‘Gentlemen of Leisure or Vital Professionals? The Officer Establishment of the British Army, 1689-1739.’

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Short Abstract

This thesis argues that the officer establishment of the British Army experienced considerable professional, administrative and social change from its expansion in 1689 to the outbreak of war in 1739. In the intervening fifty year period, the British army and the officers who led it experienced alternate periods of prolonged war and peace. This led to the retention and dissemination of administrative practices, gentlemanly behaviours and professional competencies that enabled officers to remain motivated and dedicated to military service, despite multiple factors that hindered their ambitions and reduced their career prospects. This development was not a series of comprehensive reforms, but rather ad hoc measures which took effect through the efforts of commanding officers, the will of the monarch and the administrative power of the War Office. These changes occurred within the existing military system, stretching its capacity to satisfy multiple interests to its limit, and resulting in the prioritisation of certain considerations over others. Using a greater quantity and range of archival material than previous historiography, the thesis adopts several historical approaches towards their interpretation, from institutional and military history, to cultural and political history. This offers new perspectives and in-depth analysis to challenge some arguments made about army officers during this period, and make refinements to others. It contributes to our understanding of the late seventeenth and eighteenth century army by rethinking the martial ethos of the officer establishment, and its impact on officers’ capabilities, behaviour, and relationship with the crown.
‘Gentlemen of Leisure or Vital Professionals? The Officer Establishment of the British Army, 1689-1739.’

Long Abstract

This thesis argues that the officers who led the British army experienced an ongoing process of professionalization from the expansion of the newly formed standing army in 1689 to the start of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1739. In particular, the entrepreneurial and behavioural freedoms they had been granted to recruit, pay, provision, clothe, arm and lead their regiments had become subject to greater regulation and supervision by the system of army administration that had emerged by the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, in 1713. By the peacetime decades of the 1720s and 1730s, absenteeism, ungentlemanly conduct, embezzlement and fraud had been significantly reduced. Consequently, officers had a greater opportunity to develop practical skills within the regiment through recruitment and aiding the civil power in anti-smuggling and anti-riot duties. They also had a strong sense of independent learning, in which officers brought a range of skills and experience to the service, such as fencing, riding, mathematics and languages, and a minority possessed them to a sufficient degree to qualify them for diplomatic, staff and administrative posts. Practical experience at regimental level from the two wars in the first half of the period, the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession, was retained and disseminated by the 1720s and 1730s. This ensured that the officer establishment and most regiments were well led and administered up to the outbreak of war in 1739. This was at the expense of advanced training for generals, the majority of whom instead acted as senior administrative technicians. Consequently, many higher level practices mastered during the wars in the first half of the period, such as the provisioning, marching and coordination of armies, were forgotten by the time of the first campaigns that the British army fought in the 1740s.

Whereas historians have acknowledged aspects of this changing process, in particular the restrictions placed on officers to earn profit on their administrative activities and to purchase promotion, this thesis examines these changes in greater detail, challenging outdated ideas such as the claim that patronage and promotion under George I and George II were wholly dependent on political services rendered by army officers to government ministers, or that the War Office was not an important institution under Queen Anne. It also revises certain arguments, such as the notion that officers earned far less than the minimum necessary to maintain gentlemanly status. In addition, areas that historians have not explored from the perspective of army officers are examined as subjects in their
own right for the first time. These include the relationship between the officer establishment and the army administration that supported it, and the importance and complexity of patronage networks through which army officers solicited patrons and protectors against the threats posed by politics, rivals, and disbandments. The intention is to provide a more balanced perspective on the officer establishment than found in the collective assessments of historians. This is achieved by emphasizing the continuities that affected the careers and outlook of the officer establishment, as well as the changes. This is supported by evidence drawn from 1,600 unpublished letters and papers from army officers, politicians and civil servants, and another 1,700 from published sources. These are supported by official and unofficial lists and tables concerning military matters and 50 published pamphlets, petitions and treatises. The breadth and depth of these sources provides perspectives from all levels of the military hierarchy for any particular topic, from senior generals and government ministers, to regimental commanders and junior officers.

Each chapter examines a discreet administrative, institutional or cultural element of the officer establishment. They draw on a variety of historical disciplines, from comparative studies of European armies to crime and punishment, and from the emerging professions to polite culture. This helps to provide new perspectives and a wider context in which to place the thesis and its arguments. The Introduction provides an overview of the historiography and a brief sketch of the organisation of the officer establishment. Chapter 1 examines how the administrative institutions of the War Office and the Board of General Officers emerged during the wars against Louis XIV to support the officer establishment in providing the coordination and resources needed to maintain the troops under their command. The War Office in particular emerged as the interface between the government and the concerns of the officer establishment, such as promotion, pay, employment and disputes. The chapter demonstrates that the War Office was more important than previously thought by historians, because it held the key to controlling the army, through its relationship with other supporting bodies, and most importantly, its role as a clearing house for promotion among the military ranks. The chapter also argues that a hitherto unrecognised power struggle occurred after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, in which the new Hanoverian monarchs, George I and George II, gained control over the War Office, at the expense of senior army officers like the Duke of Marlborough and the Earl Cadogan.

Chapter 2 examines the conditions of service that officers could expect from military service. Contrary to previous findings, army officers earned much more than expected, although only captains and above earned enough from their direct income to live a lifestyle that matched their gentlemanly status. There was significant inequality in pay however, with junior officers earning well below this
base line, and colonels and generals earning considerably more. There was also a disparity in pay between troops serving in Ireland and Britain. Officers were also expected to be self-reliant, investing large amounts in their equipage, which could be lost or stolen on campaign, and having to finance their own recovery from sickness and injury. The regimental system determined an officer’s service record and experience, with senior regiments requiring wealth and connections for entry, and junior regiments being much less exclusive, but at a risk from disbandment. The latter also tended to serve in Ireland and abroad, and consequently were less popular to officers with the influence to transfer to a more senior regiment in Britain. Chapter 3 argues that patronage networks expanded during the Nine Years War and flourished during the War of the Spanish Succession. Their value to the morale and career prospects of officers was great, as they provided a sophisticated means of obtaining and transmitting recommendations for promotion to officials in a position to dispense them. However, under George I and George II, these networks shrank considerably and became more exclusive. The result was that the monarch controlled most promotions directly, whilst access to officials in proximity to him was enjoyed only by a minority of well connected families. This was balanced to some extent by the personal interest that George I and George II took in the careers of all of their officers. Nevertheless, the ambitions of officers at all levels were hindered, resulting in lower morale, but also longer service in each rank.

Chapter 4 explores an area untouched by the historiography of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century army; that of gentlemanly behaviour and its impact on the values and standards of the officer establishment. It demonstrates that officers were expected to exhibit a strong sense of duty and personal honour. However, personal honour relied on a positive reputation and a willingness to defend it if threatened. Consequently officers participated in a culture of duelling, which disrupted military discipline and contravened orders. The chapter argues that courts-martial tolerated duelling, despite being forbidden by military law, because it was the only way to quickly resolve matters of honour, thereby allowing duty and honour to co-exist once again. Chapter 5 examines the competencies that officers had to acquire to carry out their duties. It argues that, contrary to the views of historians, training was not just ‘at the cannon’s mouth.’ Junior officers were expected to lead recruiting parties and, under the Hanoverian monarchs, to command troops in suppressing riots and smuggling. These exercises trained junior officers in handling finances, co-operating with civil authorities, and imposing their authority on their men, giving them a taste of independent command. The chapter also argues that regimental commanders were unable to address the poor quality of firearms issued to their men, due to institutional restrictions. They also required careful supervision from administrative bodies in order to provide adequate and regular clothing for their regiments. In
doing so, an unregulated practice with many potential opportunities for neglect or graft was turned into a routine duty. The Conclusion ties the elements in each chapter together to suggest that the officer establishment was not as demoralized in the 1720s and 1730s as claimed by the historiography, but instead experienced an increasing sense of professionalism, through reduced absenteeism, longer service in each rank, and improved learning and supervision in particular duties at junior and regimental level. This occurred at the expense of preparation for campaign operations, leaving otherwise experienced generals without sufficient practice in operations and logistics when war broke out in 1739.

The thesis makes three main contributions to the history of the British army and social history in late seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain. First, it provides a more balanced view of the relationship between the officer establishment and the crown, exploring the nature of military service as much from the perspectives of officers as from the requirements of the army administration, or the monarchs who were in ultimate control. Secondly, it shows that the officer establishment was developing an outlook and set of values and standards that was closer to the civil professions than previously thought. These formative steps helped define the identifiable ‘officer corps’ of the later eighteenth century and Napoleonic Wars. Thirdly, it adjusts previous ideas about the officer establishment and its function in civil society. Far from being focussed entirely on military and peacekeeping roles, the officer establishment was a flexible institution which tried to satisfy multiple operational, social and political interests simultaneously. Consequently, the development of a professional outlook was simply one priority among many competing priorities.
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Introduction

A student reading the key works on the British army during the reigns of George I (1714-1727) and George II (1727-1760) might be forgiven for forming a bleak assessment of its officer establishment, given the various negative aspects of the military profession highlighted by historians. Even the wartime successes of the army in the Nine Years War (1689-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) might seem to have arisen despite the officer establishment rather than because of it. From the supposed evils of purchasing promotion to regiments being left naked by neglectful or profiteering commanders, and from the dismissals of officers for their parliamentary activities to the mediocre battlefield performance of antiquated generals in the 1740s, it seems that the prestige of the gold lace and red coat concealed a mix of hard service and personal risk up one sleeve, and a range of corruption and indiscipline up the other. It might seem that only the statesmen-like character of men at the top, such as William III and the Duke of Marlborough, kept the officer establishment focussed on fighting the French and Spanish, instead of killing each other in duels or drinking themselves to gout and infirmity.

This general impression is particularly apparent in the historiography for the peacetime years of the 1720s and 1730s. After the expansion of the army during the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession, these decades can seem to be a time of low fortunes for the British army. Alan Guy has pointed out that ‘any enthusiasm for the great victories of the Duke of Marlborough quickly evaporated after 1714. All that remained was the memory of their great human and financial cost.’

Greatly reduced in size after the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, the army and the officers who led it no longer participated in military campaigns full of the promise of glory and fortune. Instead they policed Britain, guarding against riots and smuggling. In the absence of barracks in England and Scotland, these troops had to be housed by the local population, resulting in complaints to the War Office. As Tony Hayter describes it, ‘… no one had any doubt in the eighteenth century that it was a scourge to society. The vicious system of billeting the troops upon the county, with its endless bickering with innkeepers, magistrates and inhabitants generally, ensured that this attitude remained unchanged.’

Alternatively, officers might serve in the garrisons in the mainland colonies and islands of North America, or the newly won Mediterranean ports of Gibraltar and Minorca. Here service was generally

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more arduous, since regiments were not recalled for years, or decades, and sometimes to other garrisons rather than returning home.\(^3\) Although the army was socially more inclusive than it would become in the nineteenth century, those without wealth or connections, or who served in regiments abroad, with limited opportunities for advancement, could expect to end their careers as ageing captains or field officers.\(^4\) According to John Houlding, for these officers ‘long service was the rule… since they lived off their pay and meagre supplements, since they had neither interest nor private fortune, since their advancement was slow, and since merit was their chief or sole advantage…’\(^5\) Nevertheless, the pride and ambition of officers were not worn down by the burdens of military service. As Alan Guy argues, ‘beneath their veneer of technical professionalism the soldiers were often deeply insubordinate. They eagerly competed for royal grace and favour, but as members of the warrior fraternity of the European *ancien régime* and free born Englishmen to boot… they were ready to criticise the throne itself if their pretensions to honour and preferment were not gratified and even to withdraw their services.’\(^6\)

If their sense of professionalism was subject to their personal ambitions, then even their primary motivation to serve, the chance for promotion, was not necessarily guaranteed by merit or even connection. James Hayes somewhat inaccurately claims that ‘The army was thus bedevilled by the inescapable fact that promotion was in large measure determined by ‘political interest.’ Military preferment was essentially a branch of political patronage, in which jobs could be managed to placate, induce, and reward men with votes and followings in parliament.’\(^7\) Meanwhile, if the army was unpopular with the local populations they policed, the officers themselves were being accused by polemicians like Jonathon Swift of losing their traditional masculinity, as they supposedly brought home the effete customs and dress from the parts of the world they served in. According to Philip Carter, from the late 1720s, ‘for a number of commentators, foppery was now a feature not just of civilian, but also of military life; not just an illustration of declining standards but also an explanation of actual and future military defeats.’\(^8\) Given all these difficulties officers faced, it is perhaps unsurprising, that John Fortescue concluded that ‘treating first the officers, it has, I think, been


\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 102-3, 106.


sufficiently shown that there were influences at work to demoralise them, quite apart from any
legacies of corruption they may have inherited from the past.9

Whilst each of these views, with the exception of Hayes’s, is well argued and valid for the specific
aspect of the army that they examine, collectively they do not provide a balanced summary of army
officers. A reading of the collections of primary sources cited by these historians suggest greater
continuities from the previous decades of warfare than hitherto recognised. These continuities were
provided by the army administration, the regimental system, patronage networks, and gentlemanly
behaviour such as duelling and politeness. They seemed to offer occupational conditions that were
stable enough to keep the officers in service throughout the period, and vacancies into the army hotly
contested by young aspirants.10 Moreover, successive cohorts of officers who began their service as
regimental officers during the Nine Years War and War of the Spanish Succession steadily rose through
the general ranks over the succeeding peacetime decades. They served as regimental commanders, sat
on courts-martial committees, reviewed regiments, and in some cases, led their commands into
combat. The army was mobilised during the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1719, several regiments
participated in Viscount Cobham’s raid on Vigo in 1719, and a large garrison was present at the siege
of Gibraltar in 1727. The frequency with which experienced officers’ opinions were sought by the army
administration suggests that they were actively passing on the expertise they had learned during the
two wars against Louis XIV. These factors suggest that Fortescue’s ‘influences at work’ would benefit
from a wider analysis of the organisational, cultural and administrative context in which they occurred.

Understanding the continuities and changes in the 1720s and 1730s requires an examination of the
same aspects of the officer establishment in the previous decades. The ideal starting point is the
beginning of the Glorious Revolution and the Nine Years War in 1689, since these events represented
a sea change for the army and its officers. The standing army was expanded from 5,000 at the end of
James II’s reign to 87,000 at the peak of the Nine Years War, rising to an average of 93,000 men during
the War of the Spanish Succession.11 The number of active and semi-retired or half-pay officers also
increased to become a sizeable and visible component of society.12 The period examined by the thesis
thus spans 25 years of war at the start, and 25 years of peace after, ending with the start of the War

10 For examples, see Chapter 3, section 3.5, ‘Military Patronage under the early Hanoverian Monarchs.’
11 John Childs, The British Army of William III, (Manchester, 1987), p. 4; John Brewer, Sinews of Power,
12 Brewer, Sinews of Power, pp. 35-6, 45. According to Manning, the officer establishment numbered 5,000 in
1693-4. See Roger Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms and Swordsmen: The origins of the British Army 1585-
of the Austrian Succession in 1739. This chronological breakdown offers a suitable time frame for establishing the continuities and changes that affected the military profession. In the absence of a single study spanning the wars against Louis XIV and the following reigns of the Hanoverian monarchs, each chapter of the thesis explores an aspect of the officer establishment over the 50 year period. This is to overcome the chronological demarcation of the historiography. Each of the key historians limits their focus to either the late Stuart or early Hanoverian monarchs, with the accession of the Hanoverian George I in 1714 as the watershed date.

For the Nine Years War, the main authority is John Childs, whose two works, *The British Army of William III* (Manchester, 1987), and *The Nine Years War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The operations in the Low Countries*, (Manchester, 1991), provide a comprehensive introduction to the components of the army, including the officers. *The Nine Years War* also covers the army’s campaign operations under William III, in the first major war against the French monarch, Louis XIV. *The British Army under William III* reveals the political and professional challenges that faced the officer establishment during the Glorious Revolution, from the purges of Catholic officers and the appointment of loyal gentlemen to command regiments, to the indiscipline and corruption of regimental officers, and the rivalry between full-time, career-driven ‘professionals’ and part-time amateur ‘gentlemen.’\(^{13}\) Childs’s strength lies in his use of the primary sources, which highlight the diversity and individuality of Williamite officers, even as they struggled to cohere into a body capable of providing sustained military leadership. The topic of professionals and gentlemen is further covered by Roger Manning’s *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The origins of the British Army 1585-1702*, (Oxford, 2006), and *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms*, (Oxford, 2003). Manning explores the lingering notion held by established military families and courtiers that military service was the preserve of their own social milieu, and was conditional upon receiving special recognition at court for their sacrifices, which non-martial ‘gownsmen’ could never claim.\(^{14}\) In addition, the conclusion of *An Apprenticeship in Arms* is useful in pointing out that the question of how military professionalism developed in the seventeenth century has been left to political and social scientists, rather than historians. The result had been a flawed methodology based on a superficial engagement with the primary sources. By contrast, Manning has charted with greater precision the changes that the gentlemanly tradition of taking up arms underwent, both as a means of career advancement through the military ranks, and its reception among literary commentators.\(^{15}\)

\(^{13}\) Childs, *The British Army of William III*, pp. 39-41.


\(^{15}\) Manning, *Apprenticeship in Arms*, pp. 432-3; Manning, *Swordsmen*, pp. 53, 104.
The British army during the War of the Spanish Succession is well introduced by R. Scouller’s *Armies of Queen Anne*, (Oxford, 1966). Whilst there is no specific chapter on army officers as a subject in their own right, their participation in all aspects of army administration is comprehensively covered, from their pay and financial hardships, to recruitment and the provision of clothing and arms. Equally useful is the discussion of the armies that served in Spain and Portugal, which are usually overlooked in favour of the more successful troops of Marlborough’s army in Flanders. Scouller’s work reveals the complexity of army administration during the War of the Spanish Succession, and where it failed army officers in their duty to keep their units maintained and recruited. The work’s weakness, which regrettably impacts upon its contribution as a reference work, is its partial citations of archival material. This makes it difficult to track down and read sources as part of a collection or volume.

As a study focussing on the officers in their own right, Stewart Stansfield’s *Early Modern Systems of Command: Queen Anne’s generality, staff officers and the direction of allied warfare in the Low Countries and Germany, 1702-11*, (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Leeds, 2011), offers the most insightful approach for the War of the Spanish Succession. Chapter 3, ‘The paradigm of the early modern officer: life, career and duty,’ looks at the kinds of experiences an officer might acquire as a staff officer, who tended to be from less privileged backgrounds than might be expected. These experiences included the duties they had to perform, and the intense jealousies and rivalries that could arise among the high command, usually over Whig-Tory politics or perceived slights. Stansfield’s engagement with primary sources is deep and varied, with substantial quotations from personal correspondence or journals. They reveal the individual approach officers adopted in the execution of their duties. This is matched by an analysis of the official expectations of senior officers as communicated through their orders, and the example they set through their disciplinary measures. More generally, Stansfield explains how the flexibility and experience of Marlborough’s staff at all levels enabled them to overcome the logistical delays that afflicted early eighteenth century armies. Through a combination of procedures that were refined each campaign season and the personal will of staff officers, they ensured that the multi-national army under Marlborough was satisfactorily encamped, supplied, marched, and on the day of battle, co-ordinated, without a breakdown in communication or the assertion of one unit’s needs over another.

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17 Ibid., pp. 35-8, 48-55.
18 Ibid., ‘Chapter 4, Logistics and Larceny: Reconciling public and private enterprise,’ pp. 81-115; ‘Chapter 6, Command, delegations and military decision-making,’ pp. 140-182; ‘Chapter 8, Organized chaos or chaotic organization? Controlling the battlefield,’ pp. 221-246.
The final authority of the Stuart army is David Chandler, whose two works, *Marlborough as Military Commander*, 3rd edn., (Tunbridge, 1989) and *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough*, (Staplehurst, 1976), capture the spirit of Marlborough’s leadership, even if his praise of Marlborough’s abilities should be balanced with recognition of the contribution of the troops he commanded, and the talents of his multi-national subordinates. *The Art of Warfare* is a comparative study of the infantry, cavalry, and support services (including artillery) of European armies, with emphasis on organisation, equipment, clothing and tactics. Where the other general studies of the British army overlook battlefield performance, Chandler restores some of the focus on the development of technologies and tactics from the early to mid eighteenth century. Using primary sources that are usually used by historians of specialist military subjects, this work is a useful aid for penetrating deeper into such subjects as the provision of clothing and firearms by regimental colonels.\(^{19}\)

Whilst invaluable as reference works, the studies of Childs, Scouller and Chandler are aimed at creating a general picture of the army with examples selected to describe the point being made, rather than seeking to answer questions posed both by historians and by a quantitative reading of the sources themselves. This reflects the emphasis on description that this kind of work requires, although even this yields a satisfactory amount of analysis. However, the scope and depth of archival material now readily available on the British army, and the range of historical approaches that can be applied to them, means that doctoral work increasingly requires more than the revelation of sources and the description of historical processes. In terms of archival sources, the National Archives (TNA) and the British Library (BL) offer a considerable range of material, both in quantity and quality. Historians have only used a portion of these for their research, and both archives can still yield evidence to support multiple avenues of enquiry into the early eighteenth century army. For new historical approaches, associated subjects such as the fiscal-military state, the professions, the army and society, masculinity, and polite culture, all offer new perspectives from which relevant sources can be used to expand our understanding of the officer establishment and the army in general. Consequently, however important revelation and description may be in their own right, their conversion into wider analysis, whether it is the synthesis of new contexts with which to understand military matters, the strengthening of existing historiographical paradigms, or the formulation of new arguments, is the primary goal of this kind of thesis. This wider analysis only ceases to become a means to an end when the key arguments driving the thesis are explained.

\(^{19}\) See Chapter 5, section 5.5, ‘The Duties of Regimental Officers I: Regimental Firearms,’ and section 5.6, ‘The Duties of Regimental Officers II: Regimental Clothing.’
For the latter half of the period examined by the thesis, the historiography is well served by specialist studies on specific themes. The price to be paid, it seems, is a lack of general army histories of the kind produced for the late Stuart army, although Alan Guy’s doctoral work, ‘The Standing Army under George II and the Duke of Cumberland, 1727-1762: Command, Regimental Administration and Finance,’ (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1982) does cover in detail the relationship between army administration and regimental officers, from the financial duties involved in the daily running of their units, to the gradual reforms that restricted the profit they could make from their commands. Guy’s *Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and Administration in the British Army 1714-1763*, (Manchester, 1985) and *Regimental Agency in the British Standing Army, 1715-1763*, (Manchester, 1980) examine this complex subject in greater detail, and extends the period back to 1715, to show the full process of the gradual reforms of regimental economy that took place, starting with George I. *Regimental Agency* helps to rectify the reputation for graft that civilian agents have in the historiography, by showing how both colonels and agents alike had a difficult task directing regimental funds through a poorly regulated aspect of army administration. By linking regimental economy with the finances of regimental officers, Guy demonstrates not only their sensitivity to each other, but also how the efficient administration of a regiment was a key component of the duty of officers. Meticulously researched, Guy’s works make a vital contribution towards understanding the role that George I and George II had in controlling the army through their financial regulations.

John Houlding’s *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army 1715-1795*, (Oxford, 1981), applies an equally rigorous approach to the damage that peacetime policing and the division of regiments into small detachments had on the combat training of the army. As part of the thorough investigation into the positive and negative factors that affected training, Houlding includes a summary of the officers, and a detailed analysis of the drill books and other military literature available to them. As the work is already devoted to answering the questions posed by an inadequate system of formal training, it is too much to expect analysis on the informal training that anti-smuggling and anti-rioting duties offered to junior officers. Nevertheless, the work provides an invaluable examination on the distribution and rotation of regiments, which aids the argument in Chapter 2 of this thesis that the location of a regiment had a considerable impact on the motivation and career path of the regimental officer.²₀ Houlding’s other contribution, ‘The number of commissioned British military officers, 1725-1792,’ *Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research (JSAHR)*, vol. 91 (2013), pp. 92-7, provides a precise breakdown of the number of active officers serving in the army for each year, including newly

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²₀ See Chapter 2, section 2. ‘The Regimental System and its impact on the Conditions of Service.’
commissioned entrants and those re-commissioned from half-pay. Like Guy, Houlding’s works provide essential background information, as well as opening up avenues of enquiry. Although their works were written in the 1980s, the quality of their research and arguments still provide the benchmark for problematizing the army as an institution. Consequently the thesis seeks to build upon their arguments in its search for a more balanced assessment of the officer establishment.

Of more mixed utility are the works of James Hayes. Written 20-25 years before those of Houlding and Guy, the research behind the statements is less rigorous, and if the sources used are original and reveal much in themselves, Hayes’s powers of analysis are somewhat weak. This is unfortunate, because his thesis, ‘The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army, 1714-63’ (M.A. Thesis, University of London, 1956), is the only dedicated study of the Hanoverian officer establishment. Its statements on the diverse and inclusive, but clearly stratified, social composition of the officer establishment still hold true, but the remainder of the thesis focusses too much on narrative and biographical snippets of individual officers to offer much beyond an idea of how historians viewed the officer establishment in the 1960s. In particular, his view that patronage was used ‘to reward men with votes and followings in parliament,’ cited above, needs to be addressed, since primary sources suggest otherwise. In addition, his claim that ‘... once within their regiments they [the officers] were sure to mix in perfect equality, by virtue of the King’s Commission... In every regiment in the army, whether horse or foot or dragoons, the same conglomeration of social origins were to be found among its officers,’ ignores the social exclusivity created by the regimental system, and the frequency with which officers antagonised each other and fought duels.

Hayes’ journal articles look at specific aspects of the officer establishment, and offer more insight than his thesis. ‘The Royal House of Hanover and the British Army, 1714-60,’ John Rylands Library, vol. 40, (1958), pp. 328-357, explores the relationship of army officers and the early Hanoverian monarchs, George I and George II, as well as the Duke of Cumberland. In particular, Hayes argues that these royal soldiers protected the army from economy measures demanded by parliament and the requirements of peacetime duty. However, he takes the side of George I and George II too readily, without considering the impact their decisions had on the morale and careers of the officer establishment. Their decisions were often paternalistic in effect, however well intentioned they were, and even

22 James Hayes. ‘The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army, 1714-63’ (M.A. Thesis, University of London, 1956), pp. 101-2. For analysis on duelling between officers, see Chapter 4, section 4.4, ‘Quarrels among Army Officers.’
provoked protests from officers in pamphlet form.\(^{23}\) Hayes’s ‘Scottish Officers in the British Army, 1714-1763,’ *Scottish Historical Review*, no. 123, (1958) pp. 22-33, uses examples of English officers complaining of the pervasiveness of Scotsmen in the army, and the apparent ease with which they were promoted. As with his thesis, interesting examples of individual officers navigating the different aspects of their profession are only loosely tied into a wider argument or conceptualisation, in this case, of a Scottish loyalist military identity.

Hayes’s ‘The Purchase of Colonelcies in the army 1714-1763,’ *JSAHR* vol. 39 (1961), pp. 3-10, is essentially an in-depth case study of a single transaction of a regiment between two colonels in 1717, which takes our understanding of the agents and negotiations involved in purchase beyond the general work on the subject, Anthony Bruce’s *The Purchase System of the British Army, 1660-1871*, (London, 1980). Bruce’s study places the purchase of commissions in the wider context of the delegation of raising troops by the early Stuart state to private individuals, for whom the units they administered took on a proprietorial nature. Bruce also argues against the temptation of historians to view the purchase of commissions as inherently anachronistic or corrupt, which helps to balance Hayes’s bias against it, based on the opposition of George I and George II to the practice. Given the range of articles that Hayes produced, it is fair to say that he laid the foundations for subsequent historians to further develop our understanding of those fields, whatever the limitations of his analysis. In particular, Hayes’s argument that the administrative efforts of George I and George II had a significant and positive effect on the army is one of the key pillars on which the thesis is based, even if it seeks to provide a more balanced perspective on the contributions of these monarchs.

More recent historians have focused on the relationship between army and society, or the army and politics. Hannah Smith’s chapter ‘The Hanoverian Succession and the Politicisation of the British Army,’ in (eds.) Andreas Gestrich and Michael Schaich, *The Hanoverian Succession: Dynastic Politics and Monarchical Culture*, (Farnham, 2015), examines the participation of senior army officers in parliamentary politics during the polemic contests between Whigs and Tories during the War of the Spanish Succession. In particular, the attempts to suborn army officers to support either the Jacobites or the Hanoverians are examined, as Queen Anne became increasingly unlikely to produce an heir to the Stuart dynasty. In this respect the chapter builds on Geoffrey Holmes’s brief section on politics and the army in *Politics in the Age of Queen Anne*, (London, 1967), which revealed how promotion to the general ranks increasingly depended on whether the Whigs or Tories controlled the ministry.\(^{24}\)

\(^{23}\) See Anon, *Reasons Humbly Offered for Buying and Selling in the Army, in a letter to the Secretary at War*; (London, 1725), p. 15; and Chapter 3, section 3.5, ‘Military patronage under the early Hanoverian Monarchs.’

Smith’s chapter reveals the complexity of dynastic politics during this period, and her detailed analysis demonstrates the need for historians to fully understand the specific political context of primary sources and their authors’ motives before applying them to broader analyses. Smith’s ‘The Army, Provincial Urban Communities, and Loyalist Cultures in England, c. 1714-50,’ *Journal of Early Modern History*, vol. 15, (2011), looks at the patriotic activities of army units, such as the birthday celebrations for George I. Including examples of collaboration between local officials and army officers of units billeted on the populace, her work provides a new dimension to the public relations of the army, in contrast to Hayter’s view of unremitting unpopularity, cited above. Both her works show that the army and its officer establishment were dynamic and dualistic. Given this new layer of complexity, the thesis seeks to understand what system or set of compromises enabled the officer establishment to be simultaneously motivated but apparently demoralized, experienced but in some ways unprofessional, and independent yet carefully controlled by higher authorities.

The final works are a range of excellent biographical resources. As reference works, the brief but detailed entries in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (ODNB), (Oxford, 1885-) and two *History of Parliament*, (HOP) volumes, David Hayton (ed.), *House of Commons, 1690-1715* (Cambridge, 2002), and Romney Sedgwick (ed.), *House of Commons 1715-1754*, (London, 1970), together cover over 150 diverse officers for the 50 year period examined. From personal details and anecdotes to analysis of their civil and military careers, the contributions of their various authors have been invaluable in addressing prosopographical issues that might arise, to the point that only obscure or undistinguished officers remain untouched by biography. Nevertheless, these are still traceable in archival material, and covered by the general studies of Childs, Scouller and Hayes. In addition, several monographs of notable officers and the times they lived in have been published. Childs’s lively *General Piercy Kirke and the Later Stuart Army*, (London, 2014), and Lucy Gordon’s *The Duke of Schomberg: European Soldier, William’s General*, (Belfast, 2004), cover senior officers who served during the Williamite Wars in Ireland, and died during the early years of the Nine Years War. They represent individuals near the peak of the army hierarchy, who navigated the organisational chaos of the army in the early 1690s to achieve rank and favour with William III. Both of these works are of a high academic standard, providing a personal dimension to the general studies of Childs.

Perhaps surprisingly, an academic monograph on Marlborough’s life has yet to be written, although John Hattendorf’s *ODNB* entry ‘John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722),’ and Chandler’s *Marlborough as a Military Commander* provide a sufficient concentration of biographical details and a year by year breakdown of his career to place primary sources in their context. Sir Winston
Churchill’s *Marlborough, his Life and Times*, (4 vols., London, 1933-8, 2 vols., London, 1947), seeks to penetrate Marlborough’s mind, and while often succeeding, does so at the expense of understanding the perspectives of those who didn’t always see eye to eye with him, from the Dutch officials who represented their government on campaign, to Marlborough’s own subordinates. Henry Snyder’s introduction in his compilation of primary sources, *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, (3 vols., Oxford, 1975), is most useful for understanding Marlborough’s working relationship with the Lord Treasurer, Sidney Godolphin, particularly where correspondence regarding patronage is concerned. Beyond this, Frances Harris’s *A Passion for Government: The Life of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough*, (Oxford, 1991), and Ophelia Fields’s *The Favourite: Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough*, (London, 2002), provide the missing context to understand sources covering the downfall of Marlborough and his subsequent loss of patronage, given the Duchess’s turbulent relationship with Queen Anne as her Mistress of the Robes. Whereas Fields writes with a popular audience in mind, Harris follows the Duchess’s correspondence more closely, charting the responses of the parties involved. Her analysis helps to understand the pro-Whig influence the Duchess had on both Marlborough’s relationship with Godolphin and his appointments of army officers, despite his personal desire to remain aloof from party politics.

The remaining biographical monographs blur the distinction between academic and popular works. J. Watson’s *Marlborough’s Shadow: The Life of the First Earl Cadogan*, (Barnsley, 2003), is primarily a narrative of Cadogan’s annual activities, with primary sources and battlefield summaries used to show his contribution to the war effort. Adopting a revisionist approach, the work seeks to point out Cadogan’s flaws as well as his strengths, particularly his potentially circumspect handling of government funds and the officials charged with their care. It is however, too fast paced to discuss either these activities or his military roles. Denise Chantry’s *George Wade: 1673-1748*, (Ilfracombe, 2009), includes much detail to enhance the story of Wade’s life, some of which ought to have been omitted as superfluous during the editing process. Whilst the anecdotes give insights into Wade’s character as a gentleman and a duty-conscious officer, it is written for a popular audience, and the lack of footnotes hinders its utility as a reference work. By contrast, Rex Whitworth’s *Field Marshal John Ligonier: A story of the British Army*, (Oxford, 1958), does not dwell enough on Ligonier’s career as a regimental officer or junior general from the 1700s to the 1730s. As a rising senior officer under the Hanoverian monarchs, there are many references to him in the papers of the War Office. These sources could have been used to fill in the gaps in Ligonier’s own correspondence, but the work fails to examine how these formative years shaped his campaign performance in the 1740s.
Supporting the historiography are several dedicated reference works. Charles Dalton’s *English Army Lists and Commission Registers*, (6 vols., London, 1892-1904), despite their utility to many of the historians above, have been rejected as more trouble than they are worth. Attempts to trace officers mentioned in primary sources through Dalton’s compendium of regimental lists and commission dates have led only to confusion and contradiction. It was this unsatisfactory reference work that highlighted the necessity of compiling new databases for the purpose of the thesis. The primary flaw in Dalton’s work is the lack of a list stating the colonels who commanded each regiment. Since most units were referred to by the name of the colonel currently commanding it, this can lead to confusion, as hundreds of regiments might appear to have existed in the space of 50 years. In fact only around 40 permanent regiments existed, each commanded by five to twelve colonels, serving one after the other. 25 The first database formed for this thesis was a list of all regiments that survived to be given numerical designations in 1751, and where available the disbanded regiments too, with every colonel who commanded them from 1689 to 1739. This allows each designation in the thesis itself to bear both the colonel’s name and the regimental number, or if disbanded, the date of disbandment. For example, Colonel Roger Handasyde’s Regiment of Foot (16th Foot), or Lieutenant-General Echlin’s Regiment of Dragoons (disbanded, 1713). Other databases contain officer complements for regiments at any particular time; the half pay lists of 1697, 1713, and 1740; the number of regiments officers served in over their careers; and biographies of 50 individuals whose names appear frequently enough in the primary sources to require in-depth background information. These databases rely on both primary and secondary sources, including War Office regimental and gradation lists, regimental returns for various purposes, regimental histories, and biographical entries of officers from the *ODNB* and *HOP*. 26

Of far greater value than Dalton are published primary sources. Snyder’s *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence* provides transcriptions of 1,500 letters sent between the Duke of Marlborough and the Earl of Godolphin, the Lord-Treasurer, during the War of the Spanish Succession. Covering topics from promotions and campaign operations to political concerns and the regular headaches suffered

25 Calculated from a database of regimental successions of colonels, drawn from Richard Cannon’s histories of each regiment up to the mid 1840s.

26 Primary sources used include TNA, WO 64/2, ‘Regimental officer complements, 1708-9’; WO 64/6, ‘Army Lists, 1729-30’; WO 64/7-8, ‘Army Gradation Lists, 1705-36’; BL, Add MS 22264, fols. 141-44. ‘A list of the promotion of the officers in the Army since the 25th of March last (1733)’; BL, Add MS 23636, fols. 19-20. ‘A list of regiments quartered in Ireland, 1725’; BL, Add MS 35986. ‘Army List for 1740’; Add MS 41143, pp. 57. ‘Prices of commissions as regulated by a Board of General Officers, 1720’; and BL, Add MS 61160, fol. 42. ‘List of officers to be preferred in Brigadier Cadogan’s Regiment of Foot, circa. 1707.’ Secondary sources include 43 regimental histories by Richard Cannon, such as *Historical Record of the First, or King’s Dragoon Guards*, (London, 1845); and *Historical Record of the Nineteenth, or First Yorkshire North Riding Regiment of Foot* (London, 1848). Although dating from the 1840s, these works offer the most comprehensive and accurate lists of colonels commanding regiments and their dates of service.
by Marlborough, Snyder's contribution to our understanding of Marlborough's many problems as Captain-General, from the strategic and tactical, to the political and personal, is invaluable. Looking at Marlborough's correspondence alone, it is possible to assume that his concerns represent those of the army, or that they span the parameters of the officer experience during the War of the Spanish Succession. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth, as revealed in multiple volumes of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts. Although these volumes cover the correspondence of leading families from the medieval period to the Victorian period, 25 volumes have yielded 435 letters on military matters covering the 50 year period covered by the thesis. These range from personal correspondence describing the fortunes of young officers, as in *The Manuscripts of S.H. Le Fleming (HMC Fleming)*, (London, 1890), to newsletters relating to campaign operations as found in *Report on the Manuscripts of Allan George Finch*, 4 vols. II, (HMC Finch II), (London, 1922). Of particular use are the two volumes *The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland*, vols. IV, V, (HMC Portland IV; HMC Portland VI), (London, 1894, 1896). These cover the papers of Sir Robert Harley, Secretary of State for the North, (1704-8), and Lord High Treasurer (1711-14), and reveal the participation of army officers in political networks outside the direct influence of Marlborough during these years. The debt owed by this thesis to the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts is considerable, as these 435 sources are scattered in local archives, and without their concentration and publication, only a fraction could have been found during the course of a doctoral project that draws most of its archival material from the National Archives and the British Library.

The National Archives, London, has yielded 210 transcriptions of sources from 18 manuscript volumes or bundles of manuscript papers from the State papers (TNA, SP), and 840 transcriptions from 61 volumes or bundles from the War Office (TNA, WO). Of these, the letter books of the Secretary at War (TNA, WO 4/2-35, 1703-1739) are the most widely accessed and cited by historians in their works. They provide an official record of the orders and responses of the War Office to all details, major and minor, military and civil, relating to army administration. They form the basis for the argument in Chapter 1, that the War Office became the key institution for directing and supporting the officer establishment. However, their official nature only reveals the external workings and scope of the operations of the War Office, and not the underlying driving forces of patronage networks, consultations with army and administrative personnel, and the memorials and petitions of officers expressing their expectations and complaints. For these, the far less well known papers of the in-letters of the Secretaries at War, (TNA, SP 41/3-11, 1701-1739) provide a range of information which explains the rationale behind the decisions that manifest themselves in the official correspondence. Other important volumes are the ‘Minutes of the Meetings of the Board of General Officers,’ (TNA,
WO 71-7, 1705-1744), which covers the official proceedings of the various Boards that advised on army custom and discipline, and the ‘Entry books and warrants in Council,’ (TNA, SP, 55/343, 1702-5), which covers issues between colonels commanding regiments and the Board of Ordnance. When read together, the working relationships between the monarch, War Office, Board of General Officers, and supporting bodies such as the Board of Ordnance, can be understood for specific issues affecting individual officers, regiments, or the army as a whole.

The British Library, London, has provided 260 transcriptions of sources from 32 volumes of the vast Blenheim Papers, (BL, Add MS), and 290 transcriptions from 64 volumes of correspondence from assorted army officers, secretaries, and politicians, (BL, Add MS). These cover a range of subjects, from personal correspondence of volunteers and junior officers like Hugh Whitfoord and John Mackenzie, (BL, Add MS, 36592; Add MS 39189), to political papers and military matters, such as the ‘Correspondence of the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State for the Southern department, 1724-1732,’ (BL, Add MS 32687); and ‘Letters of Lord Cutts and other generals to the Duke of Marlborough, 1702-6,’ (BL, Add MS 61162). They help to fill in the gaps in the material at The National Archives, chronologically for the 1690s, such as the ‘Copybook of William Blathwayt, Secretary at War, 1692,’ (BL, Add MS 37991), and geographically, for the troops on the Irish establishment, as with the ‘Correspondence of Edward Southwell, Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1705-12,’ (BL, Add MS 38712). The final source of archival material is the Special Collections at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, containing the ‘Military Correspondence of the Duke of Ormond as Captain-General, 1711-1713,’ (Bodleian Special Collections, MS Eng. Hist. C 41-2); and the correspondence of Lord North and Grey, Colonel of the 10th Regiment of Foot, 1703-1709,’ (Bodleian Special Collections, MS North, a.3).

This thesis seeks to examine those key aspects of the eighteenth century British army that affected the duties, outlook and career prospects of the officer establishment that led it. Its primary intent is to understand how the interplay of these aspects created conditions of service that increased the professional competence and behaviour of army officers in some respects, but in doing so, lowered their freedoms and morale in others. In doing so, it will build a model of practices, behaviours and standards within which individual officers operated as part of a wider martial ethos, and which was closely connected to the attitudes and activities of civil society. It will endeavour to argue that this fluid interaction of values and roles, military and civil, enabled the officer establishment to meet most, but not all, of the varied administrative and leadership tasks assigned to it over the 50 year period. Its secondary intent is to show how army officers were crucial in directing the vast raw resources of the fiscal-military state into effective and readily applied units of force. It hopes to demonstrate that the
administrative output of the officer establishment, as well as its institutional development, are of
importance to historians of the fiscal-military state, since these two factors intimately affected the
ability of the British fiscal-military state to compete with those of her French and Spanish counterparts
both in Europe and in North America during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

The remainder of the thesis is split into five chapters and a conclusion. After this introduction and
review of the historiography, Chapter 1 looks at the emerging War Office and Board of General
Officers, as the main administrative bodies that supported the officer establishment. It also looks at
the relationship between the officer establishment and successive monarchs who, in their capacity as
commanders in chief, made executive decisions at all levels of army administration. Chapter 2
examines the conditions of service that officers experienced, such as the management of income and
expenses as proprietors of their units, the impact of sickness and injury on their ability to serve, and
the diversity of experiences and career paths caused by the regimental system. Chapter 3 discusses
the operation of patronage networks as a crucial and hitherto misunderstood aspect of an officer’s
path to promotion, as well as its links to parliamentary and dynastic politics, which could propel an
officer’s star or extinguish it entirely. Chapter 4 focusses on the complex attitudes toward
‘gentlemanly’ and ‘ungentlemanly’ behaviours such as duelling with fellow officers and embezzlement
of regimental funds. These provided the moral standards officers were judged by, in co-operation with
and sometimes overriding military law. Chapter 5 analyses the skills and attitudes an officer needed
to be competent in his duties, and the opportunities for learning available to him. Finally, the
Conclusion combines all of these factors into an analysis of their interaction with each other, and how
they influenced the particular combination of continuities and changes that led to the state of the
officer establishment through 25 years of war and 25 years of peace. Each of these chapters explores
an aspect of the officer establishment which has either only been briefly sketched by military
historians for this period, or could benefit from a more detailed re-examination using a greater
number of sources and an extension of the scope of enquiry. Depending on the chapter, this scope
can be chronological, geographical, or at different levels of the military hierarchy, from senior
government ministers and generals, to regimental commanders and junior officers. The conclusion
places the thesis within the wider context of the decisions faced by the eighteenth century army
administration, as to which operational and personnel considerations should take priority, and the
consequences to those that were de-prioritised. It also describes the state of the officer establishment
on the eve of the war it was to fight at the end of the period examined, the War of the Austrian
Succession (1740-1748).
This leads to the question of why the term ‘officer establishment’ is used in the thesis and not more familiar terms like ‘the profession of arms,’ as favoured by historians of the later seventeenth century, and ‘officer corps’ by those of the Napoleonic Wars. Historians of the professions have acknowledged that the armed forces were different to the more established civil professions, or at best, were engaged in a transitional stage towards adopting their institutional features. According to Ian Roy, ‘The armed services do not fit easily into any schema which is based upon the well-known emergence and the recognised status of the three classic professions – the law, medicine and the ministry.’ Although the debate over what constitutes a profession is useful for comparative studies of the professions, it has not been used by military historians to define army officers in this period. Instead, Childs and Manning have drawn a distinction between ‘gentlemen’ and ‘professionals’ in the late seventeenth century army based on full-time and amateur service. This distinction was problematic even to contemporaries, as not all officers fell neatly into these categories. The distinction became even less relevant in the early eighteenth century, as all officers were considered gentlemen in a social context, and were expected to carry out their duties in a ‘professional’ manner, whether they were in constant attendance at their posts or whether they combined their military duties with other important activities such as diplomatic service. As the thesis will explore the changing meaning of professionalisation over the period, it seems best to rely on ‘establishment’ as a neutral alternative, since, unlike ‘profession,’ this term has not been loaded with previous meaning by historians.

Unlike ‘profession,’ the term ‘establishment’ was used widely by contemporaries, to describe the number of soldiers voted by parliament to be paid for and garrisoned within the three kingdoms of Britain. Implied by the figures of the men voted for is a hidden establishment, that of the officers needed to recruit, pay and care for them. ‘Officer establishment’ simply means the number of army officers drawing pay from the government, active or otherwise at any time. By contrast, a ‘corps,’ in

27 Manning, Swordsmen, pp. 21, 31; Bruce Collins, ‘Chapter 3: Effectiveness and the British Officer Corps 1793-1815,’ pp. 57-76, in Kevin Linch and Matthew MacCormack (eds.), Britain’s Soldiers: Rethinking War and Society, 1715-1815, (Liverpool, 2015); Rafe Blaufarb, ‘Chapter 3 The death and rebirth of the officer corps, 1790-93,’ pp. 75-105, in Rafe Blaufarb, The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit, (Manchester, 2002).
30 Manning, Swordsmen, p. 28.
the eighteenth century sense is understood to require several criteria to qualify as such. Unlike a trade, its members must operate together in the provision of a common cause, such as interpreting the laws of the nation, or the advancement of medical practice. It should also have a body of knowledge with which its practitioners refer to in their daily activities, itself subject to debate and reform among its peers. It must also have a degree of exclusivity, either by a formal qualification or some selective barrier to entry, and a common motive to protect its privileges and rights. Finally, its members must be subject to self-regulation and internal discipline according to standards higher than those of outsiders engaged in similar business. Whether concerning a corps, profession, or even establishment, all of these criteria should combine to create a concept greater than the sum of its parts: that of a corporate identity. Although the officer establishment possessed some of these attributes to some degree, it could by no means be considered a corps until later in the eighteenth century.

Finally, a brief note on the size and organization of the officer establishment is useful before the thesis begins in earnest. The late Stuart and early Hanoverian army consisted of three main branches of service. These were the musket-armed infantry, or the Foot; the musket-armed horse-mounted infantry, or the Dragoons; and the sword and pistol-armed cavalry, or the Horse. In practice, the Dragoons were increasingly adopting both the mounted infantry and cavalry roles during the period, and were armed with swords as a result. Each branch was organised into regiments, commanded by a colonel, and assisted by a lieutenant-colonel and a major. These three were the field officers of the regiment. Each regiment was split into 10-13 companies for the Foot, and 6 troops for the Dragoons and Horse. Each company was commanded by a captain, and assisted by a lieutenant, and either an ensign for the Foot, or a cornet, for the Dragoons and Horse. These three were known as the company officers of the regiment. The colonel, lieutenant-colonel and major would each command their own companies or troops, holding the rank of captain in addition to their field rank. To allow the colonel to focus on commanding the regiment, his lieutenant would run the company for him, holding the rank of captain-lieutenant. This gave a regiment of Foot 30-39 officers, depending on the number of companies, and 18 officers for a regiment of Dragoons or Foot. There were also three regiments of Foot Guards, three troops of Horse Guards, and two of Horse Grenadier Guards. These comprised the

34 See David Bell, *Lawyers and Citizens: The Making of a Political Elite In Old Regime France*, (New York, 1994), pp. 16-17 for debate on whether the French Order of Barristers met the criteria of a corps or a modern profession.
elite Household units, which acted as the sovereign’s bodyguard in addition to the normal duties of the Horse, Dragoons and Foot. Officered by the social elite and more selective in the quality of enlisted soldiers, Guards units enjoyed higher status, pay and privileges to the rest of the army.

In addition to their regimental rank, some officers might also have an army level rank, known as a brevet rank. This gave an officer a higher rank when serving outside his regiment, enabling him to carry out tasks with greater authority than if he relied on his regimental rank alone. For example, in 1704, Joseph Sabine was the lieutenant-colonel of the 23rd Foot, but also had a brevet rank of colonel. Brevetcies were also a means of promoting officers when regimental vacancies were unavailable, and when deciding on his seniority for a promotion, an officer used his higher brevet rank. Reflecting the same practice in other European armies, Guards officers enjoyed a brevet rank two steps higher than their regimental rank, to reflect their elite status. General officers commanded two or more regiments for campaign operations or in garrisons, as at Gibraltar or Minorca. Brigadier-Generals were the most junior, then Major-Generals, followed by Lieutenant-Generals and finally, Generals of Foot or Horse. During the War of the Spanish Succession, the supremo title of Captain-General was also in use, held first by the Duke of Marlborough, and then by the Duke of Ormond. In addition to these ranks, there were also loosely defined staff roles that a regimental or general officer might hold, such as Brigade-Major, Adjutant-General, or Quartermaster-General.38

The total number of officers holding commissions to command as regimental officers and generals fluctuated greatly during wartime, but a rough maximum for the wartime years of 1689-1713 would be around 4,500-5,000, as the raising of new regiments, campaign attrition, the drafting of one unit into another, and the occasional military disaster or victory affected absolute numbers. For the peacetime years of 1714-1739, the calculation of these figures is facilitated by the reduced and largely stable number of regiments in existence, resulting in an average of 2,350 officers.39 As an indication of the maximum number of regiments in existence during this period, at the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 there were 3 regiments of Foot Guards, 6 troops of Household Cavalry, 80 regiments of Foot, 23 of Dragoons, and 11 of Horse.40 Many of these were disbanded in the following peace, and their officers placed on half-pay, or if lucky, transferred to those regiments that did survive.41

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40 TNA, SP 41/5, fol. ? ‘List of regiments permanent and broke in the army, 19 February, 1714.’
41 Anon, A Regimental List of the Half Pay Officers, for the Year 1714, (London, 1714).
3 regiments of Foot Guards, 6 troops of Household Cavalry, 40 regiments of Foot, 14 of Dragoons, and 8 of Horse.\textsuperscript{42}

It is important to note that only the Guards, Foot, Dragoons and Horse were considered part of the army proper during this period, and only these and the general officer ranks will be examined by the thesis. The artillery, engineers and pontooniers were controlled by the Board of Ordnance, which also held the arms and equipment for the army regiments themselves.\textsuperscript{43} Although several senior army officers and regimental junior officers simultaneously held commissions and appointments with the Ordnance, the ‘trains’ themselves were raised on an ad hoc basis, and it can be argued that their officers were too few in number during this period to represent a coherent institutional body in the same way as the branches of the army. In terms of administration, the army was split into three separate establishments before 1707, these being the English, Irish and Scottish establishments. After the Act of Union in 1707, there were only two establishments, the British and the Irish. The latter carried out the administration of regiments in Ireland almost independently of the War Office in Britain.\textsuperscript{44}
Chapter 1 Administrative Control and the Officer Establishment

1.1 Introduction

Historians of the fiscal-military state have explored how the development of financial institutions and methods of revenue extraction funded armed forces among eighteenth century European nations-states. However, the process of converting these resources into the end product of fielding permanent armies has been largely overlooked.¹ In response to the historiographical emphasis on revenue as an indicator of military and naval strength, Jeremy Black has argued that the effective use of armies and navies was as important as efficient revenue extraction and sustainable numbers. In particular, the decisions made by institutions charged with the administrative and logistical aspects of the armed forces played a crucial role in the quality and range of military capabilities available to a nation-state over any period of time.² Regarding the French military administration in the mid-seventeenth century, David Parrott has argued that the priority placed on financing large numbers of troops prevented the bureaucratic officials charged with their maintenance from sustaining them properly, leading to inefficiencies that hindered their combat capabilities.³ His study highlights the importance of planning and organisation among early modern nation-states, to ensure that the paper strengths of armies could be actually delivered, and realistically maintained through the friction of war. Douglas Baxter’s study of French intendants during the same period demonstrates the need for co-operation between central civil authorities, the subordinates charged with low-level administration, and senior army officers, who objected to bureaucratic encroachment on their military authority.⁴

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² According to Black, ‘... the conversion of men, material and money, into military units is and was not an automatic and uncomplicated process, and reflects and reflected different conventions and administrative practices and possibilities.’ See Jeremy Black, Britain as a Military Power 1688-1815, (London, 1998), pp. 8-9. For an introduction to building functioning military power out of a state’s raw resources in Early Modern Europe, see Ian Lindegren, ‘Chapter 6: Men, Money and Means,’ in Philippe Contamaine (ed.), War and Competition between States, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 130-162.


David Chandler has pointed out that during the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession, the limitations of military administration made logistics and management crucial factors in the large-scale, ambitious strategies of warring nations. During the latter war, Britain was part of a grand strategy in which she fielded large armies on two overseas fronts, in concert with allied troops, to oppose Louis XIV’s hegemonic ambitions. The operation of this strategy was severely limited by the realities of supply and decision-making over long distances. These considerations continued in the decades of peace afterwards. In particular, maintaining a long-term military presence in colonies and garrisons in North America and the Mediterranean posed a significant bureaucratic challenge to the centralised military administration centred on London.

Officers of the British army under the late Stuart and early Hanoverian monarchies were still responsible for recruiting, paying and maintaining the men directly under their command. However, army personnel increasingly carried out these duties in co-operation with supporting services. Whereas regimental officers could direct manpower and supplies at unit level, without central coordination they lacked information on where and when the requisite resources were coming, the assurance that other officials were taking care of them in the meantime, and the funds and equipment to pay for and transport them. General officers and their staffs could provide direction and coordination in a particular sphere of operations or within a peacetime establishment, but all army officers required administrative support from discrete bodies charged with specific responsibilities. In wartime, these included private contractors for bread, forage and general stores of clothing. Of the permanent supporting services, the Office of Paymaster-General and the Commissary-General of Musters channelled funds voted by parliament to regimental commanders or their agents, whilst the War Office was responsible for overall army administration, including manpower, supplies, and quartering. The Board of Ordnance provided arms and ammunition to colonels, to be distributed and maintained by regimental officers.

6 In 1739, Britain had an army of 35,000 to defend Great Britain and Ireland, Minorca and Gibraltar, and various colonies, islands and territories in North America. In contrast, Prussia possessed an army of 75,000 to cover its much smaller and contiguous kingdom. Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 10. See also Ibid., pp. 18-19, 122-3; Guy, *Regimental Agency*, pp. 7, 11-12; and David Chandler (ed), *Oxford History of the British Army*, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 97-8.
Army officers were ordered to perform general administrative tasks in co-operation with these supporting services. The War Office occasionally required officers to submit reports on the quantity and condition of muskets and swords in a regiment’s possession, since these were valuable assets which the Board of Ordnance was keen to retain in the event of restructuring or disbandment. For example, when the Duke of Ormond was tasked with disbanding the army at the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, he was instructed that ‘care is to be taken that the arms of such men as shall be disbanded, which were delivered out of our stores of Ordnance, be returned thither again, and acquittances taken for the same.’ The provision of clothing to regiments involved the Board of General Officers approving of the patterns of clothing selected by colonels, and authorizing them to draw funds assigned to them by the Paymaster-General for the purpose. The War Office was responsible for organising the delivery of this clothing to regiments through the Commissioners for Transportation, and colonels were instructed to assign a regimental officer to accompany the cargo to its destination, especially if the regiment was stationed overseas. Other areas of collaboration included recruitment, whereby the War Office directed civil authorities to procure additional recruits for army officers to add to their own efforts in enlisting men, and the embarkation of remounts onto chartered ships, their condition to be monitored by a regimental cavalry officer assigned by the War Office. This increase in bureaucratic supervision represented a move away from officers being contracted to raise and equip soldiers for a lump sum, independent of direct state intervention. According to military historians John Lynn and Hamish Scott, this was a feature of the transition from the ‘aggregate-contract armies’ of the sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries to the ‘state-commission army’ of the mid-seventeenth century. Whilst the original purpose of relieving the state of as much

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10 TNA, WO 71/1, ‘Order for reducing the forces in Flanders, 1713,’ William Wyndham, Secretary at War, to the Duke of Ormond, Captain-General of the Land Forces in Great Britain. See also WO 4/3, p. 197. Henry St John, Secretary at War, to Colonel Handasysse, 23 March, 1705; Bodleian Library Special Collections, University of Oxford, MS Eng. Hist. C. 41, p. 52. Edward Southwell to George Granville, Secretary at War, 5 December, 1710. 11 For the Board of General Officers’ role, see TNA, WO 7/24, ‘Out-letters, Board of General Officers: Clothing Board, 1715-1742’ and Chapter 5, section 5.6, ‘The Duties of Field Officers II: Regimental Clothing.’ For details on the Pay Office’s role, see Graham, Corruption, Party and Government, pp. 49-50. 12 TNA, WO 4/3, p. 201. Henry St John, Secretary at War to Charles Hedges, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, Whitehall, 3 April, 1705; WO 4/5, p.141. St John to the Earl of Orkney, Colonel of the 1st Foot, and 15 other commanders of regiments stationed in Flanders, Whitehall, 8 February, 1707. See also WO 4/9, p. 78. Sir Robert Walpole, Secretary at War, to Josiah Burchett, Secretary to the Admiralty Board, 8 July, 1709; WO 4/19, p. 72. William Pulteney, Secretary at War, to ‘the General Officer for inspecting the clothing of the army,’ Whitehall, 11 February, 1717, for examples. 13 TNA, SP 41/3, fol. 60. Henry St John to Charles Hedges, Whitehall, 20 November, 1705; SP 41/4, p. 180. George Granville, Secretary at War to St John, Secretary for the Northern Department, Whitehall, 30 November, 1711; WO 4/3, p. 194. St John to Mr Roop, 24 February, 1705; WO 4/4, p. 132. St John to William Wyndham, 24 January, 1705. 14 John Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army 1610-1715, (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 9-10; and Hamish Scott, ‘Chapter 1: The Fiscal Military State and International Rivalry during the Long Eighteenth Century,’ in Storr,
administration as possible remained, the increased size of armies and the complexity of operations against Louis XIV demanded greater central co-ordination of this delegated administration. This was necessary to ensure that the resources gathered centrally were not excessively diminished by time, distance, or corruption before they reached their destination to troops in the field. Once they had arrived at a garrison or camp, these resources and the troops themselves needed careful management from army personnel to ensure their impact was effective, and not merely theoretical. The late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century army officer was a manager of the soldiers under his command, and of the resources transferred to his care.

Army officers were in turn managed by the military administration, through the supervision of their activities. An officer who kept his unit disciplined, up to strength and in as good a condition as possible under the circumstances was considered successful in his administrative duties. Over time, this reputation for managerial competence could be as valuable to an officer’s career as his leadership abilities and personal bravery. However, serious administrative inefficiencies on his part were likely to invite censure from army and civil officials. For example, in 1710, the regiments of Colonel Piercy Kirke junior (2nd Foot), Colonel Andrew Windsor (28th Foot), Marquis de Montandre (disbanded, 1713), Sir Charles Hotham, (disbanded, 1713), and Major-General James Wightman (17th Foot), were severely below strength, and the recruiting efforts of their officers slower than other regiments. Windsor’s was in the worst condition, and the Secretary at War informed him that ‘Sir, it appearing by the return of the strength of your regiment that at least two hundred and fifty men are wanting of the established numbers, I am commanded by Her Majesty to signify Her pleasure that you take care for the speedy raising so many recruits... since Her Majesty will in a short time call for an account of their proceedings and show her favour or displeasure, as She finds this recruiting more or less vigorously carried on.’ The remaining colonels received similar letters in rebuke. Since colonels relied on supporting bodies to provide the resources needed to maintain their units, they could offer a valid defence if the fault lay with these bodies. Colonels Windsor and de Montandre appealed to the Secretary at War that when detachments were made from their regiments to reinforce others, they

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15 For the direction of troops, pay and supplies in camp, see Stansfield, ‘Early Modern Systems of Command,’ pp. 81-3, 100-104, 189, 191-3; and Chandler, _Warfare in the Age of Marlborough_, pp. 19-20.

