Journal article icon

Journal article

Epistemic decision theory

Abstract:

I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent's choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads to a proliferation of puzzle cases and theories to deal with them, including epistemic analogu...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1093/mind/fzt090

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
Somerville College
Department:
Faculty of Philosophy
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Oxford University Press Publisher's website
Journal:
Mind Journal website
Volume:
122
Issue:
488
Pages:
915-952
Publication date:
2013-01-01
DOI:
EISSN:
1460-2113
ISSN:
0026-4423
URN:
uuid:e6dac21e-a64d-43e8-b55e-e7642080878a
Local pid:
PHILOSOPHY:15
Language:
English
Subjects:

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP