The Politics of Gender in a Time of Change:
Gender Discourses, Institutions, and Identities in
Contemporary Indonesia

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
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Abstract

This dissertation fundamentally explores the nature of change, and the development of interventions that aim to bring this change into a particular society. What emerges is the notion of a ‘spiral’: imagining the dynamic relationship between paradigms and discourses, the institutions and programmes operating in a place, and the way individual identities are constructed in intricate and contradictory ways. Within this spiral, discourse has power – ‘words matter’ – but equally significant is how these words interact dialogically with concrete social structures and institutions – ‘it takes more than changing words to change the world’. Furthermore, these changes are reacted to, and expressed in, the physical, sexed body. In essence, change is ideational, institutional, and embodied.

To investigate the politics of change, this dissertation analyses the spiral relationships between gender discourses, institutions, and identities in contemporary Indonesia, focusing on their transmission across Java. It does so by exploring the Indonesian state’s gender policies in the context of globalisation, democratisation, and decentralisation. In this way, the lens of gender allows us to analyse the dynamic interactions between state and society, between ideas and institutions, which impact on everything from cultural structures to physical bodies.

Research focuses on the gender policies of the Indonesian Ministry of Women’s Empowerment, substantiated with case study material from United Nations Population Fund reproductive health programmes in West Java. Employing a multi-level, multi-vocal theoretical framework, the thesis analyses gender discourses and relational structures (how discourses circulate to construct the Indonesian woman), gender institutions and social structures (how discourses are translated into programmes), and gender identities and embodied structures (how discourses enter the home and the body).

Critically, studying gender requires analysing the human body as the site of both structural and symbolic power. This dissertation thus argues for renewed emphasis on a ‘politics of the body’, recognising that bodies are the material foundations from which gender discourses derive their naturalising power and hence ability to structure social relations. The danger of forgetting this politics of the body is that it allows for slippage between ‘gender’ and ‘women’; policy objectives cannot be disentangled from the reality of physical bodies and their social construction.

This thesis therefore argues that there are distinct and even inverse impacts of gender policies in Indonesia. As the ‘liberal’ and ‘modern’ assumptions of gender equality are overlaid onto the patriarchal culture of a society undergoing transformation, women’s bodies and women’s sexuality are always and ever the focus of the social gaze. The gender policies and interventions affecting change on discursive and institutional levels may thus provoke reaction at the level of individual identities that are contrary to explicit intentions. In effect, projects that purport to work on ‘gender’ are often so deeply rooted in underlying gender normativity that their net effect is to reinscribe these gender hierarchies. By exposing the contradictions in these underlying paradigms we gain insight into the politics of a transforming society. Furthermore, engaging with the politics of the body allows us to analyse the spiral processes between discourse and practice, the question of power, and the way men and women embody social structures and experience social transformation.
Acknowledgements

Indonesia is a country which has, in many ways, my heart. It is my childhood, my family, my early tongue – everything but my passport and colour. The sights and smells of Java will always feel like coming home. Yet I am nonetheless an orang asing, a bulé, a foreigner. Who am I to presume to describe this country?

Several years ago, I found it hard to imagine ever completing this dissertation. Many tens of thousands of words, warm Indonesian days and cold Oxford nights later, I am finally able to thank those who helped me finish. I did not deserve all they gave so freely, and hope one day to return their kindness. If any good is to be found in this thesis, much is due to their invaluable collective help, both academically and personally. Any remaining errors are mine alone.

In Indonesia, there are countless many to whom I am indebted: for allowing me to tell their stories, for offering their insights, their assistance, and their friendship. Both Wahyu and Irma were vital to my Bandung research in 2005, as were Ira and Yayu during my 2002 fieldwork. Those in Jakarta’s MOWE offices graciously invited me in to work with them, allowing me to interview staff and giving me free access to their resources. I am especially grateful to Deputy Minister Yusuf Supiandi, who opened many doors for me at MOWE, Pak Subagyo and Ibu Erni in the Bureau of Planning and Foreign Cooperation, and Wiwik, Kus, and Erwin. UNFPA’s staff in Jakarta was always helpful in my endeavours, especially Birgitte Bruun.

In Yogyakarta, Pak Oka and Ibu Sari opened their home to me on numerous occasions. Sitting on their back porch, listening to the birds and overlooking the rice fields, was a place of restful contemplation. Thanks also to all those at the UPN Veteran who aided me in my research – and kept me laughing – Ana, Ida, Novi, Wahyu and Sari. Collaborating with the Centre for Women’s Studies provided meaningful opportunities for all of us to learn from each other.

Pak Djuwari became a friend and collaborator, helping arrange for me to work with a university in Surabaya. These STIE-Perbanas students all did excellent research for me: Arestiana Sari, Arfin Triatmodjo, Burhanudin, Dwi Adhi Sugiharto, Dwi Novi Sari, Erna, Happy Indah, Herlina, Larisa Lana, Launawati, Lindi, Listya Maharani, Rani Mustika Sari, Rina, Rizal, and Yuliana. Thanks also to Mbak Muazaroh, who organised the research students, and Ibu Tatik, head of the faculty, who was so hospitable during my visits.

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Special thanks go to Julia Suryakusuma, a trail-blazer and inspiration. Without her, this project would not be possible.
Finally, no doctoral research can be completed without the support of colleagues, friends, and family. I am indebted to the staff at Pembroke College – where I was Junior Dean for four years – my colleagues at Oxford Analytica, and all of my students at Hertford and Pembroke. My QEH compatriots helped me survive: Leah and Emma showed me it could be done; Julie and Ami spent those last brutal days writing with me, bunkered down in the Hangar.

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And last but certainly not least, I owe this DPhil to my parents (even my mother, who never wanted to be credited in these acknowledgements!) who taught me to think and act independently, even while providing me stability and support.
# Table of Contents

Glossary: Acronyms and Selected Indonesian Words .............................................. ix

Chapter One: Frameworks

Understanding Gender Policies in Indonesia:
Research Questions, Theory and Methods ................................................................. 1

1.1 The Study of Gender and Change: Introducing Research Aims ......................... 1
   1.1.1 Shifts in Discourse, Shift in Power? Gender in Indonesia ............................ 3

1.2 The Theoretical Framework .................................................................................. 6
   1.2.1 Foucauldian Concepts of Discourse and Power .......................................... 10
   1.2.2 Development Applications: Positive and Material Power, Construction of Arenas, and Depoliticisation ................................................................. 15
   1.2.3 Gender and Bodies: Bourdieu’s Habitus and Foucault’s Self-Reflexive Construction ................................................................. 21
   1.2.4 Institutional, Relational, and Embodied Social Structures ............................ 25
   1.2.5 Summarising Frameworks ........................................................................... 27

1.3 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 28
   1.3.1 Methodological Approaches and Field Research ......................................... 28
   1.3.2 Researcher Positionality and Reflexivity ..................................................... 31
   1.3.3 Limitations .................................................................................................. 33

1.4 The Unfolding of a Narrative: Gender Discourses, Institutions, and Identities ... 39

Chapter Two: Theory and History

Gender in a Transforming Indonesia ..................................................................... 42

2.1 Multi-dimensional Gender: Building Gender from Bodies ................................. 42
   2.1.1 Gender in International Development: From WID to GAD to GMS ............ 45
   2.1.2 The Human Body ....................................................................................... 47
   2.1.3 Gender Hierarchy ...................................................................................... 49

2.2 The Indonesian Context ...................................................................................... 53
   2.2.1 Studying Gender in Indonesia .................................................................... 53
   2.2.2 The Development Project .......................................................................... 67
   2.2.3 A Time of Change: Modernity, Morality, and MTV ................................. 74

2.3 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 79
Chapter Three: Ideas
Gender Discourses and Relational Structures:
How Discourses Circulate to Construct the Ideal Indonesian Woman

3.1 From Gender to Jender and Back Again: Shifts in Language and the Significance of ‘Western’ Words
3.1.1 Gender → Jender → ‘Gender’
3.1.2 Woman: Wanita → Perempuan
3.1.3 Empowerment: Pemberdayaan
3.1.4 Mainstreaming: Pengarusutamaan

3.2 The Discursive Construction of Women: Exploring Themes of Development, Religion, and Motherhood
3.2.1 Women as Nation-builders: The Discourse of Development
3.2.2 Women as God-fearers: The Discourse of Morality and Islam
3.2.3 Women as Mothers: The Discourse of Motherhood

3.3 Conclusions: Understanding Circularity in Gender Discourses

Chapter Four: Institutions
Gender Institutions and Social Structures:
How Discourses are Translated into Programmes

4.1 Institutional Programmes: Underlying Paradigms and Reified Norms
4.1.1 The Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (MOWE)
4.1.2 Other Key Institutions: Dharma Wanita and PKK

4.2 Moving to the Regions: The Reinforcing Spirals of Gender Norms and Institutions
4.2.1 The ‘Organic’ Hierarchy, the Patrimonial State, and the Echelons of Decentralisation
4.2.2 Provincial Institutions: Four Case Studies
4.2.3 Drawing Conclusions

4.3 Indonesian Transformation and Questions of Institutional Culture

4.4 Conclusions: The Institutional Mapping of Difference

Chapter Five: Identities
Gender Identities and Embodied Structures:
How Discourses Enter the Home and the Body

5.1 A Note on Sample and Method

5.2 Analysing Constructions and Perceptions
5.2.1 Gender Roles as ‘Structured Structures’: Ideal Types and Constructions
5.2.2 Gender as a ‘Structuring Structure’: Power Relations and the Contrast Between Discourse and Embodiment
5.2.3 The Politics of the Body
5.2.4 Gender in a Time of Change ................................................................. 222

5.3 Relevant Theoretical Insights: The Politics of the Body ......................... 236

5.4 Conclusions: Gender and Social Change ................................................. 237

Chapter Six: Case study
UNFPA and BKKBN: The Paradigms and Politics of Reproductive Health ......... 239

6.1 Global and National Discourses of Reproductive Health: UNFPA at the Centre. 242
   6.1.1 Indonesian Interventions in Family Planning ......................................... 243
   6.1.2 Paradigm Shift: Post-Cairo ’94 and the Creation of a New Discourse ....... 246
   6.1.3 The Politics of Paradigms? UNFPA and Discourse Creation .................... 255

6.2 Provincial Institutionalisation: Bandung and Outwards .......................... 263
   6.2.1 Institutional Apparatus and Hierarchy .................................................. 264
   6.2.2 Ignorance and Power in Programme Implementation ........................... 267
   6.2.3 Islam and Morality in Provincial Bureaucracy ....................................... 275

6.3 A Tale of Two Desa: Discourses of Gender and Change ......................... 279
   6.3.1 Sample and Method ............................................................................ 280
   6.3.2 Discourses of Reproductive Health in the Village: Imbrications of ‘Modern’
       and ‘Traditional’ ...................................................................................... 281
   6.3.3 Gender Roles, Sex, and the ‘Threat’ of Change ..................................... 287

6.4 Conclusions: Reproductive Health and the Politics of Change .................. 291

Chapter Seven: Drawing Conclusions
The Politics of Gender in a Time of Change .................................................. 294

7.1 Gender in a changing nation ................................................................. 294
   7.1.1 The Spirals of Ideas, Institutions, and Identities .................................... 296

7.2 Deconstructing the Linkages between Gender and Social Change .......... 299
   7.2.1 Multi-level and Multi-vocal Frameworks .............................................. 300
   7.2.2 The Paradox of Development Intervention ........................................... 305
   7.2.3 The Politics of the Body ....................................................................... 311

7.3 Conclusion: The Politics of Gender in a Time of Change ...................... 313

Bibliography .................................................................................................. 317
Appendix A: Research Methodology ................................................................. 344

A.1 Issues of Inter-disciplinarity ................................................................. 344

A.2 Researcher as Interpreter: The ‘Sundanese White Girl’, Phenomenology, and Reflexivity ................................................................. 347

A.3 The Three ‘Levels’ of Research ............................................................. 351
   A.3.1 Jakarta: Observing Participant and Textual Analysis ...................... 351
   A.3.2 Provincial Level: Interviews and Focus Group Discussions .......... 354
   A.3.3 Local Level: Research Assistants, Semi-structured Interviews, and Snowball Sampling .......................................................... 358

A.4 Implications for Future Research ......................................................... 364

Appendix B: Interviews and Meetings ......................................................... 366

B.1 Interviews List ...................................................................................... 366

B.2 Meetings List ....................................................................................... 370

Appendix C: Data Tables from Gender Interviews .................................... 371

Appendix D: Interview Questions ............................................................... 386

Appendix E: List of Respondents with Brief Biographical Data ............ 389

Appendix F: Lukes on Power and Empowerment ................................... 397
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>one who is not a strict follower of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td><em>Asal Bapak Senang</em> (‘As long as the boss/patron is happy’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adat</td>
<td>custom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Advocacy Programme Coordinator (at UNFPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARH</td>
<td>Adolescent Reproductive Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>azas kekeluargaan</td>
<td>family principle which construes the state as a ‘family’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>badan</td>
<td>literally ‘body’, also refers to administrative divisions in the regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bagian</td>
<td>literally a ‘part’ or department, refers to administrative division beneath a bureau in the regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bahasa</td>
<td>literally ‘language’, usually refers to the Indonesian (or Malay) language, as in bahasa Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bapak</td>
<td>Father and/or Sir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bapeda</td>
<td><em>Badan Perencanaan Daerah</em> (Regional Planning Authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bapemas</td>
<td><em>Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat</em>, or Body for the Empowerment of Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhineka Tunggal Ika</td>
<td>Unity in Diversity (the national motto)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bidan</td>
<td>Midwife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biro</td>
<td>Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKKBN</td>
<td><em>Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional</em> (National Family Planning Coordinating Board)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBPP</td>
<td><em>Biro Bina Pemberdayaan Perempuan</em>, Bureau for the Guidance of Women’s Empowerment, the MOWE office in Bandar Lampung, southern Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td><em>Bidang Perempuan</em>, Women’s Division, the MOWE office in Bandung, West Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td><em>Bidang Pemberdayaan Perempuan</em>, Women’s Empowerment Division, the MOWE office in Surabaya, East Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPMD</td>
<td><em>Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Daerah</em>, or Regional Body for the Empowerment of Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desa</td>
<td>village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desentralisasi</td>
<td>decentralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>District Facilitator (for UNFPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharma Wanita</td>
<td>Women’s Service: organisation of wives of civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dinas</td>
<td>regional governmental operational division (below the ‘department’ at the national level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPCU</td>
<td>District Programme Coordination Unit (for UNFPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council, Indonesia’s parliament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dwifungsi</td>
<td>the army’s ‘dual function’ (military and socio-economic), a doctrine first enunciated by General Nasution in 1958 that continues to the present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon</td>
<td>designation for level of civil servant within the bureaucracy (e.g. Echelon I is a top-level bureaucrat, down to Echelon IV at the bottom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERH</td>
<td>Essential Reproductive Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Family Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAD</td>
<td>Gender and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEM</td>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerwani</td>
<td>Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women's Movement), a communist political organisation in Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1958-1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalisasi</td>
<td>Globalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMS</td>
<td>Gender Mainstreaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gotong royong</td>
<td>mutual cooperation or assistance (the ideology of community under the New Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>halus</td>
<td>smooth, refined, used to describe the appropriate well-behaved Javanese and Sundanese manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibu</td>
<td>Mother and/or Mrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPD</td>
<td>International Conference on Population and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPD POA</td>
<td>ICPD Programme of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Information, Education, and Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFPPD</td>
<td>Indonesian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ikut suami</td>
<td>follow-the-husband culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jilbab</td>
<td>head covering for Muslim women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jilbabisasi</td>
<td>‘jilbabisation’, a term used here to describe the increase in women’s wearing the jilbab in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPO</td>
<td>Junior Professional Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabupaten</td>
<td>regency or administrative district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kader</td>
<td>cadre (local health volunteer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kampung</td>
<td>village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kantor</td>
<td>office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KB</td>
<td>Keluarga Berencana (Family Planning, and/or contraceptives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDRT</td>
<td>kekerasan dalam rumah tangga (domestic violence), also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition/Clarification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shorthand for the national law on eradicating domestic violence (UU No. 23/2004)</td>
<td><strong>Kecamatan</strong> administrative district, sub-district below the <strong>Kabupaten</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kementerian</strong></td>
<td>ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kesejahteraan</strong></td>
<td>welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KKN</strong></td>
<td>korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme (corruption, collusion and nepotism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kodrat</strong></td>
<td>biological determinism or ‘women’s destiny’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Komnas Perempuan</strong></td>
<td>National Commission on Violence against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kowani</strong></td>
<td>Kongres Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women's Congress), a federation of women’s organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KPP</strong></td>
<td>Kantor Pemberdayaan Perempuan, Women’s Empowerment Office, the MOWE branch in DIY Yogyakarta, Central Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kraton</strong></td>
<td>literally ‘palace’, implying a feudal mindset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lahir dan batin</strong></td>
<td>the physical body and the inner spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LBH-APIK</strong></td>
<td>Lembaga Bantuan Hukum – Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan (Legal Aid Foundation – Indonesian Women’s Association for Justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modernisasi</strong></td>
<td>modernisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MOV</strong></td>
<td>Means of Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MOWE</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of Women’s Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muhammadiyah</strong></td>
<td>modernist Muslim organisation (founded 1912)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Musyawarah</strong></td>
<td>discussion, deliberation, and consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Musyawarah mufakat</strong></td>
<td>deliberation with consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nahdlatul Ulama</strong></td>
<td>‘Renaissance of the Ulama’, traditionalist Muslim organisation (founded 1927)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Order</strong></td>
<td>the Suharto era, 1966 to 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NPCU</strong></td>
<td>National Programme Coordinating Unit (of UNFPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Otonomi daerah</strong></td>
<td>regional autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVI</strong></td>
<td>Objectively Verifiable Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P2W-KSS</strong></td>
<td>Program Pembangunan Wanita Keluarga Sejahtera (Program for the Enhancement of the Role of Women for Prosperous and Healthy Families)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pancasila</strong></td>
<td>the five guiding principles of the Indonesian state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PDT</strong></td>
<td>Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal (Development of Disadvantaged Areas), an Indonesian government ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pembangunan</strong></td>
<td>top-down development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pemberdayaan</strong></td>
<td>empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pembinaan</strong></td>
<td>guidance (implications of management, construction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pengarusutamaan</strong></td>
<td>mainstreaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perempuan</strong></td>
<td>Indonesian word for woman, used in first four decades of the 20th century and re-emerging since 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Meaning/Example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perkembangan</td>
<td>bottom-up development (flowering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pesantren</td>
<td>Islamic religious boarding schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td><em>Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga</em> (Family Welfare Empowerment), previously <em>Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga</em> (Family Welfare Guidance) under the New Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLKB</td>
<td><em>Petugas Lapangan Keluarga Berencana</em> (Family Planning Field Worker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKUK</td>
<td>Provincial Management Unit (for UNFPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSCU</td>
<td>Provincial Programme Coordination Unit (for UNFPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puskesmas</td>
<td><em>Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat</em> (Community Health Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reformasi</td>
<td>Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RH</td>
<td>Reproductive Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPK</td>
<td><em>Ruang Pelayanan Khusus</em>, Special Service Room, housed in police headquarters for female victims of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td><em>Rukun Tetangga</em> (lowest administrative unit, a neighbourhood association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUU APP</td>
<td><em>Rancangan Undang-Undang Antipornografi dan Pornoaksi</em> (Anti-Pornography and ‘Pornoaksi’ Bill)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td><em>Rukun Warga</em> (second-to-lowest administrative unit, just above the RT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>santri</td>
<td>literally ‘student’, meaning a devout and pious Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td><em>sumber daya manusia</em>, human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekretaris Daerah</td>
<td>Regional Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharia</td>
<td>Islamic law, Arabic ‘syariah’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Ibuism</td>
<td>state ideology of gender wherein women serve as wives first, mothers second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STI</td>
<td>sexually-transmitted infection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulama</td>
<td>Muslim religious scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPT</td>
<td><em>Unit Pelayanan Terpadu</em>, Integrated Service (Care) Unit, dealing with cases of violence against women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAW</td>
<td>violence against women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wanita</td>
<td>Indonesian word for woman, used during Suharto’s New Order, with connotations similar to ‘lady’ in English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WID</td>
<td>Women in Development</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One: Frameworks

Understanding Gender Policies in Indonesia: Research Questions, Theory and Methods

1.1 The Study of Gender and Change: Introducing Research Aims

Questions of gender and development are deeply complex. This research explores these questions through examining gender policies in the contemporary Indonesian state, focusing on the island of Java. Telling this story involves a much larger tale: a way of exploring the very nature of social transformation in a nation that is democratising, decentralising, and developing, all while responding to competing pressures from modernisation, globalisation and Islam. Gender issues are deeply imbricated through the Indonesian political context at all levels, as well as influenced by global paradigms and trends. The study of gender is thus a way of analysing the processes and politics of change, the dynamic interactions between state and society that impact everything from cultural structures to physical bodies.

‘Gender’ itself is a word whose meanings are often conflated in state and developmental discourses. Typically it refers to the social roles and relations between men and women. As a theoretically elaborated concept, gender entered global discourses and policy agendas in the 1990s when GAD (Gender and Development) became the primary framework meant to guide development interventions (Rathgeber 1990). Suddenly interest in gender became a paradigmatic concern for international institutions and discourses, as evidenced by the promotion of gender mainstreaming programmes. However, difficulty lies in the extent to which this has affected the ‘way we do business’ (practices) instead of simply the ‘way we talk about the world’ and frame it with meaning (discourses). For the distinction between
sex (biological bodies) and gender (the different social roles ascribed to men and women) is often confused in actual state interventions: though language is now one of ‘gender’ and not merely ‘women’, in the end most interventions focus exclusively on women. More recently steps have been taken to shift the emphasis back to ‘women’, as a UN report has concluded, because of the ‘continuing significance of women’s subordination’ (UNRISD 2005: xx). It is critical to examine what these changing emphases accomplish in the context of power relations.

The research project explicitly analyses Indonesian gender policy – not policy as a specific government document or law, or as a set of institutions, but the entire schema and apparatus of governance focused on impacting the relationships of men and women in Indonesia and specifically the conditions faced by women. This is in line with the Foucauldian term ‘dispositif’, encompassing not only discourses but also practices (institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions, morality) which are necessary to understanding a particular situation (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 121). Viewing gender as a dispositif, a bundle of discourses and practices specifically mitigated through governmental structures, offers an inimitable perspective: we are able to analyse mutually-reinforcing processes of gender constructions.

In sum, the dissertation will explore how gender discourses gain logic and legitimacy as they circulate through governmental institutions and social structures. Power relations are relevant throughout, but there is always resistance and contestation. There is a relationship between discourse and practice, and linkages can be drawn in many directions; gender

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1 This is a simplistic distinction of the two. Chapter Two will go into much greater depth on the theorisation of gender and bodies, considering theorists such as Errington 1990; Moore 1994, 1999; Butler 1990; Turner 1996; Howson 2004.

2 These practices can be described as forming intensified surveillance and control mechanisms (Darier 1996: 589), in effect creating policy which polices and disciplines, leading to resistance among certain groups.
policies in Indonesia have material, embodied consequences. This thesis will therefore unfold by examining gender discourses and relational structures (how discourses circulate to construct the Indonesian woman), gender institutions and social structures (how discourses are translated into programmes), and gender identities and embodied structures (how discourses enter the home and the body). A case study will follow to show how these three areas are linked in one gender and development intervention. Finally, conclusions will be drawn about the nature of change, gender, and the development project.

Chapter One begins by laying out theory and methodology. First, by way of background we will ask what has changed since the constructions of gender under Suharto’s New Order regime. Second, the theoretical framework will be outlined with explanation of how theory will be used in this dissertation. Finally, methodology and fieldwork will be addressed, explaining the researcher’s status and limitations to the project’s scope.

1.1.1 Shifts in Discourse, Shift in Power? Gender in Indonesia

Gender issues are implicated at all levels of contemporary Indonesian government and society, the central expository for this thesis. With regard to the international context, some see political Islam in Indonesia as connected to an increasing global polarisation with the West (Munir, interview 27 August 2005). But as Islam becomes more significant in Indonesia as a politics of identity, this ‘identity’ is often writ large on women’s bodies – for ‘feminism’ and ‘free women’ are still associated with the West, particularly symbolically with regard to clothing. In Jakarta, the centre of policy generation, gender permeates the government agenda through national coordination efforts. Yet there is often slippage between the language of gender and that of morality: in discussing the necessity of restraining sexuality, particularly women’s, governmental constructions of ‘gender’ become
a form of political capital. At the regional level, because of decentralisation, gender is intertwined in local legislation (*peraturan daerah*); this has resulted in numerous locations where women’s behaviour and movement are constrained, contravening basic rights and freedoms. At the local level, perceptions of social change continually revert to concerns about morality and the roles (and bodies) of women.

The dissertation examines these interrelationships by looking at the various ‘levels’ and aspects of gender policies as they function on Java, thus offering an updated portrait of the complex relationship between the Indonesian state and society on gender issues. Much of the scholarship on these questions has focused on the earlier era: President Suharto’s New Order government (1966-1998). Studies have examined the various government mechanisms shaping gender relations and women’s conditions under the New Order (Smyth 1993; Lev 1996; Suryakusuma 1996, 2004; Blackburn 2004). These scholars have shown that Suharto’s Indonesian state reproduced a gender ideology that exalted traditional notions of women’s place in society. This government translated a particular set of gender discourses into power – the power to create an ordered social reality with particular gender roles understood and agreed by the general population – aiming to stabilise society. The New Order government disseminated its gender ideology through a number of national organisations in top-down fashion.3

However, since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and President Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, Indonesia has been experiencing substantial shifts in its socio-political landscape. Decentralisation and democratisation have de-linked the dissemination of gender discourses from the formerly top-down modernisation project. This in turn affects

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3 In order to better understand the mechanisms employed historically and changes brought about today, gender in the New Order will be explored further in the next chapter.
the construction of a formal political gender identity. Government officials in large part now speak a different ‘language of gender’, drawing upon discourses from the international arena that are influenced by feminist theorisation. Concretely, there have been policy shifts related to gender, including the re-naming and strengthening of the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (MOWE)\(^4\). The government of Indonesia has included directives on gender equity in its policies, including Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy, and Law No. 25/2000 on the National Development Plan. Furthermore, Presidential Instruction No. 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming elaborated the government’s commitment to provision of gender mainstreaming in all government policies, legislation and programmes. Violence against women became a national issue, with enactment of a 2004 domestic violence law.

Although gender policies and emphases have begun to change, broader structural problems still exist for Indonesian women. For example, national survey data points to low quality of life for women in the fields of education, economy, health and politics.\(^5\) While gender discourse has shifted, Indonesian practical realities remain subject to power hierarchies and patriarchal norms. Gender hierarchy – here defined broadly as the continued dominance of male over female in both public and private realms – still defines social relations. ‘Gender’ as a mobilising force for programmatic intervention into society has remained a part of social control, rendering women as objects whose delimited identities are critical for the maintenance of hierarchical order. This dissertation therefore questions the mechanisms

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\(^4\) MOWE, in Indonesian, is *Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan*. It was originally named the Ministry of Women’s Role. The institution’s re-naming and evolution will be described in Chapter Three.

\(^5\) Female illiteracy is at around 12.28\% versus male illiteracy at 5.84\%; the number of women aged 10 and older who are not or have never been in school is twice that of male citizens (*Susenas* 2003). Indonesian women’s participation in the workforce is relatively low, calculated at 38\% of the total workforce in 2004 (World Bank Group 2004). Women’s non-agricultural wage is less than half that of men’s, on average, with the ratio of estimated female earned income to estimated male earned income calculated at 0.45 (HDR 2004). Though having improved over the past decade, in 2007 Indonesian maternal mortality rates were still at 230 deaths per 100,000 live births, with an estimated 1.69 million women out of the 5 million giving birth each year without access to quality maternal care (UNFPA 2007). Additionally, women are poorly represented in government, comprising only 11.3\% of elected representatives to the House of Representatives (DPR) in 2004, and 12\% of civil servants ranked at the higher echelons of the Indonesian bureaucracy (MOWE 2004).
and outcomes of governmental gender policies – in some ways strikingly similar to those of the New Order – while addressing the complexities of contemporary policy discourse, institutionalisation, and embodiment.

1.2 The Theoretical Framework

This research is interdisciplinary and expository. The aim is to gain insight into the processes and politics of change – a central question in development, which is ultimately and fundamentally about change – as illuminated through the intersections of gender discourses, institutions, and identities. For Professor Frances Adeney, years of researching gender in Indonesia convinced her of the importance of research projects that are descriptive, narrative, and contextual. In her view, ‘such research is crucial for scholars who are seeking to continue a global conversation about meaning and values in a postmodern and multicultural world’ (2003: 189). The dissertation follows these aims, seeking to explore and explain.

Different bodies of theory are useful to gain understanding at various stages in the dissertation. The goal is not expounding theory via research findings, but rather drawing on theory creatively and dynamically to explore ‘the way the world works’. In order to situate these ideas, two helpful schema offer visual representation of where they ‘map onto’ the research project: a Venn diagram and a matrix. Both schemas will first be laid out, to be followed by further exposition. The Venn diagram below shows linkages between three broad bodies of literature and theory framing the dissertation. As with many visual representations, it is imperfect. However, it highlights overlap between various analytical dimensions, as well as indicates where different theories become particularly persuasive and useful.
Another useful schema is the multi-dimensional matrix showing how different theorists’ ideas parallel thesis organisation, offering insight into various ‘levels’ of research. This research project studies gender policies’ discourses and institutionalisation, analysing the impact governmental strategies are having on gender relations and identities in Indonesia. The matrix illustrates the centrality of multi-dimensional analysis to this research.
## Dimensions of Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis Chapters</th>
<th>Michel Foucault</th>
<th>Pierre Bourdieu</th>
<th>James Scott</th>
<th>James Ferguson</th>
<th>John Scott</th>
<th>Steven Lukes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Three: Gender Discourses</strong></td>
<td>Discourse/epistemes (programmes of power: defining forms of knowledge and discourses about objects of knowledge)</td>
<td>Symbolic order (how durable cultural expressions of gender difference are naturalised and organise social life)</td>
<td>State ideology (high modernist); public transcripts</td>
<td>Development discourse (the ‘conceptual apparatus’)</td>
<td>Relational structures (those of social networks and specific relationships, in line with symbolic identities)</td>
<td>2nd dimension of power (agenda setting, constructing the field of knowledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Four: Gender Institutions</strong></td>
<td>Governmentality/technologies of power (apparatuses of power designed to implement knowledge)</td>
<td>Practice (unconscious ‘rules of the game’ which mediate between the more ‘objective’ field and the habitus; the social practice of gender differentiation)</td>
<td>Development projects (the ‘institutional apparatus’)</td>
<td>Institutional structures (organisation of day-to-day life, rules and practices regulating and channelling behaviour)</td>
<td>1st dimension (power over, concrete action)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Five: Gender Identities</strong></td>
<td>Biopower/the ethics of the self (the disciplining of the body to create subjects who regulate themselves; the techniques of the self that include autonomy and reflexivity)</td>
<td>Habitus (the inculcation of objective social structures into the subjective experience of agents, writ in and through bodies)</td>
<td>Embodied resistance, ‘playing a role’, ‘wearing a mask’ so as to resist explicit authority</td>
<td>Local power relations/‘cultural rules’</td>
<td>Embodied structures (found in the habits and skills inscribed in human bodies and minds)</td>
<td>3rd dimension (implicit, inculcated by the oppressed in order to secure compliance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 This tri-part typology has been put forward by others also studying gender. Joan Scott and Sandra Harding both propose dividing gender relations into three categories: ‘gender symbolism, gender organisation, and gender identity’ (McCall 1992: 837; cf. Scott 1986: 1067, Harding 1986: 18). These three levels correspond to the ways in which they are analysed here as discourses, institutions, and identities.

7 Lukes’ conception of power will be included in a treatment of power and empowerment in Appendix F.
Whereas the matrix is visually ‘flat’ and static, the aim is not to imply causality or impact in only one direction, but to explore the dialogical relationships of gender policies, institutions, and identities. Therefore, the relationships between ‘levels’ outlined in the matrix – such as between discourse and institutions, or institutions and identities – are not presumed to be separate or static. Rather, the argument is that these may be explored as spiral relationships. The spiral is an important visual metaphor. As shown below, it simply expresses a dynamic mutual-constitution between elements that allows for the possibility of change – even incrementally – as elements which are interlinked can ‘operate back’ upon themselves and either reinforce or alter slightly the original position.

Choosing discourse as a starting point, discourses (point D\(_1\) on the drawing) affect institutional formations (Is\(_1\)). These institutions then create and act according to rules which affect practices and lived identities (Id\(_1\)). However, these identities may then begin to reshape either practices themselves or the boundaries of discourse (D\(_2\) and Is\(_2\)), which creates new identities in turn (Id\(_2\)) and so on. Movement can be in different directions, with multiple and multi-way shifts. For example, Chapter Five will address how people see modernisation (discourse) shaping public space differently (institutions), and the reaction
this provokes – as changed external structures then shift perceptions, which impact the parameters of gender identities. Within the spiral there is room for manoeuvre – for reaction, resistance, appropriation. However, there are differing levels of ‘power’ and capacity to manoeuvre within this framework, even as there may also be forces limiting or blocking these changes, such as institutional inertia or embodied rigidity. Bourdieu, for example, discusses the ‘the extraordinary inertia which results from the inscription of social structures in bodies’ (2000: 172). This thesis considers these processes of change by considering the effects of explicit and implicit gender policy aims – both what changes and what does not.

The next sections will lay out the project’s theoretical framework by addressing these three core areas, as shown in both Venn diagram and matrix. First, Foucauldian concepts of discourse and power will be discussed. Next, implications for the development context – factoring in institutions – will be analysed by considering two development theorists, Ferguson and Scott. Finally, as the thesis focuses on gender, Bourdieu’s analysis of bodies will be introduced along with a useful typology of social structure.

1.2.1 Foucauldian Concepts of Discourse and Power

Michel Foucault’s ideas have influenced many disciplines at the theoretical level. It is no exaggeration to say that his work has revolutionised the way we conceive of power and knowledge – in short, how we view the way the world works. But Foucault’s ideas are

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8 Foucault’s ideas have been integral to various disciplines, including but not limited to: political science (Brass 2000), feminist theory (Phelan 1990), and post-colonial theory (e.g. studying colonial ‘truth’ in India in Alvares 1988: 91-95). His work has been used in everything from studies of the body (Arnold 1993), Western science and medicine (Drayton 1999), enumeration and the census (Cohn 1987), nursing science (Gastaldo and Holmes 1999), and colonial rule in Indonesia (Stoler 2002).
inherently slippery and difficult to define. Here we explore some of these ideas, highlighting how this thesis draws upon Foucault’s changing theorisation of power.9

Foucault has contributed to the understanding that how we conceptualise something within a broader discourse affects how we then act. For him, discourse exists in a realm above language: ‘discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to language (langue) and to speech’ (1972: 49, emphasis in the original). In plainer words, discourse refers to bodies of ideas and concepts which mediate power through affecting the way we act (Parfitt 2002: 4). The dominant discourse and discursive practices develop from underlying ‘rules’ or epistemes within a particular period and place. An ‘episteme’ describes the totality of laws and rules tying together all discursive practices, not just the sum of this knowledge, and refers to the historical period during which those rules operate. Discourse is thus linked to the production of knowledge, which is in turn inextricably tied to power. In producing knowledge, power produces truth, Foucault claims. He argues that power and knowledge are mutually-constituting and cannot be viewed as discrete categories: ‘there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ (1979: 27).

Foucault came to view power not simply as top down – the exercise of a state on its citizens or a dominant conceptual apparatus on individual minds – but as diffuse and ubiquitous throughout society. Earlier work by Foucault, as McNay argues, focused on the dialectic between society and the individual, but drew on a theory of power that was monolithic and top heavy, thus tending to obviate theories of agency and change (1994: 164-165). When

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9 A treatment of power that focuses on Steven Lukes’ three dimensions of power – including its relevance to empowerment initiatives in gender and development – is given in Appendix F.
Foucault began to explore governmentality, his conception of power became more ‘capillary’ – implying resistance and allowing for individuals to react to the normalising processes of the state. The ‘subject’ was no longer someone who was brought under the power of the state and simply acted upon – as in Foucault’s articulation of ‘biopower’ acting on a docile body (1980: 186) – but rather an agent capable of autonomous action. This implies greater subjectivity on the part of individuals and makes conceivable the possibility of resistance and change.

Thus Foucault’s later scholarship conceived a richer understanding of power which operates in multi-faceted and complex ways, granting greater agency and selfhood while articulating the way power and resistance comprise social relations. In essence, ‘where there is power, there is resistance’, yet this resistance is never exterior to power, and instead power relations form a ‘dense web’ permeating through society (Foucault 1976: 94-96). What Foucault terms the ‘microphysics of power’ (1991: 73) describes how this power meets resistance not only at the grassroots level but also at the broader discursive level of the meta-narrative (the superstructural ‘truth’). Further elaborating this concept of power, Foucault talks about strategies, technologies, and programmes. Programmes of power define forms of knowledge and discourses about objects of knowledge, technologies are apparatuses of power designed to implement that knowledge, and strategies develop in response to changing circumstances and are therefore improvisations (Foucault as described in Gledhill 2000: 150). This positive conception of power underlies all social relations ‘from the institutional to the intersubjective and is a fundamentally enabling force’ (McNay 1994: 3). Even as discourse is a historical product of power producing knowledge, ‘the manifold relations of power which constitute the social body cannot be established,
consolidated or implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse’ (Foucault in Gordon 1980: 93).

Yet for Foucault it is not a question of ‘locating’ ideology and discourse. For him, discourse and power relations are immanent, deep and latent, foundationally constraining possible thought and action. As Foucault claims, ‘the discursive and the material are linked together in the symbiotic relationship of the power-knowledge complex’ (McNay 1994: 108). The dispositif mentioned earlier is one of the ways Foucault attempts to bridge discursive and non-discursive elements. By understanding this balance between ‘discursive’ and ‘real’, we have a point of reference to examine how discourses and their related vocabularies do actually refer to separately existing things and actions in the world. There are real material and social structures which must be accounted for. Foucault himself in his later genealogical work began to focus on the material conditions of discourse formation: power relations and social practices (Peet 1999: 156). It is how these structures and discourses are mutually-constituting that is significant.

1.2.1a Foucault, Power, and Gender

Understanding power is also a key means to understanding gender. Joan Scott describes gender as the ‘constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and a primary way of signifying relationships of power’ (1988: 42). Kandiyoti summarises it most clearly: ‘gender is constitutive of power itself insofar as relations which may not always literally be about gender utilise the language of sexual difference to signify and legitimise power differentials’ (1998: 145). In other words, by speaking in terms of gender other forms of hierarchy can be sustained, such as husbands over wives, religious clerics over uneducated women, male civil authorities over village
families. Typically the power-balance has swung in favour of men, thus the construction of gender hierarchies has been shown to result in the subordination of women.

However, exercise of this power need not resemble a dominant or oppressive form. Instead, it can be something individuals seem to choose – people may conform without feeling their gender roles ‘forced’ upon them. Feminist theorists have drawn on Foucauldian ideas to demonstrate that the ultimate power of gender constructs lies in how individuals learn to conform to patterns of behaviour. Sandra Bartky, for example, explores how a woman becomes ‘a self-policing subject, a self committed to a relentless self-surveillance. This self-surveillance is a form of obedience to patriarchy’ (1990: 80). Susan Bordo also relies on this perspective, drawing on Foucault’s notion of the ‘inspecting gaze’ which becomes interiorised by individuals in such a way that there remains no need for material constraints (Foucault 1980: 155). Bordo explores these ideas by arguing that, while female submission can involve coercion, usually domination is experienced much more subtly as women themselves participate in the ‘normative feminine practices of our culture, practices which train the female body in docility and obedience to cultural demands while at the same time being experienced in terms of power and control’ (2003: 27, emphasis in the original).

An anecdote can be illustrative in this instance. One of the men who worked for the STIE-Perbanas campus in Surabaya (where I was managing a research project in 2005), upon discovering my research interests, laughingly described how he handled his wife. ‘Oh, I forbid her to work outside the home’, he said, because then she would become ‘lebih susah diperintah’ (harder to manage/command). I asked calmly if he knew that according to

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10 This corresponds to Bourdieu’s account of ‘masculine domination’ (2001), to be discussed in 1.2.3, and Lukes’ third dimension of power (2005: 25-29), addressed in Appendix F.
Article 9 of the 2004 domestic violence law (KDRT), forbidding the wife to work could be legally prosecuted as a form of domestic violence. He said he had not known this, but that it was not a problem because of how he persuaded his wife. He had told her that her body was not strong enough, that she would be too tired if she worked. Instead of forbidding her outright, he convinced her that she would prefer to stay home. When she decided to stay home, it was then ‘her’ choice, so in effect she experienced a measure of control. One of the female professors with me during the conversation turned and exclaimed that he was very clever to get his wife to do his will in such a gentle way. While this story may seem tangential, it is reflective of the ways power is often exercised in the household. It is a clear example of the Javanese concept of ‘printah alus’, meaning gentle or subtle command to get people to do things without coercion – almost as if they were willing it themselves.

1.2.2 Development Applications: Positive and Material Power, Construction of Arenas, and Depoliticisation

The application of Foucauldian concepts has caused reconsideration of how to study development practices while interrogating broader discourses and paradigms of development and speaking to questions of power (Arce 2000: 50). Foucault makes us question what might previously have been taken as given in modernist thinking. He raises issues of how local power and knowledge are imbricated within larger processes and how the truth that is produced by power generates particular patterns of action that lead to – or halt – ‘development’ as conceived. Thus a discourse of development ‘identifies appropriate and legitimate ways of practising development as well as speaking and thinking about it’ (Grillo 1997: 12). Scholars such as Arturo Escobar, James Ferguson, James Scott, Alberto Arce, Norman Long, Donald Moore, R.D. Grillo and R.L. Stirrat have all worked to
conceptualise and study development by drawing on these ideas of discourse and power/knowledge.11

Given the wealth of Foucauldian theory, it is necessary to focus on key analytical points that shed most light on the current research. To highlight these areas, we consider the explicatory potential of discourse and power/knowledge in the works of two contributors to development studies: James Scott and James Ferguson. Both are sympathetic to various aspects of Foucault’s analysis, and offer unique perspectives on how to approach power relations, social change, and development interventions. What will be shown through articulating their major arguments is a progression toward specificity and an emphasis on local politics as a site of both physical and semiotic struggle. Three focal aspects will be addressed: positive and material conceptions of power and discourse, the construction of arenas for intervention, and the impact of depoliticisation. These represent theoretical starting points and critical perspectives which will be elaborated throughout the thesis.

The first area to consider is how to have constructive, positive, and inclusively material conceptions of power and discourse. The strength of Scott’s analysis lies in his ability to analyse what happens both on the level of power-sustained discourse and within the politics of local resistance. Two of his books address this theme. He employs the more ‘positive’ conception of power, showing how it is not simply a monolithic imposition but includes the ability to act. Scott began to develop the ideas of ‘transcripts’ in an early work (1985), where the ‘public transcript’ describes the open interaction between powerful and oppressed, and the ‘hidden transcript’ refers to the critique of power that remains hidden from view of the powerful. Power being exercised ‘nearly always drives a portion of the

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11 Foucault refers to power and knowledge in this way, sign-posting their irreducibility to one without the other.
full transcript underground’ (Scott 1985: 286). Therefore because of discrepancy between public and hidden transcripts, the powerful elite’s transcript tends to strengthen the hierarchical order (Scott 1990: 45). Taking Scott’s public transcript as analogous to Foucault’s ‘dominant discourse’, it is possible to argue that Scott recognises there is no such thing as a completely hegemonic discourse. The power/knowledge that seems to reign ascendant is actually much more diffuse. Scott draws from literature and the historical experiences of slaves, serfs, and peasants in other cultures to reveal how there are cloaked verbal weapons operating in the contested ‘semantic space’ between elite and oppressed. The presumed ‘powerless’ have some power after all, their resistance shown, in part, through forms of ‘embodied’ vocalising (e.g. foot-dragging, slow moving, ‘forgetfulness’, carelessness, feigned ignorance, arson, etc). Bodies themselves become the site of appropriation, contestation, and resistance. Understanding the hidden transcripts requires attention to these bodies.

Yet these positive conceptions of power, as exercised in various ways through different levels of society and often taking discursive shape, are also explored by Scott in terms of their material base. In Scott’s more recent work, Seeing Like a State (1998), even as he continues to use concepts of discourse and power/knowledge he deals more fully with their materiality, including the relationship between existing natural and social structures, strategies for implementation, thwarted intentions, and political resistance. Here Scott addresses the process and impact of state planning, or what he calls the ‘state-engineered social engineering’ by a high-modernist state (1998: 4). Scott displays subtlety and complexity in his explication of the role of discourse toward enacting change. He argues that it is only through ‘the authoritarian state’ and where there is ‘an incapacitated civil society’ that high-modernist discourse can truly transform society (Scott 1998: 5). Scott
looks at social planning’s imposition on cities, farms, and villages and notes that its success does not stem solely from the power/knowledge of a particular discourse, but rather from ‘administrative technology and social knowledge that make it plausible to imagine organising an entire society in ways that only the barracks or the monastery had been organised before’ \(\text{ibid: 378n11}\). In this sense, Scott sees Foucault’s ideas as particularly persuasive \(\text{ibid}\).

A second critical point for analysis takes a step back from looking at how power operates within a particular governmental intervention (whether discursively or with more definite material shape), and attempts to elucidate how intervention has been dictated by the way the problem has been constructed. In other words, how the arena for intervention has been mapped out serves to explain why certain actions are then legitimated and have impact. James Ferguson does precisely this in \textit{The Anti-Politics Machine} (1994). Here Ferguson offers another interpretation of development interacting with a particular society. In attempting to engage the dualism of discourse’s material and symbolic power, he does not reference ‘development discourse’ but rather deconstructs what he terms the ‘development apparatus’ (Ferguson 1994: xv). His investigation centres on ‘how specific ideas about “development” are generated in practice, and how they are put to use’ as well as ‘what effects they end up producing’ \(\text{ibid: xvi}\). He focuses not on what ideas mean or whether they are true, but on what ideas actually do.

To this end, Ferguson examines the World Bank’s interventions in Lesotho between 1975 and 1984, showing how the emphases, interpretations, and even fabrications of World Bank documents combined to paint a particular portrait of Lesotho which was ultimately distorted. Ferguson argues that what appear as mere ‘distortions’ in the World Bank’s
portrait of Lesotho are actually necessary steps toward the theoretical task of ‘constituting’ Lesotho as a Less Developed Country (LDC). If this can be achieved, then it justifies and calls for a definite kind of intervention: ‘the technical, apolitical, “development” intervention’ (Ferguson 1994: 28). The discursive project of constructing Lesotho in a particular way thus directed the World Bank’s technical-rational mode of intervention in the name of ‘development’. This is another key aspect of Foucauldian query: revealing how discourse constructs its subjects (in this case, citizens of Lesotho) to be objects of power (able to be administrated by World Bank projects), and therefore defines arenas for programmatic intervention.

The third useful application of Foucauldian ideas is that of depoliticisation. Most broadly, Ferguson’s analysis is applicable to other development interventions with regard to its concepts of ‘devthink’, depoliticisation, and unintended outcomes. Ferguson argues the Lesotho case is a microcosm of larger development practice which is highly standardised the world over (1994: 258-259). Development discourse, he says, ‘seems to form a world unto itself […] hence it is not only the matter of “devspeak” at stake, but of “devthink”’ (Ferguson 1994: 259-260). ‘Depoliticisation’, in the sense applied to the ‘development’ apparatus of international institutions, means ‘the suspension of politics from even the most sensitive political operations’ – in other words, the development project itself ends up being the anti-politics machine (ibid: 256). However, Ferguson draws on Foucault’s concept of power as being something rather bigger than intended by the elites who wield it. The unintended effects of these ‘failed’ development projects (and the vast majority do fail, he asserts) end up having political uses, and serving particular interests.
Depoliticisation can thus have the effect of masking more strategic, hidden interests beneath a seemingly neutral agenda. In the end, the whole mechanism is ‘a “mushy mixture” of the discursive and the non-discursive, of the intentional plans and the unacknowledged social world with which they are engaged’ (Ferguson 1994: 276). Ferguson argues that we need to ‘demote intentionality’ and recognise that what actually happens is usually very different from what planners conceive as it deals with ‘unacknowledged structures and unpredictable outcomes’ (ibid: 276). Furthermore, what ‘actually happens’ has its own logic in relationship to society and history (ibid).

Methodologically, Ferguson employs Foucauldian concepts in a dialectical relationship between the macro and the micro. In his analysis of clash between the World Bank’s Thaba-Tseki project in Lesotho and the cultural phenomenon he terms the ‘Bovine Mystique’, he shows how power is indeed capillary and diffuse, discourse is contested, and micro-politics infuse the process of ‘development’.

These three focal points serve as ‘analytical hooks’ to approach gender policies in Indonesia, providing insight into processes and outcomes. First, the positive construction of power and its material base exemplifies the Indonesian development experience under Suharto’s modernist New Order state. This will be explored in Chapters Two and Three, along with the implications this has for gender policies today. It will be shown in Chapters Three and Four that the ways in which various arenas for intervention are constructed through discourse have considerable impact on institutional structures, programmatic objectives, and ultimately outcomes for women and gender norms.12 Finally, some of the complexities and power dynamics of the ‘hidden transcript’, including the way people embody resistance, will be explored in Chapter Five. Overall, it will be argued that gender

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12 For instance, we will consider how the selection of arenas for intervention for women will often circulate and function to reinscribe traditional gender roles. This is particularly significant for children’s programmes are tied to women’s initiatives, highlighting women’s position as mothers within a set of social relations.
interventions are naturalised and depoliticised through various strategies, often resulting in reinforcing, rather than challenging, gender hierarchies. This will be the principle exploration of this thesis.

1.2.3 Gender and Bodies: Bourdieu’s Habitus and Foucault’s Self-Reflexive Construction

A final question must be how to navigate between these dimensions – Foucauldian discourse/power and the development context – to understand how they impact each other. This is particularly important because the theoretical framework is not only being applied to a development context, but also aims to analyse ‘masculine domination’ and gender relations (Bourdieu 2001: 83). It is thus necessary to explore the ways discourse and practice intersect for individuals, specifically examining their gender identities. Discourse is powerful insofar as it is tangled up with both ‘representational and extra-discursive elements’ (Pearce and Woodiwiss 2001: 61) – in effect, where it has material and visible effect in some way. Gender discourses are therefore even more potent, as they are writ upon and exemplified by social and physical bodies. Chapter Two will examine in greater depth theories of gender. However, here we focus on the way in which Bourdieu and Foucault offer insight into this dissertation’s approach to gender identities.

The relative roles of social structures and individual action have long been debated in anthropology and sociology, polarising ‘structure’ against ‘agency’. Structuralism attempts to articulate how individual behaviour is directed by constraining structures13; however, this offers little room for individuals to manoeuvre strategically; they become ‘acted upon’

13 Structuralists see certain structures as particularly constraining: for Malinowski it was biological and derived needs (Kuper 1996: 28); for Radcliffe-Brown and the structural-functionalists, social laws (Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 191); for Levi-Strauss and those following structuralist objectivism, the unconscious structures residing in the mind (Levi-Strauss 1966).
rather than actors, objects instead of subjects. Reversing this has also proven problematic.

Actor-oriented paradigms, from Barth’s transactionalism to rational choice models, prove overly voluntaristic, failing to see that even actors typically portrayed as independent have their choices ‘shaped by larger frames of meaning’ (Long and van der Ploeg 1994: 65; cf. Barth 1966, Asad 1972). Bourdieu has attempted to transcend this debate by portraying social structures as setting limits without foreclosing outcomes. For Bourdieu, social agents are ‘imbued with dispositions to think and behave in certain ways by the action of historical social forces’ (Gledhill 2000: 139). He shows how an individual’s behaviour is constrained or directed, but not determined by, social structures. Bourdieu employs the metaphor of a musician, who, while performing a piece, may improvise in an unpredictable manner while still conforming to the overall structure laid out by the composer (ibid). The nexus of these linkages between structure and agency is what Bourdieu refers to as habitus: ‘a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed towards acting as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu 1977: 72). The habitus is therefore how the body adopts practices and patterns of behaviour that follow external social ‘structures’.

This point is especially pertinent to examining gender, for it is precisely how bodies and social relations are discursively entangled that requires attention. Dualism between gender discourses and structures cannot be dissolved. As Bourdieu has articulated, these dualisms, ‘deeply rooted in things (structures) and in bodies, do not spring from a simple effect of verbal naming and cannot be abolished by an act of performative magic’ (2001: 103). This is because the genders, ‘far from being simple “roles” that can be played at will […] are inscribed in bodies and in a universe from which they derive their strength’ (ibid). Habitus acts as a ‘structuring structure’ for men and women, achieving specific gender identities.
that are spoken and embodied. Bodies therefore become a critical way of understanding gender relations.

Bourdieu’s ideas will be useful in Chapter Five when analysing ‘lived’ gender identities. He offers insight into how bodies are integral to the process of self-differentiation and place in the world – how, in effect, the external order is writ internally and lived physically. Furthermore, his theories are particularly persuasive for this research project, because of the way he queries power by analysing structures and systems of dominance which operate down to level of bodies. Bourdieu examines the sensitive synergy between structures of power (institutions, rules, the state) and the individual construction of identity. Incorporating his ideas allows us to have a multi-dimensional analysis and establishes what has been argued here – the spiral, reinforcing (and occasionally altering) relationship between discourse, institutions, and identities. Bourdieu strikes a balance between understanding the significance of the symbolic order, language, and power (1991), practice and institutional structures (1977), and finally habitus and bodies, particularly as they function together to establish ‘masculine domination’ (2001).

However, if taken to the limit, the ‘rigidity’ of bodies may imply unconscious inculcation by people, depriving them of greater agency. There may exist at any given moment fundamental contradictions between what people say and what they do, within their own self-perceptions. For instance, how is it that a woman might say she is empowered but lack decisional capacity in a way that seems to indicate she is in fact constrained? People can, and do, ‘re-work’ habitus, experiencing their positional power in multiple and contradictory ways. It is important to consider how this may take place, in order to explain the possibility
of conscious reflection upon embodied structures and the possibility of appropriation and transformation.14

Foucault offers perspectives in this regard in later writings on the ‘ethics of the self’, which incorporate more expansive understandings of power, allowing greater autonomy and agency on the part of individuals. This ethics of the self is ‘both constructed and self-determining’ (McNay 1994: 167), akin to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Conceived of a richer understanding of power, it grants greater subjectivity to individuals and makes more plausible the ideas of resistance and change. Therefore while there may be incongruence between people’s ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds, the way people make meaning out of what is around them implies that they will not experience cognitive dissonance at the dichotomies, but rather may operate through them in dynamic ways. This understanding of the subject, and identities, is maintained throughout the thesis. Furthermore, Foucault’s notions of episteme and discourse imply there can be opposing themes and theories co-existing, but only one dominant public discourse.15 When we understand discourse as deep and latent ideology (an institutionalised way of thinking), but acknowledge that there may be specific instances of oppositional or contradictory discourses subverted within, it becomes possible to recognise the construction of self and the subject through discourse. For example, when examining gender identities in Chapter Five, it is important to keep in mind that individuals

14 Sociologist Margaret Archer is one theorist who has reflected upon the way people themselves respond to the tensions between ‘structure and agency’. She writes on the need to understand and conceptualise the interplay between structure and agency as linked through what she calls ‘the internal conversation’ (2003). This ‘reflexive deliberation of social agents’ represents the mediatory mechanism by which individuals ‘attempt subjectively, because reflexively, to establish their own personal modus vivendi in objective social circumstances which were not of their making or choosing’ (Archer 2003: 15-16). In other words, reflexivity is a key link between structure and agency because it allows individuals to process and respond to the world around them; it has causal efficacy. Archer’s ‘internal conversation’ as a key to reflexivity offers us a way of linking the external and the internal. This is useful in the case of uncovering and understanding gender identities, where we must account for both objective constraints and enablements and subjective experiences and perceptions.

15 This resembles James Scott’s (1990) differentiation between a singular public script and more prolific and diffuse private scripts.
construct identities by borrowing heavily on the explicit discourse (public transcript) afforded to gender, while at the same time developing a subjectivity that appropriates and reshapes this discourse in unique ways.

In sum, approaching the subject of gender must incorporate an understanding of the centrality of bodies (Bourdieu) and construction of the self through discursive and reflexive iteration (Foucault). This allows us to analyse a society in flux, where gender norms are embedded in the social fabric and yet there is still space for reaction and transformation. It is illuminating with regard to a study of gender policy, which may ‘act’ upon men and women, but always has potential for multiple, complex, embodied and contested resistance.

1.2.4 Institutional, Relational, and Embodied Social Structures

Thus far we have considered three conceptual ‘groupings’: discourse and power, development interventions, and gender identities. Of final significance is sociologist John Scott’s tri-part typology of social structures. This is a useful heuristic for the current research, offering a way of mapping linkages between gender discourses and social structures. John Scott claims that the notion of ‘social structure’ as simply ‘social relations’ is too vague and one-dimensional, necessitating that we draw upon earlier sociological theory to gain more complex understandings (J Scott 2001: 75). In Scott’s formulation:

Social structures are complex articulations of the institutional and relational elements of social life into a distinct and comprehensible pattern that constrains individual and group actions. These constraints do not operate in the same way as physical forces. The knowledgeability of agents is central to the ways in which the causal powers of social structures are exercised (2001: 84).

16 As noted, gender theory will be expounded in more depth in the next chapter.
This brings us back to conceptions of power and discourse, as ‘the causal powers of social structures’ rely upon internalisation and naturalisation of these structures within individuals in order to frame their action, and in so doing, replicate a particular social order.

To deal with these complex interactions, Scott introduces a way to classify social structures as three broad typologies: relational structure, institutional structure, and embodied structure. Both institutional and relational social structures form a ‘multidimensional social space within which agents can be located and their actions explained’ (J Scott 2001: 83). Relational structures are those of social networks and specific relationships, such as that of ‘mother’ to ‘child’ (as categories of behaviour, not individual instances). Institutional structures refer to how day-to-day life is organised both on micro- and macro-scales; these are society’s frameworks or skeletons, the rules and practices regulating and directing behaviour. Institutional structures are how ‘practices become culturally standardised and […] actions are guided, regulated and channelled’ (J Scott 2001: 82).

Scott’s third category, that of ‘embodied social structures’, addresses the centrality of physical bodies, critical to analysing gender politics in Indonesia. These embodied structures ‘are found in the habits and skills inscribed in human bodies and minds’, allowing them ‘to produce, reproduce and transform their institutional and relationship structures’ (J Scott 2001: 84). Individuals conform to social expectations in ways that do not come only from their conscious knowledge of norms, acquiring habits of action: postures, gestures, ways of standing, walking, thinking and speaking. In short, embodied structures are the ways people internalise their social conditions, responding on the basis of knowledge available to them in a way that tends to generate ‘regulated social actions’ (Lopez and Scott 2000: 90, 101).
How gender discourses impact relational structures will be considered in Chapter Three, addressing the role-structures of ‘wife’ and ‘mother’. Chapter Four will consider more directly institutional structures and practices and their relationship to gender. Finally, embodied structures will be examined in Chapter Five, where we explore how gender discourses enter the home and the body in today’s Indonesia.

1.2.5 Summarising Frameworks

To comprehend development and change, especially as it relates to gender, it is important to establish the links between theory and practice. For example, how we understand ‘power’ conceptually and normatively affects how we might act, whether explicitly or implicitly. Yet insufficient attention has been paid to the way in which theory becomes practice, to the confluence of the ideas and institutions that ‘produce power’. Jane Parpart argues for the need to incorporate these broader linkages within our research, to pay attention to ‘material and institutional forces, cultural and discursive factors, as well as the strategies people use as they seek to survive and even flourish in a rapidly changing world’ (2002: 13). Thinking about the larger project of development thus requires an analytical approach addressing all these various dimensions.

The dissertation’s theoretical framework offers a multi-dimensional approach that factors in power, practice, and ultimately bodies. Specifically, Foucault and Bourdieu offer insight into power through its various workings and structures, whether at the level of discourse, its concrete channelling through institutions (governmentality, practice), or the lived reality of individual physical bodies. They point to the significance of examination resting ultimately with the person herself, seeking to understand how the dominated are complicit in their
subjugation. This perspective of power helps explain gender because of the complex and personal way that it is ‘lived’. Chapters Three through Five draw on these concepts to describe the spiral relationship between gender discourses, institutions, and identities.

A final point to recall is how Foucault (with biopower) and Bourdieu (with habitus) both look at the reproduction of domination through the disciplining of the body. Given gender hierarchies that subvert women’s position and the lived experience of a sexed body, this approach is necessary if we are to examine the politics of gender. Furthermore, it points to the need for a ‘politics of the body’ in order to explore gender policies: power is a part of gender, development, state action, and policy both essentially (insofar as it comprises their form) and instrumentally (insofar as is comprises their functioning). A study of gender and power brings us back to an account of bodies, at its basest level.

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Methodological Approaches and Field Research

If a foundational premise is the spiral and power-laden relationships between discourse, institutions, and identities, how do we study this? How do we differentiate between what people say and what they do, with regard to gender norms? It has been shown to be difficult to devise a methodology examining whether discourse and structure are truly mutually-constituting, as finding a ‘starting point’ is impossible. Instead, dialogical, reflexive analysis must constantly be ‘in motion’, using an ever-changing referential point to gain an ever-evolving understanding. It is because of the unceasing dynamic of change

17 Lukes (2005) is of particular relevance on this question; see Appendix F.
18 Foucault’s conception of biopower and biopolitics is not addressed in depth in this thesis, which relies instead on Bourdieu’s more explicit linking of bodies with gendered hierarchies (‘masculine domination’). However, Foucault’s biopolitics could provide a useful framework for additional exploration.
in social processes that such a ‘methodology-on-the-move’ becomes useful. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues for an understanding of people and institutions in ‘a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structures in such a way as to bring both into view simultaneously’ (1979: 239-240). This makes it necessary for research to move between macro, micro, and self.

This translates to a methodology that is increasingly ‘multi-vocal’ and also ‘multi-sited’, as it moves through the social ‘layers’ stretching from broader discourses down to intimate village-level ethnographies (Grillo 1997: 26-27). Therefore the dissertation tracks governmental gender discourses from their point of origin at the ‘centre’ in Jakarta through more intimate local-level enquiries. The approach here includes the researcher herself as a reference point (explained further in the next section). Accounting for these layers of the gender apparatus provides insight into the disjunction between discourse and practice. The conceptual framework attempts to balance Foucauldian notions with the ‘layeredness’ of social reality and its materiality. It is important to explain how this was approached. Rather than setting out to prove a hypothesis, or to test a focused social science query, I set out to understand a process through this ‘multi-level, multi-vocal’ framework. As such, the research uses inductive methodology, aiming to convey honestly the perspectives of those interviewed. This inductive approach, drawing on various research methods at each different ‘level’, will be discussed in full in Appendix A.

Two organisations receive focus – the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (MOWE) in Chapters Three to Five and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Chapter Six – though other governmental and non-governmental bodies will be included where relevant. These organisations were selected as they purport to work for women’s empowerment and
impact directly Indonesian women’s lives, MOWE as a state organisation with a broader agenda and UNFPA as an international organisation focused on reproductive health. MOWE has been selected for primary study, being the main Indonesian state agency handling gender issues. As Indonesia scholar Sue Blackburn notes, close study of this organisation has not yet been done, but such a study would ‘add greatly to our understanding of the salience of gender issues within the state apparatus’ (2004: 226). This agency also provides ‘a good example of the institutionalisation of international norms’ (Blackburn 2004: 27), allowing us to examine the nexus between discourses on international and national levels within a specific Indonesian governmental context.

Map showing the cities in which research was conducted. (Not available online for copyright reasons).

Fieldwork for this project took place during a number of visits to Indonesia between 2002 and 2006. The summer of 2002 was spent researching the UNFPA case study to be
presented in Chapter Six. In 2004, I completed an initial survey trip to Indonesia, during which I conducted preliminary interviews with government officials, analysts and aid agency staff in Jakarta. During fieldwork in summer 2005, I did primary research in Jakarta and managed projects in three other cities across Java – Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya – as well as doing a brief comparative study in Bandar Lampung (Sumatra).

The aim was to take a multi-tiered approach to the study of governmental infrastructure related to its gender policies and programmes, starting from MOWE headquarters in Jakarta, then analysing the provincial and district level branches, and finally gathering qualitative interviews of men and women in the provinces. From fieldwork in 2004-2006, I gathered 229 interviews (166 of men and women in Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya, and another 63 from government officials and gender activists), as well as the beginnings of ethnographic portraits of the places and institutions I studied. Research from 2002 produced qualitative data from 40 village respondents along with 20 interviews of government officials at national and district levels, analysed comprehensively in Chapter Six’s case study. This corpus of primary research forms the basis of the dissertation.

1.3.2 Researcher Positionality and Reflexivity

While the research methods appendix will explore aspects of reflexivity more carefully, it is important to recognise my position within the research project – my unique insider-outsider status and how this impacted my ability to ‘dwell among’ those I studied. I am a white, Christian, Western-educated woman doing fieldwork among a Muslim Indonesian population. However, I spent my childhood in Bandung, Java, and am conversant in

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19 This case study material was submitted in 2003 in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MPhil in Development Studies. It has been re-worked for the purposes of this dissertation.
Sundanese cultural norms and fluent in the Indonesian language (with the important distinction of having a good Indonesian – even Sundanese – accent, something Indonesians always find surprising). As historian Richard Cobb (1969) has termed it, we develop a ‘second identity’ as we study within a particular population. This blending of two identities was significant in gaining me entry not only into physical spaces (e.g. homes, government offices, meetings) but also into cultural and discursive spaces (e.g. paradigms, worldviews, metaphors, ‘street slang’).

Scott Lash argues that communal knowledge ‘is instead hermeneutic knowledge and the latter is only possible when the knower is in the same world as and “ dwells among” the things and other human beings whose truth she seeks’ (1994: 157). Yet this ‘dwelling among’ demands more than mere physical presence. More reflexive anthropology requires breaking with overt objectivism, and focusing instead ‘on a partial fusion of horizons with the world of one’s “respondents”’ (Lash 1994: 156).\(^\text{20}\) In the context of this research project, how to achieve this ‘fusion of horizons’ was particularly interesting. How my insider-outsider status affected research will be discussed in various parts of this thesis and further in Appendix A, as it had a direct bearing on the ways people responded to me.

My position in research was also significant because it allowed me to examine Indonesian gender policies not only from the outside-in, but from the inside-out. During the course of my research, I became an observing-participant, rather than simply a participant-observer. This meant that I was actively engaged not only in understanding gender policies, but also in creating them. For instance, when in Chapter Three I discuss the mobilising and narrowing potential of the development discourse on the approach to women’s

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\(^{20}\) In Arce and Long’s words, good ethnography ‘implies detailed and systematic treatment of how the life-worlds of the researcher and other social actors intersect in the production of specific ethnographies and types of interpretation’ (2000: 8).
programmes, I will address how I too became caught up in this discourse when writing reports for the Ministry of Development of Disadvantaged Regions. In the UNFPA case study, I can explore my complicity in discourse construction and what this implies.

1.3.3 Limitations

Finally, it is important to establish clearly this project’s limitations. These can be addressed on five fronts: theoretical, gender-related, disciplinary, geographical, and organisational.

Discourse Any reading of Foucault which privileges exclusively the realm of the discursive, while not engaging in ‘on-the-ground’ material realities, falls into various analytical traps. Two particular traps that must be avoided are those of discursive determinism and the assumption of a monolithic discourse. First, the trap of discursive determinism assigns discourse the power to shape social realities, while ignoring the exigent realities of brute power residing in both the material world and institutions. For example, the editor of The Post-Development Reader concludes that ‘the development discourse was bound, from the beginning, to cause the tragedies it did in fact bring out’ (Rahnema 1997: 378). Though his arguments are more nuanced than this as a whole, nonetheless he seems to ascribe to discourse an exclusive power to enact change.21 Second, the trap of a monolithic discourse may presume not only that discourse has the power to shape events, but also that this power is centralised both in the hands of the powerful elite and as a unified, uncontested body of knowledge. Various examples of this trap can be found in the analysis of development discourse. The view that development is constructed from ‘a single gaze or voice which is all-powerful and beyond influence’ (Grillo 1997: 20)

21 In critiquing this discursive determinism, Moore introduces the metaphor of ‘the crucible of cultural politics’ (2000: 656). For him, struggles are both material and symbolic: ‘There is no gap between materiality and semiosis; the meaning making processes and the materiality of the world are dynamic, historical, contingent, specific’ (Haraway in Moore 2000: 674).
is central to works such as the *Development Dictionary* (Sachs 1992)\(^{22}\) or Escobar’s *Encountering Development* (1995).\(^{23}\) It is also put forward in the claims of others who talk about ‘the one and only way of thinking’ (Ramonet 1997: 179-181).\(^{24}\)

Avoiding these traps demands that we go further than simply analysing larger-level discourses, whether of gender or development or any other category of social enquiry. Instead focus must be on what Moore describes as ‘the micro-politics through which global development discourses are refracted, reworked, and sometimes subverted in particular localities’ (2000: 655). A sensitive reading of Foucault allows for study of how discourses are ‘refracted’ through local societies. Foucault himself does not promulgate a monolithic top-down concept of power or discourse: in his view power permeates society in a capillary fashion. Nor does he assume that a discourse brings about the ends it seeks without resistance and change. We cannot deny the power of words and what they represent. But it seems doubtful, for instance, that gender discourse alone actually changes fertility rates or ends violence against women. Thus we have to consider how to apply concepts of discourse and power in more nuanced fashion, which this dissertation does by incorporating analysis of social structures and material effects, as well as physical bodies.

It must be noted that the approach in this thesis relies heavily on discourse, prioritising what people say. This runs the risk of not accounting for the contradictions between speech

\(^{22}\) For example, the definition of ‘development’ offered in this book argues that the concept of ‘underdevelopment’ began with U.S. President Truman’s speech in 1949, which ‘gave global hegemony to a purely Western genealogy of history, robbing peoples of different cultures of the opportunity to define the forms of their social life’ (Esteva 1992: 9).

\(^{23}\) Though it is unfair to dismiss the many strengths and insights offered by Escobar by simply saying he slips into this second ‘trap’ throughout his analysis, nonetheless he tends to describe development discourse in terms of its monolithic imposition by the World Bank. For him ‘the single most influential force shaping the development field’ is ‘the discourse of development economics’, wielded by the World Bank, which maintains its ‘intellectual and financial hegemony’ over the discourse (Escobar 1995: 18, 165).

\(^{24}\) Casting the development discourse in such ‘monolithic’ terms may be a necessary first step to unearthing and exposing some of the forces of power/knowledge working to define and shape social processes. However, the claim is that we must move beyond this as a possible first stage of analysis.
and behaviour and thus offering a lopsided view of ‘reality’. There are two ways I have attempted to avoid the trap of ‘discursive determinism’. First, while stressing the importance of people’s representations in relation to their performances, there will also be reference to external circumstances through both personal observation and secondary sources. Second, the impact of discourses on programmes and institutions will be studied to demonstrate that it is in fact necessary to lay stress on these representations. In other words, particular institutional discourses construct a ‘discursive space’ within which project interventions are explicitly delineated and gender roles are implicitly prescribed. So it is critical to examine these discourses as a starting point, including changes and contradictions in representation therein.

**Gender** Another important question is whether we can actually ‘tell the story of gender in Indonesia’, as this dissertation sets out to do. Will there be such variability across the regions as to make this an ultimately fragmented tale? This question will be examined in Chapter Two (Section 2.2.1a), looking at studies of women in Indonesia. Here we address briefly the tension between similarities of gender universally and more local versions of gender norms. That is, there are aspects to the constructions of ‘woman’ and ‘man’, ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’, which are found cross-culturally and throughout history (Ortner and Whitehead 1981; Strathern 1980; Ortner 1974). Furthermore, what is described as the ‘universal subordination of women’ implies that across different countries women have been afforded lesser social standing than men and unequal access to the public domain and control over resources therein. Yet we also recognise that there is both historical locality and bodily specificity to the ways in which gender roles and gender relations play out in a given place and time (Bourdieu 2001: 104).
In Indonesia, a country with great cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity, constructions of gender are not monolithic, and are not claimed to be so in this dissertation. Prominent author and feminist Julia Suryakusuma claims that the key to understanding gender construction is actually ‘fragmentation’, as gender constructions in contemporary Indonesia are ‘competing offshoots of multiple value systems, including religious, *adat* (tradition), ethnic, liberal capitalist – even lingering remnants of New Order gender ideology. Values regarding women are very ambivalent, even schizophrenic’ (2006). Thus to begin to address gender in Indonesia, we must account for deeper underlying gender norms and discourses, even as we confess the existence of local difference and need for specificity. This was something that will be demonstrated by considering (albeit briefly) the regional MOWE institutions in Chapter Four, among other things.

**Discipline** Much of the dissertation’s approach to Indonesian gender policies draws on sociological and anthropological perspectives. A different approach might instead examine the economy, as there is substantial work studying how economic structures and the market impact gender relations (for example, see Engels 1884; Young, Wolkowitz and McCullagh 1981; Bardhan 1993).25 This aims to ‘flag up’ further areas of study that would be useful to understanding gender relations.

