respondents, followed by the UK (one in four), and the USA and Germany (both around one in ten). Merely five per cent selected 'Other / Prefer not to answer' and France was particularly unpopular at around two per cent.

Comparing my interview and survey findings to the literature on the destination country preference of Syrians reveals some interesting disparities. Drawing on more than 140 qualitative in-depth interviews with Syrians, Crawley and Hagen-Zanker found that Syrians overwhelmingly mentioned Germany, Sweden, and the UK as preferred destination countries.[126] Interestingly, and in line with my findings, they state that almost nobody talked about Europe in general but rather about specific destination countries. Contrary to my findings, they found that merely a small minority mentioned Canada and the USA. While surprising at first glance, this difference is likely due to the spatial and temporal context the interviews and surveys were con-

124. 2M36.
125. Esipova, Pugliese and Ray, *More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could.*
126. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go', p.25.

Figure 5.3: Preferred migration destination countries (survey)



ducted in. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker interviewed Syrians in Germany, Spain, the UK, Greece (Lesvos), and Italy in 2015 while I conducted the interviews in 2018 and the survey in 2019, both in Jordan. It is therefore not surprising that respondents who had already made it to Europe preferred European destination countries — which might be an instance of ex-post rationalisation (see Section 2.3) — while the majority of Syrians who I surveyed and interviewed preferred North American countries over European ones. I am not aware of a large-scale quantitative study of the destination country preferences of Syrian refugees in Jordan. However, as I mentioned above, the five most popular destination countries that emerged from the interviews also feature in the top six desired destinations of potential migrants worldwide.[127]

This section has evaluated respondents' destination country preferences and particularly the reasons why they preferred some countries and opposed others. All destinations characteristics discussed in Section 5.2 above were mentioned in connection with specific countries, albeit to vastly different extents. Canada seemed to be universally liked while the USA, the UK, Germany, and France received mixed

127. Esipova, Pugliese and Ray, *More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could.*

accolades. The reputation of a country emerged among the most important factors influencing respondents' destination preferences in interviews. However, a destination's reputation did not emerge as an important destination characteristic in the survey. I revisit the role of reputation in the following chapter. Destination country preferences varied with the type of aspirer and the sizes of respondents' aspiration gaps. Very large aspiration gaps were associated with preferences to relocate to any destination possible. People with medium-sized aspiration gaps were more selective with regards to potential destination countries. Similarly, careerists had generally clear aspirations and countries where they believed they could fulfil them. Opportunists were more open to relocate to countries they might had previously been unaware of once they learned of new opportunities.

5.4 Summary

In this chapter I analysed the destination preferences of Syrian refugees in Jordan both qualitatively and quantitatively to answer the second part of the third research question: What are the aspirations, *destination preferences*, and destination choices of Syrian refugees in Jordan and how well does the revised migration decision-making framework explain them? Examining the preferences for the three durable solutions — local integration, voluntary repatriation, and resettlement (Section 5.1) — I find that a majority of interviewees preferred resettlement over integration and repatriation. While one third hoped to repatriate to Syria one day, another third could not imagine ever to return. A minority mentioned that they felt forced to return, as they could not satisfy their basic needs in Jordan due to the numerous barriers they faced. The survey evidence paints a different picture with resettlement emerging as the preferred durable solution for more than eight in ten respondents and only small minorities of around five per cent favouring local integration and repatriation, respectively. Preferences for durable solutions differed with the type of aspirer and with the sizes of respondents'

aspiration gaps. Respondents with (relatively) small aspiration gaps largely preferred local integration. They were generally happier with their lives and their status quo was higher (in terms of needs satisfaction) and closer to their life aspirations than those of respondents who preferred to leave Jordan for Syria or a third country. Safety first aspirers and opportunists tended to prefer local integration to resettlement and repatriation, given that Jordan remained safe, secure, and stable for the former group and offered opportunities to achieve life aspirations for the latter. On the contrary, those who longed for citizenship and rights were less likely to prefer local integration.

Respondents with medium to large aspiration gaps overwhelmingly preferred resettlement or repatriation. Those preferring repatriation generally had family, friends, and relatives in Syria and valued family more highly than other respondents. Careerists were more likely to want to go to a third country in pursuit of their educational and career aspirations. However, I can neither confirm nor disprove this with the survey findings. Formalists preferred resettlement and sought a non-Syrian citizenship that allowed them to travel and family persons often stated that resettlement was a means to offer their children better lives. Opportunists might relocate, integrate, or resettle, depending on the opportunities they encountered. The interview results further suggest that people with mid-sized aspiration gaps had more agency and more options in their relocation decision compared to those with large aspiration gaps. Respondents with large aspirations gaps were generally passive and waited for the UNHCR to contact them for resettlement. They would also go to any country offered, as any country was seen as an improvement compared to their status quo. The survey evidence suggests that the largest aspiration gaps and lowest life satisfaction were associated with resettlement while those with medium-sized aspiration gaps and medium life satisfaction preferred repatriation. While there is a significant difference between those wanting to resettle and those wanting to repatriate and between those wanting to resettle and those wanting to stay in Jordan, the line between those wanting to repatriate and those wanting to stay was blurry.

Where did Syrian refugees in Jordan prefer to relocate and what were the underlying reasons for their preferences? Section 5.2 discussed the characteristics that rendered potential migration destinations attractive or unattractive. My qualitative findings broadly confirmed prior research. Family, friends, and networks act as pull factors for the majority, particularly so for the few who aimed to reunify with their families. Family supporters were most likely to be pulled by networks. Employment and education opportunities particularly attracted careerists with self-actualisation needs. Citizenship and rights was the most important factor attracting formalists. Social services, benefits, and state support attracted merely a small minority. Even fewer people mentioned asylum policies, such as family reunification, as an important destination characteristic. The survey evidence highlighted the importance of citizenship and rights, education, and employment, followed by asylum policies and social benefits for potential migration destinations. Interview respondents were generally deterred by xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes as well as restrictions on religious symbols, such as the hijab. A country's reputation, language, and culture were ambiguous factors. While a good reputation generally attracted individuals, different people had very different perceptions of the same country (Section 5.3). Some respondents were attracted by English-speaking countries; some deterred by non-English-speaking countries.

The destination countries most often discussed by respondents were the USA, Canada, Germany, France, the UK, and Turkey. Canada and the UK generally had a good reputation among interviewees with the former being widely seen as the best country for Syrian refugees. The USA and Germany received mixed reactions. The USA was perceived as the land of freedom and opportunities by half of those who talked about the country. The other half insisted that it became harder and less attractive to resettle to the USA since Donald Trump became president. While some mentioned that Germany was a good country, as it had welcomed a large number of Syrian refugees, others lamented the reception conditions in Germany, insufficient fin-

ancial assistance in the face of high living costs, and employment restrictions. France was generally viewed unfavourably due to its laws restricting Muslim clothing such as the hijab, niqab, or burqa. Turkey was seen as the most likely but not most preferred destination choice due to its geographic and cultural proximity, access to the labour market, and access to citizenship. A number of respondents highlighted that they would go to any country that offered them opportunities to fulfil their aspirations. Canada emerged as the most preferred destination country among the survey respondents, followed by the UK, the USA, Germany, and France.

Syrian refugees' preferences with regards to the characteristics of potential migration destinations and destination countries is the basis to evaluate the destination choice in the following chapter. To choose where to relocate, potential migrants search for, evaluate, and decide upon several migration options. The search is generally based on and guided by prior preferences, which I presented in this chapter. In the next chapter, I briefly outline the information gathering of Syrian refugees in Jordan before presenting the results of a novel conjoint survey experiment of destination choice. The conjoint survey is based on the migration decision-making framework outlined in Chapter 2 and incorporates the qualitative interview insights presented in this chapter. The conjoint aimed to establish the relative impact of different destination characteristics on destination choice and to illustrate the use of heuristic decision-making strategies. In particular, it aimed to understand the importance of a migration destination's reputation and the country the destination is located in, as opposed to other destination characteristics.

Chapter 6

Choosing Where to Go

I have demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the majority of Syrian refugees interviewed and surveyed had considerable aspiration gaps and an increased motivation to change their status quo. As the majority had stayed in Jordan for a number of years, relocation — either back to Syria or to a third country — seemed to be the most fruitful path to increase life satisfaction and decrease the size of their aspiration gaps. How do these potential migrants decide where to go? I shed some light on this question in the previous chapter by discussing migration destination *preferences*. Preferences for destination characteristics and destination countries, however, might not necessarily be good indicators of actual migration decisions for three reasons. First, potential migrants face various barriers. For instance, while respondents overwhelmingly preferred to resettle to Canada (see Section 5.3), merely a very small minority will likely be able to do so given legal migration restrictions and the limited number of available resettlement places (see Section 5.1). Some Syrian refugees in Jordan might be offered alternative countries or might find alternative legal or irregular pathways to migrate to a third country. A considerable proportion will likely not migrate at all, at least not in the near future, even if they wished to do so. Second, the stated preferences might not reflect a person's true underlying preferences due to social desirability bias. For instance, a person who wanted to move to a certain country due to its good


healthcare and generous benefit system might have stated other reasons for preferring such country, as her true reason might have been perceived as 'benefit tourism' and might lead to 'welfare chauvinism'. Third, decisions might differ from stated preferences due to heuristic decision-making strategies. I address the latter two using novel quantitative data gathered via a conjoint survey experiment with Syrian refugees in Jordan, complemented by qualitative interview data. In this chapter, I therefore show how destination preferences transform into destination *choices*.

To situate my findings in the theoretical framework of migration decision-making (Chapter 2), Section 6.1 briefly discusses the relocation decision-making process. Section 6.2 presents qualitative interview findings on information gathering of Syrian refugees in Jordan and compares them to the empirical evidence of the role of information in migration decision-making of asylum seekers and refugees. I present the theoretical conjectures of the conjoint experiment in Section 6.3 and the conjoint results for the full sample and selected subgroups in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, I employ quantitative conjoint results and qualitative interview data to illustrate the use of heuristics in migration destination choice. Section 6.6 summarises.

6.1 Decision-making process

I have argued in Chapter 2 that the decision to migrate can be understood as two separate questions: whether to migrate and where to relocate. Chapter 4 has demonstrated that Syrian refugees in Jordan had considerable aspiration gaps, which are the basis for the motivation to migrate. Chapter 5 has established that a majority of Syrian refugees surveyed and interviewed wanted to relocate, overwhelmingly to third countries through resettlement. Figure 6.1 describes the relocation decision-making process in more detail. The decision where to relocate involves three phases: search, evaluate, and decide. They are not necessarily distinct in practice, as individuals might evaluate potential destinations while searching (see Section 2.3).

Figure 6.1: Relocation decision



The search for migration opportunities relies both on potential migrants' prior preferences and their sets of available heuristics (1a, Figure 6.1). For instance, the availability heuristic makes certain migration destinations easy to recall and such destinations will therefore likely be evaluated more often than unknown destinations. Other heuristics that guide the gathering of information include hierarchical search and satisficing to denote a stoppage point. Starting from these preferences, potential migrants gather information about migration destinations. They first gather high-level information on potential destinations, such as the region and country (1b, Figure 6.1) and then gather information on specific destination characteristics (1c, Figure 6.1). Among others, they include employment and education opportunities and migration policies. In step two of the relocation decision-making process, potential migrants evaluate the migration options found in step one. They weigh the attributes according to rational choice, satisficing, or a heuristic evaluation rule outlined in Section 2.3 above. They decide upon one migration destination in step three.

I have extensively discussed the first part of the search process, prior preferences (1a, Figure 6.1), in the previous chapter and have demonstrated that some destination countries were more quickly recalled than others (Section 5.3). They included Canada, the UK, the USA, Germany, and France. Similarly, some destination characteristics were discussed more frequently (Section 5.2). They included local contacts and networks, employment and education opportunities, citizenship and rights, social benefits, migration policies, anti-immigrant attitudes, restrictions on religion, and

reputation . In the next section, I draw on the qualitative interview data to briefly outline the information gathering (1b and 1c, Figure 6.1). In particular, I highlight the sources that Syrian refugees in Jordan stated to use and discuss their implications. However, I do not evaluate the search process in depth and do not test it in the conjoint experiment. The remaining part of this chapter discusses the evaluation of and decision upon migration options. It establishes the relative importance of different destination characteristics and illustrates different heuristics that are likely used for evaluation and decision.

6.2 Gathering information

I described the preferred destination characteristics of Syrian refugees in Jordan in Section 5.2 and the preferred destination countries in Section 5.3 above. When evaluating different migration destinations and deciding upon one, potential migrants need some information about these countries (see Figure 6.1 and Section 2.2.3 above). Information plays a central role in the migration decision-making framework outlined in Chapter 2, particularly when searching for migration options. What is the empirical evidence of the role information plays in the migration decision-making of Syrian refugees? Since the European 'migration crisis' in 2015, two competing hypotheses aim to explain why certain destination countries have received more asylum seekers than others. It has been asserted that asylum seekers were well-informed and chose countries that aligned with their preferences, such as countries with easy family reunification procedures, quick labour market access, or generous welfare benefits. Others have argued that asylum seekers were not well-informed and based their decisions on rumours, myths, and misinformation about certain countries. I briefly present the available empirical evidence and complement them with my interview findings.

The question how much migrants knew before coming to a country has been central to the work of several migration scholars. Some concluded that asylum seekers had

no or merely very little information in general and little accurate information in particular before coming to the UK.[1] Others found that asylum seekers in Norway based their destination choice on available information in countries of entry to the European Union, such as Italy and Greece.[2] Recent research concluded that Syrian respondents' preferences for Germany were strongly associated with information about the German asylum process.[3] Other authors found that asylum seekers were well-informed about asylum provisions in Europe, which also shaped their destination preferences.[4] It has frequently been suggested that information provision might alter migration destination choice: '[p]roviding correct information at key points in transit may be a tool in influencing asylum arrivals.'[5] A report by the UN Development Programme echoed this and advocated to '[e]xpand and facilitate access to information for Syrian refugees'[6] While research has shown that information in transit affects destination choice,[7] the information source likely affects the trustworthiness of information and might make such interventions less effective than anticipated or not effective at all.

How have asylum seekers acquired information about certain destination countries? Past research has stressed the vital role of personal networks, i.e. family members and friends living in the destination country.[8] The quality and quantity provided might be limited and information transmitted might be biased to positive information, portraying one's situation in the destination country as better than it actually is to justify past migration decisions and investments.[9] However, information through

1. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*; Gilbert and Koser, 'Coming to the UK'; Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, *Journeys to Europe*.

2. Brekke and Five Aarset, *Why Norway?*

3. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'.

4. Dimitriadi, 'In Search of Asylum'; Van Liempt and Zijlstra, 'Smart(phone) travelling'.

5. Brekke and Five Aarset, *Why Norway?*, p.96.

6. UNDP, ILO and WFP, *Jobs Make the Difference: Expanding Economic Opportunities for Syrian Refugees and Host Communities*, technical report (UNDP, 2017), p.14.

7. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'.

8. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'; Anke Fiedler, 'The gap between here and there: Communication and information processes in the migration context of Syrian and Iraqi refugees on their way to Germany', *The International Communication Gazette* 81, no. 4 (2019): 327–345; Van Liempt and Zijlstra, 'Smart(phone) travelling'.

9. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*; Koser and Pinkerton, *The social networks of asylum seekers and*

personal networks is generally regarded as trustworthy.[10] Smugglers and other intermediaries of the migration industry also provide information, often arguably to deceive potential migrants and induce migration behaviour.[11] Other common sources of information include governments, humanitarian organisations, and non-governmental organisations. However, a number of studies have concluded that information from such sources is unlikely to be trusted.[12]

The majority of the studies quoted above interviewed asylum seekers and refugees in destination countries to enquire about the information they had before and during migration. That research design is prone to post hoc rationalisation and might not accurately reflect the information potential migrants used to decide where to relocate at the time of migrating and the information they possessed but potentially ignored. I therefore extracted information before migration via qualitative interviews. Further, I was able to control the information people had to make migration decisions in the conjoint experiment, which I describe in more detail in subsequent sections. I asked Syrian refugees in Jordan how they acquired information about certain destination countries. The vast majority mentioned friends, family, and other contacts in destination countries, social media platforms through which they interact with friends but also with other Syrians, and the internet in general. One young Syrian remarked:

> In general I hear from my friends and relatives, but there are also facts about these countries, that there are these universities with this ranking and so on, which I can see online. So for example I search online what universities are in Turkey and the programs they have and the fees, I see some requirements for example they'd request a GRE, which needs a good maths background, which I don't like, so I'll search for other universities that request the IELTS instead of the GRE for example.[13]

the dissemination of information about countries of asylum.

10. Richter, Emmer and Kunst, *Wie Geflüchtete Medien nutzen.*

11. Fiedler, 'The gap between here and there'; Gilbert and Koser, 'Coming to the UK'; Marie McAuliffe, 'Seeking the views of irregular migrants: Decision-making, drivers and migration journeys', chap. 5 in *A Long Way to Go: Irregular Migration Patterns, Processes, Drivers and Decision-making*, ed. Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser (Acton: Australian National University Press, 2017), 103–139.

12. Saltsman, 'Displaced Iraqis in Jordan'.

13. 21M22.

In line with the relocation decision-making process outlined in Figure 6.1, he first selected a potential destination country, Turkey, before evaluating its characteristics, i.e. education opportunities and requirements. He acquired the information that Turkey has reputable universities through friends and university league tables. One woman explained that she relied both on people who had migrated and consulted Facebook, as there seemed to be insufficient information by official sources: 'In general we gather all the information from people who are about to travel or have traveled and from Facebook, UNHCR does not give information to us.'[14] Other people did not seem to actively look for information but relied on official sources, such as UNHCR and IOM, for information once they were selected for resettlement. A young woman explained:

> I assume that before they resettle us they will tell us everything about the place they're going to. Is that correct? They will tell us, they will take us and inform us. They will tell us about the traditions of these people, how they live, what they do. My friend they told her that if she sees people kissing in the street then it's normal that's how they are, don't be surprised. This is with the IOM. They told my friend everything, that some things there will be surprising for us, how they think, etc. And based on this information I can decide if I want to go or not. Our neighbour they told her that her son will go to the military service there so she refused. They give you all details.

I asked another young man where exactly he looked for information online. He answered: 'I ask google and he [sic] tells me everything. I do big research. I surf in the internet a lot. I spend a lot of my hours looking in the internet, reading.'[15] Facebook was mentioned by a third of all respondents as their main source of information about destination countries:

> I would ask, about life there, I'll ask if Syrian refugees can live well there, if the people there are good. I'll ask on Facebook, I'll ask for recommendations. Many Syrians who get resettlement offers ask such questions on Facebook.[16]

14. 11F39.
15. 17M26.
16. 3F18.

A young man's response echoed this: 'I have dozens of groups and Facebook pages that count on me that even if some decisions about refugees through UNHCR we know through social media, we don't know through iPhone messages or anything else. We know through social media.'[17] Another respondent elaborated in more detail:

> Everything is on Facebook. There's a group called 'Syrians in Jordan.' I have more than ten groups I'm informed on Syrians' situation in Jordan, on resettlement, many groups. People share practical things, for example they say we have this or that interview, today we did this. You know for the US some people waited three years to resettle. They stopped for a while because of Trump and now they are moving on with the process again. So that is where our information is from. I knew about the French embassy for a long time but I didn't go, because I doubted that it's true, if you look from the outside there is no queue or line ... Also we have some sort of people not sharing with others, because they think that if others apply they will have a lower chance themselves. ... But now I put a post on Facebook that I applied and was rejected and will apply again, and I asked if someone was rejected and applied again. You don't always get a truthful answer, but sometimes people send you a direct message and share their experience.[18]

The above quote demonstrates both the respondent's reliance on Facebook as a source of information but also highlights that information was not necessarily trusted and that people at times might strategically withhold information. This is in line with the hypothesis that migrants in destination countries withhold information to hamper further migration due to a potential negative wage effect of further migration.[19] However, I do not find sufficient evidence to state that this is necessarily the case, particularly as I did not interview or survey migrants in destination countries. The same respondent also highlighted at another point in the interview that he believed his brother, who resettled to the USA, overstated the challenges he faced and understated the benefits in order not to make him feel bad for still being in Jordan. While studies have generally found that information is withheld to appear successful and justify

17. 7M28.
18. 5M37.
19. Axel Heitmueller, 'Coordination Failures in Network Migration', *IZA Discussion Papers* 770 (2003).

one's migration decision, the opposite might be the case here.

In short, the Syrian refugees that I interviewed in Jordan acquired the majority of the information on migration options through informal sources, particularly friends, family, and social networks. Information through these sources was generally deemed trustworthy and available. Merely a small minority actively looked for information from official sources. In the next sections, I turn to the evaluation of migration options and the decision where to move. In the conjoint experiment, I control the amount of information available to respondents as well as the source. Thereby, I am able to trace the relative importance of different destination characteristics as well as the effect of a destination's reputation and the country a migration destination is located in on destination choice. I do not evaluate how potential migrants search for and evaluate the acquired information but rather how they evaluate and decide upon the presented and finite information about two potential migration destinations.

6.3 Theoretical conjectures

Before presenting the conjoint results, I briefly reiterate that I studied stated destination choice; I hence evaluated migration intentions, not actual migration behaviour. However, as I have outlined in more detail in Section 1.3 above, several studies have confirmed the link between migration intentions and behaviour in general[20] and between destination preferences and eventual destination countries in particular.[21]

I have shown in Chapter 5 that the majority of Syrian refugees interviewed and surveyed favoured certain countries over others. For instance, they strongly preferred Canada to France. The UK, the USA, and Germany were also listed less often than

20. Hoppe and Fujishiro, 'Anticipated job benefits, career aspiration, and generalized self-efficacy as predictors for migration decision-making'; Tjaden, Auer and Laczko, 'Linking Migration Intentions with Flows'; Dalen and Henkens, 'Explaining emigration intentions and behaviour in the Netherlands'.

21. Mallett et al., *Journeys on hold*.

Canada as respondents' destination preference. What explains these preferences? I investigate the driving factors of these destination preferences in the next two sections. I explained the main conjoint design in Chapter 3 above. Appendix B presents the survey questions, describes the subjects, and presents balance tests. The choice of the conjoint attributes and attribute values was guided and informed by the theoretical and empirical literature on heuristic decision-making in general and migration decision-making in particular (Chapter 2) as well as the findings of the qualitative interviews I conducted with Syrian refugees in Jordan in 2018 (Chapter 5). They further reflect the average labour market outcomes of and public attitudes towards refugees in the five destination countries chosen as well as the countries' respective laws governing asylum seekers, such as eligibility for work permits and years of residency until naturalisation. Building on these, I conjectured the following with regard to the effects of destination characteristics on migration destination choice:

1. Local contacts: Destinations with family, friends, or other Syrians would be preferred to those without such contacts.
2. Social services: Destinations with generous support in general or free healthcare or housing would be preferred to those without such provisions. It is ambiguous whether housing or healthcare will have the bigger effect size. Free healthcare was mentioned more frequently in the interviews as an important destination characteristic, especially for those with increased health needs. However, housing makes up a considerable amount of household expenditure, both currently in Jordan as well as arguably in destination countries. I hence expected that older respondents favoured destinations with free healthcare while younger ones vouched for those that offered free housing.
3. Laws: Restrictions on religious clothing, such as the burqa and hijab as well as restrictions on immigration from Muslim-majority countries would make destinations less attractive. Religious bans might particularly deter women, who were

directly affected by such bans.

4. Citizenship: The faster the destination's citizenship could be obtained, the more preferred it would be, particularly for those who had stated that access to citizenship was the most important characteristic of a migration destination.
5. Work permit: The faster a work permit could be obtained, the more preferred a destination would be. The effect should be larger for those who had stated that employment was the most important destination characteristic.
6. Employment: Syrian refugees would prefer destinations with a higher share of Syrians in employment after one year. Those who considered employment and career to be their most important destination characteristic would put a higher value on this cue.
7. Public attitudes: Destinations with a larger (smaller) share of the population supporting (opposing) immigration of Muslims or refugees would be preferred. This cue should be particularly important for those who aimed to integrate permanently, for which a preference for citizenship might be a good proxy.

