

ABSTRACT

J.N. TUNNICLIFFE
THE QUEEN'S COLLEGE

Thesis submitted for D.Phil.
Michaelmas Term 1990

The Italian Involvement in Greece from the Third Century to 167 BC

The thesis begins with the question of who were those who appealed to Rome in 230 to provide the pretext for the First Illyrian War. This is followed by an analysis of the mechanics of trade and travel to Greece, and the conditions to be encountered there; also of the honorific inscriptions which provide much of the evidence for the presence. This evidence is then assessed for Delphi, the sanctuaries of Asklepios, Aitolia and other less cohesive presences. The conclusions are in terms of Rome's dealings with Greece up to and including the First Illyrian War, as affected by her allies' presence in Greece.

There follows an excursus on the development of early Latin literature, its motivations, themes and relevance in historical context. The period of the Second Punic War is then analysed to see if and how traffic continued to frequent Greece, and how Rome's policy developed from the stance which she had taken in 230.

This leads to a consideration of the causes of the Second Makedonian War, and of the differing policies of Flamininus and Scipio Africanus as revealed by their honours, dedications and letters in Greece. The subsequent Italian presence in Delphi, Thessaly, Aitolia, Thrace, the Aigæan, Boiotia and elsewhere is then assessed in its historical context. There is then a broad overview of the presence on Delos throughout the period, with the emphasis on the Syro-Aitolian War and the freeing of the port in 166.

THE ITALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN GREECE

FROM THE THIRD CENTURY TO 167 BC



VOL. I: TEXT

Thesis submitted for degree of D. Phil., University of Oxford, Michaelmas

Term 1990: J.N. Tunncliffe, The Queen's College, Oxford

[ie 1991] GSO

"...historians do not begin from
what people seem to want but from
what they think the people ought to
want."

C. L. R. JAMES, *Beyond a Boundary*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should especially like to thank Mr. P.S. Derow for all his help, advice and guidance throughout the writing of this thesis. Always thoughtful, constructive and receptive, his forbearance and sympathy have helped to transform even my wildest hypothesising into some semblance of justifiable theory. He cannot, of course, be held responsible for the result; yet I hope that some of it might be acceptable within his own ideas of the third and second centuries.

Thanks are also due to Prof. W.G.G. Forrest for direction and sustenance during the earliest days of this thesis; also to The Queen's College for continued financial and spiritual assistance, and to the Craven Committee for enabling me to visit Greece in summer 1988. To O.U.A.R.L.F.C. and Vincent's Club for agreeable diversion and companionship. Finally and most especially to my parents and Rachel for love, support and patience, without which none of this would have been possible.

ABBREVIATIONS

In addition to the following, the abbreviations used for periodicals are those listed in *L'Année Philologique*:-

<i>ANRW</i>	= <i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
<i>BE</i>	= <i>Bulletin Epigraphique</i> , in <i>Revue des Études Grecques</i>
<i>CAF</i>	= <i>Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta</i> , T. Kock, 3 vols. (Teubner 1880-8)
<i>CAH</i>	= <i>Cambridge Ancient History</i>
<i>CHCL</i>	= <i>Cambridge History of Classical Literature</i>
<i>CIL</i>	= <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
<i>FD</i>	= <i>Fouilles de Delphes</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	= <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , F. Jacoby 3 vols. (Berlin 1923-58)
<i>FHG</i>	= <i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i> , C. Müller 4 vols. (Paris 1841-51)
<i>IC</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i>
<i>ID</i>	= <i>Inscriptions de Délos</i>
<i>IG</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>IGLS</i>	= <i>Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie</i> , L. Jalabert, R. Mouterde, J-P. Rey-Coquais, M. Sartre, P-L. Gatier (Paris 1911-86)
<i>IGRRP</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes</i>
<i>ILLRP</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae</i> , A. Degrassi 2 vols. (Firenze 1957-63)
<i>ILS</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , H. Dessau 3 vols. (Berlin 1892-1916)
<i>OLD</i>	= <i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i>
<i>RE</i>	= <i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>Schwyzers</i> ³	= <i>Dialectorum graecorum exempla epigraphica potiora</i> , ed. P. Cauer (Lipsia 1923)
<i>SEG</i>	= <i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
<i>SGDI</i>	= <i>Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften</i> , H. Collitz (Göttingen 1884-1915)
<i>SIG</i> ³	= <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , W. Dittenberger 3rd edn. (Leipzig 1915-24)

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
SECTION A Early Third Century Traffic	
(i). Introduction	7
(ii). Trans-Adriatic Traffic: what, where, how and why	11
(iii). The Honours	32
(iv). Delphi	41
App. Tarantinos	64
(v). Traffic for Asklepios	67
(vi). Aitolia	79
(vii). Other Traffic	86
(viii). Rome: Influences and Implications	94
SECTION B Early Latin Literature	124
SECTION C Traffic during the Second Punic War	155
SECTION D The Second Century Presence	
(i). Causes of the Second Makedonian War	194
(ii). T. Quinctius Flaminius and P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus	208
(iii). Delphi	241
(iv). Thessaly	267
(v). Aitolia	278
(vi). Thrace	282

(vii). The Aigaian	289
(viii). Boiotia	297
(ix). Miscellaneous	318
 SECTION E Delos	 326
 CONCLUSION	 354
 FOOTNOTES	 359
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 427
 EPIGRAPHICAL CATALOGUE	 445

INTRODUCTION

In 1919, Jean Hatzfeld published *Les Trafiquants Italiens dans l'Orient Hellénique*; despite its age, it is still the most comprehensive work of its kind. In it, Hatzfeld followed the example of Ernesti (*De negotiatoribus romanis*, 1802), Schulten (*De conventibus civium romanorum*, 1892), Kornemann (*De civibus romanis in provinciis imperii consistentibus*, 1892) and Parvan (*Die Nationalität der Kaufleute im röm. Kaiserreiche*, 1909), in plotting "l'expansion des hommes d'affaires italiens dans l'Orient hellénique". This he did over four periods: the mid-third to the mid-second century, an expansion conducted "assez timidement encore"; the mid-second century to the Mithradatic War, "depuis les grands événements qui...ont modifié les conditions du commerce méditerranéen"; from the end of that war to the end of the first century; and finally, the imperial period. He embraced under his subject of *negotiatores* bankers and merchants alike; he chose to omit magistrates, soldiers, colonists and *publicani*, all on the grounds that their business was too public. The work fell into two halves: a history of the expansion as it moved steadily east, and a set of general considerations of the origins and nature of the activity of the *negotiatores* and their role in the communities in which they established themselves. His conclusions were concerned with the political consideration afforded to this expansion by the senate, minimal until after the mid-second century when the east was opened to exploitation; also with the economic effect of the *negotiatores* seeking to spend the accumulated wealth of Rome's military victories and to exchange the oil and wine of Italy for

the abundant products of the east; and with the limited social effects of their eventually seamless integration within the cities of Greece.

If Hatzfeld had a fault, it was to label as *negotiatores* all those who were neither historically identifiable nor explicitly concerned with public business. This is a tendency which has dogged the progress of his successors. Rostovtzeff in particular, in his *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* pp.762-764, took this to the extreme, using a large brush to paint a picture of hordes of Italian *negotiatores* sweeping across Greece in the train of Rome's armies to play a prominent and revitalising role in a depressed economy that was a vista of opportunity. Wilson's *Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome* was more circumspect, posing questions about the precursors of the commercial expansion of Italy, and of the variegation within the peoples of Italy who sponsored that expansion; yet this only served to restrict his horizons to Delos, where there was a definite *terminus post quem* and a substantial corpus of later evidence to provide a study more fitted to his theme. Cassola, in an article entitled 'Romani e Italici in Oriente' in *Dialoghi di Archeologia* IV-V.1970-71.305-322, chose to examine in full that assumption of commercialism at the expense of detailed prosopography by way of exemplification; his conclusion merely added to the *negotiatores* those whom Hatzfeld had chosen to omit. Other studies, such as Donati's 'I Romani nell'Egeo: documenti dell'età repubblicana' in *Epigraphica* XXVII.1965.3-59 and Zaleskij's 'Les Romains à Délos' in *Delo e l'Italia*, are limited by geographical boundaries, commercial preconceptions and a weight of later evidence.

Indeed, the emphasis for all these studies is on the post-167 period; for then, the freeing of the port of Delos provided a genuine material incentive for Italians to frequent the trading circles of the Aegæan, and their commitment to doing so is reflected in an avalanche of late-second century evidence. Much of this is concerned with the construction and administration of Italian business communities in the east, particularly on Delos; for there was the epitome of the drift of expansionism in Greece, as the previous trickle of Italians towards the island became a flood on the heels of Rome's armed forces, an increase facilitated by a senatorial decision which may or may not have had a commercial motive. In this context, Delos is a microcosm of the issues of Hatzfeld, a latent opportunity merely awaiting the circumstances favourable to exploitation; to him, what happened before these circumstances arose is much less significant than what happened after.

There is, then, a need to reassess the boundaries of Hatzfeld's study, not least because of the fresh evidence that has been unearthed in the seventy years that have elapsed since its publication. Since the advance of Rome's armies and the decisions of her senate were fundamental to the expansion of the *negotiatores* of herself and her allies, it seems imprudent to omit the magistrates and soldiers who also appear in the east, especially for the first of Hatzfeld's periods; that their business was public surely implies that they were influential over private interests, particularly in the formative years of expansionism. Similarly, Rome's closest allies included the Sicilians after 262, as a logical extension of her domination of the Italian peninsula; the peculiarity of their kinship with the Greeks combined with their orientation towards Rome surely makes

them as much a factor in the study as were the inhabitants of Magna Graecia. Finally, it seems inevitable that the conclusions drawn from this reassessment will present a shift in the emphasis afforded to considerations of Roman policy towards Greece; the prosopography of Italians in Greece should not be extricated from the context of Rome's expansion, but needs to be seen as a factor, motivational or otherwise, in that expansion.

For this reassessment, the first of Hatzfeld's four periods is the least emphasised, but perhaps the most important. Those westerners who do appear in Greece before the onset of Roman military involvement form the advance guard for that involvement. For they define the lines of communication along which the subsequent expansion will run and, more specifically, seem to afford the pretext under which Rome initially became involved in the east; whether that involvement was accident or design can only be assessed by a definitive identification of those who comprised the pretext. During the early years of that involvement, it is a crucial consideration whether Rome was progressing in sympathy with or contrary to the interests of her allies; for the last twenty years of the third century saw a crisis in Rome's alliance which could only have been exacerbated by insensitive moves in her foreign policy regarding the motherland/trading partners of those allies. Thereafter, as *force majeure* gained priority over egalitarian relationships, it is important to see whether the diplomatic initiatives that facilitated that development took their effect on allied relations with the east, or *vice versa*. Finally, the precise period of the explosion of Hatzfeld's expansionism must be defined; did it wait until all constraints were shed in 167, or was there a more gradual increase in

trans-Adriatic traffic as Rome took a steadily tighter grip on Greek politics ?

These issues are shot through with Hatzfeld's social and cultural implications. For this early period comprises the genuine interface between Hellenism and the nascent Latin culture; the development of the latter in response to the influences of the former, and the precise nature of the material which was then returned to Greece after processing in Rome, will be an important backdrop to the wider study. This covers everything from literature to the choice of individual words for the transcription of Greek concepts to the general spread of Latinity in a political context. In this, the relations between public and private interests, between Rome and her allies, is again important; the use of Magna Graecia and Sicily as a medium for relations between Rome and Greece is as significant here as for the development of senatorial foreign policy. Similarly, the various regions and cities of Greece produce variations in attitude and adaptability that should be marked for their individualism and eccentricity; their reaction to the rise of Rome with regard to their pre-existing relations with her allies provides the reverse of this coin of Roman and Italian policy and culture in Greece.

It is this early period, then, which is in focus in our study, in order that we may explore more fully the formative years and subsequent maturation of Hatzfeld's issues. For this, the evidence is often sparse and difficult to interpret; we can never be certain whether an individual appears in isolation or as the tip of the iceberg of an otherwise submerged western presence in Greece. However, the reliance on probability is never

so desperate as all that; there are a variety of circumstances that present more positive guidelines for our assessments of individuals. If we can weave this evidence into a substantiated picture of the movements of Romans and allies, both private and public personages, then perhaps there will be a more solid foundation for Hatzfeld's three subsequent periods, for which our subjects are, as yet, merely "les précurseurs".

A. EARLY THIRD CENTURY TRAFFIC.

(1). INTRODUCTION.

οἱ δ' Ἰλλυριοὶ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνωτέρω μὲν χρόνους συνεχῶς ἡδίκουν τοὺς πλοῖζομένους ἀπ' Ἰταλίας· καθ' οὓς δὲ καιροὺς περὶ τὴν Φοινίκην διέτριβον, καὶ πλείους ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου χωριζόμενοι πολλοὺς τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ἐμπόρων ἐσθ' οὓς μὲν ἐσύλησαν, οὓς δ' ἀπέσφαξαν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ζωγρίαν τῶν ἀλίσκομένων ἀνῆγον. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παρακούσαντες τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν ἐγκαλούντων τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς, τότε καὶ πλείονων ἐπελθόντων ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον, κατέστησαν πρεσβευτὰς εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα τοὺς ἐπίσκεψιν ποιησαμένους περὶ τῶν προειρημένων Γάϊον καὶ Λεύκιον Κορογκανίους.

(Polybios II.8.1-3)

ἐπιπλέοντων δ' αὐτοῦ [Ἄγρωνος] καὶ τὸν ἄλλον Ἰόνιον, νῆσος, ἧ ὄνομα Ἰσσα, ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους κατέφυγεν. οἱ δὲ πρέσβεις τοῖς Ἰσσίοις συνέπεμψαν, εἰσομένους τὰ Ἄγρωνος ἐς αὐτοὺς ἐγκλήματα. τοῖς δὲ πρέσβεσιν ἔτι προσπλέουσιν ἐπαναχθέντες Ἰλλυρικοὶ λέμβοι τῶν μὲν Ἰσσίων πρεσβευτὴν Κλεέμπορον, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων Κορογκάνιον ἀναιρουῦσιν· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διέδρασαν αὐτούς. καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε Ῥωμαίων ἐπ' Ἰλλυριοὺς ναυσὶν ὁμοῦ καὶ πεζῷ στρατευόντων.

(App. III. VII.)

