

Demosthenes and the Islands: *On Organization* 34

Demosthenes' use of examples (*paradeigmata*), both historical and non-historical, has attracted little scholarly attention in its own right.¹ This situation is changing, though,² and it is the purpose of what follows to reassess his choice of two Cycladic island peoples – the Siphnians and Cythnians – as negative *paradeigmata* for his Athenian listeners. This double example occurs in his Assembly speech *On Organization* (speech 13), generally dated to the late 350s.³ It will emerge from the reassessment that even an example upon which Demosthenes puts relatively little weight (in terms of the overall economy of the speech) could be carefully chosen and therefore intensify the ethical significance of the advice being given. I choose this example precisely because it is one that has frequently been under-interpreted. It can therefore serve to make the point that the integration of Demosthenic examples into scholarly arguments should typically involve assessing how they fit in their context: they can respond and contribute to the wider thematic texture of the speech concerned as well as bolster a particular argument within it.

On Organization 34 runs as follows:

ἐγὼ δὲ παραινέσαιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν (καί μοι μηδὲν ὀργισθῆτε) ἔλαττον φρονεῖν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἀγαπᾶν πράττοντας, ἢ μείζω δύναμιν παρασκευάζεσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν Σιφνίοις ἢ Κυθνίοις ἢ τισιν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις οὔσι συνήδειν ὑμῖν, ἔλαττον φρονεῖν συνεβούλευον ἂν· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔστ' Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ τὴν δύναμιν παρασκευάσασθαι παραινῶ· αἰσχρὸν γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰσχρὸν λιπεῖν τὴν τοῦ φρονήματος τάξιν, ἣν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι παρέδωκαν.

I would advise you – and please do not get angry with me – either to lower your ambitions and be content to mind your own affairs or to organize a larger force. If I knew you to be Siphnians or Cythnians or some other such people, I would advise you to lower your ambitions. But since you are Athenians, my advice to you is to make military preparations. For it would be shameful, men of Athens, truly shameful, to abandon the resolute spirit that your ancestors handed down to you.⁴

In a sense, the reference is obvious in its purport: Athens should not be behaving like insignificant Cycladic island states, but instead be prepared to enact a forward policy consistent with its traditional prestige in Greece. But in what does that insignificance consist?

Scholars have, quite naturally, often assimilated the passage to the rhetoric of Athenian disdain for small, poor, or weak states, especially island states, which can be found as early as Solon but also appears numerous times in fourth-century texts.⁵ Fifth-century Athenian imperialism changed the discourse about insularity in such a way as to standardize a conception of Aegean islands as naturally 'subject', although it is important to note that this 'disdain *topos*' does embrace non-island states as well.⁶ While Seriphos is a frequent target,⁷

¹ An exception is Milns 1995; though Demosthenes has been among the orators examined for more synoptic purposes: e.g. Nouhaud 1982, Gotteland 2001, and Steinbock 2012.

² Uccello 2011; Hesk 2012, 219-26; Efstathiou 2013; Carey 2015.

³ On the speech, its authorship (now mainly accepted as Demosthenic, but see Sealey 1993, 235-237), and its date: Trevett 1994; 2011, 224-227; Aidonis 1995, 1-32, 71-75, 381-388; Lane Fox 1997, 191-195; MacDowell 2009, 223-229. Dating ranges from 353/2 to the early 340s; between early 352 and 350 seems likeliest.

⁴ Translations of Demosthenes' Assembly speeches are from Trevett 2011.

⁵ See e.g. Brun 1993, 165; 1998, 659; Aidonis 1995, 158; Sheedy 2006, 52; Constantakopoulou 2007, 109.