I included seven attributes to reflect conjectures 1–7 in both conjoint treatments. Respondents might hence prefer Canada to France due to a combination of having local contacts, better social services, no or fewer restrictions on religious clothing, faster access to citizenship and a work permit, better labour market prospects, and more favourable public attitudes. For instance, France has prohibited the hijab in public schools since 2004 and has banned the burqa in public places (see Section 5.3 above). No such nationwide bans are in place in Canada[22] or in any of the other

22. The Canadian province of Quebec introduced a law that bans some public sector employees from wearing religious symbols, including the hijab, in June 2019, towards the end of my survey. In 2017, Quebec partially restricted the wear of the niqab and the burqa, which Prime Minister Trudeau vehemently opposed (Ashifa Kassam, 'Trudeau on Quebec face-cover ban: not our business to tell women what to wear', *The Guardian*, 20 October 2017, accessed 21 October 2019, `https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/20/justin-trudeau-quebec-burqa-ban-niqab-new-law`).

potential destination countries. Refugees generally have to reside in Canada for three years before they can apply for naturalisation while they would have to wait for five years in France and the USA, six years in the UK, and up to eight years in Germany.[23] Asylum seekers generally face significant difficulties when accessing the labour market in France and the UK while there are fewer legal hurdles in Germany and they can immediately apply for a work permit in Canada.[24] Lastly, anti-refugee attitudes differ across countries and are somewhat stronger in the USA than in the other countries.[25] These facts might partly explain why Canada was preferred to France, as there seems to be a correlation between Canada and 'better' destination characteristic values. The conjoint design allows me to test the causal mechanism of destination choice. For instance, whether having local contacts or the absence of hijab bans had a larger effect on destination choice. In addition to the above seven attributes, half of all respondents were randomly displayed the destination's reputation (item 8) while the destination was revealed as being in a specific country for the other half (item 9):

8. Reputation: Destinations that were designated as good for Syrians or welcoming to foreigners would be preferred while those designated as bad countries for Syrians would carry a penalty.
9. Country: I expected the destinations to be ranked in accordance with respondents' country preferences (see Figure 5.3). Destinations in Canada would be the

23. Government of Canada, *Apply for citizenship: Who can apply*, 16 April 2019, accessed 21 October 2019, `https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/canadian-citizenship/become-canadian-citizen/eligibility.html#time`; Laurent Delbos and Claire Tripier, *Country Report: France, 2018 Update*, AIDA report (Forum réfugiés – Cosi, 2019), accessed 21 October 2019, `https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_fr_2018update.pdf`; Judith Dennis, *Country Report: United Kingdom, 2018 Update*, AIDA report (Refugee Council, 2019), accessed 21 October 2019, `http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_uk_2018update.pdf`; Michael Kalkmann, *Country Report: Germany, 2018 Update*, AIDA report (Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration, 2019), accessed 21 October 2019, `https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_de_2018update.pdf`.

24. Ibid.

25. Connor, *A majority of Europeans favor taking in refugees, but most disapprove of EU's handling of the issue.*

most preferred, followed by the UK, the USA, Germany and France. Therefore, the latter three countries would carry a penalty, relative to the UK.

The country attribute allowed me to test whether migration destinations were chosen due to their characteristics or whether the country it is located in trumped the other attributes. In short, were migration destinations in Canada chosen due to quick naturalisation procedures and no nationwide restrictions on religious dress, or simply because they are located in Canada and respondents had a positive view of and liked Canada. I also included the country attribute to evaluate whether the importance of the first seven attributes decreased once country names were included. Alternatively, the destination's reputation was included instead of the country name, as it had featured repeatedly in the preceding qualitative interviews with respondents saying that they wanted to relocate to a 'good country.' Table 6.1 shows the attribute values used in the conjoint, the expected signs of their coefficients, and the reference categories for the linear regressions. Where possible, I picked the reference category to either reflect a neutral or the middle value. In addition to conjectures 1–9, I hypothesised in Section 2.2.3 above that heuristic rules for evaluation and decision affect the migration destination choice. I hence conjectured the following:

10. Recognition: Displaying the country name of the destination would call up respondents' images and associations of the country, i.e. the country's reputation. The cognitive process behind this is the recognition heuristic. I hence expected the relative importance of other destination attributes (1–7) to decrease once the country name was displayed. Respondents who recognised a country they evaluated favourably would disregard other, potentially contradictory cues.
11. One-reason (or few-reason) decision-making: Some respondents evaluate destinations on just one characteristic, such as the generosity of social services. In the second conjoint, some might solely decide based on the country name and disregard other cues. I expected respondents to disproportionately focus on the

destination characteristic and country that they selected as most important to them (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).

12. Framing and prospect theory: Values framed in positive terms, i.e. 'half of all Syrians employed after one year', would be preferred to negative ones, i.e. 'half of all Syrians unemployed after one year.' This corresponds to prospect theory's

Table 6.1: Conjoint reference categories and expected coefficients

Local contacts	
Family	+
Friends	+
Other Syrians	+
No contacts	reference
Social services	
Free healthcare	+
Generous support for refugees	+
Free housing	+
No minimum wage	reference
Laws	
No religious bans	reference
Ban on niqab and burqa in public	–
Ban on hijab in schools	–
Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	–
Citizenship	
After 3 years	+
After 5 years	reference
After 8 years	–
Work permit	
Immediately	+
After 3 months	reference
After 12 months	–
Employment	
Half of all Syrians employed after one year	+
1 in 4 Syrians employed after one year	reference
Half of all Syrians unemployed after one year	–
3 in 4 Syrians unemployed after one year	–
Public attitudes	
3 in 4 people support taking in refugees	+
1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	reference
1 in 4 people support restricting immigration of Muslims	–
Half the population supports restricting immigration of Muslims	–

Table 6.1 (Cont.): Conjoint reference categories and expected coefficients

Reputation	
Welcoming to foreigners	+
Good country for Syrians	+
Has many well-known brands	reference
Bad country for Syrians	–
Country	
Canada	+
United Kingdom (UK)	reference
United States of America (USA)	–
Germany	–
France	–

conjecture that potential losses (i.e. unemployment) weigh more negatively than equally sized potential gains (i.e. employment).

The next section presents the main results of the conjoint survey experiment on migration destination choice. The section thereafter discusses the heuristics used to evaluate the two destinations and to decide which one to hypothetically relocate to.

6.4 Destination choice: conjoint results


I randomly presented 789 Syrian refugees in Jordan with one of two conjoint experiments. Both aimed at eliciting the causal mechanisms of destination choice, i.e. the relative importance of different destination characteristics. The 789 respondents each evaluated five destination pairs, i.e. I observe 3,945 choices over 7,890 destination profiles. The conjoint design yields 36,864 possible profiles for conjoint 1 and 46,080 for conjoint 2, both of which far exceed the number of evaluated destination profiles and thereby renders classical causal estimands impractical. To recover the causal effects of destination characteristics on stated destination choices, I followed Hainmueller et al.'s approach and estimated linear regressions of destination choice

with clustered standard errors at the individual level[26] using the *cregg* R-package.[27] The dependent variable is binary and indicates whether a destination was chosen, the independent variables are the destination's characteristics or attributes. While randomisation seems to have worked well in general (see Appendix B.3), I control for age, children, education, and gender in all regressions, as some groups have disproportionately been displayed certain conjoint attribute values. This is due to some small group sizes, e.g. those with a Master's degree or higher account for less than five per cent of all subjects. Excluding controls does not significantly alter the regression results and I hence do not present the regression results without controls. I discuss the results for the two conjoint treatments in turn. Figure 6.2 presents graphical summaries of the estimated effects of the regression coefficients with 95 per cent confidence intervals for the first conjoint treatment. The horizontal bars in all following conjoint figures present 95 per cent confidence intervals. The presented estimates are the average marginal component effects (AMCEs).[28] They represent how much, on average, an attribute value increases or decreases the probability of respondents' support for the overall profile, relative to a baseline, the reference category. The reference categories are included as dots with coefficients 0 in the figure. Some attribute values on the left scale are abbreviated in conjoint figures for better legibility. Respondents were always shown the non-abbreviated attribute values. Table B.14 (Appendix) displays numerical AMCE estimates and standard errors.

The majority of the estimated regression coefficients are in line with the above conjectures. I discuss conjectures 1–9 in this section. In the subsequent section, I focus on the results pertaining to heuristics strategies (conjectures 10–12). Starting from the top of Figure 6.2, it is surprising that friends or other Syrians at the potential destination did not increase its appeal, relative to not having local contacts.

26. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 'Causal inference in conjoint analysis'.
27. Thomas J. Leeper, *cregg: Simple Conjoint Analyses and Visualization*, R package version 0.3.1 (2019).
28. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 'Causal inference in conjoint analysis'.

Figure 6.2: Conjoint 1 AMCEs



Family at the destination increased the probability that the destination was chosen by 0.05. The latter is in line with the literature and reflects the importance placed on family, which also emerged from the preceding qualitative interviews. The former suggests that having local contacts, while certainly helpful, is not a central determinant of destination choice and highlights the importance of other destination attributes. Destinations that offered free healthcare, housing, or generous support for refugees were significantly preferred (the probability that they were chosen increased between 0.06 and 0.1) to those that were designated as not having a minimum wage. As

conjectured above, restrictions on religious clothing and the immigration of Muslims — henceforth referred to as 'religious bans' — were a strong deterrent, decreasing the probability that the destination was selected between 0.12 and 0.2. Destinations where respondents had to wait longer to access the labour market or to naturalise also received a penalty. Unemployment of Syrians at the destination decreased the probability that such destination was chosen while employment statistics increased its appeal. I discuss these findings and the framing effect in more detail in the next section. Public attitudes towards refugees and Muslims mattered. Larger support of immigration of either group was associated with a larger probability that the destination was chosen. Larger antipathy was associated with the opposite. Destinations marked as bad countries for Syrians received a sizeable penalty and the probability that they were chosen decreased by 0.2, relative to destinations that were designated as having many well-known brands. Good countries for Syrians and destinations welcoming to foreigners were not significantly more preferred than those with many well-known brands. Relative to their respective reference categories, religious bans and destinations designated as bad countries see the probability that such destinations are chosen decrease by 0.2, a sizeable negative effect. The significant and large impact of a destination's reputation is in line with the qualitative findings that I discussed in Section 5.2 but surprising given that merely two per cent of survey respondents stated that a destination's reputation is the most important destination characteristic (see Figure 5.2). While respondents hence stated that citizenship, education, and employment opportunities were the most important characteristics in theory, they acted differently when deciding between two hypothetical migration destinations and put a much higher value on the destination's reputation.

Based on the above linear regression estimates above, does the preference for migration destinations in Canada over destinations in France hold true? How would the ideal migration destination for Syrian refugees in Jordan look like? How would the least liked one look like? I simulate different values of the migration destination with

the above estimates to answer these three questions before presenting the estimates for conjoint 2. I have briefly outlined some observable differences between Canada and France above, most importantly with regards to religious bans, naturalisation, and work permits. All else equal, the probability of choosing a migration destination without religious bans, citizenship after three years, and immediate access to the labour market is 0.237 higher than for destinations that ban the hijab in schools, require five years of residence until naturalisation, and more than three months until a work permit can be obtained. The former resembles Canada, the latter France. In the interviews, France had further repeatedly been referred to as a bad country for Muslims in general and Syrians in particular (see Section 5.3 above). The negative coefficient on the attribute value 'bad country for Syrians' hence further explains the preference for Canada, which was widely referred to as a good country for Syrians in the interviews. I predict the probabilities that certain destination will be chosen. The probability that a destination with all attributes set to their reference categories (see Figure B.14) was chosen is 0.64, significantly higher than the probability of choosing a random destination profile, which equals 0.5 due to the forced choice between two destinations. The probability that the most preferred destination is chosen is 0.91. Family members are settled at such destinations and such destinations further offer free housing, do not have religious bans, allow access to citizenship after three years, immediate access to the labour market, half of all Syrians are employed after one year, three in four people support taking in refugees, and it is located in a good country for Syrians. The probability that the least preferred destination is chosen is essentially zero. This is largely driven by the combination of the following three attribute values: being designated as in a bad country for Syrians (–0.21), banning the hijab in schools (–0.19), and half of all Syrians are unemployed (–0.12). In short, Syrian refugees were mostly attracted by the absence of bans on religious clothing or immigration from Muslim countries and deterred by the presence of such bans or by destinations designated as bad countries for Syrians. I hence find preliminary quantitative evidence

for the causal mechanism why Canada was preferred to France.


Having discussed the AMCEs — the changes in probability that a destination will be chosen, relative to the attribute's reference category — Figure 6.3 displays the descriptive marginal means (MMs) for conjoint 1. The MM is the mean outcome of a particular destination attribute value across all appearances, averaged across all other conjoint attribute values. Table B.15 (Appendix) provides the numerical MMs and standard errors. Estimates above 0.5 represent attribute values that increase the likelihood that a profile containing such attribute value will be chosen. The MMs show that destinations with family were disproportionately often selected, as were those that offered free housing. Free healthcare and generous support for refugees did not contribute to destinations being chosen more often. This might reflect my sample composition and its large share of young people, with six in ten respondents aged between 18 and 30. I investigate the importance of age on destination choice below. Not having a minimum wage, however, significantly decreases the destination's appeal. Destinations without religious bans were significantly more likely to be chosen (MM=0.62) while those that restricted immigration from Muslim countries (MM=0.44) and ban hijabs in schools (MM=0.43) were less likely to be chosen. A ban of the niqab and burqa in public did not seem to matter much, potentially reflecting the fact that the burqa and niqab are considered the appropriate style of dress for women by people in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan whereas the hijab is seen as the most appropriate dress in other Muslim-majority countries.[29] Syria had already banned the niqab from universities in 2010 with the justification that it contradicted university ethics and its secular identity.[30] Destinations that offered faster access to the labour market and to citizenship were preferred to those where labour market access was

29. Jacob Poushter, 'How people in Muslim countries prefer women to dress in public', *Pew Research Center*, 8 January 2014, accessed 13 September 2019, `https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/08/what-is-appropriate-attire-for-women-in-muslim-countries/`.

30. Associated Press, 'Syria bans niqab from universities', *The Guardian*, 20 July 2010, accessed 13 September 2019, `https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/20/syria-bans-niqab-from-universities`.

restricted for the first year and naturalisation required five years of residency.

Figure 6.3: Conjoint 1 MMs



Note: N = 3,800. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


In line with the AMCEs above, destination profiles that mentioned employment were preferred to those that mentioned unemployment, which I discuss in Section 6.5 below. Similarly, destinations designated as supporting taking in refugees were preferred to those designated as in favour of restricting immigration. Lastly, destinations that are welcoming to foreigners, good countries for Syrians, or those that have well-known brands were chosen significantly more often than those designated as bad countries for Syrians. The latter's effect size is particularly large. Destinations designated

as being located in bad countries were merely chosen one in three times they were displayed (MM=0.34). No other characteristic made a destination equally less liked. Its large negative effect size suggests that respondents were disproportionately more deterred by a bad option than they were attracted to a good one, i.e. one marked as a 'good country for Syrians'. This might reflect the use of prospect theory when evaluating and deciding upon a migration destination. The characteristic that made destinations most attractive is not having religious bans, which trumped the positive effects of all other characteristics. The absence of such bans made destinations disproportionately more attractive than the presence made them unattractive.

Figure 6.4 displays the AMCEs for the second conjoint treatment, Table B.16 (Appendix) displays numerical estimates, standard errors, and the sample size (3,860). The AMCEs with regards to conjectures 1–7 above are very similar to conjoint 1 although their magnitudes are generally smaller. This is in line with the above theoretical conjectures that the relative importance of destination characteristics should decrease once destinations are designated as being located in specific countries. Relative to not having a minimum wage, generous support and free healthcare narrowly fail to reach significance at the five per cent level. Respondents preferred destinations with quicker pathways to citizenship and access to the labour market. The attribute 'reputation' of conjoint 1 was replaced by the attribute 'country' in conjoint 2. The probability of choosing the destination when it was designated as being in Canada was 0.15 higher than when the destination was in the UK. Destinations in France and Germany were 0.12 and 0.05 less likely to be chosen while destinations in the USA were not significantly more or less likely to be chosen relative to those in the UK. The ranking of the destinations was mostly in line with the survey evidence (Figure 5.3): destinations in Canada were the most preferred, followed by the UK, the USA, Germany, and France. However, the differences between UK-USA and USA-Germany are not statistically significantly different from zero. In line with the above findings, Canada was significantly preferred to France. The most preferred migration

destination in conjoint 2 is almost identical to the most preferred one for conjoint 1, except that it is located in Canada instead of being designated as a good country. The probability that such destination would be chosen is essentially 1, meaning it would always be chosen. This is driven mostly by its location in Canada, absence of religious bans, and quick naturalisation. The least preferred destination mirrors the least preferred destination in conjoint 1 but is located in France. The probability that it would be chosen is 0.11. This is driven by the ban on hijab in schools and its location in France.

Figure 6.4: Conjoint 2 AMCEs




Note: N = 3,860. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

The marginal means for conjoint 2 are similar to that of conjoint 1 (see Figure 6.5 below and Table B.17, Appendix). However, having family at the destination is no longer associated with the destination being chosen more often. Destinations marked as being in Canada were chosen almost two thirds of the time they were displayed while those marked as being in France were chosen less than four in ten times. Germany also made destinations less likely to be chosen while the USA and the UK seemed to be perceived as neutral countries, each being chosen around half the times they were displayed. The country attribute had the biggest effect on overall destination choice, both positive (Canada) and negative (France). The absence of religious bans and quick naturalisation processes were the other attributes that made destinations significantly more likely to be chosen. On the contrary, religious bans and long residence requirements until naturalisations made destinations less attractive.

The above findings are robust to changes in the model specifications and did not change substantively if I restricted the full sample to different subsamples of interest. I present robustness checks in Appendix B.6. Following from the above theoretical conjectures, I further evaluate destination choice by gender and age.

Gender. I conjectured above that gender might particularly affect preferences for destinations with religious bans with women being more deterred by such bans than men. Figures 6.6–6.7 present AMCEs for both conjoint treatments by gender. While it seems that women more strongly preferred destinations that offered social benefits, relative to those that did not have a minimum wage, and were more deterred by religious bans, the differences between men and women are not statistically significant at the five per cent level. Relative to the UK, women were significantly less likely to pick a destination designated as being in Germany, while there is no difference between the two countries for men. The difference between men and women is significant at the ten per cent level (p=0.086). Figures 6.8–6.9present MMs for both conjoint treatments by gender and generally confirm the above findings that there are very


Figure 6.5: Conjoint 2 MMs



Note: N = 3,860. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


few significant differences between men and women. Again, there is no difference in preference between Germany and the UK for men but a significant one for women, who were less likely to pick destinations designated as being in Germany. France was the least liked for both men and women. There is weak evidence that women were more strongly deterred by religious bans than men. In conjoint 1, women were somewhat less likely to select destinations that banned hijabs in school than men (p=0.067). While I did not find strong support for the gendered effect of conjecture five, I am also not able to reject it entirely.

Figure 6.6: Conjoint 1 AMCEs, by gender




Note: N = 1,040 (Female) & 2,750 (Male). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.7: Conjoint 2 AMCEs, by gender




Note: N = 960 (Female) & 2,870 (Male). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.8: Conjoint 1 MMs, by gender



Note: N = 1,040 (Female) & 2,750 (Male). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.9: Conjoint 2 MMs, by gender




Note: N = 960 (Female) & 2,870 (Male). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Age. I hypothesised above that age might particularly affect preferences for social benefits with younger respondents preferring free housing to free healthcare and with stronger preferences in favour of free housing relative to older respondents. Figures 6.10–6.11 present AMCEs for both conjoint treatments grouped by respondents aged 18–29 and 30 and above. There are very few significant differences for the majority of the attributes. An exception is social benefits. Relative to destinations that do not have a minimum wage, young respondents in conjoint 1 were 0.09 and 0.14 more likely to pick a destination with free healthcare and free housing, respectively. Both effects are significantly larger for younger than for older respondents (p=0.036 for housing and p=0.051 for healthcare). The estimated probabilities are somewhat smaller in conjoint 2 and not statistically different between younger and older respondents. Older respondents were less likely to pick France, relative to the UK and older respondents in general had stronger destination preferences than young respondents. The MMs confirm this (Figures 6.12–6.13). While there is no difference for destinations labelled as being in the UK between the two groups, there are significant subgroup differences for Canada (p=0.036), the USA (p=0.045), and France (p=0.032). The USA was evaluated slightly more negatively by young people. Destinations in Canada particularly attracted older people while France particularly deterred this group. The effect sizes are considerable: for those aged 30 and above, the marginal mean for France is 0.34 while that for Canada is 0.71. It follows that older people were twice as likely to choose destinations in Canada as destinations in France, averaged across all other conjoint attribute values.


In summary, I found evidence explaining why Canada was preferred to France and confirmed the causal relationships between several destination characteristics and destination choice. Religious bans, longer residence requirements until naturalisation, and particularly a destination's reputation as a bad country for Syrians rendered destinations unattractive to Syrian refugees in Jordan. The absence of religious bans was the most important attribute explaining why a destination was chosen. The

Figure 6.10: Conjoint 1 AMCEs, by age




Note: N = 2,390 (18-29) & 1,410 (30+). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.11: Conjoint 2 AMCEs, by age




Note: N = 2,490 (18-29) & 1,370 (30+). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.12: Conjoint 1 MMs, by age



Note: N = 2,390 (18-29) & 1,410 (30+). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.13: Conjoint 2 MMs, by age



Note: N = 2,490 (18-29) & 1,370 (30+). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

French ban on the hijab in schools, longer residence requirements for naturalisation, and its reputation as a bad country hence explain why Canada was preferred to France. Designating destinations as being in specific countries, such as Canada and France, instead of including the destination's reputation did not significantly alter the results, suggesting that the destination's reputation was inferred by respondents once they saw a specific country. Migration destinations in Canada particularly attracted those aged 30 and above while destinations in France had the opposite effect. The effects for respondents aged 18 to 29 were similar but the magnitudes significantly smaller. Having discussed how the Syrian refugees in Jordan that I sampled evaluate potential migration destinations and decide upon one destination, I illustrate the use of different heuristics in the following section.

6.5 Heuristics in destination choice


I illustrate the use of heuristic decision strategies in migration destination choice in this section by employing both qualitative interview data and quantitative conjoint results. There are generally two means to determine which heuristic strategies are used: evaluate information acquisition or outcomes of the decision process.[31] I briefly discussed information acquisition in Section 6.2 and the information respondents had about migration destinations in Sections 5.3 and 5.2. Information and preferences do not, however, say anything about how decisions are made and potential migrants might still only rely on a few cues to take decisions. I therefore mostly rely on evaluating decisions, i.e. hypothetical destination choices in the conjoint experiment. I illustrate the use of the following heuristics: availability, recognition, one-reason decision-making, framing and prospect theory, and sunk costs and path dependency.

31. Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group, *Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart*.

Availability. The interview results suggest that the countries that respondents mentioned most frequently, such as Canada, were the most available, as they could easily and quickly be retrieved from memory. While I have not established why Canada was an available migration option, current events in Germany, the USA, and France at the time of the interviews were frequently referred to, suggesting that these were at least partly responsible for the increased availability. The respective events were the inflow of Syrian asylum seekers into Germany, President Trump's immigration restrictions for Muslim-majority countries, and the ban of burqinis — a modesty swimsuit for Muslim women — in several French towns as well as restrictions on the wear of the hijab and burqa in general. These events and laws were quickly retrieved from memory when people spoke about the above countries. Information about such laws and events was acquired mostly through social media and networks.

Recognition. Individuals who recognise information about certain migration destinations might ignore other, potentially contradicting cues, about the destination. I conjectured above that the other destination attributes will decrease in importance for respondents who recognise the destination country. To trace out the importance of the recognition heuristic when deciding between the two alternative migration destinations in the conjoint experiment, I evaluate destination choices by choice time. The intuition is that the recognition will mostly be used for fast and frugal decisions whereas it is much less important for slower choices where a variety of destination attributes might be weighed and contrasted. I hence expected the country attribute to be particularly important for quick choices. Figure 6.14 displays the marginal means for the second conjoint for pairwise destination choices by choice time in the first decile (<7 seconds), first quantile (<13 seconds), and for all choices regardless of time. Both seven and thirteen seconds are arguably not enough to fully evaluate the two destinations and their eight attributes each (see Figure 3.2 for an example of an actual destination choice table presented to respondents). Not surprisingly, the

Figure 6.14: Conjoint 2 MMs, by choice time



Note: N = 384 (7s) & 776 (13s) & 3,860 (All). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


quicker choices are less exactly estimated due to the smaller sample sizes. For choices in the first decile, a few destination attributes remain significant factors that alter the frequency a particular destination was chosen: 'laws' and 'attitude'. Destinations that ban the hijab in schools were less likely to be chosen while those without religious bans were more likely to be chosen. The negative effect size of the former is significantly larger than for slower choices; the marginal mean for destinations that ban the hijab is 0.33 while for the full sample it is 0.44. Destinations welcoming to refugees were further more likely to be chosen. In addition, there is some evidence that long waiting periods until labour market access and naturalisation makes destinations less attractive. Surprisingly, the country attribute is not significant, suggesting that the country a migration destination is located in does not play a role for fast and frugal decisions. I hence did not find evidence that the importance of the attribute 'country' increases for fast and frugal decisions. I do, however, find weak evidence that destinations that ban the hijab in schools were significantly less likely to be chosen in fast and frugal decisions. This might suggest that the possibility to integrate in the potential destination country matters most for fast and frugal decisions. Expanding the sample to choices that took up to 13 seconds, the first quantile, improves the precision of the estimates. Being located in Canada made a destination significantly more likely to be chosen while the opposite was true for France. However, there are no significant differences between choices that took less than 13 seconds and all choices.