However, while recognising the relevance of this approach and agreeing that economic structures can impact gender relations, this research project limits itself to the equally important work of addressing the discursive paradigms and implications of gender policies for gender relations and identities. Thus, for example, the dissertation limits itself to examining not the concrete changes to economic participation rates, but how perceptions of

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25 Section 2.2.1a will reference Indonesian case studies that address women and the economy (Hull 1996; Wolf 1992, 1993).
those changes affect gender discourses and ultimately embodied behaviour. It will be shown throughout that there have been reactions to changes in these explicit ‘public spheres’ (such as the economy) which have provoked a heightening of gender discourses. Furthermore, the emphasis on social structures follows the claims of sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu who have argued that patterns of ‘masculine domination’ have remained surprisingly detached from economic conditions. He notes ‘the extraordinary autonomy of sexual structures relative to economic structures, [and] of modes of reproduction relative to modes of production’ (Bourdieu 2001: 81) which account for the similar forms of oppression women experience in multiple economic structures. This resonates with earlier debates around patriarchy (Walby 1990). Bourdieu thus argues that it is not underlying economic forces that construct gender hierarchies, so that instead research must examine social structures.

**Geography** The title of this dissertation points to an examination of ‘contemporary Indonesia’. However, Indonesia is diverse, and the material presented here cannot speak to all the gender discourses or cultural nuances across different ethnic groups, particularly those on islands outside of Java. As mentioned earlier, therefore, fieldwork focuses on the modern Indonesian state, centred in Jakarta, and the island of Java. For example, the case studies in Chapter Four are restricted mainly to Java, with only one comparative case study of a Sumatran province (that has many ties to Java due to transmigration). The interview sample forming the basis of Chapter Five comes from three cities in Java, with most respondents either Javanese or Sundanese. Many metaphors and cultural references come from Sundanese and Javanese ethnic groups. However, it is significant to note that these two ethnic groups dominate, with the Javanese comprising nearly 41% of the Indonesian population and the Sundanese 15%.26 Additionally, Java itself is the most populous of the

Indonesian islands, housing some 124 million people (60% of total population) – and the most powerful island by virtually any measure, whether political, economic, or military. To speak of Java cannot speak to all of Indonesia – but it can say a great deal.

This Java-focus was due not only to constraints on the project’s scope (practical considerations of time, money, and access), but also to central research questions. This dissertation aims to examine the central government apparatus as it transmits its policies at the interstices of ‘modernisation’ during Indonesia’s transition, which are then received by men and women experiencing these transitions most visibly. Therefore, addressing the larger cities of Java – tied most closely to the capital through geography and substantial urban development – offers a unique portrait of what is happening to gender at the intersection of political and social change. Conducting more case studies at the ‘fringes’ of Indonesia would likely have diversified the data and complexified the portrait. However, analysis here does not offer an ‘end result’ so much as examine a process. In this sense, even including more remote areas could have drawn upon a multi-dimensional framework that examined the spiral dynamic between discourse, institutions, and identities.

**Organisation** A final and very important point relates to the organisation of the three substantive chapters into discourse, institutions, and identities. Each chapter will focus on one dimension. However, the research premise and project aim to show how these three ‘categories’ are interrelated and mutually-constituting – in other words, how policies and paradigms are embedded in institutions, which in turn display their own logic; how gender identities are impacted by interventions that are necessarily distinct in various locales based on how policies are translated into regional institutions, and so on. For this reason, the case study in Chapter Six will examine how these various elements interact within a particular
project. It is not assumed that these ‘layers’ are entirely separate, or that a theme occurring in one does not occur in the other. Social relations and theorisations thereof are more complex than can be neatly contained in any one framework. Yet given the limits of fundamentally linear written work, as well as for the sake of organisation and analytical clarity, these sections will be imposed and maintained.27

1.4 The Unfolding of a Narrative: Gender Discourses, Institutions, and Identities

We finally consider how this dissertation will unfold – what story it is going to tell of gender in Indonesia. The theoretical framework and an outline of methodology and field research have been given. The next chapter offers historical background, looking at gender and development, and then more directly the Indonesian context.

This will be followed by three substantive chapters: gender discourses (Chapter Three), gender institutions (Chapter Four), and gender identities (Chapter Five). Chapter Three will draw upon political anthropology and discourse theory to scrutinise the major conceptual shifts regarding gender both internationally and nationally. We address the paradigmatic conflict of ‘gender’ as a translated ‘Western’ concept in the Indonesian environment, and then examine in more depth repeated ‘keywords’ in the policies. Finally the chapter focuses on two prevailing themes tying into Indonesian gender discourses – those of development and religion – analysing how these both discursively construct symbolic identities for women, as well as mobilise them toward ordered social tasks, ultimately identifying them in their role as mothers.

27 An interesting, and non-linear, way to approach this dynamic, spiral relationship might draw on ‘internet-style’ linking, mapping the dissertation’s various elements but allowing the reader to jump between various levels. For example, looking at a particular policy discourse in Chapter Three would offer an immediate bridge to local, ‘lived’ perceptions of similar ideas in Chapter Five. Given the limits of more conventional thesis presentation, this remains a project for further development.
Chapter Four will then analyse how these discourses are being mapped onto concrete institutions. This highlights the dynamic and spiral relationship of gender discourses and social structures, recalling Foucault’s *dispositif* to analyse how discourses and practices combine in policy, coming to form mechanisms of control and social construction. We consider how discourses acquire greater power when concretised through institutions. Three areas will be explored here. First, we examine the primary institution being studied – the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (MOWE) – as it functions in the Indonesian capital, arguing that its central programmes may still rely on reductionist and essentialising notions of ‘woman’ so as to reinforce traditional gender roles within a particular power hierarchy. Second, we revisit two of the organisations whose influence during the Suharto era was significant, Dharma Wanita and PKK, to show their programmatic emphasis on women as mothers, nation builders, and moral guardians. Finally, we consider linkages between discourse, cultural norms, and institutional structure by looking at brief case studies of four MOWE regional branches. This allows us to explore how power relations are negotiated in bureaucratic structures and what this implies for the ‘regional translation’ of gender discourses.

Next we follow the circulation of gender discourses to an even more intimate level: that of the home and the body. Chapter Five will analyse interviews of men and women across Java, in order to understand how, at the local level, a convergence of influences tends to constrain gender identities, even as these gender roles remain contested. The research project scrutinises the extent to which individuals have agency within their gender identities, given that the constellation of powers implementing gender policies tend to reinscribe particular gender roles. This chapter addresses several key issues: gender as
both a ‘structured structure’ (how gender roles are perceived and constructed) and as a ‘structuring structure’ (how gender is ‘lived’ and directs action), the politics of the body, and the relevance and impact of wider social transformations to gender matters.

The dissertation finally will examine a specific development intervention related to gender in a comprehensive case study. Chapter Six focuses on the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) work in the field of reproductive health. This serves to illustrate the spiral relationship between discourses, institutions, and identities – illuminating the politics of change. The case study studies UNFPA programmes in West Java, from the centre in Jakarta, in the provincial bureaucracy, and lastly in two villages. Throughout, UNFPA is attempting to implement a ‘new paradigm’ for reproductive health, which comprises a large range of issues including those related to gender roles and the status of women. Chapter Six examines the multiplicity of competing interpretations occurring at various levels to demonstrate how these different understandings direct programme action and individual behaviour. It shows how gender discourses and policies are being mapped onto hierarchical institutions with implications for the negotiation of power and identities, where change occurs in the context of contested perceptions and influences.

In sum, understanding political change in Indonesia, especially in the context of the broader development project, necessitates an examination of gender. Being able to theorise the ‘mushy mixture’ of discourse, institutions, and identities is a critical step toward understanding how societies transform, who has power and how it is perpetuated in hierarchies, and ultimately, to what extent men and women are able to choose lives that they have reason to value and embody.
Chapter Two: Theory and History

Gender in a Transforming Indonesia

Before approaching gender discourses, institutions, and identities, we must cover the relevant theory and history. This chapter will first examine theories of gender and bodies, noting how ideas of gender have influenced development practice. Examination of relevant Indonesian history will follow, covering: women in Indonesia (particularly New Order constructions and a general literature review), the development project, the effects of democratisation and decentralisation, and finally current shifts in the Indonesian socio-religious landscape.

2.1 Multi-dimensional Gender: Building Gender from Bodies

Gender is a topic that has proven surprisingly contentious, heavily theorised in academia and yet unquestioned by many people – a natural ‘given’ of social life because of its relationship to sex and the human body. In most explanations given in MOWE work, ‘gender’ is defined as the ‘socially-constructed roles and relationships of men and women’, tending to limit gender’s deconstruction to how it impacts practical roles. However, understanding gender requires a deeper level of deconstruction. Here we consider various definitions of sex and gender, account for their relationship to the body, and finally question how this body comes to be linked to broader systems of power.

Defining sex and gender is an ongoing debate, ranging from biological essentialists who claim that most differences between men and women are natural, to social constructionists who argue that gender roles are based more heavily on culture and history. By the 1970s, as Henrietta Moore notes, gender was argued to be the cultural elaboration of meaning
imbibed from biological difference (1999: 151). It was assumed that gender is simply how culture makes sense of biological sex differences. Thus binary biological sex differences underlie – though perhaps without determining – gender categories (Yanagisako and Collier 1987: 15). Shelley Errington makes these distinctions more explicit, arguing that we must distinguish between sex (lower case) as biologically sexed bodies and Sex (upper case) as a particular construction of human bodies (1990: 19-31). Gender is then how different cultures interpret sex (lower case) (Errington 1990: 27). Central to Errington’s perspective is the neo-Foucauldian notion that it is not simply gender that is socially constructed, but rather sex itself (Moore 1999: 153-154).

Whereas sex is the biological binary, and Sex the socially constructed sex, gender is the social construction of sex. Most significant are not the physical forms of bodies and sex, but the ways in which bodies are inscribed with meaning, particularly meaning that has masculine and feminine forms. So for instance, the notion of women’s ‘weakness’ persists when in many areas across Indonesia one regularly sees women carrying extremely heavy loads of rocks or bricks on their heads, working vigorously and manually and demonstrating both endurance and strength. It is not the ‘actual’ strength of their bodies called to question, but the way in which the female body is associated with weakness.

On the constructivist side of the debate lie those such as Judith Butler, who has argued for a performative theory of gender: gender not as something that one is so much as something that one does. Butler’s point is that gender is ‘an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylised repetition of acts’ – gender is central to the process of becoming (1999: 179, emphasis in the original). Yet since this is ‘an ongoing discursive practice’, it is possible for change to take place (Butler 1999: 43). This shift in
thinking has served to invert the relationship between sex and gender, for where the relationship might have been expressed as sex-therefore-gender, now there is increased emphasis on gender-therefore-sex. In essence, cultural assumptions of gender shape contemporary understandings of the human body (Howson 2004: 52). Gender roles allow bodies to be interpreted and understood in a particular way, which in turn acts back on these roles in a spiral and reflexive relationship.

If gender is perceived as social construction, it can be analysed by examining the link between power and language. Here we can apply Bourdieu’s notion of language as a ‘structuring structure’ (1991: 166). Language, in effect, acts as the filter through which our biological being must pass, meaning that ‘sex’ only has position in relation to representation. Sexual difference in this sense is therefore ‘produced in language, in the realm of the symbolic’ (Moore 1999: 168). Yet individually we are not in control of this language or the symbolic realm it signifies. Bourdieu’s point is that a discourse, such as one defining gender roles, gains power based ‘on the degree to which it is recognized by a numerous and powerful group that can recognize itself in it and whose interest it expresses’ (1991: 188, emphasis in the original). Thus the creative power of words can serve as the ‘imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world’ – and, ostensibly, as its preservation (Bourdieu 1991: 239). Discourse’s legitimacy becomes in some ways fideistic and self-fulfilling: as everyone draws upon the same language of gender, it generates recognisable principles of division of the social world, and therefore of social order (ibid: 190). Shared acknowledgment becomes central to translating ‘language’ into ‘power’.
2.1.1 Gender in International Development: From WID to GAD to GMS

Here we consider how gender has been appropriated into international development discourses and programmes. Historically, development efforts did not account for women’s roles; instead, development projects were expected to be essentially gender neutral. In her groundbreaking 1970 book, *Women’s Role in Economic Development*, Ester Boserup examined existing data within a gender framework, showing how women and men have different roles in economic development and how this had been affecting development efforts. Her research sparked concern for incorporating women’s roles in development and influenced the new focus of *Women in Development*, or WID. In older development efforts, women were not analysed separately: ‘It was assumed that the norm of the male experience was generalizable to females and that all would benefit equally’ (Rathgeber 1990: 491). WID changed this, attempting instead the ‘integration of women into global processes of economic, political, and social growth and change’ (*ibid*: 489). However, one of WID’s problems was that it designed women’s projects separately, apart from the main development efforts (which were directed at men). So WID simply added women onto development programmes, isolating them from the context of social and gender relations (Baden and Goetz 1990: 22).

As WID proved problematic, a shift occurred in the late 1980s away from its principles to those of *Gender and Development*, or GAD. Both WID and GAD are similar in that each takes gender-disaggregated analysis of roles, and of access to and control over resources. But GAD takes its analysis further, aiming to account for the notion of patriarchy and power relations between women and men. In order to create GAD frameworks, many converging issues should be taken into account: resistance to the term ‘gender’ and to attempts to change women’s roles in their communities, the risk that using gender instead
of women will further alienate women from development efforts, and acknowledgement of the importance of gender within development. In GAD, ‘gender analysis is extended beyond the sphere of production to include the range of relations through which needs are met – the rights and obligations, norms and values that sustain social life’ (Razavi and Miller 1995: 13).

Nonetheless, GAD faces problems of implementation similar to those of WID. Often gender is considered an ‘add-on’, or the ‘add women and stir’ approach, which makes gender and development aims extremely difficult. As one researcher notes, ‘Perceiving GAD as an “add on” creates the belief that gender issues can be adequately dealt with simply by making an extra element to a project, such as having a women only group meeting. This results in the false belief among many staff that a gender perspective has been incorporated into their project or programme’ (Pialek 2005: 12). The same problem then arises: development agencies offer a few projects for ‘women’ without deeper considerations of the impact of gender relations on all their work.

Gender mainstreaming (GMS) demands simply this: that gender be a central component in development discourses and a factor in all programmes across the board. It featured formally in the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and was later defined by the UN Economic and Social Council to mean that ‘any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes’ had to include assessment of the implications for both women and men, with the stated goal of achieving gender equality (ECOSOC 1997). Gender mainstreaming seeks to avoid WID and GAD’s problems – merely adding separate programmes for women to the mix – recognising that the basis of social order and action remains individual social roles, and that these are most often divided along the lines of sex.
In Indonesia, gender mainstreaming has been adopted based on Presidential Instruction No. 9/2000, directing all sections of the Indonesian government to include gender in development plans. This has led to the acceptance that gender relations play a role in the ways local societies change and develop. Implementing this has been problematic – gender mainstreaming, like WID and GAD before it, has proven difficult to put into action. Understanding gender is vital to understanding how men and women may react to change and the modernising influence of development. Any community’s sexual division of labour may have cultural, religious, historical and physical aspects. If social behaviour is fundamentally patterned according to gender roles, then it stands to reason that any attempt to motivate or mobilise a community toward specific developmental goals must account for gender roles, since these will impact the way development occurs.

### 2.1.2 The Human Body

Theories of gender and development have been translated into programmes and policies, incorporating insights from many social science and feminist debates undertaken over the past 20 to 30 years. However, this process has left out the more intimate level of theorisation and analysis of gender that aims to deconstruct the body. For example, we consider the following statement from UNIFEM (the United Nations Development Fund for Women):

> Choices for women, especially poor women, cannot be enlarged without a change in relations between women and men as well as in the ideologies and institutions that preserve and reproduce gender inequality. This does not mean reversing positions, so that men become subordinate and women dominant. Rather, it means negotiating

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28 Mainstreaming will be discussed further in Chapter Three, including the ways in which this has been translated into the Indonesian language and context.
new kinds of relationships that are based not on power over others but on a mutual
development of creative human energy […] It also means negotiating new kinds of
*institutions, incorporating new norms and rules* that support egalitarian and just
relations between men and women (2000: 20-21, emphasis added).

This statement recognises that change must occur at the level of relational structures
(husband, wife, father, mother, etc) and at the level of institutional structures (including the
norms and regulations guiding institutional activity). But it ignores the question of
embodied structures.

The dismissal of this deeper analysis is highlighted by reports such as that from the UK’s
Department for International Development (DfID) on ‘Poverty elimination and the
empowerment of women’. This report includes just one paragraph on ‘sex and gender’
(Section 1.10), and here only to note that ‘differences between women and men are both
biologically and socially determined’ and that the ‘precise boundary between these
determining factors is the subject of fierce debate’ (DfID 2000: 11). The section admits
that ‘gender roles are not fixed’ and so can be changed or negotiated; overall, the effect is
crisp and certain, not in any way problematic. The debates are presumed to be unimportant
for the end result, which is to assume that gender roles are biologically and socially
constructed, and then simply to address the relational and institutional structures which
impact negatively women’s equality and empowerment.

However, this thesis will argue for the absolute primacy of these debates. There is a
material component that cannot be ignored: the human body itself. Bodies have become a
more significant area of study over the past 20 years, particularly in the fields of sociology
and feminist theory (Turner 1996; Hancock *et al.* 2000; Howson 2004). The body has been
examined most significantly in relation to power, female subordination, patriarchal
organisation, and social change in postmodern and poststructural contexts (Turner 1996: 4;
Understanding gender requires analysing human bodies, as these bodies conflate what is ‘constructed’ with what is ‘natural’. Sociological approaches to the body have viewed it in three ways: first, the body as ‘merely a set of social practices’, highlighted by those such as Bourdieu with habitus; second, the body as a ‘a system of signs’, such as research by Mary Douglas (1966, 1970) on body symbolism and social organisation; and third, the human body as a ‘system of signs which stand for and express relations of power’ (Turner 1996: 24, 26-27).

The body is particularly important in the context of tensions between modernity and postmodernity, as it allows us to study something which is simultaneously known and material, even as it is discursively constituted (Howson 2004: 6). Foucault explores this in his *History of Sexuality*, pointing out the mutually-constitutive role of Western discourses of biology and sexuality (1976: 154-155). He argues that ‘sex’ becomes a product of a specific set of discursive practices, tying the body to sexual practice and thus to a determined ‘gender’ defined by social norms. Foucault’s work demonstrates that we can take nothing about the body for granted, even though we live in ways that assume its ‘givenness’. For bodies have ‘imaginary and symbolic dimensions’; they exist as a nexus of the social and the symbolic, such that each person’s relation with his or her body is both ‘material and imaginary’ (Moore 1999: 163, 168).

### 2.1.3 Gender Hierarchy

This final area of analysis is critical: how the body forms the basis for hierarchical gender relations. The women’s movement and feminist thought have ‘made visible the significance of the body in the oppression of women’ (Howson 2004: 5). The question becomes, if bodies are given symbolic value, why gender hierarchies consistently privilege
the masculine over the feminine both cross-culturally and historically. As Bourdieu asks, why has ‘masculine domination’ been the feature of so many societies across time and space (2001: 81-83)? If we are concerned with understanding not merely ‘gender’ in the abstract, but the ways in which this impacts development, women’s rights, and equality and justice between men and women, then it is critical to examine the power relationships established through gender differentiation.

Various theorists have sought to explain women’s being afforded lesser status than men. One approach examines the broader historical landscape, exploring links between anatomical science and socio-economic change. Before the Enlightenment in Western Europe, male and female bodies were conceived by anatomists as not being dichotomous (i.e. not binary opposites); male and female reproductive organs were perceived as similar versions of the same organ, such that ‘male’ and ‘female’ bodies were not opposites but only variations on a theme (Howson 2004: 43). Yet after 1800 there was a shift in anatomy studies from a ‘non-hierarchical, non-dichotomous representation of female anatomy to one that emphasized difference’, so the scientific field began to stress the ‘oppositional difference’ between male and female bodies (ibid: 44-45). One explanation for this greater differentiation could have been increased anatomical knowledge. However, this did not explain in full why female and male were increasingly represented in oppositional terms. Another significant explanation looks to the socio-historical context. From the late 18th to early 19th centuries, as bourgeois society emerged, middle-class women were undergoing many changes in social, economic, political position, but became increasingly excluded from public life (ibid: 45). Significantly, the female body was contrasted with the male body as justification for their exclusion. Laquer (1990) in particular has suggested that as society went through vast socio-political change, women’s place in the world was
questioned. Anatomists focused on body parts that differentiated female and male bodies, and these body parts came to stand for difference used to make claims about female inferiority. Thus the perception of the ‘natural’ female body as weaker and problematic ‘was a product of social and political impulses that sought to exclude women from entry into the new public world of the bourgeoisie’ (Howson 2004: 46).

Other arguments for female subordination have come from anthropology and even Marxist feminist thought. Anthropologist Sherry Ortner (1974) has argued that women are universally devalued because of their symbolic association with the realm of nature, which itself is perceived to be inferior to male-associated culture. This stems from bodies, based on the assumption that women are still ‘tied to nature through their sexuality and fertility’ (Turner 1996: 126). As female reproductivity, denoting an indissoluble link with nature, is universal, this helps to explain their universal subordination (ibid). Yet this link has been criticised as too simplistic (Moore 1994: 821; Turner 1996: 126-127). Another school of thought, emerging through Marxist feminist writing, notes that women’s reproductive work lends itself to a specific sexual division of labour (Moore 1994: 822). It is the way relations of production are built upon the presumption of women’s differential capacities that places women in a subordinate position. In both cases, bodies are significant.

Bourdieu attempts to explain the phenomenon of masculine domination through recourse to the body’s symbolisation and thus the naturalisation of the sexual order. By doing so, he brings together the discursive and the material in a convincing portrait. The social order functions, Bourdieu argues, as ‘an immense symbolic machine’ which divides the world according to the sexes, and in doing so structures labour, space, and even time (2001: 9). Most significant is how gender is constructed out of bodies as ‘two hierarchised social
essences’, such that bodies are arbitrarily given meaning, uses and functions but these arbitrary constructions exist in a hierarchy (Bourdieu 2001: 23). The key point Bourdieu stresses is that this process ‘legitimates a relationship of domination by embedding it in a biological nature that is itself a naturalised social construction’ (2001: 23, emphasis in the original). So bodies are first discursively constructed. For example, the body becomes imbued with, and a metaphor for, certain male/female oppositions – such as public/private, strong/weak, hard/soft, dry/wet, outside/inside, religious/magical, hot/cold, dominant/cultivated nature (Bourdieu 2001: 10, 104). These divergent qualities come to be seen as naturally part of the ‘masculine’ or the ‘feminine’. As these qualities exist in hierarchical relation to one another, relations of domination can be perpetuated by recurrence to the ‘natural’ body.

In sum, there is a ‘constant work of differentiation’ involving bodies, where men and women seek to ‘distinguish themselves by masculinising or feminising themselves’ (Bourdieu 2001: 84). Through this process, meaning inscribed onto bodies ends up linked to broader constellations of power, which in turn structure the ways individuals are capable of functioning. Social order is built on how physiology is given cultural meaning, and this meaning comes to be viewed as wholly natural. For example, in Javanese culture boys and girls are taught to carry their bodies in very specific ways. Young girls should not laugh too loudly or ‘sprawl’ when seated, maintaining a demure body position that is restrained; they must move and act in a way that is smooth and calm (‘halus’), and not be hyperactive or fidgety (Wiwiek, interview 25 July 2005). Girls are socialised, in effect, to be ‘soft-spoken, polite, and pleasing to behold’ (Adeney 2003: 43). The same restraints are not placed upon the male body. Females thus learn through their bodies to take up less space
and exercise self-control; males are able to take up more space and move with greater energy. Hierarchy is preserved through habitus.

The concluding point is that power, when recurring to and building upon the human body, makes gender seem a foundational reality. Gender becomes an unquestioned ‘given’, one that is very difficult to challenge, substantiating relations of domination. Development interventions that target ‘gender’ – if not accounting fully for its symbolic and material constructedness – will revert to the ‘natural’ female body with the aim of improving women’s relative position. Ultimately, this will fail to address the deeper underlying hierarchies. More on this ‘politics of the body’ will be addressed throughout the thesis.

2.2 The Indonesian Context

Now we move from gender theory and history to examining this ‘transforming Indonesia’, in order to better understand past and present gender relations and constructs. As has been noted, the theoretical framework employed here seeks to examine multiple layers, voices, and structures to question the politics of gender in a time of change, so it is important to understand the socio-political and historical context. The following sections will examine gender in Indonesia (including a look at how the New Order government ‘used gender’ to maintain social order), development under Suharto and in the context of democratisation and decentralisation, and finally recent cultural and religious shifts.

2.2.1 Studying Gender in Indonesia

As stated earlier, exploring the history of gender in Indonesia offers the chance to tell a much larger story. Indonesia is a developing country experiencing significant political,
economic, and socio-cultural transitions post-Suharto. With reformasi (reformation) explicitly touted as a way of progress, and the significance of Islam as a mobilising identity, Indonesia is no longer ‘a nation in waiting’ as Schwarz put in his book of the same title in 1994. Indonesia is a nation transforming, a nation ‘becoming’. This sense of social transformation is maintained by many Indonesians, accompanied by perception that these changes are taking place in an age of globalisation and all this entails.\textsuperscript{29} Much of what is happening can be illuminated through the lens of gender, as gender issues are deeply imbricated through this context.

We see this first at the level of international and national politics. Islamic feminist Lily Munir argues the rise in political Islam in Indonesia parallels the global Islamic movement, counter to Western dominance, such that they are ‘tidak lepas dari politik dunia’ (not free from global politics) (interview 27 August 2005). This is pointed out repeatedly: the more Indonesia becomes polarised with the West, the more significant Islam becomes as a politics of identity. Yet this relates to gender in many ways – not the least of which is the association of ‘feminism’ and ‘free’ (viz. ‘immoral’) women with the West, particularly with regard to clothing. The greater the polarisation at global levels, the more readily this manifests nationally as a politics of identity – in turn tied most closely to gender identities.

Moreover, gender permeates the government agenda through national coordination efforts. MOWE is a national ministry with no direct regional authority, so it must try to coordinate from the centre. However, the question of ‘political will’\textsuperscript{30} has come up, as the government

\textsuperscript{29} The ways in which Indonesian discuss these changes will be considered in Section 2.3.3.

\textsuperscript{30} This notion of ‘political will’ is problematic. Along with other key policy words in ‘devspeak’, it can be seen as a linguistic metaphor masking complex political issues – and we must question to what end. Citing a lack of ‘political will’ is too often used as a ‘nameless, faceless’ scapegoat when a particular intervention fails. This is an example of obviating blame, or perhaps more accurately, placing the blame squarely (if broadly and impersonally) on national state officials and recipients of development projects. Thus it is tied up
invests less resources toward women’s empowerment than it does in other sectors. Mainly the government’s focus is elsewhere, dealing with bigger problems related to the economy, environmental problems, conflict, corruption, and so on. In this context, governmental constructions of ‘gender’ – when speaking to women’s position and their bodies in moral overtures – become a form of political capital, one of the ways it deflects criticisms of its shortcomings. For example, President Yudhoyono has expressed concern in public statements about women exposing their midriffs (Sullivan 2006), and government legislators focus in parliament on laws related to pornography and pornoaksi (‘pornographic behaviour’) in lieu of more substantive policy (such as poverty reduction for poor women).

In order to better understand the background for studying gender in Indonesia, we first consider literature on ‘women in Indonesia’, and then explain more specifically how the New Order government used gender ideology to further its nationalist and developmental aims. This situates the current research project as a study of what has changed since the Suharto era (1966-1998). Finally perspectives will be offered on symbolic representations of Indonesian womanhood, exploring why it is insufficient to view Indonesian women as simply being ‘oppressed’. Other research might address the way gender in Indonesia has mapped itself onto other structures, such as class, ethnicity, and religion. However, the historical background – like the thesis itself – limits itself to a focus on the relationship between the Indonesian state and its citizens (i.e. political and institutional structures) as well as more symbolic, discursive constructions therein.
2.2.1a Women in Indonesia

It is important to gain perspective on the ways women in Indonesia have been studied and represented in the available literature. Though full account of this literature or a complete ‘women’s history’ is not possible here, we can offer an overview of various themes. This section therefore covers: first, whether it is possible to establish a shared perspective on women in Indonesia; second, historical periods associated with gender in Indonesia; third, studies that have explored tensions between external and internal, symbolic and material, as related to women’s status and power; and fourth, studies that struck this balance while examining ‘modernising’ gender relations. Overall, we emerge with a complex portrait of women in Indonesia, where multiple contradictions arise related to how gender identities are constructed ideologically but then worked out in material contexts.

The initial question is whether there can be agreement on the topic of ‘women in Indonesia’. History Professor Laurie Sears claims that ‘to speak of “Indonesian women” is an impossibility’, arguing that it is important to explore instead multiple representations of the ‘feminine’ throughout Indonesian contexts (1996: 4). Others researchers have echoed this, noting that ‘Indonesia’s pluralism makes discussing gender ideology for all of Indonesia a formidable task’ (Adeney 2003: 42). Similarly, an ‘Indonesian theory of feminism’ is not really existent (Sadli 2002: 80), so any approach to feminism in Indonesia must question the numerous ways feminist theories have been adopted and, ultimately, adapted. Yet given this awareness of pluralism, it is important to find common ground.

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31 Some useful sources include a few books written in Indonesian, such as a compilation of essays published at the 10-year anniversary of the Women’s Studies Programme at Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta (Poerwandari and Hidayat 2000), a similar compilation commemorating ten years of the Convention Watch in Indonesia (Irianto and Luhulima 2004), or a selection of essays on ‘Women and Empowerment’ in honour of leading Indonesian feminist Saparinah Sadli (Notosusanto and Poerwandi 1997). Additionally, Jurnal Perempuan is the leading feminist journal for Indonesia and an excellent source of analysis from Indonesians themselves. These are not explored in greater depth here because for the most part they represent studies by Indonesian women, rather than studies of Indonesian women; they focus on academic engagements with (predominantly Western) feminist theory and women’s studies.
An interesting metaphor draws upon the old Javanese motto for Indonesia, ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’, translated as ‘Unity in Diversity’ but literally meaning ‘(Although) in pieces, yet One’ (Santoso 1975: 578). Painting a portrait of women in Indonesia with broad brush strokes would account for these ‘pieces’ but compose them as ‘one’, and various themes would emerge. First, as has been argued, ‘the combination of Javanese culture and Islamic religion works together to ensure a traditional view of Indonesian women as central to the private sphere while remaining insignificant and ineffective in public life’ (Adeney 2003: 44). Women’s relegation to the domestic sphere is not limited to Java or Islam, however, and this is often accomplished in a fairly oppressive manner. A sociology professor at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, comparing adat (tradition) customs across various Indonesian ethnic groups, notes the common trend of ‘strong domination and dominant position of men’ (quoted in Murniati 1993: 10, translation mine). A psychologist from Yogyakarta agrees, noting that ‘from Sabang to Merauke, many women are not treated fairly’ (Murniati 1993: 8). Even in the famously matriarchal societies, such as the Minangkabau in West Sumatra and the Minahasa in northern Sulawesi, it has been claimed that women are given power only within the home, while men have freedom to achieve in the world outside (Postel-Coster 1987: 231).

At the same time, not all ‘common portraits’ of Indonesian women argue for their oppression. Some see the subordination of women in Indonesia as superficial, existing to maintain a veneer of respectability through the appearance of women deferring ever to men. Anthropologist Walter Williams notes that whereas one might expect women in Indonesia to ‘be subjugated to a patriarchal Islamic order’, in fact ‘women in Java share with those in the wider Southeast Asian region relatively high status and independence’ (1991: 7).
Others have supported this claim, noting that Indonesian women have since earliest times
held high positions in the home and in society (Tilaar 1991: 64-73). Nonetheless, there is
shared agreement that Indonesian women hold central position in family life, with their role
in the home remaining their primary function (Adeney 2003: 45). Women’s *kodrat* – an
Arabic Muslim term meaning ‘fate, destiny, predetermined lot’, which for Indonesian
women refers to the will of God and their biological destiny – is central. This leaves them
contributing to society primarily through bearing and raising children.

Given these common perspectives of women in Indonesia, we can sketch similarly broad
historical periods associated with gender relations. Understanding these paradigms is
useful to gain perspective. There are three separate periods that can be outlined loosely:
1945-1966 (post-independence), 1966-1998 (the New Order government), and 1998
onwards (the *Reformasi* era).

Studies of early stages of Indonesian nationhood (1945-1966) show politically active and
energised women’s movements. Saskia Wieringa describes this activity in her study of
Indonesian women’s organisations since Indonesia’s independence (1988); she also
analyses *Gerwani*, the women’s branch of PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) (2002).
Susan Blackburn offers a longer historical portrait in *Women and the State in Modern
Indonesia*, noting how women’s organisations flourished during this era, the most active of
which was Kowani, the Indonesian Women’s Congress (2004: 22-24). The New Order
period (1966-1998) has been studied extensively with regard to its use of gender ideology,
particularly ‘state ibuism’. Because of the relevance of these studies to understanding
contemporary state action, the next section will explore this period further.
Studies of gender in contemporary Indonesia (1998- ) are more fragmented than those of the New Order. An edited volume by Robinson and Bessell attempts to emphasise ‘the crucial links between the political agendas of gender equity and democratisation’ (2002: 3). One edited collection examines cultural practices related to the household and women’s domestic roles (Koning et al. 2000). Another recent book attempts to piece together Indonesian women’s relationship to Islam in a more positive light, looking at how certain women leaders are using Islamic norms as a force for change (van Doorn-Harder 2006). Yet none of these examine the broader questions of government, power, gender, and social transformation in today’s Indonesia, which is the aim of the current research project.

Of the literature on Indonesian women, it is useful to consider how women’s status and power have been explored, specifically concerning tensions between external and internal, symbolic and material. Here we survey some of the available literature, while Chapter Five will address these issues firsthand. We first look at the notion of women’s status, both intra- and extra-household, exploring the way these often have an inverse relationship. Determining women’s intra-household status, often termed ‘power’ (Safilios-Rothschild 1982), is important, because how power is distributed in the home has been shown to affect a number of decision outcomes – such as contraception and fertility (Williams 1990: 10). Various scholars have offered different analyses of the Indonesian woman’s position and her status and manoeuvring ability vis-à-vis her husband. Within this debate, many have concluded that women across Southeast Asia have relatively strong decision-making power within the household (Lont 2000: 84-85; Papanek and Schwede 1988). However, others have argued these conclusions stem from faulty questioning rather than reflect reality. For

32 The concept of women’s status has been debated and often criticised for being too abstract (Williams 1990: 9). Status definitions usually concentrate on ‘aspects of inequality between the sexes, and the inequalities examined tend to be centred [on] power, prestige, and/or resource control or access’ (ibid). Nonetheless, it is one way of attempting to assess women’s relative position.
example, Wolf contends that if questions are asked more directly, in less abstract ways, it becomes clear that husbands more often decide on household expenditures (1992: 65).

Other researchers have explored the ‘trade-off’ in women’s power both inside and outside the home. Some of these findings suggest an inverse relationship between intra- and extra-household status. For instance, it is sometimes assumed that greater education offers women better position within the house. However, in a study of women in Central Java from 1972 to 1973, Valerie Hull found that ‘although middle-class women have obtained formal schooling and have had greater exposure to modern ideas in general, they are more home and family centred than are lower-class women, but at the same time do not have measurably greater authority within the family unit’ (1996: 80). Hull’s findings are particularly interesting, as similar reversal can be found when addressing the broader socioeconomic context, in particular, women’s status vis-à-vis others in the community or society – in other words, their extra-household status. Even as the women in Hull’s study were afforded greater status outside their home, they evidenced little authority within it. Conversely, in her studies Wolf emphasises that when Javanese women are given increased freedom as economic actors within the household, this may in fact signify an inferior social position (1992: 66; cf. Keeler 1990: 128). Therefore it is important to keep note not merely of the decisional power afforded women within the household, but also outside it. Brenner (1998) argues similarly, saying that when women obtain power through playing stronger economic roles they are often mistrusted for this power, as men fear loss of control or challenge to their status in the hierarchy.

Another example of the complex interplay between material and discursive aspects of women’s status involves control of household resources, money in particular. While there
are competing interpretations, the net effect has been to demonstrate that control of household finances does not always lend itself to ‘power’, symbolically and culturally. Anthropologist Walter Williams is positive, arguing that ‘in Java, the mother has a special central position in the household because she manages the money, a skill that she often extends to the marketplace’ (1990: 7). Conversely, in her study of Javanese society, Brenner notes that control over household money actually detracts from women’s position and prestige. This stems from Javanese cultural traditions associating preoccupation with money with lower status, lack of refinement, and even spiritual inferiority (cf. Anderson 1972, Keeler 1990, Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis 1987, Errington 1990). Therefore because women have a ‘firm obligation as wives and mothers […] to attend to financial matters’ and to ‘see to it that every last rupiah of the family’s money is wisely spent’, they ‘appear to be destined to inhabit the low-status, “coarse” realm of Javanese social and cultural hierarchies’ (Brenner 1998: 141). This example highlights how ‘power’ can be ‘given materially’, and yet ‘taken away symbolically’. The question of women’s status is thus rife with contradictions that must account for various dimensions of power. Chapter Five will explore these points further through firsthand interviews.

Two studies are worth highlighting, as they demonstrate the contradictory nature of women’s engagement in the public realm. Both authors examine the intersection of gender and processes of social transformation, specifically given modernising change and gendered Indonesian state ideologies. Diane Wolf asks questions about household strategies and women’s agency, showing disparate and even conflicting effects of factory employment on rural Javanese women in the 1980s. These Javanese ‘factory daughters’ experienced more economic autonomy, but this was limited by general poverty and constraints on them in the domestic realm (Wolf 1992: 254-255). Wolf demonstrates that entry into the market,
argued to have ‘liberating potential’, may in fact produce mixed results for women’s status and power both inside and outside the home. Suzanne Brenner focuses on another central Javanese community in the 1980s: Lawéyan, the famous Muslim batik-producing district of Surakarta. Like Wolf, she explores the often contradictory roles of women in the marketplace, home, and society. Significantly, she demonstrates the centrality of a ‘gendered approach to analysing social change in any location’ (Brenner 1998: 9), studying how Lawéyan was impacted by, and resisted, ‘modernity’. Brenner looks at the ways women’s participation in the market changed with the onset of capitalist forms of modernity, and how value and prestige – always gendered – shifted in the process.

Wolf and Brenner’s studies of Javanese women in these transition periods highlight the market’s role in affecting gender relations. But they also show that these ‘external’ changes were met by resistance, such that women’s roles were simultaneously expanded and curtailed. It is important to note how their research, conducted in the 1980s, fits within the central developmental and modernising impulse of the New Order government. Here there were clear links between the role of the state, its modernising pressures, and the shifting role of women. More on how the New Order promoted particular gender ideologies and development will be discussed in the next section. Today we see there is no longer any singular thrust from the Indonesian state of similar potency to Suharto’s regime. As sources of change are more disparate, this complicates analysis of gender relations in the face of complex socio-cultural transformation.

2.2.1b Constructions of Gender in the New Order Hierarchy

Having considered studies of women in Indonesia, we can address more specifically the extensive research on gender under Suharto’s New Order government (1966-1998). It has
been argued that this period represents the direct translation of a particular set of gender discourses into power – the power to create an ordered social reality with particular gender roles understood and agreed by the general population. These discourses may have been rife with contradictions. Nonetheless, the Indonesian state reproduced a relatively coherent gender ideology that exalted traditional notions of women’s place in society (Smyth 1993: 117). Political and social relations focused on images of *ibu* (mother) and *bapak* (father), as the New Order government viewed women as a group to be brought under its control in order to secure stability and development (Blackburn 2004: 25). This particular functioning was dubbed ‘ibuism’ by Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis (1987), later expressed as ‘state ibuism’ by Suryakusuma (1987). ‘State ibuism’, according to Suryakusuma (1987), involved the promulgation of the nuclear family norm by the state, within which women adopted a Western middle-class housewife role to selflessly serve their husbands, family, and state. These gender ideologies worked to ‘domesticate’ women – taming, segregating, and depoliticising them – while relying on their categorisation as wives to contain them (Suryakusuma 2004: 166-167).

As gender ideology, ‘state ibuism’ was made material through the development of wives’ organisations that paralleled formal state structures. The New Order government disseminated its gender ideology through this wives’ network, coalesced in national organisations such as Dharma Wanita (for the wives of civil servants) and Kowani (the Indonesian Women’s Congress), and in the villages through PKK (*Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*, Family Welfare Guidance). Women were expected to play key roles supporting their husbands in an ‘ikut suami’ culture (Suryakusuma 1996: 95). ‘Ikut suami’, literally meaning ‘follow the husband’, was an idea promoted strongly through Dharma Wanita. Most civil servants’ wives always had unofficial, but specified, roles to
play, particularly in family planning networks. For example, the governor’s wife would be the provincial head of PKK; tiers of PKK officials underneath her would be wives of lower bureaucrats. The entire structure of governance was predicated upon this wives’ network. As a woman would be elevated to position by sheer virtue of attachment to a man, achievement was less about accomplishment than it was ‘marrying well’.

These organisations worked to express a particular idea of womanhood. The *Panca Dharma Wanita* (the Five Duties of Women), as forwarded by the Indonesian state, were that women were to be: 1) companions to their husbands, 2) procreators for the nation (‘generation reproducers’), 3) mothers and educators of their children, 4) household managers, and 5) loyal citizens (*Asian Womenews* 2002; cf. Iskandar 1998: 41). Women were expected to be first and foremost wives and mothers, an idea promoted through both public messages and the media. For instance, defining the *kodrat wanita*, argues Krishna Sen, was a central function of New Order cinema: ‘*Kodrat* implies both the nature and the destiny of women (*wanita*) and the central element in this seems to be the woman’s function […] contained within the family sphere’ (1993: 117). Any move beyond this sphere is hence in conflict with the dominant discourse.

The interests driving this discourse creation can be explored. Daniel Lev has argued that the ‘effort to define [women] essentially as wives and mothers [was] a New Order phenomenon’ (1996: 196; cf. Postel-Coster 1993: 133). Yet why did the New Order government do this? Lev suggests that answers lie with the ‘New Order elite and its political structure’ (1996: 197). Central to this political structure was a ‘bureaucratic
ethos’, and the New Order’s bureaucracy ran by virtue of its efforts to stabilise the nation.33

Similarly, Suryakusuma (1996) argues that the New Order constructed ‘informal ideologies’ to justify state power, not the least of which was emphasis on a particular form of gender hierarchy. Bound up in this is the idea of women as bearers of tradition, for whom preserving domestic roles is critical to maintaining stability. Because ‘what could be more uncomfortable, even destabilizing, then women redefining themselves as something other than the wives and mothers they had always been?’ (Lev 1996: 198). In other words, if a woman did not fulfil her role as wife, first, and mother, second, this would threaten the foundation of a state built upon paternalistic principles – the *azas kekeluargaan*.

In short, the New Order government drew upon the notion of ‘traditional values’ to sustain development and modernisation and to maintain order (Suryakusuma 2004: 164). Indonesian ‘gender policies’ at this time were a complex blend of discourses and institutions, yet singularly focused on the construction and promotion of a formal gender identity. Women were clearly meant to follow their ‘*kodrat*’, tied to a particular vision of being an *ibu* that left them performing endless tasks with little prospect of reward except through their husbands (Blackburn 2004: 25). Through this complex system of ideas and institutions, wherein men and women ‘knew their place’, the government increased its ability to manage society.

2.2.1c Indonesian Women Today: Symbols and Agency

Studying Indonesian gender politics, specifically women’s position, requires reflection on the complex ways women are constrained by symbols and structures, yet continue to

33 New Order rhetoric ‘consistently stressed stability as a special feature of its rule. […] Responsibility, self-control, restraint, and self-denial for the common good [were] called for in order to achieve national goals’ (Hooker and Dick 1993: 3).
exercise agency. This parallels theorisation of the ‘body-bound’ but reflexive self explained in Chapter One. Indonesian women, in effect, are not powerless. First we consider how symbols are brought to bear on gender identities. Amid a diversity of discourses upon which to draw, societies at particular times tend to emphasise particular gender discourses – to reaffirm specific ‘ways of being’ tied to masculinity and femininity. For example, we consider two classical models of Javanese womanhood dating back to 18th and 19th century central Javanese courts: Srikandhi, renowned for her skill as an archer and known as a ‘warrior princess’ – in essence representing woman as surrogate male and warrior – and Sumbadra, a soft-spoken woman who served her husband well (Carey and Houben 1992: 13-15). Of the two, Sumbadra adhered to the ‘follow-behind-and-serve’ model of womanhood (‘tut wuri handayani’ in the Javanese), and was considered to have more spiritual power. Much discourse in today’s Indonesia, particularly in big cities across Java, stresses the Sumbadra model for womanhood over the Srikandhi one. This assertion will be articulated more fully in the next chapter: how gender policies continue to promote a model for woman as mother and wife, quietly serving, reasserting morality and virtue, depicted in some ways as ‘re-traditionalising’ in the face of external changes.

Yet if this sort of model has re-emerged as a dominant discourse, it is important to question how individuals may act in complex and possibly contradictory ways. Essentially, with gender initiatives proceeding apace in the public sphere and policy discourse, has the overall position of women improved? Why might women themselves be harkening back to more ‘traditional’ gender roles in the context of these changes? To understand women’s choices we might draw on Deniz Kandiyoti’s analysis of why women make ‘patriarchal bargains’ – how they ‘strategise within a set of concrete constraints’ (1988: 275).34

34 Through Kandiyoti’s (1988) analysis of how women make decisions under two ‘ideal types’ of patriarchy – in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Middle East – she offers a way of understanding why women might
Kandiyoti argues that in the breakdown of classic patriarchy – where men are no longer able to fulfil their roles (particularly those of the ‘breadwinner’) – female conservatism is a rational response to enhance stability. This is relevant to the Indonesian context, most noticeably since the Asian economic crisis and subsequent economic insecurity, as some men are no longer effective household providers. The last decade’s political and socio-economic upheaval has provoked a profoundly cultural response, often marked (as Kandiyoti might predict) by calling for return to more traditional ways. Kandiyoti notes these ‘broken bargains seem to instigate a search for culprits, a hankering for the certainties of a more traditional order, or a more diffuse feeling that change might have gone either too far or badly wrong’ (1988: 284). Calls for ‘return to more traditional ways’ include – and in fact feature most prominently – the position of women in stereotypically ‘feminine’ and subservient gender roles. In sum, it is not merely that a ‘Sumbadra’ model for womanhood is being imposed today, but rather that Indonesian women themselves may be responding and claiming such models themselves in the context of perceived change.

2.2.2 The Development Project

Links between gender and development under the New Order government were substantial. Here we consider implications of the development project for a transforming Indonesia. After brief summary of major political and economic transitions during and after Suharto, we will consider two factors relevant to the current research: how the development project was legitimised under the New Order government, and how political decentralisation affects ongoing development interventions.

participate in social structures that ultimately reproduce their own subordination as a way of maximising their individual life strategies. For example, women might collude in subjugating social practices if they are offered the chance of eventually becoming one of the older women with status (such as a mother-in-law) and therefore improving their position.
2.2.2a **New Order Pembangunan Consciousness**

After the 1965 coup, General Suharto began his 32-year reign as president in what was purportedly a form of parliamentary autocracy. Like the Dutch colonial government before it (but unlike Sukarno’s ‘Old Order’ or the era of parliamentary democracy in the early 1950s), Suharto’s regime was successful in its ability to function as a powerful but polite state. This New Order government quickly became known, among other things, for its entanglement with military politics and KKN – *korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme* (corruption, collusion, and nepotism). Suharto’s military promoted the doctrine of *dwifungsi*, or dual function, which prescribed its purpose in both political and military fields. By the 1990s, political scientist Adam Schwarz writes, ‘the army had used *dwifungsi* to push its way into the societal fabric’ (1994: 16). When President Suharto stepped down on 21 May 1998, amid rioting and deep financial crisis, this opened the doors for a process of democratisation. After two rather short-lived presidencies (Habibie, 1998-1999; Wahid, 1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri came to power. She was followed in September of 2004 by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the sixth President of Indonesia. These 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections included direct voting for the president, and in so doing enhanced President Yudhoyono’s legitimacy and that of his non-Javanese Vice President Yusuf Kalla.

Problems abound in Indonesia, including natural disasters (the December 2004 tsunami in Aceh a prime example) and political unrest. Instability continues in outlying regions such as Aceh, Poso and West Papua and in terrorist threats such as the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002 and 1 October 2005. Indonesia’s economy continues to suffer after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. By 2001, GDP growth had declined to nearly three percent (less than half what it was in 1996), the nation was in the throes of a major banking crisis,
and unemployment rates increased, particularly among young men aged 15-24 (Asian Development Bank 2002; Lingle 2001; Sitathan 2002). Some recent indicators, however, support a more positive view of the Indonesian economy; for example, IMF loans were paid, the budget deficit narrowed, and the stock market more than doubled through 2006 (Nanwani 2006; Arman 2006). Nonetheless, economic malaise colours many people’s perceptions of present and future opportunities, contributing to general insecurity.

Prior to these political changes, the New Order government followed its modernising impulse to implement projects in highly ‘top down’ fashion. New Order rhetoric displayed a teleology of modernisation in order to legitimate the government’s actions, including the use of specific words. For example, in Indonesian there are two words for ‘development’: ‘pembangunan’ – from the root verb ‘to build, construct, erect’ – and ‘perkembangan’ – from the root ‘to flower, bloom’. Perkembangan refers to ‘a presumably natural process of change, which is motivated primarily by some internal necessity, enforced primarily, if not exclusively, by its own internal energy, its pace and extent being proportional to its own “nature”’ (Heryanto 1995: 21). Conversely, pembangunan was appropriated under the New Order government to mean development in the economic sense, and refers primarily to state-sponsored economic development programmes and large-scale infrastructure construction (ibid: 16-18).

Pembangunan consciousness, rhetoric, and programmes came to characterise the New Order in Indonesia (McDonald 1980: 68), causing one analyst to describe the government as ‘modernisation theory made flesh’ (Smith 1999). The keyword pembangunan can thus ‘be seen simultaneously as a constitutive force for the so-called pembangunan process and
an essential product of that process’ (Heryanto 1995: 9).\textsuperscript{35} Toward the ends of pembangunan the government used another slogan to maintain tranquil communities and mobilise voluntary labour, that of gotong royong, typically meaning ‘mutual cooperation’ or ‘mutual assistance’. Gotong royong was actively promoted by the state as an ‘ideology of community’; this ‘ideology’ ostensibly allowed the government’s presence and power to permeate village life (Sullivan 1992: 4, 178). In other words, the government cloaked itself in ideological language that lent symbolic substance to their hold on power, helped preserve order, and allowed goals to be achieved.

The pembangunan paradigm was successfully promulgated in the New Order regime not only because of this semiotic conquest – the inculcation of development rhetoric into the national psyche – but also through a number of socio-cultural factors. First, patron-client networks made possible the transmission of both ideas and actions along patterns of deference (Newland 2001: 30). Built into Suharto’s regime was a strong network of patron-client relations fostered from higher state levels and present down to the village (Jackson 1978). Golkar, the government party, embodied this patron-client structure, presiding over the bureaucracy of some three million civil servants (Tapol 2001).

Second, patterns of hierarchical deference were also exhibited in what one sociologist, Professor Suweno from Gadjah Mada University, has termed the kraton mentality. Kraton is the word for the Javanese kingdom of central Java and refers to a feudal structure mindset: a mentality of serf-lord, slave-master, retainer-nobleman, or, in Javanese, gawalachusti. As long as the serfs have basic primary needs (food, shelter, etc) and security needs

\textsuperscript{35} I am not attempting to argue that the double-role of this definition of development is unique; for the term ‘development’ in general ‘defies definition […] because of the difficulty of making the intent to develop consistent with immanent development’ (Cowen and Shenton 1996: 438). However, the decision to select pembangunan as the primary governmental slogan over perkembangan was a distinct choice that then legitimised the government’s further actions toward achieving the goals of pembangunan.
met, they will accept whatever the royals do. This *kraton* concept stems from Indonesia’s feudalistic roots. Mochtar Buchori, a retired government official and acclaimed writer, describes this heritage: ‘In Southeast Asia we are courting democracy, but we are still married to feudalism’ (1996: 33). Consequently, he states, ‘most people in Indonesia [exhibit] a mixture of feudal and democratic characteristics’ (Buchori 1996: 33). In addition, though a generalisation, many of Indonesia’s various languages and ethnic groups – particularly its two largest, the Javanese and Sundanese – tend to be status-oriented, hierarchical, and deferential (Geertz 1960), and hence willing to accept mandates and definitions that ‘come from above’. For example, even the Javanese language is designed to reflect and adhere to class, status, age and sex differentials, with three basic types of speech levels: *krama* (high), *madya* (middle) and *ngoko* (low). These socio-cultural trends continue to impact development interventions, particularly with regard to how information is transferred – or socialised – between those with differing levels of social standing. Chapters Four and Six will consider some of these issues.

### 2.2.2b Democratisation and Decentralisation after Suharto

Aside from these socio-cultural trends, the development project in contemporary Indonesia has also been affected by more systemic structural factors – namely democratisation and decentralisation post-Suharto. The national government’s *desentralisasi* (decentralisation) has had profound implications. This process officially began in April 1999 under Habibie and the passing of two decentralisation laws. In 2001 Megawati’s administration worked to devolve many government functions from centre to district. After decades of centralised control, Indonesia’s 440 *kabupaten* (regencies) have now been mandated to manage most affairs of state, excluding foreign and monetary policy, religion, and security (Thorburn 2002). Yet this has already proved problematic as the shift in power sparked controversy
over a number of issues, including among other things: fear of increased governmental corruption, the question of local legislators’ capacity to run their own affairs, the matter of who should control revenues from taxes on natural resources, and concern over separatist provinces. Therefore during this transition implementing programmes from the centre has become increasingly difficult. Decentralisation processes have replaced what former Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs called the ‘sistem komando’ (commando system) which made the New Order government able to implement its programmes successfully, however oppressive the machinery (Siregar, interview 22 August 2002).

What appears to be happening is the disappearance of many mechanisms of top down planning, without the concomitant fading of its impetus. The system of idea propagation still emanates from the centre – from Jakarta, or the head provincial office. Through many interviews done at the provincial level, the presence of ‘top down planning’ was reiterated. Yet this top down planning is no longer as successful in its implementation. Recalling Scott’s argument that it is only through ‘the authoritarian state’ that a high-modernist discourse can truly transform society (1998: 5), the repeated cry of provincial officials in a number of interviews has its own logic: ‘If it’s going to be top down planning, at least do it right!’ Desentralisasi is a theme – and in many cases, a concern – running through much discussion related to government and political change. There is the sense that at least top down ‘worked’ in the past, and there is not yet strong enough ‘civil society’ to fill the void left by strong governmental machinery. As Coordinating Minister Siregar noted, there seems to be a ‘gap’ in the system, where in reaction to previous authoritarianism those at the ‘bottom’ are rejecting mandates from the ‘top’, but those

36 Interestingly, I heard no Indonesian phrase/word equivalent for this. The English phrases ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ are used as such, but with Indonesian intonation.
mandates coming from the ‘bottom’ are not fully formed (‘belum mateng’, literally ‘not yet ripe’) (interview 22 August 2002).

This shifting context affects gender programmes, which must now be operationalised through an increasingly complex system of delegated responsibilities. The ‘net effect’ of decentralisation on women in Indonesia is difficult to assess. Various peraturan daerah (perda), or regional regulations, have been enacted in different areas, with different impacts on women. Some have maintained that overall decentralisation has created many ‘pockets’ across Indonesia where women’s rights and gender issues have been subverted and even harmed (Noerdin et al. 2005: viii). For example, certain perda were ratified by 2003 that emphasised Islamic law and morality and ultimately constricted women’s liberties (either by enforcing a curfew for women, or mandating the wearing of the head-covering, and so on). These perda were enforced in Banda Aceh (Nanggro Aceh Darussalam); Padang (West Sumatra); Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, and Ciamis (West Java); and Jember (East Java) (Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan 2004: 6). Yet others have claimed that decentralisation has also allowed for an increasing number of positive initiatives to be sparked from NGOs and civil society organisations (Satriyo 2003). Not all the perda have been negative for women; for example one in Wonosobo (Central Java) mandated women’s equal participation in the process of creating public policy (Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan 2004: 7).

Across Indonesia, as a result of decentralisation, space has opened for women in some areas and closed in others. Even as decentralisation has de-linked gender initiatives from the formerly top-down modernisation project – and in doing so opened up space for different interpretations and applications of gender policies through the regions – democratisation has opened discursive space for the proliferation of gender discourses and ideologies.
These changes will be considered most closely in Chapter Four, looking at how localised gender norms may impact MOWE’s regional branches.

2.2.3 A Time of Change: Modernity, Morality, and MTV

When assessing the Indonesian transformation it is critical to go beyond political and economic shifts to understand the perceived nature of this change – at what level, in whose terms, and how it is experienced. ‘Modernisation’, or *modernisasi*, is having a clear impact on gender constructions. Notions of modernity have long been debated, ranging from ‘modernising’ development projects of the post-WWII era that stressed urbanisation, industrialisation, and technological innovation, to more psychological approaches which have attempted to understand the mind of the ‘rational modern man’ (cf. Weber 1976; Lerner 1958; Cowen and Shenton 1996: 78-88, 459-460, 472-476). This thesis concerns itself more with the perception of change, rather than an examination of its structural manifestations. Echoing Brenner, ‘I want to capture a sense of the modern as something experienced subjectively by individuals through their awareness of becoming part of a new age and a new way of life’ (1998: 10).

Most evident is a sense of socio-cultural change infusing public debates. The 166 respondents from major cities in Java (Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya), when asked about changes, expressed overwhelming consensus related to standards of dress, morality, culture, and increased openness to sex. The changes they described were consistently steeped in a language of moral assessments. For instance, an older woman in Yogya described the contemporary acceptance of sex as a ‘new paradigm’ that had arisen due to ‘moral degradation’ (Respondent #46). These shifts are often couched in terms of ‘Indonesia *before* was not like this’, but ‘modern’ Indonesia has changed, and this is due to influences
from ‘outside’. ‘Globalisasi’ (globalisation) was affirmed most frequently as one of the major causes of transition, in addition to such things as the mass media, Western culture, technology, and television. One male respondent in Bandung articulated what they were experiencing as ‘cultural friction’ (‘pergeseran budaya’) due to the ‘global culture’ (Respondent #6). Chapter Five will explore and analyse these perspectives further.

Examples of this ‘cultural friction’ abound, particularly related to women’s bodies. For instance, in early stages of the public debates on the pornography bill (discussed in Chapter Three), a government minister referred to women exposing their ‘navels’ which was then linked to female artists on MTV (Nurbaiti 2004). Protest and debate surrounding *Playboy Indonesia* also serves as an illuminating case. *Playboy* first decided to publish an Indonesian edition in early 2006, sparking great controversy among the Muslim community and ultimately evincing a promise from *Playboy* that this version would ‘respect Muslim values and not contain photos of naked women’ (Diani 2006c). Since the Turkish edition of *Playboy* folded in the mid-1990s, this was the first time the magazine had published in a Muslim country. Backlash was strong, until finally a mob protest and attack on Jakarta’s headquarters forced them to relocate to Bali (a Hindu island). Both the editor-in-chief and first edition centrefold model were charged with violating the indecency provision of the criminal code (Perlez 2006). Most interesting is how protest was couched. Writing for *The Jakarta Post*, one journalist tag-lined her article: ‘Despite Indonesia’s saturation of pornographic materials, protesters focus on barring an international magazine’ (Diani 2006b). The Indonesian edition of *Playboy* included fully-dressed women, but its association in the public mind with Western indecency was too firmly engrained. As such, *Playboy* was an affront to Indonesia’s explicit image of itself, as the public exposure of more ‘private’ sexuality created unease.
Overall, social decline is consistently packaged in women’s clothing – in its more ‘modern’ and therefore less ‘modest’ variations. But understanding what is happening to Indonesia is not as simple as measuring the effects of ‘modernisation’. Indeed, the very categorisation of ‘modern’ versus ‘traditional’ is problematic, failing to communicate complexities and paradoxes in social understandings. Instead, what might be marked traditional or modern are imbricated within broader cosmological paradigms. June Nash, in her study of Bolivian tin miners, realised that ‘the simple traditional/modern dichotomies were not going to explain much in this society’ (1979: 21). Geertz argues similarly for Indonesia, asserting that we cannot slip into past dichotomies, for ‘there is nothing “underdeveloped,” “thirdworldish,” [...] or “traditional” about it’ (2000: 255-256). Just as in ‘developed’ Western countries, Indonesian cultural identity is being forged as a field of differences confronting one another at all levels: family, village, neighbourhood, region (Geertz 2000: 255-257). Indonesia is marked with the ‘hybrid character of modern societies, which have been rendered culturally complex’ through global interdependency (Molyneux and Razavi 2002: 13). The following chapters, exploring gender policies, institutions, and identities, address this dynamic and ‘hybrid’ context. The politics of gender is truly being played out in a time of change.

2.2.3a The Rise of Religion in a Post-9/11 World

Keeping in mind this shifting context, a final and significant consideration is that of religion. After the events of 9/11, the markedly political character of religion and its impact on international relations has been more evident. While not addressing directly the ‘clash of civilizations’ debate (Huntington 1996), we must consider the role of religion in Indonesian society, particularly in the context of cultural transformation and gender relations. Additional research might address in greater depth the relationship between
Islamic discourse and practice related to gender. However, as with the examination of modernisation, this research limits itself to understanding how perceptions of Islam shape discourse and practice (rather than deconstructing Islam itself).

We start here with a brief overview of Islam in Indonesia, to situate its centrality to the nation’s history and culture. Islam, the dominant religion in Indonesia by the end of the 16th century and today’s majority religion with approximately 88 percent of the population claiming to be Muslim, has played a changing role in Indonesian politics. Most Muslims are Sunni, and generally fit within two orientations. ‘Modernists’ have orthodox theology but embrace modern learning and concepts, and are represented best by the Muhammadiyah social organisation. Predominantly Javanese ‘traditionalists’ often follow charismatic religious scholars and focus on Islamic boarding schools (the pesantren), and are represented by Indonesia’s other large Muslim organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama.

Historically, a sharia state (run by Islamic law) was never established; rather the New Order government built a secular state around the principles of the Pancasila which recognised five faiths (Hunter and Mahlow 1998). Yet political Islam began to rise in prominence, influenced by organisations such as the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association (ICMI), whose members flourished under President Suharto’s patronage and sought to position themselves within the government, effectively to promote a more Islamicised society (Ramage 1995: 7). By the 1990s the Indonesian state began to adopt ‘a more Islamic demeanour’ (Cammack 1997: 167). At this point, Suharto introduced an Islamization strategy, particularly focusing on the accentuation of Islamic symbols in public discourse and the accommodation of religious socio-political powers […] there was a growth in popularity of the jilbab,
an Islamic head covering for women, the *hajj*, pilgrimage to Mecca, and religious rituals and festivals (Hasan 2002: 162).

As political Islam made a stronger appearance in the 1990s, more Muslims entered the political mainstream and the civilian and military bureaucracy. A researcher at Jakarta’s Center for Information and Development Studies described this as ‘re-Islamization’, with a particular rise in piety among the urban higher and middle classes (Lanti 2002). For these classes, ostentatious adherence to Islamic forms in dress and behaviour were a means of celebrating their social and financial success.

Others refer to this phenomenon as the ‘*santri*-nization of society’, from the word *santri*, meaning pious Muslims, or more literally ‘students’ (Lanti 2002). These *santri* practice an orthodox version of Islam, are often urban and middle-class, and are sometimes referred to as ‘*putihan*’ (the white ones) in contrast to the red ‘*abangan*’, or less devout Muslims (Magnis-Suseno 1981: 15-18). This movement parallels claims that the 21st century has witnessed ‘the eruption of Islam into the political landscape of the Indonesian nation-state’ (Hasan 2002: 145). Significant here is the link of religion’s influence to wider social changes. Researchers from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies wrote about a militant Islamist trend possibly emerging after the New Order’s fall (Hunter and Mahlow 1998), a promise fulfilled by Indonesian Jihadist organisations such as Laskar Jihad. The rapidity of transformation on social, economic, and political fronts was seen to be provoking a response from religious movements. This response – the ‘*santri*-nization’ – is argued to reflect cultural changes more so than political ones (Lanti 2002).

In the following chapters Islamic discourses and norms will be explored in the context of contemporary gender policies. We will address religion’s role in parliamentary agenda-setting and the pornography bill (Chapter Three), religious influence in regional
programmes and rulings (Chapter Four), and even the perceptions of Islam and gender as articulated by respondents across Java (Chapter Five). Here we simply stress the centrality of religion to the politics of gender in today’s Indonesia.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has examined theories of gender and bodies, asking how these considerations have (or have not) been applied in development contexts. This thesis relies on an understanding of gender with both symbolic and physical elements, particularly as exhibited in the sexed body. Attention has been given to the Indonesian context, focusing on gender, development, and current transformations relating to the political and socio-cultural climate. The aim has not been to make any singular claim, but to give theoretical and historical context for the present research project, and to demonstrate the necessity of accounting for multiple factors when addressing gender and change. In the following chapters we move to the dissertation’s substantive material, starting with gender discourses and policies as constructed and emanating from the ‘centre’.
Chapter Three: Ideas

Gender Discourses and Relational Structures: How Discourses Circulate to Construct the Ideal Indonesian Woman

Having addressed some relevant background – theories of gender, bodies, and the Indonesian political and historical context – we now turn to the fieldwork-based chapters: gender discourses, institutions, and identities. The current chapter focuses on the first dimension, analysing ideas of gender which have political currency in contemporary Indonesia. We will examine gender policies being generated from the ‘centre’ in government ministries in Jakarta. The institutional focus is on the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (MOWE), though other bodies such as UNFPA and parliament will be included. The significance of MOWE as the primary governmental vehicle for gender policies, and thus for this study, was noted in Chapter One.

We first address shifts in Indonesian gender discourses, highlighting the embeddedness of global gender constructs therein. Specifically we will consider the paradigmatic conflict of ‘gender’ as a translated ‘Western’ concept in the Indonesian environment and how this is received. This involves looking at the changing language employed in gender discourse, questioning whether this discourse is only superficially employed and what it may in fact accomplish. Several other ‘keywords’ will be explored briefly, those of woman (wanita/perempuan), empowerment (pemberdayaan), and mainstreaming (pengarusutamaan), to show how Indonesian gender discourses are both rooted in and shaped by global gender paradigms, and the effect this may have. These keywords were

39 The methodology used for this ‘level’ of research is included in the research methods appendix. Overall, conducting research in Jakarta on gender discourses involved my participant observation, gathering primary texts, and interviewing key officials and NGO activists working on gender issues.
selected through careful, inductive coding of interviews and primary source documents. They are arguably the central terminologies for government and development interventions, words that have defined the parameters of both understanding and action.\textsuperscript{40}

The second portion of this chapter moves from keywords to broader prevailing discourses tied to Indonesian gender politics – those of development, religion, and motherhood – analysing how these discursively construct symbolic identities for women and mobilise them toward ordered social tasks. Drawing on John Scott’s typology of social structure, this chapter addresses how policy discourses circulate to reinforce particular relational structures. Specifically, it examines the changing focus from the New Order ‘ranking’ of women’s roles as wife-then-mother to a more modern, naturalising conception as mother-then-wife. We will consider how this depoliticisation works, and to what end, arguing that gender discourses are imbued with normative claims that direct specific modes of action and fundamentally delimit gender roles.

Before beginning, we recall the caveat about organising these three substantive chapters into discourses, institutions, and identities. The dissertation’s analytical approach aims to examine gender policies via the reinforcing spirals of words and materials, policies and institutions, broad level change and personal identity enactment. Here we pay attention to the first element in this gender ‘spiral’, without implying unidirectional causality (i.e. that gender discourses are somehow ‘generated out of thin air’ and then impact social life). The fourth and next chapter will move this discussion forward, analysing how these discourses are mapped onto concrete social structures and have material effect, followed by an

\textsuperscript{40} These four words are not the only ones which might be examined as ‘keywords’; however, they are the most significant ones emerging from interviews and texts, ones that have framed governmental discourses and actions. Another word that could be a ‘keyword’, for example, might be ‘pornography’. But ‘pornography’ will be considered instead in Section 3.2.2a as the policy manifestation of a deeper, latent discourse: that of religion and morality.
examination in Chapter Five of how gender discourses and institutions affect individual perceptions, bodies, and gender identities in the home.

### 3.1 From Gender to Jender and Back Again: Shifts in Language and the Significance of ‘Western’ Words

First we consider what gender discourses accomplish in the realm of ideas. This is an essential first stage, particularly because of the way MOWE claims to be working. MOWE’s Deputy Minister for Gender Mainstreaming described the New Order approach as ‘sifatnya mobilisasi’ (having a mobilising character), whereas now they see the need for changes in gender to be driven from within – ‘sifatnya internalisasi’ (internalisation) (Soeparman, interview 4 August 2005). If institutional focus no longer rests on simply changing structures, but on changing minds and shifting paradigms\(^{41}\) so that people can internalise these new models, it begs the question: what do these new paradigms resemble?

It is important to recognise that there are many positive aspects to this approach, and great sensitivity and understanding on the part of top MOWE officials to the way gender transformations may or may not be possible. But we must question what model of womanhood – however unintentionally – may be constructed through discourses.

Here we will highlight the way international sources have challenged gender policies, which are then perceived to carry a particularly ‘Western flavour’. Indonesia’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom, R. M. Marty Matalegawa, described Indonesian policies as ‘intermestic’ – combining international and domestic themes (2006). Gender policy in Indonesia offers a classic example of this ‘intermestic-ness’. This can be shown by examining gender keywords: how they entered Indonesian discourses, and came to be

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\(^{41}\) MOWE Minister Meutia has also emphasised the need to change ‘mind set’ regarding gender (Khoffifah, interview 25 August 2005).
absorbed and appropriated into bahasa Indonesia. We aim to question these ‘intermestic’ Indonesian gender discourses, carrying with them underlying images which can provoke anti-Western gender constructions. This will lead us in the next section to query the ways in which the discursive construction of the ideal Indonesian woman may be a reaction.

We begin, first, by reflecting more broadly on certain ‘keywords’ in the Indonesian context: gender, woman, empowerment, and mainstreaming. To analyse these keywords, it is useful to keep in mind Alberto Arce’s ‘cartography of development discourses’ (2000: 36). The power of such discourses, he notes, lies in their ability to draw ‘contemporary linguistic maps’: institutional authorities define ‘certainties’ and in doing so they represent these certainties in ‘linguistic reference maps of reality’ (Arce 2000: 36). Critical to this process are language and language representations, without which knowledge cannot be expressed or conveyed. As policy meanings and intentions must be expressed through words, the institution uses words to ‘accomplish technical tasks’ (ibid). These words, embedded in institutions, are employed in particular ways, and actually accomplish the institution’s goals. The cartography of discourses is useful, therefore, to ‘help us to identify forms of linguistic representation and the extent to which they produce rather than reflect their objects of intervention’ (ibid: 37).

3.1.1 Gender → Jender → ‘Gender’

The previous chapter examined gender as a theoretical construct; here we examine how it has been received in Indonesia. As a concept linked to the Western world, ‘gender’ sets the stage for issues of translation and resistance. Bahasa Indonesia has a continually evolving vocabulary with many words appropriated from English, Dutch, and other languages and then ‘Indonesian-ised’, such as the classic ‘asi’ words which remain recognisable from the
This is the case with virtually all words related to gender as discussed and theorised in the international context – and most explicitly, with the word ‘gender’ itself.

When ‘gender’ entered the Indonesian language, it was adopted as an ‘outside’ word, but its spelling was first Indonesian: ‘jender’, as there is no soft ‘g’ in bahasa Indonesia. My 2002 fieldwork saw ‘jender’ used commonly in most government documents. By 2005, however, all the government documents were using the English spelling. When asked about this, MOWE officials noted that an Indonesian language expert had come to Jakarta and stressed the need to revert back to ‘gender’ from ‘jender’, as it was a proper noun needing ‘correct’ spelling. This seemingly innocuous change reflects something more significant. ‘Gender’ is often referred to as a Western concept, not inherently Indonesian. The director of Lampung’s Bureau for Women’s Empowerment spoke about this spelling change. I asked if this might make the word seem even less Indonesian, and therefore more difficult to understand. She replied, tellingly, ‘Well it’s not an Indonesian word anyway, so what does it matter if we spell it the Western way?’ (Istiqomah, interview 12 August 2005).

People are still confused by the term itself, as noted by the MOWE Deputy for Gender Mainstreaming (Soeparman, meeting 22 July 2005). Yet this confusion stems from not only the ‘newness’ of the word, but also its ‘foreignness’, specifically its association with the West. The word was lifted directly from the English, having not existed previously in Indonesian. The underlying paradigms behind the term may not have their parallel in a different language. Often MOWE staff claimed that socialising the term ‘gender’ has

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42 For more on the origin of Indonesian words, see Grijns et al. 1983.
proved difficult, as many dismiss it as a Western concept – a ‘bulé’ concept.\textsuperscript{43} UNFPA’s programme officer at MOWE, managing their gender mainstreaming projects, claimed that at the ‘grassroots’ the lack of understanding of gender is ‘alarming’ (Renosari, interview 25 July 2005). She noted that those in rural areas often told her, for instance, ‘oh, tidak ada gender di sini’ (oh, there is no gender here), or ‘gender sudah bagus di sini’ (gender is already good here). It was therefore problematic explaining gender as the ‘socially constructed relations between men and women’, due in part to language incongruities. Thus she found it easier to explain gender by focusing on the distinction between sex and gender, between biological and social roles, as ‘people seem to be able to grasp this’ (\textit{ibid}).

It is important to consider the implications of gender’s ‘translation’ as an Indonesian term. First, if the only way to make ‘gender’ palatable and intelligible to the majority of Indonesians is to remove it from its greater feminist theorisation, and reduce it to the social roles of men and woman, as distinct from biological sex, this misses out on the concepts of power. It presumes gender roles as given, without questioning their social construction. This is an instrumentalist approach to gender. In the process of simplifying ‘gender’ for explication purposes, this removes gender from its more critical contribution to deconstructing identities and power relations.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{43} Though \textit{bulé} technically means ‘albino’, it is used in the vernacular to refer to Caucasians, or ‘whities’, often with derogatory connotations. It will be used in adjectival form tied to anything ‘Western’ (e.g. pakaian bulé, Western clothing) or as a noun in slang usage (e.g. lihat bulé itu, look at that ‘whitie’).

\textsuperscript{44} Another example of this is the concluding statement of the Deputy Minister for the Empowerment of Community Organisations, at a meeting for the socialisation of gender and empowerment concepts in Bogor, West Java. His final powerpoint slide, to which the whole audience responded, stated: ‘Laki-laki dan perempuan memang beda tetapi tidak boleh di beda-bedakan’ (Men and women are indeed different but cannot be treated differently) (Supiandi, presentation 20 August 2005). This ‘different but equal’ approach is not one that is negative, per se, but it illustrates the ‘givenness’ of gender in policy discourses, rather than challenging gender constructs as the very central idea of ‘gender’ definitionally. In other words, here again we see ‘gender’ conflated with ‘women’, accompanied by the urging to treat them better, ignoring the radical position of gender that would aim to elucidate the very roots of gender constructions.
Second, as ‘gender’ has been perceived as a Western word, its use conjures up notions of a Western model of womanhood. In so doing, its imposition has met with some resistance. This resistance has generated, in contrast, a projection of ideal Indonesian womanhood. For example, as the Westernised woman is often viewed as ‘loose’ and wearing improper clothing, the Indonesian woman will be moral and modestly covered. Where the Westerner has ‘rude children’ and is caught up in her career, the Indonesian must never neglect her children and instead focus her efforts on them (Halida, interview 15 August 2005).

The ideational construction of the ‘Indonesian woman’ will be explored further in the next section, more specifically in the context of an ‘anti-Western’ projection of womanhood. The claim, here, is that this process illustrates precisely what Foucault depicts as resistance to a dominant discourse. Indonesian appropriation of the ‘gender’ concept may occur at a policy level, and has generated real effects as to the discursive construction of ideal womanhood. At the same time, it is important to recognise that ‘gender’ socialisation has occurred more in urban areas and amidst educated circles. Among the village interviews, there remains unfamiliarity with the term, implying some limits to its reach.

### 3.1.2 Woman: *Wanita → Perempuan*

Another word central to gender discourses – possessing etymological, historical, and strategic significance – is that for ‘woman’. In *bahasa Indonesia* there are two words used for woman: *wanita* and *perempuan*. Understanding how, and when, these words have gained prominence reveals the mobilising interest of the state, allowing us to question the

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45 It is important to note that I am not referring here to a ‘real’ Western model of womanhood, or even claiming that one such exists. Rather, it is significant that there is perceived to be one, whether explicitly discussed or not.

46 The example was given of ‘tega eklas’, a Javanese phrase that carries normative weight; a women does not want to be described as *tega eklas* because it would mean she was not being a good mother and ignoring the needs of her child (Tuti, interview 19 August 2005).
implications of a shift in ‘superficial’ discourse. Both words for ‘woman’ are reflected in
the very name change of MOWE. In its earliest formation in 1988, it stood as the Ministry
of Women’s Role (Menteri Negara Urusan Peranan Wanita). In 2001 it received its
current moniker: the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (Menteri Negara Pemberdayaan
Perempuan). Immediately evident is that the word for ‘woman’ is different. ‘Wanita’, a
word used commonly from the Japanese occupation in the 1940s till Suharto’s fall in 1998,
has now been changed in official policy documents and prose back to ‘perempuan’.

When investigated through interviews, this shift was described as tied to words’ Javanese
Sanskrit roots. ‘Per-empu-an’ has ‘empu’ as its root, which describes someone with
wisdom, intelligence, and authority, someone you go to for advice. It is the word used not
only in contemporary Indonesian, but also during the first four decades of the 20th century
(Blackburn 2004: ix). ‘Wanita’, on the other hand, is comprised of wani and tata, where
‘tata’ refers to being managed, and ‘wani’ implies ‘willing to’ or ‘brave enough to be’.

Additionally, wanita has been said to carry more ‘respectable’ connotations than
perempuan, much like ‘lady’ in English (Blackburn 2004: x). Etymologically, the shift
symbolises a change in perception. More concretely, ‘wanita’ was the word used by the
New Order government, e.g. kodrat wanita, Dharma Wanita. ‘Perempuan’, on the other
hand, was the word used by NGOs in Indonesia, so when Ibu Khofifah became the Minister
in 2001 she wanted to use perempuan to be closer to the grassroots and NGOs (Kristiyanti,

To analyse the shifts between these two different words, we can examine the broader
linkages between Indonesian historical periods and word choice. What this shows is that
state interests tend to coincide with the circulation of a particular word for ‘woman’. When
‘perempuan’ was being used by the Indonesian elites in the first part of the 20th century, this was during the Dutch colonial period and that of early Indonesian nationalism. Colonial gender ideology impacted the women’s movement during this period, as Western education facilitated a stronger, more outspoken, and even bourgeois female elite (Blackburn 2004: 17-20).

After Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, there was a shift back toward use of the word ‘wanita’. President Sukarno was leading a country that was trying to establish itself as respectable and modern;47 now women were referred to by a word depicting the more civilised and reputable ‘lady’. Sukarno argued in his polemical work Sarinah (1963) that women’s responsibilities were to the nation, and that national unity was more important than women’s issues. When President Suharto came to power in 1966, the New Order government demanded stability, and the basis of social order was derived in no small part from the establishment of a strongly gendered hierarchy within which every woman – every wanita – ‘knew her place’.

Then in 1998 there was a break from autocracy, and with it came another linguistic shift – back to using ‘perempuan’. The optimistic view sees this as positive, because the word for woman implies someone strong and capable. More cynically, this can be viewed in light of historical patterns of state interest: mobilising a more active woman to participate in development, freedom, and ‘progress’. This woman, this perempuan, displays agency, only now it must be accompanied by much more subtle forms of pressure to mobilise women toward particular roles and tasks. The way this happens will be explored further in the following sections on specific discourses of development, morality, and motherhood.

47 Consider, for example, Indonesia’s role in hosting the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955.
Another approach considers the impact and implications of *perempuan*’s current use. First, as with ‘gender’, we might ask the extent to which *perempuan* is used outside of central policy circles. At the Bandung regional office, the head of the sub-programme for increasing women’s rights noted that although they have to use *perempuan* in formal documents, in the villages they still use *wanita* (Guswandi, interview 1 August 2005). Yet this disjuncture may be more fundamental than that between slow-moving levels of bureaucracy. Relating back to the foundational shift toward processes of ‘*internalisasi*’, we see that gender discourses relate not simply to programmatic interventions but to the very construction of ‘woman’. Individual men and women in Indonesia still use the word *wanita* interchangeably with *perempuan*; the ‘reach’ of this language is limited.

Second, switching to *perempuan* may be another example of an instrumentalist shift, such that discourses gain legitimacy as they circulate and are used. That is, when words like ‘gender’ or ‘*perempuan*’ become part of policy discourse, superficially this may satisfy different programme aims. For instance, we consider the example of ‘gender equity’, considered central to UNFPA work in Indonesia (UNFPA 2002: 4). How to measure this proves problematic. The official sub-programme of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’ attempts to bring gender issues to the forefront of political discourse (UNFPA 2001e). This is then measured by the number and extent of seminars, meetings, official public statements, training notes, and advocacy materials that reflect gender matters. In other words, programme attempts to raise gender awareness are successful based on the increased use and reach of gender discourse itself. This implies that using a more positive word for ‘woman’ in policy documents, and changing project names to reflect this, can prove a
superficial change whose ends are accomplished simply by the reproduction of language. Knowing the ‘right words’ becomes its own end.

3.1.3 Empowerment: Pemberdayaan

MOWE’s name change also uses ‘empowerment’ (pemberdayaan), instead of ‘women’s role’. Pemberdayaan thus represents another keyword that has been appropriated into bahasa Indonesia and permeates policy discourse – considered foundational to MOWE’s aims, and a core value of UNFPA’s work in Indonesia (UNFPA 2002: 4). The word’s increasing use reflects its embeddedness within global gender discourses, the complexities of translation, and the dangers of instrumentalist application. Chapter Two noted empowerment’s centrality to gender programmes worldwide, as empowerment has become ‘an uncritically accepted goal’ of most of the development community (Parpart 2002: 41). However, the term has remained contested and abstract; so ‘empowerment’ in development has often posed problems of conceptual consistency and practical implementation. While Indonesia has appropriated the trend toward ‘empowerment initiatives’, there have been similar difficulties in theorisation and application.

First, the concept itself has lacked clarity. In the Indonesian iteration, there is arguably a lack of attention to the question of power. Pemberdayaan is a word that has only recently entered the Indonesian vernacular. It is so new, in fact, that an 11 October 2006 search of KAMUS-online.com, the largest Indonesian-English dictionary on the internet, translated pemberdayaan rather poorly as ‘the efficiency of using something’, rather than as ‘empowerment’. At a 2005 socialisation meeting in Bogor, the MOWE Deputy Minister

48 The online dictionary had correct definitions for the root words of pemberdayaan: berdaya (to have power) and daya (power). Bahasa is a language with extensive use of morfologi (morphology), where root words are given prefixes and suffixes to develop new meanings, so it is not unusual that a ‘morphed’ word can have
for Community Organisation Empowerment had to start his presentation by defining the very word *pemberdayaan*, as it was unfamiliar to many there. He began by saying that its use does not imply that people in Indonesia do not already have power (*berdaya*), but that social structures and organisations have to be ‘empowered’ in order for real change and progress to happen. The definition of *pemberdayaan* that he offered from a 2002 dictionary (*Kamus Besar Indonesia*) was two-fold: 1) the process or means of making something empowered (strong, capable); and 2) the process of ‘capacity building’ to increase functions and roles (Supiandi, presentation 20 August 2005).

Both these explications of empowerment are somewhat troublesome. The first definition implies someone doing the empowering – it is a top-down approach that maintains a power differential (the one ‘doing’ the empowering versus the one ‘receiving’ it). Second, the notion of ‘capacity building’ is not only another foreign concept being introduced, but also one with conflated and sometimes unclear meanings. This will be explored further in Chapter Six regarding UNFPA work. To explain that ‘empowerment’ occurs as a result of ‘capacity building’ is vague at best, circular at worst: ‘capacity building’ can be understood to imply such a range of activity so as to be almost as abstract as ‘empowerment’ in usage. Furthermore, noting that empowerment results from increased ‘functions and roles’ limits it to the realm of the concrete and measurable, a type of power that is ‘power over’ rather than power within, or a one-dimensional view.50

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49 ‘Capacity building’ is another example of a Western phrase appropriated without translation into *bahasa* Indonesia, or even spelling; e.g. there is no hard ‘c’ in *bahasa*, such that a ‘c’ always makes a ‘ch’ sound, so keeping the spelling is unintelligible for those who are not already familiar with its concept. Additionally, the word for ‘capacity’ itself is ‘*kapasitas*’, but ‘capacity building’ as a construct is accepted uniformly.

50 Different types of power, including this notion of ‘power over’, are explored further in Appendix F.
Conceptual ambiguity aside, the ‘application’ of empowerment initiatives is also problematic. If MOWE programmes aim to empower women, but a one-dimensional view of power underlies the approach, ultimately this may reinforce hierarchies of position and knowledge, rather than challenge deeper structures of inequality. An example is illustrative. In the villages, the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN), in collaboration with UNFPA, holds monthly sosialisasi (socialisation) meetings for village women and their husbands. At one 2002 meeting in desa Sukarasa, Bandung, the BKKBN fieldworker set forth to ‘socialise’ two concepts – the increasing danger of narcotics, especially for adolescents, and concepts of gender and gender equality. Displaying what has been referred to as the ‘banking concept of education’ (Friere 1997: 52-67; cf. Dewey 1938), she presented a definition of gender: the general population’s view, which differentiates the social responsibilities of men and women. The women in attendance then repeated this definition back to her in unison, several times, until they were able to say it without prompting. Significantly, this meeting demonstrated the goals of the new paradigm, wherein the socialisation of ideas is central to the changes being sought. If applied in such a way, a discourse touting gender equity becomes women intoning definitions, without addressing the ‘root causes’ of their unequal standing. The danger of a superficial theoretical base, and instrumentalist application of discourses, therefore becomes that change and development can be reduced to simplistic ‘information transfer’.

Where ‘empowerment’, then, is a word wielded instrumentally to legitimate a range of interventions, without proper consideration given to its context or the power relationships therein, this can be seen in two ways. Optimistically, this may be an unintentional circumvention of the ‘true’ meaning of empowerment. More cynically, this process may veil the more strategic interests at stake, maintaining hierarchies by keeping separate those
who ‘need empowerment’ from those who do the ‘empowering’. This recalls similar processes of legitimation in circularity, as ‘empowerment’ becomes central to discourse but is not queried – and part of its attainment is simply getting people to ‘speak the lingo’.

3.1.4 Mainstreaming: Pengarusutamaan

A final ‘keyword’ to analyse is that of mainstreaming – *pengarusutamaan* – which highlights the embeddedness of global concerns in Indonesian policies, as well as the trade-off between international legitimacy and domestic initiative. Chapter Two examined the origin of ‘gender mainstreaming’ in development, which became the prevalent discourse and means through which ‘gender’ is introduced into national planning. This critiqued the ways mainstreaming has influenced broader ‘devspeak’ without fully living up to its definition. Mainstreaming has only recently become part of both Indonesian vernacular and institutional frameworks. The word itself is built out of *arus* (stream, flow of water) and *utama* (main, most important, prominent): quite literally, to put the important things in the stream. Yet it remains a term that has to be explained to people, often by breaking down its root components.

*Pengarusutamaan* is another example of Indonesian policy being ‘intermestic’, imbued with an international agenda, but not always with a compelling or complete domestic ‘translation’. In addition, not only has the concept been introduced externally, but the agencies most focused on implementing gender mainstreaming initiatives are international organisations. For instance, during my internship at MOWE, the two meetings held on mainstreaming issues were run by UNFPA (22 July 2005) and CIDA\(^{51}\) (26 August 2005).

\(^{51}\) CIDA is the Canadian International Development Agency.
These brought together representatives from various government departments (e.g. Finance, Health, Education) but were organised, funded, and run by UNFPA and CIDA.

MOWE only introduced *pengarusutamaan* into its structure in 2005, appointing a Deputy of Gender Mainstreaming to run one of its five divisions. Upon being questioned about the change in organisation, this Deputy explained that it was linked to a ‘global dynamic’: when WID strategies proved insufficient to integrate gender into development paradigms, Indonesia decided to go along with gender mainstreaming as part of its national commitments until, finally, ‘*dinamika global tercermin di negeri ini*’ (the global dynamic is reflected in this country) (Soeparman, interview 4 August 2005). The Executive Secretary of MOWE echoed this, noting that gender mainstreaming is ‘*paling utama*’ (most important) in keeping with international agreements and consensus on gender (Wahyurini, interview 31 August 2005).

None of this intends to question the sincere intentions of those engaged in gender mainstreaming. Change is occurring, however slowly, with many government departments promoting gender sensitivity. However, ‘mainstreaming’ was introduced to the national development agenda originally – and perhaps primarily – because of its general popularity with the international development set. This increases the difficulty of successful implementation. As with the other keywords, where increased usage becomes their own legitimation, ‘gender mainstreaming’ risks being limited to the realm of discourse alone: more people, and more government departments, use the term, but action is limited.

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52 This resonates with much of the general discourse surrounding the international agreements Indonesia has committed to, such as Indonesia’s ratification of CEDAW (the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women) in 1984.
Reflexive analysis is relevant here, as I was tasked to write a report for the Indonesian Ministry of Development of Disadvantaged Areas (PDT) in September 2006. The report contended that gender should be mainstreamed throughout the Ministry, rather than having only sectoralised projects for women within one division. Quite telling is how I saw the need to ‘argue my case’. The report explored how ‘what may appear to be simple problems of “development” and “development planning” are actually related to the social roles of men and women, the sexual division of labour, the allocation of power in society, and the varied levels of access men and women have to public and private resources’ (Love 2006a).

Yet demonstrating the centrality of gender constructs to development efforts was not the main ‘selling point’ for the Minister. Instead, the report claimed:

Ensuring that PDT is in line with global concerns recognising the significance of gender and development […] will allow PDT to have not only the international credibility for its programmes but also the know-how to guarantee its grassroots projects will have a better chance of being successful (Love 2006a: Executive Summary, emphasis added).

It was this aspect that convinced the Minister to consider applying gender mainstreaming to PDT’s programmes – that it was accepted globally as central to development efforts. This reflects the trend of mainstreaming projects as embedded within, and dictated by, international agreements, without necessarily a corresponding integration into national paradigms and structures.

3.2 The Discursive Construction of Women: Exploring Themes of Development, Religion, and Motherhood

Thus there has been a shift in Indonesia toward employing international discourses of gender, women, empowerment, and mainstreaming. Yet these may be superficial, cloaking contested views of ‘womanhood’ in a language of internationally derived legitimacy.
Underneath this seeming consensus, the ‘ideal Indonesian woman’ is being constructed discursively in symbolic, and contradictory, ways.

We will consider three areas where discourses are mobilising distinct gender identities: women as good citizens, good Muslims, and good mothers. These comprise the most significant and repeated themes implicit within Indonesian gender policies; they refer, therefore, not to general societal discourses, but to policy more specifically. For example, we consider the key vision statement in MOWE’s Strategic Plan, referred to commonly as the Renstrat (from Rencana Strategis): ‘To bring into being gender equality and justice and child welfare and protection in the lives of the family, society, and the nation’. These three spheres correlate generally to the three discourses being explored, which impact the ideational construction of the Indonesian woman. Significantly, the Renstrat’s statement tends to be interpreted not to emphasise women’s freedoms, but rather their responsibilities, in these spheres – as mothers in the family, moral figures in the broader community, and development participants in the nation. In a further contradiction, this happens in a way that tends to reduce the notion of women from one of active subjects to one of delineated identities. For instance, women and children are increasingly inseparable in policy discourse; not only does this constrict women to an archetypal motherhood, it also constructs them as ‘less-than-adult’, bracketed with children and in need of protection.

The next chapter will explore the ways programmes and institutions reinforce these discourses materially. The focus here is how these primary identities for women are

53 It is important to note that this was my translation, as I translated the entire Renstrat into English for the Ministry. It is this vision statement in English, however, that they use on their official website (viewable at http://www.menegpp.go.id/Eng/menegpp.php). The Indonesian original uses four words, not three: ‘berkeluarga, bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara’, literally meaning ‘in the family, as a society, as a population/people, and as a nation’. I grouped the two middle words together and translated them as simply ‘society’.
influenced through competing discourses of development, religion, and gender overall. We will examine how women are symbolically and conceptually constructed through the generation of the ‘ideal Indonesian woman’ as nation-builder and God-fearer, and ultimately, as mother.

3.2.1 Women as Nation-builders: The Discourse of Development

One of the most powerful, if understated, discourses circulating to delineate Indonesian women’s identities is that of development. Earlier we noted the shift in usage toward ‘perempuan’ for ‘woman’, implying a more active agent, and how this might demand more subtle forms of mobilisation toward state interests. This mobilisation takes place through the continuing, implicit development discourse, which constructs women’s gender identities as nation-builders, and therefore serves to organise women’s role toward that specific end. Here we analyse this process, showing how ‘development’ continues to frame gender interventions, often instrumentally. The next section will apply these arguments through reflexive analysis of policy formulation and legitimation.

The previous chapter discussed the centrality of ‘pembangunan’ (development) consciousness to Indonesian politics. It showed that the persistence of pembangunan in usage – representing the type of development that can be managed, constructed, and ordered – highlights the government’s mobilising tendencies toward development. This impacts the way women participate in development: it is notionally participatory but practically top-down. Modernisation and development must be directed, and women’s role in pembangunan fostered. The result is an instrumentalist approach to women’s role, and this has a long history in the Indonesian government’s mobilisation of women toward
specific national goals.\textsuperscript{54} For example, the first sentence of the 1999 report of the Ministry for Women’s Role (later renamed to MOWE), says: ‘Women, both as national citizens and as resources for development, have the standing, rights and responsibilities, and opportunities equal to men in order to play a role in development in all areas and levels’ (MOWE 1999: 2, translation mine). In other words, ensuring women have ‘equal standing’ with men is important insofar as it fosters developmental goals. Women are a ‘resource’ for development, cast as objects and not as active subjects, reflecting the mobilising tendencies of the New Order even in a post-\textit{Reformasi} context.

The mid-term national development plan for 2004-2009, referred to as the RPJM (\textit{Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah}), marks the clearest link between development policy and gender equity. The RPJM is the overriding ‘blueprint’ for the Indonesian state’s actions and interventions over a five-year period. Its twelfth chapter outlines ways to improve the quality of life for women and increase child’s welfare. Yet the arguments made for improving women’s position, and the ways to measure this, are tied inexorably to development initiatives and measures. For example, the second of the RPJM’s four primary objectives focuses on ‘decreasing the gap between men and women in development attainments, as measured by the GDI and the GEM’ (MOWE 2004a). Hence any fundamental measure of gender equity is based on ‘equity in development’, on the fair contribution toward, and benefit from, developmental progress. Furthermore, both the GDI (gender development index) and the GEM (gender empowerment measure) are large-scale statistics produced and validated externally, and tied to development paradigms and measures. The GDI measures the same variables as the HDI (human development index), though adjusting for gender inequalities in three areas – life expectancy, literacy and gross

\textsuperscript{54} During the New Order, the Indonesian government always pointed to the ‘need for women to “participate” in various sectors of development’ (Suryakusuma 2004: 170), as articulated in all of its five-year development plans, or \textit{Repelita}.
enrolment, and income (UNDP 2006). This is not to say that measuring progress along development objectives is a ‘bad thing’, merely to illustrate that ‘gender’ – and measures of gender equality – inevitably are tied to and measured by development constructs.

Historically, women’s role within development was considered important in Indonesia. However, the assumption that women were not involved in the public realm – and therefore not assisting development sufficiently – drove programmes such as P2W, ‘Peningkatan Peranan Wanita’ (Increasing Women’s Role). P2W was the major project created under the Ministry of Women’s Role from 1993-1998, under Minister Rini Soerojo. Its aim was clear: to increase women’s participation in development both in urban and rural areas (MOWE 1999: 2). This had the potential to be positive for women. The Ministry’s claim was that as women became a ‘sumber daya’ (resource) for development, they were better able to attain their rights and fulfil their responsibilities (ibid). Yet this sort of discourse continued to portray women’s relative improvements instrumentally.

This development discourse has continued to structure meaning and project direction, even if it is no longer given the same explicit emphasis. For example, although P2W today is not one of MOWE’s central-level programmes, it still exists in the regions because of its familiarity in many villages. Yet although the institutional frameworks remain much the same (e.g. in West Java), P2W in most places has moderated its name to P2WKSS, ‘Peningkatan Peranan Wanita menuju Keluarga Sehat Sejahtera’ (Increasing Women’s Role toward Family Health and Welfare). Other regions have changed the name even further to reflect the shift from ‘wanita’ to ‘perempuan’, making it P3KSS (e.g. in South Sumatra). P2W’s renaming fits the pattern of discursive change, as reflected in particular keywords, discussed throughout. Interestingly, this slight change in focus and name also
shows that, while the programme remains harnessed to developmental objectives, it has been modified through a focus on the family and women’s role therein. This reinforces the vision of woman as mother, which will be discussed in some depth in Section 3.2.3.

Furthermore, the instrumentalism of women’s role in development still permeates policy discourses. The Deputy Minister for Gender Mainstreaming stated that women need to be seen as ‘assets’ and ‘subjects’ of development, because the problem is that they are still ‘left behind’ and so become a ‘beban’, burden, on development (Soeparman, interview 4 August 2005). Where regions do not yet realise this, they will not prioritise helping women. If women are not subjects of development, they will not make an appropriate contribution, and therefore become this burden. The Deputy Minister concluded by saying that women need to be in the public domain, and not just the private one (ibid). These sentiments were echoed by leaders of Kowani, the National Women’s Congress, who argued firmly for nationalism to improve women’s condition. Kowani leaders noted that only when women became nation-builders, increasing their role in development, would they be empowered (Agum Gumelar, interview 2 August 2005).

In various other governmental offices, similar sentiments were expressed. For instance, the head of the Lampung Bureau of Women’s Empowerment (South Sumatra) noted that their office measured gender justice and equality through participation in, and benefiting from, development (Istiqomah, interview 12 August 2005). Women would be considered ‘empowered’ if they could use and enjoy the fruits of development (ibid). The discourse of women benefiting from development is common throughout government offices. This is not to say that women should not participate in development or enjoy its rewards. But the instrumentalist approach to women in development recalls earlier 1970s WID (Women in
Development) formulations of how to help women, rather than more nuanced GAD (Gender and Development) understandings.

3.2.1a Research and Reflexivity: Participation in the Development Discourse

As noted previously, the dissertation’s methodology places the researcher as an active participant. Therefore, it is important to analyse briefly the ways I utilised the ‘pembangunan rhetoric’ to argue for greater attention to gender needs, when working with the Indonesian Ministry of Development of Disadvantaged Areas (Kementerian Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal, referred to as PDT) during 2006. This reflexive examination is revealing: in the context of development, the need to explicate gender’s centrality to social life – even with the best of intentions – can lead to almost inevitable slippages between ‘gender’ as a theoretical concept and reified as a means to an end, and also between ‘gender’ and ‘women’ (no matter how often reiterated as including men).

The second in-depth report that I wrote for PDT’s minister was entitled ‘Toward Sustainable and Equitable Development in Disadvantaged Areas: The Need for a Gender-Sensitive Plan, Process, and Programme’. Its Executive Summary argues, after some explanation of gender, that:

Without attention to gender, development projects may be ultimately unsuccessful and inequitable. The goal is not to have sectoralised projects for women, but rather to recognise that development interventions have differential impacts on men and women, and that gender relations themselves affect the ways and means through which development occurs (Love 2006a).

The report concludes that ‘gender-sensitive programming is critical to achieving PDT’s objectives’ (ibid). The writing process highlights some of the difficulties posed to the policymaker. I was writing to emphasise the need for gender sensitivity. However, I had to do so in a way that appealed to the need and desire for development. The goal remains
development – but that of a ‘sustainable and equitable’ development, necessitating greater gender sensitivity.

Two considerations arise. The first is one of audience. As this report was written for the Minister of Development of Disadvantaged Areas, it is somewhat obvious that it would focus on development paradigms and aims. However, the deeper issue is one of political will and agenda. Development is the prevailing and dominant discourse – ‘everyone wants development’. Sensitivity to and understanding of ‘gender’, on the other hand, is less familiar within national ministries and requires explication. This means that arguments for gender are often framed by, and subsumed within, the overall development discourse.

Naila Kabeer has made similar claims, noting that ‘advocacy on behalf of women which builds on claimed synergies between feminist goals and official development priorities has made greater inroads into the mainstream development agenda than advocacy which argues for these goals on intrinsic grounds’ (1999: 435).

The second issue is one of the positivist demands of policy-making. It is excellent to challenge gender constructions and power relations in theory, but when designing a project it is far too easy to slip into focusing on women vis-à-vis men (or vice-versa). Again, as Kabeer has articulated, ‘advocacy for feminist goals alone takes the policy maker out of familiar terrain and into the nebulous territory of power and social injustice’ (1999: 435). Thus, for example, the report on gender described a potential pilot project, as the minister requested. This pilot project took the form of a ‘Women in Peacebuilding’ initiative for various reasons, and was intended to be a visible action for PDT. Though stressing that men had to be consulted as well, the report’s primary emphasis was on increasing women’s political and economic participation in post-conflict regions. This project was tangible,
measurable, highlighted women’s role, and – perhaps most significantly – tied back into donor objectives. The World Bank was interested in funding the Ministry for a project on ‘Women in Peacebuilding’, as opposed to another less popular, less visible project. This brings us back full circle, therefore, to the initial consideration of audience, where the audience are not only those needing convincing of a policy measure, but those funding it.

### 3.2.2 Women as God-fearers: The Discourse of Morality and Islam

Having considered how development discourse frames gender interventions, constructing the Indonesian woman as nation-builder, we turn to another dominant discourse affecting gender roles: that of Islam. Here, the ideal Indonesian woman is depicted as God-fearer, guardian of family virtue, and moral through the symbolic covering of her head with the *jilbab*, or headscarf. Earlier, we noted that the ‘Indonesian woman’ is discursively constructed in opposition to the perceived ‘Western woman’. This process becomes clearer if we examine the rise of Islamic norms in Indonesia. We recall the introductory chapter, which situated gender politics in Indonesia in the context of increasing polarisation with the symbolic West. Chapter Two then described the ways in which Islam has become increasingly central to the Indonesian political climate. The rise of Islamic norms and discourses parallels an association of ‘feminism’ and ‘free women’ with the West, particularly symbolically with regard to clothing (Munir, interview 27 August 2005).

Although we refer to Islam as a discourse impacting women, in reality it is a complex imbrication of discourse and practice. As Islam becomes more significant in Indonesia as a politics of identity, this ‘identity’ is often writ large on women’s bodies. To begin to describe this discursive construction, and how it has affected everything from policies to women’s bodies, first we note the increasingly fundamentalist and polarised Islamic
Next we explore the ‘jilbabisation’ phenomenon, analysing it from opposing viewpoints that account for power and individual agency, and then from the perspective of wider trends and tensions in ‘re-traditionalisation’. The following section will examine pornography policy debates, illustrating further the material impact of religious discourses.

Over the past few years, polls from the respected Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, or LSI) have painted the portrait of an increasingly polarised political climate, wherein ‘radical Islam’ is gaining ground. LSI released a March 2006 report showing that religious radicalism – which aims for the establishment of Islamic norms and law in Indonesia – has considerable support from Indonesian Muslims. The report went into great detail about what this would entail; strikingly, it demonstrated that nearly one in ten Indonesian Muslims supports the use of violence for religious purposes (LSI March 2006). Specific questions were asked about Islamic sharia law, many of which relate to sexual norms and gender relations; for example, 48% of respondents in January of 2006 agreed with stoning for adultery, 34% agreed that women should not become president, and 52% agreed that more inheritance should go to sons than daughters (ibid).

Central to this strengthening of fundamentalist Islam is how it is viewed oppositionally to the ‘West’, and how this translates into norms for women in particular. The Jakarta Post published the results of a survey in March 2006 showing that 62% of Indonesians believed that ‘Western culture brings more harm to Muslims in Indonesia’ (Sijabat 2006). A senior researcher at LSI, Anis Baswedan, was quoted in the Post saying that strong support for conservatism and radicalism was very much tied to public perceptions of the ‘negative

It is important to note that there are also Islamic intellectuals in Indonesia who use Islam to challenge gender inequalities and to push for things such as human rights, such as Dr. Siti Musdah Mulia, a well-known (and somewhat controversial) Islamic scholar in the Department of Religious Affairs. In other words, it is not simply a case of a monolithic imposition of a particular religious discourse, as there is also evidence of resistance.
influence of Western culture’ and the global injustice blamed on the United States as representative of the West (ibid). Around the same time, Hidayat Nur Wahid, chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and former leader of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), spoke out on the question of social morality, saying that ‘the moral behaviour of our younger generations at present is being slowly eroded by Western culture’ (Antara News 2006).

This theme runs through many political-religious discourses: the decline in Indonesian values is based on Western imposition, and reacting to this has a clear impact on the construction of women’s gender roles. During fieldwork interviews at all levels of government, officials discussed the necessity of women’s religious roles and good virtue. For example, high-level Indonesian staff at UNFPA headquarters in September 2004, when asked at an informal meeting about major problems facing the country, stressed that it was a problem of morality. When questioned further if this meant simply ‘governmental corruption’, the UNFPA Assistant Representative herself said in clear terms that the problem was societal immorality, and the general lack of God-fearing citizens. Yet this need for ‘God-fearing citizens’ in fact meant more specifically ‘God-fearing women’. For instance, the head of Kowani made it clear that one of their three foundational principles is that of budi pekerti, good and virtuous character, and that it is women who must be these moral teachers (Agum Gumelar, interview 2 August 2005).

This language of morality thus borrows legitimacy from Islam’s ascendance as a cultural ideology, and links directly to constructed images of the ideal woman. Most importantly, this construction of the ideal woman is both discursive and material. The best example is
that of ‘jilbabisation’, or ‘jilbabisation’, a term used to describe the increase in women’s wearing of the Islamic headcovering throughout Indonesia (though examined here principally in Java). Religious discourses have a visual-symbolic impact on women more than men, for it is women more and more who wear the jilbab. When I lived in Bandung in the 1980s, it was not often that one would see a woman wearing the jilbab. Suzanne Brenner, who conducted research in Lawéyan (central Java) in the late 80s, noted that when young ‘reformist’ Muslim women began to wear the jilbab they were branded ‘fanatik’ by residents of their neighbourhoods, who thought the clothing was a Middle Eastern custom that had no place in Indonesia and that one could be a good Muslim without ‘dressing like an Arab’ (1998: 232-233). Yet by 2005 the jilbab was commonly accepted as the ‘proper’ form of dress for respectable Muslim women in Java and elsewhere. In Bandung today there is a clear divide between ‘secular dressers’ and the majority of middle-class woman in their head scarves.

There are different ways to analyse this jilbabisation. One angle examines the way the jilbab marks status, maintains hierarchies, and may be coercive. There is often a measure of socio-economic status attached to the jilbab in government offices. At each regional branch of MOWE that I visited across Java and South Sumatra, the higher-level female officials all wore perfectly matched jilbabs and accessories, whereas many of the lower-level staff had their heads uncovered. This is common in cities as well, as the more educated and middle- to upper-class woman are reflecting their status through the jilbab. Furthermore, the Director of LBH-APIK (the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation for

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56 I took part in a gathering (7 August 2005) of some of Indonesia’s most famous feminists, including Gadis Arivia (the founder of Jurnal Perempuan and lecturer at the University of Indonesia) and Julia Suryakusuma (author of Sex, Power, and Nation and current Jakarta Post columnist), among others. Much of the discussion revolved around this current phenomenon of ‘jilbabisation’, which was perceived differently by those attending, but was commonly accepted as a trend demanding critical attention and having potentially detrimental effects.

57 The jilbab is worn everywhere outside the home, not only in ‘public’ spaces such as work.
Women) noted there were issues of ‘fear’ involved: although the jilbab may be a matter of lifestyle for the middle class – a way of thinking and fitting in for women – for the lower classes it is already becoming something pushed on them, a ‘tekanan’ (pressure from above) (Munti, interview 24 August 2005). For example, a Surat Keputusan (local ruling) in Padang in 2005 made it mandatory for women to wear the jilbab on Fridays (the Muslim holy day), regardless of their religion.

The second view of jilbabisasi accepts greater agency on the part of the women involved, recognising the process as a complex appropriation of, and adaptation to, new social practice. This allows for greater complexity than mere coercion. Writing on Iran, Azari notes that young women adopted the veil because ‘the restriction imposed on them by an Islamic order was […] a small price that had to be paid in exchange for the security, stability and presumed respect this order promised them’ (1983: 68). In a time of transition, in an era of change, Indonesian women may actively choose to wear the jilbab. Though it can be argued that this head-covering symbolises oppression, women may view it simply as a ‘patriarchal bargain’ they make to usher in greater security and stability (Kandiyoti 1988).

In this case, the jilbab is no longer a simple demarcation of lesser status, but rather one of a strategic decision to generate order out of uncertainty.

The way individual women describe the jilbab as just a ‘fashion statement’ – a comment repeated by many of the women I asked (often those in positions of authority) – demonstrates how something can be re-worked materially such that it also changes symbolically. The jilbab in Indonesia takes multiple, distinct visual forms as a head covering, quite different from the stricter chador or burqa of Saudi Arabia, for example. Many of the young intellectual Muslim women wear all white or lighter colours, very
loosely flowing coverings over their dress. If they are particularly devout they may wear wrist bands and socks to prevent exposure of wrists and ankles. But most common are the brightly coloured, and neatly accessorised, head scarves, which can be made of different kinds of material ranging from standard polyester to very expensive cloth, or be tied in many ways (pinned under the chin, loosely gathered with a brooch, with or without an inset ‘brim’ over the forehead, etc). Individuality can thus be expressed through jilbab fashions, often a way of simultaneously marking piety and class status.

The third angle steps back from the level of individual inculcation and adaptation to consider broader tensions, given the perceived encroachment of ‘Western immorality’ in the context of increased political polarisation with the West (and specifically the United States). As the discourse of religion circulates to reinforce the very powerful notion of the ideal woman as God-fearer, this has material effect in the visual-symbolic change in women’s clothing. Whether strictly enforced in some cases or merely a way that women have to ‘fit in’, the jilbab marks an explicit visible shift for women. Yet as many Indonesians emphasise, this is taking place in the context of seeking to ‘reclaim’ their culture against Westernised modernisation. Toward this end, many of the debates on clothing, morality, religion, and women are cast as ‘re-traditionalisation’ – i.e. that the language of religion and morality impresses upon people the need to avoid modern excesses and ‘return to’ religious values, which in turn implicates women and women’s bodies centrally.

However, I would argue that this ‘re-traditionalisation’ is the imposition of something very new, wrought in opposition to what is seen as the advance of ‘Western, loose morals’ upon Indonesian culture. This becomes clear if we consider, for example, a statement made by
the Head of the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, the Indonesian Ulemas Council) in March of 2006, when he was asked about the MUI position on the anti-pornography bill. He responded by saying that cultural clothing in Indonesia that leaves too much of the body uncovered – for example, clothing worn by tribes in Kalimantan or Papua – should be put in a museum, remembered as a part of the country’s history but not its current society (Margianto 13 March 2006). This statement claims the past has no place in the present. Yet historically many of Indonesia’s varied ethnic groups have incorporated dress and dance that are very sensual and even erotic, such as the kebaya dress popular in Java and Bali that is traditionally made of sheer material and emphasises women’s curves, or the Sundanese dangdut dance that employs a ‘drilling’ motion of the hips seen as provocative by many. While we cannot here assess the full sum of Indonesian cultural traditions, it is clear is that there are many traditional styles of dress and custom that would be inimical to the more conservative portrait painted by contemporary religious discourses addressing Indonesian women.

3.2.2a Pornography and Pornoaksi: Women’s Bodies in the Public Eye

It is useful to consider a specific example of recent political legislation that links both religious discourses and the ‘politics of the body’. One can argue that discourses of morality and religion have driven parliament’s attempt to legislate sexuality through the pornography and ‘pornoaksi’ (pornographic behaviour) bill, the first draft of which appeared in 2003 but was put before parliament officially in February of 2006 (Rancangan Undang-Undang Antipornografi dan Pornoaksi, shortened as RUU APP). As of October 58 In fact, the dangdut dance has provoked debates over whether this is an affront to moral society and should be permitted to continue. A dangdut dancer named Inul Daratista rose to fame with her sensual style, sparking political controversy as described in many Asia-wide publications (LaMoshi 2003; Walsh and Pelaihari 2003; Lipscombe 2003). One commentator noted that it was Inul and the controversy she sparked that led to the ‘heating up’ of the pornography debate (Graham 2006a).
2006, the bill itself had not been passed into official policy. However, though its ultimate success or failure would be telling, the forces driving it are significant. The pornography bill offers us a clear example of a ‘gender policy’ devised in the context of religious discourses and having a particular impact on women. When this bill was being hotly debated in March of 2006, it was criticised in several editorials in terms of how it has been cast as necessary ‘to save the country from moral decay’ (Jakarta Post 2006c), or specifically because ‘the nation’s morality will only be preserved by women who don’t wear “sexy” outfits’ (Bisnis Indonesia 2006).

The pornography bill offers insight into how religious discourses are affecting women’s symbolic identities, constraining how they are ‘meant’ to be in the public eye down to the very comportment and covering of their bodies. The concern here is not with questions of genuine faith or religious truth. Instead we focus on the political mobilisation of religious discourses as critically potent when addressing gender issues. We will briefly consider three points: first, how these debates are tied to distinct political interests but impact women particularly; second, that the very active debate on the pornography bill shows power operating at various levels of society; and third, how the pornography debates can be seen as a spiral relationship between gender norms and social practices. The final claim is that the ‘politics of the body’ and debates of public virtue still rest on women’s shoulders – which should of course (to inject some irony) be covered.

First, a significant element of this debate concerns the political interests involved. By emphasising morality, the government acts to deflect criticisms of corruption and shortcomings; in other words, where it claims to be forging a moral nation, it can be forgiven for not creating a stronger, cleaner, more developed one. Here governmental
constructions of gender become a form of political capital, as dabbling in morality takes the form of women’s position. An article in the *Jakarta Post* states it plainly: ‘The bill focuses on the female body, meaning that a woman’s body is misinterpreted as something that disturbs morality’ (Winoto 2006). For example, President Yudhoyono has made concerned noises about women exposing their midriffs in his public statements (Sullivan 2006), suggesting this links to the decline in public virtue. This has led to legislators and parliamentarians focusing on laws related to pornography and ‘pornoaksi’ in lieu of other substantive policy. Journalists and activists alike have criticised the government on this very point, noting that it is easier for them to attack pornography than it is to challenge, for example, deeply embedded corruption (Winoto 2006). Yet without taking a cynical position and avoiding claiming intentionality – i.e. that politicians are being considered in weighing the ‘moral’ question versus other demands on them – it is clear there are distinct political interests involved in shifting attention from other agenda items to foster debates around civic virtue and public morality.

What is significant is how these debates tend to revolve on the female form. Yet actions taken have been complicated by other measures focusing on women’s bodies. For example, Maria Hartiningsih (2006) notes that although anti-trafficking laws were debated from 2002, these were sidelined by new anti-pornography and *pornoaksi* legislation. This shift in focus not only affected prioritisation of laws, but also reflected inherent contradictions between how women’s bodies are viewed. The Director of LBH-APIK pointed out these further tensions: women in trafficking laws were seen as victims, with the traffickers facing criminal charges; however, the anti-pornography law being debated defined ‘pornographic behaviour’ in such a way that women being trafficked would actually be committing acts of *pornoaksi*, and could be criminalised as such (Munti, interview 24
August 2005). The ascendance of anti-pornography rhetoric in parliamentary debates and its criminalisation of women’s sexuality – whether chosen or coerced – highlight how discourses of morality impact gender policies and essentialise women to bodies.

Second, the heated debates over the anti-pornography bill demonstrate that there is an active and outspoken segment of the population willing to take politicians to task for what they perceive to be contravening women’s basic rights. In other words, this is an example of how discursive power in Indonesia does not operate monolithically or ubiquitously, but is challenged and engaged on various levels of society – akin to Foucault’s notion of ‘capillary’ power always meeting resistance. The most famous women’s journal, *Jurnal Perempuan*, had a 2004 issue on pornography which outlined the active debates in the feminist and religious communities, showing different perspectives but no lack of impetus to tackle these questions. Many contributors to this edition became outspoken leaders and challengers in the subsequent debates on the pornography bill.

The bill’s original draft allowed fines to be imposed on women who would not cover ‘sensitive’ body parts, such as hair, shoulders, legs, and midriffs (Hotland 2006). It also contained controversial references to outlawing ‘obscene’ behaviour, with ambiguous definitions. But after a successful challenge from activists, NGOs, women’s forums, and many key figures such as Kamala Chandrakiran (the head of the National Commission on Violence Against Women, *Komnas Perempuan*) and Gadis Arivia (founder and head of *Jurnal Perempuan*) legislators were forced to redraft the bill. As of March 2006, the bill focused less on *pornoaksi* – as defining ‘pornographic behaviour’ was problematic and potentially could harm women’s rights if applied differentially – and instead concentrated more on actual pornographic materials and their distributions (Hotland 2006; *Jakarta Post*).
In an even further shift, in October 2006 it was disclosed that the politicians involved in the draft bill would focus more on protecting children involved in pornographic exploitation instead of attempting to eradicate all pornographic materials (Taufiqurrahman 2006). Though this marks a possible victory on the part of the bill’s challengers, even more current drafts contained ambiguity over what would be considered ‘indecent acts’ (*ibid*), which was of concern based on how public morality would be administrated and how it could contravene women’s rights.

Finally, we consider the pornography bill’s impact on broader discourses of morality. Here underlying norms were brought into the open via the pornography debates (sex gains visibility), which then impacted back on specific practices and attitudes (more people take a stronger position against the ‘social practice’ of adultery). Looking again at the results published by the Indonesian Survey Institute (*LSI*), these showed a shift in public perceptions between January and March 2006 – March representing the apex of intense social debates surrounding the pornography bill. This period evidenced declining support for various ‘Islamic’ norms of justice. Comparing changes from January to March, the percentage of respondents agreeing to the amputation of a thief’s hand went from 38% to 30%, those believing that a woman should not be president declined from 34% to 27%, and those agreeing with polygamy decreased from 40% to 34% (*LSI* March 2006). However, the only perspective to change *increasingly* was the question of whether adulterers should be stoned to death: 48% agreed in January versus 58% in March. This increase of 10% is substantially more than the ±2.8% margin of error over 1,200 respondents. The possible connection is interesting: the pornography bill was being hotly debated at this time, and questions of sexuality and sexual norms and mores were at the forefront of public and political discourses. Simultaneously, the one ‘Islamic norm’ receiving a visible surge in
support over this three-month period is the one tied most closely to sex itself – the measures for adultery. While this may be a tenuous link, it fits within the premise of this dissertation: that in fact there are spiral and reinforcing relationships between discourse and practice, particularly regarding questions of gender.

In sum, the RUU APP and its resulting controversy reveal how much of the debate around religion, morality, and public virtue still focuses on women’s bodies. The linking of clothing and virtue to women – whether from genuine concern to protect them from the problems of pornography or, more cynically, to oppress them – delimits women’s identities and reduces them to bodies. Again we see the politics of the body leading to a reductionist approach to ‘gender’. The next two chapters will develop this analysis further.

3.2.3 Women as Mothers: The Discourse of Motherhood

Having considered how discourses of development and religion construct the ‘ideal Indonesian woman’, we can analyse an even deeper and more subtle layer of gender discourses that naturalise women as mothers. This can be seen as inscribing a relational structure – that of motherhood – with tangible effect. Here I will argue that the construct of ‘mother’ reflects a culmination of gender discourses that is reflected in language, directive of policy efforts, and tied to the body. Ultimately this has a significant impact through policy that is both depoliticised and essentialising. Furthermore, this depoliticisation helps to explain the continual policy slippage between ‘gender’ and ‘women’.

First, the role of the Mother is indissolubly linked to both of the previously explored discourses of development and religion. For example, we think of the Indonesian concept of the *Ibu Bangsa* (Mother of the Nation), where women have the responsibility to ‘prepare
the younger generations’ to be good citizens and contribute to the nation (Poppy, interview 2 August 2005). In this notion of *Ibu Bangsa*, the strands of national development and morality are tied together through the mother figure. The idea, first coined by the 1935 second Women’s Congress, remains relevant today in contemporary understandings of women and their role. The ‘*Ibu Bangsa*’ highlights the confluence of discursive formations of identity culminating in the body and motherhood: the development discourse directs women’s participation in development through family welfare and in the home, and the moral-religious discourse points women toward upholding family virtue and teaching the young to be God-fearing. Both discursive formations flow into the primary identity for Indonesian women: their role as mothers.

The heightened discourse of motherhood – and concomitant shift in relational structures – may be viewed etymologically as a change in nuanced emphasis within a single word. *Ibu* is literally the word for mother, but it is also an honorific for married women in general, an appellation much like ‘Mrs’. Thus the word used to address (usually married) women, *Ibu*, recognises both motherhood and marriage within it. Chapter Two demonstrated that, under the New Order, women’s ‘wife’ role became the focus of gender norms and institutional apparatuses (i.e. the entire gender machinery was constructed based on a hierarchy of wives in Dharma Wanita and PKK), with their mother role stressed only secondarily. This was referred to as ‘state ibuism’ (Suryakusuma 2004: 162). However, today this has been reversed through a naturalising discourse that exalts motherhood as destiny, reifies the body, and instrumentalises all interventions for women toward this end. In an inversion of relational structures, woman’s role as mother-then-wife becomes central.
This relational structure is given weight as the motherhood discourse consistently links women and children in gender policies. How this shift has been concretised into actual programmes and institutions will be considered in the next chapter; for example, we will look MOWE’s introduction of projects and measurements for children in its institutional structure and concrete objectives. Here we focus on the shift in gender programme language. Prior to 2000, the national ministry’s focus was on women exclusively, in both its projects and discourses. The aim was improving women’s quality of life through various development initiatives (MOWE annual reports 1988-1993, 1993-1998, 1999). Some specific programmes focused on family welfare or women’s role as mothers (e.g. a project for pregnant women, or helping women with young babies, as incorporated in the 1988-1993 report: Appendix vii), but nowhere were children as an exclusive category considered part of the same mandate as that to improve women’s position.

Over the past few years, however, Indonesia has reshaped its approach to incorporate women and children under one programmatic umbrella. This discursive policy shift, like the keywords discussed earlier, is tied to global paradigms and practices.59 The trend is evident in recent key government policies on women, such as the mid-term national development plan (RPJM) mentioned earlier. The 2004-2009 RPJM has a chapter on women, but this is more specifically entitled ‘Improving the quality of life and role of women along with child welfare and protection’ (MOWE 2004a). All of its four recommended development programmes target women and children almost inseparably: programmes to improve the quality of life and protection of women, to increase child

59 We have discussed the ‘intermestic’ nature of Indonesian gender policies and discourses. Again, the emphasis on women-and-children, discussed as a unit for targeting by government interventions, fits within broader shifts in the development community worldwide. For example, in India the official state ministry is the Ministry for Women and Child Development (http://www.wcd.nic.in/). In Malaysia, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs was formed in January 2001, but was quickly changed to the ‘Ministry of Women and Family Development’, again emphasising that the ministry’s mandate was not to be ‘women’s liberation’ but rather ‘family welfare’, including children’s welfare (Mohamad 2002: 372).
welfare and safety, to strengthen institutions for gender mainstreaming and ‘children mainstreaming’,\textsuperscript{60} and to harmonise policies increasing the quality of life for women and children (MOWE 2004a). The continual linkage between women and children, reinforced through policy discourse, underlines the notion of women as mothers. In addition, by consistently grouping women with children, this legitimates a mode of intervention which seems to construct women as helpless, not as adults and active subjects themselves but in need of protection just as children are presumed to be.

The next step is to consider what underpins the discursive policy emphasis on motherhood. This move toward a ‘women-plus-children’ approach implies a shift away from gender (and its related concepts of power and social construction) and signifies return to a politics of the body – with potentially dangerous implications. That women’s bodies are differently sexed and can bear children is something commonly accepted as inescapable biological reality. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, sensitive theoretical reflection on bodies and biological difference concludes that social understandings of sex and bodies often conflate physicality with additional layers of meaning. In other words, it is not the fact that women are able to get pregnant, but how this is comprehended and denoted that matters. In Indonesian, the ‘reality’ of women’s bodies is constructed and understood as being their ‘kodrat’, mentioned earlier. This concept of kodrat has multiple implications: at its base and simplest definition it has been described to mean women’s reproductive capacity, but it is infused with greater significance as the idea of ‘women’s destiny’. Kodrat was central to gender discourses under the New Order, as it used the notion of destiny to mobilise women to fulfil their wife and mother roles.

\textsuperscript{60}Literally, \textit{pengarusutamaan anak} (child mainstreaming), directly parallel to \textit{pengarusutamaan gender} (gender mainstreaming).
Even though the same level of emphasis is not given *kodrat* in contemporary gender discourses, it remains a dominant paradigm. In 2005, when I asked the heads of Dharma Wanita, Kowani, PKK, and bureaucrats in the national and regional MOWE offices if *kodrat* was still a significant element of gender policies, their answers were always unequivocally in the affirmative. Often this leads to essentialising policy. For instance, we consider how gender was discussed in government meetings I attended, particularly those at regional and local levels. Instead of arguing that gender – as a set of constructed power-laden relations between men and women – must factor into programme planning, ‘gender’ typically became about ‘women’s different needs’. This difference was invariably tied to women’s bodies, and the explanation followed a repeated pattern. If, for example, the government intervened in an emergency situation (such as tsunami relief), and ‘gender’ was unaccounted for, this would be reflected in the supply of provisions: these would include cigarettes and coffee, because men want them, but neglect sanitary pads and milk, because men do not think of women or children’s needs. The link was clear and an oft-cited example: a ‘gender-sensitive’ project would account for women’s need for sanitary pads and milk for their children. This is not to say that these goods are not useful or necessary, but rather that reductionist and essentialising views of women’s bodies and their reproductive capacities underlie gender discourses.

The essentialist view thus constricts ‘gender’ to ‘women’s needs’, and further to ‘women’s bodies’ and ultimately to ‘motherhood’. The result may be programmatic interventions that need only redress different biological needs (regarding menstruation and childbirth) in order to account for ‘gender’, a simplistic solution that cannot speak to power relations or women’s relative position. Gender interventions are often instrumentalised toward this understanding. An example is how education is touted as a central goal for women’s
empowerment and a key measure for gender equality. Few would argue with the merits of this aim. However, when probed further through interviews, ‘education for women’ is rarely a positive end goal in itself; rather, it is always ‘in order that they can raise and teach their children well’ (Moeloek, interview 3 August 2005; Agum Gumelar, interview 2 August 2005). A well-educated woman will be able to better care for her family and thus fulfil her \textit{kodrat}, her destiny. For a woman to receive education implies obligations of motherhood. More generally, the conflation of sexual reproduction with social reproduction entails a set of social responsibilities for women.

The continuing emphasis on \textit{kodrat}, and hence the centrality of women’s bodies and motherhood to gender discourses, helps explain how gender norms are depoliticised. That is, ‘naturalising’ women’s roles through their immediate physical and discursive link to motherhood ignores the understanding of politically and socially constructed gender. The introductory chapter noted the dangers of conflating ‘gender’ with ‘women’, arguing that in fact this happens with regularity in development discourse and policy making. The discourse of motherhood is a significant element in the continual ‘slippage’ between ‘gender’ and ‘women’ in development programmes. Motherhood can be cast as entirely natural because of women’s reproductive capacity, which in turn places them within subordinated roles tied to these ‘naturally weaker, more inferior, less stable’ female bodies (Howson 2004: 49-50). As gender discourses circulating through governmental structures often reduce women to their bodies, even unintentionally, this blurs the distinction between the assumed ‘givenness’ of bodies and the gender roles they imply. Therefore, whereas policy uses the term ‘gender’, the discourse of motherhood undermines this by reinscribing women’s difference based on biological bodies and sexual reproduction, subsequently delineating their social role as mothers.
3.3 Conclusions: Understanding Circularity in Gender Discourses

In conclusion, international norms and theorisations of gender influence how ‘gender’ enters the Indonesian policy arena. Yet while these Indonesian gender discourses are embedded in global understandings and institutions, they are not accepted ubiquitously. There is resistance to gendered constructs linked to visions of ‘Western women’, such that the ideal Indonesian woman is constructed discursively through the confluence of various discourses – development, religion, and motherhood. Recalling the theoretical framework, this process reflects Foucault’s understanding of capillary and contested power, which defines forms of knowledge and shapes the discourse about objects of knowledge – in this case, women – in a way that provokes reaction and resistance. It corresponds to Ferguson’s conceptual apparatus and James Scott’s public transcripts, which define the boundaries of state interventions regarding gender.

We have also seen how discourses affect relational structures (in John Scott’s typology), by depoliticising and reifying the mother role. This occurs because gender discourses are linked fundamentally to the actual, lived bodies of women, explored throughout this thesis as the ‘politics of the body’. The discourses of development, morality, and motherhood are found in the woman’s body: it must be self-sacrificing through hard work and generous contributions (toward national development); it must be virtuous, modestly clothed, and upright (enhancing public morality); and it is envisaged as a mother, both in the more esoteric sense of national and natural ‘motherhood’ and as the flesh-and-blood carer for her children. Here we can see the spiral relationship between Bourdieu’s understanding of the symbolic order, the practices mediating this order, and finally the inculcation of practices
through the subjective experience of bodily agents. These ‘real’ bodies allow gender interventions that reinforce the ‘mother’ structure to be depoliticised.

The conflation of these discourses creating the ‘ideal Indonesian woman’ occurs as part of the national project, though arguably without intention. Rather, there are broader discursive structures tied to national interests. For example, in the Malaysian case it has been argued that the state attempted to legitimise itself by ‘[deifying] women as the guardians of family values, morals, and culture’, and using ideology to ‘convey this conflicting but often unquestioned personification of the exemplary self-sacrificing women in national development’ (Mohamad 2002: 374). This process happens as gender discourses circulate and reinforce each other, leading to concrete programmes and having material effects. In this way, the discursive construction of the Indonesian woman does not happen simply in the realm of ideas but also in the ways these ideas are mapped onto institutional structures. How they are inscribed in institutions is thus what we consider next, to highlight the dynamic and spiral relationship of gender discourses and social structures.
Chapter Four: *Institutions*

Gender Institutions and Social Structures: How Discourses are Translated into Programmes

Having considered how gender discourses circulate and gain legitimacy at central levels of government, now we consider how they acquire their power as they are concretised through institutions. This recalls John Scott’s institutional structures and Foucault’s *dispositif,* analysing the way discourse and practice combine in policy and come to form mechanisms of control and social construction. We also seek to query power relations throughout. Echoing political anthropologist Eric Wolf, we examine these institutions and organisations not simply as ‘product or outcome’ but as ‘process’, questioning as well: ‘For what and for whom is all this going on, and – indeed – against whom?’ (2002: 230). The focus is on governmental structures, rather than economic institutions, as the research focus remains on the state apparatus.

This chapter considers three different areas. First, the primary institution being studied – the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (MOWE) – will be examined briefly as it functions in the capital, arguing that its central programmes rely on reductionist and essentialising notions of ‘woman’ that reinforce traditional gender roles within a particular power hierarchy. This will include revisiting two organisations described in previous chapters whose influence during the Suharto era was significant, Dharma Wanita and PKK, to demonstrate their programmatic emphasis on women as mothers, ‘developers’, and moral guardians. Second, we will consider the role of the regional institutions in implementing these programmes at the provincial level – how power is negotiated in what we will describe as the ‘organic’ bureaucracy, and how projects are ‘translated’ and transmitted at
the provincial level. Short case studies of four regional MOWE branches will be explored to demonstrate the reinforcing circularity of gender norms and institutions. Finally, broader questions will be raised about the nature of ‘local’ gender politics in the context of Indonesia’s decentralisation, querying the role of institutions in addressing these gender policies.61

Before delving into these points, it is important to refer back to the central theoretical premise of this thesis: that of reinforcing spirals of discourse and materiality. The chapter will unfold according to this concept. In the first section we see how discourses play a role in shaping programmes, which in turn reinforce and reify discourses. Institutions are both born out of and act upon their ‘cultural soil’, as we see in the case studies of the second section. This leads us to question the wider applicability of some of these arguments, particularly given regional diversity and governmental decentralisation. Although this thesis looks rather broadly at Indonesian gender policy, focusing on the central government apparatus, its conclusions illuminate the ways gender discourses, institutions, and identities are created and reshaped out of reinforcing spirals at the interstices of the imagined and the real, words and materiality.

4.1 Institutional Programmes: Underlying Paradigms and Reified Norms

We begin by examining MOWE’s programmes in the centre. The aim is to demonstrate how these programmes do not sufficiently incorporate an understanding of gender’s constructedness or the power struggle between the ‘naturally differentiated’ sexes. Rather, 61 To research the implementation of MOWE programmes at the provincial level, I relied on interviews and focus group discussions, substantiated with relevant secondary literature. For each of the regional case studies (Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Bandar Lampung), I interviewed the officials running the provincial MOWE branch and analysed their institutional structures, substantiated by organisational documents. More on these methods are included in Appendix A.
there is slippage between gender and ‘women’ which, rather than make substantive change possible, simply keeps women ‘in their place’, albeit with better window dressing. In short, the problems involved with gender are embedded so deeply in the social fabric – tied so tightly to something as essentialised as a woman’s body – that programmes drawing on discourses of empowerment and the like will be unable to bring about substantial change. This can be sketched here by considering key aspects of programmes for women within MOWE’s overall plan of action.

4.1.1 The Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (MOWE)

The preceding chapter considered MOWE’s contemporary shift in discourse and approach. It was argued that international and perceptibly ‘Western’ gender discourses and norms have impacted MOWE’s language and structure. Indonesian reactions to, and appropriations of, these discourses have resulted in the ideational construction of the ‘Indonesian woman’. Now we begin to look more closely at the institution itself. From its 2005 organisational configuration, MOWE has five divisions: gender mainstreaming (I), improving women’s quality of life (II), women’s protection (III), child protection (IV), and the empowerment of social organisations (V). Though MOWE’s five sections include numerous programmes, only a few come to the forefront of public discourse and ultimately policy. While this cannot be an exhaustive examination of the way MOWE works, here we begin to unpack the programmatic initiatives that have gained most attention and support – violence against women, trafficking, children’s welfare, and reproductive health – questioning why these have informed policy decisions and what this implies.\(^{62}\) I do not claim that these programmes are not needed, and believe that those engaged in policy

\(^{62}\) As with the keywords and thematic discourses analysed in Chapter Three, these four policy emphases were those that emerged through observation, inductive research, and coding of interviews and policy documents.
creation have often done so with good intentions. However, only by querying broader processes underlying these interventions can we hope to question why it is they have been constructed as such, and how this may in fact have less positive consequences for women than originally expected.

4.1.1a Violence Against Women

Violence against women (VAW) has long been on the international agenda, starting with the UN General Assembly’s 1979 adoption of CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women), and followed by a more specific ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’ in December 1993. But VAW has only recently become important in the Indonesian ‘gender policy’ agenda, resulting in the passage of a 2004 law against domestic violence referred to as the KDRT (UU No. 23/2004 Penghapusan Kekerasan Dalam Rumah Tangga, Law No. 23 on the Eradication of Domestic Violence). We do not deny that violence against women is a significant problem. Yet it is important to question the confluence of circumstances surrounding VAW’s entry to the policy arena, including: the problem of data, international ‘commitments’ and institutional needs; urban priorities in agenda setting; and finally the significance of underlying paradigms, specifically those of the ‘weaker sex’. This lends insight into how VAW as a policy construct may be ineffectual, at best, or potentially negative, at worst.

First, we consider the way VAW entered the Indonesian policy agenda, addressing concerns of data and international obligations in the context of bureaucratic targeting and simplification. VAW has been consistently defined as ‘the’ problem, though data to back this up has been rough at best. For instance, MOWE’s 2005-2009 Strategic Plan lays out clear statistics on women’s relative and poor condition (compared to men) in the fields of
health, education, maternal mortality, life expectancy, literacy, and representation in government (MOWE 2005: 1-2). It then continues that ‘violence against women remains high, though as yet there are no official, precise figures on this issue’ (ibid: 3). In other words, the data for women’s poor standing on various development fronts is clear, but that for VAW is much less so.

This begs the question as to why VAW has come to the forefront of the gender policy agenda, culminating in the passage of a national law. Without demeaning the problem or the good intentions of those involved, there are two things which may have affected the process. One is the context of international compulsion. Very commonly in the MOWE offices I heard officials use the word ‘komitmen’ (commitment) to describe why they had to act in certain ways. This ‘komitmen’ was often used to explain the drive behind the recent push to legislate on domestic violence. When I asked what they meant, they would point to their national obligations, most frequently Indonesia’s 1984 signing of CEDAW. It was a matter of national honour, in a sense, to live up to these governmental commitments. But if the important driving factor is maintaining international legitimacy and credibility, rather than tackling a domestic problem, then the ‘solution’ can become simply keeping appearances. Being seen to take legislative action – issuing a law on domestic violence – is tantamount to achieving that credibility.

Another possible explanation lies in the simplification needs of institutions and the positivist bias in lawmaking. Whereas the data on broader structural problems for women is clear, solutions are not as readily available. A writer for the Jakarta Post, exploring the causes of violence against women, concluded that ‘significant changes need to be brought about to counteract the many problems mentioned. They include political, economic, social
and legal empowerment’ (Hussain 2006). How to generate ‘empowerment’ on all these levels is something that cannot be accomplished in straightforward fashion through national legislation. University of Indonesia Professor Kristi Poerwandari, presenting reflections on the KDRT, discussed the difficulties of reconciling advocacy policies with actual implementation. She noted the lack of attention to the psychological experience of violence, or broader cultural contexts, as instead the focus of the law is purely instrumental (Subiyantoro 2005). VAW, in other words, is something with measurable targets: ‘reduce the number of cases of violence against women’. Journalist Subiyantoro describes this as the ‘positivist bias’ in the KDRT law (2005). Yet this institutional need for ‘measurability’ results in concrete external targets that may not address root causes.

Second, it is important to recognise the geographic – and specifically urban – aspect of how VAW has been constructed in the Indonesian context. For example, when there are no broader laws tackling systemic violence against women, we might ask why VAW became identified as domestic violence, rather than violence in general or sexual violence in particular.63 This may be a case of the ‘centre’ setting an agenda that neglects the bigger problems faced by women across Indonesia, including the very real existence of sexual violence. A quick look at variance within available statistics on reported cases of violence is revealing. In 2004 The Jakarta Post noted that in Jakarta, of the reported VAW cases, 81.82 percent of them were filed against husbands. This contrasted a national report showing that about 46 percent of cases involved violence within the household (Hari 2004). Further evidence confirms that in outlying islands of Indonesia, sexual and other types of violence against women are significant problems. For instance, violence against female

63 UU No. 26/2000, the Law on Human Rights Court, does affirm that rape within the context of a broad or systemic assault is a crime against women (Sadli and Chandrakirana 2003). This is a rather general affirmation, however, and has been shown by various activists not to be taken seriously in the regions, particularly those like Aceh, West Papua, Maluku or Central Sulawesi which are, or have been until recently, in conflict situations (ibid).
migrant workers in West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) is an increasing problem that would not fall within the KDRT purview (Wahyuni 2004). Rape is all too rife in Papua and Aceh (Diani 2006). The National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) was strongly criticised in 2003 for its objectionable position on the violence committed against women in Aceh, where some of its members inferred that rapes of women by the Indonesian military were simply ‘personal offences’ and did not need to be addressed systematically by the courts (Sadli and Chandrakirana 2003). In short, domestic violence has become the issue translated into national law which corresponds most closely to the portrait of VAW in Jakarta, while disregarding the broader problems of violence faced by women across Indonesia. This highlights the idea of political capital and ‘political will’ at the centre of policy generation. Policymakers in Jakarta benefit from addressing more local concerns, the ‘will to act’ being greatest in immediacy.

Finally, the way policy discourse emphasises VAW must be considered from the vantage point of how it stems from, and thus may ultimately reinforce, underlying gender paradigms – specifically those of women being the ‘weaker sex’. Explicit changes in law at a higher level may not change women’s position within gender hierarchies, because implicit assumptions of women’s weakness perpetuate their victimhood and feed into cycles of violence. Consider that those who are viewed as strong and powerful are perhaps less likely to be victimised. This strength need not mean sheer brute force, but can include the capacity to resist in many forms. Though the law begins to provide legal support to women suffering domestic violence, and to prosecute the perpetrators, if these women are conditioned by parents and community to accept a certain level of aggression from husbands, having this legal framework may become a moot point.
What is significant is how women are able to conceptualise violence and victimhood in the first place. Violence against women is ‘understandable’ within a gender hierarchy that views women as weaker. The need for the programme arises not from a simple condition, but from what caused that condition – the same psyche allowing a man to hit a woman will tell him to try to protect her, the same psyche telling him she is weaker and lesser, and he will either be aggressor or defender. Germaine Greer notes that feminists have argued that ‘the emphasis upon women as targets for attack functions as an instrument of social control. The object is not protection but the engenderment and maintenance of fearfulness’ (1999: 352). The institutional and legal response – the focus on a man hitting a woman, when there is so much broader structural violence against women\footnote{For a definition of structural violence against women, see Galtung 1985.} – limits the damage to a specific situation wherein women are the weaker party, needing protection. Nothing is said of a system and a moral culture where hitting women is acceptable. In essence, implicit gender norms may create the impetus for policies that in turn strengthen these foundational biases. Continually constructing women in the position of victim may be ultimately disempowering.

4.1.1b Sex Trafficking

Another issue which has taken policy focus both nationally and regionally is that of sex trafficking. Reflection on why trafficking has come to the forefront of the ‘gender agenda’ in Indonesia raises interesting questions about how underlying, ‘invisible’ gender norms suddenly become visible and explicit, and the reaction this merits. I would agree that it is a problem that should be addressed; the weight of global consensus on the matter shows great public and political sympathy for the victims involved and a desire to work against
trafficking. However, it is important to examine why this problem exists in the first place, and then how it comes to be politicised and socialised in Indonesia in a way that roots it in the very same essentialising fabric.

First we consider how trafficking came to be politicised in Indonesia. There are striking similarities to the VAW case, wherein external pressures and the desire for credibility were significant. The issue first entered the national newspapers in 2001 with claims that trafficking of Indonesian women was ‘rampant due to inadequate legal instruments and weak law enforcement’, even though, as with VAW mentioned earlier, there was ‘no precise data’ on the extent of the problem (Jakarta Post 2001). This was soon followed by calls for a task force to deal with the problem (Hanifah 2001) and later an anti human-trafficking law (Tahilramani 2002). No real progress was made on these fronts at the time. Then in 2003 a forum of East Asia Pacific countries gathered to call for stronger cooperation to stop child trafficking. Though this broke up without an agreement, trafficking became a matter of international coordination (Mariani 2003). Pressure from outside agencies continued to build, as the Geneva-based International Catholic Migration Commission asked the Indonesian government to expand legal provisions against child trafficking (Taufiquurrahman 2003). Interestingly, the first tangible step toward addressing the problem only came directly in the wake of a US State Department official’s urging Indonesia to fight human trafficking during a 2004 visit to Batam in Riau (Jakarta Post 2004c). Shortly thereafter the government, along with NGOs, launched a campaign to end the sexual exploitation of women and children in Batam (Fadli and Sijabat 2004). The first

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national campaign to curb trafficking came later that year, as informational materials were distributed across the country, particularly across Java and in West Kalimantan and North Sumatra (both of which are ‘exit points’ for Brunei and Singapore/Malaysia, respectively) (Jakarta Post 2004b). The 2005-2009 MOWE Strategic Plan called for governmental protocol on trafficking to be put into law, but it was not until October of 2006 that the House of Representatives began to support and work toward an anti-trafficking bill (Jakarta Post 2006a).

Having questioned trafficking’s politicisation in the context of international pressure, it is important to understand the way it is socialised at the regional level. As a policy discourse, ‘trafficking’ has been disseminated in a politicised fashion that may do less to stop the problem than it does to reinscribe an emphasis on women’s bodies and victimhood. For example, we consider how this functions in West Java. The staff member responsible for women’s rights at the MOWE regional office in Bandung noted that their focus was on a programme of anti-trafficking (Agus, interview 1 August 2005). This programme had several stages, but the first aimed to give people information about the problem and convince them that there was a problem in the first place. He explained that there was no formal report on trafficking as yet, but there was ‘proof’ that people in West Java did not know that women were still being tricked into becoming victims, since they were ‘belum sadar betul’ (not truly aware) that trafficking was a problem. Only after this socialisation took place would people receive training in how to prevent trafficking, by warning potential female workers to make sure that the ‘sponsoring agency’ is legitimate. When I questioned what systems of law enforcement accompanied the trafficking programme, he reiterated that it was only about getting information to the people (Agus, interview 1 August 2005). This was consistent with the approach taken by other regional offices which looked at
trafficking. The Yogyakarta regional office, for instance, also aims to ‘socialise’ the problem of trafficking, even though it is not seen as a problem locally, because they are ‘listening to Jakarta in anticipation’ (Widiyastuti, FGD 15 August 2005). The point to consider, therefore, is that although trafficking has come to the forefront of policy discourse, the way it had been institutionalised remains focused on ‘socialising’ the problem. Convincing people of the merits of a problem seems quite different from attempting to mitigate its effects.

Finally, this leads us to query the deeper, latent paradigms. I would characterise this process as follows: women, it has been decisively argued, are sexualised and commoditised globally (MacKinnon 1987; Dworkin 1974; Nussbaum 1995). This is incontrovertibly ‘acceptable’ so long as it is not made explicit publicly, that is, when it is in accordance with social norms and/or ‘whitewashed’ through euphemism or traditional custom. For instance, a wife is essentially the sexual commodity of her husband where she is not afforded equal status with him economically or legally, and where she is pressured socially to be his ‘sexual property’. This is highlighted by the KDRT, the domestic violence law. Although this has provisions for everything from economic oppression to psychological violence, it does not specifically outlaw marital rape (Hari 2004). However, these ‘invisible’ norms are exposed when this ‘sexual property’ is explicitly traded on the open market through trafficking – provoking extensive reactions. Sex trafficking is arguably pernicious and unjust. But the much politicised response to trafficking stems in part from a ‘breach’ in the public scripts by making explicit women’s sexual commoditisation. Much like the issue of violence against women, sexual trafficking exists because there is an underlying ideology of women as ‘for-sex’, vulnerable to stronger men and deserving of domination. Therefore both VAW and trafficking must be targeted politically because – when they make these
underlying ideologies explicit and visible – it makes the public order uncomfortable. None of this implies that trafficking is not something that should be tackled by policy or legal enforcement; rather, it highlights how deeply embedded gender norms both cause social inequities as well as dictate their responses.

