Policing Human Rights

An Analysis of Law Enforcement Responses to Trafficking in Persons in the UK and Nigeria



Caitlyn A. McGeer

Green Templeton College
University of Oxford
Trinity 2022

This thesis is submitted to the Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Word Count: 93,500

For Kay and Peter McGeer,

Thank you for teaching me to find the sunshine in every day.

O' what a beautiful morning
O' what a beautiful day
I've got that wonderful feeling
Everything's going on my way

Abstract

This thesis focuses on how public police identify victims and offenders of human trafficking in the UK and Nigeria. I contribute to the field of critical trafficking studies in this thesis by exploring how police understand and respond to human trafficking. I also contribute methodologically by engaging in primary data collection in two countries, one of which is conceptualized as primarily a source country, Nigeria, and the other a destination country, the UK. I selected these countries because of the historical and contemporary linkages between the two related to the foundations of their policing culture, estimates of trafficking, and governance of their trafficking responses.

I draw on 60 interviews with police officers and their partners and analysis of 887 police case files to explore how UK and Nigerian police make sense of who victims and offenders are when they are on the job. I analyze the culture and practice of police on the ground when they are responding to human rights violations. I found that although police in the UK and Nigeria have different approaches to conceptualizing victims and offenders and that the differences in approaches do matter, they both fail to recognize and respond to the needs of vulnerable people. I argue that police responses to human trafficking reflect the performative, humanitarian aspects of anti-trafficking rhetoric. These responses result in further rights violations for vulnerable people. I find that law enforcement responses to trafficking are sites of state exercises of territoriality.

Table of Contents

Abstract i
List of Figures iv
List of Tables v
List of Statues vi
List of Abbreviations vii
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction 1
A Note on Terminology 8
Chapter 1: Policing Human Trafficking 12
UN Definition of Human Trafficking 14
The Research Context 25
International Partnerships 34
Overview of the Link between UK and Nigerian Policing Practices 42
Conclusion 50
Chapter 2: Constructing Trafficking in Persons 52
Conceptual Approaches to Human Trafficking 53
Trafficking Research: Faulty Methods and Missed Perspectives 70
Conclusion 80
Chapter 3: Deconstructing Anglo-American Policing 83
The Dominant Model of Anglo-American Police History 86
Reconceptualizing Anglo-American Policing Traditions 102
Policing and Human Rights 108
The Contemporary Relationship Between the Police and the Public 112
Conclusion 120
Chapter 4: Operationalizing Trafficking Studies Research with Police 122
Trafficking Fragments 123
Police Narratives 128
Stakeholder Collaboration 133
Methods in Practice: Interviews and Case File Analysis 138
Reflections on Positionality 158
Conclusion 164
Chapter 5: Constructing Victimhood in the UK 167

Understanding Vulnerability 168
Police as Protectors 192
Vulnerability through Exploitation 195
Conclusion 206
Chapter 6: Constructing Criminality in the UK 208
Foreignness and Criminality 210
Criminalization of British Nationals 216
The Tools of Truth-Seeking 225
Competing Policing Logics 235
Conclusion 239
Chapter 7: Constructing Victimhood in Nigeria 242
Structural Conditions 245
Rational Choice: The Individual and their Community 257
Colonial Traces of Migration Narratives 272
Conclusion 281
Chapter 8: Constructing Criminality in Nigeria 284
Assessing Trafficking Offending Rates 286
Analyzing Gendered Dimensions 311
Conclusion 326
Conclusion 329
Appendix 1 341
Reference List 342

List of Figures

Figure 1. Gender of Offender by Reported Offence Type from 2007-2011 with Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria (2014)..... 289
Figure 2. Overview of Gendered Rates of Human Trafficking Offenders 297
Figure 3. NAPTIP Cases by Type of Court as a Percent of Total Cases with the Court Labelled (n=319)..... 303
Figure 4. Jørgen Carling's (2005) Visualization of Trafficking Networks 320
Figure 5. Charge(s) by Gender of Defendants as a Percentage of Total Number of Charges by Gender Category of Defendant, Collapsed into One Chart Showing Both Genders..... 322
Figure 6. Charge(s) for Male Defendants as a Percentage of Total Number of Charges for Men (n=194) 323
Figure 7. Charge(s) for Female Defendants as a Percentage of Total Number of Charges for Women (n=183)..... 323

List of Tables

Table 1. Self-Described Rank of UK Participants 139
Table 2. UK Participants' Type of Role 139
Table 3. UK Participants' Primary Level of Action 141
Table 4. Nigerian Participants' Type of Organization 142
Table 5. Nigerian Participants by Site 142
Table 6. Frequency of Sentences by Gender 291
Table 7. Frequency of Optional Fines for Diversion from Prison by Gender 291
Table 8. Overview of Charges that Defendants with both Gender and Charge Data Points were Convicted 324
Table 9. Number of Charges by Gender for Defendants with both Charge and Gender Data Points (n=235)..... 325
Table 10. Breakdown of Charges by Type..... 326

List of Statues

Edo State Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law. 2018. Benin: Edo State Government.

Modern Slavery Act 2015. (2015 c.30). London: The Stationary Office.

Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act. Passed in 2003 and amended in 2005 and 2015. no. 4. Lagos: Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Slavery Convention (signed 25 September 1926, entered into force 9 March 1927) 60 LNTS 254.

UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999.

UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Resolution/Adopted by the General Assembly, 8 January 2001, A/RES/55/25, As Well As Two Supplementary Protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and (2) the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Which Were Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 November 2000.

List of Abbreviations

APP	Authorized Professional Practice
ATR	African Traditional Religion
DFID	Department for International Development
DPP	Department of Public Prosecution
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African State
ETAHT	Edo State Taskforce Against Human Trafficking
ETiP Law	Edo State Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law
EU	European Union
HMICFRS	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NAPTIP	National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons
NCA	National Crime Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	National Immigration Service
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
NRM	National Referral Mechanism
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEC	Policy and Evidence Centre
SJG	Security, Justice, and Growth
SPOC	Single Point of Contact
STRO	Slavery and Trafficking Risk Order
TIP Report	Trafficking in Persons Report
TIPPEA Act	Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drug and Crime

UNPOL	UN Police
UNTOC	United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
US	United States
WOTCLEF	Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation

Acknowledgements

I want first to thank my participants. I could not have done this research without you. Across my research sites, I was humbled by the generosity of those who hosted me. I want to say a particular thanks to my partner force in the UK and NAPTIP, both of whom believed in the value of my research and provided endless support and continuing access. I am also very grateful to my funders, the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission and the University of Oxford, as this research would not have been possible without them.

Thanks are due to the broader team at Oxford who supported me over the years, notably the Faculty of Law and Green Templeton College. I likewise want to thank my primary employer over my doctorate, Perpetuity Research. Martin Gill and Charlotte Howell, I learned so much from you that I will carry forward throughout the rest of my career.

My supervisors, Professors Mary Bosworth and Ian Loader, made this project feasible in the first place. Over the years, Mary and Ian provided me with infinite support, compassion, and guidance. In countless drafts, meetings, and check-ins, they enabled me to develop a project I was proud of and provided me with the tools to actualize it. Mary and Ian, I will never be able to thank you enough – you knew when to push and when to let me be, listening to what I needed without me having to voice it.

Since I joined the Centre for Criminology, I have been honoured to call myself a part of its vibrant and supportive community. I particularly want to thank Professors Rachel Condry, Carolyn Hoyle, and Katrin Mueller Johnson for their feedback and comments on earlier versions of this work. I also thank my examiners, Professors Rachel Condry and Sanja Milivojevic (University of Bristol), for their engagement with my work. Thanks are also due to the administrative staff in the Centre who assisted me over the years. Further, I have been fortunate enough to develop a close-knit group of friends, completing doctorates in the Centre at the same time as me: Anya Eber, Lucy Harry, Liz Kullmann, and Ailish Saker. Thank you for always being there and displaying a radical understanding of what this thesis process takes. We have been through this process together since the first day, and there is no one I would rather have made this journey with. Thank you for always holding faith in me.

I also want to thank those who went before me in the doctorate process in the Centre who continually inspired me. Thanks to Dominic Aitken, Diana Batchelor, Arushi Garg, Alice Gerlach, and Kate West for the documents they shared, the teaching opportunities they passed my way, and everything else they have supported me with over the years. To everyone else who made my time in the Centre, I also thank you. Especially, Douglas Brand, Luiz Dal Santo, Bill De La Rosa, Kate Farrow, Rory Kelly, Riikka Kotanen, Jenna Milani, Rachel Noah, Cian Ó Concubhair, Maayan Ravid, Sophie Serrano, Samuel Singler, Leila Tai, Laura Tilt, and Hallam Tuck.

To my family and friends, you have all been there for me in different and important ways. From the highlights and the low lights that come with life over a doctorate, I was always able to find joy in the process because of you. I especially want to thank my grandparents for making my entire university education possible and for always having confidence in me. This thesis is dedicated to them. I likewise want to thank my Aunt Lynne for all the encouragement she has given me. I also want to say specific thanks to a few others who touched this project in significant ways, helping me be resilient at crucial moments in my doctoral process: Chris Bretherton, Kristen Churchill, Katie Hoeger, Kristina Kämpfer, Chloé Lewis, Shona Loong, Saskia Nowicki, Kristen Thomas, and Josh Tralau-Stewart. A special thanks to Chris for facilitating the space I needed to finish this project.

Finally, I want to thank my parents. Mutti and Vati, there is nothing I can write here that would express the depth of thanks I have for you and always will. I am who I am because of you. I have been able to do everything I have because you believed in me and supported me. There is not a day that I am not grateful to be your daughter. Thank you, always and forever.

Introduction

With a spectrum of activity ranging from vacation to re-location and consensual to exploitative, the mass movement of people across and between borders is unprecedented, be it for pleasure, work, or re-location (Franko Aas, 2007). At the same time that movement has peaked, so too have the breadth of policies aimed at restricting it for some and expediting it for others (Pijnenburg and Rijken, 2019). Not only is there a bifurcated migratory system between those regular and irregular migrants, within the category of irregular there is further distinction. Human trafficking forces the re-evaluation of who (and what) governments label as worthy of victim and offender status within the irregular category of migration. Conceptually, 'victims' of human trafficking are responded to differently than 'offenders' of migrant smuggling or other crimes, given the level of exploitation they are perceived to have experienced on their migration journey. In practice, it is primarily border officers and public police who determine who is 'trafficked' or 'smuggled.'

This thesis explores how public police and their partners in two countries, the United Kingdom (UK) and Nigeria, understand who trafficking victims and offenders are in this context. Both countries adopt a criminal justice approach to trafficking. The UK is largely perceived to be a destination country and, Nigeria, a source one.

It is also worth noting that the original aim of this research was to explore how the UK's 'humanitarian' policing aid influences Nigerian policing practices and how the police roles and responsibilities arising out of this aid compare to the

UK's domestic practices. However, it quickly became clear that the purported threads linking UK and Nigerian trafficking responses (see Chapter 1) were less clear than I had anticipated. Across my three field sites in Nigeria, my participants spoke more broadly about donors and were unable to narrow down the specific influence of UK donors versus others. Other researchers who have worked on policing in African countries, such as Erlend Grøner Krogstad (2017, p. 41), have also found that police speak about donors broadly, unable to 'discriminate who the donors are and where the models come from.'[1] In some ways, this inability showcases the breadth of donors involved in policing reforms in African countries. Throughout this thesis, when speaking about donors, I will therefore refer to them as my participants did: 'the West' or 'the Western donors' or, even more simply, 'donors.'

Hindering my attempts to deconstruct the donor pathways of trafficking funding, there is almost no research on how public police respond to trafficking, despite the entrenched nature of criminal justice system approaches to it. What research there is primarily focuses on police training and the effectiveness of awareness raising. This research has also been localized in European countries (mostly Nordic) and the US. There is little research on trafficking in African countries, which is compounded by a paucity of research on policing in these countries. And while there is a lack of research on police responses to trafficking, there is a bewildering volume of research on trafficking. Despite this wealth,

[1] Krogstad (2017), however, did find in his research in Sierra Leone that police could sometimes distinguish reform models funded by former colonizers (the British for Sierra Leone) from other Western donors. Although in the case of Krogstad's (2017) research, the British led-police reform was highly publicized, and there was much media debate around its neo-coloniality in public forums.

there is a notable lack of critical inquiry. Most focus on theoretical understandings of what trafficking is from the perspective of Global North destination countries.[2] Even within this scholarship, there are very few empirical studies, and the ones there are suffer from flawed methodological approaches, including biased data collection which I explore in Chapter 2.

Moreover, of the eight police forces I worked with in the UK, no officer I interviewed had interacted with a Nigerian victim, despite the government purporting Nigeria as a major source country for victims. Further, of the 493 UK police case files I had access to from the force with which I was partnered, there were only four cases that involved Nigerian victims. Similarly, my Nigerian participants had also never engaged with any victims who were on route to or returned from the UK. This lack of Nigerian victims raised deeper questions about how the police are actually identifying victims. For example, are police in fact coming across Nigerian victims of trafficking but erroneously identifying them as offenders?

There are many ways to conceptualize the victim/offender dichotomy in human trafficking. These conceptualizations vary by the location of the harm of trafficking and the agency of those involved; some see trafficking as a product of organized crime that targets women and girls; others see trafficking as reflecting human insecurity. There is also a tendency to see anti-trafficking narratives as

[2] Here and throughout, I follow sociological and political theory, reflecting the Global South as a term used synonymously with the likes of the 'Third World' and the 'Periphery' to refer to largely low-income countries that are marginalized by structures of political and cultural power. Global North, by association, refers to the high-income countries that largely hold this power: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the US, Western Europe, etc.

existing in distinct silos: victims as coerced by organized crime or victims as suffering from poor socio-economic conditions. I argue throughout this thesis that these narratives exist on a continuum, wherein police leverage different aspects to explain the situations they come across. These narratives exist simultaneously for police, who have to operationalize and contextualize trafficking rhetoric in their work.

Before we can explore the funding links between UK and Nigerian trafficking responses in more depth, which I maintain is important to explore in future research, we first must understand how police frame what they are doing in these countries. This thesis seeks to address this gap in the literature by exploring police perceptions of victimhood and criminality. While this thesis does not attempt to capture the entire narrative related to trafficking in Nigeria, I seek to map how the Nigerian police conceptualize victims and offenders and how it relates to Westernized narratives on trafficking, which I explore from a UK perspective. How do UK and Nigerian police understand what trafficking is and what their role in responding to it is? Who do they believe victims and offenders of trafficking are, and what can this tell us? Therefore, my aim in this thesis is to assess how trafficking narratives work together and against each other to construct how police identify victims and offenders when responding to trafficking crimes in the UK and Nigeria. Importantly, the data collected in this thesis predates the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the pandemic does not feature in my answers to these questions.

By addressing these questions, my thesis contributes to three fields of scholarship: trafficking, policing, and African studies. It is the necessary first step required to explore the links between UK and Nigerian trafficking responses. I also seek to make a methodological contribution with this thesis, as I propose that to study trafficking we have to not only study it in destination countries, but also in source (and transit) ones.

Following Joris van Wijk's (2013) approach to assessing victimhood in international crimes, in addressing my research questions, I am not trying to 'test' the concept of victimhood and criminality in police responses to trafficking. Instead, to situate police narratives on human trafficking, I build on the concepts of victims and offenders in what van Wijk (2013, p. 160) refers to as an 'explorative way.' Similar to Gernot Klantschnig's (2009) research on police drug enforcement in Nigeria, I seek to look at the empirical dimensions of trafficking and assess how that informs our theoretical understandings. I do so for the purpose of reflecting on the ideology of policing trafficking and how that ideology compares and contrasts in UK and Nigerian contexts.

The colonial links in British-funded policing reform in Nigeria became more of the background that informed my findings. Still, the ideological links between British and Nigerian policing *are* fundamental in understanding the role of police in both empire and former colony (see Chapters 1 and 3). Where British policing was founded on the notion of public consent, Nigerian policing never involved consent. It was designed to suppress and repress the populace. Future research exploring the influence of UK funding on Nigerian police and other police

agencies is paramount. Other researchers who work in Nigeria, like Alice Hills (2012a), have also called for this.

I begin this thesis in Chapter 1 by explaining the research case study. I highlight how the Palermo Protocol defines trafficking and how the UK and Nigeria have adopted this definition into their domestic legislation. I analyze the Protocol's focus on women and girls and organized crime. I also establish the links between UK and Nigerian trafficking responses and their policing approaches more generally. This chapter lays the foundation upon which my theoretical chapters and, later, analysis rest.

In Chapter 2, I analyze the conceptual frameworks on trafficking, exploring distinctions and overlaps between different types of trafficking scholarship. I rely on American academic Ronald Weitzer's (2011) framework of a more oppressive or polymorphic scope to academic research and theorizing on trafficking to sort this scholarship. I conclude by showing the impact of the disjunct and problematic research on trafficking, which circularly serves to reinform the range of differing conceptualizations.

Chapter 3 focuses on policing scholarship and how we can understand the lasting impact of the British model of policing, which is also known as the Anglo-American model. I explore this impact from a historical and contemporary lens, using colonial policing in Nigeria as a case study. I argue that the Anglo-American model of policing developed in the UK has always been a tool of nation- and state-building using political economists Alberto Alesina and Bryony

Reich's (2015) model of nation-building. I conclude by reflecting on how police moderate the relationship between the citizen and the state, using immigration control as an example.

In Chapter 4, I outline the methodological approach of my research. My approach is tripartite and uses Yvon van der Pijl, Brenda Carina Oude Breuil, and Dina Siegel's (2011) notion of fragmented ethnography for trafficking research; Merlijn van Hulst's (2020) narrative approach to policing studies; and the principles of stakeholder collaboration for trafficking research developed by Charles Hounmenou (2020), in conjunction with Emma Durham, Helen Baker, Matt Smith, Elizabeth Moore and Vicky Morgan's (2014, p. 15) argument that balanced engagement is crucial to capturing minority research perspectives. I then explain how I collected data and analyzed it before reflecting on my positionality in the field.

Chapters 5 and 6 present my empirical findings from analysis of 24 interviews with UK police officers and 493 UK police case files (n=28 of which I analyzed in-depth). Chapter 5 focuses on perceptions of victimhood, and Chapter 6 on criminality. Across these chapters, I explore what the narrative on policing trafficking in the UK is and how that reflects the wider patterns in British policy and practice, such as the racialization of police responses and immigration control. I analyze how police navigate the competing logics of both responding to a human rights violation and protecting the state from the risk of organized trafficking offenders.

Chapters 7 and 8 focus on constructions of victimhood (Chapter 7) and criminality (Chapter 8) in Nigeria. These chapters incorporate views from 36 interviews with Nigerian National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) officers, as well as their partners, and analysis of 394 NAPTIP conviction case files. The purpose of Chapters 7 and 8 is to more broadly understand how trafficking is conceptualized in Nigeria, as there is so little research on this. Particularly, Chapter 7 explores more than just a policing narrative. It assesses how victimhood is understood in relation to the perception of migration, wherein movement is a rational choice influenced by structural factors. Because my participants only mentioned trafficking offenders in passing, Chapter 8 uses NAPTIP conviction case files to reconstruct who NAPTIP perceives the offender to be.

The conclusion draws together my findings from my empirical chapters to reflect on the broader implications of what actors from the UK and Nigeria understand trafficking to be under response frameworks that prioritize criminal justice means. I reflect on the differences and similarities in their understandings of what trafficking is and what this means in the context of tasking policing agencies with responding to trafficking, a crime perceived to violate human rights.

A Note on Terminology

At the outset, it is essential to acknowledge that there is often a lack of clarity on the definitional boundaries between slavery and trafficking. In its Modern Slavery Act 2015, for example, the UK uses 'modern slavery' as an umbrella

term to refer to practices largely captured by the global anti-trafficking instrument, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol) adopted in 2000, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). While modern slavery and human trafficking are distinct concepts, the differences and overlaps between the terms are unclear, which results in them being used interchangeably in practice (Lewis and Waite, 2019). Sometimes, modern slavery is referred to as an umbrella term that captures human trafficking and other types of exploitation (as in the UK's Modern Slavery Act 2015); other times, human trafficking is referred to as the umbrella term that captures modern slavery and other types of exploitation (as in the Palermo Protocol).

In this thesis, I use the UN-endorsed term human trafficking as an umbrella term to capture exploitation in the context of the movement of people and the crimes associated with modern slavery (see more on UN definition of human trafficking in Chapter 1). I also use the term human trafficking because of the problematic connotations associated with the term modern slavery. Labelling exploitation in the context of movement as modern slavery reconstructs understandings of historic slavery (Musto, 2009; Chuang, 2014). Conflating trafficking with slavery can also limit the critical purpose of both slavery and trafficking by raising the legal threshold for trafficking or lowering it for slavery (the latter of which is notably important because small-scale chattel slavery still exists in some countries such as Mauritania) (O'Connell Davidson, 2006;



Chuang, 2014).[3] In an example of the former, Chuang (2014, p. 635) points to the United States' *Mairi Nunag Tanedo, et al. v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, et al.* case in 2012. In this case, Filipino teachers were trafficked to the United States under debt-bondage conditions. The defence counsel used the narrative of slavery to try to illustrate how these women were trafficked. While the teachers won their case, the jury 'rejected the trafficking claim, apparently unable to comprehend how the teachers, who had conceded their love of teaching and fondness for their students, could possibly be "trafficked"' (Chuang, 2014, p. 635). These teachers did not fit the narrative associated with historic slavery.

The narrative of historic slavery is cognitively pungent, luring in images of an unequivocal wrong committed by an owner towards the owned. By categorizing trafficking – an already ambiguous term (see Chapters 1 and 2) – as slavery, this imagery avoids an analytical assessment of what conditions might lead a person to intersect with trafficking (Chuang, 2014). All trafficking that does not emote the imagery associated with historic slavery is, accordingly, rejected (Chuang, 2014).

Despite these issues with the term modern slavery, when referring to UK legislation, practice, and policy or when directly quoting my UK participants, I kept the original terminology of modern slavery. As a result, my empirical chapters that focus on the UK (Chapters 5 and 6) use the language of modern slavery in addition to human trafficking. I have done so to best capture the nature

[3] Chattel slavery is otherwise known as traditional slavery. This is the kind of slavery that most people associate with the word 'slavery.' It is called chattel slavery because people are treated as commodities to be bought and sold by those who own them as chattel – personal property.

of what I am referring to in UK legislation and policy and to authentically represent my participants' views. It is important to recognize that my participants largely used the term trafficking interchangeably with modern slavery when referring to their work, highlighting just how unclear these terms are. Given a full exploration of the definitions of modern slavery versus human trafficking is beyond the scope of this thesis (although I do touch on this in Chapter 2), there is much scope for future research to explore how police understand the differences and overlaps in the terms and whether that makes a difference in their responses. My definitional focus is on the boarder distinctions in definitions between human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

Chapter 1: Policing Human Trafficking

Since the passing of the Palermo Protocol in 2000, lurid stories captured public attention and spurred anti-trafficking activism. Media outlets became riddled with tales of the proliferation of sexual exploitation and child labour and their deep and terrifying links to organized crime (Laczko and Gozdziak, 2005).[4] The United Nations (UN) presents human trafficking as a transnational crime that violates individual liberty and threatens victims' wellbeing and sense of self. Combatting human trafficking is seen as paramount to global development, and it is embedded in three of the UN Sustainable Development Goals – Targets 5.2,[5] 8.7,[6] and 16.2[7] – (van der Pijl et al., 2011; Hiquan Zhou, 2015; Milivojević and Segrave, 2017; United Nations, 2018; Hein Van Kempen and Lestrade, 2018).

As a crime, human trafficking is defined by the Palermo Protocol adopted in 2000, supplementing UNTOC. Since the Palermo Protocol entered into force in 2003, signatory states have a responsibility to combat human trafficking. Governments around the world have leveraged their criminal justice systems to respond to trafficking, and international bodies have devised various forms of preventative and detection strategies (Weitzer, 2014; Gadd and Broad, 2018; Rodríguez-López, 2018). These criminal justice frameworks are largely referred

[4] The Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) in the UK, for instance, asserts that organized crime groups are involved in 70% of the labour exploitation typology of human trafficking (Centre for Social Justice, 2015).

[5] To eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.

[6] To take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms.

[7] To end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children.

to as ‘P-frameworks’ because they involve some variation of criminal justice actions starting with the letter ‘p’: pursue offenders, prevent the crime, protect victims, prosecute offenders, etc. The Palermo Protocol, for instance, guides focus to three main Ps: prevention of the crime, protection of victims, and prosecution of offenders (Cho, 2015; Samarasinghe, 2015).

While protection of victims is supposed to be central to anti-trafficking initiatives, narratives on what trafficking is and who the victims are tend to focus on the offender and the risk they pose to the state (Lewis and Waite 2015). By being a part of UNTOC, the Palermo Protocol signals a focus on organized crime and the threat it poses to the state. The Palermo Protocol reflects a wider tension between human rights and state security in trafficking responses (Van Dyke, 2019). Because of the emphasis on criminal justice-oriented P-approaches, trafficking is approached as a ‘quintessential police offence’ (Thorburn, 2018, p. 161). Responses are more focused on managing crime than protecting vulnerability. Broadly, the Palermo Protocol narrative on trafficking focuses on idealized versions of who a victim is and the pathway of their victimization. Trafficking is presented as a violation of human rights, by organized crime groups especially of women and girls. However, by promoting police responses to trafficking, many victims’ rights are further violated by the wider police practices in which trafficking responses operate, such as the racialization of responses and the emphasis on immigration status. These violations are an inevitable consequence of responding to trafficking through the police (Van Dyke, 2019).

This chapter begins by outlining the UN legislative framework that underpins the definition of trafficking. I explore the way the Palermo Protocol distinguishes the difference between trafficking and smuggling and how this distinction has honed the focus of anti-trafficking interventions. I, then, outline the research context of this thesis: how the UK and Nigeria approach combatting trafficking. I highlight the links between UK and Nigerian responses and provide some background on the historic connections between UK and Nigerian police, as well as the aims embedded in anti-trafficking responses.

UN Definition of Human Trafficking

Of the three protocols adopted in Palermo in 2000, one addresses human trafficking and another the smuggling of migrants.[8] These protocols were significant because they offered the world agreed global definitions of human trafficking and migrant smuggling (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018). In them, the UN laid a framework for governments to conceptualize migrant smuggling as different enough from human trafficking to warrant separate legislation. Since then, these protocols have been embodied in worldwide legislation and been central to the debate around responses to both trafficking and smuggling (Campana and Varese, 2016). Although the term trafficking was mentioned, it was never defined prior to the Palermo Protocol (Vijeyarasa, 2019). In part, the growing confusion on the purported distinctions between sex work, trafficking, and migrant smuggling led to the negotiations of

[8] The other, The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), focuses on preventing the illicit manufacturing of firearms and the trafficking of firearms.

the Palermo Protocol (Vijeyarasa, 2019).[9] Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol states:

> *'Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.*
>
> UN General Assembly (2000b)

The Palermo Protocol affirms that three elements must be in place for human trafficking: 1) the act, which involves recruiting, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons; 2) the means, which involves force, fraud, coercion, or deception; and 3) the purpose, which is exploitation (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006; Unseen, 2017). Article 3(b) highlights that the consent of the victim to the act and means is irrelevant. All three aspects of the definition are required to classify as human trafficking, but they hold 'unequal moral weight' (Bergelson, 2018, p. 195). The moral weight of the offence is focused on the purpose. The central aspect of the definition is, therefore, that the act and/or means must classify as exploitation to be defined as human trafficking (Botting and West, 2015; Welsh Refugee Council, 2015).

[9] While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that there were significant lobbying efforts behind the Palermo Protocol, particularly as related to sex work. Abolitionist feminist, religious, and human rights groups heavily lobbied during the formulation of the Palermo Protocol as to whether or not sex work constituted exploitation or legitimate labour (Vijeyarasa, 2019; Goździak and Vogel, 2020).

Smuggling of migrants is defined, in contrast, in Article 3(a) of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (the Smuggling Protocol), supplementing UNTOC:

> *'Smuggling of migrants' is the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.*
>
> UN General Assembly (2000a)

The central definition of the smuggling of migrants is the procurement of the illegal entry of a non-resident. Although this is *the* definition, the UN itself recognizes that exploitation features in the smuggling of migrants. UNODC (2018, para 4) describes that it aims to, among other goals, prevent 'the worst forms of their exploitation which often characterize the smuggling process.'

While the UN Protocols underpin anti-trafficking legislation, the Protocols have been widely criticized for failing to capture the reality of both human trafficking and migrant smuggling (see, for example, O'Connell Davidson, 2006; Nguyen et al., 2015; Weitzer, 2015a; Thorburn, 2018; Viganò, 2018; Van Dyke, 2019; Vijeyarasa, 2019; and Goździak and Vogel, 2020). The Palermo Protocol is also silent on the distinction between sex work and sexual exploitation, a highly contested legislative arena (Vijeyarasa, 2019). Indeed, the Palermo Protocol does not define exploitation. It only states what exploitation includes at a minimum, and the definition of these minimums are principally defined in other global instruments (Hein Van Kempen and Lestrade, 2018).

For example, the Palermo Protocol points to the definition of slavery, as it is

embedded in Article 1 of the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of the League of Nations, as 'the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised' (League of Nations, 1927). In only a very few extreme cases of ownership would a trafficked victim fit this legal definition of slavery (Chuang, 2014). Conversely, ownership of another person does not necessarily mean a condition of slavery according to scholars like O'Connell Davidson (2006). O'Connell Davidson (2006) argues that employees and professional athletes can meet this definition. In another example of the criticisms of the Palermo Protocol, Guth et al. (2014) stress that the slave trade has been specifically demarcated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as not including the trafficking of women.

Undercutting all these issues, the Palermo Protocol calls for a criminal justice response to a phenomenon that is not clearly defined (Thorburn, 2018; Van Dyke, 2019). It is not the act of bringing a prohibited commodity (here, people) to market (as the crime of trafficking denotes in other contexts like art, drug, and arms trafficking), but the potential for the exploitation that happens after market that is the crime, whether or not that exploitation actually happens (Thorburn, 2018).

By leaving the definition of exploitation open-ended, governments are left to interpret it in their own legislation (Viganò, 2018). As Constitutional Court of Italy judge Francesco Viganò (2018, p. 240, 242) summarizes:

> *The actual exploitation of the victim – whatever that might mean – is not a prerequisite for the offence; what is necessary, and sufficient, is that the perpetrator intends the victim to be exploited…according to the common understanding, the core evil of trafficking lies in its status as a precursor*

> *crime, pursuing the specific function of preventing the victim's future exploitation*.

Viganò (2018) goes on to describe how the criminalization of trafficking, as embodied in the Palermo Protocol, targets behaviour that often does not reflect the most egregious forms of exploitation it seeks to address. The act and means are 'functional' to the exploitation (Viganò, 2018). Viganò (2018) argues that the Palermo Protocol is intentionally vague so as to leave it open to states to interpret exploitation under domestic legal frameworks. And while this classification can account for different state responses, Viganò (2018) points out that states often just 'copy and paste' these provisions into their domestic legislation, which leaves it up to the on-the-ground actors, like police, to contextualize the response.

For example, the UK's Modern Slavery Act 2015 defines modern slavery as an umbrella term that refers to exploitative practices that fall under trafficking and slavery, including forced labour and servitude (Keast, 2017; New, 2015; Inter-Departmental Ministerial Group, 2016; Crown Prosecution Service, 2017). The Act established the offences "Slavery, Servitude and Forced or Compulsory Labour" (section 1) and "Human Trafficking" (section 2) (Modern Slavery Act 2015 c.30). Slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour refers to exploiting a person in a state of slavery or servitude or forcing a person to work; human trafficking refers to the movement or the arrangement of the movement of people for the purpose of exploitation (Modern Slavery Act 2015 c.30). The Act draws on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights' definition of slavery and servitude; forced labour's definition comes from the Forced Labour

Convention; and the definition of human trafficking from Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol (Welsh Refugee Council, 2015). Forced labour, for instance, classifies under both offence types as it is a type of exploitation under the Palermo Protocol, which makes it difficult for police to disentangle trafficking from slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour. In practice, the terms human trafficking and modern slavery are used interchangeably by police (Lewis and Waite, 2019).

The different legal approaches to sex work and begging is another example of the impact of the vagueness of the Palermo Protocol, with some countries classifying these as types of exploitation and others not. Thorburn (2018) cautions that exploitation can mean something vastly different across countries and that Palermo Protocol's inclusion of the means of deception and coercion are attempts to single out the harm caused by trafficking. Hein Van Kempen and Lestrade (2018) echo that while exploitation can curtail individual liberty, so too can it in how it is defined by those codifying the Palermo Protocol and operationalizing it in practice.

The issues with the Palermo Protocol are further compounded by neglecting to account for the harm that can come to victims during the act and means stages of trafficking. This harm is real harm that has happened while exploitation, depending on when the offence is interrupted, is the intentional/potential harm. The routes victims are taken on are incredibly dangerous: assault, rape, and death are common (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006). Yet, the harm suffered in

the act and means is not the specific behaviour codified by trafficking offences. Viganò (2018) explains that this is, in part, because the *actus reus* of trafficking is the same as that of the smuggling of migrants, which is responded to very differently.

Those who are smuggled can be prosecuted for immigration offences, whereas others who are trafficked should be protected from prosecution. As defined in the Protocols, those who are smuggled consent to the migration process, whereas others who are trafficked are deceived or coerced (even if they initially consent) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006; Weitzer, 2014). Smuggling ends when the individual arrives at the destination, whereas trafficking persists into exploitative practices after the arrival (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006). Further, while smuggling is defined as a trans-border crime, victims can be trafficked domestically (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006). In theory, there is a neat boundary between the two. In practice, however, the distinction is significantly blurred and difficult to apply (Weitzer, 2015a; O'Connell Davidson, 2016). This occurs, for example, when an individual is exploited and vulnerable but not deceived or coerced – the willing sex worker, the consensual forced labourer, or the poor migrant fleeing a war-torn country hoping for a better life (Weitzer, 2014) – when there is 'victimization in smuggling and agency in trafficking or a mixture of choice and compulsion in both smuggling and trafficking' (Weitzer, 2015a, p. 225).

Without a bounded definition, studies presenting statistics related to the prevalence or scope of human trafficking are hard to interpret (Musto, 2009; Weitzer, 2011; Lerum and Brents, 2016). For instance, the European Commission reports that 25% of trafficking is forced labour, the UN Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) finds that approximately 31% is, and the UN agency on economic and labour rights, the International Labour Organization (ILO), reports that approximately 75% is (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012; International Labour Organization, 2012; European Commission, 2013; Lerum and Brents, 2016). The European Commission and UNODC find that approximately 60% of human trafficking is sexual exploitation, whereas Anti-Slavery International, a prominent human trafficking non-governmental organization (NGO), puts the figure much lower at just 10% (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012; European Commission, 2013; Anti-Slavery International, 2017). Overall, the most cited figure of human trafficking is that put forward by the ILO and Walk Free Foundation (2017),[10] in partnership with the UN agency on migration, the International Organization of Migration (IOM), which estimates that there are 40.3 million people living in slavery and trafficking conditions around the world.[11] Within this estimate, they break it down into two categories: forced labour, which includes sexual exploitation, and forced marriage. 63% are subject to forced labour, and 37% are subject to forced marriage (International Labour Organization and Walk Free Foundation, 2017).

[10] The Walk Free Foundation is a leading anti-trafficking NGO.

[11] They report this figure separately for their estimate of 152 million children being subject to child labour.

Equally confusing are the estimates of the profits of human trafficking. On one end, the estimates are that human trafficking is a $5-7 billion USD per year business; at the other end, the ILO estimates that forced labour *alone* generates $150 billion USD per year (Bales et al., 2015). Further, some official police data on human trafficking leads to the conclusion that rates of human trafficking are actually decreasing. In the United States (US), by way of example, the figures have significantly dropped off over the last 15 years (Weitzer, 2011). As confusing as these statistics are, media and government officials have cherry-picked the most extreme estimates, generating shock value and underpinning the response to human trafficking (Weitzer, 2011). By focusing on the extreme estimates, trafficking has become one part of how states justify taking increasingly aggressive measures to secure borders. Nick Davies, a journalist with the *Guardian*, calls human trafficking a 'model of misinformation' (cited in Weitzer, 2011, p. 1352).

The UN has attempted to clarify the distinction between human trafficking and migration smuggling by focusing on a process approach to irregular migration. This process view also attempts to make sense of one most complex aspects of trafficking: where consent ends and exploitation begins (Logan et al., 2009). In such a process, there are four phases: 1) recruitment, 2) transportation and entry, 3) exploitation, and 4) criminal proceeds (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006, p. 22-24). Weitzer (2015a) explains that, at the recruitment stage, individuals can initially consent to trafficking and many even pay to have fraudulent documents made or passage fees. Others can be lured on false promises or abducted (United Nations Office

on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006). The transportation and entry stage can involve a range of hardships for trafficked individuals: assault, document theft, and even death. On the other hand, individuals can willingly circumvent immigration laws to secure passage to another country, often braving all sorts of traumatizing conditions (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006). In the exploitation phase, trafficked individuals suffer many different types of exploitation. For instance, debt-bondage can be used to force someone to work in dangerous conditions (e.g. sex work, unsafe construction sites).[12] Adults, however, can in theory consent to working in these exploitative conditions. Debt-bondage is also not necessarily exploitative (although the ILO recognizes it as forced labour) as it is an inherent part of contractual agreements for many labour migrants who will take out informal loans to fund their journeys (O'Connell Davidson, 2006). This particularly happens in forced labour, where migrants from low-income countries will still make more money under the conditions in their destination country than in their home country. Some victims may not even recognize they are being exploited, or care if they are (McGeer, 2017). The criminal proceeds phase happens when whatever type of exploitation the trafficked individuals are subjected to brings in profit for their trafficker (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Centre for Social Justice, 2006; Weitzer, 2015a).

[12] Debt-bondage is typically understood as a tool of coercion. It takes different forms, depending on the type of trafficking, but generally involves the offender holding a sum of money owed over the victim. This debt could have been incurred for the victims' transport along the migration route or it could be for their housing. Debt-bondage could involve real money spent on the victim or be entirely fictitious. If the latter, victims typically are held under the premise that they must work to pay off this sum, but invariably are never able to because the offender can just keep inflating the debt owed.

UNODC and the Centre for Social Justice (2006) argue that such a process view can also detangle the steps that lead someone to be smuggled or trafficked from a definitional standpoint: both smuggling and trafficking begin with recruitment. Both experience the destination and entry stage and potentially the criminal proceeds stage. Only those trafficked experience the exploitation stage (whether they consented or not aside) (Weitzer, 2015a).

Besides defining the three elements of human trafficking and the distinctions between human trafficking and migrant smuggling, the Palermo Protocol has two other important functions. It requires ratifying countries to make human trafficking a criminal offence, and it promotes victim support practices for those victimized by trafficking (Van Dyke, 2019). As a supplement to UNTOC, the Palermo Protocol also inherently stresses the link between organized crime and trafficking (Van Dyke, 2019), although data supporting this link is conflicted, with recent studies showing that these groups are less organized and are actually more individual (see Campana 2015 and 2018, for example). By presenting combatting trafficking as requiring a *global* criminal justice system response, the Palermo Protocol brings focus towards enforcement action at national borders and away from movement and exploitation within borders (Van Dyke, 2019). This shift locates attention back to the act and means of trafficking and away from the key part of the offence, the exploitation, which is defined to happen after border crossings or within borders (Viganò, 2018).

The Palermo Protocol is a site of contention for its stress on criminal justice system responses to trafficking, lack of clarity, and focus on organized crime. A

broader critique of the Protocol is that, even if one could accept a criminal justice approach to trafficking, such an approach has actually failed to meaningful protect victims and prevent the crime thus far (Azis and Wahyudi, 2020). As flawed as they are, estimates on the prevalence of trafficking are largely increasing.

The Research Context

At the start of this doctorate in 2017, the Walk Free Foundation (2016), which publishes the Global Slavery Index, hailed the UK's response to human trafficking as the model national response, unmatched by any other jurisdiction. As a result of the influence of the Walk Free Foundation, foreign governments and international bodies (including UN agencies) also defined the UK response as the gold standard response. Specifically, the UK's 2014 Modern Slavery Strategy, which operationalized the Modern Slavery Act (2015), was presented as the model police response for both its domestic and bilateral efforts. Human trafficking remains cemented as a top domestic and international policing and welfare priority in the UK (Department for International Development and The Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, 2017). Former UK Prime Minister Theresa May even went so far as to call human trafficking the 'great human rights issue of our time' (Home Office, Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, The Rt Hon Theresa May MP., 2016). As a whole, the UK's response is, in large part, premised on strong police enforcement action and inter- and intra-police cooperation (Inter-Departmental Ministerial Group, 2016).



The Palermo Protocol forms the basis of the UK's Modern Slavery Act (2015). The Act consolidated offences related to human trafficking in other pieces of legislation into one (Crown Prosecution Service, 2017).[13] The UK first started addressing trafficking in the 2007 Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking and provision to protect victims followed in 2008 with the National Referral Mechanism (NRM). The NRM was implemented to identify victims of trafficking and refer them to support services (Lipscombe and Beard, 2014). There was another government strategy adopted in 2011, but it was not until 2013 that the first draft of the Modern Slavery Bill was published after much championing from then-Home Secretary Theresa May. In 2014, the UK government published the Modern Slavery Strategy, which set out how they were approaching the aims embedded in the Bill and, later, the Modern Slavery Act. The Bill passed in 2015, becoming Modern Slavery Act.

The Modern Slavery Strategy sets the parameters for UK policing's strategic and operational responses to modern slavery (Inter-Departmental Ministerial Group, 2016). It highlights police have a 'key role' in identifying and investigating modern slavery (HM Government, 2014, p. 11). A criminal justice response premised on organized crime is embedded into the UK's Modern Slavery Strategy (HM Government, 2014). Adapting the 4-P framework from the terrorism and serious organized crime criminal justice response frameworks, the

[13] §59(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by §109 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012), §4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004, and §71 Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

police (as well as other agencies with a statutory duty to identify and report modern slavery)[14] aim to:

- *Pursue – Prosecuting and disrupting individuals and groups responsible for modern slavery.*
- *Prevent – Preventing people from engaging in modern slavery.*
- *Protect – Strengthening safeguards against modern slavery by protecting vulnerable people from exploitation and increasing awareness of and resilience against crime.*
- *Prepare – Reducing the harm caused by modern slavery through improved victim identification and enhanced support.*

HM Government (2014, p. 9)

Since the passing of the Modern Slavery Act and Strategy, the College of Policing (2015, 2022) has published the Authorized Professional Practice (APP) on modern slavery. The APP aims to standardize police responses across the UK. While the APP outlines what police forces should be doing, there is a consistent gap between this policy and on-the-ground practice. One year after the Modern Slavery Act was implemented, barrister Caroline Haughey (2016) published her review commissioned by then-Home Secretary Theresa May. Haughey's (2016) review raised concern over how police were responding to trafficking, or rather the lack of response thereof. The review highlighted a dearth of awareness among police, insufficient training, and an absence of a clear structure of how to identify and investigate modern slavery offences. Three days before Haughey's (2016) review became public, Theresa May commissioned

[14] These agencies include the British Transport Police, Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Scotland, Border Force, HM Revenue and Customs, the National Crime Agency, the Home Office UK Visas and Immigration Directorate, the Home Office Immigration Compliance and Enforcement, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, Local Authorities, the NHS (England, Scotland and Wales) and local health boards, Health and Social Care Trusts, Trafficking Awareness Raising Alliance, Migrant Help, Kalayaan, Medaille Trust, Salvation Army, Barnardo's, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Unseen UK, New Pathways, and the Refugee Council.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to conduct a deeper investigation into police responses. Over the next year, HMICFRS (2017) analyzed documentation from all 43 police forces in England and Wales and interviewed police from 10 forces.[15] HMICFRS (2017, p. 9) found a 'high level' of inconsistency across forces. Overall, HMICFRS (2017, p. 10) found that there was low awareness among police and 'significant failings' in police's ability to identify victims of modern slavery. These reports were coupled with high-profile cases where police failed to identify victims, such as in the Oxfordshire and Rotherham cases where the victims were perceived for years as 'very difficult children that made bad choices' instead of victims (Kragten-Heerdink et al., 2018, p. 1784).

The publication of this report coincided with the start of the thesis. In the years leading up to my 2018-2019 fieldwork with UK police, the Home Office responded to the findings of the HMICFRS (2017) report, as well as those from Haughey's (2016) review and other related findings such as those coming from the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner at the time, Kevin Hyland, and the National Police Chiefs' Council. One of the primary reform efforts was the Home Office's award of an £8.5 million grant to the Devon and Cornwall Police to host the Police Transformation Programme. The Modern Slavery Police Transformation Unit was part of this programme.[16] The Unit was developed to improve police responses to trafficking across the UK through multiple types of interventions like dedicated liaison staff and the dissemination of training

[15] The documentation included operational plans, strategic places, self-assessments, and more.

[16] The Unit is now called the Modern Slavery and Organized Immigration Crime (MSOIC) Unit.

(HMICFRS, 2017; Van Dyke, 2019). Despite many efforts to improve the poor response through the Police Transformation Programme and other initiatives, my findings in Chapters 5 and 6 highlight that inconsistencies remain.

At the time of my UK fieldwork, the forces I worked with had different levels of modern slavery responses and degrees of training for their officers. While some forces had well-developed investigation plans, others had no specific plan. Still, others had specialized response units within their force, while some simply left their front-line officers to figure out how to approach modern slavery cases when they came across them. Some had officers seconded in the Modern Slavery Police Transformation Unit, and others had never interacted with the Unit. These differences meant that some of my UK participants had specialized knowledge about modern slavery investigations and others did not beyond cases they had worked on. Across this array of response frameworks, under the Modern Slavery Strategy police are supposed to take care to respond to the vulnerabilities of victims, recognizing that they may present as offenders at first and that their testimonies can change and be unreliable (HM Government, 2014). Police are specifically tasked with recognizing the invisible harms of modern slavery, including fear of offenders and mental health issues.

The College of Policing's (2015, 2022, Victim Profile) APP on modern slavery outlines that police should approach a victim through consideration of their social, political/legal, and economic vulnerabilities:

- *Social Vulnerabilities*
    - *are vulnerable, e.g., are homeless, are hitchhiking, have addictions, have limited education, have a disability, experience mental ill health, have a learning difficulty,*

are missing, are in the social care system, are missing from care, lack family support, or have a weak or absent social network
    - *come from a country or culture where the buying and selling of people is not prohibited*
    - *come from a country or culture where witchcraft, eg, juju, is practised*[17]
    - *have limited or no knowledge of modern slavery, making them vulnerable to being deceived*
    - *are in a foreign country and cannot communicate in the language of that country*
    - *have debts in their home country or are managed into debt by perpetrators as a result of their illegal migration*
    - *have previously been incarcerated in their home (or third) country, resulting in isolation and desperation for belonging.*
- *Political/Legal Vulnerabilities*
    - *live in a state of persecution or conflict, and seek to flee*
    - *live in a country with a weak judicial system where there is likely to be corruption, and are inadequately protected by the law*
    - *hold illegal identification documents, or none at all*
    - *have an outstanding arrest warrant for minor criminal offences, e.g., failure to pay child maintenance.*
- *Economics Vulnerabilities*
    - *live in a state of poverty or unemployment and are desperate for opportunities to work and earn money*
    - *have limited employment or promotion opportunities and are seeking better prospects elsewhere*
    - *want a better education than is being offered to them.*

Across the range of vulnerabilities police are instructed to look at, the APP calls upon the police to recognize that the exploitation of victims can take many different forms, including ‘abuse,’ ‘creating dependency,’ ‘deception,’ ‘emotional control,’ ‘exploiting cultural beliefs,’ ‘financial control,’ ‘grooming,’ and ‘isolation’ (College of Policing, 2016b, Control Methods; College of Policing, 2016c).

A crucial part of UK police’s role involves the NRM. As mentioned, the NRM is the UK’s framework for ensuring a unified approach to victim care. Under §52 of the Modern Slavery Act (2015), police and other first responders have a statutory

[17] See more on ‘juju’ in Chapter 7.

duty to notify the Home Office, via the NRM, if they come across someone who they think is a victim of modern slavery.[18] All victims under 18 years-old must be referred into the NRM. §51(2) of the Modern Slavery Act outlines if age is uncertain, individuals will be assumed to be under 18 and receive the immediate provision of care like accommodation and psychosocial support until a 'suitably trained' medical profession conducts an age assessment (College of Policing, 2016b; College of Policing, 2016c; College of Policing, 2016a, Interviews, para 1). This process is supposed to happen 'regardless of [victim] nationality or immigration status' (College of Policing, 2016a, Age Assessments, para 3). Local authorities have the duty to care for children, but police are also required to be informed when a child is referred into the NRM. Adults have to consent to an NRM referral. If they do not, police still have to fill out a duty-to-notify form to fulfill their statutory duty (College of Policing, 2016b; College of Policing, 2016c).

Once referred, victims are supposed to get a reasonable grounds decision within five days (College of Policing, 2016b; College of Policing, 2016c; Home Office, 2022). While waiting for this decision, police have the responsibility to safeguard victims. If there are reasonable grounds to believe they are a victim of modern slavery, the victim gets a positive reasonable grounds decision, from which they get access to 'specialist tailored support' delivered by the Salvation Army and their subcontractors (College of Policing, 2016b, Access to Support for Victims, para 1; College of Policing, 2016c; Home Office, 2022). This support includes 'housing,' 'legal advice,' 'protection,' 'mental health support,' and more

[18] Other first responders include but are not limited to local authorities, health trusts, and other parts of the Home Office like UK Visas and Immigration, Border Force, and Immigration Enforcement (College of, 2016a; College of, 2016b).

(College of Policing, 2016b; College of Policing, 2016c; Home Office, 2022). They get access to this support for a minimum of 45 days. No earlier than 45 days, the victim will get a conclusive grounds decision. If they get a positive conclusive grounds decision, they are 'on the balance of probabilities' a victim of modern slavery (College of Policing, 2016b, Conclusive Grounds Decision, para 1). Victims then get access to continued support and can get grounds to stay in the UK for up to 30 months (College of Policing, 2016b; College of Policing, 2016c; Home Office, 2022). The NRM does not have investigatory powers, so the police have an 'ongoing duty' to assist with reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions (College of Policing, 2016b, Reasonable Grounds Decision, para 3). All NRM referrals should also be referred to the relevant police force, as determined by where the first responder identified the victim (Home Office, 2022). Importantly, under §45 of the Modern Slavery Act, any victim who has committed an offence is protected from prosecution and also must be referred into the NRM (College of Policing, 2016b; College of Policing, 2016c). They are only to be approached as a victim and not an offender (College of Policing, 2016a).

One of the most prominent concerns with the NRM remains that the decision-making process over emphasizes immigration status and conflates trafficking and asylum decisions (Home Office, 2014). Within these decisions, there is a small but growing body of evidence that 'foreign' and 'criminal' are flexible labels that police practices and culture have a pivotal role in shaping (e.g. Griffiths, 2017; Bowling and Westenra, 2018; Aliverti, 2019; Bowling and Westenra, 2020; Parmar, 2020). This evidence builds on much more expansive areas of research

related to 1) race and policing and 2) race and migration control. The police have taken on responsibility for in-land immigration control through policing operations such as Operation Nexus.[19] Although there is meant to be a connection between 'high harm' and offences, these policies give police forces flexibility on how to approach those who they perceive to be foreign and high harm. Many instances of 'low harm' cases involving social order offences like petty crime and historic crime are being caught up in operationalizing the definition of high harm (Griffiths, 2017).

For example, in her research in Birmingham's Crown Court and Magistrates' Court, Aliverti (2019) followed 88 cases and interviewed 18 court practitioners. She analyzed how the law constructs nationhood for cases involving non-British nationals. In a similar study, Parmar (2020) looked at the experience of foreign nationals and British nationals caught up in Operation Nexus through 58 interviews with criminal justice actors and 250 hours of observation, including in police custody suites. Aliverti (2019) and Parmar (2020, p. 38) respectively concluded that, through police responses to migration control, perceptions of foreignness are 'carelessly conflated' with criminality and reflect wider patterns in discriminatory (racialized) policing inherently linked to the UK's aim to create a 'hostile environment' for migration control. They found police have conflated what it means to be criminal through reference to foreignness and conflated what it means to be foreign through reliance on visual cues related to race (e.g. skin colour, language pattern, etc.). As Parmar (2020, p. 33) explains, 'the vague and

[19] A joint operation between police forces and the Home Office's immigration control agencies. This operation was implemented in 2012 to bring border control in-land, with the aim to 'target immigration offenders and "high harm" foreign national offenders' (Vine, 2014, p. 7).

expanding category of the “foreign criminal” assists the overall aim in which it is becoming harder to decipher whether it is the crime itself or the foreignness of the offender that is being punished.’ I explore how UK police understand foreignness in their constructions of victimhood and criminality more in Chapters 5 and 6.

International Partnerships

In addition to laying out police roles and responsibilities, the Modern Slavery Strategy also stresses partnership work, both within the UK and abroad. The UK’s international priorities focally rested on bilateral efforts with Nigeria when I started this research in 2017 (Department for International Development and The Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, 2017). Following the implementation of the Modern Slavery Act, the Home Office established a £33.5 million Modern Slavery Fund to engage in targeted projects in ‘high-risk’ countries – countries the UK can assist with their trafficking responses (Home Office et al., 2016).

When I began my thesis, UK policy-makers had picked up on prevalence and scope estimates that posited that Nigeria was the most common source country for victims of the sexual exploitation typology of modern slavery, including of children (Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, 2016). Nigeria was also the third most common source country for victims of all types of modern slavery in the UK at the time (Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, 2016).[20] As a

[20] Albania and Vietnam preceded Nigeria.

recognized global leader in combatting trafficking, the UK identified Nigeria as 'in need' of policing assistance to respond to trafficking. The IOM supported that 80% of girls trafficked into Europe were from Nigeria (Department for International Development and The Rt Hon Priti Patel M. P., 2017).

In the years leading up to my 2019 fieldwork in Nigeria, from 2016 to 2018, the UK invested £12 million in strengthening policing within Nigeria, specifically in Edo State (Department for International Development and The Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, 2017).[21] Nearly half of this effort was devoted to building the capacity of NAPTIP, the government policing agency tasked with responding to trafficking, under a 4-P framework: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare against trafficking.[22]

During the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly in 2017, in which world leaders endorsed a Call to Action to end human trafficking, the UK government announced it would increase its international modern slavery assistance funding to £150 million (Department for International Development et al., 2017). In addition to Nigeria, it is worth noting that the UK had bilateral cooperative arrangements at the time with the Balkans, Greece, and Vietnam.[23]

[21] The UK has many projects in Edo beyond the one mentioned here. The National Crime Agency, for example, established the Nigerian-United Kingdom Joint Border Task Force in 2016, which focuses on capacity building at Nigeria's borders.

[22] The majority of the other half of the funding went towards supporting religious efforts to educate on the dangers of trafficking and ways for potential victims (women and girls) to prevent themselves from being victimized.

[23] Through the Modern Slavery Fund, the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery, and the Department of International Development's various projects.

The anti-trafficking relationship between the UK and Nigeria paints Nigeria as in-need-of-help and the UK as able to provide that help. Yet, at the same time, Nigeria was one of the first countries to incorporate the Palermo Protocol into domestic legislation. The same year as the Palermo Protocol was ratified in 2003, Nigeria passed the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration (TIPPEA) Act, which was updated in 2005 and 2015. They adopted the Palermo Protocol through a 2003 federal bill,[24] which was brought to the table through the advocacy work of the Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF) and Mrs. Titi Abubakar, wife of the Vice-President of Nigeria at the time (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2022b). Prior to 2003, there was no specific anti-trafficking law in Nigeria (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2022b).

The TIPPEA Act created NAPTIP. NAPTIP is spread out across Nigeria. It has zonal commands, state commands, and liaison offices across the country. NAPTIP serves three core purposes for the state, which correspond to different units within NAPTIP. It is a law enforcement agency, it manages and delivers victim care and rehabilitation, and it prosecutes trafficking offenders. NAPTIP is afforded a wide range of powers to investigate, arrest, detain, and prosecute offenders under the TIPPEA Act. They also coordinate the response based on any other Nigerian law that involves trafficking (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2021). Not only did the TIPPEA Act establish NAPTIP and its departments, but it also enumerates each department's

[24] This was the first private bill that passed to become law in Nigeria (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2022b).

roles and responsibilities. For example, under §12(1) of the TIPPEA Act, NAPTIP officers in the Investigation and Monitoring Department have the duty to prevent and protect against trafficking crimes. §12(1) of the TIPPEA Act specifically outlines that this Department is to:

- *Be responsible for the prevention and detection of offences under this Act;*
- *Collaborate with the Nigeria Immigration Service and other relevant Law Enforcement Agencies in charge of entry and exit for the purpose of detecting offences under this Act;*
- *Investigate, trace and identify the proceeds, assets and properties of persons derived from acts which constitute an offence under this Act; and*
- *Effect the confiscation or forfeiture of such proceeds, asset or properties in collaboration with the Legal and Prosecution Department.*

As the policing department within NAPTIP, Investigation and Monitoring Department officers hold crime-specific policing powers. Its officers have the same roles and responsibilities as all police officers in Nigeria. However, they only have the authority to exercise them in the context of trafficking crimes. The only other difference is that NAPTIP officers do not carry arms. They investigate trafficking crimes, arrest and detain suspected people, seize property and other assets, and so on so forth. NAPTIP operates outside of the governance of the Nigerian national police force, Nigeria Police Force, referred to more commonly by its acronym, NPF. The two agencies, however, work together and are largely referred to as sister agencies.

The Investigation and Monitoring Department takes on an array of investigative methods, ranging from proactive to reactive policing and crime scene management and forensics (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2022a). Beyond investigations, the activities they carry

out include managing NAPTIP's detention facilities, doing surveillance checks on suspects, patrolling, and 'unscheduled checks of suspected facilities/dark spots' (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2022a, Activities, point 11). The Investigation and Monitoring Department works closely with the Legal and Prosecution Unit to prosecute offenders under the TIPPEA Act.

Beyond strictly law enforcement duties, as previously stated, NAPTIP is also responsible for victim care. One of their core departments is Counselling and Rehabilitation, which is legislated to provide services to victims including medical care, provision of shelters, and rehabilitation of victims after their shelter stay. Another key NAPTIP department is Research and Programme,[25] a forward-thinking department that both evaluates NAPTIP's work and conducts insight research into future trends (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2021).

In addition to these on-the-ground response duties, NAPTIP spearheads intelligence gathering on trafficking and works with local and international partners to coordinate joint anti-trafficking response work. As part of its 2012-2017 Strategic Plan, for instance, NAPTIP signed bilateral agreements with Benin, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, as well as entering into legal agreements with many West and Central African countries (Morka, 2014, p. 9).

[25] This department was my primary research partner in Nigeria.

NAPTIP takes a generally progressive approach to trafficking responses. Its strategic approach is premised on gender mainstreaming and disability inclusion (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2021). Notable aspects of the TIPPEA Act 2015 include Part IX, which lays out the legislative guidelines for how to treat a victim of trafficking, including §61(a) which highlights that no victim shall be discriminated against on the basis of 'having worked in the sex industry.' Another notable aspect is Part X, which sets up the Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund. The TIPPEA Act ultimately not only established NAPTIP and set the grounds for NAPTIP's work, but also created trafficking offences and set out how to care for and treat victims.

NAPTIP's approach to trafficking responses has been defined by their National Action Plans. The 2009-2012 plan focused on a 4-P framework: prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership (Morka, 2014). Post-2012, NAPTIP worked with the UN Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons to develop their 2012-2017 Strategic Action Plan, which framed the start of this thesis. This latter plan focused on five areas of anti-trafficking work that follow a similar 4-P approach to that of the 2009-2012 plan:

- *Strengthening law enforcement and prosecutorial response to issues of TIP, including effective assets tracing and forfeiture;*
- *Reinforcing public enlightenment, using various mediums, including movies, drama and documentaries to create greater awareness on the real impact of trafficking;*
- *Expanding platforms for victim protection and assistance and addressing factors which increase vulnerability;*
- *Strengthening partnerships at national, regional and international levels; and*
- *Improving organizational development to enhance effective and efficient work culture in order to fulfil our national mandate.*

Morka (2014, p. 8)

While there is a lot to critique about criminal justice approaches to trafficking, it is important to state that the development of NAPTIP and its approach is a significant innovation within this framework. NAPTIP is a singular agency that combines law enforcement, victim care, and research. It is a highly coordinated and centralized government response to trafficking. NAPTIP has served as a model for anti-trafficking responses across Africa and has been recognized by UN agencies for its good practice (Morka, 2014).

The UK's 'rescue' framing of trafficking and trafficking aid, however, neglects to consider the Nigerian perspective. Moreover, it completely overlooks the legacy of the colonial relationship between the UK and Nigeria. While British influence in Nigeria officially dates to the early 1800s, the British were involved in the slave trade in Nigeria dating as early as the 1600s (The National Archives, N.D.). From the 1880s on, a British mercantile company called the Royal Niger Company controlled much of what is now Nigeria.[26] By 1914, the British government amalgamated the Royal Niger Company's territories into one single colony, controlled from Lagos. British rule lasted until Nigeria's independence in 1966 (Britannica, N.D.). Through anti-trafficking efforts, among other neo-colonial actions including those related to other types of policing (see Chapter 3), prisons (see findings by Bosworth, 2017 on penal humanitarianism, for instance), and the UK's investment in Nigerian oil (see Chapter 7), Nigeria is yet again subject to UK structures of power.

[26] The Royal Niger Company was crucial in establishing Britain's claim to Nigerian territory.

I explore the legacy of British policing in detail in Chapter 3. But, it is important to highlight the historical links between the UK and Nigerian police here as it underscores the reasoning behind my research sites. The historical development of Nigerian police has been traced by prominent Nigerian historians and policing scholars (see, for example, Rotimi, 2018; Tamuno, 1970; Ahire, 1991; Alemika, 1993; and Alemika and Chukwuma, 2004), which provides a rich conceptual framework for understanding the links between the UK and Nigeria as it relates to policing.

At the outset, however, it is important to note that most of the policing literature on Nigeria largely focuses on NPF as it was established by the British in the colonial era. The literature does not specifically address how NAPTIP intersects with the legacy of colonial policing, but it infers that the more-recent state specialist policing agencies do. The literature speaks about policing more generally than just NPF, but it is difficult to tell how the public understands the difference/similarity between NPF and NAPTIP. Anecdotal evidence from my fieldwork suggests that the general public cannot distinguish between different types of law enforcement officers when they come across them. There is also a small pocket of research on this subject (see, for example, Owen, 2016 and Hills, 2017), which finds that across Africa, the public generally understands all state policing agencies as the same. More research is needed in this area. For the purpose of this thesis, I present the findings on NPF to showcase the wider tapestry of the culture of policing that NAPTIP is working in, and I assume that this culture applies to NAPTIP's practices. More research is needed to explore how the public perceives the difference between NAPTIP and NPF. For

example, while NAPTIP has the same policing powers as NPF, they do not bear arms (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2021; National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 2022). So, there are some visual differences between NPF and NAPTIP officers, which likely influence public perceptions.

Overview of the Link between UK and Nigerian Policing Practices

When the British annexed Lagos in 1861,[27] William McCoskry, the first Colonial Governor of Lagos, established a small police force (Alemika, 1993; Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi, 2016). By 1863, this force had grown and was renamed the Armed Police Force, also known as the Hausa Guard because most of the local men recruited were immigrants or former slaves from the Northern Hausa ethnic group (Alemika, 1993; Agbiboa, 2015; Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi, 2016). The British recruited Hausa men into their police force because they saw them as a 'martial race' that they believed would be better able to control other fellow 'natives' (Agbiboa, 2015; Daly, 2020, p. 194).[28] These front-line officers were held accountable under English law to colonial officers or traditional rulers who were empowered to act on their behalf (Owen, 2016).[29]

[27] Lagos was the capital of Nigeria until 1991, when Abuja became a purpose-built capital city. Lagos is one of the largest cities in Africa and by far the largest in Nigeria. From colonial to modern times, it remains a crucial commercial hub in Africa.

[28] Prior to colonization, there were also very localized groups of men that took on responsibilities to ensure community protection. They, too, were recruited into this police force (Owen, 2014; Rotimi, 2018).

[29] As policing spread across Nigeria so did English law in conjunction with the building of prisons to carry out punishments. Prisons were an effective tool to ensure obedience within the newly formed police force.

Police who performed well were rewarded with promotions, which served to pacify dissent within the force (Daly, 2020).

In 1886, the British passed a decree to create a colony-wide police force for the Colony of Lagos, separate from that of the Gold Coast Colony (modern-day Ghana). The Hausa Guard became the Hausa Constabulary, which became the Lagos Colony Police Force by 1895 (Alemika, 1993; Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi, 2016). Simultaneously, in other parts of what would become Nigeria, the Royal Niger Company established a police force in 1888. The Royal Niger Company Constabulary and the Lagos Colony Police Force worked in conjunction to establish and maintain colonial order (Hills, 2000).

As British interests spread from Lagos so did policing. The colonizers established local police forces as they went into the areas where they sought to secure their rule (Alemika, 1993). When Britain took over control of the territory of the Royal Niger Company in 1900, they established the Northern Protectorate and Southern Protectorate of Nigeria and unique policing regiments in each protectorate (Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi, 2016).[30] The Northern and Southern Protectorate regiments were merged in 1914, and, by 1930, this merged police force was renamed the Nigeria Police Force, or NPF, as it is still known today (Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi, 2016; Hills, 2000). By 1960, the British brought the local police force units established in early colonial rule into a system of central

[30] Although an exhaustive overview of the history of colonial policing in Nigeria is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that the spread and development of policing in the Southern and Northern protectorates had some differences. Marenin (1982), for instance, explains that the traditional *dogari* (palace guards) were incorporated into colonial police forces in the North as a way to establish colonial-backed native rule over harder-to-reach parts of the colony.

governance (Hills, 2000, p. 35). Since independence in 1966, leading policing scholars who research Nigeria (see, for example, Alemika, 1993; Hills, 2000; and Daly, 2020) all agree that the philosophy of policing to control and secure order stayed and persists to this day (see more in Chapter 3).