One-reason decision-making. The conjoint results for the full sample in Figures 6.2–6.5 do not support the hypothesis that respondents used one or a few cues only to make migration destination choices. The majority of AMCEs are significantly different from their respective reference categories and the majority of MMs are significantly different from 0.5. In fact, the overall results suggest that all destination attributes except having local contacts significantly affected the destination choice. I hence investigated whether there were subgroups who overwhelmingly made their

decisions based on one or a few destination cues. I asked respondents before the conjoint survey experiment what they considered to be the most important characteristic of a potential migration destination. The most common answers were 'citizenship and rights', 'education opportunities', and 'employment / career opportunities' (see Figure 5.2 above). I present AMCEs by these preferences in Figures 6.15–6.16 and MMs in Figures 6.17–6.18.


I did not evaluate subgroup preferences by other preferred destination characteristics due to small sample sizes. I hypothesised above that people who selected a certain destination characteristic, such as citizenship, as the most important factor when choosing a migration destination would place more importance on this cue, relative to other cues and relative to individuals who selected a different destination characteristic as their most important one. This did not seem to be the case for those who selected citizenship and employment, respectively. They did not value destinations with faster access to citizenship, better labour market situations for Syrians, or faster access to work permits differently than other subgroups or the full sample. However, I did find some evidence that those who valued employment significantly preferred destinations where other Syrians are settled, relative to destinations without local contacts. This might reflect the importance of networks for finding employment opportunities and integrating into the labour market. While I did not include a destination attribute related to education on purpose, I expected that those who disproportionately valued education would choose destinations that had a good reputation for education. In the qualitative interviews, the UK was repeatedly associated with good quality education due to its world-class universities. Those who considered education as the most important characteristic of a potential destination did not, however, place a higher value on the UK relative to other countries or other respondents. However, those who valued education evaluated restrictions on the hijab in schools more negatively than other respondents. Relative to the reference category, no religious bans, the probability that they chose such destinations decreased by 0.29 in conjoint 1 and 0.23 in

Figure 6.15: Conjoint 1 AMCEs, by preferred destination characteristic




Note: N = 1,180 (Citizenship) & 860 (Education) & 810 (Employment).
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.16: Conjoint 2 AMCEs, by preferred destination characteristic




Note: N = 1,320 (Citizenship) & 1,030 (Education) & 580 (Employment).
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.17: Conjoint 1 MMs, by preferred destination characteristic



Note: N = 1,180 (Citizenship) & 860 (Education) & 810 (Employment).
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.18: Conjoint 2 MMs, by preferred destination characteristic



Note: N = 1,320 (Citizenship) & 1,030 (Education) & 580 (Employment).
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

conjoint 2. The marginal means confirm their dislike for hijab-banning destinations.

Another means to illustrate one-reason decision-making is to evaluate migration destination choices by preferred destination country. I asked respondents before the conjoint whether they preferred to relocate to Canada, France, Germany, the UK, the USA, or another country, if they had the chance to do so. Canada was the preferred destination country by more than four in ten respondents, followed by the UK (25 per cent), the USA, and Germany (ten per cent each, see Figure 5.3 above). France was preferred by less than five per cent. I evaluated destination choice by country preference for all countries except France due to sample size concerns. The hypothesis was that respondents preferred destinations in countries they had indicated a preference for and would disregard other, potentially contradictory destination characteristics, which results in their diminished importance. Figure 6.19 presents AMCEs for the country attribute by country preference for conjoint 2. I do not display the first seven attributes, as they did not vary much by destination country preference and are in line with the overall conjoint results. The estimates for the Germany, the UK, and the USA subsamples further largely lack statistical significance. This might reflect the diminished importance of these cues once the country name was displayed but might also be due to smaller sample sizes. Figures B.8–B.9 (Appendix) provide the full set of AMCEs. The estimates for the country attribute provide strong evidence that respondents overwhelmingly chose destinations in countries they preferred and recognised, relative to the UK. For respondents who preferred the UK (third column in Figure 6.19), the probability that a destination was chosen decreased with non-UK-based destinations. The effect sizes are considerable. Relative to the UK, the probability that respondents who preferred Canada chose destinations in Canada increased by 0.24 (first column). The respective probabilities for the other subgroups are 0.3 for Germany and 0.2 for the USA. To test whether potential migrants ignored other and potentially contradictory cues once they recognised destinations located in their preferred destination countries, I tested for a heterogeneous effect of religious

bans on destination choice. I chose this attribute, as it generally had the largest negative effect on destination choice. I did not find a heterogeneous effect by prior destination country preference. Individuals who had indicated to prefer a certain destination country, such as Canada, did not seem to ignore religious bans that generally made migration destinations less attractive. In fact, there is slight evidence for the opposite: the negative effect of religious bans for those who preferred Canada was stronger if the destination with religious bans was located in Canada rather than in any other country (Figure B.12, Appendix).

Figure 6.19: Conjoint 2 AMCEs for country attribute, by pref. destination country





Figure 6.20: Conjoint 2 MMs for country attribute, by pref. destination country




The marginal means by destination country preference (Figure 6.20) provide fur-

ther support for few-reason decision-making. Again, I only show the relevant MMs for the country attribute for conjoint 2. The MM for migration destinations in Canada for respondents who preferred Canada is 0.73 (column 1, Figure 6.20) and the respective MMs for Germany, the UK, and the USA are 0.72, 0.61, and 0.64 for respondents who preferred these countries. Canada was chosen more than half the times it was displayed while Germany and France less than half the times by all respondents except those who had indicated to prefer to relocate to Germany. Those who preferred to move to the USA or the UK were also more likely to choose destinations in Canada, indicating that the latter was seen as an attractive alternative destination country. However, the opposite was not true for respondents who had indicated a preference for Canada. The majority of the other destination attributes was not significant. Importantly, the preference for destinations without religious bans persisted, as did the antipathy for destinations where such bans are in place (Figures B.10–B.11, Appendix). Quicker naturalisation made destinations more attractive while destinations designated as bad countries for Syrians made them significantly less attractive. The effect sizes, however, were generally second to that of the country attribute.

Framing and prospect theory. I framed some of the same attribute values for 'employment' and 'attitude' in positive and in negative terms to evaluate the impact of framing and prospect theory on destination choice. Prospect theory states that equal-sized losses weigh more negatively than equal sized gains. Hence, while it should not make any difference for economic rationality, people generally tend to put a higher value on losses than on equally-sized gains and aim to avoid potential losses. For the destination attribute 'employment', 'Half of all Syrians employed' is equivalent to 'Half of all Syrians unemployed', as are '1 in 4 Syrians employed' and '3 in 4 Syrians employed'. The first values are framed in positive terms, employment, while the second ones are framed in negative terms, unemployment. Similarly, for the attribute 'attitude', the value '3 in 4 people support taking in refugees' is equivalent


to '1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees'. The effects of framing in the vast majority of all conjoint models presented were in accordance with the above theoretical conjectures. Values framed in positive terms were significantly more likely to be chosen than their equivalents framed in negative terms. For conjoints 1 and 2, the probabilities that destinations where 3 in 4 Syrians are unemployed were chosen decrease by 0.08 (p=0.0002) and 0.04 (p=0.08), relative to destinations where 1 in 4 Syrians are employed. Figure 6.21 summarises the relevant estimates from Figures 6.2 and 6.4.

Figure 6.21: Conjoint AMCEs for employment and attitude attributes



Note: N = 3,800 (Conjoint 1) & 3,860 (Conjoint 2). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.22: Conjoint MMs for employment and attitude attributes



Note: N = 3,800 (Conjoint 1) & 3,860 (Conjoint 2). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Similarly, destinations where half of all Syrians are employed were preferred to those where half of all Syrians are unemployed. Framing effects were further at work for the public attitude attribute. Respondents were significantly more likely to choose destinations where 3 in 4 people support taking in refugees than destinations where 1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees. The marginal means confirm the above findings that destinations with attributes framed in negative terms are significantly less likely to be chosen than destinations with attributes framed in positive terms. Figure 6.22 summarises the relevant MMs from Figures 6.3 and 6.5 above. The difference in the MMs between destinations where half of all Syrians are employed and destinations where half of all Syrians are unemployed is 0.12 for conjoint 1 and 0.09 for conjoint 2. Both differences are statistically significantly different from zero. The same logic holds true for the attitude attribute.

Sunk costs and path dependency. While I did not evaluate the effect of sunk costs and path dependency on destination choice in the conjoint experiments, I did find some evidence of their importance in the qualitative interviews. When I asked a young doctor why he was not interested in going to Germany, unlike another young doctor I had interviewed earlier, he clarified:

> I originally had started down the path of the US, by doing the exams, and I can't now go back and change that, I want to continue down the path I'm in now and I'll see what happens.[32]

Similarly, the junior doctor who applied for a visa for Germany did not consider any other destination countries, as he had already been studying German for a few years and considered it an investment into his future.

32. 18M26.

6.6 Summary

This chapter built on the insights of Chapter 5 on Syrian refugees' preferences pertaining to destination characteristics and destination countries to investigate the destination choice using novel quantitative data gathered through a conjoint survey experiment. This is the third part of the third research question: What are the aspirations, destination preferences, and *destination choices* of Syrian refugees in Jordan and how well does the revised migration decision-making framework explain them? I outlined the information sources respondents indicated to consult to gather information and compared them to the migration literature (Section 6.2). In line with the latter, I confirmed the importance of informal sources known to respondents, such as friends and relatives, as well as the reliance on information gathered through social media and in particular through Facebook groups for Syrian refugees in Jordan. Interestingly, and challenging the narrative that information provided via networks is generally positive, some respondents highlighted that some Syrian refugees strategically withheld information. They either did so for their own benefit or in order not to make those still in Jordan feel bad. In short, not everybody trusted all the information provided via informal online channels.

The conjoint results (Section 6.4) broadly confirmed the theoretical conjectures (Section 6.3). Destinations that offer generous social services, free housing, and free healthcare attracted Syrian refugees while destinations without a minimum wage, a proxy for a less generous welfare state, deterred them. Banning the hijab in schools made destinations less attractive, as did immigration restrictions for Muslim-majority countries. The former is French law, the latter came into effect under President Trump in the USA. Bans on the niqab and burqa in public — such as currently in effect in Austria and France and proposed in other European countries — had a negative effect when compared to destinations without religious bans but generally did not independently affect whether a destination was chosen. Destinations with fast access

to citizenship and the labour market were preferred. At the time of writing, Germany, for instance, offered immediate labour market access while the UK generally imposed a one-year waiting period. Destinations that emphasised employment of Syrians were preferred to those that emphasised unemployment. This is evidence for a framing effect and prospect theory, i.e. respondents assessed potential losses more negatively than equal-sized gains. Public attitudes towards refugees and Muslims further affect the destination choice. There is further evidence for a framing effect with respondents preferring destinations where a proportion of the population supports the immigration of Muslims or refugees to those where a proportion oppose it. Slightly surprisingly given the plethora of empirical evidence on the importance of networks, having local contacts at the destination did not affect destination choice. The effects of these seven destination attributes were very similar for both conjoint treatments.

The destination's reputation (conjoint 1) and the country the destination is located in (conjoint 2) had the expected effects on destination choice. Destinations designated as bad countries for Syrians received a significant penalty while those designated as welcoming to foreigners or good countries for Syrians attracted them. The large negative effect size of the value 'bad country for Syrians' suggests that respondents were disproportionately more deterred by a bad option than they were attracted to a good one, i.e. one marked as a 'good country for Syrians'. Including the name of the country the destination is located in did not drastically reduce the relative importance of the other destination attributes, contrary to my theoretical conjectures. The country preference in the conjoint was in line with the preferences enquired at earlier stages of the survey. Canada was the most preferred, followed by the UK, USA, Germany, and France. Destinations marked as being in Canada were chosen two third of times while destinations in France less than four in ten times. Their effect sizes trumped those of the other destination attributes. Canada was the best indicator a destination would be chosen while France that it would not be chosen.

I generally did not find significant subgroup differences for destination preference

by gender and age. However, there is some indication that women were more deterred by religious restrictions on wearing the hijab than men and that young people disproportionately preferred destinations with free housing and free healthcare, relative to older respondents. These findings are in line with my theoretical conjectures. Further, people aged 30 and above placed a higher value on the country cue with destinations marked as being in Canada more likely to be chosen and those in France less likely to be chosen, relative to respondents aged 18–29.

Heuristics seemed to have played some role in destination choice. I presented qualitative evidence for the use of availability, sunk cost, and path dependency heuristics. The recognition heuristic might be used by respondents in fast and frugal decisions. However, and contrary to my conjectures, such decisions did not seem to be guided by the country the destination is located in but rather by the presence of bans on the hijab in schools, which made destinations significantly less likely to be chosen. I found the strongest evidence for framing effects and prospect theory. Destinations with attribute values framed in positive terms (i.e. employment and the share of the population in favour of immigration) were significantly more often chosen than their equivalents with information framed in negative terms (i.e. unemployment and the share of the population opposed to immigration). Lastly, I found mixed evidence for one-reason or few-reason decision-making. I arrived at this conclusion after evaluating conjoint results by respondents' preferred destination characteristic and preferred destination country. Surprisingly, the former revealed that preferring a specific destination characteristic, such as employment opportunities, did not change its importance relative to other destination characteristics or people with other preferred destination characteristics. In addition, there were no significant differences in the effects of the country attribute by preferred destination characteristic. This finding might imply that respondents did not consider some countries to be better in terms of citizenship, employment, and education but rather relied on the information provided. Or, they might not know whether the countries provided fare better or worse with

regard to their preferred destination characteristic. Evaluating the conjoint results by preferred destination country supports few-reason decision-making. All respondents significantly preferred destinations located in their preferred destination countries and the relative importance of other destination characteristics decreased, which might, however, be partly driven by larger standard errors due to smaller subgroup sample sizes. Canada was universally liked by all respondents except by those who preferred Germany. The latter were the only ones who were more likely to pick destinations in Germany while all others were less likely to do so.

In short, I have found mixed evidence for the applicability of the migration decision-making framework to the decision-making of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The following and last chapter discusses this thesis' overall findings and relates them back to my research questions, the literature, and the theoretical migration decision-making framework. It presents this thesis' contributions and limitations and makes suggestions for future research.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis started with the question why not more than the currently estimated 750 million people would like to migrate internationally given the wide range of migration drivers that have been identified by the theoretical and empirical literature on migration. Why do not more (if not all) people living in a conflict area decide to flee, or do not flee at the same time, even if they could? Why do certain destination countries seem more popular with certain types of migrants? The fact that these questions have largely not been adequately addressed is surprising. In response, I have developed a broad framework of migration decision-making that draws on a variety of disciplines including political science, social psychology, and economics to shed light on the migration decision-making process of potential migrants. The framework centres on needs, motivation, aspirations, individual capacities for migration, heuristics, and information. I have empirically illustrated aspects of the framework in a mixed methods study of Syrian refugees in Jordan using a novel conjoint survey experiment of destination choice, preceded by qualitative semi-structured interviews. Mixed methods give a better understanding of and insight into migration decision-making and the role of heuristics therein, which is arguably not possible using solely qualitative or quantitative methods. I focused on Syrian refugees for a variety of reasons. Syrians account both for the largest group of refugees worldwide and a considerable share of

asylum seekers who reached EU member states since 2015. Their decision-making with regards to whether to leave Syria and host countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon and where to relocate has been of interest to academics, policymakers, politicians, and the public alike. Syrian refugees in Jordan also constitute a least likely case to illustrate the applicability of my theoretical framework of migration decision-making. Further, Jordan in theory grants Syrian refugees access to the labour market and the situation of Syrians in Jordan is arguably better than in other host countries, making local integration a viable alternative to repatriation and resettlement for some people. In this final chapter, I link my findings back to this thesis' research questions in Section 7.1. I outline this thesis' contributions in Section 7.2 and discuss its limitations in Section 7.3. Lastly, I provide suggestions for further research in Section 7.4.

7.1 Research questions and answers

Three main research questions guided this thesis. I provide answers to each of them in turn. The first two questions pertain to the theoretical framework (Chapter 2), the third to the empirical illustration thereof (Chapters 4–6).

What motivates individuals to migrate, what role do life aspirations play, and who is a potential migrant?

Following from Maslow's hierarchy of needs,[1] I argued that migration is driven by a combination of different forms of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation that arise from unfulfilled physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualisation needs. The unfulfilled needs do not necessarily only pertain to the potential migrant in question but might also include her family or household members' unfulfilled needs. They are necessary but not sufficient for the motivation to migrate to arise. An individual's hierarchy of

1. Maslow, 'A theory of human motivation'.

needs is not rigid but depends on individual characteristics and the context, the migration driver environment. The driver environment challenges a potential migrant's currently fulfilled needs or corresponds to currently unfulfilled needs. Migration serves as a purposive or instrumental action to satisfy some of those needs.

The revised framework of migration decision-making builds on and extends Carling's seminal work on migration aspirations[2] and incorporates Czaika and Vothknecht's concept of the aspiration gap.[3] In contrast to Carling and in accordance with the latter two authors, I argued that the majority of potential migrants do not aspire to migrate as an end in itself but as a means to satisfy their life aspirations. Aspiration gaps, the difference between aspired and actual needs satisfaction, are the internal drivers of migration. It is hence not merely unfulfilled needs that drive migration but rather the difference between the current life and the life aspired to. Life aspirations do not only relate to and include one's own life but might also extend to one's family or ethnic-religious group. Family (or household) members might also directly influence the aspirations of a potential migrant by 'appointing' one or more aspirations. The motivation to migrate generally increases with the size of an individual's aspiration gap and the duration the gap persists. If aspiration gaps are very small, locational change will be deemed too costly, from both an economic and non-economic point of view. Individuals will likely try to meet their aspirations and close their aspiration gaps. However, very large aspiration gaps might lead to cognitive dissonance and involuntary immobility. Not every potential migrant aspires to the same level of needs satisfaction nor has the same individual needs, resulting in different aspiration gaps and hence different motivation intensity for migration for people with the same level of needs satisfaction. The motivation intensity will likely be highest for individuals with mid-range to large aspiration gaps. Aspirations and aspiration gaps are not static but rather evolve with external stimuli: the individual's environment,

2. Carling, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility'.
3. Czaika and Vothknecht, 'Migration and aspirations'.

exposure to new experiences, information, and interaction and comparison with one's peer-group. Aspirations are frequently adjusted downwards and upwards. The former might occur after a natural catastrophe, war, or conflict, the latter is often the result of the migration experience and exposure to new ways of life. Potential migrants need three capacities for migration to eventually become actual migrants: the capacity to aspire, realise, and decide migration. The capacity to aspire is the capacity to imagine a life better than the one an individual currently lives and it is nurtured by a person's economic, social, emotional, and cognitive resources. Akin to aspirations, the capacity to aspire is endogenous and may change as a consequence of peer-group interaction and external stimuli, such as exposure to new ways of living. The capacity to realise relies on economic, social, emotional, and cognitive resources and is necessary but not sufficient for migration. The capacities to aspire and realise are mutually interdependent. Potential migrants who possess both are able to establish whether to migrate or to stay put. Being able to aspire and realise migration is, however, not sufficient for migration. They might not migrate if they lack the capacity decide migration, i.e. to search for, evaluate, and decide upon a migration destination.

In principle, every human — at least every adult — is a potential migrant, embedded in the migration driver environment. Depending on the type of migration considered (local, regional, internal, international), and their individual capacities for migration, some will become actual migrants. Some potential migrants are unable to migrate because they lack any or a combination of the capacities for migration. A large part of the 750 million potential migrants worldwide that aspire to migrate are arguably unable to do so as they lack the capacity to realise and/or decide migration. These *migration aspirers* wish for a better life and consider migration to be one or the only means to close their aspiration gaps. Migration aspires who are unable to turn their aspirations into migration behaviour have three options. First, adjust their aspirations downwards to avoid cognitive dissonance and as a result settle for a more achievable migration option, such as relocate internally rather than internationally.

Second, work on increasing their capacity to realise migration to make the desired form of migration or destination achievable. Third, adjust their aspirations downwards, stay put, and try to fulfil their life aspirations at their current location. *Migration realisers* have the monetary and non-monetary resources necessary to accomplish a migration project. However, not all migration realisers are migration aspirers. While they might be able to realise migration, they do not aspire to do so. Some might aspire to international migration but are only able to realise internal migration due to migration restrictions and costs. Others aspire to and are able to realise international migration but are unable to decide where to relocate. *Migration deciders* have the mental capacity to search, evaluate, and decide upon potential alternative migration options and destinations. However, not all migration deciders necessarily aspire to or are able to realise migration. Migration deciders who also have the capacities to aspire and realise migration will stop being potential migrants and will become actual migrants if the right opportunities come up.

How do potential migrants search, evaluate, and decide upon potential migration destinations?

The vast majority of studies of migration decision-making and the drivers of migration rely on some form of economic rationality and a calculus of costs, benefits, or utility. In contrast, I posit that heuristics, a concept central in social psychology, should be considered central to human migration decision-making, particularly the decision where to relocate. Decisions are hence not necessarily made on the basis of a full evaluation of all relevant factors due to imperfect information, uncertainty, or bounded rationality. Potential migrants with the capacity to decide migration use a range of heuristics to search, evaluate, and decide upon potential migration destinations. The search for (a limited number of) migration opportunities is central to the subsequent evaluation of migration options and the decision to migrate to a certain destination or to stay put. Heuristic strategies used predominantly for the search for migration

opportunities include satisficing, availability, and hierarchical search. The number of potential destinations that have been identified in a search-and-stop process are evaluated, ordered, and transformed into a personalised 'destination hierarchy'. Heuristics to do so include prospect theory, framing, status quo bias, endowment effect, and regret avoidance. The latter three are further able to explain why some potential migrants do not migrate, even if they aspire to do so. Having evaluated different migration options, potential migrants employ heuristic rules to decide upon one preferred migration destination. Recognition, one-reason (or few-reason) decision-making, imitation, affect, exploration/exploitation, public commitments, sunk costs, and ex-post rationalisation are heuristic strategies to decide where to relocate. These search, evaluation, and decision heuristics may form part of an individual's heuristic availability set, i.e. the heuristics available to her, which she might use subconsciously for migration decisions. Factors that affect the individual availability set include personality traits, socio-cultural background, and social learning. Information about potential destinations and their characteristics is central to search, evaluation, and decision. I argued that information for migration decisions should ideally be believable, relevant, reliable, easily accessible, and comprehensive to affect migration decisions.

What are the aspirations, destination preferences, and destination choices of Syrian refugees in Jordan and how well does the revised migration decision-making framework explain them?

I empirically illustrated aspects of the migration decision-making framework in an inductive mixed methods evaluation of Syrian refugees in Jordan. I gathered novel qualitative and quantitative data obtained through interviews and surveys. I found empirical evidence for some of the framework's predictions. Syrian refugees had unfulfilled physiological, psychological, and self-actualisation needs. The majority had substantial aspiration gaps. Their main life aspirations were related to safety, citizenship, education, and employment. Aspirations were heterogeneous and different

'types of aspires' could be distinguished by the importance placed on different life aspirations and by demographic characteristics: safety first, family person, careerist, opportunist, and formalist. In line with the theoretical framework, Syrian refugees adjusted their aspirations to their context, in response to interaction with peer groups, which included both other Syrian refugees and the Jordanian host community, and as a result of acquiring new information or learning of new opportunities. Aspiration gaps formed the basis of their motivation to migrate with larger aspiration gaps associated with a higher motivation to migrate. As the average migration motivation was very high in my survey sample, the effect of the size of individual aspiration gaps was second to demographic characteristics. A majority of Syrians faced considerable and potentially insurmountable barriers — mostly caused by (perceived) dependency on others — to achieving their aspired goals in Jordan. The main barriers mentioned include restricted rights and the absence of a path to citizenship, employment restrictions, financial hardship, and discrimination due to being Syrian and a refugee. Their capacity to realise aspired change was restricted. Aspiration gaps were further associated with preferences for the three durable solutions. Syrian refugees with small aspiration gaps reported a wish to integrate in Jordan while those with medium to large aspiration gaps preferred repatriation or resettlement. I found qualitative evidence that the largest aspiration gaps were associated with repatriation and mid-range ones with resettlement in the interviews. However, there is no significant difference between these two groups in the survey data.

Prior studies on the migration drivers of asylum seekers and refugees have generally concluded that family, networks, and transnational ties alongside economic and political factors at the destination played some role.[4] Other studies have emphasised the importance of the destination's reputation.[5] While these factors arguably all

4. Crawley, *Chance or Choice?*; Day and White, 'Choice or circumstance'; Migali et al., *International Migration Drivers*; Robinson and Segrott, *Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers*.