The difference between the accounts of Polybios and Appian of the causes of Rome's first military involvement east of the Adriatic has

been the subject of much scholarly discussion; the question of their respective validities remains controversial¹. Walbank believes that Polybios used a Greek source with an anti-Aitolian prejudice (perhaps Aratos) in conjunction with a well-defined Roman tradition (perhaps Fabius Pictor). Thus the Polybian picture was of a philhellenic Rome compelled against her will to interfere in eastern affairs by the arrogant aggression of an irrational woman². That her nominal pretext was the interests of her *emporoi* was complementary to the interests of the civilised Greeks whom they served; for the Illyrians were pirates who threatened the well-being of all concerned³. That being the case, an appeal from Issa was merely gilding the lily; Walbank believes that it was a later annalistic invention to compound the impression of a "bellum iustum". Badian's opinion that the *emporoi* were blockade runners who got what they deserved is sharply dismissed; for there was no way that Teuta could claim to blockade all the states that she attacked⁴.

In Appian's camp stand Gelzer, Petzold and particularly Derow; they argue that the Issaean appeal was indeed a significant factor⁵. Issa was a colony of Syracuse, then on excellent terms with Rome; furthermore, the island was also a key point on a demonstrable trade route between Dalmatia and Southern Italy⁶. Thus there was a line of communication between Rome and Issa; that there was a strong commercial element in that line is borne out by the Issaean ambassador's name, Kleemporos, authenticated by Derow's comparison with a first century ambassador of the same name⁷. Thus Appian's account does not deny the appeals of traders to Rome; it is simply that the Issaean appeal was more

important. So to Derow, "it is...necessary to reject the view that the Italian complaints were exclusively, primarily or even largely responsible for the Roman decision to send the embassy"⁸.

Prima facie, then, the two accounts are not mutually exclusive. Walbank accepts that Issa did appeal to Rome, but not until Rome's forces were in situ; Derow accepts that Italian traders did appeal to Rome, but stresses that they had little effect. Both accounts demand that the Illyrian depredations were a threat to the general peace and prosperity of Western Greece. Dell takes this to the logical conclusion, assuming a nascent imperial policy on the part of Agron and Teuta which presented itself on a collision course with Rome⁹. This presupposes that Rome's ambitions did not end with Magna Graecia and Sicily in the south and the Po Valley in the north. It similarly resets the question: why did Rome cross the Adriatic in such impressive force and what did she hope to achieve? what was she defending in this war? was she curious of the backgrounds to the appeals of the *emporoi* or the Issaeans? what did she know of affairs east of the Adriatic in 230? Polybios says that previous approaches concerning trans-Adriatic affairs had been ignored¹⁰; what was the depth and level of those approaches? why was it that Rome chose to respond to them now? Let us, then, assess the evidence for Italians and Sicilians in Greece in the years before 230, with a view to determining their status and purpose; if we can do that, we shall be able to estimate their influence on Italian thinking and perhaps even Roman politics. That done, we can provide a context for the respective appeals of the *emporoi* and of Issa, and also for the previous

appeals which Rome ignored; that way, we can assess whether Rome was fulfilling an inevitable obligation which had been developing for some time with her full recognition, or this was a curious response to an isolated diplomatic appeal.

(ii). TRANS-ADRIATIC TRAFFIC: WHAT, WHERE, HOW AND WHY.

Casson, in his all-embracing survey of traffic in the ancient world, classifies those on the move in seven variant categories: "government representatives, businessmen, itinerant merchants, actors on tour, the sick heading for a sanctuary of Asklepios, the festival crowds en route to the panhellenic or other well-known games... (and) a few who, despite all the discouragements, travelled for the love of it"¹. Although Polybios specified the *emporoi* as the aggrieved party in 230, we should consider that there may well have been other categories of trans-Adriatic travellers who suffered at the hands of the Illyrians; our task will then be to assess the validity of Polybios' specification against the evidence we find for travel.

Trade, of course, played a major role in trans-Adriatic traffic, from the earliest days of western colonisation down into the third century². Beaumont isolated four major Adriatic areas in which trade was conducted by the Greeks up to and including the fourth century. First, Southern Illyria, exploited heavily by Korinth for its silver mines; this suggests that Kerkyra and Epidamnos were colonised for their immediate utility in this area rather than for their position on any trade routes for Sicily³. Second, the Narenta area, which offered weapons in exchange for the foodstuffs which compensated for the barrenness of the land⁴. This included the Syracusan colony at Issa, which Beaumont attempts to connect with the colony at Numana in Picenum⁵; also Pharos and Melite⁶. The third area was the Po Valley. The

Phokaians were first to appear there, followed by the Corinthians from the early sixth century⁷. Their efforts were directed largely inland, presumably up the Po to Numana; Felsina, Spina and Adria appear to have arisen when Carthage controlled the tin route from Spain and the Greeks were compelled to use the alternative route from Bohemia via the Adriatic⁸. What went east from Italy in this traffic was probably Umbrian slaves and, to a lesser extent, amber⁹. The fourth area was Apulia and Messapia; this colonisation was begun by exiles such as Phalanthos heading west¹⁰. Here the Rhodians followed up their seventh century presence in Sicily by their sixth century venture at Elpiae, aimed at the cornlands of Northern Apulia¹¹. Korinth's presence is again attested from the sixth century, whereafter the market rapidly expanded along with Tarentum and the spread of Greek influence in the heel of Italy¹². Beaumont believes that Apulia was a major corn supplier for Athens in the fourth century, whilst the Athenians held an alliance with the Messapian king Artas in the fifth century¹³. Beaumont's conclusion is that Greek colonisation of the Adriatic was aimed primarily at silver, tin and corn; it lasted only so long as those trade routes were viable and existed only at the most expedient points for those routes.

Beaumont's evidence is primarily archaeological, as indeed it must be; traders left few traces of themselves aside from the very occasional honorific decree issued in times of crisis¹⁴. Yet Beaumont's conclusion alone casts some doubt on the continuing viability of these trade routes, not to mention the changing political circumstances of the third century. It is a dangerous assumption that the trade of the fourth

century and before continued into the third, although those who have assessed the sources under consideration have assumed as much¹⁵. For example, the ῥωμαϊκή ναὺς that picked up Aratos at the unidentified site of Adria en route to Syria and then diverted to Caria, is commonly assumed to have been a trading vessel¹⁶. This incident is dated around 250, as is the inscription from Rhodes recording a bilingual dedication to Athene Lindia by one Lucius Olius son of Maraesus¹⁷. The name Olius is well-attested in Picenum and Pompeii and is interpreted as a vocational epithet/surname; the man is an oil merchant¹⁸. Yet the connection is destroyed by Forrest's alternative reading of the inscription which renders the name Folius. Under this reading, the dedicant may or may not be a merchant or trader; all that remains to support the hypothesis is his presence as a foreigner on the soil of the foremost commercial nation of the age. What we must do is emphasise that trade is only one possibility for trans-Adriatic traffic during the third century; as we shall see, Casson's other six categories are equally important.

A consideration of the mechanics of trans-Adriatic traffic will assist the interpretation of the implications of the presence of individual Italians and Sicilians in Greece. First, their means of transport. It is Gomme's supposition that the principal difference between merchantman and warship was that the size of the former rendered it unsuitable for oars and so it had to be sailed. The benefit of this was that the vessel did not share the warship's reliance on the adjacent coastline for regular and frequent stopovers, but was capable of carrying provisions for a smaller crew to enable it to remain under sail

for many days at a time¹⁹. This is a false and unnecessary polarisation; Casson points out instead that both categories of vessel admitted both means of motive power, and that a merchantman was merely more suitable for sailing whilst a warship was more suitable for rowing. For a warship would not row all the way across open-sea crossings whilst a merchantman would not sail around tricky headlands or into narrow harbours²⁰. Gomme neglects the wide variety of shapes and sizes of ships of both determinations; a merchant vessel need not be an unrowable monster, nor need a warship be no larger than a modern rowing eight²¹. The majority of vessels were surely somewhere between the two, and adaptable for a variety of purposes, from carrying freight to transporting passengers to acting as naval auxiliaries; hence Herodotos' description of the ships of the Samians²². Thus the average passenger would more often than not find himself riding shotgun on someone else's merchantman, unless he could charter his own vessel. For the more important passenger, the ambassador or diplomat, the longship provided somewhat greater protection and, if part of a flotilla or procession, added a degree of decorum to the voyage²³. If Gomme was correct, then there would be little need for communication posts on a trade route, such as Kerkyra and Epidamnos are believed to be for Korinth; yet Casson has shown the desirability of overnight stopovers at friendly ports such as the smaller, predominantly oared vessel would necessarily incur²⁴.

The importance of this for our enquiry is as follows. Larger vessels, such as those used by bulk traders, were indeed capable of undertaking long voyages without putting into port for provisions, water

or rest; smaller vessels, especially warships, were not. Thus when Italians and Sicilians are recorded many miles distant from their states of origin, we must consider whether their means of transport made this their only port of call. For these travellers, if bound for destinations further east than the Greek mainland, might tiptoe round the coastlines of Greece visiting a wide variety of Greek towns and ports, or they might be acquainted only with their immediate destination. In this, the purpose of the voyage might be equally significant. A trading expedition in a large vessel may have had a variety of ports of call in order to take advantage of a variety of markets or indeed to pay dues to the gods of Greece²⁵; a diplomatic voyage across the Aigaian in a warship may have necessitated a call at sundry islands one day's travel apart²⁶. The consideration given to nocturnal navigational skills in ancient maritime art and the inadvisability of the practice must also be a factor²⁷. With this in mind, we can elaborate upon the theme by detailing the routes that these vessels would use to the various parts of Greece.

Let us begin with the route from Italy to Central Greece, via the Gulf of Corinth and its environs. There was no need for a sailing vessel to sprint across the shortest crossing from the Sallentine promontory to Kerkyra or from Brundisium to Apollonia. Even warships might venture longer journeys from Syracuse direct to the Peloponnese, without first skirting the Italian coast, as Thucydides' account of the events of 413 and the Syracusan embassy to Sparta demonstrates²⁸. Certainly no compulsion, then; but that does not rule out desirability. The closer one sailed to the land mass, the less vulnerable one was to the storms

of the open sea; perhaps also less vulnerable to pirates of the Adriatic²⁹. Thus the hop across the Ionian Sea to Kerkyra and then the accepted πλοῦς of Strabo down via the Epirote and Akarnanian coastlines into the Gulf of Korinth, may well have been common to all types of shipping from Italy and Sicily alike³⁰. Witness the comments of Thucydides and Xenophon on the favourable position of Kerkyra on the παράπλους from Greece, Epiros in particular, to Italy and Sicily³¹. So also the prominence afforded by Thucydides to Leukas, Kephallenia and Zakynthos in his account of the crossing to Sicily. Gomme saw these as convenient marshalling points under specific strategic considerations rather than compulsory stopovers on any crossing of the Ionian Sea; this neglects their strategic importance in their position at the mouth of the Gulf, although they could indeed be circumvented as easily as visited³². Equally important would be the attitude of the Akarnanians, Aitolians and Lokrians, whose coastlines would be grazed by the traffic passing into the Gulf, especially that bound for Delphi. Even if Italian vessels had no need to put in at their harbours, they would be passing through their territorial waters; thus they were reliant to no little extent on their goodwill³³. Casson calculated that, in view of the variety of winds and currents to be encountered, the journey from Rome to Korinth would take one or two weeks³⁴.

To reach the eastern regions of Central Greece, there was a choice for the traveller which was largely dictated by his purpose and accoutrements. He could round Cape Maleia by one of two ways: either heading there directly from Italy or Sicily, as if heading for Rhodes or

Asia Minor³⁵; or heading for Kerkyra or Apollonia as before and then coasting all the way down the western coasts of Northern Greece and the Peloponnese. The latter would incur the aforementioned considerations of coastal travel; either way, the destination, with its dual hazards of the notorious climate and the voracious Kretan pirates, was not an appealing prospect³⁶. To obviate this risk, he could enter the Gulf of Korinth as before and either cross the *diolkos* with his ship at Korinth or disembark at any of the minor ports of the Gulf and continue his journey on foot. Yet both these options were inconvenient, for the unwieldiness of the *diolkos*, the expense of the exercise, the slow pace of land travel and the primitive nature and bandit-infestation of the roads, for all their extensiveness³⁷. This latter point applies especially to a further option, that of the land routes into Boiotia, Thessaly and Makedon from Epiros, Illyria and Ambrakia, explored exhaustively by Hammond³⁸. It would be easy to see why, in the early part of the third century, the far side of Central Greece might have held little attraction for the western traveller.

For those heading further afield, Casson believed that "those leaving Rome for Asia Minor who wanted to bypass Greece could get a direct sailing to Rhodes or to the Asia Minor ports"³⁹. He also preached the virtue of a direct sailing to Alexandria, with the option of cruising along the North African coastline to break the journey. However, the very currents and winds which facilitated this voyage would hamper the return leg, in which case Casson advised a route via Asia Minor, Krete, Malta and Sicily⁴⁰. Those bound for the Northern Aigaian

would cross the Greek mainland as aforementioned, whereafter their choice was again between a direct sailing and a coastal or island-hopping cruise, the latter being inevitable in some degree⁴¹. Here too the land routes across Illyria and Makedon into Thrace and beyond should not be neglected⁴².

A consideration of the institutions encountered by travellers on arrival in Greece will provide an introduction to the rudiments of cross-cultural exchange in our study. For all docking vessels, there was the immediate problem of customs and dues. These dues were payable in all ancient harbours and, if the terms of the Roman treaty with Ambrakia of 187 are a yardstick, applied as much to vessels merely seeking anchorage as to goods being landed; "portoria quae vellent terra marique caperent..."⁴³. These dues were efficiently collected and accounted even in the comparatively primitive areas of Western Greece and comprised a constant flow of income into the treasuries of individual cities and leagues alike⁴⁴. Since the dues were universally collected as a percentage of any imported goods, then the trader must know the precise quantity of his cargo and its cash equivalent to be able to pay a percentage of that value as an import tax. More, he must know its value in a foreign currency to be able to pay the tax on arrival; for this payment *ad valorem* was charged according to local rates on production of official documentation of that cargo, its quantity and worth⁴⁵. Thus either on departure, on arrival or at the moment of sale, the shipowner or *emporos* must have been affected by the problems of an exchange rate. For his own currency here might be valued only intrinsically, that is,

on the worth of the metal from which it was minted; the local currency would have a notional value on top of that intrinsic worth and so be more valued on the spot, but not so in the trader's home town⁴⁶. The problems of exchange in deals of this kind are illustrated by honours granted to Timon son of Nymphodoros, a Syracusan banker, by the Nesiotic League⁴⁷. For Timon was instrumental in the facilitation of a deal between the *σιτῶναι* of the league and Rhodian corn merchants. The latter sought to renege on 5% of their side of the bargain to allow for the losses that they would suffer in exchanging Nesiotic currency into their own; Timon's service was to waive his right to the *κόλλυβος* due to him as a money-changer so that the Nesiotic representatives should secure the proper amount of corn for their money. Although this episode took place around 188, it was surely not a fresh problem for those involved in international market places. Profit margins depended very much on a shrewd manipulation of problems such as these, and so the traders of Italy cannot have been ignorant of the markets they were using, if they had been using them for any length of time. The problem existed for all travellers in the form of those taxes on foreign nationals both entering and leaving a state; an exchange rate mechanism was inevitable somewhere along the line⁴⁸.

