

Stephen Priest The Grammar of Being

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The Problem of Persons in Philosophy and Theology

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Also by Stephen Priest:

The British Empiricists

Theories of the Mind

Merleau-Ponty

The Subject in Question

Hegel's Critique of Kant (ed.)

Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings (ed.)

A Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. with Antony Flew)

Preface

How are philosophical questions thinkable? A cluster of questions arises from a distinction between two models of the person, one derived from thinking about oneself, the other from thinking about anyone else.

Mind-body dualism, idealism, libertarianism, and idealism about meanings, are first person singular philosophies. They find their origin and plausibility in paying attention to oneself. Materialism, physicalism, determinism, and behaviourism about meanings, are third person philosophies. They find their origin and plausibility in paying attention to someone else. The conceptual resources for formulating each group of theories are, paradigmatically, derived either from *being* a person, the one one is, or from *observing* a person, any of the ones one is not. The distinction between yourself and everybody else is primordial to other distinctions in the philosophy of mind and action and, arguably, metaphysics. We do not understand it. A theory of persons is needed which does not minimise the importance of either the first or third person case; which does full justice to the ways in which people apprehend themselves, and others.

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I

PERCEPTION

How are problems in the Philosophy of Perception thinkable? We ask: What is perception? How much perception is veridical? What are the objects of perception? Are they mental, physical, neither or both? If we can know the answers to these questions, how can we know them? How is it possible for us to acquire the concepts to formulate the questions? Where does the concept of perception come from?

The ideas we have of touching, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, partly have their origin in a first person singular model of the person, and partly in a third person plural model, partly in the idea of a person as oneself, partly in the idea of a person as someone else.

What is the origin of the concept of seeing?

1. I see.
2. I see someone else's eyes, open and 'directed at' an object.

What is this 'directed at'?

3. I extrapolate from my own case that there is awareness connecting the open eye to the object. This is the origin of the idea of sight as like a beam or searchlight light. The first person experience, which is nothing like a line, but only presents the object, is projected onto the third person case, to invisibly connect the eyeball with the object of seeing. Conversely, the kind of distance that is perceived in the third person case,

between eyeball and object, is recuperated in the first person case and assumed to obtain as a relation between oneself and the object of sight.

I cannot (in the normal course of things) see my own eyes related to an object from a 3rd person perspective (for example from above).

Gunderson says:

‘I can know by directly looking at them what other people’s eyes look like, but I can never know what my own eyes look like by looking at them – except with the aid of mirrors, photographs, and so on. [...]

I can imagine what it would be like to be in a position to see what anybody else’s eyes look like, but I cannot imagine what it would be like to be in a position to see with my present eyes what my present eyes look like.’ Keith Gunderson ‘Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities’ Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol IV: Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology ed. M. Radner and S. Winokur (Minnesota, 1970)

Sartre says:

‘[...] my hand reveals to me the resistance of objects, their hardness or softness, but not itself.’ Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness trans. Hazel Barnes (London, 1972) p. 304

The concepts deployed in the philosophy of perception are empirical, in the broad sense of ‘acquired through experience’, but they are derived from a combination, a synthesis, of first person singular and third person experiences. They are not straightforwardly empirical. As Sartre says:

‘I can not “see the seeing”’ Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness trans. Hazel Barnes (London, 1972) p. 304

In each case, I write the proposition, then its verification conditions:

1. ‘I see a red bus.’

A red bus is in my visual field and I am paying attention to it.

1* ‘He sees a red bus.’

A person's eyes are observed to be open and pointing at a red bus.

2. 'I smell smell x.'

There is olfactory sensation of smell x

2* 'He smells smell x.'

He sniffs, moves his head from side to side, looks upwards. He expresses pleasure or repugnance.

3. 'I hear a noise.'

A noise is heard.

3* 'He hears a noise.'

He moves in a startled way.

4. 'I taste a taste.'

There is a sensation of taste, with an internal phenomenology.

4* 'He tastes a taste.'

He shows relish or disgust. His mouth moves.

5. 'I feel tactile sensations.'

There are tactile sensations.

5* 'He feels a tactile sensation.'

His body is observed to be in contact with something.

6. 'I am in a terrible emotional state.'

There is a feeling of being upset. Things are knocked over.

6* 'He is in a terrible emotional state.'

There is no feeling upset. He knocks things over, shouts. Much twentieth century philosophy minimised the difference between oneself and other persons, in a massive distortion in favour of the other. These common place examples show that profound asymmetries exist between the ways each person experiences just one person, and the ways they experience any other person. 'no one can be credited with an 'objective' model of the world if he does not grasp that he is modelling the world he is in – that he has a location somewhere in the model, as do the things that he can see.' (Evans, 1981 p. 212) There are many kinds of objectivity.

'Nothing can be a cognitive map unless it can be used as a map – unless the world as perceived, and the world as mapped, can be identified. For this reason, I think the gulf between the 'subjective' and 'objective' modes of thought which Nagel tries to set up is spurious. Each is inseparably bound up with the other.' (Evans, 1981 p. 212)

Evans needs to draw a distinction between two distinctions: the distinction between the world as perceived and the world as mapped, and the distinction between the world with me in it and the world as mapped. 'in a self-conscious thought, the subject must think of an object in a way that permits it to be characterized as the subject of that very thought.' (Evans, 1981 p. 213)

On one level this is right. Subject and object are identical. On another level this is wrong. The subject is not an object but consciousness, *Hiersein*, and presence. The first level is empirical and psychological, the second fundamental or ontological.

'It is not possible for there to be an 'unnoticed substitution'.'
(Evans, 1981 p. 214)

'immunity to error through misidentification.' (Evans, 1981 p. 216)

'Someone seems to see something red, but is it I who seem to see something red?' does not appear to make sense.'
(Evans, 1981 p. 216)

?[someone ...] could be caused by something other than anyone seeming to see something red. Suppose someone is aware of this possibility. They might well accurately characterise their situation by 'Someone seems to

see something red, but is it I who seem to see something red.' This would make sense to them.

'There just does not appear to be a gap between the subject's having information (or appearing to have information), in the appropriate way, that the property of being F is instantiated, and his having information (or appearing to have information) that he is F' (Evans, 1981 p. 221)

There is a gap between 'the subject's having information' and '[the subject's] appearing to have information' The first entails that the subject has information but the second does not. 'in order to eradicate this impression' (Evans, 1981 p. 217)

'immunity to error through misidentification is a straightforward consequence of demonstrative identification; it will exist whenever a subject's Idea of an object depends upon his ways of gaining knowledge about it.' (Evans, 1981 p. 218)

'The very idea of a perceivable, objective, spatial world brings with it the idea of the subject as being in the world, with the course of his perceptions due to his changing position in the world and to the more or less stable way the world is.' (Evans, 1981 p. 222)

Not right. Someone outside the world could think of it as though it were being perceived. This does not depend on being in the world or perceiving the world. Evans' view is like Heidegger's, Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's. (It is because of Evans' point that the existentialists hyphenate 'being in the world'.)

'The idea that there is an objective world and the idea that the subject is somewhere cannot be separated, and where he is is given by what he can perceive.' (Evans, 1981 p. 222)

Merleau-Ponty. Quantum physics. Consciousness actualises the world.

'we ourselves are elements in the objective order' (Evans, 1981 p. 223)

'Objective' is ambiguous here.

'the case of our knowledge of our own actions [...] compels upon us an identity between the self and a physical thing: the agent – the subject of desires, thoughts, and intentions – is identified with the object in the world that moves and changes.' (Evans, 1981 p. 224)

'identified with' too strong here.

argument shows at best 'correlated with'.

‘inner states of the subject [...] cannot intelligibly be regarded as objects of his internal gaze’ (Evans, 1981 p. 231)

How do you know that you think? (Evans rejects the metaphor of internal perception.)

‘There are two ways of finding out what a person’s two eyes look like at one time: (1) a way of finding out about the eyes of others, and (2) a way of finding out about my own. [...] Here we have a kind of other minds problem in reverse.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 289

perception. ‘a’ person. ie the same person?

‘(2) Even though I can never be in a position to look at them, the visual appearances which my eyes possess are identical in kind with members of the class of visual features to which to which the visual features of the eyes of others belong.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 300

‘(3) [...] a periscope¹ is identical in kind with members of the class of periscopes 2...n any one of which periscope¹ can place between its crosshairs.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 300-301

Being in pain, in the sense of feeling, experiencing, undergoing pain is not the same as knowing that one is undergoing it, even if it entails it. The phenomenology is not the cognitive attitude, the sensation not the veridical judgement. The case of certain animals is presumably described precisely by saying that they feel, undergo, or experience pain, they can be in agony, but it is wrong to say that an animal knows it is in pain. To know that *p* is to have adopted a linguistic attitude towards *p*. Only language users do this, and it is this linguistic attitude towards pain that is captured by 'I know I am in pain' but missed by 'I am in pain'. There is a valid inference from 'I know I am in pain' to 'I am in pain' but not in the other direction.

The purported senselessness of 'I doubt whether I am in pain' and 'I know I am in pain' partly derives from the 'contrast theory of meaning': the view that many terms may only legitimately be employed in contexts where there is at least the possibility in principle of employing a term with the opposite sense. For example, it does not make sense to say ‘Everything is up’ unless you are prepared to entertain the possibility, at

least logically, that something might be down. If everything is up, it must be that some things have been, will be, or might be thought to be, down. 'Up' and 'down' are mutually dependent for their meaning. One can take on meaning only if the other (or some synonym) does.

Is 'I know I am in pain' or 'I doubt whether I am in pain', in this uncontrasted sense, like 'everything is up'? There are *prima facie* grounds for thinking so: Allegedly, 'know' in 'I know I am in pain' is used in a context where there is no possible contrast with 'do not know' or 'doubt', where it is not contrasted with uncertainty. But this is not right. 'I know I am in pain' is used in contexts where 'know' contrasts with 'do not know'. We contrast the use in one's own case with the case of others, where we might not be certain they are feeling pain. We are usually quite sure another person is feeling pain. It is not right that we cannot know another is in pain, but we might not know. They might be in pain but hide it (not to make a fuss) or not be in pain but pretend they are (to evade work). We can also make the opposite kind of mistake: The actor whose job it is to feign illness is really ill. Some people make a lot of fuss about very little etc. The seemingly certain case is contrasted with uncertain cases. Compare 'up and down'. A sense can be given to 'everything is up'. It is perfectly conceivable that the whole universe, as we think of it, should shift one foot directly upwards relative to where you are standing. In that case everything would be up, but the expression 'everything is up' does not on that account become senseless. It has a use.

I say 'seemingly certain' because there is room for error in one's own case. From 'I believe I am in pain' it does not follow that I am in pain, because there is room for my being caused to believe that I am in pain by something other than my being in pain.

To examine the logical problem about whether any self-knowledge is incorrigible, I make the commonsensical assumption presupposed by the ontological dispute; that persons do have at least some knowledge of their own mental states.

One line of argument which casts doubt on this assumption, not on ontological but on logical grounds, is for the conclusion that first person singular claims purportedly expressing knowledge of a person's own mental states, are in fact senseless. This highly influential view is putatively entailed by Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. It is, however, false. Therefore either the private Language Argument includes one false premise, or it is invalid, or both. Wittgenstein says; 'It makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself' (PI 246) and asks: 'I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain?' (PI 246) Much

rests on what is built into 'making sense' here. 'I know I am in pain' is a respectable sentence in ordinary English, and the non-philosophical English language user would have no difficulty in understanding it, so, in this sense of 'sense', any argument that this proposition is a senseless deviation from ordinary language is unsound. In the ordinary language sense of 'makes sense', 'I am in pain' makes sense. Anyone disagreeing uses 'sense' in some special philosophical sense and, *a fortiori*, departs from 'ordinary language' philosophy.

Suppose: if p entails a contradiction then p is senseless. 'I know I am in pain' is clearly not self contradictory, so not senseless by that criterion. Wittgenstein's view in the *Investigations* is that there is no overall theory of meaning that explains how language works, but there is a vast diversity of uses to which expressions can be put. Subjected to this test, of Wittgenstein's own devising, 'I know I am in pain' clearly passes. Nor is the only use of 'I know I am in pain' to make points about the philosophy of language in *Philosophical Investigations* and other philosophy books. Although any such use is a deviation from ordinary language, if any is to count as such, there are plenty of commonsensical uses 'I know I am in pain' can be put to in everyday contexts. For example;

Doctor: Persons in your condition do not usually experience any pain, perhaps some minor discomfort.

Patient: In my case I know I am in pain. This isn't just some minor discomfort.

Doctor: How do you know you are in pain?

Patient: I know I am in pain because I have intense and acute stabbing sensations across my stomach.

Doctor: I see. Did the pain start off with your merely experiencing some discomfort?

Patient: Yes that's right. It started with a dull rumbling feeling in the pit of my stomach which was a bit unpleasant, but you couldn't call it a pain. It didn't hurt.

Doctor: It got worse though.

Patient: Yes, that's right. There was a time when I didn't know whether I was in pain or not. The sensation was very uncomfortable but I doubt whether one would have called it 'painful'. It was a feeling half way between discomfort and pain.

Doctor: How could you tell the pain had really started?

Patient: The sensation became sharper and more intense. It was then I realised this sensation was no longer just discomfort but a real pain, and I thought I'd better come and see you.

If it is objected that 'I am in pain' can be substituted for 'I know I am in pain', without loss of meaning, then this is a point which, if effective, is effective against a vast number of first person singular claims. What can 'I know I see red bus over there' say that 'I see a red bus over there' can not? The answer is that the former has everyday uses in ordinary contexts just as 'I know I am in pain' does: "You doubt me? I know it!" But the substitution is not viable. 'I know that [...]' expresses an epistemic stance that 'I am [...]' does not. In the first case, a propositional attitude exists. In the second case, there is no such implication.

That 'I know I am in pain' has a use is perhaps sufficient to show that it has sense, although that too could be disputed. That it has everyday uses is sufficient for its having sense in the ordinary language sense of 'sense'. As the dialogue shows, it makes perfectly good sense to doubt whether one is in pain; to doubt whether the state one is in is pain or one of lesser discomfort. It is feasible that of two unpleasant states, qualitatively similar but numerically distinct, felt by different people, one might be called a pain by one person but the other 'discomfort' by the other. Even this does not show that there is no room for knowledge here. One person might be right and the other wrong. One might just be squeamish.

These two expressions are ambiguous, and on one construal, (not the construal Wittgenstein gives them) they are indeed senseless;

(1) I know that I am in pain

(2) I doubt whether I am in pain

The ways in which each of us knows that we are in pain in our own case are radically different from the ways in which we find out that other people are in pain. We feel it.

This seems to make no sense, or express an impossibility:

'Someone is in pain but I'm not sure whether it is me or someone else'.

This is because every person only feels pain in their own case: For each person, there is just one person in which they have the experience of pain and that person is that person him or herself.

On certain Buddhist views, and on Hume's no-self theory, 'I' in 'I am in pain' does not refer to a self. Could this be right? If so, 'I' in 'I am in pain' refers to something illusory or unreal, which is to say, 'I' does not really refer. If sense depends on reference, 'I am in pain' is then senseless.

Wittgenstein is responsible for the establishment of pain as a paradigm of the mental. (When I was a student at Cambridge I was surprised that Elizabeth Anscombe and others did not treat physical pain as a biological phenomenon but as mental.) Not to make the point rest on this one example, it may be formulated more generally:

For each person there is just one person in whom they undergo experiences, and that person is himself or herself.

This rule holds for all states normally thought of as 'mental'. In each case, it seems never in doubt whether it is oneself or another person who is having the experience in question.

(ii) Someone is smelling a pleasant odour but I'm not sure whether it is someone else or me

(iv) Someone is hearing a noise but I'm not sure whether it is someone else or me

(v) Someone is tasting a sweet taste but I'm not sure whether it is someone else or me

(vi) Someone is having tactile sensations but I'm not sure whether it is someone else or me

(vii) Someone is in a terrible emotional state but I'm not sure whether it is someone else or me

(i) Someone is seeing a red bus but I'm not sure whether it is someone else or me.

(viii) Someone is thinking about [...] but I'm not sure whether it is someone else or me.

These claims are *prima facie* implausible, because the person entertaining the thought is the person having the experience. We cannot absolutely rule out their truth, because there is no logical inference from belief in having an experience to having that experience.

What has to be the case for sets of sentences, first, second and third person, to be true of the same person, does not differ. Suppose you say: 'He is in pain' about me. Someone says: 'You are in pain', addressing me, and I say 'I am in pain'. These three claims are true or false under the same conditions. Each, said about me, is true if and only if I am in pain. The truth conditions for the same proposition, cast in differing grammatical persons, do not differ.

On the other hand, there are sharp contrasts between the verification conditions, for first person singular and third person singular sentences expressing the same proposition. We can vary grammatical form, between sentences which are otherwise similar but thereby radically alter how we can find out their truth values. These modes of verification exhibit some of the fundamental asymmetries between *being* a person, the one one is, and *observing* a person, the ones one is not. Even though we can perceive ourselves, asymmetries obtain between the ways in which each of us perceives other persons and the ways in which we can perceive ourselves.

An important class of first person singular claims seem incorrigible in this sense: They entail the psychological fact that it is indeed oneself and not another person who is in a particular mental state.

What I have said so far is consistent with Wittgenstein's other central contentions in the Private Language Argument: There cannot be a language which other people cannot in principle learn. Private ostensive definition is an incoherent notion. Naming sensations presupposes a grammar common to a community of language users. Concepts are essentially public or social. All these claims might turn out to be true. Much depends on whether they are intended as necessary or contingent. People who reject or accept some or all of Wittgenstein's conclusions should be able to accept the self-other distinctions I have drawn above.

If there is first person singular psychological knowledge, the question remains of whether any is incorrigible in a sense other than the one in which a person's claim that it is they, and not another, who is in a state that actually obtains. Suppose I believe it is myself rather than another who is in state *S* and 'S obtains' is incorrigible. The argument against there being any logically incorrigible knowledge of this sort rests on this principle: From no proposition of the form 'It seems to me that *p*' can we derive '*p*'. It is always logically and metaphysically possible that what is the case should be other than what seems to be the case. For some values of *p* there are exceptions. For example;

- (1) It seems to me that there is something rather than nothing.
- (2) It seems to me that something seems to be.
- (3) It seems to me that there is at least one proposition.

Roughly, the exceptions to the principle are the entailments of the principle.

Applying the principle to one's knowledge of one's own mental states, from no claim such as 'I am in pain' 'I have a red after image', 'I feel upset', etc, does its truth follow.

But is this right? Suppose it is definitely true of any person at any given time that they either are or are not in any given mental state: The state is either there to be known or not there to be known. From the fact that I seem to be to be in it, it does not follow that it is there to be known.

This line of argument rests on the assumption that the distinction, between how something appears and how it is, is applicable to psychological states. There are reasons for doubting this. Rorty says; 'This distinctive point about pains is [...] the one mentioned by Kripke - that there seems to be no such thing as an appearance-reality distinction in regard to our knowledge of them' Richard Rorty *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (97) We can give a respectable use to expressions such as 'It seems to me that I am in pain' or 'I doubt whether I am in pain'. This appearance-language is applicable to situations where I am in doubt as to how to characterise a sensation that I am sure that I am having. The person in this situation is not in doubt as to what his experience is like. The phenomenology is there. He is in doubt as to whether a particular term is properly applicable to this sort of experience; whether the concept characterises the phenomenology accurately.

It might be doubted whether the issue is as clear cut as this from a psychological point of view. Although the vocabulary used in ordinary English to describe sensations is enormously rich, sensations are notoriously difficult to characterise verbally with any precision. Our concepts are in a way too vague, in a way too precise: too vague because we might be undergoing experiences of kinds, degrees, and subtlety, not captured by the term. How many sorts of 'sharp' pain are there? They are too precise because pains are not all 'either sharp or throbbing' and not all 'both sharp and throbbing'. It is characteristic of pain-experience to frequently fall between proper description by any two terms. The phenomenology is insistent, its characterisation elusive.

All of the above is consistent with the doctrine that psychological concepts take on meaning by being the names of introspective states or events. However our psychological concepts take on meaning, people do describe, characterise and refer to their sensations and other mental states in ordinary English in everyday situations.

Is there is an appearance-reality distinction in the case of psychological states? This distinction obtains in the case of some experiences but not others. Here, as elsewhere in philosophical psychology, taking pain as the paradigm of the mental is misleading. What holds good for pains might not hold good for feelings, thoughts, emotions, perceptions and what may be true of any example of one of these not be true of an example of any of the others. Suppose I sincerely report each of the following:

1. I see something red.
2. I am thinking about person x.
3. I am depressed.
4. I am in pain.

1. Someone seems to be seeing something red but I am not sure whether that is me or someone else.
2. Someone is thinking about person x but I am not sure whether that is me or someone else.
3. Someone is feeling depressed but I am not sure whether that is me or someone else.
4. Someone is in pain but I am not sure whether that is me or someone else.

1. I believe that [Someone seems to be seeing something red].
2. I believe that [Someone is thinking about person x].

3. I believe that [Someone is feeling depressed].
4. I believe that [Someone is in pain].

Is there any evidence which could convince me that any of these reports is false? We have to keep the example in the present tense, and imagine it seems to me that I am undergoing the experience continuously, and making the report intermittently. (If this stipulation is not made then I can later mis-remember my experience, or be persuaded it was not what it was.) Might I, then, in each case, turn out to be wrong?

1. 'I see something red.' contains an ontological commitment which is corrigible. The term 'something' claims too much, if it implies some red object existing independently of my perception. This claim is therefore corrigible. Someone commonsensical says to me in reply: "There is nothing red there". They could be right. Someone philosophical says: "There is nothing red there. The redness, in the object, is at most a disposition obtaining in virtue of its primary qualities." They could be right.

Suppose though I accept this. There is no public red object present to my eyes. But I still have the same experience of red, and use the word 'something' in the extended and minimal sense of 'something rather than nothing'. What then? Is there anything that could falsify 'I see something red' shorn of its objective ontological connotation?

2. 'I'm thinking about person x.' Claims about something other than one's current mental state are corrigible. Suppose while sincerely making this claim, the thoughts, say the imaginative imagery, which I conjure up are in fact perfectly appropriate for the imagining of person y, and not person x. How does my thought 'fix' x? I have made a mistake. In my musings, I have taken y for x. How did I do that? I know that x is x and y is y. I know that x is not y and y is not x. Perhaps the mix-up is caused because I have their names confused, or the clothes they wear. I hold a false belief about x which is true of y or vice versa.

3. 'I am depressed.' is corrigible at least to the extent that it is falsifiable by the evidence of others. I feel depressed but others observe me bright and active, cracking jokes etc. It is conceivable that others say "Come on you're not really depressed" and I realise I was not. There is no incoherence in: 'You are not happy. You only think you are happy.' Compare: 'You are not hungry. You only feel hungry.' It is also plausible

to say, in a situation like this, that I was depressed but the others snapped me out of it. But that is a different kind of case. The feeling goes away.

4. 'I am in pain.' expresses no claim except a psychological one, if it is about an experience, and not about what can be observed from a third person point of view. Other people might say: 'Well, you do not look (sound etc) as though you're in pain' but here we seem to have arrived at the point where if I feel pain then I am in pain. Nevertheless, this falls short of: 'If it seems to me that p, then p.' If I feel pain then I am in pain but if it seems to me that I am in pain it does not follow that I am in pain. The two cases are sharply different.

If pains exist they are necessarily and essentially felt (or had or undergone). They cannot in principle be observed. If a person is in pain then they feel pain, or else are not in pain after all. If a person feels pain, then they are in pain. Feeling pain is necessary and sufficient for being in pain.

It is open to someone to object that not all pains are undergone, that there can be pains we do not feel: "The rugby player who feels his injury only after the match was in pain during the match. His knee was damaged during the game. It would be counter intuitive, in the extreme, to say the pain was not there. It was. It was felt later." This is an incoherent notion. The rugby player who feels his injury only after the match was not in pain during the match. To mistake damage to the knee with a pain in the knee is to confuse a sensation with its cause. On the other hand, there is room for someone to feel pain during a Rugby match but adopt no epistemic attitude towards it. They are aware of the pain, but only in the minimal sense that they have the pain rather than do not. It is only after the match that they think, 'this hurts'. During the match there is sensation. After the match there is sensation plus intellectual judgement. The fact that causal relations may obtain between a sensation and the cognitive attitude towards it, is not a reason for confusing the one with the other.

These propositions are necessarily true:

1. If x is in pain x feels pain.
2. If x feels pain x is in pain.

This is because pain is an essentially phenomenological concept. What pain is is exhausted by the experience of it.

That pains are essentially felt, or undergone, entails the falsity of materialism. The brain is billions of atoms in motion in empty space. Undergoing, or feeling, is not identical with, or reducible to, billions of atoms in motion in empty space. The doctrine is commonsensical and *prima facie* consistent with any ontology entailing the reality of the mental, for example: idealism, mind-body dualism, neutral monism.

Does it follow that 'I feel pain' is incorrigible? Even after all the qualifications are accepted; that the person is not in any doubt as to how to characterise their experience, knows what 'pain' means, etc. there is still room for doubt. The logical gap between 'I seem to be in pain' and 'I am in pain' has not been closed.

Any incorrigibility of 'I am in pain' does not rest on notions of 'sense data' or 'raw feels'. Rorty defines 'raw feel' as follows; 'Any report of how something seems to one is a report of a raw feel' Richard Rorty () The definition is not right because it can seem to me that $2+2=4$ or that Paris is the capital of France without any raw feel being reported. This is not to deny that belief has a phenomenology, but no sense impressions or *qualia* are presented.

The existence of raw feels is entailed by the doctrine of 'the given', or 'data', which Rorty seeks to reject as part of a philosophical metaphor whereby 'the mind' mirrors nature. There need not be any danger of this model being employed in the explanation of psychological states like pain. The self-other, or subject-object, model of experiences is largely inappropriate to explain what it is to be in pain.

The grammar of 'I am in pain' is appropriate: If I am in pain then I am in a certain experiential state. Being in a certain experiential state should not be construed on the model of perceiving an object. It is not as though there are three things: the subject of pain, the sensation of pain, and a relation between the two of 'feeling' or 'experiencing'. Rather, the feeling of the pain is already included in the existence of the pain. Pain is smart already a sensation. The subject-object model works well for visual sense perception but when that paradigm is applied to pain it does not fit. Talk of persons in, or experiencing being in, states is more apposite.

Do we never need the subject-object model in the analysis of 'pain'? We often pay attention to the states we are in, for example: when we are in doubt as to how to characterise a sensation. In that case the model is more applicable. Just because we need not employ it, it does not follow that we cannot employ it.

The self-other or 'person and their experiences' model, even if sometimes appropriate, does not entail the doctrine that there are 'raw feels' or data because there might be no experience which is not

interpreted, as part of having it. It is not self-contradictory that a person is having some experience but not interpreting it; not subsuming it under any concepts, so passive realism about the doctrine of raw feels and data is logically and metaphysically possible. It seems though, by and large, contingently false. Having experiences when construed on the self-other model requires the use of concepts and, as a psychological fact, we tend to have the sorts of experience which can be characterised by our concepts. If we have no concept more precise than 'sharp' to characterise a pain, that is how we feel it.

That we interpret our experience, or conceptually structure it, entails that we can revise the truth value of 'I am in pain', just through paying attention to our sensations, and applying or withholding concepts. Nevertheless, 'I am in pain' is established as true or false even if the way in which I feel is partly determined by the way in which I think about it. This is a truth about states which obtain through merely being felt. It is not a truth about states which can be described intentionally: 'I am thinking about [...]' 'I am hoping that [...]' etc. because each of these embeds a proposition which could be in principle be falsified.

It is not invariably appropriate to draw a sharp distinction between interpretation and what is interpreted, experience and what is experienced. This is because

1. Some states are nothing over and above our being in them.

and

2. Interpretation of some states is part of having them; part of the way in which we have them.

Arthur Pap says 'Sense data reports are indubitable for the simple reason that they do not refer to anything that could be publicly observed. I can still be wrong in the interpretation of my private sense data'. Arthur Pap *Elements of Analytic Philosophy* (EAP 165) No matter how contentious talk of 'data' and 'private' is from a Kantian, or later Wittgensteinian, point of view, pains cannot be publicly observed even though we can observe that other people are in pain. The final arbiter then has to be the person having the pain. This point, which is often taken as true, cannot be generalised to every case in this way: When there is doubt as to whether a person is having an experience or not the person having the experience is always in a better position to judge the truth or falsity of the claim than any persons observing him.

There is a distinction between having an experience and knowing that one is having an experience.

A patient in a hospital bed is having pains and hallucinations. The staff observing are registering patterns from the patient's central nervous system on a special device. They are saying; "He is reaching the point where he has pain now", "Now he will be having those pains, hallucinating". In this situation, the patient himself is so taken up with his experiences, and so oblivious to a world of persons and discourse, that he cannot be said to 'know' what he is undergoing at all: He is too busy undergoing it. We can be lost in thought. We can be lost in experience. In this example, there are not two competing accounts of the person's experiences, the person's own and the observers, but only one; that of the observers. The observers are the better authority because the subject is in no condition to be an authority at all. Occurrently speaking, he is not an agent.

What if a subject is having milder experiences, is an agent, and a dispute arises over whether they is in state or not? Here it is useful to adapt an example of David Armstrong. (Armstrong's example is 'I seem to be seeing something green' but this claim is open to corrigibility through interpretation as an objective claim.) Suppose the person undergoing the purported experience says 'I am in a state S'. Using Armstrong's list of counter evidence that can brought to try to falsify this claim, we obtain:

- (a) I am not lying.
- (b) My brain is in the appropriate state for some other state.
- (c) There are disturbances in the brain processes responsible for introspective awareness which would account for my mistake.

Let us assume some strict form of psychophysical parallelism for the sake of this example. (Nothing I have said about it being a logical truth that pains are felt is incompatible with this theory) Who is right, the subject of the purported experience or the brain technician? (a) can be accepted straight away, we just need it for the purposes of the example. If the evidence stopped at (b) and there was no (c) then we would probably be more likely to say that there is a mistake in the special apparatus than in the person's introspective report. If the subject is not lying as assumption (a) requires then this is enough to make (b) probably false, taken alone. It is the addition of (c) which is radically ambiguous in a way in which

makes the whole argument hinges on it. The unclear notion is 'introspective awareness'. Two crucially different readings of (c) result from of these interpretations of 'introspective awareness';

- (i) The subject is induced into having the thought 'I am in pain'
- (ii) The subject is induced into having the thought 'I am in pain', and into feeling pain.

If (i) is taken as the interpretation, then the brain technicians are right. The subject believes he is in pain but he isn't actually feeling any pain. If (ii) is taken, then the brain technicians are wrong and the subject is right because not only is the subject induced to think he is in pain but he is also induced to feel pain. This might not be the pain the brain technicians were looking for but, ex hypothesi, it is pain. The brain technicians would then be right for the wrong reasons.

At the root of the dispute are two seemingly competing concepts of 'pain', one in terms of sensations and one in terms of states of the central nervous system. I am following ordinary language in saying pains are essentially felt and some feelings are essentially pains. Pains have no physical identity, even if we single them out by their neurological correlates. The physiology provides us with symptoms of pain but no criteria.

There is an important difference between these two propositions;

- (1) x believes he is in pain, so he is in pain
- (2) x feels pain, so he is in pain

The 'so' in (1) has the force of 'is inductive evidence for'. The 'so' in (2) has the force of a logical 'therefore'. (1) might, logically, be false as the example of the person's belief's being induced by altering his brain patterns shows. (2) is analytic. Therefore, J.J.C. Smart is correct to write;

'It is[...] logically and metaphysically possible that someone should sincerely report an experience and yet that experience should not occur'. J.J.C. Smart 'Brain Processes & Incorrigibility' in C. V. Borst (ed.) The Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Macmillan) p. 108

and

'Not even sincere reports of immediate experience can be absolutely incorrigible.'

J.J.C. Smart 'Brain Processes & Incorrigibility' in C. V. Borst (ed.) *The Mind-Brain Identity Theory* (Macmillan) p. 109

(1)'s contingency shows that 'I am in pain' is not incorrigible in the sense of 'If I believe that p then p is true'. If a person believes they are having a certain experience, that belief could in principle be false. Quinton says

How privileged is 'privileged access'? Access is privileged but not logically privileged. The commonsensical view is right. When it comes to what is undergone, the person who undergoes a given experience is the best judge of its occurrence and its nature. This is a psychological or even sociological rather than a philosophical point, based on the empirical fact that most users of psychological concepts are not brain technicians.

The commonsensical view is taken by Davidson, who recognises 'oddities peculiar to first person singular knowledge of one's own pains, beliefs, desires and so on' Donald Davidson 'Actions, Reasons, Causes' in his *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford) p. 18 but concludes 'A person can easily be wrong about exactly what it is he is proud of; whether it is the cost of the cut of his clothes, say, or his skill at tennis rather than his score.' Donald Davidson 'Actions, Reasons, Causes' in his *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford) p. 18 and 'Still, the fact that claims to know what one is proud of can be wrong, and can be questioned, does not show that we do not have special authority with respect to them' Donald Davidson *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford) p.290 If the ordinary language view is right, that experiences are 'undergone' or 'had', and are not observable particulars, then the person actually undergoing those experiences will, if he knows how to characterise them, usually be able to give a more accurate description of them than an observer.

Could this situation change? We might devise a rich neurophysiological vocabulary based on brain observations. This would not yield an essentially new concept of pain. It is minimally taken for granted that pains are undergone and they cannot be observed. In this situation, someone other than the person having the experience might come to know more about his pain than he does. It wouldn't follow from this that the third party could characterise the person's experience more accurately. For this the old 'feeling' language would be needed.

The shadow of the verification principle hangs over the Private Language Argument. Even if 'I know I am in pain' and 'I doubt whether I am in pain' are unverifiable, it does not follow that they are senseless. Verifiability is not a condition for making sense, but making sense is a condition for being verifiable. Unless 'I know I am in pain' made sense it would not be possible to consider the proposition's means, or lack of means, of verification.

If knowledge is justified true belief, we may stipulate clearly the conditions under which 'I know I am in pain' is true:

- (1) I am in pain.
- (2) I believe I am in pain.
- (3) I have grounds for this belief.

Arguably, the grounds could not be better. It is not true that

'I know I am in pain'

says nothing more than

'I am in pain'.

II

EXISTENCE

Cogito Ergo Sum: A Transcendental Argument?

Even if it turns out that 'Cogito ergo sum' is an inference, that it follows logically from 'I think' that 'I exist', Descartes thinks that 'I think' and 'I exist' can be established independently of one another and the logical form of the arguments used to do this is transcendental proof.

A transcendental argument is one of the form

if p then q

where, nevertheless, p does not logically entail q. In other words it would not be self-contradictory to assert p but deny q but any resulting compound proposition would be guaranteed to be false. The nature of this guarantee rests on the notion of a necessary condition. 'If p then q' is valid because q is a necessary condition for p, or what amounts to the same thing, q is a presupposition of p. It is clear that in any conventional sense q is not a logically necessary condition for p nor a presupposition of p which 'is an entailment of p', just because (p & -q), on this account, is coherent.

It is sometimes maintained that for 'if p then q' to work as a transcendental argument q must be the unique necessary condition for p. This is wrong. The necessary conditions for the truth of any given proposition, form an infinitely large set, or are very numerous, depending on the precision of the criteria for their individuation. The component of a transcendental argument

p presupposes q

might be true, even if there are presuppositions of p other than q. The non-validity of any given transcendental argument cannot be demonstrated merely by showing that there is more than one necessary condition for p. This could be established by showing that q is not a necessary condition for p.

One way of doing this is to show that the alleged set of necessary conditions for p obtain but are in fact preclude q. Unless this is done, the multiplying of necessary conditions for p merely facilitates the generation of further transcendental arguments with p as first premise. The point can be put this way: For 'If p then q' to be a valid transcendental argument there must not be alternative, or competing, necessary conditions for p other than q. There may be extra complementary or additional conditions for p, as well as q.

Any argument is 'transcendental' if it derives q from p as a necessary condition for p which is not logically entailed by p. That an argument is a transcendental one can be indicated by ' $\tau \rightarrow$ '. This signals that the necessary conditions on the right hand side are not logical.

$p \tau \rightarrow q$

Now, if we construe 'Cogito ergo sum' as valid it cannot be interpreted as 'Whatever thinks exists, I think therefore I exist', simply because 'whatever thinks exists' is not a valid inference. From the fact that x has a certain property, say thinking, it does not follow that x is instantiated. It is not a logical consequence of that fact that an object has a property that there is such object.

Despite this, Descartes thinks 'I exist' is a kind of necessary truth. He says:

'I am, I exist, is necessarily true every time I express it or conceive of it in my mind'

René Descartes 'Second Meditation' in Discourse on Method and the Meditations (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968) p. 103

If 'necessarily true' is taken broadly, as 'true and could not be false', then Descartes is right. 'I exist' is necessarily true if I utter it. What kind of necessity is this?

Its necessity does not consist in its being self-contradictory to deny, or its negation's being non-sensical. Someone who said 'I do not exist' would not have contradicted themselves because 'I do not exist' does not entail the conjunction of a proposition and its negation. But they would have uttered a statement that is guaranteed to be false. What is this guarantee? 'I do not exist' is contingently false because it cannot be a necessary truth that anyone exists. No one exists in all possible worlds. 'I do not exist' is not senseless when uttered by me. It is just bound to be false. If 'I exist' is a necessary truth when uttered by me, there is a kind of necessary truth which it is not self-contradictory to deny. What is this necessity?

The necessity of 'I exist' consists in this: 'I exist' can be uttered in all and only those situations in which it is true. The truth of the proposition 'I exist' is a necessary condition for its utterance. Whoever utters 'I exist' exists or 'I exist' could not be uttered (thought, or otherwise produced). This is precisely a transcendental argument as defined earlier. Its form is

$p \tau \rightarrow q$ (NC)

It is

If 'I exist' is uttered (thought) by me then 'I exist' is true (NC).

It in no way detracts from the force of this transcendental argument that there are other necessary conditions for the utterance of 'I exist'. For example, that

'I exist' is uttered by me $\tau \rightarrow$ 'I can speak' is true (NC).

'I exist' is thought by me $\tau \rightarrow$ 'I can think' is true (NC).

Further necessary conditions facilitate further transcendental arguments.

That 'I exist' can be concluded from the utterance of 'I exist' by transcendental argument can be doubted by showing that there is a necessary condition for the utterance of 'I exist' which is exclusive of its truth. For example, it might be doubted whether whatever utters 'I exist' is entitled to the use of 'I'. Hume, Russell, and various Buddhists imply a view like this. If 'I' is just a word every utterer uses only to refer to him or herself, then this objection is forestalled. Even if 'I exist' is uttered by a tape-recorder, the truth of the proposition is a necessary condition for its utterance so long as we allow the token reflexive to be construed in this very broad way.

What gives the argument its transcendental form? It would not be τ -valid if it were not couched in the first person singular. It is not a necessary condition for the utterance of the same proposition, with only the grammatical person altered, that that proposition be true.

I exist.

You exist.

He, She, it exists.

We exist.

You (plural) exist.

They exist.

'He exists' might or might not be true, when uttered by me yet 'I exist' is guaranteed to be true when uttered by me. So, the argument would not have its transcendental form were it not couched in the first person singular.

There is one important reservation to make about this thought: whatever produces 'I exist' exists. Its first person singular form in no way precludes its utterance by more than one person.

In the Meditations Descartes establishes his own existence by transcendental proof without immediate commitment to his ontological

status. The distinction he draws between that he is and what he is is consistent with the broad interpretation of the token reflexive.

The putative proof of what he is, 'a thing that thinks', is also transcendental but does not work. Descartes' method is to continue to doubt possible candidates for himself, notably his body:

'I am not this assemblage of limbs called the human body'
Descartes 'Second Meditation' in Discourse on Method and the
Meditations (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968) p. 105

He arrests this process when he finds an aspect of himself that is indubitable. The procedure is not a good one for finding out what you are if it just rests on this principle:

I am whatever I cannot doubt the existence of.

because from my being unable to doubt something's existence, it does not follow that I am it.

An additional premise is needed, and it is the addition of this premise which makes the attempted proof transcendental. Descartes says:

'But what then am I? A thing that thinks. And what is a thing that thinks? that is to say a thing that doubts perceives, affirms, denies, wills, does not will, that imagines, also and which feels'

Descartes 'Second Meditation' in Discourse on Method and the
Meditations (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968) p. 103

This passage is as a more or less exhaustive catalogue of what Descartes understands by 'thinks'. Descartes has been engaging in these activities in his doubting in the Meditations so far, and that it is a necessary condition for this that he is a 'thing that thinks'.

Is Descartes' claim that he is a 'thing' which thinks, that is to say a mind understanding or reason' established by the arguments he presents in the second Meditation? Descartes thinks it is a precondition (and one that has hitherto gone unnoticed in the Meditations) of the project of doubt that the question 'What am I?' be answered in this way.

In contrast with 'I exist', the truth of 'I think' does not follow from its pronunciation, or the pronunciation of 'I doubt', 'I imagine', because these propositions can be pronounced unthinkingly, or by a thing that does not think: for example the tape-recorder. The onus is on Descartes to

show that he is not in this category. Descartes has to show that he is not just a tape-recorder.

If it is assumed that the doubt of the first Meditation is carried out intelligently, or consciously, then it follows that whoever doubted thought. But that begs the question. None doubts that whoever doubted thought. No transcendental argument is needed to show that. It is a straightforward logical inference. 'I am a tape recorder' is not self-stultifying and not self-contradictory.

What is the logical status of: 'Cogito ergo sum'? A great deal has been written about whether it is a performative, an inference etc (5).

'I think therefore I am'

(1) 'I think'

(2) 'I am'

An inference?

Whether it can be interpreted as a transcendental argument does not depend upon whether 'I think' makes any existential claim. If it does, then the argument is straightforwardly a logical entailment. If it does not, then is it false? One way of taking 'I think' is as entailing:

There exists an x such that thinks x

in which case it follows logically that

There exists an x

and 'Cogito ergo sum' is a logical inference.

But if 'I think therefore I am' is interpreted as entailing

There is thinking therefore a thinker exists

then, construed as a logical inference, it is invalid. Hume, Russell and the Buddhists are not just obviously wrong. On the first interpretation it follows that if there is something that thinks then that thing exists. On the second it does not follow that whatever thinks exist.

On neither interpretation could 'Cogito ergo sum' be plausibly held to be a transcendental proof. For this we must, as Descartes does, allow the logical possibility of doubting one's own existence or allow it as at least open to conjecture whether one exists or not. From this 'position of ignorance', or 'doubt', Descartes' next step is to say (of the malignant demon):

'I existed without doubt by the fact that I was persuaded, or indeed by the mere fact that I thought at all [...] There is therefore no doubt that I exist if he deceives me.'

Descartes 'Second Meditation' in *Discourse on Method and the Meditations* (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968) p. 106-7

This is a transcendental argument so long as the question of his own existence is first left open, and then closed. His existence is a necessary condition for his being deceived: not a logically necessary condition, because Descartes could be remembering someone else being deceived. It does not follow that the person who exists now is the very same person who was deceived. It is a highly plausible hypothesis that it was he himself who existed and was deceived. The general principle which Descartes derives from this: 'I exist if he deceives me' is a logical truth.

I conclude that the arguments Descartes gives for his existence and nature are transcendental proofs.

'Whether 'I' is a name or a demonstrative, there is the same need of a 'conception' through which it attaches to its object. Now, what conception can be suggested other than that of thinking [...]?'

(Anscombe, 1974 p. 144)

referring relation.

'What 'this' has to have, if it is used correctly, is something it latches on to (as I will put it).'

(Anscombe, 1974 p. 143)

referring relation.

'for each person there is one person of whom he has characteristically limited and also characteristically privileged views: except in mirrors he never sees the whole person, and can only get rather special views of what he does see. Some of these are specially good, others specially bad.'

(Anscombe, 1974 p. 139)

body.

Kripke's arguments for dualism.

'The mind knows itself to think'
'it knows its own substance'
'it is certain of being that alone, which alone it is certain of being.'
(Augustine, de Trinitate, Book X)

(1) 'I could suppose I had no body'
(2) 'but not that I was not'
(3) Therefore, 'this I' is not a body.
(Descartes, Meditations)

'In these writers, there is the assumption that when one says 'I' or 'the mind', one is naming something such that the knowledge of its existence, which is knowledge of itself as thinking in all the various modes, determines what it is that is known to exist.' (Anscombe, 1974 p. 135)

'That mundane, practical, everyday sense in which it would have been correct for him to say 'I am Descartes' was of no relevance to him in these arguments.'
(Anscombe, 1974 p. 136)

'The non-identity of himself with Descartes'
'is that phrase not equivalent to 'the non-identity of Descartes with Descartes'?'
'No. It is not.'
(Anscombe, 1974 p. 136)

'speaking of' or 'referring to' oneself is compatible with not knowing that the object one speaks of is oneself.'
(Anscombe, 1974 p. 136)

'Yet we are inclined to think that 'It's the word each one uses in speaking of himself' explains what 'I' names, or explains 'I' as a 'referring expression'. It cannot do so if 'He speaks of himself' is compatible with ignorance and we are using the reflexive pronoun, in both cases, in the ordinary way.' (Anscombe, 1974 p. 136)

'we don't want to say 'Smith does not realize the identity of Smith with Smith'. (Anscombe, 1974 p. 137)

‘I’ – if it makes a reference, if, that is, its mode of meaning is that it is supposed to make a reference – is secure against reference failure.’
(Anscombe, 1974 p. 143)

‘Just thinking ‘I...’ guarantees not only the existence but the presence of its referent.’ (Anscombe, 1974 p. 143)

‘It guarantees the existence because it guarantees the presence, which is presence to consciousness.’ (Anscombe, 1974 p. 143)

‘But note that here ‘presence to consciousness’ means physical or real presence, not just that one is thinking of the thing.’
(Anscombe, 1974 p. 143)

‘For if the thinking did not guarantee the presence, the existence of the referent could be doubted.’ (Anscombe, 1974 p. 143)

‘It seems clear that if ‘I’ is a ‘referring expression’ at all, it has both kinds of guaranteed reference. The object an ‘I’-user means by it must exist so long as he is using ‘I’, nor can he take the wrong object to be the object he means by ‘I’.’
(Anscombe, 1974 p. 146)

‘And now imagine that I get into a state of ‘sensory deprivation’. Sight is cut off, and I am locally anaesthetized everywhere, perhaps floated in a tank of tepid water; I am unable to speak, or to touch any part of my body with any other. Now I tell myself ‘I won’t let this happen again!’ If the object meant by ‘I’ is this body, this human being, then in these circumstances it won’t be present to my senses; and how else can it be ‘present to’ me? But have I lost what I mean by ‘I’? Is that not present to me?’
(Anscombe, 1974 p. 146)

‘I have not lost my ‘self-consciousness’; nor can what I mean by ‘I’ be an object no longer present to me.’
(Anscombe, 1974 p. 146)

If ‘I’ is a referring expression:

‘Nothing but a Cartesian Ego will serve.’ (Anscombe, 1976 p. 143)
as the referent.

(1) 'Thus we discover that if 'I' is a referring expression, then Descartes was right about what the referent was.'

(Anscombe, 1974 p. 146-7)

(2) I is a referring expression.

(3) Therefore, Descartes was right about what the referent was.

'His [Descartes'] position has, however, the intolerable difficulty of requiring an identification of the same referent in different 'I'-thoughts. (This led Russell at one point to speak of 'short-term selves'.)

(Anscombe, 1976 p. 147)

'Getting hold of the wrong object is excluded, and that makes us think that getting hold of the right object is guaranteed. But the reason is that there is no getting hold of an object at all.' (Anscombe, 1976 p. 147)

'if 'I' is a referring expression, then Descartes was right.'

(Anscombe, 1976 p. 147)

'I am E.A.' is after all not an identity proposition.'

(Anscombe, 1976 p. 149)

V

MEANING

Not all reflexive language is language in which a person makes reference to themselves. Of statements containing the reflexive pronouns 'myself' 'yourself' 'himself' 'itself' 'herself' 'yourselves' 'ourselves' and 'theirselves', only the use of those including 'myself' and 'ourselves' entail that the person making the utterance refers to themselves. The other uses of reflexive pronouns require that this not be the case or, if there is self reference in any such utterance, this is not due to the inclusion of one of these remaining pronouns. They are typically used to mention some reflexive activity that a person other than the speaker is engaged in.

‘Myself’ and ‘ourselves’ are therefore peculiar in that they are not just reflexives. They draw attention to some action that a person administers to themselves but they further entail that that very person is the person using that linguistic form. They are ‘speaker - reflexive’.

It is criterial of reflexive language that the grammatical subject of a sentence containing a reflexive pronoun designate one and the same person as is designated by the grammatical object of that sentence. It is criterial of speaker-reflexive sentences in particular that it not only be that subject and object have a single referent but also that that one referent be the person who utters the sentence. They are first person reflexive.

To be non-specific as to the use of a speaker-reflexive, or a non-speaker-reflexive sentence, the indefinite reflexive ‘oneself’ may be employed without commitment to one or the other of these more precise forms.

Although the presence of a first person reflexive pronoun in a sentence signifies that that sentence is speaker reflexive, and so mentions the person who speaks, this grammatical form is not the only one in which self-reference is possible. It is also made by use of the first person personal pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’. Although the presence of either of these pronouns in a sentence is a logically sufficient condition for that sentence’s including a mention of the speaker of that sentence, such sentences are not speaker reflexive because the person uttering the sentence is only designated by the grammatical subject, and the further condition for speaker-reflexivity, speaker designation by the object, is absent. The presence of either first person pronoun in a sentence is no guarantee of that sentences being reflexive, inspite of its logically entailing mention of the speaker.

The subject of a sentence is the subject of the verb of that sentence. The object of a sentence is the object of the verb of that sentence. It is a logically sufficient condition for self-reference that a first person singular personal pronoun be the grammatical subject of such a sentence: The utterer necessarily mentions themselves. Such sentences are ‘speaker-mentioning’, though not ‘speaker reflexive’.

Although the presence of one of the first person personal pronouns is logically sufficient for self-reference, it is not logically necessary. The speaker of a sentence may refer to themselves under any description which is true of them, or by any name by which they are known, or which is truly applies to them. They might refer to themselves using the second or third person pronoun, although if in the latter case they were communicating, this use would have to be accompanied by individuating descriptions in order to avoid failure of reference.

There is then a variety of grammatical forms which may be categorised as 'reflexive' 'speaker-reflexive' and 'speaker-mentioning'. Not all reflexive sentences are speaker-reflexive, or speaker-mentioning. All speaker-reflexive sentences are both reflexive and speaker-mentioning. Some speaker-mentioning sentences are speaker-reflexive. No speaker-mentioning sentences which are reflexive are not speaker-reflexive.

Reflexive-sentences may be first, second, or third person in grammatical form. Speaker-reflexive sentences are necessarily first person. Speaker-mentioning sentences are typically but not necessarily first person.