5. Brekke and Five Aarset, *Why Norway?*; Havinga and Böcker, 'Country of asylum by choice or

play some role, their relative importance remains largely uncharted territory.[6] I evaluated stated destination choice of Syrian refugees in Jordan to determine the relative importance of different destination characteristics. Syrian refugees indicated during the interviews that they were attracted by migration destinations where they had family, friends, or migrant networks and by destinations that offered economic and education opportunities, citizenship, and rights. A minority was attracted by social services and asylum and migration policies. They were deterred by xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes and by restrictions on religion and religious symbols. The former were closely linked to a country's reputation, which I found to be an ambiguous factor. Several respondents stated that they preferred certain countries because they were good countries in general or good countries for Syrian refugees in particular. The survey evidence partly confirms these findings. Citizenship and rights, followed by education, employment, asylum policies, and social services were the most preferred destination characteristics. Interestingly, social contacts and a country's reputation were deemed important by very few survey respondents only. Canada emerged as the preferred destination country, followed by the UK, the USA, Germany, and France. I qualitatively investigated the reasons why Syrian refugees in Jordan liked or disliked certain countries. While a majority of respondents liked the USA, President Trump's 'Muslim ban' decreased the country's attractiveness and respondents perceived that resettlement to the USA had become more difficult. Canada seemed almost universally liked, as it was perceived to be a good country for Syrians. There was widespread opposition to relocating to France, as it was perceived as anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim due to its ban on religious symbols, such as the burqa, and the ban on the hijab in schools. Turkey was seen as accessible and hence the most likely but not the most liked destination, in contrast to North American and Western European countries. A number of respondents highlighted that they would go to any country

by chance'.

6. Haas, 'The determinants of international migration'.

or to any country that fulfilled certain criteria, such as giving them rights and a path towards citizenship. The interview findings indicate that Canada's reputation made it a preferred destination while France's restrictions on religious clothing made it a less attractive migration destination but their relative effects on destination choice remained unclear.

To decide where to relocate, potential migrants need information about one or more potential migration opportunities. In line with the migration literature, I found that Syrian refugees in Jordan overwhelmingly relied on informal networks and social media in general and Facebook in particular to gather information about potential destination countries.[7] I investigate the mechanism why Canada was preferred to France and the relative importance of different destinations characteristics in a conjoint experiment of stated migration destination choice. I found evidence for a causal effect of a destination's characteristics on the probability that it was chosen. Syrian refugees preferred destinations with faster access to the labour market and naturalisation as well as free housing. Surprisingly, having local contacts did not affect destination choice, despite their prominence in the migration literature. While the qualitative results highlight the importance of networks, respondents put a higher importance on other destination cues in the quantitative conjoint experiment. I am unable to exactly determine why they did so but qualitative evidence suggests that respondents had already relocated from Syria and settled in Jordan without knowing anybody and therefore discounted the importance of networks in favour of economic opportunities and access to citizenship. Destinations that highlighted the employment prospects of Syrians were significantly preferred to those that highlighted the share of Syrians who are unemployed. Similarly, public attitudes in favour of immigration made destinations more attractive while opposition to immigration resulted in those destinations being chosen less often. Whether or not destinations banned immigra-

7. Filiz Garip, 'Social capital and migration: how do similar resources lead to divergent outcomes?', *Demography* 45, no. 3 (August 2008): 591–618.

tion from Muslim-majority countries or restricted religious symbols, such as the hijab and burqa, had some of the largest effects on destination choice. To my knowledge, I provide the first quantitative account of their impact on destination choice.

In line with the emerging literature on the impact of a destination's reputation on migration flows,[8] I found that the reputation of a potential migration destination mattered but the estimated effect was asymmetric. The negative effect of a bad reputation (i.e. destinations designated as bad countries for Syrians) trumped the positive effect of destinations with a good reputation (a good country for Syrians). The characteristic that made a destination the most likely to be chosen was the absence of bans on either religious clothing or immigration from Muslim-majority countries. On the contrary, the characteristic with the single largest negative effect was the reputation as a bad country for Syrians. The results confirm the importance of a destination's reputation, which is in line with my interview findings but in contrast to the survey findings where merely a few per cent of respondents indicated that a destination's reputation was the most important destination characteristic. I can only conjecture that respondents selected other destination characteristics, such as rights, citizenship, and education, as that might appear more rational than choosing a destination based on its reputation when asked directly. Replacing the destination's reputation with the country the destination is located in did not change the results of the other destination characteristics. This is contrary to the theoretical conjectures that their relative importance would decrease once country names are included, as respondents would overwhelmingly decide upon this cue. Destinations in Canada were by far the most preferred, the UK or the USA did not significantly affect how often a destination was chosen, and destinations in Germany and France received a penalty, the latter a sizeable one. The positive and negative effect sizes of Canada and France trumped all other destination characteristics. I generally found very few significant

8. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 'Deciding Where to go'; Volcic and Erjavec, ''I want to leave Slovenia for a sunny, relaxed and open Australia''.

subgroup differences by gender and age. However, there was some indication that women were more deterred by religious restrictions on wearing the hijab than men and that young respondents disproportionately preferred destinations with free housing and free healthcare, relative to older respondents.

Heuristics seem to have played some role in destination choice. I found qualitative evidence for the use of the availability, sunk cost, and path dependency heuristics. The recognition heuristic was hypothesised to be used by respondents in fast and frugal decisions. However, and contrary to my conjectures, such decisions in the conjoint experiment did not seem to be guided by the country the destination was located in but rather by the presence of bans on the hijab in schools, which made destinations significantly less likely to be chosen. I found the strongest evidence for framing effects and prospect theory, evidenced by the fact that destinations that stressed employment were significantly preferred to those that framed the same information in terms of unemployment. Lastly, I found mixed evidence for one-reason or few-reason decision-making. I arrived at this conclusion after evaluating conjoint results by respondents' preferred destination characteristic and preferred destination country. The former did not seem to matter much. Respondents who had indicated before the conjoint that they considered certain destination characteristics to be the most important ones when choosing a migration destination did not place higher values on these cues in the conjoint experiment. However, the destination country preference did matter. All respondents significantly preferred destinations located in their preferred destination countries and the relative importance of other destination characteristics decreased. While the impact of heuristics on human decision-making is widely established in psychology and behavioural science,[9] it has, to my knowledge, not entered the research on migration decision-making.

9. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 'Heuristic decision making'.

7.2 Contributions

In this thesis, I reflected upon the migration decision-making process of potential migrants to improve the understanding why some people migrate and why a majority does do not migrate. I made four main contributions. First, I offered an improved theoretical understanding of the decision-making process of potential migrants. I did so by synthesising the migration literature with that on human motivation and behaviour, social and cognitive psychology, and decision-making. The developed migration decision-making framework centres on three central capacities of potential migrants: the capacities to aspire, realise, and decide. I argued that aspiration gaps are the basis for the motivation to migrate. I further argued that heuristics are likely used to search, evaluate, and decide upon potential migration destinations. The destination choice is hence not rational in an economic sense and does not necessarily reflect detailed knowledge of alternative destinations. It is rather hypothesised to be fast and frugal and reflects real-life human decision-making. I believe that the broad framework of migration decision-making that I developed is able to bridge gaps between existing theories and disciplines, unify macro, meso, and micro level theories of migration decision-making and ultimately enrich theoretical thinking. It offers a more holistic notion of migration while incorporating different parts of the extensive theoretical and empirical migration literature.

The second contribution is an empirical one. I illustrated aspects of the migration decision-making framework using a mixed methods research design. The sample population was Syrian refugees in Jordan. I evaluated the aspirations, destination preferences, and destination choice. I added qualitative insights to existing mostly quantitative accounts of refugees' durable solution preferences and made a novel contribution to the literature by showing that the size of a potential migrant's aspiration gaps was associated with migration motivation and preferences for different durable solutions. Larger aspiration gaps were associated with preferences for resettlement

and repatriation while small aspiration gaps were associated with local integration. The qualitative account of migration decision-making further fills a gap and complements the literature on destination choice of asylum seekers. Via quantitative conjoint survey experiments, I was able to recover the causal effect of different destination characteristics on stated destination choice. While the migration literature had established the importance of a wide range of different migration drivers on destination choice, it generally did not quantify the relative importance of different drivers at the destination. I further examined whether the effects of a destination's reputation and the country a migration destination is located in are more important than other destination characteristics. Both are novel additions to the literature and further reflect the increased academic interest in the effect of the reputation of migration destinations. My finding that migrant networks did not influence destination choice runs contrary to a wide range of theoretical and empirical migration studies. I suggest that the mechanism how networks affect destination choice is through a destination's reputation. A majority of interviewees indicated to hear about potential destinations — particularly whether they are good or bad countries for Syrians — from contacts and through social media. Further, a migration destination's reputation significantly affected destination choice in the conjoint experiments while the presence or absence of social networks had hardly any significant effect. I further found that heuristics, such as availability and framing, affect decision-making. This allows for both a better understanding of individual migration decision-making but also is of interest to policymakers and politicians who aim to affect potential migrants' destination choices.

Third, my empirical findings are of interest to policymakers. While is has frequently been suggested that migration policy is unable to affect the volume or composition of migration flows due to processes of globalisation, transnationalism, and political systems, I find evidence for their effectiveness at the individual level. Through interviews I have found that a destination's reputation matters and that the reputation is at least partly influenced by the country's respective policies governing refugees

and Islam. Such policies were President Trump's 'Muslim ban', a ban on immigration from Muslim-majority countries, and French restrictions on wearing the hijab. President Trump's rhetoric and the media attention his policies have attracted worldwide contributed to the USA being perceived as less welcoming to refugees and immigrants than before. The ease of family reunification or the fact that some European countries had accepted large numbers of Syrian refugees also affected stated destination preferences for some. Through conjoint experiments of hypothetical migration destination choice I was able to extract the causal effects of different destination characteristics on the probability that the destination was chosen. While networks did not matter, potentially as their effect was mediated via the reputation, I found evidence for the importance of policy. Destinations with faster access to citizenship and the labour market were significantly preferred to those with longer residency requirements. The mix of having policies that deter potential migrants and broadcasting this policy via the media and particularly social media to potential migrants might hence render migration destinations less attractive. Migration policy might matter after all.

Fourth, I have added to a small but growing number of studies that use Facebook ads to target vulnerable and hard to reach populations. I have used a short animated recruitment video to explain my research, which significantly increased uptake and reduced costs per completed survey. Participation via Facebook ads was not incentivised and I recruited roughly half of al respondents this way. For the other half, I have added monetary incentive and recruited participants via an organisation that broadcasts employment and education opportunities and was able to target Syrian refugees in Jordan directly. I have tested for but have not found heterogeneous treatment effects between the incentivised and non-incentivised sample as well as between subgroups, such as young vs. old, male vs. female. I therefore concluded that recruitment via different means and a mix of incentivisation and non-incentivisation did not alter the empirical findings and is hence a fruitful way to sample hard to reach populations.

7.3 Limitations

This thesis has three main limitations. First, I discuss what questions I did not ask and explain why I did not ask them. Second, I outline limitations of the methods used and data collected and their implications for my findings. Third, I acknowledge the temporal and spatial limitations of my findings. I present suggestions for further research that stem from these limitations in the next section.

There are several questions I did not ask, the majority of which concern the actual migration behaviour rather than the decision-making that precedes it. I studied stated migration destination preferences but I did not systematically address the feasibility of different migration options and whether a potential migrant's capability to migrate to these places affects the perceived feasibility and ultimately destination preferences and choices. I examined stated destination choices but did not empirically examine whether, how, and when these stated choices translate into migration behaviour. Further, I left the questions how aspirations and aspiration gaps develop while on the move and how aspirations and aspiration gaps develop once at the destination unanswered. I did not ask these questions due to practical concerns: the limited timeframe of my DPhil and the expected costs of such a complex study. Investigating migration behaviour was outside the scope of this thesis, as it would warrant to repeatedly interview or survey potential migrants over time, ideally starting before they develop a motivation to migrate until after they relocate. For a majority, this process might take several years, which complicates follow-up interviews and surveys. Attrition of respondents is hypothesised to be a main issue, which might be alleviated by incentivising follow-up interviews.

The purposive sample design to recruit interview respondents aimed to present a range of different views from people of different ages on migration decision-making. Recruiting via Facebook was judged to capture those who look online for information about migration options and might hence be willing to participate in the research.

Recruiting via NGOs and other organisations was done to diversify the sample and include refugees that feel settled in Jordan. I decided to exclude respondents in refugee camps for practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, access to refugee camps is tightly controlled for researchers in Jordan. Theoretically, individuals in camps might be the least likely to search for and respond to information, particularly to online information, as internet access is severely restricted in camps. Their separation from the Jordanian host community might further make it difficult for refugees to imagine local integration as the preferred durable solution. For they survey, I also used a purposive sample design and recruited participants via Facebook ads and an organisation that provides educational and employment opportunities to refugees in Jordan. The former was incentivised while the latter was not, raising the potential problem of heterogeneous treatment effects. The non-probability sample further aggravates this issue. However, I have found no indication of heterogeneous treatment effects and built on past research that has found that convenience samples estimate similar average treatment effects as probability samples.

Purposive sampling is by definition not representative of the population of Syrian refugees in Jordan. My results might therefore not extend to all Syrians refugees in Jordan or Syrian refugees in other host countries. I chose to focus on potential migrants in countries of current residence. Jordan was hence the origin country for subsequent migratory movements. However, Syrian refugees had already migrated and are therefore more likely to do so in the future, as migration experience has been widely found to be a good predictor of subsequent movement. I hence did not evaluate migration decision-making of potential migrants in general but rather of a subset thereof: potential future migrants who had already relocated once. My findings might hence generalise to refugees in host countries but not to potential migrants who have not migrated. I examined stated preferences and choices rather than actual migration choices. The most commonly mentioned drawback of such approach is that people might not necessarily do what they said they would do. While I acknowledge this

drawback, I have highlighted that a range of studies found that migration motivation or intentions are significantly associated with migration behaviour.

The empirical evaluation of migration decision-making of Syrian refugees in Jordan has to be considered against the external circumstances and developments at the time. When I conducted the interviews, the border between Jordan and Syria was closed and a Syrian government offensive on rebel-held Idlib was expected. Repatriation to Syria was hence arguably difficult at the time, as repatriation carried the risk of not being able to reenter Jordan if the situation in Syria was worse than expected or took another downward turn. These factors undoubtedly shaped respondents' preferences. External developments further away from the Middle East further shaped respondents' destination country preferences. These included the impact President Trump had on preferences to resettle to the USA. The generalisability of the findings is also likely spatially limited. Several respondents highlighted the importance of the status quo in Jordan for their life aspirations. My findings might hence not generalise to all Syrian refugees in Jordan or to Syrian refugees in Lebanon or Turkey that face other challenges than those in Jordan.

7.4 Suggestions for further research

I make four sets of suggestions for further research. The first three stem from the limitations outlined above, the one thereafter follows from this thesis' empirical findings. First, I suggest to address and answer some of the questions that I chose not to ask. These include how aspirations and aspiration gaps develop while on the move and how aspirations and aspiration gaps develop at the destination. I propose longitudinal mixed methods research that tracks potential migrants, some of which will become actual migrants. Such research design would primarily allow studying migration behaviour rather than merely preferences and stated choices. It would also allow testing whether destination preferences evolve on the migration journey and

whether individuals use heuristics, such as ex-post rationalisation to justify migration choices once they arrive at the destination. I further encourage to focus on the interaction between potential migrants' capabilities and destination preferences and choices. Second, a random or probability sample would arguably improve upon this thesis' purposive sampling strategy and make the findings representative of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Repeating my quantitative research with such sample would also help to further test the internal validity of this thesis' findings. Third, to establish the external validity of my findings, I encourage repeating the empirical illustration of the migration decision-making framework with random samples of Syrian refugees in other countries, with other groups of potential migrants in Jordan, such as Palestinians, and other non-refugees in Jordan and beyond. Lastly, I empirically illustrated selected aspects of the migration decision-making framework but did not systematically test the framework in its entirety. Further research should focus on the validity of the migration decision-making framework by testing the range of heuristic search, evaluation, and decision strategies that I proposed in this thesis. The final set of suggestions stems from my empirical findings. I have used qualitative interview data to demonstrate that Syrian refugees in Jordan cluster into different types of aspirers. They do not only have different life aspirations but also tend to prefer different durable solutions. While demographic characteristics and unfulfilled needs can partly explain why some people have certain aspirations, I suggest to focus on the determinants of individual aspirations; examining individual personality traits could be one means to do so. Another interesting path would be to investigate the determinants of a destination's reputation. I have found some evidence that anti-Muslim laws in France contributed to its bad reputation among Syrian refugees in Jordan but I have not found sufficient evidence to explain why Canada was seen as such a good country and enjoyed a good reputation for the same group of potential migrants. Lastly, I have found that social networks do not seem to matter for destination choice, contrary to a wide range of migration studies. I have suggested that networks might affect

destination choice via a destination's reputation, which has only recently attracted increased attention by academics and policymakers. I encourage further research on the interplay of networks, reputation, and destination choice.

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Appendix A

Interviews

This technical Appendix provides information pertaining to interview design (Section A.1), participant recruitment and subjects (Section A.2), and presents supporting interview documentation (Section A.3).

A.1 Design

Table A.1: Participant recruitment

Facebook
Facebook is a social network and is widely used by Syrians to stay in touch with family and friends but also to gather information about migration options for Syrian refugees in Jordan. I posted once on the following Facebook group, which had more than 10,000 members at the time of the interview (https://www.facebook.com/groups/1601251646809626, accessed 7 February 2019). In total, I recruited eight respondents through this Facebook group.
Jesuit Refugee Service
Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) is an international Catholic organisation that serves refugees and forcibly displaced people in conflict zones. They provide humanitarian relief, educational programmes, skill development, and opportunities to integrate into host communities (https://jrs.net/country/jordan/, accessed 7 February 2019). Five interview participants were recruited through JRS. The five were beneficiaries of JRS English language courses in their educational centres in Amman.
Kiron Open Higher Education
Kiron is a German NGO with a regional headquarter in Amman. Kiron facilitates access to higher education by providing free blended higher education courses for refugees and host communities. Jordan is one of their focus countries (https://kiron.ngo/mena/, accessed 7 February 2019). Five interview participants were recruited through Kiron. The five were studying on Kiron's online study program in Jordan.
SPARK
SPARK is a Dutch NGO with a regional office in Amman. SPARK offers educational and entrepreneurship programmes for refugees and host communities in Jordan (http://www.spark-online.org/region/jordan/, accessed 7 February 2019). Two interview participants were recruited through SPARK. They had participated in SPARK's entrepreneurship programmes.

Figure A.1: Interview question guide

Constantin Reinprecht

Migration decision-making

Interview question guide

Start with welcoming the interviewee, briefly explaining the research and taking written or oral consent. Ask whether it is fine to be audio recorded. The interviews are meant to be semi-structured and last around 30 minutes to one hour. The questions below are for guidance and do not necessarily need to be followed in this order.

1. Where are you from?
2. What is your religion?
3. How old are you?
4. What is your highest level of education?
5. What is your profession?

We should not ask people for their current job, as employment for refugees in Jordan is severely restricted and we should not possess potentially incriminating information about the interviewees. However, if they speak about employment, we will not stop them but should also not ask whether it is legal employment or not.

The next set of questions explores interviewees' life aspirations, what they would like to achieve in their lives, where do they see themselves in the future. These questions are intentionally left vague to explore how people portray their future and life aspirations. Potential answers could be related to spatial changes, i.e. migration (return to Syria or migrate to a third country) but also to changes in socio-economic status, i.e. upward mobility. Interviewees will further be asked about differences between their life aspiration and the status quo, if not obvious or already mentioned in their previous answers. This aims to detect aspiration gaps, which are hypothesised to be central to migration motivation. Questions to be asked include:

6. What is a good life for you? (aims at getting at life aspirations)
7. How does this good life differ from the life you are living right now? (aims at getting at aspiration gaps – how different are people's aspirations and the lives they report living)
8. What would you like to achieve in your life? (This question aims at the personal life – e.g. marriage, being safe, happy, and healthy – but also at education and the professional life)
9. What (level of) education would you like to have?
10. What profession would you like to have?
11. Do you believe you can achieve your personal, educational, and professional goals in Jordan? Why/why not? (maybe ask the questions about personal, education, and profession separately)

Figure A.1 (Cont.): Interview question guide

12. Where do you see yourself in 1/5/10 years? Why?
13. Please describe your current family situation to me. How old are your family members, what do they do, where do they live? What are their personal, educational, and professional goals? Do you believe they can reach them in Jordan? Why/why not?

Having talked about life aspiration, the next set of questions focuses on migration motivation and the "durable solutions", i.e. preferences for repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. People will be asked to list factors they deem important in their mobility decision. The answer will be contrasted with migration drivers identified by the migration literature: economics, politics, family, networks, culture, and life aspiration. If answers do not mention any of these factors, it will be enquired whether they also played a role or not. For instance, do respondents consider potential differences/hostility to their religion and the majority religion of the host country as an important factors shaping migration destinations? Does host country/destination country xenophobia matter? It will further be asked what factors named were the most important ones. Questions include:

14. Imagine it is safe to return to Syria. Would you like to return? Why/why not? What would the timeframe be? (return immediately or e.g. wait for school year / education to end). What are the circumstances under which you would return to Syria? Which one is the most important one?
15. Do you believe you can achieve your personal, educational, and professional goals in Syria? Why/why not? (Again, probably ask separately).
16. Would you like to stay in Jordan (for the next 1/5/10 years/longer)? Why/why not? What are the circumstances under which you would like to stay? Which one is the most important one?

The next part of the interview focuses on resettlement/migration to a third country. People will be instructed to imagine that they would have the choice to migrate to a third country to get them in the right frame of mind. They will be asked how they would decide where to relocate. This aims at validating the migration drivers identified by the literature, such as economics, politics, networks, etc. What information, if any, do they base their decision upon? How would they acquire such information? Having acquired information, if applicable, how would they decide between potentially several competing destinations? Who is involved in making the decision? If people are already considering migration, it will be explored for how long they have been contemplating to migrate. What influenced their thinking? What role, if any, did information play and what sources did they acquire this information from? Concrete questions are:

Figure A.1 (Cont.): Interview question guide

17. Imagine you could migrate to another country (other than Syria). How would you choose where to move to?
    a. What information about the country would you need/want to have?
    b. Who would you speak to / where would you look for this information?
    c. If not mentioned already: importance of family/friends in the destination country, migration policies, social welfare benefits, employment, language, family reunification, xenophobia, and religion.
18. Would you like to migrate to another country (other than Syria)? Why? Do you have a specific country / set of countries in mind? Why that country / those countries? How did you choose that country / those countries?
19. How likely is it that you will try to migrate to that country (or a different one?) in the next year / 5 years / 10 years? What are the reasons for wanting to migrate sooner or later?

In the last part, interviewees will have the opportunity to ask questions about the research. We will thank interviewees for their time and will let them know that they can contact me in case they have any questions or concerns regarding the research and their part in it. We will also provide information on what will happen next, i.e. the data will be anonymised so that the participants cannot be identified from their responses and that the research will be published to better understand migration decision-making of Syrian refugees in Jordan. They will be paid 5 JOD for participating in the research and to reimburse them for their travel costs.

3 August 2018

Figure A.2: Interview question guide, Arabic

Constantin Reinprecht

أخذ القرارات بخصوص الهجرة

دليل أسئلة المقابلات

ابدأ بالترحيب بالمشارك/ة بالبحث، اشرح باختصار البحث وقم بأخذ موافقة خطية أو شفوية. اسأل ما إذا كان/ت المشارك/ة موافق/ة على تسجيل المقابلة صوتياً. تهدف المقابلات إلى أن تكون شبه منظمة وتستمر بين 30 دقيقة إلى ساعة واحدة. الأسئلة أدناه هي للإرشاد وليس من الضروري اتباعها بهذا الترتيب.

سنبدأ ببعض الأسئلة العامة للتعرف على المشارك/ة في البحث:

1. من أين أنت؟
2. كم عمرك؟
3. ما هو أعلى تحصيل علمي لديك؟
4. ما هو مجالك المهني؟ ما هو المجال الذي تعلمته /تدربت عليه /عملت به عموما؟

ملاحظة: لا ينبغي لنا أن نسأل عن الوظيفة الحالية بل عن المهنة بشكل عام، حيث أن عمل اللاجئين في الأردن مقيد بشدة ولا ينبغي لنا أن نمتلك معلومات قد تعرض الأشخاص الذين تمت مقابلتهم للخطر. إذا تحدثوا عن عملهم الحالي في الأردن لن نطلب منهم عدم استكمال الحديث ولكن ينبغي أن لا نسأل ما إذا كان العمل القانوني أم لا .

تستكشف المجموعة التالية من الأسئلة طموحات المشاركين في البحث، وما الذي يرغبون في تحقيقه في حياتهم، أين يرون أنفسهم في المستقبل. يتم طرح هذه الأسئلة بشكل عام لا بشكل دقيق عمدا لاستكشاف كيف يصور الناس طموحاتهم المستقبلية وحياتهم. يمكن أن تكون الإجابات المحتملة متعلقة بالتغيرات المكانية، أي الهجرة (العودة إلى سوريا أو الهجرة إلى دولة ثالثة) ولكن أيضًا إلى التغيرات في الوضع الاجتماعي-الاقتصادي. في حال لم يكن واضحاً أو سبق ذكره في إجاباتهم، سيتم سؤال المشاركين في البحث حول الاختلافات بين طموحاتهم في الحياة والوضع الراهن والقائم. يهدف هذا إلى الكشف عن فجوات الطموح، التي يفترض أنها أساسية لدوافع الهجرة.

سأسئلك الأن بعض الأسئلة حول طموحك، ما ترغب في تحقيقه في حياتك، وأين ترى نفسك في المستقبل.

