2
A Critical Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

The topic of justice and the city has been widely discussed in urban studies, geography, and economics, but despite the publication of a number of interesting works, it has not yet generated a focused literature in political philosophy. We subscribe to the view that political philosophers interested in the city should carefully, even if critically, read the works of social scientists, especially when they explicitly grapple with questions of justice. In this chapter we will provide a critical review of those works that we regard as most influential or insightful in helping us think about questions of equality in the city. Although few directly address our topic, and many are limited in scope or focus, or put forward positions we may dispute, we have profited from all the books and papers we will discuss. In this introduction we will provide a brief introduction to several of the works we will return to, in order to set out some of the context of the various contributions.

Probably the natural starting point and classic source for any discussion of political philosophy in relation to the city, is geographer David Harvey's *Social Justice and the City* (2009 [1973]). Harvey, very well known for his expositions and defence of Marx, takes a type of dual perspective in this work, starting with a relatively liberal discourse on justice, and then moving to a more Marxist analysis. The second edition of his book, published in 2009, also includes a useful essay on 'The Right to the City'. Harvey is especially interested both in the use of space in the city, in terms of inequality between neighbourhoods, and the ways in which city planners can change the value of assets through decisions around such things as zoning and development. We will return this to in detail below. Another classic discussion of justice in relation to the city is urban planning academic Susan Fainstein's *The Just City* (2010), which takes case studies of three major planning developments in different cities—New York, London, and Amsterdam—and evaluates them in terms of the norms of democracy, diversity, and equity. Perhaps, though, the founding volume of the discipline is Jane Jacobs's *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961), which we have already mentioned as an influence on

City of Equals. Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, Oxford University Press. © Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit (2023).
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198894735.003.0002

our own work. Jacobs asks what makes some parts of cities feel safer than others, and her key idea, which we will return to, is diversity of uses of those streets, in stark contrast to the rigid zoning which was becoming fashionable as she was writing. In Jacobs's work concerns of justice are ever-present if not, explicitly, theorized.

We have said that the philosophical literature on our topic is not extensive, but we do not want to diminish or sideline the important discussions over recent decades that are finally generating a much wider set of debates. Significant contributions include Owen Fiss et al.'s *A Way Out* (2003), Elizabeth Anderson's *The Imperative of Integration* (2010) and Tommie Shelby's *Dark Ghettos* (2016), all of which provide contrasting perspectives on a serious injustice in the United States: the existence of largely African-American, deprived, inner-city ghettos in many large cities. We will return to this pressing issue later. Clarissa Hayward and Todd Swanstrom's *Justice and the American Metropolis* (2011a) is an important collection of relevant essays because the papers together address what today is often called the intersectionality of injustice, namely the various aspects of injustice—race, gender, age, segregation, physical abilities, and so on—that often coincide. The book focuses on these aspects and perhaps less on class matters because the editors wanted to shed light on power relations which are not always visible, at least not at first sight. The editors refer to these structural injustices which are not always noticed as 'thick injustice' (2011b, 4). In addition, the volume is vital in raising the question of how to solve these injustices, though, like many urban scholars, the first tendency is to find solutions in urban planning.

While Hayward and Swanstrom do include a section about 'justice and institutions' (in particular, voting), the connection between solving inequality in the city and democratic activism is much more developed in Margaret Kohn's *The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth* (2016), which also explores the relationship between equality and democracy in the city. Kohn begins with a very basic observation, which is not discussed widely enough in other works: namely that the city belongs to all of us, all city dwellers, as well as visitors, but many of its parts are not accessible to some, either for economic reasons (the cost of rent or of goods in local shops) or because they feel uneasy in the area. She argues that urbanites lose access to the urban commons, which, we accept, is unjust. Interestingly, Kohn, like many others, focuses on economic or racial barriers, but our interviews, which we discuss in Chapter 3 and 4, indicate that there are other, cultural barriers. For example, we mentioned in Chapter 1 an interviewee in Berlin who said that she is not the type of person who likes fashion and knows how to dress as a 'hipster', and therefore there are certain areas in the city which she avoids

going to because they are too cool, and she would feel unwelcome there. Nevertheless it is true that the many of the examples our interviewees reported to us were based on forms of exclusion rooted in class, race, ethnicity, or religion.

The issues of equality and justice in the city have been tackled by political philosophers also in works that focus on broader questions of political philosophy, but provide very helpful contributions concerning the city. For example, Iris Marion Young includes chapters about the city in her major works *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990) and *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000), although it is not the main topic of either book. For us, Young's work contains much of great insight and we will return to her in detail several times. There is also increasing attention paid inside and outside the philosophical literature to gentrification, which is broadly described as a particular process of demographic change in a neighbourhood, which is sometimes (but not always) also a racial and ethnic change.[1] Gentrification typically begins when a street or small neighbourhood becomes more attractive to people with higher incomes, who move in, thereby changing the neighbourhood's character, and making it much more difficult for those previously living there not simply because of the change in character, but because rising rent or house prices make it unaffordable. Perhaps the most disturbing and controversial kind of gentrification is where social housing is transformed and privatized. Older buildings, including blocks of apartments are demolished and replaced, or refurbished in whole or part, to be made suitable on the open market for mixed-income communities, but can soon become dominated by the better off. Loretta Lees et al. (2008; Imrie, Lees, and Raco 2009) claim that processes of gentrification, in particular the privatization of social housing, are not inevitable and that not only are there alternatives, such as community self-build or community land-trust, that can cater for the needs of everybody, but that these alternatives are more socially and economically sustainable.

A classic philosophical work on gentrification is Margeret Kohn's 'What Is Wrong with Gentrification?' (2013) where she raises the question of whether individuals who sometimes naively search for better accommodation can be thought to be morally responsible for the displacement of low-income residents. Following this question *Gentrifier* (2018), written by anthropologists and sociologists Schlichtman, Patch, and Hill, discusses one of the key issues in this debate, namely whether we should understand gentrification as a process that is created by individuals and their decisions and

[1] The term was coined in 1964 by the sociologist Ruth Glass.

actions (agency) or as a matter of structure, of big urban social dynamics (see also Kaddar 2020). A structural analysis would require viewing micro-level decisions of the agent, the gentrifier, from a macro-level perspective, for example, 'the economy', or 'the city' which then bears primary responsibility. The debate, though, is by no means settled. Marcuse's 'Gentrification, Abandonment and Displacement: Connections, Causes and Policy Responses in New York City' (1985) is perhaps less forgiving and merciful towards the gentrifier. We read Iris Marion Young's classic example of 'Sandy' who faces homelessness through gentrification, as continuing this debate about agency versus structure. Indeed this example is one of the leading illustrations of the idea of structural injustice in her posthumous book *Responsibility for Justice* (2011).

As can be seen, most of these works address injustice in the cities of North America, although Fainstein advances her analysis by studying Amsterdam and London as well as New York, even if her research is based in the urban planning scholarship of North America. We mention this because broadly speaking, there is a tendency among North Americans to analyse inequality and injustice in the city among racial and ethnic groups, whereas among European scholars there is more of a tendency to focus on class, income groups, immigrants, and often gender, as well. For example, Sako Musterd et al. (2017) argue that the essence of segregation in European cities is the separation between poor and rich, and Mehmet Yorukoglu (2002) focuses on income differences in different spaces of the city, arguing that with increasing density, for both production and trade, the key to success becomes 'location, location, location'. This, he argues, is the core of inequality differences across cities of different densities. Danny Dorling, an Oxford-based geographer, has argued that inequality is a problem because culture divides people and makes social mobility impossible (Dorling 2019). As an example, he points to the startling fact that 'the most common way people die under the age of 65 in Oxford is to die homeless', and that it has been this way 'for over two decades now' (Dorling 2022, 14).

