
IN AND OUT OF THE MIND
IN GREEK TRAGEDY

A study of fifth-century Greek ideas
about the mind, human feelings and human personality
reflected in Greek tragedy

by

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Πολλὰς δ' ὁδοὺς ἐλθόντα φροντίδος πλάνοις

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ABSTRACT

In and out of the mind

(in Greek Tragedy)

A study of ideas about the mind and human feelings

expressed in Greek Tragedy

The purpose of this thesis has been to use tragedy to discover conceptions about mental and emotional processes reflected in contemporary language which, though it may not have been used throughout the society in the particular forms tragedy uses, was understood, and felt to be powerful, by the contemporary audiences of the plays. Through detailed examination of the type of imagery used in thinking about the mind, various inferences have been made about conceptions of the sources of harmful emotion and about the ways in which men judge each other, how they sympathize with each other, and how far they can understand each other's private feelings, in a society which may have been in these respects very different from our own. The material has been confined to tragedy - though parallels from other poets and evidence of particular beliefs and theories have been sought in archaeological data, medicine, philosophy and history - since tragedy, is for two reasons, particularly suitable for a study of this kind. First, the process of watching a tragedy involves observation and evaluation of other people from their actions: the audience is invited to react to and ponder the implications of different 'serious actions' the imitation of which is included in Aristotle's definition of tragedy. Secondly, tragedy is a musical event which offers in different musical patterns the expression and resolution of extreme emotions: and one of the main points to emerge in this thesis is Greek fears of unrhythmical and uncontrollable emotion.

The images associated with emotion are those of savage daemons and wild beasts. As on the mythological level Orpheus could control wild beasts by the power of his music, on the social and dramatic level music, which imposes order, rhythm and harmony on those listening to it and performing it, can calm extreme emotions in ritual and in tragedy, of which it is an essential part.

Chapter One: In the Mind This chapter examines statements about the composition of the mind in tragedy: the different mental organs, located deep within the human body, their movement in relation to each other, and their 'darkness'. The images which express the activity of the mind disturbed include: shaking and trembling, filling, swelling and inflammation; wave, storms, wind and breath. The dreams that visit the mind are imagined as coming out of the earth; but the 'muchos' of the mind is implcitly compared to the underground darkness in which the blind seer lives. The mind itself is imagined to be 'prophetic'. The imagery of wave and storm, drawn from the world outside to express feelings within the mind, suggests the easy association of the components of the natural world and the components of the mind: an association demonstrated in the theories of Presocratics and Hippocratic writers. Finally, the supreme fear is fear of the mind 'adrift': the motif of the 'wandering mind' is reflected in the geographical wandering of mad figures in myth. Their activities and feelings are expressed in images and pursuit: of the goad, yoke, and whip.

Chapter Two: Into the Mind This chapter explores the outside sources of mental harm. Passions that trouble the mind are expressed and described with the help of imagery, and the imagery draws mainly on the outside

world: on the daemons of cult and fantasy, and on the wild animals who endanger man physically. Part A considers the shapes of persecution, culturally-determined, which provide models for the individual imagination. The Olympian gods, their winged weapons; the Erinyes, their goads and love of blood; the Gorgon, her piercing eye; the Sphinx, her claws and dangerous song; the animals, the 'death-bringers', particularly the bull, horse, dog, lion and snake. Part B examines the images of emotion themselves: wings and piercing weapons; rays of the eye; driving and blows; hunting and ambush; wrestling and capture (human imagery); biting and eating (animal imagery); and imagery from the natural world, wind, wave, fire, storm.

Chapter Three: Into And Out Of The Mind The material studied so far suggests a world-view which emphasizes the external source of human emotion and pain. But some images, some forms of theory, some direct atatements in tragedy (and elsewhere at this period) suggests that another world-view also operated within the imagination; that the source of human emotion and disease lay within man himself. For various reasons, not least emotional comfort, this view is not canvassed as widely, nor does it affect language and belief as powerfully, as the first. There are areas of experience, however, where it is important, and particularly in ideas about madness and demonic possession. Madness in tragedy is presented as a temporary event which passes and leaves the man 'himself' again. The case for belief in demonic possession at this period, which has been challenged and recently, is reconsidered; and the implications of demonic possession and inspiration are discussed, of the external and internal

sources of power good and bad. Examples are collected of the recognition in tragedy of the projection process, by which the mind projects its own feelings, particularly the dangerous ones, outside into the world. The psychoanalytic concept of projection is outlined, and the role it has played in psychologically-oriented medieval history: particularly in Paracelsus and Freud. Fifth-century medical theories are examined: theories of the origin of the physical and mental disease. These invoke both external sources of harm, and internal ones. In medicine and poetry alike the two views, though apparently paradoxical, operate in a complementary way, since belief is shifting and inconstant in societies and individuals alike. There are parallels in anthropological material for the complementary relation of inconsistent world views: and the tendency of theorists has always been to divide mental <u>functioning</u> into two types and divide them (compare theories which divide mental <u>structures</u>, into three).

<u>Chapter Four</u>: <u>Out Of The Mind</u> This chapter considers the actions that express emotion. These are of two kinds, the individual actions of which tragedy is composed (considered in chapter five), and involuntary and ritualized actions, which may have some universal physiological basis but which are also culturally determined. The natural process of observation - 'opsis' - is replaced in tragedy by words (eg 'Why are you pale?). Physical reactions to emotion mentioned in tragedy are collected, and deductions made by observers about the internal feelings which produce such reactions. Parallels from medicine are considered: the importance of observation in medical theory and practice has given us a picture of the physical symptoms of physical disease which resemble the physical symptoms of emotion

recorded in tragedy. There are dangers in taking physical symptoms recorded in poetry too literally (illustrated by a study of Sappho fr. 31); but though the poetic expression of such symptoms is affected by dictates of convention and genre, it does provide evidence for the tendencies of observation and reaction accepted in the whole society, if not for the single 'true' experience of a lyric poet. Tragedy: the main feature in physical symptoms of emotion and madness is a terrifying unrhythmical violence, which corresponds to the wild movements of the pursuing daemons in Chapter two, and the wild twisting movements in the images of the mind of Chapter one. The principle of projection, discussed in Chapter three, is working here, projecting the wild movements of the body of the man suffering intense emotions, onto both his imagined pursuers, and the unseen organs of his mind. Ritualized expression of emotion is an attempt to impose order, rhythm and control on this violence. The ritual expression of grief, the emotion which occurs most often in tragedy, tries to control emotion in two ways. First, by identification of the mourner with the dead man; shown symbolically by the veiled head, self-mutilation, black robes, and conventional expressions which involve refusal of the normal activity and perceptions of living men. This endangers the individual; he or she is isolated, as the madman (wandering away from civilization, chapter one) is isolated, and as the tragic hero (in chapter five) is isolated in his unique sufferings from the people around him. So the second aim of the mourning-ritual as depicted in tragedy is the identification of the mourner with the group: mourning with someone is a gift, which draws the isolated mourner back into the community. This is achieved partly through the imposition of rhythm and harmony on the expressions of pain.

'Harmonia' is a musical concept which is used elsewhere, in ethics and politics for instance, and for individual peace of mind: the relation of the individual with the group is an important element in most areas of Greek thought.

Chapter Five: Out Of The Mind This chapter concentrates on the ways available to the contemporary audience of judging the people they observed acting on the stage. The metaphor of the mirror, which is both self-revealing and other-revealing is used first in its other-revealing capacity: the mirror of friendship and 'homilia', the best available way of judging another person. The Greek love of typology in considering human characters (first shown in Semonides of Amorgos), is demonstrated in two ways in tragedy: first, at the simple physical level (status, sex, age) marked by the masks of tragedy. Secondly, by the use of moral advertisement: gnomai. An early example is given of the use of gnomai as moral advertisement: Odysseus and Alcinous in Od. 7. Tragedy: examples of the 'moral mask' in self-introduction, observation and judgement: from A. Supp., 1ff; S. OC 119ff; S. Phil. 54ff. Tragic expressions of the limitation of conventional methods of judgement are linked to the conventional wish for an external mark, and to the acknowledgement that gnomai may be as empty as a physical mask. Notions of 'individuality' in the fifth century, and contemporary (and later) popular and philosophical ideas about the 'self', are always linked to contemporary ideas of friendship, on the principle of 'like to like'. Man's judgement of other people is held to be related to his conception of himself; this has a significance in fifth-century society different perhaps from that in our own, since the notion of the state, and of the state's rights over the individual, were valued more highly: the 'self-revealing' mirror is linked

to the 'other revealing' mirror. Tragic action does at one level reveal character, An individual is judged as responsible in human terms for his actions, though recognition of the incalculable effect of the divine world on the human mind is a constant factor in reactions to other people, in tragedy as in life.

Conclusion Tragedy shows that man's mind is felt to be as vulnerable to emotions and non-rational forces, experienced for the most part as external pressures, as his body is to the elements and animals of the physical world. All men are alike in this; through their observation of particular actions (and the possible emotion deducible both from the action and from the language of tragedy), each member of the audience could consider the universal vulnerability of man to external fate. However, it was also possible to suppose that passions arose within the individual; at this level, it was possible for one man to judge another, through observation of his actions. The experience of watching a tragedy involved identification with the sufferer, through acknowledgement of the universal vulnerability of man; but it also involved an objective perception of him, a decision 'like me therefore not me'. At this level the tragic hero functioned as a particular example, which could be judged by the culturally-acquired processes of judging another human being current in the contemporary society. Identification with the hero produced the terror; objective observation of him produced the pity. But these emotions were pleasurable, not harmful, to the audience since they were contained within the safe rhythm and 'harmonia' of tragedy: they were presented ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ.

Preface and Introduction

Some assumptions and methods of this study require justification or, at least, explanation.

1. If we analyse the structure of a language (1) we also find information about the social conventions and implicit assumptions of its users. This is an assumption drawn from the premise of sociolinguistics. 'Humans speak ... speech is patterned in different ways according to the pattern of social relations' (2). We cannot examine the ways of thought of a society, or its habits of speech, with no reference to its social structures (3). They are interdependent; the same pattern underlies them both (4). This assumption helps to explain why I have confined this study to one genre: to tragedy. Tragedy is composed of poetic language and of human relations; and these two elements, two expressions of the thought of Athenian society, are interdependent.

I have assumed, then, that the language of tragedy, and more particularly its imagery, tells us something important about the implicit assumptions shared by people who watched it and wrote it (5). The patterns of assumption which emerge appear to correspond with patterns of thought demonstrated elsewhere in fifth-century culture: patterns of explanation in scientific theory or religious belief, patterns of interpretation of human behaviour. One argument against assuming that tragic language truly reflects patterns of thought and belief in fifth-century society is the strong influence on it of earlier poetry. Tragic language was consciously 'poetic'; it was not the language of everyday life; it was imbued with images and resonances from Homer whose poems, if they reflect the thoughts of any particular historical society, reflect those of a society very far removed in space and time and life-style, from those of fifth-century Athens. However, we have the evidence of Aristophanes that the words of tragedy were important and comprehensible to its

audiences. More importantly, the type of education and popular entertainment general in that society (6) has important implications for any assessment of popular reactions to poetry. Though the lyric passages of tragedy do contain words not used in prose, words which may strike us as arcane, archaic, obscure, the generations of theatre-goers of those years, the years 472 to 404 B.C., were familiar with elaborate and traditional poetry through the most powerful medium of all, the medium of song. Song is, traditionally, one of the three delights given to man to drive away care (7). Song, lyric or drinking-song, tragic, choral or epic, was a common source of individual pleasure. Poetry and its images affected the popular imagination in Athenian society far more than it does in ours.

The interlocking systems of behaviour, values, beliefs, conventions in a given society do shape its language: 'speech and thought are dependent parts of human communication. The control is not in the speech-form but in the set of human relations which generate thought and speech' (8). But the structure of a language also helps to shape the cultural behaviour of its speakers. The formative powers of transmitted metaphor (9) may well be one factor in the formation of fifth-century beliefs, and explain the readiness with which particular beliefs were welcomed, particular pattersn of thought instantiated most strongly. For we can scarcely underestimate the power wielded by the songs of Homer, and by the images that poetry transmits, over the generations of those who had them by heart.

2. The second assumption I have made arises out of the first: that the most useful part of the language to study, if we want to discover patterns of thought about the mind and feelings, is metaphor; more particularly the metaphors by which mental processes are expressed. I.A. Richards suggested in 1936 that 'thought works basically through metaphor' (10). A Roman, when he needed to express something that Latin could not say, used Greek. A Greek in the same position turned to metaphor (11). Metaphor is ἀνόματος

ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά (12). It involves the transfer of attention from one sphere to another. Mental processes cannot be talked of except in metaphor (13); and the sphere chosen to furnish the metaphors of mind have an effect on the ways the mind is thought of with their aid. Many metaphors attached to the mind in Greek, as in other languages, are associated with the external parts of the body and of the world outside; hence the associations of that culture to physical parts of the body and the world claim our attention in considering their effect when applied as metaphors to the mind. Psychoanalysis is familiar with this phenomenon. Each patient has his own metaphors which give the therapist, if he listens to them carefully, enharmonic information about the patient's most central attitudes to the world from which his metaphors are drawn: attitudes concealed, perhaps, except in metaphor (14). In poetry, as in other decorated arts, metaphor is both an ornament and an integral part (15). Images are part of the design; joints, the 'hidden harmonies' are part of the construction (16). Metaphors of the mind in tragedy manifest the same experiencing of the world which the plays demonstrate in other more explicit ways, in the statements, in the construction of their plots, and in the personal interaction they present.

In that I have looked for similar patterns in metaphor, in tendencies of scientific theory, in explicit and implicit ideas of social communication in tragedy, and in other aspects of Greek culture, I find I owe something to the 'structuralist approach', though this was not the original intention. Structuralists seek 'the event, the constitutive conventions behind any individual' (act or utterance); the individual is 'no longer the origin of meaning, but meaning moves through' it (17). My assumption is that the same 'meaning' is to be found moving through the metaphors of all three tragic poets, and through other 'ways of ordering experience' available in Athenian society. It is perhaps an easier task - it is certainly a less subtle process - to look for similarities rather than differences. A 'structuralist approach' does not invalidate individual differences; nor should it be invalidated by them. The differences in the language of the three poets, and the

differences in belief, experience and personality between each individual in the audience, are always important to the historian: 'human reality, like that of the physical world, is vast and variegated' (18). Historian, anthropologist and literary critic face the same problem, the problem of the relation of the individual to the tradition and culture of which he is part. The degree of parallax, that gap between the angles of vision, may have been very great in Athenian society, a society abundant with different beliefs, cults, practices and myths. In fact, I argue below (19) that tragedy exploits the tension between two different modes of explaining man's relation to the world. But the similarities of language and outlook, the universals behind the particulars (20), the structure below the surfaces, are the main object of this study.

3. Tragedy has a significant relation to the behaviour and thoughts of Athenian society, despite the distortion of its genre and conventions. This assumption is an act of faith, a leap of reason. It is possible that tragedy might be, in fact, a completely unreliable guide to contemporary practices, fears, beliefs, and ways of behaving (21). But I have assumed that its presentation of such phenomena does have a significant relation to that society's experience of life. Religious speculation, emotion, and social interaction are doubtless one-dimensional and static as presented in tragedy, compared to the shifting perspectives of real life. The nightmare imagery of fear, for instance, which moves through tragic poetry, may not have stayed on the surface of the mind continually in daily living. But I have assumed that it made real sense, and had real power, over the minds of the people who watched it: that there were many layers of fear below the surface. Equally, some elements in the ways people behave to one another in tragedy, in the ways they interpret one another's motives and in the ways they judge, understand and sympathize with one another, may be exaggerated or distorted. But I have assumed that they were handled with the conventions, not of the theatre only, but of real life.

4. Tragedy lies at some intersection of the intellectual and the popular, between 'higher' and 'lower' levels of thought. Some historians of ideas focus on the diffciulties in ascertaining the spread of the ideas they study (22) Were the men who have carried, committed and confirmed to one another the ideas that live on in their philosophy and poetry, representative of the society they lived in? How many members of the audience had the same sort of education as the poet whose play they were watching? This is perhaps where the structuralist approach is most useful: one assumes that the pattern of belief in Athenian society dominated the hoplite audience through cult-practice, myth, iconography on vases and temples, and in remembered poetry; and that it also moved through innovation in medical, philosophical or political theory. This assumption is supported, perhaps, by what little we know of general education in the fifth century (23). The questions of <u>changes</u> of thought in time, like those of individual differences, I have respected, but have assumed them to be generally irrelevant to the problems I discuss. I have assumed that it is possible to reach a general design of the patterns of thought which affected the well-educated and the less well-educated, the intelligent and the less intelligent, at one particular time. This is a picture of ideas and their patterns, not their history.

5. However hard one tries to be objective, when studying other people's ideas and culture, one is always affected by subjective associations. We should, therefore, use our involvement with the subject with as much awareness as we can. This is the area in which literary criticism, anthropology and psychoanalysis give most help to a scholar. Early in their development each of these disciplines confessed, and came to depend upon, the self-awareness and involvement of the observer with his subject; to use subjective impressions as extra evidence, though evidence of a different order, for implicit aspects of their material (24). I have assumed that I can distinguish between these two types of evidence; equally, I have assumed that I may not have done so consistently.

6. Poets and philosophers earlier and later than the tragedians provide no direct evidence for contemporary associations to the dominant ideas of tragedy. But their subjective associations and development of them has indirect relevance to a study of tragedy. We no longer look to the 'idol of origins', hoping that if we can discover the origin of beliefs, words or custom, we can understand their significance in a later society (25). Early cult-titles, however, early theories of perception, and the original meanings of words, are of interest in a study of fifth-century attitudes, if they show the same pattern of thought: especially when we remember the traditional aspects of education and the Greek habit of looking back to earlier times in myth and poetry. But what is the use of citing poets and philosophers who lived after the tragedies were written, hoping thereby to understand the tragedies themselves, and contemporary reactions to them? Plato and Aristotle, arguably, created their new designs from the tense fabric of fifth-century language and ideas. But Plotinus, Augustine, Paracelsus, and modern authors? I have quoted them occasionally, assuming that a poet sensitive to the poetic tradition he inherits, and a philosopher or scientist sensitive to the tradition they inherit, when they offer their own associations to earlier ideas, can show us something important about their implicit possibilities, show us what seeds the winged cases carried, though they may not yet have opened. If we are forced to use our own subjectivity, we can benefit also from that of others affected by the same ideas.

7. Finally, and most dangerously, I have assumed from the beginning (26) that there is a mind conceived, to which the different terms such as καρδία or φρήν refer. In making this assumption I have ascribed to the generations of the fifth century that process of arguing by analogy from aspects of body to aspects of mind which Gilbert Ryle denounced as a category-mistake (27). Argument by analogy, it has been ~~recently~~ recently demonstrated, was one important mode of ordering experience in early Greek thought (28). Ryle states that

in this context 'the antithesis between outer and inner is meant, of course, to be construed as a metaphor' (29). I have assumed (assumption 2 above) that metaphor both manifests and influences the paths of thought followed by a given society.

8. Methods and terminology. I have repeated motifs, ideas, even quotations, throughout the following chapters. To some extent the repetition serves a useful purpose, in that it elicits different points, or different layers of thought and association, in a text. But equally I could have chosen other ways of presenting my argument. Another feature I should prefer to have eliminated completely is an inconsistent use of the phrases 'pattern of thought', 'mode of thought', 'thoughtworld' and 'worldview'. It is arguable that inconsistent usage alone could have enabled me to distinguish them. Theoretically, I use the phrase 'mode of thought' to denote an inclination to interpret phenomena according to one of two principles: either that the source of movement and power enters men from the outside world (natural or demonic), or that such sources are within man himself, and flow outwards from him into the world in his words and actions. 'Patterns of thought' are the various manifestations of these two different modes. The 'worldview' of an individual is his active relating of the different available patterns, the sum of which is the 'thoughtworld' of his culture which he passively inherits. The 'worldview' of an individual naturally changes: individual belief, I assume, is shifting and volatile in everyone except some philosophers. When we say 'The Greeks believed ...' we usually mean 'one Greek once wrote ...'. But I should hesitate to impose a fixed system of belief on any of those minds, flexible, lively and alien from ours, which the poetry of tragedy once delighted.

I have used 'daemon' as a translation of the Greek word δαίμων. When I use the English 'demon', it is usually in contexts of possession, a phenomenon for which most of the conventional discussion includes reference

to demons of the Christian tradition.

I am grateful to so many friends and institutions for help, advice, encouragement, ideas, information and shelter, that I cannot name them nor thank them all properly. But I thank in particular those who have spent time reading some of this study, and in reading have improved, inspired and criticized: Mr. E.L. Bowie, Mr. M.A.D. Black, Professor E.R. Dodds, Mr. W.G. Forrest, Dr. J.D. Howard-Johnston, Mr. D.R. Nightingale, Dr. R. Ockenden, and my father, Dr. J.H. Padel. But above all I should like to thank Professor P.H. Lloyd-Jones. I might say that without him this work would be even richer in ignorance and error than it now is, but that would be inaccurate. Without him it would never have been written.

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ABBREVIATIONS

I have used the standard abbreviations, plus the following for three books:

Dodds, GI	E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational
Dover, GPM	K. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle.
Lloyd-Jones, JZ	H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus

Chapter One

IN THE MIND

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Chapter I 'In the mind'.

(i) Location of the mind within the body.

One of the basic features of the mind demonstrated in these passages is its secret, hidden position inside the body. (1) A man "hides" his feelings physically within his mind μὴ κεύθετ' ἔνδον καρδίας φόβῳ τινος (A, Cho.103). Here the unexpressed object of the verb is the enmity felt and expressed by the mind τὸν ἐκ φρενὸς λόγον Cho.107. Emotions, words, and intentions are concealed in the mind (eg μῆνις, φόνος, μῦθος (2)) and the organ that conceals may be φρένες, θυμός, καρδιά or even στήθη (3). The organs of the mind act and suffer inside the body; this point is often emphasized by adverbs, which, in at least half the examples, are placed in the emphatic final position in the line. Eg A. Sept. 968 ἐντὸς δὲ καρδία στένει

Pers. 10-11 ὀρσολοπεῖται θυμὸς ἔσωθεν (4)

Ag. 991-2 ὑμνῳδεῖ ... αὐτοδίδακτος ἔσωθεν θυμός

Hom. Od. 20.13 κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει (5)

Pi. P.2.74 θυμὸν τέρπεται ἔνδοθεν.

The securely internal location of the mind may influence the development of the image of the 'tablets of the mind'; an image with great appeal also often found with an emphatic locative adverb eg S.Phil 1325 γράφου φρενῶν ἔσω (6).
This simple basis of belief about the physical mind is important for one of the dominant themes of this thesis, the invasion of the mind by emotion. The kernel of this image is set in physical-perceptual terms at A.Cho. 451-2: δι' ὤπων δὲ σὺν

τέτραινε μῦθον ψυχῆς φρενῶν βάσεις.

The exact image here is hard to grasp. The verb συντετραίνω appears to mean "bore through so as to join" at Hdt. 2.11. Elsewhere the σύν seems, as many prepositions in many compounds, to adopt an intensifying role only. The purpose of the "boring" operation here is to reach the

βάσις of the mind. Page remarks here " βάσις φρενῶν quae sit nescio; etiam quaerendum est cur hoc loco ἡσυχος esse debeat". It is true that βάσις can have two, practically contradictory, meanings, of which either might be made appropriate to the φρένες : it can mean a step (movement) or a foot (foundation). The movement of the φρένες as of other mental organs is well attested (7); if movement is meant here, then ἡσυχη can suggest "uninterrupted (as yet) by emotion". But βάσις more commonly means "foot" or "base"; and movement in the mind is usually violent and occurs at moments of extreme emotion (8), and so should not be ἡσυχη . Ἡσυχη could mean "calm"; but this is strange in the context, which is a song of arousal, unless we understand, "Let the story bore through into the quiet foundation of your mind (scilicet in order to disturb it it must not be calm any longer)". This seems to make too many demands on the words. The most convincing interpretation of ἡσυχος here I find to be "quiet and therefore concentrated" ("ready to listen"): compare A.Supp. 724 where ἡσύχως is coupled with σωφρονισθέντως.

The picture we appear to have in these lines is a drilling operation through a channel provided by one of the five senses to reach the material mind within. This is a picture basic to much presocratic theory of perception (9). In tragedy examples of this belief are chiefly concerned with the sense of hearing. At S. Fr. 858,

βραδεῖα μὲν γὰρ ἐν λόγοισι προσβολή
μόλις δι' ὤτων ἔρχεται τετρωμένων

Pearson here defends the MS reading τετρωμένου , which he takes as "concentrated, wideawake", and he and Lloyd-Jones (10) find many 5th-century examples of ears that are "bored-through", and hence "clean", and which mark the openness of the alert, intelligent man. It is hard to resist the comparison

with Odysseus' companions who plugged their ears with wax to withstand the temptation of the Sirens (11): compare also Oedipus' wish to block this channel too to his soul from the external world, as well as that of sight (S.OT 1386f) (12).

When emotion or other sources of mental pain pierce through to the of the mind in tragedy they often aim at the ἧπαρ that organ called by lexicographers and 4th century philosophers the "seat" of emotion, particularly of lust. Prometheus' tormentor eats his ἧπαρ (14); we find a combined biting and piercing attack on it at Ag. 791,-2

δῆγμα δὲ λύπης οὐδὲν ἐφ' ἥπαρ προσικνεῖται (15)

The liver is the vessel which contains χόλη (16), and mental pain is sometimes synonymous with (and also sometimes caused by) its destruction (17).

As in Homer (18), the different mental organs depicted in tragedy often share the physical reaction that originally belonged to an individual organ. So we find that the καρδία too may be eaten or bitten by emotion, or may fill with χολή or χόλος. But characteristics of the different organs are manifested in the interaction of one upon another.

(ii) Movement of the mental organs in relation to one another

The simplest relation of this kind is perhaps seen at PV 881,

καρδία δὲ φόρῳ φρένα λακτίζει

where the obvious physical phenomenon signified by the image is the quickened, vigorous heartbeat in situations of stress. The context of this line is a description of the impact of outside influences upon the speaker. The φρενοπλῆγες μανίαι and οἶστρον ... ἄρδις act upon and against her (879-80); when she is at last the subject of a verb it is a verb in the passive voice, φέρομαι (883). The insertion of

our line in a passage that otherwise sets her under alien control suggests that the activity of her own inner organs is as uncontrollable and as hostile as the attacks she experiences from outside. The verb λακτίζειν, is often used of horses who kick against the goad (19), λακτίζειν πρὸς κέντρον (20), but it suggests contemptuous as well as indignant aggressions: the Greeks 'trample' on the dying and on the altars (Ag. 885, 383). This kind of trampling characterizes the more hostile daemons, such as the Homeric Ate and Rumour (21) who attack the heads of men: compare the will of Zeus, Supp. 92-3, which swoops on the heads of men. There is also evidence to suggest that the Erinys was 'originally', or originally 'like' a horse. (22) The attack of emotion against man is often expressed in a kicking or trampling image (23). This image develops in several directions, and it is noticeably attracted to contexts involving an outside agent working against the human mind or body. To use it, as Aeschylus does uniquely at PV 881, of the action of one internal organ upon another, taken with a context of outside attack on the sufferer, suggests that one physical part of the mind can be experienced as unquenchably powerful and hostile to the man himself.

Another Aeschylean passage also suggests that the φρένες (taken for the moment in the physical sense, either lungs or midriff) (24), are something fixed, something that is acted upon by the heart: Ag. 996-7,

πρὸς ἐνδίκοις φρεσίν,
τελεσφόροις δίναις κυκλούμενον κέαρ.

The heart appears to be[a] potentially mobile organ which may physically affect, even damage, the φρήν. Fraenkel, here, compares Pers. 767 φρένας γὰρ αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ἰάκουστρόφουν, where in his view this same relation obtains. We may notice also that the circling motion described by the heart at Ag. 997 is characteristic of emotions attacking man, and of the man's physical response (25).

In these passages it is important to find the different forms of balance between the 'literal' (descriptive) force and the 'literary' (metaphorical) element. Fraenkel remarks (26), 'Anatomical details ... should not be dragged in; they would obscure the meaning'. But here we have a use of a word with a precise anatomical meaning (such as κέαρ, φρένες) in a context which suggests their physical relation to each other and begins with a particularly physical word, σπλάγχνα Ag. 995 σπλάγχνα δ' αὐτοῖ ματάζει πρὸς ἐνδίκοις φρεσίν (Compare PV 493 σπλάγχνων τε λειότητα).

The context apparently includes a suggestion of the physical functioning of the organs; it may even suggest the other way such organs may be truthful, the way of exstispication (27). It is <u>through</u> the play upon 'anatomical details' that the more abstract force of the passage is emphasized. The physical-descriptive and the abstract-metaphorical are two faces of the same thing, for concepts of <u>mental</u> processes developed out of contemporary observation of <u>physical</u> processes.

The poetic bonus of the inextricably woven dual reference in words like φρένες or κέαρ is manifest at Cho. 390f:

πάροιθεν δὲ πρώρας
δριμὺς ἅγται καρδίας
θυμός, ἔγκοτον στύγος.

I print Murray's, not Page's text, with great hesitation. There is corruption in this strophe, but the sense does not seem to me to be improved by importing ἐκ into πάροιθεν of M. I take καρδίας to be a defining genitive dependant on πρώρας (28), and ἔγκοτον στύγος in apposition with δριμὺς ... θυμός. The basic meaning of δριμύς is sharp-<u>tasting</u>; it is used particularly of χόλος and μένος (29), which can both take a liquid form. Θυμός is more commonly (30) seen as a breath, Il. 21.386 δίχα θυμὸς ἄητο (31).

We begin to see at Cho. 390f the image of the θυμός blown like smoke or like a wind up and against the heart, as the bitter liquids approach it in emotion (32). If we take πρώρας as "ship" or "ship's prow" we see the image-picture is a wind (or wave) blown up before a ship. The same relation holds for the anatomical description; the θυμός is a breath blown before the καρδία (33). On the anatomical level, we see the heart again as the more mobile organ, but its mobility may be thought to be due to liquids or breath which move within it (34). The whole difficult passage exemplifies the shifting functions of the words which refer to mental organs. The threads of meaning of each word, metaphorical and descriptive, create a shot-silk fabric for every context; and interpretation of such a passage depends on the tilt and lighting each scholar gives to the silk.

(iii) Darkness of the mind

A dominant physical characteristic of all organs of the mind is darkness. Some passages imply that this dark colour is intensified at moments of strong emotion: eg Cho. 412-3

σπλάγχνα δέ μοι κελαινοῦ-
ται πρὸς ἔπος κλυούσαι.

Jebb suggests at Aj. 918-9,

φυσῶντ' ἄνω πρὸς ῥῖνας ἐκ τε φοινίας
πλαγᾶς μελανθὲν αἷμ' ἀπ' οἰκείας σφαγῆς,

that Sophocles supposed blood to darken on contact with air. Kammerbeck believes that μελανθέν here refers to the clotting process. The Greeks did fail to remark that the blood from different organs was differently coloured, but since blood from all organs is noticeably brighter when oxygenated, i.e. on contact with the air, Jebb's suggestion is unlikely.

So is any reference to clotting, for φυσῶντ' implies that the blood is still running. I would take μελανθέν to express the same belief that is explicit above in Cho. 412, κελαινοῦται. It is possible if some consistent system of belief underlies the contradictory evidence that the deepened darkness of the mental organs in excitement like their mobility and swelling was attributed to the increase of the dark liquids at the moment within them (35). This dark liquid swelling is manifest at Il. 1. 103, describing the onset of anger: μένεος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφὶ μέλαιναι πίμπλαντ'. Hence darkness is predicated of organs when they are in a state of emotion, eg. Pers. 115, ταῦτά μου μελαγχίτων φρὴν ἀμύσσεται φόβῳ or A.Supp. 785

κελαινόχρως δὲ πάλλεται μου καρδία.

This is an important element at Aj. 955-7,

ἦ ῥα κελαινώπαν θυμὸν ἐφυβρίσε,
πολύτλας ἀνήρ,
γελᾷ δὲ τοῖσδε μαινομένοις ἄχεσιν.

There is doubt here about (i) the unparalleled form κελαινώπαν which Jebb defends (the form κελαινῶπιν is found at Pi. P.1.7), and (ii) the owner of the θυμός - Odysseus or Ajax? If we accept the form κελαινώπαν we cannot press it as meaning much more than "dark" (36), and it is likely to refer to the darkness of the mental organ in extreme emotion (of which madness is one form v. below Ch. p). This is how Schneidewin takes it: 'Odysseus mocks the frenzy-dark soul of Ajax'. Many emendations have been proposed for this passage; most interpretations take the owner of the θυμός to be Odysseus, and explain the darkness as sinister. On this particular passage this is an open question: but the sinister aspect of the darkened mind is a second and very important one, with many associations. Acheron and Styx (37) are black; Aristophanes (Ran. 470) links this with the colour of the heart in his phrase στυγὸς ... μελανοκάρδιος πέτρα Souls leave the light to go down to Hades; the identification of light with life is found throughout

Greek poetry (and is related to the derivation of Ἄιδης from alpha privative and the verb ἰδεῖν). Ajax's cry at Aj. 394,

ὀκτός, ἐμὸν φάος
ἐρεβος ὦ φαεννότατον,

is related early in the history of scholarship to his appeal to Zeus from the mist-darkened battlefield in Homer, Il. 17.645

ἐν δὲ φάει καὶ ὄλεσσον (39)

But Ajax' later double entendre in his so-called 'deception speech' at 658-60, depends on an acceptable equation between the darkened mind by emotion, darkly hidden in the body, and the sinister dark below the earth where the dead are

κρύψω τόδ' ἔγχος τοὐμόν, ἔχθιστον βελῶν,
φαίνας ὀρύξας ἔνθα μή τις ὄψεται·
ἀλλ' αὐτὸ νὺξ Ἅιδης τε σωζόντων κάτω

The sinister Erinyes are the children of Night; Ares as well as Hades is black (40). The mind of a human being intending evil is also 'black': Clytemnestra when she is the subject of the verb κεκτῆται κελαινόφρων (Eum. 459). Again, in passages that depict part of the mind as black, simple descriptive qualities are often threaded with the non-physical and sinister characteristics in a shot-silk ambiguity (41).

Madness with its sinister implications was thought to be caused by black bile and to be cured by black hellebore (42). Μελαγχολάω and μελαγχολικός are used in a technical sense by medical writers to mean 'affected by a predominance of black bile' but μελαγχολάω is often used in Old and New Comedy to mean 'act madly' viz. 'be mad' (43). The connexion of darkness with sinister phenomena such as madness and death is pointed by the fact that the Greeks, like many peoples, wore black clothing to mark a state of mourning (44) and grief: Jocasta wears τρύχη σκότια (Phoen. 328) in sorrow at her son's exile. It is important in considering the sinister aspect of darkness (in Greek as in other poetry), to note that

the darkness is both <u>inside</u> the mind and body, and <u>outside</u> it: in the earth, in Hades, and in the black clothes symbolic of both. Goheen brings this out well in his discussion of the role played by images of darkness in the 'Antigone'.'Various associations(<u>eg.</u> of darkness) sustain the suggestion that Antigone is subject to a violent, dark external influence. There is in these lines ... a fusion of two levels of thought: not only the idea of passionate folly and wilful error on (her) part, but a larger movement of destruction, beyond a simple understanding and beyond her responsibility' (45). He draws the parallel between the darkness of her mind and the darkness of the fate and curse upon her house.

The third aspect of darkness of the mind is <u>impenetrability</u>. Darkness screens the mind from sight and knowledge as the earth hides the dead and as the body hides the mental organs in their physical capacity. At Ag. 1030 the heart is prevented from telling what it feels νῦν δ' ὑπὸ σκότῳ βρέμει. θυμαλγής (We may compare the probable meaning 'dim, dark' for ἀμαυρός at Cho.157, ἐκ ἀμαυρᾶς φρενός (46)). Dreams are black: they can be difficult to decipher as well as frightening; they emerge from the earth but also arise within, and are seen by the eye of, the mind (47). The impenetrability of the mind of Zeus is expressed at A.Supp. 89f:

Διὸς ἵμερος οὐκ εὐθήρατος ἐτύχθη.
δαυλοὶ γὰρ πραπίδων
δάσκιοί τε τείνουσιν πόροι κατιδεῖν ἄφραστοι.

It has been shown that greater emphasis [illegible] on anatomical details than some scholars have been willing to admit (48). Onians discusses the Homeric use of λάσιον κῆρ to support his case for an early belief that the more admirable a man, the greater the number of internal tubes branching from his internal organs. If this is valid, it follows that the mind of Zeus must be more richly endowed in this direction than any other. There

may be intended here

is a further ramnification of this point. In presocratic and medical writers πόροι became the accepted word to describe the channels of perception that lead into the mind (49). Δάσκιος is commonly used from Homer onwards of forests; Strabo, 9.p 423 explains the name Δαυλίς as coming from the application of δαυλός to forests: Pausanias, 3.10.6, explains 'Skotitas', an epithet of Zeus, in similar terms: the name comes from the shadowy dark oak-forest surrounding his shrine. In the context of a forest πόροι assumes the additional metaphorical meaning, 'paths'. The image/picture in the 'Supplices' passage therefore may carry the additional implication of men lost in a thick forest whose paths are uncertain (50). Οὐκ εὐθήρατος as applied to the ἵμερος of Zeus, adds associations of wild beasts. The simultaneous accompanying picture of the anatomical details presents the tube-channels branching copiously from the mental organs of Zeus. We note in passing that the internal organs are described in words often used of external parts of the body, for both δάσκιος and δαυλός are used of facial hair (51).

The three main aspects of darkness as applied to the mind are, then: the appearance of the internal liquids and the organs they influence, the sinister moral qualities suggested by the associations with Hecate and Hades, and the impenetrability created by the physical fact of the hidden location of the internal organs and the fantasies surrounding this observation. These three elements have fermented together in a long history of European speculation on the mind. The id becomes the dark inaccessible part of our personality ... we approach (it) with analogies; we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations. We picture it as being open at its end to somatic influence ... it is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts but it has no organization ... the logical laws of thought do not apply in the id. ...' (52)

(iv) Activity of the Mind expressed in images

(a) Shaking and Trembling

In many passages which mention the darkness of the unquiet mind, one of the mental organs is shaking or trembling with emotion:

A.Supp. 784-5 ἄφυκτος δ'οὐκέτ' ἂν πέλοιτο [illegible] κήρ.

κελαινόχρως δὲ πάλλεταί μου καρδία (53). At Cho. 410 the quaking of the mind, πέπαλται δ'αὖτέ μοι φίλον κῆρ precedes the darkening of the σπλάγχνα. The trembling mind is featured in Homer e.g. Il. 22.452, ἐν δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ στήθεσσι πάλλεται ἦτορ and Il.22.461 παλλομένην κραδίην Each organ, καρδία, ἦτορ and φρήν may tremble in this way (54), and the cause is usually fear (55). We find an example with φρήν linked, apparently, to an unusual image of human torture, in Sophocles, OT. 153-4,

ἐκτέταμαι φοβερὰν φρένα
δείματι πάλλων

Jebb here notes that ἐκτείνεσθαι is not elsewhere used of mental tension, except for Dionys. De Comp.Verb.c.15 ad fin. ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἔκτασις καὶ τὸ τοῦ δείματος ἀπροσδόκητον The verb usually refers to physical torture on the rack (56), and its application to the mind demonstrates the transference of conceptions of mental suffering or activity to somatic. Other parts of the body were of course observed to tremble in fear (57) and men themselves were said to tremble in emotion with no specification of organ or limb: eg H.h.Cer.293 δείματι παλλόμεναι,

The physical fact of the quickened heartbeat of strong emotion is one origin of this fantasized mental phenomenon; but the restlessness of thought at such a time may not have been separable from physical palpitations. Random and restless thoughts, eg οὐρφοιτῶ φρενῶν Sept.661, reflect the restlessness of body in a man afflicted by them: Aj.59 φοιτῶντι μανιάσιν νόσοις (58).

(b) Growth and Flowering in the Mind

The picture of the mind darkened by emotion was related to the explicit Homeric picture of mental organs swelling and filling with emotion, (v. below section (c)) and one important metaphorical elaboration of this is the image of vegetation and growth in the mind. The mental organ can figure as an animal growing fat (59) eg PV 539 θυμὸν ἀλδαίνουσαν ἐν εὐφροσύναις, but the 'food' that nourishes the organ is naturally felt to be liquid (or air: the nourishment of 'empty hopes'), for the swelling was supposedly caused by the increase of internal liquids. So Cho. 26 ἰυγμοῖσι βόσκεται κέαρ, the laments that feed the heart are closely associated with the accompanying, materially liquid tears. The forest that metaphorically represents the mind of Zeus is more easily understood when seen as one of a number of images which depict the mind as a plant bearing its crop of thoughts: compare Pindar's phrase πραπίδων καρπός (fr.211). Amphiaraus' virtues are presented in a related image, Sept. 593-4:

βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς κυρτούμενος
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.

The song of the Erinyes is ἀὐονὰ βροτοῖς (Eum.333). Drought that makes barren the land is often associated with the barrenness of man, eg Hes. Erg.582f θέρεος καματώδεος ὥρη...
μαχλόταται δὲ γυναῖκες, ἀφαυρότατοι δέ τε ἄνδρες
which Pliny explains as 'in coitum pigerrimi' (60). Just as the land's barrenness is due to drought: human barrenness is also linked with thirst: cf Alc.1.61 τέγγε πλεύμονας (61). Drought was sent by Zeus, Archil.fr 230 West, κακὴν ὀφρὶν Ζεὺς ἔθωκεν ἀὐονὴν or 'by' the Dogstar, Hes. Scut.397 ὅτε τε χρόα Σείριος ἄζει (cf Alc.loc.cit.). At the end of the 'Eumenides' the chorus is given power over childbirth (v. ἄτεκνος 785,815 also) (62). However, the most important aspect of the song of the Erinyes is its effect on the mind of the victim, δέσμιος φρενῶν and open threats against the land and people of Athens are only envisaged later in

the play. In the 'binding song' the image of withering is set in a context of control over the mind: a quality (or deficiency) of body is used to suggest a reaction of mind (63).

Another use of the flowering image is the suggestion of a graft of foreign materials into the mind. In Homer a god can throw thoughts into the human mind (64). and the extension of this picture is the planting of thoughts or songs within the mind, eg. Od.22.348 θεός δέ μοι ἐνφρεσὶν ὦμας ... ἐνέφυσεν (65). A god plants the seeds of disaster in the mind of the man: A.Fr.156N

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ.

or 'grafts into him' a new emotional state, PV 250 ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατῴκισα (66). The host organ may remain unspecified: at Cho.1009 we have only a dative of the person, μίμνοντι δὲ καὶ πάθος ἄνθει. The best-known example of this image is Ag.743, δηξίθυμον ἔρωτος ἄνθος. This image plays its part in the progression of images that compose the context (67), but its kernel is that flower of a foreign plant, love. Love took root in the and thereby destroyed it.

The liquids of the mind constitute one of the most fundamental Greek conceptions of mental and physical functioning, have many metaphorical implications and ramifications. To introduce these it is important to note the relation of the flowering image to liquids. Blossom is a common metaphorical vehicle for the frothy overflow of liquids. The Homeric phrase κρητῆρας ἐπεστέφωντο ποτοῖο (cf. ~~Il.8.232~~, Od.2.431, κρητῆρας ἐπιστεφέας οἴνου), is variously explained. Athenaeus first emphasized the crown rather than the separate flowers, but he too, in his second, more detailed discussion, explains wreathing with flowers as 'a kind of fullness' τὸ δὲ πλήρες τέλειόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ στέφειν πλήρωσίν τινα σημαίνει (68). The full complexity of the liquid-flower image is found with reference to a liquid of the internal body at Ant. 959-60;

οὕτω τὰς μανίας δεῖ-
νον ἀποστάσει
ἀνθηρόν τε μένος

(69).

(c) Filling, Swelling and Pouring: Weight in the Mind

As one might predict on first meeting the simple Homeric presentation of the swelling image, μένος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφιμέλαιναι πίμπλαντ' and οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλῳ, the emotion most often associated with its elaboration is anger (70). This may fill either the mental organ, eg Il.17.499 ἀλκῆς ...πλῆτο φρένας, or, by assimilation, the man himself (71). However other emotions, and also physical disease, can be expressed through this image: ὅταν δὲ πλησθῇς τῆς νόσου S.Phil.520 (72). The image is continued in the word chosen by technical medical language for congestion, ἧπαρ πλησθὲν (73).

The liquid swelling the mind may bubble like flowers, or it may resemble a wave, Eum.832 κοιμᾷ κελαινοῦ κύματος πικρὸν μένος, compare Cho.183-4 κἄμοι προσέστη καρδίᾳ κλυδώνιον ... χολῆς (74). The colour of the liquid is normally black, but there are exceptions. It is dangerous to decide from colour alone which specific liquid is referred to, unless it is named by the poet. Blood is proverbially dark (75); this is what distinguishes it in the Hippocratics from the paler liquids such as phlegm and yellow bile. χολή is another dark liquid swelling within the body. It is not clear to us how far details of humoural pathology may have infiltrated either the educated or the popular mind. Even among the medical writers themselves the number and appearance of the humours was a matter of dispute. When, therefore, we find a problematical passage such as Ag.1121, which certainly refers to some imagined movement of some liquid within the mind at a moment of emotion, ἐπὶ δὲ καρδίαν ἕδραμε κροκοβαφὴς στάγων, it is safest to avoid interpretations involving specific liquids.

I would prefer to take κροκο - here to indicate some unspecified pale liquid (76), not blood. The pale liquid in the mind is rare in poetry and is rightly associated with the proverbial comment χλωρὸν δέος (77). Aristotle's explanation of this phenomenon reflects the general tendency to associate emotion with the movement of liquids inside the body:

οἱ δὲ φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν ... ὅτι ... τοῖς φοβηθεῖσι συντρέχει (sc. τὸ αἷμα) εἰς τὴν καρδίαν ὥστε ἐκλείπειν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν (fr.243, cit.Rose and Fraenkel ad Ag.1121). But the details of Aristotle's explanation are not relevant to a consideration of 5th century beliefs, whether popular or medical. We find, for example, a scientific theory that contradicts it in the De Morbo Sacro 13.20 (Loeb): ἐπικαταρρεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀδηλων (Jones) φύσεων γινομένου ... εὐθὺς ἔφριξε τὸ σῶμα .. καὶ τὸ αἷμα ἐστάθη, καὶ οὕτως ἀπεκρίθη καὶ ἐπικατερρύη τὸ φλέγμα.

When the organs swell with inner liquid they are visualized as inflamed (v. below section (d)) and also heavy. The liquid that causes (or is identified with) the motion, can weigh down the mind, eg. Med. 1265-6 τί σοι φρενῶν βαρὺς χόλος προσπίτνει; Ajax is described as χόλῳ βαρυνθείς (Aj.41) and βαρύψυχος (319). Kammerbeek here compares Iliu Persis fr.V. (Allen OCT p 139):

ὡς ἄρα καὶ Αἴαντος πρῶτος μάθε χωομένοιο
θυμὸν τ' ἀστράπτοντα βαρυνόμενον (78). νόημα.

So far the uses of this picture - the mobile liquids affecting the organs of the mind in emotion - has been semi-metaphorical and semi-descriptive. The duality facilitates more fully metaphorical uses such as Ag.179-80 (Murray)

στάζει δ' ἄνθ' ὕπνου πρὸ καρδίας
μνησιπήμων πόνος,

or κακόν μ' ἔσ καρδίαν τι περιπίτνει κρύος (Sept.934) (79,

The image is not restricted to liquid engendered in the mind. Some metaphorical liquids flow into the mind from outside. Sleep is pictured as a liquid in Homer, eg Od. 12.338 οἱ δ' ἄρα μοι γλυκὺν ὕπνον ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἔχευαν (80) and a reproach "flows in" through the ears, E. Rh.566 ψόφος στάζει δι' ὤτων the beloved into In Plato's Phaedrus fantasy the streams of desire flow from the lover (81). The liquid in the metaphor also flows out of the mind, on the obvious analogy of tears: The 'dripping eye' appears in several different contexts, but especially erotic ones: Hipp.526 Ἔρως Ἔρως, ὃς κατ' ὀμμάτων στάζεις πόθον. Compare the perhaps more abstract level of the image at A. Supp. 579, δακρύων δ' ἀποστάζει πένθιμον αἰδῶ In a more sinister Aeschylean phrase, blood drips from the eyes of the Erinyes, Cho.1058: feelings may be said to be hidden in the eye as well as in the mind: Cho.738 (Murray), ἐντὸς ὀμμάτων γέλων κεύθουσ' (82). The importance given to the eye in ideas about emotion is considerable (83); an importance perhaps derived from association with tears, which fill the eye as the inner liquids fill the inner organs (84). It is noticeable (but perhaps not, in tragic contexts, altogether surprising) that descriptions of internal swelling and filling are often set in a context of dripping tears, eg Cho.183-4

κἀμοὶ προσέστη καρδίᾳ κλυδώνιον
χολῆς ...
ἐξ ὀμμάτων δὲ δίψιοι πίπτουσί μοι
σταγόνες ἄφαρκτοι δυσχίμου πλημυρίδος.

Here the language describing the tears continues the wave image of the internal liquid: κλυδώνιον is followed by δυσχίμου πλημυρίδος. Δύσχιμος is of uncertain derivation: one suggestion is that it comes from χεῖμα (though the short iota required in this passage throws doubt on this (85)). Πλημυρίς is first found used of an extra, unwelcome, wave on the sea: the wave created by the thrown rock, Od. 9.486: Bacchylides qualifies it with

πόντου (fr.30), but Herodotus uses it of a flood-tide (as opposed to an ebb-tide, 8.129). Medical language, as we have seen, took it over to describe congestion (86). So in this passage from Aeschylus we may suppose that the tears which follow the κλυδώνιον χολῆς are described in terms that suggest the waves of the sea at least, if not those of internal congestion.

Laments and grief are associated with liquid in the common use of τήκομαι and τήκω, whose basic meaning is to melt, to convey those fashionable English words 'pine' and 'repine'. The object metaphorically liquified may be an organ, Od.19.264 μηδέ τι θυμὸν τήκε πόθῳ γοόωσα (87), or it may be, by extension, the lament itself, τὸν ἀεὶ / τάκεις ὦδ' ἀκόρεστον οἰμωγὰν / τὸν ... Ἀγαμέμνονα S.El.123.

The same association is found in the common image of a cloud of sorrows or laments: clouds or a swollen with liquid. So, eg Ant. 528

νεφέλη δ' ὀφρύων ὕπερ αἱματόεν
ῥέθος αἰσχύνει,
τέγγων' εὐώπα πρεσιάν. (88).

The image of the liquid dripping out of the mind or body is found in the context of other emotions, eg. madness (v. above on Ant.959).

We see a significance in the association of the dripping image with love when we consider the frequency of hostile images expressing the activity of love, hostile images that centre on the eyes: ὀμμάτων βέλη (89). The aggressive, attacking overflow of liquid is seen in the poison that drips from the hearts and thoughts of the Erinyes:

Eum. 478 χωρεῖ μεταύθις ἰὸς ἐκ φρονημάτων

and Eum. 781-2 ἐν γὰρ τάδε, φεῦ
ἰὼν ἰὼν ἀντίπνευθ' μέθεσα καρδίας
στάλαγμόν† χθονὶ (90)
ἄφορον.

which parallels, obviously, the liquid that drips from their eyes. But Love flows in other than aggressive contexts. Like good things it can flow away. It leaves the eyes, Ag.418-9,

ὀμμάτων δ' ἐν ἀχμνίαις
ἔρρει πᾶσ' Ἀφροδίτα (91)

The impact of metaphor here is hard to assess. This verb used for the movement of deities (or states of mind) lost to their protegés, eg S.El. 249 ἔρροι δ' ἂν αἰδώς . A very vivid use of this is made at S.El.999-1000:

δαίμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐτυχεῖ καθ' ἡμέραν,
ἡμῖν δ' ἀπορρεῖ κἀπὶ μηδὲν ἔρχεται (92).

If we are right to see a strong association between this image and things divine, we might find the use of it at Eur.fr. 299.1 rather irreverent: πλοῦτον . The surface meaning, though, may be little more than "be lost". But here it is interesting to compare with it another verb with liquid associations, τήκομαι , which also came to mean "come to nothing", eg Eum 367 δόξαι δ'... τακόμεναι κατὰ γᾶς μινύθουσιν. The two suggest that the loss of valued qualities, possessions or states of mind was easily envisaged in terms of melting, over-flowing, flowing away.

There is one extremely interesting word, originally connected, probably, with the sea, with is used with reference both to the burst of tears from the eye and to bursts of madness. Barrett (ad.Hipp.1464) suggests that repeated rhythmic movement is the basic meaning of πίτυλος ; Wilamowitz (ad. HF 816) speaks of "mental rhythms of disharmony". We find it associated with the verb formed from ῥόθος which itself suggests the repeated movements of the waves (93): Ar. Fr. 84

ναῦς ὅταν ἐκ πιτύλων ῥοθιάζῃ

Euripides uses it of fear, φόβου (HF 816), of the madness induced by the wine-cup (Alc. 798 δυσφόρου) and twice of madness: IT.307 and HF. 1189,

μινυομένῳ πιτύλῳ πλαγχθείς .

Barrett is undoubtedly right to link the word with the first physical signs of madness conventional in tragedy, particularly head-tossing (HF 867, IT 282). But I would suggest that there may be further significance in its use to express the experience of μανία and intense emotion: the spasmodic swelling (94) and even spilling over of internal liquid from the body and mind. We find the suggestion of overspill in πίτυλος in its use at Hipp. 1464, πίτυλος δακρύων and perhaps in its association with the picture of the mad Orestes who foams at the mouth, IT 307-8,

πίπτει δὲ μανίας πίτυλον ὁ ξένος μεθείς,
στέφων ἀφρῷ γένειον.

The wave image used to express the experience of madness or intense emotional states is found on other writers interested in the mind: E.K. Chambers comments, in relation to his view that "King Lear" shows symptoms of mental disturbance, "But mental disturbance may come in waves". Melanie Klein uses the same metaphor: "In mourning as well as in infantile development inner security comes about not by a straightforward movement but in waves", and Ella Sharpe endorses its "live" use as an expression of "the mysterious unseen movement of the libido". (95) The belief that turbulent emotive states are due to irregular and uncontrollable swelling of liquid in the body has fertilized western abstract theories of mental processes.

The image of the liquid which affects the mind during emotion is available for several different kinds of exploitation; for the swelling of the internal liquids, which causes flow both within the mind and out, away from mind and body; for the entry into the mind of liquids engendered outside; and for the engulfing of the mind or person by waves of suffering. It is important to remember that each of these, which we shall now consider in turn, owes life to the residual belief that emotions were physically produced in the physical mind by the movement of liquids within.

(d) Swelling due to heat: inflammation of the mind

Sometimes the liquid that swells part of the mind is seen as boiling in it. χόλος and μένος often boil, eg PV 370 ἐξαναζέσει χόλον (96). This picture of inner boiling may be derived from the swelling and bubbling out of blood from the body, eg Pherecrates fr. 18 Demianczuk, ἀνέζεσεν αἷμα (97). Anger in its many different forms is the emotion most associated with images of boiling, as it is with those of weight and filling. The θυμός itself, the organ most associated with anger, can boil, eg S.OC 434 ἕζει θυμός The θυμός can also be seen as a breath (as we saw above). The two elements in the boiling image are the heat that creates it and the air that bubbles through the liquid. The easy identification of air and liquid is an important element both of scientific theory and of poetic imagery (98). At PV 370 we receive simultaneously two image-pictures: the volcano erupting, and the anger that boils over in liquid form:

Τοιόνδε Τυφὼς ἐξαναζέσει χόλον
θερμοῖς ἁπλάτου βέλεσι πυρπνόου ζάλης (99)

Here ζάλης refers to the lava (or rocks thrown up by the lava). ζάλης a genetive of definition, is dependent on βέλεσι . But the spray or rain should refer also to the boiling χόλος : the ζάλη is "fire-breathed" and is evacuated from the χόλος . Πύρπνοος as elsewhere (100) in Aeschylus is almost certainly active: hence the boiling liquid is seen in terms of fire and breath together.

Heat and inflammation, the swelling caused by heat, is an observed accompaniment of some physical disease, and this association is important in considering the swelling of mental organs. One very important passage here is PV 380:

Ωκ: ὀργὴ νοσούσης εἰσὶν ἰατροὶ λόγοι.
Πρ: ἐὰν τις ἐν καιρῷ γε μαλθάσσῃ κέαρ
καὶ μὴ σφριγῶντα θυμὸν ἰσχναίνῃ βίᾳ.

It is worth noticing that the Latin and English translations of this idea import the notion of a wound or tumour (101); the Greek is simply concerned with the swollen internal organ. The θυμός is at the same time the organ diseased and the disease itself. ἰσχναίνω appears to be a medical term for the reduction of a swelling (102). The reference here is simultaneously physical and mental/moral: the physical organ, believed to be responsible for the state of mind, is to be treated as other diseased parts of the body are treated in medical practice; and the organs of the mind, taken in their abstract or moral sense (103), are to be cured with words. The same suggestion is made in less explicit terms at Ag. 99-100,

παίων τε χεινῶν
τῆσδε μερίμνης,
ἢ νῦν τοτὲ μὲν κακόφρων τελέθει.

At Sept. 660-1,

χρυσότευκτα χράμματα
ἐπ' ἀσπίδος φλύοντα σὺν φοίτῳ φρενῶν,

the letters which are symptoms of the madness are said to be 'swollen' with it.

Anger, the emotion which easily boils, is obviously the emotion most commonly described in terms of heat and this association helps the crystallization of kindred images, such as πυρεῖς νείκη (E.El.1121). But there are other emotions expressed by the image of the heated mind; love for instance, and different forms of fear, or madness, e.g. PV 878-9

ὑπό μ' αὖ σφάκελος καὶ φρενοπλήγες
μανίαι θάλπουσ'.

At Sept.289-90

ζέοντες δὲ καρδίας
μέριμναι πυροῦσι τάρβος

the μέριμναι act inside the mind, kindling the emotion. The mind is "kindled" at Ag. 1035ff,

θυμαλγὴς τε (sc. καρδία) καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπελπομέ-
νη ποτὲ καίριον ἐκτολυπεύσειν
ζωπυρουμένας φρενός.

I would follow Fraenkel here in taking ζωπυρουμένας φρενός as a genitive absolute, 'mente inflammata'. For explanation of this state of the φρήν we turn to the preceding lines, which are mostly concerned with the καρδία. The heart is in pain, θυμαλγής, indignant (104), and unusually eager: it wants to outrun the tongue (105). There are many other applications of the heat image to eagerness, eg Eum 560 χελιδὼν δὲ δαίμων ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ θερμῷ (106).

Other strong emotions too are 'hot': the Hellenistic figure θερμὸς πόθος (AP. 5.115) is the residue of a long line of more elaborate imagery, eg. PV 590 ἢ Διὸς θάλπει, κέαρ ἔρωτι (107).

Like the image of inflammation, this figure is modelled partly on disease. At S.Tr. 1082 ἔθαλψε μ' ἄτης σπασμός the burning agent is the physical pain attacking Heracles (cf διάβορος νόσος later); likewise the liquid bubbling from Philoctetes' wound is hot: Phil. 696-7

θερμοτάταν αἱμάδα κυκιωμένων ἑλκέων.

Another state of mind associated with heat is hope: but the double-edged quality of hope turns the image to ambiguities. In some uses of the image it is uncertain whether the heat is destructive or beneficial. At Aj.478, κενοῖσιν ἐλπίσιν θερμαίνεται, and S.El. 888 ἐς τί μοι / βλέψασα θάλπῃ τῷδ' ἀνηκέστῳ πυρί; the value of hope is apparently ridiculed: But the use of θάλπειν in the sense of τρέφειν is increasingly attractive in this context to writers later than Theocritus (108), and we should perhaps take the warming action of hope upon the mind as good as well as bad (cf Alc. 354 ψυχρὸν .. τέρψιν). We do find a kind heat in rare metaphors from Homer onwards, eg Hom. Il. 6.412,

οὐ γάρ ἔτ' ἄλλη ... θαλπωρή

Bacch.Fr. 3.11 ὕπνος θάλπει, κέαρ (cf. Fr.16.2).

or E. El. 402, χαρᾶι

θερμαίνομεσθα καρδίαν.

Cold is another pathalogical condition of the body which is applied metaphorically to the mind. In one famous example it is expressed in relation to the much commoner heating image: Pi. fr. 123(Snell)

ἐκ δειδάρων κεχάλκευται μελαίναν
καρδίαν ψυχρᾶι φλογι.

Fear is the emotion most associated with cold, eg PV 693 δείματ' ἀμφήκει
κέντρωι ψύχειν ψυχὰν ἐμάν + (109). Aristotle uses it
(110)
in a moral sense, 'coldhearted', and couples with it another quality imported into the behavioural from the psychological and pathological vocabulary: the possession of blackbile, M.Mor.2.6.43

ψυχροὶ καὶ μελαγχολικοί.

Disease was observed to lower as well as raise the temperature of the body. Cold was feared for its associations with death, perhaps, as in Ar.Ach.1191, στυγερὰ τάδε μὲ κυρεῖ πάθεα
or E.fr. 908 κυρεῖ Διόθεν θανάτου πεμφθεῖσα τελευτή.
But the poetic and pathological association of disease with heat makes images of heat more common; eg. Pi. P.3.117, ἐσλοῖσι ... ἀνδράσιν θερμᾶν νόσων
At OT 27, ἐν δ' ὁ πορφύρεος θεὸς πορφύρεος
σκήψας ἐλαύνει, λοιμὸς ἐχθίστος πόλιν, the word
is used (uniquely) of Apollo in his capacity of bringer of disease.
Similarly πυρετός is used of a fever both in medical writers (111)
and once in Homer, Il.22.31

καί τε φέρει (sc. Sirius) πολλὸν πυρετὸν δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν

As a god or daemon creates disease in a man, he may heat a man metaphorically; so Aves, Of.191 φλέγει με (112)

Throughout this constellation of images showing the heated mind, we notice how the effect of emotion on the mind is treated both as parallel to the effect of disease upon the body, and as an immanent disease of the mental organs themselves. In this picture, the liquid contained within the

organs of the mind, whether considered descriptively or metaphorically, is the inner liquid, an organic part ofthhe mind in any given sense. I shall now turn to another development of the association of liquid with the mind: the metaphorical invasion or engulfing of the mind by external liquids.

(e) Inner and outer liquid: wave and storm

The sea-image has two forms: waves of emotion swell and boil within the sufferer, or waves of suffering engulf and attack him. One aspect of both, which provides an important link with material already discussed, is the association of troubled waters with darkness. The scholiast on Supp. 784

"ἄφυκτος δ' 'δύκετ' ἂν πέλοιτο κήρ·
κελαινόχρως δὲ πάλλεταί μου κραδία,

explains the reference here to the darkness of the organ afflicted as an allusion to the darkening of the sea: ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάσσης ἥτις ἐν τῷ ταράσσεσθαι μελαίνεται. Tucker on the same line recalls the φρὶξ μέλαινα of the sea (Od. 4.402) in support and elucidation of his unnecessary suggestion "ἄφρικτος for "ἄφυκτος. I do not think we should see any reference in this particular passage to the sea; but it is interesting that a reader so familiar with the literature should have interpreted the line in this way, recalling the darkness and turbulence, that are the chief ingredients of the sea-image in its explicit use.

The association of turbulent water with darkness, and the separate involvement of each with the troubled mind, are well brought out by Jebb at at Ant. 20 δηλοῖς γάρ τι κελχαίνουσ' ἔπος in his study of the ancestry of this metaphor. He compares παρφύρω, a verb in which, he suggests, the idea of trouble precedes that of darkness,

with καλχαίνω, in which colour 'precedes' trouble. Πορφύρω is used in Homer to mean "be troubled", of the sea, Il.14.16f

ὡς δ' ὅτε πορφύρῃ πέλαγος μέγα κύματι κωφῷ..
ὡς ὁ γέρων ὥρμαινε δαιζόμενος κατὰ θυμόν-.

and of the mind, Il. 2.551

ἔστη, πολλὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη πόρφυρε μένοντι.

Jebb traces this root to πορφύρα "the dark", which was used of dye and which later acquired the special sense, "be purple". Κάλχη is another word for πορφύρα the murex (it is also used of a dark flower by Alcman, 39). It is perhaps difficult to press Jebb's notion of "precedence" in the reference of each verb, or his attractive suggestion that Calchas is the "seer darkly brooding on the future"; but both these verbs interestingly associate the troubled mind with darkness, and also with the sea. The early attribution of darkness to troubled waters seems an important one in the mental context. Water that is θολερός is muddy; so the troubled heart is "no longer pure", Hipp. 1120

οὐκέτι γὰρ καθαρὰν φρένα ἔχω

The darkness at Ant. 588f, the extended simile of waves representing the effect of Ate on the mind, results from the dark mud at the bottom of the sea which is rolled up by the violence of the movement:

ὅταν
θρήσσησιν ἔρεβος ὕφαλον ἐπιδράμῃ πνοαῖς
κυλίνδει βυσσόθεν κελαινὰν
θῖνα καὶ δυσάνεμοι
στόνῳ βρέμουσιν ἀντιπλῆγες ἀκταί.

This picture may owe something to an image of the mind being disturbed "to its foundations" (cf above pp). Blaydes here compares Babrius 95. 49, κινήσασα βυσσόθεν φρένας A closer parallel is perhaps Ar. Vesp. 696, ὡς μοι τὸν θῖνα τρέττεις: compare the epithets βαθύφρων and βυσσόφρων. But the association of darkness with storms at sea is so strong and so widespread that attempts to see any significance here beyond Homeric

embellishment of the waves' darkness seems unnecessary.

The movement of these dark troubled waves is an image used in various ways. The engulfing wave of misfortune is widely used in simple and elaborate form. Vague references to κλύδων συμφορᾶς, κακῶν πέλαγος, τρικυμία (113) are the background for more subtle economical phrases such as δυσκύμαντα κακά (Ag. 653 636) or ὑπέρανιπος συμφορά (114) and more extended imagery:

ἴδεσθε μ' οἷον ἄρτι κῦ-
μα φοινίας ὑπὸ ζάλης
ἀμφίδρομον κυκλεῖται (Aj. 351f).

Whether the verb is Middle or Passive Voice, κῦμα ... ἀμφίδρομον κυκλεῖται, suggests an engulfing movement. One of the difficulties of this passage is the precise reference of φοινίας ..... ζάλης . Jebb thinks φοινίας refers to the bloodshed caused by the ζάλη of frenzy, and compares Pi. O.12.11:

οἱ δ' ἀνιαρᾶς
ἀντικύρσαντες ζάλαις ἑσλὸν βαθυτρήματος ἐν μι-
κρῷ πεδάμειψαν χρόνῳ.

Kamerbeek translates ζάλη by "gust of wind", but unambiguous examples of this meaning are extremely rare (115). In 5th-century Greek it seems usually to refer to the rain that accompanies storm-winds, rather than wind that accompanies such rain: eg Ag. 656 χειμῶνι ... σὺν ζάλῃ τ' ὀμβροκτύπου We may accept part of Jebb's views, and take ζάλης as physical rather than mental, and the whole passage as a reference to Ajax' physical appearance on stage (116). He is covered with "bloody rain" (compare Ag. 1390 βάλλει μ' ἐρεμνῇ ψακάδι φοινίας δρόσου). The wave of line 351 is the normal 'wave of misfortune'; misfortune represented by the physical blood, result of the mental storm. There need be no explicit reference to an internal storm in the passage; the association is so

familiar that it is implicit in the image as applied to both blood and wave of fortune.

The wave features in images of swamping; also in images of attacking and striking. The simple neutral image κλύδων κακῶν ἐπέλθῃ (Pers. 609) can be developed aggressively, eg by the attribution of "victory" to the wave, E.Tro. 696,

νικᾷ γὰρ οὐκ θεῶν μ' ὁ δύσπνους κλύδων

The wave can carry away its victim. This image is used only of sufferers from madness, who are adrift, swept apart from social life (v. 51f, 249, 378 (134n), 387-8, 436 (17n) below, pp.). The three actions in the wave image are combined in Io's expression of her madness, PV 883f:

ἔξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι λύσσης,
πνεύματι μάστιγι κλωσσομένα ἀκέαστος·
θοίσεροὶ δὲ λόγοι πίτνουσ' εἰκῇ
στυγνᾶς πρὸς ὠκεανὸν ἄτης.

The turbulence of sea-waves is caused by violent storm-winds: storms, metaphorical and real, in Greek tragedy are mostly set at sea (117) and the image of dangerous swelling waves as applied to the emotions is closely associated with such dangerous winds. In the second stasimon of the 'Antigone' the lines preceding the description of the dark waters, 586f, and describing the action of ἀτε,

ὁμοῖον ὥστε πόντου
οἴδμα δυσπνόοις ὅταν
Θρῄσσαν ἔρεβος ὐφαλον ἐπδρακὴς πνοαῖς.

associate the swelling, οἴδμα , with the winds running from Thrace (cf δυσάνεμα.. ἀκταί 591). Winds from the North often figure in images of mental disturbance. Mainland Greeks took this detail from Homer; at Il. 9.5 the "tumult in the breasts of the Greeks" is like a storm from the North,

Βορέης καὶ Ζέφυρος, τώ τε Θρῄκηθεν ἄητον,

So the winds that ground the ships at Aulis blow ἀπὸ Σιρυμόνος (v. infra p. 34). In its most limited form, the storm image is exploited in used to mean "be in trouble", eg. A. Fr. 99N.15. τοῦ νοῦ φρονπόιν χειμάζομαι or in similar usage of cognate words, eg Phil. 1194 ἀλύοντα χειμερίῳ δύπᾳ. With these are associated metaphors of disease eg Aj. 206f

Αἴας δεδεγμένῳ
πεῖται χειμῶνι νοσηράς.

Νοσος can refer to natural physical disasters: the trident of Poseidon, for instance, is a νόσος (PV 924). But, as we saw above, emotion could be regarded as a disease affecting the physical mind, and νοσηράς here suggests both the dark internal storm of the mind and the dangerous external situation: the disease with which he is afflicted is the storm.

The storm within the mind, grounded in the belief that emotive liquids is swell within the mental organs, often projected elaborately onto the external situation that produces the strong emotions, (Compare other instances of projection from inside, below, Ch.3, passim) but it belongs inside the mind first. And the most prized state of mind [illegible] is expressed in a metaphor of sea calm, Ag. 7.38:

φρόνημα...
πνεύμων γαλάνας.

f) Liquid and air in body and mind

Those inclinations of language which encouraged in poetic images a conception of emotion as a liquid acting on material organs within the mind, also fertilized formulation of the humoural system in medicine. Air or breath, πνεῦμα is an equally important element of the body in both medical and what we describe deductively as popular thought. This part of theory corresponds to the culturally-learnt personal fantasies represented by the image of breathing, blowing and flying in the mind. Before we discuss this image

alone, we should analyse the association of the two elements liquid and air, which merge and interchange in theory as in imagery.

As late as Plutarch (118) educated people seriously debated Plato's assertion that drinking involved the passage of liquid through the lungs. Plutarch quotes Alcaeus, πέμπε πλεύμονας οἴνῳ Eratosthenes, καὶ βαθὺν ἀκρήτῳ πλεύμονα πεπρωμένος and Euripides, οἶνος περάσας πλευμόνων διαρρόας in defence of Plato. He describes the lung as πολύπορος (699b); its 'channels' carry breath and liquid together. It is interesting to connect with this argument Onians' view, that from Homer to Plato φρένες mean the lungs, and also Homer's phrase, μενεός δὲ.. φρένες .. πίμπλαντ' Il.1. 104. We have noticed the close association of any emotion (particularly anger), with descriptions of boiling liquid. One aspect of this is the air that bubbles through the liquid.

In medical theory veins and arteries take blood and breath together round the body (119). In the poets, φυσάω or φυσιάω which indicate respiration of air, are also, apparently, used of liquid, eg Aj. 918-9,

φυσῶντ' ἄνω πρὸς ῥῖνας ἐκ τε φοινίας
πληγῆς μελανθὲν αἷμ' ἀπ' οἰκείας σφαγῆς.

Fraenkel quotes these lines in his discussion of Ag. 1389,

κἀκφυσιῶν ὀξεῖαν αἵματος σφαγήν.

He reads ῥαγήν for σφαγήν and translates, "And breathing forth a mighty eruption of blood" (120), suggesting that the sword has pierced Agamemnon's lung. A specific lung-wound is unnecessary over-interpretation; breath and blood are commonly linked in description of a wound. At Od. 22.18,

ὠπίζετο δ' αὐλὸς ἀνὰ ῥῖνας παχὺς ἠλθεν
αἵματος ἀνδομένοιο

the breath rises to the nostrils like the blood of Ajax at Aj. 918; and in poetry too liquid and blood pass round the body in similar, if not identical, pipes: Aj. 1412,

ἐπ μὲ θερμαὶ
σύριγγες ἄνω φυσῶσι μέλαν
μένος (B.100 DK 1-2)

This word, σύριγγες is used by Empedocles, [illegible] of air passages:

ὧδε δ' ἀναπνεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐκπνεῖ πᾶσι λίφαιμοι
σαρκῶν σύριγγες πύματον καὶ σῶμα πέπανται.

At Aj. 1412, however, σύριγγες seems to refer to veins rather than windpipes (Jebb quotes Ap. Rhod. 4.1647 σύριγξ αἱματόεσσα καὶὰ σφυρόν). It is probable that it could mean any channel of the body: Aristotle uses it of pores (121).

One cause of disease was the entry into the body of an alien air or liquid. So, emotions, metaphorically, enter (and fill) the mind as liquid or as air. The interchangeable nature of liquid and air in imagery is best shown in their application to the movement of Sleep. Sleep, like Death, can be pictured on vases as winged (122), which suggests (v. section (vii) below) an association with the air. Images do present sleep as breathed into the mind, A.Fr. 178A (N) καὶ διὰ πνευμάτων θερμὸν ἄγαν ὕπνον (123). But they also present it as poured (v. above section (iii). At A.Supp. 577f,

θείας ἐπιπνοίας
πλήσειε, δακρυόν δ' ἄπο
στάζει πένθιμον αἰδῶ

'breathing in the divine breath' is followed by the alternative image, emotion (αἰδῶ) as a liquid (124).

This association of liquid and πεῦμα in mind and body gives a special appropriateness to the storm image as expressing disturbance in the mind. Most of the images discussed in section (v) above involve descriptions of winds whipping up the swelling liquids; eg PV 884 λύσσης πεύματι μάργῳ.

Conventional association of liquid and breath in mind and body has an important implication. Breath and liquid, which can act as metaphorical

vehicles to express painful and frightening mental activity, are also vital components of the body (where the mind resides) itself, and direct the life of both. Necessary aspects of human functioning, once they get out of control, are projected in metaphor to imagined agents of emotional suffering.

g) Wind and breath in the mind

One of the most protean images used to express the activity of the mind is that of breathing, or blowing, in the mind. To appreciate the appeal of such images within the language itself, we should look first [illegible], at another reflection of the same thought-pattern, the formation of scientific belief.

Air is supposed to have a nourishing effect on the growing body and mind. Ajax tells his son: κούφοις πνεύμασιν βοσκου, νεαν
ψυχην ἀτάλλων (Aj.558).

Lobeck here compares Dio. Chryst. or.12. p. 202B τρεφόμενοι δὲ διηνεκεῖ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπιρροῇ ἀέρα ὑγρὸν ἕλκοντες ὥσπερ νήπιοι παῖδες.

Air and wind nourished plants as well: τοὺς ἀνέμους φυτουργοῦντας and we may compare the tale of mares' impregnation by the wind (125). In presocratic and medical theory air is intelligent, alive, or divine, and gives the brain its intelligence: Aristophanes was acquainted with theories like these (126). Plato knew them too: πρότερον τὸ αἷμα ἐστὸν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ.... (Phaedo 96B).

πνεῦμα in Hippocratic writers refers either to the breathing process, or to air breathed, breathed in or breathed out. It is sometimes hard to decide, when faced with a common semi-metaphorical phrase such as μένεα πνείοντες whether breathing in or breathing out is meant. The same difficulty appears

in tragic echoes of this phrase, eg ὁρῶ μένος πνεῦσαν (S.El.610); πνεῖν τοι μένος ⟨θ'⟩ ἅπαντά τε κόπον (Eum.840), of Cho.33 κόπον πνέων). Various considerations incline me to prefer the interpretation "breathing in". Images so far have emphasized the filling up of mental organs by a liquid which represents in various ways the emotions expressed. As we saw above, air is sometimes interchangeable with liquid in these images, and certainly the emotion-words whose origins are most "physical" can behave metaphorically as either vapour or liquid. Other passages, involving the same range of emotions as μένος , tend to support the interpretation 'breathing in': μένεος δ' ἐμπλήσατο θυμόν (Il.22.312); κότον ἔνθετο θυμῷ Od.11.102; ὀργῆς καὶ μένους ἐμπλήμενος Ar.Vesp. 427. The angry emotion fills the mind, entering it from outside as a breath, breathed in sometimes from a god: ἐπ γὰρ θεόθεν καταπνείει πεθών Ag.105. Divine control over men is often expressed in this way: e.g. Sept. 708

—ἵνως ἂν ἔλθοι δαίμων θελεωτέρῳ πνεύματι.

The effect may be to madden, Ba. 1094 θεοῦ πνοαῖσιν ἐμμανεῖς or to 'inspire', IA 761 ὅταν θεοῦ μαντοσύνης πνεύσωσ' ἀνάγκαι , and πνοαῖς Ἄρεος Ares' ('breaths' especially are often mentioned, eg Sept.115 ἔνθεος (cf ibid. 63) His breaths enter a man's mind and body, making him the god, and/or the emotion he 'inspires', is within him. So Sept. 497 ἔνθεος δ' Ἄρει (a disputed text); (S.El.1324); Ἄρης δ' Ἀτρειδῶν ἐν στέρνοις ἔκει (E.Phoen.134) (127).

These considerations incline me to interpret the phrase μένεα πνείοντες (128) and its related phrases as "breathing in". When "breathing out" is intended, the direction is usually made explicit by a preposition in compound: PV 720 ἐκφυσᾷ μένος , Pi. O 8 36 ἀμπνεῦσαι κατιόν , Il.6.182

(cf the Chimaera) δεινὸν ἀποπτύουσα πυρὸς μένος , and Ant. 136 ἐπέπτασε φίλαις ἐχθίστων ἀνέμων.

In line with this interpretation, I would prefer, with Page, to keep ἐν at Cho.952, ὁ δέθριον πτέρυξ' ἐν ἐχθρᾶς κόπτων.

The parados of the 'Agamemnon' gives an elaborate example of the divers uses of 'breath' as an image for the entry of god or emotion. The central action and central significance of the image, is Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia:

φρενὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν
ἄναγνον ἄνεμον, πόθεν
πὸ παντόπολιμον φρονεῖν μετέγνω.

Taken by themselves, these lines present as a basic picture the bad wind which, breathed in, affects the functioning of the φρήν , its faculty to think properly, φρονεῖν . The idea of "turning" the φρήν is familiar from Homer, τρέπειν φρένας. Hence the wind is τροπαία , "changing" in a transitive as well as intransitive sense (129). This passage is the climax to a sequence of images involving winds. The effect of the real winds on the sailors is mentioned at 147, ἀντιπνόοις.. ἀπλοίας . At 187 winds of fortune are called 'sudden': ἐμπαίοις τύχαισι συμπνεόντων . Real winds again, are described in detail 192f, dominating background and atmosphere in the whole parados:

πνοαὶ δ' ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος μολοῦσαι
ναυδόχους, νηστίδες, δύσορμοι,
βροτῶν ἄλαι,
ναῶν <τε> καὶ πειράτων ἀφετδεῖς,
παλίμπτυκτον χρόνον πιθεῖσαι
τρίβῳ κατέξαινον ἄνθος Ἄρτεμι-
ων.

These winds are the subject of half the fourth strophe; they both represent and balance the metaphorical wind at 219f which disturbs the φρήν of

Agamemnon, the man most affected by the blowing of the real winds. κακόσχολον δύσαρκον βροτῶν ἄλαι of the fourth strophe is balanced in the fifth by πτέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν, ἄναρτον, ἀυτέρα. The action that finally "turns" the winds at Aulis is that action 'chosen' by Agamemnon after he has breathed the 'wind of change'. When we reach the breathing image, the idea of "wind" is already resonant with the associations of the previous references, materially storm, sea (cf 199 πικρὸν χείματος) and ships; in abstract terms, misfortune. The importance of the image, and its attendant associations of disorder within and outside the mind, is marked by its position in the parodos: it introduces the scene of the human sacrifice.

Hostile metaphorical winds elsewhere 'hold' or 'dominate' the mind:

S.Ant.929-30 ἔτι τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνέμων αὐτὰ
ψυχᾶς ῥίπτα πόνδε μ' ἔχουσιν

'Rhipty' is used of the throw of a weapon, hence of a stormy blast of wind (eg Il.15.171 etc) or of wind plus waves (as Pi. P.4.195 κυμάτων ῥίπαις ἀνέμοις), and so of the whole frightening storm sent by Zeus, PV 1089 ῥιπὴ Διόθεν πεύκουσα φόβον . The mind is implicitly represented as a weathervane affected by the wind: E.El.1201f

πάλιν, πάλιν φρόνημα σὸν
μετεστάθη πρὸς αὔραν
φρενῶν γὰρ ὅσια νῦν, τότ' οὐ
φρονοῦσα...

But the solid mind and body is permeable too: the wind may pierce it, Hipp. 165 δι' ἐμᾶς ἦξεί ποτε πηδήσας ἄδ' αὔρα . The intrusive divine breath can be 'winged': Agave's divinely-sent delusion, is 'the flying element' in her mind, Ba.1263 τὸ δὲ πτερωθὲν τόδ' ἔπ' ὀμῇ ψυχῇ παρά ; (130).

Thought itself acts as a wind in the mind; E. Andr. 610 ἀλλ' οὔτι, παῖ, τῆσδ' φρένας ἐπορίσας and in this it resembles its own product, speech, S.Ant.

354 φθέγμα καὶ ἄνεμόεν φρόνημα. The advantage wings give is in swiftness of movement, and the comparison, 'swift as thought' is common in Homer, especially in descriptions of a god's flight (131). This picture takes various forms in tragedy. At Cho. 602 ὑπόπτερος φροντιδῶν (better than ὑποπτέροις , the reading of a later hand in M) means 'light' in sense, ie stupid. The basic meaning of ὑπόπτερος of course is 'winged' and therefore 'swift': characters who enter in haste have 'flying feet' (E.Or. 1565, IA 1029, cf Ba. 214). Words as well as thought move swiftly: the Homeric ἔπεα πτερόεντα fertilizes images in tragedy like S. fr. 621 ἀεθλίδες φωναί and E.Or. 1176 πτηνοῦ, μῦθος But something winged is also liable to fly away, and get lost: E.fr. 420. 4 ὑπόπτερος ὁ πλοῦτος That this can happen to rational thought is shown in Ba. 332, νῦν γὰρ πέτῃ τε καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς Hence ὑπόπτερος applied to φρονῆς at Cho. 602 implies that the thought-faculty is so light that it might blow away.

But though the wind in the mind is invoked in images of rational thought, its most common function is in images of wild emotion, wild to the point of madness. The picture of Antigone as 'held' by the winds of her soul is affected by her accuser's conception of her as mad. Capaneus' madness is imaged in similar terms, Anr. 135-7

ὃς τότε μαινομένᾳ ξὺν δορὶ
Βακχεύων ἐπέπνει
ἐπαῖς ἐχθίστων ἀνέμων.

The common association of Ares and anger with the breathing image is affected by the history of verbs meaning 'be mad'. Μαίνεσθαι in the Iliad is commonly used of the fighting fury inspired by Ares: it is even applied to Ares himself, Il. 5. 717. Βακχεύειν , linked with another god who is commonly the source of possibly destructive inspiration, is also used

in contexts of aggression in tragedy, eg E.Or. 411 ἀΐσσει σε βακχεύουσα
σύντεκνῳ φόνου. ——— . In non-aggressive types of madness
the breathing image is transferred to the sources of the madness: in Io's
case, onto the blast of madness itself, PV 884
Even Ajax' madness is seen in these terms: his return to sanity is compared
(132) to the falling away of the sharp South wind, Aj. 257-8

λαμπρὰς γὰρ ἄτης στροφὰς
ἄξας ὀξὺς νότος ὡς λήγει,
καὶ νῦν φρονίμους...