1. ما هو شكل أو وصف الحياة الجيدة بالنسبة لك؟ (يهدف هذا السؤال إلى الوصول الى طموحات الحياة)
2. كيف تختلف هذه الحياة الجيدة عن الحياة التي تعيشها الآن؟ (يهدف هذا السؤال إلى توضيح الثغرات في الطموح أي ما مدى اختلاف تطلعات وطموح المشاركين عن الحياة التي يعيشونها)
3. ما الذي ترغب في تحقيقه في حياتك:
   a. في ما يخص التعليم؟ ما هو المستوى التعليمي الذي تطمح في الوصول إليه؟ هل تعتقد أنك تستطيع تحقيق هذا الطموح في الأردن؟ لماذا / لماذا لا؟
   b. في ما يخص العمل والحياة المهنية؟ ما هو المجال المهني الذي تطمح له؟ هل تعتقد أنك تستطيع تحقيق هذا الطموح في الأردن؟ لماذا / لماذا لا؟
   c. في ما يخص الحياة الشخصية/الخاصة؟ هل تعتقد أنك تستطيع تحقيق هذا الطموح في الأردن؟ لماذا / لماذا لا؟
4. أين ترى نفسك بعد عام من اليوم؟ في أي مكان ستكون؟ وأين ترى نفسك في ما يخص هذه الطموحات؟ لماذا؟
5. أين ترى نفسك بعد خمسة أو عشرة أعوام؟ في أي مكان ستكون؟ وأين ترى نفسك في ما يخص هذه الطموحات؟ لماذا؟
6. هل بالإمكان مشاركتنا وضع عائلتك الحالي؟ من هم أفراد أسرتك؟ كم تبلغ أعمارهم؟ أين يعيشون؟ ماذا يفعلون؟ ما هي أهدافهم الشخصية والتعليمية والمهنية؟ هل تعتقد أنه بإمكانهم الوصول إلى أهدافهم في الأردن؟ لماذا / لماذا لا؟

بعد الحديث عن الطموحات، ترتكز المجموعة التالية من الأسئلة حول دوافع الهجرة و"الحلول الدائمة"، أي التفضيل بين العودة إلى الوطن، أو الانخراط في المجتمع في الدولة المضيفة، أو الهجرة الى دولة ثالثة. الجزء الأول من الأسئلة هو حول العودة الى سوريا، والثاني حول الاستقرار في الأردن، والثالث حول الهجرة الى دولة ثالثة. سنلطب من المشاركين تخيل أن كل من هذه الخيارات واردة وذلك لكي يكونوا في إطار ذهني مناسب.

Figure A.2 (Cont.): Interview question guide, Arabic

سنطلب من المشاركين في البحث مشاركة العوامل التي يعتبرونها مهمة في قرار التنقل، وكيفية أخذ قرار العودة/الاستقرار/الهجرة. سوف يتم مقارنة الإجابات مع دوافع الهجرة الموضحة في أدبيات الهجرة: الاقتصاد، السياسة، الأسرة، الشبكات/العلاقات، الثقافة، وطموح الحياة. إذا لم تذكر الإجابات أي من هذه العوامل فسيتم طرح سؤال مباشر عما إذا كانت هذه العوامل قد لعبت دوراً أم لا. على سبيل المثال: هل تعتبر الاختلافات، أو العداء نحو الجنسية أو الدين، أو الديانة الأكثرية في الدولة المضيفة عوامل مهمة تشكل قرارات وجهات الهجرة؟ هل "كراهية الأجانب" في الدولة الأصلية أو الدولة المضيفة أمر هام؟ أي من هذه العوامل هي الأهم؟ ما هي المعلومات، إن وجدت، التي يستند إليها القرار؟ كيف يتم الحصول على هذه المعلومات؟ بعد الحصول على معلومات كيف يمكن أن الاختيار بين عدة وجهات محتملة؟ من يشارك في اتخاذ القرار؟ في النهاية، إذا كانوا فعلا يفكرون بالهجرة، فسيتم استكشاف مدة التفكير بهذا القرار، العوامل التي أثرت على تفكيرهم، دور المعلومات (إن وجد) والمصادر التي حصلوا عليها من هذه المعلومات؟

سأسئلك الأن أسئلة حول دوافع أو قرارات العودة الى سوريا، أو الاستقرار في الأردن، أو الهجرة الى دولة أخرى، وعن العوامل التي تساهم في هذه الدوافع أو القرارات.

1. فلنتخيل أن العودة الى سوريا هي خيار آمن ووراد اليوم، هل ستود العودة؟ لماذا / لماذا لا؟ كيف ستقرر متى ستكون العودة؟ ما هي العوامل التي ستقرر بناء عليها العودة الى سوريا؟ ما هو أهم عامل؟ هل ستعود مباشرة أم مثلا تنتظر نهاية العام الدراسي أو أي شيء أخر مماثل؟ (في حال عدم مشاركة أي من العوامل التالية، قم بطرح سؤال محدد حولها: الاقتصاد، السياسة، الأسرة، الشبكات/العلاقات، الثقافة، طموح الحياة.)
2. هل تعتقد أنه بإمكانك تحقيق أهدافك التعليمية، والمهنية، والشخصية التي شاركتني إياها مسبقا في سوريا؟ لماذا / لماذا لا؟
3. هل تود البقاء / الاستقرار في الأردن؟ ربما لعام أو خمسة أو عشرة أو أكثر؟ لماذا / لماذا لا؟ ما هي العوامل التي ستقرر بناء عليها الاستقرار في الأردن؟ ما هو أهم عامل؟ (في حال عدم مشاركة أي من العوامل التالية، قم بطرح سؤال محدد حولها: الاقتصاد، السياسة، الأسرة، الشبكات/العلاقات، الثقافة، طموح الحياة.)
4. فلنتخيل أن الهجرة الى دولة أخرى هي أمر وارد:
    a. كيف تختار الى أي دولة ستهاجر؟
    b. ما هي المعلومات التي ستحتاجها عن هذه الدولة لأخذ هذا القرار؟
    c. ماذا ستكون مصادرك لهذه المعلومات؟ مع أي جهة ستتواصل؟
    d. ما هو أثر العوامل المختلفة في أخذ القرار: وجود عائلة أو أصدقاء في هذه الدولة / سياسات الهجرة / مزايا الرعاية الإجتماعية / اللغة / العمل / القدرة على لم شمل العائلة / التوجهات ضد الأجانب عامة أو السوريين تحديدا / التوجه ضد الدين أو الإسلام؟ (هنا بالإمكان السؤال عن الدين)
    e. من سيشارك في أخذ هذا القرار؟
5. هل فعلا تود الهجرة الى دولة ثالث؟ لماذا؟
    a. هل يوجد ببالك دول/ة معينة؟
    b. كيف قمت باختياره هذه الدول/ة؟
    c. منذ متى وأنت تفكر أو تخطط للهجرة؟
    d. ما هي نسبة أنك ستقوم فعلا بالهجرة الى هذه الدولة أو الى دولة أخرة في العام القادم أو الخمسة أو عشرة أعوام القادمة؟ ما هي أسباب اختيار وقت الهجرة؟

أخيرا، سنسأل المشاركين إن كانت لديهم أي أسئلة حول البحث. سنشكر المشاركين في البحث على وقتهم وسنقوم بإعلامهم بأنه بإمكانهم التواصل مع كونستانتين في حال كانت لديهم أية أسئلة أو مخاوف تتعلق بالبحث ودورهم فيه. كما سنقدم معلومات حول ما سيحدث بعد ذلك، أي أن البيانات ستكون مجهولة المصدر بحيث لا يمكن التعرف على المشاركين من ردودهم، وأنه سيتم نشر البحث للمساهمة في فهم أفضل لعملية اتخاذ القرار بشأن الهجرة في ما يخص اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن. سيتم دفع 5 دنانير لكل مشارك/ة في البحث وذلك لتعويضهم عن تكاليف المواصلات.

A.2 Subjects

Table A.2: Interview respondents

Code	Sex	Age	Origin	Date	Location	Duration (min)
1F29	F	29	Idlib	27/08/18	Amman	39
2M36	M	36	Homs	27/08/18	Amman	50
3F18	F	18	Homs	27/08/18	Amman	59
4M23	M	23	Damascus	27/08/18	Amman	38
5M37	M	37	Damascus	27/08/18	Amman	53
6M23	M	23	Aleppo	27/08/18	Amman	39
7M28	M	28	Dara	01/09/18	Amman	39
8F20	F	20	Aleppo	01/09/18	Amman	33
9M35	M	35	Damascus	01/09/18	Amman	55
10M25	M	25	Homs	01/09/18	Amman	32
11F39	F	39	Dara	02/09/18	Irbid	25
12F28	F	28	Dara	02/09/18	Irbid	22
13F33	F	33	Dara	02/09/18	Irbid	37
14F35	F	35	Homs	02/09/18	Irbid	38
15F21	F	21	Dara	02/09/18	Irbid	33
16F39	F	39	Homs	02/09/18	Irbid	27
17M26	M	26	Damascus	05/09/18	Amman	20
18M26	M	26	Dara	06/09/18	Amman	32
19M49	M	49	Aleppo	06/09/18	Amman	34
20M37	M	37	Hama	06/09/18	Amman	53
21M22	M	22	Damascus	06/09/18	Amman	46
22M22	M	22	Dara	06/09/18	Skype	31
23M20	M	20	Idlib	07/09/18	Skype	36
24F38	F	38	Aleppo	23/09/18	Amman	30
25F27	F	27	Homs	23/09/18	Amman	34
26F32	F	32	Idlib	23/09/18	Amman	34
27F37	F	37	Damascus	23/09/18	Amman	34
28M41	M	41	Aleppo	23/09/18	Amman	45
29M24	M	24	Aleppo	23/09/18	Amman	46

A.3 Supporting documents

Figure A.3: Confidentiality agreement for research assistants

Confidentiality agreement for research assistants

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Amman, 26/08/2018

I, INSERT NAME, being appointed a Research Assistant for the research project "Migration decision-making" in Jordan, from 26/08/2018 to 31/10/2018 to help with the administration of interviews and surveys, agree:

1. that I will not give any information (whether written down, stored electronically or not) about the research project, especially personal information regarding the participants of the interviews and survey to anybody else except the main researcher, Constantin Reinprecht;
2. that all the documents and recordings (for example audio recordings, interview notes and transcripts) regarding the research project given to me belong to the main researcher and the University and that I will be careful with these documents and recordings;
3. that I will return all documents and equipment (such as a voice recorder) when my appointment or the research project ends and that I will not keep any data related to the research on paper or on my phone, tablet, or laptop;
4. that I will inform the main researcher if I believe that any documents or data, especially personal information of research participants has been disclosed to any person, company or organisation other than the main researcher.

Main researcher (Name, Signature): Constantin Reinprecht, _____

Signed on 26/08/2018 in Amman by:

_____ _____

NAME Signature

Figure A.4: Participant information sheet

Constantin Reinprecht
Doctoral student, Department of Politics and International Relations
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UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

Migration decision-making

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Ethics Approval Reference: [R55957/RE001]

1. ***What is the purpose of this study?***
   This study is about the migration motivation of refugees from Syria (and also from Iraq and Yemen) in Jordan. In particular, it aims to find out why some people decide to migrate or to stay in Jordan. It studies the role of information in migration decisions and how people choose where to migrate.

2. ***Why have I been invited to take part?***
   You have been invited because you are a refugee from Syria, Iraq or Yemen, live in Jordan, and are older than 18 years.

3. ***Do I have to take part?***
   No, your participation is voluntary. You can ask questions about the study before deciding to participate. If you agree to participate, you may withdraw yourself and your data from the study at any time. You do not need to give a reason for withdrawing and will not be penalised. If you withdraw at any point during the interview, your data will not be used. If you withdraw after the data has been fully anonymised, your data cannot be withdrawn. Anonymisation means that you cannot be identified from your data. I will not store your name, address, phone number or any other information that might identify you.

4. ***What will happen to me if I take part in the study?***
   If you give agree to take part in the study, you will be asked questions about your migration motivation. This will include the goals for your life and the lives of your family members. You will also be asked if you would like to return to Syria when the war is over, remain in Jordan, or migrate to a different country if you had the opportunity to do so. You may also be asked about more sensitive personal information, including religion.

   The interview should take about one hour. It will take place at a local restaurant, coffee shop or facilities of an NGO or community based organisation.

   The interview will be audio recorded so that the researchers can listen to the recording after the interview. Your name and contact details will not be recorded so that you cannot be identified through the recordings. The recordings will not be shared with anybody other than the researcher and his assistant, who are present at the interview. The recordings will not be published. Further, the data will be anonymised. That means that you cannot be identified from your answers.

5. ***Are there any potential risks in taking part?***
   There are no physical risks from taking part in the research. There is a potential emotional risk from thinking about Syria and talking about your future. You do not have to talk about issues you do not want to talk about. You will not be asked about your migration from Syria or the war. You can stop the interview at any point.

Figure A.4 (Cont.): Participant information sheet

6. ***Are there any benefits in taking part?***
   You will be paid JOD 5 for the interview to thank you for your time and pay for transportation. Your answers could also help NGOs and international organisations, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and World Food Programme (WFP) to better help refugees in Jordan.

7. ***What happens to the data provided?***
   The **research data** is the consent form, interview notes, audio recordings, and typed transcripts of the audio recordings. The main researcher collects the signed consent forms before the interview. They will not be shared with anybody other than the main researcher. The interview notes will not contain personal data (such as your name) and it will not be possible to link interview notes to consent forms. The consent forms will be stored securely in a locked cabinet in Amman by the main researcher. The main researcher will take them to the United Kingdom and store them safely in a locked cabinet, until they can be destroyed. Audio recordings will be transcribed and stored securely on the researcher's laptop and an external hard drive. Both will be protected by a password (= encrypted) to increase safety. The audio recordings will be destroyed (deleted) after three years. All your responses will be anonymised. Interview notes will also be transcribed and stored securely on the laptop and hard disk of the main researcher. **Personal / sensitive data** (such as your name and address) will not be stored. The researcher and his research assistants will have access to the research data. All research data and records will be stored for a minimum retention period of 3 years after publication or public release of the work of the research.

8. ***Will the research be published?***
   The University of Oxford is committed to the dissemination of its research for the benefit of society and the economy and, in support of this commitment, has established an online archive of research materials. This archive includes digital copies of student theses successfully submitted as part of a University of Oxford postgraduate degree programme. Holding the archive online gives easy access for researchers to the full text of freely available theses, thereby increasing the likely impact and use of that research.

   If you agree to participate in this study, the research will be written up as a doctoral thesis. On successful submission of the thesis, it will be deposited both in print and online in the University archives, to facilitate its use in future research. The thesis will be published open access. Although the research (the doctoral thesis) will be published as open access, the thesis will only report information in an anonymised manner, such that you will remain unidentifiable.

   The research findings might further be published as part of journal articles.

9. ***Who is organising and funding the research?***
   My DPhil (PhD) is funded by the United Kingdom's Economic and Social Research Council, reference number ES/J500112/1.

10. ***Who has reviewed this study?***
    This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee (reference number: R55957/RE001).

11. ***Who do I contact if I have a concern about the study or I wish to complain?***
    If you have a question about any aspect of this study, there are a number of people whom you may contact. The primary researcher is doctoral student Constantin Reinprecht (constantin.reinprecht@politics.ox.ac.uk, +962 7 9723 2804), who is supervised by Prof Raymond Duch (raymond.duch@nuffield.ox.ac.uk, +441865278515). They will do their best to answer your question. The primary researcher should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how they intend to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact

Figure A.4 (Cont.): Participant information sheet

the Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee; Email: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk; Address: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD, United Kingdom.

12. Data Protection

The University of Oxford is the data controller with respect to your personal data, and as such will determine how your personal data is used in the study.

The University will process your personal data for the purpose of the research outlined above. Research is a task that we perform in the public interest.

Further information about your rights with respect to your personal data is available from http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/councilsec/compliance/gdpr/individualrights/.

13. Further Information and Contact Details

If you would like to discuss the research with someone before taking part (or if you have questions after taking part), please contact the primary researcher:

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Jordanian telephone number: +962 7 9723 2804
Email: constantin.reinprecht@politics.ox.ac.uk

Figure A.5: Participant information sheet, Arabic

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صنع القرار حول الهجرة

ورقة معلومات للمشاركين في البحث

مرجع الموافقة الأخلاقية للبحث: [R55957 / RE001]

1. ما هو الغرض من هذا البحث؟

يتناول هذا البحث موضوع دوافع الهجرة للاجئين السوريين في الأردن. يهدف البحث بالتحديد إلى معرفة اسباب اتخاذ بعض الأشخاص قرار الهجرة الى دولة أخرى أو البقاء في الأردن. يدرس البحث دور المعلومات في قرارات الهجرة، وكيف يختار الأشخاص مكان الهجرة.

2. لماذا أنا مدعو للمشاركة؟

لقد تمت دعوتك لأنك لاجئ من سوريا تعيش في الأردن، ويزيد عمرك عن 18 عاماً.

3. هل يتوجب علي المشاركة بشكل إجباري؟

لا، مشاركتك تطوعية وليست إجبارية. يمكنك طرح أسئلة حول الدراسة قبل اتخاذ القرار حول المشاركة. في حال وافقت على المشاركة، يمكنك لاحقاً وفي أي وقت الانسحاب وسيتم إلغاء بياناتك من البحث. في حال قمت بالانسحاب، لن تكون بحاجة إلى إعطاء سبب لذلك، ولن يكون هناك أي عواقب سلبية. في حال قمت بالانسحاب خلال المقابلة لن يتم استخدام بياناتك في البحث. اما في حال قمت بالانسحاب بعد المقابلة وبعد ما تم استخدام بياناتك بعد إخفاء هويتك بالكامل فلن تستطيع إلغاء بياناتك من البحث. "إخفاء الهوية" يعني أنه لا يمكن لأي شخص تحديد هويتك من بياناتك. بالإضافة الى ذلك، لن يتم حفظ اسمك أو عنوانك أو رقم هاتفك أو أي معلومات أخرى قد تحدد هويتك.

4. ماذا سيحدث لي إن شاركت في البحث؟

في حال وافقت على المشاركة في البحث سنطرح عليك أسئلة حول دوافعك للهجرة. سيشمل ذلك أسئلة حول أهدافك في حياتك وأهداف حياة أفراد عائلتك. كما سنطرح عليك أسئلة حول إن كنت ترغب في العودة إلى سوريا عند انتهاء الحرب، أو البقاء في الأردن، أو الهجرة إلى بلد آخر في حال أتيحت لك الفرصة للقيام بذلك. قد نطرح عليك أيضاً أسئلة شخصية أكثر حساسية، بما في ذلك أسئلة حول الدين.

ستستغرق المقابلة حوالي ساعة واحدة. ستتم المقابلة إما في مطعم أو مقهى أو في مرافق منظمة غير حكومية أو منظمة مجتمع.

سيتم تسجيل المقابلة صوتياً، بحيث يمكن للباحثين الاستماع إلى التسجيل الصوتي بعد المقابلة. لن يتم تسجيل اسمك أو معلومات التواصل الخاصة بك بحيث لا يمكن التعرف عليك من خلال التسجيل الصوتي. لن يتم مشاركة التسجيل الصوتي مع أي شخص آخر غير الباحث ومساعدته، والذين سيكونون حاضرين في المقابلة. لن يتم نشر التسجيلات في أي مكان. إضافة إلى ذلك، ستكون البيانات التي تقدمها مخفية الهوية، وهذا يعني أنه لا يمكن تحديد هويتك من إجاباتك أو بياناتك.

Figure A.5 (Cont.): Participant information sheet, Arabic

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5. هل هناك أي مخاطر محتملة من المشاركة في البحث؟

لا توجد مخاطر مادية أو جسدية من المشاركة في البحث. قد يكون هنالك مخاطر عاطفية جراء التفكير في سوريا والتحدث عن مستقبلك. بإمكانك رفض التحدث عن أي قضية لا تود التحدث عنها. لن نقوم بطرح أي أسئلة حول خروجك من سوريا أو حول الحرب. إضافة الى ذلك، يمكنك إيقاف المقابلة في أي وقت.

6. هل هناك أي فوائد من المشاركة في البحث؟

لكي نشكرك على وقتك وعلى المشاركة في المقابلة ستحصل على 5 دنانير أردنية لدفع تكاليف مواصلاتك. مشاركتك في المقابلة وإجاباتك والبحث ونتائجة ستساعد المنظمات غير الحكومية والمنظمات الدولية مثل مفوضية الأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين (UNHCR) وبرنامج الأغذية العالمي (WFP) على مساعدة اللاجئين في الأردن بشكل أفضل.

7. ماذا سيحدث للبيانات أو المعلومات التي سأقدمها؟

بيانات البحث هي نموذج الموافقة، والملاحظات التي يتم أخذها أثناء المقابلات، والتسجيل الصوتي للمقابلة، والنسخة المطبوعة للتسجيل الصوتي. على الباحث الرئيسي أخذ الموافقة من المشارك في البحث قبل المقابلة، وذلك من خلال الطلب من المشاركة التوقيع على نموذج الموافقة. لن يتم مشاركة نموذج الموافقة مع أي شخص آخر غير الباحث الرئيسي. لن تحتوي ملاحظات المقابلة على بيانات شخصية (مثل اسمك) ولن يكون من الممكن ربط ملاحظات المقابلة بنموذج الموافقة الذي قمت بالتوقيع عليه. سيتم تخزين نموذج الموافقة بشكل آمن في خزانة مقفلة في عمان من قبل الباحث الرئيسي. بعد ذلك سوف يأخذ الباحث الرئيسي النماذج الموقعة إلى المملكة المتحدة وسيقوم بتخزينهم بأمان في خزانة مقفلة لحين يمكن تدميرهم. سيتم طباعة التسجيل الصوتي للمقابلة وتخزينه بشكل آمن على جهاز الحاسوب المحمول الخاص بالباحث وعلى قرص صلب خارجي. سيتم حماية كلا من جهاز الحاسوب والقرص الصلب الخارجي بكلمة مرور مشفرة لزيادة السلامة. سيتم حذف التسجيل الصوتي بعد ثلاث سنوات. ستكون جميع إجاباتك مجهولة المصدر. سيتم أيضاً طباعة الملاحظات التي تم أخذها أثناء المقابلة وتخزينها بشكل آمن على جهاز الحاسوب المحمول الخاص بالباحث وعلى قرص صلب خارجي. لن يتم تخزين **البيانات الشخصية الحساسة** (مثل اسمك وعنوانك). سيتمكن الباحث ومساعدوه في البحث من الوصول إلى بيانات البحث. سيتم تخزين جميع البيانات والسجلات البحثية لمدة الحد الأدنى للاحتفاظ وهي مدة 3 سنوات بعد نشر نتائج البحث.

8. هل سيتم نشر البحث؟

تلتزم جامعة أكسفورد بنشر أبحاثها لصالح المجتمع والاقتصاد، ولدعم هذا الإلتزام أنشأت الجامعة أرشيفاً للمواد البحثية على الإنترنت. يتضمن هذا الأرشيف نسخاً رقمية من رسائل/أطروحات الطلاب التي تم إنهائها بنجاح كجزء من برنامج درجة الدراسات العليا في جامعة أكسفورد. يساعد هذا الأرشيف في وصول الباحثين الى النصوص الكاملة للرسائل البحثية/ الأطروحات بسهولة، مما يزيد من احتمال استخدام هذا الأبحاث وزيادة احتمالية أثره.

سيتم كتابة هذا البحث كأطروحة دكتوراه. عند التقديم الناجح للأطروحة سيتم إيداعها بشكل مطبوع وبشكل رقمي في أرشيف الجامعة، وذلك لتسهيل استخدامها في الأبحاث المستقبلية. سيتم نشر الأطروحة بشكل "الوصول المفتوح" يضمن وصول الجميع إليه. على الرغم من أن البحث (أطروحة الدكتوراه) سيتم نشره تحت نوع "الوضول المفتوح"، إلا أن البحث ستقوم فقط بنشر المعلومات بطريقة مجهولة المصدر، بحيث يبقى المشاركين غير قابلين للتحديد ومجهولي الهوية.

قد يتم نشر نتائج البحث أيضاً كجزء من مقالات في مجلات علمية.

Figure A.5 (Cont.): Participant information sheet, Arabic

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9. من يقوم بتنظيم وتمويل هذا البحث؟

يقوم مجلس البحوث الاقتصادية والاجتماعية في المملكة المتحدة بتمويل بحث الدكتوراه هذا، تحت مرجع رقم ES/J500112/1.

10. من قام بمراجعة هذا البحث والموافقة عليه؟

قامت الجنة المركزية للأخلاقيات البحثية في جامعة أكسفورد بمراجعة هذا البحث، وحصل البحث على الموافقة الأخلاقية من خلالها. (الرقم المرجعي: R55957/RE001).