 Trafficking therefore brings the private script of women’s sexual objectification into the public sphere, reveals its ugliness, and provokes a reaction based on denial. ‘We’ cannot be seen to be selling our women for sex, even though it is the underlying concept and discursive construction of woman as sexual commodities that creates this problem in the first place, as well as poverty and unemployment providing the circumstances under which trafficking finds its market. Political stress on these issues highlights not simply the need to combat the problems, but rather the unease provoked by exposing implicit patriarchal paradigms, and how responses will be so rooted in these paradigms that they may fail to fundamentally eradicate the practice but only slow its progress. As an opinion piece for *The Jakarta Post* on trafficking concluded: ‘Indonesian lawmakers […] are addressing the symptoms rather than the disease’ (Cotton 2006).

4.1.1c  Children’s Welfare

The previous two policy foci have been tied to assumptions of women’s weaker, sexualised status, whose resultant impact may reinforce these notions rather than challenging problems at their root. The next two programmes to be considered are tied directly to women’s bodies. Here we look at programmes for children. As has been argued, under the New Order government it was women’s role as wife, and only secondarily as mother, that was stressed by governmental agencies (Suryakusuma 2004: 167; Asian Womenews 2002; Iskandar 1998: 41). Today, this has been inverted. It is now women’s position and role as
mothers receiving most discursive and programmatic attention. This stems directly from the ways discourse has gained authority through naturalising gender roles – by arguing from biology and *kodrat* (women’s biological destiny). In essence, ‘child welfare’ programmes are an example of how women’s roles as mothers are both politicised and naturalised in a ‘spiral’ process: the underlying gender norms structure institutional practice, which in turn reassert the implicit norms.

The previous chapter analysed the discursive process linking women to motherhood; here we examine how these discourses are ‘mapped’ onto institutions through MOWE’s programmatic focus. MOWE is a key example of an institution that has made the shift to incorporating more and more concerns for children and children’s welfare into its projects. In 1998-1999, one of the Ministry’s divisions was on Family Welfare, implying the role of women as mothers. The other divisions, however, were for women labourers, women’s education, and developing socio-cultural networks. Through 1999 the Ministry had four divisions: policy and programmes, gender equality and women’s quality of life, community participation, and evaluation. It was not until January 2000 that the MOWE structure reflected a policy shift, now to be mirrored in its institutional divisions: development and information, gender equality, women’s quality of life, community participation, and the protection and welfare of children (MOWE 2001: 1). This policy change was reflected in a re-structuring of the institution itself, such that of MOWE’s current five divisions, the fourth division focuses exclusively on children’s welfare.

Today the policy focus has a tendency to view women and children together. For example, the sole chapter in the government’s mid-term national development plan for 2004-2009 addressing gender concerns is entitled ‘Improving the Quality of Life and Role of Women
Along with Child Welfare and Protection’ (MOWE 2004a). Both women and children are lumped as a unit with implications for the country’s development; in this way women become objects, not subjects of development, less active participants while tied to children. Furthermore, according to MOWE’s materials and their website, their goals are as follows: 1) developing a society that is gender aware and cares about children’s rights; 2) improving the condition and position of women in education, health, the economy/labour force and decision-making; 3) expanding child protection and opportunities for children’s participation; 4) maintaining the supremacy of law to protect women’s and children’s rights; 5) development and guidance for social organisations that are concerned with women and children; 6) developing and increasing national, regional, and international cooperation in the fields of gender equality and child protection (MOWE 2006, translation mine). Only one of these policy prescriptions (the second) focuses exclusively on women. All the rest are parcelled as ‘women-and-children’ or even ‘gender-and-children’, which implies, transitively, that ‘women’ and ‘gender’ are again conflated categories.

There is a similar emphasis and structure for the regional offices; ‘children’s rights and needs’ are handled by the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and its regional branches. The implicit assumption is that intervening for women is the appropriate umbrella programme under which to intervene for children, precisely because they are the ones with the natural inherent responsibility for children. For instance, when the head of the gender equality sub-division in the Surabaya regional office was asked why the responsibility for children was always on women’s shoulders, she laughed and replied that it is simply men’s nature to not prioritise children’s needs (‘diciptakan Tuhan demikian’ – created by God that way), and ‘women’s nature is with children’ (Tuti, interview 19 August 2005). This is not to say that women do not have significant roles as mothers, but rather that these roles are
highlighted and reified through institutional frameworks that always cast children as a corollary of women. The relational structure of ‘mother and child’ is thus inscribed through institutional structures for women and children.66

4.1.1d Reproductive Health

The final example of major ‘gender policies’ is that of reproductive health (RH). The focus on RH shows again how women are essentialised on the basis of biological difference. The UNFPA reproductive health intervention will be addressed in much greater depth in the Chapter Six case study. Here we will only make a few brief points in order to demonstrate the same process of reinforcing circularity between implicit gender norms and explicit targeting. As with the other issues mentioned, the aim is not to demean the need for RH. Women’s reproductive capacities correlate with specific rights, such as maternity leave, maternal health care access, and so on. Furthermore, efforts such as those to lower the maternal mortality rate are unequivocally good goals – it is positive to work to ensure fewer women die in childbirth due to insufficient care. But what must be questioned is what is given most attention by these RH measures, and how their emphasis may have other consequences in terms of gender norms and delimited identities.

Women’s reproductive health concerns are always cast as outside the norm, an addition to ‘standard’ care that can be given to men. In this way, women’s ‘otherness’ is emphasised: men are the norm, women and their bodies the deviation. Furthermore, these RH needs are usually cast instrumentally. As discourse revolves around ‘women as sexual reproducers’, so too do programmes focus on these areas. Yet there is an instrumentalist character

66 As noted in the previous chapter, this corresponds to a general international trend toward addressing ‘women and children’ together in development institutions. For instance, in India the official state ministry is the Ministry for Women and Child Development (http://wcd.nic.in/).
evident in these RH paradigms, similar to the education programmes where so much emphasis is placed on the importance of women’s education in order to educate and teach their children, viz. ‘women as social reproducers’.

Attention to RH needs is linked to women’s defined responsibilities for social reproduction. As Postel-Coster argued in the 1990s, the messages passed down to village women were ‘primarily concerned with women’s reproductive tasks: breeding, caring and feeding, and passing the dominant values of society to the next generation’ (1993: 133). The same rings true today, albeit with a slightly different rhetoric and emphasis. Thus there remains a contradictory tendency in the RH discourse to essentialise women to the sphere of their bodies. That is, though women’s reproductive health is now being targeted within the much broader understanding of the need to challenge underlying gender inequities, by focusing on women’s reproductive capacities – however holistically – women are still being typecast by their ability to procreate and be mothers. Government officials still describe women’s needs in planning as being for ‘sanitary pads and milk for children’ (described in Section 3.2.3), RH programmes still dominate institutional structures and donor funding (e.g. UNFPA’s funding and influence, to be described in Chapter Six). The politics of difference built on women’s bodies may ultimately serve to exclude them from more radical questioning of the underlying causes of women’s unequal standing.

4.1.1e Conclusions

In sum, the gender policies which have gained most attention for women attempt to address problems in Indonesian society as they occur. Yet these policies and programmes are so deeply embedded in underlying gender norms essentialising women to bodies that they may in fact reinforce these fundamental norms. Interventions for ‘gender’ are meant to tackle
problems at their root – going all the way to how gender roles are built around bodies but given social meaning that directly affects how men and women live their lives. When ‘gender’ becomes conflated in programmes to ‘women’, it assumes that women’s second-class position in society stems from their bodies, rather than from the discursive conditions that create – and the historical-political conditions that perpetuate – unequal gender roles. Therefore, instead of targeting these major societal inequalities from a structural standpoint (e.g. with legislation on wages, labour markets, legal representation, etc) or from the perspective of individual agency (e.g. through empowerment initiatives\(^67\)), Indonesian state gender policy continues to focus on projects envisaging women as the sum of their sexual, reproductive bodies. Ultimately this reinscribes notions of women’s inherent weakness and victimhood (violence against women), their commoditised sexuality (trafficking), their primary social function as mothers and status as object rather than subject (children’s welfare), and their reductionist and essentialised bodies (reproductive health).

4.1.2 Other Key Institutions: Dharma Wanita and PKK

The previous chapter noted how various discourses mobilise women toward particular social roles (nation building and morality upholding), all of which underpin and are tied to their roles as mothers. To illustrate how these discourses are mapped onto institutions, in this section we consider two influential organisations: Dharma Wanita and PKK. Both were profoundly dominant under Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998); revisiting them today lends perspective on what has changed, and what remains the same. Additionally, PKK remains the primary institution through which MOWE works in the regions.

\(^67\) We have noted that ‘empowerment’ is central to gender discourses, but remains an ambiguous concept that is difficult to operationalise in an unproblematic way.
Under the New Order government, Dharma Wanita’s membership was drawn from the wives of civil servants and ‘dominated the scene’ based on its ties to governmental structures (Suryakusuma 2004: 170). Today the organisation has a slightly different name, Dharma Wanita Persatuan (DWP) and a modified institutional structure and focus that reflect the discursive shift away from wives to motherhood. First, it is no longer simply the wives of officials who are given a position within the organisation. Now the different representatives must be selected by a vote of the relevant constituency at each level. But at the highest levels of representation the wife of the titled bureaucrat, or *pejabat* (e.g. the wife of the governor), is not allowed to be nominated for the position as she would have an unfair advantage and would certainly be selected ‘because people’s thinking hasn’t changed’ (Moeloek, interview 3 August 2005).

Second, DWP’s focus almost exclusively is on issues related to woman-as-mother. This assumption underlies most of their projects even if they have different explicit aims. For example, in the foreword of DWP’s book, *Bangkit dan Mandiri di Era Reformasi* (Rising and Independent in the Reform Era), stress is laid on women’s education (Moeloek 2004). Yet further reading shows this to be purely instrumental. Women should gain knowledge in five areas: how to raise their children, guard their health, increase family income, have a healthy living environment, and follow family planning (*ibid* ii-iii). The nation’s future rests on women’s shoulders, because women are ‘responsible for the nation’s youth’ (*ibid*).

Toward these ‘motherhood-oriented’ educational goals, DWP carries out programmes for socialisation and information distribution, often in the form of posters and brochures.

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68 This name change occurred because DW was under pressure to modify its image post-Suharto. However, as part of their strength and credibility came from name recognition, they wanted to keep the root name and simply add something to it. The ‘*persatuan*’, unity, was selected and voted on simply because it proved least contentious (Moeloek, interview 3 August 2005).

69 The wives of the top bureaucrats remain as ‘*penasehat*’, or special advisors, to the chosen officials. This can result in these wives maintaining positions of great influence. For instance, as the head of DWP commented, women remain intimidated by the governor’s wife, and will still be directed by her (Moeloek, interview 3 August 2005).
When in their central Jakarta headquarters in August 2005, I was shown all the brochures they were distributing across the country. Of these 23 different pamphlets, all but two were directly related to parenting or maintaining a ‘nice’, well-organised family home. Ten of these brochures focused on preparing for various stages of family life to manage it better, four on teaching children to avoid narcotics, four on being a more sensitive and emotionally-aware parent, one on teaching your child to read well, one on the ‘Healthy Mother Movement’, and the last on the 1974 Marriage Law. Education for women is therefore always tied to how they can care for their children, even as the emphasis on motherhood remains integral to any description of DWP’s work (Moeloek, interview 3 August 2005; Gartini, interview 3 August 2005; Baeba, interview 3 August 2005).

Another primary organisation is PKK, whose influence and reach has been well-documented, extending from the smallest administrative unit (over only 10-20 households) to the highest level of government. PKK provides an example of an organisation that has superficially adopted gendered ‘development lingo’, even while it institutionalises the various discourses discussed in the previous chapter – development, morality, and motherhood. In a classic example of name change, PKK used to stand for Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, Family Welfare ‘Guidance’. Now the ‘P’ stands for Pemberdayaan, such that it is the ‘Empowerment’ and Family Welfare Movement. This name change borrows the language of ‘empowerment’ and reflects the shift in gender

70 The DWP brochure for the 1974 Marriage Law highlights a few of its tenets, such as wives being able to challenge their husbands if they take another wife without their permission. This marriage law, however, was controversial at its inception (see Katz and Katz 1975) and even today drives debate with some proposed changes sparking disagreement among Muslims (Jakarta Post 2005). For example, polygamous marriages were permissible where the first wife could not fulfil her (sexual) obligations to her husband, could not conceive a child, or suffered from a terminal illness, something seen to be prejudiced against women.

71 When asked if the purpose of education should be to ‘memperluas wawasan’ (expand understanding), the DWP official’s reply focused on the importance of women’s education as related to how they would provide physical nutrition to their children. The example given was about fish, which is perceived to be a ‘lower class’ food and so would not be given often to children from middle- or upper-class families. Teaching women the nutritional value of fish would lead more women to feed it to their children (Moeloek, interview 3 August 2005); educating women thus focuses less on opening minds than on making better mothers.
discourses discussed earlier, though the institution’s structure itself has remained remarkably similar. Whereas someone from the community can be appointed to a leadership position, for the most part PKK’s organisational structure still maps onto the bureaucracy through the wives of its officials. The wife of Indonesia’s President is the titular head of PKK, for example, with the Vice-President’s wife as its secondary patron.

Even given the name change, PKK’s focus remains much the same: ‘suatu gerakan pembangunan masyarakat’, a movement for society’s development (Dewi 2005). This recalls the development discourse considered previously, highlighted by the fact that PKK’s first programme (of ten) concerns the ‘comprehension and practical application of the Pancasila’ (the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state). Subsumed within this primary focus are concerns of morality. Top PKK officials, in the central Jakarta office, noted that the promotion of Pancasila means they have to encourage ‘moral democracy’, such that people are ‘budi pekerti, soped santun’ (of good character, polite and well-mannered) (Wiendarti, FGD 24 August 2005). The ultimate goal is to create a ‘moral society’ (ibid). Furthermore, PKK’s central mission statement makes it clear that it aims to empower families in order to create ones which are, first and foremost, ‘faithfully submitted to God’ (PKK 2005: 5). They also tie development rhetoric to their projects when socialising concepts of gender equality in the regions: in order to explain what this means to people they tend to use ‘kesamaan dalam pembangunan’ (‘sameness’ in development) (Wiedarto, FGD 24 August 2005).

Striking from even a cursory examination of both organisations is how they ‘concretise’ the various gender discourses we have discussed through their programmes and structures. Dharma Wanita Persatuan still has an institutional structure built around women’s position
as wives, while its programmes focus on women’s role as mothers. PKK’s institutional emphasis remains on women’s role as mothers (guiding their family’s welfare), is tied directly to women’s position as wives (to bureaucrats and government officials), and mobilises participation toward the instrumentalist goals of national development, including the creation of ‘moral citizens of good character’.

4.2 Moving to the Regions: The Reinforcing Spirals of Gender Norms and Institutions

When addressing how gender discourses are mapped onto institutions, we must move from the ‘centre’ to the regions. This is relevant because it enables us to understand how institutional structures are built upon local gender norms, and also feed back and act upon these norms with varying degrees of success, in an eminently spiral process. We can reflect on this moving circularity in the context of MOWE’s regional branches. MOWE is a national ministry that organises its efforts from the centre. Given decentralisation, there is no enforceable mandate for the provincial branches of MOWE to take a particular institutional form or position within the bureaucracy. This means these branches are structured differently in each region. I conducted case studies of four of these regional branches: Bandar Lampung (Lampung, southern Sumatra), Bandung (West Java), Yogyakarta (DIY, Central Java), and Surabaya (East Java). In each instance, the freedom of these branches to shape their interventions varied according to its institutional structure in the strongly-tiered local Indonesian bureaucracy.

The case studies of these branches offer unique insight. This section explores how the different forms taken by the regional offices seem to be both birthed by the prevailing consensus on gender in that area and constrained by the resulting bureaucratic structure.
Scholars such as Boas and McNeill have theorised this circularity of ideas and institutions, arguing that norms shape institutions as well as ideas, even as material interests shape the nature and behaviour of institutions and ideas (2004: 220). For example, where women have historically been granted greater recognition and position, the MOWE office is ‘higher’ in the bureaucracy and has great influence on regional policy; where women have traditionally been guarded by culture and religion, there may only be a small back office led by a lower-level official with little clout. Bandar Lampung is a clear example of the former, and Bandung of the latter.

Regional gender institutions are thus structured in a dialogical relationship to gender norms in such a way as to be mutually reinforcing. Exploring this multi-directional causality will be done by examining briefly the four regional offices. It is important to note that the four themes emerging at the national level – violence against women, trafficking, children’s welfare, and reproductive health – did not always receive the same emphasis in these branches. 72 Instead of tracing these policies through the regions, inductive methodology was used to understand what was being emphasised in each regional office – and how it might differ from the centre or from other regional branches. Continuity and disjuncture were of key interest: that is, in the spiral process of transformation between discourses and institutions, where and how ideas emanating from the centre were ‘taking root’, versus where and why ideas were not being ‘translated’ into regional programmes.

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72 This disjuncture was observed by comparing MOWE headquarters and the regional offices through personal fieldwork, staff interviews, and analysis of principle policy documents and information materials.
4.2.1 The ‘Organic’ Hierarchy, the Patrimonial State, and the Echelons of Decentralisation

Before addressing how the regional bureaucracy relates to gender programmes, we first look at bureaucratic ‘culture’ and structure in Indonesia. This highlights power relations and institutional norms within the bureaucracy. Although Indonesian gender policies are meant to impact the ‘lived lives’ of men and women across the islands, they are channelled through an institutional framework that is at all levels – central, regional, local – rife with politics and contested interaction, even while masked as consensus.73

Understanding the ‘culture’ of the Indonesian bureaucracy is significant, lending insight into institutional operation and change within these organisations. We will consider this culture from two angles: the ‘organic hierarchy’ of the state and patterns of patrimonialism. First, models have been presented for the broader Indonesian state as an ‘integralistic-organic’ state where ‘state and society, in effect, [constitute] an organic whole, with individuals and groups as parts of the whole’, and within which explicit conflict cannot be countenanced (Suryakusuma 1996: 93; cf. Rahardjo 1984: 18). In this ‘organic’ bureaucracy, therefore, systems of information are highly relational. For instance, the Head of Bapeda (the central government’s regional planning office) in Garut, West Java, claimed that all the different bureaucratic departments were now ‘saudara kandung’ (siblings), whereas before they were simply ‘sepupu’ (cousins) (Faridz, interview 29 August 2002). His comment reflects the azas kekeluargaan, or family principle, of the ‘integralistic’ state where the metaphors of familial relationships are used to promote group solidarity. Another example of this azas kekeluargaan, as offered by officials in MOWE’s Bandar Lampung branch, is the way mobile phone text messages are exchanged between higher-

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73 For further analysis of the politics of institutional interaction, see Swartz et al 2002.
level officials and all their staff (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005). These text messages promote a way of interacting that is ‘akrab’ (intimate, familiar) without necessarily being face-to-face (which would involve more complex, and difficult to negotiate, contact). Texting occurs not only within offices, but between officials in various departments as well as to non-civil servants; it was one of the principle ways government bureaucrats made arrangements with me while I was conducting research.

Yet this ‘familial’ organisation reflects gender norms, which leads us to consider the second point: that of underlying patrimonial relations. As Suryakusuma notes, ‘paternalism infuses Indonesian social organisation and relationships’ (1996: 95). In other words, it is not simply a democratic familial structure, but rather one of deference to the dominant male. People will refer to an A.B.S culture, an acronym for ‘Asal Bapak Senang’, meaning ‘as long as the Boss/Father is happy’. All other meetings I observed in government offices followed formalised, almost ritualistic, patterns of deference and communication. Within this hierarchical ‘family’ structure there is avoidance of explicit conflict. ‘Business’ does not take place without a great deal of talking ‘around’ the subject. Direct and overly-explicit communication styles are seen to be too confrontational and not ‘halus’ enough for the Sundanese. This is in keeping with the Indonesian principle of ‘musyawarah mufakat’, or consensus through deliberation.

74 Benedict Anderson (1972) makes similar arguments, linking the precolonial Javanese kingdom with Weber’s patrimonial state. Some analysts have argued that there was a ‘resurgence in patrimonialism’ under the New Order government (Ferrazzi 2000: 68). Here, the bureaucratic order was based heavily on favouritism through a ranking of personal ties of loyalty and subordination. Administrative decision-making depended upon personal consideration and upon ‘purely personal connections, favours, promises and privileges’ (Weber 1978: 1041). The transition from the New Order has sought to move away from these systems of patronage, a hierarchical tier that used to end with President Suharto. However, patterns of patrimonialism still underlie Indonesian bureaucratic structures.

75 ‘Halus’ literally means smooth, and refers to a gentle, calm, collected manner of self-presentation with an almost mystical quality to it (cf. Geertz 1960).
But this emphasis on *musyawarah mufakat* acts, ultimately, to suppress contested interpretations or challenges posed from within. Consensus must be reached, and once it has been attained (however free or coercive the process might have been), it glosses over difference to present a unified decision. One useful illustration is how food – of varying quality – is always served at government meetings. The snack boxes so omnipresent in bureaucratic gatherings can be viewed as symbolic of the relational element of bureaucracy: they are both explicitly inclusive (in that everyone receives the same snack and can share in it together) and implicitly status-oriented (in that the type of snack provided correlates to the status of those organising the event). The ‘snack culture’ therefore acts as a subtle way of reinforcing the position and power of those holding the meeting, as well as encouraging agreement. Participants are given food, acting as pressure to reciprocate with respectful listening aimed toward consensus building.76

These two insights into Indonesian bureaucratic ‘culture’, though simplified, are important for understanding how the bureaucracy functions. At the same time, we must also account for the more clear-cut forms of organisational hierarchy. There are two points to be made here, one regarding the impact of decentralisation on institutional forms, and the other related to the echelon system of ranking bureaucrats.

We begin with how decentralisation has impacted the creation of MOWE’s regional offices. This provides the context to explore how institutional structures are both based on, and reinforce, underlying gender norms. As previously noted, decentralisation has resulted in

76 No formal meeting at any level of the Indonesian bureaucracy that I attended, from parliament in Jakarta to a village house in a remote Lembang district, went without uniformly packaged snacks. In fact, one of the ways volunteers are attracted at the RW (local) level is through money to buy snacks for their meetings (Newland 2001: 30). What these ‘snack boxes’ include is directly linked to the status of the meeting and the money behind it: meetings in Jakarta can be assured to have more expensive foods, usually including meat, whereas in the villages participants are likely to receive only a water cup with two small, traditional Indonesian nibbles. Because the level and quality of the food corresponds to the money behind the meeting, food becomes another way of highlighting the ‘rank’ and status of those organising the event.
many different institutional structures being chosen by the MOWE regional branches. Some regions end up with offices headed by higher level bureaucrats, while others end up as small and inconsequential branches subsumed within larger bureaucratic structures. The reasons for these differences between regional structures will be explored through the case studies.

Next, given that decentralisation has allowed variant bureaucratic structures in each region, it is important to understand the way these overlapping hierarchies are negotiated. This happens through the echelon system, which is how multiple lines of authority and delegation are organised within the Indonesian bureaucracy. The highest-ranking bureaucrat is Echelon I, down to the lowest-ranking at Echelon IV. As there are various forms of government offices in each region, skilful use of echelon rankings is required to navigate between them. A rough outline of some of these regional bureaucratic levels is shown below.
Negotiating between these structures relies on communication and reporting to other bureaucrats in accordance with their echelon level. Any work conducted between these various bodies would involve following a ‘chain of command’ built on echelon levels, particularly relevant because often each government agency will have a different and complex structure, making coordination difficult. But the ‘chain of command’ is followed carefully, with subordination to higher echelon officials well understood.\textsuperscript{77}

\subsection*{4.2.2 Provincial Institutions: Four Case Studies}

Now we turn more specifically to look at the ‘channels’ between the centre and the regions, focusing on MOWE’s branches in West, Central, and East Java, and in Lampung (southern Sumatra). In each of these offices, I spent time interviewing key officials and gathering relevant project documents between July and August 2005. The general format for describing each office will be to look first at how it operates, next at the underlying socio-cultural conditions of the city and province, and finally at its institutional structure and how this either facilitates or constrains action.\textsuperscript{78} There will then be a concluding section analysing links and themes from these four offices. One caveat is that I rely on the self-reporting of the officials in these branches, analysing what they perceive to be their constraints and successes, and only in the concluding section begin to analyse the broader processes underlying institutional structure and operation.

\textsuperscript{77} I experienced this ‘chain of command’ in many cases. One example involved my attempts to contact the regional MOWE office in Surabaya (East Java) in July of 2005. We were faxing the necessary letter of introduction (\textit{surat pengantar}) from the central Jakarta office in order to facilitate my visit there. I was only intending to contact the MOWE office itself (the \textit{Bidang Perempuan}); because of this, the original letter was addressed to the head of this office. However, this was refused on the grounds that it was not properly addressed to the highest authority in the regional office under which the \textit{Bidang Perempuan} existed. It was impossible to contact the \textit{Bidang Perempuan} directly. Instead, this had to be formalised through the Echelone II head of the \textit{Badan}, where the \textit{Bidang} was housed.

\textsuperscript{78} These case studies will be written in present tense for clarity, though changes may have occurred since 2005.
4.2.2a Bandung (West Java)

The MOWE office for West Java in Bandung is located under the Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Daerah (BPMD), the Regional Body for the Empowerment of Society. As such it is headed by an Echelon III official and is the ‘Bidang Perempuan’ (BP), or Women’s Division. The office is small, tucked in a corner of the BPMD which itself is on the outskirts of the city.\(^{79}\) BP’s name and projects do not reflect the most recent terminologies from central MOWE. It is not the Division for Women’s Empowerment, but simply ‘Women’s Division’. The primary project it runs is the P2WKSS (Peningkatan Peranan Wanita menuju Keluarga Sehat Sejahtera), ‘Increasing the role of women toward a healthy and prosperous family’, wherein the older word for woman (wanita)\(^{80}\) is used instead of the contemporary one (perempuan), even as ‘role’ (peranan) is used instead of ‘empowerment’ (pemberdayaan). When asked about recent changes in Jakarta, the head of one of the sub-bidang said they ‘did not feel’ any difference in focus or action and were continuing to follow the traditional policies and programmes (Guswandi, interview 1 August 2005). The various discourses we have argued to be impacting gender programmes are evident here: development, morality, motherhood. For example, the opening statement of their central P2WKSS project situates its efforts within the overall vision statement for West Java, which aims to develop the region with ‘faith and piety’ (iman dan taqwa) (Pemerintah Propinsi Jawa Barat 2005: 1). All of the office’s brochures and project documents reaffirm this drive toward ‘pious development’ and focus on women’s role within that promotion.

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79 When I attempted to find the place, I had been given incorrect contact details from the Jakarta office, as the staff had recently been reshuffled by the BPMD. I called the regional planning body, the Bapeda, which is meant to coordinate all government bureaucracy in the region, and even here was not given proper information on which staff held which position. This was the first illustration of how small and inconsequential the office would prove to be.

80 When I asked about word choice, they noted that in the field they still tend to use ‘wanita’, though formally in the office and with other government agencies they use ‘perempuan’.
We begin with questions of operation. Much of BP’s efforts, like MOWE at the centre, revolve around coordination, guidance, and ‘socialisation’ of gender and women’s issues. The head of BP, for example, commented that for the previous two years they had been socialising the problems women face in the region, but had not yet evaluated how people had received this or what changes may have taken place (Sudrajat, interview 1 August 2005). BP officials work with different organisations depending on their focus. For instance, the head of the sub-bidang for women’s rights noted that he tends to work in the ‘political field’, attending many training and socialisation activities in Jakarta and then doing a lot of ‘training’ of other bureaucrats through the region (Guswandi, interview 1 August 2005). His focus is on the harder-to-measure goals of socialisation, whereby things such as gender mainstreaming take the form of repeated coordination meetings and the dissemination of information to government offices (ibid). Meanwhile, the head of the sub-bidang for developing women’s ‘human resources’ claimed to work directly with the people, via PKK as an institutional vehicle for ‘direct implementation in the field’ (Noryuni, interview 1 August 2005). Thus for each of the three fields in which it works – economy, education, and health – BP simply facilitates or ‘gives guidance’ to PKK’s efforts as the PKK workers are ‘active on the grassroots level’ and run their own on-the-ground projects (ibid).

What is interesting about sub-bidang coordination is that it refers us back to the problem of development programmes overall, where no amount of planning at central levels can hide the fact that most projects ultimately rest on the shoulders of local-level workers whose job it is to do the ‘face-to-face’ implementation. It is an example of the ‘lowest common denominator’ at work in development, determining outcomes. Whereas the women’s rights staffer made the point of saying he was not working ‘with the people’, the ‘human resources’ head made it clear that she was. However, her actual work involved offering guidance to the approximately 50 PKK staff that operate at the regional level, who, as she explained, ‘perpanjang tangan dari pusat’, literally ‘extend the arm from the centre’ (Noryuni, interview 1 August 2005). These 50 staff function at a higher level, with the fieldworkers beneath them in the villages actually implementing and socialising programmes. These PKK officers at the lower levels are still the wives of the ranking bureaucrats, such as the wife of the village head (istri kepala desa). Thus the claim to be working with ‘the people’ is made not because she herself was engaged in ‘grassroots’ work but based on her working with an institution that had an organisational structure from the centre stretching to the village.
Next, we turn to evaluating the underlying culture of West Java, particularly its gender norms. This culture has been argued to be a constraint limiting the work of BP, primarily because of gender biases in the region. West Java is strongly Muslim (96.5%), and ethnically Sundanese (74%) and Javanese (11%). BP officials explained that people tend to not understand gender as a concept, thinking that government intends to make gender roles the same for men and women, and that men worry that women will take away their privileges and power (Sudrajat, interview 1 August 2005). The religious factions are the most difficult to approach, and generally non-supportive of the promotion of women’s equality. The existence of various districts in West Java – such as Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, and Ciamis – that have enacted peraturan daerah (regional rulings) on sharia law highlight the rise of religion in the public sphere. In addition, the increased wearing of the jilbab, as noted in the previous chapter, represents a visual and symbolic shift toward ever more formalised Indonesian Islamic religious norms. Bandung in particular and West Java in general are marked visibly by jilbabisasi. Underlying inequalities are also evident: in the economy, women tend to occupy lower positions (e.g. factory workers) instead of any higher managerial ones; in governmental representation for 2004, West Java had only three women parliamentarians out of more than 100 top officials for the region, a much lower figure than the national average of 11 percent. Most interesting, however, is that western Java is also perhaps the most ‘modern’ of these provinces, home to both Jakarta and Bandung, large metropolitan cities. This lends support to the argument that it is in a climate of reaction and backlash where religion has asserted itself most strongly to constrain women.

82 This notion of ‘culture’ being an ‘obstacle’ to development is not uncommon, whether explicitly stated or implicitly inferred. Whereas the issue is never that straightforward, it is clear that any targeted intervention must function in relation to pre-existing socio-cultural conditions, which will have an effect on how this intervention is received, contested, and appropriated.
Given this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that BP’s work should meet a great deal of resistance in the region. This is tied to their institutional constraints, as project staff pointed to their weakened position in the bureaucracy. These constraints tend to fall into two categories: the disjuncture between national and regional policy, and the complexity of bureaucratic structure. The absence of supporting policy in the province was noted by BP staff, who said that if they had the backing of these policies they would then have the ‘kekuatan hukum untuk berbicara’ (the force of law with which to speak), as well as a ‘corridor’ within which to move and better structure for their work (Sudrajat, interview 1 August 2005). For example, there is a Presidential Decree (*Instruksi President, or InPres*) from 2000 regarding women’s empowerment, but no Gubernatorial Decree to match (*InGub*). The head of BP commented that because they lacked formalised regional policy, they have found it difficult to achieve their goals (*ibid*). Another difficulty faced by BP is their place within the regional bureaucracy. The head official explained that fundamental obstacles arise because of the ‘system’ itself, which lengthens all processes of implementation. West Java is the most densely populated province in Indonesia (nearing 40 million), with 26 regencies and cities (*kabupaten*) and a bureaucratic structure composed of at least 16 *dinas* with different organisational hierarchies which ‘colours problems of coordination’ (*ibid*). As an Echelon III bureaucrat heading a small office within this large and dense bureaucracy, he is not in a place to give direction and is ‘not bold enough’ to even give input (*ibid*).
The MOWE office for the ‘special region’ of Yogyakarta (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta) has a very different institutional framework than the Bandung office, existing as the Kantor Pemberdayaan Perempuan (KPP), or Office for Women’s Empowerment. KPP here is a ‘lembaga otonomi’ (autonomous body) in that it stands alone, while technically linked under the regional planning authority. KPP is headed by an Echelon III official, and has its own spacious and easily accessible building near the centre of town. In their offices, I met with 13 staff members (of 42 total) all focused on different issues ‘with a gender perspective’.

Regarding operation, KPP has three primary foci: gender mainstreaming, increasing women’s quality of life, and the protection of women and children (Tuti, FGD 15 August 2005). Overall, KPP officials painted a picture of their organisation as actively engaged in facilitating gender justice and equality. For example, they set up a Unit Pelayanan Terpadu (UPT), or Integrated Care Unit, which allows women to receive medical, legal, psychological, and social support when reporting an act of violence. Additionally, they have published a bilingual ‘Integrated Service Directory’ (in both Indonesian and English) outlining all the support options for cases of violence against women (Forum Penanganan Korban Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan dan Anak 2005). They work in close partnership with PKK in the villages, and coordinate their efforts across various sectors.

Having considered what KPP does, we explore the underlying culture. Yogya, according to the head of KPP, is ‘agak lain, kebudayaannya’ – slightly different in its culture – to the rest of Java (Tuti, interview 15 August 2005). The commentary from KPP staff, supported

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83 The Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, or DIY, is actually its own province, separate from but apportioned within Central Java. While possessing a unique cultural and historical heritage that marks it as distinct, nonetheless it is dominantly Javanese.
by gender-disaggregated data on the region (KPP 2005), is that Yogya is a city where women are actively engaged in the public sphere, clearly visible in positions of influence, and very often in the work force and higher education (Jarot, FGD 15 August 2005). The perception remains that women should be in the home, but in comparison to West Java they are ‘more open’ (Sari, FGD 15 August 2005). Yogya is still a small city (compared to Bandung, Surabaya, Jakarta), but there are many organisations for women, allowing their efforts to be felt. Yogyakarta is also recognised as a centre of higher education, with many top universities, including the famous Gadjah Mada University. It is known for being more ‘open-minded’ and liberal in its thinking (Dari, FGD 15 August 2005). This is further substantiated by observations of public space in Yogya during my visits and extended stays there. One of the things one sees immediately, when driving through the city, is the greater number of women on motorbikes and the fewer number of women wearing the jilbab as compared to Bandung.

This underlying culture, however, is not straightforwardly receptive to change. There are still negative reactions to the perceived rise in women’s status, such as those claiming that if KPP gains ground then women will become ‘terlalu berani’ (too brave) and outspoken (Tuti, FGD 15 August 2005), and that where women advance, men tend to be unhappy about this shift (Halida, FGD 15 August 2005). The office also experiences problems from the religious sector, described by several officials as the main impediment to their efforts (Jarot, FGD 15 August 2005). Men’s dominance in the home is still pervasive, fuelling problems of domestic violence (ibid). Globalisation here has been described as a ‘pisau bermata dua’, or a double-edged sword, as it has opened up possibilities for women but also brought with it a feminism that is perceived to be too ‘Western’ and therefore negative (Dari, FGD 15 August 2005). In general, the West’s influence is seen to be something ‘very complex’, with general
public opinion reacting to these outside influences by seeking to reinforce messages of morality to the public (Halida, FGD 15 August 2005).

Building upon these changing but generally positive cultural norms, KPP’s institutional framework is viewed as beneficial; however, the positive impact of their institutional positioning is more complex than just their relative independence within a bureaucratic hierarchy. Overall, it was important to the staff that they are an office that stands alone. The head of KPP noted that it is better to be Echelon III ‘tapi bisa nari sendiri’ – but able to dance alone (Tuti, FGD 15 August 2005). They still receive information from the centre, but when they seek to determine which programmes to run, they tend to go to the community to ascertain what is really needed and what will be best accepted (Kanti, FGD 15 August 2005). Because KPP does not always wait for directives to come to them from MOWE headquarters, for instance, the office already has its own Strategic Plan (Renstrat) for 2004-2008, along with an in-depth booklet on the Statistical Profile and Gender Indicators for DIY 2004, the only office of the four I examined to offer gender-disaggregated data on the region (Kantor Pemberdayaan Perempuan 2005). But it is more than just their independence that facilitates action. KPP’s coordination across sectors is good, they claimed, because generally the relations between government and NGOs are ‘sangat akrab’ (very intimate and trusting) (Tuti, FGD 15 August 2005). Most important for them is how KPP is ‘motored’ from the top by a very supportive governor and bureaucratic framework.84 Furthermore, within the region they try to work to develop ‘synergy’ with other organisations who are also tackling gender-

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84 For example, in 2002 the Governor of Yogyakarta sent out a circular letter to all government agencies that offered the full backing of the governor’s office for the Presidential Decree on Gender Mainstreaming (Gubernur DIY 2002). This circular had the effect of making the national instruction a regional policy, something to which KPP pointed as offering them not only greater legitimacy but also a direct mandate for action. Another key aspect of their regional support came when gubernatorial decree No. 23/2004 ordered the creation of a team to coordinate ‘development with a gender perspective’.
related matters, for instance, developing the forum to deal with issues of violence against women (Sari, FGD 15 August 2005).

4.2.2c Surabaya (East Java)

The MOWE regional office for East Java is, like Bandung, in the form of a Bidang Pemberdayaan Perempuan (BPP) – the Women’s Empowerment Division – headed by an Echelon III bureaucrat. BPP operates underneath the Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (Bapemas), the Body for the Empowerment of Society, and is housed within the Bapemas buildings in central Surabaya. The office space itself was substantial, and filled with working staff (a total of 26 members). It was originally constituted as a bureau in 2001-2002 (with an Echelon II official at its helm), but was moved under Regional Ruling No. 10/2001 into the Bapemas structure. There was no explanation from current BPP officials for the structural change.

In terms of its operation, the office is divided into three sub-bidang: gender equality, family welfare, and ‘peran serta perempuan’ (women’s participatory roles) – the last of which includes efforts to help women workers, the poor, and so on. They work with PKK in the outlying areas, and closely with the Biro Mental Spiritual in the centre (a bureau headed by an Echelon II official). While much of its information comes from Jakarta, the office has also acted without waiting for ‘guidelines’ from the centre, for instance when they worked on child protection legislation at the regional level in 2003 (Nini, interview 19 August 2005). They made it clear that their programmes are ‘lebih luas’ (more comprehensive) than those designed in the centre because they involve a wider set of actors and are more specific, and therefore more complete (Tuti, interview 19 August 2005). In describing the history of their work in Surabaya and the wider province, they noted that ten
years ago it would have been much harder to deal with women’s issues. At this time, a team\textsuperscript{85} came from the capital to ‘socialise the need’ to have programmes for women. Only after a long period of this approach could the ‘obstacles’ to their gender programmes then be removed and their projects be ‘received’ (Nini, interview 19 August 2005). These explanations fit within the general approach faced by many MOWE officials: convincing society of the ‘need’ for projects for women’s advancement in the face of resistance is the first stage of any gender intervention.

The surrounding culture helps to explain both the way the office has been formed and how it is able to work. The culture in Surabaya is a blend of Javanese and Madurese\textsuperscript{86} influences. Due in part to this blend, the city itself has been described as very ‘open’, such that people and ideas enter and ‘langsung ceplos’ (a slang term that would be used to explain an egg cracking over and spreading onto something) (Nini, interview 19 August 2005). Women in Surabaya are becoming more involved in the public sphere, increasingly engaged in the job sector and running for public office. For instance, in 2005, 15 percent of the parliamentary representation for East Java was female (statistically higher than in West Java at only around three percent). The dominant religion is Muslim, but the impression given by BPP staff was that religion is not a ‘problem’, as they tend to work closely with NGOs and other religious organisations on common issues.\textsuperscript{87} This idea of religion as a positive channel for raising awareness of gender issues is demonstrated by the brochures that BPP uses for its socialisation, including several that aim to show how religious teaching lends itself to gender equality and justice.

\textsuperscript{85} *Tim Program Peningkatan Peran Wanita*, TP3W (Team for the Programme to Increase Women’s Role).
\textsuperscript{86} The island of Madura is just off the coast of eastern Java and is part of East Java.
\textsuperscript{87} For instance, there is an Islamic organisation called PKUB, *Perempuan Kelompok Umat Beragama* (Women’s Group for a Religious Community) that is well-known and operates smoothly in the community (Nini, interview 19 August 2005).
However, as with the social changes felt by Yogya staff, the dominant provincial gender norms both respond to, and resist, cultural shifts that would reposition women in society. For example, the head of BPP noted that there had been substantial reaction to many of the Western television programmes shown in the city; she said that what comes in from the West is ‘okay’ as long as Indonesians do not ‘ikut-ikut’ – follow along. Instead, these TV shows with their depiction of ‘Western women’ have led to increased discussions about how freedom for women is becoming more of a ‘moral problem’ (Nini, interview 19 August 2005). In addition, women’s roles as mothers and wives remain central constructs. Even if women find outside employment, they now face the ‘bebancy ganda’, or double burden, as they are still expected to care for the family and the home (ibid). Because men and women have been ‘created by God’ differently and it is women’s nature to be with the children, staff claimed, programmes for women ultimately end up targeting children as well (Tuti, interview 19 August 2005). Furthermore, the culture of ‘konco blinking’ still exists, where the wife is expected to be subservient to the husband, though this is less oppressive in big cities than in outlying areas (ibid).

Within this cultural context, the BPP’s institutional structure is viewed as helpful but limited. Their office is set up as a bidang under an Echelon III civil servant, which, according to their staff, allows them to do ‘technical implementation’ all the way to the grassroots rather than only being a coordinating body like a (higher-up) bureau (Tuti, interview 19 August 2005). There are perceived benefits from being closer to the ‘ground’ and networked within the Bapemas; their existence within the broader structure is seen as useful (in contrast to KPP’s claim in Yogyakarta that it is their ‘stand alone’ status that proves most beneficial). At the same time, however, staff claimed that decisions still tend

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88 This ‘double burden’ has been extensively theorised in Western contexts; see Hochschild 1989.
to come from the top and are too diverse, such that the office gets burdened with running too many projects dictated by external parties (Tuti, interview 19 August 2005). Overall, the office staff perceived their position within the bureaucratic hierarchy as one that may have limited power explicitly but still afforded them freedom to accomplish many of their objectives.

4.2.2d Bandar Lampung (Lampung, southern Sumatra)

The MOWE branch in Bandar Lampung, southern Sumatra, presented a contrast to the other regional offices in that it was well-known, having already received a national recognition award for success in promoting its gender programmes. It exists as a bureau – the *Biro Bina Pemberdayaan Perempuan* (BBPP), Bureau for the Guidance of Women’s Empowerment – and is headed by an Echelon II official. The office itself is housed in the Governor’s rather ostentatious headquarters, as it sits within the bureaucratic structure of the Regional Secretariat (*Sekretariat Daerah*, or *Setda*). Locating the office was easy as everyone knew where it was, in comparison to the repeated attempts to find the Bandung branch. From the outset, this greater visibility promised to be significant. As with the previous case studies, we will here look at what BBPP does, the underlying culture, and finally to its institutional structure.

Regarding operation, this bureau has been active in promoting gender projects, even ahead of decisive movement from central MOWE offices. For instance, they were the first office to enact key measures for gender mainstreaming, violence care units, and anti-trafficking. They were also the first to include anti-trafficking measures in their regional plans (*Rencana Aksi Daerah* No. 13/2005), and to set up a *Unit Pelayanan Terpadu* (UPT) in 2002, an ‘Integrated Service Unit’ to handle cases of violence against women. By 2005
there were an additional ten UPTs throughout the province, and where these do not exist they have an RPK (Ruang Pelayanan Khusus, or Special Service Room) which is housed in the police headquarters and supervised by female personnel. They run socialisation schemes alongside the creation of the UPTs and RPKs to ‘give some understanding’ to people that violence is a human rights issue, which has helped to increase reporting of cases of violence (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005). In addition, they are finally seeing more effective prosecution of VAW cases that are brought to the courts (ibid). Another major project run by the Bureau is the P3KSS, Peningkatan Peran Perempuan menuju Keluarga Sehat Sejahtera (Increasing the Role of Women toward a Healthy and Prosperous Family), well-known through rural areas and implemented for the most part by PKK fieldworkers. The BBPP still works closely with PKK because they perceive PKK to have free and unhindered access all the way to the grassroots level (Muchtar, interview 12 August 2005). BBPP also coordinates with NGOs throughout the province, including various academic organisations such as the Centre for Gender Studies at Lampung’s main university.

Underlying their operations are broader cultural and social norms. These norms were described as fundamentally positive for women’s role and freedoms. This stems in part from what is considered ‘Lampung culture’, which tends to value women highly. According to BBPP officials, Lampung has grown through transmigration, where many different cultural backgrounds have ‘sudah berbaur’ – already mixed and identified – with more ‘Sumatran values’ that place great worth on women (Muchtar, interview 12 August

89 When I asked if there were enough female personnel to cover each RPK, they assured me that this was the case, whereas in West Java it was admitted that this was not always so as there remain insufficient numbers of female police officers.

90 I noted that they have made the ‘name change’ to perempuan from wanita with regard to ‘woman’, in their P3KSS project, as opposed to how in places such as Bandung it is still P2WKSS, which uses wanita. They responded that they made all the name changes during the 2001 era of Ibu Khofifah in MOWE. Though this initially was ‘diperintah dari atas’ (ordered from above), they conducted a workshop on the name change in order that everyone understood why they were making the change (i.e. the fact that perempuan has a more positive root than wanita) (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005).
Even though the province is a Muslim majority, religion and culture are not viewed as an ‘obstacle’ to change because the different influences and entrances tend to ‘neutralise’ any oppressive approaches to women’s position (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005). The overall consensus was that women are not actively denied entrance to the public domain and are in fact relatively empowered in the province, and that the culture is ‘strong but positive’ for enhancing women’s position (ibid). In addition, BBPP leaders pointed to some progressive aspects of Islamic influence, as they work closely with several religious groups (ibid). Yet this portrait is not entirely progressive. The head of the bureau noted that, even given changes, the culture still has patriarchal aspects (Muchtar, interview 12 August 2005). While one BBPP official claimed that there is no longer a restricted ‘woman’s role’ that permeates cultural norms (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005), the others noted that in fact problems remain, particularly in outlying rural areas where women are restricted to what could be termed the ‘traditional’ gender role of staying in the home, raising children, being second to men, and so on (Istiqomah, interview 12 August 2005; Herlina, interview 12 August 2005).

As with the other provinces, there have been cultural changes which have impacted women’s position. Five to ten years ago, the majority of women in Lampung did not wear the jilbab. Only more recently has there been an increase in those donning the jilbab, estimated by BBPP officials at around 10 to 20 percent (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005). Additionally, there was much discussion about how women have begun to dress more conservatively. The head of the bureau emphasised this by saying ‘Al’hamdulillah [praise be to God], now you don’t see women wearing sleeveless shirts anymore’ (Muchtar, interview 12 August 2005). In one of the most telling statements about the jilbab and

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91 For instance, the Minangkabau of West Sumatra are the largest matrilineal society in the world, where properties such as houses and land are inherited through the female lineage. They are often held up as an example of how in Sumatra women are highly venerated.
women’s changing dress sense, they noted that the *jilbab* used to be perceived as something rather ‘*kampungan*’, village-like, while now it is seen as a status symbol, associated with the middle to upper classes. For example, ‘now you see women in fancy cars wearing a *jilbab*, including the governor’s wife herself (*ibid*). The head of the bureau noted that she herself did not use to wear the *jilbab*, but since she gained a better understanding of what the Qur’ān says about women covering their heads, she has chosen to do so (*ibid*). This association with the higher classes is a common feature of *jilbabisasi* in many areas. The BBPP office mirrored that in Yogya and Surabaya, in that the top officials all wore the head-covering whereas the lower-level staff did not (in Bandung most of the female bureaucrats cover their heads).

In this environment, BBPP experiences successful institutional positioning. According to its staff, being an Echelon II-led bureau means the ‘*lembaganya cocok*’, that is, the institutional structure is well-suited to the task (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005). The bureau is a good ‘fit’ because unlike a *dinas* it does not have to work on a specific function, but instead can ‘coordinate across sectors’, something they considered necessary for gender mainstreaming (*ibid*). Having an Echelon II official at the helm was seen to be necessary to attain policy objectives and ‘make decisions’ (which otherwise would be out of their hands) (Istiqomah, interview 12 August 2005). BBPP is more free to act, according to the bureau head, because of this strong institutional structure, along with the individual commitment of project staff, the availability of gender-disaggregated data, ‘capacity and aptitude for gender mainstreaming’, and finally the support of all the related forums, such as the involved *dinas* who have already set aside budgeting for specific gender programmes (Muchtar, interview 12 August 2005). Furthermore, the bureau exists within a political and bureaucratic structure that has good representation by women: 11 of the 65 parliamentarians from
Lampung are women – one of the highest percentages of female representation across Indonesia. This was viewed as a positive framework within which to advocate for women’s issues. Thus although BBPP is often tasked toward certain ends by MOWE in Jakarta, and receive ‘aturan main dari pusat’ (‘playing rules’ from the centre), they tend to choose their actions themselves in accordance with local needs (Muchtar, interview 12 August 2005).

4.2.3 Drawing Conclusions

There are a few points to be highlighted when considering these different regional institutions. The central argument is that underlying gender norms not only feed into the ultimate selection of institutional framework for the regional MOWE office, but also facilitate or constrain its action. This spiral, reinforcing relationship echoes that between implicit gender constructs and the programmes selected by central MOWE. In other words, both cases show the pattern of implicit discourses and paradigms framing either programmatic focus or institutional structure, which then impact back upon these paradigms. More specifically, we sketched regional branch operations by studying how they operate, what gender norms prevail in the area, and the subsequent constraints or benefits of their institutional structure (based on the self-perceived ability of the bureaucrats to act). In order better to compare these offices, we will make three brief points about broader institutional frameworks and support, the idea of ‘political will’ and freedom to act, and the questions of religion and public space.

First, a significant factor for all of the regional offices was how they fit within the wider network of institutions. The office in Bandung (BP) existed within a strongly-defined hierarchical system that was additionally convoluted and complex, while BP was weak and relatively insignificant within it. In Yogyakarta (KPP), descriptions tended toward a more
familial hierarchy, with the government and NGOs embedded together in a well-knit system, and KPP was strong within it. Surabaya (BPP) similarly had a more ‘familial hierarchy’, and though the office there was only led by an Echelon III official they tended to feel close to the people and deemed their work relatively successful. The Lampung Bureau (BBPP) was housed within a strong and a clearly defined hierarchical bureaucracy, where BBPP was well-placed and influential. Related to this broader network was the perception of institutional support. For example, in Yogya the office touted the clear and strong backing of the governor and drew upon provincial mandates (e.g. *Perda DIY No. 2/2004*) to devise their own vision and mission statement. This statement places centrally its aim to establish ‘gender equality and justice’, immediately highlighting the ways in which at the provincial level it is gender equality and justice given attention, where ‘gender’ implies the understanding that it is relations between men and women, and not just attention to women per se (KPP 2005b). The office in Bandung also used the goals of the province to construct its aims, borrowing from West Java’s policy statements about development of the province in ‘faith and piety’; however, because there are no regional statements about gender as in Yogya, this vision and mission statement thus stems directly from a focus on ‘moral development’ and only ‘women’ (not even really gender) secondarily (*Pemerintah Propinsi Jawa Barat 2005*).

Yet this ‘place within the system’ was not simply about Echelon ranking or institutional form. Based on feedback from branch officials, their ability to act was dependent not on the institutional structure, but on their self-perceived amount of leverage within the system and the sense of ‘closeness’ and political will they felt to enact programmes. This is the second point to stress: the dynamic interaction between a structural position within a given bureaucratic hierarchy and the ability of the officials to feel supported and to operate freely.
The Echelon system explains in part how authority is delineated within a complex bureaucratic system, and was often touted as an example of why an organisation is either ‘weak’ or ‘strong’. However, the case studies show that this hierarchical distinction has little to do with whether the office has standing to accomplish its objectives or not. For instance, the offices in Bandung, Yogya, and Surabaya are all Echelon III. Yogya is a stand-alone office, and therefore can make use of greater freedoms even as Echelon III. Both Bandung and Surabaya offices are housed within their regional bodies, yet claimed to utilise their positioning differently. Bandung’s officials felt keenly the constraints on their activity. Surabaya’s officials viewed their position as beneficial because it made them ‘closer to the people’ (Tuti, interview 19 August 2005).

In other words, it was how the project staff felt that mattered about their position within the hierarchy, and further that either opened possibilities or foreclosed options. For example, an official in the Surabaya office noted that in the disorder of decentralisation, there are opportunities for ‘clever people’ with interesting and creative ideas to advance in the bureaucracy – to be ‘channeled’ into a position to accomplish something (Tuti, interview 19 August 2005). This positivity contrasted with the sense of apathy within the Bandung office. Here, the disjuncture between shifts in national policy and Bandung’s implementation – even word-choice changes such as those from ‘wanita’ to ‘perempuan’ or from ‘role’ to ‘empowerment’ – was seen to reflect broader institutional weaknesses, instead of being viewed as part of increasing regional autonomy. The lack of West Java regional policies in support of gender were seen to prevent them from accomplishing their objectives (Sudrajat, interview 1 August 2005).
This brings us to the third point, that of underlying norms. Where there is a general sense of ‘women’s issues’ being viewed positively and accepted by society, the offices tended to predict success for their efforts more readily. In approaching the four case studies, I had supposed that Lampung would be the anomaly because it had such a strong regional office and a long tradition (based on Sumatran values) of valuing women highly. But further analysis casts Bandung as the anomaly and the worst case – that in fact women and support for gender initiatives are not suffering too badly elsewhere.

Here the major factor seemed to be not the existence of religion but rather its exclusivity and rigidity, particularly in its material forms (as highlighted most clearly by the jilbab). For instance, religion in Central Java is more mystical and liberal; as an official from the Yogya office noted, religion there is something ‘natural’ that flows from the people and is not pressured (Dari, FGD 15 August 2005). Historically, Sufism or mystical Islam has had great doctrinal importance to Javanese religion, and is perhaps best characterised by former president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) which he led during the New Order. Gus Dur’s spirituality and political liberalism echo that of the NU, which opposes the establishment of sharia law in Indonesia and seeks greater cooperation and understanding between all religious groups. This has remained the case not only in Yogyakarta but also in East Java, which purports a rise in the strength of its Islamic adherence but still a measure of flexibility in its political approaches. Lampung is the least ‘rigid’ of the provinces studied, displaying a measure of religious openness and naturalness; religion is not something that can be forced, officials there said, but it is what is in the heart – ‘yang ada di hati’ (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005). West Java, conversely, was the most fundamentalist and firm in its observance of Islamic law.
Though an imperfect measure, one of the simplest ways to understand how ‘religious rigidity’ in these areas affected women’s position in the public sphere is to consider clues from observations of public space. In all of these provinces there were sharp differences in how women participated in the visible interactions of city life. The most striking contrast presented itself between Bandung and Bandar Lampung. In Bandung, apart from the Jakartans driving through town for weekend shopping, the majority of women wear more conservative versions of the jilbab. For instance, only in West Java have I seen Indonesian women commonly wearing wrist bands under their long sleeves, to prevent these sleeves from slipping down to reveal any skin above their hands. They also tend to wear socks with their sandals, all covered by longer flowing robes. In Surabaya the jilbab is fashionable, worn over conservative but still fitted and tailored clothing. In Lampung more women went about with heads uncovered, in clothing that could not be described as revealing but was not extremely conservative either. When I visited Lampung, I was also very surprised to hear a woman’s voice leading a public prayer over the mosque loudspeaker – something that would be forbidden in Bandung. In Yogya the sight of women on motorbikes, flooding the streets in equal measure with men, signals the active mobility of women within the city. It is far less common to see women driving motorcycles in Bandung.

These observations, however brief, lend insight into why it is that certain offices have been able to operate with some measure of success. The links between institutional frameworks, freedom and ‘will’ within these structures, and underlying pre-existing gender norms are all significant to understanding how the regional offices function and what this implies. Most importantly, we return to the original premise to argue that the most important predictor of
success for these offices is the foundational gender relations, as these determine not only institutional structures themselves but also constrain or facilitate their action.

4.3 Indonesian Transformation and Questions of Institutional Culture

We have been examining the major gender initiatives of institutions, exploring how these are based on essentialising claims that may serve to reify existing gender norms. Points were made about the Indonesian bureaucracy and how it functions in familial yet hierarchical ways, relevant to the actual implementation of gender initiatives. We then turned to the regions, demonstrating the circularity and mutually-reinforcing relationship between the paradigms and policies of gender transmitted in a place. The next logical step is to consider the broader applicability of some of these arguments, particularly given the impact of decentralisation on programme functioning and the existence of great regional diversity.

First, the impact of the dynamic between ‘social transformation through globalisation’ coupled with ‘organisational transformation through decentralisation’ will be questioned. Next, several points will be made about the institutional element: that in fact regardless of the development project or aim, there are bureaucratic institutions and bureaucrats themselves who must translate plans into action, which has distinct implications for outcomes; furthermore, these ‘translations’ take place in the context of power relations, with distinct effects. The conclusion is not that the individual case findings are universally applicable. Rather, the central premise offers insight into the ways gender has both discursive and material elements. In addition, analysing the processes and politics of bureaucratic interventions is necessary to understanding the nature of the development project.
The first point is that of the effects of a sense of political and social transformation, possibly driven by external change (viz. globalisation), alongside the institutional transformation enacted through Indonesia’s decentralisation. Indonesia has experienced great transition and even crisis over the past ten years – the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s followed by the end of Suharto’s 32-year reign, the increasing effects of modernisation and urban growth, and so on. Decentralisation has also affected how government organisations are able to determine and enact policies. Change is a common element. This is relevant in how it relates to gender. As Wolf notes, ‘We owe to social anthropology the insight that the arrangements of a society become most visible when they are challenged by crisis. The role of power also becomes most evident in instances where major organisational transformations put signification under challenge’ (Wolf 2002: 231). Note here that signification refers to ‘encompassing cultural unities, such as patterns, […] epistemes, paradigms, cultural structures’ (ibid: 229). I would argue that much of cultural ‘signification’ is implicitly and significantly tied to gender. Thus as Indonesia encounters these transformations, it exposes many of its implicit norms related to gender – and the transformational period becomes useful for analysing these gender paradigms. This relates to gender policies, insofar as there is increased impetus to work on ‘gender’ in reaction to all the change. In other words, just as noted previously about the perceived need to ‘re-traditionalise’, during this era of change there is pressure to revert to clear roles for men and women, and particularly to standards for women’s bodies.

The final aspect to consider is that these gender policies are ultimately framed within the broader development project and implemented through bureaucratic institutions. Questions of institutional culture – the people and politics of government agencies – must be raised as to the ultimate viability of the intervention. We have begun to unpack these aspects
throughout the chapter. This is important because during the ‘transmission’ of programmes there are inevitably ‘reinterpretations, translations, or transformations, by different actors and in different social settings’ (von Benda-Beckmann 1993: 120-1; cf. Quarles van Ufford 1987).

A number of points deserve emphasis here. One is how institutional culture and the simplification needs of bureaucracies lend themselves to the targeting of ‘target-able’ problems. These problems have to be constructed in the first place in line with specific sets of solutions, and therefore often ignore broader structural constraints. For example, much of the discourse around women’s lower status in Indonesian society revolves around the question of their ‘sumber daya manusia’ (SDM), or human resources. When asked why women do not have equality with men, the Lampung BBPP officials responded that perhaps it was a problem of their SDM. I pressed further, asking if women’s not having key places in government, business, and other ‘public realm’ positions was because of a lack of ‘kesempatan atau kemampuan’ (opportunity or capability). While it was agreed that both were factors, the officials emphasised that it was a problem of opportunity more than ability, and that in fact women were not afforded the chance to enter the public sphere because of various obstacles (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005; Muchtar, interview 12 August 2005). Yet if it is actually women’s opportunities that are foundationally constrained, not their abilities, how would an institution run a programme to target the broader structural inequities that exclude women from the public domain? It is much easier to assume that the central problem is one of women’s capacity, in which case further assumptions can be made about how to improve that inherent ‘SDM’ – for example through education and literacy rates – and then set concrete targets toward those ends. But this
ignores the primary problem and therefore meets structural resistance. This method of – and even need for – targeting can thus obviate its intended aims.

Another aspect of how development institutions act seems almost the reverse problem of the previous point: whereas there is an instinctive drive to simplify problems – in order to target them to produce measurable outcomes – simultaneously there is trend toward more holistic and inclusive approaches. While this may be a positive move, it has proven difficult to operationalise the translation of rather lofty and abstract goals into physical targets. Development is also about cement, bricks, physical and material structures. Yet gender mainstreaming and the ‘socialisation’ and ‘sensitisation’ of gender paradigms, while not insignificant, have in some ways ‘left out the cement’. For instance, we can think of the Lampung office (BBPP). This bureau works with 19 total dinas (regional branches of the central ministerial departments). The BBPP officials argued for measuring gender equality based on how ‘development is used’, which they then explained by using examples that were always tied to how women are able to physically access the ‘fruits of development’ (Muchtar, interview 12 August 2005). The head of the bureau explained that equal access to development would be demonstrated if a pedestrian bridge – built over a road to allow safe crossing – showed consideration to the female body: the stairs should not be too high, and they should be closed so as to not expose women wearing skirts (ibid). The centrality of women’s differentiated (sexed) body to her example is striking. But even though the measurable outcomes of ‘access to development’ often take physical form, these are not articulated as immediate targets or integrated into more ‘concrete’ partnerships. For one of the only dinas with whom the BBPP does not partner is Public Works, which covers road construction, water projects, and the like (Fajariah, interview 12 August 2005). This is a

92 The ‘structural resistance’ here does not necessarily mean legal or even economic, as in a woman not having enough capital for a start-up business, but is also cultural, insofar as women’s internalisation of second-class citizenship precludes them from the public arena.
minor example that demonstrates the broader inconsistency between more ‘noble’ and abstract goals for development, and the institutional removal from the most specific and material manner for accomplishing these.

A third consideration is how information is transmitted from the centre to the regions, whether through formal written documentation or through face-to-face verbal interaction. Of note here is how the entire gender project involves ‘changing minds’ and socialisation, a fundamental paradigm shift, which arguably cannot be accomplished through the written word alone. This is particularly relevant for the Indonesian case – in an ‘oral’ culture that is story-oriented, and based richly in narrative. Much of the MOWE’s intended social transformation involves convincing people to think differently, and is often done through verbal communication and dialogue. However, it is written materials that are continually produced since they offer a tangible ‘product’ which can be most easily shared. Additionally, within the regional institutions there are significant differences between how written materials and actual meetings can circumvent the chain of command and give suitable direction. For instance, one of the MOWE staff for the Bandung office showed me older materials they had been using for three years (in this instance, the 2002 version of UNFPA Gender Mainstreaming manual, not the more recent 2004 version), and said that it was difficult to get the newest documents unless actually present at meetings in Jakarta (Guswandi, interview 1 August 2005). The head of the office explained this was due partly to how materials flow slowly through the bureaucratic hierarchy: unless they were to make direct contact in Jakarta, all the documents coming from central offices would have to go first to the Governor’s office, then through the Regional Secretariat, then the Assistant Echelon II official, and finally to him (Djajat, interview 1 August 2005). Although written materials are propagated to fulfil programme objectives (and may prove insufficient to
address the real aims of ‘paradigm shift’) even their transmission is a political process and not always straightforward.

A final consideration, when looking at regional information dissemination, recalls earlier arguments about the circular legitimation of discourse through central and district planning. When the MOWE Assistant Deputy for Gender Mainstreaming (GMS) was asked whether the national plan for gender mainstreaming had ‘connected’ to the regions, he said it had not yet, as implementation must still be ‘supported by all stakeholders’ (Siregar, interview 4 August 2005). However, the clear measure for GMS objectives regionally is that gender mainstreaming ‘masuk dokumen perencanaan’ (enters planning documents), such that in these regional documents ‘statement-nya ada’ (there is a statement for it) (ibid). Once this ‘statement’ occurs within regional plans, all the ‘centre’ has to do is to ‘chase’ it up with budgetary support (ibid). In other words, plans for gender mainstreaming from the centre are accomplished by the regional reproduction of these plans, whereas actual impacts are not measured. Most relevant is the reproduction of a gender mainstreaming discourse at regional and local levels. This circular legitimation process is a common theme in Indonesian gender policy.

4.4 Conclusions: The Institutional Mapping of Difference

These various points highlight the complexity of institutional interventions. The central premise of this dissertation offers insight into this complexity, by analysing how ‘gender’ has both discursive and material elements, and how gender programmes are approached by bureaucratic institutions through eminently political processes. Analysing gender requires examining the relationships between paradigms and discourses (the underlying soil of cultural and religious norms) and the policies transmitted in a place. Additionally,
understanding the development project itself is important for critiquing these ‘political processes’ and the institutions through which development transpires. This chapter has begun to articulate these elements of Indonesian gender policies. It questioned the spiralling circularity of gender – how underlying gender norms manifest themselves implicitly within the structure of institutions, and then operate back on these norms often to reinforce them – and sought to explicate how government institutions factor into the process.

Recalling the theoretical framework, this chapter has focused on the institutionalisation of discourses. The translation of gender norms into national policy programmes can be understood as Foucault’s technologies of power – the apparatuses of power designed to implement knowledge. This happens in complex, often contradictory, and always political ways. Bourdieu’s notion of practice illuminates the ways in which the ‘rules of the game’ affect these translations and apparatus workings; for example, the echelon system alone places certain constraints on idea dissemination and power sharing. These institutional structures, in John Scott’s typology (akin to James Ferguson’s ‘institutional apparatus’) serve to regulate and channel behaviour. Drawing on James Scott’s concept of public and private scripts also proved illuminating in two ways. First, by looking at four major gender policy foci, we explored how underlying ‘private scripts’ of gender (e.g. women’s weakness) feed into the creation of gender projects (e.g. violence against women) which generate an official ‘public transcript’ of gender. Second, the case studies highlighted discrepancies between these official ‘public’ transcripts and projects and those implemented regionally, problematising their reception in different locales, where multiple ‘private’ transcripts may contest and influence programmatic outcomes.
To summarise thus far, the previous chapter examined how international gender norms have entered Indonesia, impacting official policy discourses but also generating the dynamic, discursive construction of an ‘ideal’ Indonesian woman who is nation-builder, God-fearer, and mother. This chapter considered how these gender discourses have been institutionalised. It was argued that programmatic focus – such as in projects for violence against women, trafficking, children’s welfare, and reproductive health – remains on the ‘different-ness’ of women’s bodies, which serves to reinscribe existing hierarchies and maintain women’s subordinate roles therein. Continuing to ask how gender discourses are being mapped onto institutions, the chapter moved on to question how ‘local’ gender norms may interact with the regional MOWE offices in ways that structure or constrain their efforts. We gained perspectives about the Indonesian bureaucracy, an important insight that is relevant to any assessment of power relations, institutional operation, and change. Finally, it was argued that the way these programmes have been devised regionally highlights how underlying gender norms affect the construction and organisation of gender institutions, which may then serve to reinforce these gender norms rather than challenge them. It is important to examine in greater depth these ‘underlying norms’. Therefore the next chapter analyses the construction of gender identities, based on in-depth interviews with men and women in three cities across Java.
Chapter Five: **Identities**

**Gender Identities and Embodied Structures: How Discourses Enter the Home and the Body**

The previous chapters have examined gender discourses circulating through government policies and programmes. These serve to reinforce certain ideas of womanhood and mobilise women toward particular tasks. Such discourses are translated into various projects that, while having explicit targets, nonetheless reinscribe particular gendered constructs and may, in some cases, reinforce women’s position as ‘lower’ in a gender hierarchy. Now we move away from policy discourses and programmes, and follow the circulation of gender discourses to an even more intimate level – that of the home and the body – to examine the individual responses and perspectives of men and women across Java. The aim is to understand the extent to which gender discourses are embodied by individuals, which allows us better to understand how social change, modernisation, and even ‘development’ are experienced in the context of gender identities.

A significant question has been why explicit gender policy aims may be subverted, with ‘positive’ aims leading to entrenched gender hierarchies. Here we explore this through the ‘politics of the body’, given that gender policies highlight the complexity of disentangling policy objectives from the reality of physical bodies. Furthermore, gender policies both stem from, and react against, underlying gender norms in complex ways, a process which is heightened and made more visible in periods of social transformation. All of this impacts how people experience and ‘live out’ their gender identities. It is therefore necessary to ask to what extent people find these identities flexible or open to choice. It has been argued, based on available anthropological data, that most people do not experience ‘flexibility’ in
their gender identities (Moore 1999: 158). Yet neither are gender identities static over time. What appears to happen is a dynamic spiral relationship, wherein individuals are affected by discourses and socio-cultural norms but nonetheless exercise some measure of autonomy and freedom in self-determining. These understandings echo the balance between Bourdieu’s habitus and Foucault’s reflexive self-construction (discussed in Section 1.2.3).

Chapter Five begins to unpack these issues. We begin by describing briefly the methodology and interview sample. Next we explore the four major themes that emerged from these interviews. These will be discussed in the chapter in a systematic way to build an overall portrait of gender relations, lived through bodies, in a period of social transformation. The interviews’ first two themes establish the ‘givenness’ and authority of gender roles, and the normalisation of the gender order through power relations. We aim to explicate how gender identities and bodies are what Bourdieu would call ‘structured structures’, already mediated and formed through the symbolic order and social practice. These in turn act as ‘structuring structures’, which will predispose the body to function and take up space in particular ways (Bourdieu 1977: 72). Bourdieu’s discussion of the habitus – applied in this context as the nexus of gender constructs, roles, and bodies – help us to understand how masculine domination becomes a ‘natural’ part of social organisation. It is through the habitus that masculine domination is ‘transmitted from body to body, below the level of consciousness and discourse’ (Bourdieu 2001: 95).

This analysis of gender as a ‘structured and structuring structure’ will then build into our understanding of the politics of the body: how gender gets its ‘naturalising power’ and is indissolubly linked to the social order. The final theme will be how this entire process is made more visible – and how it becomes increasingly significant – in a time of change,
transition, modernisation, all of which is tied to the overarching Indonesian ‘development project’. The chapter concludes by outlining the major argument being made about the ‘politics of the body’.

5.1 A Note on Sample and Method

The original material for this chapter comes from a series of interviews of women and men conducted in Bandung (West Java), Yogyakarta (Central Java), and Surabaya (East Java) in 2005-2006. The interview questions were open-ended and focused on a number of themes: gender roles; constructions of and influences on these roles; women’s status in both ‘private’ and ‘public’ spheres (including questions of government intervention); sex, bodies, and power; and finally perspectives on modernity and change. As with previous chapters, the interview responses were approached inductively and analysed by doing repeated codings to determine primary themes. The aim was not to track particular policies (as will be done in Chapter Six regarding reproductive health), but to gain rich understanding of how gender identities are perceived and constructed – to produce ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973: 3-30).

Once these dominant themes were established, quantification was done where relevant; a series of tables presenting these gender-disaggregated responses are included in Appendix C. Where non-disaggregated results are presented in this chapter, it is because there were no significant differences between male and female responses. Any important differences that occurred have been flagged in the text or highlighted in the tables. Quantification has been avoided for all the questions in order to reflect the fact that these are, in the end, people’s perceptions and their stories. The aim therefore is to construct a strong and

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93 The interview questions are included in Appendix D in their original bahasa Indonesia.
plausible narrative. Research assistants in the three cities helped to gather the original data, with partner selection made on the basis of access and feasibility. Additional methodological questions, including comment on analytical methods used for ‘reading’ the interview responses, are discussed in the Research Methods Appendix.

The sample for these interviews was varied based on age, education level, and socio-economic status. By choice, more women were interviewed than men, though men’s perspectives were invaluable. Of the total 166 respondents across the three cities, interviewees included 116 women and 50 men. The respondents ranged in age from 19 to 77 years, distributed in a bell curve with the majority in their thirties. Regarding education, the largest group of respondents had university undergraduate degrees – 59 in total – with 47 graduating from high school and 29 possessing more technical training and diplomas (such as in banking or secretarial work). The sample was comparatively well-educated, most likely due to the higher education levels of the Yogya respondents bringing up the averages (for instance, all four PhDs were Yogya interviewees). Almost all were married, and the majority had paid employment of some kind, with 125 respondents reporting that they were currently working. Ensuring the sample had variability according to socio-economic status was based on the selection and observations of the research assistants, as direct income questions were not included in the survey. However, analysis

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94 Appendix E includes a numbered index of the interview respondents with their bare biographical data, in order to reference individual comments.
95 Broken down by city, there were 28 women and 12 men in Bandung, 27 women and 14 men interviewed in Yogyakarta, and 61 women and 24 men in Surabaya.
97 More explicitly, of those who graduated from the various levels of education: Elementary/grade school: 7; Middle school: 9; High School: 47; University undergraduate degree: 59; Postgraduate Masters: 11; Doctoral studies: 4; Technical training and diplomas: 29.
98 Another reason for the higher education levels is the selection process by the interview assistants. Those who worked on the project in Yogyakarta were all university lecturers, who often chose work colleagues of similar backgrounds. It is possible that this relatively well educated sample could have influenced answers. However, it can be argued that this merely enriched the research results, as people were better positioned to give critical, analytical responses to questions that ranged from simple and straightforward to more complex and abstract.
of the research assistants’ observations and methodologies shows that the majority of respondents grouped in the lower to middle classes, with some poorer and richer respondents on either end of the spectrum.