What has to be true of persons in order for there to be these grammatical forms? Sartre and Ryle argue that speakers do not have to be self-conscious during their utterances for speaker mentioning sentences to take on meaning. Sartre says;

'If someone asks me 'What are you doing?' and I reply, all preoccupied, 'I am trying to hang this picture' or 'I am repairing the rear tyre' these statements do not transport us to the level of reflection. I utter them without ceasing to work, without ceasing to envisage actions only as done or to be done - not in so far as I am doing them'.

Jean-Paul Sartre *The Transcendence of the Ego* (New York) p 89

In this example, someone is addressed as 'you' by another person, and the person addressed, by using the first person singular pronoun, mentions himself in his reply. Those sentences in the above passage which include "I" are speaker mentioning but they are not speaker reflexive. The grammatical subject of the sentence does not pick out the same person as the grammatical object. We could reconstruct the conversation excluding all pronouns and substituting for the above sentences new ones such as: 'What's happening here then?', 'Picture hanging', and 'Tyre repairs'. Such utterances are not speaker-mentioning, still less speaker-reflexive, but their colloquial use in the situation would be the same as those including pronouns. In Sartre's example the person replying need not think of himself. He is thinking of the job in hand. In order to answer the question, it is more useful to pay attention to what you are doing than to yourself.

In his discussion of avowals, Ryle claims that the grammar of a certain class of statement can mislead one into thinking that they are self-descriptions. He says that "unstudied utterances are not self-comments", even though 'many unstudied utterances embody explicit interest

phrases'. Avowals include: 'I want [...]', 'I hope [...]', 'I intend [...]', 'I dislike [...]', 'I am depressed', 'I wonder whether [...]', 'I guess that [...]', 'I feel hungry'. It is not so much the 'explicit interest phrases' in these avowals which make them seem like self-descriptions. It is the first person singular pronoun. The temptation is to assimilate the class of sentences which are speaker-mentioning to the class which are speaker-reflexive. In the list of avowals, there appear to be two which are very much like speaker-reflexives: 'I am depressed', and 'I am hungry'. In these propositions, self ascriptions are made even though the utterer of the sentence is not picked out by any object, only by the subject. This is because the verb 'to be' takes no object. If the speaker of 'I am depressed' makes a self ascription, then 'I am depressed' is a self-description, even if not a speaker reflexive-sentence, similarly for 'I am hungry'.

Ryle exaggerates when he says avowals do not impart biographical information. At most they need not. Any of his examples, perhaps with an appropriate change in tone of voice, or in reply to a suitably biographical inquiry, could be used as a self-description.

With the exceptions of 'I am depressed' and 'I am hungry' they are not speaker-reflexive. To become speaker-reflexive sentences they would need to be supplemented with reflexive first person singular pronouns. In 'I dislike myself' subject and object designate the speaker.

It is only the presence of the first person pronoun in the 'explicit interest phrases' which makes the speaker-mentioning sentences misleading. Interest verbs are no more misleading than other sorts of verb.

Those phrases which are not complete sentences have verbs without objects: 'I intend [...]' etc. These would be self reflexive if provided with reflexive pronouns for objects: 'I dislike myself' (as opposed to 'I dislike gardening'). Incomplete, they say nothing.

If Sartre and Ryle are right, the utterer of a speaker-mentioning sentence does not have to be paying attention to him or herself in order to use the sentence correctly. It does not even seem necessary that the speaker paid attention to himself for a few moments earlier either. What would this be for? To make sure that it was the speaker himself who was repairing the tyre and not someone else? To know that I am engaged in a certain activity I only need to pay attention to that activity. I do not have, in addition, to pay attention to myself for example, look at my body, in order to know that I am thus engaged. That a tyre is visually presented is sufficient proof, as far as I am concerned, that I am looking at it. I do not need to take a mirror to my body, or obtain confirmation from a third

party, that my eyes are indeed pointing in the direction of the tyre, that my hands are on it.

Although I do not have to introspect whenever I use first person pronouns, or be thinking of myself or paying attention to myself in any way, there are two salient conditions for this being the case. Firstly, the reason why no reflection is necessary is that it is utterly taken for granted that it is I who perform the task inquired after and who speaks. "I" is superfluous. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the speaker-mentioning sentence form is logically dependent upon the speaker-reflexive sentence form. Unless I feature as the object of some of the sentences I uttered, I could not feature as subject. Unless I had a concept of myself, I could not mention myself, or take myself for granted. The speaker-mentioning sentences are parasitic upon, or logically secondary to, the speaker-reflexive sentences. This amounts to saying that self-consciousness, in some as yet unspecified sense, is a necessary condition for the first person singulars pronoun having the uses it has, even if persons are not self-conscious whenever they use it.

Equally, a person does not have to be thinking of themselves in order to use a speaker-reflexive sentence properly. This might seem less plausible than the same lack for requirement for speaker-mentioning sentences. If in reply to an 'inquiry I say 'Yes, I shaved this morning' or (in English) more explicitly 'Yes, I brushed my teeth this morning', then I do not have to be thinking of myself at that moment. (Compare: 'Je me suis rasé ce matin', 'Ich habe mich rasiert heute morgan'.) I do not have to be thinking of myself as I was this morning. A quick recollection of the tap running or, of the sound of the shaving brush being rinsed, would be sufficient check for the reply to be forthcoming. The same goes for inquiries and replies about the present. To truly assert 'I am drying my face' I do not have to pay attention to myself, still less to my face in particular. I can reply unquestioningly because I can feel the towel. I tie up my bootlaces. I do not have to check that it is I that am doing it.

As in speaker-mentioning sentences, that it is I who am engaged is taken for granted. In reflexive sentences the presence of the reflexive pronouns is too: 'Washing my face' would do as well as 'I'm washing my face', and even 'drying' for 'I'm drying myself'. But the context would have to make any ambiguities clear. Americans say 'let's wash up' meaning 'wash ourselves' not 'wash the dishes'. For Americans the phrase is implicitly reflexive, for British people non-reflexive.

There is no single way of characterising the semantic discrepancies which arise between sentences which are syntactically reflexive or non-reflexive in form yet otherwise similar. To chart the differences

piecemeal would be a large empirical undertaking. But it can at least be shown that some non-reflexive sentences change their meaning, some retain their meaning, and some become meaningless, when translated into reflexive form.

These semantic changes result from a syntactical change; the shift from the grammatical subject and object of the sentence having two numerically distinct referents to having one. Two passages, from Wittgenstein and Ryle show contrasting attitudes to the shift from non-reflexive to reflexive language. Wittgenstein describes a type of language which he thinks is possible even in our own language;

‘A person can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it.’
Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford) 243

These are logical and metaphysical possibilities. Explaining their possibility is hard.

The meaning of a word is like a shadow or a gas around it. This is the partly (mentally) actualised possibility of imagining what would make the sentence embedding the word true. We think in units of truth or falsity : ‘This is the case... This is not the case...’ Word meaning and whole theory meaning are derivative from this. Meaning is the thinkability of truth.

‘The use of words is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification. The use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts for the assistance of their own memory; or, as it were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others: words in their primary and immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [...]’ Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford) Book III Chpt. II p. 225

‘But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker, yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things. First, they suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men with whom they communicate. Secondly, because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations, but of things as really they are, therefore they often suppose

their words to stand also for the reality of things.’ Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford) Book III Chpt. II p. 225

‘When I say “I’m going to the bank”, you (the hearer) might need to “disambiguate” my utterance. You may need to interpret whether I’m going to the river bank or to a bank where one deposits money. But I do not, in the normal case, need to disambiguate for myself my own utterance. And not only do I not need to do so, in the usual case I could not do so.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 286

Meaning. Derrida wrong and Husserl right about self-presence.

‘there is an asymmetry between the speaker vis a vis his utterance and the hearer vis a vis the speaker’s utterance.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 286

Meaning.

‘[...] we as speakers are unable to make our utterances items for public interpretation by ourself after the manner in which we find, as hearers, the utterances of others to be public items for interpretation by ourself (or anyone else excluding the speaker). Why [...] is this so?’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 286-7

‘In what sense could my utterances be my utterances if I had to interpret them in a speaker-hearer context in the way a hearer does [...]?’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 287

‘[...] in what sense could my linguistic output be treated as a specific locutionary act with a specific illocutionary force (following Austin)?’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 27

Knowledge expressed using demonstratives is knowledge by acquaintance.

‘Often [...] the mere wording, which can be grasped by writing or the gramophone, does not suffice for the expression of the thought.’

(Frege, 1918 p. 24) The Thought in Strawson Philosophical Logic

‘If a time indication is needed by the present tense [as opposed to cases in which it is used to express timelessness, as in the statement of mathematical laws] one must know when the sentence was uttered to apprehend the thought correctly.’ (Frege, 1918 p. 24)

‘Therefore, the time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought.’
(Frege, 1918 p. 24)

‘If someone wants to say the same today as he expressed yesterday using the word ‘today’; he must replace this word with ‘yesterday’. Although the thought is the same, its verbal expression must be different so that the sense, which would otherwise be affected by the differing times of utterance, is readjusted.’
(Frege, 1918 p. 24)

‘The case is the same with words like ‘here’ and ‘there’.’
(Frege, 1918 p. 24)

‘In all such cases, the mere wording, as it is given in writing, is not the complete expression of the thought, but the knowledge of certain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are used as means of expressing the thought, are needed for its correct apprehension. The pointing of fingers, hand movements, glances may belong here too.’
(Frege, 1918 p. 24)

‘The same utterance containing the word ‘I’ will express different thoughts in the mouths of different men, of which some may be true, others false.’
(Frege, 1918 p. 24)

‘Now everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.’
(Frege, 1918 p. 24)

‘So when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been wounded, he will probably take as a basis this primitive way in which he is presented to himself. And only Dr. Lauben himself can grasp thoughts determined in this way.’
(Frege, 1918 p. 24)

‘But now he may want to communicate with others. He cannot communicate a thought which he alone can grasp. Therefore, if he now says ‘I have been wounded’, he must use the ‘I’ in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in the sense of ‘he is speaking to you at this moment’, by doing which he makes the associated conditions of his utterance serve for the expression of his thought.’
(Frege, 1918 p. 24)

Meaning.

‘How can he [the speaker] be put in the position of having to ask “What does what I am saying (which is determined by what I mean to say) mean?”’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 286-7

Meaning. Husserl. Derrida. Locke. Wittgenstein.

‘my output is for everybody else except myself like everybody else’s verbal output vis a vis me.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 288

meaning.

‘(1) My (potentially ambiguous) utterance tokens are identical in kind with members of the class of utterance tokens requiring disambiguation even though I am, as encoder of my utterances, never in a position of needing to disambiguate them’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 300

meaning.

‘The meaning (Bedeutung) of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by using it; the idea which we have in that case is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense (Sinn), which is indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the moon through a telescope. I compare the moon itself to the meaning; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the stand point of observation, but it is still objective, in as much as it can be used by several observers.’ Frege ‘On Sense and Reference’ in Philosophical Writings ed. P. Geach and M. Black (Oxford) p. 60.

‘A logical picture of facts is a thought (Gedanke)’ Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London) 3

‘The totality of true thoughts (Gedanken) is a picture of the world’ Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London) 3.01

‘Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. – The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)

Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy!’ Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford) §11

‘For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.’ Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford) §43

‘Meaning is as little an experience as intending’ Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford) p. 217

‘Meaning is not a process which accompanies a word. For no process could have the consequences of meaning.’ Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford) p. 218

‘In our failure to understand the use of a word we take it as the expression of a queer process. (As we think of time as a queer medium, of the mind as a queer kind of being.) Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford) §196

‘The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in.’ Wittgenstein *Zettel* (Oxford) 16

“‘U meant something by uttering x’ is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending:

- 1) A to produce a particular response r
- 2) A to think (recognise) that U intends (1)
- 3) A to fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2)’

Paul Grice ‘Logic and Conversation’ in *Studies in the Ways of Words* () p. 92

Ryle says

“[...] I cannot literally fence with myself, resuscitate myself, outlive myself, bully, tease or outmanoeuvre myself [...]”

Gilbert Ryle On Thinking (Oxford) p. 35

Ryle asks

“Could I literally ask or tell myself things, consult myself, blab secrets to myself, give mere hints to myself or snub myself [...]?”

Gilbert Ryle On Thinking (Oxford) p. 37

the suggestion being that I could not. Both think reflexive uses of language depend on non-reflexive uses of otherwise similar expressions. Ryle says ‘thin’ uses are ‘parasitic’ on conversation with others, and Wittgenstein argues that self ascriptions presuppose a public framework of grammar and shared understanding. Suppose they are right. The problem remains of whether this dependence is strict and logical, or merely contingent and cultural.

For all the ink expended, we do not know what the referring relation is.

V

BODY

You are strikingly different from anybody else.

You have never seen your own face.

All the faces you see are the faces of other people.

It feels as though you are ‘behind’ your face but other people ‘face’ you.

You look at or into other people’s eyes but you look out of or through your own eyes. You cannot see your own eyes because the eyes that see cannot see the eyes that see. A wholly third person eye is not an eye that sees.

You have never seen the back of your own head. The heads you have seen are all other people’s heads, not your own.

You are peculiarly and mysteriously centred on just one of these human bodies, the one you call your 'own'. In fact, it is as though you are the centre of the universe. The rest of existence radiates outwards away from you. Of course this obvious fact is drummed out of us at an early age, but if you look and see, rather than obey your conditioning, it is obvious that the world is arranged panoramically all around you.

Anyone who is not you is presented as over there; as a living, speaking, body in the world, at some distance from yourself, but as not you. Although we have been indoctrinated into the view that oneself is only another, as soon as you pay attention to your own being it is obvious that there is a profound difference between being oneself and observing anybody else.

My body is not just one body amongst others in the world. It is where I view the world from. I could not (in the normal course of things) walk around my body. I could perhaps meet someone with a body that was very much like mine, but it would not be mine.

We are insufficiently aware of our own existence. To see that there is life after death you have to become much more aware of your own existence than you are now. The English mystic D.E. Harding (1909-) discovered that he had no head.

Our conditioned response to this is to say: But he does have a head, he could just reach out and touch it. On one level this is obviously right. What we want to know is: How is it possible for Harding to experience the absence of his head? This is partly because the eyes are positioned on the front of the head. It is partly because of the profoundly subjective fact that the eye that sees does not see the eye that sees. It is ultimately because Harding is himself and is centred on a particular human body. Harding himself says that the experience of having no head happened when he stopped thinking. Wittgenstein, in doing philosophy, enjoins us to look and see. Harding is doing phenomenology of the body: describing his body as it appears to him directly. Mountain tops are especially conducive to self-realisation. There will turn out to be a profound reason for this. Being on a mountain top allows an expansiveness, a kind of space, that is revelatory of the space of one's own being.

Am I my body? Am I inside my body? It sometimes feels to me as though I could be my body. Suppose I am the same thing as my brain. My brain is in my head so that might account for the sensation I have of looking out of my head through the eye sockets. I never see the eye

sockets . If I close one eye I can see one side of the end of my nose and perhaps some cheek or part of an eyebrow.

Alternatively, suppose I am my body. Then we might be able to account for the peculiar and partial perspectives I have on my own body in the following way: I am my body, so being it is an obstacle to observing it. Observation requires detachment, or the distance implied by the adoption of the third person perspective. If I am the same thing as my body I can obviously never be any distance from it. I can then never have the objectivity necessary for it to appear to me as an object 'over there'.

Neither of these explanations accounts for the body being my body. It does not follow from the peculiar perspectives I have on my body that that I am my body or that I am in it. I could be just peculiarly and mysteriously centred on it.

Things appear physical to the extent that they are subjected to the third person perspective. Things appear mental or spiritual to the extent to which they are subjected to the first person (singular) perspective. If something is physical I am perceiving it from the outside. I am adopting the standpoint of exteriority. You might think this is wrong, for example, it is an elementary truth of science that physical objects are composed of particles and particles are composed of sub-atomic particles. I do not deny this obvious truth. The point is that if you think of a physical object you think of its outside. If you think of a particle, you think of it from the outside. If you think of a sub-atomic particle you think of it from the outside (even though this is paradoxical because there is no clear sense in which a sub-atomic particle has an outside). If you think of a human body you think of its outside. (If you think of its internal organs you think of their outsides and so on.) In your own case, you live your body from the inside. Your body has a lived interiority that is not physical in any objective third person sense. Inside a motor car I have a peculiarly subjective perspective which reveals some parts but not others. Only the exterior of the motor is visible to someone some distance from it.

We model ourselves on others. I think of myself as another. If I think about myself I think of my body as one body amongst others in the world. We have seen that my body is not immediately or directly presented to me like that. I live my body from the inside out. (I am inside out.) Somehow I have come to habitually think of myself as outside in – as just like everybody else. From earliest childhood we have been conditioned to think of ourselves as like other people. This has been an essential part of our socialisation, of our becoming members of society. The German idealist philosopher G.W.F. Hegel has described the complex power

relations that leads to our constitution as self-conscious beings, or persons. In the famous ‘Master and Slave’ dialectic of his 1807 work *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel describes how we constitute one another as mutually constituting one another. I am like another and like another to another but not another to myself, even though I think of myself as another. (Hegel M&S)

That we fundamentally model ourselves on others is an obstacle to our knowing ourselves as we really are. We have to decondition ourselves of the habitual background thought ‘I am one person amongst others’ in order to begin to appreciate that there is life after death. Hegel says that in order to be self-conscious it is necessary to risk death or face death. He means that you only really feel that you exist, feel it in your bones, if you are faced with your own possible non-existence. I should say the reverse does apply. You can only understand what death is if you know what your own existence is. You can only understand what seems to be your own non-being if you understand your own being. It is interesting that we fear death. We have no idea what our existence consists in or why we are here. Why then should we fear our own non-existence or our absence from ‘here’.

On one level it is not wrong to think of yourself as another. This is how you appear to another. On one level this is wrong. You are yourself and in that respect not another. Seeing that there is life after death requires partly reversing the conditioned view of yourself as just one person amongst others. Instead we adopt a subjective point of view: the view from now-here. This will require coming to appreciate the expansive unity of your own existence right here now, and noticing the flux of colours, shapes, sounds and thoughts flowing through.

Science (whether we know anything about it or not) and common sense rush in to object: “I can see the back of my head in a mirror”. In a way this misses the point – or in a way it is the point. Why is a mirror needed in your own case but not in the case of looking at other people? Hang onto this question: Why? Our conditioned mind shies away from noticing our very own existence. Means-to-end ‘practical’ thinking and the third person ‘objective’ perspective have to be left aside for you to just be, and notice your body just as it presents itself. My body is both subject and object; the subject of my experiences, the partial object of my and another’s experiences.

[Swinburne PI p. 27 (in book with Shoemaker).] I move by moving not by moving my body, even though my body does move when I move. If a body is mine I do not move it by moving it but by moving. I do not ‘cause’ my body to move, in way in which I cause objects in the external

world to move. There are some actions I perform, but not by performing other actions. Wittgenstein on the body [insert all references] I move my arm by moving my arm not by causing my arm to go up. [Gareth Evans.]

Merleau-Ponty has pointed out that my body is not 'an object'. In its Latin etymology 'object' carries the connotation of existing at some distance from oneself (ob-jectus). Your own body precisely does not have this status of existing at some distance from you (except under special conditions that are not known in our society).

If your body were an object it would be standing in front of you, observable in a third person way, situated or locatable in your visual or tactile field, amenable to being moved by you for example picked up, or thrown, or toured. If your body were an object it could move away from you and disappear from your visual field. As Merleau-Ponty says, 'Its presence is such as entails a possible absence' (PP 90)

On the contrary, your body defies objective scientific exploration by you. It is always presented to your senses from the same sort of angle. It seems to have a kind of subjective permanence from your point of view. It intimately accompanies you. It is never really in front of you. Your body is in the margins of your perception. Your body is marginal to your being as you experience it.

The differences between being me and observing others are well shown in the striking painting by the Belgian Surrealist artist Rene Magritte *Reproduction Interdite* [include] and Ernst Mach's self portrait in *The Analysis of Sensations*. [include] Mach has drawn himself as he appears to himself. He has not drawn himself as we are conditioned to think of ourselves: as just one person amongst others. Magritte has depicted something that under normal conditions is impossible; the perception of oneself as another. Indeed, the way we are conditioned to automatically think of ourselves is a way in which it is ordinarily impossible to experience ourselves. In order to realise your own existence it is necessary to pay attention to your experience of yourself and shun your automatic third-person images of yourself.

Being you is like adopting the subjective point of view of a camera. Of course a camera is wholly physical mechanism which can be triggered to take photographs automatically, without the need for a conscious being peering down its viewfinder. The camera is like the body. The photographs are like the mind, or a series of perceptions. Contrast this however with the addition of the conscious being. This is like conceiving of a person and then conceiving of oneself as that person. For a person to be you is for something to be added to that person. You are not the same

thing as your body. You are a presence which views the world through your body.

[Body in various religions. Incarnation.]

2. Could We Exchange Bodies?

Could two people swap bodies? If so, you are not your body.

If we could exchange bodies then we could exchange subjective centres of awareness. You would look out of my body and I would look out of your body. If this idea seems ridiculous or far fetched then bear in mind that we are thinking about this only at the start of the twenty first century. Given enough funding of computational and neurological research projects it might be possible in the future to take all the information from one person's brain and place it in another's, and vice versa. This might not be possible in fifty years but what about a thousand years, or a hundred thousand years? It is important not to let our ideas of possibility and impossibility be limited by our location in history. (It was one of the mistakes of nineteenth and twentieth century thought to assume that one's historical situation limited one's world view.)

There is nothing in science which says that we could not swap bodies. Nothing in natural law says that I belong with this body, you with that body. It defies no law of nature to exchange bodies. [cf Knox 1969 RS (cited by Swinburne PI)] Natural law does not tell us which mind goes with which body nor that I go with this body, you with that body.

There is nothing in logic which tells us that we could not swap bodies. There is no contradiction in the idea that you could view the world from my body and I could view the world from yours. We are just waiting on the technology. In Kafka's disturbing but perfectly coherent short story *Metamorphosis* Gregor wakes up viewing the world from a beetle's body. [more lit egs.] If we can coherently imagine something then logic is powerless to show its impossibility.

If we exchanged bodies, where would our thoughts go? There are two possibilities which have to be sharply distinguished. On the one hand you could have your own thoughts but in my body and I could have my own thoughts but in your body. That is relatively easy to imagine. We take our minds with us in the swap so our psychological lives are pretty much as we are now (even though they would no doubt be affected by our new bodies). On the other hand there is a more profound possibility. Once we swapped bodies you might have my thoughts and I might have

your thoughts. In that case we would not only have swapped bodies. We would have swapped minds. Although it requires a greater leap of imagination to conceive this it is perfectly possible. Nothing in science or logic prohibits it. It would no doubt be curious. Your sensation of me-ness and your subjective point of view would be located in my body and you would have thoughts about Oxford in the south of England, visual perceptions of bicycles, English buses, tourists and students. Physically and mentally you would 'be' me, yet your subjective point of view on the world would be your own. I of course would have the body, the thoughts and experiences which were formerly yours. (If this thought is in any way disturbing do no worry. If we ever have the technology to do this we will no doubt have the technology to reverse it also).

The possibility of exchanging bodies shows that we are not our bodies. The fact that your mind could be in my body and my mind could be in your body shows that our minds are distinct from our bodies. The fact that I could view the world from your body and you could view the world from my body shows that we are not our bodies. The fact that you could have my thoughts and I could have your thoughts shows that we are not our minds either. There are in fact three aspects to us: body, mind and spirit.

3. Could You Leave Your Body?

Could you exist without adopting the subjective point of view from a body? Modern western society is extremely sceptical about the possibility of out of body experiences. It does not follow from this scepticism that they are impossible or do not happen. Indeed, there seems no good reason to believe in them unless you have had one yourself. If you do have an out of body experience then there is no doubt in you mind that that is what it is. It is at least as psychologically compelling as, for example, your belief that you are reading this book now. In particular it is the sight of your own face for the first time and your ability to perceive your own body as though it were the body of another that makes it hard to disbelieve in our of body experiences once you have had one.

In the literature on OBE's a distinction is drawn between two kinds of experience; OBE with the astral body and OBE without the astral body. The fact that both kinds of OBE are possible means that the answer to the question Are you an astral body? is No. You have an astral body. You use your astral body in some OBE's but other OBE's do not employ the astral body. You exist in some OBE's without an astral body. Therefore you are not identical with your astral body. This argument is

similar to the argument against identifying yourself with your physical body. If you can exist without something then you are not that thing. If you can exist without your body, mind or astral body then you are not your body, mind, or astral body.

What are the properties of your astral body? You go where it goes. You do not go where it does not go. You feel kinaesthetic sensations in it. It travels. It travel through physical objects (walls etc.) Your astral body can travel instantaneously. This means that it can travel without taking time to travel: be in a place at a time, be in a different place at a later time where no time elapses between those two times. Your astral body is invisible (at least under normal circumstances).

If the possibility of OBE's without the astral body shows that I am not the astral body then my astral body is something I view the world from. It seems then that I can exist in my ordinary human body, the one I was born with. I can acquire a new physical body, say by exchanging bodies with somebody else. I can leave my physical body and travel using my astral body. I can leave my physical body and exist with no body whatsoever. It follows that I am not any kind of body.

In ancient Yoga the expression 'linga sharira' is used in a way that is largely synonymous with 'astral body' but 'atman' is used to mean 'inner space'. This is a crucial distinction. The Yogis recognise that even in astral travel I am not exactly the same thing as my astral body. My astral body is something I sometimes use in out of body states.

OBE's show I can exist away from the physical body. Clearly then, I am not a physical object. Out of body experiences are sometimes preceded by vibrations of the physical body. Interestingly, without the body you have subjectivity without objectivity. You retain a subjective view on the world but you cannot be detected from the third person perspective. It is apparent that the third person/first person singular point of view does not just concern ways of knowing (or what philosophers call epistemology) but ways of being (or what philosophers call ontology). This is apparent because what is available to a first or third person perspective can come apart. You can exist as as subjectivity without objectivity. A being outwardly just like you could exist as objectivity without subjectivity if it had no point of view on the world.

If it is wondered how you could have a subjective 'point of view' without eyes, or without physical location then two things need to be said. This is mysterious with eyes or with physical location. Secondly, it will turn out that inner space has a kind a spatiality, a kind of subjective space. (In chapter 5. below I shall argue that you pervade the world. Indeed you pervade your body and part of the world around your body)

now.) The inner space is partly like the astral body and is largely immaterial. It has spatiality but no spatial location. (If this is difficult to grasp compare space itself. Space is spatial but space is not spatially located).

[cf Strawson in Individuals: end of persons chapter- disembodiment possible (but Strawson reneges)
[Tibetan Yoga has techniques for OBE's
Tibetan Bkash-Hgyur and Bstan-Hygyur
esp the Hatha Yoga Pradipka
Scott Rog p. 87 for bibliography
Kabbalish Zohar (cf Scott Rogo p. 71)]
Yogi Ramacharaka (pennamen of Englishman) The Hindu-Yogic Science of Breath (Chicago, 1904) What is it like to be dead?]

4. Could You Survive the Destruction of Your Body?

If you exchange bodies with someone you still have a body, the other person's body. In an OBE you still have a body, the body you travel from. In astral travel I still have a body, an astral body. But could you exist with no body whatsoever? Could you, for example, survive if your body was wholly destroyed?

Contrary to popular belief there is absolutely no scientific or logical reason why you should not exist disembodied. Of course there is no scientific reason to believe in disembodied existence either, but science is narrowly focused within the third person perspective. The fundamental facts are not the scientific facts.

What is it like to exist without your body? The best way to appreciate this is to imagine that your body suddenly becomes invisible. I mean your experience remains exactly as it is now but you do not see your body. You see this book just as it is now but now but you do not see your hands holding it, nor the ends of your arms. You see the objects in the world beyond and around the book. Downwards you see the floor or ground but not your feet nor any other part of your body. Thoughts and all other experiences, including kinaesthetic sensations, continue just as before.

It might be objected to this description of disembodied existence that it presupposes the existence of the body. [Flew, Penelhum, Hospers, Strawson]. After all, I have used the word 'see' and does that not presuppose eyeballs and a functioning brain? I have used the word 'downwards' and implicitly described the book as in front of view. Do

not these concepts presuppose a spatial orientation and therefore embodiment?

There is nothing in this objection. The experience that we call visual experience is not divided into two channels of vision, one per eyeball. We speak, rightly and insightfully, of a visual field. There is nothing about the visual field that suggests that it has an eyeball as its source or origin. As Wittgenstein says

T 5.631 'There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.

If I wrote a book called *The World as I found it*, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.'

5.633 'You will say this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye'

The eye that sees does not see the eye that sees. We are so conditioned in our ordinary thinking that we automatically assume that if there is vision then there must be an eye that sees. In fact this habit of thought has a twofold origin: in seeing the eyeballs of others orientated towards objects and in seeing through the eyeballs that are in fact our own. Like so many of our concepts of the human, it has an origin that is essentially partly first person singular and partly third person [Locke, Wittgenstein]. The visual field is part of an intersensory field, a subjective space in which all your thoughts and experiences occur. It is this space which remains intact if the body disappears. In fact, your normal everyday experience of your body is something that occurs in this subjective space. In chapter 5 we shall see how this space is essential to what you are, in a way that the body is not.

John Hospers in his excellent *An Introduction to philosophical Analysis* (1956 4th ed.) uses H.G. Wells' description of the central character of *The Invisible Man* but then wrongly concludes that the body is presupposed. So-called brain-in-a vat cases show that the body is not presupposed. If you are a brain in a vat then you are not reading a copy of Stephen Priest's *The Grammar of Persons* but a mad scientist is stimulating your brain in all and only those areas which are neurologically active when you believe you are reading Priest's book (or perhaps when you are reading Priest's book). Philosophers are interested

in this kind of case because it raises the questions: How can appearance be distinguished from reality? How can virtual reality be distinguished from reality? What is the relation between my inner mental states and the external public world? We just need to push the thought experiment one stage further to say that the brain in the vat is an illusion. Even this is not necessary if we note that, even in normal sane circumstances, the brain does not perceive itself. Of course the brain can think about itself. You can use your brain to think about your brain. There is no problem about that, you could be doing it right now. The problem is that the brain cannot perceive itself. This could have been otherwise, in a different world. Suppose your brain (which has a crinkly surface anyway) could frown, rather like your forehead. Then in a way the brain would be experiencing itself. (Sensation is not enough to perception so the brain would have to truly say to itself things like, yes, now I am feeling the exterior of the right cerebral sphere, using its sensitive surface membrane, and so on, while frowning.) The perceiving brain does not perceive the brain that perceives. So, in the ordinary brain in a vat experiment, the external world is an illusion and the brain is not perceived. Nothing physical is perceived. Nonetheless, you continue to exist in the brain in a vat scenario. Of course, the way the experiment is set up it is supposed that you are your brain, or in some way closely dependent on your brain. This though is an article of materialist faith. You have never seen your own brain. Yes, of course it exists, but this is to invoke the third person perspective too quickly. The fundamental point is that you exist irrespective of the appearance of your brain. If you delete the brain from the brain in a vat thought experiment you have something like an accurate description of out of body experience. Delete the brain and leave everything else. This essentially leaves us with the scenario of Descartes. He rightly saw that everything around him could cease to exist but he could be left over. (However, as we shall see, he wrongly assimilates the mind and the inner space).

5. Why Are You Self centred?

Suppose all apparent reality is virtual reality. We need to know who or what sees or apprehends this reality. We need to know who or what is the subject, 'subject' in the sense of 'that which has experiences'. So far I have suggested that without the body there would remain your current subjective space. There would still be the sensory zone in which all your thoughts and perceptions take place. I shall argue later that you essentially are this space.

[Husserl and the transcendental ego. But, take seriously Wiggins and E.J. Lowe. Are you constituted by your body? Wrong in the end.]

Phenomenalism is an empiricist theory of perception. It is the doctrine that to talk about physical objects is equivalent to talking about actual and possible sense experiences. More precisely, it is the thesis that any set of sentences about physical objects may be translated into a set of sentences about sense contents without loss of meaning. If this translation project is possible then it is possible to translate the public into the private, the external into the internal, the physical into the mental. If the translation is only possible one way, in the direction physical mental, then it shows that the physical is reducible to the mental but the mental is not reducible to the physical. Now, I maintain that disembodied existence is like the truth of phenomenalism. Phenomenalism being true is closely like what it would be like to be dead. All the experiences are there, intact as in life, but the physical world has disappeared. The world is phenomenologically reduced to one's experience in it. (In philosophy there are two groups phenomenologists and phenomenologists. They insist their views are not to be confused with one another and are in fact profoundly opposed. In philosophy this is often a sign that they turn out to be saying the same thing.)

Phenomenalism shows that the disembodied private language does not depend on the public language. Wittgenstein and Geach have wrongly argued that phenomenalism is an impossible doctrine because it presupposes a private language but there is no private language. They are not right about this because phenomenalism is only the claim that the public language can be translated into a private language. A private language that can be translated into from a public language is not a private language in any strong sense of 'private'. For example, it is a language anyone could in principle understand. Phenomenalism is a route from the public physical world to the subjective space of the inner space.

In some kinds of meditation consciousness of the body is lost. The subjective space of one's own awareness remains, but the body does not feature as an object of that awareness. In some religious traditions it is concluded on this basis that your consciousness blends into the cosmic consciousness of which it is but a part. This is not right. It overlooks the fact that, if we are both meditating, your subjective centre of awareness is not my subjective centre of awareness. Your internal emptiness is not my internal emptiness. This interiority is not that interiority. There is still you and there is still me even after our bodies have dissolved, and even if our thoughts and experiences have relaxed to nothing.

According to The Egyptian Book of the Dead (Budge p. lxix)

‘...the whole man consisted of a natural body, a spiritual body, a heart, a double, a inner space, a shadow, an intangible ethereal casing or spirit, a form, and a name’(EBD p. lxix)

and these are mutually dependent for their welfare. For example the spirit suffers if corpse not preserved, so, as is well known, the ancient Egyptians went to enormous length to preserve the corpses of their dead. Although to the atheistic scientific materialist mind of the West the Egyptian taxonomy of selves is, to put it politely, implausible I do not find it exaggerated or outrageous. The natural body is that flesh and blood living body that you view the world from now. The heart is the seat of your emotions (in sudden fear ‘your hear is in your mouth’). Your double is a person who is exactly like you but not you. We shall consider this curious being in chapter 2. Inner space is you. Your shadow is your astral body. The ethereal casing or spirit is the aura or glowing field around your body that can be detected by certain sensitive people even from a third person perspective. Your form is the way you are, mentally and physically. Your name is the proper name by which you are called.

You are not your body but even if you were, it does not follow that there is no life after death. It is an essential tenet of the Christian religion that there exists the hope of the resurrection of the body. By the grace of Ultimate reality you may live again. This doctrine is also found in Judaism and Budge claims early Egyptian belief in resurrection of the body. (EBD lxx) [more religions on resurrection] Wittgenstein’s idea of reassembly (Notes on Aesthetics & Religious Belief) It has happened once so is more likely to happen again. Hume and Popper wrong about probability. In the tomb (so corporeal?) However, the existence of the inner space is necessary to guarantee that a resurrection is your resurrection, results in you living again. Suppose a thousand beings qualitatively identical to you were resurrected. This is in Ultimate reality’s power because everything is in Ultimate reality’s power.

Western philosophy has seen a forgetting of the inner space. The West has forgotten what we are. This has been caused by the decline of church religion, the rise of science, the rise of capitalist commercialism and the fact that our minds are crowded with incomplete thoughts. Drugs in animals used for food, chemicals in vegetables, television, medication, recreation hide from us our own being. Science cannot explain the human subject as a free conscious individual (still less as the inner space).

You have these thoughts and sensations because of the brain, because of embodiment. Our embodiment is responsible for our conditioning.

This turns tables on objection that the mind depends on brain. Yes. That is the problem. We are very conditioned. This is the reason we do not realise we are inner spaces. The West (over the last 2-3 centuries) is the most conditioned culture/civilisation in history. Therefore it is the one most ignorant of the inner space and immortality. You have to exist.

There is suffering caused by identifying yourself with your body. This is a deep neurosis of the West. Your body will die. You think you are your body so with perfect logic you think you will die. The body is too fat, too thin, is the wrong shape, suffers ailments and diseases and physical blows. You think this happens to you. In fact it only happens to your body even though it is felt in the mind.

The journey from the scientific and ordinary commonsensical understanding of the world to seeing that there is life after death is via philosophical questions. Common sense is historically constituted and historically changing. Our Western capitalist common sense has little in common with most historical communities. If you can really feel the bite of the philosophical questions without wandering onto conditioned thought you will see that Metaphysical questions can be posed within the physical world. Metaphysical questions cannot be answered only by looking inside the physical world (except in a profound and subjective sense of 'inside' that is not meant here:- I am the inside of the world.) Metaphysical questions have to be answered by looking outside the physical world. (cf the famous picture of the person looking through the sky to the heavens(in Renaissance).) Scientists can make little of this, because of the 3rd person perspective. (FN 'perspective' = epistemological access. 1st person singular general, but only one is you. Russell's E shriek).

If materialism is true immortality is still possible, even likely.

Christian incarnation and resurrection

Although you do experience your body, your body is not presented to you as one object amongst others that you could experience in the course of the world. You experience your body by being where it is.

The eye that sees cannot see the eye that sees. This is not because the eyes are located on the front of the body but because you see through them. In so far as it sees, your eye is not one object amongst others you could see in the world.

You are not just another. You are not somebody else except to somebody else. You are not another to yourself. You are only another to somebody else. These are not fundamentally facts about self-consciousness. They are facts about being you, facts about embodiment. Some embodiment is your embodiment. This makes possible the

peculiar perspectives you have on just one body but not on any of the other bodies. You are yourself and somebody else at the same time. You can even be presented to two people, you and someone else, both these ways simultaneously. You cannot be presented in these ways to one person simultaneously. There are asymmetries between first person singular (singular) and third person perspectives on the body.

You are given to yourself subjectively and only partly objectively. Another person is presented to you objectively and only partly subjectively. Subjectivity exists because there is something it consists in to be someone. Subjectivity is partly mental and partly physical. Mentally it shows up in the undergoing of sensations and the private having of thoughts. Physically it shows up in the perspective your body gives on the world. Other people appear to you to be physical but they also appear imbued with mentality and emotion, as purposeful, as cooperative as threatening, in an infinity of ways.

The part of your body that touches cannot touch the part of your body that touches, even though the body can touch itself. This is not simply some physical awkwardness concerning the shape of the human body or the location of its limbs. It is a consequence of a human body's being someone's body. You have a subjective point of view and centre of action in one body.

You ordinarily think of your body as one body amongst others. You ordinarily think of yourself as one person amongst others in the world. This however is not how you are originally or fundamentally given to yourself. It is a psychological achievement. You have to perceive other people as objects in the world and think the thought about yourself: I am one of those. The perception of another is recuperated or taken back and applied to your own case so that you take yourself to be one person amongst others. As the conditioning is reinforced by practical concerns and many perceptions of other people, you take yourself to be just one person amongst others. This conditioning submerges and conceals the profound mystery of your own existence. It masks from you the startling fact of your own existence; of some existence's being yours. It is always obvious to you that you exist as one person amongst others. What is startling and seemingly inexplicable is that you do not just exist as one person amongst others but as yourself.

Being you is not being a body even though you have a body. It is acceptable to say that 'I am a body' so long as 'am' is not used to express straightforward identity. You view the world from a certain body. It is right either than you are your body. The full truth is that your body is in you. Your body is at the subjective centre of the world. You experience

the world as distributed all around you. You experience your body as at the centre of the world. This subjective or disc shaped world is much closer to what you are than your body. This world, without its contents, is what you are. Your body is at the centre of your world but it is one being amongst others in the world.

It seems obvious that you cannot see without eyes. Damage to the eyes causes loss or impairment of eyesight. However, the fact that the eyes do not appear within the visual field is a clue to the possibility of a kind of seeing without eyes; a kind of disembodied seeing or spiritual seeing. To appreciate this, imagine that the whole content of your visual experience is just as it is now, but with one difference: there is no visual perception of your body. Your body does not appear within your visual field. This should not be difficult to imagine because, as things are now, very little of your body is appearing to you visually: parts of your hands holding this book perhaps, parts of your legs. Suppose, instead of seeing these parts of your body you saw straight down to the floor. The book is in front of you still but not held. Your visual field is in fact like an unbounded circle, not like a cone or a searchlight beam. It is the habit of assuming you are a body confronted with a world 'in front' of you that distorts our assumptions about the visual field. This seeing without seeing your own body is perfectly imaginable. There is no incoherence in it so it is at least theoretically possible. It is logically and metaphysically possible. The logically and metaphysically possible reveals the metaphysical fissures in the world. Although eyesight without eyes is empirically or physically impossible, disembodied seeing is logically and metaphysically possible. Spiritual seeing is possible without physical eyes, indeed, without the body. Physical objects can be seen through disembodied seeing.

Do these subjective facts about the body suggest that you are your body? Perhaps you cannot see it as an object because you are it. Being it is in the way of apprehending it. The word 'am' denotes a kind of pervasion. 'Am' captures being it, not in the sense of being identical with it, but in the sense of being where it is. You are not your body because if your body disappears you remain. The logical possibility of this is shown by the fact that your experience, except for the experience of your body, could remain the same if your body disappeared. There is a phenomenology of disembodiment. I am then present to myself not as nothingness but as a kind of no-thing-ness. It is possible to notice one's own being as no-thing-ness when embodied. Between the world and your experience there is no-thing-ness. Your body is thingness. The content of the world is thingness. The world is no-thing-ness, as is the visual field.

The whole experiential field that you have and the world where objects and events are presented to you are the same thing, except this is not a thing. It is no-thing-ness.

Your body is not co-extensive with the world, spread across the things in the world, but you are co extensive with as much of the world as is presented to you. You are not this presented world. You are where the presented world is. You are the space against which the contents of the world occur. You are background. The events and objects of the world are foreground. To see that inner space space that you are this has to be reversed. You have to see the space of the world as foreground and the objects of the world as background. This is to begin to take a spiritual view. Understanding that there is life after death does not involve postulating something extra. It requires making salient structures of your experience that are normally repressed by practical matters, by science, by dealing with others.

You are a centre, like a mathematical point but also the subjective space emanating from that point. The events and objects of the world are arranged all around the central point that you are and in the subjective space that you are. You are invisible but you can be detected by the sense of sight. The gaps between the leaves of the tree are invisible but may be detected as spaces because the leaves of the tree are visible. Similarly, you are invisible as spiritual space emanating from a point, but this structure can be detected by sight because visible things are arranged according to it. Ordinarily, you are not known to yourself. You are immediately spiritual space. You are mediately a certain body and a certain mind. The world is a clue to what you are because the world has your shape, your structure, your imprint. You contain the world as it is present to you. You pervade the world.

You are not identical to your body. There is always more to you than your body or your mind. When all the facts about your body, or your mind, have been specified not all the facts about you have been specified. Your body allows a point of view on the world but you are what has that point of view. 'Point' is right in 'point of view'. You are a point. In a sense you are infinitely small and in a sense you are infinitely large. This is because of your spiritual nature. You are infinitely small in the sense that no matter how small you think you are you are smaller than that. You are infinitely large because no matter how large you think you are you are larger than that. You are closer to yourself than you think. You are more distant from yourself than you think. You are much closer to yourself than your body or your mind. You are yourself, but this identity entails a kind of infinity. There is no limit to the extent to which

you are what you are. The truth is that you are the coherent combination of infinite proximity and infinite distance, of infinite smallness and infinite expansiveness. You are the infinite zone in which these oppositions are held in coherent tension. You are in the inside of infinite interiority.

You are inner space to the extent that you exist. You 'are' partly your body for a while, in earthly existence. Your partly being it or really pervading it consists in the point that you are being located at the centre of a body. You could have had a different body. The point or absolute centre of your existence could have been at the centre of someone else's body. Their absolute point could have been at the centre of your body. Then you would have viewed the world from their body and they would have viewed the world from theirs. You could have had your own mind or you could have had their mind. This reverse could take place now. There is no incoherence in the supposition that we exchange human beings instantaneously. You view the world from my human being. I view the world from your human being. The logical possibility of our exchanging bodies shows that you are not your body and I am not my body. If you were identical with your body and me with mind then we could not exchange them: we would go where our bodies go.

Although your body is composed of matter you are not composed of matter. You are where matter is. You pervade a portion of matter. Matter itself is not rightly understood as a substance. Matter is a complex constellation of events occupying a portion of space time. 'Occupying' is to be understood in terms of attraction and repulsion of events, not inert and massive presence in space like a macroscopic physical object.

Although your body is a physical object and a physical subject you are neither a physical object nor a physical subject. You pervade a physical subject-object. You are where a physical subject-object is (but not only there). Subjectivity can be physical, even though mental subjectivity is not physical. Subjectivity is physical to the extent that matter is inhabited from the inside by the inner space. The inner space is inside and outside matter because it pervades matter and exceeds it.

The inner space is where matter is but matter is distributed through it. There is no contradiction in the idea that the point that is the centre of inner space should be centre on a body that is not a human body. Reincarnation is a logical possibility. (Theologically: Reincarnation is within the power of Ultimate reality because everything is within the power of Ultimate reality.) Embodiment is possible because you are a inner space, not because you are a mind. For a body to be your body is for the inner space that you are to be centred in it.

Because the inner space is not the mind or the body, understanding why there is life after death is not the same problem as the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem is that of specifying the relation between the mind and the body. The solution to this problem as usually conceived is this: Thinking is the mental activity of the brain, even though thinking is not physical. From the fact that the brain, which is physical, engages in an activity which is mental, thinking, it does not follow that thinking is a physical activity. A human being is a psycho-physical complex or a psycho-physical whole. Its 'being' you consists in you being centred in it as a inner space. The point that is the centre of the inner space is at the centre of a human being. (Put 'being' under erasure with a 'X' because you are not quite it. Like Heidegger and Derrida. I am not my body but I 'amX' my body.)

If you close your eyes and look at the inside of your face you do not see nothing even though you do not see any thing. You do not see absolute blackness or whiteness but shifting residues of light impressions in darkness. This shimmering presence happens against a background space which is your experiential field. The subjectivity of the body and the objectivity of the world of objects is dissolved in this space. In so far as your experience ceases to be visual, this space is disclosed as what you are. You are aware of being this space by being it. 'Aware' is not the right word if it implies three things: you as the subject of awareness, space as the object of awareness, and awareness as a relation between the two. The space is monolithic and it is disclosed in so far as the tripartite structure of awareness of consciousness dissolves. In so far as there can be consciousness with no object and no subject consciousness is this space. Consciousness is reduced or expanded to become this space.

Your body is at the centre of the subjective space that is inner space. On the other hand, the dimensionless point that is the centre of inner space is at the centre of your body (in the heart?).

If you imagine away your body and your mind then you are what is left over. If you close your eyes and successfully imagine you are facing the other way then you realise how little dependence there is on your subjective space and that human being with whom you ordinarily identify yourself. If you move the world stands still. If the world moves you stand still.

You probably already know you are not your body. You do not exactly coincide with your body, but the part of you that does not coincide with your body is not a marginal or contingent part of you. It is essential to what you are. It is you.

When you breath in your body inflates, like a balloon. This expansiveness is rather like the inner space. Inhalation and exhalation are metaphors for the inner space. The world in the sense of the planat earth is a metaphor for the inner space. If it were possible to view the outside of the inner space it would look like a sphere. This is not possible because the inner space has no physical outside. In the ordinary sense, the inner space is an inside without an outside. You are not inside your body. Your body is inside you.

In sleep the body and mind partly shut down. Mind-travel is possible within the dream space disclosed through sleep. This space is not a different space from the inner space that, with care, is disclosed in waking life. Waking and sleeping are events within the inner space. They all fall on the content side of the inner space.

It is possible to travel but leave your body behind. There are two kinds of imagining: imagining in the sense of fanciful non-veridical thinking and veridical imagining. Veridical imagining causes the disclosure of the inner space. It must be unfocussed imagining: not imagining this object rather than that but imagining the expansion of what you are to be the space all around you.

It is sometimes asked: Are out of body experiences possible? We are out of our bodies anyway. If you think of yourself as your body you are already thinking of yourself as outside in. You are thinking of yourself as coinciding or not coinciding with your body, and this entails thinking of yourself as not coinciding with your body. You are not a non-physical thing inside your body. Your body is a physical thing inside your non-physical self. You are not an object in the world. Better to think of objects in the world as in you. By leaving your body you are joining inner space. Here, 'joining inner space' means shedding the conditioning that has prevented you from noticing all along that you are inner space.

The inner space owns the body. The body is an animal. The inner space owns the body like a pet dog. The owner and the kennel are one and the same. The body is unruly - like an ill trained dog. The dog has to be trained. The dog deceives you into thinking he is you. The dog is tethered to a stake at the centre of the inner space. The inner space is kind of light. The inner space is a light with your body at the centre. You are this light.

If I am aware of myself as a bodily subject I am aware of myself as spatially located, but the reverse does not follow. I can be aware of myself as a spiritual substance that 'pervades' part of the physical world.

The body is in the inner space. The body is located in the portion of spiritual space-time that is the inner space. The body is the physical form

of the inner space. The body is the expression of the inner space. The inner space makes a body my body.

Visually, you always presents itself to you from the same angle. Your head is invisible to you except perhaps the end of your nose and the boundaries of my eye sockets. Look at Ernst Mach's self portrait. You can see your eyes by using mirrors but the eyes you then see are the exteriors of the observed eyes of an observer, not the lived interiority of your own eyes observing. The nearer to your eyes are the regions of my body within your visual field, the less your body appears as an object. It is in a subjective space.

Your body is not metaphysically necessary for your experiences because it is not that which has them. Although you use my body to observe physical objects in the external world, you are not your body.

You may observe your own body objectively in an out of body experience. To do this I do not require a second body but remain as my inner space. It does not much matter whether we think of the inner space leaving the body or the body moving to a different region of the inner space. Your body could in principle move within inner space and turn around to face you. Then you would be confronted with your own body as an object in the interior space of the inner space. Your body would be presented to you in the way that the body of another is normally presented: facing you. You would not then be aware of your body in the place you have your experiences. There would be an absence of body there. Then, perhaps for the first time, like in the Magritte picture *Reproduction Interdite* you could look at your body's back and look at the back of your own head. You would encounter your body as one item amongst others in the world, perhaps saturated with your own thought and emotion, otherwise like the body of another. This body would be like the body of another but would not be the body of another. You would not adopt or inhabit the subjective point of view of this body. Your mentality but not your being, not your spirituality, would be centred on this body.

Ordinarily, in so far as your body sees or touches the world it cannot be seen or touched by you. You move external objects by moving your body, but you move your body by moving.

Out of your body, you encounter your body in objective space. Normally, you have no need to look for your body because it is already centred on you. Your body is presented to you as a subject-object. Your body as body-subject makes possible the ordinary perspectival ways in which objects appear to you. Conditioning prevents you from being aware of the space from which you view objects.

VI

MIND

‘Any satisfactory solution to the mind-body problem must include an account of why the so-called “I”, “subjective self”, or “self as subject of experiences” seems so adept at slipping through the meshes of every nomological net of physical explanations.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 273

Mind-body problem. Quantum Physics provides the laws, and the dependence of the physical world on consciousness. Idealism, it turns out, is the right theory of the mind.