16 TNA, WO 4/10, p. 83. Granville to Colonel Andrew Windsor and four other colonels, Whitehall, 29 December, 1710.
had received neither the levy money for raising new recruits, nor the subsistence pay to cover their living expenses. The Secretary at War appreciated that these two colonels were not entirely to blame, and ordered the Paymaster-General to release the necessary funds as a matter of urgency.\(^{17}\)

As the number of active and retired officers increased as a consequence of the standing army, the officer establishment grew into an entity that possessed its own unique administrative concerns. Issues of professional interest to officers, including promotions, transfers, seniority, pay and conduct towards each other, became routine matters that were handled by the constituent central bodies that comprised the army administration. First summoned by Queen Anne in 1705, the Board of General officers advised on personnel matters in accordance to army custom, with members of early Boards being appointed by the monarch, and later Boards electing member from the list of active generals. They advised the War Office on technical matters and personnel affairs beyond the civil knowledge of the Secretary at War.\(^{18}\) The Judge Advocate General ensured that disciplinary measures taken against officers conformed to statutory procedure.\(^{19}\) The monarch retained prerogative powers concerning the appointment of officers to regimental and general ranks, and to governorships of towns and forts.\(^{20}\) Collectively, these institutions recognised the status of army officers as gentlemen; the personal sacrifices they endured in the completion of their duty; and the leadership they provided. These attributes marked them as a clearly defined administrative group. Discrete from either non-commissioned officers or private soldiers, their affairs required a greater level of consideration to match their dignity and prestige.

Despite the diversity of backgrounds and experiences within the officer establishment, its members shared common expectations in the pursuit of their careers, which they held the government answerable for. When they encountered obstacles or injustices that they could not solve themselves, or when administrative faults deprived them of the support they drew from the state, they complained to the War Office, and in extreme cases, to parliament. Such grievances included arrears, regimental posts superseded in an officer’s absence, and personal debts incurred in the maintenance of a company or regiment.\(^{21}\) Whether in the form of a private letter to the Secretary at War, or a published

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 4/10, p. 88. Granville to James Bridges, Paymaster-General of the Forces, Whitehall, 2 January, 1711.

\(^{18}\) Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, pp. 30-1.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 31. See also TNA, WO 81/1-2. ‘Letterbooks of Edward Hughes, Judge-Advocate-General, 22 October, 1715-1734,’ for examples of the routine business of this appointment.

\(^{20}\) TNA, WO 4/18, pp. 244-5. Pulteney to Lord William Hay, 3 September, 1716.

\(^{21}\) For examples of complaints to the War Office and the Departments for the North and South, see BL, Add MS 37991, fol. 165, William Blathwayt, Secretary at War, to the Earl of Nottingham, Secretary for the Southern Department, 18 September, 1692; TNA, WO 4/17, p. 105. William Pulteney, Secretary at War, to Mr Byde, Whitehall, 31 March, 1715; WO 4/35, p. 40. William Yonge, Secretary at War to John Scrope, April 6, 1739. For
petition to parliament, they expressly stated the government’s responsibility for their redress. Where officers had suffered hardships or injuries in the service and were unable to sustain themselves independently, appeals were sent to the War Office for charity, in consideration of their long or loyal service. In return, the notion of ‘His Majesty’s bounty’ required that worthy but impoverished or infirm officers be granted relief, as a display of the beneficence and goodwill the monarch offered in return for loyal service.

At the same time, the military administration sought to impose a basic standard of service throughout the officer establishment. Absenteeism, financial mismanagement, and ungentlemanly conduct were all vices which senior officers and the Crown sought to reduce, through a combination of inspection and disciplinary measures. Commissaries of the Musters and later in the period, reviewing generals, were sent to regiments to compare financial accounts of units with the men and equipment on parade. Officers guilty of incompetence or embezzlement had the missing men’s funds charged to their account, or were court-martialled and dismissed, depending on the severity of the crime. Regimental commanders were required to submit registers of officers, with explanations for those listed as absent, who would receive a reprimand if without sufficient excuse. For example, in 1707, the Duke of Marlborough wrote that ‘Mr [Secretary at War] St John has been ordered to lay a list before the Queen, of such officers upon the establishment of Spain, as are absent from their commands, in order I hope, to make some examples...’ The administration’s punitive response to these infractions in most cases indicates an intention to limit the exploitation of the regimental system. Regimental officers were permitted under this system to obtain financial perquisites from their appointments as an incentive, and a degree of absenteeism was tolerated for privileged officers engaged in other activities, or were otherwise excused. Beyond this margin for absenteeism however, the War Office strove to control the worst excesses in the conduct of officers by monitoring the returns published petitions, see The Case of Captain John Hutchinson, in relation to his petition... against Col. Lillington and the agent of the regiment, Mr John Thurton, (London, 1699); and The Case of several Officers of Brigadier Stanwix’s late Regiment, (London, 1712).

Examples include Cornet Colvert, who was injured falling off a horse and was discharged after incurring large expenses in search of a recovery; and Captain Peter Lisle, whose wife requested half-pay on account of his madness and loss of senses. See TNA, SP 41/3, fol. 71. The humble petition of Thomas Colvert, late cornet in Your Majesty’s Royal Regiment of Horse Guards, 9 January, 1706; WO 72/1, bundle 2, fol. ? ‘The petition of Mrs Lisle, on behalf of her husband, Captain Lisle, a lunatic,’ 1715.


Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 133; Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, p. 34.


it received from regimental commanders and acting on the complaints of army commanders. Through its routine and otherwise sympathetic regard to officers’ affairs, the military administration created a bureaucratic dimension to the military experience of officers. In doing so, it enhanced their identity as a corporate group that could count on a regulatory and advisory authority to manage their military careers. This chapter will examine the patterns of control that the War Office, Board of General Officers, and late Stuart and early Hanoverian monarchs attempted to exert on the officer establishment.

1.2 The Growth of the War Office and the Board of General Officers

Although originally limited in their functions, by the late 1710s the War Office and the Board of General Officers had together expanded sufficiently to encompass all administrative responsibilities related to the management of army officers. The Secretary at War issued reprimands, drew up commission papers, ordered officers to pay or be paid, and organised exchanges of personnel between establishments and units. As a member of the ministry, he was kept informed of government policy on domestic and foreign matters, and represented his office’s activities when queried in the Commons. He also routinely presented administrative business to the sovereign in council for a decision or formal approval. Combining these functions with routine administration meant that the Secretary at War possessed a thorough working knowledge of the financial, personnel and logistical components of the army. This allowed the War Office to place officers’ affairs within the wider perspectives of the army as a whole. The Board of General Officers acted as a pool of opinions on army custom and practice from the most senior officers in the army, on subjects which civil officials like the Secretary at War would have only indirect experience. These included personal disputes between officers, claims to a regimental or general appointment, and the financial activities of officers within the regimental economy.

The War Office and the Board required mutual trust in order to co-ordinate their activities effectively, due to the way in which military affairs were assigned to the relevant component of the military

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administration. In the first instance, army affairs and requests from personnel were submitted to the War Office, which decided on the next course of action. The Secretary at War could either deal with an issue directly, transmit it to the appropriate supporting service for further inquiry, or lay it before the monarch for his instruction. The Board received its instructions from the War Office, and was required to submit its report to the monarch for the final decision, which if approved was communicated to the War Office to carry out.30

Like other supporting services within the army administration, partisan politics and common interests contributed to a collaborative atmosphere. Personnel of both institutions were in close communication with each other, in their official capacity, and in correspondence between individual generals and the War Office concerning their careers and duties.31 In addition, many generals serving on the Board in the reigns of George I and George II also sat in the Commons or Lords, and participated in parliamentary debates. Of the total 23 generals elected to serve on the Board formed in 1714, seven were currently MPs, and two peers spoke regularly in the Lords.32 Another two had been MPs before the succession of George I, whilst one member, General Henry Lumley, had a brother who served on the Privy Council and was a junior minister.33 The current Secretary at War, William Pulteney, had a brother serving as captain in the 2nd Foot Guards. The commander of his regiment was Lieutenant-General William Cadogan, whose close friend, Major-General Joseph Sabine, was also a member of the Board.34 Subsequent Boards had similar connections with parliament and also the royal court.35 These links demonstrate the interconnectivity between the army high command and the civil administration. They enhanced the personal relations between the War Office and Board of General Officers, by affirming that the two institutions shared similar political attitudes and access to

30 The Board increasingly began to examine disputes between officers from 1708 onwards. See TNA, WO 71/1, p. 143. Dispute between Captain Crespigny and Lord Charlemont, 5 May 1708; and Ibid, p. 304. Brigadier Elliott cleared of accusations made by Captain Cleland; Whitehall, 5 April, 1709, for examples.
32 These were Generals Thomas Erle and Henry Lumley; Lieutenant-Generals John Webb, Henry Seymour and George Carpenter; and Major-Generals Thomas Whetham, and George Wade. The two peers were the Earl of Orkney and the Duke of Hamilton. The two ex-MPs were Major-Generals George Cholmondeley and Robert Echlin. See TNA, WO 71/3, pp. 42-3. ‘Results of the Election of the Board of General Officers,’ 15 November, 1714.
33 John Childs, ‘Richard Lumley, 1st Earl of Scarbrough, (1650-1720), ODNB.
35 For example, the Board that convened in 1726, contained 5 current MPs and 4 peers who sat in the Lords, from a total of 18 members. One member, Lord Mark Kerr, had a cousin, Brigadier William Kerr, who was an MP. The Board that convened in 1739 had 13 current MPs and 2 peers active in the Lords, out of a total of 32 members. See TNA, WO 71/5, p. 295. ‘Warrant constituting a Board of General Officers,’ 14 December, 1726; and WO 71/124, ‘Warrant constituting a Board of General Officers,’ 26 October, 1738.
patronage. This reflects a similar process to that which Aaron Graham suggests occurred within the office of the Paymaster-General and the various bodies that comprised the commissariat. Graham suggests that the alternative to mutual trust and overlapping responsibilities would have been to follow transparent practices and defined procedures. These would have restricted the flexibility officials relied on by forcing them to adopt slower and ultimately more complicated financial activities for the sake of bureaucratic housekeeping. Similarly, it can be argued that the political links and common outlook between the Board of General Officers and the War Office allowed military affairs to be addressed with less friction than if administrative personnel and bodies operated independently of each other according to strict rules. Rather than creating new bureaucratic posts and apparatus to meet the management needs of the officer establishment and the army in general, existing institutions were given greater scope in the affairs they could intervene in. In this way, political connections provided a harmonizing influence on the administrative approaches of both the War Office and the Board of General Officers.

From its creation under Charles II to the late 1690s, the War Office was simply a secretarial office. It was only late into the reign of William III that William Blathwayt increased the roles and responsibility of the office, as Secretary at War. He combined the technical duties of a senior civil servant with the decision-making of a junior minister. The office was still not fully centralised, since the functions of the War Office in Ireland were handled by George Clarke during the Williamite Wars of 1689 to 1691, and he later shared overall joint responsibility with Blathwayt. They received briefings on military and naval affairs from the Secretaries of State, and were instructed in their duties with limited margins for discretion. In addition, Blathwayt kept the Secretary for the Southern Department routinely informed of William III’s decisions on various matters when he accompanied the king abroad. Although Blathwayt and Clarke were MPs, their parliamentary and secretarial activities remained separate. From 1704 onwards, the secretary at war was a junior minister chosen by the governing

36 According to Graham, ‘Political partisanship did at least create a set of relatively clear and cohesive public priorities against which competing public and private interests could be measured and aligned.’ See Aaron Graham, Corruption, Party and Government, p. 2.
38 Childs, The Nine Years War and the British Army, p. 70.
39 Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, pp. 10, 16.
40 Andrew Hanham, ‘George Clarke, (1661-1736), HOP 1690-1714; Timothy Clayton, ‘George Clarke, (1661-1736), ODNB.
41 TNA, WO 4/2, p. 163. Blathwayt to Mr Gary, 9 December, 1690; BL Add MS 24328, fol. 2. Nottingham to Blathwayt, 21 April, 1693; Add MS 21552, fol. 7. Marquess of Winchester to Blathwayt, 1 June, 1697.
party from promising MPs, largely for political reasons. Serving both senior ministers and the sovereign, there was still little margin for executive decision-making, or even collaborative input into the direction of foreign policy where the army was concerned. This meant that ambitious politicians like Henry St John, Robert Walpole, William Pulteney and Henry Pelham saw the post as a stepping stone on their path to higher office. St John and Pulteney resigned from the post in 1710 and 1717 respectively, as manoeuvres to express dissatisfaction with ministerial choices, and to gain support for returning to office on their own terms.\textsuperscript{43} The other politicians appointed to the office were placemen or favourites, like William Wyndham, Francis Gwyn and William Strickland. Their assignment to the War Office represented the limits of their political talents.\textsuperscript{44}

The political nature of the secretaryship resulted in 14 incumbents from 1689 to 1739, with all but one having no military experience.\textsuperscript{45} The time spent in this post varied greatly. At 15 years, Blathwayt held it the longest, although this is hardly surprising since his role more closely resembled the long-term appointments of senior civil servants than the political post it was to become after him.\textsuperscript{46} Subsequent secretaries filled the post for an average of two years, until 1718, when two candidates, Viscount Castlecomer and Robert Pringle, were removed within months of each other. Thereafter, the secretaryship became a long term appointment, with incumbents lasting five or six years each. Turnover of permanent staff was slow throughout the period, with deputy-secretaries continuing in their posts over decades and outlasting several secretaries at war. This was because the post was considered a form of property, like the technical posts of other government departments.\textsuperscript{47} Samuel Lynn served as deputy-secretary from 1701 to 1708, and from 1710 to the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.\textsuperscript{48} James Taylor filled the post under Walpole from 1708 to 1710, returning to the post in 1715. Richard Arnold served in 1721, and was conducting business in the Secretary at War’s absence through to the end of the period examined.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} Stephen Baskerville, ‘Sir William Wyndham, 1688-1740,’ \textit{ODNB}; Shirley Matthews, ‘Francis Gwyn, (1648-1734),\textit{HOP} 1715-54; Romney R. Sedgwick, ‘Sir William Strickland (1686-1735),’ \textit{HOP} 1715-54.
\textsuperscript{45} The exception was Henry Pelham, Secretary at War from 1724-1730. He had been briefly commissioned as a captain of dragoons during the Jacobite rebellion of 1715. See Romney Sedgwick, ‘Henry Pelham, (1695-1754),’ \textit{ODNB}; Henry Hamilton, \textit{Historical Record of the 14th King’s Hussars}, (London, 1901), p. 1.
\textsuperscript{46} See Holmes, \textit{Augustan England}, pp. 244-5, for examples of civil servants holding long incumbencies.
\textsuperscript{49} Biographical information on deputy-secretaries at war is extremely limited. The best indicator for their activities comes from letters drafted and signed in the secretary at war’s absence, as found in the marching
With the staff headed by long-serving deputy-secretaries, a change in the Secretary at War does not seem to have caused much disruption to the continuity of administrative business. An absence of delays in the routine administration found in letter books and state papers suggests that the War Office continued smoothly during such transitions. Unless facing a crisis or instructed by the monarch to attend to a specific matter, a minimal level of administrative output could be maintained by new secretaries or incumbents adopting a laissez-faire approach. The letter books of such secretaries deal only with general administration at army level, such as troop deployments, appointing officers to military postings, and organising reviews of regiments. When faced with matters requiring greater inquiry, they simply forwarded them to other officials, such as officers in charge of a garrison, or the Board of General Officers, without any direct involvement regarding details. For example, as Secretary at War from 1713 to 1714, Francis Gwyn focussed on administration in a cursorial manner, tasking other bodies with responsibilities and rarely inquiring into the realities of regimental organisation or the ongoing complaints from officers. Although the military administration was experiencing new burdens following the demobilisation in 1713, including determining the criteria for receiving half-pay and organising peacetime garrisons, the work conducted by the War Office in these areas was much more limited than it would be under subsequent secretaries. From 1713 to 1714, the tasks seem to have been dealt with directly and without much central supervision by James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormond as Captain-General, the Board of General Officers, and local army commanders. Gwyn’s secretaryship represents the War Office at its most minimal in managerial energy, despite the real depth and range of administrative influence the department was capable of wielding by the end of Anne’s reign.

By contrast, during the War of the Spanish Succession, Gwyn’s predecessors, St John and Walpole, acted as trouble-shooters down to the lowest levels of administration, from ensuring that recruiting


50 For example, the continuity of ongoing affairs between the transfer of the secretaryship from St John to Walpole in 1708, TNA, WO 4/8-9; Robert Pringle to George Treby in 1718, WO 4/21-2; and Strickland to Yonge in 1735, WO 4/34.


52 See TNA, WO 72/1, bundle 1, fol. ‘Order for reducing the forces in Flanders, 1713.’ Secretary at War to James Butler, Duke of Ormond, Captain General of all the land forces of Great Britain; Bodleian Library Special Collections, MS Eng. Hist. c.42, fol. 18-19. Ormond to Lords Justices, London, 19 March, 1713; TNA, WO 71/2; BL, MS Stowe 481. ‘General Instructions for the Garrison of Ghent,’ 1714, for examples.
officers attended judges to receive recruits and the organisation of transportation for officers’ horses to their posts abroad, to ensuring the arrears of a deceased colonel went to his family and not to pay for regimental debts. For example, in 1709, Walpole received a complaint from the Mayor of Coventry that a Lieutenant Roteler had not paid a landlord for the quartering of his troops. Informed by his clerks that Roteler had received £50 from his regimental agent, he wrote to the Mayor of Coventry that ‘I am to desire you will inform me if he pays the same, and in case he refuses, I will take effectual care the same shall be paid and the officer punished according to martial law.’ Similarly, in 1707, St John received a complaint from Captain Garston of Colonel Howe’s Foot (15th Foot) that he had spent levy money in enlisting a recruit named Alexander Murray, who was detained at the Savoy. A naval officer appeared and released Murray, claiming that he was in fact already a serving seaman aboard his vessel. St John ordered that ‘Captain Garston be paid by the sea officer what charges he has been at on account of the said Murray.’ An important innovation for the officer establishment was St John’s recording of officers’ commissions in a single log book, by requiring officers to register their commissions with the War Office in 1705. This was accompanied by a circular in the Queen’s name stating that ‘... it is become impossible to find in any one place a register thereof, we have thought fit and do hereby declare our will and pleasure that all commissions shall be duly entered in the office of our Secretary at War.’

Despite its growing influence over all aspects of military administration, the War Office itself lacked the bureaucratic apparatus necessary to directly control the diverse forces fielded during the war. Local spheres of authority were charged with organising troops under their command, the largest being Ireland; Scotland until the union with England in 1707; Flanders; and the armies in Portugal and Spain. These were supported at a distance by the War Office to varying degrees. The majority of daily administration and personnel matters of the forces in Flanders were handled by Marlborough and his competent staff. This sphere had developed its command structure to act with a significant amount of independence from central intervention, whilst remaining in close communication with the ministry in England. In Ireland, military administration was largely carried out by the Commander in Chief of

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54 TNA, WO 4/8, p. 343. Walpole to Benjamin Brockwurst, Mayor of Coventry, Whitehall, May 24, 1709.

55 TNA, WO, 4/6, p. 152. St John to Josiah Burchett, Secretary to the Admiralty, Whitehall, February 18, 1707.


57 For Marlborough’s staff’s ability to handle local crises, see Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, pp. 70-1, 327; Stansfield, ‘Early Modern Systems of Command,’ pp. 20-1, 22-7, 81. For the collaborative process between Marlborough, Godolphin, Hedges, Harley and other ministers, see Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin.
the Forces and his military staff, under instruction from the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and various government ministers in London, including the Secretary at War.⁵⁸

Even within Britain the War Office shared its administrative authority with other bodies. In 1711 the War Office had several senior army officers secretly attached to it to advise the Crown on key administrative decisions.⁵⁹ This short-lived ‘Committee of Council at the War Office’ was an attempt to deny Marlborough a significant amount of the power he still wielded, even as his deteriorating relations with the Queen led to his dismissal later that year.⁶⁰ The committee was consulted on the difficulty for dragoon regiments in Portugal to afford barley, the regulation of officers selling their commissions, and a scheme to free regular units for operations by using Chelsea Hospital out-patients as garrisons.⁶¹ Although the activities of this committee were secret, its recommendations appeared in the business of the ‘Committee for the Affairs of the Army of the Privy Council.’ This was a larger and more formal committee, and appears to have been an official mouthpiece for the administrative decisions of the secret committee.⁶² Like the committee attached to the War Office, the absence of Marlborough’s influence in its activities was apparent.⁶³ The ‘Committee for the Affairs of the Army’

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⁶² Records regarding these two committees are extremely rare, making the full relationship between them difficult to identify. Scouller found only allusions to the Committee for the Affairs of the Army of the Privy Council in the minutes of the Board of General Officers. However, limited records can be found in the Earl of Strafford’s papers. See BL Add MS 22264, fols. 63-5, ‘Minutes of the Committee for the Affairs of the Army,’ Privy Council, meeting 19 March, 1711. Three of its military members, Lieutenant-General Erle, the Earl Rivers and the Duke of Argyll, served on both committees. All three were supporters of Harley’s ministry, whilst Rivers and Argyll were military rivals of Marlborough. It is very likely that the two committees shared an anti-Marlborough agenda.

⁶³ Excluded from the committee that proposed the regulation that no officer should have leave to sell unless he had served at least 20 years or was disabled, Marlborough wrote to Harley arguing against its provisions, and requested that if enforced, it should apply only to field officers. See BL, Add MS 22264, fol. 79. ‘Regulation for the Better Government of Her Majesty’s Forces,’ 1711, article 5; and Murray, Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, V, p.321. Marlborough to Harley, 16 July, 1711.
drafted regulations concerning commissions, considered memorials from officers, and tasked the War Office with various administrative problems. Its members consisted of senior army officers and secretaries of state who were also Privy Council members. The collective weight of its members politically and militarily outweighed that of the Secretary at War, whose office complied with their directions. Both committees were limited in their scope however, and only laid down regulations on a few specific, albeit important, administrative matters during their brief duration. The Secretaries of State by contrast, were directly involved in the routine business of the War Office throughout the War of the Spanish Succession. They alone were empowered at the monarch’s approval to draw up commissions, passes, and leaves of absence for officers, which the War Office processed and sent to the recipients at their posts. They also shared some of the War Office’s routine duties, by tasking the various supporting services, such as the Board of Ordnance, with preparations for operations.

Whilst the administration of these establishments were shared between various bodies, the War Office had much greater responsibility for Portugal and Spain. The War Office had to raise and send entire regiments to the Iberian peninsula on a regular basis. This involved completing units through drafts from others and sending them to Ireland, where they would assemble with other regiments and their transports, ready for embarkation. Transportation of replacement recruits, clothing and grain was also a regular concern. The War Office relied on army officers to ensure their safe passage across

64 In 1711, its members consisted of the Duke of Ormond; the Duke of Argyll; Earl Rivers; Lieutenant-General Thomas Erle; St John, Secretary for the Northern Department; the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary for the Southern Department; and the Duke of Queensbury, Secretary of State for Scotland. See BL, Add MS 22264, fol. 63; Sainty, Office Holders: Secretaries of State 1660-1782, pp. 24, 32.

65 According to David Chandler, the Secretaries of State ‘became increasingly the effective link between the Queen’s ministry and the army on the one hand, and parliament on the other over certain financial and establishment matters.’ See Chandler, Oxford History of the British Army, p. 80.

66 John Fortescue, History of the British Army, II, p. 21. For examples of passes and leaves of absence, see Calendar of State Papers, 1703-4, ‘Section VII Passes, Post Warrants and Licences of Absence, pp. 222-228.

67 TNA, SP 46/170, fols. 145-6. Nottingham to Marlborough as Master General of the Ordnance, 1 April, 1703; SP 41/3, fol. 63. Board of Ordnance to Charles Hedges, Secretary for the Southern Department, 6 December, 1705; SP 45/104, p. 334. Hedges to the Commissioners for Victualling, 11 January, 1706; BL, Add MS 61652, fol. 29. Sunderland to the Lord High Treasurer, 1 August, 1707; Ibid., p. 60: Sunderland to the Commissioners of Transport, 1 May, 1708; Ibid., fol. 150. Sunderland to Brigadier Whetham, 30 May, 1709.

68 Burton, ‘The Secretary at War and the Administration,’ p. 275.

69 Problems included transferring regiments from the English to the Irish establishments, with corresponding changes in pay, raising replacement units, and organising quarters for recruiting officers and their recruits. See TNA, SO 1/15, fol. 158. 15 July, 1703; Ibid., fol. 164. 9 August, 1703; BL, Add MS 38712, fols. 90-1. Hedges to Ormond, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 2 August, 1706; TNA, WO 4/2. Blathwayt to the Mayor of Dorchester, 13 April, 1703.

70 St John made inquiries into clothiers’ output, observing that ‘that William Churchill and Richard Harnage, who supply such accoutrements to her Majesty’s forces in Portugal, have to hand 20,000 pairs of stockings, 20,000 pairs of shoes and the same number of shirts, cravats and hats.’ TNA, SP 41/3, fol. 61. St John to Hedges, 3 December. See also SP 44/105, fols. 313-4. St John to Hedges, 10 December, 1705.
the sea, and civil officials to organise their finance and distribution. The War Office also discussed details such as whether remounts should be procured in Ireland or in Portugal, and the utility of permitting soldiers serving in the peninsula to take their wives with them. Unlike the army in Flanders, routine administration required constant supervision from the War Office. Army officers in Spain lacked access to the comparatively sophisticated staff structure or support from their allies that Marlborough was able to utilise in Flanders. Although the Dutch often proved to be difficult allies, they contributed large numbers of fully equipped troops and experienced commanders to Marlborough’s army in Flanders.

By contrast, the Portuguese and Spanish allies lacked the resources to field and finance their own troops independently, and their quality was often unreliable. The difficulty of converting British subsidies and supplies into effective Portuguese units is summarized by Stanhope’s observation to Galway in 1709, that ‘I am truly sorry for the ill success of the Portuguese Army, which mortifies me the more after all the pains your Lordship had taken to bring them so early in the field.’ They required shipments of clothing and equipment from Britain, as well as subsidies to fight alongside British troops. Like the British forces, the Dutch contingent in the peninsula operated far from its central

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71 BL Add MS 38712, fols. 54-55. ‘Complaint regarding clothing of Harvey’s Horse (3rd Dragoon Guards),’ circa. 1705; TNA, WO 4/8, p. 342. James Taylor to Captain Edward Hull, 24 April 1709. Charles Medlicott was appointed ‘Commissary-General of the Provisions for Her Majesty’s Army in Portugal’ in 1706. He was required ‘to provide waggons, carts, carriages, horses, drivers and all attendants necessary for the said service.’ TNA, SP 44/171, fol. 400. ‘Warrant for Charles Medlicott,’ St James’s, 9 January, 1706.

72 For remounts, see BL Add MS 38712, fols. 11-12, 23-24. Hedges to Southwell, 27 February, 1705. ‘Sir... I am glad to find you had got 1,100 horses of 1,380 that are to be brought in that kingdom [Ireland]. We shall soon send some of the men from here to whom they are to look after them in their passage to Lisbon.’ For soldiers’ wives, see TNA, WO 4/3, p. 17. St John to Hedges, 22 May, 1704. ‘Sir, Having discoursed with Lieutenant-General Stewart... to whose regiment the husbands of those women who desire to go to Portugal belong, I am to acquaint you that he thinks the regiment may want necessary women, and that it may not be improper to let them go if you think it fit to give them your pass.’

73 For example, financing the successful siege of Lille was due to men on the spot such as Adam Cardonnel, Lieutenant-General Erle, and Lieutenant-General William Cadogan. See Graham, ‘Partisan Politics and the British Fiscal Military State,’ pp. 219-222. See also Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, , p. 70.


77 In 1705, the subsidy paid to the Portuguese was £150,000, whereas in 1710 the sum had dropped to £103,100. See TNA, SP 34/7, fol. 18. ‘Account of Her Majesty’s proportion of the subsidies for 1705, payable to her allies pursuant to treaties,’ circa. 1705; and BL, Add MS 61513, fol. 124. ‘Estimate of the charge of the War in Spain
administration, and could offer none of the logistical support of the forces operating in the United Provinces. The British troops in the peninsula were therefore much more dependent on supplies carried over from Britain and Ireland. Over the course of the war, the War Office handled the routine challenges and occasional crises of the peninsula with energy and usually adequate co-ordination, considering the obstacles it faced. However, it was not able to create an intermediary administrative structure between itself and the armies serving there. An experienced military staff, like the one formed by Marlborough in Flanders, would have possessed the campaign experience to organise regular supplies to the troops, and would have had the diplomatic skills and contacts to engage local contractors and financiers to make up any shortfalls. However, Marlborough’s staff had been carefully chosen by him, and their expertise was difficult to find among those officers willing to serve in the peninsula. In 1707, Godolphin informed Marlborough that ‘everybody who is there desires to leave the service, and come home.’

The situation was compounded by the need to create separate staffs for the armies serving in Portugal and Spain, since the rivalries between the commanders of each made it unlikely for a central organisation to efficiently administrate them all. This placed the full burden on the War Office, and gave the department the opportunity of developing its abilities to handle complex administration at a distance. The War Office gained considerable experience in supervising the details of a range of administrative matters, and balancing different interests so that most were reconciled satisfactorily. At the same time, the primary aim of delivering army strengths was for the most part fulfilled. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the War Office was more than capable of assuming full authority over military administration.

1.3 The War Office under George I and George II

The subsequent reduction of the army after 1713 did not necessarily mean that the War Office would become the primary administrative department. Shifting diplomatic relations between Britain and her former allies, and the possibility of British involvement in the Great Northern War, gave the various

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for 1710.’ In 1710, the War Office organised the provision of clothing for six regiments of Portuguese dragoons. TNA, WO 4/9, p. 377. Walpole to the Commissioners of Transport, 8 March, 1710.

Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, II, p. 802. Godolphin to Marlborough, 1 June, 1707.

In 1707 there were three separate commanders in the Peninsula, the Earls of Galway, Peterborough, and Rivers. After the defeat at Almanza, Peterborough claimed ‘... the management of the war in Spain when under the conduct of other generals was not only supported with great numbers of men and vast sums of money; but also with notorious falsehoods published in their favour to excuse their repeated disregards, whereas his Lordship [Peterborough] was not supported as the service required with either men or money.’ See BL, Add MS 22200, fol. 1. ‘Replies of the Earls of Peterborough and Galway, relative to the war in Spain, 10 January 1711, before the House of Lords.’ See also Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, II, p. 816. Marlborough to Godolphin, 23 June, 1707, for Marlborough’s reservations about these commanders.
bodies that intervened in army administration a potential purpose for continuing in their functions. The Peace of Utrecht in 1713 produced territorial and commercial treaties that meant that foreign policy would be at the forefront of parliamentary debates and government decision-making.\(^{80}\) After the Hanoverian succession in 1714, George I wanted the British government to actively support Hanoverian claims on Swedish territories and to oppose the threat posed to Hanoverian trade by Russia’s recent military successes.\(^{81}\) In 1716, the Royal Navy sent squadrons to the Baltic and Mediterranean, to counter Russian and Spanish aggression respectively, resulting in the defeat of a Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro.\(^{82}\) In the War of the Quadruple Alliance that followed, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Temple commanded a raid against the Spanish coast, with 4,000 British troops.\(^{83}\) The conceivable and actual use of the army to further foreign policy could have encouraged senior officers and wartime bodies to adopt a central role in military administration. With the exception of the War Office, each one either quietly disappeared or found their influence curtailed. The War Committee of the Privy Council was disbanded before the government’s exit from the anti-French alliance in 1712, and the Secretaries of State ceased to consider the details of military administration as relevant to their responsibilities. The Irish establishment carried out the majority of its administration independently, but was ultimately subject to royal orders and warrants.\(^{84}\) Orders from the Secretaries of State to the commander in chief in Ireland or the viceroy over military matters declined rapidly, leaving the War Office to co-ordinate any business between the two establishments, such as exchanges between officers, the transfer of regiments, and the standardization of equipment.\(^{85}\)


\(^{81}\) Senior ministers were divided between those that supported George I’s desire for greater British influence over the Baltic, and those who did not. Their debates prevented British troops from being sent abroad to support Hanoverian interests. See Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, ‘Charles Townshend, 2nd Viscount Townshend, (1674-1738)’ *ODNB*; Andrew Hanham, ‘James Stanhope, Earl Stanhope, (1673-1721), *ODNB*; Henry Snyder, ‘Charles Spencer, 3rd Earl of Sunderland, (1675-1722),’ *ODNB*.

\(^{82}\) Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat*, p. 135.


\(^{84}\) Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, p. 34, Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 158. See also BL, Add MS 23636, fols. 11-12, 21-22, 23-30, and 43, for military administration in Ireland during the 1720s.

\(^{85}\) The Irish records for this period were lost in a fire at Four Courts, Dublin, 1922, making it impossible to establish the precise relationship between the Irish establishment and the War Office. Evidence that the War Office occasionally exercised its authority over the Irish establishment can be found in the copybooks of the Secretary
With the administrative powers of these bodies and posts waning with the end of the war, senior army commanders could easily have encroached upon the authority of the War Office in the early years of George I’s reign. Some of them had performed important military, political and diplomatic services, such as William Cadogan, the Duke of Argyll and James Stanhope. They had also demonstrated their Hanoverian credentials, and now expected their ambitions for office and power to be satisfied. The posts of captain-general and commander-in-chief still afforded their holders some patronage, and potential influence over decision-making.\textsuperscript{86} After George I dismissed the 2nd Duke of Ormond from the captain-generalcy for his Jacobite connections, Marlborough was restored to the post, as well as that of Master-General of the Ordnance.\textsuperscript{87} Marlborough’s actual activities included assisting the Commissioners for stating and determining the debts of the army, directing the Board of General Officers’ sub-board for clothing the army, and writing to those civil officials who did possess administrative power to consider the cases of deserving officers.\textsuperscript{88} George I granted Marlborough his former army rank and appointments in recognition of his military services and support for the Hanoverian succession, but was wary of his ambition.\textsuperscript{89} In 1714, rumours circulated that a military appointment Marlborough had felt was strictly within his power to dispose of had been granted by the King to a subordinate of the Duke of Argyll, on the latter’s recommendation. Despite appealing to the King, Marlborough was unable to have the decision reversed.\textsuperscript{90} Hindered by a stroke in 1716, he found the War Office taking disciplinary actions against an officer of his own regiment without informing him. When Marlborough complained of being excluded from the proceedings, the Secretary at War responded with platitudes, whilst the King approved of the court-martial’s sentence to dismiss the officer. In addition, the King appointed the son of a favourite to the vacancy without seeking

\textsuperscript{86} Guy, \textit{Oeconomy and Discipline}, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{88} TNA, WO 7/24, p.1. J. Astry to James Taylor, 24 January, 1715; SP 41/5, fols. 69-70. Marlborough to the 2nd Duke of Bolton, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Windsor Lodge, 2 July, 1718; Ibid., fol. 76, Cardonnel to the Commissioner of Accounts, Bath, 2 September, 1717.
\textsuperscript{89} Routine administration at the War Office seems to have bypassed Marlborough from 1714 to 1721, with almost no mention of him regarding the administrative or executive decision-making process. See TNA, WO 4/17-23. It is possible that George I wanted to prevent Marlborough from forming a duumvirate with Sunderland in the same manner as he had with Godolphin during the War of the Spanish Succession. See Henry Snyder, ‘3rd Earl of Sunderland, (1675-1722),’ \textit{ODNB}, for Sunderland’s relationship with Marlborough.
Marlborough’s opinion.91 Both these incidents must have undermined Marlborough’s authority, in a similar manner to when Anne circumvented his authority over officers’ appointments in 1710-11.92 With Marlborough’s death the post remained vacant until the Duke of Cumberland was appointed in 1744.

After Marlborough, the next officer with potential for exercising administrative power was Lieutenant-General William Cadogan, Marlborough’s former adjutant-general. After the Captain-General’s death he took over his master’s myriad activities without a formal appointment.93 He had demonstrated his Hanoverian credentials during his self-imposed exile in the Netherlands with Marlborough, and on his return, in negotiating the Third Barrier Treaty, which required the Dutch to recognise the Hanoverian succession.94 In 1715 he played a vital role against the Jacobite rebellion, taking over from the Duke of Argyll as temporary commander of the forces in Scotland. Despite this military and diplomatic service, and a promotion to General in 1717, George I denied him any control over military appointments or army administration. When he brashly referred to himself as Commander in Chief during the King’s visit to Hanover in 1723, the reaction from rival officers and the King himself made it clear that his military career had reached its limit.95 Of the remaining senior officers capable of assuming administrative responsibilities, the Duke of Argyll was confirmed commander of the forces in North Britain after the ‘15, but focussed on his political career in the House of Lords until the War of the Austrian Succession. Although the King granted him limited powers of patronage by asking him to recommend officers for promotion for their role in the ‘15, the task of securing the Highlands during the 1720s was handled by a junior general, Major-General George Wade.96 Similarly, the recently elevated Earl Stanhope found himself thrust into senior ministerial appointments with the King’s support, and held no active army command.97 He did however, wield some patronage over officers’

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91 BL, Add MS 61336, fol. 56. James Craggs to the Duke of Marlborough, 24 October, 1717.
92 For Marlborough’s declining relationship with Anne over army appointments see Smith, ‘The Hanoverian Succession and the Politicisation of the British Army,’ pp. 220-224.
93 Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, p. 28. For court gossip on the affair see BL, Add MS 31134, fols. 444-9. Peter Wentworth to Lord Raby, 27 January, 1710.
95 Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, p.28.
commissions as Secretary of State, first for the Southern Department, and later the Northern Department.  

In the absence of personalities among the high command able to assume administrative control of the army, senior officers could have collectively exercised authority through the Board of General Officers. In the final years of Anne’s reign multiple Boards had dealt with the management of officers’ affairs, as well as general matters such as clothing and disbandments. Hypothetically, their members could have been officially appointed on a more permanent basis, or assumed a more a general authority over army administration, on the merit of their accumulated years of experience. After the disbandment of 1713, parliament and the government sought less direct involvement in army affairs. The Board of General Officers could have filled this vacuum, without attracting the scepticism of MPs concerned with the size of the army and the presence of army officers in parliament. However, after George I acceded the throne in 1714 he clearly defined the limits of the Board’s authority, decreeing that it was a consultative body, albeit a respected one, whose recommendations were to be submitted for his approval. For example, in 1717, the Secretary at War, James Craggs, explained to Edward Southwell that ‘...though His Majesty can always act as he pleases... he would have everyone else see that he is willing that those who ought to know best the business and pretensions of the army should give their opinion of it.’ In addition, certain Boards were formed with specific functions and for a brief duration, thereby limiting their ability to acquire lasting influence.

The War Office co-ordinated bureaucratic activity between the Board, Secretaries of State, and the King. Without any military personality or body competing for control, it became the only institution with broad and deep powers over military administration. This may explain why the War Office under Francis Gywn in 1713-14 was satisfied with only issuing general directions to senior officers and officials, rather than co-ordinating routine affairs at all levels. With various military authorities still in existence at the end of the war, Gwyn may have considered them to be more qualified to handle the

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98 TNA, SP 41/5, fol. 2 ‘Warrant from James Craggs to Viscount Stanhope, authorising countersignatures for commissions granted before his appointment,’ 25 March, 1718; WO 4/22, p.5. Treby to Viscount Irwin, 5 January, 1719.
99 Chandler, Oxford History of the British Army, p. 80
100 TNA, WO 71/3, p. 265. James Craggs to Edward Southwell, 17 August, 1717. See also Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, pp. 31-32.
101 For example, the Board that was elected in November 1714 was to enquire into issues of seniority among officers and between regiments. The Board that formed in 1718 addressed claims of officers to half-pay, whilst the Board that formed in 1734 addressed affairs of units stationed in America. See TNA, WO 71/3, pp. 41-2; WO 71/4; and WO 71/7, pp. 1-2.
various tasks brought about by the end of the war. At the same time, Gwyn may not have fully appreciated how far down the administrative hierarchy the War Office was capable of penetrating, and indeed, was required, as senior army officers adjusted to their reduced administrative influence under George I. The usual channel of patronage through the Secretary at War may also have been disrupted at this time by the threats made by Tory politicians and generals to army officers, that their commissions would be in jeopardy should they not support a pro-Jacobite regime in the event of Anne’s death. This administrative vacuum disappeared after the accession of George I in 1714. For the next two and a half decades and beyond the War Office was the undisputed central authority of army administration. Over the same period, the monarch had effectively become the only person with the right to commission officers, with the limited exception of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland over ensigncies and cornetcies on the Irish establishment. During the wars against Louis XIV, commanders of field armies and smaller expeditionary forces were authorized to commission officers. During the 1720s and 1730s this power had been quietly withdrawn on the few occasions when commanders were appointed to lead active operations. For example, when Brigadier Jasper Clayton was appointed to command two regiments in an abortive landing in Italy in 1731, the customary clause authorizing commanders to promote officers was crossed out of the draft warrant. In the margin was written ‘His Majesty was pleased not to approve of this part of the instruction.’

The War Office, with its experience and apparatus, proved an effective instrument for projecting the royal will. From the beginning of George I’s reign, the War Office circulated warrants and regulations at the King’s instigation, which gradually restricted the allowances and perquisites available to regimental officers in return for executing their financial duties. Similarly, George I attempted to

102 For example, the Board of General officers was tasked with examining the accounts of disbanded regiments in 1713, rather than the War Office. See TNA, SP 41/5, fol. 37. Petition of Francis Cocksedge, agent to Major-General Owen Wynne’s late regiment of foot, 15 January, 1713.


104 Its dominance after 1714 would be first challenged, temporarily, by the Duke of Cumberland when he attempted to introduce reforms from 1749 to 1751. See Rex Whitworth, William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, (Barnsley, 1992), pp. 132-8.

105 For example, Marlborough’s warrant from William III gave him ‘power and authority, in our absence from Holland, in case of death, removal by sentence of a court-martial, or the quitting of any of the present officers, to supply the said vacancies... as if they had received commissions from us.’ TNA, SP 44/168, fol. 356. ‘Commission to the Earl of Marlborough to be Commander in Chief of the Forces in the service of the States-General,’ Hampton Court, 1 June, 1701. See also TNA, SP 44/72, p. 309. ‘Instructions to Brigadier-General William Stewart commanding our land forces going for Cadiz,’ Kensington, 12 March, 1695; and SP 44/171, pp. 413-15. ‘Warrant to Earl Rivers, appointing him General and Commander in chief of the forces accompanying the fleet to Lisbon,’ Kensington, 25 March, 1706.

106 TNA, WO 41/7, fol. 91. ‘Instructions for Brigadier Clayton, General of our forces... going to the Mediterranean,’ Hampton Court, 5 July, 1731.

107 In particular, dividends from stoppages, musters and allowances for officers’ servants were regulated. See Guy, Economy and Discipline, pp. 53, 64, 67, 68. These restrictions would continue throughout the mid-
subject the purchase of commissions to regulation. In practice the King had to rely on the Secretary at War as a barrier to persistent applications to purchase, to avoid directly rejecting officers on a subject close to their hearts. Several officers were formally rebuffed, although in some cases the Secretary tried to maintain favourable relations by claiming that he had done all he could despite the king’s stubbornness. For example, in 1724, Henry Pelham frankly told Captain Sibthorpe that ‘Sir, His Majesty having been pleased to put a stop to the practice of buying and selling commissions in the army, your agreement with Captain John Vincent for the disposal of your independent company cannot take place…’ However, a more senior officer, Colonel Richard Irwin, at least received the satisfaction that the Secretary at War had pressed his case personally with the King: ‘… I could not however resist your Lordship, and not only laid before his Majesty your request in favour of Lieut. Mood, but as far as I was able pressed his consent to it…’ Drives against absenteeism occurred regularly throughout the 1720s and 1730s, with the War Office renewing regulations issued on the subject and directing senior army officers and commissariat officials to follow procedures to identify recurrent cases. The War Office also provided the Hanoverian monarchs with regimental rosters for their personal inspection, allowing them to directly intervene via the Secretary at War on the affairs of individual officers.

It can be argued that the cumulative effect of these measures were improvements in the centralised management of officers, and an enhanced ability to keep track of the details of units and personnel. The Secretary at War also had a range of coercive measures at his disposal to motivate officers to carry out his duties. Where an officer did not respond to the pressure of submitting reports to the War Office, a repeat issue of orders signalled growing dissatisfaction with his conduct. For example, one regimental commander was told in 1715 that, ‘Sir, I am surprised to hear… that you should say you have no orders for embarking Lieutenant-General Webb’s regiment at Chester… when if you read His Majesty’s orders for 9th March (which I again send you enclosed) you will find you were positively commanded to do.’ Secretaries at War also threatened to forward disputes to the Board of General Officers, thereby encouraging the officers concerned to settle their differences privately. For example,
in 1721, Richard Arnold, the deputy-secretary at war, informed Major Cosby that his superior officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Weld, ‘desired that his complaint against you might be referred to a Board of General Officers, to prevent which, the Secretary [at War] would have you wait on Colonel Weld and settle the matter to his satisfaction.’

More severely, reprimands were sent, mentioning the sovereign’s awareness and disapproval of an officer’s conduct. In the worst instances, officers were threatened with losing their commissions at the King’s direction. In 1731, Richard Arnold wrote to Lieutenant Armitage informing him that ‘in the absence of the Secretary at War, I am to signify to you His Majesty’s pleasure that you repair forthwith to your duty in Colonel Cope’s regiment of Foot (39th Foot) now at Jamaica, and to prevent loss of time, that you embark on board the first ship that sails from Ireland to that island, on pain of being cashiered from His Majesty’s service.’ For problems affecting the officer establishment as a whole, the War Office could delegate responsibility for disciplining officers to garrison and regimental commanders. These disciplinary measures were only issued in clear instances of officers neglecting their duty, suggesting that a degree of indiscipline and negligence may have existed beyond the War Office’s powers of inspection and supervision. Nevertheless, the prompt and decisive action taken by the army administration in more severe cases must have made a distinct impression on their recipients and officers serving with them.

By the 1720s, the War Office had established an increasingly sophisticated set of interactions with the officer establishment that would continue until its replacement by the War Department in 1794. The Secretary at War became more effective at managing the officer establishment as the effective head of the army administration than previous administrative arrangements. Whilst this was in part due to the smaller size of the army in peacetime, the absence of competing bodies for administrative power and the executive decisions of the early Hanoverian monarchs were also contributing factors. These interactions constituted a relationship with the officer establishment that was sensitive to the needs of individual officers, but also firm in laying down rules and expectations of behaviour. Essentially, the officer establishment had to alter its ambitions and outlook to fit within these administrative and regulatory boundaries.

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1.4 The Officer Establishment and the Crown

Whereas the War Office grew in its administrative influence throughout the period, executive decision-making remained entirely in the hands of the monarch, or senior army officers acting on their behalf. In addition to shaping the high command through their power to appoint or dismiss senior officers, the monarch also influenced the identity and outlook of the officer establishment through organisational changes. The attempt of James II to alter the personnel of the officer establishment in the mid 1680s, by favouring Catholics over Protestants, showed the power that English monarchs could potentially exert over the new standing army. It also highlighted the resistance this could generate amongst society, as well as the proscribed officers. Whilst many of James II’s officers did not object to the army being used against communities and individuals that resisted his political policies, the army disintegrated when faced with a more acceptable Protestant alternative to James II, in the form of William III. This was mainly due to the desertion of James II’s senior commanders to William III, and the subsequent disaffection of subordinate officers. With the fate of James II in mind, and the possibility that the high command could turn again in the future, loyalty was a key consideration when selecting army officers to general appointments and to command regiments.

There were few senior officers within the armies of England, Scotland and Ireland to choose from, as those who had not followed the Pretender, chose to resign. William III appointed officers who were personally known to him, either through prior service with him in the United Provinces, or by making contact with him when he landed in England in 1688. These included officers of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, like Major-General Thomas Tolmache or Colonel Charles O’Hara, but also those who had attended him in Holland like the Earls of Portmore and Cholmondeley. This priority on loyalty was initially more important in opposing the Jacobite forces in Scotland and Ireland than honourable conduct or proven competence in independent command. For example, Major-General Piercy Kirke, arrested by James II in 1688 for attempting to desert to William III and favoured by the new monarch, was an experienced but controversial choice for senior command. He had acquired a reputation during

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120 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, p. 364.
121 Childs, General Piercy Kirke and the Later Stuart Army, p. 134.
123 Child, British Army of William III, p. 41.
his service as a Governor of Tangiers for irresponsibility and indebtedness, and during the Monmouth Rebellion of 1685, for baiting rival officers and allowing his troops to antagonise the local populace.\textsuperscript{124} In 1689, his delay in sailing to Ireland to relieve the besieged town of Londonderry provoked a stern rebuke, given the urgency of the situation. The Earl of Shrewsbury, William III’s Secretary for the Southern Department, informed him that ‘the King commands me to write to you that it is no little concern that he hears that you are still on this side of the water, being satisfied that it would have been very much for his service that you should have sailed... There is a considerable body of men ordered immediately to follow, in case you can get time enough to save the town.’\textsuperscript{125} Even one of the more respectable officers and a former member of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, Major-General Hugh Ramsay, felt it necessary to justify his loyalty after his defeat at Killiecrankie in Scotland in the same year. Writing to a close colleague, Lord John Murray, he declared that ‘What men may speak to my disadvantage I do not much care, for I defy them to get a man more zealous and upright for the cause; and if they attack me in point of conduct, they must know the trade better than I to condemn me withall.’\textsuperscript{126}

Whatever William III’s misgivings about the military capabilities of most English and Scottish officers, aristocrats were an essential link between him and the army on which he depended to secure his rule over the three kingdoms. Richard Lumley, later the Earl of Scarbrough, the Earl of Angus, the Viscount Mordaunt, and the Viscount Colchester, worked to legitimise his reign in the English and Scottish parliaments, and also raised new regiments for the army.\textsuperscript{127} The loyalty of such units was essential if the King and the army administration were to factor them into their strategic decisions. Like other recently raised units however, their discipline and military skill was lacking.\textsuperscript{128} This led to an inefficient combat force overall, with disciplinary measures being issued frequently by the Secretaries of State, to ensure the goodwill of local communities.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{125} TNA, SP 44/1, p. 76. Earl of Shrewsbury to Major-General Kirke, May 13, 1689. For an assessment of Kirke’s military conduct during the Williamite War in Ireland, see Childs, \textit{General Piercy Kirke and the Later Stuart Army}, p. 167.
\textsuperscript{126} HMC \textit{The Manuscripts of the Duke of Athole}, (London, 1891), p. 41. Major-General Mackay to Lord Murray, St Johnston, 4 August, 1689; Piers Wauchope, ‘Hugh Mackay, (d.1692),’ \textit{ODNB}
\textsuperscript{128} Manning, \textit{An Apprenticeship in Arms}, pp. 378, 385.
\textsuperscript{129} Examples of indiscipline included the seizing of horses owned by Catholics by officers, and damage to property caused by billeted dragoons. See TNA, SP 44/97, fol. 82, 90 105, 106, 107.
In practice, William III appointed Dutch officers to the most senior military appointments in the English army, partly because he did not trust English candidates to remain committed to his person, but also because he strongly doubted their competency in high command. Whilst this gave William III a largely capable and familiar group of senior officers, the morale of the officer establishment suffered, as the ambitions of English officers were thwarted. This led to indiscipline along the army hierarchy, with speeches in parliament against the appointment of Dutch commanders, and resignations in protest from English officers. The Earl of Marlborough was the main exception to this preferment of foreign commanders, since his military abilities to some extent compensated for his continuing connection with the Jacobite Pretender. Although by 1692, Marlborough had come to terms with William III by disclosing the names of Jacobites he had been in correspondence with, there were nevertheless consequences for family members during his period of disgrace. His brother was suspended from command of a ship of the line, as a precaution against any possible disloyalty. Such suspicion filtered down the hierarchy of the armed forces. The Commissioners for Reforming Abuses in the Army were required to seek out any officers who were disaffected with William III’s rule, and to suspend or cashier them immediately. Some junior officers were acquitted, but others were outraged, and felt that the reputation they relied on for their careers had been ruined by their accusers. William III’s selection of officers prioritised the basic readiness of the army for immediate service against the Jacobites and Louis XIV. It could be argued that the urgency of this aim inhibited the development of an officer identity until an atmosphere of mutual trust between the officer establishment, army administration and the sovereign could develop, rather than one between individual officers and the current monarch alone.

131 Childs, British Army of William III, pp. 62, 72.
132 TNA, SP 8/4, fol. 142. Prince of Waldeck to William III, 18 September, 1689. After Marlborough’s dismissal, no replacement commander in chief was appointed. See Childs, The Nine Years War and the British Army 1688-1697, p. 69.
133 HMC Finch IV, p. 127. Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham, to Admiral Russell, 16 May, 1692.
134 TNA, SP 44/338, fol. 215. ‘List of officers to be arrested for being Papists or reputed papists, and suspected of dangerous practices against the government;’ SP 32/1, fol. 8. Earl of Shrewsbury to Colonel Heyford, 21 May, 1689.
135 TNA, SP 44/166, p. 19. Instructions to Commissioners for Reforming Abuses in the Army, 10 May, 1689; SP 44/338, fol. 215; Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, p. 439.
136 TNA, HO 130/61, p. 97. Shrewsbury to Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzwilliams, 8 June, 1689; SP 32/1, fol. 77. Lieutenant William Underhill to Shrewsbury, 13 June, 1689.
During the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession a total of 181 officers served as MPs in the House of Commons. During the latter war in particular, partisan politics complicated the development of an institutional identity among the officer establishment. Army commanders like Marlborough made use of subordinates who were members of parliament to defend their interests against opposition attacks. However, the greatest effect of partisan politics on the officer establishment was its impact on the promotion process. Promotions among general officers were overwhelmingly Whig until the Tory election victory in 1710, after which many Whig generals were censured and replaced with Tory ones. When three Whig officers, Brigadier Philip Honywood and Lieutenant-Generals Thomas Meredith and George Macartney freely cursed the new Tory ministry in December 1710, Queen Anne dismissed them from their regiments. These officers’ military careers were further stalled in January 1711, when the list of active general officers was being prepared. The Secretary at War noted that ‘I have received her Majesty’s demands to acquaint the Board of General Officers that they [the three officers] are not to be inserted in the said list, which you will lay before them at the next meeting.’

As Marlborough’s influence with Queen Anne waned after this date, the monarch asserted her prerogative power to directly appoint officers to senior posts. After the dismissals of Marlborough as Captain-General and his wife as Mistress of the Robes in 1711, Abigail Masham tried to use her influence as the new court favourite to promote her husband, Colonel Samuel Masham and her brother, Jack Hill to the rank of brigadier. At the recommendation of the Lord Treasurer and others in the new ministry, the Tory Duke of Ormond replaced Marlborough as Captain-General in Flanders, with the specific intention of using him to cease operations against Louis XIV in order to open

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137 See History of Parliament 1690-1715, Appendix VIII: ‘Army Officers,’ for a list of names.
139 For example, the inquiry requested by the Earl of Peterborough and supported by Tory peers into the conduct of the Earl of Galway and Baron Tyrawley. See BL, Add MS 22200, fol. 1. ‘Replies of the Earls Peterborough and Galway.’
140 Geoffrey Holmes, Politics in the Age of Queen Anne, (New York, 1967), pp. 27-8
141 Smith, ‘The Hanoverian Succession,’ in The Hanoverian Succession, p. 216
142 TNA, WO 4/10, p. 137. George Granville to Mr Thurston, 24 January, 1711
143 The dismissal of the Duke of Marlborough as Captain-General and his wife was due partly to Marlborough’s clash with Anne over army appointments, and partly due to Anne’s increasing preference for the Duchess’s rival, Abigail Masham. See Edward Gregg, Queen Anne, (New Haven, 2001), p. 369; Ophelia Fields, The Favourite: Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, (London, 2002).
144 BL, Add MS 31134, fols. 444-449. Peter Wentworth to Lieutenant-General Thomas Wentworth, Lord Raby, 27 January, 1710; Jonathon Spain, ‘John Hill, (d.1735), ODNB; Frances Harris, ‘Abigail Masham, (1670?-1734), ODNB; Stuart Handley, ‘John Hill, (d. 1725), HOP, 1690-1715
negotiations with the French. Similarly, Masham’s husband was elevated to the peerage in 1711 along with 11 other new creations, to sway the vote in the House of Lords in favour of ending the war on Tory terms.

In 1714, Queen Anne’s failing health and the lack of a direct heir caused a succession crisis, in which a small number of Whig and Tory officers plotted to secure their candidates for the throne. Their plans included the sounding out of officers in control of key assets in London for securing the city, and for the Tories, the ‘closeting’ of officers as to whether they truly served the Queen, which was a euphemism as to whether they supported the possible coronation of the young Pretender, should he convert to Protestantism. These plots reveal the vulnerability of the army to a coup, should uncertainty arise as to the future of the ruling dynasty. As a potential factor in dynastic struggles, the officer establishment of the British army was similar to other European armies of the eighteenth century, especially the Russian army. As monarchs without surviving heirs, it can be argued that William III and Anne were able to encourage stability in the officer establishment only as long as their personal leadership and popular faith in their dynastic future held out. Once these began to wane, the cohesion of the officer establishment was threatened by the plots of senior officers, as had happened during the Glorious Revolution in 1688.

The coronation of George I in 1714 occurred without the planned political plots taking place, and the initial unpopularity of the Hanoverians in the public eye gave way to lasting political and dynastic stability. Popular trust in the monarchy’s values was largely achieved through the cultivation of George I’s image, including that of a Protestant soldier-king. Political stability was achieved at the expense of the parliamentary opposition, which was reduced and divided, except for limited attempts of Tories and anti-Walpolean Whigs to unite in the 1720s and 1730s. Pro-Whig officers who offered their support to the court in Hanover before the succession found favour with the King once he was

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146 Mark Knights, ‘Samuel Masham, (1679-1738),’ HOP 1690-1715.
148 Russian troops were frequent participants in palace coups, in particular the Streltsy revolt against Peter the Great in 1698, and during the crowning of Elizabeth I and Catherine II in 1741 and 1762. See Simon Dixon, The Modernisation of Russia; (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 15, 17, 18; and Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony from Peter the Great to Nicholas II, (Princeton, 2006), pp. 20, 53.
149 Jeremy Black, Robert Walpole and the Nature of Politics in Eighteenth Century Britain, (London, 1990), pp. 22-32. For debates on which aspects of society were not as stable as previously argued, see Jeremy Black, Britain in the Age of Walpole, (London, 1984).
crowned.\textsuperscript{151} By contrast, Tory army officers lost their non-military offices and sinecures.\textsuperscript{152} This included those who had tried to gain favour with the Hanoverian court, such as Brigadier John Hill, who pledged his allegiance to Electress Sophia upon Queen Anne’s death.\textsuperscript{153} Most retained their commissions, even if they lost their parliamentary seat and were denied access to the King’s favour. This was essentially a reshuffle of senior personnel of the officer establishment, with some suffering a degree of censure that that was well within the precedent laid out by previous monarchs like William III or Anne against officers they did not care for.

However, the Jacobite rebellions led to more punitive measures against officers suspected of Jacobitism. In 1715, General Charles Ross, and Lieutenant-Generals Richard Sutton, John Webb, Robert Echlin and the Earl of Barrymore, were dismissed from their regiments for their Tory politics and ties with Jacobitism, suspected or real.\textsuperscript{154} Echlin, colonel of the 6th Dragoons, was informed by the Secretary at War that George I had decided ‘to dismiss you from the command thereof; and I have His Majesty’s express command to do it in this manner that it may not only be a punishment to you but likewise an example to deter others from having their regiment in so bad a condition, which his Majesty on no account will suffer to pass with impunity.’\textsuperscript{155} Echlin’s regiment was in a particularly poor condition, especially the clothing and finances, but his Jacobite affiliations were the real cause for his dismissal. Several junior officers were also court-martialled, but those connected to loyalist senior officers such as the Earl of Orkney, benefited from their protection.\textsuperscript{156} This was still not a purge of the officer establishment as had occurred under William III in 1689, but rather the removal of the least reliable officers at that time. Other Tories continued to serve in parliament and in the army, although the Atterbury plot in 1722 led to the dismissal of the last senior pro-Jacobite officers.\textsuperscript{157} For the remainder of the period, Tory officers remained a minority, because of the difficulty of attaining promotion when the King had a surplus of more loyal officers to reward, whether on half-pay, or for serving against the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1719. Some of these loyal officers were allowed to

\textsuperscript{151} BL, MS Stowe 226, fol. 118. Lord Polwarth to the Electress Sophia, 9 February, 1714; fols. 263-265. Lieutenant-General Cadogan to Baron Bothmer, 20 March, 1714. Others attended the electoral court, such as Charles Hotham, 4th Baronet, and his son, Charles Hotham, 5th Baronet. See also A. Stirling, The Hothams, being the chronicles of the Hothams of Scorborough and South Dalton from the hitherto unpublished family papers, (London 1918), pp. 143-5.