As we have mentioned, among the 'classic' and most cited works, many explore injustice in terms of spatial organization of cities, especially looking at planning law and practice. Prominent examples include Marcuse et al. (2009) *Searching for the Just City: Debates in Urban Theory and Practice*, Pavel (2009) *Breakthrough Communities: Sustainability and Justice in the Next American Metropolis*, and Soja (2010) *Seeking Spatial Justice*. However, these works, do not attempt a specific definition of justice for the city, as distinguishable from justice and equality in the state. Instead they either apply political theory written in the context of the state to the context of the city,

or concentrate on how to remedy injustice and improve justice in the city, focusing primarily on issues concerning planning, and relying on an intuitive sense of justice.

We will bring out the main themes of these and other works in what follows, focusing on elements that will help us draw up our own account of a city of equals. But we wish to do more than just review the literature here. In fact, we are claiming that while these studies are extremely valuable, none directly asks exactly the question we are interested in: what is it for a city to embody the egalitarian spirit? Accordingly, none provide an answer to that question, although the questions they ask are often very close to ours, and the answers they provide often yield important insights on which we build, as we will explain. This is an important point. Analytical philosophy often advances by applying an antagonistic approach. That is to say that philosophers challenge previous theories and arguments, showing why this or that is not intuitive, or contradicts a well-established theory. They then offer an alternative theory. But we see our project differently. While we do emphasize the difference between our question and questions discussed in the literature so far, and while we do believe that our theory is novel, we do also acknowledge that we have been inspired by many works by philosophers and social scientists, and we do not intend to reinvent the wheel. For illustration we return, once again, to Jane Jacobs (1961) who, as we noted, asked the question of what makes some parts of cities feel safe. In the course of her answer she drew attention to two major, and connected, issues: diversity of use of space, and chance interactions in the street. Consider an environment where people shop in walking distance of where they live, their children go to neighbourhood schools, there is some light industry, with regular deliveries, collections, and other visitors. In local streets one or two grocery shops open early morning and do not close until late into the evening, and children can play in close-by parks and other open spaces. This type of mixed use may seem untidy, and perhaps noisy and chaotic. To a certain cast of mind, zoning to keep busy, messy, and noisy activities out of peaceful residential neighbourhoods may seem more appealing. Yet Jacobs points out that where there is diversity of use there are more people around who get to know each other, at least by sight, and develop an instinct for when something is wrong and keep an eye out for each other, even if they have no direct relationship. People feel safer, as well as included and welcome. Although, as we have said, equality is not her explicit topic, we take a degree of inspiration from her picture and rich descriptive accounts of urban life.

In contrast to Jacobs's attention to the rich patterns of daily interactions, much of the literature from economics focuses on the much more abstract

and data-driven study of economic inequality, and that is where we will start in the next section. Urban studies, however, centres more on spatial factors such as residential segregation by race or class, such as issues around exclusion and inclusion, immigration and diversity. That will be the subject of the following section, before we turn to look at work that has taken up questions of justice or equality, or providing models of the 'just city' more explicitly. We will conclude this chapter with a summary of what we take from the literature and the gaps we intend to fill through our interviews and own further reflections.

2.2. Income Inequality: The Importance and Limitations of Material Inequality

As we indicated in Chapter 1, the most obvious starting point for thinking about inequality in the city is to look at the distribution of income and wealth, and some studies, such as Glaeser, Resseger, and Tobio (2008) do exactly this, although they do admit that measuring inequality in such terms yields unintuitive results (we discuss their argument later). Other studies explore alternative economic parameters for inequality,[2] and show staggering, and growing, levels of inequality in particular cities (for example, the London Poverty Profile, Aldridge et al. 2015). Economists debate the causes of such inequalities, and mechanisms for addressing them (see Long et al. 1977; Baum-Snow and Pavan 2013; and Behrens and Robert-Nicoud 2014).

This is important work, but is limited in a number of ways. For example, David Harvey discusses what he calls the 'hidden mechanisms' of redistribution within a city, including the change in value of property as a consequence of local government policies such as the development of a new school or transport facility (Harvey 2009 [1973], 52–3). Others might be more comfortable describing this as changes to wealth, rather than hidden increase in income, but the general point is that material fortunes can change in numerous ways, and they will not all be recorded in official statistics. Indeed, Harvey notes that simply the growth of a city, and therefore increased demand for

[2] Such as the price of sushi rolls, number of eateries per capita, or least upwardly mobile for fast food workers (Miller and Lu 2019), as well as bike lanes, home ownership, and so on. More sensitively, the focus might have been goods which are consumed by a wider portion of the population, for example, the price of street food in different parts of the city, the cost of renting an apartment or a room, or the price of public transportation for those residing far away from the city centre. However, while these reports grade the cities they do not necessarily say anything about inequality unless their consequences are discussed in the context of justice, as Macedo (2011) does.

prime property, pushing up house prices and rental values, can increase inequality more than direct attempts at redistribution reduces it (Harvey 2009 [1973], 54).

The relationships between rising property prices and inequality in the city is discussed also by Stephen Macedo (2011). He notes that higher house prices near better schools not only have (negative) redistributive effects, but show how difficult it is to equalize educational opportunities in a city. This is especially true in the United States, where, unlike other wealthy countries, schools are funded from local taxes rather than more general resources, and so there is a vicious cycle of educational inequality, because wealthy neighbourhoods pour extra resources into schools. As schools gain in reputation, property prices, and hence the tax base and resources available for local schools increase, with no obvious corrective mechanisms and no incentive for the wealthy and powerful to make changes. Another issue that concerns Macedo, like many other commentators, is the differing prices charged for the same goods and services in different neighbourhoods where counter-intuitively the poor often have to pay more, perhaps because both demand and competition between suppliers is less intense in poorer areas and so shopkeepers need high margins on lower sales volumes to pay rent, and shoppers have nowhere else to turn.

For Harvey such inequalities, and especially the regressive effects of policy, are clearly contrary to justice, and in Part 1 of his book *Social Justice and the City*, called 'Liberal Formations' he turns to Runciman and Rawls to present the outlines of a pluralist approach to justice, drawing on considerations of need, contribution, and merit in a weak ordering (Harvey 2009 [1973], 100) to demonstrate the injustice of such rising inequalities (we explain these ideas in a little more detail later). We should also note, however, that hidden redistribution can work to reduce inequalities, if, for example, the city increases its spending on libraries and leisure centres in deprived areas, or issues more permits for small businesses, galleries, cafes, etc., though such facilities could be co-opted by the wealthier, either by travel or through gentrification, pushing poorer people out to under-served areas.

Valuable though this work is, some of the methodological difficulties with relying on income measures, whether direct only, or incorporating indirect measures, are pointed out by Glaeser, Resseger, and Tobio (2009) themselves. They were among the first to argue that inequality within cities is 'quite different than inequality within countries' (2009, 617). They caution that what, by these measures, will count as the most equal societies are those where 'rich live with rich and poor live with poor' (2009, 618). This is an

excellent statement of our unease with income measures. As Douglas Rae puts the point:

> Given the historical flow of American urbanization, a low degree of central-city income inequality almost always arises because the high end of the distribution has melted away. This has happened as upper- and middle-income strata depart for the suburbs at high rates, leaving the poor to fend for themselves in the urban core.
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> **(Rae 2011, 105)**

Rae argues that some level of inequality in the city is justified, as it indicates that the city is open to various groups, and more importantly, it implies that the better-off subsidize, through their taxes, services for the worst off. Applying Rawls's difference principle, Rae argues that the inequality is justified so long as it benefits the least advantaged. This is possible, he claims, if you consider that the rich pay local taxes, and thereby some services can be provided for the poor that would not be possible if they were not subsidized by the taxes of richer residents.

While we agree with Rae that income equality is likely to be the result either of policies that exclude poorer residents, or the flight of the more wealthy, we would not want to argue that income inequality always leads either to improving material fortunes for the worst off or to inclusive social policies. Our own view is that there is no simple relation between material inequality in the city and the idea of giving everyone a secure sense of place. Much depends on how the city authorities respond to such inequalities, as we will explain in the following chapters.