Killingray (1986) argues that there were two elements involved in securing colonial authority: 1) law and order, and 2) taxation. The British were able to colonize Nigeria because they spread police across the territory through local communities as means to forcibly establish the legitimacy of their authority. These police worked in conjunction with the British military. As Daly (2020, p. 194) explains, 'soldiers were the thin edge of the wedge that established British authority, and police maintained it after they marched onward.' Whereas the British soldiers played a key part in initiating the colonization process, police were the lasting legacy that established and continually re-asserted colonial rule.

Fanon (1963, p. 38) refers to police in the colonies as the 'official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression.' The police were the visual aspect of colonial control and ensuring the collection of taxation was a significant part of their role (Marenin, 1982b; Agbiboa, 2015; Daly, 2020). Taxation was a crucial control tactic in British colonization as it was an effective means of keeping traditional rulers subdued (Killingray, 1986). Marenin (1982b) highlights that it cost money for the colonizers to establish police, so they only did so when it was essential to securing their rule.[31] Marenin (1982b, p.

[31] At the same time, however, colonial police forces were often chronically underfunded (Owen, 2016)

387) emphasizes police secured rule by: enforcing colonial taxation and forced labour policies; subduing any opposition to colonial governance; protecting settler colonial towns and their commercial interests, such as railways and waterways (Killingray, 1986; Human Rights Watch, 2010); and, although much less of a priority, responding to crime when colonialists were victims. Black police officers had little authority over the actions of white colonists because of racialized sentiments held by colonial authorities – the colonial police largely only policed (other) Black bodies (Owen, 2012)

While the colonial legacy of policing is easiest to trace onto NPF because it existed in the colonial era, the state policing agencies that have been developed more recently are also rooted in this legacy (Schlichte, 2017). Since independence, the Nigerian government has developed a series of specialist law enforcement agencies focused on specific crime types like the Drug and Law Enforcement Agency, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, and NAPTIP. While largely operating distinctly from NPF, these agencies suffer from the same crisis of legitimacy as NPF because they have the same powers as NPF (although crime-specific) and operate as agents of the state with similar roles and responsibilities to NPF (Owen, 2012; Owen, 2018). As discussed at the outset, one notable difference is that some of these specialist agencies, like NAPTIP officers, do not carry arms.

One of the reasons that the colonial legacy has persisted is because, while the UK formally gave over control of Nigeria in 1966, the British have still been heavily involved in Nigerian policing (among other aspects of Nigerian society).

This involvement has taken many forms, including funding for police reform and training initiatives (Klantschnig, 2009; Krogstad, 2017). Leading Nigerian policing scholar Etannibi E.O. Alemika (2018) argues that these initiatives have failed because they do not critically engage with the colonial legacy left by the UK. Tiffin (1995, p. 95), for example, explains that critical engagement in former colonies would involve recognizing that they are 'hybridized' because these states have yet to be disentangled from colonialist interest. Former colonies have a 'dialectical relationship between European ontology and epistemology' (Tiffin, 1995, p. 95).

In her research in Nigeria, Hills (2000) argues that the British never really left Nigerian policing, supporting evidence of this hybridization. In 1967, the year after independence, senior British police officers were sent over to Nigeria to report on the issues with NPF and suggest areas for improvement (Hills, 2000). Hills (2000) details how British involvement in the 'idependent' Nigerian police only increased from then on. Hills (2008, p. 228) calls these interventions 'neo-Peelian' in their emphasis placed on strengthening the relationship between the community and the police (see more on Peel's influence in Chapter 3). Hills (2012a) explains that the current transmission of Western policing practices (largely from the UK and the US) to Nigeria is a 'billion-dollar business' that has weak justifications; 'despite decades of international support for police reform and re-education, there is little evidence to support the assumption that the skills, technologies and procedures associated with western policing can act as an effective channel' (Hills, 2012a, p. 739).



One of the main reforms that the British have been involved in is community policing. From 2002 to 2010, the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID) funded a program called Security, Justice, and Growth (SJG). The premise behind this thesis, the UK's investment in ameliorating NAPTIP's practice, is one of many other examples. Focusing on SJG, the program was managed by the British Council in Nigeria and implemented in 18 states. The program aimed to 'enhance access to and quality of safety, security and justice for the poor' through community policing, which they defined as 'formal policing…through encouraging a community-based approach to law enforcement and police oversight' (DFID Nigeria's SJG Programme, 2010, p. 2; Iwar, 2010, p. 10). Essentially, the program sought to improve public trust in the police by cementing the notion that the police are the public (Hills, 2012a). While the project was supposed to be co-developed, and there is an argument that its delivery could be construed this way, the actual knowledge, skills, and material involved in the program were British (Hills, 2012a). SJG involved the transmission of British ideals to Nigerian police (Hills, 2012a). Hills (2012a, p. 746) highlights that Nigerians adopted a 'hybrid form' of delivery that contextualized the UK's donor guidelines based on their reality.

Hills (2012a) found that SJG sought to implement a normative change in Nigerian police, but failed to account for how norms transmit in non-UK contexts. DFID and the British Council assumed that norms would transmit throughout NPF because they are centralized. Hills (2012a, p. 754-755) refers to the difference in Nigerian and UK approaches to policing through three terms: 'knowledge as utility,' 'knowledge as theory,' and 'adaptive knowledge.'

Knowledge as utility refers to the Nigerian approach of adopting normative changes through learning and applying new technical skills that require this change. Knowledge is gained because it relates to a tangible outcome. This contrasts with the British approach of teaching norms more theoretically for the purpose of informing current as well as future practice. This approach focuses more on the process than the outcome. Hills (2012a) refers to adaptative knowledge as the way in which ideological change can be transmitted between these two approaches. It is where Western and African knowledge systems have the potential to speak to each other. Adaptive knowledge involves the co-creation of new norms through tangibly implementing them in practice and then building in processes to recognize and evaluate these newly learned norms.

More broadly, Ordu and Nnam (2017) argue that before we can even begin to explore whether or not community police would be effective in Nigeria, police themselves need to follow the rule of law. The public will not trust police until there is a drastic response to police corruption (see more in Chapter 3). Another critique of SJG is that it failed to critically engage with the fact that it was the British yet again bringing a model of policing to Nigeria. The only point where DFID refers to this colonial subtext is when answering 'Why do people resist Community Policing?' in one of their reports. One of their answers: community policing is resisted when it is '*mistakenly* considered by some as an import from a former colonial power and therefore irrelevant to policing in Nigeria' (emphasis my own, DFID Nigeria's SJG Programme, 2010, p. 12).



Klaus Schlichte (2017, p. 22) calls this forgetfulness of colonial pasts when implementing neo-colonial projects as the 'Janus face' of post-colonial policing practices: it is 'repressive' and 'paternalistic' at the same time. Part of this Janus Face reflects what Achebe (1995, p. 58) describes as former colonialists believing they 'know' what is best. For the transmission of British police interventions in former colonies, this knowing rests on two principles. First, that the British can actually know what is best for their former colonies; and, second, that British policing is better than alternatives (see more on the British model of policing in Chapter 3). Analyzing Britain's role in police reform in Sierra Leone, Krogstad (2017, p. 50) describes this historical amnesia as facilitating the modern iteration of colonialism: 'interdependence.' Or more specifically, Sierra Leone policing is interdependent with British influence. Krogstad (2017, p. 50) highlights this neo-colonial trend as different than in the colonial era where the British perceived their colonies to be dependent on them. The spread of British policing interventions extends across Africa (Sinclair, 2016; Schlichte, 2017; Brankamp, 2020). These interventions have even taken the form of bringing community policing to refugee camps, prefaced as a type of humanitarian aid (Brankamp, 2019; Brankamp, 2020; Brankamp and Daley, 2020).

Schlichte (2017) argues that the proliferation of modern British policing interventions through the lens of 'humanitarianism' is one of the new 'technologies' of governance. By failing to critically assess how these technologies intersect with historical governance, Schlichte (2017, p. 23) finds that the 'asymmetry' of power between former colonies and their colonizers persists. On a larger scale, Schlichte (2017, p. 26) highlights that the focus on

humanitarianism raises the profile of what he calls the ‘matrix of global dangers:’ ‘organized crime, transnational terrorism, and “state failure.”’ Such a focus ‘glosses over’ the crucial difference between countries and the underlying causes of these types of crime (Schlichte, 2017, p. 26).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the case study of this thesis. I began by highlighting the definition of trafficking by analyzing the Palermo Protocol and how it sets up the distinction between trafficking and smuggling. The Protocol signals a focus on trafficking as a threat to the state. While protection of victims is supposedly central, the emphasis on organized crime orients combatting trafficking through a criminal justice lens. The Palermo Protocol leaves states with much flexibility in how they codify trafficking in their domestic legislation. I put forth that the lack of clarity in the Palermo Protocol has led to equally unclear estimates on the scope and scale of trafficking.

Still, the Palermo Protocol’s definition of human trafficking underscores UK and Nigerian anti-trafficking legislation. Both countries have developed legislation that seeks to address trafficking from a criminal justice approach. The UK model of policing trafficking has been globally accepted as one of the best; whereas Nigeria has been labelled as submerged by its sheer extent of trafficking, particularly sexual exploitation. Within this context, the UK has identified Nigeria as in need of their help to respond to trafficking. The UK has invested much resourcing into strengthening NAPTIP’s policing response to

trafficking. As a former British colony, the UK has been highly involved in funding Nigerian policing efforts since the colonial era.

Ultimately, in this chapter, I laid out how British and Nigerian police respond to trafficking. In the next chapter, I explore how we can conceptualize human trafficking.

Chapter 2: Constructing Trafficking in Persons

Since the passing of the Palermo Protocol, Sanja Milivojevic and Sharon Pickering (2013, p. 585) point out that the 'unprecedented interest' in human trafficking has created a 'body of literature on the topic is so vast that it is almost impossible to keep up with.' Across this vast scope of scholarship, Ronald Weitzer (2011) suggests there *is* a way to order it. Weitzer (2011) classifies the discourse and action around human trafficking as either: oppressive, where victims are good and traffickers are evil, or polymorphous, where trafficking is viewed as a symptom of poor socio-economic conditions.

Weitzer (2011) juxtaposes these schools of thought under what he calls the 'oppression paradigm' and the 'polymorphous paradigm.' He argues that proponents of the oppression paradigm bolster and amplify ideal victim understandings of trafficking, whereas those of the polymorphous paradigm refute them. Closely linked to Weitzer's (2011) original classificatory approach of the oppression paradigm is Chuang's (2014) conceptualization of exploitation creep. Exploitation creep has two main characteristics: 1) forced labour is trafficking and 2) all trafficking is slavery. As Chuang (2014, p. 611) describes: 'First, all forced labour is recast as trafficking, even if no one changes location at all. Second, all trafficking is labelled as slavery.' Chief among the distinctions between Weitzer's (2011) two paradigms are how to frame exploitation, how trafficking relates (or not) to slavery, whether movement is essential, whether consent matters, and what distinguishes trafficking and smuggling (Weitzer, 2014; Weitzer, 2015a). Given the wide breadth of scholarship on trafficking, Weizter's (2011) approach provides an important tool for conceptualizing the

distinctions in this scholarship and the ample policy and practices. It is, however, not without critique for oversimplifying the difference in perceptions of the risk posed by trafficking.

In this chapter, I begin by mapping the ways trafficking is conceptualized, using Weitzer's (2011) concepts of the oppression and polymorphous paradigms as my starting point. Next, I reflect on how these conceptualizations of trafficking have influenced critical trafficking scholarship and research. I conclude by highlighting the gaps in current research and how this thesis is positioned to address them.

Conceptual Approaches to Human Trafficking

Weitzer (2011) calls the oppression paradigm the dominant approach to trafficking. Academics whose scholarship falls under the oppression paradigm (most influentially Kevin Bales, 2004 and Donna Hughes, 2014)[32] label human trafficking as modern slavery under the rationale that people are bought and sold as commodities (Hernandez and Rudolph, 2015). In calling it modern-day slavery, oppressionists draw on notions of 'good' and 'evil' to spur advocacy (Kempadoo, 2015). While acknowledging that there are fundamental differences between modern slavery and chattel slavery (e.g. people are not *legally* owned

[32] Weitzer (2011; 2014) argues that Kevin Bales and Donna Hughes are two of the leading scholars in this paradigm. Both are highly influential in international policy formulation. Bales has won multiple accolades and is currently a Professor of Contemporary Slavery at the University of Nottingham, directing their Rights Lab which has strong ties to UK policy and practice on human trafficking. Bales has been crucial in re-framing trafficking as slavery and setting the prevalence estimates of trafficking (Weitzer, 2014). Weitzer (2011) points out that Donna Hughes, a Women's Studies Professor at the University of Rhode Island, is a key scholar in arguing that trafficking equates to sex trafficking (Weitzer, 2011). She has authored reports for the Council of Europe, and her work has also informed IOM's actions (Weitzer, 2007; Kempadoo, 2015; University of Rhode Island, 2018).

in modern slavery), scholars working from this approach draw on the association that the public at large has to chattel slavery – that of poor, Black people in chains forced to work for a white master most often in the southern US – to drive home the point about just how awful modern slavery is. This is, of course, premised on the assumption that everyone *can* recognize how bad chattel slavery was (Kempadoo, 2015).

The awfulness of human trafficking is central to the trafficking-is-oppression approach. This paradigm depicts trafficking as the deprivation of the most fundamental human rights and entitlements such as liberty, choice, and basic living needs (Logan et al., 2009). Under this paradigm, human trafficking involves deep and adverse psychological coercion, in which victims are pawns manipulated by the greed of their exploiter to generate profit (Kim, 2007; Department of State, United States of America, 2017). A victim of trafficking is only a victim if they were born, tricked, kidnapped, sold, or forced into trafficking (Laczko and Gozdziak, 2005; Lee, 2015; Weitzer, 2015a).

Weitzer (2011) explains that the oppression paradigm reflects the dominant and most familiar narrative on human trafficking. It is espoused across media campaigns and by national governments and international institutions, most notably the UN (Chuang, 2014). This aspect is also signalled in the language of the Palermo Protocol itself as it references 'Especially Woman and Girls,' who are perceived as more vulnerable to sexual exploitation (Yousaf, 2018). This gendered language embeds an equally gendered response to the crime. Male victims are outside the scope of these 'iconized' standards of victimization (Azis

and Wahyudi, 2020, p. 157). The Smuggling Protocol, in contrast, notably omits any gendered references (Azis and Wahyudi, 2020).

This gendered approach also reflects the influence of the Christian evangelical advocacy that is highly associated with the oppression narrative (Weitzer, 2007; Bernstein, 2010). Such advocacy is so enmeshed with combating human trafficking that Weitzer (2007) refers to the Christian Church as on a 'moral crusade.' The Church's crusading efforts are premised on ridding society of the sins of sex work in order to preserve traditional sexual norms and marriage and family values (Bernstein, 2010). For the Church, sex work (prostitution) is immoral, sex workers (victims) require rescuing, and pimps (traffickers) are folk devils (Weitzer, 2007).

Standing Against Global Exploitation (SAGE) and the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), along with prominent oppression scholars like Bales (2004) and Hughes (2014), have effectively lobbied to have trafficked women depicted in anti-trafficking campaigns and material including those of the IOM, which 'reflect their vision of "the prostitute" as object, victim and slave' (O'Connell Davidson, 2006, p. 14). This image portrays trafficked women as 'puppet-like objects or slabs of meat, or even as decapitated heads packaged as sex toys…[their] bodies in pain: pierced, bleeding and defenceless' (O'Connell Davidson, 2006, p. 14).

The focus on sex work as gender violence strips sex workers of agency and simplifies the labour conditions that surround sex work (Lerum and Brents,

2016). Even the term ‘sex trafficking’ emphasizes the ‘product (sex) rather than people (sex workers)’ (Lerum and Brents, 2016, p. 19). Sex workers, themselves, and their advocates prefer to use the term ‘trafficking in the sex industry’ (Lerum and Brents, 2016, p. 19).

Labelling all sex work as sex trafficking neglects the socio-economic tenets of the sex industry, particularly as to what might drive women (and some men) into it (Lee, 2015). Whether one considers people able to consent to sex work or not, it is clear that systemic, gendered legacies (e.g. lower rates of education compared to men in low-income countries; the difficulty in re-entering the labour force after childbirth; and the challenges of being a single mother) may drive *some* women into the sex industry. Others may enter the sex industry as an expression of sexual liberation (Standing Committee on Justice Human Rights, 2006; Lee, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015).

While a full discussion of the divided opinions surrounding the legitimacy of the sex industry is beyond the scope of this research, it is important to note that the assertion that most involved in the sex industry are trafficked has not been substantiated in empirical work. Yet, it underpins many nations’ trafficking responses (Lerum and Brents, 2016). Taking strip clubs as an example, Weitzer (2011, p. 1359) points out that a US government-funded report ‘only’ found six cases over a seven-year period in the US where someone working in a strip club was trafficked. Even taking into account the difficulty of identifying victims of trafficking, Weitzer (2011) argues that small number certainly does not prove that most of those who work in sex industry are trafficked. Identifying all activities of

the sex industry as trafficking does a disservice to the 'real' victims of sex trafficking because it depletes resources (Nguyen et al., 2015).

Central to Weitzer's (2011) conceptualization of the oppression narrative is that those who bolster these approaches adopt Nils Christie's (1986) concept of the 'ideal victim.' Ideal victims are those that fit into Christie's (1986, p. 19-21) criteria, which describes victims as weak, respectable, blameless, and *just* powerful enough to claim their victim status, and their offenders as bad and unknown to the victim. According to Christie (1986), victimhood is simplified into notions of good and bad: innocent victims are wronged by bad people. Such notions galvanize societal responses; whereas, victims who do not meet Christie's (1986) criteria, the non-ideal victims, are largely left ignored (Hoyle et al., 2011). For example, in their analysis of 361 descriptions of victims from the US Department of State's Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Reports from 2001 to 2012,[33] Wilson and O'Brien (2016, p. 31) found that these descriptions represent victims as 'weak' with a reliance on their 'age, gender, and country of origin' to do so. These reports also define victimhood through reference to how the victim has been exploited, with an 'overt focus' on sexual exploitation and the characteristics of the offender, like the victim not knowing them (Wilson and O'Brien, 2016, p. 31). Wilson and O'Brien (2016, p. 33) concluded that the victims are presented as 'passive agents of the criminal behaviour of offenders.'

The TIP Reports' portrayal of human trafficking as innocent girls who are

[33] The US Department of State publishes the TIP Report yearly. It addresses the state of trafficking in every country and what responses are being done. It highlights best practices, issues within responses, and areas to improve. It is a highly influential report that governments around the world use to conceptualize the state of affairs on trafficking.

coerced into sex work by evil traffickers plays into notions of ideal victimhood. The non-ideal victims – perhaps the young, migrant man forced into exploitative labour to feed his family or the empowered sex worker – are pushed to the wayside by the trafficking-is-oppression narrative as illegitimate victims (Lee, 2015). In this way, these conceptualizations of trafficking create a hierarchy of victims in which some are more deserving and others less.

By recasting trafficking as sexually exploitive slavery, the sense of moral outrage among policy makers that advocates of the oppression paradigm institute have funnelled a wealth of resources into combatting trafficking (O'Connell Davidson, 2006). These funds have resulted in distinct types of responses to trafficking that seek to detect a 'very specific constellation of abuses' (O'Connell Davidson, 2006, p. 16). Responses are premised on a gendered, pastoral care ethos that prioritizes rescuing the vulnerable (ideal) victim. Identified victims are also rehabilitated in ways that socialize them into being 'respectable' women once again (Lee, 2015). The oppression paradigm has also shifted prevention to border control strategies that can identify at-risk women and girls and keep dangerous (mostly male) traffickers out (Lee, 2015). The paradigm inherently demands a criminal justice response to human trafficking (Gallagher and Holmes, 2008).

Beyond viewing trafficking in relation to sexual exploitation, as part of exploitation creep under this paradigm, law and policy have also largely conceptualized forced labour in relation to sexual exploitation (Chuang, 2014). While this overlap has begun to infuse a labour perspective into human

trafficking, it has mostly resulted in responses that focus on rescuing or protecting vulnerable victims in lieu of tackling the structural issues that lead to trafficking (particularly for forced labour), such as dual market bifurcation (Kempadoo, 2015, O'Connell Davidson, 2016, Department of State, United States of America, 2017).[34] Migrant smuggling, for example, is outside the definitional bounds of human trafficking as it is seen as movement merely for work. The migrant does not end up in a condition of slavery and is therefore not a 'real' victim of trafficking (Kempadoo, 2015, Department of State, United States of America, 2017). Even if the migrant has been oppressed and has suffered, they do not qualify (O'Connell Davidson, 2016).

Still, there are intricate ways that ideal victimhood intersects with other criminal justice tendencies. Rodríguez-López (2018) explains that through emphasis on ideal concepts of victimhood most trafficking responses brush over the complexities involved in victim identification. This simplification of trafficking narratives has led to victim agency being stripped and a complete silencing of the experience of male victims (Rodríguez-López, 2018). Concerns about idealized victimhood have enabled states to frame their anti-trafficking interventions as rescuing innocent women and girls (Lee, 2005; Milivojevic and Pickering, 2013; Jones et al., 2018; Gadd and Broad, 2018). In the context of the UK, Gadd and Broad (2018, p. 1450) explain that this 'politics of pity' leads to a focus on women and girls that 'obscures' the reality of state response to migration. This 'rescue industry' masks both the complexities of trafficking and its

[34] Dual market bifurcation is the notion that there exist two different labour markets: low to high skilled labour market and the no skill labour market, the latter of which is requisite for economic activities but undesirable for most workers.

overlap with migration (Jones et al., 2018). Lee (2005, p. 8) also points out that these rescue responses are inherently 'counter-productive' as they typically involve sending victims back to their home country without consideration for the socio-economic conditions that still exist that lead to their intersection with trafficking in the first place.

An important part of the rescue industry is the focus on who the victim is being rescued from (Lewis and Waite, 2019). The oppression narrative constructs the evilness of traffickers through the lens of organized crime. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Palermo Protocol itself is an addition to UNTOC, firmly embedding the linkage between trafficking and organized crime at an international global governance level (Rodríguez-López, 2018; Lewis and Waite, 2019). The focus on organized crime heightens the focus on border control as a way to protect the state from infiltration by these groups (Milivojevic and Pickering, 2013; Rodríguez-López, 2018).

These rescue narratives have more broadly framed some countries as in need of rescue and others as having the potential to rescue them. For instance, the Walk Free Foundation's Global Slavery Index 'names and shames' ten countries that are the 'worst' for human trafficking (Weitzer, 2014, p. 14). The named worst countries are calculated as such based on high prevalence rates and low response action (Weitzer, 2014; Weitzer, 2015b). The ten best, which are calculated based on low prevalence and high response action, are celebrated (Weitzer, 2014; Weitzer, 2015b). Predictably, the best countries are elite, high-income countries, and the ten worst are relatively deprived, low-income countries

(Weitzer, 2014; Weitzer, 2015b). In the 2018 version of the Global Slavery Index, Nigeria was in the top countries for absolute number of victims, and the UK was listed as in the top three for countries taking responses (Walk Free Foundation, 2018).

The rhetoric of the oppression paradigm, however, has done some good in raising the profile of forced labour as a serious issue. Although it recognizes sex trafficking as the major type of human trafficking, it also acknowledges other forms. The impact of this can be seen in the ILO's reporting of statistics on forced labour. In 2005, the ILO reported on non-trafficking forced labour and trafficking forced labour. As of 2006, however, it only reports on forced labour under the assumption that it is trafficking (Chuang, 2014). Other major reports on trafficking, such as the TIP Reports, have followed suit (Chuang, 2014). The UK has taken this a step further and has recognized forced labour as the most common form of human trafficking, although it also contradictorily promotes statistics on trafficking that reflect sexual exploitation as more common (Mustill, 2016). Acknowledging labour relations under human trafficking also brings attention to the global supply chain. Efforts to promote sustainable purchasing (e.g. fair trade branded products) have developed an almost cult-like following (Musto, 2009; Chuang, 2014). A prominent example of this was the 1990s boycotting of Nike products because of their use of sweatshops. The campaign successfully led to Nike changing its employment practices, at least temporarily (Birch, 2012).

Such supply chain efforts fulfill what Weitzer (2011) refers to as the polymorphous paradigm's aim of pulling attention away from individual victims and towards structural injustices, demanding labour-based solutions (Chuang, 2014). And while the oppression paradigm has had some success in raising the profile of forced labour, it has also done so by relying on notions of the ideal victim. The narratives of the polymorphous paradigm, in contrast, oppose the notion of an ideal victim and point to the large body of empirical studies which find that there is no typical victim or offender in trafficking (Vocks and Nijboer, 2000; Weitzer, 2011; Akee et al., 2014; Cho, 2015; Cho et al., 2014;).

Instead of framing anti-trafficking efforts through reference to the rescue industry, Weitzer (2011) argues that scholars under the polymorphous paradigm (see, for example, Lee, 2005; O'Connell Davidson, 2006; Weitzer, 2007; Bernstein, 2010; Milivojevic and Pickering, 2013; Kempadoo, 2015; Jones et al., 2018; Gadd and Broad, 2018) draw attention to the structural inequalities that drive people to seek out opportunities that may lead them to become a victim of trafficking. In this paradigm, those who become caught up in trafficking are viewed as victims of globalization, capitalism, and conflict (Lee, 2015; Weitzer, 2015a). More broadly, numerous scholars whose work would conceptually fall under the polymorphous paradigm have focused on framing trafficking through the lens of migration (Lee, 2005; Pickering and Ham, 2013; Fitzgerald, 2016; Gadd and Broad, 2018; Jones et al., 2018; Yousaf, 2018; Rodríguez-López, 2018; Pirjatanniemi, 2018). Trafficking then is a violation of human security, as is all irregular migration (Lobasz, 2009; Yousaf, 2018).

By emphasizing structural matters, proponents of the polymorphous paradigm reject the individualized accounts of human trafficking entrenched in the oppression paradigm – the innocent young women/girl victimized by the evil traffickers. Such an approach, these scholars argue, paints human trafficking simply as one individual (or a group of individuals) forcing another into slavery. It also juxtaposes good and evil: the innocent, good victim and the evil, bad trafficker. In so doing, they suggest it overlooks the wider, more challenging question of what causes both the victim and the trafficker to intersect with human trafficking (Kempadoo, 2015).

In transitioning from an individual to a structural approach, the polymorphous narrative moves away from a criminal justice response framework, premised on protecting the traffick*ed* and detecting the traffick*ers*, to a labour response framework focused on remedying the underlying causal push/pull factors inherent in traffick*ing* (Weitzer, 2015a). The shift in approaches re-configures the polarities of the oppression narrative – trafficking versus smuggling, illegal versus legal, forced versus voluntary, slavery versus freedom – into a continuum, redefining human trafficking, its prevalence, and relation to historic slavery in the process (O'Connell Davidson, 2013; Chuang, 2014).

Employing sociological approaches to understanding working conditions and anti-sex work biases, scholars of the polymorphous paradigm challenge the oppression paradigm's assertion that sex work is not work (Lerum and Brents, 2016). Proponents of the polymorphous paradigm fundamentally disregard the view that sex work is trafficking on the basis that it fails to grasp the nuances of

sex work and does not sufficiently recognize labour trafficking typology (Weitzer, 2014). Weitzer (2014) highlights that the nearly exclusive emphasis on trafficking through the lens of sexual exploitation moves resources away from the other typologies.

The polymorphic narrative presents human trafficking as a by-product of growing disparities in living conditions (Gilbor, 2016)**.** Environmental destruction, the erosions of the rule of law, rampant poverty and unemployment, and armed conflict are some of the many conditions that constitute as push factors for migration, as well as make individuals vulnerable to trafficking (The Walk Free Foundation, 2016). Moving to better one's life depicts a type of agency, even if it becomes trafficking, that is often void in oppression paradigm narratives. There is, however, a much larger question about whether individuals can even make autonomous choices if they are subjected to desperate conditions. Mantouvalou (2010, p. 428) queries: 'Are [people] actually free to work in extremely poor conditions if their only alternative is extreme socio-economic deprivation…?' The economic impacts of globalization simultaneously decrease access to basic resources (food, water, healthcare) for those in most low- and middle-income countries and increase the demand for the unregulated, informal sector at the sourcing end of the global supply chain that provides products to higher-income countries. Both deprivation of basic needs and market forces serve to push and pull workers from low- and middle-income countries to higher-income ones (Chuang, 2006).

Higher-income countries need labourers from low- and middle-income

countries because they do not have the populace to fill all employment sectors, or they do not have people willing to fill these roles. Due to low fertility rates and low to no skilled jobs being too 'dirty' and 'difficult,' countries' own citizens do not want to take them up (Chuang, 2006, p. 145). Workers from low- and middle-income countries are drawn to higher-income countries on the premise of having *any* job – because any job is better than no job – and these jobs typically, even if they pay far below minimum wage in the higher-income country, enable the worker to earn more than they otherwise would in employment in their home country (Chuang, 2006; O'Connell Davidson, 2015; Weitzer, 2015a). In fact, sometimes so much more money that when they return home they can provide for their families, buy a house, set-up a business, and own the latest technology (Weitzer, 2014).

Supporting this polymorphic labour perspective in their cross-national multi-variate analysis on globalization and human trafficking, Landman and Silverman (2019) found that countries with the highest levels of overall globalization, economic development, and democracy have the lowest rates of trafficking. And while this is strong evidence in favour of socio-economic conditions underpinning trafficking prevalence, Landman and Silverman (2019) are also quick to point out that the data could actually be showing that these more globalized, developed, and democratic countries could just have more resources to have stronger responses to trafficking, which has led to lower prevalence rates. They urged that more research is needed to expand on their study.

The polymorphous paradigm, overall, captures the argument that trafficking involves an array of factors instead of the coalescence of a single set of factors, like an ideal victim intersecting with an evil trafficker. Understanding trafficking this way brings to light the multiplicity of experiences that exist under the umbrella of trafficking. Victims can also become traffickers, or they may adapt to their surroundings and no longer identify as victims (Weitzer, 2015a). A trafficked woman, for instance, might become a Madam at a brothel and assist in exploiting others.[35] In another example, Weitzer (2015a) illustrates how young women trafficked to work in sex clubs at the Thai-Laos border began to normalize their situation and became grateful for their earnings. This calls into question, even from a victim standpoint, how trafficking is perceived and what narrative it fosters.

Polymorphic scholars also acknowledge that the definitions of human trafficking are contested and ambiguous and that there is no real consensus on its definition (Musto, 2009; Weitzer, 2014, 2015b; Piper et al., 2015). Legislated definitions such as those in the Palermo Protocol, upon which most governments base their legislation, largely skirt around this by operating a very broad definition of trafficking, which in turn contributes to the problem as mentioned in Chapter 1 (Weitzer, 2015a).

[35] A Madam is a woman who runs a brothel. The term is most often used to describe Black, African women who had become alpha victims. Ikeora (2016, p. 8) explains that Madam is actually a term of respect, '"Madam" (female) and "Oga" (male) are terms often used to refer to people in some parts of Africa in terms of their class/status/position and age (as a form of respect). It has often been used as a sign of respect. Victims often use those terms for their traffickers (as boss).'

Ultimately, under Weitzer's (2011) conceptualization of trafficking paradigms, the oppression paradigm takes an individualist approach to human trafficking, focusing on the innocence of victims and the evilness of exploiters, and it calls for enhancing criminal justice responses. In contrast, adherents to the polymorphous paradigm argue that focusing on sexual exploitation ignores the experiences of most victims of trafficking and, in turn, they highlight the structural conditions that drive individuals to intersect with exploiters. The oppression paradigm dominates current understandings of human trafficking, and the polymorphous paradigm set itself up in opposition to this, challenging the current understanding of human trafficking. The polymorphous paradigm shifts discourse towards more intersectional understandings of immigration, race, gender, and exploitation.

Weitzer's (2011) paradigms are useful in disentangling the location and influence of sexual exploitation in anti-trafficking discourse. His paradigms also provide a way to navigate the great scope of trafficking scholarship. And although useful for framing the discourse on trafficking, Weizter's (2011) paradigms can foster oversimplification of anti-trafficking narratives. Notably, Weizter (2011) describes these narratives as distinct paradigms. Whereas, there is a growing overlap between the two in policy and practice, particularly for UN agencies and other international organizations. In practice, these narratives exist on a continuum where policy or practice is perhaps more oppressive or more polymorphous, but still incorporates notions from both (see the College of Police, 2015, 2022 indices of vulnerability in Chapter 1, for example). In another example, under the oppression paradigm trafficking as sex work and trafficking



as organized crime locate the harm caused by trafficking at different levels: sex work as harm against women, and organized crime as harm against the state. In the polymorphous paradigm, in contrast, the harm is caused by the state. As Milivojevic and Pickering (2013, p. 596) explain more broadly, 'the "risk" of trafficking is constantly debated, managed and policed; yet we are not entirely sure what that risk might be.'

To capture the differing locations of harm and risk, Jennifer Lobasz (2019) argues that, instead of two paradigms, trafficking conceptualizations can be broken down into six: trafficking as a security threat, trafficking as an abuse of human rights, trafficking as migration, trafficking as sex work, trafficking as coerced and exploited labour, and trafficking as international relations. These six orientations have distinct understandings of the harm and risk of trafficking. For instance, security threat focuses on threats to state sovereignty through the lens of organized crime and illegal migration. This orientation is premised on enhancing criminal justice system responses to trafficking and strengthening border control, and Lobasz (2019) argues it inherently results in framing trafficked people as potential offenders. Trafficking as human rights abuse focuses on the harm and risk to the person. Human trafficking violates the rights of those trafficked. This orientation focuses on redressing trafficking by calling on states to prevent and address human rights abuse by providing legal and medical assistance (among others). Trafficking as migration, however, essentially combines these two perspectives, analyzing the overlap between trafficking and smuggling and framing both as human rights abuses that have been securitized. On the other hand, trafficking as international relations takes a

step back from focusing on the victim as central to the definition to assessing how state and non-state actors develop the normative problem of trafficking. This perspective focuses on the power relationships involved in labelling trafficking and the impacts of that label at a global governance level. Lobasz (2019) ultimately argues that these six orientations combine to frame the global anti-trafficking narrative. She urges for trafficking research to adopt a critical constructivist perspective to assess how anti-trafficking actors work across these six different orientations when they understand and react to trafficking. Lobasz (2019) describes this approach as focusing on the many locations of power in trafficking discourses that are circularly produced and reproduced.

There are also other approaches to conceptualizing trafficking narratives, such as Navid Pourmokhtari's (2015) three approaches: criminal, economic, and rights-based. More broadly, Gadd and Broad (2018), Rioux et al. (2019), and McQuade (2019) highlight that most of the narratives on trafficking miss the influence of the political economy that governs trade. Countries that take strong stances against trafficking, like European countries, will at the same time support companies that engage workers in slave-like conditions (Gadd and Broad, 2018; McQuade, 2019). The global supply chain is 'inescapably enmeshed' in labour exploitation, and, while there have been some efforts, there has been no real change to this reality (Gadd and Broad, 2018, p. 1455).

Assessing the rise of anti-trafficking efforts since the 1990s, Milivojevic and Pickering (2013) refer to the overlapping conceptualizations of trafficking as forming a conceptual 'trafficking nexus.' While they trace three pillars of this



nexus – sex, migration, and crime – they stress that these pillars have '*individually and together*, have been instrumental in the process of the development, application, validation and evaluation of current global anti-trafficking strategies' (emphasis my own, Milivojevic and Pickering, 2013, p. 586).

Milivojevic and Pickering (2013) also raise the important point that the majority of anti-trafficking conceptualizations are driven by agendas in the Global North, particularly those in Europe and the US. Importantly, Milivojevic and Pickering (2013) found that these trafficking agendas and wider conceptualizations are 'stripped to black-and-white narratives' (p. 596) because they have 'only sporadically been accompanied by rigorous investigation and critical research' (p. 585).

Despite the breadth of narratives on trafficking, there are distinct perspectives that have been missed, such as non-Western conceptualizations of trafficking. Moreover, the scope of the differing narratives and approaches to trafficking are influenced by the research that underpins them, which is often faulty. Next, I explore how this research has hindered our ability to conceptualize trafficking.

Trafficking Research: Faulty Methods and Missed Perspectives

Victims (and frequently offenders) of trafficking are often exploited people living in highly precarious situations, adding a heightened layer of complexity to trafficking research and the importance of doing it rigorously. Lewis et al. (2015,

p. 582) developed the concept of 'hyper-precarity' to capture their exploitation, which 'emerges from the ongoing interplay of neoliberal labour markets and highly restrictive immigration regimes.' People are extremely vulnerable at all points of trafficking routes: source, transit, and destination. There is little recourse for researchers (or police, for that matter) to interact with trafficking victims when they are not in a situation of hyper-precarity and, thereby, extremely vulnerable. As a result, the existing trafficking scholarship largely focuses on, as van Meeteren and Wiering (2019, p. 108) so duly summarize, 'theory and argumentation rather than empirical study.' Victims' vulnerabilities have been long documented but how these vulnerabilities coalesce in exploitation has little empirical backing because doing this kind of research is very challenging (van Meeteren and Wiering, 2019).

At the outset, therefore, it is important to recognize that trafficking research is difficult to conduct. Victims are hidden and difficult to access (Musto, 2009; Bosworth et al., 2011; Weitzer, 2015b). As is true with many other types of crime, it is nearly impossible to generate a representative sampling frame, so any quantitative data that is collected consequently uses probability sampling (Laczko, 2005; Musto, 2009; Weitzer, 2014). Further, data collection methods and operational definitions of human trafficking (e.g. whether sex work and sex trafficking, as well as forced labour and sex trafficking, are disaggregated or clumped together) vary across countries, NGOs, and government branches (Hernandez and Rudolph, 2015). Different definitions lead to differences in policy and practice that further compound the difficulties of accurately researching trafficking (Choo et al., 2010). Moreover, research focuses on victims of sexual

exploitation because they are the most identified type of victim (Hernandez and Rudolph, 2015; Weitzer, 2015b; Lerum and Brents, 2016).

There are also distinct cultural approaches to responses to trafficking that underscore the nuances in how trafficking is defined, understood, and approached. When researching the trafficking of Korean nationals in the US, for instance, Choo et al. (2010) found that the notion of not bringing shame to the community influenced victims' actions, and thereby also changed the way they had to approached their research.

For these reasons, very few empirical studies have actually been conducted, and the ones that have do not have transparent methodologies and present findings that are largely anecdotal and based upon the moral credence of the researcher and their interpretative angle (Musto, 2009). When empirical work is conducted, research is dominated by qualitative interviewing methods, as interviews are seen as sensitive enough to respond to the situation of hyper-precarity (Cockbain et al., 2018). Choo et al. (2010) found qualitative research methods worked best to access their trafficking research population as they could work to establish trust, snowballing research participants. Choo et al. (2010, p. 168), however, highlighted that much of the qualitative research that has happened has employed substandard methodology and unethical research practices, which were are based on anecdotes coupled with 'emotive manipulation of wobbly statistics' and entrenched biases.

In their ambitious study, Cockbain et al. (2018) map out and synthesize the European Union (EU) evidence on trafficking. They screened over 6,106 pieces of scientific research, but only 152 could be mapped and eight synthesized. They found that very few publications met 'minimum scientific standards' (Cockbain et al., 2018, p. 319). Most had 'poor methods reporting, unclear or imprecise results and conclusions not properly grounded in the data' (Cockbain et al., 2018, p. 319). Cockbain et al. (2018) also found that the literature was largely descriptive and lacked thematic and geographical scope. They called for research that addresses these gaps and adheres to higher conceptual, procedural, and ethical standards. Cockbain et al. (2018, p. 354) summary of their findings is worrisome:

> *Our criticisms of the literature, in particular the low reporting standards, are not mere 'academic pedantry.' These shortcomings represent genuine barriers to building and advancing a strong evidence base.*

The lack of reliable research on trafficking could be construed as a product of the nature of trafficking itself – it is hidden and crosses jurisdictional boundaries (Choo et al., 2010). But these challenges do not justify poor research practices, particularly given the influence trafficking scholarship has. From a policy and practice perspective, Bryant and Landman's (2020) systematic review of human trafficking programming found that programs are drawing on research like that outlined by Cockbain et al. (2018) to justify their approach. Bryant and Landman (2020) point to the lack of consensus on what is/what is not trafficking as an issue in program development and delivery. They describe it is nearly impossible to determine 'what works' for responding to trafficking when there is a multiplicity of ways of defining trafficking being responded to under the same programming umbrella.

Despite a multiplicity of ways of defining trafficking, Zimbabwean academic Munyaradz Mawere (2019) emphasizes that there is almost no literature on trafficking conceptualizations in African contexts, let alone that which that comes from African authors.[36] For instance, Russell's (2018) analysis of 1,231 articles on trafficking from between 2000 and 2014 found that Africa (4% of articles) and South America (1%) were the most under-represented geographic areas.[37] Mawere (2019) argues that there are distinct understandings of trafficking in African countries that are not captured by the current Global-North driven research. Focusing mostly on Zimbabwe as his case study, Mawere (2019) argues that anti-trafficking frameworks should be re-conceptualized through the lens of trafficking as poverty, which locates the harm as a rights violation at the state level towards its citizens. Mawere (2019) underscores that there is a significant gap in research not only in African contexts, but specifically focusing on how poverty contributes to different types of trafficking. Most research that does exist related to poverty focuses on the feminization of migration,[38] but he argues the reality is more complex (Mawere, 2019). Mawere (2019) explains there are many causes and types of poverty. He points out that poverty is caused not only by state actions, but also by their omission of any action. Mawere (2019) specifically argues that neo-colonial practices leave many African states unable to control their own natural resources. As Mawere (2019, p. 67) puts it:

[36] Less still African authors working within African countries!

[37] They also found that Australia (2% of articles) was an underrepresented area, although it is the only area listed that was categorized as a single country instead of a group of countries.

[38] The feminization of migration largely refers to the gender composition of migration, which has seen an increase in the number of women migrating.

> *While poverty on the continent was previously driven by conquest and subjugation by the colonial regime, which, besides looting, instituted the privatization of communally-owned resources, today it is perpetuated in more subtle ways, such as direct resource externalization, under-invoicing, tax evasion, capital flight, corruption, bribery and debt repayment, all with the complicity of African governments.*

Mawere (2019) contends that a holistic understanding of poverty is also needed – it is not just about absolute poverty, but also the lack of ability to obtain material goods that make life more enjoyable. Mawere (2019, p. 7) fundamentally explains that poverty violates not only basic human rights but also people's 'liberty to make independent decisions' about how they live their lives. In their research with Nigerian returnees from Norway, Paasche et al. (2018) found some evidence that the failure to recognize poverty can actually exacerbate trafficking vulnerabilities. Paasche et al. (2018) found that Nigerian returnees would have to wait weeks or months to receive their reintegration support payments promised to them by IOM. This failure of payment left the returnees unable to pay their bills and support themselves or their children, which in turn can lead them to turn back to trafficking. Mawere (2019, p. 79) ultimately calls for an 'African perspective on combatting human trafficking through the eradication of poverty.'

Paasche et al.'s (2018) research also highlights the importance of analyzing race in trafficking studies, which Pourmokhtari (2015), whose research largely focuses on Middle Eastern contexts, points out is a level of analysis largely overlooked in scholarship on trafficking. Paasche et al. (2018) found that 94% of Nigerians attempting to apply for asylum in Norway were rejected. They were the highest national origin country rejected (Paasche et al., 2018). According to the

Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (2020), for all countries of origin in 2020, of those immigration applications not withdrawn or dropped (n=1,754),[39] Norway only rejected 20% (n= 354) applications. Not only are Nigerians rejected at the highest rate, but it is disproportionality high compared to other nationalities. In Paasche et al.'s (2018) study, trafficked women were denied asylum, and, on return to Nigeria, in addition to not receiving their support payments as mentioned above, they faced 'unprofessional and disrespectful' treatment by IOM staff that were supposed to assist them to reintegrate (Paasche et al., 2018, p. 7).

Not only are there perspectives and levels of analysis missed in current research, but there are also other entire research areas that have not been explored. Milivojevic and Pickering (2013) stress that we need research that directly engages with those involved in anti-trafficking efforts, including state and international agencies. Despite most governments adopting a criminal justice system response to trafficking, for example, there is little empirical research that analyzes how police respond to trafficking. The research that has been done largely focuses on how law enforcement officers are being trained to respond to trafficking and if that training has increased their awareness of the crime (see, for example, Grubb and Bennett, 2012 and Renzetti et al., 2015). Some other research looks at investigation pathways and what would qualify as a successful investigation in human trafficking cases (see, for example, Bjelland, 2018 and

[39] This includes outcomes of applications made for asylum, other protection, humanitarian grounds, UAM limited, and Dublin III Convention, as well as for residence in a safe third country.

Pajón and Walsh, 2018).[40] These studies have also largely been on police responses in the US and Nordic countries.

Above all, there is very little academic research on police responses to human trafficking in the UK and less still on Nigeria, the case study countries of this thesis. While there is some research on policing in Nigeria, it has centred on the colonial history, what classifies as everyday policing, and the role of non-state actors and vigilantes (Klantschnig, 2009; Hills, 2017; Beek et al., 2017; Cooper-Knock and Owen, 2015). The CLEEN Foundation (2022), based in Lagos, has been crucial in tracing the history of Nigerian policing and bringing together Nigerian academics working on policing topics. As an independent body, they are also highly involved in monitoring police corruption and advocating for reform. Since June 2020, they have held consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN in New York (CLEEN Foundation, 2022). To be clear, however, this is a limited research field, and significantly more research is needed to truly grasp the roles and responsibilities of policing actors in Nigeria. Because it is so under-researched, Cooper-Knock and Owen (2015, p. 356) call it an 'exciting time' to be involved in research with police in Africa.

In contrast to Nigeria, there is certainly a large body of scholarship on policing in the UK. Still, there have only been a few studies on police responses to trafficking. What research has been done on policing trafficking in the UK suffers from empirical problems that limit the ability to use their conclusions. For example, in a recent study by Machura et al. (2019), the authors set out to

[40] What qualifies as success varies by force.

analyze if police can recognize human trafficking cases. They conducted a survey with 287 police officers from the North and South Wales forces. Machura et al. (2019, p. 213) explained that they collected data on how much training the officers had received to find that most participants had received a 'moderate' amount of training (what moderate means is not cearly defined). In their analysis of their findings, Machura et al. (2019, p. 213) concluded that 'a clear majority' were able to recognize human trafficking cases. Yet, when I reviewed their descriptions of cases, I was not surprised that police had been able to make this identification. They used idealized descriptions of human trafficking in their seven scenarios. For example, Machura et al.'s (2019, p. 207) cannabis farm example reads as follows:

> *A Vietnamese girl, 12 years of age, has been brought to the UK on the back of a truck. She is told that she must work in a cannabis farm to pay for her journey to the UK. When interviewed by police, she claims that she has agreed to work on the cannabis farm and does not feel constrained at all.*

They also based their scenarios on major police investigations. Investigations, which I learned in my fieldwork, are usually shared around police forces as part of training programs. There were also some really interesting ways they described their scenarios. All UK victims were named, but international ones were not – e.g. Sarah, a UK housewife in scenario 2, versus 'an underaged sex worker…transported to the UK by a gang' in scenario 3 (Machura et al., 2019, p.207). Further, all examples where smuggling overlap with trafficking involved women, and three of these four scenarios involved underaged girls. The only exception to this was in scenario 4, which involved overseas cockle pickers found by the UK coast guard, which was based on a 2004 case where 23 cockle pickers drowned off the coast of the UK and, after police investigation, they were

later found to be victims of trafficking (Craig, 2015; Machura et al., 2019). This cockle pickers case was pivotal in the UK because it led to increased awareness on forced labour, which spurred the development of the Modern Slavery Act (Craig, 2015). Somewhat confusingly, Machura et al. (2019) use the importance of this case as their justification for why they should use it as an example, without considering what the importance meant for police awareness of the case.

The calls to do trafficking research better are not new nor exclusive to the scholars mentioned here like Cockbain et al. (2018) and Bryant and Landman (2020). By 2005, numerous academics were sounding the alarm on poor research practices in trafficking studies in a special issue of *International Migration* (see for example Andrees and van der Linden, 2005; Kelly, 2005; Laczko and Gozdziak, 2005; Tyldum and Brunovskis, 2005). Yet just shy of two decades later, the same research practices are being replicated, and the same criticisms still apply.

Responding to the criticism of trafficking research practices involves drawing on methodological expertise and innovation from a range of fields within and beyond trafficking studies. Additionally, research involving human trafficking demands highly nuanced consideration of the way in which Western ideals influence anti-trafficking rhetoric and associated responses. As Milivojevic and Pickering (2013, p. 595) summarize: ‘behind supposed intervention to “rescue the innocents” lies a neo-colonial and punitive, anti-immigration agenda.’

Trafficking is an inherently global crime, yet the majority of research on trafficking has occurred in the Global North. Because trafficking research inherently involves links between the Global North and Global South, it also requires an assessment of the overlap and distinction in responses from countries in these areas. For Brown (2021), this type of research involves questioning the ethical foundations of our research question. When engaging in Global North and Global South research, where we situate the research question matters. It reflects the core of what we think we understand a phenomenon to be. For this thesis, that is police.

Police not only have to navigate the anti-trafficking narrative but also the wider policing one. There is some research (see, for example, Pickering, 2011 and Franko Aas and Gundhus, 2015) that suggests border police in the Global North believe they are protecting human rights under a more polymorphous style narrative, but they are operationalizing this work from a more trafficking-is-oppression perspective. There is little research, however, on how public police navigate this landscape nor how they do so within African contexts. So to explore how police are responding to trafficking in the UK and Nigeria, the first step is to explore what the role of the police is and how the colonial history between the two has influenced these roles. This is my task in the next chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on exploring how we have conceptualized trafficking. I relied on Weitzer's (2011) understanding of the bifurcation in trafficking

narratives, that which is oppressive and focuses on ideal victimhood and the offender versus that which is polymorphous and recognizes the multiple socio-economic conditions that led victims and offenders to meet in space and time. Weitzer's (2011) oppression and polymorphous paradigms provide a useful starting point for categorizing the key differences in trafficking discourse, particularly as it relates to pathways of victimization.

However, Weitzer's (2011) approach lends itself to oversimplifying the field of critical trafficking studies. These paradigms do not capture the overlap in narratives nor the range of differences in where the harm and threat of trafficking are located across scholarship, policy, and practice. I illustrated this limitation by outlining the multiple different ways the risk of trafficking can be understood using Lobasz's (2019) six orientations. Regardless of how it may be categorized, the breadth of ways to conceptualize trafficking has real consequences for victims. It changes who gets recognized as a victim and what levels of resourcing there are to support them.

The lack of consensus on what trafficking is has also fuelled a range of research that suffers from poor methodology and ethics. There are significant gaps in trafficking scholarship. Despite being approached as a crime, there is little research on how police respond to trafficking. Importantly, conceptualizations of trafficking are centralized in the Global North. There is also almost no research on how trafficking is understood in African countries. I concluded this chapter by highlighting how my research is positioned to address

both of these gaps. In the next chapter, I assess how we can understand the role of police in responding to trafficking.

Chapter 3: Deconstructing Anglo-American Policing

When historians trace the model of policing that exists in the UK and Nigeria, the Anglo-American model, they largely do so to 1829 and the passage of Britain's Metropolitan Police Act and its impact on the colonies. These historical accounts capture what Georgina Sinclair (2016, p. 30) refers to as the 'dominant model of police history.' Sinclair (2016, p. 30) explains that, in this model, the development of the police is distortedly 'congratulatory' and fails to assess the critical purpose of the police and how that purpose was framed in the metropole and colonies. The dominant history of the police is, in short, a Whig history.[41] This history is part of the shared philosophy of the British and Nigerian police, underpinning police culture and police activities (Sinclair, 2016).

The best iteration of the philosophy of the Anglo-American model, specifically as it applied in the metropole, is in the Peelian Principles, named after Sir Robert Peel who championed the Metropolitan Police Act. The principles capture Whig interpretations of modern policing's foundation on public consent and the notion that police gain legitimacy through their relationship with the public (Sinclair, 2016). Ultimately, the dominant history of policing presents the modern police as a 'force of progress' (Sinclair, 2016, p. 29), describing police as 'citizens in uniform' (Reith, 1943a, 1943b as cited in Sinclair, 2016, p. 33). These idealized versions of who the police are and what they do, however, have come to define police culture and practice today. In the UK, for instance, the resonance of the 1829 model of policing can be seen in the Code of Ethics of College of Policing

[41] A Whig view of history describes the interpretation of history as progress from some dark and dismal time to the 'glorious' present (Blackburn, 2016, p. 169).

(2014, p. v),[42] which states that 'the public are the police and the police are the public.' This view of police history romanticizes the development of the Anglo-American police, focusing on Britain's supposed successes at home and abroad (Sinclair, 2016).

Yet, where domestic policing was viewed as policing by consent, the colonial model never involved a consenting populace. Colonial policing was explicitly militaristic, premised on securing British commercial interests. The legacy of British policing in the colonial era remains embedded in repressive policing tactics being used in Nigeria to this day. Revisionist accounts of police history also point to significant overlap between police practices in the metropole and colonies. Scholars like Emma Bell (2013) contend that, while presented as ideologically different, the metropole and colonial police's purpose and their associated practices were the same. The colonies served as a testing ground for police practices that were brought to the metropole.

The flow of policing knowledge from metropole to colony and back to metropole has taken on new forms in modern times, as described in Chapter 1. The British are heavily engaged in monitoring and spreading their model of policing across Nigeria by funding numerous policing practices and reform initiatives policies (Hills, 2012a). What they have currently, of course, was implemented by the British in the first place. The British have labelled this 'new' type of policing as a supposedly better version than what former colonies currently have. At the same time, this model of policing was developed in the

[42] The professional body for those working in the police service in England and Wales.

same colonies in the colonial era. Inherent in this understanding is that colonial policing was different than metropole policing and that metropole policing evolved into a distinct and superior model of policing.

In their influential book on the politics of the police, Benjamin Bowling, Robert Reiner, and James Sheptycki (2019, p. 4) underscore that critical accounts of the modern police require a 'conceptual exploration of the taken-for-granted idea of police.' I also adhere to preeminent post-colonial scholar Jenny Sharpe's (1995, p. 99) advice that, when analyzing institutions, academia must progress with 'critical awareness of colonialism's ideological effects.' Combining these two perspectives, the most taken-for-granted idea of policing is that police are representative of the public – the citizen in uniform. The embeddedness of this policing ethos raises a critical question: who is the citizen? In the context of Nigeria, as a former colony, the question evolves: how has colonial ideology shaped the citizen?

Answering these questions is the purpose of this chapter. I begin by highlighting the dominant model of police history and outlining the relevant critiques.[43] I, then, employ political economists Alberto Alesina and Bryony Reich's (2015) model of nation-building to highlight the main failing of Whig interpretations of police history. I argue that the Whig model silences the relationship between police and the colonial state, with a focus on the case study of Nigeria. Next, I transition away from the specific links between the UK and

[43] There are many more critiques of this model than I have scope to explore, so I focus on those ones relevant to my argument.

Nigeria to more broadly focus on analyzing the current iteration of the dominant Anglo-American model by exploring who the citizen being policed was conceptualized to be and how that influences who is policed today. I argue that police roles and responsibilities are derived from their position as a representative of the state. Despite the ideological trick of the dominant model to present police as the embodiment of the national community in the domestic context, I contend that the police have always been an expression of state power, and, that, in a globalized world, this impacts domestic and international policing. I conclude by analyzing how the state polices through and beyond its territorial boundaries and what implications this has for shaping who is and who is not perceived to be a legitimate citizen.

The Dominant Model of Anglo-American Police History

The Anglo-American model of policing was developed in London in 1829 in response to growing concerns about crime and civil unrest. Society at the time was divided, with deep class conflict and a growing working class populace (Bowling et al., 2019). While there was a system of night watchmen, constables, and professional detectives, these were seen as not effective enough to protect (ruling class) victims nor catch (working class) offenders (Emsley, 2008). Whig historians argue that crime at the time was caused by ‘mob violence’ and ‘evil individuals’ (Emsley, 2008, p. 72). It was then-Home Secretary Robert Peel’s proposal for a seemingly better and more centralized police organization that led to the Metropolitan Police Bill of 1829, birthing the New Police (Emsley, 2008; Sinclair, 2016).

While policing has evolved since 1829, the Peelian Principles (see Appendix 1) shape the roles and responsibilities that have come to be central to the definition of modern Anglo-American policing and its wider reach (Loader, 2016; Sinclair, 2016). The nine Peelian Principles frame the policing-by-consent model. Under this model, the public consented to the power of the police because the police were perceived to be members of the public, reflecting and protecting citizens. The British government claimed the New Police were non-partisan upholders of the law that represented the public's interests. Officers were unable to vote until 1887, and police legitimacy was intended to be rooted in law and public consent (Bowling et al., 2019). The contemporary importance of the Peelian Principles can be seen in the current Code of Ethics of the College Policing in the UK:

> *Peel's principles focus heavily on the importance of public support and emphasize the need for the police to 'secure and maintain public respect.' This Code of Ethics remains true to the founding principles of British policing and highlights the responsibility of those of us who work in policing to behave in a manner most likely to win the trust and support of fellow citizens.*
>
> College of Policing (2014, p. v.)

Prominent police historian Clive Emsley (2014), however, points out that, despite being called the Peelian Principles, there is no evidence to support that these principles were actually from Peel nor that they were developed to define the model of the New Police. Although the prevention of crime and public consent were central to the establishment of the New Police in 1829, the principles were not.

The ‘best’ iteration of the principles as we have come to know them are from P.D. Mayhill’s 1985 book, *Police-Community Relations and the Administration of Justice,* which referenced both Charles Reith and Captain W.L. Melville Lee, the latter of whom had written a 1901 book on the history of policing in England (Emsley, 2014a, p. 13). Emsley (2014a) largely traces the development of the principles to Reith, a rubber planter who went on to become an Army Officer. After ‘little archival research,’ Reith published the nine principles of police in the 1940s as a ‘summation of both how the British police evolved and the foundations upon which it is’ (Emsley, 2014a, p. 12-13). Emsley (2014a, p.12) contends that Reith specifically wrote these from a ‘middle-class Victorian’ perspective with ‘general ignorance of the structure of policing in Europe and how it had developed.’

Reith contrasted the ‘citizen in uniform’ of the British Bobby with what he described as the more militaristic, ‘top-down “ruler-appointed” and essentially “despotic” even “totalitarian”’ style policing in the British colonies and in Europe (Emsley, 2014b, p. 7). Reith entrenched the framework of two distinct conceptualizations of policing that still remain: 1) the civilian, British model and 2) the militaristic, colonial and European model (Emsley, 2014b). The militaristic policing model from Ireland is often described by Whig historians as different from the metropole model and also as providing a framework for other colonial policing practices (Bell, 2013; Emsley, 2014b). Reith and his contemporaries, however, importantly neglected to consider the influence of colonial policing traditions on the metropole (Bell, 2013; Emsley, 2014b). Reith also assumed the British policing traditions in both the colonies and the metropole were distinct

from the European gendarme model (Mawby, 2008). Reith's understanding was supported by the British government, which purported to have created a model of policing across the colonies that was distinct from the militaristic European model (and also the metropole model) and more 'appropriate for the control of a subjugated population' (Mawby, 2008, p. 24).

Then and now, the roles and responsibilities of police in the Peelian policing-by-consent model focus on responding to public needs when something has happened while also thinking ahead about what might happen and how the public could be protected. Specifically, policing focused on addressing some wrong that has already happened while also preventing future wrongs (Bowling et al., 2019). In Egon Bittner's (1990, p. 249) famed words, we turn to police in situations when 'something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now!' Yet, drawing on Bittner (1990), Ian Loader (2014, p.45) indicates that 'many of the things that "ought-not-to-be-happening" turn out not to be crime.' For example, in the Peelian era, patrolling was a central police task. The police supposedly prevented crime from happening by their mere presence on the streets (an idea that holds true today) (Bowling et al., 2019). For order maintenance actions, the police took on a range of formal and informal service-oriented tasks such as inspecting scale weights and waking people up for work by knocking on their doors (Emsley, 1983, p. 158-159).[44]

[44] Known as 'knockers-up,' for 2-3 pence per week, officers on the night shift would knock on doors at the end of their shift to wake up households (Emsley, 1983, p. 158).

Although the focus on order maintenance and crime prevention through foot patrols were promoted as the core function, police took on roles far beyond these so-called 'low policing' tasks (Bowling et al., 2019). 'High policing' functions such as covert surveillance of suspect groups and various forms of intelligence gathering are 'as old as policing itself' (Gill, 2000, p. 188). Such covert policing tactics are equally synonymous with the role of the police. Today, the actions associated with low and high policing tasks are diverse (Mawby and Wright, 2008). Bowling et al. (2019, p. 103) duly summarize the breadth of policing action:

> *Most discussions of the role of the police begin with patrolling neighbourhoods on foot or by car, rapid response to emergencies, and the investigation of crimes. Dig a little deeper, and myriad other roles are revealed: preparing criminal cases for prosecution, appearing in court, and holding arrestees in police cells; responding to terrorism; managing traffic; licensing firearms; controlling the vices of pornography, prostitution, and gambling; responding to sudden death; maintaining social order during elections and the detection of election malpractice; responding to people suffering mental health episodes in the community.*

Bowling et al. (2019, p. 103) conclude: 'How are we to make sense out of this bewildering diversity?'

While police have a seemingly 'open-ended list' of roles and responsibilities (Jacobs, 2016, p. 10), underpinning this list is their monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Tankebe, 2019). Through force, police have shaped how citizens understand themselves under the law since their advent (Lerman and Weaver, 2014). As Meares (2016, p. 3) puts it, the 'police are teachers who offer a "hidden curriculum" to the public,' wherein the public 'learns' who is a citizen with rights and protections and who is not. Loader (2014, p. 44-45) guides us to consider beyond the basic question of 'what the police do' to the question of 'why

do the police matter?' They matter, Loader (2014, p. 45) contends, because 'every police action, or inaction, sends a powerful message to its recipient and to wider audiences about who belongs within a society and about their place (or lack thereof) within its extant social hierarchies.' Loader (2016) highlights that the Peelian Principles are a useful starting point for reflecting on police action and why it matters. The Principles serve as a foundational framework for analyzing police roles and responsibilities and police culture.

Because of their origins, the Peelian Principles are an idealized version of how middle-class white Victorian men thought the police *should* work in their public encounters, encounters of which their position in society largely protected them from having in the first place. Loader (2016) picks apart the majority of these principles to prove that, while they are appealing, they are misleading. Loader (2016, p. 430) describes them as 'too general, or thin' to accurately represent policing and how the police are both a product and producer of modern state-building. Loader (2016, p. 428) argues that the Peelian Principles reflect the 'decorative work' of what policing is perceived to be, hindering an exploration of what it actually is. Here, Loader (2016) points out that policing is not *just* for order maintenance and crime control. Right from the start, police were set out to control certain classes of people – those who were viewed as a threat to the ruling class.

The New Police were created to establish *and* maintain a 'new threshold' order and respectability (Emsley, 2008, p 74). In other words, the New Police were established as a tool of civilization. Revisionist accounts of police history

reveal the deep class conflict and an increasing population coupled with the large shift from rural villages to towns and cities. The 19th century was a period of rampant poverty and labour issues leading to industrial protests (Emsley, 2008; Rawlings, 2008). The result was a 'burgeoning, and increasingly self-confident and non-deferential, working class' (Emsley, 2008, p. 72). The police socialized working-class citizens into the ruling class status-quo by punishing unacceptable behaviour (e.g. social order offences like rioting), while also marking them out as not belonging. Crime prevention was the New Police's primary task, which involved patrolling the streets to catch and stop disorderly (working-class) behaviour as a form of crime deterrence (Emsley, 2008). Police took on roles similar to 'domestic missionaries' (Bowling et al., 2019, p. 9).

Despite this class-focused enforcement, the British government continually presented the New Police as a force of progress (Sinclair, 2016). The New Police were presented as protecting the whole imagined nation, despite actually only protecting a certain sect of the state. The New Police were established as an institution of the state that would build the nation through the 'mystical process' of public consent (Bowling et al., 2019, p. 81). The silencing on the politics of the police fails to account for how police socialized those within and outside of the bounds of law and order (Loader, 2016). That is, the Peelian Principles (re)create the socio-economic inequalities that policing itself perpetuates as a state institution (Loader, 2016). Police mould life in democratic states: 'policing materially and symbolically mediates belonging' (Loader, 2016, p. 428). Bowling et al. (2019, p. 105) add to Loader's (2016) argument by extending that the Principles effectively established the police as a 'specialist

agency' of the state, given how cited they still are in British police governance. The Bobby on the Beat image remains fundamental to policing through community policing activities (Sinclair, 2016; Bowling et al., 2019).

Sinclair (2016, p. 33) argues that the Whig model of policing-by-consent has been:

> *A useful tool for the British police to project a particular vision of policing across their historical landscape; to continually enhance their legitimacy; and, to maintain common ground with a general public where these values can be shared and their role legitimized.*

The historical vision of the British Bobby has been maintained and recreated not only at a domestic level but also at an international one through international police assistance (Sinclair, 2016). In one example, the Western policing-by-consent model has been deployed by the UN Police (UNPOL) and other government and UN agencies as part of democratic transitions and in response to crisis situations. Recently in South Sudan, for instance, this model was implemented by the UK's Department for International Development in refugee camps (Sinclair, 2016).