Two caveats on method are necessary before beginning. First, though the interviews come from different locations across Java, the responses will be considered as a whole. I recognise the danger in removing these responses from their more distinct locales to generalise a ‘perspective from Javanese cities’. Those such as Arturo Escobar, who has written on how ‘culture sits in places’, might stress the need to take the interviews by more immediate location, not losing sight of the ‘place-based practices and modes of consciousness for the production of culture’ (Escobar 2001: 144). However, the three cities were chosen not to contrast different perceptions of gender between them, per se, but rather to gather a more diverse geographical sample across Java.

Second, the selection of these cities was made precisely because this dissertation seeks to examine the politics of gender in a time of change, and these changes are easier to examine when the inhabitants of the cities feel the changes most keenly. Bandung, Yogya, and Surabaya are all large urban metropoles at the intersection of a modernising impulse, globalising influence, and an adapting culture. For example, the respondents frequently affirmed ‘globalisasi’ (globalisation) as one of the major causes of transition, including emphasis on the mass media, Western culture, technology, and television. Without proposing an urban/rural dichotomy, it seems reasonable to accept certain trends within these larger cities as representing at least Indonesia with the clearest links to ‘modernising and developing’ forces. This research aims to understand the converging influences coming to bear on gender constructions, thus the significance of analysis in the interstices.
5.2 Analysing Constructions and Perceptions

The interview responses will be analysed according to various themes. First we identify the way gender roles (specifically those for wife, mother, husband, and father) are perceived and constructed – gender as a ‘structured structure’. Next we consider the way that gender is ultimately experienced as a series of options and constraints, which focuses on the immanence of power relations and the contrasts between the ways gender is talked about and how it is lived – gender as a ‘structuring structure’. This will bring us to the politics of the body. Indeed, it is out of this material, sexed body that gender relations are given power and experienced. Finally we return to the broader context, that of gender in a time of change: how social transformation is understood through both material and symbolic effects on gender identities. Throughout, various data, such as percentages of respondents, may be presented in support of particular points. More detailed gender-disaggregated data tables can be referenced in Appendix C.

5.2.1 Gender Roles as ‘Structured Structures’: Ideal Types and Constructions

We begin by questioning how the respondents understood gender roles, particularly as they are tied to ‘ideal types’ for wives, husbands, mothers, and fathers. This will be followed by questioning why gender roles are perceived as ‘given’, and therefore impact the way people experience their gender identities. In essence, how are these roles constructed in the context of power relations so as to naturalise them, and therefore to place constraints upon people to act in certain ways?
5.2.1a Gender Roles: Wife, Husband, Mother, Father

Analysing the portrayal of roles for wives, mothers, husbands, and fathers proves interesting as it exposes competing constructions of particular identities. It will be shown that the more clearly demarcated role for women – especially given their existence in power-laden relations – is that of wife, and only secondarily as mother. Yet gender policies and discourses lay heavy emphasis on the mother role as a means of guiding women’s action, and this mother symbolism allows women’s position to be naturalised and thus unquestioned. Whereas women’s role as mother is held as a claim against her, to highlight her difference from men (in pregnancy, child-bearing, child-rearing), it is in fact her role as wife that divides her most deeply from masculine roles. The construction of the wife clearly dictates the parameters of women’s action, more so than the construction of the mother, yet it is constant recursion to the ‘mother’ which maintains and subverts women.

First of all, we look at the wife. The description of this role emphasises two words in particular, mendukung (to support) and mengurus (to look after, oversee, manage). Wives are thus portrayed as a kind of ‘managerial support’ for the household. This ‘managing’ function is expressed in a variety of words, some associated quite strongly with business administration, such as mengelola (manage, administer, execute, superintend) and membina (to develop, cultivate, lead). Stress is additionally laid on wives guarding the family name by honouring (menghormati) and even obeying (mentaati) their husbands. They are to be ‘istri baik’, literally ‘good wives’ – wives that are ‘solehah’ following their husbands according to religious teaching. A number of the words used are linked to caring for the husband (melayani, membantu) and meeting his needs (memenuhi kebutuhan suami). The

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99 According to a website for Muslim resources, the three keys to a husband’s happiness are expressed in this term ‘solehah’, meaning a wife who is pleasing to view, who makes the husband secure because she can guard his honour, and is obedient to him (retrieved 2 July 2007 from http://www.muslimsources.com/id/NEWS/detail.php?cat=1&iid=134).
word ‘partner’ also recurs (in both Indonesian and English versions, ‘pendukung’ and ‘partner’), often in conjunction with a word to express a ‘supporting’ type of partnership. For instance, if the wife is to be allowed to help provide for the family through external work, this is always referenced as permissible due to the fact that she can act as her husband’s partner. Some comments made it clear that even if existing in some version of a partnership, women play the lesser role; the wife is meant to be ‘the secretary of the family, where the boss is the husband’ (Respondent #154).

There were nuanced differences between this portrait – how women themselves described the wife – and how men described this role. Men tended to emphasise similarly the issue of morality (‘good, polite, and respectful wives’), but focused more on the terms taat and teman – obedience and friendship. There was less stress on the term ‘partner’ and more use of ‘friend’, in that the wife is meant to be the friend of the husband. Similarly, in describing the way in which women oversaw the household, whereas women tended to use managerial terms such as mengurus and mengelola, men used ‘softer’ terms that implied ‘caring’ for the household such as mengatur and melayani.

Next, we move to the male constructs to consider the husband. The key words here evoke the image of a provider (penafkah) and a protector (pengayom, pelindung). Respondents repeatedly emphasised the idea of responsibility toward the family (bertanggung jawab kepada keluarga) as the husband must represent the ‘head of the household’ (kepala keluarga). This responsibility is cast as paramount – the husband is ‘most responsible for the running of the family’ (Respondent #26). His role is both ‘material and spiritual’ (Respondent #149), because the husband must meet the family’s needs of both body and spirit (‘lahir dan batin’, Respondent #130). The moralistic adjective used most frequently
in conjunction with the husband – much like the repetition of the ‘good wife’ (isteri baik) – was that of the ‘faithful husband’ (suami setia).

Women tended to use this term stressing the husband’s faithfulness more often than men did; this can be seen to come back to bodies. Husbands are impressed upon by wives to maintain sexual fidelity. This may be due to their capacity to father children outside of the marriage. Similarly, wives have to be ‘good’ as they carry the honour of their husbands by their modest and pure bodies. In describing the husband, women also tended to repeat the term ‘mitra’, or partner, saying that the husband should view his wife as his ‘mitra’ and support her without placing too many demands and constraints upon her. This contrasted with male perspectives that emphasised the freedom of the husband to a greater degree, saying, for example, that he could ‘freely do whatever’ as he was ‘not forbidden by his wife’ (Respondent #13). The divergent views of men and women on the husband role demonstrate the ways in which wives and husbands exist in a power relationship, both bound to act in ways that relate and respond to the other. Thus women would articulate their relationship as a partnership wherein the husband sought to make the wife his partner, when men were more reluctant to posit the relational dynamic in this light and emphasised instead the man’s position as head of the house.

Third, the respondents were asked what it means to be a mother. The primary word used to describe this role was mendidik (to educate, raise, bring up), followed closely by mengurus (to oversee, manage). Emphasis was placed on the responsibility (tanggung jawab) of mothers for their children, particularly with regard to setting an example for them. Yet this care occurs in a specific manner; the words ‘mengasuh’ (to take care of and nurture, rear) and ‘merawat’ (tend to, minister to), while not unkind, are more about meeting external
needs and less about providing a more ‘emotional love’.\textsuperscript{100} In fact, women did not mention ‘loving’ their children as part of their role as mothers. Rather there was an expressed responsibility to raise and direct children to become good and productive citizens. In contrast, there were a couple of references by men to ‘love’ as part of the mothering role, in addition to the portrait already noted of educators and example-setters. This may reflect differing assumptions about the ideal mother. Women accepted responsibility as mothers to create the ‘next generation’, whereas men viewed mothers in a softer and more emotional light. Apart from this minor difference, both men and women depicted the ‘mother role’ almost identically. There was marked consensus as to what mothers are meant to be.

Finally, we asked how the father is constructed as a role. The key words appearing here were \textit{melindungi}, \textit{mendidik}, and \textit{membimbing}: to protect, to educate, and to guide. As with mothers, emphasis was laid on setting an example (\textit{memberi contoh, menjadi teladan}) and ‘directing’ children. The father’s role in child-rearing was expressed similarly to the mother’s; although as one female respondent noted, perhaps when compared to the mother, fathers only have to follow their child’s development ‘maybe not exactly 100%, so 95% is enough’ (Respondent #15). There was no discernible difference between the way women and men described the father role. This father represents an educator and example-setter – much like the mother. The only distinction between the two respondents made was that the male is the ‘protector’ while the female represents the care-giving ‘provider’. It is possible to link this difference back to bodies again: understanding the male to be physically stronger ties him to the role of protector, whereas the ‘softer’ female is the care-giver. Bodies are intimately tied to responsibilities, which are expressed as relationships and roles.

\textsuperscript{100} This perspective mirrors my experience being raised in Indonesia, having Indonesian relatives, and watching the way children are brought up. It can be argued that there is a contrast between a ‘Western emphasis’ on caring for children by providing emotional nurture and affection, and an ‘Indonesian emphasis’ on caring for children by providing for them financially and materially.
Having looked at these roles, there are two points to be explored further. The first relates to the contrast between how women and men described the roles for wives and husbands, when there was much greater consensus between them about the ideal roles for mothers and fathers. For example, as described above, women would stress that wives are to be ‘partners’ and to ‘manage’ and run the household, where men emphasised words like ‘obedience’ and expressed women’s work in the house in less controlling terms. This must be understood in the context of power. In essence, the relationship between husband and wife is a power relationship, so each will view the dynamic and their place in it in different ways, perhaps in opposition to one another. The contrasts between portraits have to do with how each positions himself or herself with concomitant powers and freedoms within their relationship. Women tended to sketch the wife in strong managerial terms, with the husband seeking her as his partner, whereas men emphasised the wife’s friendship and support, as well as the liberty of the husband, to a greater extent.

An illuminating and related point is that overall there are sharper contrasts between women’s description of the ‘wife’, as compared to men’s, than between their portrait of expectations and roles for the ‘husband’. This may reflect the way in which gender is a lived experience in the context of pre-existing social hierarchies. There is an accepted centrality for the ‘masculine norm’ and hence agreement on what it means to ‘be a man’, but women experience their femaleness in more conflicted ways as it relates to power. Women are meant to be submissive, even as they recognise their strength, so there is greater incongruence between whom they are expected to be and whom they are free to be.
A second distinction emerges if we consider the contrast between descriptive roles for wives and husbands as compared to those for mothers and fathers. There is greater divergence between the ideal types for ‘wife’ and ‘husband’, whereas the discourse of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ has much greater similarities. As described above, for instance, fathers and mothers are both educators and primary example-setters, differentiated primarily by aspects of strength tied to their bodies that shape the male ‘protector’ and the female ‘care-giver’. This brings us back to the issue of power relationships. Men and women offered contrasting portraits about the ways they interrelate dynamically, in effect allowing them to carve out more ‘space for manoeuvre’. But they were more ready to agree on the ideal way in which to relate to a third party – the child. This power relationship of parent-to-child is somewhat exogenous to the husband-wife binary, and thus it is easier to achieve consensus about what the role implies.

5.2.1b The Construction of Gender Roles: Questions of Power

Having looked at the perceptions of gender roles, we consider the influences brought to bear on how gender ‘ought’ to be. This section addresses questions about religious and cultural influences, as well as what and who impact constructions of gender. The portrait that emerges is of gender’s ‘ideal types’ as constructed in the interstices of power relations and within hierarchies.

Religious influences are considered first. Of the respondents, 90% were Muslim (very close to the national average of 88%), with an additional thirteen Catholics, one Protestant, and two Hindus. Virtually all respondents stressed that religion was of the utmost importance (‘sangat penting’) and acted as a guiding principle for the way people should
live their lives (e.g. Respondents #21, 36, 91). When asked what religion teaches about gender, specifically the role of women, respondents answered in ways that focused on the portrait of woman as wife and mother, and clearly within a hierarchy that places her ‘behind’ or subordinate to men. There were no discernible differences between Muslim and Christian respondents in this instance. Coding the answers produced 13 different categories of replies which were then grouped to make sense of broader themes:

Q24. What does religion teach about gender and women’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General theme of reply</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>Grouping the categories</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>% of sample (N=143)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wives should obey, honour, and respect their husbands</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>The wife’s role in the family: to obey and honour the husband and to care for the children</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s role revolves around raising the children and being centrally useful to the family and the household</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should know ‘their place’ in the hierarchy, behind men (e.g. not in leadership), as well as the limitations and restrictions (batas) placed on women</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Women as subordinate in a gender hierarchy</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proper roles/tasks for men and women (peran/tugas)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Roles and responsibilities of both sexes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to rights and responsibilities</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on women being pure, clean, polite, and solehah (virtuous)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on being the ‘good wife’ (istri baik) and a ‘good woman’ (perempuan baik)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>The ‘pure and good’ woman</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should cover their heads and wear modest dress</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men and women are equal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Equality and mutual respect between the sexes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be mutual respect and love between husbands and wives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be honoured and protected</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Focus on protecting and honouring women</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husbands should love their wives (and provide for and protect them)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That inheritance rules for men and women differ</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

101 Religion was articulated as organising the present through practice, such as praying (sholat) five times daily and doing the fast (puasa) each year, including avoidance of what Islam forbids. It also organises the present in relation to the future, with a sense of eternal accountability permeating many answers. The word pedoman was used repeatedly, meaning among other things ‘guidelines, directives, precepts’, but also more specifically referring to a compass; for example, ‘religion is the compass for my daily life’ (Respondent #42).
What emerges from these responses are the ways in which religion is seen to communicate women’s role as wife and mother through a hierarchical lens. Even as the recurrent answers about religious teaching related to the role of wife, it was in terms of how women are to obey and honour their husbands. The comments about women ‘knowing their place’ ranged from women literally needing to ‘walk behind men’ to more general commentary on women not taking certain forms of leadership. Furthermore, the notion of women’s purity was repeated, whether vaguely as in being a ‘good’ woman, or bound up in bodies and dress as in wearing the jilbab. Most striking is the way that people understood religion to be constraining women, rather than offering more general guidelines for both genders. For example, just over 85% of respondents answered in a way that pointed to a ‘pure and good’ women’s role in the family and as subordinate in a hierarchy, whereas only 36% mentioned roles, responsibilities, equality and mutual respect between both sexes.

The links between roles, rights, responsibilities, and hierarchy within religion are also significant. Referring back to the previous points, much of the language used when talking about the ideal roles for wives, husbands, mothers, and fathers drew upon the notion of responsibilities – a sense of duty that is tied to gender roles. But when talking about how religion (in this case mainly Islam) views gender and provides teachings on the appropriate role for women, the language of rights and responsibilities is almost entirely lost. Instead, the focus is on women’s position within a hierarchy (‘Woman, know thy place!’). Images of peace and harmony are tied to everyone knowing his or her place, and these ‘places’ are inherently gendered. Furthermore, the question of hierarchy is ultimately about power.

The centrality of power and authority to gender construction is a theme we see emerging from the next set of responses. These questions aimed to discern what and who might
influence gender constructions. The answers demonstrate that gender roles are constructed in the context of power relationships: they do not ‘appear’ out of thin air, but are transmitted through lines of authority and hierarchy. The way gender is understood and ‘lived’ thus has direct correlation to hierarchical authority.

First, analysing how people perceived what influences gender, the most significant conclusion is that external factors are internalised and experienced such that gender is built ‘from without and within’ simultaneously. The single greatest influence on the construction of gender comes from the way people internalise a normative vision of gender tied to images of a happy and harmonious family. In fact, one of the unique non-category words that kept appearing was *harmonis* (or another use of its synonym, *keslasaran*), with 14 occurrences. This vision of harmony is a key link between gender being built from within and without – people experience their gender roles as a personal choice in order to attain a vision of the harmonious family, but this is externally influenced as there are clear notions of what women and men must ‘look like’ in order to achieve this ‘harmonious vision’. We consider these perceived influences on gender in the table below. The grouping of responses demonstrates how gender is constructed through a dynamic interaction between exogenous and endogenous pressures. It is not something that can be understood to be ‘imposed from without’.
**Q26. What influences the construction of these gender roles?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General theme of reply:</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>Grouping the categories</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>% of sample (N=157)</th>
<th>111 internal factors (endogenous)</th>
<th>70.7% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notion of what ‘should be’ regarding how to have a happy and harmonious family</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>How gender ‘ought’ to be to achieve a particular vision, as learned through comparisons to others</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>111 internal factors (endogenous)</td>
<td>70.7% of respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on comparisons to other people, seeing other people’s gender roles</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One’s own desires</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Internalised desires and needs, the ‘natural state’ of gender</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Kodrat’ and the way things exist naturally, by instinct</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The age’, current era (jaman sekarang)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>More ‘abstract’ external influences</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>82 external factors (exogenous)</td>
<td>52.2% of respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture/social rules</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate environment (lingkungan) and education</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>More ‘concrete’ external influences</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>52.2% of respondents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life experience</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents/family</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 11 original and broad categories for responses, as shown above in the first column, are categorised to understand the portraits they sketch. The endogenous, internalised factors incorporate the first five categories, where gender roles are influenced by a normative vision of what the ‘perfect family ought to be’. This is usually based on comparison to other families, and stems from internal hopes and desires for achieving this particular end, including the notion of needing to educate children to produce the perfect family. Also among these endogenous factors is the kodrat – the assumption of biologically innate gender roles as they ‘ought to be’ in nature (rather than as they ‘ought to be’ to produce a particular end). The exogenous factors encompass the remaining external influences in both ‘abstract’ forms (religion, culture, the current era) and ‘concrete’ forms (the immediate environment, life experiences, parents and family).
In a move from the general to the personal, the next question asked who taught the respondents how men and women ‘ought to be’.\textsuperscript{102} This demonstrates conclusively the way that gender is linked to explicit constructions by people in power. People are clearly influential in constructing and influencing gender roles, parents most of all, as claimed by 63\% of the respondents. The question that arises is what form of person or external factor is involved. Thus the responses can be evaluated by asking a question about power. Respondents recognised gender as something ‘taught’, whether by people or educational sources such as books.\textsuperscript{103} Though some gave more abstract answers (saying that gender roles are influenced by the environment they grew up in, culture, religion, etc), for the most part people were relatively specific in their answers: they were taught to be a certain way by key figures of authority in their lives, whether well-placed religious leaders, parents, or teachers. Consider the following grouping of responses, wherein of the total answers, two-thirds pointed to teaching from authorities:

\textsuperscript{102} However, even though the question had specified ‘who’, people continued to answer with other factors such as religion or education. To clarify these responses, both religion and education were recoded to make a distinction when a respondent had specified an actual teacher (whether an \textit{imam} or a school teacher).

\textsuperscript{103} The question might be argued to be leading since it asked people \textit{who} taught them how women and men ‘should’ be and thus allowed them to answer assuming that in fact it must have been a ‘taught thing’. But since there were people who replied that their gender roles had not been taught – but rather they existed because they were the way they should be, by instinct (\textit{natür}) – it may be that the wording did not foreclose options.
Q27. Who influences constructions of gender?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General theme of reply:</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>Grouping the categories</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious teacher</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher (guru)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (books, teaching)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>External directly authoritative environment</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (books, school)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>External directly authoritative environment</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own wishes and experiences</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>Self and ‘natural’</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>External environment (including other people)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV and the mass media</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>External environment (including other people)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>External environment (including other people)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>External environment (including other people)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the responses have been differentiated based on whether they are explicitly in authoritative positions; this accepts the authoritative nature of religion, which is articulated as having directive power, but places things such as culture or the mass media in the category of sources without direct authority (even as it can be argued that these are profoundly influential).

5.2.1c The Constraints of Roles

A final point is that roles are experienced not only as ‘ideal types’ that have been constructed by powerful converging influences, but also as binding constraints upon possible ways of ‘living gender identities’. This evidences that gender identities are ‘structured structures’ that have been already formed through symbolism and social practice (Bourdieu 1977: 72). They are thus deeply embedded in the social order.
To illustrate this, we consider an example of how gender roles are constructed as powerfully for men as for women – and so often in dichotomous opposition. Respondents were asked to identify what they perceive to be general problems that women encounter in their area. The results were relatively straightforward, with respondents pointing to the economy (43.8% of the sample), education (14.4%), and domestic violence/violence against women (13.7%). But two other ‘problems’ were noted: men’s role and women’s psychology. For men, a failure to live up to their characterised role, particularly as economic providers, was cast as problematic by numerous respondents. This becomes an issue for women as it places demands on women to work and thus into a role not ‘meant’ for them. Additionally, women’s ‘emotional role’, or psychological condition, was described as awkward for women by nearly 10% of the male respondents (versus less than 3% of female respondents). For instance, one man commented that he felt women in his area gossiped too much, and did not use their time wisely to be more creative and productive (Respondent #161). This emphasises how essentialising women down to a caricature of their emotional state may be viewed as negative.

These trade-offs and tensions show that roles may evolve, flex, and change, but also that this may be couched as threatening to the general social order. It is less of a problem that women assume a variety of roles, particularly in the public realm, and more an issue of the challenge posed to implicit assertions of gendered positions in society and negative perceptions of shifts therein. To better understand these tensions and oppositions, we can consider the longer narratives respondents offered regarding problems faced by women in their area. Often stories were repeated: women have to work to provide for their families (either with ‘deadbeat’ husbands or as widows/divorcées) in less than ideal conditions, and in a way that forces them, as one respondent put it, to ‘step outside their kodrat [biological
destiny] as women’ (Respondent #127). Furthermore, there were frequent references linking these shifting roles to women’s struggle to pay their children’s tuition (particularly with increasing educational costs in some areas due to regional autonomy). In other words, men’s ‘failure’ to fulfil their economic role forces women to step into the public sphere. This takes women out of their domestic role, even while limiting their ability to better educate their children – another central ‘mother’ role. Thus the initial problem of men not living up to their roles forces women to take on the ‘male’ role, which in turn removes them even further from their mothering roles. This puts both men and women in a bind.

5.2.2 Gender as a ‘Structuring Structure’: Power Relations and the Contrast Between Discourse and Embodiment

The preceding section discussed the construction of gender roles. Here we question how gender acts as a ‘structuring structure’ by examining the immanence of power to these gender identities, specifically the power differential between men and women. Then, given that these gender roles do not ‘appear out of nowhere’ but are constructed at the convergence of many influences, we question the possible difference between discourse and embodiment. In other words, if gender discourses change – something that has been happening, as discussed in Chapter Three – does this affect how people ‘live their gender’? Here the claim is that the experience of gender is tied to power hierarchies such that changes to gender relations may be experienced as ‘trade-offs’, and that these gender identities ultimately reach far deeper than can be changed by ideas alone.

104 According to Bourdieu, the sexually characterised habitus structures a sexual division of labour. The feminine habitus constrains women’s functions in three ways: first, appropriate functions for women are usually an extension of their domestic functions (education, care, service); second, women should not have authority over men (leading to subordinate positions); and finally, men have the monopoly on the handling of technical objects and machines (2001: 94).
As noted earlier, there is a difference between theorising gender’s construction and understanding how it is embodied and lived. This embodiment happens in the context of power relations and social structures. So tensions exist between the idealised norms for ‘wife/mother/husband/father’, which, in sum, manifest underlying gender hierarchies. People do not find their gender identities particularly open to choice; rather, there are responsibilities that stem from gender, which in turn derives its potency from bodies. This may serve to explain why particular gender discourses circulate — including emphasis on rights and equality and topical issues — whereas gender as a lived experience offers a marked contrast to these discourses — focusing on the physical body and concomitant obligations. Furthermore, the way specific roles are constructed differently by both men and women tends to reflect existing power relations, showing that gender always acts concomitantly as a ‘structured and structuring structure’.

5.2.2a Power Relations Between Men and Women: From Private to Public

Gender policies may implicitly depend upon an understanding that power is not a ‘zero sum’ game; in other words, more power for women does not have to mean less power for men. This concept of power hopes to reduce possible resistance from men, who may feel threatened by women’s increasing participation in the public sphere. However, if we analyse the balance of power in gender relations, it becomes clear that it is insufficient, and perhaps even naïve, to simply believe that power is not a zero sum game. The way people perceive and experience power relations between the sexes is important: ‘more’ power for some can be felt as ‘less’ power for others. Here we will explore how gender relations are fundamentally about power, space, freedom and agency and the perceptions thereof. Gender interventions therefore face a tightly woven fabric of gender hierarchy that is rooted ultimately within the home and that acts substantively upon the public realm.
5.2.2a (i) The Domestic Sphere

We begin by considering women’s status within the home, focusing on questions of the relative positioning of men and women. The aim will be to ascertain the way respondents view the spousal relationship, exercise decisional capacity, and run household finances. It will be argued that both symbolic and material conceptions of power converge in this intra-household dynamic, which can be tied back to the politics of the body. We will see the complexity of deeper power structures limiting how women are able to exercise decisional freedom within the home, whether in scope (e.g. limited mobility and the car), the process (e.g. ‘gifting’ and monitoring from men), or the means (e.g. ‘only for children’ and according to the mother role).

First, analysing perceptions of the spousal relationship offers insight into the way men and women experience relative freedoms differently within marriage. Respondents were first to describe his or her spouse, and next to comment on the closeness of their relationship. Overall, men were more apt to view their spouses positively (87%) and to report feeling very close to their spouses (54%) than were women (of whom 67% and 43% responded, respectively). None of the men described their wives negatively, whereas 12% of women regarded their husband in less than positive light, and another 21% offered a positive view but with sufficient modifying disclaimers (versus only 13% of men). These results correspond to various sociological studies showing that marriage may be more beneficial for men than for women in terms of reported levels of happiness. One researcher reports that ‘men reap greater gains than women for virtually every outcome affected by marriage’ (Nock 1998: 3).105

105 See Bernard 1972 for the classic account of men’s higher gains through marriage. Another more recent study by Kaufman and Goldscheider (2007) concludes through extensive sociology surveys that both men and women in the U.S. feel that men need to be married more than women do. But these claims are not unilateral,
However, the responses were more complex than simple statements of closeness or approval. Careful reading reveals the power dynamics in the complex relations of husbands and wives. One man commented somewhat in jest – but in his wife’s presence and causing her some embarrassment – that she was a ‘musuh di ranjang’, literally an ‘enemy in bed’ (Respondent #119). A female respondent explained that her husband was very overprotective toward her – but then assured the interviewer that this was only because he loved his family (Respondent #99). Men repeatedly used the word ‘supel’ to describe their wives in a favourable light, meaning pliable and flexible (e.g. Respondents #22, 48). One husband made it clear that he guards the level of closeness with his wife because if they are too close, it reduces his authority (‘mengurangi wibawa’) (Respondent #97). In essence, he viewed his position and power as something needing to be reinforced and maintained.

When describing the spousal relationship, it is interesting to note the multiple references to men’s escorting their wives on any trips outside the home (e.g. Respondents #69, 59, 70). This corresponds to observations of women travelling in the cities I researched, where many middle-aged women had male escorts; only in Yogyakarta would women often be seen driving motorcycles by themselves.106 These references further emphasise the notion of roles (men as the protectors of women), of space (‘outside’ the home as a man’s domain), and of morality and purity (a good woman requires accompaniment by a male figure to guard her honour).107 Related to this was the repeated association of the car as a

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106 Women’s travel outside the home is of course extremely complex, and will be varied across different regions, and in urban versus rural areas. It is not claimed here that Indonesian women are entirely constrained, as most exhibit independence and freedom. Nonetheless, discourse about the ‘appropriateness’ of women’s unaccompanied travel outside the home may still draw certain boundaries for archetypal ‘woman’. It can be difficult to avoid (or overcome) this identity construct.

107 I can offer an additional, if unusual, anecdotal reference to the relative freedoms of men and women in travel. When requesting the emergency exit aisle on a Lion Air flight in September of 2006, travelling from Jakarta to Denpasar (seats are smaller and leg room comes at a premium), I was told that I could not sit in this
man’s domain (whether purchasing, buying petrol, or upkeep), a consistent theme for respondents that highlights the boundaries of the house. The car may be part of the household, but it exists at the boundary, is part of the ‘outside world’ implying mobility and ease of travel. This allows it to be more associated with men. Additionally, this recalls Bourdieu’s argument that men tend to dominate the handling of technical objects and machines (2001: 94). These aspects taken together offer a glimpse into the ways women’s freedoms are somewhat bounded, albeit subtly.

A second consideration of the intra-household power dynamic is that of decision-making. This again points to the question of relative liberties. Respondents were asked if they felt free to make decisions within the home and outside it. Both men and women reported experiencing high levels of ‘felt’ freedom in decisions, but there were subtle variations that point to a correlation between women’s higher role in the private or domestic realm versus the public sphere. Slightly more women than men said they felt free to make decisions inside the home, though it was a narrow gap (86% versus 81%). A starker contrast exists outside the home, where 35% of women said they lacked freedom to make decisions, compared to only 17% for men. Yet the issue is not as straightforward as simply having the capacity to make a decision; rather, it is how this is experienced that is significant. For example, there were numerous cases where people (37 women and 10 men) said they needed to consult their spouse before deciding. Some would pose it as ‘yes I have freedom … but I need to check with my spouse first’; others would claim, ‘no I don’t have freedom – because I have to check with my spouse first’. For these, it was the experience of shared

exit aisle as a woman – that the computer system would in fact not allow the booking to be made, as inputting data for a female passenger would cause an automatic block. Yet when I boarded the plane, I discovered these seats were occupied by a woman with her pre-pubescent son. Considerations of the boy’s size and strength had not been made; he was allowed the exit aisle by sheer virtue of being male and therefore accepted by the computer system.
power that mattered in the end, whether it would be felt as more or less binding depended on the circumstances.

Understanding the process of decision-making itself is also illuminating. When the respondents were asked how decisions were made within the household, the portrait that emerged was one of consensus seeking through mutual and extensive consultations. The majority of men (92%) and women (83%) saw household decision-making as a process involving both of them to some degree. However, men tended to use the word *musyawarah* more frequently than women. ‘*Musyawarah*’, meaning deliberation and consultation, is a word embedded in the way Indonesians approach politics and political discussions, and has been argued to be a concept used by Indonesian political elites for years in order to create legitimacy for their decisions (Kuipers 1999). This highlights the way in which power is exercised implicitly, in such a way so as to secure not only compliance but the aspect of legitimacy. It also points to the way men are more likely to draw upon political terminology within domestic discussion. While perhaps a cynical evaluation, this nonetheless resounds with arguments that levels of participation in decision-making vary, and there is often a contrast between what is explicitly touted and how participants experience the process.

The third way to explore the differential exercise of power within the home relates to decisions about household finances. What this shows are subtle limits on women’s explicit exercise of power, whether related to the ‘source’ of this power or how it is tied to gender roles. When respondents were asked how household finances are managed, and

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108 Further, ‘*musyawarah*’ exists as part of Islamic teachings on communal deliberations. Irfan Awwas, when he was chair of the Executive Committee of the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin (MMI), claimed in an interview that ‘Islamic *musyawarah* aims to find the truth’ (Subkhan 2004); Islam and *musyawarah* are indelibly linked.
specifically who is in charge of the money, responses indicated that the wife manages the house in 57% of reported cases and holds the money nearly 70% of the time. However, this requires further unpacking. First of all, even for those stating the woman manages finances, the language used most often makes clear that the husband is the source of the money and chooses to give it to his wife to dispense. Implicit in this are images of ultimate control; the wife may take charge but she has only vested authority that stems from the man’s provision. A Javanese wedding tradition provides an interesting illustration. Here the groom gives the bride some money to symbolise he will let her manage the household. But the wedding ceremony also involves the bride washing his feet. Where her purse strings may have a measure of freedom but her body is subordinated, we must question what these power relations imply overall for her relative position within the home.

Additionally, women demonstrate control of finances but only insofar as decision-making corresponds to the roles and responsibilities of wife and mother, and under the ultimate monitoring of men. For example, one woman said that she holds the money, but only to meet the needs of her children (Respondent #53). There remains a discrepancy based on ‘small’ versus ‘large’ expenditures: women are responsible for the mundane, the routine, the minutia of everyday life (Respondents #66, 70, 98, 163, 164). Yet men are consistently mentioned as being involved in bigger purchases or for the ‘kebutuhan pokok’, primary and central needs – or for anything to do with the car. There is also reference to the supervisory functions played by men, so even where women are in charge of finances, they might refer to having to ‘report back’ to their husband (Respondent #88), or being ‘monitored’ by the husband (Respondent #114).
This analysis is not meant to portray women’s position as solely negative. In fact, women do play a substantial role in decision-making and managing household finances. One respondent laughingly referred to herself as the ‘Minister of Finance’ (Respondent #83), evidencing both confidence and competence. Yet it is clear that there remain constraints on the extent to which women have space to step outside their roles and their domestic space.

5.2.2a (ii) The Public Realm

Moving from the home to the public sphere allows us to view the spiral process between the material and symbolic aspects of gender relations. The argument to be made here is three-fold: Indonesian women are recognised to have some power. However, there is tension between the material and symbolic such that changes to women’s concrete external position provoke a response. Thus as people express a desire for social change, they want to bring the power dynamic back into ‘balance’, reaffirming women’s roles as wife and mother.

We begin by questioning women’s status in society. The majority of respondents (63%) felt that Indonesian women were already somewhat empowered, though still needing some advancement.109 Respondents were also clear in their belief that gender equality exists in Indonesia, with 82% of respondents responding in the affirmative.110 When discussing this

109 There were two main reasons given for why women still needed to advance in terms of social status: the contrast between rural and urban areas – arguing that women in the desa still experience oppression as opposed to women in the cities (Respondents # 1, 22, 45, 115) – and the continuing problem of violence against women (Respondents #18, 35, 57, 64).

110 One interesting note was the number of times respondents explained that gender equality existed, but only because it was a necessary precondition for a peaceful society. One respondent noted that ‘in principle’ men and women have equality, because ‘they should’ (Respondent #161); another man claimed that if there was no balance between men and women it would not allow for the household to be peaceful and calm, so clearly this balance must be in place (Respondent #109). A woman in Surabaya said that she believed gender equality existed ‘because men and women work together in this life, so there needs to be gender equality’ (Respondent #92). These comments, among others (e.g. Respondents #135, 137, 138, 163), highlight conflicting
gender equality, a quarter of respondents referenced the economy/workplace from some angle. The way these references were made shows that tensions exist when the external positioning of men is challenged, and how this relates to underlying norms. For example, many pointed to the fact that women can now work at ‘male jobs’ as proof that gender equality exists. But one respondent described seeing a female bus driver who was consistently harassed by the male passengers; her reaction was to feel sorry for this driver, a woman clearly out of place in this role (Respondent #54).

This point about having a ‘public job’ that is incongruent with a ‘private norm’ demonstrates the friction between the symbolic and the material. Women might fill jobs that were traditionally men’s – a concrete change – but this poses a challenge to the underlying gender symbolism of particular roles and tasks, which in turn has social effects. One respondent who had watched a television show about a woman pilot objected to the woman’s job, arguing that pilots should be male (Respondent #126). This also explains why debates around Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia’s first female president, cropped up repeatedly. The job is for the highest ranking leader and therefore should be ‘traditionally male’; having a female president offers a potent concrete and symbolic change, while also challenging underlying norms that result in some measure of backlash against more women taking up these roles.¹¹¹ For example, some respondents noted that the only reason gender equality exists is because women do not want to ‘lose to men’, and so take up positions they should not (e.g. Respondent #125). This is reminiscent of a zero sum approach to

¹¹¹ Ideas about a female president and the more general question of appropriateness of women in leadership might be affected by political views, and support for different political parties, for which there are regional patterns in Indonesia. Disaggregating these answers by party affiliation could therefore prove interesting. Nonetheless, the central theme emerging from interview responses was simply that Megawati was iconic for both detractors and supporters of increased women’s political participation. She was visible and symbolic, hence reaction from both sides.
power. People may still assume that women’s increase means men’s decrease, and blame
women for upsetting this balance and taking more than their fair share.

All of this brings us to the ways in which external challenges to the ‘power balance’
between men and women may provoke a reassertion of women’s gender identities. We
consider here how respondents described the social changes they desire to see for women.
The dominant category of responses, as grouped in the table below, relates to changes in
women’s external position, including positive impacts in education and the economy.
These are areas on which development interventions focus attention, as they are concrete
and can be targeted by institutions and programmes.

Q68. Are there changes you hope to see for women more generally?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired changes for women</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>% (N=157)</th>
<th>Grouping the categories</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>% (N=157)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved external position and measure, better equality (and thus improved quality of life)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>External positioning for women, validation and equality in the public sphere</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved education for women</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better position economically, right to work and be equal in the workplace</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention paid to women’s rights and responsibilities</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s self-actualisation, empowerment, independence</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>Internal positioning of women, independence and empowerment, awareness and knowledge</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of women’s awareness, perspectives, knowledge</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s role as mothers and wives, their kodrat, reasserted</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>Women’s roles as wives and mothers, morality, dress, and virtue</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced moral virtue, more focus on religion</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s dress and appearance to be more modest</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These responses can be analysed further. First we consider questions regarding one such
‘concrete’ intervention, that of the economy. Here it becomes clear that even though some
changes to the economic realm are viewed as acceptable, even desirable, this is always tied
to reemphasising the assumption of women’s central, almost primordial and innate, position
within the home. We see this happening as follows: Those claiming that Indonesian
women are not empowered (nearly 30% of the sample) tended to point to economic shortfalls, where women still lack control over economic resources (e.g. Respondents # 41, 43, 58). Later, when asked specifically what the government should be doing for women’s empowerment, 21% of respondents (the single biggest category) claimed that interventions are necessary in the economic sphere. Yet these desired changes are not straightforward. When stress was placed on the economy, this was usually couched so as to increase family income (and therefore welfare). For instance, one respondent noted that women should be given opportunity to work, but only to add to the family’s income overall (Respondent #92), while another saw education and experience as being central to their economic productivity, but again only to increase family revenue (Respondent #140). The terms used tend to place women in a very different category to men, such that women who enter the workplace needed to find jobs that are ‘in accordance with the characteristics of female abilities’ (Respondent #94), or that women who are increasingly productive externally need to know how to do this in line with their motherly and wifely duties (Respondent #135).

This argument for the reassertion of ‘traditional gender roles’ is evidenced most explicitly by the third major category of responses, as shown in the table. Here, nearly 31% of respondents pointed to their desire to see women’s identities as wives and mothers emphasised, particularly in the context of a society perceived to be moving away from these roles. For instance, one respondent said that she preferred to see women of the previous era, who were more ‘sopan dan terarah’, polite and directed, guided (Respondent #152). Even within these three areas, therefore, there is a complex interrelationship of
reinforcement: the emphasis on a ‘return to virtue’ for women correlates to the increasing prominence of women in the public sphere and perceptions of how this has eroded their more ‘traditional’ roles. This explains why respondents often made comments much like that of a man in Surabaya, who said that he hoped to see women’s quality of life improve to become more independent, educated, and aware – but only insofar as this allows women to better fulfil their roles as mothers (Respondent #93).

5.2.2b Gender Differences: Discourse versus Embodiment

It has been shown that gender identities are constructed through the convergence of multiple influences which are tied to power hierarchies. Attempts to change these gender relations meet resistance on many levels. Moreover, changing the way we talk about gender – as many of the gender socialisation programmes attempt to do – is insufficient. The way gender identities are embodied presents a contrast to the ways it may be discussed. The central argument here is that gender discourses provide greater room for manoeuvre. In fact, they can be used by some to find space for themselves and means to reshape expectations of the self. But the embodied, daily reality of gender identities proves more constraining. To illustrate the difference between gender as a discourse and gender as a lived experience, we consider three examples: the physicality of the body, the language of rights versus that of responsibility, and the contrast between abstract and concrete changes to men’s role in the household.

First, we address the ways respondents discussed the differences between men and women. There were two questions posed. Initially respondents were asked what they had heard discussed about these differences. Next they were asked to develop from their perspective what they thought these differences actually were. The results diverged in interesting ways.
During the coding process, I had planned to analyse both questions together, expecting similar themes to emerge whether it regarded perceptions of gender discourses or perceptions of gender differences themselves. In essence, I presumed that the questions were getting at the same thing. Instead, what resulted were two different ‘languages’ of gender that demonstrate the contrast between how gender might be talked about and how it is lived and experienced.

To explore this distinction, we can outline the emerging themes. When asked how the differences between women and men are discussed, respondents gave the following answers, grouped in descending emphasis: rights and responsibilities (37%); position in society, often related to work and status/authority and including representation in government (32%); sameness, equality, emancipation (24%); gender roles (18%); specific ‘gender issues’, such as violence against women and reproductive health (15%); psychology, mental and emotional differences (9%); and the body and morality (5%). These themes were conveyed in context specific ways. For example, if referring to political representation there were repeated references to Megawati as a female president and whether religion allowed for women to be in leadership. One respondent captured a number of salient issues, noting that discussions tend to revolve around ‘sex, HIV/AIDS, religious teachings in Islam, equality of roles and the position of women in an era of globalisation’ (Respondent #145).

The next question asked what the respondents themselves considered to be the main differences between men and women. There were fewer labels and themes that emerged here, and some striking contrasts between the points given greater emphasis. Very generally, the responses fell into four categories articulating differences of: the body
(59%), gender roles (32%), psychology/temperament (29%), and rights and responsibilities (25%).

Strikingly, within these categories, distinctions were often expressed in terms of a gender hierarchy that favoured the masculine. Women were described as softer and child-bearing, with numerous references to their ‘kodrat’, and generally weaker than men (e.g. Respondent #22 said that women were weaker because they were made from the ‘rib of man’). Bodies and minds were often linked by the respondents; for example, one claimed that ‘there are clear physical differences; men have not been given by God the capacity to be pregnant, give birth, nurse. Thus men have been given physical superiority, muscle strength and mental tenacity’ (Respondent #52). This comment illustrates how masculine supremacy is assumed. In one breath men are described as having a ‘lack’ – they cannot ‘be pregnant, give birth, nurse’ – and in the next as ‘physically superior’. It demonstrates the ‘unthought-ness’ of male dominance, where not being able to do something gives someone the upper hand.

Analysing the responses to these two questions points us to the contrasting emphasis on the body as a site of distinction, which in turn is understand within a hierarchy. When differences between men and women were put into the ‘abstract’ – viz. ‘what do people talk about?’ – only 5% of respondents referenced the body. But when it came down to how the respondents themselves viewed the differences between men and women, the dominant answer had to do with physical difference. This reveals a personalisation of the understanding of gender, in that as a topic and discourse it is comprehensible under a variety of categories, but as a ‘lived’ experience it continually returns to the body. A further distinction between responses to the two questions was in the talk of equality and

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112 The mention of roles and responsibilities arose almost interchangeably; a response was coded as a responsibility only if it used the synonymous words tanggung jawab or kewajiban, and was coded as both if it described a role but cast it as a responsibility, e.g. it is the ‘kewajiban’ (responsibility) of men to be the head of the household (role).
sameness, as if in the abstract, people are taught that ‘gender’ should be equal, and even the
same. The follow-up question, however, evoked the opposite – men and women are not the
same, and it is most often because of their bodies.

Another point that emerged from analysing the two questions was how a language of rights
was used in reference to how gender is taught and discussed, whereas a language of
responsibilities was used in reference to how gender is experienced and lived. I had
initially coded ‘rights/responsibilities’ for both questions as one category, as they often
appeared together: ‘hak dan kewajiban’. Yet when going back to compare the two sets of
responses it became apparent that each question favoured a different emphasis. When
people were asked to talk about how gender issues come up in conversation, the answers
focused more on rights (37 of 49 responses), whereas when talking about the differences
between men and women (what they ‘should’ be, a normative implication) the emphasis
was on responsibilities (38 of 40 responses). This reinforces the earlier assertion that there
are distinctions between gender discourses and embodiment.

All of this can be interpreted in different ways, perhaps even positively – for instance,
arguing that it implies women and men are equal even if there are physical differences.
However, the claim made here is that the lived experience of gender implicates bodies
centrally, and there is thus a disjuncture between this experience and the discourse of
gender existing in the realm of rights, equality, status, and so on. An insightful comment
was made by a young mother in Surabaya, who noted the ‘thin separation’ between the
responsibilities and kodrat of women (Respondent #141). In other words, there is a fine
line between bodies and ultimately the roles women end up playing and their position in
society. Gender is experienced within physical constraints, not simply social ones, and
these are tied closely to roles and responsibilities. The disconnect between an examination of bodies and social roles, however, prevents a better investigation of this line.

We can consider one final example of the contrast between gender in the abstract and gender in the immediate lived reality: the question of whether husbands should help their wives more in the home. This relates back to the earlier discussion of traditional gender roles where women are expected to be in charge of the home and housework, and men to play the ‘breadwinner’ role outside the house. Men’s becoming more actively involved in household affairs would challenge this balance. Respondents were asked their thoughts on this in two ways. First they were asked if husbands ‘in general’ should do more housework. When posed generically, people agreed that perhaps men should participate more in household labour (45% of respondents). However, this is usually only when the wife is busy (e.g. Respondents #17, 42), or if the husband happens to have spare time and is willing (e.g. Respondents #31, 40, 59, 160). In other words, there is no imperative expressed for them to work more in the house, but sometimes a ‘why not, if possible?’ affirmation given.

The questioning then moved from the general to the personal, asking female respondents if their husbands should do more household chores, and asking the men if they themselves should do more. Here there was greater reticence to seek increased male involvement, with less than 30% of respondents thinking these men should do more. This demonstrates again the difference between gender roles conceptually versus gender roles practically. While men and women are more likely to acknowledge that ‘in theory’ husbands should help more around the home, they are less likely to specify that in their own home the man should do more. In other words, even if a minor ‘re-drawing’ of the boundaries between male and
female tasks within the home is acceptable in an abstract general sense, individuals are reluctant to re-draw their own intra-household division.

This evidences the way there may be a reversion to – and reinforcement of – underlying norms and roles that determine where intra-household boundaries are drawn. Further analysis of the responses drives this point home. For instance, even where answers are framed differently, they point to the same implicit assumptions. Quite a few women said they thought their husbands should help more, but only if the wives fell ill. Others said that their husbands did not need to help more, but maybe they should if the wives fell ill. The same situation was expressed from a slightly different angle, highlighting what has been noted before about how choices and situations are experienced differently, whether as empowering or constraining. Yet both answers limit the husband’s involvement to when the wife is somehow incapacitated. This both refers to and reasserts the woman’s position as the pengurus and pengelola (manager) of the household. Only if the manager is on leave do the employees step up to take charge.

5.2.3 The Politics of the Body

So far, gender has been analysed by questioning the effects of power, hierarchies, and embodiment. The way gender is lived returns to this final point: the physical body. This section will therefore address power relations by showing that they do not materialise ‘as if from thin air’ but are built upon the human body. In turn this has immediate implications for the way the gender order can be naturalised and depoliticised. First we will address the body more closely, noting how historical separations between mind and body lead to a rationalisation of gender hierarchy. Next we consider explicit concerns of ‘ownership’ and
control over this body. Finally we explore three examples that highlight the centrality of bodies to everything from domestic labour to the economy and legal bias.

5.2.3a Body/Mind Hierarchies

Power and bodies are intertwined. Unpacking these linkages offers insight into the politics of gender and the irreducibility of bodies. The argument here is that bodies are naturalised into a gendered hierarchy of the earthly and material (women) subjected to the spiritual and rational (men). This has wide-ranging implications for both the way ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ are constructed and valued, as well as the range of options available to and constraints upon the bodies of men and women. Analysis will unfold by considering the perceived view of a distinction between mind and body, the association of women with bodies, how mind and body exist in a hierarchy, and the way this therefore contributes to the naturalisation of the gender order.

Historically, bodies have been ascribed meaning as a distinctly different entity from the ‘soul’ or spirit. This separation between physical and spiritual planes has a long history in both Western and Eastern philosophy, ranging from Aristotle and Plato to Hindu schools of thought to concrete articulations by René Descartes in the 17th century.\textsuperscript{113} The comments of Indonesian respondents paralleled these claims. All but seven of the respondents, when asked if a difference existed between mind and body, pointed to a clear separation between the two. A common Indonesian phrase, ‘lahir dan batin’, describes this dualism, where

\textsuperscript{113} Plato and Aristotle maintained that man’s ‘intelligence’ (mind or soul) could not be identified directly with his physical body (Nussbaum 1984). In the Eastern schools of Hindu philosophy, sankha and yoga, the world was seen as divided into purusha (mind/spirit) and prakriti (material substance) (Sivananda 2003). Finally, it was René Descartes who articulated what came to be known as the ‘Cartesian dualism’ between the ephemeral mind and the physical brain, posing it as a ‘mind-body problem’ (i.e. how could the non-physical direct and animate the physical) (Descartes 1999).
lahir means birth and refers to the physical body, and batin means the inner spirit; both are symbiotically linked, and cannot exist in human form without the other.\textsuperscript{114}

The significance of this mind-body dualism is how it has been linked to a masculine-feminine dichotomy. In brief, maleness is associated with the metaphysical plane (and action) and femaleness with the physical plane (and passivity). As Bordo has argued, this has been ‘one of the most historically powerful of the dualities that inform Western ideologies of gender’ (2003: 11; cf. Krais 2006: 126). Again, this dates back to Cartesian philosophy and its critiques. Some feminists argue, for example, that Descartes poses the mind-body split in a way that is inherently gendered and based on the assumption that women are emotional, bodily creatures. Lloyd (1993) claims that reason and objectivity are associated with maleness throughout Western philosophy; Bordo (1987) also argues that the rise of modern science generated ideas of reason and objectivity that were inherently gendered male. The Indonesian respondents maintained these associations: women with bodies, men with ‘spirit’. As in the earlier discussion of gender roles, respondents consistently linked women to emotions and their hearts (closer to bodies) and men to rationality and logic (closer to the mind).

The next important connection is how the body is viewed not only as distinct from the mind but subordinate to it. Classic Cartesian dualism approaches a kind of transcendentalism, always exalting the mind over the body. Thus it is never simply a clear divide of mind and body, but a hierarchy. This can be seen in the perspectives of the respondents. They

\textsuperscript{114}This concept of lahir and batin stems from Islamic philosophy, examination of which could provide useful avenues for further study, particularly in its discussion of the separation of physical and spiritual planes. The aim here is simply to highlight the long and rich historical trend of philosophical distinctions between mind and body, and how these influence and intersect gender constructions in surprising ways. For sources examining this ‘mystical mix’ in Indonesian Islamic philosophy, see Woodward 1989 and Magnis-Suseno 1981.
described the body as ‘kasar’ (rough, base), whereas the jiwa, spirit, is ‘halus’ (smooth, refined) (Respondents #21, 35). The body, and bodily functions, are earthly and ‘lower’ in status. The body must submit to the soul, which is in charge of energy and ‘semangat’ (spirit, enthusiasm) (Respondents #2, 3, 41). The body might do the physical work, but the jiwa, the spirit, is always in charge. The spirit gives direction (‘mengarah’, Respondent #86), organises (‘mengatur’, Respondent #87), is the driving force (‘pendorongnya’, Respondent #94), and is the commander and conceiver (‘perintah’ and ‘konseptor’, Respondent #96). In essence, the body is the outward manifestation of an inward spirit (Respondent #51); it is the spirit which dominates (Respondent #83). The body is outside and on display, while the spirit is inside and invisible (Respondent #19).

This, therefore, is how gender hierarchies are built upon the hierarchical dualism between body and spirit. ‘Woman’ is symbolically and materially tied to the body, ‘man’ to the spirit and intellect which controls the body. The way the body is subverted to the mind has multiple gendered implications. For example, as one respondent noted, the body will decline as it ages, whereas the mind becomes wiser, even ‘ripen’ over time (Respondent #46). This offers insight into why men gain in stature as they age, while women, judged on more physical attributes, are seen to lose beauty and thus some of their status. This hierarchy of body and mind is rooted in religious and spiritual understandings of the world: the body is of the earth, the spirit is of the skies (Respondent #25). The body, in fact, would not even be human without the spirit: ‘tubuh tanpa jiwa ya mati moal, tidak jadi manusia’ (Respondent #27). It is the spirit that grants humanity. As men are associated with spirit, then men become ‘more human’ than women. Finally, it is clear that the body is what is visible, while the spirit is invisible (Respondents #10, 64, 66, 68, 69). The body
is what is on display, what receives most immediate and obvious scrutiny. This substantiates the way in which women’s bodies are so clearly in the public eye.

Interestingly, when respondents were asked what comprises the difference between men and women, it was men who tended to lay greater stress on physical difference than women (65% of men versus 56% of women). It can be argued that men may emphasise this physical difference as part of an implicit – if unconscious and unintentional – symbolic project that maintains gender hierarchies. This parallels arguments from those such as Simone de Beauvoir (1972 [1949]), who has noted that women throughout history have tended to be defined as the ‘other’ sex, a deviation and aberration from the ‘normal’ male sex. In other words, where men comprise the ‘standard’ and norm, and women’s bodies are therefore the deviant ‘other’, it makes sense that maintaining and emphasising women’s lesser physical status is a critical stage toward sustaining dominance.

5.2.3b Body Ownership, Body Decisions

Having noted the centrality of bodies to gender hierarchies, it is important to explore further how these bodies are perceived, lived in, and tied to power relations between men and women. To what extent do people own and control their bodies? What might this imply? The respondents answered consistently that they have the right to make decisions over their own bodies\(^{115}\) and also feel ownership of their bodies.\(^ {116}\) However, reality is more complicated. Understanding perceptions of bodies alone is insufficient; the critical link is power, how one’s body is the site of converging influences and concrete decisions. Here we address two specific decisional situations to show that multiple tensions and

\(^ {115}\) Of the sample (N=165), 148 replied they alone had the right to make decisions about their bodies, nearly 90%. The remainder pointed to their spouse as having these rights.

\(^ {116}\) Of the sample (N=165), 155 indicated a sense of ‘ownership’ of their bodies, almost 94%. The rest, all women, said their bodies belonged to God, their husbands, and their families.
contradictions exist within people’s sense of ‘ownership’ of their bodies. The contradictions in these situations highlight the fact that although women and men consciously express bodily ‘ownership’, there may be deeper mechanisms of power at work that subordinate women’s sexual and reproductive bodies to men’s decisional capacity.

We first consider the example of decisions about sex. Respondents were asked two questions, the first more generally about who had had the power to make decisions about sex – men, women, or both – and the next more specifically about who chose when to have sex in the home – the husband, wife, or both. In both cases, respondents pointed to male and mutual control (in the general case, 40% claimed male-decisional capacity and 54% said both; in the household itself, 43% claimed the husband made decisions about sex and 52% said both). Most significant are the reasons given for male dominance in decision-making. Often respondents pointed to a ‘law of nature’ whereby men are more likely to pursue sex (Respondent #106). If men are not kept satisfied sexually they might ‘become angry’ (Respondent #9); men cannot resist their sexual urges whereas women can control sexual desire (Respondents #19, 92). Without debating the possible biological merit of this point, the contrast between bodies and power is interesting. Men ‘cannot control their own bodies’, in the sense that their sex drive dominates – yet this is the reason given for why men may lay claim to women’s bodies. It is not assumed that women have no measure of control over their bodies. However, this highlights some contradictions: the way the female body may be constrained based on men’s decisional capacity.

A second example relates to reproductive decisions, demonstrating that women experience ‘control’ over their bodies in complex and even contradictory ways. The issue of bodily

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117 As with previous questions, the move from the general to the specific aimed to ascertain if there were any discrepancies between more generic assumptions about sex and the more personal intra-household dynamic.
control can be highlighted by the determination of when to have children. When respondents were asked who tended to choose when the couple would have a child, 62% pointed to it being a mutual decision. However, the results show some interesting discrepancies between male and female perceptions of the husband’s authority in this regard. Concerning pregnancy, 35% of men saw themselves as being in charge of the decision, whereas only 17% of women thought that men made this choice. Women were more inclined to view it as a shared decision (65% of women versus 54% of men). What this may indicate is that women do have a defined sense of control over their bodies. Women might be willing to relinquish some control over the decision to have sex, but when it comes to a decision with greater lasting effect, pregnancy, they are inclined to view themselves less passively. For instance, one woman noted – while smiling – that she had made the choice when to have her first child, but that the decision was ‘usually’ her husband’s (Respondent #15). He might have been acknowledged to hold authority, but she was still responsible for decision-making. However, this possible sense of ‘ownership’ is complicated by the consideration of when women will seek reproductive healthcare. For example, Indonesian women will sometimes wait for their husbands’ permission before getting medical attention, even in emergency situations surrounding childbirth. One of UNFPA’s concerns has been to target these issues, because when women experiencing birthing complications wait for their husbands to act, this can lead to situations where it is too late for an effective medical response. Women’s ownership of their bodies is thus never uncontested and never absolute.

Religion also plays a role in control over bodies in this context. A number of respondents pointed to God as holding ultimate power over child-bearing (e.g. Respondents #53, 130, 145). For them the question of ‘choice’ was not there in the same way; they saw their bodies as submitted to God and therefore what happened to those bodies was in some way out of their control. In this case, the experience of power is interesting: when the choice to submit to a higher authority is made, ‘second-order’ choices beneath that may not be experienced fully, whether as option or as constraint.
5.2.3c Examples of Body Politics in Chores, Jobs, and the Law: The Question of Masculinity

The politics of the body has been stressed throughout. Here we demonstrate how the convergence of multiple perspectives writ on men’s and women’s bodies can produce tension and competing understandings. The centrality of the body will be illustrated through three examples.

The first looks at the division of domestic labour. Respondents were asked to explain how they distributed chores within the household. A number of themes emerged.\(^{119}\) Whereas men might be involved in helping with the children, they do not assist with the household chores as frequently. ‘Male chores’ include sweeping, taking care of the grounds, driving the children around, and generally doing the things that are ‘lebih berat’ (heavier). But men tend to avoid the ‘domestic’, ‘lighter’ work. Women do the cooking, men the washing. Strangely enough, chores involving water are more likely to be associated with men (washing clothes, mopping, bathing the children, watering the grounds).

Overall, men seemed to be willing to help on the ‘harder’ jobs; for instance, one man said that he will only do the work that is ‘berat dan pekerjaan khas laki-laki’ (heavy and exclusively male work) whereas his wife does the work that is ‘ringan-ringan seperti memasak’ (light such as cooking) (Respondent #98). Husbands help when the woman is incapacitated or unable to perform a task (e.g. Respondent #22 works when his wife is tired, or the husband of Respondent #17 only helps when it is a job she cannot do such as heavy lifting). Additionally, respondents emphasised that domestic space is gendered. The

\(^{119}\) My initial instinct was to use a social science query to see how the answers fit within particular categories for domestic labour, rather than code the data ‘as it fell’. However, it became apparent that labelling and quantifying even the most specific chore proved somewhat illuminating, therefore a more open-ended approach was used.
grounds outside the house are tended to by the men; spaces like kitchens are exclusively female domains. Researchers like Hoschchild have described this phenomenon in the United States, showing how in some families what is agreed as an ‘egalitarian division’ (both wife and husband contribute to household chores) is actually a division of space; for example, the wife takes ‘upstairs’ and the husband takes ‘downstairs’. Yet this means in practice that the husband takes care of a certain task like the pet and the garage, while the woman does everything else (1989: 43-45). It is a token arrangement that delineates space, aimed at keeping everyone content with the ‘contribution’ of his or her partner.

A careful reading of the ways in which people articulated the household division of labour makes apparent an implicit link to bodies and power. This is surprisingly consistent with the underlying dichotomies Bourdieu outlines in *Masculine Domination*. Respondents emphasised that the male domain in domestic labour is ‘harder’ and/or ‘outside’. The principle determinant in this normative division of labour related to men’s perception of what women are capable of doing, versus what they felt men should be doing. Women are to be kept from doing what is ‘heavier’; this makes the husband feel as if he is contributing to the household labour while relinquishing neither his masculinity nor the need to stress his physical/bodily superiority, while also pacifying the woman that the man is helping somewhat. This notion of ‘harder’ and ‘outside’ is thus symbolically tied to masculinity and masculine labour, much like Bourdieu postulates in his construction of the dichotomies (2001: 10). Furthermore, these dichotomies are tied explicitly to the physical body and to differences of anatomy: the male genitalia is ‘outside’ and ‘harder’, the female genitalia is ‘inside’ and ‘softer’ (Bourdieu 2001: 11). The consistency and repetition of these dichotomies, manifest even in something such as the division of domestic labour, bring us back to the politics of the body.
A second example concerns how people view the bodily demands of particular jobs. People were asked early in the interview if women and men are ‘dibedakan’ (literally ‘made different’, differentiated) in society, the economy, and politics. There was considerable agreement that men and women are differentiated strongly in society, with nearly 65% of respondents making this claim. The economy as a site of difference was given the greatest emphasis, with a quarter of all respondents referencing it in some way. Yet the way in which respondents talked about men and the economy highlights the necessity of unpacking masculinity when examining gender, for the male role as provider was stressed repeatedly as the additional differentiation for males. In other words, men are the ones who are ‘dibedakan’ because they have to work for their wages, while women do not (e.g. Respondents # 89, 99, 106, 123). Very often this role is linked to men’s bodies; for example, one respondent noted that men are leaders because they have stronger bodies (Respondent # 141), while another drew associations between men’s physical strength and the type of work they are meant to do (Respondent # 131). Interestingly, the responses challenged my own assumptions. I had approached this question thinking I would find that women are being oppressed in a system that favours men. What emerged instead was the way that the system is actually viewed to place a greater burden on men. In turn, this is perceived as being indissolubly linked to men’s roles and ultimately their bodies.

A final illustration considers the legal system. Respondents were asked about potential bias against women in the existing legal structure. Governmental programmes often mention this bias, particularly as it has been a problem regarding violence against women and laws for inheritance and divorce, stemming in part from related Islamic regulations. The majority of respondents believed that such prejudice did exist (68% of respondents).
However, in subsequent discussion, two major themes emerged. Both revolve around women’s bodies, though from entirely different angles. One theme relates to insufficient punishment for crimes tied to harassment, rape, and violence against women, as a quarter of the respondents noted problems related to the protection of women in this area.

The other theme also takes as its starting point the ‘weakness’ or perhaps ‘softness’ of women, needing protection. But it views this ‘softer’ side as causing the law (or more specifically, law-makers) to be lenient with women, which in turn affects men negatively. This surprised me, as again I had assumed the law would be viewed as more harmful to women. One respondent talked about women being let off any charges if they just ‘batted their eyelashes’ (Respondent #153); another noted that women could use their beauty and their bodies to avoid the law – just as she had seen on television programmes (Respondent #151). A man in Bandung commented that he would frequently hear people saying, ‘kasian lah it mah perempuan’ (take pity, they are women) (Respondent #8). Another saw women’s power in being able to control the situation through manipulating men in legal contexts: ‘What man won’t be swayed by a woman? Even if a woman is wrong in the eyes of the law, if she “makes eyes” at the lawmaker the man will be like a fish out of water, powerless to resist!’ (Respondent #155).

This reveals the question of masculinity, the ‘other side of the coin’ wherein gender relations constrain and impact back on both men and women. Women are seen as negatively affected by their weak, sometimes targeted bodies, but these very same bodies are perceived as being able to ‘harm’ men by taking away their power. There is a concern to protect women’s bodies, as in violence and harassment cases. But concomitantly
resentment persists at the perception that the law favours women in their ‘softness’ and need for protection, which provokes reaction against seeming injustice.

5.2.4 Gender in a Time of Change

We have examined how gender roles are constructed in the context of power relations, leading to discrepancies between the ways people talk about and then ‘live’ their gender; further, this embodied gender is tied directly to the physical body. Now we return to a central exploration of this thesis – understanding the spiral process between discourse and practice – by situating gender as a ‘structured and structuring structure’ built upon bodies within the context of social change. It is important to study how these processes are affected by social change, specifically the kind that gets packaged alongside ‘development’.

Here it is argued that as women begin to take on greater responsibilities in the public sphere, the discourse of gender tying them to the private sphere strengthens. In other words, when the external, productive differences between women and men grow smaller, the internal, discursive differences are emphasised increasingly. These shifts happen in the context of social change, as ‘modern’ society is viewed as a place in which the external differences between women and men tend to converge. First we question how Indonesian respondents evince a sense of change that is driven from without. Next we consider how this ‘modernising impulse’ is seen to affect sexual mores and gender. Finally, we ask how this may impact Indonesian women today.
5.2.4a Transformation from Without? Modernity and the Globalisation of Information

If attempting to understand the gendered dynamics of social change, we might question how gender roles are part of larger dialogical encounters. Indonesian men and women living in urban Java are developing gender identities at the intersections of a more self-conscious and evolving modernity, borrowing from cultural categories that could be described as ‘Western’ versus ‘traditional’. How have modernity and its trappings, therefore, shaped understandings of gender that are being targeted by government policies? How might this affect people’s understandings of change? This section aims to show that becoming ‘modern’ is perceived as driven by external, mainly Western, influences.

Respondents were first asked to express what it meant to be modern in their thinking and to focus particularly on the psychological aspect. There was a dominant association of modern with ‘maju’ and all that connotes. The word maju has a variety of meanings, implying making progress, improving, flourishing, advancing. If used specifically as ‘berpandangan maju’, or ways of thinking that are ‘maju’, it tends to means liberality. Furthermore, ‘negara maju’ are developed countries. Thus being modern implies being like the developed countries – perhaps an obvious linkage, but nonetheless one which highlights the fact that ‘modernising’ is not entirely an isolated project of social transformation, but one which implies imitation and a shared end: it is not simply ‘becoming’, it is ‘becoming like’. These answers are coded as follows:

120 There is the assumption by all government bureaucrats that there is a difference between the discourses of gender in the cities versus that of the rural areas. Indeed, there is general agreement to this effect. All my research was in urban areas that would be described as more ‘modern’.
### Becoming ‘modern’ in thinking means …

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Total responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=156)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being ‘maju’, ‘berkembang’ (blooming, thriving, expanding)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being educated, free thinking, open-minded (<em>berpikiran terbuka luas</em>)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following the age, the era, changing with the times</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing but able to resist an outside influence (e.g. the West, and religious decline)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being more open to change and difference, new things, flexible</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using rational, logical thinking and analysis</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking to the future</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being free, democratic, more liberal, not conservative (<em>kolot</em>)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using more positive, creative thinking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So for some respondents, modernising meant not being ‘left behind’; the world was changing and adapting around them and the only way to succeed was by staying in step with these changes (Respondents #105, 140). However, this notion of cultural change exacts a response, as a number of respondents made it clear that it is important to maintain a framework that retains moral and cultural boundaries. One woman noted, for example, that change should come only if there is consistency with ‘Eastern adat’ (custom) (Respondent #56). Others pointed to the necessity of not going ‘too far’ with change and still adhering to underlying norms and religion (Respondents #25, 36, 90, 95). The key here is to understand how all of these changes are perceived to ‘enter’ and transform a society. Respondents were asked what they saw to be the source of all these changes. From their answers, it is clear that the dominant perception is that change is being driven ‘from without’, as shown here:
What is causing these changes, this new openness, in society?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is causing these changes, this new openness, in society?</th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=165)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass media, information, information technology</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of outsiders, outside culture (especially Western culture)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral decline, increase in free sex (pergaulan bebas), declining religion</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘modern era’; a change in the era (‘kemajuan jaman’)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation, global culture</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General change in thinking (pola pikir, pandangan, paradigms)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were some differences between male and female responses: while men were likely to point to the decline of morality and religion, as well as the effects of globalisation, women were more apt to ascribe change to the ‘modern era’ while specifying the influence of Westerners. Though there might be distinction in terms, the overall impact is the same – change is brought on by ‘globalisation’ or a particular ‘brand’ therein that is Western by default. Consistently these cultural norms are introduced through the mass media, as information via television, magazines, movies, and new technologies. Thus, for example, ‘foreign cultures’ keep entering Indonesian society (Respondent #105) through the ‘information stream’ that is influenced by ‘Westernisation’ (Respondent #141). One telling response came from a man in Surabaya, who explained that change was from ‘the influence of television, and outside culture’, but then went on to clarify that of course he actually meant ‘Western’ culture (Respondent #129).

5.2.4b The Discourse of Sex

The example of sex and sexual mores illustrates the conflicting angst produced by this perception of ‘transformation from without’. The way sex is viewed represents a significant social change as experienced by respondents. Sex is tied to the discourse of
transformation underway in Indonesia, and female sexuality above all is a subject of concern. This issue is imbricated with morality and religion, ‘Western versus Eastern’ notions of purity and culture, and women’s bodies. It is also important to address as it forms the nexus between men and women, religion and bodies, control over reproductive capacity, and human sexuality. Most interesting in the responses are the assumptions of a schism between past and present, traditional and modern. When sex was discussed, people were more likely to construct it as a major contrast between eras. Yet people did not suddenly start having sex in modern times. What is more realistic is the openness with which it pervades public discourse. This explains the emphasis on how the flow of information and accessibility of this information has created a new atmosphere of sexual license. As one woman put it, ‘before it was covered up and now it is more in the open’ (Respondent #142). Discourse may have changed – but has practice?

Here we consider views of sex and changes therein, the perceived source of these changes, how these are related to modernity, and finally what impact this is said to have regarding sexual practice, particularly that for adolescents. Throughout we note the complex overlapping of ideas of sex, shifts in thinking about sex, the tensions between increasing visibility in public discourse and the fear that this might affect private norms, and the ways these are all linked with inculcation of, and resistance to, external influences.

When asked to describe their perceptions of sex, responses were varied, but reflected some basic shifts in emphasis. Coding the answers resulted in the following emerging themes:
Some minor distinctions arose between male and female responses. Women were slightly more likely to emphasise that sex is bounded and for marriage only. They emphasised a distinct responsibility (kewajiban) tied to their bodies for the purposes of bearing children. Men laid greater stress on pleasure and importance as a central aspect of sex, though it was a common theme for all respondents. This ‘pleasure consideration’ in particular was often viewed as something new. For example, one woman noted that sex used to be seen as a ‘responsibility’ between husbands and wives in order to have children, but now it has changed to imply pleasure and recreation (Respondent #7). The sense that this change has to do with the modern era is present in other answers. In discussing the ‘boundedness’ of sex, one woman argued that sex needs to be guarded, because they are not allowed to just ‘randomly go along with the current age’ – people need to be warned of the ‘effects of free sex’ (Respondent #116).

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In fact, when directly queried, 151 respondents (92% of 164) said that sex should ‘menyenankan’, be pleasurable. The caveats given focused on the following: sex should not be forced, would only be pleasurable in its proper place (marriage), was a good way for husbands and wives to connect, acted as a stress reliever, and was a ‘gift from God’ (Respondents #36, 93) or even ‘an act of religious service’ (Respondent #27).
When asked directly if the ‘modern era’ is more open to sexually related issues, 164 of 166 respondents agreed. They tended to reference the influence of outside information, whether magazines like *Cosmopolitan* or mass media more generally, including changes in information technology and internet use. Nearly a quarter of respondents in total referred specifically to how information is changing minds and societal norms. Yet a number of people also replied that this shift in sexual mores is more importantly about women gaining control and becoming more dominant (e.g. Respondents #130, 134). This corresponds to the fear expressed throughout that ‘Westernising’ will increase sexual freedom for women, which is viewed negatively.

Overall, this increased sense of ‘openness’ related to sex has to do with the heightened visibility of ‘sexual discourse’. So, for example, though some reticence was shown, the majority of respondents viewed the topic as no longer taboo. Most interesting is why they claimed that it is now acceptable to talk about sex. Respondents noted this is because the era is ‘advanced’ (Respondent #99) and because there are ‘worrying changes’ in modern times (Respondent #41) such that sex is now more public, particularly on television. There is therefore no use fighting it (Respondent #1). In essence, sex is perceived to have entered public discourse, and thus some of its taboo quality has been erased. However, there are still indications that it is a sensitive topic. Words such as ‘risih’ (feeling uncomfortable about something risqué) and ‘segan’ (feeling inhibited, especially toward someone of higher status) were used frequently.

This sense of discomfort may be explained by the links several respondents drew between the increase of the discourse of sex and outside influence. Their comments often revolved

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122 Respondents were asked whether sex was still a taboo topic for discussion. The majority claimed that it was no longer taboo (117 respondents, or 71%; N=165), while 28 respondents said that it remained taboo (17%) and another 20 said that it might be taboo depending on context (12%).
around contrasts with the ‘West’, such as the increase in concern over ‘free sex’ (Respondents # 86, 159) or how Indonesians approach sex differently than Westerners (Respondent #148). One man noted they tended to talk about the ‘merging’ of ways of sex in the West with those in the East (Respondent #124). It was only one younger female respondent who referred specifically to some of the practices she associated with the ‘modern’ world, whispering very quietly that people did talk about ‘orgasms, different positions, fantasies, porn videos’ (Respondent #115).