Important to both usages of this image, is the sense of uncertainty that surrounds something which inhabits and moves through the air. A man affected by winged things coming from the air, a man loving, fearing, hoping, affected by joy or by drink, is said to 'fly', or to have a mind that is 'fluttering' (133). The distinction between the mind so affected and the things represented in metaphor as affecting it from outside, is of course very properly blurred. Wind and breath are natural parts of the mental organs; they affect emotion from within; but in images they invade the mind from outside. The mind flutters in emotional states; its own swift moving products, thought and speech, are winged too; but the mind's enemies, the daemons and emotions, are also endowed with wings, and in fact create those flutters in the mind. The relations between these elements are delicately confused, and the confusion helps to engender the sense of uncertainty and fear conveyed by the image:

Ag. 975 πῖπτε μοι πόδ' ἐμπέδως
δεῖμα προστατήριον
καρδίας πρασκόπου ποτᾶται;

There is one more winged product of the mind, commonly supposed to enter the mind from outside: the dreams.

h) Dreams and the prophetic μυχός of the mind

Dreams, like all impulses, that enter the mind from outside and flutter within it, are known to be divine. They are black, A.Supp. 887.

ὄναρ ὄναρ μέλαν
ἀτοτοτοῖ
μᾶ Γᾶ μᾶ Γᾶ ...

because of their subterranean origins: IT 1261-2

νυχία χθὼν ἐτεκνώσατο φάσματ' ὀνείρων.

Earth who sends out the dreams is one of the most ancient mantic powers, and dream too were thought to reveal divine will: Zeus knows that the divine dream θεῖος ὄνειρος, he sends Agamemnon will be accepted as telling the truth (Il. 2.22). Belief in the mantic potency of dreams lies behind the practice of incubation, which brings Bellerophon success in Pindar (O.13. 65 - 70), and which played an important part in temple trade at Asclepius sanctuaries in the fifth century and later (134). The mantic veracity of dreams is an issue often discussed in tragedy: S.El. 499f

τοι μαντεῖαι βροτῶν
οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν δεινοῖς ὀνεί-
ρασ οὐδ' ἐν θεσφάτοις,
εἰ μὴ τόδε φάσμα νυ-
κτὸς εὖ καταστήσει. (135)

Past and present truths, as well as future, were shown in dreams: IT 1264f

οἳ πόλεσιν μερόπων τά τε πρῶτα, πάρ τ'
ἔπειθ', ὅσα τ' ἔμελλε τυχεῖν,
ὕπνου κατὰ δνοφερὰς γᾶς εὐ-
ναὶς ἔφραζον.

This opinion, as today, had its interested opponents, and the ground for contradiction found by Jocasta (OT 981f) and Clytemnestra is that dreams come from the human mind: Ag. 275 οὐ δόξαν ἂν λάβοιμι
βριζούσης φρενός (136).

Before the end of the first half of the fifth century the opinion could be articulated that the human mind rather than the gods was the only source of dreams: a delicate extraction of one strand of meaning in the language. φάσμα, used eg Ag. 453 to mean 'dream', ὄψις (v. below, Ox. Pap. 2881), and φαντασία all have both subjective and objective meanings. In classical Greek φαντασία means "a mental image, or the power of forming such" (137). In Longinus (ch. 15), where extra, literary-critical connotations are present, it still means basically "the power of visualizing vividly". It is used to describe the power of imagination (Arist. de Anim. 428a5 etc) and of the use of imagery in literature. Words cognate with φαντάζομαι and φαίνομαι record the observation that the object "seen" may be a creation of the mind of the watcher. On Ox. Pap. 2831, a fragment from tragedy, Lobel distinguishes between ὄψις a spectre and ὄψις a dream. Ὄψις, like English "vision" extends its meaning from "faculty of the eyes" to something which the eyes in fact do not see, but which the mind persuades them that they do. This is true of waking and sleeping states. Dreams do belong in some sense to the mind, e.g. S.El. 1389–90

ὥστ' οὐ μακρὰν ἔτ' ἀμμενεῖ
τοὐμὸν φρενῶν ὄνειρον αἰωρούμενον.

The ὄψις is both the "seeing" of the dream and the thing "seen" in it. The temptation to project the vision created by the mind onto a source in the external world, to give it, in other words, an extra-mental reality, is equally strong in contexts of waking or sleeping visions.

Dreams expressed as external reality are often given wings, Hec. 71

ὦ ποτνία χθών
μελανοπτερύγων μήτερ ὀνείρων,

and like other winged creatues they vanish: Ion 1049 νυκτιπόλων ἐφόδων (cf eg PV 657, E. Phoen. 1543). There they resemble the unburied dead (eg Tro. 1082) and other creatures of darkness. Black-winged dreams that

rise from the earth and appear to men at Night combine the association of prophecy and darkness. The μυχός in the earth is the traditional home of the prophet: Amphiaraus, Trophonius and Rhesus (v. E. Rh. 970f) all operate from caves within the earth (138). Variations on the expression μυχὸς μαντεῖου are very common: eg μαντικῶν μυχῶν Eum 180, μυχὸν χθονὸς Cho.954 (cf Eum 169-70). The word μυχός is also used to refer to Hades (eg PV 433, cf Eum. 39, 170). The belief that true revelations of past, present and future emerge from a dark, hidden μυχός is strongly related to fantasies about the mind as a dark, mysterious place hidden within the body. Empedocles uses μυχός with reference to the respiratory and circulatory systems of the body, e.g. (B.100, 22).

Τέρεν αἷμα κλαδασσόμενον διὰ μυίων
ὅππότε μὲν πλίνορσον ἀπαίξειε μυχόνδε.

Parallels between the earth and the human body are exploited in Ajax' so-called 'deception speech', pinpointed in his decision to bury his sword

ἔνθα μή τις ὄψεται·
ἀλλ' αὐτὸ νὺξ Ἅιδης τε σωζόντων κάτω

(Aj. 658-60). It is interesting in this context that Plato chose a cave as point of allegorical departure for the development of the soul (139).

There is an interesting elaboration of the aspect of the earth-body parallel at Cho. 32f:

τορὸς γὰρ ὀρθόθριξ δόμων
ὀνειρόμαντις ἐξ ὑπνου κότον πυέων
ἀωρόνυκτον ἀμβόα·
μα μυχόθεν ἔλακε περὶ φόβῳ.

The text of the first two lines, and therefore the precise sense of the whole passage is disputed. φοῖβος appears before ὀρθόθριξ in M. Page accepts Weil's rejection of this as a gloss; but it is hard to see why one would introduce Phoebus in elucidation of the text as printed above. It seems to me more likely that φοῖβος may represent a distortion

of φόβος. This provides a subject for πνέων and ἴλακης, and would resemble Aeschylean style: compare Ag. 976-7

δεῖμα προστατήριον
καρδίας τερασκόπου ποτᾶται.

Another possibility is that δόμων may conceal δαίμων, since the agent working through Clytemnestra's sleep is the Erinys, δώμασιν ... πίτνων (line 38). Particularly interesting here is μυχόθεν which refers to the women's sleeping quarters deep in the palace, but also suggests the μυχός of the mind, which is where the guilt is felt and where the Erinys dwells. We can compare the Erinys at S.El.490, δεινοῖς κρυπτομένα λόχοις. There is a rather similar, puzzling line at Phil. 1013

ψυχὴ ... ἡ κακὴ σὴ διὰ μυχῶν βλέπουσ' ἀεί

Jebb translates this as 'the soul, peering forth through (the obscurity of) the secret places from which it watches' (140). The sense that the daemon or the dream is inside the secret parts of the mind conforms to the pattern of ideas discussed above; liquid and breath which represent emotion enter and work inside the secret organs of the mind. The sense of the dream (or the daemon) as the mind's physical creation is linked with the belief that the liquid or breath is a physical part of the organs of the mind. Hence the mind (soul) itself behaves like a possessing daemon, looking out from the body:

εὐδουσαλφὴν ὄμμασιν λαμπρύνεται, Eum. 104.

Dreams are something frightening, something that issues from dark and mysterious place. For the fear surrounding Clytemnestra's dream in 'Choephoroi' compare Ox. Pap. 2881

καὶ τότ' ἐξεγείρομ[αι
]ὀρθίας φρίκης ὑπο
]ὄψιν εἶδον ἔννυχον
..ρ[υ]μφυτον τόδε
..κάρπιμος φίλοι
..εκ τ'ὀνείρατων.

The source of dreams, like that of emotion, is projected away from the mind onto the outside world. Being endowed in imagery and iconography with wings which associate them with restless, wandering movement, they frighten, wound and penetrate the vulnerable mind.

The possibility that the dream was engendered by and in the mind as well as by a daemon was used in another important way: to transfer the mantic power of dreams onto the physical organs that produced them. The figure of the "prophetic soul" is used in connection with several different organs of the mind, eg καρδίας τερασκόπου Ag. 976: κακόμαντις ἄγαν ὀρσολοπεῖται θυμὸς ἔσωθεν Pers. 10 of Trag. fr. adesp 176N πηδῶν δ' ὁ θυμὸς ἔνδοθεν μαντεύεται. Emphasis on the inward location of the organs is common in such a context; as Ag. 991,

θρῆνον Ἐρινύος αὐτοδίδακτος ἔσωθεν ὑμνῳδεῖ / θυμός.

Fraenkel here compares the only use of αὐτοδίδακτος in Homer, Od. 22.347, where Phemius explains

θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας πάντοίας ἐνέφυσεν

Song claims an ancient connexion with prophecy and shares the same explanation: a god put the truth into the heart (141). The "truth that comes out of the breast" is something that properly inspires awe in the audience and in the singer-prophet himself. We may recall that Cicero compares the arms of the 'concert kithara', which extended the area of resonance in lyre and phorminx, to the 'nasal canals' ND. 2.59.149.

Associations to the practice of divination from entrails are relevant here. The word, σπλάγχνα, can be used in emotional as well as anatomical contexts; ἄσπλαγχνος Aj. 472, for instance, is translated by 'without guts' (Stanford). A similarly abstract force of the word is seen at Aj. 994

ὁδὸς θ' ὁδῶν πασῶν ἀνιάσασα δὴ
μάλιστα τοὐμὸν σπλάγχνον.

Kammerbeek here compares Groenboom ad Hdt. III.42, 'in our terms emotional rather than mental organs'. But at Ag. 995 σπλάγχνα δ' οὗτοι ματάζει, in a context which mentions the separate organs and their movement (τελεσφόροις δίναις ...

κυκλαίμεναν κέαρ), suggests the truthfulness of the organs as objects of divination. Prometheus claims (PV 493f) to have helped men by teaching them entrail divination:

πλάγχνων τε λειότητα καὶ χροιὰν τίνα
ἔχουσ' ἂν εἴη δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν
χολή, λοβοῦ τε ποικίλην εὐμορφίαν.

The inner organs, components of the mind in our period, from much earlier times are represented as divided for purposes of divination. The famous bronze liver from Piacenza had Bronze Age ancestors. J.C. Courtois has published twenty-one clay livers from Ras Shamra (142). Many of these have rough divisional markings; he has also found a lung which is marked, like four of the livers, with inscriptions in the Ugaritic alphabet, and is partly divided into lobes in a manner resembling the divisions of the Piacenza liver. These were found with fragments of rhytons which date them to the thirteenth century BC.

Popular interest in the appearance of the organs for divination purposes is relevant to the literary image of the prophetic mind. It is related also to the complementary picture of the daemon or dream inside which is the source of the mind's/power. Hesychius says that θεός (s.v.) was prophetic

the name of one part of the entrails inspected; a name which reflects the ancient conviction that the mantic power of entrails was due to the presence within them of a god.

I have suggested that behind many other images we can trace a central one: the mind which prophesies, αὐτοδίδακτος, which is beyond the control of its owner. This has connotations at several levels of belief. From the centre provided by this image radiate other images, such as the figure of the mind uttering sounds from within the body. This is found in Homer, eg Od.20.13

κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει,

and is a feature of Aeschylean lyric, eg Sept. 967-8

⟨Ant.⟩ μαίνεται φόβοις φρήν.
Ism. ἔντὸς δὲ καρδία στένει.

Sophocles continues to use it in contexts that suggest how the image became part of the common speech. Oedipus (OT 63-4) makes use of it, ἡ δ' ἐμὴ ψυχὴ ... στένει and so does the Guard (Ant. 227), ψυχὴ γὰρ ἡ δὸα πολλά μοι μυθουμένη (143).

The fantasy of the 'speaking' mind underlies the passage at Ag. 1028f:

Προφθάσασα καρδία
γλώσσαν ἂν τάδ' ἐξέχει·
νῦν δ' ὑπὸ σκότῳ βρέμει.

The 'singing heart' is a common picture, eg Ag. 990 ὑμνῳδεῖ ... θυμός and metaphorical dancing sometimes accompanies it, Cho. 1024

πρὸς δὲ καρδία φόβος
κἴδειν ἑτοῖμος ἡδ' ὑπορχεῖσθαι κότῳ.

Dancing has its own ambiguities, carrying associations both of the restless, twisting, trembling (v. above section (i)) of/and the patterned and ordered whirling of the mind coping with emotion (v. below, ch. 4 p. 159f)

In sum: the possibility that dreams are created in and by the mind, is symbolized by beliefs of their origin in the darkness of the earth; but thie motif is associated also with the divinely-sent mantic powers of the dark mental organs. Because the mind is felt to have access, on whatever level, to important truths, the power of perceiving truth is assigned to the physical organs of the mind and also to their products: thoughts, words, emotions, dreams. The same power is attributed to the dark earth, the 'mother' of dreams. and of many other daemons which affect the mind (v. below pp. 26ff (47n), 62ff, 88ff).

(i) Madness and the wandering mind. Παρά, ἐκ and violent movement

Although the development of common figures of language me nt that it was easy/for feeling to an internal organ rather than to the man, feeling, to give responsibility and the action of the image in which feeling was presented, had to be appropriate to the organ. We saw above that the figure of the prophesying organ made possible by a constellation of diverse beliefs. On one level this feature of the language is due to a culturally-determined perception of the mind as a collection of physical organs in no way different from other organs of the body. At another level, as in other cultures it involves a transference of characteristics of the body onto the mind. Hence the figure of the mind with eyes, eg Cho. 854 φρέν'... ὠμματωμένην (144), or the mind asleep, Eum. 104 εὕδουσα γὰρ φρὴν ὄμμασιν λαμπρύνεται (cf. Ag. 275 βεβρύχοις φρενός). If the whole man's experience of emotion is consigned to the mental organs, these can borrow in metaphor other properties of men. The subject of ὀρθολοπεῖται , for instance, is a man at H.h.Merc. 308 and θυμός at Pers. 10 ὀρθολοπεῖται θυμὸς ἔσωθεν This feature is most marked in descriptions of madness. The mind can 'rave' like a man, Sept. 967 μαίνεται ... φρήν Ba. 999-100

ὀργὰ μᾶτρός τε σᾶς
μανεῖσα πραπίδι
παρακόπῳ τε λήματι στέλλεται.

Sappho 1.18 μαινόλᾳ θυμῷ . One of the commonest activities of the madman is wandering, and the mad mind too behaves like a man, and 'wanders' off the proper course.

The wandering mind is common especially in short Sophoclean images in iambic contexts which suggest that it may have entered common idiom eg ἐλθόντα OC 316 ἆρ' ἔστιν; ἆρ' οὐκ ἔστιν; ἢ γνώμη πλανᾷ; or, OT 67 πολλὰς δ' ὁδοὺς φροντίδος πλάνας It is associated with the idea of the disturbed and moving mind: φρενῶν Sept. Pers. 661, or OT 727 ψυχῆς πλάνημα κἀνακίνησις φρενῶν οὐκ φοίτης

There are two elements in the image: one is the violence of the movement

itself, the other is the movement aside, away from the proper place. itself is a transitive verb, and means 'turn aside', as bronze is 'turned off' from bronze at Il.11.351 πλάγχθη δ'ἀπὸ χαλκόφι χαλκός. Poseidon turns Odysseus away from his home, πλάξει δ'ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης Od.1.75., cf Od.24.307 ἀλλά με δαίμων πλάγξ' ἀπὸ Σικανίης δεῦρ' ἤλασεν. So πλάζομαι is to be 'turned aside', to be 'banished from' the right place, Il.14 120 Ἄργει· νάσθη πλαγχθείς, to go astray πλαγχθέντα...ἧς ἀπὸ νηὸς Od.6.278, and hence to wander: exile and wandering are, with madness, the most frightening and disgraceful conditions a Greek can meet (146). Grammatically this notion is expressed by the prepositions παρά, ἐκ and, less often, ἀπό.

We can divide words compounded with these propositions into several types: the main ones being 'striking aside', 'carrying aside', and 'thinking aside', We may note, first, that πλάζω itself appears to be related to πλήσσω (147), even, at times, its synonym eg Il.21.269, μέγα κῦμα...πλάζ' ὤμους καθύπερθε. So παραπλάζω is used of the wind which 'drives out of' the right path, κῦμα..καὶ Βορέης ἀπέωσε, παρέπλαγξεν δὲ κυθήρων Od.9.81. This verb more often refers to mental states, where it preserves this sense of striking aside: Od.20.346 παρέπλαγξεν δὲ νόημα (148). Παρακόπτω and its cognates are also common in contexts of mental disturbance. The Maenads, (Ba.33 ὄρος δ' οἰκοῦσι παράκοποι φρενῶν cf. Ba.1000 παρακόπῳ τε λήματι), and Io (PV 591) are παράκοποι. Παρακοπή is the climax of the explanation of Agamemnon's motives in the terrifying decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia (Ag.223). The song of the Erinyes is παράκοπος. (149). Παραπαίω and παρακρούω also convey madness and delirium. Photius explains παρακεκομμένος by παράφρων, μαινομένος both of which, with the extra clarification τὰς φρένας βεβλαμμένος, he uses to explain παραπλήξ. Παρακρούομαι, is used in the Hippocratica to convey delirium (150);

παραπαίω intransitively used, conveys delirium and, in Aeschylus, Aristophanes and Plato, madness (151). παραπλήξ and παρεπλαγκτός commonly mean "mad" and "frenzied" in fifth century tragedy, history and medicine: παρεπλήσσω is less frequent but still used in similar contexts (152).

Compounds with παρά are the commonest in images of striking aside, but ἐκ and ἀπό feature too, eg Il. 16.403 ἐκ γὰρ πλήγη φρένας (153). Ἐκπλήσσω and ἀποπλήσσω are used for the shock of joy or horror. Different compounds are often juxtaposed, eg Hipp. 935, σοὶ γὰρ ἐκπλήσσουσί με/λόγοι παραλλάσσοντες ἔξεδροι φρενῶν

Related to this image is that of <u>driving astray</u>. Παράγειν is used very commonly to express metaphorically the action of emotion or a daemon on the mind eg OT 974 φόβῳ παρηγόμην The locus classicus for this image is perhaps Pers. 99,

φιλόφρων γὰρ ποτιδίνουσα τὸ πρῶτον παράγει
βροτὸν εἰς ἄρκυας Ἄτα.

where the driving image suggests a hunting scene, the quarry tricked into the net, and moral vocabulary naturally adopts such associations in its own imagery (154). ——————————. Παρασπάω comes, perhaps, from the language of chariot manoeuvres (eg S.El.732 ἔξω παρασπᾶ), and brings these associations with reference to mental or emotional experience, eg OC 1185 and Ant. 792 δικαίων δ' ἀδίκους φρένας παρασπᾷς Another word taken from the picture of a chariot, transferred to the context of mental disturbance is παρήορος. ~~The native use of~~ Παρήορος is to refer to a horse harnessed <u>outside the traces</u>, eg Il.16.471. From Homer onwards it is common in a metaphorical sense referring to a state of mind: eg Il. 23.603 οὔ τι παρήορος οὐδ' ἀσόφρων (155). The image of driving is related to the image of carrying aside, which also expresses madness or mad activity. Παράφορος means "reeling", eg Hec.1050

παραφορά ποδί and is appropriate both to the gait of the drunk (Pl. Legg. 775D) and the words of the mad (Plut. Artax.1). With a genetive case, it means "carried away from", eg παράφορος ξυνέσεως Pl. Soph. 228D (156). Photius explains it (s.v) as ὁ παρ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας παραφερόμενος.

The idea that one may think "aside" or "astray" is conveyed mostly by παρά used both in compounds and as a proposition, eg παραφρονεῖν, παράφρονιμος and παράφρων (157). Mad speech is aslant from the rational mind:

S.Phil.1194-5 ἀλύοντα χειμερίῳ
λύτᾳ καὶ παρὰ νοῦν φρονεῖν.

παραληρῶ is not used in tragedy, but elsewhere exhibits the same range of meanings as παράφρων, from "talk deliriously" to "be mad" and "be a fool" (158).

A further fantasy, often linked with a παρα- compound or with the wandering image, is the removal of the mind: PV 472 ἀποστάδεις φρενῶν πλανᾷ. This has two aspects. A man may be outside his mind, ἔξω φρενῶν (Pi.O.7.47), or ἔκφρων (159). So the opposite condition, sanity, is perhaps expressed by means of the opposite image, ἔσω φρενῶν (160), as E. Heracl. 709 φρενῶν οὐκ ἔνδον ὤν. This may be a static state, but the original action, leaving the mind, is conveyed in verbs like ἐξίημι, ἀφίστημι, S.Phil.865 μηδ' ἀφεστάναι φρενῶν, E.Or.1021 ἐξέστην φρενῶν. But the mind is also removed from the man, and more violent verbs express this aspect of the image, e.g. ἐκβάλλει. The gods destroy the mind, Il.7.360 ἐξ ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοῦ or push it out, Il. 19.137

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην καὶ μευ φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς

an image which had a widely powerful appeal: so Trag. Adesp 266 (N^2)

ὅταν γὰρ δαιμόνων βλάβη τινά
τοῦτ' αὐτὸ πρῶτον, ἐξαφαιρεῖται φρενῶν
τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἔσθλόν.

(compare the action of a possessing daemon, ch. 3 below, §section ii). A man is then in a state of emptiness, deprived of his mind, Ant.754 φρενῶν κενός,

or OT 550 τοῦ νοῦ χωρίς, and again sanity can be expressed in the opposite image, possession of mind, PV 444 (cf S.Fr.95,108 Pearson Ant.492): 'self-possession'.

The wandering mind was associated with so many images of madness, that the word "wandering" by itself, understood to mean 'wandering in the mind', meant 'mad', e.g. Ag. 593, πλαγκτὸς οὐδ' ἐφαινόμην (161).

The other element in the image of the wandering mind is the violence of the movement aside from normality. This dominates many images of twisting linked with the idea of a twisting and violently moving whole body: PV 673 μορφὴ καὶ φρένες διαστρόφοι ἦσαν. Sophocles links outer and inner organs in the twisting movement: Aj. 447-8 κεἰ μὴ τόδ' ὄμμα καὶ φρένες διαστρόφους γνώμης ἀπῆξαν. διαστρέφω and διαστρόφος are used both of the eye whirling in madness or emotion, and of broken, distorted limbs (162). Their application in such lines to μορφή or to ὄμμα facilitates their extension to φρένες Hence twisted organs become accepted parts of descriptions of a mind distorted, either mad, (Luc. Vit.Auct. 74 διαστραφῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν, cf D.L. 2.87), or bad, (eg A.Supp. 1017 ἦχνος τὸ πρόσθεν οὐ διαστρέφω φρενός (163)).

The violence of mental movement is associated not only with similar eye movements (eg OT 528 ἐξ ὀμμάτων ὀρθῶν δὲ κἀξ ὀρθῆς φρενός) but also with movement of the whole body. The Hippocratics associate restless physical movement with delirium and disturbance of the mind (164), and violent emotion is expressed in tragedy by violent movement, patterned socially in its song and dance (165). It is partly the accepted association between physical rhythm and emotion that leads Plato to reject all but martial music(166): ᾠδαὶ καὶ ὀρχήσεις ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι κινουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς (Athenaeus 628C)

The congruent violence of physical and emotional movement is suggested in the strange word πίτυλος (cf above p. 194). At IT 307 and HF 1187

this word refers to repeated bursts of violent madness, and of violent fear at HF 816 ἐς τὸν αὖτὸν πίτνον ἥκομεν φόβου.

The violent movements on which are modelled images that express mental movement are represented in scientific theory by explanations of madness that invoke physical movements within the mind and body, eg De Morb. Sac. 17.20 (Loeb): καὶ μαινόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ ὑγροῖτος· ὅταν γὰρ ὑγρότερος τῆς φύσιος ἡ ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, κινευμένου δὲ μήτε τὴν ὄψιν ἀτρεμίζειν μήτε τὴν ἀκοήν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὁτὲ ἄλλ' ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν...
Madness and hallucination here are attributed to abnormally swift rushing movement within the brain. The same movement, on a pictorial and mythological level, is attributed to personified sources of suffering which move with wings (v. below ch. 2(A) passim)

The central aspect of the image of the wandering mind is the unexpected twist away from the straight path, from the ὀρθὴ ὁδός which is the natural place of the healthy mind, within the healthy body, for physical mental and motal hygene are intimately linked, Hdt. 3.33 οὐ νύν τοι ἀεικὲς οὐδεὶ ἦν τοῦ σώματος νοῦσον μεγάλην νοσέοντι. Διαστροφή is perversion, A. EE 1227a21, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ μηδὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὑπαίνειν· καὶ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ ἀναθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.
Such perversion of the natural, safe mind, away from the known and stable path, is a result of observation of the mad or emotionally disturbed person, and the fantasies, expressed in images, that express such activity.

(j) Wanderings of the mad: driving images, the goad and yoke

The image of the wandering mind owes much of its resonance to the wandering activities of madmen in myth. Bellerophon wanders when he is made mad, I. 6.200f:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ κεῖνος ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν,
ἦ τοι ὁ κὰπ πεδίον τὸ Ἀλήϊον οἶος ἀλᾶτο,
ὃν θυμὸν κατέδων, πάτον ἀνθρώπων ἀλεείνων.

This fate, the state of being outside society, is so shameful that Pindar (O. 13.91) declines to mention it, διασωπάσομαί σφ' μόρον ἐγώ. Orestes describes his own wanderer status as shameful, Eum. 98 αἰσχρῶς δ' ἀλῶμαι. The wandering madness of the daughters of Proetus is accompanied by physically shameful features:

καὶ ῥά σφιν κεφαλῇσι κατ' κυσὶ κόσμον ἔχευε
ἄλφος· ῥὰ χρόα πάντα κατέσχεθεν, ἐκ δέ νυ χαῖται
ἤρρεον ἐκ κεφαλέων, ψιλοῦτο δὲ καλὰ μετώπα.
(Hes. fr. 29 Rzach) (167).

Madmen wander in wild, uncultivated places, mountains and forests, as, for instance, the maenads, or the Proetides, Bacc. 10.55 φεῦγον δ' ὄρος ἐς πανύφυλλον and ibid. 93 κατὰ δάσκιον ἠλύκταζον ὕλαν φεύγον. At Hipp. 141f the chorus link Phaedra's feverish behaviour with "possession" by one of several conjectured deities. All the deities they consider are worshipped in wild dance and are associated with wild untamed places:

ἦ σύ γ' ἔνθεος, ὦ κούρα,
εἴτ' ἐκ Πανὸς εἴθ' Ἑκάτας
ἢ σεμνῶν Κορυβάντων φοι-
τὰς ἢ ματρὸς ὀρείας;

Here φοιτὰς implies both mental and physical wanderings. In elucidation here it is worth noticing an early (Hesiodic) explanation for the persecution of the Proetides: that they refused to accept the rites of Dionysus (168). Prof.

Dodds reminds us of the oldest literary allusion to the association of Dionysus with maenads, mountains and woods, H.h. Dem. 386 ἠΐξ' ἠύτε μαινὰς ὄρεσ κατὰ δάσκιον ὕλην (169). Virgil, after comparing Pasiphae to the Proetides, Ec. 6.50

a virgo infelix, quae te dementia cepit?
Proetides implerunt falsis mugitibus agros,

shows her wandering in mountains,

a virgo infelix, tu nunc in montibus erras (52).

The feature that links Io with Pasiphae is the cow-shape. This is associated with Hera, who, in other traditions, persecuted the Proetides (170). Io was Hera's κληδοῦχος at Argos (A.Supp. 291), and Pasiphae is linked with her by Zeus' adoption of bull-shape in pursuit of her (eg Supp.301) and of Europa (Pasiphae's mother-in-law). The offspring of both Io and Pasiphae are given, sometimes, a half-bull shape (171). Hera is responsible for Io's cow-shape and for her wanderings and persecution by οἶστρος (172). In this persecution, which in Aeschylus at least represents a kind of μανία she is linked in another way to the Proetides: οἶστρος is a term used of sexual desire (173), and one aspect of the Proetides' affliction was to have strong sexual desires and be at the same time so physically repulsive that men avoided them.

There is one further element usually present in these situations. Wandering and madness are caused by the enmity of the gods. In some cases the gods send madness only and wandering is incidental; in some cases they send madness and send pursuing agents who cause the wandering (eg Io, Orestes). Hence images of pursuit, hunting and driving, impregnate descriptions of wandering and madness.

Orestes and Io are the two mad wanderers of extant tragedy whose expression of suffering and feeling are explored doubly through wanderings

physical and mental. Io's wanderings are described in geographical detail in the PV, but the language noticeably suggests the metaphorical aspect of the phenomenon, 'vagus animi'. Io's question on entering, 564-5

σήμηνον ὅπου
μῆς ἡ μογερὰ πεπλάγμαι

recalls not only the request of a stranger on stage but the 'recovery scenes' of Heracles , and Orestes after a period of madness (174). Some of her wandering activity, eg 572 πλανᾷ .. ἀνὰ πὰν πρεμαίαν ψάμμον refer unambiguously to physical movement, but many suggest that the wanderings which rack her are also imposed upon her by her own mind, eg 576 ἰὼ ἰὼ πόποι, ποῖ δε'μ' ἄγουσι, πλεύπλαγκτοι πλάναι; She is driven and worn by the οἶστρος

580-1

οἰστρηλάτῳ δὲ δείματι δεινάλαν
πρᾴκοπον ὧδε πτίρεις;

and exhausted by the wanderings, 585-6

ἄδην με πολύπλανος πλάνα
γεγυμνάκασιν

and the twisting image is also used: 589 οἰστροδινήτου κόρης.
But her final lines strikingly suggest identification of mental with physical wanderings, 878-886

ὑπό μ' αὖ σφάκελος καὶ φρενοπλῆγες
μανίαι θαλπουσ', οἰστρου δ' ἄρδις
χρίει μ' ἄπυρος,
καρδία δὲ φόβῳ φρενὰ λακπάζει,
ἰθοχοδεῖται δ' ὄμμα θ' ἑλίγδην,
ἔξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι λύσσης
πνεύματι μάργῳ γλώσσης ἀφρανής,
θολερὰ δὲ λόγοι παίουσ' ἰδίᾳ
σὺν γνώμᾳ πρὸς κύματιν ἄτης.

Images here are juxtaposed: the striking aside, παίουσ' εἰκῇ, carrying aside ἐξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι, heating, θάλπουσ' : compare χρίσει μ' ἄπνοος, the suggestion of breath and liquid inside and outside the mind, the whirling eyes. All these conventional images of intense emotion are attributed explicitly to madness λύσσης πνεύματι. Similar images are combined in the final words of Orestes in 'Choephoroe' 1026f, when he is about to be hounded off the stage, ἐλαύνομαι δὲ κοὐκέτ' ἀν μείναιμ' ἐμῶ (1062). He explains this sensation in detail earlier, 1021-5:

οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅπῃ τελεῖ
ὥστε ξὺν ἵπποις ἡνιοστρόφῳ δρόμου
ἐξωτέρω· φέρουσι γὰρ νικώμενον
φρενῶν δύσεκπυστοι πρὸς δὲ καρδίᾳ φόβος
ᾠδὴν ἑτοῖμος ἡδ' ὑποχεῖσθαι κότῳ.

The restrained tone of these lines, compared to the passage in PV, is explained by Orestes himself, 1026: ἔως δ' ἔτ' ἔμφρων εἰμί. He is still sane, he only feels the madness approaching; this is reflected in the use of iambics. The core of each set of images is the 'out of the road' idea: ἐξω δρόμου or δρόμων ἐξωτέρω. The victim is carried away by feelings that form part of his or her own mind: with φρενοπλήκτεις μανίαι ... φέρομαι ... πνεύματι compare φέρουσι ... φρενῶν δύσεκπυστοι. This situation creates intense fears in the heart: καρδίᾳ δὲ φόβῳ φρένα λακπάζει and πρὸς δὲ καρδίᾳ φόβος ᾠδὴν ἑτοῖμος.

The physical wanderings of the mad are wide-flung: Pausanias found widespread testimony to the wandering of Orestes and the Proetides (175), and Io covers two continents. But small-scale, aimless, to-and-fro movement also characterizes mad wanderings. So Ajax, described (Aj. 30)

πηδῶντα πεδία σὺν νεοῤῥάντῳ ξίφει

will be 'driven by madness' in this way, l. 59,

ἐμὲ δὲ φοιτῶντ' ἄνδρα μανίασιν ναΐοις
ὤτρυνον.

as Philoctetes wanders in his pain, Phil.1194-5

ἀλύουσα χειμερίῳ
λυπᾷ καὶ παρὰ νοῦν θεοσίν.

Such random restless movement is the twisting of escape (176): the pursuing force is conceived in terms of hunting.

Ceres and the 'hound-faced goddesses' in their pursuit of Orestes constitute his madness: E.El.1252

αἱ κυνώπιδες θεαὶ / τεθηλατήκασι σ' ἐμμανῆ πλανώμενον

Lyssa is ordered to drive Heracles, HF 835-6

φρενῶν παραγμοὺς καὶ ποδῶν σκιρτήματα
ἔλαυνε, κίνει, φόνιον ἐξίει κλόνον (177)

One element of the driving image is the κέντρον which is translated conventionally by "goad" (178).

The attack of the οἶστρος is seen as a goad, PV 597,

νόσον ὠνόμασας ἃ / μαραίνει με χείρουσα κέντροισι, φοιτάδεσσιν.

which causes Io's wanderings (φοιτάδες used in an active sense, as at E. O.327, or φοιτάλεος μάστιξ Opp. H.2.513). The chorus revert to this image in their wish to avoid similar sufferings PV 691-2

† πήματα λύματα δείματ'
ἀμφήκει κέντρῳ ψύχειν ψυχὰ ἐμὰν †

The goad of madness is experienced within the mind, eg A.Supp. 109-10

διάνοιαν μαινόλιν
κέντρον ἔχων ἄφυκτον.

Athene's description of the possible effect of the Erinyes on the minds of her citizens is set in a similar image, Eum. 859-60,

οὐ δ' ἐν τύποισι τοῖς ἐμοῖσι μὴ βάλῃς
μήθ' αἱματηρὰς θηγάνας, σπλάγχνων βλάβας
νεῶν, ἀοίνους ἐμμανεῖς θυμώμασιν.

Madness itself is the metaphorical sword in the mind, sharpened by the whetstone (180). The image of the internal goad within the mind recurs in Sophocles, eg OT 1318

οἷον εἰσέδυ μ' ἄρα
κέντρων τε τῶνδ' οἰδήγμα καὶ μνήμη κακῶν,

where the image is applied simultaneously to physical and mental pain. Like the οἶστρος whose action as a gadfly is biting or stinging, the κέντρον image is often applied to love, eg Hipp. 1303 (187), and to the action of an unspecified god, eg Phil. 1039

εἰ μή π κέντρον θεῖον ἦγ' ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ

The most common use of κέντρον is with explicit madness. Lyssa herself is a goad (HF 881): here Euripides probably was influenced by Lyssa's speech in Aeschylus' 'Xantriae', A.Fr.169N,

ἐκ ποδῶν δ' ἄνω
ὑπέρκεται σπάσμος εἰς ἄκρον κάρα
κέντημα λύσσης (Lobeck, for γλώσσης) ἀκαρπίου βέλος λέγω

The goad was a stimulus to action: Eum. 427 τοσοῦτο κέντρον ὡς μητρο-κτονεῖν; It acts upon and within the mind at the same time. At Eum. 155f

ἐμὸν δ' ὄνειδος ἐξ ἀνεψιῶν ποτοῦ
ἔτυψεν οἴστρου διφυλάτου
μεσολαβεῖ κέντρῳ
ὑπὸ φρένας, ὑπὸ λόβον.

the driving image linked to the chariot is blended with the picture of the organs affected physically by emotion; as at PV 881 (v. above p.) the action of the heart on the φρήν is set in terms of horses (who kick more than oxen). Compare Ag. 1624 πρὸς κεντρὰ μὴ λάκτιζε or PV 323 πρὸς κέντρα κῶλον ἐκτενεῖς.

The image of the goad is used in two metaphorical contexts, hunting (ie hounds, pursuit), and driving (horses, chariots etc) (compare ramifications of both, below ch. 2 p). Another image drawn from driving is used sometimes in representing the effects of emotion on the mind: the image of the yoke that binds. The song of the Erinyes is δεσμιος φρενων (Eum. 332, 344). The yoke image expresses the tyranny of man over man (or woman) as well as that of a δαίμων over men (183). So Ajax, Aj. 923 ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ and Agamemnon, Ag. 218 ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον This image is so common that its frequent use in any one play does not seem to me to be particularly significant for that play: Stanford, for instance, suggests that the yoking-driving images of the 'Ajax' combine to give the effect of Ajax' resemblance to an ox yoked and driven to doom (184). The only play in which there may convincingly be seen a possible significance in the overall use of this image would seem to me to be the 'Persae', where it is also used of the act of hybris, the building of the bridge, in which thoughts about human tyranny are explicit (185).

At this point the nature of the pursuing, driving, goading agents becomes inseparable from the effects upon the mind of their (imagined) pursuit. Even Freud's explanation of the functioning of instinct (German 'Trieb') involves to some extent the linguistic creation of imagined external and pursuing objects (186). The Greeks invested, on the whole, even more imagination in fantasized representation of sources of mental suffering than in the expression and description of such suffering So far we have considered fantasies and images about the mind itself, about its nature, action and reaction. These images are set mostly in context of high emotion and suffering, since it is in such situations that the workings of the mind seem most important and yield the highest poetic

potential. But the same contexts include projection of characteristics of the suffering mind or man onto an externalized source of suffering. The manifold agents of suffering are created, 'as if a magic lantern threw the nerves in patterns on a screen' from the characteristics of the body of the man with a disordered mind. And their culturally-determined properties naturally resemble the properties of the disordered mind in that culture's literary metaphor.

Chapter Two

INTO THE MIND

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Chapter Two:

Shapes of persecution: Nature's attack on man

Εἶναί τε πάντα τὸν ἀέρα ψυχῶν
ἐμπλεων· καὶ τούτους τοὺς δαίμονάς τε καὶ
ἥρωας νομίζεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων πέμπεσθαι
ἀνθρώπους τούς τ' ὀνείρους καὶ τὰ σημεῖα
νόσου ... (Diog.Laert.8.32)

This statement, which may have been made by Pythagoras (1), delineates the spine of sixth and fifth century belief regarding the effect of the universe on man. It directs conceptions of mental suffering as they are represented in most tragic language and imagery: man's mind, like his body, is felt to be assaulted physically by invading emotions, by δαίμονες Influenced by amalgamated and inherited images, portrayals of emotion acquire particular forms and iconographical characteristics. This chapter mostly concentrates on this tragic imagery (part B below). But I wanted to explain as far as possible the ingredients and derivations of these images, and related notions about superhuman and subhuman elements of the universe and their effect on man. So I have prefaced the images by a review of contemporary attitudes to external influences, divine, bestial or demonic. This is necessarily brief and partial, and should be supplemented by the standard works on Greek cults, rituals, myths and social customs (2).

In the following discussions I have concentrated on the particular aspects of the gods, daemons and animals that I have found to be represented in the images of emotion. The three daemons, Erinys, Sphinx and Gorgon, illustrate three fundamentally different categories of attack on man. They differ in status as well as technique. Sphinx and gorgon are attached to particular myths (3) and supply apotropaic motifs in contemporary art; Erinyes are (probably) divinities in contemporary worship,

with particular functions and forms of ritual (4). But there are important similarities between them. Their origins are with Earth and the Night (5), they are all female (6), and they are all represented, from time to time, as winged.

(i) The gods: wings and pointed weapons

Though the gods live in the air and move through it (7) they are rarely portrayed in tragedy explicitly as winged. When wings are mentioned in a description of a god, they usually refer to his transport or weapons. By contrast, the wings of other daemons, not Olympians, which also attack man are often mentioned. The wings of Death or Hades are black, (8) πτερωτὸς Ἀίδας. The κῆρες stand over the head of the dying Sarpedon, and are often portrayed as winged on vases in this position. The winged Dawn who carries off Sarpedon (9) may have influenced Euripides' attribution of wings to other elemental daemons, such as Daylight (10) and even Ὀσία (11):

Ὀσία δ' ἁ κατὰ γᾶν
χρυσέαν πτέρυγα φέρεις.

Olympians do not need wings, apparently. They can when they wish use against man the lesser, winged daemons, and they also have their own winged weapons. Their Homeric titles often refer to the particular weapon each uses: ἰοχέαιρα, ἀργυρότοξος, ἑκηβόλος (12). Arrows are obviously feathered: the arrows of Eros, the hunting arrows of Artemis (13), the plague-bearing arrows of Apollo (14). Other divine weapons also fly at man from the air like winged creatures. The winged thunderbolt (15) comes from the 'far-shooting hands' of Zeus (16), though Athene also borrows it (17). The gods control the weather (18) and the effect of the elements on man and the earth he inhabits is often represented as an armoured attack (19):

λαμπρὰ μὲν ἀκτὶς ἡλίου, καναὶ δ' ἀφῆς,
ἔβαλλε γαῖαν.

The potent and mobile force of every natural object which impinged on man is the natural model for the relation adopted towards him by the developed gods. The Cyclops, for instance, boasts that he cares nothing for the power of the gods since he can protect himself from the elements (20). Every part of the natural world is divine and potentially dangerous to man. Hence there is a danger of any view of man's achievements that stressed his

control over the elements of the world: the elements man has learnt to use for his own ends are divine, more powerful than they may seem, and potentially hostile (21):

θεῶν τε τὰν ὑπερτάταν, Γᾶν
ἄφθιτον, ἀκαμάταν, ἀποτρύεται

It is another cliché of discussions on Greek religion that the Greek language readily - too readily? - personified its abstracts (22). It is important to dis inguish between the kinds of abstractions that are personified. Part of the divine armoury is emotion: divine emotions as well as human. Divine ὀργαί, like the thunderbolt may unexpectedly 'swoop down' on a man (23):

ὀργαὶ κατασκήψουσιν ἐς τὸ σὸν δέμας

Specifically human emotions, and conditions and evils of human life such as Old Age (24), are used in a similar way. Their mythical prototype is represented by the νόσοι liberated by Pandora (25). All these abstractions are metaphorically portrayed (26) as making a physical attack on man. It is natural to poetry to show the gods working <u>through</u> these abstractions in their efforts to influence man. The more autonomous personifications seem to be those denoting man's achievements, ideals and failures in life: these are personified in worship, apparently, as much as in art and poetry (27). But theme seems to be one abstraction, used in a significant variety of roles and contexts in tragedy, often actively hostile (though she has been described as 'not a personal agent in Homer'), who is never, as far as I have found, represented visually (28). Dodds sees the basic reference of 'Ate' to be a 'state of mind', and so I include her among the images of emotion below (29). But Ate's special function was to provide a matrix of possibilities for denying human responsibility for uncontrollable states of mind, and so emphasize divine mechanisms inside as well as outside man. So it collected magnetically more behavioural characteristics of non-human forces than did

most states of mind. In poetry though not apparently in painting it attracted various types of iconographical embroidery, licensed perhaps by Homer's two descriptions. These descriptions Dodds calls 'transparent pieces of allegory; I should prefer to call them 'embroidered personification' (30). By saying this he raised the question that has subverted most discussions of Greek personification: how far were the personified forces 'believed in' ? (or, in another form, 'believed to be divine' ?). There is no single answer to this. Over-simplification has been the vice of both sides, whether they believe that personification is only a convenient aspect of poetic technique (supporters of this view have to explain the cult-worship of some personifications) or whether they take seriously every personification as an agent in belief (31). Again, Dodds provides an answer: 'Even a '<u>façon de parler</u>' must have an origin' (32). But 'origin' suggests an overly historical, diachronic picture. Personifications, like other images with a strong hold on popular imagination, have a powerful transformative force (33), especially within a religion in which every natural object was potentially divine. A figure conventionally decorative in Homer might be quickened by a fifth century poet with a new constellation of images and associative attributes, and presented again as a validly powerful force operating in the outside world and inside man (34). The fear and speculation which directed a great deal of religious belief might be re-aroused towards any personification by a writer who was powerful and evocative enough.

In part B below I treat the emotions, partly for my own convenience, as examples of forces that were taken seriously - as having quasi-daemonic powers at least - by listeners and poets. It may have been open, of course, to any member of the audience, or to the post himself, to write these images off as 'mere <u>façons de parler</u>'. But if this happened often, not only the images but the tragedies themselves would have lost a great deal of their apparent power (35).

The gods, to sum up, work through their available material to punish men and to get their own way. Their weapons are winged weapons, winged daemons, and, next in scale, human emotions, which as we shall see may be portrayed also as winged. Men are vulnerable most of all to attack from the air; hence anger, punishment, Ate or madness often swoop onto the head of their victim (36). The gods also send winged dreams and visions out of the air to trouble men (37). Throughout the chapter it should be remembered that in poetry, as apparently in popular religion (38), the air over men's heads was intense with possibilities of divine attack.

(ii) Erinyes: the goading pursuit

How are the Erinyes described in the words of tragedy, and how do they make their attack on man (39)? They are dark (40), black-robed (41), and when their number is mentioned it is always three (42), though Aeschylus presumably forsook this tradition in making them compose a tragic chorus (43). Often, though, one Erinys acts alone: in Theban plays, for instance (44) and elsewhere, particularly in Sophocles, the phrase 'your Erinys' or 'the Erinys of Oedipus' is common. Here the Erinys apparently stands for the curse of Oedipus on his sons, or his father Laius' curse on him (45).

Their physical parts most often mentioned are their feet, eyes and hair. Their feet are swift, long, curved like talons, and harsh as metal (46). This emphasizes, presumably, their main function, speed in pursuit and in punishment (47). But the prominence given to their feet in descriptions may also recall their origins, which may have involved Arion, the horse-shaped child of Demeter Erinys and Poseidon (48). Their original method of attack, if this is the true derivation, may have been kicking, then, as well as the goading with whips so characteristic of them (the whip-element also may be associated with the original horse-shape); and would recall Ate's method of attack in Homer (49), 'walking on the heads of men, harming them'.

The Erinyes' attack is most fully described by Aeschylus (50). What is noticeable in this passage is the subjective nature of the attacking forces (σόξαι δ' ἀνδρῶν); the emphasis on their feet (ἐφόδους.. ὀρχηστοὺς ποδός), and the aerial attack, a heavy pressure from above:

σόξαι δ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλ' ὑπ' αἰθέρι σεμναὶ
τακόμεναι κατὰ γᾶς μινύθουσιν ἄτιμοι
ἀμετέραις ἐφόδοις μελανείμοσιν
ὀρχηστοὺς τ' ἐπιφθόνους ποδός·
μάλα γὰρ οὖν ἁλομένα
ἀνάκαθεν βαρυπετῆ
καταφέρω ποδὸς ἀκμάν,
σφαλερὰ <καὶ> τανυσρόμοις
κῶλα, σύοφορον ἅταν,

The Erinyes presumably are enabled to attack from above because they possess wings, though Aeschylus prepares his audience for disappointment about this on stage by making the priestess declare that they are wingless (52). However, Euripides makes Orestes shoot them in the air, and archaeological evidence as well as literary is divided on this point.

Their eyes of course are very fierce; they resemble the eyes of the Gorgon; they are brutish, and ooze a disgusting liquid, usually blood (53). Blood in the eye has two implications in the fifth century. The eyes of madmen are proverbially bloodshot (54), hence the Erinyes in this as in other features display the characteristics of their victims (55). More generally, because the eyes show a man's intentions most clearly, a bloodshot eye marks the wish to kill, particularly in revenge: revenge as an abstraction is traditionally steeped in blood (56): τίς δ' ἄνωθεν εἶσιν αἱματορρόφος.
The Erinyes are πράκτορες αἵματος (57); though Ate and Eris and their blows are bloody enough (58), the Erinyes are so bloody that they drip with it. They are an αἱμοστα γὲς ἔθνος (59): an obvious allegorical image of the social reaction they represent. Blood is shed, in the Orestes-legend at least, after they appear; the fact that blood is also shed before they arrive on the scene - that it 'calls them up' - is represented in the fantasy that they track down their victim by blood like hounds (60). They follow the 'man who hides his bloodstained hands', but they are also said, in the 'Oresteia', to drink his blood themselves (61): they cannot get enough of it:

φόνου δ' Ἐρινὺς οὐχ ὑπεστανισμένη
ἄκρατον αἷμα πίεται τείσην πόσιν (Cho. 577).

But their bloodsucking can be over-emphasized as a common fifth century feature. The idea of any bloodsucking creature, human, demonic or animal,

is rare in the fifth century, except for the viper. The Erinyes have obvious associations with snakes, for their hair is often said to be like snakes, or composed of them and sometimes they are called 'snakes' (62) and they are unambigiously chthonic deities. But the bloodsucking motif occurs in tragedy only in the 'Oresteia', and concentration on this detail was perhaps most suited to trilogy-form (63), since it was liable to throw off-balance the conventional equilibrium between their metaphorical attack - what they do to a man in fantasy - and the social human events they precipitate - what they drive a man to do to others. Though the attack is envisaged as a swoop down, a kick from above, plus an assiduous application of the goad, the metaphors of their activity have to remain complementary to human behaviour. If the metaphors are embroidered with details of their very physical relation to their victim - like sucking his blood - the balance between metaphor and human action is jeopardised. Aeschylus could surmount this problem by showing them as invisible to the audience in the first plays, but visible in the third, in which verbal details could build up a picture of what they could not actually perform on stage (64).

Fear of the Erinyes is concentrated on their feet, eyes and goads of emotion (65); it is by these means that they inspire fear in the guilty. The goads, or whips, damage and pain the physical mind (66), and stimulate in the man what the observer takes to be hallucinations, and also deluded but murderous action. The fact that the victim alone can see them (eg the Orestes in the I.T. and the Orestes) is represented in Sophocles by the picture of the Erinys in the mind: the favourite Sophoclean image of ambush: But Euripides also shows the attack as subtle and secret (67)

ἀλλὰ σῖγα καὶ βραδεῖ ποδὶ
στείχουσα μάρψει τοὺς κακοὺς ὅταν πύχῃ (fr. 979.3)

(iii) Sphinx: seizure and song

Sphinx and Erinyes have a weapon in common: her feet are the part of the Sphinx's body most often mentioned. But where the feet of the Erinyes are used for pursuit (and perhaps for kicking), the feet of the Sphinx are used for snatch and grab activities, and perhaps earlier for strangling and choking too (compare her derivation from σφίγγω) (68). In tragedy her feet are like the talons of a bird of prey (69) and she seems to devour her captives. Aeschylus calls her ὠμόσιτος (70), and though later writers are not over-explicit about this aspect of the Sphinx (71), and though most fears focus on her feet, ie the first moment of capture, this motif is implicit in most Theban plays (72). From the earliest representations in art (73) the Sphinx has a lion-body, though this is not explicit in tragedy, where she is normally winged and her main animal affinities are with a bird of prey. Images of her as hound are misleading: the bird of prey and hound are generally interchangeable in imagery of carniverous pursuit (75).

The Sphinx' other main feature, and another aspect of the fear she inspires, is her riddling song. She is ἀοιδός, ἐναψῳδός , music is an essential part of her and she composes her deadly riddles in verse (76). In this she resembles the Erinyes, whose song is 'maddening' and δεινμιος (77), but also, more particularly, the Sirens. Like them she works her victims' downfall by means of her song; and the Sirens too may have had an original interest in the same mixture of song with snatch and grab. Their singing is associated in Homer with the bones of the shipwrecked victims (78):

Σειρῆνες λιγυρῇ θέλγουσιν ἀοιδῇ
ἥμεναι ἐν λειμῶνι, πολὺς δ' ἀμφ' ὀστεόφιν θὶς
ἀνδρῶν πυθομένων, περὶ δὲ ῥινοὶ μινύθουσιν.

But they have early affinities, apparently, with other snatching daemons,

the stormwinds or harpies, who carry off the daughters of Pandareus as slaves for the Erinyes (80):

τόφρα δὲ τὰς κούρας ἅρπυιαι ἀνηρείψαντο
καὶ ἒ ἔδοσαν στυγερῇσιν Ἐρινύσιν ἀμφιπολεύειν.

The Harpies have obvious connotations, as their name shows, with snatching and grabbing, but after Homer this is mostly at human food, not at humans as food. Sirens and Harpies are virtually indistinguishable on pots: nomenclature seems to be a matter of archaeological convenience (81). The so-called harpy usually has the uglier face, which reflects archaeological sensitivity to the literary tradition, in which the Harpies are repulsive rather than dangerous (82). Sphinx and Sirens on pots, like the harpies, are half women, half birds: a μειξοπάρθενος (83). Both have archaeological associations with death, and their origins are similar (84).

One of the most frightening aspects of the song that entraps and slays is that music, in tragedy and epic, as in the Greek tradition generally (85), has sweet and honourable connotations, being one of the things given to man to help him forget his cares. Just as the sound of war is the antithesis of true music (86), the deceptive music of the Sphinx is the more hateful because it lacks the basic ingredient of true music, its soothing quality (87).

(iv) Gorgon: the piercing rays of the eye

The Gorgon's most important and frightening feature in tragedy and epic, (whatever her ancestry in archaeological motif] (88) is her head, and more specifically her eyes. Homer knows only one Gorgon, and she is used as a fear-inspiring motif on armour (89). Hesiod makes this single Gorgon mortal and gives her two immortal sisters (90). Her head, cut off by Perseus, inspires terror in two ways: by her snake-locks, part of her chthonic inheritance (91), and by her wild eye. The petrification theme is apparently absent from tragedy - at least, it is not elaborated there - and the real source of fear is the ray that darts out of the eye.

The thought that the eye radiated rays towards the object it perceived is found throughout Greek poetry and philosophy (92). In tragedy such rays are compared to flashes of lightning, and are considered harmful not only for what they portent, but in their own right, as a weapon (93):

ἐξ ὀμμάτων δ' ἠστράπτε γοργωπὸν σέλας.

The eye of Orestes, afflicted by the Erinyes and an object of terror himself to Menelaus, seems to his cowardly uncle to flash deadly lightnings from his eye: δράκων στίλβει νοσώδεις ἀστραπάς (94). The fact that he is compared to a snake here connects the two attributes of the Gorgon eye: snake-like and deadly. Most references in tragedy to the Gorgon eye are in descriptions of passionately angry men (95); and it is worth noting that the Gorgons themselves are called βροτοστυγεῖς (96).

Euripides' version of a creature called Gorgo, killed in the Gigantomacheia by Athene, is perhaps his own invention (97). But it combines some of the traditional features of the Gorgon killed by Perseus. Euripides gives his Gorgo two kinds of blood, one that has healing properties, and one that has poisonous properties, due to the poisonous snakes of her hair (98).

Some vases show a winged Gorgon, but tragedy is silent about this (99): in tragedy the Gorgon is the archetype of the terrifying eye. Out of it run the rays, sharp as the weapons of the gods, poisoned like the eyes of a snake (100).

(v) Animals

Animal behaviour is often attributed to the emotions in the imagery discussed below (part B), as it is to the composite daemons considered above. What are the relevant attitudes towards animals in Greek that might help to explain the flavour and feeling of these images? They are, of course, very confused: animals touch Greek life and religion at the most ordinary everyday points, and also at the strangest. One thing that stands out is the Greek habit of observation. Bergson's suggestion that 'Man treats an animal with a deference that is not entirely dissimilar to religion' (101) is important to Greek observation of animals from the Bronze Age onwards: sympathetic, detailed and willing to attribute special powers to them in art, ritual and science. In the sixth and fifth centuries, it has been suggested (102), a changing attitude to animals is reflected in a transition from magic to a symbolic use of them. Sixth and fifth-century animal imagery and animal symbolism certainly multiplies in the 'boundless profusion' (103) normal to animal symbols in all times and all art; nourished particularly by the Eastern iconographies and by the constant cross-fertilisation of Greek art and Greek poetry. But the suggestion that it replaced magical beliefs about animals is a misleading result of histories of philosophy which emphasize the scientific classification and analytic objectivity with which the Ionian philosophers are supposed to have influenced popular attitudes in the fifth century. The ritual use of animals and the attribution to them of magical powers in fact persisted through the fifth

century into Alexandrian times at least (104), while animal symbolism, though it went forth and multiplied, never replaced it.

There is, of course, a complete and happy confusion of feelings about animals. In material available to us, this seems due not least to the force of the inherited image in poetic genres, but is also reflected in the oddities within Aristotle's remarkable research on animals where myths, folklore and magic are introduced on equal terms with sober classifications. One important tendency in all these feelings is to view animal behaviour as illustrative of different types of human behaviour. Aristotle discusses (105) the kinds of comparison possible between animals and humans. Animals have some psychical qualities in common with humans. Some animal qualities are <u>identical</u> with some human qualities: the snake is mean and treacherous, the lion high-born, noble and brave, the stag intelligent but timid (106). Some <u>resemble</u> human characteristics, in that they have traditional friendships and enmities (107). Some animal qualities are <u>analogous</u> to some human ones: family relationships are made, the cranes choose their leader, and the stag and bear, etc. have an innate knowledge of medicinable herbs (108).

Insistence on the illustrative use of animal qualities for human behaviour is shown first in poetry by Homer, whose sympathetic observation and love of detail for its own sake in portraying animals suggests the delight in animal movement shown by the Minoan fresco-painters and seal-engravers (109). The courage in the hungry lion or the lion at bay is a point of admiring comparison for human feelings and behaviour in Homeric similes as it was in mediaeval heraldry (110). But there is another view of the lion in Homer, the savage beast dangerous to man (111), and this is the point of comparison that persists into tragedy. In tragedy comparisons of human to animal behaviour predominantly refer to the dangerous and

unpleasant aspect of animals, lions or anything else (112). Occasionally there is a morally neutral comparison: the speed of the horse, for instance (113). Occasionally too there are references to courage, eg. in the rare topos, the mother hen protecting her chicks (114), but often these dwell only on the danger and savagery of the attacking animals (115). There is not in tragedy the same delight in animal descriptions for their own sake that is so strong in Homer; in the Bacchic vision of the fawn the emphasis is on the human feelings and movement of the maenad compared with it; as in earlier lyric associations of dancing girls and horses (116). In the Aristophanic animal choruses, affection and laughter is mostly directed at the human qualities the animals represent (117). Delight in animal representation for its own same persisted though in the visual arts: Kalamis, Strongylion and Myron were renowned for their animals (118), and sculptural verisimilitude is praised throughout the anthology (119): the difference between poetry and visual arts here perhaps reflects the fact that the comparison between human and animal behaviour was possible in poetry but not sculpture, and that this was the use of animals most interesting to the poets. Sculpture has no metaphors.

This aspect of animal observation, its possibilities of comparison to human behaviour, contains a built-in paradox. The animal is 'like' the human in one particular and this is the point of departure for the 'totemic' attitude, in which there is a basic belief in the affinity between the man and the totem animal (120). Some anthropologists have shown (121) that in societies with a highly developed ancestor-cult, animal totemism is related to the actions and intentions of the god (or ancestor hero) represented by the animal. 'Locomotion and versatility of movement ... characteristics of shape, colour, ferocity ... cries ... is represented in the list of media which serve as an outlet for the supernatural beings'.

There is a 'symbolic link with the potential aggression of ancestors' (122). Lévi-Strauss finds this interpretation of 'totemism' narrow, since it applies only to those societies with a developed ancestor cult (123). But it is obviously appropriate to fifth century Athens with its very highly developed awareness of ancestor-cults; for the assimilation of ancestors with animals we may compare Jane Harrison's work on the snake which represented the soul of the murdered (or just of any dead) man (124). But the more structural explanation of 'totemism' favoured by Lévi-Strauss (125) is also illuminating for Greek poetry and its traditional habit of animal observation for purposes of comparison with human behaviour. Lévi-Strauss emphasizes the importance to 'totemism' of the observation of social relations between animals and their resemblances to human ones (126), and concentrates on the animal embodiment of 'ideas and relations conceived by speculative thought on the basis of empirical observation'. This is one important side of the coin: the tendency of thought from Homer to Aristotle to observe animal relations and consider them as illustrations of human behaviour , to observe animal emotion and make it illustrative of human passions (127).

But there is a paradoxical side to such comparison, well brought out by Vidal-Naquet (128). In a man-animal comparison, a distinction is 'built into' the comparative relationship (129), a polarity, 'like man and therefore <u>not</u> man'. The animal provides simultaneously an example and a comparison. In the qualities which distinguish animal from human reside all the powers which make the animal most 'feared and admired' by humans. These powers are connected with the special animal, non-human relations with the daemonic: the animal plays the intermediary between man and nature (130). In Greek terms, as elsewhere, this means also, of course, between man and the gods.

The relations between animals and the gods are as confused as that between animals and man. There is a certain continuing relation between their divine associations in ritual and their rationalizing scientific classification by scientists. Durkheim, in a magnificent passage, suggests a way of explaining this: that 'there is no abyss between the logic of religious thought and the logic of scientific thought. Both are composed of the same essential elements, only unequally and differently developed. The special characteristic of the former seems to be its natural taste for immoderate confusion as well as for abrupt contrasts. It is willingly excessive in both directions. When it compares, it confuses; when it distinguishes, it opposes. It knows neither measure nor subtlety, it seeks extremes; consequently it employs logical mechanisms with a kind of awkwardness, but it is ignorant of none of them' (131). So even in the violently confused religious associations of animals it is possible to see manifestations of the same attitudinal mechanisms we find in Aristotle's objective classifications. This complex of attitude concentrates as much on the special non-human qualities of animals, as on the qualities they share with humans: and their non-human qualities are specifically related to the gods.

It is probable that many Greek gods had animal origins. Their animal titles and familiars suggest this; but there is a dearth of early evidence on this point and a corresponding accretion of speculations, which should have been inhibited (but never was) by Herodotus (132):

ὅθεν δὲ ἐγένοντο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε αἰεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖά τε τινες τὰ εἴδεα, οὐκ ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ ... οὗτοι δὲ (sc. Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ὅμηρος) εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες.

It is a simple conceptual convenience to postulate 'original' animal forms for the Greek gods; for some phenomena are most easily explained as residual beliefs of this: eg cult titles (133), and myths of metamorphosis (134). Also, in epic there are odd phrases which compare a god (or more often a goddess) to a bird. This is clearly not a simple metaphor, for specific birds are mentioned: the god (or goddess) is envisaged as adopting a particular bird disguise (135). In ritual, the animal form or animal epiphany of gods lingers in practices such as 'omophagia', and also perhaps in ancestor-cults (136).

The gods interbreed, if that is the right expression, with animals and in animal form with human beings; they also interbreed with odder daemons, and so do the animals. This promiscuity produces such composite creatures as the satyrs (137) or Erichthonius (138); the Harpy Podarges bears Achilles' horse Xanthus to Boreas, and other mares, real horses, are impregnated by the winds (envisaged as breaths, souls or personified daemons)(139). It also produced (according to one tradition, through Ixion's mistaken union with a cloud), the centaurs, whose leader Cheiron is the central figure in any mediation between raw and cooked, savage and civilized, in Greek myth, and who were seen by Méautis as an attempt to define in art the contrast between the animal and the human, the wild and the tame (140). The horse is anyway supposed to be (141) the next most salacious animal after man; this may contribute to the fact that more animal-daemon, animal-god and daemon-god unions involve horses, than any other animal.

Gods use animals too, as they use other daemons, as a vehicle for communication with man. They send animals to man as omens to warn and advise (142): they use birds especially for this purpose (143). The gods also send animals as punishments, as a scourge to men. Artemis particularly,

with her special relationship to animals (144), sends such scourges: the Calydonian and Erymanthine boars; the lions of Nemea and Cithaeron. Zeus too: he sends, for instance, a plague of snakes to Argos (145). Gods also madden domestic animals and make them destroy their masters (cf below pp. 82, 324 (168n)). But the animal communication between gods and men is not entirely one-way: men sacrifice animals to the gods, and they also use animal powers to discover divine intentions.

Animals are vessels of magic themselves. It is their special powers to which men try to gain access, which they try to siphon off in an effort to discover more about the universe and more about the gods. The different powers possessed by animals are mostly purificatory, healing, mantic, and apotropaic; but man tries to acquire also the special extra physical strength of the animals.

The earliest Greek armour known to us uses physical parts of animals for human defence: and, interestingly - though perhaps obviously - uses the offensive weapons of animals: boars' tusk, antelope's horn. The boar's tusk helmets we can still see; the great bows of horn are described in Homer (146). Aristotle emphasizes the offensive as well as defensive nature of animal accountrements like horn, tusk and teeth, and the use of war dogs was apparently peculiar to Greece (147). In Greek ritual as well as in battle men were anxious to borrow the special daemonic physical strength of animals by dancing in animal skin, drinking animal blood and eating animal flesh (148). Heracles' special physical strength is <u>symbolized</u> by the lionskin, which Dionysus wants as a disguise in the '<u>Frogs</u>'; but also perhaps at some level it is felt to be <u>conferred</u> by it (149). Animal skins were used in purificatory rites at Eleusis and elsewhere (150); and the importance of the golden fleece of the ram which Phrixus sacrifices to Zeus is central to several myths (151).

Prophets use the mantic powers of animals: originally,,probably, by learning to understand the voices of the birds. This is a motif in the myths of Cassandra, Helenus, Melampus, and Mopsus as well as Teiresias (152); this power can be conferred by contact with snakes, who often figure at the birth of a prophet (153). Birds, or the gods they were associated with, were credited with powers of causing the seasons and foretelling the weather by their migratory flights and this is mirrored in the many myths that identify a hero or leader with a bird (154). Birds filled the temples in Greece, and in tragedy it is principally their flight rather than their cries that seers use for their interpretations (155).

Birds had a special place in magic - perhaps because they were cheaper than other animals?(156) - but the cockerel had special apotropaic powers (157) and the unfortunate wryneck when tied to a wheel and rotated had the power to draw back a reluctant lover. This invention Pindar attributed to Aphrodite (though one would think she might not need it) (158). The practice of divination by entrails also suggests a belief that the sacrificed animal was in intimate contact with the divine, a contact mirrored in their entrails (159). Animals also showed their knowledge of divine intentions by guiding men to sacred springs (160) (and by creating them) and to the proper site for a settlement (161).

The mantic powers of animals are associated closely with their healing and purificatory powers. The snake's 'pharmaka' can be used for malign or benign purposes, on the good Greek principle of ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται (162). There were dogs too with healing powers (163) in the temples, and Asclepius often recommended riding on horses as a cure (164). Pigs among other animals were used in purification rituals (165).

Pet animals are not much mentioned in the fifth century: the first

zoo was invented in Alexandria (166). Animals as public or dinner-party entertainment are a feature of Rome (167), not Athens where they were kept for their functional uses; where animals admired as decoration are mostly carved and painted. It was their physical properties that made them useful; but their demonic affinities endowed the special physical powers of the different animals, which could be used for or against man, with special danger too. Their allegiance to man was only lent: gods could remove it by maddening domestic animals, and making them turn on their masters. Many myths record this fear: Glaucus, Actaeon and Lycurgus, Diomedes with his man-eating horses (168), and, with slightly different connotations, Hippolytus (16). Animals, with their different strengths and weapons, furnish many images of emotion as they furnish the developed daemons iconographically, with many of their components of fear. The lion, with which the fifth century Greeks were not personally familiar (170), provided some images of ferocity and courage (171). The other animals that provide the main images of fear and anger are the horse and bull, eagle and dog, and the snake.

(vi) Animal agents of fear: 'the death-bringers'

I have smelt them, the death-bringers, senses are quickened
By subtile forebodings; I have heard
Fluting at night-time, fluting and owls, have seen at noon
Scaly wings slanting over, huge and ridiculous ... I have heard

Laughter in the noises of beasts that make strange noises: jackal
jackass, jackdaw; the scurrying noise of mouse and jerboa; the
laugh of the loon, the lunatic bird. I have seen
Grey necks twisting, rat tails twining, in the thick light of dawn ...
... I have seen
Trunk and horn, tusk and hoof, in odd places. I have felt
The horn of the beetle, the scale of the viper, the mobile hard
intensitive skin of the elephant, the evasive flank of the fish.
... It was here, in the kitchen, in the passage
In the mews in the barn in the byre in the market-place
In our veins in our bowels our skulls ...
What is woven on the loom of fate ...
Is woven also in our veins, our brains,
Is woven like a pattern of living worms
In the guts of the women of Canterbury (172).

Though other animals, wild ones like the wolf, are occasionally found as representative of savagery in tragedy, I shall concentrate in this section on animals which have ambig ous associations, special powers by virtue of associations with gods in cult and myth, but which also have associations of ferocity and fear, affecting man outwardly in the real world, and inwardly in the images of fear of things operating within himself.

The horse is associated in myth and cult with rivers, winds (173), Poseidon, particularly as Earthshaker (174), and chthonic cults. Pegasus, for instance, is in some versions related to the Gorgon Medusa (175), and the Erinyes have horse-ancestry in their blood (176). Horse-monsters are usually male, although female horses were prized as swift runners

from Homer's time onwards (177): the horse in Greece is primarily a weapon of war (hence the appropriateness of the image of the Trojan Horse). This fact is sometimes explained by the failure of the Greeks to invent the horse-collar, which meant that a heavy farm-implement would strangle the beast as it pulled (178). So, although some parts of the horse had medical properties (179) and though the wise centaur Cheiron taught healing and civilizing, as well as hunting, skills (180), the main symbolism of the horse in Greece is martial. In mediaeval heraldry too this persists: the horse symbolizes 'a man prepared to fight, for at the faint sound of the clarion is the horse provoked to battle' (181). In Aeschylus the jingling of the bridle is a symbol of the terror of war (182), and all centaurs except Cheiron eat their meat raw: a touch which fills in the background to those myths of man-eating horses, represented in several tragedies (183). The restiveness and fieriness of horses in war and racing chariots (184) perhaps contributed to the belief in the horse's exaggerated sexuality (185), but also turned the horse into a symbol of the spirited and physically graceful man: 'Indeed a prancing horse is a thing so admirable that it holds the gaze of all who see it, young and old alike' (186). Hermes compares Prometheus' resistance to Zeus to a young colt's resistance to the goad, PV 1010.

The bull is particularly associated with Dionysus and with Zeus (187). This reflects at some level the odd intricacies of the relation between Zeus and Hera, for Hera in cult and myth is closely concerned with cows (188). The cow can be an image of helplessness: the chorus of Aeschylus' Supplices is compared to a heifer pursued by wolves, and Io is pursued in the form of a cow (189). Hera's connexion with cows in the context of Zeus' over-active love-life may help to explain the proverbial lasciviousness of the cow, which is particularly strong in Crete (190). The bull was the fiercest of domestic animals; hence the triumph of sacrificing one,

represented first in the painted sarcophagus from Agia Triada (191). In myth the bull can represent rape and danger: the fire-breathing bulls conquered by Jason, the Minotaur, the bull-shape of Achelous (192). Heracles struggling with the Cretan bull was a favourite sculptural motif in the fifth century (193). The particular points of fear in bull-images are his bellow (194) and his glare (195): they both threaten and presage the actual violence about theerupt.

The most frightening characteristic of animals is their carnivorous rending of human - or any other - flesh: and the unburied corpse left for birds and dogs to desecrate is an image of horror and fear (196). It is doubtful whether there was any distinction in the popular mind in the fifth century between carrion-eating birds and other birds of prey (197), especially since hound images are sometimes interchangeable with eagle/vulture images (198): dogs will eat anything, carrion or living. The dog was used for hunting and sometimes for war (199), but it is clear from sculpture that dogs were caressed in the home (200), and the hunting dog of Odysseus became an image of fidelity (201). There were temple dogs, in the temples of Asclepius at least (202), and their lick, like the attention of temple snakes, could heal patients. But the dog's friendly behaviour to man could be construed as sinister too: a dog will fawn on a man, but attack other animals with ferocity: it scavenges dead bodies, and could turn on its own master, as in the myth of Actaeon (203). The fear of dogs is represented in the dog-monsters of myth, Scylla and Cerberus (204), and perhaps in the fact that 'dog' or 'bitch' is used as a reproach in human behaviour (205). Dogs were guardians, of a home or a tomb (206), and there was good reason to fear them.

The eagle, pre-eminently the bird of Zeus, is used by him in myth to punish and/to rape. The eagles of Prometheus and Ganymede are obeying

Zeus's command (and pandering to his more selfish wishes, perhaps) (207). The eagle-imagery throughout the 'Oresteia' augments the sense of Zeus' will and the demands he makes on men throughout the trilogy (208). The eagle tearing at a hare was a common motif on coins (209). The terror of the eagle's attack from the air is suggested in the King's comforting reply to the Danaids, who are afraid to leave their sanctuary (210) οὐ τοι πτερωτῶν ἁρπαγαῖς <σ'> ἐκδώσομεν and is exploited in the (probably proverbial) picture of the eagle's surprise at being pierced by an arrow of eagle feathers (211). The eagle wings of the sphinx, harpy, gorgon (sometimes) and Erinys (sometimes) enhance the terror of these daemons: and man's vulnerability to them. But the eagle-wings are only the vehicles that carry closer the talons that snatch and the beak that rends (212).

Some unambiguously nasty animals make their appearance in metaphors of tragedy. The herald of the sons of Aegyptus is compared to a crocodile (213) and to a spider carrying unpleasant, perhaps poisonous associations (215). But the herald in the 'Supplices' is also called a δίπους ὄφις which bites like an ἔχιδνα (216); and with the snake we reach the most important and ambiguous animal in Greek thought.

The snake is associated with cults of Athena, Asclepius, Dionysus, and every chthonic deity (217). It was the chthonic guardian of tombs, and may have been thought to represent, or actually to be, the soul of the dead man (218). The snake-locks of the Erinyes and the Gorgon augment their terror: but snakes could also use their powerful associations with divinity for healing (219), and blessing (220). In myth also snakes are guardians of tombs or other holy sites. This is often an impediment to the human hero of a myth, but emphasizes the protective nature of the snake over what is considered sacred (221). Though they sometimes appear to mark the birth of a prophet, whether in the flesh, or in dream (222) when they are by a god

at a hero's birth it is most often with hostile intent (223). Their hostility in myth may be manifested in constrictor-like squeezing, as with Laocoon (AAA) or by poison, as with Philoctetes and Eurydice (224). Hence, in spite of their connection with cults, snakes were feared: a man draws back if he sees one, and trembles (225):

ὡς δ' ὅτε τίς τε δράκοντα ἰδὼν παλίνορσος ἀπέστη
οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃς, ὑπό τε τρόμος ἔλλαβε γυῖα,
ἆψ δ' ἀνεχώρησεν, ὠχρός τέ μιν εἶλε παγείας

In tragedy the snake is an image of secret and persistent attack. The bird trying to protect her young from the snake is a common image (226), and it is in the 'Septem' a part of a complex pattern of snake imagery by which the beseiging army (and, by implication, the merimnai that haunt the mind) is compared to the snakes beseiging the nest (226) and Tydeus in his attack is depicted as 'yelling like a snake' (227). The prevalence of snake imagery in this Theban play may be due partly to the motif of seige and attack; but may be influenced also by the myth of the Spartoi and the chthonic associations of the snake. The fantasy that the eye of the snake is poisonous or dangerous to look on is also reflected in tragic imagery, and is related to the theme of 'seeing the wolf first' or 'catching the gorgon's eye' which is associated with other animals too (228). The echidna was supposed to suck or lick blood (it is unclear which) (229).

Animals symbolize (among other things) danger. In their violence and unpredictable use of their soecial physical powers of attack, they are an image for dangerous men (230)

ὡς καὶ ματαίων ἀνοσίων τε κυνοδάκων
ἔχοντας ὀργάς, χερὶ φυλάσσεσθαι κράτος,

and for other dangers too: the danger of daemons and human emotions. Their wildness and savagery can only be calmed, in myth, by the spell-binding harmony of Orpheus. Music in the Greek mind is the opposite of wild things: the music of Apollo (231), or the music of Orpheus (232) in the groves of Olympus, ἔν-

Θα ποτ' Ὀρφεὺς κιθαρίζων
σύν ἀγεν δένδρεα μούσαις,
σύναγεν θήρας ἀγρώτας.

Though music could have its wild side too (233), music represented the only hope of civilized man in controlling both himself and the animals (234) by whom his own inner emotions could be represented; as T.S. Eliot recalls to us in the quotation at the top of this section.

Control was possible through the musical concepts of <u>harmonia</u> and <u>nomos</u> (235).

Chapter Two: Part B

The metaphorical attack on the mind (236)

The hostility, mobility and power of the daemons and animals discussed above are recognizable models for decorated fantasies of emotion attacking the human mind. Most forces attacking the mind can be conceived of as winged; as daemons or their pointed weapons; as elements of nature; as animals; and sometimes as hostile human beings. Very noticeable, throughout the corpus of imagery, is the fear that the mind can be destroyed physically by these forces (237): πάρεστι δ' ὠδὶς καὶ φρενῶν κατα φορά A.Cho. 211.

This should be taken seriously as representative of some fear in the users of this language, even though it may be 'only' a metaphor (238).

(vii) Wings: the aerial attack on the head

The emotion most often lent wings in the metaphoris eros (239). The purpose of these wings is clear in, for instance, the Hippolytus: they aid love's hostile attack. In the first stasimon the martial imagery ἐπισπρατεύσῃ 527, and βέλος 530, makes the image of the bee, μέλισσα δ' οἵα πτ πτεπόταται 563, which follows the sad exemplum of Semele, suggest the combination of piercing stings with the traditional sweetness of love (240). The association of love's military campaign with his wings is explicit later in the play:

ποτᾶται δὲ γᾶαν...
πτανὸς ἐφορμάσῃ 1272-3

Fear, often personified from Homer onwards (241) also uses wings to aid its bitter attack:

δεῖμα προστατήριον καρδίας ...ποτᾶται A.Ag. 977.

The winged attacker swoops down from above, and often concentrates on the head of its victim, like the attack of madness in Xantriai A.fr.169:

ἐκ ποδῶν δ' ἄνω
ὑπέρχεται σπαραγμός, εἰς ἄκρον κάρα
κέντημα λύσσης.

It resembles the attack of the specific daemons which make a man act in a way incomprehensible (242) to other people, OT 1299:

πῇ σ', ὦ πάλαι πον,
προσέβη μανία; πῇ δ' ὑπεδύσας
μείζονα δαίμων τῶν πάροιθεν
πρὸς σὴν δυσδαίμον μοῖραν;

The action is embodied on stage when Lyssa swoops down from her perch above the house of Heracles (243). Misfortune and confusion in general seem to concentrate on the head of their victim (244) and we may associate this, rather tentatively, with the derivation of πότμος from πίπτω (245):

ἐπὶ κρατί μοι πότμος ... εἰσήλατο S.Ant. 1345.

A man suffering the pressure of an aerial attack on his head can be addressed as βαρύποτμε (246), and the pressurizing daemon is also 'heavy' (247) e.g. E.Alc. 865 ἡ βαρυδαίμονα μητὴρ μ' ἔτεκεν

The weight that rushes down from above - ὦ τόλα

ὡς μοι βαρεῖα καὶ δόμους ἐπεστάθης —

and is inescapable (248) -

— πᾶ φυγὼ βάρεος κακῶν; —

resembles the Erinyes and the anger of the gods that rushed on man from the air (249): ἐν δ' ἠνῷ κάρᾳ θεὸς ... μ' ἔπαισεν.

The air is thick with imagined emotions, with divine things, with divinations: OT 480f

πᾷ μεσόμφαλα γᾶς ἀπονοσφίζων
μαντεῖα · τὰ δ' αἰεὶ
ζῶντα περιπωτᾶται.

Prophecies and curses (250) once released take wing in the air; so do dreams which visit men on their black wings (251), and other communications, human or divine, laments, songs (252) and words (253). The epic phrase ἔπεα πτερόεντα is directly reflected once in extant tragedy: Or. 1176 πτηνοῖσι μύθοις

The winds of the air are often portrayed as winged on vases (254), like the πνεύματα related to the divine πνοή of inspiration and communication (255). Anything that communicates, that flits from man to man, can be described metaphorically as winged : and emotions, the transient πάθη sometimes divinely sent, they too are winged, and their metaphorical wings increase the power they have over men: as St. Augustine knew (De div. daemonum III.7): 'Daemonum eam esse naturam, ut aerii corporis sensu terrenorum corporum sensum facile praecedant; celeritate etiam propter eiusdem aerii corporis superiorem mobilitatem non solum cursus quorumlibet hominum vel ferarum, verum etiam volatus avium incomparabiliter vincant'.

(viii) <u>Piercing rays and weapons</u>

Emotions can be represented metaphorically as piercing the **body** and/or the **mind of their victim (256). Fear 'penetrates the breast', E.Tro. 157**

διὰ δὲ στέρνων φόβος ἧκεν

and drills into the inner organs: PV 181, ἐμὰς δὲ φρένας ἠρέθισε διάτορος φόβος.

So, more softly, but just as surely, does grief: Ag. 430

πένθεια πλησιπάρθιος...
πολλὰ δοῦν θιγγάνει πρὸς ἧπαρ.

Emphasis is sometimes placed on the flesh through which the emotion drills:

διὰ σάρκα δ' ἐμὰν
ἦλθος ἦλθος ἔμολε μα- **E.Phoen. 1286**
τέρος δειλαίας (257).

Not human emotion only but human communication is presented in this image too. Lying words 'sink into' the mind, S.Phil. 1111-2

ἀλλά μοι ἄσκοπα
πρυπτά τ' ἐπη δολερᾶς ὑπέδυ φρενός,

and the sound of grief ''runs the hearer through' (258).

The picture behind the image is the thrust of the sword into the vital organs, Pi, N, 7. 26 ἔπαξε διὰ φρενῶν λευρὸν ξίφος

and the same image occurs of physical pain (259): S.Phil. 791-2

εἶθε σου διαμπερὲς
στέρνων ἵκοιτ' ἄλγος ἥδε.

When the weapon of mental or of physical pain is distinguished from the emotion that causes the pain, the weapon is usually an arrow, that shoots through the air like a wind - cf Hipp. 165 δι' ἐμᾶς ἦξέν ποτε κηδύος ἀὸ' αὔρα **- and reaches the heart within: A.Ag.834** δύσφρων γὰρ ἰὸς καρδίαν προσύμενος **The darts Love shoots from its hands (260) are pointed** κέντρα **(261) which madden their victim (262): Hipp.38-9**

στένουσα κἀκπεπληγμένη
κέντρου ἔρωτος ἢ πάλιν' ἀποίδυται.

Love's arrows are 'stronger than the pointed rays of fire or stars' (Hipp. 530). The motif of radiation is an important aspect of Greek ideas about the eye, and love especially is involved with eyes (263). Rays of light are sharp and pointed weapons, and so are eyes of a lover: the eye of Zeus lusting after Io is an ἄφυκτον ὄμμα PV 903, and the hunting eyes of love send out lightning flashes (264):

ποτάνδ' ἐν ὄψει †ἴυγγα θηρατηρίαν
ἔρωτος, ἀστραπὴν πν' ὀμμάτων.

These flashes are like arrows, A.Supp. 1004

πᾶς τις παγεὶς ὄμματος θελκτηρίου
τόξευμ' ἔπεμψεν..,

and since Greek ideas of vision involved a two-way radiation (265), the eye of the beloved also radiates its weapons. Helen is described A.Ag.743 as μαλθακὸν ὀμμάτων βέλος (266).