Yet, revisionist accounts of police history, such as the work of Bell (2013), are highly critical of the distinction between colonial and metropole police under the policing-by-consent ethos, highlighting significant overlap between these models. Peel is credited with spurring the development of *both* the Royal Irish Constabulary (the colonial model of policing) and the London Metropolitan Police (the metropole model) (Bowling et al., 2019). Bell (2013, p. 10) points out that Peel served as the Chief Secretary of Ireland before he came to London and that he showed 'similar concerns when establishing both forces…both forces aimed

primarily to control problem populations.' Sir Charles Jeffries, Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, supported this position when describing that colonial policing was: '[mo]delled upon the Royal Irish Constabulary and organized mainly with a view to the suppression of crimes of violence and mass outbreaks against the peace' (quoted in Jeffries, 1952, p. 32 as cited in Sinclair, 2016, p. 32). Although presented as distinct, in practice there were only 'marginal differences' between the metropole and colonial models (Brogden, 1987, p. 9).

Bell (2013) debunks the notion that policing knowledge flowed from the metropole out to the colonies. While the metropole did establish police forces in the colonies, in many instances, police practices that became the norm in England were first tested in the colonies. Colonial policing was used as a site for testing and trialling new methods of control and subordination (Owen, 2016). Bell (2013, p. 7) gives the example of intelligence gathering, which is a fundamental policing role that was originally a tactic employed by colonial forces to monitor 'suspect' local populations that the British government brought back specifically to manage minority ethnic and urban populations. 'Inner core' areas with settler colonies and valuable resources had a much higher police presence than 'outer empire' areas (Emsley, 2014b, p. 9). Particularly in settler areas, local populations were regarded as suspect populations that posed a substantial threat to British interests (Bell, 2013, p. 8). Through paramilitary practices, colonial policing enabled the British government to control and maintain order in these areas (Mawby, 2008; Owen, 2016). Colonial police took on roles similar to missionaries, legitimizing British rule by giving a 'civilian face' to colonization (Bell, 2013, p. 7). Authoritarian surveillance and control mechanisms were

imposed over local populations, particularly in areas with white settler communities (Killingray, 1986; Bell, 2013). Colonial policing practice reflected deeply embedded racial biases against local populations. Although over time British officers were replaced with local officers, this localization often further legitimized British rule (Bell, 2013). Racialized practices remained prevalent as local officers were unable to rise to the same ranks as white officers.

While British colonialism largely developed structures of policing across all its former colonies, the legacies of British colonialism and in-country policing are some of the most glaring in Nigeria (Daly, 2020). The development of police in Nigeria not only highlights the realities of colonial policing, but the continued reach of British policing. As the imagined community that the state protects has shifted from British commercial interests to Nigerian citizens, the UK has left a legacy of human rights abuses at the hands of police.

Because of their paramilitary structure (see Chapter 1), colonial era Nigerian police forces took on mercenary-like actions to secure British rule (Alemika, 1993; Hills, 2000; Agbiboa, 2015). Alemika (1993, p. 202) shows that these police forces were extremely punitive. They would engage in ‘burn and loot’ tactics on the houses/villages of those who opposed colonial rule. According to Tamuno (1970, p. 220), police used ‘batons, rifles and revolvers’ to suppress the opposition. Moreover, because the police were largely decentralized until just before independence and spread out over a large territory with little oversight on daily activities, police also started to act in their own interest, not just that of the colonizers (Marenin, 1985; Alemika, 1993; Iwar, 2010). Corruption became

synonymous with the Nigerian police. Police had great power and imposed punishments flagrantly, engaging in corrupt behaviours largely unfettered (Daly, 2020). Outside of colonial hubs, the only oversight over police were soldiers, who were equally subject to engage in corruption (Daly, 2020).

In 1887 for example, Claude MacDonald, Consul General of the Oil Rivers Protectorate,[45] wrote to Sir Perry Anderson, detailing how the community was referring to police in the Protectorate as the 'forty thieves in police uniform' because of their 'numerous acts of lawlessness and pillage' (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2010, Historical Overview, para 1). In 1897, Henry McCallum, Lagos Colony Governor, supported this notion in a letter to Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, where he wrote that the Hausa Constabulary, 'no doubt behaved very badly in the hinterland by looting, stealing and generally taking advantage of their positions' (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2010, Historical Overview, para 1). Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe (2001, p. 175) expands that the police embed a 'spirit of violence' in the fabric of life in former colonies. Using his concept 'necropolitics,' Mbembe (2003) describes that the structural and real violence in post-colonial states in Africa leave most of the populace 'subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of *living dead'* (emphasis in original, Mbembe, 2003, p. 40).

When Nigeria gained independence in 1966, a turbulent period of military rule that included a civil war continued until 1999 when an elected democratic

[45] A protectorate east of Lagos that the British established in 1885 that eventually became part of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1900 (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

government took over (Isima, 2011).[46] From 1966 to 1999, the state continued to use NPF as a tool of control, and they also continued to grow the force (Daly, 2020). The colonial police were essentially handed over to the newly formed leaders of the independent state. They enforced and continue to enforce the laws of those in power, which further enabled the unification of repressive structures of governance (Klantschnig, 2009; Iwar, 2010; Owen, 2012; Daly, 2020). By 1989, NPF had established Quick Intervention Force Unit outposts in each state and provided them with 'vehicles, communications gear, weapons, and crowd-control equipment, including cane shields, batons, and tear gas' for the sole purpose to 'monitor political events and control unrest' (Hills, 2000, p. 42). Instead of de-militarizing with the democratic turn in 1999, Hills (2000) highlights that the state leveraged the police even more to supposedly ensure a smooth transition to democratic governance.

Today, not only do police enforce state order, but they also serve the elites (Cooper-Knock and Owen, 2015). Cooper-Knock and Owen (2015) explain that because Nigeria bans private security guards from holding weapons, elites will pay police to give special attention to them/their homes/their neighbourhoods. This practice proliferates police corruption and creates a system of policing where the rich are protected and the poor are left to fend for themselves (Cooper-Knock and Owen, 2015; Daly, 2020). Comaroff and Comaroff (2006, p. 41) describe former colonies as the 'hyperextended versions of the history,' capturing this overlap in structures of governance in colonial and post-colonial times.

[46] There was a break in military rule between 1979 and 1983 (Isima, 2011).

Iwar (2010, p. 7) calls these state-sanctioned mechanisms of control 'anti-people' laws and practices because they cause the 'further deepening' of the 'culture of violence that the police had inherited' from their colonial predecessors. Part of the 'promise' of independence was freedom from colonial exploitation, but military rule continued to repress Nigerians and control their daily lives through police (and military) force (Isima, 2011, p. 38). Isima (2011, p. 39) refers to post-colonial policing as facilitating 'extreme state violence.' Alemika (1993, p. 205) summarizes that the post-colonial Nigerian police are not 'qualitatively different from their colonial predecessors.' Supporting this claim, in his 18 months of ethnographic work in Nigeria in 2009-2010, Owen (2017) traced what 'everyday' policing looks like to find numerous instances where the role and responsibilities of current officers matched directly onto that of the colonial era police.

The colonial 'subtext' (Krogstad, 2017) of modern policing in Nigeria has led to them being one of the most unpopular police forces in the world (Owen, 2014; Agbiboa, 2015; Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi, 2016; Chibuzor et al., 2018; Daly, 2020). The vast majority of Nigerians have no trust in police, and they see the police as one of the primary agents engaging in human rights abuses in the country (Owen, 2014; Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi, 2016; Chibuzor et al., 2018). One of the most recent examples of this public sentiment was the #EndSARS protests in 2020.[47] For Agbiboa (2015, p. 245), in Nigeria policing symbolizes 'unbridled corruption, mismanagement, and brazen human rights abuses.'

[47] These protests focused on highlighting the brutality of NPF's Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) and calling for this squad to be disbanded, which it now is. NPF had tried for years before to reform SARS, but the squad continued to act with impunity (Amnesty International UK, 2020).

Human Rights Watch (2010) conducted research with NPF from 2008 to 2010 to find that police corruption and human rights abuses were endemic. In the report coming out of this research, Human Rights Watch (2010) traced the impact of the colonial legacy of control by force and subjugation to present day. Human Rights Watch (2010, Historical Overview, para 2) argues that:

> *The primary purpose of the colonial police was to protect British economic and political interests. The police accomplished this objective through the often brutal subjugation of indigenous communities that resisted colonial occupation. The use of violence, repression, and excessive use of force by the police has characterized law enforcement in Nigeria ever since.*

They find that NPF abuse human rights in two main ways: extortion and the impact of that extortion. The Human Rights Watch (2010) report highlights numerous ways Nigerians suffer at the hands of the police that were some variation of an armed police officer demanding money – at a taxi stop, from a shop, at a checkpoint, etc. – and, if the person cannot pay, they are threatened with or actually arrested and subjected to physical harm. Human Rights Watch (2010) found that physical harm ranged from all types of assault to extrajudicial killings. They detail that this extorted money works its way up the hierarchy of police through a 'perverse system of "returns"' (Human Rights Watch, 2010, Summary, para 1). Senior police officials also siphon off significant portions of the policing budget into their own pockets, with the most infamous case being in 2005 when the news broke that the then-Inspector General of Police Tafa Balogun's ill-gotten gains totalled $98 million USD (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The sheer breadth of this corruption moves nearly all focus and resourcing away from practices that seek to maintain justice. Not only did Human Rights Watch (2010) find that criminals could bribe their way out of the criminal justice system,

they found that nearly a third of Nigerian police were spending their time on shift only carrying out private security duties for the rich. Human Rights Watch (2010, Summary, para 2) conclusions are stark: ‘Members of the force are viewed more as predators than protectors, and the Nigeria Police Force has become a symbol in Nigeria of unfettered corruption, mismanagement, and abuse.’

Not only does the colonial legacy of excessive police force continue in the colonies, but it also does in British society today (Bell, 2013). As mentioned, the UK adopted many policing practices first tested in the colonies. In a recent example, the measures embodied in the Terrorism Act 2000, such as curfews and travel bans, were imported to the UK from Northern Irish practices dating back to the 1970s. Other examples include strategies to police protests and riots that have been used as recently as during the 2011 London riots (Bell, 2013). Bell (2013, p. 10) concludes that ‘perhaps there was no such thing as a unique British or even English policing model.’ The true model of British policing is one of commercial interest, social control, discrimination, and exploitation (Brogden, 1987).

As Bowling et al. (2019, p. 231) put it, ‘reproducing inequality is central to policing, not deviant.’ The British police have always reproduced power structures that value the interests of white elites over racialized others (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006; Jauregui, 2013; Jacobs, 2016; Bowling et al., 2019). Police reflect wider structures of power dictating who and what is policed. Police define what and who is good (legal) versus bad (illegal) (Goold, 2016). While it is legislation and policy that ultimately govern police action and policy, McConville

et al.'s (1991, p. 22-34) 'working rules' of the police culture summarize the police's interpretation of this legislation. Under these working rules, police focus on responding to threats to order. Who and what is a threat, however, changes drastically, and many of these threats politically embody what/who is perceived as dangerous at the time (Garland, 1996; Sanders and Young, 2008). Police have power over people, even when 'no specific power is invoked power' (Sanders and Young, 2008, p. 281).

In the modern era, police forces modelled on Anglo-American traditions shape social formation through enforcing 'general order' and 'specific order' (Marenin, 1982a, p. 258-260). General order refers to securing interests autonomous from the state, such as 'public tranquillity and safety,' and specific order is the promotion of 'particular interests' dominated by the state (Marenin, 1982a, p. 258-259). Walker (2008, p. 120) explains that even general order tasks like neighbourhood patrols express the state's monopolization of violence and the bureaucratic organization within that state that delivers it (Bierschenk, 2016). The police's ability to achieve general order in the first place is questionable, particularly with police involvement in violent behaviour (Bowling et al., 2019).

How and when police actively or passively deploy power over others is an essential part of the definition of their role and responsibilities (Sinclair, 2016). Although the relationship between citizen and state is riddled with a myriad of complex power relationships, the power of police agencies *is* unique because the modern state envisions that the public is consenting to this power as per the Peelian Principles (Sanders and Young, 2008). To understand police roles and

responsibilities in the Anglo-American model, the role of the state in policing and the power that affords the police over the public must be considered.

Reconceptualizing Anglo-American Policing Traditions

The dominant Anglo-American model of policing and those who advocate for it overlook the relationship between police and the state. The state is central to understanding responses to crime in modern and historic times (Barker, 2017). Max Weber's (1946/2009) conceptualization of the state offers important insight in policing studies. Weber (1946/2009, p.78) defines the state as 'a human community that successfully claims monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.' Using this definition, Lemay-Hébert (2009) explains that security considerations are central to defining a state and its effectiveness. Bourdieu (1994, p. 4) expands that 'the state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army,[48] police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital.' While an analysis of these different types of capital is beyond this thesis' scope, it is important to recognize the importance of economic changes in the formation of the state. Centralizing economic capital through state-wide taxation played an important role in

[48] In this thesis, I only focus on the police as the state's mechanism of physical force or instrument of coercion. The army is the state's other mechanism.

developing (aka civilizing) states, as mentioned in the Nigerian context in Chapter 1.[49]

In their influential study on state formation, Alesina and Reich (2015, p. 3) explain state-building as the 'construction of state institutions.' Central to state-building is nation-building. Alesina and Reich (2015, p. 3) summarize nation-building as the process of 'homogenization' in which 'citizens feel a sufficient amount of commonality of interests, goals, and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from each other.' In their study, Alesina and Reich (2015) analyzed how different political models created the conditions of nationhood. Although largely focusing on how different government arrangements relate to nation-building, Alesina and Reich make some key points relevant to draw out for my arguments on the development of policing. Alesina and Reich (2015, p. 29-30) describe the 'divide and rule' approach of colonizers, where dividing the population limits the ability of the citizenry to mobilize. In these situations, states specifically seek to undermine community cohesion to protect structures of power, as happened in Nigeria. In these colonies, rulers would often start to invest in state-building mechanisms by building and/or bolstering state institutions that socialized the different, divided communities into ruler-supporting norms. Such rulers invested heavily in nation-building in ruler-sponsored institutions like education, military, and policing to emphasize and enforce the dominant rule as the status quo. In Nigeria, for instance, education and religion were leveraged as tools of nation-building in addition to law enforcement.

[49] Theorists have taken different approaches to how violence and economic principles form the modern state (Williams, 2016). Charles Tilly (1985), for example, saw the relationship between the two as central, whereas Pierre Bourdieu (1994) focused on the combination of these elements with their symbolic dimension.

Colonizers and Christian missionaries used schools and churches as civilizing tools to spread colonial ideologies on the 'backwardsness' of the populace's African past and the benefits of colonization (Ekeh, 1975, p. 97). Such revisionist accounts of African history framed Nigerians as being saved by the British. Ekeh (1975, p. 97) refers to these practices as 'ideological weapons' that changed how Nigerians see themselves:

> *Every schoolboy in colonial Africa, and many in post-colonial Africa, read in history books that Africa and especially its important landmarks and waterways were 'discovered' by European explorers. The mental outlook here is important. To say that River Niger or Kano was discovered by European explorers is to invite the African to see his own people from the point of view of the European.'*

Alesina and Reich (2015) also point to an overlap between colonizer-rule and domestic-rule: when the status quo of the ruler's power is threatened, nation-building is used to secure the ruling order in colonies *and* at home. That is, the imperial powers learned how to control and secure order in the colonies through building imagined, united communities and implemented this learning at home. Taking education as an example, Alesina and Reich (2015) focus on the nation-building policies of 19th-20th century Europe. In this rapid period of nation-building, Alesina and Reich (2015, p. 25) highlight how, in England, the divided populace and non-ruler-supporting nationalism were only overcome once the threat to democracy (i.e. threat to the domestic status-quo) was 'very high' in the form of mass rioting in the 1820-30s. Public education first appeared in England in 1833 after three years of particularly intense rioting in divided rural areas. Alesina and Reich (2015) are quick to point out, however, that rioters were never seeking education. The main concerns were labour rights and poverty.

Alesina and Reich's (2015) position is well supported by Hobbesian arguments that the state must already hold enough power to socialize those within its bounds, which forcibly establishes mutual consent in the name of 'collective security' (Walker, 2008, p. 120-121). As Walker (2008, p. 120) summarizes: 'the unitary force at the root of the state was a necessary means of overcoming the problems of collective action that stood in the way of collective security.' Alesina and Reich (2015, p. 3) argue that both state-building and nation-building are crucial for a 'functioning state.' The state functions like a 'building block;' state institutions themselves are crucial to a functioning state, but the communities that are created around them from which they derive legitimacy are too (Bowling et al., 2019, p.31). It is, however, the state's 'monopolization of legitimate violence' that is a defining feature of state sovereignty (Williams, 2016, p.180). Locating the state's 'concentration of physical violence' in the state institution of the police, the state's ability to exert violence over citizens is how it establishes control, security, and, ultimately, its authority (Williams, 2016, p.182). Citizens' adherence to this authority is equally important, and therein lies the necessity of nation-building (Williams, 2016, p.182). For Williams (2016, p. 180), the result is that 'national policing seems coincident with the nation-state – an inalienable dimension of what it is to be a fully-fledged state.'

Through the 'pluralization' of policing, Loader (2000) shows that the network of what we have come to understand as policing works both through the state and extends beyond it. In this sense, policing is not only synonymous with state-building, but also with nation-building. Loader (2000) describes this 'pluralization'

of policing and the relationship between police and the state in five ways: policing by government (e.g. 43 police forces in England and Wales, the Transport Police, etc.), policing through government (e.g. private police for government buildings), policing above government (e.g. Interpol, Europol), policing beyond government (e.g. private security for businesses or people), and policing below government (e.g. vigilantism). While the police are the public body tasked with responding to crime and securing order, there are numerous other agents involved in this task as well, such as private police and other state agencies like fire and rescue, border control, traffic control, and aviation security. This network of collective security also extends to citizens themselves through schemes like Neighbourhood Watch and the education system through the UK's Prevent duty under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015). In Nigeria, there is an extensive range of the more grassroots pluralization of policing like vigilante groups, paramilitary groups, and civilian anti-crime networks that take up protecting citizens because of the failures of the public police (Hills, 2000; Okereafoezeke, 2003; Lar, 2017; Schlichte, 2017; Owen, 2018; Pratten, 2017; Owen, 2012; Hills, 2017).

Jones and Newburn (2002) use a tripartite approach to delineate the pluralization of the state’s policing power. According to them, primary social control actors are those whose main duty is to prevent crime, keep the peace, and investigate. This group includes public police, private police, and other bodies such as border control agencies and traffic control. Secondary social control actors have some function of control in their role, but it is secondary, like teachers and caretakers. Finally, tertiary social control actors are community

embedded, intermediate groups like churches and community groups (Jones and Newburn, 2002). The role of these primary social control agents is unique, however, as their role and responsibilities have developed alongside modern state-building (Valverde, 2016; Bowling et al., 2019).

By policing through, above, and beyond the state, the pluralization of policing illuminates Foucault's (1984, p. 241) concept of a wider ‘system of regulation’ that is inherently part of neoliberal global governance. Seen this way, the pluralization of police is a ‘symptom’ of state power and not the ‘solution’ to it (Bowling et al., 2019, p. 273). Policing is principally tied to the nation-state, but it operates within and beyond the state through neoliberal ideologies that are central to notions of good governance (Stewart, 2016). The police are part of a web of institutions continually interacting and deriving meaning and purpose from the ‘securitization of society’ to secure the bounds of the state and the nation in the name of spatial governance (Bowling et al., 2019, p. 152). The police’s monopoly on violence also moves beyond the ‘spatial boundaries’ of the state – global policing strategically spreads and reinforces the state’s concept of nationhood (Loader, 2000, p. 325). Therefore, the police are no longer merely building-blocks of the state, but an institution involved in ‘state crafting’ (Wacquant, 2010, p. 210). In many ways, this notion of police as state governance contradicts the ideals of democratic policing, which is inherently bound by Whig interpretations of the legitimacy and accountability of the police through their relationship to the public (Bowling et al., 2019). Instead, we have moved towards police accountability being tied to nationhood approaches to crime and justice (Walker, 2008). The police are accountable to what the

‘imagined community’ of the state feels is necessary to respond to crime and secure justice (Williams, 2016, p. 2). The police are the ‘symbolic order of the state’ (Williams, 2016, p. 6). As Meares (2016) describes, this leads us to re-question: What are police for? And what are their powers for?

Policing and Human Rights

In answering what police and their powers are for, Benjamin Goold (2016) argues that, in modern states with Anglo-American policing traditions, police must both protect human rights and secure order. Police can protect and violate individual and collective rights through their use of legislative, policy, and discretionary power (Sanders and Young, 2008). In the UK, one of the foremost examples of this violation is the grossly excessive policing of Black and ethnic minority communities through stop and search policies (Parmar, 2019). The power differential between those protected by the police and those policed is most stark in countries with high inequality rates, like in Nigeria (González, 2017). In these contexts, policing alters democratic citizenship because the threat of insecurity is so high that citizens cannot meaningfully engage in democratic processes: police generate a ‘negative feedback loop’ (González, 2017, p. 495).

Goold's (2016) analysis offers a framework for how we can begin to understand policing that aims to be more humanitarian, as criminal justice approaches to human trafficking seek to. He highlights that there are two ways rights and policing have been conceptualized. First, the impact of human rights on policing. Here, Goold (2016) uses Neyroud and Beckley's (2001, p. 68-70) list

of key impacts, including limits on police powers and use of force, decision-making processes, duty of care, and the due process considerations such as fairness. Secondly, the impact of policing on human rights. Here Goold (2016) draws on Crawshaw et al.'s (2007) argument that in democratic societies policing is fundamental to the protection of rights and vice versa. Seen this way, effective policing cannot be realized without the protection of human rights, and rights cannot be realized without effective policing. Police can both 'meet and fail' human rights obligations for citizens and non-citizens (Crawshaw et al., 2007, p. 19). Crawshaw et al. (2007) clarify that social order is essential to human rights, and police are important in securing it. Yet, police also limit the exercise of rights, some of which is prescribed and some action which is not. Crawshaw et al. (2007, p. 18) saw this as evidence that policing and human rights are inherently linked:

> *As human rights concern the relationship between individuals and the state, controlling and regulating the exercise of state power over individuals, and as police exercise power on behalf of the state, it is now necessary to consider the nexus between human rights and policing.*

Goold (2016) draws attention to the fact that there is an assumption the police have a positive obligation to protect human rights and that this can be read into their roles and responsibilities. As a state institution, the police serve as a public good. Their authority comes from their commitment to the public and surpasses state politics**.** Goold (2016) points out that these Whig-inspired positions take for granted that human rights and policing are congruous. The legacy of policing in Nigeria and other former colonies with Anglo-American colonial policing models particularly challenges this assumption. These perspectives miss the relationship between the state and police. Police authority is no longer derived from its

relationship with the public (if it ever was) and instead from their position as agents of the state. As Goold (2016, p. 7) argues: 'the state – and by proxy, the police – can never be fully committed to protecting human rights because, at their core, such rights exist to constrain the power of the state.'

Goold (2016) ultimately calls on researchers to assess the role of police in society to understand the relationship between the police and human rights. He supports calls for framing the police as an exercise of state power with a monopoly on violence. This underpins both the promotion and protection of rights and the roles and responsibilities of the police, respectively, and the relationship therewithin. Goold (2016, p. 10) argues that to do so, researchers need to assess human rights policing 'on the ground,' as this research seeks to do. An on-the-ground assessment of police practice is particularly important to assess in the context of trafficking because, after the adoption of the Palermo Protocol, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report outlining how to adopt a rights-based approach to anti-trafficking laws, policy, and action (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002). The report importantly linked trafficking to human rights abuses and also linked trafficking to migration control more generally:

> *Violations of human rights are both a cause and a consequence of trafficking in persons. Accordingly, it is essential to place the protection of all human rights at the centre of any measures taken to prevent and end trafficking. Anti-trafficking measures should not adversely affect the human rights and dignity of persons and, in particular, the rights of those who have been trafficked, migrants, internally displaced persons, refugees and asylum-seekers.*
>
> Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2002, p. 3).

The guidelines stressed the importance of recognizing the vulnerabilities that lead to trafficking and addressing these at their 'root' through state partnerships with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002, p. 9-10). The report guides responses to trafficking to actively work to protect victims and prevent trafficking. The report highlights that victims can be identified through infringement of their rights and that states have a responsibility to address the consequences of this violation (Van Dyke, 2019). A human-rights approach to policing trafficking has become a 'necessary condition' (Van Dyke, 2019, p. 55).

The necessity of this human-rights approach, however, forces us to consider a much more fundamental question that I take throughout this thesis: do the police have the capacity to take on these human-rights roles and responsibilities and, if so, should they? A further question is, do human rights extend to non-nationals and what implications does this have for policing? For example, do human rights only shape policing in respect of citizens? In their study on the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on police in the UK, for example, Bullock and Johnson (2011) actually found that officers focused on risks instead of rights protections, using rights language to justify risk-oriented police action. We can begin to explore these questions by looking at how the citizen is understood in police's role in irregular migration control. I focus on exploring this role from a Global North perspective as this model of policing is being brought to the Global South, as is happening in Nigeria. There is also little scholarship on this topic within Nigeria. I map this role more broadly for the purposes of exploring it in my analytical chapters.

The Contemporary Relationship Between the Police and the Public

The symbolic role of the police in nation-building is changing. The legitimacy of policing is clearly no longer derived from its relationship to the public (if it ever was), but rather from its relationship to the state. Through its 'presence, practice, reputation and iconography,' policing has become a mechanism of asserting what it means to be a national of a state (Walker, 2008, p. 122). Although set-up as the anthesis of political, the police are inherently a political entity as an agent of the state with a monopoly on violence.

Both Garland (2001) and Wacquant (2009) offer insight here, even as they disagree on where police power is located. For Garland (2001), the expanding powers of policing are weakening the nation-state, whereas Wacquant (2009) argues this same aspect strengthens the state. Williams (2016, p. 7) summarizes both perspectives to highlight that 'globalization has not resulted in a weakening of national police – at least in terms of resources and symbolic power – it has resulted in its empowerment.' Globalization has empowered the police in its ability to 'not only enforce and symbolize social norms, [but] also produce them,' which leads to the 'reproduction and transformation of the nation and the legitimation of the national political order' (Williams, 2016, p. 7). Such a focus on the global has also shifted the priorities for the police towards ones premised on 'global mobilities' (Williams, 2016, p. 8). Purdon (2016) explains that even using the term 'policing' to capture the wide range of securitization practices in existence shifts thinking towards the actions of the sovereign state within their

borders, while failing to capture the breadth of securitization that happens beyond borders.

In addition to setting out who is an outsider within borders, police now do so beyond borders. Police have stretched outside of the bounds of the state to 'protect' the nation. As global institutions have shaped the structure and aims of policing, so too have the changes in mobility. In short, globalization has changed how the state leverages police. Zedner (2010, p. 380) summarizes globalization as the 'mobility of people, goods, services, capital, and technology, the formation of world markets and of global institutions.' These advances have changed the way we eat, sleep, work, and interact with each other. Globalization has also altered patterns of crime. Although it is difficult to get an exact estimate, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2017) conservatively estimates that the value of transnational organized crime was $3.6-$4.8 trillion USD in 2015-2016,[50] representing 7% of the global GDP. In addition to responding to crime in a globalized world, police have also taken on transnational order maintenance roles such as responding to crises in weak and failing states like post-conflict responses, as well as wider disaster response roles.

This system of global policing, however, is inherently asymmetrical. There is a staunch divide between those who police – the 'North' – and those who are policed – the 'South' – forming a 'new' iteration of class formation (Schierup et

[50] This estimate covers the crimes of money laundering, asset misappropriation, counterfeiting and contraband, fraud and extortion, human trafficking, and cybercrime committed by criminal groups of three or more people and their impact on the private sector (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017).

al., 2015). And, in no area is this divide best seen than in state approaches to migration regulation. As Schierup et al. (2015, p. 53) summarize:

> *The international system continues to be structured in asymmetrical dominance between states and regions and along intersecting lines of class, nation, race, and gender, with migration as the mediating practice and regulatory tool.*

This asymmetrical dominance leads to what Beck (2000, p. 12) refers to as the 'self-perception of transnationality.' Here, the boundaries of a state are only eroded 'inside' for certain states, and these non-eroded states develop a high degree of networked cooperation (Bowling, 2009; Williams, 2016). 'Glocalization' – Robertson's (1995, p. 38) term referring to the enmeshment of the local and global – then perhaps becomes a better term to describe the patterns in the globalization era, particularly for the police (Franko Aas, 2007). Police have created 'hybrid identities and "glocal" belongings' (Franko Aas, 2007, p 286). By undertaking local and global crime and order maintenance activities, police work within the boundaries of the state and beyond it to assert nationhood. Domestic police are at once local and global simultaneously (Franko Aas, 2007).

Through their glocal function, police come to define both the boundaries of the state and the nation. That is, police determine who is inside and outside at both local and global levels. As Franko Aas (2007, p. 292) explains, 'an essential part of the globalizing condition is precisely the creation of a mechanism for distinguishing between "good" and "bad" mobilities.' The bad mobilities, therein, represent what Colin Powell referred to as the 'dark sides of globalization' in a briefing to the US Senate in 2001.[51] This terminology was subsequently picked

[51] Colin Powell was the US Secretary of State in the Bush Administration (2001-2005).

up by Bill Clinton during his presidency and has since become culturally embedded in the Global North (Lancet, 2001, p. 937).

To sort out what 'good' and 'bad' migration are, states have blurred the line between criminal law and immigration law – crimmigration (Stumpf, 2006) – using evaluations of citizenship as decision-makers. States use legal recourse as a sorting tool to reframe bad mobilities as illegal mobilities (Stumpf, 2006). Zedner (2010, p. 381) explains that 'it is no coincidence that in the bid to reassert one territorially bounded good – national security – governments have had recourse to another territorially bounded concept – citizenship.' Beyond framing a nation by who is included and excluded from the definition of the polity, by expanding criminality to include *certain* migrants, policing works through crimmigation to define the community in relation to who is inside the geographic border and who is outside. Zedner (2010, p. 381) highlights that the securitization of citizenship has had two main 'worrisome' outcomes: 1) migration has been criminalized; 2) migration control is now part of crime control. Effectively, borders, the policing of borders, and the policing of those who cross borders make the community of the nation a members-only club where non-membership warrants expulsion (Stumpf, 2006). Franko Aas (2007, p. 292) summarizes: 'The passport, the nation-state's traditional instrument for controlling mobile identities, has gained a renewed salience as an instrument of social control and exclusion.' Borders have become a mechanism of social ordering through what Beck (2002, p. 51) deemed 'methodological nationalism,' wherein society is ordered internally through the creation of the nation-state and

externally through the development and enforcement of borders to 'distinguish themselves from other nation-states.'

While becoming more global in many ways, the nation-state is also becoming more insular, seeking to secure the identity of a particular nation. Loader and Sparks (2002, p. 104) explain that 'people's *sense of place* – and of *differences* between "here/there," "inside/outside," "us/them" – takes on renewed force as a structuring feature of social relations and culture' (emphasis in original). And while borders define who belongs or does not, they are not static in their function. Borders and the people who flow across them are influenced by socio-political notions of crime and security (Franko Aas, 2007). In the global risk society (see Beck, 2002), the sovereign state both loses power through the priority on economic growth and gains it by responding to risks, namely via the 'war on terror' (Franko Aas, 2007, p. 287). The terrorist represents the ultimate 'enemy within' and the greatest point of insecurity for the state and the boundaries of the imagined community of the nation (Franko Aas, 2007, p 289). Reframing foreignness as a threat brings national identity to the forefront, wherein notions of what it means to belong to said state from a cultural and moral standpoint are promoted with great vigour. So too, notions of what it means *not* to belong are promoted through the punishment, banning, and expulsion of those othered from the nation. The current notions of who belongs and who does not flip the colonial script of 'native' and 'immigrant.' Whereas at the height of Empires it was the immigrant who was deemed worthy and the native illegal, it is now the native that is worthy and the immigrant illegal (Franko Aas, 2007). The decision of who belongs is ascribed along pre-existing

delineations of who is in power, who is the subject of that power, and who that power comes at the expense of.

Franko Aas (2007, p. 287) highlights that we are 'witnessing a renewed exhibition of the state's muscle power through the "war on terror," visible in the intensification of border controls, and the expansion of state surveillance and bureaucracy.' Crimmigration, therefore, becomes seen as a practice of 'good' governance by securing the nation and protecting the state from 'dangerous' outsiders (Franko Aas, 2007). This deviant other is the enemy from whom the state needs securitizing. The deviant other is a threat to state security and national identity (Franko Aas, 2007). As a result, to protect the nation and state from this threat, states attempt to halt these bad mobilities *before* they cross over the state's borders. Through this 'externalizing' of borders, states serve to spread their internal notion of belonging in a much wider context, exercising power over not only those migrating but also states that people migrate from and/or transfer through (Pijnenburg and Rijken, 2019). British policing principles are being implemented as part of humanitarian aid responses in refugee camps in Kenya, for instance. In assessing how refugees are being trained to act as community police in refugee camps in Kenya, Brankamp (2020) argues that this new type of humanitarian governance seeks to further protect state interests. Brankamp and Daley (2020, p. 114) also argue that such interventions further 'others' refugees, framing them as dangerous subjects instead of people in crisis.

While borders are an ordering structure of the sovereign state – and therefore, a demonstration of power – Mary Bosworth (2008, p. 199) highlights that borders also depict the 'limits of the sovereign.' Borders are porous, and goods, services, and people pass through whether or not they are legally allowed to. So, while borders are the state's 'best-laid plans' to securitize against irregular migration, their existence alone does not halt migration nor crime (Bosworth, 2008, p. 210). This is because the state wants to securitize only certain elements of border flows.

Such crimmigration tendencies map onto David Garland's (1996; 2001) 'culture of control' and 'criminology of the other.'[52] Bosworth (2008, p. 208) argues that Garland's approach is a 'useful lens' for analyzing the response to migrants. Bosworth (2008) highlights that only 'illegal' foreigners are labelled as dangerous. In the context of the UK, Bosworth (2008) points out that 'legal' foreigners are differentiated from illegal foreigners. Legal foreigners are those 'who can contribute economically to Britain and abide by the norms of British culture and society' (Bosworth, 2008, p. 202). Those illegal ones are those otherwise perceived to be incapable of such assimilation into the nation. Again, this flips the otherwise colonial script of assimilation, where it has previously been immigrants who force the natives to assimilate.

[52] In Garland's (1996) new culture of crime control, crime control is premised on the distinction between 'us' and 'them:' 'there is a *criminology of the self,* that characterizes offenders as rational consumers, just like us; and there is a *criminology of the other,* of the threatening outcast, the fearsome stranger, the excluded and the embittered' (Garland, 1996, p. 461, italics in original).

There is, however, further bifurcation in this illegal category. Often presenting as illegal at first instance, refugees, asylum seekers, and victims of trafficking can legally seek to remain in the UK. Yet, it is increasingly difficult to obtain a positive grounds decision for these claims. Moreover, there is evidence that many otherwise-perceived illegal migrants have the same vulnerabilities as those who successfully make refugee, asylum, and trafficking claims. Gadd and Broad (2018) detail that borders increasingly force irregular migrants to take on the very dangerous migratory routes, and many require rescue along the way. The route itself victimizes migrants (Gadd and Broad, 2018). Those who are 'rescued' become subject to punitive state responses such as detention before their expulsion from the nation and state through deportation (Plambech, 2014).

The sheer vulnerability of irregular migrants within the criminal justice system places police in a dual role: keep these people safe and keep the citizens safe from them (Hadjimatheou and Lynch, 2016; Aliverti, 2019; Parmar, 2020). Through state immigration control practices, police have come to take on a dual humanitarian and crime control role. In their study with the Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking Unit of the UK Border Force at London's Heathrow airport, Hadjimatheou and Lynch (2016, p. 947; 952) found that this dual role can create 'tension' for many policing actors, and many seek to 'outsource' the more humanitarian function. Hadjimatheou and Lynch (2016, p. 954) found that this created the 'illusion' of helping while failing to consider the implications of this role. Namely, police in such roles interact with people with less protection of their rights, and this runs contrary to the emphasis on enhancing rights protections within the state and the state's supposed humanitarian policing functions abroad

(Cole, 2016; Goold, 2016). In assessing how police determine who is someone that needs protection and who is someone that the state needs protecting from, as highlighted in Chapter 1, Aliverti (2019) and Parmar (2020) found that police rely on visual cues related to foreignness as a proxy for dangerousness – police use racialized cues to determine nationality and thereby who poses a high potential for harm to the state. In short, penal power at the border is a combination of old and new forms of symbolic and real state violence (Barker, 2017).

Conclusion

Police, historically and contemporarily, meditate belonging. There was actually very little difference between colonial and metropole policing. Both of these trajectories of British policing had similar aims and objectives, but, by presenting them as ideologically different, the British have been able to repackage the Anglo-American model for the purposes of bringing it back to former colonies as a way to reform their police. Using Alesina and Reich's (2015) model of nation-building, the police are and always have been a tool of the state to signal who belongs, or not, to the nation. In building the nation-state, police across the colonies and the metropole violated human rights under the guise of protecting them.

Querying the role of the police and why police matter leads to a more nuanced assessment of what police do from a human rights perspective (Goold, 2016). Progress on this front has been slow because it is challenging to re-

configure policing through a human rights lens as the police are ‘the most visible symbol of the power of the state’ (Goold, 2016, p. 3). As an arm of the state that is supposed to be a member of the body politic, through police, the state is authorized to both protect and exert violence over its citizens (Bowling et al., 2019). The police’s roles and responsibilities are derived from Whig interpretations of the police’s position as a member of the public. Yet, since their origins, the police were developed as a state body that reflected the interests of some over those of others. Police arbitrate who belongs and who does not. Despite this power, the police have remained a staunch symbol of nationhood, particularly in the UK (Bowling et al., 2019). The symbolic power of the police remains widely entrenched in the public consciousness as well as public policy. Not only is this power leveraged domestically, but also in the UK’s international efforts, such as those police reform ones in Nigeria. A human rights perspective, however, forces us to question how this power influences the culture and practice of police on the ground when they are responding to human rights violations.

While in the UK police are perceived to have the capacity to protect human rights, in Nigeria the police are one of the greatest violators of human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Migration control requires police to protect the security of the state, while human trafficking responses require police to protect individual human security. But, in identifying victims and offenders, how do police themselves frame what they are doing? Is it through reference to state security or human security, or both? In the next chapter, I outline the methods I used to address these questions.

Chapter 4: Operationalizing Trafficking Studies Research with Police

In this thesis, I seek to describe how police perceive what they are doing and map that onto normative considerations about what police ought to be doing in the context of trafficking responses. When police bear witness to trafficking trends, how do they understand what they are witnessing? And how does their experience frame their work as 'anti-trafficking?' In doing so, I reflect on how police are tasked with enforcing human rights (Miller, 2016).

In response to the critiques of trafficking research outlined in Chapter 2, I sought to develop methodologically rigorous findings that capture the underrepresented areas in trafficking studies: police perspectives and perspectives from the Global South. In addition to responding to the critiques of trafficking studies research, my research approach is premised on Loader et al.'s (2016, p. 3) evaluation that research involving the police is at 'constant risk of excessive concentration on official problematics,' which involves 'prioritization of questions around instrumental effectiveness (does this or that police tactic work?).' Loader et al. (2016, p. 3) argue in favour of global focused research of 'sociological curiosity (why did this happen? what is its meaning and significance?) and philosophical import (can this be justified?).'[53]

In doing so, I developed a tripartite research approach that drew methods from trafficking studies, police studies, and health care research. This approach involves Yvon van der Pijl, Brenda Carina Oude Breuil, and Dina Siegel's (2011)

[53] Loader et al. (2016) conceptualize a global focus in three main types of research arenas: 1) research outside the Global North, 2) research on cross border movement of policy and practice, and 3) research on cross border policing.

conceptualization of fragmented ethnography for trafficking research; Merlijn van Hulst's (2020) narrative approach to policing studies; and Charles Hounmenou's (2020) argument in favour of the principles of stakeholder collaboration for trafficking studies, the principles of which already constitute good research practice in health care research. Through these methods, I was able to collaborate with my stakeholders in a manner that enabled me to interpret police narratives across my fragmented sites of trafficking responses. I begin by outlining these methodological approaches, in turn, before outlining how I operationalized them in the context of this case study through data collection and analysis of 60 interviews and 887 case files (n=28 case files analyzed in-depth, see description later in this chapter). I conclude with reflections on my positionality in the field.

Trafficking Fragments

van der Pijl et al. (2011) sought to respond to the need for more innovative methodologies in trafficking studies by expanding on Anthropologist George E. Marcus' (1995) theory of multi-site ethnography. Using the terms fragmented or patchwork to describe their ethnographic practices, van der Pijl et al. (2011) selected vignettes from Bulgaria, France, and the Netherlands to demonstrate how disjointed the discourse and practice on trafficking is – that is, it is fragmented and therefore requires research methods that are able to adapt to this fragmentation. van der Pijl et al. (2011) argue that it is the difference in approaches between research sites – ethnographic fragments – that enable us to better understand the reality both of trafficking itself and the responses to it.

Fundamentally, van der Pijl et al. (2011) found that collecting fragments of data from different sites can build up a patchwork picture of trafficking that extends our knowledge and better captures the reality of trafficking than traditional methods. In their piece in favour of global ethnographic methods for transnational crimes that flow between states, Vigh and Sausdal (2021, p. 175) support that 'researching even fragments of such flows enable us to piece together larger pictures and comparatively elucidate their differences, similarities, and entanglements.'

Marcus (1995) originally developed what he called multi-site ethnography as a mapping exercise. He detailed different ways to approach designing a multi-site ethnography on a research topic: 1) follow the people; 2) follow the thing; 3) follow the metaphor; 4) follow the plot, story, or allegory; 5) follow the life or biography; and 6) follow the conflict.[54] Follow the people is what Marcus (1995, p. 106) calls the 'most obvious' application of multi-site ethnography. Among other areas of application such as medicine and media studies, he specifically references the importance of a multi-site ethnographic approach for studies on

[54] Follow the thing involves following a material object through different capitalist processes. This could be, for example, following the commodity chain from manufacture to sale. Follow the thing could also be applied to art, following the development and/or circulation of art and music. Follow the metaphor involves mapping the movement discourse and thought through 'signs, symbols, and metaphors' (Marcus, 1995, p. 108). Here, Marcus (1995) points to work of the Emily Martin (1994) – *Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture from the Days of Polio to the Age of AIDS* – that explored how the immune system is perceived in different cities in the US, which Martin used to trace how society's thinking on the body changed after the AIDS pandemic. Follow the plot, story, or allegory refers to the stories people tell and how they can change across space. Marcus details the example of collective memory and how that narrative can differ between geographic locations of the same group. Follow the life or biography perhaps has the best applicability to those doing autobiographies or tracing historical figures. It involves tracing someone's life and developing data points at each stage of their life, which can often be in different physical locations (e.g. different archival libraries). Finally, follow the conflict involves mapping the development and manifestation of conflict through both space and time. Marcus (1995, p. 110) highlights that this approach is a common research practice in the anthropology of law called the extended case method.

human migration (Marcus, 1995, p. 106). Follow the people simply involves following a movement route that people take. This can involve following the same group of people along the route or following different places on the route that multiple groups pass through. This last iteration is what I did. I followed policing action at two different places on a trafficking route: source and destination.

Multi-site ethnography strengthens the data collected and goes far beyond what traditional ethnography was ever able to do in terms of capturing missed perspectives. Marcus (1995), for example, argues that fieldwork is already inherently multi-sited. There is the site the data is collected and almost always another site where it is analyzed – Marcus (1995, p. 100) calls this the distinction between where data is 'perceived' and where it is 'practiced.' Multi-site ethnography merely 'adds' more sites where the data is perceived. Further, by tracing and translating difference between and within research sites, multi-site ethnography enables us to better understand those othered from traditional ethnographies (Marcus, 1995). That is, the purpose is not to study the research phenomenon as if it is something unique and distinct (i.e. not exoticize it), but rather to study it as a piece of a larger world system. While highly nuanced, this distinction changes the relationship between the researched and the researcher, as the researched are positioned as experts in and of themselves. Multi-site ethnography does not just add in the perspective of the subaltern; it collaborates with the subaltern (Marcus, 1995).

The ability to capture the difference in field sites is where van der Pijl et al. (2011) felt fragmented ethnographic principles adds the most value to trafficking studies. According to van der Pijl et al. (2011, p. 578), justice officials, NGOs, researchers, and etc. only 'see' their own interactions with trafficking victims and offenders and rarely that of others. A judge, for example, and an NGO health care worker can have very different viewpoints on who victims are and this can also differ greatly based on geographic locale. Across these different branches of trafficking work, fragmented ethnography can allow us to assess what van der Pijl et al. (2011, p. 579) call the 'incomparable and controversial opinions and knowledge' of trafficking studies by *not* seeking to combine them into one representation. Instead, fragmented ethnography enables us to understand how the differences and similarities in knowledge are part of understanding the complexities in establishing global knowledge. The main advantage of fragmented ethnography is that it enables researchers to assess the 'connections between the "sites of diverse knowledge," without losing sight of the individual stories of people making those connections' (van der Pijl et al., 2011, p. 567).

Importantly, van der Pijl et al. (2011) call for reconceptualizing trafficking studies methods. Instead of analyzing movement, we should analyze the 'friction' in responses to movement. van der Pijl et al. (2011) centred their methodological theorizing on cultural Anthropologist Anna Tsing's (2005) concepts of 'friction' and 'collaboration.' In her book, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*, Tsing (2005) lays out how the metaphor of friction can enable the study of global connection, which holds great potential for trafficking research as it is a crime

that is perceived to connect many different countries. Tsing (2005, p. 4) describes friction as the 'awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference.' Tsing (2005, p. 6) uses roads to describe how friction influences global connection:

> *Roads create pathways that make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they limit where we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also a structure of confinement. Friction inflects historical trajectories, enabling, excluding, and particularizing.*

All global processes operate through friction. van der Pijl et al. (2011) argue that understanding trafficking through friction is essential to analyzing hegemonic discourse on trafficking and capturing differences in discourse between fragments. By analyzing friction, we can challenge the 'reifying categories produced by both insiders and outsiders to describe and/or manipulate the ostensible powerless and poor people, the subaltern, the victims or zoë' (van der Pijl et al., 2011, p. 574).

The importance of considering the way we approach analyzing friction is captured by Tsing's (2005) corollary term, collaboration. Tsing (2005) argues that knowledge is produced and reproduced through collaboration. Collaboration does not require stakeholders to have the same goals. As van der Pijl et al. (2011, p. 574) summarize it, 'collaboration means that people may come to results without necessarily sharing knowledge and even that people might work together while systematically misunderstanding each other.' Knowledge is therefore produced through friction, even if it is collaborative. One of the primary examples of this in trafficking studies is the proliferation of global anti-trafficking efforts at a local level which share the same messaging but are being

implemented in drastically different environments with distinct trafficking realities. This disjuncture is particularly happening in law enforcement; 'law enforcement projects [have travelled] around the world globe [sic] and are seamlessly copied and pasted into different national contexts' (van der Pijl et al., 2011, p. 573). I, therefore, used the principles of fragmented ethnography to map the similarities and differences in UK and Nigerian narratives on trafficking from a policing perspective.

Notably, I did not aim to conduct strict ethnographic research, but be informed by an ethnographic sensibility when using multiple research sites. The purpose of conducting trafficking research through fragmented ethnographic sensibilities is twofold: look at the overarching framework *and* the individual specificities to assess how they replicate and perpetuate models of what trafficking is and is not. Although compelling, van der Pijl et al. (2011) argument in favour of fragmented ethnography is merely a framework, not any practical tips for how to actually conduct it. To further contextualize van der Pijl et al.'s (2011) fragmented approach to trafficking studies research in my case studies, I turned to literature on how to engage in narrative-based research with police to understand how to capture data within my fragmented sites.

Police Narratives

The value in understanding data through narrative is linked to the historical argument that most people have the capacity to be storytellers – it is how we transfer knowledge over time and how we bond with others (Presser and

Sandberg, 2015). As humans, we tell stories that highlight how we orient ourselves in the world and our understanding of our actions or inactions. In the context of crime and criminal behaviour, these stories can help us understand what leads to criminal activity and the cultures that develop around responding to it. Presser and Sandberg (2015, p. ix) call this source of data the 'elephant in the room,' highlighting that 'these stories are not the literal or complete truth (if such a thing exists), nor are they in and of themselves the sole explanation for criminal behaviours, but they are an unmistakable source of evidence.' Narratives are small slices of perceptions of experience that tell us something valuable (Presser and Sandberg, 2015).

In policing studies, the stories that police tell have been used to understand and analyze police culture since the late 1970s/early 1980s (see a classic example by Shearing and Ericson, 1991, as well as recent influential studies by Loftus, 2009 and Fassin, 2013). Building on these studies, van Hulst (2020) delivers an authoritative how-to for approaching interviews with police through the len of narratives. van Hulst (2020, p. 99) locates police narratives as stories that 'one (or more) person(s) [tells] another person (or persons) about something that happened.' Police stories are fragments of police work and action. They are often not clearly organized and can leave out important details, such as the location of the story. Police stories are also not necessarily ones that are in the past. They can be stories about present police work and ongoing cases (van Hulst, 2020). van Hulst (2020, p. 100) puts forth that police stories do a variety of different types of 'work:'

- *Report on what events took place*

- *Make sense of situations, diagnose them and help image [sic] what might be done next*
- *Help to educate and warn their audiences*
- *Construct the identity of people in them*
- *Entertain, carry value and emotion*
- *Provide access to the world being talked about*

Across these different types of work, stories carry the same messaging. The stories that are told are often the ones that stand out the most from their working day: the ‘strange, unusual and uncommon’ that ‘dramatize the job’ (van Hulst, 2020, p. 100-101). Physical danger and the heroism of the police are cultural tropes that are produced and given legitimacy through stories. Kurtz and Upton (2018, p. 283) argue that police stories ‘reproduce existing masculine ideals of physical strength, violence, and heroism.’

Police stories create the pathways through which officers understand their work and form their own perspectives on it; ‘police culture, and not just canteen culture, is to a large extent built from stories’ (van Hulst, 2020, p. 103). In the first account of the importance of police stories, Van Maanen (1973) outlined that stories socialize new police recruits into the organizational culture of the force, which conversely replicates and reproduces the culture. On the other hand, stories can also be leveraged to undermine organizational structures in policing (van Hulst, 2020). In this way, police stories are inherently embedded in the politics of policing. Yet, police stories are not necessarily reflections of the truth. In many ways, the assessment of the truthfulness of a narrative is beyond the scope of this type of data exploration (van Hulst, 2020). The storyteller picks what stories they tell. Why they picked it and what it tells us about how they understand their work is the location of analysis. In this way, police stories tell a

'cultural truth;' 'the stories are truthful as they show how officers give meaning to policing life' (van Hulst, 2020, p. 102). Cope (2008, p. 405) expands that such 'experiential' knowledge on crime and how to respond to it is not 'systemically recorded' by police. It is, rather, 'held in officers' heads or shared informally' (Cope, 2008, p. 405). Storytelling, therefore, plays a critical role in policing as it enables knowledge and skill to be transmitted, but says little about the factual accuracy of what is told in the story.

Drawing on the work of Loftus (2010) and O'Neill (2019), van Hulst (2020) adds that where the police story is told also matters for what kind of 'work' it does. I ultimately investigated what van Hulst (2017, p. 364) calls the 'policing meta-narrative' – the 'over-arching comments or generic stories that involve the depiction of a phenomenon police officers have to deal with' – and analyzed how and why different sites had different meta-narratives. By seeking to understand how police orient themselves in their roles at an individual-level story, we can analyze the meta-narrative that shapes larger patterns of experience (Lesutis, 2018). Lesutis (2018, p. 516) explains that this meta-narrative is the 'the researcher's conception of the whole.' In framing a meta-narrative, Lesutis (2018, p. 512) argues that we also cannot lose sight that the researched are continually 'negotiating' narratives as both a 'performance and resistance' tool. The researcher must therefore explore the 'broader contexts' of the narratives (Lesutis, 2018, p. 513). Different forces within the same country will tell different stories about their work. The rank of officers telling stories also makes a difference in the type of story told. Beyond different working cultures, one possible reason for this difference in types of stories told rests with the

audience of the story. A middle-ranking officer, for example, might stress more dramatic details to new recruits but keep their stories relatively subdued around senior officials. Similarly, stories told to researchers can stress the perceived importance of the work police are doing, focusing on key stories and events (van Hulst, 2020).

Just as officers use stories to frame their work, researchers use them to understand police work. Researchers 'reconstruct typical police practices and typical beliefs that go with them, and then later use a selection of stories to illustrate patterns of culture' (van Hulst, 2020, p. 101). Misinterpreting narratives has very real consequences. Hansson (2013, p. 143) refers to these misinterpretations as 'interpretative violence.' Lesutis (2018, p. 519) and Okech (2013) argue that the potential for interpretive violence is most present in research in African countries. Lesutis (2018, p. 510) particularly cautions of the importance of deconstructing our perceptions of what things are when engaging in research in African contexts because there is a legacy of 'ivory-towerization,' wherein those who do research bring preconceived notions about who they are researching.

van Hulst (2020), thus, offers caution on researching police storytelling. First, researchers should use interviews to collect stories in a way that reflects multiple angles of a story (many ranks, across forces, etc.). Second, researchers need to be aware they are only hearing stories that officers choose to tell them – the dramatic and exceptional – and seek to ask questions that delve into how officers make sense of the less exciting aspects of their work (which is also what

a period of observation can provide, although it was beyond the scope of my research). Third, researchers must understand that officers are influenced by their own personal biases. They bring their own personal experience, prejudices, and beliefs to their work. Lastly, stories, although not necessarily reflecting truthfulness, are ones that police act on. Officers tell stories as a way to make sense of their work, but by doing so these stories can also 'script' police action (van Hulst, 2020, p. 108). When officers encounter a situation on the job, they will pull from their knowledge to decide how to act. Stories form part of this knowledge (van Hulst, 2020, p. 108). Even though stories are not necessarily based on truth, they can become true in the way that police operationalize the meaning in them.

Particularly as my work involves Nigeria, to limit the potential for misinterpretation, or interpretative violence as per Hansson (2013, p. 143), across my field sites it was crucial to ensure my research involved local stakeholders. Collaborating with stakeholders not only ensured I was interpreting my narratives accurately, but also facilitated access to police.

Stakeholder Collaboration

Stakeholder collaboration constitutes good research practice in health care research, but such research relationships do not hold the same weight in social science research (Hounmenou, 2020). Hounmenou (2020) argues that there is, however, a cognitive overlap between health care research and trafficking studies given the vulnerability of those involved, so there are important lessons

that can be learned from these clinical settings. Hounmenou (2020) particularly stresses that these practices can help ensure ethical research in African countries as they help capture a range of participants' views. Stakeholder collaboration is a bi-directional research approach that involves input from stakeholders and output back to them, ensuring the right research questions are asked and that the research produced is relevant and able to be implemented into practice (Concannon et al., 2012; Hounmenou, 2020; Deverka et al., 2012; Pollock et al., 2017; Forrester et al., 2008).

Hounmenou (2020, p. 32) describes research as involving five key stages:

1. *conception stage*
2. *research design stage*
3. *empirical stage*
4. *analytical stage*
5. *dissemination stage*

Truly engaged stakeholder research will involve stakeholders to varying degrees at all five of these stages.[55] Hounmenou (2020) details that while stakeholder engagement often does happen in social science, it is only after the first two stages when the project is already conceptualized and designed. Most social science researchers will approach their stakeholders with a research question already set, which can limit the relevance of the research and reduce buy-in from

[55] Throughout these five stages, Durham et al. (2014, pp. 11-12, 14) outline four degrees of stakeholder engagement: information, consultation, involvement, and collaboration. Information refers to the act of keeping stakeholders informed. It involves information being transferred from the researchers to the stakeholder in a way specified by the stakeholder (e.g. mid-term reports, final report, etc.). While the stakeholder is involved, their involvement is characterized as passive compared to the other three degrees of engagement. Consultation involves consulting stakeholders for their expertise on the research topic, and involvement refers to stakeholders being more actively involved and sharing resources or data. Collaboration is the highest degree of engagement, and it involves stakeholders partnering with the research team to co-design and co-produce the research. Durham et al. (2014) detail that nearly all research should involve some aspect of keeping stakeholders informed and that most research will have a different 'mix' of all four levels of engagement at various stages of the research process.

stakeholders (even if they agree to participate in the research). Limited stakeholder involvement also hinders the ability to capture the perspective of those in the Global South because research questions are developed from a Global North perspective.

While stakeholder engagement benefits research, there are many challenges in conducting it. Stakeholder engagement can make research more complicated, which often correlates to an increase in cost. While the benefits of this approach are clear, they are long-term ones that are only really felt by the stakeholder upon the completion of the research and the production of a final report (Durham et al., 2014). Throughout the project, stakeholder engagement can increase the burden of work for both researchers and stakeholders. Although researchers may be exclusively focusing on the research project, stakeholders rarely are. They are balancing contributing to the research amongst their other duties. 'Stakeholder fatigue' can happen when stakeholders feel overburdened by research engagement and can lead to them either withdrawing or providing lower quality engagement (Durham et al., 2014). Durham et al. (2014, p. 15) describe 'unbalanced engagement' as leading to replicating structures of power and privilege that 'discourage minority perspectives,' particularly for projects in the Global South. Another challenge in conducting stakeholder research is developing working agreements that protect intellectual property rights and the transfer of data (Durham et al., 2014).

I partnered with key stakeholders early on in my research. In Nigeria, I partnered with NAPTIP, the government policing agency tasked with responding



to human trafficking. The Director General at the time, Julie Okah-Donli, supported my research, but my main contacts within the agency were with the Research and Development Unit. NAPTIP sponsored my visa to enter the country, helped set the parameters of my research, and they provided me with access to all my research sites and NAPTIP participants, also sharing the meta-data of their conviction case files with me.

I conducted research in three different states in Nigeria: Edo State, Federal Capital Territory (FCT), and Lagos State. I selected these sites on advice from NAPTIP because they are hot spots for trafficking response activities and because NAPTIP has branches in all of them. Edo State is the source state for most victims (international and domestic bound), FCT is where most of the anti-trafficking organizations have their headquarters, and Lagos is where all victims are returned to and where, resultantly, NAPTIP has most of its shelters.

In the UK, I had nine microsites: eight different police forces and a national police force body tasked with responding to modern slavery. I partnered with a UK police force, and we signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Confidentiality Agreement.[56] They shared their NRM case files with me and gave me access to interview their staff leading on modern slavery investigations.

I had more informal arrangements with the seven other forces and a national police task force specialized in trafficking. For these forces, no case files were

[56] As per the terms of the MOU with the partner force, they will not be named to protect anonymity. They will be referred to as the UK partner force. Because I cannot name this force, I will not name any.

exchanged; I only interviewed their main trafficking response officers. While the eight forces represent slightly less than one-quarter of the forces in England and Wales, this representation also means that a small but notable percentage of the police officers leading police responses to human trafficking in the UK participated in this research.

My partner relationships were essential to my research. My partners helped workshop my research questions, pilot my interview schedules, and granted me access to their staff and data. A critique of my stakeholder approach is that there is a very real possibility that my participants from my partner agencies did not feel as though they had the choice to participate. My gatekeepers were senior members of staff who gave me a list of people I should interview. In Nigeria, my gatekeepers actually set up many of my these meetings for me. As my research in Nigeria was supported by the Director General of NAPTIP, which facilitated a lot of access, I felt it gave the participants from within NAPTIP little choice but to participate. Also, because they were the participants that my partners felt I *should* talk to, it introduced a selection bias. To mitigate this bias, I interviewed participants beyond these partner agencies as well. However, within the agencies themselves, the only people I interviewed were from these lists.

Across my research sites, in addition to my main partners, I engaged with other stakeholders. I did so particularly in Nigeria, given the lack of on-the-ground trafficking research. These interviews helped me map what is happening in trafficking responses in the country. I ended up interviewing participants from those who work in partnership with NAPTIP: international and domestic NGOs,



intergovernmental organizations, shelters for returnees and survivors, faith-based organizations, civil society networks, the National Immigration Service (NIS),[57] and NPF. I worked comprehensively with people in the voluntary sector to ensure I was capturing a range of perspectives. As a result, I spent time speaking directly with returnees and survivors in trafficking shelters: two shelters for children and one for young women. I also visited the office of the Edo State Taskforce Against Human Trafficking (ETAHT), the Edo State government response agency to trafficking, which shared crucial data and reports on the extent of trafficking in Edo State. In the UK, the interviews included in my data were only with police officers.

Methods in Practice: Interviews and Case File Analysis

Interviews

To accommodate a range of perspectives, my participants had different responsibilities in the police and partner agencies they worked for. In the UK, however, they were all police officers who were modern slavery points of contacts (SPOCs) for their respective forces or worked on a specialized national task force. In some cases, working as a modern slavery SPOC was their official role (single role officers), and, in others, this had become their de-facto role in addition to other policing responsibilities (dual role officers). For these latter cases, officers had led the major modern slavery investigation that had

[57] A little known but interesting fact: Nigeria's immigration service started as a small office in NPF during colonial rule. After independence, the office was split from NPF into its own department to guide how to control borders post-colonization (Okpu, 2021). Immigration control has its roots in the colonial policing enterprise.

happened in their force area, so they had knowledge to share with future investigators, but they continued to work on other types of crime. In the partner force, I interviewed all officers who were currently modern slavery strategic leads.

24 officers were involved in the UK phase of the research (see overview in Table 1 and Table 2 below). 16 of these participants consented to provide demographic details, six identified as female and 10 as male. The officers all identified as white British.

Table 1. Self-Described Rank of UK Participants

Rank	Frequency
Detective Constable	3
Detective Inspector	3
Detective Sergeant	3
Police Analyst	3
Assistant Chief Constable	1
Constable	1
Deputy Chief Constable	1
Detective Chief Inspector	1
Inspector	1
Intelligence Officer	1
Police Constable	1
Police Consultant	1
Police Forensic Psychologist	1
Police Policy Specialist	1
Police Sergeant	1
Police Victim Care Liaison	1

Table 2. UK Participants' Type of Role

Area	Frequency
Single Role	13
Dual Role	11

Across these different ranks and roles, officers described engaging in different levels of action: local authority, force, and national (see Table 3 below). These different areas of action corresponded to specific types of anti-trafficking work. Officers who were engaged in national level action described tasks involved in establishing an evidence base and gathering intelligence on trafficking. They also were involved in training the forces and local police areas and offering operational, tactical, and strategic advice. The national level officers disseminated guidance reports to support force action and acted as a liaison between forces and policy makers. Officers at the force level described engaging in more of a coordination role. While this role also involved intelligence gathering and training local officers, these officers largely engaged in partnership work and coordinating operational, tactical, and strategic advice for local police. At the force level, officers mostly advised on cases and did not actively take on cases themselves. Investigations happened almost exclusively at the local police level. These officers were also the only ones that engaged directly with victims. These different work levels highlight the breadth of types of officers and their experiences that were involved in this research. Interestingly, the only time their difference in roles became apparent was when they were describing what type of work they do. Their understanding of what trafficking is and who the victims and offenders were was largely a singular narrative, the only exception being those who worked on county lines drug trafficking (see Chapter 6).[58] This likely highlights the strength of the police culture on anti-trafficking responses.

[58] County lines refers to organized crime and gang transport of drugs from one geographic area to another, typically across police force areas involving the exploitation of children and vulnerable for the purposes of moving drugs and money (National Crime Agency, 2021). The county line is 'the mobile phone line used to take the orders of drugs' (National Crime Agency, 2021, County Lines, para 1).

Table 3. UK Participants' Primary Level of Action

Area	Frequency	Summary of Action
Local Authority Level	7	• Investigation • Victim Care
Force Level	10	• Coordination • Advice: Operational, Tactical, Strategic • Intelligence Gathering • Partnership Work • Training
National Level	7	• Establish Evidence Base & Gather Intelligence • Training • Advice: Operational, Tactical, Strategic • Disseminate Guidance & Support Force Action • Liaise between forces and policy makers

In Nigeria, I interviewed 36 participants from NAPTIP, international and domestic intergovernmental organizations, shelters, non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, civil society networks, NIS, and NPF (see Table 4). I largely interviewed senior officials from these organizations and collected no demographic data as I had been advised not to ask these questions. Most participants were interviewed in FCT and Edo State (see Table 5). This was primarily because it is where I spent the most time. There is also an incredible amount of road traffic in Lagos, so the most I could do was one interview a day, and I was lucky if I made it on time. Often for that one interview, I would spend six to eight hours in traffic. In FCT and Edo State, I could do multiple interviews a day. Further, when I was in Lagos, I spent half of my time there attending a UN and NAPTIP co-led conference with all the major anti-trafficking actors. That conference forms part of the tapestry of my research but is not included in my formal interview data. Although the conference did provide me with many more contacts I could have interviewed in Lagos, my visa expired

the day after it ended, so I had to make haste to get out of the country.[59] Similar to my UK interviews, besides their description of their work, a common narrative developed on what trafficking is and who the victims are. Because of the range of participants involved in these interviews, this narrative presents some interesting questions for future research, particularly as NGO work is typically understood as more victim-centred than police work. I also largely interviewed senior police in NAPTIP, so it also raises the likelihood that more on-the-ground officers would have a different understanding of their work. These are areas for future research.

Table 4. Nigerian Participants' Type of Organization

Type	**Frequency**
NAPTIP	10
NIS	7
Faith-Based Organizations	4
NGOs	3
Shelters[60]	3
UN Agencies	3
Civil Society Networks	2
NPF	2
Other Governmental Agency (not listed above)	2

Table 5. Nigerian Participants by Site

Area	**Frequency**
FCT	17
Edo State	14
Lagos State	5

[59] This was also pre-pandemic, before online interviews were commonplace. As a result, I did not conduct interviews remotely with these additional Lagos contacts when I was back in the UK.

[60] All the shelters could also be classified as NGOs. Those listed as NGOs, however, do not have shelters.

I used conventional content analysis to analyze the interview data, 'coding categories…derived directly from the text data' (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1279). That is, my coding scheme arose out of a thematic analysis of the data, assessing patterns and omissions in the data. I adopted this form of analysis as I wanted to be guided by what was said in the interview data and build my interpretations from there.[61] I ultimately sought to describe my data (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Key to this research approach is immersion in the data: listening and reading it many times over (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). From there, I coded data to capture important thoughts and concepts and made notes on my interpretations, which led to the recognition of other crucial concepts. From these thoughts and concepts, I labelled the codes and sub-codes to organize these ideas. I also looked at the relationship between these codes (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).