\textsuperscript{152} Smith, ‘The Hanoverian Succession,’ p. 222.

\textsuperscript{153} BL, MS Stowe 226, fol. 385. Brigadier John Hill to the Electress Sophia, circa. 1714; Stuart Handley, ‘John Hill, [d. 1735],’ HOP 1690-1715. Other Tory MPs allowed to continue their military service included Major-General Thomas Pearce, Lieutenant-General John Webb, and Lieutenant-General Henry Withers.

\textsuperscript{154} HOP 1715-1754, Surveys, Appendix VII: Members, ‘Army Officers.’

\textsuperscript{155} TNA, WO 4/17, p. 102. Pulteney to Lieutenant-General Echlin, 20 March, 1715.

\textsuperscript{156} HMC Townshend, p. 170, James Griggs to Lord Townshend, 23 November, 1715.

\textsuperscript{157} See Eveline Cruikshanks, The Atterbury Plot, (Basingstoke, 2004), for the exile of Sir Henry Goring and Lord North and Grey.
remain colonels of the regiments recently raised to fight those rebellions, whilst others were given court positions and rewarded with monetary grants. In addition, whenever the colonelcy of the prestigious 1st Troop of Horse Grenadier Guards became vacant, the King rewarded either a member of the royal court, or an officer who had raised a regiment against the rebellion of 1715. In terms of military careers and associated rewards for service, the King had no time for officers who felt that they deserved more from the Hanoverian succession that they received, and leaned towards the Pretender’s as an alternative.

George II continued his father’s practice of controlling the officer establishment, particularly where his right to commission officers was concerned. For example, In 1725, the Secretary at War, Henry Pelham, offered various recommendations for the promotion of officers, but acknowledged that ‘His Majesty being the best judge himself and very exact in the discipline of the army, I thought it my duty to send copies of these papers to your Lordship for His Majesty’s consideration.’ However, the activities of opposition officers in parliament overrode the criteria of merit and seniority that the King usually applied to assessing an officer’s right to promotion. Two senior officers, Viscount Cobham and the Duke of Bolton, were dismissed from their military posts for their opposition to Sir Robert Walpole’s Excise Bill in 1733, and for their calls for an enquiry into the South Sea Company scandal. The Earl of Stair lost his regiment a year later for continued opposition. Another aristocratic officer, Colonel John Fane, was barred from standing for parliament in 1737 for voting for an increase in the Prince of Wales’s income. Furious that his electoral patron, the Duke of Dorset, had withdrawn his support at the request of the government, Fane threatened to stand for the same constituency as Dorset’s son, in revenge. The Duke of Dorset was able to dissuade Fane by promising him another constituency under his influence, but according to the Earl of Egmont, ‘Sir Robert Walpole, who is not apt to forgive any who oppose his measures in or out of parliament, remembering the last vote mentioned, obliged the Duke to go off his word.’ The censure of these officers should be understood in the context of Walpole’s attempts to use posts and appointments as a means of parliamentary

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158 For their role in suppressing the rebellion of 1719, Parliament voted for £3,000 to be distributed among deserving officers. See WO 4/23, p. 34. Richard Arnold to Lieutenant-General Macartney and Major-General Evans, August 24, 1720. Other officers were rewarded with court positions. See W. Williams, ‘Sir Robert Rich, 4th Baronet, (1685-1678), ODNB; A. Hansham, ‘Sir Philip Honywood, (1677-1652), ODNB.

159 Richard Lumley was given the troop in 1715, John Fane in 1717, Sir Robert Rich in 1733, Sir Charles Hotham in 1735, and Major General James Dormer in 1738. This contrasted with the other troops of the Household cavalry, which were subject to purchase rather than royal appointment. See TNA WO 64/7, ‘army gradation lists 1705-1736.’


162 Jonathon Spain, ‘John Fane, 7th Earl of Westmorland (1686-1762),’ ODNB.

management.164 These military appointments were the exception to Walpole’s normal reliance on civil posts for political leverage, and marked the limits of Walpole’s interference with military personnel. Walpole expressed frustration regarding George II’s refusal to relinquish his control over army personnel matters, writing

‘it is as true as that there is an army that I never ask for the smallest commission by which a member of parliament may be immediately or collaterally obliged, that the King’s answer is not “I won’t do that; you want always to have me oblige all my old soldiers; you understand nothing of troops; I will order my army as I think fit; for your scoundrels of the House of Commons you may do as you please, you know I never interfere, nor pretend to know anything of them, but this province I will keep to myself.’165

By retaining control over military appointments, George II acted as a brake on promotion becoming a tool of parliamentary management. The officer establishment was still politically active, but the risks of parliamentary opposition were borne by a limited number of high ranking officers. Army officers were not removed from parliament by attempts to introduce anti-placemen legislation, and continued to act as placemen, ‘whimsicals,’ backbenchers and ministerial grandees according to the same dynamics that bound other MPs together. This meant that political participation and military service would continue to be combined by officers throughout the eighteenth century and beyond, but without the divisive effects of the ‘rage of party’ of Anne’s reign. The opposition groups formed by Viscount Cobham and the Duke of Argyll were not military in their political aims. Rather, they opposed government policies according to conventional opposition politics, and used conventional political tactics. Cobham and his followers publicised themselves as the champions of true Whig principles, whilst Argyll used his considerable electoral influence to deny the government a majority in Scotland in 1741.166 Consequently, the majority of the officer establishment remained fenced from these political dismissals.


1.5 Conclusion

Historians of the army in the early eighteenth century have described the duties of the War Office as ‘secretarial,’ or ‘routine,’ implying that it lacked any real influence or power.\(^{167}\) In particular, Ivor Burton argued that that the purely administrative functions of the War Office hindered its political importance during the War of the Spanish Succession.\(^{168}\) This chapter has suggested that the army administration was the real key to controlling the army. Army officers wielded power over their own commands, but the War Office co-ordinated the assembly of manpower and resources, as well as their distribution to regiments. It also supervised officers in the execution of their duties through administrative decisions. In addition, personnel matters, especially the management of officers themselves, provided the army administration with the means to cultivate officers’ careers, regulate military practices, and instil a higher sense of duty. The senior army officers under George I and George II, shorn of the higher administrative authority enjoyed by their counterparts during the wars against Louis XIV, lacked the freedom and patronage to organise military practices and behaviour according to their own ideas. The Duke of Marlborough was the most notable example of the loss of administrative power, on two occasions, but the same was true for his subordinates under the early Hanoverian monarchs.

Both the army administration and the monarchy exerted a complex, dynamic hold on the officer establishment. Each monarch set the outlook and expectations of successive cohorts of army officers through their executive powers. Under William III and particularly Anne, the unique relationship each monarch had with the army, and the context of party conflict threatened to work against the development of a corporate identity among officers. Even Marlborough had to factor the political soundness of candidates into his decisions, since the political will to continue the war depended on building a consensus among officers and politicians that all war aims could be achieved. During the reign of George I, a simplified structure between executive and administrative decision-making had emerged, in which the King issued instructions and judgements on army matters, and the War Office integrated them into routine business. The Hanoverian monarchs were able to impose their personal aims regarding the running of the army, in which the regulation and control of the officer establishment was a distinct priority.


\(^{168}\) According to Burton, ‘The War Office did not develop under Anne into an office of first class political consequence because of its administrative functions.’ See Burton, ‘The Secretary at War and the Administration,’ p. 282.
As the only permanent organisation in the army administration, the War Office acted as a lasting interface between army officers and the bureaucratic and executive framework on which they depended for pay, troubleshooting, and most importantly, promotion. The War Office had to consider ‘the good of the service,’ as a priority, subject to the constraining factors of parliamentary accountability for financial mismanagement of the army, and the need to maintain a positive reputation for the army in the face of locally unpopular activities such as anti-smuggling and anti-riot duties. At the same time the Secretary at War was required to carry out the king’s directions, both in spirit and regarding specific decisions. These considerations had to be weighed along with those of the army. Consequently, royal or civil interests could override a Secretary’s personal views, and his commitment to supporting army interests. This was the bureaucratic context which officers had to accept as a core part of their relationship with the state, and their identity as early eighteenth century military men. Whereas officers were free to build fortunes, earn social status out of their military reputations, or gain prominence through political and diplomatic activities, their military careers would be subject to the restrictions imposed on them by the War Office, the judgement of the Board of General Officers, and the approval of the King.
Chapter 2 Officers’ Income and the Conditions of Service

2.1 Introduction

Although the army administration of the early eighteenth century was able to impose changes on the officer establishment, its impact was gradual and cumulative, sometimes taking years to reach the desired effect.¹ Part of the difficulty in improving the standards of conduct was the resistance of officers themselves. The performance of their duties was challenging enough without attempts to restrict their freedom to turn military service to their advantage. In keeping with the entrepreneurial origins of their duties, a large part of the motivation of officers flowed from financial self-interest.² Individual officers might serve for religious or ideological reasons, for adventure, ambition or because of family tradition.³ Nevertheless, few officers could afford to ignore the financial dividends they could make from their commands. Even the wealthiest and most privileged officers managed the income from their companies or regiments, as part of a portfolio that included sinecures, investments and land holdings. The lavish expenditure that was expected of them as distinguished persons demanded careful husbandry of their assets, if they were not to suffer from debt and disrepute.⁴ Officers with only their commissions for income were dependent on their ability to draw credit to support themselves through arrears and difficult times.⁵ For all officers, short-term debt was likely to be a regular occurrence, but insolvency and the debtor’s prison was also an ever present and serious threat to an officer’s career.⁶

¹ For example, the decline of financial dividends available to captains began with George I, but ended only in 1766 after a series of regulations. See Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, p. 162.
² For the legacy of military entrepreneurship in late seventeenth century European armies, see David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 261, 279, 293-4. For the wider entrepreneurial system which officers of the British army were a part of, see Stansfield, ‘Chapter IV Logistics and Larceny: reconciling public and private enterprise,’ in ‘Early Modern Systems of Command,’ pp. 81-115; and Graham, Political Partisanship and the British Fiscal-Military State, pp. 106-47.
⁴ Examples of senior officers acquiring heavy debts include the Duke of Ormond, Earl of Peterborough, Sir Richard Ingoldsby and the 2nd Baron Tyrawley. Their debts ranged from £1,000 to £11,000. See Stuart Handley, ‘James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormond, (1665-1745),’ ODNB; Hattendorf, ‘3rd Earl Peterborough, ODNB; H.M. Chichester, ‘Sir Richard Ingoldsby, (1664-1712),’ ODNB; and James O’Hara, 2nd Baron Tyrawley (1681-1773), ODNB.
⁵ For examples of imprisonment for debt, see The Case of Col. J Michelburne, late governor of Londonderry, and the regiment under his command, (London, circa 1703); The Deplorable Case of the Londonderry and Iniskilling Regiments, London, 1707); TNA, WO 4/1, p. 149. Blathwayt to Thomas Herriot, 22 October, 1689; BL, Add MS 61288, fol. 29. ‘The petition of Lieutenant Thomas Gaudy,’ circa 1705; WO 72/1, fol. ? ‘The Petition of Lieutenant
To deal with the financial dimension of their duties, officers relied on the strength of their status as soldiers and gentlemen. The virtues of reputation, honour and courage were important characteristics that military men sought as distinguishing marks of social and masculine identity in their own right. These characteristics could yield tangible returns by improving their chances of gaining credit, especially if the officer had an aristocratic background or influential connections. For example, when Henri de Massue, Earl of Galway lost the Irish estates he used to support his Huguenot regiment and fellow exiles in 1699, he noted that ‘I am reduced to borrowing, and thanks to my position and my good reputation for paying my debts, I have been able to raise some money, but as I have no funds, my credit will not last long.’ Similarly, despite Lieutenant-General Macartney’s controversial private life, his standing with the Duke of Marlborough and other important persons meant that he was able to secure large sums of credit. When Peter Wentworth kept his brother, Lieutenant-General Baron Raby, informed of gossip in England in 1709, he wrote of Macartney that ‘he has the character of a man that will get money at any rate, and that will spend it as fast as he gets it.’

Consequently, prestige and reputation can be considered a form of social capital that officers could transform into financial trust. The wealth and power that came with regimental commands and general ranks appealed to the ambitions of officers, especially as they were members of a society that held property in high regard. Regimental commissions were considered property by their holders due to the proprietary rights that were attached to them, in the form of dividends and perquisites.

General ranks were not exactly property in this manner, as they yielded only a salary, and the

Gelot,’ circa 1713. For examples of officers petitioning the government to sell their commissions to cover their debts, see Bodleian Special Collections, MS Eng. Hist. C.974, fols. 93-4. Colonel Charles Schomberg to Ormond regarding Cornet Beach’s commission, Ghent, 15 July, 1713; WO 4/22, fol. 15. George Treby to Major Brown, Whitehall, 3 February, 1719.

7 Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, pp. 35-6, 74-5; Manning, Swordsmen, the Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms, pp. 4, 10-11; Arthur Gilbert, ‘Law and Honour among Eighteenth Century British Army Officers,’ Historical Journal, vol. 19, no. 1 (1976), p. 75. According to a pamphlet opposed to unmanly behaviour, military service was ‘… worthy to be signalized and encouraged by particular marks of honour, as compensation of the many dangers and fatigues to which you are exposed above others for the public safety.’ The Soldier’s Monitor, being serious advice to soldiers, to behave themselves with a just regard to religion and true manhood, (London, 1722), p. 7.

8 TNA, SP 60/360, fols. 78-9. Earl of Galway to James Vernon, 10 April, 1699.


10 According to Guy, ‘Georgian army officers looked on administrative arrangements and incidental bonuses established by long prescription and convenience as integral to property rights associated with their commissions.’ Deconomy and Discipline, p. 1. See also Childs, British Army of William III, p. 57; Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, pp. 278-9, for the same proprietary attitudes under William III and Anne.
commissions could not be bought or sold. To the propertied mind of the eighteenth century however, the public service performed by general officers itself counted as an indicator of property, in addition to the visible wealth that generals possessed in order to project their image and to support their duties. To the officer establishment, a regimental or general commission was as much a proprietorial investment as it was advancement through the military profession.

The high level of responsibility and delegated authority given to officers provided a variety of opportunities for financial gain and patronage. However, the boundaries between obtaining legitimate dividends and fraudulent practices could be wilfully blurred. Officers were not required to disclose their profits to the War Office under the articles of war, nor was it considered appropriate to inquire into their activities by court-martial without prior complaints of fraud or negligence. To do so would undermine the mutual trust on which officers served. In carrying out their duties, a moderate degree of speculation and profiteering was expected, and tacitly permitted. However, the vast fortunes made by commissariat officials and senior generals through the speculation of funds in their care were difficult to ignore, and were tempting examples which could encourage an officer to exploit the regimental funds entrusted to his care. For example, as Paymaster-General during the War of the Spanish Succession, James Brydges, Duke of Chandos, made the colossal sum of £600,000 from the state revenues allocated to him. Brydges and his friend, Lieutenant-General Cadogan, exchanged these sums on the Dutch market before distributing them among the army, and kept the profit from the favourable exchange rates. As quartermaster-general, Cadogan also speculated on funds given to him to purchase forage before it was paid to contractors.

Although historians of European armies in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century have described aspects of the conditions and realities of service that are relevant to their lines of inquiry, a dedicated work on these experiences for this period has not yet been written. For the latter half of the eighteenth century, there is Christopher Duffy’s study on the impressions and responses of the

11 Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 100.
14 See Chapter 4, section 4.6, ‘Fraud and Misrepresentation,’ for examples of when an officers’ accounts were enquired into.
officers of European armies to military service.\textsuperscript{16} Covering duties, conduct and social acclimatization, Duffy’s work provides a useful reference for their earlier counterparts, as certain features such as the regimental system and personal expenses remained basically the same throughout the century. In his description of the officer establishment under William III, Childs focuses on the vices and abuses of officers to illustrate their indiscipline and resistance to reform.\textsuperscript{17} For the War of the Spanish Succession, Scouller includes instances of the sacrifices officers made in the maintenance of their units, and the lack of assistance given to them by the army administration.\textsuperscript{18} Stansfield includes examples of arrears and sickness in his overview of officers serving in Flanders, to illustrate the rigours of campaigning.\textsuperscript{19} Alan Guy’s extensive studies on the internal economy of regiments from 1714 to 1763 provide the most accurate model within which the financial concerns of regimental officers can be understood.\textsuperscript{20}

Together, these works provide an idea of the everyday conditions of service that officers had to deal with, although they lack the framework needed to bring individual subjects into a model that can explore the impact that they collectively had on the officer experience. This chapter, by exploring officers’ income, expenses, sickness, and the regimental system, seeks to highlight the institutional features that affected how officers viewed their service.

\section*{2.2 Officers’ Income and Regimental Finance}

The income derived from regimental service was complicated, with multiple allowances and reductions creating a significant difference between gross and net income. Officers holding a regimental commission received pay and subsistence directly from the government, whilst captains and colonels were also allocated regimental funds to offset specific expenses incurred during the management of their units.\textsuperscript{21} Any remaining money from these funds could be considered indirect dividends to add to their total income. Pay effectively amounted to disposable income, calculated after deductions, with the exception of the universal poundage tax of one shilling in the pound, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{16} Christopher Duffy, ‘Chapter 2, the Officer Class,’ pp. 35-88, in \textit{Military Experience in the Age of Reason}, (New York, 1987).
  \item\textsuperscript{17} Childs, \textit{The British Army of William III}, pp. 36-7, 43-8.
  \item\textsuperscript{18} Scouller, \textit{The Armies of Queen Anne}, pp. 131-2.
  \item\textsuperscript{19} Stansfield, ‘Early Modern Systems of Command’, pp. 77-9.
  \item\textsuperscript{20} Guy, ‘The Standing Army under George II’; Guy, \textit{Oeconomy and Discipline}, pp. 91-105.
  \item\textsuperscript{21} These funds were generated from the subsistence paid to a set number of private men per company, who were not actually recruited, known as ‘warrant men.’ For a detailed analysis of the regimental economy, see Guy, \textit{Oeconomy and Discipline}, pp. 57, 63-5.
\end{itemize}
one day’s pay per year for the Pensioners’ Hospital at Chelsea. However, it included servants’ allowances, and in the case of horse and dragoons, forage allowances as well. In contrast to pay, subsistence was money allocated to officers to cover regular living expenses, with various local deductions, from victuals and accommodation, to stoppages to cover any losses in equipment and recruits which exceeded the regimental funds allocated for the purpose. Subsistence effectively amounted to income advanced to officers to cover costs which non-military gentlemen would have had to pay for out of their full income. Recruiting officers, usually company officers, could add any funds left over from their levy money of £2-3 per recruit to their gross income. In addition to these routine sources of income, there were also monetary rewards paid to deserving officers. Those present at a hard fought battle could receive a bounty, as was given to all officers who fought at Landen in 1693, Blenheim in 1704, and Oudenarde in 1708, or the sum of £3,000 split between the senior officers who defeated the Jacobite forces during the ’19. Officers serving in marine regiments might also receive prize money for vessels they assisted in capturing, divided between themselves, their troops, and the crew of the warships on which they served.

With all these various sources of income to consider, some of which might be years in arrears, a carefully prepared record of payments and expenses was necessary for an officer to manage his finances from year to year. Local conditions also affected the net income available to officers, so that variables in expenses resulted in a range of wealth among officers of the same rank or even establishment. For example, in 1728, company officers of the regiments at Gibraltar benefited from a favourable exchange rate between English gold and Spanish dollars. However, the Lieutenant-Governor, Jasper Clayton, observed that ‘gold is here a trade and that all persons that go to market with it cannot get the same profits, and some captains may be luckier than others, and consequently in the same corps some soldiers may have more to receive than others.’ The analysis of gross pay

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22 Scouller, *Armies of Queen Anne*, p. 132. The Hospital at Chelsea was reserved for enlisted personnel only.
23 Ibid., p. 127.
24 See TNA, WO 4/4, pp. 30-1. St John to Southwell, 17 November, 1705; SP 44/201, fol. 481. Hedges to the Lord High Admiral’s Council, 10 February, 1706; Bl, Add MS 61652, p. 25. Sunderland to the Lord High Treasurer, 8 July, 1707, for examples.
25 For the suggestion of following William III’s example of rewarding officers, see Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, I, 361-436, Marlborough to Godolphin, 2 September, 1704. For the Blenheim and Oudenarde bounties, see TNA WO 4/3, p. 149; and Scouller, *Armies of Queen Anne*, p. 148. For rewards given for defeating the Jacobite rebellion of 1719, see WO 4/23, p. 34. Richard Arnold to Lieutenant-General Macartney and Major-General Evans, Whitehall, 24 August, 1720.
27 For an example, see Colonel Roger Townshend’s personal account for the year 1706, in Bl, Add MS 37647, fols. 8-9.
28 BL, Add MS 23643, fols. 76-77. Clayton to Pelham, Gibraltar, 21 August, 1728.
and expenditure by Alan Guy suggests that the average annual pay of an officer in the mid-eighteenth century was around £100, whereas at least £300 was needed in order to maintain the lifestyle expected of a Georgian gentleman. However, these calculations only include an officer’s pay, and not his pay and subsistence combined, which together comprised the direct income paid by the government to an officer throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Subsistence in fact amounted to 39-42% of an officer’s direct income, for the period of 1689-1739, depending on the establishment on which he served. This suggests that previous estimates in the historiography and primary sources are too conservative as indicators of the average officer’s income. This is particularly true once the full income of officers above captain is considered, including profits from the provision of recruits and clothing, and the pay of general officers, which was granted in addition to their regimental pay and subsistence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1 Pay per diem for colonels, captains and cornets/ensigns 1694-1740 For regiments on the establishment of Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horse regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1694£1 9s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708£2 1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718£2 1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728£2 1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740£2 1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718£1 1s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728£1 1s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740£1 1s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718£1 1s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728£1 1s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740£1 1s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoon regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1 4s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1 15s</td>
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<tr>
<td>£1 15s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1 3s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1 15s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718£1 5s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728£1 5s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740£1 5s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718£8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728£8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740£8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1 17s 8d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718£1 19s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728£1 19s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740£1 19s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15s 8d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718£16s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728£14s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740£16s 6d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


30 For example, a captain of foot on the English establishment in 1718 received 10s in pay and 7s 6d in subsistence per day, whilst a colonel of horse in Ireland in the same year received £1 18s in pay and £1 4s 6d in subsistence. See Tables, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.

31 This includes historical estimates such as Gregory King’s, which must have included the pay of NCOs to produce the anomalously low figure of £60, and Joseph Massie’s average of £100, which begins to reflect the average pay of regimental officers. For critiques, see Tom Artell, ‘Illuminations and Distortions: Gregory King’s Scheme for the year 1688 and the Social Structure of Later Stuart England,’ *Economic History Review (EHR)*, vol. 59, no. 1 (2006), pp. 32-69; and Peter Mathias, ‘The Social Structure in the Eighteenth Century: A calculation by Joseph Massie,’ *EHR*, vol. 10, no. 1 (1957), pp. 30-45.
Similarly, although historians have included pay scales for the periods they have examined in the appendices to their works, none have analysed changes in pay over any period of time, or compared the pay between establishments. After the end of the Nine Years War in 1697, officers’ pay across the ranks increased, and then remained stationary for the next forty years. There were minor changes for individual ranks on particular establishments, but on the whole, pay did not increase to match inflation. Colonels of horse earned the most pay out of all regimental posts, by virtue of the higher pay due to their branch of service, and the higher pay scale from their senior rank. Like other field officers, they also drew the pay of their company or troop within the regiment, which was usually incorporated into their total gross pay. From the start of Queen Anne’s reign onwards, colonels of horse on the British establishment received £2 1s a day. Those on the Irish establishment lagged far behind, drawing a meagre £1 2s, which only approached their Britain-based counterparts’ pay in 1718, with a new rate of £1 18s. Colonels of dragoons and foot were paid significantly less than the horse within their establishment, their daily pay amounting to £1 15s and £1 4s in Britain, and £1 11s 4d and £1 4s 6d in Ireland. These figures were nevertheless substantial relative to the subordinate ranks. Captains were the middling rank in the regimental structure, which the majority of officers either

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foot regiments</th>
<th>5s 10d</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>5s</th>
<th>5s</th>
<th>5s 10d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Captain</td>
<td>£1 2s 8d</td>
<td>£1 4s</td>
<td>£1 4s</td>
<td>£1 4s</td>
<td>£1 4s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>9s 4d</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>3s 8d</td>
<td>3s 8d</td>
<td>3s 8d</td>
<td>3s 8d</td>
<td>3s 8d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Includes allowances for forage and servants

1 Childs, *British Army of William III*, pp. 265-7  
2 Scouller, *Armies of Queen Anne*, pp. 376-7  
3 BL, Add MS 41143, fols. 14-21. ‘Pay and Subsistence for the English Establishment, (1718)’  
4 BL, Add MS 21188, fols. 63-4. ‘Army Lists for the year 1728’  
5 BL, Add MS 35896, ‘British Army List for 1740’

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32 See tables. 2.1 and 2.2 for pay the pay of ensigns/cornets, captains, and colonels on the British and Irish establishments.

33 This is usually denoted in tables of pay as ‘Colonel as colonel and captain.’ Where only the colonel’s pay is listed, this is denoted by ‘Colonel as Colonel,’ to which the pay of a captain must be added to calculate the full pay or subsistence owed to him.
passed through fairly early in their careers, or retired in after decades of service. The captaincy therefore represents the pay rate relevant to most officers at some point in their military career. Captains in Britain earned £1 6s; 15s 6d; and 10s for horse, dragoons and foot respectively, whilst those in Ireland earned 17s, 12s 4d; and 9s 6d. At the bottom of the officer hierarchy, the ensigns and cornets received disproportionately less pay relative to higher ranks, and between mounted and dismounted officers. A cornet of horse or dragoons in Britain made 14s and 8s respectively, whilst an ensign of a foot regiment collected only 3s 8d. Their counterparts on the Irish establishment received 8s 6d, 5s 2d, and 3s 6d. This meant that a cornet of horse in England received 40% more pay than one in Ireland, and a cornet of dragoons in England 36% more than one in Ireland, or a full £100 7s 6d and £51 5s a year respectively. By contrast, the difference in pay between an ensign of foot in Britain and Ireland was negligible, amounting to £3 a year, or the equivalent to the levy money for a single recruit during the peak of the War of the Spanish Succession.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2 Pay per diem for colonels, captains and cornets/ensigns 1715-1740</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For regiments on the establishment of Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoon regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Includes allowances for forage and servants

1 BL, Add MS 29880, fol. 1 ‘An establishment or list containing all payments ... for our Kingdom of Military Affairs for Ireland, to commence from the fifth and twentieth day of March 1715, in the first year of our reign.’
2 BL, Add MS 41143, fols. 5-12. ‘The full pay and subsistence per diem of the officers and private men... on the Irish establishment (1718)’

From their pay alone, officers differed hugely between ranks, arms and establishments. A cornet of dragoons in England was paid just 1s 6d less a day than a captain of foot in Ireland, whilst an ensign of foot in Ireland was paid a mere 8.5% of what a colonel of horse received in England. To an extent these differences in pay reflected the amount of work and responsibility required by a regimental officer in his daily duties. Colonels had the most responsibility, if not necessarily the most work, since they could delegate the majority of the details to their subordinate officers and the regimental agent. They were nevertheless answerable directly to their commanding generals and the War Office for their regiments not being complete, or for any defect in their behaviour or training. His subordinate field officers, the lieutenant-colonel and major, were often charged with carrying out specific tasks within the colonel’s responsibilities, and would have to assume command of the regiment in the colonel’s absence. As the chief decision-makers of the regiment, they therefore received additional pay to add to the companies they commanded. Captains had to be masters of the details of their companies or troops, necessitating the daily inspection and record keeping of individual soldiers, for the tabulation of company records and their submission for the field officers’ review. The majority of this work was repetitive, but bore responsibility, since the captain was answerable for the condition of his unit. A captain’s pay was therefore close to the additional pay received by field officers for the work they carried out at regimental level. Ensigns and lieutenants had little formal responsibility, except to aid the captain, and carry out small-scale operations such as leading patrols, mounting guards, and recruiting. They were more like apprentices, learning their trade, and were still in the earliest stages of building their reputation and patronage networks. The value of their experience and social capital to the army was therefore limited, and arguably reflected in their low pay.

Another factor was the inclusion of forage allowance in the pay of officers of horse and dragoons. The set rate for forage was 2s per animal for regiments of horse, whilst officers of dragoons received only

35 Guy, *Regimental Agency in the British Standing Army*, pp. 9, 36
37 BL Add MS 23636, fols. 23-30, articles 22, 24; Bodleian Special Collections, L.R.404.n.5(40), fol. 341, *The Case of Captain John Hutchinson, in relation to his petition now before the House of Commons, against Col. Lillington, and the agent of the regiment, Mr John Thurton*, (London, 1697); Guy, ‘The Standing Army,’ p. 93
38 Stansfield, ‘Early Modern Systems of Command,’ pp. 34-6; *The Art of War in Four Parts*, p. 73.
1s per animal.\textsuperscript{39} The difference in forage allowance most likely reflected the official difference between regiments of horse and dragoons, with horse units being equipped with larger, stronger animals to mount an effective charge, whilst the dragoons, originally intended as mounted infantry, supposedly used smaller, hardier breeds that did not require as much forage.\textsuperscript{40} All officers of horse received enough forage allowance for two of their horses, whilst in the dragoons, field officers and captains received enough for three, and lieutenants and cornets two. This allowance would prove particularly useful during the peacetime years of George I and II, when 14 new dragoon regiments were raised during the ’15, and dragoon detachments were deployed extensively on anti-riot and anti-smuggling duties.\textsuperscript{41} By contrast, foot officers received no forage allowance at all, even though officers of all branches of service usually had pack horses or mules to carry their baggage, and field officers of foot regiments had to be mounted in order to quickly cover the ground from one end of their unit to another.

Another allowance incorporated into pay was the servants’ allowance. The allowance was calculated according to a private’s pay in the relevant arm, multiplied by the number of servants allowed to the rank. Since 1698, the allowance for officers’ servants in England was 2s 6d per day each for the horse, and 1s 6d and 8d each for dragoons and foot. From 1708 onwards, colonels of horse were allowed 6 servants each at these rates, captains 3, and cornets 1. By contrast, the servant allowance on the Irish establishment in 1726 was set at 1s 6d, 1s 2d, and 6d for each arm respectively, whilst colonels were given enough allowance for 6 servants, but captains of horse and dragoons received enough for only 2 servants. Since these rates were fixed to a private’s pay in the relevant branch of service, they did not reflect the wages of servants on the local labour market, nor were they adjusted for wage increases during the period. They did however reflect the greater number and quality of servants according to rank and branch. As leaders of regiments and their composite tactical units, colonels and captains needed to maintain a reserve of horses to remain mobile and visible to their troops. This necessitated multiple grooms, farriers and veterinarians to care for remounts, who would command greater wages than the less specialist domestics required by foot officers.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} Calculated from Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 377. ‘Appendix G: Table of Pay of Regimental Officers and Men.’
\textsuperscript{40} Although the distinction between dragoons and horse was increasingly blurred, a difference in height was enforced. The recommended height for a remount of a horse regiment in the 1720s was 15 hands and 1-2 inches, and for the dragoons, a maximum of 15 inches. See BL, Add MS 41143, fol. 67.
\textsuperscript{41} For a list of the dragoon regiments raised in 1715, see BL Add MS 21188, pp. 7-20. For examples of dragoons assisting the civil power, see TNA SP 41/9, fol. 9; WO 4/25, p. 13; WO 4/31, p. 190; WO 5/31, p. 25; WO 5/32, pp. 162-3.
\textsuperscript{42} The Art of War in Four Parts recommends recommended that a captain of horse makes ‘… use of many of his own horses, and mount several of his own servants, which may prove very advantageous to him… He ought also to have a smith in his retinue, as well to shoe his own as his troopers’ horses.’ See Art of War, p. 31.
Table 2.3 Subsistence per diem for colonels, captains and cornets/ensigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Horse regiments</th>
<th>Dragoon regiments</th>
<th>Foot Guards</th>
<th>Foot regiments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col. and Capt.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>Col. and Capt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708</td>
<td>£1 11s</td>
<td>£1 11s</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718</td>
<td>£1 11s</td>
<td>£1 3s 8d</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718</td>
<td>£1 11s</td>
<td>£1 3s 8d</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728</td>
<td>£1 8s 9d</td>
<td>£1 8s 9d</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740</td>
<td>£1 8s 9d</td>
<td>£1 8s 9d</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740</td>
<td>£1 8s 9d</td>
<td>£1 8s 9d</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, pp. 381-2
2 BL, Add MS 41143, fols. 14-21. ‘Pay and Subsistence for the English Establishment, (1718)’
3 Ibid., fols. 5-12. ‘The full pay and subsistence per diem of the officers and private men with the deductions out of the full pay and remains for clearances of the horse, dragoons and foot on the Irish establishment (1718)’
4 BL, Add MS 29880, fols. 1-5. ‘Military Establishment for Ireland’
5 BL, Add MS 35896, ‘British Army List for 1740’
6 Ibid.
By including a forage and servant’s allowance, officers’ pay was already calculated to meet the basic needs of a gentleman, so that he was free to carry out the duties of an officer and practise the lifestyle expected of the ruling classes. Whether these allowances met an officers’ needs in practice depended on his personal tastes and parsimony. For an aristocratic officer possessing substantial wealth, his table and equipage would match the dignity of his social rank. For example, Colonel Townshend’s equipage included 15 wine glasses, 12 tea cups, 6 chocolate dishes, and assorted silverware, with which to offer his guests refreshment in style. By contrast, a humble captain of foot might be content with a single valet, a cheap horse, and a pewter service. Among junior officers, modest changes of pay could make a significant difference. A saving of just 1s per day from any source of income equated to an additional £18 5s annually. With the annual pay of a captain of foot in England amounting to £182 5s, this saving was nearly a tenth of his disposable income, assuming that his subsistence had been spent on living expenses, and there were no dividends from the company funds. Both pay and subsistence remained largely fixed over the fifty year period examined, with some changes to the amount due to individual ranks. Subsistence was usually set a lower rate in Ireland than in Britain, but remained proportionate through the ranks. Since subsistence was intended to cover living expenses, it seems likely that the cost of living was not considered to be as high in Ireland than in Britain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.4 Combined Pay and Subsistence (Direct Pay) per annum for colonels, captains and cornets/ensigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British establishment in red, Irish establishment in blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Capt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoon Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel and Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 BL, Add MS 37647. Similarly, the Earl of Strafford obtained a silver service through one of his regimental captains, presumably for his use as ambassador in Prussia. See also Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, pp. 95, 99, and HMC Ormond VIII, pp. 286-7, Lord Raby to Ormond, 22 February, 1707, for examples of extravagant equipages, including expensive horses.

44 See table 2.3 for a comparison of subsistence between the establishments.
Foot Regiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Pay (1718)</th>
<th>Pay (1740)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>£766 10s</td>
<td>£781 14s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>£319 7s 6d</td>
<td>£302 12s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>£121 12s 4d</td>
<td>£115 10s 8d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries highlighted in yellow show a decrease of 4s 3d per diem in subsistence
Entries highlighted in blue show a decrease of 5s per diem in subsistence

1 BL, Add MS 41143, fols. 14-21 ‘Pay and Subsistence for the English Establishment, (1718)’
2 Ibid., fols. 5-12.
3 BL, Add MS 35896, 'British Army List for 1740'
4 Ibid.

Historians have observed this difference in income between the British and Irish establishments, but the reason why has not been established. Clearly the discrepancies were much more than ‘little idiosyncrasies of pay,’ as Scouller has claimed. Historians may have been reluctant to put forward a definitive explanation because potential information was lost to fire in the relevant archives in Dublin in 1922. However, it possible that the annual supply of revenue from the Irish parliament did not stretch far enough to match the pay scale of the British establishment. Since there were more regiments in Ireland than England, this meant a correspondingly larger number of officers to divide the revenue among.

When direct income is considered, rather than pay alone, all officers above and including a captain of foot on the Irish establishment earned over £300 a year. Foot captains on either establishment still tottered on the border of this gentlemanly boundary however, earning between £302 12s and £319 7s 6d, whilst ensigns and lieutenants of foot and dragoons on both establishments, as well as cornets of dragoons in Ireland, earned well below the £300 threshold for gentlemanly living. After the disbandments of 1713, these junior officers represented 53% of all regimental officers, meaning that over half of the active officers of the army were unable to maintain their gentlemanly status through their direct military income alone. Direct income offered security only to captains and above in the...

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45 Scouller, *Armies of Queen Anne*, p. 83
46 Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, p. 34
47 This percentage was calculated by using Houlding’s figures for the British army in 1713, to determine the total number of regimental officers in the army, and the percentage of ensigns and lieutenants within that number. Cornets and lieutenants of horse in Britain, and their equivalents in the foot guards and household cavalry have been included with captains and above, as their direct income was over the £300 threshold. The independent companies of foot have also been included in this calculation. See Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 8, for the army establishment in 1713. For numbers of companies or troops per regiment, see Scouller, *Armies of Queen Anne*, pp. 98-101; and Chandler, *Warfare in the Age of Marlborough*, pp. 46, 96.
horse and dragoons, and majors and above in the foot. A dragoon captain in Ireland earned just under £400, whilst a major of foot in Britain could claim £483 12s 6d. Colonels earned well above the £300 threshold, with colonels of foot of either establishment receiving around £750, and those of dragoons and horse sums in the region of £1000 and £1300. Colonels who held general ranks could add their general’s pay to their regimental income derived from their commissions as colonel and captain. From 1702 onwards, a general’s pay was £1 10s a day for a brigadier, £2 for a major-general, £4 for a lieutenant-general, and £6 for a full general. This provided an annual income of £547 10s, £730, £1,460, and £2,190 respectively. A brigadier received a sum greater than the pay he drew for commanding a regiment of foot, and a major-general earned more from his general’s commissions than the direct income he got from a regiment of horse.

Considering this lavish pay scale, it is hardly surprising that senior colonels applied considerable pressure on monarchs and army commanders for promotion to the general ranks, especially if they felt that lesser men had access to the general ranks before them. The scramble for promotion led to some officers resorting to ungentlemanly measures to obtain promotion. In 1707, Brigadier John Pepper altered his regimental commission to make it appear that he was a more senior colonel than he was, thereby strengthening his claim over other candidates for promotion to brigadier. Despite the Secretary at War’s opinion that he ought to be cashiered, Pepper still secured Marlborough’s support in his promotion to brigadier. Serving in Portugal in 1711, Brigadier Hunt complained that he had not received the pay due to his general’s rank, since he was acting solely as colonel of his regiment in Portugal. The Committee for the Affairs of the Army granted him the pay of a brigadier on the Portugal establishment, in case he was given a brigade to command in the future. Clearly, a promotion to brigadier and above proved a strong motivation for regimental officers to continue their careers into the general ranks. Although attaining the rank of colonel was a milestone of income and authority in itself, it was merely a stepping stone for ambitious officers. The pay scale of general officers was in another league to that of regimental officers, and came without the deductions and expenses that affected their regimental income.

48 The direct income of a major of foot between 1718 and 1740 consisted of 15s pay and 11s 6d subsistence per diem, or a total of £1 6s 6d. See BL, Add MS 41143, fol. 15-16, and Add MS 35896, British Army List for 1740.
49 See Table 2.5 for generals’ pay in England and Ireland.
52 BL, Add MS 22264, Minutes of the Committee for the Affairs of the Army, 11 March, 1711.
Table 2.5 Pay per diem of General Officers 1696-1715
For the English/ British establishment unless otherwise stated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Captain-General/C-in-C General of Horse or Foot</th>
<th>Lieutenant-General</th>
<th>Major-General</th>
<th>Brigadier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£4</td>
<td>£2</td>
<td>£1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1702</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>£4</td>
<td>£2</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708</td>
<td>£10 (Horse only)</td>
<td>£4</td>
<td>£2</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1714</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>£4</td>
<td>£2</td>
<td>£1 10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715 (Irish)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£6</td>
<td>£2</td>
<td>£1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Childs, British Army of William III, pp. 265
2 BL, Add MS 61317, fols. 14-5. ‘Pay Scale for the Army, 1702’
3 Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 379
4 BL, Add MS 61317, fol. 28. ‘General and staff officers allowed on the establishment [of Britain], 1714’
5 BL Add MS 29880, fol. 1. ‘Military establishment for Ireland, 1715’

2.3: The Costs and Dividends of commanding a company or regiment

Colonels and captains earned enough from their direct income to support their status as gentlemen, but their commands could also yield dividends through any remaining funds after the men had been recruited, equipped, fed and paid. Fixed sums equivalent to the subsistence of two private men per company or troop went to the company’s non-effective fund, to contribute towards extraordinary costs, whilst the regiment’s non-effective fund received one private man’s subsistence per company or troop to pay for general expenses such as the clothing and equipment of recruits, and the expenses caused by deserters. These sums offset the expenses the officers of the regiment would otherwise have had to cover out of their own direct income. The colonel’s non-effective fund accumulated the subsistence of either 6 private men per day if his regiment was of horse or dragoons, or 10-13 if it was a foot regiment, depending on the number of troops or companies it had. This yielded a fund of 12s and 7s 6d a day for horse and dragoon regiments on the British establishment in 1718, but only

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53 This fund was referred to as the off-reckonings. See Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 137; Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, pp. 164, 167.
between 5s and 6s 6d for those of foot, since the subsistence of foot privates was much lower than their mounted counterparts. In years when fewer recruits were needed, or desertion was minimal, the profit available to a colonel from this source would increase substantially. Lord Raby, colonel of the 1st Dragoons, received £100 from the troop of which he was captain when it first arrived in Spain in 1705. Burton and Newman estimated a yield of £60 for a captaincy of foot in a regiment under Marlborough’s command. In the 1730s, a dragoon regiment stationed in Scotland was supposed to yield £600-£700 a year for its colonel.

In other years, high attrition among the men led to the depletion of this fund. Marching his dragoon regiment to Morpeth during the Glorious Revolution in 1689, Lieutenant-Colonel Russell and his officers had not received their pay, yet were in the process of completing their troops. He had already spent his subsistence in recruiting for his own troop, and wrote to his brother requesting him to arrange a personal line of credit in London worth £150, to cover the arrears in subsistence for his men. As the acting commander of Viscount Irwin’s regiment (16th Foot), Major Samuel Sleigh noted that death and desertion on the march from London to Scotland in 1716 had cost him £40 2s over the course of two and a half months. The responsibility of clothing and equipping the regiment also fell to the regimental commander, which could put him to considerable expense when funds were not directly advanced to him. In 1705, Lieutenant-General Harvey’s regiment of horse had its establishment increased by 150 men, which were provided by drafting volunteers out of two horse and two dragoon regiments. The colonels of these units demanded £14 14s per horse trooper and £11 per dragoon to cover the cost of the clothes and equipment they had to replace. This left Harvey’s regiment with a bill for £1,846 12s. He submitted a memorial stating that these expenses amounted to two years worth of his non-effective fund, but that the current funds had already been used to pay for the routine expenses of the regiment.

In a related matter, Colonel John Hay was assigned two troops to his dragoon regiment (2nd Dragoons) in the same year, but found that he had to re-clothe

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55 In 1718, the subsistence of privates of horse, dragoons and foot in Britain was 2s, 1s 5d, and 6d respectively. See BL Add MS 41143, pp. 13-21.
56 Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 138; General de Ainslie, Historical Record of the 1st or Royal Regiment of Dragoons, (London, 1887), pp. 51-2. As envoy and later ambassador-extraordinaire to the Prussian court, Lord Raby was absent from regiment, and relied on one of his subordinates, Captain Francis Ellison, to act as an agent on his behalf. See BL, Add MS 22233, fol. 34. Captain Ellison to Lord Strafford, 29 February, 1712.
59 TNA, SP 44/338, fol. 200. Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to his brother, 31 March, 1689.
60 HMC Various Collections VIII, p 98. Major Samuel Sleigh to Viscount Irwin, 27 September, 1716.
61 BL Add MS 38712, fols. 54-5, 63, circa. 1705.
them at his own expense. He protested that ‘I do not think I am in justice chargeable with anything upon that account nor do I think the Governor will put so great a hardship upon me.’

There was nevertheless some official consideration for officers bearing unusual expenses of clothing. In recognition of the damaging effects of policing duties in the Highlands to clothing, the two independent companies of foot drawing pay on the English establishment were granted full pay according to the Scottish establishment in 1701, from which their captains were to purchase clothing and necessaries for their men. Other officers saw the duty to clothe their men as an opportunity for graft. In 1689, Colonel Sir John Edgeworth (18th Foot) purchased the clothing of discharged Catholic soldiers from Jewish traders at a discount, which he then clothed his regiment with, whilst claiming to the War Office that the uniforms were brand new and pocketing the difference. In 1706, Colonel Lillingston received funds to clothe his entire regiment, but only provided uniforms for half. In 1735, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Ferguson of Anstruther’s Foot (26th Foot) was court-martialled for disobeying an order not to convert his regiment’s old coats into waistcoats, in the hopes of keeping the savings made from using the old material.

Captains were responsible for covering the individual expenses of the men in their troop or company. For this purpose, captains of horse, dragoons and foot on the British establishment received 4s; 2s 4d; and 1s respectively into their non-effective fund per day. On the Irish establishment the amount of subsistence paid to each private was less, resulting in a smaller non-effective fund. Captains in Ireland in 1718 received 2s 8d; 1s 11d; and 10d into their non-effective fund per day. The smaller non-effective fund intended to reflect the fewer privates kept in companies in Ireland, with a corresponding reduction in the contingencies it was supposed to cover. In 1726, an estimate of contingent expenses for a company of foot in Ireland claimed that the non-effective fund of £12 3s 4d barely covered the average costs of £11 19s 8d. Furthermore, it was suggested that the same captain had to advance £4-5 a year to his men in order to pay for their equipment and clothing, despite special stoppages of the men’s subsistence to cover the costs. A captain’s personal finances were therefore tied directly to

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62 Ibid., fol. 64.
63 TNA SP 57/18, fols. 48-9. Royal Warrant to the Treasury of Scotland, 18 November, 1701.
67 On the Irish establishment in 1726, the number of privates per company or troop was 25, 25, and 38 for horse, dragoons and foot respectively. In 1734, the number for foot companies was 33. Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 47-8.
68 These company expenses included the maintenance of deserter’s equipment; printing costs, burial expenses, and printing costs. See BL, Add MS 23636, fols. 43-4. ‘A Computation of the yearly expenses a company of foot is subject to and for which the captain is allowed two men’s’ pay,’ 1726.
the fortunes of his company. If his unit suffered heavily from desertion or sickness, or wore its equipment out faster, he was more likely to be in debt. Furthermore, any arrears in either his own subsistence or that of his soldiers, would hinder his ability to advance the sums necessary to ensure his company was sufficiently recruited and maintained to pass a general's inspection or paymaster's muster.69

The pressure for captains to complete their companies could be considerable, and this could lead to abuses which inconvenienced military personnel and damaged the reputation of the army. Recruits could be deprived of their pay and subsistence, with no explanation, contrary to the articles of war.70 The army under William III and Queen Anne suffered significantly from abuses arising from false musters, including the use of officers' servants and local persons to flesh out a company's complement of rank and file during a muster.71 This invited heavy fines and the risk of dismissal, but persisted until its gradual decline after the War of the Spanish Succession.72 Other captains took advantage of their fellow officers. In 1696, Lieutenant-Colonel Mortimer, of the Earl of Essex's regiment (4th Dragoons), was found guilty by court-martial of taking two horses from another captain's troop in his absence. He placed them into his own troop during a review, whilst the absentee captain's men had to parade on foot. The absent officer took the blame from the inspecting general.73 Jealous subalterns might even try to frame their company commanders. At a court-martial in 1716, Lieutenant Robert accused his superior, Captain Matthew Draper, of falsifying the company musters. This accusation was itself discovered to be a falsehood when it became apparent that he had a grudge against his superior, and had forged promissory notes relating to the company to discredit him.74

69 In 1704, officers of the army in Flanders had to advance money to their men from their own pocket, in order to complete their units. Baron Cutts reported that 'The officers complain so much of their being in arrears of subsistence at this time, and I say that it hinders them in getting their equipages ready, being forced to advance so much to their men.' BL, Add MS 61162, fol. 39. Lieutenant-General Cutts to Marlborough, 15 March, 1704.


71 If a muster-master was fooled by these 'faggots,' the captain would receive their pay and subsistence, as well as appear to have done his duty satisfactorily. See Childs, British Army of William III, pp. 47-8; Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 143; See also TNA, SP 44/167, p. 339. Court-martial of Captain Wolfson Cornwall, Earl of Oxford's Horse, circa. 1694; and SP 46/171, fols. 192-3. Report of a false muster committed by Captain Charles Desromaines, 2 August, 1704 for the seriousness with which the Judge Advocate General regarded accusations of false musters.

72 Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 135. In 1689, The Commissioners for Reforming Abuses in the Army were authorised to disband any unit that was subject to a false muster. See TNA, SP 44/166, fol. 173. ‘Instructions to Commissioners,’ 10 May, 1689. See also Guy, 'The Standing Army of George II,' p. 187.

73 TNA, WO 71/121. ‘Court-martial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Mortimer,’ 11 June, 1696.

74 TNA, WO 71/122. ‘Court-martial of Captain Matthew Draper, independent company of invalids,’ 2 May, 1716.
The system of pay and subsistence motivated officers through the financial opportunities offered by the regimental economy, and the generous pay scale of the general ranks. Like other forms of motivation such as access to patronage, family tradition or a sense of public duty, financial enterprise contributed to the preservation and enhancement of an officer’s status as a gentleman, and was therefore not in itself a purely ‘mercenary’ reason to serve. The funds reserved for maintaining the manpower of their units could yield a steady stream of income, but heavy losses in men or poor administration could plunge an officer into debt. Whether an officer was working hard to pay his creditors or receiving frequent dividends, the regimental economy encouraged an officer to carry out administrative duties. Any attempts by the army administration to regulate the regimental economy had to balance the elimination of corruption and greed with preserving regimental officers’ willingness to bear financial risks. To ignore this balance altogether could deprive officers of an important motivation to serve.

2.4 Personal expenses and contingencies

Income and regimental expenses occupied a large portion of the officer establishment’s financial concerns, but officers also had to consider the personal expenses that they were likely to incur when on active service. The initial outlay when going on active duty, the risk of capture, and of contracting sickness or wounds all had a direct impact on an officer’s career, and his responses towards them revealed his ability to cope with the conditions of service. The majority of officers paid for their accommodation, unless their unit was assigned garrison duty in a fort or barracks. Captain John Brown’s company of Brigadier Wightman’s regiment (17th Foot) was stationed at Inverness Castle in 1717, and was fortunate to have its refurbishment paid for by the government. The bill for the unit’s furnishings included painting the officers’ houses, new bedding, and a range of range of cooking and dining utensils reserved for their use. Officers whose regiments were placed on long-term garrison duty could find their living costs reduced in this way.

Renting private accommodation in London was expensive, with Colonel Hugh Wyndham paying £60 a year for an apartment in a popular part of the capital from 1699 to 1701. The cost of living in London

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75 By 1729, there were 80 barracks in Ireland. BL, Add MS 23636, fols. 17-18. See also Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 52-3.
76 TNA, WO 41/5. ‘Account for work, furniture and other necessaries for the detachment of the honourable Brigadier Wightman’s Regiment, now lying at Inneraiss (Inverness)’, 19 July, 1717, pp. 2-4.
might be too much even for a Guards officer to bear, despite the generous pay scale. To avoid paying rent of £20 a year in 1717, Ensign Gugleman of the 3rd Foot Guards (Scots Guards) claimed to his landlady that he was a private guardsman, for whom lodging was free. He threatened to billet an entire squad of guardsmen on her if she objected.\textsuperscript{78} In 1729, Major Foliot of the 2nd Foot Guards (Coldstream Guards) requested the deputy-governorship of Pendennis Castle in Cornwall. Unusually perhaps for a Guards Officer, he had no other income than his pay, and sought the £91 5s a year from the post to support himself and his family whilst serving in London.\textsuperscript{79} Living costs could be high abroad too, particularly in a garrison town where demand for accommodation from the officers of multiple regiments elevated the price of property rental. For example, in 1712, Brigadier Sutton noted that the officers of Major-General Owen Wynne’s Foot (disbanded, 1713) would soon be in debt due to the rent they paid in Ghent, unless their regiment marched to join the army in the field.\textsuperscript{80}

Before an officer could begin his duties on any particular service, he needed to assemble an equipage, or personal baggage. It might include luxuries necessary to a gentleman’s standing, but had to contain the essentials for campaigning. These at the very least would have included horses and tack, his service uniform and spare clothing, culinary utensils, toilette kit, periwig, and sword.\textsuperscript{81} Each of these needed accessories to ensure their care, such as brushes for cleaning wool, polish for leatherwork, and luggage in which to transport them. Captains and colonels also maintained a larger equipage than junior officers, and required a range of domestics, to provide the hospitality they were expected to extend to their fellow officers.\textsuperscript{82} Senior officers, particularly colonels and generals, might require more servants than those provided for out of the servants’ allowance. When living in London from 1698 to 1699, Colonel William Wyndham spent an additional £46 2s 2d on servants’ wages, equivalent to the annual allowance of one servant from his military pay as a colonel of horse.\textsuperscript{83} Whatever the personal preference for servants, every officer, from ensign to colonel, needed the services of a valet, in order

\textsuperscript{78} TNA, WO 4/25, p. 105-6. Pelham to the Attorney-General, 12 September, 1724.
\textsuperscript{79} TNA, WO 5/26, p. 19. Pelham to Townshend, Kensington, 29 May, 1729.
\textsuperscript{80} BL, Add MS 38852, fols. 151-2. Brigadier Richard Sutton to Henry Taylor, Ghent, 24 May, 1712.
\textsuperscript{81} See Wyndham, \textit{A Family History}, p. 19, for a basic list of campaign possessions. For a similar equipage list compiled later in the century, see. Captain Thomas Simes, \textit{The Military Medley}, (London, 1768), pp. 195-6. For the baggage items French officers took with them, such as hunting dogs, see Guy Rowlands, \textit{The Dynastic State and the army under Louis XIV}, (Cambridge, 2002), p. 140. See also Chandler, \textit{The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough}, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{82} According to Duffy, ‘By the Eighteenth Century, the table had become a means of displaying the hospitality of the senior officers, and of getting to know the character and opinion of subordinates in a relaxed atmosphere...the colonel in nearly every army was expected to pay handsomely from his own pocket to maintain open table for his officers...’ See Duffy, \textit{Military Experience in the Age of Enlightenment}, pp. 39, 82.
\textsuperscript{83} The servant’s wage closely matches the annual allowance of £45 12s 4d for a servant of an officer of horse, or 2s 6d per day. See Wyndham, \textit{A Family History}, p. 19; and Childs, \textit{The British Army of William III}, p. 265-66.
to clean their uniform and attend to their personal appearance. Servants and horses increased the time and energy available for an officer to attend to his duties or engage in gentlemanly activities. Their importance to the morale and efficiency of the officer establishment was therefore significant.

Horses were acquired privately according to the officer’s needs and riding ability, and varied significantly in speed, temperament, hardiness, and price. Their maintenance on campaign was expensive, as discovered by officers serving in Flanders during the War of the Spanish Succession. A replacement officer’s horse in Portugal cost £18 in 1703, although wealthy officers might use those reared from their own stables, or those of their families. This did not always guarantee a steady supply from year to year however. In 1709, Marlborough informed his wife Sarah that ‘I have had ill luck in my stables this year, so that I beg of Lord Rayalton [Rialton] that he would endeavour to get me two horses for my own saddle. They should not be above 14 hands and 2 inches. I should be glad they might be ready to come with the convoy of recruit horses in the beginning of March, so that they might have some little time to be seasoned to the air and water of this country.’ The low endurance of horses for sea travel and their vulnerability to the rigours of campaign meant that they had to be frequently replaced. Colonel Wyndham lost two of his three horses during the overseas voyage from London to Flanders in 1702, whilst Colonel Henry Conyngham complained to the War Office that his dragoon regiment had lost 100 horses in transport to Flanders in 1704, 27 of which belonged to officers who were now on foot. Horses were also at risk from being captured and carried off by enemy raids, as Lieutenant Patrick Hume informed his father had happened to his own mounts in 1694.

An officer also needed to pay attention to the quality of his uniform. Translated into English in 1707, the Art of War in four parts recommended that ‘if rich, he must have a good stock of handsome clothes, well chosen, according to the most universal and received fashion, without ever being fond of following those that invent them; or appearing gaudy; for though it is said a young person may wear all sorts of colours, yet if he does not he will be better looked upon, and everyone will say he has the

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84 In particular, officers needed to have their heads shaved to accommodate the periwigs and later, powdered hair that were worn in the early eighteenth century.
86 For the price of horses, see TNA, WO 4/2, p. 69. Blathwayt to Brigadier Lloyd, September 10, 1703.
87 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, vol. III, 1214-5, no.1228. Marlborough to the Duchess, Brussels, 10 February, 1709. Lord Rialton, also known as the Earl of Godolphin and Lord of the Treasury, had a large stable from which he lent horses to his close friend and ally, Marlborough. Marlborough probably asked for horses below 14 hands 2 inches, because they would be faster and more durable than larger, fleshier horses.
88 Wyndham, A Family History, p.21; TNA, WO 41/3, p. 21, circa. 1704
discretion of one in years.’ If poor however, ‘he must spare out of his belly, to be handsomely yet modestly clothed...’ Though less flamboyantly dressed than the French, it would have been hard to follow this advice in the British army, where the wealthier subordinates and senior officers also bought expensive items to ‘cut a dash.’ In 1696, Lieutenant Michael Fleming, of a respectable gentry family, asked his father for some additional money, since ‘if one can but appear handsome in camp it goes a long way in his preferment.’ Coming from an aristocratic background, Colonel Roger Townshend’s equipage in 1706 included two high quality suits, five campaign coats, and two servants’ liveries. In 1742, his relative, Viscount Townshend, purchased an equipage costing £400 for his son, including a custom sword and pistols. Costing as much as a commission for a foot ensign, equipages of this value or greater would have been considered extravagant for subaltern officers without family fortunes, but less so for field officers, and certainly expected of generals. Lord Falkland, a captain in the Foot Guards, estimated his equipage at £500 when taken prisoner in 1711. Given the inconvenience of losing an equipage, it is hardly surprising that officers detached additional soldiers from their units to guard the regimental baggage when on campaign. In Flanders in 1693, so many troops were sent to perform this task that Marlborough issued a stern rebuke to officers, forbidding all except generals from assigning additional soldiers, otherwise they would be ‘severely punished.’ 

Although captured British officers were generally treated well by the French and their Spanish allies, and a fairly reliable exchange system operated during the wars against Louis XIV, many officers struggled to replace their equipage after returning from captivity. Officers tried to claim compensation for their personal effects, usually with little success. In 1707, Lieutenant-General Charles O’Hara valued his equipage at £1,000, when trying unsuccessfully to petition parliament for compensation after its capture at the battle of Almanza. In the same year, Lieutenant-Colonel Ambrose Edgworth appealed to the Duke of Marlborough for the loss of his possessions when

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90 Art of War in Four Parts, p. 80.
95 BL, Add MS 61336, fol. 57. Circular regarding the guarding of baggage, Courselle, 1 July, 1693.
96 For exchanges of captured officers during the Nine Years War and War of the Spanish Succession, see TNA 44/274, fol. 57. ‘Minutes of the proceedings of the Lords Justices’, 26 July, 1696; and BL, Add MS 61160, fols. 50-1. Cadogan to Marlborough, 8 June, 1708. See also Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 311.
97 John Childs, ‘Charles O’Hara, Baron Tyrawley (d. 1724),’ ODNB; Marlborough suggested that his request should be ignored, as ‘it should set a very troublesome precedent.’ Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, II, 816. Marlborough to Godolphin, 23 June, 1707. John Childs, ‘Charles O’Hara, Baron Tyrawley (d. 1724),’ ODNB.
Captured on a transport en route to England. Captured after the defeat at Brihuega in Spain in 1710, Major-General James Stanhope spent 20 months as a prisoner in Paris, during which he incurred ‘greater expense and uncommon hardship.’ He had been forced to hire French servants to maintain his equipage, his own having been denied passage into France. Although officers were unlikely to receive compensation for their personal effects, they could expect to receive spending money from the government to help them survive their captivity. Marlborough recommended that the regiments which surrendered at Almanza in 1707 remain un-recruited, so that the funds could be sent to the captured officers and soldiers until their return. In 1708, 6,000 pistoles worth of funds were allocated to the relief of British officers captured at Leffinghen, in Flanders. For some officers their period of captivity was short. Some of the senior officers who were captured at Almanza were allowed to return to England on parole, after a brief imprisonment in Madrid, due to the influence of Lady Tyrrey, an English-born member of the Spanish court.