We want to make three comments about this. First, while it is true that businesses and shops owners do contribute by paying local taxes, when it comes to accommodation the situation is different. It is often the case that those who rent, such as students, or less-affluent families who do not own a flat, pay the local tax for the flat they rent, rather than the landlords. So it is not only the rich who pay the local tax in the city. Second, and more importantly, in the context of the city, perhaps a more just and inclusive way for the wealthy to work for the benefit of the disadvantaged is for the city to enable and encourage investments in urban renewal that will attract the rich to make business investments in the locations where the poor reside, improving the quality of goods and services in under-served areas, without thereby forcing them to leave, in what Levine and Aharon (2022) call 'in place mobility'.

Third, sadly Rae's hopes that the wealth of the rich can materially benefit the poor in unequal cities appears to have limited empirical confirmation. For

example, the urban economist Glaeser found that often, especially in recent years, the richer the city is, the higher its inequality. More precisely, he found that the idea that the higher average income in the city is, the less unequal it is, worked only in the 1980s. By the 2000s this has ceased to be the case. Glaeser found that 241 out of 242 metropolitan cities in the United States became more unequal, materially speaking. The main reason for this was the different kinds of skills and human capital that city-zens had, and the very different returns to skills, especially rapidly growing income rewards in certain sectors such as finance and IT (Tonkiss 2015; minute 36:20). Also, according to OECD research (2018) income segregation, that is, the uneven geographic distribution of income groups within a certain area (Reardon and Bishoff 2011), in our case, the city, increases the higher household disposable income is in a city, and the higher a city's GDP. So it seems that attracting rich people to cities and allowing inequality does not automatically result in more money and services flowing to the poor, as Rae suggests.

Unless a utopian transformation of cities is available, the problem that confronts us is how to increase the sense of equality in cities against a background in which they contain a wide of diversity of people and life experience, including in some cases very striking inequalities of income and wealth. Implementing policies that encourage very rich or very poor people to leave will reduce material inequality, but is the opposite of the solution we seek, which is to make all people feel that they belong, on the same terms as everybody else, or as we described it in Chapter 1 and will develop later in Chapter 5, that everyone has a secure sense of place.

At this point we should clarify that we do not regard income and wealth inequality within a city as morally unproblematic, and we accept that there are powerful reasons for opposing gross and growing material inequalities. Economic factors will be central to the account of equality in the city in numerous ways. For example, some cities raise and control their own taxes, and can make the tax rates progressive;[3] if it does so, the city is in that sense tending towards equality, providing that such policies do not encourage the wealthy to leave. Spending within a city's budget also reveals its nature. If a greater amount of money is spent cleaning the streets of the already wealthy then it appears that it prefers to reinforce privilege than aim for equality. But if it invests in shelters for homeless people, or for women who suffer from domestic violence, then it seems more egalitarian. We can also explore what

[3] In Sweden, most people pay only local tax on their annual income, and the tax is progressive. It also varies, and in more affluent localities it can reach 35.15 per cent whereas in less-affluent localities it can reach 29 per cent only (Swedish Institute 2022).

portion of the budget is invested in affordable housing,[4] what conditions the city puts on new property developments, the average size of small flats in the city, whether there is a local tax on empty flats which are not let, whether the city subsidizes daycare, and so on. For example, the London Poverty Profile (Trust for London n.d.) has developed a new, impressive, and interesting list of indicators to compare and rank London's thirty-two boroughs and the City of London, and offers data, borough by borough, about such parameters as: people seen sleeping rough by outreach workers; rent for a one bedroom dwelling as a percentage of gross pay; percentage of 19-year-olds who lack any educational qualification; percentage of people on benefit payments; premature mortality; and infant mortality; and so on (Trust for London n.d.). Such a detailed list is very welcome as it can supply a much broader and deeper picture of inequality across boroughs or neighbourhoods than referring to income only. Admittedly, this is a picture of inequality between different neighbourhoods rather than individuals, but it can also reveal a lot about inequality between inhabitants of these units.

Our question, though, is how such economic and other material factors relate to what we are calling the egalitarian spirit. At a minimum it is fair to say that we believe a city does not embody the egalitarian spirit if it is not concerned about economic equality, if it does not try to ensure that everyone within its boundaries has a sufficiently good life, and if it fails to give priority to the worst off (to repeat the concern with equality, sufficiency, and priority raised in Chapter 1).

We follow here the footsteps of Richard Schragger (2013), who claims that while the conventional wisdom is that cities can do very little to make the city more egalitarian regarding income, taxes, and transfer payments, they can contribute to creating conditions of equality in other ways. Which ways? Schragger suggests that local policies and regulations should be less inspired by consumerist attitudes: what he refers to as 'the dominant competition paradigm (. . .) aimed at attracting and capturing mobile taxpayers'. Instead, he contends, the city should respond to egalitarian attitudes, such as resisting the privatization of public space, and encouraging the development of small, local businesses. If they do so, argues Schragger, cities can still do a great deal to improve the income and wealth of those who are financially less

[4] In April 2021, four-hundred thousand people were living in NYC in affordable housing provided by the NYCHA (New York City Housing Authority). It is the largest public housing authority in the United States. Around a hundred thousand people were living in other public housing facilities. This is, relatively speaking, a high percentage in a city of 8.46 million people. Affordability of housing is considered a serious problem in the United States, as it is in many countries and cities. In the 2020s people living in American cities have been finding housing to be a serious problem, In 2020, 46 per cent of American urban renters spent 30 per cent of their income on housing, and 23 per cent spent 50 per cent (Schaeffer 2022).

well off, and make more people feel welcome and included. Earlier, when we discussed Jacobs's book, we acknowledged that we are inspired by many scholars; this is another example. We develop such insights further, based also on interviews with many city dwellers, in subsequent chapters.

Indeed, we would be especially worried if the city deliberately implemented policies that aim at increasing material inequalities. More realistically cities very often follow policies in pursuit of economic growth that have the unintended but foreseeable consequence of increasing inequality (Fainstain 2001; Harvey 2019). We do not claim that there are never good reasons for introducing such policies, but we do consider increased material inequality a powerful negative factor that needs to be weighed in the balance, especially when other choices can be taken.

Nevertheless, some cities of similar levels of economic inequality seem to do more than others to embody the egalitarian spirit. How so? There are many factors that we will introduce during the course of the subsequent chapters; but if a city experiences the injustice of gross material inequality, and can do little directly except lobbying the national government, it should nevertheless find ways in which people can enjoy the many elements of an urban good life whatever their level of wealth. This means making economic success, and purchasing power, much less central to the ability to live an urban good life and to enjoy the various facilities and services that cities can and do provide, through the provision of various public services and perhaps in other ways. We will return to this in detail, but the main point is that for a city, one egalitarian response to unjust inequality of wealth is simply to make wealth less important, or, in other words, to prevent a situation whereby lack of wealth becomes a risk to a city dweller's secure sense of place.

2.3. Space and Segregation, Exclusion and Inclusion

In Chapter 1 we mentioned that geographers tend to think about justice in the city in spatial terms. But such a focus is not restricted to geographers. In a recent paper that we find very inspiring, and will briefly return to at the end of this chapter van Leeuwen (2020) claims that the whole point of justice in the city is access to human space. Following Honneth, van Leeuwen argues that it should be a space that is structured to meet the demand for recognition, especially of key human features, namely, basic needs, personal autonomy, and social attachments. We prefer the language of 'secure sense of place' to 'recognition', as 'recognition' lacks the immediate connection with a location, and also has been used in political philosophy in particular ways,

and so will have connotations for some readers that takes it out of the context of our present discussion. Nevertheless, despite different terminology, there is good deal in common between our approaches, even if, for us, space and its use is only one part—albeit a vitally important part—of a bigger picture. But certainly, accessibility to spaces such as parks, including transportation, commuting, taking children to school, access to cafes, restaurants, food markets, and shops, all of which are components of urban well-being, are central to the picture of equality and inequality in the city that we shall paint. We return to this point in Chapters 3 and 4 where we discuss the interviews we conducted, as these dimensions of equality were mentioned by interviewees time and again. But here we want, first, to look not only at the advantage of this approach for grasping what a city of equals means, but also at some debates among scholars, and at the limitations of this approach, and what is known and what is less known and less clear about the way justice manifests itself through space in the city.