‘Philosophers find themselves forced to endorse quixotic views of the self primarily because they systematically fail to show how a human being might conceive of himself as being completely in the world.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 273

Self. being-in-the-world.

‘[...] physicalism seems intuitively plausible because mainly because of a dramatic absence of reasons for supposing that were we to dissect, dismantle, and exhaustively inspect any other person we would discover anything other than a complicated organization of physical things, properties, processes, and events.’

(Gunderson 1970) p. 273-4

mind-body. physicalism.

‘the conceptual hardship each person faces when trying to imagine himself as being completely accounted for by any such dissection, dismantling, or inspection.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 274

mind. physicalism.

‘A physicalistic [...] account of the mind at the outset seems quite convincing so long as I consider anyone except myself.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 274

mind. physicalism.

‘[We] cannot have any [re]presentation whatsoever of a thinking being, through any outer experiences, but only through self-consciousness.’
Kant (CPR p. 332)

‘Actually if after grasping ‘my’ consciousness in its absolute interiority and by a series of reflective acts, I then seek to unite it with a certain living object composed of a nervous system, a brain, glands, digestive, respiratory and circulatory organs whose very matter is capable of being analyzed chemically into atoms of hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, etc., then I am going to encounter insurmountable difficulties.’ (Sartre, 1943 p. 303)

‘But these difficulties all stem from the fact that I try to unite my consciousness not with my body but with the body of others. In fact the body which I have just described is not my body such as it is for me [...]’ (Sartre, 1943 p. 303)

‘So far as the physicians have had any experience with my body, it was with my body in the midst of the world and as it is for others. My body as it is for me does not appear to me in the midst of the world.’
(Sartre, 1943 p. 303)

Mind-body theories are putative solutions to the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem is that of stating the exact relation between the mind and the body, or, more narrowly, between the mind and the brain.

Dualism, or mind-body dualism, is the theory that both minds and brains exist and no mind is a brain and no brain is a mind, nor is a mind any part of a brain or a brain any part of a mind. Materialism is the theory that the mind is the brain, or nothing over and above the brain. Idealism is the theory that only minds exist and that physical objects, including the human body, are dependent on minds or consciousness for their existence. Logical behaviorism is the theory that minds can be reduced to publicly observable bodily behavior. Functionalism is the theory that a mind is a set of states essentially causally related to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and one another. On double aspect theories, mind and body are two aspects of some jointly presupposed reality that is intrinsically neither mental nor physical. Phenomenology offers ways of marking the distinction between mental and physical and diagnoses of how the mind-body problem is thinkable. Parts of the mind-body problem arise in research in artificial intelligence and might be solved by a better

understanding of the relations between hardware and software. Most of the theories of the mind-body relation exist also as metaphysical theories; theories of reality as a whole.

Mind-Body Dualism

Hinduism, and non-Atavaidic Vedanta, entail mind-body dualism because if the inner space migrates through distinct incarnations then it is something that can exist independently of the body and if atman's fusion with Brahman preserves atman's individuality then atman can exist without the existence of a human body.

The earliest Western philosopher to endorse dualism is the Presocratic Pythagoras. He inherited the ancient Egyptian religious doctrine that a non-physical part of the person survives death and he believed in the reincarnation of the inner space. If Plato is not correctly read as an idealist then he is a mind-body dualist. In his dialogue *The Phaedo* especially, Socrates advances arguments for the conclusion that the inner space survives bodily death. Aristotle holds that the inner space is the 'form' of the human body. He is nevertheless a mind-body dualist because he insists that the intellectual part of the inner space is immortal, even though he offers functionalist or materialist accounts of affective and sensory faculties.

Orthodox Christianity is not mind-body dualist. Human immortality consists in the hope of bodily resurrection, or the living again of the whole person by the grace of Ultimate reality, not in the immortality of a disembodied inner space. Although the term 'inner space' is sometimes used in the Old and New Testaments it does not there explicitly denote an immaterial mental substance that could exist whether or not the body exists. The inner space in this strong metaphysical sense was introduced into Christianity by St. Augustine who, believing Platonism and Christianity mutually consistent and true, sought to fuse them into a single philosophical system. Augustine's synthesis accounts for the subsequent Christian belief in mind-body dualism even though a guarantee of the immortality of the inner space would seem to make the hope of resurrection redundant. On the other hand, it might be that some resurrection can only be my resurrection if I am or have a inner space. If that is right, the immortality of the inner space is a logical presupposition of the truth of Christianity.

The seventeenth century French philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes argues in his *Meditations* that the only fact of which he can be certain is that he exists. The evidence of the senses, the truths of

mathematics and the whole physical world are ultimately dubitable but his own existence cannot be doubted, because if he doubts he exists. On these premises Descartes concludes that he is a thing that thinks that does not depend on the physical world, including his own body. Cartesian dualism is the view that each of us is essentially a substantial inner space that is distinct from the body.

Materialism

The Greek atomist Democritus maintains that there exist only atoms and the void. Atoms are indivisible material particles and the void is the infinite empty space in which they are in motion. If atomism is true then anything is either an atom or reducible to atoms. If there are minds or mental states then they are reducible to atoms and if atoms are physical then minds are physical.

Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth-century English political theorist and philosopher, was a foundationalist about geometry: Unless the statements of geometry are true then no statement can be true. Geometry is the mathematics of space so it follows that everything is spatial. If everything spatial is physical then everything is physical and so materialism is true. Hobbes has an account of how people come to be misled into dualism or otherwise believing in non-physical realities. Because a mind does not seem to be straightforwardly a physical object we falsely assume it is a non-physical object, but this is an abstraction caused by thinking away just some material properties, notably solidity. Hobbes thinks that if you think of anything you can only think of it as physical. You think of a ghost as having some physical properties; extension and indeterminate shape perhaps. This sort of criticism of putative non-physical realities was later adopted in the 1930's by the Vienna Circle, who sought to replace religion by natural science.

The Mind-Brain Identity Theory was influential from the mid 1950's into the 1980's. The main claim of the English philosopher U.T. Place's seminal paper 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' (British Journal of Psychology, 1956) is that consciousness is strictly or numerically identical with a physical process in the brain. The identity is a contingent and a posteriori one, not a necessary and a priori one. Place's claim is not have proved that consciousness is a brain process but to have removed a priori philosophical objections to it as a scientific hypothesis.

Idealism

Although non-dualistic Vedanta entails the idealist doctrine that only subjective centres of experience exist and the empirical world is only an appearance, the first systematic thinker who could be construed as an idealist is the Presocratic monist Parmenides of Elea. He thought all and only what can be thought exists.

Plato insists that the Forms (eidos) are non-physical types or essences which exist independently not only of space and time but the human mind. However, they are in principle graspable by the human mind given appropriate training and the inner space 'participates' in them before birth and after death. To the extent that the Forms are ideal Plato is an idealist, because he thinks the empirical world depends upon the Forms for its existence. The neo-Platonist Greek-Egyptian philosopher Plotinus is plausibly construed as an idealist because he maintains that the empirical world is ultimately an emanation of the One, which is at least non-physical and spiritual and possesses mental properties.

Berkeley, argues that it makes no sense to claim that physical objects exist independently of the possibility of thinking of them, or perceiving them. He also argues that the concept of matter, or a physical substratum which the properties of a physical object are properties of, is incoherent.

Immanuel Kant is usually read as an idealist philosopher of some type or degree because his own name for his philosophy is 'transcendental idealism'. However, transcendental idealism is the epistemological doctrine that we are cognitively constituted in such a way that we may only know things as they appear to us not as they really are in themselves. We are psychologically equipped to formulate philosophical questions but not to answer them. There are no metaphysical propositions because putative claims about a reality beyond space and time are neither true nor false. So 'idealism' in 'transcendental idealism' is best read as 'anti-realism'. In so far as a solution to the mind-body problem may be extracted from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, it entails a repudiation of Cartesian mind-body dualism for misusing the category 'substance' outside space and time, and an implicit endorsement of the construction of the mental-physical distinction out of a prior monism of phenomena.

It is in the writings of Kant's successors J.G. Fichte and F.W.J. Schelling that transcendental idealism becomes a kind of idealism. Hegel's Absolute Idealism is the doctrine that the multiplicity of kinds and degrees of consciousness are ultimately aspects or shapes (Gestalten) of the one ultimate cosmic consciousness called Geist. On this thesis, which is partly Brahmanist and partly Neo-Platonist, the distinction between mental and physical ultimately depends on Geist.

Logical Behaviorism

Logical (or ‘analytical’) behaviorism is the theory that any statement about minds or mental states may be translated into a claim or set of claims about actual or possible bodily behavior that is in principle observable. Logical behaviorism is a reduction of the inner to the outer, the subjective to the objective, the private to the public, the first person singular to the third person singular.

The German-born American positivist philosopher Carl Hempel is a logical behaviorist in this defined sense. The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein and the English philosopher Gilbert Ryle offer subtle analyses of the uses of ordinary psychological language designed to show that seemingly Cartesian or introspective language in fact takes on its meaning from shared uses in a public world. In particular, Wittgenstein argues in his Private Language Argument in *Philosophical Investigations* that there have to be public, third-person criteria for psychological ascriptions. Mental concepts cannot take on meaning by a kind of private ostensive definition, a sort of inner private labeling of one’s own sensations. In that case, there would be no criterion for the correctness of a putative ascription: There would be nothing it would consist in for the ascription to be true or false. It follows that there are no logically private psychological ascriptions and mental terms do not take on meaning only from one’s own case.

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein would strongly resist being called a behaviorist. Ryle, who in *The Concept of Mind* argues that the myth of Cartesianism does not have to be true in order for our psychological vocabulary to be meaningful, was not wholly uncomfortable with the label.

Functionalism

Functionalism may be partly understood as an attempt to overcome some shortcomings of logical behaviorism. Behavior seems neither necessary nor sufficient for mentality. It is not sufficient because from the fact that someone behaves in a particular way it does not follow that they are in a particular mental state. Behavior is not necessary for mentality because from the fact that a person is in a particular mental state it does not follow that they behave in a particular way. Mind does not seem to be behavior. Mind seems to be the inner cause of behavior. The Princeton philosopher David Lewis and the Harvard philosopher Hilary Putnam have argued

that being in a mental state is being in a functional state; one caused by sensory inputs and causing behavioral outputs. Functionalism does not entail a view about the intrinsic nature of a mental state so in a sense avoids the mind-body problem. However, with the addition of just one extra premise: Only physical events may be causes or effects, functionalism is a kind of materialism. Functionalism is consistent with the assumption of Cognitive Science that a person is best viewed as an information processing system.

Double Aspect Theories

The seventeenth century Portuguese-born Dutch Jewish philosopher Benedictus de Spinoza argued that reality has two essential properties: thought and extension, or consciousness and physical size. The totality of what is could appropriately be called 'Ultimate reality' or 'Nature' (*deus sive natura*). As parts of the whole, human minds and bodies are two aspects of an underlying reality. Thought cannot exist without extension nor extension without thought. As on many double aspect theories, this raises the question of what the underlying reality is that is allegedly neither mental nor physical. Spinoza's answer is existence or being. However, the concept of existence or being has proved recalcitrant to more primitive analysis by philosophers from Parmenides to Heidegger.

Bertrand Russell endorsed two kinds of double aspect theory at different stages of his intellectual career. He endorsed the empiricist view that mind and matter are logical constructions out of sense data; the contents of sensory experience as they are directly given. Intrinsically they are neither mental nor physical. In *An Outline of Philosophy* (London, 1970) he argues that there can be no distinction between mental and physical unless fundamentally there exist events that are not clearly mental or physical. In particular the smallest events postulated by science have no intrinsic mental properties and, on Russell's endorsement of the De Broglie Shroedinger view of matter, are non-material constituents of matter.

Peter Strawson argues in *Individuals* (1959) that the concept of a person is primitive with regard to the distinction between mind and body. Unless we are already possessed of the concept of the person as a whole we are not in a position to draw a mind-body distinction. There is a considerable class of predicates that are not clearly only mental or only physical, for example 'is smiling', 'is running'.

The Harvard philosopher and psychologist William James invented the term 'neutral monism' for the view that there are items neither mental

nor physical which are ontologically or epistemologically prior to the distinction between mind and matter.

Phenomenology

Phenomenology is the description of appearances just as they are given to consciousness. Assumptions about their objective reality or causal relations are suspended or bracketed by an *epoche* (Greek for: 'suspension of judgement'). The ambition of phenomenology is to show how knowledge, including all scientific, religious and philosophical knowledge is possible. Husserl grounded knowledge in the transcendental ego; a subjective source of experience that one's own being ultimately consists in, even after ontological commitment to the empirical human being has been suspended by the *epoche*. The transcendental ego is purportedly neither mental nor physical and phenomenology is purportedly prior to the drawing of that distinction. However, the construction of the world out of acts of consciousness on some construals entails idealism and Husserl sometimes called his own philosophy 'transcendental idealism'. As is the case with Kant, however: that consciousness of an object is necessary and sufficient for the objective givenness of that object would seem not to entail that object's dependence on consciousness for its existence. Husserl's teacher and phenomenological predecessor, the Austrian philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano argued that the essence of consciousness is intentionality: directedness towards an object.

Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre reject the *epoche* and the transcendental ego and argue that the mental physical distinction is dependent on the fundamental existential category being-in-the-world. (Neurosciences; Cognitive Science; Consciousness Studies; Mind-Brain Interaction; Experience, Religious)

'[...] the soul comes to the actual realisation of its existence through the fact that it understands and perceives' Aquinas *De Veritate* 10, 8

'The World (... that is, the whole masse of things that are) is Corporeall, that is to say Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Breadth, and Depth; also every part of Body is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe.' Hobbes *Leviathan* ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, 1985) p. 689

‘Spirits [...] have dimensions, and are therefore really Bodies’ Hobbes Leviathan ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, 1985) p. 689

‘Examining attentively what I was, and seeing that I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world or place that I was in, but that I could not for all that pretend that I did not exist, and that, on the contrary, from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed very evidently and certainly that I existed: while on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although the rest of what I had imagined had been true, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed: I thereby concluded that I was a substance of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing; so that this I, that is to say the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and even that it is easier to know than the body, and moreover, that even if the body were not, it would not cease to be all that it is.’ Descartes Discourse on Method in Discourse on Method and Meditations (Harmondsworth, 1954) p. 54

‘All the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a inner space or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking.’ Berkeley Principles of Human Knowledge ed. G. Warnock (London, 1977) 139

‘In short: all ostensible mind can be attributed to matter, but all matter can likewise be attributed to mind; from which it follows that the antithesis is a false one.’ Schopenhauer Essays and Aphorisms trans. R. J. Hollingdale p. 212

‘When we have a percept, just what we perceive [...] is an event occupying part of the region which, for physics, is occupied by the brain [...] what we perceive is part of the stuff of our brains, not part of the stuff of tables, chairs, sun, moon and stars.’ Russell An Outline of Philosophy (London, 1970) p. 292

‘All psychological statements which are meaningful, that is to say, which are in principle verifiable, are translatable into statements which do not involve psychological concepts, but only the concepts of physics. The

statements of psychology are consequently physicalist statements. Psychology is an integral part of physics.' Carl Hempel 'The Logical Analysis of Psychology' p. 18 in Ned Block (ed.) Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Vol. 1 (London, 1980)

'But in what sense can the physiological processes be said to correspond to thoughts, and in what sense can we be said to get the thoughts from the observation of the brain?

I suppose we can imagine the correspondence to have been verified experimentally. Let us imagine an experiment crudely. It consists in looking at the brain while the subject thinks. [...] the subject is at the same time the experimenter, who is looking at his own brain, say by means of a mirror. [...]

Then I ask you, is the subject-experimenter observing one thing or two things? (Do not say that he is observing one and the same thing from both the inside and the outside; for this does not remove the difficulty. [...]) The subject-experimenter is observing a correlation of two phenomena. One of them he, perhaps, calls the thought. This may consist of a train of images, organic sensations, or on the other hand of a train of the various visual, tactual and muscular experiences which he has in writing or speaking a sentence. – The other experience is one of seeing his brain work.' Wittgenstein The Blue Book in The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, 1972) pp. 7-8

'the "subjective" selves of others are beyond the pale of physical description.'

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 276

self. other. physicalism.

'it is difficult to make sense out of one's own "raw feels" being located in the net of physical descriptions.'

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 276

perception.

'The feeling that physicalism leaves out of account the essential subjectivity of psychological states is the feeling that nowhere in the description of the state of a human body could there be room for a physical equivalent of the fact that I (or any self) and not just that body, am the subject of those states.'

Thomas Nagel 'Physicalism' Philosophical Review 74 (July 1965)

p. 354

mind-body. I.

‘what [...] needs to be shown is that the pragmatic conditions underlying the difference in use between the indexical “I” and nonindexicals do not add up to a metaphysical difference between whatever the indexical “I” denotes when it is used and the sorts of things which the nonindexicals might refer to or characterize.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 277

I.

‘inadequately assessed asymmetry between:

(a) how I am able to view myself as a potential object of investigation (within a spatio-temporal setting)

and

(b) how at first sight it seems one would be able to investigate virtually anything else including (supposedly) other people within such a setting.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 277

‘the seeming duality of the phenomenal and the physical does not constitute an analogue to the “complementarity” involved in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 278

quantum physics.

‘[...] both particles and waves are, in some sense, equally at home in or “out of” the world.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 278

quantum physics.

‘[...] it seems I need know nothing about my brain processes in order to know that I am in pain, whereas all that I can ever know in order to know (if I can know) that you are in pain is something like a brain process (together with behaviour).’

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 281

Empiricism and the Mind-Body Problem

Recent attempts to solve the mind-body problem have been overwhelmingly positivist. Although admitting a priori problems of logical clarification and conceptual revision, logical behaviourism, the mind-brain identity theory, functionalism and eliminative materialism all presuppose the thesis that the mind-body problem can at least in principle be solved scientifically. (11)

Davidson argues for a token-token version of the mind-brain identity theory to remove the appearance of inconsistency between three principles: Some mental events and some physical events interact causally; causally related events fall under deterministic laws and; there are no psychophysical laws. Mental events cause physical events and fall under physical, but not psycho-physical, laws, because mental events are physical events. It has been cogently objected that this is not a genuine case of mental causation because mental properties have no causal role in bringing about physical events. It is the physical properties of mental events that do all the causal work, and they would do even if there were no mental properties. (12)

David Lewis has argued for a functionalist version of the mind-brain identity theory which might circumvent some of its conceptual difficulties. 'Pain', for example, is defined functionally and pain necessarily has a certain causal role but pain is realised physically so, although pain is identical with a state of the central nervous system, the concept of pain is not the concept of part of the central nervous system. (13) I am inclined to define 'pain' phenomenologically and say that pain is essentially a sensation, a hurting sensation with some neurological causes, or the link between explanans and explanandum is severed.

Searle's theory that the mind is an emergent property of the body entails the reality of mental events as ineliminably intentional and subjective and so is inconsistent with the eliminativism of Paul and Patricia Churchland, according to which the terms of folk psychology should be replaced by neurological terms in a truly scientific psychology. (14) Searle avoids the eliminativist's difficulty of showing how a psychology that is only neurological could be consistent with explanations in day to day living and, say, history or political science. However, it remains unexplained how consciousness emerges from matter. Despite its immense anatomical complexity, the brain is only billions of atoms in motion in empty space. Any atom is only physical, so it is hard to see how our ordinary awareness comes out of atoms, however numerous or arranged.

Dennett argues that adopting the 'intentional stance' is a necessary condition for understanding a rational system such as a person or a

computer. Its adoption entails the ascription of beliefs and desires to that system and so facilitates prediction of its behaviour. (15) Is the intentional stance an empirical stance? I suggest it is because the conceptual resources needed to adopt the intentional stance are partly first person singular and partly third person plural in origin. All psychological concepts, so a fortiori, beliefs and desires, are acquired partly from one's own case, partly from the observation of others. Both procedures are empirical. So is the subsequent imaginative synthesis.

Are these theories empiricist? The claim that mental processes are identical with brain processes is not empirical. It arguably admits of empirical falsification but not empirical verification. For example, if someone could think without a brain the mind-brain identity theory would be falsified. Conversely, no amount of establishing of correlations between physical events and mental events is enough to establish the identity of the mental with the physical. Even constant correlation is consistent with dualism.

Is there an empiricist solution to the mind-body problem? We know that ordinary thinking and experiencing depend empirically upon the neurological functioning of the brain. (I take it this is obvious, uncontroversial, and consistent with any plausible theory of the mind.) It follows that ordinary thinking and experiencing is sufficient for the neurological functioning of the brain. I suggest, then, that the solution to the mind-body problem is this: the physical is necessary for the mental and the mental is sufficient for the physical. Mental states have causal efficacy on the physical because they are sufficient for brain states. All those brain processes which are necessary for mental processes are necessitated by them. What kind of necessity is this? The determination of the physical by the mental is as strong or as weak as the dependency of the mental on the physical.

This entails over-determination of brain processes if they have physical causes which are sufficient for their occurrence. If there is psychological determinism but no over-determination of neurological events, those brain processes with mental causes do not have sufficient conditions for their occurrence that are physical. Although repugnant to the physical determinist intellect, something has to go. I conjecture that the physical causes of neurological events have an efficacy greater than 0 but less than 1. Because everything guarantees its own prerequisites, the causal efficacy of a mental event has a probability of 1. In other words: the brain is a probabilistic system made deterministic by being a mind.

Nagel not only emphasises the reality of subjective conscious experience, which is hard to reconcile with physicalism, but in *The View*

From Nowhere (1986) has drawn attention to the problem of 'being someone': the seemingly inexplicable fact that a particular person is oneself. Once grasped, the fact is startlingly obvious but recalcitrant to scientific explanation. (17) Nagel's problem admits of no narrow empirical solution. In grasping one's own existence as one's own a certain limit of narrow empiricism is reached. Although grossly implausible from the point of view of narrow empiricism, Nagel's problem is only soluble if I am my soul. My soul is essentially me, pervades my body with the consequence that I view the world from it, is simple and immaterial. My soul has all and only the properties I have. In this solution existentialism and theology coincide. (18)

Two important philosophical problems need to be resolved by any theory of how the concept of self is possible:

(1) Nagel's Problem.

(which says in Being and Nothingness he is unable to resolve). It is really a cluster of problems: What is it for something to be me ? Why is something me ? From no non-indexical description of something does it logically follow that this something is me. Why not ? What has been said about something when it is said that that is me ? It can be coherently imagined that there should be something qualitatively identical to me that is numerically distinct from me. How come ?

This cluster of problems arises for any being such that there is something it consists in to be that being, yet the solution has to be different for each such being.

Gough nearly addresses this issue on pages 198-9 but not quite.

(2) A Problem About Self-Consciousness.

From the fact that a being is conscious of itself it does not follow that that being is self-conscious. A being could be conscious of many things and amongst those things could be itself but this is not sufficient for self-consciousness. Think of the case where several children play the game of interlocking their hands so that it is not clear whose fingers are whose. If the children look at those fingers, typically each child is perceiving some of their own fingers. However, although they are thereby aware of (parts of) themselves they are not thereby self-conscious.

What is missing in these cases ? It is necessary not only that a being be conscious of itself but it must also know that it is itself that it is conscious of. It must have the knowledge that it is conscious and that that which is

conscious is numerically identical with (or at least a part of) that which is conscious.

This problem, I cannot see it is really resolved.

The Nagelian problem is very hard.

Can the concept of oneself as 'pure' subject be primordial with regard to the 'strong conceptual dualism' between consciousness of objects and consciousness of being conscious ? A reason for answering 'yes' is that a pure subject can be argued to be presupposed as the subject of both kinds of consciousness. However, a reason for answering 'no' is that it might not make much sense to speak of a pure subject without postulating a 'pure' object or some such correlate. (Rather as it does not make sense to admit 'here' without admitting 'there' or elsewhere').

Hegel claims to be doing phenomenology and not metaphysics.

4 fundamental self-conceptions. Why not more ?

temporal self-representation.

(Think of the first premiss of Kant's Refutation of Idealism in the 'B' version of the Critique of Pure Reason: 'I am conscious of myself as located in time...')

Unmediated self-identification

- to do justice to the idea that I do not mix myself up with anyone else in introspection (if I do not).

It is true that if I am aware of myself as a bodily subject I am aware of myself as spatially located, but does the reverse follow. Might I not be aware of myself as a quasi-Lockean spiritual substance that 'pervades' part of the physical world ?

What unifies consciousness here ? The pure subject ? If so, how does the pure subject do that ?

Last para. '...the subject cannot consistently doubt that it is in a given certain conscious experiential state, which is also a "raw feel"'. An argument against this: a scientist could use a machine to affect my brain so that I acquire the belief that I am in a conscious experiential state which is also a "raw feel" even though I am not in that conscious

experiential state. Although I have the belief, the belief is false. In that case it may be consistently (and correctly) doubted that I am in that state.

Logical equivalence in the schema $Ax (Cx \leftrightarrow Fx)$ might be too strong. It seems to exclude the possibility that I might find indubitable anything that is not my present state of consciousness, for example that $1 + 1 = 2$.

knowing ones mind/ knowing one's body does not coincide with the first person singular/third person grammatical distinction.

Not clear what view is of the possibility that although I introspect mental states qua mental they are in fact physical (ie I only introspect the mental properties of states which are essentially physical).

sense data are neither mental nor physical.

In Neo-Platonism and souls or consciousnesses are parts of the whole called the 'world spirit'.

Suppose we took the view that the present is when our experiences happen (as, say, Hugh Mellor does in Real Time). Then the Kant/Peirce view that experiences have duration looks inconsistent with the view that the present is instantaneous.

Mention the points of contrast between Husserl's transcendental ego and the Cartesian soul, especially note that Descartes is doing ontology, Husserl phenomenology.

What is the quality of selfness ?

understanding oneself as a subject of conscious experience is sufficient for possession of a concept of self but on page 153 says about personal identity: 'the correct criterion is continuity of the body'. If the concept of self includes the concept of oneself as persisting over time then the suggestion on page 2 implies that no concept of the body is necessary. The suggestion on page 153 implies it is necessary.

Also, there is not much of an argument for the bodily criterion, nor a consideration of objections to it.

'this subject/substance is an object' What does 'object' mean here ?

say: 'The Ego'...is unanalysable.

Is Harrison's imagination of disembodied existence coherent ? If not, where exactly is the incoherence ?

Does the pure subject have a 'point of view' ? If so, is it in space ?

the discussion of the 'I' as bodily would profit from a reading of the chapter on the body in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* and possibly from a reading of Husserl's *Ideas II*.

Does it make Heideggerian sense to use 'Dasein' in the plural or talk of 'individual Dasein's' ?

"I do not exist" would be self-contradictory, in that the truth conditions for it could not hold'. Is this enough to make the sentence self-contradictory, or just false ?

Hegel's so called 'Master and Slave Dialectic' is the locus classicus for the view that self-consciousness depends upon other conscious beings. It could be usefully considered in chapter 13.

VII

Death

How could we know? From everything we can glean from a third-person perspective, the observing of someone who is not yourself, the prospects for life after death look slender. At death the brain dies. The human being disintegrates. Empirically, the mind seems to clearly depend on the brain so, if you depend upon your mind, you die.

But from this picture we cannot logically infer anything about death *from the inside*, first person singular death, your own death. Necessarily, none of us has experienced this. Necessarily, each of us will.

It is possible to know there is life after death, before we die. The aspects of *being you* identified in chapters I and II are naturally indestructible. You can know what it is like to be dead.

Is life after death desirable? We should not assume that immortality is desirable and finitude not. Living for ever might be tedious.¹ We might find something to do for the first few billion years but then what? It makes a difference whether we can commit suicide, whether we can opt out. If immortality thwarts suicide attempts, eternity might appear hideously agoraphobic.

It might be that the unconscious prospect of death being the end lends life meaning. It gives, in the most literal sense, a deadline for our projects.

Not every religion straightforwardly teaches immortality. In Christianity there is the *hope* of resurrection. On several interpretations, the mind or soul depends on the body, so if the body is not resurrected then you are not resurrected. In orthodox Judaism, there is no life after death. The Buddha says that, in rebirth, the person living the new life is and is not you. In Hinduism, *atman* becomes *Brahman*, but it is open to interpretation how much of *atman's* identity is thereby preserved. In Islam, there is life after death, but only by the mercy or compassion of Allah. Conversely, there are, at the time of writing, strenuous scientific efforts to extend the human lifetime.

What happens when you die? It seems an obvious and uncontroversial truth that a well-functioning human brain is a necessary condition for our day to day thinking and experience. One does not need any kind of scientific training to know this. (Indeed, that such knowledge is ancient is apparent from accounts of battle. Homeric warriors wear bronze helmets, because they think consciousness depends on the brain.) When you die your body dies. When you die your mind dies.

However, you are not your body and you are not your mind. It does not follow that when the body and the mind die you die. *Me-ness*, *now-ness* and *absolute interiority* do not depend on bodily or psychological functioning, including the neurology of 'the' brain. When you die, this human being dies (this human being who you 'are'). Its mental processes cease as its brain processes cease. The body dissolves.

1

However, when you die it is still Now. (It is still *now* and *it is still now*.) When you die there is still *you-ness*. When you die, the subjective space in which your life was led still exists. *Dying is a transformation in the contents of the present*. As St. Paul says *We shall be transformed*: [1 Corinthians 15:51](#) 'Listen, I tell you a mystery: We will not all sleep, but we will all be changed.'²

What Happens when I die?

- (1) When I die my body dies.
- (2) When I die my (ordinary) mind dies.
- (3) I am not my body and I am not my mind.
- (4) When my body and (ordinary) mind die it does not follow that I die.

Is the unchanging indestructible? When you die, your body dissolves and your mind dissolves because that psycho-physical human being who you 'are' (pervade, view the world from) ceases to exist. However, the you-ness of you, the me-ness of you, and the interior space that is the soul is unaffected. Physical objects may be destroyed by dissolution into parts. Physical or mental events may cease. In complete contrast, *me-ness*, *absolute interiority*, *space*, *one-ness*, *the Now* do not admit of destruction by either method. They have no parts, so cannot be destroyed by dissolution into parts. They are not events, so cannot cease in the way in which events cease. Surprisingly, the here and now remain at death. The here-after is the here, after death. it is still here then. Only temporal items admit of natural destruction. Your real nature is not a temporal item, so your real nature does not admit of natural destruction.³

What happens when your body dies? No matter how painful or disconcerting the process of dying, you feel safe because this is not happening to *you*. It is happening to your body. You were less dependent on your body than you had thought. Or, it falls on the floor 'at your feet'. Your body disappears. (From your point of view. Of course other human beings can still see it).

² As Kierkegaard says; perhaps surprisingly, when we die *we remain*.

³ Leibniz is right, if by 'true unity' he means here one-ness, and not only the unity of consciousness: 'By means of the soul or form there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the I in us.' Leibniz 'New System' in *Philosophical Writings* G. H. R. Parkinson (ed.) (Everyman) p. 120

For a while, everything else remains exactly the same. Your experience continues exactly the same without your body.

When are you dead? Dying takes time. As we know from witnessing the deaths of others, the physical and psychological process of dying is sometimes slow and often painful. But in dying, even though the human being is physically and psychologically deteriorating, the person is not partly alive and partly dead. Although the dying process is gradual, or in time, the dying human being is alive, not dead. Being partly alive is being alive and not dead. Being dead is being wholly dead and not being alive.

However, *the transition from life to death is instantaneous*: an event that takes no time. Death is an end and a beginning. (Beginnings and endings are events that take no time. If it seems that an event is beginning *it has already begun*. If it seems that an event is ending *it has not ended yet*.)⁴

What dies when you die? In dying, the human being dies. This is a momentous event but mainly because we identify ourselves with human beings. If you can know the soul that you are, before you die, then death is less frightening. The here loses its earthly content.

The ego dies but the soul is not the ego. The ego is what you think you are. You are of course very attached to what you think you are. Your pride and self image is bound up with what you think you are. At death this self image ceases, because it is only a concretion of thoughts, a bundle of emotion-saturated images and impressions. We protect it during life but only as a piece of technology to engage with other human beings. Your ego is what you think you are but you are not what you think you are. It is not just that you have made a mistake. You are not identical with your picture of yourself. Your ego is your picture of yourself. Because your ego is your picture of yourself you protect it and endow it with all sorts of positive attributes. In fearing death, it is worth asking what am I afraid will die? It is mainly this ego-picture that we are afraid of losing. We wrongly think we are our thoughts and emotions. These are things we have or undergo.

We try to create order out of emotional and mental chaos and then identify ourselves with the degree of order we have succeeded in establishing. Although the ego is saturated with me-ness this me-ness is lent by the soul. In the dissolution of the ego, me-ness remains.

⁴ St. Paul reports the instantaneous transition from life to death:

'In a flash, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed'. [1Corinthians 15:51-53](#)

The ego is illusory. There are two illusions of the ego. The ego is not you but you take it to be you. The ego is not an accurate depiction of the human being who you 'are'. These are two reasons why its dissolution at death should not be mourned, or mourned in advance. Fearing your own death is mourning for your own death in advance.

Is death painful? It is important to draw a clear distinction between *death* and *dying*. Dying is often painful but death is the ultimate peace: like putting your head on the most comfortable pillow after hard but rewarding work.

Is death experienced? For most human beings, death is like going to sleep. The part of you that could notice dying, or think 'I am dying', dies, and so is unable to think that thought at the time it is true. Compare: The part that could notice falling asleep, or think 'I am falling asleep right now' falls asleep and so is unable to think that thought at the time it is true.

It is possible not to fall into unconsciousness in dying. Near death experiences are had by people who nearly-die consciously. ie who experience near-death.

Can the soul think? Do thoughts happen in the inner space that survives death? In life, thoughts are caused by and cause brain states. In the here-after there is no brain. If the soul thinks, how is this possible?

There is an important distinction between *consciousness* and *the subject of consciousness*, between that which is conscious and the consciousness it exercises. The subject of consciousness is the true and hidden referent of 'I'. the contents of the consciousness the 'I' exercises are in causal interaction with the brain. The 'I' is *pure consciousness* or the soul. Far from depending on the brain, consciousness is fundamental, and makes the physical world, including the brain possible.

God causes my soul to have new thoughts. The soul can think on its own without a brain. ts.

Could I witness my own funeral? Of course. Flew is completely wrong about all this.

God gives the soul a new body (cf resurrection of the body). The soul uses the brain of the new body to have though

Does blissful being exhibit intentionality? Could spiritual states be cognitive states? Could being in a spiritual state involve pervading objects of 'knowledge'. Could there be spiritual knowledge by

acquaintance. Distinguish between a spiritual state and a mental state. Being in a spiritual state does not consist in having this thought rather than that. It consists in being in a particular way.

What is the soul? The soul is infinite inner space, the unchanging now, me-ness, inner being or absolute interiority.

What is outside the soul? God is outside the soul. The soul has no physical or empirical outside. It has a spiritual outside: God. The soul is held in God. God is all around the spiritual space that you are. (It has never been any different during your existence). When I die the empirical world dissolves (a more profound and thorough *epoche* than Husserl's *epoche* because the phenomena dissolve too). God is then disclosed. More accurately, God and the absolute interiority of the soul are both disclosed. The soul does, in the end, have an outside after all. All around the soul is God. God holds you in the palm of his hand.⁵ There are religious images of this.

What is death? Death is a transformation of the contents of the present. Death is not the end of experience. Death is an experience. Death is the release from dying.

Something like death is happening all the time because the eternal present is changing in content. Events come and go in the infinite abiding present. At death the unchanging present is thoroughly transformed in content. That is how it is done.

Death is the detachment of the subjective from the objective. Is there life after death? There is life after death. Death is the end of worldly life and the start of spiritual life. Spiritual life is subjective life that is not opposed to objective life. My biological life does not survive death, because the body disintegrates, though I could live again were my body to be reconstituted.

Can you cease to exist? Although the human being you are closely associated with can and will cease to exist, *you* cannot cease to exist. That which has your thoughts is immortal. That which lives your life cannot end, even when this life ends.

You cannot cease to exist because you are *tout court*. Other things are seen to be, remembered to be, and so on. What is *tout court* cannot cease to be, therefore you cannot cease to be. You are a region of pure being. I could search for my real self if I want to find being. I am *tout*

⁵ St. Augustine says in *The Confessions*: His body melts into God(s) love.

court. The world is perceived to be, believed to be remembered to be.⁶ The being of what is, whatever is, may be found within. You are at the centre of being. You are the interiority of being

Pure being cannot not be, therefore you cannot not be. Your own existence is rightly designated by 'I am'. We need to understand this 'I' and this 'am'.

Is it still Now After Death? You are distinct from spatio-temporal things, because you are that which spatio-temporal things are *present to*. Things are present to you but you are not just another thing. Your body is not wholly unlike a thing, but not presented to you from the outside like a thing. The nearer we approach your own real nature the less thing-like your existence becomes. The more you move your attention away from your own nature and approach worldly things the more thing-like they become.

It is always now. The past did exist, but it doesn't exist, because it is over. The future will exist, but it doesn't exist, because it has not yet begun. Therefore only the present exists. If someone asked what the time was, it would be philosophically correct to reply that it is *now* (however irritating to the pragmatic mind). In this profound and metaphysical sense it is always now despite the fact that clock time changes and different things happen. There is something motionless or non-temporal in the midst of time, and that is now.

The infinite interiority of you as now-ness contains all your experiences of this spatio-temporal world.

Is Anything still You After your Death?

You *are*, whatever is, was, and shall be. Spatio-temporal things and events are not part of you, even though this human being has spatio-temporal parts. The now-ness that is your unchanging interiority has no parts. You as now-ness are a whole without parts, an inside with no outside. Relatively speaking, a physical object is an outside with no inside. Cutting it open reveals more outsides. Absolutely speaking a surface is an outside without an inside.

You coincide with yourself as unchanging. The flux of worldly life contents is always becoming. It is never fully become. As Now you are Parmenidean. The content of the Now that you are is Heraclitean.

⁶ Jaspers' 'I must *search for being* if I want to find my real self' Karl Jaspers *Philosophy I* trans. E.B. Ashton (Chicago, 1971) p. 45, because the horizon of being is one's own subjectivity, is a reversal of Heidegger's insistence that *Sein* be inquired into by inquiring into *Dasein*, the being of the inquirer.

What began to be can cease to be. Space-time processes can readily be conceived as beginning and ending. Your own existence is less readily conceived as beginning or ending, even though the death of this human being is quite imaginable, especially by your adoption of a third person perspective on it. Whatever naturally begins and arises can be coherently conceived not to be: either as not having begun, or as being over.

Whatever does not naturally begin or cease to be cannot be coherently conceived as not being; as not having begun or as being over.

Presence is like that. It is extraordinarily difficult to conceive of the absence of presence: not in the sense of a presence that is absent, but in the sense of there being no presence.

Is there Absolute Interiority After Death?

Interiority is like that. It is difficult to conceive of an object except as within one's own psychological space. This seems false. I seem to just think of the object. However, the object is given in and *as in* that space which is in fact your phenomenological space (irrespective of whether you understand it under that description). The object is also given perspectivally and so in and as in the phenomenological space that presupposes. It is given as at some distance from *this human being* at the centre of your own phenomenological space. (We are pre-philosophically familiar with a portion of and an analogue of phenomenological space: the visual field.)

What Dies When You Die?

(It stops. Something has gone. Both are right. Yet, you remain.) That which does not exist but did exist and will exist but does not yet exist exists as an event but therefore only as something transitory; as something that comes and goes. Your own existence is not like that, even though the existence of this human being is like that. The existence of this human being is transitory because it is a constellation of space-time processes which replace one another and will cease. As such, this human being is part of the flux of the present. The psycho-physical constellation is a temporary structure: subjective to itself, objective to others.

When you die your body and mind dissolve but the soul-space that you are remains. Your body dissolves into God as St. Augustine suggests. There is no need to be afraid of dying. *When you die you remain what you have been all along.* You fear death because you are unduly attached to your body and your mind. You are attached to these as possessions.

This is either because you think you *are* your body and your mind, and so you think you will cease to exist in your body and your mind cease to exist. Or, you think you *depend upon* your body and your mind without being identical with them. Or, you are sad to be losing your body and your mind because you are so used to them in this life. Or, you fear that without your body and your mind you will be impoverished in the after life. But, God is omnipotent and benevolent. It is therefore not impossible that God will give you a new body and mind if that is the best thing for you.

Are you Immortal?

You are a being who exists in a permanent way because you have no past or future existence but only present existence. It is not conceivable that you do not exist, in so far as this entails imagining the absence of presence. Naturally, you can imagine the non-existence of this human being because you are not it. You cannot imagine the absence of presence because you are it. It is not enough to think of yourself as having infinite duration, you are a kind of eternity. Your real self is timeless.

You are not metaphysically enclosed in space-time even though this human being is metaphysically enclosed in space-time. Space-time objects are spatio-temporally constrained objects. Their spatio-temporal properties bind them as what they are. It follows that you, but not this human being, have a kind of unbounded-ness that does not pertain to worldly things.

Infinity is eternal. Infinity did not begin and it will not end. There are sequences, i.e. the positive number sequence beginning from zero, which could be regarded as infinite, while still having an origin, i.e. zero but that is something infinite, an infinite series. Infinity itself does not begin and will not end. Infinity is ageless.

Should death be feared? There is no need to fear death, even though it is difficult not to. Death looks bad from the outside. It does not follow that death is unpleasant from the inside. Dying might be painful and unpleasant, swift or slow. It does not follow that death is unpleasant. From the fact that we have been taught to fear death it does not follow that we should. Cultures which minimise the significance of subjectivity and maximise the significance of objectivity teach the fear of death.

Has something gone from a dead human being? Subjectivity has gone from a dead human being. A dead human being is objectivity without subjectivity.

Is disembodied existence possible? There is no contradiction in the idea of an unperceived perceiver. Disembodied existence is possible. I offer a non-psychologistic interpretation of a Cartesian argument, in terms of possible worlds⁷:

(1) In every possible world, in which I exist, I am a think that thinks.

(A)

(2) In some possible worlds I am not physical.

(A)

(3) I am not essentially physical.

(3)

(4) I am essentially a thing that thinks.

(1)

(5) I could, in principle, exist without a body. (4),

(5))

Are you a physical object? The physical world, *a fortiori*, your body, falls by the epoche. But you survive the epoche. Therefore, you are not physical. I am something rather than nothing. Therefore, I am not physical.

Are you out of your mind? Mentality falls by the epoche. You do not fall by the epoche. You are not mental. You are something rather than nothing.

Therefore, you are something that is not mental.

Are you out of this world? You are nothing physical or mental. Anything in the world is either mental or physical. I am something rather than nothing. Therefore, I am out of this world.

⁷ The main criticism is that from the fact that Descartes can imagine that he exists without a body it does not follow that he does, or could. From the fact that Descartes can imagine that *p* it does not follow that *p*. (As a matter of biography I suspect that Descartes was more aware of these elementary points than his critics.) Rewriting the argument in terms of possible worlds circumvents the alleged difficulty.

What is the relation between God and the Soul? Love is the relation between God and the soul.

Do ghosts exist? Ghosts exist.

What is a ghost? A ghost is subjectivity without objectivity.

What is a dead body? A dead body is objectivity without subjectivity.

What is a soul? A soul is one's own being as subjectivity without objectivity.

Is the soul spatial? The soul is space. There is no difference between your own infinite consciousness, space, and the soul. The perceptible horizon of space is the horizon of one's own soul. A soul may occupy the same region of space as a physical object. For example, before death, one's own existence consists in one's body occupying some of the space occupied by one's soul.⁸

Do souls exist in time? One's soul is the unchanging present, the now that abides through all change. The changing time that one is acquainted with exists in the soul, in other words; comes and goes in the now. Now is the time it is inside the soul.

Is the soul in the body? The soul is not in the body. The body is in the soul. Your body is at the centre of the soul-space you are. This can be noticed if one attends to the stillness of the subjective-space-time you are.

At death, you are not only 'out of this world' but this world is out of you. This is to say; the here and now is transformed.

Why is there Scepticism about the Soul? The existence of the soul is known in most human cultures so our own scientific, capitalist, materialist, culture is unusual in masking it.

We take anything real to be *other*.

We are always *on the way* to happiness, fulfillment, true existence. The craving in capitalist consumerism takes us out of the lived present into imaginary futures, for life-times at a time. Presence is repressed by

⁸ John Locke argues that a physical substance cannot be exactly where another physical substance is, and a mental substance cannot be where another mental substance is. But a mental substance can be where a physical substance is.

capitalism consumerism and materialism. Capitalism is always 'on the way' so we are never in the present. Consumerism is always on the way. it conditions us into means to end thinking. Materialism is only objective. It treats everything as other.

We think in types, not particulars.

Out thinking is essentially third person and first person, at best, derivatively.

Your own immortal reality, or real self, cannot be revealed to these conditioned modes of thinking and being.

Your soul cannot be rightly construed as *other* because it is self; far too intimately you to be 'over there'. Your *being* it precludes your encountering it in the manner of an object, even an ethereal object.

You cannot be *on the way to it* because it is always already all-here-now. You are it. It cannot be apprehended only as a type because it is a particular, an absolute particular; essentially qualitatively distinct from anything it is not.

De-conditioning discloses the soul to itself. Being the soul reveals it. The soul has been increasingly masked by history since the Renaissance of the 15th 16th centuries and the scientific revolution of the 17th century. This historical masking is the conditioned content of the soul in the present. De-conditioning is partly shedding the weight of history. We have to recover and experience the medieval and ancient Greek ideas of immortality. There needs to be a re-discovery of the soul.

What is the cause of death? Birth is the cause of death. Birth is necessary and sufficient for death, not logically, but actually. There is no contradiction in the idea that something that never began will end or something that began will never end but, in fact, everything born dies. Birth is not logically necessary for death because there is no contradiction in the idea that something with no origin dies. Birth is not logically sufficient for death because there is no contradiction in the idea that something that has an origin lives forever. In fact, however, a being that is born biologically is a temporary being. Being born is the cause of being caused to die. Living is dying. Living is aging and approaching death.

What is it like to be dead? Immediately after you have died, it seems to you, surprisingly, that little has changed even though you are being transformed. If you were standing up when you died, your body will be visible to you, lying on the floor as though at your feet. I say 'visible' because you do not need physical eyes to see, as you did during earthly

life. If you did not know you were going to die then you almost certainly will not immediately realize that you are dead.

The zone or space in which your experiences have always happened remains intact. This field of awareness is infinitely vast in every direction, as it was when you were alive. In this space are unfolding the events in the scene following your death. Perhaps you see friends or relatives rushing to your prone body and attending to it. Perhaps others are running from the scene to seek help. Perhaps you died peacefully in bed and you see your body surrounded by those at the bedside.

Then, the content of the field of experiences dissolves. Your body and every other physical thing fades into nothingness. The space of your awareness becomes co-extensive with the vast emptiness it really is. As it expands it is filled with light. Although you are being transformed, the fundamentals of existence while you were alive still remain: It is still *now*. You are an *absolute interiority* or an infinite phenomenological space. The quality of being you called 'you-ness' *remains*. You are aware, much more aware than when alive.

What happens next depends partly on what you have done in life and partly on the grace of God: Hell, purgatory, heaven, the beatific vision of God, the hope of resurrection, the company of loved ones. The properties of the soul become apparent after death: immortality, immateriality, spatiality, subjectivity, no objectivity, infinity, absolute interiority. In earthly life the soul has earthly contents; physical objects, sensations, thoughts. After death the soul has spiritual contents; bliss.

We have to use the empirical, conditioned idea of clock time as a ladder to reach metaphysical thinking. Now is the time it is inside the soul. It is always now inside the soul.

Nothing in the spatio-temporal world contains your soul, but your soul contains all those spatio-temporal things that you experience. Your soul embraces or pervades them so you, in a sense, permeate the world. Your own existence as now-ness is prior to the world, not in a chronological sense but in a logical sense. You are necessary for your experience but, in the ordinary course of things, not to be found within it.

Being makes coming to be and ceasing to be possible. You are the zone of being in which coming to be, lasting and ceasing to be take place.

The spatio-temporal things could not exist as objects of your experience unless you existed. Even if spatio-temporal processes all ceased you would not cease. If there was no space-time there would not be nothingness but no-thing-ness. No-thing-ness is not nothing but profound spiritual reality. Ordinary spatio-temporal objects can be

coherently thought to have a natural beginning and end but you as now-ness are not like that. Spatio-temporal objects are really slow space-time events. They have an origin, a duration and an end. The now-ness of your own being is not an object so it is not a space-time event. It is a now not contrasted with past and future but with the absolute present outside it and through it. It is not possible for now-ness to end naturally because only space-time processes end naturally and now-ness is not a space-time process. Now-ness, which does not begin or end, grounds space-time processes as possible objects of experience. Space-time processes do not ground now-ness. This is apparent through different kinds of mediation, mystical and spiritual experience.

Once thinking and ordinary experiencing are calmed to the point of cessation there is not nothing, or nothingness, but no-thing-ness: the infinite interiority of the now. This is the now-space in which thoughts and experiences ordinarily arise and subside. It is the inside of the soul. The absolute remaining of this now-ness, after the cessation of thoughts and experiences shows that it is in no way dependent on thoughts and experiences for its existence. On the other hand, although there can be events that are not now, there cannot be experienced events that are not now because now is when your experiences happen.

You are not to be identified with any spatio-temporal thing since your eternity and their transience are wholly alien to one another. As objects of experience, events are present to you, and they have a future a present and a past. As a human being, the constellation of psycho-physical events that make up your worldly existence also has a beginning, a duration and an end, a past a present and a future. Each one of the events making up that constellation has a beginning, duration and an end. You, however, have no past and you have no future. You have only a present because you are only present. When you die you are still present. The structured spatio-temporal flux that constitutes worldly existence ceases. You remain without worldly content.

It is misleading to only think of your death as the death of a human being, a human being located in space-time with a specific duration. Of course, empirically speaking this view is not wrong. It is what happens to *this human being*. However, the death of *this human being* is an event that happens within the now-ness that is really you. The demise of *this human being* is that last worldly episode within the unchanging now-ness that is you.

How on earth could you know what it is like to be dead? The aspects of your being that survive death can be seen to be indestructible in life: being you, the interiority of space, the now-ness of the present.

Being you is not some empirical feature that could come and go.

Space could not be destroyed like the physical objects recomposing within it.

The eternity of the present, the fact that it is always now whenever it is, cannot be changed from within the world.

When you die *this human being* dies but it is still now, there is still phenomenological space, even though the world has dissolved.

What is the Hereafter? The hereafter is the here-after, that is: *here*, but after death, here *after the world has dissolved*. The hereafter includes the pure interiority of spiritual space-time, after the death of the human being. This is one of the meanings of 'The Kingdom of God is within you'. 'Here' denotes that region of spiritual space-time that is your soul. 'After' refers to what is after death. Death is a transformation in spiritual space-time. This is one of the profound truths expressed by *Heaven is a place on earth*.

Is Re-incarnation Logically Possible? Reincarnation breaches no scientific law. Being disembodied presents no philosophical problem. Reincarnation is, therefore, possible.