Officers also had to pay for their travel expenses, although when travelling overseas, subsistence was usually advanced to them to cover victuals for the journey abroad. Travel expenses were also paid to officers in certain circumstances, at the discretion of the War Office. Even travel within England could be dangerous, with Guards units unable to police the approaches to London effectively. In 1695, Lieutenant Michael Fleming described how one of his colleagues, Captain Dorster, ‘has had a very ill misfortune. Last week as he was going for the Tower [of London] to his regiment he met with four highwaymen, who stripped him of all his gold, viz. £35, his two horses, his mail, and the very wig off his head. He pleaded very hard so they gave him £5 to take him to town.’ If regiments abroad were disbanded at the conclusion of a war, then the officers would find themselves on half-pay and obliged to make their own way home at their own expense. On his way to command the remaining troops in Spain following the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, the Earl of Barrymore observed that ‘I shall be

98 BL, Add MS 61287, fol. 11. ‘The petition of Lieutenant-Colonel Ambrose Edgworth,’ August, 1707.
100 Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, II, 814-5. Marlborough to Godolphin, 984, 20 June, 1707; Ibid., 980-1. Marlborough to Godolphin, 24 May, 1708.
101 Bl, Add MS 61158, fol. 138. ‘An account of the distribution of 6000 pistoles sent to Newport by Captain Brooks,’ 2 November, 1708.
102 In 1715, Major-General Carpenter recommended Lady Tyrrey for a reward for her efforts in caring for captured officers during the war. See BL, Egerton MS 2170, fol. 55. Major-General Carpenter to George Bubb, Envoy-Extraordinaire, 10 June, 1715.
103 For example, in 1704, the Postmaster-General was instructed to ‘... allow free passage to officers actually employed for recruits... all other officers whatsoever to pay the usual rates for their passages.’ TNA, SP 44/350, fols. 335-6. Throughout the period, absentee officers might have their passage arranged for them on warships by the Secretary at War to expedite their arrival at their posts, or at least have their subsistence advanced to them for the journey. See TNA, WO 4/19, p.52; WO 4/23, p. 34; WO 4/35, p. 114.
104 Fortescue, History of the British Army, p. 15.
left to myself to be baited by the officers of the three reduced regiments in Catalonia, who are without money and ships to carry them home. Their case is pretty hard, but I hope some speedy care will be taken of them.\textsuperscript{106} The officers of the dragoon regiments ordered to be disbanded a few years after the ‘15 were allowed to keep the horses they had purchased for their men, having borne the cost out of their own funds. However, this caused a mutiny in Molesworth’s regiment, since the normal custom was that the troopers were entitled to them upon discharge. The dispute was settled in favour of the officers, with limited compensation for the troopers.\textsuperscript{107}

When their pay and subsistence was insufficient to cover these contingencies and other expenses during the service, officers relied on their estates or their families, or drew upon their credit arrangements. Young officers wrote to family members, asking for money to help them through the short-term, as with Ensign Michael Fleming, who asked his father for funds to assist with his recruiting duties.\textsuperscript{108} As young gentlemen serving as privates until a subaltern’s vacancy became available, volunteers found their income particularly difficult to live on. Serving as a volunteer trooper in the 5th Dragoons before earning a commission, John Mackenzie, asked his father to encourage his uncle to fulfil a promise of sending money if he should ever need it. In 1731 his uncle eventually sent him 4 guineas (£4, 4s) from Scotland to his regiment in Ireland, which enabled him to cope with daily living costs such as repairing clothing and laundry.\textsuperscript{109} Another volunteer, Edward Phillips, complained to his cousin, Cornet Hugh Whitefoord, of the lack of necessities in the garrison at Minorca in 1739. He asked Whitefoord to send him, among other things, a dictionary of historical events, and white and black silk stockings, from a mutual supplier in London. He relied on his cousin to pay for them, and then obtain an advance on his pay from the regimental agent, to cover the cost.\textsuperscript{110}

Rent from estates enabled officers of landed backgrounds to finance their careers, but in some cases, these estates required attention themselves if they were to continue to provide future income. In 1706, Lieutenant-Colonel Bellew petitioned Marlborough to grant him 12 months leave to attend to the affairs of his estate, or leave to sell his commission to pay off his creditors.\textsuperscript{111} Wealthy or aristocratic officers were prone to spending the revenue from their fortunes almost as fast as they received it. In 1698, Colonel Wyndham spent the £1,000 left to him by his father in the course of a

\textsuperscript{106} HMC Portland V, p. 270: The Earl of Barrymore to the Earl of Oxford, Port Mahon, Minorca, 17 March, 1713.
\textsuperscript{107} TNA, WO 4/21, pp. 131-34. Robert Pringle to Edward Beecher Esq. of Southwell, Nottingham, 1 January, 1718.
\textsuperscript{108} HMC Fleming, p.338. Michael Fleming to Sir Daniel Fleming, Lancaster, 6 December, 1695.
\textsuperscript{109} BL Add MS 39189, fols 1-2, 4. S. John Mackenzie to his father, 13 April, 23 June, 18 July, 1731.
\textsuperscript{110} BL Add MS 36592, fols. 14-15. Private Phillips to Cornet Hugh Whitefoord, Guard Room, 19 April, 1739.
\textsuperscript{111} BL Add MS 61283, fol. 136. Petition of Lieutenant-Colonel Bellew to Marlborough, circa 1706.
year, necessitating a reduction in living costs in subsequent years. In 1709, Major-General Macartney squandered the £30,000 entitled to him when he married an heiress, and ran into further debt.

Other officers combined their military careers with parliamentary or diplomatic posts to generate considerable revenues. Lieutenant-General Lord Raby was appointed as ambassador-extraordinary to the Prussian court to secure the annual provision of troops for the allies during the War of the Spanish Succession. He received £3,000 a year from the Treasury for his expenses in Berlin. As a lieutenant-general, William Cadogan received an annual salary of £1,460, in addition to his direct income of £1,314 as the colonel of a horse regiment. As envoy-extraordinary to the United Provinces, he had been able to convert £50,000 of Marlborough’s private fortune into Dutch securities as a loan to the Habsburg monarchy, which he then demanded back with interest at the Peace of Utrecht. Both Raby and Cadogan had acquired considerable real estates during their careers, which they were able to combine with their diplomatic and military income. However, senior officers without large estates to draw on found their expenses far exceeded their military pay. As an MP and a soldier of fortune, Baron John Cutts owed £17,500 in 1699, and despite a considerable source of income from his military and civil posts. Upon Cutts’s death in 1707, Archdeacon Perceval noted that ‘His lordship thought he had by his place under the government in England and Ireland together above £6,000 per annum, is vastly indebt in so much that the poor butchers, bakers, and all others that dealt with him are half-ruined.’ Brigadier Francis Panton noted that his own debts had ‘been no ways contracted, but by endeavouring to live in some measure to the credit of his command and character, and by keeping a good troop.’ In an attempt to receive arrears for their services as general, he and Brigadier Humphrey Gore petitioned the Duke of Ormond that they ‘differ from all the other officers of their rank in having no private means... they are unable to support the character of their commands.’ Both officers had relied on brevetcies to further their careers. Whilst a brevety saved an officer the expense of purchasing a commission, he also forfeited the subsistence, perquisites and proceeds from selling that

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114 TNA, SP 44/354, fol. 163. Bill from Lord Raby for diplomatic expenses, 30 January, 1706.
116 HMC Portland V, p. 267, John Drummond to the Earl of Oxford, the Hague, 9 January, 1713; p. 426. The Duchess of Marlborough demanded the £50,000 sum back in 1717, which Cadogan paid out of his own fortune. See Falkner, ‘William Cadogan,’ *ODNB*.
came with a regimental rank. When he became a general, he would most likely regret not investing in a regimental colonelcy earlier, as over time the regimental economy would have paid for itself, if run properly.

2.5 Sickness and Recovery

Unlike the men under their command, the medical bills of officers do not appear to be covered by deductions from their subsistence.119 In the absence of formal arrangements for officers’ healthcare, medical treatment had to be covered out of their own pay. In addition to reducing his income, sickness and wounds can be seen as the physical limitation of an officer’s ability to carry out his duties, and therefore a reduction on efficiency. Particularly long periods of recovery could also be measured in terms of lost experience that could have been gained from serving with the regiment. In severe cases, officers would suffer dismissal from the service, and possibly death. The recovery of officers also had an impact on the quality of the service they could provide, individually in terms of the personal example and regimental management they were not providing, and collectively in maintaining army-wide organisational and combat efficiency.

Officers with combat wounds might be conveyed to hospitals set up near a battle or siege like other casualties, like Colonel Wyndham after he was shot in the leg at Blenheim in 1704.120 There is no firm evidence however, to suggest that officers suffering non-combat related injuries or diseases recovered in the hospitals set up for the troops. The use of army hospitals for long-term recovery is absent from officers’ correspondence, and it can be argued that the dignity with which officers distinguished themselves from ordinary soldiers in other ways implies that they would not accept the same standard of healthcare and treatment other than in an emergency. One possibility is that officers remained with the regimental surgeon, benefiting from his services throughout their convalescence and having access to their servants, belongings, and fare from the colonel’s table. Another is that they arranged for private healthcare, either by local medical staff or their own physicians brought over from Britain. Campaigning brought with it the risk of contracting local diseases, which inexperienced troops were particularly prone to. During the Williamite War in Ireland, the choice of a marshy camp site at Dundalk

119 Field armies in Flanders were supported by a medical staff, static hospitals, and field stations during the Wars of Louis XIV, but accounts of injured officers being patients at them are rare. For medical services, see Eric von Arni, ‘The Medical Resources of William III’s English Army during the Nine Years War,’ Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research, vol. 85 (2007), pp. 126-145; Eric von Arni, ‘Medical Support for Marlborough’s Army during the War of the Spanish Succession,’ pp. 158-165.
for Schomberg’s army in 1691 led to a total of 6,300 casualties from malaria and trench foot, from a total of 14,000. The officers themselves also contracted the diseases, including Colonel Thomas Erle.121 Meanwhile in Flanders, the British troops under the Earl of Marlborough were also suffering widespread sickness, necessitating their return to garrisons in order to recuperate.122 The risks associated with poor camp site choices seems to have been learnt a couple of years later, when in 1693 the Secretary at War advised the Secretary for the South Department to order foot regiments to delay setting up camp on Hounsloew Heath until later that spring, when the drier weather would be less damaging to their health.123 Nevertheless, camp duties could still be dangerous to individual officers. Lord Raby’s elder brother died of a fever contracted on guard duty in 1693.124 In 1722, Captain Henry Lowe of the 3rd Foot Guards developed rheumatism after camping in Hyde Park with his company. The case was severe enough to end a career spanning nine years in the navy and nine in the army.125 Diseases were regularly attributed to environmental factors. Marlborough equated wet or unseasonably cold weather with sickness among his troops, and warm, dry weather to their healthiness.126 He also attributed an outbreak of dysentery among his army in 1702 to an excessive consumption of honey. When troops in Spain suffered from fatigue during the War of the Spanish Succession, Colonel Wyndham believed the warm weather, and the British soldiers’ inexperience of it, was responsible. By contrast, he felt that the heat was good for his health.127 Officers were also vulnerable to fevers of various kinds. When Wyndham lost his horses in transit to Flanders in 1702, he caught a fever when riding with the Dutch postal service.128 When Lieutenant-General Erle contracted the ‘flux’ on the voyage to Spain in 1707, he was unable ride a horse or carry out his duties for five weeks.129 Marlborough himself regularly contracted fevers towards the end of campaign seasons when serving in Flanders.130 The subordinate generals he relied could also be incapacitated, resulting in less than desirable replacement officers.131

121 John Childs, ‘Thomas Erle, (1649/50-1729),’ ODNB; TNA, SP 8/5, fol. 114; 8/6, fol. 110; Arni, Hospital Care and the British Standing Army, pp. 59-61.
122 TNA, SP 8/5, fol. 128. Prince of Waldeck to William III, Gemappe, 18 September, 1689.
123 BL, Add MS 24328, fol. 2. Nottingham to Blathwayt, 21 April, 1694
126 Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, vol. III, 1136. Marlborough to Godolphin, Roeselare, 1 November, 1708; Ibid., III, 1381-2. 3 October, 1709; Ibid., III, 1604. Villers-Bruin, 25 August, 1710. In the latter letter Marlborough wrote ‘I do not love to complain, but we have vast numbers of our soldiers and officers sick.’
128 Ibid., p. 20.
129 BL, Add MSS 61160, fol. 41. Lieutenant-General Erle to Marlborough, Barcelona, 31 July, 1707.
130 Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, I, 351; III, 1214, 1381.
131 Ibid., II, 602-3. Marlborough to Godolphin, 8 July, 1706.
These fevers could be fatal, with Brigadier James Ferguson dying of ‘a high malignant fever,’ in 1705, and Colonel Marcus Trevor and Brigadier John Hay succumbing a year later. In the peacetime years of the 1720s and 1730s, fevers caught in Britain or Ireland were not necessarily life threatening, but they could nevertheless hinder an officer’s career. Sickness prevented Colonel Hopkey in 1727 from attending the meeting of a Board of General Officers at which his promotion to brigadier was being considered. Serious illnesses were more common in garrisons abroad, most notoriously in the West Indies, but also in the Mediterranean. Serving in Minorca in 1731, gentleman-volunteer John Mackenzie suffered from ‘… a violent cough and spilling of the blood, that was enough to kill a horse besides a man.’ His medical bill came to 40s, which he did not have the means to pay for. In Gibraltar, the medical facilities were in poor condition, provoking a complaint from its governor, Major-General Sabine. In 1735, Captain William Franks was forced to resign his commission, being unable to continue his duties in Gibraltar due to his health, and being unable to find an alternate post in a more amenable climate.

Although the army administration paid close attention to the medical care of the enlisted men, its approach to officers seems to have been more laissez-faire, restricting its activities to granting leave to officers for recovery. They had to seek private treatment, like Cornet Henry Colvert, who was operated on by several surgeons at personal expense, after a severe fall from his horse. Unable to mount a horse afterwards, he was pronounced incurable, and dismissed from the service. Some officers went home to recuperate from serious wounds or injuries, relying on their families to care for them. After losing his arm in a cavalry charge in 1698, Colonel Wyndham was nursed by his sister at their family home. Visiting Bath was a popular cure for recovering from the rigours of campaigning, due to the healing properties of the waters. Marlborough’s subordinate, the Earl of Orkney, used the springs there after the demanding Blenheim campaign in 1704, whilst in 1721, Major Cunningham

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133 TNA, WO 71/5, p. 355-6. Recommendation of the Board of General Officers regarding the memorial of Colonel John Hopkey.
134 Bl, Add MS 39189, fols. 1-2. Volunteer John Mackenzie to his father, Kenneth Mackenzie, 13 April, 1731.
135 TNA, SP 41/11, p. 168. Major-General Joseph Sabine to William Yonge, 2 October, 1739.
137 TNA, SP 41/3, fol. 71. ‘The Memorial of Cornet Thomas Colvert,’ 9 January, 1709.
139 Contracting a fatal fever in Spain, Erle Rivers visited Bath in 1712. See Hattendorf, ‘Richard Savage, 4th Earl Rivers,’ ODNB.
obtained leave to go to Bath from the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{140} Similarly, Godolphin recommended his own cure for the headaches that Marlborough intermittently suffered, using spa water as the main ingredient.\textsuperscript{141}

More serious ailments required prolonged leave from active service.\textsuperscript{142} During the War of the Spanish Succession, most regiments had officers recovering on leave at any one time. In a list of absentee officers in Spain, 35% had authorised leave to recover their health, with another 10% remaining with the army without leave, possibly because their wounds would have prevented their evacuation back home.\textsuperscript{143} Beyond half-pay, the government made little formal provision for officers who were unable to serve at all after recovering from their injuries, with individual officers relying on petitions asking for compensation. Lieutenant John Fenwick had served during the Nine Years War in Selwyn’s regiment (2nd Foot), but was forced to leave the service to recover from multiple serious wounds. Several petitions on his behalf from others asked Marlborough to provide either a commission for him, now that he had recovered, or some other remuneration for his medical care.\textsuperscript{144}

Army officers demonstrated considerable self-sufficiency in coping with threats to their health, and the resulting impact on their finances and careers. They relied mainly on their personal resources, receiving assistance from the government only in specific circumstances. Medical treatment was largely dependent on an officers’ means and preferences. In the absence of circulars providing medical advice regarding local conditions, which could readily have been produced by the Surgeon-General and other senior medical staff, officers relied on their own interpretations of the causes of sickness, and their own forms of treatment. Together, these responses suggest that officers viewed sickness as an unavoidable but surmountable part of military service. The government offered only a readiness to grant leave, for officers to pursue their own recovery. This at least had the benefit that officers did not have to worry about censure for being absent from their posts, and saved the government further medical costs. However, this passive approach lacked the organisation and supervision necessary to

\textsuperscript{140} BL, Add MS 61162, Letters of General Officers to Marlborough 1702-1706, fol. 89. Orkney to Marlborough, Wiebaden, 17 October, 1704; TNA, WO 4/23, fol. 264. Richard Arnold, Under-Secretary at War to Major Cunningham, 2 September, 1721.

\textsuperscript{141} Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, III, 1164-5. Godolphin to Marlborough, 30 November, 1708.

\textsuperscript{142} For example, Brigadier Bissett was given leave to return from Venice for his health, and Ensign Wroth was permitted to return from his post in America to settle regimental accounts, and recover his health. See TNA, WO 4/23, p. 125. George Treby to Brigadier Bissett, 7 December, 1720; and WO 71/6, p. 180. ‘Recommendation of the Board of General Officers regarding Ensign Wroth’s memorial,’ 24 February, 1730.

\textsuperscript{143} TNA, SP 41/3, fol. 89. ‘List of the officers belonging to the several regiments hereunder mentioned in Spain and Portugal who are absent from their commands, with reason for their absence,’ circa 1709.

\textsuperscript{144} BL, Add MS 61287, fols. 104-5. The Humble Petition of Lieutenant John Fenwick to the Duke of Marlborough, circa. 1705.
ensure the efficient rehabilitation of officers into their regiments. In some cases officers recovered readily to re-enter service, despite losing a limb or suffering serious wounds. In other cases, officers took much longer to recover, or were forced to leave the service after ineffective treatments and personal debts. Ultimately, the approach adopted by officers to the conditions of service was one of self-sufficiency by necessity, and the lack of comprehensive support from the government sealed off an opportunity to foster a corporate identity within the officer establishment, or to enhance relations between officers and the army administration.

2.6 The Regimental System and its impact on the conditions of service

Throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the regiment was much more than an organisational unit within the army. It was the source of morale, training and sociability that was crucial to the effectiveness of the manpower contained within it. Within its troops or companies lay the financial machinery with which a standing army could be maintained indefinitely. As the primary combat unit, it was the formation with which officers could cover themselves with glory and advancement, within sight of their fellow officers. In the absence of any other permanent formations or institutions, regiments were the main source of a collective identity among the officer establishment. Nevertheless, regiments differed greatly from each other in the experiences available to their officers. The Guards units had an established tradition of being socially elite formations. The three regiments of Foot Guards and the three units of Household cavalry were officered by men of aristocratic backgrounds, or courtiers with royal connections, in keeping with their status as royal escorts. Although less privileged than the Guards, those regiments of foot, horse and dragoons formed before James II’s rule enjoyed a distinguished heritage with which to attract officers whose families were already connected to these formations. However, it was only with the rapid expansion

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145 Guards officers drew higher pay and held a brevet rank two ranks higher than their regimental rank. Guards units also enjoyed privileges when encountering horse and foot units on the march. The rank and file of the Horse Guards and Horse Grenadier Guards consisted of gentlemen, whilst those of the Foot Guards contained superior recruits to those of the horse and foot, both in height and character. See Scouller, *Armies of Queen Anne*, pp. 95-6, 376; TNA, WO 4/3, p. 18. St John to Anthony Boloyer, 22 May, 1704. See also Bl, Add MS 41143, fols. 62-3, 67; and Add MS 57344, fol. 49.

146 Such officers had to have genteel breeding and courtly manners for escort and guard duties to the Royal Household. Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Madan was a typical Guards officer in this respect. See Bodleian Library, MS. Eng. Lett. C. 284, ‘Madan Family Correspondence, 1723-1737,’ and R.S. Lea, ‘Martin Madan (1700-1756),’ *HOP 1715-54*. See TNA, WO 5/28, fol. 120, 28 May, 1728, and Ibid., fol. 173, 5 September, 1728, for examples of marching orders to Guards units to escort the King.

147 The first six regiments of foot were in existence before James II’s raising of a further nine during his reign. The majority were commanded by distinguished officers throughout the period examined, either by aristocratic
of the army under William III that a large enough number of regiments were raised to create significant variations in service records, esprit de corps, and the social composition of their officer complement.

Although regiments raised in wartime would normally be the first to be disbanded, they were nevertheless popular with ambitious officers, as it gave them the chance to sidestep the waiting list for established regiments. Demand for regiments outstripped supply throughout the period, since there were multiple sources of aspirants. Every lieutenant-colonel of an existing regiment had an interest in the colonelcy of his regiment, whilst officers with brevet lieutenant-colonelcies and colonelcies added to the list of candidates. Since colonels did not relinquish their regiments when promoted to generals, turnover in available colonelcies was further limited. Given this bottleneck effect on career advancement to the senior ranks, it was unsurprising that wealthy officers during the War of the Spanish Succession were willing to pay for the privilege of raising a new regiment, whatever the risks of losing their investment on disbandment. These colonels were in essence, founders of new military practices and customs at a local level. Since the officers of the regiment held their commissions at their recommendation, colonels could order them and the regiment as they saw fit, rather than following the custom built up over decades and by previous colonels as in existing regiments. Furthermore, those new regiments which survived the major disbandments of 1697 and 1713, and the smaller ones after the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1719, could increase in their seniority and desirability, as successive new regiments were raised later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

As the wars against Louis XIV came to an end, it was in the interest of colonels of new regiments to purchase more senior regiments, as they could recover the cost of their former regiment by selling it to another officer before its disbandment. It was this possibility of losing the investment altogether

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148 For an example of multiple candidates to the 26th Foot in 1705, see HMC Portland IV, p. 265. Major Cranston to Robert Cunningham, October 20, 1705. See also Stansfield, ‘Early Modern Systems of Command,’ p. 43.

149 For proposals to raise new regiments from private persons see TNA 41/3, fol. 19. St John regarding Mr Appletree’s proposal to raise a regiment, 19 September, 1704; WO 4/3, fol. 95. Colonel Henry Fairfax’s proposal to raise a new regiment, 8 October, 1704. Although offers from private persons to raise regiments were fairly frequent, the War Office was more restrained in authorising them than in France. Louis XIV actively sought to exploit the wealth of bourgeois officers by allowing many of them to form small regiments at their own expense. See Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 226-7, 306-7.

150 According to Lynn, ‘the military administration expanded automatically every time the army added new regiments and companies.’ Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, p. 598.

151 The most junior regiments were not automatically disbanded, particularly if they were of good quality. See Fortescue, History of the British Army, II, p. 4.
that made new regiments less desirable than senior ones.\textsuperscript{152} Even colonels of regiments which had existed for several decades sought to purchase more senior regiments, and to transfer from foot to dragoons, and dragoons to horse where possible. Regiments were essentially stepping stones to greater sources of wealth and prestige for some colonels. For example, Major-General Charles Cathcart began his path on the regimental ladder in 1728, as the colonel of the 31st Foot, one of the most junior regiments. He transferred to the 8th Dragoons in 1731, then to the 7th Horse (6th Dragoon Guards) in 1733. Colonel Owen Wynne was unfortunate enough to be colonel of a regiment of foot that was disbanded in 1713, but he raised a regiment of dragoons in 1715 (9th Dragoons). When this regiment was disbanded after the ’15, he purchased the colonelcy of the 5th Horse (4th Dragoon Guards) in 1719, transferring to the 5th Dragoons in 1732.\textsuperscript{153} Like Wynne, Sir Robert Rich’s first colonelcy was of a foot regiment that disbanded in 1713, and he also raised a temporary regiment of dragoons in 1715. Losing the command for political reasons in 1717, he was appointed colonel of the 13th Dragoons in 1722 for supporting Walpole as a backbencher in parliament. In 1725 he transferred to the 8th Dragoons, and in 1731 the 7th Horse (6th Dragoon Guards). In 1733 he was given the prestigious 1st troop of Horse Grenadier Guards, and transferred to the 4th Dragoons in 1735 of which he remained colonel until his death in 1768.\textsuperscript{154}

The practice of colonels transferring to ‘better’ units lay in the inbuilt inequality among regiments, and the freedom of wealthy officers essentially to purchase the military experience that most appealed to them. The higher income of the horse and dragoons compared to the foot, as well as the greater prestige of fighting on horseback, explains why many colonels sought command of a mounted regiment.\textsuperscript{155} Regimental seniority was also an important factor. Although regiments were widely known by their current colonel’s name rather than their official ranking until 1751, the respect and honours due from a junior regiment to a senior was nevertheless an important component of military pride, with the officers of several regiments contesting the decisions of the Board of General Officers.

\textsuperscript{152} When speculating over a possible candidate for command of the late Brigadier Borthwick’s Foot (26th Foot), Major Cranston noted that ‘… the [26th’s] lieutenant-colonel will not accept of Macartney’s regiment, … as it is new and must be broke.’ See HMC Portland IV, p. 264. This feature would continue into the late eighteenth century. See Guy, ‘The Standing Army of George II’ p. 108.

\textsuperscript{153} A Regimental List of the Half Pay Officers, for the Year 1714, (London, 1714); Cannon, Historical Record of the Fourth Dragoon Guards, p. 20; Walter Wilcox, ‘Lieutenant-General Owen Wynne,’ in Historical Records of the Fifth (Royal Irish Lancers), (London, 1908), Appendix iv.


\textsuperscript{155} Junior officers with enough connections also transferred into the cavalry or guards. See TNA, WO 4/33, pp. 370. William Strickland to the Duke of Dorset, 12 October, 1732, for the transfer of Ensign Hugh Whitefoord of Colonel Hargrave’s Foot (31st Foot) to be cornet in the Earl of Stair’s Dragoons (6th Dragoons); and SP 41/9, fol. 105. Judge Alex Denton to ‘Secretary of State’, circa 1735, for a request for Ensign Denton of Colonel Harrison’s Foot (15th Foot) to be an ensign in the guards or a cornet of a horse regiment.
regarding regimental ranking during this period. The most senior regiments in the army were beyond this quarrelling over ranking, and their prestige made them highly desirable among the wealthiest officers. For example, in 1711, Peter Wentworth informed his brother, Lord Raby, Colonel of the 1st Dragoons, that ‘old regiments become now the fashion to be sold makes Colonel Cornwell very fond of buying one, and has said often to me he wished you would talk with him in earnest about selling yours to him as you did in jest when here in England, for he had rather have yours than any regiment in the service, and would give what anybody would give.’

The ranking of a regiment also influenced the location in which it served. Guards units never served outside of England, with the exception of battalions of foot guards in wartime. In wartime, a commission with a regiment on campaign was most desirable, not only because battle casualties and sickness increased the chances of promotion, but also because of the social capital it yielded through the acquisition of glory. In peacetime, service in England was rated the most highly, with Scotland (North Britain) and Ireland somewhat less so, and overseas duty the least. Although there were exceptions, senior regiments tended to serve in Britain, ‘middling’ units in Britain and Ireland, whilst the most junior ones served in Ireland, the Mediterranean, and the Americas. Calling North Britain ‘North Hell,’ Captain George Malcolm complained in 1738 that ‘the Alps are like molehills to the vast number of craggs and ragged mountains covered in snow... In this cold sharp air we are all wits, but in short, the wittiest of us all can’t live here by them.’ The lower pay and subsistence of the Irish establishment was a contributing factor to the unpopularity of service there, as was the division of regiments into small detachments, and their dispersal into remote parts of the country. Frustrated by the low pay and the difficulty in securing a commission in Ireland, volunteer John Mackenzie declared

156 For example, In 1694, Hamilton’s Foot (18th Foot) was ranked 11 places after that which its officers had hoped for. See Cannon, Historical Record of the Eighteenth Regiment of Foot, p. 14. For an order granting Whetham’s Foot (27th Foot) the rank of Preston’s Foot (26th Foot), see TNA, WO 4/14, p. 345, Wyndham to the Duke of Ormond, 4 June, 1713. The order was never carried out, and Whetham’s regiment remained junior to Preston’s. See also TNA, SP 41/5, fol.? ‘Report of the General officers in relation to the rank of the forces, 19 February, 1714;' WO 4/17, p. 115. Recommendation of Board of General Officers for Bowles’ Dragoons (12th Dragoons) to rank behind Molesworth’s Dragoons (9th Dragoons), 13 April, 1715. See BL, Add MS 41143, fol. 17-19, for a list of regiments according to seniority in 1718.
159 In 1707, Lieutenant-General Robert Echlin asked the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland if his dragoon regiment might be deployed abroad, before ‘this glorious war’ ended. HMC Ormond VIII, p. 286. Echlin to Ormond, Dublin, 15 February, 1707.
'I would rather go as a slave to Virginia, than live a private dragoon in Ireland.' The remoteness of service in Scotland or Ireland would have deprived many subalterns and captains of the company of their fellow officers, as well as reduced their contact with social events, unlike their counterparts fortunate enough to be based in Dublin, Edinburgh, London, or another English large city.

The conditions of service in Ireland may have been dreary, but a large number of regiments with small company strengths were kept there during peacetime. This was a compromise between parliament’s desire to reduce the absolute number of personnel, and the need to maintain a large pool of active officers in the event of war. Considering the alternative was a few large regiments commanded by a minimal complement of officers, those serving in Ireland under George I and George II were fortunate to hold commissions at all. Much worse from the average officer’s perspective was service in the Mediterranean or certain parts of North America. In particular, the West Indies was as unpopular during this period as it was later in the eighteenth century. Upon learning that their regiment was to leave Ireland for the West Indies in 1701, the majority of the officers of Colonel Tiffin’s Foot (27th Foot) resigned. Sickness, in particular malaria and yellow fever, were unavoidable conditions of service in the Caribbean and Leeward Islands, and officers suffered as much as the troops. Furthermore, the less desirable a location was to its officers, the longer the War Office chose to keep them there. Most regiments on the Irish establishment in the 1720s and 1730s had been there since the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Regiments sent to Minorca or Gibraltar, usually spent a quarter of a century there, whilst those in the West Indies and the American mainland could be there for forty or fifty years before returning to Britain.

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161 See BL, Add MS 39189, fol. 16. John Mackenzie to his father, Dublin, 29 March, 1732. For income scales, see Table 2.4. For dispersal of units, see Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 52, 54, 57.

162 HMC Various Collections VIII, p. 412. In the same letter as above, Captain Malcolm missed the ladies he had been introduced to in London. For plays, operas and other social events which officers depended on in London for their social lives, see HMC Egmont II, p. 215. Helen Le Grand to Sir John Perceval, London, 6 February, 1707; Ibid., p. 236. - Dering to Sir John Perceval, London, 17 March, 1709; and HMC Portland V, p. 540. Newsletter. 27 November, 1717.

163 Fortescue, History of the British Army, II, pp. 16-17; Houlding, Fit For Service, pp. 46-7

164 Chandler, Oxford History of the British Army, pp. 112-3.

165 BL, Add MS 61283, fol. 86. Memorial of Mary Baird on the behalf of her husband, Captain, James Baird, circa 1705.

166 For example, the Earl of Donegal’s Foot (35th Foot), lost 26 out of 36 of their officers from 1701 to 1704. See Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, pp. 245.

167 For example, the 27th foot was stationed in Ireland from 1697 to 1736, whilst the 5th Horse (4th Dragoon Guards), had been in Ireland from 1701 to beyond 1739. See William Copeland, Historical Record of the Twenty-Seventh Regiment, (London, 1876), p. 30; and Richard Cannon, Historical Record of the 4th Dragoon Guards, (London, 1848), pp. 18-19. The 20th, 28th and 30th spent 10-15 years each in Ireland under George I and George II. See Richard Cannon Historical Record of the Twentieth Foot, (London, 1848), p. 10;

168 Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 18-19.
The result of all these factors was that each regiment had its own unique character, based largely on its ranking. Junior regiments were likely to be officered by those who lacked the connections and wealth to enter a more senior regiment, or were willing to bear the added health risks and ennui associated with long service abroad in pursuit of their ambitions. Senior regiments tended to favour officers from more distinguished backgrounds, whose careers were more stable since their units were unlikely to be disbanded, and whose service was likely to leave plenty of opportunities for leisurely pursuits. Many colonels led this trend, by frequently exchanging regiments to reap the advantages of either more senior regiments, mounted units, or both. This diversity of regimentsal experience, encouraged by the rotation and deployment decisions of the War Office, exercised a powerful effect on the conditions of service officers served under. It essentially provided a motivation for them to overcome the limitations of their regiment themselves, through purchase into a ‘better’ regiment, or be absent from their posts altogether.

2.7 Conclusion

Building on the findings of previous historians, the direct income of army officers was much higher than previously thought, once the separate sources of pay and subsistence are combined. To only consider an officer’s pay alone makes little sense, since subsistence was provided to pay for those expenses that gentlemen would be expected to incur, such as servants and forage. Once an officer reached the rank of captain, regardless of establishment or branch of service, he could consider himself sufficiently remunerated to support the basic lifestyle of an Augustan gentleman. This was dependent on his troop or company remaining free of large expenses however, and even small fluctuations of the annual fortunes of his unit could affect his personal finances. The real financial incentive to serve lay in the colonelcies of regiments and the general ranks, which offered a significantly higher direct income. Nevertheless, these higher ranks also required higher expenditure, not only to maintain a lifestyle and table in keeping with the dignity of the rank, but also to cover regimental debts if the unit’s funds could not pay for the supplies it needed to function. For company officers, the quest for marginal profits and the desire to avoid heavy losses kept them focussed on their administrative functions. This was particularly the case for officers serving in Ireland, where the pay and subsistence were much lower than in Britain. Although officers did not express complaints to the government, the fact that a cornet of dragoons or horse in England earned 36-40% more than their counterparts in Ireland, and that a captain of foot in Ireland earned less than a cornet of dragoons
in Ireland, reveals the extent of the inequality of income between branches of service and establishments.

The military system produced by the early British fiscal-military state required and encouraged officers to be as self-reliant as possible in overcoming the problems and issues they would encounter during the course of their careers. Whilst the War Office and Board of General Officers were directly involved in the management of the officer establishment, their activities did not extend to comprehensive support of officers suffering from the occupational hazards of military service. With the exception of half-pay, individual officers were only given support for contingencies in limited cases, whilst entire categories of aid were denied, such as replacement of equipages and medical bills. Expenses and setbacks which were common to military service had to be borne by the officer himself. His ability to recover from them and resume his career depended on his personal resources and situation. In most areas, the freedom given to officers to carry out their duties facilitated the maintenance and management of manpower, and provided incentives in terms of regimental profit and generals’ pay. However, the pressure to carry out these duties, and the way in which the War Office organised and deployed its manpower, encouraged officers to act individualistically in ways that could damage the service.
Chapter 3  Promotion and Patronage Networks

3.1 Introduction

For the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century army officer, promotion was a powerful motivation to serve. The increased income that came with each successive rank was the most tangible benefit, but there were also intangible benefits that had significant value within army and society. As he rose through the ranks, his opinions began to count for more, for his judgement on military affairs, and as a member of the ruling classes who contributed to the security of the nation. The higher an officer rose, the greater the authority he wielded over those he commanded, through the direct orders he gave to subordinates, and ultimately, his judgment on their behaviour through courts-martial, and for generals, the Board of General Officers. If he was promoted to colonel, he would also exercise a degree of patronage through the direct or indirect role he played in the appointment of officers wishing to join his regiment. According to Guy, under the Hanoverian monarchs, ‘the crown was forced to rely on colonels to vet young gentlemen seeking to obtain commissions, and it was usual for them to have a host of clients of their own to recommend.’

Competition for an appointment was always intense, whether for a regimental vacancy, a general rank, or the governorship of a fort. Consequently, an officer’s chances for promotion were measured against those of his competitors. Although appointment and promotion are synonymous terms for examining the process of career advancement in the army, the contemporary language used by army officers reflected this ranked competition. ‘Pretension’ meant the aspirations an officer had for promotion, as well as the strength of his claim to a particular vacancy, based on the interest he had developed in it, and his suitability to carry out its duties. For example, in 1704, Edward Southwell, secretary to the Viceroy of Ireland, recommended an officer to Marlborough on the grounds that ‘... he has very good pretensions to be employed here because he served in another English regiment...

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1 A popular expression of the opinions of senior officers was in electoral and parliamentary politics. According to Brewer, ‘... the presence of military men in parliament was not a sign of the militarisation of government but of the permeation of the military by civilian politics.’ Brewer, Sinews of Power, p. 45. See Handley, ‘James Stanhope, (1673-1721), HOP 1690-1715; Watson and Wilkinson, ‘Thomas Erle, HOP 1690-1715; Romney Sedgwick, ‘Charles Howard, (1696-1765),’ HOP 1715-54; H. Stephens, ‘John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair, (1673-1747),’ ODNB; and Eveline Cruickshanks and Richard Harrison, ‘James Stanley, 10th Earl of Derby, (1664-1736), HOP 1690-1715, for examples of officers speaking on key political issues in parliament.

2 General courts-martial committees usually consisted of generals down to captains, and could recommend the death penalty for enlisted personnel and officers, pending confirmation by the monarch. See TNA, WO 71/121. ‘At a court-martial held at Horse Guards, 24 January, 1696;’ BL, Add MS 61336, fols. 23-9. ‘At a General court-martial held near Tournai, 14 June, 1709;’ WO 4/24, p. 12. Pelham to Judge Advocate General, 28 April, 1724.

3 Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, p. 143.
foremost.'⁴ Similarly, during a dispute between Major-General Tatton and the Earl of Dunmore in 1725, the Secretary at War directed that ‘...if my Lord Dunmore should persist in his opinion that he had a right to command, they should then both of them draw up their pretensions in writing.’⁵ By contrast, when Queen Anne wished to promote the Earl of Hertford to a vacant colonelcy in 1709, Godolphin described the regiment’s lieutenant-colonel, who might otherwise have established a claim to the colonelcy, as ‘... a man of no deep pretensions.’⁶ Whilst also meaning promotion in general, ‘preferment’ could also mean an officer’s chances of selection over other candidates. For example, in 1696, Blathwayt advised against an officer seeking promotion from William III in person, ‘... he having been so long out of service that it will be difficult for him to get a suitable preferment there.’⁷ Similarly, in 1735, the Secretary at War wrote to the Secretary for the Northern Department, that ‘among the recommendations you will find Cornet Herbert by the Duke of Portland, who is very much in earnest about him, and I am told has expressed a little discontentment, at his not being preferred.⁸

The instrument for promotion was the issue of a new commission paper, which superseded the old one by authorising its holder to command a new unit in a higher rank. If issued by the War Office, it was countersigned by the Secretary at War and the Commissary-General or Muster-General, entitling the officer to draw pay.⁹ Constitutionally, the right to grant a commission lay within the monarch’s prerogative powers, and officers served at their pleasure.¹⁰ This established a hierarchy of patronage among civil and military officials, based on the proximity and relevance of their influence with the sovereign. The Secretaries of State for the Southern and Northern Departments held the greatest direct influence, through the weight of their political opinion, and because the formal process of issuing commissions began with their official warrant.¹¹ The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland could also directly commission ensigns and cornets in regiments on the Irish establishment, as well as staff appointments such as master of the barracks.¹² The Secretary at War was the most informed of the

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⁶ Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, II, 1,338. Godolphin to Marlborough, Windsor, 27 September, 1709.
⁷ BL, Add MS 37992, fol. 145. Blathwayt to James Vernon, Camp at Corbeay, 4 July, 1696.
⁸ TNA, SP 41/9, fol. 63. William Yonge to Lord Harrington, 13 June, 1735.
⁹ For examples, see BL, Add Ch 13949. ‘Commission of Lord Raby to be a Major-General,’ At James, 1 January, 1704, 1705; BL, Add Ch 2228. ‘Commission to Robert Bulman to be Ensign in Barrymore’s Foot (13th Foot),’ 22 January, 1705; BL, Egerton Ch 2231. ‘Commission of Charles Bussell to be Captain in the 1st Foot Guards,’ 23 April, 1736.
¹⁰ Chandler, Oxford History of the British Army, p. 67; Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 4.
¹² See BL, Egerton 1631. ‘Copybook of Commissions granted by the Duke of Ormond, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1705-7,’ for draft commissions.
career records of officers, as well as their aspirations for promotion, through the recommendations of superior officers and the decisions of the Board of General Officers over contested vacancies, which passed through his office. He was also in close communication with the Secretaries of State, over administrative matters concerning officers and the memorials of individual officers. During wartime, army commanders on campaign could also grant regimental commissions, pending approval by the Captain-General, the monarch, or both. As government ministers and commanders in chief, these individuals were closest to the monarch in terms of influence over appointments. This influence was general in nature, extending to all commissions within their particular sphere, but individual patrons at this level could be linked to each other by partisan politics, co-operation over administrative tasks, or other forms of patronage, both civil and personal. The dynamics of military networks therefore shifted with changes in senior military and civil personnel, with new appointees integrating their own networks and clients into the existing system, and old, defunct networks losing their influence.

Within each sphere rested a range of interests, including political grandees, local elites, and their extended clients and dependents. Army officers might be anyone one of these, depending on their military rank, social status and political power. For example, the Earl of Galway was a patron to Huguenot officers during the Nine Years War, finding commissions for them in units under his own command, and appealing on their behalf to the Secretaries of State for pensions. He himself was dependent on the patronage and influence of Whig friends and family connections for his military appointments and estates. Young men wishing to be commissioned as ensigns or cornets tended to rely on their family connections to secure ‘a pair of colours.’ More senior officers within these networks wielded a degree of local influence themselves, through their connections and recommendations. For example, as the Duke of Marlborough’s Quartermaster-General and confidante, William Cadogan informed Major-General Lord Raby, ambassador to Prussia, that ‘as to

13 For examples, see TNA, WO 4/13, pp. 1-2, 27; WO 71/1, pp. 312-3; WO 71/3, pp. 41-2, 85, 104-5; WO 71/5, pp. 20, 140, 153-4.
14 TNA, SP 41/3-11. ‘Letters and Papers from the Secretary at War to the Secretaries of State, 1703-39’; BL, 61652, ‘Correspondence of the Earl of Sunderland, Secretary for the Southern Department, 1706-1715,’ pp. 15. Sunderland to St John, Whitehall, 8 July, 1707; Ibid., p. 53. Sunderland to Walpole, Whitehall, 31 March, 1708.
15 TNA, SP 44/168, fols. 335-6. ‘Commission to the Earl of Marlborough to be Commander of the Forces in the United Provinces’; SP 44/171, fols. 413-5. ‘Warrant to Earl Rivers, appointing him general and commander of the forces to accompany the fleet to Lisbon,’ 25 March, 1706.
what concerns your Excellency’s interests or pretensions in the army, I can sincerely protest, I never omitted a favourable opportunity of improving as far as was in my power the good opinion the Duke has ever had of your Excellency.'

Colonels also exercised control over candidates for vacancies in their own regiments. The amount of direct patronage they had varied from unit to unit, according to pre-existing interests, the decisions of the army administration, and the personal intervention of the sovereign. For example, in 1737, Viscount Richard Molesworth, colonel of the 5th Dragoons, was expected to find a cornetcy in his regiment for an orphaned nephew, who was still at school. Knowing that George II was less keen to allow minors to serve than previous monarchs, his sister, Mrs Titchborne, wrote ‘I will immediately engage some friend to engage His Majesty not to enquire into his age. I think this will be easily obtained, the King is infinitely good natured and knows that, now that his father is dead, he has only that, both for his present education and future hopes...’

It was an accepted practice for colonels to reserve subaltern vacancies in their regiments for their sons and nephews, but regiments were never so bound by ties of kinship as to attract complaints or official attention. The Earl of Meath appointed three relatives to his regiment (18th Foot) in 1689, under the family name of Brabazon. Colonel Sir Charles Hotham (4th Baronet) commissioned his son, Charles Hotham (5th Baronet), and another relative, Beaumont Hotham, as ensigns in his regiment (disbanded, 1713). Lieutenant-General William Cadogan commissioned his younger brother, Charles Cadogan into his regiment (5th Dragoon Guards) in 1708, and Brigadier Humphrey Gore had two relations, Lieutenants William and George Gore in his regiment at the time of its disbandment in 1713. Considering most foot regiments had a maximum of 39 officers (3 per 13 companies) and a mounted regiment 18 (3 per 6 troops), this cannot be seen an abuse of this proprietary custom.

For comparison, patronage in the French army under Louis XIV translated directly into the right of courtly aristocrats, members of the lesser nobility, and a tolerated minority of bourgeois officers, to award promotions in return for personal gratitude and loyalty from their subordinates. This also

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19 For examples see TNA, WO 71/1, pp. 312-3. Board of General Officer’s recommendation for Lieutenant-Colonel John Knox, Temple’s Dragoons (4th Dragoons) to keep his commission; 9 December, 1710; BL, Add MS 61336, fol. 56. James Craggs to Marlborough, 24 October, 1717; WO 71/5, pp. 63-4. Memorial of Lieutenant-Colonel William Congreve, 5 December, 1717; TNA, SP 41/9, fol. 89. General Honywood to a Secretary of State, 18 June, 1735.
20 HMC Various collections VIII, pp. 411-2. Mrs C. Titchborne to Viscount Molesworth, 8 February, 1737.
21 TNA, SP 44/166, fols. 37-40. Commissions for Meath’s Foot, 1 May, 1689; WO 64/2, fol. 5. List of officers of Cadogan’s Horse, 1709; A Regimental List of the Half-Pay Officers, (London, 1714).
22 According to Rowlands, ‘Once in regiments owned by grands, or controlled by governors and lieutenant-generals, any existing attachments officers already had to them were nourished, and new loyalties grew where none had existed before,’ and ‘...ties of kinship, service and ‘fidélité’ still played an important part in the creation and composition of the grands regiments in the Nine Years War.’ See Rowlands, ‘Power, Authority and Army
enabled them to maintain a degree of cultural cohesion within their units by appointing their kinsmen, or men from the same pays (region). Members of the royal household and grand aristocratic houses wielded considerable patronage over vacancies, with some families owning several of the most prestigious regiments simultaneously. The standing they enjoyed with the royal court, and the political and economic power they wielded, meant that the French King only refused their choices in cases of obvious unsuitability. Colonels of lesser regiments or lower social status also possessed control over appointments in their regiments, by submitting one or two candidates for a vacancy for the King’s approval.

By contrast, in the British army, the majority of military networks were governed by the broader terms of ‘friendship’ and ‘protection’. For example, seeking compensation upon the disbandment of his regiment in 1699, the Earl of Galway wrote to James Vernon, Secretary of State, that ‘you are one of my friends, and I fully believe the assurances of your friendship, which you have often been so good as to give me.’ Similarly, the Duke of Ormond, when asking the Lord Treasurer, Robert Harley, in 1711 to elevate Lieutenant-General Richard Ingoldsby to the Irish peerage, wrote ‘My Lord, I some time ago recommended Mr Ingoldsby to your protection, and I do it now again...’ Acknowledging Marlborough’s confidence in his abilities in 1706, Lieutenant-General John Cutts wrote to Marlborough that ‘as I have the happiness to be under your Grace’s patronage... I am sure no success will ever alter you to your friends, and your Grace will always make it a great part of your fame to protect men of honour.’ Clients and patrons were brought together by mutual interests, whether these were political, military or social. Patrons offered favourable recommendations for promotion, direct appointments to posts within their power, or promises of help in times of difficulty. In return, a


23 According to Alan Forrest, many French regiments in the eighteenth century were recruited locally and commanded by local nobles, resulting in a ‘personal contract between seigneur and commoner.’ Alan Forrest, _Conscripts and Deserter: The Army and Society in France during the Revolution and Empire_, (Oxford, 1989), p. 8. Considering the regional diversity of French regions in custom, language and political autonomy, it is understandable that commissioning officers from the same pays meant more to the identity and cohesion of a French regiment than in their British counterpart. See Robin Briggs, _Early Modern France_, 1560-1715, (Oxford, 1997), pp. 5, 6-7; (eds.) Linch and MacCormack, _Britain’s Soldiers: Rethinking War and Society 1715-1815_, (Liverpool, 2014), pp. 26, 29, 31; Brewer, _Sinews of Power_, pp. 3-8; Houlding, _Fit for Service_, p. 105.

24 According to Rowlands, ‘the Grands’ patronage, if important for the filling of the posts of colonel and mestre de camp in their regiments, was even more pervasive at the ranks of lieutenant-colonel, captain and subaltern officers.’ Rowlands, ‘Power, Authority and Army Administration under Louis XIV,’ p. 148.


26 Rowlands, ‘Power, Authority and Army Administration under Louis XIV,’ p.149-50.

27 TNA, SP 63/360, fols. 78-9. Galway to Vernon, 10 April, 1699.


29 BL, Add MS 61162, fol. 65. Baron Cutts to Marlborough, 6 August, 1706.
client might express a willingness to perform services when requested, bring over their influence to the cause of their patron, or simply be counted as a follower, rather than a potential opponent.

Despite their centrality to the officer establishment and the army administration, patronage networks and promotion have not been fully explored in their own right by historians of the British army. 30 Burton and Newman’s study of Sir John Cope’s military career examines the process involved from the perspective of a single officer. 31 As a reconstruction of Cope’s negotiations for regimental promotion during the War of the Spanish Succession, it highlights the influence of regimental colonels over vacancies, and the importance of securing a recommendation from a superior officer. 32 However, their focus on a single officer raises the question of how representative Cope’s experience was, and consequently whether the horizons of his promotion prospects applied to the remainder of the officer establishment. Indeed, the difficulty that Cope found in selling his commissions despite serving in elite regiments and during wartime emphasizes the importance of cultivating relationships with existing patrons and seeking out new contacts, two social skills which Cope does not appear to have been adept at when compared with other officers. 33 Stansfield’s chapter on officers serving under Marlborough includes multiple examples of promotion, and demonstrates the need for Marlborough to balance the political suitability of a candidate with military competence. 34 It does not however, explore the structure of Marlborough’s own patronage network, or the necessity for ambitious officers to navigate networks, as a key feature of military experience.

The other study touching on promotion and patronage is Hayes’s, ‘The Royal House of Hanover.’ 35 Whilst it brings attention to the often conflicting priorities between officers and the monarch over military appointments, Hayes argues that patronage was inherently partisan, because of the involvement of the Secretary at War in the process. 36 Furthermore, Hayes assumes that patronage was a detrimental practice, since ‘over-privilege had a vast potential for doing harm... from the direction of purchase another danger threatened, since it might well have impeded the Crown’s ability

30 See Childs, *The British Army of William III*, pp. 59-60 for examples of officers being promoted under William III; and Chandler, *Oxford History of the British Army*, pp. 102-3, for the importance of patronage in furthering an officer’s career under George I and George II. See also Scouller, *Armies of Queen Anne*, pp. 73-7; for brevetcies and irregular practices, such as the commissioning of children.
32 Ibid., p. 660-1.
36 For Hayes’s citation arguing that promotion was political, see the Introduction of this thesis, p. 2.
to make changes for the better.'

This argument exaggerates the damaging effects of patronage on promotions within the army, as it does not take into account the complex dynamics of interest and influence that facilitated the careers of officers, or the widespread operation of patronage in civil appointments and parliamentary politics. The limitations of Burton’s and Hayes’s studies highlight several issues that need to be explored if patronage and promotion in the late Stuart and early Hanoverian army is to be fully understood. These include the kinds of client-patron relationships that existed during this period, how far participants were obligated to each other in an arrangement, and the interplay of political, social and military considerations during the process of selecting a candidate to a vacancy.

Historians of local elections, parliamentary politics and the royal court have demonstrated the importance of patronage and influence in a range of political activities and spaces in the early eighteenth century. Political patronage was largely aimed at securing votes, whether in a local election or in a parliamentary division, although historians of Irish and Scottish patronage have argued that the forms it took were more subtle than is generally acknowledged among historians, and was not always explicitly political in design. Ronald Sunter argues that the offer of a reward in exchange for a single action, or the threat of revocation in the event of non-compliance, was in fact the crudest form patronage took. Marjorie Cox’s study of the constituency of Wigan, including the electoral campaigns of a senior army officer, Lieutenant-General James Barry, highlights the advantages for candidates who patiently improved their standing among electors, rather than buying votes outright.

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37 Ibid., p. 333
38 According to Jeremy Black, ‘patronage networks were a social feature of the age, often controlled by private citizens for socio-economic as well as for political purposes, and not merely the aberrant creation of Crown and ministers.’ Jeremy Black, *Robert Walpole and the Nature of Politics in Eighteenth Century Britain*, (London, 1990), pp. 22-3
41 According to Sunter, patronage expressed through friendship was ‘…all the stronger because the shrewd political manager never breathed a word about a bargain or the anticipated political return. Acts of seemingly disinterested friendship, reinforced by regular social contacts, were in fact the only sound approach to building a county interest.’ Sunter, *Patronage and Politics in Scotland*, p. 3.
Covering the significant patronage wielded by James Butler, the 2nd Duke of Ormond in his military appointments and as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, David Hayton’s study demonstrates the large number of applicants requesting posts, sinecures or commissions from Ormond, of which only a minority were his placemen in the Irish Parliament, or his supporters within the army. These studies imply that the development of networks was at least as important as direct acts of patronage, since they facilitated frequent contact between patrons and clients, in person or through correspondence. This chapter will examine these networks, and their impact on the morale and motivation of the officer establishment.

3.2 Military Networks during the Nine Years War

After the arrival of William III’s army from Holland in late 1688, the low morale of the troops and the defections of senior officers led to the rapid disbandment of James II’s forces in England. The changes made by William III in army personnel for the English and Scottish establishments, and the raising of new regiments meant that the patronage networks of the army essentially began anew. Faced with a disillusioned and inexperienced officer establishment, the new monarch dismissed known Catholics and those suspected of Jacobite tendencies from their posts. Adding to this large pool of vacancies was the raising of new regiments, fourteen of which were to be raised in Ireland alone. In practice the King had to choose between English and Scottish officers he had brought over from Dutch service, whose experience and loyalty was proven, and English aristocrats who had played a political role in securing the new monarch’s reign. The former provided the immediate expertise needed to stiffen the army as it fought against Jacobite armies in Scotland and Ireland, whilst the latter rallied local support to the Williamite succession, as well as providing the much needed manpower for the new units through their ability to raise recruits. Of the regiments in existence prior to William III’s

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47 TNA, WO 4/1, fol. 124. The 1st Duke Schomberg to William Herbert, 21 March, 1689.
invasion, just over half retained their colonels, whilst the remaining regiments had theirs replaced by more loyal commanders. A database of regiments and their colonels compiled in the preparation of this thesis shows that 16 out of 27 foot regiments and 9 out of 15 horse or dragoon regiments retained their colonels on grounds of proven loyalty to William III during the period 1688-1690, whilst the remainder had their colonels dismissed and replaced. In regiments posted further from authorities in London, Dublin and Edinburgh, colonels were to give blank commissions for the officer vacancies in their regiments, allowing them to bypass the time-consuming involvement of the secretaries of state and secretary at war. This represented a considerable delegation of patronage to colonels, and was granted on the condition that their choices were reliable. For example, Colonel Piercy Kirke informed the newly appointed colonel of a regiment stationed in Liverpool that ‘whomsoever you recommend for command, I have the King’s orders to place. They should be men known to you.’

The junior ranks of the army were not always filled with suitable candidates, however. There is evidence that some colonels abused their patronage. In 1692, the Earl of Monmouth complained to the Secretary of State for the South that the colonels of regiments stationed in Portsmouth disposed of commissions in their regiments ‘... most scandalously to any man with the least pretence (against the most just ones) that gives them the most money. It disoblige[s] all the good officers that expect to rise by their service and diligence, and if not prevented will prove of great ill consequence... at this rate the King of France might secure at a cheap expense [a] good number of friends in our army. I have now eased it to your lordship, but desire you will be pleased to make what use of it you think fit, without bringing me upon the stage and exposing your humble servant to the fury of angry colonels.’ Army officers also wished the King would take greater care in appointing junior officers. Writing on the subject of the morale of the officer establishment in 1692, Captain Henry Mordaunt remarked in the Commons that ‘I wish the King would reward and punish more than he does – corporals and trumpeters have been made officers.’ As a newly raised regiment, the Earl of Angus’s regiment (26th Foot) suffered from indiscipline among its rank and file, provoking Alexander Munroe, father of Captain George Munroe, to complain ‘... I hear the Earl [of Angus] is a discreet youth and understands

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50 TNA, SP 44/166, fol. 28. Commissions for Robert Lundy to raise a regiment of foot, Whitehall, 24 April, 1689; National Records of Scotland, GD/68/1, fol. 259. Commissions for Colonel Ludovic Grant to raise a regiment of foot, and draft commission for George Gordon to be lieutenant-colonel, 15 May, 1689; ibid., SP 57/14, fols. 456-7. Blank commissions for officers in the Scots Troop of Life Guards, 8 February, 1690.
51 HMC Finch IV, pp. 97-8. The Earl of Monmouth to the Earl of Nottingham, 23 April, 1692.
52 Anchitell Grey, Debates of the House of Commons from the year 1667 to the year 1694, (London, 1767), X vols., vol. X. 252-3, November 21, 1692. The main question in the debate was whether William III had the right to appoint foreign commanders over English choices.
his business, and if he desires to have a regiment he must quite change the frame of this... if the Earl had commissions from the King for men who are worthy to be officers, he might have had a good regiment in eight days time with the same soldiers or others.\textsuperscript{54} Despite being newly formed, the Earl of Angus’s regiment already had its officers appointed over the Colonel’s head, possibly because its Covenanter composition narrowed the pool of candidates to men known to its founders for their religious beliefs.

Other colonels had to argue for the right to suggest officers for their own regiments. In the same year, the Earl of Meath seemed to have very little control over his own regiment (18th Foot) when initially appointed to its colonelcy: ‘I know my Major, Frederick Hamilton, will use his interest for his brother George to get a commission for Philips’s company: he never served in the army that I can learn, and there is here Mr John Culliford who bought a commission in my regiment, but was passed over... he has served in Tangier and other places and I recommend him to be captain in the room of Philips. Postscript. Just now my major has brought new commissions and I have not been consulted in it. He has obtained one for his brother to be captain in the place of Captain Ambrose Edgworth, which commission I desire may be superseded by one for Captain John Culliford.’\textsuperscript{55}

Six weeks earlier the Earl of Shrewsbury, the Secretary of State for the North, had issued no less than 33 commissions (including Meath’s own commission) out of the regiment’s total of 42.\textsuperscript{56} Some of the previous officers had been dismissed for Jacobitism, others for defrauding the regiment of its clothing.\textsuperscript{57} This may have been the reason why the King appointed officers to the vacancies himself, as he wanted to ensure the regiment was officered by men whose loyalty could be vouched for. After Meath complained to the Secretary of State, Shrewsbury assured him that ‘... His Majesty has thought fit to sign for the vacancies in your regiment, but [I] shall for my own part be ready to propose only those that you name.’\textsuperscript{58} The fact that Shrewsbury was willing to filter out recommendations to ensure that only those of the regiment’s colonel reached the King’s attention, suggests that the influence of the Secretary of State in patronage networks was continuing to grow.