Conventional content analysis is a 'flexible' research method that enables gaining 'direct' information from participants without imposing predetermined categories, but this flexibility can also limit its critical purpose because important thoughts and concepts can go unseen (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Another critique is that content analysis findings can vary based on the researcher doing the analysis. As Elo and Kyngäs (2008, p. 113) explain:

> *There is no simple, 'right' way of doing it… there are no simple guidelines for [content] analysis: each inquiry is distinctive, and the results depend on the skills, insights, analytic abilities and style of the investigator.*

[61] As opposed to directed content analysis, for instance, which would start with a theoretical approach and then code based on that.

To mitigate against these critiques, once I had developed my codes, I consulted with new and emerging theoretical and practical perspectives on policing human trafficking with an emphasis on content from the Global South and compared their findings to my coding structure to see if I had missed any key themes. My process was, therefore, both inductive and deductive (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). Overall, in spite of the potential limitations, content analysis has gained wide repute as a 'content-sensitive' research method, which has been commonly used in settings with vulnerable participants and in the Global South (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008, p. 108).

One of the limits of my interviewing process, particularly in the UK, is that I mainly have one type of story I am telling: a police-centric one. I have no way of knowing the truth of what the officers described for victims. Even though I did interact with numerous victims in Nigeria, I only formally interviewed one, who had founded an anti-trafficking NGO. When I was invited into shelters, it was around mealtime; it was a time when victims were relaxed. They were laughing and enjoying themselves. Our conversations were rarely about what had brought them to the shelter. It was about movies, books, music, and often what they wanted to do next. I did not feel it ethical to include any of the conversations in this research, even though I was always presented to the victims as a researcher. Two of the three shelters I visited were children's shelters, and I felt that the children did not understand what my role as a researcher meant. To be honest, I also was not carrying myself as a researcher when I was interacting with the children. We were having fun, and I made no attempt to ask them anything about their trafficking experience. I had been told about their

victimization from the shelter heads prior to visiting the shelters, and I did not wish to extract anything from the children themselves. I did visit a shelter with adults (young women) for a demonstration of the vocational program. While this group could have perhaps consented to be more formally part of the research, I must admit it just did not feel right. It felt too exploitative.

For these trafficked victims, the shelters where they were staying were their homes. They welcomed me into their homes with warmth and grace. I was in their space, and it did not feel right to use it for my own purposes. I know there are some people who have conducted research in Nigerian trafficking shelters (see Stacy Vanderhurst, 2017, for example), but this was primarily in NAPTIP shelters where women only stay for six weeks and where these women are looking for someone to talk to about their experience of being in the shelter because they take issue with it (see more in Chapter 8). I believe doing research with victims of trafficking in Nigeria is important, but it requires enhanced sensitivity and a well-thought-out approach (e.g. using non-interview methods with children like storytelling through drawing). It also requires spending time to form relationships, not just popping into the shelters for a few hours at a time. Therefore, the only people I interviewed at shelters were those who ran them, and these interviews always happened at a different time than my shelter visits and often not in the shelter itself.

Although assessments of truthfulness are outside the scope of narrative-based analysis, understanding the space between police and victim narratives can highlight important patterns and omissions in police perceptions of their

work. There is huge value in conducting future research with trafficking victims both in the UK and Nigeria. Because I largely did not include victims' voices, I sought to triangulate my interviews with other types of data: policy and practice reports. The limitation of this, however, is that police and practitioner narratives can circularly inform policy and practice reports (van Hulst, 2020). Moreover, police and practitioner narratives can arise out of policy and practice reports. Taking the police, for example, are police influencing the policy narrative based on what they are seeing or is the policy narrative influencing how police interpret what they see? To mitigate against this potential circularity, I turned to police case files to help analyze their work.

Case Files

Case files were essentially write-ups of main police actions on NRM police cases (UK) or descriptions of conviction case outcomes (Nigeria) for the partner agencies. Case files are an unexplored type of data in police studies.[62] Goodey (2008, p. 430) hypothesized that case files on human trafficking investigations are likely 'the most valuable untapped source of information.' And, having done my research, I can confirm that the files provided a wealth of rich information that was both different and complementary to my interview data. They enabled me to see police self-understandings in action, not just as they were relayed to me in interviews.

[62] Police files are typically very difficult to access.

While there are some pieces of policing research that involve an analysis of police case files (see, for example, McConville et al.,1991; de Bie et al., 2014;, Bondü and Scheithauer, 2015; and van Meeteren and Wiering, 2019), there are not many, so it was difficult to determine the best way to collect and analyze the files. The lack of previous studies using case files particularly presented a challenge in determining how many files to get access to and, later, how to analyze them. Bondü and Scheithauer (2015), de Bie et al. (2014), and van Meeteren and Wiering (2019), for instance, all used very small sample sizes – n=7, n=12, and n=8, respectively – but they delved into them in great detail. Taking van Meeteren and Wiering's (2019) study of trafficking case files to expand further, over these eight files, the authors developed a codebook of approximately 80 codes by using inductive and deductive coding strategies. They then piloted the codebook on five files before finalizing them and re-coding all the data.

In the UK, my nominated point of contact in the partner force shared with me a data cut from their internal excel document of all NRM submissions by and into that force over a two-year period from 2016 to 2018 (n=493). They removed any identifiable information. As it was described to me, this document was updated throughout the years as cases came in. This document was a summary of key data points of NRM case files held in the force's record management system, NICHE.

There were some meaningful differences between the data sheets in this document that limited my ability to analyze the meta-data of the files. For the

2017 data from external agencies, nationality was not recorded, and for external agencies in 2016, gender was not recorded. One possible explanation is that this data was not passed on to the force. However, because the force had access to the NRM referrals themselves, it likely could have been collected post-de-facto even if it was not provided in the overview of the data provided.

I treated all blanks as missing data, and, after creating a master sheet, I spent some time familiarizing myself with the data by running various descriptive statistics in SPSS: frequencies and crosstabs for the most part. This helped provide a good overview of what kinds of cases are getting referred into the NRM from the force area, as when an NRM referral is made it launches a police investigation. The proposal from the force was that I 'pick' which cases I wanted full access to for further analysis. After quite a bit of back and forth, it was still unclear how many cases would be appropriate to ask for. I asked if something like ten was best or if more like 50 would work. The reply I got was that it was fairly easy to download the case files from NICHE, so both of those numbers worked.

At this point in my research, my first visa application to Nigeria had been denied, and my interviews with UK police officers were very, very slowly trickling in. I was a bit worried I would not have any data for my doctorate.[63] I asked if I could have 'something like 200 cases' as that would enable me to sample enough cases for the analysis to be statistically significant in terms of

[63] What I have since learned is that this is a somewhat classic worry for doctoral students, most of whom almost always end up with too much data to write about – it is one of those things you need to experience to believe.

representation of the total referrals. Specifically, a sample size of n=217, based on a population n= 493, with a 95% confidence interval and a 5% margin of error. I was not yet sure exactly what I would do with the cases so asking for enough that would have statistical significance seemed like a logical approach. I also asked for four cases of particular interest. There were only four victims where the nationality indication was Nigerian.

I was told 200 odd cases would be no problem. I ended up giving the force three options for numbers of cases: n=221 cases, n=196 cases, and n=176 cases. The first sheet ('All n=221') was the widest range of statistically significant cases to include in this analysis (n=217) plus the cases of interest (n=4); this would be the most complete analysis possible. The second sheet (Positive and pending NRM only n=196) was a statistically significant sample from only those cases that were flagged as having a positive or pending grounds decision (n=194) plus the cases of interest (n=4). The third sheet (Positive NRM Only n=176) was those from a statistically significant sample of only positive grounds cases (n=172) plus the cases of interest (n=4). I gave these options on separate excel sheets, each of which contained randomly sampled NICHE reference numbers for a statistically significant case file analysis plus the four cases of interest. To generate a random sample, I used Google's random number generator and assigned each case file a unique number to add to the generator. They provided me with all 221 cases as of last update on April 9th, 2019 at 10:58am.

What I neglected to realize was just how much data is generated from these cases. These files detailed both the reason for the NRM referral and the record of police activity on that referral.[64] At first, I was quite excited by the breadth of detail contained in the document. One of the very first cases I read was about a 13-17 year-old victim of child sexual exploitation with 72 separate notes on her case file.[65] That is, 72 different times police had made a record of their action involving her. The victim had disclosed to her guidance counsellor four instances with different individuals of what the file labelled as 'Sexual Activity with a child under 16.' These individuals were all aged 17-18. No charges were filed, and the victim was put on a child protection plan under the category of child abuse. Sometimes the victim's disclosure was referred to as sexual 'activity,' and sometimes it was referred to as 'assault.' It appears that the officers felt the truth was unknown. The officers who wrote in the file described being both unable to fully engage in an investigation and also unable to disengage:

> *Engagement continues with [the victim]. There are no current CSE concerns specifically and no evidence of this however [the victim's] sexual behaviour leaves her vulnerable to this and there is still too many unknowns to be able to file. I have noted the updates in the [Occurrence Entry Log] and there is still a need to engage in relation to trying to develop the investigations into the sexual activity crimes which are recorded (x5).[66] All partners are engaged which is having a positive effect on [the victim].*

[64] These were not the police's detailed investigation files – i.e. I did not have access to police evidence. However, often they would summarize or describe the evidence they used.

[65] It was somewhat difficult to tell how old this victim was. The case file overview lists her age as 17, but the actual notes refer to her as 13. I thought perhaps she was likely 17 when the file was pulled from NICHE (in 2019) and 13 when the case was first reported. A separate database I had, however, listed her age as 16, but gave her date of birth, which would have made her 15 at the time of the report. This lack of precisions was common, but it appeared to reflect the fact that multiple officers (sometimes upwards of 10) were writing in the same case file and that these were often very lengthy files. It makes logical sense that not all officers read the whole file through before adding their notes, so inconsistencies were common. Moreover, because these were long cases, they also took a long time. Some officers, for instance, would recognize that a birthday had passed and would reference the 'new' age, whereas others would not.

[66] I think this is in error as only four are listed elsewhere.

This case also flagged a much larger question of how I was going to manage the files. The files were also either two extremes: either detailing seemingly every aspect of an investigation or hardly any detail. My original plan had been to analyze all 221 cases in great detail to assess how police were engaging with victims. While there is a wealth of analytical potential in the files, it quickly became clear that I simply did not have the time to analyze them all.

In their research on school shootings, Bondü and Scheithauer (2015, p. 283), for example, found it can take 'two and several weeks' to analyze a *single* police case file. Granted, their cases were undoubtedly much longer than mine. Even if it took me half that time per file, it would be impossible to analyze them all in the time of my doctorate (one week at 221 files = 221 weeks = just over four years, not including any other type of doctoral work). I, thus, had to narrow the scope of how I was looking at them to be able to manage it alongside my other types of data. After some back and forth, and after advice in my Confirmation of Status, I decided to use the case files more like case studies. I randomly selected a much smaller sample (n=24)[67] to explore in-depth, as well as the cases of interest (n=4).[68] So, while I used the meta-data (e.g. nationality, outcomes, etc.) for all of the case files (n=493), I only explored 28 in-depth.[69] Bondü and Scheithauer (2015), de Bie et al. (2014), and van Meeteren and Wiering (2019) support the notion of focusing police case file analysis on a small number of cases, as this smaller number allows for a more in-depth analysis of the files.

[67] 24 for the simple reason that I interviewed 24 officers in the UK, and these were UK case files.

[68] I randomly selected files using the Google number generator process previous described.

[69] The other files present remain an exciting avenue for future research.

The Nigerian case files were much less detailed. I was given access to all of the conviction outcomes (n=394) for NAPTIP cases (n=319) from 2004 to what-was-at-the-time present (June 2019).[70] These were easier to digest in that they were overview files, not in-depth ones. I could *only* collect meta-data from these files. Specifically, I could only collect data points on: case name (which included the defendants' names), case number, jurisdiction, date filed, length of trial, nature of offence, judgement, and number of persons convicted. These files still provided a wealth of data, particularly on trafficking offenders, which my interviewees spent little time discussing (see Chapter 8 for more details).

Once I had my sample of cases (n=887 for meta-data and n=28 in-depth), I had to figure out how to actually analyze them, particularly for the 28 cases I was going to analyze in-depth from the UK. Previous research on police case files provided no practical nor realistic methodological framework for how to analyze case files, other than hiring many research assistants to alleviate how long it takes to go through them. Most advice on how to analyze case files comes from child protection. Case file research happens to be one of the most common methodologies in child protection research because of the vulnerability of those involved – i.e. these children cannot be interviewed (Witte, 2020). Child protection files, however, are different in that many other people beyond police are involved in creating the file (Research in Practice, 2015). That said, there are still lessons that can be learned from child protection case file analysis because

[70] The convictions were presented by case. Some cases had multiple convictions. I excluded one case because too much data was missing from it. I assumed that case should have had four convictions, as NAPTIP's official records show 398 convictions over that time period.

the files themselves hold similar types of data that can be extracted: 'unstructured and narrative descriptions' (Witte, 2020, p. 1). Case files are the perception of an individual filtered through a professional's point of view; the files document a 'sequence of events' that have happened over time (Witte, 2020, p. 2).

Susanne Witte's (2020) meta-analysis on case file research in child protection provides a clear conceptual framework for how to approach case files in policing.[71] Witte (2020, p. 2) summarizes a three-step process in how case files (for child protection) are created – gathering, processing, and presenting information – that repeats over time and informs itself; 'the presentation of information about one incident will most likely influence the gathering of information on the second incident' (Witte, 2020, p. 2).

Gathering information reflects how case workers – or police – talk with the victims and witnesses to collect information on what has happened. Witte (2020) highlights that the quality of information gathered varies depending on how the information is processed: the relationship between the person collecting information and the one giving it, resourcing spent to collect information, accuracy of recall from those involved (case workers and those questioned), the nature of surrounding events (e.g. traumatic events), and the types of questions asked (e.g. suggestive questioning). For the person collecting the information, their processing can be influenced by their workload, emotions, and memory. Case file entries are most often tests of memory recall; 'people add information

[71] N=219 articles met the full inclusion criteria for Witte's (2020) analysis.

from a general script to descriptions of specific events in order to fill in the blanks' (Witte, 2020, p. 3).

This information is then presented in the case file. Witte (2020, p. 4) found that four factors influenced what information was presented:

1. *aim of the presentation*
2. *audience of presentation*
3. *habits of documentation*
4. *cultural and institutional practice*

Witte (2020) found that case workers use case files to record events, help prioritize next steps, memorize key events of cases, and create a trail of information for colleagues who will be taking over and/or joining on the case. According to Witte (2020), complex cases tended to have more detail as the aims were more clear for those writing the files. More ambiguous cases, where action was not clear, tended to have an unclear presentation of information, which I also found to be true in the case files I read. Importantly, for many social workers, who write the majority of case files in child protection, actually writing the files may feel like a comparatively 'pointless task' to their interactions with children and their families, which can also influence how information is presented (e.g. they can rush through writing it up) (Witte, 2020, p. 4). Similarly, in policing, it is common knowledge the police consider paperwork the tedious part of their work.

Audience matters quite a bit for child protection case files as families can have access to them. Social workers can change how they present write-ups depending on how they think a file will be used: just for colleagues, for the family, for a judge, etc. (Witte, 2020). Similarly, while police files are largely internal

documents (e.g. victims do not often access them), they can be used in trials. That said, Witte (2020) found that the largest influence on recording practices was institutional norms. These norms dictated what kind of language was used (direct, indirect, passive, active, etc.), how detailed cases were, and the types of information presented (e.g. assumptions, opinions). These norms also dictated how files were kept. In one example, Witte (2020) points out that in Germany a whole family will be under one file, but in the UK, each child in a family would have their own file. Liaising with those who grant access to case files is an important part of understanding the context of how files are recorded (Witte, 2020).

Witte (2020) also highlights some important ethical concerns. First, very little research involving case files seeks informed consent from the person whose file it is.[72] Last, data security is of the utmost importance because, even when attempts have been to anonymize case files, cases are so long and detailed that there are always bits of identifying information that remain, which I found to be true in my files.

While Witte (2020) emphasizes the contextual factors involved in conducting case file analysis research, she stops short of providing a framework of analysis. Although, Witte (2020) did find that most case file analysis involves quantitative analysis (e.g. looking at demographic patterns). Witte (2020, p. 8) describes case files as ‘messy,’ with ‘ambiguous and inconsistent information within a

[72] Only 8.7%, n=20 of the studies involved in Witte’s (2020) meta-analysis sought informed consent.

case.' Witte (2020, p. 9) cautions that 'abstracting information from case files is difficult, and the reader might not always grasp the meaning of the author straight forward…different individuals might not always draw the same conclusion.'

Martina Althoff (2013), however, delves into this messiness, emphasizing qualitative methods for case file analysis. Referring to case file analysis for court files, Althoff (2013, p. 397) explains that the files are 'condensed documentation of constructions and interpretation patterns of social reality' that require 'sensitive' methods. Althoff (2013) argues that qualitative methods are more sensitive and can, therefore, better capture gender and racialized patterns in the file narratives. Expanding beyond content analysis (as explained for interviews), case file analysis should embody the ability to 'find social patterns of interpretation relating to intersectionality' (Althoff, 2013, p. 397). Althoff (2013, p. 397) finds that Höffling et al.'s (2002)[73] interpretation pattern analysis is best suited to the analysis of criminal justice case files because it assesses how 'members of social groups…share such interpretation patterns.'

Interpretation pattern analysis is a constructivist approach focused on patterns of interpretation; 'social constructions and categorizations are not simply a reflection of individual experiences and observations…Interpretation patterns must be understood as an expression of social relationships or phenomena' (Althoff, 2013, p. 397). Under Höffling et al.'s (2002) model, interpretation can be

[73] Höffling et al.'s (2002) article was written in German, which I do not speak, so I have relied on Althoff's (2013) interpretation of it.

influenced by many things: media, previous experience, the responsibilities of those interpreting, etc. Interpretive patterns analysis is a type of content analysis that recognizes that the data in question is mediated through numerous levels of interpretations of a social reality (Althoff, 2013). Case files are interpretations of interpretations of a social reality. While the data cannot tell us anything concrete about the social reality itself, it can tell us about how the social group (in my case, the police) describes, understands, and ultimately gives meaning to this reality (Paternoster, 2011).

To analyze the 28 UK case files in-depth under this model, I employed the method of conventional content analysis I described for interviews. In addition, after reading each case file thoroughly, I made a summary of the victims' involvement with the police and highlighted key points – a chronology of their case file. The purpose of this activity was to assess how the case evolved, how many police were involved in this evolvement, and what the decision-making points were. I, then, analyzed this summary looking for patterns and differences in how cases evolved (O'Neill Gutierrez and Hollinshead, 2016; Twis et al., 2020). Essentially, I explored the narrative patterns in the case files in two ways: through what was written (conventional content analysis) and what that which was written can tell us about the police (interpretative pattern analysis) (Twis et al., 2020).

Because the Nigerian case files were meta-data about cases, I was unable to use any qualitative methods to analyze them. I, instead, used statistical modelling to look at patterns between the data points on cases, which I also did

for the meta-data of 493 UK cases. In terms of analysis software, for the qualitative analysis of interviews and case files, I used NVivo. For statistical analysis of meta-data, I used SPSS.

Importantly, all participants' quotes and vignettes from case files presented in this thesis are done using pseudonyms. For the quotes from the case files, force plans, and other written communication, I have presented the quotes as they appeared in the original, not making any edits to grammar or spelling. Pseudonyms for the case files include a first name only. The UK interviewees have last names that are pseudonyms (I gave them no first names), but their role is accurate. The Nigerian interviewees have first and last names that are pseudonyms. For those not working for NAPTIP, I have given a description of their position and type of organization in a way that protects their anonymity, but still provides detail on their role.

Reflections on Positionality

Because I worked directly with participants, it is important to reflect on how I situated myself in my research. This consideration is particularly important for my research in Nigeria because I am white. As a white woman, I turned to feminist researchers Charmaine Pereira (2013) and Sondra Hale (1996, 2018), both of whom identify as women and conducted rigorous gendered research in African countries, Nigeria for Pereira (who identifies as a woman Indian descent) and Sudan for Hale (who is a white woman). These researchers thoroughly reflected

on their positionality so they offer great insight on researcher identity when doing research in African countries.

Hale (1996, 2018) delves into the importance of recognizing the power differential between those who colonized and those who were colonized when it comes to feminist interactional research practices. Hale (1996, 2018, p. 37) highlights that under feminist research practices, interviews are more like participant observations compared to those non-feminist-oriented interviews, which are 'calculated, formal, and pre-structured.' This interactional process involves 'the interviewer/interpreter/ biographer [setting] up the situation and then [participating] in it…being and doing are important to both the narrator and her interpreter' (Hale, 1996, 2018, p. 37). Both the interviewer and the interviewee are 'agents' in the research process (Hale, 1996, 2018, p. 32). As a white American, Hale (1996, 2018, p. 36) found that, for her participants, she was 'representative of the colonizer': 'the neo-colonizer, the exploiter.' Hale (1996, 2018, p. 38) ultimately concludes that, despite taking on an interactional, feminist approach, she was not a 'character' in her research nor was she 'erased' from it.

Expanding, Pereira (2013, p. 60) argues that the politics of location *and* identity are crucial in the research process and particularly so in 'a political context marked by conflict or religious and/or ethnic tension,' as is the case in Nigeria. Pereira (2013, p. 60) contends that 'even with the same person, one's positioning may change radically from one moment to another, depending on how one is seen and which aspect of one's "identity" is constructed as paramount.' Here, Pereira reflects on how different participants will respond and

react to different elements of the researcher's identity based on their own identity and that this identity can change based on location. In an example from Pereira's (2013) research, judges, although all belonging to the same professional category, responded to different researcher identities based on different geographic locations in Nigeria, which was a proxy for different tribal and religious affiliations. Similarly, within the same geographic location, different categories of participants (e.g. judges compared to sex workers) picked up on different researcher identities. It is, therefore, not *just* that researcher identity is not erased that is important as per Hale (1996, 2018), but that researcher identity has an interactional effect in and of itself as Pereira (2013) stresses.

To assess the impact of this interactional effect, Kathy Charmaz (2017, p. 35) calls for a feminist reflexivity constructivist approach to the research process that she refers to as 'methodological self-consciousness.' This type of self-awareness involves analyzing our research practices beyond mere considerations of reflexivity. Charmaz (2017) specifically urges that researchers need to examine themselves 'in' the research process and to assume their role in research is continually in flux. Further capturing the impact of the identity of the researcher, researchers interpret the data they collected, and, inherently, their own perspectives influence this process (Gubrium et al., 2012). As much as we may wish to, we do not impartially interpret our data. Campbell (2002) reflects that cognitive (attitudes, beliefs, values) and affective (emotions, biases, expectations) tenets influence researchers.



Reflecting on my experience in Nigeria, I am not African nor am I Black. I am a white woman from Canada. I am honestly still working through how I feel about (white) Global North scholars conducting research in the Global South. I have mixed feelings, and I am in a constant place of learning and unlearning. What place, if any, do I – a white woman from Canada – have to research trafficking in Nigeria? One answer is none. Another is that I might be able to research this topic because my whiteness and foreignness protect me from some of the repercussions that could affect Nigerian scholars. That is, by being a white Canadian, it is safer for me to ask probing questions about difficult topics. The very fact I can leave Nigeria also enhances the protected bubble around me. This is highly problematic, of course. In the field, I was acutely aware of the access that being white and affiliated with Oxford granted me. It changed the way my participants interreacted with me in ways that benefited this research. I met with elites without having to wait. I was able to schedule last-minute interviews. People gave me space and time to talk to them and ask my questions. I was left with much unease and many reflections on what I will do differently in the future – e.g. ways to support local researchers in-country to safely carry out interviews instead of doing them myself. As I said, I am learning and unlearning, and I am committed to considering how my identity will influence my research *before* I conduct it in the future.

My religion (or lack thereof) also influenced my research. The majority of anti-trafficking work in Nigeria is conducted through organizations with religious affiliations. Importantly, the anti-trafficking legislation was brought forth by a religious-affiliated NGO, WOTCLEF. And within NAPTIP, my gatekeepers were

highly religious. I found myself finding ways to avoid stating that I did not believe in God.[74] In many instances, I think that I likely gave off the appearance I believed in God as I was highly respectful of any comments they made about the importance of religion. Was I misrepresenting myself or adjusting to the religious norms? Again, I am left with much to reflect on. In Nigeria, life is very often mediated through religion. Religion is an institute of great power, and this power is particularly acute in the anti-trafficking space (Pereira, 2013). For most, religion orients life in Nigeria. Religion shapes 'nearly all aspects of everyday life,' and it 'crosses all socio-economic and ideological divides' (Emerson and Solomon, 2018, p. 42). Moyo (2007, p. 317) adds that 'the importance of religion in any attempt to understand African life in all its social, economic, and political aspects cannot be overemphasized.' Religious institutions profoundly influence people, and most anti-trafficking NGO work is religiously affiliated. According to my participants, religious facilities are also used as recruiting grounds.

In the UK, I benefited from a more insider position, particularly as I was living and studying there. Although, my Canadian accent was commented on in every single one of my UK interviews. In many ways, because I was not British, my participants seemed more candid in their reflections on the structure and limitations of British policing.[75] I had also done quite a large research project in a professional capacity that involved a UK police force about two years before I started my doctoral research, which provided me with legitimacy on my ability to work with the police, as well as key contacts. Further, I had written a police

[74] Most anti-trafficking work is Christian-dominated in the areas I conducted my research.

[75] I often felt this was because they believed UK police to do it better than Canadian police, which they largely seemed to conflate with having the same issues as US police.

briefing paper on policing modern slavery in 2017 that many of my participants had read, which offered me further legitimacy.

Lesutis (2018, p. 518) expands that the 'positionality of a researcher is important as it might trigger particular forms of self-representation' from those researched. I was an outsider, but maybe one who my UK participants saw as more of an insider compared to what they had originally perceived. I can only assume this influenced how they represented themselves, but I cannot say just how much. I know it did make some difference in what they said, as many of my participants used signal phrases like 'and you know how that works' or 'and then the usual police thing happened.' I always made sure to clarify exactly what they meant by these statements and found myself crafting some replies that did not do away with any insider status I thought I had, but also made sure I did understand what they were talking about.

In the UK and Nigeria, I also found myself wanting my participants to like me. Belur (2014, p. 192) refers to this wish to be friendly with participants as a feminist research approach to afford some power to those we are researching. Although, Belur (2014) cautions that it is not appropriate in all research settings. I remember one interview where I was meeting with a NAPTIP officer who was also very reluctant to be interviewed. I told her, of course, that she did not have to be, but, as my access had been granted by the Director General of NAPTIP, I believe she felt like she had little choice but to do the interview. She was the only NAPTIP participant who did not want to be audio recorded. Somewhat unconsciously, I set about trying to make her feel more at ease and feel the

interview was an enjoyable process. I remember trying to flatter her by commenting on how successful her NAPTIP department is and so on and so forth. I cringe quite a bit in hindsight at this, but I also think it reflects the precarity of the researcher. Power relationships are negotiated through the interview process. While we are supposed to be impartial actors, we are also invited guests. Busy people have given us access to their working lives because they (or someone in their organization) believe what we are doing has value.[76] We depend on our participants to continually facilitate our access and doing so requires that we maintain an amicable relationship. For example, at the end of that interview, once I had sufficiently won her over (for lack of a better way to describe it), this NAPTIP officer provided me with a wealth of information her work. There are, however, important questions to ask about how researcher friendliness intersects with the power of the participants. For example, would I not have awarded this NAPTIP officer more power by stopping the interview when I noticed her reluctance?

Conclusion

To address the lack of empirically rigorous trafficking research, as well as the gaps in our knowledge, I used a three-pronged approach to my methods. I brought three different methodological principles together in this research: van der Pijl et al.'s (2011) conceptualization of fragmented ethnography for trafficking research, van Hulst's (2020) narrative approach to policing studies, and the

[76] Although, I often think that the value they see us to have is different than the one we perceive ourselves to have.

principles of stakeholder collaboration for trafficking research as put forth by Hounmenou (2020). I argued that these approaches provide a framework for how we can conduct trafficking research that involves multiple countries and criminal justice system actors.

From van der Pijl et al. (2011), I drew on the understanding that the similarities and differences within multiple research sites are important sources of data. These sites can collaboratively contribute to a narrative, or, through friction, diverge from it. This approach enables trafficking researchers to situate their sites within the overall architecture of trafficking responses while still capturing local nuances. From van Hulst (2020), I let my research be driven by my participants' narratives. van Hulst (2020) highlights that the long history of narrative police research has enabled us to recognize how police understand and respond to crimes, illuminating police culture. Finally, I used Hounmenou's (2020) emphasis on the importance of stakeholder engagement in trafficking studies, as well as Durham et al.'s (2014, p. 15) argument that balanced engagement is crucial, to capture minority research perspectives.

After outlining the pillars of my methodological approach, in this chapter, I introduced how I operationalized them in my research sites in the UK and Nigeria and in the analysis of the data I collected. I concluded this chapter by reflecting on what it means to be a white woman doing research in Nigeria, as well as more broadly how my positionality impacted my research.

My methodological approach provided me with the tools to analyze police narratives on trafficking across different field sites in the UK and Nigeria. Through this approach and through 60 interviews and 887 case files, I collected data that enabled me to assess how UK and Nigerian police and their partners understand and respond to human trafficking. I explore these findings in the coming four empirical chapters. I first present my findings on UK narratives on victims (Chapter 5) and offenders (Chapter 6) before outlining my Nigerian findings on narratives of victims (Chapter 7) and offenders (Chapter 8). I present the UK findings first as policing knowledge is perceived to flow from the Global North to the Global South (see Chapters 1, 2, and 3).

Chapter 5: Constructing Victimhood in the UK

In their determinations of vulnerability, British police responding to modern slavery do so amid rhetoric on crime and migration control. This rhetoric includes being tough on crime, creating a hostile environment for immigrants, and presenting modern slavery as the vilest abuse of human rights that requires the immediate safeguarding of victims. I find that policing responses to modern slavery have become a by-product of this larger racialized system in which they operate.

In this chapter and the next, I build on the findings of Katja Franko Aas and Helene Gundhus (2015), Melanie Griffiths (2017), Ana Aliverti (2019), and Alpa Parmar (2020) related to the 'foreign criminal' in policing migration control from Chapters 1 and 3. I conceptualize my findings through Weitzer's (2011) delineation of oppressive or polymorphous trafficking narratives and Christie's (1986) framework of ideal victims and offenders, both outlined in more detail in Chapter 2.

Despite the range of roles and levels of work my participants were involved in, it was striking how they presented a mostly similar narrative on victimhood. There was some variation between national level officers and all others, but this difference rested primarily on their experience of joint-work, which few had experience in beyond those working on the national task force. Still, those on the national force only referenced one instance of joint-work, and it was with the Romanian police. The other difference in narratives was between front-line

officers and the rest when it came to county lines. I reflect on this finding more in Chapter 6.

These narratives on victimhood constitute police practice and culture (van Hulst, 2020). This chapter investigates how UK police navigate these indices of vulnerability and exploitation to make determinations of someone's status as a victim. The unitedness of my participants' perceptions of victimhood is significant because these perceptions profoundly shape the way police do their work on the ground.

In what follows, I analyze my findings from interviews with 24 UK police officers, along with details from an in-depth assessment of 28 UK police case files and the meta-data from 493 UK case files. In this chapter, I find that police construct victimhood through perceptions of victims' gender, nationality, and level of injury and how this intersects with police's perception of how victims are exploited by organized crime. These framings of victimhood are also influenced by what police perceive to be their role in these responses – that of saving innocent victims. I conclude by assessing the implications of this framework for victim vulnerability. I take this framework forward in Chapter 6, where I assess how it influences police understandings of the overlap between victims and offenders, particularly for British victims, and the value officers place on victim testimony.

Understanding Vulnerability

Interview participants spoke of their work in combatting modern slavery as one that 'responded to vulnerabilities.' In these conversations, officers described themselves as responding to the needs of vulnerable people who organized crime groups had victimized. While their accounts of the types of vulnerabilities were wide-ranging from homelessness to addictions to the need/want for a 'better life,' officers' narratives on vulnerability centred around the offenders 'taking advantage of the weak' for financial gain. As Detective Sergeant Williams[77] describes:

> *If you break it down to the simplest form, when I speak to people, it's the strong taking advantage of the weak and exploiting them. And it's all generally about financial gain at the end of the day. Sometimes in obviously horrific circumstances.*

Detective Sergeant Williams' quote shows the main theme that arose from the interviews: police conceptualize victims in terms of their vulnerability – weakness – and offenders were described in terms of their strengths – organized crime and foreignness (see later in this chapter, as well as the next). This perceived notion of the 'weak' victim and 'strong' offender is an important one in the context of modern slavery, as such narratives conform to Weitzer's (2011) oppression paradigm and thereby Christie's (1986) concept of the ideal victim. Constructions of victimhood hinged on the notion that victims are weak. When I specifically asked who a 'weak' victim is, one officer explained that the question they ask in the context of investigating exploitation is, 'would your average person do this?' Detective Inspector Jones explained that police use this question to try and understand how the victim has ended up in their predicament:

[77] As mentioned in Chapter 4, all participants and case files are presented using pseudonyms. For the UK interview participants, their role is accurate, but I have pseudonymized their last names.

> *You have to ask yourself: 'Would your average person do this?' You know, that's, sort of, within the context of the current definition of exploitation. I think that's what we had to look at to understand why they were doing that.*

This 'average person' test allows police to distinguish between the weak who would be vulnerable to trafficking and the strong (all others) who would not be. The vulnerability of victims then becomes defined through reference to what is abnormal – i.e. not average. This averageness was framed through the backdrop of racialized and crimmigration sentiments in the UK.

In many ways, such a description of victimhood also places the blame for exploitation on the victims themselves – if victims had been 'average,' this would not have happened to them. Detective Inspector Jones also highlights the police emphasis 'to understand why they were doing that.' This phrasing implies that police seek to understand what the average person would do in an effort to explain their behaviour. Inherent in this phrasing is the assumption that the behaviour must be explained as something a 'normal' person would *not* do for a victim to be legitimate. Through such tendencies, police use perceived legitimacy as their starting point for assessing victim vulnerability. But what do police understand as normal? As Garland (1996, p. 461) describes, 'there is a *criminology of the self,* that characterizes offenders as rational consumers, just like us; and there is a *criminology of the other,* of the threatening outcast, the fearsome stranger, the excluded and the embittered' (italics in original). While victims are not necessarily 'threatening' or 'fearsome' in their presence, their potential involvement in criminality is. The average person consideration, therefore, not only serves as a framework to assess who is weak enough to be a

victim, but also who is too strong to be a victim. These too-strong victims are not only perceived as a threat because their pattern of behaviour is deviant from what someone 'just like us' or worded another way 'just like the average person' would do, but they are othered because they have the potential to be criminal.

Grounded in notions of a legitimate type of victim, my participants constructed the weak victim in terms related to gender, nationality, and level of injury. Wherein, certain characteristics make a person ideal (victim) or unideal (offender) and enable a framing of victims as good people who need help and traffickers as bad people for harming these good people. An important note on these constructions is that these were not responses that came out of prompted questions. For example, I did not prompt my participants to tell me about the gender of victims or their nationality. These findings came across in the stories they told me about the work that they do. I explore these narratives on gender, nationality, and level of injury in turn.

Women, regardless of race, were largely perceived as victims. For men, however, a different pattern emerged. White men were more often described in the language of victimhood than men of other racial identities. Notably, I was able to infer victim race based on the way officers spoke about the victims. Non-white victims were always prefaced by their nationality or ethnic origin – e.g. Asian victims, African victims, etc. White victims were merely called victims. Interviewed officers described numerous cases in which they questioned the legitimacy of non-white victims' claim of victimhood and often labelled them instead as offenders. For men, the focus was mostly on their immigration

offences (international victims) or their intersection with other criminal offending (UK victims) unless there was visible evidence of some harm caused to them. Therein, for male victims, there seemed to be a greater focus on the perceived respectability of victims as a proxy for legitimate victimhood. Understandings of respectability rested primarily on whether a victim was seeking to stay in the UK or had a desire to return home, the latter being perceived as more respectable.

The case files supported this gendered finding, particularly in terms of how cases were closed. For men, cases were most often closed in a way that signalled there were no further inquiries to carry out on the cases. For women, even if modern slavery lines of inquiry were closed, other lines of inquiry were still explored. In one example, 47-year-old Josephine (case 21) was a victim of torture in Ghana (her home country) who was then held hostage in a house for a number of years in the UK where her captor and his friends repeatedly raped her. After a few years, Josephine managed to escape, but she was arrested for immigration offences a few months later. Josephine's case was 'easy' for the police to support in a sense because she had visible injuries that corresponded to her story, and she was cooperating with the police. While the modern slavery investigation was closed due to insufficient evidence (and with the victim's support), the rape investigation continued and became the lead offence.

Not only were case files involving women diverted to other lines of inquiry if there was not sufficient evidence of modern slavery, but these cases were also more frequently advanced down more inconclusive lines of inquiry than cases involving men. There were numerous instances where officers noted that the

evidence was inconclusive for women victims, but they kept investigating. For men, when evidence was inconclusive, cases were closed. The best example of this gendered approach to inconclusive case files is in the pathways through which cases came into the partner force: from the force themselves launching an investigation (force-led) or were transferred to the partner force by another force (outside force).

In general, outside force case files came into the partner force through an NRM referral. As part of the NRM process, there should be a police investigation into the crime, even if the victim does not consent to this investigation (but has consented to the NRM referral). Some of these cases were terse ones where officers detailed how no crime happened in their force area, so they transferred the file elsewhere. Other referral cases launched lengthy investigations. A gendered pattern was particularly notable in how these outside force case files were closed. For men, the cases were closed under a code that identifies that no crime was recorded. For women, the cases were often closed under a code that acknowledges that a crime has occurred, but, after investigation, no suspects were identified (which often was because the crime occurred outside the UK). 29-year-old Mary's case (case 4), for example, detailed her exploitation on her journey from Kenya to Italy and then later from Italy to the UK. Despite Mary herself not wanting to engage with the police, the crime happening outside the UK, and there being little evidence to investigate, this case was filed as a confirmed crime. In the final case entry, where the officer explains why they are closing Mary's case, they state:

> *Crime confirmed but no named suspect has been identified – No reasonable lines of inquiry to identify suspects as offences have*

> *happened abroad and victim not willing to talk to police to discuss any further.* [78]

Mary's case contrasts with 28-year-old Chaoxiang's (case 7). Chaoxiang was exploited on his journey from China to the UK. He was detained in Spain under debt-bondage and forced to work as a sex worker for a number of months. While both Mary and Chaoxiang's cases came to the force's attention via NRM referrals and both were in the context of their asylum claims, where Mary's case was recognized as having a crime occurred, Chaoxiang's was not. The bulk of Mary and Chaoxiang's reported exploitation occurred in Europe – Italy for Mary and Spain for Chaoxiang. That is, for both of these cases, wherein they detailed similar exploitation stories, they happened outside of the UK. They also had no evidence beyond the victims' testimonies. Yet, Chaoxiang's case has no recognized crime, but Mary's does. As per one of the final entries into Chaoxiang's case that justifies closing the case:

> *Verifiable information determines that no notifiable crime has been committed…In this investigation it has been established that all offences have taken place outside the UK, no offences to be recorded. Based on this I am satisfied that there is sufficient to determine that without doubt no notifiable crime has been committed.*

The assertation that there was 'verifiable information' confused me because I could not find any such information in the case file. I could not find anything that disproved (or for that matter proved) Chaoxiang's case beyond his testimony. While the officer writing in this case identified that no notifiable crime had happened, meaning no crime under UK law, a reading of Mary's case file implies that officers were working towards building a case, even though the crime

[78] All passages from the case files, written victim testimony (see Chapter 6), and text message conversations (also in Chapter 6) are quoted exactly as they stand in the original documents shared with me. The names, however, are pseudonyms.

happened outside the UK. There was also no notifiable crime in Mary's case, but the police engagement was different, even though, like Chaoxiang's case, there was no identified perpetrator.

In general, women were almost wholly approached through the lens of vulnerability and victimization in case files. Officers largely did not question women's testimonies and had a high capacity for recognizing their vulnerabilities. In some cases, this recognition of victim status went beyond the victim's account of their own experience. For men, cases were largely closed if the victim was uncooperative; for women, police still investigated modern slavery lines of inquiry. 42-year-old Si Mok's experience (case 18) is a good illustration of this commitment to investigating cases involving women.

In Si Mok's case, officers noted how Si Mok, a Thai national, was surprised to learn that the police had been investigating her as being a victim of modern slavery. She had no idea why they were doing so. Si Mok only learned the police were investigating her leave to remain application for modern slavery *after* she received a positive reasonable grounds decision. Police outlined how Si Mok was confused as to why she had received this decision in the first place in the first place. In this case, she had only applied for leave to remain based on her private life. Si Mok had been living in the UK with her husband, but she had separated from him a year before. As he was sponsoring her UK visa, she was now applying to stay in the UK independent of him. Officers investigating Si Mok's case originally outlined that they perceived her to be a slave for her husband. Si Mok's husband had used her good credit score to get different

lenders to loan him massive sums of money in her name. She reported the fraud, but he (a Canadian national) had managed to flee the country with another woman, taking £90,000 of this fraudulent money with him. Officers had to backtrack on their own assessment of Si Mok's case in the file and explain the difference between 'feeling like a slave' versus 'being a slave:'

> *Often [slavery] is a generalized term used to express how a person in a domestic based relationship feels. This report has been examined by [others in the force] who are of the opinion no there is no slavery offence to investigate. What has been reported by the recorded victim is a fraud which is being investigated separately.*

Notably, as far as I can discern, Si Mok never used anything close to the language of 'I feel like a slave' in her leave to remain application. Officers projected this language onto her, willing to see her as a victim even without evidence. Si Mok's case also highlights how officers had a hierarchy of victimhood related to nationality.

Female victims from African countries were more likely to have a focus on immigration offences, with officers referring to them as 'alpha victims.' Officers working on sexual exploitation cases described an alpha victim as an offender because they had undergone a 'psychological change' after being victimized and 'gained a hierarchy or position within the victims' (Police Consultant Clarke). These victims then became traffickers themselves. Officers explained that trafficked women from African countries, in particular, became alpha victims and returned to their home country to recruit more victims by showcasing their own success in achieving a better life. These alpha victims also started running brothels in the destination country. Alpha victims were the exception to the more-foreign-more-weak-more-legitimate narrative outlined later in this chapter. These

alpha victims from African countries were approached through the lens of offending more than victimhood compared to victims from other nationalities, particularly South East Asian nationals such as Si Mok. UK female victims were nearly exclusively referenced in terms of victimhood, although it was complicated if they came to police attention via other crimes (see more in Chapter 6).

This different treatment of specific nationalities implies a racialized approach to constructing victimhood. Gearon's (2018) study with young people trafficked into England had similar findings. Gearon interviewed 20 young people, all but one of whom were from African countries.[79] All described being not believed by police and child welfare and feeling like they were being blamed for their situation. I expand on the racialization of responses based on perceived nationality in Chapter 6.

More broadly, officers used descriptors of nationality to categorize vulnerabilities. Interviewed officers habitually described victims of sexual exploitation as involving more Asian women as victims than other nationalities, as Detective Constable Taylor shows:

> *If you are talking down the route of the prostitution and the sex side of it, it tends at the moment to be Asian females. By Asian, I am talking predominantly Chinese or Oriental. Sort of side of the Asian community rather than the Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indian sort of community. It tends to be more the Oriental side. And it tends to be the younger females, obviously.*

These descriptions corroborated notions of an archetypal victim of modern slavery, wherein a vulnerable young *foreign* woman is trafficked for sexual

[79] The one was from China.

exploitation. My participants perceived these gendered types of exploitation to be clear cases of victimization. Slightly less than half of my interviewed participants, however, also described sexual exploitation by using the language of prostitution or sex work, which highlights the presence of problematic tendencies described under Weitzer's (2011) oppression paradigm in conflating willing sex workers and unwilling victims as described in Chapter 2. The conflation of sexual exploitation with sex work supports the notion that police adhere to idealized understandings of who a victim of modern slavery is under the oppression paradigm, wherein sex work is inherently exploitative, so all sex workers must be victims.

Many officers also described Eastern European victims as more often sexually exploited than other types of exploitation, reflecting what Aliverti (2019, p. 18) refers to as the perception of 'cultural expertise' on nationality groups. By contrast, British nationals were described as the most common victim of forced labour, followed by European and Vietnamese victims. The most cited European nationalities were Romanian, Hungarian, and Albanian. Vietnamese nationals were most often described as exploited as labour for cannabis cultivation (men) or nail bars (women). Detective Inspector Wright shows a typical example of how officers described victims:

> *We see Romanian victims of sexual exploitation working as sex workers in pop-up brothels. We see male Romanian workers who are working in car washes. We see Chinese females who are working in private residential pop-up brothels – trafficked into those. We see Vietnamese people working in cannabis cultivation. And we see Albanian males in cannabis cultivation as well.*

Officers generally perceived that offenders had the same nationality as their victims, although there was variance in this based on the crime type. For example, forced marriage and domestic servitude were perceived to have less of this nationality-likeness pattern. In these cases, officers focused on likeness of ethnic origin – a British national offender being exploited by someone of their same ethnic origin. As Detective Constable Smith summarizes:

> *It is the usual thing where it tends to be a Hungarian trafficking a Hungarian, a Romanian trafficking a Romanian. It is usually with their own Nationalities.*

Officers I interviewed were clear, though, that they had also seen many offenders and victims who did not fit into these overarching patterns. For instance, one trend stated was an 'uptick' of Pakistani and Bangladeshi victims of domestic servitude with little pattern in terms of the perpetrator. These officers often mentioned having heard of different patterns in different areas but not having such tendencies in their own force area. Officers generally felt that their area had specific patterns in nationality, as per Detective Inspector Wright's statement that there exists such a thing as 'unusual nationalities:'

> *So we get Romanian, Chinese, etc. and a whole host of unusual nationalities. Like we had Brazilian prostitutes.*

In their reliance on nationality, officers largely referred to trafficking as a consequence of people's 'desire for a better life.' Although this notion suggests a broader understanding of trafficking, in the belief that foreigners were vulnerable because they wanted a better life, officers did little to recognize the circumstances of a victim's 'original' life. Instead, they offered paternalistic attitudes on how much better the UK is than wherever else the victim came from and that the UK *can* offer a better life. Such descriptions also dismiss an

assessment of vulnerabilities in favour of focusing on organized crime groups. The further away a victim's perceived home country was, the more likely police were to identify them as legitimate victims. Eastern Europeans involved in cannabis cultivation, for example, were much more likely to be described as offenders than Vietnamese nationals involved in cannabis cultivation, who officers referred to as victims.

Perceived distance from the UK and nationality patterns in types of exploitation was a way officers exercised their cultural expertise on nationality groups (Aliverti, 2019, p. 18). The police's perceived ability to 'decipher national identities' traces back to front-line imperial policing's perceived abilities to '"see inside" the otherwise unknown colonized societies' (Aliverti, 2019, p. 18). Police develop their perceived cultural expertise over time on the job. The further the victim's home country, the more 'clearly' foreign they are seen to be (language differences, cultural differences, different visual cues, etc.) and the greater the implications of this foreignness for their victim status. If a victim was clearly foreign, the police perceived it to be more likely that these victims came to the UK through exploitation by traffickers. Police rely on racialized views of nationality as a form of 'expertise.' These findings mirror those of Bosworth's (2018) research with detention officers in British immigration removal centres, who used stereotypes on race and ethnicity to form their professional expertise. Bosworth (2018, p. 216) found that detention officers' 'ideas about race, ethnicity, and national identity, in other words, are central to how they do their job.' I expand on this finding more in Chapter 6.

The further away a victim's home country based on officers' 'expertise,' the weaker the victim is and the less able they are perceived to be to have travelled to the UK on their own. Therefore, they are more likely to be recognized as legitimately victimized, regardless of exploitation type. It is easier for police to ascribe a humanitarian narrative to their action for these 'clearly' foreign victims. Although, nationality intersected with perceptions of offending in complex ways, which, again, I explore in more detail in Chapter 6.

Broadly, officers relied on nationality to understand the links between offenders and victims, as Detective Constable Smith exemplifies below. In many ways, this language models the wider 'othering' phenomena in the criminal justice system, where certain individuals are deemed worthy of victim care and police attention while others are not (Garland, 1996). Garland's (1996) criminology of the other is particularly notable in officers' descriptions of modern slavery as a 'nationality on nationality crime.'

> *We have predominantly Romanian and Hungarian nationals being exploited, thrown in with Vietnamese as well.*
>
> Detective Constable Smith

Notwithstanding their claims on victim nationality trends, police rarely recorded victim nationality in the official data. For example, in the national operational data shared with me during this research in July 2018,[80] of the 869 operations with a modern slavery flag raised that month, police did not record the

[80] An officer on a national task force shared this data snapshot with me.

nationality of the victim in nearly half (48%) of those investigations. The police also did not routinely record the nationality of the suspect, if there was one.[81] This difference implies that this nationality-based language is more culturally embedded than official. Even though police talk about nationality often and use nationality to make sense of who is and who is not a true victim, they do not routinely record nationality. In the partner force's NRM case files shared with me, 24.5% (n=121) did not have a recorded nationality.[82] The nationalities that were recorded were often inconsistent; when I read through the cases, it was not uncommon for two or three different nationalities to be mentioned for the same victim, and there were numerous instances where the officially recorded nationality was different than the one officers referenced in the file.

This lack of recording of nationalities and the inconsistencies in doing so particularly contrasts with the emphasis that official reports place on nationality, wherein the UK is able to track what its most common countries of origin are – see, for example, a recent report commissioned by the specialist modern slavery evidence centre the Home Office established, the Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre (PEC) (2021), which analyzed the top 20 source countries for modern slavery in the UK. Such reports present a conundrum: how can they even track this trend, if those who collect the data are failing to record nationality? The UK BME Anti-Slavery Network (2021) draws attention to the NRM data, highlighting that the failure to adequately record

[81] There was also not enough detail about the suspects to determine if it was one suspect or multiple (e.g. if there were links to organized crime).

[82] As these NRM referrals were often made in the context of refugee/asylum applications, it is not surprising that the percentage of nationalities recorded is higher than the operational data.

nationality, as well as ethnicity, leads to oversimplified understandings of modern slavery. Particularly from child trafficking experts, there have been calls to ensure this data *is* recorded, as it would facilitate a 'culturally competent' approach to response interventions (Saker, 2022, p. 31).

It is also striking which nationalities were not mentioned by the officers. No officer I interviewed had any interaction with Nigerian victims, despite the Home Office reporting that Nigeria was a major source country for sexual exploitation and trafficking more generally (Department for International Development and The Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, 2017). Even when prompted, the only time Nigeria was mentioned was as 'something' officers had heard about: an unknown wealthy Nigerian (or Black African more generally – most officers did not make a distinction between Nigerian and African) in a 'high' position keeping someone in domestic servitude, where 'those victims again will more likely look like women, more likely from places like Nigeria' (Detective Chief Inspector Hughes). Not a single officer in this phase of the research, however, had encountered a victim of domestic servitude from 'places like Nigeria.' The few people who worked on domestic servitude cases referenced 'Asian' victims.

Only four of the 493 case files in my sample involved Nigerians. Yet, at the same time, the Home Office continues to rank Nigeria as a major source country for the UK. The Modern Slavery PEC's 2021 report captures the most recent figures. In their report looking at NRM referrals of the top source countries for trafficking in the UK (besides the UK), the Modern Slavery PEC (2021) finds that Nigeria is the fifth most common source country to the UK, after Albania,

Vietnam, China, and Romania. Out of 10,627 NRM referrals in 2019, Nigerians accounted for 4.9% of referrals into the NRM, including UK referrals (Modern Slavery PEC, 2021).[83] Although, Nigeria's ranking as a source country varies by year. For example, in 2018, Nigerians referred into the NRM made it the eighth most common source country, with 208 referrals (Home Office, 2019). At the start of my research, Nigeria was the third most common source country into the UK (Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, 2016). Whether the third, fifth, or eighth most common source country, the number of Nigerians referred into the NRM is still a very small percentage of total victims referred into the NRM, making it not too surprising that my participants had not come across any Nigerian victims if one assumes that the victims are spread out across the country. Still, it does contrast with the public perception of the large number of African women being trafficked for sexual exploitation, as the UK has put forth.

However, the relatively low percentage of African victims more generally being referred into the NRM leads to the question of whether police are, in fact, coming across these individuals but merely falsely identifying them as offenders or even witnesses. The identification of modern slavery as a crime largely relies on first responders identifying victims properly (College of Policing, 2015, 2022). In the case of the police, this identification involves police being able to correctly identify victims in the context of other calls to service and/or responses – i.e. within the context of other crimes. While county lines were primarily perceived to be crimes against British nationals, the racialized way in which the officers

[83] The report does not give the raw number of victims, and it presents data in ways which make it difficult to triangulate. But, I have estimated that the 4% represents n=521 victims based on the total number of NRM referrals.

working on this type of modern slavery perceived the victims (which I explore in detail in the next chapter) highlights a strong case for there being a pattern of failing to identify and/or recognize the legitimacy of victimhood for those who are members of Black or minority ethnic communities. This concern has also been well documented by NGOs. The UK BME Anti-Slavery Network (2021) even points to the overwhelming number of African women in trafficking shelters in African countries who say they were trafficked to the UK and then deported. Yet, these women do not show up in any UK data on trafficking.

In their emphasis on constructing trafficking through nationality, my participants also focused on the importance of joint-international work to respond to trafficking. This emphasis is built into UK police policy that highlights the importance of engaging in joint-work (Southwell et al., 2018). Yet, only police officers on the national force had engaged in this kind of work, and only in one investigation in Romania, albeit an extensive one. Only one case file I reviewed involved joint-police action (Mihai, case 3). There were many instances where there was a back and forth dialogue in the case files between officers about offending that had happened outside the UK and what to do with the case as a result. Usually, this meant one or two officers proposing to file or close a case and then a senior officer responding they had reviewed the file and approved this request. Essentially, because no offending had taken place on UK soil, the police closed the case, even though they had evidence they could have at minimum passed along to international forces. Beyond Mihai (case 3), there was one instance (Piotr, case 1) where officers recognized that they *could* liaise with police in-country (Romania), but this was to ensure that, when the victim was

repatriated to Romania, he did not pose a threat to his wife (as the victim had disclosed to them that he had previously had domestic violence charges). In the end, they did not.

As mentioned, Mihai's experience (case 3) was the outlier. Mihai was a 25-year-old man brought by van to the UK from Romania. He left willingly with his friend, but, once they got to the UK, they were told they would be beaten if they left. The man who had arranged their transport told him and his friend that they owed money for the drive and would have to work in a car wash to pay off their debts. They were kept in a house in poor conditions – food only once a day and many people were getting sick. Mihai managed to escape by saying he was going back to the house from the car wash to change clothes because they got wet. Mihai called his sister, who booked him an Uber to the airport, a hotel at the airport, and a ticket to her home in Italy. It is unclear exactly how Mihai came to police attention, but, from the files, it seems that he or his sister called the police while he was staying in the hotel waiting for his flight. Mihai was different from other victims in that he had both the means and the support to seek help on his own. Mihai's brother-in-law was part of the US Air Force stationed in Italy. His brother-in-law quickly took over managing the case. Further, he also did not want to stay in the UK. The police on the case worked with the National Crime Agency (NCA) in Italy. The NCA's partner force collected a statement from Mihai when he was in Italy that led to an investigation into the car wash, collecting over 200 pieces of evidence. Police used this evidence to pursue a Slavery and Trafficking Risk Order (STRO).

Yet, many cases with a similar level of lines of inquiry were closed before police even considered reaching out to international partners, let alone collecting evidence. For other crimes, maybe filing cases as closed makes logical sense – how can the already under-resourced UK police investigate a crime that happened in another jurisdiction? But, for human trafficking, the UK police have specifically aimed to engage in joint-work to combat the crime as per the Modern Slavery Strategy. The College of Policing (2015, 2022) also purports the narrative that police do this type of work, which would at minimum involve sharing of information. Others, such as Van Dyke (2019), have also found there to be a large gap between policy and practice in modern slavery partnership work in the UK.

From my data, it seems like this type of work rarely happens, even though it is something that is supposed to be common practice. In Mihai's case, officers themselves recognized this uniqueness:

> *This [case] will be an unprecedented way of dealing with like offences both in [the partner force] and nationally and the reward of this outweighs the reward from a collapsed investigation and following our commitment to this investigation we have also caused disruption with any crime group who wants to exploit individuals connected with their criminal activity.*

When analyzing Mihai's case further, however, it became evident that the police perceived him to be highly respectable. He wanted to go home after being exploited, and he had a family with professional careers advocating for him. The police also described Mihai as very articulate. He did not want anything from the UK state apparatus; all he wanted was to go home. Mihai was exploited, but he was also clearly held against his will. The police perceived Mihai as a type of

ideal victim: blameless and respectable, but weak enough that others still exploited him.

The issues with joint-working were also not exclusive to international partners. When partnership work did happen between forces, the case files highlighted numerous issues with this joint-working within the UK, particularly in the context of cross-force information sharing. These issues mostly centred around what was omitted from NRM referrals transferred into the force. These referrals would typically include some background context on the victim, but not make reference to exactly what happened to lead to the referral. Officers working on these cases had to invest more time and resources to figure out why someone was being referred before they could start investigating. This figuring out why someone was referred started from a place of questioning their victim status, particularly if their background information outlined any immigration-related consideration.

For 27-year-old Vihaan (case 8), officers were missing details on why he was referred to the NRM. Vihaan was arrested on 'suspicion of being an overstayer' and was transferred to immigration detention. It took six days for police to clarify why Vihaan was referred. At which point, Vihaan had received a positive NRM decision,[84] been released from immigration detention, and alarmingly been released into the care of the person who had been suspected of holding him in conditions of forced labour in the first place.

[84] The NRM decision-making process happens independently of the police.

Vihaan's case rested between three forces, and, to give them their due, the partner force engaged quite rigorously to get the force where the victim was released into the care of the suspects to do a welfare check, but this was slow-moving. To be very clear, Vihaan had a decision from the NRM that recognized he was a victim of modern slavery, yet he was somehow released into the care of those that were highlighted in the NRM files as being the ones who kept him in the modern slavery conditions that led to that decision. It took three weeks to confirm that the other force had tried to do a welfare check, but they only went once and no one was at the house. The partner force also could not transfer the file until the other force took ownership on the system, which the force where the crime had happened was being reluctant to do. They refused the case initially on the grounds that there was no indication of where the victim was forced to work (which there was, so they clearly had not read the case file), and, as per their email to the force in the case file, 'the fact that the victim now appears to be *voluntarily* staying with the suspect does not make that address the venue for the initial slavery/forced labour offence' (emphasis my own).

As one officer contributing to Vihaan's case noted, 'there are clear concerns around the lack of progress on this case and potential associated risks to the victim and also the reputation of the Police service.' Then they 'lost' the victim. By the time the partner force was able to get the other force to take up the case (after escalating the issue to very senior policing authorities), Vihaan was no longer being held at that address, and everyone had lost contact with him. Lest we forget, Vihaan had a reasonable grounds decision, so the state had a considerable duty of care to him. A month later, after the police lost Vihaan, it

turned out the other force had miscoded his file when the case was successfully transferred, so the modern slavery flag was not raised.[85] Although Vihaan's case highlighted great police inaction, it also outlined strong action on the part of the partner force. The main officer working on that case made near-daily attempts to get action on file over two months.

In addition to signals of ideal victimhood like Mihai's (case 3) blamelessness and respectability, victims who had suffered visible harm were also more likely to be perceived as a victim. The way officers wrote about these high-harm victims in the case files was different too. Usually, case entries were rather dispassionate or factual accounts. One officer even wrote a note to other officers in the file for Si Mok (case 18) about how the facts of the case 'do not have to be "war and peace," just enough to support the classification or occurrence type.' Yet, they noted more impassioned accounts of facts for high-harm victims. Jianyu's (case 15) file had a note taken from his asylum application written with a particular flourish, for instance:

> *[Jianyu] was constantly subjected to violence and was treated as property and an inanimate object. He was heavily exploited and his life and soul was slowly drained from him with each passing day. The only way for him to survive was to follow orders and to remain submissive. The pain and torture he endured was never ending as the days continued to pass. He dare not look any one in the eyes. Friend or foe; [Jianyu] could never be sure. To live in constant fear was draining and [Jianyu] did not wish for his life to continue. He felt everyone in the world was against him and it was just him all alone fighting for his side. [Jianyu] had no hope for freedom or life. He did not know what it meant to be happy. The life he led was bleak, torturous, and punishing; a life lived by no one. Although this may have been in previous years and [Jianyu] wishes to forget these times, no matter how hard he tried, the memories cannot leave him. They are embedded so deep in [Jianyu's] mind and soul that they are permanently with him.*

[85] There were numerous instances in the case files of this same force in question mislabeling or mismanaging cases. In all of these cases, the burden fell on officers in the partner force to resolve the issues.

Yet, Jianyu's case was remarkably similar to Vihaan's (case 8) outlined above. Jianyu was a 52-year-old male from an Asian country (the case file does not specify which country). He entered the UK decades ago in 1999 and had come to police attention more recently when caught overstaying his visa. Jianyu came to police attention when he claimed asylum and modern slavery from immigration detention. He detailed how he was locked and enslaved while in the UK and was forced into being a domestic servant. He also outlined how he was beaten and subjected to violence for not helping coerce other non-status people into trafficking. The main difference between Jianyu and Vihaan? Jianyu had visible indications of being beaten; Vihaan did not.

The impact of visible harm on police action was most poignant for boys and young men. Where boys typically had their age questioned as to whether they were men (see more in Chapter 6), if they had visible indications of poor treatment, this did not happen, even if the victim was from outside of the UK where police usually felt there was nothing they could prove. 17-year-old Gabir (case 13), a Sudanese national, is a good example of this pattern. Gabir came to police attention when he was caught by immigration officials. Like many international victims, Gabir's account of his trip to the UK was harrowing, and he described clear victimization. Gabir went to Libya from Sudan to try and make it to the UK. He was caught in Libya and sold to a farmer there. He was forced to work in Libya for three years for no money. After befriending a Sudanese man who passed the farm, he escaped with him. Gabir then made his way to

Europe.[86] He came to the UK from Belgium by truck. Unlike the other young men who came to the UK without visas (e.g. Khuong, case 3; Ahsan, case 9), Gabir had visible injuries and poor health that officers felt clearly supported his story. He had kidney failure, a stoma, latent tuberculosis, and pneumonia, which the case notes outline supports his account of being held on the farm for three years. They also used the language of calling him a 'prisoner in Libya.' Officers never doubted Gabir's age or his victimization:

> *[Gabir] has kidney failure and has a stoma. It is clear from his health and presentation since being in the UK that he has taken care of this the best he can but no specialist care has been given to him and no care of consideration given to this by the farmer he was made to work for, which has compromised his health and potentially could have become life threatening…[Gabir] is an unaccompanied minor without a passport or identification documents and therefore has limited freedom of movement.*

Overall, officers developed working rules for modern slavery victim identification based on their gender, nationality, and degree of visible injury. When mentioning victim weakness beyond these traits, interviewed officers and notes on the case files focused on describing the victims through reference to how the police respond to victims. That is, police officers chronicle how they help vulnerable victims, which in large part defines *who* is vulnerable. I explore this finding next.

Police as Protectors

Officers described going to great lengths to support victims: buying them food, purchasing them clothing, paying for a hotel room, etc. With pride, some

[86] The case file does not detail exactly how Gabir made it to Europe or where he landed. It is impossible to say whether this was omitted by Gabir or just omitted from the file.

compared how they protect victims of modern slavery to the known failures of protecting victims of other types of crimes. Officers prided themselves on having better victim safeguarding than their colleagues working on other crimes. When explaining this, officers pointed out how they protected victims of modern slavery despite the difficulties in gathering evidence.

Detective Constable Taylor explained that for all non-modern slavery cases: 'When we sit there and look at theft, we look at theft. When we look at rape, we look at rape. We look at the points to prove and meeting that evidential value.' Yet, for modern slavery, 'there is that big gray area where [we] have not met the evidential value for the offence to be committed but they are still a victim that needs looking after' (Detective Constable Taylor). While underscoring the difficulty in meeting the evidential value of the modern slavery offences under the Modern Slavery Act (see more in Chapter 6), officers highlighted that they felt the government response via the NRM enabled the police to better respond to victims than other crime types. Victims are 'protected' through the NRM regardless of what happens with the investigation. Officers emphasized that victim care is where police typically fail. Officers found this victim-centred approach, as they described it, speaks to the important innovations of the policing approach to modern slavery compared to other types of crimes.

The case files supported officers' assertions that they carry out protective actions for some victims. Still, this help applied only to certain kinds of victims – namely, those they could identify as vulnerable as per the points mentioned above: gender, nationality, and visible injury. Despite my participants' perception,

many case files also showed that many are not protected by the NRM, depicting the implications of an over-emphasis on immigration status. Both the aforementioned Vihaan (case 8) and Jianyu (case 15) came to the partner force with trafficking flags already raised. Yet, both were being held in immigration detention facilities (almost certainly since these flags were raised because of their asylum applications). They were not released until sometime later when they received positive reasonable grounds NRM decisions. For both, it was not an immediate release after the NRM decision nor was there immediate support.