The more visible ‘discourse of sex’ may be renewing a focus on adolescent sexual behaviour. Fear is involved in the way that premarital sex, particularly for teenagers, is approached. Respondents were asked if there is a change in the understanding of and participation in sex by teenagers, and whether this contrasts with earlier generations.123

Significant here is word choice. The following words appeared most frequently:

- **berani**, brave: 33 times (20%, N=166)
- **bebas**, free: 33 times (20%)
- **terbuka**, open: 15 times (9%)
- **tidak malu**, not embarrassed: 10 times (6%)

Overall, very positive words were used in a negative sense by all the respondents. Bravery, freedom, openness, lack of shame – all were cast negatively to explain how teenagers are having sex more than they should. This corresponds to the many references to morality and moral decline (28 respondents, nearly 17%). Among perceived solutions, sex education was seen as a way to stop the decline of sexual mores brought on by this ‘era of globalisation’ (Respondents #84, 85), preventing youth from ‘salah jalan’: taking the wrong road (Respondents #84, 100, 103, 125).124

123 While it may be said that every generation bemoans its younger generation’s perceived ‘disregard’ of traditional values (the way things are seen to change but similar patterns remain the same), nonetheless this verbalised concern is a common theme in the discourses of change.  
124 This ‘problem’ of sex tended to arise more specifically with regard to sex education for adolescents. Of the sample (N=157), 143 respondents agreed that teenagers should be educated about sex (92%), 8 said they
5.2.4c The Impact of Modernisation on Gender

Modernisation is also seen to be impacting gender, with conflicting responses. Those who described the differences between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ gender kept returning to three major themes – those of separation, status, and space. The first significant theme points to the notion of separation: how men and women come to be differentiated. Generally it was perceived that the differences between men and women are decreased significantly in modern society, a point which has been emphasised throughout this chapter. In essence, many respondents argued that the differentiation, or ‘perbedaan’, between men and women has been lost almost entirely (Respondents #7, 16, 19). Now differentiation rests more heavily on abilities and tasks, rather than on sex (Respondents #11, 45), to the point that rights and responsibilities for men and women are the same (Respondents #113, 120, 121). Likewise, a ‘modern’ approach focuses more on the ‘kesamaan’ (sameness) of roles for men and women (Respondents #88, 162).

The second theme is that of status: modern forms of gender tend to change the status differential between men and women. This is related to how they are perceived to become more the ‘same’ and therefore more equal. Previously, women were ‘dinomor-duakan’, literally ‘made number two’, or second class, but modernity is seen to bring with it an egalitarian impulse that demands greater gender equality (Respondents #14, 26, 42, 57, 66, 94, 154, etc). Women no longer want to be ‘diremehkan’: belittled, underestimated, or disparaged (Respondents #71, 73), and instead are more emancipated (Respondents #107, 108, 140), more advanced (Respondent #112), more open and less constrained by culture should be educated with some provisions (5%), and only 4 said they should not be given sex education at all (2.5%). Yet whether the answer was yes or no, the reasons given were rarely about information being useful or the protection of the teenagers. Rather the focus was on knowing enough about sex to know that it was not right to have sex, and even to ‘scare them’ enough to keep them from having sex. If people expressed reticence to allow sex education, it was because they thought it would lead to adolescents ‘trying’ sex (e.g. Respondents # 1, 13, 35).
(Respondents #26, 34, 117), and braver and more free to do what they think is right (Respondents #84, 85, 102, 119, 148).

The final theme is how the narrowing of separation and shifts in status are rooted in *spaces*. Modernity tends to be located more in cities than in rural areas as well as to open up different spaces for women in the public sphere. In other words, gender is perceived to be increasingly modern in the city, where women experience greater freedoms, less cultural constraints, and heightened mobility (Respondents #11, 54). Additionally, ‘modern gender’ allows women to move more outside the home, to be less tied to the household, and to enter the public arena, whether government or business (Respondents #22, 28, 31, 44, 49, 52). Women can become leaders, which is a combination of status and space (Respondents #31, 111, 114, 145).

There is therefore a relatively unified depiction of the difference between traditional and modern gender as tied to changes in separation, status, and space. Yet the respondents evidenced two major reactions to this shift, demonstrating the contested nature of ‘modernisation’ as a lived reality. Their first response had to do with the distinction between changes in discourse and changes in ‘reality’ as they perceived it. In short, the claim made by some was that in fact ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ are not separate entities without overlap (Respondent #48) and even in earlier times there had been a desire to ‘equalise’ men and women in education (Respondent #161). Whereas there was a shift in language with the introduction of gender as a concept, this has been tied to modern feminism; as one man put it, not much has changed beyond the language and terms involved (Respondent #50). Overall, respondents evinced some scepticism, noting that although the modern age has brought some change, ‘gender’ has always been around. The
only difference now is that gender is more publicised, with little real transformation (Respondents #83, 104).

The second response was to see the negative aspects of this modernisation. The most commonly used word here was ‘kebablasan’, meaning excessively or ‘too much’; women are seen to be taking their liberties too far to the point that they are forgetting their kodrat and sometimes putting themselves above men (Respondents #46, 59, 64). This means that women might stop honouring their husbands as the head of the household (Respondent #163), or even that men are now ‘losing out’ (Respondents #47). Because these differences are seen by some to be generating disagreement and harming society, there is a call to return to more traditional ways of thinking (Respondents #149, 166).

5.2.4d The Impact on Women

These reactions to the perceived impacts of modernisation on gender can be unpacked further, to address more specifically how these may affect women. It can be argued that the effects of modernity are writ on gender roles, but only as gender discourses strengthen in response to external changes. People generally perceive that women’s position has improved in some ways, such as becoming more educated and involved in the economy. Yet instead of this external change challenging gender hierarchies more meaningfully, it tends to reinforce them. This is because there is a strong gender discourse present to mediate external changes by infusing them with internal meanings. Therefore the way people refer to these external changes must always be in reference to how they support women in their primary role as mothers and wives: education helps women better raise their children; working allows them to help meet the material needs of the family.
This final section looks at the ways women’s roles are changing and the reaction this provokes, followed by questioning why this may increase the attention paid to women’s bodies. We begin with the question of roles. What emerges here is that women’s engagement in the public sphere does not necessarily challenge the underlying ideals of womanhood, as these can simply be reshaped to include a broader range of activities directed at the same purpose. We must question how much freedom this really offers women, if discursively it is maintained as tied singularly to one particular role.

Respondents were asked about women’s increasing access to education and the business world. Of the sample (N=152), 15% were generally positive about this change while 13.8% were directly negative. The majority of respondents, 58%, felt that it is acceptable for women to be more involved in the public sphere as long as they remember their kodrat and their primary responsibilities to the home and their children, and are able to manage their time successfully to cover these roles. Some respondents noted specifically that this change in roles for women is driven not by a shift in gender norms but by economic need, wherein women have to find work to help provide for their families (Respondents #100, 108, 141, 146). More positively, the question of women having jobs was also pointed to as helping to make women more independent, getting them out of the house, and adding to their status and power (Respondents #55, 133, 153).

When asked to make a link between these changes in women’s social position and their roles, virtually all respondents agreed that changes in society are having an impact. Numerous themes emerged. It was viewed positively for women to be more educated, but primarily so that they will be better equipped to help their families (Respondents #3, 5, 85, 88). As economic pressures force women to engage in the world outside the home, this
places pressure on their roles (Respondents #55, 71). But since the roles of mother and wife are assumed ‘natural’, even if they work outside the home women will not leave these roles – whereas there is no guarantee that men will do the same (Respondents #1, 9).

These two fields, education and the economy, were explored in greater depth through further questioning. Of the 166 respondents, only one claimed that education was not important to improving women’s condition, with nearly 40% (66 respondents) saying that it was *penting sekali* (very important) and nearly 60% (99 respondents) saying it was *penting* (important). Yet there are competing priorities at stake that have to do with educating women versus the resultant impact this might have on the workforce and women’s roles. The main benefits of educating women given by respondents were: to increase their awareness, to help women teach and be more responsible for their children, and to increase women’s self worth to be more independent and able to get a better job. This final link between education and work is what causes tension. As one Sundanese respondent put it, women in the desa tend to be marginalised in school attendance, because they are expected only to end up in the kitchen: ‘*da istri mah ngke ge di dapur*’ (Respondent #1). An Indonesian saying substantiates this: ‘*Area Wanita itu Hanya Dapur, Kasur dan Sumur*’ – the woman’s place is only the kitchen, the mattress, and the well. Even if a woman is educated, she might still be forbidden by her husband to work, in which case higher education is pointless (Respondent #16). Therefore respondents tended to display a measure of tension in their responses. It was clear that many understood that women need to be educated in order to get a good job (e.g. Respondent #128), but this is counterbalanced against the pressures which tie women to domestic roles.
It is important to question, then, this transition from domestic roles into economic ones. Respondents were asked directly whether it was important to have more women in business and engaged in the economy. Several themes emerged from the responses. First, the issue of quality or capability (‘mampu’) is more important than the sex of the worker; in other words, the need is for quality labour, not specifically more women or more men (35% of respondents). Those who supported women’s greater economic activity tended to revert to essentialised notions of women and their natural tendencies to make this claim. Some stated that women are better than men at performing tasks such as selling or ‘being the brains of the affair’; women are more ulet (tough, persevering), teliti (careful), honest, graceful, diligent, and conscientious than men, qualities which would help them economically. Overall, men were more likely to view women’s transition into the economy as a value judgement – either pointing out what women are particularly good at, or what they are bad at (50% of men referenced capabilities while only 29% of women did so). Women, conversely, often emphasised that they should participate economically only insofar as it allows them to help their husbands or families.

In the end, this is both a deep tension and a significant ‘bridge’ in gender constructions: the claim that women do not need to be in economy because they should stay at home with the children, counterbalanced against the argument that it is actually to help support these children and their husband that women can and should work. Thus the question of women’s work outside the home is supported insofar as it can be explained by the discourse of a more inclusive ‘motherhood’, the Ibu who helps to provide for her family. In short, the shift in external circumstance is met with renewed discursive emphasis on gender identities.

125 This economic arena is distinct from that of from rural agriculture, where Indonesian women have a long history of active engagement. The respondents perceived, and reacted to differently, the visibility of ‘modern’ economic activity for women – often conducted in cities.
5.3 Relevant Theoretical Insights: The Politics of the Body

The way differently sexed bodies exist within power structures is central to a politics of the body. This has been shown through analysis of the interview responses. The argument has run as follows: Gender and gender hierarchies are often presumed to be ‘natural’ – after all, the bodily differences between men and women are ‘pure biology’. Without slipping into biological essentialism, we cannot avoid the ‘ontological primacy of sexual difference’ (Kandiyoti 1998: 140).

Yet these differences are constructed within hierarchies that often favour men and the male form. James Scott and others have argued that those who are subordinated within these hierarchies – in this case women – are merely ‘acting a mask’, and will play along within particular power structures without necessarily buying into assumptions of domination. Scott rejects both the ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ theories of false consciousness, both of which argue that the dominant ideology, here understood as masculine domination, ‘achieves compliance by convincing subordinate groups that the social order in which they live is natural and inevitable’ (Scott 1990: 72). The thick theory implies that women consent to this order, while the thin theory merely claims their resignation to it.

Others such as Steven Lukes disagree with Scott’s assertion, asking whether it is possible for someone to ‘act a mask’ long enough that it becomes them (2005: 131). Lukes points to a more complex answer, saying that ‘consent’ or ‘resignation’ are insufficient explanations for hierarchies and conditions of powerlessness. He mentions the ‘range of cosmological, religious, moral and political ideas and everyday commonsensical assumptions whose acceptance has served to make such conditions appear intelligible and tolerable, or less intolerable, or even desirable’ (2005: 132). This range of influences therefore converges to
generate acceptance of gender hierarchies. But it is the ‘everyday commonsensical assumptions’ which may be tied most closely to bodies and the naturalisation of gender.

Therefore, this is the crux of the politics of bodies: that bodies form the basis for the naturalisation of a social order wherein women are subordinated. Bourdieu has stressed this in *Masculine Domination*, and interesting parallels between bodies and social practice have been highlighted in this chapter – for example, in the division of household labour. Embodiment is a central way that we must understand Scott’s domination and Lukes’ mediation of this domination as being a set of strategies within social complexity. Men and women live in bodies that have particular meaning, and this meaning underpins social stasis or change. Bodies are the material foundation from which gender discourse derives its ‘naturalising’ power and hence ability to structure social relations, even as this power circulates through society to reinforce the image of normative gender via discourses and institutions. Therefore, put most bluntly, ‘bodies matter’ (cf. Butler 1993). Bodies are lived within power structures that are bigger than we comprehend consciously, and impact patterns of behaviour and experience. The very nature of the social order is built upon these bodies, and social change meted out through them.

### 5.4 Conclusions: Gender and Social Change

This chapter has demonstrated the complex and spiral relationships men and women have to gender discourses, to each other, to perceptions of social change, and to their own bodies. We examined the contradictions and perceptions of gender within individuals themselves, in order to understand the tensions between how gender is talked about and how it is lived. We also explored the ways gender identities are always present within broader paradigms and structures and experienced in irreducible physical bodies – gender is both a ‘structured
and structuring structure’, drawing on Bourdieu’s conceptualisation, and an ‘embodied structure’, in John Scott’s typology. It has been shown that there may be incongruities between the ‘positive-sounding’ explicit layer of gender discourses and the ‘practice’ of gender as something conflicted, embodied, and tied to power relations and gender roles, reflecting concepts put forward by James Scott and Steven Lukes.

Additionally, the sense of a society-in-flux impacts gender norms in multiple ways. At times there are perceptions of social transformation driven by external sources of development and modernisation. This generates reactions in gender discourses and norms. At other times people seem to feel that not much has really changed ‘on the ground’ even though life has been imbued with a new language, new terms and ideas. This complex and even ‘reflexive modernity’\textsuperscript{126} turns back upon itself in a spiral process, mediated by individual men and women who reflect upon their engagement with, and ways of living in, a world that seems to be changing out of their control. It is an engagement with the ‘politics of the body’ that allows us to understand these spiral processes, the way men and women embody social structures and experience social transformation.

\textsuperscript{126} For more on reflexive modernisation see Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994.
Chapter Six: Case study

UNFPA and BKKBN: The Paradigms and Politics of Reproductive Health

Thus far we have examined the broader bundle of governmental gender policies and institutions in Indonesia, spanning from MOWE in Jakarta through to its various regional structures. We analysed how gender discourses are resisted or appropriated by men and women living in increasingly modern cities across Java. Gender discourses, institutions, and identities have been studied as distinct components, while trying to articulate how they exist in a spiral relationship – a complex and imbricated process related to political and social change. By applying Foucauldian concepts of discourse and power to explore how ideas map onto institutions and impact identities, we gained insight into the politics of change.

This chapter provides a case study of a particular gender programme as it stood in 2002: reproductive health (RH) socialisation implemented by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in partnership with the Indonesian National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN). The case study analyses connections between a particular gender discourse (‘reproductive rights’) and institution (UNFPA) in a specific context (West Java). Chapter One’s theoretical framework guides this analysis, linking theories of discourse, development, and gender within a multi-level, multi-vocal framework. By exploring here the dynamic interaction of discourse/power, institutions, and identities, this case study seeks to disentangle the processes and politics of change. In the end, it will show how the multiplicity of competing agendas may generate unintended outcomes, with variable gains accruing to the different parties involved. The methodology, as with the broader research
project, is inductive, qualitative, and reflexive. It examines three primary levels of the RH programme: centre (Jakarta, the national capital), province (Bandung, the provincial capital, and Tasikmalaya), and ‘grassroots’ (two villages in West Java, Sukajaya and Cisayong). Three questions guide analysis, each question correlating to one level:

- First, how did the international development discourse on the issue of reproductive rights and gender equity translate itself as it entered Indonesian society at the ‘centre’? What were the underpinning paradigms, and how did this affect the politicisation of this process of ‘translation’?

- Second, how tangibly were these paradigms operationalised through governmental institutions at the level of the provincial bureaucracy? In essence, how were the discourses being ‘mapped onto’ institutions?

- Third, how was this discourse contested or appropriated in the everyday lives of women and men in villages, where competing agendas for change flourish? How, if at all, did it affect their ‘lived lives’?

Scholar Sue Blackburn describes reproductive health promotion in Indonesia as an example of the international community’s success in promoting its agenda (2004: 157, 166). Whether successful or not, the case allows us to examine clearly the linkages between international, national, and local levels.

Before beginning, and to establish context, we describe briefly UNFPA work in Indonesia. The UNFPA agenda, once focused predominantly on population-reducing policies, began to elaborate as its guiding principle the notion of human rights (UNFPA 2002: 3). As with MOWE, ‘empowerment’ was held to be a core value of UNFPA work in Indonesia (ibid: 4). UNFPA’s 6th Country Programme in Indonesia (2001-2005), operating in West

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127 Analysing these levels required research in three different sites in 2002. In Jakarta, I worked in the UNFPA offices as the Advocacy Programme Coordinator, with unique responsibilities for programme operation. At the provincial level, I conducted interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), collected documents, attended meetings and workshops, and worked closely with the UNFPA District Facilitator for Kabupaten Bandung. Finally, at the village level, I collaborated with two research assistants who conducted 40 in-depth interviews in two kampungs (villages) in which UNFPA operates: Sukajaya and Cisayong, in the districts of Bandung and Tasikmalaya respectively. Appendix A discusses methodology further.

128 This is in keeping with most development work today, as intertwined with the explicit promotion of human rights (Sen 1999; Peet 1999: 5-6; Sheth 1997: 329-330).
Java and three other provinces, focused on advocacy, population and development strategies, and essential reproductive health. UNFPA was meant to provide both initiatives and project funding, working closely with the Indonesian government agencies charged with actual project implementation. The government agencies, most notably BKKBN (*Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional*, the National Family Planning Coordinating Board), ran national reproductive health (RH) programmes. These included family planning, contraceptive security, maternal care, adolescent reproductive health, sexually-transmitted infection and AIDS prevention, and improvements in clinic-level quality of care. BKKBN is structured in tiers that range from the central offices in Jakarta to the PLKBs (*Petugas Lapangan Keluarga Berencana*, or Family Planning Field Worker) who visit people in their homes and hold ‘socialisation’ meetings in villages. UNFPA representatives exist in some form at all levels, though at the lowest level they cover an entire district, which may number hundreds of thousands of people.

Throughout, in 2002 UNFPA was attempting to implement a ‘new paradigm of gender sensitivity and integrated RH service delivery’ (UNFPA 2001d: 9). In other words, UNFPA tried to change the way people thought about a huge range of issues involved in ‘reproductive health’, including gender roles and the status of women. What will be considered here are both the explicit aims of the project and the implicit paradigms underlying it – the frameworks and assumptions within which the aims have been constructed. The focus in this case study will be on UNFPA reproductive health discourses and the intersection of these discourses with those of the other stakeholders of this programme, including Indonesian bureaucrats and the project recipients in the villages. These ‘intersections’ are ultimately about power and knowledge, and relate to the positions people occupy within specific social and institutional structures. Understanding the
multiple and competing interpretations occurring at the various levels of governmental structure allows us to analyse how these different understandings direct programme action and individual behaviour.

6.1 Global and National Discourses of Reproductive Health: UNFPA at the Centre

We begin analysing UNFPA’s reproductive health (RH) interventions by examining the broader paradigms within which it operated in 2002. This corresponds to Chapter Three, unpacking questions of discourse and power, as we explore how the international development discourse on reproductive rights and gender equity entered Indonesian society at the ‘centre’, the capital city of Jakarta, and to what extent this was politicised. This section will progress in three stages. First, the history of family planning in Indonesia through the early 1990s will be described within its global and theoretical context. Second, the post-1994 paradigm shift of the population establishment will be examined, problematising the RH discourse that has developed from this shift with regard to both terminology and theoretical implications. What will be explored here are the ways in which discourses display a circular logic, rationalise certain interventions, obscure conflict, and can be applied instrumentally with wide-ranging implications. Finally, the politics of paradigm creation will be considered by a study of UNFPA’s intra-office relations at its headquarters in Jakarta. Here, we will examine the dynamic between the UNFPA Representative and the staff and the writing of the UNFPA brochure.
6.1.1 Indonesian Interventions in Family Planning

6.1.1a BKKBN: The National Family Planning Coordinating Board

The history of Indonesian family planning through the early 1990s provides an illuminating contrast to more recent RH developments. In the late 1960s the total fertility rate for Indonesia was around 5.5, education levels were low, infant mortality high, and marriage nearly universal. These combined conditions were ‘not normally considered conducive to rapid fertility decline’ (Streatfield 1985: 342). Then in 1970 the New Order government established BKKBN (the National Family Planning Coordinating Board) to integrate all family planning activities. By late 1974, the Indonesian government began experimenting with village distribution of contraceptives. This local dissemination seemed successful, particularly by grouping together the ‘acceptors’ of the contraceptives programme, which was claimed to create ‘a development dynamic’ (International Family Planning Digest 1976: 4). At this time, contraceptive resupply depots were often in village leaders’ homes, who were also ‘acceptors’ (ibid: 3). Typically the village head’s wife would lead the ‘Acceptor Club’ for the village, which grouped around not only contraceptives, but also access to credit and basic mother and child health services (Hartmann 1987: 75). BKKBN estimated that by 1976 21 percent of married women in Java and Bali (aged 15-44) were using modern contraceptives obtained from their programmes (Freedman et al. 1981: 4). This rapid growth surprised many people. By the late 1970s BKKBN had expanded ‘its ways of reaching the people more than any other large national program outside China’ (Ross and Poedjastoeti 1983: 69), and the Indonesian family planning programme was considered ‘a model of government-sponsored fertility in a developing country’ (Warwick 1986: 453).
The question became how Indonesia in all its vast diversity ‘came to accept such a swift and fundamental transition in reproductive behaviour’ (Ross and Poedjastoeti 1983: 76). One answer lies in socio-cultural factors. Early programme assessments noted that the highest rates of contraceptive use took place among families with the highest and lowest standards of living. Freedman et al. argue that this stems from

the convergence of two forces: modernization may work to increase contraceptive use among higher status groups; sheer Malthusian pressure coupled with aspirations arising out of access to outside influences including the information and services of the family planning program may increase contraceptive use among the poor (1981: 15).

It is possible to argue that the poor were using the information given them by BKKBN as a form of access to the ‘trappings of modernity’ in which they have active choice; in other words, their participation in the programme was an exercise of agency. Counterbalanced against this is the very striking possibility that these poor people adopted contraception because they found it ‘difficult to resist the strong pressure of local officials to help them meet the mandated goals for local areas’ (Freedman et al. 1981: 15).

Yet the Indonesian government relied much less on overt coercion than it did on ‘subtle forms of paternalism and social pressure’ (Hartmann 1987: 81). The message conveyed was that by participating in family planning, women were doing their patriotic duty. To analyse the Indonesian family planning programme, Parsons (1984) explains its success as partly stemming from the ‘mystical reverence’ of the lower classes toward authority figures. Practically speaking, when health officials and workers told villagers that they needed to take contraceptives for the good of the nation, this was accepted without much (if any) argument. There are observable parallels here to the ‘development discourse’ as a means to mobilising women’s activity toward nationalist ends, as discussed in Chapter Three, specifically in the context of their roles as mothers.
6.1.1b Paradigms of Reproductive Health

Having considered BKKBN’s institutional framework, we situate this within global family planning trends of the population establishment. Various scholars have noted primary rationales driving this group. Freedman argues that contraceptive delivery programmes have three fundamental paradigms: demographic, biomedical, and reproductive health (1995: 23). The demographic approach emphasises population control. Philipps (1990) shows that this approach views population growth as a root cause of poverty, underdevelopment and environmental degradation, necessitating fertility decline through family planning programmes. The biomedical approach arose when reports found family planning to have general health benefits; thus family planning could be promoted ‘to prevent maternal mortality in pregnancy and childbirth, to improve women’s health and to reduce child mortality through birth spacing’ (Smyth 1998: 226). Finally, there is a reproductive health paradigm, in which ‘human rights are a formative principle’ (Freedman 1995: 29).

The demographic approach describes the women-focused, population-reducing programmes of the Indonesian government in the 1970s and 80s. During these years, on the global level, ‘family planning [had] been divorced from the concern for women’s health and well-being’ (Hartmann 1987: 31). The goal was numbers, namely the achievement of ‘contraceptive acceptance’ targets. By the late 1980s, the population discourse was

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129 The population establishment includes UNFPA as a primary figure, along with the Population Council, the IPPF (International Planned Parenthood Federation), the World Bank and USAID (cf. Marden et al. 1982).
130 This biomedical model has been noted to be strongly associated with conventional Western medicine (Freedman 1995: 28). Furthermore, it has been argued that ‘assumptions about gender have always played a formative role in biomedical conceptions of the physical body and in the health policies and programmes that derive from them’ (Freedman 1995: 28; cf. Hubbard et al. 1982, Shapiro 1985).
131 The distinction between the biomedical and RH paradigms might be seen as one drawn between consent and choice, for ‘where ethically sensitive biomedical programmes champion informed consent, viewing women as the objects of medical practice, reproductive health programmes champion informed choice, viewing women as the subjects and architects of health strategies’ (Freedman 1995: 30, emphasis in the original).
beginning to change. Betsy Hartmann argued that ‘the expansion of reproductive choice, not population control, should be the goal of family planning programs and contraceptive research’ (1987: 33). She also noted that ‘safe, effective birth control services cannot be “delivered” in a top down, technocratic fashion’ (1987: xiv). Yet at the time she was writing, these services were being successfully administered in Indonesia in precisely such a way. It was not until later that the population establishment began experiencing a paradigm shift toward the reproductive health paradigm described above.

6.1.2 Paradigm Shift: Post-Cairo ’94 and the Creation of a New Discourse

Till the early 1990s, trends in Indonesian RH emphasised quantitative demographic targets without overmuch concern for women’s reproductive rights. However, as the global intellectual climate began moving toward greater emphasis on human rights, so too did pressure build on nations such as Indonesia to work toward more ‘strategic gender goals’ (Moser 1993), such as gender equity, empowerment, and participation. The result was a paradigm shift among the population establishment as a whole, and UNFPA in particular. This shift will be examined here, followed by problematising the RH discourse that developed from it, with both terminology and theoretical implications.

6.1.2a Paradigm Shift

In 1994 the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) was held in Cairo. The ICPD signalled a shift in the population establishment, confirming that organisations previously operating under the demographic paradigm were now using the language of reproductive rights (Smyth 1998: 217). Paragraph 7.3 of the ICPD Programme of Action declared that reproductive rights
rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health.

Reproductive health was defined more holistically as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters related to the reproductive system, its functions and processes’ (ICPD POA paragraph 7.2). Using a human rights framework, the ICPD thus extended the scope of work within the population and development field.

By the late 1990s UNFPA had fully adopted ICPD’s agenda. UNFPA’s types of activities, documents, and terms used all indicated a new tone and range of work. Smyth notes these elements reveal ‘a shift in approach from one which focused on the statistical correlation between women’s fertility and their social position […] to one which allegedly looks at population issues from a woman’s perspective’ (1998: 219). This idea of taking women’s perspective along with other relatively ‘new’ terminology infused UNFPA programme documents. Interestingly, these terms were rarely questioned. For instance, Hartmann argues that if family planning programs are ‘organised for the explicit goal of reducing population growth, they are subverted and ultimately fail’ (1987: 34). Yet she indicates that if we organise RH efforts toward the pursuit of ‘basic rights’, which are presumed themselves to be a worthy end, then somehow the goals will not be subverted. In other words, by promoting these ‘worthy ends’ the means to achieving them are not problematised sufficiently.

It is useful, here, to illustrate what this paradigm shift looked like ‘on the ground’, though more about this institutionalisation will be considered later. BKKBN’s changing yet similar strategies since the fall of the New Order demonstrate the complexities of this shift.
The 1980s and early 90s family planning programmes’ core strategy for recruiting contraceptives clients, at the village level, was a combination of individual urging and community pressure (Warwick 1986: 469). The goal remained to ‘win’ these clients and reach numerical targets of contraceptive users. The BKKBN Director for Kabupaten Bandung noted that BKKBN achieved its greatest success in the 1970s and 80s when they simply ‘pushed’ contraceptives, giving explanations or information about the different methods only when deemed necessary. The point, he said, was simply to get people into the family planning programme. He then explained that more recently a different approach was required: people had to be informed and educated first, and only then could they be put on some form of family planning (interview 11 July 2002). Yet both methods involved strong networks reaching all the way into the family home – whether these families were being presented with contraceptives or simply ‘information’.

6.1.2b The Logic and Power of Discourse

To analyse UNFPA’s paradigm shift, we return to linguistic representation, asking how particular keywords are being used to ‘reflect’ the new reproductive health paradigms even as they may ‘produce’ their stated goals. This matches analysis in Chapter Three of major keywords informing gender policies in Jakarta. A few terms used in UNFPA project documents for Indonesia will be questioned, namely: participation and ownership, gender equality, and capacity building. It will be shown that these particular discourses display a circular logic which renders particular modes of action legitimate while obfuscating underlying conflict.

132 The history of these keywords could be deconstructed more fully, in the manner of those introduced in Chapter Three. However, for brevity in the case study, they will be examined as they shape immediate discourse and practice. The aim is to show the complex intertwining of words, ideas, and programmes, rather than in-depth examination of each individual keyword.
First of all, ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ were ideas used throughout many UNFPA project documents. The premise is that the community – individuals benefiting from UNFPA programmes – must participate in and ‘take ownership’ of these programmes in order to maximise their potential. The UN Junior Professional Officer (JPO) in the UNFPA Jakarta office noted that ‘the idea of ownership is really interesting’, as ‘ownership is something that donors ask governments to feel’ (interview 8 August 2002). For instance, in a 2004 meeting for the Mid Term Review, one question answered by participants was whether the plans had successfully generated commitment and a ‘sense of ownership’ toward UNFPA’s 6th country programme (UNFPA 2004b: 23). In other words, UNFPA acted to ‘generate’ this ‘ownership’; it was never a question of plans originating from the recipients themselves. Yet as noted by the same JPO, in the end ‘there is no room for the government to move’ and so ‘donors decide’ (interview 8 August 2002). This statement highlights the tension between what governments express and the actual constraints upon their action. BKKBN had to implement UNFPA projects while acknowledging its ownership of this work; at the same time, BKKBN was given a definitive mandate by UNPFA to work in a certain way. For in a seeming contradiction, ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’ appeared always as a methodology and request from higher to lower levels. As a ‘grassroots’ example, the Essential Reproductive Health programme document noted that ‘through innovative demand creation activities, the community will be galvanized to take a more active role in seeking information and service for their reproductive health care needs’ (UNFPA 2001d: 6). The assumption here was that the project official remained the significant actor, with the job of ‘galvanising’ the community out of their supposed inactivity to take more ownership of their RH needs.
Project documents thus maintained a divide between the ‘actors’ (the development project workers) and the ‘acted upon’ (those who are being asked to ‘feel ownership’). We see such a divide in the log-frame for the RH sub-programme. The log-frame, shorthand for the ‘logical framework matrix’, linked project outputs to Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs) to Means of Verification (MOVs), with reference to risks and assumptions therein. In the RH sub-programme log-frame, there were 19 different risks and assumptions listed. Of these, 17 focused on the project ‘actors’ – the government, the various ministries, donors – and only two addressed the potential recipients of the programme. Furthermore, of these two only one was positive, noting that to achieve a particular output ‘community support’ would be needed, whereas the other simply pointed to their being ‘no significant opposition’ from the community (UNFPA 2001c: Annex I, i-xv). Thus although terms such as participation and ownership were used, there remained an underlying assumption of binaries – micro versus macro, margins versus the centre, local versus elite, powerless versus the powerful. This bifurcation, when local people are viewed as the ‘powerless’, may reproduce the notion that ‘power’ lies at the centre – and thus reinforce further the polarisation (cf. Cooke and Kothari 2001). In essence, as ‘participation’ or promoting the ‘ownership’ of others becomes a privileged methodology, this legitimises those who purport to practice it even while obscuring potential tensions arising from its exercise.

Second, the concept of ‘gender equality’ was noted as fundamental to UNFPA work (UNFPA 2002: 4). Measuring this, however, proved problematic. Instead, the discourses of gender equity and empowerment became self-perpetuating as their dissemination was an end in itself. They legitimatized the ‘socialisation’ process (which will be further problematised in the next section), and they also obscured the dynamic of power and conflict shaping gender roles, treating the population as a blank sheet. For example, the
OVIs listed for ‘gender equity and equality’ in the log-frame were that the Gender and Development Index increased and the female illiteracy rate decreased. Yet UNFPA programmes did not actually work on these specific fronts (particularly not with education). Rather, the goal was to integrate gender concerns in policy and planning (UNFPA 2001f: 5). The official sub-programme of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’ (GMS) attempted to bring gender issues to the forefront of political discourse (UNFPA 2001e). This was then measured by the number and extent of seminars, meetings, official public statements, training notes, and advocacy materials that reflect gender matters. Programme attempts to raise awareness on gender thus were successful based on the increased use and reach of gender discourse itself – though this had to be measured quantitatively, not qualitatively.

Two other implicit assumptions are revealing. One is the unique terms used to describe how gender issues would be broached among different groups, highlighting assumptions about these populations. Politicians and decision-makers at both central and provincial levels, religious and community leaders at central and provincial levels, and parliamentarians were targeted for GMS and gender ‘sensitisation’ (UNFPA 2001f: 5). However, those at local programme levels, including villagers, were targeted for gender ‘socialisation’ (ibid). This mode of intervention – the idea that people must be ‘socialised’ to understand the ‘correct’ conceptions of gender – was legitimated as the discourse of ‘gender equality’ was cast as unequivocally positive. Additionally, even if sensitivity to notions of ‘gender’ did increase, this ‘gender’ usually referred to the external position of women – their literacy rate, employment rate, etc – whereas the social construction of this position was not queried.133 In UNFPA discourse, ‘gender equality’ became an abstract

133 This refers back to concepts of the social construction of gender as theorised in Chapter Two, and demonstrates again the contention that there is a constant slippage between ‘gender’ and ‘women’ as a group.
Finally, ‘capacity building’ was another term used frequently in UNFPA documents. The term usually referred to assistance given in order to help develop a particular skill or competence, or more generally to upgrade performance ability, but remained imprecise in its definition.\(^{134}\) It was often conflated with a number of meanings, such as tangible acquisitions (e.g. supplying offices with computers or obtaining new cars with the official logo) and more intangible human capacity building (in terms of skills upgrading and heightened work proficiency). On a more abstract level, capacity building was also used to denote the implementation of UNFPA’s ‘new paradigm’ within the minds of those it sought to reach. For instance, it was used to refer to helping a group of parliamentarians or other decision-makers to understand the concepts of ‘gender’ and ‘gender equality’, because this was therefore ‘capacity building’ toward the goal of attaining this equality. In this sense, capacity building most often meant capacity for advocacy, decision-making, and information handling. For example the ‘outputs’ for the RH Sub-programme referred to having the ‘capacity’ of BKKBN et al. ‘strengthened’. Specifically ‘Output One’ related to the capacity strengthening of BKKBN and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare ‘for planning and management of the RH programme at central, provincial and district levels’ (UNFPA 2001c: 6).

How this capacity building was measured proves significant. Among the OVIs for Output One were that the National Commission on RH became functional – which was then to be verified through reference to the Commission minutes – and that standardised protocols and

\(^{134}\) For more on capacity building as foundation to UN efforts, consider the following site: http://www.capacity.undp.org/ (retrieved 19 July 2007).
guidelines were to be developed and applied (UNFPA 2001c: ii). In the first instance, ‘capacity building’ would be attained through the use of discourses (i.e. if the Commission minutes evidenced particular paradigms, such as gender sensitivity); in the second it would be realised through the concretisation of discourses in protocols and other written documents. However, in practical terms capacity building often became simply ‘experience building’. In other words, the need for capacity building was met once the proper number of meetings and seminars had been held, wherein attendance requirements were set as the targets that measure the success of the transfer of knowledge. Additionally, there was the problem of project justification: since capacity building was a goal of UNPFA work and yet remained imprecisely defined, a variety of activities could be subsumed under the category of ‘capacity building’ and therefore justified. The stress placed on capacity building further legitimated UNFPA work by carrying with it the implicit assumption that the projects themselves were not controversial and it was only a matter of ‘strengthening capacities’ to guarantee their implementation.

### 6.1.2c The Danger of Instrumentalism in Discourse

By critiquing a few of the terms in UNFPA programmes, it has been shown that discourses may display a self-perpetuating logic, legitimate particular modes of action, and obscure underlying conflict. We now analyse more specifically the instrumentalist use of discourses, particularly where there is a disjuncture between the discourse and the underlying paradigm.

Ines Smyth, a sociologist who has long studied population issues in Indonesia, questions whether organisations such as UNFPA have actually grasped the principal theoretical tenets of some of the early feminist critiques of family planning, so pivotal to the post-Cairo
paradigm shift in population policies. Failure to do so leads to what she describes as ‘a kind of instrumentalism’ that characterises much of the population establishment, where basic feminist concerns and terminologies are adopted but only superficially (Smyth 1998: 218, 226-228). Before the paradigm shift occurred, Smyth notes that most interventions in population planning attempted to mitigate symptoms rather than deal with the root causes of problems and inequalities which afflict women (1993: 128). Today in Indonesia there has been a visible discursive shift toward targeting the root causes of women’s unequal standing. For instance, in writing about the national programme for women’s health, Iskandar notes that ‘addressing safe motherhood must go hand in hand with addressing gender inequality, the creation of better women’s condition and position, starting during adolescence’ (1998: 42). Yet whether these root causes are actually being targeted remains questionable, precisely because an instrumentalist use of terms such as ‘gender equity’ means that much of what has been accomplished remains in the realm of discourse.

To illustrate this point we consider how the change being sought within the new paradigm of RH involved not only a change in ‘behaviour’, but also one in ‘perception’. For instance, under the early demographic paradigm of family planning, if a woman was to accept birth control then she was exhibiting proper ‘development’ behaviour (i.e. behaviour that was in line with the goals of the family planning institutions). However, it became no longer enough that this woman was an ‘acceptor’ of birth control – she had to be able to speak the proper ‘lingo’ of empowerment and gender equality. The danger in simplifying and applying discourses instrumentally was that development could become little more than information transfer, or ‘sloganising’. 135 Another example of the unintended consequences of instrumentalist application of particular discourses was a contradictory tendency in the

135 This echoes analysis in Chapter Three of the way various keywords (such as ‘woman’ and ‘empowerment’) reflect instrumentalist approaches.
RH discourse to essentialise women to the sphere of their bodies. This has been pointed out repeatedly as the politics of the body, its irreducible nature, where bodies are simplified and depoliticised to meet the needs of institutions and programmes and thus may have essentialising outcomes.

6.1.3 The Politics of Paradigms? UNFPA and Discourse Creation

The historical trends of family planning in Indonesia and subsequent shifts in UNFPA discourse have been examined. Now we approach the intra-office politics of UNFPA in Indonesia. UNFPA headquarters in Jakarta is a critical nexus point wherein some of the global discourses of human rights, gender equity and empowerment are being translated into a plan of action for the Indonesian context. This process of ‘translation’ will be considered here: the micro-politics of those defining macro strategies. Using Alberto Long’s concept of an actor-oriented approach, the intra-office relationships – most specifically those between the foreign UN Representative and the national staff – will be studied. Next, Hobart’s understanding of discourse theory will be applied to analyse the writing of the UNFPA brochure during August of 2002. Through these various points, we will explore the idea of agency within prescribed social boundaries. What is implied is that although institutional discourses typically create an image of consensus, in fact much contestation occurs. Discourse is created out of a disjuncture between the more powerful and the less powerful, the ideal and the real.

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136 Research for this section is based on my internship in the central UNFPA office in Jakarta. I acted as the Advocacy Programme Coordinator for five weeks in August and September of 2002.
6.1.3a Domains and Arenas

To study the inner-workings of the UNFPA office, what Long terms ‘an actor-oriented approach’ (2000: 189) will be applied. An actor perspective does not take the organisational standpoint, which focuses on formal rules and administrative procedures. Rather, it looks at the way the rules governing interaction are being shaped at the ‘interlocking of actors’ projects […] where discontinuities exist based on discrepancies in values, interests, knowledge and power’ (Long 2000: 197). Attention to the links, changes, accommodations, and contestations that take place – instead of assuming a set of rules governing interaction – will illuminate how programmes function. This ‘actor-oriented approach’ must have a setting within which to examine these interlocking projects. Long (2000) depicts this setting as being one of domains and arenas. A domain refers to an area of social life organised around a cluster of values that order social relations (for instance, the domains of family, community, market), and tends to have social and symbolic boundaries (Long 2000: 191). It is precisely this boundedness of domains that is critical, for it defines the ways in which actors’ choices and room for manoeuvre are shaped (ibid: 191-192). Arenas, on the other hand, are where ‘contests over issues, resources, values, and representations take place’ (ibid: 192). It is difficult to separate domains from arenas entirely because the boundaries of domains may be defined more by exclusion than inclusion; that is, as they are in conflict with other domains, in the interstices that are here denoted arenas.

137 To analyse these ‘micro strategies’, this chapter draws upon particular ideas from Long, Hobart, and van Ufford. Chapters Three through Five did not explore these concepts, because they dealt with broader, macro themes, making it difficult to map out distinct ‘domains’ or ‘arenas’ – as this chapter seeks to do within a more narrow context involving specific people.

138 This concept of arena is particularly useful for analysing development projects, Long argues, since intervention processes comprise a set of interlocking arenas of struggle, each characterised as belonging within a particular domain (2000: 192).
In looking at how power structures the relationships within UNFPA headquarters, we consider the relationship between domains and arenas. We begin by looking at the domains of those in the office, including my shifting set of domains and related status. Understanding how these domains were ‘bounded’ will allow us to better view the constraints upon those acting within them. The principal division between UNFPA staff at headquarters was that between the Representative (the Rep), a foreigner, and the national staff. The Junior Professional Officer noted that two stereotypes within the office were that the ‘Rep is king’ and the ‘national staff is lazy’ (interview 8 August 2002). Yet these stereotypes tended to be mutually reinforcing, for the Representative would respond to his perceptions of the laziness of staff by keeping tight control of all of their projects. The more that he micro-managed all of these projects, the less the staff members seemed to care about showing initiative. The general perception of the staff was that he did not trust them to perform their jobs and thus it was difficult to ‘ever want to do them well’, in their words. According to them, their ways of handling matters were resonant with their general social norms (such as a more passive, consensual approach to change), which the Rep could not understand as an ‘outsider’.

As the boundaries of domains are socially defined they remain open to fluctuation at the perimeter, especially where contestation occurs. This is evident in how my status within the office varied over the course of my time there. When I first arrived, both the Rep and the staff attempted to take me into their confidence. The Rep would share things with me about the staff, treating me as an ‘outsider’ to the culture like himself. Yet the Indonesian staff included me in their circle over lunchtimes, rather boldly telling me story after story about the Rep and painting a less than flattering portrait of his abilities. Both groups saw me as being able to switch sides: to the staff, especially since I had grown up in Indonesia
and was fluent in the language and customs, I was able to be an ‘insider’, a sympathetic collaborator; to the Rep, as I was still a Western-educated foreigner, I was able to be ‘on his side’. In each case, it was a sense of shared values that allowed for a common identity.

However, this sense of shared values was breached when I wrote a monitoring report of various UNFPA projects in West Java that pointed out many of the structural problems related to implementation. The reaction from the office staff was mixed. The Rep, who tended to be more critical of the Indonesian government’s coordination efforts, agreed with my critique and commended the report. A couple of the staff members noted that I had written things that everyone already knew. Yet the reaction from the Senior Programme Director (the top-ranked Indonesian staff member) was particularly intense. She criticised my report as being ‘typical’ of a ‘foreign female researcher’, saying that I ‘had not understood the issues’ and was painting a negative and ‘one-sided’ portrait of BKKBN in particular. Whereas before she had treated me as being almost ‘native’, she now deliberately cast me as a ‘foreigner’ with no understanding of local needs. This may have reflected the extent to which I had transgressed the boundary of our shared domain.

The relationship between Rep and staff highlighted the discontinuities between their domains, the differences between their ‘values, interests, knowledge and power’ (Long 2000: 197). This intersection of domains, where issues and values are contested, can be studied as arenas. By exposing the dynamic of power and difference in social relationships, arenas can be useful to analyse intra-office dynamics. In UNFPA headquarters, very often within the official discourse there was a harmonious picture of objectives presented. Yet this disguised considerable conflict.

139 This came from an informant in the office who wrote to me about these varied reactions.
In the office, for instance, power discrepancies required regular acts of dissimilation on the part of the staff. I referred to these acts as ‘the daily dance’ during my time there – the ritualised wearing of ‘masks’ around the boss in every formal setting. This ‘dance’ would play itself out as follows: The Rep would summon a staff member into his office to give an account of a project he or she was overseeing. After it was over the rest of the staff would gather to hear about the meeting, which was then re-enacted, often with dramatic flair. There might be jokes about how to accept criticism from the boss (‘Oh, Sir, you are so smart to notice my mistake’) or how he had ‘only’ yelled five times, or other such comments. Humour was usually used to portray the event. However, the minute the Rep would walk into the main office, all conversation, tone, and even body language would change in a way that portrayed absolute deference – voices softened, heads lowered, body movements slowed, eyes averted. James Scott (1990) has referred to such a gap between what those in power speak and what those without power speak as the discrepancy between public and private transcripts (described in Chapter One). Yet it is important to recall that the boundaries for such transcripts are based on a set of power imbalances between the two groups. As Scott argues, ‘most subordinates conform and obey not because they have internalized the norms of the dominant, but because a structure of surveillance, reward, and punishment makes it prudent for them to comply’ (1990: 193, emphasis in the original).

6.1.3b Complicity in Discourse Creation

Though analysing discourse is necessarily abstract, nonetheless it draws attention to the differential functioning of knowledge and power in practice (Hobart 1993: 12). In other words, discourse allows us to study power, and more specifically, the power disparities of various social relationships. Here we will examine a specific instance of discourse creation,
namely the process through which I wrote the primary brochure for UNFPA work in Indonesia. This brochure was intended to describe UNFPA’s values, agenda, and programmes for an audience ranging from the Indonesian government to foreign NGOs to other health workers in the field of family planning. The goal of this analysis is to highlight both the complicity of individuals and the constraints placed upon them by the broader agenda of power. Additionally, it falls within the methodological aim to include reflexive and self-critical analysis.

Performance marked the initial stages of writing. This text was meant to emphasise all of UNFPA’s achievements as well as describe their strategies and goals. As somewhat of a ‘critical outsider’ who had been asked to perform the task of an insider, I had to read through large amounts of official UNFPA documents and listen to input from the office staff and the UNFPA Representative. Before I began to write I was aware of two things. First, as the goal of this brochure was to promote UNFPA work it needed to portray UNFPA in an unequivocally positive light. Second, there were no actual constraints upon my options: there were no guidelines for the writing and there was no pressure to keep my job as I was only an intern. I was bound only by my knowledge of what was expected; it was a question of performance. In the first draft of the text, I maintained an impartial position toward UNFPA programmes, depicting them as occasionally problematic but always good-intentioned and working toward improvement. When the Rep read this text, he said that it did not give the ‘impression’ of UNFPA that he wanted. He proceeded to stress major themes that he wanted to emphasise, such as freedom of choice, the empowerment of women, and the new focus on quality of care. All of these were to be linked to the ICPD, ICPD+5, and Millennium Development Goals under the umbrella of human rights.
The second stage of writing was marked by embellishment and establishment of a particular ‘tone’. As the second draft reflected the Rep’s themes, he praised it by saying that the ‘tone was excellent’, minor revisions aside. However, precisely this tone marked what I perceived to be a disjuncture between words used and the programme’s reality. This reflected what Hobart termed the ‘differential working of knowledges and powers in practice’ (1993: 12). That is, the Rep’s knowledge of affairs was paramount and had to be expressed in the brochure, even though I knew the embellishments were substantial. For example, the text stressed UNFPA’s engaging with people – partnering with men, women, and youth – to promote a higher quality of life. The tone was quite ‘personal’. Yet with regard to programme operation UNFPA functioned based on numerical targets. The new ‘logistical framework matrix’ linked clear outputs to inputs, and all the projects (however ‘qualitative’ they might have been) had numerical measures of their success. For instance, toward the goal of attaining ‘gender equity and equality’, OVI’s included reducing the female illiteracy rate from 14.5 to 7.5 percent (UNFPA 2001e). But as noted earlier, none of UNFPA’s programmes worked directly with literacy or education. This OVI illustrates how numerical targets were used as measures even when targets were outside the project’s purview. As another example, the text represented UNFPA as the primary implementing agency for a myriad of efforts, which obscured the fact that as a donor agency UNFPA was not involved directly in project execution so much as it influenced policy while allowing others to do the grassroots work.

One particular sample from the text is illuminating: the section on partnership. This section was added to the final draft, the finishing touch to ensure the Core Values ‘tone’ was right:
UNFPA recognizes that only in true partnership can positive change come. In Indonesia, this means working not only with government officials and NGO staff, but also with field workers, health practitioners and community leaders across public and private sectors, at different levels of society, and with the men, women, and youth who are striving for a better future (UNFPA 2002: 4).

All research data to this point told me that these statements were not fully true. There remained competing interpretations of UNFPA’s strategies and methods. Interviews with BKKBN officials indicated a sense that UNFPA held budgetary strings and therefore dictated the course of action in terms of project design and implementation. The men and women interviewed in different health clinics in Bandung, Garut, and Tasikmalaya, including those villages where UNFPA purported to work, had never heard of UNFPA at all. These included many health workers themselves.

Analysing the process of writing, and in particular being aware of a gap between the ‘ideal’ model of UNFPA work and the ‘real’ model, required critical self-reflection as well as understanding how distancing relates to discourse. I was willing to portray what I felt were UNFPA’s good intentions as actual practice. I constructed an image of UNFPA claiming that the organisation worked in a particular way (for example, through partnerships with local populations), and in so doing, promoted UNFPA work. The critical next step was the circulation of this ‘package’, for if these claims were circulated widely enough it would be possible to gain them sufficient credence to be sustained. Extrapolating from this, it is possible to conceive of the staff members of other international organisations also writing in such a way to infer that what they wish to be true is actually true, thus perpetuating belief in its accomplishment.

This implies that discourse helps to create its own realities. If, for instance, the underlying aim of the partnership section was to validate UNFPA methodology, then this aim was
realised every time an interested party read the brochure without enough knowledge of grassroots circumstances to be aware of the embellishment. Yet we must also consider the distance that most major donors are from these grassroots. Assuming that those in power would be somewhat distanced from the recipients of development interventions (with regard to class, status, physical location), it follows that the discourse would be most easily received at this level. Thus the discourse gains even more power as it is sustained by those in power, further widening the rift between the reflection and the reality.

6.2 Provincial Institutionalisation: Bandung and Outwards

The paradigms underpinning reproductive health work in Indonesia, and how these shaped power relations and avenues for change, have just been examined. This section explores how these paradigms were operationalised through governmental institutions at the level of the provincial bureaucracy. This parallels the analysis in Chapter Four, questioning the ways discourses are mapped onto institutions and their programmes. However, unlike in Chapter Four the focus will be less on programmes and more on the discursive discrepancies and contestations between these various layers of the bureaucracy. Ultimately this seeks to expose the politics of interventions.

The institutional apparatus, that of UNFPA and its coordination with BKKBN, will first be described and analysed briefly, noting the hierarchical and relational nature of its organisation. Then Hobart’s theorisation of ignorance will be used to examine the interrelationships of knowledge, ignorance, and power in project implementation. This will show the need to approach the multiple translations and contradictions at work in the different levels within the BKKBN-UNFPA programmes through the arena model, which can account for contestation. Finally the influence of morality and religion in provincial
government will be addressed, to demonstrate that religion’s intersection with the development project requires study as it comprises a specific arena within which there are competing agendas and paradigms.

### 6.2.1 Institutional Apparatus and Hierarchy

#### 6.2.1a UNFPA and BKKBN Structures: Power Relationships in the Organic Bureaucracy

UNFPA began working in Indonesia in 1971 to aid family planning and to undertake demographic research. Since then it has spent more than $110 million on population projects over five country programme cycles, working with various Indonesian NGOs and government agencies, though primarily through BKKBN. As of 2002, UNFPA coordinated with BKKBN and other Indonesian government branches on four different levels: central oversight (Jakarta), provincial support, district management, and clinic level activities (UNFPA 2001d). In Jakarta it had two locations, the actual UNFPA office in the UN building, headed by the UN Representative, and the NPCU (National Programme Coordinating Unit), which was supposed to have ‘responsibility for the overall country programme’ (UNFPA 2001d: 23). By all accounts, including interview responses and my own observations, the UNFPA office was the real headquarters for their programmes. Beneath this there was a Provincial Programme Management Unit (PPMU) with a Provincial Programme Manager and a finance secretary, both UNFPA staff, coupled with a government counterpart. The next and final level comprised the District Facilitators (DFs) who were meant to collaborate with government employees in the district government headquarters and to ensure that UNFPA programmes were being properly implemented.
Though purportedly a well-structured system, there remained a disjuncture between stated aims and bureaucratic feasibilities within the UNFPA programme. For instance, UNFPA noted that the *Puskesmas* (community health centre) was the actual ‘project implementation unit’, where the service delivery staff would ‘perform many of the key project activities as they try to implement an integrated approach to reproductive health’ (2001d: 24-25). This meant that at the key intersection of bureaucracy and the actual ‘clients’ there was no actual UNFPA presence. Much of the success of UNFPA programmes thus rested on the assumption that these clinic staff would ‘perform many of the key project activities’.

Another example of a contradiction was in UNFPA documents describing the PPMU presence at the provincial level as ‘crucial’ because of diversity necessitating a ‘bottom-up approach addressing different local needs’ (2001d: 24). Yet the recorded population of West Java in 2000 was approximately 32 million people. The expectation that a staff of two was sufficient to ensure a ‘bottom-up approach’ in West Java may be seen as foolishly optimistic or blatantly ignorant.\(^\text{140}\) Indeed, the outgoing Provincial Programme Manager (who resigned in frustration with UNFPA administration) noted that the main problem with the project was its continued use of ‘top down planning’. She also argued that UNFPA programmes continued to be implemented without regard to actual problems and not in response to felt needs (Alam, interview 4 July 2002). Considering that the UNFPA DFs – the final tier of UNFPA staff – were expected to cover districts which comprised up to hundreds of thousands of people, it is unsurprising that determining ‘felt needs’ was an impossibility. These points merely highlight what seems obvious: however good ‘on paper’ a plan of bureaucratic action might be, implementation requires there to be ‘implementers’ who are inevitably distanced from the problems they seek to address.

\(^\text{140}\) The implications of this second perspective will be considered in Section 6.2.2.
Historically, BKKBN had been the primary implementing agency for UNFPA programmes. The defining characteristic of BKKBN’s organisation was the strength and breadth of its hierarchy, as it extended from large office complexes in Jakarta all the way into villages across the islands. BKKBN was ‘structured from centre to periphery, from city to rural areas, with the intention that family-planning education [would] trickle down and outwards’ (Newland 2001: 30). In the cities the highest office was the kodya madya (municipality), while in the rural areas it was the kabupaten (regency). Below this was the family planning fieldwork supervisor, operating at the kecamatan (district) level and overseeing the family planning field workers (called PLKB) who worked at the village level. Volunteers operated below the PLKB at both RT and RW levels (representing village organisation), and were typically under the supervision of health cadres. Describing the family planning efforts of the 1970s through the 1980s, Hartmann noted that the ‘structure of political authority in Indonesia [had] profoundly influenced the organization of family planning services’ (1987: 80). In fact, according to AID, it was this ‘strong hierarchical power structure’ that allowed central authority to ‘produce compliant behaviour all down the administrative line to the individual peasant’ (1979: 33-34). All branches of the government were integrated in BKKBN’s efforts. For instance, even the military in certain cases became directly involved in promoting IUD insertion in order to meet high targets (Hartmann 1987: 80).

The organisation of BKKBN was paradoxical, being both highly structured and highly relational. It can be described as having a hierarchical ‘familial’ structure that resulted in deference to the dominant male, with avoidance of explicit conflict in a seemingly consensus-based approach, much in keeping with Chapter Four’s analysis of the Indonesian bureaucracy. Regarding this structure, from the early days of Suharto’s rule the government assumed the bureaucracy could advance economic growth only through a
highly centralised hierarchical structure of command directly under the regime’s control (Legowo 1999: 81). Up till Suharto’s fall in 1998, BKKBN was a monolith within this bureaucratic framework, integrated through many government departments in order that family planning could be factored into the government’s broader development objectives (Sumbung et al. 1984: 15). While BKKBN was less powerful by 2002 than it was under the New Order, it still maintained a structure with clearly delineated lines of authority. The hierarchy of the family planning programme was suffused with power relationships on all levels while remaining ‘personal’. For instance, it was argued that as the institutional structure extended to the villages it created the possibility for certain local leaders to ‘gain another source of leverage’ (Hartmann 1987: 83). Many studies confirmed the critical role of village leaders in the programme (Warwick 1986: 464). Within this decidedly ordered framework, BKKBN displayed a modus operandi based on a network of interpersonal relationships with ritualised patterns of deference, reflecting in particular the patron-client dynamic that permeated Indonesian relationships (Newland 2001: 30). This resonates with the description of the bureaucratic institutions in Chapter Four as ‘organic’ and relational, and has clear implications for how ‘business is done’.

6.2.2 Ignorance and Power in Programme Implementation

6.2.2a The Role of Ignorance

In researching programme implementation in West Java, the incongruence between rhetoric and reality became evident. Though change was occurring it did not always take the

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141 For instance, anthropological research in East Java ‘showed that community response to the family planning program was greatly affected by the degree of residents’ deference to the hamlet head’ (Warwick 1986: 465). Interestingly, as village leaders were always male, it can be argued that the ‘rules of the game’ for family planning were held in male hands.

142 Admittedly, it is difficult to separate these two as reality has phenomenological interpretations understood through language and rhetoric. However, I use this distinction in the simplest of senses to describe the
direction intended. The closer one was to the centre, the more of the new human rights
discourse one would hear, but the farther away one travelled, the less of this there was.
This led many upper-level bureaucrats to discuss the problem of needing to ‘socialise’ the
UNFPA programme down to each administrative level. In Jakarta, a typical comment from
the UNFPA Representative was whether or not the level under discussion had received the
project documents. In one instance, I was sent to monitor the West Java Provincial
Management Unit (PMU) to ensure that the new Provincial Manager had received all of
these documents, was familiar with them, and knew how to use them properly. Stress was
placed on disseminating the discourse even though inculcation of this discourse in action
seemed to be lacking. Programme goals were thus achieved if people came to know the
programme paradigms – if, for example, they began speaking the new ‘lingo’ of
empowerment, something problematised earlier as ‘sloganising’ or ‘devspeak’. This
process of coming to know something, Hobart claims, is ‘an act which involves work as
part of one’s relationships with others’ (1993: 21). However, with regard to UNFPA work
knowledge was not regarded as relational so much as unidirectional, with UNFPA and
BKKBN staff in charge of its transmission.

To question why there was a unidirectional flow of information transmission, and how this
contributed to incongruence between stated objectives and actual outcomes, we consider
the role of ignorance. Quarles van Ufford argues that within development programmes
there is an ‘inherent ambiguity, an inescapable contradiction’ between the interests of those
who set the projects in motion, particularly Western donor agencies, and those on the
receiving end of said projects (1993: 142). However, these ambiguities are contained or
overcome by

difference between lofty visions of ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’, etc and the continued trend of bureaucrats
simply telling villagers what they need to do.
segmenting the different levels of organization. This compartmentalization consists of a careful balancing of knowledge as well as ignorance by the various parties involved; and it is this which makes the coexistence of multiple, and often contradictory, bodies of knowledge possible (van Ufford 1993: 142).

The concept of ignorance is important, for it does not merely describe a void but rather an active re-ordering of representations and judgements. Hobart notes that as ‘systematic knowledge grows, so does the possibility of ignorance. Ignorance, however, is not a simple antithesis of knowledge. It is a state which people attribute to others and is laden with moral judgement’ (1993: 1). For instance, just as the Jakarta office discussed how the problem was provincial bureaucrats’ not ‘being familiar’ enough with project documents, much bureaucratic discourse (particularly on the UNFPA side) was replete with the assumption that the majority of the people were ‘ignorant’ and needed only to be given the ‘right information’.

Yet Hobart takes this a step further, arguing that instead of merely being the effect of compartmentalisation, ignorance may be ‘used actively as a means of ignoring what others say and do’ (1993: 16). He suggests ‘resurrecting the old English word “obliviate”, which implies an active ignoring of such representations [of resistance or denial] and the prosecution of one’s own point of view’ (ibid). Many examples of this ‘active ignoring’ were present throughout the time I worked at UNFPA headquarters. These could be grouped in two categories: what might be termed ‘turning a deaf ear’ and ‘passive listening’. In the first instance, information was completely blocked out as in the reporting I did on desa Surabaya in Garut. At a gathering in the Limbangan health centre, the village head argued that the primary needs of his community were those of communication and transportation infrastructure without which any projects faced major obstacles (FGD 29 August 2002). In fact, this expressed need for improvements in very basic infrastructure was common across many villages and in a variety of settings, but when this was presented
in a report to UNFPA staff it evoked no reaction and was summarily dismissed. In the second case, information was received and yet relegated to inactivity, making no difference to the way things are run. For example, when all the District Facilitators for West Java were gathered for a meeting, the top complaint from each one was the manner in which funds were disbursed late in each fiscal quarter, resulting in project failure and budgeting crises (PPCU and DPCU meeting 28 August 2002). When the scope of the problem was conveyed to the UNFPA office, programme officers made it clear that they were fully aware of the situation and yet were not going to do anything about it. The line between these two ‘methods of ignoring’ is admittedly blurred, yet it is clear there is some spectrum across which those in charge of programme operations use ignorance strategically.

As ignorance and knowledge are inextricably linked, it can be argued that basic assumptions about knowledge are tied to patterns of ignorance. We might consider, for instance, the push to socialise Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) programmes in BKKBN and UNFPA work. IEC was defined by UNFPA as ‘a comprehensive programming intervention – an integral part of a country development programme, which aims at achieving or consolidating behaviour or attitude changes in designated audiences’ (Cohen 1994: 3, emphasis in the original). These attitude/behavioural changes were expected to be elicited through the successful transmission of information. If IEC failed, the problem was perceived to have been not using the ‘right techniques’ (Mamdani 1972: 40). The information itself was unquestioned, because it was conceptualised within these programmes as ‘a model of knowledge as communicable propositions’ wherein rationality and interpretations were shared (Hobart 1993: 11). Therefore, the programme operated by assuming that content was communicable and the method of transmission compatible. For example, at Puskesmas Manonjaya in
Tasikmalaya, one doctor commented that the number of men using contraceptives was still very low, but that the problem could be solved simply by using ‘KIE ke stakeholders-nya’ (‘IEC to the stakeholders’) (FGD 30 August 2002). The assumption here and in other such cases was that project goals need only to be ‘targeted’ through the proper IEC approach. This is in striking contrast to Hobart’s notion of understanding, ‘which is inevitably always imperfect, dialectical and critical’ (1993: 11). Thus information tended to be used instrumentally for the purposes of those in charge of the programme.

6.2.2b The Question of Power

If both the transmission and ‘ignorance’ of information are integral elements of the relationships permeating UNFPA and BKKBN bureaucratic structures, a logical question is why this is so. It has been argued that knowledge and ignorance are mutually-constituted. But what ends – or perhaps more explicitly, whose ends – does this serve? As van Ufford notes, ‘we must try to understand the part played by knowledge and ignorance in the struggle for power between the various interdependent, yet relatively autonomous groups of participants’ (1993: 141). His point is that ignorance is an ‘important asset’ for those in development policy-making. In fact ‘lack of insight into what is actually going on in the “implementation” process […] becomes of paramount importance’ (van Ufford 1993: 157). This, therefore, is the link between ignorance and power: ignorance typically serves the ends of those with the power to direct policy, who are adept at ensuring project perpetuation (and thereby job perpetuation) without necessarily ensuring that the project is implemented as intended. For UNFPA work, needing to know what happened locally as well as needing to remain ignorant of it was inextricably connected. The projects’ survival depended on ‘maintaining – or creating – sufficient ignorance about what was happening locally’ (ibid: 138). To analyse the relationship between ignorance and power, we will
follow van Ufford’s model and address two social fields ‘(1) the relations between the project officers and the local population, and (2) the relations of the project staff with the sponsoring agencies who have authority over funding and the continuation of the programme’ (1993: 137).

The first social field, in which problems of constituting knowledge and ignorance can be discussed, includes the relations between project officers and the local population. Scholars have noted the ‘paternalism, status consciousness, high centralisation and low initiative and autonomy’ of the Indonesian bureaucracy (Legowo 1999: 90). Yet it is not simply a question of a dominant bureaucracy, for Indonesian attitudes toward government officialdom and other powerful figures have tended to stress respect and deference (Legowo 1999: 89), compounding the power dynamic of ‘uppers’ and ‘lowers’ (Chambers 1984). There are also differences in coordination among the various bureaucratic levels, much like those explored in Chapter Four. In describing provincial coordination the Bandung District Facilitator noted the problem of ‘ego sektor’ (sectoral ego), with a general lack of cooperative integration (Yenni, interview 10 July 2002). A Department of Health official from Garut noted that ‘koordinasi di lapangan sudah enak’ (coordination on the field was already good), whereas the coordination from offices to the field was problematic (Faridz, interview 29 August 2002). His comments, like others’, reflected the common perception that physical distance played a role in how easy it was to coordinate efforts. Even at the most intimate level of the bureaucracy, however, that of the kader (cadres), bidan (midwives) and PLKB (BKKBN fieldworker), there seemed to be a trend toward ‘transmitting’ knowledge rather than engaging in dialogue with the local population. One of the kaders for desa Kalimanggis in Tasikmalaya, when discussing her strategies for reaching the adolescent population, noted that she would link information on sexually-
transmitted infections with already present social gatherings in order to ‘terjun ke lapangan’ – to ‘dive/enter into the field’ (FGD, 30 August 2002). The kaders and bidans in this FGD were in agreement: their mission was simply to ‘reach the people’; there was no talk of listening to them.

To study the second social field, that of the relationship between the project staff (BKKBN) and the sponsoring agency (UNFPA), we consider the issue of agenda-setting. For even where ‘planning from above’ was rejected in favour of a ‘bottom-up approach’, this did not necessarily change matters since the terms of the debate and the parameters for action were still defined by ‘superiors’ (Hobart 1993: 15-16). On a larger scale, Smyth notes the possibility ‘that the population establishment can use dialogues as a way to “engineer consent” around specific activities, thus silencing oppositional voices’ (1998: 232). This is due to general power imbalances between those who call the meetings and set the agenda, and those who are ‘consulted’ by the population establishment, such as women’s groups, NGOs, health workers, and others. Put most dramatically, there are fears that ‘dialogues and co-operation are fraught with dangers of co-option, of marginalisation and of trivialisation of women’s issues’ (Smyth 1998: 233). More specifically for UNFPA, its programmes were built around the logical framework matrix (the ‘log-frame’ mentioned previously). The log-frame was meant to drive how project officers worked. They were given the project documents, ‘socialised’ into how to use the log-frame, and then expected to use it as the primary tool guiding their actions. However, this meant that a rigid structure was being enforced from above, both of described problems and for prescribed solutions.

In both of these social fields – noted to be ‘antagonistically interrelated’ (van Ufford 1993: 137) – the delineation of problems and solutions was often misleadingly presented as a
consensus. Smyth notes that one ‘danger of the institutionalisation of women’s issues has been their removal from the domain of struggle, to one where technical solutions can be negotiated leaving basic social relations unchanged’ (1998: 232). It is precisely this abrogation of struggle, of difference, of conflicting interpretations, which marked the dominant narrative. Yet the process of defining problems and solutions inevitably was one of conflict and difference. For example, the UNFPA District Facilitator for Tasikmalaya commented that there was ‘no unified perception at the top level’, with different information transmitted down various departmental lines that were ‘not in sync’ (Desi, interview 12 July 2002). BKKBN’s national Director of Adolescent RH and Reproductive Rights claimed there had been ‘struggling’ over preparation of project documents; although there were UNFPA/BKKBN discussions of the relevant issues, in the end UNFPA staff wrote up the documents and set the budget according to their own agenda (Hasmi, interview 22 August 2002). This agenda-setting imbalance was further perpetuated through budgetary and transparency differences: though UNFPA required BKKBN to report all their expenditures to them in detail, they did not share their own financial records.

While some explanation for this imbalance may come from institutional arrangements, it was clear that attitudes also played a role. For example, in a private meeting, the UN Representative quoted a saying from the era of British colonial rule in India: that ‘three British overseers’ were required ‘for every working Indian’. Because of this, he said, he needed to scrutinise the work of those underneath him lest it be incorrect or of poor quality. His comment, and others like it, exposed underlying racialised notions, much like those critiqued by Paulette Goudge (2003). Goudge studied well-intentioned development practitioners to analyse the unacknowledged and sometimes unconscious assumptions of Western superiority, finding echoes in their words of colonial and imperial eras. These
implicit and racialised assumptions, she argues, are central to the maintenance of ‘the whole structure of global inequality’ (Goudge 2003: 8). Whether or not her arguments are applied at this level, concepts of superiority and inferiority infused perceptions in many cases. A general lack of trust permeated many of UNFPA’s interactions with Indonesian government institutions, generating conflict and misperceptions. Understanding this interaction, as well as that of the Indonesian bureaucracy with the local population, requires a careful look at the contending voices and contradictory perceptions therein. A useful tool of analysis is therefore the arena model, conceptualising the policy process not as an integrated whole but as multiple negotiations between participants that are inherently problematic (Quarles van Ufford 1993: 139).

**6.2.3 Islam and Morality in Provincial Bureaucracy**

It has been shown that contestation occurred through BKKBN and UNFPA hierarchies, marked by relationships of power and ignorance in programme implementation. The arena model is useful to account for such contestation. Here we will look at one particular arena: the intersection of Islamic norms and the UNFPA reproductive health agenda. Although the debate surrounding religion and power cannot be addressed fully, we explore the role religion played at various levels of programme bureaucracy. An important caveat remains: in analysing the relationship between Islam (or other socio-cultural norms) and UNFPA objectives, it is overly simplistic to view religion or ‘culture’ as mere ‘obstacles’ to change. Nor should UNFPA be criticised for promoting programmes that may be unsettling for more ‘traditional’ approaches. Instead, we should avoid dichotomised ways of thinking that view one side as a promoter of change and the other side as an obstacle to change. It is in the intersection of these competing agendas and paradigms that change occurs. Arenas are therefore important to study, questioning relations of power.
The Indonesian state’s family planning efforts have been kept under an Islamic veneer, replete with all its terminology. It has been argued that the government’s regulatory efforts came to be ‘articulated with a vocabulary supplied by Islam’ (Cammack 1997: 168). This expropriation of Islamic vocabulary could be seen in all RH-related bureaucratic proceedings in which I participated in West Java. Every mid-level bureaucrat (i.e. excluding those in Jakarta and in the villages) that I observed would open their speeches with the formulaic greeting ‘Assalam-u-alaikum wa rahmatullahi wabarakatuh’, to which everyone would intone in response ‘Wa-alaikum-us-Salam’. Though the individual act was not necessarily significant, the ritualising of religious phrases situated bureaucratic action within religious discourses. It was never long before the question of morality came up in such settings. For instance, although specifically entitled ‘Reproductive Health’, a 2002 seminar held for the entire Bandung municipality spent more than two hours out of three on issues of personal and public morality. Every speaker cited religion on more than one occasion, yet never only as a reference but always in such a way so as to give it causal significance. For example, the head of the proceedings noted that although he did not want to criticise the practice of women ‘choosing to work and limiting their number of child-bearing years’, as a doctor and a religious man he felt that this was ‘a problem’. Similarly, the BKKBN Director for Kabupaten Bandung noted that the primary need related to RH was that of adolescent reproductive health insofar as it was a ‘moral issue’ (interview 11 July 2002). In short, morality and religion comprised integral parts of the bureaucracy’s reproductive health discourses.

On the level of the village and the local health centres, religion continued to affect reproductive health behaviour. We consider two examples, that of contraceptive choice and
early marriage. In West Java, where the Sundanese are the predominant ethnic group, Islam is strong and people take the religion seriously (Hull et al. 1977; cf. Lerman et al. 1989: 33). In terms of contraceptive choice, orthodox Muslims traditionally shied away from using IUDs, ‘because of the intimate physical contact between medical personnel and clients’ (Lerman et al. 1989: 33). The study of Lerman et al. (1989) found that in areas predominantly Islamic and least developed, there was a tendency to use the pill most often, and the IUD, condoms, and other ‘modern’ methods least. More than ten years later, I found similar trends in the different health centres I visited. At Puskesmas Kumisangan in Garut, health workers noted that those who will not use the IUD fall generally into two groups: ‘ada yang takut’ (there is fear), and ‘engga boleh’ (not allowed) (FGD 29 August 2002). They estimated that 30 to 40 percent of those who chose not to use the IUD did so out of embarrassment (‘rasa malu’) or because their husbands would not allow them for religious reasons. Similarly, vasectomies were ‘haram’ (forbidden), as an Islamic fatwa had been issued prohibiting vasectomy. With regard to marriage, West Java continued to show higher incidences of early marriage, reflecting the claim that in strong Islamic areas it was preferred for girls to be married quite young (Blackburn and Bessell 1997: 133-134; cf. Taj 1990: 56). Though the official position of Islamic groups changed to accept the desirability of later marriage for girls (Blackburn and Bessell 1997: 141), much anecdotal evidence from focus group discussions and interviews in several towns across West Java suggested that early marriage remained common. In other words, even while there may have been discursive shifts on the question of early marriage, the tangible effects of such a shift were still contested.