If all the atoms composing my body were to reamalgamate after my death (perhaps billions of years after my death) then I would be reincarnated. Given infinite time this is not unlikely but likely. Given that I have existed once it is more likely that I will live again than it would be if I had never lived.

Reincarnation is a transformation of the present: the existence once again of my body inside this soul that I am.

If there is no re-incarnation this is not because there is any *a priori* or logical obstacle to it. It can only be because God does not choose that it should happen. If anything logically possible is within the power of God, and re-incarnation is logically possible, then re-incarnation is within the power of God. If there is no re-incarnation it is because God does not choose it. In a sense, it would be odd if there were no reincarnation, or rebirth. It would mean that consciousness is the only element we know that is not recycled.

Do Heaven and Hell Exist? Heaven is normally hidden from you by the world of physical objects and events, and by moral imperfection. Heaven

is the space where your soul exists. Heaven is the space in which God and the souls exist.

Hell is distance from God. Hell is absence of God. The world is partly hellish because it involves some distance from God. By 'distance' here is meant spiritual distance.

What happens to you depends upon the grace of God. After death you are the same soul you were in life. You remain your soul. After death you are not the same human being you were in life, because you were not a human being all along. You were centred on a particular human being for a lifetime. God could provide you with another body. God could provide you with another mind. God does not just to cause you to think but allows you to think your own thoughts freely. This is part of what it consists in to be a created being.

Can Souls Communicate? Love is the relation between souls. What is love?⁹ What is the afterlife like? How is communication between souls possible? How is communication between human beings possible? Of course, by sound waves, brain waves, semantics etc. The question is how can you understand me? How can I understand you? This really hard question remains once all the neurological and linguistic facts are known. Communication would still be unexplained if we knew all the linguistics and neurology there is to know. How can you communicate with my privacy? How can I communicate with your privacy. It is privacy that makes communication hard to understand. God holds your soul, as he always has done. Once the world has dissolved into nothing God and the souls remain. It is revealed that God is all around your soul. You see your dead relatives. You are close to the living too (the 'activated'). They cannot see you because they are absorbed in the world. Their being is partly being-in-the world. The soul has spiritual states. The soul can be a mind. Mind is multiply realizable. Bliss is the soul's natural, spiritual state of being. This is clouded over by being in the physical world. Being in the physical world hides the soul from itself. The natural state of the soul is being-with-God. This is a natural state of bliss. The soul has states of being. The mind has states of mind. States of being are: emptiness, bliss, space, no-thing-ness. Being-in-God is being held by God. Being-in-God is the 'Atman "is" Brahman relation'. Individuality is retained in being-in-God. Plotinus underestimates the retention of individuality in union with God.

How would you recognise your relatives if your relatives were souls? (Telepathy?) Love. There is spiritual intuition without the brain.

⁹ (McTaggart)

Intellectual intuition: If think that p then p. I detect that p by thinking that p. Humans (by and large) do not have it.¹⁰ With the disappearance of the world the soul acquires it, or is revealed as possessing it. So, there is intellectual intuition but only at or after death. It was there all along but stifled or unmanifest as a faculty. There are no doubt a great many psychic powers that are latent in us so long as our being is-in-the-physical-world. If we can become deconditioned in life, we may have glimpses of these powers. The physical and mental worlds hide the powers of the spiritual world. Disembodied souls have intellectual intuition, mystical intuition, mystical consciousness.¹¹

There are intermediary positions: The soul is disclosed to itself after death (aletheia, uncovering). The soul is in state of spiritual bliss. States of being are not brain states but soul states.

How do souls communicate? It is obscure how we communicate anyway using our bodies. The body is an obstacle to communication. Talking about sound waves or eardrums falls short of explaining understanding (understanding is sense, or making sense). It is hard to explain how we communicate using our bodies, given subjectivity or consciousness. ie the mind body problem is an obstacle to understanding how ordinary empirical communication is possible. Even if the mind-body problem could be overcome as an obstacle to communication, it remains unexplained how I communicate with you or you with me. The individuality and privacy of each of us is a barrier. Souls communicate by virtual reality. In the brain in a vat case imagine away the brain then. Then there is no brain, or only an imaginary brain. Make the brain part of the imagined or virtual world. Delete the brain. You are not aware of your brain anyway.

Demon, and brain-in-a-vat experiments, all show the possibility of communication, or at least understanding, in the absence of the physical world. The evidence for the existence of your soul is much more immediate and direct than the evidence for the existence of your brain. If something survives my death will it be me?

Continuity theories are underestimations of the absolute nature of personal identity. You are misidentified with a human being and so personal identity seems to admit of degrees. The identity of a human being does admit of degrees but whether something is you is an all or nothing matter. The continued existence of something is not identical to

¹⁰ Kant

¹¹ (Wittgenstein, Geach, Kerr)

it, but if something continues then there is something identical between what starts and what is. The later life is continuous with the earlier. That is all.

Something is and is not something, possibly in two different senses of 'is' eg: 'is' in the sense of 'is continuous with' but 'is not' in the sense of 'is numerically identical with'. For example, the butterfly is continuous with the life of the caterpillar but the butterfly is not the caterpillar.

The soul case not like this. The soul exists before death and the soul exists after death. Death is an episode within the soul. Death is a radical change of contents in the soul.

This life imprints the next life. As this human being dies and that soul begins to live again, the old life imprints the new.

Will you meet God? The soul is an inside without an outside. That is only true in a qualified or provisional way. It is the best way of beginning to grasp one's own being as a soul. However, after death the soul is revealed to have an outside after all, not an exterior physical face, but a greater infinity which surrounds its own infinity. Outside the soul is

Although there is the hope of resurrection, by the grace of God, the resurrection is not a necessary condition for the Beatific Vision because there is no contradiction in the supposition that a disembodied soul should be in the presence of God.

Although it is empirically false that one might see without physical eyes, there is no contradiction in the supposition that there should be an intact visual field but not eye as its subject. Indeed, one reason why this may be readily conceived in a way free from contradiction is that the eye that sees does not see the eye that sees. It might even be the case that after death, or before death in the case of rare mystical experiences, there is seeing non-physical reality.

Does Rebirth Presuppose the Soul? Rebirth presupposes the soul. Rebirth presupposes the soul. The spiritual sky is the soul. Reincarnation is logically possible.

It is in God's power to reincarnate souls in distinct bodies. To deny this is to deny divine omnipotence. Omnipotence, and this is crucial, is the *ability* to do anything. It does not follow that God does do everything he could.

By God's grace there can be a resurrection of the body. In scripture there is the resurrection of the dead in Ezekiel, the resurrection of Lazarus and the resurrection of Christ.

If the new human being is not you but only continuous with you by imprinting, Karma seems unfair on the new human being. If the new human being has the old human being's soul karma is fair (or not unfair just on the earlier ground). Continuity presupposes the soul. To see there is no continuity without identity ask: What continues?

What is death? Death is the transition from being to no-thing-ness. At the moment of death, phenomenalism seems to be true. The physical objects dissolve into a mass of sensations. The sensations then dissolve into nothing. You are then not nothingness but no-thing-ness. The physical objects disappear at death. You do not disappear. You are something not nothing. Because the soul is spirit it is pure awareness, a spiritual light. After death being and knowing coincide. This is not ordinary knowledge but spiritual knowledge. Being-with-God is having spiritual knowledge. Knowledge after death is knowledge by acquaintance rather than knowledge by description or propositional knowledge.

Fundamental theology describes the transitions from Being-in-the-world to Being-in-God through death. Fundamental theology describes the transitions from Dasein to soul, from authenticity to bliss, from Being-towards-death to Being-after-death, from being and nothingness to no-thing-ness. When dead- there is disclosure rather than 'experience'. In Fundamental Ontology there is already an eschewing of psychologism as inessential to being. Psychology is not necessary to being-after-death either. The mental in the everyday sense is not necessary to spirituality. Indeed, thoughts cloud the soul.

A synthesis of being and knowing takes place after death. It is enacted at death and then obtains after death. 'I am' expresses *aletheia* rather than self-consciousness. What does 'am' mean? This subjective being which is one's own ownmost being survives death, is disclosed to itself by death. Death is the great uncovering. Death is the great disclosure. 'I am' is true at the levels of fundamental ontology and fundamental theology not the level of psychology. The 'I being' reported by 'I am' is subjective being, not just first human being singular propositional knowledge of a being. What makes 'I am' true? That I am; my being.¹²

Is there Mystical Consciousness? The Christian mystics of the early Church Fathers, writing on the life of the soul after death and before the general resurrection, identify intermediary positions between bare existence of the soul on the one hand and brain-dependent mentality on

¹² 'What is death? A passage to peace.' – Mozart's opera *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* (1782) Gottlieb Stephanie wrote the libretto. Konstanze(?) says this.

the other. The 'experience' of the soul after death depends upon God. After death your being is already subjective being so it is superfluous to talk about experience. This is like talking about *a sensation of* colour. Phenomenological colour is already a secondary quality. The soul has transcendental consciousness in life and after death but this is fully apparent after death. Mystical consciousness is transcendent. It transcends the physical world. The physical world disappears from it in the sense that the physical world does not appear as part of or anything within transcendental consciousness.

In mystical consciousness there is consciousness but no consciousness of the body. In mystical consciousness there is no presentation of physical objects. Physical objects are absent (not present as opposed to presented as absent). Reduce physical objects to sensations and reduces sensations to nothing or (no-thing-ness). This is what happens in dying. Phenomenalism reduced physical objects to actual and possible sensations. You need no physical objects to exist in order to exist.

My ordinary empirical consciousness depends on my presence (my pervading it). That makes it mine. What makes something mine, my body mine, my mind mine is my subjective presence pervading it from the inside: my being the interiority of it, the interiority for it (its interiority). There is mystical consciousness. In mystical consciousness there is no awareness of the body. There is no body.

Are You Invisible? The moment you die you become invisible. But this was the case in earthly existence anyway. I can see your body hear what you are saying and draw inferences about your mind but in earthly life I can never see you. You are a pure subjectivity not perceptible from a third person point of view. No one has ever seen anyone else. All that is different after death is that we cannot see their body or their mind either, because their body and mind have ceased to exist. What you could not see of them in life survives death. What you do not see of someone in life is what they are; their essence.

What is the Soul? The soul has some primary and secondary qualities. If the primary and secondary qualities are subtracted one by one the soul remains: shape (figure), size (extension), number, solidity, lose this as disembodied, visibility, colour (to transparent to invisible). Subtract some primary and secondary qualities to obtain the astral body. Subtract more to obtain the soul. These qualities may be subtracted There is a possible world in which or theoretically in life. They may be subtracted really or

metaphysically in life by mystical experience. They are subtracted really or metaphysically in death.

How do you know when you are dead? The world disappears and the spiritual world that has always sustained it is revealed. The structure of the world remains as its content evaporates. I know things when I am dead but this knowledge is spiritual knowledge.

Will We be with God? You do not exactly fuse or blend into God. You are revealed as being-within-God all along. Atman 'is' Brahman by being in Brahman and being of the same spiritual nature as Brahman. My individuality is what is most empirically inexplicable about me and so was unlikely anyway not to be ultimate. Individuality is metaphysical. That something is you is metaphysical. You melt, or blend, into God. If we think of a drop of water falling into a pool as an analogy then we should think of the atoms of the drop remaining juxtaposed but the pool atoms all around it. This is the situation of the soul anyway. God is holding you right now. All the time. It is just the existence of creation, the material universe, thoughts and experiences that clouds the fact that the soul is in-God. Atman is Brahman but the 'is' is not the 'is' of numerical identity. The 'is' means the same as 'in' in 'being-in-God'. Out of body experiences are had by human beings who are alive not dead, but are still important. They show the mind operating without the body or the brain, at least as it is ordinarily dependent. They show the logical or theoretical possibility of the mind operating after the death of the body.

Does the Soul Survive death? Life, your life, is something that happens to and in your soul. My life is something that happens to me. Your life is a series of contents for and of the soul. In a fundamental sense the mind survives death. Mystical consciousness, bliss, the identity of being and knowing, being-in-God, all this is disclosed by death. Death is the great unveiling. On the other hand, it is clear that ordinary mental processes that depend on the brain cease with death. Dying is rather like falling asleep in that respect. The part of you that would be conscious of dying dies so, without special training, you do not die consciously. God could cause ordinary mental processes to resume. God could replace the brain in sustaining or causing to resume ordinary mental processes.

Does the Body Survive Death? Although the body does not survive death, God could cause your subjective interiority to be centred on that body again,

or equip you with a new body. After death the being of *Hiersein* is out of this world. The real end of being and time is No-thing-ness.¹³

Is there Self-Knowledge After Death? In death, the soul is disclosed to itself. The soul after death is identical with the soul before death (ie. numerically identical). There can be an astral body after death. There can be a subtle body after death. The being who survives death will be you. It will not have a body so it will not have your body. It will not have an empirical mind so it will not have your empirical mind. Will you remember being alive? Will you have a memory. In a way this question rests on a false assumption. Memory is a faculty that depends on a distinction between past, present and future. Past, présent and future are features of the world not the afterlife. But, as dead, do you have information about the world, about the living? Could a soul have a memory? Will the memory be 'wiped' by the death of the brain?

Is there Consciousness after death? 'Consciousness' is the right word after death, or before death. Awareness comes and goes. Spiritual space is abiding in life and in death. Your is a life that your soul has undergone. There is no reason in principle why the soul should not have, and have had, many more. God could cause this because God can do anything. Does not follow that he does do it.

What is Revealed after Death? There is disclosure of being after death. The 'Dasein', 'Lichtung' of fundamental ontology become the soul of fundamental theology. Fundamental ontology at the level of being makes brains, Physical objects, the physical world, possible. Fundamental ontology undercuts neurology (and the rest of science). The non-psychologistic properties of Dasein are a clue to understanding the spiritual life. Dasein is the being who in each case I am. This subjective *being' 'be-ing' is ultimately the soul. What is it like to be dead? The world is not present to me. I am not present to the world. I see the world.

The world does not see me. You are subjectivity without objectivity. You are subjective presence but objective absence. You are presence as self but absence as other. What is gone from a dead human being's body is their subjectivity, their point of view, their subjective point of view. When you are dead it is still here and now but your body falls to the floor. This is one act of dying.

¹³ *Being and Time* is incomplete. It needs theology to be completed. *Being and Time* is badly compromised by Kantianism. That is why Heidegger wrote the Kant Buch. That is why *Being and Time* is unfinished. Fundamental ontology fails to be metaphysics. It respects the Kantian limits and falls short of fundamental theology.

Are You Identical With Your Soul? I survive death if the soul does because me-ness belongs to the soul and I am my soul. my disembodied spirit would be me.¹⁴ Your body dies but could be resurrected. Your mind dies but only empirically. Your soul is indestructible(except by God).¹⁵

My mind is not me. My mind is not necessary for something to be me. Something can be me without my mind existing. My body is not me. My body is not necessary for something to be me. Something can be me without my body existing. You can successfully think away your body. Disembodied existence is coherent. The soul is me. Me-ness is not mental and not physical. Is me-ness me? The soul is me. Its being me is its me-ness. I could have had a completely different human beingness. I could have been a different human being (a human being numerically distinct from the human being I am (have)). personal identity does not require bodily continuity. If my bodily continuity broke or was interrupted it would still be me whose existence was resumed. Something like this happens if there is immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body. My soul exists 'in' a body. (Or, my body exists in my soul.) My body ceases to exist but my soul continues to exist so my bodily continuity is broken. My spatial but not temporal continuity is broken. Then God provides me with the original body (or on some versions a new one). If God provides me with the old one my bodily continuity or existence resumes.

The soul is necessary and sufficient for my identity. Is the soul a human being? Am I a human being? Do I have/occupy a human being? Does a human being occupy me (the centre of the soul)?

'In' is not an inappropriate word for the soul/body relation. However, the body is in the soul. The soul is not in the body. (Although the centre of the soul does pervade the body.)

Could Disembodied Spirits have Experiences? eg sensations of pain, or eg see something. There is no philosophical obstacle to this: Subjectively, disembodied spirits are presented with exactly what we are presented with now (in earthly existence). But objectively (from the third human being perspective) they are invisible.

It is not right that experience words are meaningless when severed from public criteria for their use. Human knowledge is extended through

¹⁴ Pace Aquinas, Geach, Swinburne et al.

¹⁵ Disembodied existence is subjectivity without objectivity

Strawson in Individuals and H.G. Wells in his story The Invisible Man and film(s) describe stages of disembodiment coherently. Descartes is right. I am only contingently related to my body. But Descartes misses that I am only contingently related to my mind.

analogy and metaphor. However, spatial metaphor can mislead in the philosophy of mind. Soul is space and the physical universe is in space but mind, in between, is not spatial. It can be misleading to use spatial terms to describe the non-spatial. The soul is spatial even though non-physical. Being spatial is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being physical, as is shown by the existence of the inner spatiality of spiritual substance.

It is important not to confuse the public *origin* of words concepts etc with the conditions for their intelligible use. Even if the private or metaphysical use of words is parasitic upon their public origin it does not follow that these private or metaphysical uses are impossible or illegitimate or not really meaningful. Suppose: a word has sense if and only if it has a definition. Suppose: a word has a referent if and only if it refers to something (not necessarily something physical or apparent).

Does a disembodied soul have experiences? ¹⁶

How are disembodied minds individuated? (What are the criteria for counting them? How do we tell them apart?) the asymmetry between my subjective interiority and the objective interiority of all others *even when embodied*. This interiority prevents mixups by me between my soul and others. I am the interiority of mine not anybody else's'.

Are souls made of 'spirit matter'? (Aquinas thought not?)

Souls are 'side by side'. Geach thinks this expression applies only to bodies. Geach does not realise that souls are spatial. They are individuated but absolutely individuated by being distinct interiorities. This inside is not that inside. An inside without an outside. Absolutely or spiritually, outside the souls are other souls and God. I am never presented with my mind and others. I am never presented with my soul and others (although I can be presented with my soul if I disclose it. It it discloses itself to itself by de-conditioning).

Where is God? God is outside the soul. The inside without an outside has an absolute outside. The soul is an inside without an outside. The soul has no physical outside. The soul has a spiritual and absolute outside: God. God surrounds the soul. God holds the soul: now and after death. The theological structure is the same. Content changes. This is the theological structure of the world (which is phenomenologically obvious once seen).

¹⁶ Aquinas thinks disembodied spirits have thoughts and will but no sensations, according to Geach on Aquinas. Augustine is probably right and Aquinas wrong.

VIII

Causation

That psycho-physical interaction occurs seems obvious. How it occurs seems inexplicable. It is a presupposition of common sense, but *prima facie* consistent with materialist science, that mental events cause physical events and physical events cause mental events. If a commander's decision is a cause of an air strike, then a physical event has a mental cause. If eating over ripe cheese causes vivid dreams, then a mental event has a physical cause. However, if the physical universe is a closed deterministic system, then any physical event is caused by distinct physical events sufficient for its occurrence. If physical causes are sufficient for physical effects, then nothing else is necessary, so no mental cause is necessary for any physical event to happen. It follows that mental causation is redundant in the physical universe.

It is the third law of thermodynamics that the quantity of energy in the universe is constant. If there were mental causation extra energy would be introduced into the universe, so if the third law of thermodynamics is true there is no mental causation. If there is mental causation, the third law of thermodynamics is false.

It is just as scientifically inexplicable how mind, consciousness or awareness could be produced by the brain. The brain is the most complex object known to exist. Nevertheless, for all its neurological complexity, the brain is only billions and billions of wholly physical atoms moving through empty space. It is hard to see how billions and billions of atoms could give rise to awareness, your own awareness of this page in front of you for example. Consciousness seems to be so radically qualitatively distinct from matter in motion it is unimaginable how it could arise out of it.

It is extremely difficult to specify exactly how it is possible for a neurological event to cause a mental event or a mental event to cause a neurological event. If there exist both minds and bodies, then the logically possible permutations of psycho-physical interaction would seem to be these:

Minds affect bodies but bodies do not affect minds.

Bodies affect minds but minds do not affect bodies.

Minds affect bodies and bodies affect minds.

Minds do not affect bodies and bodies do not affect minds.

Cartesian Problems

Anaxagoras claims 'Mind [...] causes all things' but does not explain how. [Anaxagoras and Quantum Physics] Aristotle says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that choice is the efficient cause (that is, sufficient condition) of action so, if choices are mental and actions are physical, there is mental causation. Nevertheless, Aristotle offers no account of how mental causation is possible.

Descartes argues for two-way psycho-physical causal interaction between the immaterial inner space and the human body, but admits being unable to explain how this is possible.

One solution to the problem is to deny that there is causation in either direction, a view entailed by the psycho-physical parallelism endorsed by G.W. Leibniz, the seventeenth century German philosopher and mathematician, and his French partial contemporary Nicholas Malebranche. Leibniz argued that Ultimate reality has caused a 'pre-established harmony' and thereby initiated the causal chain that results in mental events and the causal chain that results in physical events which are correlated rather like the motions of two clocks, each of which tells the right time and therefore the same time. Malebranche agreed that Ultimate reality initiated both causal chains but claimed further that Ultimate reality intervened to determine the timing of each mental event and each physical event. Malebranche's version of psycho-physical parallelism is sometimes called 'occasionalism' for this reason. On Benedictus Spinoza's monist theory thought and extension are two aspects of one substance and do not interact causally.

Much contemporary work on mental causation is also a reaction to Cartesianism. Descartes' mind body dualism is rejected but his recognition of psycho-physical interaction is accepted. The attempt is then made to explain how mental causation is possible.

Anomalous Monism

The most influential theory of mental causation of the last quarter of the twentieth century was Anomalous Monism, advocated by Donald Davidson, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley. Davidson argues in his paper 'Mental Events' that mental events cause physical events because they are physical events.

Davidson's motivation is to relieve the appearance of contradiction between three principles he thinks are true: Causal Interaction, the Nomological Character of Causality, and the Anomalism of the Mental.

According to the principle of Causal Interaction at least some mental events cause physical events and at least some physical events cause mental events. For example, if intentions, perceptions and decisions are amongst the causes of the sinking of a battleship in a naval engagement then a physical event has at least some mental causes. If the perception of a physical object, say a battleship, causes beliefs then a mental state has at least some physical causes. On the principle of the Nomological Character of Causality if two events are causally related then they always fall under some strict deterministic law. On the principle of the Anomalism of the Mental there are no psycho-physical laws so no strictly deterministic laws relating mental events and physical events as causes and effects.

These three principles are *prima facie* mutually inconsistent. Seemingly, if mental events cause physical events or physical events cause mental events then they are related by strict deterministic laws so it is then false that there are no psycho-physical laws. On the other hand, it seems that if there are no psycho-physical laws then either mental events do not cause physical events and physical events do not cause mental events or not every pair of events related as cause and effect falls under strict deterministic laws. Nevertheless, Davidson aims to reconcile the three principles by his Anomalous Monism.

Anomalous Monism entails that mental events are identical with physical events. Every mental event is identical with some physical event but not every physical event is identical with a mental event. Mental events are causes of physical events because they are physical events and physical events cause physical events. Nevertheless, Davidson rejects the thesis that there exist psycho-physical laws. On Nomological Monism every mental event is a physical event and there are psycho-physical laws. Davidson accepts the first part of this but not the second. On Nomological Dualism no mental event is identical with any physical event but there are nevertheless psycho-physical laws: for example because mental events are correlated with physical events in some close and invariable way that falls short of identity. Davidson rejects both parts

of this. On Anomalous Dualism (or Cartesian dualism) no mental event is identical with any physical event and there are no psycho-physical laws. Davidson accepts the second part of this but not the first.

If there are no strictly deterministic psycho-physical laws then there is no physical explanation of the mental. For example, it is not possible to predict someone's mental state given a complete knowledge of their physical state, or even a complete knowledge of their present and past physical states or even a complete knowledge of the prior state of the physical universe. If there are no psycho-physical laws then no mental events may be subsumed under strictly deterministic scientific generalizations.

If the mental is anomalous then room seems to be left for human freedom. If there is no strict deterministic law relating my choices or decisions to physical events then they are not necessitated by physical events. Indeed, if my choices and decisions may cause physical events then my mental states are at least amongst the causes of my own actions and, arguably, this is part of what it means for me to have free will, to be an autonomous agent.

Supervenience

Davidson holds that the dependence of the mental on the physical is very close. The mental is supervenient on the physical. This means that if two mental events differ in some mental respect then they cannot only differ in that mental respect but must differ in some physical respect. However, if they differ in some physical respect it does not follow that they differ in any mental respect.

The doctrine that some property F supervenes on some property G is expressed by a cluster of views, because the supervenience relation admits of variants and degrees:

(1) If being F supervenes on being G then if two objects, a, b, are indiscernible with regard to being F then they are indiscernible with regard to being G. So, if the mental supervenes on the physical then it is not possible for two persons to be indiscernible with regard to some mental property without being indiscernible with regard to some physical property.

(2) If being F supervenes on being G then if a is F and b is exactly like a in being F, then b is G. So, if two people share a mental property then they share a physical property.

(3) If being F supervenes on being G then a cannot change with respect to being F without changing with respect to being G. So a person cannot change in any mental respect without changing in some physical respect. It is unclear how much is entailed by 'without changing with respect to being G' but, arguably: If being F supervenes on being G then a cannot cease to be F without ceasing to be G. In that case a person cannot cease to possess a mental property without ceasing to possess a physical property. Also arguably: If being F supervenes on being G then a cannot begin to be F without beginning to be G. In that case a person cannot gain a mental property without gaining a physical property.

'Weak supervenience' is the doctrine that if in the actual world a is F then in the actual world a is G. So if the mental is weakly supervenient on the physical then if a person has a mental property in the actual world then they have a physical property in the actual world. 'Strong supervenience' is the doctrine that if in every possible world a is F then in every possible world a is G. So if the mental is strongly supervenient on the physical then if a person has a mental property in every possible world then they have a physical property in every possible world.

Arguments for supervenience are harder to find than formulations. The supervenience of the mental on the physical is designed to capture the 'intuition' that mental facts depend on physical facts but physical facts do not depend on mental facts. It also seems to promise dependence without reduction: Mental events are not nomologically reducible to physical events because there are no psycho-physical laws. Mental events are not logically reducible to physical events because it is not true that any sentence or set of sentences about mental events can be translated into a sentence or set of sentences about physical events without loss of meaning.

Even though the mental supervenes on the physical there can be no hope of a reduction of psychology to neurology in the way in which, arguably, biology may be reduced to chemistry and chemistry reduced to physics.

Epiphenomenalism and Psycho-Physical Laws

It is objected to Anomalous Monism, notably by the Canadian philosopher Ted Honderich, Professor at University College, London, that on this theory mental events do not cause physical events 'in virtue of' being mental events but in virtue of being physical events. The mental

properties of the mental events are not causally efficacious. Honderich points out that some pears on a weighing scale depress the scale in virtue of their physical property of being a certain weight, not in virtue of, say, being green. If this sort of objection is right then in Anomalous Monism the mental properties of mental events do no causal work. Mental causation has not been explained because nothing mental qua mental is causing anything physical.

Anomalous Monism arguably collapses into a kind of epiphenomenalism: the theory that mental events are caused by physical events but physical events are not caused by mental events. In reply it might be urged that the sentence 'Mental events cause physical events' is true on Anomalous Monism because mental events cause physical events because they are identical with physical events that cause physical events.

It has been argued, notably by Honderich in his *A Theory of Determinism*, that the neurological is sufficient for the mental: The occurrence of some neurological event is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of some psychological event and, as is logically entailed by this, the occurrence of that psychological event is a necessary condition for the occurrence of that neurological event. On this view there seems to be no reason in principle why psycho-physical laws should not be discovered, because true sentences about neurology would entail true sentences about psychological events. It ought then to be possible to predict the occurrence of psychological events from knowledge of neurological events.

It is empirically uncontroversial in the case of human beings (if not inner spaces, computers and deities) that the neurological is necessary for the mental. Neurological impairment leads to psychological impairment. If the neurological is necessary for the mental then the mental is sufficient for the neurological. Arguably the dependency of the mental on the neurological is ultimately an empirical and contingent one. If computers, inner spaces or Ultimate reality have mentality but no neurology then it is not a necessary truth that the mental depends on the neurological.

Karl Popper has argued that the self-conscious mind is an evolutionary product of the brain that nevertheless acts causally upon it. However, if mental events are sufficient for neurological events and if the physical universe is a closed deterministic system then neurological events are overdetermined. Some event is overdetermined if at least two conditions sufficient for its occurrence obtain. This would seem to make either mental causes or neurological causes redundant. If a neurological event is sufficient for the occurrence of a neurological event then no mental event

is necessary for it. If a mental event is sufficient for a neurological event then no neurological event is necessary for it.

One solution, adopted by the English philosophers Tim Crane and D.H. Mellor for example, is to give up the assumption that the universe is a closed deterministic system. Crane and Mellor see no reason in principle why there should not exist psycho-physical laws as scientifically respectable as physical laws. (Related topics: Cognitive Science; Consciousness Studies; Mind-Body Theories; Experience, Religious.)

How is Mental Causation Possible?

The problem of Overdetermination:

A neurological event is sufficient for a physical event.

A mental event is sufficient for that physical event.

This gives overdetermination because:

If P then P1

If M then P1

so if not M, then if P then P1 and if not P then if M then P1 which is overdetermination.

The solution is:

A mental event can override a physical cause of a physical event.

If P then P1 unless M, and if M then P2.

ie M cancels the effect of P, even though P happens. How is this done?

An analogy: A ship is steered by a helmsman, using wheel, rudder. The helmsman can also control the speed of the vessel. Suppose the helmsman were to do nothing. The ship would move anyway, propelled by the current. Mental causes = the helmsman. Neurological causes = the current.

Breathing goes on anyway. One can override this and decide to breath faster, slower, more deeply etc.

Thinking goes on any way. I can choose to think this or that. I can decide to do this or that. Moving my arm. I can deliberately move it. My heartbeat: I cannot control this (without special training in yoga).

The neurological is (empirically) necessary for the mental.

The neurological is sometimes sufficient for the physical.

The neurological is not always sufficient for the physical. Sometimes it is overridden by the mental.

$M \rightarrow P$

$\neg P \rightarrow \neg M$

We know the physical is necessary for the mental.
It follows that the mental is sufficient for the physical.

I can mentally intervene in the course of my actions.

Suppose there is mental causation, then how is this possible? This is the Q. here. (We are not doubting that there is mental causation here.)

Do we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that the brain is a deterministic system? Suppose some probabilistic account of its causal connections is right. Then we have:

Neurological event P1 causes neurological event P2 with some probability greater than zero but less than one. Suppes in Probabilistic Metaphysics argues that causation is probabilistic. Apply this to neurological connections. Popper in A World of Propensities and other places argues that probabilities are objective (not just degrees of belief and ignorance or Bayesian). Also, the attempts to model the brain in terms of quantum theory might well yield a probabilistic or partly indeterministic account of neurological causal connections.

Suppose the neurology of the brain is indeterministic (but obviously not utterly random). Then we could have a chain of causally related neurological events:

P1 makes P2 likely, P2 makes P3 likely etc.

P1 is not associated with any mental event. P2 is necessary for mental event M2, so M2 is sufficient for P2. M2 clinches it that P2 happens – mental causation.

M2
suff
I
v

P1 prob->P2 prob-> P3

We know that the neurological is necessary for the mental. It follows as a matter of logic that the mental is sufficient for the neurological. If the neurological is not determined by the neurological then there is not overdetermination if the mental determines the neurological. The mental has a causal role. Intuitively: we can intervene in our own actions.

What makes M2 happen? We do not know that there are sufficient conditions for mental events. Intuitively (or scientifically) we assume that nothing happens without sufficient conditions for its occurrence.

Suppose the reverse picture applies. Suppose the occurrence of some prior mental event M1 makes the occurrence of M2 likely but there is not determination of the mental by the mental. Suppose then there is some physiological input that causes in turn some neurological event that clinches it that M2 occurs. Then we have:

M1 prob-> M2 prob ->M3

P1 prob-> P2 prob -> P3

but, say, P1 determines M2.

But then, if P1 determines M2, and M2 determines P2 then P1 determines P2 (via M2). But then the brain is deterministic after all in a sense. Maybe the brain needs the mental to complete it as a deterministic system.

It is better to think of these psycho-physical connections as webs rather than chains. Look at neural nets.

The Indeterminate Mind: How is Mental Causation Possible?

(Ted Honderich has refuted the Davidsonian program on mental causation: The pears make the scales go down because they weigh so many pounds, not because they are green.)

Mind and Matter: A Difference of Degree?

Thoughts are mental.

They have: intentionality, phenomenology, syntax, semantics

They are events or sets of events.

Brain processes are physical.

They have spatio temporal location.

They are events or sets of events.

Experiences are both mental and physical.

Eg a pain has both phenomenological content and spatial location.

No semantics.

No syntax.

Awareness

Semantics

Intentionality

Phenomenology (content) Syntax (form) [equiprimordial]

Neurology

Cellular biology

Matter shades into mind.

Matter blurs into mind.

Nothing mental is physical and nothing physical is mental. (Even though people are both mental and physical.)

Analogy: nothing black is white. Nothing white is black. There is grey in the middle.

Thought: mental

Experience: both mental and physical – not as mental as thought and not as physical as matter.

Matter: physical.

Mind and matter are on the same continuum.

(Of course, leaves many questions unanswered.)

IX

MACHINES

Are machines intelligent?

Some machines are intelligent.

Suppose intelligence is a capacity to solve problems, perhaps speedily and accurately. By this criterion a machine may be as intelligent, or more intelligent, than a human being.

Something is intelligent if and only if it solves problems. Intelligence admits of degrees because the complexity of problems and the rapidity and accuracy of their solution admits of degrees.

Can machines think?

Some machines can think. We are used to connecting the concept of thinking with two other concepts: being alive and being conscious.

Thinking is distinct from being alive and does not depend upon it and thinking is distinct from being conscious and does not depend upon it.

Thinking is distinct from being alive because there are things that are alive that do not think: plants and trees for example.

Thinking is distinct from consciousness because there are unconscious thoughts, or, at least, 'unconscious thinking' is not a contradictory form of words.

No computer is alive and no computer is conscious.

We are conditioned into the historical prejudice that nothing can think unless it is both conscious and alive by the empirical fact that before computers were invented everything that thought was both alive and conscious. This inductive correlation, however, is insufficient to establish a dependency of thought on life and consciousness.

Can airplanes fly?

Compare a possible situation before 1914. People witness the early flights of airplanes and make the following judgements: Airplanes do not fly. For a start, airplanes are not alive. Birds fly but only beings that are alive may fly. Being alive is a necessary condition for. These airplanes are travelling through the air but we should not call this 'flying'. Travelling through the air is logically insufficient for flight. Secondly, there is a man in it. The airplane is not really flying because its movements are directed by a human being. It shows no originality in its movements. It merely mechanically executes human commands. That is not flying. Also, we do not have a clear idea of what thinking is in the human case, so we do not have a clear idea of what we are extending or failing to extend to machines.

Can compact-disc players sing?

Is the machine or the system intelligent?

A machine or a system might be intelligent. The distinction between a system and an object is not clear. We think of a swarm of bees as a system, rather than an object, but if we think of the behaviour of atoms in an object, or think of its molecular structure, the object seems like a system. A swarm of bees seen from a distance could look like an object. We count something as a system or an object depending upon whether it presents itself to us in way that makes its constituents conspicuous or inconspicuous.

There is space in an object and space in a system.

The machine is both an object and a system. The software is both a system and an object.

Could a computer have experiences?

Something has experiences if and only if it has an internal phenomenology.

What do a computer and a human being have in common?

They run programs: human being more anarchically than computers.

Input: sense experiences in the human case, keyboard input in the computer case.

Output: behaviour in the human case, VDU or printer output in the computer case.

Language: natural language in humans, machine code and program language in the computer.

Learning: education in the human, programming in the computer.

Belief: dispositions to allocate truth values to propositions.

Problem solving.

Being an electronic system. Brain/circuits.

Innate capacities: genes/brains. Inbuilt circuitry.

Intentionality. Reference. Program referents. túflying

ntal event, so a mental event is sufficient for a neural event.

It is because the difference between mind and matter is one of degree that there is no interface problem.

X

CONSCIOUSNESS

The ordinary subject-object distinction is dissolved within consciousness because it is the difference between the subjecti-object that is the human being you are closely associated with and, on the other hand, the world of

moving physical objects with which you are ordinarily confronted, a world that is 'in front' of you. This entire opposition of subjective psycho-physical body and objective world-over-there is enacted within consciousness (and every embodied being's consciousness). Once apprehended as a constellation of psycho physical events within the consciousness, subject object dualism is not assumed to be primordial. However, on a spiritual or metaphysical level, subject object dualism has not been abolished. Although the consciousness is an inside without an outside, this means it is an inside without a physical outside. It has an absolute exteriority or an other-sidedness that, when thoroughly understood, will turn out to be Non-local consciousness. Subject-object dualism therefore exists on the spiritual plane because you, as a finite consciousness, are not Non-local consciousness and Non-local consciousness, as the infinite spirit, is not you. The consciousness that you are between ordinary finitude and the infinity of Non-local consciousness. It is infinite in that it has no outside. It is infinite in having the eternal now as its interior time. It is infinite in having an infinite interiority as its here or space. The infinity of Non-local consciousness is however greater than the infinity of the consciousness. The idea of different sizes of infinity is coherent. Think: there are more numbers than odd numbers. There are more numbers than even numbers, even though each of these number series is infinite. The sum of odd and even numbers is infinite but greater than the sum of even numbers that is infinite and greater than the sum of odd numbers that is infinite. There are different sizes of infinity or different infinities. The infinity of Non-local consciousness is greater than the infinity of your own consciousness.

Science assimilates two kinds of objectivity that need to be separated. In one sense objective just means 'true' or 'the case'. That is uncontroversial. In another sense of 'objective' 'objective' means 'other' or 'not to do with me' or 'over there'. Science conceives everything as objective in this second sense. Science conceives everything as other. This means that the consciousness systematically escapes detection by science. For science to admit the existence of the consciousness would create a scientific revolution greater than that of Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton or Einstein. For science to admit the consciousness would be for it to admit the possibility of a synthesis of science and theology, a synthesis that is ideologically and methodologically difficult for science to admit. The third person perspective that emerged with science and as essential to it since the Renaissance requires the suspension of religion.

Consciousness is not situated. Consciousness has never left you and you never leave consciousness. Consciousness is directly available to you. Consciousness is not an idea. Consciousness is not your idea of consciousness. Understanding that you are a consciousness does not consist in thinking this thought rather than that, having this idea rather than that. Appreciating that you are a consciousness requires noticing that your experience has a constant structure. Of course, experiences come and go, colours, sounds, shapes, smells, images, flit in and out of the experiential field. You are that field. You are the zone where your experiences happen. Your body walks about inside your own consciousness. Consciousness is not present to you like a thing even though it is present to you. It is present to you as no-thing-ness.

The presence of the consciousness does not entail its possible absence because the consciousness is presence. However, the presence of the consciousness may be obfuscated. The mirror needs to be wiped clean of thoughts and sensations. You are the mirror. This is not a cognitive mirror or mind, it is a field of being against which or in which the events of experience occur.

Consciousness is permanent in a way that your body is not. Consciousness is not presented to you from any angle or disclosed side by side like a physical object. Consciousness is disclosed all at once, although there is a difference between the consciousness as presented as the field of thoughts and experiences and the consciousness as presented as free of earthly contents. The empiricists are right in a way: most what is in our minds comes from the world through the senses. It is these layers of conditioned thought and experience that have to be suspended or cleaned off for consciousness to be disclosed to you as what you are: as what you have been all along.

The permanence of consciousness is a natural permanence. Nothing physical or mental could destroy or in any way damage consciousness. Consciousness is not in front of you. Consciousness is not presented to you as an object of perception or thought. Consciousness is the spatial structure of your experience. If the totality of your experience is content, that invites the question Content of what?. Consciousness is the container for the whole content of your experience: an inside without an outside. Objects and events of experience are mutually related within the consciousness field that you are. Your experience presupposes the consciousness in so far as it is your experience.

Consciousness is but is not a thing. The further from you something is the more thing-like it is. The nearer something is to you the less thing-like it is. You are no-thing-ness. The world is thing-ness.

You move external objects by moving them by moving your body. You move your body by moving. You do not move consciousness. You can move your body inside consciousness.

Consciousness is not in objective space but pervades objective space. We do not apprehend everything in objective space because our mind and body is finite. Your mental and sensory capacities are limited. If they were not, they would apprehend everything in the infinite space that is the soul, in so far as this infinite space pervades the world, you would apprehend all the events and objects in the world. We are cognitively finite but spiritually infinite. Our finite cognition provides us with a finite amount and degree of information about the world. Spiritually, we wholly pervade the world.

You have no need to look for consciousness. It is already you. In a sense you have never come across anything else. The consciousness cannot be grasped from the impersonal standpoint of science. The consciousness is more personal than the personal, more intimate than the intimate.

Consciousness cannot be grasped by generalisation. It is more particular than the particular. It is infinitely inside itself. It is the inside of infinity. It is infinity inside itself. It is infinite inwardness.

The Subject of Self-Consciousness

Two kinds of problem need to be solved by any theory of how the concept of self is possible:

(1) What is it for something to be me?

Why is something me? From no non-indexical description of something does it logically follow that this something is me. Why not? What has been said about something when it is said that that is me? It can be coherently imagined that there should be something qualitatively identical to me that is numerically distinct from me. How come?

This cluster of problems arises for any being such that there is something it consists in to be that being, yet the solution has to be different for each such being.

(2) A problem about self-consciousness.

That a being is conscious of itself does not entail that it is self-conscious. A being could be conscious of many things, and amongst those things

could be itself, but this is not sufficient for self-consciousness. Think of the case where several children play the game of interlocking their hands so that it is not clear whose fingers are whose. If the children look at those fingers, typically each child perceives some of their own fingers. Although they are thereby aware of (parts of) themselves, they are not thereby self-conscious.

What is missing in these cases? Not only must a being be conscious of itself, but it must also know that it is what it is conscious of. It must have the knowledge that it is conscious, and that that which is conscious is numerically identical with (or at least a part of) that which it is conscious of.

Is the concept of oneself as 'pure' subject primordial with regard to the 'strong conceptual dualism' between consciousness of objects, and consciousness of being conscious? A reason for answering 'no' is that it might not make much sense to speak of a pure subject without postulating a 'pure' object or some such correlate (rather as it does not make sense to admit 'here' without admitting 'there' or elsewhere'). A reason for answering 'yes' is that a pure subject is arguably presupposed as the subject of both kinds of consciousness.

How many fundamental self-conceptions are there? There is temporal self-representation. If I think of myself, I think of myself as located in time. But do I not in a way represent myself as something permanent?

There is unmediated and mediated self-awareness. We have to do justice to the idea that I do not mix myself up with anyone else in introspection (if I do not). If I am aware of myself as a bodily subject I am aware of myself as spatially located, but does the reverse follow. I can be aware of myself as a spiritual substance that pervades part of the physical world. I use 'pervades' this way:

a pervades b (def.) if and only if a is where b is & $\neg (a = b)$

What unifies consciousness? The pure subject? If so, how does the pure subject do that? Is there incorrigible knowledge of sense contents or qualia? An argument against this is:

(1) A scientist could use a machine to affect my brain so that I acquire the belief that I am in a conscious experiential state, which is also a 'raw feel'.

(2) I am not in that conscious experiential state.

(3) Therefore, although I have the belief, the belief is false.

In that case, I may correctly, and so consistently, doubt that I am in that state.

Logical equivalence, the schema $x (Mx \leftrightarrow \neg Dx)$, is too strong. It excludes the possibility that I find indubitable anything that is not exhausted by being in my present state of consciousness, for example that $1 + 1 = 2$. It excludes the possibility that there is anything in my mind that is dubitable.

The distinction between knowing one's mind and knowing one's body does not coincide with the first person singular/third person grammatical distinction.

It is not clear whether when I introspect mental states they are also physical. Perhaps I only introspect the mental properties of states which are essentially physical.

Sense data are neither mental nor physical.

Inner spaces or consciousnesses are not parts of the whole spirit.

The view that experiences have duration looks inconsistent with the view that the present is instantaneous. Suppose the present is when our experiences happen.

Husserl thinks the transcendental ego is not the Cartesian inner space. Phenomenology entails ontology.

What is the quality of self-ness ?

Understanding oneself as a subject of conscious experience is sufficient for possession of a concept of self.

Personal identity: the correct criterion is not continuity of the body. If the concept of self includes the concept of oneself as persisting over time then that suggestion implies no concept of the body is necessary.

This subject/substance that I am is not an object. What does 'object' mean here?

The Ego is not analysable.

Is imagination of disembodied existence coherent? If not, where exactly is the incoherence?

Does the pure subject have a 'point of view'? If so, is it in space?

The 'I' as bodily.

Does it make sense to use 'my existence' in the plural, or talk of me as a set or series of individuals ?

'I do not exist' is not self-contradictory, even though the conditions for its truth could never obtain. Is this enough to make the sentence just false, or necessarily false?

Self-consciousness does not depend upon other conscious beings.

Does it logically follow from the existence of the human being that I in fact 'am' that this something is me? Why not? 'Am' does not express identity. What has been said about something when it is said that that is me? It can be coherently imagined that there should be something qualitatively identical to me that is numerically distinct from me. How come?

This cluster of problems arises for any being such that there is something it consists in to be that being, yet the solution has to be different for each such being.

Does being conscious entail being self-conscious? If a different question is asked: 'If I am conscious, am I then self-conscious?' or 'If a person is conscious, is that person then self-conscious?' then one is more tempted to answer 'yes'; not because of what is logically entailed by the concept of consciousness, but because self-consciousness is frequently held to be criterial of being a person, and that persons are self-conscious is necessary condition of the first person singular personal pronoun having the function it does. Stripped of these considerations the answer to the question in its original formulation is 'No'.

The doctrine that if a being is conscious, then it is self-conscious is one that has features in several otherwise competing philosophies. It is a cornerstone of the representational theory of perception common to the

rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. It appears in a much qualified, and much misunderstood, form in Kant. In addition arguments by more modern philosophers have been advanced in its favour. Quinton says:

“A conscious being is always in some sense a self conscious being”
Anthony Quinton *The Nature of Things* (Routledge) p104

Sartre says:

“The existence of consciousness is an absolute because consciousness is consciousness of itself”
Jean-Paul Sartre *The Transcendence of the Ego* (New York) p. 40

Its earliest formulation seems to be in Aristotle. Aristotle says

“It is by sight that we perceive that we see but by sight not qua sight but qua perception”
Aristotle *Metaphysics* (Oxford) p. 246

In his discussion of ‘knowing of knowing’ Aristotle claims that knowledge, perception, opinion and reasoning in passing apprehend themselves. For Aristotle the aim of the spiritual life is pure self-knowledge. The clearest and most explicit formulation of the doctrine is perhaps Locke’s who says

“It being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel or will anything, we know that we do.”
John Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford) p188

For Locke, being self-conscious is part of what it means to be a person but these are not his grounds for holding that if a person is conscious then they are self-conscious. His definition of a person is as follows;

“We must consider what ‘person’ stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places”.
John Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford)

It is rather part of what is meant by 'perceive' that if a person is in a mental state, then they know they are in that state. The term 'perceive' as used by philosophers subscribing to the representational theory of perception is broader than our word and should be translated 'experience', although this translation should neither deny nor imply the doctrine about self-consciousness. It is part of the representational theory of perception that to experience is to perceive ideas, where an idea is any content of consciousness.

Ryle summarises the doctrine that being conscious entails being self-conscious, in the view that the mental is self-intimating;

'The things that a mind does or experiences are self-intimating, and this is supposed to be a feature which characterises these acts and feelings not just sometimes but always. It is part of the definition of their being mental that their occurrence entails that they are self-intimating. If I think, hope, remember, will, regret, hear a noise, or feel a pain, I must, ipso facto, know that I do.'

Gilbert Ryle The Concept of Mind (Hutchinson) p. 158

The view that if I am conscious then I am self-conscious is not quite the same as the view that if I am in a mental state I know it.

There are four main arguments that are deployed to try to show that if a being is conscious that they are self-conscious. The first of these is what I call 'the argument from correct reports': If asked at t_2 what they were perceiving or thinking at t_1 a person can answer correctly. The second, which I call 'the argument from recognition' rests on the premise that experience requires the application and reapplication of concepts, and this in turn requires memory which is memory of oneself. The third, which I call 'the argument from subliminal awareness' is: If a person is conscious then they are minimally or partially conscious of themselves, as a secondary object of consciousness. Finally, 'the argument from inalienable states' is: In so far as a person experiences pain, emotion, or other states which are not perceptions of objects that person is self-conscious.

(1) The argument from correct reports.

(1) persons are habitually engaged in everyday tasks which can be performed without a great deal of conscious effort or deliberate self-scrutiny.

(2) It is possible to ask any such person what he was doing a few minutes earlier and be answered correctly. For example, A is perceiving x at t1 and is asked at t2 what he was perceiving at t1 and replies 'x'. As Ryle says;

"If asked what I had just been hearing or picturing or saying, I could usually give a correct answer" (CM159)

(3) what is necessary for A to give any such correct report is his remembering himself perceiving x at t1.

(4) In order to remember himself perceiving x at t1 A must have been aware of himself as perceiving x at t1 and hence self-conscious at t1.

(5) Therefore, a conscious being is a self-conscious being.

The soundness of this argument is not sufficient to establish that conscious beings are perpetually self-conscious. This conclusion could be established inductively by repetition of the above test described in the first two premises over a large number of cases. This would not prove that being conscious entails being self-conscious, but it would at least establish something like a lawlike, or causal, connection between being conscious and being self-conscious.

The original argument on the basis of which any such inductive procedure was adopted is fallacious. The first two premises of the 'argument from psychological reports' can be readily conceded. Persons are typically and habitually engaged in tasks not requiring especially deliberate application, and it is possible to ask people at a later time what they were engaged in at an earlier time. Let us suppose their answers are generally correct. The next step in the argument is ambiguous and might or might not be legitimate: the claim that anyone recollecting a previously performed action, or remembering being conscious of an object, thereby remembers themselves performing that action, or being conscious of that object. A great many different things can be meant by 'remembers themselves'.

If they recollect, and answer correctly, that they do not remember another person performing the action, or being conscious of the object, it is not necessary that they remember that it was they rather than someone else who performed the task, or who was conscious of the object, in order to answer correctly. Someone might thoroughly take it for granted that it was they who perceived x, and not someone else, and so it

is sufficient for their being able to answer correctly that they remember x at t1, and not in addition their perceiving x at t1. Therefore:

If a person is conscious of an object at t1, and is asked at t2 what he was conscious of at t1, it is sufficient for his being able to answer correctly that he recall, at t2, the object present to his consciousness at t1. He does not in addition need to recall himself at t1, or his consciousness of the object at t1.

The third premise of the 'argument from correct reports', at least construed in the strong form that a person must remember themselves to remember correctly, is therefore fallacious. (No doubt people do often recollect not only an object but also being conscious of it, and themselves being conscious of it.)

The premise might be amended to express the weaker claim that it is sufficient for the making of a correct report that at some time or other the person recollect themselves, but this need not happen on every occasion of remembering. The argument now at best establishes that people who remember being conscious were self-conscious when they were conscious. It can no longer establish that if a person is conscious then that person is self-conscious.