A second hurdle was the obvious difference between Greek and Roman law and custom. How much this applied to Italians and especially Italiote-Greeks is largely conjectural; yet we do know that in regard of traders in particular, there were strictly contrasting principles applied by Greeks and Romans respectively in their attitudes to the

striking and keeping of a bargain. This is brought out most vividly by the apparently irreconcilable problems of the plot structure of the first act of Plautus' *Pseudolus*⁴³. Therein the young man, Calidorus, has apparently struck an essentially Greek deal with the leno Ballio for the purchase of the girl Phoenicium; Greek insofar as a deposit, ἀρραβών, had been laid down, but the deal was not legally binding until the balance of the deal had been paid in full. Therefore if a third party appeared with the full sum in hand, then the vendor had the right to withdraw from the original deal and sell the girl to this third party. This feature of the deposit has, as far as we know, no place in Roman law. However, later at vv.279ff., there is a variation in that deal, one which involves the very Roman feature of *stipulatio*. This takes the form of a verbal contract in formulaic form (for example, the exchange "vendisne ?"-"vendo") which was binding on the vendor under the dictates of *fides*; the rupture of such a contract was legitimate under Greek custom, but an act of *perfidia* in Roman eyes. It is this that forms the inconsistency inside the plot of the play. In the first scene, the young man receives the news of the sale of his girlfriend, but retains the hope that he might raise the full price of sale in order to perform a Greek-style gazump; in the third scene he is flabbergasted to hear of the sale since any form of contract to his Roman ears is binding and complete. The problems of structure for the play as a literary entity are largely swamped by the high comedy of the subsequent proceedings; yet the variation in legal practice between the two sides of the Adriatic surely meant that any trader must again have been forearmed

with the requisite nous to be able to complete the sale of his cargo on arrival at his destination.

These considerations of travel and cross-cultural variation apply to all of Casson's seven categories of traveller. Yet Polybios specified the *emporos* as plaintiff in the First Illyrian War, and so we should examine the particular criteria of this separate category. The first point to make is that, before 218 and the *lex Claudia*, there was no prohibition against Roman senators playing a full and overt role in maritime trade. Since the law took the form of a ban on senators possessing large cargo vessels, it is reasonable to conclude that before this date, both the means of production and the means of disposal or transport of the produce was in the hands of the same men⁵⁰. This is not to deny the presence and contribution of the independent shipowner that was to play an increasing role after 218; Velissaropoulos' comprehensive study of the *naukleros* at least in Greek history brings out their importance as middle-men and their terminological distinction from *emporoi*, *autopolai*, *kapeloi*, *palinkapeloi* and *metaboleis*⁵¹. It is unclear, however, how universal these terms were and how precise the distinction seemed to the man in the street; Polybios' use of *emporos* as a portmanteau term for the whole species was no doubt sufficient for his readership. Yet the chain of sale depicted by the scholiast on Aristophanes' *Ploutos* 1156 conveys some impression of complexity in ancient trade procedures; the *autopoles* (the seller of his own produce) and the *kapelos* (who sold what he had bought) sold their goods to the *emporos* who sold them to the *palinkapelos* who sold them to the

metaboleus (the merchant of specific goods) who sold them to the public⁵². One must see the *emporos* as the agent of transport in this equation to render his role significant; therefore the chain here spans two areas, that of production and that of demand. There are no hard and fast rules here; one or more of the functions may be superfluous or combined within the scope of one individual. For Rome, the model of the Catonian company from the turn of the century may be transposed back in time; modifications in this would allow for the overt participation of the wealthiest men in the procedure, rather than merely their covert financial support⁵³. Whereas the smaller landowner or producer would act as an *autopoles* and employ the services of *emporos* and *naukleros* to dispose of his surplus, the larger capitalist would have these services at his own disposal, perhaps possessing his own ships and using his freedmen as the agents of sale. Thus all the elements of the trade would be of concern to him and his. In this sense, Rome could function similarly to the other major producer-timocracies of Italy, if not so prolifically. In this, then, we see the distinction made by Casson between the businessman and the itinerant merchant, paraphrased sociologically by Garnsey and Whittaker as that between those who could afford to build a ship and those who could not. In this latter category, we also see the absolutely crucial distinction between *emporos* as agent-merchant and *naukleros* as the adaptable shipowner⁵⁴.

If these are the people who were involved in Italian trade in the early third century, then the mechanics of it can be reconstructed as follows. Modern practices provide a more or less reliable yardstick, as

described in the *Geographical Handbook for Greece Vol. II*, issued by Naval Intelligence in 1944. This expresses the principle of larger freight-bearing vessels anchoring in larger harbours, especially Peiraeus, or in offshore positions before transshipping their cargoes into smaller sailing vessels; these then ply the coast to convey the goods to the smaller centres of consumption. The most telling point is this:

"the ports of Greece...are principally concerned with national as opposed to international trade, and their main function is to connect their hinterlands with other parts of the country. By western European standards, these ports appear as little more than roadsteads where vessels can anchor and unload into lighters, using their own winches and derricks. In view of the poverty of Greece, these simple facilities have been adequate for the needs of the country; and if the Greek mercantile marine depended entirely on the trade of Greece, it would not be the prosperous business that it is..." (pp. 224-225).

This adds to what Velissaropoulos says about the *emporium* being largely interchangeable with a fully functioning harbour as a separate commercial centre for a neighbouring conurbation⁵⁵. In modern Greece, Krioneri and Messolonghion are the manifestations of this small-port principle, important for their anchorages and their positions on the railway lines, but without surrounding urban development⁵⁶. In the ancient world, this status was achieved by the likes of Kreusis, Aigosthena, Itea and Lechaion. For Strabo stresses that Lechaion was Korinth's port for traffic coming in from Italy, whilst Kenchreiai acted similarly for Asian traffic; Pausanias credits Kreusis with being the harbour for Thespiiai, despite its sparse settlement, whence one can see Strabo's network of roads connecting Thespiiai with the rest of Boiotia as an added advantage⁵⁷. That offshore mooring and subsequent unloading into smaller vessels was the habit is implied by Plautus' *Mercator*

256ff.: "postquam id quod volui transegi, atque ego conspikor / navem ex Rhodo quas^theri advectus filius; / conlibitumst illuc mihi nescio qui visere: / inscendo in lembum atque ad navem devehor". That this play is set in Athens supports much of what the above concerning the larger ports of Greece. Smaller vessels carrying passengers or less substantial cargoes would no doubt proceed to dock at the quayside in the usual manner.

Thus an Italian trader arriving in Greece with a large cargo-bearing vessel would anchor off or in one of the recognised harbours of the mainland or islands with a view to disposing of his goods in that harbour or in the adjacent conurbation; either of these might then serve to disperse the merchandise around the smaller consumption centres of the immediate area by their own businessmen or by a central market. The point is that the trader did not do this himself and so did not necessarily ever visit the town or city that the harbour served. This seems to be supported by the plays of Plautus which, set largely in Athens where the Peiraieus provided the opportunity for every aspect of a business transaction, show the harbour as the epicentre of business and commerce⁵⁸. However, not every Italian trader was a bulk trader and so not every Italian trader plied only the major ports. Granted that trade passing as far afield as Alexandria or Rhodes would surely be predominantly large-scale in order to produce the profits able to cover the overheads involved in such trade⁵⁹; yet there can be no sure rule that says that he who has passed beyond the harbour or is found in a minor consumption centre is not a trader.

There is, in this context, a slight variation in concept between Greek and Roman commercial centres. For the Greeks used only two terms with any frequency, *ἀγορά* and *ἐμπόριον*; the Romans used *forum*, *macellum* and *emporium* with definite distinction⁶⁰. Furthermore, archaeology demonstrates that Paestum, a city of fundamentally Greek orientation, experienced a definite reorientation within its civic structure as it fell under Roman influence in the third century. Although the existing structure was not eradicated, the *agora* was extended in such a way as to suggest to Torelli the politicisation of the previous religio-civil arena⁶¹. A piazza, a rounded *comitium* and shop frontages were added, and the linear organisation altered to create a civic space with no facing frontal temple. At the same time, the Greek cults of Asklepios, Herakles, Mater Matuta and Apollo were "re-used" in Roman contexts to simulate their stance in the *forum Boarium* and on the Aventine at Rome⁶². What this seems to demonstrate is the turning of a Greek community away from the old focal point of the motherland of Greece and towards the new one of Rome; this was no external imposition, but rather a melding of Greek, Italian and Roman, with the emphasis towards the latter. If this phenomenon occurred within the civic geography of Italy, then we should watch carefully for any repetition or echo of it within the human geography of trans-Adriatic traffic.

To the Romanocentric Plautus, the *emporium* and the *macellum* stood alongside the *gymnasia*, *myropolia*, *palaestra*, *medicina* and *tonstrina* as places in which a visiting relative might be found; they all stood distinct from the *forum*⁶³. The former two were strictly business areas;

thus the only superstructure was that concerned with commerce, that is, warehouses, shop frontages and so on. The *forum*, being a more cosmopolitan area, would boast a wider variety of buildings; yet what was its true orientation ? The distinction between our three categories of market space was valid only in those civic centres large enough to support all three; thus in the likes of Puteoli, the *emporium* would effectively be an extension of the harbour structure, whilst the *macellum* as a provision market would be part of the *forum*⁶⁴. Indeed, if there is any satisfactory distinction, then it is this: the *macellum* was largely for internal consumption, the *emporium* for external trade and the *forum* for political and civic concerns. To the Greeks, the *macellum* was literally an enclosure without specification⁶⁵; that its Roman function was subsumed within the *agora* gave the latter a more commercial aspect than the Roman *forum* whilst still accepting the primacy of the gods there. The alterations at Paestum thus contrive to separate politics and business from religion, which must direct our impression of the Roman concept of the *forum*, to them, a civic centre might accommodate the gods, but religion generally stands apart from such ephemeral dealings⁶⁶. The distinction is subtle but effective; the Italian businessman in Greece might expect to have more contact with the gods than would the Greek in Rome.

These remarks confirm a vital element in our enquiry; this is that many of those characters with whom we are dealing had initially more in common with their Greek cousins than they did with their Roman masters, but fell subject to the will and the influence of the latter during the

270s and 260s. Thus we should be alive not only to what Rome stands to learn from the activities of her own and her allies' traders and representatives, but also to what these men might be disseminating abroad. Initially, however, much of Rome's knowledge of things Greek would be learnt from these colonists and expatriates, as much as the latter would be the first Greeks to absorb Roman culture and politics; the role of Magna Graecia and Sicily as media via which this two-way flow of information passed will be a crucial element in our enquiry⁶⁷. On the basic level, we should consider how the spread of Latinity was aided and abetted by this mediation. The short answer seems to be that it was not. From 282, when L. Postumius Megellus was grossly insulted for his representations in Greek to the Tarentines, Greek was apparently the language of communication between east and west, more precisely between Romans and Greeks⁶⁸. The aforementioned bilingual inscription of Olius/Folius seems more to have been for his own benefit than for that of the Rhodians; even after 167, the Athenian cataloguers of the Delian temple inventories were unable to read and transcribe inscriptions in Latin⁶⁹. Other exchanges, such as that of Cato in Athens, are well documented and attest to the Romans' fluency in Greek as compared to the almost complete Greek ignorance of Latin⁷⁰. Surely our travellers were instrumental in the promotion of this linguistic indolence amongst the Greeks; by acceding to the conditions of the country inside which they found themselves, the travellers must have increased their own knowledge of things Greek whilst not encouraging the Greeks to reciprocate.

The political developments of the third century undoubtedly affected trans-Adriatic traffic; these were as follows. Rome's policy both within and without Italy was quite definitely delineated by the terms of her treaty with Carthage in 306. This in the words of Servius defined the *litora Romanorum* as Italy, whilst the *litora Carthaginiensium* were defined as Sicily; Corsica was to be a kind of no-man's land for both to use as best they could⁷¹. Roman traffic was also limited by her treaty with Tarentum from 302, barring Roman ships from entry into the Tarentine Gulf⁷². The question is of course begged of whether the bar applied to all ships or merely warships; on the one hand, there was Carthage's jealous preservation of her commercial empire in the first two treaties with Rome, whilst on the other there was Rome's freshly acquired naval strength which would prompt a revision of those previous terms⁷³. Other than the disputed Rhodian agreement of 306, there was no obvious eastern trade by Romans themselves (barring the Etruscan ventures of the fourth century, which were 'trade' inasmuch as piracy ever was)⁷⁴; yet the "statelessness" of individual itinerant traders of whatever nationality may have provided a loophole in this barrier. The difference between a fleet of ships in martial or commercial guise, and a single vessel is fundamental to this issue; how far were these treaties enforced or enforceable against independent chartered ships passing in ones and twos ? The precise definition of a Roman fleet is also relevant; since they depended quite heavily on the *socii navales*, who themselves relied more on naval auxiliaries than on regular warships, the letter of the law was surely open to interpretation⁷⁵. Furthermore, the use of the term 'litora' in the Carthaginian decree

adds an interesting dimension to the discussion; did the parties assume it to apply from the coastline inland, and so not concerned with naval matters, or to the coastline and its immediate environs both landward and seaward ? The distinction is a fine one, but would say much about the attitudes and aspirations of the two sides.