We noted in the previous section that David Harvey's concern with hidden forms of redistribution occurs in Part 1 of his book *Social Justice and the City* (1973) which he calls 'Liberal Formulations'. Part 2, entitled 'Socialist Formulations', turns especially to spatial factors and how the evolution of cities tends to reinforce spatial segregation, with, he suggests, middle-class families moving to the suburbs, abandoning inner-city areas to deprived populations, and often ethnic minorities. Since the 1970s, though, many cities have seen a reversed trend, with wealthier citizens, especially those without young children in the home, moving back into gentrified inner cities, and poor and working families moving out to badly served suburbs, with limited public transport and other facilities. But Harvey's point remains valid. Cities segregate themselves on social, and often, ethnic lines, though how that takes place is dictated by the more affluent groups. Harvey is self-consciously in a long tradition of writers, going back to Engels, and probably well before, exposing demographic patterns within large cities. Charles Booth's famous maps of wealth and poverty in London streets are a further example of this phenomenon at a descriptive level, although Harvey is keen to look for explanations of segregation in terms of the dynamics of property markets. Other theorists have also explored the mechanisms behind segregation. For example, building on a study of socio-economic segregation in twelve European cities, Musterd et al. (2017; see also Musterd 2006) suggest that socio-economic segregation has increased because of four structural factors: social inequalities; globalization and economic restructuring; welfare regimes; and housing systems. A more recent OECD study (2018) suggests that cities with a higher percentage of migrants also display higher levels

of segregation for the bottom 20 per cent of income groups, and that the two together result in socio-economic segregation. On the more positive side Johansson and Panican (2016) show how, in the absence of sufficient national interventions, grass-root groups, as well as cities, engage in various poverty relief activities, which has increased inclusion in various European cities.

Although Musterd (2017) is cautious and suggests that 'relatively little is known about the spatial dimensions of rising socioeconomic inequality' in cities, it can be argued that there is evidence that economic inequality and spatial segregation cannot be completely separated. Massey and Denton (1988) measure segregation in terms of evenness of spread across neighbourhoods, and so, for example, if non-EU immigrants tend to reside only in certain neighbourhoods the spread is not even, and therefore segregation is present.

More precisely, geographers, as well as the US Bureau of the Census, argue that there are five parameters which are related to segregation in what they call an 'areal unit'. First, evenness: a minoritized group is not segregated, when in all areal units there is the same relative number of members of the minority and the majority groups as in the city as a whole. Second, exposure: the degree of potential contact, or the possibility of interaction, between minoritized and majority group members within geographic areas of a city. Third, concentration: relative amount of physical space occupied by a minoritized group in the urban environment. Fourth, centralization: the degree to which a group is spatially located near the centre of an urban area. Fifth, clustering: the degree of spatial clustering exhibited by a minoritized group—that is, the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority members adjoin one another, or cluster, in space.

Space is also related to other parameters which are often linked to inequality. On these lines Nijman and Wei (2020) plausibly argue that in cities, processes of segregation and gentrification tend to involve not the highest incomes (certainly not the infamous '1 per cent') but rather gentrifiers of middle and upper-middle incomes displacing people on lower incomes. In a comprehensive study of inequality in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles, O'Connor, Tilly, and Bobo (2001) widen the focus on inequality beyond housing to include the labour market. In the North American literature there is a debate whether inequalities in the labour market are predominately the result of latent racism or whether they are structural and spatial, irrespective of racism, that is to say that racism, whether existent or not, does not play a role. O'Connor, Tilly, and Bobo argue that in these four cities—Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles—even as old heavy industries gave way to new commercial centres, 'longstanding hostilities' and racial and ethnic

segregation continue to exert their influence, generating gross inequalities. The authors argue that it is true that job and hiring procedures require skills that are less common in people of racial and ethnic minorities and that some jobs have moved outside the cities to the suburbs; nevertheless unfortunately, some racist discrimination still remained in hiring, causing severe inequality not only in spatial terms but in the labour market as well. One of their case studies concerns Los Angeles, which is also studied by Bobo, Oliver, Johnson, and Valenzuela (2000), once again exploring the links between race, ethnicity, and gender to housing and jobs opportunities. According to this study housing segregation patterns are repeated, and members of ethnic minorities refrain from searching for jobs in areas where they suspect there is racism. Apparently there is some form of collective memory which influences people's behaviour and even informal segregation. Portland is considered the whitest big city in the United States, and this might have to do with 'severe history of racism that, to this day, permeates all systems and institutions, including our neighborhoods, schools, laws, and housing policies' (Habitat for Humanity 2020).

Other studies home in more directly on racism as a manifestation of urban inequality such as Wilson (2012 [1987]), Bullard (2009), and Powell (2009). Powell claims that the mechanism of private property in practice sustains ethnic exclusion in American cities. Robert Sampson and William Julius Wilson (1995) bring violent crime into the analysis, suggesting the thesis of 'racial invariance', which states that 'racial disparities in rates of violent crime ultimately stem from the very different social ecological contexts in which Blacks and Whites reside, and that concentrated disadvantage predicts crime similarly across racial groups' (Sampson, Wilson, and Hanna Katz 2018).

However, a more recent and less US-focused study by the OECD (2018), suggests that what we regard as spatial factors contributes to inequality in the labour market. When a city is already at least partially segregated it is often the case that there is a lack of easily accessible transport connection to enable travel to employment centres by those living in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of people who are poor or minoritized. This is not necessarily the result of explicit racism, but rather of the market: bus and train companies find that such lines and services are less profitable. The research argues that this hinders job opportunities or at least makes it much more difficult for those who are unemployed to find about new jobs and then reach their work place easily (Pritchard, Tomasiello, Giannotti, and Geurs 2019).

Naturally and understandably, in the attempt to provide a type of dispassionate 'scientific' methodology to the study of inequality and its spatial

appearances theorists look to measurable, countable, and hence, material factors in defining and explaining inequality. In doing so the studies tend not to capture what for us is a central issue: how the marginalized and segregated feel when they face discrimination and lack of opportunity. In other words, those approaching spatial questions as quantitative social scientists tend not to apply the relational approach to social justice and to inequality, which makes more room for considering how it feels to be treated in particular ways by others. For example, in his very influential book, *The Origins of Urban Crisis* (1996) Thomas Sugrue describes how red-lining—the refusal to give loans to residents of certain neighbourhoods with above-average risks of default, which were typically heavily occupied by people from ethnic minorities and those on low incomes—had the consequence that African Americans who had been living in these neighbourhoods and wanted, following the economic boom in the city after World War II, to improve their homes or buy new homes, could not afford to do so because they could not find mortgages or loans. This created a troubling cycle of poverty and spatial problems, on top of social discrimination, because the job market and the home market are linked, and people could not find better jobs because they lived in these neighbourhoods, and could not leave the neighbourhood because they did not have enough income, nor could they take loans. Sugrue's work is undoubtably important, and these material factors will play a role in our analysis. And yet, in emphasizing measurable indicators he downplays the subjective, emotional aspect of such practices and events, which for us are a crucial aspect of the nature of inequality in the city. Therefore, we also need to bring out in more detail how people are treated, and the way other city-zens in the city relate to them, think about them, exploit them, and more generally behave towards them.

Getting closer, explicitly, to relational equality, the phenomenon of segregation is taken up in detail in two important recent works of philosophy: Elizabeth Anderson (2010), *The Imperative of Integration* and Tommie Shelby's (2016) *Dark Ghettos*. Similar themes and arguments are explored in the earlier book *A Way Out: America's Ghettos and the Legacy of Racism* (Fiss et al. 2003), containing an essay by Owen Fiss, and ten responses, which in many aspects anticipates the debate between Anderson and Shelby. Anderson, like Fiss, drawing on empirical precedents such as the 'Moving to Opportunity' (MTO) programme, argues that disadvantaged African American families should be subsidized to move to better neighbourhoods to improve their life prospects. Two concerns, however, stand out: first, whether there is sufficient absorptive capacity (both attitudinal and physical) within 'good neighbourhoods' to have more than a marginal effect overall; and second, why the

responsibility to make such a disruptive change should fall on those who are already disadvantaged.