⁶ Athenian disdain for small, weak, or poor states: Sicinos, Pholegandros: Solon fr. 2 West; Belbina: Hdt. 8.125; Aegina, Megara, Oreus: D. 23.211-213; unnamed Cycladic islands: Aeschin. 2.71; small Thracian *poleis*:

its neighbours Siphnos and Cythnos appear in this constellation for the first time in *On Organization* 34; the fact that Roman-era writers include Siphnos among a number of bywords for insular weakness or poverty probably owes something to this appearance in the Demosthenic corpus.⁸ Plutarch, for example, belittles the leadership credentials of the Siphnians and Cythnians in a Persian Wars setting (*Mal.* 863e) and notes the smallness of the Cythnian contribution to the Salamis campaign (873d). It is important to keep in mind, though, that the two islands did make *some* contribution,⁹ at substantial risk given that they would have been unable to resist Persian reprisals,¹⁰ and also that both appeared (one after the other) on the Serpent Column commemorating victory in 479/8.¹¹

This juxtaposition of Siphnos and Cythnos suggests that Demosthenes has not made his choices at random, and in fact neither island qualifies easily for the ‘disdain *topos*’ anyway. Both were moderately prosperous in the fourth century,¹² had been assessed at moderate to high rates for tribute in the fifth century,¹³ and had been more prosperous earlier.¹⁴ In particular, Siphnos’ great mid-to-late sixth-century wealth, derived from its mines, had allowed it to build its ornate Treasury at Delphi, conferring on it a significance beyond its small size. Neither Siphnos nor Cythnos, however, ever seems to have used its wealth for geopolitically ambitious purposes, and by the fourth century Siphnos’ mines were failing or had failed in any case.¹⁵ But the island was still prosperous enough to maintain a competitive propertied class,¹⁶ and the epigraphic evidence testifies to continued official and unofficial intercourse between Siphnos and Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries.¹⁷

Demosthenes’ Athenian listeners would also be well aware of the wealthy Siphnians in their own midst: Callaeschrus, one of the contemporary Athenian super-rich, was a metic from Siphnos,¹⁸ and a member of a distinguished family whose Athenian connections went back at least to Polypeithes, the recipient in 422/1 of honours proposed by Alcibiades.¹⁹ The family was active in mine-leasing (the only non-Athenians in the extant lists).²⁰ That some Siphnians were connected to broader Athenian social networks is further indicated by the hiring of Isocrates to write the *Aegineticus* (for a case involving elite Siphnians, in 391 or

Aeschin. 3.82; D. 8.44 = 10.15; Abdera and Maronea: [D.] 17.23; Peparethus ([Pl.] *Alc.* 1 116d. Isocrates varies the *topos*, commenting on Megara’s relative success *despite* its lack of resources (8.117). A choice as odd as the ones currently under consideration is Olynthus (D. 23.109). On the phenomenon and how it relates to the broader historical notion of ‘island weakness’ (*faiblesse insulaire*) or ‘island poverty’: Brun 1993; Constantakopoulou 2007, esp. 80-89, 99-115, 257-260; also Brun 1996, 196-209; Pérez 2005, esp. 78-96.

⁷ Seriphos: Ar. *Ach.* 541-543; Isoc. 19.9; Pl. R. 1.329e-330a; Plu. *Them.* 18.5; not listed on the Serpent Column despite its contribution (Hdt. 8.48). See Brun 1993, 166-175; Pérez 2005, 79-86; Constantakopoulou 2007, 103-106; Rutishauser 2012, 26-27.

⁸ On these sources: Brun 2000, 234-235.

⁹ Hdt. 8.46, 48.

¹⁰ This might apply especially to the Cythnians, who had actually surrendered (Hdt. 8.46).

¹¹ Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 58 (*ML* 27, Coil 10). Their positioning is odd: cf. Paus. 5.23.2 (Siphnians possibly omitted at Olympia).

¹² Siphnos: Brun 2000, esp. 230-233; Cythnos: Brun 1998; also 1996, 130-131; Rutishauser 2012, 24. Rutishauser 2012, 115-116, 139, 189-200, 235-242 argues for moderate prosperity in the Cyclades in the fifth and fourth centuries, and increasing connection with Athens.

¹³ Reger 2004, 756, 772-773; Brun 1996, 130, 191; 1998, 661.