The interventions of Alexander of Epiros (in treaty with Rome in 334), Kleonymos of Sparta and Agathokles of Syracuse on Tarentum's behalf had established a tradition of Greek involvement in Southern Italy that reached a denouement with Pyrrhos; his defeat by 272 effectively ended the tug-of-war between Rome and Greece for the sympathies and control of Tarentum and the Greek confederacy of Southern Italy. The establishment of Roman hegemony over the southern part of the peninsula was completed by a diversity of treaties, in many cases with the imposition of garrisons and the obligation to act as *socius navalis*; this is commonly interpreted as a land-loving Rome relieving herself of the noisome distraction of naval affairs⁷⁶. Hereafter the 260s saw the standardisation of an Italian currency of the didrachm⁷⁷; an Apolloniate embassy crossed the Adriatic for some irrecoverable purpose, to be insulted by a Fabius who was then surrendered for reparation⁷⁸; colonies were settled on the Adriatic coast for the first time, at Ariminum and Firmum⁷⁹. These events were followed almost immediately by the outbreak of the First Punic War, seen by at least one modern critic as an attempt by Rome to prevent Carthaginian domination of Sicily, since that would have established a *mare clausum* into Greece; the disaffection which this would have caused amongst the *socii navales* might have put them under

such pressure as to force them away from the Roman alliance, whereupon the stability of Southern Italy would be shattered⁸⁰. The course of this war and the vacillating control of the seas around Sicily rendered traffic to and fro across the Adriatic a hazardous but not impossible occupation. After Syracuse, with her vast range of contacts and concerns, passed under the Roman sway, so did the majority of Sicily; this opened the seas off Italy once more and confined the war zone to Lilybaeum and her environs. The war also saw the establishment of Brundisium in 244, "to close the narrow straits of Otranto to Carthaginian or any other hostile shipping seeking to enter the Adriatic"⁸¹. The subsequent destruction of Carthaginian interests in the waters of Italy, Sicily and Greece opened those same waters to potential exploitation by the victors; the continued range of Italian and Sicilian maritime contacts is demonstrated by the numbering of Gelon of Syracuse, Neapolis, Camerinum and Gela amongst the guarantors of Koan asyilia in 242⁸². Whether or not that potential was fulfilled is a question seminal to our understanding of the causes of the First Illyrian War.

If this is only a brief sketch of the history of the years in question, then it at least provides a framework from which to hang assessments of individuals. It also affords a brief summary of Roman policy throughout the period, which appears concerned only with the landward side of her 'litora'; the 260s, however, when Greece apparently took note of Rome's appearance on the shores of the Adriatic, are worthy of further consideration. The sketch also provides a picture of the southern Italian cities in transition from Greek colonies to Roman

subjects, that is, no longer mere outposts of hellenism but inward-looking Italian allies. Their willingness or reluctance to undergo this transformation and the degree to which they abandoned their birthrights is a further matter for estimation, whilst allowing for individual eccentricity and variation.

(iii) THE HONOURS.

More often than not, the evidence for Italians in Greece is in the form of honorific decrees; dedications in sanctuaries and catalogues of competitors in festivals are also fruitful sources. However, the majority of honorific decrees are formulaic and jejune, without detail of the service performed by the honorand to merit the reward. Let us consider, then, what we may and may not expect to garner from these decrees.

It is commonly assumed that the standard grant of honours, *proxenia*, had mislaid many of its more substantial and political connotations by the third century. Thus it was no longer the conferral of ambassadorial status on an individual, whereby he acted as a consul either for residents of his own city in the city in which he was honoured, or for residents of the honouring city in his own city; instead, the grant became a devalued and empty privilege bestowed as a personal gratuity in lieu of more material rewards. This, largely Gschnitzer's creation, is illustrated by the citation of a number of examples showing the grant as a cheap and meaningless method of payment for mercenary troops, doctors or corn merchants¹. Yet Gschnitzer undercuts himself by beginning to fuse the status of *proxenia* in the third century with that of *evergesia*. The two are by no means synonymous; *evergesia* was the reward for a service performed and applicable only in the state which granted it, whilst *proxenia* represented the often unfulfilled potential for service, an obligation which the honorand took home with him². Hence the frequent

use of the formula καὶ διατελεῖ and the extension of the privileges of *proxenia* to the sons of the honorand; that potential was not seen as a finite entity by the grant's donors. Gschnitzer is right to see the potential services as a wide-ranging and diverse spectrum; he is wrong to conclude that they are therefore lesser services³. The tangible rewards, inscriptions, gold crowns, immunity from taxes and grants of land, made a grant of *proxenia* a costly investment from the state's point of view⁴. That being the case, one must conclude that such investments were made in men of resources, be they resources of wealth, status, property or talent.

Thus the assessment of *proxenoi* will depend largely on circumstance. For example, grants made by sanctuary cities such as Delphi or Akraiphiai in Boiotia can safely be assumed to have some relation to the sanctuary; yet this may be in connection with the provision of supplies or money to the regular festivals, with artistic or gymnastic performances at those festivals, with dedications in the sanctuary or with some obscure service. Thus at Delphi the Dionysiac guilds of the Isthmia and Nemeia and of Athens had been granted certain privileges to allow their members to compete in the Soteria⁵. Yet the games were not a closed shop; non-members of the guilds who auditioned successfully such as Aristarchos of Camerina, received individual grants of privileges such as were not recorded for members. Yet Aristarchos was granted only such privileges as would facilitate his participation in the festival. Nachtergaele's cases 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18, are *proxenia* grants for attested competitors in the Soteria; so he tentatively concludes that

these grants are a step up from mere rights of access, a reward for distinguished performance in the festival. Yet there is no explicit causal link between their participation and the honours; probability is the only guiding light⁶. It is undoubtedly true that the presence of high-class performers was a state benefit, since it boosted the status of one's festival and so attracted more pilgrims and visitors, which meant profits both material and notional. Yet, in the absence of corroborative evidence, the grant may merely fall into one of a multiplicity of civil categories that the secular centres present. These civil categories are largely impenetrable without secondary evidence; yet again the circumstances are not unhelpful. Robert saw the extensive *proxenia*^{ia} list of Histiaia Oreus in Euboia in 266 as an attempt to broaden and consolidate the trading links of the city, on the basis of the commercial nature of both Histiaia Oreus and the native cities of her new *proxenoi*⁷.

What can qualify *proxenia* grants are the associated statuses of *euergesia* and *thearodokeia*, predominantly in the honours granted by sanctuary cities. *Euergesia*, as aforementioned, was granted on fulfilment of the potential to serve; thus its combination with *proxenia* was recognition of the service performed allied to the imposition of the obligation to continue that service. In terms of *euergesia*, that service was often material; hence the application of the term to a variety of hellenistic monarchs in response to benefactions and acts of largesse⁸. Here considerations of the timocratic basis of government may apply. For an act of largesse by an external element, on the understanding that it

would be rewarded with definite privileges and facilities of a political nature, might be seen as much an investment by the benefactor as the imposition of the *proxenia*-obligation by the recipient state. This is especially true of smaller states where the private wealth of individuals was often synonymous with that of the state itself; any boost to that wealth from an external source might then be seen as much on a personal as on a political level⁹. The same is true of sanctuary cities, whose wealth was synonymous with that of the sanctuary; any dedication made in the sanctuary would simultaneously assume sacred and secular significance¹⁰. It is most difficult not to be suspicious of so duplicitous an arrangement.

The grant of *thearodokeia* was exclusively associated with the sanctuary cities, and was better described as "une charge plus qu'un honneur". The duty is best outlined by Daux:

"le rôle de ces derniers (théarodoques)...consiste à s'occuper matériellement et moralement des theores, qui sont leurs hôtes, ξένοι, au sens plein et riche que ce mot avait dans l'antiquité; ils les abritent et en partie les nourrissent (mais la cité les invitait à des repas officiels d'hospitalité...); ils leur procurent ou les aident à trouver des moyens de transport pour la prochaine étape; ils accomplissent avec eux toutes démarches propres à assurer le succès de la pieuse mission; les theores doivent en effet se présenter devant l'Assemblée des cités qu'ils visitent, ou devant les magistrats, et donner large publicité à l'ἐπαγγελία solennelle de la fête ou des fêtes auxquelles ils convient le monde grec"¹¹.

The very nature of the obligation, then, suggests that the recipient was a man of some considerable private means and public influence; how else to be able to accom^modate the *theoroi* of the festival and to represent their claims to the assembly of his own state? That combination is important, since timocratic government meant that private wealth was a

qualification for office, but not an obligation to hold it; the *thearodokos* surely fulfilled that potential for political participation¹². It should be noted that the *thearodokos* was often appointed by his own city of residence, rather than by the sanctuary city¹³.

The proviso attached to all three aforementioned grants is that none of them insisted that the honorand ever set foot in the state which honoured him; the *thearodokos* was necessarily resident in his own home state, whilst it is conceivable that both the *proxenos* and the *evergetes* were honoured by association with services performed in their absence. In this context we must consider the associated privileges attached to the grants, often in formulaic terms; were they merely empty rights or a genuine facilitation of the fulfilment of the *proxenos*' obligations¹⁴? It is the use of formulae that has called them into question; if such rights can be reduced inside the ambit of a portmanteau phrase such as καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πρόξενοις, then surely their importance cannot be great? However, since the Delphic inscriptions as a corpus admit such a variety of privileges in a variety of combinations outside of that formula, then there is indeed significance in those which are specifically enumerated; those which are not cannot be held to apply¹⁵. In other states, comparative studies of *proxenia* decrees will produce similar conclusions. These sundry privileges are *prodikia*, *proedria*, *prosodos*, *promanteia* (rights of priority in law-courts, festivals, councils and assemblies and oracles), *asylia*, *asphaleia* (the protection of the state against physical attack),

ateleia (immunity from customs dues and taxes) and *enktesis* (the right to own property in the state); subsidiary to these, but rarely seen, were rights of intermarriage and the facility to import and export goods of a specific quantity or nature. It will be our assumption that, of these, only those mentioned by name are granted to the honorand, and that the rest do not fall inside the all-embracing formula.

Of those privileges, the ones of most interest to us are *asylia*, *ateleia* and *enktesis*. *Enktesis* is perhaps the most significant, since it offers a permanent presence in the state to the honorand; given the obvious expense of the grant, it shows a considerable depth of state gratitude for whatever was the service. Pečirka's study demonstrates that the grant extended across the board, was hereditary and admitted no discernible distinction between the γαῖαι and the οἰκίαι involved, be they domestic, industrial, commercial or sacred¹⁶. *Asylia* was important to the traveller, since it theoretically guaranteed his security from pirates, bandits and brigands whilst in transit; however, it is difficult to see how this was enforced. Still, the encouragement offered by the grant might be sufficient to have enticed the recipient to brave the threats offered by Aitolians, Kretans and other assorted pirates operating in Greek waters. Coasting past Aitolia in particular was a hazardous exercise; their grant of *asylia* would be useful to the traveller whose destination was any part of Central Greece¹⁷.

Ateleia was important for the *emporoi* whom we seek, since it conveyed immunity from the taxes and dues which he and his cargo would

incur on entry to a port or town¹⁸. For the larger businessman, this may well have been an attractive proposition; Plautus demonstrates that it was the habit of hellenistic businessmen to travel in person with their cargo to ensure its ultimate profitability, or at least send a son or a freedman, to whom the grant of *ateleia* also applied¹⁹. For the state, this facility would be an important incentive for the attraction and maintenance of otherwise inconsistent and fickle trade; the loss incurred on duties would be calculated against the utility enjoyed under this engagement of service. If this remains a potential without proven fulfilment, then it would be a slight on the business acumen of the *negotiatores* of Italy and the initiative of their potential markets to ignore the probability; it is such an arrangement that Robert had in mind in his assessment of the *proxenia* list of Histiaia Oreus²⁰. It is here too that the grant of *prodikia* might earn its salt; if there was room for exploitation, then there was also room for dispute and a need of some recourse²¹. Some hint of the future of such arrangements might be seen in the terms of the honours to M. Vallius and C. Apustius from Abdera in the early second century; for restrictions and provisos are attached to the grant of *ateleia* to distinguish between private and commercial usage. The Abderitans refused to be exploited, and the implication may be that they had learnt from the mistakes of others²².

Ateleia also applied to Casson's other categories of traveller, since all travelled with at least some quantity of luggage and all were subject to the sundry taxes that most states operated against foreign nationals. Pilgrims, temple-goers and ambassadors to the panhellenic

festivals carried substantial offerings to their gods and so paid substantial dues upon them; Strabo's story of the destruction of Krisa by Eurylochos of Thessaly has as its cause the city's heavy imposts on temple-goers, specifically those pilgrims from Italy and Sicily upon whose merchandise the city had grown fat²³. Those Italian states who had treasuries at Delphi would be especially prey to such outgoings; an ambassador or pilgrim who carried the privilege of *ateleia* might quite literally be worth his weight in gold. Equally, one of those hybrid charter vessels carrying both cargo and passengers might bring a great deal of trade to such as Delphi; the passengers comprised a lucrative pilgrim traffic, whilst the cargo could supply the festivals and sanctuary or follow the routes which Strabo attests through the Krisaian Gulf from Italy, Sicily and Africa to Boiotia and Central Greece²⁴. The captain of such a vessel would no doubt be most popular with the locals.

We should also remark upon the usefulness of the other rights in terms of incentives and the facilitation of activity. In the sanctuary cities, a grant of *proedria* might well be attractive to the pilgrim traffic, since it conferred pride of place for the duration of the festival. For the sanctuary cities were the scene of many important proclamations and decrees that were active in as much a political as a sacred sense, everything from *proxenia* grants to the liberation of the Greeks at the Isthmus by Flamininus in 196 and Perseus' cancellation of debts and amnesty for debtors in 179²⁵. If *proedria* afforded access to such a forum, then *prosodos* would facilitate active participation in it, both in sanctuary cities and in secular centres²⁶. That this right

afforded access to the elective, timocratic, probouleutic *boule* might be seen as confirmation of the almost personal political connections between *proxenia* and *euergesia*. For thus the benefaction was to the benefit of the ruling élite who proposed and voted through the granting of such privileges; *prosodos* would maintain this political link between state, qua the individuals who governed it, and benefactor. This sense of a corrupt complicity should not be pressed too far. *Prosodos*, *prodikia* and *promanteia*²⁷ are *prima facie* the mere cossetting of a welcome visitor; the true significance of the grants will often depend on the individual and his ambition, which in many cases are provisos not open to exploration due to lack of evidence²⁸.

With many of our honorands, then, we are reliant upon reasonable probability for their *raison d'être*, their services and their backgrounds. However, there is more that can be made of a simple *proxenia* grant than meets the eye; thus our earlier question of whether *proxenoi*, *evergetai* and *thearodokoi* ever set foot in the state that honoured them admits the likelihood that the incentives offered to them as men of status made travel an almost irresistible proposition. Having defined these criteria and the geographical, political and cultural circumstances above, let us catalogue the Italians, Italiote-Greeks and Sicilians who are found in Greece in the first seventy years of the third century, with a view to defining the purposes and regularity of their visits and communications and the implications and influences to be inferred from them.