The eye of the polluted man must be avoided for the same reason (267). A curse, like other human utterances, once released in the world has its own motive force, and may settle on the cursed man's eyes, and pollute his gaze: ἐχθρά μοι.. κρὰ .. ὄμμασιν προσιζάνει (268). Such a gaze may pollute even the sun (269), though Theseus in Euripides denies that human eyes could pollute things divine. We should compare here the fear of infection, poison or petrification from the gaze of some animals (270). The motif goes back to Homer, where the eye of an angry man also flashes out lightnings: χωομένοιο ὄμματά τ' ἀστράπτοντα (Iliu Persis Allen v.p. 139). The connection with anger may be linked to the notion of the heat anger engenders: θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητικὸν ὁ θυμός (271). The eye's power to wound recalls the power of the evil Eye, and the petrifying power of the Gorgon's (272).

Weapons from the eye, especially the eye of love, are κέντρα

or κεντήμασι (273). This seems to correspond roughly to English 'goad', something used for a purpose, as a driving force (274), not simply for punishment. When emotion is sent against men it is sent not for its own sake, but to get them to act in a certain way: the gods are driving the man to do something by means of the emotion (275). The most potent κέντρον is madness (276), and it is a weapon wielded most often by Hera. She uses it on Io, A.Supp. 563 ὀδύναις τε κεντροδαλήτοι θυιὰς Ἥρας and on Heracles, HF 861 Ἡρακλῆς ὑπὸ κέντρου δαμασθείς (277). Resistance against the κέντρα θεῶν is useless; they drive man like a horse, Ba. 795 πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζοιμι θνητὸς ὢν θεῷ and the goad of emotion, like the arrows of love, pierces the body and reaches to the heart or soul of the victim (278).

(ix) The physical blow: striking and driving

The image of the piercing goad of emotion is linked to the image of a blow that knocks the mind awry (279). Surprise does this, and the words that cause surprise, Hipp. 935 σαὶ γὰρ ἐκπλήσσουσί με

λόγοι παραλλάσσοντες ἔξεδρον φρενῶν.

Madness especially acts in this way. The attack of the οἶστρος is seen sometimes as a blow rather than a sting: the sisters of Agave are οἰστροπλῆγες (280). Grief, joy and desire strike blows at their victims (281) and the soul is 'struck' with fear as it wakes from a nightmare (282):

ὀρθρεύου σὰν κυχαῖ

ἐκπλαγχθεῖσ' ἦλθον φρένας

Like the punitive thunderbolt, which strikes Typhon, for instance in the inner parts of his body, PV 362 φρένας... εἰς αὐτὰς τυπείς, the punitive daemons, Ate, Erinyes, act as a blow to the mind: Eum. 103 ὦρα.. πληγὰς..καρδίᾳ and Cho. 467 ἅτας αἱματόεσσα πλαγά. The direction urged by the blow is usually the way madness lies, or other disaster. A god may be known to be the motive power (284):

ὅτῳ φρένας

θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄτας.

So the god of plague drives the city of Thebes to disaster, OT 27.

ἐν δ' ὁ παμφόρος θεὸς

σκήψας ἐλαύνει, λοιμὸς ἐχθίστος, πόλιν

Sometimes the god makes the human desires provide the driving force: so the love of gold drives the minds of men, HF 774

ὁ χρυσὸς ἅ τ' εὐτυχία

φρενῶν βροτοὺς ἐξάγεται.

After disaster has struck, man is still 'driven': driven by grief, driven to mourn, driven, occasionally, by hope (285). Even the most commonplace examples of this image convey a sense of human impotence after disaster,

The driving image suggests a picture of the daemon or emotion goading the human victim and guiding him like a horse. This imagery is expanded in the vocabulary of possession, by which the invading god, using his κέντρα, mounts and ropes the human body and the human soul (286).

(x) Hunting imagery: pursuit, approach, ambush

In the hunting images the human victim is seen not as a horse harnessed and driven, but as a quarry pursued by the hounds. The image is common in cases of punitive madness: the gods hunt down the sinner (287): θηρῶσιν τὸν ἄθεον The image often mentions the hunting daemon's feet, hot on the track (288):

κρύπτουσι δὲ ποικίλως
δαφὼν χρόνου πόδα (sc. θεοί).

It is on the hound's feet that his speed in pursuit depends and the hounds of Lyssa are very swift (289): θοαὶ λύσσας κύνες.

The Erinyes, as Keres (290), are like hounds in their pursuit of Orestes (291):

δειναὶ δὲ κῆρες

Ate also behaves as a hunting dog in the famous ambiguous passage from the Persae, 111f. She fawns on her victim before driving him into the nets (292):

φιλόφρων γὰρ ⟨ποτ⟩αίνου-
σα τὸ πρῶτον παράγει
βροτὸν εἰς ἄρκυας Ἄτα
πόθεν οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπὲρ θνα-
τὸν ἀλύξαντα φυγεῖν.

One aspect of hunting imagery is particularly Sophoclean. It is a picture derived not/perhaps from hunting with hounds, but from men lying in ambush. However the passage S.Ant.617 be interpreted (293)

εἰδόπ' ἰοὺδεὺ ἕρπει
πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ

the picture involves the unfortunate victim in a trap of some kind. It is Sophocles whose imagery of emotion most often suggests ideas of daemonic possession (294) and he has an idiosyncratic picture of the ambush within the mind itself. A man is betrayed externally by an ἀφή, by Ate or the Erinys of his house; but it is the Erinys as part of his own mind, φρενῶν Ἐρινύς that traps him (295).

The image of pursuit is found in a weakened form: the commonplace picture of the emotion that 'approaches' the mind. It seems a dead metaphor most of the time, and quoted out of context; but it is not dead but sleeping, and skilful poetic contexts wake it (296). It fits into the same pattern as other more vivid imagery. The popularity of a phrase like ὑπηλθέ μοι φόβος (297), rather than a simple verb φοβοῦμαι, may have been due partly to the support the metaphor gave to belief in the external derivation of emotions. The belief gave emotions the useful function of depriving man of responsibility for the action they drove him to perform (298). As physical pain 'approaches' a man and a curse 'approaches' the house (299), so mental pain approaches the mind, S,Aj. 938 χωρεῖ πρὸς ὕπαρ, οἶδα, γενναία δύη or heart, Hipp. 841 ἔβα καρδίαν. Hope, autonomous, winged, wandering and mobile (300) comes up to man unexpectedly, HF 771 δοκημάτων ἔκτοσ ἦλθεν ἐλπίς. So does courage, surprise, pity and love (301), and very often fear (302).

The emotion's 'approach' to the mind of man is modelled perhaps partly on the approach of a god to worshippers. Kletic hymns pray the god to approach (303), as Sappho prays Aphrodite to come to her, and as the chorus of suffering Thebans pray Apollo Paian to approach and heal the citizens (304). So emotion, which often rushes unasked and violently on man, may be requested, courteously, to come to him more quietly, Hipp. 525f μηδ' ἄρρυθμος ἔλθοις

(xi) Human imagery: wrestling and victory

This group of images is modelled on human activity rather than animal. Wrestling, plunder, and victory are the main themes, and the weaker form of the image, 'binding' and 'holding' also suggest a human model. The Erinyes wrestle with Orestes, and Fortuns is a 'bad wrestling opponent' (305) πύξ δυσπάλαιστος. Love goes out to war (306) and conquers all comers; Cho. 600: ἔρως πρεσανικᾶς

κυνοδάκων τε καὶ βροτῶν.

Emotions related to love, ἵμερος and πόθος also conquer (307). Ate 'captures' the mind in Homer, Il. 16.805 τόν δ' ἄτη φρένας εἶδε and so does divine Phthonos or sleep (308). An emotion can 'take hold of' the mind, φόβος μ' ἔχει φρένας and conquer it (309): μὴ φόβος σε νικάτω φρένας. Madness 'captures' Ajax, Aj. 216

After the capture comes the sack: the daemon 'plunders' Orestes from his sister (310): ὦ δαῖμον,

μόνον ὅς με καστιγήτου σοφᾶς

Ἄιδα πέμψας (IT. 157).

Capture involves enchainment. The song of the Erinyes is δέσμιος. and grief may 'bind' the soul (312): λύπᾳ δ' ὑπὲρ θαλθέων

εὐναίᾳ δέδεται ψυχά;

So the daughters of Pandareus, captured by the Harpies in Homer, were enslaved to the Erinyes; and the Sphinx 'captured' and 'held' her victims [illegible]. As man is a 'prisoner' in the body, he is likewise 'enslaved' to the conquering emotions (313). The imagery is modelled on the daemons, but also on human war.

(xii) Biting and eating: animal imagery

The verb δάκνειν seems to have a wider range of meanings than the English 'bite'; or perhaps it grew into metaphor more quickly (314). It is hard to say what associations of teeth it might give to the image of the mind bitten by emotion, for δάκνειν seems to apply also to stings. But whether bites or stings are intended, the basic imagery is definitely animal. Homer makes grief and shock or indignation 'bite the mind'(315): δάκε δὲ φρένας Ἕκτορι μῦθος. Sophocles (316)separates the united image, makes the words that enter man bite in two places: ἢ 'πὶ τῇ ψυχῇ δάκνῃ, ἐν τοῖσιν ὠσὶν. Grief and shame bite most frequently: Prometheus' heart is bitten by consciousness of his situation, PV 437 συννοίᾳ δὲ δάπτομαι πέαρ (317) as Admetus' heart is bitten by grief (318): λύπῃ καρδίαν δηχθομένου and as the body is bitten by physical pain (319).

Love bites the mind too, though in these metaphors the image of δάκνειν seems to refer rather to the sharp pain of the wound than to actual teeth: one is 'bitten' by the κέντρα of love (320): δηχθεῖσα κέντρου παιδὸς ἠφάνθη σέθεν. Desire is 'raw-biting', however, ὠμοδακής (Sept. 692) and some connexion with biting seems to be intended in that obscure phrase used (perhaps) of Helen (321): δηξίθυμον ἔρωτος ἄνθος.

The obvious mythological model for this image is the eagle that bites Prometheus' liver (322) and the ὠμόσιτοι talons of the Sphinx (323). The biting image is linked with the picture of a carnivorous beast eating the flesh. Eating images are common with physical pain. Philoctetes feeling the pain begin cries (324) ἀπόλωλα.. βρύκομαι and the image created the technical medical term for a sore, φαγέδαινα Aristotle (325) compares Aeschylus' description of Philoctetes' sore, φαγεδαίναν ἣ μου σάρκας ἔσθίει with Euripides' adaptation using the more vivid verb, θοινᾶται. The eating image is more rarely used of mental pain. The Homeric compound θυμοβόρος

used of Eris (326) only reappears twice in extant tragedy, both times (327) in dubious passages: A.Ag.103 πὴν θυμοβόρον λύσσης φρένα and S.Aj.625-6 νοσοῦντα φρενοβόρως.

The Poinai of madness, like the Sphinx, eat their victim raw, HF 889, λυσσάδες ὠμοβρῶτες. There are two passages from the Persae, where the verb ἀμύσσειν is used. The mind is 'gashed': ἀμύσσειν means lacerare, and suggests perhaps a rabid animal, which fear resembles: φρὴν ἀμύσσεται φόβῳ and worry (328): καρδίαν ἀμύσσει φροντίς.

(xiii) Imagery from the elements: Wind, storm, fire and flood

The Cyclops bases his insouciance about the power of the gods in his own ability to protect himself from the elements of nature (329):

Ζηνὸς δ' ἐγὼ κεραυνὸν οὐ φρίσσω, ξένε,
οὐδ' οἶδ' ὅ τι Ζεύς ἐστ', ἐμοῦ κρείσσων θεός.
οὔ μοι μέλει τὸ λοιπόν. ὡς δ' οὔ μοι μέλει,
ἄκουσον. ὅταν ἄνωθεν ὄμβρον ἐκχέῃ,
ἐν τῷδε πέτρᾳ στέγν' ἔχων σκηνώματα ...
ὅταν δὲ βορέας χιόνα Θρῃκίοις χέῃ,
... χιόνος οὐδέν μοι μέλει.

The attack of these elements, often expressed with the imagery of divine weapons, provides another kind of model for the metaphorical attack of the emotion on the mind. Wind and storm are very important images of emotion (330) in tragedy as in earlier poetry. Sappho sees love as a whirlwind shaking her, causing ταραγμός in her mind: Ἔρος δ' ἐτίναξέ μοι
φρένας, ὡς ἄνεμος κὰτ ὄρος δρυσὶν ἐμπεσών.

Love causes this chaos even in the minds of the gods (331): ἔρως καὶ
θεῶν ψυχὰς ταράσσει.

Similar ταραγμοὶ φρενῶν are caused by madness. Lyssa causes 'chaos of mind and leaping feet', HF 835: φρενῶν ταραγμοὺς καὶ ποδῶν σκιρτήματα and her effect on Heracles is compared to storms (332), sea-waves and earthquakes:

εἰμί γ'. οὔτε πόντος οὕτως κύμασιν στένων λάβρως
οὔτε γῆς σεισμὸς κεραυνοῦ τ' οἴστρος ὠδῖνας πνέων,
οἵ' ἐγὼ σάλα δραμοῦμαι στέρνον εἰς Ἡρακλέους.

The motif of the breath or wind that attacks the mind from outside but whose effect is felt inside is close to the common Greek picture of the

winds of fortune that govern men's lives (333).

The image of the storm in the mind is connected with the picture of the liquids whose bubbling within the inner organs causes emotional disturbance (Ch. 1 above, pp. 13-14, 18). Ajax in his madness is described as suffering from a 'turgid storm', Aj. 206-7 θολερῷ .. χειμῶνι νοσήσας. and Io's mad words are turbulent, affected by the waves of Ate; PV 885-6:

θολερὰ δὲ λόγοι πλέουσ' εἰκῇ
στυγνῆς πρὸς κύμασιν ἄτης.

Waves and storms go together: storms are perhaps more frightening at sea, and the topos of a storm at sea is set by Homer's description of it, Od.5. 291f. The idea that Ate came in waves, is connected to the idea that 'the third wave is biggest'. Use of this idea is reinforced by the sea imagery depicting the overwhelming disaster in store for the house that is 'shaken by the gods (σείεται θεόθεν): an idea in which 'Ate is not lacking' (ἄτας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει) in the Antigone (334):

ὄμοιον ὥστε πόντου
οἶδμα δυσπνόοις ὅταν
θρῄσσωσιν Ἔρεβος ὔφαλον ἐκπρὸ πρᾳΐς,
κυλίνδει βυσσόθεν κελαίναν
θῖνα καὶ δυσάνεμοι
στόνῳ βρέμουσιν ξυμπλῆγες ἄκται.

The wave and sea imagery associated to images of storm for emotions is linked to the rare image of an emotion 'flooding' the mind. Phaedra is 'swamped by the bilge' of misfortune, Hipp. ~~777~~ 699 χαλεπᾷ δ' ὑπέρπλησε .. συμφορᾷ and ἄτεγκτον συλλαβοῦσα καρδίαν means 'keeping your heart unwetted by emotion' (335).

Emotion is described metaphorically as burning or freezing the mind, according to the physiological effects emotions have on the body (336). Fear falls cold on the mind (337): κακόν με καρδίαν τ' περιπίτνει κρυός. Words derived from the stem ῥιγ- refer in medical contexts to fits

of cold shivers; elsewhere they come to be associated generally with fear and horror: Phoen. 1284 τρομερὰν φρίκα τρομερὰν φρέν' ἔχω.
It refers originally, perhaps, to bristling, suggesting again a physiological departure for the image, the hair bristling in fear, as at a bad dream (338):

ἐξεγείρομ.[αι
]όρεθίας φρίκης ὕπο
]ὄψιν εἶδον ἔννυχον.

Other emotions enflame and burn the mind. Madness and grief kindle it (339), but anger and love are the emotions that burn the mind most often, presumably because of the physiological effects of these emotions. Sappho's picture of the mind burning with longing (fr. 48 L-P): φρένα καιομένων πόθῳ is repeated in endless imagery of the fires of love (340) in tragedy. Anger is the most heated of all emotions: it makes man reckless, kindling their mind (341).

The imagery of emotion seems to be modelled on mythological fantasies, religious mechanisms of punishment and control, and observation of the elements and animals of nature. The activity of emotion on the mind resembles the wild, brutal and dominating forces against which man conceived himself, at times, to be powerless. Why is this? Why is emotion metaphorically represented as having a daemonic natural power over the mind of man? The implication that man is not responsible for his emotion and for the acts he performs under their duress cannot be the whole picture of belief (342). What is the mechanism that projects this picture of man's helplessness: and are there any indications, in imagery or in statements of implicit belief, that a man's emotions originated not outside him, but within him, and that he was responsible for them?

Chapter Three

INTO AND OUT OF THE MIND

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Introduction

In this chapter I consider some explanations for the tendency of imagery noticed above in the previous chapter, and the apparent ascription of responsibility to powers external to man. This tendency is noticeable in the portrayal of madness in tragedy (section (i)). I consider the other way of looking at man's reaction to his emotions: the view that makes emotions originate inside man, which carries implications of man's responsibility, if not for his actions, at least for his emotions. This alternative view has various components and histories in Greek thought. It is made possible, I think, partly by ideas about daemonic possession (section ii), in which the god acts not only upon man from outside, but from man within him. It is also facilitated from the beginnings of Greek literature by the picture of human motivation as 'double', the gods being both 'immanent and transcendant'. It is strengthened by a gradual recognition of the projected nature of the daemonic fears: I give a brief sketch of psychoanalytic theories of this process of 'projection' (section iv). In tragedy the projected nature of these fears is shown throughout by the resemblances between the hunting daemon and the hunted man. It is recognized apparently in Euripides, who offers examples of emotion that arises from within man, not outside him (section iii and v).

In section (vi) I examine medical theory contemporary with Euripides - and of course with Sophocles - which also continues into the fourth century, concerning the origins of disease. This seems to me to be relevant to contemporary poetic speculation on the origins of madness and emotion which cause the actions that direct a tragedy. There is an interesting balance in the medical theorists between the internal and external origins of disease: a balance which reflects the double vision of the poets. But I am anxious to avoid any hypothesis of 'influence'

from the scientists on the poets. It is one of the assumptions of this thesis that tendencies of theory and tendencies of imagery reflect certain structures of belief in the society that engendered them (1), even if the structure is haphazard and internally inconsistent. (2). Medical theories of the origin of disease simply provide another example of tendencies of ideas that were simply 'in the air' at the time. In other societies also accepted views of the world have been fractured and replaced by new ones simultaneously, mysteriously and in unrelated fields. In the late nineteenth century, for instance, scientific and aesthetic theory simultaneously with literary and artistic practice troubled and challenged the accepted image of the world: 'Though it has become conventional in some quarters to view modernism as the response to social and economic factors, such an interpretation seems incapable of accounting for many characteristics of the moment ... What all the moderns have in common - perhaps the only thing they have in common - is an insistence on the fact that what previous generations had taken for the world was only the world seen through the spectacles of habit. That similar discoveries were being made in the realms of science and philosophy seems significant, but not vitally so. Modern art has in no way been influenced by Einstein ... or Wittgenstein. All we can safely say is that the discovery that the world is not 'given' but depends on the kinds of assumptions we bring to it occurred in the fields of art, science and philosophy at about the same time, giving rise to an exploration not of new fields but of the foundations of mathematics, of logic, of art (3). So we should see no direct scientific 'influence' in the fifth century, even on Euripides: but see both Euripides and the medical theorists as reacting to similar ideas in relevantly similar ways.

(i) Madness in tragedy: its temporary nature

The medical writers draw no distinction between madness and the temporary delirium caused by fever. Hallucinations are due to movements in the brain caused by excess moisture (4); once it dries, hallucinations cease, the man is sane and sees correctly once more. The vocabulary of madness in tragedy also suggests that one important part of fifth century ideas about madness was its temporary nature. There is no non-metaphorical adjective, for instance, that means 'mad'. Ἄφρων applies to a wide range of behaviour; its basic feature is an abnormal neglect of self-interest (5). It is not, or not always, the precise opposite of ἔμφρων 'in one's mind' (6). Μάργος has rapidly appetitive associations of greed and lust (7). It is participles rather than adjectives that describe the mad: some are related to the verb μαίνεσθαι (8), many are metaphors (9). A man is called 'mad' by an observer when he is performing a mad action, or a series of them. When he is seen to act sanely again, he can be called 'mad' no longer.

Single fits of madness are sent in tragedy to Heracles, Ajax and Agave. Cassandra has a fit of prophetic frenzy which resembles these, though we know that these have been recurrent (10). Recurrent also are the mad fits sent on Orestes and Io, who have lucid intervals but are permanently outside the norms of society and cannot regain any social placing until the god's purpose is fulfilled (11). All of them lose the normal distinctions between reality and illusion (12). Heracles and Ajax kill their children in the belief that they are enemies, animal or human; Ajax kills animals believing they are human (13). Cassandra sees something no-one else on stage can see: Erinyes sitting over the palace, the feast of Thyestes. She does not see false visions - nor are we invited to think that Orestes is mistaken in seeing the Erinyes in

Euripides - but she does not see reality as the chorus perceives it; though the things she sees do live in the memory of the chorus and Aegisthus (14). Orestes and Io also have hallucinations, visual and auditory; these which in the Hippocratica are symptoms of delirium (15).

The delusions of madness endanger other people, and deluded actions can have consequences significant for the whole society: the pollution of Orestes, Heracles and Agave requires them to undertake particular practical steps for the good of society, once their madness is past (16). Once the madness passes other people are variously concerned with the ex-madman's future actions, but they do not expect the madness to recur. There is a gap, for instance, between Ajax' view of his madness and that of the other people around him. He is concerned with the shame of his delusion: and of being foiled in his intentions (17). But Calchas repeats that the 'wrath of Athene will follow him only for a day', and the argument concerns his rationally hostile intentions towards the Greeks, not his acts (18). Ajax shows surprise after the madness passes at the idea that he could have harmed his son (19); Heracles and Agave cannot re-kill their children, and no-one in the plays shows fear that the mad agents will harm anyone else after their madness. This is due perhaps to the recognizedly punitive nature of madness in tragedy.(20) The gods send madness to make a man perform a 'mad' act, one which is against all his interests and wishes. Once the disaster has happened, the obvious function of the madness is discharged and the agent has to live with the consequences. Io and Orestes, who might be taken as suggesting a belief in chronic madness, are also cases in which the madness is less clearly punitive: Orestes, in Euripides, is pursued by the Erinyes after his purification, and there are doubts about the fairness of this. Io has done nothing for which she could be punished. But in both cases an important motif of their conditions is the end appointed to their madness, their cure, purification, or rest from the wanderings which symbolize their madness (21).

The disaster precipitated by a temporary attack of punitive madness has permanent consequences and in the worst thing that could happen to that individual: the thing that is most against his true interests. In more mundane terms, madness is associated, in tragedy, with neglect of one's true interests. Madness as it is treated in tragedy belongs to that general category of theories of madness which treat it as a deviation from the norm (22). For the practical and practically religious Greeks this meant any general neglect of one's interest, and particularly, neglect of them by failing to honour the gods (23): ὅταν τι θεὸν ἀφεὶς τις ἐς τὸ μαίνεσθαι τρέπῃ. Observers make the deduction 'mad' when they see the agent acting or saying anything that damages their own interest, but especially by ignoring divine power. Xerxes' attempt to 'overpower all the gods including Poseidon' shows him to be ἄνους and suffer from νόσος φρενῶν (24). Lycurgus' insulting defiance of the gods demonstrates his μανίαι (25): κεἰ-
νοῖς ἐπέργνω μανίαις
φαίην τὸν θεὸν ἐν κε-
τοιαῖς γλώσσαις.
The deduction may be made with more commonplace phrases than μαίνεσθαι Deianeira would be mad (μαίνεσθαι) if she blamed her husband for succumbing to the power of Eros, for any man who defies this power 'does not think well' (οὐ καλῶς φρονεῖ):

Ἔρωτι μέν νυν ὅστις ἀντανίσταται
πύκτης ὅπως ἐξ χείρας, οὐ καλῶς φρονεῖ.
οὗτος γὰρ ἄρχει καὶ θεῶν ὅπως θέλει,
κἀμοῦ γε· πῶς δ' οὐ χἀτέρας οἵας γ' ἐμοῦ;
ὥστ' εἴ τι πῶμῳ τ' ἀνδρὶ τῇδε τῇ νόσῳ
ληφθέντι μεμπτὸς εἰμι, κἄρτα μαίνομαι.

S.Tr.441f

Other phrases, weaker than μαίνεσθαι, express the same idea: that neglect of one's interest, especially in denying the power of the gods, is madness. Other examples of a man who is οὐ φρονῶν or οὐκ εὖ φρονῶν, are: to expect to maltreat a relation without reprisal; to try to raise the dead, to make unfounded accusations, to imprison a kinswoman (one betrothed to one's son); and to insult one's father, who is also the king (26). Ἄνοια is demonstrated in the pursuit of empty illusions, in defiance of king or state (27).

Behaviour characterized in tragedy by μανία and cognate words similarly demonstrates such disregard for both the agent's interests and fear of the gods, that observers must explain it by an emotional force more than ordinarily powerful (28). The more violent the act and the more dangerous the consequences, the stronger the daemonic force that produced them. Madness is an excess of any emotion. In Homer μαίνεσθαι is used of battle lust and drunkenness; the effect of wine resembles the effect of Ate, for it 'strikes senseless the mind' (29):

ὃ δ' ἐπὶ φρένας ἄασεν οἴνῳ
μαινόμενος κακὶ ἔρεξε δόμον κάτα περιθοῦτον.

In tragedy Clytemnestra is 'mad with pleasure' (30), or the mourner's mind is 'mad with grief' (31): μαίνεται θυμὸς φρήν.

The distinction between madness and emotion is quantitative only (32). The mad fits of Cassandra, Phaedra, Ajax, Agave, Io and Orestes are excesses of different emotions, sharing the physical characteristics of excess (33). But though ideas of chronic madness are rarely found expressed in the fifth century, they are there. The life and death of Cleomenes of Sparta, for example, is explicable to some contemporaries only by the possibility that he had been mad for a long time (34). But tragedy concentrates on madness which has a definite end, which is shown in a mad act, which neglects the

agent's interests and defies at some level the power of gods. The form of tragedy goes some way to explaining its stress on the temporary nature of madness, and reminds us of the possibilities of distortion inherent in a study through tragedy of the background values and thought-patterns of the society. But it does not fully explain tragedy's silence about chronic madness; however distorted the lens of tragedy, it does have some degree of transparency.

In tragedy, the gods send madness into their victim, as they send emotion. But can they also inhabit the body of their victim themselves? In the madness, or daemon, envisaged as occupying the human body and acting through it? Plato distinguished two kinds of madness: τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν νοσημάτων ἀνθρώπων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην (Phaedr. 265a). He subdivided divine madness into four: (i) prophetic, sent by ἐπίπνοια Ἀπόλλωνος (ii) poetic, sent by the Muses, (iii) mystic or orgiastic, the τελιστικὴ madness of Dionysus, and (iv) erotic, sent by Aphrodite or Eros. This is his individual classification of thought-patterns which in the fifth century are not very clearly distinct. There <u>any</u> interference by a god is a <u>nosos</u>, real or potential. By Plato and by those he influenced, the 'blessings of madness' were prized. Men act most like the gods, says Strabo, when they are happy; and they are happy when they are rejoicing, celebrating festivals, and making music or philosophy (10. 3. 9). Strabo also values the blessings of madness. He concentrates on the function of madness as release: the madness of corybantic rites has ἄνεσις, turning the mind towards τὸ θεῖον (10. 3. 9). He is talking here about ἐνθουσιασμός whose function we may equate with 'abreaction', in modern psychiatric theory (35), In Strabo's terms ἐνθουσιασμός is the temporary movement of a god <u>inside</u> the human being. Plato would call this a blessing, but in the fifth century it was feared and often resisted.

The resistance of the priestess to the inspiring god is a 'topos' early set up in ancient literature (36): their attitude recalls to us the connotations even our word 'blessing' has of blood and wounds. The idea of a god invading the mind brought both fascination and terror.

(ii) Demonic possession and the fifth century

The problems surrounding the idea of demonic possession pivot on the relationship between the external view of origins of emotion and the internal. However comforting ; the view that attributed mental states to outside forces, it did not give complete satisfaction. There are two main forms of objection to it. First, it limits human responsibility for human action. In practice this difficulty is resolved in various ways: Lloyd-Jones gives an explanation of its resolution in the Iliad (37). Secondly, in ascribing all madness, bad and good, to external divine forces, it makes non-human not only the most destructive, but also the most creative and divine-seeming human faculties and experience. Prophecy and poetry, as well as epilepsy and the degradation of madness, go to the demons. These two considerations may have facilitated the early operation of a quite different world-view, underpinned by a pattern of thought in which sources of emotion, noble and inexorable, already existed within man. This view, with its confused and complementary relation to the view which emphasized external origins, has wide and perplexing ramifications. More intense awareness of it in the late fifth century created what Dodds saw as the first significant split between psyche and body. This led, he suggested, to ideas of the shamanistic autonomous wanderings of the soul, and to puritan tendencies to see each individual soul as a divine thing sullied by its contact with the body (38). It is certainly true that the fourth century demonstrates the most widespread reactions to this view. No-one in the fifth century, for instance, produced the statement, 'all that injures lies within', elaborated by Menander (39):

Μειράκιον, οὔ μοι καταγνοεῖν δοκεῖς, ὅτι
ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἕκαστα κακίας σήπεται,
καὶ πᾶν τὸ λυμαινόμενον ἔσθ' ἔνδοθεν.
οἷον ὁ μὲν ἰὸς [illegible], τὸν δ' ἵδηρον, ἂν ὀκνῇς,
τὸ δ' ἱμάτιον οἱ σῆτες, ὁ δὲ θρίψ τὸ ξύλον.

σὲ δὲ τὸ κάκιστον πᾶν κακῶν πάντων φθόνος
φθοσικὸν πεπόηκε καὶ πονοῦσι καὶ ποιεῖ,
ψυχῆς πονηρᾶς δυσσεβὴς πραστάτης.

The statement πᾶν τὸ λυμαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἔνδοθεν does not harmonize with the thought-pattern that produced speculation about most psychological motivation in tragedy and speculation about physical causation in pre-socratic and early Hippocratic writing. But I would suggest that it did operate earlier than the late fifth century, and was felt from early times to be an acceptable complement to the external view. One may compare here Evans-Pritchard and Godfrey Lienhardt who found apparently contradictory thought-patterns in the religious thinking of the Nuer and Dinka respectively. In both societies belief in a single supreme deity functioned as a complement to the apparently contradictory belief in a large number of minor divinities. In both societies the former belief was invoked for help with problems concerning the world at large; the numerous weaker deities were invoked to cope with smaller-scale problems, problems limited, for instance, to the family. Lienhardt made the significant additional point that as the outer world impinged more upon the Dinka, the relation between the two thought-patterns changed: the single supreme being was invoked more often (40). A similar sort of explanation may underlie the shift in emphasis between the two views, the internal and external, as I have called them, that seems to have taken place in the late fifth century. The increased emphasis on the internal seems to some to open the way to puritanism, to others to be a gesture towards a higher evaluation of things human (41). The relation between the two views is seen in its most confused and sensitive state in problems of demonic possession: so it is crucial to determine the evidence for fifth-

century ideas of possession, and to evaluate the differences between fifth century and later evidence.

The traditional view of demonic possession in the ancient world, the view of Tamborrino and Rohde, formulated most recently and compellingly by Dodds, is that in the fifth century, as later, some madness (taking madness to be the extreme of any emotion), some disease, and poetic and prophetic inspiration, could be caused by a god or daemon's entry into the human body (42). There has been a serious but not, I think, successful attempt to challenge this view. W.D. Smith has suggested (43) that it is anachronistic to apply the term 'demonic possession' to any phenomena, experience or belief in the pre-Christian era. He maintains that the Greek gods were felt to control human life only from outside; that words like <u>entheos</u> refer to conditions in which the god has caused something to happen in the human mind but remains outside it himself; and that there is no evidence for the existence of exorcism before the time of Lucian. It should perhaps be noted that the mere absence of exorcism might not be sufficient argument for the absence of possession: one can imagine a society in which possession was accepted, never resisted. But in fact there is good evidence for the existence of exorcism-rituals well before the first century AD: evidence from the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

Sophron, the fifth-century writer of mimes, wrote a piece entitled αἱ γυναῖκες αἱ φαντὰν τὰν θεὸν ἐξελᾶν. A fragment of it remains, in which a sorceress is preparing to liberate a group of women from illness inflicted by a goddess, almost certainly Hecate, since a dog-sacrifice is involved (44). Preparation takes place in a room with closed doors: these will be opened when the ceremony starts, line 11. Scholars suggest the open doors will facilitate the exit of the goddess. The ladies have apotropaic laurel in their ears: the suggestion is that this will prevent

the physical entry of a demon (another demon, once the goddess vacates their bodies?). The expulsion may be possibly through another orifice: the mouth? The fragment ends with the sorceress beginning her address to the goddess. She intends to 'fight' with her, line 16, π[υ]κταλ-εύσω. The fragment itself leaves us unclear as to the purpose of the ceremony: whether the goddess is to be invited or expelled. This is an important point, for other techniques of exorcism involve the summoning up of the possessing daemon by the exorcist (45), and such a procedure would at first resemble an ordinary aletic prayer for the god to approach. But the title leaves us in no doubt that exorcism is meant. It might perhaps be objected that the title was given to the piece later; it is quoted by Apollonius and Athenaeus. But this would still be an application made by later generations to a representation of a procedure which was recognizable to them as exorcism. It is probable that the poet's intentions are ironical, and that Sophron is ridiculing a belief in possession and the rites of exorcism (46). If so, it is good evidence for popular belief in possession and exorcism in the fifth century.

The fourth-century poet Menander wrote a play entitled Θεοφορουμένη. Whether this word means 'carried by a god' or 'carrying a god' is unclear (47). But it certainly refers to cases of possession in later antiquity (48), and Menander's is the earliest attested use of it. Related words are used earlier, however, in similar contexts. In Aeschylus, the chorus see Cassandra as φρενηλαμής τις... θεοφόρητος and ask her the source of her θεοφόρου ..δύας (49). The fourth-century comic poet Alexis wrote a play called Θεοφόρητος (50). Fragments of Menander's play confirm the probability that the word θεοφορουμένη refers to a form of possession. The action involves, apparently the eponymous heroine's peculiar behaviour which is interpreted as possession.

The issue in the play is whether her possession is real or feigned. A test of flutemusic is arranged to see if the possession is genuine. The argument runs: if her possession is genuine, and if the experimentors find the correct tune, the possessed girl will leap around to it (51):

εἰ θεοφορεῖται ταῖς ἀληθείαισι γὰρ
νῦν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐνθάδ' ἐκπηδήσεται

The first sign of her affliction is that she has been seen wandering away from home: a wandering which recalled perhaps the wandering of the mad figures of myth (52). One fragment of this play contains a series of lyric hexameters, music appropriate apparently to Cybele, the goddess in possession. She is invited to attend: δεῦρο . Handley, in his study of the fragments, compares here Plato's image of possession in the Ion. There Socrates pretends that Ion is possessed by the spirit of Homer, since he reacts to Homer's tune and no other (53):

ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὀξέως ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ οὗπερ ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχήματων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν.

The possessing deities in this type of madness are usually chthonic goddesses, Hecate, Cybele; those professionally affected by them are the Corybants.

Strabo calls the Corybants ἐνθουσιαστικούς τινας καὶ βακχικούς and explains that because they are ὀρχηστικοί their name is given to anyone who is 'madly moved (μανικῶς κινουμένους): madmen act like a Corybant, κορυβαντιᾶν (54). This verb, and the verb δαιμονᾶν also, have strong associations with the idea of 'the god within the breast'. The sisters of Eteocles and Polyneices describe their brothers as δαιμονῶντες ἐν ἄτᾳ , in fighting and killing each other (55). The implication is not merely that a daemon was driving them to act in this way; the human actions are actually the acts of the daemon-

the daemon is acting from inside. The contexts of words like ἔνθεος, βακχάω ἐνθουσιασμός, θεοφόρητος and δαιμονᾶν often suggest this (56).

One of W.D. Smith's main points is that most images show the gods as acting <u>from outside</u> on a man's mind and body. This, of course, is correct: but it would be naïve to assume that one kind of view only was operating in the society. Some types of imagery do suggest the presence of a god, daemon or emotion within the mental organs. Such a presence may take one of two forms. A daemon, or an emotion used by a god as a daemon is used, may pierce the mind and body, as in the normal invasion images, and then stay there, like a disease. So in the famous passage from the <u>Odyssey</u>, the disease that leaves the sick man is a daemon (57). But the resonant picture of the liquids and breaths within the mental organs helped to create the image of the emotion that is part of the man's body, which acts on his mind from inside (58). The mental organs in Greek thought were essentially vessels, containers which held their own proper fluids in their own proper balance; but which could be forced to contain an alien presence.

W.D. Smith offers many interesting observations about the relation of the human world to the divine. But I think he has been misled by the very different character of demonic possession in later, Christian, antiquity. There the possessing demons are malevolent; the holy man was one who had conquered his own body by ἄσκησις, and could thereby conquer the demons who tried to possess his own body, and did possess other people's (59). The motif of combat with the possessing demon was taken from pagan times; but in the fifth century and especially in the fourth, the possessing daemon, though it was frightening, and frighteningly powerful, did not necessarily have dishonourable intentions. The Christian idea that the devil wants to gain power over men in order to demonstrate

his power, would have made nonsense in classical religion. Belief in the gods entailed acknowledgment of their power; gods possessed men or drove them to act in certain ways, in order to gain their own ends. One of these ends was, in fact, communication of their own desires to other men. The possessed person was <u>useful</u> to his society. Like animals, he was in touch with the demonic world in a way that normal men were not, and the society of men derived benefit from the poetic inspiration and prophetic possession which affected individuals temporarily (60). In late antiquity, on the contrary, the holy man who had power over possessing demons, the power to drive them out, was the man who gave benefits of healing to the community (61).

Assuming, then, that W.D. Smith is mistaken in treating attribution of a belief in demonic possession to classical times as an anachronism; assuming such a belief did affect some people some of the time, though Smith is quite correct in pointing to the general silence about it in literature: what were the mechanics of divine possession? Virgil describes the Pythia affected by the god as 'immanis', which in the light of the following line

- magnum si pectore possit
excussisse deum -

I take to mean, simply, 'huge' (62). Apollo is inside her, and his presence and power enlarge her body. Greek evidence is not explicit on this point: we could relate it, perhaps, to the imagery of growth and swelling in the mind (above, Ch. 1, sections (b) and (f)), which in turn is related to the idea of breath and liquid contained in the mental organs. This makes sense, for one dominant image in contexts of possession is the divine ἐπίπνοια.

W.D. Smith quotes Plutarch on the prophetic current of breath which Plutarch calls 'very divine', and rightly associates it with the ancient picture of a god 'breathing' an idea into a man, and with 'the influence

of a daemon on the house as a breath' (63). Plutarch considers the belief that Apollo worked through the Pythia by {breaths' and mentions the 'exhalations' thought by some to be the cause of prophetic inspiration at Delphi. It is not clear how ancient this belief may be, but it is in line with the rest of the vocabulary and theory about the mechanics of 'inspiration' (64). Smith is right to assert that gods can breathe into man states of mind like courage, charis, madness and persuasion (65); from his argument, however, that divine things did not actually enter the human breast, he omits the possibility that these states of mind could be treated as daemons themselves (66). The boundary between human emotions and orthodox daemons is elastic, apparently. The most common use of δαίμων is indefinite, carrying an ambiguity about the divinity's intentions: the words apparently imply an indefinite dynamic power (67).

There is perhaps some confusion at this point: is the god himself envisaged as entering the man in his breath, or does the god breathe in some other demonic force which then occupies the man's breast? This confusion is best resolved by pointing to the other uses of the image of divine breath. Io is made pregnant by 'the touch and the breath' of Zeus ἐξ ἐπαφῆς καὶ ἐπιπνοίας Διός A. Supp. 17. PV. The erotic penetration of the human by the divine, a motif so important in Greek myth, is an important symbol too of the different ways demonic possession could operate. It was not simply an aggressive or selfish invasion: 'the embrace of a god is never infertile' (68). The god was present in the human being; and left behind some part of himself. This could be seen in two ways. It could be a seed: images of implanting are common in divine-human relations. As Prometheus claimed to have grafted hope into men's hearts, the Muses could plant words and the seeds of song in the poet (69). But it could also be something that resembled the god, a simulacrum, an εἴδωλον.

Democritus attributed sight to εἴδωλα τινα ὁμοιόμορφα ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων συνεχῶς ἀπορρέοντα καὶ ἐμπίπτοντα τῇ ὄψει. This was a development of the Empedoclean theory that 'all things give off effluences which fit into the pores of the sense organs' (70). Plutarch explains that the εἴδωλα issuing from an evil eye are charged with βασκανίας, μεθ' ἧς ἐμπιπλάσσόμενα καὶ ἁπτόμενα καὶ συνοικοῦντα τοῖς βασκαινομένοις ἐπιταράττειν καὶ πάσχειν αὐτῶν τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν διανοίαν (71).

This is the language of possession. Byzantine writers use the word πλάσμα to refer to the body possessed by the daemon (72). The verb συνοικεῖν is used in tragedy and in Plato of the relation between a man and his emotions: συνοικοίην φόβῳ (73). It is a verb commonly used of the marriage relation, and suggests a physical union of two originally separate bodies and lives. Similar verbs have been drawn into the language of possession: a New Comedy fragment of Theognetus uses συνοικιάζω in a demonic context, οἵῳ με δαίμων φιλοσόφῳ συνῴκισεν (1. 6). The adjective σύναυλος (from αὐλή : not the adjective σύναυλος from αὐλός, though the two grew to be confused), is used in similar contexts: Ajax 'dwells with madness,' θεᾶς μανίᾳ ξύναυλος (74).

Emotion, then, especially in its extreme form, madness, can be spoken of as dwelling with the man it enters. Plutarch uses the same language of the Democritean eidola which issue from an alien eye and mind, and enter the man to possess him. The possibility that this forms the rough general basis for ideas about the entry of a god into the human frame is possibly supported by a piece of archaeological evidence (75).

A short late sixth-century series of coins from Caulonia show

Apollo standing with his arm outstretched. He is holding a branch in the other hand. On the outstretched arm is a little figure in a running position. He too holds a branch, and he is about to run off the arm and away to the right. This has been interpreted, more or less, as Apollo sending a messenger to accounce his arrival at Delphi (76). Brian Shefton suggests to me that it may be the eidolon of the prophetic god himself, the aspect of himself by which he possesses his prophets. The interpretation would at least resolve the difficulty we have in reconciling statements about 'the god within the breast' with explanations of gods' absences in tragedy, which suggest that a god could not be in several places at once (77). It also brings possession into line with the picture of the breath or daemon sent into man by god as a weapon. In Ch. 2 I suggested that the gods used daemons and emotions against man as they used their weapons. Colin Kraay has pointed out to me the similarity between Apollo's position on these Caulonian coins, and the normal stance for a god holding a trident or other weapon (78).

There is one ceremony which adds perhaps to the likelihood that it was possible to see the god as present in an individual, and also omnipresent in some ill-defined sense, or present in several individuals at the same time. Dionysus in the rites of omophagia 'may appear in many forms, vegetable, bestial, human; and he is eaten in many forms ... the omophagia was a sacrament in which God was present in his beast-vehicle and was torn and eaten in that shape by his people' (79). The god could enter and affect each one of his worshippers simultaneously. This demonstrates a kind of logic behind the thought-patterns of the century which produced the Bacchae, whose presence makes it dangerous to take, as W.K.C. Smith does take, the scepticism of De Morbo Sacro as representative, when its author asks: what is the precise relationship between the daemon supposed to be aitios for the noses, and the nosos itself? He is here (80) exploiting deliberately the paradoxical nature of the two views, the internal and external, which functioned in most people, most of the time, as complements.

The pattern of ideas about demonic possession I have suggested for the fifth century harmonizes with the stress we found in tragedy on the temporary nature of madness (above, section (i)). Part of the god may be left inside to act on the man, after the god's initial intrusion. Again, this may be modelled on the divine associations of physical disease. The arrows of Apollo in the 'Iliad' carry plague; Apollonius changes this to the wind (or breath?) from the angry god, which carries the plague into the bodies of men (81). Wine gets the same way: like a god it enters the human body from outside and then affects his from within (82). Brunius-Nilsson stresses the duality of Elpenor's explanation of his own death, which we may see as the internal and external thought-patterns working together (83): ἀσέ με δαίμονος ἄϊδα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος.
But the thought-pattern which insisted on the internal origins of the emotions and divine impulses within men, would naturally stress the more permanent aspects of their presence in man. The difficulty, as far as ideas of possession are concerned, is made clear in one feature of demonic possession I have not yet mentioned: glossalalia, speaking with tongues. This has been a pronounced feature of possession in our era, found today in various forms, and explained at one level by F. Goodman: 'These features (rhythmic patterns of syllables, full of intensity, in sounds emitted in glossalalia) since they occur so widely in different cultures and languages must be produced by something that all these speakers have in common, namely, the trance state' (84). We find a remnant of the idea perhaps in the 'Ajax'. Ajax is "not within his own temper and experience; // he is speaking 'abroad'":

οὐκ ἔστι συντρόφου
ὀργῆς ἔμπεδος, ἀλλ' ἐκτὸς δρμίσεις

and the words he speakes are 'taught him by a daemon,

ἃ δαίμων
πουδὲς ἀνδρῶν ἐδίδαξεν (85).

He is, in fact, 'not himself' οὐκ ἐαυτός ; but this is a temporary state only. However there is evidence for the existence of fifth-century 'belly-speakers', who carried a speaking daemon permanently within them (86). For the permanently divine elements within a man we may perhaps compare the use of the word θεός to mean a part of the liver, and the notion of the 'prophetic heart' of man (87). There was a divergence of opinion, evidently. As Pearson said (ad Phoen. 888): 'belief in demoniacal possession was more underground than is directly suggested by the literature'. Dodds finds different elements of clairvoyance and possession in different places in Aeschylus' presentation of Cassandra (88). One reason for the confusion is the range of emotive implications each view - both the internal and the external - may carry.

We have seen (above, Ch. 1 section (i) and (j)) how imagery of mental action displayed the fear of the mind struck aside and wandering from its right place. This would correspond to what Dodds has called the 'shamanistic' view, which he suggests grew up in the late fifth and fourth centuries. But perhaps even beliefs in possession, the view Dodds placed in opposition to 'shamanism', might involve pictures of the wandering mind. One implication of the mad or possessed mind is that the possessing daemon has struck out, struck aside, temporarily disinherited, the original contents of the mental organs or body, the man's own right mind. Hence Ajax is 'not himself'; hence Cassandra, silent, foreign, and about to erupt into a frenzy-fit, is not ἔσω φρενῶν (89). Lucan and Virgil also suggest that the god strikes out the mind of a priestess (90). The fear, then, of lack of control that is represented in images as the wandering, uprooted mind, reacts in both thought-patterns: both the one that attributed all madness to the invasion of a possessing god, and the one that stressed the originally divine and autonomous element of the human soul. This is one consideration that makes me suspect that the two views, though historically we can see a shift in the balance between them, were associated much

earlier in Greek thought than the fifth century, and already by the fifth century had combined to form a particular fabric of imagery on the one hand, and ideas of religious experience and human motivation on the other. But we should now turn to this other unexplored view itself: to the beliefs in the internal origin of emotion and to the ancestry and implications of this pattern of thought.

(iii) 'The internal view': the recognition of 'projection'

I suggested that the 'external view' of human motivation failed to give adequate underpinning to notions of human responsibility for human action. Lloyd-Jones shows how this could be overcome in practice (91): it is a conflict which is explored in several agon scenes in Euripides. The issues raised by the poet are interesting; they shed light on the mechanism which underlay the 'external view', and imply that by the recognition of this mechanism, the 'internal view' was being invoked and accepted. Helen in the 'Troades' (946f) disclaims responsibility for leaving her husband:

πῶ δὴ φρονοῦσά γ' ἐκ δόμων ἁρπ' ἐσπόμην
ξένῳ, προδοῦσα παῖδά καὶ δόμους ἐμούς;
πρὸς θεοῦ κόλαζε ... σωφρόνης δ' ἐμοί.

Hecuba replies that Helen's lust belonged to her, and that she casts it falsely onto a god. She derides (981f) the idea that Aphrodite accompanied Paris to the halls of Menelaus:

μὴ ἁρπαθεὶς ποίει θεὰς
τὸ σὸν κακὸν κοσμοῦσα, μὴ οὐ πείσῃς σοφούς.
κύπριν δ' ἔλεξας - ἆρα γὰρ θέλων ποδὶ -
ἐλθεῖν ἐμῷ ξὺν παιδὶ Μενέλεω δόμους.
οὐκ ἂν μένουσ', ἂν ἡδυχὸς σ' ἐν οὐρανῷ
κύπρις Ἀμύκλας ἦγεν πρὸς Ἴλιον;

She maintains that Helen's own lust was 'made into the Kyprian':

ἦν σὸς μὲν υἱὸς κάλλος ἐκπρεπέστατος,
ὁ σὸς δ' ἰδὼν νιν νοῦς ἐπῳήθη κύπρις.
τὸ μῶρον γὰρ πᾶν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν Ἀφροδίτη βροτοῖς.

This speech suggests two views: (a) that the gods are all powerful, that they do not need to move themselves in order to make men do as they want, and that men endow them, wrongly, with human follies and desires; (b)

that men have their own desires and follies, and call these the gods, in order to cover up their own vices. Whichever of these the audience would have accepted - and it is possible that different members of the audience would have reacted in different ways - what we are interested in at this point is Euripides' argument that the feeling of lust originated within Helen and was falsely attributed to an external influence. In this play, the conflict is nicely balanced: as Lloyd-Jones says, both sides are right. Euripides refers to the same possibility elsewhere: Iphigeneia denies that Artemis is as bloodthirsty as the Taurians pretend (IT 389-90):

τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ', ὡς τοὺς ὄντας ἀνθρωποκτόνους,
ἐς τὴν θεὸν τὸ φαῦλον ἀναφέρειν δοκῶ.

She follows this with an affirmation of the goodness of the gods,

οὐδένα γὰρ οἶμαι δαιμόνων εἶναι κακόν,

a statement which recalls Euripides' other - tongue in cheek ? - remark: if gods do something shameful, then they are not gods (92). Euripides' position on the gods is famous for its ambivalence and ironic potential. The precise problem of projection suggested in the 'Troades' and IT was probably repeated in the agon-scene of the 'Cretans': we have unfortunately only Pasiphae's defence, which is remarkably similar to Helen's (93):

τί δῆτα τῇδ' ἐμαινόμην νόσῳ;
δαίμων ὁ τοῦδε κἀμὲ [ἐνέπλησεν κα]κῶν.

The line of reply which invokes the perception of projection is first, of course, formulated by Xenophanes (94):

ἀλλ' οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεοὺς
τὴν σφετέρην δ' ἔσθητα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε

But long before Euripides tragedy had explored this area of conflict. Aeschylus makes Clymnestra claim first, that she had the help of Ate and Erinys (Ag. 1433); later, that the deed itself was performed by the original alastor of the house (Ag. 1500 f.):

φανταζόμενος δὲ γυναικὶ νεκροῦ
τοῦδ' ὁ παλαιὸς δεινὸς ἀλάστωρ
Ἀτρέως χαλεποῦ θοινατῆρος
τοὐπὶ τοῖσδε τέκνοις

Aechylus does not formulate a reply to this: but in his portrayal of Clytemnestra before the murder as 'man-souled', deceitful, and angry (95) and in his acceptance of her guilt after it, he suggests that her view is not the only one possible.

The possibility that there is some divine part of man within him, or some part of man which acts as divine things do, Dodds sees as part of a 'new religious pattern'. He would begin it with Pindar's picture of the αἰῶνος εἴδωλον given by the gods to man, which operates in man during sleep. He distinguishes between a divinity dependant on the immortality of the psyche and divinity dependant on special powers within man (96). Immortality of the psyche we find of course already in Homer: though the word psyche of course acquired new meanings (without necessarily dropping old ones completely) through the changing societies and their literature (97). Dodds takes issue with Rohde for 'reading back' some of Pindar's implications about the powers of the psyche into Homer (98). But I would suggest that the new pattern is a new balance merely; that the picture of the inner organs in Homer, later developed with associations of prophetic and speaking powers (99) does already carry some implications of the special powers of those organs. The gods are shown as manipulating these powers; but there is a sense in which the organs and liquids, or at another level the emotions, aroused by the gods are as divine as the other natural elements of the world through which the gods work. When Achilles makes his famous reproach to Zeus, Il. 19. 270f, the framework he invokes is the frame in which the gods direct human action for their own purposes. But

the vocabulary and imagery suggest that the powers of men and in men are the powers used by the gods for their manipulations, and they are powers as strong and special as the sea or storm, natural elements also used by the gods, elements which are as we saw (above, Ch. 1 section (e)) natural models for the experience of emotion in man.

Ζεὺ πάτερ, ἦ μεγάλας ἄτας ἀνδρεσσι διδοῖσθα·
οὐκ ἂν δή ποτε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἐμοῖσιν
Ἀτρεΐδης ὤρινε διαμπερές, οὐδέ κε κούρην
ἦγεν ἐμεῦ ἀέκοντος ἀμήχανος· ἀλλά ποθι Ζεὺς
ἤθελ' Ἀχαιοῖσιν θάνατον ποτέεσσι γενέσθαι.

Zeus aroused the power in the breast, the thymos: it was the thymos that caused the damage. Here is the origin of the phrase used by Lloyd-Jones, 'double motivation', to describe causation in Homer and later.

It is perhaps useless - it is certainly no longer fashionable - to search for the origins of particular forms of thought (100). Dodds found the origins of what he called the 'shamanistic' view, the view that in his terms introduced the vision of the detachable individual soul, in the Northern shamans. I should prefer to rephrase this, and suggest that some beliefs in the inner powers of man, and in the internal origins of his emotions and thoughts, had always operated underground in Greek thought, surfacing occasionally in imagery (particularly that of madness and the wandering mind, above Ch. 1 section (i)), which may have been acted upon by the introduction of new ideas of religious experience (101)

Tragedy, in demonstrating human conflict, continuously provoked ideas of divine conflict. A depth of perspective was given to any human choice by the possibility that both alternatives were required by different divine forces. The particular genre of tragedy, then, made it likely that the external view would be more often invoked: the vision of the gods sending the seed of disaster to man (A.fr. 156 (77 Lobel)).

This is, of course, the mechanism of projection which Euripides and Xenophanes recognized. It is right to see the Greek gods as projections, at some level, of destructive human desires for which humans would like to deny responsibility. So perhaps we should examine a little more closely the concept of projection as it is used in the history of psychoanalytic theory.

(iv) 'Projection' in psychoanalytic theory

Distinctions between internal and external reality change from culture to culture, from person to person, and form one of the most sensitive and dangerous areas of thought. One reason for this, which one has to assume is true at some level in every culture, is resistance to the idea that desires and impulses that are not socially approved in the particular culture do in fact exist and operate within each man. It is primarily the feelings and powers that are unacceptable to the individual for which he wishes to deny responsibility. If he accepts them in the world at all, he projects them onto other people or forces. Projection is then primarily defensive in nature: what is defended is man's view of himself as acceptable in terms both of the particular social values of his culture and of his particular personality. The notion that projection is a defence is basic to Freud's view of it. 'The paranoiac projects his intolerable ideas outwards, whence they return in the shape of reproaches' (102). Freud's picture of the use of projection in conditions of phobia and persecutory paranoia corresponds with the traditional pattern of wandering madness in Greek myth, Io, Orestes, Bellerophon, the Proetides, and explains the ambiguities of tragic presentation of these themes: 'The ego behaves as if the danger of a development of anxiety threatened it not from the direction of an instinctual impulse but from the direction of perception, and it is thus enabled to react against this external danger with ... attempts at flight' (103).

But Freud stressed also the normal and universal use of projection, outside conditions of madness, suggesting that 'the obscure recognition (the endopsychic perception, as it were) of psychical factors and relations in the unconscious is mirrored ... in the construction of a super-natural reality'. This is nothing new to us today: anthropologists have spent a long time suggesting correspondences between the structure of the

personality in a culture and the construction of that culture's institutions, rituals, language and myths (104). But historically, Freud challenged interpretations of primitive religious belief which stressed 'primitive' inabilities to conceive of nature except as modelled on man. Earlier attitudes had suggested, for instance, that the ancients projected human qualities and passions onto the forces of nature. This is opposed to the view I have suggested above, in Chapters 1 and 2, that Greek imagery projected human emotions into the outside world, and endowed them with qualities of natural forces, and also with the qualities of the daemons who shared properties with the animal and elemtal forces of nature. It is opposed also to Freud's point, which was that the assimilation of natural forces and human qualities had as its basic principal the 'refusal to recognize something' in man himself: 'Ghosts and demons are embodiments of bad and therefore unacceptable unconscious desires'.

There is continued controversy over the place of projection in the overall development of Freudian theory. The most important general concept behind it is his picture of <u>instinct</u>. He saw man as vulnerable to two kinds of 'tension-generating excitation': 'those the ego can flee, and against which it can protect itself; and which it cannot evade, against which there exists at first no protective shield'. (This is one way of seeing the distinction between external and internal: v. below, section (vii)). Freud stressed the unbearable intensity of the feelings for which the projective mechanism was invoked: he crystallized the theory in 1920 as operating on the principle of pleasure: 'There is a tendency to treat them (sc. excessive, internal, unpleasant stimuli) as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against (outside) stimuli into operation as a means of defence against them (too)'

(105). The drawback for the individual who operates in this way is

that he is forced 'to believe completely in something that is henceforth subject to the laws of external reality'. Hence, though it purchases for him peace with his own image of himself, it does so at the cost of increasing the objective terrors of the world around him. This is one of the main sources of the fear and feelings of vulnerability generated in tragic imagery. But the drawback in the theory itself is that man demonstrably projects not only what he refuses to be (the destructive qualities of the Erinyes or Gorgon, the selfish and incestuous qualities of the Olympians) but also what he is (the red hair in Xenophanes' picture of the gods), and what he wishes to be (the qualities of justice and beauty attributed to the Olympians). Freud confronted this paradox in various ways, though it has been teased out of the body of his theory mostly by later writers. Inkblot tests, for example, operate on the principle that man projects what he is. The confusion in Freudian theory is most apparent in connexion with his theory of dreams.

Freud explained dreams and hallucinations as projections; but he had also explained that the content of dreams acted as the fulfilment of desires. To reconcile these, he might have tried to mitigate his claim that what was projected was necessarily unpleasurable. Instead, he suggested that the primary function of a dream was defensive. 'A dream is among other things a projection: an internationalization of an external process' (106). However, since Freud was involved in work with his patients in which defences were defences against his own perceptions, he stressed the undesirable and unpleasurable qualities of defence-mechanisms more, perhaps, than a study of the operation of such defences in another society might require. The Greeks took pleasure as well as fear from the construction in their projected supernatural world. Though the supernatural Greek world contains many projections which are obviously the refusal of unacceptable human impulses, hostile, destructive, deceitful, selfish, bestial, incestuous, immoral and ugly, it reflects also the best and brightest aspects of

the successive societies in Greece and their ideals of human behaviour; generous, hospitable, just, tolerant, friendly and at all levels attractive. Perhaps the projective mechanism, primarily defensive though it may be, meant that the society was protected [illegible] from inherently self-damaging tendencies of thought to which other societies - our own, for example - may be continually exposed. It is possible that the student who observes (and implicitly despises?) defensive mechanisms in another society has not learnt from his own to defend himself enough.

Freud was not the first physician to be aware of the rôle played by projective mechanisms in the illnesses and fears of his patients. The sixteenth-century doctor Paracelsus shows in his writings his insight into the human origins of dreams, visions and demons: 'As we desire things in our hearts, so they appear to us in dreams' (107). But though even the demons were born in the imagination of his patients, Paracelsus could not question their reality. 'They plagued his patients. Trustworthy people had seen them with their own eyes. There was no point in denying that they were a psychological reality. But he parted from his predecessors at one point ... Mental disease (had been) treated as sin, since both were held to be caused by demons'. For Paracelsus, 'Demons and witchcraft exist, but neither is the cause of disease, except when a sorcerer uses a force of nature to produce the disease' (108). Paracelsus' position on the conflict between subjective and objective or internal and external sources of emotion, is closer to Euripidean exploration of it than is Freud: the mode of thought that frames his ideas stresses the external origins, the external world, just as the language and imagery of the fifth century meant that Euripides' explorations of human motivation, and Hippocratic theories of the origins of disease stressed the external derivation of human experience, even in the

consideration of internal sources. 'My lack of will is the cause of my disease' wrote Paracelsus (109): physical and chemical causes operated with internal mental ones to cause disease, just as the external αἰδὼς μανή combines with the internally working ἀθέσφατος οἶνος to cause Elpenor's death.

To sum up: Freud's hypothesis of the mechanism of projection is that it is primarily defensive. Man projects unacceptable qualities of his own onto the external world. Whether there already exists in external reality a screen to receive the projection or whether man gradually evolves a fantasy figure to receive it, the mechanism is the same. Freud uses projection often, of course, of the feelings one person, who denies them in himself, projects onto another person. This is a common mechanism in conditions of envy: the chronically envious person, once he is in possession of some good of his own, expects others to be envious of him (110). The mechanism is an important and pervasive one, and useful to any study of religion; though Freud's stress on the defensive nature of projection needs perhaps to be qualified in cross-cultural studies, and in other than clinical conditions. Recognition of this mechanism has been used by other creative medically-oriented writers, in terms that recall the suggestions of Euripides and Xenophanes that qualities of the gods arose within the human mind. It is not accident that, in the [illegible] time of Euripides, medical writers were searching for theories of the origin of disease which combined internal and external causes (v. below, section vi). But at all periods, recognition of the projection process does not imply that the force onto which qualities or feelings are projected, has no objective reality of its own. Iphigeneia does not say, Artemis does not exist. She says, I do not believe the goddess has this particular characteristic: this characteristic only has been projected onto the goddess by the Taurians.

The creative ambiguity inherent in recognition of the mechanism runs throughout tragic explanations of motive. Euripides 'shows us men and women nakedly confronting the mystery of evil, no longer as an alien thing assailing their reason from without, but as a part of their own being - ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων,' wrote Dodds (111). But δαίμων is not simply ἦθος, even though ἦθος can act as δαίμων. Euripides is careful to show the external causes of Phaedra's forbidden love, before he shows it working within her. Just as, as Jung suggested, the phobic condition which involves the creation of irrational sources of irrational fear, is a mask for a high degree of creativity (112), so the projective mechanism seems to have functioned in Greek religious ideas as a creative force. In chapter three I outlined the multiplicity of attacking forms that threatened the mind in imagination. The multiplicity extends to the Greek divinities with protective, helping, apotropaic and nourishing powers over men. It may be that the greater the number of supernatural forces imagined by a culture, which draw into themselves the best and worst feelings of the members of that culture, the greater the opportunity for creative, energetic and free living and thinking. Post-Freudian generations, who see all the evil in the world as emanting from their own psyches only, may be much more restricted.

(v) Different uses of projection in tragedy

Projection is used in many very different and subtle forms in the relation between the divine and human worlds, between the thought-world and the physical world surrounding the characters of tragedy. The most obvious example of its use, demonstrated by a comparison of the material of chapters one and two above, is the projection of the imagined or observed characteristics of the human mind onto the imagined external forces that attack it. As the mind is black, restless, whirling and twisting, conceived of in terms of the natural elements (ch. 1) so the daemons that trouble the mind are black, volatile, modelled on animal and elemental forces of nature, twisting and violent (ch. 2, part A). As the mind is conceived of as flying or fluttering in emotion (ch. 1 sections (f) and (g)), so the daemons and the emotions modelled on them fly and flutter in the outer air (ch. 2 sections (vii)). Qualities of the human mind, then, are projected onto the daemons it has created as the sources of its troubles.

Qualities of the man whose mind is suffering are also projected onto the demons. This is most marked in the relation between Orestes and the Erinyes who pursue him. IN 'Orestes' and the IT Orestes and the Erinyes share the characteristics tabulated below.

Orestes	Erinyes
Looks around wildly	Glare terribly
His eyes are hard; they roll	Their eyes are fierce
	they are 'hound-eyed,
	or bloody-eyed
Has wild, tangled hair	Have wild, snake-like hair
Resembles 'one of the dead'	Resemble Night,
	Rise out of the Earth
He is maddened by the blood he has shed	They are maddened by blood
He has bloody hands	They drip blood

Orestes	Erinyes
He is compared to a 'drakon'	They are snake-like; snake-haired
His appearance upsets others who see him.	Their appearance upsets Orestes.

Qualities of the mind, then, and also of the body of a man troubled by the Erinyes are projected onto the Erinyes themselves. When one talks in terms of the projection 'mechanism', that is, of course, a metaphor only. It is not suggested that the poet (for instance) has a picture of the mad Orestes' mental and physical attributes, and then projects these onto the daemons. The process is simultaneous: conceptions of madmen are set in terms of conceptions of the daemons; the ingredients of the daemons are partly inherited, partly modelled on other animal and divine fantasies, partly elaborated in a particular context. As in poetic imagery, the two terms, the man and the imagined recipient of his projections, overlap, are seen and constantly reseen in terms of each other; they affect each other continuously. In the same way, in particular plays, one finds similarities such as that between the hunter and the hunted in the 'Bacchae' (113). The same principle operates in cult-conceptions of gods with particular functions. The goddess Eilithyuia, for instance, is represented often with clenched hands and spread knees, the position supposed to facilitate childbirth (114).

The mechanism of projection as we see it working in different ways in tragedy exploits the paradox Freud created in his formulations of the theory: that men project away from themselves [illegible] what they refuse to be, and what they are, and also what they want to be. The refusal to see the destructive and repulsive qualities embodied in the Erinyes as belonging to man himself, means that even these creatures, as external forces, can be accepted into the world as creatures which have a useful function in relation to man:

ἔσθ' ὅπου τὸ δεινὸν εὖ
καὶ φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον
δεῖ μένειν καθήμενον (115). The ability

to create in the figure of Artemis the focus of all ideals of that particular way of thought - beauty, power over and in the wild, chastity, honour and brightness - means that Hippolytus has a permanent external standard of the kind of life he has chosen to live (116). The fact that onto this figure also are projected reactions of revenge on a rather more human scale (117) does not detract from its power as a more-than-human standard. For one of the basic elements, apparently, in the process of comparison between gods and men, of which projection in its different forms is one ingredient, is that the very process of making one figure resemble another involves a basic distinction between the two as well. The thought is, 'Like man (god) therefore not man (god)'. This underlies such principles as homeopathy in medicine. The material outside the human body has the same quality as the wounded organ in the human body. Because it is the same, it can heal: but it also heals because it is something different and has the power of its difference (118).

(vi) The internal view in medicine: in and out of the body

In Homer, disease is a daemon that enters a man's body, and either leaves him or destroys him (119):

ὃς ἐν νούσῳ κεῖται κεκαδὼν ἄνδρα πάροχον,
δηρὸν τηκόμενος, στυγερὸς δέ οἱ ἔκφατος αἰών.

When medical writers began to form their technical vocabulary, they were faced not only with the body of scientific theory, already elaborated in terms of poroi (120), of the appropriateness and similarities between material in the outside world and material in the human body (121), of the influence exerted by the outside world on men (122): they were also faced with the fabric of popular imagery and vocabulary which stressed and transmitted belief in the external source of human ills. Hence such belief is embedded in Hippocratic thought at many levels, a belief that is iconographically represented for us first in poetry by the nosoi released by Pandora to wander the world (123). Disease attacks its victim ἔξωθεν (124). Fever is a 'burning', πυρετός, καυσώδης, and attacks randomly, 'wanderingly, πεπλανημένως (125). It can be sharp, ὀξύς, and burns and wounds like a pointed weapon (126). Relations between the body and the disease are seen in terms of battle: one or other has to conquer, κρατεῖν. To cure a patient one must evict the force that has entered him, τὸ προσθὲν (127). An ulcer 'eats' the body's flesh; a stroke 'strikes' it, ἀποπληξία. All these are the standard modes of attack on man represented in poetic imagistic descriptions of the effect of emotion and daemon on the human mind.

Much medical theory conformed to this thought-pattern: and still does. From it we derive such theories as bacteriological infection, contagion, respiration, and the permeability of tissue. The pattern of theories

of sense-perception which stressed the external origins of sensation

and the arrival of sensation in the body through the poroi (128) and of physical science which stressed the travels of the atoms of matter through the void (129) affected important areas of hippocratic theory at all times. The author of De Victu, for instance, found room in his field of speculation for the poroi of the soul, through which the soul drew its nourishment from the outside world (130). It is a basic tenet of Hippocratic thought that the human body is affected, for good and ill, by τὰ ἐσιόντα . It recalls to us, obviously, the main difference between Christian and classical ideas of possession: in Christian experience the intrusive demon is always malignant; in classical times, though feared, it could be acting for human good as easily as human destruction. We saw above (p. 334) the easy assimilation of possessing daemons with breaths and winds. Winds, of course, are an important model in the imagery of the sea-faring Greeks, and the sudden changes of wind occur often as images for changes of mind, possibly directed by divine force (131). In medical theory, the prevailing wind is always important: the author of Epidemics includes the direction of wind in his case-histories (132). Winds could, like daemons, be useful or harmful to man; one was equally dependant on the good ones and vulnerable to the bad. Winds, food, temperature, enter the body from the outside world. Their qualities are often abstracted: heat, coldness, moisture, dryness are turned, with the basic Greek attraction for abstracts that complicates discussions of personification into the very ἐόντα themselves (133).

But the alternative thought-pattern, the one that stressed the internal powers of the human body and mind, and the internal source of its ills as well as goods, directed other aspects of Hippocratic theory. Another pattern of theory is that the origin of disease lies not in the world

outside, but in an imbalance of the internal elements, powers, δυνάμεις of the body. In one very popular form of this theory-pattern, one of the δυνάμεις threw out of balance the healthy of all the elements, became isolated from the other δυνάμεις, and was freed to act in its pure, concentrated form <u>against</u> its own body. The body could not control or defeat the rebel δύναμις, since it had lost the harmony essential for health and strength. This condition, produced by the process called ἀπόκρισις 'separation off', could cause madness, physical illness, and confusion of soul and body (134). The body therefore carried within it the seeds of its own disease.

However, this pattern of theory could very easily be brought into some kind of line with the first. Formulations of the ἀπόκρισις theory often included the extra element of <u>intrusion</u>, but one of the ἔδιόντα, whose arrival threw out the balance, the κρᾶσις, and freed the single <u>dunamis</u> to act on its own. The foreign force <u>worked with</u> or through the <u>dunameis</u> (135). Most of the great Hippocratic writers followed their own particular brand of synthesis between the internal and external views. The author of <u>De Morbo Sacro</u> drew on the work of Alcmaeon of Croton, apparently the first scientist to assign to the brain the central role in the functioning of mind and body. He gave the brain the role of <u>guide</u> to the body (136): the author of the <u>De Morbo Sacro</u> develops this into the role of ἑρμηνεύς, interpreter (137): κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζω τὸν ἐγκέφαλον δύναμιν ἔχειν πλείστην ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἠέρος γινομένων ἑρμηνεύς .... Διὸ φημὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον εἶναι τὸν ἑρμηνεύοντα τὴν σύνεσιν. Activity denoted by ἑρμηνεύω elsewhere includes poetic interpretation of the gods' desires: a poet is ἑρμηνεὺς τῶν θεῶν (138).

It includes also, of course, mediation between people (eg Pl.Epin.984e), and the expression of thought into words (eg Thuc. 2. 2C0). Its basic force is the processing of powers for a recipient who could not otherwise cope with them. The powers it translates are usually words, ideas, or divine communications. When used of the brain's relation to the body, it suggest the element that mediates between the two parties: between the potent ἐδόντα which nourish the body but can also cause disease in it, or bring disease into it, and the δυνάμεις which compose the actual ingredients of the body.

We do not know the date of this amazing treatise, though most opinions favour the late fifth century (139). Other treatises do not match it, either in its analysis of the brain's role, or in its breadth of religious ramifications. In the fourth century philosophers achieved their own subtle, idiosyncratic and influential syntheses of external and internal thought-patterns (140) in various areas. But only the author of De Morbo Sacro relates his theories of human physiology to religious belief in such a powerful and balanced way (141):

οὐδέν τ' μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἄλλων θειοτέρη εἶναι νούσων οὐδὲ ἱερωτέρη, ἀλλὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχει καὶ πρόφασιν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐνόμισαν θεῖόν τ πρῆγμα εἶναι ὑπὸ ἀπειρίης καὶ θαυμασιότητος ... εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ θαυμάσιον θεῖον νομιεῖται, πολλὰ τὰ ἱερὰ νοσήματα ἐσται καὶ οὐχὶ ἕν... τ' δὲ νόσημα τοῦτο οὐδέν τ' μοι δοκεῖ θειότερον εἶναι τῶν λοιπῶν, ἀλλὰ φύσιν ἔχει ἥν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα νοσήματα, καὶ ἰπρόφασιν ὅθεν ἕκαστα γίνεται.

Here he accepts that what enters the body and causes distressing physical symptoms in mind and body, may be <u>what men call daemons</u>. But the body must be treated as if the forces it contains while sick are the normal forces familiar to every doctor as the natural components of the human body. In cases of the sacred disease itself, the [illegible]/cause in familiar human terms is excess moisture, which affects the brain and causes extra movement in it (142): καὶ μαινόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ ὑγρότητος (sc. τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου)· ὅταν γὰρ ὑγρότερος τῆς φύσιος ἦι, ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, κινευμένου δὲ μήτε τὴν ὄψιν διαιρεῖζειν, μήτε τὴν ἀκοήν, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν τήν τε γλῶσσαν τοιαῦτα διαλέγεσθαι οἷάν ἂν βλέπηι τε καὶ ἀκούηι ἑκάστοτε. ὅσον δ' ἂν διαιρεθῆι ὁ ἐγκέφαλος χρόνον, τοσοῦτον καὶ φρονεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Once the original κρᾶσις of moisture and the other elements has been re-established, the patient will appear mad (and hence <u>be</u> mad) no longer.

This treatment of a disease which caused what was called madness suggests two things. First, it adds to our picture of the background to the treatment of madness in tragedy, which avoids any notion of <u>chronic</u> madness (above, section (i)). The chief fifth-century evidence for the existence of a belief in chronic madness is Herodotus, in a possibly rather later part of his History (143), who includes the theory that Cleomenes' madness was due to his early habit of drinking his wine unmixed. Secondly, the external-internal synthesis of <u>De Morbo Sacro</u>, though it stresses the temporary nature of the so-called mad fit, suggested, as did other treatises, that disease was caused by a combination of external forces and internal powers. This meant that the body was liable to be affected by a particular

disease chronically: when the seeds of nosos are within a human body, susceptibility to it is not just random. Chronic diseases are mentioned in the Hippocratica (144) and were, presumably, recognised in the street (145). The possibility of chronic physical disease may have underpinned the rare speculations about chronic madness. There is another important link between Herodotus and the medical writers. Just as the author of De Morbo Sacro considers both a divine and a physical, humanly comprehensible, cause and operation of disease, mental and physical, and stresses the way human beings have to cope with it practically, whether they consider it to be of divine origin or not, so Herodotus considers both natural physical interpretations of events and divine ones. As a narrator, he shows the oracles, dreams and prayers mentioned in his story coming true. As a scientific observer, he introduces the possible human level at each crucial step (146).

The kind of synthesis between external and internal thought-patterns, exemplified best in De Morbo Sacro, directed interpretations of events in history, and directed theories of education. Mental health depends both on what goes into the young mind and on the qualities there already (147). It may not be the case that the medical treatises were read in the latter half of the fifth century, nor even that the ideas they contained were popularly transmitted. What is important is that the pattern of theory it demonstrates was being used in different areas with various effects. It is because scientists are analytic and pay attention to the processes of their thought that we can see in them most clearly the efforts being made to blend the two views which, I have suggested, were always operating in Greek thought; the view of the internal origins of human powers and ills, and the external view.

vii. 'Modes of Thought'; the complementary nature of external and internal views

I have suggested above that fifth-century facts about human motivation, emotional experience and thought, manifest two apparently contradictory views of the world; and that these views were in some sense complementary to each other, being present in different proportions from hour to the end of the fifth century. In this respect my suggestion conforms to most theories formulated recently within various different disciplines, concerning the 'sociology of thought' (148). It is easiest, apparently, or it corresponds best with observable facts, to divide modes of thought in any society into two kinds. Freud, for instance, by his identification of the 'reality principle' and the 'pleasure principle' distinguished two modes of mental functioning which in the conditions of mental health normal in his society be regarded as integrated in such a way as to make the separation and analysis of each impossible. In mental disturbance the two were dissociated, making clear the particular characteristics of each (149). Freud misled himself and others by creating an implicit chronological relation between the two by the names he gave them. The names have been kept, though theory has developed to a point at which theorists may deny priority to either.

Freud maintained that the 'primary processes', the ones which are directed by the 'pleasure principle', are first demonstrated by the infant, who has only wishes. The mother, however, has acquired the 'secondary processes', those which grow out of experience of external reality, those which are properly conscious. Freud's picture of the relation between mother and infant is of one creature using the one kind of process, one the other. This element is now discredited, but the division is still in some sense useful. Rycroft points out that the infant <u>is</u> in his terms in touch with reality, and Bruner's experiments have shown that the mother is directed by very subtle and powerful <u>innate</u>

principles in her adaptation to the child (150). Freud's division had other than chronological implications. The primary processes had 'an intrinsic connexion with dream-imagery ... fantasy and wish-fulfilling tendencies; the secondary processes with 'verbal imagery and reality-adaptation' (151). Though the two modes have obvious features in common - both use symbolism, for instance (152) - it is a long tradition in the West to distinguish them. Ryeroft cites, for instance, T. S. Eliot's much quoted (and perhaps much regretted) idea of a 'dissociation of sensibility' that took place with the increased emphasis in the seventeenth century on scientific modes of thought (153). One common element between Freud's formulation of his hypothesis, the seventeenth-century writers considered by Eliot, and the fifth-century B.C. poets affected by contemporary scientific ideas, is that the scientist is compelled to use existing language which in its metaphors and forms often presupposes the modes of thought which the theorist may be attempting to analyse, and even perhaps replace. 'In reading Freud it is not easy to know when the metaphors and analogies that were those of his time constricted his thought' (154); similarly the Hippocratic writers in developing ideas of internal causes of disease fell naturally into metaphors which displayed a strong tendency to believe in external causes instead. A 'rise of scientific modes of thought and methods' does not perhaps suggest dissociation of two modes of thought; but it does suggest a shift in balance between two ways of functioning that theory may usefully still distinguish.

Outside the Western tradition societies cannot be divided into those thinking scientifically and those thinking non-scientifically (155); even though both individuals and societies have 'basic differences of thought' which can be distinguished in various ways. The wish to distinguish in this area by polarizing is demonstrated in most anthropological studies of such differences: savage <u>versus</u> modern, tradition-oriented ('closed') versus science-oriented ('open') 156).

Levi-Strauss, though he mentions that 'wild thought' operates in all of us, makes this predominate in traditional cultures, and makes 'domesticated thought' into the characteristic of modern cultures; he sees them as two 'forces essentially incommensurable, devoted to different ends: wild thought attempts to grasp the world through symbol and metaphor ... domesticated thought is concerned with fitting means to ends' (157).

What is interesting about the different theories is this widespread desire to divide modes of thought in a given culture into <u>two</u>. It is not simply a universal human desire in the formation of theories about human experience; theories about human <u>nature</u>, as distinct from mental functioning, often turn towards a tripartite division of the soul and personality (158). Another common element in most theories is the paradoxically complementary nature of two views which are logically incompatible. In most societies, perhaps, and also in most individuals, integration is never complete: the person for whom mind and body, will and desire, objective and subjective thought processes are not sometimes at war with each other, is perhaps a theoretical ideal (159). But as in Freudian terminology many differently-balanced relationships between primary and secondary processes are possible in individuals, perhaps in a society whose language and religions generally underpinned belief in the external origins of harmful forces, individuals might have found their own particular balance: a precarious point of equilibrium between this view and the more threatening view which suggested that the causes of human harm resided in the human self.

Chapter Four

OUT OF THE MIND
(Involuntary and ritualized acts in tragedy which express emotion)

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Chapter 4

So far I have concentrated on what happened inside the mind and why. But in tragedy as in life thesespeculations are associated with actions. The observer uses actions to infer what is happening in the minds of other people (1). In these last two chapters I shall consider the expression in action of the emotional states explored above: and in the present chapter, the involuntary actions that betray emotions or physical disease, and also their ritualized forms. In tragedy the natural observation of physiological activity expressive of emotion must be replaced for the audience by verbal description. The question, "Why are you pale", asked of one character by another, provides the audience with the same clues that real pallor could have given in real life. The amount of attention paid to these phenomena in tragedy for this reason may be unrepresentative of contemporary life; but the kind of attention given to physiological detail in the society should be reflected, one may hope, in the plays.

I am indebted in this chapter particularly to the work of anthropologists and psychologists, on bodily gesture and other physical expressions of emotion. I have borrowed from them, two propositions; rather obvious propositions, but perhaps it is worth stating them clearly. First, body gestures have a communicative and expressive force, and a symbolic language of their own, though like other languages this can be used ambiguously (2). I shall be exploring some levels of significance of various actions presented in tragedy, but I do not mean to claim that this is the only level at which we should take them, or even at which the fifth century took them. Second, ritual can be used to express an emotion, and thereby overcome some of its painful and unwelcome aspects. "Rituals ... produce changes of ... states of mind ... ritualized behaviour is apparently

a response to anxiety, and ritual is able to reduce the anxiety" (3). The concept of ritual is used in various different ways in different disciplines, but its expressive and transformative functions remain constant. Psychoanalysis often emphasizes its expressive and protective force: "The word, ritual, is borrowed by both psychiatists and psychoanalysis to describe a form of behaviour displayed by patients suffering from an obsessional neurosis, in which the patient attempts to reduce anxiety by carrying out a more or less complex and stereotyped series of actions. Obsessional rituals can be regarded as a privately constructed system of counter-magic by which the patient attempts to ward off fantastic fears by equally fantastic actions, the logic of both being animistic ..." (4). Anthropologists emphasize sometimes the transformative power of gestures in and out of ritual: "Gestures have a significance, a propriety, a restorative effect, a kind of creative force which words alone cannot give" (5). Because physical gesture is a symbolic mode of communication and says formally what cannot be expressed informally - interest, anxiety, desire, respect or fear perhaps (6) - the opening and healing possibilities of the symbols are as important a part of tragedy as the resonance of verbal symbolism. This explains the degree of concentration, surprising perhaps to us, on such actions in tragedy as the refusal of Odysseus' help with Ajax's funeral, the dressing-up scene of Pentheus, and Electra's insistence on her sister's substitution of her own hair for Clytemnestra's offerings (7). We may compare the transformative power of imagery over language and belief (8).

I have concentrated on the mourning ritual particularly, because a large part of Greek tragedy is composed of laments for misfortune and death (hence Ridgeway's theory of the development of tragedy).

The gestures and actions of the ritual seem to me to be composed of the involuntary physical effect of the emotion which the ritual both expresses and allays. The huge significance of ritual may be due partly to the fear of excessive emotion often expressed by Greeks of this period, and to the desire to control it by expressing it in a coherent, patterned form (9). Physical effects of emotion are called unrhythmical, unpredictable and violent, like the gestures of a sufferer from physical disease. These features of excessive emotion are the focus of the fear of such emotion, both in other people and oneself. Ritual, song, dance, which are also the formal elements in the structure of a tragedy, transformed these and made the emotions themselves acceptable. One cannot go any further back in explanations and interpretations of the Greek love of 'balance' which characterizes scientific theory as much as popular belief and choral lyrics. Harmony in the body is the prerequisite of - in some theories synonymous with - physical health, just as harmony in the soul, manifested by controlled movements and careful actions, is responsible for the safety of the mind and moral health (10). Since the body is such an important model for images of the mind, I shall begin this chapter by concentrating on the physical effects, collected in the Hippocratica, observed in the fifth century of νόσος, the opposite of ἁρμονία .