11. مع من أتواصل في حال كان لدي ملاحظة حول البحث أو في حال رغبت بتقديم شكوى حول البحث؟

إذا كان لديك سؤال حول أي جانب من جوانب هذا البحث، فهنالك عدد من الأشخاص الذين يمكنك التواصل معهم. الباحث الرئيسي هو طالب الدكتوراه كونستانتين ريينبرخت (constantin.reinprecht@politics.ox.ac.uk، 962797232804+). يشرف على هذا البحث البروفيسور ريموند دوتش (raymond.duch@nuffield.ox.ac.uk، 441865278515+). سوف يبذل كلاهما قصارى جهدهم للإجابة على أسئلتك. على الباحث الرئيسي الإجابة على استفساراتك أو ملاحظاتك في غضون 10 أيام عمل، وأن يعطيك مؤشرا على كيفية تعامله مع ملاحظاتك. في حال كنت لا تزال غير سعيد بالإجابة أو ترغب في تقديم شكوى رسمية ، فيرجى التواصل مع لجنة أخلاقيات البحوث للعلوم الاجتماعية والإنسانية: البريد الإلكتروني: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk
العنوان: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD, United Kingdom.

12. حماية البيانات

جامعة أكسفورد هي الجهة التي تتحكم بالبيانات فيما يتعلق ببياناتك الشخصية، وعلى هذا النحو ستحدد الجامعة كيفية استخدام بياناتك الشخصية في البحث. ستقوم الجامعة بمعالجة بياناتك الشخصية لغرض البحث الموضح أعلاه. البحث هو مهمة نقوم بها من أجل المصلحة العامة.

تتوفر معلومات إضافية حول حقوقك فيما يتعلق ببياناتك الشخصية من خلال الرابط التالي:
http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/councilsec/compliance/gdpr/individualrights/

13. معلومات إضافية ومعلومات التواصل

إذا كنت ترغب في مناقشة البحث مع شخص ما قبل المشاركة، أو إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة بعد المشاركة، يرجى التواصل مع الباحث الرئيسي:

كونستانتين ريينبرخت
جامعة أكسفورد
قسم السياسة والعلاقات الدولية
رقم الهاتف: 00447834740804
رقم الهاتف الأردني: 00962797232804
البريد الإلكتروني: constantin.reinprecht@politics.ox.ac.uk

Figure A.6: Interview consent form

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Migration decision-making

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Ethics Approval Reference: [R55957/RE001]

Purpose of Study: Understand how migration decisions are made in practice and what role information plays in this process.

		Please initial each box
1	I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.	☐
2	I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time during the interview, without giving any reason, and without any negative consequences. After the data has been anonymised, it is not possible to withdraw the data, as your data can no longer be identified.	☐
3	I understand that research data collected during the study may be looked at by designated individuals from the University of Oxford, (the primary research and his supervisor and the primary researcher's assistants) where it is relevant to my taking part in this study. I give permission for these individuals to access my data.	☐
4	I understand that this project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee.	☐
5	I understand who will have access to personal data provided, how the data will be stored and what will happen to the data at the end of the project.	☐
6	I understand how this research will be written up and published.	☐
7	I understand how to raise a concern or make a complaint.	☐
8	I consent to being audio recorded.	☐
9	I understand how audio recordings will be used in research outputs.	☐
10	I agree to take part in the study.	☐

Name of Participant	Date	Signature
Name of person taking consent	Date	Signature

Figure A.7: Interview consent form, Arabic

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صنع القرار حول الهجرة

ورقة معلومات للمشاركين في البحث
مرجع الموافقة الأخلاقية للبحث: [R55957 / RE001]

هدف البحث: فهم كيفية اتخاذ القرارات حول الهجرة من الناحية العملية، وفهم الدور الذي تلعبه المعلومات في هذه العملية.

الرجاء وضع إشارة في
كل مربع توافق عليه

1. أؤكد أنني قمت بقراءة وفهم ورقة المعلومات الخاصة بالبحث المذكور أعلاه. وأنه قد أتيحت لي الفرصة للنظر في المعلومات وطرح الأسئلة وتمت الإجابة على أسئلتي بشكل كامل. ☐
2. أؤكد أنني أفهم أن مشاركتي في هذا البحث تطوعية وأنني حر في الانسحاب في أي وقت خلال المقابلة، دون إبداء أي سبب، ودون أي عواقب سلبية. أفهم أن البيانات ستصبح مجهولة المصدر لاحقًا، وفي حال تم ذلك لا يمكن سحب بياناتي من البحث لأنه لن يعد من الممكن تحديد بياناتي الخاصة. ☐
3. أؤكد أنني أفهم أن البيانات التي تم جمعها أثناء البحث يمكن أن يتطلع عليها أفراد معينين من جامعة أكسفورد (الباحث الأولي ومشرفه ومساعدي الباحث). أعطي موافقتي لهؤلاء الأفراد للوصول إلى بياناتي والإطلاع عليها في ما يخص مشاركتي في هذا البحث. ☐
4. أؤكد أنني أفهم أن هذا البحث قد تمت مراجعته من قبل اللجنة المركزية لأخلاقيات البحوث في جامعة أكسفورد، وأن اللجنة قدمت الموافقة الأخلاقية لهذا البحث. ☐
5. أؤكد أنني أفهم من سيكون لديه إمكانية الوصول إلى البيانات الشخصية التي سأقدمها، وكيف سيتم تخزين هذه البيانات، وماذا سيحدث للبيانات في نهاية البحث. ☐
6. أؤكد أنني أفهم كيف ستتم كتابة هذا البحث ونشره. ☐
7. أؤكد أنني أفهم كيف بإمكاني مشاركة أي ملاحظات حول البحث أو تقديم شكوى. ☐
8. أوافق على أن يتم تسجيل المقابلة صوتياً. ☐
9. أؤكد أنني أفهم أن التسجيل الصوتي سيستخدم في مخرجات البحث. ☐
10. أوافق على المشاركة في هذا البحث. ☐

اسم المشارك	التاريخ	التوقيع
اسم الشخص الذي يأخذ الموافقة	التاريخ	التوقيع

Figure A.8: Oral interview consent form

Migration decision-making

ORAL CONSENT SCRIPT

Ethics Approval Reference: [R55957/RE001]

Record this consent process using a digital recorder (if participant has consented to this) or by using a Record of Consent Form.]

Hello again, my name is Constantin Reinprecht from the University of Oxford and I wanted to talk to you about the project I gave you information about before. The aim of my project is to understand migration preferences and migration decisions of refugees in Jordan.

Are you still interested in taking part in the project? *[Await confirmation].* Now I'd like to confirm some of the details of the project to make sure you understand what's involved for you:

- It's a project about migration decision-making of Syrian refugees and it's being used for my doctoral research.
- If you agree to take part, I will ask you questions about your plans or motivation to migrate. The interview will last around one hour. It takes place at [a local restaurant, cafe, NGO or community-based organisation].
- The following risks are involved in taking part: You might find it difficult and distressing to talk about migration, as that might remind you of war in Syria. I will not ask you about the reasons why you left Syria but about your current situation and future plans. You may also be asked about more sensitive personal information, including religion.
- You don't have to take part; you can ask me any questions you want before or during the interview. You can also withdraw at any point without giving a reason and without any negative consequences.
- You will be paid JOD 5 to reimburse you for your time and travel.
- The researcher and his research assistant will have access to the research data (what you said in the interview. We will not save your name or any other personal information. We will not use what you told me in the interview if you withdraw during the interview.
- You can withdraw your data completely before it has been fully anonymised. In practice, this means that you can withdraw before, during or on the day after the interview.
- You are aware that an Oxford University Research Ethics committee has approved this research project and how to contact me (in the first instance) or the committee in case of any concerns or complaints. I have given you the project's ethics reference number and relevant contact details. To reiterate: their contact details are ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk
- The University of Oxford is responsible overall for ensuring the safe and proper use of any personal information you provide, solely for research purposes.
- I won't use your name next to data you provide.
- I will store any information you provide safely and confidentially and will keep the research data for three years after publication. I will store all research data electronically on a password-protected (encrypted) laptop and external hard drive. My research assistants and I will have access to the research data.
- I would like to be able to use your anonymised data in future studies
- I would like to audio record you unless you say that I can't.

Figure A.8 (Cont.): Oral interview consent form

- You're aware that my written work will be published online. The project will be published in a doctoral thesis and academic journal.
- Are you happy for me to collect information about your religious affiliation?

Are you still willing to take part? Do you give your permission for me to interview you and audio record you?

[*Await confirmation]* So if you're happy with all of that, and have no more questions, let's start.

Figure A.9: Oral interview consent form, Arabic

صنع القرار حول الهجرة

ورقة معلومات للمشاركين في البحث

مرجع الموافقة الأخلاقية للبحث: [R55957 / RE001]

قم بتسجيل عملية الموافقة على المشاركة التالية باستخدام مسجل رقمي (في حال وافق المشارك على ذلك).

مرحباً مرة أخرى، اسمي كونستانتين ريينبرخت من جامعة أكسفورد، وأردت التحدث معك حول البحث الذي تواصلنا حوله مسبقاً. الهدف من البحث هو فهم كيفية اتخاذ اللاجئين في الأردن قرارات حول الهجرة، وما يفضلونه في ما يخص قرارات الهجرة.

هل ما زلت مهتم بالمشاركة في البحث؟ *[انتظر التأكيد]*.
أود الآن تأكيد بعض تفاصيل البحث للتأكد من فهمك لما ينطوي عليه الأمر:

- موضوع البحث هو حول كيفية اتخاذ اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن لقرارات الهجرة، وسيتم استخدام البحث في أطروحة دكتوراه.
- في حال وافقت على المشاركة، سأطرح عليك أسئلة حول خططك و دوافعك للهجرة. ستستمر المقابلة حوالي ساعة واحدة وستتم المقابلة في [مطعم، مقهى، منظمة غير حكومية، أو منظمة مجتمع].
- يوجد بعض المخاطر المرتبطة بالمشاركة في البحث: قد تجد بعض الصعوبة أو الألم في الحديث حول الهجرة، لأن ذلك قد يذكرك بالحرب في سوريا. لن أسألك عن أسباب مغادرتك سوريا ولكن سأسئلك عن وضعك الحالي وخططك المستقبلية. قد أسألك أيضاعن معلومات شخصية أكثر حساسية، بما في ذلك الدين.
- مشاركتك ليست إجباربة، بإمكانك أن تطرح أي أسئلة لديك قبل أو أثناء المقابلة. يمكنك أيضاً الانسحاب في أي وقت دون إبداء سبب وبدون أي عواقب سلبية.
- سيتم منحك 5 دنانير أردنية لتعويضك عن وقتك ومواصلاتك.
- سيتمكن الباحث ومساعد الباحث من الوصول إلى البيانات البحثية (ما ستقوم أنت بمشاركته أثناء المقابلة). لن نقوم بحفظ اسمك أو أي معلومات شخصية أخرى. في حال انسحبت من المشاركة أثناء المقابلة لن نستخدم ما شاركتنا اياه في المقابلة.
- يمكنك طلب إلغاء بياناتك تماماً قبل أن يتم جعلها مجهولة المصدر. يعني ذلك في الواقع أنه بإمكانك الانسحاب وطلب إلغاء بياناتك قبل أو أثناء المقابلة، أو في اليوم التالي للمقابلة.
- أنت على علم بأن لجنة أخلاقيات البحوث بجامعة أكسفورد قد وافقت على هذا البحث. إضافة الى ذلك أنت على علم بكيفية التواصل معي (في المقام الأول) أو مع اللجنة في حالة وجود أي مخاوف أو شكاوى. لقد أعطيتك رقم المرجع الأخلاقي للبحث وآلية التواصل مع اللجنة. للتكرار: البريد الإلكتروني الخاص باللجنة هو ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk
- جامعة أوكسفورد مسؤولة بشكل عام عن ضمان الاستخدام الآمن والسليم لأي معلومات شخصية تقدمها أثناء المقابلة، وذلك لأغراض البحث فقط.
- لن يتم وضع اسمك بجوار البيانات التي تقدمها.
- سأقوم بحفظ البيانات التي تقدمها بشكل آمن وسري، وسأحتفظ ببيانات البحث لمدة ثلاث سنوات بعد نشر البحث. سأقوم بتخزين جميع بيانات البحث إلكترونياً على جهاز حاسوب محمول وعلى قراص صلب خارجي كلاهما محميان بكلمة مرور. سيكون للباحث الرئيسي ومساعده المجال في الوصول إلى البيانات البحثية.
- أود أن أكون قادراً على استخدام بياناتك بشكل مجهول المصدر في دراسات مستقبلية.
- أود أن أقوم بتسجيل المقابلة صوتياً ما لم ترفض أنت ذلك.
- أنت على علم بأن البحث هذا سيتم نشره رقمياً عبر الإنترنت. سيتم نشر البحث في أطروحة الدكتوراه وفي المجلات الأكاديمية.
- هل أنت موافق على الإجابة على أسئلة حول انتمائك الديني؟

هل مازلت على استعداد للمشاركة؟ هل تعطي موافقتك لإجراء مقابلة معك وتسجيل المقابلة صوتياً؟

[انتظر التأكيد] لذا، إذا كنت موافق على كل ما سبق ولا يوجد لديك أي أسئلة سنبدأ الأن.

Appendix B

Survey

This technical Appendix provides additional material pertaining to the survey design (Section B.1), presents subject demographics (Section B.2), provides balance tests (Section B.3), additional regression models (Section B.4), additional conjoint models (Section B.5), and conjoint robustness checks (Section B.6).

B.1 Design

Figure B.1: Survey questions

Migration decision-making

Please select the language you would like to complete the survey in from the dropbox above.

الرجاء تحديد اللغة التي تريد إكمال الاستبيان بها من الخيارات أعلاه.

Consent form

General Information

The aim of this study is to investigate how Syrian refugees make migration decisions. We appreciate your interest in participating in this online survey. You have been invited to participate as you are a Syrian refugee living in Jordan and are 18 years or older. Please read through these terms before agreeing to participate by ticking the 'yes' box below. You will be given some questions / scenarios to read, and then answer questions on hypothetical migration destinations. It should take about 10 minutes. No background knowledge is required. The study aims to find out why some refugees decide to migrate or to stay in Jordan. In addition, it aims to find out how people would choose where to migrate to, if they had the choice. The data collected in this survey will be used for my PhD project and to find out how refugees make migration decisions. Your privacy and anonymity will be maintained.

Do I have to take part?

Please note that your participation is voluntary. I would be grateful if, once you have started the survey, you complete it fully, but of course you may withdraw at any point during the questionnaire for any reason, before submitting your answers, by closing the browser. You will not be paid for completing the survey but would help me gather data for my doctoral thesis. You would also help to better understand how Syrian refugees in Jordan make migration decisions and how they decide where they would like to migrate to.

How will your data be used?

Your answers will be completely anonymous, and we will use all reasonable endeavours to keep them confidential. Your data will be stored in a password-protected file and may be used in academic publications. Your IP address will not be stored. We have included a 'Prefer not to say' option for each set of questions if you prefer not to answer a particular question. Research data will be stored for a minimum of three years after publication or public release.

Who will have access to your data?

Qualtrics is the data controller with respect to your personal data and, as such, will determine how your personal data is used. Please see their privacy notice here https://www.qualtrics.com/privacy-statement/. Qualtrics will share only fully anonymised data with the University of Oxford, for the purposes of research. Your information may be shared with research assistants that help with the translation of the research data. We would like your permission to use your anonymised data in future studies, and to share data with other researchers (e.g. in online databases). Any personal information that could identify you will be removed or changed before files are shared with other researchers or results are made public. Responsible members of the University of Oxford, funders may be given access to data for monitoring and/or audit of the study to ensure we are complying with guidelines, or as otherwise required by law. This questionnaire is for a DPhil (PhD) project. The principal researcher is Constantin Reinprecht, who is attached to the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. This project is being completed under the supervision of Dr

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Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

Raymond Duch. This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee [R55957/RE001].

What if there is a problem?

If you have a concern about any aspect of this project, please speak to the researcher Constantin Reinprecht [constantin.reinprecht@politics.ox.ac.uk, +44 7834 740804] or their supervisor [Dr Raymond Duch, raymond.duch@nuffield.ox.ac.uk, +441865278515], who will do their best to answer your query. The researcher should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how they intend to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the relevant Chair of the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford: Chair, Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee; Email: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk; Address: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD The Chair will seek to resolve the matter in a reasonably expeditious manner.

نموذج موافقة

معلومات عامة

نقدر اهتمامك بالمشاركة في هذا الاستبيان عبر الإنترنت. الهدف من هذا البحث هو دراسة كيفية اتخاذ اللاجئين السوريين لقرارات مرتبطة بالهجرة. لقد تمت دعوتك للمشاركة في الاستبيان بصفتك لاجئ سوري يعيش في الأردن ويبلغ من العمر 18 عاماً أو أكثر. يرجى قراءة الشروط قبل الموافقة على المشاركة، في حال وافقت على الشروط قم باختيار مربع "نعم" أدناه. من خلال هذا الاستبيان سنطرح عليك بعض الأسئلة والسيناريوهات للقراءة، وسيُطلب منك الإجابة عن أسئلة حول وجهات هجرة افتراضية. سيستغرق تعبئة الاستبيان حوالي 10 دقائق من وقتك، ولا يحتاج ذلك وجود أي معرفة سابقة حول الموضوع. يهدف البحث إلى معرفة أسباب أخذ بعض اللاجئين لقرار الهجرة أو البقاء في الأردن. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، يهدف البحث إلى معرفة كيفية اختيار الأشخاص لبلد الهجرة في حال كان لديهم خيار. سيتم استخدام البيانات التي سيتم جمعها في هذا الاستبيان لمشروع رسالة دكتوراه حول كيفية اتخاذ اللاجئين .قرارات الهجرة. سيتم الحفاظ على خصوصيتك وعدم الكشف عن هويتك

هل المشاركة إجبارية؟

يرجى ملاحظة أن مشاركتك تطوعية. سأكون ممتناً في حال بدأت بتعبئة الاستبيان بأن تقوم بإكمال تعبئته بالكامل، ولكن يمكنك بالطبع الانسحاب في أي وقت خلال تعبئة الاستبيان لأي سبب من الأسباب وذلك عن طريق إغلاق المتصفح قبل الانتهاء من تقديم إجاباتك. لن يكون هناك مردود مادي للمشاركة بالاستبيان ولكن المعلومات التي ستقدمها ستساعد في جمع البيانات لدراسة الدكتوراه المذكورة سابقاً، كما ستساعد أيضاً في تطوير فهم أفضل لكيفية اتخاذ اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن لقرارات الهجرة، وكيف يأخذون القرارات حول ..المكان الذي يرغبون في الهجرة إليه

كيف سيتم استخدام البيانات؟

ستكون إجاباتك وبياناتك مجهولة المصدر تماماً، وسنفعل ما بوسعنا للحفاظ على سريتها. سيتم تخزين البيانات الخاصة بك في الخاص بك. يمكن استخدام البيانات في منشورات أكاديمية. لقد قمنا بتضمين IP ملف محمي بكلمة مرور ولن يتم تخزين عنوان خيار "يفضل عدم الإجابة على هذا السؤال" في الأسئلة في حال كنت تفضل عدم الإجابة عن سؤال معين. سيتم تخزين البيانات البحثية لمدة لا تقل عن .ثلاث سنوات بعد النشر في رسالة الدكتوراة أو المنشورات الأكاديمية

من سيكون لديه حق الوصول إلى بياناتك؟

هي الأداة التي سيتم استخدامها في ما يخص البيانات والإجابات، وعلى هذا النحو هي التي Qualtrics أداة كوالتريكس ستحدد كيفية استخدام بياناتك الشخصية. يرجى الاطلاع على إشعار الخصوصية الخاص بهم

البيانات مجهولة المصدر مع Qualtrics سوف تشارك https://www.qualtrics.com/privacy-statement/ هنا جامعة أكسفورد لأغراض البحث. قد يتم مشاركة معلوماتك مع مساعدي البحث والذين سيساعدون في ترجمة بيانات البحث. نود الحصول على إذن منك لاستخدام بياناتك المجهولة المصدر في دراسات المستقبلية، ومشاركة البيانات مع باحثين آخرين (على سبيل المثال في قواعد للبيانات على الإنترنت). سيتم إزالة أو تغيير أي معلومات شخصية يمكن أن تحدد هويتك قبل مشاركة البيانات مع باحثين آخرين أو النشر. قد يتم منح الأعضاء المسؤولين عن البحث في جامعة أكسفورد الحق في الوصول إلى البيانات لرصد و/أو مراجعة البحث للتأكد من أننا نلتزم بالمبادئ التوجيهية كما يقتضي القانون. هذا الاستبيان هو لمشروع رسالة دكتوراة للباحث كونستانتين راينبريخت، وهو ملحق بقسم السياسة والعلاقات الدولية في جامعة أكسفورد. يشرف على هذا البحث الدكتور ريموند دوتش. تمت مراجعة هذا البحث من طرف اللجنة المركزية لأخلاقيات البحوث في جامعة أكسفورد وتلقى الموافقة على الرقم [R55957 / RE001]

ماذا لو كان هناك مشكلة؟

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Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

إذا كان لديك قلق حول أي جانب من جوانب هذا المشروع يرجى التواصل مع الباحث كونستانتين راينبريخت عبر الإيميل
أو رقم الهاتف التالي +44 7834 740804 أو التواصل مع مشرف constantin.reinprecht@politics.ox.ac.uk التالي
أو رقم الهاتف التالي raymond.duch@nuffield.ox.ac.uk البحث الدكتور ريموند دوتش عبر الإيميل التالي
حيث سيبذل كلاهما قصارى جهدهما للإجابة عن استفسارك. على الباحث الإجابة على أسئلتك أو +441865278515
مخاوفك في غضون 10 أيام عمل ، وأن يعطيك مؤشراً على كيفية تعامله مع مخاوفك. إذا بقيت غير سعيد أو كنت ترغب
بتقديم شكوى رسمية يرجى الاتصال برئيس لجنة أخلاقيات البحث للأقسام الاجتماعية والعلوم الانسانية في جامعة أكسفورد
.حيث سيسعى رئيس اللجنة إلى حل المسألة بطريقة سريعة ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk عبر الإيميل التالي

[Comment: The following consent form was used for the incentivised survey.]

Consent form

General Information

The aim of this study is to investigate how Syrian refugees make migration decisions. We appreciate your interest in participating in this online survey. You have been invited to participate as you are a Syrian refugee living in Jordan and are 18 years or older. Please read through these terms before agreeing to participate by ticking the 'yes' box below. You will be given some questions / scenarios to read, and then answer questions on hypothetical migration destinations. It should take about 10 minutes. No background knowledge is required. The study aims to find out why some refugees decide to migrate or to stay in Jordan. In addition, it aims to find out how people would choose where to migrate to, if they had the choice. The data collected in this survey will be used for my PhD project and to find out how refugees make migration decisions. Your privacy and anonymity will be maintained.

Do I have to take part?

Please note that your participation is voluntary. I would be grateful if, once you have started the survey, you complete it fully, but of course you may withdraw at any point during the questionnaire for any reason, before submitting your answers, by closing the browser. You will not be paid for completing the survey but would help me gather data for my doctoral thesis. You would also help to better understand how Syrian refugees in Jordan make migration decisions and how they decide where they would like to migrate to. After completing the survey, you can choose whether to participate in an optional prize draw for a 70 JOD Amazon voucher. One winner will be determined from all complete responses in September 2019, after the survey ends on 30 August 2019. To participate in the prize draw, we require your e-mail to contact you in case you are the lucky winner. We will not save your e-mail address together with your answers and it will not be able to link your answers to your e-mail address. We will only contact you in case you win the Amazon voucher. All e-mail addresses will be securely deleted in September 2019. You may still complete the survey without participating in the prize draw.

How will your data be used?

Your answers will be completely anonymous, and we will use all reasonable endeavours to keep them confidential. Your data will be stored in a password-protected file and may be used in academic publications. Your IP address will not be stored. We have included a 'Prefer not to say' option for each set of questions if you prefer not to answer a particular question. Research data will be stored for a minimum of three years after publication or public release. Your e-mail

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Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

address, if you decided to participate in the prize draw, will be stored until all survey responses are collected and will be deleted in September 2019.

Who will have access to your data?

Qualtrics is the data controller with respect to your personal data and, as such, will determine how your personal data is used. Please see their privacy notice here https://www.qualtrics.com/privacy-statement/. Qualtrics will share only fully anonymised data with the University of Oxford, for the purposes of research. Your information may be shared with research assistants that help with the translation of the research data. We would like your permission to use your anonymised data in future studies, and to share data with other researchers (e.g. in online databases). Any personal information that could identify you will be removed or changed before files are shared with other researchers or results are made public. Responsible members of the University of Oxford, funders may be given access to data for monitoring and/or audit of the study to ensure we are complying with guidelines, or as otherwise required by law. This questionnaire is for a DPhil (PhD) project. The principal researcher is Constantin Reinprecht, who is attached to the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. This project is being completed under the supervision of Dr Raymond Duch. This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee [R55957/RE002].

What if there is a problem?

If you have a concern about any aspect of this project, please speak to the researcher Constantin Reinprecht [constantin.reinprecht@politics.ox.ac.uk, +44 7834 740804] or their supervisor [Dr Raymond Duch, raymond.duch@nuffield.ox.ac.uk, +441865278515], who will do their best to answer your query. The researcher should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how they intend to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the relevant Chair of the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford: Chair, Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee; Email: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk; Address: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD The Chair will seek to resolve the matter in a reasonably expeditious manner.