Taking up this second point in particular, Tommie Shelby points out that where one chooses to live is an important element of freedom of association, and many people will prefer to stay in the communities where they currently live rather than move to white-majority areas. This is echoed in Sundstrom (2013) and Cassiers and Kesteloot (2012), and also in Young (2002, Chapter 6), who suggests several criteria for observing whether residential concentrations of ethnic minorities reflect people's preferences to live next to each other, or a policy or a social atmosphere of exclusion, which we will explore in detail later in this chapter. One of these criteria that we find especially interesting is whether residents 'know' where racial and ethnic minorities are said to be living and if these places carry associations of danger. Young builds on Peter Marcuse's (1997) distinction between three types of residential patterns. *An enclave* is a voluntary clustering of persons according to affinity groups; *a ghetto* is a concentration of some ethnic group, or lower-class people, as a result of formal or informal exclusion and confinement of this group by a dominant group; *a citadel* is the mirror image of a ghetto: it is an exclusive community of class and/or race privilege, restricting others from living there or, in extreme cases, restricting access to the area, as in a gated neighbourhood. An enclave, Marcuse argued, can be a positive and empowering social structure. Some flourishing African-American-dominated neighbourhoods in American cities, and Chinatowns, are good examples. A less-known case is that of the Portuguese-speaking community in South London's South Lambeth Road who have chosen to live together as a matter of self-selection. Many non-Portuguese-speaking people are attracted to visit this neighbourhood because of its uniqueness, or what we might term, its flavour. Indeed, a city that has lots of flavours in that sense is both attractive and egalitarian. We will return to this in detail in Chapter 5.

To paraphrase Shelby's concern in Marcuse's language, for him the onus is to improve local facilities turning ghettos into enclaves rather than to encourage people to abandon their neighbourhoods. But Shelby's main concern in looking at the experience of African Americans living in inner-city ghettos is not so much to attempt to come to an account of equality or inequality, but rather to consider the morally appropriate forms of response to the deep injustice of living as a victim of an unjust basic structure. In the course of his analysis he points out many ways in which African Americans living in the inner city face worse life prospects than their white co-citizens.

As we have already noted, the topic of racial injustice has especially exercised those studying US cities. An excellent example is Hayward and

Swanstrom (2011b) in their introduction to their edited collection *Justice in the American Metropolis*. Their focal point is the 1948 US Supreme Court ruling in Shelley versus Kraemer that states could no longer enforce racial restrictions for sales even if in private law this was not illegal. However, as they argue, the fact that African Americans, in some limited degrees, had the capacity to overcome spatial exclusion did not guarantee overcoming economic inequality and deprivation. They convincingly claim that at least in the United States, political and legal institutional structures contribute to injustice in cities, or what they term 'thick injustice', as these structures make it very difficult to change anything. One reason this is so is the privatization of governance which created fragmented institutional structures. Another reason, they argue, is that these structures make it difficult to comprehend where the injustice lies and what its source is.

This argument echoes a claim made by Iris Marion Young (2002, 207–10), that in many cities the privileged do not realize how privileged they are because of spatial (often racial) exclusion; they don't mix with the disadvantaged and therefore are not aware of their privileges:

> Life does not feel privileged for the white family with two working adults (. . .) Being able to stop off at a gourmet grocery on the way home, to count on police protection and snow removal and to walk or drive a short distance to see a first-run movie seem like the most minimal rewards for an arduous week of work. Segregation thus makes privilege doubly invisible to the privileged, by conveniently keeping the situation of the relatively disadvantaged out of sight.
>
> **(Young 2002, 208)**

2.4. The Importance and Limitations of Spatial Analysis

Spatial issues are important partly because they can be manipulated by policies of zoning. Gerald Frug claims that contemporary American cities are divided into neighbourhoods and zones, to the extent that people from one area feel uncomfortable walking in another area, but, he hastens to add, this inhospitable situation is not the intended result of individual choices about where to live or work; rather it is the consequences of many local government regulations, such as, but not only, zoning (Frug 2001). Still, while spatial issues are central to inequality in the city there is a question of the degree to which they should dominate the analysis of a city of equals. We are not claiming that they do not matter. Take, for example our acknowledgement that factors of inequality of income and wealth can be important. But would they

be so important if they were not spatially represented through segregation? And yet, we are arguing that spatial aspects do not reveal the entire picture; hence assuming that inequality in the city can be analysed through spatial analysis alone is misleading. Here are a few examples of why spatial analysis doesn't reveal the whole picture of inequality in the city.

Consider the possible link between segregation and political representation. For example, Cassiers and Kesteloot (2012) argue that on top of the more discussed consequences of segregation—fewer opportunities for income, as one lives far away from the economic centre of the city, and lack of social network and social capital, which in turn make social mobility even harder—there is a third: stigmatization (both of the area or of people) and lack of political representation, in that people living in more deprived areas are often overlooked by decision-makers. But the picture is complex, as, paradoxically, segregation can sometimes assist local political organization. It may help integrate immigrants who look for similarities in culture in their city of destination and may yield common political agendas which in turn make political organization easier.

People have common interests that have to do with their locality and neighbourhood. Now, as Patti Lenard (2013; 2015) argues, recent immigrants (most of whom lack voting rights) tend to be attracted to live next to longer-standing immigrants from their original country, and therefore reside in the same neighbourhood; this implies that if the electoral district, the constituency, is not the entire city, but rather the city is divided to several constituencies based on neighbourhoods, then neighbourhoods where there are many immigrants who have not been naturalized and therefore lack a vote, are not fairly represented.

Lenard's point reveals a possible limitation to an argument made by Loren King (2011), to which we are otherwise sympathetic. King suggests that justice in cities is more procedural than resting only on principles of distribution. He holds that for a city to be egalitarian it must equally respect all its city-zens, including those groups that are often marginalized from the public domain. Thus, in order to see whether a city's regulation or policy is just and egalitarian, we should look whether its rationale appeals to and takes into account the values of all groups in the city, as he defines it, whether it gives equal political standing to all who will be affected by the policy. This is a very appealing suggestion and provides a dimension of equality that takes us beyond pure spatial issues. Still, as Lenard argues, when it comes to political equality there seems to be a need for actual representation of people from all groups and not merely to give them equal weight. The question is how should we give equal weight to the interests of immigrants who are not yet

naturalized and therefore lack voting rights. Lenard argues that considering their interests isn't sufficient. This actual representation, as Iris Young insists, guarantees that the narrative of those marginalized will be put forward the way they would like it to be put forward. Representation is of real value, not merely of symbolic value.

However, as the above-mentioned example shows, the motivation for separation is not always negative, and separation of groups in spatial terms is sometimes the result of an egalitarian policy. Practices that enable immigrants to live next to their relatives and friends from their country of origin can be beneficial, and as long as locales don't, in effect, become ghettos, proximately to those of similar origin who have already established a foothold in the city can make integration easier. But as Lenard noted the consequences, though, might be problematic in terms of representation and equality, because their localities' interests will not be represented in the council. An egalitarian should object to practices of segregation which are clearly the result of policies or norms that have segregation as their aim. It would be a gross violation of the idea of a city of equals if a city had regulations that separate populations and influence a person's chance to reside in any part of the city based on their ethnicity, nationality, race, religion, and so on. But even without explicit regulations, as Anderson (2010) and Tilly (1998) argue, there are some practices of segregation, which are the result of entrenched norms, rather than policy or market transactions. This can happen in residential matters—where people want to move to areas that have more people 'like me' or get to hear about apartments available to rent through family and friendship groups. And patterns of non-residential segregation, or segregated social mixing, can also emerge through norms of behaviour. One obvious example is habits of avoidance, such as avoiding parts of town where out-group members gather, or not attending football games which the out-group members attend, and so forth. Municipal museums sometimes distinguish between what counts as high art and what does not, and therefore (unintentionally) between art of one group and art of the other group, and therefore between members of these groups (Kirchberg 2015).