\textsuperscript{54} HMC Roxburgh: The Manuscripts of the Duke of Roxburgh, p. 119. Alexander Munroe to Sir Patrick Hume, Edinburgh, September 24, 1689. The indiscipline may have been exacerbated by the new unit’s first combat experience at Dunkeld a month before. Black, Britain as a Military Power, p.14.
\textsuperscript{55} TNA, SP 32/1, fol. 83. The Earl of Meath to the Earl of Shrewsbury, Chester, 15 June, 1689.
\textsuperscript{56} TNA, SP 44/166. Commissions for Meath’s Foot, 1 May, 1689. Meath’s regiment consisted of 14 companies of three company officers each (including field officers.)
\textsuperscript{57} Robert Parker, Memoirs of the most Remarkable Military Transactions from the Year 1683 to 1718. Containing a very particular Account of the several Battles, Sieges etc. in Ireland and Flanders During the Reign K. William and Q. Anne, (Dublin, 1746), p. 13.
\textsuperscript{58} TNA, SP 44/97, fol. 105. Shrewsbury to the Earl of Meath, 18 June, 1689.
Over the next few years, William III appointed Dutch and a limited number of British officers to general ranks, some of whom threatened to resign if their rivals were promoted instead. When on campaign in Flanders, William III allowed Queen Mary and the Lords Justices to consider petitions and complaints from officers forwarded to them from the secretaries of state, but the Queen refused to sign any commissions for field ranks without the King’s approval. Having appointed Dutch generals he had served with in Holland to senior commands in the English, Scottish and Irish establishments, William III used their opinions of the officers directly under their command to inform him of which officers should be promoted. As Commander in Chief, the 3rd Duke of Schomberg was the senior soldier in England when the King was absent on campaign, and controlled promotions within the kingdom. His choices were relayed to the King through the Secretary for the South, via Blathwayt, as were those of other senior Dutch commanders, such as van Ginckel, 1st Earl of Athlone. As the Nine Years war progressed, the secretaries of state and secretary at war increased their influence over military appointments. For example, in 1694, the Earl of Shrewsbury, as Secretary for the Northern Department, wrote to Colonel Fairfax (5th Foot), stating that ‘I am to recommend to you one Mr Hunt, now a lieutenant in your regiment. I do it in confidence that he is a person who will behave himself so well as to deserve your favour.’ The secretaries of state were also involved in the patronage of marine regiments, which had been recently converted from foot units for shipboard service. In 1695, the Marquess of Carmarthen, colonel of the 1st Marines, wrote to James Vernon about his choices for vacancies in the regiment.

‘I am informed of the death of Colonel Davis, who was lieutenant-colonel in the first marine regiment under my command. Since his Majesty has always allowed me to nominate my own officers, I desire Captain Stopford, who is the oldest captain in the said regiment, may gradually rise, and that Lieutenant William Bradbury, my captain-lieutenant, may have the command of his company, that

60 Gertrude Jacobsen, William Blathwayt: A Late Seventeenth Century Administrator, (Yale, 1932), pp. 265-266; TNA, SP 44/1, fols. 33, 35, 43.
62 HMC Finch IV, p. 74. Blathwayt to Nottingham, Loos, 24 April, 1692; BL, Add MS 37991, fol. 7. Earl of Nottingham to Blathwayt, Whitehall, 11 March, 1692.
64 TNA, SP 44/100, fol.23. Shrewsbury to Colonel Thomas, Lord Fairfax, 28 May, 1694.
65 It was not until 1702 that the Navy Board replaced the War Office as the administrative institution responsible for the Marine establishment. See Britt Zerbe, The Birth of the Royal Marines, 1664-1802, (Woodbridge, 2013), p. 29.
Lieutenant John Foster, now first lieutenant in Captain Hoskins’s company, may be my captain-lieutenant, and that Mr Charles Christian, who has been adjutant and quartermaster ever since the regiment was raised, may have the addition of youngest lieutenant in Captain Hoskins’s company. Hearing also that Captain Billop, another captain in my regiment, is turned out of all employments, I desire the command of his company may be given to whom Lord Berkeley (colonel of the 2nd Marines) shall recommend.”

Regarding Billop’s now vacant company, Carmarthen appears to have granted Admiral Berkeley the decision to appoint a candidate on the understanding that he appoint one to his own liking. Eager to maintain his independence in the matter, Berkeley wrote to the Secretary of State that ‘I never preferred any officer upon Lord Carmarthen’s recommendation, but promised to make one Mr Vanbrook, a gentleman at sea with him last year, a captain in my regiment, if there was a vacancy in his regiment, and any of my captains willing to go to him: So now I will agree to take him, provided Captain Rodney of my regiment will be put into his.’

During the Nine Years War, the secretaries of state and the secretary at war had become central channels through which recommendations for candidates flowed through the army administration to the King. In addition, the large number of regiments that were created, and the conversion of some of these into marine regiments, gave colonels greater influence over vacancies to junior posts. With the purchase of commissions becoming widespread, colonels became facilitators of the career choices of regimental officers, through their recommendations and the influence they had with other officers and the civil officials they corresponded with in the course of their duties. With the first major disbandment of the army at the conclusion of the war in 1697, a large number of regiments were kept in existence, albeit at a reduced company strength. This meant that surviving regiments carried their full complement of officers into peacetime, and that the demand and supply of commissions, and the networks they facilitated, survived into the next war against Louis XIV.

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66 TNA, SP 42/4. Carmarthen to Vernon, New Milford, 7 August, 1695. Mr Vanbrook was actually Sir John Vanbrugh, later architect of Castle Howard and Blenheim Palace. See Kerry Downes, ‘Sir John Vanbrugh, (1664-1726),’ ODNB.
67 TNA. SP 42/4. Admiral Berkeley to Vernon, off Dover, 15 August, 1695.
68 12,000 troops were kept in Ireland, in 2 regiments of horse with 36 men in 6 troops each, 3 of dragoons of 36 men in 8 troops each, and 19 of foot, consisting of 36 men in 11 companies each. TNA, SP 44/167, pp. 374-84. ‘Proclamation for the disbandment of regiments on the Irish Establishment, 1699.’
3.3 The Patronage Network of the Duke of Marlborough

The scale of the War of the Spanish Succession extended the nature of patronage networks from their initial structure during the Nine Years War. The British army was deployed on two European fronts, as well as in North America, with expeditions being sent against mainland France, and garrisons in the Mediterranean following the conquests of Gibraltar and Minorca. This meant that a larger number of colonial governors and army commanders were authorized to award commissions to officers under their command. The attrition of service in the West Indies and several pitched battles in Europe led to regular turnover of personnel within particular units in the army. After the victories of Blenheim and Malplaquet and the defeats at Brihuega and Almanza, some regiments lost almost all their officers in a single day.69 These losses meant that there was a regular supply of vacancies at both regimental and general level.

In parliament, Whigs and Tories considered the war to be another ground on which to fight battles of party ideology.70 As Captain-General for most of the war, the Duke of Marlborough faced the difficult task of selecting officers for promotion who were qualified for the post, and whose selection satisfied multiple powerful political and military interests.71 He was assisted in the decision-making process by the Lord Treasurer, the Earl of Godolphin.72 Marlborough’s wife, Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, was also an important influence, especially in her function as Mistress of the Robes.73 To an extent they could promote and favour those officers who were loyal to Marlborough on campaign and who in parliament supported the continuation the war until Spain was free of French influence. Some of these officers served Marlborough faithfully, such as his quartermaster-general, William Cadogan; his invaluable wing commander, the Earl of Orkney; Richard Molesworth; Lieutenant-General James

69 See HMC Rutland, p.181. Lord Gower to the Duke of Rutland, 6 July, 1704; BL, Add MS 61318, fol. 87, ‘List of officers killed and wounded at Brihuela,’ 1710; BL Add MS 22264, fols. 42-47, ‘List of English Officers that were taken and those that were killed at the battle of Almanza,’ 1707, ibid., fols. 38-39: ‘An account of Her Majesty’s forces that were at the battle of Almanza.’ See Dalton, English Army Lists, vol. V, part II: Blenheim Roll, for a list of officers killed and wounded at that battle. The Earl of Barrymore’s regiment (13th Foot) was captured at the battle of La Caya in 1709, along with two other British regiments. Colonel Barrymore and twenty other officers were taken prisoner. See Hugh Popham, The Somerset Light Infantry, (London, 1968), p. 26.


71 Smith, ‘The Hanoverian Succession and the Politicisation of the Army,’ pp. 220-1; Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 328.

72 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, I, xvi. Marlborough corresponded with Godolphin on appointments with political consequence. For example, see Ibid., II, 835-36, Godolphin to Marlborough, Windsor, 30 June, 1707.

Stanhope; and Major-General Sir Richard Temple. For example, Marlborough lent his influence towards the election of Cadogan to the constituency of New Woodstock, both as a sign of his high regard and to gain a supporter in parliament. Marlborough also made sure that any candidates Cadogan recommended for vacancies in his regiment were immediately appointed. Similarly, Marlborough asked Godolphin to use his political patronage as Lord Treasurer to grant Molesworth the comptrollership of the customs in Newcastle, to provide him with enough funds to maintain his equipage as Marlborough’s aide de camp. Molesworth admitted that he had insufficient access to patronage to obtain the sinecure himself, writing ‘... I thanked him [Godolphin] most kindly for the employment he so kindly bestowed upon me at a time when both I and my friends were at a distance to him and consequently out of the reach of application. And to me, benefit conferred in this generous manner bears ten times the value it would be were it the effect of long and obstinate solicitation.’

However, other senior officers required careful management to prevent their ambitions from turning against Marlborough and creating rival factions within the officer establishment. Considering himself at the very least to be Marlborough’s military equal, John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, expressed frustration at remaining a subordinate general to Marlborough. Marlborough felt he had done all in his power to recommend Argyll to the Queen for promotions and honours. But when Argyll began to criticise Marlborough’s conduct of the war from 1710, the Captain-General made it clear to his allies that Argyll was to be ostracised, thereby cutting him off from his military network. He wrote to Godolphin that ‘I have thought it best for my own honour as well as for the service, not to let him [Argyll] abuse me with false profession, so that by my behaviour to him, all the officers will know that I think him to be an ungrateful man, so that I believe his number of attenders will not be so great.’ Nevertheless, Argyll’s own considerable political and military patronage would interfere with Marlborough’s attempts to keep parliament and the army focussed on supporting him, and Argyll even

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75 Andrew Hanham, ‘William Cadogan, (1671-1726),’ HOP 1690-1715.
76 BL, Add MS 61660, fol. 42: ‘A List of Officers to be preferred in Brigadier Cadogan’s Regiment,’ circa. 1707.
77 H Chichester, ‘Richard, Viscount Molesworth (1680-1758),’ ODNB.
78 BL Add MS, 16312, fol. 186, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Molesworth to his brother, Berlegem, 3 December, 1708.
79 For examples, see Hattendorf, ‘3rd Earl Peterborough,’ ODNB; Hattendorf, ‘Earl Rivers,’ ODNB.
80 Murdoch, ‘2nd Duke of Argyll,’ ODNB.
81 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, II, 658-59. Marlborough to Godolphin, Verlaine, September 6, 1706; Murdoch, ‘2nd Duke of Argyll,’ ODNB.
82 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, III, p. 1474. Marlborough to Godolphin, 10 May, 1710.
offered to travel to Flanders and arrest Marlborough, if he protested Queen Anne’s refusal to extend his Captain-Generalcy for life.83

Similarly, Major-General Webb turned against Marlborough after a misunderstanding that led to Cadogan receiving initial credit for Webb’s victory at Wijnendale in 1708.84 Webb felt that his efforts had earned him a lieutenant-generalcy and a governorship. Wary of empty promises, Webb reminded Marlborough that he expected that the letters of introduction from the Duke to be converted into the rewards he sought. He wrote ‘I have so deep a sense of all the favours I have received from your Grace, that though I am sensible I can make no suitable return, yet I’ll endeavour by all my actions to show you my acknowledgement, and especially for the two letters you gave me at my coming away, to the Queen and my Lord Treasurer. I don’t doubt but they will produce the effect your Grace proposed by it, which is doing me good; for having delivered the very night I came to town your Grace’s letter to the Queen, she was pleased to tell me she would make me and my family safe. I went the next day to wait on my Lord Treasurer at Newmarket, who received me very kindly and assured me of his friendship, all this is owing to your Grace’s recommendation.85 Webb was promoted the following year, and received various sinecures in lieu of his governorship. These were awarded due to the pressure exerted by the Tories in parliament however, whilst Webb, himself a Tory MP, proposed a motion to strip Marlborough’s army in Flanders to bolster the armies in the Iberian peninsula.86

Senior ministers other than Godolphin extended their own influence over military appointments. Army commanders depended on the government to grant them the military, diplomatic and financial resources necessary to lead their multi-national armies. On his arrival in Portugal in 1704 as commander in chief of the forces there, the Earl of Galway wrote to Sir Robert Harley, Secretary of State for the North. In return for promoting the political friends of Harley, Galway hoped to have a personal champion in parliament. He wrote that ‘you may be assured I shall lay hold of all occasions to serve any persons who have the honour of your recommendation, and particularly Colonel Dobbins. I’m mightily obliged to you for the good opinion you have of me... I flatter myself such with the honour of your favour and protection in the House of Commons for the Portugal establishment that we may have our share in the augmentation of forces I hear the House intends to give the Queen.’87 In the

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83 Smith, ‘The Hanoverian Succession and the Politicisation of the Army,’ p. 220-1, 224; Murdoch, ‘2nd Duke of Argyll,’ ODNB.
84 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, II, 1106. Marlborough to Godolphin, Roncq, 1 October, 1708.
same year Lieutenant-General Sir John Cutts wrote to Harley, stating that ‘I thank you for your letter and presume to accept your generous offer of being my friend, and when a favourable occasion offers shall ask your protection. I am glad you think I have done my duty.’

Harley’s falling out with Marlborough and Godolphin and subsequent resignation from office in 1708 was the beginning of a shift in parliament against the Godolphin administration, which had in practice favoured Whigs, rather than being the more inclusive ministry it claimed to be. Although Marlborough himself professed to follow neither Whigs nor Tories, a disproportionate number of Whigs were promoted to the general ranks, reflecting the greater reliance placed on Whig support in parliament. The return of a Tory majority in 1710, and the replacement of Godolphin with Harley as Lord Treasurer in 1711, accelerated Marlborough’s loss of support among the new ministry. In court, Marlborough’s control over promotions in the army had been increasingly met with resistance from the Queen, who had sought to impose her own preferences since 1709. The conflict this caused culminated when the Queen tried to appoint a candidate to the colonelcy of Lord Essex’s regiment (4th Dragoons), following the incumbent’s death in 1710. Aware that the Duke of Marlborough would oppose her choice, Colonel Jack Hill, as he was the husband of Abigail Masham, the Duchess of Marlborough’s rival at court, the Queen prohibited Marlborough from appointing his own favourites. According to Peter Wentworth, brother of Lord Raby, ‘Upon the death of the Lord Essex the Duke read a letter from the Queen not to receive applications from anybody for the regiment, for she designed to dispose of it, not then naming anybody, which was a circumstance the Duke thought looked very cool to him. I have a further proof of the truth of this for a lord that was with the Duke asking for the regiment about two hours after the vacancy, was complimented by him how glad he should be to serve him, but by a letter he had just then received from the Queen, [he said] ‘twas out of his power, and showed him the letter...’ Although the Queen reluctantly accepted Marlborough’s choice of Richard Temple for the colonelcy, relations continued to deteriorate until Marlborough’s resignation from his military appointments and posts, and the Duchess of Marlborough’s dismissal from Anne’s court, in 1711. In their absence, their army-wide influence over patronage ended. Although

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88 Ibid., p. 116. Baron Cutts to Sir Robert Harley, Marlborough’s camp at Speyer, 7 September, 1704.
89 For the reasons for Harley’s dismissal, see Geoffrey Holmes and W.A. Speck, ‘The fall of Harley in 1708 reconsidered,’ English Historical Review, vol. 80 (1965), pp 673-698.
90 Holmes, Politics in the Age of Anne, p. 27.
92 Frances Harris, ‘Abigail Masham, (1670-1734),’ ODNB; Stuart Handley, ‘John Hill, (d.1735),’ HOP 1690-1715; Richard Cannon, Historical Record of the Fourth Regiment of Light Dragoons, (London, 1842), p. 28
94 Smith, ‘Hanoverian Succession and the Politicisation of the Army,’ p. 223; Harris, A Passion for Government, 176-8
Marlborough’s subordinates were vulnerable to proscription from the Tory ministry without his protection, the military networks remained largely intact further down, since many of his former colleagues, such as Cadogan, were able to remain in their posts for much of the war.  

Although appointments to senior posts in the army frequently bore a political dimension, the majority of regimental commissions remained free of partisan politics, if not from rivalry between prospective candidates. Some memorials came from regimental officers requesting promotion for their non-commissioned officers. These included Sergeant Goodall’s application for an officer’s commission, which was supported by three officers in his regiment, or the memorial of Quartermaster George Armstrong for promotion to cornet.  

Promotion depended on presenting superior officers with a favourable reference and a valid claim, so that when a vacancy became available, the interest of that officer stood out from the others. For the majority of officers this was achieved in the form of the memorial or petition, in which the details of their service were described, and their claim to a vacancy was established. Sickness and injury, unexpected circumstances, or the contravention of military custom were frequent themes that applicants mentioned. For example, in 1705, Captain John Gignous petitioned Marlborough that whilst he was recovering from sickness, ‘one Lieutenant Dasby, by cunning and artful contrivances (as is certified in a petition by the major and some of the captains in the said regiment lately delivered to your Grace), got a commission to command his company.’ He requested command of a new company in the additional units being raised Ireland that year, since he was ‘not able to subsist by any other means, is loaded with many misfortunes and must be utterly undone without your Grace’s favourable thought of his deplorable condition.’ In the case of Captain Gignous, his petition earned him a commission in Zuylestein’s Regiment of Foot (disbanded, 1713) in 1706. He would continue to serve in the regiment until its disbandment. Other bids for promotion

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95 HMC Hodgkin, pp. 205-6. Ormond to the Earl of Oxford, Hague, 26 April, 1712  
96 BL, Add MS 61288, fol. 46, 71. Memorial of Sergeant Samson Goodall, and recommendation of Captain Alastair Gordon; BL, Add MS 61283, fol. 38, Memorial of Quartermaster George Armstrong. See also BL, Add MS 61287, fol. 18. Petition to Charles Fox on behalf of Sergeant Peter Edmonds, from various personages of New Sarum, 24 February, 1703.  
98 BL, Add MS, 61288, fol. 42. ‘Memorial of Captain John Gignous, circa. 1705.’  
required more work, with some officers attempting to wait personally on Marlborough or Cardonnel.\textsuperscript{100}

Marlborough’s decisions would inevitably draw protests from officers when they felt that their own interests in a vacancy were unfairly overridden by his own. Since the beginning of the war, Lord North and Grey had grown accustomed to drawing up lists for candidates in his regiment, the 10th foot, which Marlborough approved of without reservation.\textsuperscript{101} In 1709 however, North and Grey wished to assign the elite grenadier captaincy of his deceased brother to another personal choice, but Marlborough had already appointed Alexander Spotswood, the deputy quartermaster-general, to the post. North and Grey complained bitterly to Marlborough’s secretary, Adam Cardonnel, that ‘the professions of friendship which his Grace has honoured me with, makes that I cannot believe I am refused this favour, especially without having the honour of a line from him, nor you about it.’\textsuperscript{102} Marlborough struck a compromise, drawing a commission for Lord North and Grey’s choice, but insisting that Spotswood be appointed to another vacant company in the same regiment.\textsuperscript{103} In 1705, Baron Cutts objected to attempts by officers to circumvent his control over vacancies in his regiment, the 2nd Foot Guards. He wrote to Marlborough that ‘I am informed since, that application is made to your Grace by letter (though I don’t know from what hand), in favour of Captain Steel, who has made an interest to come into my regiment without my knowledge, though the Prince [of Denmark] made me a promise, when Colonel Churchill came in, that my captain-lieutenant should have the first vacant company... It would be so great a discouragement to all the officers of the regiment, and to me in particular as their colonel... Captain Steel’s pretensions being totally without foundation.’\textsuperscript{104} Under such circumstances Hayes’s claim that ‘once within their regiments they [the officers] were sure to mix in perfect equality,’ cannot hold true. An outsider like Spotswood or Steele would have to overcome any resentment the colonel harboured at having his candidate overruled, as well as that of any junior officers with an interest in his post.

\textsuperscript{100} BL, Add MS 61288, fol. 151. Petition of Lieutenant John Grey, 5 February, 1705. He writes ‘... on Wednesday next (God willing) I propose to do the honour of waiting on you [Marlborough], to receive your Lordship’s answer.
\textsuperscript{101} Bodleian Library Special Collections, North MS, A.3, fol. 26, Bonne, 3 May, 1703.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., fol. 96. North and Grey to Cardonnel, circa. 1709.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., fol. 156. Henry Watkins, Judge-Advocate-General, to North and Grey, circa. 1709; TNA, WO 64/2, fol. 27. ‘Regimental list of Lord North and Grey’s Foot.’
\textsuperscript{104} BL, Add MS 61162, fols. 51-2. Cutts to Marlborough, London, 15 May, 1705. This may have been Sir Richard Steele, founder of The Tatler, and impeached in the Commons for attacking the ministry in 1714. He had been an ensign in the 2nd Foot Guards until 1697 and then a captain in Colonel Lucas’s regiment (34th Foot) until 1705. It is possible he wished to transfer to his old unit, but in actuality resigned from the army altogether that year. See Andrew Hanham, ‘Sir Richard Steele,’ (1672-1729), HOP 1690-1715.
A more serious problem than the occasional resentful colonel was when a regiment’s officers united to resist an external candidate. In 1705, Colonel George Macartney sought to exchange his new regiment for the more senior one of the recently deceased James Ferguson (26th Foot). There were other outside contenders, most notably Lord Mark Kerr and Lord Edward Murray, but Macartney had obtained recommendations from Generals Cadogan, Meredith and Palmes to strengthen his application to Marlborough. The regiment’s officers felt that the incumbent lieutenant-colonel, William Borthwick, had a right to its command, having served with the regiment since its formation in 1689. The regiment’s major, John Cranston, claimed that ‘… our whole officers and soldiers have such a terror of Colonel Macartney’s coming over our head, that they are all in despair about it, looking upon the regiment as inevitably ruined, for he who has already squandered all his own and lady’s fortune, and I fear her children’s also… and is so much himself in debt that he can now neither go to England or Scotland, must by these measures not only oppress but soon utterly ruin any regiment he gets.’ The regiment’s officers felt so strongly about Macartney’s impending appointment that they took the unusual step of presenting a petition signed by all the officers present (excluding Borthwick, who did not wish to appear biased), and on the behalf of the sergeants. Major Cranston presented this petition personally to Marlborough, in what he termed ‘a bold action, and by others a vigorous address, but [which] most people here approved of.’ Given the strong opposition to Macartney’s appointment the regiment was granted to Lieutenant-Colonel Borthwick, to the relief of the regiment’s officers.

Marlborough’s patronage network during the War of the Spanish Succession was the most extensive and inclusive of its kind, through the size of the army he commanded, and through the influence he and his supporters in the army and ministry wielded. Negotiating this network was complicated, whether an officer was involved in high politics or not. Promotion depended on the ability of an officer to make the most of his career when putting superiors in mind of their interest in a vacancy. A memorial served as a career record, which Marlborough or his subordinate generals could appreciate at a glance. As well as the length of service and any actions an officer had served in, a memorial also contained the personal expectations of an officers, generated by sacrifices or promises made in the past. Its success depended on the ease with which it could pass upwards through the hierarchy, as each officer used his influence to have it considered by his superior. Memorials nevertheless gave officers of all ranks, and even non-commissioned officers, access to the commander of the army.

105 HMC Portland V, p. 265, Major Cranston to Robert Cunningham, Calemthout, October 20, 1705
106 Ibid., p. 266.
107 Cranston was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in Borthwick’s place, who held the colonelcy of the 26th Foot for only a year. Thomas Carter, Historical Record of the Twenty-Sixth Regiment of Foot, (London, 1867), p. 17.
3.4 The Patronage Network of the Duke of Ormond

After Marlborough, James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormond, wielded the second largest military network of the War of the Spanish Succession. Whereas Marlborough’s network permeated throughout the army and across establishments, Ormond’s was more regional, and was composed of multiple sources of political and military patronage. As Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland from 1703-1707, and 1710-1713, Ormond possessed influence over appointments in the Irish church, judiciary and revenue, as well as the right to directly commission ensigns and cornets in regiments on the Irish Establishment.\textsuperscript{108} Uniquely among Irish viceroys, Ormond was also allowed to raise a regiment of horse on the Irish establishment, and to hold a commission of lieutenant-general.\textsuperscript{109} This allowed him to appoint officers to his regiment, and aides de camp and brigade-majors to his staff. This concentration of civil and military authority into a single minister facilitated the assembly and dispatch of troops from Ireland to various theatres, as well as management of the Irish parliament.\textsuperscript{110} With several regiments stationed permanently in Ireland, new ones being formed, and others arriving from England for embarkation to Portugal, Ormond exercised similar administrative duties to Marlborough, with the exception of those connected with campaign operations and liaising with allies.\textsuperscript{111} Although the influence he exercised over promotions in regiments stationed in Ireland was considerable, it was not absolute, as lists were sent to him from the Queen for officers to be appointed to new units being raised in Ireland, many of whom were successful applicants to Marlborough in the first instance.\textsuperscript{112} Ormond was expected to use his patronage to keep prominent Irishmen and Englishmen serving in Ireland loyal to government


\textsuperscript{109} Handley, ‘2nd Duke of Ormond,’ \textit{ODNB}.

\textsuperscript{110} See BL, Add MS 38713, ‘Correspondence of Edward Southwell, 1705-1712,’ fols. 90-91, for an order from Charles Hedges, Secretary of State for the South Department, in which Ormond was to have four regiments of foot, one of horse and one of dragoons ready for embarkation at Cork, in August, 1706. See BL, Add MS 15895, Hyde Papers vol. IV 1688-1709, fols. 52-54; 187-88; 188-90, for examples of embarkation plans of troops under Ormond’s predecessor, the Earl of Rochester, in 1701. As Commander in Chief of the forces in Ireland, Lieutenant-General Thomas Erle and his staff would have assisted Ormond in the same manner.

\textsuperscript{111} According to Hayton, ‘As a regimental commander and staff officer, Ormond took decisions over a wide range of issues affecting the welfare and prospects of his subordinates: admitting new officers; or granting others permission to sell their commissions; administering courts-martial; making vital operational decisions on the recruitment; billeting and feeding of troops.’ Hayton, in (eds.) Barnard and Fenlon, \textit{The Dukes of Ormond}, p. 232.

\textsuperscript{112} For an idea of the quantity and diversity of military commissions, regimental and otherwise, see BL. Egerton MS 1631, ‘Copybook of Commissions granted 1705-1707.’ See also BL, Add MS 31782, fols. 1-2. ‘List of Officers recommended by Her Majesty to be commissioned by His Grace the Duke of Ormond, in the regiments of foot to be raised for the service of Ireland, under the command of the Earl of Orrery and the Lord Henry Scott; Add MS 61283, fols. 71-2. Memorial of Captain John Bickley; Add MS 61288, fol. 151. Memorial of Lieutenant John Grey.
policies in Westminster, and consequently many seem to have expected him to grant them the favours they requested out of course, rather than displaying the gratitude found in long term patronage relationships.\footnote{See McNally, Parties, Patriots and Undertakers, p. 88; Hayton, in (eds.) Barnard and Fenlon, The Dukes of Ormond, p. 232.}

Ormond inherited substantial debts from his grandfather, to which he added through his own lavish spending.\footnote{Stuart Handley, ‘James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormond, (1665-1745)’, ODNB.} This indebtedness, together with his susceptibility to demands from his friends, gave the ministry in London doubts as to how free he was to carry out his duties according to their intentions.\footnote{HMC Portland V, p. 136. Earl Rivers to the Earl of Oxford, January 9, 1712. See also Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, II, 1184-85, Marlborough to Godolphin, Ghent, January 3, 1708.} In 1706, when Ormond was considering resigning from the lord-lieutenancy, Marlborough wrote to Godolphin, saying that ‘I think you have done very well in quieting Ormond, for this is not a proper time to let him quit; though you may depend upon it that he is so poor a man, that the hands he is in will never let him serve the Queen as he ought to do so...’\footnote{Ibid, II, 589-591. Marlborough to Godolphin, Rousselaer, June 26, 1706.} In 1712, Lieutenant-General the Earl Rivers described Ormond as ‘... so good natured, that he is easily influenced upon, and very ready to answer for people that I think would if it lay in their power undo all that has lately been brought to pass by your good management.’

After the Tory election of 1710, Ormond was involved in the dismissal of senior Whig officers from their military posts. As a member of the Whig Junto that had thwarted various Tory policies in parliament during the previous Godolphin ministry, the Earl of Wharton was the ideal choice to have his dragoon regiment disbanded to provide drafts for units serving in Portugal.\footnote{Christopher Robbins, The Earl of Wharton and Whig Party Politics 1679-1715, (New York, 1992), pp. 1-2; Bodleian Special Collections, MS Eng. Hist. c. 41, pp. 56-7. Ormond to Lord Justices of Ireland, London, 29 November, 1710.} Denying Wharton a chance to defend his unit, Edward Southwell, Secretary of State for Ireland, informed him that ‘His Grace [Ormond] told me that Her Majesty had come to a final resolution in that matter to breaking it, which I thought proper to acquaint your Lordship withall, as believing you could not care to speak anything in a matter which had been determined.’\footnote{Bodleian Special Collections, MS Eng. Hist. c. 41, p. 52. Edward Southwell to the Earl of Wharton, London, 4 December, 1710.}

Officers who were considered Ormond’s friends did enjoy long term client-patron relationships. These included Sir Richard Vernon, Colonel Theophilus Oglethorpe, Major-Generals Robert Echlin and
Thomas Pearce, Lieutenant-General Richard Ingoldsby, and Ormond’s own relation and namesake serving in his regiment, James Butler.\footnote{Hayton, in (eds.) Barnard and Fenlon, \textit{The Dukes of Ormond}, pp. 323-3; Chichester, ‘Richard Ingoldsby,’ \textit{ODNB}.} Many of these officers did express gratitude in their correspondence, for promotions that Ormond secured for themselves and their own friends or kinsmen.\footnote{HMC \textit{Ormond VIII}, p. 95. Captain Sir James Vernon to Ormond, Kilkenny, 8 July, 1704; Ibid., p. 97; Robert Echlin to Ormond, Kilkenny, 13 July, 1704; Ibid., p. 116. Captain James Butler to Ormond, Dublin, September 23, 1704; Ibid., p. 244. Thomas Pearce to Ormond, Booton, near Norwich, 17 July, 1706.} When Colonel Congreve was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Gibraltar in 1714, he wrote to Ormond that ‘... had I known sooner, how much I had been honoured by his Grace’s protection in the business of my commission as lieutenant-governor of the place, I would have been quicker in acknowledging so great an expression of your Grace’s favour...’\footnote{HMC \textit{Hodgkin}, p. 217. Colonel Congreve to Ormond, Gibraltar, 2 May, 1714.} Another long-term client, Colonel William Van Nassau de Zuylestein, 2nd Earl of Rochford, was a naturalized Dutchman who had served in Ormond’s expedition to Cadiz in 1702. Before Zuylestein’s elevation to the Irish peerage in 1708, Ormond had used his interest to return him for Kilkenny in the Irish parliament, and commissioned him a lieutenant-colonel in the newly raised regiment of Irish Guards in 1705.\footnote{Stuart Handley, ‘William van Zuylestein, 2nd Earl of Rochford, (1681-1710)’, \textit{ODNB}.} At the same time he was an acquaintance of Marlborough’s favourite, the Earl of Orkney, and requested Marlborough’s assistance in securing his father’s pension.\footnote{Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, vol. I, p. 23, no.21. Marlborough to Godolphin, 23 August, 1701; Handley, ‘William van Zuylestein,’ \textit{ODNB}.} By 1704, Zuylestein had entered into a long-term relationship with Ormond, arranging to deliver regular shipments of expensive wines from his estate in Holland to Ireland. In October of that year, a shipment costing 950 guilders was sent to Ireland ahead of Ormond’s return from London. In the same letter describing its progress, Zuylestein also asks whether Ormond had secured him a command of one of the new regiments being raised for the Irish establishment.\footnote{HMC \textit{Ormond VIII}, p. 117. Zuylestein to Ormond, 5 October, 1704; p. 179. Zuylestein to Ormond, 20 August, 1705.} Later that year, Zuylestein was sent from Flanders to London by Marlborough with dispatches of the victory at Blenheim. After meeting Zuylestein at a London play, Major-General George Cholmondeley wrote to Ormond, mentioning that Zuylestein was preparing to wait on him in Ireland.\footnote{Ibid., p. 120. Major-General George Cholmondeley to Ormond, London, 28 November, 1704.} A bout of ill health prevented Zuylestein from seeing Ormond, but he informed him of his intention to wait on him once he had recovered, as well as reminding him of his promise of a commission.\footnote{Ibid., p. 125. Zuylestein to Ormond, London, 19 December, 1704.} In 1706, Ormond granted Zuylestein the colonelcy of one of the newly raised regiments.
Zuylestein’s movements and activities in 1705 reveal a subtle but important element of patronage, that of maintaining social circles. Zuylestein procured fine wines for Ormond, itself a necessary ingredient for the social events that Ormond hosted, such as the invitation to Godolphin, the Lord Treasurer, to stay at Richmond Park in 1705. Cholmondeley was a neighbour of Ormond, having been granted the manor and estate of Richmond, Surrey, near Ormond’s own estate in Richmond Park.\textsuperscript{127} It was therefore understandable that he would include in his correspondence to Ormond the latest news of their mutual friend, Zuylestein. This probably enhanced the friendship element of patronage, and possibly made the relationship feel less transactional for its participants. It is likely that a portion of Ormond’s expenditure went towards providing hospitality and gifts to those in his patronage network. For example, in 1713 he wrote to the Lords Justices in Ireland, ordering them to make a warrant for the payment and delivery of a brace of bucks for Lieutenant-General Gorge’s new estate, Phoenix Park, near Dublin.\textsuperscript{128} Such an order can only have been countenanced by the Lords Justices if it served the purpose of making Gorge more receptive to the wishes of the government.

In addition to these cultivated friendships, Ormond also fulfilled straightforward requests for commissions from those under his command, as Lord-Lieutenant or Captain-General.\textsuperscript{129} When many regiments were disbanded or had their complement of companies reduced in 1713, officers looked to Ormond to protect them from the half-pay list. Some colonels of disbanded regiments were able to find alternative employment for themselves, but asked for Ormond’s assistance in the meantime. Major-General Evans wrote in June, 1713, that he relied ‘... upon your Grace’s goodness in keeping me from feeling this disbandment, altogether as so much as some poor officers I see here.’\textsuperscript{130} Evans became colonel of the 4th Dragoons in October that year, after the dismissal of its previous colonel, Sir Richard Temple.\textsuperscript{131} Some colonels of the disbanded regiments felt obliged to use their influence on the behalf of their subordinate officers. Brigadier Henry Grove sent recommendations to Ormond to remind him of the memorials sent to him by officers under threat of disbandment.\textsuperscript{132} In a particularly deserving case, Grove wrote a letter of introduction to accompany an officer’s memorial, to be presented in person: ‘My Lord, Major-General Sabine having given your Grace an account of the

\textsuperscript{127} See Eveline Cruickshanks and George Harrison, ‘George Cholmondeley, 2nd Earl Cholmondeley (1666-1733); and Handley, ‘2nd Duke of Ormond,’ \textit{ODNB}.


\textsuperscript{129} Hayton, in (eds.) Barnard and Fenlon, \textit{The Dukes of Ormond}, p. 232. For examples, see \textit{HMC Ormond VIII}, p. 287; \textit{HMC Hodgkin}, p. 218; BL, Add MS 61652, fol. 16; Add MS 21553, fols. 60-2; TNA, WO 4/7, p. 139. St John to Edward Southwell, 5 February, 1707.

\textsuperscript{130} Bodleian Special Collections, MS. Eng. Hist. 974, fols. 83-4. Major-General Evans to Ormond, June, 1713

\textsuperscript{131} Cannon, \textit{Historical Record of the Fourth Regiment of Light Dragoons}, p. 30; TNA, WO 4/14. Wyndham to Sir Richard Temple, Whitehall, 8 April, 1713.

\textsuperscript{132} Bodleian Special Collections, MS. Eng. Hist. 42, fols. 77-9, 85-6.
reducement [sic] of the foot, I shall not trouble you with it, but one company being broke, and two more as we are told in danger, of every regiment, I could not refuse Captain Langley, who hath the favour to give this to your Grace, and hath served always like a man of honour and been very ill-wounded, being the third youngest captain in the Lord North’s regiment (10th Foot)...’ Grove asked Ormond to place a Captain Trevannion on half-pay rather than Langley, since Trevannion had never actually served with the regiment.133 Brigadier Grove’s recommendation was successful, and Captain Langley continued to serve with the regiment, rising to major in 1715.134

Ormond’s military patronage as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was a result of the necessity of keeping the forces in Ireland prepared to reinforce the campaigns and garrisons abroad, although its unique geographical demarcation created a military network that was more exclusive than the networks of other army commanders which operated under the overall aegis of Marlborough’s authority. Ormond had a following of high-ranking friends and family, who in turn requested that he appoint their own supporters and kinsmen, thereby creating a close-knit alliance of officers bound by political and military ties within the broader military network. He also had complete control over appointments to the regiment of horse he had raised, unlike Marlborough’s colonelcy of the 1st Foot Guards, which contained strong pre-existing aristocratic interests. In this respect, Ormond’s network resembles the kind of layered, interlinked network a French Colonel-Général of horse or dragoons was likely to possess, with the exception that Ormond’s influence was regional, rather than specific to a particular military branch of service.135 Even in his brief tenure as Captain-General, Ormond was a crucial link between officers and the army administration, as a result of the patronage attached to the post, and the political favour he had with the Tory government.

3.5 Military Patronage under the early Hanoverian monarchs

During the years between Britain’s withdrawal from the War of the Spanish Succession and the death of Queen Anne, the army underwent significant organisational and political changes. The disbandments of 1712-13 created a large pool of long-serving officers who qualified for half-pay, numbering 1,373 in 1714.136 Some of these were keen to be re-commissioned in the existing

133 Ibid., fols. 79-80. Grove to Ormond, 3 June, 1713.
134 TNA, WO 64/4, p. 162. ‘List of the Officers of Brigadier Grove’s Regiment of Foot with the dates of their commissions.’
135 See Rowlands, ‘Power, Authority and Army Administration under Louis XIV,’ pp. 47, 50-1.
136 Number of half-pay officers derived from A Regimental List of the Half-Pay Officers. See also Fortescue, A History of the British Army, II, 3-4.
regiments. Like the disbandments of 1697, a large number of regiments with a small number of privates per company or troop were maintained on the British, and especially the Irish establishments. This continued the practice of keeping a full complement of officers in each regiment into peacetime. Nevertheless, the disbandment of the most junior regiments left only 34 foot, horse and dragoon regiments in existence. This resulted in a much smaller active officer establishment than during the war, averaging 2,300 during the 1720s and 1730s. In contrast to the brief few years between the two wars against Louis XIV, officers at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession would have to wait twenty-five years before the next significant conflict. Although they would be kept busy with peace-time duties, and enjoyed a slightly higher income than before, the opportunities to earn promotion were severely reduced. Regimental vacancies were rare, with the exception of the new regiments raised to combat the ‘15, but many of these were disbanded soon after, adding to the existing pool of half-pay officers.

In the early 1710s, the Tory ministry continued to proscribe army officers with Whig credentials, with several officers in the Commons and Lords losing either their military posts or their parliamentary seats. When Anne’s health began to fail in 1713, pro-Jacobite politicians pursued the Queen’s refusal to allow the Hanoverian dynasty any foothold in Britain during her reign by exerting pressure on officers with political careers to declare themselves in favour of a Jacobite succession. They sought to subvert the Protestant succession, which had been confirmed as statutory law since 1701, and made practical by parliamentary debates, foreign treaties and the Whig-led Hanover Club. Army officers of varying political shades courted the Hanoverian family in 1714, in anticipation of their possible invitation to the British monarchy in accordance with terms of the Act of Settlement.

137 TNA, WO 4/17, fols. 86-7, Brigadier Withers to Pulteney, 3 March, 1715; BL, Add MS 29880, fols. 16-18. ‘Half-Pay of Officers on the Irish Establishment, 1715.’
139 For examples, see Hanham, ‘Sir Richard Steele,’ HOP 1690-1715; Eveline Cruickshanks and Stuart Handley, ‘Richard Temple, Viscount Cobham, (1675-1749), HOP 1690-1715; Murdoch, ‘2nd Duke of Argyll,’ ODNB.
As seen in Chapter 1, the Jacobite rebellion of 1715, and several subsequent Jacobite plots destroyed any tolerance George I had for allowing politically active Tories to keep their military posts. This was not a purge of a group within the officer establishment, as with Catholics under William III. Rather, it was the proscription of officers on an individual basis, if and when they lost the confidence of the King, whether their Jacobite associations were substantial or not. Officers were dismissed for their political activities on one more occasion during George I’s reign, when the opposition tried to impeach Cadogan in 1715 for embezzling funds granted for bringing over Dutch troops to combat the ‘15. The ministry dismissed seven officers in total. Whereas these dismissals were either instigated by George I or occurred with his support, George II usually dismissed officers only under pressure from Walpole’s ministry, as during the failure of the Excise Bill in 1733. The promise of civil posts and sinecures, and the threat of their revocation in the event of an MP’s non-compliance, was an integral part of Walpole’s management of parliament. George II’s resistance to the use of army posts for political purposes meant that only in exceptional circumstances did the ministry have its way. Walpole also succeeded on this occasion in rewarding officers who had supported the Bill, such as Henry Herbert, Ninth Earl of Pembroke, who received Viscount Cobham’s regiment after his dismissal, and Colonel John Fane, who was promoted to Pembroke’s former post, as captain and colonel of the prestigious 1st Troop of Horse Guards. Fane explained to Newcastle the difficulty in accepting the commission, considering the patron-client relationship he had previously enjoyed from Cobham, writing ‘it would have been the last thing in my thoughts to have desired a succession arising from the

142 See Chapter 1, section 1.4, ‘The Officer Establishment and the Crown.’
143 For example, Lieutenant-General Robert Echlin was dismissed from the colonelcy of the 6th Dragoons in 1715 ‘without any charge other than that of being a Tory,’ (although in reality the condition of his unit was also responsible). Although General Charles Ross had relinquished ties with the Stuart cause in 1714, his Tory activities led to his dismissal from the 5th Dragoons in 1715. Colonel Charles Boyle, 4th Earl of Orrey, irritated the government with his opposition tactics and his increasing Jacobite sympathies, losing the 21st Foot in 1716. Lieutenant-General Lord North and Grey was stripped of the 10 Foot in 1715 and exiled in 1724, for his plans to disaffect the army during the Atterbury plot. See David Hayton, ‘Robert Echlin (1657-1724),’ HOP 1690-1715; TNA, WO 4/17, p. 102. Pulteney to Echlin, March 16, 1715; David Hayton, ‘Charles Ross, (1667-1732),’ HOP 1690-1715; David Hayton, ‘Charles Boyle (1667-1732),’ HOP 1690-1715; Lawrence Smith, ‘William North, Baron Grey of Rolleston and Earl North, (1678-1734),’ ODNB.
144 These were John Campbell, Duke of Argyll; Giles Earle, Charles Churchill, John Middleton, Alexander Grant, John Montgomerie and Sir Robert Rich. See ‘Army Officers,’ Appendix VII: Members, HOP 1715-1754.
145 Chapter 1, section 1.4, ‘The Officer Establishment and the Crown.’
removal of my Lord Cobham, with whom I have lived in the most perfect friendship, and from whom I have received several obligations.”

Whereas these were the only major instances where Walpole was able to make promotion in the army conditional on parliamentary compliance, it seems that Walpole’s ministry tried to influence enfranchised officers with greater determination. In 1730, Henry Pelham, Secretary at War, made the influence of a by-election official military business, writing to Cornet Long that ‘Sir, I am informed that Captain George Purvis of the navy stands as a candidate for the Borough of Aldborough in Suffolk and is like to be opposed in that election by Sir John Williams, and as you have a vote in that place, I have been solicited to desire that you will give it for Captain Purvis, in confidence of which I have obtained the King’s permission for you to go hither for that purpose. You will therefore upon receipt hereof leave the regiment, first showing this to the commanding officer, who no doubt will allow this to be a sufficient justification of your absence.’

In Scotland, the combination of close family ties and strong political and royal connections led to the Earl of Ilay’s patronage network overreaching itself. Before the general election of 1734, Charles, 9th Laird of Elphinstone, received an unsolicited offer from Simon, 11th Laird of Lovat, professing that ‘I have my Lord Ilay’s orders to assure your Lordship of his sincere humble service… I can faithfully assure your Lordship that as your Lordship was long in the army and one of the oldest captains, if a majority of dragoons happens soon to be vacant would your Lordship accept to be a major of dragoons.’ Elphinstone made it clear he was not willing to play the game that Ilay’s friends were trying to draw him into, saying ‘I am as able and willing to serve my King and country as ever I was, and I may without vanity say my long and faithful service entitles me to at least a majority in any regiment of horse or dragoons… as your Lordship does not mention any particular engagements I am to enter into for such a preferment I take it for granted I am not to be tied down to an implicit faith and blind obedience to give my vote at the ensuing election for sixteen peers to represent Scotland.’

Illy’s political subordinates were unwilling to develop a long-term client-patron relationship with Elphinstone, with the potential risk that nothing would come of it before the election. As a relation of the Duke of Argyll and a member for Dunbartonshire, Lieutenant-Colonel John Campbell was...

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150 BL, Add MS 32688, Correspondence of the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State, 1727-1760, fol. 15. Colonel John Fane to Newcastle, Hanover Square, 23 June, 1733.
151 TNA, WO 4/31, fol. 34. Pelham to Cornet Long, Cobham’s Horse (1st Dragoon Guards), 4 April, 1730.
153 Ibid., pp. 68-4, Elphinstone to Lovat, 4 November, 1733.
accustomed to coercing electors to change their political outlook. As Groom of the Bedchamber to George II, he threatened Elphinstone with the loss of the King’s favour and the revocation of his son’s commission in the army. He advised Elphinstone ‘not to do any thing that may give a handle for those entrusted with the King’s affairs to suspect but that you will go along with them even in what they call the Court List... if you are under any engagements to the Earl of Stair I am heartily sorry for it and for him likewise. I plainly foresee he will endanger what he now has if he goes on in his opposition and hurt his friends into the bargain... Consider for God’s sake the welfare of yourself and your family. Your son’s name I know was on the Secretary at War’s list for an ensign’s commission and I fear a stop may be put to that. In the station my Lord Ilay is in it’s ticklish even to do small favours when it is for these that he cannot answer for.

Illy’s concern was that Elphinstone might use his vote to re-elect Lieutenant-General John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair, as one of the Scottish peers permitted to sit in the Commons as a commoner. If so, he could mobilise opposition against the government from within Westminster, and destabilise the Walpole’s legislative agenda. Elphinstone replied to Campbell that his son’s commission had been arranged outside of Ilay’s political influence. He observed that ‘... the Earl of Ilay asked me what he could do for me. I thanked him for his friendship and begged he would not give himself any trouble by putting my name in the list for one of the sixteen at the next election and for myself I had nothing to ask. His Lordship desired to know how my sons were employed. I told him one of them carried arms in Lord Stair’s regiment, the other in the Dutch service, and the only favour I had demanded was to be allowed to pay my money for a pair of colours for my son Charles. At my mentioning my paying money for such a trifle in some heat he said, were such practices known to the King it would break any colonel, but ‘I will take it upon me to do the thing immediately.’ Upon which I thanked him and said it was very kind and would lay the young gentleman under the strongest obligation to be his Lordship’s faithful servant.’

For example, In 1723, Campbell wrote to a Dunbartonshire lord that ‘The Duke of Argyll was lately very much surprised at hearing your son was the chief person who went... to make interest against my father at a time when he had actually given me orders to write to offer to bring him a quartermaster [commission] in his own regiment till he had a vacancy to make him an officer. This put a stop to the offer... Now what I have to offer as a sincere friendly advice is that upon this occasion you will write to His Grace (if you think proper) to offer your vote and interest in the next elections...’ Cited in Sunter, Politics and Patronage in Scotland, pp. 47-8.


Stair would lose his seat in the election, and would be dismissed from the colonelcy of the 6th Dragoons, after supporting a bill to make the dismissal of officers in parliament from their military posts more difficult. See Stephens, ‘2nd Earl of Stair,’ ODNB.

HMC Polwarth V, p. 70. Elphinstone to Campbell, 7 December, 1733.
Elphinstone had made it clear that he owed no obligation to Ilay himself, and especially not for his son’s commission. It was clear to Ilay’s supporters that they had reached the limits with which they could exert pressure on Elphinstone. Since Elphinstone was ‘trimming,’ rather than actively supporting Stair, they lacked the justification to make good their threats. Soon after, Elphinstone received a conciliatory letter from Lovat: ‘It is with great pleasure that I send your Lordship enclosed your son Mr Charles’s commission which my Lord Ilay sent me in a letter that I received this morning, in which he speaks of your Lordship and your family in the most friendly and kindly manner imaginable. He did reprimand my Lord Ross’s agent that kept up the commission so long and not acquainting your Lordship or Mr Charles of it. However Mr Charles gets his pay since the date of the commission.’

The examples of electoral pressure on Cornet Long and Lord Elphinstone seem to represent the limits of government pressure over patronage in the 1720s and 1730s. The former stands out among the routine business of the letter books of the Secretary at War, and appears to be an anomaly among the official correspondence of WO 30-34 of letter books that cover the early 1730s. Similarly, the outright promise of promotion for electoral votes, and the threat of revocation in the event of non-compliance seems to be confined to Elphinstone’s example. If it was more widespread, it has not been observed by historians on Scottish patronage and military experiences. Although only a small minority of officers were dismissed for political reasons under the early Hanoverian monarchs, it can be argued that their example posed a definite threat to officers who served in parliament. Since the number of officers serving in parliament increased during the 1720s and 1730s, whilst the officer establishment remained relatively small, a larger proportion of officers served under the pressure of dismissal, real or imagined. This situation was exacerbated by an attempt to pass legislation empowering parliament to remove officers from their posts, instead of the monarch. If passed, Walpole would not have needed to persuade the King to proscribe officers, since he would have possessed the means to do so himself. Fortunately for the independence of the officer establishment, the measure was opposed by senior officers on the grounds that it would add to the supposed state of indiscipline in the army.

A much larger number of officers were frustrated in their promotion plans by George I and George II’s deep-seated opposition to the purchase of commissions, which was not practised in the Hanoverian

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158 HMC Polwarth V, p. 79. Lovat to Elphinstone, Drumshire, 15 January, 1734.
159 See Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army; Sunter, Patronage and Politics in Scotland.
160 There were 58 army officers in the Commons during the parliament of 1715-22; 53 from 1722-1734; and 55 in the parliament of 1734-41. See ‘Main Categories in each Parliament’; Appendix VII: Members, HOP 1715-1754; Brewer, Sinews of Power, p. 45.
army that they nominally commanded. Although previous monarchs had tried unsuccessfully to prohibit purchase in the British army, George I was the first who tried to abolish it altogether. The Board of General Officers opposed a regulation in which serving officers would be permitted to sell, but not future officers. This left George I with the alternative of refusing purchase on an individual basis. With the administrative authority that army commanders had enjoyed during the War of the Spanish Succession removed by 1716, the King retained control over the majority of promotions in the army, and permitted only a limited number of individuals to influence his decisions. Even these few, including the secretaries at war, found it difficult to represent the interests of junior officers wishing to buy or sell to George I. In 1717, Pulteney apologised to Colonel Irwin for failing to secure permission for one of his subordinates to sell his commission, writing that ‘... though it is scarcely possible for any who has not applied to the King to conceive the great aversion he always expresses upon the mention of leave for any officer to dispose of his commission, and everybody is discouraged from speaking on that head, I could not however resist your Lordship, and not only laid before his Majesty your request in favour of Lieut. Mood, but as far as I was able pressed his consent to it, which I could not obtain...’ Henry Pelham had the same difficulty with George II. When Colonel John Fane tried to use his influence to facilitate the sale of a majority in 1730, the Secretary at War responded that he had ‘urged all I was able for Major Godolphin to resign his commission to Captain Dejean, but His Majesty could by no means consent to it in any other way than by the Major’s exchanging with some half-pay officer in the British establishment, being very unwilling to make promotions in any corps in His service by resignations. I am very sorry I could not succeed on this occasion.’

As a concession to his refusals to allow purchase, George I allowed colonels the recommendation of an officer from the half-pay list, which he commissioned once they had met with his approval. However, this modest gift of patronage was of no compensation for officers wishing to purchase. Whereas before the reign of George I, officers were accustomed to taking advantage of vacancies through purchase, they now found that the networks they had cultivated and the funds they had

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163 William III required officers to swear an oath that they had taken no consideration for their commissions, and a draft regulation under Anne’s reign forbade officers to sell without 20 years service or exceptional circumstances. See TNA, WO 5/5, p. 73; BL, Add MS 22264, fol. 79. ‘Regulations for the Better Government of our Forces, 1711,’ article 5.
164 Bruce, _The Purchase System_, p. 23.
166 TNA, WO 4/19, p. 90. Pulteney to Irwin, 23 March, 1717.
167 TNA, WO 4/31, p. 18. Pelham to Fane, Whitehall, 13 April, 1730.
accumulated to out-compete other officers were less likely to succeed. Furthermore, the half-pay officer who was appointed in their place effectively blocked the chain of advancement that would have occurred if an active officer had been promoted, as each rank below was filled in succession. This meant that promotion took longer for the officer establishment under the early Hanoverian monarchs, even where an officer had served long enough in his current rank to progress to the next.

Although George I succeeded in denying many junior officers from purchasing their commissions, he found it much harder to refuse officers with either distinguished service records, high connections, or both. Most senior officers were granted leave to buy or sell their regiments.\(^{169}\) George I tried instead to regulate purchase prices in 1720, and to bring the practice under his control by requiring colonels to submit recommendations to the War Office.\(^{170}\) Given the new restrictions on what was previously acknowledged to be a private proprietary transaction, it is unsurprising that the morale of the officer establishment suffered.\(^{171}\) Officers were wary of directly criticising the King, on whom their commissions depended. However, a pamphlet in favour of purchase addressed to the Secretary at War in 1725 summarized the establishment’s view: ‘After all sir, if a restraint must be placed upon the buying and selling of commissions in the army, and the present officers who most of them purchased their posts, must be obliged to die in them, the old officers of the army, who have signalised themselves in the service of their King and Country, are the only unhappy people under His Majesty’s auspicious government.’\(^{172}\)

The reduction in access to patronage particularly affected volunteer gentlemen, who were dependent on connections to secure a commission. With ensigncies and cornetcies in such high demand during these peacetime decades, colonels were more likely to reserve their recommendations for their close relatives or family friends, no matter how deserving or long-serving volunteers in their regiment might be. John Mackenzie, a Scottish volunteer in Colonel Owen Wynne’s Dragoons (5th Dragoons), joined the regiment in Ireland in 1731. He found that even quartermaster’s commissions were beyond his means, since the colonel allowed their incumbents to sell them, the price ranging from £280 to £300.\(^{173}\) Despite obtaining a letter of recommendation for the garrison commander, a year later he

\(^{169}\) For examples see Hayes, ‘The Purchase of Coloneliacies,’ pp.5-6. See also, TNA, WO 4/17, p. 114. Pulteney to John Thurston, 11 April, 1715.

\(^{170}\) TNA, WO 4/23, p. 340. For the 1720 prices, see Bl, Add MS 41141, pp. 57-61. ‘Regulation Prices of Commissions of Horse Guards, Horse Grenadiers, Horse, Dragoons and Regiments of Foot, 1720.’

\(^{171}\) See Ibid. for the rules on purchase.

\(^{172}\) Anon, Reasons Humbly Offered for Buying and Selling in the Army, in a letter to the Secretary at War; (London, 1725), p. 15.

\(^{173}\) BL, Add MS 39189, fols. 1-2. John Mackenzie to his father, 13 April, 1731.
was still unable to purchase a quartermaster’s commission when one became available.\textsuperscript{174} When a cornetcy became available a year later, Mackenzie found that the post was soon filled with a favourite of the Duke of Dorset, using his authority as the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. He bitterly remarked that ‘nothing is to be got in the army nowadays without money or very great interest, and I find that great patience to go through a vast many difficulties is the only comfort left me.’\textsuperscript{175} Bearing in mind the need for a patron, Mackenzie tried to travel to Dublin with General Price’s son, on whom he relied on for an introduction to the Duchess of Dorset. Meanwhile, he asked his aunt to contact General Colyear, but she confessed that she did not know the general well enough to ask him if he could use his influence, and had missed the opportunity of using her friends to ask on her behalf. She had approached General Price and General Cathcart in London, who promised to help Mackenzie if they could.\textsuperscript{176} In 1736, after five years of hard service as a dragoon, Mackenzie was commissioned as an ensign in Lieutenant-General Sutton’s Foot (19th Foot), after an uncle reminded the Lord-Lieutenant of Mackenzie’s case.\textsuperscript{177} Ensign Mackenzie expressed his joy now that his career as an officer was about to begin, whilst his father made a list of all the persons to whom he owed his commission, and to whom he might be obligated in the future.\textsuperscript{178}

Unfortunately, not all volunteer gentlemen could establish a connection with a powerful patron. In 1738, Lieutenant Charles Whitfoord proposed a complex scheme for obtaining a captaincy for his brother, Hugh, in his regiment (6th Dragoons). The retiring officer, Captain Bissiere, had arranged to receive a premium of around £200 from Cornet Fitzwilliams, in exchange for his recommendation. To make a better offer, Hugh was to ‘go to Pons’s coffee house and inform yourself of Mr Sallee how far Fitzwilliams is off; there being more money in the case, he’ll be sure prefer him: but as I could not prevail on Bissiere to give longer than three months... deliver Bissiere’s letter to Sallee [at] the end of March, which will keep him bound till the end of May, being valid for three months after Sallee receives it.’ In addition, Charles recommended that ‘Brigadier Armstrong’s consent must be had; that our worthy friend will procure you. Ply the little commander’s wife: she may help you on this occasion; leave no stone unturned, and give me your thoughts of it by first post.’\textsuperscript{179}

Whitfoord’s approach to promotion is somewhat brasher than Mackenzie’s, demonstrating the limited options available to officers without connections. Instead of creating an interest, or forming

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., fol. 16. Mackenzie to his father, John Mackenzie, Dublin, 29 March, 1732.  
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., fols. 56-7. Mackenzie to his father, Saintfield, 23 March, 1733.  
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., fols. 66-7. Eliza Mackenzie to her brother, the Earl of Seddie, 26 September, 1733.  
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., fols. fol. 193. London, Ebenezer Stuart to Kenneth Mackenzie, 30 March, 1736.  
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., fol. 194. Kenneth Mackenzie, circa. 1736.  
\textsuperscript{179} Add MS 36592, fols. 2-3. Charles Whitfoord to Hugh Whitfoord, Ciudedela, Minorca, 15 December, 1738.
\end{flushright}
the elements of a traditional patronage network, Whitfoord relied on a broker in a coffee house, a long established, but dubious means of obtaining a promotion. Brokers of commissions were often regimental agents, whose trustworthiness in the execution of their official duties was notoriously poor. Hugh was unable to purchase the commission, moving Charles to write ‘Mr Dear Hugh, your letter which I received last night dated the 1st instant has struck me such a damp on my spirits that a ton of Hartshorn [smelling salts] won’t be able to revive them. Had formed so many schemes for happiness in the enjoyment of your company... alas, how fleeting are all our joys...’

3.6 Conclusion

Promotion in the late Stuart and early Hanoverian army was heavily dependent on the ability of officers to navigate patronage networks. At their most sophisticated, these networks facilitated the cultivation of ‘friendship,’ which in its basic form was a pool of obligation between client and patron that lasted over several years and with multiple favours granted. This was maintained by a combination of correspondence, in which the friendship was affirmed and requests expressed, and social contact, through public and private events or the involvement of mutual friends. Patrons and clients exercised dynamic relationships with each other, and military patronage could overlap with political and other forms of patronage, to form a complex web of connections and opportunities. The delegation of military appointments to colonels and army commanders during the Nine Years War and the Spanish Succession led to a variety of client-patron relationships, but the two Secretaries of State became the lynchpins of all networks, channelling interest through their hands to the sovereign via the Secretary at War. During wartime, army commanders such as Schomberg, Marlborough and Ormond exercised considerable influence over promotion within their spheres of operation.