If a person sometimes remembers their perceiving x or their being conscious of x, and does not simply remember x, to make their report at t2, it does not follow they were self-conscious when conscious of x at t1.

A person's attention might be totally absorbed by x at t1, so that there is no residual attention directed at themselves at t1. It is not a necessary condition for someone's perceiving an object that they be self-conscious, while perceiving the object, or even know that they are perceiving the object, except in the minimal sense that they perceive the object. Self-consciousness and knowledge of perceiving the object would detract from the attention paid to the object. No attention need be directed to an activity in order to perform it. Ryle says:

'The committee member who is totally absorbed in the business finds to his surprise when the committee adjourns, that his finger and pencil have inscribed a picture or pattern on the blotting paper.'
Gilbert Ryle On Thinking (Oxford) p. 40

A distinction between conscious and unconscious action accommodates Ryle's example. It is not necessary to be self-conscious in order to

perform actions. It might not even be necessary to be conscious of them in order to perform them. It is necessary that a person must be conscious in order to perceive an object.

A distinction is needed between expressions of the form 'I remember doing [...]' and 'I remember that I [...]' on the one hand, and 'I remember myself doing [...]' on the other. Or 'I remember being conscious of [...]' and 'I remember that I was conscious of [...]' on the one hand and 'I remember myself being conscious of [...]' on the other. Only expressions of the second form entail that the utterer was self-conscious at the time of what is remembered. The utterer might or might not have been self-conscious at the time of what is remembered in the case of expressions of the first form.

To be able to remember x, it is sufficient to be able to truly report that you were conscious of x. It is not possible to doubt whether it was oneself or somebody else who was conscious of x, if it is oneself who remembers x. It is a sufficient condition of its being oneself and not another person who was conscious of x, at an earlier time, that it is oneself who correctly remembers x, at a later time. This does not preclude other persons being conscious of x at any time that one is conscious of x. Additional persons being conscious of x provide no doubt as to whether it was oneself, or another person, who was conscious of x.

None of this precludes the possibility that one's remembering is mistaken. In order to recall what one was doing correctly it is not necessary to have been self-conscious during its performance. One may be mistaken in one's reports, but this just detracts from the second premise of the argument.

What you remember when you remember seeing an object is qualitatively different from what you remember when you remember another person seeing an object. In the second case you remember seeing the person's eyes pointing in a certain direction, his not appearing to daydream, etc. In one's own case you remember just what was seen, and do not need to remember yourself in addition.

In making reports on what other people were looking at, or otherwise conscious of, it is necessary to recollect a particular person, as well as the object of that person's attention. In the remembering what just one person was conscious of, and this person is oneself, it is not necessary to recall a particular person, only an object of awareness.

(2) The argument from recognition.

(1) Cognition is never cognition of a bare particular.

- (2) Cognition is always of a particular, or particulars, in relation to other particulars - notably in the temporal relation of before and after.
- (3) In order to ensure that cognitions of particulars do not 'fall apart into different worlds of experience' a subject of cognition, conscious of its own identity is necessary.
- (4) Therefore, the subject of cognition is self-conscious in cognition.

It has perhaps been advocated in its clearest and most convincing form by C.A. Campbell. Campbell concludes: 'Cognition of any kind - not merely remembering - implies a subject conscious of its own identity in its different apprehensions' *On Selfhood and Ultimate realityhood* (Routledge, London, 2004) pp. 75-7 where 'implies' means 'logically entails'.

Campbell anticipates and rejects the position I advocate: that there merely has to be a self-identical subject of different experiences, in order for these experiences not to fall into 'different worlds'. The subject does not have to be conscious of their continued identity. Campbell's argument against this is:

'the prius of any discernment by the subject of a specific relation between A and B is surely that the subject is aware of A and B as having at least that general relationship to one another which consists in their both being objects for him the one self.'

C.A. Campbell *On Selfhood and Ultimate realityhood* (Routledge, London, 2004) pp. 75-7

where the 'specific relation' could be, for example, that A temporally precedes B. This is sufficient, but all that is necessary is that A and B are in fact objects for that subject's experience. They are seen as standing in this (temporal) relation to one another. It is not necessary for recognising B as following A that the subject be aware of A and B as being related to the subject as objects of his or her own consciousness. The putative requirement that the subject know, be aware of, or be thinking of this is redundant. Indeed, it is only sometimes the case.

To clarify and strengthen his position, Campbell invokes premises which amount to the claims about memory in the argument from recollection. Campbell says;

‘Suppose I hear Big Ben striking. A moment later I, the same subject, hear it striking again [...]. It is a precondition of my hearing the second stroke as the second stroke that I remember having heard the first. But then I do not ‘remember’ having heard the first (and here is the crucial point) unless I am aware that it was I, the being who now hears the second stroke, who heard the first stroke; unless, in other words, I am not merely the same subject, but also conscious of my self-sameness, in the two experiences.’ C.A. Campbell *On Selfhood and Ultimate realityhood* (Routledge, London, 2004) p. 77

This is not right. All that is required are: that I am in fact the subject of both experiences, and that the second stroke did in fact follow the first in temporal sequence. In order to hear the second stroke as the second, I do not have to exercise my memory at all. It lasts in my consciousness. Of course, if I had forgotten that there had been the earlier stroke, then recollection would be necessary to hear the second stroke as the second stroke. Campbell’s ‘unless I am aware that it was I’ suggests there is room for a certain kind of error: “Someone just heard the clock strike a moment ago: Was that me or someone else?” Remembering in a first person singular way, what Swinburne calls ‘remembering from the inside’, precludes that error.

Even when recollection is necessary, it is not necessary that I recall myself as hearing the first stroke. It is sufficient to recall the first stroke. If I recall the first stroke, and hear the second, then I can hear the second stroke as the second.

The argument from recognition fails generally then, but in particular in so far as it invokes premises concerning memory, for the same reasons as the ‘argument from recollection’.

Variants on the ‘argument from recognition’ deploy as the first premise the claim that all experience requires the application and reapplications of concepts, and conclude that using concepts entails being self-conscious. However, ‘x is conscious’ does not seem to entail ‘x uses concepts’.

(3) The argument from subliminal awareness.

(1) All consciousness is ‘self-intimating’, or transparent to itself.

(2) Any consciousness transparent to itself entails consciousness of that which is conscious.

(3) Consciousness entails self consciousness.

The view expressed by the first premise is endorsed by Sartre who, despite distinguishing 'pre-reflective' from 'reflective' consciousness, thinks even pre-reflective consciousness is a kind of self-consciousness. Sartre says:

'Pre-reflective consciousness is self-consciousness.'
Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness (London) p. 76

This is because:

'[...] the existence of conscious is an absolute because consciousness is consciousness of itself. That is to say that the type of existence of consciousness is to be consciousness of itself and consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is consciousness of a transcendent object. All is therefore clear and lucid in consciousness; the object with its characteristic opacity is before consciousness, but consciousness is purely and simply consciousness of being consciousness of that object. This is the law of its existence'

Jean-Paul Sartre The Transcendence of the Ego (New York) p.40

Sartre thinks this self-intimating character applies to pre-reflective, and reflective consciousness: Both consciousness of an object which is other than oneself, and an overt reflective act of awareness of consciousness itself, are self-intimating.

The view is false, and Sartre would do well to reject it as detrimental to his useful reflective/pre-reflective distinction. If pre-reflective consciousness is self-intimating, then reflection on consciousness is superfluous. If I am perpetually minimally self-conscious, whenever conscious, there is no need for any act of self-consciousness on my part for me to be conscious of my consciousness.

Sartre distinguishes the consciousness consciousness always has of itself from reflective consciousness:

"This consciousness of consciousness - except in the case of reflective consciousness [...] is not positional which is to say that consciousness is not for itself its own object"

Jean-Paul Sartre The Transcendence of the Ego (New York) p. 40-41

but 'pre-reflective consciousness' cannot be 'self-consciousness' without making consciousness an object, in precisely the reified way

consciousness appears to the reflective act. The problem Sartre sees in Husserl et. al. arises for his own view.

Sometimes, when a person is conscious of an object that person is conscious that they are conscious of that object. Using an expression like 'conscious that [...]' would allow Sartre to escape the difficulty of how consciousness can be consciousness of itself without being its own object. It does not enable him to hold that all consciousness is partly or implicitly self-consciousness. Sartre implies that what sometimes is the case is always. He asks rhetorically:

'But how could there be an understanding which would not in itself be the consciousness of being understanding?'

Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness (London) p. 73

This can easily be. I can understand that p without being conscious that I understand that p. There is nothing incoherent about such a notion. There could be beings which understand that p that q that r [...], and yet are never conscious of understanding that p that q that r [...].

To accept this is in no way detrimental to Sartre's reflective - pre-reflective distinction nor, to adopt this metaphors, to the 'translucence of consciousness' and the 'opacity of objects'.

What of someone who made a set of weaker claims than Sartre? For example: If I am conscious, then I am subliminally aware that it is I, and not another, who is conscious, or I am conscious and not unconscious. Again, it is sometimes true of me, discontinuously, that when I am conscious of an object that I am conscious that I am aware of that object. Typically, attention is absorbed by the object of consciousness. It is not a condition for this that it be absorbed by anything else.

What does the claim that I must be subliminally conscious that it is I who am conscious, for me to be conscious, amount to? It is sufficient but not necessary. If I am conscious of x, there is room to doubt whether it is x that I am perceiving, but not whether it is I or someone else who is conscious of x.

(4) The argument from inalienable states.

(1) If a conscious being is in a state which is not a thought or perception of something other than itself, then that being is self-conscious.

(2) Beings are sometimes in states which are not perceptions or thoughts of something other than themselves.

(3) Therefore, if a being is conscious, it is self-conscious.

In its stronger version, it minimises the distinction between states of the person which are perceptions and those which are not. Hume says:

‘[...] every impression, internal and external, passions affections, sensations, pains and pleasures are originally on the same footing; and whatever other differences we may observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true colours, as impressions or perceptions.’

David Hume ()

as part of his argument that

‘[...] all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness.’

David Hume ()

That consciousness entails self-consciousness is built into the representational theory of perception, because it is a central tenet that only ideas are perceived directly, and ideas belong to the person. On this view, having experiences is automatically being self-conscious because what anyone’s direct experience is of, is their own mental states.

In order to reject this version of the self-intimating mind doctrine it is necessary to reject the representational theory of perception along with any other theory which entails that we only experience our own states directly. To do this we need to draw a distinction between two things which the theory assimilates: experience and what experience is experience of. When I am conscious of x, x is the object of my experience. x is not my experience but what my experience is experience of. To be conscious of x, I do not have to be conscious of being conscious of x. My experience does not have to be the object of my experience; x does.

This revised theory still allows me to be partly, or *prima facie* even entirely (as Hume and the Buddhists think), my experiences. When I perceive an object I am partly my perception of the object but I am not the object. When I am experiencing x, I am at least partly my experience of x, but I am not x.

If the representational theory of perception is rejected, we reject what is entailed by that theory: being conscious entails being self-conscious.

A weaker version of the 'argument from inalienable states' has been put forward by Quinton, who does not subscribe to the representational theory of perception, but holds that a being is self-conscious in so far as it has sensations. Quinton says:

'A conscious being is always in some sense a self-conscious being. The most elementary form of consciousness has sensations, pre-eminently pain as its objects. A being that is aware of pain is aware of something in itself, something that constitutes part of itself, but it is not on that account aware of itself as a continuing identity through time analogous to but distinct from other selves. It is this that is characteristic of a complete personality. But restricted personality must be ascribed to anything that is at least minimally self-conscious in being susceptible of pain.'

Anthony Quinton *The Nature of Things* (Routledge, London) p. 104

It is not a sufficient condition for a being's being self-conscious that it feel pain. Quinton is right when he says that pain is part of a person, but there are reasons for doubting whether pain requires self-consciousness. We do not have to analyse 'x person is in pain' on the model of 'a person is aware of [...]'. We can speak of a person as being in a state of pain, or undergoing pain. To use the 'aware of [...]' model is to introduce a subject-object framework which, although facilitating a commitment to self-consciousness, is not necessary to characterise being in pain.

More decisively, a being could be in pain without drawing any self-other distinction, so without having any concept of self. It is conceivable that such a being should make the judgement: 'There is pain here', or 'There is pain now', and be wholly unable to frame the judgement 'I am in pain'. Being self-conscious is entailed by being able to formulate 'I am in pain' meaningfully, because it includes the first person singular pronoun. Using any grammatical or semantic form with the same function as the first person singular pronoun, presupposes drawing a self - not self distinction. It is not a sufficient condition for self-consciousness that a being be conscious of the being which in fact it is, although this is necessary. It is further necessary that that being draw a distinction between itself, and what is not itself, between states of itself, and what is not a state of itself. These two conditions are jointly sufficient for a beings' being self-conscious.

Quinton's other point, that being able to feel pain does not imply being conscious of one's continued identity through time, and does not guarantee being a fully fledged personality is correct but really falls into the category of what self-consciousness is consciousness of .

Being conscious does not logically entail being self-conscious, and none of the arguments advanced in favour of that position is sound. The majority of animals which are conscious do not seem to be self-conscious, and self-consciousness is to be one of the hallmarks of the human. This is the nearest thing to an empirical refutation of the doctrine that being conscious entails being self-conscious.

Why have people been misled into holding the self-intimating view of the mental? One habit is the assimilation of 'undergoing' or 'having' or 'experiencing' to 'being conscious of'. When I am thinking about something, I am not necessarily thinking about my thoughts. I am having thoughts. This assimilation is present in Armstrong's claim:

'When I am 'lost in thought' I am nevertheless conscious of my thoughts. It is just that I am paying no attention to the fact that they are my thoughts.'

David Armstrong *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (Routledge, London) p. 94

When I am 'lost in thought' that I am not paying attention to the fact that they are my thoughts; unless it so happens that it is this that I just happen to be absorbed in doing, but that is a comparatively rare phenomenon. It is not even true, generally that I am paying attention to my thoughts at all when I am 'lost in thought'. My attention is fully absorbed by what I am thinking about. Occasionally it is true that I am thinking about thinking but it is wrong to say that this is true whenever I am thinking. When I am experiencing but I am not experiencing my experiences. I am not thereby conscious of my experiences.

Assimilating 'having' or 'undergoing' to 'being conscious of' is one mistake which leads to the doctrine that the mental is self-intimating. McTaggart has pinpointed another:

'It seems to me perfectly possible for a being to be conscious without being self-conscious. It is true that the only conscious being of whom in present experiences I am aware is necessarily self-conscious when I am aware of him since he is myself. But I do not think that I am always self-conscious when I am conscious.'

John McTaggart *The Nature of Existence* Vol. II (Cambridge) pp. 78-9

In order to think about, and discuss, these matters concerning self-consciousness it is necessary to engage in a certain amount of reflection

on oneself. It is then quite possible, because when aware of ones' thinking one thinks about oneself, to be misled into thinking that one is perpetually self-conscious. In fact one is only self-conscious when thinking about oneself, and, although people vary, most people most of the time are thinking about something other than themselves.

XI

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Of the theorists considered in this book, Hegel has the most sophisticated and complete theory of self-consciousness. Three of Hegel's major works contain a section wholly devoted to the subject: The Phenomenology of Spirit or Jena Phenomenology of 1807, The Philosophy of Mind and The Berlin Phenomenology. The latter two books form part of the so called 'Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences' (17/27/30), which Hegel regarded as the most definitive exposition of his system, and to which the Jena Phenomenology is a prolegomenon. Self-consciousness occupies a great deal of space in the Hegelian texts because the concept is key for understanding Hegel's philosophical system. Our concern is what light Hegel can shed on the self-consciousness, not what light self-consciousness can shed on Hegel's system but, it is impossible to untangle what Hegel says about self-consciousness without making frequent reference to the system in terms of which he intends the concept is to be understood.

In brief outline, then, this is the Hegelian system. Reality for Hegel is ultimately and fundamentally mental or spiritual. In this sense, Hegel is an Idealist: not that he denies that there are physical objects, or that he thinks the objective world is constituted by human sense perception. None of that is true of him. He is an idealist in the sense that Marx is a materialist. Marx allows that persons are conscious, but holds that reality is ultimately material. Hegel allows that there is matter but holds that reality is ultimately spiritual. Hegel calls ultimate reality 'Geist', German for 'mind' or 'spirit'. Geist is not identified with Ultimate reality in Hegel's system and, in the interest of Protestant orthodoxy, he rejected the label 'pantheist'. Despite these disclaimers, Geist is best understood

as a sort of all pervading aspect of reality; reality in the sense of 'everything there is' or 'the universe as a whole'. Geist is infinite according to Hegel, not in the sense in which the number series is infinite, but in the sense in which there is not anything which is not it. Geist is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite. Geist is all pervading.

Geist, or the cosmic spirit, has two essential features. Geist is embodied, and Geist is conscious. Geist is embodied in nature. 'Nature' is Hegel's word for the physical universe disclosed in everyday sense perception, and investigated by the natural sciences. Geist's embodiment does not commit Hegel to mind-body dualism. Embodiment is to be understood on Aristotelian rather than on Cartesian lines. Nature or matter is the expression of Geist: the forms or shapes (Gestalten) of the cosmic spirit. Geist only exists in so far as it is embodied. Nature only exists in so far as it is the embodiment of Geist.

The relation between Geist and nature exhibits a recurrent theme in Hegel's philosophy, that of 'identity-in-difference'. If:

(i) x is a necessary condition for y

and if:

(2) y is a necessary condition for x (either logically or causally)

then x and y are, in this sense, 'identical': They are two aspects of one reality. Hegel is not involved in a breach of the logical principle of identity here. He is not saying 'x is y' or 'y is x' he is saying x and y are parts of a single larger whole (which as aspects they may exhaust). Characteristically, the mutually dependent 'moments' are opposites. There is no up without down, no here without there, no Being without Nothing, and so on. This reconciliation of seemingly incompatible perspectives is an essential part of Hegel's philosophical technique, known as 'dialectical reason'.

The other major feature of Geist is consciousness. Geist is conscious according to Hegel, to the extent and only to the extent, that persons are conscious. It is clear, then, that human existence is of major importance to Hegel's metaphysics. The point can be put this way: Persons are conscious, and persons are part of the universe. Therefore, the universe is conscious. Not only this, but to the extent that persons are conscious of nature, of the physical world, the universe is conscious of itself. Person's consciousness of Nature is, when fully understood though all its presuppositions, Geist's self-consciousness. It is at this point in Hegel's

metaphysics that the central importance of self-consciousness can be seen.

His view that history, or reality in time, is the process of Geist's coming to self-realisation. Geist has posited his own ignorance. To the extent that persons are ignorant, so is the universe ignorant of itself. The historical process is precisely the process of Geist recovering recovering its knowledge of itself though the growth of human freedom in the universe. Human experience in history is the 'cutting edge' of this cosmic process. All products of human action, all the artefacts, political and social institutions are, to greater or lesser degree, expressions of Geist's progress to self-knowledge. Different historical phases have been better or worse expression of Geist's progress. Hegel's, often tremendously rich, analyses of art, religion, law, politics, social institutions and the history of philosophy chart this progress. It was Hegel's perhaps over optimistic, and pretentious, view that Geist was nearing self-realisation in his own day and that his own philosophical system was the most appropriate and complete expression of this progress. Hegel calls the final stage of history 'Absolute Knowing' and this is the title of the final chapter of the Phenomenology.

Such, in barest outline, is Hegel's system. The view I have given is metaphysical one; one that sketches Hegel's view of reality as a whole. There are other readings of Hegel. It is possible to present a very 'humanistic', Hegel based on the consciousness of individual persons. Geist is then the world of everything human. There is Hegel the social and political theorist, Hegel the Philosopher of History, Hegel the pre-Marxist, Hegel the theologian, Hegel the first Existentialist etc etc. However, much of what he says about self-consciousness is incomprehensible if his metaphysics is neglected.

Armed now with an overview of his system, and a statement of what dialectical reason consists in we can turn to Hegel's theory of self-consciousness. As is frequently the case, the contents pages of Hegel's books are a useful guide to the structure of his thought. The headings for 'self-consciousness' in the 'Jena Phenomenology' are;

B. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

(iv) The Truth of Self Certainty

A. Independence and dependence of Self-consciousness; Lordship and Bondage.

B. Freedom of self-consciousness; Stoicism, Scepticism, and the unhappy consciousness.

The equivalent section in the Berlin Phenomenology is as follows;

B. Self-Consciousness

- 1) Characterisation
- 2) Freedom
 - i) Abstract
 - ii) Free Self-Certainty
 - iii) Objectification
- 3) Division of Self-Consciousness
 - a) Desire
 - 1) Drive and Activity
 - 2) Self seeking and destruction
 - 3) Satisfaction and Identification
 - b) Recognitive Self-Consciousness
 - 1) Struggle
 - i) imperiousness
 - ii) life and death
 - iii) coercion and subjection
 - 2) Mastery and Servitude
 - 3) Community of Need
 - i) slavery
 - ii) service
 - iii) communal provision
 - c) Universal Self-Consciousness
 - 1) recognition
 - 2) acceptance
 - 3) rationality

and in the Philosophy of Mind:

- (b) Self-Consciousness
 - a) Appetite
 - b) Self-Consciousness Recognitive
 - c) Universal Self-Consciousness

Synthesising Hegel's views of self-consciousness in these three works, a common structure can be extracted. This structure can be understood in two ways:

- (1) the charting of the chronological development of self-consciousness, in the individual, in society, and the universe
- (2) the description of the logical structure of self-consciousness. An outlining of the preconditions for self-consciousness, and an explication of what self-consciousness is

Hegel no doubt intended the two modes of understanding to be complementary: History is a chronological progress of universal self-consciousness, yet, in a sense, the universe is only becoming what it really is by this process. The goal is implicit in the origin.

The second 'explicative' interpretation is equally valid as a conceptual and dialectical unpacking of the notion of self-consciousness. The structure explicated is threefold:

1. Self-Certainty.
2. Master and Slave Dialectic.
3. Universal Self-Consciousness.

Each of the three stages marks either a 'moment', or component aspect, of self-consciousness (interpretation (2)), or else a chronological stage in a developing self-consciousness (interpretation (1)), or both. This threefold structure broadly parallels Hegel's treatment of 'consciousness', earlier in the Phenomenology. In both explications we are offered, to begin with, the most rudimentary and commonsensical level of understanding the concept and this is gradually shown to be inadequate. Thus the analysis of 'consciousness' began with 'sense certainty' in the Phenomenology: a set of utterly taken for granted beliefs about the world, found in naive realism, and sense perception. In a parallel way, Hegel begins the explication of self-consciousness with 'self-certainty'.

'Self-Certainty' is Hegel's term for our belief in what we are. On Hegel's view, there is a tension, some incompatibility, between what we think we are and what we are. It is this tension which will reveal the inadequacies of 'self-certainty' but, for the moment, the expression should be taken to include one's concept of oneself in ordinary everyday life, when that concept is not reflectively criticised. In the sense that we tend to think that what we believe about ourselves is fundamentally

correct (when we are not engaged in self-questioning) the phrase 'self-certainty' is apposite. We are self-certain, in that we by and large take for granted the accuracy of our self-image.

Hegel begins the section called 'self-certainty' by distinguishing self-consciousness from consciousness generally, the 'moments', or aspects of which, he has been charting so far in the book. Hegel says:

'[In the previous modes of certainty] what is true for consciousness is something other than itself. [...] But now there has arisen what did not emerge in these previous relationships viz a certainty which is identical with its truth; for the 'certainty is to itself its own object, and consciousness is to itself the truth'.

Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 104

Hegel uses 'certainty' to describe the manner of conviction generated within a particular form of consciousness. It is the being who is conscious, or that particular sort of consciousness, which is 'certain' (of, for example, itself, physical objects, etc). Hegel uses 'true', and 'truth', both in his own appraisals of these forms of consciousness, and in the appraisal of the justifications of the sorts of knowledge they yield. To use a spatial metaphor, an internal, and an external, perspective is being taken. Both 'certain' and 'true' are deployed in the elucidation of the perspective of the consciousness Hegel is talking about, 'true', but not 'certain', in Hegel's own perspective on that consciousness.

In interpreting Hegel, it is important to be clear when he is reconstructing the standpoint of a particular form of consciousness, and when he is appraising, and showing the deficiencies of, that form of consciousness. There is some overlap in the vocabulary used for both tasks. Bearing this in mind, we can interpret the distinction in this way:

Consciousness is consciousness of something other than itself.

Self-consciousness is consciousness of itself, ie. of something which is not other than itself.

On the face of it, Hegel's next remark is paradoxical:

'In this (self-consciousness) there is indeed an otherness: that is to say, consciousness makes a distinction, but one which at the same time is for consciousness not a distinction'

Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 104

Hegel says:

‘It is the distinguishing of what is not to be distinguished or the unity of what is distinguished’ Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 106

There are several ways of explaining this paradox as not entailing any contradiction.

Hegel thinks of consciousness (at this stage, short of Absolute Knowledge) as a relation. If I am conscious, then I am conscious of something or other. On this analysis of ‘consciousness’, there is something *prima facie* paradoxical about self-consciousness. There is a distinction because something is related to something, but, in a different sense, there is no distinction because something is related to itself. I am related to myself, but I am not on that account two persons. No breach of the law of identity is involved because, in Aristotle’s phrase, I am not related to myself ‘in the same respect’.

A distinction can be drawn between ontology and epistemology here. There is an epistemological distinction between what is conscious, and what consciousness is consciousness of, but not an ontological distinction. In an ontological sense, the person who is self-conscious is self-identical. (Even this is misleading for Hegel but can be accepted at present). There is a structural relation which presupposes no distinction at the ontological level.

Using the vocabulary of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ we can say: Subject and object are identical in self-consciousness. If I am self-conscious, I am both the subject and the object of my experience. If, say, I look at my foot I am subject qua having the experience of looking. I am also object as I am what my experience is of.

An ‘internal/external’ distinction can be used to show that ‘consciousness makes a distinction’. The distinction is drawn by the particular form of consciousness under consideration, ‘internally’, and does not have to be ascribed to this consciousness, by Hegel and his readers, who are in the ‘external’ position of appraising this form of consciousness.

Conversely, the distinction is drawn and ascribed to this consciousness, by Hegel and his readers, who are in the ‘external’ position of appraising this form of consciousness. It is not drawn the particular form of consciousness under consideration, ‘internally’, because, in self-consciousness, only consciousness appears.

Consciousness of consciousness does not appear to consciousness in consciousness of consciousness.

In self-consciousness, I am both active and passive; active in so far as I am conscious, passive in so far as I am what my consciousness is consciousness of. That I am self-identical is a precondition of the possibility of this structure.

Once its coherence is explained in one or all of these ways this proposition can be seen as a precise description of the structure of self-consciousness:

‘what it distinguishes from itself is only itself’ (M105).

The subjectivity of self-consciousness, or, what amounts to the same thing for Hegel, the structure of the self, or ‘I’, in self-consciousness has so far been omitted from the description. Hegel says:

‘[...] the ‘I’ is the content of the connection and the connecting itself. Opposed to an other the ‘I’ is its own self, and at the same time it overarches this other, which for the ‘I’ is equally only the ‘I’ itself’.

Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 104

Using the subject-object vocabulary, this passage can be understood as follows: The I, or self, is not just one of the structures of self-consciousness but all of them: subject, object and the relation between them. Using the term ‘experiences’ the point can be made this way: the ‘I’, or self, is what experiences, what experience is experience of, and the experience itself. It is appropriate for Hegel to introduce the first person singular pronoun here because it is a necessary truth that:

That which could not in principle be described in first person singular terms could not be self-consciousness.

Non-language users might be self-conscious. This is doubtful, but at least not self-contradictory, and any such beings might be described using third person grammatical forms, even though they had no language themselves. Despite this self-consciousness is irreducibly ‘subjective’. Any being that is self-conscious is necessarily thereby only related to itself. If any description of x logically excludes this possibility then x is not self-conscious.

Hegel’s distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness is illustrative of his philosophical method. Consciousness is aufgehoben by self-consciousness. ‘Aufgehoben’ is the term employed in dialectical reasoning to describe the reconciliation, and exhibiting as particular

truths, of two perspectives, or concepts, and their subsequent subsumption under a new, and broader, concept or perspective. All that was described by Hegel as true of consciousness is retained as a part description of self-consciousness. All the 'moments', or logical components, or stages, of consciousness are part of self-consciousness. This is part of what Hegel means here:

'the knowing of another [...] though this other has indeed vanished, its moments have at the same time no less been preserved, and the loss consists in this' that here they are present as they are in themselves'
Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 105

Self-consciousness is not the knowing of another, but self-knowledge. What was described under Sense-Certainty, and the subsequent chapters, has here been retained. For example, sense experience can be part of self-consciousness. Attitudes, and ways of knowing, adopted in being conscious of what is not oneself can be employed in being conscious of oneself. The difference, according to Hegel, is that considered as aspects of self-consciousness, these moments, or aspects of consciousness, can be considered as they are, not just as they appear. This is because, as rational contemplators of the structures of consciousness, we are not thereby actually thereby engaged in being conscious of objects, in the sense under examination. If we were, our view would be an 'internal' or 'participant'. We would understand them as experienced, not as thought.

Merely thinking about x is a mode of being conscious of x, and no more likely to be free of interpretative preconception than experiencing x directly. If the trend to neutrality, or objectivity, is made less strict, say one of degree, then it becomes plausible to maintain that rational contemplation of x is less likely to be distorted than experience of x.

Hegel next presents an argument to show that self-consciousness is consciousness of itself. This is not just the claim that if x is self-conscious then x is conscious of x, but is also the further claim that if x is self-conscious then x is conscious of x's self-consciousness. *Prima facie* this further claim seems not to follow logically from the first. It seems that from 'x is conscious of x', 'x is conscious that x is conscious of x', cannot be soundly inferred, nor any such meta-claim.

Hegel begins with the now familiar point that the structure of self-consciousness is a combination of unity and distinction:

‘As self-consciousness it is movement; but since ‘what it distinguishes from itself is only itself’ as itself, the difference as an otherness is immediately superseded by it’

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 105

Self-consciousness supersedes this otherness in the sense that the ‘distinction’ is ‘aufgehoben’ or maintained as part of what self-consciousness consists in. Otherness is a ‘distinct moment’ for self-consciousness’

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 105

‘but there is also for consciousness the unity of itself with this difference as a second distinct moment’ Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 105

It is the unity of both (a) the unity of subject and object, and (b) the structural difference between them, that characterises self-consciousness more fully.

There is another interpretation of Hegel’s view here, complementary to that put forward so far. The ‘distinction’ that Hegel mentions is a self - not self distinction. It is a necessary condition for any person’s being self conscious that they draw a distinction between what is themselves, on the one hand, and what is not themselves, on the other. Hegel can then be taken as defining the structure of self-consciousness, in contrast to experience of what is not oneself (including ordinary sense experience). This interpretation is born out by:

‘Consciousness, as self-consciousness [...] has a double object; one is the immediate object, that of sense certainty and perception which however for self consciousness has the character of a negative; and the second viz itself which is the true essence.’

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 105

The ‘negative’ role of ‘sense certainty’ suggests a merely contrastive role for sense experience which self-consciousness is not engaged in but requires, logically, to be what it is.

The obvious drawback with this interpretation is that the self/not self distinction does not coincide with the thought/sense experience distinction. I can be conscious of myself through the senses and I can merely think about what is not myself. It follows that ‘sense experience’

cannot do the work of bestowing meaning on 'self-consciousness' contrastively.

A more plausible interpretation is that, to be fully self-conscious, it must be possible, at least in principle, to know that one is self-conscious. This is because, when self-conscious, the subject-object/unity, or subject and object framework, of self-consciousness is not revealed. When I am self-conscious I am only conscious of that which in fact I am, whether through sense experience or thought, unless the further requirement is fulfilled that I can know that I am self conscious, ie, that it is myself that I am conscious of, and not just, say, 'a hand' or 'this body here', where this hand is just in fact the hand of the same person who is conscious of it. It is not just necessary to draw a self - not self distinction, to facilitate self-consciousness. This is necessary, but not sufficient. The person who is self conscious must themselves realise that he is both the person who is conscious and the person who his consciousness is of. This is the force of Hegel's conclusion that the 'second' object of self-consciousness is 'itself - which is the true essence'. Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 105

Hegel says:

'This antithesis of its appearance and its truth has however for its essence only the truth viz, the unity of self-consciousness with itself'
Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 105

The antithesis is between the part perspective of the person who is conscious of himself, but does not know it. and the fuller, truer, perspective of the person who is conscious that he is self-conscious. This latter, including and retaining the structure of the former, is the 'true essence' of self-consciousness, that is, what self-consciousness really is.

Rational reflection, here as elsewhere for Hegel is a more reliable guide to the truth than experience.

Hegel describes self-consciousness as a 'being that is reflected into itself'. This image, perhaps of mirrors facing each other, is designed to capture an aspect of self-consciousness which is not present in an analysis of self-consciousness as mere consciousness of oneself, as yet another object for sense experience. It is a poetic way of reiterating the point that what is self conscious is what self-consciousness is consciousness of.

There is one controversial element in Hegel's account that has not been discussed so far: the role of 'desire'. In some sense, a being must feel desire in order to become self-conscious. This is a causal, or

metaphysical claim, not a logical one, as it is not self-contradictory to hold that x has no desires but x is self-conscious.

The concept of desire employed by Hegel can be understood on two main levels: the ordinary human level, and the universal or metaphysical, level. In each context 'desire' differs in sense. At the human level, Hegel believes it is a causally necessary condition (or historically necessary condition) of our drawing the self - not self distinction, in the way we do, that as persons we feel desires. Desire is the emotion which establishes a discrepancy between our own state, and the way the world is. (This discrepancy is not logically inevitable. I can desire what I already have, for example, if I have forgotten that I have it.) If there was never any disharmony between the way we are, and the way the world is, then we would have no reason, no occasion, to draw a self/rest of world distinction. This is a historical and psychological claim. 'To be self-conscious we must draw a self /other distinction' is a logical claim. It is ultimately a contingent fact that it is drawn through desire. Desire, and the self-certainty obtained in it gratification, are conditioned by the object.

On the other, metaphysical, reading the subject of desire is not the individual human being but the universal mind, 'Geist', who finds fulfilment through the individual's aspirations and actions in history. This reading is consistent with the first. In the context of Hegel's metaphysics, it includes that account. The cosmic process of Geist's coming to self-realisation can be called 'desire'. This gives the concept its teleological sense. As Geist is infinite, and humanity is finite, and the finite part of the infinite, so Geist's desire is infinite and man's finite, and humanity's desire part of Geist's desire. On this metaphysical view, the individual's coming to self-consciousness is the expression of Geist's cosmic purpose.

It is part of Hegel's philosophical style to make the preconditions for x (metaphysical and causal, not just logical) part of the fully explicated concept of x . Therefore he can say 'self-consciousness is desire in general'.

The necessary condition for being self-conscious that Hegel devotes the most attention to is:

' x can only become fully self-conscious through consciousness of another consciousness.'

Self-consciousness is necessarily social and an utterly 'private' or solipsistic self-consciousness is impossible. These for Hegel are not

contingent claims. The argument for them is mainly in the 'Master and Slave' section but they are evident in the demonstration of the inadequacies of 'self-certainty'.

Before examining this social precondition for self-consciousness one qualification must be made. I have been using language like 'x is conscious' etc. which implies that there is a subject of consciousness ie, a person or being of some sort which is conscious. Now, Hegel sometimes speaks like this but, much more often, he construes consciousness itself as a subject and agent. This is peculiar at first sight. It would seem to be a simple category mistake to hold that what is conscious is consciousness, what is self-conscious is self-consciousness, etc. To account for this usage we have to refer to Hegel's system. Geist is not a subject over and above his consciousness. Geist is embodied in nature but there is no Cartesian inner space, which could do the work of being that which is conscious, at least not any irreducibly particular inner space. If there is a subject of consciousness, in this sense, it is Geist the world spirit itself. What looks through your eyes is what looks through my eyes. In the end, there is only one subject. In this very fundamental sense then, the subject of every individual consciousness is this universal spirit. Because the primary concern is to shed light on the concept of self-consciousness, rather than reconstruct Hegel's metaphysics, phrases like 'x is self-conscious' will be retained, without commitment to the characterisation of x (as e.g. person, mind, spirit etc).

The transition from 'self-certainty' to the more fully developed social self-consciousness of the Master and Slave chapter takes place, as usually in the Phenomenology, by the earlier more rudimentary shape of consciousness being exhibited as in some way deficient, or inadequate, and its being superseded, and shown to be part of the structure of a more complete form of consciousness. Hegel says:

'Self-Certainty's inadequacy is as follows; '[...] the shape is divided within itself; and the suppression of this dividedness accordingly takes place through an other'.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 107

What does this dividedness within itself consist in? It consists at least in being the subject-object structure that we saw earlier, together with an underlying identity or unity: the structure of self-consciousness. Hegel is saying more than this though: The private self-consciousness is divided from itself. It does not know it is itself. It cannot identify what is conscious with what self-consciousness is consciousness of. To use a

Hegelian turn of phrase, self-consciousness does not know itself 'as such'. In individual terms, a person might perceive, or think of, an aspect of the person who they in fact are but not know that they are in fact (identical with) that person. This is a logical possibility. This is precisely the condition of the deficient [?] self-consciousness is of himself. The condition that needs to be fulfilled is: For x to be self-conscious, x must know that x is related to x. In this context, this claim is to be understood :

'self-consciousness, exists in the first instance for self-consciousness only as this simple essence, and has itself as pure 'I' as object'.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 109

The stress must be put on 'object'. Self-certainty knows itself as the object of its consciousness, but not as subject, and not as identity of subject and object. Hegel says that the 'I' must 'enrich' itself. The 'I' is really the 'simple universal for which the differences are not differences'. Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 109

Towards the end of the 'Self-Certainty' chapter, Hegel makes it explicit that self-consciousness is necessarily social:

'Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness'.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 110

'Achieves its satisfaction' means 'becomes more fully what it is'. Being what it is, and knowing what it is, are not independent in the case of self-consciousness. Each is a necessary condition for the other, and so, in a dialectical sense, they are 'identical'. Coming to know that I am self-conscious is what becoming fully self-conscious consists in. 'Otherness', in this passage, does not refer to what self-consciousness is not, but to what self-consciousness is of:

'A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it'.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 110

Only when the subject of self-consciousness recognises itself, in what it is conscious of in self-consciousness, will it be fully self-conscious, and thus 'undivided'.

The critique of 'Self-Certainty' ends with an introduction to Geist. Hegel is mentioning 'what still lies ahead' (p. 110). He is giving us a short preview of a later and more developed explication of self-consciousness. The description Geist coming to self-realisation cannot be properly achieved before earlier stages of consciousness are described. Geist is described at this point:

'Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousness[es?] which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence'.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 110

This statement of what Geist is is consistent with the interpretation of the 'subject' of self-consciousness. The concept of Geist is invoked at this point in the argument for a very appropriate reason. There is a strong analogy between the limitations in the structure of a particular self-consciousness and, on the other hand, looking ahead, in the limitations inherent in the intersubjective structure of a plurality of individual self-consciousnesses. The analogy is this: What the solitary, or solipsistic, self-consciousness cannot do is know itself as undivided; as a unity. This is precisely what a plurality of self-consciousnesses cannot do either. They conceive of themselves as unique individual units even though, as we shall see, interrelated in complex ways. Just as one self-consciousness finds its unity, and true structure, by encounter with another so, in a parallel way, disparate self-consciousnesses come to realise their underlying unity as so many expressions, or manifestations, of one universal consciousness which is Geist. The role of Geist in displaying the 'identity in difference' of a plurality of self-consciousnesses is structurally identical to the role of one self-consciousness in generating the recognition of unity.

Common to both processes is the notion of 'independence and dependence'. The very concept of 'dependence' implies a degree of independence. 'Independence' is a two term relation. There must be two, to some degree independent, elements which can be dependent on one another. The title Hegel gives to the Master and Slave dialectic is;

'Independence and Dependence of self-consciousness Lordship and Bondage'

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 111

The logical relationship exhibited here is: if x is dependent on y, then x is in some sense independent of y. The relation is not a reciprocal or dialectical one. If x is independent of y, it does not follow that x is in any sense dependent on y.

The conclusion of the Master and Slave dialectic is its first sentence:

‘Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is it exists only in being acknowledged’. Hegel
The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 111

The biggest single question of this chapter is ‘Why’? Why is the encounter with another consciousness a necessary condition for any self-consciousness? The answer is this. One self-consciousness models itself on another. There are many different and complex reasons why self-consciousness is necessarily social but this is the most fundamental. It is not possible for a solitary self-consciousness to have a complete picture of itself, as a self-consciousness, only from its own case. The very structure of self-consciousness, in a sense, belies this.

In order to understand this dependence more fully, it helps to examine the process of the acquisition of the concept of a self on a more commonsensical level. Each of us conceives of himself or herself as an individual person in the world. This self-image is a composite one. It is partly made up of reflection on oneself, but also partly based on observation of other persons. Each of us must be able to think: ‘I am one of those.’ If there were no exposure to other persons, then each person would be restricted to that partial and part perspective he has on him or herself. Unless I conceive of myself as an individual, as a particular which can be discriminated from the world, from its environment, then my concept of myself would not be possible. I would be presented with, what is in fact, myself as simply continuous with the world. Perhaps I could think of, what is in fact, myself as coextensive with my sensory field. On this view, then, the concept of the self is a construct, not speaking on the level of personality yet, but at a level which is a precondition for personality. The way each of us thinks of him or herself is modelled partly on our observation of others, partly on our experience of ourselves.

In this chapter, Hegel is less concerned with how we come to conceive of ourselves as persons than with how self-consciousness is possible (even though Hegel thinks being self-conscious is criterial of personhood). The level of the discussion is, therefore, not one of ‘self-images’ but ‘self-consciousness’. It is precisely the encounter with

another self-consciousness which overcomes consciousness' otherwise 'divided' nature, which allows it to recognise its own unity. This cannot be done solipsistically. It is perceiving another, and recognising itself in another, that supplies the missing component in the solipsistic consciousnesses's transition to self-consciousness. What it learns from the other it realises applies to itself. It perceives the other as a unity, as undivided, realises it is just like the other, and no longer perceives itself as divided but as a unity.

In order to see how self-consciousness finds its unity through the encounter with another we have to follow Hegel's account in detail. Hegel says:

'Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has a twofold significance; first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self'. Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 111

For self-consciousness to encounter the other self-consciousness, it must 'come out of itself': It must logically cease to be self-consciousness, if it is consciousness of something other than itself. In this sense it has 'lost itself'. It finds itself as another being. Its attention is absorbed by that other, so, in a sense, it is it. (Heidegger says: 'I am what I am concerned with') It is a familiar and recurrent theme in idealist and radical empiricist philosophy that the self is identified with its experiences. Berkeley holds that what experience is of is states of oneself ('ideas') and Hume holds that the self is its experiences (its 'ideas' and 'impressions'). Similarly, Hegel is saying that consciousness of the other self-consciousness partly constitutes that consciousness.

In this consciousness of the other self-consciousness, the consciousness of the other recognises itself as the other. This can be understood in at least two ways. The other is recognised as a fellow self-consciousness, as a being essentially like the one perceiving it, by the one perceiving it. Consciousness finds itself in the other in the idealist and empiricist sense. The perceiving self-consciousness recognises that it requires the other to be what it is; not just to return to being self-consciousness, and fully become self-conscious, but also just to be the present structure of consciousness; consciousness of the other self-consciousness.

In these passages, there is an ambiguity in Hegel's use of the term 'other'. Sometimes he means 'the other self-consciousness', the one

encountered by the first, externally. Sometimes he means ‘the other of the first self-consciousness’, what that self-consciousness is consciousness of. Then it denotes the object pole of the subject-object relation, which structures self-consciousness, internally. In this second sense, the use is parallel to Geist’s ‘other’, which is Nature. The other of Geist is its embodiment; the physical world. It would seem fair to conclude that the other of the individual’s self-consciousness includes the human body, although that is not made explicit by Hegel. This embodiment is, again, understood on Aristotelian, not Cartesian, lines.

Interpreting ‘other’ in the second sense, the following sentence shows self-consciousness coming to be possible:

‘it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self’.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. [110?]

The subject of self-consciousness realises it is its own object. Before, it was divided. It did not know that what its consciousness is of is itself. Modelling itself on the other, unified, self-consciousness ‘supersedes this otherness of itself’. (p. [110?])

A further line of thought supports this interpretation. How can x, the subject of consciousness, become conscious of y, also the subject of consciousness? This can only be through sense experience, that is, perceiving the other self-consciousness as embodied. Of course x can think of y, but perceiving y entails sensing y. It is therefore as an embodied consciousness that x perceives y.

Not only is x’s concept of x partly modelled on x, and partly on y, but x’s concept of y must be partly modelled on x and partly on y. By perceiving y as embodied, x realises that it is that itself embodied. x realises that its other in self-consciousness is its own embodiment: the embodiment of itself as subject of consciousness, and not just an ‘other’ as object of consciousness.

The ambiguity in the concept of ‘other’ is deliberate. Hegel speaks of

‘This ambiguous suppression of its ambiguous otherness’

and

‘an equally ambiguous return to itself’.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. [110?]

The two processes, or the double process, is this:

(1) 'it receives back its own self because by superseding its otherness (Hegel's italics) it again becomes equal to itself'

and

(2) 'the other self-consciousness equally gives it back again to itself for it saw itself in the other'.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. [110?]

'Other', in (1), is the embodiment of the first self-consciousness. 'Other', in (2), is the second self-consciousness.

There is a point that needs to be emphasised next which is often missed but crucially affects the way in which the Master and Slave dialectic is understood. Hegel is describing the relationship between two self-consciousness, from the point of view of only one of them. It should not at all be concluded that what he says about one self-consciousness does not apply equally, simultaneously, and in every respect, to the 'other' self-consciousness. Master is Slave and Slave is Master. The relation between the two self-consciousnesses is symmetrical and reciprocal. Hegel puts it this way:

'[...] this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this way been represented as the action of one self-consciousness, but this action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well. For the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the origin.'

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 112

By an action being both one self-consciousness' own action, and that of the other, Hegel does not mean 'numerically the same action'. He means there is a mirror action, a numerically distinct but qualitatively identical action, performed by the other self-consciousness. This observation has an important consequence for understanding the Master and Slave dialectic. It means it is extremely misleading to say there are two qualitatively distinct forms of self-consciousness; one master and one slave. This is only true from an internal perspective, from the point of view of one of the two self-consciousnesses. Objectively speaking the

structure of individual self-consciousnesses is identical. Hegel at this point describes the relationship symmetrically:

‘[...] the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both.’ Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 112

‘Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself.’

Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 112

‘They recognise themselves as mutually recognising each other.’ (Hegel’s italics)

Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 112

In understanding the Master and Slave dialectic, we must bear constantly in mind that, for several pages, Hegel is describing a symmetrical, or reciprocal, relation from one side only. Hegel says we have to now see how

‘the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness appears to self-consciousness’

Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. 112

We are to adopt the standpoints of the self-consciousnesses themselves. This is yet another example of Hegel’s tendency to oscillate between an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ perspective. He abdicates rational reflection for hermeneutic reconstruction (‘hermeneutic’ in the sense of ‘understanding understanding’, through empathy, or identification with, the subject of study). The oscillation is deliberate and effective.

Hence, in describing how the inter-action ‘appears to self-consciousness’ he speaks of

‘At first [...] one only recognised, the other only recognising’.

Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford) p. [112?]

This is a heuristic device in Hegel’s part, to show the interaction from one point of view only. In this way the argument continues.

A self/not-self distinction is necessary for the form of self-consciousness called 'self-certainty' to be possible but, in addition, for full self-consciousness to be possible, a 'self-other' distinction is necessary. The distinction between the self-not self distinction and the self-other distinction is that between, on the one one hand, oneself and everything that is not oneself, and that between, on the other hand, oneself and another individual self-consciousness. It is the first distinction that Hegel is employing when he says :

'self-consciousness is to begin with, simple being for self, self-equal though the exclusion from itself of everything else'.
Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 113?

but the second when he says :

'the other is also a self-consciousness'.
Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 113

Although the self-consciousnesses are in all respects similar when considered objectively, or from the view from nowhere, it should be emphasised that there are two numerically distinct self-consciousnesses which interact in the Master-Slave dialectic. Although Hegel is trying to show what self-consciousness consists in, he has to thereby consider two self-consciousness and not just the structure of one. He says;

'one individual is confronted by another individual'.
Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 113

The precise role of the other self-consciousness is rendering the first self-consciousness fully what it is, is to supply the first self-consciousness with an objective understanding of itself. The first self-consciousness cannot experience itself as an individual object which can be discriminated from the world or its experience. In this sense, it is solipsistic. The other provides the model on which consciousness understands itself. The other stands proxy for this impossibility which is the viewing of oneself as another views one. (It is perhaps a impossible for a being to have a complete experience of itself at one time.) Hegel says

‘Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth. For it would have truth only if its own being-for-self had confronted it as an independent object’.

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 113

Hegel says this vital condition for self-consciousness is fulfilled

‘only when each is for the other what the other is for it’

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 113

Hegel calls the ‘presentation of itself’ at this stage a ‘pure abstraction’. This means the concept of self is partly modelled on the other, and partly on the self. It is a synthesis, a construct, out of materials which are partly first-person and partly third-person.

Hegel emphasises that the concept of self-consciousness is not empirical or, at least, cannot be entirely acquired empirically. There is no one particular object one could have experience of, and thus acquire the concept of self-consciousness, even though certain experiences are necessary for the synthesis of the concept. The concept requires something like the denial of its restricted employment in sense experience. My consciousness of myself exceeds my experience of myself. The concept must be seen to be applicable to make oneself intelligible, and this involves ‘negating’ its role as just part of the ‘other’.

‘The presentation of itself [...] as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as the pure negation its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific existence as such, that it is not attached to life. This presentation is a twofold action; action on the part of the other and action on its own part.’

Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford) p. 113

The thesis that concepts of the self do not have application within experience is recurrent in modern philosophy. Hume is unable to find any one impression which could give rise to the idea of self. In Kant, the transcendental unity of apperception is a formal precondition of experience, not an object of experience. In the early Wittgenstein, I am a ‘limit’ of the world, and not part of it, Heidegger is reluctant to employ the terms ‘self’ and ‘subject’, because they ‘completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein.’ Martin Heidegger Being and Time (Oxford) p. 150 Ryle tackles the ‘systematic elusiveness of ‘I’. Hegel is

concerned with self-consciousness, but says the concept has no application to ['?']any particular existence', and is 'not attached to life'.

What it is about the concept of self-consciousness which prevents it from finding application within experience? The concept of self being part of the concept of self-consciousness gives *prima facie* grounds to Humeans to be sceptical about its empirical employment. The 'conscious' component of 'self-conscious' impedes the concept finding a straightforward empirical use. If I am conscious, I can know that. But I cannot perceive, or notice, my consciousness in the way I perceive, or notice, objects I am conscious of. My consciousness of an object is not another object I am conscious of. Rather, it is a precondition of my being confronted with objects at all. The concept 'consciousness' seems liable to the same sort of empirical scepticism as 'self', yet seems, equally, a condition for experience. Perhaps 'I was having experiences, but not conscious' is not self contradictory. Perhaps I was dreaming, or can give sense to 'unconscious experience'. But being conscious is a condition for experience in the paradigm case. Hegel does not think this shows the concept of self-consciousness is not partly acquired through sense experience.