One area, however, where police seemed to go above and beyond to protect victims from known gaps in the NRM was when alcohol abuse was involved. Victims with alcohol abuse issues are excluded from the NRM's safeguarding pathways. Often this exclusion meant that police took on safeguarding responsibilities beyond their normal role. Piotr (case 1) was a 'chronic alcoholic with suicidal tendencies who can be violent when drunk.' He was rejected from Salvation Army's services because of these tendencies. As Piotr's file details:

> *The Salvation Army have stated that they will not allow him onto the NRM programme for a number of reasons…They have no safe houses that would accept him with his issues of alcoholism/suicidal tendencies etc…[Piotr] is an alcoholic and the safe houses offered by the charity do not allow any alcohol on site, he is a self-harmer previously tried to hang himself… As such the Salvation Army asked the police service to try other agencies and organizations to help [Piotr].*

In situations like Piotr's, the police arranged for the victim to stay at a hotel. Although in these situations police recognized the (white) victims' vulnerabilities to some extent, police still showed an apparent failure to understand the depths of how vulnerability impacts victims' lives. The help they offered was at a surface

level. Police detailed how almost all the victims who were placed in hotels suffered from feelings of isolation and depression because of being in the hotels. In most of these cases, family members called the police worried about their loved one's state of mind. The case files detail how victims felt trapped in the hotels, unable to leave but also without anything to do (other than watch TV) or the ability to have anyone visit. One case (Logan, case 10) was so severe that the victim left the hotel to return home to where he had been a victim of grievous bodily harm and drug trafficking.

Beyond gender, nationality, injury, and their protection of victims, officers who were interviewed mainly described identifying victims based on how organized crime groups have exploited them. Victims' vulnerability is understood through reference to those who abuse it. Instead of the victim's own fear and other mental health issues, officers framed victim vulnerability through their exploitation, which further shifted the understanding of what makes victims vulnerable away from the individual's lived experience.

Vulnerability through Exploitation

Repeatedly throughout my interviews, my participants stressed that victims are victimized by organized crime groups. They depicted these groups as having total power over victims. The interviewed officers detailed at length how organized crime groups prey on weak and vulnerable people. Officers described preparators as having an 'active' phase where they recruit and befriend victims before beginning more exploitative actions. The offenders create a bond to gain

the victim's trust, and, in many instances, the victim feels the offender is doing them a favour. As Detective Sergeant Walker summarizes:

> *[The offenders] are very good at identifying local vulnerable people who've got various vulnerabilities and whether that's drug or alcohol related issues, mental health. And sort of almost befriend them and take them under their wing and sort of then begin the exploitation side of things. Gaining their trust and then obviously exploiting them for what they can get.*

For foreign national victims, interviewed officers felt that offenders exploited the differences in wages between victims' home countries and the UK. The offenders will make the victims feel they have a good job because, in comparison, it is better wages than they would get in their home country. In these cases, officers described these victims as people who did not self-identify as a victim. This labour perspective hinted at a deeper understanding of what might make someone vulnerable, but officers largely mentioned it more in passing and focused much more on gender, nationality, and visible injury.

Officers also highlighted the various ways that organized crime groups exert control over victims. Regardless of how the victims were recruited, officers explained that offenders use social media and other technology to control them. They specifically mentioned GPS tracking and CCTV as mechanisms used to exert power over victims. Detective Sergeant Williams expands:

> *We've had victims who explain the psychological impact [organized crime groups] had: 'He's tracking me, he's aware of what's on my phone;' 'There's CCTV filming, he knows where I am all the time.' Just those implements that the suspect is using to manipulate the victim through that, and that's going to be done with technology. The victims believe they were being tracked, bugged.*

Some officers claimed that organized crime groups often make it hard to differentiate between victims and offenders. Offenders use the details of their victims to rent a car, for instance, increasing the overlap between victims and offenders. This overlap binds the victim to the offender because the victim fears they would be identified as an offender if they went to the police, effectively masking the group more. Officers perceived that, because offenders act in a group and create confusion between the victims and the offenders, organized crime groups add a 'layer of protection' between themselves and the police. As Constable Harris explains:

> *[Organized crime groups] will use vulnerable people and that could be just from using their address, using their vehicles, using their details to hire vehicles and things like that. So, they certainly do have an impact and it seems to give them that extra layer of protection from the police because if somebody else hiring the car in their name, if somebody else is dealing the drugs for them, if somebody else is carrying out the crime for them and that gives them that layer of protect from us.*

So, too, officers told me that organized crime groups deliberately change who 'deals' with victims to make it difficult to identify anyone beyond vague descriptions. These strategies meant that victims were unable to provide police with any substantive evidence on those who exploited them. Officers highlighted that, sometimes, victims were drawn into criminality themselves in ways that made the victim and offender distinction less clear.

Officers provided lengthy descriptions of the structure of organized crime groups. My participants described groups as familial and generational, with sisters/brothers and mothers/fathers being involved. Officers explained that these groups typically have a base in the area from where the victim had initially been exploited, which ties back to their understanding of modern slavery as a

nationality-on-nationality crime. By operating at both ends of the trafficking route – source and destination – these groups exert multiple layers of control over victims. As Detective Constable Smith and Detective Sergeant Williams outline:

> *We have a lot of father and sons and family units trafficking other members of their village or you know their town. So usually quite small networks rather than the large gangs. However, that is there as well.*
>
> Detective Constable Smith

> *Maybe a mum and dad who are matriarch, patriarch of the family, or it's a large, another large family which will exploit individuals, again bringing them from their area within the host country to a specific area within the UK and exploit them there.*
>
> Detective Sergeant William

These groups ranged from organized to less organized, more opportunistic to less opportunistic, and more to less supply/demand focused. Larger groups tended to focus on the organized use of victims as assets, I was told. Officers explained there was some research to suggest the more organized and sophisticated the group, the less the level of direct harm posed to the victim.[87] While the level of harm is of course relative here, the officers explained that more sophisticated groups tended to treat their victims better because that increased the value that could be 'extracted' from each victim. More disorganized and opportunistic groups, in comparison, were ones that officers found to be less long-term oriented and more 'here and now,' seeking to extract as much value as quickly as possible. The description of the groups' commodification of victims was salient across these explanations. The victims are not seen as people, but as financial assets.

[87] I was never able to substantiate where they got this knowledge from.

My participants' focus on organized crime reflects a much wider perception of what trafficking is and who the offenders are, as described in Chapters 1 and 2. While the focus on organized crime groups justifies a criminal justice response to trafficking and is, therefore, an unsurprising narrative for police, it further shifts focus away from the victim as someone with agency to towards them being a pawn in a wider pattern of criminality.

Just as they did in their accounts of victims, officers relied on nationality to categorize the offenders. Officers believed that the national origins of perpetrators tended to map onto different types of modern slavery. Eastern European perpetrators were most often mentioned as offenders of sexual exploitation and labour exploitation. Thai and Vietnamese perpetrators were more often involved in labour exploitation, particularly nail bars for Thai perpetrators and cannabis cultivation for Vietnamese perpetrators. Lastly, British perpetrators were mentioned for labour exploitation, criminal exploitation, and child exploitation, the latter particularly as related to county lines. County lines were perceived to have a pattern of offending where typically 'young Black men' were recruiting other 'young Black men' (see next chapter).

These descriptions of nationality-based organized criminal groups relied on racialized tropes of offending. For example, British traveller communities were usually described as a very 'disorganized' organized crime group involved in modern slavery. Numerous officers said British traveller or Roma communities in the UK exploit Eastern Europeans. These more opportunistic crime groups were

not ‘getting rich’ from the exploitation of victims but gaining income to meet their basic needs. Officers described these traveller groups as ones that generally were living in poor conditions themselves and engaged in other types of criminal activity, namely firearms and drug-related. These groups were described as having a complete lack of empathy or compassion towards whoever they were exploiting. As Detective Constable Thomas explains:

> *So I like to call them disorganized crime groups where you might have a small family unit, whether it’s two, three, four or five people working together and I say working together. They might be family; might be a family unit. And they will exploit very small numbers of individuals for their own personal benefit, whether it’s out of laziness or just another source of income. They’re living, you know, they don’t have a decent lifestyle. You know, they’ll live in filth and fund gambling or substance misuse issues. The people that we’ve usually identified are not very wealthy and are more opportunistic and they’re just preying on somebody who’s really vulnerable who relies upon them to provide their basic needs.*

Although my participants described all of their trafficking cases as involving organized crime, I could not triangulate interviewed officers’ accounts with the case files. The case files do suggest some reference to organized crime groups, where there were suspected identified (who were not the victims themselves), but officers in the case files largely did not back it up with any evidence. Still, most cases were closed without much investigation, let alone identification of the suspect(s). Despite these limitations, the case files point to the need to query how prevalent the organized crime narrative is in trafficking and what purpose it serves the police to use this narrative even though evidence points otherwise.

While there is some evidence linking organized crime and trafficking, it is largely driven by UN agencies and research from a law enforcement perspective involving the sex trafficking of women along the West Africa to Europe route

(see, for example, Baarda, 2016 and Campana, 2018). Most research that directly involves victims does not present findings in favour of this organized crime thesis (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). Even UNODC (2011, p. 6) themselves find that the link between organized crime and irregular migration (which covers trafficking and smuggling) is a 'sensitive and controversial issue.' In their report on organized crime and irregular migration, UNODC (2011) points out that much of the focus on organized crime comes from a focus on one specific manifestation of a trafficking route: Nigerian women to Italy. Their report also highlighted that the link between irregular migration and organized crime is fuelled by particular types of news stories about these very specific and arguably rare manifestations of trafficking. Writing for the IOM, de Haas (2008, p. 12) challenges that organized crime is involved in irregular migration from Nigeria to Italy to begin with. de Haas (2008, p. 12) finds there is a 'lack of empirical research,' and the research that has happened is 'rather shaky.'

My participants' consensus on framing vulnerability through organized crime groups echoes findings from Pickering's (2011) research on Australian border police responding to sex trafficking, as well as Franko Aas and Gundhus' (2015) findings in relation to Frontex officers' interactions with migrants.[88] Franko Aas and Gundhus (2015) describe this focus on legitimizing victims through reference to the criminality of their exploitation as the 'performative aspects of humanitarian thinking' (p. 11), reflecting the 'centrality of the humanitarian self-image' (p. 9). Framing vulnerability in relation to organized crime groups reflects

[88] Frontex is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.

risk-centred approaches to policing, where 'the objectives of combating crime stand in contrast to the needs of victims and may ultimately lead to a weaker focus on their vulnerability' (Franko Aas and Gundhus, 2015, p.11).

In this view, police must tackle organized crime to save victims from bad and manipulative offenders. Christie's (1986) conceptualization of the ideal victim provides a useful starting point for assessing how police approach victims and offenders in this performative way. The police 'save' the 'innocent' victim from the 'evil' organized crime groups, inherently capturing the power differential between those who do policing, those who receive policing services, and those who are policed. Christie's (1986) concept could be extended to capture not only an ideal victim and offender, but also an ideal police officer: one who seeks to save the weak victim from the strong offender.

Not only does a focus on organized crime draw on idealized notions of victimhood and obscure victims' lived reality, it also focuses on the threat to the state (Milivojevic and Pickering, 2013). In so doing, police frame vulnerability through reference to the risk posed to the state by organized crime groups, which overlaps with perceptions of victim legitimacy related to gender, nationality, and visible injury. Police prioritize this view over considering other characteristics of vulnerability, like situations of precarity and fear. Such a focus on narratives that highlight police's empathy and compassion for vulnerable victims in the context of threats to the state is a form of what Didier Fassin (2007, p. 151) calls humanitarian governance.

Fassin (2007, p. 151) explains that humanitarian governance is premised on 'administration... in the name of a high moral principle which sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action.' Although Fassin (2007) broadly refers to the relationship between government and NGOs, his work does help highlight the importance of reflecting on the humanitarian functions put forth in policing modern slavery. Police fit their narrative of what they are doing within wider narratives on modern slavery and who is and who is not a victim outlined in Chapter 2. Walters (2011, p.143) expands on Fassin's concept of humanitarian governance by asserting that there are 'specific forms of authority' that form 'humanitarian reason.' Police are an authority here that help form this humanitarian reason circularly. Arguably, police approach their work through this humanitarian lens because of the government's position on modern slavery as the vilest of human rights abuses; however, police discourse around saving vulnerable victims from organized crime circularly reaffirms government narratives that focus on the evils of trafficking. These narratives construct not only the identity of the police, but also the victims (van Hulst, 2020).

The constructions of victim identity through gender, nationality, and visible harm serve to justify themselves. With gender, for example, because of the embeddedness of the oppression narrative at an international level, Bell and Banks (2018) highlight that states have enhanced 'pressure' to respond to trafficked women. This pressure silences the experience of men as victims and inherently influences government criminal justice system responses as it infers that some victims take priority over others. Skrivankova (2019), for instance,

found evidence that UK police can only recognize trafficking victimization when a woman is involved. In her research, Skrivankova (2019) analyzed the case study of a migrant man who went to different police stations in different UK cities to say he was a victim of forced labour. In the stations he went to, the police repeatedly told him it was an 'immigration matter and not a police one' (Skrivankova, 2019, p. 246).

The focus on trafficked women also brings with it a focus on those perceived to victimize them. Men, particularly foreign men, become 'the embodiment of all risks to trafficked women' through organized crime (Fitzgerald, 2016, p. 189). More broadly, Fitzgerald (2016, p. 182) argues that this emphasis on trafficked women in the UK brings a focus on the humanitarian nature of trafficking responses that has facilitated the 'spatial reorganization' of border control. Such a reorganization has not only oriented domestic border control, but also brings attention to gender and nationality under the purview of extraterritorial humanitarian interventions (Fitzgerald, 2016). The government funding for projects with NAPTIP would be one example of such an intervention. Across domestic and international spheres, these interventions stress a prioritization on risk (Fitzgerald, 2016). Riskiness is detected through the threat posed to the state by organized foreign men under the guise of focusing on the threat they pose to women. As Fitzgerald (2016, p. 189) concludes, 'when governments make claims about the need to protect trafficked women, her vulnerability to harm becomes a proxy for more invasive forms of…regulation and control.'

More broadly, my participants' narratives focused on rescue, an outcome of which Roberts (2019) argues comes at the expense of recovery. The police accounts of vulnerability leave many questions open about what happens to these vulnerable people. The rescue narrative also presupposes that police *can* rescue victims, but there is growing evidence, as outlined in Chapter 2, that criminal justice responses to trafficking are not effective because they fail to recognize victims' true vulnerabilities. Without addressing the underlying causes that have led someone to intersect with trafficking, like poverty or unemployment, victims are at risk of being re-trafficked (Adams, 2011). Even if a victim is rescued from a situation of hyper-precarity, they have to be assisted in transitioning out of it for there to be lasting change (Lewis and Waite, 2019). Lewis and Waite (2019, p. 226) explain that the key problem of the criminal justice responses to trafficking is that they frame trafficking as the 'exception.' Victims are being rescued from an exceptional type of crime. In actual fact, victims are being temporarily taken out of the 'pervasive characteristics of neoliberal globalization' (Lewis and Waite, 2019, p. 226), without any meaningful engagement with ensuring their lasting human security (Yousaf, 2018).

Police ultimately construct victimhood through reference to visual cues they perceive to signal weakness and the criminality of their exploitation. In so doing, they manage to be responsive to victims of trafficking but hostile to migrants, effectively creating an 'ambiguous juxtaposition of compassion and utilitarian thinking' (Franko Aas and Gundhus, 2015, p.9). In my data, police adoption of the humanitarian narrative cloaks a much more prevalent investigation into the truth of victimhood. Police narratives that hyper-focus on organized crime

groups, gender, nationality, and injury are premised on uncovering truth over responding to vulnerability. Police emphasis on organized crime groups reveals 'other crime-related activities rather than subjects deserving of protection' (Franko Aas and Gundhus, 2015, p. 9). Seemingly protecting the vulnerable victim, victims are actually 'screened' and 'debriefed' about their exploitation (Franko Aas and Gundhus, 2015, p. 9). As is similar with migration control, my participant described approaching victims to try and get at the 'truth' of what they were saying. This 'truth' relies on perceptions of foreignness, gender, and injury, categorizing people as victim or offender based on perceived legitimacy therein.

Conclusion

Police understand their role in trafficking responses as one that responds to victim vulnerabilities. They described victims as weak and used gender, nationality, and level of injury to define what they mean by weak. Women were more likely to be viewed as victims than men. Unless they had visible injuries, men presenting as victims were more likely to be approached through the lens of offending. Officers described trafficking as a nationality-on-nationality crime and used nationality to make sense of types of exploitation and patterns in victimization. This tendency reflected a cultural policing practice because they did not routinely record nationality in their official data. There were also racialized ways police understood victimization. Non-white victims were more likely to have their claim to legitimate victimhood questioned, which is a finding that I also carry through to Chapter 6. Beyond gender, level of injury, and nationality, police constructed victimhood through how much they helped victims and how

exploited they perceived victims to be by organized crime groups. I ultimately concluded that police understood victims' vulnerability through reference to how they were exploited, and, in doing so, they stressed the humanitarian functions of their job. By focusing on what Franko Aas and Gundhus (2015, p. 9) call the 'humanitarian self-image,' police reaffirm the government narrative on trafficking. Yet, they also partake in great humanitarian inaction by their narrow understanding of who victims are.

.

Ultimately, in the working set of rules police develop to determine who is and who is not a victim of trafficking, they rely on gender, nationality, and visible injury to construct the victim. This construction intersects with their understanding of how they have helped the victim and how the victim has been exploited by organized crime groups. These working rules happen despite official policy that points to other indicators of victimhood, as per Chapter 1. Yet, understandings of victimhood are only part of the analysis. When people were not identified as victims, police instead referred to them as offenders. In the next chapter, I explore how perceptions of victimhood influence police's understanding of criminality.

Chapter 6: Constructing Criminality in the UK

> *An association of strangers with danger and criminality is one of the most enduring social myths.*
>
> Griffiths (2017, p.534)

> *The 'foreign criminal' has come to embody the nation's most derided individual who combines racialized fears about the stranger and the criminal.*
>
> Aliverti (2019, p.12)

The UK government's Modern Slavery Strategy requires police to make decisions related to foreignness on who to protect or be suspicious of. Most police interact with potential victims of modern slavery through investigating or responding to other crimes. Police leverage their understanding of vulnerability in the field to make decisions about who to protect and who to criminalize. Officers are suspicious that victims are actually offenders. Building on findings from Chapter 5, this chapter focuses on how gender and perceived foreignness inform perceptions of criminality.

My participants described many situations where a person claimed to be a victim, but the police determined they were not. In these cases, the police described these individuals as offenders. The links between police narratives and gender, race, victimhood, and criminality illuminate biases and structural conditions that perpetuate perceptions of who is and who is not a legitimate victim of modern slavery.

If a victim was a foreign national, police questioned whether the individual was a victim or an illegal migrant. Yet, for Black British nationals, police often wondered if they were an offender.[89] Instead of asking 'what would the average person do?' as the measure of vulnerability, the question police asked became: 'are they actually a victim?' (foreign nationals) and 'of what are they an offender?' (Black British nationals). Black British citizens, in particular, were more likely to be viewed as offenders, even when they had identifiers of vulnerability like a visible injury. Looking 'foreign' (i.e. non-white) and being British actually resulted in more questioning of victim status than 'just' being foreign. The police start from an already formed preconceived notion of doubting the victims' legitimacy and then set about to confirm/deny this notion. Such crime-centred truth-seeking does little to account for the breadth of factors contributing to an individual's circumstances.

Relying on UK interviews and case files, in this chapter, I begin by analyzing how perceptions of foreignness intersect with criminality, exploring the gendered dimensions thereof. I explore how police construct criminality, with a focus on racialized patterns in identifying British victims and offenders. I argue that police rely on nationality as a proxy for race, wherein race is conflated with criminality. Next, I assess the tools of truth-seeking that result in these racialized and gendered outcomes. I argue that these outcomes are correlated to police's emphasis on victims' testimony and their training on responding to modern slavery, reinforcing racialized policing practices. I conclude by outlining how

[89] Officers only spoke about Black British nationals. Future research is needed to explore their perception of British nationals belonging to other ethnic minority groups.

police narratives on vulnerability and criminality from this chapter and Chapter 5 showcase the competing logics of policing.

Foreignness and Criminality

Perceived foreignness had the potential to protect certain victims' legitimacy, particularly as it intersected with gender and visible harm as outlined in Chapter 5. Yet, perceptions of foreign nationals rested precariously between victimhood and criminality. In assessments of whether an individual was more victim or more offender, officers spoke about what made someone intersect with trafficking: a 'desire for a better life.' By framing trafficking through the lens of 'desire,' officers inherently recognized the agency of those involved, but they approached this agency as an axis that determines offending. Precarious immigration status underscored victims' vulnerability, but it is also underscored offenders' criminality.

Officers always questioned the victim status of people who came to their attention via immigration services. These cases came to police attention when someone raised a modern slavery defence as part of refugee/asylum claims. Police perceived this to happen when someone had exhausted all other appeals, casting this as a 'last-ditch effort' to remain in the UK. Detective Constable Taylor described how their team gets three to four referrals from immigration services per week. At some length, DC Taylor summarized a typical case:

> *It is somebody who has been in the UK, who has been told they are getting deported. Who has exhausted all their appeals. And has reached a point where they are about to put them on a plane and they say 'I am a victim of modern slavery.' And that happens a lot. And we've had*

> *everything from, 'I was forced to work at the harbour in [a town in the middle of England].' Well we don't have a harbour (laughs). Right the way through to 'there's a piece of forest in around [this town] somewhere that has a cannabis farm in it, that's got fields of cannabis hidden within this jungle of [this town].' And they were forced to work there before escaping. Which if you just helicopter over the place, you know there is no field of cannabis going that's for sure. So some of them are blatantly false reports and you can see. I picked one up yesterday actually. And it's an identical situation, where somebody is in the process of being deported. And they are about to be put on the plane and say, 'I've been forced into this country for prostitution; my boyfriend sent me over here from China. I entered the UK under a tourist visa two years ago, and I have been housed in various different houses against my will and forced to sleep with people. And I managed to escape when a student who was one of the clients helped me escape, and he told me I was in [a town in the middle of England]. But I don't know where I was. And I can't tell you any details, and I can't tell you any names, and I can't describe anyone involved in this.' And you're like, 'well-hold on.' And then she's got a phone which has been topped up regularly by herself. She's got a bank account that she's opened up in the UK and that's she's been taking money out of and paying for top-ups on her own phone. You know. Now, I am not saying it hasn't happened, and we can't say it hasn't happened, but you know – she's unable to give us any detail that would help us prove or disprove the case because, for her, her benefits remain vague and remain open and she's not going to get deported. Now I am not saying it hasn't happened. There is nothing she is telling us that will help us investigate this at all. But, it draws the question: 'is she actually a victim?'*

Despite DC Taylor's assertions that 'I am not saying it didn't happen,' it is clear he doubts that the people being described are victims. DC Taylor particularly references how someone who can top-up their own phone is not a victim. Here, he relies on notions of victims being under total control of the exploiter as what makes a victim of modern slavery. Many victims, however, are held in situations of partial control. Further, just because the individual tops-up their own phone does not mean they are not in a situation of total control. There are many other ways control is exerted (e.g. debt-bondage). Officers had also specifically recognized that organized crime groups involve the victim in actions like topping up a phone and bank deposits to create confusion (see Chapter 5).

DC Taylor's narrative shows that, when the influence of organized crime groups is not clear, victimhood is questioned. Any sort of perceived agency on the victims' part undermines their legitimacy as a victim in the eyes of the police.

The case files also support officers' great suspicion of victims that came to them via immigration services. For example, in one case (Khuong, case 5), the victim (accused) was found on a truck in the UK with approximately 20-30 other men on it. The case details that they suspected all of these men were illegal immigrants. While the case details the victim's account at length, one officer summarized Khuong's case sufficiently:

> *[Khuong] flew from Vietnam to Russia, he stayed in Russia for ½ month then travelled to the Ukraine, Germany, France, and then in a container to the UK. [Khuong] has stated his passport and ID case were taken away from him when he flew to Russia. [Khuong] travelled in a container to France and then to the UK. During his journey, the people who brought him to the UK made him carry water and chop wood in the forest. [Khuong] has stated he doesn't owe any money for the journey as it was paid for by his uncle. [Khuong] has explained he was 'forced to go' from Russia by people who had their faces covered. [Khuong] was 'forced to go' with a group of people and they were told they were going to England. [Khuong] has said he does not feel threatened during this time…[Khuong] has stated his uncle arranged for him to travel to the UK as he would have a better life. [Khuong's] parents are both deceased and he was told by his uncle he had an aunt in the UK and he was heading to London to meet her. He was told his aunt would meet him when he got the UK although he did not have a contact number for her. It is unclear as to how they would have met up once he arrived in the UK. [Khuong] does not have contact details for his uncle, he was able to speak to him before he got in the lorry container and this conversation was facilitated by the people who bought him to the UK. [Khuong] has not provided a name for his uncle…[Khuong] was brought into care with [two other boys]. The boys stories are very similar in that they have come to the UK for a better life.*

The officer who wrote this note questioned whether Khuong really felt 'forced to go,' implying the perception of some level of agency on Khuong's part. Elsewhere in the case, however, a different officer details an earlier statement

from Khuong where he described that he was taken against his will on this journey, to Russia and then to the UK via mainland Europe. Although I cannot definitively say, from analyzing the case, it appears this latter statement was the first one taken from Khuong right after he was found on the truck. Khuong appears to have stayed consistent with the story that he was forced to go along this route. Still, as the case progressed, officers appeared to become more and more dubious of this story – officers increasingly focused on the fact that Khuong did not have to pay for the journey.

Khuong's case is interesting for many reasons. Firstly, technically, under the UK legislation (and international), trafficking only occurs at the exploitation stage. By apprehending Khuong just as he was getting to the UK in a truck, it is impossible to say whether he would have been exploited in the UK, but the potential was there. His lack of knowledge on how to contact his Aunt implies this exploitation might have been likely as he clearly would have had nowhere to go once he left the truck unless he was guided by the people that brought him over. Second, the journey detailed would have been costly: a flight and multi-country transport in a vehicle. While Khuong's uncle could very well have paid his fee upfront, the boys found at the same time as Khuong all described the exact same story. This suggests that, unless they all had an uncle in the UK who paid their fees upfront (which seems unlikely), there has been some level of deception involved. This deception is compounded by the fact that Khuong did not want to go on the journey and described being coerced to do so. All of which point to indicators that, at the very least, these boys were moved for

questionable purposes. He was a 16-year-old from Vietnam found in a truck in the UK.

I felt that it logically flows from the notes in the case that the boys were likely moved for the purpose of exploitation once in the UK. The officers, however, reached an entirely different conclusion without carrying out much of an investigation. At minimum, this case should have warranted some degree of investigation into Khuong's victimization. Instead, very quickly, Khuong was determined to likely not be 16 (as he reported and as the social care team who assessed him had confirmed) but, in fact, 18.

Khuong was, therefore, an illegal adult migrant instead of a child victim of trafficking. Throughout the notes on the case, Khuong went from a child victim of trafficking who was placed in a childcare home to an illegal adult migrant determined to be aged 18, who was transferred into the 'care of the Home Office' as described in the case files. At least entry, he was housed in an immigration detention facility awaiting deportation. Khuong's journey from a 16-year-old boy to an 18-year-old man happened in 5 months. No lines of inquiry raised in Khuong's account were explored. All effort was focused on disproving Khuong's story and age. A version of Khuong's story was repeated over and over in the case files.

Wanting to *not* stay in the UK appeared to be strongly correlated to how much officers believed in victim accounts. How much they believed in victim accounts related to how much they investigated cases and invested in those

investigations. If a victim was not asking for support to stay in the country, officers focused on investigating the modern slavery lines of inquiry. The cases with the most investigation energy were often these cases (e.g. Piotr, Case 1). If they were trying to stay, police seemed to focus on the immigration lines of inquiry first. The contrast between these approaches can be seen in the cases of Vihaan (case 8) and Ionuţ (case 11).

For Vihaan's case outlined in Chapter 5, officers focused on how Immigration was looking to deport him as soon as possible even though he made a modern slavery claim: '[Immigration] are aware he has made a fresh allegation of Modern Slavery – he had not mentioned this in the three weeks he was there and has been spoken to regularly' (Vihaan, Case 8). Although Vihaan had a *positive* reasonable grounds decision, and there were a lot of notes in the case about this decision, the police did not take action to protect him. In fact, they exposed him to tremendous risk by releasing him into the care of the person who had exploited him and then losing contact with him. Police know what they should be doing, to some extent, but, in practice, this is not happening when immigration offences are also part of the equation.

Vihaan's case contrasts with that of Ionuţ (case 11). Ionuţ was a 22-year-old from Romania who called the Modern Slavery Helpline about being exploited at a car wash. After Ionuţ had returned to Romania *and* had received a *negative* conclusive grounds decision, officers still made an effort to investigate his claim and contact him. Although, the case was impacted by his not being in the UK. As one officer summarizes it in the case file, 'the victim having left the UK is likely to

have a significant impact upon our ability to take this investigation forward' (Ionuţ, case 11). That said, they still *tried* to take the case forward, which was a level of effort not seen in most other cases with international victims in the UK. Mihai's experience (case 3), which I explored in Chapter 5 is another strong example of this level of effort.

Criminalization of British Nationals

In contrast to foreign nationals where foreignness could be a protective or a risk factor, perceived foreignness was always a risk factor for certain British nationals. As Griffiths suggests (2017, p. 536), Black and minority ethnic British nationals are often ascribed 'aspects of the foreign criminal label… that simultaneously accentuate both their alterity and criminality.' Griffiths (2017) refers to this as 'dual Othering,' whereby Black and minority ethnic British nationals are othered based on visual cues associated with nationality (i.e. racial cues) and also othered for the criminality inferred from these visual cues. Although Griffiths (2017) research focused on migration control and criminality, a similar pattern presented in my data. Police dually othered Black British nationals for being Black and doubted their legitimacy as victims to the point where they actually described these victims solely as offenders. Black British nationals were constructed as foreign and criminal most frequently by officers working on county lines. All officers in my sample who worked on county lines issues were local level officers. As local level officers are the ones engaging with victims and doing most of the modern slavery investigations, this finding is worth considering.

County lines victims were described as 'young Black men,' and many were described as offenders instead of vulnerable youth. Constable Harris perceived that the line he worked on almost exclusively involves Somalian British nationals. He described these victims as drug users and often having a drug debt and criminal history. As Constable Harris described:

> *The drugs line I am looking at, at the moment, comes from [a specific neighbourhood], and they are predominantly of Somali origin. And their parent gang, for want of a better word, are again confirmed majority from a Somali—a community from Somalian background. And quite often, the defences I've been given are very vague and very difficult to prove or disprove. And they are generally along the same lines of 'I was forced by an elder to do it.' A common one quite often is a drugs debt. So where they will be asked to hold drugs and then claim that they've been robbed of those drugs and therefore have some kind of, well, almost like a debt-bondage to an elder because they've lost their drugs and now they need to work to pay for those drugs.*

Constable Harris showcases the 'intricacies of citizenship, criminality and race,' with British citizenship being a 'formality' and Somali a 'marker of identity' (Aliverti, 2019, p. 19). Aliverti (2019, p. 12) argues that the 'foreign aspect can accommodate some British nationals whose citizenship remains suspect and vulnerable to being stripped.' Therein, by associating identity through national or ethnic origin beyond formal citizenship, police are enabled to focus on 'truth' through reference to criminality instead of vulnerability. Officers perceived that these 'young Black men' were also coached by the organized crime groups running county lines on using modern slavery as a defence if they were caught on a drug line, as Police Sergeant Davies highlights below. Many local level officers asserted that offenders had done their own form of proactive intelligence gathering and investigated different officers and knew which ones would be aware of modern slavery or not. As Police Sergeant Davies describes:

> *It is very, very easy for a suspect to raise in an interview to say, 'I've been a victim of modern slavery.' As soon as they've said that one line, obviously, we will treat them as a victim of modern slavery. Automatically because we need to find out and investigate fully to be fair to everybody involved, so we have to, you know. It's not something we should, and we don't dismiss straight away by saying, 'oh they are clearly an offender so we shouldn't look into this.' Because the drug lines involve a lot of exploitation at various levels at various times. And it might be you've got a suspect who we've arrested who was a victim of modern slavery previously but is actually an offender the next time round for want of a better word. So you have to do it on a case-by-case basis and try and understand it. So we spend as much time investigating modern slavery as we do investigate the drugs offence – (laughs) to put it in perspective. Because obviously, if someone is a victim, we want to help them. In a weird kind of way, you know, trying to prove they are not is something we can do. You know, because there's evidence which clearly backs that they are not.*

Police Sergeant Davies also shows how quickly police can replace the victim label with an offender one. Officers claimed that some people say they are victims of modern slavery just to 'get out of it.' When the modern slavery defence is raised, the individual (provided they consented) is automatically diverted into the NRM (i.e. into support services) while the officers and the NRM team investigate. Constable Harris explained:

> *We do see [offenders who are claiming to be victims] quite a lot. Predominately with the county lines coming from [name of location is omitted] where they already have that defence, and they know exactly what to say and when to say it to get themselves out of the situation they are in. They'll very much be coached with what to say. When people have been convicted in jobs I've investigated, I've gone and spoken to them after and (laughs) every single one of them without fail so far has always said, 'I was never a victim of modern slavery. I just said it because that's what I was told to say.' And that is a huge issue that we are coming across. It's just being used as a smokescreen.*

The racialized perceptions of county lines victims were most striking compared to how participants described white British national victims.[90] Police frequently described the elements that made Black British nationals vulnerable to county lines in terms of drugs debt, drugs use, criminal history, and the desire for a life that 'looks good on Instagram.' Officers largely perceived county lines victims as being 'sold on an image' associated with drug dealing, with the concept of an 'Instagram lifestyle' frequently mentioned. Officers found that social media plays a vital role with Snapchat and Instagram proliferating this image. Although a better life was cited as a recruitment strategy for most types of exploitation, with county lines, this better life aligned with the stereotypical image of drug dealing with fancy cars and shoes – i.e. extravagance. This approach to recognizing the influence of organized crime groups through feeding a want for goods effectively shifts the blame from the organized crime groups to the individual as the individual becomes active in pursuing these goods and this lifestyle. Only one officer described how these boys come from 'broken homes,' and another mentioned their age as making them vulnerable. Otherwise, my participants described 'vulnerability' to modern slavery through reliance on descriptions of racial markers of national origin, criminal history, and desire for nice things. Police Constable Roberts summarized the influence of social media:

> *A big part of it is this Instagram life, this easy money, quick money. And then you can have your designer gear…It's all based around social media lifestyle, especially with the younger kids. You know we know of drug dealing happening through Snapchat. That's how they deal drugs now. You know. So I do think they see this lifestyle on Instagram and all the rest of it and think, 'ya I want that,' and then so that then is a tool that these people use to recruit.*

[90] Officers who worked on county lines described white British nationals by simply referring to them as British nationals. Black and minority ethnic British nationals were always prefaced through reference to nationality or ethnic origin. Therein, British nationals were described as victims and nationality or ethnic origin prefaced British nationals as offenders.

In contrast, white British nationals were described as adults and in terms of vulnerabilities like homelessness, addictions, financial debt, mental health, and estrangement from families, as Detective Inspector Jones explains:

> *So some of the victims were alcoholics, some were drug addicts, a lot had mental health problems. They were people on the fringes of society is what I'm trying to say. And, and I see that now even in, in cases that we've, that have, have been dealt with in the office is that the victims remain vulnerable, so they're vulnerable to exploitation.*

Accounts of these victims focused on how organized crime groups capitalized on these vulnerabilities and filled the gaps, whether it be providing housing, food, or substances. Debt-bondage was explained as a way organized crime groups keep victims working for the offender to pay off these provisions.

The ‘young Black men’ involved in county lines, however, were described as ideal offenders. They were trying to claim victim status when they were not victims, and their vulnerabilities were descriptors of criminality. Their pre-existing criminality was used as a justification for why they became involved in further criminality. As opposed to weak, they are strong; as opposed to respectable, they are questionable; as opposed to blameless, they are blamed; and as opposed to powerless, they are too powerful. Whereas, white British national victims are weakened by their visible mental health issues, substance abuse issues, etc. They are respectable in that they are generally ‘clearly’ victimized by someone else. They are blameless because they have been ‘tricked’ into their situation, and they are just powerful enough to justifiably claim being a victim of modern slavery, if indeed they choose to do so. One could argue that victims that shy away from self-identifying as victims are even more ideal because it

makes them more respectable and more blameless, showing they are even weaker than anticipated as they cannot recognize their situation or are unwilling to. These victims would be extremely unideal in any other crime type, primarily because they would lack perceived respectability.

Because of the involvement of organized crime groups and the connotations of these groups exploiting vulnerable people as per Chapter 5, Black British nationals were also described as victims. Officers recognized that young Black men could be both victims and offenders, but the offender status came out on top. Their 'master status' is criminal, reflecting a quite limited understanding of their vulnerabilities while focusing on punishing them for it, which is contrary to §45 of the Modern Slavery Act wherein any criminal offending of victims is excused and particularly for those under 18. Officers recognized, for example, the great length organized crime groups go to recruit young Black victims: waiting outside foster homes, faking a robbery, or through Instagram and Snapchat. Police Constable Roberts explains:

> *We've had tactics where they've gone outside care homes and sat up outside and then sold this life to these kids. I've had ones where they've staged a robbery of a young child and then rescued him from said robbery and said, 'don't worry, we'll look after you.'*

It is important to note, however, that officers who had not worked on county lines cases spoke about county lines as a type of child exploitation. Notably, county lines officers also all belonged to the same force and worked in varying locations across the force on the same main vein of a county line. On one hand, this finding could speak to the practice only in this specific force or on a specific drug line, which is what findings from the Children's Society (2019) point to.



Although, the Children's Society (2019) research focused on if ethnicity/race was a risk factor for exploitation, not how it influences the identification of this exploitation. In more recent findings from a report commissioned by Cumberland Lodge and Dame Sara Thornton, the current Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, practitioners supported that this racialized police response pattern is endemic across the UK police (Saker, 2022). Indeed, more research is needed.

There is, however, a wealth of research that shows that Black boys are typically viewed as men at a much younger age than other racial groups and that they are more likely to be stopped by the police – Paul Gilroy (1992) has written extensively about this, for example – which perhaps contributes to why front-line county lines officers had a different perception than those not working on county-lines nor at the front-line. The immigration system also has a long track record of a racialized ageing-up of youth (Setter, 2019). My interviewed participants working on county lines appeared to have done the same, ageing Black boys they described into men, by referring to them as 'men' while acknowledging they were 'as young as 14,' further solidifying their perception of them as offenders rather than vulnerable children or victims.

Supporting the findings from my interviews with county line officers more broadly, the criminalization and adultification bias of Black county lines victims was also notable in the case files. For instance, in case 23, 16-year-old Johnny[91]

[91] While race was not recorded by police, there were signals in the case files that enabled me to draw conclusions. For example, there were many notes on the involvement of NGOs that specialized in providing support to Black children who are victims of crime, as was the case for Johnny and Thato mentioned in this chapter.

was arrested for possession and intention to supply Class A drugs.[92] The very first line of inquiry on the case relates to Johnny being a victim of child drug exploitation. Three weeks after arrest, officers note that Johnny had received a positive reasonable grounds decision from the NRM.[93] Despite this legal recognition of reasonable victim status, the investigation continued into Johnny's criminality for a further nine months until February when a positive conclusive grounds decision was noted.[94] One officer explained their investigative approach in Johnny's case after the reasonable grounds decision:

> *I will discuss [positive reasonable grounds] updates with [the lead on the drugs investigation] but for the time being, [Johnny] remains as a suspect in a drugs investigation and that investigation is progressing. Safeguarding concerns have been discussed with him (as far as possible as he is not fully engaging with police) and his parents and these have been documented in [a Resident Medical Officer statement]. Whilst I am aware of the issues in relation to his criminal activity and his disclosures in relation to being exploited, the correct route for this investigation is in relation to his involvement in drug supply. I am not aware of any threats or violence or any particular vulnerability in relation to him (other than the fact that he is a child).*

While ultimately Johnny did receive a positive conclusive grounds decision nine months after his arrest, for nine months, he was profiled as an offender despite the evidence that he was, on the balance of probability, a victim (as per the positive reasonable grounds decision three weeks after his arrest). The failure of officers contributing to the case file (n=5) to recognize his vulnerability was apparent. As the officer above shows, Johnny was perceived by the police as not having 'any particular vulnerability,' 'other than the fact that he is a child.'

[92] Class A drugs are crack cocaine, cocaine, ecstasy (MDMA), heroin, LSD, magic mushrooms, methadone, and methamphetamine (crystal meth).

[93] I routinely found in the case files that reasonable grounds decisions took longer than the five days they were supposed to.

[94] As did conclusive grounds decisions take significantly longer than 45 days.

However, being a child is supposed to be a trump vulnerability, particularly in the context of exploitation as outlined in §45 of the Modern Slavery Act (see more in Chapter 1).

A similarly stark understanding of Black children's vulnerability in county lines was present in 15-year-old Thato's case (case 2). Thato, a known missing person, was found in a drug den during a welfare check:

> *[Thato] was located in possession of two mobile phones & a large quantity of cash. Within the living room area was evidence of drug paraphilia & a knife on the living room table. On a search of the address numerous needles were found uncapped dotted around the address. Due to the previous experiences of this situation [of the arresting officers] & the environment, [Thato] was arrested by [an officer] for being concerned in the supply of class A drugs.*

One of the officer's responses to a form they have to fill out highlights the overlap between offender and victim status for children exploited by county lines. Officers had to answer: 'Were Police Protection Powers considered/precluded and why?'[95] This question specifically queries if police have identified a vulnerable child and are taking action to protect them. In Thato's case, the officer who filled out the form responded: 'He was arrested instead.' The 'instead' implies a partial recognition of the harm posed to the Thato by staying at the address, but it also appears to conflate arrest with protection.

[95] Under §46 Children Act 1989, Police Protection Powers enable police to remove a child from an accommodation/location that poses them significant harm for up to 72 hours.

Johnny and Thato's cases contrast with Mia's (case 14).[96] Similar to Johnny, 16-year-old Mia was arrested after officers saw her selling Class A drugs on the street. Mia had heroin and cocaine on her when she was arrested. Mia gave no indication that she was being forced to do this, but the leading officer, on the very first case note, reflects that '[Our] thoughts are that [she] is being forced into selling drugs and running a [county] line, although [she has] answered no comment in interviews.' After this initial encounter, Mia was immediately transferred to a safeguarding team and referred into the NRM (she later received a positive conclusive grounds decision).

While being female was largely a protective factor, as seen in Mia's case, it also worked in complicated ways when it came to the police's truth-seeking approach to domestic victims. In most of the case files, the first and often only piece of evidence police have is the victim's account of what happened.

The Tools of Truth-Seeking

The files particularly detail the emphasis the police put on victim accounts. Even ideal victims were still approached with suspicion and a truth-seeking framing. 40-year-old Olivia's experience (case 20) showcased the emphasis officers place on victim testimony and how their truth-seeking mentality proliferates, particularly in the context of victims that came to police attention initially as offenders. Despite gathering numerous accounts of Olivia's experience, officers

[96] There were no specific indications in the case file of police's perception of Mia's race or ethnicity. Police, however, did speak about her peers, who they specifically referenced as having parents from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

were set on getting an official victim statement from her. These were repeated attempts to get at the truth of Olivia's situation.

Olivia was arrested at her home as part of a more extensive drug operation. The police had uncovered evidence and intelligence to suggest that a county drug line was using her home. She was found in possession of 40 wraps of heroin and crack, and she was an active drug user. From the very start of her file, police note that they believed that 'she is being exploited and actively involved in the supply.' Olivia was also known to police because, last time a search warrant was issued at her house (also for drugs), she attempted suicide shortly after. Olivia was quickly put into safeguarding after her arrest as a result. Notably, never in Olivia's case file is she referred to as anything other than a victim, despite officers having a warrant to arrest her at her home for drug possession and supply, which is in glaring contrast to how Black children like Thato were treated. Officers spend considerable time and resourcing to safeguard Olivia – it was always their priority. In interviews with Olivia, officers note that she said she had been raped by two men about eight to nine times in the three weeks before her arrest, the last rape being a week before she was taken into custody. She disclosed the same to safeguarding staff who were working with her. Despite this, officers described Olivia as resistant to make an 'official' statement about the rapes (the interview did not count as official). Quite later on in her file, one officer notes that, '[Olivia] has not yet provided a first account of what has happened and the investigation cannot progress until this has been done.' At the point that this note is made, however, Olivia had already recounted the story of her rape at least four times, as documented in the case

file. Officers found a diary in her house, collected as evidence for the drugs investigation, that detailed the rapes too. They also collected formal testimony from the safeguarding workers who had worked with Olivia. Officers detailed how, on numerous occasions, Olivia had voiced she was terrified of the drug dealers and other drugs-related actors she had been involved with. In fact, officers noted that her suicide attempt after the last warrant happened after she was forced to go to another city by a dealer, where she was sexually exploited for three weeks to raise the money lost to the dealer caused by her house being raided (£1,000). Olivia's fear was clearly linked to her not giving an official statement. Yet, her case ends up being filed, and no further investigation happens into her experience of being held in conditions of slavery and being trafficked for sexual and criminal exploitation. The investigation is dropped when, after being in a safeguarding house for four weeks, Olivia outlined that she did not like the new place she was being transferred to for safeguarding, so she went to stay at a friend's house 'very far away' from the location of the crimes. The note that justifies why Olivia's case is being closed reads:

> *Without the support of the victim it is not possible to establish the details of any offences, identify a suspect or progress the investigation as no other witnesses have been provided*.

Of course, it makes investigations more difficult when the victim is not giving further details, but the police underscored how they knew this was happening in Olivia's case because she was scared. They also already had this type of information from other evidence. In modern slavery cases, police are instructed by the College of Policing (2015, 2022) and their official force policies to be aware that this will happen because victims are scared (see more in Chapter 1). Police are supposed to focus on establishing victimless prosecutions to

safeguard victims, similar to domestic violence. Police should be seeking additional evidence beyond first-hand accounts from the victim to build modern slavery cases (College of Policing, 2015, 2022). There was a wealth of this type of evidence in Olivia's case. Yet, officers still closed the case because of the perceived need for the victim's 'official' testimony. They acknowledged Olivia's fear, but failed to recognize how it intersected with her vulnerability.

36-year-old Logan's case (case 10) highlights the consequences of officers failing to recognize fear too. Logan came to police attention from a major trauma centre in the force area. He was severely beaten and forced to deal drugs along a known county line. He spent six days in the hospital before being discharged, but he had to go back to the hospital every few days to change his dressings. Logan was placed in a hotel after his hospital discharge because the police deemed it unsafe for him to go home as the suspect was still at large, and the potential for him to try and 'silence' Logan was great. The file has many notes on Logan's state of mind, highlighting that the police recognized he was in a low mood from being in the hotel and felt really isolated. Logan also wanted to return home because he felt he was not receiving the right support for his injuries. He was continually running out of medication and not being supported to go to the hospital to get his dressings changed in time. It came to the point where Logan's mother and friends were advocating for him, trying to get additional support for him in the hotel because they were growing increasingly worried for him. Yet, officers kept telling Logan and his loved ones that the risk for him was greater at home. Logan, however, felt the risk was greater in the hotel room, so ultimately

he went back home. Logan then withdrew his statement of grievous bodily harm, although the suspect was arrested on different charges anyways.

There was a repeated pattern of officers underestimating the impact of fear on Logan and other victims and how that influenced their testimonies. Despite police emphasizing how they protect victims (see Chapter 5), the actions during police investigations suggest a limited understanding of what vulnerable people need. For Logan, the result was him withdrawing his statement as a form of self-safeguarding.

The impact of fear and how that intersects with victim testimonies was most notable for international victims. Case files outlined numerous times when police recognized a real fear instilled in victims as to what might happen if they went back home. In many of these cases, reporting what happened to them, even within the UK, can put the victims at greater risk. Yet, officers also detailed putting pressure on victims to make accounts of what had happened to them and pursuing lines of investigation that could put the victim at risk. In one case (Liliana, case 16),[97] officers noted that they told Liliana that they had an obligation to report the crime she was outlining to her home country (Albania), an obligation which they did not express in any other cases and as far as I can tell was never force policy. As a result, the victim completely withdrew her statements. In Liliana's case file, one officer notes:

> *The victim has decided that she does not wish for any investigation to occur in this country or anywhere else and is not willing to engage in a medical or evidential account. She is in fear of people outside of the UK.*

[97] Lilian was held in conditions of sexual exploitation when she was caught on her route from Albania to the UK with her two young children. Her children were spared from exploitation.

This officer noted Liliana's fear of reprisal, but also described her as 'not willing' to engage, putting the burden of self-safeguarding on an already vulnerable victim. For Liliana, like many others, officers overemphasized the evidential value of victim testimony.

This emphasis on victim testimonies runs contrary to what they are being trained to do with modern slavery investigations. Detective Inspector Wright, who runs force-wide modern slavery training across multiple forces (including the partner force from which the case files are from), shared with me some of the documents he uses as part of his training sessions. In these documents and in his interview, he highlights that all officers are trained not to rely 'too much' on victim accounts. Detective Inspector Wright also explains that officers have to balance how much they rely on victim accounts versus other types of evidence because it is time-consuming to collect other types:

> *Due to a combination of the victims' vulnerabilities, plus their trauma from the exploitation they have suffered, they may be viewed as 'unreliable' for court by CPS, and their unreliability attacked by the defence. Therefore, officers who rely too much on the victim evidence may struggle in the run-up to the court case, as victims may withdraw their account, decide not to return to the UK for the trial etcetera…It is a risky police strategy to rely too much on the victims' account. If we decide to use all the other evidence to build a case, then each of the other areas, surveillance, mobile evidence (texts in foreign language need translating etc.), financial, high tech, cyber etc. are always expensive both resource-wise and financially, and very time consuming and therefore take a long time to get to court stage. However, this should ensure the case is strong and less reliant on mainly witness evidence. We may even get guilty pleas before the trial.*

When I prompted Detective Inspector Wright on how much reliance he and his colleagues are guiding officers to give victim accounts, he shared that victim accounts should make up no more than one-third of the evidence used in

modern slavery investigations. He explained that the other two-thirds should be made of the following evidence: 'bad character, high tech, forensic, mobile, surveillance, documents seized, suspect interview, financial, CCTV, and witnesses.' He described these later ten types of evidence as having equal weight in making up in this other two-thirds of evidence.

In the case files, I rarely saw any references to the other types of evidence listed above in Detective Inspector Wright's breakdown.[98] Likely, officers were unable to collect this information (maybe because the crime happened outside the UK), which is often why cases refer to insufficient evidence to progress investigations, so they had to rely on victim evidential accounts as the primary type of evidence. This reliance also explains why cases were often filed without further investigation – there was not enough supporting evidence to progress the case. Therein, however, the dependence on victim testimony intersects with understandings of vulnerability. Vulnerable victims were more likely to have their stories believed, even with no supporting evidence, than otherwise perceived not-vulnerable ones. The only case where I saw reference to trying to collect any surveillance or CCTV data was in Piotr's (case 1). This case was also unique because it was the only one thoroughly investigated in my sample of 28 case files – even so far as collecting forensic evidence from the car that the victim was transported in. In other cases where victims were found in vehicles like Khuong (case 5), in contrast, no forensic evidence was collected. One reason why so much evidence could be collected in Piotr's case is likely because the traveller

[98] Notably, however, I only had access to the NRM case files, not their full investigative files. While there is some overlap, there are certainly specific investigative details that are missing.

camp where he was being held was already known to the police.[99] This latter interpretation points to officers' failure to understand what kind of evidence is involved in trafficking investigations.

The failure to attempt to collect or even acknowledge the existence of other types of evidence beyond victim evidential accounts becomes more apparent when looking at the investigation plan provided by Detective Sergeant Robinson. Detective Sergeant Robinson shared her force's modern slavery investigation plan, which all officers must use when investigating modern slavery.[100] Mapping on to the College of Policing's (2015, 2022) APP for modern slavery evidence, this plan details 13 points in a modern slavery investigation where different lines of inquiry should be explored: 'scene, victim/witness, suspect, interview, forensic, financial strategy, passive data/digital forensics strategy, communications/media strategy, covert policing, foreign national inquiries, partner agencies strategy, liaising with the NCA's Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit, and investigation outcome.' At each of these 13 points, the plan details around 10-20 steps that officers should take or consider (justifying why they are not taking them after consideration).

The plan reflects the tension between narratives on human trafficking. Officers are instructed to act in a way that captures a wide range of vulnerabilities. Officers are to look for evidence, for instance, that a Madame is controlling any

[99] The level of evidence collected could also correlate to the racialized troupes associated with traveller communities.

[100] I have summarized the plan, but not provided full details of it to protect my participant's anonymity.

environment where evidence of sexual activity is present. This involves officers looking for condoms/sexual aids, appointment books, evidence of locking mechanisms on windows and doors, analyzing the location of where property and vehicle keys are kept (i.e. in a locked safe), and considering what items are kept within the fridge, cupboards, and garbage bins within/connected to the property. These instructions reflect one understanding of who is trafficked and why – i.e. women for sex work. Yet, the plan gives many other instructions too. It outlines to assess if the victim/witness is a single mother as that makes someone more vulnerable to exploitation. It also highlights that any child is considered highly vulnerable. Further, the plan outlines that the lack of the above-mentioned pieces of evidence for a Madame might also indicate someone is exploited. The plan instructs officers to consider, 'Why didn't they escape?' There is also emphasis that officers must 'Consider Suspect may be victim!' (sic). Notably, these are, of course, very gendered understandings of signals of victimhood.

The plan details at great length the type of questions officers should ask in interviews to navigate this complex balance between what evidence might show and what the lack of evidence might mean, but it also specifically instructs officers not to rely on interviews to determine what has happened. The plan details over 100 different types of evidence that could be explored to corroborate the victim's account. This includes forensic, financial, passive data/digital forensics communications/media, covert policing, foreign national inquiries, and engaging with partner agencies.

Despite there being a reference to the complexities of vulnerabilities in the investigative plan, the plan also demonstrated an over-emphasis on immigration lines of inquiry. In many of these immigration lines of inquiries, the victim's credentials are being checked along with any offenders. Officers are instructed to, for example, check flight logs, do immigration status checks; look-up passport details; liaise with the Criminal Records Office to make requests for criminal conviction data on foreign nationals; check if the suspects fit a category for removal or deportation based on their 'intel,' 'convictions,' or 'Treaty Rights;' and so on and so forth. This implies that victims who had precarious immigration status would be more likely to be questioned for the legitimacy of their victim status.

The reliance on victim evidence likely arises because not enough officers are receiving specialized training, like Detective Inspector Wright's, or on how to use plans like Detective Sergeant Robinson's if they exist. Regardless of their experience, most of the interviewed officers described having no formal training on modern slavery beyond 'learning on the job,' despite the national emphasis on up-skilling all police on modern slavery. The Modern Slavery Police Transformation Unit, for example, has implemented training across the country. Still, many participating officers explained that it is up to forces to decide who to send on these courses, if indeed any officers, which creates further variation in training between forces. Most officers laughed when I asked about training, signalling that they acknowledged this was a failure somewhere in the process. While most of the officers highlighted that they picked the job up pretty quickly



through their own self-directed learning, some pointed to sheer luck that cases had worked out as well as they had.

This 'learn on the job' approach reflects the College of Policing's business model for all crimes. Namely, police are trained to respond to and investigate any type of crime within their level. Police are trained in the building blocks of crime responses, and these principles should be applied to any crime, with contextualization based on the crime type. This contextualization process – or nuances of crime, as some officers called it – creates additional training needs beyond the standard building blocks. The training on modern slavery that currently exists (and there is a lot) addresses these nuances at each level of the police: training for front-line officers, training for detectives, training for specialists, training for senior police, etc. Officers who had gone on specialized training, or who now run it, advocated the importance of such nuanced training, not only for how it benefits investigations from a policing perspective, but also for victims. These officers explained that better trained officers could better respond to the needs of victims. Yet, I found they did not.

With most training happening on the job, narratives around who is a victim and an offender are circularly reinforced. New officers learn about human trafficking based on the experiences of others in the past. This learning mode, in part, has led to the proliferation of certain kinds of vulnerability being identified where others are dismissed, resulting in the racialization of police investigations.

Competing Policing Logics

In my data across Chapters 5 and 6, police describe performing a humanitarian role for the victims they deem to be legitimate (weak victims) and performing securitization roles for those they deem as illegitimate victims or offenders (e.g. Black British nationals). Police have taken on a dual capacity that speaks about victims through doubting their experience, but also recognizes the importance of their potential victimization. Police 'negotiate' the labels, as Griffiths (2017, p. 535) puts it, of victim and offender based on where they situate the truth of an individual's testimony about their situation. The way police identify victims (or not) shapes the perception of what this type of crime is and who its victims are not only at an individual level, but also from an institutional perspective. Police become the gatekeepers of victimhood, tasked with responding to people at the crosshairs of criminality and vulnerability (Parmar, 2020).

That said, my participants described their actions as different from immigration control. In practice, however, they are making decisions inherently linked to immigration control outcomes, like determining whose claims of victimization are legitimate and the criminalization of foreign nationals. Police make determinations on who is/is not a victim and thus deserving of support or punishment via nationality, which falls into racialized tropes related to criminality. Police responses to modern slavery, therefore, are a diffusion of traditional sites of border control. These responses have become a new scene for exercising territoriality.

The findings from my UK case files and interviews related to vulnerability and criminality support what Fassin (2011, p. 136) refers to as the tension 'between humanity and security, between compassion and repression.' Franko Aas and Gundhus (2015, p.11) refer to this tension as the 'two competing logics of policing….with an image of "police as social workers," and... conceptions of "proper" police work as crime fighting and catching offenders.' These logics create a 'dichotomy between help and suspicion' where 'those with legitimate protection needs are therefore first and foremost defined through their risk qualities – as threats – rather than through their vulnerability' (Franko Aas and Gundhus, 2015, p.9-10).

Franko Aas and Gundhus (2015, p. 9) locate these competing logics within the 'ambiguous' nature of risk. Focusing on border police, Franko Aas and Gundhus (2015) argue that they both securitize and provide assistance at the border. There is an inherent 'incoherence' in these roles, however, as police responses are simultaneously 'with, against and through humanity' (Franko Aas and Gundhus, 2015, p.14). Franko Aas and Gundhus (2015, p.14) resultantly refer to border policing as at the 'humanitarian borderlands.' At these borderlands, police operate in a legal vacuum where their (in)actions are not clearly defined in law and where they use the language of human rights in performing some humane and many 'deeply inhumane' actions (Franko Aas and Gundhus, 2015, p. 12-14).

My findings are also supported by Aliverti's (2019, p. 18) evidence related to 'how racialized markers [are] used as proxies for nationality.' In policing modern

slavery, race is a proxy for nationality, which is a proxy for both victimhood and criminalization. Police have 'carelessly conflated' nationality with both criminality and victimhood (Parmar, 2020, p. 38), redefining and reinforcing 'racial boundaries' of who is and who is not criminal in the process (Parmar, 2020, p. 41-42).

The narratives UK police give on human trafficking enable us to see 'how [police] culture is reproduced and altered in practice' (van Hulst, 2020, p. 98). Police inherently regulate social meaning as 'cultural agents with a significant symbolic power to authorize, categorize, evoke, represent, reinforce and undermine elements of the wider culture' (Loader and Mulcahy, 2001, p.42). Police shape 'cultural mentalities and sensibilities,' but these also shape policing. Police outline the boundaries of who is and who is not a victim of trafficking and, in doing so, uphold oppressionist perceptions of victims despite describing interactions with victims that fit more polymorphic understandings of victimhood.

Christie (1986) and Weitzer's (2011) concepts of victimhood enable us to assess who the police view as legitimate and who is illegitimate in the context of victimhood and offending. While overwhelmingly police use the language of nationality to describe victims and organized crime to describe the offenders, the actual descriptors used have little to do with victims' true vulnerabilities. Victims who did not fit into the officers' conceptualization of vulnerabilities were either understood as an 'uncooperative' victim or as offenders.

Besides the archetypical victim of trafficking (i.e. a foreign female victim of gross sexual exploitation), police understandings of when a victim is weak fluctuate depending on the type of exploitation in question and the victim's nationality. Christie's (1986) concept of the ideal victim perhaps better serves for highlighting what police perceive trafficking victims *not* to be. Insofar as, victims of modern slavery are those who are not overtly claiming victim status, not engaging in preceding behaviour that links to their exploitation, and not appearing as strong or willing participants in their exploitation.

Conclusion

This chapter explores how police narratives on vulnerability intersect with their understanding of criminality. Police use racialized visual cues and gender to determine if someone they come across is a victim or offender. Male victims from Black and minority ethnic communities were most often perceived as offenders instead of victims. For international victims, police focus was mostly on their immigration offences, and, for Black UK victims, their intersection with other criminal offending. Police approached these victims by trying to understand what they had been an offender of at the expense of considering how they had been victimized. This focus on offending happens despite their recognition that victims might present as offenders due to the influence of organized crime groups.

I exposed how Black British men were almost exclusively constructed as offenders. I used Griffiths' (2017) concept of 'dual Othering' to analyze how officers working on country lines approached young Black men. Black British

men were othered based on visual cues associated with racialized understandings of nationality and othered based on the perception of criminality associated with these visual cues.

Yet, there was also a more nuanced pattern in how female victims were perceived. Although generally believed to have a more legitimate claim to victimhood, women's narratives on their victimization were still approached from a place of truth-seeking, underpinned by suspicion, particularly for domestic victims. This focus on truth-seeking correlates to police's emphasis on using victim testimonies as their main piece of evidence, despite policy directing them otherwise as per Chapter 1. Of course, there are practical reasons why this focus might happen, such as resourcing, but it introduces another layer to questioning the legitimacy of someone's victimhood.

Like the findings from Chapter 5, I find there to be a tension between how police perceive themselves and what they are actually doing in this chapter. They perceive their work to be more humanitarian, but their descriptions of their work highlight a racialized and criminalizing pattern in their response to trafficking. Police navigate the competing logics of trafficking responses – protect the victim and protect the state from the victim/offender – reflecting the incoherence of leveraging police to respond to a human rights violation within the wider context of racialized policing in the UK.

The key findings from Chapters 5 and 6 are that the police conflate their crime control and human rights obligations when they take on supposedly

humanitarian roles in the context of trafficking. These roles can lead to discriminatory policing of trafficking and police pursuing a risk-oriented approach that can be unhelpful for some victims and harmful to many.

UK responses to combatting modern slavery are causing harm to those they are seeking to protect, and this is happening through the lens of human rights protections. Milivojevic and Pickering (2013, p. 597) conclude that we need to 'resist the appropriation of a human rights agenda and ring the warning bell when we see it happening.' The findings from the UK chapters highlight many reasons to ring the warning bell.

In the next two chapters, I revisit the main themes of victimhood (Chapter 7) and criminality (Chapter 8) via my analysis of Nigerian interviews and case files. I draw the findings from the UK and Nigeria together in the conclusion to assess their implications for how we understand how police perceive their role in the context of trafficking.

Chapter 7: Constructing Victimhood in Nigeria

> *If you ask the ordinary man in Nigeria, "How do you see your country?" They'll tell you, 'I want to leave.'*
>
> Oladele Ismaila, Country Director
> International Religious Anti-Trafficking NGO[101]

> *In Nigeria, to be an emigrant is to possess illustrious social capital and a badge of honour that is not only reserved for you, but also for your family.*
>
> Adebayo (2021, para 1)

This chapter explores how victimhood is constructed in Nigeria. I draw on interviews with 36 NAPTIP officers, as well as those they work in partnership. The differences between trafficking and other types of crime rested in my participants' perception of crime and victimization. Although many of my participants were law enforcement officers or those who worked in close partnership with them, they fundamentally did not frame trafficking as a policing problem. Their overall belief was that the way to decrease trafficking was not to increase policing, but to address the 'root causes' of poor economic conditions for Nigerians. NAPTIP officers like Senior Prosecutor Moses said they wanted to 'create more policies that the Nigerian government can utilize to improve the economy so that this issue of trafficking can be reduced.' NAPTIP officers largely referred to policing trafficking as nothing special – the tools required to police it are the same ones they use with other types of crimes.

My participants believed that donors focused too much on police responses instead of root causes. They also felt that most of the focus is on non-Nigerian

[101] For the interviewed Nigerian participants, I have pseudonymized their first and last names. Their role is accurate, but I have removed identifiable information from the organization they work for, with the exception of NAPTIP.

intelligence. As Senior Prosecutor Moses from NAPTIP explained, they are 'appreciative of the effort of UK, US, UN, UNODC, IOM, etc.' because they are doing their best to support NAPTIP, but most of this support is aimed at criminal justice system measures. He continued, these agencies need to 'step up their game and give NAPTIP more support.' This senior prosecutor went on to explain that while border management is an issue, NAPTIP and NIS already had that under control. The more significant problem is that the agency needs to 'reduce the crave to travel' (Senior Prosecutor Moses, NAPTIP). Because of my officers' understanding that this perception of movement was deeply embedded, Senior Officer Peters from NAPTIP pointed out that 'we have actually got to destroy a culture [of emigrating]' to fight trafficking.

My participants believed that people's desire to travel underpins trafficking. They cast this desire as a response to two elements: structural conditions that disadvantage the populace and what they called a 'cultural mindset' that has arisen out of these conditions. They described this mindset as the acceptance of irregular migration as a solution to structural conditions like poverty and unemployment. Many participants believed that the state of the Nigerian economy creates what they described as the push/pull factors for trafficking, which they felt linked trafficking to migrant smuggling. My participants framed these socio-economic conditions through structural understandings of what 'pushes' someone out of Nigeria, as well as what 'pulls' them to Europe.[102] These so-called push/pull factors are a widely popularized explanation of the drivers of migration in policy (Bakewell, 2008).

[102] Their examples mostly always involved Europe.

This push/pull language aligns with functionalist migration models like the push/pull model of Ravenstein (1885) and, later, Lee (1966),[103] as well as neo-classical models like that of Todaro (1969) and Todaro and Maruszko (1987) that see individuals as making a rational choice to emigrate based on economic opportunities. Yet, my participants also understood migration as a consequence of structural and socio-economic changes. Their accounts thus fit within a structuralist view of migration too, which is much less focused on the individual and more on the broader societal changes that produce migration over time (see, for example, the transition theories of Zelinsky, 1971 and Skeldon, 1990, 1997).[104] These two branches of migration scholarship situate the individual differently: functionalist theories see migration as a decision made by the individual, whereas structuralist theories view individuals more as passive actors in wider structures that cause demographic imbalances and transitions over time (de Haas, 2010).