¹⁴ Sixth-century prosperity: Siphnos: Hdt. 3.57-58; Wagner 2000; Sheedy 2006, 47-57. Cythnos: Sheedy 2006, 34-40; and below nn. 24-25.

¹⁵ Mines failing: Brun 1996, 129; 2000, 232; Sheedy 2006, 53-54; Rutishauser 2012, 27-28.

¹⁶ Competition in *choregiai*: Isoc. 19.36. On their civil war: Rutishauser 2005.

¹⁷ For an overview: Papazarkadas 2007, 144-145.

¹⁸ D. 21.157. Davies 1971, 591; MacDowell 1990, 377.

¹⁹ For the evidence: Rutishauser 2012, 142 n.1; also Davies 1971, 590-592.

²⁰ Clark 1990, 66.

390).²¹ In this speech, tellingly, Isocrates allows his Siphnian client to voice the Athenian *topos* of disdain for Seriphians (19.9: ‘he married a woman of Seriphos, belonging to a family of greater consequence than might be expected of a native of their island’). Given that the Siphnians and Seriphians were both apparently ethnic Ionians from Athens,²² this preferential treatment may testify to a wider Athenian sense that Siphnians could be considered quasi-Athenians in a way that their ‘cousins’ the Seriphians could not.²³

Although we have less evidence for Cythnos, its Athenian connections are becoming clearer as archaeological work on its Classical *polis* reveals both the extent of the island’s Archaic and Classical prosperity²⁴ and also its Demeter sanctuary’s links with Eleusis.²⁵ Cythnos was possibly one of the allies the Athenians sought help from after Chaeronea,²⁶ and at some point soon after the mid-fourth century had the funds to embark on a major renewal of its fortification system.²⁷ In addition, both Siphnos and Cythnos lie close to major routes through the Cyclades to and from Athens,²⁸ aiding the transmission of the island stories of both states and helping to create a broad-brush Athenian mental picture of them.

All of this reduces the likelihood that Demosthenes is using these two as mere backwaters in *On Organization* 34. But if so, how is the example to be explained? We could fall back on the explanation that Demosthenes is picking two Cycladic islands at random, unaware of the implications.²⁹ The Serpent Column juxtaposition makes that less likely, though,³⁰ as does the fact that Demosthenes had so far made Athenian relations with other Greek states his area of political concentration (*On Organization* is roughly contemporary with *For the Megalopolitans* and *For the Liberty of the Rhodians*). Another possibility is that *On Organization* is a pastiche put together by a later composer; on that view, the choice here would be a further sign of gauche sub-Demosthenic compositional decision-making.³¹ But authenticity is now widely accepted.³² Instead, reading the paragraph in its speech context provides an alternative which nuances the ‘disdain *topos*’ explanation and indicates that Demosthenes is making a different point about the nature of the two islands’ insignificance.

The last third of *On Organization* addresses, in a consciously abstract and disquisitionary manner and with the support of numerous historical examples, Athens’s place in the wider world and what characteristics it should be demonstrating in order properly to sustain it. Shortly before 34, Demosthenes has made clear that the main problem is the current Athenian pursuit of civic priorities conducive to prosperity rather than to military preparedness or the sustaining of Athens’s traditional eminence – a passage he would rework (with even more obvious vitriol against those in charge of the Theoric Fund than is on show here) in 349/8 in the *Third Olynthiac* (21-32). Having noted the modest size of the personal

²¹ On Isoc. 19: Rutishauser 2005.

²² Hdt. 8.48.

²³ Possible pro-Siphnian and anti-Seriphian favouritism by Athens in the Persian Wars commemoration: Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 60.

²⁴ Mazarakis Ainian 1998; 2005.

²⁵ See e.g. Mitsopoulou 2010; also Papazarkadas 2011, 31-32.

²⁶ The Cythnian *demos* was crowned by Athens in the period c.330-c.320 (*IG II²* 549+306 = *IG II³* 485); Rutishauser 2014, 79-80. This may connect in some way with Hyperides’ lost *Cythniacus*, but see for caution Whitehead 2000, 6 n.25.