We have now covered the parts of the *Phenomenology* which show how self-consciousness is constructed out of experience of self and other. Self-consciousness is made possible by the fundamental asymmetry between being a person and observing someone else. The concept of self-consciousness is a combination of first person and third person components. The Master and Slave dialectic continues with the emphasis switching from metaphysics to social theory, and a detailed investigation of how self-consciousness is changed by interaction with other self-consciousnesses.

Logical incorrigibility is too strict a requirement for self-knowledge. There are things we believe about ourselves which we would be willing to give up to greater or lesser degree; beliefs about our existence, appearance, social role, abilities, etc. Some of these beliefs are so taken for granted that experience would be almost inconceivable without them; other so false as to be pieces of self deception.

One of the sternest critics of the strong incorrigibility of introspective reports is Sartre, who thinks that self-knowledge, and knowledge of other persons, are no more certain than each other. Sartre says;

'The state appears to reflective consciousness [...] Is it therefore necessary to conclude that the state is immanent and certain? Surely not. We must

not make of reflection a mysterious and infallible power, nor believe that everything reflection attains is indubitable because attained by reflection. Jean-Paul Sartre The Transcendence of the Ego (New York) p. 61

and concludes that;

'My I [...] is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate'

Jean-Paul Sartre The Transcendence of the Ego (New York) p. 104

Sartre is reacting against the Cartesian and Husserlian idea that philosophy could be placed on sure foundations by the findings of introspection. Husserl, in the introduction to the English translation of Ideas says his phenomenological method will be

'pure self reflection revealing original self-evident facts'

Husserl Ideas (London) pp. 19-20

Brentano says

'As everyone knows, memory is to a great extent subject to illusion, while inner perception is infallible and does not admit of doubt'

Franz Brentano Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (London) p 35

The main target of Sartre's attack is Husserl's reification of the Ego, which results, according to Sartre, from a reflective act of consciousness. An important by-product of Sartre's attack is criticism of the assumption that what is known in self-knowledge is 'given' or free from interpretation. Sartre brings together the attack on the reified Ego and the attack on incorrigibility in this passage;

'I can see clearly that I am ill tempered, jealous etc and nevertheless I may be mistaken. In other words I may deceive myself in thinking that I have such a me.'

First person singular psychological reports are falsifiable to the extent to which they entail ontological commitment to the publicly available world of objects. Sartre attacks a similar kind of objectivity here, except the ontological commitment is to a purely mental reified self and not to a publicly available object: an objective mental existent. How this opens up first person singular psychological claims to falsification is parallel. If 'I'

is used in the sense of 'persisting reified ego' then the claim is falsifiable, if Sartre's arguments against Husserl, or some other ones, work. I evaluate Sartre's attack on Husserl in *The Subject in Question* (Routledge, London, 2000).

If 'I' is used without this Husserlian connotation, then this still will not establish claims as corrigible, even if couched in the first person singular. I can make first person singular psychological reports without an implicit reification of the self as ego. I merely hold that I exist, and leave unanswered the question of what I am. The use of the first person singular pronoun is consistent with the possession of a wide variety of concepts of the self, but not with none.

Sartre's argument against the incorrigibility of first person singular psychological ascriptions draws attention to the dispositional nature of many mental states. It does not follow that I have a particular psychological attitude towards another person just because on a certain occasion I feel a certain way towards them. In Sartre's example, 'I hate Pierre' is not rendered incorrigible by my reflectively becoming aware of the emotion of hatred directed at him by me. Hatred lasts, and by saying you hate someone one 'implicates the future': makes a generalisation which commits the utterer to more than what is evident simply from present experience. This dispositional analysis supports the thesis that the sorts of things a person can know about himself are the sorts of things a person can know about another person. Just as it would be rash to generalise about another person's attitude to oneself, or another person, on the basis of witnessing one piece of behaviour so also in one's own case, a judgement based on a single present experience is not incorrigible.

XII

FREEDOM

How is the problem of free will and determinism thinkable? Where do the concepts of freedom and contingency, causation and necessity, law and probability, come from?

The idea of free will is grounded in a model of the person as oneself. The idea of determinism is grounded in a model of the person as somebody else. Freedom is essentially a first person singular concept. Determinism is essentially a third person plural concept. This is not a distinction between the mature applications of the concepts, but their primitive origins.

The debate between freedom and determinism rests on two competing views of the person one of which is first person singular in form the other of which is third person. The first person singular view takes 'ones own case' as the foundation or paradigm case of a person. The third person view takes other persons as the paradigm of the person. First-person theories of the person are libertarian: Cartesianism, idealism, phenomenology, existentialism. Third person theories of the person are deterministic: psychological behaviourism, materialism, materialist functionalism, physicalism. It looks as though persons are, as Kant thought, objectively determined but subjectively free. The problem is reconciling these two views.

'It can be shown in writings from Fichte to Sartre that a [...] view of the self as a free or autonomous subject occurs as a simple corollary to the [...] claim that whatever its nature the self will not be found to reside as do objects at any spatio-temporal address.'

(Gunderson, 1970) p. 276

freedom.

'As occupant of a more ethereal dwelling the self can hardly be expected to feel constrained by the zoning laws of determinism.'

(Keith Gunderson, 1970) p. 276

freedom.

Determinism is the conjunction of 'every event has a cause' and 'caused events are inevitable'. Libertarianism is the doctrine that human actions are performed freely: If I do something, I could have not done it. The theories are *prima facie* irreconcilable. It cannot both be that an action is the result of a causal chain of events, external to the agent, and temporally prior to the action, and the action is freely performed by the agent.

That there are two opposing views here is of crucial importance for both natural and social science, on the one hand, and for moral and legal systems on the other. The reality of causal efficacy is as central to scientific explanation as the concept of responsibility is to the ascription

of 'right' and 'wrong' or 'guilty' and 'not guilty' to persons. Materialist science presupposes the truth of determinism. Moral and legal thinking presupposes the truth of libertarianism. If only one or neither of these doctrines is true, then either or both of scientific and evaluative thought is without foundations.

Attempts to reconcile libertarianism with determinism have foundered through a failure to appreciate the radically divergent perspectives which make the two doctrines possible.

Libertarianism is essentially a first person singular doctrine which becomes problematic when extended to the second and third person cases. Determinism is essentially a third person doctrine which becomes problematic when extended to the first person singular case. To see this, it is necessary to examine deterministic and libertarian accounts of human action. This reveals the discrepancy in the two perspectives. Then a positive account of the origins of the incompatibility can be offered.

In her discussion paper 'Is Determinism Self-Refuting?' Patricia Churchland claims

'What I have shown is that determinism is not self-refuting, any more than the thesis that there is no such thing as vital spirits is self-refuting.'
P. S. Churchland 'Is Determinism Self-Refuting?' Mind ()

and argues that Popper and Eccles' argument that 'to deny free will is neither a rational nor a logical act' involves a non-sequitur. However, from the fact that a particular argument is insufficient to establish that determinism is self-refuting, it does not follow that no further argument could not succeed in doing so; and this much stronger negative conclusion would have to be reached in order to substantiate the claim that 'determinism is not self-refuting'. Some seemingly coherent claims about persons are exhibited as self-stultifying, when their presuppositions are made explicit.

In an important sense, determinism is self-refuting. There is a use of the 'free' and 'determined' such that the purported propositions 'I am not free' and 'I am determined' are if not, self-contradictory, at least self-stultifying when uttered by a person. Consider the following;

- (a) A person is that of which, in principle, both a first and third person grammatical account is possible.
- (b) A third person account of persons that is strong deterministic is not self-refuting.

- (c) A first person singular account of persons that is strongly deterministic is self-refuting.

It is necessary and sufficient condition for x's being a person that x be self conscious. Any adequate account of what a person is must do justice not just to the way in which each person experiences others, but also to the way in which each person experiences their own case. An account of the person that is only first or only third person is necessarily incomplete. This is a priori, given the discrepancies, and inconsistencies, between the way each person is conscious of others, and the ways each is self conscious.

There is no logical barrier to a third person account of persons being deterministic. There is no a priori reason why a causal account of human action in terms of physiology, psychology, sociology etc should not be coherent. Propositions of the form:

'The action performed by x was inevitable, because caused x's upbringing, or brain state, or subconscious etc'

are not self contradictory. They are capable of being true or false, so express genuine propositions. Sophisticated theories can be provided to give causal explanations of human action, so determinism seems to be true. In principle there seems to be no reason why we should not predict x's next action if we know enough about x's history, brain states etc, at least from a third person perspective.

The problem arises in the first person singular case. If we stipulate that 'determined' means 'completely determined' and 'I am not free' means 'I have no measure of autonomy whatsoever' then these first person singular propositions are covertly self contradictory. Consider:

I do not exist

He does not exist

I do not speak any English

He does not speak English

I am not speaking.

She is not speaking

I am dumb.

He is dumb.

I am determined.

She is determined.

I am not free.

It is not free.

The propositions expressed by the first person singular sentences are self-stultifying when said by a person. They negate what is presupposed for their utterance. They are guaranteed to be false. The propositions expressed by the third person sentences are not self-negating. They are capable of being true or false. The first-person sentences could be given a use. One of Wittgenstein's 'language games' could be imagined where each made sense. That is beside the point though.

'I am not free' is self-stultifying because the scope of one's autonomy is a criterion of self-knowledge from a first person singular standpoint. It is not the only criterion, but, to a large extent, I am co-extensive with my freedom. This is a discrepancy between a third and first person account of the person. Autonomy need have no role in establishing personal identity from a third person perspective. The criteria for the identification and re-identification of other persons are derived from the appearance of these persons. In one's own case, the situation is radically different. How do you tell the difference between yourself and the rest of the world? Where do you end, and where does the rest of existence begin? How is it that a particular province of experience is designated as 'mine'? Some intuitive grasp on the problem is gained by asking: 'What are the grounds for saying "This is my hand" rather than "There is a hand here" as one might with objects, or, 'I feel pain' rather than "There is pain here" as one would "There is a red patch here"'.

It is a sufficient, though not necessary, condition for an aspect of reality to be part of oneself that it be freely and autonomously controlled from a first person singular standpoint. It is one's autonomy that marks the distinction between what 'happens', and what one 'does'. If people did not experience themselves as autonomous, then they would have no

basis for distinguishing what they do from bare natural occurrences, happenings.

To say that I perform my actions autonomously is not to claim that they are preceded by acts of will, merely that I perform them. 'Autonomy' is part of the logic of 'action' and of 'self'. The semantic links between the prefix 'auto', and the notions of self are complex but if something is automatic then it is, in some sense, self-controlling, or self-directing, or self-causing (not necessarily in any sequential way). The reverse also applies: 'Autonomy' is a component part of the meaning of 'self' (although this is rarely noticed).

To see this, consider the extent that it is conceivable that one might experience oneself as determined, from a first person singular perspective. 'Determined' here means 'utterly determined', not the weak sort of determinism which just means there might be antecedent causes of my present actions of which I might not be aware. It is, of course, quite easy to imagine oneself determined to a large degree. Not only might I be under direct threat or duress, but there might be actual physical constraints on my attempted actions. One can imagine oneself resisting a moving obstacle, and being gradually pushed back. However, in these imagined situations, the agent possesses a residual degree of autonomy. If under threat, could one do otherwise, even if against one's interests. In resisting physical pressure, the agent exerts pressure himself, and is intending, wishing, struggling. What is not so readily conceivable is that I might be so thoroughly determined that no such residual measure of autonomy existed.

Instead of eating my food, food would just be eaten. Instead of walking, one's limbs would simply move themselves along. Everything which I formally did now just happens to me. Instead of raising my arm, my arm just goes up. This would be 'experiencing determinism'.

What makes even this situation conceivable is a minimal measure of autonomy of the 'witnessing self'. I freely have thoughts about those occurrences which formerly would have counted as my actions. I think:

"My goodness! My body is getting up and walking out of the room! It is taking me with it! I don't want to leave. I want to stay here reading. What can I do?"

For another person, witnessing my bodily movements, there would be no phenomenal difference between these occurrences and the previous ones which were actions. The difference is subjective, that is; revealed by a

first person singular perspective on the person. (We have to drop the 'merely' from 'merely subjective' in philosophy.)

What is this witnessing self? Suppose the experience of determinism were extended, beyond my bodily movements, to my thoughts about them. Instead of thinking my thoughts, my thoughts just happen to me. But here the regress must stop. For my thoughts to just happen to me would be for me to be a passive witness to my thoughts, thoughts I do not wish to have, or for me to disappear out of the picture altogether.

In the first case, there is a residual self at work, witnessing the thoughts, doing the introspecting. In the second case, the last residual part of subjectivity, or self, is gone. A third person account of you would have become adequate.

So 'I am not free' is self-stultifying, because subtracting freedom subtracts the possibility of self-consciousness:

- (1) I am self-conscious.
- (2) Freedom is necessary for self-consciousness.
- (3) Therefore, I am free.

In 'I am not free' the personal pronoun has been deprived of a fundamental criterion for its use. To formulate the proposition 'I am not free' I must be free, so the sentence can be uttered in just those cases in which it is false.

The only exception to the generalisation 'persons are determined' is one's own case, that is, first person singular reality. It is possible to be conscious of determinism, but it is not possible to be self-conscious of determinism. Self-consciousness is consciousness of freedom. People are subjectively free but objectively determined.

This does not entail the solipsistic view that only I am free, and other persons are all determined because other people are self conscious. That a first person singular account is possible of them, is a necessary condition for their being people.

It follows that determinism is self refuting. This is a very strong form of determinism couched in the first person singular case.

This logically entails dualism; at least a dualism of perspectives on the person; a first person singular perspective and a third person perspective, and arguably ontological dualism. It has the important consequence that no person can correctly believe they are determined,

only that other persons are. I can believe I am causally determined just on condition my belief is false.

What is the role of freedom in knowledge of personal identity from a first person singular standpoint? It involves a separate faculty called the 'will'. The will is the capacity to make choices. The will is the ability to intend. The difference is marked by the active and passive voices:

'I do it'

'It happens to me'

Action logically entails freedom in this sense of freedom: being in control of one's own actions. Being in control is a necessary condition both of their being actions, and their being your actions.

In discussing free will, reference is sometimes made to the experience of free will. It seems to each of us that we exercise choice, take decisions, and could have done otherwise (even against our perceived interests, or better judgement). If determinism is true, then the experience of free will is an illusion. Whatever it is, it is not experience of free will. But if freedom is an illusion, then so is the self: There is no basis for the discrimination each person makes between themselves, and the rest of the world. Freedom is the fundamental criterion for drawing this distinction, on which other criteria depend.

In an interesting passage in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein discusses possible means of demarcating the self from the not-self:

5.631 [...] I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not etc., this being the method of isolating the subject [...]

Wittgenstein *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* (Routledge, London)

Wittgenstein is embarked on a Hume-type search for that which has experiences; a subject that is not an object.

A by-product of this is a description of the phenomenal self, in Kant's phrase for me as I appear to myself. What distinguishes the way I appear to myself from the way what I am not appears to me? There are several candidates, each less fundamental than freedom.

(1) Feeling, including pain, and kinaesthetic sensations.

Am I the zone in which sensations are felt? Why do we say 'here is my hand' not 'here is a hand', 'my pain' not 'the pain' etc? This question

could not be asked about a freely performed act. If I act I cannot doubt that I act. It does not make sense for me to ask who is in pain if I am in pain, as Wittgenstein points out. The language of doubt only has application where there is a possibility of error. It is not possible to doubt who performs a present action if I perform it, but nor is it possible to doubt what 'I' gives to the meaning of 'I perform the action' over and above 'an action is performed', because actions are performed by person and persons are free. The self is nothing if not freed. It is co-extensive with freedom, or control, or autonomy. The Greek 'autos', 'self', suggests this truth.

Is freedom a mere result, or by-product, of self-consciousness rather than a property of subjectivity or the self? Free is not merely how we appear to ourselves. Free is how we are. It is up to a point possible to experience oneself as determined, but not as wholly determined.

A determinist holding that the experience of freedom is illusory might say 'I' is just an event in a causal chain. Consider the following;

e, e1, e2 [...] en

Suppose you in some sense are part of this sequence of cause and effect.

e, e1, e3, e4 (an event in your brain) e5 (an action of yours) e6 [...] en

Suppose you are aware of the occurrence of e5 but not of e4 but that e4 caused e5, (either a necessary condition or a sufficient condition). Could freedom consist in being aware of ones actions, but not of what caused them? Might the experience of freedom be illusory, in that one might be ignorant of the truth of determinism?

This line of argument is not plausible. It is impossible to experience oneself as determined. There is no further analysable difference between 'I act' and 'something happens to me'. The only difference between a naturally occurring set of events, that could be objectively observed, is that you are part of the chain of events. You are it. This generates the problem of freedom. Suppose we were transparent to ourselves. Suppose I could observe the brain state which is the antecedent cause of my present action. Would I then be determined? No.

When I act unconsciously, am I then determined? When driving a car, or walking, or riding a bike, there is no need to premeditate every action. It is easy to believe these bodily movements are the causal result of upbringing, or training. What if I become conscious of them? Suppose I reflect on them as I perform them. Do I then seem to perform them

freely? Yes. One is the conscious of the fact that one could do otherwise. I intervene in the causal chain. There causes of my actions, but I could do otherwise.

If I am conscious of doing something then I do it freely. If I am not conscious of doing something, but I do it, then I am not acting freely [?] If I am just part of the causal chain, then I am both passive and active. The self is irreducibly active. If I am then I am free. I act. If I am self-conscious I appear to myself as free.

Arguments for determinism are:

1. Every event has a cause
2. Caused events are inevitable.
3. Human actions are events.
4. Therefore, human actions are inevitable.

1. Human actions are inevitable.
2. Persons could not do other than they do.
3. If people are free, they could do other than they do.
4. Therefore, people are not free.

How come what I count as myself coincides with those aspects of reality over which I have direct control? Control entails controller and controlled. This is the relation of a person to an object, or to the rest of the world, but for the relation of a person to his actions 'control' is misleading. It implies a way in which a person can be related to himself. He can be, in self-consciousness, but not in the relevant sense. I control my arm. I raise my arm by raising it not by causing it to go up. Wittgenstein says. Consider:

1. I raise my arm.
2. I will my arm to go up.
3. I cause my arm to go up.

4. My arm moves up and down independently of my wishing it. I am the mere observer of my arm going up, not the mover of my arm (even though it is still attached to my body).

Motor actions such heartbeat, circulation, movements of kidneys, count as part as me, yet I do not freely control their movements. If I did become introspectively aware of them, would they thereby be performed freely? No. I would just be a spectator of movements of certain organs of my body.

I can breathe as and when I want to, as long as I do not hold my breath for too long. Yet if I do not breathe intentionally, breathing continues all the same. Breathing is half way between freedom and determinism. What is the difference between these two kinds of breathing? That would show us the difference between freedom and determinism. I cannot choose to breathe, or breathe intentionally, unless I am conscious of breathing. If I am not conscious of breathing I cannot breath freely. Consciousness is a prerequisite for the exercise of freedom. Is this a necessary or a contingent truth? It is a necessary truth.

Freedom is a necessary for consciousness and consciousness is necessary for freedom. Therefore, each is necessary and sufficient for the other. Because x is a necessary and sufficient for y, it does not follow that x and y are identical. (If whatever has shape necessarily has size, and vice versa, it does not follow that shape is size.) If whatever is conscious is free and what ever is free is conscious, it does not follow that freedom is consciousness.

As long as you are conscious you are free. Un-self-conscious action' is really a contradiction in terms. Actions are necessarily self conscious conscious and free. Hence robots and dogs are not free. One could not freely perform an action yet not know what one was doing. If there is no self conciousness, there is no freedom. If there is no self conciousness then there is no self, only matter in motion.

To say 'I am determined' is to remove the basis for the utterer's individuating himself in self-consciousness. To say 'He is determined' is not to undermine any of the criteria for the individuation of the person. The criteria are radically different between the first and third person perspectives on the person. It is essential to the concept of a person that persons are free. This is an extrapolation we have made from our own case, through an imaginative leap of empathy.

If we extend the concept determinism to our own case, then this can only be a recuperation of our view of other persons, and an illegitimate

one. We cannot experience the freedom of others, any more than we can observe our own determinism.

The discrepancy is between two perspectives on all persons, not between one person and all other persons. The concept of 'autonomy', for example, needs both public criteria to take on meaning and the experience of self-causation.

Am I free? We now know from quantum physics that universe is not a deterministic system. The universe is self-determining and so indeterministic. Ultimate reality has made creation the realm of contingency. Ultimate reality gave freedom of choice to human beings. This is a part of what it means to be made in the image of Ultimate reality, who has absolute or unconstrained freedom.

16 And the LORD God commanded the man, "You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; 17 but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will surely die." Genesis 2

15 Likewise you also have those who hold to the teaching of the Nicolaitans. 16 Repent therefore! Otherwise, I will soon come to you and will fight against them with the sword of my mouth. 17 He who has an ear, let him hear what the Spirit says to the churches. To him who overcomes, I will give some of the hidden manna. I will also give him a white stone with a new name written on it, known only to him who receives it. Revelation 2

'I manifest self-conscious thought, like 'here'-thought, in action; but I manifest it, not in knowing which object to act upon, but in acting. (I do not move myself; I myself move.)' (Evans, 1981 p. 207)
Yes. Why? freedom.

XIII

OTHER MINDS

The problem of other minds is the problem of whether, and, if so, what, other people think. Sometimes, it is assumed we know that and what other persons think, and the problem then is how we know that (given that we do know that).

Related problems are whether machines, could think, and the extent to which we may successfully reconstruct, say, historically, the mentality and life style or culture that is not our own. These problems show the problem of other minds is faced outside metaphysics and epistemology, in these cases: Artificial Intelligence and History.

‘The way back into the world for the self which seems to itself not to be there is simply its coming to realize that it is to other people what other people are to it.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 286-7

self-other. Reverse this:

‘The way out of the world for the other which seems to me to be there, is simply its coming to realize that it is to itself what I am to myself.’

‘‘The way out of the world for the other which seems to the self to be there, is simply the other’s coming to realize that it is to itself what the self is to itself.’

‘[...] my self is [...] to everyone else except myself like everybody else’s self vis a vis me.’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 288

XIV

SCIENCE

Quantum mechanics shows the first person perspective is ineliminable and entails an ontology: whether we like it or not, idealism.

Materialist and neo-Newtonian materialist science is essentially third-person. Quantum physics shows the first person singular perspective to be ineliminable. Quantum physics forces materialist science to accommodate the conscious existence of the observer, that is, a person understood on the model of one's own existence.

Human Existence and the Limits of Materialist science

My own existence is scientifically inexplicable. It is necessary to examine philosophical theories of what we are because physics, chemistry, biology and scientific social science do not do justice to the lived human reality of one's own being. This is not simply a contingent fact about the relation between natural materialist science and one's own existence. It is not as though by just doing more of fundamentally the same kind of materialist science your existence could be explained. That is to make an unscientific leap of faith in the progress of materialist science. Despite the enormous explanatory success of materialist science over the last four or five centuries though the paradigms of Galileo, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein, materialist science only ever explains matter in motion. Materialist science explains something in so far as it is a physical object, or essentially bound up with physical objects. We need to know, then, whether we are physical objects. Although we have bodies, it is impoverished and inadequate to identify ourselves with our bodies.

Materialist science and descriptions of what is essential to human reality are antithetical. The conflict between materialist science and your own existence is the conflict between concepts essential to central problems of philosophy.

Materialist science treats its subject matter as physical, but a human being qua oneself does not only have physical properties. At this moment you are consciously aware of these words. Other thoughts are at the back of your mind. You are in a certain mood, or undergoing certain emotions. It is to beg the question, in an illogical and unscientific way, to insist that the mental is physical. *Prima facie*, it is compelling that the mental is not physical. How much does an emotion weigh? Is a regret solid, like an iron bar? Materialist science has nothing to say about psychological interiority.

Materialist science is by and large deterministic but, apparently at least, you have freedom of choice. Your freedom of choice need not imply a great deal of power. Each of us is powerless, if we lack the money, the physical strength, if the situation is not right. If we have

freedom of choice, our choices are not inevitable. If we choose, we could have done otherwise.

Quantum physics is indeterministic. Chaos theory is indeterministic. By and large, materialist science is determinist. On a materialist scientific view, causes necessitate their effects. That causes necessitate their effects is incompatible with human free will. Therefore, materialist science is incompatible with free will. There is free will, therefore materialist science is false.

Materialist science is objective but your own existence is subjective. Doing materialist science requires bracketing or suspending your own subjective point of view, so that discoveries can be made, or data recorded, undistorted by emotional, personal, or political prejudice. This is admirable, and partly explains the success of materialist science in gaining predictive control over physical objects. However, to understand ourselves it is just this subjective point of view that is one's own that needs to be examined. To explain ourselves, we need to understand everything materialist science leaves out. That requires understanding subjectivity. The scientist needs to explain the scientist.

Materialist science has no room for the temporal categories past, present and future. Old physics deals only in the ordering before, simultaneous with, after. 'past', 'present', and 'future', do not mean just 'before', 'simultaneous with' and 'after'. 'Past' means 'before now'. 'Future' means 'after now', and now means 'when I am', or, roughly, 'when I am saying, or thinking, this'. These are subjective or self-centered concepts. A past is someone's past. A future is someone's future. A present is someone's present. 'Before', 'simultaneous with' and 'after' are deployed in materialist science to putatively denote objective relations that could obtain if there were no conscious beings. Materialist science has nothing to say about human time.

Materialist science uncovers structures of the physical world. In human reality, everything that matters is surface. What do I mean by 'surface'? The surface is not superficial. The surface is essential. Colours are surface. Pains and pangs of hunger as felt are surface. Political discontent is surface, as is emotion and sexual desire. Materialist science can only describe colours as lightwaves of varying lengths, pains as neurological occurrences (the firings of 'C'-fibres). Materialist construals of physics, chemistry and biology can only describe a political demonstration as living matter in motion. Everything that we are directly concerned with in our lives escapes the austere characterisations of materialist science. Lived reality is beyond materialist science.

Materialist science is quantitative but the adequate description of human reality is qualitative. Materialist science gains predictive and manipulative mastery of the physical world through mathematical models. Human experience is a kaleidoscope of shifting qualities that cannot be quantified.

Materialist science is general but you are particular. Materialist science aspires to include exceptionless generalisations about the universe, deterministic natural laws. The world of human action evades deterministic natural laws. It is not captured in terms of them.

Materialist science treats its subject matter as irreducibly other, in a third person grammatical way. The possibility of a first person singular account of you is essential to your own reality.

There is such a thing as being you. From your own point of view, things and other people are over there. They exist at some distance from you, as beings you can perceptually make out in the world around you. Your own existence is not like that. You are a certain being. There is a profound 'me'/'everybody else' distinction which we do not understand. Materialist science at best understands a person as other, and not as self. There are two ways of understanding a person: by observing some or by being one. Materialist science has no understanding of being someone, of what it is to be you.

In a scientific revolution one set of rigorous problem solving methods is replaced by another. Typically, the old scientific world picture survives as a part of the new. In this way, Newtonian mechanics is superceded by the Einsteinian special and general theories of relativity and, by quantum physics. Newtonian mechanics is not false, but only approximately true, or true only for medium sized physical objects. In the history of ideas, the ancient Babylonian world picture is supplanted by the Greco-Roman, the Greco-Roman superceded, and absorbed into, the Judeo-Christian. Ptolemy is supplanted by Galilei, Aristotle by Darwin, Newton by Einstein. The new way of explaining explains everything the old way explains, and more besides, including why the old way was explanatory. This why relativism about scientific world-pictures is wrong. If one theory explains more than another, including why it explains more, it is a more explanatory theory.

A scientific revolution occurs when existing methods of problem solving break down, when it is realised that current methods cannot even in principle explain the subject matter at hand.

We are at just such a point. We cannot explain ourselves using existing scientific methods. The neurological is not sufficient for the experiential, and the cognitive, even where it is necessary. Psychological

interiority is not reducible to physical exteriority. Human actions are not inevitable, so escape the web of deterministic explanation. Objective materialist science cannot explain the subjective point of view that makes it historically possible. The temporal ecstasies past, present, and future, are irreducible to the ordering before, simultaneous with, after. There is more to pain than C-fibre stimulation. It hurts. Colours are more than lightwaves. They have hue, vividness, tone. You are not just another. You are yourself.

For all its logical rigour, twentieth century philosophy and psychology have been a catalogue of materialist scientific attempts to explain what lies in principle beyond the reach of materialist science. In philosophy, Logical Behaviourism and its ally Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, the versions of the mind-brain identity theory, Functionalism, neo-materialisms, and physicalism, are all so many attempts to force square pegs into round holes. The features of human reality are antithetical to the properties these theories range over. In psychology, experimental psychology, behaviourism, developmental psychology, and cognitive psychology are all forlorn attempts to construe the discipline as a materialist science. Central problems of philosophy stand in the way of any scientific psychology. Psychology is not a materialist science.

This is the situation now. When it comes to explaining one's own existence, existing scientific methods break down.

The new quantum science that will supplant the old materialist science is so novel it is hard to know whether to call it 'science'. This revolution involves science in the antithesis of materialism. While materialist science is reductionist, new science is inflationary. New science is realist about the human world. It requires understanding the human being as: both mental and physical, self and other, individual and social, free and determined, temporal and atemporal, internal and external, predictable and unpredictable. The work involved in effecting the next scientific revolution involves showing how these seemingly mutually exclusive predicates are in fact complimentary. They apply to different aspects of the same reality without contradiction. This reality is your own present existence.

4. Is Science Empirical?

There are three main conceptions of science: empiricist, rationalist and pragmatist. I suggest they should be reconciled to produce a more complete understanding of what science is.

Carnap has an empiricist concept of science:

‘Science is a system of statements based on direct experience, and controlled by experimental verification. Verification in science is not, however, of single statements but of the entire system or a sub-system of such statements.’ (19)

Popper is a rationalist about science. He thinks scientific knowledge is made possible by innate knowledge, cites

‘Hume’s discovery (so well expressed by Born) that it is impossible to justify a law by observation or experiment, since it “transcends experience”’ (20)

and argues that verifiability is neither necessary nor sufficient for science. That p is falsifiable is the criterion for p ’s being a scientific claim.

Nicholas Rescher holds a pragmatist view of science:

‘As science grows and develops, it poses new issues of power and control, reformulating and reshaping those demands whose realization represents “control over nature”. For science itself brings new possibilities to light.’ (21)

To avoid the inconsistency between Carnap’s and Popper’s view, I suggest their (inclusive) disjunction as a necessary condition for a claim’s being scientific:

p is a scientific claim only if p is verifiable or falsifiable (or both).

The disjunction does not provide a sufficient condition for p ’s being scientific because p could be a proposition of, say, pure mathematics. As Berkeley says: ‘to be of service to reckoning and mathematical demonstration is one thing, to set forth the nature of things is another.’ (31) Another necessary condition for p ’s being a scientific claim is provided by pragmatism:

p is a scientific claim only if p is verifiable or falsifiable and pragmatic.

Still this does not quite capture what we mean by science. ‘Kerry is fixing the car right now’ meets this criterion but, intuitively, is not a claim of science. To be part of science a claim has to have a role in sophisticated

theory. It has to be, or be part of, an explanation. By ‘sophisticated’ I mean, paradigmatically, ‘mathematical’. I suggest this definition of ‘scientific claim’:

p is a scientific claim iff (def.): p is verifiable or falsifiable, and pragmatic in virtue of a rigorous theoretical role.

Science is intellectual technology: a pragmatic fusion of empiricism and rationalism in which metaphysics but not necessarily innatism is discarded.

That science is this practical fusion of two modes of knowing explains scientific explanation. It explains why science has been so fruitful in predicting and controlling natural phenomena over the last four hundred years. If we look at how science is actually conducted, it is a process of hypothesis or theory formation and empirical testing. Indeed, as Comte says in this quasi-Kantian remark:

‘[...] if on the one hand every theory must be based on observation, on the other it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without the guidance of some theory.’ (22)

It is as Duhem says:

‘what the physicist states as the result of an experiment is not the recital of observed facts, but the interpretation and the transposing of these facts into the ideal, abstract, symbolic world created by the theories he regards as established.’ (23)

Theory formation is the rationalist component of science. Experimental testing is the empiricist component of science. We can see this mutual dependency in the Greek etymologies of ‘theory’ and ‘experiment’. ‘Theory’ comes from $\triangle \bullet \Gamma \parallel \times \bullet \checkmark$ (theoria) ‘contemplation’, ‘theory’, which is derived from $\triangle \bullet \Gamma \parallel \times \parallel ?$ (theoros), ‘spectator’. Science has returned theory to its empirical origins. ‘Experiment’ comes from $\Gamma \parallel \parallel \parallel \Gamma \times \bullet \times \bullet$ ἐμπεριρί (emperiri) ‘to try out’ which in turn is from $\parallel \Gamma \bullet \times \checkmark$ (peira) which, as we have seen, is the main etymological root of ‘empiricism’. If a theory admits of no possible empirical test it is not a scientific theory. Similarly, observations do not count as scientific knowledge unless at least interpreted, and subsumed under a theory. (24)

It follows that science is an essentially Kantian enterprise. Kant consigned reason to an only empirical role.

Whewell claims: 'there is a mask of theory over the whole face of nature' (25) and 'We may [...] conceive the discoverer as inventing and trying many conjectures, till he finds one which answers to the purpose of combining the scattered facts into a single rule.' (26)

Ayer and the Logical Positivists are right to suppose science is essentially empirical. Popper is right to suppose science is essentially rational. Popper and the positivists each have half of a theory of science. Popper rejects

'the principle of empiricism which asserts that in science, only observation and experiment may decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, including laws and theories' [suppose the theory is found to entail a contradiction] and claims 'the acceptance by science of a law or of a theory is tentative only; which is to say that all laws and theories are conjectures, or tentative hypotheses' (27)

Kuhn is right that there are paradigm shifts in which normal science is replaced by revolutionary science (Newton replaces Galileo, Einstein Newton). (28) The crucial point, which needs to be added to Kuhn's account, is that in a paradigm breakdown pure rationalism and pure empiricism come apart in science and metaphysics is temporarily reinstated. Either there is theoretical conjecture without clear knowledge of what would count as confirmation, or there are empirical data which cannot be subsumed under existing theory, or both.

Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions should not be exaggerated. There are no complete scientific revolutions because science is accumulative. For example, Newton was not rejected by Einstein because although Newtonian mechanics does not work for very small or very large systems, it works for medium sized physical objects. Kuhn's theory should be tempered by Whewell's remark:

'The principles which constituted the triumph of the preceding stages of the science may appear to be subverted and ejected by the later discoveries, but in fact they are (so far as they were true) taken up into the subsequent doctrines and included in them. They continue to be an essential part of the science. The earlier truths are not expelled but absorbed, not contradicted but extended; and the history of each science, which may thus appear like a succession of revolutions, is, in reality, a series of developments.' (29)

Whewell should write 'believed to be true' or 'accepted as true', not 'were true'.

If empiricism entails the thesis that there is no a priori metaphysical knowledge and science eschews a priori metaphysics then science is in this respect is empiricist. If rationalism entails the thesis that there is a priori metaphysical knowledge then science entails the absolute exclusion of rationalism. However, B. C. van Frassen casts doubt on the idea that science is only empiricist:

Do the concepts of the Trinity, the soul, haecceity, universals, prime matter, and potentiality baffle you? They pale beside the unimaginable otherness of closed space-times, event horizons, EPR correlations, and bootstrap models. Let realists and antirealists alike bracket their epistemic and ontic commitments and contribute to the understanding of these conceptual enigmas. But, thereafter, how could anyone who does not say *credo ut intelligam* be baffled by a desire to limit belief to what can at least in principle be disclosed in experience? Or, more to the point, by the idea that acceptance in science does not require belief in truth beyond those limits?' (30)

If van Frassen is right the difference between science and metaphysics is one of degree.

XV

Persons

The continuity of your body is neither necessary or sufficient for your identity over time. It is not necessary, because if this human being ceased to exist, and at a later time came back into existence your existence would be wholly unaffected. It is not sufficient, because the continued existence of the body with which you are in fact associated does nothing to bring you into existence or make you centred in it.

The continuity of your mind is not necessary or sufficient for your existence. The continuity of your mind is not necessary, because you exist without mental states. It is not sufficient, because the continued existence of the mind you are ordinarily associated with does nothing to bring you into being.

Suppose somebody you were talking to disappeared, ceased to exist, for a minute or two, and then reappeared: resumed existing, and continued the conversation as though absolutely nothing had happened. Would you feel forced to say that the later person is not numerically identical with the person who existed up to the time of their disappearance? Nothing forces this conclusion. It is more natural to say that your interlocutor, rather oddly, ceased to exist for a minute or so. This holds whether or not such an intermittent person could remember their earlier states. We suppose he behaves as though he does.

A person at one time is numerically identical with a person at a different time by having the same immaterial inner space. This is only to the extent to which a person 'is' someone. If a person is you at an earlier time, and at a later time, what makes that person you at both those times is inner space being centred on that person. If we ask what the identity of the person consists in, in complete abstraction from the person being someone, then this identity admits of any number of mental, physical and psycho-physical degrees. There might be brain transplants, part brain transplants, memory implants, split brain operations. Part of one brain might be put in another and vice versa. There is multiple personality. One human being could be, or become, another, through a process of gradual replacement of physical, mental or psycho-physical parts.

Often, 'What makes someone me?' is assimilated to 'What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time?' But these are not the same question. I remain me, and you remain you, irrespective of the existence, non-existence, or changes, in any human beings. The inner space has an absolute or unqualified existence. You 'are' a person or you 'are' a human being, if inner space is centred on that one. We say you 'are' the human being on whom you are uniquely, or typically, centred during your earthly life. You could be only partly centred on a person, or off-centre. Your point of view on the world would not coincide exactly with the subjective point of view of a certain human body. It would make sense to say that you 'partly' are that human being. 'Are' even in the case where you are normally and wholly centred on a person does not denote identity.

The inner space, not the human being, is conscious or unconscious. The inner space is the space where consciousness occurs.

In dying, the human being dies. This is a momentous event, but mainly because we identify ourselves with human beings. If you experience the inner space that you are, before you die, then death is less frightening. Surprisingly, the here and now remain at death. The here-after is the here, after death. It is still here then. The here loses its earthly content.

The ego dies at death, but the inner space is not the ego. The ego is what you think you are. You are very attached to what you think you are. Your pride and self image are bound up with what you think you are. At death, this self image ceases. It dies, because it is only a concretion of thoughts, a bundle of emotion-saturated images, and impressions. We protect it during life, as a piece of technology, to engage with other human beings. But you are not what you think you are. It is not just that you have made a mistake. You are not identical with your picture of yourself. Nothing is a picture of itself. Because your ego is your picture of yourself, you protect it, and endow it with positive attributes. In fearing death, it is worth asking: What am I afraid will die? It is mainly the ego-picture that we are afraid of losing. We wrongly think we are our thoughts and emotions. These are things we have, or undergo. We try to create order out of emotional and mental chaos, and then identify ourselves with the degree of order we have succeeded in establishing. Although the ego is saturated with me-ness, this me-ness is part of the inner space. In the dissolution of the ego me-ness remains. The ego is illusory. There are two illusions of the ego. The ego is not you, but you take it to be you. The ego is not an accurate depiction of the human being who you 'are'. These are two reasons why its dissolution at death should not be mourned. Fearing death is mourning in advance.

A person is essentially a inner space, in so far as anyone is anyone. There could be anonymous human being but not anonymous persons. Even if a human being has a personality, they could be anonymous.

'One acute problem of subjectivity remains even after points of view and subjective experiences are admitted to the real world – after the world is conceded to be full of people with minds, having thoughts, feelings and perceptions that cannot be completely subdued by the physical conception of objectivity [...] the fact that a particular person in it is himself.

What kind of fact is it – if it is a fact – that I am Thomas Nagel? How can I be a particular person?' p. 54

'[...] how can a particular person be me?' p.54

'How can I be merely a particular person?' p.55

Thomas Nagel The View From Nowhere (Oxford, 1986)

‘Consider all the people of the past (if you like, in a long line), add to that all present and future people (again, if you wish in a line). Now consider yourself. It is a striking and puzzling fact that out of all the people there have been, are and will be, you yourself are one of them. You are, so to speak, inserted into history. Why should this be so? How come? Why should it be that out of all these people, you are one of them?’ Stephen Priest Theories of the Mind (Penguin, London, 1991) p. 220

‘Consider for a moment some differences between you and everybody else. You look out of your own eyes but you look at or into other peoples’ eyes. You have never seen your own face, nor the back of your own head. In the case of just one human body (the one you call your own) you feel yourself to be wholly or largely coextensive with it. Perhaps you are inside your body or perhaps you are your body, looking out of it. In just this body but nobody else’s you experience sensations and thoughts. The rest of the world seems physically arranged around you, with your body at its centre. You cannot in the normal course of things encounter your body as one object amongst others in the external world. This, on the other hand, is just how we encounter other people’s bodies, as living, speaking, expressive, but as over there.

These strange but intimate phenomenological and physical facts are symptomatic of being oneself. We are so used to thinking in a general or abstract way that we fail to something is me.

Once noticed this fact is at once obvious and extremely puzzling. For many people, for much of their lives, being what they are is an obstacle to noticing what they are.’ Stephen Priest The Subject in Question (Routledge, London, 2000) p. vii

‘Is it [...] obvious a priori that access to Dasein must be gained only by mere reflective awareness of the “I” of actions? What if this kind of “giving itself” on the part of Dasein should lead our existential analytic astray and do so, indeed, in a manner grounded in the being of Dasein itself? Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says “I am this entity”, and in the long run says this loudest when it is ‘not’ this entity. Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein is not itself?’ Martin Heidegger Being and Time trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Blackwell, Oxford, 1962) I.4. 25 p.151

The problem of being someone exceeds the problem of being. This means: If we solve the problem of being, work still has to be done to solve the problem of being someone. The problem of being is: What is it to be? The problem of being someone is: What is it to be you?

Is being someone to be explained as self-consciousness? There is a distinction between :

(1) Being conscious of oneself.

and

(2) Being self-conscious.

There could be a being that is conscious of itself without being self-consciousness. It says: 'Here is a hand', 'Here come some thoughts', in the way it says: 'Here is a hammer' or 'Here is a book'. What does the being who is conscious of itself, but not self-consciousness lack? It does not know that it is what it is conscious of. If we put these two ideas together: being conscious of the being it in fact is, and knowing that it is the being it is conscious of, then we obtain self-consciousness.

But what does a being know, if it knows that it is what it is conscious of? What is identified, and what identified with what, in this 'it is'. What does 'I am' mean? If we understood the meaning of 'I am' we would have understood what it consists in to be someone.

'Am' means more than 'is'.

'I exist.'

says more than

'This person exists''

even when both are said by the same person. Using 'I' presupposes the truth of 'I exist', not just 'This person exists'.

Uses of 'am' map onto uses of 'is':

(1) Existential

In:

‘There is a university in Oxford.’

‘is’ is the existential ‘is’. ‘Is’, here, means ‘exists’

In:

‘I am.’

‘am’ is the existential ‘am’. ‘Am’ entails ‘exists’, but also entails being someone.

(2) Predicative

In:

‘The university is in Oxford.’

‘is’ is the predicative ‘is’ or ‘is’ of predication. ‘Is’ here means ‘has the property of being [...]’

In:

‘I am sitting in the aula.’

‘am’ is the ‘am’ of predication. ‘Am’ entails being something, but also being someone.

(3) Identity

In:

‘FK is the Master of the college.’

‘is’ is the ‘is’ of numerical identity. ‘Is’ here means ‘is the same one as’.

In:

‘I am the student.’

‘am is the ‘am’ of numerical identity. ‘Am’ entails being the same one as, but also entails being someone.

What does ‘I’ mean? ‘I’ is a word each person uses to refer only to himself. (‘a’ word only because ‘me’, ‘myself’ etc also have this function.)

(1) I am in pain.

(2) Stephen Priest is in pain.

Where (1) and (2) are uttered by Stephen Priest they have exactly the same truth conditions. The extra dimension to reality is pervasion of portion of the world with one’s own being or presence, that is; inner space.

In its ordinary day to day use, ‘I’ is the word each person uses to refer only to him or herself. ‘I’ is not like ‘Stephen Priest’, as used by me, because I could use ‘Stephen Priest’ to refer to someone else, someone who is not me, but also happens to be called Stephen Priest. I could never correctly use ‘I’ to refer to someone who was not me, not even someone else called Stephen Priest.

Although correct as far as it goes, this understanding of the meaning of the word ‘I’ is superficial and inadequate. Anyone can use ‘I’ to refer to themselves. In some languages, first person singular ascriptions are made using a different kind of grammatical device, so there is nothing essential about the use of the ‘I’, ‘Ich’, ‘je’ etc. In Latin, it is customary to drop the word for “I”, ‘ego’, from a first person singular sentence. ‘Ego cogito’ is appropriate for emphasis, but this use of ego adds nothing essential to the meaning of ‘cogito’.

The problem of the self, and the problem of personal identity, are not the same problem, even though sometimes assimilated. The problem of personal identity is: What is it for a later person to be the same person as an earlier person? or: What lasts when a person lasts, at least, from birth to death? The problem of the self, on the other hand, is: What is it for somebody to be you? It is possible that both these questions turn out to have the same answer. If they do, that does not show that they are really the same question. Different questions can have the same answer. For example, many different questions can have the answer ‘Yes’.

‘Here’ and “now” are ‘indexical expressions’, ‘token reflexives’ or ‘demonstratives’, like ‘I’, ‘this’, ‘today’, ‘my book’, ‘your flat’. Russell calls them ‘egocentric particulars’. The name is perspicuous.

What is an indexical? The reference of an indexical is determined by the context of its utterance. For example:

‘Here’ said at a place refers to that place.

‘Now’ said at a time refers to that time.

‘I’ said by a person refers to that person.

The truth conditions of a sentence including an expression in an indexical role are determined by the context of its utterance. For example:

‘It is hot here’ said at a place is true if and only if it is hot at that place.

‘It is hot now’ said at a time is true if and only if it is hot at that time.

‘I am hot’ said by a person is true if and only if that person is hot.

The propositional content of a sentence including an expression that is an expression in an indexical role is determined by the context of its utterance. For example:

To say ‘It is hot here’, at a place, is to say that it is hot at that place.

To say ‘It is hot now’ at a time is to say that it is hot at that time.

For a person to say ‘I am hot’ is for that person to say that they are hot.

Indexicals depend upon egocentric facts. All indexical expressions depend upon the possible use of ‘I’ and ‘me’ or similar. ‘I’ is the primitive indexical:

‘This’ means ‘the thing near me’

‘that’ means ‘the thing (fairly literally or metaphorically) far from me.’

‘Here’ means ‘where I am’.

‘Now’ means ‘simultaneous(ly) with me’ or ‘simultaneous with my utterance’.

Russell sees this, in a way.

What is the difference between believing:

1. The tutorial is in DHT 3.12 and 2.

The tutorial is here.
where DHT 3.12 is here?

What is the difference between believing:

1. The tutorial is at 4.00 pm

and

2. The tutorial is now

when it is 4.00 pm. now?

What is the difference between believing:

1.is in this tutorial*

and

2. I am in this tutorial

where I am *

*(Write your own name in the spaces.)

The differences are not just epistemological. It is not just that I do not know that x is me. It is which fact there is ignorance of that is at issue here. If I ask what is identical with that human being, if I am identical with that human being, that raises the metaphysical issue. The question rests on the assumption 'I am identical with a human being', which might be false. I am closely associated with a human being, for the time being.

Why is something me? 'I' and 'me' have a loose and empirical sense, to indicate the human being who uses them. 'I' is a word each person uses to refer only to him or herself. 'Me' is a word each person uses to refer only to him or herself. 'I' and 'me' have a profound and metaphysical sense to indicate the 'me-ness', or inner space, of the

human being who uses them. There is a tone or felt quality of being me that is appropriately called 'me-ness'. There is a phenomenon of me-ness.

Is

the me-ness you feel in you is qualitatively identical to the me-ness you feel in me (once we disregard the connotations of personality)?

Contrast these claims:

(1) This human being does x.'

(2) I do x.'

Me-ness, and the inner space, introduce the dimension referred to by 'I'. Contrast these claims:

(1) 'This person exists' (said by me)

(2) 'I exist' (said by me)

'I exist' provides new information not already provided by 'This person exists'. Wittingly or unwittingly, 'I' is used to mention the inner space.

Why is something you? We are really inner spaces. Presence in the physical world prevents us from knowing or seeing ourselves as we really are. Incarnation prevents the inner space knowing itself as a inner space. Content obscures form. Why?

Content does not typically obscure form. Or does it? Does content obscure form in the inner space because we move about? If we were rooted to the spot, like a tree, then the field of awareness that you are would be disclosed (to itself). The inside of the Parmenidean sphere would know itself. As Parmenides and Hegel say, being and thought would coincide. Thought would be a kind of experience. Awareness and the interiority of the Parmenidean sphere would be the same, (as) one. One. The inner space is the secret referent of 'I' The spirit is the secret referent of 'am'

13 But Moses said to Ultimate reality, "If I come to the Israelites and say to them, 'The Ultimate reality of your ancestors has sent me to you,' and they ask me, 'What is his name?' what shall I say to them?" 14 Ultimate reality said to Moses, "I Am Who I Am." He said further, "Thus you shall say to the Israelites, 'I Am has sent me to you.' " Exodus 3:13-14

The Hebrew expression in this text is written YHWH (Yahweh / Jehovah) meaning literally “I am that which I am” or “the existing one.” ¹⁷[10]

‘Jesus said to them, “Very truly, I tell you, before Abraham was, I am.’
John 8: 58

‘We have found the definition of ‘person’, namely, ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’ Boethius *Contra Eutychen* Loeb Classical Library No 74 p. 84

‘Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person. It is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness [...]’ Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford) Book III Ch. 27 p. 198

‘You are no thing, you are simply the person who has to live with things, among things, the person who has to live not any life but a particular life.’ Ortega y Gasset *In Search of Goethe from Within* p. 118

‘What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.’ P. F. Strawson *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London) p. 102

‘There is noncriterial knowledge of the identity (or persistence) of persons, namely that expressed in memory statements. So far as I can see, there is no noncriterial knowledge of the identity of such things as hurricanes.’ Sydney Shoemaker *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity* (Ithaca NY) p. 258

XVI

Knowledge and Belief

What is a Belief?

Analyses of belief can be grouped into two broad categories. Beliefs are a kind of disposition, tendencies to behave, and beliefs are introspectible items, hidden from others. The first model is tacitly based on a third person plural model of the person, the second on a first person singular model. The dispositional account is derived from observing people, people you are not. The introspective account is derived from holding beliefs, from being a person, the person you are.