In addition, Marlborough enjoyed overall supervision of patronage networks during the War of the Spanish Succession, but the influence of colonels over vacancies within their own regiments remained a serious consideration for army commanders. Marlborough’s management of senior officers proved insufficient where rank or ambition exceeded what was in his power to control or satisfy. Officers such

180 The brokering of commissions in coffee houses was known to be below board from the 1690s. The Earl of Monmouth wrote to the Earl of Nottingham that ‘I must confess I was surprised at it, when I was told there were two particular coffee houses in London where people met for such bargains, and drove them on as publicly as the brokers do on the stock exchange.’ HMC Finch IV, pp. 97-8. Monmouth to Nottingham, 23 April, 1692.
181 Guy, Regimental agency, p. 23.
182 BL, Add MS 36592, fols. 6-7. Charles to Hugh Whitfoord, Ciudedela, Minorca, 26 February, 1739.
as Lieutenant-General Webb and the Duke of Argyll became his rivals in parliament, and joined those Tories and Whigs who strove to end the Captain-General’s leadership of the war. Although Marlborough exercised greater authority over commissions than any other commander of the period, his patronage was dependent on the political support of the ministry and his standing at court. Marlborough’s administrative authority was strong enough to withstand multiple attacks in and out of the army. This power disintegrated only after the removal of his allies in the ministry and the complete loss of the Queen’s favour.

Patronage networks survived the Wars of Louis XIV into the reigns of the Hanoverian succession, although they were smaller in extent and more exclusive. Contrary to the claim of Hayes, patronage was not subject to political pressure, in the narrow sense of commissions in exchange for parliamentary co-operation. Whereas Walpole’s extensively used patronage and coercion to achieve his political aims, the instances in which military appointments were used in this way were limited. The independence of the officer establishment was protected from this particular threat through the control over promotions that George II sought to retain against ministerial pressure. The appointment of officers were carefully controlled by the early Hanoverian monarchs, and participants in patronage networks had much less influence in the process than before. Their choices had to coincide more precisely with George I and George II’s idea of who was suitable for the post, politically and militarily. Both these monarchs slowed down the promotion process considerably for all officers within the establishment, through their refusal of most purchase transactions and the frequent appointment of half-pay officers instead. An officer’s career was still dependent on access to military networks, arguably more so given the fewer opportunities of officers to distinguish themselves in the presence of those colonels and generals who used their patronage to reward their connections rather than merit. However, the freedom and ease with which officers had navigated networks during the Wars of Louis XIV had ended for all but a privileged few.
Chapter 4  Gentlemanly Behaviour and Military Discipline

4.1 Introduction

As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, army officers navigated a range of social and institutional features of the late Stuart and early Hanoverian army. However, this thesis would be lacking a vital element in its analysis if it did not also examine the cultural features of the officer establishment that determined how officers behaved to each other and set an example of leadership and authority. In addition to their functions of administration and the projection of force, officers were also expected to display particular forms of gentlemanly behaviour, to set a martial example to subordinates of all ranks, and to match the dignity of their status as members of the ruling classes. This served a social function, by marking officers as men of honour, distinct in this respect from their civil counterparts. However, it also had an important self-regulatory function within the military profession. Both these functions contributed significantly to the sense of corporate identity and sense of professionalism that should be considered in creating a balanced view of the officer establishment throughout the period examined.

To acquire a positive reputation, officers had to exhibit a combination of attitudes and behaviours that simultaneously projected the image of a soldier and warrior on the one hand, and a member of refined society on the other. Honour, duty, manliness and politeness were complex concepts that military service blended into a working ethos. The changing forms with which these were expressed over the course of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries caused officers to behave in ways that seem ambivalent and contradictory. Officers were expected to maintain order among their men, yet they themselves quarrelled over trivial matters. Although the articles of war expressly forbade duelling and declared that officers refusing a challenge would bring no shame upon them, officers continued to fight and kill each other to preserve their honour.¹ Courts-martial were officially required to punish all involved, but frequently allowed the victor to return to duty. As gentlemen, officers possessed refined manners, but many of their manly pursuits, such as gambling and drinking, were criticised by social commentators as contrary to ideal soldierly behaviour.² These apparently paradoxical behaviours were the result of the relationship between army officers and the society they came from and spent

¹ See appendix 1, ‘Selected Articles of War’, Article 19.
² Donna Andrew, Aristocratic Vice: the Attack on Duelling, Suicide, Adultery and Gambling in Eighteenth Century England, (New Haven, 2013), pp. 25-6, 30; Anon, The Soldier’s Monitor, being serious advice to soldiers, to behave themselves with a just regard to religion and true manhood, 12th edn., (London, 1722), p. 8
much of their time in. Consequently, military and civil codes of conduct played a significant role in shaping the identity and outlook of the officer establishment.

Historians of social behaviour in late seventeenth and eighteenth century England have highlighted the transforming nature of masculinity and politeness, as various activities and attitudes were either praised by writers, integrated into everyday life, or ridiculed in satires. Eighteenth century constructs of masculinity were multi-faceted, in which a range of sexual practices, choice of dress, and affectations were tolerated because they helped to define more socially acceptable masculine identities. This was because they provided more nuanced layers of ‘otherness’ than the emphasis on the biological differences of gender favoured by social commentators during the seventeenth century. These new tropes included men who were effeminately homosexual or sought excessive approval from female company, known as ‘mollies’ and ‘fops.’ Their fixation on politeness and refinement rendered them superficial and lacking masculine vigour. Polite conduct, with its emphasis on being agreeable in manners and conversation, emerged around the early eighteenth century as a means of addressing concerns that coarse, inconsiderate behaviour would otherwise disrupt the benefits of social interaction that could be found in public spaces such as coffee houses and pleasure gardens. Such public spaces were viewed as forums for civilised discussion, but were at risk of subversion from disruptive behaviour. These included displays of unmanly exhibitionism and public violence, the latter of which frequently involved army officers. The concept of a set of socially

3 For a similar contradiction experienced by naval officers, in which the personal dignity of a gentleman was incompatible with the trade-like duties of a seaman, see. N.A.M. Rodger, ‘Honour and Duty at Sea, 1660-1815,’ Historical Research, vol. 75, no. 193 (2002), p. 428.


5 According to Philip Carter, ‘a major feature of recent histories of masculinity has been the realisation that gender identity was (and is) constructed in relation not just to women, but also, crucially, in relation to other men.’ Philip Carter, Men and the Emergence of Polite Society in Britain, 1660-1800, (Harlow, 2001), p. 5. For an introduction to the emerging complexities in gender constructs in the eighteenth century, see (eds.) Hitchcock and Cohen, English Masculinities, pp. 5-8.


8 According to Cowan, ‘The stock characters of the fop, the beau, the town gallant, and the excessively Frenchified petit maître were seen as the bane of coffee house society…’ Ibid., 228, 230. Examples of violence involving army officers included a large brawl after a card game at the Royal Chocolate House in St James Street in 1717, including, Colonel Cunningham, and in 1726, a sword fight in a London tavern which later
acceptable masculine attributes was itself changing throughout the period, with model ‘Christian’ virtues such as forgiveness and temperance competing with older seventeenth-century versions of honour and reputation, and emerging eighteenth century practices of politeness and sensibility.\(^9\)

Masculine violence was also a controversial subject among eighteenth-century writers, particularly in the 1730s, with literature emerging which attacked duelling and other displays of physical bravery as examples of an elite, artificial kind of honour which was contrary to universal qualities of honesty, simplicity and compassion.\(^10\)

Military historians of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries have not analysed duelling in the army or officers’ behaviour as subjects in their own right, although examples of indiscipline have been used by Childs, Manning and Stansfield to demonstrate the readiness of officers to quarrel to protect their reputations, and the bullying behaviour of some officers.\(^11\) General courts-martial records of officers are available for this period, and reveal the difference between those actions which seemed acceptable to individual officers, and the attitudes of their peers who judged them. However, with the exception of those included in Stansfield’s thesis, they have not been used by historians of the early eighteenth century army. This is possibly because they are dispersed in various archival volumes at the British Library and The National Archives, the latter of which are not fully catalogued.\(^12\)

Arthur Gilbert has used officers’ courts-martial records from later in the century to argue that honour resulted in a duel in which Major Oneby killed a Mr Gower. See John Milligen, *A History of Duelling*, (London, 1848), II, 50, 52-4.


\(^10\) According to Carter, ‘The idea that acts of physical bravery were insufficient in themselves to earn a reputation for courage was again raised in discussions of honour. Debates on duelling led to many commentators to examine the nature of what were termed ‘true’ and ‘false’ honour.’ See Carter, ‘Mollies, Fops and Men of Feeling,’ p. 6.


\(^12\) Courts-martial records in The National Archives are stored in boxes of unmarked bundles and are not individually numbered. This chapter refers to them by the standard reference code for sources located at the TNA; the officer on trial; and the date and location of the court-martial. Those in the British Library are referred to as normal. For the courts-martial records used in this chapter, see TNA WO 89/1-2, ‘Courts-martial all ranks 1666—1697’; BL, Add MS 61336, ‘Courts-martial, beating orders and mutiny bills, 1697-1717’; Add MS 61370, ‘Recruiting, Orders, Warrants, etc., 1702-11’; Add MS 38853, ‘Hodgkin Papers vol. VIII, 1697-1713’; WO 71/2, ‘Courts-martial and other proceedings, 1686-1806’; WO 71/13, ‘General courts-martial; WO 71/121-122, ‘Courts-martial and other proceedings, 1668-1780’; and ‘WO 71/124, ‘Courts-martial, 1726-1740.’
was an important but ill-defined concept which governed officers’ attitudes independently of values drawn from civil society.\(^{13}\)

Studies on the courts-martial of enlisted personnel are more frequent, such as Glen Steppler’s and Arthur Gilbert’s on Regimental courts-martial later in the century.\(^{14}\) Also focusing on the rank and file, William Tatum III’s chapter on courts-martial from the 1720s to the 1770s argues that privates and NCOS had a reciprocal relationship with their officers.\(^{15}\) When they felt that officers had been excessively rude or negligent, they employed a range of protests in proportion to the severity of their mistreatment.\(^{16}\) Tatum’s interpretation of the rank and file as agents with negotiating power challenges their portrayal as victims of arbitrary courts-martial and cruel punishments, as previously claimed by Gilbert.\(^{17}\) Similarly, Ilya Berkovich’s study of the order books for the garrison of Gibraltar from 1720 to 1790, reveals the independent-mindedness of soldiers when presented with orders aimed at restricting their activities, such as bans on drinking and the keeping of dogs.\(^{18}\) Both these works show that there is far more to eighteenth century military discipline than the older and somewhat dry studies of Steppler and Gilbert suggest, and that a careful examination of the subtext beneath the formal style of courts-martial and order books can reveal the cultural and environmental reasons behind the behaviour of their participants.

Courts-martial records comprise the majority of archival sources examined in this chapter. The difficulty of locating officers’ courts-martial for the entire period and for all establishments makes a quantitative analysis like Tatum’s hard to produce without large gaps in the analysis, whilst the small size of the officer establishment compared to the rank and file means that conclusions would be drawn from a much smaller statistical base. The value of officers’ courts-martial lies in the testimony of witnesses, which reveal their opinions of their fellow officers’ daily conduct. Consequently, a

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\(^{13}\) Arthur Gilbert, ‘Law and Honour among Eighteenth Century British Army Officers,’ *Historical Journal*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1976), pp. 75-87. For a response to Gilbert, emphasizing the contribution of civil values such as politeness and sensibility to military codes of honour, see Matthew McCormack, ‘Chapter 4: Stamford Stand-off; Honour, Status and Rivalry in the Georgian Military,’ in (eds.) Linch and McCormack, *Britain’s Soldiers*, pp. 77—92.


\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 109-12.

\(^{17}\) Gilbert, ‘Law and Honour, pp. 75-87; Tatum, ‘Military Justice and Negotiated Authority in the Eighteenth Century British Army,’ pp. 95, 115.

qualitative approach is more useful for the purposes of this chapter. When selecting case studies of criminal behaviour, historians of crime and punishment in early modern England seek to establish links between the social implications of a particular category of crime and the rationale behind the state’s response. Trial proceedings and sentences are considered in terms of how they addressed the damage done to the social integrity of the community, and their efficacy in upholding the power of the state. Adapting this approach to courts-martial records requires the selection of cases whose proceedings engaged with the social attitudes of the officer establishment, and the wider context of military discipline. Consequently, this chapter examines cases of duelling, quarrelling or insubordination, since these threatened the social cohesion of a regiment’s complement of officers, and instances of personal enrichment or misrepresentation, since these contravened one of the primary duties of officers, to look after their men and to maintain their units to a certain standard.

However, the differences between criminals in civil law and court-martialled army officers needs to be considered. Historians of crime and punishment rely on a clear demarcation between the identities of the criminal and the punishing authority. Criminals occupied an undesirable social status, separated from the authorities prosecuting them by differences in class, wealth, morality, and power. The specialised training of the legal profession meant that its personnel were detached from their clients. By contrast, army officers were all gentlemen, served in the same profession, and, by virtue of the courts-martial system, were entitled to trial by their peers. As the ultimate arbiter of general courts-martial decisions, the sovereign was usually a soldier himself. They appreciated the difficulties under which officers operated and generally sympathised with them. This contrast lay in the fact that the activities for which officers were under censure were not crimes in a civil sense. Some activities were prohibited in the articles of war, but in practice flexibly enforced, whilst others were not forbidden in any codified form, but were contrary to the behaviour expected of an officer. As such, they did not directly harm the state, as civil crimes such as arson or larceny did, but rather they took place on the fringe between legitimate behaviour and undermining ‘the good of the service.’

For this reason, the interpretative methods of cultural historians are needed to understand the criteria with which officers judged the behaviour of their fellow officers as either acceptable or contemptible. This context is provided by the discussion of various masculine behaviours during the late seventeenth

and early eighteenth centuries. In particular, periodicals, pamphlets and plays discussed politeness, honour and duels, as well as tropes of masculinity. They therefore provided gentlemen with access to behavioural models which they could practice or avoid. Contrary to Gilbert’s claim that army officers’ attitudes were independent of society, officers were not only a part of this cultural community through their readership and interaction in public spaces, they were themselves the subject of discussion as symbols of honour, courage and pride.

4.2 Gentlemanly Behaviour and Soldierly attitudes

Identifying who in civil society qualified as a gentleman and what constituted gentlemanly behaviour depended heavily on outward appearances, and the acceptance of those appearances by men and women who considered themselves to be genteel. Those who attained or already possessed wealth or status could turn these assets into refined pursuits, such as architecture, collecting, landscaping, and scientific endeavours. Many senior army officers practised these interests. Other gentlemanly activities included horse breeding, gambling, and for younger men, embarking on the Grand Tour, which officers either engaged in themselves, or came from families that did. Up to the 1690s, gentry

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20 For discussion on historical approaches to masculinity, honour and reputation in Eighteenth Century Britain, see (eds.) Hitchcock and Cohen, English Masculinities, p.1-22; and Foyster, Manhood in Early Modern England, pp. 11-23.

21 For example, anti-duelling debates help illustrate the different forms of honour and the reactions they provoked amongst supporters and opponents of duelling. See Andrew, Chapter 1 ‘Contesting Cultural Authority: The Code of Honour and is critics,’ in Aristocratic Vice, pp. 15-41; Banks, A Polite Exchange, p. 20; and Chapter 5 ‘Politeness, duelling and honour in Bernard Mandeville,’ in The Duel in Early Modern England, (London, 2003), pp. 263-302.

22 Andrew, Aristocratic Vice, pp. 19, 34. For the participation of military men in the culture of honour in the seventeenth century, see Banks, A Polite Exchange, pp. 16-17; and Manning, Chapter 3 ‘Dueling and Martial Culture,’ in Swordsman: The Martial Ethos, pp. 193-216. The periodicals, The Spectator and Tatler, were particularly popular among officers. See Cartwright, The Wentworth Papers, pp. 85, 86-7, 92; HMC Le Fleming, p. 356; BL Add MS 36592, fols. 6-7; and Anon., The Spectator Inspected: Or a Letter to the Spectator from an Officer in the Army in Flanders, occasioned by the spectator of the 8th of Sept. 1711, (London, 1711)


25 See Holmes, Augustan England, p. 272, for examples of architecture commissioned by army officers. Viscount Molesworth and the 2nd Baron Tyrawley were fellows of the Royal Society. See Jonathan Spain, ‘Richard, 3rd Viscount Molesworth, (1680-1758), ODNB; and Stuart Handley, ‘James O’Hara, second Baron Tyrawley (1681/2-1773)’ ODNB.

26 For example, General Sir Philip Honywood bred horses, one of whom, owned by Sir Robert Walpole, won the Newmarket race in 1735. Lieutenant-General Earl Cadogan developed the ‘gambler’s lust’ as a young officer, and General Algernon Seymour, Earl of Hertford, embarked on a Grand Tour of Italy aged 16. See Andrew Hanham, ‘Sir Philip Honywood, (1677-1752), ODNB; Andrew Hanham, ‘Charles Cadogan, (1671-1726), HOP 1690-1715; and Eveline Cruickshanks, ‘Algernon Seymour, (1684-1750), ODNB.
and aristocratic families with a tradition of ‘gentlemanly soldiering’, considered service in the militia or regular regiments to be such an activity.\textsuperscript{27} With the possible exception of military service, the expense and time required by these interests meant they could only be indulged in by a small proportion of those who considered themselves gentlemen. This was also true for officers without private wealth or privilege, since their military income alone did not support such a lifestyle.\textsuperscript{28}

More accessible and universally necessary were the skills and characteristics a gentleman was expected to display in public spaces. Polite conversation was praised by writers of conduct manuals and periodicals, because of its refining powers. In particular, conversation with female company was a desirable art to practise, as it removed those aspects of male conversation which would otherwise give offence as vulgar.\textsuperscript{29} However, writers like Addison and Joseph Spence pointed out that overindulgence in female conversation led to emasculation.\textsuperscript{30} Certain conversation topics could restore the missing element of masculinity, without being vulgar. During the War of the Spanish Succession, discussion of military matters was encouraged among military and non-military readers alike. In order to encourage sales, the preface of \textit{The Art of War in four parts} (1707), suggested that readers should ‘... be better informed in a discussion on military affairs, and so achieve a mastery of conversation. ‘Is every man not ambitious? And is it not very commendable, in discourse, to talk pertinent and properly to the subject at hand? And what greater subject of discourse at present than the martial exploits performed abroad?’ The treatise then suggested how pleasant it would be for ‘every gentleman discourse like a general.’\textsuperscript{31} When considering the accounts told by officers of the experiences of the war, \textit{The Spectator} in 1711 claimed that ‘there is no sort of people whose conversation is so pleasant as that of military men... the many adventures which attend their way of life makes their conversation full of incidents, and gives them so frank an air in speaking of what they have been witnesses of, that no company can be more amiable than that of men of sense who are soldiers. There is a certain irregular way in their narrations or discourse, which has something more warm and pleasing than we meet with among men who are used to adjust and methodise their thoughts.’\textsuperscript{32}


\textsuperscript{28} See Chapter 2, sections 2.2 and 2.3 for analysis on officers’ income and debts.


\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 50.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Art of War in four parts}, preface, ii.

\textsuperscript{32} Joseph Addison, \textit{The Spectator}, (London, 1711-1713), 3 vols., II, no. 152, Friday, August 24, 1711.
Military men were at least in theory, ideal participants in the public sphere, by virtue of their accomplishments and conversation. Army officers embraced politeness from the start of the eighteenth century and continued to do so until the following century. But they relied upon, and were expected to display, certain masculine qualities to a greater degree than other men, which increased their propensity to disrupt the civility of social spaces. Honour was the primary quality with which an officer defined his conduct, but military forms of honour could conflict with those of civil society. Officers possessed a strong sense of personal honour, stemming from their military service and the dignity of their rank. According to Major Humphrey Bland in his A Treatise on Tactics, first published in 1727, ‘the military profession has, in all ages, been esteemed the most honourable, from the danger that attends it. The motives that lead mankind to it, must proceed from a noble and generous inclination, since they sacrifice their ease, and their lives, in defence of their country.’ Similarly, The Soldier’s Monitor (1722) claimed that military service ‘is also worthy to be signalized and encouraged by particular marks of honour, as compensation of the many dangers and fatigues to which you are exposed above others for the public safety.’ The last statement identifies honour with the pride, or self-regard, of military men, by suggesting that they should receive ‘marks of honour.’ This is expanded upon in Bernard Mandeville’s An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, and the usefulness of Christianity in War (1732), for ‘when [person] A performs an action which, in the eyes of [person] B, is laudable, B wishes well to A, and tells him that such an action is an honour to him… in this sense the word honour, when it is a noun or a verb, is a compliment we make to those who act, have, or are what we approve of.’ The personal pride of officers therefore depended heavily on the favourable judgement and respect of their peers. It can be argued that, if an officer perceived an insult to himself, this would undermine the respect and esteem he sought from others. In such circumstances it would therefore be necessary for him to seek redress for the insult, in order to restore his pride and confidence, as well as his right to be considered an officer and a gentleman.

All gentlemen exercised authority in some form, whether as arbiters of custom and manners like writers; as politicians and landowners; or as leaders of soldiers and sailors, like officers of the army and navy. It can be argued that polite and gentlemanly values served to unify an otherwise diverse

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33 According to Matthew McCormack, ‘... given the formality of military manners and the importance in the army of such ‘polite’ practices as bodily comportment, fine dress and heterosexual gallantry, soldiers took to the culture of politeness in a big way...’ See McCormack, ‘Stamford Stand-off; Honour, Status and Rivalry in the Georgian Military,’ in Britain’s Soldiers, p. 90.
35 Anon, The Soldier’s Monitor, p. 7.
and not necessarily harmonious group of men within public spaces. The requirement for officers to be physically brave was not confined to the battlefield. As leaders of large organisations of men, their opinions and judgement were important, and needed to be backed up with personal conviction, if they were to have any substance. If an officer was not respected for some reason, then his opinions were not respected either, and his mandate to make decisions on the behalf of others was invalidated. As long as he was willing to back up his convictions with the threat of force, and if necessary his life, he could recover that mandate. In this context, duelling was an expression of how much a gentleman valued his personal conduct, or sense of honour. His willingness to risk injury to himself and his challenger in defence of it, entitled him to respect from his peers.\(^{37}\) *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour* observed that ‘take away the pride, and you spoil the soldier, for it is as impossible to strip a man of his passion, and preserve in him his principle of honour, as you can leave him his bed after you have taken away the feathers.’\(^{38}\)

A sense of duty was another characteristic that officers were expected to possess.\(^{39}\) Unlike honour, duty was not a contested term among social commentators, being used to describe an obligation to carry out responsibilities in variety of contexts, such as religious worship, marriage, and work.\(^{40}\) Carrying out the responsibilities relevant to his military rank was a formal requirement of an army officer’s commission. In 1716, Lieutenant Thomas Kentish of Viscount Windsor’s Horse (4th Dragoon Guards), complained about looking after the horses of his company commander, Captain Pitt. According to a witness, Pitt ‘bid him to look into his commission to know his duty.’\(^{41}\) Active generals set an example in placing their duty above personal considerations, particularly if serving in a campaign. As Marlborough’s subordinate in Flanders in 1703, Baron Cutts wrote that ‘... I have in all other occasions stuck so close to my duty, and shall do so for the future, for I’ll never put it in the power of such an accident again to keep me from it a moment.’\(^{42}\) Similarly, when the Earl of Orkney was recovering in England from ill health in 1711, he promised Marlborough to ‘lose no opportunity in returning to my duty.’\(^{43}\)

\(^{37}\) According to Carter, ‘for defenders of duelling, honour was understood as the essential component of an individual’s self-worth and reputation. Honour and reputation were to be preserved through the avoidance of public shame.’ See Carter, ‘Mollies, Fops and men of feeling,’ p. 235.


\(^{41}\) TNA, WO 71/122, ‘General court-martial of Lieutenant Thomas Kentish,’ 14 December, 1716.

\(^{42}\) BL, Add MS 61162, fol. 14. Lieutenant-General Cutts to Marlborough, Hague, 2 June, 1703.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., fol. 111. The Earl of Orkney to Marlborough, 11 May, 1711.
Unlike other gentlemanly occupations, with the exception of naval officers, the officer establishment was required to be on duty for prolonged periods, serving with their regiment, or commanding larger formations on campaign. They were also given considerable administrative and executive responsibilities over large numbers of men. Consequently, military duty needed officers to exercise honesty, consideration of other people's interests, and self-restraint. It could be argued that these qualities amounted to a form of moral courage, especially in resisting distractions such as an officer's own comfort or leisure, as long as there were tasks that remained to be completed. Mandeville claimed that duty was the choice a gentlemen ought to prefer, observing that 'when a man wavers in his choice, between present enjoyments of ease and pleasure, and the discharge of duties that are troublesome... the more transcendent the reward is... when he sides with his duty.' In a discussion about the sacrifices officers were willing to make 'in the prosecution of worthy actions and the service of mankind,' an edition of The Spectator in 1711 suggested that 'the event of our designs, as it relates to others, is uncertain, but as it relates to ourselves it must be very prosperous, while we are in the pursuit of our duty, and within the terms upon which providence has ensured our happiness, whether we live or die.'

Another attribute that officers brought to the public sphere was a strong competitive spirit. The schooling of young gentlemen in England was influenced by educational literature that favoured the toughening of boys physically and socially. This taught them resilience and courage, in order to maintain their position in the school-boy hierarchy. Those who attended boarding schools like Eton and Windsor were subjected to a strict daytime curriculum that taught discipline and obedience to superiors, and a night-time routine in which the boys were subject to physical bullying and hardship. Boys who benefited from personal tutors in their homes were subject to a range of literary sources

44 For example, at the battle of Blenheim, the Duke of Marlborough and the Earl of Orkney spent 17 and 20 hours on horseback respectively whilst commanding the allied army. See Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, I, 350-1. Marlborough to the Duchess of Marlborough, Höchstädt, 14 August, 1704; HMC Duke of Athole, p. 62. Earl of Orkney to unknown, Camp at Hochstet, 14 August, 1704.

45 For example, cavalry officers could not rest until horses were fed and sheltered for the night, whilst officers commanding sentries at night were advised to remain at their outposts, and to only delegate to another officer if overwhelmed by fatigue. See Art of War in four parts, pp. 131, 175.

46 Mandeville, An Enquiry in to the Origin of Honour, p. 32.


48 Carter, 'Mollies, Fops and Men of Feeling,' p. 7

49 Banks, A Polite Exchange, p. 27. Officers who attended Eton and Westminster included Lieutenant-General James, Earl Stanhope, General John Fane, 7th Earl of Westmorland, and Field Marshal Sir Robert Rich, 5th Baronet. The Duke of Marlborough attended St Pauls, along with Major-General James Stanley, 10th Earl of Derby. See Andrew Hanham, 'Stanhope, James, first earl Stanhope (1673-1721)', ODNB; Sonya Wynne, 'John Fane (1686-1762), HOP 1690-1715; and Alastair Massie, 'Sir Robert Rich, 5th Baronet, (1717-1785), ODNB.'
aimed at instilling an understanding of when gentlemen could and could not engage in aggressive behaviour.\textsuperscript{50} Upon becoming men, they faced an environment of intense competition for social recognition and status.\textsuperscript{51} As seen in Chapter 3, army officers were also in competition for promotion and the favour of patrons within patronage networks. Confrontation in front of their peers could be used to settle arguments and issues of status.\textsuperscript{52} Politeness and confrontation seem to be contradictory behaviours that gentlemen and officers were expected to express in equal measure, but it can be argued that they worked together to regulate the public spaces that officers inhabited, albeit imperfectly. Politeness encouraged affability between people of varying backgrounds and status at venues such as coffee houses and taverns, and in sociable activities such as conversation and gambling. In such environments however, even participants of politeness might feel it necessary to boast about their own accomplishments to raise themselves in the opinions of their social superiors, or to mock those around them in the hopes that their wit would earn them social credit, at the expense of their victims. Such individuals would inevitably antagonise ‘men of honour,’ who could not let such affronts to their reputations pass uncontested.

For example, in 1725, several Whig and Tory gentlemen were dining at the invitation of Sir William Staple, including his brother, Ensign Stapleton of the Foot Guards, and Captain Cook, an Irishman commanding a French troop of horse and serving as equerry to the French ambassador in London. After a Jacobite toast and several persons expressing a desire for the Pretender to invade with 10,000 French troops, Captain Cook boasted that his troop was the equal to three British, and that Guards officers were ‘but boys, and would run away if they saw a naked sword.’ As a Whig, Ensign Stapleton replied that ‘... if you are a man of honour, come down into the yard and I’ll show you that one boy is not afraid of the naked sword, and I think I have the same opinion of all the rest of my brother officers in King George’s service.’ In the resulting duel, Ensign Stapleton wounded and disarmed Cook, and presented his sword back to him.\textsuperscript{53} The dinner guests were all gentlemen who practised politeness, but in this case a combination of conflicting politics, an insult levelled at Ensign Stapleton and his unit, and a boast at the expense of the British army in general, meant that confrontation and competition, in the form of a duel, was the only recourse. A similar point was made in Susannah Centlivre’s play \textit{The Beau’s Duel, Or a Soldier for the Ladies} (1702). Captain Bellmein, annoyed by the self-aggrandizement of the cowardly Sir William Mode, declares that ‘sir, since everybody that has money

\textsuperscript{51} Banks, \textit{A Polite Exchange}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{52} Foyster, ‘Boys will be Boys,’ p. 151.
enough, sets up an equipage, a gentleman ought to find out some other way of distinguishing himself.\textsuperscript{54} His implication was that whereas Sir William preferred to wear his sword as a decorative part of his dress, a true gentleman could be distinguished by a willingness to use it.\textsuperscript{55} Whether caused by polite behaviour, or in spite of it, it can be argued that violence was a likely consequence of gentlemanly egos and personalities coming into conflict with each other, especially where the dignity and pride of military men were at risk.

4.3 The Codes of Duelling

By the late seventeenth century, the customs of duelling demanded that participants display courage and reserve, to distinguish the violence of gentlemen from the petty brawls of other social groups. The duel was recognised as the acceptable means by which gentlemen displayed these qualities, since it required superior moral qualities to observe the duel’s rituals, which non-gentlemen were not considered to possess.\textsuperscript{56} It was a universal distinction of gentlemen to carry a sword, and given the propensity for violence, it followed that an honour-conscious gentleman should know how to use it. Fencing schools had established themselves in England from the sixteenth century, founded mainly by Italian masters.\textsuperscript{57} By the early eighteenth century, most duels were fought with the rapier or broadsword, although the use of pistols was not unheard of.\textsuperscript{58} The Gentleman’s Tutor for the Small Sword (1730) described fencing as ‘an art so proper a qualification for a gentleman that I had almost said, he can be none that is not skilled therein.’\textsuperscript{59} Fencing toned the body through exercise, and prepared a gentleman to defend himself against physical attacks.\textsuperscript{60} It was also considered to be a polite recreation like dancing, or later in the century, boxing.\textsuperscript{61} In this way it could be considered as another masculine pursuit, particularly as it taught certain gentlemanly values within the realm of physical exertion. Fencing itself did not make men courageous, however. The Gentleman’s Tutor observed that

\textsuperscript{54} Susannah Centlivre, \textit{The Beau’s Duel, or a Soldier for the Ladies}, (London, 1702), p. 13.
\textsuperscript{55} Sir William is described as hating ‘the light of a drawn sword... He will sometimes pretend to courage, as some women will to honour and honesty.’
\textsuperscript{57} Banks, \textit{A Polite Exchange}, pp. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{58} Pistols only replaced swords in popularity in London in the 1760s. See Shoemaker, ‘The Taming of the Duel,’ p. 528.
\textsuperscript{59} Henry Blackwell, \textit{The Gentleman’s Tutor for the Small Sword, or the Compleat English Fencing Master, containing the truest and plainest rules for learning that noble art; showing how necessary it is for all gentlemen to understand the same}, (London, 1730), ii
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., pp. 48-9.
‘there is a great deal of difference in cowards, as well as in stout men ... the hectoring cowards will stand a battle if they are sensible... which is to show you, one coward will fight when another dare not... and judgement will encourage some cowards to fight, as well as the bravest men living.’

Consequently, it can be argued that it was not enough to simply to fight a duel to demonstrate honour and courage; the manner in which it was fought was also important. There were certain behaviours during a duel that were expected, and possible outcomes which proved the genuine bravery of its participants. A duel had to be fought some time after the initial quarrel, in order to allow formalities to be observed. These included an opportunity for reconciliation; the selection of seconds to bear witness and continue the fight; and the choosing of a suitable venue. During the duel itself, the death of an opponent was not considered necessary for a participant to recover his honour, and minor wounds were often enough. For a swordsman with greater skill to kill his opponent, rather than disarm or wound him, was seen to be ungentlemanly, as the test of courage and skill was unequal. *Hope’s New Method of Fencing* (1714) placed emphasis on the defence, so that a swordsman could demonstrate his bravery and skills without having to kill. Fencing was ‘... at first never intended to kill or destroy, but to defend and preserve, and therefore it always was, and will be called, the art of defence; besides, the offensive part will intrude itself upon man whether he will or not, so prompt is mankind to be vengeful, and do mischief.’

In actual duels, this defensive conduct was highly regarded. It showed that the duellist valued gentlemanly restraint over cruel revenge, and in doing so proved he possessed noble qualities. A duel fought in 1681 between two aristocratic army officers demonstrates this. The 3rd Earl of Peterborough, then styled Lord Mordaunt, and the 4th Duke of Hamilton, known at the time as the Earl of Arran, met each other at Greenwich Park to fight. A contemporary biographer of Hamilton wrote that ‘their weapons were sword and pistol a foot, the Earl firing first, very narrowly missed the Lord Mordaunt, upon which the other having the Earl’s life in his hands, generously fired the pistol in the air, and upon the importunity of the Lord Mordaunt they came to their swords. In this the latter received a wound about the privy parts, but running the Earl into his thigh his sword broke, so that his life, in turn, came into the Earl’s power, who honourably gave it to him, and they parted good friends.’

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62 The Gentleman’s Tutor for the Small Sword, pp. 46-7
63 Andrew, Aristocratic Vice, pp. 46-7.
64 Sir William Hope, Hope’s New Method of Fencing, or the true and solid art of fighting with the back-sword, small sword, sheer sword, and sword and pistol, (Edinburgh, 1714), p. 147. See also, pp. 18, 14.
65 John le Neve, The Lives and characters of the most illustrious persons, British and Foreign, who died in the year 1712, (London, 1714), p. 177.
In contrast, a coward might seek to kill outright to ensure his own safety, or retain the passion of the initial quarrel, to the disapproval of those who saw or read about it. This was why the notorious Hamilton-Mohon duel of 1712 was so controversial to public opinion. Although the duel has been covered from various historical perspectives, the reason why the duel sparked sustained interest among the public has not been explained by historians. The duel involved four army officers, including the 4th Duke of Hamilton, three decades after his duel with Peterborough. The others were his opponent, Colonel Charles, 4th Baron Mohun, and two seconds, Major-General George Macartney and Lieutenant-Colonel John Hamilton. The high profile of the participants and the multiple causes behind the duel led to various blow-by-blow accounts, each one slightly different. The general consensus was that the Duke of Hamilton sustained multiple wounds before receiving a final mortal wound, and himself inflicted a mortal wound upon Baron Mohun. Macartney inflicted a non-mortal wound on Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, and was accused of delivering the mortal wound to the Duke of Hamilton, who was already wounded and unprepared for the attack.

As well as failing to show gentlemanly restraint in continuing to attack the Duke of Hamilton, Macartney also went into hiding once it became clear that the two main participants would die. As an experienced senior officer and a favourite of Marlborough, Macartney’s conduct fell short of both the codes of the duel and the expectation that he would assume responsibility for his actions. By contrast, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton seems to have exercised restraint during the duel, and also presented himself to the authorities immediately afterwards. The aristocratic status of the participants and the running drama of the quarrel that led to the duel were important reasons behind its notoriety. However, the dubious details of the duel itself highlighted the apparent double standards of society that permitted aristocrats and army officers to engage in violence contrary to civil attitudes, the articles of war, and even their own codes of conduct. Instead of ensuring that the rituals were

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68 According to one commentator, ‘It is a scandal, that our nation only has not made sufficient provision for this crime, but that we may have the liberty of killing one another, and yet be reckoned good subjects.’ See Anon, *The Case at Large of the Duke Hamilton and Lord Mohun: A full and exact relation of the duel fought in Hyde Park on Saturday 15th November, 1712, between his Grace*
observed and intervening to stop the duel if required, the seconds participated in the duel almost immediately. The death of both principals negated the point of the duel as a means of gaining satisfaction for ill-treatment, whilst the flight of Macartney to the Netherlands for four years meant that the legal system was effectively subverted. After he returned to England in 1716 and stood trial, Macartney was effectively acquitted of murder, and both he and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton of abetting the killing of the principal duellists, despite the testimony of multiple witnesses and implicating evidence of the coroner’s inquest. Their acquittal mirrored those of aristocratic courtiers and army officers who had received the royal pardon for duelling since Charles II. The price of Macartney’s cowardly conduct was not a legal sentence, but a loss of reputation and honour. For example, Mr Fletcher, an acquaintance of the Duke of Richmond, Macartney’s protector after the duel, wrote that ‘Colonel Hamilton has twice deposed before the council, that Macartney ran Duke Hamilton through, while he was upon the ground. This oath is wondrous strange and I think [presents] a true picture of a man I would not keep company with.’ Nevertheless, Macartney was considered a useful supporter of George I, and after a brief demotion to colonel, resumed his career as a senior general until his death in 1730.

Although none of the participants of this duel could have been pleased of the outcome, all had willingly agreed to have their conduct openly scrutinised by strangers, by choosing Hyde Park as the venue. It can be argued that this was the main reason that duels in this period took place in public spaces where possible, particularly in parks. Duels were an outward display of gentlemanly behaviour, and relied on witnesses to acknowledge and disseminate the conduct of the participants. This conduct could even serve as a character reference for courts-martial. For example, when Lieutenant-Colonel John Ward was accused of displays of disaffection to William III in 1697, two witnesses attested to his conduct during two duels fought in 1681. He was described in each to have ‘behaved himself bravely and very honourably,’ wounding and disarming each opponent rather than killing them. Many duels ended in friendship for the participants, like those of Lieutenant-Colonel Ward or Hamilton and Peterborough in 1681. If both parties felt that they had had a fair chance to obtain ‘satisfaction,’

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69 Ibid., pp. 4,5.
70 V.G. Kiernan, ‘George Macartney, (1660-1730),’ ODNB.
71 Banks, A Polite Exchange, pp. 16-17, 19.
72 BL, Add MS 36772, fol. 19.
73 Kiernan, ‘George Macartney,’ ODNB.
74 Duels in parks became a recognised trope in popular culture by the 1700s. The play The Beau’s Duel was set in Hyde Park, foreshadowing the Hamilton-Mohun duel a decade later. See Centlivre, The Beau’s Duel, or a Soldier for the Ladies, p. 30.
75 TNA, WO 89/2, pp. 8-9. ‘General court-martial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Ward, 10 July, 1697.’
through a display of their gentlemanly qualities, then the matter was considered resolved.\textsuperscript{76} Since duels offered a chance of resolving issues of personal honour that civil law and peaceable behaviour could not, it can be argued that duelling was an effective if controversial last resort for a gentleman to convince his peers of his gentlemanly qualities. John Oldmixon’s \textit{In Defence of Mr Macartney} (1712), pointed out the lack of alternatives, writing that if the ‘legislatures of Europe have not been able to find a remedy for this evil, nor a way of making injured honour an ample reparation, then a man of Honour has no recourse but to a duel, or live under a blemished reputation.’\textsuperscript{77}

4.4 Quarrels among Army Officers

When on active service with their regiments, officers co-operated with each other to carry out the running of their unit on a daily basis. This gave them plenty of opportunity to observe each other’s behaviour, and to discuss it during their leisure hours. The tavern, coffee house or sutler’s tent provided an environment where officers were less formal with each other, and where alcohol might impair their judgement.\textsuperscript{78} Tensions might break out into quarrels, and even perceived insults might lead to duels. When an officer’s words or actions were challenged by an equal, his authority over his men was indirectly challenged, since that authority rested as much on the consent of his peers to allow him to rule as it did on the acceptance of his men. Whilst insubordination among the ranks could be redressed by imposing punishments permissible by the articles of war, an officer had to rely on his sense of personal honour if his fellow officers treated him discourteously. An officer could not refuse a duel without losing the respect he needed from his fellow officers to continue serving with them.\textsuperscript{79}

In 1711, Henry Watkins, the Deputy Judge Advocate General, noted that Colonel Algernon Seymour, Earl of Hertford had let matters get out of hand by not fighting a duel when initially challenged. He wrote that ‘an unlucky accident has befallen Lord Hertford, he is pretty lavish with his tongue, Major Petit of the [Artillery] Train, who thought himself reflected on, called him to account. His Lordship rather than fight condescended to eat his words in a full coffee house, but the Major still talks of it in

\textsuperscript{76} For example, a month after the Hamilton-Mohun duel, Lieutenant-Colonel John Farmer lightly wounded Anthony Hammond in a duel in Catalonia, at which point the duel ended. \textit{HMC Portland V}, p. 251. Edward Stawell to the Earl of Oxford, Gibraltar, 21 December, 1712.

\textsuperscript{77} John Oldmixon, \textit{A Defence of Mr Macartney}, (London, 1712), p. 3.


\textsuperscript{79} The stigma for refusing a duel would continue among the officer establishment into the latter half of the eighteenth century. See Gilbert, ‘Law and Honour,’ p. 80.
such a manner as will make the Lord notoriously scandalous, or venture the having his throat cut, which is a risk he [Major Petit] seems unwilling to run.\textsuperscript{80}

When officers did fight duels, courts-martial committees tried to establish if the conduct of the participants satisfied the personal honour allowed to a gentleman. In 1703, Captain John Steuart and Lieutenant-Colonel William Steuart of Lieutenant-General William Steuart’s Regiment (9th Foot) fought a duel with pistols, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Steuart was killed.\textsuperscript{81} The evening before, the Lieutenant-Colonel spilt a communal punch bowl over Captain Steuart’s clothes. The supposed pretext for this action was a rebuke delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Steuart for criticising a letter from Captain Steuart’s brother, also an officer in the regiment. Witnesses at the court-martial agreed that although the Lieutenant-Colonel denied any intended insult, he also refused to confirm this admission to the officers present when requested to by the Captain. As the two officers went outside to discuss the weapons to be used, they were placed under arrest by the ensign commanding the guard. The two officers decided to disobey the ensign’s authority, and in the morning they met each other outside the city gates and fought the duel.\textsuperscript{82} Upon receiving the mortal wound from Captain Steuart, the Lieutenant-Colonel claimed that the Captain had spent a considerable length of time aiming his shot. If true, this would have given the Captain an advantage over the Lieutenant-Colonel, who had fired first. A careful examination of witnesses revealed that there was no lengthy pause between the Lieutenant-Colonel’s shot and the Captain’s. Furthermore, the surgeon and adjutant stated that the Lieutenant-Colonel forgave the Captain on his deathbed. The court-martial found that Captain Steuart’s conduct during the duel therefore followed the codes of the duel, whilst the fact that the Lieutenant-Colonel forgave him meant that the duel had been resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.

Captain Steuart was acquitted of all charges, despite disobeying an order forbidding duelling in camp by Marlborough, undermining the authority of a junior officer, and killing a fellow officer. Although the two officers had tried to circumvent Marlborough’s order by duelling outside the city walls, the court-martial did not enquire into either this or their subversion of regimental order. The priority of the court-martial was whether they had conducted the duel fairly, and not that they conducted the duel in the first place. This suggests that in such cases the officer establishment permitted personal honour to temporarily override duty, so long as the matter was settled fairly and quickly. In this case,

\textsuperscript{80} HMC Portland V, pp. 191-2. Henry Watkins to John Drummond, Camp at Lens, 2 July, 1711.

\textsuperscript{81} BL, Add MS 61370, fols. 12-15. ‘General court-martial of Captain John Steuart, held at the Camp of Huys, 20 May, 1703.’

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., fols. 13- 14.
all seemed to be in agreement of Mandeville’s view that ‘a Soldier is of no esteem, if he does not sacrifice all considerations to his honour.’

Nevertheless, the discipline of Marlborough’s army was threatened if officers disobeyed orders without consequence. A scapegoat was made of the default commanding officer after Lieutenant-Colonel Steuart had been placed under arrest, Major Thomas Steuart. During the court-martial, Captain Borthan and Lieutenant Wallace complained that the Major showed insufficient interest in the arrested officers, and remarked only that he was ‘sorry that gentlemen should quarrel.’ Major Steuart provided no defence for failing to stop the duel. Instead he admitted his fault and placed himself at the mercy of the court-martial. The committee found him guilty of ‘a great fault and misdemeanour and neglect of his duty.’ He was suspended from the service indefinitely. Major Steuart’s mistake was that he failed to recognise that he had become the acting commander of the regiment once Lieutenant-Colonel Steuart had been arrested, and that he was required to enforce the arrest of his subordinate officers. For this neglect of duty he was punished, whilst Captain Steuart’s honour was restored.

To show that this attitude toward duelling was not unique to this court-martial, in the same year, Lieutenant George Weston of Lord Raby’s Dragoons (1st Dragoons), was drinking with Captain Ralph Argyll, of the Earl of Barrymore’s Foot (13th Foot), in a sutler’s tent. In a state of extreme intoxication, Argyll objected to Weston placing his hand on his cap, and made a half-hearted attempt to strike Weston, but fell over instead. The following morning, Argyll approached Weston to ascertain if an insult had been given, which Weston denied, saying that ‘no un-gentleman-like language had been spoken between them.’ Argyll left, only to return and demand a duel take place. They left the camp to fight with swords, and after a clumsy lunge from Argyll, Weston delivered a mortal wound with his blade.

Although the pretext was even flimsier than the duel fought in Steuart’s Regiment, it did not invite comment from the court-martial committee, possibly because the rituals of a duel were observed. However, it transpired that although Argyll was himself satisfied that no insult had taken place, he nevertheless insisted on fighting the duel because of pressure from a fellow officer, Captain Lassarelle. One witness stated that Lassarelle had said ‘Argyll is a coward, was beat last night, and that all the

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84 BL, Add MS 61370, fols. 48-51. ‘General court- martial of Lieutenant John Weston, held at the camp at Val Notre Dame, 3 September, 1703.’
regiment talks of it. [Lassarelle] had been speaking to him to go out [to fight]. 85 Lassarelle conceded this, resulting in his own court-martial two weeks later, on the charge of abetting Captain Argyll’s death. 86 Despite the testimonies of Lassarelle’s good character from several officers, he was found guilty of neglect of duty in failing to prevent the duel. The court recommended that he be suspended at the pleasure of the commanding general, the Duke of Marlborough. 87 The opinion of Captain Lassarelle, whose baiting would later be found to be in the wrong by his peers, meant more to Argyll than his own judgement of the incident, and compelled him to risk his life to recover his honour. Weston was acquitted of all charges, because his conduct had not been antagonistic at any point in the affair. As Argyll lay dying, Weston commented that he ‘hoped the wound was not mortal, but if it should be, it was his own seeking, and he was sorry for it.’ In doing so he demonstrated compassion for his opponent, which translated into acceptable gentlemanly behaviour. He also received favourable character references from various witnesses, being described as ‘a well behaved gentleman.’ By contrast, Argyll was described as being ‘quarrelsome in his drink,’ which seemed to have been sufficient reason for the court-martial to conclude that he had received what he deserved. 88

Similarly, in 1705, Captain Fry Vickeridge of Colonel Godfrey’s regiment (16th Foot) entertained fellow officers of his regiment and a couple of guests from the Royal Regiment (1st Foot) in his tent, including Captain Bridges. 90 Following a misunderstanding, one of Vickeridge’s regimental colleagues, Captain Molesworth, hit Vickeridge in the head with his sword. After issuing an apology, which Vickeridge accepted, Captain Bridges mocked Molesworth’s swordsmanship by commenting that he could not imagine him capable of inflicting a wound on Vickeridge. The next evening, the party assembled and began to drink again, and Molesworth insisted that Bridges retract his words. When Bridges refused, Molesworth prepared to fight, but Vickeridge intervened, and he fought with Bridges instead. Both officers were wounded, with Bridges receiving a mortal thrust. At the court-martial, Molesworth was acquitted of all charges, whilst Vickeridge was cleared of causing the duel, but was found guilty of killing Bridges. He was sentenced to death, but considered ‘an object fit for mercy.’ Marlborough reprieved him, and he continued as captain in the regiment for several years after. 91 The most senior

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85 Ibid., fol. 50.
86 BL, Add MS 38853, fols. 95-7. ‘General court-martial of Captain Louis Leffaret, held at St. [Sic], 18 September, 1703.’
87 Ibid., p. 97.
88 BL, Add MS 61370, fol. 49.
89 Ibid., fol. 51.
90 BL, Add MS 38853, fol. 107. ‘General court-martial of Captain Fry Vickeridge, held at the Camp at Elpt, 16 June, 1705, at the Duke of Marlborough’s request.’
91 Ibid., 107.
92 Vickeridge is listed as a serving captain in the regiment in 1709. See TNA, WO 64/2, p. 34.
officer present during the quarrel, Major Thomas Parsons, was suspended for failing to prevent the
duel, just like Major Steuart of the 9th Foot. Promoted within the regiment in August 1704, Major
Parsons had served for less than a year as a field officer. After one month of suspension and
acknowledging his fault, Major Parsons was allowed to return to duty.

In quarrels which resulted in passionate violence, without a ritualized duel, officers received more
leniency from courts-martial committees than might be expected, considering the similarities with
common brawls. These cases were taken on their individual merits, rather than the examination of
honour and duty that applied to duels. In 1697, after several hours spent together with other officers
at a coffee house in London, Cornet Hall and Quartermaster Moore of the 2nd Troop of Horse Guards
had a disagreement, in which Hall stood up and struck Moore. The other officers present intervened
and prevented further violence. Later, Lieutenant Hawkes approached Hall in a separate room in an
attempt to reconcile the two parties. Without provocation or a chance to defend himself, Hawkes
received two serious wounds from Hall’s sword. Hall’s brash actions prevented any reconciliation or
duel from taking place, and the original slight to Moore’s honour was forgotten. Instead, the court-
martial inquired into Hall’s state of mind when he attacked Hawkes and decided that no malice was
intended. Hall was ordered to seek forgiveness from Hawkes and to pay 100 pistoles towards his
recovery, and to remain under arrest until he did so. This sentence amounted to a restoration of the
damage done to Lieutenant Hawkes. Hall was neither reprimanded for losing control of himself, nor
made an example of for assaulting an unarmed colleague.

In late 1727, Ensigns Daniel Cole of Brigadier Clayton’s Foot (14th Foot), and Scipio Oliphant of Major-
General Pearce’s Foot (5th Foot) were drinking wine at a bar in Gibraltar. As they left, Oliphant called
Cole a ‘footie fellow,’ at which Cole beat Oliphant with his cane. Another officer, Ensign John, Murray
sent two soldiers to escort the officers to their tents under arrest, but three hours later, he noticed
Oliphant returning from Clayton’s camp, where Cole had been taken. Oliphant admitted that he had
searched for Cole’s tent, and beaten him in his bed in retaliation, to provoke a duel so that he could
obtain further satisfaction. The court decided to try both officers for breach of the 13th article of war,
which stated that ‘if any officer under arrest shall leave his confinement before he is set at liberty by

93 TNA, WO 64/1, p. 221. ‘Colonel Godfrey’s Regiment of Foot.’
94 BL, Add MS 61319, fol. 120. Marlborough to Colonel Francis Godfrey, Meldert, 14 August, 1705.
95 TNA, WO 71/121. ‘General court-martial of Cornet Robert Hall, 12 February, 1696.’
the officer who confined him, or by a superior power, he shall be cashiered for it.’97 Oliphant denied that he was aware he was under arrest due to intoxication, but an examination of Ensign Murray and the soldiers assigned to escort him made it apparent that they had considered Oliphant to be under arrest. Both officers were found guilty and sentenced to be cashiered. However, they were recommended to the Governor of Gibraltar for a reprieve because both had ‘done their duty well,’ probably at the recent siege of Gibraltar, which had ended in June that year. Oliphant was still a young and inexperienced officer, and Cole ‘had the character of an inoffensive man.’ Whereas Oliphant’s behaviour fell within breach of article 13, Cole had remained within his tent, and so did not violate his arrest. It would seem that the accuracy of the charge against him was less important to the court-martial committee than finding some way of rebuking him for assaulting Oliphant with his cane.

In 1728, Major Forster of Colonel Fielding’s regiment of invalids cornered and struck Captain-Lieutenant Schute, formerly of the same regiment, and a brawl ensued. The Board of General Officers that examined the conduct of the two officers concluded that Schute had ‘treated Major Forster’s character so scandalously that the said Major being so highly provoked could not help doing what he did the first opportunity he met him.’98 Schute had previously been before a regimental court-martial for various charges, before which he had been insubordinate. His fellow officers refused to serve with him, and he had agreed to leave the regiment and accept half-pay. In the meantime, there was a dispute over arrears owed to him, which he attributed to Major Forster’s negligence in his duty. Forster had agreed to meet Schute at Portsmouth to settle his accounts, but was driven away by a mob composed of Schute’s family. In addition he was the subject of letters and messages accusing him of cowardice for failing to account with Schute. This was considered sufficient provocation for the Board to recommend to the King that Forster be acquitted. His fellow officers also supplied a character reference for him, describing him as ‘having the reputation of a sober, gallant officer,’ As the brawl had occurred in public, the image of the army was at risk, but Major Forster’s previous good conduct and extreme provocation provided sufficient cause to ensure that the Board decided to protect his reputation and career rather than make an example of him.

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97 TNA, WO 72/2, ‘Rules and Articles for the Better Government of the Horse and Foot Guards, and all other His Majesty’s Land Forces in Great Britain and Ireland & Dominions beyond the Seas, 1727,’ p. 4.
98 TNA, WO 71/5, p. 293. Meeting of a Board of General Officers of the army, 28 October, 1728.
4.5 Complaints and insubordination against superior officers

The procedure for addressing complaints against superior officers was designed to discourage junior officers from undermining the authority of regimental commanders. In the first instance a subaltern was permitted to seek redress from the commander himself, followed by a general court-martial if the dispute could not be kept within the regiment. Consisting of 13 senior officers from other regiments, General courts-martial were more likely to be more sympathetic to the justifications offered by the commanding officer for his conduct than the claims of the appealing subordinate. The articles of war provided for the subordinate to be punished if his case was groundless and had wasted the commander’s and court’s time.\(^9^9\) In 1696, a general court-martial enquired into a dispute over regimental finances in the Royal Regiment of Foot (1st Foot) and found that Colonel George Hamilton owed Major Munro 47 guilders, 7 stivers for various expenses relating to his company. Compared with the 2,488 guilders Munro had claimed were due to him, this was a modest sum and was considered insufficient to warrant his accusation that Hamilton had neglected his duty in allocating regimental funds. Munro was found to have ‘unjustly aspersed Colonel Hamilton in his reputation and honour.’ He was sentenced to be cashiered, but a reprieve was recommended given his poor understanding of regimental accounts.\(^1^0^0\) Similarly, upon the disbandment of Colonel Melloniere’s Huguenot regiment in 1697, a general court-martial examined the allegations of several junior officers that their colonel had deprived them of their perquisites. Upon finding that Melloniere had actually overpaid them their servants’ allowance, one lieutenant was cashiered, three lieutenants were suspended, and one ensign was reprimanded.\(^1^0^1\)

This disciplinary policy continued during the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1708, Ensign Henry Fletcher was suspended for three months when multiple complaints against his regimental commander, Major-General Webb, were judged to be baseless.\(^1^0^2\) In 1711, Ensign Richard Combes of the Earl of Hertford’s Foot (15th Foot) appealed to a general court-martial that he had been offered a lieutenancy as the eldest ensign in the regiment, but that another ensign had persuaded the colonel to commission him instead. The Earl of Hertford’s testimony declared that Combes was not the eldest ensign, and so could not claim any pre-emptive rights from seniority. Furthermore, contrary to Combe’s own claims that he was never absent from his post and had been wounded in combat, Hertford stated that he ‘had missed his duty on occasion, being drunk, and did not receive any wounds

\(^9^9\) See appendix 1, article 18.
\(^1^0^0\) TNA, WO 71/121. ‘General court-martial of Colonel George Hamilton,’ 8 February, 1696
\(^1^0^1\) TNA, WO 89/2, fol. 16. ‘Court-Martial at the camp at Cockleberg,’ 30 July, 1697
\(^1^0^2\) BL, Add MS 38853, fol. 128. Marlborough to Colonel Sutton, 16 September, 1708
that he or the regimental surgeon were aware of.’ Combes was sentenced by the court-martial committee to apologise to Hertford at the head of the regiment and confess that the petition was groundless.103

As seen in Chapter 2, officers were expected to bear setbacks to their careers and finances, sometimes over long periods, before they could appeal to senior officials for attention. Perceived injustices were understandably a major concern for a subordinate officer, but it was important that their word did not destroy the overall reputation of a regimental commander without sufficient evidence. It was for this reason that witnesses were essential to the court-martial process, to confirm factual statements and provide additional character references for their fellow officers. As current and former junior officers themselves, witnesses and court-martial committee members might understand the reasons behind the frustration that appealing subordinates felt. However, they would also have understood that most commanders, in attempting to manage multiple interests in the execution of their duties, rarely singled out an officer for deliberate mistreatment. This meant that general courts-martial only decided in favour of appellants in clear instances of negligence or discrimination. This in practice enforced the chain of command, by restoring the honour and reputation of a commander, at the cost of the appellant’s own, should he suffer the punishment prescribed in the articles of war.

General courts-martial enquiring into insubordination placed a similar emphasis on protecting senior officers from the agitated behaviour of junior officers. In 1696, the Marquis de Puissar reported that one of his regimental officers, Captain Harris, had assaulted his superior, Major Mead, in his tent. The court’s examination of the witnesses confirmed his guilt. Harris was recommended to be suspended for one month, and to ‘ask pardon of the Colonel and the Major, before all the officers of the regiment, when the regiment is under arms.’104 This punishment amounted to a restoration of the two field officers’ authority, at the expense of the junior officer’s reputation in the eyes of his fellow officers and soldiers under his command.

In London in 1717, Major-General William Tatton approached Ensign John Gore of the 1st Foot Guards about complaints made by his fellow officers that they had to carry out his duties in his absence. According to Tatton’s testimony, Gore began to criticise his regimental colleagues, forcing Tatton to warn Gore that ‘if he insulted the corps of officers, they would treat him like a scoundrel.’ Tatton added that he was entitled to arrest Gore for his insubordinate attitude toward him. Gore retorted

103 Ibid., fol. 142-3. ‘General court-martial of Ensign Richard Combe,’ 10 May, 1711
104 TNA, 89/2, fol. 38. ‘Court-martial at the camp at Cockleberg,’ 21 August, 1697.
that he would not submit to being arrested, at which point Tatton placed him under arrest and informed him that the King would be informed of his disrespectful behaviour. Absent at his court-martial and defying his arrest, Gore was recommended to be dismissed from the service, to which George I gave his approval. As a field officer in Gore’s regiment, a brevet Major-General, and a member of the Board of General Officers, Tatton’s reputation and testimony was indisputable. His unfavourable character reference of Gore was sufficient to persuade the court-martial committee of the severity of its sentence.

Although general courts-martial favoured protecting senior officers from the accusations of their subordinates, they nevertheless took the complaints of junior officers seriously. Where there was sufficient evidence of mistreatment, or bullying, junior officers might receive the redress that they deserved. In Flanders in 1709, Captain Balfour of Lieutenant-General Webb’s Foot (8th Foot) was inspecting his picquets along with his subordinate, Lieutenant Eyton. The officer commanding the regiment in Webb’s absence, Lieutenant-Colonel Columbière, called Eyton halfway during the inspection to discuss another matter. Regimental custom required that Lieutenant Eyton report to Balfour, who would then brief the regimental commander on the state of the picquets. When Balfour insisted that Eyton report to him first, as required by custom, Lieutenant-Colonel Columbière placed Balfour under arrest for insubordination. According to witnesses, Columbière had asked Balfour where his hat was, and upon receiving the sullen answer ‘on my head,’ he had threatened to ‘make you have it somewhere else presently.’ These two officers were speaking with neither the politeness expected from gentlemen nor the mutual respect required from officers on duty. However, Balfour was trying to carry out his duty, whilst Columbière was undermining regimental custom and the authority of his subordinate. This persuaded the court-martial to decide that Balfour was not guilty of any charge, and ordered that he should be released from his arrest to return to duty.

In 1715, the Board of General Officers assembled to address a petition forwarded to them from the War Office from Captain William Charlton, formerly of the Earl of Barrymore’s Foot (13th Foot). A deserving officer who had served for 22 years, Charlton complained that his fellow officers had forced him out of the regiment by imposing indignities upon him. He had struck the paymaster for refusing to pay the subsistence of his men or show him the accounts of his company. The commanding officer in the Earl of Barrymore’s absence, Colonel Godby, used the resulting regimental court-martial as a pretext for humiliating the captain. Exceeding his powers, he imprisoned Charlton for three months,

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105 BL, Add MS 61336, fols. 44-5. ‘General court-martial of Ensign John Gore,’ 30 September, 1717.