In their explanations of trafficking, my participants used both the principles of structure and rational choice from these schools of thought in their explanations of trafficking. To understand structural pressures and individual choice, I use the work of contemporary migration scholars Elizabeth Fussell and Douglas Massey's (2004) use of Massey's (1990) term cumulative causation; Biao Xiang and Johan Lindquist's (2014) assessment of the complexities of migration

[103] Functionalist models of migration are based on equilibrium assumptions between that which pushes someone out of a country and pulls them towards another (de Haas, 2010).

[104] Structuralist models of migration look at the demographic transitions in societies that drive migration patterns.

infrastructure; and Oliver Bakewell's (2008) argument that successful development is understood as no migration.

I begin by exploring my participants' perceptions of the structural conditions underpinning trafficking, which they also described as underpinning all migration. I, then, highlight how these conditions related to their understanding of the cultural mindset that drives individual and community choice to emigrate. Next, I explore the wider question of what it means that my participants orient their understanding of trafficking through the lens of migration. I outline some possible suggestions, including the colonial traces of development aid.

Structural Conditions

My participants largely understood the motivation to emigrate through reference to their perception of how much better other economies are. By locating motivation at a structural level, they wove a mostly sympathetic narrative that trafficking has become one of the ways that people seek to better their lives. Poverty, unemployment, and corruption were the main economic factors that my participants focused on.

Most of my participants narrowed their focus to Nigeria's economic problems and specifically to the asymmetrical growth from the oil boom that has defined the state since independence: the rich get richer while the poor get poorer. During our interviews, my participants spent a great portion of our time together discussing the state of affairs in Nigeria. They felt the country had a disillusioned

populace living in poverty and that many feel there is no hope of bettering their situation within the country. Even my participants, who were economically well-off, described that they felt this disillusionment. They had nice houses with staff to take care of domestic chores, car(s) with driver(s), children in private schools, and so on and so for, but they repeatedly pointed out that even for university graduates there are no jobs.

Many NAPTIP participants cited a recent report that 80% of University graduates remain unemployed for years after graduation. I could never find this report. The ones I did find listed comparatively more modest figures between 15% to 33% (Dabalen et al., 2000; Ukazu, 2021). Although, a 15 to 33% unemployment rate for university graduates alone is still significantly higher than the overall unemployment rate of many Global North countries.[105] It is possible that people were factually incorrect, but still expressing fears and concerns about living in Nigeria. It points to a perception of an uncertain promise of life in Nigeria even if you get a degree and that this perception is held across socio-economic classes.

Nigerian academic Sakiru Adebayo (2021) argues that this uncertainty underpins the 'Nigerian Dream' to emigrate. The term was popularized by Nigerian pop culture, primarily Nollywood,[106] and is a derivative of the American Dream. Unlike the American Dream, which purports that through hard work you can go from rags to riches, Nollywood largely depicts the Nigerian Dream as the

[105] In 2021, for example, the UK unemployment rate was 4.1% (Office for National Statistics, 2022).

[106] Nigeria's film industry.

achievement of riches through moving abroad, whether that happens legally or illegally. The Nigerian Dream is ‘anchored in the desire to emigrate’ (Adebayo, 2021, para 5).

Adebayo (2021, para 8) outlines that many Nigerians feel ‘excluded from the country’s cartography of belonging and are unable to imagine a habitable future for themselves there.’ This inability to imagine a future in Nigeria overlaps with the belief that Adebayo (2021) describes as Nigerians believing they have the *ability* to emigrate, whether legally or illegally. This belief is rooted in what Adebayo (2021, para 9) describes as ‘the un-colonial conquering of the world and the confidence in overlooking barriers (even if that barrier is an impervious migration policy).’ Adebayo (2021), therefore, describes the Nigerian Dream as involving two overlapping elements: the perception of no future in Nigeria because of the poor state of affairs and the belief that conditions are better abroad and that Nigerians can immigrate. Both elements, he finds, are influenced by Nigeria’s colonial legacy, which I explore later in this chapter. As Adebayo (2021, para 7) summarizes, ‘many of us live to leave, and the essence of our “Nigerianness” finds expression in our ability to emigrate.’

Significant evidence supports that there are poor living conditions in Nigeria. My participants’ perception of the asymmetry in wealth accumulation since the oil boom has been long supported by findings from the World Bank and UN agencies (see, for example, World Bank, 2020a and World Bank, 2020b). These asymmetries can be largely traced to the stake that oil giant Shell has in Nigerian

oil and gas,[107] as well as the failure of the systems put in place to maximize the dispersal of what oil and gas profits do stay in Nigeria. Nigeria's oil boom started in the 1950s, and, today, Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the fifth or sixth largest in the world (depending on what source you look at) (Mohammed, 2021).

Founded in 1833, the British company now known as Shell first started exploring for oil in Nigeria in 1936.[108] This exploration licence was granted to Shell after numerous failed attempts to find oil by other British interests (Shell, 2022a; Shell, 2022b). Shell began commercial oil production in the Niger Delta in 1958 (Shell, 2022a; Shell, 2022b). But by independence in 1966, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had formed,[109] and it enabled oil producing states to develop their own national oil companies (Isochukwu, 2018). After the Biafra civil war, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was founded in 1977. From 1974 to 1993, six participation agreements were negotiated between the Federal Government (and through NPCC from 1977-on) and Shell and other interested parties.[110] Over these agreements, the percentage ownership of the Niger Delta oil fields changed

[107] An interesting fact about why the company is called Shell: its founder, Marcus Samuel, was an antiques dealer in London. In 1833, he decided he wanted to expand and started importing seashells from the Far East. He continued importing shells until he passed away. His sons took over in the 1870s, and they had expanded to oil by the 1880s. In 1897, his sons renamed the company the Shell Transport and Trading Company to capture their new business (Shell, 2022a). Shell has been a crucial part of the British economy since the 1880s. For example, they were the main supplier for the British army in World Wars I and II (Shell, 2022a).

[108] At the time, Shell was known as Royal Dutch Shell after the merger between Dutch (Royal Dutch) and British (Shell Transport and Trading Company) companies. This merger happened in 1907 as a means to compete after oil was discovered in the US (2022a). Royal Dutch Shell founded Shell D'Arcy as their Shell company in Nigeria (Shell, 2022b).

[109] It was formed in 1960.

[110] Other Nigerian companies like Elf and Agip were involved in the later agreements.

multiple times, but Shell has remained a significant shareholder (Shell, 2022a).[111] Shell has also been instrumental in funding oil and gas infrastructure, such as the Trans-Niger oil pipeline (Oil Review Africa, 2013).

From 1958 to today, Shell has been implicated in an extensive record of human rights abuses and environmental degradation (Curtis, 2016). It forms part of a wide array of neo-colonial British interest in natural resources across African countries,[112] which have been implicated in exacerbating poverty and insecurity across the continent. The UK government has been instrumental in securing the position of the British companies in African resource extraction (Curtis, 2016). In colonial times in Nigeria, for example, this was granting Shell exploration and operation rights. Beyond Nigeria, a modern example that clearly shows the influence of the UK government was the government's funding of the Mozal aluminum smelter in Mozambique. Among other funders, Curtis (2016, p. 31) highlights that for every $1 USD from the smelter that went to the Mozambique government, $21 USD went to international funders like the UK government. Moreover, Curtis (2016, p. 31) details that the UK government has received over $88 million USD in interest payments on the loan they provided to build the smelter.

While the Nigerian government currently holds a majority stake in most of the oil-related activity in Nigeria (Walker, 2009), these arrangements can take many

[111] In the first participation agreement, the Federal Government acquired 35% interest. By the fourth in 1979, they had 80%, and Shell had the other 20%. In the final agreement in 1993, NNCP had 55%, Shell had 30%, Elf had 10%, and Agip had 5%.

[112] British interests mainly rest with gold, platinum, diamonds, copper, oil, gas, and coal (Curtis, 2016, p. 2).

different forms, including licensing out oil production. Estimates range from 40% to 90% of the country's GDP comes from oil, making the country's economy dependent on oil (World Bank, 2004; Walker, 2009; Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 2021). Despite the sheer amount of wealth generated from Nigeria's oil production, the World Bank finds that it is not being used to improve living conditions as it is constitutionally embedded to (Junger, 2007). Nigeria has specific domestic policies and legislative frameworks aimed at ensuring that 'oil and gas resources are held in trust by the Federal Government on behalf of the citizens of Nigeria for the overall benefit and development of the country' (Olusola and Idiaru, 2020, para 2). In his ground-breaking exposé on oil financing in Nigeria, journalist Sebastian Junger (2007, para 28) found that the gross profits taken in by the Nigerian Federal Government, which at conservative estimates amounts to tens of billions in USD per annum, is 'plenty, it would seem, to take care of basic social services.' Some estimates are even as high as $440 billion USD being embezzled by Nigerian officials (Agbiboa, 2015). Junger (2007, para 28) found that the problem is that the 'money goes to the governors' offices and then simply disappears.'

While an exhaustive overview of the impact of oil and gas in Nigeria is beyond the scope of this thesis, there are a few important outcomes: 1) estimates range from 40% to 70% of the Nigerian population living in extreme poverty – less than one USD per day – and that this has only increased since the oil boom (World Bank, 2020a; World Bank, 2020b); 2) of those not living in extreme poverty, 25% are classified as vulnerable (World Bank, 2022); 3) oil production overlaps with documented violence and human rights violations in the nine oil producing



states,[113] and these states are also the ones peppered with the highest levels poverty and violence in the country (Amnesty International, 2006b; Junger, 2007; Walker, 2009; Mohammed, 2021); 4) oil production is destroying the environment in the impacted states, which (among other things) has greatly limited agricultural production, a pillar of the Nigerian economy before oil (World Bank, 2003); 5) Nigeria's dependence on oil makes the economic security of the state very tenuous as it is hugely subject to market fluctuations (World Bank, 2022); and 6) the UK has great neo-colonial stake in Nigerian oil and gas through Shell (Curtis, 2016). This state-level corruption results in a crisis of legitimacy, where citizens do not trust their government (Owen, 2012).

The degree of corruption associated with the oil boom has devastated the economy and livelihoods of a vast swath of the population, but it is also not unique to Nigeria. Other resource-rich countries like Venezuela and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have suffered from the same 'resource curse' (Mohammed, 2021, para 1). This 'paradox of the plenty,' as Mohammed (2021, para 3) refers to it, captures the inverse relationship between wealth generation from natural resources and citizen welfare if the state does not have transparent and rigid structures to monitor and track how this wealth is dispersed (Mohammed, 2021).

[113] These states are Akwa-Ibom, Lagos, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Ondo, Edo, Imo, and Abia.

Temidire Ezeh, the Director of an anti-trafficking NGO, took this argument about poverty further by explaining that in many states even crime is no longer profitable. Contrasting the Niger Delta region[114] with Edo State,[115] he explained:

> *Many [young people] are going into crime in the Niger Delta region now. Many of them are going into oil bunkering, you know, kidnapping and so on and so forth. And then in [the Edo] region, we don't have so much crude oil in this region, so moving abroad seems to be the easiest.*

For this reason, Ezeh explained, efforts to eradicate trafficking were met with public backlash in Edo State. Here it is worth quoting his words at some length as they captured the sentiment echoed by all my participants so succinctly:

> *People will only look at the importance: how trafficking has helped families, how it has helped homes, how the rate of crime in the state would have been very high if these people were not leaving, you know. So every effort to stop it, to eradicate it, is often met with some kind of resistance. People don't really welcome it. It is like, 'You're telling me and you're telling the children not to go. What option do you have for them?' There are no jobs; their parents are aging; they don't have pension; the children cannot go to school. They set up businesses; these businesses cannot survive because there is not sufficient power supply; they cannot even run generators. So they just work if they can, and they earn so little. They cannot take care of their families and all of that. So it's like, 'What option do you have for them?' Even if the children or the young people are not really making it abroad, but for the fact that they are away gives the families one mouth off. One extra mouth to take care of off, you know. So it doesn't really matter, as long as they are away, it's not a problem.*

As Ezeh highlights, even if youth are not 'making it' abroad, them just being abroad alleviates pressure on families, highlighting the perception of how dire the situation is for Nigerians.

[114] The Niger Delta is the major oil-producing region of Nigeria, where there is a lot of violent crime. A common occurrence in the Niger Delta the kidnapping of oil workers for ransom. While kidnappings for ransom happen across all of Nigeria, the ransom sums requested in the Niger Delta region are significantly higher. White westerners who work for companies like Shell bring in the most ransom money.

[115] While Edo is one of the nine oil-producing states and part of the Niger Delta, it also holds a different place in society because it is the major source and transit locale for those seeking to leave Nigeria by irregular means.

My participants ultimately conceptualized trafficking through the lens of human insecurity, linking trafficking to migration. They particularly focused on irregular migration when they discussed structural factors, not just trafficking. The impact of recognizing trafficking vulnerabilities as a consequence of socio-economic conditions was evident in claims people made to me that trafficking and migrant smuggling are 'essentially the same thing.' Even a UNODC employee explained that they 'contextualize the UNTOC definitions based on our reality' to focus on 'humanitarian interventions in these areas.'[116]

My Nigerian participants also *all* used the terms trafficking and smuggling interchangeably.[117] The exception being the gendered difference in how they identified trafficking victims in the field, which I explore later in this chapter. Particularly my NAPTIP participants brushed off my queries about the difference between trafficking and smuggling: 'same thing; same thing.' Numerous people told me that it is Western governments that like to make the distinction between trafficking and smuggling. They saw this as a failure of European powers to understand Nigerian trafficking.[118]

[116] As detailed in Chapter 1, UNTOC protocols define human trafficking and migration smuggling and the differences therein.

[117] I was continually surprised by the different ways the UK and Nigerian participants in this study framed trafficking and smuggling. It felt like participants went to great lengths to create space between smuggling and trafficking in the UK. Yet in Nigeria, I often felt like they thought I was asking a silly question about the differences between the two.

[118] There were also many other areas where my interviewees expressed that donor countries had failed to understand the pathways and processes of trafficking in Nigeria. For example, Nigeria is not just a source country but also a major transit and destination country in its own right. By focusing on Nigeria as only a source country, my participants felt that donors were missing two-thirds of the phenomenon. There are also new and evolving types of domestic trafficking within Nigeria, such as baby factories and ovum trafficking. My participants explained that their intelligence showed them that the geographic patterns of irregular migration are changing too. Middle Eastern countries are now prime destinations, as well as other African countries such as Mali.

One of the examples my participants gave was of the gap between Western and Nigerian understandings of consent. They focused on how consent is used to distinguish between trafficking and smuggling consent in the West. They felt European countries frame consent largely as the starting point or endpoint of trafficking.[119] My Nigerian interviewees thought this approach overlooks what happens along the journey. As Nagodeallah Okonkwo, the Director of an anti-trafficking NGO, explained, 'consent often times could also be a route to deception.' Deception can happen at many points: the route they take to Europe, what happens along the route, how much the route costs, what happens when they arrive in Europe, etc. This deception violates the framework of movement individuals will have consented to, and this violation occurs in both trafficking and smuggling. Fundamentally, my participants mostly perceived migrant smuggling as inseparable from human trafficking and that both involve abuse, exploitation, and deception. As Senior Commander Adamu from NAPTIP summarized, 'we combine the two…There's just a thin line between migration and human trafficking.'

Much more broadly, by linking trafficking and migration, my participants described the risk posed by trafficking as societal. They explained how migration is so normalized in Nigeria that it has resulted in a significant brain drain. This notion of the Nigerian brain drain is reinforced by many studies, such as that of Hynes et al. (2018). Many Nigerians want to move and not just those in poverty

[119] The notion of consenting to go (smuggling) versus being stolen or highjacked (trafficking); the notion of consenting to work in the destination country (smuggling) versus being exploited and abused (trafficking).

nor simply those undertaking irregular migratory routes. For instance, Adebayo (2021) details that of the 72,000 Nigerian doctors who hold current national medical registration, only 35,000 are actually practicing in the country (Banke-Thomas, 2018). Adebayo (2021) also highlights findings from PEW Research that found that 45% of Nigerian adults plan to permanently move abroad in the next five years (Connor and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2018). Accordingly, many participants framed society as a victim of trafficking (and a victim of outward migration more generally). Supporting this perception, in their study with 500 government workers from across Edo State, Ogwokhademhe (2013) found that these government workers also believed that the most significant risk posed by trafficking is at the societal level (Ogwokhademhe, 2013). And while this emigration creates a brain drain, it is also worth noting that it benefits Nigeria. Nigeria's economy depends on its diasporas abroad. Adebayo (2021) points to a PWC report by Nevin and Omosomi (2019) found that in 2018 migrant remittances accounted for 6.1% of Nigeria's GDP, a sum equivalent to 83% of the Nigeran Federal Government's budget.

Other studies conducted in Nigeria by Okogbule (2013), Bello (2018), and Hynes et al. (2018) also find that the human insecurity framing is commonly used to describe trafficking. Okogbule (2013), for instance, emphasizes the need to re-examine how we conceptualize the drivers of irregular migration in light of Nigeria's multiple role as a source, transit, and destination country. Human rights violations are not just happening to people seeking to leave the country, but also to those coming into and passing through it. Okogbule (2013, p. 57) finds that there are 'deficiencies in current efforts' to address trafficking because of a

failure to consider ‘Nigeria's unenviable position as a country of origin, transit, and destination.’ Hynes et al. (2018) support that anti-trafficking efforts should be re-framed to focus on the risk and protective factors that make people vulnerable at an individual, household, community, and societal level. Hynes et al. (2018, p. 7) trace the ‘economies of shortage,’ as they describe the Nigerian economy, back to 1966 when the first military coup happened post-independence. Hynes et al. (2018, p. 7) summarize that ‘there is a need to invoke a debate about the “root causes” of human trafficking utilizing a development paradigm.’

While they framed migration as normal, my participants stressed there is a problem with *irregular* migration, including trafficking *and* smuggling, as irregular migration exposes vulnerable people to abuse and exploitation. As Nagodeallah Okonkwo, the Director of an anti-trafficking NGO, stated, trafficking and migrant smuggling are a ‘blade of two faces, but they are the same blade.’ He explained that much donor funding is ‘zeroed in’ on the issue of exploitation as the defining feature of trafficking, but that many migrants get stuck because they run out of money and get exploited for their labour or otherwise along the route they have willingly gone on. People along an irregular migratory route will flow in and out of exploitative conditions as a means to facilitate their journey. At different times in their journey, most people will both meet UN definitions of a smuggled migrant and a trafficked person.

My participants gave no reference in any of my interviews to cases where a victim was forced to leave Nigeria. All the victims they told me about, and the people I met during my research, left willingly but were stopped. Eventually,

somebody took advantage of them and began to exploit them. My Nigerian participants referred to people who had been identified as smuggled or trafficked as both victims. As Kwento Abubakar, a trafficking survivor and Founder of an anti-trafficking NGO, described:

> *Victims of smuggling actually end up at the end of the day becoming victims of trafficking. Because at the point in time of transit, you get stopped, you get stranded, you know, and some of them could now give into any offer, and so it becomes trafficking.*

For these reasons, all those I spoke to explained that their prevention activities focus on irregular migration rather than just trafficking. Both journeys start with someone wanting to leave Nigeria, both involve an element of deception about what the journey will be like, both involve people taking on debts with the promise to pay them back, and both involve conditions of exploitation and abuse. In making their point about the overlap between smuggling and trafficking, my participants pointed to the phenomena of re-trafficking. Because the economic conditions still exist in Nigeria as they did when an individual left, the same drive to leave is still there. Even those who have been recognized as trafficking victims by NAPTIP or another agency still have the desire to leave and, in many cases, do. Often paying off their travelling debt before taking out another loan and trying the route again. The motivation out of Nigeria is so great that even those who go to Europe and get deported try to go back. Those who also suffer significant exploitation and abuse along the route still try to go back.

Rational Choice: The Individual and their Community

In addition to taking a structural approach, my participants believed there was a cultural mindset in Nigeria driving people to move. In taking this view, my participants conceptualized victims as having a rational choice in how they navigate structural conditions and the agency to do so. Senior Commander Adamu from NAPTIP describes this mindset as acceptance of irregular migration as a solution to poverty, unemployment, and corruption. My participants more broadly described this urge to move as the 'promise of a better life' or 'seeking greener pastures.'

My participants relied on explaining what they perceived as the cultural acceptance of (irregular) migration as a way to achieve financial success in life in response to the socio-economic conditions in Nigeria. Senior Commander Adamu from NAPTIP underscores that there is a widespread belief that 'when you get to Europe, you can pluck gold. You can pick gold on the streets of Europe'. Migrants have great optimism that they can have better lives in Europe. This optimism reflects the confidence that Adebayo (2021) describes as an inherent part of the psyche of the Nigerian Dream. It reflects the confidence that the risk of emigrating is worth it and the belief that the barriers can be overcome. It is the aspirational part of the Nigerian Dream.

Importantly, my participants outlined that the misinformation underpinning this mindset has deep links to exploitative ideologies embedded in the colonial era – that life is better elsewhere than Nigeria. The normalization of migration is part of a wider set of beliefs and ideologies that orient Nigerian identity in relation to the West. Part of the issue with these ideologies is that they present trafficking as a

by-product of migration, just another form of migration. My participants felt that Nigerians currently have beliefs that are rooted in the experience and understanding of those who came before them that have been able to successfully emigrate. It is also fundamentally linked to colonialist agendas that spread British civilizing practices and values across Nigeria, such as those described in Chapters 1 and 3, where British ways were presented as better than Nigerian ones. Nigerian academic Samson Oluwatope Ijaola (2016), who is based in Edo State, also explains that this civilizing of Nigerians has continued through neo-colonial structures of power, like Shell's involvement in the Nigerian economy through oil. The 'philosophy of life that forms the basis of any society and stands as their identity' is inescapably linked to the notion that the West is best in former colonies (Ijaola, 2016, p.163).

Kwento Abubakar, a trafficking survivor who went on be a Founder of an anti-trafficking NGO, shared his written testimony with me where he outlined his journey.[120] An excerpt from Abubakar's testimony tells of the enthusiasm many Nigerians have to move out of the country and their perception of the West:

> *It was the best day of my life. It was a brilliant morning, the sun was high, the sky was bright, and I was set to leave. I felt a thrill that was bigger than the excitement that coursed through my veins during my graduation, and a greater surge than I felt during Christmas as a boy. This was the beginning of the rest of my life, it was the day I travelled to jand[121]…Jand was every Nigerian youth's proverbial paradise – a land where the sun rays had the cooling effect of an air-conditioner; where the government listened to its people, and fulfilled all their wishes; it was a place where life was easy, and job were in abundance. It was not a land of frustration, but a land where dreams actually came true. I could hardly believe it. Finally It was happening to me – I was janding!*

[120] This testimony was in the form of a book.

[121] Jand is a common expression used to describe the UK or the US.

As seen in Abubakar's passage, migrants use what they perceive to be lacking in their own countries to imagine what the West will provide. In many ways, people who do not want to emigrate are looked down on – who would not want to move to the land where there are jobs in abundance and the government cares for its citizens? Even if individuals know the risks, as many of my interviewees explained that individuals do, the benefits still outweigh the risks. Abubakar added, 'the situation is so terrible that, some of them, they don't want to hear anything other than leaving the country at all costs.'

Importantly, my participants explained that the people who seek out irregular migration have faith that God will protect them from the dangers. Religious narratives on destiny intersect with notions of the promise of a better life. My participations descriptions of greener pastures were laced with the understanding that God seeks to give you the best you can have, and he will help you overcome struggle. Dayo Thomas, the Director of an anti-trafficking NGO, and Senior Officer Peters from NAPTIP highlighted this notion for me:

> *When you trust your God, it's that you can do all things and that God will strengthen you. So far you are hard-working, you trust him. It's gonna take a long time, but you will get there.*
>
> Dayo Thomas, Director, Anti-Trafficking NGO

> *The LORD will show up for you and your family in greater dimensions. He will change natural and human laws to favour you and do for you exceedingly abundant above whatever you've been asking or thinking about.*
>
> Senior Officer Peters, NAPTIP
> Except from WhatsApp communication

This notion of destiny helped protect victims' ideologies around irregular migration. It also helped isolate so-called-failed migratory stories as one-offs – it

is an ‘oh that will not happen to me’ mentality. These stories of not making it abroad are framed as the exception to the norm. As Temidire Ezeh, the Director of an anti-trafficking NGO, explained:

> *When you fail, not many people want to know why you fail. It's like, ‘one bad luck,’ you know. ‘Doesn't have a good head. I will go and I will make it,’ you know. So they look down on people who don't make it and emphasize only on those who make it.*

A successful returnee, therefore, has achieved financial advancement through irregular migration. Returnees’ focus is on this wealth aspect of their journey and they do not divulge other details (European Asylum Support Office, 2015; European Asylum Support Office, 2021). Particularly, successful returnees do not detail exactly how they earned their money; ‘people are not interested in the origin of the earnings’ because perhaps ‘they are associated with shame’ (European Asylum Support Office, 2015, p. 38). At the same time, wealth gained through sex work and other illicit activity is ‘socially acceptable’ as long as you do not talk about which activities you were specifically engaged in (European Asylum Support Office, 2015, p. 38). The notion of there being shameful ways of engaging in work in Europe serves to undermine claims that the streets are paved with gold.

These successful returnees contrast with unsuccessful ones who have been deported or stopped by anti-trafficking agencies and identified as a victim of trafficking, most of whom are women (European Asylum Support Office, 2015; European Asylum Support Office, 2021). They often return with no money, and they are labelled as having engaged in sex work. They also often return with debt from their journey, which puts their family in a position of woe as they still

have to pay their facilitators. There is a wholescale lack of empathy for these victims from their close family to their community (European Asylum Support Office, 2015; European Asylum Support Office, 2021). As the European Asylum Support Office (2015, p. 38) concludes, 'the victim returns with health problems instead of wealth.'[122]

My participants explained that women identified as victims of trafficking *before* making it to Europe are considered unsuccessful and are stigmatized when they return home. Importantly, if they made it to Europe, so long as they did not talk about how they received their money, they were the pinnacle of a successful returnee even if they were later deported. The ones who are stopped on the route are labelled 'prostitutes,' which hinders their re-integration into the community, despite the fact that many may have supported their families through sex work for months or even years. Even the Nigerian media labels these victimized women as 'prostitutes' (Hynes et al., 2018). Women are perceived to have violated social and religious norms on what it means to be a 'good' woman. They are highly stigmatized for engaging in 'immoral' and 'shameful' behaviour. Women are in a position where they cannot win either way. If they stay, they are accused of not supporting their families. If they leave and get stopped, they are accused of bringing shame on their family. The result is that many women avoid self-identifying as someone who has been trafficked, even if they have been violently exploited. The cost to them is higher if they speak up than staying silent.

[122] The European Asylum Support Office is mandated with applying EU asylum laws for Member States. It has recently been renamed the European Union Agency for Asylum.

My participants' narratives of women victimized by sexual exploitation created contradictions with their views on what trafficking is. Their gendered perceptions of victimization were not congruent with their wider understanding of what trafficking is and why it happens. On the one hand, trafficking and smuggling are the same; yet, on the other, women are trafficked and men are smuggled.

Women, particularly girls, were more often described as having been deceived along the journey than men. My participants believed that women were uniquely vulnerable to poverty. In many ways, men who were smuggled were privileged because they had the capacity to raise funds before their journey. Women, on the other hand, typically had to agree to work for their facilitator to pay off the costs of their trip. Women who did manage to raise enough money to travel before their journey were often more impacted by the unexpected costs that arose along the way because they did not carry enough cash with them.

Kwento Abubakar, the trafficking survivor turned founder I interviewed, survived the journey from Lagos to the coast of Libya and back. He explained to me that he had not been told the details of how much extra he would have to pay along the journey. He had assumed that the upfront costs he had paid (₦250,000; approximately £480 as of the May 2022 exchange rate) would cover the whole journey to Italy. Only once they left Nigeria, however, their 'guide' told them they would have to pay at each stop they made and that there would be about 10 stops. He had enough money to pay for these stops (until he was

robbed and beaten),[123] but he told me that the women he was travelling with did not have enough, so they were either abandoned on the route or raped in lieu of payment if they were allowed to continue.

Abubakar also explained there are more opportunities for men who run out of money to make it up on the journey. He ran out of cash in Quatron and was able to find work breaking blocks of rock to raise money so he could continue to Tripoli.[124] He was paid below market for his labour because there were so many similarly stranded men trying to get work. This survivor's journey was deeply traumatic, and his descriptions helped shape my understanding of what Nigerians go through. No person should have to live through what he did. And yet, the tens of thousands of Nigerians who follow in his footsteps every year do. Under the UN's definition, the only part of his experience that *might* meet the definition of trafficking is that he was underpaid for his labour in Quatron. Yet, Abubakar was clearly victimized. He was abused and exploited along the journey, and he voiced being deeply traumatized by what he witnessed.

Significantly, Abubakar did not self-identify as a victim of trafficking, just as a victim of smuggling, because he saw his experience as different from the 'young girls' on the route. As Abubakar explained in his written testimony,

> *I observed that a lot of young girls on route were not properly informed. They were deceived and they were coerced into that journey. And some of them were even exploited because some of them were promised that, 'Don't worry, you're not going to pay, when you get there you get a job,*

[123] While this is how he finally lost his money, he was depleted of his cash through abuse at many stops before this one. At one stop, Nigerien soldiers in Duruku gave his group a strong purgative to make them expel money they had hidden by swallowing it.

[124] Quatron does not show up on maps. It is just over the Niger-Libyan border on the Libyan side, very close to Algeria. It is near the border of Libya's Ghat and Murzuq districts.

> *you'll be paying us.' Unknown to them was what they are going to do. They're going to be sold. And for me, those are victims of trafficking*

This survivor and my other interviewees linked trafficking victimhood mainly to sexual exploitation, which they perceived to impact women more frequently. Smuggling did not involve 'serious exploitation' like that, but they recognized it involved exploitation nonetheless. One of the questions my participants used to try and determine if someone was 'seriously' exploited was if they knew where they were going and how they were getting there. If they did not, it pointed to a more serious type of exploitation, but not always.

While men were not really spoken about as victims of trafficking (although they were as victims of smuggling), boys often were for child labour. My participants intimated that mothers play a crucial role in changing the narrative on trafficking. Jaiyesimi Zakari, the Head of Programming at an international anti-trafficking NGO, highlighted this notion when she explained the distinction between money a man earns and money a woman earns:

> *In this side of the world, many a times, the money of the man is not the money of the family. It's the woman that actually thinks ahead to 'what would my child eat? Where would I get the money?' And, I don't intend to play down on any gender, but his money is his money. His money is not the family's money. But the woman's money is the family's money.*

In many ways, Zakari blamed women for child labour. If the mother cannot raise enough money, her children have to work. This claim, however, also recognizes the pivotal role that women play in shaping a country. In the quote, Zakari was commenting on the difference between finances for men and women in the context of how you can target anti-trafficking interventions. Zakari continued, 'it's obvious that when you train a woman, you have trained a nation.'

This description is at once agency denying and agency awarding (Howard, 2014),[125] reflecting the complexity of anti-trafficking narratives and gendered perceptions therein in Nigeria.

Although highlighting how women are victims of trafficking and men of smuggling, my participants were careful not to blame the cultural mindset that normalizes movement for this victimization, but rather to trace how it has led to the acceptance of irregular solutions to structural deprivation. In many ways, they described a mindset informed by a pattern of practice that has been transmitted over generations. This was evident because they described how many Nigerians have family members or friends abroad. This culture of movement and acceptance of it has become what Ijaola (2016, p.162) refers to as a 'media' for transmitting knowledge and practice 'from one generation to another.'

My participants emphasized the long association many communities have of those bettering their lives abroad – i.e. many stories of successful returnees. As Senior Commander Adamu from NAPTIP explained:

> *The major reason is that the first few persons that succeeded flaunted their wealth. People saw them and thought, 'Oh,' they could also make*

[125] Neil Howard (2014), who interviewed 100 young labour migrants in Nigeria, found that young labour migrants felt they were perceived both as victims of trafficking and as earners for their families. Howard's (2014) participants described themselves as doing work that was in no way different than the type of work they would have done on their family farms or in their households: 'while challenging and at times even overwhelming, [they felt] their work was nothing like slavery' (Howard, 2014, p. 136). Howard (2014) found there to be a 'dissonance' between young migrants and family's motivations for their labour movement and that of the anti-trafficking establishment's. For youth and their families, moving for work is merely part of supporting themselves. Howard (2014, p. 136) found many examples across Nigeria where the 'incorporation of the young as money-earning agents is materially and socially essential.' The anti-trafficking establishment, however, paints these youth as coerced and deceived into work and that their families are grossly ignorant for enabling it. Howard (2014) describes these two narratives as agency-awarding or agency-denying.

> *the same money that they made. The first few people that succeeded came back with cars, and they're building houses. And people thought that they can equally go to Europe and make that same money, build houses to better their lives, buy cars, and all that things. You know? So the success of the first earlier ones is one of the driving forces of the trade.*

The individual and societal factors that motivate individuals to move are negotiated not only through current conditions but also historical, community ones. The interviewees felt the main reason that trafficking persists is that those who seek out irregular migration know someone who gained great wealth from it – bettering life through irregular migration is possible because some *have* achieved this Nigerian Dream. Many people, particularly in Edo State, have family members outside the country who influence those within, selling the benefits of the journey while downplaying the risks.

Since the 1980s, Nigerians, and particularly ones from Edo State, have been migrating to Italy and coming back to Nigeria with great wealth. For example, Nigerian women from Edo State were enlisted to do agricultural work in Italy in the early 1980s. The belief at the time was that 'many' women transitioned into sex work as it was significantly more profitable, allowing them to send large remittances back to Edo (Vanderhurst, 2017). Estimates vary greatly on how many Nigerian women were in sex work in Italy in the 1980s-90s, however. Some estimates put the figure at 1,000; others were as high as 25,000 (Angel-Ajani, 2003). The enhanced focus on Nigerian sex workers overlaid with the wider European intensification of borders and immigration control (Angel-Ajani, 2003). In Italy, the perceived high numbers of undocumented immigrations became viewed as the cause of the country's economic crisis (Angel-Ajani,

2003, p. 439). Given the legacy of the mafia violence in Italy, the fear of migrants also became conflated with the pre-existing fear of organized crime. By 1999, 54% of Italians perceived that illegal immigration was organized crime (Angel-Ajani, 2003, p. 439). Italy began deporting Nigerians in highly publicized media spectacles in both Italy and Nigeria in 1999. These have continued since. The perception of 'planeloads' of Nigerian women engaged in sex work in Italy was the impetus for the panic that led to the development of the TIPPEA Act in 2003 and, ultimately, NAPTIP (Vanderhurst, 2017, p. 194). Because of the long history of normalizing movement to Europe, families often feel they are losing out if someone is not abroad. As Kwento Abubakar, a trafficker survivor and Founder of an anti-trafficking NGO, describes:

> *Families compare themselves with other families, 'Look at this guy he has gone, this guy has gone. What are you doing?'*

Massey's (1999) concept of cumulative causation is particularly useful for assessing how my participants understood the influence of community. As Massey (1999, p. 45) explains, 'causation is cumulative in the sense that each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely.' Fussell and Massey (2004) drew on cumulative causation to analyze emigration from Mexico to the US. They used data from the Mexican Migration Project, which surveyed households in 70 communities across Mexico between 1987 and 1998.

Fussell and Massey (2004) analyzed how migration can become localized to specific source and destination areas. They found that once people start to

emigrate, the social and economic pressures have cumulative momentum. They build up in the social system as there are more networks that come to exist that facilitate even more emigration, which reduces the associated cost. For the people who are left behind, there is a lot of pressure on them to go.

Xiang and Lindquist (2014, p. 122) expanded on the impact of social capital in their term migration infrastructure, which they define as the 'systematically interlinked technologies, institutions, and actors that facilitate and condition mobility.'[126] Xiang and Lindquist (2014) used this term to reflect on the complexities of migration processes in Asia. They highlight that social networks are a key element that combines with other factors to influence migratory processes.

Fussell and Massey's (2004) approach has been particularly influential in explaining why irregular migration is geographically centred in more rural areas, such as Edo State. Remittances and the social and economic capital that those abroad send back to their communities increases the pressure on those who have not moved in the first place because there are fewer employment opportunities in rural areas. Remittances also become community norms: 'once the level of migration in a community reaches a certain level, migration takes on a momentum of its own, independent of the structural forces that originally caused it' (Fussell and Massey, 2004, p. 168). Stark and Bloom (1985) put forth

[126] Xiang and Lindquist (2014, p. 124) define five aspects of this infrastructure: 'the commercial (recruitment intermediaries), the regulatory (state apparatus and procedures for documentation, licensing, training and other purposes), the technological (communication and transport), the humanitarian (NGOs and international organizations), and the social (migrant networks).'

that emigration, then, is a decision often made at a household level as a way of diversifying household revenue.

For instance, in contrast to their descriptions of how all Nigerians want to leave, my participants felt that women were ‘recruited’ for trafficking by members of their own family or middlemen known to the family. Where men seek a greener pasture for their benefit, women do so more for the benefit of their families. The pressure on women to provide for their families is unique. The European Asylum Support Office (2015) supports this notion in finding that most Nigerian women who immigrate to Europe do so to support their families. They also found that the decision that a woman or girl will make to emigrate is often made as a family, with the ‘sacrifice’ of a daughter being an ‘investment for the whole family’ (European Asylum Support Office, 2015, p. 26).

Places that are supposed to be safe for women serve as recruitment zones – their own homes and neighbourhoods (European Asylum Support Office, 2015). As one of my participants put it, ‘because of their vulnerability, they tend to buy in on what they are told’ (Senior Commander Adamu, NAPTIP). Their vulnerability, it seems, is mainly related to their position as women in a patriarchal social structure, where a successful migratory journey is celebrated at a family level, but an unsuccessful one is born as a failure by the woman alone.

While the ‘feminization of migration’ and the ‘feminization of poverty’ are not new concepts, they take on a complex meaning in relation to cumulative

causation in the context of trafficking (Chant, 2015; Torres, 2015).[127] And while it was clear that my participants' understanding of the reasons to emigrate was a mesh of structural, community, and individual factors, my participants described that these processes work in gendered ways in Nigeria. Women were more likely to be sent by their families as a solution to poverty. They were both more likely to be victimized and recognized for that victimization. At the same time, they were also most celebrated and revered if they did succeed, so long as they did not specifically speak about how they gained their wealth. Yet, it was an open secret that most did sex work. Women were also more likely to be blamed for why trafficking persists, but also presented as a strong force in efforts to combat trafficking.

Sylvia Chant (2015) attempts to navigate this complexity through the argument that the lived experience of conditions of poverty impacts women and men differently. The disadvantage that women face in situations of poverty compounds with an intersecting nexus of other disadvantages they experience in many Global South countries: lack of legal rights, subject to violence, agency controlled by men, etc. Chant (2015, p. 193) describes that the feminization of poverty has three main outcomes: 1) women are more likely to be poor than men; 2) poor women are poorer than poor men; and 3) there is a link between the growing number of women in poverty and the growing number of women taking over for men as the 'headship' of households. Chant (2015, p. 196)

[127] The feminization of migration refers to the gender composition of migration, which has seen an increase in the number of women migrating. The feminization of poverty is used to describe the gap in men's and women's experience of poverty and the opportunity to get out of it, as underscored by societal structures that privileged men over women. The feminization of poverty captures how women experience more devasting and lasting impacts from poverty than men.

explains that the feminization of poverty is not just about there being more women in situations of income poverty, but that there has been a huge increase in women taking on financial responsibility for their families – the 'feminization of responsibility and/or obligation.' It is not just about the number of households only supported by women in other words, but also how women are positioned within male-headed households. Increasingly women are not only managing the household (e.g. raising children, cooking meals, cleaning) but also being used to support their families financially, whether that is by them engaging in work, typically in the informal sector, or migrating to support their families (Chant, 2015). The feminization of poverty intersects with the feminization of migration to reflect the extreme level of 'choicelessness' that women in poverty have (Chant, 2015, p. 196).

MacKinnon (2006) calls for the re-framing of trafficking through the lens of violence against women because it reflects the inequality of the sexes. Even in situations where women willingly seek to emigrate, the factors that undermine their decision to move are fundamentally different from those of men. In situations where people in poverty already have to pick between movement or survival, women are the most vulnerable of the choiceless.

Colonial Traces of Migration Narratives

While migration principles help organize and understand my participants' narratives, deeper questions remain: What are the implications of police and their partners using the language and principles of migration theories to

understand trafficking? And, what does it mean that they use these descriptions in a gendered way?

My Nigerian participants had a much broader understanding of trafficking and its situation within globalization patterns than my UK participants. Where the UK participants described trafficking as a result of organized crime caused by globalization, Nigerian participants saw it as part of the migration patterns caused by globalization. This distinction infuses a much deeper understanding of trafficking and how to address it. For example, as they described, most of their programming is not focused on policing, but instead on addressing the 'root causes.'

Yet, at the same time, while the root causes focus is the antithesis of many trafficking policies in the Global North, such narratives still also reflect donor priorities. For decades, Global North donors have been pouring money into development programs to reduce irregular migration. Inherent in these programs is the aim to develop 'out' of the root causes of migration (Bakewell, 2008). These programs focus on addressing the root causes through development, as the assumption is that 'development is about enabling people to stay at "home"' (Bakewell, 2008, p. 1342).

Still, many migration scholars like Bakewell (2008) argue that migration is not a dysfunction. Migration is not a problem that needs to be solved. It is a ubiquitous aspect of human societies – people always move. By using the language of root causes and push/pull factors, my participants get close to the



paternalistic policy language used in these types of development programs. These policies frame migration as something that *can* be solved (Bakewell, 2008).

Bakewell (2008) argues that in many ways the professionalization of development aid mirrors civilizing policies from the colonial era. As Bakewell (2008, p. 1343) explains:

> *While the theories and practice of development appear to have moved away from such blatant hangovers from the colonial past, many of these roots remain in place; in particular, the ongoing ambivalence, or at times hostility, towards human mobility that is outside the control of states.*

Bakewell (2008, p. 1354-55) continues, 'the idea of a migrant from Africa moving to a European state, changing citizenship and cutting links with his/her place of origin, without any particular interest in supporting its development, remains an uncomfortable one.'

Alemika (2018, p. 5) underscores that these deeper colonial meanings are crucial to explore in the context of policing because most officers just accept the 'philosophy and goals' of what they are doing, but these have developed out of colonial pasts, as described in Chapters 1 and 3. By framing trafficking through reference to a cultural mindset, the Nigerian narrative – funded by Western donors – approaches trafficking as a 'product of African culture' (Woods, 2013, p. 124).

The focus on framing trafficking through reference to the 'backwardness' of African practices depicts the legacy of colonial practices premised on 'anti-Blackness' (Woods, 2013). Black Studies scholar Tyron Woods (2013, p. 124)

argues that the anti-Blackness embedded in trafficking discourse is the extension of the discourse purported after the abolition of slavery, wherein African slave traders were perceived as equally culpable to Europeans and Americans. Such interpretations of the slave trade reflect the biopower of the colonial state (Mbembe, 2003). Woods (2013, p. 124) refers to this flawed logic as ‘colonial racism:’ the ‘regime of colourblindness.’

Focusing on Nigeria, Woods (2013) points out that attention on the root causes of trafficking takes accountability away from the 1) the colonial states that have influenced these root causes and 2) the underlying colonial premise of fetishizing Black female sexuality. Mbembe’s (2003) analysis of post-colonial states through necropolitics is particularly useful for assessing Wood’s first point. In Nigeria, the population is not only managed through violence, as described in Chapter 3, but also through the absence of violence prevention.

Mbembe (2003, p. 23) refers to the former colony as a ‘formation of terror’ where the state has the power to manage the population’s lives and engage in actions/omissions that facilitate their deaths. Mbembe (2003, p. 24) expands that former colonies are ‘zones in which war and disorder, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each other.’ Mbembe (2003) highlights that one of the largest areas where the colonizer continues to exercise control over the former colony is through resource extraction. The Nigerian state was defined by colonization and remains subject to the power of the colonizer through neo-colonial economic policies like those governing oil, as well as those related to policing described in Chapter 3.

To his second point, Woods (2013) highlights the focus on sex trafficking within anti-trafficking discourse. He outlines that this focus on sex trafficking intersects with the emphasis on African victims as being the most visible type of sex trafficking victim, and specifically Nigerian women. Angel-Ajani (2003) supports that Nigerian women are considered to be the most visible because Europeans perceive them to be un-European in their behaviours. Not only are all Black migrants cast as African, all sex workers are cast as Nigerian, regardless of country of origin (Angel-Ajani, 2003). Focusing on Italy, since the highly publicized arrests and deportation of Nigerian sex workers in the early 2000s, Angel-Ajani (2003, p. 437) found that media depictions of sex work remain 'exhibited through Black African female bodies,' where 'Nigerian' is a 'substitute for "prostitute."' Angel-Ajani (2003) explains that this happens despite Eastern European women being the vast majority of sex workers in Italy. Angel-Ajani (2003, p. 438) found that Nigerian women were more likely to have their pictures published in news media, and they were more often pictured as 'scantily clad' and 'in the streets.'

Woods (2013) argues that this fascination with the sexualization of Black bodies traces to the colonial era and is evident in the continued emphasis on efforts to control the movement of Black women. Woods (2013) explains that this asymmetry of focus leaves Black women's movement subject to the interpretation of the need/purpose of that movement in the Global North. These women can be understood as criminal and victim. For example, in their study of how Norwegian police respond to migrant sex workers, Jahnsen and Skilbrei

(2017, p. 259) found that, despite Nigerians being more likely than other nationalities to be denied entry at the Norwegian border (see Chapter 2), Nigerian women were also viewed as the most vulnerable victims. Jahnsen and Skilbrei (2017, p. 259) describe that Nigerian women were perceived by police and border control as the most 'visible forms' of sexual exploitation. At the same time, however, Jahnsen and Skilbrei (2017) found that Nigerian women selling sex in Norway were not often treated as victims. Instead, they were framed as 'louder and rowdier' than other women selling sex – they 'break the unwritten rules relating to how and where prostitution is practiced in Norway' (Jahnsen and Skilbrei, 2017, p. 263). Capturing the notion that there is a right or wrong way to be a sex worker, Ashcroft et al. (1995, p. 250) point to the term 'double colonization' to capture how Black African women are 'doubly colonized by both imperial and patriarchal ideologies.' Through such practices, Woods (2013, p. 123) summarizes that 'in this narrative, African agents foist slavery upon an unwilling West and Africa is construed, again, as the locus of criminality and barbarism.'

While Black women are controlled, the white Global North men who purchase their services are largely overlooked. My participants echoed frustration that the wider responsibility for stopping trafficking is on the Global South when the demand is in the Global North. They called for a move away from framing the fight against trafficking as one that happens *in* the former colonies to one that is global. They felt the actions to curb the demand within destination countries were more important than those in source countries. My participants particularly highlighted how there is a huge demand for sex labour and other labour in

Europe. Many of my participants voiced frustration at Europe's overfocus on policing Nigerians before they get to Europe, while failing to address the demand for these services that draw Nigerians away in the first place. A few suggested that no one in Europe wants freedom of movement with Nigeria because of racialized and colonial traditions. They queried, 'Why can't Nigerians travel the way Europeans do?'; 'Why do so many Nigerians have to resort to irregular migration when Europeans can move for work easily?'; 'Why is it ok for them and illegal for us?'

In analyzing the racism embedded in migration policies, Nigerian philosopher Nkiru Nzegwu (2018) cautions against conflating colonial racism with slavery racism in the US. Nzegwu (2018) explains that while these types of racism are related, they are different variants of the impact of slavery and colonialism. Distinguishing between these types of racism helps highlight the difference between the overt 'body racism' in the Americas and the comparatively more subtle 'cultural racism' in African areas controlled by the British (Nzegwu, 2018, p. 131). In British West Africa, racism happened most strongly along cultural lines according to Nzegwu (2018). Nzegwu (2018, p. 132) outlines that West Africans in the colonial era would only experience racism comparable to that of Black Americans at the time if they went to England. Nzegwu (2018) expands that colonial racism includes the oppression of expression of culture as well as the misinterpretation of that culture. Colonial racism 'problematized the people by representing their cultures as primitive and retrograde' (Nzegwu, 2018, p. 132). As Nzegwu (2018, p. 131) concludes, 'colonial racism, then, is a historically specific form of cultural racism practiced against non-Europeans. It

was operationalized in West Africa during European colonial rule and had the weight of governance behind it.'

The legacy of colonial racism can be strongly seen in the emphasis the West places on the influence of 'juju' on African victims of trafficking. My participants felt that donor countries were wrong to focus on juju both in terms of the prevalence of juju, but also for their failure to understand how African Traditional Religions (ATRs) function in practice. They described the West's focus on juju as sensationalist. The West generally presents juju as a type of voodoo that binds Nigerian women to their trafficker, making them unable to speak out against their trafficker because they fear death/injury to them or their family (Ikeora, 2016). The Western narrative on juju also entrenches the view of the African female victim as entirely subject to the powers of the magical African rituals and her traffickers (Ikeora, 2016). There is a growing field of academic literature and an abundance of popular culture exposés on the terribleness of juju and its hold over trafficked African women (see, for example, Kara, 2017; van der Watt and Kruger, 2017; Dunkerley, 2018; Southwell et al., 2018; and Spyropoulos, 2018). Even influential agencies like the US Department of State (2021) and the European Asylum Support Office (2015; 2021) recognize the importance of it in Nigerian trafficking, although they do also include some (very limited) critique of the juju narrative. The focus on juju is particularly pervasive in policing, with, for example, Dunkerley's (2018, p. 98) research with UK police who had worked with Nigerian victims concluding that juju 'must take primacy in an investigation of this nature.' The College of Policing's (2015, 2022) APP also signals for police to recognize the influence of juju.

Nigerian academic and anti-trafficking activist May Ikeora (2016) argues that this sensational focus on juju others both African and Black cultures. Ikeora (2016) urges the West to call what is happening what it actually is: psychological coercion. She argues that calling the psychological coercion used by traffickers as juju others Black victims of trafficking from non-Black victims when the mechanisms are the same. Ikeora (2016, p. 2) points out that this othering effectively 'hinders the protection, prosecution and prevention' of Nigerian victims because law enforcement perceives their experience to be something different, and therefore more difficult, to respond to. Juju is portrayed as a type of 'black magic,' which signifies 'the Western construction and imagination of Blackness, equivalent to a large degree with Africanness itself' (Ikeora, 2016, p. 6).

Ikeora (2016) claims that what Western literature describes is not actually juju, but a type of traditional oath-taking in ATRs. She points out that this traditional oath-taking happens *after* someone has already agreed to go on the journey. Ikeora (2016, p. 10) explains that juju is 'a fetish or charm believed by (but not limited to) West Africans to have magical or supernatural powers, mostly vindictive.' Ikeora (2016, p. 13) argues that juju is not even a Western African word. It is a word that originates from a French word that means 'little doll' or 'toy' (Ikeora, 2016, p. 13). Ikeora (2016, p. 13) concludes: 'the word "juju" is a misleading and derogatory term which has been commonly used out of either sheer prejudice or ignorance.'

On the other hand, oath-taking is a fundamental part of the African traditional belief systems, even embedded in some legal frameworks across Africa (Ikeora, 2016; Ayodele, 2017). It is essentially an oral contract. And while Ikeora (2016) is clear to recognize that oath-taking is happening in the context of trafficking and that it is used to make victims believe that if they report their trafficker something bad will happen to them or their family, she underscores that it is no different to debt-bondage, fear-mongering, and other contractual agreements that are used as psychological coercion mechanisms over *all* victims of trafficking. Oath-taking *is* an important control tool used over African women, but it is ultimately only one way of labelling the same control mechanisms used in all trafficking. For Nigerians, these processes are labelled as juju, something 'primitive, pagan, fetishistic, [and] animistic' that only 'certain' people could believe in (Ikeora, 2016, p. 13). For non-African victims, these same processes are merely labelled psychological coercion and that anyone can fall victim to them. Ikeora (2016, p. 15) summarizes:

> *Anti-trafficking practitioners in Europe have relegated [juju's] nature of control to 'brainwashing.' Such misunderstanding attacks the belief system of the victims, denying the agency of victims and, as a result, affecting their rapport with the law enforcement authorities.*

Conclusion

My participants' descriptions of trafficking rested on a broader understanding of the push/pull factors of migration and the need to address the structural, community, and individual level root causes involved in the decision to emigrate. I explored how the narrative of my Nigerian participants used the language embedded in the principles of migration theories to situate their understanding of

what trafficking is and who the victims are. They used push/pull factors to understand the drive to emigrate and conceptualized their role as addressing the root causes of trafficking, which they saw as the same as those of migration. Importantly, they did not see their role as involving a police response. They instead focused on how the Nigerian state fosters a high degree of insecurity for Nigerians and that this insecurity combines with historic and community patterns of migrating. My participants ultimately underscored that there is a widespread mindset in favour of migration, which they felt captured the desire to seek out irregular migration. In linking trafficking to migration, my Nigerian participants saw migrant smuggling and trafficking as indelible outcomes of these wider patterns. Most pronounced, they did not distinguish between trafficking and migrant smuggling at a conceptual level, and they underscored that donor countries get it wrong by driving a wedge between these two concepts.

While my participants largely described trafficking as the same as irregular migration, they operationalized the difference between trafficking and smuggling based on gendered notions associated with vulnerability to different types of trafficking. Where men were victims of smuggling, women were of trafficking. Notably, they saw both men and women as victimized by irregular migration processes. And while they used gender to identify victims of trafficking in the field, they also reflected a complex understanding of how gender intersects with trafficking. I outlined the example of how women are both seen as victims of trafficking but ostracized from their communities for this victimization. They understood the link between gender and trafficking in multifaceted and often contradictory ways – women are both celebrated and decried for trafficking.

My participants' construction of trafficking through the lens of migration, however, also raised a much broader question: what purpose does it serve them to understand trafficking this way? I offered an explanation using a coloniality approach to analyzing development discourse and policy. More research is needed on mapping the dynamics of trafficking discourse in Nigeria and how this narrative is influenced by donor governments and organizations.

Overall, my Nigerian participants presented a distinctly different understanding of trafficking victimization than my UK participants. My participants recognized the agency of trafficking victims and critiqued the distinction between choice and coercion. They felt that individuals make important decisions on migration but are limited by the structural conditions. I found that, to some extent, Nigerian police understood the complexity involved in trafficking victimization from a victim's perspective, although there was still a focus on trafficking victimization through reference to sexual exploitation.

Another important difference between my UK and Nigerian participants was that my Nigerian participants rarely considered trafficking offenders. To understand who they perceived to be an offender, I used their case files. I explore my findings related to trafficking offenders in Nigeria in the next chapter.

Chapter 8: Constructing Criminality in Nigeria

From the findings described in Chapter 7, it is clear that my research participants believed that gender mediates the experience of victimhood. Ideas of gender also defined their perceptions of the differences between trafficking and smuggling. Where men are smuggled, women are trafficked. In contrast to the British police, the Nigerian participants in this study spent very little time discussing trafficking offenders. Usually when they did, it was part of describing what trafficking is (organized crime) and how Madams are involved in trafficking women. Notably, these descriptions were only mentioned in passing. I was, however, able to analyze patterns in how NAPTIP is approaching trafficking offenders from their 394 conviction records in the 319 case files shared with me,[128] which dated from inception in 2004 to mid-2019.

The NAPTIP conviction case files suggest that a much more nuanced understanding of gender is required to understand trafficking and its victims and offenders in Nigeria. Not only can gender mediate vulnerabilities for victims, but also for offenders. The NAPTIP data highlight how women were nearly equally likely to be convicted of trafficking offences as men.

There is starting to be an exploration of the gender of offenders in trafficking studies, but it is a nascent subfield. Some recent studies supports findings that women are as or more likely to be convicted of trafficking offences compared to men, such as Dina Siegel and Sylvia de Blank's (2010) study on women's roles

[128] NAPTIP records by case, not by individual.

in organized crime in Dutch trafficking conviction rates; Annette Hübschle's (2013) study on women's role in organized crime in 12 southern African countries;[129] Rose Broad's (2015) analysis of the role of women in UK trafficking conviction rates; and Lauren McCarthy's (2020) recent study using media narratives to analyze gendered dimensions of Russian trafficking conviction rates.

The 2020 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons by UNODC (2020), however, highlights that the gendered breakdown of offending is very regionalized. Across the 148 countries included in the report, UNODC (2020) described that overall women are 36% of offenders, but in some regions, like Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 80% of those convicted are women and in others, like Central American and East Asia, convictions are nearly half and half. UNODC (2020) reflects that this difference in conviction rates showcases the distinctions in how organized crime groups operate in these regions. Overall, UNODC (2020) found that women are mostly involved in trafficking recruitment, which explains perhaps why source countries have higher rates of convictions for women and destination countries have much higher rates for men. While the report does not specifically discuss the rates in Nigeria, it does report on the rates for Sub-Saharan Africa, which includes Nigeria. UNODC (2020) points out that men represent 66% of convictions and women 34%, but that this varies across the region. They find that West Africa still convicts more men.

[129] These countries were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

A critique of the UNODC (2020) findings, however, is that it pulls datasets and information from wildly different contexts with unique criminal justice systems and data recording capabilities and distills all of this information down into singular figures (McCarthy, 2020). Underpinning all the previous research on gendered patterns in offending, McCarthy (2020, p. 82) contends that it is impossible to distinguish if women are 'more likely to be involved in trafficking or whether they are simply more likely to be caught.'

Across the previous studies and UN figures, there is little focus on how these different rates of conviction compare to other conviction rates – for example, do these figures merely reflect a wider gendered pattern within these countries? Moreover, is there any difference in what men are convicted of within trafficking compared to women? In Russia, however, McCarthy (2020) did find some evidence that women are sentenced similar to men, but these findings were based on cases she could find in the media, which raises questions such as if these cases were the ones the media were most likely to pick up because they were the most 'newsworthy' (i.e. most sensational).

This chapter explores how gender influences offending in Nigeria through analyzing the NAPTIP conviction case files. I begin by exploring the trafficking offending rates in the NAPTIP case files and how we can understand those findings in the context of other criminal justice data in Nigeria, such as prison rates. I, then, explore the gendered dimensions of the convictions.

Assessing Trafficking Offending Rates

Out of 394 NAPTIP convictions, I collected the gender of the convicted person for 251 people, 64% of convictions. To code for gender, I cross-referenced the defendants' names with five Nigerian baby name databases and news stories from the cases. I only coded for female or male when I was either able to confirm gender via a news story or if the five databases I looked at agreed on the gendered nature of the name. If they did not agree or the name was unisex, I left the data missing. There are, of course, issues with this labelling approach, most prominently that I ascribed only two gendered identities to the name and that the gender of the name might not match up with an individual's expressed gender. NAPTIP publishes some data related to the gender of the offender in their quarterly reports from 2015 to present, which matched my gender coding – i.e. these reports showcase patterns in offender gender that match what I was finding in the data, which confirms that my coding of gender was consistent.

Of these 251 convicted people, 112 were women and 139 men. That is, where I was able to determine gender, 45% of convictions under the TIPPEA Act were women, and 55% were men. Of all the NAPTIP convictions, even those for which I could not determine gender, I identified that approximately one third (28%) of those convicted were women. Even this figure significantly challenges our current understanding of crime. Embodied in Braithwaite's (1989, pp. 44-49) '13 Facts about Crime,' which have proven stable in the Global North, one of the hallmarks of crime research is that men commit crime at disproportionality higher rates than women.

I initially questioned whether the pattern of offending might be different in Nigeria, reasoning that perhaps our understanding of the gendered nature of offending does not capture the experience of people in the Global South. Almost certainly, our current understanding of crime and justice fails to capture the Global South experience, and more research is required into how and why. However, both crime and prison data from the National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria (2014) suggest otherwise. From the 2011 reported crime data (most recently available data with gender), men committed 94% (n= 123,464) of reported crimes. Men committed more crimes related to human trafficking (n= 3,361 for the offence of smuggling and n=3,716 for the offence of human trafficking) than women committed total crimes (n=6,094) in 2011.[130] Yet, crimes related to human trafficking accounted for only 0.05% (n=7,077) of reported crimes committed by men and approximately 6% (n=389) for women. Although women are more frequently reported for trafficking offences compared to other types of crime they commit than the frequency of men compared to other types of crime men commit, the actual number of reported offences involving women was still very low. Focusing on trafficking-related reported crimes only, even in the year that women committed the most trafficking-related crime (2007), women still only were reported for committing 7% (see Figure 1).

[130] Given the overlap described in Chapter 7 between trafficking and smuggling, I have included data points on smuggling as part of this chapter's analysis.

Figure 1. Gender of Offender by Reported Offence Type from 2007-2011 with Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria (2014)



While women were reported for committing an average of 6% of trafficking-related offences from 2007-to 2011 (or 9% of trafficking-only offences if you exclude smuggling), during that same period, in the case files women accounted

for 45% of the convictions under the TIPPEA Act where the gender of the offender could be determined. Overall, these data indicate that while women commit significantly fewer trafficking offences, they are convicted at a significantly higher rate than men. Focusing on the NAPTIP case files, they are convicted at almost an equal rate to men.

Similarly, the NAPTIP data show women are sentenced comparably to men. The spread of frequencies of sentences for women was similar to men (see Table 6). The frequency of sentences was similar between genders, and women nearly equally had their sentence diverted by a fine: 23% of women (n=22) and 30% of men (n=36) were offered the option of paying a fine instead of serving time in prison (see Table 7). Women, however, appear to be slightly more frequently fined at a higher fine band than men. Prior to a 2015 amendment to the TIPPEA Act, offenders were often able to pay a fine to avoid prison time. The inconsistency of sentences and fines was a major contributing factor to the need to amend the Act in 2015. Although fines were most often imposed in addition to a prison term after 2015, I do have cases after 2015 where offenders were able to pay a fine to avoid prison, but the costs were substantially higher post-2015. There were only 10 cases that convicted a collective of 15 people between 2015 and the data end period in 2019 where the fine option was given. Of these 15, three were men, two were women, and for 10 I was unable to determine gender. Interestingly, though the fines were generally higher (only one was for a fine below ₦100,000, equivalent to slightly less than £200 as per the exchange rate in May 2022), they appeared to be imposed as inconsistently as before. Many of those who were diverted through fines had victimized children, the most

vulnerable of trafficking victims. These people were still able to avoid prison by paying a fine, even after the 2015 amendment.

Table 6. Frequency of Sentences by Gender

	Women		**Men**	
Sentence	*N*	*% of Total Sentences for Women*	*N*	*%of Total Sentences for Men*
Caution	1	1	0	0
Fine Only	3	3	8	6
> 1 year	21	19	20	15
1 - > 2 years	24	22	32	23
2 - >3 years	21	19	32	23
3 - > 5 years	9	8	13	9
5 - >7 years	14	13	14	10
7 - >10 years	7	6	9	7
10 years	8	7	6	4
Over 10 years	3	3	3	2
Total	111	Total	137	

Table 7. Frequency of Optional Fines for Diversion from Prison by Gender[131]

	Women		**Men**	
Fine	*N*	*% of Total Fines for Diversion for Women*	*N*	*% of Total Fines for Diversion for Men*
>₦10,000	0	0	2	6
₦10,000 - ₦20,000	4	18	12	33
<₦20,000; >₦50,000	7	32	6	17
₦50,000	7	32	6	17
<₦50,000; >₦100,000	0	0	1	3
₦100,000	1	5	6	17
<₦100,000; >₦250,000	3	14	1	3
<₦1,000,000	0	0	2	6
Total	22	Total	36	

[131] Of those I could categorize for gender, n=6 women and n=10 men were issued fines *in addition* to their sentence.

The reported rates and conviction data combined suggest women are convicted at disproportionality higher rates than men, although they are punished similarly to men. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria (2016) on prison rates, however, muddle the gendered conclusions from NAPTIP's data. While it is unclear whether the prison data refers to the overall number of people in prison for each offence type or to the number of people admitted that year,[132] it still presents a different picture than NAPTIP's data either way. For trafficking-related offences between 2013-2014 (the latest available data), women accounted for approximately 3% of the prison population for those offences. For trafficking only, 10 women were in prison in 2013 and nine in 2014; 15 women were in prison for smuggling in 2013 and 15 in 2014. The prison rates for trafficking-related offences are much higher than the NAPTIP data, even if the prison data is taken to mean the whole population by offence within that year as opposed to admits for the year. In 2013, 858 people were in prison for trafficking-related offences, and in 2014, 855 people were. Even if we remove smuggling from our analysis, 222 people in 2013 were in prison for the offence of human trafficking and 315 in 2014. NAPTIP conviction data, however, *only* captured 394 total people convicted over 15 years. The prison data present a few problems for analyzing the NAPTIP data: 1) why are there so few women in prison if they are convicted at a near equal rate to men? and 2) why are there so many more people in prison for trafficking offences than is captured by NAPTIP's data?

A straightforward explanation for the gap between these two data sources is that even though women are sentenced at the same rate as men, something is

[132] No data codebook is available.

happening between sentencing and imprisonment, which leads to them not serving out their sentences in prison. Perhaps, for example, women are more likely to pay the optional fine. Maybe different states have programming to divert women with children from prison. While there is little research on sentencing in Nigeria, a recent study by Aborisade and Adedayo (2020) that interviewed prosecution and defence counsels and judges who work in federal courts in Ogun State found that some of their participants perceived that judges were sometimes more lenient on women who are mothers.

Another easy way to make sense of this gap is to assume that more offences are captured under the prison category of offences of human trafficking and smuggling beyond those captured by the TIPPEA Act. For example, the Nigerian Criminal Code §§30-32 outline crimes that overlap with trafficking, such as §30 assaults on females: abduction; §31 offences against liberty: slave dealing; and §32 offences relating to marriage and parental rights and duties. The offences captured by §§30-32 of the Criminal Code are not demarcated in the 29 categories of offences listed under the prison rates dataset. Nor is there a data codebook to accompany the prison rates data, making it effectively impossible to tell which offences are categorized under each of the 29 overarching categories.[133] If these offences fall under the category related to trafficking and are sufficiently common, then it would likely explain the difference between the prison rates and NAPTIP data.