So while we pay a lot of attention to spatial parameters for inequality in the city, we are careful about the limits of what can be deduced from them. For another example the Dutch sociologist Gwen van Eijk (2010) wished to examine the hypothesis that because information and ideas are spread in social networks and because these information and ideas can help to reduce inequality (as some of this information is helpful in that sense, such as when information about job opportunities is shared), then neighbourhoods as mixed networks will help reduce inequality, and if they are segregated then

the opposite will happen. But her study did not sustain this hypothesis. She found that neighbourhoods are not as important as many assume in shaping and constructing social networks. Van Eijk is probably right. When we think about ourselves we can see that neighbourhoods are meaningful, yet their influence on our lives are limited. How many of your friends reside in your street or neighbourhood, and how many outside the neighbourhood? Do you work with people who live next to you? Does your family live in your neighbourhood? Presumably the answers to these questions are at least mixed. So neighbourhoods are not always that important in terms of networking. But moreover, neighbours are not necessarily the people to whom we compare ourselves when we think of equality. Despite the idiom 'Keeping up with the Joneses', which suggests that we do think of our neighbours as the benchmark for status and equality, people also tend to compare themselves to friends, to people who studied with them, to colleagues at work, to other family members, and therefore not necessarily to their neighbours.

At this point it is worth returning to and reconsidering the MTO (Moving to Opportunity) experiment discussed above in the context of Elizabeth Anderson's argument for the 'imperative of integration'. MTO was a randomized experiment conducted and sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development of the US Federal Government in the 1990s. Our discussion is based on some studies of this experiment, and especially Chetty, Hendren, and Katz (2016). The idea was quite simple but very impressive. Four thousand six hundred low-income families from five cities (Los Angeles, Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, New York) who had been living in the same neighbourhoods were randomly assigned to three groups. Two groups were offered housing vouchers. The third group was the control, and remained where it was, not receiving any voucher. As for the groups that did receive vouchers, one group could use the voucher to rent anywhere in the city, whereas the second group could use the voucher only in a neighbourhood which was considered more affluent than the one they had been residing in.

Researchers studied the impact of this experiment on the housing, earning, and education of the families up to twenty years after the experiment took place. Obviously, if we take the simple, determinist, view that location and neighbourhood are the key parameters when it comes to progress in life, then there is reason to expect that all children who moved to more affluent neighbourhoods would do better. But the results are much more complicated and suggest that human capital as well as other social parameters can play an equally important part.

It turned out that moving to a more affluent neighbourhood when young (before age 13) was associated with positive impact, such as increased college

attendance and earnings and reduced single parenthood rates, compared to the other two groups. But, alarmingly, it was also found that children who moved when they were already 13 years of age or older did worse than their friends who remained in the high poverty neighbourhood, perhaps because of disruption effects (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 2016). At least three explanations of this difference are possible. One is that it is more difficult for older children to integrate into a new neighbourhood, and therefore the potential benefits of an 'improved' space will be lower. The second is that their personalities were already shaped to the spaces where they spent their early years, and they didn't 'fit' the new space, which implies that change of space had a negative effect. And the third is that they did not benefit from the move because they longed for their friends and comrades from the previous neighbourhood, in which case space was positive in creating a sense of community, but not necessarily in helping individuals who are transported from a place where they have a strong community to one where they have none. It is plausible, in fact, that all three mechanisms were in place.

To make this even more complicated, it seems that results also differed between gender groups. Girls in general benefitted more than boys (National Bureau of Economic Research n.d.). Another interesting finding which does point to the importance of location and space was that parents in families who moved to low-poverty areas had lower rates of obesity and depression (National Bureau of Economic Research n.d.). So what we see is that location matters and mixing matters but not to all, and to some it is counterproductive.

Some of these findings have to do with the intimate social ties that the adult poor had with each other in their original neighbourhood, which, when broken, had detrimental effects. This sustains what John Bird, who in earlier life had been homeless, and a rough sleeper, but nevertheless went on to found the magazine *The Big Issue* and now sits as a member of the UK House of Lords, told us in a previous study (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). Bird described how he had lived in a run-down neighbourhood, where despite high rates of unemployment and poverty, people survived because of mutual help and a sense of community. However, when the authorities wanted to improve their accommodation, they offered the residents alternative places for the two to three years during which the place was renewed. Alas, when people left their immediate communities, they lost their social ties, and many returned as drug addicts, chronically unemployed, or even became homeless. When those who returned to live in the renewed neighbourhood came back, both they and their neighbourhoods were transformed and, they could not settle. So, according to Bird, while space had been positive in giving people a sense

of place and community, it could not cure them once they had gone through the shock of displacement and returned in a perplexed state of mind.

So what weight should spatial dimensions be given when we think about the idea of a city of equals? Given our particular interest in relational equality, debates about Contact Theory, which is often associated with a seminal book by Gordon Allport (1954), is especially important for us. Contact Theory suggests that interpersonal contact between individuals from different groups can reduce prejudice. For example, living in segregated and desegregated housing units was compared, and it was claimed that there was a correlation between attitudes that white residents held and whether they were living in segregated housing units (in New Jersey) or desegregated housing units (in New York City). The latter were significantly less prejudiced. But Allport found out that in other cases things were more complex. Contact can yield more openness but also it can do the opposite. Analysing all these cases, he suggested that four conditions are necessary to reduce prejudice: members of the two groups enjoy an equal status; they all share common social goals; the members of the two or more groups do wish to, and do in practice, cooperate; and there is some institutional support for contact, at least in the minimal sense of there being no regulations prohibiting it, and, beyond that, there are policies which encourage it. Also, many years later it was established that contact had a positive effect on individuals even when they were not the persons inclined to choose contact over no contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). How does the contact work? This is quite intuitive: by meeting the 'other' and learning about him or her, individuals develop empathy to, and lose anxiety about, the other.

However, notice that Contact Theory concentrates on individuals and their behaviour. In the last decade, urban political scientist Ryan Enos has argued that we need to consider those individuals' acts as conducted within the context of their groups. This makes sense as individuals experience their belonging to groups, such as women, African Americans, people from LGBTQ+ communities, in whatever they do; and second because spatially they are often separated to some extent, especially when we think of ethnic and racial groups in cities. Thus Enos (2014 and 2016), Enos and Celaya (2018), and Enos and Gidron (2016) argue that the picture needs to be deepened. Basing his theory on big data research as well as both designed and natural experiments, Enos argues that geographical space creates psychological space which creates political space. Because groups live separately, they perceive the 'other' in a certain manner. Space is used to help people map the social world in our minds. We tend to identify with those living around us, for example. Spatial separation ('here and there') therefore prima facie leads

to social separation ('us and them'). We also ascribe to people who live next to us characteristics which are similar to ours, and, more importantly, to all who live in different areas, we ascribe, often subconsciously, what Enos calls similarity, that is, the feeling that all those I don't know are similar to each other in certain characteristics. However, a key claim in Enos's theory is that three parameters determine the level of trust and cooperation with members of other groups: the level of segregation, the size of the two groups, and the proximity—the physical nearness of the two groups and the likelihood that a member of one group will meet a member of another group. Size is a key issue here. It relates to the relative size of each group within the two groups. So, suppose that in a city there are 100,000 members of group A and 200,000 of group B; the size of B from A's perspective is 2 whereas the size of A from B's perspective is 0.5. Enos argues that everything else equal, in a situation whereby the two sizes are close to 1 the tension will rise, compared to a situation whereby one of the sizes is small. As an example, consider Enos's RCT experiment (Enos 2014).[5] For two weeks Latinos were asked to visit several train stations located in areas which demographically were rather homogeneously white. This created an impression as if all of a sudden there were many immigrants in the area. Other train stations in the area served as control. Passengers who were 'regulars' in these stations were asked about their political views about integrating immigrants and about Latinos and American identity. The results are clear: the surveyed persons who were exposed to the presence of many Latinos all of a sudden tended towards more conservative views about migration and were more open to excluding policies, compared to those in the stations were Latinos did not show up.

