Journal article
Epistemic decision theory
- Abstract:
-
I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent's choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads to a proliferation of puzzle cases and theories to deal with them, including epistemic analogu...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Mind Journal website
- Volume:
- 122
- Issue:
- 488
- Pages:
- 915-952
- Publication date:
- 2013-01-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1460-2113
- ISSN:
-
0026-4423
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:e6dac21e-a64d-43e8-b55e-e7642080878a
- Local pid:
- PHILOSOPHY:15
- Deposit date:
- 2013-12-17
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Greaves, H
- Copyright date:
- 2013
- Notes:
- This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The version of record Greaves, H. (2013, October 1). Epistemic Decision Theory. Mind. Oxford University Press (OUP). is available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt090.
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