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and drew up an apology which the Captain was to read out to the paymaster in public. Following further threats, Charlton sold his commission below the price he had paid for it. The Board decided that Captain Charlton had ‘been dealt with in a very arbitrary manner,’ and recommended to the King that he be permitted to purchase back his commission and receive his withheld pay.\footnote{TNA, WO 71/3, pp. 91-2. Report on the enquiry into the case of Captain Charlton, 24 March, 1714} George I took the case seriously, reviewing all papers relating to it via the War Office, before approving of the Board’s recommendation, all within a week of requesting the information.\footnote{Ibid., p. 109. Pulteney to the Board of General Officers, April 5, 1715; WO 4/17, fol. 116. Pulteney to Thomas Byde, 13 April, 1715}

Insubordination and complaints against regimental commanders posed a serious potential threat to the social cohesion of the regimental system. If the senior officer being accused was the regiment’s colonel, it could be argued that his proprietor rights were being indirectly threatened, as well as his official right to command. If the accused was the lieutenant-colonel or major, commanding in the colonel’s absence, the opportunity for these future commanders of regiments to develop their leadership potential and understand the practicalities of discipline and regimental finance was under threat. In either case their authority needed to be upheld in order to maintain the patience and fortitude with which junior officers obeyed their orders and shouldered hardships. In rare cases where junior officers were clearly being mistreated, the authorities acted decisively in favour of them.

Even in these cases however, court-martial committees protected the commanding officer’s overall authority, by only reversing those orders that were judged to be wrong. Given the collective experience of court-martial members and the seniority of committee presidents, it could be argued that this was not a particularly dishonourable response, as their reversals resembled a superior officer overriding the judgement of a subordinate during the daily execution of military affairs. The regimental commander was not required to apologise publicly for his misconduct. Nor did the wronged subordinate receive any compensation at the expense of the regimental commander. By contrast, when a subordinate’s complaints were proven to be unfounded, he was punished severely and often publicly, according to the articles of war. It can be argued that the military chain of command overrode gentlemanly codes of who was in the right in these cases. It was more crucial to military discipline for junior officers to learn respect and humility towards their regimental commanders than it was for gentlemen to reconcile their differences regardless of rank.
4.6 Fraud and Misrepresentation

Unlike cases of personal complaints and insubordination, an officer who was guilty of fraud or misrepresentation could expect severe sentences from a court-martial. Personal honour was important to an individual officer’s confidence, but without a strong sense of duty, the army could not function effectively. Officers were expected to maintain their units and obey the orders of their superiors. This was made clear in their commission papers, which required them to ‘duly exercise the officers as well as the soldiers thereof in arms, and to use your best endeavours to keep them in good order and discipline... and you are to observe and follow such orders and directions from time to time, as you shall receive from your colonel, captain or any superior officer.’ In order to fulfil this requirement, an officer had to attend to a range of daily tasks in order to ensure his unit was sufficiently paid, equipped, fed and housed. There were guidelines as to how these were achieved, based on the customs of the regiment and general practice. However, officers were permitted some leeway in how these tasks were carried out, partly because of the broad powers delegated to them by the fiscal-military state, and partly because they were allowed to generate some remuneration for their efforts.

Colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors were particularly susceptible to abusing these opportunities for remuneration, since they controlled the interior economy of their regiments, and could exert pressure on the other officers to participate in their fraudulent activities. In 1696, a general court-martial enquired into the various abuses committed by Brigadier Richard Cunningham, colonel of the 7th Dragoons. Cunningham had made an agreement with his officers to pay for new equipment by way of stoppages of soldiers’ pay rather than off-reckonings. According to regulations, lost equipment could be replaced by stopping an individual soldier’s pay, but new equipment was to be paid for strictly from the off-reckoning fund. Cunningham’s intention was to protect this central fund from legitimate deductions, thereby increasing the dividend available to him. The court-martial committee ordered this agreement to be void, and for Cunningham to repay the stoppages. Cunningham had also refused his captains access to the regimental accounts necessary for them to calculate their own troop accounts, contrary to the articles of war. He was ordered to account with his captains within 28 days. Cunningham attempted to justify this fraudulent behaviour by claiming he faced unique circumstances in equipping and paying his regiment. It was more likely that he was trying to hide other fraudulent

109 See Chapter 3, fn. 4 for examples of commissions papers.
110 TNA, WO 89/1, fols. 157-165. ‘General court-martial by order of Lieutenant-General D’Averquerque for the examination of a complaint given in by Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes against his Colonel Brigadier Richard Cunningham,’ Ghent, 9 July, 1696.
practices, including the employment of more soldiers as personal servants than allowed, receiving illegal retainers from the surgeon’s mate, and a £300 debt he had incurred in the off-reckonings fund, which he had used to advance sums to pay for the officers’ own equipage. As seen in Chapter 2, officers were expected to pay for their own equipage privately. The committee declared this contract to be void, and ordered that the debt should not be paid out of the off-reckonings. Instead, the officers involved were ordered to pay the debt in proportion to their involvement in the contract, since they were benefiting from its existence at the expense of the troops.\footnote{Ibid., fol. 157.}

Cunningham had been appointed to as the president of a general court-martial less than a month before his own court-martial.\footnote{TNA, WO 89/1, fols. 144-6.} It can be argued that although he was considered fit to judge the activities of other officers, in reality he operated a double standard between his own conduct and that of subordinates. A regiment’s colonel was permitted significant freedom in controlling the finances of his regiment, since many of the administrative and financial arrangements were directed at his discretion and through his personal connections. It was assumed that an officer who had accumulated a reputation for distinguished military service, or had his own estates or other resources, could be trusted to understand when his actions were considered legitimate and when they qualified as abuse. Cunningham’s abuses were too serious and too calculated to be explained away as anything other than wilful fraud, however. He was ordered to be cashiered from the service.\footnote{Ibid., fol. 164.} Furthermore, the committee recommended to William III that Cunningham’s second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, should not benefit from Cunningham’s dismissal, as he had been complicit in several of Cunningham’s arrangements. The recommendation to stall Forbes’s claim to the colonelcy, normally his by right, was due to the fact that he too had demonstrated he was unworthy to command. By agreeing with Cunningham’s actions, he had effectively alienated his own sense of judgement to his colonel, and consequently could not be expected to set a leadership example to those under his command.

In 1696, the officers of the Earl of Essex’s Dragoons (4th Dragoons) petitioned against the officer commanding in chief in the Earl of Essex’s absence. They claimed that Lieutenant-Colonel Mortimer’s fraudulent practices made it ‘impossible for men of honour to serve under such hardship.’\footnote{TNA, WO 71/121. ‘Court-martial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Mortimer, June 11, 1696.’} The general court-martial found Mortimer guilty of assigning forage to the regiment’s troops based on their current complement of horses, despite a larger fixed amount being officially ordered regardless
of actual troop strength. The surplus retained by Mortimer amounted to a considerable sum, which could have been sold for his own profit, rather than being used at the discretion of his captains. He had also detained the subsistence pay of the men for two weeks, despite the regulations forbidding such an obvious abuse. The court-martial and witnesses suspected that the motive behind these infractions was personal enrichment.\textsuperscript{115} In addition, the captains of the regiment complained that Mortimer was reserving the best forage sites for his own troop, rather than observing the custom of randomly assigning them to the quartermasters of each troop. Furthermore, Mortimer had borrowed two horses from an absent captain’s troop and placed them into his own for a muster inspection.\textsuperscript{116} The captain was recovering from a wound and was unable to stop the incident from happening. He was then upbraided by the inspecting officer for having more horses on his muster roll than present during the muster. Mortimer’s defence was that he borrowed the horses ‘to show the General as good a troop as he could.’ Since a captain’s troop was effectively his own property, to borrow horses from it without permission was tantamount to theft. The fact that Mortimer was unconcerned about the captain whose troop he had borrowed from, being interested only in his own reputation, showed that he lacked the care for those under his command required of a senior officer.

The final charge Mortimer was guilty of was the most inexcusable, since it was subverted the chain of command by misrepresenting a commanding general’s orders. When a regiment was ordered to receive additional bread in quarters, the costs of production and distribution were often borne by the regiment’s contingency funds, thereby reducing the profits available to the captains and colonels. Mortimer attempted to pay the contractors who supplied the bread a bribe for not providing it to the regiment, which was declined. He claimed that General Auverquerque, commander of the horse and dragoon regiments of the army, had given an order to this effect. Auverquerque supplied a statement to the court-martial that he had mentioned the bread in a meeting of regimental commanders, but had given no order to stop the bread supply, which was confirmed by other officers present. Mortimer had deliberately misinterpreted Auverquerque’s words to use as a mandate for cheating his soldiers out of their rations. This behaviour was so contradictory to an officer’s duty to his men and his ability to obey orders that it alone was sufficient for his cashiering. The court-martial found Mortimer ‘guilty of very high misdemeanours contrary to rules and discipline of war.’ He was cashiered and declared ‘unfit for His Majesty’s service.’ He was also ordered to remain under arrest until he had paid back the money he had made.

\textsuperscript{115} See \textit{HMC Portland V}, pp. 265-7 for complaints against Major-General Macartney for ‘ruining regiments’ by extracting their resources.

\textsuperscript{116} TNA, WO 71/122, fol. 17.
Mortimer’s court-martial demonstrates why officers needed a strong understanding of duty. It helped them to identify the moral implications of an action, and assess whether they were contrary to the interests of the service or not. Mortimer failed to understand that the equal distribution of resources to the entire regiment was his priority, not the quality of his own troop. He also thought that he could misrepresent his commanding officer’s orders to protect his own profits. Officers needed to acquire an element of self-sacrifice for the good of the service as a whole, despite the demands of a military career on their finances and well-being. This was an important aspect of duty which was not an express part of gentlemanly culture like honour, but was nevertheless just as integral to the ethos of the officer establishment. Officers who did not appreciate the purpose behind the orders being given to them, were likely to violate them in their own self-interest.

This emphasis on duty continued through to the end of the period examined. In 1739, a general court-martial examined the petition of Captain Hugh Mackay against the officer commanding Colonel Oglethorpe’s Foot (disbanded, 1748), recently formed for garrison duty in North America. Lieutenant-Colonel James Cochran had already accused Mackay of several charges of negligence and insubordination, of which Mackay had been cleared by a regimental court-martial. Mackay retaliated by complaining that Cochran had used recruits, soldiers and invalided veterans as labour to build a grand fence around his living quarters. The fencing materials had been reserved for constructing the soldiers’ own huts, which were neglected. Furthermore, these men received none of the musket training required for the officers to employ them for garrison duty. Cochran had further disobeyed orders by failing to transport invalids from Gibraltar to Georgia as ordered. Instead he sailed for Savannah, ‘to take care of his wines and other goods… under pretence of taking care of the regimental stores, [normally] the business and province of the quartermaster.’ Like Mortimer, Chochran’s actions served his personal interests whilst actively diminishing the capabilities of his troops. Whilst he was not guilty of financial embezzlement, he had nevertheless abused the discretion and judgement granted to him to overcome the administrative difficulties caused by colonial service. His conduct was considered by the Board of General Officers in London, and reviewed by George II, who expressed displeasure at the apparent trading of goods that Cochran was engaging in. This resulted in his indefinite suspension from service.

117 Oglethorpe’s Foot was disbanded in 1748, and the Black Watch gained the numerical designation of the 42nd Foot.
118 TNA, WO 71/24, fols. 9-10. ‘General Court Martial by warrant from his Excellency General Oglethorpe,’ St Simons, Georgia, 6 January, 1739
119 Ibid., fol. 7
120 TNA, WO 4/35, fol. 104. William Yonge to Colonel Oglethorpe, 1 July, 1739
The commission paper, annual editions of the articles of war, and intermittent regulations on specific subjects provided broad written rules for officers to follow when given financial and administrative responsibilities. Within this framework, regimental custom and practice offered a collective guide for daily duties, so that an officer who followed the example set by his fellow officers was unlikely to place his own personal wealth above either the welfare of his troops or the orders of his superiors. As long as an officer bore this in mind, he was permitted considerable freedom to run his company or regiment as he saw fit. It was only when his activities interfered and upset his fellow regimental officers to the point that they complained about him, that his financial and administrative decisions were no longer compatible with ‘the good of the service.’ The resulting regimental and general courts-martial provided a degree of self-regulation regarding the administrative services officers provided to the army. Whilst hardly a comprehensive means of keeping the officer establishment informed of current opinions on regimental economy, they did have a local impact, on the officers serving on the committees themselves, and the regiment to which the court-martialed officer belonged. Throughout the period, officers continued to lose sight of their duty and place their own personal gain over the welfare of their men, but the protests of their fellow officers and the resulting courts-martial seem to have kept the worst excesses in check.

4.7 Conclusion

The armies of eighteenth century Europe required their officers to combine the characteristics of leadership by example and administrative competence. Personal bravery and gentlemanly behaviour served to inspire men in a period when morale was a more decisive factor in winning wars than superior technology or markedly different tactics. On the other hand, officers required the patience and dedication to pay, equip and discipline their men properly. In the officer establishment of the British army, these characteristics were encouraged by an awareness of duty and honour. Duty was the more important characteristic to the army as it ensured units were competently organised and led. It also ensured that officers possessed the moral courage to make decisions that would benefit the army, and not just themselves. As gentlemen, officers were expected to possess honesty, self-control and consideration of other interests when they joined the army. As they rose through the ranks, their understanding of how these qualities applied to specific situations improved, particularly as they were given opportunities to judge each others’ performances through observation of their fellow regimental officers, and by sitting on courts-martial committees.
To carry out their duties, officers required confidence, which came from self-esteem and the respect of their peers. Personal honour provided this in a universal manner, since an officer learnt the meaning of it as a child, had access to literary discussions of it as an adult, and then experienced it on a daily basis through the social practices of their fellow officers. The importance of personal opinion among officers and the provocative nature of drinking in social spaces led to the testing of honour by means of the duel. Potentially there was everything to lose, from loss of reputation to an officer’s life. It also offered intangible rewards, such as proof of gentlemanly conduct and the respect of fellow officers. This kept duelling officers and witnesses in a keen state of awareness of what kind of character needed to be displayed to demonstrate officer status. Personal honour was therefore as highly prized as duty, despite its self-destructive tendencies. Courts-martial recognised this by considering the implications of dishonour in their examination of honour-related disputes. The sentences they imposed regarding quarrels and brawls were designed to officially confirm this dishonour, through suspension, reprimands or dismissal from the service. Only in cases of extreme provocation were officers involved in these incidents acquitted. By contrast, officers who fought duels, often over trivial disagreements, were allowed to keep their personal honour and reputations intact, as long as they followed the gentlemanly code of the duel.

Politeness, honour and duty collectively formed a standard of behaviour by which officers not only measured their own conduct, but also those of their peers. Not only did this raise the moral standards of the entire officer establishment, it also meant that superior officers had to demonstrate even higher levels of judgement to set an example to their subordinates. This also earned them the respect and reputation which came with fulfilling their duty in their rank, which could then be used as a character reference when seeking promotion. This can help to explain why length of service was equated with quality of service in the recommendations and memorials of officers seeking promotion. The fact that they had remained in their posts for so long implied that their understanding of duty and honour had protected them from falling foul of complaints from fellow officers and the sentences of courts-martial. Many of the officers who were cashiered in the case studies examined in this chapter were lieutenant-colonels or majors who had been placed in command in the absence of the colonel. Their performance was effectively a test of whether they would be suitable for permanent command one day. Colonels were permitted considerable leeway in the management of their regiments, and as long as the men were equipped and paid, and the officers dedicated and dutiful, there was no real cause for complaint. The fact that these field officers had lost the confidence of their subordinates, and were exploiting their men, meant that they had to be punished, to serve as a deterrent, and if necessary, to remove them from service.
General courts-martial enforced the discipline and reliability of the officer establishment regardless of other changes that affected its motivation, such as the transition from war to peace, career prospects, and the conditions of service, as explored in previous chapters. In this respect, the standards of gentlemanly behaviour, attention to duty and personal example continued from the wars against Louis XIV through to the reign of George II. In a period where character was more important to an officer’s capabilities than formal military training, it is not surprising that the early Hanoverian monarchs paid close attention to the quality of their officers’ behaviour. Their military backgrounds enabled them to appreciate the importance of duty and honour, but also of the role of justice in regulating the treatment of officers.
Chapter 5  Military Experience and Competencies

5.1 Introduction

The duty of officers in late seventeenth and early eighteenth century European armies, with its emphasis on recruiting and managing units, overcoming logistical shortcomings, and co-operating with supporting services, relied upon a range of skills and technical knowledge that had to be developed without institutionalized training. In addition to pitched battles, regiments of the British army might be engaged in garrison duties, siege warfare, suppressing riots and combating smuggling. The only formal instruction an officer received was the small arms drill and platoon level manoeuvres taught by the regimental adjutant to ensigns and cornets upon joining the army.¹ Military academies had been established in France and Italy during the seventeenth century, primarily to provide potential officers with training in languages, mathematics and the theory of gunnery and fortifications.² An official military academy in England was proposed by Daniel Defoe in 1697, and attempted in 1720, but was only founded in 1741, as the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich.³ From its conception the academy was intended primarily to provide practical skills useful for officers of the artillery and engineers, rather than officers of the horse, dragoon, and foot regiments.⁴ A private academy was run by the Huguenot Foubert family in Piccadilly since the 1680s, with some financial patronage from the monarch. Lessons included riding, fencing, mathematics and small arms exercise. These provided a foundation course in military skills to some army officers, like Lord North and Grey, who enrolled in 1694, aged 16.⁵ After the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, French military academies were popular with potential army officers until the middle of the century, when German academies began to attract candidates.⁶ In 1719, Lieutenant-General Cadogan recommended the French academy at Luneville to his son-in-law as ‘the best in Europe.’⁷ Nevertheless, only a minority of officers received formal training at military academies, and it was by no means considered a pre-requisite step to military service in the British army during this period. As an alternative, aristocratic families preferred to send their sons to elite schools such as Eton and St Paul’s, and sometimes to a university

¹ Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 272-3.
² Manning, Apprenticeship in Arms, p. 273.
⁵ Eds. Glozier and Onnekink, War, Religion and Service, pp. 32-3; Charles Kingford, The Early History of Piccadilly, (Cambridge, 1925) p. 126; Lawrence Smith, William North, Baron Grey of Rolleston, Earl North (1678-1734), ODNB.
⁶ Eds. Linch and McCormack, Britain’s Soldiers, p. 33.
afterwards. The majority sent their sons directly into the army as gentlemen volunteers, or as commissioned officers, as soon as they were old enough.

This dearth of formal training raises the question of how important the development of skills was to the officer establishment. Previous historians have accepted the practical nature of an officer’s duties at face value. For David Chandler, officers learnt their profession ‘at the cannon’s mouth.’ Alan Guy writes that ‘drill and tactics were straightforward at the level most regimental officers were expected to carry them out; military accounting could be learned on the job… theirs was at bottom a practical, non-theoretical training regimen.’ Whilst this was certainly true of these basic duties, they still required a certain competence in leadership and arithmetic that was supposedly present in officers before they joined. Even ensigns and lieutenants were expected occasionally to command independently, as recruiting officers, marching detachments to quarters, or supervising horses and clothing on board transports. In instances of widespread absenteeism or emergency, subalterns might receive additional tasks, such as serving on regimental courts-martial or enforcing quarantine against ships arriving from infected territories. Staff officers and active generals drew upon an advanced level of leadership, generalship and administration, none of which were developed according to any reliable method through regimental service alone. In addition to their regimental ranks, many senior officers also served in diplomatic posts, as governors of forts, or with the Board of Ordnance. These activities demanded a higher command of languages, management, general

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9 Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 76. See also Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 272

10 Chandler, The Oxford History of the British Army, pp. 100-1.


13 Regimental officers serving with the Ordnance included Captain Richard King of the Royal Scots Fusiliers (21st Foot); Captain Hanway of Gore’s Foot (disbanded 1713), and Captain Bennet of Sabine’s Foot (23rd Foot). See Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 66; TNA, WO 4/6, p.36. St John to Mr Dodington, Whitehall, 29 October, 1707; and BL, Add MS 61283, fol. 145. Petition of Joseph Bennet to the Duke of Marlborough, London, 12 May, 1710.
knowledge or technical expertise. Finally, the basic training offered to British army officers does not square with the supposedly higher level of expertise that was expected of and encouraged by their rivals in the French army.\textsuperscript{14} The French army was acknowledged by several English authors of military publications to have been the leader in European warfare until the War of the Spanish Succession.\textsuperscript{15} This led to the translation of several French military treatises in the hopes that British officers might equal their French counterparts. For example, the French treatise \textit{The Art of War in Four Parts} suggested that captains of foot should be experienced in the theory and practice of siege warfare, because ‘although these are the skills of an engineer, captains should know these manoeuvres and duties because their co-operation with engineers would make a siege more efficient.’\textsuperscript{16} Given the wide range of responsibilities officers fulfilled and the diversity of skills needed to carry them out, it should not be assumed that learning drill and accounting within the regiment was sufficient for the officer establishment to acquire the competencies necessary to achieve the successes that it did.

As examined in the previous chapters of this thesis, the regimental system, the conditions of service, patronage networks, and the practise of honour and duty, all had an impact on the career path and outlook of any one officer. This also extended to the opportunities for acquiring experience and knowledge of the service. For example, a unit on garrison duty in North America for decades at a time was unlikely to offer a varied career to its officers. By contrast, a regiment on annual rotation in England might assist excise officers against smugglers or suppress riots in different locations, before deploying to Ireland, or Minorca and Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{17} However, an absentee regimental officer might be ignorant of the most basic skills needed to be a competent officer, such as knowing the names of the soldiers in his company.\textsuperscript{18} On the other hand he might be attached to the general staff, serving as an

\textsuperscript{14} Lynn, \textit{Giant of the Grand Siècle}, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{15} One author wrote that ‘all the world must own, that in the last century, France could justly boast of great generals... it cannot but be of great importance to know the strength and weakness of so puissant and subtle an enemy as France is known to be.’ Another wrote that ‘the operations of the present war consist chiefly in sieges... fortifications are a French invention, things invented in France are likely to be expressed in French terms; ergo, he who gives an account of the conduct and success of the present war, will be frequently liable to make use of French terms.’ See A.R., \textit{The Accomplished Officer, by way of conversation between Philarmus and Bellarchus}, (London, 1706), preface; and Anon, \textit{The Spectator Inspected: Or a Letter to the Spectator from an Officer in the Army in Flanders, occasioned by The Spectator of the 8th of Sept. 1711}, (London, 1711), pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{The Art of War in four parts}, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{17} For examples of colonial garrison duty, see TNA, WO 4/4, pp. 46-7. St-John to Charles Hedges, 6 December, 1705; and WO 4/35, fol. 40. William Yonge to John Sconepe, Whitehall, 6 April, 1739; SP 41/6, fol. 441. William Strickland to Lord Harrington, Whitehall, 5 December, 1730. For examples of rotation of regiments in Britain, see Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, pp. 398-9, 410. For smuggling and anti-rioting see Ibid., pp. 31, 36; and Hayter, \textit{The Army and the Crowd}, pp. 20-1.
\textsuperscript{18} For the importance of captains and their subordinate officers to know the names of their soldiers, see \textit{Art of War in Four Parts}, pp. 2, 11; Guy, \textit{Oeconomy and Discipline}, p.13
aide de camp, brigade-major, or deputy-governor of a fort. These appointments offered insight into command level operations that went beyond the running of a single company or regiment. Clearly there was great variation in the experience and expertise available to an officer in any one rank or branch of service. It is therefore necessary for historians to analyse not only the difference in competence and learning among officers of a similar cohort or theatre of operations, but also the variations across different establishments and the difference between war and peace. The benefit of this focus lies in a stronger understanding of the multiplicity of functions the army played throughout the fifty year period, and the possible necessity of sacrificing peak performance in one function for the fulfilment of another.

The other half to this emphasis on individual experience and initiative was the need of the army administration to monitor and control those habits and practices of the officer establishment that negatively impacted on the army’s capabilities. Absenteeism, abuses of regimental resources, and persistent failure to recruit, clothe and equip the regiment all required firm responses from senior officers, civil officials, and the monarch. Despite the success of the army during the Wars against Louis XIV, army commanders and the emerging War Office never found ways to satisfactorily address these problems, let alone identify them before they became critical. Throughout the period, the two primary remedies available were to punish individual officers, which had an immediate but limited effect, or to issue army-wide orders, whose effectiveness depended on the will of officials to enforce them and the willingness of the officers to co-operate. The key difficulty lay in developing the existing practices of musters and reviews to provide the information necessary to evaluate the condition of regiments evenly and across an establishment, and to identify officers failing in their duty. It was vital for the personnel of the army administration to have a quantitative record of the officer establishment, which could offer a comparative analysis of different regiments and officers at a glance.

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19 For an example of the duties of an aide de camp and other staff roles, see Stansfield, ‘Early Modern Systems of Command,’ pp. 183-6
21 For an introduction to the ‘Friction of Peace,’ see Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 192-3
This chapter examines what competencies were required of army officers to carry out their duties, as well as how and where they acquired these competencies. It places this development of individual officers and the whole establishment over time within the wider context of the fiscal military state, by analysing their contribution to the British army’s efficacy and competitiveness. Whether the focus was on wartime campaigns, or the projection of power in peacetime, the key concerns of the army administration remained constant. They included the raising of manpower, the maintenance of units and their equipment, and the co-ordination of these units’ activities with military and civil authorities. The chapter also examines the emergence of more sophisticated methods of collecting information on regimental officers under George I and George II, and how these facilitated their efforts to create a minimum standard of professionalism within the officer establishment.

5.2 Independent Learning

Although adjutants taught ensigns and cornets small arms drill and the words of command, they were also published with minor variations at least twelve times during the period. Some of these were official attempts to enforce a standard set of drills among the regiments on a particular establishment. This was the case with *The Duke of Marlborough’s New Exercise of Firelocks and Bayonets*, in use with the army in Flanders since 1708. Its use was extended to foot regiments on the Irish establishment the same year and recirculated in 1713. Similar attempts were made by George I and George II for the British establishment in 1716 and 1728. Carrying official approval, officers were expected to familiarise themselves with their details. Typically reduced in size to fit into a pocket, drill books offered an instant reference source for a variety of possible circumstances. An officer might witness such drills spoken and executed regularly, but the drill book allowed him to have at hand the many commands and the order in which they were made, rather than relying on observation alone. Drill books could refresh the memories of officers returning to their posts after a period of absence. In addition, these books would have been useful for officers transferring between the foot, dragoons and horse, particularly among field officers, for whom seeking out the adjutant for instruction like a

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22 These included Anon, *The Exercise of the Foot, with the Evolutions*, (1693); Sir Thomas Livingstone, *The exercise of the dragoons both on horse-back and on foot* (London, 1693); Anon, *The Exercise of the Foot: with the evolutions ... to which is added the exercise of the horse, granadiers of horse, and dragoons*, (London, 1701); and Anon, *Exercise for the horse, dragoon and foot forces*, (1728). For a full analysis of drill, see Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 172-95.


lowly ensign or cornet would have been embarrassing. A regimental commander also needed to spot flaws in the handling of the troops by his junior officers. Drill books therefore facilitated the learning and standards of drill for regimental officers of all ranks and backgrounds.  

Whereas drill books were directly applicable to training, inspecting and manoeuvring troops, warfare was considered to be as much an art as a science during this period. The more senior an officer became, the greater the need to understand the campaigns of the great captains of the past, and to apply their examples to situations they might encounter themselves. In addition to the traditional genres of commentaries and biographies of military figures from antiquity onwards, a new range of contemporary military publications emerged during the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession. They included military treatises, campaign histories, battle maps and multiple editions of a military dictionary. The prefaces of these publications encouraged their use by both officers and the public. For some authors, this was an attempt to profit from public interest generated by the wars. For others however, the intention was to update drills and translate the practical advice of French officers to raise the professionalism of British officers. Published in 1702, soon after the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, *The Compleat Gentleman Soldier* warned that ‘The necessity and usefulness of a treatise on military discipline and the arts, is too evident to need proof... we never had greater occasion, to arm ourselves with resolution and warlike knowledge of the military arts than in the present juncture.’ Translated from the French and published in 1707 and in 1726, the translator of *The Art of War in Four Parts* wrote that ‘would soldiers at their leisure times apply themselves to a little more reading, no doubt is to be made, that it would better capacitate them for officers, and officers would be better fitted for higher posts.’ Similarly, Humphrey Bland’s *A Treatise on Military Discipline* was first published in 1727 to ensure that the experience and practice developed during the War of the Spanish Succession was not lost to subsequent generations of officers.

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25 Speaking for the majority of the eighteenth century, Houlding suggests that ‘if he [the officer] were wise, he would refer repeatedly to his primers and keep a commonplace book... containing extracts taken from the regulations.’ Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 272.


27 For examples see, Anon, *The Exact Narrative of the Conflict at Dunkeld, betwixt the Earl of Angus’ Regiment and the rebels, collected from several officers of that regiment*, (London, 1689); A new map of the seat of war in ye counties of Namur and Hainault..., for the French King for his use, (1692); *The Incampments of ye Imperialists and French in Italy since last April*, (1701); *The History of the Campaign in Flanders in the year 1708...to which is prefix’d a map of Lille, and adjacent countries*, (London, 1709); Anon, *A Military and Sea Dictionary*, (London, 1702, 1704, 1708, 1711). Some editions also included the drill book, *The New Exercise for Firelocks and Bayonets*.


29 *The Art of War in Four Parts*, ii.

Military treatises discussed a range of contemporary military topics not covered in the drill books, such as the management of soldiers, how to build and besiege fortifications, the conduct of raids and patrols, and ruses of war. They also encouraged the study of arithmetic, at least as far as the extraction of the square root, without which it ‘is very hard and difficult to divide armies into regiments, and so companies into equal number, or to quantify the proportions of provisions, or ammunition.’ Some also had the foot and horse drills included at the back, bridging the gap between theory and practice. Military maps were published for general use, including maps of recent theatres of war, fortresses and battles. Small maps were often included in treatises, biographies and histories to illustrate the manoeuvres and deployments of armies. Examining these maps could help familiarise an officer with drawing maps himself, which was a skill that was recommended by The Accomplished Officer. They could also improve his map-reading abilities, which would be of use on campaign, or in peacetime, as when following a route of march sent from the War Office.

Over the early eighteenth century, army officers and those claiming to be army officers translated multiple memoirs and maxims of important commanders of European armies from the campaigns of Charles V in the sixteenth century and Turenne and Montecuculi in the late seventeenth century, to Marshal Tallard and Prince Eugene in the War of the Spanish Succession. The appearance of these...
works suggests that some British officers recognised the contribution of these commanders to general military theory, and the value of making them available to other officers interested in learning more about the art of war. *The Accomplished Officer* considered reading such works to be an essential part of an officer’s education, since ‘by history he becomes acquainted with famous battles, retreats, sieges, and the circumstances of each. He finds out the epochs of the art of war, and models to go by.’

Similarly, *A Relation or Journal of the Campaigns of the Maréchal Turenne*, (1732), suggested ‘that the perusal of this little book might be of great use to officers who have served with application and will take the trouble to read it with some application.’ Officers were also encouraged to combine their studies of military history with treatises. Published in 1740, Brigadier Adam Williamson’s *Maxims of Turenne* recommended that Bland’s *Treatise on Military Discipline* ‘should be carefully read by all young officers, before they study or attend to the consideration of these maxims.’ Like Bland’s *Treatise*, it was written from a growing awareness of the younger officers’ lack of combat experience. To make Marshal Turenne’s advice more relevant to these officers, Williamson added his own observations from his service as aide to Lieutenant-General Meredith during the War of the Spanish Succession.

These works provided the officer establishment with access to resources primarily aimed at developing their understanding of warfare in practice and theory. As with their finances and health, officers were expected to be self-sufficient when it came to improving their education. As part of a social group that had time for and engaged in scholarship, the absorption of practical knowledge from written works, particularly on scientific subjects, would have been a recognisable activity. Indeed, until regimental libraries appeared in the late nineteenth century, officers had to procure these works for themselves. Serving as a gentleman volunteer in Minorca in 1739, Edward Phillips asked his cousin, Cornet Hugh Whitefoord, to send him a military dictionary from Britain.

Fathers and relatives encouraged young officers to concentrate on physical and academic pursuits when not attending to their duties. Whilst serving as a gentleman volunteer in 1732, John Mackenzie’s father wrote to him that ‘I beg it of you to get acquainted with the French and other languages you can attain to and get books concerning you and read as well all manner of history and anything else [that] can accomplish

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37 *The Accomplished Officer*, p. 13.
38 *A Relation or Journal*, pp. 2-3. Out of a total of 63 subscribers to the first edition, 48 were army officers. See *Ibid.*, pp. 3-7
you for society, and not neglect by any means to learn all the art of broad or small sword.”

Mackenzie’s father was suggesting the basic accomplishments necessary for his son to be considered a gentleman in character, since French was the universal language of European courts and diplomats, and as seen above, history provided examples to emulate. As seen in Chapter 4, fencing with the small sword encouraged masculine behaviour that was inherent to a gentleman’s identity, such as the means to defend his honour in a duel. The broad sword was a traditional weapon among Scottish military families, and of greater effectiveness in combat than a small sword. The challenge for young officers was to find the will to study with the many distractions of regimental life. Whilst serving in Flanders in 1709, Lieutenant William Hayes was asked by Henry Watkins, Marlborough’s deputy Judge Advocate General, to give guidance to his nephew, a seventeen year old ensign in the same regiment. Lieutenant Hayes noted that that his protégé was ‘fond of labour and fatigue and military exercises, but averse to study and impatient of fixed thoughts. I have pressed him to learn French, but in vain… I doubt not but he will make a good man, we have all our periods of liberty.’

Independent learning was considered an important part of an officer’s training, although not all officers possessed the self-discipline to benefit from it. The aim was to develop a well rounded officer, with some mathematical proficiency, command of one or more languages, awareness of history, and some ability to ride a horse and handle a sword. Those that were able to put their skills to practice were at an advantage over their fellow officers, as well as adding to the overall capabilities of their units. The fact that many of these officers were themselves enthusiastic about passing on their military knowledge to successive generations of officers through published works, suggests an emerging degree of responsibility toward the competence of the officer establishment as a whole, rather than any one regiment or cohort. It does not seem to have been essential to the effectiveness of a company or regiment, or the officer establishment, that all officers possessed the recommended skills to the highest standards. As long as the ethos of independent learning produced enough officers that had them to a sufficient level, there was no need to extend formal training beyond small arms-drill, or to require qualifications based on examinations, as in other professions. It could in fact be argued that the absence of stringent entry requirements into the officer establishment brought in a broad range of talents, from experienced riders and swordsmen to linguists and students of history. This range included a smaller proportion of officers with the skills and aptitude for the more demanding posts and appointments, such as brigade-major or quartermaster-general. To deliver its wide range of functions, the officer establishment needed a greater range of skills but to a more general standard

43 BL, Add MS 39189, fol. 11. Kenneth Mackenzie to John Mackenzie, Inverness, circa 1732.
44 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.
than the exacting requirements of other professions, such as the navy, medicine and law.\textsuperscript{46} Independent learning provided the basis for this general standard, as well as an unofficial incentive to those officers who did apply themselves, by making them more capable officers than those who did not.

5.3 Absenteeism and the Crown’s Response

The managerial role that regimental officers fulfilled meant that their presence among their soldiers and NCOs was essential for prolonged periods. A company or troop with the standard complement of three officers might be able to function in the short-term without one or possibly two of its officers, but the energy available for supervising the troops in all aspects of their welfare and discipline would naturally be smaller. Furthermore, this decline in quality would be repeated throughout the regiment’s companies if they also had their officer complements reduced by absentee officers. In the longer term, without at least an experienced major or lieutenant-colonel acting as the ‘officer commanding in chief,’ the regiment would lack the experience to distribute funds allocated from the government or organise the provision of clothing and equipment. Since colonels were frequently away from their regiments, often on authorized military or parliamentary business, it was also necessary for the Secretary at War to know who was in actual command of the unit. Consequently, the routine collection of information from regiments was essential for the army administration, in order to establish the capabilities of the unit for planning purposes, and to ensure that actual strengths matched the army estimates voted for by parliament.

The most basic information needed was how many officers were present with their regiments, whether those absent had obtained leave or not, and if so, for what purpose. Where officers were absent on regimental duty such as recruiting, buying horses or transporting clothing, the various aspects of a regiment that were currently lacking could be considered to be in the process of rectification.\textsuperscript{47} Officers assisting the general staff such as aides might not be benefiting the regiment from behind the scenes, but they were learning about operations and helping the army in general. By contrast, officers without leave, or abusing what leave they were given, were adding to the burdens

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\textsuperscript{46} For example, in the navy, an officer-candidate had to pass the naval entrance exam and have served aboard a Royal Navy vessel for at least four years in 1703, rising to six in 1729. See Daniel Baugh, \textit{British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole}, (Princeton, 1965), p. 101.

\textsuperscript{47} As indicated by lists of recruiting officers, etc. See BL, Add MS 61319, fol. 40 (i). ‘A list of the officers of the Royal Scots Dragoons for recruiting men in Scotland and Ireland and buying horses in England,’ 1707;
of those officers who were at their posts, and possibly losing their respect. The difficulty lay not only in obtaining this information from all regiments on a particular establishment or on campaign, but also in devising effective measures to eliminate the abuses connected with absenteeism altogether.

The limited bureaucratic apparatus at the beginning of the Nine Years War was unable to address the complaints of senior officers. Despite procedures issued by the War Office requiring officers to obtain leave from their colonels and to register their absence with the commissary of musters, many simply left their posts without authorization. Without enough officers, the discipline of a regiment inevitably declined. Unpaid and under-officered, the soldiers of the Earl of Leven’s Foot (25th Foot) mutinied in 1692. Fully half of the regiment’s 12 company commanders were absent with no legitimate reason. In reporting the situation to the Secretary for the Southern Department, the Earl of Monmouth observed that ‘notwithstanding the regiment was mustered complete but six weeks ago, there are six captains missing, that are making their recruits.’

Monmouth’s puzzlement is understandable, since it would be unlikely that a regiment in England would lose so many men in six weeks as to send six officers away to recruit. Reporting on two regiments embarking at Portsmouth the same year, Monmouth noted that one had seven captains out of its twelve, and another only three.

In the absence of central control over officers’ activities, the only real defence against these abuses lay with the colonels. As Secretary at War, Blathwayt issued circulars to colonels and even summoned some to attend the Queen in Council, where they were ordered to return to their units and prepare returns on absentee officers under their command. Since some colonels were given blank commissions with which to appoint officers at their own discretion, it was likely that they felt more for the wishes of these friends and kinsmen than the orders of the Secretary at War. When combined with a weak-willed colonel, subordinates might even take advantage of their commanding officer. Colonel Harry Mordaunt complained to Blathwayt in 1694 that he found it impossible to refuse the requests of his subordinates, as ‘Being too good natured... my officers take too great a liberty of

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48 For example, when Major-General Tatton reprimanded Ensign Gore for prolonged absenteeism in 1717, he pointed out that ‘the officers would take it ill, if he asked for further leave, as they had done his duty among them for twelve months altogether.’ See BL, Add MS 61336, fols. 44-5. ‘Court-martial of Ensign Gore,’ 30 September, 1717.

49 Childs, British Army of William III, p. 51.

50 HMC Finch II, p. 85. Earl of Monmouth to Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham, 31 April, 1692.

51 Ibid., pp. 97-8. Monmouth to Nottingham, 23 April, 1692.

52 Ibid., pp. 99-100. Nottingham to Blathwayt, Whitehall, April 26, 1692; TNA, WO 5/5, fol. 77. Blathwayt to various colonels, 20 February, 1689.
absenting themselves from their posts. Therefore that I would desire you send me a private order to send them all over.’

Chronic absenteeism continued to affect the performance of regiments during the War of the Spanish Succession. Nevertheless, multiple reports compiled for regiments in Flanders seem to suggest that unauthorized absenteeism was rare. For example, in 1707, a typical inspector’s report on absenteeism consisted simply of ‘Sir, there was no officer absent last campaign either of the Earl of Stair’s regiment of dragoons or Colonel Preston’s regiment of foot.’ However, historians should not necessarily accept reports like this at face value. Without tables listing the names and ranks of the officers, and entries as to whether each one was present or not, with notes describing the reasons for their absence if not, it is easy to assume that a regiment was fully officered for months at a time. In reality, sickness, recruiting and the exodus of officers to sit in parliament for the winter meant that a regiment in Flanders always had absentee officers, before those on leave for private reasons are even counted. It seems that officers were no longer foolish enough to simply leave their regiments without permission, but this does not mean that they were returning promptly once their leave had expired, or that regiments were fully manned as claimed. The general orders circulated by the Secretary at War to regimental colonels at Marlborough’s request, and the orders Marlborough sent to his subordinate generals when he left each winter for England, suggest that absenteeism was a recurring problem in Flanders, despite the reports on attendance in individual regiments. For example, during the spring of 1704, before the victory at Blenheim, the lack of officers in Flanders caused Lieutenant-General Cutts to report to Marlborough that ‘the few officers present with the forces on this side of the water is a very great prejudice to the service.’

As an explanation for this discrepancy, it appears that the expanded patronage networks of the War of the Spanish Succession enabled officers to apply for and receive leave more freely, provided they

53 BL, Add MS 21552, fols. 5-6. Colonel Harry Mordaunt to Blathwayt, 1 January, 1694.
54 Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 46; Fortescue, History of the British Army, p. 576.
55 For examples see BL Add MS 61319, fols. 5, 9, 27; 40 (ii), Add MS 61320, fols. 34, 40, 41, 50, 57.
56 BL, Add MS 61319, fol. 43. P. Gordon to Adam Cardonnel, 11 December, 1707.
57 For examples, compare the above report with Appendices 5 and 6.
58 HMC Portland IV, p. 264. Newsletter, October, 1705.
followed the correct procedures to obtain it.\textsuperscript{61} Officers with access to the networks of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland or the Secretary at War could fast track their applications through the language of patron-client relationships.\textsuperscript{62} For example, Captain Thomas Coningsby wrote to Edward Southwell, the Lord Lieutenant’s secretary that ‘I hope you will favour me so far as to get me a licence for to stay three months after the regiment’s shipping off, to get my father’s blessing and to desire my relations to intercede with him to be reconciled to me and to take my leave of all the rest of them in England.’\textsuperscript{63} In 1707, Colonel Dobbins’s friendship with Sir Robert Harley, then Secretary for the North, ensured that his application for leave was hastened by the Secretary at War, Henry St John. St John apologized to Dobbins for the delay in his application, as he was unusually busy, but assured him that ‘I will now take an opportunity in a short time to move Her Majesty for leave for you to come to town.’\textsuperscript{64} Alternatively, officers could circumvent their colonels’ permission and request leave direct from army commanders such as Marlborough. Seemingly powerless to refuse applications for leave in 1709, Colonel Strathnaver wrote to Marlborough that ‘being informed that there are some of the officers of my regiment desiring leave to be absent from their posts, I presume to give your Grace the trouble to prevent the same lest it should incapacitate my regiment in the field this ensuing campaign, there already being some of them absent on account of their being sick.’\textsuperscript{65}

By contrast, the War Office was under no illusions about absenteeism among regiments in Portugal and Spain. Officers of units serving in the Peninsula were even less inclined to leave England on their own initiative than those whose regiments were in Flanders. This prompted the Secretary at War in 1704 to organise transportation for them as a group, with precise instructions for embarkation and the threat of punishment. St John ordered that ‘all officers belonging to the regiments in Portugal who are now in England do repair forthwith to Falmouth, as to be there on the 23rd instant in order to take their passage in the packet boat that goes then for Lisbon, upon pain of having their commissions suspended in case they do not go by that opportunity.’\textsuperscript{66} Unlike the army in Flanders, the War Office

\textsuperscript{61} Stansfield notes that many junior officers who obtained prolonged leave were younger relatives of senior officers. See Stansfield, ‘Early Modern Systems of Command,’ pp. 64-5. This is supported by the frequency with which leave was granted from 1704-1710. See TNA, WO 25/3180 and WO 25/3181 for examples.

\textsuperscript{62} According to Fortescue, Secretaries at War would grant leaves of absence ‘as a matter of jobbery in the case of a friend.’ \textit{History of the British Army}, p. 576.

\textsuperscript{63} BL, Add MS 38172, fols. 37-8, Thomas Coningsby to Southwell, Tralée, 25 March, 1705.

\textsuperscript{64} TNA, WO 4/5, p.144. St John to Colonel Dobbins, 11 February, 1707. For another example of Dobbins’ influence with Harley, see Chapter 3, section 3.3 ‘The Patronage Network of the Duke of Marlborough.’ For other examples, see WO 4/10, p. 88. George Granville to Major-General Whetham, Whitehall, 30 December, 1710.

\textsuperscript{65} BL, Add MS 61288, fol. 85. Colonel Strathnaver to Marlborough, Antwerp, 13 March, 1709.

\textsuperscript{66} TNA, WO 4/3, fols. 10-11, St John to Edward Southwell, Whitehall, 13 May, 1704.
was able to obtain a single list of all officers absent from regiments serving in the peninsula in some years, with reasons for their absence.\textsuperscript{67}

With this information, the Secretary at War was occasionally able to chase up specific officers and ensure that they embarked upon the transports provided for them. After identifying Lieutenant Bramber as an absentee officer from the 1705 list, St John informed him that ‘Sir, His Royal Highness does order that you and all the other commission and non-commission officers of the Lord Charlemont’s, Col. Caulfield’s, and Brigadier Gorge’s regiments that came from Portugal, do immediately repair to Portsmouth, and apply to Capt. Price commander of Her Majesty’s ship the Somerset, in order to your passage to Lisbon with the ships going thither, from whence you are to take the first opportunity of repairing to your respective regiments.’\textsuperscript{68} The War Office’s responses to absentee officers were varied. Sometimes the Secretary at War wrote a letter to an individual officer, as with Lieutenant Bramber, but sometimes the task was delegated to a regiment’s agent, presumably because he knew of the absent officers’ whereabouts better than the Secretary at War.\textsuperscript{69} In 1711, Lieutenant-General Echlin complained to the Queen that Cornet Hay of his regiment remained in London, ‘although he has had repeated orders both from himself and his lieutenant-colonel to repair to his quarters in North Britain.’ On Anne’s recommendation the Secretary at War ordered an immediate court-martial on the charge of disobeying orders.\textsuperscript{70} One further abuse that emerged from absenteeism was that vacancies in regiments in the Iberian peninsula were going to officers in England rather than those actually serving there. In 1708, the commander of the forces in Portugal, the Earl of Galway, blamed this on ‘the avarice of the colonels, who keep almost all in England, and must sell their vacancies there. Tis most certainly for Her Majesty’s service that they should be sent to their duty, or if they are allowed to be absent they should have no direction of their regiments which they are so much strangers to.’\textsuperscript{71}

The wars against Louis XIV marked a period in which a large proportion of army officers were absent from their posts, and remained a step ahead of the army administration’s attempt to catch up with their abuses. Many officers deserved leave for a range of reasons, but the ease with which individual

\textsuperscript{67} SP 41/3, fol. 61i. ‘List of Officers belonging to the Forces in Catalonia and Gibraltar that are not with their regiments,’ 1705. See also TNA, SP 41/3, p. 89. ‘List of the officers belonging to the several regiments hereunder mentioned in Spain and Portugal who are absent from their commands, with reason for their absence’; WO 4/10, p. 128. George Granville to St John, Whitehall, 20 January, 1710.

\textsuperscript{68} TNA, WO 4/4, p. 96. St-John to Lieutenant Bramber, Whitehall, 9 January, 1706.

\textsuperscript{69} TNA, WO 4/9, p. 157. Walpole to Mr Philpott, 6 September, 1709.

\textsuperscript{70} TNA, WO 72/1. ‘Extract of the report of the House of Commons on false musters and other abuses, to be laid before the Board of General Officers,’ Whitehall, 4 July, 1711.

\textsuperscript{71} TNA, WO 89/2, Lisbon, 13 April, 1708.
officers obtained it meant that regiments could not easily control how many officers were absent, or when they would return. The problem was that the army administration had not yet formed a policy regarding absenteeism which could penetrate the attitude of the officer establishment towards regimental attendance, nor did it have the apparatus to collect the necessary information routinely.

By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the War Office had developed its administrative control over the army to a greater extent than before.72 From 1716, George I began appointing generals as reviewing officers, and personally reviewing regiments when possible.73 This gave the army administration an opportunity to monitor its personnel to a greater degree. From the early 1720s, reviewing officers began to compile detailed information into the state of dispersed units or whole regiments, for both the British and the Irish establishments. Consisting of tables and brief notes, they included information on the experience and attendance of officers. They offered the Secretary at War and the King an appraisal of a regiment’s officers that could be compared with those of other units, or of the same unit over a period of time.74 Although basic compared with returns made later in the century, they offered the first reliable measure of the nature of absenteeism since the sporadic lists for the regiments in the peninsula during the War of the Spanish Succession.

Historians have acknowledged the efforts of the early Hanoverian monarchs to address absenteeism, in particular Hayes and Houlding.75 However, the full extent of their measures has not been recognised, nor has its impact on the professionalism of the officer establishment been analysed. Hayes only looked at the general order published in the London Gazette by George I in 1717, titled ‘orders for the attendance of officers in their quarters.’ He dismissed this order, requiring commanding officers of regiments to return lists of absent officers within 15 days as ‘an outburst prompted by no other motive than righteous indignation.’76 If this was the case, then it would be unlikely that the same order would be repeated in 1724, and accompanied by more direct measures than in 1717.77 The order was not circulated in the London Gazette in 1724, but sent to the colonels of each regiment. In addition, the Secretary at War instructed the Commissary-General to only register officers with up to date licences to be absent. Furthermore he was ‘... to signify to the commanding officer and the rest

72 See section 1.2, ‘The Growth of the War Office and the Board of General Officers.’
73 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 100
74 For the English establishment, see Appendix 2, ‘A report of the three regiments of horse and dragoons reviewed by Major General Evans in 1721.’ For the Irish Establishment, see Appendix 3, ‘A state of seven troops of the Royal Irish Dragoons (5th Dragoons).’
75 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 60; Hayes, ‘The Royal House of Hanover,’ pp. 342-3
76 Hayes, ‘The Royal House of Hanover’ p. 343
77 TNA, WO 4/25, p. 19. Pelham to the Duke of Bolton. Like letters to other colonels of regiments on the British establishment, Whitehall, 7 May, 1724
of the officers of each regiment at the next muster that for the future His Majesty expects a strict compliance with these orders and that regular returns be made to the Secretary at War pursuant to their intent and meaning.\textsuperscript{78} Furthermore, licences granted by colonels were to be reproduced in triplicate, one being sent to the War Office, another to where the absent officer was staying, and the third to be kept with the regiment, to be shown to the commissary when the unit was mustered. These new procedures took much of the process out of the absentee officer’s hands, and required several officials to be aware of his absence, and when his leave expired.

In the same year, greater care was being taken to ensure that a unit did not lose too many of its officers through requests for absenteeism. For example, whilst leave was granted to Lieutenant Draper for urgent personal reasons, his company commander, Captain Alerhand, was informed that ‘it is for His Majesty’s service that you do immediately repair to your command, that the company may be taken care of and not be left without a proper officer.’\textsuperscript{79} Individual officers were also being identified and reprimanded for neglect of their duty. When Major-General Pearce, colonel of a regiment in Gibraltar, complained to Pelham that his subordinate, Lieutenant Purcell, was deliberately making himself scarce in England to avoid having to travel to Gibraltar with the regiment’s clothing and recruits, Pelham informed Purcell that ‘I am thereupon commanded by His Majesty to acquaint you forthwith to repair to your duty, by going over in the same vessel which is hired to carry the clothing and recruits to Gibraltar, upon pain of His Majesty’s displeasure.’\textsuperscript{80} The fact that Purcell’s behaviour had been reported directly to George I meant that he had no alternative but to do his duty, or risk being summarily dismissed in accordance with the sovereign’s prerogative powers. Whilst the King was strict on officers who were absent without an excuse, he was also willing to accommodate deserving cases, albeit on his own terms. For example, when George I noticed that Lieutenant Mowbury was absent from a review, he intended to replace him with another officer. His fellow officers intervened with the Secretary at War, explaining that he was too sick to be present. Pelham informed Mowbury that rather than dismissing him from the service entirely, the King had decided to transfer him to a company of invalids, whilst his post was to be filled by an officer capable of attending it in person.\textsuperscript{81}

At the same time as George I and the War Office were tackling absenteeism on the English establishment, officers serving on the Irish establishment were being subject to similar measures from

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid, p. 17. Pelham to Sir William Strickland, Commissary-General of Musters, 6 May, 1724
\textsuperscript{79} TNA, WO 4/25, p. 12. Pelham to Captain Alerhand, Whitehall, 28 April, 1724. For another similar case, see Ibid., p. 11. Arnold to Lieutenant-Colonel Reading, Whitehall, 26 April, 1724.
\textsuperscript{80} TNA, WO 4/25, p. 102. Pelham to Lieutenant Purcell, Whitehall, 10 September, 1724.
\textsuperscript{81} TNA, WO 4/25, p. 209. Pelham to Lieutenant Mowbury, Whitehall, 10 January, 1725.
the Commander in Chief of the forces in Ireland, Lieutenant-General Viscount Shannon. General officers were overcoming the dispersal of regiments into small detachments across Ireland to review them in a manner that was usually as detailed as those in England. From these it was possible at a glance to see which absent officers had leave, and which did not. Those taken in 1725 reveal an average of one to three regimental officers who were absent without leave, usually including the colonel. Nevertheless, the musters taken of regiments in Ireland in 1725 showed absenteeism to be sufficiently high to require the circulation of a general order, stating that ‘... no officer is upon any pretence whatsoever, to absent himself from his garrison or quarter, without special licence in writing first obtained from us, otherwise they must expect to be answerable for their disobedience.’ In addition, draft regulations were drawn up, allowing officers to be absent for a maximum of four months, and needing special permission to leave Ireland. Foot regiments were to have at least one field officer and two thirds of their captains present, precisely matching the requirements set out in the ‘orders for the attendance of officers in their quarters’ that applied to the British establishment.

George II continued his father’s habit of personally viewing reports on regiments on the English establishment and personally granting licences to be absent. However, George II was more insistent that officers take no more leave than was granted. In 1731, William Strickland, the Secretary at War, observed that Lieutenant Churchill’s leave had expired, and ordered him to his post in Jamaica. Although Churchill had done nothing to suggest otherwise, Strickland hastened his departure by informing him that ‘that to prevent your delay you are to embark on board the first ship that sails from hence to that island, on pain of being cashiered from His Majesty’s Service.’ Similarly, Ensign Philbridge of Colonel Fielding’s regiment of invalids was granted two month’s leave in the same year, on condition that if he did not return to his post afterwards, he would be superseded. Despite the efforts of George II, absenteeism was a recurring problem which required the administrative apparatus to continue leaning on officers to ensure their attendance. In 1734, the governor of Gibraltar, Lieutenant-General Sabine, complained that ‘the duty of the officers now at Gibraltar is too hard upon them, by reason of the absence of a great number of officers belonging to the several

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82 See Appendix 3. For other examples, see TNA, SP 41/6 (part 1), fols. 34, 38, 43, 50, 69. ‘Reviews of various regiments, 1725’; and BL, Add MS 23636, fols. 36-7: ‘A list of regiments in barracks and their condition for 1726, reviewed by the General (Viscount Shannon).’
83 BL, Add MS 23636, fols. 21-22. Printed declaration requiring officers to obtain licences to be absent from the commander in chief of the forces in Ireland, 1725.
85 See TNA, WO 4/32, p. 163, 186; and WO 4/35, p. 17, for examples.
87 Ibid., p. 186. Richard Arnold to Ensign Conyer Philbridge Whitehall, 23 June, 1731.
regiments in that garrison.’ In the absence of the Secretary at War, the deputy secretary ordered that those officers currently recruiting in England set out immediately for Gibraltar, with what recruits they had.\textsuperscript{88}

During the reigns of George I and George II, a definite policy toward absenteeism emerged. Stricter procedures for requesting leave, the collection of information, its examination by the monarch, and the transmitting of responses through the War Office, ensured that officers found absenteeism harder to get away with, and had no alternative but to return to their posts when their leave expired. Whilst this was not a comprehensive or entirely successful process, it was achieved by using the existing personnel and methods to achieve a consistent approach to improving the professionalism of the officer establishment. Compared to the chaos experienced during the wars against Louis XIV, regimental attendance was a competency that improved significantly during the peace time years of the early Hanoverian monarchs. By acting as their own inspector-generals, if can be argued that they were able to combine royal authority and singleness of intent to override the personal interests of the officer establishment, for ‘the good of the service.’

5.4 The Duties of Junior Officers

Although historians have focussed on the instruction given to junior officers in platoon level drill and military accounting, it could be argued that recruitment and the maintenance of civil order provided an opportunity for officers to develop their leadership skills in ways hitherto unrecognized. Throughout the period, regiments recruited their rank and file annually, and sent a portion of their company officers out to enlist a set quota of men.\textsuperscript{89} Although the statutory regulations and practical difficulties that recruiting officers faced varied according to the requirements of war or peace, the skills needed and the measurements of success remained the same. As winter approached, a portion of junior officers in each regiment were assigned the task, not just for their own companies, but of those whose officers remained with the regiment as well.\textsuperscript{90} Officers could expect to be assigned recruiting duties regularly over the course of their early careers, regardless of their feelings toward

\textsuperscript{88} TNA, WO 4/33, p. 1. Richard Arnold to Brigadier Kirke, the like letters to other colonels of regiments in Gibraltar, Whitehall, 25 May, 1734.
\textsuperscript{89} HMC Fleming, p. 334. Lieutenant Michael Fleming to Sir Daniel Fleming, Dendermonde, 24 October, 1694. See also Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{90} BL, Add MS 61513, fol. 55. ‘List of the officers of Colonel Hotham’s Foot who are on recruiting duties in England, and those who remain in Spain’; Andrew Chrichton (ed.), The Life and Diary of Lieutenant- Colonel John Blackader, (Edinburgh, 1824), pp. 178, 228.
this duty. In 1705, the pious Captain John Blackader of the 26th Foot wrote that ‘this vexing trade of recruiting depresses my mind. I am the unfittest for it of any man in the army... I cannot ramble, and rave and drink, and tell stories, and wheedle, and insinuate, if my life were at stake.’\footnote{Chrichton, \textit{Life and Diary of Blackader} p. 236.} In 1711, Captain Robert Ferguson of the same regiment was court-martialled for refusing to recruit in Scotland, ‘where he had worn out his goodwill, and could only look after his own money.’ Although the court-martial decided he was not guilty of insubordination, Ferguson was still expected to recruit in England.\footnote{BL, Add MS 38853, fols. 136-9, Court-Martial of Captain Robert Ferguson, 23 January, 1711.} Recruitment was so crucial to the process of ‘mustering complete’ that field officers might request leave to recruit personally if they wanted to guarantee their own companies would be fully manned. In 1703, Lieutenant-Colonel Lucas of Lord North and Grey’s Foot wrote ‘I fear that I shall want so many men, that I should be very unwilling to trust it to another, especially considering how my lieutenant has encumbered himself by doing it for me last year.’\footnote{Bodleian Special Collections, Oxford, MS North A.3, fol. 29. Lieutenant-Colonel Lucas to Lord North and Grey, 10 September, 1703.}

Operating independently of the support of the regiment and its superior officers, the recruiting officer had to work with civil authorities to procure recruits, manage the funds granted for the task, and impose his authority to ensure that the recruits were secured and led back to the regiment.\footnote{For examples of the individual responsibilities that comprised recruiting, see TNA, SP 41/3, fols. 41, 54, 60; WO 4/6, p. 21; WO 4/10, pp. 58, 85; and WO 71/1, pp. 308-9. ‘Request of Captain Sir James Bourk to be paid levy monies and subsistence for 21 recruits,’ August 2, 1710.} Each of these gave the junior officer a simplified version of the greater duties that he would have to carry out later in his career. They were expected to follow the laws that regulated recruitment procedures to avoid antagonizing the local populace. If provoked, crowds would interfere with their recruiting efforts, sometimes violently.\footnote{BL, Add MS fol. 51. ‘Petition of Lieutenant Stephen Gillman to the Duke of Marlborough,’ circa. 1705; Scouller, \textit{Armies of Queen Anne}, p. 126.} In 1705, Captain Foxton acted beyond the statutory powers granted to recruiting officers, resulting in a mob rescuing his recruits from his custody. The Secretary at War notified him that the Queen had been informed, and advised him to take ‘care to act in such a manner as shall occasion no breach of the Act of Parliament.’\footnote{TNA, WO 4/4, p. 112. St John to Captain Foxton, Whitehall, September 11, 1705.} Similarly, officers who were reluctant to discharge recruits whose status otherwise protected them from enlistment, would be forced to release them if a complaint was sent from local officials to the War Office.\footnote{TNA, WO 4/5, p. 144. St John to Colonel William Tatton, 11 February, 1707; WO 4/9, p. 20. Walpole to Lieutenant-General Ingoldsby, Whitehall, 2 June, 1709; WO 4/19, fol. 7. Pulteney to the Mayor of Leicester, Whitehall, 11 December, 1716; WO 4/32, fol. 132. George Treby to Colonel Harrison, Whitehall, 22 December, 1720.} It can be argued that walking the fine line between carrying out their duty and upsetting civil society in England taught
officers the necessity of respecting the sensitivities of foreign communities when serving abroad. Distributing funds to cover enlistment bounties and travelling expenses was not unlike distributing pay to soldiers and operating within a company or regimental budget, albeit on a smaller, temporary scale. Marching the recruits to wherever the regiment was located would require him to assert his authority to preserve order, and to care for the men to prevent sickness and desertion.  