²⁷ Louyot and Mazarakis Ainian 2005, esp. 580-583 for the (rough) date; also Rutishauser 2012, 223-224.

²⁸ Samartzidou-Horkopoulou 2005, 268; Rutishauser 2012, 31-32, 212-213.

²⁹ Brun 2000, 235.

³⁰ The Siphnians seem to have been added later to Coil 10 rather than Coil 11 in order to group them with the Cythnians: Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 59. That suggests that the two islands might have been readily or regularly associable, and/or that the Serpent Column’s juxtaposition set up (or helped to set up) a habit of such association on which Demosthenes draws here.

³¹ For ‘flaws’ in *On Organization*, see Weil 1912, 435-438; Fossey 1986; Sealey 1993, 235-237.

³² See above n. 3.

dwellings of Themistocles, Cimon, and Aristides, *On Organization*'s version (30) runs as follows:

But now, men of Athens, in public our city is happy to build roads and fountains and apply whitewash and such nonsense – and I put the blame not on the proposers of this expenditure, far from it, but on you, if you think that this is good enough. But in private some of those who hold positions of public responsibility have made their houses not only more extravagant than most others but also grander than public buildings...

Demosthenes, then, is interested in the question of civic priorities, but also in the question of civic pride or spirit; earlier in the speech, this is filtered through an attack on what he regards as Athens's recent prodigality with its awards of citizenship. His closing comment is (25):

You do these things not because you are naturally inferior to your ancestors but because they happened to have a high opinion (μέγα φρονεῖν) of themselves, whereas you, men of Athens, have been stripped of this quality. In my view, it is never possible for those whose actions are small and trivial to have a great and vigorous spirit (μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα), just as those whose actions are glorious and fine cannot have petty or humble thoughts. For men's spirits (τὸ φρόνημα) must conform to their habitual behaviour.³³

Later, in 34, as we saw above, he refers to this civic pride as τὴν τοῦ φρονήματος τάξιν, ἣν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι παρέδωκαν ('the resolute spirit that your ancestors handed down to you').³⁴ Talking in terms of φρόνημα allows him to avoid the negative (and depressing) insinuation that the essential character of the Athenians has changed for the worse over time;³⁵ instead, he intimates that all will be well if they rediscover their previous self-esteem (μέγα φρονεῖν in 25, cf. ἔλαττον φρονεῖν in 34). Meanwhile, the figurative notion of a φρονήματος τάξις recasts a dead metaphor (of a physical position in the battle-line) in a characteristically Demosthenic way to evoke past Athenian martial – and broader – prowess.³⁶

I suggest, then, that the example of the Siphnians and Cythnians picks up on those islands' past wealth (especially that of the Siphnians) and points to their contemporary middling prosperity, intimating that they never had any outward-looking φρόνημα and so have remained tied to the vicissitudes affecting any state's national prosperity. They are therefore not so much 'weak' states as comfortably-off states which once had the potential for dynamic and outward-looking use of their resources but did not activate it and (so) no longer have it: they can therefore function as apotropaic models for Demosthenes' Athenians, who are currently in danger from their self-indulgent priorities and from the self-interest and parochial thinking of their leading politicians.³⁷

More speculatively, the example may also recall the part played by the Siphnians and Cythnians in the Persian Wars. Presumably, few of Demosthenes' audience would know

³³ The final sentence recurs at D. 3.32.

³⁴ This is closely imitated at D. 3.36; see also 15.32-33.

³⁵ As hazarded at Aeschin. 3.178.

³⁶ See Yunis 2001, 145 for seven examples of figurative uses of τάξις from *On the Crown* alone; cf. also 10.47, 14.35, *Ep.* 3.15.