(i) Physical results of mental and physical movement in the Hippocratica

The sound principal on which the Hippocratic doctors based their observation of patients was that any physiological abnormality was a symptom of potential danger. Different types of abnormal breathing, for instance, denote different diseases or outcomes of the disease, but all of them are dangerous: πυκνόν, or ἀναπνευόμενον καὶ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου, or ψυχρόν (11). A warning found in many treatises is: "action x is dangerous if the patient does not normally do that in health". This is the principle on which the tireless author of the 'Epidemics' records his case-histories, and it is summed up in the advice given in the 'Humours' (12): Set down everything, 'coughing, vomit, hiccoughs, sneezes, tears, itches, pluckings of the hands, thirst, πόνοι and their absence, body, mind, learning ability, memory, voice, silence'. The author of the 'Epidemics' records delirium, convulsions, pallor etc., but also the patients' nightly fears, sulkiness, disobedience, forgetfulness, depression and despair. Emotional symptoms are included with the physical. This advice so forcibly recalls that of Freud on the observation of chance actions that it is worth quoting it here (13): "All the things that a person does with his clothing, often without realizing it, are no less important and deserve the doctor's attention. Every change in the clothing usually worn, every small sign of carelessness - such as an unfastened button - every trace of exposure, is intended to express something which the wearer of the clothes does not want to say straight out and which for the most part he is unaware of" [illegible] Here Freud is concerned with involuntary or habitual actions symptomatic of a particular problem in a patient, or, in other terms, of his personality.

The physical abnormalities symptomatic of disease but also of emotion most often mentioned in the Hippocratic corpus are change of colour (of the body and its fluids), change of temperature, peculiarities in delivery and content of speech, and body position and movement. Colour change is often linked, in treatises with a rigid doctrinal bias, to different humours, but generally observation is not greatly affected by theory. The usual colour range is from red to white, eg Prog. 24.60 (Loeb), in diseases of children, there will be convulsions if they change colour, χρῶμα μεταβάλλωσι καὶ χλωρὸν ἢ πελιδνὸν ἢ ἐρυθρὸν ἢν ἰσχωσιν. Convulsions, spasmoi, and other restless, violent and meaningless movements, are often described in the contexts of many diseases.

There are various physical activities supposedly caused by madness or delirium: it is important to remember that there is not a clear distinction between what we would see as the physical condition, delirium, and what we would call the psychological condition, madness (14). Παραφρονεῖν and μανικόν signify both. In Prognostikon 3.18f unaccustomed positions in the bed or tooth-grinding are physical symptoms of μανία :

ἐπὶ γαστέρα δὲ κεῖσθαι, ἢν μὴ σύνηθές ἐστι, καὶ ὑγιαίνοντι κοιμᾶσθαι οὕτω, κακόν· παραφροσύνην γὰρ σημαίνει ἢ ὀδύνην τινὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν γαστέρα τόπων... ὀδόντας δὲ πρίειν ἐν πυρετῷ, ὁκοίοισι μὴ σύνηθές ἐστιν ἀπὸ παίδων, μανικοῦ καὶ θανατώδες.

The author of De Morbo Sacro even postulates unverifiable physical effects of emotion, such as a flux of phlegm to the brain caused 'either by a south wind that suddenly succeeds the north winds, or by fear': ἐπικατάρρει δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀδήλου φόβου γινομένου, καὶ ἢν δείσῃ βοήσαντός τινος. (DMS 13. 16-20). There are other more apparent physical effects:

flushed faces and red eyes caused by fear or the 'contemplation of a **wicked act'**, 18. 27-30

ἐρεγχορότι τότε μάλιστα τὸ πρόσωπον φλογιᾷ
καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐρεύθονται ὅταν φοβῆται, καὶ
ἡ γνώμη ἐπινοῇ τι κακὸν ἐργάσασθαι (15).

Madness, associated in tragedy with a particular set of physical symptoms, is associated, not surprisingly, with similar ones in the medical writers: the only symptom missing here is the red eyeball. Epilepsy has the same symptoms: gnashing teeth, frothing mouth, twisting hands, rolling eyes (DMS 10). These are also recognized, by doctors and in the tragic poets, as signs of extreme physical pain; fevered as well as delirious patients have 'pluckings and twistings of hands', grinding teeth, and grotesquely distorted and writhing bodies (16).

The medical writers took for granted the fact that a troubled mind - κινουμένη ψυχή (Diet 8.6,10)- affected the body in particular ways, ways which also resembled some of the symptoms of extreme physical disease. The author of 'Humours' points out, 9. 16, that different emotions may have the same physical effects. Doctors are constantly meeting the same physical symptoms, though the diseases that have caused them differ: there is a finite number of physical changes and movements possible to the human body (17).

(ii) Involuntary physical results of emotion in poets

Introduction: a warning illustrated by Sappho fr. 31

The obvious difference between Hippocratic material and tragic in descriptions of physical movement is the purpose behind the writings. Clinical accuracy is the aim of the Hippocratic writers, and though their records may be distorted by doctrinaire theories or habits of description, they were concerned to describe certain symptoms for purposes of recognition. But it is becoming more and more clear that in Greek poetry in general, within each of its particular genres, treatment of similar material developed in certain traditional formalized ways (18). Mourning, for instance, or madness, described by Euripides, may well be influenced more heavily by descriptions of these phenomena in Aeschylus than by their appearance in contemporary life. This warning is best illustrated by reference to the arguments surrounding Sappho's description of physical reactions to emotion in Fr.31. Page and Devereux in their different ways take her list of symptoms to be 'simple', 'realistic', 'uninfluenced by Homer' and 'accurate'. Longinus and more recently Cairns refer her choice of symptoms to poetic skill. Cairns (on another poem, fr.94) speaks of Sappho 'combining several topical and generic sophistications: the apparent simplicity is a tribute to her art.' Marcovich is obviously right to take apparent 'realism' as the result of art rather than experience, or at best a blend of both (19). The 'traditional features' in fr. 31, the reactions that are found in Homer, are blindness, speechlessness, trembling, sweating, pallor and fainting. Page points out that in Homer these mark different emotions, not love, but 'fear, anger, sorrow and pain'. He cites Archilochus who first 'adapted' these symptoms to erotic contexts, fr. 112 D.

τοῖος γὰρ φιλότητος ἔρως ὑπὸ καρδίαν ἐλυσθεὶς
πολλὴν κατ' ἀχλὺν ὄμμάτων ἔχευεν
κλέψας ἐκ στηθέων ἁπαλὰς φρένας.

But there are a comparatively small number of abnormal physical reactions possible for the human body; it is unlikely that it was a startling innovation for Archilochus or Sappho to transfer these reactions from the battlefield to the boudoir, or even that it was, in either literary or popular language, an innovation at all. Sweating, pallor, speechlessness can act as the symptoms of most emotions: as Devereux points out (20), different diseases can have symptoms in common, and so can different emotions. In the examples I give below from tragedy, the emotions concerned are usually fear, sorrow, anger and the like, since these are the emotions which the plots of most tragedies portray. Phaedra and Orestes, though, faint, tremble and refuse food with quite different emotional motivation. Tears in tragedy are usually shed in grief and shame, but Orestes and Iphigeneia, IT 832, cry for joy (21).

In Sappho fr. 31 there are two symptoms which Page (p.29) points out do not appear in Homer. Critics might suppose that these at least are the result of an individual experience of the poet. These are: the fiery sensation, 9-10 λέπτον

δ' αὐτίκα χρῶι πῦρ ὑπαδεδρόμηκεν

and the thunder in the ears, 11-12 ἐπιρρόμ-

βεισι δ' ἀκουαι.

If we assume that the symptoms are carefully grouped in the poem, as well as carefully selected, the context of these two should be studied. Marcovich well emphasized the difference of tense and mood between ἔπτοαισεν 6, and the verbs following ὡς γάρ , 7, which he takes to be the reactions that occur whenever Sappho sees the girl. The reactions

following ὡς γάρ are grouped as follows. First, speechlessness; then 8 lines introduced by ἀλλ' and ending with the climax (22):

τεθνάμην δ' ὀλίγω 'πιδεύης
φαίνομ' ἐμαυτᾶι 15-16.

The sequence produces four lines of reactions, in which the two non-Homeric ones occur, and alternates two phenomena: organs that fail to work and intrusive abnormal subjective sensations. Eyes and tongue do not work; speech and sight fail. Touch and hearing however are abnormally affected (see also how the two 'failures of functioning') speech and sight, are contained within the lines that describe them, while the two 'intrusive sensations' intrude on these lines and are carried over into the next. Formally and rhythmically too, the two kinds of phenomenon are distinguished. There is fire on her flesh and thunder in her ears.

What literary resonance can we assign to the two non-Homeric phenomena? There is no exact parallel for λέπτον πῦρ and ὑποδρομέω is not used again in extant poetry (except for Apollonius' imitation). However, fire and thunder are both associated with daemonic attacks on man. Cassandra's mantic frenzy touches her as a fire, Ag. 1256

πάπαι· οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἐπέρχεται δέ μοι.

The weapons of Eros are 'stronger than fire', Hipp. 530

οὔτε γὰρ πυρὸς ... ὑπέρτερον βέλος.

The subtle and secret element in the approach implied by the ὑπό of ὑποδρομέω is paralleled in similar contexts: in the approach of an emotion and the physical reaction to it, eg A.Cho. 463 τρόμος μ' ὑφέρπει. I would suggest that the combination of types of sensation by which Sappho approaches her near-death, the un- or supernatural phenomena from outside (flame and thunder) and the failure of organs to function (23) is due to considerations

of balance and structure, rather than an attempt at accurate representation of historical experience: though no less validly moving and intense for that (24). Sappho, that 'topically sophisticated' poet, is making imaginative use of a literary tradition. However, the fact that in this tradition these particular physical effects of emotion are observed and handled in this particular way does afford some clues to the attitudes of the societies in whose poetry these effects were observed.

In collecting examples from tragedy of physical effects of emotion I am using literary compositions as evidence for the experience of such phenomena in the society that produced the tragedies. I should like them to be considered as evidence only for fifth century observations on the pathology of body and mind, not for fifth century clinical facts. It may be clinically valuable to discover in the fifth century apparently accurate poetic descriptions of pathological conditions observable today; and this may in turn be useful one day to psychoanalytically-oriented historians. But I am interested here only in the ingredients of fifth century poetic language and imagery as clues to the imagination and beliefs of this society. The way chosen by these 3 poets to describe the body's reactions to emotion, and the ways they choose to present this to outside observers, (both audience and other characters in the drama), is important to a study that deals with their conceptions of the processes of the human mind. It is particularly important in drama; and in a kind of drama enacted under physical conditions which prevented the audience from receiving detailed physical details of the actor's changes in appearance. This is one of the reasons why descriptions of a character's appearance, especially facial changes, were guide-lines, as necessary to the audience, as were expressions of his mental state: they could see neither for themselves (25).

(iii) Abnormal violence and loss of rhythm in physical effects of emotion

The most violent examples of physical effects of emotion occur in fits of madness. Such a fit in tragedy 'often begins with violent head-tossing'(26) as Heracles, HF 867 ἦν ἰδού· καὶ δὴ ταράσσει κρᾶτα βαλβίδων ἄπο and Orestes, IT 282 ἔστη κάρα τε διετίναξ' ἄνω κάτω. A madman leaps around, Tro. 1205-6 ἔμπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοσε πηδῶσι. Electra tries to stop Orestes from doing this as his fit begins, Or. 263

σχήσω σε πηδᾶν δυστυχῆ πηδήματα

These unpredictable leaping movements are often associated with aggressive actions, e.g. HF 836 παιδοκτόνους / φρενῶν ταραγμοὺς καὶ ποδῶν σκιρτήματα. Ajax, Orestes and Heracles try to pursue and kill. Orestes and Heracles demand their bows, Or. 268f, HF 942; Ajax, and Orestes in IT, kill with a sword, Aj. 10, IT 297f; Agave kills with her bare hands, Ba. 1206, 1209, 1237. The mad are feared for their abnormal strength: this is why Odysseus fears Ajax, Aj. 81-2:

ΑΘ. μεμηνότ' ἄνδρα περιφανῶς οἰκεῖς ἰδεῖν;

Οδ. φρονοῦντα γάρ νιν οὐκ ἂν ἐξέστην ὅκνῳ.

These leaps can be fugitive as well as aggressive. Io tries to escape the gadfly, PV 675 μύωπι χριστὸς ἐμμανεῖ σκιρτήματι / ἧσσον, as Orestes tries to escape the Erinyes, Or. 257-263. The physical wanderings of the mad, reflected in descriptions of their mental condition, are portrayed on a large scale and a small. Io leaps and whirls around the stage to escape when the fit comes upon her, for the attack makes her rush around, PV 596 μαραίνει με χρίουσα κέντροισι φοιταλέοισι (compare PV 589 οἰστροδινήτου κόρης) as Ajax leaps on the plain, Aj. 30 πηδῶντα πεδία, in his madness, 59 φοιτῶντ' ἄνδρα μανίασιν νόσοις. But like Orestes who twists to escape and pursue the Erinyes (27) and

wanders around in his madness, IT 284 μανίαις ἀλαίνων,

Io is a large-scale wanderer over the world as well. Much of the 'Prometheus' is devoted to a catalogue of her wanderings (28). The double scale of mad wanderings is reflected in the behaviour of the maenads who inhabit anyway the uncultivated areas, woods and mountains, but also perform wild twisting movements when the dancing fit comes on them

Ba. 569 εἱλισσομένας Μαινάδας,

Ba 162 f φοιτάσιν εἰς ὄρος εἰς ὄρος . . .

κῶλον ἄγει ταχύπουν σκιρτήμασι βάκχα (29).

Heracles' actions (he performs a deluded chariot journey) are described as wandering (though πλαγχθείς here may be purely metaphorical), HF 1189

μαινομένῳ πτώλῳ πλαγχθείς.

This expression introduces a word of large importance to the whole subject of physical reactions to emotion. Wilamowitz (ad HF 816) described πίτυλος as a rhythm of disharmony. Barrett disagree with this interpretation and, citing the use of this word in contexts of rowing, suggests that in Hipp. 1464 it refers to regular onsets of weeping, πολλῶν δακρύων ἔστα πίτυλος. The regularity of the beating noise this word describes is an old problem, and commentators add to the literature on it in every text where it occurs (30). It must refer to rhythmical beating in passages concerned with sailing and also mourning, as

Tro. 1236 ἄραστ' ἄραστε κρᾶτα
πιτύλους διδοῦσα χειρός.

But in passages which concern emotion and weeping it seems to me unlikely that it retains this regularity. Emotion occurs (31) sporadically and violently:

IT 307 πίπτει δὲ μανίας πίτυλον ὁ ξένος μεθείς,

HF 816 ἆρ' ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν πίτυλον ἥκομεν φόβου.

Hence the prayer to Eros, Hipp. 528-9, is a prayer for a more controllable, rhythmic onset of this emotion μή μοί ποτε σὺν κακῷ φανείης
μηδ' ἄρρυθμος ἔλθοις.

Tears, originally involuntary, are formalized as a part of mourning (v. below, p.181f); So are the beating movements of the hands. Like the rest of the mourning ritual πίτυλος χειρός provide a way of coping with the emotion by imposing on it a particular rhythm and form. The frightening aspect of madness and emotion is the unrhythmical nature of the attacks and the actions they produce. The blows of μανία PV 877-8 are as irregular and convulsive as Io's reaction to them,

ὑπό μ' αὖ σφάκελος καὶ φρενοπλῆγες
μανίας θάλπους.

It is in deadly irony that Lyssa uses a dancing image, implying regular rhythm, for her attack on Heracles, HF 878 μανίαισιν λύσσαις

χορευθέντ' ἐναύλοις,

an irony that reappears in the 'music non-music' and the 'dances' of Ares, eg Phoen. 790 αἵματι Θήβας

πῶμον ἀναυλότατον προχορεύεις.

For the absence of music means the absence of real rhythm and control: HF 891

κατέχεται χόρευμα τυμπάνων ἄτερ.

The irregular wildness of a madman's bodily movements is reflected in other aspects of his appearance. Orestes' hair is matted and wild, Or 387

ὡς ἠγρίωσαι πλόκαμον αὐχμηρόν (cf ibid. 223):

a contrast to the attractive flowing locks often mentioned in rhythmical dances of joy (often Dionysiac). Cropped, uncared-for hair is a sign of mourning (32). When Menelaus sees his nephew in this state he asks, Or. 395 τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; πῆς σ' ἀπολλύσιν νόσος;

The nosos, which affects his body is wild, Or 34f

ἀγρίᾳ συντακεὶς νόσῳ δέμας.

Hair is a common mark of wild emotion, but physical signs of a dangerous

wildness in the mind are usually focussed on the face, and especially the eyes: HF 990 ὁ δ' ἀγρίωπον ὄμμα Γοργόνος στρέφων.

The nurse fears for Medea's children because she has seen Medea's eyes as she looks at them, Med. 91f

καὶ μή πέλαζε μητρὶ δυσθυμουμένῃ·
ἤδη γὰρ εἶδον ὄμμα νιν ταυρουμένην
τοῖσδ', ὡς τι δράσειόυσαν (33).

The eye is used as a true indication of the emotion and intention in the mind. The twisting, rolling eye is often an indication of madness: the off-course element in the movements of the mad wanderer resembles the movement of his eyes, which twist away, do not look <u>straight</u> ahead (34).

PV 882 τροχοδινεῖται δ' ὄμμαθ' ἑλίγδην

HF 868 διαστρόφους ἑλίσσει σίγα γοργωπούς κόρας.

Ba. 1123 διαστρόφους κόρας ἑλίσσουσ'.

This is the first sign of madness at Or. 283 ὄμμα σὸν ταράσσεται, and is essentially a wild movement, HF 990 ἀγριωπὸν ὄμμα suggesting a wild animal or daemon, the bull or the Gorgon (35). The wild rolling eyes of madness are often bloodshot, HF 933-4

ἐν στραίοιν ὀμμάτων ἐφθαρμένος
ἕρζας τ' ἐν ὄσσοις αἱματῶπας ἐκβαλών.

The chorus at Ag.1428 see Clytemnestra's bloodshot eye as a symptom of madness: λίβος ἐπ' ὀμμάτων αἵματος ἐμπίπτει (36).

Like the eyes of the Erinyes, the eyes of the mad drip liquid (37): Or.220 στόματος ἀφρώδη πέλανον ὀμμάτων τ' ἐμῶν.

The importance of the eye in Greek thought as a gauge for emotion and temperament cannot be overstressed. It is reflected in the many compound adjectives describing mood and character, -οψ, -ωπις.

Many passages in tragedy refer to the evaluation of temper through the eyes eg

E.Phoen. 1333 τὸ μὲν σημεῖον εἰσορᾷς τόδε
σκυθρωποῦ ὄμμα καὶ πρόσωπον ἀγγέλου,
Alc. 773 τί δεμνὸν καὶ πεφρουτικὸς βλέπεις;
Alc. 778 στυγνῷ προσώπῳ καὶ συνωφρυωμένῳ /δέχῃ.

Phaedra fears Theseus will read what she has done in her face, Hipp. 280
εἰς πρόσωπον οὐ τεκμαίρεται βλέπων;

The whirling eyes of madness reflect the whirling of the whole body (v. Page ad Med. 1174f);

Cho. 1022 ἡλιοστρόφου δρόμου ἐξωτέρω
Cho. 1051 τίνες σε δόξαι .. στρεβοῦσιν;
Ag. 1215 ὑπ' αὖ με δεινὸς .. πόνος στρεβεῖ ..
Ba. 569 εἰλισσομένας Μαινάδας,

and are associated with another characteristic of mad movements: high speed: Or. 836

Εὐμενίδες, θέαμα, φόνου
δρομάδες, δινεύων βλεφάροις.

Cassandra in her frenzy enters running, Troades 307
μαινὰς θοάζει δεῦρο κασάνδρα δρόμῳ.

Orestes, furious at Helen's escape, enters running after the Phrygian slave.

Or. 1505 ἐπτοημένῳ ποδί Compare Ba. 864f:
πόδ' ἀναβακχεύουσα δέραν/εἰς αἰθέρα δροσερὸν εἴπους! (38).

Animals react in the same way: horses run and twist in fear, Phoen. 1125
πῶλοι δρομάδες ἐσκίρτων φόβῳ,
εὖ πως στρόφιγξιν ἔνδοθεν κυκλούμεναι
. . . ὥστε μαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν.

A wild grief makes Jocasta rush off the stage once she has realized the truth, OT 1073-4
π' ποτε βέβηκεν, Οἰδίπους, ὑπ' ἀγρίας
ἄξασα λύσσης ἡ γυνή;

Other movements, less violent, of the whole body include shuddering and trembling. Shuddering is usually the product of fear, eg Hipp. 855
τὸ δ' εἶτ' ἐπ' ὦδε πῆμα φρίσσω πάλαι,

but once of joy, Aj. 693 ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι (39).

But real trembling is almost exclusively associated with fear (40). Orestes trembles in madness (41), but his madness is mixed with fear, real or imagined.

Sweating, is another sign of strong emotion, though a sign difficult to establish, since strong emotion so often causes violent physical movement. Anger, for instance, can cause sweat, Ba. 620 θυμὸν ἐκπνεόντων, ἱδρῶτα σώματος στάζων ἄπο. Wine, of course, heats the body also, Alc. 758:

ἐθέρμην' αὐτὸν ἀμφιβᾶσα φλὸξ
οἴνου.

Sweating is related to body temperature and when this is mentioned, it usually has extra more important metaphorical implications, eg in Ant. 88

θερμὴν ἐπὶ ψυχροῖσι καρδίαν ἔχεις

or E.El. 407 χαρᾷ θερμαινόμεσθα καρδίαν.

The implication, however of Aj. 221 ἀνδρὸς αἰθόνος is that Ajax when mad is 'heated' (42).

Colour changes, visible mostly in the face, are signs of strong emotion: Ant. 528f αἱματόεν ῥέθος where Jebb compares E. Phoen. 1487:

τὸν ὑπὸ βλεφάροις φοίνικ', ἐρύθημα προσώπου.

Flushing became associated with love in later poetry, eg Theoc. 20.116

χροιὰ φοινίχθην.

Pallor is associated mostly with fear, eg A Supp. 586 χλωρᾷ δείματι, as in Homer (43), but also grief, Trach. 847 δεινῶν χλωρὰν πέτρει δακρύων ἄχναν. (For the wider implications of pallor in mourning v. below, (b), pp. 178, 180.) A sudden change of colour may be a mark of pain and disease, as when a poison begins to work, Med. 1168 χροιὰν ... ἀλλάξασα, but it also marks an access of emotion:

Oedipus' sons might be expected to change colour when they meet in battle. Their failure to do this marks their determination and lack of feeling for each other, Phoen. 1246

ἔστὰν δὲ λαμπρὼ χρῶμά τ' οὐκ ἠλλαξάτην.

Electra in the flush of excitement at Helen's presumed murder tells the chorus not to betray/in emotion their eyes or in their colour which could warn the next victim, Or. 1317-8 πάλιν καθόσμηθ' ἡσύχῳ πεὐ ὄμματι, χρόᾳ δ' ἀδήλῳ τῶν δεδραμένων πέρι.

The mouth gives other signs of emotion and madness. Frothing at the mouth is a common symptom of madness,

HF 934 ἀφρὸν κατέσταζ' εὐτρίχου γενειάδος

Or. 219 στόματος ἀφρώδη

IT 308 σταζων ἀφρῷ γένειον,

Ba. 1122 ἡ δ' ἀφρὸν ἐξιεῖσα.

Rapid breathing is another result of strong emotion; it marks the onset of Heracles' fit HF 868 ἀμπνοὰς δ' οὐ σωφρονίζει

and Orestes when he gains sanity wonders at his breathing, Or. 278

πνεῦμ' ἀνεὶς ἐκ πνευμόνων

(though this may be due to his exertions during the fit). Rage, particularly battle rage, is marked by particular breathing, eg S.El. 610 θρῴ μένος πνέουσαν (44).

These phrases show the external observer deducing the emotion from the breathing. The [illegible] Ways of breathing can describe [illegible] metaphorically a mental/or moral attitude, eg E.Andr. 189 πνέοντες μέγαλα. Pindar is especially fond of these, eg P. 11.30 χαμηλὰ πνέων.

The mouth produces wild cries and occasionally laughter as outward results of strong emotion. Laughter is not common: it appears only in Heracles' fit, HF 935 ἔλεξε δ' ἅμα γέλωτι, παραπεπληγμένῳ. It may however be related to the deluded pleasures. Ajax, heracles and Agave are triumphantly delighted at having killed their enemies. Orestes when he thinks the Erinyes are frightened of him cries out ἀ ἀ Or. 275.

Cassandra encourages her mother, Tro. 332f, to dance and celebrate her

wedding, and describes herself and her song as blessed,

312 μακαρία δ' ἐγὼ βασιλικοῖς λεκτροῖς ,

336 μακαρίαις ἀοιδαῖς .

Philoctetes shouts out, either at the climax of his pain or at the μερίμνημα

Phil. 187, βοᾷ as Oedipus does on blinding himself, demanding

the doors to be opened, OT 1237 βοᾷ διοίγειν κλῆθρα

The noise of maddened or terrified people is loud and savage. The roars of Heracles, HF 869f ταῦρος ὡς ἐς ἐμβολὴν

~~are as fearful as the bull-glare of Medea.~~ δεινὸς μυκᾶται δὲ κῆρυξ ἀναλκιῶν,

are as fearful as the bull-glare of Medea.

The panic of the chorus in the 'Septem' is expressed loudly and wildly, and reflects the battle that causes their fear. They announce their intention of making a loud noise as they enter, Sept.78 θρεῦμαι φοβερὰ μεγάλ' ἀχή

and Eteocles describes their noise, Sept. 186, as αὐσιν, λακάζειν, σωφρόνων μοῦμματα. Their song is marked by wild cries and exclamations, as ὀὀ

88, ἰώ 97, and ε ε ε ε 150 and 158 (45). Such cries seem to follow the word that contains the focus of the emotion: so the chorus in the 'Supplices' cries twice, ἀνδρῶν ε ε

A.Supp. 142, 152. The cries of this chorus, described by the herald, 872, ἴυζε καὶ λάκαζε are marked by what Tucker (approved by Page) described as a gurges vasta of sense and nonsense in the text, including such exclamations as 825 ο ο ο ἀ ἀ ἀ

The exclamation οτοτοτοτοῖ in different lengths and spellings occurs only in tragedy and marks passionate grief or fear (46). In madness, Io as well as crying ἀ ἀ ε ε 560, cries ἐλελεῦ ἐλελεῦ 877, and another noise, which has caused chaos in the text, 567, ἰλλεύ ἀ δ ἀ (47). Prometheus, when asked if he hears her φθέγμα replies, 589 πῶς δ' οὐ κλύω τῆς οἰστροδινήτου κόρης ;

Also in madness, Ajax is reported to cry out terrible words, 243-4

κακὰ δεινάζων ῥήγματ' ἀ δαίμων
κοὐδεὶς ἀνδρῶν ἐδίδαξεν.

The fantasy that strange, babbling, wild words are spoken not by the man himself but are learnt or perhaps actually spoken by a possessing daemon, is reflected in phrases such as 'not himself', HF 932 σ' δ' οὐκέθ' αὑτὸς ἦν (cf Ajax, who ἔκτος - δρμᾶσθαι Aj. 640). It is related to features of mantic frenzy and possession, Ba. 239

ὅταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸ σῶμ' ἔλθῃ πολύς,
λέγειν τὸ μέλλον τοὺς μεμηνότας ποιεῖ (48)

The different meaningless cries uttered at times of great emotion (usually grief and terror) are normally found in lyric passages. Single exclamations can be found in iambics, though, and usually mark the change of emotion on part of one or several characters. Phaedra when her love comes on her begins to groan, Hipp. 38 στένουσα κἀπεπλήγμένος κέντρους ἔρωτος and so does Orestes at the beginning of his madness, Or. 283 ἀπεστέναξεν. He marks the end of his madness with an interjection, ἔα 277. This resembles the famous ἀ of Dionysus, Ba. 810, which, as many commentators have remarked, is the turning point of emotion in this scene.

Jerkiness, choppiness, and violent speed characterize the metrical, grammatical and intellectual structure of the speech of characters suffering intense emotion (49). They often use short words, and repeat them, or use words so similar they sound like a repeat. So Cassandra, Tro. 308f

ἄνεχε πάρεχε φῶς φέρε· σέβω φλέγω·
ἰδοὺ ἰδού.

Often the word repeated is the word that pinpoints the pain. Hippolytus dying in agony cries 1371 νῦν ὀδύνα μ' ὀδύνα βαίνει (compare also the physical agony Phil. 943-4 διέρχεται διέρχεται), and Oedipus emphasizes both the horror of his sufferings and the fact that they are his, OT 1330 ὦ κακὰ κακὰ πεπλῶν ἐμὰ τάδ' ἐμὰ πάθεα.

It is a common feature of choral lyric, usually in sorrow and horror: Phoen. 1030 (to the sphinx) ἔψεσ ἔψερες ἄχεα πατρίδι φόνια Phoen. 1350 ἀνάγετ' ἀνάγετε πωκυπόν. But it can also express intense joy too, Trach. 221 ἴδε ἴδ, ὦ φίλα γύναι (50).

The question of the different overtones of the different words that mean 'shout' and 'cry' is impossible to answer satisfactorily. Most cries in tragedy are, anyway, loud and piercing, ὀξυτόνων γόων (S.El. 243 and elsewhere). I suspect that behind the distinctions between the different words there lie concealed distinctions of tone, pitch and volume, and, above all, rhythm: but these are irrecoverable.

The movement and noise of a tragic character suffering madness or intense emotion are characteristically violent and unpredictable, wild as an animal, dangerous as a daemon. His body changes rapidly from its normal state: one recalls the advice of the Hippocratic doctors in physical disease; to record in physical appearance and movement every departure from normal physical habit and appearance. His body may twist, tremble, sweat and change colour. He performs aggressive actions he would avoid in his right mind: he utters wild cries, often meaningless. All these can be also symptoms of physical 'nosoi', and it is another mark of the close relation between the 'straight' and metaphorical uses of 'noses' that physical 'nosoi' produce the same effect as emotion and madness, so often called 'nosoi' by the poets (51).

The material given above may not seem very surprising or important. Certain cross-cultural physiological phenomena we have in common with the Greeks: what is so odd and worth remark about flushing, sweating or trembling in emotion? I have included it because this type of reaction belongs in the whole cluster of beliefs and observations concerning the

the whole cluster of beliefs and observations concerning the mind and body, and human reactions to emotion, and because it affected some kinds of imagery. It is obvious, for instance, that there are close correspondences between the activity of the body in emotion, as illustrated in the present chapter, and the imagined movement of his mind, illustrated in chapter 1 above. The leaping, wandering and trembling of the body in emotion and madness corresponds to the shaking and trembling of the mind (chapter 1 p. 11f). Flushing and sweating correspond to pictures of the mind inflamed and moist, (chapter 1 above, pp. 21f). For the restless speed of the man emotionally upset, compared to the flight of wings, compare the image of flying in the mind (chapter 1, pp. 35f). Obviously, a transference of physical qualities to mental fantasies of the sufferer has been made: a transference similar to the 'projection' mechanism which transferred properties of the frightened mind on to the daemons and emotions that attack it (chapter 3). Properties of the body in its reactions to mental pain have been transferred to the organs that were thought to be the centre of mental functioning. This must have happened at a very early stage, and the same mechanism of transference was invoked at each stage in the development of theories about these organs.

I have called the reactions described above 'involuntary'. They are presented as outside the control of the sufferer. Madness, of course, is openly shown to be outside his control (52). The lack of control demonstrated in the activity of emotionally overwhelmed people is incomprehensible, distasteful and frightening to observers. Eteocles, for instance, calls the panicking howls of the chorus ὠμοφόρων μυγήματα Sept. 186. The chorus of the 'Hippolytus', faced with the physical results of Phaedra's love, can only refer it to possession by some daemon, Hipp. 141f. Any emotion, after a certain pitch of intensity, may have the same effect as madness, extreme physical pain, or excess of wine: it removes the normal judgement of the sufferer, and this affects his

physical action. This observation has important consequences when we come to consider not physical activity but decisive physical action which affects the plot. The borderline perhaps is instanced by two actions [illegible] in the 'Phoenissae' that are called responsible for the most of the misfortunes as we see them in this play: the begetting of Oedipus by Laius and the cursing of his own sons by Oedipus. Laius was acting under the influence of drink and lust:

ὁ δ' ἡδονῇ δοὺς ἐς τε βακχείαν πεσὼν
ἔσπειρεν ἡμῖν παῖδα (53).

Oedipus after the mental agony of discovery and the physical agony of his blinding is 'sick at his fate', and in this condition pronounces his curse, πρὸς δὲ τῆς τύχης νοσῶν
ἀρὰς ἀρᾶται παισὶν ἀνοσιωτάτας 66.

How far we should see these actions as 'involuntary' in the eyes of the poet, is the central question of chapter 5 below.

There is one further point about the physical reactions discussed in this section. The kind of reaction described here is violent and rapid. Violent speed is often conveyed in Greek by a metaphor of flying (54) and the violent physical reactions to mental pain are quite commonly characterized by such a metaphor. Hands outstretched in terror are χεῖρας ἐπτομένας Tro. 559; Pentheus enters in a rage, and an observer remarks ὡς ἐπτόηται Ba. 214; Orestes enters in murderous rage ἐπτομένῳ ποδί Or.1595; Paris' lust makes him 'fly' Ἔρως δ' αὖτοὺς ἐπτοάθης IA 586. The image was important also in pictures of the mental organs distressed (55). Agave, for instance, when still mad has 'the flying element in her soul', τὸ δὲ πτοηθὲν τόδ' ἔτι ἐν ψυχῇ παρά Ba. 1268. It may not be accident that one formulation of a wish to escape severe mental

pain or the situation that produces it is the topos, 'Would that I had wings to fly away', The most common type of wish expressed by a sufferer (Heracles, Oedipus, etc) is the form ποῖ τραπῶμαι : the first thought of physical action is a wish to excape (55). After this question, one very common suggestion is the wish for wings that will carry the sufferer out of the painful situation and away from his mental sufferings. So Polymestor, when he emerges blinded after Hecuba has murdered his sons, Hec. 1098f

δεινά
δεινά πεπόνθαμεν·
ὤμοι ἐμᾶς λώβας.
ποῖ τραπῶμαι, ποῖ πορευθῶ;
ἁμπτάμενος οὐράνιον
ὑψιπετὴς εἰς μέλαθρον
Ἅλιος ἢ Σείριος ἔνθα πυρὸς φλογέας ἀφίη-
σιν ὄσσων αὐγάς...

There need be no fixed or conscious correspondence between the flying image used to characterize violent physical effects of emotion and this topical wish for wings to escape painful emotion and situations. But, the power of this wish-formulation and its popularity may be due partly to the general tendency to see physical reaction to mental pain in such terms. Polymestor elaborates his fantasy with details beautifully chosen to express the violence of the image and the focus of his agony: the burning rays resemble the hot flush of emotion in the body (eg above p. 157) and in the mind (above pp. 21f, 102f). And they shoot from the eyes of Sirius and Orion, πυρὸς φλογέας ἀφίησιν .. αὐγάς, like weapons of the gods. I pointed above (chapter 2 pp. 1, 88f) to the demonic wings that represent and augment the danger daemons offer humanity. Violence from the air, which man cannot conquer except in thought (57) is the danger to which man is

most vulnerable: the violence and speed of the daemons is increased by their flight: and the violence of the suffering mind is enhanced by metaphorical wings.

I would relate the lack of rhythm and the violence, which alike characterize Greek conceptions of the suffering mind and the extra-human sources of its suffering to the Greek reverence and wish for rhythm and harmony that permeate all areas of Greek theory and art. In medical theory, health is a ἁρμονία or κρᾶσις ; in personal life due measure is one of the perequisites of happiness, βίου συμμέτρησις Democr. 191, as in political life (58), (v Arist. de Anim. a.4.407b 27)). The musical imagery of concepts such as ἁρμονία, μέτρον and perhaps ἰσονομία is not accidental in Greek. We have no equivalent ethical associations to the two elements of music, harmony and rhythm, such as deminated Greek education and imagination (59). Thethe chorus of Sophocles, Electra's excessive grief is unrhythmical and unhealthy. Normal mourning, being ritualized, is given a musical and rhythmical form, it has limits and measure: the strophic parados, S.El. 121f, is a rhythmic contrast to her astrophic lyrics that precede it. Their reaction to her is set in these terms, 140:

ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν μειρίων ἐπ' ἀμήχανον
ἄλγος ἀεί στενάχουσα διόλλυσαι.

Electra accepts their terminology, 231-2

οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκ καμάτων ἀποπαύσομαι
ἀνάριθμος ὧδε θρήνων.

Euripides in the equivalent place makes Electra refuse the chorus invitation to join a dance.

The formal elements of tragedy, structure and music, are seen as an important part of tragedy's emotional effect on the audience: seen so by Aristotle, at least (60). It is the ordered emotions, or, more precisely, the ordering of them, that the audience of a tragedy is invited to share.

iv) Two forms of attempt to reduce the violence of motion

In this section I suggest that pattern may be imposed on unacceptably powerful emotion by two forms of identification. The suffering individual can withdraw from the normal aspects of being a human being by resembling the dead he is mourning. Mourning is, after all, a rite de passage both for the dead and for the bereaved (61), and the mourner has more in common with the person he has lost than with any other person. This state leads to mitigation of the emotion, since the dead proverbially cannot feel. The other possibility, and we find this with expressions of joy as well as grief, is that the individual may identify with the group, and the patterned, rhythmical and shared group expression of the emotion diffuses it and gives it an acceptable form. If this schema is too rigid and abstract a vehicle for the presentation of the following material, I hope that the substance of the material itself may not be invalidated by the structure. But such a structure does place this ceremony of mourning in the long-established pattern of Van Gennep's rites de passage, 'séparation, marge, et agrégation': separation (by symbolic death), transition, and incorporation into the group.

(iv) (a) Mourning and withdrawal: identification with the dead

οἴμοι, τί δράσω; ποῖ κακῶν ἔρημίαν
εὑρώ, πτερωτὸς ἢ κατὰ χθονὸς μολών; HF 1157-8

The other medium, the alternative to the upper air, which offers a symbolic refuge from the intensity of emotion, is the earth. This is Polymestor's other hope, Hec. 1104: ἢ τὸν ἐς Ἅιδα
μελάγχρωτα πορθμὸν ἄξω πάλας;
The double-barrelled escape-wish is often expressed, particularly in Euripides (62), and neatly symbolizes the wish for mental anaesthesia by withdrawal from the painful emotion. I would suggest that, particularly in the mourning ritual, the wish to dive below the earth involves the rejection of the properties of a living man, the wish to resemble the dead in their lack of sensation. Isolated sufferers from painful emotion refuse some of the attributes of the living: Phaedra, Orestes, Medea and Hecuba refuse to eat, wash or speak. Oedipus goes further: he refuses sight, and expresses a wish to block his ears as well, and Menelaus mourning the loss of Helen has 'lifeless' eyes. As Orestes says

ἀνώδυνος γὰρ οὖν
... δάκνει βροτούς (63)

The dead have no pain,
Tro. 605f ὁ θανὼν δ' ἔπ-
λαθεται ἀλγέων [ἀλάκητος]
because they cannot feel, Tro. 538 ἀλγεῖ γὰρ οὐδεὶς τῶν κακῶν ἡδυμένος. (64). The fact that one is hurt through one's feelings by attachment to other people is often observed in tragedy: throughout 'Phoenissae', for example, the chorus comment on the fact that Jocasta's sufferings are due to her love for her children. The nurse in 'Hippolytus' advises a μέτρια φιλία (65). Humble characters in tragedy, people outside the

main action, often voice the hope that all things in life, including the affections, will come to them at only medium strength:

χρὴ γὰρ μετρίας εἰς ἀλλήλους
φιλίας ὀνητοὺς κἀνακίρνασθαι
καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἄκρον μυελὸν ψυχῆς
εὐλυτα δ' εἶναι στέργηθρα φρενῶν
ἀπό τ' ὠδᾶσθαι καὶ ξυντείνειν. Hipp. 253f.

The wish to reject the touch of mental pain, imaged so often by the attack of weapons or animals on the physical organs of the mind, is represented by the rejection of the physical senses and the channels through which these weapons pass from the reality of the outside world into the human body (66). In mourning, identification with the dead, like the literary expression of the wish to escape painful emotion by driving below the earth, is a symbolic rejection of the normal functions of living man

Other intense emotions related to grief make their victims behave in ways appropriate to the mourning rites. Medea's emotions are anger (and the attendant range, jealousy, shame, hatred, fear); she is ἡ δύστηνος ἠτιμασμένη She shows her feelings by refusing food, by lying prone on the ground, 'abandoning her body to pain', Med. 24 κεῖται δ' ἄσιτος, σῶμ' ὑφεῖσ' ἀλγηδόσι. Love has the same effect on Phaedra, (Hipp. 138, 277)

Orestes refuses all food after his mother's murder, Or. 41-2, and so does Ajax after his madness, Aj. 323-4.

νῦν δ' ἐν τοιᾷδε κείμενος κακῇ τύχῃ
ἄσιτος ἀνήρ, ἄποτος.

People making this type of physical reaction to emotion often refuse

καὶ τὸν μὲν ἔστο

to talk also, Aj. 311 λιπλείστον ἄφθογγος χρόνον. The deep silence of intense emotion, obviously an extremely powerful dramatic weapon on stage and off, was exploited by Aeschylus (67) and reappears in different ways in his successors. Hecuba sinks silent to the ground as Cassandra is led away, Tro. 463 ἄναυδος εἰς πέδον πίτνει. Electra is silent when she hears of the Argive sentence on her and her brother, Or. 957-8

ὦ δυστάλαινα παρθένε, ὡς ξυνωρεφὲς
πρόσωπον εἰς γῆν σὸν βαλοῦσ' ἄφθογγος εἶ.

The suggestion that speechlessness was felt to represent at one level an attribute of the dead is supported by the behaviour of Alcestis. For three days after her return from death she remains speechless, Alc 1143.

Very often the person in mental pain who is refusing food and speech will lie on the ground or hang his head towards it. This again suggests the position of the dead. Orestes, Phaedra and Hecuba (68), for example, lie on the ground in anguish, their bodies wasted and faint. The head hanging, the eyes looking at the ground, is a reaction to grief, anger, longing or shame, eg Hipp. 246

ἐπ' αἰσχύνην ὄμμα τέτραπται.

It also marks hostility to the person not looked at: Antigone looks at the ground when brought before Creon, Ant. 441

οὐδ', οὐδὲ τὴν νεύουσαν εἰς πέδον κάρα

and Jason's bride veils her eyes when approached by Medea's children, Med. 1147-50

ἔπειτα μέντοι προὐκαλύψατ' ὄμματα
λευκήν τ' ἀπέστρεψ' ἔμπαλιν παρηίδα,
παίδων μυσαχθεῖσ' εἰσόδους (69).

The body of a person reacting like this becomes, not unnaturally, wasted and feeble; but it is not only to the lack of physical care and

food that the wasting process is attributed, but to the emotion itself. Orested' body is wasted by his 'sickness': Or. 34f ἀγρίᾳ συντακεὶς νόσῳ δέμας and even tears, the physical symptom of grief, are responsible for the wasting process, eg Med. 25 τὸν πάντα συντήκουσα δακρύοις (70). Neglect of the living body is expressed also in refusals to wash, eg Orestes at Or. 41-2. This refusal is clearly related to the habit of covering the body with dust, especially the head, as Hecuba does in grief

ἐπὶ χθονὶ / κεῖται, πόνει φύρουσα δύσμορον κάρα (71).

<u>Covering the head</u> with dust is an symbolic burial such as Antigone performs for Polyneices (Ant. 256, 409). It suggests that there is a buri symbolism also in the more common action of <u>veiling the head and body</u>. Hecuba with her head covered in dust is ξυγκεκυμμένη πέπλοις Hec. 437, in a swoon on the ground, 438. Heracles, having wakened to a sane knowled of his actions cries HF 1157f

ποῖ κακῶν ἐρημίαν
εὔρω πτερωτὸς ἢ κατὰ χθονὸς μολών;

He then stays silent, 1163-1229, with his head veiled. Theseus asks why his head is veiled and Amphitryon explains he is ashamed to expose his eyes to the eyes of friends, 1198f

Θη. τί μὴ πέπλοισιν ἄθλιον κρύπτει κάρα;
Αμ. αἰδόμενος τὸ σὸν βλέμμα
καὶ φιλίαν ὁρόφυλον...

He is entreated to unveil, 1204; ultimately Theseus performs this for him, and he does not want to expose his head to the sun, 1231

τί δῆτά μου κρᾶτ' ἀνεκάλυψας ἡλίῳ;

Andromache recalls her first moments of slavery when she veiled her head, Andr. 110 δουλοσύναν στυγερὰν ἀμφιβαλοῦσα κάρᾳ (72).

<u>Black robes</u> often feature in passages of mourning and sorrow in tragedy and are obviously related to the idea of the head veiled and covered in

dust: the symbolic covering of the mourner's body by the earth which drinks the blood and tears shed at the tomb (73). For the equation of black robes with the earth compare the skin and clothes of the Erinyes, who rise from the earth to do their work. Black robes do not mark mourning only: Jocasta wears them in sorrow, Phoen. 326.

This type of reaction to emotion is marked by a wish to withdraw, to retire into darkness, not to feel. Oedipus when he leaves the palace and is forced on stage at the end of the 'Phoenissae' comes out of the dark retirement he has inhabited since his disaster: σκοτίων ἐκ θαλάμων, 1541 The wish to resemble the dead is evident in mourning situations where the unfeeling lot of the dead is envied by the unhappy mourners still living. Andromache compares her fate unfavourably with that of dead Polyxena, Tro. 630

ὤλωλεν ὡς ὤλωλεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐμοῦ
ζώσης γ' ὀλωλεν εὐτυχεστέρᾳ πότμῳ.

It contributes also towards that ancient and favourite topos, 'Count no man happy until he is dead' (74).

There are other more active and positively destructive activities that accompany the expression of intense grief. The hands of the mourner beat violently on her head, breast, and at times the ground (75).

eg Tro. 794 τάδε σοι δίδομεν,
πλήγματα κρατὸς στέρνων τε κόπους.

Other acts, eg Tro. 794, of self-mutilation are performed involving the head and face: the women tear their cheeks with their nails. This is described in detail in many passages in tragedy, and the colour effect is often prominent: the red blood runs down the white skin, eg Or. 960f

κατέρχομαι στεναγμόν, ὦ Πειθοῖ, σὸν
πιθεῖσα λευκὸν ὄνυχα διὰ παρηίδων,
αἱματηρὸν ἄταν,
κτύπον τε κρατός, ὃν ἔλαχ' ἁ κατὰ χθονὸς
νερτέρων Περσέφασσα καλλίπαις θεά.
ἰαχείτω δὲ γᾶ Κυκλωπία,

στάξαν εἰπὶ κάρα πόθεια κούρειον,
πήματ' οἴκων.
ἕλσος ἕλσος ὅδ' ἔρχεται
τῶν θανουμένων ὕπερ...

The mourner's hair is cut: the locks, the blows, and the streaming blood from the body of the living person are a kind of gift to the dead (76). Cropping the hair disfigured the mourner; it was an indication of how deeply the mourner felt for the dead. Hence Electra's bitterness at Helen, σώζουσα κάλλος Or. 128-9, and Astyanax' childish promise to his grandmother, Tro. 1183

ἦ πολύ σοι βοστρύχων
πλόκαμον κεροῦμαι πρὸς τάφον.

Alexiou mentions evidence for this activity on vases; there is one vase where the hair is shown loosened at the roots as the woman pulls. Alexiou stresses the ritual element in these actions: 'The violent tearing of hair, face and clothes were not acts of uncontrolled grief, but part of the ritual indispensible to lamentation throughout antiquity' (77).

I shall consider aspects of thenecessity for this ritual in section (c). But first: what do these violent, self-destructive activities mean? Why are they necessary? If the more passive and self-hiding reactions to grief are behind the wish not to feel pain, in fact to die, it seems possible that these more violently self-destructive actions may contain this element too. Important and complicated rituals of course possess many different levels of significance in life: luckily in literature we are concerned in more limited terms with their place and meanings within the composition. Kurtz and Boardman warn us of the possibility that mourning activity as shown in tragedy may not correspond to contemporary practice: 'Tragedians concern themselves with death and funerary practice,

But we cannot always be certain whether the poet is describing contemporary practices or whether he is elevating them to heroic status' (78). The poets may be more interested in their own poetic tradition than in any other reality; so the significances proposed below for rituals as expressed in tragedy are offered in a literary sense as literary observations. They are part of a cluster of ideas about human behaviour which the language and structure of these plays reflect (or, perhaps, refract). Self-mutilation, black clothes and lamentation have occurred in many contexts and in many societies across the world and certainly they will have had an enormous number of meanings in fifth-century Athens alone (79). The significances picked up here could not be, possibly, the sole ones in the ritual itself, as practised in the society. But it seems to make literary sense in this particular genre.

Both self-concealing and self-mutilating activities in grief share, then a suggestion of the symbolic death and burial of the still living mourner; in effect a symbolic sacrifice of the living person to the dead. Human sacrifice is one motif, a rare one, of tragedy. Polyxena is slaughtered at the tomb of Achilles as his ghost demanded. She speaks of her body as a dedication to Hades, Hec. 368

Ἀΐδῃ προστιθεῖσ' ἐμὸν δέμας

and her blood is a drink both for the earth and for the dead man within it, 392-3 καὶ δισσὸν πῶμ' αἵματος χεύσεται
γαίᾳ νεκρῷ τε τῷδ' ἐξαιτουμένῳ .

Talthybius misleads Hecuba on purpose by telling her that Polyxena has been appointed as tomb servant to the dead Achilles, Tro. 263 τύμβῳ τέτακται προσπολεῖν Ἀχιλλέως .To minister to a tomb is a function required of the living by the dead: "The annual commemorative rites, if we may judge from the number of times they are mentioned in Classical literature, were

even more important than 'ta trita' and 'ta enata'. Assurance of proper performance of annual rites was reason enough for a man to adopt a son" (79). It is the job of the living relations to perform these rites: but there were also slaves and professionals, such as Talthybius intends Hecuba to imagine that Polyxena will be, who ministered to shrines. It is not straining interpretation to see some kind of link between the tending of such a tomb and the actual sacrifice of a live and related person (such as in other cultures (80)). Other human sacrifices in tragedy, eg Iphigeneia, are performed pro bono publico (81), not for a single dead person. There may linger, however, in the literary imagination some memory of historical human sacrifice at the individual tomb.

The possibility that there is one wish common to both reactions to grief, the wish to destroy oneself, to sacrifice one's living body to the dead, is reinforced by the kind of offerings made by the living mourners and the ways these are described in tragedy. Apart from the often-mentioned libations, and ritual food and drink (82), the mourners dedicated locks of their own hair, and wept their tears specifically over the grave: in this way parts of their own bodies became part of the offerings. E Elpenor's request to Odysseus, with which Alexiou begins her studies, begins with the demand not to be ἄκλαυτος:

μή μ' ἄκλαυτον ἄθαπτον ἰὼν ὀπίθεν καταλείπειν
νοσφισθείς, μή τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι Od. 11.72-3.

Tears are poured like a libation, Il. 1388, or like the flowing blood of the sacrificial victim. So Iphigeneia's blood flows down to the ground: and the mourners also produce blood by tearing their own cheeks (83). Alexiou found a clear example of the important physical communication between the dead and the living at Larisa in 1963: The mourning daughters 'let down their long hair and spread it upon her face (of their dead mother) They wept and lamented, first wetting her face with their tears, then

drying it with their hair' (84). Tears, blood and hair are the main physical link between the bodies of mourner and mourned, the dead and the would-be-dead.

It is probable that behind the wish expressed in tragedy for a state of non-feeling, and behind the form it takes in tragedy and ritual, a symbolic death manifested by wishes to dive into the earth and refusal of normal appetitive functions of living men, some historical cultural fact may lie. Mourners were polluted for a period of time (85). By this the bereaved family was set apart from the rest of the community. Such setting apart is an important motif in Greek thought, for exile, signifying wandering, uncertainty and homelessness, was equated with madness and was as terrible as death (86). Deprivation of society's protection and removal of social 'rights' was an extreme form of punishment at Athens (87). Anthropologists call a transitional period such as this mourning period a 'rite de passage', from which the mourners emerge as integrated members of the society. 'During mourning, the living mourners and the deceased constitute a special group, situated between the world of the living and the world of the dead' (88). Mourning ritual covers a period of transition for the dead man: he descends to Hades from the upper world, and the manner and effectiveness of descent is popularly supposed to depend on the activities of the relations he has left in the upper world. But it is also a period of transition for the relations . . The emphasis on the symbolic identification with the dead in the Greek mourning ritual suggests that by symbolic identification with the dead person - who cannot feel pain, mental or physical - the mourner is <u>helped</u> over the period of greatest grief. She mutilates herself, becoming physically as well as emotionally distinguished from the people around her: she covers

her face and body, imitating the concealment in the earth given to the dead; she offers to the dead parts of her own body as a sacrifice and a mark of her temporary identification with him. Every situation of this type in tragedy is different, and contains different reasons for the suffering person to express a wish to escape. But escape in this context really means escape from the emotion itself; this is assuaged in part by 'becoming' the dead person who cannot feel.

But an individual mourner also had access to another ritualized way of expressing her grief. By participating in formalized expressions of emotion by a group, the individual could mitigate by another type of identification the intensity of emotion.

iv (b) Identification with the group: public, shared, ritual expressions of emotion

Greek descriptions of mourning, from Homer onwards, bring out the importance of women in the ceremony, and the number of people involved. The structure of many laments, particularly the antiphonal, suggests the importance of group activity (89). These two are linked: women live in static groups in the home, and celebrate the festivals peculiar to them: so that groups of women engaged in peaceful domestic activities operate in Greek literature as a symbol of permanent peace, around which various topoi are woven (90). Woman is described in some passages as a creature who loves to mourn: Aj. 580 κάρτα τοι φιλοίκτιστον γυνή and this is demonstrated from the male viewpoint with the appropriate male reactions, most obviously A.Sept. 77-200. The whole society expects the women of the house to mourn the dead (eg Alc.106) though this does not mean the men do not mourn. (At Alc. 768, the male servant resents Heracles' demands, which have prevented him from following the funeral). Women take the larger and longer part of mourning. This is described in later Greek writers: Lucian, Περὶ Πένθους 12:

Οἰμωγαὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, καὶ κωκυτὸς γυναικῶν καὶ παρὰ πάντων δάκρυα καὶ στέρνα τυπτόμενα καὶ σπαραττομένη κόμη καὶ φοινισσόμεναι παρειαί.

The process of mourning is a relief; it obviously answers not only dramatic expectations but some other 'need' (91). The relief offered by mourning is sometimes expressed in tragedy; though not as often as the word 'commonplace', used by commentators on the relevant passages with reference to Wordworth, would imply (92). It is nearly always expressed by women: though Prometheus uses it he does so with reference to Io, PV 637-9

ὡς τἀποκλαῦσαι κἀποδύρασθαι τύχας
ἐντεῦθ', ὅπου μέλλοι τις οἴσεσθαι δάκρυ
πρὸς τῶν κλυόντων, ἀξίαν τρισβὴν ἔχει.

Apart from this Aeschylean use, the expression is only found unambiguously in Euripides, and it always refers to the sharing of the mourning process. Electra demands from the chorus, in whose friendship she has confidence, (Ψ.El. 175), and in whose communal activities she regrets she cannot join (178f), the 'pleasure of tears', El. 126

ἄναξ πολύδακρυν ἀδονάν

The Trojan women comment on the pleasure of tears when Hecuba and Andromache are sharing the lament for Hector, Tro. 608-9

ὡς ἡδὺ δάκρυα τοῖς κακῶς πεπραγόσι,
θρήνων τ' ὀδυρμοί μοῦσά θ' ἡ λύπας ἔχει.

Andromache in another play explains that this is the last pleasure a suffering woman can have, Andr. 93f:

ἐμπέφυκε γὰρ
γυναιξὶ τέρψις πῶν παρεστώτων κακῶν
ἀνὰ στόμ' ἀεὶ καὶ διὰ γλώσσης ἔχειν.

The idea that this is a <u>common</u> topos has been influenced by references to the pleasure in tears <u>of joy</u>: (94). The greater frequency of the statement in Euripides may be referred, perhaps, to the proverbial interest shown by this poet in the affairs of women. But it is also an Homeric echo. Aeschylus treats γόοι as the object of an <u>appetite</u>: A.Pers. 545 γόων ἀκορεστοτάτοις and in Homer a man may 'joy in' laments as he joys in food, Il. 23.98 ὀλοοῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο (95).

We may notice in extended examples of shared mourning how the interplay between the singers is explicitly related to words of giving

and receiving: the Persian Elders, for instance, 'give' their participation in the exchange to Xerxes, though they call it an 'unfortunate' gift: Pers. 1038f

Ξε. δίαινε δίαινε πῆμα, πρὸς δόμους δ' ἰέναι.
Χο. αἰαῖ αἰαῖ δύα δύα.
Ξε. βόα νυν ἀντίδουπά μοι.
Χο. δόσιν κακαὶ κακῶν κακοῖς
Ξε. ἴυζε μέλος ὁμοῦ πεθείς
Χο. ὀτοτοτοτοῖ.
βαρεῖά γ' ἅδε συμφορά.
οἰ, μάλα καὶ τόδ' ἀλγῶ.
Ξε. ἔρεσσ' ἔρεσσε καὶ στέναζ' ἐμαὶ χάριν.
Χο. δινέομαι γοεδνὸς ὤν.
Ξε. βόα νυν ἀντίδουπά μοι.
Χο. μέλειν πάρεστι, δέσποτα.

The chief sufferer requires of them certain actions, which they perform, including the echoed cries, ἀντίδουπα The play ends with their assurance that they will 'escort him with their wails'. It is an assurance of shared misfortune similar to that which ends the 'Prometheus'; compare the end of the 'Hippolytus' κοινὸν τόδ' ἄχος πᾶσι πολίταις (96).

Sharing of experience is a part, of the process of assuaging the emotion felt by an individual. The Sophoclean chorus first try to comfort Electra by reminding her that her sorrow is not hers alone: S.El.153

οὔτοι σοὶ μούνᾳ
τέκνον, ἄχος ἐφάνη βροτῶν,
πρός τ' οὐ πῶν ἔνδον εἶ περισσά,
οἷς ὁμόθεν εἶ καὶ γονᾷ ξύναιμος,
οἷά Χρυσόθεμις ζώει καὶ
Ἰφιάνασσα . . .

The comforting idea behind the ritual is the closeness of all people in suffering. The comfort is derived from the ritual in two ways: from the form of it, and from the experience of sharing it with others. The comfort of form is related to the desire for rhythm, harmony and pattern discussed above (97). The comfort of sharing an emotion has likewise a wider perspective in the traditional publicity of experience in Greek society. The Greek language, reflects the strong consciousness in this society of the regard of others, felt in every action, mood and experience: "It will have been noticed that in cases where a modern speaker would probably make some reference to good and bad conscience the Athenian tended instead to use expressions such as 'be seen to ...', 'be regarded as ...', and these expressions were also used where we would refer neither to conscience nor reputation, so that an Athenian's 'I wanted to be regarded as honest' is equivalent to our 'I wanted to be honest'". Associated with this consciousness of public regard is the competitive aspect of many areas of Greek life which included funeral observance (98). Mourners were aware of other people during their expressions of grief, who 'shared' by watching and judging.

The importance placed on friendship and its benefits throughout Greek poetry of all periods (99) is linked to two Greek concepts. One is the notion of the peer-group, so much more elegantly expressed in Greek by the word ἡλικία Aristotle and Plato both quote the proverb ἦλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει Friendship was regarded as the sharing of age: μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ συντρέφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἦλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα. Arist. EN 1161b34.

People who shared the same age were expected to share the same sorrows and joys: and Plato (Rep. 5) makes this the basis of an efficient and unified community. The other important idea was the ὁμοιότης principle, which underlies all ideas behind the concept of ἡλικία (100).

This raises, finally, the question of sympathy. The chorus in the 'Persae', in both 'Electra's and at the end of the 'Prometheus' are performing in a ritual or symbolic manner an act of sympathy, an acceptance in their share of individual sufferings. 'Greek tragedy is essentially a representation of human suffering, and of its causes and effects ... Within and without the play this suffering produces in humane characters or in humane spectators the feeling of sympathy for the sufferer' (101). Vickers makes the commendable assumption that the kind of sympathy, evaluation and reaction shown by characters in the play towards each other, must have some relation to the kind of emotional reaction expected from the audience towards the suffering characters on stage (102).

Individual actions as well as involuntary and ritual acts are regarded in tragedy some of the time as physical effects of mental interference. They must be considered in this light; but not wholly. If reactions to people shown on stage have some relation to reactions to individual actions in normal life, the practical significant possibility that their actions arise out of some individual 'character' may be imported from real life too. The difficult questions of choice, responsibility and character in tragedy are re-opened along with the problem of individual actions, and its genesis in, or outside, the mind.

Chapter Five

OUT OF THE MIND
(Action and character in tragedy)

"Εστιν οὐν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀγγελίας, ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαροιν.

Arist. Poet. 1449 B 21

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Chapter 5: introduction

Our thinking about Greek beliefs about the human mind has been dominated always by our attitude to Greek religion. The Greek picture of emotions approaching man from the outside, forcing him, as the gods force him, to act; and the Greek stress on reason as the only defence against these emotions, are linked in many ways to aspects of their Greek religion. The structures of their religion helped to develop, for instance, their emphasis on self-control, on the middleway, on the value of the man who is, literally, σω-φρων (1). Though E.R. Dodds corrected a tendency to treat a regard for 'the mean' as the main feature of Greek culture (2), tragedy, partly because tragedy presents extreme actions, does reflect such regard as an important element in general ideas of emotion and behaviour. Regard for the mean provides one resolution of the tension created out of the ideas discussed above, summed up best in the problem of character and individuality in tragedy (3). If the traditional imagery really reflects the shape of belief; if it suggests a belief in the extra-human source of human emotions which dominate human action: does this mean that the people who wrote, acted in and applauded the tragedies did not believe that human actions were freely chosen or were a useful guide to individual character? Of course not. Dover has suggested in his survey of popular morality that freedom of the will was not the central problem in Greek ethics that it is in post-Christian ethics (4). Though he illustrates from fourth-century rhetoric the common use of the belief that human action was directed by forces beyond human control, he also illustrates appraisal and judgement of human behaviour (5). The equivalent point is stressed by Easterling in relation to character in tragedy: the audience of a tragedy must have responded to the 'human intelligibility' of the characters portrayed by the actors. 'To say: "he behaves in this extraordinary way because a

daimon is at work in him", and assume that one has explained the oddity seems to me like saying, "I have broken my leg because I have fractured my femur", pretending that two ways of saying the same thing stand in a causal relation to one another' (6). One function of being human, taken for granted by the dramatist and presumably by his audience, is vulnerability to divinely-caused emotions and the suffering they precipitate; another is the necessity of coping with them in practical human living. We cannot treat this, as students of comparative religion might treat it, as a source of weakness created by the religion itself (7). The loose collection of personifications and beliefs, which represent Greek religion to us in tragedy, continued, through several different periods, to function as the religion of a series of remarkably efficient societies. It is one expression of the whole system of interlocking tendencies of thought which directed ways of ordering experience in those societies: a system also shown in their other institutions, most relevantly their language, imagery, forms of drama, and conventions of watching and judging other people (8). The picture of divine dominance over the human mind which is expressed in tragedy indirectly by images, directly by statements of belief, is expressed also in the structure of a tragedy: in the divine energy which directs the shape of the myth. The few explicity challenges to this view (9) reflect the human energy which interacts with the divine in shaping the myth and the action of the tragedy. In the myth and the language of a tragedy the divine is the basic source of human experience, but choice of an action, however unfairly forced on a man, is still human choice of a properly human act. The tension between the two is the basic source of tension in tragedy; Euripides' ability to explore more explicitly (though not perhaps more clearly) the implications of this tension is partly accounted for by his familiarity with the tradition of the genre he inherited (10).

So far I have concentrated on the nature of the divine influences on the human mind, rather than on ideas of human nature and personality: for the predominance of the divine influences is an important feature of fifth-century poetic language. But in this final chapter I shall consider fifth-century ideas about relations between people, about the effect they have on each other, and the way they judge each other's character through observing their words and actions. Brian Vickers, who also values Easterling's criterion of 'human intelligibility' in assessing the actions of tragedy, points out that the way people are shown judging each other in tragedy must have some relation to the ways they judged each other in contemporary society. So, although we must always allow for the distorting conventions of the genre, one may with caution take the ideas tragedy suggests about the ways people deduce internal thoughts and feelings from externally observed human actions, to represent some processes in the society itself (11). The action that betrayed the ἦθος of a man may have been due to δαίμων and this motif is elaborately explored in poetry; but in life and tragedy alike such action provided the only practical guide by which the character of the ἀνθρωπος also could be judged.

(i) Methods of assessing other people: the mirror of friendship

Characters in tragedy sometimes complain how difficult it is to assess the character of others: one reaches a true assessment only through ὁμιλία with the other, E. El. 383f,

οὐ μὴ φρονήσετ', οἱ κενῶν δοξασμάτων
πτήρεις πλανᾶσθε, τῇ δ' ὁμιλίᾳ βροτοὺς
κρίνεῖτε καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν τοὺς εὐγενεῖς·

Commentators here in elucidating ὁμιλία κρείττω refer to the ancient theme of 'like to like' in friendship (the earliest statements of which are found in Homer), and take the whole passage to mean 'a man is judged by the company he keeps' (12). This is a good fifth-century thought; but in fifth-century Greek ὁμιλία also refers to an abstraction, to the process of knowing and being with the companion, as much as to the companion himself (13). If we attach this perhaps more important sense to ὁμιλία in this passage, we arrive at the meaning: 'Judge men by intercourse with them and (find out) the noble ones by (observing) their morals': a comment which has more relevance to the relations between Orestes and his peasant brother-in-law who has provoked the comment. The process of ὁμιλία is seen metaphorically as a glance in a mirror: an 'other-revealing' mirror which shows the observer the true nature, not of himself, but of someone else. Time, for instance, acts in this way: Phaedra illustrates her claim that the only important possession in life is a γνώμη δικαία by an appeal to the mirror of time, by which the bad are shown up for what they are, Hipp. 428f:

κακοὺς δὲ θνητῶν ἐξέφην', ὅταν πύθῃ,
προθεὶς κάτοπτρον ὥστε παρθένῳ νέᾳ
χρόνος· πρὶν οἵτινες μάτην' ὀφθεῖεν ἐμοί.

Barrett here complains of the confusion of metaphors. A mirror is 'both self-revealing and other-revealing'; Phaedra's first use of the image refers to the other-revealing function, her second to the self-revealing. This confusion is basic to the application of the mirror-metaphor to ways of knowing another person through friendship and time: a process which involves two objects of knowledge. Philosophical ideas of φιλία, involving both ὁμοιότης and the passage of time reflected in

κοινωνία and παρουσία, stressed the nature of the self as an essential feature of the relation with the friend. Love of a friend is an expansion of self-love, and has the same qualities as the good man's relation to himself (14). Each person is actively engaged in observing the other, and looks to find his own thoughts and values reflected in him. One follower of Plato uses the mirror-metaphor in this context (15):

Σω: Ἐννενόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ὄψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλοῦμεν, εἴδωλον ὄν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος.

Alk: Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σω: Ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾧ ὁρᾷ, οὕτως ἂν αὑτὸν ἴδοι.

'So one eye, viewing another, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing by virtue of which it sees, will therefore see itself'. Socrates goes on to argue that if a man's eye looks at anything in a mirror nature which does **not** resemble itself, it cannot see itself; and he uses this in his argument that self-knowledge, knowledge of one's own soul, is reached through observation of what is θεῖον καὶ ἀμιγές: observation of something that is **other**, but which reflects the self, by virtue of its similarity to it. The two-fold power, self-revealing and other-revealing, of the mirror-metaphor, is related in an important way to the acquisition of self-knowledge through knowledge of other people; mirrors provoke in most societies speculation about ways of knowing other people in that society, linked to one's own body-image and self-knowledge (16).

The importance of the eyes and body in ideas about ὁμιλία is suggested early in the 'Philoctetes', a play concerned with evaluating the true

character and intentions of other people. Odysseus can have no ὁμιλία with Philoctetes; Neoptolemus can have an ὁμιλία with him that is πρὸς καὶ βέβαιος, since his body has never been seen by Philoctetes' eyes (Phil. 71) This sounds rather obvious: but it is related to other motifs in Greek ideas of human relations that centre on the eye. A host is 'an eye' to his guests: the ξένος - relation is a process of reciprocal understanding that begins through the eye. Clytemnestra offers the strangers, who bring her news of Orestes' death, both a hot bath and δικαίων τ' ὀμμάτων πρόφρονα (A.Cho. 671). Battus in Pindar is ὄμμα φαεννότατον ξείνοισι καὶ θεοῖσιν and θεὸς ὅπιν δίκαιον ξένων (17). This fills in some of the background implications to gestures, discussed above, Chapter Four. To turn your eyes to the ground, or to turn them away from the person addressing you, is a refusal of communication, of ὁμιλία, of the metaphors of vision and visibility involved in the process of getting to know the other person (18). The importance of communication in vision is ~~stressed~~ evidenced also in Greek theories of vision: in Plato's discussion in the 'Timaeus', for example, where the eye, like the mirror and the liver, is a smooth surface that both emits and receives light (19).

The passage from tragedy which should confirm the association of the mirror-metaphor with the process of understanding another man's character through the process of visual communication and ὁμιλία, is Agamemnon's conclusion at A. Ag. 838-40.

εἰδὼς λέγοιμ' ἂν, εὖ γὰρ ἐξεπίσταμαι,
ὁμιλίας κάτοπτρον, εἴδωλον σκιᾶς,
δοκοῦντας εἶναι κάρτα πρευμενεῖς ἐμοί.

Unfortunately, like ~~most~~ many of the most interesting passages of Aeschylus, this passage appears to be corrupt. I print Page's text above; punctuation, however, makes all the difference. The general sense is clear; Agamemnon

has learnt that men who seem at first eager to help may turn out to be worthless, by identifying Odysseus, initially reluctant to help, as the only follower whose loyalty stood the test of time. The relevant problem is: does the reference to the mirror act as an image for truth or for illusion? My preference is of course for the truth; but the punctuation and grammar required to give this sense in the passage as it stands are probably untenable, though they have the authority of Fraenkel. Fraenkel puts no comma after ἐξεπίσταμαι nor after σκιᾶς, but a semi-colon after κάτοπτρον — He takes the whole passage to mean: 'For I, since I am well acquainted with the mirror, the intercourse of men, would surely call those who seem to be friendly to me only the reflection of a shadow'. If it be who points out that κάτοπτρον always means 'mirror', never 'reflection', and who quotes Aeschylus' version of in vino veritas, fr. 393.

κάτοπτρον εἶδος χαλκός ἐστ', οἶνος δὲ νοῦ

(copied by Theopomp. com. fr. 32.3 κάτοπτρον φύσεως). His punctuation is open to two main objections. It involves the absence of the article, τοὺς, with δοκοῦντας which is, on his reading, the object of ἐξεπίσταμαι. It also entails the sequence of two noun-adjective phrases ὁμιλίας κάτοπτρον and εἴδωλον σκιᾶς, which both carry the sense of a reflected image or something which reflects, which are supposed to be understood as opposites, not equivalents, to each other. This makes for an impossible - and untypical - ambiguity, unless we conjecture a lost line which pointed the contrast between them. Page's punctuation makes the two synonymous, and this seems to be the only sensible way to take the passage as it stands. I suspect, however, that if we knew the missing line, Fraenkel's observation on the meaning of κάτοπτρον would have more weight, and the mirror-metaphor in the phrase κάτοπτρον ὁμιλίας might appear as a conventional image for the process of gauging correctly another person's character.

The wish for a visible guide to the inner character of another man becomes a topos throughout ancient literature. Cicero, wishing for a physical mark by which he may choose his friends, falls back on the Euripidean advice, ὁμιλία κρίνεῖτε :

'In amicis eligendis neglegentes esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos qui ad amicitiam essent idonei iudicarent, et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum, experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia' (21). Amicitia itself is a process of testing the character of the other; this is the aspect of φιλία emphasized by Aristotle (22) in quoting Theognis on the value of the test of time in assessing the worth of a man:

'When a man loves another qua himself, not qua musician or qua doctor, the pleasure of friendship is the pleasure derived from the person himself, not from any particular role that is his, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι (sc. φιλίαι) δι' αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσιν καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦνται βέβαιον γάρ τι δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία, μονὴ δ' αὐτὴ βέβαιος· τὸ γὰρ κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ μινόμενα, μηδὲ ῥᾳδίως ποιεῖ τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθήν, οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἄνευ λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Θέογνις. πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος· ἡ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου· δεῖ γὰρ πεῖραν λ
οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικὸς,
πρὶν πειραθείης ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου.

Here Aristotle uses the same predicates of φιλία that Sophocles used of ὁμιλία : βέβαιος καὶ πιστή. The traditional connexions between sight, self-knowledge, friendship, ὁμιλία and the testing of character through time, reappear in different contexts, philosophical, poetic and scientific, throughout Greek literature. How do these background ideas affect the particular conditions of tragedy?

The actors in tragedy are the πρόσωπα , the masks, faces, roles which combine to present the myth to the audience. J.D.P. Bolton in his discussion of the changing notion of the self through antiquity, invokes the Latin word for mask, 'persona': 'Each mask had a set expression, ... and depicted a set character ... The spectators ... knew that beneath the mask was an actor, and that the same actor might be beneath different masks at different times. This suggested an inference about real life, that behind an individual's changing moods and expressions ... there was a continuing entity. And this entity was given the name 'person' from the only means it had of manifesting itself to others' (23). Bolton compares the Greek word for actor, ὑποκριτής : but the true parallel to Latin persona in Greek is πρόσωπον . Well before the Roman period masked drama had mingled with already-established ideas of the difficulty of telling the person from the role, the inner nature from the visible face. Though changes on the face were observed (v. Ch. 4 sections ii, iii) the face itself was unchanging compared to the invisible mood changes and motions of character within. John Jones reminds us that though later antiquity multiplied the number of masks used in drama - Donatus lists forty-four different types - it is very unlikely that the mask of a particular character was ever changed during a performance. Disguise, in Comedy, for instance, was achieved by changing the clothes (24). The face of a character is the non-variable point of recognition through the play for the eyes of the audience.

Ὄψις is Aristotle's first element in tragedy (25):

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τ μόριον τραγῳδίας ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος.

By ὄψις he may mean simply the appearance of the actors and the scenic effects; but it is a word which carries an important ambiguity between its subjective and objective meanings. It can mean both the facility of sight

and the vision seen. In tragedy ὄψις involves interaction between the πρόσωπα enacting the myth down on the stage, and the eyes of the spectators, performing their proper function of θεωρία .

The word θεωρία carries various associations of comparison and evaluation. The meaning 'discernment' is first used in physical context, but later applies particularly in contexts of moral judgement. In the theatre, ~~the~~ to watch is to evaluate: the masks provide the continuing physical basis for the processes of evaluation of each character by other than visual methods. Their purpose is visual identification, ~~not~~, and, as Vickers points out, is not to make human feeling 'anonymous or generalized' (26). Ὄψις is Aristotle's first element in tragedy; and the masks are the first element in the process of θεωρία by which the audience is invited to evaluate the characters. Such concentration on the face and eyes of the person observed has parallels in other societies. Recently experimental psychologists have suggested that the observer's evaluation of another person is intensified in proportion to the dilation of the pupils. If the evaluation is, for instance, 'attractive', it will be 'more attractive' if the pupils of the observed person are enlarged: the eyes are the natural focus for evaluation (27). Greek adjectives compounded with -οψ which describe mood and character, and the mass of speculation and poetic imagery involving eyes, suggests the unconsciously-felt importance in Greek societies also of eye-contact and the power of the eye. Jones believes that Euripides 'weakened' dramatic action by using ὄψις to arouse pity and fear. He mentions Aristotle's apparent condemnation of the role of ὄψις in tragedy as inartistic (28). But Euripides and Aristotle in their different ways reflect their society's interest in the eye as a means for judging people; and it is dangerous to see visual effects

in Euripides as different in kind from those in the other two tragedians. Writing against the same background ideas and conventions Euripides, though he stresses particularly the difficulty of penetrating the mask (v. below section (v)), still uses the same visual basis for identification and evaluation of character: the masks are the starting-point for the operatio of that typology of characters most natural to the audience.

(ii) Typology of character: physical evaluation

Greek descriptions of human nature, from Semonides of Amorgus onwards, involve the categorizing of different qualities. Semonides uses animals as his principle of categorization; hippocratic writers use the humours: both deal with physically recognizable types of action which betray inner emotion and which provide a basis for moral evaluation also. Both principles enter poetic, philosophical and, we may suppose, popular terminology. Medea is feared because she 'glares like a bull'; the μεθαρχόμενος character in Plato is impulsive and dangerous (29). The tragic masks offered physical categories of character based both on sex, status or age and also on emotion. What implications do they have for human interaction and evaluation in tragedy?

Jones suggests that Euripides, by making Electra's peasant husband display noble sentiment and action, has 'deployed human relationships within the story in such a way as to break through the crust of type-distinctions founded on status' (30). He is mistaken here on two counts. The tradition of noble sentiment shown by the slave, serf or agricultural labourer stretches back as far as Homer. From the beginnings of Greek literature men are aware of the reversal of fortune and status due to war, and are therefore likely to accept signs of moral nobility even in a serf (31). Work in the fields does not entail an ignoble set of

moral values. Laertes is found working in the wine-fields; Hesiod stresses the association of hard work in the fields with decent moral behaviour : an association exploited in urban Hellenistic topoi in praise of the country life (32). Secondly, in the particular context of the 'Electra', Euripides is using the type-distinctions of status, enforced by the masks, in a way which provides a point of speculation about the process of evaluation (above, p.3, section (i)), but which does have obvious precedents in tragedy: paidogogoi, nurses, heralds and messengers show delicacy of feeling and concern for their rulers' welfare throughout tragedy. The crust of status-distinction is anyway reinforced in the play: Electra is finally betrothed to Pylades.

The Greek love of typology is shown very simply at work in the categories of tragic mask and in the support such distinctions receive from the text of the play. Masks recorded the difference between age and sex: and this was reinforced for the audience by the attitudes of reverance, fear, envy or protection taken by other characters in the drama (33). An old man is addressed frequently as γέρον : a woman as γύναι : this may reflect forms of address natural in contemporary relations, but also reminds the audience of a tragedy of the age, gender or status of the person addressed. Distinctions of status, conferred visually by masks, are also verbally reinforced. The gnomai expressed by palace servants, for instance, may link fears for their own personal safety either to fear of their rulers, displeasure, or to sympathy with their rulers' predicament. Speeches addressed to them, which use verbs in imperative forms, and sometimes threatening conditional moods, stress the relationship of master to slave.

Types of passion however, shown to some extent in the masks themselves, are also reinforced by the speeches and deductions of characters

in the drama. Antigone's nature, for instance, is compared to that of her father: she always had the tendency to be swept by ῥιπαί of mind (34). Medea's character, which Euripides alters from the original myth into a dangerous, barbarian princess who is jealous rather than a healer (35), is 'heavy' enough to make the nurse fear her:

βαρεῖα γὰρ φρήν, οὐδ' ἀνέξεται κακῶς
πάσχουσ'· ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ δεδεγμένη τέ νιν. (Med. 36–9)

It is not clear whether the Nurse knows that her φρήν is permanently βαρεῖα – a feature of temperament which a mask-maker could perhaps reflect – or temporarily dangerous. But the wild grief, or madness, which could be suggested in the mask itself, is betrayed most clearly in the actions which are also the only basis for moral evaluation of the characters.

John Jones, in his discussion of the nature of character in tragedy, sees a development from Aeschylus to Sophocles in what he guardedly calls the 'personalizing of consciousness' (36). He suggests that Sophocles presents for instance, Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon in such a way as to make the audience concentrate on her motivation. The question, 'Why does Clytemnestra act as she does?' he allies to the question 'What sort of person is Clytemnestra?' Citing one answer to the first question, the chorus' statement, S. El. 197 δόλος ἦν ὁ φράσας, ἔφος ὁ κτείνας he suggests that Sophocles presents the character of the queen by emphasizing the forces that act on her, or in her. This would seem to be neither a move towards a <u>personalizing</u> of consciousness, nor a change from Aeschylus, who also reflects the tendency of the language to abstract and personify emotion (37). The audience's answer to his question, 'What <u>sort</u> of person is Clytemnestra', would have been affected by the interlocking systems of categories of character. In terms of the categories of emotional motivation, she is the <u>sort</u> of person liable to be attacked by two kinds

of emotion: first by the kind of hatred which elsewhere in tragedy is linked to the wish for revenge (38), and which in her self-defence she calls Dike

ἡ μὴ Δίκη νιν εἶλεν, οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνη (S.El. 528)

and secondly by lust, which Electra in her attack on her mother calls Peitho -

ἀλλά σ' ἔσπασεν

πειθὼ κακοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρός ... (ibid. 560-1).

In terms of physically-marked categories, she is a queen, a mother, a wife. Into this combination of different type-systems each member of the audience will inject his own, individually developed, way of judging character based on his own experience in real life: in watching plays by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides alike. The audience's frame of response, their reaction to the <u>human intelligibility</u> of different figures, is a non-variable, however differently the three tragedians may seem, to some modern critics, to have handled their characterization (39). All three tragedians give the audience what it expects: the same <u>kind</u> of evidence on which to make their own moral judgements.

(iii) <u>Typology of character: moral evaluation. Gnomai and the moral advertisement</u>

The language of characters, as well as their appearance and physical action, gives the audience further evidence for their individual assessment of the character of the figures on stage. One function of <u>gnomai</u> in tragedy, as throughout Greek literature, is to offer familiar <u>signs</u> which will help the audience place the speaker within whichever set of values he chooses (40).

A **gnome in** Aristotelian theory makes members of the audience identify opinions expressed by the speaker as the ones they hold themselves, and therefore approve the moral character of the speaker. Even a trite one can be used well: διὰ μὲν τὸ εἶναι κοινάς, ὡς ὁμολογουμένων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν.

Aristotle stresses the function of gnomai in making the speaker's character more attractive to his audience: τὸ δὲ ἦθος βέλτιον (41). They supposedly reveal his moral tendencies and suggest what kind of actions he performs: for gnomai are concerned with behaviour δεῖ δὲ τῇ λέξει τὴν προαίρεσιν συνδηλοῦν. If the speaker cannot make his ἦθος clear by gnomai alone, he can add his reasons for using them: εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, οἷον οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι "δεῖ δὲ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀεὶ φιλήσοντα· ἐπιβουλὴ γὰρ θάτερον."

Gnomai are effective because men are delighted to hear their own opinions expressed: χαίρουσι μὲν ἅπαντες καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτυχὴ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν (42). Since their opinions are formed by particular cases, the orator must guess what sort of opinions his audience is likely to hold, and must express them in general terms: δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι ποῖα τυγχάνουσι προπολαμβάνοντες, εἶθ' οὕτως περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν.

By the somewhat mechanical operation of gnomai, the orator gives his speech a moral character (43): πᾶσαν δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν μιᾶι χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω· ἠθικοὺς μὲν ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους· ἦθος δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν οἷς ὅσοις δηλή ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥστε, ἂν βέλτιαι ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ βελτιοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.

He invites the audience to use the moral categories pointed by his gnomai in assessing his character, as they might use physically recognizable categories in weighing up the external facts of his life. The language operates, though Aristotle does not seem to be cynical about this, as a kind of mask behind which the orator, if he wishes, can hide his true character. How does this function of gnomai affect our view of the interaction between people in, for instance, epic and tragedy?

The earliest example of a man using gnomai to make a good impression on strangers is of course Odysseus, and it is perhaps worth examining in detail the way Odysseus introduces himself to the Phaeacians, setting rhetorical standards and conventions of self-introduction for the whole of Greek literature. It is important that though Odysseus disguises his historical self many times through the epic, he does not disguise his real moral values in adopting these disguises. The poet approves, apparently, the opinions uttered by Odysseus, even when it is clear Odysseus is exploiting them in order to make a good impression.