Etymology suggests a *prima facie* analysis. Belief is be-lief : What I would lief-be. But ‘I desire that p’ and ‘I believe that p’ are logically independent. Bernard Williams used to draw a distinction between ‘What it did mean?’ and ‘What does it mean?’ What it means does not flow with inevitable logic from what it did mean.

Tenets of Ryle’s theory of belief are:

1. There is no ‘introspective ingredient’ in believing.
2. Knowledge and belief ‘do not signify occurrences’
3. ‘Know’ and ‘believe’ are ‘dispositional verbs’
4. ‘Believe’ is of the same family as motive words.
5. Belief is narrowly propositional.
6. To believe p is to
 - i be unhesitant in telling oneself and others that p
 - ii acquiesce in others assertions that p
 - iii object assertions to the contrary of p
 - iv draw conclusion from p.

There is a sense in which it is true that there is no introspective ingredient in believing, and a sense in which it is false.

Beliefs are not introspectible particulars. Hume’s mistake is to think that to have a belief is to entertain mentally a particularly vivid idea. Ryle is correct to imply that having a particular thought, and being aware of having this thought, is neither necessary nor sufficient for having a belief.

Ryle’s remark is too eliminatory. Although beliefs are not objects of introspection, inner perception, or inner sense, beliefs are objects of introspection in that I can come to know that I believe that p, on the basis

of thinking about myself. It is possible to discover what one believes by thinking about oneself.

'x believes that p' does not entail 'x believes that x believes that p'. Believing that one believes that p is neither necessary nor a sufficient for believing that p. It is as possible for meta beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, to be false as first order beliefs. It is possible to ascribe beliefs to oneself. The anti-introspective component of Ryles account should not preclude this possibility.

Ryle says knowing and believing 'do not signify occurrences'. To make sense of this, we need to clarify the distinction between occurrences and dispositions. Occurrent mental states have an experimental dimension: The subject undergoes, or experiences, the state. They have phenomenological content. There is something that it is to be like in that state: pain, grief, joy, and imagining something vividly. Dispositional states are tendencies, or propensities, to act: worry anxiety carelessness clumsiness diligence intelligence. They have a minimal phenomenological content. Some mental states are both occurrent and dispositional components for example; depression anger.

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for some person x believing p? I offer:

x believes p if and only if x has a tendency or disposition to allocate the truth value 'true' to p.

x believes p if and only if x has a tendency or disposition to allocate the truth value 'true' to p, where x has evidence that p.

x believes p if and only if x has a tendency or disposition to allocate the truth value 'true' to p sincerely, where x has evidence that p.

x disbelieves p if and only if x has a tendency or disposition to allocate the truth value 'false' to p.

x disbelieves p if and only if x has a tendency or disposition to allocate the truth value 'false' to p where x has evidence that not p.

x disbelieves p if and only if x has a tendency or disposition to allocate the truth value 'false' to p sincerely, where x has evidence that not p.

The subset of cases where x disbelieves p is distinguished among the cases where x does not believe that p, like this:

If x disbelieves p then x does not believe p, but if x does not believe p it does not follow that x disbelieves p:

(DB) $Bx-p \star Bx-p$

but

(NB) $\neg(\neg Bxp \star Bx-p)$

There may be reasons, other than x's disbelieving p, for x's not believing p. For example, x might have no opinion as to the truth of p. x might think and understand p, but have no inclination to allocate any truth value to p. It might not have occurred to x that p. In these cases, x does not believe p but x does not disbelieve p.

That x has a disposition to allocate the truth value 'false' to p does not entail that x has no disposition to allocate 'true' to p. Aristotle is wrong in, *Metaphysics Gamma*, to say human beings cannot both believe, and disbelieve, the same proposition. The dispositional theory allows us to model human incoherence.

That x has no disposition to allocate the truth value 'true' to p does not entail that x has a disposition to allocate the truth value 'false' to p.

That a person has a disposition to allocate the truth value 'false' to a proposition does not entail that that person has no tendency to allocate the truth value 'true' to that proposition.

This is correct because: Someone might change their mind about what they believe. Someone might be inconsistent in their beliefs. Someone might be muddled, or unclear, about what they believe. For these reasons a measure of indeterminacy needs to be modelled in any account of belief. What is needed though is a coherent model of irrationality, not an irrational model. Irrationality is modelled this way:

(IR) $Bx(p \ \& \ \neg p)$

Someone's changing their mind about what they believe is modelled like this:

(9) $Bxp \text{ at } t1 \ \& \ Bx \neg p \text{ at } t2$

If x is uncertain whether p, then x does not believe p. This is because, if x does not know which truth value to allocate p, then x has no disposition to allocate the truth value 'true' to p.

It might be that x does not know that they believe that p. For example, x might have unconscious beliefs, or might not know what he believes. x has a disposition to allocate the truth value 'true' to p, but is 'uncertain' whether he believes p. This is a different sort of uncertainty from the uncertainty as to which truth value to allocate p. It is x's uncertainty about which truth value they do in fact allocate to p. The distinction can be marked this way: In the first case, x does not allocate a truth value to p. In the second, they do. In the first:

$\neg Bxp \ \& \ \neg Bx \neg p$.

In the second :

Bxp .

These criteria distinguish belief from disbelief, and non-belief, and model indeterminacy and inconsistency in belief.

A problem arises about what it is that is believed. It is a proposition that is believed. It is just the proposition that is believed. Although a proposition is not its truth value, to believe p is to believe that p is true. The locution

'I believe p, but p is false'

is self-contradictory, because to believe p is just to believe that p is true. Notice that second and third person forms of this locution are in no way incoherent:

'x believes p but p is false'

is not self-contradictory.

One alternative candidate for what is believed is a sentence. Why not say, instead of x believes that p, x believes, or believes the truth of, some sentence? Only a subset of sentences is capable of being true or false. Those that are not include questions, commands, and various unverifiable utterances. It is part of the concept of belief that beliefs admit of truth and falsity. Even if we say those sentences which are capable of truth or falsity are the content of beliefs, objections remain. These are to do with

translation, suppose a French person believes the sentence ('Il pleut') and an English person the English sentence ('it is raining') then there is an important sense in which the two persons have the same belief even though they believe different sentences are true. Their beliefs are numerically distinct, or, they have distinct belief tokens. The disposition of the French person to allocate the truth value true to 'Il pleut' is not the disposition of the English person to allocate 'true' to 'It is raining'. This distinction can be accommodated both to a model in which the contents of beliefs feature as sentences, and one in which the contents of beliefs feature as propositions. The sense in which the beliefs are the same cannot be accommodated on the sentential model. What the French person believes is what the English person believes, and this is precisely because the two persons believe different sentences.

What does 'having the same belief' consist in? The two beliefs, construed as numerically distinct, have identical truth conditions and identical propositional content. 'Il pleut' is true if and only if it is raining' and 'it is raining' is true if and only if it is raining'. Each is true only and always when the other is true, and each is false always and only when the other is false. It is clear also that the two sentences have the same semantic content: It is because they are synonyms that one is accepted as a translation of the other. The two sentences express the same proposition, and it is precisely sameness of proposition which guarantees sameness of belief. So, even if x believes s and y believes s', if s and s' express the proposition, then x and y share at least one belief. This is true on any coherent theory of what a proposition is.

Some logical consequences of this are:

If s and s' express different propositions, yet are believed by x and y, then there is at least one belief that x and y do not share.[WRONG]

As a consequence of this, if s is true when s' is not true, or if s' is true when s is not true, yet each of s and s' is believed by x and y respectively, then there is at least one belief that x and y do not share.

If s and s' do not have the same semantic content, yet each of s and s' is believed by x and y respectively, then there is at least one belief that x and y do not share.

If s and s' share the same semantic content, and are each believed by x and y respectively, then x and y share at least belief.

This is because identity of semantic content is a guarantee of identity of truth conditions, but identity of truth conditions is no guarantee of identity of semantic content. For example, if there are four chairs in his room it follows that there are four physical objects in this room. There being four chairs in this room provides the truth conditions, in the sense of 'is sufficient for the truth of', two propositions:

1. 'There are four chairs in this room'

and

2. 'There are four physical objects in this room'.

But these propositions differ in semantic content. For example, one could not be used as a translation of the other. But from the fact that there are four physical objects in this room it does not follow that there are four chairs in this room. This failure of logical inference shows that identity of truth conditions is no guarantee of identity of semantic content, and hence no guarantee of identity of proposition.

I turn now to the concept of a disposition used in this model of belief. 'Disposition' means 'tendency', or 'propensity', to act or behave in a certain way. To say that glass is brittle is to say that glass has a disposition, or propensity, to break (when contacted by a heavy object, with a certain speed, or force). This dispositional property is explicable by some occurrent state of the glass, in this case, its molecular structure. A disposition might never be realised. A piece of glass may be fragile, in virtue of its molecular structure, yet never break. Nevertheless, the object is brittle.

In the case of belief, a person can have a disposition, or propensity, to allocate the truth value 'true' to a proposition, yet that disposition never be exercised. We need a supplementary account of dispositions in terms of hypotheticals. In the case of the glass, we can say: 'The glass's fragility, that is, its tendency to break, would have been realised if a large heavy object had contacted it at speed.' The disposition to allocate the truth value 'true' to a proposition, would be realised if say, the person was questioned about his beliefs, or exposed to a situation in which the proposition he believed was being denied. We can allow for people having beliefs they do not express, even to themselves.

There are two differences between the belief case and the fragility case. We have, so far, found no neuro-physiological correlate for belief: the occurrent state which grounds a belief. Perhaps there is no such thing.

In the case of any particular person, it is going to be terribly difficult to discover what they believe, if their disposition is never realised. In the case of a glass that does not break, we still say it is fragile, because we know it has the same molecular structure as other pieces of glass we have known to break.

Two questions need to be distinguished:

(i) What is it for x to believe that p?

and

(ii) How do we know that x believes that p?

The first is a logical question the second is epistemological. (i) means What does x's believing that p consist in? Answering (ii) might include answering What is the evidence that x believes that p? For the moment, we are only concerned with the logical question.

x might believe that p even though their disposition to allocate the truth value 'true' to p is never realised. x's disposition can be realised in a variety of ways. There is not just one way of allocating the truth value 'true' to a proposition: x might sincerely think that p, assent to the spoken sentence 'p', dissent from the spoken sentence not p, assert that p or write that p. x might act in such a way that presupposes logically, or causally, that they believe that p). The variety of ways in which the disposition is exercised means that it is unlikely that that any single neurophysiological state of the person will be discovered on which this disposition can be explained, as a glass's breaking is explained by its molecular structure.

This model of belief fits into the interface between several sciences: cognitive psychology, neurophysiology, linguistics, history. This is what we should expect, because beliefs have diverse properties: semantic, logical, psychological etc. Beliefs are capable of being true or false, so they have semantic properties, consistent or inconsistent, so they have logical properties, beliefs are about something, so have semantic content. We believe fervently, fanatically, half heartedly, so they have psychological properties. Beliefs are acquired and dropped historically. The history of ideas is essentially the history of beliefs. It is therefore, unsurprising that work in several disciplines is needed to fill out the implications of the concept of belief.

Are first person singular psychological ascriptions incorrigible? If p is a first person singular psychological ascription:

$$(1) \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \rightarrow p)$$

and so

$$(2) \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (-p \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

On the minimal assumption that the self-intimating nature of consciousness counts as evidence, then:

$$(3) \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \rightarrow Kxp)$$

and so

$$(4) \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (-Kxp \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

Suppose a neurologist wires me up so that those parts of my neurology that operate when and only when I believe I am in pain are operating. I scream and writhe appropriately. I believe I am in pain.

However, I am not in pain. Therefore, consciousness admits of an appearance/reality distinction and (pace Wittgenstein) I can believe I am in pain and this belief can be false:

$$\Diamond (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \ \& \ -p)$$

and so

$$\Diamond (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \ \& \ -Kp)$$

because $\neg p \rightarrow -Kxp$.

It follows that (1) is false:

$$\neg \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \rightarrow p)$$

because

$$\Diamond (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \ \& \ -p) \rightarrow \neg \Box \mathcal{B}p (Bxp \rightarrow p)$$

and (2) is false:

$$\neg \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (-p \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

because

$$\Diamond (\wp p) (Bxp \ \& \ -p) \rightarrow -\Box (\wp p) (-p \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

and (3) is false:

$$-\Box (\wp p) (Bxp \rightarrow Kxp)$$

because

$$\Diamond (\wp p) (Bxp \ \& \ -Kp) \rightarrow -\Box (\wp p) (-p \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

and (4) is false:

$$-\Box (\wp p) (-Kxp \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

because

$$\Diamond (\wp p) (Bxp \ \& \ -Kp) \rightarrow -\Box (\wp p) (-Kxp \rightarrow -Bxp) \ (9)$$

Two theses need to be distinguished:

(SIM) If a person is in a mental state then that person knows they are in that mental state.

and

(IT) If a person believes that he is in a particular mental state then that person's belief is true and could not be false.

The first thesis is the doctrine of the self-intimating mind. The second is the 'incorrigibility thesis'. Historically, philosophers who have held one of these two doctrines have tended to subscribe to the other. This though is a contingent fact, not just because what is historical could have been otherwise, but also because neither thesis entails the other.

It is not impossible that the putative knowledge a self-intimating mind has of itself turn out to be false, nor that, the knowledge that a person has of his own mental states is always correct, and could not be false, yet any such person is sometimes in mental states of which he had no knowledge.

One way of denying this, and holding that the self-intimating thesis entails the incorrigibility thesis', at least, is to insist that 'true' in a standard definition of 'knowledge' (if a person believes that p, has good reasons for that belief, and p is true) requires that p could not turn out to be false. Then the self-intimating mind's knowledge of itself could not turn out to be false, solely on the grounds that if anyone knows that p, then p could not turn out to be false. Even if we make the truth of a proposition a logical condition for knowledge of that proposition, we still want to allow for what is commonly the case; that our purported knowledge is not knowledge after all in that, while we believed that p, p was false.

The self-intimating doctrine might then be held in the weaker form:

(SIM) If a person is in a mental state then that person believes he is in that state.

or

(SIM) if a person is in a mental state then that person is conscious in some way of that mental state.

where 'belief' and 'consciousness of' are fallible. Even on the stronger version of the self-intimating thesis, that could be construed as entailing the incorrigibility thesis, there are two theses here not one and the second does not logically entail the first. It is therefore possible to isolate and consider the incorrigibility thesis without making reference to the self-intimating thesis. The incorrigibility thesis could be held by anyone who thought it possible to hold some beliefs about one's own mental states.

The incorrigibility thesis can be formulated in this way:

(IT) If p is about a person's mental state, and that person believes that p, then p is true.

'Incorrigibility' is distinct from 'indubitability' with which, again, it has been closely associated. These two sentences do not express the same proposition:

(INC) 'p is true and cannot be corrected'

(ID) 'p is true and cannot be doubted'.

because one could be false and yet the other be true. This in turn is because 'incorrigible' and 'indubitable' are not synonyms. If a proposition is 'incorrigible' it is true and could not be shown to be false. Its truth value could not alter. 'Indubitable' means 'cannot be doubted'. To doubt that p is to adopt a particular psychological attitude towards p: to be disposed either, to withhold the predicate 'true' from p or, to some degree, to allocate the truth value 'false' to p. The distinction between 'incorrigible' and 'indubitable' shows up in the notorious fact that persons do doubt the truth of propositions which are in fact incorrigible. For example, logical truths are frequently doubted yet logical truths are incorrigible. Someone or other is inclined to withhold the predicate 'true' from them but they could not turn out to be false.

Not only are incorrigible propositions dubitable but indubitable propositions are corrigible. Where p expresses some very fundamental proposition about our experience such that we would, as a matter of contingent fact, find it psychologically impossible to doubt, it is still logically and metaphysically possible that p turn out to be false. From 'it is psychologically impossible to doubt that p' it does not follow that not possibly p. Therefore the concepts 'incorrigible' and 'indubitable' are logically independent.

If a proposition is 'incorrigible' then it is not true. This is because 'corrigible' means 'could be corrected' and only what is false could be corrected. Thus only what is true could not be corrected.

There are different reasons why a proposition might be thought to be incorrigible. It might be that we have no way of allocating a truth value to a proposition, either in principle or practice. If there is in principle no way of allocating a truth value to a proposition it might in an anti-realist manner be held to have no truth value, or even to be senseless, but if these strictures are not applicable then this is a sense in which a proposition could be incorrigible, and yet be false. A proposition might be weakly or contingently incorrigible, because we might lack the practical or intellectual resources to show that it is false even though we think it might be false.

The sense in which a proposition is incorrigible which is concerned with self-knowledge is the sense in which p's incorrigibility depends upon the truth of p, not upon the notion of 'incorrigibility' specifically or difficulties in practice or principle in demonstrating its falsity, or, at least, any such difficulties of principle are entailed by the reasons why p is true.

The logical link between the doctrine that if a person is conscious then that person is self-conscious in a self-intimating way, and the

doctrine that a person's knowledge of their own mental states is incorrigible, is illustrated by Hume's argument:

'For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear'.

David Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford, 190)

Hume thinks that the truth of the incorrigibility thesis follows from the truth of the doctrine of the self-intimating mind. But this is not right. The claim is either tautologous or false. It is tautologous if our mental states appearing to us what they are is part of the claim that they are known to us by consciousness. (Here Hume uses 'consciousness' in essentially the same sense as Locke, to mean: 'consciousness which is implicitly conscious of itself'). Then the thesis is analytic.

If not construed analytically it is false. Being conscious does not have to involve being self-conscious, still less that our mental states are accompanied by an occurrent subliminal self-awareness. That persons are sometimes self-conscious, does not logically preclude the possibility of their making mistakes in what they think they are aware of.

The philosophical foundations of the incorrigibility thesis are to be found famously or notoriously in Descartes. Descartes draws a distinction which isolates a formulation of the incorrigibility thesis which is almost certainly true: between that he is and what he is. The truth conditions for the proposition 'I am' and the truth conditions for 'I am F'. There is a logical dependency between propositions asserting one's own existence and those characterising it: I could not characterise my own existence unless I existed, and I could not assert my own existence unless I had some minimal concept of myself, ie, unless I minimally characterised myself. It does not follow that the two propositions are not otherwise distinct.

Descartes is correct to hold that the first person singular existential claim 'I exist' is incorrigible. He says;

"I am, I exist, is necessarily true every time I express it or conceive of it in my mind"

Descartes *Meditations* ()

Although 'I exist' is a necessary truth when I utter it, its necessity does not consist in its being self-contradictory to deny or its negation being non-sensical. Someone who said 'I do not exist' would not have contradicted

themselves but would have uttered a statement that was false. It would be a contingent fact that it was false, because it cannot be a necessary truth that anyone exists. Nor is the sentence 'I do not exist' senseless when uttered by me. We can understand it. Again, it is just contingently false.

How, then, can it be right to regard 'I exist' as some sort of necessary truth when uttered? It is a necessary condition for the utterance of 'I exist' that it be true. It can only be uttered in those contexts where it is true. Its truth is presupposed by its utterance, even though not logically entailed. It follows that there is at least one necessary truth which it is not self-contradictory to deny, and not true in all possible worlds. It follows also that there is at least one first person singular claim that is incorrigible: 'I exist'. If 'I exist' is claimed then whoever claims it exists.

Are there any others? There are not, if an 'incorrigible' claim's truth follows from a person's believing it. An exception is 'I have at least one belief'. If someone believes this proposition, it follows that the proposition is true. This is because the belief in the truth of the proposition makes it true.

There are beliefs we hold about ourselves which are fundamental in that we should be extremely unwilling, and perhaps psychologically unable, to give them up. Into this category fall Moore's famous examples. Moore says

'There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes; it was, for instance, much smaller when it was born and for some time afterwards, than it is now. [?] Ever since it was born, it has either been in contact with, or not far from the surface of the earth [...]'

G. E. Moore DCS (p 33)

and

'I can prove now [...] that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, 'Here is one hand', and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, [?] 'and here is another' [...]'

G. E. Moore PEW (p 147)

Moore says

'[...] the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one'.

G. E. Moore PEW (p 147)

None of these propositions is incorrigible in the sense that its truth follows logically from its being embedded in the propositional attitude form 'I believe that [...]'. It is logically and metaphysically possible that each of them should be false, in that their truth is not logically presupposed by their utterance. Any such presupposition is at best contingent because there are possible worlds in which they are false, and their negations are not self-contradictory.

If we adopt a weaker notion of 'incorrigible' than the logical sense, then are they in a way incorrigible? Commonsensically, it might be argued that it is extremely difficult to imagine what the evidence would be like which would show them to be false. If a person is staring at his hand and claims 'I have a hand' what could count as the falsification of this claim? Perhaps his hands are false or artificial and this is wishful thinking to the point of self-deception on his part. People in very disturbed or peculiar mental states might believe they have no body, that they are no where near the earth's surface, that they were never born, exist for this moment only, etc.

Such cases are rare and show only that fundamentally commonsensical claims are dubitable and not that they are corrigible. In the sense that most sane people most of the time do believe them and the conditions for their falsification in the face of the evidence that they are true is so inconceivable, these propositions are 'incorrigible'. This sort of incorrigibility can be called 'practical incorrigibility' to distinguish it from 'logical incorrigibility'. We find it very difficult to disbelieve them and it seems we have to believe them to get by. Of course anything which is logically incorrigible will be practically incorrigible but not everything which is practically incorrigible is logically incorrigible. Fundamental propositions of common sense are in this latter category.

On the other hand, Moore has no convincing disproof that what he perceives exists in a simulated reality. He could, for example, be a brain in a vat.

Moore shows no appreciation of the world of quantum physics which is remote from common sense. He is talking at the level of common sense.

There is no clear criterion for distinguishing first person singular practically incorrigible from practically corrigible claims. For every proposition, its corrigibility depends on the conceivability of the circumstances which, were they to obtain, would persuade us of the need

to alter the truth value of the claim expressing it. This in turn depends largely on people's powers of imagination.

XVII

Information

XVIII

An-Aesthetics

Ethics and Aesthetics

Art is a guide to reality.

Taste is subjective, beauty objective. Do not underestimate how objective.

Is An Empiricist Aesthetics Possible?

Aesthetics, the attempt to solve philosophical problems about art and the beauty of natural world, is one of the weakest parts of empiricism. Here I argue that broad empiricism but not narrow empiricism offers a plausible aesthetics.

Perceiving a beautiful object is not sufficient for perceiving the beauty of that object. I can perceive that an object is beautiful. I can perceive the beauty of the object. But the apprehension of its beauty is not another sense perception of it. The beauty of the object is not an extra empirical quality of it that could be sensed, like being red or being round. Nonetheless, there is experience of beauty.

It follows that aesthetic experience is not sense experience, even if sense experience is necessary for aesthetic experience.

What is aesthetic experience? In the experience of an object as beautiful, aesthetic experience pervades sense experience. Experiencing something as an object of aesthetic appreciation entails sensing its 'suchness', its detail and its givenness, in a way that is to some degree shorn of pre-conception. Aesthetic experience belongs, then, to unconditioned experience. Means to end thinking and thinking in generalities are obstacles to aesthetic experience. They are an-aesthetics. An-aesthetics are obstacles to an aesthetics.

Thinking is an obstacle to experiencing. Nevertheless, there can be the beauty of the exquisite appropriateness of an object to its function. Even the function of an object can be beautiful if it is apprehended in its own right. In ordinary day to day experience we hardly perceive objects aesthetically because we sense only as much as is necessary for our practical purposes.

There is no a priori obstacle to the apprehension of non-physical objects as beautiful. A logical proof might exhibit elegance, economy and pleasing precision and be a source of aesthetic delight. A number, for example the infinite number Aleph Zero, might have an awesomely beautiful role in the number system. Someone might have a beautiful

thought as opposed to the thought of some beautiful thing, a thought perhaps beautiful in its intricacy and connotation.

There is a distinction between the beautiful and the artistic, not because of the beauty of nature, but because a work of art can be a great work of art without being beautiful. For example: Picasso's *Guernica*.

Although aesthetic judgement involves the intellect, aesthetic experience is empirical rather than rational, as the Greek etymology of 'aesthetic' suggests: 'pertaining to the senses'. Nevertheless, it is broadly empirical not narrowly empirical. The reason why unconditioned experience includes aesthetic experience is it is partly revelatory of the work of God. In short, aesthetics belongs to revealed theology. There is no serious empiricist aesthetics because narrow empiricists are far from realising its dependence on the divine.

Kant rules out any rationalist aesthetics: 'There can be no objective rule of taste which shall determine by means of concepts what is beautiful.' (47) but in this sense aesthetics is not empirical: 'A judgement of taste is therefore pure, only so far as no merely empirical satisfaction is mingled with its determining ground.' (48)

Kant thinks 'the beautiful is that which pleases universally without a concept' (49). There is a danger and an insight here. The danger is: that something pleases universally is neither necessary nor sufficient for being beautiful. The insight is, beauty is revealed 'without a concept' if aesthetic experience is unconditioned experience.

Kant is right that 'For beautiful art, therefore, imagination, understanding, spirit and taste are requisite' (50) whether he means the production or the appreciation of beautiful art.

The Third Critique

11 Kant's Aesthetics

The third Critique, *The Critique of Judgement* contains not only a philosophy of art, of man-made beautiful objects, but a philosophy of nature. The latter includes a teleological theory, that is, a theory of purposiveness. Hence the book is divided into two sections: a 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement' and a 'Critique of Teleological Judgement'. Kant thought of the third critique as a reconciliation of possible tensions between the first and second Critiques, for example between the confinement of knowledge to the empirical in the first critique, and the

possibility of rational moral knowledge in the second. I shall mention just two ideas, central to his aesthetics and teleology respectively. The first is that Kant thinks perceiving an object as beautiful requires being conscious of it in its bare particularity without the intrusion of any interest by the beholder. It has to be contemplated for its own sake and as an end in itself, and not as a means to an end. There is an obvious connection between a beautiful object and an object of moral treatment here.) This perception of a beautiful object also requires that the object not be subsumed under any empirical concept (though he does not depart from the view that it must be subsumed under a category, and maintains the theory that noumena are cognitively inaccessible). So the aesthetic attitude requires a suspension of preconceptions about an object. This is achieved by an act of the imagination. It will be remembered that in the 'Schematism' he said it was the imagination which facilitated the application of concepts to objects. Now that same faculty can be used to peel concepts off the world to reveal it in its uniqueness and beauty; although it is still categorially ordered. This is difficult according to Kant, but just what an aesthetic appreciation requires.

The other point is that the natural world is inherently purposeful. The objects there exist as means to one another's ends. This introduces two strains into the critical philosophy which Kant has hitherto neglected. It shows an appreciation of the practical functions and interrelated systems of the world about us, and is partly an appreciation of how consciousness is itself guided by pragmatic interests in what it selects for attention. But it also reveals Kant's respect and sympathy for the Argument from Design. Although he criticised it in the first Critique, the contemplation of nature leads him to the feeling that the world's teleology must be 'transcendental', and even 'divine'.

Faith and feeling should not be forgotten.

We contemplate Being, Presence, Space, Consciousness as One.

Contemplation is something quite distinct from thought, even metaphysical thought.

Manifestations are in actuality.

Kantian philosophy is a prison, a comfortable prison, and one we are used to, but a prison.

Art is vision in the *spiritual* sense.

Appreciating art requires intuition.

The artist is an image generator.

Art is not entirely empirical.

Distinguish high and low art, or mere entertainment. High art requires education for its appreciation.

Does art represent? To the extent to which art represents with strict accuracy, or absolutely literally, it is not art. A tape recorder is not an artist.

The essential in art is whatever it is that exceeds the representation.

Representation is re-presentation. Sending along the same thing again. Art is not doing this, except at the level of universals.

Art presents. What does art present?

Feeling presented in the work of art we are contemplating – yet it is a sort of intellectual sympathy, a sense that here is a Feeling that one can comprehend, a reasonable feeling.’ (55)

Beauty is the manifestation of the divine in the empirical.

Can we draw a distinction between the beauty of art and the beauty of nature? There is no distinction because nature is a work of art, and art is part of nature. Nature is the art of God. God is an artist. God is the greatest artist.

What is a work of art? The conclusion of *The Psychology of the Imagination* includes a discussion of the work of art, reproduced below. Here I discuss ’s views on music and painting.

“Music means a great deal to me personally.” Would sound be music if it meant nothing to anyone?

“I liked it” and “I didn’t like it” should be banned from the discussion of art, including literature, for a thousand years, along with “It was good”. Then we could listen with fresh ears, look with fresh eyes.

What is expressed or communicated through music cannot be wholly expressed in words.

Words cannot substitute for music (and, if they could, music would be in a sense redundant. Music would be, perhaps, an abbreviation of verbal language).

Music will always be over and above anything you can say about it.

No matter how thorough the attempt to characterise in words what is expressed in music something remains uncaptured.

Music says more than we can say that it says.

Music as heard cannot be verbally described, even though musical notation is an abstract description of music, and the language of physics or aesthetic appreciation includes true assertions about music.

Music does not take on meaning by referring to non-musical reality. But what about Richard Strauss's *Alpensymfonie*? What the music expresses does not depend on the didactic.

The 'significance' of a melody is nothing outside the melody itself.

Does music signify music? If what music signifies is music then the significance of music cannot be found in non-musical reality.

It does not follow that words cannot express what music expresses but it is inconsistent with the existence of any non-musical source of musical significance that could be accessed either verbally or musically.

Language expresses non-linguistic reality but music does not express non-musical reality.

This does not soundly refute the possibility of the verbal expression of the musical but it is inconsistent with one picture of that putative possibility.

What is music ? What is a musical work of art ?

Beethoven's 7th Symphony: I hear it actually. It only exists in its performance. Its performance only exists in actuality. It only exists in actuality.

Listening to music in the imagination is something quite distinct from listening to a performance (something quite possible that does go on).

If we draw a distinction between a symphony and the performance of that symphony then it makes more sense to speak of listening to the performance than listening to the symphony. If one is listening to a performance then, at any one time ('actually'), one is hearing only part of the performance although, in another sense, one is thereby hearing all of it.

In order to hear part of a performance of a symphony as part of the performance of that symphony certain psychological facts have to obtain.

Does the distinction between protention and retention have to obtain? Protentions are tacit anticipations about the course of one's future experience. Retentions are memory-like traces, of the past course of one's experience. Both protentions and retentions are 'read into' the present content of one's experience to make it the kind of experience it is. For example, it is part of Beethoven's 7th is heard as such if and only if it is located as such through protention and retention. It has to be heard as a continuation of as much of the performance has elapsed and as the initiation of the remainder of the performance. Hearing the performance as a performance, and as a performance of Beethoven's 7th, requires imagination. We see here a preliminary plausibility in 's claim that 'I listen to it in the imaginary'.

is claiming that the performance is heard in the concert auditorium but the symphony it is a performance of is heard in the imagination. A performance is an audible and datable occurrence and numerically distinct performances may exist at different times and in different places. A symphony is not that. A symphony is what a performance is a performance of. A symphony not only does not exist at different times in different places, a symphony could exist even if there were no performances of it. There could be and are unperformed symphonies.

identify the symphony with its performance it is beyond the real.

The real is what exists in the past, present or future. The symphony does not exist in past present or future so the symphony does not exist in the real.

The concept of painting.

Painting is ontologically controversial.

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a painting?

How it is possible to see something as a painting?

Painting effects peculiar ontological syntheses.

In art, as opposed to reality, intentions affect the truth.

Identification of this with that in metaphor.

Anguish is an emotion, something intrinsically unobservable but undergone.

A painting is observable.

A painting can be a painting of. A painting then has its own intentionality.

It lacks literal sense to say a painting it is undergone, even though I undergo something in observing it.

If we could see emotion it would look like painting or sculpture..

Is music the sound of emotion? The sound of emotion seems to be something distinct: screaming, sighing. If we could hear emotion would it sound like music?

Depiction and depicted have something in common which is more aesthetically conspicuous than the differences between them.

Music is an expression of emotion.

Painting is emotion made outward in paint.

In the work of art, the inner and private is made outer and public. Then, in the audience, it is taken back in again.

Speech is the expression of thought. Speech is thought made outward in sound.

Can you hear thinking? Perhaps listening to speech is the nearest possibility.

Rather as a piece of music is neither its performance nor its score, a painting is not a distribution of paint on canvas even though to destroy an intentionally painted canvas is enough to destroy a painting, and to intentionally put paint on canvas is enough to bring a painting into existence.

A painting is not identical with what is necessary and sufficient for its existence.

The painted canvas is only the distribution of paint molecules on a surface, or a grouping of phenomenological colours.

Something makes the canvas, wood and paint count as, say, a painting of Charles VIII.

A painting is not what a painting is a painting of (excluding certain ambitiously self-reflexive paintings).

A painting of Charles VIII is not Charles VIII.

A painting is something 'between' the canvas and what it is a painting of. It is neither but it depends on both.

A painting is a reality.

It is a product of the special kind of consciousness he calls 'imaginative consciousness'. Rather dramatically, imaginative consciousness negates the world and freely generates its own substitute unrealities. Visually confronted with the physical object that is wood, canvas and paint imaginative consciousness sees this as a painting of Charles VIII. The content of this act of imagination is not an image. is not claiming that an image of Charles VIII psychologically accompanies the visual presentation of the painted canvas. It is not the case that two things are presented simultaneously: the painted canvas and the image. Rather that painted canvas is seen in a special way, as something phenomenologically similar to the visual appearance of Charles VIII.

draw a distinction between cinema and theatre when he says 'A tree for a cinema- goer is a real tree, while a tree on the stage is obviously synthetic' but this provides us at best with an inductive generalisation about some some films and some plays. Mid-twentieth century black and white films frequently include artificial scenery and a

theatre play might deploy real trees or plants. misses the point that in watching a play we see real people but in watching a film we see pictures of people, and each showing of a play is a performance of that play but each showing of a film is not a performance of that film.

It is not the character who becomes real in the actor, it is the actor who becomes unreal in his character'. Hamlet never becomes non-fictional in a performance or film showing of Hamlet but the living psycho-physical whole human being who is the actor who plays Hamlet is negated or ignored by an act of imagination by the audience. The audience sees the actor as Hamlet but they do not mix him up with a real prince of Denmark.

Although never published any poetry, it is clear that he regards poetry as a radical art form. He says in *What is Literature?* 'the poet is outside language'(6). takes the neo-Hegelian view that language is the 'element' in which human beings exist, rather, perhaps as fish exist in water. With the exception of rare individuals such as Nausea's Roquentin human reality is mediated by language. The world appears to us through our language. Poets are capable of escape this linguistic prison and perceive things in their bare particularity. With unscientific detachment they concatenate words in original forms to present us with new phenomenologies of things. says of the poet 'He sees words inside out'.

A work of art involves an image and what calls an 'analogue'. The analogue of a work of art is its material vehicle. The analogue of a poem or a novel is the ink distributed over the page, the analogue of a painting is the wood, canvas and paint, the analogue of a character in a play is the actor who plays that character. The existence of the analogue is a necessary condition for the existence of the work of art, at least as a publically available object.

Does the work of art as aesthetic object have an ethereal or abstract ontological status in 's philosophy? It is not spatio-temporally located. It is not identical with its material vehicle. It is not an image in the consciousness of the artist or the audience. It is unreal. Despite all this, the work of art exists. What is it then? 's answer in *What is Literature ?* is dispells any Platonic construal: 'the aesthetic object is properly the world in so far as it is aimed at through the imaginary' (p. 42).

If the world is what is, then in watching a play or looking at a painting, we are grasping what is in a new way. The work of art does not exist in its own world. We are imaginatively presented with a transformed world.

How is Literature Possible? Any narrative entails a synthesis of the Parmenidean and the Heraclitean: an unchanging Parmenidean space or arena in which or against which the Heraclitean flux of events unfolds.

The boundaries of a story are birth and death. Peter Camenzind at Lake Lucerne. The story starts and finishes at the lake. The soul is conspicuous as life begins and as life ends but is rarely apparent during life. Rosshalde by the lake. Joseph Knecht drowns in a lake. The psycho-physical human being, the Magister Ludi, Knecht becomes his own soul in the drowning. The lake is the soul.

Literature is the art form which expresses philosophy.

The novel is true in this sense: true to life.

Novels and plays are strewn with characters in

Draw a sharp distinction between literature and science: literature is ambiguous. Each sentence of science or philosophy has, or should have, one and only one meaning. Sentences of literature may have multiple meanings, or may express different propositions.

This presents a dilemma. To the extent to which the sentences making up his novels, stories and plays are ambiguous they do not serve as a vehicle for his philosophy. To the extent to which they are unambiguous, they are not literature, at least by his own criterion. This dilemma is never fully resolved in his work.

Literature contains solutions to philosophical problems.

The problem of induction is genuine, and at once psychologically liberating and disturbing.

What exists exists contingently rather than necessarily, and what is is what it is contingently, not necessarily.

What passes for reality is constructed by language which in turn is driven by pragmatic preconceptions, but these can in principle be set aside by certain unusual experiences.

Existence is shown to precede essence in the case of human beings, but it is shown to coincide in naturally occurring objects such as the root of the

chestnut tree, and the reverse relation obtains in the case of human artefacts.

Feeling existence to be pointless or without justification.

Will the future resemble the past?

Could what is not be ?

Could what is have not been what it is?

Are the ordinary objects of our experience linguistically, psychologically or pragmatically 'constructed'?,

If so, could they be perceived as they are, or at least in new ways?

What is the relation between being and being something?

Is it possible to be without being anything?

Is it possible to be something without being?

Does life have a meaning?

The characters in a novel are living a philosophy.

Any novel is an existential novel.

What is it like to be ...? The novel is phenomenology.

As with the characters in freedom and bad faith,

To the extent to which we find the experiences of the characters in the novel credible we should find their philosophy credible.

Novels put over existential phenomenology.

A novel has to be a synthesis of the credible and the incredible.

Writing is a historical act.

an act which should be an authentic and committed (engage) expression of the author's freedom. The writer should be fully committed in what

they write. What is this difference between committed and uncommitted literature?

cannot simply mean that the author should write what he or she believes and refrain from writing what he or she disbelieves.

This ethical requirement rests upon a picture of the author which rejects: the author as a repository of beliefs or attitudes which may be externalised in writing sincerely or insincerely. Rather, writing is a choice: not just the choice whether to write or not, but having chosen to write, the act of writing is itself the making of choices. The literary work does not predate the writing of it. It does not already exist in the writer's mind before being written down. It comes into being by being freely composed.

The distinction between committed and uncommitted literature depends upon the distinction between authenticity and bad faith. Authenticity is the recognition of freedom, and bad faith is the denial or refusal of freedom. Committed literature is produced by authentic acts of writing; acts of writing that the author recognises as exercises of his own freedom and for which he alone accepts and has responsibility. most writing is done is bad faith. We write in order to be read, in order to be needed, in order to find a substitute for immortality. This is bad faith because it is a case of 'being-for-others'; producing an image of oneself which others will judge favourably rather than exercising one's free possibilities as a writer. himself frequently insists that he writes for the present generation, not for posterity, although when interviewed he has confessed that he would not be displeased if his works were still read a hundred years from now. They no doubt will be.

Because they are written in bad faith, most literary works are would-be escapes or conquests. What is fled from is the freedom of the writer. What is conquered is the freedom of the reader. The writer is master and the reader slave but, in with Hegelian irony, the writer enslaves himself in enslaving the reader and the reader finds a new freedom in freely interpreting the writer's works in ways that undo the writer's mastery over them. Qui perde gagne: loser wins. Loser wins and winner loses.

The contingency of existence produces anguish. The writer therefore tries to make his existence necessary, indispensable, by creating something that does depend upon his own existence; a literary work. This seems successful, because the work's existence does depend upon his having written it. This security is undermined, however, because what the work is is not wholly dictated by the interpretation of its author. Its essence is

open to manipulation by its readers. Its existence too is contingent and not necessary. Even if it is read for thousands of years, there will no doubt come a time when it is forgotten. Its author too will be forgotten.

A literary work is the free creation of its author and readers because its existence is not causally necessitated by the prior state of the world. A writer accepting these facts evades bad faith. The role of the other in literary production is inescapable but it can either be affirmed or denied by the writer. Freedom is primordial with regard to the choice between authenticity and bad faith.

the authenticity of a literary work is sufficient for its morality. La literature engage cannot be immoral. He says, for example, nobody could write a good anti-semitic novel. But could not a writer recognise that their writing is the exercise of their own freedom and yet choose to write the most appalling laudits to suffering and injustice? Commitment in writing seems neither necessary nor sufficient for the morality of what is written: not necessary because something moral could be the product of bad faith, not sufficient because something immoral could be the product of authenticity. If there is freedom either good or evil can be done freely.

claims that the aesthetic imperative presupposes a moral imperative. Freedom is prior to both aesthetics and morality and freedom is the ultimate value. Committed literature not only exercises and acknowledges freedom, it provokes it, and provokes its acknowledgement. In reading committed literature the reader is a pure freedom, an unconditioned activity, and is conscious of being free. What is reading? Reading is a free dream.

Writing is a political act. For a good society is a free society. We do not know what a free society would be like, precisely because it would be one we would be free to make. There can be no blueprint for a free society; no Platonic blueprint, no Marxist blueprint, no Christian or utilitarian blueprint. There is no a priori knowledge of a free society. Committed literature dissolves the readers' bad faith and shows them their freedom, so it is the responsibility of the intellectual to be engaged; committed to freedom.

In the passages below from *What is Literature?* (1948) develops the idea of *la literature engage*. In the one from *The Family Idiot* (1972), 'Absolute-Art', he examines the possibilities of writing in the historical situation of post-romanticism in mid-nineteenth century France.

Is Art a Language ?

's considered view is that 'we must refrain finally from treating art as a language' (PW 47)(1) but he says nonetheless that 'the parallel is in principle legitimate' (PW 47).(2) How may these two claims be reconciled ?

The ground for the claim that art should be treated as a language is ambiguous between the claim that art is a language and art is like a language. That art is like a language does not entail that art is a language but that art is a language does entail that art is like a language because it would be incoherent to maintain that something is qualitatively distinct from something with which it is numerically identical.

The translation has 'in principle' (PW 47) but the original French is 'un principe' (PM 66) which should be rendered 'a principle' so then we have 'the parallel is a legitimate principle'. However, the translation is here more philosophically perspicuous than the French original. It implies that it is in principle possible for art to either be or be like a language. In other words, there is no contradiction in either the identification of art with a language or a comparison between art and language on which it turns out that art is like a language. By 'like' here we may mean this; a is like b if and only if a and b share more properties than they do with some further object c. This reading may be extracted from the original French if for 'legitime' ('legitimate') we read 'logically legitimate'. Understood this way, has said something meaningful and true.

The following partial ascriptions of common properties to art and language may be extracted from 's text:

- (1) 'the same transmutation' (PW 48).
- (2) 'The same migration of meaning scattered in experience' (PW 48).
- (3) 'The same expressive function is at work in both cases' (PW 48).(3)

I shall discuss each in turn.

A transmutation is a change of form or nature so if a is a transmutation of b then a does not cause b to cease to be but changes b qualitatively by translating b into a different medium. Both art and language operate on their subject matter so that certain intrinsic properties of that subject matter remain unchanged, yet that subject matter is in the one case translated onto canvas and, in the other, into writing or speech. On this

analysis, if some art or language, PL, is a transmutation of some subject matter, x, then x has at least one property, F, and PL comes to be F by being caused to be F by x's being F.

The analysis of 'transmutation' can be used to read 'migration' in (2) but (2) says more than (1). (2) reports the special case where F is a 'sens' (PM 67) 'meaning' (PW 48) and 'meaning' cannot only mean 'linguistic meaning'. Suppose, on the analysis of 'transmutation' or 'migration' x is some experience (other than that involved in understanding PL) and F is a meaning, then, as in (1), x is F and x causes PL to be F but F is known empirically and PL has (at least one) meaning in virtue of being caused to be F by x.

On this analysis it has to make sense to talk of meanings as (at least part of) the subject matter of art or language where this means something other than: the art or the language is meaningful. allows, indeed elsewhere emphasises, such a use of 'meaning'. For example, he speaks of 'the active meaning-giving operation which may be said to define consciousness' (PPT xi).(4) Consciousness bestows a 'meaning' on some (partially or wholly intrinsically indeterminate) subject matter 'x' if and only if consciousness (partly or wholly) makes x be what x is. This analysis gives rise to several issues. One I shall not address is the sense that may be given to 'x' if x is wholly indeterminate; especially the question of whether such a putative subject matter could be individuated. Another is the question of what x is when x is made what it is by consciousness. Here I would say that x is only what it is under a possible description. eschews that linguistic idiom so I say x is what x is in virtue of that which would make some description of x true. That is bestowed by consciousness. It is meanings in this sense of 'meanings' that migrate from experience into both art and language. I suggest as examples: a work of art of x and a definition of 'x'. These have something in common: a depiction of x.

Both art and language 'express'. 'Express' is not clarified by but 'express' has the literal sense of 'emit' or 'exude' or 'symbolise'. The first two senses may be taken as denoting the causal relation between x and PL and those relata, when x causes PL to be F in virtue of being F. The sense in which 'express' can mean 'to represent by symbols' (as, for example, in the notations of mathematical logic) captures a new similarity between art and language. It is an unsolved philosophical problem what it consists in for one portion of what is to represent another portion of what is (despite the currency of the concept) but the appearance of the word suggests 'to present more than once (at least twice)': to 're-present'. We may take the first presentation just as the presentation of x. If PL 'represents' x, then, PL presents x without being x. Again, it follows that

PL acquaints us with what x is without thereby directly acquainting us with x.

It follows from this account too that both language and art either are or contain 'symbols'. I shall understand by 'symbol' just whatever it is in the ontology of art or language in virtue of which art and language represent. It follows that PL's being or containing a symbol is both necessary and sufficient for PL's being or containing a representation.

We are in a position now to see how 's two claims may be reconciled. Clearly, from the fact that it is not a contradictory supposition that art is or is like a language it does not logically follow that that claim is true. It follows that may consistently reject it even if he sees no logical ground for its negation.

Arguably, whether art is like, or sufficiently like to be, a language are in principle undecidable questions. This does not mean it is philosophically uneducative to try to answer them. The problem is that questions of the form 'Is x (qualitatively) similar to y ?' always logically invite the question 'In what respect ?'. Then we need criteria for counting respects and the task becomes infinite. In this particular case the difficulty is compounded because it is not obvious that there exist necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a language and necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a work of art. Evaluating 's comparison requires solving these prior problems in the philosophy of language and aesthetics.

part of the wider question 'how can there be objectivity ?' (PPT 300).(1)

He says 'a thing has "characteristics" or "properties" which are stable, even if they do not entirely serve to define it' (PPT 299).(2) I shall not distinguish between characteristics and properties but stipulate that x has at least one property, F, if and only if at least one proposition is true of x (leaving aside 'x exists'). A property of x is 'stable' if and only if some proposition

2 Art and Science

In L'Oeil et L'Esprit argues for two main conclusions: art is phenomenologically prior to science and only an embodied being may be an artist. These are themselves putative substantiations of his theses that science presupposes but does not explain the lived world, and a subject of thought and action is a subject with a body.

ascribes certain properties to science which art allegedly lacks. Notably:

- (1) 'Science manipulates things and gives up living in them'
- (2) 'It comes face to face with the real world only at rare intervals'
- (3) '[Science's] fundamental bias is to treat everything as though it were an object in general - as though it meant nothing to us and yet was predestined for our own use' (EMT 159).(5)

I shall take each of these in turn.

'Science manipulates things' is either elliptical for 'science makes possible the technology which physically manipulates things' (or some logically equivalent proposition) or entails that the conception of the world by science is itself a kind of manipulation: a kind of intellectual construal. The two interpretations are mutually consistent and nothing logically forces us to choose one over the other.

The idea that science 'gives up living' in things is consistent with 's thesis that science essentially proceeds by ignoring the subject. Indeed, a world without the subject is not a world that can be 'lived in': subjectively inhabited from the inside. It follows that something like 's subjectless view of science is a logical prerequisite for the impossibility of a scientific account of being-in-the world. The argument is this: If something is an account of being-in-the world then it must postulate a subject. Science postulates no subject. Science cannot provide an account of being in the world:

This argument is not only valid, but sound because it is true that science has no depiction of the subject and a depiction of the subject is a necessary condition for an account of being in the world.

Art, in contrast, neither manipulates things nor gives up living in the world.

5/31/97 5/31/97 "223223existence of what one might like to call 'mentality' partly consists in the existence of artefacts, or, better, a human-manipulated world.

's characterisations of menta

3 Art and the Body

Art for is, in a sense, the opposite of science. While science is formal and universal, art, especially art, depicts content and the particular:

'...art, especially art, draws upon this fabric of brute meaning which activism [or operationalism] would prefer to ignore. Art and only art does so in full innocence.' (OET 161)(8)

Science, in so far as it treats of individuals, describes them qua occupiers of a functional role, not in virtue of their intrinsic perceptible properties. Art shuns this means-to-ends thinking in order to depict the individual as it is given to consciousness. Art, like phenomenology, is concrete and immediate but science is abstract and mediated.

While science can tell no one how to live literature and philosophy suggest an ethic. When says:

'From the writer and the philosopher...we want opinions and advice. We will not allow them to hold the world suspended' (OE 161).(9)

he is implicitly presenting a critique of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology which 'suspends' the world by the epoche. As we have seen, we cannot eschew the epoche and substitutes for it the structures of 'existential' phenomenology, notably being-in-the-world. Phenomenology is not subject to the same critique as the natural sciences. Philosophy tells us how to live.

Although music is the most formal of the arts, science fails where music succeeds in describing the structure of being:

'Music...is too far beyond the world and the designatable to depict anything but certain outlines of Being - its ebb and flow, its growth, its upheavals, its turbulence.'

While it makes sense to say that a work of art or a sculpture is of something this does not make much sense in the case of music. At least in the case of realist arts it can be seen what the art is a work of art of (whether or not the object of depiction is something that exists). In music this is far more difficult and thinks the reason is that music has a generality which art lacks. Music depicts the changes in what is as they might be given to a subject, almost irrespective of what is.

Art is paradigmatically art for and for two reasons. Art is revelatory of the visibility of what is, the visibility of what is revelatory of what is is, so art is revelatory of what is is. Secondly, art uncovers the role of the body in the constitution of what is.

Art is revelatory of the nature of being not only because what is is paradigmatically visible and art depicts the visible qua visible, but also because

'Only the painter is entitled to look at everything without being obliged to appraise what he sees.'

Art exhibits an objectivity which not only the sciences but even the other arts lack. Here turns the table on a widely held assumption: art is in some broad sense 'subjective' and science is in some broad sense 'objective'. 'Subjective' and 'objective' are useless words in philosophy unless they can be disambiguated but one sense of subjective is: x is subjective if and only if x is wholly or partly constituted by the psychology of the subject, and one sense of 'objective' is 'x is objective if and only if x is and x wholly is what it is irrespective of the psychology of any subject'. As we have seen, thinks science is a 'construction' and this means not only that the theories and the experiments of science are human artefacts but also the world as depicted by science is itself a human artefact. Its coming, so to speak, to be that world, is a contrivance of human intelligence, human ingenuity. It follows logically that science is subjective in the sense defined above. Of course science might not be thus subjective because some of its premises might be false. They are certainly philosophically contentious. However, the derivation is valid.