³⁷ Herodotus may be plotting a similar pattern with two episodes involving distribution of surplus civic income: the Siphnian case (3.57) mirrors the later Athenian one (7.144): van Wees 2013, 103. Book 7's Athenians have Themistocles to intervene and put them on the course that will lead to military preparedness and power. They are therefore saved from becoming Book 3's Siphnians, who do not use their resources in a geopolitically astute way, and suffer what feels (at least symbolically) like a major setback: Sheedy 2006, 53.

much about this beyond (possibly) the fact that both did contribute; but from 20 onwards Demosthenes has been inviting audience members to immerse themselves temporarily in the world of the Greek defeat of Persia and Athens's subsequent hegemony, via numerous previous examples taken from the 490-430s period;³⁸ moreover, the πρόγονοι referred to at 34 must embrace the Athenians who helped defeat Persia. Considering 34 amid this 'Persian Wars atmosphere' can therefore still help interpret Demosthenes' compositional decision. From that point of view, the inalienable *smallness* of these islands' plucky contribution to the Salamis campaign, if Demosthenes knew about this or (perhaps more likely) could assume it, may be of thematic relevance: unlike the Athenians of 480, who were fuelled by their φρόνημα, Siphnos' and Cythnos' time for realizing their potential had already passed.

The 'some other such people' of 34 (τισιν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις), therefore, allows tacit reference to other states who have neglected their potential for international enterprise. This is what Athens must avoid, and where the real insignificance of the Siphnians and Cythnians lies. Worth final comment is the next paragraph, which runs as follows (35):

Moreover, it is not possible for you, even if you wish to, to withdraw from the affairs of Greece (οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ὑμῖν, οὐδ' ἂν ἀποστῆναι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν βούλησθε). You have achieved many things throughout your history, and it is shameful to sacrifice your existing friends, and impossible to trust your existing enemies and allow them to become great. In short, you are faced with the same fate as your political leaders, who cannot stop whenever they want. For you are the political leaders of Greece (πεπολίτευσθε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν).³⁹

This passage alludes to Thucydides' Pericles' famous admonition to the Athenians that they cannot simply evade their imperial responsibilities;⁴⁰ they are 'in too deep' for that (2.63.2):

ἤς (i.e. ἀρχῆς) οὐδ' ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τότε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιῶς ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται· ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον.

You no longer have the option to abdicate from your empire, should anyone out of present fear affect this idea as a noble-sounding means of disengagement. The empire you possess is by now like a tyranny – perhaps wrong to acquire it, but certainly dangerous to let it go.⁴¹

Few audience members would catch the allusion (though subsequent readers might); it is presumably there because Demosthenes found it a compelling way of summing up this particular nexus of ideas about personal and international obligation.⁴² As such, it is valuable – it corroborates the impression that in this part of the speech he is especially interested in the active, critical, and historically-aware mediation of suitable models.

On Organization 34, then, sees Demosthenes give a meaningful slant to a familiar *topos*. Athens is best contrasted not with small, poor, or weak states as such, but specifically

³⁸ Themistocles and Miltiades, Marathon and Salamis: 21-22; Menon's support for Athens's Eion campaign and Perdiccas' (i.e. Alexander's) harrying of the Persians: 23; Athenian hegemony and the Periclean building programme: 26, 28; Themistocles, Cimon, Aristides: 29.

³⁹ The passage picks up on 13.7-8 and is echoed at 15.28.

⁴⁰ Noted by Weil 1912, 457.

⁴¹ Translation: Hammond 2009.

⁴² On Demosthenes' use of Thucydides: Hernández Muñoz 1994, 139-154; Yunis 1996, 240-241, 256-257, 268-277; Gotteland 2010.

with ones which have not had the drive to make enterprising use of their opportunities. In contrasting the Athenians with the Siphnians and Cythnians, Demosthenes alerts his audience to what is ultimately an optimistic core message (as we saw at *On Organization* 25): that Athens's *potential* for greatness is undiminished. It can avoid sliding into mediocrity if it will reorientate its priorities away from inward-looking material satisfaction and towards the forward, outward-looking hegemonic role which its glorious past makes its only compelling option for the future. Instead of a traditional sneer at, say, Seriphos, Demosthenes harnesses Siphnos' and Cythnos' historical profile to offer listeners an example of his thoughtful engagement – which emerges repeatedly in the public part of his corpus – with the question of Athens's place in the world and the values that are required to maintain that. In turn, the *paradeigma* emerges as tied closely not only to demonstrating a particular point but to advancing the thematic interests of the speech as a whole.⁴³