OOdysseus and Alcinous

At the end of Od. 6 Odysseus is given two kinds of information about Alcinous' palace. Nausicaa, 6. 249 - 315, gives him direct information, including references to the beauty and strength of the city and harbour, to the temple of Poseidon, to naval traffic, the existence of ὑπερφίαλοι among the natives who might be expected to criticize the princess' behaviour; to her own noble suitors, to the palace gardens, the grove of

Athene the power and handmaids of the Queen, to the King's resemblance to an immortal. All this gives Odysseus opportunity to assess the main features of this new society: most importantly, the wealth, efficiency, and rewarded piety of city and palace. Athene gives him further direct information, 7. 28-36. She warns him first of the native xenophobia and tells him of their patronage by Poseidon. This coincides with Nausicaa's warning against the ὑπερφίαλοι and her mention of Poseidon's temple: these are for Odysseus the sources of potential danger. These he avoids by walking through the city wrapped in mist, and on this walk Homer shows him observing the already-mentioned wealth of city and harbour. The ships, they represent both are the focus of his attention 7.42-5: Poseidon's regard for the citizens, hence their potential hostility, (since Odysseus' his story must include allusion to Poseidon's hostility to him), and his own goal. From the wealth he observes in the harbour will come the wealth he takes with him when he leaves in one of these same ships. Athene's second piece of information is the history of the royal family: she concentrates on the Queen, demonstrating incidentally the close relations between palace and city. The people, the source of danger, are closely connected with the palace, and winning-over of the one must include the wooing of the other's good opinion. At this point Homer gives us in detail the picture Odysseus receives of the palace itself, and shows the hero wondering at all of it: πολλὰ δέ οἱ κῆρ
ὥρμαιν' ἰσταμένῳ πρὶν χάλκεον οὐδὸν ἱκέσθαι.

The details give Odysseus an understanding of the society which he later exploits. The wealth is shown in metalwork, slaves, agricultural produce, and in the continuing sufficiency of food and drink: ἐπητανὸν γὰρ ἔχεσκον. Skills of god and man are shown in the work of carvers, builders , weavers.

There is an emphasis on the community, on the common table, on the benches round the halls. Most important is the fact that all these goods are gifts of the gods. By putting careful explanations not apparent to an observer - the fact for instance that it was Athene who made the hand-maids of the house so skilful in weaving inside the passage of description as it appears to Odysseus, Homer produces the impression that Odysseus has understood the degree to which all this is the result of close communion with gods. He uses his understanding of Phaeacian piety acquired here in his speeches later on (44). He stands, gazes, and admires everything before he enters the palace:

Ἔνθα στὰς θηεῖτο πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα ἐὺ θηήσατο θυμῷ,
καρπαλίμως ὑπὲρ οὐδὸν ἐβήσετο δώματος εἴσω (133-5).

When he enters, the first thing he sees is the group of nobles pouring libations: that is, dependants of the palace (who may include the xenophobes, the ὑπερφίαλοι against whom he was warned), associating themselves with that pious observation of the gods/of which he has seen evidence throughout the country.

From this point Odysseus begins to use his famous rhetorical powers. He begins at 146; by 311 he has secured preliminary approval by the community of nobles, and has got the King to say:

αἲ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον,
τοῖος ἐὼν οἷός ἐσσι, τά τε φρονέων ἅ τ' ἐγώ περ,
παῖδά τ' ἐμὴν ἔχεμεν καὶ ἐμοὶ γαμβρὸς καλέεσθαι....

He creates this effect in a sequence of four speeches: throughout them his main task is to impress Alcinous with those aspects of his own character which match what he has guessed to be Alcinous' too; his subsiduary task is

to secure the friendship, or at least neutrality, of the other people in the hall, who represent potential danger.

I. 146-152

First Odysseus mentions his long labours and the fact that he has distant φίλοι whom he longs to rejoin. He requests help and shows familiarity with palace courtesy, demonstrating by the way his knowledge of the family tree, in his address to the Queen. Also, he contrasts his misfortune with the prosperity and friendship he recognizes they possess, and with their expectation of normal family life, by a polite wish for the further happiness of τοίσδε τε δαιτυμόνας He manifests a belief that happiness is a gift of the gods, a belief both in the importance of riches and honour in human society, and in the dependance, for a man's honour, on the goodwill of the people: γέρας θ' ὅ τι δῆμος ἔδωκεν 150.
His first moral advertisement, therefore, is a comment on man's dependance both on the gods and on the community. The responses to this speech give him further direct and indirect clues to the piety of the country and Phaeacian kinship with the gods. He is given a hope of success, 193, and then makes his second speech, this time in direct reply to Alcinous.

II. 208-225

He first denies being a god in disguise; in his disclaimer he advertises his own recognition of the gods τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν 209.
He emphasizes his troubles - implying he could make a good story of them - and asks for food, with a gnomic appeal to common humanity:

οὐ γάρ τι στυγερὴ ἐπὶ γαστέρι κύντερον ἄλλο
ἔπλετο, ἣ τε καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἔο μνήσασθαι ἀνάγκῃ
καὶ μάλα τειρόμενον καὶ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ πένθος ἔχοντα,
ὥς καὶ ἐγώ... 216-219.

Here again he suggests for the crowd a contrast between his hunger and

their own state - they had just finished dining when he came, 138. He follows this contrast by suggestion of his own rank, originally equal to their own in wealth and property:

κτῆσιν ἐμήν, δμῶάς τε καὶ ὑψερεφὲς μέγα δῶμα 225.

They all praise his speech as κατὰ μοῖραν , 226; and recommend that he be given a ship to get home, ἐκέλευον πεμπέμεναι τὸν ξεῖνον.

Odysseus now faces the private audience with King and Queen, in which he uses other knowledge. He has exploited his understanding of the community's piety, wealth and strong-knit family ties. Now he uses his knowledge of Nausicaa, and of information she gave him. Arete ~~has re-~~ has recognized the clothes, and asks him directly where he - and they - have come from. Odysseus replies with a short history of his most recent adventures.

III. 241-297

In his third speech Odysseus hints again at the story that could be told of his troubles, and shows his awareness that trouble and happiness alike are god-given. In his story he stresses the seductive guile of Calypso and his own resistance to it,

ἀλλ' ἐμὸν οὔ ποτε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι ἔπειθεν 258.

He shows his faith in the gods by suggesting - what we know from Book Five - that Calypso may have released him finally only at the command of Zeus. He confesses to them Poseidon's enmity towards him. He did not specify this particular enmity before the whole assembly, having seen the huge temple to Poseidon at the centre of the city. He piously attributes to a god his sleep after landing on the island. Now he begins his judicial praise of their daughter: first, of her divine beauty, then of her mature judgement: ἣ δ' οὔ πω νοήματος ἤμβροτον ἐσθλοῦ

ὡς οὐκ ἄν ἔτι παῖδα νεώτερον ἀντιάσαντα

ἔρξέμεν . . . 292-3,

and indicates his own good judgement in his comment on it:

αἰεὶ γάρ τε νεώτερον ἀφραδέουσιν.

Alcinous takes issue with this judgement on his daughter: he thinks she should have brought Odysseus straight to him. Odysseus, described at this point as πολύμητις , gives his answer, which includes his only lie.

IV. 302-7

Odysseus addresses the king as Ἥρως , and tells him that his own first feelings on meeting Nausicaa and on approaching Alcinous were fear and modesty: δείσας αἰσχυνόμενός τε 305. Now he lies: he says Nausicaa suggested exactly what Alcinous said he would have preferred i.e. that Odysseus should follow her straight to the palace. He says he refused to do this, because he was afraid of the King's anger: His clinching argument is a gnomic appeal to the nature of commun humanity:

δύσζηλοι γάρ τ' εἰμέν ἐπι χθονί φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων.

In the first person plural he includes himself and the King: they are united in their human vulnerability to irrational anger. Here he puts Alcinous in the position of disclaiming an unjust temper or any kind of mistrust of strangers, and forces him to announce what sort of man he is:

Ξεῖν', οὔ μοι τοιοῦτον ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον κῆρ
μαψιδίως κεχολῶσθαι. 309-10.

This leads the king into his evaluation of Odysseus as a man who thinks ἃ π' ἐμὲ περ.

Throughout this passage Odysseus advertises his material possessions and status which are in fact the same as those he sees valued in Phaeacia: house, slaves, φίλοι . But he has advertised even more strongly his moral tendencies, those which he has good evidence for supposing are also valued in Phaeacia. For example: his resistance to guile, his perception

of good judgement, his wry acceptance of the domination of appetite over grief, his courtesy and courage. Most of all, he has indirectly drawn attention to the common humanity between himself and all the members of the group he has addressed; particularly with regard to the less admirable human qualities, vulnerability to the 'shameful belly', or to anger. This pre-empts the main source of possible attack or suspicion: the enmity of the gods shown by his misfortune. He has told only one factual lie and he has not assumed false moral values. He has, however, exploited them to make the right impression.

From Homer onwards gnomai are used in personal relations to give the stranger or the audience careful information about the moral qualities, beliefs, and tendencies to particular kinds of behaviour, possessed by the speaker. The moral categories are added to the visually recognizable categories of age, status, sex and wealth which are, in tragedy as in the contemporary society, the first basis for the evaluation of character. Gnomai function, in fact, as a verbal, moral mask, which gives identifying characteristics, but which (see below, section (v)) can be used, as effectively as the physical categories, for the purposes of concealing the inner character within.

(iv) The moral mask: self-introduction and evaluation in tragedy

Odysseus' self-introduction to Alcinous is a scene of supplication, and it is these scenes in tragedy too that bring out most strongly ~~the~~ conventional rules of moral self-advertisement. The close link between the physical and the moral assessment of the stranger, and the way in which the physical acts as a model for the moral assessment, is brought out by John Gould in his examination of supplication ritual (45). He emphasizes the

importance in the ritual of actual physical contact and demonstrates its operation in tragedy. Medea's physical gesture, for example, 'locks Creon into a situation from which there is no escaping'. Gould shows how the language of supplication builds its terminology around the body-relationship of suppliant and supplicated (46). Behind this 'figurative supplication' embedded in the language of tragedy there are assumptions about human interaction and reciprocal evaluation which are obviously different from our own. Assumptions inherited by the fifth century from earlier social ceremony exemplified in, for instance, Odyssey 7, and demonstrated in Gould's analysis of the 'gamesmanship' in physical and figurative acts of supplication, may 'strike the modern reader as disingenuous or cynical, as coming close to treating the entire ritual as a sort of game with rules that can be played to, or by. But that is ... the correct light in which to view the operation of a ritual act within a living framework of ritual' (47).

Aristotle's exposition of the use of gnomai as moral self-advertisement (above, section (iii)), similarly suggests to the modern reader a cynical or disingemuous approach to the process of assessing another man's character: moral qualities are mechanically deduced from advertised public and familar opinions about human behaviour, in much the same way that status and wealth are deduced from the appearance of the stranger. The operation of rules, both in supplication ritual and in the creation of a good impression on an audience, is one element that makes the assumptions of interaction and reciprocal assessment seem alien to our own: our own society, at the moment, has much less surface awareness of the rules governing human relations. It is possible that the degree of importance given to the rules changed through the fifth century: Gould stresses the gradual replacement of physical forms of supplication by verbal, suggesting that by the end of the century the language of suppliants was 'little more than an empty shell' (48). Our

attempts to understand this kind of change will be distorted, since we lack the background of what Gould calls 'gamesmanship' just as our ideas of the function of masks in tragedy will be distorted, since we have no tradition of masks in our own drama. It is possible, though, that reliance on the verbal forms of supplication, and the awareness of the emptily metaphorical nature of the ritual in some situations, were both of them expressions of an idea entertained frequently in Euripides: that current methods of assessing people, both materially and morally, were too external, too mechanical, were fundamentally deceptive. Gnomai, like the masks of drama, are designed to give particular information, and thereby to conceal what lies behind them (v. below, section (v)).

The stranger and the suppliant are those on whom the duty of self-introduction rests. The stranger is the 'outsider who does not fit into the categories of social existence' (49). It is worth considering in detail a few scenes in tragedy where such self-introduction is made, and worth watching the themes, procedures, and associations by which the final assessment of stranger or suppliant is made.

A). A. Supp. 1ff

The most obvious, exotic and large-scale self-introduction in tragedy is the Danaids' supplication of the King of Argos. Their self-introduction to the audience is an important precursor to this scene: information given indirectly to the audience is later elicited directly by the King. The audience learns: that they are fugitives, φεύγομεν 5, and although they use the language of exile, φήμη πόλεως, they are innocent, 6. Their reason for flight is given in the reference to their suitors, 9; and the status of their father, βουλεχος , 11. They identify the scene of the play, 15, and their mythically-motivated reason for coming to Argos. Their links with the country are elaborated in the story of the common ancestress , Ἰνάχος 51f, which they refer to as τεκμήρια by which they can identify themselves to the King (50).

νῦν ἐν ποιονόμοις
ματρὸς ἀρχαίας τόποις τῶν
πρόσθε πόνων μνασαμένα,
πἀπὶ νῦν ἐπιδείξω,
ποτὰ τεκμήρια φιλονόμοις .

Such a τεκμήριον is proof of a physical bond and forms the basis for expectations of practical help.

Before the King enters, Danaus gives his daughters certain instructions about their behaviour. He tells them to answer the Argives by cries and groans, but to supply clearly, τορῶς, the facts of their innocence and their flight. He tells them to be θρασύ in speech, but to keep a calm face, 198 , τὸ μὴ μάταιον δ' ἐκ μετωποσωφρονῶν
ἢ τῶν προσώπων ὄμματος παρ' ἡσύχου.

Strangers are easily angered: τὸ τῆσδε κἀφ' ἑπτάφθογον γένος (51): they must be neither προσλεσχος nor ἐφοπτικὸς ἐν λόγῳ , but submissive, line 203, μέμνησο δ' εἴκειν
θρασυστομεῖν γὰρ οὐ πρέπει τοὺς ἥσσονας.

The King on his entry points out that his first task is to guess at their identity, lines 234f. He wonders where they come from, refers to their foreign clothes, and from there speculates on their less apparent qualities: on their courage, for instance, demonstrated by their unheralded journey to a strange land. He notes their suppliant status, marked by the branches, 241. He has now covered all the clues a Greek can use, l. 243, and turns to direct questioning; speech is the best method of finding out facts about foreigners (52), and next to speech, guesses:

καὶ τ' ἄλλα πολλ' ἐπεικάσαι δίκαιον ἦν
εἰ μὴ πάρουτι φθόγγος ἦν ὁ σημανῶν

The question-and-answer interaction of the King and the Danaids shows the suppliants as unyielding in their demands; they even blackmail the King with threats of pollution by suicide. But Danaus had instructed them, line 195, to behave ὡς ἐπηλύδας πρέπει : εἴκειν here must refer not to submission in their demands, but to adoption of the submissive verbal role appropriate to suppliant or stranger. The King opens with his own self-introduction: he gives details of his own ancestry, 250-272, inviting, we presume, a similarly detailed reply. The Danaids approved his first speech as ἀψευδῆ λόγον , line 246. They now praise his self-introduction, βραχὺς πορὸς θ' ὁ μῦθος 274, and produce their strongest card: they also are of Argive ancestry. They emphasize their wish to speak the truth to the King, as the King has spoken truthfully to them,

καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ πάντα προσφύσω λόγῳ , 276.

This assurance is necessary, for the King finds difficulty in supposing them to be Argive: they remind him of African or Egyptian women, line 277. It is worth noting here that as a preface to his speech of incredulity, line 277, he maintains the theme of belief, truthworthiness, proof and truth-telling, initiated by the Danaid's reliance on the story of Io as their τεκμήριον and continued in their assessment of the King as a man who tells the truth himself. It is in response to his incredulity that they come out with the story of Io, eliciting from him in stichomythia, 291 f, his own memory of the story and its ramifications. They finish the story together. The Danaids have established a family memory in common: myths, like gnomai, function as τεκμήρια , a familar unit of exchange between strangers, as between a post and his audience. (Hence Pindar's mixture of myth and

gnome: both involve an appeal to values and memories poet and audience enjoy sharing with each other). Having established that in ancestry, in family memory, and in attitude to the gods who figure in the myths, they are linked with the King, the Danaids fill in the family history after Epaphus, culminating in their complaint about Aegyptus, and in their reason for flight, ὡς μή γένωμαι δμωὶς Αἰγύπτου γένει 335. An exchange which involves again the testing of each other's values - ideas of what is θέμις - leads up to the King's question, line 340, πῶς εὐσεβὴς μέλω; Not, how can I help you? but how am I to be pious? He is aware now that he is doubly bound: by their supplication, and by the family links he has accepted. The guesses he made before questioning them turn out to be both factually correct, and in line with the good impression the strangers needed to make: two aims in self-introduction which are not always found together (53). They have been confirmed by direct questioning, and he is now in a position to act.

The King's first reactions to the strangers brings out an important element in Athenian attitudes to foreigners and introductions. He stresses that the Danaids arrive in his country, ἀπρόξενοι 239. The possession of a πρόξενος is something to trust in (for both parties, presumably): Pi. N. 7.96, προξενίᾳ πίσυνοι. A foreigner in Athens needed a πρόξενος there: hence the question at E. Med. 359, τίνα προξενίαν ἐξευρήσεις; A πρόξενος technically was a patron who managed the foreigner's affairs, arranged introductions for him; προξενεῖν generally covers activity of recommending one person to another, as for example a potential pupil to a teacher, Pl. Leg. (?) c. The technical difference is unclear between the πρόξενος, a position of protection publically assumed, and προστάτης the title of an Athenian who undertook charge of the interests of μέτοικοι at Athens. πρόξενος seems to stand somewhere between the προστάτης and the κῆρυξ. The sacred office of the κῆρυξ was protected internationally: harming a herald was a crime against his state and against the gods. Some figures acting as heralds in tragedy behave

rather badly (54) and there may be behind their behaviour a stock idea of the bad herald. But heralds are necessary means of communication: possession of a κῆρυξ makes clear to foreigners certain facts about the traveller's status in his own society. Possessions of a πρόξενος, as far as we can tell from fourth-century usage, gives the foreigner a point of reference in a strange society; it confers protection of a different kind from that conferred by the κῆρυξ ; a protection sanctioned by the society he is visiting, rather than by internationally-recognized convention. His relation with a κῆρυξ is, we presume, a temporary one; his relation with his πρόξενος is permanent (55). A κῆρυξ gives the society the facts of provenance, ancestry, status, wealth and aims of the stranger. A πρόξενος preserves these for him in the society, and protects his interests while he is there.

The precise meaning here of the King's word ἀπρόξενοι is disputed: some commentators suggest it means 'Without a κῆρυξ '. One should recall, perhaps, that distortion is necessarily present, a distortion due to the poet's conception of archaic conventions. Private individuals are unlikely to have travelled with their own κῆρυξ in the fifth century; should the Danaids have a herald because they are royal, because they are women, or because there are so many of them? We cannot tell; nor can we be sure that ἀπρόξενοι refers to the technical office of πρόξενος as it existed at Athens in the fifth century. But the basis of the King's observation is clear: the Danaids are travelling without any visual marks of identification; their τεκμήριον is an internal one, their memory of the common ancestor, their relation to the myth of Io. The physical emblems of family and status provided by a κῆρυξ or protected by a πρόξενος, are lacking: to assess the character of his visitors the King is forced into direct interrogation, into the uncertainties of πόπος and ἀλήθεια - in speech.

B). S. OC 119f

Oedipus at first in the OC plays a suppliant role. The chorus know only that he is ἐκτόπος , 119, a πλανήτας πρέσβυς 124, occupying holy ground within their land. They enter looking for the intruder: at the end of the parodos they ask where he is, 137, and Oedipus replies

ὁδ' ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ . φωνῆ γὰρ ὁρῶ .

The basic categories, physical and moral, which can be applied to Oedipus at the opening of the play, are quickly assessed by the chorus, reinforcing the impression made already on the audience: aged, wandering, exiled, blind, unholy. These are the features basic to the figure of Oedipus, and any changes (of atmosphere, personality or tone) throughout the play concern these qualities: at the end of the play he is holy not unholy, in control of prophecies rather than blind, no longer an exile, but one who has found the right end to his wanderings (56).

The first piece of information Oedipus gives the chorus - his blindness - leads on to the revelation of his historical character: inevitably, since his blindness is his identifying characteristic. The revaluation is made gradually. On learning he is blind the Chorus asks, line 150, Were you born blind? They sum up their attitude to what they know of him so far in calling him, 165, ὦ πολύμοχθ' ἀλάτα . They ask for further information when he has consented to leave the sacred grove. They ask his identity (57) and that of the girl who leads him, and that of his country, 204f:

αὐδάσατον, πῆ ἔφυς βροτῶν;
πῆ σ' ὁ πολύπονος ἄγει; τίν' ἂν
σοῦ πατρίδ' ἐκπυθοίμαν;

Oedipus replies, ὦ ξένοι, ἀπόπτολις . He requests them not to ask πῆ εἰμι ; he tells them he has an αἰνὰ φύσις (58). But

when the Chorus repeat the question he is forced to answer it, either by social conventions, or by the conventions of tragedy. He prefaces his answer by the rhetorical question π' πάθω; Like Odysseus (59) one of his main identifying characteristics is the nature of his past sufferings. Their demand, 215, was for the details of his parentage: he relies on their familiarity with the myth to give them the information they require, eliciting their knowledge of his history as the Danaids elicit the King's knowledge of the story of Io:

Ο: λαιὸν ἵστε τιν' ἔκγονον; Χο: ἴοὺ ἴοὺ.
Ο: π' τε Λαβδακιδᾶν γένος; Χο: ὦ Ζεῦ.
Ο: ἄθλιον Οἰδιπόδαν; Χο: σὺ γὰρ οὗτ' εἶ;
Ο: δέος ἴσχετε μηδὲν οὕτ' αὐδῶ.

Some of Oedipus' behaviour is motivated by a wish to allay fears: recalling γνώμη - 'strangers are easily angered' - used also as a warning by Danaus to his daughters. The wish of the stranger is to avoid rousing strong and perhaps dangerous emotions in the inhabitants. Oedipus explains to the chorus that their fear is fear of his name alone, 265f,

ὄνομα μόνον δείσαντες; οὐ γὰρ δή π' τό γε
δῶμ' οὐδὲ πάτρα πάρ'. ἐπεὶ τἄ γ' ἔργα μου
πεπονθότ' ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεδρακότα.

Here he separates his name, his identity in history, from his physical self, the body which has undergone the identifying suffering: and he explores the problem central to his historical character, the question of his physical guilt and mental purity. 270:

καίτοι πῶς ἐμὸν κακοὶς φυτὸν
ὄντος παθὼν μὲν ἀντέδρων....
νῦν δ' οὐδὲν εἰδὼς ἱκόμην οἷ' ἱκόμην.

The chorus' reaction is to ask for the facts.

In this passage, as in the exchange between the Danaids and the King, we notice how the emotional reactions and moral evaluation of the interrogators are based on factual information and physical observation. Historical identification in both cases rests on the shared knowledge of a story; moral assessment is made partly through an appeal to shared values. And both myth and values are presented by the poet as true.

C). S. Phil. 54f

Neoptolemus' self-introduction to Philoctetes, however, is based on disguise and pretence: not of historical identity, but of intentions. Neoptolemus early in the play is made to exploit moral values on which he does not act in his relation with philoctetes. The emptiness of Philoctetes' trust in his moral values (though it is finally vindicated), demonstrates contemporary thoughts about the possible inadequacy of gnomai as a guide to behaviour. Gnomic affirmations of belief in decent behaviour may mask indecent intentions.

Neoptolemus' task, like Oedipus' at the beginning of the OC, is to allay the inhabitant's fears of the stranger. Odysseus advises him to tell the truth about his historical self - he is still 'the son of Achilles' - but to 'disguise his soul' (61):

μὴ Φιλοκτήτου σε δεῖ
ψυχὴν ὅπως δόλοισιν † ἐκκλέψεις λέγων.
ὅταν σ' ἐρωτᾷ τίς τε καὶ πόθεν πάρει,
λέγειν, Ἀχιλλέως παῖς· τὸ δ' οὐχὶ κλεπτέον

He need disguise neither his historical self, nor his true moral self, but his mood and intentions (62). Odysseus, referring to the popular premium on the appearance of virtue (63), encourages Neoptolemus by saying, 82,

τόλμα· δίκαιοι δ' αὖθις ἐκφανούμεθα.

When Philoctetes meets Neoptolemus he guesses at his Greek origins and assures him of friendship, line 224: we notice again the wish on both sides to allay fears of the stranger. He then asks for practical help (64), and concludes lines 230-1 with a hope of reciprocal fair dealing (similar to the hope of reciprocal truth-telling implied by the Danaids in their meeting with the King):

οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς οὔτε σὲ
ὑμῶν ἁμαρτεῖν τοῦτο γ' οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ.

Sophocles early in the play gives the audience an impression of Neoptolemus' moral values in harmony with the standards and hopes now expressed by Philoctetes: he is preparing them, among other things, for Neoptolemus' later change of heart (65). Here the audience and the stage interlocutor are being given different information; they ~~knew~~ 'know' Neoptolemus differently. Sophocles gives this situation his own irony by making Philoctetes' moral evaluation of Neoptolemus coincide with the audience's original impression of him. Neoptolemus' soul is not, in fact, disguised, either from Philoctetes or from the audience. When for example, Neoptolemus sees the pain attack, he tells Philoctetes, 806

ἀλγῶ παῖδαι δή ταῦπ' σοὶ στένων κακά.

The audience here can recall his expression of pity in the prologue, 86,

ἀλγῶ [illegible] κλύων.

Philoctetes and Odysseus are betrayed by Neoptolemus in turn. Neither comments on this in terms of the Euripidean topos (below, section (v)), 'How hard it is to know another person'. Odysseus has no time: he is anxious to avoid danger, and merely calls Neoptolemus κάκιστ' ἀνδρῶν, 974. Philoctetes' reaction is more complex. When he hears Neoptolemus asking Zeus what he should do, 908, he realizes he has been tricked:

ἀνὴρ ὅδ', εἰ μὴ 'γὼ κακοῦ γυνώμην ἔφυν,
προδοὺς μ' ἔοικε ...

When he hears the truth he prefaces his persuasion by calling Neoptolemus' **action** ἔχθιστον 928: his case rests on a distinction between the action and the agent. He appeals to the true moral character of Neoptolemus; he tries to shame him - οὐδ' ἐπαισχύνει μ' ὁρῶν - and points out that he is now an oath-breaker, 941. He brings up again the possibilities of discrepancy in judging men between appearance and reality (referred to by Odysseus earlier): τοῦ δοκοῦντος οὐδὲν εἰδέναι κακόν 960. When he hears Neoptolemus pity him he realizes he is winning, appeals again to his pity, ἐλέησον , and reminds Neoptolemus of his true moral self, 971, οὐκ εἶ κακὸς σύ . Neoptolemus' moral transparency towards Philoctetes is stressed in Philoctetes' defence of Neoptolemus in his confrontation with Odysseus, 1010f,

οἵς οὐδὲν ἦδη πλὴν τὸ πρόσταχθὲν ποιεῖν ,
δῆλος δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἀλγεινῶς φέρων
οἷς τ' αὐτὸς ἐξήμαρτεν οἷς τ' ἐγὼ 'παθον.

Odysseus' moral nature he condemns in contrast. Concealment of the soul, mind, emotion or intention within the human body can make an individual dangerously opaque to others:

ἀλλ' ἡ κακὴ σὴ διὰ μυχῶν βλέπουσ' ἀεὶ
ψυχή νιν ἀφυὴ τ' ὄντα κοὐ θέλοντ' ὤμως .

This complaint, echoed in the Euripidean topos (below, section (v)), reflects a growing distrust in the conventional methods of judging other people. If, like Odysseus and his ancestors (67), an individual is cunning, willing to exercise self-aggrandisement at the expense of others - a process discouraged at Athens in fourth-century rhetoric (68) - he can conceal his unsociable intentions: his secret soul watches the world in safe obscurity. The point is made later by Plato (69):

ἦ οὔπω ἐννενόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων ποτὲ μὲν σοφῶν δὲ
ὡς δειλὸν μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διαφᾷ πάντα,
ἐφ' ἃ πέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακὴν δὲ
ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν, ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ,
τοσούτῳ πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον;

Sophocles reflects the gradual realization through the fifth century that verbal exchanges modelled on physical ceremony could function as a mask to the inner men not only by giving this essential identifying characteristics, but also by <u>disguising</u> his true moral values. Verbal formulas, like ritual or conventional forms of exchange, protected both parties to a meeting, and formed the basis of further exchange. But just as the body was known to contain and conceal the inner organs, the mask of language protected and concealed the inner values and character of the stranger. The very basis of recognition, the τεκμήριον itself, was also the basis for deception.

(v) <u>A Euripidean topos: the inadequacy of evaluative processes</u>

Greek literature, in showing people interacting with each other, shows from the first people exploiting gnomically expressed moral ideas in rhetorical attempts to give strangers a good impression of their own character (above, section (iii)). Strategic lies in human relations are also a feature of early epic: strategic lies and the exploitation of <u>gnomai</u> are found in historians' examples of fifth-century political speeches (70). <u>Gnomai</u>, supposed to be a guide to a speaker's true moral values, turn out to be masks as empty and potentially misleading as any other physical characteristic of the stranger may be. Euripides often expresses

the limitations of conventionally available ways of assessing character; he elaborates the topos of the wish for an external sign by which inner character may be judged (71).

The locus classicus in Euripides of the wish for a physical clue to character is found at Med. 516f. This passage contains the word χαρακτήρ in a context which prepares for its later metaphorical sense. In the fifth century, it normally means the stamp impressed on a coin which showed where it had been minted: Aeschylus, for instance, uses the money-metaphor in the King's guesses at the Danaids' place of origin, Supp. 281-2

κύπριος χαρακτὴρ τ' ἐν γυναικείοις τύποις
εἰκὼς πέπλωται τεκτόνων πρὸς ἀρσένων.

Medea also uses the currency-metaphor: the χαρακτήρ should be a physical τεκμήριον to the true inner nature of a man:

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δή χρυσοῦ μὲν ὃς κίβδηλος ἦ
τεκμήρι' ἀνθρώποισιν ὥπασας σαφῆ,
ἀνδρῶν δ' ὅτῳ χρὴ τὸν κακὸν διειδέναι,
οὐδεὶς χαρακτὴρ ἐμπέφυκε σώματι;

This thought has many intriguing fifth-century parallels (72): among them an Attic skolion, which expresses a wish for a scalpel to open the breast of a man and read his character within (73).

Another Euripidean fantasy woven round this topos focusses on the voice of a man. Theseus, in his wish for an sign of character, combines the two different methods (discussed above, section (ii) and (iii) of assessing character by categories. To his wish for a visible sign he links the wish for a sign given in speech, Hipp. 925f

φεῦ, χρὴ βροτοῖσι τῶν φίλων τεκμήριον
σαφές τι κεῖσθαι καὶ διάγνωσιν φρενῶν,
ὅστις τ' ἀληθὴς ἔστιν ὅς τε μὴ φίλος·
δισσὰς τε φωνὰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἔχειν

τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δ' ὅπως ἐτύγχανεν,
ὡς ἡ φρονοῦσα τἄδικ' ἐξηλέγχετο
πρὸς τῆς δικαίας, κοὐκ ἂν ἠπατώμεθα.

The fantasy expressed here clearly reflects the distrust of conventional language which supposedly revealed a man's character to another. Euripides elaborates, in a set of choral lyrics (74), another more complex fantasy (-method for-) knowing another person. It is interesting to find the wish for reliable guides to character expressed both in sane iambics and complicated lyrics. χαρακτήρ here is used in its pure metaphoric sense:

εἰ δὲ θεοῖς ἦν ξύνεσις
καὶ σοφία κατ' ἄνδρας,
δίδυμον αὖ ἦβαν ἔφερον
φάος χαρακτῆρ' ἀρετᾶς
ὅστοισιν μέτα, καὶ θανόντες τ'
εἰς αὖγὰς πάλιν ἡλίου
δισσοὺς αὖ ἔβαν διαύλους,
κἀ δυσγένεια δ' ἁπλοῦν αὖ
εἶχεν ζοᾶς βίοτον,
καὶ πῶδ' ἦν τούς τε κακοὺς αὖ
γνῶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθούς,
ἴσον αἰ', εὐ νεφέλαισιν ἀ-
στέρων ναύταις ἀριθμὸς πέλει.
νῦν δ' οὐδεὶς ὅρος ἐκ θεῶν
χρηστοῖς οὐδ' ἀκακοῖς σαφής,
ἀλλ' εἰλισσόμενός τις αἰ-
ὼν πλοῦτον μόνον αὔξει.

These examples of Euripidean fantasy elaborate the theme of the speech he gives Orestes at El. 367f (above, section (i) p. 192), in which he concludes that the normal categories by which men evaluate each other, wealth, status, physical strength, are all inaccurate guides. Jones suggests that this speech marks some difference between Euripidean notions of character on the one hand, and those held by the other two dramatists: he denies what he calls 'inwardness' to the characters of Sophocles and Aeschylus (75). He is arguing, apparently, from Euripidean expressions of surprise that one cannot tell the inside from the outside; and from Euripidean expressions of the inadequacy of conventional categories of character-assessment. This is an unsound basis for his argument, since the possibility of a king or a god disguised as a beggar is as old as Homer (76); and Sophocles (as we saw above, section (iv), C), reflects in his dramas too the use of conventional language and values to mask a mind at variance with them. Tragedy is the literary genre to which questions of judging other people by their words and actions is particularly important. One common feature of tragedy is the isolation of the tragic hero; isolated because it is he and no-one else who is suffering, and though other people are shown sympathizing with him in his suffering, they cannot understand it as he does: 'A warm man cannot understand a man who is cold' (77). Though the Oceanida, for instance, sympathize with Prometheus to the point of sharing his punishment at the end of the play, they criticize, as their father does, his continued defence of what he has done:

οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὅτι ἡμαρτες; PV 260.

Though Tecmessa and the chorus of sailors identify Ajax' interests with their own, and though they are aware of the shame attached to what he has done, they are so far from sharing his subjective feelings about it that they are deceived by him into hoping all will turn out well. Tragedy

depends on an awareness that human beings experience different feelings and can never share them fully with each other, however strong the sense of sympathy one person's suffering arouses in another (73).

Jones' comments on the lack of 'inwardness' in some tragic characters ought, perhaps, to have been supplemented by reference to contemporary methods of assessing the 'inward' over-values character of the individual in real life. To our post-Romantic society which values, perhaps over-values, 'inwardness', it seems an arrogant judgement to make on any other society, to suggest that it lacked notions of 'inwardness'. One might look instead for contemporary notions to correspond with the areas roughly covered by our own society's conceptions, doubtless inadequate, of personality and individuality. According to fifth-century ideas, what sort of thing needs to be disguised when a person is pretending, is playing a false role? We have the answer in Odysseus' instructions to Neoptolemus. He must disguise 'his soul': which means, in practice, his wishes and emotions. It is the hidden passions, marked inadequately by physical τεκμήρια in body and gnomic τεκμήρια in speech, which direct observers in tragedy toward some notion of the individual inwardness of each character.

(vi) 'Individuality' in the fifth century?

Bruno Snell, in his idiosyncratic picture of Greek intellectual history links the universalizing tendency of myths and gnomai to what he calls the 'rise of the individual', a rise he sees reflected in the growing popularity of lyric song (79). This is perhaps a rather over-hopeful phrase, indicating a new ~~rise~~ history as a continuous growth and ~~discovery~~ ighoring the possibility that the individual might have suffered several rises and falls. It does however, demonstrate some assumptions about fifth-century beliefs which bear closer examination. First, it assumes an internally consistent and coherent system of belief in one society which historians and scholars are capable of discovering. In fact only those observers whose evidence is stringently limited can hold such an assumption about any human society. Conceptual consistency may be χρήσιμον now for a scholar, but that does not mean it was συμφέρον for the poets he studies, nor for their original audience. Intellectual historians of other periods have no such illusions: 'The culture of any society at any moment is more like the débris, or fall-out, of past ideological systems, than it is itself a system, a coherent whole' (80). It is likely that religious beliefs, for instance, in fifth-century Athens alone were inconsistent both in the society as a whole and in its different members according to their family, experience, status and Moods. We have seen above (81) how religious beliefs are involved in most Greek ideas about human nature and human relations. It is likely that ideas of 'individuality' may have been entertained before the lyric genre was developed; that they produced their own 'débris' later in various different forms of literature, philosophy and popular expressions, and that throughout the different generations of the fifth century, within each mind, and over several areas of life, they may have worked side by side with quite different, even

incompatible, beliefs. Secondly, the phrase 'rise of the individual' betrays a dangerous confidence in ~~the~~ Aristotelian vegetable imagery. In intellectual or literary history it is a sound principle to distrust any theory of change whose exposition depends on vegetable metaphors: imagery which implies a natural, non-variable, inevitable formation at every stage and prejudges the root from what is represented by the flower(81A). Any 'flowering of individuality' in the fifth century, ~~then~~ shorn of its metaphors, seems to be created by one simple fact: that the different kinds of artist through the fifth century extended different techniques for expressing human emotion. This extension is not, of course, limited to the fifth century: both the sixth and the fourth century saw each its own kind of development in techniques available to painting, sculpture and poetry for the representation of human emotion. D.R. Stuart, for instance, sees the biographical art as the ultimate flower of fourth-century individuality: 'The portrait sculpture of the fifth century deals in types in which the variety of specific language is lost (sic)in idealization. In the fourth century verisimilitude prevails in delineation of the human subject; a god becomes under the hands of Praxiteles a creature susceptible to mood and human charm' (82). So run the clichés of differentiation and change between the centuries. For Bolton and Snell, the rise of the individual in Greek lyric is tied to the ~~expression~~ experience of emotions, individually expressed (83).

Technical discoveries in different genres of new ways to express human emotion, excite the intellectual historian into using this kind of imagery. But although D.R. Stuart opposes the tendency to categorize human nature by types to the accurate representation of human emotion, in every sphere ~~of expression~~ analysis and depiction of human emotion and motives were susceptible to the long-established process of typology

(v. above, sections (ii) and (iii)). New techniques do not always fight against old ideas: they are normally assimilated into them. One might compare the development of dramatic masks: the range of differences was extended; more distinctions of emotion were included; but they still provided the basis of type-distinctions between the different stage-characters (84). From Homer to Plato literary conventions for the portrayal of different characters involve categories of human nature dependant on types: types of status, of skill, but also of emotion. At the beginning of the fifth century sculptural technique developed the representation of emotional or physical passion. It is this that creates, for example, the figures on the West pediment of the Aphaia temple on Aegina, carved circa 490 BC, and those on the East pediment of the same temple, carved circa 480 BC. J.J. Pollit points to this difference - the later figures suggest physical pain in a more dynamic way than do the earlier to demonstrate the growing interest in individual personality and experience (85). It is, rather more simply and practically, a change of technique, either in one and the same sculptor, or, more likely, between one sculptor and another.

Attempts to prove that there was an increasing awareness of 'the individual' in fifth-century Athens rely too heavily on flimsy assumptions about natural change in human society (and on the cliches that accompany these assumptions); on an assumption that most human societies and human beings have internally coherent beliefs about the nature of gods and men; and on unexamined ideas, culturally-determined themselves, that observation of emotion reflected in various art-forms constitutes an enlarged sense of something undefined called 'individuality'. It might be more useful, perhaps, to consider other factors in the common stock of ideas approved by this society which might affect their notions of the 'individual'; such as the relation of the individual to the state.

Dover in his recent work on popular ethics of the fourth century suggests conclusions relevant to this question, gleaned from fourth-century orators. One important thought is that human beings have common ideals of behaviour, and are right to judge each other by their own ideals. The belief is often affirmed that the community's rights over the lives and properties of individuals are unlimited; and that though there are 'stable assumptions' about the difference between 'mine' and 'thine', and although all men naturally want to increase their own property, rich men are expected to invite their friends to share their fortune. No clear distinction is drawn between generosity to the state and charity to individuals (86). Popular ideals expect the individual to put his love for the city above questions of individual rights: a popular assumption in American rhetoric today, perhaps, but no longer in our own. We have no means of knowing if it was privately accepted at Athens; but it was at least a public ideal to which legal speeches about human behaviour might effectively refer. It carries with it an important implication, an implication involving beliefs incalculably different from our own, about the relation of men with each other. The underlying assumption seems to be that by understanding themselves men can understand each other, since all men are made the same way, are composed of the same material (87). Our own theories of individuality rest often on assumptions about the infinite possibilities of <u>difference</u> between people. It is certainly probable that by the end of the fifth century there were more people at Athens with different experience and background than there had been at the beginning of the century. Foreign service, wars, new political and philosophical systems, and changes in the wealth and international status of the city itself were all symptoms, causes and effects of these differences. But

these differences do not seem to have diminished the common assumption by which fifth- and fourth-century world-views may be distinguished from ours : that all men are ~~the same~~ alike, are only marked out from each other by individual details of property, physique, family, status, ~~and~~ age and skill (88). All men are susceptible to externally-derived 'symphorai': they are not alone in their sufferings (89). Individuals are defined partly by the timing and character of the misfortunes that attack them. Human emotions constitute an important category of these misfortunes; and so do the crimes human beings are driven by their emotions to commit against each other and against the gods (90).

It is hard enough to ponder our own assumptions about individuality and personality, to calculate the direct and indirect influence on popular ideas of the divers scienfitic theories of personality, and of their technical language; and harder to try to uncover different assumptions about the same thing in fifth-century thinking, and to try to assess the effect the differences may have. John Jones in his discussion of character in tragedy suggests (91) that what he calls 'modern man' thinks of 'inwardness' in terms of 'privacy'. I have argued above (92) that ideas of the inner organs, hidden within each man's body, affected fifth-century notions of the human soul, and of the way human beings were affected by emotion. The hidden organs are that part of a man which is first affected by the random tyranny of the emotions; it is there, if anywhere, that the individual self was felt to reside. All men possessed similar mental organs, as they possessed the same external limbs, susceptiole to the same, familiar physical accidents. But their movement, their colours, their changes under the influence of emotion, were concealed from observers. Intentions and moral standards were concealed: one man never knew what another was secretly intending, what he was going to do next,

though he could recognize it and in accordance with the universalizing tendency of the whole society, sympathize with it. Myths, the stories that link families, link men and gods, link also the present to the past by their function as exempla of human behaviour; as gnomai, the approved currency by which information about each other's moral values was exchanged, link the particular to the universal. Both function as appeals to a shared memory, shared experience, shared education. But, as Snell points out, they are also important as ways of universalizing particular human experiences: in this sense also they function as masks, which provide set, familiar contours into which particular sensations, actions, characters can be fitted. What happens behind the mask, behind the myth, behind the gnome is particular, but no observer, apparently, is capable of perceiving it: he observes only the externals, the actions, the clues on the face (above, ch. 4, ~~pp.~~ sect'n ii) and from the analogy of his own experience (93) he deduces the inward experience which never can be shared. Post-Romantic notions of 'privacy' are replaced by pictures of the ~~secrecy~~ secrecy and opacity of the individual mind: compare Philoctetes' warning, quoted above p. 222.

Greek tragedy has been susceptible, recently, to studies which take as their terms of reference 'the individual and the group' (94). The isolation of the tragic hero is, I have suggested, a feature of the structure of a tragedy; the visual aspect of the chorus could emphasize this in the orchestra. But the sufferings of a tragic character on stage were also made universal; by the moral queries and solutions expressed in dialogue and in lyric speculations; by the myths reflected in the choral odes, or in short exempla, and in the myth which the whole drama re-enacted. The universalizing tendency of Greek thought, whatever its origins (95), is implicit in the popular ethical assumptions analyzed by Dover, concerning the fundamental similarity of all men and the analogies to every human situation. This tendency to universalize resulted in the use of

mythical exempla and gnomic exchanges to establish common ground between a stranger and a new society, between a poet or orator and his audience, between any two people who wanted each other's approval; it is shown in Greek tragedy most clearly of all. The characters of tragedy, dressed physically in the masks which concealed the inner actor, have been oddly effective in conveying to later societies also various universally acknowledged categories of human nature, emotion and experience.

(vii) The self-revealing mirror; popular and philosophical ideas about the self

One element at least in popular fifth-century ideas of the self is a residue of Homeric attitudes. In Homer a man is defined physically by his body: by his possessions, won and kept by the strength of his body; by his family ties, dependant on body-relationships; by the different parts of his body. All these are φίλοι to him (96) and form the basis of other people's evaluation of him, marked in the titles and τιμαί they grant him. This, the 'biological self' is the obvious model for any further notions of the self (97). Bruno Snell, in his discussion of the 'Homeric view of man' suggests that this view entails an imperfect view of the 'unity of the personality', referring to the fragmented representation of the human figure in early Greek art (98). The attitude he refers to probably did affect fifth-century attitudes: but it is no longer necessary to see it as an absence of a thought-pattern. Dover suggests that it may represent a true sense of the disunity of the personality, a sense which, he suggests, was lost in the generations succeeding Homer (99). But such a sense of disunity might help to explain the fifth-century ideas of individuality discussed above: in which an individual is distinguished as unique by the

random and anarchic passions by which he is assailed, which, if he fails to control them by the use of reason, become the motives of his otherwise inexplicable actions. The early body-images of pre-Homeric societies, which are reflected in painting, if they affected Homeric views of man, passed from Homer into fifth-century literature. They would have been added to, rather than replaced, by new body-images reflected in the changing fifth-century techniques of sculpture and painting. Among other things, they may have enabled people in the fifth century to accept inconsistency in an individual's behaviour, thoughts, feelings or capacities: in daily life, and in the theatre (100).

In popular ideas of the self, as they are expressed in poetry of the fifth century, one important element is the acceptance of inconsistent behaviour and feelings. The opacity and strangeness of other people's feelings and intentions correspond to the ancient topos in Greek poetry, man's vulnerability to the strange, vicious accidents of weather and fortune sent by the gods (101). Another element, important in more intellectual, philosophical ideas of the self, is the acquisition of self-knowledge through friendship (discussed above, section (i), pp.192ff). Some philosophical ideas of friendship, and of friendship as a way to self-knowledge, are affected, as we saw above, by metaphors of vision and reflection. The principle, 'like to like' on which ideas of friendship revolved, is evidently related to the belief in the similarity of all men, whoch produced the tendency to universalize discussed above (102). Hence the usefulness of the mirror-metaphor for the process of self-understanding through friendship. Bruno Snell begins his enquiry into views of man in the Greek world by concentrating on the different verbs for looking (103): whatever the validity of his conclusions, it is clear that ways of seeing have long been thought an important element in Greek ideas about man's view of himself.

There are two Greek myths which in particular involve mirrors. One invokes the 'reciprocal nature of vision ... more fundamental than that of spoken dialogue' (104): Perseus conquered the Gorgon by using the other-reflecting mirror of his shield. Sartre makes his interpretation of this myth the climax of his discussion of human relations (105). But the self-revealing mirror is also represented in Greek myth. The myth of Narcissus has been used as the basis for much philosophical and psychological speculation by authors influenced by Ovid's extraordinarily vivid narrative (106). Narcissus can be made to represent the dilemma of the individual, his difficulties in knowing himself. 'The essential paradox of the experience of self' according to psychoanalysis, is that 'no-one can communicate directly from his self or be related to directly in his self' (107). Hence the need for friendship: the friend is 'he in whose presence we can try out ... all the potentialities of our inner life' (108). Notions of self, in classic psychoanalytic practice and in various forms of personality theory, are biased towards 'exploring the meaning of behaviour' (109); this includes the meaning it has <u>for other people</u>.

Another Greek myth involving a mirror brought out the dangers in a self-contemplation which excluded 'the other'. Nonnus preserves the Orphic fragment (110) which records how Dionysus-Zagreus was murdered by the Titans. In Rohde's words: 'They made Dionysus trust them by giving him presents, and while he was looking at his own image in a mirror that they had given him, they fell upon him'. Greek poetry expresses in many contexts the pleasure and pride felt in the gaze of other people; and the way it intensifies both triumph and disgrace (111); this is the positive side to the tendency, noticed by Dover, to emphasize the appearance of virtue rather than its realities (112). In popular Greek attitudes to self-knowledge, there seems to have been a greater value on self-knowledge through the

other, rather than on narcissistic self-contemplation which excluded the other.

Some Freudian theory suggests that there is a universal need to define the self both by differentiation from, and by identification with, the other person (113). Identification with 'the other' is the process, presumably, which Aristotle invokes when he speaks of the 'terror' caused by watching a tragedy; perception of him as the other, is differentiation from the other, and enables the spectator to feel the 'pity' (114). The self, as classic psychoanalytic theory approves it, needs 'the other for one to be and become oneself' (115). And this tendency of Greek thought extends to man's relations not only with other men, but to the world outside. The world in Presocratic theory is composed of the same substances as man (116): man takes details of the world to symbolize himself and his relations with other men; and he also sees the elements of the outside world in terms of himself and of his relations with other men (117). This is perhaps another ramification of the tendency to universalize which affected Greek attitudes in other areas of thought. But though gnomai, myths, ideas of friendship, and relations to the outside world all express this tendency to universalize, and though they are all linked to the question of self-knowledge, it was left to Plotinus explicitly to consider the importance of universality to the concept of the self.

The Delphic command, γνῶθι σεαυτόν is possibly as old as Heracleitus (118). As a guide to practical living, advocated by Xenophon, it consists of knowing one's individual worth and bility, and its advantages are worldly success and τιμαί granted by other people (119). Knowledge of one's self is thereby linked with other people's evaluation. As a 'philosophical propaideutic', used already, perhaps, by Socrates, it links knowledge of the individual self with universal truths about the human condition: it means also 'a knowledge of human limitations' (120).

Plotinus, in his complex arguments on the nature of the self, classifies as particular and universal respectively the concrete historic self and the self which leaves particular bodies after death and which from Homer onwards is called the soul (121) This corresponds to a distinction between the terms 'self' and 'ego' as they are used in current psychoanalytic theory of personality: 'The self refers to the subject as he experiences himself', belonging to a 'phenomenological frame of reference which views personality as experience'. The ego refers to a man's personality as 'a structure about which impersonal generalizations can be made'; it is a topographical concept, which in Freudian theory refers to 'the organized parts of the psychic apparatus', or in later elaborations, to 'that part of the personality which is experienced as being oneself, which one recognizes as "I" ' (122). Plotinus' terms are the εἰκονικός and the 'noetic' self. It is the second which is the target of self-knowledge, and in which all men share. By distinguishing the historical, individual self, from the structure of the human mind which is similar in all men, and by making this the target of self-knowledge, Plotinus lifts out of the tradition he inherits the tendency to confuse every particular with its universal which is one of the elements in fifth century thought about human character that make the problem so opaque to us. By losing in our own attitudes systems of characterization by type, we have lost the faculty of judging by universal ideals so natural to the Greeks: the faculty present in characterization from Homer to Plato, which blends portraiture with universally approved gnomic truths, with universally familiar mythical examples.

Plotinus, in making the 'noetic self' the universal self, confirms to us perhaps the possibility that previous popular thought had defined the individual not by his reason, by which he could control his emotions, but

by the timing and nature of the autonomous emotions and the actions they made him perform. Reason was available to all men: emotion, and the suffering they caused differentiated them. In tragedy, in that they were presented as universally true, they inspired a fear based on identification with the other. In that they were presented as particular, as attached to particular names, particular figures, particular events and relationships, they inspired pity, a sense of the uniqueness of the other person, a differentiation of self from other. The 'mirror of the stage' is both self-reflecting and other-reflecting; it is both universal and particular; and the characters it presents are perceived both universally and particularly. This is partly a product of the habits of thought, as far as we can find them out, in that society; habits of reaction and feeling in personal relations which, if we suppose the characters of tragedy to have been 'humanly intelligible' to those audiences, must have been as important in life as in art.

(viii) Μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας : action which reveals the agent's mind?

The centre of attention in a tragedy is a particular human action. Most tragedy is an exploration of the effects and implications of a particular action performed during the course of the tragedy, though not necessarily on stage (125). The audience experiences different feelings about the action and the characters who perform it, affected by the changing reactions to it of various stage figures. There is no good reason for us to suppose that all members of the original audience felt the same reactions to a play; though where we know a particular play won a prize we may assume, perhaps, a fairly uniform intensity in the reaction. The evidence of Aristophanes suggests to us that the audience of a tragedy attended carefully and critically to the quality of poetry and music; and that they discussed the moral implications of the action. An action chosen, as far as an act could be said to be chosen, by a human being betrayed, in tragedy and in life, his moral individuality (126). Men judged other men by themselves, allowing for the same forces of emotion which produced in themselves also both the involuntary physical acts considered above (in chapter Four), and the single unique acts which affected their lives. Acts of this kind had to be seen as deliberate. They constituted the only guide to the secret intentions and feelings under the mask of the other person: they had to be treated as human and chosen, however deeply the divine motivation for them was also accepted. Involuntary and ritual expressions of emotion tell the observer which kind of emotion is working in a man, and demonstrate its intensity. Deliberate unique tragic action defines him: as the tragic mask defines him, for the mask chosen was the one which showed the emotion appropriate to his πρᾶξις σπουδαία . Oedipus's mask, for instance, probably represented his blinded eyes (127).

Each member of the audience was invited to explore for himself this definition of a character through action. Oedipus's action of self-blinding is given two explanations by the agent himself. When the chorus see him they ask why he did it: their question is framed in terms of outside forces, OT 1298f,

πῇ σ' ὦ τλῆμον,
προσέβη μανία; πῇ σ' ὑπερήλατο
μείζονα δαίμων τῶν μακίστων
πρὸς οὐ δυσδαίμονι μοίρᾳ;

Oedipus's first explanation accepts this level of interpretation. His cries use the same language of passive suffering found by Io to express her persecution by divine forces of madness (128); OT 1309-1315,

αἰαῖ, αἰαῖ, δύστανος ἐγώ,
ποῖ γᾶς φέρομαι τλήμων; πᾷ μου
φθογγὰ διαπωτᾶται † φορᾶσθαν;
ἰὼ δαῖμον, ἵν' ἐξήλου.

He refers to the Olympian mechanics of the myth (references to the oracle of Apollo recur throughout the play), OT 1329f

Ἀπόλλων τάδ' ἦν, Ἀπόλλων, φίλοι,
ὁ πακὰ πακὰ τελῶν ἐμὰ τάδ' ἐμὰ πάθεα.

But Oedipus in a second explanation of his action gives another, human, frame of reference. He accepts his action as his own, 1331 ἔπαισε δ' αὐτόχειρ νιν οὐχὶς ἄλλ' ἐγὼ τλήμων. He gives a reasoned defence of it: he could not have looked at his children, alive, nor at his parents, after death, nor at his city, polluted by himself. The audience is given both levels of explanation; we may assume that different individuals in the audience will have reacted differently to this problem; a problem implicit in their own language and

inherited ideas, of the tension between the divine and human forces affecting human events. Sophocles invites them to speculate on particular actions and universal truths simultaneously (129: the 'character' of the man who initiates the serious action is the focus for their speculation.

Questions of responsibility and motive in tragedy have produced in some subsequent audiences and in some scholars an 'impression of chaos' (130). This is an appropriate reaction to the chaos of inconsistent feelings and explanations out of which the different aspects of Greek religious belief and ethical argument were built. Chaos: since the members of the audience were different and would have had different explanations of the plays; chaos, since the paradoxes inherent in the inconsistent beliefs held by each of those individuals will have been excited by the play chaos, since the language in which tragedies were written contained various implications and images of conceptual confusion; chaos, finally, produced on purpose. It is hard to find in any tragedy a solution explicitly approved by the dramatist to a moral problem which he has posed through the representation of his action. Hence it is inappropriate to import notions of truth into considering motives for tragic characters from other disciplines: from psychoanalysis, for example. Psychological theory, which makes various suggestions about the human mind as a structure, is useful in assessing people's relations to each other and ideas about themselves from another society. But psychiatric practice, based on the examination of words and behaviour as a clue not simply to perceiving character but to healing a personality, is irrelevant to discussion of dramatic poetry whose main function was to make the audience enjoy themselves in the contemplation of particular events and universal truths about human life. Interpretations of the 'Bacchae', for instance, which involve references to Pentheus' obsession with sex, latent effeminacy, or relation to his mother,

are all as valid, as partial, and as inappropriate, as those which concentrate exclusively on the symbolism of Pentheus' dressing-up scene. Every tragic action is σπουδαία in an infinite number of ways. It is the different number of implications it suggests that makes tragedy so everlastingly interesting: and the dramatists have, after all, chosen their actions and tried to make them as σπουδαῖαι as possible. Questions of consistency of character are, of course, irrelevant. Jones refers to the trouble caused by Antigone when she laments her approaching incarceration (131). He attributes the surprise of a modern reader at the apparent change in personality to the modern reader's private picture of Antigone's 'inner debate'. He suggests that the modern reader fails 'to distinguish between what happened and what might have happened'; fails to 'make contact with an Antigone, i.e. a real person, who can conceive of other situations and alternative solutions, whose apprehension of self in absent circumstances is so shifting and feeble that she projects in debate an alter ego who can subordinate a religious duty to the royal edict'. This is muddled and muddling, and ignores various important features of the tragic genre. First: Antigone's exploration of hypothetical 'alternatives' is typical of rhetorical, reasoned speculation about the various implications of an action in tragedy which also has precedents in epic (132). Secondly, the double exploration of the same situation, once in lyrics and once in iambics, is also typical of tragedy (133). Thirdly, tragedy is concerned with the expression of the emotions which cause action and are aroused by action. Appropriate emotion must be expressed at appropriate points in the action: it underlines the action for the audience, and invites them to share the feelings of the characters. The topical lament of an unmarried girl before her death is important in tragedy as elsewhere (134): it is necessary at this point in this play, and it is most effective dramatically if it is

Antigone who delivers it. Jones also ignores contemporary ideas about 'selves', whether shifting or not. Athenians were able to refer explanations of human action to contradictory beliefs. They did not admire inconsistency of behaviour, but they were aware of it as a phenomenon (135). If we attributed to the character Antigone a 'shifting sense of self' we should attribute it also to the audience who were expecting to identify with and pity her character. Though this may fit in with the elements of Greek thought which perceived a certain 'disunity of the personality' (136), it seems a somewhat arrogant judgement to make on the society for which the plays were written. One deduces the audience from the plays, grateful for outside evidence about their ways of judging each other, and wary of the distortions produced by conventions of the genre.

It was a truth universally acknowledged that human life and the movements of the human mind were unpredictable and difficult. The different members of the audience watched the representation of an action on stage; they both compared themselves to its agent, and contrasted him with themselves; they pondered the moral problems his action suggested, problems of explanation, involving divine and human forces, and problems of behaviour; perhaps even, they invoked (to help them) that ambiguous catch-phrase, ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων. We might assume that some members, at least, of the audience were conditioned by their culture to enjoy finding universal significances in particular actions, to enjoy assessing the moral tensions posed in the poetry, characters and actions of a good play, and to enjoy evaluating the dramatists who offered them these problems for their entertainments. Those audiences were the judges of the plays we still possess, and also of a very large number of lost ones. Either the lost plays were even better than those we have, and Greek drama was of an even higher order than we suspect; or what we have does

represent the best of it, the result, in part, of the audiences' choice. Either way, the plays we have were written for those audiences, and we must take on trust that these audiences and judges were worthy of the plays. Perhaps some of them even found katharsis through the pity and fear Aristotle thought they should have felt.

CONCLUSION: 'MARK THE MUSIC'

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Conclusion: 'Mark the Music'

> 'Almost the greatest difficulty before good work in the ordinary theatres is that the audience has no binding interest, no great passion or bias that the dramatist can awake' (1).

Introduction

The theatre was a focus of passion for a substantial section of society in fifth-century Athens; not in our own. If we want to understand, from our own society, the plays once produced in that theatre as they may have been expected to be understood, we look to aspects of the social background - at facts of life, ideas, assumptions that permeated the society - in the hope that these will enlighten us as to the binding interest and passions which their poets wanted, inter alia, to wake. In the first part of this conclusion I shall summarize the argument of the five preceding chapters. The progression of the argument from details of language to aspects of behaviour is explained partly by the emphasis it places on interaction of language pattern, behaviour pattern and thought pattern: 'All life ... comes back to the question of our speech, the medium through which we communicate with each other; for all life comes back to the question of our relations with each other' (2). In the second part of the conclusion I suggest some background facts and ideas which seem to me to be importantly different from our own, in the belief that the differences of outlook they imply may help us to see the plays more nearly as they may have been seen by their contemporary audiences. However widely we open our eyes we cannot escape the limits of our vision; but we can multiply the angles from which we see, finding some which might follow some line in the plural gaze of the Athenian audiences. For Aristotle, self-confessedly, is no accurate guide. The crowd, he tells us, is a better judge of poetry and music than the single, and partial, critic (3): διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον πάντα δὲ πάντες.

(i) Summary

One basis for our discussion of fifth-century Athenian attitudes to the mind, as tragedy represents them, is the kind of metaphorical association made to the collection of physical organs hidden in the centre of the human body. These were felt to be the centre of mental and emotional energy. They are dark, hidden from other people and therefore partially protected, opaque to other people and therefore potentially dangerous (4). The horror of mental life is their vulnerability, their porosity (5). Man is prey to emotion as his body is prey to the outside world: the horros of material life is the corpse left for animal scavengers: οἰωνοῖσιν ἅλωρ καὶ κύρμα (6). The dilemma of mental life is brought out in the tension between the two prevalent modes of thought, the two ways of explaining man's relation to the world (7): is the source of human power and human movement internal or external, human or divine? The tragedian makes this dilemma the source of tension in his drama: he does not indicate its solution unambiguously (8). The central fact of this tension is the tremendous power of those forces that act on the mind, which can be described in these two ways: a power for both destruction and creation, a blessing and a curse. All objects and states of mind which are felt to have some more-than-human power (9) have it for good and for harm. Equally, man himself, who uses them and is at their mercy, is powerful for good and bad: οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον (10). The animal world is the mediating element between the human and the divine (11), and animals furnish many images to describe the forces which empower and impel the mind (12). From some cultural associations to the animals of the real world (13) we can gauge some implications of the animal quality in mental images.

The poet can indicate in tragedy his awareness of the relation between inner and outer worlds: the relation of 'projection' (14). The fabric of the invisible demonic world is composed, through the pressure of ancient images and dark cults (15), of personalized forces so powerful that most men, most of the time, feel more comfortable if they see them as belonging to the visible world outside. Tragedy, which presents so vividly man's vulnerability to forces outside and inside, shows man as solaced by two things; tragedy itself embodies both. First, the form of a tragedy instantiates the security to be found in order and musical structure. The most frightening aspect of emotion, as presented in tragedy, is its clumsy, unrhythmical violence (16). Such fears are often exemplified in trimeters: the structured musical form of choral odes may elaborate them. One idea characteristic of several areas of Greek thought is that the single unit is dangerous when isolated from its normal blend, when removed from its normal structure. The dunameis of the body, when isolated from one another (17) endanger the body as the madman, exiled from society by his sickness, endangers other people, as a god is dangerous to the man who isolates one deity from all the others in worship or neglect (18). The violence of emotion can be calmed by its shared expression in song and dance. Music is one cultural expression of the wish to impose form on emotion and thereby to control it: an expression very important in Athenian society (19). Secondly, ritual, as distinct from music though it often incorporates it, is another expression of the same desire (20) and tragedy embodies aspects of Greek ritual. Tragedy explores the deepest horrors of Greek imagination: incest, genocide, parricide, anger and curse, war, enslavement, jealousy, insanity, suicide. Its relation to the narratives which contain these elements resembles the intricate, ambiguous relation of ritual to myth, seen in the rehearsal of myth in ritual (21). In some ritual participants were led, in culturally accepted forms, through the anticipated emotions generated in myth - darkness, fear, sadness, desolation, violence - to their resolution. In tragedy, the audience finds a pleasure, a

peace of mind, which we may typify by the words taken sometimes to describe the best state for the mind; a kind of hesychia or harmonia which they would not have found except by vicarious participation in violent events, by accepting those elements in their own imaginations, as shaped by their own culture (22)

Men judge each other by observing action and movement (23). Sometimes they judge by identifying the other's condition as their own, real or potential (24). But they judge objectively as well, judge people who suggest no relation to their own experience: then their involvement is strong enough to pity another man's suffering, but not strong enough to identify with the particular form it takes (25). Friendship and time, or friendship through time, are ways of judging another man's nature: ways which can be expressed metaphorically in the double functions of a mirror. A mirror has a self-reflecting and an other-reflecting quality. Men see in the mirror both 'the other' and themselves. When a friend or stage-figure is suffering, we pity him in that we see him as 'the other'. In that we see our own sufferings reflected in his, we are afraid (26). The various implications of such thoughts supply us with a basis for considering contemporary views of character, the self, and personal interaction which may have affected the presentation and understanding of character in tragedy.

(ii) Background facts and thoughts, and their implications

There are some background facts of life, and some background ideas, common to fifth-century Athenian life which we do not share. In considering the matter of the argument above, we should perhaps take into account the following facts and thoughts which imply large gaps between fifth-century Athenian attitudes and our own: should try, perhaps, to think ourselves into the implicit assumptions created by such different conditions of living and thinking.

(a) Some background facts and their implications

1. Many citizens in the tragic audiences were in some sense literate (27); many were also musically knowledgeable (28), experienced not only as critics in the 'perpetual competition of new music with recollected models and standards' (29), but also, in varying degrees of skill, as performers. Some might have sons in the chorus, or might look forward or back to being choreutai themselves. 'The citizen's part on stage was the choric voice; and the classics, repeated by the citizen's voice and his lyre in school and on domestic occasions, consisted in a body of song'. (30). It was a familiar part of life to participate in shared song. This personal familiarity with song, and the experience of sharing it with others, helps to explain the ability to universalize the human experiences evoked in song: an ability which, I have argued, was generally greater, or more widespread, than is common in our own society. Music has a tremendous power to generalize (31).

Further, standards of composition and performance were commonly associated with ethical standards. The rhythm and harmonia chosen for the song, and the balance or control with which it was executed, indicated the ethos of performer and composer (32). Despite the degree of musical professionalism, which increased in the last quarter of the fifth century, and the corresponding increase in respect for such professionalism, the standards of musical criticism applied by the audience to a tragic performance, were applied in the context of personal musical skill. Musical and ethical judgement was linked with an awareness of universal human powers.

2. 'Music' does not mean poetry and song only. Dance was also an integral part of a tragic performance (33), and was equally familiar to those audiences both as an object of criticism and as a personal experience of worship and pleasure, which they shared actively with one another (34). Pleasure and interest taken in the structure of the dance, in the combination of the whole from individual dancers, is shown early in Greek culture, in

sculptural reliefs depicting joined dancers (35). Dance could also involve active participation from the audience: when a dance was performed without song it was performed without music too, and the rhythm was established and maintained by the handclaps of the audience (36). Interdependence of dancer on dancer offers the citizen, whether he is participating or watching, a model for the interlocking human relationships in his society. A knowledge of letters can be seen as an integrating element in Athenian society (37). Equally, a musical experience, particularly of dance, offered Athenians a way of seeing in concrete terms the construction of the whole by individuals. The image of the city may have magnetized the imagination of those audiences, and may have influenced their critical standards both aesthetic and moral, to a far greater extent than we can understand. Our own imagination knows no such image: or no image of such common and consistent power (38).

3. The three branches of Athenian education were mousike, grammata, and gymnastike (39). Words are one way to judge character but, I have argued, tragedy also acknowledged their power to mask it (40). Music, as we have seen, could be another indication of character and mood (41). But the strongest focus of the observer's gaze is the movement of the other man's body on stage: movement which indicates those movements of his mind which poetry and song evoke and represent (42). Fifth-century observers were very used to judging other men physically by their movements in athletics, gymnastics, and ultimately, in battle. In this sphere too of physical performance ethical implications creep into objective and aesthetic standards. In this sphere too the citizen judged others both as a critic and as a performer. 'The art of the theatre has sprung from action, movement, dance' (43). The Athenian audience was far more aware of standards of physical movement, the basis of theatrical performance, both in competition with other men, and in the joint creation of a common pattern, than are most members of our society(44). They applied those standards in different activities of life, judging each other as competitors, fellow-dancers, fellow-soldiers. They were an audience

experienced in war, used to gauging each other's power (45) and to choosing their own leaders, political and military, for strength both of body and of mind. The tragedians were writing for men whose lives could depend on their judgement of other people.

(b) Some background thoughts and their implications

1. The conditions of tragic performance reminded the audience of that most sensitive area of their thought: of the uncertain boundary between the inner and the outer world. What was the relationship, for instance, between the actor and his mask, between character and the words which revealed and concealed it, between internal motivation and external demonic pressure, between the particular and the universal hidden in its heart (46), between the body of a man, changed by his experience and action (47) and the secret, isolated individual mind within, which felt the first impact of feeling and thought? The problematic ambiguous relation of inner to outer affects many areas of fifth-century thought (48); not least, the question of human movement.

2. Balanced control of the body was a cultural ideal in the fifth century. The horror of extreme emotion was in part the horror of the unrhythmical external violence it caused (49). Emotion, deduced from external movement, was described metaphorically as internal movement. As physical movement was a source of danger and pleasure, of honour and shame, so was the movement of the mind (50). The 'choric voice' of tragedy, and minor tragic characters, often express a wish for metrical, modified movement, for hesychia in mind and living. Emotion and perception can hurt. This is the area of fifth-century thought to which we look to answer Page's indirect question, 'φρενῶν βάσις ~~nescio quid sit~~ quae sit nescio; etiam quaerendum est, cur hoc loco ἥσυχος debeat esse' (51). Whatever the phrase φρενῶν βάσις precisely signifies, hesychia is, clearly, a desirable state for the φρένες : and κίνησις φρενῶν is its antithesis. But Aristotle observes (53) that man needs strife and struggle in order to achieve the harmonia he desires: harmonia is valued

through the experience of its antithesis. Tragedy satisfies the need of its audience to experience κίνησις φρενῶν by presenting them with violent emotion and corresponding violent action. But it did so within a structure whose ingredients were familiar parts of the citizen's own life, but which yet remained artificial, composed, remote, external: bolt something which they could judge objectively, and something with which they could feel themselves involved. In fulfilling their dual need, tragedy embodied for them both external and internal movement. It embodied physical and mental power, but it embodied also the balance and control of such movement: power and its control were ~~avowed~~ familiar objects of admiration, satisfaction, and desire. 'The world is the richer for having a devil in it, so long as we keep our foot upon his neck' (53).

3. The music of tragedy was not embroidery; it furnished the essential texture. It furnished also a powerful metaphor that expressed a common ideal in many interlocking areas of Greek thought: in theories medical, mathematical, political, psychological, moral. Human life, proverbially, was two parts bad to one part good: music was one of the three gifts to man by which he could forget how hard life was ~~to forget~~ for a little while (54). Just as there were several different harmoniai to which you could tune your lyre (55), there were many different kinds of metaphorical harmonia. But in every area harmonia represented a balance between dangerous extremes, a balance valued the more intensely for its impermanence.

Tragedy, a musical genre, embodied implicit assumptions made by means of the metaphors music provided. One of the main elements in tragedy is the portrayal of human passion, metaphorically expressed as animal (56). Animals are tamed in myth, by the power of music; so are human passions and sickness in early therapy (57).

Secondly, tragedy embodied the calming of emotion by the power music has to unite people. Music was a shared, a public and a communal experience at Athens. Tragedy united the members of its audience in the huge ring

round the stage. Like ritual and worship it provided a focus of communal regard and attention: like the music by which worship and ritual were expressed, it reminded the spectators that they belonged together.

Thirdly, tragedy embodied the alternating states of mind, peace and violence, which music could create in every individual, and embodied the pleasure to be found in both.

Finally, tragedy embodied the two different modes of explaining such an alternation of mental states, different modes of explaining man's relation to the world. It showed at one level the gods provoking human violence and pushing human events through to some resolution, a god-given harmonia. It showed simultaneously how human emotions, humanly interpreted, provoked human violence and a human dénouement, a πάθει μάθος (58) which is the human way of finding harmonia. This was a rich and sensitive area of thought; the boundary between the two explanations was bruised on the one hand by the need to project human power, bad and good, on the outside world; was bruised on the other by the wish to accept human powers as human, whatever the responsibilities that might ensue (59). In exploring and exciting it, tragedy embodied various possibilities of harmonia between the two modes of thought, and could provoke, perhaps, sudden moments of insight for each individual spectator. It offered him the chance of fleeting harmony, an understanding which might last no longer than the time it took him to fight his way out of the theatre back to his life, but which might remain as a lasting source of the pleasure he took in watching a tragic performance: a sudden bright spot in the dark (60). One goal of the tragic poets, when they set out to please their audience by waking their passions, might have been the creation of such moments, in which the two conflicting explanations of life found a sudden harmony.

(iii) Postscript: subjective judgement and 'harmonia'

Trying to anatomize, from our own society, the movements of the mind, the sources of pleasure felt by the Athenian audiences in the plays, trying to see what breeds about their hearts, we are doomed to subjectivity, to using our own experience. The ideal of 'harmonia' happens to be woven into our own tradition, and to touch some of the same speculations in our poetry that it did in fifth-century Athens. Through metaphor it influences questions posed equally in our poetry and theirs: questions of how one's mind works and when it is happiest, how to look at the world, how to enjoy the life one has, how to relate to the other people in one's society, how to wonder, to fear, to admire. All these questions are raised by their tragedians, and also, in terms rather similar, by our own.

> Here will we sit and let the sounds of music
> Creep in our ears (61); soft stillness and the night
> Become the touches of sweet harmony (62) ...
> Such harmony is in immortal souls (63),
> But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
> Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it ...
> ... do but note a wild and wanton herd (64),
> Or race of youthful and unhandled colts
> Fetching mad bounds, bellowing and neighing loud,
> Which is the hot condition of their blood -
> If they but hear perchance a trumpet sound,
> Or any air of music touch their ears,
> You shall perceive them make a mutual stand (65),
> Their savage eyes tun'd to a modest gaze (66),
> By the sweet power of music. Therefore the poet
> Did feign that Orpheus drew trees, stones, and floods;
> Since naught so stockish, hard, and full of rage,
> But music for the time (67) doth change his nature.
> The man that hath no music in himself (68),
> Nor is not mov'd (69) with concord of sweet sounds,
> Is fit for treason, stratagems, and spoils;
> The motions of his spirit are dull as night,
> And his affections dark as Erebus (70).
> Let no such man be trusted (71). Mark the music.(72).

Though we shall never be able to mark the music itself of tragedy (73), we can make ourselves conscious, to some degree, of the power it had; power in itself and power as an image by which men could express a cultural ideal in many areas of their life and thought. We can try to use our awareness of its influence on our <u>own</u> tradition, on our <u>own</u> wandering images, that we may feel its power in <u>that</u> society. No-one can calculate the degree of parallax

between the various visions of the world possible in Athenian society, and those possible in our own; nor evaluate the different thresholds of light-tolerance between their eyes and ours. Ours may not be able to stand the ruthless lights and darks comprehended in their field of mental vision. We can establish a few background differences between the two real worlds and the two thought worlds and ponder the implications of divergence. But equally we have to assume that there are points of similarity, which the image of harmonia, perhaps, exemplifies. It is an image which might help the lover of the ancient world in resolving the permanent tension he or she inhabits: in finding some private and temporary harmonia between the realities of his or her own world, and theirs.

Notes to Preface and Introduction

1. 'Language' in the sense of 'parole': for the traditional structuralist distinction between 'langue' and 'parole', and for a useful discussion of the 'structure' of each, v. J. Culler, Structuralist Poetics, 1975, pp. 8-10.

2. v. M. Douglas, Implicit Meanings, 1975, p. 175.

3. ibid., p. 144.

4. The particular pattern which is the structure of that society: each institution or convention being an expression of it, a 'text'. v. J.A. Boon, From Symbolism to Structuralism, pp. 9-14: 'texts' of a given society are defined as the 'ways experience is organized', and 'language', ibid., p. 11, is 'one variety of evidence' for the prevailing pattern of thought.

5. 'The implicit is ... whatever is taken for granted ... it represents a community of shared assumptions', M. Douglas, op. cit., p. 173.

6. v. REG 71 (1966), pp. 585ff (F.D. Harvey).

7. Music is a source of pleasure, a way of forgetting the cares of living, below, p.

8. M. Douglas, op. cit., p. 176.

9. Language and Social Context, ed. P.P. Giglioli, 1972, pp. 9-10. Metaphors become fossilized in language as clichés, v. M. Silk, Interaction in Poetic Imagery, 1974, pp. 27ff. But even fossils have their effect; the transformative power of a metaphor can be felt even after its death. On the transformative powers of symbol and metaphor v. e.g. V. Turner, The Forest of Symbols, 1967, Introduction, Ch. 1 passim, M. Douglas, op. cit., p. 142.

10. I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 1936, p. 30 Cf. D. Donaghue, The Third Voice, OUP 1959, p. 250: 'One of the special concerns of modern criticism has been to show that metaphor and image, far from being mere decorations on an already given, wrapped-up meaning, are often the essential ways of bringing meaning to birth. How then can poésie de théâtre be fully articulate unless it utilizes all the exploratory potentialities of words?'

11. A. Poet. 1457 b. 25 ἐνίοις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα κείμενον τῶν ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται· οἷον τὸ τὸν καρπὸν μὲν ἀφιέναι σπείρειν, τὸ δὲ τὴν φλόγα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὸ σπείρειν πρὸς τὸν καρπόν, διὸ εἴρηται "σπείρειν θεοκτίστην φλόγα" ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν οἰκείων τι.... Cf. Socrates' defence of metaphor, Rep. 487e - 488a (ἄκουε δ' ὁ τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵν' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω).

12. ibid., 1457 b. 5.

13. Cf. Ryle, cit. below, 27 n.

14. e.g. Ella Sharpe, 'An examination of metaphor' in Collected Papers, pp. 155f.

15. Cf. Owen Jones, The Grammar of Ornament, 1856, pp. 5-6, 'Propositions', 5, 6, 11. Metaphor can, of course, be used to obscure meaning as well as clarify it. Such use of it corresponds to Jones' 'excrescences' of decoration in architecture.

16. Cf. below, Conclusion, and Ch. 4, n. 10.

17. J. Culler, op. cit., p. 30.

18. M. Bloch, The Historian's Craft, trans. Putnam, 1954, p. 144.

19. v. below, p. 255 and cf pp. 145-7.

20. v. , pp. 239, 251, 433, (124n.)

21. Tragedy distorts, (probably), funeral rites, Kurtz and Boardman, Greek Burial Customs, p. 142; and perhaps fear of the Erinyes, Aeschines i. 190f, v. Dover, Greek Popular Morality, p. 145.

22. e.g. H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society, 1974, pp. 9-10.

23. Cf. above, n. 6, p. 258.

24. Cf. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology, p. 66f. Lévi-Strauss maintains (The Raw and the Cooked, p. 21): 'It makes little difference whether, in this book, the thought of South American Indians takes shape through the operations of my thought, or my thought through the operations of theirs'. Cf. J. Culler, op. cit., p. 51. On the involvement of the reader in literary critical theory v. e.g. G.H. Hartman, 'The Dream of Communication', in Essays presented to I.A. Richards, ed. R. Brower, H. Vendler, J. Hollander, 1973, pp. 157f. For the emotional involvement of the analyst with the patient in psychoanalytic theory v. C. Rycroft, A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, s.v. 'counter-transference': according to some theory, the analyst can 'assume that his own emotional response is based on a correct interpretation of the patient's true intentions or meaning'. Compare Professor K. Dover, whose study of fourth-century morality is structured by attention to 'his own moral experience', GPM, p. xii.

25. v. M. Bloch, op. cit., pp. 29ff, 'The Idol of Origins'; cf. Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 37.

26. I am indebted to Dr. C. Gill for this observation; cf. below, Ch. 1. 1n. Snell denies this assumption, Discovery of the Mind, introduction.

27. G. Ryle, Concept of Mind, Hutchinson 1949, pp. 18f.

28. v. G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, CUP 1966, pp. 172ff.

29. op. cit., p. 12.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE.

1. 'The mind' being defined as the collection of organs thought to be responsible for thinking and feeling. One of my friends doubts "whether the Greeks had any conception of the mind". Cf above, p xv.

2. Od. 3.18, Empedocles 100.5, E. Supp.295.

3. Il. 9.313; Od. 18.406; S. Ant.1253-4, μή τι καὶ κατάσχετον
κευθῇ καλύπτει καρδίᾳ θυμούμενη
(where Blaydes (Spicilegium Sophocleum) compares Phoen.92, Tro. 176 and Ant.483 and Od. 3.18).

4. Cf Cho.746 ἤλγυνεν ἐν στέρνοις φρένα.

5. Cf Od.11.337, 14. 178 φρένας ἔνδον εἴσας.

6. For other examples, v.A.Cho.450, Eum.275, PV 789, Pi.O.10(11) 3, S.Tr.683, fr.535. Compare perhaps the stamping image at E.Med 516 (v. below, Ch. 5, 72n, 73n).

7. eg Cho. 410, 1023, Supp. 785, S.Ant.1060 with Jebb's note; v. Aristotle, Poet. ed. Lucas App. II.p.262.

8. eg OT 727, where the onset of real fear is marked by the image ψυχῆς πλάνημα κἀνακίνητος φρενῶν.

9. For sound penetrating to the brain and its place among the images of penetration in Presocratic theories of perception v. eg. Anaxagoras (DK 59 A 92):

ἀκούειν φῶν τὸ μὲν ἅμα τῇ ἀναπνοῇ, τὸ δὲ διικνεῖσθαι τὸν ψόφον ἄχρι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου. (263)

10. Pearson reads ἐύπουμένου , v. his note ad loc. and Lloyd-Jones, JHS Lxxxiii (1963) p. 81. v. further, D. West, On Reading Horace, p. 144, 23 n.

11. v. Plutarch's interpretation of Plato's use of this, Quaest. Conv. 745 C-D. At OT 1386 Jebb compares Pl. Phaedr. 245 C ψυχὴ . . . πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.

12. For further examples of hearing which stress the physical organ of the mind v. S. Aj. 16, φώνημ' ἀκούω καὶ συναρπάζω φρενί, Ant. 317 ἐν τοῖσιν ὠσὶν ἢ 'πὶ τῇ ψυχῇ δάκνῃ; and E.Hipp. 573, Ar. Nub.775.

13. eg Pl.Tim.71C and
A. P.A.4.67B24.

14. cf. σὺ δ' ἔνδοθ, θυμὸν ἀμύξεις χωόμενος, Il.1.243; Bacc 16.19, καρδίαν ἄμυξεν ἄλγος, Call. Aet 3.1.10 and Theoc. 13.71, μαινόμενος· χαλεπὸς γάρ ἔσω θεὸς ἦπαρ ἄμυσσεν. At Pl. Tim. 71 the liver is a mirror for divine thought of which, at the moment of death, physical traces may be caught. Compare Stat. Theb. 176, 'In nullis spirat deus integer extis,' and Luc. Phars. 1.633, 'Caesique in viscera neuri invenere dei.'

15. cf S.Aj. 938 χωρεῖ πρὸς ἦπαρ, οἶδα, γενναία δύη.

16. eg Archil.1.31 χολὴν ... οὐκ ἔχεις ἐφ' ἵππαι.

17. Cf. S. Phil.791-2 εἴθε σοῦ διαμπερὲς
στέρνων ἵκοιτ' ἄλγησις ἥδε.

18. The movement of the φρένες is taken perhaps from movement of the καρδία ; the swelling and filling of ἧπαρ from that of the φρένες perhaps. Onians, Origins of Western European Thought, 2nd Cambridge, 1954, Ch. 2 passim ingeniously suggests that φρένες in Homer refers to the lungs. I would doubt, however, if it refers to the lungs in every case; the complexity and variety of mental organs seems to have produced relatively early and conceptual chaos which is not susceptible to systemic explanation. v. below, 33 n.

19. For the goad image, especially in relation to the οἶστρος of Io, v. below, Ch.1. section (j).

20. eg, A.Ag.1624, E.Ba.795.

21. Compare ἀρτίπους Il. 9.505.

22. Wilam. Glaube I p. 398 and his preface to his translation of Eum. More recently, Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods, pp. 131, 137f, (especially the Areion/Erinys derivation). One can add many phrases in which attention is paid to the feet of these attacking daemons, eg S.El.491 χαλκόπους Ἐρινύς (a word applied in Homer also to horses) or OT 418 δεινόπους ἀρά. v. below, Ch. 2, A section (ii).