[133] There is also no other research evidence that explores this dataset that I have been able to find, which could have helped provide insight on how the data are coded.

Another possibility is that more agencies than NAPTIP are prosecuting under the TIPPEA Act, in addition to prosecuting trafficking under the Criminal Code. The US Department of State's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (2021) found evidence to support this other-agency hypothesis. The US Department of State explicitly references the NIS, NPF, the Labor Inspectorate, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit as all working in conjunction with prosecutors and the judiciary to form Nigeria's 'criminal justice response to human trafficking' (para 10). When referring to agencies that identified victims, the US Department of State focuses primarily on NAPTIP, NPF, and ETAHT, with specific reference to ETAHT prosecuting offenders in addition to NAPTIP (although the US Department of State does not specify under which legal framework these prosecutions occurred). State governments are also referred to as having the responsibility for prosecuting offenders. The US Department of State (2021, para 3) highlights that anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts are 'mixed' among agencies.

Yet, when I interviewed the senior prosecutorial staff from NAPTIP's legal and prosecution units,[134] they rarely mentioned other agencies prosecuting trafficking offenders. The joint prosecutorial work they did describe involved other countries, although most of this support was for assisting in investigations and training the judiciary. The senior prosecutors did mention having MOUs with other Nigerian government agencies, but that this, they told me, was primarily for 'sharing data.' The two they focused on were NIS and the Anti-Corruption

[134] NAPTIP's legal and prosecution units consist of very small teams. Sometimes just one or two prosecutors. To protect anonymity, I have not included any further details beyond their level of role for the quoted prosecutors.

Agency for the purpose of 'checking the influx of people, you know, being taken out of the country' (Senior Prosecutor Moses, NAPTIP). My interviews with members of the legal and prosecution units, and in fact with all of NAPTIP's other major units (Research, Counselling and Rehabilitation, and Investigation and Monitoring), gave the impression that NAPTIP dominates the investigatory and prosecutorial space in relation to trafficking in Nigeria.

And while other agencies I interviewed recognized that NAPTIP is tasked with responding to trafficking, they voiced that they are also very active in this space. When I met with a senior member of NIS's leadership team, he informed me that NIS actually had the first anti-trafficking unit in Nigeria, not NAPTIP. He rhetorically said: 'Why you may ask? To control the borders!' In fact, he suggested that when NAPTIP was first established it was seen as more of an advocacy agency. Although, now NIS refers to them as a 'sister agency,' and they refer cases for victim care to NAPTIP, as well as for investigation, *only* if NIS does not have enough capacity at the time.

Similarly, in Edo State, when I met with a senior member of ETAHT's leadership team and a representative from the Local Government Secretariat, they noted how both ETAHT and the local government were prosecuting offenders for trafficking. While the TIPPEA Act is a federal law, Edo State also has a state anti-trafficking law that was implemented the year before my fieldwork: The Edo State Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law of 2018 (ETiP law). When I specifically asked the representative from the Local Government Secretariat about their work with NAPTIP, they said that:

> *We always try to work hand-in-hand with NAPTIP. Some of the trafficking cases before ETAHT was inaugurated went to NAPTIP. But, it does not really matter. Anyone can prosecute.*

This representative highlighted the Edo State Attorney General and the prosecutors of the Ministry of Justice had 'good legal backing' to prosecute cases for the State, even before the ETiP law.

Another possible explanation for the gendered difference between my findings and the prison rates is that I have coded gender incorrectly in some of my cases, overestimating the number of women who are offenders. However, 2017-2019 data from ETAHT supports the gendered finding in the NAPTIP conviction rates. Over these two years, 103 cases were flagged by ETAHT's Investigation Unit as potential cases of human trafficking.[135] 83 were investigated and referred to the Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit of the Department of Public Prosecution (DPP) (Edo State Task Force Against Human Trafficking, 2019).[136] The Commissioner of Police also refers cases to the Human Trafficking Unit of DPP, but the specific number of referrals from the Police over this time is unknown. Of these 83+ referrals, the Prosecution Unit filed 25 cases involving 86 offenders. 45% (n= 39) of the suspects arrested were women and 55% (n= 47) men. Figure 2 below showcases how the ETAHT data compares to the NAPTIP, prison, and reported rates data.

[135] These were flagged via 'petitions and verbal complaints made during security screening, profiling of returnees, and information from the general public' (Edo State Task Force Against Human Trafficking, 2019, p. 46).

[136] The Unit is part of the ETAHT, but it operates under the supervision of the DPP.

Figure 2. Overview of Gendered Rates of Human Trafficking Offenders[137]



While the ETAHT data is crucial because it supports the pattern in the NAPTIP data, reports from Amnesty International provide a strong explanation for the difference between trafficking conviction rates from both ETAHT and

[137] For the reported rates and prison rates here, I have only included the specific category called 'human trafficking' and have not combined this category with migrant smuggling. ETAHT and NAPTIP will only be convicting under specific legislation related to human trafficking, which is likely better reflected by only the human trafficking category.

NAPTIP and prison rates. In investigations into the 'appalling state of Nigeria's prison system' (para 1), Amnesty International UK (2008) found that at least 65% of Nigeria's prison population have not yet been convicted of the crime they were charged with. Some are held for up to 10 years awaiting trial, exceeding the sentence for many of the charges they are facing in the first place in most cases. This over-imprisonment overlaps with a broader trend in Nigerian prisons, where 86% of the population uses public defenders – yet, there were only 91 public defenders in the whole of the country at the time of Amnesty International UK's (2008) report. Amnesty International UK (2008, para 8) concludes that 'many inmates awaiting trial are effectively presumed guilty.'

Equally worrying, Amnesty International UK (2008, para 6) flagged that 'all too often' the people being held have not even been charged. The prison system is being used to house people with mental illnesses that family members cannot cope with/care for any longer – prison authorities refer to these people as 'civil lunatics' (Amnesty International UK, 2008, para 9). There are also numerous cases where police have arrested the family member of the person charged because they cannot find the accused. While analyzing the 'conveyor belt of injustice,' as Amnesty International UK (2008, para 2) refers to the Nigerian prison system, is beyond the scope of this thesis,[138] it is important to acknowledge here that every few years the Nigerian government will release detainees (Amnesty International, 2006a). In 2006, for example, which was two years *before* the findings mentioned above by Amnesty International UK, they

[138] For example, Amnesty International UK (2007) also found that Nigerian prisons are keeping children and adults housed together, that the conditions of prisons are 'squalid,' and that prisons are grossly overcrowded.

sped up the trial or released over half of the prison population on unconditional release – 25,000 of 45,000 incarcerated people (Amnesty International, 2006a). Although these are essential releases, they have not impacted the overall trend in detainment. In 2022, World Prison Brief (2022) data highlight that 72.4% of the Nigerian prison population is being held pre-trial. This figure is an increase on Amnesty's findings, implying that the issue has become more pervasive.

The findings from Amnesty and the World Prison Brief also draw into question how differently the criminal justice system appears to work for those charged and prosecuted by NAPTIP compared to other agencies. Of the cases I had charge, trial, and conviction dates for (approximately 94% of individual conviction cases shared with me, n=299 for charge to trial and n=301 from charge to conviction),[139] 90% (n=269) of them went to trial within a year after being charged, and many within that had the trial start within a month of the charge being filed. 68% (n=204) went to trial *and* were sentenced within a year of being charged. Only 11% (n=32) of cases went beyond two years between trial and sentencing. The longest case was 11 years, and the next longest were three cases that took seven years respectively. These longer cases were distributed across the country and across courts – i.e. there were not one or more courts that consistently took longer to process cases.

Although there is some small evidence that those whose cases took longer to process served longer sentences, most cases that involved long sentences did

[139] The majority of those cases only had one offender – 82% (n=260). The next most frequent number of offenders was two offenders, 14% (n=43) of cases. Only 5% of cases had three or more offenders: three offenders (n=13, 4%), four offenders (n=1, 0.3%), five offenders (n=1, 0.3%).

not. Further, many cases that took longer than two years to process involved short sentences. Numerous involved only one-year sentences. One case that took three years to convict only had a month-long sentence, and one that had a two-year sentence took seven years to process. It is also difficult to extrapolate anything based on sentence length to the time cases took to process because it is impossible to know if the sentence is more lenient *because* the case took longer to process – e.g. was re-tried under less serious offences for whatever reason. There were only three cases where NAPTIP had noted in the conviction records that it was a retrial. Still, there are likely numerous other judicial delays and appeals not captured by their conviction records, which would mediate the relationship between sentence length and case processing time. How NAPTIP cases move through the stages of the judicial process is an important area for future research.

In one example, a case that took one year to go to trial and four years for sentencing only had the case note that the offender pled guilty, which would typically imply a much more expedient case. The circumstances between the charges being filed and the guilty plea would help in understanding why this case took so long to process through the system, but they are omitted from this case note. In another example, in the case that took 11 years from charge to conviction, the defendant was a doctor, implying he had a high degree of privilege. Did the case take a long time because of the severity of his crimes (three counts of deceitfully inducing victims for sexual exploitation) or because he had the wealth to appeal the charges and drag out the trial? While Aborisade and Adedayo (2020) could not find a clear relationship between gender and

sentencing, their participants unanimously agreed that offenders receive differential treatment based on socio-economic status. Further, although he was sentenced to 10 years on each of the three counts, the defendant in this case was given the option of a ₦100,000 fine on each of the counts instead of serving time in prison – slightly less than £200 per count as of the exchange rate in May 2022. So even though the cases that take longer to process appear to have more severe sentences, they might actually be ones that are diverted through fines. Again, more research is needed on how many convicted people served their sentence versus paid a fine.

Another variable that appears to confound the relationship between time between charge and conviction and sentence length is the number of people being prosecuted on the case. For those whose cases took five years between charge and conviction, four out of five of them were convicted under the same case. This case leads to the possibility that the number of offenders correlates to the case processing length. Again, more investigation into how each individual case is processed through the system is warranted to deconstruct this tentative trend.

It is clear, however, that NAPTIP cases, regardless of the severity of the charges, process through Nigeria's criminal justice system faster than non-NAPTIP cases. Where Amnesty found that defendants are waiting up to 10 years for a trial, let alone sentencing, the vast majority of NAPTIP cases are processed from charge to sentence within a year.

During my interviews with members of NAPTIP's legal and prosecution units, the prosecutors explained to me that the courts in Nigeria are 'a very congested institution,' particularly in the High Courts,[140] but they have developed a work pattern to get around this. As Senior Prosecutor Moses highlights:

> *We have to follow up the cases in the High Court to ensure that once we file the charge, the High Court or the chief judge of the High Court can quickly give us a date for hearing. So, but then because of the way our Chief Executive has actually linked up with the judges, we have appealed to them that, 'Please make some of the priority cases,' so that they can easily be assigned to a particular judge. Then from there, we can follow up and get a date for hearing...by and large we have some listening ear from the judges over some of our cases in court.*

Beyond a listening ear, Senior Prosecutor Balogun, with one of NAPTIP's legal and prosecution units, explained how they strategize which court to send a charge to based on how congested the courts in each state are:

> *[Trafficking cases] go straight to the High Court because of the seriousness of the crime. And in Nigeria, we have three types of Courts right now that we can send human trafficking cases to. One is called the Federal High Court. Another one is called State High Court, and the third one is the National Industrial Court. It depends on the nature of the crime [which court it goes to]. The area of the jurisdiction will determine which of the courts we can take it to...Most of the time, we prefer taking the cases before Federal High Court, but if the Federal High Court is so congested and we believe that it will take longer time to get the person arraigned, we take it before the State High Court.*

Despite Senior Prosecutor Balogun's statement, the nature of the offences only mattered for which court the case went to when it came to the National Industrial Court, which is only used when it is civil action cases related to trafficking – in most cases, the victim seeking claims. NAPTIP rarely prosecuted in the Industrial courts (see Figure 3). Of the 319 cases I have, only two

[140] High Courts are the highest court at the state level. The Federal High Court, which is also very confusingly referred to just as 'High Court' in many documents and in everyday language, also has a division in most states. Most of NAPTIP's cases are tried in Federal High Courts, although some are held in State High Courts.

convictions came from an Industrial court, one in Abuja and another in Calabar. Otherwise, the senior prosecutor's quote leads to the conclusion that the decision between the State High Court or the Federal High Court comes down to two things: 1) the relationships NAPTIP has with the judges, and 2) how congested the courts are.

Figure 3. NAPTIP Cases by Type of Court as a Percent of Total Cases with the Court Labelled (n=319)



Although overall NAPTIP cases move quickly through the criminal justice system, officers in NAPTIP's legal and prosecution units still felt that the case processing speed is too slow. Legal officers I interviewed detailed at length how, despite their efforts to make cases move quickly per the strategies above, the process is still riddled with slowdowns and bottlenecks, as captured by those

cases that did take longer than a year to process. The control NAPTIP feels it has is over *where* they file a case, but what happens *after* they file a case is out of their hands. There are two main reasons those in the legal and prosecution units outlined as to why this perceived slow down happens. First, court administration. Entire courts can travel on assignment to hear cases in another region of the state without much notice. Judges as well can move the ordering of cases on their dockets. Not only did this delay the case processing, but it did also on occasion create financial pressures for the legal and prosecution units. In one example, I was told a story about how a legal and prosecution unit had organized for their legal team to travel well over 200 miles by car to get to a court only to realize the judge had reshuffled the docket and their case was not being heard that day.[141] Not only did this waste gas and staffing, but it also took away from energy that could have been spent on other cases.

Second, the legal and prosecution units felt that the defence counsel slowed down cases. The legal and prosecution units perceived that most delays caused to case processing rested with the 'antics' of defence counsels (Senior Prosecutor Balogun, NAPTIP). Specifically referring to case processing in Nigeria being 'not like Europe, where, you know, there's rigidity' (Senior Prosecutor Moses, NAPTIP), the prosecuting lawyers in the legal and prosecution units explained that they felt the defence lawyer could just keep asking for more and more, even though the law specifies and regulates the number of adjournments that defence and prosecution counsels can request for. The unit staff highlighted that they felt these delays happen via 'other technical

[141] 200 miles is a full day journey each way given the state of the roads.

procedures,' such as no case submissions and focusing on arguing that witnesses are being coerced into statements or that there is a lack of witnesses.[142]

An important strategy used by the defence under this focus-on-the-witness tactic is to call into question the legitimacy of the victim. Because of the Nigerian legal system, Senior Prosecutor Moses from one of NAPTIP's legal and prosecution units underscored that 'if, for whatever reason, you are not able to produce the victim, your case is as good as bad.' Senior Prosecutor Moses continued:

> *The defence counsel will hammer on it so much, hammer on it so much, and say to the judge: 'My Lord, this counsel brings a fake case before you. You know this man is just being framed up. If not, where is the victim?' You know? They will hammer on it, and judges says, 'Yeah, they are not even serious. If they are serious, they should have brought the victim.'*

While there are measures that seek to protect victims, the legal and prosecution unit staff found that they still imply that a victim must be present. For example, some measures enable the prosecution not to use the victim's name, they can submit applications for the cases to be held in chambers (most often used for victims who are children), and there are ways of protecting the victim by angling them in the court, so they are not visible to the media or public. The unit lawyers also mentioned that some courts are trialling video conferencing, funded

[142] Nigerian criminal cases have two parts. In the first part, the prosecution presents all of their evidence, and, in the second, the defence does. After the prosecution has finished presenting their case, under Nigerian law, the defence can put forth an application of 'no case submission' if they feel the prosecution has failed to prove their case. It is essentially an application for the case to be acquitted. If the judge approves the application, the case is dismissed; if they deny it, then the case moves forward to the defence's arguments. The defence loses relatively little by making this application, so it is a common strategy used by the defence counsel (LawPadi, 2021).

by European partners. As a senior prosecuting officer with one of NAPTIP's legal and prosecution unit puts it: 'the story of the victim is paramount for us' (Senior Prosecutor Moses, NAPTIP). The point to prove at trial, or disprove for the defence, is how believable the victim is, as the victim's story is used as the primary evidence to support whether the offending happened.

This overt focus on the victim in trafficking cases creates many problems for NAPTIP before they even file a case. Many victims do not want to speak about their experience, let alone testify. Reasons include those outlined in Chapter 7, such as the stigma around being a victim of trafficking, the relationship between traffickers and victims, fear of retribution, victims not self-identifying as a victim, and victims moving on with their lives.

Senior Prosecutor Moses highlighted that NAPTIP's investigators and counsellors are important in getting the victims to testify:

> *So now it takes a lot of ingenuity and expertise and high level of wisdom of the investigators and sometimes counsellors to say [to the victim], 'Please, we are here to help you. We are the ones that actually have your interests at heart. Please tell us the true position of things.' So that is how sometimes they open up. So, that is a big issue for [the victim] if they haven't even disclosed to us what has happened. You know, it takes us more time to be able to get such information from them.*

Using counsellors to get victims to support investigations is problematic in and of itself, but it is compounded by how NAPTIP's Counselling and Rehabilitation Department interacts with victims more broadly. Stacey Vanderhurst (2017), who conducted ethnographic research directly with NAPTIP and was embedded in one of their shelters in Lagos, found that very few women referred to NAPTIP's counselling and rehabilitation services (which largely only serves women)

actually accept the interventions. The lack of trust in NAPTIP reflects a wider mistrust of government and state institutions, particularly of law enforcement, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Amnesty International (2009, p. 8) refers to a 'widespread phenomenon' of excessive and unlawful use of firearms, extrajudicial killings, and the denial of life-saving medical treatment by NPF. Amnesty International (2009, p. 6) found that the Nigerian public has little trust in the police and perceives the police to be 'a friend of the rich and the lawless.' Vanderhurst (2017, p. 6) found that counsellors leveraged rehabilitation as 'ordained by God' to get the women to accept the otherwise 'unwelcome state intervention.'

Most troubling, however, is that victims are detained involuntary in NAPTIP shelters, even though doing so is expressly forbidden by law. Vanderhurst (2017, p. 10) discovered that 'most women entered the shelter under protest' and that 'shelter staff often read their resistance as further evidence that they required counselling.' Many of my non-NAPTIP interviewees mentioned this aspect of NAPTIP's shelters too, and they were highly critical of NAPTIP for it. The overall architecture of NAPTIP's counselling and rehabilitation services is focused on control, and there is also an instrumentalization of the victim by NAPTIP processes. In one interview with a UN staff member, they outlined how NAPTIP 'counsels and preps the victim relates directly to the investigation. The evidence is the human. They are the custodians of the victims.' Shelter staff explained to Vanderhurst (2017, p. 10) that the 'purpose of counselling is instead to "convince" them that it is for the best.' In doing so, Vanderhurst (2017) found that NAPTIP counsellors played on similar religious narratives to those used by

smugglers and traffickers to promote movement. Nwokeoma et al. (2019, p. 4932), for example, found that in their study involving 325 victims in Edo State some victims even regarded their traffickers as 'Messiahs' who were 'sent to deliver them.'

While I did not visit any NAPTIP shelters, I did visit three NGO-run shelters: two for children and one for women. All of them were closed shelters meaning that their inhabitants could not leave of their own accord until they had finished the shelters' Christian programming. In the shelters, I found myself reflecting on how the movements of those within them are restricted and controlled once again by someone else, although under the purpose of helping them recover. I often wonder how much the purpose behind NAPTIP's actions matters to those women being detained against their will in shelters – do they feel any safer?

Although the wheels of justice usually move slowly, NAPTIP cases process through the system much faster than the norm in Nigeria and faster than in many Global North countries. From the quotes above, NAPTIP is connected into the judiciary and networked among its own departments to facilitate the smooth processing of these cases. There are a few reasons that could explain why NAPTIP does this. First, NAPTIP receives a considerable amount of funding from Western donors; no less the premise of this thesis is the investment that the UK has made in NAPTIP. While it is difficult to get an estimate of the exact percentage of NAPTIP's budget that comes from Western donors,[143] it is widely accepted as a substantial percentage of their budget. Given the projects they

[143] Their operational budget is not publicly available.

discussed in interviews and the ones I can find reference to online, most funders are based in Europe and the US. NAPTIP is also the recipient of much funding via UN agencies, particularly UNODC, ILO, and IMO.

The investment of these Western funders means that NAPTIP has pressure to deliver results – one of which would be convictions. At the same time, NAPTIP also does receive funding from the Nigerian Federal Government. It is then likely they also receive a lot of domestic pressure to deliver results given they are an additional law enforcement agency, above the standard state ones of the police and immigration control. Logically, these pressures combine to create an environment where NAPTIP has to prove they are worth the investment. The relationships that NAPTIP develops with judges and between its departments then become strategic and political.

My interview with a Senior Officer Peter's highlighted the tension that the agency faces:

> *On a day-to-day basis, it's always a struggle to get backing. This proposal for a country report has been on the drawing board for three years. No money, no money, no money…The fact-finding mission to Mali, for example, was a long way coming, two years of trying, but we eventually got IOM to sponsor.*

Here the senior officer underscores that for projects NAPTIP wants to bring forward, most of the funding that NAPTIP does get has resulted from NAPTIP making proposals to international agencies or other governments. The hustle to get funding was something that many NAPTIP officers reflected on in this context. Because they have had to work so hard to get this funding, there is additional pressure to show results.

These types of pitch-funded projects contrast with ones where funding agencies approach NAPTIP. Here, interviewees from NAPTIP critiqued that projects are not necessarily well thought out and often create extra pressures for the agency. Often they have to accept them to secure funding, leaving them to deliver on projects that they do not necessarily feel facilitate their main work priorities. As Senior Officer Peter's continued:

> *[International funders] think they know, so they just write all kinds of ideas and bring up all kinds of ideas. We will normally ask them, 'Okay, you want to do school sensitization; why are you choosing to do that? Why have you chosen to go to this particular [area]? What is the message, and why did you choose that message?' They tell you they can't tell you why. They just know that it feels good to go and tell [others] about human trafficking.*

Outside NAPTIP, numerous other interviewees also expressed the tension between what they identify as important and what funders want projects to be about. One interviewee went so far as to tell me they just take the money, deliver the project the funder wants at the lowest possible cost, and then spend the rest of the budget on what they actually want to do. This distinction between donor and local interest was also reflected in Hills' (2012b) analysis of UK funding in NPF and Brankamp's (2019) research on the purposes of implementing community policing in refugee camps in Kenya. It is also a broader critique of humanitarian initiatives.

Another explanation for why NAPTIP cases move faster than others is because NAPTIP has the capacity to deliver the kind of legal care that *should* be the norm in Nigeria. That is, when a case is stalled, prosecutors should be able to identify that and respond. Maybe, a good prosecutor should know about the

patterns in judges' rulings and understand that some might be more lenient to their case than others. NAPTIP has a legal and prosecution unit in every one of its zonal commands, solely focused on bringing trafficking cases to trial. Not only does this capacity mean that there is more focus on the cases, but also more offence-specific focus. This specialized knowledge likely makes cases move faster through the system. Although NAPTIP has figured out the system, that is how to process cases more quickly than the norm, this could be a good thing and there are lessons of best practice that could be adapted to other types of crime.

Analyzing Gendered Dimensions

Although more research is needed to understand the pathways through which cases move through NAPTIP and the Nigerian judiciary, there is a gendered difference in convictions amongst the specialized policing agencies in Nigeria tasked with responding to trafficking. I see this in the NAPTIP data, and the ETAHT data support it. It is important to acknowledge that the data are confusing for all of the above-mentioned reasons. However, the fact that my gendered findings with the NAPTIP data are backed-up by the ETAHT data is significant. These specialized agencies are convicting women of trafficking offences at a much higher rate than other non-specialist agencies, and they are convicting them at a higher rate than compared to non-trafficking offences. These findings lead to the conclusion that there is a gendered difference in trafficking charges and convictions in Nigeria.

I explore a few possible explanations for this difference in turn. First, this rate is one that we should be convicting women at. Second, the women who are being convicted are victims themselves. Third, there is an increased punitiveness towards women because being involved in trafficking is perceived to violate both gender and religious norms. Last, the labour market for trafficking is different from what research we have to date shows.

First, the data might show a more accurate portrayal of the rate of women's convictions. There is also some evidence to support this. Through analyzing media stories about court cases in Russia from 2003 to 2013, McCarthy (2020), for example, found that out of 125 cases, women were involved in 48%. This level of involvement varied across the cases, however, and men were still the majority (75%) of those convicted of trafficking. McCarthy (2020) found that women were most often presented as supporting these male offenders, for instance through recruitment. Broad's (2015, p. 1058) analysis of 71 UK conviction files for trafficking between 2004 and 2008 similarly found that women are only involved in 'lower level roles' in trafficking. Broad (2015) also found that women who are convicted were almost all victims and that they were in relationships with the male trafficker they were arrested with.

Although, when researching organized crime including trafficking in 12 southern African countries, Hübschle (2013, p. 49) found that women took on more than low-level involvement. Some were in 'managerial' or 'decision-making' roles within organized criminal networks. Sometimes through association to their male partner and sometimes because of their own volition. In their analysis of

the roles of women as offenders in organized criminal networks in 89 Dutch court case files on trafficking from 2006 to 2007, Siegel and de Blank (2010) found a similar multiplicity of roles women took on. Siegel and de Blank (2010, p. 446) found, however, that most women took on more 'practical' roles for these networks: taking money, recruiting victims, etc. They found very few instances where a woman was at the top of the network; these few cases nevertheless involved African women as Madams, particularly those from Ghana and Nigeria.

One of the hallmarks of trafficking research, outlined in Chapter 2, is that women are more likely to be victims than men. Maybe because of all the forces outlined in Chapter 2 and reflected in Chapters 5 and 6, we have been overly lenient towards women, and, by being much more likely to label them as a victim instead of an offender, we have silenced a fuller understanding of what trafficking is. Perhaps what my findings and those of Siegel and de Blank (2010), Hübschle (2013), Broad (2015), and McCarthy (2020) show is a failure to explore the more profound questions outlined in Chapter 2 of 'how accurate is our data that these narratives are formed on?' and the related question of 'what would accurate data look like?'

On the other hand, maybe the data show that women are more likely to be victims of trafficking, *and* these female victims are more likely to be mislabelled as offenders. Interview data highlight that NAPTIP is more suspicious of women who present as victims, as the gendered language from a Senior NAPTIP Commander below shows. In this passage, the commander is responding to my question about what happens next when they are trying to determine if someone

is a victim of trafficking or a trafficker. He responded by explaining what they do when they come across a suspected victim of trafficking. They determine victimhood through their counselling and investigation departments. Senior Commander Adamu (emphasis my own) explains:

> *Through counselling and investigation, we're able to know. And, through counselling we're also able to know that somebody we thought of as a victim was a trafficker. And we then have to remove a victim from the shelter to the holding centre, the custody, and get the person detained. Now we discovered that it's not a victim but rather a trafficker. So, we have* ***her*** *detained.*

Senior Commander Adamu's comments are, of course, confounded by the fact that NAPTIP's shelters are only for women. But because of this, the only real time that NAPTIP will change someone's label from victim to offender is for women. This suspicion of women in shelters feeds into a larger dialogue around which offenders are trying to 'trick' the system – women try to trick the system.

One of the trends that many interviewees spoke about was the presence and influence of Madams from Benin City in recruiting and transporting women and girls. However, when I specifically followed up with Senior Commander Adamu to ask if this identification happens more frequently with women because the ones they come across as victims are these Madams, he said no and only elaborated that in the course of the investigation they are able to find out: 'Oh, that this person played a role in taking some persons away. And, they were not a victim.'

The NAPTIP commander's quote shows that the determination of victimhood is happening in the context of counselling, which supports the instrumentalization

of the counselling process as a tool of investigation and prosecution. It also leads to a series of questions for future research about what is happening during NAPTIP counselling, for what purpose, and how the success of the counselling process is measured.

Counselling could, for example, pivotally shape prosecutions by filtering out a victim willing to participate in the criminal justice process versus those that are not. As all prosecutions need victim testimony, the conviction rates could only reflect cases where the victims are ones that the counselling department has been able to work with to convince them to tell their story and carry it forward to prosecution. I would speculate that my findings in Chapter 7 related to perceptions of victimhood overlap with those that the counselling department would have, but more research is needed. For example, are more vulnerable victims more 'willing' to carry their cases forward to prosecution because they are 'easier' to convince? If so, what does this imply for the nature of the relationship between the counselling department and the victim? It could be that willingness to testify is also gendered – e.g. that victims are more 'willing' to testify against women than men; or that women are more likely to be the 'willing' victims to testify and that they have been more often victimized by other women; and so on and so forth.

On the other hand, the gendered nature of conviction rates could reflect that those who are victimized by women are more likely to be visible to law enforcement and the public. This visibility could reflect the different pathways in trafficking for women, or it could reflect a wider perception of what trafficking is.

As set out in Chapter 7, trafficking is often defined in relation to sexual exploitation, and there is a demonstrated pattern of the public perceiving that women are involved in recruiting other women for sexual exploitation in Nigeria.

The gendered nature of the conviction rates could additionally reflect a more punitive attitude towards women. This more punitiveness could underlie investigations and counselling practices too. Women who are traffickers are not only criminal, but they also violate social norms related to gender. Moreover, women involved in sex trafficking also violate religious norms. Female defendants, then, suffer a compounded punitiveness in a way that male defendants do not.

Alternatively, the conviction rates could be capturing a difference in the labour market more generally. They could reflect an otherwise hidden labour market in which women really are near equal participants to men. That said, assuming that most women who are trafficked are done so for sexual exploitation, consideration of the labour market would also necessitate analysis of how the sex labour market differs from other illicit labour markets. There were only a few times that interviewees referenced traffickers themselves, even when prompted, and most of the focus therein was on Madams. This focus on Madams likely stems from the focus on sex trafficking. This emphasis is also not exclusive to Nigerian anti-trafficking agencies. The European Asylum Support Office (2015, p. 21) even goes so far as to refer to a Madam as the ‘most important person in Nigerian sex trafficking.’

If women – Madams – are more likely to be traffickers in the sex labour market, why do we not see *more* women than men convicted? And still, why are not more of these women imprisoned? Could these women be from a higher socio-economic status, so they are more likely to pay fines instead of serving prison sentences? If our current understanding of the role of Madams is accurate, however, are we actually convicting women who are victims?

My interviewees described Madams in relatively straightforward terms: a woman who has been a victim that becomes a trafficker. She has travelled from Nigeria to, almost always, Italy. In Italy, she has worked as a sex worker – or rather, been exploited for sex – and then returns to Nigeria, builds a big house, displays her wealth, and starts the process of recruiting other women to go to Italy to do the same. She either stays in Nigeria or moves back to Italy or another European country. She typically 'supports' the journey to Italy for the recruits through organizing the details, financing, and housing. Madams will then use this support to bind the victim to them. Debt-bondage repayments typically range from €35,000 to €50,000 and can take two to five years for victims to pay off; only Madams can decide when the debt is settled (European Asylum Support Office, 2015). However, often after victims finish repaying their debts, they continue to work for Madams as their families back home rely on the remittance payments they send. Those who stay are the ones that typically become Madams themselves or are otherwise involved in trafficking future victims. Sex trafficking, in short, has a 'self-reproducing' organizational structure (European Asylum Support Office, 2015, p. 21). Madams were described as the worst traffickers *because* they have been victims – they have a ruthlessness and a

harshness that enables them to succeed in the business, and, for them, it is very much a business.

My interviewees described Madams as at the top of the trafficking business model, who often use men to facilitate the journey and other lower-level elements of the business. As Senior Officer Sabo described:

> *Most of the people, the big Madams that is, most of them hold up outside there in Europe or in destination countries. And then the ones that we see here are more or less like the middlemen for them, the smaller fries who are helping them to facilitate by helping them to procure these people.*

This senior officer went on to describe how these middlemen are leveraged to recruit people who trust them, such as friends and family, and that victims themselves are also used to recruit their own family and friends too.

Yet despite my interviewees' descriptions of how Madams are trafficking offenders, they gave the impression that they do not give too much operational focus to their role in organized criminal networks. Much more of their attention was given to addressing the socio-economic conditions and cultural mindset that they felt created the desire to move, as mentioned in Chapter 7, even though they recognized that organized crime is a focus for Western donors. When they did discuss how trafficking offenders use organized crime networks, it was mostly as part of a description of what trafficking is – e.g. it involves organized criminal networks that use coercion, threats, and deception to transport and exploit victims. But actual descriptions of these networks clarified that they are loosely organized and not like what the West perceives as organized crime. One senior officer at NAPTIP's headquarters referred to the pattern as more 'gang-like' than networked (Senior Officer Sabo, NAPTIP).

In many cases, my participants even went so far as to downplay the role of male offenders, calling them ‘travel agents’ and claiming that sometimes middlemen do not know the whole travel process themselves. These men are just one link in a longer value chain.[144] At the same time, participants who used this kind of language juggled through an explanation of how to distinguish between those (men) who smuggle and those (women) who traffic people. In these cases, my participants relied on distinguishing between smuggling and trafficking to draw a line between who is an offender and who is not. They disconnected the process of travelling from their definition of an offender. That is, those involved in the value chain are not necessarily offenders,[145] only those that deliver the product (people) to the customer (exploiters/traffickers). The distinction between customer and product becomes vital. In smuggling, the individual being smuggled is both the product and the customer. In trafficking, the individual being trafficked is the product only. The value chain description of the offender does little to explain situations that start as smuggling and end as trafficking or the many situations that fluctuate between the definition of smuggling and trafficking along the transport route. Moreover, in his network analysis of two major trafficking investigations between Nigerian and Italian authorities, Campana (2015, p. 82) found that the separation between the transport and exploitation stages is a strategic ‘division of labour and role

[144] A value chain describes a set of activities in a business model to deliver the product to a customer.

[145] At least not necessarily of trafficking. Some of them did *not* use the language of an offender when describing smugglers; however, some did.

specialization' that is a 'crucial organizational arrangement that allows for higher trafficking capacity.'

Although using the problematic language of 'prostitution' and 'black boy,' Jørgen Carling (2005), a Research Professor in Migration and Transnationalism Studies at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, developed Figure 4 for the European Migration Policy Institute to showcase not only the perception of the gendered dimensions of the trafficking process but also this division of labour.[146] The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011) supports Carling's visualization by describing that Nigerian Madams are 'in league with the main passeurs'[147] along the route.

Figure 4. Jørgen Carling's (2005) Visualization of Trafficking Networks[148]

[146] The Migration Policy Institute (via Lauren Shaw, Editor & Publications Manager) granted written consent and copyright permission to use Carlen's (2005) visualization in this thesis.

[147] Passeurs, or trolleys as per Carling's (2005) visualization.

[148] Carling (2005) defines an 'ohen' as an ATR priest that will perform a role similar to a lawyer or registrar to design to contract between the victim and the trafficker(s). 'Trolleys' are the men who work in small groups to transport women. A 'Madam's (black) boy' is her partner in Europe that assists in managing trafficking-related activities.



Descriptions of offenders underscored the difference between how the interviewees conceptualized irregular migration versus how they operationalize it, as outlined in Chapter 7. Yet, the conviction data show that women and men

are charged with offences at almost a comparable frequency with a few exceptions, including §§13, 15, and 19 (see Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7). Implications from the data are that there are some notable differences in offending patterns between men and women, but not nearly as many as we perceive. Although, I am hesitant to read too much of this finding for a few reasons. Importantly, some people were referenced as charged with multiple charges under the same section of the TIPPEA Act, for which I counted each charge – e.g. an individual listed as charged under §§15(a), 15(b), and 15(c) would be recorded as having three charges under §15. In contrast, others were only referred to as more broadly being charged under a specific section of the Act, which I only counted as one charge – e.g. for an individual only listed as charged under §15, I only recorded one charge under §15.

Figure 5. Charge(s) by Gender of Defendants as a Percentage of Total Number of Charges by Gender Category of Defendant, Collapsed into One Chart Showing Both Genders



Figure 6. Charge(s) for Male Defendants as a Percentage of Total Number of Charges for Men (n=194)



Figure 7. Charge(s) for Female Defendants as a Percentage of Total Number of Charges for Women (n=183)



Moreover, many offenders had multiple charges levied against them (41%, n=43 of women had more than one charge; 29%, n=38 of men had more than one charge (see Table 8 and Table 9 for more details). It is difficult to tell which was the lead charge and which were the supporting charges. For example, more women could have been charged under §15 as their supporting charge to another primary one. These data points are also not complete as the gender of the victim would enable a better deconstruction of any patterns – for example, are more charges brought forward under different sections of the Act based on the gender of the victim and are men/women more likely to be charged with these gendered offences.

Table 8. Overview of Charges that Defendants with both Gender and Charge Data Points were Convicted[149]

		Women		**Men**	
Section Number	**Description of Section**	*N*	*% of Total Charges for Women*	*N*	*% of Total Charges for Men*
11	Exportation of any person out of Nigeria and importation of persons into Nigeria	3	2	0	0
12	Procurement of any person	7	4	1	1
13	Causing or encouraging the seduction or prostitution of any person under 18 years	7	4	24	12
14	Procurement of any person under 18 years	11	6	5	3
15	Procurement of any person for prostitution, pornography and use in armed conflict[150]	37	20	25	13

[149] This table uses the 2005 TIPPEA Act's description of sections. The conviction data appears only to use the 2005 version of the TIPPEA Act when it describes charges. The 2005 Act lists sections slightly differently than the 2015 version. For example, §11 in the 2015 version refers to the establishment of special departments.

[150] §15(d) of the TIPPEA Act refers to use in armed conflict. No one was convicted of this sub-section

16	Foreign travels which promote prostitution	27	15	36	19
17	Unlawful detention with intent to defile	1	1	4	2
18	Procuring defilement of any person by threats, fraud or administering drugs	2	1	12	6
19	Kidnapping from guardianship	41	22	31	16
21	Buying or selling a person for a purpose	6	3	6	3
22	Unlawful forced labour	11	6	18	9
23	Traffic in slaves	9	5	2	1
24	Slave dealing	5	3	14	7
26	Offence by alien in contravention of the Act	2	1	4	2
27	Attempt to commit an offence	12	7	12	6
29	Any commercial carrier who knowingly carries any person in contravention of the Act	1	1	0	0
58	Obstruction of the Agency or authorised officers	1	1	0	0
	Total	183	Total	194	

Table 9. Number of Charges by Gender for Defendants with both Charge and Gender Data Points (n=235)

	Women		**Men**	
Number of Charges per Defendant	*N*	*% of Total Number of Charges for Women*	*N*	*% of Total Number of Charges for Men*
1 charge	61	59	93	71
2 charges	16	15	23	18
3 charges	20	19	11	8
4 charges	3	3	2	2
5 charges	2	2	2	2
6 charges	2	2	0	0
Total	104	Total	131	

A deeper analysis on how cases are processed through the criminal justice system would be crucial to make any authoritative conclusions on gendered

patterns in charges. The data tentatively show that the pattern in charging does *not* reflect the types of offending differences we perceive there to be between male and female traffickers. While women appear to be slightly more frequently involved in procuring a person for sex work, men are more frequently involved in doing so for someone under 18. For the most part, men and women are charged under the breath of the TIPPEA Act at a relatively comparable spread of frequencies for sex-related offences versus other trafficking offences, with men being slightly more frequently charged with sexual-related offences than other trafficking offences (see Table 10) – this presents as an interesting and important area for future research.

Table 10. Breakdown of Charges by Type

	Women		**Men**	
Type of Charge	*N*	*% of Total Charges for Women*	*N*	*% of Total Charges for Men*
Non-sex-related charges: §§19-24, 29, and 58	74	40	71	37
Sex-related charges: §§13-18	85	46	106	55
Charges that can be sex-related or non-sex-related: §§11, 12, 26, and 27	24	13	17	9
Total	183	Total	194	

Conclusion

Like Siegel and de Blank (2010), Hübschle (2013), Broad (2015), and McCarthy (2020), my findings on Nigerian conviction data raise questions about what we know about victims, offenders, and their gender. Gender is both a marker of

vulnerability and culpability. Are Madams set up as the visible face of offending in the hierarchy of traffickers? The easy targets in an otherwise male-dominated space. Or are they at the top of the hierarchy, with the middlemen involved in sexual exploitation getting arrested and convicted less frequently?

The punitive focus on women as offenders fails to consider whether gender could also frame unique vulnerabilities as offenders – particularly given the perception that all women who are Madams were once victims. The recognition of female offenders as also victims leads to a series of important considerations such as: What kind of different approach or intervention does this require? And, what provisions are there for these victimized women in prison? It also requires a deeper consideration of the sex labour market and whether females and males are the same or different types of offenders in this space. My participants suggest women are more extreme offenders, but this is actually true? Instead of capturing a type of female criminal agency, does the pattern we see more simply reflect the ripple effect of the feminization of poverty and other gendered patterns outlined in Chapter 7?

The complexities of understanding the data highlight a much broader consideration. It is a privilege to be able not only to collect but use data to answer questions related to crime and justice. My experience forced me to confront my own expectation that the data would be clearly defined and concise. There is an asymmetry in data collection between the Global North and Global South. Corruption, lack of infrastructure, and hard-to-interpret data can make it challenging to analyze Global South data. Nigeria does quite well compared to

other Global South countries, as the National Bureau of Statistics publishes a lot of data readily available online. In my case, however, there was no data guide published to facilitate the interpretation of the readily available data. So, I was left to interpret what the data points were referring to as best I could. At the same time, I feel uneasy about me, a white woman from the Global North, being the one to critique Nigeria's data collection policies and find this gendered difference in NAPTIP's data. Still, my findings demand that we ask more questions about the data, even considering the limitations.

The data in this chapter suggest that the relationship between gender and trafficking is much more complex than previous research has shown. Women are both the most extreme type of victim and extreme type of offender. They are both used by men and use men. They are convicted alongside men at a similar frequency yet appear to be reported as offenders significantly less. Similarly, despite being convicted alongside men, they serve prison sentences less frequently. These data overlay an equally complex and gendered understanding of the distinction between trafficking and migrant smuggling. While I do not have the data required to deconstruct the full extent of the gendered phenomena I have found, in the conclusion I outline ways we can start to make sense of this finding and my other ones in the context of my research questions. There are no simple answers, and, mainly, my research has highlighted numerous areas where future research is desperately required.

Conclusion

This thesis explored the stories law enforcement officers and their partner agencies tell about their work when they respond to human trafficking. I analyzed the construction of victimhood and offending using portraits of the responses in the UK and Nigeria. In the UK, I analyzed interviews with 24 police officers from eight forces in England and Wales and a specialized national task force. In each case, my participants were the authorities on modern slavery investigations. For some, their role was built into a more comprehensive set of policing responsibilities after they successfully investigated the first modern slavery offence in their force. For others, working on modern slavery was their exclusive focus, and they took on responsibility for advising others in their force on how to investigate these kinds of offences. In addition to interviews, I also partnered with one force in the UK that shared 493 NRM case files, 28 of which I analyzed in-depth. In Nigeria, I interviewed NAPTIP officers and their partner agencies. This approach helped frame a broader understanding of how the Nigerian anti-trafficking apparatus perceives trafficking and how police have been leveraged therein. I interviewed 36 participants from NAPTIP and their partner agencies. I also analyzed 394 NAPTIP conviction records from 319 case files.

Over this thesis, I looked at the narratives that UK and Nigerian police and their partner agencies put forth on trafficking. My participants presented two different stories of what trafficking is and who its victims and offenders are. In the UK, being a woman was a marker of vulnerability. In Nigeria, it was both a marker of vulnerability and culpability. My participants also described their role in trafficking responses distinctly. Whereas UK participants emphasized the



offender, Nigerian participants were largely uninterested in the offender. The organized criminal offender was a focal point for my UK participants. UK officers were protecting victims from organized crime, and they took trafficking to be a symptom of poor border control. In contrast, my Nigerian participants gave little reflection on the place of organized crime in trafficking. Nigerian police and their partners fundamentally understood trafficking as reflecting wider migration patterns. They saw irregular migration as a choice people make to better their lives and that trafficking victimization is one outcome of this choice.

For the UK participants, victim vulnerability was based on what the officers could see – signs of weakness signalled by aspects such as injury, gender, and race. Participants also focused on how this weakness was exploited by organized crime. The UK participants presented themselves as protectors, reproducing policing and 'masculine ideals of physical strength, violence, and heroism' (Kurtz and Upton, 2018, p. 283). Such discourse did not give much consideration to what it means to truly help victims. In contrast, for the Nigerian participants, vulnerability was about understanding what conditions had fostered insecure livelihoods and the normalization of migration that had led to the victims' intersection with trafficking.

The differences in UK and Nigerian narratives on trafficking reveal distinct understandings of how victims' rights are violated in trafficking. UK participants believed that women's rights were being violated by male traffickers who worked in organized criminal groups. To protect these ideal victims, they ultimately did not recognize the rights of the many men presenting to them as victims by

instead approaching them as offenders. Nigerian participants saw all Nigerians as having their rights violated by the failures of the state, which led many to seek out irregular migration that had the potential to result in trafficking situations. While not denying male victimhood, they also did not specifically protect men under the auspices of trafficking responses. Still, Nigerian trafficking responses resulted in some questionable human rights behaviour, particularly related to the treatment of victims in shelters. It was not necessarily NAPTIP's identification of victims that had the potential to violate human rights as it was in the UK, but what happens after this identification.

While there were many differences in the national responses, there were also some crucial similarities in the UK and Nigeria. Both sets of respondents emphasized the victim's story. In the UK, police relied on victim testimony to determine the legitimacy of their claim to victimhood. For Nigerian participants, victim testimony was critical for convictions. Cases did not proceed to trial unless the victim was believable. Both the UK and Nigerian data also raise the question, what about the male victims? The men were largely silenced as victims in both countries, although Nigeria participants did recognize that men are victimized by smuggling, whereas the police I spoke to in the UK approached them mostly as offenders.

For both countries, there is a performative aspect of the humanitarian work being carried out by the police. In the UK, perhaps predictably, the police responses were racialized. On the other hand, in Nigeria, police take on humanitarian roles, but the mechanism through which they are doing it

potentially result in further rights violations. There are many remaining questions about how NAPTIP understands the overlap between victimization and offending for women.

My research, therefore, raises urgent practical and intellectual questions about the police in a globalized world. What do the police do? Why do they do it? Why does it matter? Such considerations return us to the questions outlined in Chapter 3: Do the police actually have the capacity to adopt the human-rights roles and responsibilities they are tasked with, and, if so, should they? In the UK, for citizens and foreign nationals, human rights protections are only extended to victims who meet ideal conceptualizations of victimhood. In Nigeria, the picture is more complex. NAPTIP does have some capacity to take on human rights roles and responsibilities, but they also have the potential to violate rights.

Another question raised in this thesis was, how do police themselves frame what they are doing? Is it through reference to state security or human security, or both? I found that it is through state security in the UK. However, participants believed they were acting to protect human security. In Nigeria, police framed their work more through human security in response to the perceived failures of the state.

Where do my findings fit in the overall architecture of the anti-trafficking establishment? The UK government's response to trafficking relies on an ideal victim construct, which leads to overlooking many victims; yet, it is held up as a gold standard. In Nigeria, the police are funded by the UK’s anti-trafficking

establishment, as well as that of other Western countries. My findings make us think critically about the British commitment to eradicating trafficking and the flow of Western ideals. Principally, what authority does one state have in the jurisdiction of another? Trafficking responses are both an exercise of state sovereignty and may oppress it. The UK exercises its territorial boundaries through combatting trafficking, but in so doing, it infringes on Nigeria's. As Fitzgerald (2016, p. 191) puts it, 'in the pursuit of protecting UK sovereignty from unwanted immigrants and external security threats, the government downplays the question of the sovereignty for trafficking source and transit nations.' There is great scope for future research to investigate how Global North donor practices influence Global South narratives on trafficking.

We need to accept that Nigeria is probably getting trafficking responses wrong to some extent too, particularly as it relates to NAPTIP's victim care. There are gendered dynamics that warrant more exploration, such as how gender intersects with offending and why specialized agencies in Nigeria are convicting women of trafficking offences at a much higher rate than other non-specialist agencies. Also, what are the consequences of NAPTIP's multifaceted approach? I found that NAPTIP cases are streamlined into prosecution – what implications does this have for victim welfare? And, again, what about men? There remain significant questions to ask about how we deliver services to victims of irregular migration, many of whom suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder because of what they experienced on their journey (Kidane and Stokmans, 2019).

By framing trafficking as a policing problem rather than a socio-economic one, we are inherently implying that through enough police response – enough resourcing, enough investigation, enough intelligence, etc. – we can curb and/or stop trafficking. This approach to trafficking presents an easier problem for states to solve, as there is a cause (organized crime), effect (victimized women), and solution (police).

If states, particularly in the Global North, reframe trafficking as a symptom of globalization as my Nigerian participants did, as causing and being caused by endemic poverty and other situations of economic and social depravity, the solution becomes much more complex. Trafficking, in this view, would require global action to redress poverty, inequality, and corruption. It needs an entire undoing of a capitalist structure of global governance, elements of which have been caused by colonial and neo-colonial patterns that maintain the unequal participation of states in the global whole. These processes have othered countries like Nigeria and other low-income countries, which suffer the brunt of the adverse effects of globalization while simultaneously being blamed for not being developed enough. Such a socio-economic approach, however, still implies there can be a solution to trafficking and that trafficking has the same 'root causes' as migration. If we acknowledge that migration is an indelible part of human life, as per contemporary migration scholars like Bakewell (2008), does that mean we also have to accept that trafficking is too?

Overall, the definitions of victims and offenders are complex, and trafficking responses show how unreliable and fluid these concepts are. The UK and

Nigeria highlight two different approaches to trafficking responses. There are unique understandings of crime and victimization. There are also two different conceptualizations of what leads people to situations that result in trafficking and how we can redress it. But they are part of a singular response: a criminal justice one. They are the face of different views of our understanding of the criminal justice approach to trafficking. These narratives exist on a continuum, and responders to trafficking locate both their response and their understanding of it somewhere on this continuum. Yet, the question remains, what is human trafficking really?

There are, of course, limitations to my findings. One is that police stories are known to recount those that 'dramatize the job' (van Hulst, 2020, p. 100-101). It could be that the stories that officers were telling me, particularly in the UK, were the most extreme – or idealized – versions of their work. Another consideration is whether they told me about what they actually do or the narrative they are trained to deal with. My findings could be capturing the strength of the UK and Nigerian cultures of combatting trafficking. Police and, in Nigeria, their partners orient their work through reference to the larger state narrative on what trafficking is. In the UK, we see the strength of this narrative through the rescue focus that puts organized crime as central, despite shaky evidence. In Nigeria, the strength of this culture can be seen in how officers understood trafficking as the same as smuggling, but adopted gendered ways of identifying who is a victim of trafficking versus smuggling.

In a related limitation, van Hulst (2020) cautions that police in different ranks can tell different stories. In the UK, I interviewed across various forces and levels of police rank, yet all presented a similar story about their work, with the exception being county lines officers. This singular narrative is somewhat unique, as different ranked officers are typically understood to tell distinct stories (van Hulst, 2020). One possible explanation is that something about my identity as a researcher or my questions elicited police to respond in such a way. Another is that getting different narratives could take more time. I only interviewed each of my participants once. Maybe if I had interviewed them another time or been able to shadow some of their work, differing stories would have emerged. However, because I triangulated my findings with the case files, it bolsters my claims.

Similarly, where I did not have access to detailed case files in Nigeria, I triangulated NAPTIP narratives with that of their partners, which adds strength to my findings. I did, however, only interview senior level NAPTIP officials. Front-line officers may well have different perceptions of their work. One of my research's more interesting background findings was that my NAPTIP participants and their partners had the same understanding of trafficking. This finding raises important questions about the relationship between NAPTIP and its partners. Maybe the NAPTIP response is guided by NGOs or NAPTIP's guides NGOs. If the latter, there are many questions to be asked in future research about how criminal justice approaches influence NGO work in Nigeria. A broader consideration, however, is that maybe despite adopting the principles of a criminal justice framework as per the Palermo Protocol and embedding it in

domestic legislation with the TIPPEA Act, Nigeria's response to trafficking is not a criminal justice one, or at least not how we understand it in the Global North. NAPTIP officers' understanding of their role as not being a policing one perhaps reflects this. Or maybe what I have captured is a difference between how NAPTIP operates and how NPF operates. While I interviewed a few NPF officers, it would be essential to do more work with NPF in future and analyze any distinctions in their work. I also argued that the colonial history of NPF is the subtext to NAPTIP's work – but is it really? More research is needed to explore how the public perceives NAPTIP in relation to NPF.

A further consideration is that my participants could be using their stories as resistance tools (Lesutis, 2018, p. 512). My Nigerian participants, for instance, could have been putting forth stories that resisted the British narrative of what trafficking is. While not criminalizing men, they still did create a hierarchy of victimization where some were perceived as having suffered more unduly than others. Moreover, my Nigerian participants used other aspects of donor narratives, such as those related to migration. There is also some evidence that, through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria and other West African states are implementing migration policing practices that are comparable to Frontex (CLEEN Foundation, 2015). Another limitation of my research is that it talks about perceptions of the victim without including the victim. We need more research that captures the victim's perspective. This research could help illuminate not only more on how police respond to victims, but also how the relationship between consent and coercion is constructed.

One thing that is clear from my research is that it starts to map trends that need further exploration. We need more research on police and on trafficking narratives in African countries. There are differences that are important to investigate. Although not explored in this thesis, I had significant findings that warrant future research. Particularly, more research is needed on how religion intersects with culture in Nigeria and how that relates to the perceptions of trafficking and types of anti-trafficking projects carried out. Another unexplored finding I had was about child labour and how it relates (or not) to trafficking in Nigeria; some felt it was trafficking, where others felt it was not.

My research also raised questions about how we understand Nigerian women. Nigerian women are the most visible victim of trafficking, but are also often denied the status and protections of victimhood in Europe and may be conflated with offending in Nigeria. In trafficking, women's bodies are sites where power is exercised. There is a considerable need to explore trafficking responses through the lens of the links to slavery and the position of Nigerian women's bodies therein (Woods, 2013).

We also have to conduct more research into the neo-colonial practices that are being implemented in the name of combatting trafficking, and we specifically have to explore what is happening in criminological contexts in under-represented areas. This type of research fits within the aims of decolonizing criminology (Cunneen, 2018; Mignolo, 2018; Moosavi, 2018; Blagg and Anthony, 2019; Moosavi, 2019; Dimou, 2021; Goyes et al., 2021; Aliverti et al., 2021).

Trafficking responses are a new iteration of colonial power. As Gadd and Broad (2018, p. 1441) put it:

> *Before 'evil' traffickers were exploiting 'innocent victims,' 'bogus asylum seekers' were posing as legitimate refugees…, and before that 'black muggers' were the 'enemy within' British society, an insult to the assumed hospitality afforded to 'the black community'…who were, in truth, disparate populations deriving primarily from former colonies where people were told that their sacrifices rendered them part of the former empire's Commonwealth.*

Not only do we need more research on under-examined contexts, but we need to bolster the work of those from these contexts. One of the main frustrations in my work was the lack of representation of African academics in major academic journals. As a result, I often had to rely on the work of non-African authors to situate my understanding of Nigeria, which certainly not only limits the critical purpose of my work but also brings with it many limitations. Decolonizing criminology is not only about what kind of work we do or the questions we ask, but how we can bring forward work from under-represented areas – we have to meaningfully decolonize our publication practices.

While there are many other limitations and areas for future research beyond just those mentioned here, my findings raise some significant critiques related to police responses to trafficking. This research explored under and un-researched areas, making notable contributions to the scholarship on trafficking and policing. Despite trafficking being a 'quintessential police offence' (Thorburn, 2018, p. 161), there is little research on trafficking responses from a policing perspective and almost no research on policing trafficking in African contexts. As explained in Chapter 2, the research that does exist focuses on conceptualizing trafficking from a Global North perspective. This research focuses on theorizing what

trafficking is or is not, and few studies engage in empirical research. The ones that do are often methodologically flawed, with biased, unclear, or inaccurate data collection and analysis.

This thesis addresses these gaps in scholarship by providing empirically rigorous findings from a perceived trafficking route: Nigeria to the UK (via Italy). I put forth that to study trafficking, we must do so in source (here, UK) and destination (Nigeria) countries. We also need to conduct research in transit countries, although it was outside the scope of this thesis. Finally, we must conduct research that bridges the Global North and Global South to truly understand the implications of trafficking policy and practice. While there are limits to my research as mentioned in my methods chapter (Chapter 4) and in this conclusion, I included stakeholders throughout my research and triangulated my analysis with interviews and case files. I, thus, combined methodological tools to construct an understanding of police response to trafficking from the ground up.

I adopted decolonial research principles to question the core of police responses to trafficking: how police conceptualize victims and offenders in a source and destination country. I found that police responses to trafficking are racialized and gendered and that there are important differences in perceptions of trafficking in Nigeria and the UK, respectively. These findings significantly advance our understanding of police responses to trafficking. We must critically reconsider the purpose, costs, and limits of leveraging the criminal justice system to respond to trafficking.

Appendix 1

Peelian Principles as listed by Mayhall, 1985, pp.425-426 in Emsley, 2014, pp. 13-14:

1. *To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.*
2. *To recognize always that the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions, and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.*
3. *To recognize always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public also means the securing of the willing cooperation of the public in the task of securing observance of the law.*
4. *To recognize always that the extent to which the cooperation of the public can be secured diminishes, proportionately, the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.*
5. *To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing; by ready exercise of courtesy and good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.*
6. *To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public cooperation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or restore order; and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.*
7. *To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.*
8. *To recognize always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the power of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the state, and authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.*
9. *To recognize always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.*

Reference List

ABORISADE, R. A. & ADEDAYO, S. S. 2020. Gender and Sentencing in the Nigerian Justice System: Are Women Given Preferential Treatments? *Gender & Behaviour,* 18**,** 15581-15590.

ACHEBE, C. 1995. Colonialist Criticism. *In:* ASHCROFT, B., GRIFFITHS, G. & TIFFIN, H. (eds.) *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader.* London; New York: Routledge.

ADAMS, C. 2011. Re-Trafficked Victims: How a Human Rights Approach Can Stop the Cycle of Re-Victimiztion of Sex Trafficking Victims. *The George Washington International Law Review,* 43**,** 201-234.

ADEBAYO, S. 2021. *The Nigerian Dream is to Leave Nigeria* [Online]. Africa is a Country. Available: https://africasacountry.com/2021/03/the-nigerian-dream-is-to-leave-nigeria

AGBIBOA, D. E. 2015. Protectors or Predators? The Embedded Problem of Police Corruption and Deviance in Nigeria. *Administration & Society,* 47**,** 244-281.

AHIRE, P. T. 1991. *Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria, 1860-1960,* Milton Keynes, Open University Press.

AKEE, R., BASU, A. K., BEDI, A. & CHAU, N. H. 2014. Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement, and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective. *The Journal of Law & Economics,* 57**,** 349-386.

ALEMIKA, E. 1993. Colonialism, State and Policing in Nigeria. *An Interdisciplinary Journal,* 20**,** 187-219.

ALEMIKA, E. & CHUKWUMA, I. 2004. *Crime and Policiung in Nigeria: Challenges and Options,* Ikeja, CLEEN Foundation.

ALEMIKA, E. E. O. 2018. Why Has Police Reform Failed to Produce Reformed Police in Nigeria. *In:* OWEN, O. (ed.) *Police Reform in Nigeria: The Devolution Debate.* Abuja: CLEEN Foundation.

ALESINA, A. & REICH, B. 2015. Nation-Building. Working Paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University.

ALIVERTI, A. 2019. Patrolling the 'Thin Blue Line' in a World in Motion: An Exploration of the Crime–Migration Nexus in UK Policing. *Theoretical Criminology,* 24**,** 8-27.

ALIVERTI, A., CARVALHO, H., CHAMBERLEN, A. & SOZZO, M. 2021. Decolonizing the Criminal Question. *Punishment & Society,* 23**,** 297-316.

ALTHOFF, M. 2013. Multiple Identities and Crime: A Study of Antillean Women and Girls in the Netherlands. *European Journal of Criminology,* 10**,** 394-407.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. 2006a. *Nigeria: 'Release' of up to 25,000 Detainees and Prisoners* [Online]. Amnesty International. Available: https://www.amnesty.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/afr440022006en.pdf

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. 2006b. *Nigeria: Oil, Poverty and Violence* [Online]. Available: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/017/2006/en/

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. 2009. *Killing at Will: Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria* [Online]. London: Amnesty International Publications. Available: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/038/2009/en/

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL UK. 2007. *Nigeria: Prison Conditions 'Appalling' – New Findings* [Online]. London, UK: Amnesty International UK. Available: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/nigeria-prison-conditions-appalling%E2%80%99---new-findings

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL UK. 2008. *Nigeria: Criminal Justice System is a 'Conveyor Belt of Injustice' says Amnesty* [Online]. London, UK: Amnesty International UK. Available: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/nigeria-criminal-justice-system-conveyor-belt-injustice-says-amnesty

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL UK. 2020. *#EndSARS: Investigate Killings of Protestors* [Online]. UK: Amnesty International UK. Available: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/urgent-actions/endsars-investigate-killings-protestors

ANDREES, B. & VAN DER LINDEN, M. N. J. 2005. Designing Trafficking Research from a Labour Market Perspective: The ILO Experience1. *International Migration,* 43**,** 55-73.

ANGEL-AJANI, A. 2003. A Question of Dangerous Races? *Punishment & Society,* 5**,** 433-448.

ANTI-SLAVERY INTERNATIONAL. 2017. *What is Modern Slavery?* [Online]. Available: https://www.antislavery.org/slavery-today/modern-slavery/l

ASHCROFT, B., GRIFFITHS, G. & TIFFIN, H. 1995. Introduction. *In:* ASHCROFT, B., GRIFFITHS, G. & TIFFIN, H. (eds.) *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader.* London; New York: Routledge.

AYODELE, J. O. 2017. A Qualitative Study of the Crime-control Potency of Traditional Justice System in Oshogbo. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 58**,** 925-943.

AZIS, A. & WAHYUDI, R. 2020. Imperfect Victims and an Imperfect Protocol: Reflecting on the Trafficking Experiences of Indonesian Migrant Fishermen. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 6**,** 156-167.

BAARDA, C. S. 2016. Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation from Nigeria into Western Europe: The Role of Voodoo Rituals in the Functioning of a Criminal Network. *European Journal of Criminology,* 13**,** 257-273.

BAKEWELL, O. 2008. 'Keeping Them in Their Place:' the Ambivalent Relationship Between Development and Migration in Africa. *Third World Quarterly,* 29**,** 1341-1358.

BALES, K. 2004. *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy,* Berkley, California, University of California Press.

BALES, K., HESKETH, O. & SILVERMAN, B. 2015. Modern Slavery in the UK: How Many Victims? *Significance,* 12**,** 16-21.

BANKE-THOMAS, A. 2018. *The Emigration of Doctors from Nigeria is Not Today's Problem, it is Tomorrow's* [Online]. Africa at LSE Blog: Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Available: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/10/15/the-emigration-of-doctors-from-nigeria-is-not-todays-problem-it-is-tomorrows/

BARKER, V. 2017. Penal Power at the Border: Realigning State and Nation. *Theoretical Criminology,* 21**,** 441-457.

BECK, U. 2000. *What is Globalization?,* Cambridge, Polity Press.

BECK, U. 2002. The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited. *Theory, Culture & Society,* 19**,** 39-55.