(iv). DELPHI.

The most striking weight of traffic crossing the Adriatic is for religious purposes. This is particularly true for Delphi, where there are a number of honorands of western origin alongside a consistent representation in the agonistic catalogues from the Soteria. This traffic stretched from the latter years of the fourth century down throughout the first half of the third century. These individuals are as follows, with commentary on their chronological and socio-political circumstances:

Neon son of Andron of Syracuse. So identified by von Effenterre as the recipient of a grant of *proxenia* with *ateleia*, roughly dated to the fourth or third centuries¹. However, the restorations of Daux and Dunant read honours to Nikon son of Andron of Sikyon, which is almost certainly correct².

Hippis son of Ekphantos of Tarentum. Granted *proxenia* and *euergesia* with associated *promanteia* and *prodikia*; dated by the *bouleutes* Lysidamos to 318-305³. The privileges extended to Hippis would suggest pilgrim-ambassador status; his service was tangible and his needs met by *promanteia* and *prodikia*. The date falls between the interventions of Alexander of Epiros and Kleonymos of Sparta, when Rome's triumph in the Second Samnite War brought control of the majority of Central Italy and opened the door to a disunited Southern Italy and Magna Graecia⁴; the effects of this are best illustrated by the Punic, Tarentine and Rhodian

rapprochements with Rome, discussed above. Under the circumstances, a Tarentine envoy in Greece might be looking for the support of friends or at least broadcasting the nature of his plight to his kinsmen at the common centre. Since the *promanteia* suggests that his prime purpose was indeed the oracle, he may have been seeking guidance in his state's crisis⁶.

Zopyros son of Lykiskos of Tarentum. Granted *proxenia* and *thearodokeia*, with associated *promanteia*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and other privileges; dated precisely by Flacelière to 293/2, although Daux more cautiously places it between 315 and 280⁶. Zopyros' role as *thearodokos* marks him out as an individual of means and influence; however, his chronological circumstances and his associated rights mark him down as something of an oddity. By now Rome was preoccupied with the Samnites once more, although Zopyros' honours are contemporaneous with the expedition of Q. Ogulnius Gallus to Epidauros to fetch the serpent of Asklepios to Rome⁷. More leading, however, is Flacelière's reconstruction of the events of the 290s in Greece. Herein the Aitolian domination of Delphi compelled Demetrios Poliorketes to hold the Pythia of 290/89 in Athens for a hamstrung Amphiktyony; his intent was to demonstrate the barbarity of the Aitolians on a panhellenic stage⁸. Yet in the middle of this rupture of normality, the Delphoi made this provision for the reception of their *theoroi* in Tarentum; however, the next *theoria* was to be for the displaced Pythia of 290/89, which the occupied Delphoi could not advertise⁹. Perhaps the Tarentines conceived a vacancy for a *thearodokos*, be it due to death or incapacity, and

communicated this to the Delphoi, with Zopyros as their nomination for the replacement; somewhat embarrassed by their circumstances, the Delphoi confirmed the appointment and accordingly adapted their privileges. This would explain the oddities of listing *promanteia* before *thearodokeia* and of omitting *proedria* altogether; pro tem., the *promanteia* carried more weight than the *thearodokeia* due to its comparative efficacy¹⁰, whilst the Delphoi were in no position to guarantee *proedria* when the Pythia was staged in Athens. There is no reason why the Aitolians should have opposed these privileges; there would have been little point in occupying Delphi if they were about to interfere with her status as the spiritual centre of the Greek world¹¹. Thus Zopyros, a member of the Tarentine ruling class, can be seen perpetuating his city's longstanding links with Delphi in such a way as to establish a community of interests with Aitolia; the alignment is important in the light of the forthcoming Tarentine appeal for Greek help¹².

Timagoras and Eudoxos, sons of Zöilos of Gela. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *thearodokeia*, *ateleia* and other privileges; dated securely 277/6. This is part of a new era at Delphi in the aftermath of the Gallic invasion and the emergence of the Aitolians as the saviours of Greece and the guardians of the spiritual centre. To mark this, the Aitolians were loading the sanctuary with offerings and marshalling the votes of their supporters to make an impact on the Amphiktyony¹³. As for Gela, it was only three years since the entire population had been uprooted by Phintias of Akragas and resettled in his

foundation of Phintia Gelorum; the old city was destroyed by the Mamertines. However, here as in IG XIV. 256, the inhabitants preserve their former ethnic, despite their new location. This hint of nationalistic stubbornness is borne out by Diodoros' account of Phintias' self-reform in the face of the popular opinion of those under him; the insurrection was headed by the εὐποροί, of whom our brothers, notably from their *thearodokeia*, were obviously members¹⁴.

In 277/6, Gela also found herself in the centre of Pyrrhos' campaigns in Sicily to free the Greeks from the Carthaginian influence¹⁵. Rome and Carthage had found common ground against this mutual enemy¹⁶; this decree may be a further indirect line in the unstable relationship between Pyrrhos and the Aitolians, perhaps now little more than the facility for Pyrrhos to recruit mercenaries¹⁷. Yet if he was fighting to free the Greeks of Sicily and Italy, and those Greeks were frequent and valued visitors to Delphi, and the Aitolians had definite ambitions in Delphi, then a line exists between the three¹⁸.

The fraternity of these Geloians, as with the three Tarentines discussed below, multiplies the chances of the potential behind the *proxenia* being fulfilled. For the brothers doubtless represented the successful hand in the strife that surrounded the displacement of the Geloians to Phintia; otherwise, there would be little point in the Delphoi imposing a lasting obligation on them¹⁹. The low rating of *thearodokeia* in the listings is peculiar; if deliberate, it might be

explained by the scepticism of the Delphoi concerning the prospects of any *theoria* which they might despatch to Sicily in the face of violent warfare and/or Carthaginian domination.

Megakles son of Sosipater of Neapolis. Granted *thearodokeia*, *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia* and other privileges; dated 275/4. To state Megakles' position baldly, he comes from a state allied to Rome since 326 and was honoured at Delphi in the immediate aftermath of Pyrrhos' retirement from Italy in autumn 275, on the eve of Rome's reduction of all of the Greek cities of Southern Italy²⁰. It should, of course, be no surprise to find Neapolis in the Delphic orbit; the city was more Greek than Italian and was permitted to retain her Greek status and characteristics, from language to religion, at all times²¹. Thus Delphic *theoroi* there would expect to receive a sympathetic hearing; hence this appointment of a *thearodokos*.

The anomalies here are the listing of Megakles' privileges and the timing of the grant. The latter may be coincidental; however, as Rome surmounted the horizon of Greece, Megakles, an influential man as his *thearodokeia* intimates, was conveniently placed halfway between the two as a potential medium for communication in both directions. His responsibility for the *theoria* confirms this, opening a panhellenic festival to an ally of Rome. It seems likely that the *theoroi* came to Neapolis to find him and appointed him *thearodokos* on the spot, rather than that he was a visitor to Delphi; the *theoroi* then relayed Megakles'

services to Delphi on their return²². Again, the background presence of Aitolia at this festival should not be ignored.

As for the listing of Megakles' privileges, he is first and foremost a *thearodokos*, and a *proxenos* second; he is given precedence at festivals and before the oracle, but is not afforded the physical and material security normally extended to other honorands. Perhaps these omissions are purely practical. For a grant of *asylia* might be ineffectual against the residual hostility of the Tarentines or the predatory Carthaginians off Sicily. However, why a local grant of *ateleia* should be inoperable is unclear; the simple answer may be that he was unlikely ever to visit Delphi and so did not need this privilege.

Hierokles son of Hieron of Syracuse. Granted *euergesia*, *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *prodikia*, *ateleia*, *proedria*, *asylia*, *asphaleia* and other privileges of *euergesia*; of uncertain date. Although Dittenberger admits the possibility that Hierokles was merely an unknown relative of the royal family, the consensus is that he was the father of Hieron II, ruler of Syracuse from 268 to 215²³. This calls into question the literary traditions of Hieron's birthright. For Iustinus and Zonaras record that Hieron's mother was of servile origin whilst his father was a gentleman; Polybios eulogises him for having risen to greatness without the advantage of wealth or reputation as his birthright²⁴. The arguments against this centre around the fact that, if Hierokles is indeed his father, then Hieron assumes his grandfather's name; this was not permissible for an illegitimate son. What this decree most probably

expresses is the flimsiness of the myth contrived to obfuscate the fallow years of the Deinomenid dynasty out of which rose Hieron; Hierokles, then, was indeed his father and Hieron his grandfather, and the slave-girl was imported as a false element (perhaps by Timaios) to explain the comparative lack of ambition of his forebears.

The problems of chronology arise from the confusion over the account of Hieron's rise to power in Polybios and the congestion in the Delphic archons in the 270s and 260s. Walbank makes full discussion of the conflation in Polybios' account of the preliminaries of the First Punic War in Sicily, giving three possible dates for Hieron's accession: first, on the withdrawal of Pyrrhos from the west, in 275; second, in 270/69, based on a calculation of a rule of fifty-four years from his death in 215; and third, around 265, on the eve of the developments that led to the conflict at Messana²⁵. The Delphic archon in our decree is Erasippos, who belongs to the period in epigraphical terms, but is the cause of much scholarly discord. Homolle refused to be drawn. Flacelière plumped for 269/8, which Daux described as "arbitraire"; Daux himself went variously for 290-280, 279/8 or 276/5. Dinsmoor subscribed to an earlier date, choosing 274/3, whilst Dittenberger assigned Erasippos to the later period of 267-3²⁶.

Hierokles was principally a *evergetes* following his act of *eusebeia* to the sanctuary and his philanthropy to the city as a whole and the individuals with whom he has dealt; the services may be couched in formulaic jargon, but the implication is that he was a *evergetes* first

and a *proxenos* second. Whatever his service, it was sufficient to qualify him for the full range of associated privileges, barring *enktesis* (which was obviously not desirable) and *thearodokeia* (which capacity was probably undertaken by some other Syracusan). The implication is that he was a wealthy man and a welcome visitor to Delphi. That he possessed such material wealth to be able to make such a benefaction again gives the lie to Polybios' account of Hieron's disadvantaged upbringing; the reverse scenario, that Hierokles benefitted substantially from his son's rise to power, is improbable. However, the imprecision of the date of the decree prevents us from discerning whether the Delphoi were shrewd in imposing this indirect obligation on Hieron himself via his father's honours (αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑγγονοῖς) or merely fortunate that their benefactor should turn out in time to be related to the monarch of Syracuse. The importance of the result, a constant high-level relationship between Syracuse and Delphi from at least 263 until 215 via the status of the monarch as a hereditary *evergetes*, would suggest the former²⁷.

-----los, Euthyneides and Euandros of Tarentum. Sons of an unrestored father, granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and other privileges; dated securely 272/1. The remarkable thing about this decree is its date, agreed by Bourguet, Flacelière and Daux to be the same year as the fall of Tarentum to Papirius Cursor²⁸. Herein the Epirote garrison came to terms with the consul without consultation with a citizen body divided between pro-Romans and those who accepted neither Roman nor Epirote rule; the city was treated mildly and awarded

status as a *socius navalis*, although the senate stationed a permanent legion there and took hostages²⁹. This decree shows that, throughout this political and social upheaval, Tarentum continued her religious obligations without disruption. The timing suggests that the Delphoi were appointing representatives of their interests who were unaffected or elevated by the crisis. It is not as certain as with *thearodokoi* and *euergetai*, that these men were possessed of wealth and influence; their service or potential remains obscured behind the bald *proxenia* formulae³⁰. Yet the terms of Rome's success make it virtually certain that the Tarentine ruling classes after 272 were predominantly pro-Roman, especially in view of the recorded sympathies inside the city before the fall. It would be reasonable to see Delphi making sure that the shifted centre of government contained at least three who would be sympathetic to the sanctuary. The fraternal tie, as with the Geloians, merely spread the obligation and provided extra insurance for the fulfilment of the potential.

Sokrates son of Molon of Metapontum. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia* and other privileges; dated securely 272/1, under the same archon, Eudokos, as the Tarentines above³¹. Metapontum's political stance during these years is somewhat obscure; friend of Carthage in 306, she was turned away from Tarentum in 303 by the wanton aggression of Kleonymos. Livy ascribes this latter move to a tacit Roman hand in Lucania, in view of Lucanian assistance to Rome in the Samnite Wars. Metapontum probably came under the direct influence of Rome during the cleaning-up operations in the south of Italy in the aftermath of

Pyrrhos' departure, that is, roughly contemporaneously with this decree³². It would, then, be easy to see a shift in Metapontine governing circles similar to that at Tarentum being recognised by this fresh grant of *proxenia*. However, the restriction on privileges might suggest a lesser light than any prominent governmental individual. It is the timing that seems significant, as with the Tarentine brothers and the Geloians; the plurality of such grants at such periods of crisis suggests something other than coincidence³³. Further, since neither *euergesia* nor *thearodokeia* are involved, the grants seem unconnected with sanctuary business, but have more to do with secular diplomatic practice; one remembers that the Geloians were installed as *thearodokoi* almost as an afterthought in the terms of their decree.

Aristarchos son of Silenos of Camerina. Granted *prodikia*, *asylia* and *asphaleia*; dated 266/5 or 264/3 by Flacelière and Daux and (wrongly) 234/3 by Dittenberger³⁴. The honours were conveyed by an Amphiktyonic council containing six Aitolians, three Phokaians, two Delphoi, two Boiotians, Athenians and a Histiaian; of these, three of the Aitolians also appear on the comprehensive list of Histiaian *proxenoi* dated solidly by Robert to 266, a list which also includes a Tarentine and a Syracusan³⁵. With this corroboration, we shall adhere to the earlier date for Aristarchos' decree.

There is a lacuna in the inscription between Aristarchos' patronymic and ethnic. Nikitsky restored it to read an additional ethnic, Σικελιώτης, but Daux deemed this superfluous; he preferred the

possibilities of the name of the grandfather, or details of Aristarchos' profession, or a stone-mason's error emended by a *rasura*³⁶. It is the last of Daux's suggestions which seems much the more likely³⁷.