23. Cf below Ch.2 sections (ix), (x). E.G. also A.P.12. 16(Stat.), S.Ant. 1097 ἀτη πατάξαι θυμὸν, and Ar. Ran.54 πόθος καρδίαν πατάσσει . V. Lloyd-Jones, CR 14(1964)p.129.

24. V. Onians, op. cit. p.35f.

25. eg Ag. 1215-6 ὑπ' αὖ με φρενὸς ὀρθομάντειάς πόνος στρωβεῖ παράσσων..

Cf S.Tr.216-220 and Lloyd-Jones, Yale Studies 22(1972) p.264. Compare the whirling movement of men ridden by emotion, below, section (i), especially the rolling eyes. Cf. also A. Pers.767 φρενῶν γὰρ αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ἀλακοστρόφουν.

26. Ag. vol. II.p.447

27. For divination by entrails v. Halliday, Gk. Divination, pp. 189-90, 200, and Körte, "Über die bronze Leber von Piacenza", Mitt.Arch.Inst. (Rom.) xx, 1905, pp. 348-79; Bouché-Leclerq, l. p.171, Blecher, De Extispicio capita tria, p.29, with Pliny NH viii 203 on abdomen and bowels. For its 5th-century importance v. A. PV 493f where it is included in Prometheus' list of benefits to mankind:

σπλάγχνων τε λειότητα, καὶ χροιὰν τίνα
ἔχουσ' ἂν εἴη δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν
χολή, λοβοῦ τε ποικίλην εὐμορφίαν.

Cf. the image of δέλτοι φρενῶν , above 14n, and on earlier archaeological evidence for the practice, below 142 n.

28. For this image compare Casaubon's suggestion ἐκ πρυμνῆς φρενός , A.Supp.989, for εὐπρυμνῆ φρενός which Page retains.

29. Il.18.322, Od.24,319, cf Mimn.13.6 and Eum332 κύματος πικρὸν μένος . V. Ag.1501 παλαιὸς δεινὸς ἀλάστωρ, Ant.955 ὀξύχολος (of Lycurgus). Aristophanes uses δεινός of smoke, V.146.

30. Onians op.cit. p. 44f, v. Bolton, Glory, Jest & Riddle, p.8.

31. Cf. A.R. 3.688

32. eg Cho.183 κἀμοὶ προσέστη καρδίᾳ κλυδώνιον χολῆς (cf below section (iii), with notes, for discussion from a different angle);
Ag.1121 ἐπὶ δὲ καρδίαν ἔδραμε κροκοβαφὴς σταγών,
Ag.179 στάζει δ' ἀνθ' ὕπνου πρὸ καρδίας (Murray) μνησιπήμων πόνος.

33. It is dangerous to add εκ . Although the wind-ship relation it suggests may be protected by S.Phil.639 πνεῦμα τοὐκ πρώρας , the breath(liquid)-heart relation is destroyed. It is rarely that breath (or liquid) comes <u>from</u> the heart in emotion. Every passage suggests that the heart inflates with liquid rather than deflating. The rare image of overflowing (v. section (iii) and Ant.959-60 quoted there) is always explicit. The basic image is that of Il.9.646 οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλῳ and may be used with any organ, even νόος , eg Il.9.554 χόλος . . . οἰδάνει ἐν στήθεσσι νόον. . At A. fr. 282.32 θυμοίδ[η] is applied to a son of Zeus: Lloyd-Jones in his discussion (Loeb) derives this from the root of οἰδάνω , ie "having a swelling θυμός ". (V. also Winnington-Ingram, CR NS 9(1959) p.241).

34. For the interchangeable images of liquid and breath in body and mind v. section (f).

35. αἷμα as well as μένος and χόλος is usually

black, eg Ag.1020, Il.4.149, 5.354 etc. I find the interpretation of κροκοβαφὴς σταγών as blood unconvincing, v. section (c) below.

36. Though the 'eyes of the soul' is an important notion in Greek poetry and philosophy, v. below Ch.5 Section (vii) with 66 n.

37. v. eg. A.Sept. 856-6.

38. Cf Pl. Gorg. 493B, Crat. 403A, Phaedo 81C 10-11. Also Lloyd-Jones, CR 15(1965) p.242, with notes 2, 3, 4 and 5. On light and dark in general v. Bultmann, Philologus 97, 1948,'Geschichte der Lichtsymbolik in Altertum' and C. J. Classen, Stud. Gen.18, 1965, p. 976, "Licht und Dunkel in der frühgr. Phil." The ghost at Hec.1.ff. leaves the gates of darkness, after lying in the dark under the earth. Dead men have a σκοτίαν αἰῶνα , Phoen. 1484, lived on dark plains, γαίας ἐς μελάγχιμον πέδον , Rhes. 962.

Cf. Phoen.1746 σκοτίᾳ γᾷ καλύψω . The dead return to the dark earth whence they came, a topos in funeral speeches and epitaphs, E. Supp.532. v. West ad Theog.116(p.193) on darkness and chaos , and compare the darkness of the womb, Eum.665 ἐν σκότοισι νηδύος .

39. v. Stanford ad loc.

40. eg Ag.1511
v. below Ch.2 sections (i), (ii).

41. φρήν , Sol.42.4.; καρδία Pi fr. 225 and 123-5 (Snell).

42. Black hellebore is a cure for madness, v. Ar. V.1488 and lexica s.v.v. ἑλλεβοριάω , ἑλλεβορίζω . The implication is that since madness carried metaphysical implications of the darkened mind, homeopathic principles operated to find its cure.

43. Ar.Plut.12, 366,903, Av. 14; Menander, Samia 218 et al. Cf. H. Flasche, Melancholes und Melancholikos, introduction. (v. also the use of χολάω in New Comedy).

44. eg E.Hel.1088, 1198. v.Wilam.Gr. Trag. iv.285
Cf. For the symbolic implications of this dress v. below, Ch.4, section (iv) (a).

45. 'Imagery of the Antigone' p. 61.

46. Which I take to refer to the soul of the dead king. Other explanations have been offered.

47. eg IT 1261 νυχία χθὼν ἐτεκνώσατο φάσμαθ' ὁ⟨νείρων⟩
cff. Ar. Ran. 1333 ὄνειρου πέμπεις ἐξ ἀφανοῦς,
A.Eum.379 δνοφερὰν τιν' ἀχλὺν κατὰ δώματος/αὐδᾶται πολύστονος φ
ibid. 395-6 ὑπὸ χθόνα τάξιν ἔχουσα
καὶ δυσηλίου κνέφας.
and below, section (h).
For the eye of the mind v. above 38n, and below, Ch.1. section (i), the correspondence between the madman's rolling eyes and his wandering movements of mind and body.

48. V. Onians, op. cit. p.29f.

49. On πόροι in eg. Empodoclean theory V. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 4 p.246f.

50. ἄφραστος ; "unseen", as in H. h. Merc.353; also perhaps as "incomprehensible", as Orph.L.46.

51. In tragedy σπήνη is qualified by δαυλός at A.Fr. 27N, and γενείας by δάσκιος at Pers. 316, Trach.13.

52. Freud, Standard Ed. vol. xx(1932-36) lecture 31, "Dissection of the Personality", p.73. With his image of the cauldron, compare Ch.1 section (a) on liquid and bubbling in the mind.

53. The scholiast here explains the darkness as an allusion to the darkening of the sea, v. section (e) below.

54. eg Phoen. 1284 τρομερὰν φρίκᾳ, τρομερὰν φρέν' ἔχω.

55. But joy or love can produce similar tremors, Aj. 693 ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι (where Stanford cites A. fr. 387 ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι τοῦδε μυστικοῦ τέλους, for whose text v. Loeb ad loc.). Compare Hel.632-3

γέγηθα, κραδίαι δ' ὀρθίους ἔθειρας
ἀνεπτέρωκα καὶ δάκρυ σταλάσσω

which suggests another physical reaction also symptomatic of fear. Cf Lebeck, Gr.R. and Byz. Studies, vol.13 (1973) pp.271, 273-4.

56. eg. Xen. Cyr.1.3.11. I prefer this interpretation to that of Triclinius who understands ἐκπέπληγμαι . Jebb compares Pi.P.11.54, I.1.49.

57. eg. γόνυ , Ar.Ran.345. Cf. Ch.4, sections (ii), (iii).

58. Cf.OT 476, 1255, and Aristotle, Poet. ed. Lucas, App. I (cf. 7n. above). On twisting and whirling, below, Ch.1, Sections (i), (j). Ch. 4, section (iii). Cf. Hom. Od.14. 354 οἱ δὲ μεγάλα στενάχοντες φοίτων , and the wandering mind of the mad wanderer, below section (i).

59. Compare the textually suspect lines Eum.522-3

τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν φάει
καρδίαν ἀνατρέφων

Page obelizes φάει , which one might take as a reference to the light/life equation and to the nourishing power of light. The sentence does not, however, offer a sense that suits the context.

60. NH 22.22.

61. For thirst affecting the lungs cf. Plut. Quaest Conv.697F and Onians, op. cit. p.31, 36. At OT 27, 172,254, 270-1, the plague is seen as responsible for the barrenness of land and people alike.

62. Presumably the principle ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται is working here. v. Dodds, GI, ch.3.p.100n and p.98, (and cf. Pl. Rep.333E. for the corollary).
Cf. Halliday, Gr. Div.p.259 for the birds which accompany particular seasonal weather conditions being said to cause them.

63. The flowering-image is common in genealogical vocabulary, and in moral allegories of human change: e.g. Solon fr.4.36,

εὐνομίη αὐαίνει ἄτης ἄνθεα.

Cf. A.Pers 822, S.fr.786 ὕβρις ἐν νεοῖς ἀνθεῖ.

64. ἔμβαλε θυμῷ : v. eg. Lloyd-Jones, Justice of Zeus, p.17 with 68n.

65. V. R. Harriott, Poetry and Criticism Before Plato, 1969, p.63ff on the chariot of the Muses and the paths of song. Compare the double meaning of πόροι at A. Supp.89f.

66. The object grafted may be bad, as here; also A. fr. 277, 15-16 (Loeb),

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ

(v. below, n.67. for a 'bad' love). But hope is traditionally ambivalent. Prometheus is acting supposedly as a benefactor in planting these hopes; Electra in Sophocles mourns the loss of her hopes as of something good,

ἀποσπάσας γὰρ τῆς ἐμῆς οἵ' ἔχῃ φρενὸς
αἴ μοι μόναι παρῆσαν ἐλπίδων ἔτι 809-10.
Growing hope has been uprooted from her mind.

67. v. Fraenkel ad loc.; Lloyd-Jones, HSCP 73(1968), 99f, makes it clear that the whole expression refers not to Helen but to love.

68. Athen.xv.674f: v, his whole discussion, 673b-675a, and ibid. I.13d. Cf. Paus. Gram. Fr. 159, ἐκστέφειν and ἄνθος οἴνου , Gal.11.628 etc.; ἁλὸς ἄνθος AP 206 (Antip.Sid.). For some possible erotic connotations of garlanding v. Padel, CQ N.S. xxiv (1974) p.234, 2n.

69. Compare the dripping images below, section (c), and S.Tr. 998 μανίας ἄνθος . The startling image Ag.659, the sea flowering with corpses, is of course in a different category. It is doubtful whether we should see in the common Homeric epithet ἀτρύγετος anything more than a comparison with the fruitful earth.

χόλος with heat: v. Onians' examples, op.cit. p.46. He suggests, p.47, 6n, that unpleasant feelings were felt to 'freeze', pleasant ones to 'warm': this is too simple, unfortunately.

71. Cf. OC 768 μεστὸς ἢ θυμούμενος
and Ant. 280 πρὶν ὀργῆς κἀμὲ μεστῶσαι λέγων.
Less aggressive emotions behave in the same way: eg Pl. Rep.579B φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων μεστός and 330E ὑποψιάς.

72. Cf. Ant.1052 τῆς νόσου πλήρης ἔφυς.

73. Aret. CD.1.3, cf also, Hp. Acut. 62, Aret. S.D.23, CD2 et al.

74. The construction προσέσῃ καρδίας has caused argument. The genitive has three possible explanations:

(i) local, of 'place from which' (Verrall). Gramatical considerations apart, the evidence considered above (esp. nn 32, 33 above) suggests that the liquid is imagined as moving towards and into the organ, not away from it. When liquid does emerge, this is indicated by prepositions, either alone or in compound verbs (so also with breath, below, section (g)). The healthy organ is disturbed by the extra liquid swelling in it.

(ii) Genitive 'of movement towards' (Klausen). This is grammatically unsubstantiated: it has been pointed out that in the construction at S.El.900, adduced as a parallel, the genitive τύμβου is affected by ἧσσον.

(iii) 'Locative', ie 'at the heart' (cf πάρεισθεν Cho.390). Again grammatically unparalleled: but as a balance between the requirements of grammar and sense perhaps the best. However, it may be safest to adopt, with Page, the dative, καρδίᾳ, proposed by Scaliger.

75. V. above, 35n. Blood may identified in Homer with μένος though this is not as certain nor as universal as J. Harrison implies, Themis [2] p.160. AtS.Tr.1055 and EHec.127 χλωρὸν αἷμα almost certainly means "fresh blood". At Hp. Vict.Acut.7.37 τάμνειν χρὴ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀγκῶνι φλέβα τὴν εὐρεῖαν, μὴ ὀκνεῖν συχνὸν ἀφαιρεῖν, ἔστ' ἂν ἐρυθροτέρου πολλῷ ἐκῇ ἢ ἀντὶ καθαροῦ τε καὶ ἐρυθροῦ πελιδνόν, the author carefully avoids saying that it is true blood that may not be red, or may become redder, by using the vague term συχνός

76. Consideration of this passage should include the description of Iphigeneia's sacrifice, Ag.239.

κρόκου βαφὰς δ' ἐς πέδον χέουσα

Here χέουσα suggests a liquid; but it need do no more than suggest it. I find the theory (eg Maas, Kl.Schr. p.42) that the picture presents the blood running from throat to ground (or basin?) as unlikely as the suggestion of total disrobing. κρόκου βαφὰς is however appropriate to women's clothing (cf E. Ion 889 where Creousa gathers κρόκεα πέπλα for dyeing clothes) and is not, according to my argument above, appropriate to blood. The robes need do no more than flow downwards in folds to satisfy both the image in χέουσα and the meaning of ἐς . Clothes can touch the ground without falling off the girl. So Lloyd-Jones, CR 2(1952)p.132f (Against this view v. J.T. Hooker, Agon 2 (1968) p.59f.

It is likely that κρόκου βαφὰς of line 239 stayed in the poet's mind (either pictorially, or verbally, or both) and occurred to him when the need ofr a similar image arose: when "flowing" was associated with an equally emotive context. Unusual words, or unusual meanings of common words, often recur in the same work, even within a few hundred lines, and thereonly; eg. the unusual meaning of χρίω in PV where it means, apparently 'to sting', 566, 597, 675, 580; elsewhere it means to 'anoint'.

77. Il.10.376, Sappho fr. 2.14, E.Supp.599 etc.
Cf. below, Ch. 4, sections (i), (ii).

78. For some examples v. OT 782 βαρυνθείς , Aj.656, Phil.367-8, and Ant.767, νοῦς δ' ἐστὶ τηλικοῦτος ἀλγήσας βαρύς ("resentful", Jebb). The weight image should be related also to the pressure and downward attack of the external daemon, below Ch.2, introduction, sections (ii), (vii).

79. Hence I should accept ἄχθος δειματοσταγές , Cho.842 which Page calls 'vix tolerabile', citing Portus' pedestrian conjecture αἱματοσταγές.

80. V. Onians op.cit.p.31f. and e.g. κῶμα καταρρεῖ Sappho fr. 4. The phrase at Ag.176, στάζει δ' ἀνθ' ὕπνου πρὸ καρδίας πόνος (Murray) in alluding to this familiar image, liquid sleep, smooths the way for the presentation of πόνος as a liquid.

81. V. Lebeck, Gr.Rom. and Byz. Stud. 13(1972)p.279 on the eye, on Plato's derivation of ἵμερος and on the obvious sexual imagery in the interchange of liquids. (On eyes in Greek thought generally v. Malten, DieSprache des menschliches Antlitzes im frühen Griechentum, 1961; and v. below, Ch.2 section (ii), Ch.5 sections (i).

82. This is disputed. Page now reads

πρὸς μὲν οἰκέτας
θέτο σκυθρωπῶν πένθος ὀμμάτων, γέλων
κεύθουσ' ἐπ' ἔργοις

83. V. references above, 81n.

84. eg. S.El.906 χαρᾷ δὲ πίμπλημ' εὐθὺς ὄμμα δακρύων and 1231.

85. Euripides uses δυσχίμος of πνεύματα Supp.962, (and of χθών Ba.15, meaning 'stormy'?).

86. Above, 73n.

87. So ἧπαρ ,Call.Aet.Oxt.2079.8; A.P.5.277(Agath.), ἔρωτες τήκουσιν καρδίην , E.Heracl.645 ψυχὴν ἐτήκου.

88. Cf. Sept.228-30; HF 1140 στεναγμῶν.. με περιβάλλει νέφος where Wilam. cites Hipp.192, OT1314, Hipp.172 νέφος ὀφρύων and Med.107.V. Wilam. Kl.Schr.I.41.

89. eg PV 649 Ζεὺς γὰρ ἱμέρου βέλει
πρὸς σοῦ τεθάλπται.

90. Poison is usually liquid: cf. Pindar's metaphorical use of ἰός as honey, O.6.47.

91. Fraenkel is evidently right to take ὀμμάτων as those of Menelaus. Any reference to statues, however, seems to me unnecessary; G. Devereux suggests the phrase refers to the lacklustre gaze of the depressed man, R.E.G. vol.81.1968, p.xv. All interest in Aphrodite has left his eyes. "Aphrodite" then has the same strange relation to the eye as δαίμων to ἦμιν at S.El.999 1000. The δαίμων that disappears there is a human faculty: cf. E. Brunius-Nilsson, Daimonie, p.12f, and below, Ch. 3, section (ii) with 67n. (Though cf. Dodds GI p.23, 65n.) Here Headlan translated 'All passion of love is lost'. v. further Wilam. ad Ar.Lys. 335.

92. Cf. also OT 910 ἐρρεῖ δὲ τἀ θεῖα , Aj.524 ἀπορρεῖ μνῆστις and S.fr.787.8.

93. v. Diggle, ad Eur. Phaeth. 80.

94. For spasms in the experience of the movement of madness

cf. S.Tr.1032, ἔθαλψε μ' ἁτης σπασμός. Σπασμός is used of attacks of epilepsy or convulsions Hp. Coac.350, Aph.2.26, Hdt. 4.187, Thuc. 2.49.

95. Chambers, Life of Shakespeare, O.U.P. (1933): cit. E. Sharpe, Int. J. Ps-Anal vol. xxvii (1946) 'From" King Lear "to the "Tempest".' I cannot find the ref. in Williams' abridged version (O.U.P. 1933) but traces of it remain, eg p.61, 'submerged by 'Lear''.

96. After Il.1.103, μενεος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφιμέλαιναι /πίμπλαντ' there is a reference to fire in the eyes, 104
ὄσσε δέ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἐίκτην.

97. Cf. S. Phil.783f στάζει γὰρ αὖ μοι φοίνιον τόδ' ἐκ βύθου κηκῖον αἷμα. Κηκίς is used of liquid bubbling out of somewhere enclosed, eg Od.5.455, the sea out of the mouth between rocks. Cf. A.Cho.1012, and fr.230N.

98. For the interchangeable nature of air and liquid v. below section (f).

99. I prefer θερμοῖς to θερμῆς, but the case does not affect the argument.

100. PV 917, Sept.511.

101. Cic.Tusc.D.III, 31.76:
Si quidem qui tempestivam medicinam admovens
Non adgravescens vulnus adscivit (or inlidat) manu.
Milton, Sam.Ag.184,
Apt words have power
To 'swage the tumours of a troubl'd mind
And are as Balm to fester'd wounds.

102. Hp.Liqu.6, Aph.v.25 τὰ δ'ἐν ἀρθροῖς ἀλγήματα καὶ οἰδήματα. Its connexion with liquid is shown also in Aeschylus' metaphorical usage, fr.124N βρῦτον ἰσχναν θὲν χρόνῳ, "beer thinned by age". A wound could be treated with emollients instead, eg Il.4.190, 15.394 Pi.p.4.271, Hp. Acut.22, S.Phil.698.

103. As the scholiast takes Θυμός: ἐν ἀκμῇ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐστι Ζεὺς καὶ οὐ πείσεται. v. λόγοι ἰατροί ibid. 378, and Lain Entralgo, Therapy of the Word in Class. Antiquity, p.69, and passim.

104. For the common use of βρέμειν to express indignant mutterings v. PV 424 and Fraenkel on this passage Ag.1035f., who cites Eum.978 μήποτ' ἐν πόλει στάσιν ... βρέμειν (similarly Sept. 378). For heat generally as expressing 'boldness' v. Wunder/Dindorf ad S.Phil.909 who cites E. Hec. 607, Andr.271, Ar.Eq.381, Lys.1014, and Musgrave on Ant.88.

105. I do not agree with Earp, Style of Aeschylus p. 174, that εἰ δὲ μή τεταγμένα expresses the divinely-ordered relation between heart and tongue (for which v. Longinus Περὶ Ὕψους 325-6, p.39 Russell). I prefer to take the preventitive μοῖρα as attendant on the fixed relation between the members of the chorus and their rulers.

106. Cf. Sept.603 ναύτῃσι θερμοῖς καὶ πανουργίᾳ τινὶ /ὄλωλεν. Whether the allusion is to the eagerness only, or whether it applies to rashness too, is hard to decide. Ajax (Aj.222) is ἀνδρὸς αἰθωνος. The scholiast there explains θερμοῦ ἐν ταῖς μαχαῖς· ἢ τὸ θερμὸν νῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρακεκινηκότος κεῖσθεν Stanford quotes the comparison of Ajax to αἰθωνα λέοντα, Il.11.548, and Sept.447 Ἄρης.. αἰθων λῆμα (cf. Aj.1038) in support of the μαχαῖς interpretation. (One could add OT 191, Ἄρης με φλέγει). There is a textual problem here. αἰθωνος is written by the first hand in L and some recentiores. Except in a v.l. at Hes. Erg.363, αἰθων retains a long ω in obliquie cases.

This is not in itself enough to doubt αἰ″θωνας here (v.Dodds ad Ba.229-30); but L corr. and other recentiores have αἰθοπος . This may be the true reading, and might suggest the fiery eye of the madman. αἰ″θοψ is used metaphorically of metal and wine (Il.4.495, Il.4.259); the eyes of the mad, and of people in a state of high emotion, are watched for indications of future action (v. below, Ch; 5 sections (i), (ii)). It may be that αἰ″θοπος had become corrupted to αἰθονος , but it is perhaps unwise to make a choice. In both adjectives there is a suggestion of burning. With αἰ″θοπος it is hard, and with αἰ″θονος unnecessary, to restrict the meaning to ardour in battle. The sense may rather be "impetuous, rash".

107. Cf. eg S.fr.474, and Pi.O.10(11)105, θερμαίνει φιλότατι νόον and the association of this image with that other familiar image, the shafts of love. So lightning is struck from the eye, E.Or.480. It is impossible to distinguish images in which heat is engendered in the mind from burning caused by emotion acting as an external attacker. Cf. below Ch.2. sections (i), (iv), (viii) and (ix).

108. Who is the first to use it, eg 14.38.

109. Perhaps because of its association with death, cf. E. fr. 916.6.

cf. Ant.88, E.IA 1014

110. So Plato, Euthyd.284E.

111. πυρετός as a fever: Hp. Epid.1.26. et al.
So θέρμη , feverish heat, Hp.Vet.Med. 16, Thuc. 2.49 et al.

112. For the identification of λοιμός with θεός cf. Simonid.Amorg.fr.7.101, οὐδ' αἶψα λιμὸν εἰκίης ἀπώσεται
ἐχθρὸν συνοικητῆρα, δυσμένεα θεόν.
Apollo attacks with other fiery weapons, OT 470, fire and lightning.

113. eg OT 1527, E.Hipp.822, HF 1087, Ion 927, A.Pers.605, PV 1015. cf. Pl.Euthyd.293A, Luc.Dem.Euc.333 τρικυμία τῆς τυχῆς.

114. Cf. Ion 927, κακῶν γὰρ ἄρτι κῦμ' ὑπεξαντλῶν φρενί and Med.78 εἰ κακὸν προσοίσομεν
νέον παλαιῷ, πρὶν τόδ' ἐξηντλῆκέναι.

115. Kamerbeek quotes a scholion on Aj.206, ἐν παραχωδέᾳ ζάλῃ κεῖται (meant to explain χειμῶνι , which in any case normally involves rain as well as wind), and Hesych.s.v. ζάλη : συστροφὴ ἀνέμων μεγάλων. Hesychius adds here ἔνιοι δὲ μετὰ ὄμβρου πνοήν . Plato, Tim.43C, seems to suggest that in the absence of a defining genitive ζάλη should be taken as rain. See Fraenkel ad Ag.656.

116. Ajax is revealed on stage at 348 surrounded by blood and carcasses; this is his first speech after his "awakening". Imperatives at similar points in other tragedies refer to the speaker's physical condition as shown on the stage, eg PV 92 ἴδεσθέ μ', οἷα πρὸς θεῶν πάσχω θεός (rock and chains), and PV 1093 ἐσορᾷς μ' ὡς ἔκδικα πάσχω, (the descent).

117. Where man is most vulnerable to storm. From Hesiod (v. West and Theog. 440) to Plutarch (φοβοῦνται, μὴ πιστεύοντες τῷ παρόντι, περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, Q.N. xi)
sea-travel is feared for its uncertainties.

118. Q.Conv. vii. 1. 698-700. Pl. Tim. 70C, 91A. Alcaeus fr. 13.1,

13.1. Eratosth. fr. 25 Powell, E. fr.983N. V. Onians op. cit. p. 31f.

119. E.D. Phillips, Gk. Medicine, p.143 suggests that the belief originated in the observation that the arteries were empty of blood after death. For details, v. C.R.S. Harris, The Heart and the Vascular System in Ancient Gr. Medicine, 1973, pp. 26, 40-3.

120. But cf. Lorimer, CR 9(1959) p.108. Kamerbeek on Aj.918 collects other examples of the use of φυσῶ and φυσιάω with blood, including Ant. 1238
καὶ φυσιῶν ὀξεῖαν ἐκβάλλει φόνῳ
λευκὴ παρεία φοινίου σταλάγματος
where a scholiast comments τουτέστιν αἷμα ἐξέπνευσε. See Jebb's Appendix on Trach.1054. We amy compare the use of πνέω or ἀποπνέω in a liquid context: eg. the disputed text H.h.Apoll.361 λεῖπε δὲ θυμὸν
φοινὸν ἀποπνέουσ';
(v. Gemöll ad loc.), where Ruhnken suggested λείβε δὲ φοινόν, θυμὸν ἀποπνείουσ' and Döderlen suggested ἀποπτύουσ', palaeographically an easier change, supported perhaps by Virgil, Aen.9.349 purpuream vomit ille animum. (v. Starkie ad Ar.Nub.712). Allen, Sikes and Halliday compare Il.4.524, 13.654 θυμὸν ἀποπνείων. 'Blood' has so many metaphorical possibilities that specific interpretation is impossible. Cf.Ag.1309, φόνον δόμοι πνέουσιν αἱματοσταγῆ.

121. De resp.15.p.478A13.

122. Sleep's wings are not mentioned in Il.16.682, but visual depictions of the death of Sarpedon, such as we have seen on the 'Euphronius vase' presumably affected the literary tradition, producing lines like Call. Hym.Del. 134, οὐδ' ὅτε οἱ λιγαῖον ἐπὶ πτερὸν ὕπνος ἐρείσσει.

passage at Sept.705-8, ἐπεὶ δαίμων
λήματος ἂν τροπαίᾳ χρονίᾳ μεταλ-
λακτὸς ἴσως ἂν ἔλθοι θελεμωτέρῳ
πνεύματι.
For Professor Dodds' view on τροπαία here v. Ch. 5, section (viii).

130. We may, with hesitation, compare the corrupt passage Cho. 388-9, τί γὰρ κεύ-
θωτ' φρενὸς θεῖον ἔμπας†
ποτᾶται.

Something, (some thought?) is hidden and flying in the mind. The lines are so corrupt that it is hard to decide what exactly it is. θεῖον is understandable: the idea that what is flying is a divine thought, breathed in or put there by a god, is acceptable: cf. Pl.Ax.370C εἰ μή τι θεῖον.. ἐνῆν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (v.Ch.3, Section (iii)).
But grammatical and metrical requirements cast doubt on θεῖον It is probably a gloss that fell into the text. It is probably best to read with Page φρενὸς οἷον ἔμπας, though I would prefer to obelize the line. The image is maintained in the ensuing lines, in ἄηται .. θυμός a wind or wave blown up against the heart. v. above Ch.1. section (ii).

131. Il.15.80, cf. L.H. Apoll,186, Il23.590, Od.7.36; cf. Allen and Halliday ad.H.H.43. On the added power of wings v. St. Augustine, [illegible] above, [illegible]. p.89.

132. The point of the first line is unclear. Jebb quotes Arist. Probl.942A34 ὁ νότος ὅταν μὲν ἐλάττων ᾖ, αἴθριός ἐστιν, ὅταν δὲ μέγας, νεφώδης.
and suggests that Sophocles alludes to a belief that the south wind blows hardest on a cloudy day. Stanford cites Theophr. Weathersigns 32. 3 for a belief that lightning abates the wind. Lightning is often used in the range of images of

123. Cho.619, Νῶιν ... πνέουθ' ὕπνῳ is difficult in sense and construction, and provides no parallel. Onians op.cit. 32 mentions the pouring but not the breathing of sleep into a man.

124. So χάρις is breathed from the god into a man. Ag. 1206 (ἐμοὶ) πνέων χάριν. In many of the breathing out images which involve blood, a more abstract idea, "Bloodshed" is obviously appropriate. But at Ag. 1309, φόνον δόμοι πνέουσιν αἱματοσταγῆ, the adjective qualifying it adds to the idea of liquid by presenting a picture of the blood dripping from the walls. One should compare here the vision of Theoclymenus, Od.20.354 αἵματι δ' ἐρράδαται τεῖχοι.

125. Lucian Bis accus 11, cf. Catull.62.39, Pliny NH 18.34. V. below Ch. 3 section (vi) with notes.

126. eg. of Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia. v. Ar.Nub. 224-36, 828-30, 930-1. and further, De Morb.Sac.19(Loeb). These theories were held in fragmented form by different people at different times: I do not to suggest that any idea was part of a formed body of dogma accepted by presocratics, Hippoctatics and philosophers alike, though it may have been convenient for poets temporarily to pretend they thought it was.

127. For the whole question of daemonic possession v. below Ch.3 section (ii).

128. Homer only uses the plural of this word in this phrase. Does it refer to the individual μένος breather by each man separately or to the quick pants of every man in the army?

129. O. Becker was the first to point this out: v. Fraenkel Ag.187. For the mind being turned v. below, 154n. For the δαίμων turning the mind like a wind compare the full

weapons of the eye (eg. Or.480). We do not appear to have enough knowledge to say we understand the implication of ἄτερ στερεπᾶς . Lobeck ad loc. cites the available material but ends by quoting a conjecture ἀπ' ἀστερεπᾶς , (which suggests he reached the same conclusion).

133. Eg. with fear, E.El.1255, S.Ant.1306f, E.Supp.89; with hope, OT 487, A.Cho.227; drink E.Cycl.497 cf Anacreon fr.52D (PMG 37B p.191 - compare our term "high" for "drunk"); joy, Aj.693. Cf. the image of the wings of song, eg Ar.V.93
ἐπὶ τραγωδίᾳ ἀνεπτερῶσθαι καὶ πεποιῆσθαι τὰς φρένας.
In general, Ar.Av.1444 ἡ ψυχή μου πεπότηται .

134. For the ancient prophetic powers of the earth of the early oracle of Ge at Delphi, the Gaeum at Olympia etc: V. Bouché-Leclercq Hist.Div.ii.p.250-60, Parke, Gk. Oracles pp. 26-7, 36, 41, and Parke-Wormell Ch.2.p.3ff.

135. cf. S.El.474 εἶσιν ἁ πρόμαντις Δίκα where Jebb explains πρόμαντις "because she has sent the dream, a presage of her advent".

136. "Dreams ... dismissed by some as random and senseless twitchings of the organ of the mind", Freud, Stand.Ed.vol.32, p.220. For dreams as copies of the thoughts and images of the day v. Hp. Dreams 89(Loeb); in Humours 4.15 (Loeb) the writer emphasizes the organic causes of dreams. In dramatic writing, as in historical, the dream must be fulfilled or the balance of the story is distorted. A dream in poetry is liable to be treated as 'true' unless stated to be false: like the false dream in the 'Iliad' first introduced from the divine viewpoint. So in tragedy any argument on the veracity and interpretation of dreams is always weighted. On the Freudian theory of dreams as projections, v. below Ch. 3. section (iv).

137. A. Poetics ed. Lucas, App.I. p.258. cf below, p. 412 (25n).

138. For Trophonius, v. D. Papathanassiou, L'Oracle de Trophonios, Athens, 1935, and D. Kouretas, 'Aspects Modernes des cures Psychotherapiques Appliquées dans les Sanctuaires de la Grèce Antique', Comm. au XVII^{e} congrès Int. d'Histoire de la Med, 1960, p.10; on Amphiaraus, id., 'Therapy in the Temple of Amphiaraus', Medical Annals6. no.8, 1966, pp.679-673. Teiresias the blind prophet prophecies still in Hades in Od. xi; other blind seers in Homer alone include Evenius, Ophioneus, as well as Phemius the bard. v. Halliday, Gr. Divin. p.776 for references. cf above pp 9, 267 (38n), 268 (47n).

139. For the idea that the starting-point of the soul is in darkness cf. the picture of the starting-point of the body in earth Hes. Theog.116, E.Supp.532. For the return of the dead to the earth, and for earth as the symbol of escape from unwelcome passions, v. below, Ch.4 section (iv) (a). For the corollary, the aether as the element of Souls, v. Rohde, Psyche Ch.14.53n,137n.

140. I would relate both these to the ambush-image Sophocles especially found so appealing: v.Ch.2. section (X). Cf. also Ch.5, pp.222-3.

141. R. Harriott, op.cit. p.35, and v. below Ch.3, section (ii), p 112f.

142. Mission Archéologique de Ras Shamra, Tome xvii, Ugaritica vi, 1969, "La Maison du Prêtre aux modèles de poumon et de foies d'Ugarit". The lung is shown in Fig.6. Mr. Gerald Cadogan kindly directed my attention to this publication. Cf. above p. 265, 27n.

143. V. also: Cho.167, Ag.481, 546, E.IA 475, Pi.N.7.102. Aj.482, ἔλεξας ... τῆς σαυτοῦ φρενός is a special case, for it seems to be related to the thought expressed

before, in the play (line 243) that a daemon taught him the words he spoke in his madness cf. below Ch.2. section (ii). Compare the shocking separation of heart and speech, Hipp.612.

144. cf. S.Phil.1013 ἡ βλέπουσ' ἀεὶ ψυχή , Plato often pictures the soul as watching, eg Rep.519A δειμὺ μὲν. βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον v. Ch.5. p.223.

145. Lebeck, Gr.Rom.Byz.Stud.14 (1973) p.269, states that "motion is the essential property of soul". This is true only insofar as being disturbed is an essential property of the soul, for movem is characteristic of the disturbed soul: τοῦ κεκινημένου in Phaedr.245B4, which she cites, refers to the soul of the man upset and afflicted by love.

The idea that the mind has a proper place from which unusually stimulating thoughts and feelings force it to move, would seem to lie behind colloquialisms intended to cast doubt on the sanity of the person addressed: eg S.Ant.42, ποῦ γνώμης ποτ' εἶ ; On S.El.390 ποῦ ποτ' εἶ φρενῶν ; Campbell asks if the εἶ in these phrases is from εἰμί or εἶμι . He compares IA480 εἰμὶ δ' οὗπερ εἶ σὺ νῦν , where in fact Kirchhoff, followed by Murray, corrected εἶμι to εἰμί , "I am where you are" (though Monk and Headlam preferred εἶμι , "I shall place myself in your position" which seems weak and artificial). I prefer the derivation from εἰμί and would compare this type of question with the man who, reawakened from madness, wonders where he is, eg. HF 1093-1105. The use of ποῦ rather than ποῖ is a slight, though perhaps insignificant, weight in favour of εἰμί. Compare Ba. 358, ὦ σχέτλι' ὡς οὐκ οἶσθα ποῦ ποτ' εἶ λόγων, where εἰμί is almost indisputable.

146. v.eg Bolton, Glory, Jest & Riddle, p. 44-5, for the social implications of Diogenes' boast of homelessness.

147. Dodds, §1 p.67, nn.16,17. Aristarchus, at least, (ap. An.Ox. i. 149) took πλάζω to be a dialectic form of πλήσσω, 'perh. rightly' (LSJ). V.Dodds §1,67, with 16, 17 nn.

148. Cf. Pi.O.7.31 αἱ δὲ φρενῶν ταραχὰὶ παρέπλαγξεν καὶ σοφόν, (id.N.10.6 παρεπλάγχθη used absolutely, 'was wrong'); E.Hipp.240 ποῖ παρεπλάγχθην γνώμης ἀγαθῆς;

149. Eum.329, = 342. The verb παρακόπτω may keep some of its original force at Ar.1252

ἦ κάρτα ⟨μακ⟩ρὰν παρεκόπης χρεσμῶν ἐμῶν.

This is Fraenkel's supplement and rearrangement, adopted by Page. Fraenkel's translation, "greatly ... have you failed to keep the track of my prophetic words" preserves the image, the swerve from the proper path.

Παρακοπή means delirium and raving in medical writers e.g. Hp Aph.1257 (cf. Plu.2.1123B). Galen uses παρακοπτικός to convey a similar range of meanings. παρακόπτω can mean "drive mad"; or, "be mad" in later authors.

150. e.g. Epid.1.26; cf. Com.Adesp.705 παρακεκρούσθαι τῶν φρενῶν.

151. PV 1056, Ar.Pax 90, Plut.508, Pl. Symp.173E et al. A music-metaphor may also lie behind the phrase. The word is used of striking a false note in A.fr.314(N). For the significance of music, which should colour the passions, failing to do so, and for the nasty image of perverted music, v.Ch.4, sections (iii), (iv)b.

152. e.g. HF 935 χέλωτι παραπεπληγμένῳ
cf. Ar.Lys.831, Ecc.139 etc.

153. ἐκπλήσσω : eg S.El.1045, Ant.433, Aj.33, E.Alc.1125, Hipp.342,
ἀποπληκτός : Ant.1188, Phil.731
Compare Dem.34.16, Hdt.2.173, Dem.21.143 ("paralyzed"), Hp.Aph.6.57, Flat.13.

Neither ἔκπληκτος nor ἀπόπληκτος should be translated automatically as "surprised". "Upset" is a better equivalent of the image; for in English we tend to give "surprise" a status of its own in the range of emotions, whereas these Greek participles are used in conjunction with different emctions (eg Ant.1188 with fear).

154. ἔννυχοι πάραγον κοῖται Pi.P.11.25. cf. Lycurg.92 οἱ θεοὶ
τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν διανοίαν παράγουσι.
At Ant.298-9 Jebb translated παραλλάσσει φρένας as "pervert" and compares uses of παράγω and παραστρέφω, including A.Pol.8.7.7, αἱ ψυχαὶ παραστραμμέναι.
cf. Theogn.403 εἰς μεγάλην ἀμπλακίην παράγει, p.288, and Trag.Adesp. fr.240: quoted above p. 48. v. below, 163n.

155. In a spatial context it means "sprawling" ie lying outside a neat straight line: so Il.7.156 ἔκειτο παλίορος ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.
After Zeus' thunderbolt Typhus lies ἄχρειον καὶ παράορον δέμας κεῖται (PV 365). Physical "sprawling" is linked with mental.
For contexts of mental distortion with this word v. Archil. 56.5 νόου παλίορος, and Theoc.15.8, Tryph.371.

156. LSJ takes παράφορος γνώμης Hp.Prorrh.1.36, as an example of "its use in an active sense, ie confusing". I should prefer to see it as 'astray in judgment' ie 'unbalanced'.

157. eg Sept.806 παραφρονῶ φόβῳ λόγου "mad with fear".
cf. S.Phil. 815, OT 692, παράφρονιμον, ἄπορον εἰπεῖν φρόνιμα
El. 473 εἰ μὴ 'γὼ παράφρων μάντις ἔφυν καὶ γνώμας λειπομένα σοφᾶς.

158. ef. Ar.Eq.531, Ran.594, Hp.Epid.1.934, and Dem.1421, 10.

159. ἔκφρων has a wide range of meanings, from 'delirious' and 'mad' (eg Hp.Mul.2.117), 'frenzied' (of poets eg Pl.Ion 534B or maenads eg Luc.Bacc.1, cf. Pl.Legg 790E) to 'stupid', Dem.19.267.

160. Cf. Med 316 also. Dr. Oliver Taplin suggested to me that at Cho.233 ἔνδον γενοῦ might be a reference to the state of Electra's mind, not an order to enter the palace: compare the rest of the line, χαρᾶς δὲ μὴ 'κπλάγης φρένας.

161. For explicit reference to madmen v.eg OT 316, γνώμης πλανᾶς, Or.532 φρενῶν ἀλαίνων καὶ φόβοις, and PV 472 ἀποσφαδεὶς φρενῶν πλανᾶς.
Stanford on Aj.23, ἴσμεν γὰρ οὐδὲν τρανὲς ἀλλ' ἀλώμεθα remarks that ἀλῶμαι is not elsewhere used by itself of a mental condition. But it's use there is unusual in a context of sane intellectual perplexity. Schol. PV 473 explains πλάνωμαι by πῷ νῷ ἀλώμεθα, but the verb alone was evidently intelligible to a fifth-century audience. ἄλη is used of distractions of the mind E. Med.1285.

162. ef. Trach. 794-5. διάστροφον ὀφθαλμόν and Ar.Ach.15, διεστραφὴν ἰδών (which one might take as a "wandering eye" rather than a squint). PV 882 τροχοδινεῖται, ὄμμα θ' ἑλίγδην, HF 932, Hdt.1.167, Ar. Eq. 175. v. Page ad. Med. 1144f. For distorted limbs, v.Hp. Aph.4.49, Ath.8.339 τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, τὸ σῶμα.

163. It also lends itself easily to moral terminology. v. Ant.781 σὺ καὶ δικαίων ἀδίκους φρένας πρασπᾷς ἐπὶ λώβᾳ.
Compare OC 1185 and Ant.623-4 θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν
where the scholiast has
ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων ἀνδρὶ πορσύνῃ κακὰ
τὸν νοῦν ἔβλαψε πρῶτον, ᾧ βουλεύεται.
See Jebb's excellent Appendix on the history of the "dementat

prius" idea. The movement aside is connected with the idea of a god striking. Cf. also above, 154n.

164. For the restless movement of sufferers from physical disease v. Ch.4, sections (i), (ii), (iii). Herodotus connected the derangement of body and mind, v. Dodds, GI.p.65.

165. Violent emotion is expressed by violent movemnet in tragedy: eg Cassandra's frenzied entry, Tro.307, μαινὰς δοάζει δεῦρο Κασάνδρα δρόμῳ. Cf. below Ch.4, section (iii).

166. This was apparently the opinion of the followers of Damon. See further A. Poet. ed. Lucas, Appendix I.p.262, and below Ch.4, sections (iii) and (iv)b.

167. For a possible changes in the ὄνειδος of madness v. Dodds GI.Ch.3.n.2, p.82, but v. also Dover, GPM p.127, 148-9.

168. v. Jebb ad Bacc. 10.52, and 1. Löffler, Die Melampodie, (Beitr. zur Klass. Philol. 7) 1963.

169. Dodds, GI., Appendix 1, p.271, and in Harv. Theol. Rev.33(1940) p. 155f, 'Maenadism in the Bacchae'.

170. Hera is βοῶπις in the 'Iliad'. Ovid describes her own transformation into cow Met.5.330. Her cult-titles in the Argolid were Ζευξίδια and Εὐβοια, and sacred herds of cows were kept at the Heraeon at Argos. See Guthrie, The Gks and their Gods, p.70, Cook, "Zeus" i.444f, Farnell, "Cults" I.p.181-2; Paus. 2.17.1 with Frazer ad loc., and Et. Magn.s.v.

171. Epaphus appears as the Gk. transformation of the Egyptian Apis, Hdt.2.38, 153. 3.28.

172. Cook, loc.cit. 440 points out that it is only post-Aeschylean authors who assume that Zeus, not Hera, changed Io's shape.

173. Cf. Hipp. 1300f καὶ σῆς γυναικὸς οἴστρεον ἢ τρόπον τινὰ γενναιότητα· τῆς γὰρ ἐχθίστης θεῶν ἡμῖν, ὅσαισι, παρθένειος ἡδονή, δηχθεῖσα κέντροις παιδὸς ἠράσθη σέθεν.
Here the elements of biting/stinging and pursuit are associated with those of love and of virginity. Cf. Hdt.,2.93, where οἶστρος means the mating impulse of fish. (Cf. Pl. Rep.577E). Like ἔρως, οἶστρος can be used metaphorically to mean any strong desire, eg AP.11.389 (Lucill.) οἶστρος κτεάνων.

174. HF.1089f. Or.277f. For the stranger's attitudes and questions on entering the stage v. below, Ch.5 sections (iii) and (iv).

175. Cf. Paus.8.24.2 (Arcadia). Strabo (xii.2.3.) states that Orestes brought hair-shearing rites to Comana in Asia Minor, from Taurian Scythia.

176. Cf. S.Tr.980 φοιτάδα δεινὴν νόσον. The maenads are φοίτασες, Ba.165; φοιτάλεος is an epithet of Dionysus, AP 9.524.22. The κέντρα of madness, (PV598) and μανία itself, (Or.327) are φοιτάλεος.

177. Or.38 ἐξαμιλλῶνται φόβῳ, 36 τεθήγασιν, 412 ἐλαύνομαι. Other emotions with which this image is used include fear (Hel.312); hope (Andr.27); love (E.Alc.1080) and grief (S.Aj.275 where Stanford compares Il.16.517-8 ὀδύνῃσιν ἐλήλαται). Other personified phenomena include wine (Theognis 414), τύχη (IT 478) and of course δαίμονες (eg οὐπαγῶν ἀλαστόρων IA 878) and Olympian gods, (v. above 154n). Sometimes the image is inverted: the drive is towards the emotion, eg S.El.628 πρὸς ὀργήν, ἔκφερε where Blaydes (Spic.Soph.) cites E.Alc.601 ἔκφερεται πρὸς αἰδῶ.

178. Presumably it suggests some kind of ankus rather than a whip, but the uncertainty is obstinately reflected in the

obsolescent English translation. v. below Ch.2. section (ii), (ix) and (x).

179. Textual corruption is deep-seated here. But in any version κέντρῳ is preserved in some form.

180. τόποισι τοῖς ἐμοῖς could refer to the minds of the Athenian citizens as well as to the area owned by the Athenian state. σπλάγχνα ... ἐμμανεῖς : ἐμμανεῖς unusually in an active sense. Compound adjectives such as ὀξυκάρδιος (Sept.907, cf. Ar.V.430) and ὀξύπλαγκτος . (S.Ant.1301) perhaps incorporate this image. With ὀξύθῡμος (cf. E. Med.319, Ba.671) there is perhaps a further consideration. τὰ ὀξυθύμια referred to places at cross-roads where rubbish, especially branches used as whips, was burnt. (Schol. ad OC 99). τὸ ὀξύθῡμον is a kind of thyme, often burnt as νηφάλια ξυλά , which are particularly appropriate to the Erinyes, (OC 100). So ἀοίνοις θυμώμασιν, Eum.860, may possibly carry allusions to τὸ ὀξύθῡμον and/or τὰ ὀξύθῡμα and thus attendant images of whipping and burning, in a context of which the main image is the sharpened sword.

181. Cf. Hipp.39, and Ps.-Theoc.19 (love as a bee). v. below Ch.2, section (xii).

182. Cf. A.Supp.563 μαινομένα πόνοις ἀτί-
μοις ὀδύναις τε κεντροδοκ-
λήτοις, θυιὰς Ἥρας,
and E.Supp242 ἐς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ' ἀφιᾶσιν κακά.

183. v. Goheen, The Imagery of Sophocles' 'Antigone', p.27.

184. Ajax ed. App. C p.274. His examples are 24, 193, 275, 736, 944, cf. 1253-4 and the simile at 322.

185. The bridge is a 'yoke', Pers.72; cf. 50, 594 for metaphors. But the yoke-metaphor of slavery is common elsewhere in Aeschylus: e.g. Ag.953, 1071, 1226; Sept.75,471, 793.

186. "An instinct is distinguished from a stimulus by the fact that it derives from sources of stimulation within the body, that it operates as a constant force and that the subject cannot avoid it by flight, as is possible with an external stimulus. We ... picture it as a certain quota of energy which presses in a particular direction. It is from this pressing that it derives its name of Trieb". Freud, Stand. Ed. xx, 1932-6, p.96.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. B.1a (I.451. (32)) in Diels, who treats it as an anonymous statement from the Pythogorean school.

2. Those I have found useful include Farnell Cults(all 5 vols. - a most under-used work): Rohde Psyche; Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus; J. Harrison, Prolegomena to Greek Religion, (and to a lesser extent Themis); Halliday, Greek Divination; Dodds, Gks & the Irrational; Dietrich, Death Fate and the Gods (mostly because it summarizes other work, especially that of Wilamowitz); F. Klingender, Animals in Art and Thought (1971); and N. Richardson, Commentary on H.h. Dem. For the sake of completeness I should also mention: O. Keller, Thiere des klassischen Altertums (1887), and Die antike Tierwelt (i) and (ii) (1909-13); Richter, Animals in Greek Sculpture (1930); and N. Douglas' enchanting 'Birds and Beasts of the Greek Anthology (1928, reprinted 1974).

3. Though we cannot tell when. The motif of the sphinx confronting man may have been a general motif that became attached to the Oedipus myth in particular. v. C. Robert, Oidipus, Berlin 1915 p.48f and H. Walter, Antike und Abendland 9 (1960). p.63f, with plates. For the gorgon-head as an apotropaic motif, and fierce staring snake-covered heads in painting and sculpture, which, again, may pre-date the myth of Medusa herself, v: J.Six, De Gorgone, 1885 for different types of gorgoneion, (Ch.1, 'de genere') and origins (p.93f). For the figure of the pursuing Gorgon, v. J.M. Woodward, Perseus, 1937, P.28f, with plates. (On existential implications of the Medusa myth v. below, Ch. 5, section (vii)). On the Gorgoneion, as the Evil Eye v. Harrison,

Proleg. p.196f,: cf. Deonna, Le Symbolisme de l'Oeil, 1965, pp. 159-196. This has a special relationship in the Greek mind to φθόνος : v. Pauly-W. s.v. 'fascinum'. βασκαίνειν is to bewitch by the evil eye, to malign, to envy (cf. below, Ch.3, n.71). 'Fascinare' seems related to it, though v. Fordyce ad Catull.7.12 who point out the importance of the stem φασκ- v. also Fitrem, in Studies Presented to D.M. Robinson, p.531f, 'The Pindaric Pthonoc'; W. Steinlein, Phthonos u. Verwood. Begritt in du alte. Gr. lit., diss, Erlanger 1944 (unavailable). Cf. also H. Schoeck, 'Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour', tr. Glenny and Ross, 1969; and Lloyd-Jones, JZ p.69.

4. v. Dietrich op. cit. pp. 92-3, 98, 118, 120, passages which illustrate the confusing nature of theory and evidence on this point. Harrison, Prolog. p.223f, (esp. 239f), suggests that the 'Semnai Theai' , named at Colonus and elsewhere but never at Athens, as the Eumenides, were identified with the Erinyes first by Aeschylus. She reproaches modern commentators (p. 241-2) with laxity in using the terms Erinyes, Semnai Theai, and Eumenides as interchangeable. However, since even she admits that after Aeschylus they were used interchangeably, except perhaps (she gives, non-characteristically, no evidence) in ritual formula, we should perhaps see the Erinyes in Aeschylus, as in Euripides, as deities who were related to some form of cult-worship.

5. Harrison, Proleg. 176f, 187f, 207f, and 213f, suggests that Harpy, Gorgon, Sphinx and Erinys were all 'originally' 'keres', (which she regards as the prototype of Greek bogeys, to which all others gravitated). v. Dietrich Death Fate and the Gods: or

chthonic Erinyes, pp. 85, 94, 98, 114, 117f, 147 n.7, 156, 328; on Gorgon with snake, p.143. In tragedy, the Erinyes are often described as daughters of Night, rising from the Earth (like dreams, above, Ch. 1. sections (i) (h)).

6. Male monsters are usually single: Cerberus, Pegasus, Argus, and the male version of Python (v. Fontenrose, Python, 1959, p. 15f.). Apart from the quasi-psycho-analytic reasons for this fact, advanced by P. Slater, Glory of Hera (Beacon, 1968) p. 66, there are other physiological ones: the females of most animals on whom daemons are partly modelled, tend to herd together in a bunch, but the males wander off by themselves. The 'bunch of females' was a human image too of peace and stability, (v. Padel, 'Imagery of the Elsewhere', CQ 24 (1974), p. 231, 4n), and this behavioural characteristic was extended to tribes of female daemons.

7. Leaf ad Il. 8. 398 points out that the gods in Homer, though they move through the air, are not usually winged themselves. They can disguise themselves as birds, apparently, v. below 132n, 135n. On vases v. eg. Beazley, Red-Figured Vases nos. 174-5, (winged cars); pp. 1156, 151-2, 1348 (winged steeds): compare the winged steed of Oceanus and Aristophanes' burlesque on this motif. In tragedy gods move through the air (eg. Hel. 1496, 246) but the wings are wings of their transport, eg. of the sun-chariot (Ion 123, Or. 1002).

8. E.Alc. 262 οὐχ ὁρᾷς; –
νεκύων ἐς αὐλάν,
ὑπ' ὀφρύσι κυανωπεῖς
βλέπων πτερωτός – †αἴδας†.

A corrupt passage: v. Dale ad loc. for possible solutions. The problem turns on two questions: 1), how to secure responsion between 255-6 and 262-3; and 2) Do the "wings" belong to Hades or to Thanatos? C. Robert, Thanatos (Berlin 1879) p. 34, points out that the winged Hades is found both in art and poetry, but he prefers the much more familar image of the winged Thanatos (v. ib. pp. 4, 8f, 17, 27, 37 and plates 1-3). The scholiast on 843 follows the mainstream of tradition: εἰδωλοποιεῖται μέλανας πτέρυγας ἔχων ὁ Θάνατος.

9. Il. 12. 326.

10. E.Tro. 848, cf. Cr. 178, the more common Night.

11. Ba. 370f. Cf. Gerard Manley Hopkins, who was surely influenced by this image when he wrote:

> Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
> World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.
> ('God's Grandeur').

He too elaborates the core of the metaphor ('broods') by drawing on the visual iconography to which the extra decoration ('warm breast ... bright wings') belongs.

12. In the 'Iliad' ἰοχέαιρα and ἀργυρότοξος refer only to Artemis and Apollo. Ἑκηβόλος as title refers to Zeus, but cf. 1.438 ἑκηβόλῳ Ἀπόλλωνι.

13. eg. Il.24. 605f (Niobe); Od.6. 102 (a gentler picture); Pi.P. 3.10 (the death of Coronis), S. fr. 401, E. Supp. 168 τόξων μεδέουσαν Ἄρτεμιν.

14. Il. 20.68. He is addressed as ἀργυρότοξ' in Chryses' prayer for vengeance which of course involves the bow, Il.1.37 and the arrows clatter as he responds, 1.46. Less appropriately he is addressed as τοξήρης at 226; cf. OT 203f and Pi. Paean 9.38.

15. Cf. Ba. 93 πταμένας Διὸς βροντᾶς. It is used against Capaneus, E. Supp. 640, 860; against Asclepius, E. Alc. 4, 128; and against Semele Ba. 93. For a possible extension of the normal 5th-century position of a god wielding such a weapon, v. below, pp 121, [illegible] 368 (76n).

16. Ion 213f uses the Homeric title.

17. Tro. 93.

18. The complex relations between the gods and the weather include identifying gods as the weather and lead to theories about the

origins of the gods which are neither helpful nor clear, v. Ch. 3 section (iv). For the similar confusion, 'birds presage weather therefore they cause it', v. Halliday, op. cit. p.259.

19. E. Supp. 650. Cf. κύκλος δὲ πανσέληνος ἡκόντιζ' ἄνω, Ion 1155; ἄστρων ὑπέρτερον βέλος, Hipp. 530. Οὔλιος ἀστήρ, Il. 11.62, presumably refers to the season of the year at which the star appears; but v. previous note.

20. E. Cyc. 320ff, v. below, Part B, section vii. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, pp. 194, 199f, 203 shows the different ways of associating the gods and natural elements.

21. S. Ant. 337-8.

22. Cf. eg. Dietrich op. cit. p. 62, 6n, and Appendix viii; Dodds GT p.7 with 30n; p.41. For the reaction against this view cf. R.M. Cook, Gr. Painted Pottery, p. 279, on 'zealots who sense "daimonic" forces' on pots.

23. Hipp. 1418, cf. ibid. 438, and E. fr. 294.2
ἐς ταὐτόημα δ' ὁ φθόνος πηδᾶν φιλεῖ.
Phthonos in this picture is not always divine: cf. S. Aj. 157 where it probably refers to human feelings.

24. For Geras personified in vase paintings v. F. Brommer, 'Herakles u. Geras', Arch. Anz. 1952 Band 67, p. 60ff. Geras. is sometimes a wizened old man, sometimes winged, eg. Abb. 10.

25. Hes. Erg. 90f, v. D. & E. Panofsky, Pandora's Box (Harper 1956), Ch. 1.

26. Metaphorically? Or were they 'really' thought to attack man? DMS iv.32 (Loeb) gives a moving picture of the forms delirium could take: νυκτὸς ...δείματα παφίστατας καὶ φόβοι καὶ παράνοιαι .. καὶ φεύξιες ἔξω ... Ἑκάτης φασὶν εἶναι ἐπῳδαὶς καὶ ἡρώων ἐφόδους.
Cf. the existence of hero-cults such as that of Ephialtes (Pauly-W. s.v. (2)). 'The investigation of metaphor is curiously like the investigation of any of the primary data of consciousness; it cannot be pursued very far without our being led to the borderline of sanity' - Middleton Murry, Countries of the mind (cit. E. Sharpe, 'An Examination of Metaphor' 1940, reprinted in her Coll. Papers, Hogarth 1950, p. 155. I cannot trace the Murry quotation but its style and title are characteristic.)

27. Nike, Peitho, Nemesis, Themis, Hygeia: for temples of eg. Nike and Nemesis, v. Farnell Cults i.75 and ii 487 ff respectively. Αἰδώς, ἔλεος, γέλως and φόβος are known in cult also, ibid. v. 444 with references. v. Dover GPM. 141f.

28. Dodds, GI. p.5, Dawe, HSCP 72 (1968) p.95f, n.10. It is the more surprising, since other abstracts on vases include such nebulous characters as Himeros and Pothos. (Perhaps the associations of Ate were too diffuse to be portrayed except in linguistic ambiguities?)

29. Part B. For Dodd's discussion of the usages of Ate and its changing significance v. GI pp. 2-8, 37-41; cf. Lloyd-Jones, Justice of Zeus, p. 149. On Ate and Erinys cf. [illegible], JZ 76, Dawe, art. cit. p. 95 who cites Ant. 603.

30. Il. 9. 505f, 19.91f. 'Allegory' is used usually to denote a literary mechanism by which one thing, not stated, is represented by another, either an abstraction, or another animal or human figure. The representation must be fully

worked-out and intended by the author, and must be intended to be understood clearly by at least some of his readers. The exclusiveness of allegory is often an important factor, eg in the representation of slave - master relations. v. H. Tudor, Political Myth, Macmillan, 1972, p. 17f, and F. Klingender, Animals in Art and Thought, (p. 86) on Aesop as the guardian of 'dangerous thoughts'. Allegory is mostly absent in this sense from early Greek writing, the first example perhaps occurring in Parmenides (v. Bowra, Problems in Gk. Literature, p. 39f). I should prefer to call Homer's picture of Ate 'embroidered personification' to distinguish it from this particular sense of 'allegory'.

31. v. above, n.27.

32. The phrase 'façon de parler' in this context is often prefaced by 'mere'. But 'façons de parler' not only 'must have an origin' (Dodds, GI. p.5), they have also a powerful influence on the men who use the language in which they are embedded. Cf above pp x-xiii, 258 (9n).

33. Metaphors can have the transformative power of ritual acts. On the transformative powers of metaphor in ritual, cf. V. Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors, p. 29f; and in general, E. Cassirer, 'The Power of Metaphor' in Language and Myth, tr. Langer, 1946, pp. 83-97.

34. On the different powers of metaphor and cliché in poetry v. above, Preface, and M. Silk, Interaction in Poetic Imagery p. 27ff.

35. Perhaps it is only when the 'façons de parler' attitude to divine interventions is over-subscribed that a scholar can charge Greek poetry (or myth: eg. G. Kirk, Myth, 1970, p. 240 (& 182) with 'lack of imagination'.

36. v. below section (vii), (ix).

37. For the gods using daemons as weapons or instruments, as Juno uses Allecto, V. Aen. 7. 324f, and as Homer shows them using dreams, cf. the stance of the weapon-throwing god with the Caulonian coin of Apollo, above Ch. 2. n.15 and below Ch. 3, n. 75,76.

38. v. above p.249 26n, and below Ch.2. section (vii) passim, eg. the strange passage, OT 480f (cit. above, p. 89).

39. It is not clear how far the evidence of tragedy distorts the role of the Erinyes in Gr. popular feeling (v. Dover GPM p. 145). Harrison, Proleg. 223f, suggests that Aeschylus makes the priestess describe them so explicitly, Eum. 46ff, because they are being presented for the first time on stage. Whatever the truth-value of her whole theory (sc. that Aesch. was innovating in identifying the Erinyes with either the Semnai Theai or the Eumenides) it is possible that this was the first stage-presentation of them: it certainly affected vase-painting and later literary presentation. What is not clear is the depth of non-artistic popular feelings about them.

40. κελαιναὶ, μέλαιναι , etc., A. Ag. 463, Sept. 977, et al.

41. Sept. 699 μελάναιγις.

42. cp. E. Tro. 457.

43. On the number of the Aeschylean chorus v. Pickard-Cambridge, Dramatic Festivals,[2] p.234f. Harrison, Proleg. p.242 suggests that the Semnai Theai were later three, but two 'originally' (v. above Preface p.xv on the 'search for origins'). See further, Lloyd-Jones, L'Antiquité Classique 33(1964) pp 368-9.

44. e.g. OC 1229, cf. E. Phoen. 623, 1029, (also 1503, 604). For the single Erinys elsewhere in Sophocles, eg. Aj. 1034, Trach. 809, El. 491, 1081.

45. v. Lloyd-Jones, JZ 104-6, and on the possible derivation of Erinys from a curse, eg. Harrison, Proleg. p. 218f. She points out, p. 222f, that in Homer and Hesiod the Erinyes punish people who are forsworn, Il. xix 258, Hes. Erg. 803, rather than murdered. She suggests that the Erinyes are personified curses first in Aeschylus. Cf. below 250n, p. 337.

46. ταυύποδας S.Aj. 837; καμψίπους A.Sept.791; πολύπους καὶ πολύχειρ ... χαλκόπους S.El. 491.

47. E. IT 941 μεταδρομαῖς Ἐρινύων ἐλαυνόμεσθα φυγάδες and S. Aj. 843 ταχεῖαι ποινικοί τ' Ἐρινύες. Their instruments are fear, E. Or. 38, by which they drive their victim, ἐξαμιλλῶνται φόβῳ , and the 'oistros' of madness, E. Or. 791, μὴ θεαί μ' οἴστρῳ κατάσχωσι cf. IT 1456.

48. Arion: Dietrich, op. cit. p. 106, 108f, 136. For fear of the war-horse, v. below section (vi), and for the kicking image, sections (ix), (x).

49. Il. 19. 91f πρέσβα Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἄτη, ἣ πάντας ἀᾶται, οὐλομένη· τῇ μέν θ' ἁπαλοὶ πόδες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' οὐδεῖ πίλναται, ἀλλ' ἄρα ἥ γε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· κατὰ δ' οὖν ἕτερόν γε πέδησε.

Here Ate's feet are soft: 'She does her harm by walking on their heads ... '.

50. A. Eum. 367ff, cf. Cho. 283 προσβολὰς Ἐρινύων.

51. A. Eum. 51. v. Pauly-Wissowa for archaeological evidence on winged and wingless Erinyes. Harrison suggests the human shape added to the horror on stage but that contemporary vase-painters could not forego the pleasure of drawing big curved wings (Proleg. 228f). They are certainly winged in Euripides eg. Or. 275.

52. E. Or. 261.

53. A. Eum. 54 δυσφιλὴς λίβα (v. Harrison, Proleg. p.195). For their eyes dripping blood, A. Cho. 1058, v. E. Or 256, Andr. 978, αἱματωπούς.

54. v. Fraenkel, ad Ag. 1428.

55. v. below, Ch. 3, section (iv) on Orestes and the Erinyes.

56. Sr. fr. 743 τίσις δ' ἄνωθεν εἶσιν αἱματορρόφος
v. Pearson ad loc. for the Erinyes as snakes, and snakes drinking blood. (For their wish to kill v. E. IT 286, and for eyes showing secret intentions v. below Ch. 5, section (i), (vii)). See Pfeiffer, Wiener Stud. 79 (1966) p. 63f, who shows that the daemon's name should be Τιώ, short for Tisiphone.

57. Eum. 319.

58. A. Cho. 468, 474, Ag. 698, Pho. 1503 cf. Hf 1076.

59. Eum. 365. So Pace for the sake of responsion. The MSS have αἱματοσταγές.

60. Eum. 316; cf. 246, Cho. 924, 1054, IT. 294.

61. Eum, 183, 265-6, Ag. 1188. For the earth drinking blood as a libation in this trilogy, v. Lebeck, The Oresteia, pp. 86-91.

(cf Il. 16. 162)

62. Blood-eating wolves, snakes, insects are common after the 5th century. The echidna indubitably has blood-drinking, or blood-licking, tendencies in later antiquity, but this is not a common feature in the earliest (Homeric) references and Hesiod, where its poison is more important. Cf. IG. 4. 620 (date unknown) a snake as biting, then eating and drinking,

οἵα τις εἰοβόρος δίψας ἔχιδνα δάκνει

There are two tragic passages, both in Sophocles, which contain metaphors apparently involving vampires, S. El. 784

ξύνοικος ἦν μοι, τοὐμὸν ἐκπίνουσ' ἀεὶ
ψυχῆς ἄκρατον αἷμα.

(Cf. Ar. Nub. 712 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκπίνουσιν) and S. Ant. 531

σύ δ', ἥ κατ' οἴκους ὡς ἔχιδν' ὑφειμένη
λήθουσά μ' ἐξέπινες.

In both the girl is accused of diminishing spiritually or physically the head of the house she inhabits. The first passage, more heavily metaphorical, apparently describes vampire-activity to Electra, but this is explained by the second passage: Clytemnestra is in fact comparing her daughter implicitly to a snake: an image of domestic treachery. The snake is apparently the only animal which in the fifth century is thought to lap blood. This may be explained by its chthonic associations in ritual. The blood of the dying is a drink-offering to Hades, S. OT. 400; it is drunk by the dead already under the earth, Ag. 1391. For the Erinys depicted as snake, v. Harrison Proleg. 232, E. IT 286. Hence the blood-drinking of the snake-linked Erinyes, which appears only rarely elsewhere, eg. Aj. 843 Ἐρινύες, γενέσθε , is more prominent in the 'Oresteia'. It emphasizes perhaps their

chthonic ancestry and the increasing number of family corpses in the earth.

63. For the emphasis on blood throughout the 'Oresteia' v. Lebeck, op. cit. p. 83ff.

64. A further argument ex silentio against widespread 5th-century attribution of vampirism to the Erinyes is the general absence of fantasy about their tongue, teeth and lips. This is made more noticeable by their frequent metaphorical title as hounds. (cf. above, 60n), (whose main function in symbolism is eating flesh, not drinking blood; v. below section (vi)).

65. V. above Ch.1.section (j). For images of pursuit v. below Ch.2.(x). Cf. κέντημα λύσσης A fr. 169. For whips of Erinyes in art v. Harrison Proleg. p. 224f.

66. For madness as physical pain and damage to the mental organs v. above Ch.1, section (j) and below Ch.2. B, Introduction.

67. E. fr. 969.3-4. For Sophoclean images of ambush v. S. El. 490 δεινοῖς κρυπτομένα λόχοις , Ant. 603 λόχου τ' ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρίνυς . He pictures them in the hiding-places of Hades, Ant. 1075 λωβητῆρες ὑστεροφθόρα λοχῶσιν Ἅιδου καὶ θεῶν Ἐρῖνύες , and 'fawning in darkness', S.fr. 577,

ἡ δ' ἄρ' ἐν σκότῳ λιθουσά με
ἔσαιν' Ἐρίνυς ἡδοναῖς ἐψευσμένον.

Here he may well be affected by Il.9.567-8,

τῆς δ' ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρῖνὺς
ἔκλυεν ἐξ Ἐρέβεσφιν

But the darkness in which an Erinys may lurk is not merely physical nor mythological. In Aeschylus at the end of the 'Eumenides' there is an implied equation of the Eumenides, the guardians of good behaviour in the state, with the Erinys the conscience within the mind: Eum. 517ff ,

ἔσθ' ὅπου τὸ δεινὸν εὖ
καὶ φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον
δεῖ μένειν καθήμενον (cf. below, pp 137, 254).

ε [illegible]. Sophocles is attracted by images of ambush which depict misfortune attacking man from outside, but which imply that the disaster lurks within the dark mind: Ant. 8-9 εἶδέν τ' οὐδὲν ἔρπει
πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσεύνῃ. (Cf. below, p. 127f).
Ch. 3. [illegible]. Hallucinations in tragedy are of two kinds: those in which a person or criminal is seen as someone else (Agave, Heracles, Ajax, Orestes in IT and perhaps at Or.264), and those in which the visions are created out of thin air, for Cassandra, and Orestes in the 'Choephoroi' and intermittently in Or. 251-275. Compare the auditory hallucinations of Io, pursued by the ghostly pipe of Argus.

68. Unsubstantiated. Cf. Marót, Die Anfänge der Gr. Lit. 1960, p.146 with 90n. Hesiod calls her Φίξ, Theog. 326, but the original form is probably Σφίξ. (West ad loc., pace Plato, Crat. 414D). Though σφίγγω is more common in later Greek, it is ~~used in the~~ a 5th-century word. Some vase-paintings show her with one foot raised at her interlocutor.

69. χηλαί can be used of horses' hooves, but usually refers to eagles' talons, eg A. Pers. 208, S. Ant. 1003 etc.

70. Sept. 541. Her feet are ὠμόσιτοι, E. Phoen. 1025, like those of the eagle holding the dove, Ion 1205. For the sphinx clutching her victim (mostly with lion claws rather than eagle talons) v. H. Walter, Antike und Abendland 9 (1960) plates 29, 30 and 39. Jebb, OT ed. p. 227 cites an Attic vase showing two sphinxes with a prostrate man between them.

71. The riddle-motif becomes more prominent v. OT ed. Jebb pp. 5-6, until in Gide's Oedipus she became only the enigma of

life facing adolescence. In the Graeco-Roman tradition she brings death, but what she does with her victims is not stressed, eg. Ov. Ib. 378.

72. She spreads murder over the land with ἀμουσοτάτοισι... ᾠδαῖς and τετραβάμοσι χαλαῖς , Phoen. 807; the depopulation of Thebes by plague, sphinx or war is a tragic commonplace.

73. v. H. Walter, art. cit. 63f for her history in art.

74. Her wings often feature in descriptions of her: OT 508, Phoen. 1022, etc. Cf Euripides' description of her in his Oedipus, fr. 1. Austin, p 60.

75. In passages such as A. fr. 236 (Ar. Ran. 1287)
Σφίγγα δυσμερίαν πευτανιν κύνα,
or S. OT 391 ἡ ῥαψῳδὸς ἐνθάδ' ἦν κύων,
'hound' is a metaphor for savagery, pursuit, and perhaps a guardian (Jebb translates it 'Watcher'). V. below, 84 n for sepulchral sphinxes, and below section (vi) for dogs as guardians of tombs. Cf. Aeschylus' image for griffins, PV 803 ἀκραγεῖς κύνας , where Groeneboom compares Ap. Rhod. II. 89 κύνες for harpies and, more importantly, Ag. 135 πτανοῖσιν κυσὶ πατρός for eagles. For the association of dogs and birds of prey in scavenging corpses v. above pp 83-4

76. eg. S. OT 130, Phoen. 50, 1506. v. Paully-W. s.v. for the different adjectives applied to them which refer to music.

77. Eum. 332. Cf. perhaps the Sirens' song, which required the 'binding' of Odysseus? On the singing Erinyes, and song in the underworld generally, v. E. Buschor, Die Musen des Jenseits 1944, p. 5 et seq. and ὑμνῳδεῖ θρῆνον Ἐρινύος ... θυμός, Ag. 990; θεῶν τῶν κατὰ χθὸς ὅδ' ὕμνος Sept. 867 ~~191~~; and ὑμνοῦσι δ' ὕμνον ... ὅταν Ag. 1191. ~~; Sept. 867~~.

78. Od. 12. 39f. Cf. the possible ancestry (Harrison Prolem.176f) of Sirens and Harpies as dangerous winds.

79. v. above, Preface p. xv, for a warning against searching for origins and making deductions from hypothetical 'early affinities'.

80. Od.20.77-8. Buschor, op. cit. 48ff suggested that Sirens, Harpies and Sphinxes were basically the same creature. Mr. E. L. Bowie, to whom I am indebted for many ideas on this subject, points out to me that the same figure (in folk-tale or pictures) is likely to have been called by different names in different areas. The 'Odyssey' suggests early associations of the Harpies with the underworld; Euripides confirms chthonic origins of the Sirens, Hel. 169 παρθένοι Χθονὸς κόραι Σειρῆνες . Buschor, following Wilamouitz (Glaube i. 286) in quoting Alcman fr. 7, ἃ Μοῦσα κέκλαγ', ἃ λίγεια Σειρήν , argued that the Sirens were the underworld equivalent of Muses, entertaining the dead with song, and demonstrating to us the balanced structure of upper and lower divinities. Marót, Die Anfänge der gr. lit., 1960, Kap.2, suggested that the name Σειρήν was taken from Homer and given to other, independantly evolved creatures (v. Pollard, Seers, Shrines and Sirens, 1965, p.143). The whole problem seems to rest on the absence of clear connexions between the obscure and fragile literary evidence, and the abundant but inexplicable archaeological material . However, the presence of sphinxes, and other half-woman half-bird daemons, on tombs suggests that even in literary references in which a Siren might seem innocent, one should always look for undertones of death and fear. Sirens and Harpies may be slightly variant expressions of the μεσημβρινὸς δαίμων

(v. Harrison Proleg. p.203, Fig.38 for a rather purged illustration and Lawson, Modern Greek Folklore, p.78): the female daemon who snatches something from men during sleep. If one is interested in these creatures as models for the visualizing of emotion one may be excused, perhaps, from speculation over their origins and kinship. One can even note Harót's derivation (op. cit. p.141f) of 'Siren' from the oriental root ṣir meaning fascination, and add the Evil Eye and the Gorgoneion to the sheaf of associations to these creatures (v. above p. 293 note 3). The destructive song of the Sirens and θεαὶ ἅρπυιαι, is linked at some dark level in Greek thought with the raiding activity of Harpies. The Sphinx combines the two herself.

81. The basis of identification seems to be claws, hands, feet, etc. v. eg. Pollard, 'The Boston Siren Aryballos' AJA 1949 p.357f.

82. v. J.R. Bacon, Voyage of the Argonauts, Methuen, 1949, pp. 14f, 76ff.

83. E.Phoen. 1023 of sphinx, (cf. Hdt.4.9, of Echidna).

84. For sphinxes and sirens on tombs, and their apotropaic possibilities, v. Harrison Proleg. p. 204f. For their common origins, v. Harrison also, with n.n.79 and 80,above. I am informed by Dr. J. Boardman that Phineus' harpies are named in art from the 7th century: all other funerary,decorative or musical creatures of similar components are now, for convenience's sake, called sirens.

85. v. West ad. Hes. Theog. 55,

86. For sinister music, φθογγὴ οὐλομένη which does not fulfil the proper function of music v. above, 80n; below Ch. 3, p. 116 section and Conclusion, p 251

87. E. Phoen. 807.

88. Again, the motif in art does not seem always relevant to the poetic image of the Gorgon. v. above, 3n, for the main studies; add perhaps O.G.S. Crawford, The Eye-Goddess, Phoenix Publications, 1957, for the universal appeal of the motif in painting and artefacts. J. Six, De Gorgone, discusses the different variations of face in detail. (v. Harrison, op. cit. p. 187-96).

89. Its effect is similar to that of Ares on the battle-field, Il.8.349, Γοργοῦς ὄμματ' ἔχων ἠὲ βροτολοιγοῦ Ἄρηος.

90. Hes. Theog. 274f., v. West ad loc.

91. For the snake's eye having the power to 'fascinate', like the Evil Eye (which snakes decorate in some variation of the Gorgoneion), v. below section (vi), and notes 94, 228, 269.

92. Cf below pp.340 (268n) 380 (140n), 410 (19n). This is part of a larger frame of theory, the view of all sense-perception as due to physical ξύνταξις, which affects Hippocratic theory of disease as well as poetic imagery of emotion: v.below, Ch. 3, section(vi).

93. PV 356. Cf. Bacchylides 18, 54, ὀμμάτων δὲ σπίλβειν ἄϊτο Λαμνίαν φοίνισσαν φλόγα. Λημνίαν βλέπειν is quoted as a proverbial phrase in Hesych. For the image of the lantern, and the different arguments about scientific theories of fire in the eye, v. Arist. de sensu 437B 10-438 A5, Theophr. de sens. 7-8, O'Brien JHS lxxxviii (1968) 110-3 and JHS xc (1971) 141f; Lloyd op. cit. 326n.1, 403 n.2. (Cf. below, p.340 264n and Ch. 1 p.276 96n.)

94. E.Or. 480. On the idea that a snake's eye is dangerous v. Pliny NH. viii. 32-3, on the glance of the basilisk (which he compares in the subsequent paragraph to that of wolves, v. below, 228n). The snakes that attack the infant Heracles have κακὸν πῦρ in their eyes, Theoc. xxiv. 18-19. v. further Verdenius, Studia Vollgraff 161-2 for other 'noxia ocelli', animal and human. The Gorgon's eyes have fiery rays too, v. below, 100n, p.313.

95. The Erinyes glare Γοργόνων δίκην, Cho. 1048, cf. Or. 261; Lyssa, μαιμακωπός, is a 'Gorgon of Night', HF 884. Athena in her hostility to Ajax is γοργῶπις, Aj. 450. Γοργωπος is 'fierce'; E. Ion 1266, HF 868, El. 1257, Rh.8, cf. HF 990: some derive it from Γοργώ; others from γοργός, and interpret it as

'flashing', cf. 93n. Since in Sophocles γοργῶπις is applied to Athene (Aj. 450, fr. 844) whose eyes are also refered to in the older epithet γλαυκῶπις, this interpretation might be correct: Jebb quotes Il.1.199 δεινὼ δέ' οἱ ὄσσε φάανθεν. But it would be surprising if connotations of the gorgon aegis were absent from uses of the word, even if absent from its origins.

96. PV 799.

97. E.Ion. 988f. For the possibility that she is Euripides' invention cf. Wilamowitz ad loc. who suggests that it was a rare version, but not original, since if is treated as familiar to the old man: a shaky argument. It is found also at Diod.3.70.

98. Ion 1015, v. Owen ad 988. For the motif of poisonous blood, v. Trach. 717 ἰὸς αἵματος and for the poison-image, Pi.O. 6.47, where it is exploited paraprosdokian, ἐθρέψαντο δράκοντες ἁμερὲ ἰῷ μελισσᾶν καδόμενοι. Since snakes were the purveyors of poison and poisonous snake-bite figured in myth (Philoctetes, Eurydice), it was their lick which could heal as well as poison, on the principle ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται, v. Dodds GI p. 98 (100n) and below, p. 331 (219n).

99. Winged Gorgons: J. Six, op. cit. Ch.1, J.M. Woodward op. cit., plates; Harrison Proleg. p. 193.

100. eg. HF 130 ὡς γοργῶπες αἵδε προσφερεῖς
ὀμμάτων αὐγαί . For the petrifying power
of the Gorgon eye v. Cr. 1520
μὴ πέτρος γένῃ δέδοικας ὥστε Γοργόν' εἰσιδών;

101. H.L. Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, 1958, p. 192.

102. F. Klingender, Animals in Art and Thought, 1971, p. 67f, esp. 82f.

103. Jung, ed., Man and his Symbols, 1964, p. 238.

104. For the wryneck's unpleasant experience in ritual and magic v. eg. Theoc. II. 17. Gow, JHS liv (1934) p.1ff, makes it clear that ἴυγξ can refer to the wheel without the bird. His fig. 2 shows the bird, but not attached to the wheel.

105. H.A. 588 a - h.

106. ibid. 487b. et seq.

107. Arist. draws on folklore here, but does have a scientific explanation for these traits: they are due to competition for food, 608b. et seq.

108. eg. ibid, 611b et seq., 612a.

109. Minoan seal-rings, frescoes, cups and other objects are ~~also~~ decorated with very lively animals, or with animals playing with, or reacting to, each other.

110. Human courage is compared with a lion's actions; and provides a point de départ for sympathetic elaboration of details about the lion irrelevant to the original comparison. Of 19 comparisons in the 'Iliad' of human actions to lions, 4 are short phrases describing a leap; 9 allude to lions' attacks on herds but add a certain sympathetic detail, (eg. 12.299 θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ... ἐς πυκινὸν δόμον ἐλθεῖν or 17.61f, the dogs and men who fear the marauder) suggestive cf admiration for the lion's courage and magnificance; 2 show the lion hunting wild animals; and 3 show the lion himself being hunted. One of these (17.133) shows the lion defending his young (as Ajax over Patroclus' body). The actions compared are those which show courage and strength, ferocity but also magnificence: martial virtues, in fact, eg. Menelaus' 'joy' at seeing Paris on the battlefield at last, 3.23f. Cf. R. Dennys, The Heraldic Imagination, (Barrie & Jenkins, 1975) pp. 48f, 133f.

111. eg. Il. 21.483 (of Artemis), (Cf. 14.41f).

112. eg. E.Or. 1401 and A.Cho. 938 (Orestes in murder attempt); Ag.1224 (ἀνδρεῖον of Aegisthus); Ag.141, 717, 1259 (Clytemnestra and Agamemnon, lioness and lion), Eum. 193, Sept.53 (ὡς Ἄρη

δεδορκότων). Admiration of the lion's ferocity has changed to fear. Is the difference, [illegible] the absence of sympathetic detail from tragedy, due to the requirements of genre? There is no time in tragedy for similes. But this does not explain why predominantly nasty actions and human qualities are compared to animals in tragedy.

113. Comparisons to the speed of a horse in tragedy, eg. Ba.166, Hel. 543, Or. 45.

114. eg. HF 71f, v. Wilam. ad loc.

115. eg. HF72 ὄρνις ὡς.

116. The picture of Helen leading the dancers, ἅ τε πῶλοι ταὶ κόραι παρ' τὸν Εὐρώταν, provokes speculation about any specially Spartan motif in the comparison of girls dancing to horses. v. A.H. Griffiths, QUCC 14 (1972) p.23f nn. 45, 48. Cf. Alcman, Partheneion 46f, esp. 51. But of course it appears elsewhere, eg. E. Ba. 163, 1056. In Anacr. fr. 417 the girl is not necessarily dancing, simply avoiding the poet.