نموذج موافقة

معلومات عامة

نقدر اهتمامك بالمشاركة في هذا الاستبيان عبر الإنترنت. الهدف من هذا البحث هو دراسة كيفية اتخاذ اللاجئين السوريين لقرارات مرتبطة بالهجرة. لقد تمت دعوتك للمشاركة في الاستبيان بصفتك لاجئ سوري يعيش في الأردن ويبلغ من العمر 18 عاماً أو أكثر. يرجى قراءة الشروط قبل الموافقة على المشاركة، في حال وافقت على الشروط قم باختيار مربع "نعم" أدناه. من خلال هذا الاستبيان سنطرح عليك بعض الأسئلة والسيناريوهات للقراءة، وسيُطلب منك الإجابة عن أسئلة حول وجهات هجرة افتراضية. سيستغرق تعبئة الاستبيان حوالي 10 دقائق من وقتك، ولا يحتاج ذلك وجود أي معرفة سابقة حول الموضوع. يهدف البحث إلى معرفة أسباب أخذ بعض اللاجئين لقرار الهجرة أو البقاء في الأردن. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، يهدف البحث إلى معرفة كيفية اختيار الأشخاص لبلد الهجرة في حال كان لديهم خيار. سيتم استخدام البيانات التي سيتم جمعها في هذا الاستبيان لمشروع رسالة دكتوراه حول كيفية اتخاذ اللاجئين قرارات الهجرة. سيتم الحفاظ على خصوصيتك وعدم الكشف عن هويتك.

هل المشاركة إجبارية؟

يرجى ملاحظة أن مشاركتك تطوعية. سأكون ممتناً في حال بدأت بتعبئة الاستبيان بأن تقوم بإكمال تعبئته بالكامل، ولكن يمكنك بالطبع الانسحاب في أي وقت خلال تعبئة الاستبيان لأي سبب من الأسباب وذلك عن طريق إغلاق المتصفح قبل الانتهاء من تقديم إجاباتك. لن يكون هناك مردود مادي للمشاركة بالاستبيان ولكن المعلومات التي ستقدمها ستساعد في جمع البيانات لدراسة الدكتوراه المذكورة سابقاً، كما ستساعد أيضاً في تطوير فهم أفضل لكيفية اتخاذ اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن لقرارات الهجرة، وكيف يأخذون القرارات حول المكان الذي يرغبون في الهجرة إليه. بعد الانتهاء من تعبئة الاستبيان

4/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

يمكنك اختيار ما إذا كنت تريد المشاركة في السحب الاختياري على قسيمة لموقع أمازون بقيمة 70 دينار. سيتم اختيار فائز واحد من جميع المشاركين بتعبئة الاستبيان بشكل كامل، وذلك في شهر سبتمبر 2019 بعد انتهاء فترة الاستبيان (30 أغسطس 2019). للمشاركة في السحب على القسيمة سنحتاج معرفة بريدك الإلكتروني وذلك للتواصل معك في حال كنت الفائز. لن نحفظ بريدك الإلكتروني مع إجاباتك للاستبيان، ولن نتمكن من ربط إجاباتك ببريدك الإلكتروني. سوف نتواصل معك فقط في حال فوزك بقسيمة موقع أمازون. سيتم حذف جميع عناوين البريد الإلكتروني بشكل آمن في سبتمبر 2019.

بإمكانك تعبئة الاستبيان دون المشاركة في السحب على الجائزة أي دون مشاركة بريدك الإلكتروني.

كيف سيتم استخدام البيانات؟

ستكون إجاباتك وبياناتك مجهولة المصدر تماماً، وسنفعل ما بوسعنا للحفاظ على سريتها. سيتم تخزين البيانات الخاصة بك في الخاص بك. يمكن استخدام البيانات في منشورات أكاديمية. لقد قمنا بتضمين IP ملف محمي بكلمة مرور ولن يتم تخزين عنوان خيار "يفضل عدم الإجابة على هذا السؤال" في الأسئلة في حال كنت تفضل عدم الإجابة عن سؤال معين. سيتم تخزين البيانات البحثية لمدة لا تقل عن ثلاث سنوات بعد النشر في رسالة الدكتوراة أو المنشورات الأكاديمية. إذا قررت المشاركة في السحب على الجائزة سيتم تخزين عنوان بريدك الإلكتروني إلى أن يتم جمع جميع الردود على الاستبيان، وسيتم حذفه في سبتمبر 2019.

من سيكون لديه حق الوصول إلى بياناتك؟

هي الأداة التي سيتم استخدامها في ما يخص البيانات والإجابات، وعلى هذا النحو هي التي Qualtrics أداة كوالتريكس ستحدد كيفية استخدام بياناتك الشخصية. يرجى الاطلاع على إشعار الخصوصية الخاص بهم

البيانات مجهولة المصدر مع Qualtrics سوف تشارك https://www.qualtrics.com/privacy-statement/ هنا جامعة أكسفورد لأغراض البحث. قد يتم مشاركة معلوماتك مع مساعدي البحث والذين سيساعدون في ترجمة بيانات البحث. نود الحصول على إذن منك لاستخدام بياناتك المجهولة المصدر في دراسات المستقبلية، ومشاركة البيانات مع باحثين آخرين (على سبيل المثال في قواعد للبيانات على الإنترنت). سيتم إزالة أو تغيير أي معلومات شخصية يمكن أن تحدد هويتك قبل مشاركة البيانات مع باحثين آخرين أو النشر. قد يتم منح الأعضاء المسؤولين عن البحث في جامعة أكسفورد الحق في الوصول إلى البيانات لرصد و/أو مراجعة البحث للتأكد من أننا نلتزم بالمبادئ التوجيهية كما يقتضي القانون. هذا الاستبيان هو لمشروع رسالة دكتوراة للباحث كونستانتين راينبريخت، وهو ملحق بقسم السياسة والعلاقات الدولية في جامعة أكسفورد. يشرف على هذا البحث الدكتور ريموند دوتش. تمت مراجعة هذا البحث من طرف اللجنة المركزية لأخلاقيات البحوث في جامعة أكسفورد وتلقى الموافقة على الرقم [R55957 / RE002]

ماذا لو كان هناك مشكلة؟

إذا كان لديك قلق حول أي جانب من جوانب هذا المشروع يرجى التواصل مع الباحث كونستانتين راينبريخت عبر الإيميل constantin.reinprecht@politics.ox.ac.uk التالي أو رقم الهاتف التالي +44 7834 740804 أو التواصل مع مشرف البحث الدكتور ريموند دوتش عبر الإيميل raymond.duch@nuffield.ox.ac.uk التالي أو رقم الهاتف التالي +441865278515 حيث سيبذل كلاهما قصارى جهدهما للإجابة عن استفسارك. على الباحث الإجابة على أسئلتك مخاوفك في غضون 10 أيام عمل ، وأن يعطيك مؤشراً على كيفية تعامله مع مخاوفك. إذا بقيت غير سعيد أو كنت ترغب بتقديم شكوى رسمية يرجى الاتصال برئيس لجنة أخلاقيات البحث للأقسام الاجتماعية والعلوم الانسانية في جامعة أكسفورد حيث سيسعى رئيس اللجنة إلى حل المسألة بطريقة سريعة ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk عبر الإيميل التالي

Please note that you may only participate in this survey if you are 18 years of age or over.

○ I confirm that I am 18 years of age or over

.بإمكانك المشاركة في هذا الاستبيان فقط إن كان عمرك ١٨ أو أكثر

○ أؤكد أن عمري ١٨ سنة أو أكثر

5/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

I have read the information above and agree to participate with the understanding that the data (including any personal data) I submit will be processed accordingly.

- Yes, I agree to take part
- No

لقد قرأت المعلومات الواردة أعلاه وأوافق على المشاركة في هذا الاستبيان مع إدراك أن البيانات التي سأقدمها (بما في ذلك بياناتي الشخصية) ستتم معالجتها وفقاً لذلك.

- نعم، أوافق على المشاركة
- لا

We will start with questions about basic information about you.

بدايةً، الأسئلة التاليه سوف تكون حول المعلومات.

What is your sex?


- Male
- Female
- Prefer not to answer

ما هو جنسك؟

- ذكر
- أنثى
- أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

6/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions



How old are you?

- 18 - 29
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60 or older
- Prefer not to answer

كم عمرك؟

- ١٨- ٢٩
- ٣٠ - ٣٩
- ٤٠ - ٤٩
- ٥٠ - ٥٩
- ٦٠ أو أكثر
- أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

How long have you lived in Jordan?


- Less than one year
- 1-4 years
- 4-8 years
- More than 8 years
- Don't know / Prefer not to answer

منذ متى وأنت تسكن في الأردن؟

- أقل من سنة
- بين سنة وأربع سنوات
- بين أربع سنوات وثمانية سنوات
- أكثر من ثمانية سنوات
- لا أعلم /أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

7/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions



Do you have children?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to answer

هل لديك أي أطفال؟

- نعم
- لا
- أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

- Less than high school degree
- High school graduate (Baccalaureate / Tawjihi)
- Some college but no degree
- Diploma or technical certificate (2-year)
- Bachelor's degree (4-year)
- Master's degree or higher

ما هو أعلى مستوى تعليمي أنهيته أو أعلى شهادة تعليمية حصلت عليها؟


- أقل من توجيهي
- أنهيت مدرسة /توجيهي
- درست في كلية أو جامعة لكن لم أتخرج /أدرس حاليا في كلية أو جامعة لكن لم أتخرج بعد
- دبلوم أو شهادة تقنية)كلية أو كلية تقنية(
- بكالوريوس)4 سنوات جامعة(
- دراسات عليا)شهادة ماجستير أو أعلى(

Thank you. We would like you to think about your current life and your idea of a good life. We will ask you questions about your aspirations and goals for a good life.

شكرا. نود منك أن تفكر بحياتك الحالية وبتصورك أو آرائك عن الحياة الجيدة. سوف نسألك أسئلة حول تطلعاتك وحول أهدافك للوصول الى حياة جيدة.

8/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions



How satisfied are you with your current life?


- Extremely satisfied
- Moderately satisfied
- Slightly satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Slightly dissatisfied
- Moderately dissatisfied
- Extremely dissatisfied
- Don't know / Prefer not to answer

ما مدى رضاك عن حياتك الحالية؟

- راض لأقصى حد /راض جداً
- راض إلى حد ما
- راضٍ بعض الشيء
- لا راض ولا غير راض /محايد
- غير راض بعض الشيء
- غير راض الى حد ما
- غير راض للغاية /غير راض أبداً
- لا أعلم /أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

9/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions



What is your most important aspiration for a good life?

- Job / career
- Education
- Safety / security / stability
- Family
- Dignity
- Citizenship
- Don't have any aspirations myself
- Don't know / Prefer not to answer

ما هو أهم طموح لديك في ما يخص الحياة الجيدة؟

- العمل /مهنة
- التعليم
- السلامة /الأمن /الاستقرار
- العائلة
- الكرامة
- المواطنة /الجنسية
- ليس لدي أي طموحات شخصية
- لا أعلم /أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

10/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

How does your current life compare to the good life you imagine? On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 indicates "Extremely close to the good life" and 7 indicates "Extremely far from the good life", how would you evaluate your current life?

- Extremely close to the good life1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- Extremely far from the good life7

كيف تقارن حياتك الحالية مع الحياة الجيدة التي تتخيلها/تتمناها؟ على مقياس من ١ إلى ٧ حيث يشير الرقم ١ إلى "قريب جداً من الحياة الجيدة" ويشير الرقم ٧ إلى "بعيد جداً عن الحياة الجيدة" ، كيف تقيم حياتك الحالية؟

- قريب جداً من الحياة الجيدة ١
- ٢
- ٣
- ٤
- ٥
- ٦
- بعيد جداً عن الحياة الجيدة ٧

Thank you. We would like you to think about the future and whether you would like to stay in Jordan, return to Syria, or migrate to another country. We will ask questions about your migration preferences.

شكرا. نود منك أن تفكر في المستقبل وما إذا كنت ترغب في البقاء في الأردن، أو العودة إلى سوريا، أو الهجرة إلى بلد آخر. سنطرح عليك الآن أسئلة حول تفضيلاتك حول الهجرة.

11/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

If you could choose, which of the following options do you prefer?

- Return to Syria
- Stay in Jordan
- Migrate to another country
- Don't know / Prefer not to answer

إذا كنت تستطيع أن تختار، أي من الخيارات التالية تفضل؟


- العودة الى سوريا
- البقاء في الأردن
- الهجرة إلى بلد آخر
- لا أعلم /أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

Imagine you could migrate to another country. What is the most important factor of a potential migration destination to you?

- Education opportunities
- Employment / career opportunities
- Social benefits and healthcare
- Citizenship and rights
- Language and culture
- Friends / family / relatives in the country
- Asylum policies (e.g. family reunification, resettlement)
- Good reputation
- Don't know / Prefer not to answer

12/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions



تخيل أنك تستطيع الهجرة إلى بلد آخر. ما هو أهم عامل بالنسبة لك في ما يخص وجهة الهجرة؟

- فرص التعليم
- فرص العمل /المهنة
- المنافع الاجتماعية والرعاية الصحية
- المواطنة /الجنسية والحقوق
- اللغة والثقافة
- الأصدقاء /الأسرة /الأقارب في البلاد
- سياسات اللجوء)على سبيل المثال شمل الأسرة ، إعادة التوطين(
- السمعة الجيدة
- لا أعلم /أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

How motivated are you to migrate?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all
- Don't know / Prefer not to answer

ما هو مدى دافعيتك نحو الهجرة؟

- عالية جداً
- عالية
- متوسطة
- قليلة
- لا يوجد حماس أو دافعية
- لا أعلم /أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

13/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

How likely is it that you will migrate within the next year?

- Extremely likely
- Likely
- Neither likely nor unlikely
- Unlikely
- Extremely unlikely
- Don't know / Prefer not to answer

ما مدى احتمالية هجرتك خلال العام القادم؟

- احتمالية عالية جداً
- احتمالية عالية
- محايد /لا محتمل ولا غير محتمل
- احتمالية قليلة
- احتمالية قليلة جداً /شبه معدومة
- لا أعلم /أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

Which of the following countries is your preferred migration destination?

- Canada
- Germany
- UK
- USA
- France
- Other / Prefer not to answer

14/18

Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

أي من البلدان التالية هي وجهة الهجرة المفضلة بالنسبة لك؟

- ○ كندا
- ○ ألمانيا
- ○ المملكة المتحدة)بريطانيا(
- ○ الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
- ○ فرنسا
- ○ آخر /أفضل أن لا أجيب على هذا السؤال

[Comment: The following is conjoint 1, which half the respondents were randomly assigned to. The other half skips the next questions and continues with conjoint 2 below.]

Imagine you have the option to migrate to one of two destination countries. Please read the following hypothetical descriptions of the two destinations. We would like you to evaluate each of the two destinations and then select which one you prefer.
The descriptions include employment and education opportunities, social benefits, laws and regulations, public attitudes, and the reputation of the destination country.
You will be asked to make five separate evaluations and choices.

تخيل أن لديك الخيار للهجرة إلى بلد واحد من خيارين. يرجى قراءة الوصف الافتراضي التالي للبلدين. نود منك تقييم كل من .البلدين حسب الوصف الافتراضي ثم اختيار أي واحد تفضله للهجرة

الوصف الافتراضي يشمل فرص العمل والتعليم، والمزايا الاجتماعية ، والقوانين والسياسات، والمواقف العامة مع أو ضد .اللجوء، وسمعة البلد

.سيُطلب منك إجراء تقييم والاختيار بين بلدين خمس مرات مختلفة

[Comment: The randomly generated conjoint table was displayed here. The table and the next two questions were displayed five times per respondent.]

Which of the two migration destinations do you prefer?

- ○ Destination 1
- ○ Destination 2

أي من وجهتي الهجرة المذكورتين تفضل؟

- ○ وجهة الهجرة رقم ١
- ○ وجهة الهجرة رقم ٢

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Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you strongly dislike the migration destination and 7 indicates that you strongly like the migration destination, how would you rate Destinations 1 and 2?

	Strongly dislike 1	2	3	4	5	6	Strongly like 7
Destination 1	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Destination 2	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

على مقياس من ١ إلى ٧ ، حيث الرقم ١ يشير إلى أنك "لا تحب بشدة وجهة الهجرة" والرقم ٧ يشير إلى أنك "تحب بشدة وجهة الهجرة"، كيف تقيم وجهتي الهجرة ١ و ٢؟

	لا أحب بشدة ١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	أحب بشدة ٧
وجهة الهجرة رقم ١	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
وجهة الهجرة رقم ٢	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

[Comment: The following is conjoint 2, which half the respondents were randomly assigned to. If they already completed conjoint 1, they will NOT see the following questions but will skip to the end of the survey]

Imagine you have the option to migrate to one of two destination countries. Please read the following hypothetical descriptions of the two destinations. We would like you to evaluate each of the two destinations and then select which one you prefer.

The descriptions include employment and education opportunities, social benefits, laws and regulations, public attitudes, and the name of the destination country.

You will be asked to make five separate evaluations and choices.

تخيل أن لديك الخيار للهجرة إلى بلد واحد من خيارين. يرجى قراءة الوصف الافتراضي التالي للبلدين. نود منك تقييم كل من البلدين حسب الوصف الافتراضي ثم اختيار أي واحد تفضله للهجرة.

الوصف الافتراضي يشمل فرص العمل والتعليم، والمزايا الاجتماعية ، والقوانين والسياسات، والمواقف العامة مع أو ضد اللجوء، واسم البلد.

سيُطلب منك إجراء تقييم والاختيار بين بلدين خمس مرات مختلفة.

[Comment: The randomly generated conjoint table was displayed here. The table and the next two questions were displayed five times per respondent.]

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Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

Which of the two migration destinations do you prefer?

- Destination 1
- Destination 2

أي من وجهتي الهجرة المذكورتين تفضل؟

- وجهة الهجرة رقم ١
- وجهة الهجرة رقم ٢

On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you strongly dislike the migration destination and 7 indicates that you strongly like the migration destination, how would you rate Destinations 1 and 2?

	Strongly dislike 1	2	3	4	5	6	Strongly like 7
Destination 1	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Destination 2	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

على مقياس من ١ إلى ٧ ، حيث الرقم ١ يشير إلى أنك "لا تحب بشدة وجهة الهجرة" والرقم ٧ يشير إلى أنك "تحب بشدة وجهة الهجرة"، كيف تقيم وجهتي الهجرة ١ و ٢؟

	لا أحب بشدة ١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦	أحب بشدة ٧
وجهة الهجرة رقم ١	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
وجهة الهجرة رقم ٢	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Thank you for participating in the survey. Your answers are very helpful for my PhD project at the University of Oxford.

You have helped me a lot already but I still need more people to take part. Please also share this survey with family and friends. Thank you.

شكراً جزيلاً لك على المشاركة في استطلاعي. ستكون إجاباتك مفيدة جدًا لمشروعي الدكتوراه في جامعة أكسفورد.

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Figure B.1 (Cont.): Survey questions

لقد ساعدتني كثيرًا بالفعل ، ولكن ما زلت بحاجة إلى المزيد من الأشخاص. فهل يمكنك أيضًا مشاركة هذا الاستطلاع مع العائلة والأصدقاء؟

شكرا.

[Comment: For the incentivised survey, the following question was displayed instead of the end of survey message. If participants selected Yes, they were forwarded to a separate survey to record their e-mail addresses.]

Thank you. Do you want to participate in the prize draw for a 70 JOD Amazon voucher?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Q38 شكرا جزيلا. هل ترغب في المشاركة في السحب على قسيمة لموقع أمازون بقيمة 70 دينار؟

- ○ نعم
- ○ لا

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Figure B.2: Conjoint treatment values

English	Arabic
Local contacts	**علاقاتك في هذا البلد**
Family	عائلة
Friends	أصدقاء
Other Syrians	سوريين آخرين
No contacts	لا يوجد لك علاقات في هذا البلد
Social services	**الخدمات الاجتماعية**
Free healthcare	الرعاية الصحية مجانية
No minimum wage	لا يوجد حد أدنى للأجور
Generous support for refugees	دعم سخي للاجئين
Free housing	سكن المجاني
Laws	**القوانين**
No religious bans	لا يوجد حظر مرتبط بالدين
Ban on nikab and burka in public	حظر على النقاب والبرقع في الأماكن العامة
Ban on hijab in schools	حظر على الحجاب في المدارس
Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	حظر على الهجرة للأفراد من دول إسلامية
Citizenship	**المواطنة / الجنسية**
After 3 years	بعد ٣ سنوات
After 5 years	بعد ٥ سنوات
After 8 years	بعد ٨ سنوات
Work permit	**تصريح العمل**
Immediately	فوراً
After 3 months	بعد ٣ أشهر
After 12 months	بعد ١٢ شهر
Employment	**التوظيف / العمل**
1 in 4 Syrians employed after one year	١ من كل ٤ سوريين يعملون بعد عام واحد
3 in 4 Syrians unemployed after one year	٣ من كل ٤ سوريين عاطلين عن العمل بعد عام
Half of all Syrians employed after one year	نصف السوريين يعملون بعد عام واحد
Half of all Syrians unemployed after one year	نصف السوريين عاطلين عن العمل بعد عام واحد
Public attitudes	**المواقف العامة مع أو ضد اللجوء**
1 in 4 people support restricting immigration of Muslims	١ من كل ٤ أشخاص يدعمون تقييد/حصر هجرة المسلمين الى البلد
1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	١ من كل ٤ أشخاص يعارضون استقبال اللاجئين
3 in 4 people support taking in refugees	٣ من كل ٤ أشخاص يؤيدون استقبال اللاجئين
Half the population supports restricting immigration of Muslims	نصف السكان يدعمون تقييد/حصر هجرة المسلمين الى البلد
Reputation	**سمعة البلد**
Good country for Syrians	بلد جيدة نحو السوريين
Welcoming to foreigners	بلد ترحب بالأجانب
Bad country for Syrians	بلد سيئة نحو السوريين
Has many well-known brands	بلد تحتوي الكثير من العلامات التجارية المعروفة
Country	**البلد**
Canada	كندا
Germany	ألمانيا
United Kingdom (UK)	المملكة المتحدة (بريطانيا)
United States of America (USA)	الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
France	فرنسا

B.2 Subjects

Figure B.3: Distribution of educational attainment




Figure B.4: Distribution of years since migrating to Jordan




Figure B.5: Distribution of life satisfaction




Figure B.6: Distribution of migration motivation





Figure B.7: Distribution of migration likelihood



B.3 Randomisation and balance tests

Table B.1: Summary of conjoint attribute randomisation

Conjoint attribute variable	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	N
No local contacts	0.24	0.43	0	1	1926
Family	0.25	0.43	0	1	1971
Friends	0.25	0.43	0	1	1954
Other Syrians	0.26	0.44	0	1	2039
No minimum wage	0.24	0.43	0	1	1889
Free healthcare	0.26	0.44	0	1	2018
Free housing	0.26	0.44	0	1	2043
Generous support for refugees	0.25	0.43	0	1	1940
No religious bans	0.25	0.43	0	1	1953
Ban on hijab in schools	0.25	0.44	0	1	2005
Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	0.25	0.43	0	1	1951
Ban on nikab and burka in public	0.25	0.43	0	1	1981
Citizenship after 5 years	0.34	0.47	0	1	2650
Citizenship after 3 years	0.33	0.47	0	1	2626
Citizenship after 8 years	0.33	0.47	0	1	2614
Work permit after 3 months	0.33	0.47	0	1	2625
Work permit after 12 months	0.33	0.47	0	1	2630
Work permit immediately	0.33	0.47	0	1	2635
Half of all Syrians employed after one year	0.24	0.43	0	1	1868
1 in 4 Syrians employed after one year	0.25	0.43	0	1	1981
3 in 4 Syrians unemployed after one year	0.26	0.44	0	1	2025
Half of all Syrians unemployed after one year	0.26	0.44	0	1	2016
Half the population supports restricting immigration of Muslims	0.25	0.43	0	1	1945
1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	0.25	0.43	0	1	1969
1 in 4 people support restricting immigration of Muslims	0.24	0.43	0	1	1927
3 in 4 people support taking in refugees	0.26	0.44	0	1	2049
Has many well-known brands	0.13	0.33	0	1	1005
Bad country for Syrians	0.12	0.33	0	1	965
Good country for Syrians	0.12	0.33	0	1	983
Welcoming to foreigners	0.12	0.33	0	1	967
UK	0.1	0.31	0	1	825
Canada	0.1	0.3	0	1	782
France	0.1	0.3	0	1	805
Germany	0.1	0.3	0	1	768
USA	0.1	0.3	0	1	790