BEEK, J., GÖPFERT, M., OWEN, O. & STEINBERG, J. 2017. Introduction: Policing in Africa Reconsidered. *In:* BEEK, J., GÖPFERT, M., OWEN, O. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *Police in Africa.* Oxford University Press.
BELL, E. 2013. Normalising the Exceptional: British Colonial Policing Cultures Come Home. *Cahiers du MIMMOC,* 10.
BELL, S. R. & BANKS, V. 2018. Women's Rights Organizations and Human Trafficking. *Social Science Quarterly,* 99**,** 362-376.
BELLO, P. O. 2018. Criminal Justice Response to Human Trafficking in Nigeria and South Africa: Suggestions for Better Performance. *Contemporary Justice Review,* 21**,** 140-158.
BELUR, J. 2014. Status, Gender and Geography: Power Negotiations in Police Research. *Qualitative Research,* 14**,** 184-200.
BERGELSON, V. 2018. Vulnerability, Exploitation and Choice. *In:* HAVERKAMP, R., HERLIN-KARNELL, E. & LERNESTEDT, C. (eds.) *What is Wrong with Human Trafficking?: Critical Perspectives on the Law.* Oxford: Hart Publishing.
BERNSTEIN, E. 2010. Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: the Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns. *Signs,* 36**,** 45-72.
BIERSCHENK, T. 2016. Police and State *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
BIRCH, S. 2012. *How Activism Forced Nike to Change its Ethical Game* [Online]. Available: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/green-living-blog/2012/jul/06/activism-nikefiles/368/activism-nike.html
BITTNER, E. 1990. *Aspects of Police Work,* Boston, Northeastern University Press.
BJELLAND, H. F. 2018. Conceptions of Success: Understandings of Successful Policing of Human Trafficking. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice,* 14**,** 712–725.
BLACKBURN, S. 2016. Whig View of History. *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy.* 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BLAGG, H. & ANTHONY, T. 2019. *Decolonising Criminology: Imagining Justice in a Postcolonial World,* London, Palgrave Macmillan.
BONDÜ, R. & SCHEITHAUER, H. 2015. Kill One or Kill Them All? Differences Between Single and Multiple Victim School Attacks. *European Journal of Criminology,* 12**,** 277-299.
BOSWORTH, M. 2008. Border Control and the Limits of the Sovereign State. *Social & Legal Studies,* 17**,** 199-215.
BOSWORTH, M. 2017. Penal Humanitarianism? Sovereign Power in an Era of Mass Migration. *New Criminal Law Review,* 20**,** 39-65.
BOSWORTH, M. 2018. 'Working in this Place Turns You Racist': Staff, Race, and Power in Detention. *In:* BOSWORTH, M., PARMAR, A. & VÁZQUEZ, Y. (eds.) *Race, Criminal Justice, and Migration Control: Enforcing the Boundaries of Belonging.* First ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BOSWORTH, M., HOYLE, C. & DEMPSEY, M. M. 2011. Researching Trafficked Women: On Institutional Resistance and the Limits to Feminist Reflexivity. *Qualitative Inquiry,* 17**,** 769-779.
BOTTING, A. & WEST, D. 2015. *Revised Modern Slavery Report* [Online]. Croydon Council. Available: http://croydonlcsb.org.uk/wp-

content/uploads/2016/10/Prevention-of-Modern-Slavery-Report-to-CSCB-2015-16.pdf
BOURDIEU, P. 1994. Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. *Sociological Theory,* 12**,** 1-18.
BOWLING, B. 2009. Transnational Policing: The Globalization Thesis, a Typology and a Research Agenda. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice,* 3**,** 149-160.
BOWLING, B., REINER, R. & SHEPTYCKI, J. W. E. 2019. *The Politics of the Police,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BOWLING, B. & WESTENRA, S. 2018. Racism, Immigration, and Policing. *In:* BOSWORTH, M., PARMAR, A. & VÁZQUEZ, Y. (eds.) *Race, Criminal Justice, and Migration Control: Enforcing the Boundaries of Belonging.* Oxford University Press.
BOWLING, B. & WESTENRA, S. 2020. 'A Really Hostile Environment': Adiaphorization, Global Policing and the Crimmigration Control System. *Theoretical Criminology,* 24**,** 163-183.
BRAITHWAITE, J. 1989. *Crime, Shame, and Reintegration,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BRANKAMP, H. 2019. 'Occupied Enclave': Policing and the Underbelly of Humanitarian Governance in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya. *Political Geography,* 71**,** 67-77.
BRANKAMP, H. 2020. Refugees in Uniform: Community Policing as a Technology of Government in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya. *Journal of Eastern African studies,* 14**,** 270-290.
BRANKAMP, H. & DALEY, P. 2020. Laborers, Migrants, Refugees: Managing Belonging, Bodies, and Mobility in Colonial Kenya and Tanzania. *Migration and Society: Advances in Research,* 3**,** 113-129
BRITANNICA. n.d. . *Nigeria — The Arrival of the British* [Online]. Available: https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/The-arrival-of-the-British
BROAD, R. 2015. 'A Vile and Violent Thing:' Female Traffickers and the Criminal Justice System. *British Journal of Criminology,* 55**,** 1058-1075.
BROGDEN, M. 1987. The Emergence of the Police: The Colonial Dimension. *British Journal of Criminology,* 27**,** 4-14.
BROWN, M. 2021. Truth and Method in Southern Criminology. *Critical Criminology: An International Journal,* 29**,** 451–467.
BRYANT, K. & LANDMAN, T. 2020. Combatting Human Trafficking since Palermo: What Do We Know about What Works? *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 6**,** 119-140.
BULLOCK, K. & JOHNSON, P. 2011. The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on Policing in England and Wales. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 52**,** 630-650.
CAMPANA, P. 2015. The Structure of Human Trafficking: Lifting the Bonnet on a Nigerian Transnational Network. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 56**,** 68-86.
CAMPANA, P. 2018. Out of Africa: The Prganization of Migrant Smuggling Across the Mediterranean. *European Journal of Criminology,* 15**,** 481-502.
CAMPANA, P. & VARESE, F. 2016. Exploitation in Human Trafficking and Smuggling. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research,* 22**,** 89-105.

CAMPBELL, R. 2002. *Emotionally Involved: the Impact of Researching Rape,* New York, Routledge.
CARLING, J. 2005. *Trafficking in Women from Nigeria to Europe* [Online]. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute. Available: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trafficking-women-nigeria-europe
CENTRE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, T. 2015. *A Modern Response to Modern Slavery* [Online]. London: Centre for Social Justice. Available: www.gla.gov.uk/media/1576/a-modern-response-to-modern-slavery.pdf
CHANT, S. 2015. Gender and Poverty in the Global South. *In:* COLES, A., GRAY, L. & MOMSEN, J. H. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Development.* London, [England]; New York, New York: Routledge.
CHARMAZ, K. 2017. The Power of Constructivist Grounded Theory for Critical Inquiry. *Qualitative Inquiry,* 23**,** 34-45.
CHIBUZOR, C. N., JAMES, O.-O. & NDU, J. Y. 2018. Prioritising Training and People-Oriented Security Education for Effective Policing in Nigeria. *Review of European Studies,* 10**,** 82-88.
CHILDREN'S SOCIETY. 2019. *Counting Lives: Responding to Children who are Criminally Exploited* [Online]. London: The Children's Society. Available: https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/counting-lives-report.pdf
CHO, S.-Y. 2015. Evaluating Policies Against Human Trafficking Worldwide: An Overview and Review of the 3P Index. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 1**,** 86-99.
CHO, S.-Y., DREHER, A. & NEUMAYER, E. 2014. Determinants of Anti-Trafficking Policies: Evidence from a New Index. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics,* 116**,** 429-454.
CHOO, K., JANG, J. O. & CHOI, K. 2010. Methodological and Ethical Challenges to Conducting Human Trafficking Studies: A Case Study of Korean Trafficking and Smuggling for Sexual Exploitation to the United States. *Women & Criminal Justice,* 20**,** 167-185.
CHRISTIE, N. 1986. The Ideal Victim. *In:* FATTAH, E. A. (ed.) *Crime Policy to Victim Policy.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.
CHUANG, J. A. 2006. Beyond a Snapshot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the Global Economy. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,* 13**,** 137-163.
CHUANG, J. A. 2014. Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law. *American Journal of International Law,* 108**,** 609-649.
CLEEN FOUNDATION 2015. Mobility and Security in West Africa. Abuja: CLEEN Foundation.
CLEEN FOUNDATION. 2022. *The CLEEN Foundation* [Online]. Lagos: CLEEN Foundation Available: https://cleen.org/
COCKBAIN, E., BOWERS, K. & DIMITROVA, G. 2018. Human Trafficking for Labour Exploitation: The Results of a Two-Phase Systematic Review Mapping the European Evidence Base and Synthesising Key Scientific Research Evidence. *Journal of Experimental Criminology,* 14**,** 319-360.
COLE, D. 2016. Countering Transnational Terrorism: Global Policing, Global Threats and Human Rights *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
COLLEGE OF POLICING. 2014. *Code of Ethics: A Code of Practice for the Principles and Standards of Professional Behaviour for the Policing*

Profession of England and Wales [Online]. Coventry. Available: https://assets.college.police.uk/s3fs-public/2021-02/code_of_ethics.pdf

COLLEGE OF POLICING. 2015, 2022. *Authorized Professional Practice: Major Investigation and Public Protection — Modern Slavery — Investigation* [Online]. Available: https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/modern-slavery/investigation/#cross-border-investigations

COLLEGE OF POLICING. 2016a. *First Response and the National Referral Mechanism* [Online]. Available: https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/modern-slavery/national-referral-mechanism/

COLLEGE OF POLICING. 2016b. *Major Investigation and Public Protection: Modern Slavery Act* [Online]. Available: https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/modern-slavery/modern-slavery-act-2015/

COLLEGE OF POLICING. 2016c. *Major Investigation and Public Protection: Risk and identification* [Online]. Available: https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/modern-slavery/risk-and-identification/

COMAROFF, J. L. & COMAROFF, J. 2006. Law and Disorder in the Post-Colonial: An Introduction. *In:* COMAROFF, J. & COMAROFF, J. L. (eds.) *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

CONCANNON, T. W., MEISSNER, P., GRUNBAUM, J. A., MCELWEE, N., GUISE, J.-M., SANTA, J., CONWAY, P. H., DAUDELIN, D., MORRATO, E. H. & LESLIE, L. K. 2012. A New Taxonomy for Stakeholder Engagement in Patient-Centered Outcomes Research. *Journal of General Internal Medicine,* 27**,** 985-991.

CONNOR, P. & GONZALEZ-BARRERA, A. 2018. *Many Nigerians, Tunisians and Kenyans say They Plan to Leave Their Countries in the Next Five Years — Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey* [Online]. Pew Research Center Available: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/27/many-nigerians-tunisians-and-kenyans-say-they-plan-to-leave-their-countries-in-the-next-five-years/

COOPER-KNOCK, S. J. & OWEN, O. 2015. Between Vigilantism and Bureaucracy: Improving Our Understanding of Police Work in Nigeria and South Africa. *Theoretical Criminology,* 19**,** 355-375.

COPE, N. 2008. 'Interpretation for Action?': Definitions and Potential of Crime Analysis for Policing. *In:* NEWBURN, T. (ed.) *Handbook of Policing.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

CRAIG, G. 2015. Human Trafficking and the UK Modern Slavery Bill. *Social Inclusion,* 3**,** 136-139.

CRAWSHAW, R., CULLEN, S. & WILLIAMSON, T. 2007. *Human Rights and Policing,* Leiden: Biggleswade, Martinus Nijhoff and Extenza Turpin [distributor].

CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE. 2017. *Human Trafficking, Smuggling and Slavery* [Online]. Available: www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/human_trafficking_and_smuggling/

CUNNEEN, C. 2018. Indigenous Challenges for Southern Criminology. *In:* CARRINGTON, K., HOGG, R., SCOTT, J. & SOZZO, M. (eds.) *The*

Palgrave Handbook of Criminology and the Global South. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
CURTIS, M. 2016. *The New Colonialism: Britain's Scramble for Africa's Energy and Mineral Resources* [Online]. London. Available: https://waronwant.org/sites/default/files/TheNewColonialism.pdf
DABALEN, A., ONI, B. & ADEKOLA, O. A. 2000. *Labor Market Prospects of University Graduates in Nigeria* [Online]. US and Nigeria: World Bank and Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research. Available: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/387541468775777646/pdf/299420UNI0Labor1market0graduates.pdf
DALY, S. F. C. 2020. Policing and the Limits of the Political Imagination in Postcolonial Nigeria. *Radical History Review,* 2020**,** 193-198.
DE BIE, J. L., DE POOT, C. J. & VAN DER LEUN, J. P. 2014. Jihadi Networks and the Involvement of Vulnerable Immigrants: Reconsidering the Ideological and Pragmatic Value. *Global Crime,* 15**,** 275-298.
DE HAAS, H. 2008. *Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends* [Online]. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Available: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs-32_en.pdf
DE HAAS, H. 2010. *Migration Transitions: a Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry into the Developmental Drivers of International Migration* [Online]. Oxford: International Migration Institute. Available: https://www.migrationinstitute.org/publications/wp-24-10/@@download/file
DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE DOWNING STREET & THE RT HON THERESA MAY M. P. 2017. *A Call to Action to End Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking* [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-call-to-action-to-end-forced-labour-modern-slavery-and-human-trafficking-files/371/a-call-to-action-to-end-forced-labour-modern-slavery-and-human-trafficking.html
DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE RT HON PRITI PATEL M. P. 2017. *UK Cracks Down on Modern Slavery in Nigeria* [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-cracks-down-on-modern-slavery-in-nigeriafiles/373/uk-cracks-down-on-modern-slavery-in-nigeria.html
DEVERKA, P. A., LAVALLEE, D. C., DESAI, P. J., ESMAIL, L. C., RAMSEY, S. D., VEENSTRA, D. L. & TUNIS, S. R. 2012. Stakeholder Participation in Comparative Effectiveness Research: Defining a Framework for Effective Engagement. *Journal of Comparative Effectiveness Research* 181–194.
DFID NIGERIA'S SJG PROGRAMME. 2010. *Community Policing: Frequently Asked Questions* [Online]. Nigeria: DFID Nigeria. Available: https://www.britishcouncil.org.ng/sites/default/files/community_policing.pdf
DIMOU, E. 2021. Decolonizing Southern Criminology: What Can the "Decolonial Option" Tell Us About Challenging the Modern/Colonial Foundations of Criminology? *Critical Criminology,* 29**,** 431–450.
DUNKERLEY, A. W. 2018. Exploring the Use of Juju in Nigerian Human Trafficking Networks: Considerations for Criminal Investigators. *Police Practice and Research,* 19**,** 83-100.

DURHAM, E., BAKER, H., SMITH, M., MOORE, E. & MORGAN, V. 2014. *The BiodivERsA Stakeholder Engagement Handbook* [Online]. Paris, France: BiodivERsA. Available: www.biodiversa.org/706/download
EDO STATE TASK FORCE AGAINST HUMAN TRAFFICKING. 2019. *Annual Report August 2018 - August 2019* [Online]. Benin: ETAHT. Available: https://etaht.org/uploads/resources/TASKFORCE.pdf
EKEH, P. P. 1975. Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement. *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 17**,** 91-112.
ELO, S. & KYNGÄS, H. 2008. The Qualitative Content Analysis Process. *Journal of Advanced Nursing,* 62**,** 107-115.
EMSLEY, C. 1983. *Policing and its Context, 1750-1870,* London, Macmillan.
EMSLEY, C. 2008. The Birth and Development of the Police. *In:* NEWBURN, T. (ed.) *Handbook of Policing.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
EMSLEY, C. 2014a. Peel's Principles, Police Principles. *In:* BROWN, J. (ed.) *The Future of Policing.* London and New York: Routledge.
EMSLEY, C. 2014b. Policing The Empire/ Policing The MMetropole: Some Thoughts on Models and Types. *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés,* 18**,** 5-25.
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE. 2015. *Nigeria: Sex Trafficking of Women* [Online]. Italy: European Union. Available: https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/BZ0415678ENN.pdf
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE. 2021. *Nigeria Trafficking in Human Beings: Country of Origin Information Report* [Online]. Malta: European Union Agency for Asylum. Available: https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_04_EASO_COI_Report_Nigeria_Trafficking_in_Human_Beings.pdf
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2013. *Trafficking in Human Beings* [Online]. France: European Commission. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/trafficking_in_human_beings_-_dghome-eurostat_en_1.pdf
FANON, F. 1963. *The Wretched of the Earth,* London, MacGibbon & Kee.
FASSIN, D. 2011. *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*, University of California Press.
FASSIN, D. 2013. *Enforcing Order: An Ethnography of Urban Policing,* Cambridge, UK, Polity.
FITZGERALD, S. A. 2016. Vulnerable Geographies: Human Trafficking, Immigration and Border Control in the UK and Beyond. *Gender, Place & Culture,* 23**,** 181-197.
FORRESTER, J., GERGER SWARTLING, Å. & LONSDALE, K. 2008. *Stakeholder Engagement and the Work of SEI: An Empirical Study* [Online]. Stockholm: SEI. Available: https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Policy-institutions/stakeholder_engagement_workof_sei.pdf
FOUCAULT, M. 1984. Disciplines and Sciences of the Individual. *In:* RABINOW, P. (ed.) *The Foucault Reader.* New York Pantheon Books.
FRANKO AAS, K. 2007. Analysing a World in Motion: Global Flows Meet 'Criminology of the Other'. *Theoretical Criminology,* 11**,** 283-303.
FRANKO AAS, K. & GUNDHUS, H. O. I. 2015. Policing Humanitarian Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the Precariousness of Life. *British Journal of Criminology,* 55**,** 1-18.

FUSSELL, E. & MASSEY, D. S. 2004. The Limits to Cumulative Causation: International Migration from Mexican Urban Areas. *Demography,* 41**,** 151-171.
GADD, D. & BROAD, R. 2018. Troubling Recognitions in British Responses to Modern Slavery. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 58**,** 1440-1461.
GALLAGHER, A. & HOLMES, P. 2008. Developing an Effective Criminal Justice Response to Human Trafficking: Lessons From the Front Line. *International Criminal Justice Review,* 18**,** 318-343.
GARLAND, D. 1996. The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society. *British Journal of Criminology,* 36**,** 445-471.
GARLAND, D. 2001. *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
GEARON, A. 2018. Child Trafficking: Young People's Experiences of Front-Line Services in England. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 59**,** 481-500.
GILBOR, J. 2016. *How Can Universities Contribute to Tackling Modern Slavery?* [Online]. Available: www.ed.ac.uk/files/atoms/files/uoe_modern_slavery_and_universities_briefing_final_oct_2016.pdf
GILL, P. 2000. *Rounding Up the Usual Suspects?: Developments in Contemporary Law Enforcement Intelligence,* Aldershot, Ashgate.
GILROY, P. 1992. *'There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack:' the Cultural Politics of Race and Nation,* London, Routledge.
GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. 2017. *Transnational Organized Crime and the Impact on the Private Sector: The Hidden Battalions* [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Available: https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/transnational-organized-crime-and-the-impact-on-the-private-sector_-the-hidden-battalions_html/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-3.pdf
GONZÁLEZ, Y. M. 2017. 'What Citizens Can See of the State:' Police and the Construction of Democratic Citizenship in Latin America. *Theoretical Criminology,* 21**,** 494-511.
GOODEY, J. 2008. Human Trafficking: Sketchy Data and Policy Responses. *Criminology & Criminal Justice,* 8**,** 421-442.
GOOLD, B., J. 2016. Policing and Human Rights. *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
GOYES, D. R., SOUTH, N., SOLLUND, R. & DE CARVALHO, S. 2021. Editors' Introduction to the Special Issue, "Southern Criminologies: Methods, Theories and Indigenous Issues". *Critical Criminology,* 29**,** 423–429.
GOŹDZIAK, E. M. & VOGEL, K. M. 2020. Palermo at 20: A Retrospective and Prospective. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 6**,** 109-118.
GRIFFITHS, M. 2017. Foreign, Criminal: A Doubly Damned Modern British Folk-Devil. *Citizenship Studies,* 21**,** 527-546.
GRUBB, D. & BENNETT, K. 2012. The Readiness of Local Law Enforcement to Engage in US Anti-Trafficking Efforts: An Assessment of Human Trafficking Training and Awareness of Local, County, and State Law Enforcement Agencies in the State of Georgia. *Police Practice and Research,* 13**,** 487-500.

GUBRIUM, J. F., HOLSTEIN, J. A., MARVASTI, A. & MCKINNEY, K. D. 2012. *The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of the Craft,* Thousand Oaks, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
GUTH, A., ANDERSON, R., KINNARD, K. & TRAN, H. 2014. Proper Methodology and Methods of Collecting and Analyzing Slavery Data: An Examination of the Global Slavery Index. *Social Inclusion,* 2**,** 14-22.
HADJIMATHEOU, K. & LYNCH, J. K. 2016. 'Once They Pass You, They May Be Gone Forever': Humanitarian Duties and Professional Tensions in Safeguarding and Anti-Trafficking at the Border. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 57**,** 945-963.
HALE, S. 1996, 2018. *Gender Politics in Sudan: Islamism, Socialism, and the State,* Boulder, Routledge.
HANSSON, S. 2013. Analysing Responsibilization in the Context of Development Cooperation. *In:* HANSSON, S., HELLBERG, S. & STERN, M. (eds.) *Studying the Agency of Being Governed.* London: Routledge.
HAUGHEY, C. 2016. *The Modern Slavery Act Review* [Online]. London: Home Office Available: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/542047/2016_07_31_Haughey_Review_of_Modern_Slavery_Act_-_final_1.0.pdf
HEIN VAN KEMPEN, P. & LESTRADE, S. 2018. Limiting the Criminalisation of Human Trafficking: Protection Against Exploitative Labour versus Individual Liberty and Economic Development. *In:* HAVERKAMP, R., HERLIN-KARNELL, E. & LERNESTEDT, C. (eds.) *What is Wrong with Human Trafficking?: Critical Perspectives on the Law.* Oxford: Hart Publishing.
HERNANDEZ, D. & RUDOLPH, A. 2015. Modern Day Slavery: What Drives Human Trafficking in Europe? *European Journal of Political Economy,* 38**,** 118-139.
HILLS, A. 2000. *Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization,* Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
HILLS, A. 2008. The Dialectic of Police Reform in Nigeria. *Journal of Modern African Studies,* 46**,** 215-234.
HILLS, A. 2012a. Lost in Translation: Why Nigeria's Police Don't Implement Democratic Reforms. *International Affairs,* 88**,** 739-755.
HILLS, A. 2012b. Policing a Plurality of Worlds: The Nigeria Police in Metropolitan Kano. *African Affairs,* 111**,** 46-66.
HILLS, A. 2017. Epilogue. *In:* BEEK, J., GÖPFERT, M., OWEN, O. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *Police in Africa.* Oxford University Press.
HIQUAN ZHOU, C. 2015. Chapter 5: Global Sex Trafficking Overview: Facts, Myths, and Debates. *In:* ACKERMAN, A. R. & FURMAN, R. (eds.) *Sex Crimes: Transnational Problems and Global Perspectives.* Columbia University Press.
HM GOVERNMENT. 2014. *Modern Slavery Strategy* [Online]. London: Home Office. Available: https://www.antislaverycommissioner.co.uk/media/1079/modern_slavery_strategy_final_dec2015.pdf
HM GOVERNMENT. 2015. *Prevent duty guidance* [Online]. London: HM Government. Available:

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf
HMICFRS. 2017. *Stolen Freedom: The Policing Response to Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking* [Online]. London: Home Office Available: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/stolen-freedom-the-policing-response-to-modern-slavery-and-human-trafficking.pdf
HÖFFLING, C., PLAS, C. & SCHETSCHE, M. 2002. “Deutungsmusteranalyse”; (Interpretation Pattern Analysis) in Criminological Research. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/ Forum: Qualitative Social Research,* 3**,** 1-22.
HOME OFFICE. 2014. *Review of the National Referral Mechanism for Victims of Human Trafficking* [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-the-national-referral-mechanism-for-victims-of-human-traffickingfiles/561/review-of-the-national-referral-mechanism-for-victims-of-human-trafficking.html
HOME OFFICE. 2019 *Country Policy and Information Note — Nigeria: Trafficking of Women* [Online]. London: Home Office Available: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/821554/Nigeria_-_Trafficking_-_CPIN_-_v5.0__July_2019_.pdf
HOME OFFICE. 2022. *National Referral Mechanism Guidance: Adult (England and Wales)* [Online]. London: Home Office. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-trafficking-victims-referral-and-assessment-forms/guidance-on-the-national-referral-mechanism-for-potential-adult-victims-of-modern-slavery-england-and-wales#:~:text=All%20NRM%20referrals%20should%20be,confidence%20under%20the%20common%20law).
HOME OFFICE, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE DOWNING STREET & THE RT HON THERESA MAY. 2016. *Defeating Modern Slavery: Article by Theresa May* [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defeating-modern-slavery-theresa-may-articlefiles/508/defeating-modern-slavery-theresa-may-article.html
HOUNMENOU, C. 2020. Engaging Anti-Human Trafficking Stakeholders in the Research Process. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 6**,** 30-49.
HOWARD, N. 2014. Teenage Labor Migration and Antitrafficking Policy in West Africa. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 653**,** 124-140.
HOYLE, C., BOSWORTH, M. & DEMPSEY, M. 2011. Labelling the Victims of Sex Trafficking: Exploring the Borderland between Rhetoric and Reality. *Social & Legal Studies,* 20**,** 313-329.
HSIEH, H.-F. & SHANNON, S. E. 2005. Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. *Qualitative Health Research,* 15**,** 1277-1288.
HÜBSCHLE, A. 2013. Of Bogus Hunters, Queenpins and Mules: The Varied Roles of Women in Transnational Organized Crime in Southern Africa. *Trends in Organized Crime,* 17**,** 31-51.
HUGHES, D. M. 2014. Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union: Gender, Sexual Exploitation, and Digital Communication Technologies. *SAGE Open,* 4**,** 1-8.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. 2010. *"Everyone's in on the Game": Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force* [Online]. New York: Human Rights Watch. Available: https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/17/everyones-game/corruption-and-human-rights-abuses-nigeria-police-force

HYNES, P., GANI-YUSUF, L., BURLAND, P., DEW, J., OLATUNDE, A., THURNHAM, A., BRODIE, I., SPRING, D. & MURRAY, F. 2018. Report of Shared Learning Event held in Lagos, Nigeria: 17-18 January 2018. *Vulnerability to Human Trafficking: A Stufy of Viet Nam, Albania, Nigeria and the UK.* Bedfordshire: University of Bedfordshire, UN Migration, Institute of Applied Social Research, Home Office.

IJAOLA, S. O. 2016. From Colonialism to Neo-Colonialism, Christianity in Cultural Demythologization and Ecological Crises in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *International Journal of Arts and Humanities,* 5**,** 161-178.

IKEORA, M. 2016. The Role of African Traditional Religion and 'Juju' in Human Trafficking: implications for Anti-Trafficking. *Journal of International Women's Studies,* 17**,** 1-18.

INDEPENDENT ANTI-SLAVERY COMMISSIONER. 2016. *Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner Annual Report 2015-16* [Online]. London: Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/559571/IASC_Annual_Report_WebReadyFinal.pdf

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MINISTERIAL GROUP. 2016. *2016 Report of the Inter-Departmental Ministerial Group on Modern Slavery* [Online]. London: Inter-Departmental Ministerial Group. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/559690/Modern_Slavery_IDMG_Report_2016.pdf

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION. 2012. *Statistics on Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking* [Online]. Available: http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/policy-areas/statistics/lang--en/index.htm

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND WALK FREE FOUNDATION. 2017. *Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage* [Online]. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Available: https://www.alliance87.org/global_estimates_of_modern_slavery-forced_labour_and_forced_marriage.pdf

ISIMA, J. 2011. Police Internal Control Systems in Nigeria. *In:* ALEMIKA, E. E. O. & CHUKWUMA, I. (eds.) *Police Internal Control Systems in West Africa.* Abuja: CLEEN Foundation.

ISOCHUKWU. 2018. *Oil and Gas 1.3 State Participation (A) Contractual Arrangements: State Participation and Contractual Arrangements for Exploration of Petroleum* [Online]. Lagos: Isochukwu. Available: https://isochukwu.com/2018/01/20/oil-and-gas-1-3-state-participation-a-contractual-arrangements/

IWAR, A. I. 2010. Community Policing Impact Evaluation. Nigeria: Nigeria Police Force.

JACOBS, J. 2016. Police, the Rule of Law, and Civil Society: A Philosophical Perspective *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. &

STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
JAHNSEN, S. & SKILBREI, M.-L. 2017. Leaving No Stone Unturned: The Borders and Orders of Transnational Prostitution. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 58**,** 255-272.
JAUREGUI, B. 2013. Cultures of Legitimacy and Postcolonial Policing: Guest Editor Introduction. *Law & Social Inquiry,* 38**,** 547-552.
JONES, S., KING, J. & EDWARDS, N. 2018. Human-Trafficking Prevention is not "Sexy:" Impact of the Rescue Industry on Thailand NGO Programs and the Need for a Human Rights Approach. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 4**,** 231-255.
JONES, T. & NEWBURN, T. 2002. The Transformation of Policing? Understanding Current Trends in Policing Systems. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 42**,** 129-146.
JUNGER, S. 2007. *Blood Oil* [Online]. California: Vanity Fair. Available: https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/02/junger200702
KARA, S. 2017. *Modern Slavery: A Global Perspective*, Columbia University Press.
KEAST, M. 2017. *Understanding and Responding to Modern Slavery within the Homelessness Sector* [Online]. England: The Passage and the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. Available: http://www.antislaverycommissioner.co.uk/media/1115/understanding-and-responding-to-modern-slavery-within-the-homelessness-sector.pdf
KELLY, L. 2005. "You Can Find Anything You Want": A Critical Reflection on Research on Trafficking in Persons Within and Into Europe. *International Migration,* 43**,** 235-265.
KEMPADOO, K. 2015. The Modern-Day White (Wo)Man's Burden: Trends in Anti-Trafficking and Anti-Slavery Campaigns. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 1**,** 8-20.
KIDANE, S. & STOKMANS, M. 2019. Desperate Journeys: The Need for Trauma Support for Refugees. *In:* STOKMANS, M., VAN REISEN, M., MAWERE, M. & GEBRE-EGZIABHER, K. A. (eds.) *Mobile Africa: Human Trafficking and the Digital Divide.* Langaa RPCIG.
KILLINGRAY, D. 1986. The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa. *African Affairs,* 85**,** 411-437.
KIM, K. 2007. Psychological Coercion in the Context of Modern-Day Involuntary Labor: Revisiting United States v. Kozminski and Understanding Human Trafficking. *University of Toledo Law Review,* 38**,** 941-972.
KLANTSCHNIG, G. 2009. The Politics of Law Enforcement in Nigeria: Lessons from the War on Drugs. *Journal of Modern African Studies,* 47**,** 529-549.
KRAGTEN-HEERDINK, S. L. J., DETTMEIJER-VERMEULEN, C. E. & KORF, D. J. 2018. More Than Just "Pushing and Pulling": Conceptualizing Identified Human Trafficking in the Netherlands. *Crime & Delinquency,* 64**,** 1765-1789.
KROGSTAD, E. G. 2017. The Colonial Subtext of British-Led Police Reform in Sierra Leone. *In:* BEEK, J., GÖPFERT, M., OWEN, O. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *Police in Africa.* Oxford University Press.
KURTZ, D. L. & UPTON, L. L. 2018. The Gender in Stories: How War Stories and Police Narratives Shape Masculine Police Culture. *Women & Criminal Justice,* 28**,** 282-300.

LACZKO, F. & GOZDZIAK, E. (eds.) 2005. *Data and Research on Human Trafficking,* Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
LANCET, T. 2001. A World War Against Terrorism. *The Lancet,* 358**,** 937–938.
LANDMAN, T. & SILVERMAN, B. 2019. Globalization and Modern Slavery. *Politics and Governance,* 7**,** 275-290.
LAR, J. 2017. Historicising Vigilante Policing in Plateau State, Nigeria. *In:* BEEK, J., GÖPFERT, M., OWEN, O. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *Police in Africa.* Oxford University Press.
LAWPADI. 2021. *What is a No Case Submission?* [Online]. Lagos, Nigeria: LawPadi. Available: https://lawpadi.com/no-case-submission/#:~:text=When%20a%20no%20case%20submission,having%20to%20present%20a%20defence.&text=Therefore%2C%20because%20the%20defence%20really,in%20criminal%20cases%20in%20Nigeria
LEAGUE OF NATIONS. 1927. *Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery* [Online]. Available: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/SlaveryConvention.aspxfiles/502/SlaveryConvention.html
LEE, E. S. 1966. A Theory of Migration. *Demography,* 3**,** 47-57.
LEE, M. 2005. Human Trade and the Criminalization of Irregular Migration. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law,* 33**,** 1-15.
LEE, M. 2015. Sex Trafficking and Control. *In:* SANDERS, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Sex Offences and Sex Offenders.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
LEMAY-HÉBERT, N. 2009. Statebuilding Without Nation-Building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 3**,** 21-45.
LERMAN, A. E. & WEAVER, V. M. 2014. *Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control,* Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
LERUM, K. & BRENTS, B. G. 2016. Sociological Perspectives on Sex Work and Human Trafficking. *Sociological Perspectives,* 59**,** 17-26.
LESUTIS, G. 2018. The Politics of Narrative: Methodological Reflections on Analysing Voices of the Marginalized in Africa. *African Affairs,* 117**,** 509-521.
LEWIS, H., DWYER, P., HODKINSON, S. & WAITE, L. 2015. Hyper-Precarious Lives: Migrants, Work and Forced Labour in the Global North. *Progress in Human Geography,* 39**,** 580-600.
LEWIS, H. & WAITE, L. 2019. Migrant Illegality, Slavery and Exploitative work. *In:* LEWIS, H., WAITE, L., CRAIG, G. & BALCH, A. (eds.) *The Modern Slavery Agenda.* Bristol University Press.
LIMONCELLI, S. A. 2009. The Trouble with Trafficking: Conceptualizing Women's Sexual Labor and Economic Human Rights. *Women's Studies International Forum,* 32**,** 261-269.
LIPSCOMBE, S. & BEARD, J. 2014. *Human Trafficking: UK Responses* [Online]. House of Commons Library. Available: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/176891/SN04324.pdf
LOADER, I. 2000. Plural Policing and Democratic Governance. *Social & Legal Studies,* 9**,** 323-345.

LOADER, I. 2014. Why Do the Police matter? Beyond the Myth of Crime-Fighting. *In:* BROWN, J. (ed.) *The Future of Policing.* London and New York: Routledge.
LOADER, I. 2016. In Search of Civic Policing: Recasting the 'Peelian' Principles. *Criminal Law and Philosophy,* 10**,** 427-440.
LOADER, I., BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B. & STEINBERG, J. 2016. Global Policing Studies: A Prospective Field *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
LOADER, I. & MULCAHY, A. 2001. The Power of Legitimate Naming: Part I—Chief Constables as Social Commentators in Post-War England. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 41**,** 41-55.
LOADER, I. & SPARKS, R. 2002. Contemporary Landscapes of Crime, Order and Control. *In:* MAGUIRE, M., MORGAN, R. & REINER, R. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology.* 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
LOBASZ, J. K. 2009. Beyond Border Security: Feminist Approaches to Human Trafficking. *Security Studies,* 18**,** 319-344.
LOBASZ, J. K. 2019. *Constructing Human Trafficking: Evangelicals, Feminists, and an Unexpected Alliance,* Cham, Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan.
LOFTUS, B. 2009. *Police Culture in a Changing World,* Oxford, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
LOFTUS, B. 2010. Police Occupational Culture: Classic Themes, Altered Times. *Policing & Society,* 20**,** 1-20.
LOGAN, T. K., WALKER, R. & HUNT, G. 2009. Understanding Human Trafficking in the United States. *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse,* 10**,** 3-30.
MACHURA, S., SHORT, F., HILL, V. M., SUDDABY, C. R., GODDARD, F. E., JONES, S. E., LLOYD-ASTBURY, E. L., RICHARDSON, L. & ROUSE, C. A. 2019. Recognizing Modern Slavery. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 5**,** 201-219.
MACKINNON, C. A. 2006. *Are Women Human?: And Other International Dialogues,* Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
MANTOUVALOU, V. 2010. Modern Slavery: The UK Response. *Industrial Law Journal,* 39**,** 425-431.
MARCUS, G. E. 1995. Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 24**,** 95-117.
MARENIN, O. 1982a. Parking Tickets and Class Repression: The Concept of Policing in Critical Theories of Criminal Justice. *Contemporary Crises,* 6**,** 241-266.
MARENIN, O. 1982b. Policing African States: Toward a Critique. *Comparative Politics,* 14**,** 379-396.
MARENIN, O. 1985. Policing Nigeria: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of Coercion. *African Studies Review,* 28**,** 73-93.
MARTIN, E. 1994. *Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture From the Days of Polio to the Age of AIDS,* Boston, Beacon Press.
MASSEY, D. S. 1999. Why Does Migration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis. *In:* DEWIND, J., KASINITZ, P. & HIRSCHMAN, C. (eds.) *The Handbook of International Migration: the American Experience.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

MAWBY, R. C. & WRIGHT, A. 2008. The Police Organisation. *In:* NEWBURN, T. (ed.) *Handbook of Policing.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
MAWBY, R. I. 2008. Models of Policing. *In:* NEWBURN, T. (ed.) *Handbook of Policing.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
MAWERE, M. 2019. Bound Together in the Digital Era Poverty, Migration and Human Trafficking. *In:* MAWERE, M., VAN REISEN, M., STOKMANS, M. & GEBRE-EGZIABHER, K. A. (eds.) *Mobile Africa: Human Trafficking and the Digital Divide.* Langaa RPCIG.
MBEMBE, A. 2001. *On the Postcolony,* Berkeley, University of California Press.
MBEMBE, A. 2003. Necropolitics. *Public Culture,* 15**,** 11-40.
MCCARTHY, L. A. 2020. A Gendered Perspective on Human Trafficking Perpetrators: Evidence from Russia. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 6**,** 79-94.
MCCONVILLE, M., LENG, R. & SANDERS, A. 1991. *The Case for the Prosecution,* London, Routledge.
MCGEER, C. 2017. *Eliminating Slavery: Enhancing the Police Response - Conference Report* [Online]. Windsor Park: Cumberland Lodge. Available: https://www.cumberlandlodge.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Eliminating%20Slavery-%20Briefing%20Document.pdf
MCQUADE, A. 2019. Modern Slavery in Global Context Ending the Political Economy of Forced Labour and Slavery. *In:* CRAIG, G., BALCH, A., LEWIS, H. & WAITE, L. (eds.) *The Modern Slavery Agenda.* Bristol University Press.
MEARES, T. L. 2016. Police Lawfulness and Public Security *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
MIGNOLO, W. 2018. Part 2: The Decolonial Option. *In:* MIGNOLO, W. & WALSH, C. E. (eds.) *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis.* Durham: Duke University Press.
MILIVOJEVIC, S. & PICKERING, S. 2013. Trafficking in People, 20 Years On: Sex, Migration and Crime in the Global Anti-Trafficking Discourse and the Rise of the 'Global Trafficking Complex'. *Current Issues in Criminal Justice,* 25**,** 585-604.
MILIVOJEVIĆ, S. & SEGRAVE, M. 2017. Gendered Exploitation in the Digital Border Crossing?: An Analysis of the Human Trafficking and Information-Technology Nexus. *In:* SEGRAVE, M. & VITIS, L. (eds.) *Gender, Technology and Violence.* London: Routledge.
MILLER, S. 2016. Political Theory, Institutional Purpose and Policing *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015. (c.30). London: The Stationary Office.
MODERN SLAVERY PEC. 2021. *The Top 20 Source Countries for Modern Slavery Victims in the UK: Comparative Report* [Online]. University of Nottingham: The Modern Slavery PEC. Available: https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/beacons-of-excellence/rights-lab/resources/reports-and-briefings/2021/april/the-top-20-source-countries-for-modern-slavery-in-the-uk.pdf
MOHAMMED, K. 2021. *A Wealth of Sorrow: Why Nigeria's Abundant Oil Reserves Are Really a Curse* [Online]. London, UK: The Guardian. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/global-

development/2021/nov/09/a-wealth-of-sorrow-why-nigerias-abundant-oil-reserves-are-really-a-curse
MOOSAVI, L. 2018. Decolonising Criminology: Syed Hussein Alatas on Crimes of the Powerful. *Critical Criminology,* 27**,** 229-242.
MOOSAVI, L. 2019. A Friendly Critique of 'Asian Criminology' and 'Southern Criminology'. *British Journal of Criminology,* 59**,** 257-275.
MORKA, G. 2014. National Rapporteurs on Trafficking in Persons and Equivalent Mechanisms in Addressing Trafficking in Persons (NREMs): Institutional Framework – Nigeria's Perspective. *In:* NATIONAL AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (ed.) *Second Consultative Meeting on Strengthening Partnership with National Rapporteurs on Trafficking in Persons and Equivalent Mechanisms.* Thailand: Office of the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons.
MUSTILL, A. 2016. *Modern Slavery In The UK | Anti-Slavery Day 2016* [Online]. Carter Law. Available: http://www.carterlaw.co.uk/modern-slavery-uk/files/424/modern-slavery-uk.html
MUSTO, J. L. 2009. What's in a Name?: Conflations and Contradictions in Contemporary U.S. Discourses of Human Trafficking. *Women's Studies International Forum,* 32**,** 281-287.
NATIONAL AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS. 2022a. *Investigation and Monitoring Department* [Online]. Abuja: NAPTIP. Available: https://naptip.gov.ng/investigation-and-monitoring/
NATIONAL AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS. 2022b. *Legal and Prosecution Department* [Online]. Abuja: NAPTIP. Available: https://naptip.gov.ng/legal-and-prosecution-department/
NATIONAL AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, T. 2021. *About NAPTIP* [Online]. FCT Abuja: NAPTIP. Available: https://www.naptip.gov.ng/about-naptip-2/
NATIONAL ARCHIVES. n.d. *Britian and the Slave Trade* [Online]. London: The National Archives. Available: https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/slavery/pdf/britain-and-the-trade.pdf
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF NIGERIA. 2014. *Crime Statistics, 2007-2013* [Online]. Available: https://nigeria.opendataforafrica.org/ygmacic/crime-statistics?states=1000000-nigeria
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF NIGERIA. 2016. *Crime Statistics: Nigerian Prisons* [Online]. Nigeria: Federal Government of Nigeria. Available: https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/download/379
NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY. 2021. *County Lines* [Online]. Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Available: https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/drug-trafficking/county-lines
NEVIN, A. & OMOSOMI, O. 2019. *Strength from Abroad: The Economic Power of Nigeria's Diaspora* [Online]. Nigeria PWC. Available: https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/pdf/the-economic-power-of-nigerias-diaspora.pdf

NEW, S. J. 2015. Modern slavery and the supply chain: the limits of corporate social responsibility? *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal,* 20**,** 697-707.

NEYROUD, P. & BECKLEY, A. 2001. *Policing, Ethics and Human Rights,* Cullompton, Willan.

NGUYEN, C., FURMAN, R. & ACKERMAN, A. R. 2015. Chapter 7 — Sex Work and Agency: Decriminalization of Prostitution. *In:* ACKERMAN, A. R. & FURMAN, R. (eds.) *Sex Crimes: Transnational Problems and Global Perspectives.* Columbia University Press.

NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION. 2021. *History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry* [Online]. Nigeria: NNPC. Available: https://nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Business-Information/Pages/Industry-History.aspx

NORWEGIAN DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION. 2020. *Asylum Decisions by Citizenship and Outcome (2020)* [Online]. Norway: Norwegian Directorate of Immigration Available: https://www.udi.no/en/statistics-and-analysis/statistics/asylum-decisions-by-citizenship-and-outcome-2020/

NWOKEOMA, B. N., OSADEBE, N. O., AMADI, K. C. & UGWU, N. H. 2019. Interrogating the Nature and Push Factors of Human Trafficking in Benin-City, Edo State Nigeria in the Context of the Africa We Want. *African Population Studies,* 33**,** 4927-4939.

NZEGWU, N. 2018. Colonial Racism: Sweeping Out Africa with Mother Europe's Broom *In:* BABBITT, S. E. & CAMPBELL, S. (eds.) *Racism and Philosophy.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, J. 2006. Will the Real Sex Slave Please Stand up? *Feminist Review,* 83**,** 4-22.

O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, J. 2013. Troubling Freedom: Migration, Debt, and Modern slavery. *Migration Studies,* 1**,** 176-195.

O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, J. 2015. *Mediterranean Migrants are Not Slaves – Do Not Pervert History to Justify Military Action* [Online]. Available: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/17/mediterranean-migrants-slaves-history-military-action-eu-leaders-libyafiles/487/mediterranean-migrants-slaves-history-military-action-eu-leaders-libya.html

O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, J. 2016. De-Canting 'Trafficking in Human Beings', Re-Centring the State. *The International Spectator,* 51**,** 58-73.

O'NEILL, M. 2019. *Police Community Support Officers,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

O'NEILL GUTIERREZ, C. & HOLLINSHEAD, L. 2016. *Alternatives to High-Cost and Secure Accommodation for Victims of Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) in Greater Manchester: Analysing Case Files to Explore Young People's Journeys Through Social Care* [Online]. The Children's Society: London. Available: https://www.itsnotokay.co.uk/downloads/act_docs/the_children_s_society__-_case_file_analysis_report.pdf

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. 2002. *Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking* [Online]. Available: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Traffickingen.pdf

OGWOKHADEMHE, M. 2013. Consequences of Women Trafficking as Perceived by Working Class People in Edo State, Nigeria. *Gender and Behaviour,* 11**,** 5278-5284.

OIL REVIEW AFRICA. 2013. *Shell and Kaztec Engineering Limited Sign Pipeline Deal in Nigeria* [Online]. Nigeria: Oil Review Africa. Available: https://oilreviewafrica.com/technical-focus/technical-focus/shell-kaztec-engineering-limited-sign-pipeline-deal-in-nigeria

OKECH, A. 2013. Researching Discourses on Widow Iinheritance: Feminist Questions about 'Talk' as Methodology. *In:* BENNETT, J. & PEREIRA, C. (eds.) *Jacketed Women: Qualitative Research Methodologies on Sexualities and Gender in Africa.* Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press.

OKEREAFOEZEKE, N. 2003. Traditional Social Control in an Ethnic Society: Law Enforcement in a Nigerian Community *Police Practice and Research,* 4**,** 21-33.

OKOGBULE, N. S. 2013. Combating the "New Slavery" in Nigeria: An Appraisal of Legal and Policy Responses to Human Trafficking. *Journal of African Law,* 57**,** 57-80.

OKPU, A. 2021. *Nigeria Immigration Service: From Kakawa in Lagos to technology building, Abuja* [Online]. Nigeria: Daily Post Available: https://dailypost.ng/2021/09/16/amos-okpu-nigeria-immigration-service-from-kakawa-in-lagos-to-technology-building-abuja/

OLUSOLA, J. J. & IDIARU, W. 2020. *Nigeria: Legal Framework And Requirements For Oil And Gas Investment In Nigeria* [Online]. Nigeria: Resolution Law Firm. Available: https://www.mondaq.com/nigeria/oil-gas-electricity/998566/legal-framework-and-requirements-for-oil-and-gas-investment-in-nigeria#:~:text=Section%2044(3)%20of%20the,oil%20and%20gas%20are%20situated

ORDU, G. E. O. & NNAM, M. U. 2017. Community Policing in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of Current Developments. *International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences,* 12**,** 83-97.

OWEN, O. 2012. *The Nigeria Police Force: An Institutional Ethnography.* Doctorate, University of Oxford.

OWEN, O. 2014. The Nigeria Police Force: Predicaments and Possibilities. *NRN Working Paper No 15.* Nigeria Research Network, Oxford Department of International Development.

OWEN, O. 2016. Policing After Colonialism. *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.

OWEN, O. 2017. Risk and Motivation in Police Work in Nigeria. *In:* BEEK, J., GÖPFERT, M., OWEN, O. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *Police in Africa.* Oxford University Press.

OWEN, O. 2018. Police Reform in Nigeria: The Devolution Debate. Abuja: CLEEN Foundation.

OYEMWINMINA, C. & AIBIEYI, S. 2016. Analysis Towards Effective Policing in Nigeria. *African Research Review,* 10**,** 61-72.

PAASCHE, E., SKILBREI, M.-L. & PLAMBECH, S. 2018. Vulnerable Here or There? Examining the Vulnerability of Victims of Human Trafficking Before and After Return. *Anti-Trafficking Review,* 10**,** 1-10.

PAJÓN, L. & WALSH, D. 2018. Proposing a Theoretical Framework for the Criminal Investigation of Human Trafficking Crimes. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice,* 14**,** 493–511.
PARMAR, A. 2019. Policing Migration and Racial Technologies. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 59**,** 938-957.
PARMAR, A. 2020. Arresting (Non)Citizenship: The Policing Migration Nexus of Nationality, Race and Criminalization. *Theoretical Criminology,* 24**,** 28-49.
PATERNOSTER, R. 2011. Studying Desistance From Crime: Where Quantitative Meets Qualitative Methods. *In:* BOSWORTH, M. & HOYLE, C. (eds.) *What is Criminology?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
PEREIRA, C. 2013. *'An Opportunity for Knowing': Researching the Sexual Politics of Zina in Northern Nigeria,* Tokyo; New York, United Nations University Press.
PICKERING, S. 2011. *Women, Borders, and Violence: Current Issues in Asylum, Forced Migration and Trafficking,* New York, Springer Science.
PICKERING, S. & HAM, J. 2013. Hot Pants at the Border: Sorting Sex Work from Trafficking. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 54**,** 2-19.
PIJNENBURG, A. & RIJKEN, C. 2019. Playing Cat and Mouse: How Europe Evades Responsibility for its Role in Human Rights Abuses against Migrants and Refugees. *In:* VAN REISEN, M., MAWERE, M., STOKMANS, M. & GEBRE-EGZIABHER, K. A. (eds.) *Mobile Africa: Human Trafficking and the Digital Divide.* Langaa RPCIG.
PIPER, N., SEGRAVE, M. & NAPIER-MOORE, R. 2015. Editorial: Whats in a Name? Distinguishing Forced Labour, Trafficking and Slavery. *Anti-Trafficking Review,* 5**,** 1-9.
PIRJATANNIEMI, E. 2018. Victims of Trafficking in the Migration Discourse: A Conceptualisation of Particular Vulnerability. *In:* HAVERKAMP, R., HERLIN-KARNELL, E. & LERNESTEDT, C. (eds.) *What is Wrong with Human Trafficking?: Critical Perspectives on the Law.* Oxford: Hart Publishing.
PLAMBECH, S. 2014. Between "Victims" and "Criminals": Rescue, Deportation, and Everyday Violence Among Nigerian Migrants. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society,* 21**,** 382-402.
POLLOCK, A., CAMPBELL, P., STRUTHERS, C., SYNNOT, A., NUNN, J., HILL, S., GOODARE, H., WATTS, C. & MORLEY, R. 2017. Stakeholder Involvement in Systematic Reviews: A Protocol for a Systematic Review of Methods, Outcomes and Effects. *Research Involvement and Engagement,* 3**,** 1-13.
POURMOKHTARI, N. 2015. Global Human Trafficking Unmasked: A Feminist Rights-Based Approach. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 1**,** 156-166.
PRATTEN, D. 2017. Policing Boundaries: The Cultural Work of African Policing. *In:* BEEK, J., GÖPFERT, M., OWEN, O. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *Police in Africa.* Oxford University Press.
PRESSER, L. & SANDBERG, S. 2015. *Narrative Criminology: Understanding Stories of Crime,* New York, London, New York University Press.
PURDON, J. 2016. Literature and Global Policing *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
RAVENSTEIN, E. G. 1885. The Laws of Migration. *Journal of the Statistical Society of London,* 48**,** 167-235.

RAWLINGS, P. 2008. Policing Before The Police. *In:* NEWBURN, T. (ed.) *Handbook of Policing.* Cullompton: Willan.
RENZETTI, C. M., BUSH, A., CASTELLANOS, M. & HUNT, G. 2015. Does Training Make a Difference? An Evaluation of a Specialized Human Trafficking Training Module for Law Enforcement Officers. *Journal of Crime and Justice,* 38**,** 334-350.
RESEARCH IN PRACTICE. 2015. *Special Guardianship: Qualitative Case File Analysis* [Online]. Department of Education: London. Available: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/485146/DFE-RR497_-_Special_Guardianship.pdf
RIOUX, S., LEBARON, G. & VEROVŠEK, P. J. 2019. Capitalism and Unfree Labor: A Review of Marxist Perspectives on Modern Slavery. *Review of International Political Economy,* 25**,** 1-23.
ROBERTS, K. 2019. Human Trafficking: Addressing the Symptom, Not the Cause. *In:* CRAIG, G., BALCH, A., LEWIS, H. & WAITE, L. (eds.) *The modern Slavery Agenda.* Bristol University Press.
ROBERTSON, R. 1995. Globalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. *In:* FEATHERSTONE, M., LASH, S. & ROBERTSON, R. (eds.) *Global Modernities.* London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
RODRÍGUEZ-LÓPEZ, S. 2018. (De)Constructing Stereotypes: Media Representations, Social Perceptions, and Legal Responses to Human Trafficking. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 4**,** 61-72.
ROTIMI, K. 2018. The Relationship Between the NPF and the NA/LGPFs in the Northern and Western Regions, 1919-1966. *In:* OWEN, O. (ed.) *Police Reform in Nigeria: The Devolution Debate.* Abuja: CLEEN Foundation.
RUSSELL, A. 2018. Human Trafficking: A Research Synthesis on Human-Trafficking Literature in Academic Journals from 2000–2014. *Journal of Human Trafficking,* 4**,** 114-136.
SAKER, A. 2022. *Practitioner Responses to Child Trafficking: Emerging Good Practice* [Online]. Windsor Park: Cumberland Lodge. Available: https://www.cumberlandlodge.ac.uk/read-watch-listen/practitioner-responses-child-trafficking-emerging-good-practice-cumberland-lodge
SAMARASINGHE, V. 2015. Female Sex Trafficking: Gendered Vulnerability. *In:* COLES, A., GRAY, L. & MOMSEN, J. H. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Development.* London; New York: Routledge.
SANDERS, A. & YOUNG, R. 2008. Police Powers. *In:* NEWBURN, T. (ed.) *Handbook of Policing.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
SCHIERUP, C.-U., ÅLUND, A. & LIKIĆ-BRBORIĆ, B. 2015. Migration, Precarization and the Democratic Deficit in Global Governance. *International Migration,* 53**,** 50-63.
SCHLICHTE, K. 2017. Policing Africa: Structures and Pathways. *In:* BEEK, J., GÖPFERT, M., OWEN, O. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *Police in Africa.* Oxford University Press.
SETTER, C. 2019. Child Trafficking in the UK. *In:* CRAIG, G., BALCH, A., LEWIS, H. & WAITE, L. (eds.) *The Modern Slavery Agenda.* Bristol University Press.

SHARPE, J. 1995. Figures of Colonial Resistance. *In:* ASHCROFT, B., GRIFFITHS, G. & TIFFIN, H. (eds.) *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader.* London; New York: Routledge.
SHEARING, C. D. & ERICSON, R. V. 1991. Culture as Figurative Action. *The British Journal of Sociology,* 42**,** 481-506.
SHELL. 2022a. *Company History* [Online]. London: Shell PLC. Available: https://www.shell.com/about-us/our-heritage/our-company-history.html
SHELL. 2022b. *The History of Shell in Nigeria* [Online]. Nigeria: Shell PLC, Nigeria. Available: https://www.shell.com.ng/about-us/shell-nigeria-history.html
SIEGEL, D. & DE BLANK, S. 2010. Women Who Traffic Women: The Role of Women in Human Trafficking Networks — Dutch Cases. *Global Crime,* 11**,** 436-447.
SINCLAIR, G. 2016. Disentangling the 'Golden Threads:' Policing the Lessons from Police History *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
SKELDON, R. 1990. *Population Mobility in Developing Countries: A Reinterpretation,* London, Belhaven.
SKELDON, R. 1997. *Migration and Development: A Global Perspective,* Harlow, Longman.
SKRIVANKOVA, K. 2019. The UK's Approach to Tackling Modern Slavery in a European Context. *In:* CRAIG, G., BALCH, A., LEWIS, H. & WAITE, L. (eds.) *The Modern Slavery Agenda.* Bristol University Press.
SOUTHWELL, P., BREWER, M. & DOUGLAS-JONES, B. 2018. *Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery: Law and Practice,* London, Bloomsbury Publishing.
SPYROPOULOS, D. C. 2018. The Application of Ethical Principles in Treating Juju Believing Nigerian Sex Trade Survivors. *The Journal of Pan African Studies,* 12**,** 218-231.
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE HUMAN RIGHTS. 2006. *The Challenge of Change: A Study Of Canada's Criminal Prostitution Laws* [Online]. Available: http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2599932&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1
STARK, O. & BLOOM, D. E. 1985. The New Economics of Labor Migration. *The American Economic Review,* 75**,** 173-178.
STATE, U. D. O. 2017. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2017* [Online]. United States of America Department of State. Available: https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2017/files/470/2017.html
STEWART, M. 2016. Complex Needs in Policing: Training, Responsibility and Contestation in Late Neoliberalism *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
STUMPF, J. 2006. The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power. *American University Law Review,* 56**,** 367-419.
TAMUNO, T. N. 1970. *The Police in Modern Nigeria, 1861-1965 : Origins, Development and Role,* Ibadan, Nigeria, Ibadan University Press.

TANKEBE, J. 2019. Cooperation With the Police Against Corruption: Exploring the Roles of Legitimacy, Deterrence and Collective Action Theories. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 59**,** 1390-1410.
THORBURN, M. 2018. Human Trafficking: Supplying the Market for Human Exploitation. *In:* HAVERKAMP, R., HERLIN-KARNELL, E. & LERNESTEDT, C. (eds.) *What is Wrong with Human Trafficking?: Critical Perspectives on the Law.* Oxford: Hart Publishing.
TIFFIN, H. 1995. Post-Colonial Literatures and Counter-Discourse. *In:* ASHCROFT, B., GRIFFITHS, G. & TIFFIN, H. (eds.) *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader.* London; New York: Routledge.
TILLY, C. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. *In:* RUESCHEMEYER, D., EVANS, P. B. & SKOCPOL, T. (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
TODARO, M. P. 1969. A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries. *The American Economic Review,* 59**,** 138-148.
TODARO, M. P. & MARUSZKO, L. 1987. Illegal Migration and US Immigration Reform: A Conceptual Framework. *Population and Development Review,* 13**,** 101-114.
TORRES, R. M. 2015. Gendered Costs to the "Left Behind": A Challenge to the Migration and Development Nexus. *In:* COLES, A., GRAY, L. & MOMSEN, J. H. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Development.* London; New York: Routledge.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (PROHIBITION) ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 2015. no. 4. Lagos: Federal Republic of Nigeria.
TSING, A. L. 2005. *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
TWIS, M. K., KIRSCHNER, L. & GREENWOOD, D. 2020. Trafficked by a Friend: A Qualitative Analysis of Adolescent Trafficking Victims' Archival Case Files. *Child & Adolescent Social Work Journal,* 38**,** 611–620.
TYLDUM, G. & BRUNOVSKIS, A. 2005. Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Challenges in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking. *International Migration,* 43**,** 17-34.
UK BME ANTI-SLAVERY NETWORK. 2021. *Promoting Racial Equality, Diverity, and Inclusion: An Action Plan for the UK Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking Sector* [Online]. London: UK BME Anti-Slavery Network. Available: https://bmeantislavery.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/BASNET-Race-EDI-Action-Plan.pdf
UKAZU, I. 2021. *Unemployment: Too Many Graduates Fighting for Too Few Jobs* [Online]. Africa Edition: University World News. Available: https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20211113143735211
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 2000a. *Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* [Online]. Palermo: UN General Assembly. Available: https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/smuggling-migrants/SoM_Protocol_English.pdf
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 2000b. *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing*

the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime [Online]. Palermo: UN General Assembly. Available: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/protocoltraffickinginpersons.aspx

UNITED NATIONS. 2018. *Sustainable Development Goals* [Online]. Available: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300files/452/sustainabledevelopment.un.org.html

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUG AND CRIME. 2020. *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020* [Online]. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. Available: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tip/2021/GLOTiP_2020_15jan_web.pdf

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME. 2011. *The Role of Organized Crime in the Smuggling of Migrants from West Africa to the European Union* [Online]. Vienna: United Nations Office. Available: https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Report_SOM_West_Africa_EU.pdf

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME. 2012. *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons* [Online]. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/Trafficking_in_Persons_2012_web.pdf

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME. 2018. *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto* [Online]. Available: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME & CENTRE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE. 2006. *Measures to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings in Benin, Nigeria and Togo* [Online]. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available: https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/ht_research_report_nigeria.pdf

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND. 2018. *Donna M. Hughes, Ph.D* [Online]. Gender and Women's Studies. Available: https://web.uri.edu/gws/donna-m-hughes-ph-d/

UNSEEN. 2017. *Modern Slavery Helpline: Annual Assessment 2017* [Online]. United Kingdom: Unseen. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/trafficking_in_human_beings_-_dghome-eurostat_en_1.pdf

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 2021. *2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Nigeria* [Online]. Available: https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/nigeria/

VALVERDE, M. 2016. Beyond the Social Control of Space: Towards a Multidimensional Approach to Local Security Networks *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.

VAN DER PIJL, Y., BREUIL, B. C. O. & SIEGEL, D. 2011. Is There Such Thing As 'Global Sex Trafficking'? A Patchwork Tale on Useful (Mis)Understandings. *Crime, Law and Social Change,* 56**,** 567-582.

VAN DER WATT, M. & KRUGER, B. 2017. Exploring 'Juju' and Human Trafficking: Towards A Demystified Perspective and Response. *South African Review of Sociology,* 48**,** 70-86.

VAN DYKE, R. 2019. The UK's Response to Modern Slavery Law, Policy and Politics. *In:* CRAIG, G., BALCH, A., LEWIS, H. & WAITE, L. (eds.) *The Modern Slavery Agenda.* Bristol University Press.
VAN HULST, M. 2017. Backstage Storytelling and Leadership. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice,* 11**,** 356-368.
VAN HULST, M. 2020. Ethnography and Narrative. *Policing & Society,* 30**,** 98-115.
VAN MAANEN, J. 1973. Observations on the Making of Policemen. *Human Organization,* 32**,** 407-418.
VAN MEETEREN, M. & WIERING, E. 2019. Labour Trafficking in Chinese Restaurants in The Netherlands and The Role of Dutch Immigration Policies: A Qualitative Analysis of Investigative Case Files. *Crime, Law, and Social change,* 72**,** 107-124.
VAN WIJK, J. 2013. Who is The 'Little Old Lady' of International Crimes? Nils Christie's Concept of The Ideal Victim Reinterpreted. *International Review of Victimology,* 19**,** 159-179.
VANDERHURST, S. 2017. Governing with God: Religion, Resistance, and the State in Nigeria's Counter-Trafficking Programs. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review,* 40**,** 194-209.
VIGANÒ, F. 2018. Rethinking the Model Offence: From 'Trafficking' to 'Modern Slavery' ? . *In:* HAVERKAMP, R., HERLIN-KARNELL, E. & LERNESTEDT, C. (eds.) *What is Wrong with Human Trafficking?: Critical Perspectives on the Law.* Oxford: Hart Publishing.
VIGH, H. & SAUSDAL, D. 2021. Global Crime Ethnographies: Three Suggestions for a Criminology That Truly Travels. *In:* BUCERIUS, S. M., HAGGERTY, K. D. & BERARDI, L. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Ethnographies of Crime and Criminal justice.* New York: Oxford University Press.
VIJEYARASA, R. 2019. A Move in the Right Direction? The Model Law against Trafficking in Persons and the ILO Operational Indicators. *International Migration,* 57**,** 177-191.
VINE, J. 2014. *An Inspection of Immigration Enforcement Activity in London and the West Midlands ('Operation Nexus')* [Online]. London: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. Available: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547331/Operation-Nexus-Report_Dec_2014.pdf
VOCKS, J. & NIJBOER, J. 2000. The Promised Land: A Study of Trafficking in Women from Central and Eastern Europe to the Netherlands. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research,* 8**,** 379-388.
WACQUANT, L. 2009. *Punishing the Poor: the Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity,* Durham, Duke University Press.
WACQUANT, L. 2010. Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity. *Sociological Forum,* 25**,** 197-220.
WALK FREE FOUNDATION. 2016. *The Global Slavery Index 2016* [Online]. The Walk Free Foundation. Available: www.antislaverycommissioner.co.uk/media/1073/globalplusslaveryplusindexplus2016.pdf
WALK FREE FOUNDATION. 2018. *Global Slavery Index* [Online]. Australia: Walk Free Foundation. Available: https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2018/findings/global-findings/

WALKER, A. 2009. *The Day Oil Was Discovered in Nigeria* [Online]. Oloibiri, Nigeria: BBC News. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7840310.stm
WALKER, N. 2008. The Pattern of Transnational Policing. *In:* NEWBURN, T. (ed.) *Handbook of Policing.* Cullompton: Willan.
WALTERS, W. 2011. Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border. *In:* BRÖCKLING, U., KRASMANN, S. & LEMKE, T. (eds.) *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges.* New York, London: Routledge.
WEBER, M. 1946/2009. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. *In:* GERTH, H., MILLS, C. W. & TURNER, B. S. (eds.) *Routledge Sociology Classics.* Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge.
WEITZER, R. 2007. The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and Institutionalization of a Moral Crusade. *Politics & Society,* 35**,** 447-475.
WEITZER, R. 2011. Sex Trafficking and the Sex Industry: The Need for Evidence-Based Theory and Legislation. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,* 101**,** 1337-1370.
WEITZER, R. 2014. New Directions in Research on Human Trafficking. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 653**,** 6-24.
WEITZER, R. 2015a. Human Trafficking and Contemporary Slavery. *Annual Review of Sociology,* 41**,** 223-242.
WEITZER, R. 2015b. Researching Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Comparatively. *Sexuality Research and Social Policy,* 12**,** 81-91
WELSH REFUGEE COUNCIL. 2015. *Human Trafficking, Modern Slavery and the National Referral Mechanism in Wales* [Online]. Available: https://www.welshrefugeecouncil.org/migration-information/legal-briefings/human-trafficking-modern-slavery-and-the-national-referral
WILLIAMS, M. C. 2016. Global Policing and the Nation-State *In:* BRADFORD, B., JAUREGUI, B., LOADER, I. & STEINBERG, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing.* London: SAGE Publications.
WILSON, M. & O'BRIEN, E. 2016. Constructing the Ideal Victim in the United States of America's Annual Trafficking in Persons Reports. *An Interdisciplinary Journal,* 65**,** 29-45.
WITTE, S. 2020. Case File Analyses in Child Protection Research: Review of Methodological Challenges and Development of a Framework. *Children and Youth services Review,* 108**,** 1-12.
WOODS, T. P. 2013. Surrogate Selves: Notes on Anti-Trafficking and Anti-Blackness. *Social Identities,* 19**,** 120-134.
WORLD BANK. 2003. *Nigeria — Poverty-Environment Linkages in the Natural Resource Sector: Empirical Evidence From Nigerian Case Studies with Policy Implications and Recommendations* [Online]. Africa Environment and Social Development Unit: World Bank. Available: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/115331468775788053/pdf/multi0page.pdf
WORLD BANK. 2004. *Taxation and State Participation in Nigeria's Oil and Gas Sector* [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/18078
WORLD BANK. 2020a. *Nigeria Releases New Report on Poverty and Inequality in Country* [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available:

https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/lsms/brief/nigeria-releases-new-report-on-poverty-and-inequality-in-country
WORLD BANK. 2020b. *Poverty & Equity Brief: Nigeria* [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available: https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_NGA.pdf
WORLD BANK. 2022. *Nigeria* [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview#1
WORLD PRISON BRIEF. 2022. *World Prison Brief Data: Nigeria* [Online]. London: Institute for Crime and Justice Policy Research. Available: https://www.prisonstudies.org/country/nigeria
XIANG, B. & LINDQUIST, J. 2014. Migration Infrastructure. *International Migration Review,* 48**,** S122-S148.
YOUSAF, F. N. 2018. Forced Migration, Human Trafficking, and Human security. *Current Sociology,* 66**,** 209-225.
ZEDNER, L. 2010. Security, the State, and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of Crime Control. *New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal,* 13**,** 379-403.
ZELINSKY, W. 1971. The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition. *Geographical Review,* 61**,** 219-249.