117. Mr. E. L. Bowie suggests to me that the animal character of the chorusses was important mainly for spectacle. v. Sifakis, Parabasis and Animal Choruses, 78ff, Taillardat, Les Images d'Aristophane, p. 37f; Lloyd, Polarity & Analogy, p. 184-5 and

Norman Douglas, Birds and Beasts of the Greek Anthology, Introduction, p. 3: 'We find no Natural History ... in the Anthology; what its authors say about animals constitutes a human rather than a scientific document ... '

118. eg. Richter, Gk. Sculptors, pp. 159, 138, 164.

119. v. Klingender op. cit. p. 67.

120. First formulated by Malinowsky; v. Levi-Strauss, Totemism, Eng. tr. Needham, (1963) p. 56f.

121. Foster, The Dynamics of Clanship Among the Tallensi, 1945, and Firth, 'Totemism in Polynesia', Oceanica vol. 1, no. 3 and no. 4 (1930-31).

122. Firth, op.cit. p. 393.

123. Levi-Strauss loc. cit. 77.

124. Harrison, Proleg. 232 with pictures. Cf. also J.M.C. Toynbee, Animals in Rom. Life and Art (1973) p. 223f.

125. Initiated by Radcliffe-Brown in his Huxley Memorial Lecture of 1951: The Comparative Method in Social Anthropology.

126. Levi-Strauss, op. cit. p.87; cf. Aristotle's third group of comparisons, H.A. 488 a, above.

127. eg. Plato, Rep. 580a ἀϋθάδεια and δυσκολία are due to τὸ λεοντῶδες and τὸ ὀφιῶδες in man. 'Aesopian fable' in the fifth century meant an animal tale with an educative moral suitable for children, (v. Klingender op. cit. 83, 'their value lay in the power to harness more primitive layers of the imagination for the purpose of moral instruction'.) Cf. also Artemidorus' explanation of animal symbolism in dreams, eg. On. 2.12, 'goats make trouble for themselves and their masters: there is an affinity between all wild or troublesome animals and our enemies.' For the earliest known 'best-seller' collection of animal stories v. West, HSCP 73 (1969) pp. 114-5, cf. 124.

128. Proc. Cam. Phil. Soc. NS xiv (1968) 'The Black Hunter ...' p. 56f, G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy p. 183f, illustrates such animal comparisons and cites Pindar, O.11.16ff. Neither the fox nor the lion will change τὸ ἑλικτὸν ἦθος : animals are used 'as the paradigms of constancy and disposition'.

129. Cf. Ch. 5, pp. 194, 235, Conclusion p. 250

130. For the theory of 'fear and admiration' as the emotional basis of totemism v. Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, pp. 56, 89.

131. Durkheim, les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1925) p. 328, trans. Needham, Lévi-Strauss Totemism, p. 96. V. also G.E.R. Lloyd, op. cit. p. 3ff, who puts this quotation in its historical and argumentative context.

132. Hdt. 2.53. For speculation about original animal forms of gods v. J. Harrison, Proleg. 257ff for goddesses, (esp. bird and snake forms), and 322 for gods (Dionysus' epiphanies as bull and snake, 433f.); id. Themis, 447f. On bird-forms of gods, v. Mayer, Megarische Sagen, Hermes, xxvii (1892) p.480f and Halliday, Gr. Divination, 256, who cites a Corinthian aryballus from the Megarid which shows Athene Ailthyia as a human-headed bird. But Halliday sensibly says, 257, that evidence for bird-gods in Greece is 'slight'. v. Nilsson The Minoan-Mycenean Religion, p.339, 491f, and Dodds, GI p. 277 (on associations of Dionysus Melanaigis, cf. Vidal-Naquet, art. cit. p.54). Cf. Dietrich, Origins of Gr. Religion, de Gruyter 1973, p.300 on gods with apotropaic powers over particular animals, and their connexion with animal cults; ibid. p. 100f on divine powers of animals in pre-Greek worship.

133. v. Nilsson op. cit. 505-531.

134. v. Halliday, op. cit. 40f. Cf. below Ch. 3, section (ii) on εἴδωλα and erotic models for divine penetration of human

mind and body. It is remarkable how many stories of transformation Ovid found; and how many stories of animal-transformation also involved erotic pursuit. Cf. also the myths in which animals act as foster-parents for young deities, v. Dietrich, Origins p.109 n.230, L. Preller, Gr. Mythologie[4] ed. Robert, 1887, I. 35, 4n.

135. eg. Il. 7. 59 ὄρνισιν ἐοικότες αἰγυπιοῖσ, cf. of Athene, ἀπέβη..φήνῃ εἰδομένῃ, Od. 3. 371; also Il. 5. 778, 15. 237, 18. 616, 19. 935-6, and H.h.Ap. 114, Ar. Av 575; Sleep perches 'like a bird' on a tree, Il. 14. 289. v. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, p. 187 with note.

136. Dodds GI, Lloyd, op. cit. p. 177f; Halliday op. cit. 40 (esp. Paus. 3. 23. 7 and 6. 20. 5).

137. v. Kirk Myth, 154-156.

138. The product of Hephaestus' attempt on Athene: seed that fell to the ground, v. Kirk op. cit. 155, 198. Kirk cites Poseidon (p.178) as the god who 'produces monstrous progeny, because he is the horse-god (and horses ... were once conceived as monsters) and also god of the deep sea'. Other gods too, though, are responsible for half-animal offspring, whatever the hypothetical basis for their original forms.

139. Podarges, Il. 16. 150, v. J. Harrison, Proleg. 178; for the winds and mares v. ib. 179: she cites Hp. Dreams Il. p. 14 (Littré)

ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἀποθανόντων αἱ τροφαὶ καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ σπέρματα.
On mares' impregnation by the wind v. also Il. 16.150, 15.221f, Arist. H.A.572a, Virgil G. 3. 273f and Conway Zirkle, 'Animals impregnated by the wind' in Daron's Isis (1936) pp. 95-130.

140. For Pindar's description of Ixion's union with the cloud and its results v. P.2.42f τέκεν γόνον ὑπερφίαλον , v. Kirk, Myth p. 155f and Méautis, Les chefs d'oeuvre de la peinture greque (Paris 1939) p. 43-5. (See Mus Helv. 25 (1968) 226f).

141. A. H.A. 576b 31. Cf. Arion, horse-child of Demeter Erinys and Poseidon, v. Dietrich, Death Fate and the Gods p.127 n.10, 128 n.3, 144, or of Zephyrus and Harpy, 144 n.5.

142. Animals as omens: Halliday, 164-5. It is often the relationship between two animals which is important: as eg. the hare-eagle omen in the 'Agamemnon'. Cows, etc. showing the right site for the foundation of a city are a common motif. On divination from the neighing of horses and the prophecy of Achilles' death v. Halliday, p.144.

143. On οἰωνός v. Halliday op. cit. 240f, and cf. Ar. Av. 719: 'You call every kind of omen a bird'. Il.2.238ff. Cf. E.Hel. 1051. On the augural pre-eminence of carnivorous birds v. Halliday op. cit. 249, and Bouché-Leclerq, Histoire de la divination, vol. i. p. 142.

144. On Artemis, πότνια θηρῶν v. Harrison Proleg. 263f, Dietrich, Death Fate and the Gods, p. 142, Farnell, Cults ii pp. 431-4, 440-2, 523-6. Cf. her anger over the hare-omen, Ag. 135.

145. A. Supp. 267.

146. For horn bows v. eg. Il. 4. 105f, and Snodgrass Armour (1964), p. 24; tusk helmets, Snodgrass p.19.

147. v. Snodgrass op. cit. pp. 88, 140.

148. For the earliest pictorial evidence on animal skins in ritual dance v. Sargant, The Mind possessed (1975) p. 58. Cf. Dionysus Melanaigis (v. above n. 132). On drinking animal blood v. Halliday, Gr. Div. p. 126 (and Frazer, Golden Bough^{2} i.p.130f). Bull's blood drunk eg. at Aigai, Paus. 7. 25. 13, lamb's blood at eg. Argos Paus. 2. 24. 1. On ὠμοφαγία and the homeopathic qualities of animal flesh v. Dodds GI p. 277, and on homeopathic principles generally, Lloyd op. cit. pp. 180-1, and above p. 268, (42 n.)

149. Describing someone as a lion-killer demonstrates his strength, v. N. Douglas, Birds and Beasts of the Gr. Anth. p. 7; demonstrations of heroic virility often involve the murder of a particular animal or monster, v. Kirk Myth pp. 184, 188.

150. v. J. Pley, De lanae in antiquorum ritibus usu (Naumburg 1911); Hesych. s.v. δῖον κῶδιον , and J. Harrison Proleg. 23f; for the lambskin and/or lionskin at Eleusis v. N. Richardson H. H. Dem.Commentary (1974) p. 212.

151. On Phrixus and the Golden Fleece v. A. B. Cook, Zeus pp. 414-428 and J.R. Bacon, The Voyage of the Argonauts, pp. 13ff, 19, 21-7; for its rationalizing intepretation as gold ibid. pp. 43, 64-5, 169. (Other ancient interpretations include the sun, pp. 50-4, corn p. 59, and the sea at dawn, 59).

152. Melampus: Apoll. i. 9, 11, 3; i. 9. 12.6; Pliny NH x. 49 (70) 13.6. Mopsus: Clem. Alex. Stom. i. 133. Teiresias: Pherecydes, ap. Apollod. iii. 6. 7. 3. For other references, v. Halliday, op. cit. 24f.

153. Halliday op. cit. 82, Compare the snake-motif, associated with prophecy, in the Glaucus-myth, v. Persson op. cit. pp. 10ff.

154. Halliday op. cit. 262; v. his Appendix on bird-names for kings, tribes, places and heroes. For Picus etc. v. also (with reservations) v. Harrison, Themis, 58-60, 102-110, and Halliday op. cit. 67-9, 251-268.

155. For birds in temple, v. Ion 106 πτηνῶν τ' ἀγέλας, αἳ βλάπτουσιν σέμν' ἀναθήματα cf. 154, 166, 171. On prophets using

wisdom of birds and animals generally v. Kirk Myth p. 155f.

156. On different animals and the appropriate time and deity to sacrifice them, v. P. Stengel, Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer, (1920) pp. 115, 122f, and further, P. Stengel, Quaestiones Sacrificiales, (Berlin 1879).

157. v. Dodds, GI 291 and 304 (n. 63).

158. Pi. P. 4. 213f, cf. id. N.4. 35 (metaph. use), and Theoc. 2.7. (but v. Gow's reservations, above 104n). Dodds GI 290f on birds in magic, and J.E. Lowe, Magic in Gr. and Rom Lit. (1929).

159. Pl. Tim. 71; cf. Ch. 3 section (ii) and, for divination by mirrors, Ch. 5 . pp. 408 (16n), 428 (106n), 429 (110n).

160. Halliday op. cit. p. 118. The animal-guide might also create a spring, eg. Pegasus and Hippocrene (Hes. Theog. 6) or Polybus' cow whose horn created Bukerais at Plataea, Et. Mag. 207.42. Cf Gow ad Theoc. 7.6-7 and Vian, Les origines de Thèbes, ch. 1.

161. v. Halliday op. cit. 118f.

162. Dodds p. 98 (100n). For the snake's φάρμακα as both good and bad v. Halliday op. cit. 90f. (Compare the drops of Gorgon

blood in the Ion, above 97 n). For the temple snakes of Asclepius v. Dodds GI 114, 128(n. 63) and 193.

163. v. Dodds GI p. 114, 128 (n. 64).

164. Festugière, Personal Religion Among the Greeks (1954) 91f.

165. v. Mylonas, Eleusis, p. 244 (n. 126).

166. By Ptolemy II; Athen. V. 201B - C.

167. J.M.C. Toynbee, Animals in Roman Life and Art, (1973) p. 16, and for pet snakes, monkeys etc., ibid. p. 224.

168. Actaeon: A.fr.135 κύνες δισμάθυνον ἄνδρα δεσπόσην.
Glaucus: A. fr. 23 ('Glaucus Potnieus'), εἴλκον <δ'> ἀνὰ λυσσηδόν . . . . For Pindar fragment 169, describing the rending of Diomedes by his horses, v. Lloyd-Jones, HSCP 76 (1972) p. 45ff.

169. The Messenger explains that they were maddened with fear, Hipp. 1229: but we can note the frothing jaws etc., 1223 αἱ δ' ἐνδακοῦσαι, στόμια πυρίγενῆ γναθμῶν βίᾳ φέρουσιν... Cf. L. Malten, 'Das Pferd im Totenkult', Jahrb. xxix (1914), 179 f.

170. On the ideas of lions in 5th century, v. E.S.G. Robinson JHS lxxi (1951) p 161,'a knob on the nose of the lion - Nature's lions know no such swelling'. See W. Llewellyn Brown, The Etruscan Lion, passim.

171. v. above, ch 2 nn. 110, 112, 127.

172. T.S. Eliot, Collected Plays, 'Murder in the Cathedral', PT. 1, pp. 41-2.

173. v. Kirk, Myth pp. 154, 156, Harrison, Proleg. and Farnell Cults iv. p. 20.

174. For Poseidon's association with horses being linked to his rôle as Earthshaker, v. Halliday op. cit. 104f; cf. the oath to Poseidon which is sworn while touching horses, Il. 22. 584, v. further Farnell, Cults iv, pp. 5-9, 15-23.

175. For the Medusa-horse v. Harrison Proleg. p. 179, Kirk Myth p. 155.

176. v. Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods pp. 131-138, 106.

177. v. Kirk on Centaurs and Pegasus, Myth 155f, esp. 161. Mares were particularly prized for racing v. H.A. Harris Sport in Greece and Rome p. 157.

178. H.A. Harris, op. cit. pp. 151f.

179. v. Kirk, Myth, 161. On 'hippomanes', Arist. H.A. $577^{a}9$, 605 a 2 and Gow ad. Theoc. 2. 48.

180. For Cheiron's healing powers and his ambiguous position between the wild and the civilized, v. Kirk, Myth, 156f. The satyrs though 'wild in origin' (Harrison Proleg. 379) are presented in the fifth century as comic. So is Dionysus.

181. Dennys op. cit. 157; cf. T.H. White, The Bestiary, p. 84f.

182. eg. A. Sept. 102-3, 206.

183. eg. Pholus, in Apollod. 2.5.4., (v. Kirk, 156f.) Compare man-eating horses, above 168n., p. 324.

184. H.A. Harris op. cit. p. 152. Il. 23. 262f is the first description of a chariot-race.

185. Cf. Arist. H.A. 575 b.

186. Xen. Equ. x.3f xi. 8-9. Cf. Richter, Animals in Gk. Sculpture, p.12.

187. Zeus and the bull: Harrison Proleg. pp. 431f, 481f, Farnell Cults i. 95, 56-8, A.B. Cook, Zeus, i. pp. 430-719. Pentheus sees Dionysus as a bull Ba. 920. Cf. ib. 1159 and Dodds ad loc.

188. v. A.B. Cook Zeus 430ff.

189. A. Supp. 351f. Io is presented as a cow; she is shown on vases as a horned maiden, perhaps under the influence of tragedy, but this argument depends, of course, on the date one assigns to the PV (v. Lloyd-Jones, JZ pp. 95-103).

190. Among the various Crete-based myths (Pasiphae, Minotaur, Europa) involving cows and bulls, there is the story of Minos' cow whose colours were red, white and black: v. Persson op. cit. pp. 9f, 19ff.

191. v. Harrison Proleg. 158ff (figs. 30, 31) for illustration and speculation.

192. For Jason's bulls v. Med. 478 ταύρων πυρπνόων . Cf. Ba. 743, ταῦροι δ' ὑβρισταὶ κεἰς κέρας θυμούμενοι , and the bull from the sea, Hipp. 1214 ἄγριον τέρας .

193. v. Richter, Animals in Gr. Sculpt. pp. 20-21.

194. eg. A. fr. 159, Ἐτανθόρυζε ταῦρος ⟨ὡς⟩ νεοσφαγής .

195. E. Med. 92 ὄμμα νιν ταυρουμένην τοῖσδ' , cf. Ba. 922.

196. Corpse left for dogs: v. Achilles' threat, Il. 23.183; for birds, Ant. 29 οἰωνοῖς γλυκὺν θησαυρὸν εἰσορῶσι πρὸς χάριν βορᾶς or E. Phoen. 1628 οἰωνοῖς βορά to Antigone . Cf. Jebb introd. §9.

197. v. further J.R.T. Pollard, 'The Lammegeier', G & R.(1947), p. 23ff and D'Arcy Thompson, Greek Birds, s.v.

198. κύων is often applied to bird-agents of the gods, eg. to eagles, PV 1022, Ag. 136, S. Tr. 884; to griffins PV 803. It should be pointed out, though, that it also applies to Pan, Pi. fr. 96, and in later Greek even to Hecate. But the association in the κύημα image (cf. οἰωνοῖσιν ἕπεσθαι καὶ κύημα eg. Il. 17.272 , Od. 3. 271) suggests the particular association of bird of prey with dog. See H. Scholz, Der Hund in der gr.-röm. Magie und Religion, diss. Berlin 1937. Cf above, p. 307, 75n.

199. For dogs of war v. Snodgrass, op. cit. 88 and R.M. Cook in Festschrift für A. Rumpf 1952, 35 ff. I note that in J.M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad, 1976, the dog is seen as 'a symbol of the impurity of battle'. It is in Homer 'a predator and scavenger' the most completely domesticated animal ... but he remains an animal'. (B. Knox, review in New York review of Books, vol. xxiii no. 7 (29.4.76)). κύων is, of course, a term of

abuse in Homer, Od. 20.18, Il. 8. 243, cf. Il. 1. 159, 3. 180, 18.396.

200. v. Richter Animals, p. 32, esp. the gem representing a hound stroked by a child.

201. Od. 17.290f.

202. Dodds GI 114, 128 (65n).

203. σκίνω , used of dogs, in metaphor means 'greet' or 'gladden', but also 'deceive', 'cheat'. For Actaeon v. above ch 2 n. 168.

204. Hes. Theog. 311 Κέρβερον ὠμηστήν, Ἀΐδεω κύνα χαλκεόφωνον...
For Scylla, πῆμα βροτοῖσιν , v. Od. 12.106f, 222f.
Homer seems to imply, Od.12.86, that her name derives from σκύλαξ .

205. Il.8.243, Od.20.18, cf. Il.1.159, 3.180, 18.396. Cf. A.Supp.758 κυνοθρασεῖς.

206. The dog as guardian of the tomb (and Cerberus the archetypal dog-guardian of Hades) is the opposite image of σκύλαξ the scavenger of corpses: compare the healing and poisonous qualities of the snake's φάρμακα , above 93n.

207. The lust of Zeus is an element which reappears in the PV, not only in connexion with Io, but with Thetis: a motif perhaps explored more fully in the lost plays.

208. On eagles in the 'Oresteia' v. Lebeck, The Oresteia pp. 8ff, 15ff, 29, 33-36. Cf. Harriott, Poetry and Criticism Before Plato, p. 85.

209. Eg. the coinage of Acragas at the end of the 5th century, v. Richter, Animals in Gr. Sculpture, figs. 187, 188. Cf. also N. Douglas, op. cit. reprinted 1974 (Minerva Press), frontispiece.

210. A.Supp. 510. They are earlier described as doves afraid of hawks, 226.

212. v. J.R.T. Pollard, in G. and R. (1947) and 'Birds in Aeschylos' G. and R. (1948) p. 116ff.

213. A.Supp. 878.cf. Hdt. (on the crocodile), i.68 and Aristotle's borrowings from him, HA.558 a 17-24.

214. A.Supp. 887.

215. Oistros and μύωψ are distinguished by Aristotle, (HA. 490^{a}20, 596814) but apparently equated by Aeschylus. The odd use of the

verb χρίω , which normally means 'anoint', to denote the action of this beast on Io might suggest that the poet envisages some kind of poison - ἀλ smear? (PV 567, 598, 695). Semonides' only good housewife is like a bee: priestesses of Demeter were called μέλισσαι and bees are a symbol among other things of purity, Schol Pi. 4. 104(60). The bee who produces honey is a favourite symbol for a poet, (v. Harriott op. cit. pp. 84, 124, 138).

Coins of the Ephesian Artemis (6th century) and the Vatican statue of Artemis show the bee as her emblem (v. L-J ad A. fr. 43 and fr. 1274), v. H. M. Ransome, The Sacred Bee, (1937) pp. 91-140. But the sweetness is inseparable from the sting: v. CQ, xxiv (1974) p. 232; and cf. the proverb ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπών, Pl. Pha 91C.

216. Supp. 895: cf. above, p. 67f.

217. The suggestion that at some time it represented the soul of the dead has been embraced by several scholars, eg. L. Malten, Jahrb. xxix, p. 225; Rohde, Psyche 105 n.12, 111 n.33, 602 appendix xi; Harrison Proleg. 213ff. v. Dietrich, Death Fate and the Gods, p.47 n2.

218. A snake is a 'child of earth', Artemid. On. ii. 13. 103.

219. Snake's healing φάρμακα : for the Asclepius-cult v. Dodds 114, 128 n.64. It is associated with the oracle of Trophonius

also, Paus. v. p. 20. (Frazer). Cf. Halliday op. cit. p. 89f. Snake-kings with the power of blessing include Kekrops (Apollod. 3. 1. 77), and Erichthonius whom Kirk, Myth p. 196-8, takes to represent fertility.

220. Compare Asclepius' sacred snake entertained by Sophocles, Wilamowitz, Glaube II. 233, Dodds GI p. 193.

221. Snakes guard the apples of Hesperides, the golden fleece, and the early shrine at Delphi.

222. The prophet who operates from a spiritual and often physical μυχός (v. Ch. 1. section (iv) (h)) is obviously linked to the snake who inhabits the earth, who both heals and kills, v. Halliday, op. cit. p. 82 (and for dreams of snakes before the birth of a prophet v. Artemid. On. 4.67.).

223. eg. Heracles: the motif inverted in Pindar's picture, above 98 n.

224. Eurydice: first mentioned in Greek literature in the lament for Bion; Virgil and Ovid are the main sources. Harrison Proleg. 602f. suggests she was 'originally' an underworld goddess. v. above 79 n. and Preface. v. Böhme, Orpheus 296 f.

225. Il. 3. 33-5: compare the lady of Alexandria: Theoc. 15. 58.

226. A.Sept. 290f.

227. Sept. 381 μεσημβριναῖς κλαγγαῖσιν ὡς δράκων βοᾷ

228. The motif is extended to the woodpecker and praying mantis (Theophr. H.P. 9. 86, Aristarchus in Σ. 10. 18, v. Gow ad Theoc. 14. 22). But it was particularly the wolf whose eye had power to make any man, who failed to see the animal, before the animal saw him, ὀστενέστερον καὶ ἄφωνον , Geop. 15.18, Plat. Rep. 336 D 14.22, v. Ec. 9.53, cf. above, 94n; and Pliny N.H. xi. 55, the eyes of the wolf 'splendent lucemque iaculantur'.

229. I prefer 'lick' since it is the snake's lick that also heals in dreams, Dodds GI p. 114. Perhaps the idea came from the snake's flickering tongue?

230. A.Supp. 762 (Page).

231. E.Alc. 578f: σὺν δ' ἐποιμαίνοντο χαρᾷ μελέων βαλιαί τε λύγκες
ἔβα δὲ λιποῦσ' Ὀρφνος νάπαν λεόντων
ἃ δαφοινὸς Ἴλα·
χόρευσε δ' ἀμφὶ σὰν κιθάραν,
φοῖβε ποικιλόθριξ
νεβρός...

232. Ba. 562f.

233. For φθονηθεῖσα ὀυλομένη v. above, pp 307 (77n), 310 (86n).

234. Although Sophocles takes man's control over beasts to illustrate his achievements, Ant. 342f, he turns it also into an example of man's mistaken assumptions of control over all powers in the world which may, at any moment, demonstrate the helplessness of man.

235. In Hesiod, Harmonia is the daughter of Ares and Aphrodite, sister of Phobos and Deima, Theog. 937. She is linked with her mother in dance (H.h. Ap. 195) and in blessings (A.Supp. 1041). Empedocles (v. West ad Theog. 937) apparently equates her with Aphrodite. She was given in marriage to Cadmus and all the gods attended their wedding (v. Pi. P. 3. 167, Diod. 4.48, 5.49, Ba. 1330f, κτλ.). Euripides' picture of this event, Phoen. 822f, links it to Amphion's φόρμιγξ to whose music rose the walls of Thebes. (v. Powell ad loc. for later references to this story). But at the wedding one bridal gift was the lethal necklace subsequently bequeathed to Eriphyle: Harmonia in myth issurrounded by dangerous objects and dangerous brethren. Similarly the concept of ἁρμονία in music, politics, medicine or individual living was a precious balance; v. above p.151, with p.385 (10n), and below, Conclusion, pp. 251f, 254, 256, 440 (65n).

Part Two.

236. I shall leave references in the text for the rest of this chapter. The material is taken from tragedy mainly, with references to other poets where appropriate.

237. Cf. E. Supp. 613 and ibid. 1078. Grief, as powerful as a god, has the gods' destructive power, E.Or. 398.

238. On habits of metaphor and cliché which betray a patient's most severe and truest terrors v. E. Sharpe, Examination of Metaphor, in Coll. Papers. On the use of metaphor in general, cf above, Preface, pp. xii-xiii.

239. Eros with wings: Hipp. 127, ὠκυτάτῳ πτέρῳ , 1275, πτανοὺς ἐφορμάσῃ . Cf. Ant. 617 κουφονόων ἐρώτων The material throughout lyric poetry is vast. For the whole subject of wings in metaphor, and their derivations in religious belief, v. T. Tzavella-Evjen, Τὰ Πτερωτὰ Ὄντα Τῆς Προϊστορικῆς Ἐποχῆς , Athens (1970) passim, esp. 65ff.

240. The bee image at the end recalls στάζεις πόθον and γλυκεῖαν χάριν at the beginning of the ode. But the implication of piercing is in other passages - βέλος .. ἵησιν ἐκ χερῶν , 531, cf. the lightning that pierced Semele - and reminds the listener of the bee's sting as well as her sweetness. The scholiast of B is scolded by Barrett (p.266 who thinks that the only image intended is of 'flitting from one victim to another'), for crediting Euripides with 'a meaning which he has simply not expressed'. But the expressed meaning is not the only important one: associations and implications of the whole contribute to the effect of the ode within its play. The wings of love are 'sharp', 1270f. Sophocles' images of love also include martial vocabulary, eg. S.Ant. 781f ἀνίκατε μάχαν .. ὃς ἐν κτήμασι πίπτεις.

241. Personifications of fear: Hes. Theog. 935 Phobos and Deimos, (v. West ad loc. for evidence of cults), and in Homer, Il. 4.40, 11.37, 15.119 et al. Cf. Cho. 524 νυκτιπλάγκτων δειμάτων. Fear also 'puts to flight' eg. Ba. 304 διεπτόησε. Cf T.B.L. Webster, 'Personification as a Mode of Gr. Thought', Journal of Warburg and Courthauld Institutes xvii (1954) pp 10-21.

242. Compare the guesses which the chorus of the Hippolytus make about the <u>specific</u> powers responsible for Phaedra's behaviour, Hipp. 141f.

243. Lyssa attacks Heracles' breast, HF 863, but she attacks from the air, as do the Erinyes in Orestes' visions, <u>Or</u>. 274.

244. OT 263 νῦν δ' ἐς τὸ κείνου κρᾶτ' ἐνηλάθ' ἡ τύχη, cf. Jebb ad OT 1299. Also A.Pers. 515, Ag. 1175, Cho. 1056, Eum. 370-1.

245. Though the derivation could also refer to lots <u>leaping</u> from the helmet.

246. S.Phil. 1096, E.Hipp. 827 where Theseus compares Phaedra to the daemon who has helped her 'press him down'. Cf. OC 1449 βαρύποτμα κακά.

247. Cf. Tro. 112, συμφορᾷ βαρύνομαι Alc. 1081 and Aj. 41 χόλῳ βαρυνθείς, v. Stanford ad loc.

248. Hipp. 819, 873.

249. Ant. 1272-3.

250. For arai personified v. Harrison Prolem. pp. 138f. Lloyd-Jones follows her, and Rohde, in seeing the Erinyes as 'personified ghosts, or later curses, of the victims of injustice'. JZ p 75. Dodds rejected this view, GI p.21 n. 37, since in all but one of the Homeric examples 'the claims they support are those of living persons'. He has an interesting note on the erinys as projected maternal anger (v. Ch. 3. section (iv), (v)). Whatever the origin of the Erinyes and their relation to curses, Arai could be seen in tragedy as personified, autonomous creatures, sitting on the head of their victim, leaving irrevocably the lips of their invoker, living or dead. A.Supp. 1167 ἀραί τε τοῦ σοῦ στόματος Phoen 475, and 876 ἐκ δ' ἔπυσεν' αὐτοῖς ἀρὰς δεινάς . Cf. A.Sept. 787 πικρογλώσσους ἀράς , 833 μέλαινα... ἀρά and 699, ἐχθρά μοι πατρὸς ... ἀρὰ

... ὄμμασιν προσπίτνει

For the sense of the dangers winged words may have once they leave your lips v. the Homeric phrase, ποτὶν σε ἔπος φύγεν ἕρκος ὀδόντων ; (eg. Od. 5.22). Compare the weapon-metaphors of song, Harriott op. cit. p. 69ff, and Gorgias' rationalized expression of the ancient fear: λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ (D-K. 11. ').

251. Winged dreams: Phoen 1545, Hec. 71 μελανοπτερύγων ... ὀνείρων, Tr. 533.2, IT. 571. Compare sleep 'perching like a bird', Il. 14. 289 [illegible], cf. above p. 319 n. 135, and pp 36-7, 280, 122 n.

252. S.El. 242 πτέρυγας ὀξυτόνων ῥόων . Cf. πτεροῦται ὕμνων Pi.I.5.63. The Muses themselves are often winged on vases.

253. M. Silk, Interaction in Poetic Imagery p. 122 (n. 17) refers this to the Muses' bow. But the Muses are not armed in Homer: I prefer to see words taking shape like dreams or emotions, autonomous and winged.

254. On winged souls as ἄνεμοι v. Rohde Psyche p. 356 n.45. Cf. the winged 'Boreads' on vases and reliefs. Boreas himself appears on vases throughout the fifth always as winged.

255. Aetius attributes to Anaximenes (DK 13 B.2) some comparison between the breath-soul in man and air in the world; on πνεῦμα as 'soul' v. Rohde pp. 500f; on the winged soul on vases, ibid. 171f, and on the bird-form of souls, Dodds GI p. 141, 162 n.38.

256. Erotic attack by gods on humans is often represented in weapon-imagery, eg. the lightning-stroke on Semele. In elaborate personification, the weapon of the image become separated from the emotion itself: eg the arrows of love. In less sustained or less iconographical passages, the emotion itself acts

as a piercing weapon.

257. Other organs also, eg. Eum. 842 τίς μ' ὑποδύεται πλευρᾶς ὀδύνα;
The memory of sorrow 'sinks into' a man, S.OT 1318 οἷον εἰσέδυ μ' ἅμα κέντρων τε τῶνδ' οἴστρημα καὶ μνήμη κακῶν.

258. E. Supp. 288 κἀμὲ γὰρ διῆλθέ τι . Compare the image of sound drilling through ears into the mind, Ch. I, section (i).

259. So Hipp. 1351, διά μου κεφαλῆς ἄσσουσ' ὀδύναι
κατὰ δ' ἐγκέφαλον πηδᾷ σφάκελος.
Cf. A. Cho. 184 ἐπαίθην δ' ὡς διαντίαν βέλει.

260. Hipp. 530f.

261. Hipp. 39, 1303. Cf. Ch.1. section (iv) j.

262. Hipp. 391f, λέξω δὲ καὶ σοὶ τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης ὁδόν.
ἐπεὶ μ' ἔρως ἔτρωσεν, ἐσκόπουν ὅπως
κάλλιστ' ἐνέγκαιμ' αὐτόν

The 'archer-god himself is struck by arrows'. For the ἔνθεος κόρη v. Tro. 255 (On love 'going out to war', Hipp. 527).

263. v. L. Malten, Die Sprache des Menschlichen Antlitzes im frühen

Griechentum, (de Gruyter 1961) p. 17, 5n.

264. S.fr. 474, 1-2. Pearson prefers πέλοψ / ὄψις (to ἐν ὄψει λύγνα) which has its metaphorical uses (but v. 104n). V. Pearson, CR xxiii 255f, on the gaze of the lover. For the ἀστραπή flashed from the eye v. Pi. fr. 123 ἀκτῖνας πρὸς ὄσσων μαρμαρυζούσα δράκεις / ὃς μή πόθῳ κυμαίνεται. v. Jebb-Pearson ad loc. for other refs, and below, 93n 94n. v. also Trach. 548 ὀφθαλμὸς ἄνθος, Ap. Rhod. 3. 1015, Mosch. 2. 86, and, in a different context, S. fr. 161 ὀμμάτων ἀποστόλους ἵησιν.

265. V. above p. 311 93n, and articles cited there.

266. Ag. 743: v. Lloyd-Jones, HSCP 73 (1969) p. 100; ~~where~~ it is interesting to notice the associations of fire and flower (cf. 'fire in the eyes', Ch. 1. 96n) with ὀμμάτων βέλος.

267. Cf. above, 97n and eg. Iphigeneia's command to Thoas, IT 1212, not to come εἰς ὄψιν (of τὰ μυσαρά).

268. Sept. 695-6. Verrall and Tucker take the ara to be the personified owner of the eye; Paley and Groeneboom think the ara is sitting on the eye (which is surely the natural meaning of προσιζάνει). Cf. A.Supp. 650 βαρὺς δ' ἐφίζει, and Pohlenz Gott. gel. Aug. 1930 p. 445 for βαρὺς δαίμων. What is important is the infectious nature of the man's own eyes. Arai can be described as black (833 : ~~and~~ so Weil would read here μέλαιν' ἀν). The eyes may be seen as 'darkened' - and 'dried'? - by the curse. Cf. perhaps OR. 389 δεινὸν δὲ λεύσσειν ὀμμάτων ξηραῖς κόραις

- of Orestes.

269. The rationale behind Iphigeneia's veiling of Orestes' and Pylades' heads; cf. HF 1231-2. Compare the veiling of mourning symbolic of death, Ch. 4. (iv)a. For the attack on the head cf. below Ch. 1. 55n.

270. v. Above, notes 91, and 228. Cf. Pers. 81 κυάνεον δ' ὄμμασιν λεύσσων φονίου δέρμα δράκοντος.

271. Arist. de part. anim. 650 b. θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητικὸν ὁ θυμός

v. Jebb-Pearson ad S.fr.474.1, and below, Ch.1.104n.

272. Above, notes 3, 100.

273. V. Above pp 55ff, 62ff.

274. For driving images v. section (iii) below.

275. v. Ch.5. section (viii) and Dover GPM pp. 195-6.

276. For madness as only qualitatively different from emotion v. Dover GPM pp. 126-7, and Ch. 3. section (i).

277. HF 20 v. Wilam, ad loc. Other κενέρα θεῶν include shame, Eum 156, grief PV 691-2, and cf. Eum 466, ἀλγη προφωνῶν ἀντίκεντρα κληδίς.

278. Eum. 156 ὑπὸ φρενὸς ὑπὸ λοβόν, PV 692 κέντρῳ τύψειν ψυχάν, cf. Ch. 1. section (i), p. 24.

279. Cf. the ἐκ -images, Ch. 1. section (iv) (i) and M. Silk, Interaction p. 121 n. 17, (on ἔξω used of madness) who cites Od. 18. 231 ἐκ γέ μ' πλήσσουσι —, Il. 6.234 φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς and Od. 18.327 οὐ γέ τις φρένας ἐκπεπαταγμένος ἐσσί. The participle 'struck' etc, can mean 'mad' or 'surprised', eg. Tro. 1205. Cf. Wilam ad HF 846, and Dodds GI. p.67.

280. Ba. 1229 and S.El.5. οἰστροπλήγος ἰνάχου κόρης. But whether goad or blow, the oistros is involved with the driving image, eg. E.Peirithous 9 οἰστηλάτοισιν.

281. E.El. 1270, E.Alc. 1125, Ag. 1203.

282. E. Tro. 182. Cf. Ba 604, the blow of fear, ἐκπεπληγμέναι φόβῳ (though there may be associations of madness here too, considering which god is responsible).

283. Cf. Ant. 1097 ἄπη παίξαι θυμόν . Cf. perhaps the textually difficult passage Ant. 596-603, ἐρείπει θεῶν τις ,... φοινία θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων ἁρπὰξ κοπίς , with commentators ad loc. For the 'goads' of the Erinyes v. above, Ch 2 47 n, 65 n.

284. Ant. 622-5.

285. To mourn: Alc. 1080 ἔρως τις (sc. to mourn) ἐξάγει cf. E.Supp. 79. Of grief, S.Aj. 275 κεῖνός τε λύπῃ πᾶς ἐλήλαται κακῇ , of hope, Andr. 27 ἐλπίς μ' ἀεὶ προσῆγε. Cf. the cry after disaster ποῖ γᾶς φέρομαι πλάμων; eg. OT. 1309: cf. Ch.5. section (viii) and note there the Passive voice, φέρομαι

286. Above, Ch. 1. section (iv) (j); below, Ch. 3 (ii). For the 'yoking' of the Proetides, Bacchyl.11. 43-6, cf. Od. 20. 346. For the 'bridle' on Phaedra, Hipp. 237-8: though ἀναστειράζει probably means 'roping' not 'bridling'. Cf. Ar.Vesp. 1022, Or. 845 λύσσῃ δαμείς , and Ag. 1087, 'Apollo led her there'. On bridles v. H.A. Harris, Sport, p. 172.

287. Ba. 890. Cf. images of dogs attacking their prey, and above, Ch 2 199n.

288. Ba. 888. Compare the feet of the Erinyes, above p. 66

289. Ba. 977.

290. v. Harrison Proleg. 213f.

291. E.El. 1252. Like hounds, too, they chase him into exile, IT 931, Ἐριν́ων δεῖμα μ' ἐκβάλλει χθονός.

292. Cf. above, Ch. 2. 203n, and p. 83

293. It has provoked some complex explanations (eg. allusions to the practice of 'fire-walking').

294. v. below, Ch. 3 section (ii).

295. Cf. [illegible] above pp 42f with 307 (77n); further, Ch. 1. section (iv), h, passim (p 38f).

296. v. above, p xii Preface, and M. Silk, op. cit. 27, on 'dead' metaphor: 'If this word, used then, had been so used x years ago, it would have been a metaphor' (?).

297. eg. S.Phil 1231, El. 1112, cf. φρίκης ... ὑπεκθοροῦσης Hdt. 6.134. cf. ἐς δ' ἄκραν δεῖμ' ὑπῆλθε κράτος φόβαν, O C 1465.

298. Cf. I.M. Glanville, CQ 43 (1949) p. 48: 'the analogy of the compulsion exerted by an external force upon inanimate or animate objects ... Aristotle decided that if the circumstances are outside the agent's control, he is acting under compulsion'. v. Ch. 3, section (ii), Ch. 5. sections (i), (viii).

299. Pain, Hipp. 1371 ὀδύνα μ' ὀδύνα βαίνει (and compare medical imagery, Ch. 3. section (vi), Curse, E.Or. 996, ἦλθ' ἀρα' πολύστονος, cf above, p. 337 (250n).

300. Winged hope: E.fr. 271 πτηνὰς διώκεις ... ἐλπίδας, where the context suggests the vain pursuit of a very elusive hope. Cf. the winged and wandering nosoi of Pandora, Hes. Erg. 100, μυρία λυγρὰ ..... ἀλάληται. Of these only hope stays:

μούνη δ' αὐτόθι Ἔλπὶς ... .
ἔνδον ἐμιμνε πίθου ὑπὸ χείλεσι, οὐδὲ θύραζε
ἐξέπτη.

Cf. Ant. 615 πολυπλαγκτός

301. S.El. 479 θάρσος, S.El. 928 θαῦμα cf. E.Cyc. 411 θεοῦ τι, Or. 968 ἕδεος ἕλκεται, Hipp. 1080 οἶστος, Med. 57 ἵμερος μ' ὑπῆλθε

302. E.Or. 1668 μ' ἐσῆλθε δεῖμα p. 345, and above, 4 (297n).

303. On Kletic hymns v. Adami, 'De Poetis Scaenicis Graecis hymnoram sacrorum imitatoribus', Jahr. 1901 p. 213f, Page ad Sapph. fr. 1,

and prayer-forms generally, E. Norden, Agnostos Theos esp. pp.148-202.

304. Sapph. fr. 2 δεῦρύ μ' ἐκ Κρήτας ἐπὶ τόνδε ναῦον
CT 166 ἔλθετε καὶ νῦν.

305. Alc. 889 δυσπάλαιστος τύχα (an image perhaps affected by the picture in this play of Heracles wrestling with Death?). Cf. Or. 38 εὐμενίδας, αἳ πόνδ' ἐξαμιλλῶνται φόβῳ and Trach. 442 Ἔρως .... ὅστις ἀνταίρεται πυκνὰς ὅπως ἐς χεῖρας.

306. ἐπιστρατεύει Hipp. 527, ἀνίκατε μαχάν Ant. 781, v. above, ch.2. 238n, 239n.

307. E.Hcld. 299 νικηθεὶς πόθῳ (a line omitted by Stobaeus, perhaps not genuine). A.Supp. 1005 τόξευμ' ἔπεμψεν ἱμέρου νικώμενος. Cf. Hipp. 725-7:
κύπριν, ἥτις ἐξόλλυσί με ...
πικρὸν δ' ἔρωτος ἡσυχάσασθαι.

308. eg. Phil. 766 λαμβάνει γάρ οὖν ὅπως μ' cf. Il.10.193.

309. Sept. 379, Eum. 88, Ba. 828, Or. 460, the weak form of it, λιπὼν μ' ἔχει. Usually it is an inhibiting emotion that 'holds' the mind like this; but not invariably: the lust to kill 'holds' the 2 brothers, Phoen. 622 πατρὶ τοῦδ' ἔρως ἔχει. So,

more vividly, fear grasps the tongue, Sept. 259 ἀφυκτὶς γὰρ γλῶσσαν ἁρπάζει φόβος (cf. Ag. 36 βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ βέβηκεν). Cf. the binding image, and v. 311n. below.

310. Cf. E.Hel. 669 πῆς σε δαίμων συμφορᾶς πάτερας; with the less vivid αἴρεω cf. ἵμερος , Il. 3.446.

311. Cf. 77n. above on Sirens.

312. Hipp 159-60.

313. Above, 70n. This becomes an important Platonic image, of course, eg. Phaedo 62 B.3 ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι v. Burnet ad loc., and the σῶμα - σῆμα equation of Gorg. 493 a 2-3.

314. Dogs and lions are the subject of δάκνειν , eg. Il. 18. 585, but so are insects Il. 17. 572 and smoke, dust or dry winds that 'sting' the eyes (Ar. Ach. 18, Lys. 298).

315 Il. 5. 493, Od. 8. 185, 19. 517, v. Hes. Theog. 567 with West ad loc.

316. S. Ant. 317. Cf. above pp. 2-4.

317. Cf. Trach. 254 ἐδήχθη ποῦ ποτ' ὀϊστεύσας λαβών.
Perception causes pain, E.El. 291 αἴσθησις γὰρ οὖν / κἀκ τῶν θυραίων πημάτων δάκνει βροτούς. Cf. Med. 1345, μυρίοις ὀνείδεσι δάκοιμι. For the fear of perception coming in from outside cf. OT. 1387 f.

318. Alc. 1100. For grief, v. also A.Ag. 791 δῆγμα δὲ λύπης
Ag. 1164, E.Hcld. 483 πῆμα σὴν δάκνει φρένα, Med. 110
ψυχὴ δηχθεῖσα κακοῖσιν, Rh. 596 λύπῃ καρδίαν δεδηγμένος
E.fr. 572.4 (συμφοραί), E.El. 242. Also In compounds, eg.
S.Phil. 705 δακέθυμος ἄτα, Ag. 1471 κρατὸς .. καρδιόδηκτον
———. Hence δακνάζου means 'mourn', Pers. 571,
(cf. Eum. 638 ὡς δηχθῇ λεώς).

319. δακτώδης, for instance, Hp. Aph. 5.20, is 'hurtful'.
Cf. 324n below.

320. E.Hipp. 1303. Cf. E.fr. 316.6 πόθῳ δεδηγμένος, Pl.
Rep. 474d. Call. Ep. 50.

321. Ag. 743: cf. above, Ch.2 §266n, and Ch.1, 67n.

322. West, ad Theog. 323f, states that the liver 'does not appear as
the seat of passions' before Aeschylus. It is a strange accident
that the conventional ~~phrase~~ translation for θυμός, φρήν κτλ is
'seat' of passions. As we saw (above, pp. 2-5, 15ff),

the liquid/emotion fills the organ, or pierces it. Its effects are transient, intermittent, alien and undesirable: they do not own the mind, as 'seat' implies.

323. Above, Ch. 2. p 70n.

324. Phil. 745. Cf. Phil 7 νόσῳ καταστάζοντα διαβορᾷ πόδα cf. Phil. 313.

325. A.Poet. 1458 b20. Cf. M. Silk, op. cit. p. 7.

326. Il. 19. 58.

327. At Ag. 103 θηροβόρον , and at Aj. 626 φρενοβόρως both seem the most sensible readings, though both passages contain corruption, and the Aeschylus passage is extremely uncertain.

328. Pers. 115 and 161. Possibly Aeschylus in using this image particularly in this play (and not elsewhere) is influenced by the images of tearing-up in the theme of the play: of the Persian army, symbolized in the rags of Xerxes at the end (whether we think of them as on stage or simply mentioned in the actors' lines).

329. Cyc. 320f. Cf. Ch. 2 section (i) above.

330. Also of thought: ἀνεμόεν νόημα , Ant. 354 where Jebb cites Il. 15. 80, ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἀν' ἀΐξῃ νόος ἀνέρος and Od. 7. 36 νέες ὠκεῖαι ὡς εἴ πτερὸν ἠὲ νόημα . Compare the πνεῦμα -ἄνεμος - ψυχή equation, below 255n; the products of the mind are winged too: The Homeric ἔπεα πτερόεντα can be changed to move violent whirlwind images, eg. E.fr. 621 ἀελλάδες φωναί (v. above 252n). On storms in the mind v. also Ch.i. section (iv) e.

331. Sapph. 42, E.fr. 607.3. It particularly affects 'young minds', like this, Hipp. 969 ταράξῃ κύπρις ἡβῶσαν φρένα.

332. HF 861f. Cf. Ant. 1095 ταράσσομαι φρένας. Ταραχή is a common word in the Hippocratica for abnormal upset in one or other physical organ, eg. τῆς κοιλίης Coac. 205, as well as mental.

333. Ion 1506, IT 1317, HF 216, E.El. 749, (v. Denniston ad loc.) and 1147. Cf. Ch. 1. (iv) e, f, g. On the winds of daemonic possession etc., v. Ch. 3 section (ii).

334. Ant. 586f. v. Goheen Imagery of the Antigone p. 44f. ~~ad loc.~~ for related imagery in the play. Also Phil. 1194 ἁλύουσα χειμερίῳ λύπᾳ and 1460 παρέπεμψεν ἐμοὶ / στόνον ἀντίτυπον χειμαζομένῳ. cf.

At Il. 9. 5: the tumult in breasts of the Greeks likened to storm: cf. OC 1240, ὡς τις ἀκτὰ

κυματοπλὴξ χειμερίᾳ κλονεῖται,

ὡς καὶ τόνδε κατ' ἄκρας
δειναὶ κυματαγεῖς
ἅλαι κλονέουσιν.

335. HF. 833. For bilge in a storm v. Alc. 326.6 (L-P), πρὶν μὲν γὰρ ἄντλος ἱστοπέδαν ἔχει , and for the image of 'drawing off' v. Cyc. 10 ἐξαντλῶ πόνον , and ibid. 110 τὸν αὐτὸν δαίμον' ἐξαντλεῖς ἐμοί , Med. 79, Ion 927-8 κακῶν γὰρ ἄρτι κῦμ' ὑπεξαντλῶν φρενί.

336. Cf. Ch. 4. sections (i), (ii).

337. Sept. 837.

338. Ox. Pap. 2881: v. Ch. 1. section (iv) h. Tro 183 ἐκπλήξεως ἦλθον φρίκας . The 'original meaning' of φρίξ seems to be 'a ruffling'; φρίκη in the Hippocratica is a fit of shivering; φρίσσω is primarily 'to bristle'. Cf. OC. 1465 (cit. ~~in~~ 297n above) for fear that makes the hair lift on the head.

339. Sept. 290 μέριμναι ζωπυροῦσι τάρβος , Ag. 481 παραυτίκμασιν νέοις πυρωθέντα καρδίαν , Cho. 272 δυσχείμερους ἅλας ὑφ' ἧπαρ θερμὸν ἐξαυδώμενος, and PV 879 μανίαι θάλπουσ'.

340. eg. PV 590 Θάλπει κέαρ ἔρωτι : compare the image of fire in the eye (above 93n.) and the importance of the eye in love.

341. Above, 271n. and Ch. 1. section (iv)d.

342. Cf. Ch. 5, (responsibility) sections (i) (viii); ch. 3. (iii)

Notes on Chapter Three.

1. For the shape of belief shown also in tendencies of theory in an age or in a society v. Heidel, Hippocratic Medicine, pp. 18, 118, 137; J.A. Boon, Symbolism to Structuralism, p.13: ''no sorts of 'things' - people, objects, events, ideas etc. - can be shown to be any more immanently ordered or orderable than any other sorts of 'things' ... Nor do orderings-of-objects (eg. economics) 'explain' orderings-of-events (eg. History) ... Attributing primacy to any one sort of ordering seems to be a matter of taste, in light of cross-cultural evidence which reveals that 'societies' can exist with very different relative degrees of ordering of all these sorts. However, the cross-cultural or comparative viewpoint also provides the only sort of 'independent source of verification' left ... the chance to discover empirically various instances of similar types of ordering.'' Scientific and scholarly theories show the same thought-patterns of the society from which they rise as do its language, conventions of personal relations, institutions, and orderings and explanations of mental experience: 'there is no bridge over which to pass from the concrete to the abstract; just because the abstract is not a reality, but a form of thought, one of our ... abbreviated ways of thinking'. (Cf. B. Croce, 'Concerning the Interpretation and Criticism of Some concepts of Marxism', Historical Materialism p. 104). Cf. Hp. De Victu I xii. (Loeb): ἐγὼ δὲ δηλώσω τέχνας φανερὰς ἀνθρώπου πρήγμασιν ὁμοίας ἐούσας καὶ φανεροῖσι καὶ ἀφανέσι. Cf. above, Preface pp. x, 258 (4n).

2. Cf. Ch. 3. section (vii), and p. 228.

3. G. Josipovici, The World and The Book, Paladin (1973) pp. xv-xvi.

4. De Morbo Sacro xvii (Loeb): hallucinations are due to excess moisture and the extra movement this produces within the brain. Cf above pp 19f, 49f, 275 (97n) on πίτυλος; pp. 12, 270 (58n) on restlessness of body and mind; pp 45, 253, κίνησις φρενῶν.

5. Electra, for instance, would be ἄφρων if she tried to raise the dead; she is planning something more practical, S.El. 941.

6. ἔμφρων can mean 'living' (as opposed to 'dead'), S.Ant. 1237; 'awake' (as opposed to 'asleep' or to 'fainting') Hp. Coac. 136, S.E.M. 7.129; 'sensible'. It can sometimes mean 'sane', i.e. the opposite of ἄφρων, eg. PV 848, Cho.1026, Aj. 306. Cf. above, Ch.1, section (i) for the metaphorical possibilities of the phrase ἔνδον γένους, and v. M. Silk, Interaction in Poetic Imagery, CUP (1974) p. 121, 17n.

7. For μάργος v. eg. A.Supp. 741 μάργον Αἰγύπτου γένος For its basically appetitive sense cf. Od. 18.2 μετὰ δ' ἔπρεπε γαστέρι μάργῃ, Cyc. 310 πάρες τὸ μάργον σῆς γνάθου and eg. Pl. Leg. 792 e, μάργοι ἡδοναί.

8. For Homer's use of μαίνεσθαι v. χεῖρες ἄαπτοι μαίνονται Il. 16.245, μαίνεσθαι ἐάσομεν οἷόν Ἄρηα Il. 5.717. When the madness is not in a martial context, it is still associated with anger, eg. Il. 8. 360, except for the phrase μαινόμενος Διόνυσος Il. 6. 132.

9. For other metaphorical participles v. above, Ch. 1, section (iv) i, p.45f.

10. Cassandra's fits of prophetic frenzy are recurrent: A.Ag. 1081, 1210, and 1215, αὖ. Compare the Pythia's behaviour at Delphi (v. Parke and Wormell, The Delphic Oracle, vol. i, p.30ff).

11. Electra describes Orestes' intervals of sanity, E. Or. 43-50, and the Argive reaction to the matricide. Orestes is afraid of future fits, Or. 790f. Io is exiled from her home, PV 665, wanders in barbarous lands 707f, 787f, until Zeus restores her to permanent sanity 848 and a place in society: to the position of mother to a particular race.

12. Cassandra's words, Tro. 310ff, are ironic rather than deluded: the prophetic frenzy is a epecial way of seeing, seeing in a way that looks wrong to other people, but is closer to tne truth. Cf. above Ch. 1, section (iv)h, for the paradox of the blind seer and the inversion of darkness and light, and v. Cassandra's explanation of her position, Ag. 1210-1213. But her behaviour and metre resembles other fits of madness in tragedy.

13. Other, lost, tragedies using this motif included 'Athamas', (A. frs. 1, 2), the 'Bassarids' (A.fr. 23), 'Pentheus' (A.fr. 183).

14. For Aegisthus' memory of the curse and his celebration of the murder as revenge for the ancient wrong, v. Ag. 1580-3. Cf. De Victo VI. 20 (Loeb).

15. For hallucinations in the Hippocratica, v. eg. DNS xviii. 25 (Loeb).

16. v. Dover, GPM p. 148 for the social treatment of madness. For the pollution of madness itself cf. De Morbo Sacro xv (Loeb): φεύγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἢν μὲν ἐγγὺς ἢ αὐτῷ τὰ οἰκία, οἰκάδε, ἢν δὲ μή, ἐς τὸ ἐρημότατον τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης τοῦ πάθεος. . For popular treatment of epilepsy by purification, (as for pollution) ibid. iv.30 (Loeb). For the pollution and exile of Agave v. Ba. 1382f and schol. ad Ar. Plut. 907; for the pollution and exile of Heracles, HF. 1358 τὰς ἐμὰς φυγάς, 1285 φεύγω πάτραν, 1233 ἀνόσιον μίασμ' ἐμόν. Cf. 52n. below.

17. Aj. 367 οἴμοι γέλωτος, 382 γέλωθ', 384 ὧδ' ἀτώμενος, 407 μώραις δ' ἀγραις προσκείμεθα, 427 ἄτιμοι ὧδε πρόκειμαι, 440f the share of the award of Achilles' arms and his own just cause: all the feelings concluded in οὐκ ἔστι τοὔργον πλητόν, 466.

18. The wrath of Athena follows him for a day, Aj. 756-7. Subsequent argument centres on his ~~—~~ intentions when sane, not on the mad actions themselves.

19. Ajax is surprised his son might have been thought in danger from him, Aj. 532. Interpretations that make Ajax mad throughout the play ignore the principle of criticism that the audience is told by one character when another is mad. Similarly, theories which

make Prometheus deluded in the PV in supposing he had helped Zeus, or in supposing he has power over Zeus, or which make the chorus of the 'Bacchae' the victim of delusion during the earthquake, flout the only safe principles of criticism available to us.

20. Madness is thought to be punitive elsewhere [illegible] at this period eg. Hdt. 75-84. It is, however, one aspect of contemporary attitudes to madness that is particularly emphasized in tragedy.

21. For wandering of body and mind, from Bellerophon onwards, v. above, Ch.1, section (iv)j. For the final rest of Orestes v. IT. 1439-1461.

22. For various types of definition of madness v:

[illegible], J. H. Morley, Culture and Mental Illness, East African Publishing House (1970) pp. 15ff, P.M. Yap in 'Transcultural Psychiatry', Ciba Foundation Symposium, London, and R. Horton 'A definition of religion and its uses', JRAI, vol.90, Part II (July - Dec. 1960) p. 201ff.

23. S. OC 1537. For other examples from tragedy of the label 'mad' applied to an action implying neglect of the gods, v. below Ch.3 24n, 25n. In terms of projection (v. [illegible], Ch.3 sections (iv) and (v)) it is obviously in one's [illegible] interest to obey the commands of one's own strong desires, whether acknowledged or repressed.

24. Pers. 750: Telamon, καιρῶς λέγων , calls his son ἄνους for boasting his independence of Athena, Aj. 763.

25. Ant. 960-1.
The problem here is primarily grammatical, but does involve questions of attitude and belief. Is the accusative τὸν θεόν governed by ἐπέγνω , as Jebb thinks, or by ψαύων , a verb which usually takes the dative? If this is a rare example of ψαύειν with accusative, and the ἐπί in ἐπέγνω has the force it has in 'Epimetheus': 'he knew later, by his madness, that he harmed the god in bold language'. The main problem of thought is that μανίαι can act both as symptoms and punishments for τὸ θεομαχεῖν . Here, however, μανίαις seems instrumental and the punishment idea is perhaps more dominant? Campbell ad loc. quotes Pl. Polit. 310D ἐξανθεῖν παντάπασι μανίαις , ibid. 273 D τελευτῶντος δ' ἐξανθεῖ τοῦ χρόνου , and Legg. 6. 783 A διαπυρωτάτους ..... μανίαις . Prometheus' defiance of the gods earns him the description μεμηνότ' οὐ σμικρὰν νόσον PV 977. The suitors, who ignore the power of the gods, are μεμαργωμένοι , A. Supp. 757-8.

26. οὐ φρονεῖν, οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν : OT 550, 552 and 626; S.El. 941; Ant. 754 and 1052. Cf. also the range of actions covered in accusations of μωρία : to show useless and inappropriate pain, to wish for death, to defy those more powerful than oneself and to attempt an unsupported coup d'état, OC 592, Ant. 220, A.Ag. 1670, OT 540.

27. ἄνοος and ἄνοια : S.El. 1054, OC 931, Ant. 99 (cf. Ant. 67, to be pointlessly overzealous).

28. v. Dover, GPM pp. 270 and 157-8, for the unfairness of making misfortune a reproach, and for the Athenian's anticipation of the demands of the state over and above his private affairs.

29. Hom. Od. 21. 297. For Homer's description of Ate cf. Ch. 2 Part B Introduction. Euripides makes Laius' drunkenness responsible for Oedipus' conception, Phoen. 21.

30. S.El. 1153 μαίνεται ὑφ' ἡδονῆς Cf. S.El. 294 ἔρρωγε βαθεῖ.

31. A.Sept. 967.

32. Dover GPM p. 126-7: 'The distinction between emotion, thoughtlessness and shamelessness, all of which we tend to think one ought to control, and insanity, which we know one cannot control, was generally treated by the Greeks as quantitative. Prodikos (fr. B7) defined eros as 'desire doubled' and 'eros doubled' as madness' (mania)'.

33. For physical reactions to madness v. below Ch. 4 sections (ii) and (iii).

34. Hat. 6. 75 ἐόντα καὶ πρότερον ὑπομαργότερον - the Spartans explain it, 6.84, by his habit of drinking strong wine (ἐκ Scythian cup), learnt some time before his death. There are examples in the Hippocratics of chronic physical disease of course: for hereditary physical disease v. De Morbo Sacro v. (Loeb) De Aere Aqua Locis xiv (Loeb); for the principle of hereditary defects, v. Heidel, Hippocratic Medicine p. 127, and for the attention paid to the permanent individual constitution, ibid. pp. 73f, 63, 128. For the idea of chronic madness in Hippocratic medicine v. De Victu xxxv 126f (Loeb), DMS xviii. 7.

35. Psychoanalytic terminology signifies by abreaction the violent discharge of emotion attaching to previously repressed feelings or experiences. Psychoanalysts no longer think it of therapeutic value in itself: partly because of the extreme pain and fear involved, which has some relation, perhaps, to the ancient topos of the fear and resistance initially shown by the prophetess to the approach of the god, v. below 36n. More behaviourally-oriented modern practitioners however still use it: eg. W. Sargent (v. The Mind Possessed, p. 4ff) who used drug-induced abreaction on mental casualties of the last war, and who compares it to the collapse following a period of violent demonic possession.

36. For resistance to the possessing god v. eg. Lucan 5.124, pavidam vatem, 128 metuens, 148 deum simulans, 156 veritam se credere Phaebo prodiderant.

37. Lloyd-Jones, JZ, p. 10f, for the practical resolution: a man

knows that a god destroyed his judgement by sending Ate to him, but by making reparation and apologies he accepts responsibility in human terms.

38. Dodds, GI, p. 139f.

39. fr. 538 (Koerte).

40. For the interaction of different belief-systems in a single society, and the history of anthropological attitudes to it, v. R. Horton and R. Finnegan ed, Modes of Thought, (1973) Introduction pp 31ff, (v. also p. 182ff, B. Barnes, 'Anomaly versus falsehood').

41. eg. E. Bevan, Sibyls and Seers, (1928) p. 151.

42. Tambornino, De antiquorum daemonismo, RGVV vol. 7 no. 3 (Giessen, 1909). Rohde, Psyche 235f, esp. 312-3. Dodds, GI 70f. Farnell, Cults 4. 191-2 and 3.11 held the view, unverifiable unfortunately, that belief in possession was pre-Greek. For the phenomenon of possession generally v. the classic work, Oesterreich, Demoniacal Possession, Eng. trans. 1930. More recently, v. eg. I.M. Lewis, Ecstatic Religions, Penguin 1971, W. Sargent, The Mind Possessed, (1973) esp p. 58.

43. TAPA 96 (1965) 463f.

44. Select Papyri III (Literary) ed. D. Page (Loeb) p. 328ff. On the probable influence of Sophron generally v. most recently Cunningham, Herodas ed. pp. 10-14. Theocritus supposedly borrowed from a mime of Sophron with this title, of which one frag. survives, Athen. xi. 480 B, and our fragment looks as though it belongs to the same piece. (v. Page ad loc.) For chthonic associations of dogs v. Ch.2 (vi).

45. For the invocation of the demon by the exorcist cf. P. Brown JRS 60 (1971) p. 88-9, and Oesterreich op. cit. passim, K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic p. 575.

46. So Latte, Philologus (1923) p. 259f and 487f.

47. θεοφόρητος certainly means 'carrying a god' at Luc. Asin. 37, but in writers earlier than Lucian it seems to mean 'carried by a god i.e. inspired' eg. the medical writer Soranus (1.88), and perhaps also Str. 12.2.3. It should be pointed out that the state 'carrying a god' could be re-interpreted as 'being carried by a god', especially in view of the natural erotic-pregnancy metaphor for inspiration (v. Russell ad Longin. 13.2). Cf. the blast of madness that 'carries off' Io, PV 884-7.

48. Luc. Philops. 38, Longinus 13.2.

49. Ag. 1140, 1150.

50. Athenaeus preserves two frags. of Alexis' play, v. Kock vol II, p. 325. The subject was fairly popular, it now appears, among post-classical dramatists. For Diphilos' play Παραδυόμενος v. F. Lasserre, QUCC, 1976, p. 300f (and v. above Ch. 1, section (iv) i). Philodemus D.1.4 apparently uses θεόφορος to mean 'possessed': a century before Lucian.

51. Handley, BICS 16 (1969) p. 92f.

52. v. above Ch. 1, section (iv) j. Compare the association of pollution and exile, and the isolation of the sufferer from epilepsy, above p. 356 (16n).

53. Handley p. 92. Pl. Ion 536 c–e (cf. Longinus 13.2) is interestingly paralleled by another poet: T.S. Eliot, in 'The Uses of Poetry' (1964 ed.) ('On the Development of Taste in Poetry') p. 34: 'It is not deliberate choice of a poet to mimic, but writing under a kind of daemonic possession by one poet.'

54. Strabo 10.3.21. Dodds suggests (GI p. 85 21n.) that the question at Ar. Vesp. 8 παραφρονεῖς σὺ οὐ κορυβαντιᾷς; could perhaps imply 'a distinction between "natural" and "divine" madness'; or could refer simply to a difference of degree. Starkie ad loc. thinks that corybantic madness 'was supposed to surpass all in violence', and compares Pl. Symp. 215 E πολύ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ κορυβαντιώντων ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ Compare Dover [illegible]: GPM [illegible] p. 126-7.

55. A.Sept. 1001. Euripides adapts this picture of them in Phoen. 888, ὡς δαιμονῶντας κἀναιρέψοντας πόλιν.

56. Cf. Aj. 244 κακὰ ... ῥήμαθ', ἃ δαίμων ..... ἐδίδαξεν (cf. below 74n). For δαιμονάω v. Cho. 566, X. Mem. 1.1.9, and Men. fr. 127.1. (Koerte). βακχάω is only found at A.Sept. 498; βακχεύω is used of places, eg. στέγη, A.fr. 58, IT. 1243, and might therefore suggest a violent movement which leads the observer to deduce that the place or person is 'filled by the presence of 'this god. Cf. of people, A.Ant. 136, Ion 1204 et al. The verb can be used in a causal sense: 'inspire with frenzy', eg. Or. 411, HF. 966, Or. 835. On ἔνθεος v. Dodds GI p. 87 (41n). On δαιμόνιε, v. E. Brunius-Nilsson, Δαιμόνιε, (Uppsala 1955) passim, esp. 132f.

57. Od. 5.396. Cf. P. Laín Entralgo, Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity, p. 8.ff.

58. Hence some of the images that express movement in the mind suggest a movement growing outwards: flowering, smelling, flooding, flying (Ch. 1.(iv) b,c,g, cf. Ch. 2 (xiii)).

59. P. Brown JRS 60 (1971) p. 81.

60. For the idea of a gift in the process of possession cf. the transfer of χάρις involved at eg. Ag. 1205 πνεῶν χάριν and v. Dodds GI p. 69.

61. P. Brown art. cit. p. 86ff.

62. V. Aen. 6.77. Not all commentators have done so: Mackail and others translate 'uncontrollable' or 'frightening'. Compare Lucan's prophetess who carries 'aliena colla', Luc. 5.169-70.

63. Smith art. cit. p. 419, on Plu. De def. orac. 324d. For the god breathing in v. eg. Hom. Od. 19. 138-9, and v. Sittl, Die gebauden der gr. und r. (Leipzig 1890) p. 345, with notes. For the god 'breathing over the house', Smith's examples are E.HF 216 (θεοῦ σοι πνεῦμα μεταβαλόν : the wind of fortune), and A.Supp. 27 (δέξασθ' ἱκέτην ... αἰδοίῳ πνεύματι χώρας).

64. Smith art. cit. p. 415 dismisses Plutarch's evidence on the grounds that he is the first to mention such a theory. For Dodds' appraisal of Plutarch's evidence (de def. orac. 438c) v. GI pp. 70-71.

65. Smith art. cit. p. 420. His (relevant) examples are: A.Ag. 105 (Peitho), Sept. 343 and E.Rh. 387 (Ares the subject), Ba. 1094.

66. Cf. above, Ch. 2, notes 8, 11, 26, 27 and 238, and for a treatment of personification from a more philosophical standpoint, Lloyd, Polarity pp. 200f. Euripides treats λύπη, φιλοτιμία, αἰδώς and ἐλπίς each as a θεός, bad or good (Or. 399, Phoen. 532,

Ion 337, IA 392). Though phrases of this kind are semi-ironic, they exploit nevertheless a contemporary sense of emotion as an autonomous power. Compare the common use of a god's name to designate the emotion he inspires.

67. v. E. Brunius-Nilsson, op. cit. p. 132f. In this chapter of her fascinating work she refers only to Homer. Her contention, however, that the basic element in the use of δαίμων (as distinct from θεός) is the actual dynamic power, which can be used for good or ill, seems to hold good for the fifth century too. Cf. ibid. p. 118f where δαίμων is considered as parallel in Homer to the indefinite θεός. For examples of the vague use of θεός v. W.H.S. Jones, CR vol. xxvii no. 8 (1913) p. 252f.

68. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀποφώλιοι εὐναὶ ἀθανάτων, Od. xi. 249. Compare the relation of Apollo and Cassandra: the prophetic, inspiring relation is a substitute for an erotic relation (Ag. 1202f): a relation which lingers in the vocabulary of possession, the images of bridling, mounting, and general excitement. Compare Russell on the erotic images in literary-critical uses of 'possession' (ad. Longin. 13.2).

69. PV 250 ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατῴκισα (cf. Eum. 756, γαίας πατρῴας ... σύ τοι κατῴκισάς με: the normal use of this verb, eg. Pl. Criti. 113 C, κατοικίζειν ἐκγόνους ἐν τόπῳ).

Cf. Cd. 22. 347 (and v. P.A. Singleton, in her as yet unpublished Cambridge thesis, Inspiration and Poetic Genius, Ch. 1. 46n.), and the grafting image at A. fr. 156 (N),

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα πημήνῃ θέλῃ.

Cf. below Ch. 1. 66n.

70. v. Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 343, 422ff.

71. Plut. Q.Conv. V. 7, 682f. See above pp. 30, 279(118n)

72. v. the Life of Theodorus, Festugière, Subsidia Hagiographoca no. 43 (1970) 84. 19 (p. 20f). Festugière compares ibid. 92.7, 92.20, and Pap. Gr. Mag. 4. 211. Dr. J.D. Howard-Johnston (v. his review of Festugière's edition and commentary, Rev. Theol. Stud. 24 (1973) p. 280f.) tells me that the term πῶμα is used, in this 'Life' and elsewhere at this period, far more often than Festugière suggests to denote the human body possessed by the demon.

73. Compare κατοικίζω above, 69n. E. Heraclid. 996, cf. S.Phil. 1168 (ἄχθος), OC 1238, Plato Rep. 587 C.

74. Aj. 611 Cf. below, 85n. for 'belly-speakers' and 'glossalalia'.

75. B.B.Shefton has kindly brought the following material to my notice.

76. For the Caulonia series v. C. Kraay Gk. Coins nos. 259-261.

77. The inconsistent attitudes to this question are exploited in kletic hymns, (v. E. Norden, Agnostos Theos part 2) as in the narrative of epic, in which Poseidon, for instance, is necessarily absent at some crucial scenes. It involves the idea that it is possible for a human to cheat a god, in spite of all-seeing, ever-present divine powers, cf. West ad. Theog. 551.

78. eg. Kraay, Gr. Coins nos. 217-222 (Poseidonia, c. 530 B.C.), no. 53 (Zancle c. 460 B.C.: Zeus). The stance is common in bronzes later than the coin series: as a fifth-century stance it is best exemplified in the famous Artemisium statue of Zeus/Poseidon.

79. Dodds, GI p. 277-8, who makes it clear that there is not enough evidence, about either the practice of omophagia, or contemporary associations to it, for us to be certain that this was the chief significance of the act. It is however his own view, and was that of Gruppe, Gr. Myth u. Rel (9106) p. 732.

80. Smith art. cit. p. 405f. v. Edelstein, 'Greek Medicine in its Relation to Religion and Magic', B.I. Hist. Med. 5 (1937) 218f.

81. Il. 1. 51-2, cf. A·R. Arg. 2. 500f.

82. On Hippocratic theories of liquid reaching the lungs v. Hp. Cord. 8, cf. Heidel, Hipp. Medicine 105; and on popular views of it v. Ch. 1. 118n, 18n.

83. Od. xi. 61; v. Brunius-Nilsson loc. cit. p. 120. Compare Lloyd-Jones, JZ Ch. 1, on the delicate interplay of divine (external) and human (internal) motivation in Homer.

84. F. Goodman, New Society, vol. 22 no. 531 (7.12. 1972) p. 566

85. Aj. 639-40, 243-4. Cf. Dodds, GI p. 85, 24n, for examples from tragedy
Oesterreich. On 'barbaric cries'/v. Haldane CQ 22 (1972) p. 42ff.

86. Eurycles was the most famous: v. Dodds GI pp. 71, 88 47n, 48n. W.D. Smith, art. cit. p. 425-6, states that Eurycles was not an estatic prophet in the Greek sense; he is committed to some such statement since he denies to 'the Greek sense' of estatic prophecy any notion of a god within the human body.

87. Hesych. s,v, θεός : v. above, Ch. 1, section (h).

88. Dodds, GI p. 88, 45n.

89. Ag. 1052, - Cassandra is silent; Clytemnestra expects her to

speak a βάρβαρον φωνήν , 1051, and says of her μαίνεται ... καὶ κακῶν πλήει φρενῶν . Cf. also Cho. 233 ἔνδον γενεᾶς , and M. Silk, op. cit. p. 121.

90. Lucan 5. 166, 'mentemque priorem expulit', and V. Aen. 6.77-80, 48-50. Compare also Lucan 9.580, 'Iuppiter est quodcunque vides, quodcunque moveris'. For divine responsibility for movement in the soul v. above, Ch. 5 p.p. 191-2

91. Lloyd-Jones, JZ p. 10f. For his discussion of the debate in Troades v. ibid. p. 150f, with notes.

92. E. fr. 292. Cf. G. Vlastos, Rev. of Relig. (1949) p. 278f on Asclepius.

93. E. Cret. fr. 9. Pasiphae concludes,

νῦν δ', ἐκ θεοῦ γὰρ προσβολῆς ἐμηνάμην,
ἀλγῶ μέν, ἔστι δ' οὐχ ἑκούσιον κακόν.

94. Fr. 14; cf. also frgs. 16, 23.

95. Ag. 351, 613-5.

96. Dodds, GI pp. 135, 139.v. Pindar fr. 116B (131S).

97. For interpretations of the different meanings assigned to psyche v., for instance: Onians, Origins of European Thought, Ch. 1, Dodds, GI pp. 138f, 153, 159(n. 26-7), 209f, 212. Rohde saw the word as developing towards its Platonic sense throughout the fifth century; (Psyche p. 364f). Tragic usage rather suggests that the Homeric senses, the "life-force", and 'that which is left when the body dies" was just as important in the fifth-century; See above Ch. 1 passim; it can be used instead of one of the more material 'mental organs' to designate the mind disturbed by thought, memory or emotion.

98. Dodds GI p. 156 1n. Also Rohde, Psyche p. 417.

99. For the speaking powers of the ἦτορ etc., v. above, Ch. 1, section (h), esp. 42f.

100. Cf. R. Horton and R. Finnegan edd., Modes of Thought, Faber 1973, Introduction p. 32ff.

101. This seems to me at the moment the most satisfactory compromise between Dodds' picture, in The Greeks and Irrational, of changes in Greek religious belief and emotional experience, and Lloyd-Jones' picture, in The Justice of Zeus, of the static elements in these beliefs and experience. v. Lloyd-Jones, JZ, Preface p. xi.

102. v. Laplache and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, Hogarth 1973, s.v. 'projection', pp. 349-355. The following quotations

from Freud come from the pages of Laplache and Pontalis unless otherwise stated.

103. Freud, 'The Unconscious', (1915), cit. Laplache and Pontalis loc. cit. p. 351.

104. v. above, Ch. 3 n.1. The original mixture of anthropology and psychoanalysis which produced among other things the science of ethnopsychiatry concentrated on this kind of area: v. eg. Margaret Mead's introduction to G. Devereux, Reality and Dream, pp. xxvi and ff.

105. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, v. Laplache and Pontalis op. cit. s.v. 'instinct'.

106. A Metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams, v. Laplache and Pontalis s.v.v. 'projection', 'dream'.

107. Paracelsus, De Morbis Invisibilibus, vol. v. p. 337 v. H.B. Pachter, Paracelsus, Ch.3. Cf. Paracelsus' contemporary Samuel Daniel:

'Cease dreams, you images of day-desires
To model forth the passions of the morrow ... ' (Delia, 1592).

108. H.P. Pachter, Paracelsus, Magic Into Science, Schumann Press, N.Y. 1951, pp. 231-4.

109. Preface to 'Diseases which deprive man of his reason', ed. Sigerist, p. 160.

110. C. Rycroft, A Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, s.v. 'envy'.

111. Dodds, GI p. 186, cf. Dover, GPM p. 141 (with Men. fr. 714, there cited).

112. v. Jung, 'The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche' p. 364 in Collected Works^{2}, trans. Hall, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).

113. eg. Ba. 817, 839, 848, 1146; v. Winnington-Ingram, Euripides and Dionysus p. 104-8.

114. Farnell, Cults, ii., pp. 613-4; Wilamowitz, Gr. Lesebuch 2. 168-9.

115. Eum. 517f.

116. Cf. Hipp. 84f.

117. Hipp. 1421-2.

118. For homeopathic medicine v. above pp. 9, 268 (42n), and Lloyd, Polarity 180-1.

The principle of medical therapy ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται, Dodds GI p. 98 (100n) is close to the 'like to like' principle involved in choosing friends (ch. 5 (i))and also to the therapeutic nature of ritualized expressions of emotion (v. Ch. 4, sections (iii), (iv)). Ritual is composed of the same natural inevitable gestures which express, for example, despair; but by impcsing order and pattern on these it carries the sufferer through, and heals. So the Praetides, whose symptom of madness is wild dancing, are healed by dance; For the 'like to like' principle acting in a sinister way v. Lebeck, Oresteia p. 57f; in a 'nutritious' way, Empedocles DK 31 A 77, DK 31 A 95.

119. Od. 5. 396-7.

120. On poroi in Empedocles v. eg. Lloyd, Polarity, 328-9, 346. v. further Ar. Rhet. ii. 10f with Lloyd 167-8. Presocratic ideas of πόροι affect different Hp. writers differently according to their views and interests. The author of De Victu, for instance, interested in the proper diet for the soul, and in ψυχή as something which can be treated physically, and move physically, sees the ψυχή travelling through πόροι : τῶν πόρων δι' ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ πορεύεται , XXXVI (Loeb).

121. For presocratic ideas of the similar material of cosmos and man compare the 'social' metaphors first, apparently, used by Anaximander (fr. 1) and Heracleitus (fr. 53, 80, 126) to describe the tensions in the composition of the cosmos. (Lloyd, op. cit. 213f, and v. Kirk and Raven's discussion, The Presocratic Philosophers 117-121). v. further Heracleitus frgs, 36, 118 etc.,

for the relation of 'soul-fire' to 'world-fire', and Alcmaeon's theory of health (K. and Raven op. cit. 234f). This gave rise to medical ideas such as the diet of watery foods which will allow a man to conceive a daughter, since τὰ δὲ θήλεα πρὸς ὕδατος μᾶλλον κύ̈ξεται ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν (De Victu I. XXVII (Loeb)). Airs Waters Places connects the effects of the environment on the physical health and moral character of different men with the similar components of the world and the human body. φύσις ἀνθρώπου was one function of the cosmic φύσις : v. W.A. Heidel's great paper, 'Περὶ φύσεως , A Study of the Conception of Nature Among the Presocratics', Proc. Amer. Acad. Arts, xlv no. 4 (1910) pp. 77-134. (Cf. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae 8ff.). Compare above Ch. 1. p. 38f: the dark μυχὸς φρενῶν , in which prophetic dreams are seen, is implicitly compared to the dark underground cave of cult and myth from which the blind seer prophesies, and the dark underground world from which dreams rise, 'children of Night and Ge'.

122. Empedocles on sense perception: fr. DK 31 A 86, τῷ ἐναμόττειν ἐὸς τοὺς πόρους τοὺς ἑκάστης αἰσθάνεσθαι . Atomists' theories of vision, eg. Aetius iv.8.10 (KR 586) τὴν αἴσθησιν... γίνεσθαι εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων . (Cf. above Ch.3, section (ii)). In Hippocratic writings the influence of this kind of theory is evident everywhere: Empedoclean ideas are most obvious in Nat. Hom. I-VIII. Dreams come in from the outside, DMS XVIII (Loeb); the different elements enter in different forms, De Victu I, VI.1., ἐσέρπει δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπων μέρεα μερέων . The prevailing wind is important in a case-history because the moisture or dryness of the air outside enters the body, creating moisture and dryness in the air of the body, DMS XVI.7 (Loeb). Cf. Airs Waters Places XXIV:

plants and men, composed of the same elements as their environment, grow to resemble it.

123. Hesiod. Erg. 100.

124. Dreams 89. 105 (Loeb), ἔξωθεν ἐπαγωγῇ .

125. Epid. I, III and XXIII, (Loeb); Aph. 4.54 (Littré).

126. eg. Epid. III.VI (Loeb): ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν οἱ καῦσοι καὶ τὰ φρενιτικὰ περὶ τοῦ ἦρος . Compare the martial imagery in verbs which depict disease's relation to the body: κατὰ ἐπιλαμβάνω eg. D.M.S. IX.16 (Loeb), κατέχω , eg. Airs Waters Places II. 10 (Loeb), and diseases spoken of as πολεμιώτατος to the body, DMS XXI.18 (Loeb).

127. eg. dreams, 89. 106 (Loeb): πνεύματι δὲ ὡς πυκνοτάτῳ χρησάμενος ἐκκρίνῃ τὸ παρελθόν .

128. Empedocles, Arist. de anim. and poroi, cf. v. Beare, Gr. Theories of Elementary Cognition pp. 17f, 95f, 133f, 161f, 180f, 204.

129. Aristotle, de generationis anim. 747a, follows Hippocratic ideas about women's flesh: it is softer than man's because it is more porous (cf. Hp. de sterilibus mulieribus 8.408 (Littré), de mul.

8.64f (Littré). The porosity of the human body is a significant scientific equivalent to the porosity of the human mind suggested by religious fears of demonic possession, above section (ii): showing how the direction of scientific theory is similar to that of contemporary popular belief, cf. Ch. 3. n.1.

130. De Victu. III 71. 12 (Loeb). The soul is moved by sense-perception, and is thereby either nourished, or harmed. While the body sleeps the soul is still awake, κινεομένη καὶ ἐγρηγορέουσα γινώσκει (Dreams 86, Loeb) πάντα, καὶ ὁρᾷ τε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκούει ... λυπεῖται ... δκόσαι τοῦ σώματος ὑπηρεσίαι ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς, πάντα ταῦτα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διαπερήσεται (Dreams 86. (Loeb), cf A. Eum. 104). V. above Ch.1. p. 12ff, esp. 45f. on the mind 'moved'.

131. For wind and breath in metaphors of the mind and its feelings, v. above Ch. 1. p. 32ff, and Ch. 2, section (xiii). On winds generally in the Hippocratica v. Airs Waters Places passim = paragraphs I-XI deal with the effects of climate (particularly winds) on physical health, XII-XXIV deal with their effects on human character. v. below, Ch. 5, section (ii). For the doctrine of Anaximenes, of cosmic respiration, πνεῦμα and the ἄπειρον, v. in particular W.A. Heidel, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, xlviii: no. 1 (1912) p. 691 with references there cited.

132. Epid. I.I, IV XIII; Epid III: II, XV.

133. On personification and abstractions, v. above Ch. 3, n.66. For

abstract nouns as the moving agents of disease in the Hippocratics v. eg. Dreams (De Victu IV) LXXXVIII: ἡ ψυχὴ .... οὔτε πλησμονῇ κρατηθεῖσα οὔτε κενώσει οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἔξωθεν προσπεσόντι.

134. The concept of ἀπόκρισις as a cause of disease is implied by the κρᾶσις theory of health originated by Alcmaeon (DK B.4) and followed by many later theorists. The clearest example is the Hippocratic corpus in the Nat. Hom. which, in ~~the~~ its first 8 chapters, shows in a highly schematized form the influence of Empedocles in particular, (eg. frs. 17, 21) where φιλότης is a κρᾶσις, the correctly measured κρᾶσις of the four elements). Nat. Hom. IV (Loeb) uses χωρίζειν rather than ἀποκρίνειν: ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὅταν μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρήσιος καὶ δυνάμιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος ... ἀλγεῖ δὲ ὅταν τούτων τ... χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκερασμένον ᾖ τοῖσι ξύμπασιν.
We see here in a context which explores the effect of his outside environment on man, three ideas which are important in arguments about the mind and human relations. The right κρᾶσις of δυνάμεις is, like Empedocles' φιλότης, of measured proportions: μετρίως ἔχῃ. Cf. the desirable rythms of emotional expression (below, Ch. 4, section (iii)). The isolation of one part of a unit endangers the whole: the isolated individual, the mourner, (Ch. 4, section (iv) a-b), the madman (Ch. 1. section (iv) j) and the tragic hero (Ch. 5. section vi.) endanger themselves and their community. Man should, ideally, be a unity (Nat. Hom. II (Loeb)). Thirdly, the δυνάμεις which form such a κρᾶσις are the natural components not only of the outside world but also of the body itself. At De Victu IV, (Dreams) LXXXVIII (Loeb) line 18, the soul is disturbed (ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχήν) by ἀπόκρισις due to πλησμονή; other instances of ἀπόκρισις

in this treatise include LXXXIX lines 15 and 54, (I am grateful to E. Hussey for these references). V. further Anc. Med. XIV, 37, and 42, παρεκστάμεθα . . . ὥσπερ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀποκρινομένων. Παραγμός of body or soul is produced when, of the forces [illegible] which are both internal and external, one becomes for some reason isolated from the others, and its power is so long diluted by them. (This treatise is close to Anaxagoras: compare his use of ἀπόκρισις and ἀποκρίνομαι in discussing the creation of the world eg. fr. 2, 15, 16.).