Guy Westwood
 Merton College, University of Oxford, UK
 guy.westwood@classics.ox.ac.uk

Bibliography

- Aidonis, A.A. 1995. *Demosthenes: Orations XIII and XIV (On the Syntaxis, On the Symmories): Introduction and Commentary* (Diss. Glasgow)
- Brun, P. 1993. *La faiblesse insulaire: histoire d'un topos*, ZPE 99, 165-183
- 1996. *Les archipels égéens dans l'antiquité grecque (V^e-II^e siècles av. notre ère)* (Paris)
- 1998. *Pauvreté et impuissance de Kythnos: essai pour un jugement équilibré*, in: Mendoni, L.G., Mazarakis Ainian, A. (eds.) *Kea-Kythnos: History and Archaeology* (Athens), 657-667
- 2000. *La prospérité après la richesse: Siphnos classique et hellénistique (V^e-II^e siècles av. J.C)*, in: (no eds.) *Proceedings of the 1st International Sifnean Symposium: Sifnos 25-28 June 1998; Vol. I: Antiquity* (Athens), 227-238
- Carey, C. 2015. *Solon in the Orators*, Trends in Classics 7, 110-128
- Clark, M. 1990. *The Date of IG IP² 1604*, ABSA 85: 47-67
- Constantakopoulou, C. 2007. *The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire, and the Aegean World* (Oxford)
- Davies, J.K. 1971. *Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C.* (Oxford)
- Efstathiou, A.A. 2013. *The Historical Example of Marathon as used in the Speeches On the False Embassy, On the Crown, and Against Ctesiphon by Demosthenes and Aeschines*, in: Carey, C., Edwards, M.J. (eds.), *Marathon – 2,500 Years* (London), 181-198
- Fossey, J.M. 1986. *A Demosthenic doublet (xiii, 22-24, & xxiii, 198-200)*, LCM 11: 77-78
- Gotteland, S. 2001. *Mythe et rhétorique: les exemples mythiques dans le discours politique de l'Athènes classique* (Paris)
- 2010. *Conseiller et persuader: quelques échos thucydidiens dans les Harangues de Démosthène*, in: Fromentin, V., Gotteland, S., Payen, P. (eds.) *Ombres de Thucydide* (Paris), 35-50
- Hammond, M., in: Hammond, M. and Rhodes, P.J. 2009. *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War* (Oxford).
- Hernández Muñoz, F.-G. 1994. *Tucídides y Platón en Demóstenes*, CFC(G) 4, 139-160
- Hesk, J.P. 2012. *Common Knowledge and the Contestation of History in some Fourth-Century Athenian Trials*, in: Marincola, J.M., Llewellyn-Jones, L.J., Maciver, C.A. (eds.) *Greek Notions of the Past in the Archaic and Classical Eras* (Edinburgh), 207-226
- Lane Fox, R. 1997. *Demosthenes, Dionysius and the Dating of Six Early Speeches*, C&M 48, 167-203
- Louyot, D., Mazarakis Ainian, A. 2005. *Les structures défensives antiques dans les Cyclades: l'exemple de Kythnos*, REA 107, 559-583
- MacDowell, D.M. 1990. *Demosthenes: Against Meidias* (Oxford)
- 2009. *Demosthenes the Orator* (Oxford)

⁴³ My thanks go to Chris Pelling and to *Mnemosyne*'s anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments and suggestions.