Out of the broader arena where UNFPA projects intersected religious paradigms, two other cases can be examined. These highlight the differential workings of power, as well as the
ways in which explicit programmatic interventions interact with underlying social structures in complex ways. First, UNFPA’s advocacy projects included the targeting of religious leaders to develop advocacy messages on topics including the ‘prevention of violence against women in the context of Islam’ (2001f: 8). This ‘context’ required a measure of sensitivity. Though a debated issue, the Qur’an does permit husbands to hit wayward wives as a third and final resort (although only lightly and not on the face) provided they have admonished them first and refused to share their beds second (Surah 4:34; cf. Chaudhry 1997: 7-18). Different reactions to this marked all levels of the programme. Most government bureaucrats in Jakarta and Bandung evidenced a general disapproval of any forms of violence against women. However, of the village level interviews, a number responded that husbands were perfectly within their rights to beat their wives so long as it was done with the intent to instruct and discipline and not in anger, assuming that the wife had been ‘nakal’ (misbehaving).

Second, through the regular distribution of advocacy materials UNFPA hoped to influence Muslim imams (religious leaders) to discuss in religious settings ‘selected issues of reproductive health with special emphasis on adolescent reproductive health [and] gender’ (2001f: 8). Yet both gender and adolescent reproductive health (ARH) remained contested issues where Islamic and social norms were strongly felt, as noted in Chapter Five. For instance, UNFPA’s ARH programme offered the youth community something akin to sexual education, in particular counselling them on the dangers of HIV and other sexually-transmitted infections. In interviews ranging from the PPMU to various government offices to clinic staff, however, concern was expressed that the ulama (religious teachers) and parents would view this sex education as encouraging youth to be sexually active. One kader at a Tasikmalaya health centre said that she was hesitant to pass on the IEC
information from BKKBN for teenagers, as she was afraid the youth would use the information to ‘do bad things’. For instance, because kissing was not listed as a way to contract AIDS she was afraid kids would ‘coba cium-ciuman’ (try kissing) (FGD Puskesmas Cisayong 31 August 2002).

6.3 A Tale of Two Desa: Discourses of Gender and Change

We have considered some of the broader discourses involved in UNFPA programmes in Indonesia, as they relate to the Indonesian government and BKKBN in particular (6.1) as well as to programmatic functioning in West Java (6.2). Now we turn to a more intimate level of analysis, that of the Sundanese women and men targeted by UNFPA work, to consider how UNFPA’s prevailing discourse is either contested or appropriated ‘on the ground’.143 We problematised how this functions in the current MOWE programmes across Indonesia. Chapter Five in particular examined this ‘level’, where it was argued that gender is irreducibly complex – embedded in a host of social relationships, in a perpetual process of construction, and tied to physical bodies – and therefore attempts to change gender roles are necessarily problematic.

In this case study we examine the underlying gender assumptions of the UNFPA intervention and the reaction it evoked. This section will develop in two stages. After addressing sample and method, we start by analysing interview responses on reproductive health. Here it will be shown that maintaining the assumption of dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ practices and beliefs – a simplification required by organisations

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143 However, these considerations are limited to how paradigms of gender and reproductive health are understood by those interviewed. Chandra Mohanty has pointed out that agency is ‘figured in the minute, day-to-day practices and struggles of third world women’ (quoted in Sears 1996: 28); I am arguing that agency is also figured in the comprehension and words of these women. In other words, as with the other portions of this thesis, I am consistently emphasising what people say, focusing on their representations of their realities instead of describing what I think this ‘reality’ might be.
such as UNFPA in order to function – is tenuous at best. What occurs at the local level is more nuanced, as distinctions between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ are in fact blurred. Second, we analyse responses related to gender roles and sex, in order to emphasise the overly-simplistic contrast between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ conceptions of gender roles, the differing model of change each vision offers, and how these models of change are being appropriated and contested at the local level. Many of these responses parallel findings in Chapter Five, particularly related to the ways people react to modernising progress.

6.3.1 Sample and Method

In 2002, forty women and men were interviewed in two villages: desa Sukajaya in Kabupaten Bandung, and desa Cisayong in Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. In each village sample, six husband-and-wife pairs and eight individual women were interviewed. Respondents were selected from different generational and economic groups, with the sample including respondents ranging in age range from 17 to 70, grouped generally in low-, middle-, and high-income groups. Two research assistants under my close supervision conducted these interviews. Interview question categories were selected to match the components of the UNFPA programme; for example, one such component was Adolescent Reproductive Health (ARH), thus a series of questions were related to adolescents. Sukajaya lies in the Lembang hills, just on the outskirts of Bandung, where many of its residents are agro-pastoralists. Cisayong is more than an hour outside of Tasikmalaya, a city of around one million said to be strongly Islamic in comparison to other parts of West Java. With respect to the surrounding area, Cisayong is a relatively wealthier village. The methodology appendix discusses these research techniques further.

144 Unlike in Chapter Five, the respondents’ data is not included in an appendix, nor are they cited by number. This was due simply to the dataset being analysed as a smaller unit and at an earlier date.
These locations were selected as they were villages ‘targeted’ by UNFPA interventions. It is relevant to consider, however, the degree of UNFPA ‘presence’ in these places. UNFPA only worked in a very limited number of villages – 16 in West Java by 2002 – claiming that limited resources forced them to be selective with regard to choice of locales. Selection of these locales was related purportedly to higher incidences of events UNFPA worked to mitigate, such as maternal and infant mortality rates, violence against women, HIV/AIDS, substantial youth populations, etc. Yet with regard to on-the-ground implementation, it was primarily BKKBN fieldworkers (the PLKBs) and Puskesmas (health clinic) workers expected to convey the UNFPA programmes’ relevant points. This reflects patterns described earlier: there was removal between the project ‘directors’ at the top levels, and those who did the work ‘on the ground’. Often for an entire village, the burden of communicating the ‘new paradigm’ of reproductive health fell upon the PLKB’s shoulders.145

6.3.2 Discourses of Reproductive Health in the Village: Imbrications of ‘Modern’ and ‘Traditional’

To ‘unpack’ the interviews of the proposed beneficiaries of the UNFPA programme, first we consider nuances in their conceptions of reproductive health (RH). The argument is that these understandings cannot be disembedded from their context, nor different elements disaggregated from each other. However, this is precisely what UNFPA projects assumed was possible: that society could be led to change very specific practices in isolation from the broader social fabric in which they existed. UNFPA’s vision of change ostensibly

145 For instance, the PLKB for Sukajaya had the responsibility of organising monthly ‘socialisation’ meetings with the women and men of the village. After working with her and watched her run one such meeting in 2002, it was clear that her personal energy in social interaction was vital to programme operation. She noted that she had no teaching tools and no reading materials, yet was expected to pass along the information she received from her superiors to the women in her area through regular house visits and community gatherings.
involved a shift from ‘traditional’ perspectives on reproductive health to increasingly ‘modern’ ones. We will examine how the interview respondents conceived of and acted out reproductive health, arguing that the distinction between elements of tradition and modernity within these responses is more complex than cursory examination would maintain, and that these views and actions need to be understood in light of wider social relations. I do not propose to draw quantitatively substantiated conclusions related to RH. Rather, it is precisely as project planners rely on such conclusions being drawn that they disregard the embeddedness of knowledge and practices in highly interwoven social fabric. Further, by remaining blind to this fabric they may promote plans for change which have unintended effects.

We begin by examining how the concept of ‘reproductive health’ was received at the local level. What we see is the ‘newness’ of the term, the extent to which it was appropriated or modified, and how – if at all – it affected practice. A series of questions sought to assess familiarity with the term. People tended to be more familiar with the long-existing concept of KB, which encompasses both contraceptives and family planning. Of the respondents only 37.5% claimed to have heard of RH – ‘kespro’ (the shortened version of kesehatan reproduksi, viz. reproductive health) – twice as many in Sukajaya than in Cisayong. Most had heard of RH from personal contact with health workers. Some were daunted by unfamiliarity with the term and reticent to suggest a definition. Only when assured there were no right or wrong answers did some venture to define what they

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146 KB literally stands for Keluarga Berencana, or ‘Family Planning’. Yet KB is conflated with contraceptives such that it can mean both family planning and the actual contraceptives themselves; hence someone would both ‘practice’ KB (family planning) as well as ‘use’ KB (contraceptives).

147 Questionable, however, is the extent or depth of this knowledge. For instance, one male respondent claimed to have enough information about KB and RH, yet soon thereafter began to ask very basic questions about what options were available for KB, finally admitting that he knew very little of what family planning actually entailed or the choices offered of contraceptives.

148 This contrast between the two villages was explained by the UNFPA District Facilitators as the length of time the programmes had been in place. RH interventions in Cisayong had only been in place for several months, explaining the limited dissemination of information.
thought could be classified as RH. The two general replies were consistently that RH had to do with the health of ‘pregnant women’ and with contraceptives. Nearly two-thirds of respondents indicated they wanted to learn more about reproductive health. Many were curious to know what was entailed by the term ‘kespro’; others listed more tangible areas about which they would like greater knowledge, such as the effects of different contraceptives or what steps to take in health emergencies. The majority indicated a preference to receive this information from a health professional, typically in a personal meeting with the bidan, the kader, or another health official. A possible explanation for this stems from what has been described as a culture built around patron-client relations, with established systems of deference to and learning from authority figures (explored in Chapter Four).

Having considered the extent to which the RH discourse was received, next we analyse perspectives of pregnancy – maybe the primary ‘practice’ of reproductive health – within their broader context. Interestingly, of the responses that described care during pregnancy, the dominant theme that emerged stressed the prohibitions on pregnant women. These prohibitions excluded the following things: sitting in doorways or on windowsills, leaving the house after magrib (the final call to prayer marking sundown), wearing cloths or towels around the neck, letting the hair hang loose (‘it must be pinned up’), carrying heavy objects, and eating fruits such as pineapple and salak. The women interviewed were also told to do things such as eat off smaller plates, take various natural herbal drinks, eat healthy foods and get a lot of rest, sit with their feet crossed, and drink milk and the juice of young coconuts. One respondent listed a number of prohibitions from her husband, such as not bathing during the middle of the day, not looking for lice on anyone’s head, and not

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149 In only five instances were women not forbidden anything.
loosening her hair, and then said that she did these things during her pregnancy because of ‘khawatir terjadi sesuatu bila tidak dituruti’ (fear that something would happen if they were not obeyed). Interestingly, the only couple to say they saw these general prohibitions as ‘not making sense’ noted they would not follow them as religion forbids the things that ‘berbau syirik’ (suggest an element of polytheism).

To understand these prohibitions, we must first situate them within wider belief systems, looking at respondents’ perceptions of what it means to be healthy. Much as Lansing’s (1987) research demonstrated that Balinese cosmological-religious beliefs ordered rice cultivation and the selection of agricultural technologies, so too can it be argued that Sundanese cosmology orders understandings and practices of health. Many simply noted that health means being ‘not sick’, yet the words frequently employed were ‘segar’ (fresh) and ‘bersih’ (clean). Of those in the more fundamentalist Cisayong, ten used the phrase ‘sehat jasmani dan rohani’ (healthy in body and spirit) – a term coming from Islamic teachings – whereas only one from Sukajaya said the same. When asked what elements of daily life are most important to individual health, ‘kebersihan’ (cleanliness) was one of the most common answers, along with eating nutritious food. One respondent from Cisayong replied that to be healthy one must ‘wake up early’ and ‘ikut pengajian’ (follow the Qur’ânic teachings, usually held at the local mosque).

We can consider these recommendations from the viewpoint of religion and Sundanese cultural norms. For Muslims, ritualised ablutions are necessary before each five-times daily prayer time and there are prohibitions with regard to personal cleanliness (for instance, bodily fluids are perceived as unclean, women are meant to shower after sex and avoid prayers while menstruating, certain foods are forbidden on a halal diet).
Furthermore, it is a norm among the Sundanese to shower twice daily, in the morning and just before *magrib*. Personal cleanliness is both inscribed in social and religious customs; its correlation with a state of health is unsurprising. Interesting to note is the difference in tone between this ‘wider umbrella’ for RH and that of UNFPA. Whereas UNFPA’s broader conception of RH included aspects such as women’s empowerment and human rights, the Cisayong and Sukajaya respondents painted a portrait of health involving spiritual overtones.

Assuming this interrelatedness of Sundanese cosmology and understandings of health, we return to evaluating the pregnancy prohibitions. Most of these could be labelled by Western rationality as ‘traditional’ or even ‘irrational’ beliefs. Yet we must consider them from two vantage points. First, the ways in which the respondents were comfortable with these beliefs challenges the notion in dichotomised development planning thinking that ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ are exclusive categories. Instead, the traditional and modern are tied to bigger cosmological paradigms.\(^{150}\) These worldviews, however, are rarely perceived as contradictory by those who hold them. In this case, as women followed the recommendations given them and experienced no complications, this ‘proved’ their effectiveness.\(^{151}\) We recall the one couple that described the prohibitions as ‘*berbau syirik*’. They viewed what may be termed Sundanese folk beliefs as being in contention with their Islamic faith. In contrast, we consider one woman’s claim that during her pregnancy, as instructed, she always carried the leaf of a particular tree and garlic cloves when she walked alone at night. This same woman had one of the higher levels of education among the respondents (up to but not including university) and by all other

\(^{150}\) As June Nash concluded from her research in Bolivia, ‘indigenous thought is capable of entertaining coexistant and apparently contradictory worldviews’ (1979: 122).

\(^{151}\) Evans-Pritchard (1976) argues similarly for the Azande, demonstrating that their magical beliefs formed an intellectually coherent system with each set of rites and actions ‘proved’ by others.
appearances seemed ‘modern’ in her thinking; the daughter of the local ulama, she wore the jilbab and said her faith was central to her life. For her, as with other respondents, no such contradiction between ‘folk beliefs’ and ‘religious rationality’ existed: cultural and religious identities proved fluid categories that could be maintained concomitantly.

A second way to analyse these prohibitions questions their place within hierarchical social relations. In other words, what is banned is not as significant as who is in position to make prohibitions. As has been noted, we do not deny the role of culture in informing action, but need ‘to understand more precisely how cultural forms work to mediate social relationships among particular populations’ (Wolf 1997: 19). In every case prohibitions came from parents, parents-in-law, and/or the pregnant woman’s husband. Of those who explained why they followed particular recommendations, the only reason offered was ‘fear of something happening’ if they were not kept. There was no evidence of coercion or the intent to wield power by those telling the women what needed to be avoided or done. This is not an argument for an intentional exercise of power by the older generations over the younger, or husbands over their wives. It is, however, an argument for the impossibility of comprehending these patterns out of context. It also points to power whose exercise is so subtle that people modify behaviour without feeling overt compulsion, much like Lukes’ ‘third dimension of power’ (2005: 25-29). Any dismissal of these pregnancy-related beliefs as ‘traditional’, needing to be replaced by modern conceptions of reproductive health practices, disregards the social relationships in which they exist. In fact, it could be argued that changing these beliefs might undermine the deference afforded older generations as bearers of more ‘traditional’, or ‘folk’, knowledge.
6.3.3 Gender Roles, Sex, and the ‘Threat’ of Change

It has now been shown that reproductive health perceptions and practices cannot be disembedded from their wider social context, nor do they exist in simple ‘traditional versus modern’ dichotomies. Interventions which fail to recognise this complexity may have unintended or problematic effects. Now we turn to question understandings of gender roles and sexual practice, along with both descriptive and prescriptive explications of the changes taking place in these areas. We will explore these areas by analysing the underpinning assumptions of UNFPA work and the reactions these incurred on several fronts: the gender roles described by the respondents, perceptions of sex (examining in particular the relationship of changing sexual practice to HIV/AIDS, abortion, and youth), and finally the respondents’ vision of change.

First, we consider the tensions between changes to gender roles in the ‘public sphere’ and the reassertion of gender roles in the ‘private sphere’, which parallels Chapter Five’s analysis. UNFPA intervention in West Java was directed at the public sphere, aiming explicitly to expand the range of reproductive health choices available to women. Given RH’s increasingly broad definition, as well as emphasis on empowerment and human rights, UNFPA efforts assumed that changes had to occur to improve the status of women. Underlying UNFPA’s more explicit goals, therefore, was the need to influence a paradigm shift toward more ‘modern’ understandings of gender roles. This paradigm shift necessarily included changes in the private sphere. If we consider this ‘private sphere’, the portrait given by respondents correlates to what may be termed ‘traditional gender roles’. Though we have just critiqued the category of ‘traditional’ as failing to communicate the complexities and paradoxes existing in social understandings, most of the available literature would ascribe certain basic attributes to more ‘traditional’ gender relations. In
Sukajaya and Cisayong, a number of these characteristics were iterated: women worked within the home while men worked outside it to provide for the family, women were the primary care-givers for the children (responsible for their physical and moral well-being), and men were the heads of households with whom the ultimate authority rested.

More specifically, UNFPA aimed to expand women’s opportunities in employment and education (among other things) through empowerment (2002: 4). Without suggesting that this widening of opportunity was not positive for women, there remained the complication of achieving these ends. When asked what they thought of more and more Indonesian women receiving educations and entering the work force, most respondents were either ambivalent or negative. Only six expressed unequivocally that this was a positive change, while ten expressed the opposite statement. One 20-year-old woman was very direct: ‘The woman’s place is in the kitchen – higher education and a job, these won’t be brought into the hereafter’. Interestingly, the implication of such a perspective was that although religious rewards would not be bestowed upon women for achieving such things as education or jobs, women would be rewarded in the afterlife for fulfilling their roles in the home. Regarding what changes the respondents would like to see for women in the future, only five mentioned better education or employment. The rest wanted either no change at all or a return to more ‘traditional’ gender roles. For example, they emphasised the need for women to dress more modestly (‘they should not wear mini-skirts’), to put their families first, to obey their husbands, to ‘know herself that she is a woman’ and to ‘know how to act as a wife’. Underlying this was the assumption of the woman as the guardian of social morality. UNFPA’s overarching goal of ‘empowering’ women, which necessarily affects gender roles, thus challenges this understanding.
Next, it is important to address how perceptions of sex affected an intervention that was ultimately ‘gendered’, and therefore linked to bodies and sex. An implicit assumption within UNFPA related to the level at which its programmes ultimately operated. By speaking a language of empowerment and human rights with regard to reproductive health, the discourse, in effect, became a ‘sterile’ discussion of what was in fact a highly intimate set of bodily practices. But even as the discourse of the population establishment linked ‘sexual and reproductive freedom to women’s human rights’ (Petchesky 1998: 3), the transition to greater ‘sexual freedom’ was perceived negatively. These harmful consequences were discussed throughout the interview responses related to sex. Overall, respondents pointed to the increase in ‘pergaulan bebas’ (free sex) against the backdrop of a shifting moral landscape. As with questions of sex in Chapter Five, respondents declared sex as no longer taboo for discussion, though many said they were ‘malu’ (embarrassed) to describe social perceptions of sex, as it was still ‘not proper’ to discuss.

The respondents tended to display a distancing mechanism whereby they were able to discuss sex as something that ‘other people’ were doing, usually ‘in the city’, so long as it did not impinge upon themselves or their local community. This was evident in the responses related to increases in cases of HIV/AIDS and abortion. Defining HIV/AIDS, as well as offering ways of avoiding the disease, most respondents spoke with a tone of judgement. For instance, the largest number of responses to the question ‘what is HIV/AIDS?’ referred to loose morals and free sex; one woman commented that HIV/AIDS was the ‘penyakit akibat perbuatan nakal’ (illness resulting from ‘naughty’ or ‘mischievous’ action). Similarly for the issue of abortion, in virtually all cases respondents classified it as either forbidden or a sin. Three central reasons were offered to explain the increase in abortions: the rise in free sex (and changing between sexual partners),
pregnancy outside of marriage, and a general lack of a sense of responsibility. Interestingly, one respondent said in Sundanese ‘atos jamanna meureun’, to the effect of ‘I suppose it is just the age’, demonstrating a sense of helplessness that permeated many of the responses seeking to explain why particular changes were occurring.

Like this particular response, many of the interviews were imbued with comments related to a changing moral environment. The respondents’ vision of change was therefore the third area where there were clear tensions between overt programmatic objectives and implicit social norms. Some of these changes could be linked to the guiding assumptions of UNFPA work, even though UNFPA did not explicitly seek to bring about such transformation, nor could it have done so through its efforts alone. Rather, certain aspects of UNFPA’s vision of change lent themselves to misinterpretation, at best, and problematic social outcomes, at worst. We see this most clearly with regards to the youth population, the target of UNFPA’s adolescent reproductive health programme. UNFPA claimed to promote safe and responsible behaviour among the adolescent population through providing them with ‘full and accurate information regarding reproductive health’ (2002: 7). It was assumed that the adolescents would exercise a certain degree of autonomy in assessing this information and making decisions. However, virtually all respondents criticised this freedom most heavily, noting that adolescents were ‘terlalu bebas’ (too free). Without exception, they said that young people were having sex ‘more than they should’ (pointing to increased cases of pregnancy outside of wedlock) and linked this to greater access to TV and video CDs, lack of religious faith, and a ‘change in the era’. When explaining in more general terms how Indonesian youth were changing, respondents emphasised how information had been transforming sexual practice by emboldening youth. For example, one respondent stated that ‘teenagers before were afraid because they didn’t
know anything about sex; teenagers today have no such fear’. Furthermore, when asked what changes they would like to see for youth, the majority of respondents called for limitations to be placed on their freedom, whereas only one noted that youth needed better sex education.

6.4 Conclusions: Reproductive Health and the Politics of Change

This case study has elucidated the ways ideas and institutions intersected in a particular gender intervention, analysing the underlying paradigms and the discourses this generated. It employed the multi-level and multi-sited methodology laid out in Chapter One, tracking the discourses of a programme from its point of origin at the ‘centre’ through more intimate village-level enquiries at the local level. There was attention given to the dialectical tacking between the macro and the micro – that is, between global discourses and local contestation, the ‘developer’ and the ‘developed’, and the researcher and the ‘researched’. By realising how multiple competing agendas generate unintended outcomes, we are able to better appreciate the politics of change.

Analysis of UNFPA intervention in the field of reproductive health (RH) began in Jakarta with an examination of the broader paradigms within which this intervention functioned. This corresponded to Chapter Three’s analysis of gender discourses emanating from the centre and embedded within global understandings. We explored how the international discourse related to reproductive rights and gender equity shaped UNFPA work in Indonesia. It was argued that the RH discourse emanating from this paradigm shift was problematic on several fronts: this discourse tended to be self-perpetuating, to legitimate modes of intervention, and to obscure conflict. There was the danger that when discourses were applied instrumentally they could become ends in themselves. Therefore
development that is tied to changing paradigms can be reduced to ‘information transfer’, which in turn reinforces hierarchies of position between those who are in place to ‘give’ information and those who must ‘receive’ it. The environment within which these official discourses were generated was then scrutinised – considering the UNFPA central office in Jakarta, and analysing a specific instance of institutional discourse creation. This noted the tension between competing visions of what constitutes reality, as well as the constraints placed upon individuals in the process of document writing.

The next section shifted the scope of analysis to the provincial bureaucracy, evaluating Indonesian government officials, UNFPA provincial and district staff, and health workers at various levels. As with Chapter Four’s examination of institutions, the goal was to understand how underlying paradigms come to be operationalised, how ideas ‘map onto’ institutions. By exploring how power, knowledge and ignorance infuse the institutional apparatus – BKKBN in its coordination with UNFPA – it was suggested that ignorance is often necessary for a project’s survival, and that bureaucratic discourses are often disingenuously represented as consensus. Furthermore, it was argued that it is important to conceptualise the policy process as a series of problematic negotiations involving divergent agendas for change over time.

The final level shifted focus to the Sundanese women and men targeted by UNFPA programmes, addressing perceptions of reproductive health in two West Java villages. By considering distinctions between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ beliefs and practices, it was shown that local beliefs and practices are, in fact, much more nuanced – and that understanding them requires reference to the social relationships of power in which they occur. The assumption of a ‘traditional versus modern’ dichotomy – a simplification
UNFPA required in order to function – was shown to be unconvincing. Interview responses relating to gender roles and sex were likewise analysed to illustrate the conflicting visions of change stemming from differing conceptions of gender roles. It was argued that UNFPA work rested on certain assumptions about women and gender that create an arena within which gender roles are contested. Thus UNFPA’s intervention with regard to these roles led to negotiations of identities and problematic social outcomes.
Chapter Seven: Drawing Conclusions

The Politics of Gender in a Time of Change

This dissertation has attempted to articulate the spiral relationships between gender discourses, institutions, and identities in contemporary Indonesia, focusing on their transmission across the island of Java. It has done this by examining the Indonesian state’s gender policies in the context of globalisation, democratisation, and decentralisation. In this way, the lens of gender has allowed us to analyse the processes and politics of change: the dynamic interactions between state and society, between ideas and institutions, that impact on everything from cultural structures to physical bodies. Analysis drew on political anthropology to study gender policies which not only construct the ‘ideal Indonesian woman’ but may end up reproducing gender hierarchies. Power has been a central concern throughout.

This chapter establishes general conclusions. First we sum up gender issues in Indonesia today, followed by synopsis of major contentions made in previous chapters. Next we consider how the dissertation’s three primary aims – methodological, political, and feminist – have been addressed throughout. This allows us not only to gain deeper understanding of how to approach gender and social change, but also to begin considering new avenues and narratives for gender and development as a whole.

7.1 Gender in a changing nation

In the mid-1990s, historian Laurie Sears stated that gender ‘may be one of the least contested sites of discontent in contemporary Indonesia where poverty, ethnic tensions,
persecution, and disease coexist within global networks of late capitalism’ (1996: 4). At that time, in a nation full of many cross-cutting cleavages of identity, the ‘gender question’ was not subject to much dispute. Suharto’s New Order government had a clear and cogent articulation of gender roles which were then mobilised through a strong governmental apparatus. But after the overthrow of Suharto in 1998 and the subsequent democratisation of the reformasi era, this ‘official’ and unified vision of gender began to fragment.

The discourse of gender has shifted in contemporary Indonesia, borrowing from international development terminology such as ‘empowerment’ and ‘mainstreaming’. Institutional intervention and gender programmes have begun focusing on different issues, including violence against women, trafficking, child welfare, and reproductive rights. Yet these changes have also provoked societal reaction and impacted the ways people experience and live their gender. This has both opened new spaces for, and created new constraints on, women’s identities. Where power is exercised most subtly, naturalising and depoliticising gender discourses by tying them more tightly to the physical body, ‘gender’ as a mobilising force for programmatic intervention into society remains a part of social control. Women thus become objects whose delimited identities are critical for the maintenance of hierarchical order.

In the end, it is important to recognise the complexity of gender. Anthropologist Anna Meigs (1990) has argued that societies will most likely have more than one model and discourse of gender, and that these discourses are likely to be in conflict with each other. This basic assumption is important. When we begin to listen to the voices of the women and men living in Java, we must be sensitive to a multiplicity of understandings which necessarily overlap and contradict. For ‘women and femininity in Southeast Asia’, Oester
argues, ‘are never what we expect’ (1998: 201). Gender exists as a paradox, to be held gently.

### 7.1.1 The Spirals of Ideas, Institutions, and Identities

The preceding chapters examined the spiral relationship between ideas, institutions, and identities within Indonesian gender policies. Overall, we considered gender discourses and relational structures (how discourses circulate to construct the Indonesian woman), gender institutions and social structures (how discourses are translated into programmes), and gender identities and embodied structures (how discourses enter the home and the body). A brief summary of these major arguments is necessary.

Chapter Two, offering theoretical and historical context, demonstrated the importance of accounting for multiple factors when addressing gender and change. Here we examined theories of gender, specifically highlighting the centrality of bodies, and the ways in which gender has been understood and applied in development contexts through WID (Women in Development), GAD (Gender and Development), and mainstreaming. The socio-historical Indonesian context was described, with special emphasis on current social and religious transformations.

Chapter Three then analysed the circularity and significance of gender discourses as they emanate from the centre, the governmental apparatus in Jakarta. This looked at how gender discourses create an image of the ‘ideal Indonesian woman’ that reacts to international norms and feminist theorisations of gender. These gender discourses in Indonesia are embedded in global understandings, but are not accepted without contestation. Resistance exists to the vision of ‘Western women’ that is often tied to the development project. Yet
various discourses – particularly those of development and religion – are brought to bear upon gender. This process ultimately reifies the role of motherhood and reinscribes the relational structure for women as mother-then-wife. Thus official policy discourses promote a vision of an Indonesian woman who is a nation-builder, God-fearer, and mother. These discourses are often writ on the bodies of women, as in the example of ‘jilbabisation’, where new traditions for women’s dress are being forged in reaction to a changing landscape (even if cast as ‘re-traditionalisation’). The process is one where gender discourses circulate and reinforce each other, leading to specific programmes and interventions. It is therefore important to understand that the discursive construction of the Indonesian woman has material impact as these ideas affect institutional structures.

Chapter Four then unpacked this process: how discourses shape institutional programmes and practices. It was argued that programmes are so embedded within implicit gender norms essentialising women to bodies that they may actually reinforce these fundamental norms. Thus when ‘gender’ becomes conflated in programmes to ‘women’, there are implicit assumptions that women’s second-class position in society stems from their bodies, rather than from the discursive conditions that create – and the historical-political conditions that perpetuate – unequal gender roles. This leads state gender policy to focus on projects that envisage women as the sum of their reproductive, sexual bodies. The net effect is to reemphasise notions of women’s inherent weakness and victimhood (violence against women), their commoditised sexuality (trafficking), their primary social function as mothers and status as object rather than subject (children’s welfare), and their reductionist and essentialised bodies (reproductive health). Chapter Four also explored MOWE’s regional branches to examine how the underlying gender norms and paradigms in four cities – Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Bandar Lampung – both frame and constrain
institutional structure, which in turn impacts back upon these paradigms. Thus gender discourses have been institutionalised by effectively instrumentalising women’s needs, stressing the ‘different-ness’ of women’s bodies in such a way so as to maintain women’s subordinate role in existing hierarchies.

Chapter Five then followed the circulation of gender discourses past institutions to an even more intimate level: the home and the body. This allowed us to examine how ‘positive-sounding’ and explicit gender discourses may affect perceptions of social change, even while there are deeper underlying gender norms that may react to these changes. Chapter Five explored interviews with women and men in three cities across Java, addressing the complexity of gender as a ‘structured and structuring structure’, the politics of bodies, and the significance of these processes in a time of perceived social transformation. Understanding views of gender within the home – and within individuals themselves – demonstrated the contested and contradictory nature of the converging influences on gender identities. It was claimed that exposing the nature of gender’s ‘embodied structures’ may help to explain why explicit gender policy aims are often subverted. Explored throughout were the complex and spiral relationships men and women have to gender discourses, to each other, to perceptions of social change, and to their own bodies.

Chapter Six allowed us to examine these three analytical dimensions within one programme, taking as a case study the UNFPA reproductive health (RH) intervention in Indonesia. This began by showing how RH discourses circulating in Jakarta emanated from a broader global ‘paradigm shift’, and how this legitimated particular modes of intervention and reinforced hierarchies of position. The case study then shifted analysis to the provincial bureaucracy, questioning how RH paradigms were operationalised. This
regional analysis explored the policy process as a series of problematic negotiations involving divergent agendas for change over time, demonstrating the centrality of questions of power and ignorance in project implementation. Finally, focus shifted to the Sundanese women and men targeted by UNFPA programmes, looking in particular at two villages in West Java. This raised questions about the nature of modernity and the development project itself. It was argued that UNFPA work rested on certain assumptions about women and gender, which created an arena for the contestation of gender roles. The processes described through the case study highlight the politics of transformation – linking discourses, institutions, and individual identities.

7.2 Deconstructing the Linkages between Gender and Social Change

The dissertation has covered a wide range of material. This recalls the Venn diagram outlined in Chapter One, repeated below, which sketches broadly the three areas of theory – discourse/power, development, and gender – that have guided analysis. Here we summarise principle findings to understand how the research aimed to offer insight into gender and social change, through its multi-level, multi-vocal framework.
7.2.1 Multi-level and Multi-vocal Frameworks

The dissertation’s first aim has been methodological: seeking to understand the dynamic interactions between gender discourses, institutions, and identities, through an interdisciplinary approach drawing upon political anthropology, development studies, sociology, and gender studies. The theoretical framework moved beyond both positivist and post-modern approaches\(^{152}\) to demonstrate linkages between ideas and social structures within specific political-historical contexts. It focused on the dialogical interaction between

\(^{152}\) Or in other terminologies: structuralist versus interpretive frameworks, realism versus constructivism, etc.
discourse and practice, how words and consciousness are embedded within and structured by social institutions, and finally ‘lived’ and embodied by individuals. Research was multi-level and multi-vocal, in keeping with Geertz’s stress on the ‘continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structures’ (1979: 239-240).

The underlying intention was to construct a way to approach and understand change: its processes and politics. This section will summarise how parallels were drawn between major theorists, in order to establish key analytical angles that could lend insight into this central examination – the politics of gender in a time of change. When studying gender policies and development interventions, by exposing contradictions in their underlying paradigms we gain insight into the politics of change. By unearthing the tensions and inconsistencies of implicit gender norms, we understand better the politics of a transforming society and how it affects the lives of men and women.

7.2.1a Theory Explored: Drawing Parallels to Understand Change

Development interventions, particularly those targeting gender relations, seek to bring change. This managed change is a political process involving negotiations which both shape discourses and are shaped by them. Negotiation occurs on many levels. For MOWE, these included global discourses on human rights influencing national paradigms of gender equality, while provincial and local discourses of gender roles also challenged MOWE’s vision of change. In order to explore these relationships, Chapter One drew from significant theorists – including Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, James Ferguson, and James Scott – to demonstrate parallels between their key analytical dimensions. This was represented visually in Chapter One’s matrix (‘Dimensions of Analysis’).
By showing these parallels, I sought to find a way to conceptualise change, and the development interventions that aim to bring this change into a particular society. What emerged was the notion of a ‘spiral’: imagining the dynamic relationship between paradigms and discourses, the institutions and programmes operating in a place, and the way individual identities are constructed in intricate and contradictory ways. Within this spiral, discourse has power – ‘words matter’ – but equally significant is how these words interact dialogically with concrete social structures and institutions – ‘it takes more than changing words to change the world’ (Peet 1999: 161). Furthermore, these changes are reacted to, and expressed in, the physical, sexed body.

In essence, change is ideational, institutional, and embodied. Both Foucault and Bourdieu offer insight into change by bridging these three areas – whether at the level of discourse, its concrete channelling through institutions (governmentality, practice), or the lived reality of individual physical bodies. For instance, ‘jilbabisation’ as a social phenomena can be understood as a ‘spiral’ relationship between – in Bourdieu’s terminology – the symbolic order, the practices mediating this order, and the inculcation of practices through the subjective experience of bodily agents. Chapter Six provides another example, linking all change elements within one particular ‘spiral transformation’: reproductive health discourse and paradigms impacting policy in the Jakarta centre, translated and implemented in the regional bureaucracy, and finally received and contested in two West Java villages. As such, Chapter Six demonstrates most concisely the dissertation’s methodological framework.
The first ‘dimension’ of change – ideas, discourse, power/knowledge – was explored in Chapter Three. Here we examined gender discourses in Jakarta and how they are embedded within global paradigms. As a result, an ‘ideal Indonesian woman’ has been discursively constructed, in opposition to a ‘Western’ image, through the confluence of various discourses: development, religion, and motherhood. Yet ideas only have ‘weight’ – and bring change – insofar as they are ‘powerful’. Foucault’s notion of capillary and contested power is therefore illuminating. This power, residing in paradigms and discourses, may be held by individuals able to enforce a particular discourse, such as policymakers or donors. Power also exists in capillary form, as evidenced by the action of mid-level bureaucracy where there is no single ‘powerful’ or ‘non-powerful’ person but rather layered relations of subordination and domination. Power is evident in the relationships of husbands and wives within the home. More specifically, power is reinscribed in social hierarchies when discourses are used instrumentally – when the attainment of a particular discourse becomes an end in itself. This can be seen in the way people are influenced to speak a specific ‘lingo’ of empowerment and gender equality. This gives rise to a divide between those who are ‘fluent’ in the discourse and those who are not. The socialisation of paradigms implies relative positions of power, those who have knowledge ‘giving it’ to those who have not.

Chapter Four focused on the second dimension of change: its institutionalisation. Even if ideas have power, they do not transform society until they have been ‘filtered’ through social institutions. This is the difference, for example, between James Ferguson’s conceptual apparatus, defining the boundaries of gender interventions, and his ‘institutional apparatus’, both regulating and channelling behaviour. Institutional workings are best read with Bourdieu’s notion of practice, highlighting how the ‘rules of the game’ affect these
translations and apparatus workings. Moreover, institutionalisation tends to expose underlying paradigms – either reinforcing, or complicating and multiplying, them. For example, it was argued that national policy programmes, such as those for sex trafficking or violence against women, revealed implicit gender norms at work, such as women’s sexual commoditisation or weakness. This is a clear portrait of Foucault’s technologies of power at work – apparatuses of power designed to implement knowledge. Moving the other direction within the ‘spiral’, Chapter Four’s regional case studies, drawing on James Scott, addressed discrepancies between official ‘public’ transcripts emanating from the centre and those implemented in regional offices, where multiple ‘private’ transcripts may be operating and influencing programmatic outcomes.

A final element in the social transformation ‘spiral’ is that of identities – specifically accounting for the sexed human body. Chapter Five, listening to the voices of men and women in cities across Java, drew various conclusions about this ‘deepest’, embodied structure. James Scott’s understanding of ‘acting a mask’ was questioned, in light of the profound naturalisation of gender that takes place through bodies. It was argued that bodies form the basis for the naturalisation of a social order wherein women are subordinated, a principle argument in Bourdieu’s *Masculine Domination* (2001). Gender identities were explored in terms of the complex mediation between broader discursive paradigms and the experience of irreducible physical bodies: gender is both a ‘structured and structuring structure’, in Bourdieu’s conceptualisation, and an ‘embodied structure’, in John Scott’s typology. Incongruities were exposed between the ‘positive-sounding’ explicit layer of gender discourses and the ‘practice’ of gender as something conflicted, embodied, and tied to power relations and gender roles.
7.2.2 The Paradox of Development Intervention

The dissertation’s second aim has been political: seeing more clearly the tangled interactions of the gender dispositif, we are able to say something about the nature of the Indonesian state’s ‘gender project’ and how it is inherently problematic. Chapters Four and Six examined most explicitly this project’s translation into gender and development programmes, though it has been a consistent theme throughout. We explored the ways gender hierarchies are being reinforced (however unintentionally) by the development project, specifically as it exists within a particular socio-religious and politicised context. This touched upon pathologies of bureaucratic targeting and institutional simplification, which may serve to ‘create’ women as objects and ‘conduits of policy’ (Molyneux 2004).

Taking its cue from political anthropology, this research therefore examined gender policies as instruments of governance which construct their subjects as objects of power. It questioned how these policies may fail to function as overtly intended, even as they lay authoritative claim to specific modes of action through normative discourses (Shore and Wright 1997: 1). In order to do this, it was important to use discourse analysis – examining the things people said, words used in policies, implicit paradigms and underlying conceptualisations. It was also critical to analyse the processes and strategies through which these discourses are mapped onto social structures, and in so doing, how these discourses may legitimise and reinforce material structures (Parpart 2002: 54).

This section will explore further two paradoxes related to state gender interventions and the development project, which emerged from research findings. These are: the curiously inverse effects of gender and development policies, and the construction of womanhood in the context of ‘Western versus Indonesian’ paradigms.
7.2.2a Complexities of Gender Policy and the Development Project

Ultimately, the development project is one which carries within it the notion of ‘modernisation’, whether or not this is explicitly stated (as it was in the post-WWII era). It has a particular teleology, an implicit vision of change and progress, and complex consequences for different cultures. Embedded within concepts of the ‘modern’ are particular roles for men and women, conceptions of gender that have been perceived by many to have a distinctly ‘Western’ flavour.

Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that the effects of modernity, particularly for Indonesia as a nation in transition, are felt keenly as related to gender roles. Suzanne Brenner has made similar claims, noting that in Indonesia ‘much of the public angst over modernization has focused directly or indirectly on women, suggesting that women’s attitudes and behaviour are considered crucial in determining the course that Indonesian modernity will take’ (1999: 22). She contends further that ‘women’s sexuality, domestic life, and work life all serve as arenas in which symbolic battles over modernity are waged’ (Brenner 1999: 22). The ‘modern’ thus intersects with a flourishing urban culture across Java’s larger cities, generating discourses and institutions of gender which in turn provoke reaction that impacts back on Indonesian women.

We begin by questioning the policy paradox – how gender policies and modernity are experienced as affecting separation, status, and space; the inverse impacts of gender policy; and finally what this implies for the development project and institutionalisation of development initiatives. First of all, in its broadest sense the ‘development project’ lends itself to a particular vision of gender. The Indonesians interviewed all had distinct perceptions of how modernity impacts gender. Three recurring themes in the interviews
relate to changes in separation, status, and space. Modernity tends to minimise the external
separation between men and women, such that the differences between men and women are
perceived to decrease significantly in modern society. Modern forms of gender tend to
change the status differential between men and women, bringing an egalitarian impulse that
demands greater gender equality. Finally, this modernity tends to be located more in cities
as well as to open up different spaces for women in the public sphere. But none of these
changes are experienced in a vacuum, particularly as they are perceived to come from
‘without’ and are tied to Western culture. So as the external and public gender differentials
shrink in society, discourses of gender become more strident and more contested.

This reiterates a basic argument of the thesis: there are distinct and even inverse impacts of
gender policies. As the ‘liberal’ and modern assumptions of gender equality are overlaid
onto the patriarchal culture of a society undergoing transformation, women’s bodies and
women’s sexuality become the focus of the social gaze. Thus gender policies and
interventions affecting change on discursive and institutional levels may provoke reactions at
the level of individual identities that are contrary to explicit intentions. It is over women that
Brenner’s ‘symbolic battles’ are waged (1999: 22). Even more concretely, as activist and
legal advocate Ratna Batara Munti has argued, it is over women’s bodies that the government
now seeks to intervene. Under the New Order the government mobilised a role for women –
that of wives. Now the Indonesian state is in effect mobilising and controlling bodies
through motherhood and sexuality (Munti, interview 24 August 2005). State intervention has
become ‘lebih parah’ (even worse) as the government reaches into the private sphere when it
legislates personal morality and bodies (ibid).
On a superficial level, gender policies may not seem to bring substantial change. As CSIS researcher Medelina Hendytio noted, whereas the ‘discourses of gender are more open, the impact on real life is still very limited’ (interview 16 September 2004). Women in Indonesia are not weak individuals, helplessly subordinated and unable to make choices for themselves. Yet the constellation of powers tied up in contemporary gender discourses and institutions may directly impact the creation of gender identities, even though this may occur in the opposite direction than intended. ‘Modern’ gender discourses explicitly challenge conventional gender norms, and institutions make some attempt to implement ‘empowering’ initiatives. However, these interventions are still rooted fundamentally in essentialist perspectives of women, and in the context of polarisation with the perception of ‘Western womanhood’, in such a way as to generate new ways of formulating and constricting gender identities. In effect, the projects that purport to work on ‘gender’ are often embedded so deeply in underlying gender normativity that their net effect is to reinscribe these gender hierarchies.

The curious complexity of gender policies points us to question the broader framework of development. This thesis has critiqued the bureaucratic culture of development institutions and the state apparatus. It is possible to evaluate development by examining how potentially good ideas are unfortunately – and maybe inevitably – realised in oversimplified target-driven projects. Many even deviate from the ultimate objectives of the programme. Some of these issues were raised in Section 4.3 about bureaucratic institutions and in Section 6.1.2b about targeting in UNFPA projects. This raises a simple but poignant question: is the road to hell really paved with good intentions?
There is most often a contrast between what project planners conceive and what actually happens (Ferguson 1994: 276). Yet it is not a matter of intentionality per se. Porter et al. (1991) contend that people involved in development projects have sincere intentions to improve the lives of project beneficiaries. In the UNFPA office in 2002, I listened to a senior staff member saying that she wanted to ‘nangis darah’ (literally to cry tears of blood) because she was frustrated with her inability to do more to slow the increasing spread of HIV/AIDS. Rather, only by exploring the politics of change – occurring in the realm of ideas, institutions, and identities – can we understand this incongruence between development aims and project actualities.

The crucial paradox might be seen to reside in the question of development itself. Criticism of the concept from post-developmental thought has argued that ‘the idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape’ (Sachs 1992: 1). In essence, the claim is that development is based on faulty conceptual foundations. This is because much of the development project is based on binary dualisms – a structural-functionalist conception of society juxtaposing ‘developed’ with ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘modern’ with ‘traditional’. These dualisms then necessitate a certain mode of action upon the world. This explains why implicit within gender policies are constructions of the traditional and the modern, and cultural assumptions of what the ‘modern’ entails for gender roles. Understanding development interventions should therefore draw on a post-structural conception of development as a set of conflicting discourses and practices (Peet 1999: 156). From the perspective of materialist post-structural critique, in Peet’s words, ‘the social relations that undergird discourses have to be transformed by radical politics rather than the discourses themselves merely being deconstructed: it takes more than changing words to change the
world’ (1999: 161). That is, both paradigms and politics are central to the development process, the interaction of which can lead to surprising results.

7.2.2b Western ‘Mother’ versus Indonesian ‘Ibu’

A second paradox – in which we see development interventions, contested discourses, and implicit gender norms – concerns the mother role and its symbolism. This is significant as the naturalisation of motherhood links the politics of bodies to social roles, thereby depoliticising the gender order and preserving gender hierarchies. Analysis of the motherhood discourse illustrates tensions between cultural norms, which are often tied to development. The influence of Western notions of womanhood should not be discounted. We see this when reflecting on the notion of the mother.

The ‘Ibu’ figure in Indonesia has broad-ranging implications. She is not simply the domesticated wife, subservient in the kitchen; rather, she is expected to be strong for her nation, her community, her family, while seeking work outside the home. The Indonesian Ibu bridges the private and the public, whereas the Western ‘mother’ presides solely over the private. The Western conception of ‘mother’, particularly in the ‘perfect housewife’ version\textsuperscript{153} reinforced by the capitalist demands of the nuclear family, places greater constraints on women. This is tied up in the development project which transplants culture without necessarily intending to do so. The visual symbolism of the mother is made even more potent in a media-driven age. Gender constructs enter Indonesia through not only formal development projects but also the media, which may have greater effect than

\textsuperscript{153} Consider, for example, a bestseller in the UK in the summer of 2007: Anthea Turner’s \textit{How to be the Perfect Housewife: Lessons in the Art of Modern Management} (2007) which was ranked 30\textsuperscript{th} in book sales on \url{amazon.co.uk}, one of the top online book stores in the country (5 July 2007). This book was based on a BBC TV series called ‘The Perfect Housewife’ where Turner (a self-professed ‘domestic goddess’) teaches ‘hopeless housewives’ how to better take care of their homes.
governmental gender policies or at the least provide a framing context for the reception of these projects.

Therefore it is never simply the translation of Western ‘motherhood’ that is relevant, but rather associations of ‘mother’ with the sense of political and social change, all influenced by perceptions of globalisation and Westernisation. Motherhood’s emphasis within current Indonesian state constructions seems to afford a much narrower construction of the *Ibu*, one that is closer to a Western model. In essence, discourses of motherhood (Chapter Three) are translated into programmes for mothers (Chapter Four), which ultimately impact perceptions of gender identities and constructs of the mother (Chapter Five). While the development discourse may stress a role for the *Ibu* that contributes to the nation, there remain clear visions within the overall development project which convey a more limited domesticated portrait for women (‘she builds the nation through raising its children’).

### 7.2.3 The Politics of the Body

The dissertation’s final aim has been feminist: arguing to incorporate more deeply a ‘politics of the body’ into both theory and methodology. In short, if we seek to understand the world and how policy impinges upon gender relations within it, we have to reintroduce a more rigorous analysis of the body. This research has argued that policy frameworks do not yet account fully for the sexed body and its theorisation. This is especially critical as ‘gender’ is the site of both structural and symbolic power. In other words, when we try to understand the slippage between ‘gender’ and ‘women’ as it applies to development projects, the question of physical bodies is always an issue. The body itself can be politicised or depoliticised, naturalised or reified, and these discursive practices have varied but certain impacts.
This ‘politics of the body’ has been explored throughout the dissertation. It has been argued that reluctance to engage with the ‘politics of the body’ at a level other than cursory recognition of basic physical difference may have problematic outcomes. The danger is that it allows for slippage between ‘gender’ and ‘sex’, and ‘gender’ and ‘women’, attempting to negotiate power at the level of the superstructure rather than addressing the substructures of society. Policy objectives cannot be disentangled from the reality of physical bodies and their social construction. This has been shown throughout. For instance, the discourses of gender policy serve to construct a limited view of women that engages primarily with their social role and external capacity, without questioning how these women were ‘constructed’ in the first place (Chapter 3). So gender programmes end up essentialising and reducing women to their bodies and therefore reify and reinscribe hierarchies (Chapter Four). Finally, whereas gender policies target external changes to gender relations, men and women experience their differences in bodily ways that are ‘structured and structuring’ and react accordingly (Chapter Five). Yet insufficient attention is still given in development interventions to debating the ‘naturalness’ of the body – what it implies and how it is given meaning in society.

This is the crux of the politics of bodies: that bodies are the material foundations from which gender discourses derive their ‘naturalising’ power and hence ability to structure social relations. Power then circulates through society to reinforce the image of normative gender roles via discourses and institutions. Gendered bodies are impacted by and exist within specific power structures, usually at a level that is larger than conscious comprehension. This is why for those such as Bourdieu, it is only through understanding the body that we are able to uncover the ‘unthought categories’ of life (1992). Gender is
fundamentally about these physical and therefore ‘unthought’ categories, how it is that masculine domination is inscribed in social practice and institutions, reified symbolically, and inculcated in bodies. Bourdieu goes further, arguing that to resist hierarchies and forms of domination through ‘the language of consciousness’ cannot succeed because it ignores how social structures are inscribed, ultimately, in bodies (2000: 172). Change, in other words, will be writ on bodies, even as social stasis is maintained through them.

In sum, the body can be understood ontologically – it has substance; there are physical differences between men and women. But it must be viewed epistemologically – it is how bodies are perceived, understood, and experienced that has the greatest impact on social life. Gender is both structurally and symbolically powerful as it is tied to bodies. Thus engaging with the ‘politics of the body’ allows us to understand questions of power, and the way men and women embody social structures and experience social transformation.¹⁵⁴

7.3 Conclusion: The Politics of Gender in a Time of Change

Gender is particularly significant in times of social transformation. As Indonesia undergoes changes, often through the guise of development, modernisation, and other influences perceived to come from ‘without’, gender is increasingly contested. There may be a decrease externally in gender differentials as women move toward increased representation in politics, the economy, and education, and begin to take on roles that were previously reserved for men. Yet this declining public separation between men and women leads to an increase in the strength of gender discourses, both drawing upon latent gender norms and seeking to reassert constructed roles for women in particular. In Indonesia this process is

¹⁵⁴ It is important to note that although there has been focus here on how ‘gender’ is often conflated with ‘women’, and in turn with ‘women’s bodies’, that has in fact left out men’s bodies. Studies of masculinities and the male body are equally important in order to begin to break the dominant link between ‘women’ and ‘bodies’ (see for example Connell 1995, Silberschmidt 2001).
clear. The editors of a volume on contemporary Indonesia argue that ‘the rethinking of relations between men and women is at the very heart of the changes being pursued under the democratisation agenda of reformasi’ (Robinson and Bessell 2002: 12).

This parallels other historical experiences. It has been argued that during historical periods when women made greater incursions into public space, there was a pointed reaction. During the 18th century Enlightenment, for example, while claims for human liberty and equality advanced, a particular discourse was required to exclude women from access to these new freedoms. This was done through the naturalisation of women’s ‘weaker bodies’, Laqueur argues, as ‘the bodies of women became the battleground for redefining the most ancient, the most intimate, the most fundamental of human relations: that of woman to man’ (1997: 228). The woman’s body thus becomes the focus of scrutiny when there is explicit resistance to the political, social, and economic claims of women. These processes of resistance to women are evident during the French Revolution (1789-1799), the rise of female suffrage movements in Britain in the 1870s (Laqueur 1997: 228-229), and even in early United States democracy (Tocqueville 1945 [1840]: 223). In short, ‘wherever boundaries were threatened, arguments for fundamental sexual differences were shoved into the breach’ (Laqueur 1997: 229).

Similar patterns are evidenced in Indonesia. For example, we considered the intense political debates about the pornography and ‘pornoaksi’ bill, controversy over Indonesian Playboy, the regional rulings (peraturan daerah) requiring women to cover themselves,

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155 In the French Revolution, male leaders would oppose women’s participation in public life by pointing to women’s physical nature, viewed as making them ‘unfit for public life’ and better suited to domesticity, a similar response found in Britain during the suffrage movement (Laqueur 1997: 228). Tocqueville argues that democracy in the United States eroded the basis for patriarchal authority, which demanded that the boundaries between men and women be redrawn with ‘two clearly distinct lines of action for the two sexes’ (1945 [1840]: 223).
increased wearing of the *jilbab* (with pressure to wear it in some cases), heightened visibility of women’s sexual commoditisation in trafficking initiatives, and even realigned stress upon woman’s reproductive body naturalising her mother role. By exploring gender and power, we gained insight into the spiral process of social transformation in Indonesia.

Given these complex dynamics, more thought must be given to the possibility of alternatives – how to understand gender or formulate gender policies without falling into some of the traps outlined in this thesis. This becomes the subject for further research: studying gender and development while accounting more fully for the body and richer social complexity, and finding a way to link this coherently to more practical, institutional considerations. We have pointed toward the need for greater sensitivity to the politics of the body as it is entangled with policy objectives. Further research should be even more grounded in materiality – specifically the body – providing empirical analysis of particular bodily practices and material living conditions that contribute to and constrain gender formation. This dissertation has admittedly leaned heavily on the side of Foucauldian discourse, concerned with the ways in which people represent their bodies and the ‘real world’ around them.156 Yes this does not diminish the argument for the necessity of analysing both discourse and practice. Rather, it suggests that more work should be done to understand these impacts and implications.

If failures of gender and development programmes can be conceived of as ‘failures of the imagination’, then greater imagination is required. I recall being a consultant for the Indonesian Ministry of Development for Disadvantaged Areas (*Kementerian Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal*) in 2006 and talking to key officials about gender issues. After listening

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156 Another scholar attempting to blend both Foucault and Bourdieu, Judith Farquhar (2002), aimed to develop an anthropology of discourses and practices. But she drew more on Foucauldian analysis and was critiqued for privileging ‘mental representations and ideas’ (Buchholz 2006: 484).
to some of the complexities and pitfalls involved in their projects as related to gender concerns, Minister Saifullah Yusuf turned to me and asked, ‘So, then, what do we do?’ Finding alternatives is important. This research has been critical of the processes involved in current gender policies and their institutional formulations. Yet it has been driven by a desire to understand better how to oppose gender injustice and inequality. It is precisely because I feel so strongly about these matters that I am suspicious of the invidious and subversive effects being had on gender relations, and on women in particular, by oversimplified and essentialising approaches.

‘Ideational changes’ are profoundly important. They must occur before other changes to enhance women’s position can take place (Abadian 1996: 1803). It is therefore important that gender and development approaches go deeper than mere policy targets. Perhaps this is why it has been argued that gender planners should acknowledge directly the link of gender planning with feminism in order that feminism’s transformative and empowering agenda becomes a central part in the dialogue surrounding gender policy (Wieringa 1994: 843; Parpart et al. 2003). While this ‘new story’ is still incomplete, here we have begun to consider a fresh narrative, one that asks the big questions and attempts to elucidate broader social patterns. This story is of the very nature of change as it relates to social transformation and embedded identity. It has been centrally concerned with the spiral relationships between the material and the discursive, as well as the gendered constructions impacting an individual’s ability to live a life she or he has reason to value.
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319


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328


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Appendix A: Research Methodology

Research design needs to maintain a degree of elegance and rigour. Yet this is a complex process, and research conclusions must be critiqued as faulty methodological approaches may bias results or invalidate findings. This appendix aims, therefore, to outline thesis methodology and then discuss its limitations. First, the inter-disciplinarity of the thesis will be discussed relative to how this affected overall research design. Second, the involvement of the researcher herself will be explored: the significance of the emic/etic perspective, questions of reflexivity, and phenomenological considerations. Third, the three stages of the research project will be outlined as different techniques were employed at each level: centre, province, and ‘local’. It will be argued that using these different techniques was necessary for each level even as their limitations will be addressed. Finally, the implications for future research will be considered briefly.

A.1 Issues of Inter-disciplinarity

Research for this dissertation was inherently interdisciplinary as situated within the field of development studies. The overall methodology required a blending of approaches, including such things as participant observation, interviews, ethnographic study, and textual analysis. The goal was to avoid what Daly and Cobb (1989) refer to as ‘disciplinolatry’ – the demarcation of boundary lines around the academic disciplines as singularly providing a way of thinking, structuring arguments, gathering data and explicating it. Regarding how this research project fits into the currently available scholarship, I have found no other studies applying my methodological approach to the Indonesian context. A PhD thesis which studied an FAO aquaculture development project in Zambia uses a similar approach,
tracking the project from its conception to the grassroots level within a framework drawing upon discourse analysis (Harrison 1995). Another PhD student has approached the family planning programme in West Java within a Foucauldian framework, yet much of the research draws upon only one ‘layer’ of the programme, that of clinic-level health care (Newland 2001).

The theoretical framework laid out in the introductory chapter of this thesis required that a ‘multi-sited’ and ‘multi-vocal’ approach be used, which then necessitated the use of a variety of research techniques. In particular, being ‘multi-vocal’ meant that care was taken to listen to – and represent accurately – a broad range of views from those interviewed. Based on the breadth and depth of interviews conducted, not every nuance or interesting detail was able to be incorporated. However, careful and repeated coding of interviews aimed to ensure that principle themes were represented fairly. In this way, the findings from these found voice in the thesis.

Fairly representing inter-disciplinarity, during the writing process, was helped by two visual schemas: the Venn diagram and the matrix presented in Chapter One.157 These gave a ‘road map’ for the dissertation, showing how the various theories, and theorists, came together within one coherent framework. The Venn diagram in particular aimed to show how multiple bodies of knowledge related to the subject at hand – that in fact, while it was the overlapping that was significant, different sections would draw upon particular ideas and/or theorists that were pertinent. In addition, the matrix (showing the various dimensions of analysis) sought to compare side-by-side the core themes of several key

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157 Interestingly, while the matrix was devised during early stages of writing – since it was key to the central premise – I only devised the Venn diagram much later. This stemmed from being questioned about interdisciplinarity. When I was challenged to explain how and why I was using particular theorists and ideas in specific places, it became clear that I needed a way to represent this visually.
theorists. Evaluating how they structured their analysis – rather than weighing their various arguments or conclusions against each other – enabled me to conceptualise the politics of change within a framework focusing on ideas, institutions, and identities. The matrix thus offered a schematic structure to support this tri-part approach.

As a word of caution, it must be noted that this inter-disciplinarity has its own limitations. In writing, as many multiple bodies of theory were used, inevitably some complexity was lost. For example, only some of Foucault’s ideas were addressed, while others (such as biopower) could have benefitted from greater attention. Nonetheless, care was taken to explain ideas and theories without oversimplifying; this necessitated a great deal of background reading in multiple subjects in order to be able to select – and present a careful portrait of – central principles. During fieldwork, it is possible that by drawing on a variety of techniques without sufficient depth the explicatory power of each is not fully captured. For example, because of the time spent in the MOWE and UNFPA offices in Jakarta less time was spent in the villages doing ethnographic observation, which then constrained how in-depth this portrait could be.

Yet in scrutinising the overall methodology of this research project, it may be argued that the bottom line, as Bernard notes, is that ‘validity is never demonstrated, only made more likely’ (1995: 42). In essence, the validity of the methodology itself ‘depends on the collective opinion of researchers’ (Bernard 1995: 43). Because interdisciplinary approaches are gaining credence, along with the application of discourse analysis in Foucauldian frameworks, it can be claimed that the methodology used in this thesis is legitimated by its more widespread acceptance among researchers as a legitimate approach (an inescapably tautological argument).
Before addressing more specifically the techniques employed in the research project, it is relevant to examine my role as a researcher in three different ways. We begin by addressing my status as both foreigner and ‘native’ among the Sundanese. Though a Western researcher, my childhood was spent in Bandung, West Java, leaving me fluent in Indonesian and familiar with the Sundanese worldview and social customs. Precisely because of this intimate involvement with the people over a substantial portion of my life, there is a degree of empathy and ‘resonance’ in my approach to the Sundanese. That is, there is ‘an underlying appeal to shared experience’ which enables me to appreciate the local contexts over and above mere ‘understanding’ (Wikan 1993: 194).

Therefore when I am in Indonesia (Java especially), I am received at a number of levels. Indonesian government officials and Jakartan elites perceive me as a Western-educated foreigner, yet one they accept as being sympathetic to their country and practices. When I am in the kampung (village), the people’s typical reaction is that of one to a foreigner – until I speak with them, at which point my Sundanese accent invariably enables them to be more comfortable and familiar with me. After a broad survey of ethnographies Raoul Naroll has argued this very point: that fluency in the local language builds rapport (1962: 89-90). It has also been shown that accent and intonation play a part in giving a researcher access to cultural insider phrases (Bernard 1995: 146). We might draw upon Bourdieu’s idea of habitus to argue that in my body I hold many Sundanese traits, physical and linguistic. It is as simple as stepping into an Indonesian village, and my entire vocal tone and volume, comportment, and mannerisms change instinctively. Over time, my ‘felt identity’ has become more ‘Indonesian’ than ‘Sundanese’, though I consider both to be
overlapping and part of each other. However, because of my childhood ties to Bandung and the continued hint of a Sundanese accent, most Indonesians still respond to me as having predominantly Sunda ties.

This ability to switch between both Western and Indonesian perspectives affected my research. Being able to slip on the two identities gained me access not only to elite situations in Jakarta but also to the sitting rooms of small village homes. I was able to have that ‘intimate contact’ which Evans-Pritchard (1951) holds is essential to observe and understand social interactions even as I was able to understand folk analyses and seek the emic perspective so important from a humanistic standpoint (Lofland 1971). At the same time, I remained a visible outsider and retained some degree of scepticism, not ‘going native’ and instead having an etic perspective considered so valuable to ethnographic research (Miles and Huberman 1994: 216; Monaghan and Just 2000: 30). This balance between emic and etic perspectives on a culture is not unique to me; current writings on the ‘third culture kid’ (the TCK) cast light on my unconscious accommodation to whichever of the two childhood cultures I currently inhabit (Pollock and Van Reken 1999).

A second theoretical consideration related to the role of researcher is linked to issues of phenomenology in qualitative research.\textsuperscript{158} My research relied on a subjectivist point of view, seeking to address the concepts and meanings of the actors involved rather than simply describing their actions from my viewpoint (Bernard 1995: 14-15). Heidegger (1962) argues that all understanding has an essentially circular nature, thus we can never have an explicit understanding of anything unless we come with some kind of implicit understanding.

\textsuperscript{158} Phenomenology differs from ontology in that it incorporates the layer of perception and awareness; whereas ontology is the study of being, phenomenology is the study of the perception of being, thus adding another layer to interpretation of data. Phenomenology’s relevance derives from the fact that there is no disengaged subject. As Karl Popper has noted, ‘knowledge never begins from nothing, but always from some background knowledge’ (1979: 71).
understanding of what is to be understood. We come to any and all encounters with the
world with our own ‘interpretive presuppositions’ (Madison 1990: 51), or ‘forestructures’
in Heidegger’s terms (1962: 195). In other words, my research must be placed within
phenomenological brackets, as it has been influenced by my own preconceptions and
paradigms. Geertz puts it plainly: ‘what we call our data are really our own constructions
of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to’ (1973: 9).
This understanding highlights the need to be critical of how I was engaged in a process of
‘joint construction of meaning’ with the subjects of my research (Pawson 1989: 292).
Criticism of this qualitative approach includes claims that findings cannot be replicated,
observations tend to be selectively reported, and flexible research design means it is
difficult to substantiate findings through statistics (Katz 1983: 128). Nonetheless, this
qualitative, phenomenological research approach was necessary in order to investigate the
nuances of discourse and power.

Finally, there was a need for reflexivity in my research approaches, particularly important
because I was helped by research assistants. Even given my ability to adopt more ‘local’
perspectives and my awareness of phenomenological considerations, there were surprising
instances which highlighted the contrast between my implicit assumptions and those of my
research assistants. Exposing these ‘unthought categories’ requires reflexivity, exercised
upon and within bodies, and often provides interesting insights. Bourdieu in Invitation to
Reflexive Sociology (1992) speaks of reflexivity as being the process by which we
systematically uncover the ‘unthought categories’ which themselves are the preconditions
for our more self-conscious practices. In other words, these unthought categories are
‘ontological foundations of practical consciousness’ (Lash 1994: 154). For reflexivity is
more than mere recognition of how the researcher dynamically affects the research process;
it requires attempting to understand how my own unconscious understandings impact upon the information I perceive and process.

The best example to illustrate this process – and how being reflexive opened up new ways of thinking – was my confusion over the Indonesian names of the interview respondents. My research assistants in the regions recorded their data by the name of the interviewee. Yet it would sometimes be unclear whether the respondent was a man or a woman because of the non-gendered structure of the Indonesian language. *Bahasa Indonesia* has no masculine or feminine pronouns, and only ‘*dia*’ to express a person, no ‘*he*’ or ‘*she*’. Most professions do not have masculine or feminine forms; for example a teacher is simply a *guru* and a worker is a *pegawai*. Work roles are typically not differentiated by gender (e.g. as in English a ‘waiter’ and a ‘waitress’). I was not familiar enough with the diversity of Javanese names in particular to recognise immediately which names were ‘for boys’ and which ones were ‘for girls’ (as in English I would have no trouble distinguishing, for example, between a ‘James’ and an ‘Elizabeth’), whereas my Indonesian assistants would not have had this problem. This demonstrated my assumptions about how I thought I should be able to easily identify sex – male or female – as I could in any English-language discussion.

At the same time, however, navigating through this non-gendered language exposed the underlying thought categories of my Indonesian research assistants. I began to notice a trend in the interview records. If the respondent was a woman, it would specify in some way in the ‘observations’ section that she was female. But if the respondent was a man it rarely specified his sex; the observations might instead point to the job this person had, such as *guru* or *pegawai*. I would then have to consult the section on the household to see
if the respondent referenced his wife to determine whether it was, in fact, a man. This highlights a common argument: men are more likely to be identified according to their role in the public realm (by profession, for example, which in Indonesian would be a non-gendered noun), whereas women are likely to be tied directly and explicitly to their role ‘as woman’. The use of language reinforces these linkages: men become the ‘non-gendered’ constant, the norm, while women occupy a specific category that makes clear their femaleness. By exploring reflexively the contrast between my ‘unthought categories’ and those of my research assistants, this revealed my implicit assumptions about the pervasiveness of gender constructs in language, as well as those of the assistants, who would slip into ways of defining men by their role, and women as women.

A.3 The Three ‘Levels’ of Research

A.3.1 Jakarta: Observing Participant and Textual Analysis

The methodology used for research in Jakarta – in the ‘centre’ of policy generation – involved acting as an observing participant, gathering primary texts, and interviewing key officials and NGO activists working on gender issues. In 2005, I served as a technical consultant for the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (MOWE) in Jakarta, where I performed such tasks as translating key documents into English, including the Ministry’s Strategic National Plan (Renstrat) and their Mid-Term Planning Policies (RPJM). Here I gained access to many officials involved in the formulation of gender policies, and spent time interviewing those in positions of influence. I interviewed the former Minister of Women’s Empowerment (now an important figure in parliament), who was central to changing MOWE’s structures and impetus. I also spoke with the heads of Dharma Wanita Persatuan, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation for Women (LBH-APIK), the National
Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan), leaders of Kowani (National Women’s Congress) and PKK, and other key NGO leaders and feminist thinkers such as Julia Suryakusuma and Gadis Arivia. Furthermore, I gathered many primary source documents – government policy papers, written legislation, project brochures, and even sources such as the powerpoint presentations of MOWE officials (used in various ‘socialisation’ meetings) – which provide useful examples of how gender discourses are being concretised in written form.

My role as ‘observing participant’ merits further query. Part of my fieldwork involved interning in the MOGE offices in 2005, acting as a translator and consultant in the Bureau of Planning and Foreign Cooperation, and in the UNFPA office in 2002, standing in for the Advocacy Programme Coordinator (APC) who was on maternal leave. I was invited to fill both these positions after having a preliminary meeting with organisation staff and submitting official letters to the Directors. For both organisations, I explained my research goals and asked if I could help them with work around the office in exchange for access to their project documents. They were willing to enter into such an arrangement, particularly as they needed help translating key documents and wanted someone for whom English was a first language.

Because of these more formal consultant positions, it can be said that I shifted (however unintentionally) from the role of participant observer to that of observing participant (Bernard 1995: 138-139; cf. Fleisher 1989). This had its benefits and its drawbacks. Bernard notes that participant observation gives an intuitive understanding of what is going on in a particular ‘culture’ in such a way that allows the researcher to make strong statements about the collected information: ‘In short, participant observation helps you
understand the *meaning* of your observations’ (1995: 141, emphasis in the original). At the same time, however, because I was drawn into programme management considerations, I had to be disciplined to distance myself enough to analyse what was happening around me. Toward this end, I kept detailed diaries of my observations and my interactions, which proved useful in directing my research (Moore 2000: 144).

Participant observation ‘involves a certain amount of deception and impression management’ (Bernard 1995: 136-137); understanding this is a first step toward conducting ourselves ethically in fieldwork. I made it clear to MOWE and UNFPA staff from the beginning that I was researching their programmes, not wanting to fall into the ethical trap of disguised observation, where a researcher pretends to join a group and proceeds to record data about people in the group (*ibid* 347-349). However, it is possible to argue that I was involved in passive deception as my day-to-day role was that of an intern/consultant, not obviously that of a researcher. Bernard notes that ‘passive deception is ethically aseptic’ and up to the individual researcher to assess as a practice (1995: 352). As I never hid the fact that my research agenda was primary and reiterated this through my time in the office, particularly in my semi-structured interviews with more senior officials, I am confident that I did not compromise my integrity as a researcher.

However, there remain ethical considerations specifically related to the writing of the UNFPA brochure, as described in Chapter Six. Part of the reason I agreed to write the brochure was my knowledge that I could critique and analyse the process itself. This did not change how I wrote the text, as I had to follow particular guidelines and to create a certain image. Yet without my involvement the brochure would invariably have been worded with slight differences, raising the question as to whether any reference to the text
is thus invalidated. I aimed to circumvent this possibility by using the case to illustrate the process of discourse creation rather than relying heavily on analysis of the resulting text.

With regard to document analysis, both primary and secondary sources were used in different ways. MOWE and UNFPA documents were analysed as discourses, where I attempted to ‘read between the lines’ in order to understand the paradigms underpinning their explicit statements. This could have led to selective and inconsistent illustration, as I only used a few textual examples to substantiate my arguments. However, my interpretations of the texts were checked and confirmed through general discussions with office staff to avoid misinterpretation based on a lack of clarity. Secondary sources added historical depth to my analysis that would have been otherwise unattainable given the limited time-frame of my research (Hoddinott 1992: 74). As my research goals involved ‘unearthing’ the gender paradigms, I read these documents in light of their relevant frameworks. In doing so, I had to resort to the uneasy dualism described by Moore and Vaughn, where the constructedness of accounts are called into question even while acknowledgement is made of the basic ‘realities’ underpinning them: ‘All accounts, including our own, are constructed accounts, but they are also accounts of something’ (1994: xxiv).

**A.3.2 Provincial Level: Interviews and Focus Group Discussions**

To research the implementation of MOWE and UNFPA programmes at the provincial level, I relied most on interviews and focus group discussions, substantiated with relevant secondary literature related to project structure and the Indonesian bureaucracy. The strategy for these interviews matches closely what is described by Douglas:
Creative interviewing is purposefully situated interviewing. Rather than denying or failing to see the situation of the interview as a determinant of what goes on in the questioning and answering processes, creative interviewing embraces the immediate, concrete situation; tries to understand how it is affecting what is communicated; and, by understanding these effects, changes the interviewer's communication processes to increase the discovery of the truth about human beings (1985: 22).

Informants were told that confidentiality would be maintained, and if they so chose their name would not be mentioned in the thesis (Bernard 1995: 143). For each of the regional case studies (Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Bandar Lampung), I interviewed the officials running the provincial MOWE branch and analysed their institutional structures, substantiated by organisational documents.