135. For 'medicine is the science of the human body as a part of the universe, and the body is subject to the laws of the universe and is composed of elements ... common to the body itself and to the world at large', W.A. Heidel, Hippocratic Medicine p. 13-14, v. Plato, Phaedr. 269e and ff. Παθήματα arise from δυνάμεις and from σχήματα (Anc. Med. XXII (Loeb)), from τὰ ἐνέοντα and from τὰ ἐσιόντα.

136. v. Stella, Importanza di Alcmeone nella storia del pensiere greco, Rome (1939) passim, esp. 248f, discussion of the passage in which Alcmaeon gives to the brain the role of guide.

137. De Morbo Sacro 19-20 (Loeb).

138. Pl. Ion 534e.

139. Airs Waters Places, which has close affinities with De Morbo Sacro, was probably composed , c. 450 B.C., 'certainly not later than 430 B.C.', Mr. Hussey has suggested.

140. v. O'Brien, JHS xc (1970) pp. 140-6; Beare, op. cit. pp. 202ff, esp. 210f, 215f, 227f and 241-2: 'the media (of the organs of sense-perception) are internal and external to the organism.' For implications of two-way theories of vision v. above, p. 194f, below p. 410 (17n, 18n, 19n).

141. DMS I, and V (Loeb).

142. DMS XVII (Loeb). The idea that movement in the mental organs is either the cause or effect of intense and dangerous emotion has a wide influence on Hippocratic theories. Empedocles links the beginning of strife with the movement and dissolution of the Sphere (fr. 31, cf. Anaxag. fr. 13 with Kirk and Raven P. 372ff). The movement of winds disturbs the air we breath and therefore our bodies, ταράσσει τὸ πνεῦμα ὃ ἀναπνέομεν , De Vict. II. 38 line 70 (Loeb). So the external mark of emotion (as of disease, DMS XX. 24 (Loeb)) is violent movement, below Ch. 4, section (iii), and the imagined movements of the mind disturbed by emotion are also wild, above Ch. 1, section iii, iv. Cf. Ch.3, 90n.

143. Hdt. 6.75. Cleomenes at his death is ὑπομαργότερος . Hdt's other uses of this word (3.29, 3.145) do not tell us if it refers to action or disposition.

144. eg. DMS XIV line 20 (Loeb).

145. Compare the embarrassment of epileptics, DMS XV (Loeb). On-lookers could protect themselves from the fear that it might strike them by ascribing it to divine punishment, as at DMS II passim, AWP XXII .32f (Loeb). In being a symbol of divine punishment it was repellant, ugly, αἰσχρός, v. Dover GPM p. 242, 148f. But θεῖα μὲν καὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις, Airs Waters Places XXII line 40f (Loeb), whose author ingeniously argues that if impotence be ascribed to divine vengeance, it should attack the poor more than the rich, since the poor pay the gods less and blame the gods for their poverty.

146. Hdt. 7.189 illustrates his attitude to divine and non-divine explanations of decisive human events.

147. On the ancient image of moral health v. eg. M. Silk, Interaction in poetic imagery, p. 42, 17n. On ἄφρων as a medicinal and moral concept v. A.J. Kenny, 'Mental Health in Plato's Republic', Proc. Brit. Acad. 1969 p. 229f, and above; pp. 172, 251, 254, 385f (10n), 437 (32n), 439 (57n, 58n).

148. Horton and Finnegan edd., Modes of Thought, p. 36f.

149. For the clearest summary and exploration of this area of Freudian theory known to me, v. C. Rycroft, Imagination and Reality, Hogarth (1968) p. 102f.

150. Rycroft, op. cit. p. 103. According to Rycroft, op. cit. p. 43, the distinction is one of Freud's earliest and most fundamental psychoanalytical ideas.

151. Rycroft op. cit. p. 102.

152. ibid. 58-9.

153. T.S. Eliot, 'Metaphysical Poets' in Selected Essays, 1921: reprinted in Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, ed. F. Kermode, (Faber, 1975), p. 64: 'In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered ...' I cannot find the reference to his implicit regrets for this magnetic phrase, but he rejects the idea implicitly in Uses of Poetry, (Faber, 1964) ed., p. 56. v. Rycroft, loc. cit. p. 108 and p. 37. (Some perhaps might like to qualify Rycroft's suggestion that historians have dated the rise of the scientific outlook and method to the seventeenth century).

154. H.M. Lynd, On Shame And The Search For Identity, (Routledge 1958), cit. Rycroft (loc. cit. p. 108).

155. S. Wolfram, in Modes of Thought p. 304-5.

156. For examples, v. Modes of Thought 62f, 92f, 112f, 182f, 319f.

V. also Durkheim's vision of the religious and scientific outlooks, quoted above Ch. 2 p. 76. Jung's use of the terms 'extravert' and 'introvert' distinguishes personality-types by the importance placed on external perceptions and internal ideas. Eysenk uses them as a dimension of personality, according to which all individuals are placed at some point along an axis of extraversion-introversion. (v. Rycroft, Dictionary s.v. 'extravert'). In both writers, personalities are divided into two types according to their type of mental functioning.

157. R. Horton, in Modes of Thought, p. 274. No wonder Lévi-Strauss has been called 'an incorrigibly French footnote to Freud' (C.R. Babcock, Structuralism and Sociological Theory, (Hutchinson 1975) p. 117).

158. Plato, or Freud, for instance.

159. Rycroft, loc. cit. p. 110.

Notes to Chapter 4.

1. v. M. Argyle, The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour, Penguin (1972) pp. 36f, esp. 47f, for physical gesture and non-verbal utterances treated as ways of communicating. For interaction and mutual evaluation based on such communication v. ibid. 97f: 'What happens when ... people meet. They categorize each other, select appropriate behaviour from their repertories'. For more recent relevant work in this area by the same author v. Argyle, Bodily Communication, Methuen (1975) esp. 105f (the expression of emotion), 73f (cultural differences in bodily communication) and 359ff.

2. v. V. Turner, 'The Syntax of Symbolism in African Religion', in J.S. Huxley, ed., A Discussion Of The Ritualization of Behaviour in Animals and Men: (Transactions of Royal Society of London, 1966).

3. M. Argyle, Bodily Communication, Ch. 9, 'Ritual and Ceremony' p. 172-5.

4. C. Rycroft, A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, Nelson, 1968 s.v. 'Ritual'.

5. R. Firth, Symbols, 1973 p. 173.

6. ibid. 176-7.

7. S. Aj. 1394f., E. Ba. 935f., S.El. 448f.

8. In social and psychological terms, v. A. Paivio, Imagery and Verbal Processes, 393f, 505; in poetry, M. Silk, Interaction in Poetic Imagery, p. 9f, 16f. One may note, with respect, the effect/particular image may have on the formation of a theory, v. below Ch. 5, p. 228-9.

9. For Ridgeway's theory v. Ridgeway, The Origin of Tragedy, Ch. 4. Fear of the projected demon world (Ch. 2 above) which Jane Harrison took as her starting-point, Proleg. 1-8, for the study of Greek religious belief, is itself an expression of this fear: the fear of man's own intense and destructive emotional forces. Greek ritual and art required an even more powerful patterning and ordering of such forces: their success misled Ruskin to make the famous statement Harrison quotes: 'there is no dread in their hearts; pensiveness , amazement, often deepest grief and desolation, but terror never'.

10. Ἁρμονία is central to the structures of Greek thought, scientific, social, psychological, moral. The concept is elaborated in presocratic theories of nature, influenced by contemporary political structures (v. G. Vlastos AJP 74 (1953) 361ff; and his rev. of Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, in Gnomon 27 (1955) p. 76). Heracleitus, in his arguments of justice and conflict, used musical metaphors of proportion and tension to explore cosmological structure: παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη (or παλίντονος : v. Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophy p. 193f,

G. Vlastos, AJP 76 (1955) 337-368). ἁρμονία is literally ' communion, a means of joining through opposite tensions' (Kirk and Raven op. cit. 1942): hence, the phrase 'hidden harmonies' according to one theory refers to the invisible dove-tailing of the master-craftsman; visible joints mark the work of the inferior τέκτων, cf. Lloyd, Polarity 274. Pythagoras associated it with mathematical and cosmological ideas of proportion, linking κόσμος, 'orderliness' with his notion of κάθαρσις (Kirk and Raven op. cit. 228-9) which was a function of music: οἱ Πυθαγορικοί ... καθάρσει ἐχρῶντο τοῦ μὲν σώματος διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς (Anec. Graec. Par. ed. Cramer, i. 172). Iamblichus (Vit. Pyth. 110) stresses the care one must use in musical therapy: συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ὑγιείαν, ἂν τις αὐτῇ χρῆται κατὰ τοὺς προσήκοντας τρόπους · εἰώθει γὰρ οὐ πάρεργως τῇ τοιαύτῃ χρῆσθαι καθάρσει.

(Compare the dangers of φθογγὴ αὐλομένη, Ch. 2 n. 80) His picture of Pythagoras music-therapy stresses the group, κύκλῳ ἐκαθέζοντο and the balance, rhythm and happiness they reached through shared song (δι' ὧν εὐφραίνεσθαι καὶ ἁρμοδεῖς καὶ ἔνρυθμοι γίνεσθαι) and the different μέλη used πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. Harmony was on a large scale and a small: 'the whole heaven is harmony' (F.M. Cornford, Princ. Sap. 112: for the differences of 'harmonia' in theory of Heracleitus and the Pythagoreans v. Guthrie, History of Gr. Philosophy 1. 435f, and in the characteristics of Heracleitus' use of it, Lloyd, Polarity p 99). Empedocles linked ἁρμονία with his doctrine of Love and Strife. He, particularly, helped to import it into Hippocratic ideas through his picture of the mingling of four elements, appropriate mixtures of which produce different organisms: 'harmonia' is that which bonds together different elements in the κόσμος and in man -

τὰ δ' ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο

Ἁρμονίης πόλλησιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίηθεν (fr. 96).

In the Hippocratica the idea of ἁρμονία, close to the doctrine of κρᾶσις (v. Ch. 3 n. 134) was particularly important in theories of conception, as one might expect from Empedocles' intermittent equation of Harmonia with love and the formation of life (v. frr. 34, 96, 273). Male and female, fire and water, mingle in the foetus in the due proportions of ἁρμονία (De Victu 1. 8 (Loeb)). Cf. περὶ ὀκταμήνου 9. (Littré). But Alcmeon's vision of health as the ἰσονομία τῶν δυναμίων which influenced particularly the author of Airs Waters Places, similarly used the musical-mathematical proportion as a political image of health (v. Stella, Importanza di Alcmeon, passim).

Plato's vision of the soul as 'harmony', therefore, derives from different musical, medical, cosmological and political theories which had infiltrated and enriched each other long before (Phaedo 85e, 92 c-d, Tim. 36d - 37a, cf. Cornford, Princip. Sap. p. 58, Lloyd Polarity p. 394); he adopted the early ~~name for~~ moral usage of ὑγιεία (cf. Conclusion, below) in his portrait of ἁρμονία (Rep. 400d-401a, 444d). In individual living, ἁρμονία instils order into the raw, random impulses which require the πέρας music gives, in order to be united in a κρᾶσις of body and soul (Philebus 25e, 47c). Without measure and harmony, no mixture of things, physical or emotional, is safe: μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν συγκρᾶσις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὐτήν (Phileb. 64D).

This final idea, developed by Aristotle in his ethical theories, is experienced in various other thoughts relevant to tragedy: the δυνάμεις of the body are dangerously strong when isolated, are the cause of νόσοι (Ch. 3. 134n); as

the madman is isolated from the community he endangers (Ch. 1. section (j), Ch. 3, section (i), cf. Inachus' expulsion of Io, PV 655). 4. All destructive human emotions projected onto the demon world must be propitiated (compare the Therapon's warning to Hippolytus Hipp. 93f, 107, 120) and must be expressed in ritual with the calming power of rhythm (Ch. 4. (iv)b). is expressed mythologically in the figure of Harmonia (Ch. 2. 235n). Daughter of Ares, sister of Terror, recipient and donor of a fatal ornament, she is nevertheless one of the brightest, most central and most desired of Greek personifications. Strife, and the human conflict it represents, is necessary to produce her: οἱ δὲ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι

ὡς ἔρις ἐκ τε θεῶν κἀξ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο (Il. 18.107).

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα ἄνευ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων (Ar. EE. 1235a). ; all the gods came to her wedding:

Ἁρμονίας δέ ποτ' εἰς ὑμεναίους
ἦλυθον οὐρανίδαι .. Phoen. 822.

For tragedy as an embodiment of ἁρμονία v. Conclusion, p. 255: see further pp. 172, 251-4, 334 (235n), 381 (147n.), 385f (10n), 437 (32n.), 439 (57n. 58n.).

11. Prognosticon 5 (Loeb).

12. Humours 2 (Loeb).

13. Freud, Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Ch. 9, 'Symptomatic and chance actions', p. 194. Also M. Khan, The Privacy of the self, Hogarth, 1974, p. 234f. esp. 245-250.

14. Madness is only quantitatively different from emotions: Dover GPM 126-7. Similarly, delirious fever is one extreme of many diseases.

15. Cf. the physical marks of madness and emotion, Ch. 4, pp. 155-171.

16. Prognosticon comments on the altered speed in bodily movements which is a sign of danger (IV -?V, VII Loeb) and Breaths (XIII) mentions the quick jerky breathing and (XIV Loeb) frothing at the mouth symptomatic of ἀποπληξία. Trembling, panting (Reg. Acut. XXXIV. 42 Loeb), shaking, teeth-grinding (Humours IX 10f Loeb) and violent raving (βοή, ταραχή, λόγοι πολλοί, Epid. III case 13 (286 Loeb)) and violent changes of emotion are visible signs of disease. On the principle (Regimen 2, vi.20 (Loeb)) that the visible is judged by the invisible and vice versa, similarly violent invisible movements are imagined to be the causes of the external violence: a rush of phlegm produces choking, gnashing teeth, twisting bodies, rolling eyes, etc., DMS X.4f (Loeb): καταῤῥοοι cause violent madness, AWP III. 34 (Loeb). An imbalance of food and exercise causes ταραγμός in the soul, Regimen III. LXXX1. 12f (Loeb). Movement of soul is linked to movement of body (cf. DMS XVIII the shaking of body due to χολή in the brain; Regimen 2. XXXV (Loeb), the madness (ὑπομαινόμενοι) due to an inner excess of fire). The very word δυνάμεις, which is used (v. Ch. 3. 134n) of the ingredients of the body whose combination produces health, whose isolation causes disease, suggests a sense of physical violence within the body: πάθήματα ἀπὸ δυναμίων γίνεται, Anc. Med. XXII (Loeb).

17. Cf. Ch. 4. 20n: Devereux comments that most emotions have in common the finite number of physical symptoms possible. The Hippocratic writer preserves an open mind on diagnosis from symptoms which can be common to all diseases: a principle which not all observers and observing scientists have followed.

18. Cairns, Generic Composition, p. 5ff (et passim) goes perhaps rather far in measuring every poem with a tape-measure fabricated later by Menander Rhetor. He concentrates on the structural development of 'topoi': for the development and implications of their intellectual and emotional elements v. E.R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, 79ff, 128ff, 159.

19. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus, p. 26f; Devereux, CQ N.S.20 (1970) 17ff; Marcovich, CQ N.S.22 (1972) 19ff; Cairns, Generic Comp. p.54.

20. Art cit. p. 18.

21. E.IT 832. (There is more grief and shame in tragedy, of course, than joy).

22. A phrase fortunately discovered for us in the new papyrus, now included in Lyrica Graeca Selecta.

23. This obviously imitates characteristics of the dead, a symbolism brought into the open by τεθνάκην . v. p. 174f on

symbolic identification with the dead in mourning ritual.

24. I intend no reference to the possibility that such an experience actually happened to the poet. What might have happened is impudent speculation, what we have left are the words: and most poets anyway transform an experience or thought by writing it. The act of writing functions as a 'rite de passage' structuring the emotion and making it bearable (v. above, n. 10 and below, Conclusion). But the point for us is that whether Sappho had an experience that corresponds to what she wrote or not, she structured it in her poem with the help both of traditional material and of individual artistry.

25. Cf. A.M. Dale, 'Seen and Unseen on the Greek Stage', Wien. Stud.,, 69 (1956) 96ff.

26. Barrett ad Hipp. 1464.

27. cf. Ch. 3, p.136 for his movements and appearance projected onto the Erinyes.

28. Cf. Ch. 1, section (j).

29. On the Proetides v. J. Loeffler, Die Melampodie, Beitr. zur Klass. philol. 7, (1963). Their dancing is both the symptom and the cure of madness: cf. Ch. 3, 118n.

30. Most commentators, citing πίτυλος used in rowing contests to mean the beat of oars, explain it as a 'regularly repeated rhythmical movement', eg. Barrett ad Hipp. 1464. Barrett is surely right to discount ancient explanations of it as a sound (eg. Hesych. s.v.). He finds Wilamowitz ad HF 816, who collects instances of its nautical use, 'quite obscure' in adding that it is also the rhythm of disharmony. But Wilamowitz's comment is important. Though Platnauer calls μανίας πίτυλον, IT 307, 'pulse of madness', i.e., rhythmical, England refers it there to the driving force behind the movement; and Barrett himself collects examples of actions whose main element is force rather than regular rhythm: men drinking and boxing, spears thrusting, rams butting, for instance. English 'beat' is used both in contexts, technical and non-technical, which require regulated rhythm, and in those which imply force and movement but not measure. As song is both therapeutic and οὐλομένη, so πίτυλος is used for rhythmic movement but is also 'der Rhythmus der Disharmonie', particularly in the movements of the mad.

31. V. Ch. 2 part B passim.

32. V. below, Section (iv) a. Flowing locks in dances can be Dionysiac; they symbolize a luxuriance often erotic, v. Dodds ad Ba. 150. See P. Friedländer, Studien zur antiken Literatur und Kunst, p. 525.

33. Cf. Page's parallels ad loc, and Med. 188 δέγμα λεαίνης. On the expressive powers of the eye v. Ch. 5, sections (i) and (vii), on its frightening powers, Ch. 2, section (iv).

34. On the 'off-course' element in madness (compare the eye 'rolling' out of straight) v. Ch. 1, section (iv) i and j.

35. v. Ch. 2, n.3.

36. So Fraenkel in his valuable note on this passage.

37. Ch. 2, section (ii), cf. Ch. 3, p. 136.

38. Though this is patterned and formalized speed, ἐν παννυχίοις χοροῖς, cf. Ch. 4, section (iv)b.

39. Stanford ad loc. cites A. fr. 741 (387N, 215 [illegible], Loeb): ἔφριξ'. ἔρως δὲ τοῦδε μυστικοῦ τέλους and comments on the 'basic notion' of φρίσσω, a 'bristling of the hairs in a frisson of excitement (cf. Lat. 'horreo')'.

40. Ba. 600, δίκετε πέδοσε τερμερὰ σώματα δίκετε, Μαινάδες.
Ba. 607, θηρεύετε σαρκὸς ἐξαμείψασαι τέρμον
Tro. 1328, τερμερὰ μέλεα
Cho. 463, τέρμος μ' ὑφέρπει κλύουσαν εὐγμάτων.
Pers. 64, τοκέες τ' ἄλοκοί θ'..τερμέονται.

41. Or. 259, IT 283.

42. cf. Aj. 9-10 πάρα /στάζων ἱδρῶτι καὶ χέρας ξιφοκτόνους.
Wunder/Dindorf collect examples of fire 'used as a symbol of boldness and impudence' at S. Phil 909, including E. Hec. 607, Andr. 271, Ar. Eq. 9 381, and Ar. Lys. 1014 οὐδὲ πῦρ. . . πρόβαλις . : which equates fire with animal ferocity. Cf. above Ch. 1, nn. 106, 111, 112. For fainting v. Hipp. 119 λέλυμαι μελέων σύνδεσμα cf. λυσιμελὴς ἔρως Supp. 40, Archil. 85, Hes. Th. 911.

43. As χλωρὸν δέος , Od. 9.320, 12.243 et al, Il. 7. 479, 14.506 et al: [illegible] used as at H.h. Cer. 190, τὴν δ' αἰδώς τε σέβας τε ἶδε χλωρὸν δέος εἶλεν . Cf. χλωρὸς ὑπὸ δείους Il. 10.376.

44. Menos: does one breathe it in or out? v. Onians, op. cit. p. 49-58, and above Ch. 1, p. 32ff. On the whole, I prefer the image of breathing out: supported by a private conversation with Prof. Dodds, and PV 720 ἐκφυσᾷ μένος . Dodds suggests to me that Ag. 219 πνέων τροπαίαν may refer to alternating gasps.

45. On barbaric cries in tragedy, v. J.A. Haldane, CQ. 22 (1972) 42ff.

46. v. E. Schwentner, Die Primaren Interjektionen in der Indogermenische sprachen (Heidelberg 1924), pp.6-7, 50 (ἆ), 27 (πάπαι), 5, 12 (ἔα), 32 (τοτοτοῖ), 12 and 52 (ὀτοτοτοτοῖ), and D. Fehling, Die Wiederholungsfiguren und ihr gebrauch bei den Greichen vor Gorgias, Berlin 1969, p. 206f.

47. Mr. Stinton suggests to me that either ἀλεῦ ᾶ δᾶ (or simply δᾶ) is the right reading here.

48. Cf. Ch. 3, section (ii), 112ff; cf. Havelock's suggestion Yale Stud. 22 (1972) p. 1ff, 'The Socratic self', esp. pp. 8f that there was a characteristically Socratic use of the reflexive pronoun which stressed the necessity for correct rational thought with 'the subject itself as object'. (art. cit. p. 15).

49. On the use of metre to express emotion v. Wilamowitz, Gr. Verskunst pp. 58f, 418f, P. Maas, Gr. Metre trans. Lloyd-Jones, p. 52-3. G. Thomson, 'Significant Rhythm', in Greek Lyric Metre, p. 40ff, is interesting, but probably exaggerates the extent to which a given metre was thought to represent a given emotion.

50. For the device of word-repetition to express emotion, v. P. E. Easterling, Hermes, 101 Band, (1973) 14ff, and her conclusion, p. 34, that Sophocles, because he is 'a master of language' uses this device for different purposes, some extremely subtle. All three tragedians are capable of using it to highlight the word which is the focus of the emotion in their context: though repetition in itself is not, in good poets, a device for marking or engendering emotion.

51. Nosos: 'general bothersomeness' as Prof. M.L. West suggests: in contexts of emotion, it is both something that controls the individual and the danger this state offers to other people, cf. PV 224 ἔνεστι γάρ πως τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι νόσημα, τοῖς φίλοισι μὴ πεποιθέναι. Νόσημα is used, with a defining genitive, of ἀδικία, and νόσος can be used of

madness,(Pers. 750, Aj. 185, 59 and 452), of love (Trach. 491, E.Hipp. 747), lack of self-control in speech (Or. 10) and ἀνοια (Pl. Leg. 691 d).

52. Orestes and Io are 'swept along' by the force of their madness, PV 879, Cho. 1023f. Heracles, the epitome and exemplum of human strength is 'overpowered' by Lyssa, cf. HF. 1144 τοῦ δ'οἰστρος ἡμᾶς ἔλαβε ποῦ διώλεσεν; . Agave has the strength to murder Pentheus, as she foams at the mouth and rolls her eyes, οὐ φρονοῦσ' ἃ δεῖ φρονεῖν Ba 1123f, because of the god. God-driven madness, like the emotions that attack the mind (Ch. 2, part B) in images is 'physically stronger' than man (cf. A.Supp. 738 προίσχομαι, πάτερ, δείματι).

53. Phoen. 21.

54. Compare Augustine's remarks on the speed of winged daemons, quoted Ch. 2, section (i), and of pp. 88-90.

55. Ch. 1, section (iv) f, g.

56. On escape wishes v. Barrett ad Hipp. 1290-3 and below p. 397 (62n).

57. Cf. Ch. 1, section (iv) g. on ἀνέμοεν φρένημα.

58. Cf. Ch. 4, 10n. above. On ἰσονομία πολιτική v. Vlastos, Platonic Studies, Princeton 1973, pp. 164f, and Plato's relation of political isonomia to personal harmony of soul, 194f.

59. (G. Ansel, De vi atque indole rhythmorum, Breslau, 1887 would have been interesting, if available). v. W.D. Anderson, Ethos and education, in Gr. Music, Harvard 1966, p. 11 et passim.

60. Structure eg. A. Poet. 50a 15-b20; music, eg. ib. 49b29-39, et al., and v. below, Conclusion.

61. M. Argyle, Bodily Communication, Ch. 9, p. 183f.

62. v. Padel, CQ 24 (1974) p. 62 n.1 for the history and significance, ~~particularly~~ of the wish to dive into the earth.

63. E.El. 290-1. Cf. Oedipus' wish not to feel OT 1386f and Ch. 1, section (i), where the βάσις φρενῶν is ἥσυχος until disturbed by sounds heard. V. also below, Conclusion.

64. Conjectures over this passage include three further metra from Wilamowitz: Murray obelizes, but Biehl (Teubner 1970) accepts ἡσθημένος which apparently stands for αἰσθανόμενος. We may compare Pindar, O.8.81f, picturing the joy his dead father and uncle will take in a boy's victory, and, of course, the anger

of Ajax and regrets of Achilles in Homer, Od. xi. 543ff, 471ff.

65. Hipp. 253. (Cf. Phoen. 354, 618, 1578 and the theme of Menoeceus' death in this play). The prayer for a μέτριος χάρις (IA.554), which takes many forms (eg. μετρίας ἀνέμων ... αὔρας Med. 839, μέτρια βιοτά fr. 893, cf. εἴη γ' ἐμοὶ ⟨μὲν⟩ μέτρια Ion 632) is evidently related, however weak its metaphorical sense, to the desire for ἁρμονία (cf. n.10 and Conclusion). One should have a μέτρον and ἄριθμός of one's ills, Tro. 620: ὧν (sc. νόσων) γ' οὔτε μέτρον οὔτ' ἀριθμός ἐστί μοι. One should suffer μετρίως (fr. 46.2 μετρίως ἄλγειν) for grief unmeasured is unbearable, Ba. 1244, πένθος οὐ μετρητόν.

66. Cf. Ch. 1, section (i), Ch. 3, section (vi), Ch. 2, section (viii), with notes.

67. On Aeschylean silences v. O. Taplin, 'Aeschylean Silences and silences in Aeschylus', HSCP 76 (1972), 57ff, esp. 76, 79, 81 and 94f.

68. Hecuba, Tro. 37, Phaedra Hipp. 119, Orestes 36-7: the last two are said to be 'wasted' by their νόσος as well.

69. For eye contact and its implications of friendship and ὁμιλία v. below Ch.5, section (i).

70. 'Wasting away' with emotion is a common motif from Homer to Plato (eg. Od. 19.264, Pl. Rep. 609c). For Onians' explanation of this image - viz, that life is imagined as a liquid which drains away, (cf. Med. 141 τήκει βιοτάν) - v. op. cit. pp. 203-9.

71. Hec. 496.

72. The Attic Theseus is a lightning-conductor for pollution and disaster: cf. his roles in OC and Euripides' Supplices. Was this partly why Euripides, in his second Hippolytus, moved the Athenian hero to Troizen as the scene of his disgrace?

73. Leach asserted that it was immaterial which colour was used in mourning ceremony, black or white, outside its symbolic connotations inside a given society. This has long been queried (v. M. Douglas, Implicit Meanings, 1975, p. 146) and is susceptible to the challenge of common-sense: it is surely a universal tendency to associate black with the earth and the under-world. The recent dissertation on Greek blacks and whites by Norbert Zink would have been useful here perhaps, but is, unfortunately, unavailable. The black earth 'drinks' the rain, Hdt. 3.117 etc.; hence will drink the blood of men, πιοῦσα κόνις μέλαν αἷμα , A.Eu. 979: cf. Sept. 736 and 821, OT 1401f.

74. v. Solon's speech at Hdt. 1.32 οὕτω σε ἐγὼ λέγω, πρὶν τελευτῆσαντα καλῶς τὸν αἰῶνα πύθωμαι.... σκοπεῖν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτήν, κῇ ἀποβήσεται , and A.Ag. 928, S. OT 1189f, and 1529, Trach. 1, IA. 161, Andr. 100,

Tro. 510, Heracl. 865. Aristotle, at least, (E.N. i. x.) believed the sentiment to be Solon's own. v. Jebb ad OT 1530 for references.

75. Cf. Alexiou, Ritual Lament, pp. 8, 28, 41, 55-6, 68-9, 92-6, 106, 175, and beating the head, 6. On self-mutilation, ibid. 10, 28-9, 33-4, 41, et passim.

76. 'Among the first groups of beings with whom men must have made contracts were the spirits of the dead and the gods. They in fact are the real owners of the world's wealth.' (M. Mauss, The Gift, trans. Cunnison, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p 13). Gifts would be given also as a way of allaying fears of the dead, cf. Freud's contention (Totem and Tabu, passim) is right, that gifts to the dead are a propitiation, and stem from a fear of the guilt and resentment projected onto the dead by the living.

77. Alexiou op. cit. p. 6. It is hard, however, for one even of the same culture to know where 'uncontrolled grief' ends and 'ritual' begins, in an individual act such as Hecubas's at her first utterance in the 'Troades'. All we can say, is that a chorus may express alarm, sympathy, or fear, at astrophic lyric outbursts of emotion from an individual: compare the psychiatrists' use of 'ritual' to denote obsessive (sometimes salutary, sometimes harmful) acts of individual ritual: v. Rycroft, Dictionary s.v. 'ritual'.

78. Kurtz and Boardman, Gr. Burial Customs, p. 142.

79. Compare the picture of the earth 'drinking' blood, above, 73n. Achilles kills twelve Trojans at Patroclus' pyre, Il. 23.176: where the poet comments κακὰ δὲ φρεσὶ μήδετο ἔργα.

80. On human sacrifice v. Wace and Stubbings, Companion to Homer, pp. 479-80, who explain Achilles' act as an act of revenge rather than sacrifice.

81. Pro bono publico sacrifices: Iphigeneia (IA), Menoeceus (Phoen). Compare wives' suicide after deaths: Jocasta, Eurydice, Evadne and cf. Alcestis.

82. Alexiou p. 8f.

83. For Iphigeneia's blood pouring to the ground v. above pp. 16, 273 (76n).

84. Alexiou op. cit. p. 41-2.

85. Pollution of mourners at Athens: Kurtz and Boardman op. cit. p. 201f, 146, 149f, Alexiou op. cit. pp. 5, 10, 16-17.

86. For the Greek horror of exile v. Polyneices' reply, Phoen. 388f,

— τί τὸ στέρεσθαι πατρίδος; ἦ κακὸν μέγα;
— μέγιστον· ἔργῳ δ' ἐστὶ πεῖζον ἢ λόγῳ,

quoted by Plutarch, De exilio 599 D-E, in order to refute the proposition from his Cynic-Stoic position, for an exiled friend.

87. Cf. Dover GPM, eg. pp. 157-8, 290.

88. Van Gennep, Rites of Passage, p. 23.

89. Alexiou, op. cit. Ch. 6. passim.

90. Cf. Ch. 2n.

90. Padel art. cit. p. 231, 4n.

91. 'As a concept in the social sciences, 'need' has been borrowed from two sources, biology and psychology. Its ambiguity as a social science concept stems from a confusion in its two possible meanings. In biology 'need' refers to what might be termed a 'want', i.e., to some requirement which must be satisfied if an organism is to survive. In psychology, on the other hand, it refers to what might be termed a 'desire', i.e., a wish to satisfy some felt desire by the attainment of some goal. These two meanings may, of course, overlap'. M.E. Spiro, 'Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation', in 'Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, ed. M. Banton, Tavistock 1966, p. 107. I use 'need' here in what Spiro calls the psychological sense. But the biological meaning also is relevant to our context: the organism of that society would have disintegrated if this ritual had been neglected. It is interesting how the rites tended to lose control, and had to be regulated by laws inhibiting expense, v. Kurtz and Boardman op. cit. p. 143ff.

92. v. Heracl. 777.

93. Cf. E.Supp. 79-80, ἄπλητος ὧδε μ' ἐξάγει χάρις γόων πολύπονος.

94. eg. Ag. 270, 541. For this reason too it is hard to evaluate the force of fragments like E. fr. 263, 573, πολύδακρυν ἁδονάν (cit. Denniston ad E.El. 126).

95. Tears are the object of an <u>appetite</u> which must be satisfied; like music (Od. 4.17, 13.52) sleep, (Od. 4.295 etc.), water, food, κύδεα (Od. 15, 399) and women (eg. h.H.Ven. 226).

96. Hipp. 1462. For the implications of this sentiment (assuming it was, if not genuine, v. Barrett ad loc., at least felt to be appropriate by someone within the generation,) v. Dover, GPM p. 272: 'a good individual is able to ... express his sympathies in his interaction with others because he 'puts himself in their place' and sees the situation through their eyes'. Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1362 B. 38 and Ch. 5, (viii).

97. See pp. 385-8 (10 n) and references cited there.

98. Dover GPM p. 229ff. v. also p. 226. On Solon's funeral laws, limiting the number of mourners and length of mourning period v.

Kurtz and Boardman op. cit. Ch. 7, Alexiou op. cit. p. 14f.

99. v. Ch. 5, sections (i), (vii). Some of the most popular songs in Greece during the years of the recent junta recalled, safely, years spent in companionable military service, men's friendship for each other, etc.

100. For the proverb v. Pl. Phaedr. 240c. It is for instance one of the evils in the tyrant's situation, Pl. Rep. 9, 580A, that he ha no peer and can therefore have no friends: v. Dodds ad Pl. Gorgias 507e.5 and 510a.11. and the whole discussion in Arist. Rhet. I. xi.

101. B. Vickers, Towards Greek Tragedy, p. 52.

102. This type of argument is of course open to the attack: to take the depiction of mourning ritual in tragedy as evidence for the ritual in the society would be to ignore the rules of literary genre. (Also, from a historian's viewpoint v. both Dover GPM p. 145 and Kurtz and Boardman, op. cit. p. 142). Literary and generic conventions may have influenced the content of tragedy more deeply than did contemporary habits. But once we agree that this distortion may be present, there is still a residual sense in which Vickers' attitude is valid. Sympathy shown in tragedy must have some relation to ways of showing sympathy in the society, though the relation may be far from constant. Cf. Preface, above, p. xiii.

Notes to Chapter Five.

1. eg. The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard, Presented by W.H Auden, Midland Books, 1971, pp. 9-11. Auden is taking Kierkegaard's division of religion into three types, the aesthetic, exemplified by Greek religion, the ethical (Platonic), and the revealed, the Christian. (For justification for quoting this type of work v. Preface p. xv).

2. In 'The Greeks and the Irrational' he illustrated 'an important, and relatively unfamiliar, aspect of the mental world of ancient Greece.' (GI p. viii). But, he pointed out, 'an aspect must not be taken for the whole'. For the 'middle way' in tragedy, cf.

μάκαρες οἱ μετρίας θεοῦ
μετὰ τ σωφροσύνας μετέ/σχον....
γαλανείᾳ χειμάρρου

(IA 543f) and Ch. 4 n.65. It is important, too, that τὸ μέτρον is used both for a mathematical proportion and measure, and, as early as Homer, for 'a goal'. On the allied political concept, ἰσονομία, and the important statement that the parts of a man are equal to those of the state, v. pp. 174, 397 (58n), and Plato Rep. 9. passim.

3. The two most interesting and lengthy discussions in English are John Jones, Aristotle and Greek Tragedy, Chatto and Windus 1971, and Brian Vickers, Towards Greek Tragedy, Longman 1973. Other important articles include: Diller, Über der Selbstbewusstsein der Sophokleischen Personen, Weiner stud. 69 (1956) 70-85; Garton, JHS 77 (1957); Dawe, PCPS n.s. ix (1963) 21-63; A.M. Dale, 'The Creation of dramatic character', Coll. Papers, CUP 1969; Dover, JHS 93 (1973) 58ff. and P. Easterling, 'Presentation of character in Aeschylus', Greece and Rome 20 (1973).

4. GPM pp. 144 et. seq., 154 et. seq., 157, and 129 n. 14.

5. Dover op. cit. 154-5.

6. Easterling, art. cit., pp. 6-7, 14-27.

7. Auden, op. cit. p. 11: 'The facts on which the aesthetic religion is shattered and despairs, producing in its death agony Tragic Drama, are two: man's knowledge of good and evil, and his certainty that death comes to all men, i.e., that ultimately there is no Either/Or of strength or weakness but even for the exceptional individual the doom of absolute weakness'.

8. In 'structuralist'language, a 'text'. For the range of this noun in structuralist literature v. eg. J.A. Boon, From Symbolism to Structuralism, Blackwell, 1972, p. 10ff. 'Classic' sociological theory maintains that society is the main formative power which shapes 'not only the value system of a society but also its conceptual tools'. But some anthropologists, however, suggest that the structure of a language determines the ways of thought, social structures, and modes of personal interaction, of its speakers. Some sociologists, eg. Basil Bernstein, look for a relation between the two views which stresses the interdependence of linguistic, cultural and social structures; v. eg. P.P. Giglioli, Language and Social Context, Penguin 1975, pp. 7-8, 13. For the inconsistencies and chaos in specifically Greek religious belief and practice v. eg. Farnell, Cults, i. p. 7ff. It is of course important to remember that a given poet or philosopher in structuring

a statement about relations between men and men, or men and gods, is choosing one colour from a shifting ocean of inconsistent beliefs: and the critic is always liable to compare and perhaps confuse one intellectual statement with the whole fabric of popular thought. Cf. above pp. xiv, 260 (22n).

9. Dover, GPM pp. 138-141 illustrates the influence of these challenges on fourth-century patterns of thought.

10. v. above Ch. 3, section (iii), pp. 125-8; cf Euripides' greater awareness of the masking quality of external words and appearances, ch. 5 p. 223f.

11. Vickers, op. cit. pp. xi, ff, 52ff, and Ch. 3 passim.

12. Dodds in ad loc. cites E. Hipp. 997 and E. fr. 812 τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἵπερ ἥδεται ξυνών. For ramifications of the thought 'like to like' v. above, Ch. 3.25n (madness as both symptom and punishment), 118n. (dance is both symptom and cure of the Praetides' madness) for the principle ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται. Compare Alcinous' liking for Odysseus, based, apparently, on the assumption that he 'thinks like' himself, Ch. 5, section (iii), esp. p. 210, on ὁμοιότης as the unifying element in a community v. above, p. 187.

13. eg. E.fr. 609 τὰς ὁμιλίας ἐσθλὰς διώκειν, ὦ νέοι, σπουδάζετε Again, this might mean either 'have good companions' or 'have good relationships with your friends'. A bad ὁμιλία is the worst thing a man can have, A.Sept. 599.

ἐν παντὶ πράγει δ' ἐσθ' ὁμιλίας κακῆς
κάκιον οὐδέν...

Cf. PV 39, where τὸ συγγενές and ὁμιλία contribute

to Hephaestus' reluctance in binding Prometheus.

14. A.EN 1171 b 32-4, κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον.
For the idea that love of friends is an expression of self-love, and for the ancient principle of ὁμοιότης in friendship v. ibid. 1159 a-b. Attraction of opposites is only accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) and the desire in such a case is the desire for the mean, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν). (1159 b.). ϕ above p.187.

15. (Pl.) Alcib. I 133

16. In considering the symbolic force mirrors have in Greek thought, we should recall the practice, almost certainly classical, of catoptromancy, divination by mirror. A. Delatte, La Catroptromancie Grecque et ses dérivés (Bibl. de la faculté de phil. et lettres de l'université de Liège, fasc. XLVIII 1932) reviews the literary (pp. 133-148) and archaeological (pp. 185f.) evidence for the origins and development of this practice in the classical and later Greek world; his argument seems conclusive and inclines me to accept his interpretation of his only 5th-century text, Ar. Ach. 1124-8, as a parody of catoptromancy (p. 133-5). In later practice, most explicitly in byzantine and mediaeval records, catoptromancy was associated with demonic possession, (manifested in the eyes of the 'visionnaire', p. 30f.), and so it may have been in the classical period. It is worth noting that Plutarch explains the hallucinations involved in catoptromancy by referring to the εἴδωλα of atomist theory (Q. Conv. V.7.4., Delatte op. cit. p. 152):

εἴδωλα may have entered theories of demonic possession also (v. above Ch. 3, pp 119-121). Catoptromancy is related to divination from water-reflections in basins or streams (v. eg. Paus. 7.21.12, Delatte pp. 135-8). It is important that the practice is associated with sacred rites (v. Paus. loc. cit; the 5th-century vase involving the oracle of Themis, Delatte p. 185 and fig. 18: cf. the water-reflections at the oracles of Apollo in Didyma, Claros, Miletus and Delphi): as with everything divine, the mirror-power is dangerous (v. below, nn. 106, 110) but it is also useful, even apotropaic. (Cf above pp 123, 43-4, 140: the organs of the mind, used in divination, resemble a mirror too) Damoetas looks at himself in water to escape the effects of the evil eye (Theoc. 6.39, cf. Lawson Modern Gr. Folklore p. 10) and Artemidorus suggests some optimistic interpretations of dreams featuring mirrors. In legends, prophetic and healing figures are associated with mirrors; Pythagoras supposedly invented a 'mirror-game' involving letters of blood and moonlight (Schol. ad. Ar. Nub. 752, Suda s.v. Θεστορίδης γυνή cf. Delatte p. 149 n.2 for later development of this story), and Apollo in an orphic fragment gives the seer Helenus a present of a shining stone (v. Delatte p. 145). Delatte explains Greek catoptromancy by Greek observation of light reflections (pp. 149, 154). His own evidence, however, suggests that though we cannot tell if the practice arose from belief in the special power of mirrors to reflect future events and present truths otherwise hidden, such associations were made to mirrors as a result of the practice. Hence the utility of the mirror as a metaphor for ὁμιλία or φιλία. A mirror could reflect present truth (as in Lucian's parody, V. H. 1.26) or future events (as Aristophanes' parody, Ach. 1128): a metaphor for a method of knowing the (present) disposition of a man and the (future) things he was likely to do. The 'other-reflecting' quality of a mirror was, therefore, more significant to a fifth-century poet than to modern scholars, not many of whom have gazed in crystal.

17. Pi. P.5.56; At, P. 5.17 Gildersleeve explains the metaphorical use of ὀφθαλμός and ὄμμα as ὄλβος. It is perhaps unwise to have cited O.2.6, ὄπιν (or ὄπι) δίκαιον ξένων : but the word ὄπις, which denotes Theron's attitude of reverence towards his guests and to strangers, is derived from ὀπίζομαι, a verb of attitude whose object is nearly always abstract in Homer: Διὸς μῆνιν, (Od. 14.283, Hes. Sc. 21), τὸν θυμόν (Od. 13. 148), ἐφετμή (Il. 18.216), but which may have behind it some idea of looking reflected in L-S-J's translation 'regard with awe and dread'. It is used of affection too: v. Odysseus' complaint, Od. 22. 332, ἐμὲ δ' οὐδὲν ὀπίζεο νόστιμον ἐόντα, cf. Theogn. 734, 1148. Is it possible that the root of this verb is related to the root of ὄψ ? Compare Snell's anatomy of Greek verbs of looking, Discovery of the Mind, 1ff., which denote 'a visual attitude', ibid., p.3.

18. eg. Jason's bride who refuses to look at Medea's children, Med. 1145-1149, (cf. above Ch. 4, p.176).

19. For Plato's theory of vision v. Tim. 68d et. seq. and see references cited above p. 380 (140n); further, 311 (93n), 340 (268n).

20. In conversation on this passage E.L. Bowie has suggested to me a comma after εἰδώλων, but points out this does not solve the problem of the missing article; and Professor Dodds has suggested that Fraenkel is misleading, that the meaning 'reflection' comes naturally from the original meaning 'mirror', of κάτοπτρον that the missing τοὺς is no problem, giving δοκοῦντας

a particular, not a general reference, and that there is no need to suppose a lacuna; and Professor Lloyd-Jones, like both Bowie and Dodds, prefers to see the two noun-adjective phrases as synonymous as the passage stands, but like Page agrees with Dawe in suspecting one missing line, if not more.

21. Cic. de amicit. 62. χαρακτήρ, in its original meaning (v. Jebb-Pearson on S.fr. 176), is a stamp on a coin which provides recognition of its provenance and proof that it is genuine. The τεκμήριον of the Danaids is their memory of their mythical ancestor, below pp. 213-4. Their τεκμήριον is an emblem drawn from myth: something that can be encapsulated as a blazon on a shield, a totem. (For totem animals v. above Ch. 3, section v, p. 73f, and M. Douglas, Implicit Meanings, Ch. 1.) External τεκμήρια, like the physical objects which furnish proof of identity in New Comedy, are detachable; one's relationship to them, however, is not, and the Danaids' memory of Io is a proof of their permanent and important connexion with her, and through her to the King.

22. Ar. EE 1237 b 12 et seq. For the Theognis fragment cf. Semonides of Amorgos 67-8, πολλὸν μὲν ὢν θέμις τοι αὐτὴ γυνὴ
ἄλλοισι, τῷ δ' ἔχουσι γίνεται κακόν.
The warning, to refrain from judging a man or animal until you have tried them out, reminds one of the advice 'Call no man happy till he's dead' (cf. Ch. 4 n.74): first impressions are misleading.

23. Bolton, Glory, Jest and Riddle, Duckworth, 1973, p. 17. For masks cf. A.Poet. 1449 a 37ff., Pickford-Cambridge, Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy^2, p. 135 (on δείκελα which sometimes meant the

'masks', sometimes the 'imitation' i.e., the performance'), 153f on 6th-century clay 'votive?' masks cf. his 'List of Monuments' no. 54, 58-60, 74); Dramatic Festivals of Athens^{2} pp. 190-6; T.B.L. Webster, Greek Theatre Production plates 6,11,19,24 and pp. 38ff, 111. On the probably non-masked actors of mime v. Cunningham Herodas ed. p. 2ff.

24. John Jones, op. cit., p. 275. For the possibility that Oedipus' mask could have had two different sides, cf. Levi-Strauss, Structuralist Anthropology, Ch. 13, 'Le redoublement et la representation'. Cf. Dover on the 'disunity of the personality', below 1. 234, 99n, 136n, and the significances of both the other-revealing and self-revealing qualities of the mirror, 16n, 106n, 110n. But this seems to me unlikely: should we also suppose that the Erinyes changed their frightening masks at the end of the 'Eumenides'? Lessing's theory does not explain how an actor could keep one eye only turned to the whole audience during most of the play in a circular stage. v. Jebb-Pearson, Sophocles, Fragments, i. p. 177-8 for the mask of Thanytas and for Lessing's theory, based on Pollux 4.141.

25. A. Poet. 49 b 33. Some commentators explain ὄψις here simply with reference to the clothes of the actors and the scenic properties and effects; eg. Bywater: 'visible appearance of actors in their costume', who quotes T. Gomperz, Festschrift, 1902, p. 166 for ὄψις as a technical term in the language of the theatre. Lucas, ad A.Poet. 49 b, points out that at 53 b 1-4 ὄψις apparently refers to the whole content of τὸ ὁρᾶν :

he compares Sophocles' introduction of scene-painting. For the implications of the two senses, subjective and objective, of v. above, Ch. 1, [illegible] p. 39,

26. B. Vickers, op. cit., p. 56. 'Gaze' is used 'as a signal', M. Argyle, Gaze, p. 58f. 'Gaze' plays a central part in human social behaviour, and 'to account for perceptual phenomena we have to deal with the gaze-patterns of the perceiver' (ibid. p. 107). The use of 'gaze' does not, according to Argyle, vary much, but there are some significant differences between cultures, especially when 'in a few cultures special symbolic significance is attributed to gaze, as when people believe in the evil eye' ibid. 169f. Hence the possible symbolic associations physiological 'looking' may bring to intellectual metaphorical use of the idea are important in, for instance, a study of Plato's picture of ὀπωπία . (v. Rep. 517 A, ὀπαὶ ὀπωπίαι) or Aristotle's development of the notion of ὀπωπία . When 'gaze' in a culture is felt to pollute and transform for the bad, it can also transform for the good. (For the symbolic force [illegible] ideas of physiological pollution bring to its application in a moral sphere cf. M. Douglas Implicit Meanings p. 47f, and for the evil eye, Ch. 2, n.3).

27. Eckherd Hess, 'Attitudes and Pupil Size', Scient. Amer. 1965, vol. 212, pp. 46-54. We look at another's eyes 'because we need to know the other's intentions', M. Argyle, Gaze, p. 169. On the perception and interpretation of 'gaze' in general v. ibid. 82ff.

28. John Jones op. cit. p. 267 uses Aristotle's apparent belittling of the ὄψις element, Poet. 53 b.1, to belittle the visual effects of Euripides. But Aristotle only observes that the better poet provokes pity and fear from his σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων rather than from the ὄψις : even for Aristotle, it is not the element of ὄψις that is ἀτεχνότερον , but dependence on it to cover up the weakness of construction.

29. E. Med. Pl. Rep. 573c, Arist. E.H. 1152 n 19. Cf. H. Flasher, Melancholie und Melancholiker, pp. 14ff, 21ff, 109f. For early categorization by animal types, v. Lloyd-Jones, Female of the Species, Duckworth, 1975, p. 21f, 29f, and Semonides himself passim.

30. op. cit. p. 243.

31. Compare Odysseus' interest in Eumaeus' childhood, Od. 15. 381f and in the way he became a slave; and Eumaeus' own narrative, from his father's ὑψερεφές house to slavery, 463f. Cf. the often-quoted observation of the Chorus on Cassandra, Ag. 1084, μένει τὸ θεῖον δουλίᾳ περ ἐν φρενί;

32. Laertes, found λιστρεύοντα φυτόν , Od. 24. 227f. For Hesiod's association of high morality with rural labour v. Erg. 352f, 248f, and v. Erg. 40-1, which could be read as, among other interpretations, a praise of such an association, of the universal morality which the wise man applies to his labours in a particular limited sphere: νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντὸς
οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μέγ' ὄνειαρ

33. The attitudes appropriate to the old and to the young, and the verbs that distinguish them, are still marked in modern Greek. Recently I asked a young skilled workman on an excavation why he did not correct the mistakes of an older and richer, but more stupid, colleague. φοβάσαι ; I asked. No, he said: σέβομαι.

34. S. Ant. 929-30, ἔτι τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνέμων αὐταὶ
κυρῆς εἶπαί νιν δ' ἔχουσιν.

cf. Lloyd-Jones, Justice of Zeus, p. 124 on the familiar 'mythic' personalities of Sophocles heroes and their dispositional vulnurability to the family turbulence and curse. On the idea of an ἔμφυτος ἕδος cf. Ch. 2, 128n.

35. Euripides exploits it: it seems to have been he who first decided to make Medea kill her own children. v. J.R. Bacon, Voyage of the Argonauts, p. 129ff, and Page, ed., pp. xxiiff.

36. John Jones, op. cit. p. 192.

37. v. above, Ch. 2, Part B passim, eg. nn. 250 or 268, 277, 309, 318, 339 et al. Further, Dover GPM p. 141ff.

38. eg. Hecuba, Hec. 842ff, 1044f.

39. For the criterion of 'human intelligibility' v. Easterling, art. cit. pp. 10, 14, Vickers, op. cit. p. 52ff. It is true that a genre

creates its own frame of intelligibility: 'The function of genre conventions is essentially to establish a contract between writer and reader - or spectator - so as to make certain relevant expectations operative and thus to permit both compliance with and deviation from accepted modes of 'intelligibility' (J. Culler, Structuralist Poetics p. 147). But the way tragedy as literary genre distorts the beliefs and human interaction of its society is ~~- - - - - -~~ a product of that society, and is also a guide to those relationships and beliefs (v. Preface p. xiii). 'What is made intelligible by the conventions of genre is often less interesting than that which resists or escapes generic understanding, and so there arises, over and against the vraisemblance of genre, another level of vraisemblance whose fundamental device is to expose the artifice of generic conventions and expectations'. (ibid. p. 148). The Euripidean topos discussed below, pp. 223-228, represents the inadequancy of judgements made in the context both of real life and of tragedy.

40. For Aristotle's whole discussion of gnomai v. Rhet. 1395 a-b.

41. ibid. 1395 a 11-26. A gnome is a statement about general facts, 'those that are the object of action'.

42. 1395 b 3.

43. 1395 b 12-17.

44. The prominence of the gods and their gifts to the Phaeacians is a feature of the whole passage, eg. 92, 110, and is stressed at the end of it, τοῦ ' ἄρ ' ἐν Ἀλκινόοιο θεῶν ἔσαν ἀγλαὰ δῶρα,

a conclusion reached after the climax of the description, the springs of water which feed both the palace-dwellers and the citizens. So we, the listeners or readers, understand Odysseus as perceiving for himself how the palace is protected and indulged by the gods and how such protection is linked to the element in the situation he faces which carries most potential danger for him. The populace, in this, as in all other things, in the new land he has found, share with the palace natural and divine as well as social bonds.

45. JHS xciii (1973) pp. 74 et seq.

46. Art. cit. p. 86. For further development of this process v. eg. M. Douglas, Natural Symbols, (1960) Preface, pp. vii-viii, et passim. For psychoanalytic use of the idea that mental relationships are understood in terms alrady established appropriate to particular physical relationships v. eg. Ella Sharpe, op. cit. pp. 155ff. Cf. G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, p. 192 for a delicate discussion of the overlap between the natural model for a metaphor, and the effect a metaphor may have on thought.

47. Art. cit. p. 87. It is, however, possible for a society to express attitudes of cynicism towards semi-formalized behaviour to which it continues to conform, as a literary genre may do too, cf. above, 32n. It is only when something turns up, better rules fostering

expectation generically, better ceremonies . - for relating suppliant to supplicated, that the old framework is replaced: it may have lost its binding-force or vitality, but it provides the only lines available until then.

48. art. cit. p. 101.

49. Gould, art. cit. p. 90. Except, of course, into a comprehensive policy of the ξένος , who is protected by 'acts of God'.

50. As Glaucus' lineage, Il. 6. 152ff, is an invisible mark for Diomedes, which has physical consequences: he refrains from fighting him, 215f. The mental τεκμήριον , memory of a narrative which has ancestral ties with the narrator, is a substitute for the physical signum wished for by Cicero and others, above section (i). It is interesting to ask, what is the actual object of ἀναγνώρισις in tragedy? Not the nature of a man, but his blood-relationships, in Plotinus' terms the εἰκονικός (or historical) self, v. [illegible] section (vii), p. 234f.

51. Cf. Od. 7. 306, quoted above p. 210. Cf. also QC 223, δέος ἴσχετε , quoted above [illegible] p. 219.

52. The precise meaning of l. 243 is uncertain: there does seem to be some reference, though, to conjecture and to foreigners. On Athenian attitudes to foreigners and foreign states in the fourth

century v. Dover, GGI pp. 279f, 313f; though they may not be in this case good evidence for fifth-century attitudes. Opinion on foreigners at Athens may have changed radically at the end of the fifth century, for obvious reasons.

53. eg. in tragedy, the false facts Neoptolemus gives Philoctetes, v. above pp. 220-3; cf. the wanderers who beg a meal off Penelope, recounting stories of her husband to make their good impression, Od. 14.126f.

54. eg. A. Supp. 874ff, esp. 893. On the sanctity of heralds v. Hdt. 7.136.2, who regards it as a universal law. On heralds in general, v. Gauthier, Symbola, 1972, pp. 53-5, and 133-4, with references to Wilamowitz, and Adcock and Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, pp. 152ff. I am grateful to Mr. D. Lewis for these references.

55. I owe this suggestion to Professor Dodds. We cannot be certain of the exact differences between a κῆρυξ and a πρόξενος. Some suggest that ἄπροξενοι at A.Supp. 239 means simply 'without a κῆρυξ'. Tucker ad loc. supposes that a large group would need a κῆρυξ as a single foreigner needed a πρόξενος, but this is an unsupported hypothesis, and seems to muddle what we do know of the two categories.

56. One argument for a 'development' of character in the OC is found by Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama, p. 150f. The play 'puts on stage the mystery of his transition from human status to something greater' B. Knox, The Heroic Temper, p. 148. Compare

I. Linforth, Religion and Drama in the OC, pp. 75ff., with Knox's note 11 (op. cit. p. 193-4).

57. Jebb here compares S. Phil. 220

τίνες ποτ' ἐς γῆν τήνδε κατέσχετ'...
ποίας πάτρας ἂν ἢ γενοὺς ὑμᾶς ποτε
τύχοιμ' ἂν εἰπών;

cf. also E.Hel. 86, ἀτὰρ πῖς εἶ; πόθεν; πίν' ἐξαυδᾶν δὲ γῆς; Hom. Od. 1.170 πῖς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ τοκῆες; The first lines of the Odyssey give the audience the hero's main identifying characteristics, of action and feeling.

58. For answers in terms of φύσις to the question τίς εἰμί v. Plotinus' distinction, below section (vii), of the historical and the 'noetic' self.

59. Odysseus emphasizes what he has suffered: v. above section pp. 208-9.

60. To answer the question 'Who are you?'by asking the rhetorical question 'What do I suffer?' suggests the method of identifying individuals by their emotions, v. below pp. 229ff.

61. Phil. 55f.: Gedike conjectured δόλοισιν for λόγοισιν here to avoid the repetition λόγοισιν .... λέγων : a repetition Jebb found emphatic, 'with words, I repeat, by speaking'. λόγοισιν reminds the listener of Odysseus' traditional

rhetorical powers, and also of the masking quality words have in a rhetorical tradition.

62. Though there is a sense in which he is asked to disguise his moral self too, since he is being asked to act against his previous moral code.

63. Cf. Dover, GPM p. 235 on the implications of the occasional need to import the words 'reputation for ... ' when translating a Greek noun.

64. For the request for pity constituting a practical call for help v. Dover, GPM p. 196. Philoctetes asks for pity and is anxious for an answer from Neoptolemus: οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς οὔτ' ἐμὲ / ὑμῶν ἁμαρτεῖν τοῦτο γ' οὐθ' ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ, Phil. 230-1.

65. 'Among other things': for I am in full agreement with Easterling, art. cit. p. 15, when she criticizes Dawe's implication that 'dramatic considerations' are the only determining factor in the composition of a tragedy.

66. S. Phil. 1013f. For the soul that hides in the secret places of the body v. also above, Ch. 1, section (i).

67. For the lies of Odysseus' grandfather v. eg. Plat. Rep. 334 B. For the tradition of Odysseus' lies v. Stanford, The Ulysses Theme,

p. 16ff. Cf. ὁ πάνθ' ὁρῶν , S.Aj. 379. Odysseus is in a different way as dangerous to the Phaeacins in the Odyssey as he is to Neoptolemus: though the poet of the Odyssey does not represent him as concealing his dangerous power from the Phaecians.

68. Dover GPM p. 272. Cf. also S.Aj. 379, A.Supp. 412, and Philo Ind. Vol. II p. 78, τὸν ἀεὶ βλέποντα καὶ ἐν μυχοῖς τῆς διανοίας .

69. Pl.Rep. 695 b.

70. For Cleon's use of gnomai in his argument in the Mytilene debate, an argument which the writer clearly disapproves, v. e.g. Thuc. 3.39.3, 3.40.3, 3.40.6.

71. 'We take to the theatre with us the ethical principles ... which we hold in the rest of our lives. We can hardly leave them at home', Vickers, op. cit. p. 57. Cf. below 124n for the ancient association of drama with the perception of universals. (For the passage from Euripides' Electra, v. above p. 192).

72. v. also Hypereides fr. 229 (198)
χαρακτὴρ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου τῆς διανοίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
Leo, Plaut. Forsch.[2] p. 114f, collects other examples from outside tragedy; v. also Barrett ad Hipp. 925, and above, n. 21.

73. Athenaeus, 694 d-e. Cf. Plato's picture of Thoughts inscribed on

the mental organ, and the topos of the δεδορκὼς φρεσίν, Ch. 1, section (i).

74. HF 655f.

75. op. cit. p. 195f. For the Sophoclean statements of the limitations of methods of knowing another person, v. above pp. 220-223.

76. For gods in human disguise, and the possibility one might meet them, v. eg. Od. 7. 198-200, and for the myth of Philemon and Baucis v. Ovid Met. 8. 618f: Ovid's most probable sources being 'Micander, Callimaclius and the 'Odyssey' on the one hand, and a local Phrygian legend on the other' (A. Hollis Met. 8 ed., pp. 110-111). For the story of Odysseus' return and his disguise described without the divine assistance of the original narrative, v. Od. 24. 157f. where the shade of Amphimedon describes recent events at Ithaca to the shade of Agamemnon.

77. A. Solzenitsyn, A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Penguin, p. 23 et al.

78. On sympathy v. Vickers, op. cit. pp. 52ff. There is, presumably, some probably unquantifiable relation between the degree to which sympathy is witheld by other characters on stage and the degree of sympathetic identification the audience feels for the character from whom it is witheld. The audience is invited to sympathize

more fully by contrast: cf. scenes where the audience is given fuller knowledge than other characters , of the hero's predicament or intentions.

79. This phrase seems to have originated with B. Snell, Discovery of the Mind, trans. Rosenmeyer, Blackwells 1953, Ch. 5, esp. pp. 44-5. But v. also his remarks on the tendency to universalize that underlies the appeal to both myths and gnomai in narrative and rhetoric, (cf. below p. 239) K.J. Dover, in 'The Poetry of Achilochus', Entretiens Fondation Harat, X: Archiloque, (Geneva 1964) pp. 183-212, has challenged Snell's assumption: stating that the 'individualism' of lyric poets is neither autobiographical nor new; and B. Vickers, op. cit. p. 102, has pointed out other weaknesses in Snell's theory.

80. V. Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors, Cornell 1974, p. 114, and v. also H. Stuart Hughes, op. cit., pp. 3-32.

81. p. 190f; cf. Ch. 3, pp. 104-125, Ch. 2, pp. 62-72, 87-95.

81A. Cf. Lloyd-Jones, L'Antiquité Classique 23 (1964) p. 372-3 on the dangers in applying metaphors of vegetable growth to the development of an art-form. The sociologist R.A. Nisbet (in Social Change and History OUP 1969, passim) has studied the history of this metaphor's application to history, and the influence it has had on ways of looking at social change. (v. in particular 211-223 on the persistence of metaphor, 251 ff,

the abuses of metaphor, and 267ff, on the irrelevance of metaphor).

82. D. R. Stuart, Epochs in Greek and Roman Biography, p. 127.

83. v. eg. Bolton op. cit. pp. 102, 107, and Snell, op. cit. Ch. 3 passim.

84. Cf. above, 23n.

85. J.J. Pollitt, Art and Experience in Classical Greece, CUP 1972, pp. 18 et seq., with illustrations.

86. Dover, GPM pp. 167, 289, 170, and 176 respectively. For the thought that all human situations are analogous, ibid. p. 272; and for the common acceptance that the future for all men is unpredictable, ibid. p. 269.

87. Hesiod's picture of the different races, all but one called by the names of different metals, Erg. 108f., as if they were composed physically of different material, carries various implications of belief. Presocratic ideas of the same materials which composed the universe and man alike, and hippocratic doctrine of the affinities between elements inside man and the same elements outside in the world (v. Ch. 3, (vi) passim) are in line with it, for instance. One should remember that Greek philosophy contributed to the development of alchemy (v. A.J. Hopkins, Alchemy, Child of

Rise of alchemy in the Greek world to the Roman period

Greek Philosophy, 1934, Ch. 1, and H.H. Dubs, 'The origins of alchemy', Ambix 1961, p. 23. L. Thorndike, however, A History of Magic, London 1923, vol. i. p. 193f, dates the Division of types of human being by division of the elements to which they are affiliated is an important aspect of later alchemical theory.

88. Since the nineteenth century we seem to have believed that human beings are infinitely various. Various areas of psychology and psychiatry of course employ some kinds of typology of characters, based on typology of diseases, but most flexible practitioners only recognize such distinctions as a metaphorical frame of classification for their own practical convenience.

89. Dover GPM pp. 175, 138, 143, 269, et al. for the sommon susceptibility to unexpected suffering. On 'not being alone' in suffering v. ibid. p. 269.

90. Dover GPM p. 153.

91. John Jones op. cit. p. 275ff.

92. v. above Ch. 1, pp. 2-7. Ch. 4, pp 155-173, and cf. the mechanism of projection, Ch. 3, pp. 130-139.

93. On the fundamental rules in Greek thought of argument from abalogy v. Lloyd, Polarity, pp. 172-209. The awareness of analogy in human situations is the basis of sympathy and understanding, Dover GPM p. 272.

94. A distinction preserved in the theatre, especially in the choral dances, v. L.B. Lawler, Dance in the Ancient Greek Theatre, pp. 26-38.

95. Snell makes it begin with lyric poetry, op. cit. p. 43ff, v. Dover's attack, art. cit., above n. 79.

96. For the meanings of φίλος in Homer v. Bolton op. cit. Ch. 1, passim. For more recent explorations of the boundaries or territories which define the self v. eg. E. Goffman, Relations in Public, Ch. 2, pp. 28ff.

97. Bolton op. cit. Introduction. Cf. Ella Sharpe, op. cit. p. 156f. 'Self-experience is intimately connected to the body-image', M. Khan, The Privacy of the Self', Hogarth, 1974, p. 297. Cf. below, 106n.

98. Snell, op. cit., p. 7f.

99. Dover, GPM p. 151 n5.

100. Consistency of behaviour or personality was admired, but inconsistency understood, Dover, GPM p. 217f: a habit of mind made possible by the acceptance of divine intervention, it offends the assumption made by 'personality theorists' of our own culture that 'behaviour which manifests personality must at all times be

consistent: eg. Peek and Whitlow, Approaches to Personality Theory, Methuen 1975, p. 11. v. below, n.133.

101. Cf. above Ch. 2, Part A passim.

102. v. above section (i) p. 4 and n.12, section (vi).

103. Snell op. cit. p 1ff.

104. John Berger, Ways of Seeing, Penguin, 1972, p. 9.

105. On some intriguing implications of the Gorgoneion, v. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Barnes, N.Y. 1966, pp. 555 and 347-8; cf. H. Barnes, The Meddling Gods, Nebrasks Press 1974, p. 21f. In that the mirror is 'other-revealing' it is useful, protective, informative: cf. above 16n., below 106n.

106. Ov. Met. 3.417f. In that the mirror is self-revealing, it can be, in Greek and later thought, destructive. Aristotle (de Insomniis 2.4. 459b 26) sees mirrors as potentialy harmful; Proclus (In Remp. 1. 290 Kr.) treats them as one basis for sympathetic magic, (... not necessarily ... sympathetic in a beneficial sense): the image in a mirror, like a shadow, keeps a συμπαθεία with its original body. Narcissus' fate has parallels in Greek myth. Eutelidas perished that way, Plu. Q. Conv. v. 7.4 (cf. Delatte, op. cit. p. 151) putting the evil eye on himself: αὐτὸν βασκαίνειν ἰδών ... δινηέντι ποταμῷ. Compare the destructive element in the mirror of Dionysus (below

110n.) Like all things which are a vessel for the demonic world, the mirror and its power is feared more than trusted. G. Lienhardt tells me that the first glance in a 'mercury-backed' mirror, for one whose culture does not know them, produces severe shock. The quality of the image is so much sharper, than in metal or water, that previous illusions of beauty are shattered. Perhaps it is beneficial to a culture to preserve its members' attractive body-images using only polished metal and random water (cf. above, 97n). Further on mirror- and water-magic v: Delatte op. cit. p 5ff; 10-132, Roheim, Spiegelzauber (Internationale Psychoanalytizche Bibliotek 6, Leipzig 1919) and references they quote. ἐνοπτρίζεσθαι in Byzantine Greek - 'to look on as in a mirror' - is used of the vision of a holy (or medicine) man , v. Delatte p. 9.

107. M. Khan, op. cit. p. 294.

108. Louis Lavalle, The Dilemma of Narcissus, trans. W.T. Gairdner, Allen and Unwin, 1975, p. 176.

109. M. Khan, op. cit. p. 293; Peek and Whitlaw, op. cit. p. 10f.

110. Nonn. vi. 173. Cf. Rohde, op. cit. Ch. 10, n.29, and Delatte, op. cit. p. 153f. Plotinus refers ambiguously to the mirror of Dionysus, 4.13.12: ἀνθρώπων δὲ ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα αὐτῶν ἰδοῦσαι οἷον Διονύσου ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐκεῖ ἐγένοντο ἄνωθεν ὁρμηθεῖσαι - in a passage where he discusses those 'souls that are drawn to the earth' by contemplation of their own images. His comparison to Dionysus' mirror would seem to contravene

other neoplatonist interpretations of this mirror, v. Delatte op. cit. p. 153, which make the toy an other-revealing medium of cosmic vision.

111. Alcimedon has cast onto the limbs of his rivals a hateful and secret return, Pi. O.8.67f: ἐν τέτρασιν παίδων ἀπέδειξε καπὸ γυίοις νόστον ἔχθιστον .. καὶ ἐπίκευθον οἶμον.

Compare the beneficial eye-contact of hospitality, p. 195 above.

112. Dover GPM p. 235f. on the importance of being seen to be virtuous: cf. A.Sept. 592, οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, referred to by Plato, Rep. 362 A for the antithesis of seeming and being: an antithesis which would not be so important if conventional behaviour had not often equated the two.

113. eg. S. Freud, Standard Ed. vol. xiv p. 88; also J.H. Padel in his review of D. Entralgo, The Therapy of the Word, Int. J. Of Psychoanalysis, 1971, p. 363, who suggested to me the association here to Aristotle. v. also E. Erikson, Childhood and Society, N.Y. 1963, passim, on role diffusion and identity; and C. Rycroft, Dictionary s.v. 'Ego development'. For the identification with the group in the Greek mourning ritual v. above, Ch. 4, section iv.

114. On Aristotle's pity and fear v. Else, Aristotle's Poetics pp. 225ff, 371ff, 410ff; W. Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy, p. 43f.

115. M. Khan, op. cit. Preface.

116. Cf. Lloyd, Polarity p. 232ff.

117. v. M. Khan op. cit. p. 294 on the individual's use of 'symbolic forms' to build up a system of thinking about his self. On the place of universals in thinking about the self, v. eg. C.D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature, Kegan Paul 1937, p. 607ff, on the different types of theory about the relation between the mind and the universe.

118. ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν , D-K 101; cf. D-K 116. So Kirk and Raven interpret: but cf. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of Self, pp. 12-19 who follows Diog. Laert. 9.5 in referring fr. 101 only to Heracleitus' 'independence of thought'. This does not mean, of course, that the theme is not as old as Heracleitus, only that Heracleitus may not have known it.

119. Xen. Mem. iv. ii. 24-8. Cf. Dover, GPM p. 269.

120. This is not established theory, but is convincingly argued by O'Daly, op. cit. pp. 13ff.

121. Plotinus, eg. vi. 4. 141ff; cf. O'Daly, op. cit. introduction passim and Ch. 1, esp. p. 14. For Plato's distinction v. Phaedo

115 c-d. Dodds, Sources de Plotine, Entr. Fond. Hardt. 1957, p. 18f suggested that Plotinus first distinguished 'between the concepts of the soul and the ego'.

122. C. Rycroft, Dictionary, s.v.v. 'Self', 'Ego'.

123. The name of an individual man is the title of many Platonic dialogues. Careful, involved physical description of this individual is often an important part of the scene-setting for the dialogue: he is the visual focus for the ideas that follow.

124. Cf. J.L. Styan, Drama, Stage and Audience, CUP 1975 p. 5, and for the phrase, 'mirror of the stage' v. ibid p. 69. The distinction between universal and particular is traditionally associated with theories of drama in ethical thought. Plato, interestingly, identified the love of drama with the love of the particular, calling spectators φιλοθεάμονες - not those who love θεωρία - who love surfaces: they love καλὰς φωνὰς καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα (whereas the φιλοσόφος loves the καλόν or κάλλος itself, Rep. 476 b). φιλοθεάμονες are dreamers who take particulars to be καλά, but do not think of τὸ κάλλος itself (Rep. 476 c-d). Aristotle associates the universal-particular distinction with character and naming in drama. Poetry (Poet. 1451 b) is μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει. Poetry is for this reason φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον than history. He then explains his use of general and particular: Ἔστιν δὲ καθόλου μέν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν

ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷς στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιβερεύη (For names, of course, indicate 'types'). Comedians construct plots from probable events and put down any names. But ~~in~~ tragedy uses real names: αἴτιον δ' ὅτι, πιθανὸν ἐστι τὸ δυνατόν· τὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γενόμενα οὔπω πιστεύομεν εἶναι δυνατά, τὰ δὲ γενόμενα φανερὸν ὅτι δυνατά, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ μὴν ἀδύνατα. Both character and the universal in the particular are concerned with the 'probabilities' the poet presents.

125. The important action around which the play is built is usually performed off-stage; the burial of Polynices; the fall of the Persian army; the rending of Pentheus. The drama itself explores motives for it, and associations and reactions to it.

126. Dover, GPM pp. 150-156.

127. v. n.23 above.

128. Cf. above, Ch. 1, section (iv) i and j.

129. For the Greek love of perceiving universals within a particular action v. Dover GPM 268.

130. John Jones, op. cit. p. 192f for the 'impression of chaos'.

131. John Jones, op. cit. p. 196.

132. The shade of Achilles, for instance, Od. xi. 488f gives a beautifully constructed and balanced rhetorical speech on the subject of an impossible alternative, on ὡς wish to be alive.

133. On the double exploration, once in lyrics, once in iambics, of the same action in tragedy v. eg. Alcestis' double death, Alc. 268f, πλησίον Ἄιδας , and 280f, her long passage of sober rhetorical advice to Admetus. She does not die until 391.

134. The lament ἄνδαυτος ἄφιλος ἀνυμέναιος , Ant. 876, is answered by ironic reference to the 'bride of death' topos, 890, ὦ τύμβος ὦ νυμφεῖον . Cf. the exploiting of these themes in the IA passim, esp. 1398-1400, and cf. J-P Guépin, The Tragic Paradox, p. 137f. Cf T. von Wilamowitz, Die Dramatische Technik des Sophokles, 1917, passim; Lloyd-Jones, CQ 22 (1972) p. 216f.

135. Dover, GPM p. 218-20.

136. On the 'disunity of the personality' in Greek thought v. above p. 234 and 99n.

Notes to Conclusion

1. W.B. Yeats, The Letters of W.B. Yeats, ed. Allen Wade, London, 1954, p. 406 (June 28th, 1903).

2. Henry James, 'The question of our speech', cit. I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, as preface to Lecture Six.

3. A. Pol. iii. 1281 b 7. Cf. ibid. 1286 a 30 (with no specific reference to poetry): διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἷς σοφισοῦν.

4. Protected: Ch. 1. pp. 2-3. Dangerous: Ch. 5. p. 223.

5. Cf. Ch. 3, with 129n, and Hp. de sterilibus mulieribus, 8. 408 (Littré), Arist. de generatione anim. 747a.

6. Il. 5. 488, etc. cf. above, p. 328, 198n.

7. Ch. 3 passim, especially section (vii).

8. Since it is the source of tension in tragedy, it is arguable that tragedy exaggerates and therefore distorts its significance in real life. But the fact that tragedy does exploit it suggests it was present, to some degree, in the contemporary imagination: that it was there to be exploited. Comedy does not often mention the divine side of explanation: but cf. Merkelbach ZPE 1967 (p. 161) for the fragment of Ar. Heroes. The heroes claim to be the source of human discomforts.

9. e.g., the mirror, Ch. 5, 16n; song, ch. 2 77n, 80n; animal powers, Ch. 2, pp. 72ff.

10. Ant. 332.

11. Compare the mediating principle in Lévi-Strauss' system of explaining myths, described e.g. by Kirk, Myth, pp. 42ff; cf. above, Ch. 2, pp. 74ff.

12. Ch. 2, pp. 88f, 98f; Ch. 5, 29m. Cf. Lloyd-Jones, Females of the Species, Introduction. Plato portrays the weakminded man, 'weak in his best part', Rep. 590c4, as the man who cannot rule the beasts within him.

13. Ch. 2, Part A, section (v), (vi).

14. Ch. 3, sections (iv), (v).

15. e.g. Ch. 2, Part A, section (ii).

16. Ch. 4, section (iii), pp. 159ff.

17. Ch. 3, 134n., Ch. 4, 10n.

18. Ch. 1, pp. 52ff, ch. 3, 134n.

19. v. p. 251 above.

20. Ch. 4, section (iv), introduction.

21. v. e.g. N. Richardson, ed., The Homeric Hymn to Demeter, pp. 12ff.

22. Cf. below, 53n.

23. Ch. 4, pp. 149f, Ch. 5, pp. 200f.

24. For identification and its implications v. Ch. 5, pp. 236f. For argument by analogy v. above, . , pp. xv, 261 (28n.).

25. For the tendency to universalize, v. Ch. 5, pp. 237f.

26. Ch. 5, p. 239.

27. v. F.D. Harvey, 'Literacy in the Athenian Democracy', REG 79 (1966), pp. 585f.

28. Isobel Henderson, Oxford History of Music, vol. i, pp. 390-394.

29. ibid., p. 336.

30. ibid., p. 339.

31. Ch. 5, p. 239 with n. 134.

32. They were often one and the same. v. Henderson, art. cit., pp. 339, 383-4, 390-1, 394-6. On the ways that rhythm can show differences of character v. Werner Aulich, Untersuchungen uber das charakterologische Rhythmusproblem, 1932, and C. Sachs, Rhythm and Tempo, 1953, p. 16. There were different harmoniai: the schoolboy learnt which one to choose for the appropriate occasion, and how to tune his lyre to each. v. D.B. Monro, The Modes of Ancient Greek Music, 1894, p. 13. Cf. Ar. Thesm. 159f.

33. On the dances of tragedy v. H. Kitto, 'The dance in Greek tragedy', JHS 75 (1956), 36ff, and L.B. Lawler, Dance of the Ancient Greek Theatre. 'The father of the dramatist was the dancer', E.G. Craig, On the Art of the Theatre, 1911, p. 140

34. For the significance of the dance of worship v. e.g. OT 696, τί δεῖ με χορεύειν ; Cf. Ar. Ran. 1419: Aeschylus returns to Athens to help the city, ἵν' ἡ πόλις σωθεῖσα τοὺς χοροὺς ἄγῃ.

35. Cf. Il. 18, 590f. Ἐν δὲ χορὸν ποίκιλλε περικλυτὸς ἀμφιγυήεις,
τῷ ἴκελον οἷόν ποτ' ἐνὶ κνωσῷ εὐρείῃ
Δαίδαλος ἡδμήσεν καλλιπλοκάμῳ Ἀριάδνῃ.
The relief referred to presumably depicted a dance in honour of Ariadne, v. Paus. 9. 40. 3.

36. Henderson, art. cit., p. 378.

37. F.D. Harvey, art. cit. p. 629f.

38. Henderson art. cit., p. 394: she sees the 'Frogs' as an appeal for the continued musical tradition among Athenian citizens. For the 'image of the city' v. above, Ch. 5, pp. 231 and 86n.

39. Pl. Rep. 403, etc.

40. Ch. 5. pp. 233ff.

41. Cf. the topos of the music of Hades, v. above ch. 2, pp. 69ff with notes; cf. τὸν Ἀιδαχόρον HF 1027.

42. On the movement of the soul v. Ch. 3, 90n, 142n, and pp. 12, 45, 154, 270(58n), 285(145n).

43. E.G. Craig, op. cit., p. 139.

44. Football or cricket, the nearest equivalents in our own society, are representative of sections of the society only, and do not supply many images for other spheres of life.

45. Agamemnon's speech, cit. Ch. 5, pp. 195f, refers to judging a man in war.

46. The philosophical problem of Plato's relation of the forms to the particulars requires no documentation. Aristotle's account of this relation came to be called, in medieval scholastic philosophy, 'universalia in rebus'. Cf. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1951 for the relation between Aristotle's and Plato's views.

47. Cf. OC 265ff; above Ch. 5, p. 219.

48. e.g. theories of sense-perception, Ch. 1, 9n, theories of the ingredients of the cosmos, which are also the ingredients of man's body; cf. p. 375(122n). compare the analogy between the individual and the state, Plat. Rep. 577c. For the projected nature of this relationship v. Ch. 3, section (iii), (iv).

49. Ch. 4, sections (ii), (iii).

50. On the movement of the soul, v. Ch. 3, 90n; 142n; and p. 49; Ch. 4,

16n; and Ellendt, Lexicon Sophocleum, s.v. ῥιπή : 'quod ipsum Sophocli maxime dictum de mente et animi motibus'. Thucydides implies that κίνησις is the basic source of human interest: §1.1.2 κίνησις γὰρ αὐτὴ μεγίστη δὴ τῶν Ἑλλήσιν ἐγένετο....

51. ad. Cho. 452, v. above, Ch. 1, pp. 2ff. On the pain of perception, v. Ch. 1, pp. 3ff; ch. 4, p. 174, 397 (63n), 380 (140n).

52. Ar. E.E. 1235a cit. above Ch. 4, 10n.

53. W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902, p. 50.

54. Cf. Lloyd-Jones, J2, p. 43.

55. v. Monro op. cit., p. 17, Henderson, art. cit., pp. 335ff.

56. Cf. ch. 2, pp. 73f; ch. 5, pp. 201f.

57. Ch. 2,231n. Compare the use of choral interchange in ritual, ch. 4 (iv) (b). For the image of harmonia in questions of 'mental health', v. A.J. Kenny, 'Mental Health in Plato's Republic', Dawes Hicks Lecture, 3rd Dec. 1969, Proc. Brit. Acad. 1969, pp. 229f, and especially p. 240. I am grateful to Professor D. Wiggins for this reference.

58. Ag. 177. Cf. Lloyd-Jones, JHS 76 (1956), p. 55f.

59. Ch. 3, pp. 112ff.

60. Hence the peculiar satisfaction, perhaps, in the use of the image to describe the relations of the stars: (cf. above p. 256, the lines I have omitted here from The Merchant of Venice (V. 1. 60): 'There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st/But in his motion like an angel sings'. Cf. the tremendous power in the image of the 'music of the spheres'.

61. Cf. Ch. 1, pp. 3ff.

62. Cf. G.E.R. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 226 and above, Ch. 4, 10n.

63. Cf. below, 68n, and E. Tro. 985, where Hecuba states that Aphrodite could have organized Helen's desertion while still ἥσυχος ἐν οὐρανῷ.

64. Cf. pp. 72ff, 80ff, Ch. 5, 200ff.

65. For the relation of harmonia and isonomia and the unifying power of music v. above, pp. 151, 385 (10n), p. 172, 334 (225n).

66. On eyes that show emotion v. Ch. 4, sections (ii), (iii).

67. Music, wine and love: all change one's state of consciousness, but only for a little while.

68. For the soul as a harmonia, v. Ar. de anim. n. 4407 b.27. and Ch. 4 (10n).

69. For movement in the soul v. above, 50n.

70. Cf. Ch. 1, pp. 15f, 25f.

71. Harmonia and balance are the desirable qualities for which one looks in another man when deciding to trust him, v. ch. 5, pp. 192ff.

72. The Merchant of Venice, V. 1. 55-88.

73. Henderson, art. cit., p. 338.

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I have omitted from the bibliography below all the commentaries and editions of ancient authors which I cite in the notes. In this sense my bibliography grossly misrepresents my debts: the books I have used most do not appear in it.

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