Since the grant was made by the Amphiktyony rather than the Delphoi and since the honours were severely restricted, they were merely to usher Aristarchos into the country, presumably for an agonistic purpose. For his privileges amounted to safe conduct into Greece and precedence in any legal dispute he might encounter. The parallels for this limited combination are the Amphiktyonic grant of *asylia*, *asphaleia* and *ateleia* to the Athenian guild of Dionysiac artists in 279/8; the Delphic grant of *promanteia*, *proedria* and *prodikia* to the Isthmian and Nemeian guild prior to 280; and the Aitolian grant of *asylia* and *asphaleia* to the Ionian and Hellespontine guilds in 240-228 and to the Isthmian and Nemeian guilds at some earlier unspecified date³⁸. These grants similarly afforded access to mainland Greece for agonistic purposes, and so Aristarchos' intent was much the same; there were no doubt many such grants to individual artists who were not members of the guilds, but who gained entry to the games by contract with the *agonothete* in charge³⁹. The difference between Aristarchos and those artists identified by Nachtergaele as awarded *proxenia* is one of dating and degree. The latter were honoured after the games with a higher honour, perhaps for some greater service that was not confined to their own particular agonistic skill; however, since these *proxenoi* were honoured in the same year as their performances, the grant might well be seen as a direct result of the quality of their performances. *Euergesia* could as easily take the

form of a dramatic or musical performance for the god as it could a more tangible offering⁴⁰. Since Aristarchos was honoured in 264/3, then he fell between the Pythia of 266/5 and 262/1. If the Pythia was his destination, the quality of his performance would not be known until 262/1; so in 264/3 the Amphiktyony would extend only such privileges as would enable him to reach Delphi and so fulfil the contract that we presume lay behind his participation.

As for Aristarchos' city of provenance, Camerina in Sicily, Manganaro remarks upon its unusually active role in third century religious history, despite its obscurity in other fields and its supposed destruction by Rome in 258. He counters this latter supposition by pointing out the place of Camerina in the Delphic *thearodokos* lists of the early second century, and by its association with the Asklepieia at Kos and Epidauros in the mid-third century. He concludes that, rather than being destroyed, the city was merely part-occupied and suffered the enslavement of part of its population⁴¹. If Aristarchos was an artist or performer, then he would probably spend much of his working life on the road away from home, seeking an audience or a festival in which to perform. Such festivals were abundant the length and breadth of the Greek world; the fact that the Amphiktyony honoured Aristarchos might open to him the whole range of festivals in Amphiktyonic member states, the Athenian Dionysia and Lenaia, the Boiotian Amphiararaia, Basileia and Pamboioteia and so on⁴². If this was the case, then it would reduce the chance of Aristarchos playing a significant role in the political life of Camerina. Yet if he spent his time flitting between Sicily and

Greece, then the contributions he could make to the furtherance of his profession in Sicily would be most significant; what Aristarchos brought back from the panhellenic festivals in terms of cultural influences and political news would be as important as the gifts which he took to them⁴³. In the late 260s, Aristarchos would find his passage to Delphi untroubled. Aitolia was at peace with Makedon, although the latter was embroiled in the Chremonideian War; the Pythia of 262/1, which we presume Aristarchos to have attended, coincided with the signing of the Aitolio-Akarnanian alliance⁴⁴. If he conveyed the news of this consolidation of Aitolian influence in Western Greece, then the Sicily to which he returned had changed its allegiances since his departure in 264 as the First Punic War saw Rome capture Syracuse and the favours of the king Hieron⁴⁵. His presence at the Pythia might have provided early news of this conflict to Greece; it also implies that the seas off Sicily were not closed to the continuing traffic to and from Greece by the fleets of Rome and Carthage⁴⁶.

Philostratos son of Sosistratos of Syracuse. Member of guild of artists participating in the Soteria; dated 262/1. Philostratos, a reasonably secure restoration of his name from the lacuna, was a member of a chorus led by Pythokles of Hermione and including artists from Hermione, Sikyon and Athens. Pythokles was honoured by the Delphoi around 270/69 and appears in other catalogues dating between 265/4 and 255/4, latterly with his brother Pantakles⁴⁷. That he is found alongside these men illustrates the role of the guild as the binding link between them to bring them together for performances such as this⁴⁸. On the

chronological implications of Philostratos' presence, see above on Aristarchos.

Kallias son of Archetimos of Syracuse. Member of guild of artists participating in the Soteria; dated roughly 261-59. The loss of the name of the archon in the inscription renders its dating hazardous; however, it seems that Kallias does not date much later than Aristarchos, especially since his fellow rhapsode, Kleitorios of Arkadia, appears in other catalogues of performers dating from 260⁴⁹. What Kallias would find in Delphi was news of the end of the Chremonideian War and refuge from the Roman campaigns in Sicily as the First Punic War continued; he and Philostratos would be two of the first of Rome's allies from Syracuse to visit Greece⁵⁰.

Drakon son of Lykon of Tarentum. Participant in the Soteria; dated quite securely to 255/4⁵¹. Drakon was a member of a company performing under Satyros the Athenian and including an Arkadian and a Troizenian. He was no doubt part of the thriving dramatic scene at Tarentum that is supposed to have spawned Livius Andronicus; this is attested by his presence on Delos as a *tragoidos* somewhat earlier⁵². Honours were voted to what appears to be his son Aristophamos towards the end of the third century in Aitolia⁵³. What Drakon might know of the now epic encounter between Rome and Carthage, spanning as it did two continents, he would bring to a Delphi whose pitch was further east in the operations of Antigonos Gonatas in the Aigaian⁵⁴.

Herakleitos son of Nikodemus of Tarentum. Victor at the Soteria; dated quite securely to 253/2⁵⁵. Herakleitos was part of a chorus including two performers from Sikyon, and one each from Argos and Samos. On his circumstances, chronology and origins, see above on Drakon.

Ortheas son of Damon of Locri. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and other privileges; dated around 250.

Demarchos son of Philotas, a Locrian from Hipponium. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *ateleia* and other privileges; of uncertain mid-third century date. Although the name Ortheas is not widely attested, Colin preferred it to the orthographical variant Throeas; however, his date of 268, also that of Pomtow and Bourguet, must be altered to meet the mid-third century criteria of Daux and Flacelière⁵⁶. The dating problems of Demarchos are immense. The archonship is that of Xenochareus; Daux identified two such archons, one of indeterminate date between 315 and 280, the other around the middle of the third century. The second of the two accorded with that placed by Flacelière in 261/0; however, the associated *bouleutai* of our decree accord with Daux's first Xenochareus. Baunack went for the panacea 260-230, whilst Bourguet decided on 244 as a *terminus ante quem*, with the rider from the parallel *FD* III.1.168 that "je crois que nous devons faire remonter cet archontat de trente ou quarante ans"⁵⁷. The issue does not admit satisfactory resolution.

Locri had been overtly pro-Roman since the expulsion of Pyrrhos, not least because Rome presented a more friendly aspect than the rapacious Epirote at whose hands the Locrians had suffered appalling atrocities⁵⁸.

The most eloquent witness of this comes in the shape of a coin marked ΠΩΜΗ ΠΙΣΤΙΣ, dated by Crawford to the later years of the Pyrrhic War⁵⁹. Our honorands seem sufficiently distant from that development to rule them out of the suggestion of the curiosity grants made by Delphi to secure representation in a newly orientated government; yet Ortheas' privileges are too straightforward to offer scope for interpretation. However, the more eclectic rights offered to Demarchos seem geared to facilitate his use of the oracle. Thus he may be involved with what Huxley identifies as the restoration of the tribute payable to Athene Ilias by the Lokrians in recompense for the impiety of Aias, at some stage between 306 and 240⁶⁰. Huxley believes that the tribute was renewed on the recommendation of Delphi under the auspices of an Antigonos, by this reckoning Gonatas. He does concede that there was no explicit mention of the Epizephyrian Lokrians in the terms of the liability to the tribute, as opposed to the Ozolian or Opountian Lokrians; however, that Demarchos is here marked as specifically an Epizephyrian Lokrian may suggest that there were Lokrians of other provenance in the air at Delphi at the time⁶¹. Under this interpretation, the western branch of the family were showing concern and consideration for their eastern cousins; perhaps Demarchos was asking the oracle if his Locri was equally liable to the tribute. Thus an ally of Rome (or potential ally, depending on the precise date of the decree) was involved in a debate in the centre of Greece over whether her founding fathers should pay tribute to the state of origin of the Romans. Although there are difficulties with the date, we should remember that in the middle of the third century at the end of the First

Punic War, Rome herself explored her own foundation myths as a means of access to diplomatic links with Akarnania and Ilium⁶². Demarchos' connection is inexact, but Huxley's construct will be important for our theme.

A footnote to the Locrian connection is the remark of Kroll that, sometime prior to 237, when Rome colonised the site, Hipponium fell under the control of Locri. For, although Demarchos styles himself first and foremost a Locrian, his precise place of provenance is Hipponium (63).

'ho deinos' son of -----anax of Syracuse. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia* and other irrecoverable honours; dated around 250. The fragmentary nature of the inscription renders it difficult to use. It is important to note Bourguet's belief that hereafter "on sait que le nombre des stèles à proxénie va en diminuant au III^e siècle". Yet we are still some distance from the block grants of *proxenia* recorded baldly under the officials of one individual year, as is found in other states and used by Delphi for the years following 197. Individual grants may be comparatively few, yet they still continue with sufficient honorific eccentricities to permit interpretation until the end of the century⁶⁴.

Agemachos son of Deinokrates of Tarentum. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and other privileges; of uncertain date, but carved on the same stone as Xeneas.

Xeneas son of Xenaithos of Tarentum. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*,

prodikia, *proedria*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and all other privileges of *proxenoi* and *euergetai*; dated approximately 234/3.

We list Agemachos here purely because of his position on the same stone as the more secure Xeneas; for the arguments concerning his dating are circular and inconclusive. The fragmentary nature of his decree obscures the name of the archon; Bourguet lists it alongside Xeneas among the later third century inscriptions, but remarks that "cette stèle aurait sans doute eu le droit d'être citée plus tôt, à côté de la base des Tarentins, comme le no. 135", no. 135 being the decree in honour of the Tarentine Hippis (see above). The arguments concerning such an early date for Agemachos centre upon the archon in Xeneas' decree, Herys, of whom there are two examples; the first dates some time between 300-280 (Flacelière) or 315-300 (de la Coste-Messelière), whilst the second dates to the 230s (Flacelière variously 238/7 and 234/3, Daux 232 or 228)⁶⁵. Xeneas himself must surely be honoured under the second Herys; the confusion surrounding Agemachos appears to be a hangover from the earlier belief that it was rather the first Herys, and so physical proximity has confused an issue that cannot be settled by the identification of the archon nor by epigraphical style. Xeneas' date is confirmed by corroboration of his *bouleutai*, who were all archons in the 240s⁶⁶.

Xeneas received the standard privileges of *proxenia*; although he receives the extra sundry privileges of the *euergetes*, this merely reflects formulaic procedure. However, his importance lies in his date and his provenance. As a traveller to Delphi from Tarentum in the 230s,

his route would almost certainly take him past the Epirote coastline at roughly the same time as the Illyrians were conducting their depredations there⁵⁷. Whether Xeneas was one of Polybios' *emporoi* is irrecoverable; his virtue for our enquiry is that he was in the right place at the right time, direct evidence of the trans-Adriatic traffic that may have brought the wrath of Rome upon Illyria.

Leon son of Leonidas of Messana. Victor in the Pythia; dated 238-222.

Leon inscribes a vauntful ode declaring himself to be the first Messanian to win the Pythian pentathlon. The date cannot be accurately set; epigraphy sets the boundaries, yet Bousquet's observation that the most logical period for Leon's participation in the Pythia was 241-218, between the Punic Wars, is neither helpful nor watertight. Bousquet's argument for Leon's provenance being Zancle-Messana rather than Messene is based on the comparative autonomies of the towns in view of the declaration that Leon is from an *αὐτόνομον πατρίδα*⁵⁸. If this is true, then it sets a comparatively early date for the reintegration of Messana within the cultural ambit of Greece following the Mamertine occupation; we know that she was an attender of the Epidaurian Asklepieia in the fourth century and received a Delphic *theoria* in the second, but this is the only clue for the intervening period⁵⁹. This identification, especially Leon's nationalistic boast on behalf of his autonomous fatherland, also draws significance from its general chronological context; this was a time when Rome was either on the point of establishing formal relations with the Greeks or had recently done so. A representative of the first state to draw Rome outside of Italy and so a

most particular witness to the results of such an association, would be an encouraging example to the Greeks at the Pythia either in prospect or in hindsight⁷⁰.

Herakleides son of Lykon, his sons Demetrios and Herakleides junior, and Sosikles son of Sosios, all of Syracuse. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia*, *enktesis* and all other privileges of *proxenoi* and *euergetai*; dated, without absolute certainty, 230/29. The arguments surrounding the date are multiple. Flacelière ascribes the archonship of Phainis here to 230/29, which Daux describes as "très incertaine". Pomtow's 219/8 and Baunack's 227/6 are countered by Flacelière's claim that it cannot be so far from the archonship of Dion in 243/2 owing to the shared *bouleutai*; Tarn's argument that the date cannot be after 235 since the Arkadian also honoured in this year retains his ethnic, is equally quashed by Flacelière on the inconsistency in the use of the ethnic⁷¹. The fairest conclusion to draw is that Flacelière's determined efforts to stand his corner are justifiable.

These Syracusans share a decree with the aforementioned Arkadian, an Ephesian and a Knidian. Given the parallels from other states in Greece, it might seem reasonable to assume that all they shared was basic contemporaneity, that for convenience's sake the Delphoi inscribed four or five separate grants on the same stone under the one archon. Yet this was not Delphic practice in the third century; all other multiple grants were for residents of a single city⁷². Our assumption must therefore be

that all seven honorands had a single service in common and that all were honoured for the performance of that service. What is apparent is that the sons of Herakleides performed this communal service in their own right; otherwise there was no need for them to be separately listed, but they were included under αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑγγονοῖς. Further, the grant of *enktesis* was one grudgingly applied by the Delphoi in the third century; those few who did receive it at this time do not appear to be foreigners, and only one of the three received full rights of *proxenia*⁷³.

Again, the significance of these men lies in their date, at the outbreak of or just prior to the First Illyrian War. For they would be approaching Delphi as the Illyrian atrocities were at their worst and ranging as far afield as Elis and Messene, that is, right the way across the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth⁷⁴; there would be no security for traffic from Syracuse even if it headed directly for the mouth of the Gulf instead of skirting the Italian coast to seek the shortest crossing. It is perhaps this that provides the clue to the communal service. Under this Illyrian threat, any traffic which reached Delphi was doubly valued; the Syracusans in particular had proved their worth purely by getting there. It is possible that the seven were participants in the Pythia of 230/29, brought together by the guilds for an especially laudable performance. However, since the Ephesians and Knidians were involved, perhaps there was a commercial link that bound them together to supply Delphi at festival time when she was feeling the pinch from the disruption of trade around Western Greece. If so, the

offer of *enktesis* might have served to provide a permanent base for this trade, whereafter those involved could continue to supply Delphi for as long as they were able.

This survey of the traffic that passed between the west and Delphi in the years of the third century leading up to 230 demonstrates a number of things. The *thearodokos* decrees demarcate the states that were likely to send a steady stream of traffic across the Adriatic, that is, in response to every festival announcement issued by the sanctuary. In the early years of the Soteria at least, this would amount to an annual traffic, whilst the Pythia would call forth representatives, competitors and pilgrims every four years. The *thearodokos* decrees and the *euergesia* decrees highlight a number of wealthy and therefore at least potentially influential people who were connected with Delphi and her rituals. The *proxenia* decrees present less certain evidence, other than of traffic and connections; their holders may be artists and performers, of whom we know a little more from the festival catalogues. The cultural implications of their participation may be considerable and will admit further treatment, even though their transient nature makes them difficult to pin down.

But perhaps the two greatest intimations to arise from this survey are the following. First, when Polybios spoke of depredations being committed against *emporoi* who plied the Adriatic and appealed to Rome in 230 as they had done many times in previous years, there is a chance

that he was referring to the characters we have listed above. For they all crossed the Adriatic by the appropriate route, and in two notable instances, were heading for Delphi around the exact time of Rome's intervention. Even if neither Xeneas nor the family of Herakleides were *emporoi* or attacked, they demonstrate that a certain traffic was passing through the area at the right time and was vulnerable to the Illyrians; the very existence of the threat may have been enough to sponsor an appeal to Rome from Tarentum or Syracuse. Second, and important for the future of Rome's intervention in Greece, we have seen a reasonably wide variety of Italian and Sicilian states whose contribution to the wealth, status and prosperity of Delphi would bring them into contact with Aitolia. For, as the self-appointed guardian of the sanctuary, it was in Aitolia's interests that the sanctuary remained wealthy, reputable and prosperous. In the 280s, it was Pyrrhos who sought to maintain the liberty of these western Greeks and thus also, tangentially at least, their attendance at Delphi; Aitolian support for him was therefore in the interests of all concerned, not least herself. Rome's assumption of this tutelary role for Southern Italy and Sicily in the 270s and 260s therefore placed her on the end of a chain of mutual interests that led via her charges and Delphi to Aitolia. Delphi's realisation of this is implied by the honours to Megakles of Neapolis in 275/4, as close to Rome as possible without touching her; her realisation of the changing status quo within her longstanding associates is implied by the honours granted in 272/1, when Rome's arrival in Greek Italy was complete. Aitolian and finally Roman realisation of this contiguousness will be discussed below.

APPENDIX Tarantinos.

One striking aspect of the Delphic inscriptions is the comparative frequency with which the name Tarantinos appears amongst the officials of the sanctuary and of the town, right through our period from the late-fourth century into the mid-second and beyond. It is not clear whether the name was common to any particular family over a number of generations; if so, it was certainly a prominent and influential one, most particularly from the latter years of the third century right down throughout the whole second century¹. However, the name was not exclusively confined to Delphi. It appears elsewhere: in Athens in the first quarter of the second century, where Tarantinos is listed alongside Simaristos as *prytanis* from the small inland deme of Trinemeia in the tribe of Kekropis²; and on Keos, in a third century catalogue of those who swore an unrestored oath of allegiance³.

The question is, whence the name? Does it denote an empathy or continuing connection with, or an origin in the city of Tarentum? One possible explanation is that the name was a development out of the appearance of an élite cavalry corps in Greek military circles, first at Paraitakene with Antigonos Monophthalmos in 317, and thereafter in general use in Greece and Asia by the end of the third century⁴. These men went under the name Tarantinoi, and may be foreshadowed by the appearance of Dokimos Tarantinos in the army of Philip, who was remarkable for his tendency to wash in warm water; he may be either a mere mercenary or the first exponent of this new tactic⁵. Yet neither

Griffith nor Martin can adequately explain the origin of the term. Griffith notes that it is the first known manifestation of the tendency to describe a type of soldier by an ethnic; yet he doubts whether it even developed from an original group of Tarentine mercenaries since the ones he exemplifies cannot be from Tarentum and are often not even mercenaries⁶. Martin more logically reasons that the name may emanate from a parade exercise, from the agility of the soldier or his equipment, in much the same way as the *ludi Tarentini* at Rome represented a style rather than a firm geographical origin⁷.

Both of these assessments leave us with a chicken-and-egg situation. For the first noted manifestation of this phenomenon in 317 is roughly contemporaneous with our first Tarantinos at Delphi, as *bouleutes* some time between 323/2 and 312/1; if this date is close to the first actual appearance of the corps instead of merely the first recorded appearance, it is not sufficiently early to be reckoned a cause for the development of the personal nomenclature, unless the two developed simultaneously. It would be strange, however, to see such a militaristic predilection inside such a peaceable community as Delphi, one devoted to the running of the sanctuary and without a standing army. The only alternative that we can offer is that the name developed from the pure ethnic, and so there was a prominent family in Delphi throughout our period that, to all outward appearances, declared a Tarentine interest. Perhaps this was derived from some tutelary connection with the Tarentine treasury that provided a permanent, physical link between the sanctuary and Tarentum throughout antiquity; if this was overlaid with a human connection of

similar durability, then there is added a fresh aspect to our picture of trans-Adriatic communication.

(v). TRAFFIC FOR ASKLEPIOS.

Second to Delphi, the lure of Asklepios, especially from the Lourdes-type centre at Epidauros, was responsible for sufficient traffic from Italy and Sicily to the east to warrant a separate category in Casson's survey of travel in the ancient world; he pictured shiploads of invalids heading for Epidauros, Kos and the like in quest of a miraculous incubatory cure in the temple of the god¹. For Epidauros, the most telling evidence comes from outside ■ our period, from the second half of the fourth century in the form of a *thearodokos* list; this runs roughly from 365 to 311 and records representatives at Syracuse, Locri, Croton, Thurii, Tarentum, Terina, Rhegium, Metapontum, Tollophon, Leontini, Catana, Zmarathas, Messana, Gela and Acragas². The elevated positions occupied by the historically identifiable *thearodokoi* in their home states suggests quite strongly that the other *thearodokoi* in this list were similarly influential³. Thus there were high-level lines of communication between this wide smattering of Italian and Sicilian states and Epidauros, and a regular traffic to the quadrennial festival of Asklepios.

Leophron of Metapontum. Dedication to the god Asklepios, from the late-third century. Leophron is the only example of a third century dedicant from the west leaving evidence of himself at Epidauros⁴; along with Nikokles of Tarentum and Dazos, a Canusian from Italy of imprecise date in the second century, he comprises the only attested traffic in the two centuries following the *thearodokos* list⁵. Dazos' use of the qualified

ethnic suggests an earlier date when Epidauros was still unfamiliar with Italian geography, or Dazos himself assumed their unfamiliarity; either intimation suggests that traffic between the west and Epidauros was not voluminous⁶. We must consider whether Leophron, Nikokles and Dazos are indeed significant in their isolation after 311, or it is a mere accident of epigraphy that only three westerners have survived among the dedicants at Epidauros. If the *thearodokos* list suggests that fourth century traffic was considerable, was there then a sudden and dramatic shortfall from the third century onwards ?

What might have militated against Epidauros was Asklepios' residence in Rome after Q. Ogulnius Gallus fetched the serpent of the god in 292 in answer to the pestilence that had smitten Italy⁷. The effects of the importation on the general traffic to Epidauros remain to be assessed. For the route from Southern Italy or Sicily to the sanctuary was either through the Gulf of Korinth and over the Isthmus, or around Cape Maleia into the Saronic Gulf; both routes were hazardous, laborious and expensive. After Rome established her influence over Italy and Sicily in the 270s and 260s, surely the hardship of such travel might have been avoided by the shorter voyage to Rome ? There were also sanctuaries in colonies such as Fregellae, Paestum and Antium, the former boasting deposits of anatomical terracottas dating from the late-fourth century⁸. The availability of such hospital and worship facilities in Italy may well have had a noticeable effect on the traffic from the west to Epidauros as these colonies grew in size and began to prosper. However, the epigraphy of the sanctuary on the Tiber island is unhelpful,

recording only five unremarkable Romans and a slave from this early period⁹. Indeed, the evidence for any attendance at such sanctuaries is uninformative. The customary dedication to the god was a model of the afflicted part of the body, usually without inscription; thus for all the multitude of such offerings, we are in the dark over the identity of their owners¹⁰.

If the epigraphical evidence from Epidauros and Rome is thus devalued, geographical considerations might carry more weight. However, Rome and her colonies could not offer a rival to the great panhellenic festival built up at Epidauros in the fourth century. Held every four years after the Isthmia¹¹, the festival accounted at least in part for the architectural developments on the site between 370 and 320 and for the amount of structures that offered accommodation for visitors to the sanctuary¹². It would be strange to see the large-scale commitment to that festival in the fourth century replaced by an instant apathy in the third. Indeed, the victory won there by Nikokles of Tarentum in the mid-third century suggests that, even if ordinary pilgrim attendance at Epidauros fell off in the face of more convenient facilities, this festival traffic continued for as long as it was practical, desirable and safe.

There was, however, a rival attraction established on the island of Kos, the second largest centre of Asklepios worship in the Greek world, around 242. A set of sixteen decrees attest to an initiative to secure *asylia* for both a penteteric festival and the temple, and the

solicitation of contributions from all invited states¹³. The scope of these decrees show that the invitations were unlimited by Kos' Ptolemaic affiliations, in line with her nominal independence; however, the earliest of the extant decrees records Ptolemaic approval for the move¹⁴. The cities who accepted include Sparta, Messene, Thelphoussa, Elis and Aigeira, Makedonian Kassandreia, Amphipolis, Pella and Philippi, Homolium, Phthiotic Thebes and Megara, the Thracian Ainos and Maroneia and Kios, Iasos and Kerkyra; of special interest to us are the decrees issued by Gelon of Syracuse, Neapolis, Velia, Camerina and Gela¹⁵. The decrees are dated on the arrival of the *theoroi* back in Kos, and so their departure and travels were some time prior to 242¹⁶. The first festival was to be quite considerable, as was shown by the terms of the Koan *lex sacra*, describing the sacrifice of oxen with gilded horns to the god; the expense would be met from public and private funds, the former consisting in part of the contributions of the participants¹⁷.

Letter of Gelon, son of Hieron II of Syracuse. This identification is by restoration, but is commonly accepted¹⁸. The prince writes on behalf of himself, his sister and their citizens, primarily in apology for the cessation of previous philanthropy towards Kos, which was occasioned by some unspoken impediment. This issue was raised by the *theoroi*; although the prince is duly contrite, he cannot guarantee that it will not happen again. He acknowledges Koan kinship with his city, as the *theoroi* had pointed out with reference to his father, and accepts the announcement of the festival and the claim to *asylia*. He promises that if any other

state claims kinship with his city as an introduction to the Koans, he will confirm the validity of that claim. The letter ends with a strenuous affirmation of his goodwill towards the Koans.

The latter stands out from the other decrees by virtue of its epistolary form; this was the standard medium for royal communication. That it is the prince Gelon rather than the king Hieron who wrote the letter is concomitant with Hieron's indirect status as *evergetes* of Delphi via his father Hierokles; like the Delphoi, the Koans preferred the indirect line of communication with the monarch. Equally, perhaps Hieron did write in person to the Koans, but his letter does not survive; there are parallels from similar instances for both kings and princes of the same state making similar responses to the same proposition, most notably the acceptance of the festival of Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia-Maiandros by Antiochos father and son¹⁹.

The impediment that cut short Syracusan philanthropy towards Kos was no doubt the First Punic War. Although there was no naval blockade to shipping from Sicily, Hieron's attention was firmly focussed on events closer to home and on the cause of his new allies²⁰. Hence Gelon's reluctance to guarantee the future of that philanthropy. Since 242 is the *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the letter, the war was not yet over; Gelon could foresee neither its conclusion nor the resumption of former normalities. Perhaps also Kretan piracy had provided a strong deterrent to traffic to and from Kos. Yet it seems strange that an essentially defensive *theoria* saw fit to rebuke the

Syracusans in such aggressive terms, and that the Syracusans were made to feel guilty. Hieron's role in the restoration of Rhodes after the earthquake of 225, along with Ptolemy, Antigonos, Seleukos, Mithridates and Prousius, suggests that Syracuse was deeply implicated within the trading circles of the Eastern Aigaian; that *portoria* were remitted to Rhodians in Syracuse surely confirms that impression²¹. Perhaps the Koan rebuke was by way of an enquiry into a reduction in Syracusan activity in these trading circles, explicable by Hieron's economic support for Rome in the First Punic War; perhaps Gelon's reply was in terms of regret over that reduction and resignation over whether Syracuse would ever be free of such obligations. Thus the agreement to support any claims of kinship as a introduction to Kos was the only solid support Gelon could offer to the *theoria*, at least for the moment²².

Decrees of Neapolis and Velia. On the same decree, or on fragments of the one stone. The Neapolitans record the arrival of the *theoroi* Epidauros son of Nikarchos, Philophron son of Dardanos and Simias son of Timasiphron²³, who announce their requests on the basis of the *oikeiότης* and *εὐνοία* that existed between the two states. This representation is approved by archons, *synkletos* and *demos*, and agreement is made to grant three minae to the running of the festival and to entertain the *theoroi* during their stay in Neapolis. The archons and *demos* of Velia receive the same three *theoroi*, but the details of their response is lost; it was probably along similar lines, as the very existence of their decree on Kos would corroborate.

Primarily, the fact that one of Rome's closest and longstanding Greek allies accepted these proposals should reinforce our opinion that Italians and Sicilians were prepared to ignore the closer shrines of Asklepios and travel if there was a major festival at stake. However, there is nowhere in the decree any intimation that the Neapolitans sent an official representation to Kos; they were courteous and generous to the Koan *theoroi* for the duration of their stay, but did no more than accept the *asylia* of the festival. The bonds of *οἰκειότης* and *εὖνοια* mean little more than that the two states recognised their fellowship of race in a friendly manner; there is none of the *ἀναγκαιότης* that bound Gelon nor of the vigorous kinship of Camerina. Indeed, the Koans might have been testing the water so close to Rome²⁴; of their *theoroi*, Epidauros might have reminded the Neapolitans of Rome's links with Epidauros, whilst the son of Dardanos might have evoked the currency of Rome's hellenistic foundation myth²⁵. Yet if they sought an introduction to Rome, they were politely stonewalled by the Neapolitans, their interest killed by kindness.