The rationale, according to Enos, is that when we see members of the other group in big numbers, we are more likely to perceive them as a threat and as different than when we see them in small numbers. Notice, that unlike contact theorists, Enos does not focus on the experience of interaction between individuals, but on interactions which affect (sub-consciously) our cognition and our perceptions of the other as members of groups. So contact between members of different groups in the context of segregation does not necessarily lead to more understanding, but, actually, might lead to the opposite, to more fear and even hate. In opposition to contact theory, according to Enos, close contact combined with spatial segregation along racial lines is likely to reduce city dwellers' readiness to embrace egalitarian policies and policies that invest in the well-being of the 'others'.

[5] We thank Itamar Alroey for drawing our attention to this important research. See also Alroey (2022) for a profound discussion of Enos's theory.

Whether Contact Theory or Enos is right, what is important in our context here is that segregation matters not only in economic terms, including employment and housing, but also in the way we perceive others. It therefore influences the most basic question: do we even care about inequality, and want to show good will and wish to limit gaps between members of different groups in the city? Both theories claim that spatial separation affects our political values. Which leads us to the discussion of theories of justice in the city.

2.5. The Just City: Towards a More Holistic Notion of a City of Equals

Several writers have explicitly taken on the task of deriving an account of the just city. We mentioned above that David Harvey in his book *Social Justice and the City* (Harvey 2009 [1973]) initially draws on Runciman and Rawls to offer an account of social justice in the city, appealing to need, contribution, and merit in a weak ordering (Harvey 2009 [1973], 100), although Harvey's attention to liberalism soon gives way to a more thoroughgoing socialist critique of the city in capitalist society. Harvey's liberal account is brief though complex, moving between distribution to individuals, through groups and territories, with some aspects of distribution directly to individuals and some mediated through territories. Harvey's notion of need is fairly conventional, although he is keen to emphasize that it is socially variable. Contribution as a key factor when an institution distributes access to its goods is the idea that those who work in ways that benefit more people have a higher claim to resources and services than those who benefit fewer. This seems not, however, to be a claim about intrinsic desert, but rather the beneficial effects of placing assets where they have the greatest multiplier effects, which, he notes, comes close to traditional concerns with economic growth, but in his schema is secondary to need. Finally, 'merit' is understood as a type of special sacrifice, so that, on an individual basis those, such as miners, who have to expend special effort to work should be rewarded. But in his application of this idea, it takes a territorial or environmental—by which he means spatial—twist: those who live in places that present special difficulties (such as in flood plains) should receive special treatment. How, then, does this differ from need? It appears that the main consequence of this criterion is negative: if you have chosen to live in a flood plain when other options are available, then your need-based claim is diminished in the case of a flood. Hence, for Harvey, merit takes the role of choice or responsibility in other theories.

As noted, Harvey's theory of social justice in the city is sketched rather than fully elaborated, and he notes the difficulties in moving from a sketch to concrete proposals. However, having got this far he neither elaborates nor attempts to apply his theory, so it remains somewhat under-developed. He did claim, though, in a more recent paper, jointly written with Potter (Harvey and Potter 2009) that in order to genuinely address issues of injustice in the city one needs to theorize outside the frameworks of liberal theory and capitalist society.

One of Harvey's examples of theorists who remains confined to theorizing about injustice in the city within the liberal theory is Susan Fainstein and her book *The Just City*. Indeed Fainstein's contribution to the question of justice is one of the most influential and cited works. Fainstein draws on three values: equity, democracy, and diversity, and much of her analysis brings out the potential tensions between these values, for if democracy amounts to majority rule then equity and diversity could be diminished. However, her interpretation of these values is as follows: equity implies that gaps in income are minimal; democracy implies that no person is excluded from the opportunity to influence the political process of self government; and diversity implies that no person is excluded because of her ethnicity or religion.

She applies her analysis to three cities, New York, London, and Amsterdam. In each case she uses a series of major development schemes as case studies to reveal the nature of the cities she discusses. She judges that Amsterdam does better on the three criteria (equity, democracy, and diversity) combined than New York or London, which is intuitively very plausible, of course. However, although her work is full of insightful empirical analysis, it is limited in a number of respects. First, she does not consider whether a special theory of justice is needed for considering justice in the city. Instead, she refers to works on justice in the state to analyse the city, even though these are different social and political institutions. Second, her own account is not developed in detail and hence her judgements remain largely intuitive (though not implausible). Third, her case-study methodology means that her focus is primarily on urban planning and the built environment, rather than encompassing factors such as the experience of day-to-day life (although in fairness these are mentioned in the discussion of cases). Of course she is free to pursue her analysis in the terms that seem most fruitful to her but we mention this because we hope to show that additional aspects of equality should be considered when concentrating on the question of the nature of a city of equals. Fainstein's goal of applying principles of justice to cases of urban planning, as an alternative to the neo-liberal model of planning, which subjects the process of planning to deregulation, privatization, and prices sets by

markets, was highly important. Epting's distinction between 'urban planning' and 'city planning', is another way of capturing Fainstein's approach. By city planning Epting means an approach to cities that derives from understanding what it means to love the city, whereby 'all urban dwellers can see their power in the thinking behind the process of changing the city (. . .) through discussions, debates, compromises, and civil arguments' (Epting 2023, 78). Fainstein wanted to shout loud and clear: there should be other considerations, and we should not leave everything to the market. She insisted that we pay attention to how space is a product of social processes, how interests shape planning, how property markets, the built environment, are not neutral terms, how the idea that we can separate the aesthetic from the political is false, and that therefore planners, architects, and designers should be concerned with social issues. As an example, the reason Amsterdam's social housing was spread all over the city and not concentrated in separated neighbourhoods was social; it derived from the values of equity and diversity, and was therefore just.

Yet Fainstein limits the scope of her study to the context of planning (broadly understood), whereas our argument is that while planning is an important aspect of equality and inequality in cities, it is only part of the picture. It might preserve, even create, inequalities, and though it can also reflect the city's egalitarian values, it has limited influence in bringing about these values. True, it can help the city integrate, equalize, and compensate for disadvantages; but it is only one part of a portfolio of measures available to a city. Fainstein is right that planning policies should take into account the interests of employees, not merely owners and employers, and that megaprojects should be subject to scrutiny so that they provide benefit to low-income people in the form of employment provisions as well as in other ways. These and other suggestions of hers are highly welcome; yet they do not exhaust what city dwellers intuitively think of when they think of an egalitarian city (as we shall demonstrate in Chapters 3 and 4, where we analyse the interviews we conducted) and as was suggested more recently by Talja Blokland (2017; 2023), who perceives justice in the city in terms of a strong sense of community, not necessarily regular face-to-face interaction but rather non-durable, fluid encounters in urban public spaces (see also Valentine 2008). Thus, Blokland argues that in the city, we encounter people whom we do not know and whom we might not know or meet again in the future. Yet, through this encounter, we learn a lot about opportunities in the city, and about ourselves in the urban environment. Moreover, this encounter can enable us to help somebody in need, learn about those marginalized, and 'engage in moments of sociability'.