- Mazarakis Ainian, A. 1998. *The Kythnos Survey Project: A Preliminary Report*, in: Mendoni, L.G., Mazarakis Ainian, A. (eds.) *Kea-Kythnos: History and Archaeology* (Athens), 363-379
- 2005. *Inside the adyton of a Greek temple: Excavations on Kythnos (Cyclades)*, in: Yeroulanou, M., Stamatopoulou, M. (eds.) *Architecture and Archaeology in the Cyclades* (Oxford), 87-103
- Meiggs, R., Lewis, D.M. 1988. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the fifth century B.C.: rev. ed.* (Oxford)
- Milns, R.D. 1995. *Historical Paradigms in Demosthenes' Public Speeches*, *Electronic Antiquity* 2.5, no pp.
- Mitsopoulou, C. 2010. *Το ιερό της Δήμητρας στην Κύθνο και η μίσθωση του ελευσινιακού τεμένους*, in: Leventi, I., Mitsopoulou, C. (eds.) *Sanctuaries and Cults of Demeter in the Ancient Greek World* (Volos), 44-90
- Nouhaud, M. 1982. *L'utilisation de l'histoire par les orateurs attiques* (Paris)
- Papazarkadas, N. 2007. *An Honorific Decree from Classical Siphnos*, *REA* 109, 137-146
- 2011. *Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens* (Oxford)
- Pérez, C. 2005. *La perception de l'insularité dans les mondes méditerranéens ancien et archipélagique polynésien d'avant la découverte missionnaire* (Paris)
- Reger, G. 2004. *The Aegean Islands*, in: Hansen, M.H., Nielsen, T.H. (eds.) *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* (Oxford), 732-793
- Rutishauser, B. 2005. *A case of Siphnian stasis: The Aiginiticos of Isocrates*, in: (no eds.) *Proceedings of the IInd International Sifnean Symposium: Sifnos 27-30 June 2002; Vol. I: Antiquity* (Athens), 297-304
- 2012. *Athens and the Cyclades: Economic Strategies 540-314 BC* (Oxford)
- 2014. *Crowning the Polis: Island Gifts and Aegean Politics*, in: Bonnín, G., Le Quéré, E. (eds.) *Pouvoirs, îles et mer: Formes et modalités de l'hégémonie dans les Cyclades antiques (VII^e s. a.C.-III^e s. p.C.)* (Bordeaux), 69-80
- Samartzidou-Horkopoulou, S. 2005. *Ἐρευνώντας τις λαϊκὲς λατρεῖες καὶ τὰ σπήλαια τῆς Σίφνου*, in: (no eds.) *Proceedings of the IInd International Sifnean Symposium: Sifnos 27-30 June 2002; Vol. I: Antiquity* (Athens), 251-270
- Sealey, R. 1993. *Demosthenes and his Time: A Study in Defeat* (New York/Oxford)
- Sheedy, K.A. 2006. *The Archaic and Early Classical Coinages of the Cyclades* (London)
- Steinbock, B.K. 2012. *Social Memory in Athenian Public Discourse* (Ann Arbor)
- Trevett, J.C. 1994. *Demosthenes' Speech On Organization (Dem. 13)*, *GRBS* 35, 179-193
- 2011. *Demosthenes, Speeches 1-17* (Austin)
- Uccello, C. 2011. *Il παράδειγμα in Eschine e Demostene*, *Vichiana* 4a ser. 13.1, 3-11
- Van Wees, H. 2013. *Ships and Silver, Taxes and Tribute: A Fiscal History of Archaic Athens* (London/New York)
- Wagner, G.A. 2000. *Ancient Gold and Silver Mines of Sifnos*, in: (no eds.) *Proceedings of the Ist International Sifnean Symposium: Sifnos 25-28 June 1998; Vol. I: Antiquity* (Athens), 147-164
- Weil, H. 1912. *Les Harangues de Démosthène (3rd ed., rev.)* (Paris)
- Whitehead, D. 2000. *Hypereides: the Forensic Speeches* (Oxford)
- Yunis, H. 1996. *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (New York)
- 2001. *Demosthenes: On the Crown* (Cambridge)