Now, art cannot be objective in the sense of 'objective' that contrasts with 'subjective' above. This is because it could not with any plausibility be argued that art is not a 'construction'. Works of art are products of the human world just as much as the theories and experiments of science. But that is not what is claiming. He is claiming that the artist is passive and non-evaluative in the face of his subject matter and that subject matter itself belongs to the lived world. So long as he paints well, then, the painter paints the world as we experience it, as we live through it. There is a profound sense in which it follows that the painter paints the world as it is: the world 'as it is' can only mean 'as it is for us'. This is not a kind of subjectivism, *prima facie* appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, because we have no conception of any world as it is unless this means as it is for us.

Art is phenomenologically prior to science. Unless the world is as depicted in art there could be no science. This is because art is art of the lived world and the lived world grounds science. Without the lived world there could be no scientists and no scientific subject matter.

calls art 'this secret science' perhaps because it contains an objectivity that is usually assumed only to pertain to the strict or natural sciences. Perhaps also because it is a fundamental enquiry into the universe, a more profound inquiry than any scientific inquiry.

Is there is anything that grounds art, anything that makes even art possible?

'What, then, is this secret science which he [the painter] has or which he seeks? That dimension which lets Van Gogh say he must go "further on" ? What is this fundamental of art, perhaps of all culture ?' (OET 161). (12)

is establishing a hierarchy of dependencies: Science depends on the lived world. The lived world could not be what it is unless it were a visible world. The lived world qua visible world could not be what it is unless it could at least in principle be painted. Now he is asking what has to be the case for something to be a possible object of art, what the necessary conditions for depiction by art are.

If this hierarchy seems shocking or provocative it is because it is phenomenological rather than commonsensical or positivist. Non-phenomenologically we would assume that unless the world is as described by science then there could be no painters, no canvases, no paint or brushes and no empirical world to depict by art. But would say that this hierarchy, however psychologically compelling, however much we think it must be right, is an abstraction. It is an abstraction because it is derived from thinking about the world not from experiencing it. In the background again are the old dualisms seeks to overcome: rationalism and empiricism, idealism and realism. Here the commonsensical and positivist hierarchy is rationalist and ideal. The phenomenological hierarchy is empiricist and real. If we think in terms of what we experience, if we so to speak, pause to look and see, it is possible to see the plausibility in 's hierarchy. Unless we were acquainted with a world of everyday physical things it is hard to see how we we could make sense of the postulates of science or so-called common sense.

finds a clue to what makes art possible in the physical activity of art:

e cannot imagine how a mind could paint. It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into arts. To understand these transubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual body - not the body as a chunk of space or a bundle of functions but that body which is an intertwining of vision and movement' (OET 162).(13)

It is perhaps too strong to say that we cannot imagine how a mind could paint - he means a mind without a body. I can imagine this. Suppose one never perceived one's body, for example, suppose one's body never entered one's visual field so that one 'saw' objects which would normally be concealed by one's body. Suppose further that one is aware of one's thoughts and some of these thoughts are intentions and willings to paint parts of a picture. Suppose further, by the mere thinking of these thoughts and the exerting of these acts of will a brush suspended in mid air were to leave paint on the canvas in accordance with one's intention and will. This would be imagining a mind art.

It is important to separate the idea that this happens from the idea that this can be imagined: the implausibility of its happening is not the impossibility of its being imagined. (Although, its being imagined without contradiction removes all logical obstacles to its happening). If one balks at the idea of imagining psycho-physical causal connections, think of the relation between one's own intentions and one's own bodily movements. They are as mysterious or as uncontroversial as moving objects in the external world by mere acts of will.

However, a more modest claim does go though: the painter uses his body to paint. It is then a phenomenologically legitimate project to describe the role of the body in making art possible: empirically possible or phenomenologically possible. By 'phenomenologically possible' here I mean: x makes y phenomenologically possible if and only if y could not have the phenomenology it has unless x has the phenomenology it has. We could allow an additional sense: x makes y phenomenologically possible if and only if x allows y to be a possible object of experience. Before turning to that, however, we should examine 's claim that 'le peintre change le monde en peinture' (OE 16) 'the artist changes the world into arts' (OET 162). ('The painter changes the world into art' would be a more accurate translation.)

One way of taking this is to consider that a work of art is itself, in a sense, a part of the world. A work of art is a manipulation of matter and changing of the spatio-temporal location of innumerable physical items. Matter is wrought into a new form. In this sense, part of the world is changed into a work of art. Wood, paint and canvas are changed into a work of art.

Another interpretation is this: art the world enables us to perceive the world as like a work of art. For this, in some respects, means perceiving the world as it is; that is, as we directly experience it to be as opposed to how we believe it to be.

Now, arts are produced by the painter qua body subject, not qua physical object. In the body subject there is a mutual dependence between vision and movement which art both reveals and depends upon. According to

we would not see what we see unless we could move as we do and we could not move as we do unless we could see as we see. This is why he says there is 'an intertwining of vision and movement'. Notably, the world appears visually like a world through which I could travel and the world I travel through feels like the world I see. Here is an interdependence between movement and vision:

'My mobile body makes a difference in the visible world, being a part of it; that is why I can steer through the visible.' (OET 162)(14)

The visible world would not look how it does unless I could take a mobile route through it, but unless it looked to me how it does I could not take any route through it. Here is a dependence of vision on motion:

'Vision is attached to movement. We see only what we look at. And what would vision be without eye movement ?'
(OET 162)(15)

However, the bare movement of the eyes qua physical objects is not sufficient for vision, they have to be the functioning eyes of a conscious body subject:

'How could the movement of the eyes bring things together if the movement were blind ? If it were only a reflex ?'
(OET 162).(16)

If only a third-person singular physiological description of the eye were possible then we could not conclude from this that the eye sees. It is the eye's being part of a body subject engaged in the world that is further necessary for vision.

The visible world and the world of my movements are in fact one and the same world, describable either in terms of possible routes or in terms of what can be seen. Each of us has both what calls 'the map of the visible' (OET 162)(17) and 'the map of the "I can"' (OET 162)(18): not only the idea of what I can see but the idea of the totality of my possible projects. He says
'chacune des deux cartes est complete' (OE 17) 'each of these two maps is complete' (OET 162) but adds that although there are two 'maps' there are not two worlds. What they depict is so mutually dependent that we can only talk of one world:

'The visible world and the world of my motor projects are each total parts of the same Being.' (OET 162)(20)

thinks that the philosophical implications of this mutual dependence have been underestimated (at least, this is how I read his claim that we do not think sufficiently about 'cet extraordinaire empietement' (OE 17) 'this extraordinary overlapping' (OE 163). Notably, the numerical identity of the world of motor action and the world of vision prevents our correctly conceiving the world as only a picture or a representation. does not spell out the philosophical implications of this but they may be conjectured.

We may use 's identification of the world as a set of routes for my travelling with the visible world to combat a pervasive and recurrent tendency in the philosophy of mind and perception. This is the view, or the sceptical possibility, that the world we experience is only a representation, or, if not that, then in some sense just mental: a set of ideas, impressions, sense data, phenomena and so on. The viability of this view derives from neglecting the fact that the world is one I may travel though and privileged the fact that the world is a visible world. We may use 's identification of the motor-world with the visible world to place the onus on the idealist or the sceptic to argue for the privileging of vision over movement; of contemplation over action.

Suppose is right that the world could not have its visible properties unless it was a set of routes for my travels and vice versa. If the world is a visual world then that will then turn out to be a sufficient condition for the world being a motor world.

The idealist and the sceptic accept that the world is a visual world, but a necessary condition for the world's being visual is that it be a motor world. But then the world is a motor world and that is inconsistent with idealism and scepticism about the world. This is because it makes no sense to say that I travel through a world that is not physical or is a part of me. If the world is not motor then the world is not visible. The world is visible. Therefore, the world is motor.

If this argument is sound then 's exhibition of the dependence of the visual on the motor may be used to solve two long standing and conceptually interrelated problems in philosophy: Is there an external world ? and Is the external world only mental ? The answers are, respectively, 'yes' and 'no'.

It may be, for like 's subjectless view of science is a logical prerequisite for the impossibility of a scientific account of being-in-the world. The argument is this: If something is an account of being-in-the world then it must postulate a subject. Science postulates no subject. Science cannot provide an account of being in the world:

absurd, the. That which has no meaning, reason or purpose despite a human need or prima facie appearance to the contrary. In atheistic existentialist philosophy, existence, one's own life in the face of death and the *world are held to be absurd because contingent and without external justification. * the impossible human project of being a synthesis of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, the desire to be God, is absurd. The absurd is a Leitmotif of the philosophical literature of Albert *Camus and Samuel Beckett (1906-89) and the 'Theatre of the Absurd'.

laughter. Laughter seems essential to humour because something is funny only if it is appropriate to laugh at it. However, not everything that sounds like laughter is laughter and not all laughter is humorous. Putative *necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being funny include its being incongruous, deflatory, surprising, predictable, and insulting. *Schopenhauer in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and Idea) (1818/1844) and *Bergson in *Le Rire: essai sur la signification du comique* (Laughter: Essay on the Significance of the Comic) (1900) argue that the humorous depends upon incongruity; for Schopenhauer between concept and object, for Bergson between the static and the living.

anti-realism. The doctrine that truth and falsity do not exceed the possibility of in principle knowing truth and falsity. Hence 'p is true' entails 'p is provable' and 'p is false' entails 'p is refutable'.

authenticity. Genuineness, sincerity, integrity. In existentialist philosophy, the shedding of conditioning and the recognition through Angst of one's own freedom and the responsibility for being oneself this entails. (German: *Eigentlichkeit*)

being someone. The fact of a particular person in the world being oneself. Thomas *Nagel in *The View From Nowhere* argues that a description of the world from no particular point of view is incomplete because it omits the peculiar fact that something in the world is me. It is also puzzling that I can be merely one person amongst others in the world.

What is colour? Colour might be a secondary *quality, in the quasi-Lockean sense of a *disposition of a physical object to cause sensations in a percipient, a subjective *sensation or quale, or a phenomenological property of a surface or light. These philosophical theses are consistent with the scientific theory that there is a physical property of a surface or light that causes experience of what we call 'colour', depending on the wavelength of the radiation reflected, transmitted or emitted. Colour

might be a visible property of surfaces. It is not clear why phenomenological colour exists, why once all the scientific facts are known not all the facts are known. Philosophical problems about colour are addressed in epistemology, the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of mind. Can it be proven that what I call 'red' is what you call 'red'? Are colours mental, physical, neither, or both?

difference.

disclosure.

epoche. (Greek for: suspension of belief) In ancient scepticism, the attitude of neither accepting nor denying p where p is putatively known. In *Husserl's phenomenology, the methodological refusal to posit the world of common sense and science in order to facilitate the phenomenological description of the essences of our cognitive attitudes towards it.

given, myth of the. Derogatory expression coined by the North American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912-89) for the thesis that there exist uninterpreted yet incorrigibly presented contents of sense experience which could be epistemologically foundational. The critique was anticipated by *Kant, *Vico and, arguably, *St. Augustine.

hermeneutic circle. The problem that obtains if understanding a requires understanding b but understanding b requires understanding a . For example, understanding something arguably presupposes understanding its parts, but understanding a part as a part of that thing presupposes an understanding of the whole.

Any interpretation entails presuppositions about the interpreted. Arguably, the interpretation of those presuppositions is a necessary condition for interpreting the interpreted because necessary for understanding the interpretation. However, the interpretation of such presuppositions itself entails uninterpreted presuppositions because the interpretation of presuppositions is itself an interpretation. In *Sein und Zeit*, *Heidegger claims that understanding being already presupposes at least a minimal or everyday understanding of being as the object of inquiry. However, this presupposition can only be made fully explicit in the fundamental disclosure of being.

horizon. The limit or background against which perception or understanding is possible. For example, in *Husserl's *phenomenology,

the inner horizon of a physical object is the set of possible perspectives on it which allows it to be grasped as a whole when only a part of it is directly presented. In *Sein und Zeit* *Heidegger claims that time is the horizon of being.

intentionality. The property of being directed towards some object. Following the medieval scholastics *Brentano argued that all and only mental states exhibit intentionality. For example, all love is love for someone or something, all perceiving is perceiving something, all thinking is thinking about something, irrespective of whether the intentional objects are real. *Husserl thought intentionality sufficient but not necessary for the mental because sensations and some moods do not exhibit intentionality, despite being mental. It is doubtful that intentionality is sufficient for mentality either, if, for example, missiles may direct themselves onto targets.

intuition. In Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy, sense experience, especially its content. In twentieth-century anglophone philosophy, one's pre-philosophical opinion.

literature, philosophy of. The attempt to solve philosophical problems about literature. For example: What is literature? Does literature include philosophy (either in the sense of; Is philosophy a kind of literature? or in the sense of; Does literature contain much philosophy?)? What is the role of metaphor in philosophy and literature? Can a clear distinction be drawn between content and style (between what is said and how what is said is said)? What is the ontological status of fictional objects? How can I be moved by the fate of a character who I know is not real? Can fiction be used to express truths? It is notorious that *Plato thought art an obstacle to knowledge of reality and banished the artists from his Republic. *Socrates and J.L. *Austin, have construed philosophy as essentially argued oral debate rather than a kind of writing. *Russell and * were each awarded the Noble Prize for Literature. Plato, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are thought to have pleasing literary styles, Kant and Hegel less so. See *Derrida, *Rorty.

noema. (Greek for: [that which is] thought). In *phenomenology since *Husserl, the *content of an act of consciousness in contrast to the act itself or *noesis. *Intentionality presupposes a distinction between what is thought (noema) and the thinking of what is thought (*noesis) or between what is perceived (noema) and the perceiving of what is perceived (*noesis).

noesis. (Greek for: [the operation of] thinking). In *Plato's philosophy, metaphysical knowledge, that is, knowledge of the *Forms. In *phenomenology since *Husserl, the act of consciousness in contrast to the content of that act, or *noema, presupposed by *intentionality.

phenomenology. The description of appearances. Movement in nineteenth and twentieth-century European philosophy. The term 'phenomenology' was first used by J. H. Lambert (1728 -77), the German mathematician and philosopher. *Husserl attempted to ground all *knowledge in the contents of *experience and describe the *essence of *consciousness, *intentionality. *Heidegger repudiated what he took to be Husserl's *psychologism and reconstrued phenomenology as fundamental *ontology, the attempt to clarify and answer the question of *being (Seinsfrage). * and *Merleau-Ponty both rejected Husserl's *epoche and his postulation of the *transcendental ego, substituting the Heideggerian category being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-sein, etre-au-monde) in their 'existential' phenomenology. The salient works of phenomenology are Husserl's Ideen I (Ideas I) (1913), Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) (1927), 's L'Etre et le neant (Being and Nothingness) (1943) and Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenologie de la perception (Phenomenology of Perception) (1945).

protention/retention. A distinction drawn by Husserl in Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, delivered from 1905). Protention is the present anticipation of the future. Retention is the present phenomenological persistence of the past. Protention and retention influence the phenomenological apprehension of the content of the present. For example, hearing part of a melody as part of that melody requires hearing it as the continuation of the part of the melody that has elapsed and as the initiation of the anticipated future course of the melody. The distinction is putatively constitutive of the distinction between past, present and future. It is influential on *, *Merleau-Ponty and *Derrida.

qualia. (Singular: quale) The phenomenological contents of experience. The sound as heard, the pain as felt, the smell as smelled etc. Twentieth century *materialism and *eliminativism entail that qualia are only physical or do not exist. Nevertheless, they seem essential to one's conscious life and are defended by Thomas *Nagel.

quasi-realism. The thesis that values and *secondary qualities are projected onto the *world by the subject in a way that explains their

seeming objectivity and partly justifies our realist talk about them. The term is due to the Cambridge philosopher Simon Blackburn (1944 -).

self-evident. p is self-evident if and only if perceiving the truth of p is necessary for understanding p.

self-intimating. If a mental state is self-intimating then if a person is in that state then they know they are in that state.

sempiternal. Existing at all times. Everlasting. In one sense, *eternal.

simulation. Understanding another person by having thoughts or experiences qualitatively similar to that person. Simulation is a kind of *hermeneutics and its understanding a kind of *Verstehen in the hermeneutic sense. Simulation theory is an alternative to the theory that *folk psychology is a theory. I explain and predict the action of the *other by simulating being the other not by formulating theories about the other .

Verstehen (German for: understanding). In Kantian and neo-Kantian critical philosophy, the mental faculty whose categories have genuine application only to the spatio-temporal world. In *hermeneutics, especially in *Dilthey, the faculty used to empathetically reconstruct the mentality of others.

Vernunft (German for: reason). In Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy, the mental faculty employed in the attempt to do metaphysics.

virtuality. A world that is not quite real.

voice. Philosophical style of writing. For example, one might ape the style of *Ayer or adopt one of the many voices of *Derrida.

yonder, the (das Dort). In Heideggerian fundamental ontology, the fact of *Dasein not being confined to 'here' but having a trajectory in life or existence which makes possible concern with the world.

The Self

‘metaphysically neutral’

(Gunderson, 1970) p 301

not right. Self left out. Problem of being someone is underestimated.

Gunderson thinks non-reflexivity solves the problem. The problem is ‘ontologically benign’. Gunderson is biased towards physicalism.

This not right. Quantum physics compels philosophy to privilege the first person perspective over the third. This does not mean privileging private opinion over public fact. It does mean recognising that the entire physical world depends, ontologically, on consciousness. The existence of what can be publically accessed depends on the existence of what can only be privately accessed.

‘[...] the fact that it is possible to give impersonal truth conditions for first-person statements does not enable one to make those statements without using the first person singular. The crucial question is whether the elimination of this particular first-person thought in favour of its impersonal truth conditions leaves a significant gap in our conception of the world. I think it does.’ (Nagel, 1986) p. 59

The problem is ontological not just epistemological.

Peacocke and Sartre think the problem is not ontological. Nagel,

Peacocke, Blackburn think postulating a ‘new entity’ will not solve the problem.

Nozick on the self.

Heidegger’s use of Dasein:

Sein and Dasein

Lichtung

The Who Of Dasein.

Temporalität prior to Being. The End of Being and Time

The word ‘I’ has a secret reference to the inner space.

In Buddhism, ‘I’ refers to nothing.

Frege: ‘I’ thoughts.

Gareth Evans. Russell misses the ‘me’ point in ‘It is raining’.

Evans’ hierarchy of explanatory dependency:

1. self identification

depends on

2. the self ascription of mental predicates
depends on
 3. the significance of those predicates
depends on
 4. an account of the mind
- (Evans, 1982 p. 205)

Why not:

1. an account of the mind
depends on
2. the significance of mental predicates
depends on

3. the self ascription of those predicates
depends on

4. self identification ?

The self is primordial, epistemologically and ontologically.

‘irreducibility of self-conscious thoughts to thoughts involving definite descriptions.’ (Evans, 1982 p. 207)

‘‘I’-thoughts depend upon the knowledge we have in memory of our past states.’ (Evans, 1981 p. 207)

‘the essence of ‘I’ is self-reference.’ (Evans, 1981 p. 207)

‘‘I’-thoughts are thoughts in which a subject of thought and action is thinking about himself – i.e. about a subject of thought and action.’
(Evans, 1981 p. 207)

‘a knowledge of what it would be for an identity of the form $\ulcorner I = \delta \urcorner$ to be true, where δ , is a fundamental identification of a person’
(Evans, 1981 p. 209, 223)

‘anyone who has a grasp of the concept of being F must be able to understand what it is for an arbitrary proposition of the form $\ulcorner a \text{ is } F \urcorner$ to be true (where a is an Idea which he possesses of an object).’
(Evans, 1981 p. 209)

‘Idea’ and ‘object’ wrong here.

‘‘I’-thoughts are not, as is sometimes suggested, restricted to thoughts about states of affairs ‘from the point of view of the subject’.’

(Evans, 1981 p. 209)

‘a fundamental identification of a person involves a consideration of him as the person occupying such-and-such a spatio-temporal location.’

(Evans, 1981 p. 211)

I, person, human being.

‘we cannot state in non-indexical terms what it is for the identity-proposition to be true’ (Evans, 1981 p. 211)

‘objectively true – true from the standpoint of eternity.’

(Evans, 1981 p. 211)

‘Nagel’s suggestion – that we do not really understand what it is for us to be identical with objects conceived to be parts of the objective spatio-temporal framework – surely must be wrong. Were it correct, our thinking about ourselves could not conform to the Generality Constraint. We would then have to suppose that we have an Idealist conception of the self.’

(Evans, 1981 p. 212)

‘This would be the same as saying that ‘I’ does not refer to anything.

(This would be a reason for the extraordinary conclusion of G. E. M. Anscombe [...].)’

(Evans, 1981 p. 212)

Are reports of introspection incorrigible? Philosophers of a materialist tendency doubt the possibility of there being anything that corresponds to the Cartesian notion of introspection.

XX

God

Problems in epistemology, philosophy of mind and action may be analysed using the first/third person distinction. Could the same method be deployed in metaphysics?

The Trinity, as properly understood, is the inseparability of Being, Now, and Consciousness. The three persons of the Trinity are grammatical persons. I should no doubt add that I had no prior Christian, or even religious, agenda in arguing for the Trinity. I have been trying to solve philosophical problems for over three decades and have seen every secular solution fail. It turns out that ultimate truth is Christian. In some epistemic sense of 'could have been otherwise', it could have been otherwise.

Can the existence of God be proven? The existence of God is far more certain than is usually supposed. It is not more doubtful than the existence of many things we take for granted in philosophy or in everyday life.

Objections faced by traditional arguments for the existence of God not faced by the argument I advance here include: Either God's existence is known by the senses (empirically) or God's existence is known by reason (rationally). God's existence is not known either by the senses or by reason. Therefore God's existence is not known.

This objection proves too much. The existence of the past, the present, the future, other minds, physical objects independently of minds, numbers, physical constituents of physical objects, universals, moral facts, and many other things cannot be known with certainty through the senses and cannot be proved through reason. It is not however concluded from these premises that those things do not exist nor that they are not known to exist. There is no valid a priori proof of these things and there is no valid a posteriori proof of them but there are not many atheists about them. God would seem to be a special case.

I suggest that in the case of everything that I have mentioned it is a pragmatic postulate we employ to find the content of our experience intelligible and, sometimes, tolerable. In saying that physical objects, numbers, etc are pragmatic postulates I do not mean to imply that these things do not exist. Nor do I mean to imply that in some anti-realist fashion it is neither true nor false that they exist. On the contrary, the best explanation of why their postulation works is that they exist in the most robust of metaphysical senses. (There would be physical objects if no conscious beings, numbers if no numbers of things and so on).

In each case at least one logical inference fails. From the existence of the present it does not logically follow that there was a past and will be a future. From the existence of one's own mind it does not follow that there are other minds. From the existence of thoughts and perceptions it does not follow that they are of physical objects that predate them, postdate them and do not depend on them during them. From the fact that there are numbers of things it does not follow that there are numbers. From the fact that there are physical objects it does not follow that they have atomic

constituents. From the existence of particulars it does not follow that there are universals.

It is clear that not all of the things that I have mentioned is perceptible through the senses. Although you may perceive something happening in the present you may not perceive the present it is happening in, still less the past or the future because your perceiving is present. Although you may perceive the body of another person you may not, logically, see their mind. Although one may perceive numbers of objects one may not also perceive the numbers they are numbers of. Although one may perceive a physical object, one may not perceive it existing independently of the perception of it, nor its atomic constituents, the first for reasons of logic the second for contingent reasons of science. Although I may think using concepts and may think of universals they are not the sorts of item with which I may be directly acquainted. Although I may think or form a conception of God, God cannot be directly perceived by me.

However, the intelligibility of experience and, in some cases, its tolerability, depend upon the postulation of each of these. Their postulation is a necessary condition for understanding the present qua present, physical objects qua physical objects etc.

The intelligibility of 'present' semantically depends upon the intelligibility of 'past' and 'future' even though we are never perceptually acquainted with what those terms denote. It is easier to make sense of the bodily movements, facial expressions and speech of another on the assumption that they are expressions of mentality. A condition for understanding them as actions, manifestations of emotion, and the use of language is the ascription of mentality to the other person. If there are numbers then numbers of objects may be counted and systematised into something more than an indeterminate plurality. If we postulate physical objects existing independently of our perceptions of them then it becomes explicable that there should exist qualitative repetitions in the contents of our perceptions. It also becomes explicable why we should believe there are physical objects and why the world perceptually appears to us as though it contained them. What a physical object is admits of a reasonably precise explanation in physics if it has some atomic constituents. Thought and perceptual recognition are less mysterious if we classify using concepts. We do not know what examples are examples of unless we postulate universals. We do not know what our own existence and what the world is and ought to be unless we postulate God. If we do postulate God this becomes clear.

Within a life without God a number of dualisms exist; dualisms that are not metaphysically postulated but undergone experientially. One is this; the dualism between what I do and what I feel I ought to do. Each of

us falls short of his or her own expectations and does what is easiest, or brings the most immediate gratification rather than what is either in the interests of others or in the longer and surer term interests of oneself.

Praying. Doing any of a number of things which logically entail postulating the existence of God solves this problem. For example, performing one's actions for God rather than for oneself has the effect of bringing about the ones that one ought to do irrespective of whether they are the ones one weakly wishes to do. Or, praying that one may do what one ought rather than what one desires immediately to do has the effect of allowing one to do what one ought to do. One reason for this is that praying that one may do what one ought to do has the effect of causing one to want to do what one ought to do.

A clear objection to what I am claiming is this. From the fact that I pray that I may do what I ought, and from the fact that I then do what I ought, it does not follow that I do what I ought because God caused my to, or gave me the strength to, so it does not follow that God exists either.

My reply is to agree that this inference fails but assert that the kind of proof required of God's existence here is too strong. Deductive or logically valid proof of God's existence is not logically required for God's existence and is not required for our knowledge of God's existence either. Compare; we have no valid deductive proof of the existence of physical objects, other minds, numbers, and many other things. It does not logically follow that these things do not exist and it does not logically follow that we do not know that these things exist. We do know that these things exist even though we have no deductive proof of their existence.

Another objection, logically consistent with the first, is this. It is conceded that prayer works but then held that the true explanation of this is not theological but psychological. It is prayer alone that has the effect of causing me to do what I ought, and not the fact that the prayer is 'answered'.

My reply is that the ethical efficacy of prayer alledged here is so mysterious as to be inexplicable. If the prayer is not answered then the sounds in the mind's ear, or the synaptic firings alone, or the strings of names and predicates alone (or perhaps some combination of these) have ethical efficacy. This is perhaps not an incoherent supposition but it is one that is scarcely intelligible. However, if I am caused to do good by a being who is good, and powerful enough to cause me to do good, then the efficacy of prayer is explicable.

God cannot always straightforwardly answer prayers in the way one might like. Suppose, for example, A prays that P but B prays that not P. It is logically impossible that God should bring it about that both P and not P so at least one of A and B is bound to be disappointed. However, sooner or later and in a way that maximises our overally interests, God

answers our prayers. This is not a (to me) a priori claim but an a posteriori one. It cannot be known with certainty by someone who has not prayed and had his or her own prayers answered over a period of time.

Spiritual Happiness. A life without God is fundamentally an unhappy life. A life without God is deeply unhappy even though it is unwilling to admit this to itself and to others. A life lived for God is the only kind of life that does not create its own unhappiness. The reason for this is that a life without God is a life always seeking happiness or hiding from the need to seek happiness, but any happiness short of spiritual happiness causes unhappiness. This is because non-spiritual happiness depends upon unhappiness, and the causes of non-spiritual happiness disappear. They cease to exist and the happiness ceases with them.

God is a permanent source of happiness, a source of happiness who does not cause unhappiness. If you have faith in God, or think and act in a way that presupposes belief in God, then your unhappiness ceases. God's happiness in you is a kind of happiness that does not depend upon being in one situation rather than another. Postulating God removes unhappiness.

Again, a foreseeable objection is that belief in God may no doubt bring happiness but belief in God is not sufficient for the existence of God. From 'I believe that P' it does not follow that 'P'.

The logic internal to this objection is valid. From 'I believe in God' we cannot validly derive 'God exists'. However, the existence of God is the best explanation of why belief in God causes happiness and removes unhappiness.

Compare: the existence of physical objects is the best explanation of why we seem to perceive physical objects. The existence of numbers is the best explanation of our ability to count. The existence of other minds is the best explanation of why I seem to interact with other people. In each case, from 'I believe that P' it does not logically follow that P. However, nobody could plausibly maintain that the fact that 'Physical objects exist' does not follow from 'I believe in physical objects' was a good reason for not believing in physical objects.

Order. Belief in physical objects brings order to perceptions. Belief in God brings order to a life. Perceptions are only a part of a life so the grounds for believing in God are greater than those for believing in physical objects.

The kind of order that belief in God introduces into a life is a kind of calm.; analogous to the subsiding of a violent storm in the physical world and the shining forth of the sun. Lost directions are found again. People concern themselves with the practicalities of the present and do not worry about the future.

The kind of order the postulation of physical objects brings is a coherence. Not a coherence between propositions, but the seeing of a set of properties as properties of one and the same thing, and the seeing of a number of physical objects as numerically distinct.

I suggest that the reason why the postulation of physical objects introduces order into perception is that the belief in physical objects is true. I suggest that the reason why the postulation of God brings order into a life is that belief in God is true. In both cases the truth of the belief is the best explanation for the efficacy of the belief. In both cases, adoption of the belief allows the believer to see the world more approximately as it is.

Someone who believes in physical objects has access to more truth than someone who does not. They may think of the world in two ways: as arrays of perceptual contents without systematic order or as arrays of perceptual contents in a systematic order. He or she may see it as more or less chaotic or as more or less orderly. Someone who lacks the belief in physical objects may only see it only as more or less chaotic. The perspective that includes belief in physical objects may explain why the perceptions of the other person may only appear chaotic as well as why his or her own are orderly. The other person may do neither of these things.

Similarly, someone who believes in God has access to more truth than someone who does not. They may think of their life in two ways: as a directionless but hedonistic meeting of short term goals extracted from chaos and unhappiness, or as a self-controlled and orderly plan that reveals unchanging happiness. He or she may think of his or her life in either of these ways. Someone who lacks belief in God may only think of their life as more or less chaotic.

The perspective that includes belief in God is more complete than atheism or agnosticism and reveals more truth. The person who believes in God may explain why the life of the other is unhappy and directionless as well as why his or her own is happy and ordered. The other person is unable to explain either of these things.

These epistemological considerations may be deployed to strengthen traditional arguments for the existence of God. The Argument From Design

The Cosmological Argument. The Ontological Argument

GOD

Does God exist ?

God exists.

What is God ?

God is the existence of what is.

Does God necessarily exist ?

God necessarily exists.

What is cannot not be, and God is what is, so God cannot not be, so God necessarily exists.

Is God infinite ?

God is infinite.

God is infinite because what is is infinite and God is what is.

Is God omnipotent ?

God is omnipotent.

Everything that happens is done by what is, God is what is, so everything that happens is done by God.

Only what is can do everything that can be done, God is what is, so only God can do everything that can be done, so only God is omnipoent, so God is omnipotent.

Is God omniscient ?

Everything that is known is known by what is. God is what is, so everything that is known is known by God.

Only what is can know everything that can be known. God is what is, so only God can know everything that can be known, so only God is omniscient, so God is omniscient.

Is God benevolent ?

God is benevolent.

God is benevolent because God maximises good over evil.

Is God a utilitarian ?

God is a utilitarian.

Can God do the logically impossible ?

There is no such thing as the logically impossible.

If one person prays that P and another person prays that not-P, God cannot bring it about that both P and not-P so somebody is going to be disappointed. However, there is no such state of affairs as both P and not-P, so there is no such state of affairs as the one God cannot bring about. It is not a constraint on any power not to bring about what is not a possibility. A logical impossibility is not some remote or difficult possibility, it is not any kind of possibility at all. A logical impossibility is nothing.

Because God is a utilitarian, if A prays that P and B prays that not-P, God chooses whether to bring it about that P or whether to bring it about that not-P by maximising the happiness of the greatest number of possibly happy beings.

Why does evil exist ?

Evil exists because good exists.

It is not possible to abolish all the evil that there is without abolishing good. This is because good and evil depend upon one another for their existence (rather like up and down, or left and right, or here and there). However, it is possible to maximise good and minimise evil (as one could move many objects to the left and leave only some to the right). God works in the world to maximise good over evil, in so far as this is consistent with the existence of good.

It is better that there should be good, and so some evil in the world than that there should be neither good nor evil. This is better because it is conducive to more happiness. There is more happiness in a world that contains some evil than in a world that contains neither good nor evil because in such a world there would be no happiness.

Is God a substance ?

God is a substance.

- (1) A substance is but depends upon nothing else to be.
- (2) What is is a substance because what is depends on nothing.
- (3) God is what is.
- (4) God is a substance.

Is the ontological argument valid ?

The ontological argument is valid.

- (1) God is what is.
- (2) What is is.
- (3) God is.

Is the argument from design valid ?

The argument from design is valid.

- (1) God is what is.
- (2) Whatever is is caused to be what it is by what is.
- (3) Whatever is is caused to be what it is by God.
- (4) God exists.

Is the cosmological argument valid ?

The cosmological argument is valid.

- (1) God is what is.
- (2) Whatever is is caused to be by what is.
- (3) Whatever is is caused to be by God.
- (4) God exists.

What is the difference between scepticism and religion ?

Scepticism is suspension of belief, religion is suspension of disbelief.

Scepticism seems like intellectually respectable caution but is narrowmindedness. Religion seems like intellectual extravagance but is openmindedness. Through scepticism knowledge is diminished. Through religion knowledge is enlarged.

There is sound proof of the existence or nature of God.

God whose existence could be proven would still be the transcendent God of Christianity.

I resist the integration of Christianity with Aristotelianism.

Not all knowledge depends upon sense experience.

Not all knowledge depends upon knowledge of particulars.

God and immortality are objects of faith not knowledge.

All empirical facts are contingent.

God, not creation, is the domain of necessity.

a posteriori inquiry into the world

a priori inquiry into God.

God as an empty intellectual postulate, and return to the living God who suffers as Christ: the self-revelation that essentially distinguishes Christianity from other religions.

This 'theology of the cross' is apparent as early as the dissertation *Akt und Sein* (1931), his most overtly philosophical work. The cost of discipleship argued for in *Nachfolge* (1937) is

the death of the old worldly self in submission to Christ.

Human beings are naturally religious.

emphasise the immanence rather than the *transcendence of God.

Absolute predestination entails the inevitability of the eternal salvation of the elect and the eternal damnation of the unchosen, irrespective of perceived desert but according to the will of God.

The inamissibility of *grace is a logical consequence of absolute predestination (because F is inamissible if and only if F is not liable to be lost).

Scripture is the only guide to faith, there is human free-will before but not after the Fall of Adam, and the distinguishing of the righteous from the sinful is by faith alone (*sola fide*) not works.

The omnipotence of God, and human sin, rather than His benevolence and human freedom.

Arguments against the possibility of *natural theology and insistence on the unique importance of God's self-revelation in Christ.

grace. That which is granted by the will of God. Divine assistance, especially that conducive to sanctification and salvation.

the grace of God does not depend on merit.

Augustine distinguishes grace necessary for action (*adiutorium sine quo non fit*) from grace sufficient for action (*adiutorium quo fit*).

Aquinas calls the inspiring presence of God in the soul 'habitual grace' or 'sanctifying grace', and divine intervention causing a good human act 'actual grace'.

The ability to not act sinfully since the Fall, the salvation of the soul, and the possession of Christian faith itself are arguably by the grace of God.

The Sacraments are symbols or instruments for the reception of grace but grace might be bestowed without them.

heaven. 160 The abode of God and the angels. Celestial paradise. The ultimate destination of the redeemed (for example, in Job 3, Hebrews 12, and Luke 16.). Once wholly free of sin, souls or resurrected persons in heaven enjoy the Beatific Vision, the intuition of God's essence. According to Job 3, the wicked no longer trouble those in heaven, the weary are at rest, both 'small' and 'great' are there, and the slave is free from the master. There are graphic descriptions of heaven in Revelation and in Dante's *Divine Comedy*.

Although spatial, heaven is not spatially related to ordinary space-time. Travel to heaven is only by dying and redemption, not by *motion so the existence of heaven is inconsistent with [the] Kant's thesis that there is only one space because putatively distinct spaces will turn out to be spatially related. Heaven exists now (Romans 10: 6, Thessalonians 1:10,

4:16) but is concealed by ordinary space-time events and sin. At death, the presence of God is revealed.

natural theology. The acquisition of truths about God through the natural human capacity to know rather than by *revelation. The study of God through the exercise of human reason, especially as legitimated by *Romans* I 18 ff. Natural theology includes the study of God through his works and the drawing of conclusions about God from premises about creation. All putative proofs of the existence and nature of God belong to natural theology.

Kant and the Logical Positivists think natural theology impossible, Kant on the ground that the transcendent misuse of the categories generates contradictions, the Logical Positivists partly on the Humean ground that there is no valid inference from empirical premises to transcendent conclusions, but also on the ground that the sentences of theology are without meaning because in principle unverifiable. Aquinas takes the view that human reason provides only a limited perspective on reality that needs to be supplemented by faith. Faith is by *Grace.

religion and epistemology. The epistemology of religion is the attempt to solve philosophical problems about *knowledge which arise from religion. For example: Is there mystical knowledge? Is there knowledge by *revelation or *natural theology? Can *God be known to exist, for example, if there is a sound proof of God's existence? Is it possible to have knowledge of the properties of God: omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence, simplicity and eternity? (Omniscience is arguably a part of omnipotence, if omnipotence is the ability to do anything, and knowing is something that can be done.)

Arguably, religion yields ways of experiencing and understanding that exceed the secular powers of the senses and the intellect. Augustine's claim *creo ut scio*, 'I believe in order to know', rather than a dogmatic reversal of ordinary intellectual priorities, is a principle conducive to non-reductivist explanation. *Aquinas maintains that reason needs to be supplemented by faith in order to obtain a fuller understanding of reality, even if this falls far short of adequate knowledge of God, because we are finite and imperfect beings. *Pascal famously said there are two mistakes: to deny reason and to allow only reason.

Hume and Kant have argued that, in a sense there is no epistemology of religion if this implies knowledge of God. Hume criticises arguments from design in *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and the likelihood of miracles in the *First Enquiry*. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant argues that there is no persuasive *a priori* or *a posteriori* argument for the

existence of God. Nevertheless, in his moral philosophy he allows God, freedom and immortality as postulates of pure practical reason.

All the problems of epistemology are problems of the epistemology of religion. For example: Knowing what belief is is necessary for knowing what belief in God is. Knowing whether there is knowledge is necessary for knowing whether there is mystical knowledge. The debate about internalism and externalism in epistemology is applicable to the relationship between God and world.

It could be that once metaphysical problems about ultimate reality and one's own existence are grasped with clarity it is seen that their answers have to be theological. For example 'Why is a particular person you?', 'Why is it now now?', 'Why is there a universe?', 'Where is there metaphysical room for what ought to be as well as what is?' only admit of answers if theism is true. Nevertheless, a God whose existence and nature could be established by human beings with logical certainty would arguably not be the God of Judaism, Christianity or Islam, the God of faith.

What is revelation? The self-disclosure of God to humanity. The body of theological fact God allows human beings to know unnaturally, especially through His 'Mighty acts' (*magnalia Dei*) Acts 2. 11. Revealed theology is distinguished from *natural theology. Aquinas distinguishes sharply between 'truths of reason' and 'truths of revelation' in knowledge of God. Karl Barth thinks revelation is a necessary condition for any human knowing of God.

Revelation is the last book of the New Testament, authored by St. John the Divine (who is almost certainly not St. John the Apostle). A series of vivid visions is related, culminating in the pouring out of the wrath of God from seven bowls (14-16) and the defeat of Satan (19 ff.), followed by the general resurrection of the dead and the judgement of souls. Revelation raises difficult metaphysical issues: How can a benevolent God be wrathful? What has to exist if good and evil exist? What makes some resurrection my resurrection? What is *heaven? Do angels exist?

What is hermeneutics? The understanding of understanding.

Religion is understood by intuition and a sense the infinite in the finite rather than evidence.

philosophy of the person

the dependency of each of cognition, feeling and action on the other two.

God is the highest and only unity of what is.

All particular things are disclosed only through God.

The deepest awe at the existence of the universe as a whole is only possible through a feeling of devotion.

The profound experience of union with the infinite implies the existence of God.

Christianity is not the only true religion but the most complete.

Arguments against Kant's critique of arguments for the existence of God,

God, freedom and the immortality of the soul are not 'postulates' but ineliminable presuppositions.

transcendence. Existence beyond. Independent existence. For example, God, numbers and universals are sometimes argued to exist beyond space, time, the physical world or experience (in some non-spatial sense of 'beyond'). In theology, the transcendence of God is contrasted with his immanence or pervasion of the world. In medieval philosophy, the transcendentals are notions [that] too fundamental to be accommodated in Aristotle's ten categories, for example: unity, truth, goodness and being. In Kant's critical philosophy, 'transcendent' knowledge of non-spatio-temporal reality that cannot be subsumed under the *categories is impossible. 'Transcendental' knowledge, **a priori* knowledge of how knowledge is possible, is possible and is the content of the critical philosophy.

One of the most fundamental and persistent divisions within philosophy is between philosophers who think there is a transcendental reality and those who do not. Indeed, the history of philosophy can be understood as the recurrent advocacy and repudiation of transcendence. A clue to understanding belief in metaphysical reality lies in taking the world with which we are acquainted as only a part of a greater whole. The known arguably depends upon the unknown, because metaphysical questions can be raised within and about the empirical world but cannot be answered by any further empirical inspection: Why is there a universe? Why is a particular person oneself? Why is it now now? What is being? Is there life after death?

Why does suffering exist? van Inwagen rightly points out that a free will defence is only plausible if at least some beings have free will. However, God is omniscient, so God knows what any being will do, so it looks as though there is no room for free will. van Inwagen thinks the arguments for the incompatibility of omniscience and freedom are 'if not indisputably correct, at least pretty convincing'. (p. 81) I am disinclined to be as pessimistic as van Inwagen about a solution to this problem. The problem has less to do with God or time than is often thought. Suppose that God, or anyone else, knows how I shall act at a time. *Prima facie*, I cannot not act in that way at that time because knowledge is truth entailing. My being able to not act is a necessary condition for my acting freely, so I am not free. The solution to the problem is to accept that knowledge is truth entailing but to note that if '*a* knows that *p*' is sufficient for *p* then the truth of *p* is necessary for the truth of '*a* knows that *p*'. My acting one way rather than another is a necessary condition for God, or anyone, knowing that I act in that way but this is consistent with my acting freely. If I do not exercise my free will to act in that way God does not know that I exercise my free will to act in that way. This is not a constraint on God's omniscience because God, like anyone else, only knows the truth. Here, there is no other truth to know.

van Inwagen endorses the view that if God's knowledge is foreknowledge then the problem is particularly acute. It looks more acute because if God knows at an earlier time how I shall act it seems fixed at that earlier time how I shall act. The solution to this version of the problem is to say that my acting one way or another in the future is a necessary condition for God's (or anyone's) prediction of my action: If I do not choose this way at a later time then God or anyone does not know at an earlier time that I choose this way. Again, there is no constraint on my freedom and no constraint on God's omniscience. I once suggested to the late A. J. Ayer that there is no logical inference from 'You can predict my behaviour' to 'I am not free' because you might have become acquainted with the patterns in which I exercise my freedom. Ayer seemed willing to accept the point. The inference still does not go through in the divine case even though, of course, God is infallible and does not have to ground his knowledge inductively.

Nor do I change God or change the past by freely acting one way or another. God knows everything so God knows how I will exercise my free will. If I were to exercise my free will differently in the future, God would have known something else in the past. I only exercise my free will the way I do, so God does not have to know something else. Nor does God have to change his mind.

In an endnote, van Inwagen says 'It is by no means clear that supposing that God is non-temporal solves the problem of reconciling

divine omniscience and human freedom' (fn. 6 p. 165). This would, however, eliminate the version of the problem which van Inwagen judges particularly acute. If our actions are not in God's future, because God has no future, then there is no problem about divine foreknowledge (only about knowers who are *not* God.) van Inwagen endorses the view that God is everlasting but temporal (at least as an assumption in his discussion of divine foreknowledge) because he does 'not really know how to write coherently and in detail about a non-temporal being's knowledge of what is to us the future'. (p. 81) I agree with van Inwagen that this is difficult. One of the challenges of philosophical theology is to describe the permanent, the utterly unchanging, when the whole drift of our vocabulary is to the temporal. We can make a start by saying that what is future to us is present to God, unchangingly present to God. God is unchanging presence. van Inwagen should give up the view that God is everlasting but temporal because it is inconsistent with divine immutability. If God is everlasting but temporal and if changing is necessary for temporality then God changes but if God changes the doctrine of divine immutability is false.

In an interesting passage in Lecture VII, where the free will defence is no longer deployed, van Inwagen says

'Every world God could have made that contains higher-level sentient creatures either contains patterns of suffering morally equivalent to those of the actual world, or else is massively irregular.' (p. 114)

By 'massively irregular' van Inwagen means entailing massive failure of natural laws. He says such irregularity is a defect at least as great as the defect of containing the suffering of the actual world. It seems to me that massive failure of laws of nature would preclude the existence of (flesh and blood) suffering beings. Would it be a worse evil if nothing lived than that things live but suffer? For example, is the fear of death so terrible that it would have been better never to have been born than to face the inevitability of one's own death? Arguably, if there were no suffering beings there would be no suffering and no suffering is better than suffering. On the other hand, a world in which there are living things seems a better world than a world in which there is none.

If there are (higher, sentient) living things must there be suffering? van Inwagen argues that *for all we know* pain is a necessary condition for the emergence of those creatures through evolution. Then, if it is a good that there should be such creatures, pain is necessary for that good. van Inwagen says:

‘no one, I believe, would take seriously the idea that the highest subhuman animals, the immediate evolutionary precursors of human beings, could have evolved naturally without hundreds of millions of years of ancestral suffering.’ (p. 119)

They *did* not. The difficult question is: Could God have brought it about that they evolved without pain? Why does phenomenological pain exist? In particular, if the neurological (C-fibre stimulation) is causally sufficient for the behavioural (the evasive, the adaptive) why is phenomenological pain necessary? A regular world with higher sentient beings but without suffering looks metaphysically possible. Without suffering there is no value, no significance, nothing to live against.

van Inwagen says:

‘It is asking too much, it is asking the wrong thing entirely, of a philosopher’s or a theologian’s response to the argument from evil, to ask that it will be suitable reading for a mother who has lost a child.’ (p. 11)

It is understandable that van Inwagen might be ‘by nature [...] the wrong person’ to minister to the bereaved. (p. 10) The philosopher is not the pastor. However, I cannot help feeling that if we had solved the problem of evil that solution could be presented directly to the grieving mother. She is one reason why evil is a problem.

What is no-thing-ness?

No-one has ever perceived pure nothing. No-one has ever thought pure nothing. The attempt to perceive or think pure nothing results in the presentation of no-thing-ness.

(PD) No-thing-ness is not nothing but is no-thing.

(PD) No-thing-ness is what remains if the world ends.

(PD) No-thing-ness is necessary for things.

(PD) No-thing-ness is pure presence.

(PD) No-thing-ness is pure transcendence.

(PD) No-thing-ness is pure being.

Once thinking and ordinary experiencing are calmed to the point of cessation there is not nothing, or nothingness, but no-thing-ness: the infinite interiority of the now. This is the now-space in which thoughts and experiences ordinarily arise and subside. It is the inside of the soul. I am not nothing. I am no-thing-ness. Space is not nothing. Space is no-thing-ness. The Now is not nothing. The Now is no-thing-ness. God is not nothing. God is no-thingness.

Notes

Appendix

Knowledge

$$(1) \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \rightarrow p)$$

and so

$$(2) \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (-p \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

On the minimal assumption that the self-intimating nature of consciousness counts as evidence, then:

$$(3) \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \rightarrow Kxp)$$

and so

$$(4) \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (-Kxp \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

I can believe I am in pain and this belief can be false:

$$\Diamond (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \ \& \ -p)$$

and so

$$\Diamond (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \ \& \ -Kp)$$

because $\neg p \rightarrow -Kxp$.

It follows that (1) is false:

$$\neg \Box (\mathcal{B}p) (Bxp \rightarrow p)$$

because

$$\Diamond (\wp p) (Bxp \ \& \ -p) \rightarrow -\Box \wp p (Bxp \rightarrow p)$$

and (2) is false:

$$-\Box (\wp p) (-p \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

because

$$\Diamond (\wp p) (Bxp \ \& \ -p) \rightarrow -\Box (\wp p) (-p \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

and (3) is false:

$$-\Box (\wp p) (Bxp \rightarrow Kxp)$$

because

$$\Diamond (\wp p) (Bxp \ \& \ -Kp) \rightarrow -\Box (\wp p) (-p \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

and (4) is false:

$$-\Box (\wp p) (-Kxp \rightarrow -Bxp)$$

because

$$\Diamond (\wp p) (Bxp \ \& \ -Kp) \rightarrow -\Box (\wp p) (-Kxp \rightarrow -Bxp) \text{ (9)}$$

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Hegel tries to overcome subject-dualism through synthesis, Heidegger by writing at the level of Fundamental Ontology. Both expose presuppositions of the first-person/third-person distinction.

[As a de dicto proposition necessarily is F, where F is necessarily has the property of being true, and this necessarily has F' where F'' is the property of having size. WRONG]

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THE GRAMMAR OF BEING AND THE HOLY TRINITY

The Holy Trinity:

Being
Presence
Consciousness
= one substance
x3 grammatical persons.

Ontology makes the grammar possible.

UNUSED:

Twentieth century philosophy massively privileged the third person model over the first. It was assumed, usually without argument, that Descartes's mind-body dualism and Berkeley's idealism are false, and some kind of physicalism is true. It might be thought that the right approach to philosophical problem solving is therefore to do equal justice to both perspectives, and arrive at a theory of the person that will stand the strain of translation back and forth between first and third person descriptions. However, the philosophical scene has changed.

We now know from quantum physics that physicalism, and the massive privileging of the public and the physical, was a mistake, and that either Descartes or Berkeley is right. Physics has proven that the physical world depends on consciousness. The strength of this dependence entails dualism if causal, idealism if logical and constitutive. Consciousness cannot be eliminated, at the individual or the cosmic level.

Philosophy faculties in the West are beginning to understand and digest the Fundamental Ontology of Martin Heidegger. It is therefore becoming possible to think and write at the level of Being, not just at the level of epistemology and psychology.

Quantum physics and Fundamental Ontology have broken the anti-metaphysical stranglehold over philosophy exerted for two centuries by Hume and Kant. Now that the industrial revolution is well and truly over, we can drop the false and impoverishing view that the universe is a machine and you a cog within it.

x2 versions:

Inner space and ultimate reality version. Title or sub-title is 'The Grammar of Being'.

God and the soul version: (1) expand second part (Holy trinity) (2) sub-heading: the problems of phil & the Holy Trinity, or similar)