Detailed explicit philosophical reflection can also be found in the concluding chapter of Iris Marion Young's *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Young 1990) which, incidentally, begins with a citation from Jane Jacobs. The nature of Young's project is not made fully explicit although she does say that she wants to develop a 'normative ideal' of city life. Hence, we will take her as proposing an account of a 'good city' which is not necessarily the same as a city that embodies the egalitarian spirit. Nevertheless, having in mind her body of work, for Young, naturally the two things will come close. For Young, the city, or we should say the ideal city, is defined sociologically: individuals and groups interact in places, spaces, and institutions to which they all feel they belong. What distinguishes the city from small towns and villages is that these interactions do not work against the uniqueness of each individual and/or group. In other words, the tension that drives her project is the combination of individual and community in the city, for she is keen to avoid any form of communitarian merging of identities, especially on an involuntary basis. Young emphasizes the idea of 'public vitality': the city, for Young, should be exciting and take one out of the routine, and in that sense, she says, is 'the obverse of community' (Young 1990, 241), which she understands in terms of a type of semi-stultifying conformity. She notes, 'As a normative ideal city life instantiates social relations of difference without exclusion' (Young 1990, 227; see also Wolff 2017). Face-to-face relations are always mediated, and a city is made up of relationships between strangers, though Young stresses that alienation and mediation are not the same. It seems that alienation is avoided not always on the individual level—that is to say that individuals may still be strangers to each other—but mitigated because they all feel that they belong to this big social project, namely their city. The many social networks, community groups, and other aspects of civil society in the city sustain a sense of belonging and can reduce feelings of alienation. It also helps to create heterogeneity and inclusion.

Young builds up a picture with four main themes, to which she refers as the city's virtues:

1. Social differentiation without exclusion which is created by many and varied social gatherings and interactions, including individuals moving from one gathering to another.
2. Variety of institutions, restaurants, cafes, places of meetings, and a variety of uses of the city, which create a sense of place and a safe space.
3. Eroticism by which she means, not, we think, anything directly involving sexual contact or approach, but the pleasure of being drawn out of the routine into the unexpected and thrilling.

4. Publicity, which she understands as the availability of public spaces and of many interactions which include disagreements, debates, demonstrations, and forms of voluntary activity, all of which are fertile for the city.

Young notes that contemporary cities are very far from instantiating this ideal, but precisely because of this we find Young's picture very inspiring and appealing, and in some respects it overlaps with the analysis we will present. However, our own question is much more focused on the idea of embodying the egalitarian spirit, rather than a 'normative ideal' of the city; and in drawing on the urban studies literature and our own interviews, we will present things in a rather different way. One reason we find Young's approach so insightful is her understanding of the city as space of relationships, where the quality of relationships constitutes an 'ideal' city or, as we would put it, a city of equals.

Perhaps as a mirror image of Young's ideal city, de Silva et al. (2021) studied the city of Manaus in Brazil, pointing to how important relationships are for making a city egalitarian, in the most basic sense of the term, namely that people can survive without fear, that they have self-esteem and that they feel part of the city, and emphasizing the potentially devasting effects if such relationships fail. Making use of the theory of corrosive disadvantage[6] that we set out in *Disadvantage* (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007) as well as Bourdieu's theory of symbolic violence, de Silva et al. argue that the very high current levels of physical, as well as symbolic, violence in this city particularly affects the least advantaged who reside in extremely violent neighbourhoods and have to sacrifice some functionings (affiliation, ability to work) in order to protect the critically important functioning of bodily integrity. The authors cite female interviewees who gave up their jobs because of the high risk of robbery as soon as they received their wages, or being attacked when they leave the workplace on their way home. Others described how they gave up socializing because being outside increases vulnerability to violent crime. Interviewees said they chose social isolation to minimize exposure to risks of violence. A further effect is that few informal social institutions develop in the neighbourhood, and those that do are very weak (de Silva et al. 2021, 7). The authors argue that 'distrust of others and reducing social interactions erodes the capacity for affiliation, which is based on trust, belonging, respect, and equity' (2021, 11).

[6] We defined corrosive disadvantage as a case whereby disadvantage in one functioning leads to disadvantage in others.

Another very interesting step forward in tying urban justice and equality in the city to relational equality is provided by van Leeuwen (2020), which we mentioned at the opening of this chapter. He claims that a recognition-theoretical approach such as a modified version of Honneth's theory of recognition, paying more attention to ways in which people differ from each other, should be relevant to cities as it is already both spatial and relational, and includes diversity. These spatial and relational elements combine with diversity to comprise what van Leeuwen regards to be the three aspects of urban justice which distinguish it from justice within the state, based on issues of basic rights and wealth distribution. On the city level, he claims, questions of justice concern mainly the way urban space is organized, and what it expresses. The just city, van Leeuwen claims, is a city where space is structured to meet the demands for recognition. This is an important step forward and ties in with our account of a city of equals, and has influenced the direction we take in the next chapters. We also aim at understanding what such recognition, or what we define as having a secure sense of place, consists of.

Finally, not everybody holds that inequality in the city is, morally speaking, prima facie bad. First, we must remember that often inequality and poverty in cities is not always the result of any policy by the city, but rather the result of the fact that the particular city is attractive to poor and disadvantaged people. Glaeser (2012) argues that cities are therefore not to be blamed for the resulting inequality and poverty. Well, to this we answer that while it is true that cities attract the poor, we are not in the business of blaming. Instead we hope to offer materials that will help city officials develop ways of minimizing inequality. We are, to repeat, especially interested in how a city responds to inequality and poverty, whatever their causes. For this we claim, we need first to understand the complex nature of inequality in the city. Although we will set out an account of a city of equals, this is not intended as some sort of blueprint or ideal notion of equality in the city. Instead, we identify clear cases of inequality in the city and learn and build from these cases and issues in order to draw out the main determinants of equality and inequality in the city. We want to understand what it will take to move cities in the direction of being cities of equals.

Second, although our topic is inequality in cities, nevertheless it has to be looked at within the context of the state, in that it would be problematic if all the cities within a state are internally broadly equal, but externally are highly unequal, with some consisting only of rich people and others of only poor people. Rae (2011) we noted above, argues that inequality within the city, if it is not too radical, implies that the population is not overly homogeneous and that rich and poor live in the city together, rather than in separate cities,

in segregation. This, Rae continues, affects not only inequality and equality between cities, but also the well-being of the least advantaged within the city. Margaret Kohn (2011) also argues that human plurality is good for the city, though she argues that this is because of the democratic and social utility that emerges from the meeting of different populations. We cannot deny that there is some truth in these arguments; but while the interest of the poor in living with the rich is obvious, at least in the best cases, it is less apparent what the interest of the rich is in living with the poor. This becomes clear in the light of Macedo's argument (2011) that the rich prefer affluent cities, those that are less mixed.[7] So we accept that some rich people would prefer to leave a city if the city does not permit them to enjoy their wealth and privilege. Perhaps we should concede that human nature is what it is. We are not expressing any view about whether it is ever possible to transcend inequality, and in that sense we are realists like Rae. However Rae also claims that it is morally good to have some inequality within the city because otherwise inequality will fall between the city and the suburban penumbra. (Rae 2011, 105) Rae appears to assume that some form of inequality is inevitable at state level, and a society's main policy choice is simply where that inequality should be located. We do not share these assumptions, but in any case our topic is primarily what it means for a city to be a city of equals and here take no position on whether inequality at state level is inevitable.

2.6. Conclusion: The Many Dimensions of a City of Equals

Many theorists of all disciplines have been greatly concerned about the injustices they perceive in the city. The most visible manifestation is spatial, which very often, though not exclusively, is correlated with race and frequently economic class, and the intersections between race and material income and wealth have troubled many, especially as they also correlate with inequities in housing, education, jobs, and transport, as well as racial and gender discrimination. All of these factors are critically important and will figure in our own analysis.

However, to summarize, we find two significant areas where more work is needed. First, discussions have typically focused on income and on space, and, to a degree, on processes of decision-making, but much less on what it feels like to live in a city in relation to others. Second, most, though by no

[7] We would like to thank Tal Banin for this point.

means all, work on justice in the city has not considered the city to require particular treatment as a special topic but has applied a theory of justice initially designed for conceptualizing justice at the level of the state. So in the following chapters we will attempt to address these gaps, first by setting out some of the findings of the interviews we conducted and then in presenting our account of a city of equals.