Table B.2: Balance test: Local contacts

	Dependent variable: (Ref.: No local contacts)		
	Family	Friends	Other Syrians
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age: 30-39	−0.027	−0.135	−0.098
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Age: 40 and over	0.008	0.026	0.142
	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.122)
Gender: Male	0.064	−0.062	0.064
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Children	0.031	0.045	−0.073
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Education: High school	0.044	0.091	0.086
	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Education: Some college	−0.052	−0.049	0.019
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.112)
Education: Diploma	−0.087	−0.016	0.052
	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.123)
Education: Bachelor's	0.106	0.099	0.196*
	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Education: Master's	−0.182	−0.130	−0.082
	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.179)
Constant	−0.067	0.014	−0.056
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.115)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	20,994.850	20,994.850	20,994.850

Note: N=7,660 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.3: Balance test: Social benefits

	Dependent variable: (Ref.: No minimum wage)		
	Free healthcare	Free housing	Generous support for refugees
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age: 30-39	0.022	0.162*	0.131
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Age: 40 and over	0.080	−0.021	−0.074
	(0.119)	(0.123)	(0.125)
Gender: Male	−0.037	0.072	0.021
	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Children	−0.00003	0.069	0.019
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Education: High school	−0.010	0.047	−0.025
	(0.117)	(0.122)	(0.124)
Education: Some college	−0.165	−0.037	0.022
	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.114)
Education: Diploma	−0.185	0.116	0.085
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.125)
Education: Bachelor's	−0.004	0.125	0.102
	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.110)
Education: Master's	−0.249	−0.115	0.125
	(0.181)	(0.185)	(0.178)
Constant	0.085	−0.219*	−0.170
	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.117)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	20,977.670	20,977.670	20,977.670

Note: N=7,660 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.4: Balance test: Laws

	Dependent variable: (Ref.: No religious bans)		
	Ban on hijab in schools	Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	Ban on nikab and burka in public
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age: 30-39	−0.120	−0.069	−0.013
	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Age: 40 and over	0.107	−0.044	0.110
	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.123)
Gender: Male	0.0004	0.030	0.008
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Children	0.003	0.022	0.073
	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Education: High school	−0.014	−0.021	0.047
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.123)
Education: Some college	−0.109	−0.088	0.015
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.114)
Education: Diploma	−0.244*	−0.094	−0.082
	(0.126)	(0.123)	(0.125)
Education: Bachelor's	−0.022	−0.110	−0.055
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.110)
Education: Master's	−0.038	0.225	0.248
	(0.192)	(0.184)	(0.185)
Constant	0.061	0.044	−0.061
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.117)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	20,994.800	20,994.800	20,994.800

Note: N=7,660 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.5: Balance test: Citizenship

	Dependent variable: (Ref.: After 5 years)	
	After 3 years	After 8 years
	(1)	(2)
Age: 30-39	0.028	−0.051
	(0.079)	(0.080)
Age: 40 and over	0.097	0.087
	(0.107)	(0.107)
Gender: Male	0.005	−0.001
	(0.066)	(0.066)
Children	−0.015	−0.044
	(0.074)	(0.074)
Education: High school	−0.129	−0.102
	(0.105)	(0.105)
Education: Some college	0.028	0.039
	(0.098)	(0.098)
Education: Diploma	0.086	0.004
	(0.108)	(0.109)
Education: Bachelor's	0.032	−0.022
	(0.094)	(0.094)
Education: Master's	0.141	0.175
	(0.161)	(0.160)
Constant	−0.010	0.030
	(0.100)	(0.100)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	16,638.590	16,638.590

Note: N=7,660 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.6: Balance test: Work permit

	Dependent variable: (Ref.: After 3 months)	
	After 12 months	Immediately
	(1)	(2)
Age: 30-39	0.014	0.061
	(0.079)	(0.079)
Age: 40 and over	0.193*	0.180*
	(0.107)	(0.107)
Gender: Male	0.039	0.112*
	(0.065)	(0.066)
Children	−0.097	−0.057
	(0.074)	(0.074)
Education: High school	−0.179*	−0.030
	(0.105)	(0.106)
Education: Some college	−0.119	0.021
	(0.098)	(0.099)
Education: Diploma	−0.068	0.087
	(0.108)	(0.109)
Education: Bachelor's	−0.207**	−0.054
	(0.094)	(0.095)
Education: Master's	−0.153	0.038
	(0.159)	(0.158)
Constant	0.112	−0.098
	(0.100)	(0.102)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	16,634.200	16,634.200

Note: N=7,660 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.7: Balance test: Employment

	Dependent variable: *(Ref.: Half of all Syrians employed after one year)*		
	1 in 4 Syrians employed after one year	3 in 4 Syrians unemployed after one year	Half of all Syrians unemployed after one year
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age: 30-39	−0.088	0.022	−0.108
	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Age: 40 and over	−0.161	0.015	0.026
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.121)
Gender: Male	−0.041	−0.073	0.041
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Children	0.072	0.053	0.035
	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Education: High school	−0.172	−0.152	−0.076
	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Education: Some college	−0.076	−0.104	0.085
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.114)
Education: Diploma	−0.238*	−0.405***	−0.027
	(0.123)	(0.128)	(0.123)
Education: Bachelor's	−0.083	−0.085	0.029
	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Education: Master's	−0.187	−0.089	0.075
	(0.185)	(0.183)	(0.182)
Constant	0.177	0.097	−0.020
	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	20,984.410	20,984.410	20,984.410

Note: N=7,660 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.8: Balance test: Attitudes

	Dependent variable: *(Ref.: Half the population supports restricting immigration of Muslims)*		
	1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	1 in 4 people support restricting immigration of Muslims	3 in 4 people support taking in refugees
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age: 30-39	0.107	0.029	0.031
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Age: 40 and over	−0.035	−0.021	−0.117
	(0.124)	(0.120)	(0.123)
Gender: Male	−0.112	−0.013	−0.077
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Children	−0.035	0.072	0.060
	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Education: High school	0.039	0.086	−0.026
	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.122)
Education: Some college	0.014	−0.004	0.028
	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.112)
Education: Diploma	−0.011	0.109	−0.096
	(0.127)	(0.123)	(0.126)
Education: Bachelor's	−0.122	−0.041	−0.169
	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.108)
Education: Master's	−0.227	−0.069	−0.170
	(0.185)	(0.178)	(0.181)
Constant	0.071	0.004	0.091
	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.116)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	20,994.570	20,994.570	20,994.570

Note: N=7,660 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.9: Balance test: Reputation / Country

	Dependent variable: (Ref.: Has many well-known brands)							
	Bad country for Syrians	Good country for Syrians	Welcoming to for-eigners	UK	Canada	France	Germany	USA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age: 30-39	−0.182	−0.146	−0.177	−0.231*	−0.131	−0.047	−0.158	−0.057
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.138)
Age: 40 and over	−0.238	−0.246	−0.232	−0.331*	−0.099	−0.103	−0.079	0.051
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.190)	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.181)	(0.182)
Gender: Male	−0.059	−0.027	0.075	0.098	0.036	0.090	0.157	0.209*
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.116)
Children	0.243**	0.093	0.317***	0.050	−0.013	0.132	−0.010	−0.048
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Education: High school	−0.199	−0.386**	−0.050	0.189	−0.151	0.194	0.083	−0.074
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.182)	(0.176)	(0.183)
Education: Some college	−0.031	−0.131	0.148	0.007	−0.208	0.040	−0.184	0.094
	(0.164)	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.172)	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.170)	(0.169)
Education: Diploma	−0.022	−0.178	−0.162	−0.163	−0.155	−0.203	−0.395**	−0.115
	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.181)	(0.189)	(0.182)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.185)
Education: Bachelor's	0.154	−0.001	0.227	−0.075	−0.219	0.021	−0.077	−0.162
	(0.155)	(0.153)	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.163)	(0.168)	(0.162)	(0.166)
Education: Master's	−0.228	0.210	−0.142	0.134	0.182	−0.064	−0.017	0.114
	(0.278)	(0.250)	(0.279)	(0.277)	(0.262)	(0.289)	(0.274)	(0.272)
Constant	0.035	0.183	−0.172	−0.206	−0.027	−0.349*	−0.136	−0.291*
	(0.165)	(0.163)	(0.168)	(0.177)	(0.172)	(0.178)	(0.172)	(0.176)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	33,174.500	33,174.500	33,174.500	33,174.500	33,174.500	33,174.500	33,174.500	33,174.500

Note: N=7,660 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4 Additional regression models

Table B.10: Predictors of main life aspiration, multinomial logit regressions

	Dependent variable: (Ref.: Citizenship)				
	Safety security stability	Education	Job / career	Family	Dignity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female	0.622**	0.846***	0.915***	0.849**	0.703*
	(0.265)	(0.278)	(0.289)	(0.354)	(0.380)
Parent	0.128	−0.388**	−0.299*	0.293	−0.705***
	(0.131)	(0.157)	(0.163)	(0.191)	(0.236)
Age (Ref.: 30 or older)					
18–29	0.046	0.874***	0.301	−0.535	−0.538
	(0.263)	(0.332)	(0.320)	(0.379)	(0.409)
Education (Ref.: Some college)					
High school or less	0.444	0.276	−0.003	0.115	−0.167
	(0.294)	(0.304)	(0.384)	(0.487)	(0.482)
Diploma / Bachelor's / Master's	−0.126	−0.646**	0.415	0.418	−0.227
	(0.274)	(0.288)	(0.317)	(0.426)	(0.404)
Constant	−0.430	−0.255	−0.673	−1.929***	0.095
	(0.444)	(0.508)	(0.530)	(0.672)	(0.659)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,561.761	2,561.761	2,561.761	2,561.761	2,561.761

Note: N=756 two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.11: Predictors of aspiration gaps

	Dependent variable:
	Aspiration gap
Female	−0.065
	(0.138)
Age (Ref.: 18–29)	
30–39	−0.076
	(0.165)
40–49	−0.248
	(0.244)
50–59	−0.850**
	(0.428)
60 or older	−3.001*
	(1.606)
Parent	0.448***
	(0.155)
Time in Jordan (Ref.: 1–4 years)	
< 1 year	−1.096**
	(0.435)
4–8 years	0.251
	(0.211)
> 8 years	0.051
	(0.245)
Education (Ref.: Some college)	
Less than high school	0.307
	(0.204)
High school	0.299
	(0.196)
Diploma	0.202
	(0.202)
Bachelor's	−0.216
	(0.167)
Master's	−0.693**
	(0.326)
Constant	4.920***
	(0.263)
Observations	732
R^2	0.073
Adjusted R^2	0.055
Residual Std. Error	1.594 (df = 717)
F Statistic	4.034*** (df = 14; 717)
Note:	two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.12: Aspiration gaps and migration motivation: additional regression models

	Dependent variable:			
	Migration motivation		Migration motivation	
	ordered logistic		*OLS*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aspiration gap	0.345***	−0.829***	0.125***	−0.128
	(0.052)	(0.284)	(0.023)	(0.124)
(Aspiration gap)^2		0.134***		0.028**
		(0.032)		(0.013)
Male	0.883***	0.812***	0.376***	0.360***
	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Parent	0.317	0.334	0.118	0.114
	(0.222)	(0.225)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Age (Ref.: 18–29)				
30–39	0.014	−0.081	−0.003	−0.022
	(0.234)	(0.238)	(0.093)	(0.093)
40–49	−0.980***	−1.054***	−0.411***	−0.415***
	(0.315)	(0.321)	(0.152)	(0.152)
50–59	−1.213**	−1.434***	−0.621*	−0.649*
	(0.534)	(0.548)	(0.358)	(0.361)
60 or older	−16.633***	−16.774***	−2.913***	−3.044***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.132)	(0.146)
Constant			3.154***	3.683***
			(0.219)	(0.330)
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years in Jordan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	730	730	730	730
R^2			0.144	0.150
Adjusted R^2			0.126	0.131
Residual Std. Error			0.882 (df = 714)	0.879 (df = 713)
F Statistic			8.013*** (df = 15; 714)	7.889*** (df = 16; 713)
Note:		two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table B.13: Predictors of durable solution preference: multinomial regression results

	Dependent variable: (Ref.: Repatriation)	
	Resettlement	Integration
	(1)	(2)
Life aspiration (Ref.: Citizenship)		
Safety / sec. / stab.	−0.240	0.912
	(0.597)	(0.782)
Education	−0.654	−0.351
	(0.658)	(0.892)
Job / career	0.302	0.803
	(0.787)	(0.993)
Family	−1.281**	−1.750
	(0.634)	(1.264)
Dignity	−1.360*	0.223
	(0.705)	(0.923)
Female	−0.704*	0.451
	(0.394)	(0.502)
Parent	−0.047	−0.089
	(0.234)	(0.310)
Age (Ref.: 30 or older)		
18–29	0.973**	1.108*
	(0.458)	(0.610)
Time in Jordan (Ref.: 1–4 years)		
< 1 year	0.347	0.487
	(0.841)	(1.344)
4–8 years	1.971**	1.195
	(0.778)	(1.252)
> 8 years	3.699***	3.752**
	(1.252)	(1.597)
Education (Ref.: Some college)		
Diploma / Degree	−0.075	0.089
	(0.468)	(0.637)
High school or less	0.162	0.967
	(0.568)	(0.723)
Constant	1.377	−2.274
	(1.142)	(1.705)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	596.626	596.626
Note: N=719	two-tailed tests, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

B.5 Additional conjoint models

Table B.14: Conjoint 1: AMCEs

feature	level	estimate	std.error	p
contacts	No contacts	0.000		
contacts	Family	0.047	0.023	0.042
contacts	Friends	0.006	0.023	0.791
contacts	Other Syrians	0.018	0.021	0.407
social	No minimum wage	0.000		
social	Free healthcare	0.056	0.023	0.013
social	Free housing	0.100	0.024	0.000
social	Generous support for refugees	0.074	0.023	0.001
laws	No religious bans	0.000		
laws	Ban on hijab in schools	-0.194	0.024	0.000
laws	Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	-0.186	0.022	0.000
laws	Ban on niqab and burqa in public	-0.121	0.022	0.000
citizenship	After 5 years	0.000		
citizenship	After 3 years	0.031	0.020	0.113
citizenship	After 8 years	-0.063	0.018	0.000
workpermit	After 3 months	0.000		
workpermit	After 12 months	-0.056	0.018	0.002
workpermit	Immediately	0.012	0.020	0.570
employment	1 in 4 Syrians employed	0.000		
employment	Half of all Syrians employed	0.004	0.023	0.864
employment	3 in 4 Syrians unemployed	-0.084	0.022	0.000
employment	Half of all Syrians unemployed	-0.119	0.023	0.000
attitude	1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	0.000		
attitude	Half the pop. supports restr. immig. of Muslims	-0.045	0.023	0.049
attitude	1 in 4 people support restr. immig. of Muslims	-0.040	0.021	0.063
attitude	3 in 4 people support taking in refugees	0.044	0.022	0.051
reputation	Has many well-known brands	0.000		
reputation	Bad country for Syrians	-0.207	0.021	0.000
reputation	Good country for Syrians	0.029	0.022	0.190
reputation	Welcoming to foreigners	0.003	0.022	0.875

Note: N=3,800 (=5 paired choices of 380 respondents)

Table B.15: Conjoint 1: Marginal means

feature	level	estimate	std.error	p
contacts	No contacts	0.481	0.016	0.235
contacts	Family	0.536	0.016	0.027
contacts	Friends	0.491	0.016	0.563
contacts	Other Syrians	0.494	0.016	0.684
social	No minimum wage	0.443	0.016	0.000
social	Free healthcare	0.500	0.016	1.000
social	Free housing	0.539	0.016	0.012
social	Generous support for refugees	0.514	0.016	0.388
laws	No religious bans	0.622	0.015	0.000
laws	Ban on hijab in schools	0.428	0.016	0.000
laws	Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	0.439	0.016	0.000
laws	Ban on niqab and burqa in public	0.510	0.016	0.521
citizenship	After 5 years	0.509	0.014	0.515
citizenship	After 3 years	0.545	0.014	0.001
citizenship	After 8 years	0.447	0.014	0.000
workpermit	After 3 months	0.517	0.014	0.222
workpermit	After 12 months	0.456	0.014	0.001
workpermit	Immediately	0.529	0.014	0.038
employment	1 in 4 Syrians employed	0.548	0.016	0.003
employment	Half of all Syrians employed	0.553	0.016	0.001
employment	3 in 4 Syrians unemployed	0.467	0.016	0.040
employment	Half of all Syrians unemployed	0.434	0.016	0.000
attitude	1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	0.510	0.016	0.542
attitude	Half the pop. supports restr. immig. of Muslims	0.453	0.016	0.003
attitude	1 in 4 people support restr. immig. of Muslims	0.469	0.016	0.054
attitude	3 in 4 people support taking in refugees	0.565	0.016	0.000
reputation	Has many well-known brands	0.545	0.016	0.004
reputation	Bad country for Syrians	0.339	0.015	0.000
reputation	Good country for Syrians	0.566	0.016	0.000
reputation	Welcoming to foreigners	0.547	0.016	0.003

Note: N=3,800 (=5 paired choices of 380 respondents)

Table B.16: Conjoint 2: AMCEs

feature	level	estimate	std.error	p
contacts	No contacts	0.000		
contacts	Family	0.047	0.022	0.030
contacts	Friends	-0.001	0.023	0.973
contacts	Other Syrians	0.032	0.022	0.140
social	No minimum wage	0.000		
social	Free healthcare	0.035	0.022	0.104
social	Free housing	0.082	0.022	0.000
social	Generous support for refugees	0.038	0.023	0.095
laws	No religious bans	0.000		
laws	Ban on hijab in schools	-0.159	0.023	0.000
laws	Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	-0.135	0.025	0.000
laws	Ban on niqab and burqa in public	-0.097	0.023	0.000
citizenship	After 5 years	0.000		
citizenship	After 3 years	0.088	0.019	0.000
citizenship	After 8 years	-0.051	0.019	0.008
workpermit	After 3 months	0.000		
workpermit	After 12 months	-0.038	0.020	0.053
workpermit	Immediately	0.031	0.019	0.109
employment	1 in 4 Syrians employed	0.000		
employment	Half of all Syrians employed	0.050	0.023	0.031
employment	3 in 4 Syrians unemployed	-0.039	0.023	0.085
employment	Half of all Syrians unemployed	-0.039	0.022	0.084
attitude	1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	0.000		
attitude	Half the pop. supports restr. immig. of Muslims	-0.041	0.022	0.065
attitude	1 in 4 people support restr. immig. of Muslims	0.006	0.022	0.781
attitude	3 in 4 people support taking in refugees	0.071	0.023	0.002
country	United Kingdom (UK)	0.000		
country	Canada	0.150	0.025	0.000
country	France	-0.122	0.025	0.000
country	Germany	-0.050	0.026	0.053
country	United States of America (USA)	-0.022	0.026	0.400


Note: N=3,860 (=5 paired choices of 386 respondents)

Table B.17: Conjoint 2: Marginal means

feature	level	estimate	std.error	p
contacts	No contacts	0.486	0.016	0.382
contacts	Family	0.517	0.016	0.272
contacts	Friends	0.484	0.016	0.307
contacts	Other Syrians	0.512	0.016	0.451
social	No minimum wage	0.460	0.016	0.013
social	Free healthcare	0.497	0.015	0.853
social	Free housing	0.533	0.016	0.036
social	Generous support for refugees	0.508	0.016	0.628
laws	No religious bans	0.602	0.016	0.000
laws	Ban on hijab in schools	0.440	0.015	0.000
laws	Ban on immigration from Muslim countries	0.456	0.016	0.007
laws	Ban on niqab and burqa in public	0.504	0.016	0.777
citizenship	After 5 years	0.489	0.014	0.436
citizenship	After 3 years	0.575	0.013	0.000
citizenship	After 8 years	0.434	0.014	0.000
workpermit	After 3 months	0.503	0.014	0.805
workpermit	After 12 months	0.466	0.014	0.014
workpermit	Immediately	0.529	0.014	0.031
employment	1 in 4 Syrians employed	0.514	0.016	0.377
employment	Half of all Syrians employed	0.556	0.017	0.001
employment	3 in 4 Syrians unemployed	0.471	0.015	0.059
employment	Half of all Syrians unemployed	0.466	0.016	0.032
attitude	1 in 4 people oppose taking in refugees	0.498	0.016	0.899
attitude	Half the pop. supports restr. immig. of Muslims	0.449	0.016	0.001
attitude	1 in 4 people support restr. immig. of Muslims	0.490	0.016	0.524
attitude	3 in 4 people support taking in refugees	0.559	0.015	0.000
country	United Kingdom (UK)	0.507	0.017	0.702
country	Canada	0.659	0.017	0.000
country	France	0.385	0.017	0.000
country	Germany	0.461	0.018	0.030
country	United States of America (USA)	0.491	0.018	0.618


Note: N=3,860 (=5 paired choices of 386 respondents)

Figure B.8: Conjoint 1 AMCEs, by preferred destination country




Note: N = 1,820 (Canada) & 380 (Germany) & 1,010 (UK) & 320 (USA).
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.9: Conjoint 2 AMCEs, by preferred destination country




Note: N = 1,810 (Canada) & 330 (Germany) & 930 (UK) & 520 (USA).
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.10: Conjoint 1 MMs, by preferred destination country




Note: N = 1,820 (Canada) & 380 (Germany) & 1,010 (UK) & 320 (USA).
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.11: Conjoint 2 MMs, by preferred destination country



Note: N = 1,810 (Canada) & 330 (Germany) & 930 (UK) & 520 (USA).
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.12: Conjoint 2 AMCEs for laws, by destination country displayed



Note: N = 1,810. Sample restricted to individuals who indicated to prefer to relocate to Canada before the conjoint.
The estimates represent the impact of religious bans, relative to no bans, by destination country displayed, for those who preferred to relocate to Canada.

B.6 Robustness checks

I conducted three main robustness checks. First, I estimated AMCEs and MMs for the second conjoint treatment separately for choices when the two destinations displayed were located in the same country – e.g. France for destinations one and two – and when the country displayed differed. The idea behind this is that the importance of the other destination characteristics should increase once both destinations are in the same country. On the flip side, the effect of the destination country should be more precisely estimated once I exclude choices between the same countries. I present the graphical estimates in Figures B.13– B.14. Respondents were presented with a choice of the same two named destination countries in 780 destination pair evaluations, or just under 20 per cent. The larger standard errors for those displayed the same country reflects the smaller sample size for the subgroup. The results confirm the theoretical predictions. Excluding choices between the same countries tends to increase the effect size of the country attribute and decrease those of the other attributes. Focusing on choices between the same countries highlights the importance of other destination characteristics. While the estimates are generally larger than for the whole sample or for the subgroup of choices between different destinations, the estimated standard errors are relatively large, rendering a number of estimates not significantly different from zero. One attribute seems to gain in importance: religious bans. However, the difference in AMCEs and MMs between the two subgroups are not statistically significant. In general, the results of the first robustness test corroborate the results for the full sample presented in Chapter 6.


Second, I evaluated whether the estimates changed if very quick choices were dropped. The rationale was to drop choices where respondents likely did not evaluate the two destinations but merely clicked to get to the next question. Figures B.15–B.16 show that restricting the sample to destination choices that took longer than approximately seven seconds (first decile) or 13 seconds (first quantile) does not alter the results, which remain practically identical. I again find no evidence that the results for the full sample presented in Chapter 6 should be called into question.

Third, I checked for differences in AMCEs between incentivised and non-incentivised responses[1] in Figures B.17–B.18. The responses for both subgroups are very similar.

1. To recall, around six in ten respondents were recruited via Forsa, an online platform for employment opportunities, training, and scholarships in the Middle East, that had an e-mail list of Syrian refugees in Jordan. To increase the response rate, participants could enter into an optional prize draw for an Amazon voucher. The other respondents were recruited via Facebook ads and snowballing and were not incentivised, as I was not able to specifically target Syrian refugees in Jordan specifically and might hence incentivised non-Syrians to complete the survey.


Notable small differences are that incentivised respondents cared less about having any local contacts at the destination and more about social benefits, relative to the respective reference category. Looking at the subgroups' MMs, however, reveals that the differences in AMCEs are driven by different underlying preferences for the reference categories (Figures B.19–B.20). Overall, the results for incentivised and non-incentivised respondents are almost identical, further strengthening the findings for the full sample that I presented in Chapter 6.

Figure B.13: Conjoint 2 AMCEs, same vs. different country




Note: N = 760 (same country) & 3,100 (different countries). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.14: Conjoint 2 MMs, same vs. different country




Note: N = 760 (same country) & 3,100 (different countries). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.15: Conjoint 1 AMCEs, by min. choice time




Note: N = 3,430 (7s) & 3,008 (13s) & 3,800 (All). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.16: Conjoint 2 AMCEs, by min. choice time




Note: N = 3,476 (7s) & 3,084 (13s) & 3,860 (All). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.17: Conjoint 1 AMCEs, by incentivisation




Note: N = 1,360 (not incentivised) & 2,440 (incentivised). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.18: Conjoint 2 AMCEs, by incentivisation




Note: N = 1,550 (not incentivised) & 2,310 (incentivised). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.19: Conjoint 1 MMs, by incentivisation



Note: N = 1,360 (not incentivised) & 2,440 (incentivised). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.20: Conjoint 2 MMs, by incentivisation



Note: N = 1,550 (not incentivised) & 2,310 (incentivised). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.