Friendliness and respectful inquisitiveness served me well in the interview situation. Often points of greatest interest would emerge from discussion where I had remained silent to allow respondents to speak openly without interruption. These interviews provided a wealth of information, confirming the claim that verbal data has become ‘the keystone of contemporary social science’ (Foddy 1993: 11). However, it must be recognised that this verbal data may be at times unreliable or invalid (Bernard 1995: 114; cf. Cicourel 1982). For instance, some methodologists have concluded that the many factors at work in the interview situation invalidate the links drawn between verbally expressed attitudes and actual behaviours (Foddy 1993: 3; cf. Douglas 1985). It has also been argued that interviews are social situations with their own agendas, wherein verbal responses may be given not to communicate reality but to influence the interviewer (Bulmer and Warwick 1993). There were moments where I felt as if the stress placed upon issues of religion and morality were directed at me as a Western woman, particularly when this was linked to the

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159 Whether informants chose strict confidentiality or said it was all right to use their name depended for the most part on the sensitivity of the material they shared. Many of the bureaucrats and healthworkers in particular stayed with comments that could be deemed ‘public information’ and indicated that quoting them was acceptable.
debate about ‘free sex’. For example, if the topic under discussion had to do with sexual practice or women’s freedom, often the person with whom I was speaking might note that ‘in America there is free sex’, or infer that because I was not a Muslim, I would be less moral than they were and therefore it might be difficult for me to agree with their choices to live in particular ways. Through these situations, when I was open, honest, and friendly, I was often able to challenge some of the assumptions they had about me as a ‘licentious Western woman’ and to find common ground to build on for productive dialogue – using our perceived differences both to clarify unique social practices and then to develop shared understanding.

There are other considerations related to the interview situation. I hoped that by asking open-ended questions people would reply based on their own worldviews or conceptual frameworks. However, symbolic interaction theory predicts that instead respondents will negotiate a shared definition of the situation with the researcher (Silverman 1993: 95; Foddy 1993: 20-21). In other words, even though I was attempting to understand the paradigms behind verbal answers, these paradigms were influenced by my interaction. Moreover, it proved difficult to strike a balance between indicating what kind of information was required in the interview situation and not asking leading questions. Foddy has noted that respondents will look for clues to contextualise questions and therefore guide their responses (1993: 21). In explaining my research objectives, for example, I indicated my intention to critically examine gender programmes. My goal was to gain the trust of the Indonesians involved in the projects and allow them to express their own thoughts and opinions of these projects. Yet it is possible that interviewees read this as an invitation to criticise governmental work, rather than simply a chance to do so. If this
were the case in some interviews, it could mean that the responses were selectively unfavourable, which would indicate bias in results.

Worth noting also was my link to MOWE and UNFPA. Peil (1993) notes the need for researchers to define their role to the people they are involved with because of the ascriptive nature of roles (people need to know into what categories the researcher fits). Even though I defined myself as a researcher from a foreign university, frequently people assumed that as a foreigner I was there to represent a bigger organisation with the capacity to help them (perhaps even financially). This led to my having to emphasise more than once that I could not make changes in the organisation or provide funding alternatives, which seemed difficult for some informants to receive.

Focus group discussions at the regional level proved a rich source of perspectives on issues related to gender and MOWE’s and UNFPA’s work. They were a quick way to gain general knowledge of many viewpoints and helped to bridge the gap between a dearth of available research on the local situation and the need for basic knowledge of local contexts in order to conduct research properly (Peil 1993). Focus group discussions thus offered an excellent starting point from which to draw themes for further inquiry during individual interviews, a practice employed by many researchers.\textsuperscript{160} One danger in using these focus group discussions, however, is that of receiving the ‘situational opinion’, that is, the opinion given in a group context which is different from one that would be given in private, even where both might be equally valid (Stycos 1993). It remains that ‘question-answer behaviour involves complex interrelationships between sociological, psychological and

linguistic variables’, and this complexity is both compounded and made more visible in the context of groups (Foddy 1993: xi).

A.3.3 Local Level: Research Assistants, Semi-structured Interviews, and Snowball Sampling

Most research at the ‘local level’ was conducted through research assistants. In 2005, I coordinated a team of 22 researchers in Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. These research assistants were contracted to conduct in-depth, semi-structured interviews in their respective cities. I spent time with all of these individuals discussing research aims, the methodologies she or he would use, how interviews were to be written up, and how we would coordinate data sharing. Every interview write-up included notes on methodology and observations, as the research assistants had been tasked to be reflexive in their approach and to analyse and observe accordingly.

Selection of research assistants was done on the basis of availability and mutually-beneficial partnership. In Bandung, I worked with two research assistants, both trained in anthropology, who received monetary compensation for their work. In Yogyakarta, the research partners were professors and lecturers at UPN ‘Veteran’ Yogyakarta, who had formed a Centre for Women’s Studies (Pusat Studi Wanita). A sum of money was donated to the Centre in exchange for this research, which the professors themselves expressed interest in doing. In Surabaya, I worked with university students and faculty from the STIE-Perbanas campus, selected based on their superior performance in a research methods course. Each research student was given a small donation to cover expenses and a competition was held to identify the ‘best researcher’; whoever won this prize in the end received an additional monetary award, intended to add incentive for high performance.
The interview questions (included in Appendix D) were written originally in *bahasa Indonesia*, and then refined in wording through collaboration with two anthropologists in Bandung. Questions related to the following topics: gender roles; the constructions of and influences on these roles; women’s status in both ‘private’ and ‘public’ spheres (including questions of government intervention); sex, bodies, and power; and finally perspectives on modernity and change. After consideration of the ‘open question versus closed question’ debate (Foddy 1993: 126-152), I chose open-ended questions in line with a more qualitative research approach. I was careful to minimise the level of delimitation inherent to question-posing, recognising that even something as seemingly innocent as question order has an effect on how they are answered (*ibid*: 52-75). The format for interview questions thus adhered to principles of simplicity, using concrete language and moving sequentially from the more general to the more specific (*ibid*: 38-51). The selection of concrete terms to query abstract ideas highlighted the problem with operationism: determining how to measure perceptions of things necessarily turns abstractions into reality and is difficult to achieve (Bernard 1995: 31-32). Also, the language used in the interviews changed depending on the individual; for example, the research assistants sometimes used Sundanese or Javanese in homes of lower socio-economic status and/or education levels. It is possible that between multiple translations (Indonesian, Sundanese, Javanese, and English) nuances and shades of meaning could have been lost.

A blend of quota sampling and snowball sampling was used to target interview respondents; this was agreed upon with the research assistants in advance. Certain cross-cutting cleavages were assumed – namely age, socio-economic status, and education level –

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161 Questions for the 2002 case study used many of these broad themes, but also specifically drew upon the basic categories in UNFPA programmes; hence, along with general questions about reproductive health there were also questions related to adolescent RH, HIV/AIDS, violence against women, etc.
and the interviews had to include different levels within these categories (viz. women and men who were younger and older, wealthier and poorer, more and less educated). The sample for these interviews was thus varied based on quotas for variability in age, socio-economic status, and education. Finding the respondents required a snowball approach, similar to the methodology employed by Diniz et al. (1998) who started their research with contacts among community leaders who then referred them to individual participants. In the 2002 reproductive health case study, for example, research began with the PLKB (family planning fieldworker), who was the key ‘gatekeeper’ for the community and closely involved in discussing RH issues with village members. For both villages, the PLKB helped to name a few key individuals to interview, who then named others as suitable candidates for research. This method proved especially useful as the local communities included a relatively small population of people in contact with one another (Bernard 1995: 97). However, overall the reliance on methods of nonprobability sampling limit the applicability of this study to the broader population and further ethnographic data would be required to substantiate my conclusions (ibid: 94).

Regarding the data, once it had been collected: fieldwork in 2005 yielded a total of 166 in-depth interviews from Bandung, Yogya, and Surabaya (116 women and 50 men). Appendix E includes a numbered list of these respondents with their bare biographical information (generic enough to maintain privacy), in order to reference individual comments. The 2002 case study produced qualitative data from 40 village respondents in two villages in the region of Bandung and Tasikmalaya.162 I met with the research assistants to discuss their results once they had submitted the word-processed interviews and their final reports (where they analysed their participation in the process, explained

162 These two villages, Sukajaya and Cisayong, were selected after discussion with UNFPA District Facilitators for Bandung and Tasikmalaya respectively, and based on practical considerations of transportation and access.
their methodologies, raised difficulties they may have encountered, and summarised findings). These interviews, using direct quotations as often as possible from the respondents, were then compiled into Excel spreadsheets. Questions were coded according to emerging themes, then quantified where relevant. Some of the information that came from this coding process is included in gender-disaggregated tables in Appendix C. Techniques used in the coding process included word analysis (word repetitions, key-indigenous terms, key-words-in-contexts), linguistic analysis (metaphors, transitions, connectors), and other reading techniques (social science queries, compare and contrast) (Bernard 1996).

This data analysis must be problematised. First, my intuitive understanding of the local culture, described earlier as based on years of close contact with the Sundanese, guided the ways I elucidated meaning from the interviews (Bernard 1995: 141). However, I recognise that I ascribed significance to answers based on interpretations. There is thus a caution to avoid the trap of thinking the research explicates nomothetic theory when in fact it may be more idiographic (ibid: 110-113). Another significant issue was the way in which interview responses were ‘disembodied’ through the process of analysis. Although setting out to study ‘the raw material [of] social life itself’ (Evans-Pritchard 1951: 74), in the end I was dealing with texts, divorced from the people who spoke them and the contexts in which they were born and helped to shape. In the process of producing ‘labels for themes and labels for articulation between themes’, I risked reducing people to their words – and to my words (Bernard 1996). Robert Chambers speaks of moving from things to people, toward the paradigm of ‘people as people’ (1997: 188). By studying interview responses as texts I may have reified the stories of the individual respondents. Yet caution was taken not to over-interpret the data or to offer an overly-determined conclusion, and I tried to concretise
answers within broader social contexts. In the end, I realised the need to admit that I was dealing not with raw experience but with interpretations (Schafer 1978: 24) in order to escape the myopia of positivist constructions. The aim was never to offer a series of numbers or decisive claims, but rather to construct a plausible and insightful narrative.

Another potential problem was that using research assistants could have impacted results. It has been argued since the shift from ‘armchair anthropologists’ to the groundbreaking fieldwork by Bronislaw Malinowski, Franz Boaz, and others, that the idea of ‘experience’ has become paramount. The principle is that if researchers want to test a hypothesis, they need to collect the data themselves. By relying on research assistants, I broke the ‘cardinal rule’ of anthropological research: ‘being there’ (Monaghan and Just 2000: 23-24; Ellen 1984: 21; Malinowski 1999 [1922]: 2-8). However, given constraints of time and access, I felt that I could get a much bigger ‘data set’ with the help of research assistants.

The issue therefore became how to ensure a certain level of consistency in data collection. To do this I had to be aware of, and act to mitigate, a few potential limitations. First was whether local and regional differences might have gone unnoticed because the research teams for each site were from that place; so, for example, a Bandung research assistant might not have had the ‘outsider’ perspective to pick up on local particularities when interviewing Bandung residents. This would mean that when I compiled data ‘centrally’, some of the regional differences would have been lost. However, I tried to give them more of this perspective, holding several training sessions with the research assistants before they conducted their interviews. Together we addressed not only methodology but also the subject of the research – for example, the idea of gender constructions – which allowed the researchers to ‘step back’ from the process sufficiently to gain the necessary perspective.
Most of my research assistants noted that they experienced a change in thinking regarding gender through the process, and became more critical and analytical in approaching the interview topics. In addition to gaining more of an ‘outsider’ perspective, they were able to benefit from being ‘insiders’: as ‘local’ people conducting interviews, they may in fact have had more privileged access to understanding how things ‘worked’ in a place, so as to better engage with the respondents and their paradigms. Furthermore, some of the village respondents may have been intimidated by the interview situation if they had had to sit across from a foreigner instead of a fellow Indonesian (cf. Srinivas et al. 1979).

Other steps were taken to ensure consistency across the interview cities. First, most of my researchers were female (with the exception of two male University students in Surabaya), in line with literature that claims that women researchers will sometimes face more problems initially and yet in the long run find greater ease at entering both female and male worlds (Peil 1993). I also required a basic standard in education levels (all my assistants were just completing or had completed a university degree), as some literature argues that this can provide greater evenness in reporting (Stycos 1993). I viewed the fact that some of my researchers had higher education as an asset to the process. Furthermore, to mitigate the possibility of wage-driven research leading to lower standards of precision and standardisation in recording, observing, and questioning, I offered a financial incentive for overall results that were of high quality, on top of otherwise fair compensation for their work. Finally, to allow me to assess my assistants’ work and aim for better consistency, the research assistants all met with me repeatedly to discuss basic principles for conducting interviews. They were given a basic template for the interview write-up, which included a section after each interview for a methodology and observations section. Regarding these

163 As these two researchers were both young, I hoped this would offset any of the potential ‘threat’ they might pose as males conducting the research.
methods and observations sections, the research assistants were told that they were to be my ‘eyes and ears’ in each interview setting, and encouraged to be self-critical of their work and aware of their influence upon the research situation. These methods sections proved revealing at times; for instance, one assistant mentioned that she always ‘lowered her voice’ whenever she talked about sex. We discussed how her manner of broaching the subject could influence responses, particularly around questions of whether sex was a taboo topic.

A.4 Implications for Future Research

One of the primary lessons learned from this research project was the need for more time. Although increasing the amount of information derived from research might not have facilitated understanding (Moore 2000: 16), the study could have benefited from additional time spent in ethnographic fieldwork. Perhaps this increase in time engaged with a particular place, and solidarity with those working for change within it, would allow one to answer in the affirmative the questions posed by Sears: ‘who has authority to speak about Indonesian women’s experiences? […] Do non-Indonesians or men have rights to the hidden transcript of Indonesian women?’ (1996: 17).

A second consideration is the need for more objective data, possibly by way of quantitative interview methods using probability sampling. Adding more objective data would lend weight to the research, yet these ‘objective data’ nonetheless would still achieve their highest intelligibility not when they had been subsumed under universally binding, atemporal ‘laws’ but when they had been interconnected and integrated into a narrative account (Madison 1990: 47). In other words, the ultimate validity of research conclusions rests not on empirical verification (or falsification) but on ‘narrative acceptability’
(Madison 1990: 49). Paul Ricoeur builds upon this idea as he discusses the plausibility measure of narrative:

Following a story, correlatively, is understanding the successive actions, thoughts and feelings in question insofar as they present a certain directedness. [...] But a narrative conclusion can be neither deduced nor predicted. [...] So rather than being predictable, a conclusion must be acceptable (1980: 170, emphasis in the original).

The research for this thesis employed qualitative techniques to draw plausible and acceptable narratives of the ways in which state gender interventions operate on paradigmatic and political levels. Future research projects would need to develop further the balance between subjectivist and positivist methodological approaches.
Appendix B: Interviews and Meetings

B.1 Interviews List

Interviews and Focus Discussion Groups (FGDs) are listed by the name of the interviewee. As many Indonesians use only one name, they are noted here as such (with Pak or Ibu, Mr. or Mrs., as they would typically be called). Some respondents requested anonymity and are noted as such.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Identifying Information</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achmad, Sjamsiah</td>
<td>CEDAW Committee Member, 2001-04</td>
<td>23/09/04</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Lectured on ‘Women’s Rights and Sustainable Development’</td>
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<td>Adhynegara, Mustari</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy in MOWE for religion</td>
<td>21/07/05</td>
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<td>Bandung</td>
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<td>Alam, Ibu</td>
<td>UNFPA provincial manager, Bapeda Bandung</td>
<td>04/07/02</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Interview</td>
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<td>Anonymous</td>
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<td>UNFPA Junior Professional Officer</td>
<td>08/08/02</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
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<td>Arivia, Gadir</td>
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<td>07/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
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<td>Bapak Raja, Tulehu</td>
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<td>16/08/05</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
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<td>15/08/05</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
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<td>Desi, Ibu</td>
<td>UNFPA District Facilitator, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya</td>
<td>12/07/02 and 30/08/02</td>
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<td>Head of 1st division on data and policy analysis, Biro Pemberdayaan Perempuan</td>
<td>12/08/05 Lampung</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanti, Ibu</td>
<td>Coordinates with Kantor Pemberdayaan Perempuan, works with Dinas Perindustrian</td>
<td>15/08/05 Yogyakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristiyanti, Wiwik</td>
<td>Staff of MOWE, Planning Division</td>
<td>27/07/05 Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kusumaharta, Halida</td>
<td>Coordinates with Kantor Pemberdayaan Perempuan</td>
<td>15/08/05 Yogyakarta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kusumayudha, Sari</td>
<td>Dean of the Science department, UPN Veteran Yogyakarta</td>
<td>16/08/05 Yogyakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lily, Ibu</td>
<td>IFPPD Project Officer</td>
<td>20/08/02 Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Malakew, Richard</td>
<td>UNFPA Population and Development Strategies Officer</td>
<td>02/07/02 Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Maraful, Murniati</td>
<td>Secretary for Pokja III (workgroup),</td>
<td>24/08/05 Jakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title/Position</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PKK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashabane, Norman</td>
<td>Ambassador from South Africa to Indonesia</td>
<td>24/09/04</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Lecture at the International Symposium on gender in sustainable development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moeloeck, Nila</td>
<td>President of Dharma Wanita Persatuan</td>
<td>03/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
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<td>Muchtar, Elya</td>
<td>Echelon II, head of Biro Pemberdayaan Perempuan</td>
<td>12/08/05</td>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munir, Lily</td>
<td>Director, Center for Pesantren and Democracy Studies</td>
<td>27/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munti, Ratna Batara</td>
<td>Director of LBH-APIK (Legal Aid Organization of Indonesian Women's Association for Justice)</td>
<td>24/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nini, Ibu</td>
<td>Staff of Bidang Pemberdayaan Perempuan</td>
<td>19/08/05</td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nona, Ibu</td>
<td>Staff for gender projects, PDT (Ministry for Development of Disadvantaged Regions)</td>
<td>14/03/06</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noryuni, Annie</td>
<td>Head of the sub-bidang for increasing women's 'human resources', Bidang Perempuan (regional office of MOWE) in Bandung</td>
<td>01/08/05</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parawansa, Khofifah Indar</td>
<td>Parliamentarian, former head of MOWE</td>
<td>25/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy, Ibu</td>
<td>Staff of Kowani</td>
<td>02/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purwani, Tuti</td>
<td>Head of the Kantor Pemberdayaan Perempuan</td>
<td>15/08/05</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahmawati, Anna</td>
<td>Pusat Studi Wanita, Faculty at UPN Veteran Yogyakarta</td>
<td>16/08/05</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Renosari, Gondon Putri</td>
<td>UNFPA officer at MOWE</td>
<td>25/07/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risman, Pak</td>
<td>BKKBN Advocacy Director, Jakarta</td>
<td>22/08/02</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rono, Dr. Hanni</td>
<td>Seminar on RH for Bandung</td>
<td>11/07/02</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Lecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sakundarini, Novita</td>
<td>Pusat Studi Wanita, Faculty at UPN Veteran Yogyakarta</td>
<td>16/08/05</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samekto, Pak</td>
<td>BKKBN Advocacy Division</td>
<td>02/08/02</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saut, Pak</td>
<td>BKKBN Advocacy Division</td>
<td>02/08/02</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siregar, Herman</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy, Gender Mainstreaming Division, MOWE</td>
<td>04/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siregar, Mahendra</td>
<td>Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, Government of Indonesia, Jakarta</td>
<td>22/08/02</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soebekti, Susi</td>
<td>Head of Pokja IV (workgroup), PKK</td>
<td>24/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soeparman, Surjadi</td>
<td>Deputy for Gender Mainstreaming, MOWE</td>
<td>04/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soeparman, Surjadi</td>
<td>Deputy for Gender Mainstreaming, MOWE</td>
<td>22/07/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>meeting with CIDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soetjipto, Ani</td>
<td>Professor and author of a book on Indonesian women in politics</td>
<td>08/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solihin, Drs. H.</td>
<td>Head of DPCU Kabupaten Bandung</td>
<td>27/08/02</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stove, Andy</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer, US Embassy</td>
<td>17/09/04</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position and Details</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subagyo, Pak</td>
<td>Head of Planning and Foreign Cooperation Bureau, MOWE</td>
<td>26/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudrajat, Djadjat</td>
<td>Head of the Bidang Perempuan (regional office of MOWE) in Bandung</td>
<td>01/08/05</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supiandi, Yusuf</td>
<td>Deputy for Empowerment of Civil Society Institutions, MOWE</td>
<td>20/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview and presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tati, Ibu</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy for Gender Mainstreaming, MOWE</td>
<td>26/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuti, Ibu</td>
<td>Sub-division head for gender equality, Bidang Pemberdayaan Perempuan</td>
<td>19/08/05</td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utami, Sri Surya</td>
<td>Sub-division head for labour, Biro Pemberdayaan Perempuan</td>
<td>12/08/05</td>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgawati, Sari</td>
<td>Pusat Studi Wanita, Faculty at UPN Veteran Yogyakarta</td>
<td>16/08/05</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahyurini, Ernanti</td>
<td>Executive Secretary of MOWE</td>
<td>31/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widiyastuti, Sari</td>
<td>Coordinating Team for the Kantor Pemberdayaan Perempuan, Law professor</td>
<td>15/08/05</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Widodo, Hartati</td>
<td>Secretary for Pokja IV (workgroup), PKK</td>
<td>24/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiedarto, Pak</td>
<td>General Secretary for PKK Central</td>
<td>24/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiendarti, Ibu Dyn</td>
<td>Head of Pokja I (workgroup), PKK</td>
<td>24/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiwin, Ibu</td>
<td>MOWE Civil Servant, training at Gender Mainstreaming Seminar, <em>Kabupaten Bandung</em></td>
<td>27/08/02</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yayu, Ibu</td>
<td>MOWE Civil Servant, training at Gender Mainstreaming Seminar, <em>Kabupaten Bandung</em></td>
<td>27/08/02</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yenni, Ibu</td>
<td>UNFPA District Facilitator <em>Kabupaten Bandung</em></td>
<td>08/07, 10/07 and 27/08/02</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusfar, Nurni Husin</td>
<td>Head of Pokja II (workgroup) for PKK</td>
<td>24/08/05</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuyun, Ibu</td>
<td>MOWE Civil Servant, training at Gender Mainstreaming Seminar, <em>Kabupaten Bandung</em></td>
<td>27/08/02</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>FGD</td>
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</table>
### B.2 Meetings List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection of Meetings Attended</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reproductive Health Seminar, including NGOs and government officials</td>
<td>Kabupaten Bandung (Soereang)</td>
<td>11/07/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFPPD Meeting (Indonesian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development)</td>
<td>Indonesian Parliament, DPR assembly room</td>
<td>20/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering at Tegal Sumedang (Rancaekek, Kapubaten Bandung) of: GSI leaders, kaders, community leaders, BKKBN staff, and DF</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>27/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPCU &amp; DPCU Meeting, coordination for all West Java District Facilitators of UNFPA</td>
<td>Bapeda Bandung</td>
<td>28/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering at <em>Puskesmas</em> Kumisangan (Tasikmalaya) of: PLKBs, bidans, Health Department, BKKBN, UNFPA District Facilitator, and other healthworkers</td>
<td>Tasikmalaya</td>
<td>29/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering at <em>Puskesmas</em> Limbangan (Garut) of: PLKBs, bidans, Health Department, BKKBN, UNFPA District Facilitator, and other healthworkers</td>
<td>Garut</td>
<td>29/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q&amp;A session with BKKBN, MOWE, and Ministry of Health staff</td>
<td>DPCU Tasikmalaya, government offices in Tasik</td>
<td>30/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering at <em>Puskesmas</em> Manonjaya (Tasikmalaya) of: kaders, bidans, Doctors</td>
<td>Tasikmalaya</td>
<td>30/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering at <em>Puskesmas</em> Cisayong (Tasikmalaya) of: kaders, bidans, Doctors</td>
<td>Tasikmalaya</td>
<td>31/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Forum Komunikasi dengan Tokoh-Tokoh Peduli Politik, Organisasi Perempuan dan LSM yang Peduli Politik</em> (Communications Forum with Politically Concerned Parties, Women’s Organisations and Politically-active NGOs)</td>
<td>Cisarua, Bogor</td>
<td>20/07/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training session of government civil servants for gender mainstreaming</td>
<td>Hotel Millenium, Jakarta</td>
<td>20/07/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-annual meeting the Gender Mainstreaming (GMS) project, funded by UNFPA, including various government planning bureaus involved in GMS</td>
<td>MOWE, Jakarta</td>
<td>22/07/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pertemuan Dewan Pimpinan Kowani dengan Dewan Pertimbangan dan Tim Ahli Kowani</em> [Meeting of the Kowani Leaders with the Team of Kowani Consultants and Experts]</td>
<td>Kowani, Jakarta</td>
<td>08/08/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Diskusi Review Strategi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah (tema: Strategi Pemberdayaan Perempuan)</em> [Strategy Review for Regional Poverty Solutions (theme: Women’s Empowerment Strategies)]</td>
<td>Bapeda Rangkasbitung (Propinsi Lebak)</td>
<td>14/03/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering of NGOs (Martha Christina Tiahalui and Ikatan Muslimat Maluku), civil servants, and military discussing Women, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Ambon</td>
<td>Hotel Cipta, Jakarta</td>
<td>17/03/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering of NGOs working in Maluku, including: Humanum, Humanum - Jaringan Baileo Maluku, Penyintas Support Group, and Yayasan Suara Hati (Pemerhati Masalah Perempuan &amp; Anak)</td>
<td>Humanum offices, Ambon</td>
<td>20/03/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Symposium on Gender in Sustainable Development</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>22-25/09/04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Data Tables from Gender Interviews

### Q15. What is discussed related to the differences between women and men?[^164]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of sample (N=137)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=98)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=39)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rights/responsibilities</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37.23%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their position <em>(kedudukan)</em> in society, often related to work and</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32.12%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status/authority, including representation in government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sameness, equality, emancipation</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24.09%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17.52%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues, such as violence against women, reproductive health</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.60%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology, mental and emotional differences</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.76%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The body and morality</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.11%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^164]: These questions can be cross-referenced in their original Indonesian translation in Appendix D.

### Q16. In your opinion, what are the differences between men and women?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of sample (N=158)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=112)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=46)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Body</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>58.86%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31.65%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological difference</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29.11%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights/responsibilities</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25.32%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference perceived</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.43%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Q27. Who influences constructions of gender?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of response</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>% of sample (N=158)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>88.61%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examples from other people/society</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious teacher <em>(imam, guru agama)</em></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Self and 'natural'</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher <em>(guru)</em></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own wishes and experiences</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>External environment</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>60.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one taught, ‘just the way it is’</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (books, teaching)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (books, school)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV and the mass media</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^164]: These questions can be cross-referenced in their original Indonesian translation in Appendix D.
**Q24. What does religion teach about gender and women’s role?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General theme of reply</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>Grouping the categories</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>% of sample (N=143)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wives should obey, honour, and respect their husbands</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>The wife’s role in the family: to obey and honour the husband and to care for the children</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41.96%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s role revolves around raising the children and being centrally useful to the family and the household</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should know ‘their place’ in the hierarchy, behind men (e.g. not in leadership), as well as the limitations and restrictions <em>(batasan)</em> placed on women</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Women as subordinate in a gender hierarchy</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proper roles/tasks for men and women <em>(peran/tugas)</em>.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Roles and responsibilities of both sexes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to rights and responsibilities</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on women being pure, clean, polite, and <em>solehah</em> <em>(virtuous)</em></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on being the ‘good wife’ <em>(istri baik)</em> and a ‘good woman’ <em>(perempuan baik)</em></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>The ‘pure and good’ woman</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should cover their heads and wear modest dress</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men and women are equal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Equality and mutual respect between the sexes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be mutual respect and love between husbands and wives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be honoured and protected</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Focus on protecting and honouring women</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husbands should love their wives (and provide for and protect them)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That inheritance rules for men and women differ</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Q26. What influences the construction of these gender roles?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General theme of reply:</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>Grouping the # of replies sample</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notion of what ‘should be’ regarding how to have a happy and harmonious family</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>How gender ‘ought’ to be to achieve a particular vision, as learned through comparisons to others</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on comparisons to other people, seeing other people’s gender roles</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One’s own desires</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Internalised desires and needs, the ‘natural state’ of gender</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having children and needing to educate them</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Kodrat’ and the way things exist naturally (instinct)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The age’ (jaman sekarang) and current era</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>More ‘abstract’ external influences</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture/social rules</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate environment (lingkungan) and education</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>More ‘concrete’ external influences</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life experience</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents/family</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q31. Describe your spouse. How close are you with your spouse?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the spouse</th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>% of women (N=75 for description; N=89 for closeness)</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>% of men (N=30 for description; N=37 for closeness)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generally positive description of the spouse</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>86.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive overall but with disclaimers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21.33%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally negative description of the spouse</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Closeness of the spousal relationship                                               |                  |       |                                                     |     |                                                   |
| The relationship is very close (akrab sekali/sangat akrab)                          | 58               | 38    | 42.70%                                             | 20  | 54.05%                                             |
| The relationship is close (akrab)                                                   | 55               | 39    | 43.82%                                             | 16  | 43.24%                                             |
| The relationship is close enough (cukup akrab)                                      | 6                | 6     | 6.74%                                              | 0   | 0.00%                                              |
| The relationship is not close (tidak akrab/kurang akrab)                            | 7                | 6     | 6.74%                                              | 1   | 2.70%                                              |

---

165 Some of the research assistants preferred to pose the question as ‘what influences your hopes for these gender roles’ instead of more directly ‘what influences these gender roles’. This softer approach aimed to link influences with desires such that people could express why they chose the gender roles as they did, rather than having to answer in such a way that may have indicated their gender roles were ‘imposed’ on them.
**Q28. Do you feel free to make decisions in the home? Outside the home?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>% of women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>% of men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=103 for inside the home; N=59 for outside)</td>
<td>(N=116)</td>
<td>(N=50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES inside the home</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>86.41%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>80.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO inside the home</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.59%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES outside the home</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>64.41%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>82.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO outside the home</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35.59%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse has a say / gives permission</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends on context</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q29. How are decisions made in the house, if there is something important to be determined?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>% of women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>% of men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=166)</td>
<td>(N=116)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musyawarah</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>51.20%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47.41%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion, exchanging thoughts, democratic decision made together</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34.94%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36.21%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man decides ultimately</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.45%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.34%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman decides ultimately</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.42%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.23%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.76%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q30. How is income managed to meet household needs? Who holds the money?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # of responses</th>
<th>% of total (N=149 for control of money; N=140 for household management)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who holds the money?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife holds the money</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>69.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband holds the money</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both hold the money</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife holds her money, husband holds his (each keeps his/her own)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is the household managed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband gives money to wife and she manages</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife manages house, man holds some money</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife manages the house</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both in charge to some degree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man more in charge</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specific way they use the money</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22.86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Q32. In your opinion, should husbands help their wives around the house more often?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of total (N=157)</th>
<th>Women % of women (N=111)</th>
<th>Men % of men (N=46)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes he should</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>44.59%</td>
<td>46.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes but with provisions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.46%</td>
<td>11.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No he shouldn't</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37.58%</td>
<td>43.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They work together (saling kerja)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure, or it depends</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.46%</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Q33. Should your husband help more around the house? / [addressing the man] Should you yourself help your wife more around the house?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of total (N=147)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=104)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=43)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes he should</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.93%</td>
<td>28.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes ‘in theory’ but with provisions</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18.37%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No he should not / he does enough</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25.17%</td>
<td>30.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No but with provisions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.44%</td>
<td>6.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They already work together (saling kerja), husband does a lot/ enough</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.12%</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man already helps, if rarely or occasionally only</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.24%</td>
<td>14.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will not happen, man will not help</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
<td>3.85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Q34. Please explain the division of household chores – what is done by the woman, what is done by the man?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=156)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=111)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=45)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General explanation that there is some division of chores (non-specific)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19.23%</td>
<td>22.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No division of chores/ ‘flexible’</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16.03%</td>
<td>20.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman does everything</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.90%</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man does ‘odds and ends’, sometimes (kadang-kadang), plays a back up role</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.51%</td>
<td>21.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man does ‘harder’ (lebih berat) jobs woman can’t do, like fixing things</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.31%</td>
<td>14.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man does ‘outside’ jobs (e.g. driving kids) or sweeping the grounds</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>18.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man does the washing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.82%</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman does the cooking</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>45.51%</td>
<td>50.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of an egalitarian divide / working together</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.41%</td>
<td>8.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive help from the servant (pembantu)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.41%</td>
<td>9.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q38. Are women and men differentiated in society, the economy, politics, and other fields?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=154)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=45)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes they are differentiated</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>64.29% 69</td>
<td>63.30% 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No they are equal</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35.71% 40</td>
<td>36.70% 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis placed on kodrat / bodies/ nature</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.79% 6</td>
<td>5.50% 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiated in the economy / workplace</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24.68% 30</td>
<td>27.52% 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiated in the political field</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18.18% 23</td>
<td>21.10% 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment made regarding how things have changed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.34% 16</td>
<td>14.68% 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q39. Is there gender equality, balance between the position of men and women?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=152)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=43)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes there is equality</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>82.24% 88</td>
<td>80.73% 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No there is not equality</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.76% 21</td>
<td>19.27% 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis placed on kodrat / bodies/ nature</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.26% 5</td>
<td>4.59% 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to the economy / workplace</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25.00% 28</td>
<td>25.69% 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to the political field</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.84% 12</td>
<td>11.01% 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q40. Are there still biases in the legal system against women?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total % of sample (N=155)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=109)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=46)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes there is bias</td>
<td>106 68.39%</td>
<td>79 72.48%</td>
<td>25 54.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No there is not bias</td>
<td>49 31.61%</td>
<td>30 27.52%</td>
<td>19 41.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The law is soft on women</td>
<td>15 9.68%</td>
<td>11 10.09%</td>
<td>4 8.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central problem is related to laws for rape/ violence/ harassment</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25.16% 31</td>
<td>28.44% 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q43. Is it also important to have more women in the business realm and the economy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=155)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Penting</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>74.84% 86</td>
<td>77.48% 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not penting</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25.16% 25</td>
<td>22.52% 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The question is about capability; quality is more important</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.74% 8</td>
<td>7.21% 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s good qualities for business</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.65% 20</td>
<td>18.02% 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s bad qualities for business</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.45% 4</td>
<td>3.60% 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summing up discussion of qualities: (character/quality of women whether good or bad + discussing issue of ‘mampu’ in general)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>34.84% 32</td>
<td>28.83% 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women join the economy to help family and husband</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.55% 19</td>
<td>17.12% 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

376
### Q36. Generally, what problems are faced by women in this area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems related to:</th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>Women % of sample</th>
<th>Men % of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy / work</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>43.84%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.38%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence/ VAW / sexual harassment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.70%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s rights / position / inequality</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.33%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare issues (education and kenakalan, children’s misbehaviour)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.27%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trouble with men (specifically men not fulfilling their role)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.59%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (including: religion-2, political representation-1, corruption-2, divorce-1)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No problems</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.48%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society/ lingkungan (environment)/ culture</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.79%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s psychology (e.g. too emotional, too much gossiping)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.79%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household problems</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.11%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Q45. What should be done by the government for women’s empowerment?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>Women % of sample</th>
<th>Men % of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic sphere</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21.19%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political sphere/ policy creation</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20.53%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (penyuluhan etc)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17.22%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect women, especially their rights</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.27%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (very generic, non-specific)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>43.05%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes on Q45

Two points can be made. First is the discrepancy in emphasis between men and women concerning education and the economy, and how this contributed to the overall portrait of the government’s role. Men tended to lay greater stress on education; however, rather than simply using the word ‘pendidikan’ for education, it tended to be referenced as ‘penyuluhan’, meaning illumination, offering elucidation, the idea of a light permeating darkness. This was combined with repeated comments about the government looking at social problems from below, ‘bawah’; there was a clear distancing such that the problems existed ‘below’ and in outlying regions. Word choice here was specific, combining to paint a portrait of a parental figure at the top needing to target those in the ‘bawah’, to facilitate and motivate until they are more ‘semangat’ (energised). Instead of memimpin (leading) and pendidikan (education), the words used more frequently were membimbing (leading by hand) and penyuluhan (illuminating). These words portray a situation where women are not in need of ‘hard’ leadership and education, but must rather to be taken by the hand, inspired and given motivation, then allowed to have knowledge permeate their ‘internal’ darkness.

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166 This category included the very broad statements made about the government ‘helping women’, or ‘empowering women’, or simply ‘making things better’, with no specific explanation of how this would be done.
Q41. What does it mean to increase the quality of life for women? What changes should this ‘increase’ include?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External ‘hard’ factors (61.5% of 330 responses)</th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of total (N=154)</th>
<th>Women % of women (N=110)</th>
<th>Men % of men (N=44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>43.51%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy / work</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37.66%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household / children</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.64%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living standards (taraf hidup)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.99%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill / knowledge</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.39%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.19%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social environment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political representation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External social factors (13% of 330 responses)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm/mindset of society, especially men</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.04%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse inequality/ hierarchy/ change relative position of women</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.74%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion / morals</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.79%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal factors (24% of 330 responses)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve women’s potential, self-confidence, awareness, choice</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35.06%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should know her role / her place</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.44%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s independence (mandiri)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.79%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on Q41

The first set of responses is typical of most government programmes: targets such as improvements to education, economic access, living standards, health, and welfare. The other substantial answers relate to more ‘internal factors’: how women themselves needed improved potential, confidence, self-awareness, and independence (only 24% of the total responses, but over half of all respondents at 51%). Yet within these internal factors, there was mention of women ‘knowing their place’ which was then seen as improving overall conditions. For instance, one man said women needed to be ‘positioned in accordance with their kodrat as women’, as this would lead to their receiving ‘respect, protection and direction’ (Respondent #150). This resonated through many of the responses, showing the contradictory and demanding position in which women are placed. One man explained that women needed to change from being just housewives to becoming ‘housewives with a financial contribution to the family without needing a specific title or position’; this required a change on their part both of their ‘pola pikir’ (mindset) and their actions (Respondent #96). More demands are placed on women to take up the ‘double burden’ of housework and external jobs, but women are not supposed to use this for additional authority or ‘titles’. Another woman noted that women needed to change this ‘pola pikir’ from being ‘traditional and only thinking of children’ to being ‘modern and thinking of family welfare’ (Respondent #101). This reinforces women’s domestic role but implies greater responsibility, while tying ‘modernity’ to overall management of the family in greater capacity, often through work outside the home and therefore income.
Q48. What do you discuss about sex with your friends?  
Q49. What do you discuss about sex with your family?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discussing sex with FRIENDS</th>
<th>Discussing sex with FAMILY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total % (N = 153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not talk about sex at all</td>
<td>33 21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk about reproductive health and the body</td>
<td>17 11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss morals, sex education, ethics</td>
<td>4 2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q50. What are general views of sex?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex as …</th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=154)</th>
<th>Wome n % of sample (N=108)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=46)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure, value of sex, importance; Sex as ‘love-making’ and pleasure</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29.22%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something needing to be or not to be discussed; Sex as information</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24.03%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something between husband and wife (outside forbidden); Sex as marriage-only</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21.43%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical aspects (basic, direct), Sex as biological need</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.83%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodrat, from God, with purpose of bearing children; Sex as holy responsibility</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.04%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems w sex (e.g. free sex) morality of sex, boundaries; Sex as problematic and bounded</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.14%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Q58. Who has the ability to make decisions about sex: women or men?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=155)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=109)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=46)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.16%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>54.19%</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q59. Who usually makes the decision about when to have sex, the husband or the wife?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=149)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=104)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=45)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.70%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>42.95%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>52.35%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q60. Who usually makes the decision about when to have a child?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=144)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=101)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=43)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.97%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>61.81%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65.35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q35. Are women in Indonesia already empowered, not empowered, or somewhat empowered by needing more progress?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses (N=165)</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=115)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=49)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Already empowered</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.90%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowered but needing more advancement</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>63.23%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not yet empowered</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29.68%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q62. Do you yourself feel empowered?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses (N=162)</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=114)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=48)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>76.54%</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>74.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18.52%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.94%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on Q62
It is interesting to note the diversity of reasons offered for why a person did or did not feel empowered. For example, reasons people felt empowered included: being able to stand by one’s principles and not be embarrassed to admit error (Respondent #151), having a strong faith and religious conviction (Respondents #65, 71), feeling respected and supported by the local community (Respondents #97, 153, 154), having a commitment with her husband that there could never be any physical violence in their home (Respondent #18), or more simply being able to face problems as they arise (Respondent #123). Even given the different ways people might express their experience of empowerment, there remained some consistent themes. A number of women stressed their ability to care for their children and their household as evidence of their sense of empowerment (Respondents #17, 105, 122, 146). Yet the women who cited a lack of empowerment tended to point to the fact that they did not have jobs or income (Respondents #23, 29, 88, 99, 112, 148). Men, on the other hand, consistently pointed to their ability to work and provide economically for their families as proof they felt empowered (Respondents #8, 108, 109, 124, 129, 145). Both men and women also commented on their education as important, such as the man who noted that it was clear he must be empowered as he had gone through higher education and had a PhD (Respondent #61), or the woman who felt her empowerment was based on high education levels that allowed her to be a teacher (Respondent #91).
**Q61. What does empowerment mean to you?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total # responses (N=156)</th>
<th>Women (N=111)</th>
<th>Men (N=45)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functioning</strong> (<em>mampu</em> and able to do something)</td>
<td>47 30.13%</td>
<td>37 33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities</strong> (<em>kemampuan, potensi, bisa</em>), inherently capable</td>
<td>35 22.44%</td>
<td>25 22.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total category for <em>kemampuan/mampu</em> as both capabilities and functioning</strong></td>
<td>82 52.56%</td>
<td>62 55.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The freedom to act, to self-actualise, independence</strong></td>
<td>32 20.51%</td>
<td>27 24.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strength</strong> (<em>kekuatan</em>)</td>
<td>28 17.95%</td>
<td>23 20.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Being of use</strong> (<em>berguna, bermanfaat</em>), providing for others and particularly the family</td>
<td>28 17.95%</td>
<td>20 18.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taking specific action, advancing, acting</strong></td>
<td>10 6.41%</td>
<td>6 5.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>An outside measure, particularly that of gender equality</strong></td>
<td>10 6.41%</td>
<td>6 5.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy</strong> (<em>semangat, tenaga</em>)</td>
<td>6 3.85%</td>
<td>3 2.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>14 8.97%</td>
<td>7 6.31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes on Q61**

The word most commonly used, *kemampuan*, translates as both capabilities and functionality. I had initially put *‘kemampuan’* under only one category, but when I saw that it was being used in two different ways I went through the responses again and re-coded to differentiate between capabilities and functioning. For instance, one respondent said that empowerment meant *‘mampu dan mempunyai kemampuan’* (able and having capabilities) (Respondent #65), which was coded under capabilities; another noted it meant *‘mampu untuk melakukan sesuatu’* (able to do something) (Respondent #123), which was coded under functioning. Interestingly enough, these two words fit into Amartya Sen’s notion of the ‘capability approach’, where there are differences between the *‘realised functionings’* (what a person is actually able to do) [and] the *‘capability set of alternatives’* she has (her real opportunities) (Sen 1999: 75, emphasis in the original). In essence, this Indonesian word bridges the two, and the Indonesian respondents here tended to express empowerment most frequently by reference to what is ostensibly this bridge between capabilities and functioning.

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167 Additionally, the root word *‘mampu’* means more than just ‘capable and able’; it also has an economic basis, and can be translated as ‘afford’, so someone who is *‘kurang mampu’* (not *mampu*, less than *mampu*) is understood to be poor.
Q70. **What does it mean to become ‘modern’ in thinking?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=156)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=112)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being ‘maju’, ‘berkembang’ (blooming, thriving, expanding)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31.41%</td>
<td>34 30.36%</td>
<td>15 34.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being educated, free thinking, open-minded (berpikiran terbuka, luas)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23.08%</td>
<td>29 25.89%</td>
<td>7 15.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following the age, the era, change with the times</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.59%</td>
<td>22 19.64%</td>
<td>7 15.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing but able to resist an outside influence (e.g. the West, and religious decline)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.46%</td>
<td>15 13.39%</td>
<td>6 13.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being more open to change and difference, new things, flexible</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.82%</td>
<td>16 14.29%</td>
<td>4 9.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using rational, logical thinking and analysis</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.69%</td>
<td>8 7.14%</td>
<td>4 9.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking to the future</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.41%</td>
<td>7 6.25%</td>
<td>3 6.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being free, democratic, more liberal, not conservative (kolot)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.77%</td>
<td>6 5.36%</td>
<td>3 6.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using more positive, using creative thinking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.13%</td>
<td>5 4.46%</td>
<td>3 6.82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q66. **What is causing these changes in society?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>% of sample (N=165)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=116)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=49)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass media, information, info technology</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60.61%</td>
<td>71 61.21%</td>
<td>29 59.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of outsiders, outside culture especially Western</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21.82%</td>
<td>28 24.14%</td>
<td>8 16.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral decline, increase in free sex (pergaulan), declining religion</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17.58%</td>
<td>16 13.79%</td>
<td>13 26.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘modern era’, change in the era (‘kemajuan jaman’)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.52%</td>
<td>16 13.79%</td>
<td>3 6.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation, global culture</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.27%</td>
<td>4 3.45%</td>
<td>8 16.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in thinking (pola pikir, pandangan, paradigms)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
<td>10 8.62%</td>
<td>0 0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.42%</td>
<td>4 3.45%</td>
<td>0 0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

383
Q68. Are there changes you hope to see for women more generally?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired changes for women</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Grouping the categories</th>
<th># of replies</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved external position and measure, better equality (and thus improved quality of life)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15.92%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved education for women</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.83%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better position economically, right to work and be equal in the workplace and responsibilities</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention paid to women’s rights</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s self-actualisation, empowerment, independence</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17.83%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of women’s awareness, perspectives, knowledge</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s role as mothers and wives, their <em>kodrat</em>, reasserted</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.47%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced moral virtue, more focus on religion</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.64%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s dress and appearance to be more modest</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.46%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on Q68

The dominant category related to changes in the external, social position of women, including positive impacts in education and the economy. These are areas in which development interventions focus attention, as they are concrete and can be targeted by institutions and programmes. However, as has been noted in Chapter Two related to empowerment interventions, the internal aspect of empowerment – the ‘conscientisation’ – is also a significant component, as more than a third of respondents highlighted this notion of ‘inner’ progress for women. The third major category related to the reassertion of women’s roles as wives and mothers in the context of a society perceived to be moving away from these roles. For instance, one respondent said that she preferred to see women of the previous era, who were more ‘*sopan dan terarah*’: polite and directed, guided (Respondent #152). Even within these three areas, therefore, there is a complex interrelationship of reinforcement: the emphasis on a ‘return to virtue’ for women correlates to the increasing prominence of women in the public sphere and perceptions of how this has eroded their more ‘traditional’ roles. This explains why many respondents would make comments much like one man from Surabaya, saying that he hoped to see women have improved quality of life and become more independent, educated, and aware – but only to insofar as this allowed them to better reveal and open up their roles as mothers (Respondent #93).
Q69. Are there changes you hope to see regarding gender equality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equality of outcome (concrete change)</th>
<th>Total # responses</th>
<th>Total % of sample (N=156)</th>
<th>Women % of sample (N=110)</th>
<th>Men % of sample (N=46)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality of outcome (concrete change)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31.41%</td>
<td>39 35.45%</td>
<td>10 21.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-specific ‘should be better’</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.31%</td>
<td>17 15.45%</td>
<td>10 21.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of opportunity (ability, mampu, rights)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16.03%</td>
<td>16 14.55%</td>
<td>9 19.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s position/ morality/ kodrat, importance of keeping gender roles in place (and in play)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16.03%</td>
<td>18 16.36%</td>
<td>7 15.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s internal perspectives need to change</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.97%</td>
<td>11 10.00%</td>
<td>3 6.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation is already good enough now</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>8 7.27%</td>
<td>5 10.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on Q69

As with the previous question, the greatest number of respondents pointed to a concrete change to achieve greater equality of outcome – external and structural – while a significant number also pointed to improving equality of opportunity – internal and motivational. Yet there were some differences, as men were more likely to advocate general improvements and equality of opportunity, whereas women saw the need for more direct changes to equality of outcome. This points to the issue of a power hierarchy and underlying fears that gender ‘equality’ means women will advance at men’s expense. Recognising this is important, for a number of respondents addressed concern for men’s relative position. For instance, one woman pointed out that because men needed to provide for their families and were struggling to find jobs, instead of providing opportunities for women to work the government should focus on improving the business field for men (Respondent #1). This demonstrates the point that gender is not about projects for women as so typically assumed, but constructions of masculinity and roles are similarly relevant. Further, there remains tension between the way gender equality is sometimes posed as ‘sameness’ for men and women, while so often gender difference is assumed to be completely natural. So, for example, it is argued that to have gender equality ‘women have to be the same as men, whether in the family or in society’ (Respondent #84), contrasted against those who say that there will never be gender equality because ‘it seems that no matter how things change women’s and men’s roles will still be different’ (Respondent #23).
Appendix D: Interview Questions

**Background data**
1. Nama anda?
2. Umur anda?
3. Status berkeluarga?
4. Lama anda tinggal di daerah ini?
5. Asal tempat tinggal anda?
6. Tingkat pendidikan anda?
7. Jurusan (pada pendidikan tinggi) yang anda ambil?
8. Apakah anda bekerja (punya penghasilan)?
9. Jika ya, apa yang anda kerjakan?
10. Apa kewajiban dan tanggung jawab sosial anda?
11. Kepada siapa?

**Gender Roles**
12. Pernahkah anda mendengar tentang jender?
13. Di mana anda mendengarnya?
14. Pernahkah anda mendengar debat/pembahasan mengenai perbedaan antara perempuan dan laki-laki?
15. Apa yang dibahas?
16. Menurut anda, apa perbedaan antara perempuan dan laki-laki?
17. Peran apa yang diharapkan dari seorang perempuan sebagai istri?
18. Sebagai ibu?
19. Peran apa yang diharapkan dari seorang laki-laki sebagai suami?
20. Sebagai ayah?

**The construction of gender roles: Religion, Culture, and the Family**
21. Apa agama anda?
22. Bagaimana anda menghayati keyakinan anda?
23. Dengan cara apa agama menjadi bagian dari hidup anda?
24. Agama mengajarkan apa tentang jender – tentang peran perempuan?
25. Apa yang lebih mempengaruhi jender dan peranan perempuan – agama atau kebudayaan? Kenapa?
26. Apa yang mempengaruhi pengharapan terhadap peran-peran tersebut?
27. Siapa yang mengajarkan bagaimana seharusnya perempuan dan laki-laki itu?

**Women’s Status in the Home: Decision-Making in the Domestic**
28. Apakah anda merasa memiliki kebebasan untuk membuat keputusan di dalam rumah? Di luar?
29. Bagaimana keputusan dibuat di rumah anda, bila ada sesuatu yang dianggap penting untuk diputuskan?
30. Cara apa saja dipakai untuk membagi penghasilan dan mencukupi kebutuhan rumah? Siapa yang pegang uangnya?
31. Ceritakan tentang suami (istri) anda. Seberapa akrab anda dengan suami (istri) anda?
32. Menurut anda, apakah seorang suami seharusnya lebih sering membantu istrinya di rumah?
33. Apakah suami anda seharusnya juga lebih sering membantu anda di rumah?/Apakah bapak sendiri seharusnya juga lebih sering membantu ibu di rumah?
34. Tolong jelaskan pembagian tugas domestik (dalam rumah) – apa yang dilakukan ibu, apa yang dilakukan bapak?

**Women’s Status in Society: Empowerment, Quality of Life, and Government Intervention**

35. Pemerintah Indonesia ada Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan. Apakah anda pikir bahwa perempuan di Indonesia sudah ‘berdaya’ atau tidak, atau mungkin sudah berdaya tapi perlu kemajuan lagi?
36. Secara umum, masalah-masalah apa saja yang dihadapi perempuan di daerah ini?
37. Dapatkan anda menjelaskan sejumlah kasus, contoh dari masalah-masalah tersebut?
38. Apakah perempuan dan laki-laki diberdayakan di masyarakat, ekonomi, politik dan lain-lain?
40. Apakah masih ada masalah di bidang hukum dengan bias terhadap perempuan?

**MOVED**

41. Apa artinya ‘peningkatan kualitas hidup perempuan’? Kalau peningkatan itu harus termasuk perubahan apa saja?
42. Untuk peningkatan kondisi perempuan, pendidikan itu penting?
43. Apakah penting juga untuk adanya lebih banyak perempuan di bidang bisnis dan perekonomian?
44. Apakah pemerintah Indonesia seharusnya bekerja untuk pemberdayaan perempuan, atau lebih baik dari kaum/lembaga lain (misalnya dari LSM atau kaum Islam)?
45. Apa yang harus dilakukan oleh pemerintah?

**Sex, Bodies, Power**

46. Apakah seks merupakan hal yang tabu untuk dibicarakan?
47. Secara umum, apa yang dibicarakan orang-orang di sini tentang seks?
48. Apa yang anda bicarakan dengan teman-teman tentang seks?
49. Apa yang anda bicarakan dengan anggota keluarga tentang seks?
50. Bagaimana pandangan tentang seks?
51. Seharusnya menyenangkankah seks itu?
52. Apakah seks lebih penting untuk laki-laki atau perempuan, atau sama? Kenapa?
53. Perlukah remaja mendapat pendidikan mengenai seks?
54. Adakah perbedaan antara tubuh dengan jiwa (lahir dan batin)?
55. Jika ya, tolong jelaskan pendapat anda?
56. Siapa yang mempunyai hak untuk membuat keputusan atas tubuh anda?
57. Apakah anda merasa “memiliki” tubuh anda?
58. Siapa yang punya kemampuan untuk mengambil keputusan tentang seks – perempuan atau laki-laki?
59. Siapa yang biasanya membuat keputusan mengenai kapan ada berhubungan seks dengan suami/istri?
60. Siapa yang biasanya membuat keputusan mengenai kapan memperoleh anak?
61. Kalau ‘berdaya’ itu artinya apa saja untuk anda?
62. Apakah anda sendiri merasa berdaya? Kenapa iya atau tidak?
Modernity and the Future: Visions of Change and ‘Progress’

63. Saat ini semakin banyak perempuan memperoleh pendidikan, pekerjaan, dan mereka tidak lagi banyak berada di rumah bersama anak-anak (tidak seperti generasi sebelumnya). Bagaimana pendapat anda mengenai hal ini?
64. Adakah hubungan antara hal tersebut di atas (kedudukan perempuan) dengan peran perempuan?
65. Jaman modern lebih terbuka kepada hal-hal mengenai seks, atau tidak? Yaitu ada perubahan pikiran tentang seks di kebudayaan Indonesia?
66. Apa penyebab perubahan ini dalam masyarakat?
67. Adakah perubahan pengertian dan perilaku mengenai seks di kalangan remaja masa kini? Apakah suatu hal yang umum bagi remaja untuk berhubungan seks, dibandingkan dengan remaja generasi sebelumnya?
68. Adakah perubahan yang anda harapkan mengenai perempuan secara umum?
69. Mengenai kesetaraan jender?
70. Menjadi ‘modern’ dalam pikiran itu artinya apa?
71. Hubungan jender yang ‘modern’, apakah itu berbeda dengan hubungan jender yang tradisional? Bisa dijelaskan?
Appendix E: List of Respondents with Brief Biographical Data

The following data is self-disclosed information, accounting for differences in employment descriptions. All information was current for August-September 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent #</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age (yrs)</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Family status</th>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 1 child</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>Works at a store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #3)</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>Works at a private factory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #2)</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #5)</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #4)</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Junior lawyer at a legal consulting bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #7)</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Staff working on taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #6)</td>
<td>Diploma (D3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #9)</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>Sells at a local market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #8)</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Works in sales (has a small store in the home)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #11)</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #10)</td>
<td>Masters degree</td>
<td>Police officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #13)</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>Works at a store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #12)</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>Chauffeur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Not married</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Works for the national banking bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 1 child</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Entrepreneur in sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 1 child</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Started own business selling Muslim clothes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 2 children</td>
<td>Diploma (D1)</td>
<td>Doctor and research assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 2 children</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 1 child</td>
<td>Diploma (D3)</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Not married</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #22) with 3 children (and 1 deceased)</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Sells snack foods she has made herself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #21) with 3 children (and 1 deceased)</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #24) with 4 children</td>
<td>Diploma (D1)</td>
<td>Opened a warung (local store) and manage a beauty salon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #23) with 4 children</td>
<td>High School (some University, never finished)</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #26) with 2 children</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #25) with 2 children</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Pensioner (from a factory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #28) with 1 child</td>
<td>Diploma (D3)</td>
<td>Works at a hospital as a nutrition advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #27) with 1 child</td>
<td>Diploma (D3)</td>
<td>Owns a handphone outlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #30) with 1 child</td>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>Makes 'lontong' (rice wrapped in banana leaf) and sells that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #29) with 1 child</td>
<td>Diploma (STM)</td>
<td>Motorcycle repairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married (to respondent #32) with 1 child</td>
<td>Diploma (D1)</td>
<td>Teacher at a children’s playgroup, selling clothes at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married to respondent #31 with 1 child</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Marketing staff in a national credit bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 1 child</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>Works with an organisation researching maternal and child health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Not married</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Works an organisation researching maternal and child health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Widowed, married 3 times with 1 child</td>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>Pensioner, but still takes cooking jobs, previously worked as a seamstress, caterer, and chef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Widowed with 5 children</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Pensioner, previously employed as a school principal and teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Not married</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Nutritional staff at a hospital (having just finished work at a Muslim clothing store)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Not married</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Works at a Muslim clothing store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Married with 3 children</td>
<td>High School (some University, never finished)</td>
<td>Opened a training course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Not married</td>
<td>Diploma (D3)</td>
<td>Teaching a course on skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 3 children</td>
<td>Diploma (D3)</td>
<td>Trying to start a business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<td>Diploma (D3)</td>
<td>Trying to start a catering business</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>Diploma (D3)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>Masters degree</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>Counselor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Widowed with 6 children</td>
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<td>Self employed in selling</td>
</tr>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Advocate and legal consultant</td>
</tr>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Involved in a leadership training business with joint venture capital (along with other friends)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>Administrator at a printing office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Teacher for middle school, involved in fishery</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Sells building materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Islam</td>
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<td>Sells small snacks out of the home</td>
</tr>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>Married</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>High School</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Married with 4 children</td>
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<td>Hindu</td>
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<td>PhD</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>Works at the local university</td>
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<td>Widowed with 3 children</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>Makes cakes and sells them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Islam</td>
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<td>High School (further diploma studies, never finished)</td>
<td>Entrepreneur, selling rice and porridge every morning</td>
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<td>PhD</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<td>67</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Organiser for a research branch at the local university</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 2 children</td>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Manager of a local radio station</td>
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<td>Yogyakarta</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married twice with 2 children</td>
<td>Elementary School (only till Grade 2)</td>
<td>House servant (pembantu)</td>
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<td>Married 3 times, 4 children (and 1 deceased)</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Widowed with 4 children</td>
<td>Elementary School (and some madrasah/religious school)</td>
<td>Makes cakes and sells them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 1 child</td>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>Labourer and house servant (in four locations)</td>
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392
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Gender</th>
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<td>73</td>
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<td>High School (some further technical training, never finished)</td>
<td>Seamstress</td>
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<td>Teacher</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Manager at local company</td>
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<td>76</td>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>Civil servant covering health issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
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<td>Masters degree</td>
<td>Professor (former government legislator)</td>
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<td>Dean at university</td>
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<td>PhD</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<td>81</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
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<td>Technical diploma (banking)</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Islam</td>
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<td>High School</td>
<td>Entrepreneur, selling food with her husband</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>High School</td>
<td>Entrepreneur, the owner of a travel agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>87</td>
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<td>High School</td>
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<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Married with 2 children</td>
<td>Masters degree</td>
<td>Professor, also opened a store and a depot to refill drinking water</td>
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<tr>
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<td>High School</td>
<td>Works in home catering (snacks)</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>Works in accounting and purchasing</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>50</td>
<td>Islam</td>
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<td>High School</td>
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<tr>
<td>129</td>
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<td>130</td>
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<td>131</td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>High School</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Islam</td>
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<td>High School</td>
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<tr>
<td>148</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<tr>
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<td>163</td>
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<td>Widowed with 2 children</td>
<td>High School</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Widowed with 5 step-children</td>
<td>Technical training (skills)</td>
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</table>
Appendix F: Lukes on Power and Empowerment

Theorising power is central to how we approach the subjects of gender and development, with its modern emphasis on ‘empowerment’ as a strategy linking the two. A recent book, *Rethinking Empowerment*, argues that the empowerment approach needs to reassert the conceptual and practical centrality of ‘power’ to development projects targeted at women, particularly more nuanced, feminist interpretations thereof (Parpart *et al.* 2003). The dissertation has already drawn on Foucault’s conception of power and how it helps to explain aspects of development projects and the state, as well as Bourdieu’s understanding of ‘power-worked-on-bodies’ and how this relates to gender identities. Here we incorporate the perspectives of one other theorist: Steven Lukes. He is a useful counterpart to Foucault and Bourdieu, particularly helpful when drawing linkages to the field of ‘empowerment’ as a strategic gender intervention. We first recall the matrix linking these theorists, and then summarise Lukes’ conception.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis Chapters</th>
<th>Michel Foucault</th>
<th>Pierre Bourdieu</th>
<th>Steven Lukes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Three:</strong> Discourses (Ideas)</td>
<td>Discourse/epistemes (programmes of power: defining forms of knowledge and discourses about objects of knowledge)</td>
<td>Symbolic order (how durable cultural expressions of gender difference are naturalised and organise social life)</td>
<td>2(^{nd}) dimension of power (agenda setting, constructing the field of knowledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Four:</strong> Institutions</td>
<td>Governmentality/technologies of power (apparatuses of power designed to implement knowledge)</td>
<td>Practice (unconscious ‘rules of the game’ which mediate between the more ‘objective’ field and the habitus; the social practice of gender differentiation)</td>
<td>1(^{st}) dimension (power over, concrete action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Five:</strong> Identities</td>
<td>Biopower/the ethics of the self (the disciplining of the body to create subjects who regulate themselves; the techniques of the self that include autonomy and reflexivity)</td>
<td>Habitus (the inculcation of objective social structures into the subjective experience of agents, writ in and through bodies)</td>
<td>3(^{rd}) dimension (implicit, inculcated by the oppressed in order to secure compliance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Steven Lukes, in his seminal work *Power: A Radical View* (PRV), approaches the ‘essentially contested concept’ of power by identifying its three dimensions. He seeks to explain not only the observable dimensions of power but also how the powerful operate to ‘secure the compliance of those they dominate’ (Lukes 2005: 12). The first analysis of power, or the one-dimensional view (2005: 16-19), traces its roots from Robert Dahl’s (1961) classic definition of power, ‘when A gets B to do something he wouldn’t otherwise do’. This concept of power focuses on overt conflict and decision-making in the political arena. Power is seen as a ‘zero sum game’, such that more power for one results in less power for another. Lukes moderates this perspective in the updated edition of PRV to note that power in this instance is not necessarily something exercised but rather a capacity, and does not need to be exercised in the negative but can include the advancement of others’ interests, a more beneficent view of power that is ‘productive, transformative, authoritative, and compatible with dignity’ (2005: 109).

Lukes’ description of the two-dimensional view of power (2005: 20-25) focuses on agenda-setting. Here power resides with those who are able to define the parameters of decision-making and inheres in the ‘implicitly accepted and undisputed procedures within institutions’ which demarcate decisionable from non-decisionable issues (Kabeer 1994: 225). This can be seen as the way ‘power’ shapes the field of knowledge, and the knowledgeable, or the realm of discourse itself.

The third dimension of power (2005: 25-29) goes further in analysing how power is exercised in such a way that the ‘dominated’ become willingly compliant (2005: 110). This assumes in Gramscian ‘hegemonic’ terms that the most invidious form of power is being exercised when the dominated are unaware of their subordination and in fact view it as
natural. Lukes makes the point that true power will prevent conflicts from happening by cutting them off at the root. ‘Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power’, he claims, ‘to prevent people […] from having grievances by shaping perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?’ (2005: 28). This is similar to Tocqueville’s classic argument about the ways autocracy can present itself as a benevolent force, a kind of paternal power that would prove difficult to resist (Siedentop 1994: 93). The way in which social hierarchies and subordination are ‘naturalised’ is central to this notion of power. Furthermore, this corresponds (as on the matrix) to the most intimate levels of the exercise of power – individual inculcation.

Given these three dimensions of power, an important question becomes how notions of power have become central to development interventions targeting gender – through the centrality of empowerment. For instance, a major 2000 report from DfID (the UK’s Department for International Development) explicitly touts the empowerment of women as a major strategy for achieving international development targets. This thesis, most explicitly, studies the Indonesian Ministry of Women’s ‘Empowerment’. Yet empowerment has become ‘an uncritically accepted goal’ of most of the development community (Parpart 2002: 41), one whose very definition has become more abstract and more contested. As the general meaning of the term ‘empowerment’ is imprecise, it has been argued that this makes it possible ‘to sustain a notion of empowerment as something that can be “done” to people […] Unless empowerment is given a more concrete meaning, it can be ignored, or used to obscure, confuse or divert debates’ (Rowlands 1997: 8).
The theorisation of power can be linked to the implementation of ‘empowerment’ initiatives by considering three related arenas: empowerment as a factor of external social positioning (more specifically in the economic realm and through education); empowerment with regard to research, agenda setting, needs determination and responses; and finally empowerment as conscientisation, emancipating the consciousness of the individual. The distinction between the three areas is not to imply that they ought to be kept distinct – as they are actually interconnected – but to highlight the trend within development planning that tends to isolate empowerment approaches to a particular context, with a particular underlying conception of power. The aim will be to demonstrate how ‘empowerment’ in development poses problems of conceptual consistency and practical implementation. As there are ethical and theoretical problems with the empowerment approach that lead to difficulties in execution, it is critical to examine the links between conceptualising power and empowerment.

We start with the first arena, that of the socio-economic context. Here empowerment measures are tied to improving women’s position in the economy and to educating them to assume a better position in society. This application of ‘empowerment’ is tied directly to what Lukes described as the first dimension of power, as ‘power to’. This implies ‘power given’ in empowerment, where people who are outside the decision-making process are brought into it. Furthermore, as power is conceived here as a zero sum game, the empowerment of some leads to the disempowerment of others. More specifically, empowering women, in this conception of power, requires the disempowerment of men. However, the ‘difficulty with this interpretation is that if power can be bestowed, it can easily be withdrawn; empowerment as a gift does not involve a structural change in power relations’ (Rowlands 1997: 12). So even as ‘empowerment’ in this case can be tied to more
tangible goals, namely increasing educational and employment opportunities for women, it does not consider the underlying, more covert structural issues. Relying on a definition of power as ‘power to’ that is expressed only in the explicit political realm, programmes seeking to ‘empower’ women may in fact relegate them to the ‘acted upon’, and by doing so, reinforce hierarchies of position and knowledge. This is a danger where ‘empowerment’ is used instrumentally to legitimate particular interventions without proper consideration given to contextual relationships of power.¹⁶⁸

The second arena where an empowerment approach has been attempted, though not unproblematically, is in the area of research, agenda setting, and needs determination. This corresponds directly to Lukes’ second dimension of power. Here, development planners stress a participatory, empowering approach to research and agendas, arguing that empowerment necessitates including those who are being targeted by development planning into the research and planning process itself. Yet this approach to empowerment still has many conceptual flaws. Often women’s condition is assumed as a given and there is insufficient attention to how ‘realities’ and needs are being ‘discursively constructed’ (Wieringa 1994: 838). For instance, the approach to development policy that conceptualises women’s gender interests by distinguishing them between practical and strategic (originally from Molyneux [1985], popularised by Moser [1989]) assumes that it is unproblematic for outside planners to make this distinction, and that it can be made at all. Wieringa argues that in fact, there are both empirical and theoretical problems with

¹⁶⁸ A focus on ‘empowering’ women in the marketplace or through education, which does not address the gender relations of the household, will fail to address the broader context of women’s condition. For example, development planners have been criticised for assuming that by simply improving women’s access to external employment, this will necessarily improve their relative position and/or status. Instead, a number of researchers have shown the opposite – an inverse relation between intra- and extra-household status (Wolf 1992: 66; cf. Hull 1996, Brenner 1998).
separating practical from strategic interests. By preferring simplified tools and quantifiable targets gender planners do not provide for social complexities. It is also possible to see that where development projects claim to be more participatory and yet continue to set the broader terms of the debate – and thereby delimit particular sets of interventions – this may serve to further entrench power in bureaucracies. Other problems arise in the field of research and agenda-setting. For example, Scheyvens and Leslie (2000) point out that cross-gendered and cross-cultural research done by men and by Western women of women’s issues in the Third World poses many ethical problems. Post-colonial feminists such as Mohanty (1995) and Spivak (1987) have critiqued the politics of representation of Third World women in the research and resulting texts of Western researchers. Additionally, Maxine Molyneux notes that independent women’s movements do not necessarily lead to the empowerment of women, even though they are usually autonomous and have the ‘power’ to set agendas and decide direction (1998: 70-72).

The third arena of empowerment approaches corresponds to the idea of constructing a space for underprivileged women to speak, making room for their ‘voices’, as well as empowering them through an emancipatory conscientisation (cf. Freire 1997). This targets what Lukes has described as the third dimension of power, which focuses on the individual’s internal response to power. In essence, there must be a transformation of the person’s perception of the world and her place in it. Empowerment in this sense is more than participation in decision-making (the one- or even two-dimensional view of power); it

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169 Wieringa studied two women’s organisations in Indonesia, the Communist women’s organization Gerwani and the state-led PKK, in the 1950s and early 60s. Both organisations focused on problems women faced in their daily lives and could thus be categorised as addressing women’s ‘practical’ gender interests. However, they had far different ‘strategic’ interests. Gerwani was involved in consciousness raising and mobilised women to fight for their gender interests and justice/equality, while the PKK, set up by the government to control and re-subordinate women, emphasised their role as housewives and mothers and ultimately aimed to make women obey the military leaders of their country. ‘It seems, therefore, not to be the nature of the activities which determine whether they affect the relations of oppression which women are faced with, but the context in which they take place, and the political motivation behind them’ (Wieringa 1994: 840).
must also include ‘the processes that lead people to perceive themselves as able and entitled to make decisions’ (Rowlands 1997: 14). This can be seen to be the ‘deepest’, most intimate level of empowerment approaches, where the greatest amount of agency is ascribed to the women being ‘targeted’ through development. The notion of ‘self-empowerment’ is central, wherein women are expected to articulate their own interests rather than having them chosen by someone else (Kabeer 1994: 304). Yet there are a number of problems related to this conception of empowerment. Relying on a third-dimensional view of power, women must speak and discover for themselves. Yet how can women be given the ‘space’ to speak or even to think? We might conceive of a situation where Third World women are allowed to share their experiences, but these focus on their plight as the helpless and oppressed poor, emphasising their ‘victim status’ rather than providing stories of agency and positive action. Where space is constructed for women’s voices, it is significant to examine who is constructing and delimiting this space, which then implicates how ‘empowering’ it may ultimately be – whether it breaks misconceptions and stereotypes by bringing to light original views of the world or merely reinforces these same stereotypes.170 Another problem with this focus on empowering the individual is that it may actually presume a certain degree of universality and ignore the impinging social relations. So ‘empowering’ a highly constrained individual by opening her mind may result in little real change for her.171

170 An example comes from the resurgence in popularity of African American women’s writing in the United States. While black women had ‘greater opportunity than before to define and name their experiences’ for a wider audience, simultaneously their accounts were often ‘appropriated and commodified by other more dominant groups in society’ (Reynolds 2002: 595). That is, these women may be empowered through the opening of a semantic space through which their voices can be heard, yet concomitantly disempowered as their stories are only selectively commercialised and promoted in such a way so as to pander to racial stereotypes of black womanhood (ibid: 603).

171 Chris Allen’s study of two Kenyan organisations is illustrative. He notes their different approaches to empowerment at the grassroots level: Undugu focuses on raising the consciousness of the individual, whereas in the Green Belt Movement (GBM) thousands of rural women’s groups join as groups, not individuals, and act collectively (1997: 333). Of these two, the GBM was more successful in mobilising a movement toward political and social reform in Kenya, ultimately bringing change for women. Undugu did ‘liberate’ the minds of a few women who campaigned for change on their own, but proved ineffective in bringing real transformation.
In the end, therefore, we note the complexities of translating concepts of power into empowerment approaches, and the difficulties this poses on both theoretical and practical fronts. This brief overview of the various ‘arenas’ wherein empowerment approaches are used demonstrates the insufficiency of monocausal models. The links between conceptions of power and empowerment must be made clearer in order to prevent theoretical inconsistency leading to problematic application. It is important to note that although ‘empowerment’ as practice may often be compartmentalised into the arenas as highlighted above, there is growing recognition of the necessity of bridging both external and internal factors, both the discursive and the material. The process of empowerment includes the conscientisation of an individual to consider herself ‘a capable agent’, coupled with tangible and material aims (e.g. women’s credit schemes, education, etc) (Sharp et al. 2003: 283; cf. Kabeer 1999). This internalisation is critical, for in this ‘power from within’ (Rowlands 1997: 111), greater change and transformation is possible as women are able to ‘think of alternative ways of existing’ and to play a greater role in bringing change (Sharp et al. 2003: 282-283).

This thesis has explored questions of power and empowerment in Indonesian gender policies. Lukes’ three dimensions of power lend additional insight to the complex workings of power in relation to gender discourses, institutions, and identities – for the power exercised to maintain gendered social hierarchies operates in multiple ways structurally and discursively.