After the wars against Louis XIV, the reduced complement of men per regiment and the lack of campaign attrition meant that recruiting became less of a challenge to an officer’s resourcefulness. However, the peacetime roles of army units in Britain offered new opportunities for developing command abilities. The rise in smuggling, rioting and poaching in the 1720s and 1730s required the regular deployment of small detachments of troops for policing duties. Although the use of violence against lawbreakers was fairly uncommon, these frequent assignments demanded firm leadership from junior officers to ensure that the soldiers remained disciplined and responsive to their commander’s orders. They also needed some skill in manoeuvring platoons or troops through the streets, in order to maintain the formation’s cohesion and present as many muskets or swords to the crowd as possible, to persuade them to stand down. Riots in particular required cool judgement from an officer, since opening fire on the mob was increasingly considered a last resort by civil authorities. For example, in 1725, a captain who ordered his company of foot to fire on a mob during a riot in Glasgow against the malt tax was found guilty of manslaughter by a civil court, but pardoned.

By contrast, officers who co-operated with the civil power to resolve the situation before bloodshed became inevitable were commended. In 1724, the Secretary at War wrote to Captain Abercrombie that ‘I think you did very right in marching with the forces under your command to the assistance of the under sheriff, as he desired you, to supress the riot made by the weavers and wool combers.’ Similarly, in 1739, the Secretary at War wrote to Cornet Scot that ‘I have not yet had an opportunity

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98 For successful recruiting efforts, see TNA, SP 44/168, fol. 135; Bodleian Special Collections, MS North A.3, fols. 22, 36, 44. If an officer’s recruits deserted en route to the regiment and their cost couldn’t be covered by the regimental contingency fund, he might be personally liable. According to Defoe, ‘if he has the misfortune to lose many of them, ‘tis as much the price of his commission will make satisfaction for.’ See Daniel Defoe, An Essay on the most effectual way on Recruiting for the army, and rendering it more serviceable, (London, 1707), p. 16.

99 Houlding, Fit for Service pp. 64-8, 74, 78; Hayter, The Army and the Crowd, p. 34. For examples, see TNA, WO 4/17, p. 144. Pulteney to General Lumley, July 23, 1715; SP 41/6, fol. 120. Pelham to Charles Delasaye, August 6, 1725; and WO 4/32, p. 182, Robert Arnold to Charles Carkesse, Whitehall, 16 June, 1731.

100 For this purpose, Bland’s Treatise on Military Discipline includes information on ‘street firing.’ See Bland, Treatise, pp. 86-8.

101 Hayter, The Army and the Crowd, p.11

102 TNA, SP 35/60, fol. 2. Robert Delasaye to the Duke of Newcastle, Whitehall, 1 December, 1725.

of acquainting His Majesty with the contents [of his report], but I doubt not he will approve your conduct, in not taking any step, without the directions of some civil magistrate. I am sorry to hear this tumultuous spirit still continues in those parts, but the examples which will be made at Salisbury will put a stop to these disorders. ¹⁰⁴ Alan Guy has already suggested that anti-smuggling and rioting duties gave officers ‘a high level of experience in the Georgian equivalent of low level-operations.’ ¹⁰⁵ This observation should be further expanded to suggest that they helped to prepare junior officers for small scale wartime duties such as securing villages or towns, and sending out patrols and raids. When war broke out in 1739, many junior officers already had opportunities to develop their command skills of troop and company sized units in situations of responsibility and even danger. For example, in 1737, the 2nd Dragoons was deployed against smugglers in Kent, then marched to Dorsetshire and Wiltshire to put down riots in 1738. In 1742 it formed part of the 16,000 strong British contingent sent to serve on the continent during the War of the Austrian Succession. ¹⁰⁶

When junior officers were serving with the regiment, they were expected to adopt a subordinate role to their superior officers, assisting them in the running of their companies. Not all junior officers recognised the importance of certain duties, such as the bi-monthly musters. In 1696, Captain-Lieutenant Emmett of Leigh’s Dragoons (disbanded, 1697) was accused of false musters by his fellow officers. On investigation, the court-martial committee found that he had given two soldiers permission to be absent from the muster inspection. As a relatively inexperienced officer, it appears that Emmett had made a genuine mistake in not understanding the importance of having all the men in his troop present for inspection. Musters were intended to establish actual regimental strengths and the corresponding pay due to each man in the army, as well as to discover any fraudulent practice such as false musters. ¹⁰⁷ The figures would then be used to justify the army estimates compiled by the Secretary at War for the annual mutiny bills in parliament. By excusing two of his men from duty, even out of good intentions, Emmett was making this exercise more difficult for the commissary of musters, as well as diverting attention from actual false musters committed by fraudulent officers. It was considered necessary to teach Emmett that he needed to take musters more seriously. The court-martial reprimanded him and ordered his colonel to discipline him as he saw fit. ¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Richard Cannon, Historical Record of the Royal Regiment of Scots Dragoons, (London, 1840), pp. 64-5. For other examples, see Cannon, Historical Record of the Sixth Regiment of Dragoons, (London, 1847), pp. 38-41; and Canon, Historical Record of the Fourth Regiment of Foot, (London, 1839), pp. 43-4.
¹⁰⁸ TNA, WO 71/121. ‘Court-martial of Captain-Lieutenant Emmett, held at Horse Guards,’ London, 24 January, 1696.
It was also important for young gentlemen to set an example of military virtues and respectable character for the enlisted men. Whereas duelling and insubordination discussed in Chapter 4 involved the resolution of matters of honour between two officers, more general displays of un-officerly behaviour questioned the fitness of the officer to serve on a more fundamental level. In 1716, Lieutenant Thomas Kentish of Colonel Windsor’s Horse (3rd Dragoon Guards) was brought before a general court-martial on several instances of minor incompetence and poor attitude. When taken together, they led the committee to recommend his dismissal, ‘as being a person not qualified for the service.’ The first set of mistakes related to the proper execution of his duties. Lieutenant Kentish was in charge of marching his troop to Tewkesbury, but abandoned the troop at Dorchester without any further orders, and with the route of march in his pocket. Kentish had also appeared late to a muster, having offered no prior help to his superior officer, Captain Pitt, in preparing the troop for inspection. His excuse was that he had to obtain a new uniform to replace his spoilt one. In addition, Kentish had also assigned a recruit to another captain’s company, despite the man bearing a letter addressed to Captain Pitt stating that he was permitted to enlist by his master only if he served under Pitt.

The second set of mistakes Kentish made related to the respect given and received along the chain of command. When Captain Pitt denied him leave, he burst out ‘damn it, must I take care of your horses?’ When drunk, he refused to follow Pitt’s suggestion that he return to his quarters, and ‘questioned the Captain’s power to confine him ‘for words spoken over a bottle.’ He also implied that Jacobites were protected in the troop. When Pitt asked him whether he was accusing him of personally protecting them, Kentish replied ‘Oh Captain, do you accuse yourself?’ Even more irregular was that Kentish drank with the enlisted men at his own quarters, where according to a witness, ‘he spent six pence to their three pence a piece.’

Each of these mistakes represents a failing that any inexperienced officer might make in the course of his early career. In this respect, the example of Kentish offers several failures of awareness that should have been apparent to most officers simply by paying attention to regimental practices and following the examples of their fellow officers. In the first set of mistakes, Kentish should have realised that the precise and full execution of his responsibilities took priority over other personal considerations. He also should have realised that his own troop came first, rather than giving a recruit away to another troop. In the second set, he should have realised that he owed his captain a greater degree of respect than he showed. He also should have preserved the respect due to himself from the enlisted men, by

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109 TNA, WO 71/122. ‘Court-Martial of Lieutenant Thomas Kentish, Colonel Windsor’s Regiment of Horse,’ Horse Guards, 14 December, 1716.
not socializing with them as equals. Junior officers were part of the company level team, and did not have the liberty to act with the freedom of senior officers. Consequently, their co-operation with and respect for their companies or troops was a paramount characteristic that they needed to demonstrate.

Officers who allowed their baser instincts to override the standards of conduct expected of gentlemen in public spaces also had their fitness to command called into question. In the case of Lieutenant Macmanus of the Royal Fusiliers (7th Foot), a combination of violence against an enlisted man and a public display of officers’ nocturnal habits threatened not only his reputation, but also that of the garrison of Minorca. At a public house on the island around 6 o’clock on 19 December, 1717, Macmanus and another lieutenant, Powell, were drinking alcohol. Macmanus objected to the presence of a female servant, saying ‘bitch, are you here?’ He then beat her at Powell’s insistence, until another patron said ‘don’t beat the woman.’ Having chased her out of the house, they returned half an hour later, and upon finding she had not returned, they seized another woman and tried to make her tell them of her whereabouts. Around 9 o’clock they went to another drinking establishment, and demanded to know the whereabouts of prostitutes from a private soldier and a Jewish patron. When they said there were none there, Macmanus attacked the patron and threw the soldier outside, and cut the latter on his face with his sword. After the patron complained, the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsford, ordered McManus under arrest, which he broke when he left his quarters to explain himself to Ramsford.¹¹⁰

Unsure of how to judge Macmanus’s behaviour, the court-martial found him guilty of breaking his arrest, but then selected a punishment designed to reflect his aggressive conduct. He was to be cashiered in disgrace and imprisoned until either the commander in chief of Minorca or the King ordered his release. Imprisonment was a more fitting punishment for a criminal in civil law. However, Macmanus had not only struck a soldier with his sword, contrary to explicit orders issued that day, he also had verbally and physically abused male and female inhabitants for personal reasons. Macmanus had shown that he thought that bullying was acceptable behaviour for an officer. Whilst the average officer was not expected to be as pious and pleasure-denying as John Blackader mentioned above, or as was encouraged by contemporary Christian discourse, those that could not project a level of

¹¹⁰ TNA, SP 41/5, ‘General court-martial at St Nicholas’s Castle on the island of Minorca, 23 December, 1717’
gentlemanly decorum when off duty were dangerous to the discipline of the troops and the reputation of the officer establishment.  

5.5 The Duties of Field Officers I: Regimental Firearms

Field officers faced different tests of their competence, having for the most part risen to their higher rank by learning from their mistakes as junior officers, or avoiding them altogether. Instead, the primary competencies of these senior regimental officers included matters of drill and discipline, but also the provision and distribution of arms, clothing, equipment and food, as well as mounts and forage for the dragoons and horse. Majors, lieutenant-colonels and in particular colonels were accountable to army commanders and the Secretary at War for the combat readiness of their regiments, and had to submit returns on the strength and condition of their units. Based on this information, the army administration could organise transportation, provisions and pay from the various supporting services to keep the regiment supplied and ready to deploy. Providing a regiment with supplies and material meant organising a set of complex negotiations, which could be subject to financial and logistical factors that were beyond the direct control of regimental officers. Consequently, there was potential for significant variation in the delivery of the set of competencies that comprised regimental management. The basic criteria for judging these competencies includes balancing cost efficiency and profit-making with quality of material; the response of regimental commanders to problems of finance and supply; and any special measures taken to improve the condition of their unit. However, the nature of the supply chain structures that provided arms and clothing, and the administrative system that colonels operated under, meant that regiments were likely to be less well armed and clothed than they otherwise could have been.

111 For example, the Soldier’s Monitor wrote ‘If a soldier steals, lies, or swears profanely, if he drinks to excess, or does violence to man or woman, he degrades himself, and forfeits the honour due to his station.’ Anon, The Soldier’s Monitor, p. 8.
112 See Chapter 4, section 4.6 for examples of field officers abusing their authority.
113 Childs, The Nine Years War and the British Army, p.70; Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 149.
114 For examples, see TNA, WO 4/3, p. 197. St John to Colonel Handasyde, 29 March, 1705; WO 4/4, p. 43. St John to Lieutenant-General Charles O’Hara, the like letter to Colonel William Breton, 3 December, 1705; and WO 4/10, p. 117. Granville to Lieutenant-General Lumley and four other colonels of horse and dragoons, 17 January, 1711.
As the primary weapon for foot and dragoon regiments, muskets and carbines needed to be obtained in large quantities by the colonel. When a regiment was initially raised, the colonel received funds granted by the Treasury for their purchase, or through reimbursements if in Ireland. Any replacement arms had to be purchased at the regiment’s expense. The primary source of arms was the Board of Ordnance, which contracted out their manufacture to private armourers. If not already complete, the constituent parts were then assembled into complete weapons at the royal armouries, tested, and made available for purchase from the Ordnance. Alternatively, colonels could purchase complete weapons directly from the armourers, if they were not already busy fulfilling Ordnance contracts. Although essentially of the same design, improvements throughout the period meant that muskets varied considerably in attributes and reliability. In theory, colonels were free to obtain the best quality muskets possible for their regiments, but in reality many units retained outdated weapons. For example, some regiments had abandoned pikes completely during the Nine Years War, and by the start of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Ordnance was restricting their issue to those that still retained a mixture of pikes and muskets. Nevertheless, as late as 1704, the regiments of Lieutenant-General Steuart (9th Foot), Brigadier Blood (17th Foot), and Colonel Duncanson (33rd Foot) exchanged a total of 582 pikes for muskets, or about 15 per company. It was only in 1705 that Colonel Elliot’s Foot (disbanded, 1713) had its remaining 110 pikes exchanged for muskets. When additional companies were added to existing regiments in 1703, and new regiments raised, the Ordnance armed them with cheaper snaphaunce muskets, an early version of the flintlock musket, despite the development of more reliable but expensive ‘true’ flintlocks during the same period.

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116 TNA, SP 41/34, fol 47. Officers of the Ordnance to Sir Charles Hedges, 29 December, 1705. See also Houlding, _Fit for Service_, p. 139; West, _Gunpowder, Government and War_, p. 9.
117 Scouller, _Armies of Queen Anne_, p. 190.
120 Houlding, _Fit for Service_ pp. 138-9.
121 TNA, SO 1/15, pp. 142-3. ‘Warrant for Master-General of Ordnance of Ireland to contract for the repair of 6,000 useless muskets,’ 21 March, 1703; Scouller, _Armies of Queen Anne_, p. 193; Houlding, _Fit for Service_, pp. 140, 168.
122 TNA, SP 34/1, fol. 5. Minutes of the Privy Council, 26 March, 1702; SP 44/209, fol. 75. Nottingham to the officers of Ordnance, 4 August, 1703. See also Childs, _The British Army of William III_, p. 172, Chandler, _The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough_, pp. 67, 82; Scouller, _Armies of Queen Anne_, p. 193.
123 TNA SP 44/209, fol. 138. Hedges to the officers of the Ordnance, 8 February, 1704.
124 TNA, SP 44/105, fol. 222. Hedges to the officers of the Ordnance, 9 February, 1705.
125 TNA, SP 44/171, fol. 183. ‘Warrant for 517 snaphaunce muskets each for Colonel Evans and Colonel Elliott’s new regiments,’ 16 April, 1703; Ibid., fol. 217. ‘Warrant for 130 snaphaunce muskets and cartridge pouches for Colonel Stanhope’s regiment,’ 25 August, 1703. For improvements in flintlock design through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Reid, _The Flintlock Musket_, pp. 8-10; H. Blackmore, _British Military Firearms 1650-1850_, (London, 1994), pp. 20-1, 40-1; 43-5; D. Bailey, _British Military Longarms 1715-1865_, (New York, 1986), pp. 15-16.
The opportunity of introducing this improved firearm was ignored until 1722, when the Ordnance adopted the first ‘Land Pattern’ musket. Considered to be one of the best arms in Europe, it was only after 1730 that foot regiments were uniformly armed with it. Until then, colonels had to rely on their own initiative to purchase better weapons. In 1717, Colonel Richard Irwin of the 16th Foot had received a critical review of his regiment’s muskets from the Ordnance. He sent his agent, Richard Worthington, to a private armourer to re-equip his regiment with new muskets, which had longer barrels than preferable but were ‘very well finished and [have] a good muzzle.’ Despite their quality, the armourer could only provide 50 muskets a month, as the barrels came from Birmingham. A year later, Brigadier Humphrey Gore petitioned George I to replace the unsuitable carbines of his dragoon regiment with the muskets of the recently disbanded foot regiment of Colonel Sir Charles Hotham. Writing in French to appeal to George I’s preference of that language to English, his request was granted, simultaneously equipping his unit with better weapons and saving Gore the trouble of dealing directly with the Ordnance.

The Ordnance offered little support to regiments for the replacement and repair of their weapons, declaring that ‘the colonels of each regiment are expected when once armed to keep them at their own expense in good condition.’ As Master-General of the Ordnance, Marlborough had always refused requests to replace a regiment’s muskets during the Nine Years War, and as Secretary of State for the Southern Department in 1703, the Earl of Nottingham agreed with him, out of concern at the cost to the public purse. When 69 muskets of Lieutenant-General Steuart’s Foot burst during the siege of Lille in the same year, they were fortunate to have them replaced free of charge, the Ordnance reluctantly admitting that ‘King William III on occasion used to supply such losses.’ In 1706, when the Earl of Barrymore’s Foot (13th Foot) was converted into a dragoon unit, save for a cadre around which the foot regiment was to be reconstructed, Barrymore requested replacement muskets for the ones given to the dragoons. The Ordnance’s response was that ‘once armed out of the stores of our Ordnance, it was quite contrary to the rules and practice thereof to issue arms to them a second time.’ Barrymore had to buy the arms privately, but after petitioning the government, was granted special

126 Blackmore, _British Military Firearms_, pp. 45-6.
127 Houlding, _Fit for Service_ p. 139; Chandler, _The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough_, pp. 80-81.
128 Chandler, _Art of Warfare_, p. 79.
129 TNA, SP 41/5, fol. ? ‘Petition of Brigadier Humphrey Gore to George I, 30 October, 1718’; ibid., fol. 48. Robert Pringle, Secretary at War, to James Craggs the younger, Secretary for the South, 30 February, 1719.
130 TNA, WO 55/343, fol. 172. Officers of the Ordnance to the Earl of Nottingham, 11 September, 1703.
131 Scouller, _Armies of Queen Anne_, p. 192.
132 TNA, SP 44/171, fol. 111. ‘Warrant to supply 69 muskets to Steuart’s Foot,’ 20 January, 1703.
dispensation to pay for them through six months worth of off-reckonings.\(^{133}\) When Colonel Creighton’s Foot (disbanded, 1713), was ordered on active service to Portugal in 1706, the muskets they had received from the Irish Ordnance were dangerous to operate. As Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the senior army officer on the Irish establishment, the Duke of Ormond had ordered their return to stores, noting that ‘what they [the officers] represent of their proving unserviceable is very true, being old arms now fixed up and which proved money thrown away. The general officers reported to me that they could not bear firing at their common exercise…’ In 1710, the regiment’s captains were still requesting a reimbursement of £765 12s for the new arms, which Ormond supported by noting that since they ‘were not by their negligence a fault become unserviceable, they are entitled to receive a set of arms in the same manner as the new regiments at their first raising.’\(^{134}\)

Given the obstacles to obtaining decent firearms, it is hardly surprising that colonels considered it enough that soldiers were given a musket upon enlistment, and did not concern themselves any further as long as they were remotely serviceable. Reviewing officers usually condemned the firearms of units they inspected. In 1725, Officers reviewing mounted units in England found that the troops of five out of six regiments had poor quality firearms. Those of Brigadier Munden’s (8th Dragoons) and Sir Robert Rich’s (13th Dragoons) were nearing the end of their lifespan, being issued in 1715, whilst the carbines of Colonel Sidney’s (5th Dragoons) were an incredible 21 years old, having been issued in 1704.\(^{135}\) Regiments on the Irish Establishment were in a similar state. In 1726, of the 17 regiments of foot, 6 of dragoons and 4 of horse, only seven regiments possessed weapons ‘in good order,’ all of them from the foot. The rest were described as ‘bad.’\(^{136}\) Houlding has shown that, despite the introduction of the ‘Land Pattern’ musket into foot regiments from the 1730s, the problem of badly maintained firearms continued to affect the British army into the 1770s.\(^{137}\) Under the late Stuart and early Hanoverian monarchies, the reasons behind this lay more with the interests of the Ordnance than those of the colonels. Despite being a supposed free market, the supply of firearms was in practice restricted by the Ordnance, which sacrificed quality for quantity and offered support and maintenance only in extreme circumstances or at the intervention of important persons such as the Duke of Ormonde. Consequently, the original benefit of contracting out the raising of regiments to colonels had been lost by the early eighteenth century, as far as firearms were concerned. It could be

\(^{133}\) TNA, WO 25/3180, pp. 112-3. ‘Warrant for the Earl of Barrymore’s Foot to draw the pay of six men per company to pay for arms,’ 6 September, 1706.

\(^{134}\) Bodleian Special Collections, MS Eng. Hist. C 41. Ormond to the Lords Justices of Ireland, London, 29 November, 1710.

\(^{135}\) TNA, SP 41/6, part 1, fol. 38. ‘A return of nine and a half troops from three regiments of dragoons,’ 1725.

\(^{136}\) Bl, Add MS 23636, fols. 36-7. ‘A list of regiments in barracks and their condition,’ 1726.

\(^{137}\) Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 140-1.
argued that, contrary to the original intention, the state was now directly involved, through the Ordnance, but not involved enough to formulate a policy on the quality of firearms, or provide satisfactory support for their maintenance. The Ordnance meanwhile, was finding it difficult enough to produce enough muskets in wartime for newly raised units and Britain’s Portuguese allies, whilst retaining enough reserves for domestic emergencies. Unlike the other competencies examined in this chapter, this was a regimental duty for which there was no emerging official oversight.

5.6 The Duties of Field Officers II: Regimental Clothing

The provision of clothing was a different matter, with colonels exercising much greater freedom in their activities, which the army administration attempted to regulate and supervise. Where historians have examined regimental clothing, the instances in which the system failed tend to be emphasized. These units, usually experiencing a combination of distance, neglect and corruption, were left with virtually ‘naked’ troops, and colonels either richer by dubious means or ruined through debt in the process of clothing them. When considered as a competency however, which field officers were expected to handle annually, it could be argued that the system made a valuable contribution to the changing professional outlook of the officer establishment.

Ensuring that a regiment was regularly uniformed was an essential part of a colonel’s responsibilities, since clothing was replaced annually for most items such as coats, breeches, stockings and shoes, and every two years for additional shirts, breeches and neck cloths. Clothing also contributed to retaining manpower. The rapid substitution of a recruit’s personal clothing for a red coat, with lining and facings in the regimental colour, reduced his chances of deserting and blending into the crowd. In 1717, an officer of Colonel Irwin’s Foot (16th Foot) informed him that ‘... we lose men every day, and I cannot find any way to prevent their desertion, since we have no red coats to give the recruits...’ Officers were also motivated to maintain well dressed units, to impress their superiors and out-compete rival regiments. For example, in 1704, Captain Sir Richard Vernon wrote to his colonel, the

139 For examples, see Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, pp. 157-63; Guy, Economy and Discipline, pp. 150-151. See also TNA, SP 41/3, fol. 68. ‘Memorial of Colonel Whetham to Hedges,’ 12 January, 1706; and WO 4/13, p. 1. Granville to Colonel Jones, 19 November, 1711.
140 Bodleian Special Collections, MS North A.3, fol. 7. ‘At a meeting of general officers and colonels, 6 December, 1703;’ BL, Add MS 41143, fols. 66-7. ‘Regulations for the clothing of His Majesty’s Forces, 1729.’
141 Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough, p. 88
Duke of Ormonde, that the reviewing general was particularly pleased with the fine appearance of his troop.142

Being able to produce well clothed soldiers not only added to a commanding officer’s reputation, it also improved a unit’s marketability to potential buyers. In 1707, Daniel Defoe observed that ‘whenever a gentleman buys a regiment, the state of the clothing is always as strictly enquired into, as in what condition the land, how wooded, and what repair the mansion house is in, by the intended purchaser of a manor that’s up for sale.’143 This was certainly the case when Colonel Irwin wished to purchase the colonelcy of Lieutenant-General Lumley’s Horse (1st Dragoon Guards) in 1717. Lumley explained at length to Irwin’s agent that he had spent £500 on new hats, gloves and accessories for the men, saving Irwin the expense when he took command. It was also shown that Lumley had purchased new clothing for the entire regiment, even though the new recruits had only worn theirs for a year rather than the full two years. Otherwise ‘the regiment would have looked piebald if one part had new and another the clothing that had been worn a year.’144 By contrast, in 1705, Lieutenant-General Macartney’s regiment (disbanded, 1713) was in such a poor condition that a prospective lieutenant-colonel decided against becoming its colonel.145

As long as the soldiers were adequately uniformed, colonels were free to take any remaining funds as personal profit throughout the period.146 This was a considerable incentive for ensuring that the provision of clothing went smoothly. Nevertheless, not all colonels sought to extract profit from off-reckonings. As colonel of the 4th Horse for 18 years, Major-General Cornelius Wood had acquired a reputation for distributing any remaining off-reckonings among the rank and file, rather than considering them to be a source of his indirect income.147 Similarly, in a record summarizing his service under William III, Lieutenant-General Cutts claimed that ‘never any man obeyed with more diligence and exactness the King’s commands in his several posts, neither selling commissions, oppressing officers or soldiers under his command, or making undue profits of the clothing…’148 From reducing desertion to improving the proprietorial value of his unit, regimental commanders therefore had a range of incentives to work within the system to provide adequate clothing. Although some of these

142 HMC Ormond VIII, p. 95. Sir Richard Vernon to Ormond, Camp at Grove, Kilkenny, 8 July, 1704.
143 Defoe, An Essay on the most effectual way on Recruiting, p. 11
144 Hayes ‘Purchase of Colonellies,’ p. 3
145 HMC Portland IV, p. 266. Major Cranston to Robert Cunningham, Camp at Calemthout, 20 October, 1705
146 See also Guy, ‘The Standing Army under George II,’ p. 235
147 Archibald Hutcheson, Abstracts of the numbers and yearly pay of the land forces of horse, foot, and dragoons in Great Britain for the year 1718, (London, 1718), p. 4
incentives appealed to their sense of entrepreneurship, others benefited the regiment in other ways, such as reducing desertion, or encouraging pride in a unit’s appearance. Furthermore, some officers claimed to be unmotivated by profit, and instead regarded clothing as a straightforward duty.

One of the main flaws of the system was that clothing was paid for out of the off-reckonings of the regiment, by which each company was permitted to have several men fewer than the official establishment, and their daily pay diverted to a regimental fund.\(^{149}\) Since the daily pay of a private was minimal, off-reckonings had to accrue for some time before they could cover a bulk order from a clothier. During the wars against Louis XIV, some colonels had already assigned their off-reckonings to cover previous regimental debts, or found their current off-reckonings in arrears from the government.\(^{150}\) Unable to pay for current clothing, they instead assigned future off-reckonings to pay clothiers.\(^{151}\) Others abused the off-reckonings for personal gain. In 1706, a complaint from Lieutenant-General Cutts to Sir Robert Harley revealed that Colonel Luke Lillingston had ‘obliged his clothier to give him a note under his hand not to pay the off-reckonings of the officers’ servants to the officers, but to him, which we have likewise overruled besides many other severe, irregular and arbitrary steps too long to trouble you with.’\(^{152}\) Because of the poor condition of his regiment, and his refusal to join it in the West Indies, Lillingston was dismissed from the service, and refused leave to sell his commission.\(^{153}\)

Other officers were forced to rely on their personal credit and private fortune to provide security to clothiers. As the executor to the late Earl of Macclesfield, who had been a colonel of a regiment of horse during the Nine Years War, Baron Mohun represented to the government in 1702 that ‘the Earl was compelled to give to the clothiers his bond with securities conditioned for payment for them, the clothiers refusing any assignment [of off-reckonings] on the regiment on account of their going for Ireland.’ He owed a total of £1,148 15s 1d, which had to be paid by the paymaster-general.\(^{154}\) Similarly, in 1711, Colonel Richard Morris was ordered to detach 122 men from his regiment of dragoons (disbanded, 1713), which he clothed at his own expense. The detachment was not attached to a

\(^{149}\) For the numbers of these ‘warrant men’ and ‘contingent men,’ see Scouller, *Armies of Queen Anne*, pp. 137-8; and Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, pp. 64-5.

\(^{150}\) TNA, SP 63/353, fol. 227. ‘Petition of colonels in Ireland for payment of off-reckonings,’ 1691; SP 63/361, fols. 230-1. ‘Proposals by Lieutenant-General Erle for troops in Ireland,’ March, 1702; SP 44/261, fol. 23. ‘Petition of Colonel Stanhope for payment for his regiment’s clothing,’ 11 September, 1704.


\(^{152}\) HMC Portland IV, p. 350. Baron Cutts to Harley, Dublin, 19 November, 1706.


\(^{154}\) TNA, SO 1/15, pp. 4-5. ‘Warrant authorising payment to creditors of the late Earl of Macclesfield,’ 9 June, 1702.
regiment however, and so the colonel could not be reimbursed the £488 it cost him. Fortunately, he was able to obtain payment from the government two years later, plus £75 interest for drawing upon his own finances. The off-reckoning system caused a variety of financial difficulties for officers during the wars against Louis XIV, whilst the negotiating power of clothiers took the process out of the direct control of the army administration. As the Comptrollers of Army Accounts recognized in 1704, greater central supervision of the process was required than had actually been provided up to that date. They recommended that the off-reckonings should be fixed for a maximum period for each round of clothing. It could be argued that the best form this supervision could take would be to turn the provision of clothing from a variable that could adversely affect the conditions of service for officers into a duty whose handing could be internalized as a routine competency.

At the beginning of the Nine Years War, various bodies had been appointed to rectify administrative issues among army units, with limited success where off-reckonings were concerned. During the War of the Spanish Succession, the regulation of clothing continued to be conducted with a degree of informality. In 1703, Marlborough requested that a Board of senior officers assemble to decide upon clothing for Flanders regiments, but some of these officers requested special treatment regarding their own regiments. As colonel of the 2nd Horse (1st Dragoon Guards) and close subordinate of Marlborough, Lieutenant-General Henry Lumley enjoyed the Captain-General’s personal approval of his regiment’s clothing, writing in 1707 that ‘I hope your Grace will give yourself the trouble to see the patterns of the clothing as you formerly used to honour me, to do at my house.’ In 1711, the short-lived Committee for the Affairs of the Army set the maximum amount of off-reckonings at 14 months’ worth for all regiments, but like many of its decisions, there is little evidence that it was observed. It was only from 1708 that the Board of General Officers’ sub-board of clothing established permanent administrative supervision of each regiment’s clothing. The Board approved patterns exhibited to them by each colonel of the regiments on the British establishment, sent its members to the clothiers’ warehouses to inspect the finished articles, and attempted to monitor the assignment of off-reckonings.

156 TNA, T 1/92, fol. 48. ‘Comptrollers of the Accounts of the Army to Godolphin,’ 24 November, 1704.
157 TNA, SP 44/166, fol. 19. ‘Instructions to commissioners for reforming the abuses in the army,’ 10 May, 1689. See also Childs, The British Army of William III, pp. 28, 168-9.
158 Bodleian Special Collections, MS North A.3, fol. 7. ‘At a meeting of General Officers and Colonels,’ 6 December, 1703.
159 BL, Add MS 61162, fol. 124. Lumley to Marlborough, September 30, 1707.
161 Scouller, Armies of Queen Anne, p. 159.
After George I assumed control of the army administration in 1714, these practices became integrated into a routine procedure throughout the peacetime years of the Hanoverian monarchs. Now established at Privy Garden in Whitehall, each Clothing Board usually consisted of seven generals of all ranks and lasted two months. They were served by a permanent secretary who liaised with the Secretary at War and the Board of General Officers. Benefiting from the improved records of the nearby War Office, as discussed in Chapter 1, the Board was able to correspond with the current colonels and agents of those regiments deployed on the British establishment in any one year. These regimental personnel were summoned to the Board each year to present the patterns for their clothing and obtain approval for the off-reckonings. Consequently, regiments which had not complied were easily identifiable, and the personnel responsible ordered to report to the Board before it adjourned. For example, in 1717, Edward Burt, the secretary to the Board of General Officers wrote to Marmaduke Bealing, his counterpart on the Clothing Board, directing that ‘colonels or commanding officers of such regiments or independent companies as have not clothed according to his Majesty’s late regulation be summoned, and ordered not only to clothe forthwith, but to give their reasons why they have delayed it this long.’ Similarly, in 1718, Bealing informed Colonel Mark Kerr (29th Foot) that the Clothing Board ‘desires you would not fail to cause the clothing of your regiment to be viewed before the 19th instant…. you may please before that day to procure a state of your Regiment’s off-reckonings from the Pay Office, that so it may appear when your last assignment will be paid off.’

By requiring colonels and agents to appear before the Board, the provision of regimental clothing was turned into a routine competency, since the selection of patterns and the assignment of off-reckonings had to be managed in advance in order to pass Board approval, and colonels were encouraged to view clothing and its financing over the long term, to avoid having to explain future failures to the Board. Unlike the provision of firearms, the centralized supervision of clothing under the Hanoverian

162 For summons of general officers to the Clothing Board, see TNA, WO 7/24, pp. 30, 78, 136, 187, 336.  
163 Ibid., pp. 137, 185, 306, 334. For improved record keeping in the War Office, see Chapter 1, section 1.2, ‘The growth of the War Office and the Board of General Officers.’  
164 See TNA, WO 7/24, p. 54. Marmaduke Bealing, Secretary to the Clothing Board, to various regimental agents. Privy Garden, 10 January, 1717; Ibid., p. 198. Bealing to colonels of regiments on the British establishment, Privy Garden, 9 February, 1726; Ibid., p. 252. Robert Nelson, Secretary to the Clothing Board to colonels of regiment on the British establishment, Privy Garden, 11 January, 1733.  
165 TNA, WO 7/24, p. 55. Bealing to various regimental agents, 23 January, 1717; Ibid., pp. 139-140. Bealing to colonels on the British establishment and captains of independent companies in Jamaica,’ Privy Garden, 14 March, 1721.  
166 Ibid., p. 72. E. Burt, Secretary to the Board of General Officers to Bealing, Horse Guards, 27 June, 1717.  
167 Ibid., p.95. Bealing to Lord John Kerr, Privy Garden, 10 June, 1718.
monarchs provided colonels with a clear sense of what outcomes they had to generate in order to satisfy the criteria laid down for them by the army administration. As Guy observes, colonels still retained the right to profit from any surplus off-reckonings, and as shown above, there were incentives to provide smart clothing that appealed to a colonel’s prestige and reputation. With the oversight of the Clothing Board, they now had to conform to standards of approval and inspection which applied to all their fellow colonels. With colonels and Clothing Board members thinking at least as much about the ‘good of the service,’ as their own profits, it could be suggested that the same ethos might have permeated into later developments of eighteenth century military professionalism, such as the standardization of drill among regiments, or the development of an ‘officer corps,’ in which officers identified themselves as the leadership component at army level, rather than as individuals within their regiments.

5.7 Conclusion

Although the early eighteenth century officer establishment would not have conceptualised their performance as leaders of regiments in terms of competencies, the nature of their duties lends itself to being considered as such. The management of men and material was judged by specific criteria, ranging from whether an officer brought in enough recruits or whether the soldiers satisfactorily performed their platoon level drill, to the provision of clothes on their backs and firelocks in their hands. An officer could be judged competent in any of these duties through quantitative measurement of his success. This measurement was achieved largely through the supervision provided by the army administration, through commissaries of musters, army commanders, the reviewing generals, the War Office, and the Board of General Officers. Improvements in the collection of information proved vital to this system. During the wars against Louis XIV, central bodies tasked with supervising the managerial activities of regimental officers lacked satisfactory information with which to act effectively. In part, this was mitigated by the energy and proximity of local army commanders and individual Secretaries at War. There were limitations however, to what they could do to address those abuses and logistical problems that the system itself was unable to cope with. The provision of clothing and firearms raised such difficulties, especially for units serving in America or Spain, but absenteeism was the most damaging to the army’s capabilities. It was only after the wars against Louis XIV that the War Office was able to co-ordinate the gathering and processing of information to address absenteeism in a more comprehensive and effective manner.
Many of the skills needed for regimental administration could be learned from the experience gained through regular regimental attendance. It could be argued that the initiatives launched against absenteeism under George I and George II contributed greatly to ensuring officers gained that experience. For junior officers, regimental attendance was essential if they were to understand their role as assistants to their superior officers, and to set an example of behaviour and standards to their men. Where they acted to the contrary, they could expect an unfavourable court-martial, which could determine their suitability for military service, and if necessary remove them from the army. It can also be argued that regimental attendance ensured that officers received the regular training opportunities provided by recruitment and clothing. Recruitment gave junior officers a chance to develop their administrative skills and confidence in independent command, whilst the addition of anti-smuggling and anti-rioting duties under the Hanoverian monarchs tested their leadership. Clothing the regiment gave field officers an understanding of funding and organising supplies for their regiment. This may have prepared them for larger logistical operations, such as working with army contractors at brigade level or higher when on campaign. As a competency whose procedure was regulated and internalized by a centralized system from the 1720s onwards, it also cultivated a more professional attitude from colonels, with the exception of those few regiments that were stationed so far from London as to leave their troops ‘naked’ for years at a time.

Independent learning played an integral role filling in those gaps that this practical experience could not provide, and promoting learning in a range of subjects and skills that a gentleman was expected to possess. From languages and mathematics to fencing and riding, young officers were encouraged by their elders to perfect their studies in order to perform their duties better and improve their chances of promotion. There was also access to a range of military subjects, published from the Nine Years War onwards, which covered technical skills such as platoon drill and fortifications. There were also works on more abstract subjects such as the primers on the art of war and the maxims of great generals such as Caesar and Turenne. The prefaces of these publications, encouraging to varying degrees their use by army officers, suggests a growing awareness of the utility of producing military works for current and future generations. They can therefore be considered to be a step, however formative, towards a martial ethos that considered itself part of something larger than any one officer, and beyond the present experiences of any particular cohort of officers.

The officers of the British Army had to acquire a range of competencies and skills, and contrary to the suggestions of previous historians, the eighteenth century regimental system provided training in much more than just the basics of platoon level drill and accounting. The practices and duties of each
regiment, as observed by their superiors, taught officers how to behave to each other and how to set
an example to their men. The annual tasks of recruiting and clothing meanwhile, gave officers a chance
to develop skills that would be necessary in greater quantities in higher posts. However, the successful
execution of these competencies competed with other factors that were inherent to the officer
experience, in particular the opportunity to make profit and the conditions of service. Ideally, an
officer would be able to carry out his duties competently whilst making a reasonable profit, which in
turn, would reduce the impact that setbacks or hardship would have on his ability to serve. In practice,
any part of the system was vulnerable to abuses, the causes of which could range from wilful
corruption or enrichment, to the pressure to divert regimental resources to pay for debts incurred to
the regiment. Proficiency on all competencies in any rank was therefore too much to expect from the
officer establishment at this time, and would only become an identifiable part of the officer corps’
outlook during the French Revolutionary Wars, at the end of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{168} For example, by 1795, junior officers were required to attend regimental courts-martial for the first three
months of their joining a unit, whilst in 1811, after two years of regimental service, every officer ‘… shall be
capable of commanding and exercising a troop or company in every situation… and after having been two years
captain of a troop or company, shall have rendered himself competent in every respect the duties of a field
officer.’ See Thomas Reide, \textit{A Treatise on the Duty of Infantry Officers}, (London, 1795), p. 9; and (Office of the
Adjutant-General), \textit{General Regulations and Orders for the Army}, (London, 1811), pp. 85-6, 125.
Conclusion

The overall impression of army officers in the 1720s and 1730s is one of poor morale, ‘corrupt’ practices such as purchase, and slow career prospects. However, this thesis has argued that the officer establishment underwent considerable development between 1689 and 1739, which transformed it into a resilient and dedicated institution capable of delivering multiple leadership and administrative functions, in the face of many obstacles. The experience gained by army officers and the army administration during the wars against Louis XIV were retained and refined upon during the peacetime years of George I and George II, ensuring that the officer establishment continued to benefit from the same practices, behaviour and martial spirit of the wartime decades. Whilst entry into the army and subsequent promotion was slow and frustrating for most officers, this did not affect the officer establishment’s administrative capabilities, or its competence in the execution of its multiple roles.

Chapter 1 showed how the wars against Louis XIV in the 1690s and 1700s led to the development of administrative and organisational practices needed to support a large, permanent officer establishment within the emerging standing army. The administrative power vacuum caused by the end of the fighting in 1713 was filled by the Hanoverian monarchs. Hitherto unrecognised by historians, a contest for power between senior army officers and George I took place, in which the former lost the key to controlling the army, the power to influence promotions, to the new Hanoverian dynasty. Chapter 2 showed that officers possessed a strong sense of self-reliance in the execution of their duties, seeking to overcome financial loss and sickness through their own resources. A reappraisal of total income has shown that captains and above earned enough to live comfortably as gentlemen, contrary to previous calculations by historians. However, salaries remained unchanged during the 1720s and 1730s, and a major discrepancy in pay between the British and Irish establishments added to the harder conditions for officers serving in Ireland. The regimental system also created considerable inequality in the conditions of service among the officer establishment, encouraging a desire among officers to transfer to more senior regiments and more prestigious branches of service throughout the period. Chapter 3 argued that patronage networks were a complex and vital part of an officer’s relationship with the army, generating patrons with the power to protect officers’ careers and clients offering support in a variety of ways. Contrary to the arguments of historians, military patronage was not inherently dependent on submission to the political demands of the government, although politics was a serious consideration for the growing minority of officers engaged in parliamentary politics. These networks reached their peak at the War of the Spanish Succession, and contracted significantly under George I and George II. The result was that only a
minority with access to influential persons such as the King, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and government ministers benefited from ready promotion. The remainder had to rely on long applications for promotion, and even longer lengths of service.

Chapter 4 showed that a sense of duty and honour played a vital role in guiding officers through the example they were expected to set as military leaders, and through the moral implications of their administrative responsibilities. Duelling affirmed an officer’s right to be obeyed and respected, and despite its controversial nature, helped to resolve instances when duty and honour came into conflict, enabling the restoration of regimental discipline. This topic has been overlooked by military historians, but the courts-martial that examined officers’ conduct played a continuing role in regulating the behaviour of officers for the ‘good of the service.’ Chapter 5 has challenged the assumption in the historiography that the military profession did not require much training at junior levels. Independent learning in a variety of skills and subjects was highly encouraged and knowledge was disseminated to officers willing to learn. The end of the War of the Spanish Succession saw the army administration catching up to officers’ methods of evading duty at their posts, with the result that absenteeism was much harder to get away with. Consequently, junior officers were given more opportunities to develop their competencies, through the skills they would develop recruiting and aiding the civil power against riots and smuggling. In terms of regimental management, colonels cannot be held responsible for the poor quality of their units’ firearms, and the conflicting interests of the Ordnance must be to blame. This was an example of the administrative system reaching its limits, to the detriment of the army’s capabilities. By contrast, the annual duty of providing clothing combined multiple incentives for colonels, from a smartly dressed regiment to financial dividends, with greater centralised supervision and control. This improved the chances that enlisted personnel were provided with adequate clothing, and also turned clothing from an largely unregulated entrepreneurial practice into a routine duty.

Through the constant refinement of administrative control, and the subordination of officers’ ambitions and personal interests to the inclinations of the Hanoverian monarchs, a more equitable balance was struck between the various needs of the officer establishment, the crown, and the civil population. Through a range of gradual measures instigated by George I and George II, the freedom with which officers were granted to execute their managerial duties and express their gentlemanly right to command was subject to greater supervision and direction. This and other conditions of service during the 1720s and 1730s, such as slower promotion prospects, reduced financial perquisites and narrowing patronage networks, marked an apparent decline in absolute terms of the opportunities for wealth and promotion that military service offered, compared to the 1690s and
1700s. However, the diversity of experiences throughout the officer establishment, caused by the seniority of regiments, deployment at home or overseas, and the talents or resources of the individual officer, meant that the majority of officers remained focussed on military service and loyal to the Hanoverian succession. Furthermore, the officer establishment developed a greater sense of professionalism, with greatly reduced chances to abuse or neglect their units, and a more thorough grounding in the long term requirements for maintaining and training troops within a regiment.

Continuities in military practice and experience throughout the period ensured that the basic standards of officer behaviour and unit capabilities were upheld, despite the disruption caused by the transition of two and half decades of war to two and a half decades of peace. Veteran officers from the Nine Years War and the Spanish War of Succession continued to provide their opinions on how operational, logistic and personnel matters should be resolved, and a small but not inconsiderable number conducted successful combat operations against Jacobite rebellions and the Spanish over the 1720s and 1730s. Others wrote treatises and translated foreign works for their fellow officers. This retention of personnel and learning ensured that army customs and attitudes that had emerged during the War of the Spanish Succession continued to yield benefits to the officer establishment. In particular, behavioural customs such as codes of duelling, attitudes to embezzlement and fraud and respect for the authority of superiors, were preserved and passed on.

Although the ‘friction of peace,’ caused by the division and rotation of regiments to fulfil peacetime roles did negatively affect training and morale, as Houlding has argued, the officer establishment continued to ensure regiments and their constituent companies were near fully manned, well trained in basic drill, experienced in marching and conducting small scale operations. An emerging identification with more universal aspects of the officer ethos, beyond regimental and personal ties, contributed to the notion of an ‘officer corps,’ that would form later in the eighteenth century. The leadership and management of the army became much more reliable quantities than they had been when William III first took over its expansion in the 1690s, through experience gained and passed on during the wars against Louis XIV, and the dissemination of that experience through published works after the wars. Furthermore, the administrative guidance provided by the War Office and the Board of General Officers, and the personal approval or disapprobation of the Hanoverian monarchs ensured that central authority penetrated the practices and behaviours of the officer establishment to a greater level than before.
The efforts of the War Office and the Hanoverian monarchs were not sweeping universal reforms, but attempts to rectify specific faults such as absenteeism or financial abuses in an ad hoc manner. Civil officials and army commanders had attempted to address the same problems before the Hanoverian succession in 1714, with varied results. The difference under George I and George II was that twenty-five years of large-scale warfare had created an administrative hub in the form of the War Office, with real power over the career paths and quality of support open to the officer establishment. Combined with this was the willingness of the Hanoverian monarchs to use this administrative apparatus to override army interests that might encourage the abuse of entrepreneurial freedoms. They did this by excluding senior officers like Marlborough and Cadogan from administrative power, and imposing their own personality instead. Inevitably this had significant disadvantages, such as the reduction of patronage networks and longer service with fewer promotion prospects. As a side-effect, alternative proposals on how the army should be run by these experienced officers were stifled. This would continue into the 1740s and 1750s, when George II would prevent the Duke of Cumberland from implementing his ideas for improving the army.\(^1\) In the 1720s and 1730s however, only the direct authority of the monarch as commander in chief, could ensure that measures would be obeyed, and begin to have a long term effect. The alternatives might have been to appoint commissioners, inspector-generals or senior officers to issue declarations forbidding absenteeism, or report on information collected in regimental reviews. None of these could have matched the authority of the Hanoverian monarchs in pushing through changes, however.

Within this increasing regulation of the officer establishment there was still considerable room for fluidity, with a pool of officers engaging in politics, diplomacy and governorships of forts without necessarily compromising their military careers. Even if these activities meant long periods of authorized absenteeism from their army posts, the commissions they currently held added to their prestige and reputation in the execution of their civil duties. The fact that a regiment could cope without a colonel so employed for prolonged periods of time, as long as it had a competent major or lieutenant-colonel, suggests that the officer establishment was flexible in the application of its skills, to the benefit of the government. Its members could perform other public services, thereby reducing the absolute number of officials needed, and combining their military expertise with civil duties. Historians examining the professional outlook of the eighteenth century army should consider this flexibility, since forcing the entire officer establishment to dedicate their energies to full-time service with a regiment or a general’s duties was neither a logical outcome nor an existing aim of the army administration.

\(^1\) See Guy, *Economy and Discipline*, pp. 20, 26; Guy, ‘The Standing Army under George II,’ pp. 20-76.
At its core, the officer establishment was an institution that sought to achieve multiple functions and satisfy often contradictory interests within a fixed organisational structure. Regimental officers were required to manage their troops and permitted to make a profit, but they were also supposed to be self-reliant, even when the conditions of regimental service plunged them into hardship. They were expected to bring a range of specific skills to the service, but had to acquire these on their own initiative and through their own resources. Promotion was supposed to be both a reward for services rendered and a motivation for future distinguished service, yet it relied heavily on the networking skills of the individual officer, and each vacancy was subject to strong competition, with several losers for each successful candidate. Favourites of the monarch, and to a lesser extent, officers rewarded by a ministry for their political support, were promoted to the colonelcies of elite regiments and the general ranks, overriding interests cultivated towards the purchase of particular regiments. By the same graces, officers could find themselves dismissed for their political preferences, whatever their contribution to the service. Yet at the same time these monarchs were the main driving forces for appointing capable army commanders, and selecting competent subordinates from the recommendations that filtered through to them from various patronage networks. It is because the changing nature of professionalism was only one contender among several processes and interests influencing the army, each of which needed satisfying to some extent some of the time, that historians should not judge the officer establishment against linear models of progress that might be expected of other professions in the eighteenth century, such as medicine or law.

Instead, the expansion of the army’s capabilities within the existing administrative system was closely linked with an increasing appreciation of the need for professional values among the officer establishment, rather than a recognised set of qualifications they had to acquire. Over the fifty year period, significant gains were made across competencies, within the limitations of the administrative system. A feature of this system was that large and minor failures were almost inherent, as long as distance, the friction of peace and the conditions of service hindered the best efforts to combine multiple interests and priorities into a competitive and increasingly global projection of force. Another feature was its remarkable success and robustness, since the Hanoverian monarchs were able to constantly push the goodwill and self-sacrifice of the officer establishment in order to maintain a satisfactory standard of service from its personnel. Much of the basic administrative apparatus for military success was already in existence in 1689, but its development was crucial to ensure the expanded standing army continued to possess the conditions for future successes. Particularly revealing of its limitations is the fact that in the 1720s and 1730s, the system was able to significantly
improve the administration of both the officer establishment and the army as a whole, but at the expense of retaining and developing competencies in campaign operations and the high command.

Although an examination of the largely lacklustre performance of the army during the next major European conflict, the War of the Austrian Succession, is beyond the scope of this thesis, the subjects it has addressed reveal much about the state of preparation of army leadership at regimental and general level before the wartime campaigns of 1742-1747. During the 1720s and 1730s, the army administration can be considered to be efficient, with personnel and organisational matters being addressed by experienced senior officers and co-ordinated by the War Office. Regimental officers were inclined to serve in their current posts for considerably longer than before, with the ambitions and freedoms of the wars against Louis XIV restricted by smaller patronage networks and the greater regulation of promotion, absenteeism, and regimental management. Despite being poorly armed, troops were well clothed and mounted, and performed platoon drill well, even if opportunities for battalion level drill were limited to reviews and parades.

The high command however, did not retain the skills for wartime operations developed during the wars against Louis XIV. The dispersal of regiments except for intermittent reviews and parades reveals the lack of comprehensive command exercises even at brigade level, let alone larger formations that would incorporate the foot, horse and artillery. Whilst generals of the French and Austrian armies were fighting in the War of the Polish Succession in the 1730s, the general officers of the British armies were acting as senior technicians on administrative affairs, by serving on the Board of General Officers or the Clothing Board. Reviews and parades placed a greater emphasis on inspecting regiments and ensuring that they were ‘fit for service,’ than in exercising general officers’ aptitude for manoeuvre, tactics and timing, or rectifying deficiencies in logistics, command structure and communication. This showed when the army embarked on active campaigning in 1742. Lacking practical experience in logistics such as marching multiple regiments, setting up encampments and obtaining supplies from contractors, the War Office attempted to recover its records from the War of the Spanish Succession for reference. Consequently, the high command’s failings would be a logical place to start in examining the army’s performance, and not the quality and condition of the regiments, or the regimental officers who led them.

2 The lack of peacetime training for generals occurred again between the end of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748 and the start of the Seven Years War in 1756. In response, Samuel Bever asked ‘What should hinder us from forming our camps in the summer season, where general officers might exercise their troops in the grand manoeuvres of war... we should form, by this method, experienced soldiers, excellent officers, and Generals capable of commanding armies.’ Samuel Bever, The Cadet. A Military Treatise, by an officer, (London, 1756), pp. 19-20.
To answer this question, the next avenue of enquiry after the conclusions of this thesis would be an analysis of how effective the peacetime preparation of the 1720s and 1730s was for those officers who would provide the senior leadership of the army during the wartime years of the 1740s, such as the Earl of Stair, Jasper Clayton, George Wade, and John Ligonier, and the role that the administrative experience gained by George II in those preceding years had on his leadership in the field. For example, Stair’s proposed march from Germany into mainland France in 1742 represents a significant instance of over-complicated planning and confusing communication, whilst the War Office failed to follow his experience during the War of the Spanish Succession and avoid contracting rye bread, which proved indigestible to the stomachs of the British troops.\(^3\)

There is also potential for further research within the 50 year time frame of the thesis. In particular, the correspondence of the Duke of Argyll and the Earl of Stair might reveal alternative patronage networks in the 1720s and 1730s to that of the King and his ministers, given the parliamentary opposition of these two aristocratic officers to Walpole’s ministry.\(^4\) In addition, the Derbyshire Record Office holds much correspondence relating to military affairs in Ireland over the 1730s and 1740s.\(^5\) Since some regiments transferred from the Irish establishment to the English via Liverpool during this period, it is possible that this county acted as a halfway house between Liverpool and London for handling the transition of units from one establishment to another. If so, research in this archive could provide hitherto unknown links between the War Office and the forces in Ireland, thereby compensating for the loss of many military records relating to the Irish establishment in the Four Courts fire in Dublin, 1922.

Finally, this thesis has shown how the ability of the eighteenth century British army to compete in wars against her competitors, and to project power in peacetime, was reliant on the management and direction of massed resources into the finished article of clothed, manned, paid and armed regiments,
by army officers. These officers also needed management, and in this sense, were themselves a product of the fiscal-military state that required them and supported them. Consequently, this thesis is an impassioned plea to historians of the fiscal-military state that the ‘military’ part is at least as important as the ‘fiscal’ part.
Appendix 1 Selected Articles of War, from ‘Rules and Articles for the Better Government of the Horse and Foot Guards and all other His Majesty’s Forces,’ for the year 1718.’¹

Article 18: Right of officers to remonstrate against colonels
If any officer thinks himself wronged by his colonel or the commanding officer of his regiment, and shall on application to him be refused to be redressed, he is to complain to the General or Commander in Chief of our forces in order to have justice done him... from which if either party thinks himself not fully righted, he may appeal to a General Court-martial, where if upon a second hearing the appeal shall prove groundless and vexatious, the appellant shall be punished accordingly.

Article 19: Duelling
No officer or soldier shall use any reproachful or provoking speeches or gestures to another upon pain of imprisonment, and asking pardon of the party offended in presence of his commanding officer. Nor shall any officer or soldier presume to send a challenge to any other officer or soldier to fight a duel upon pain of being cashiered, if he be an officer, or suffering the severest corporal punishment if a non-commission officer or private soldier...

All officers of what condition soever have power to part and quell all quarrels, frays and other disorders, though of another company, troop or regiment, and to command officers to arrest, and soldiers to prison, until their proper officers be acquainted therewith; and whoever shall refuse to obey such officer (though of inferior rank) or draw his sword upon him, shall be punished as a General Court Martial shall appoint.

Nor shall any officer or soldier upbraid another for refusing a challenge since according to these our orders, they but do the duty of soldiers who ought to subject themselves to discipline. And we do acquit and discharge all men who have quarrels offered or challenges sent to them of all disgrace or opinion of disadvantage in their obedience hereunto; and whosoever shall upbraid them and offend in this case, shall be punished as a challenger.

Article 25: Discharge of commission officers and non commission officers
No commission officer may be cashiered or dismissed from our Service, but by order from us, or by the sentence of a General Court Martial approved of by such Generals or Commanders of our Forces as by our power, and authority shall appoint the same to be held. But non-commissioned officers may be discharged in like manner as private soldiers, and by the sentence of a Regimental Court Martial, may be reduced.

¹ TNA, WO 72/2. ‘Rules and Articles for the Better Government of the Horse and Foot Guards, and all other His Majesty’s Land Forces etc,’ 1718.
Appendix 2 ‘A review of Major-General Wade’s Regiment of Horse by Major General Evans in 1721.’

In crimson: date of officer’s first commission in the regiment and total years of service in the army to 1721.
In blue: years spent on campaign/years in England. F= Flanders, S=Spain, P=Portugal I=Ireland M=Marines E=England.

At a review at Sarum, August 26, 1721

Colonel and Captain Major General Wade; Lieutenant-Colonel and Captain Hull – January 1, 1689 18F/14E (32); Major and Captain Ballandines August 1, 1703 12F/8E (20); Capts. Pitts – September 10 ? 18F/15E (33), Wade - February 24, 1719 - (-), Ashby -November 24, 1693 19F/15E (34); Capt.-Lieut. Hicks – June 1704 22F/11E (33); Lieuts. Fetherstonehalgh, - August 24 1704 12F/8E (20), Synge – December 20, 1708 21F/11E (32), Roles – March 9, 1716 5E (5), Armstrong – November 10, 1710 12F/12E (24), Foulerton – November 1715 6E (6); Cornets Fitzthomas – November 11, 1711 5I/5E (10), Richards - February 24, 1718 3E (3), Rea – March 13, 1718 4E (4), Townshend – March 15, 1721 5 months (5 months), Morgan – July 20, 1715 1S/5E (6), Beaux – September 2, 1720 1E (1).

Regimental Staff: Adjutant Seward, Surgeon Seaton, Chaplain Hescot

Officers absent: Major-General Wade, Lieut. Foulerton by leave, Quartermaster Descott buying officers’ horses; Chaplain Hescot by leave

NB. Original is in French

1 TNA, WO 55/1808.
Appendix 3 ‘A state of seven troops of the Royal Irish Dragoons (5th Dragoons) commanded by the honourable Colonel Thomas Sidney. Reviewed by the Honourable Brigadier Napier, 1725.’ (tables of other ranks omitted) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regimental Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Service Abroad</th>
<th>Service at Home</th>
<th>Total service in years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieut.-Col. and Capt.</td>
<td>Bretton</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major and Capt.</td>
<td>Robert Burton</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>William Cope</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Gustav Hamilton</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Anthony Cope</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Richard Madan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>John Warberton</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>James Welsh</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>William Congreve</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Richard Cawfield</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>John Taver</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Edward Hamilton</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>William Ross</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Ludlow-Bernard</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>Robert Burrows</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>Thomas Wilson</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>Edward Stanhope</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>James Scott</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>William Bleckney</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>Lewis Griffith</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cornet</td>
<td>Thomas Baldwin</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In obedience to your Excellency’s commands I reviewed the above seven troops of the Royal Irish Troops commanded by the Honourable Colonel Sidney, at their several quarters. The men and horses are good, well disciplined, perform their exercise very well, their accoutrements are good, arms are bad, the non-commissioned officers men are regularly paid, I heard no complaints, they have no tents or camp necessaries. [signed] Robert Napier

Absent Officers

Lieutenant-Colonel Bretton: in Britain by licence for 3 months past
Major Burton: in Dublin
Captain William Cope: in Britain by licence 18 months past
Lieutenant Congreve: in Britain by licence
Lieutenant Ross: absent for 6 months
Cornet Wilson: in Dublin by order of the government
Cornet Stanhope: in Britain by licence 5 months
Cornet Baldwin: in Britain by licence 3 months

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