In this decree, there is what appears to be the earliest use of the term *synkletos* in Italy as descriptive of a probouleutic council²⁶. The term appears in Aristotle and in Athens in a most specific manner; but in the west it is not found until the end of the century at Syracuse, Agrigentum and Melite, by which time all were subordinate to Rome²⁷. The only other appearances are at Larisa, in the context of Romanisation; and in Polybios of Carthage and the Achaian League, where the signs are that the historian was more influenced than influencing²⁸. Rome's

somewhat eccentric use of the term *synkletos* for her senate seems thus drawn directly from the Neapolitans; when she needed to describe herself in official terms to the Greeks in their own language, these terms were derived from her oldest Greek ally. This specific use of the medium is most important, not least during these closing stages of the First Punic War.

Decree of Camerina. On receipt of the envoys Epidaurios and Sosistratos son of Kaphisios, the Camerinaians accept the proposals for the sake of their mutual good fortune, *ὁμόνοια* and *σωτηρία* with Kos²⁹. For the Koans are their *συνοικίσται* and so enjoy *συγγένεια*, *οἰκειότης* and *ἰσοπολιτεία* in Camerina; the Camerinaians deem it worthy of their *οἰκειότης* and *εὐνοία* to participate in the festival, and are pleased to be reminded of their *συγγένεια* with Kos along with all other *οἰκίσται*³⁰. Thus their offering of *ξενία* to the *theoroi* and to those who have always come to Camerina is also couched in terms of mutual good fortune, *ὕψεια*, *σωτηρία* and *ὁμόνοια*.

This espousal of the Koan cause is staggering in its enthusiasm and zeal. Camerina undertook to attend the festival with an official representation, with none of the hesitation which marked Gelon's reply. Yet this lack of concern for their circumstances stands the Camerinaians out on a limb. As aforementioned, the tradition recorded by Polybios had it that Camerina was destroyed in 258, as was supported by Diodoros³¹. However, the town was not destroyed, but rather suffered part-occupation and the enslavement of part of her population and thereafter lived on in

subordination and poverty. Manganaro shows that the penury of Camerina was so severe that her entertainment of the *theoroi* suffered badly by comparison with Phintia Gelorum³². Thus the effusive gestures made by the Camerinaians partially obscure the fact that they promised nothing of substance or value to the Koans, merely acceptance of the festival, attendance and some kind of ξενία for the *theoroi*. The impression is that it was enough for the Camerinaians to participate at all, perhaps via the entry of such as Aristarchos into the games, without the further imposition of a financial burden such as the contributions made by the Neapolitans and Geloians.

Decree of Gela. The decree is most fragmentary, but was restored by Herzog and Klaffenbach to read virtually the same as the Camerinaian decree. The additions are the granting of πωλητήρες to the festival for the sacrifices, as for the Olympic games, and of ten silver minae; a common sacrifice was to be made by the *theoroi* and the *hieromnemes* of Gela for the mutual good of the two states.

The Geloians had no poverty to hide in flowery rhetoric, but still apparently indulged in the same verbosity. Thus, unless the restoration is inaccurate, the formulae may be only part-front and so also part-genuine sentiment; on the eve of their final subsumption within Rome's sphere of influence, Gela joined Camerina in making vigorous statements of their status as Greeks and of their inextricable links with the hellenistic chains of kinship. This is more remarkable when placed in apposition to the uncertain Gelon and the uncomplicated Neapolis; the

former seems unable and the latter unwilling to succumb to what was no doubt a similar initiative to that placed before the Geloians and Camerinaians. It is a vivid if limited scenario. Due to the eclecticism of epigraphy, we do not know if other states received the *theoroi* and responded favourably to them; we also cannot tell what influence Rome might have had on the decrees which do survive. Yet these four contrasting responses are important indications of contemporary sympathies at the time of the Koan appeal.

The first Asklepieia on Kos were held shortly after the return of the *theoroi*, around 241, and thereafter in 236 and 231. Of the two routes from the west to Kos, that through the Gulf of Korinth, across the Isthmus and then out via the Kyklades would bring the pilgrims into greater contact with the mainland Greeks in a vastly changing decade. In 241, Aitolia was allied to a subservient Boiotia, whilst Achaia maintained her hostility towards Antigonos of Makedon following Aratos' seizure of the Akrokorinth; the Achaian defeat of the Aitolians at Pellene in that year altered considerably the face of Greek political alignments. This change was fully evolved by 236, when the Boiotians had returned to the Makedonian fold following the death of Antigonos and the accession of Demetrios II, whilst the Aitolio-Achaian accord sought to extend the influence of the respective parties in Western Greece and the Peloponnese from the Gulf³³. Then in 23¹~~3~~, travellers by this central route would run straight into the depredations of the Illyrians, once again providing potential victims and plaintiffs; yet this is not as certain as the traffic to Delphi, given the alternative route available.

The route around Cape Maleia, quicker and cheaper, albeit more physically hazardous, still presented the chance of encountering the Aitolians on the early part of the journey, as they pursued their ambitions in the Peloponnese³⁴. Equally, there was the chance of encountering the Illyrians in 231, as their activities ranged some way to the south³⁵. However, this route would not demonstrate such an aspect of central Greek politics as would its more laborious counterpart. Yet both would share the crossing of the Aigaian in the sphere of the thalassocratic struggle between Egypt, Makedon and Rhodes³⁶. At a time when Romans and Italians were beginning to appear on Delos and Tenos, and some time after the evidence for Roman ships heading for Caria and Rhodes, Italians and Sicilians seeking Kos were certainly not heading along an untrodden route into the unknown³⁷.

The issue of western traffic involved in the worship of Asklepios in the third century is a thorny one, not least because of the lack of a genuine weight of evidence. We know that there was a regular attendance at Epidauros in the fourth century, but there is little further evidence to suggest that the weight of traffic was similarly continued into the third century. The presence of the god in Rome from 292 presented a rival and more convenient centre of worship; but again, evidence is lacking as to whether this potential was fulfilled. Even the western acceptance of the Koan festival in 242 provides no certain evidence for a regular traffic across the Aigaian in quest of Asklepios; the only subsequent westerner found on the island is Protarchos of Tauromenium in

the mid-third century, and even he is a victor at the Dionysia rather than a participant in the Asklepieiaia³⁸.

Yet Leophron of Metapontum and Nikokles of Tarentum show that the traffic did continue to at least some degree in the third century; the lack of a rival Asklepieiaia until 242 probably means that representations continued to visit Epidauros every four years to maintain a high-level respect for the sanctuary and its precepts from the west. Travel thither would engage these representations with the Achaians, although the paucity of the evidence deprives us of contexts and circumstances. As for Kos, pilgrims thither were very much in the worlds of Rhodes and Egypt at a time when the former was waxing and the latter beginning to struggle to maintain her position. Traffic to either sanctuary may have become embroiled with the Illyrians in 230. We know only enough to adumbrate this potential. Yet again there is a implied mutuality of interests for Rome as her allies move in the spheres of Achaia, Ptolemy and Rhodes; realisation of this will again be discussed below.

(vi). AITOLIA.

We have already highlighted the almost inevitable contact into which travellers from the west must have come with Aitolia, be it pilgrims at her protégée Delphi or tangential traffic on her coastline. It should be no surprise, then, to find a number of honorands in Aitolia herself from our period; from these we might hope to define Aitolia's relations with such travellers and, indeed, with the states whence they came. *Prima facie*, these honours seem to be civil and secular. Aitolia held no panhellenic festival at which artists might be honoured for their performances; the subsequent *asylia* grants for the Dionysiac guilds of Ionia, the Hellespont, the Isthmia and the Nemeia were not until 240 at the earliest and should not be confused with the *proxenia* grants from Thermon¹. For there was a need for the rapacious Aitolians to guarantee safe passage for artists and performers bound for Delphi, but not so for them to reward these participants for their performance.

Lucius L. f. 'Olkaios' Rhomaïos. Granted *proxenia* around 262. This inscription is a comprehensive list of *proxenoi* recorded year by year and updated more than once; in it is found the first Roman to be honoured in Greece. He was recorded by name alone, along with that of his guarantor, Damoitas of Naupaktos, who acted similarly for a Makedonian from Pella². Klaffenbach has the following to say concerning our man:

"nomen Romanum videtur interpretandum L. L. f. Volceius, cf. Dessau 400, 2097. Aut Olkaïos = Ulcius (cf. *CIL*. VI. 39800) ? Vix est, quod moneam, cuius momenti sit proxenia Aitolica Romano cuidam iam tunc temporis collata".

Subsequent considerations of Volceius have remarked merely upon his isolation and questioned his circumstances without ever addressing the problem in full³.

Volceius, in short, was honoured either as an official representative of Rome, or for lesser services performed as a private citizen. To compare him with other individuals in the lists, there were also honoured a Makedonian poet, an Arkadian from three generations of Delphic *thearodokoi*, what appears to be the grandson of a noted Athenian flautist, an Athenian *curator sacrorum* and the brother of an Achaian *nomographos*; a fair mix, then⁴. Other *proxenoi* are found from prominent trading nations such as Rhodes, Kyzikos, Mitylene, Krete, Seleukeia and Kalchedon, no doubt because Aitolia had long depended on the produce of others to maintain her comparatively primitive economy⁵.

The prosopography of the list is thus no help; what of the chronological circumstances ? By 262, Rome was heavily involved in the First Punic War, having carried the fighting to Sicily and won over Hieron of Syracuse from the Carthaginian alliance; her forces spent much of that year engaged in the siege and capture of Agrigentum⁶. Yet the fighting was confined to Sicily and in the hands of a limited number of legions and the *socii navales*; there was no reason why the majority of Romans should not have carried on their daily business. Even if Volceius was involved with the military operation, there was plenty of time to spare during the tedious siege of Agrigentum. If he was not, then these were the derestricted years of senatorial business interests, prior to

the *lex Claudia* of 218. As for Aitolia, these were the years of consolidation during the Chremonideian War, during which she was at peace with Makedon and machinating for the alliance with Akarnania which effectively integrated the two states⁷. For the Pythia of 262/1, we should remember Aristarchos above; also the discussions below.

It seems likely that Volceius' name was derived from some connection with the Etrurian town of Vulci, formerly associated with the ascent of Servius Tullius to the monarchy in the sixth century and now reduced inside the Roman alliance⁸. The alternative that might suggest Volcei in Northern Lucania as his provenance produces the ethnic Vulcientes or Volceianus, neither of which is sufficiently close to our name to attempt identification⁹. If he was an Etruscan, he may have been one of those who were making their way in Rome having entered and integrated at an earlier period, such as the Ogulnii or the Volumnii; or he may have been one of those *principes* by whose good favour Rome sought to exercise her control over Etruria¹⁰. That Dessau's examples of his family are found in somewhat lowly military ranks need not be strictly relevant to our enquiry; there is a considerable time lapse between those imperial years and our republican ones¹¹.

This circumstantial evidence on which the case for Volceius is built is insubstantial and inconclusive. Let us leave it to one side until we have discussed the other honorands in Aitolia and elsewhere, and begun to consider the implications of official Roman activities in the years

under question. For it is only then that any sense will be made of Volceius' presence in Aitolia in 262.

----- son of Eiramenes of Syracuse. Granted *proxenia* around 262. Neither the honorand's forename nor the name of his guarantor can be restored. The timing is crucial, the year after Hieron's surrender to Rome which represented the collapse of the last bastion of Greek independence in the west. Hieron's volte-face was presumably not without casualties in his court, the monarchic equivalent of the governmental reorientation that seemed to be the driving force behind the Delphic grants to Tarentines and a Metapontine in 272/1. Aitolia was in a privileged position geographically when it came to the receipt of such information, an almost obligatory port of call for all traffic destined for Delphi in particular. In this context, 262/1 was a Pythian year; Aitolia's tutelage of the Amphiktyony and of the sanctuary itself bound her inextricably to the goings-on at the festival¹². Thus she of all the Greek powers would have gleaned from the Pythia detailed news of world events, including those in Italy and Sicily; she would also have picked up something of the Delphoi's shrewdness in keeping tabs on developments by appointing representatives of their own interests in the states of the relevant protagonists.

For Syracuse, the events of the last two years meant that they would probably not cross the Adriatic without good reason; the Pythia might have been just such a reason. The state was involved with Delphi on all levels, from Hieron's own royal euergetism to the steady flow of artists

and performers that competed in Soteria and Pythia. If she sent a representation, then it would have been bound to pass Aitolia; it would also have been bound to meet Aitolian representatives when it arrived at the festival¹³. Perhaps, then, the son of Eiramenes either survived or benefitted from the change of heart of Hieron in 263, and was so dispatched in 262 to represent the king at the Pythia. There as a representative of the new order in Syracuse, he was promptly honoured by the Aitolians, so receiving the obligation to safeguard their interests before Hieron and to keep them appraised of developments in Sicily. How that proposition reflects on Volceius will be discussed below.

Theodoros son of Pasikles and Leon son of Antileon, of Metapontum.

Granted *proxenia* around 262. Both men are recommended by Trichas son of Eoitas, *hieromnemon* of the Aitolians in 272/1¹⁴. Klaffenbach identifies Leon with that 'celeber' Metapontine Pythagorean listed by Iamblichos; yet it should be noted that Leon was not an uncommon name¹⁵.

The pursuit of the Pythian theme would seem most appropriate for these Metapontines. Relations with Delphi had been refreshed by the proxeny grant to Sokrates in 272/1; that Trichas was *hieromnemon* in that same year and now proposes these honours can hardly be coincidence. Mayer's attempts to link Metapontum with Aitolia by means of her cult forms, especially those of Achelous and Apollo Laphrios, are unnecessary and uncertain; such connections are inchoate and intangible at best¹⁶.

Drakon son of Charilaos and Hiketas son of Tharrydamos of Akragas.

Granted *proxenia* around 262; their guarantor was Alexon of Naupaktos, possibly an Aitolian *hieromnemon* in the 250s¹⁷. However, there was an Akragas in Aitolia, according to Stephanos of Byzantium, and it is probable that this was the provenance of these men rather than Sicily¹⁸; it would represent an extraordinary scenario if the Agrigentines, under heavy siege from the Romans, managed to squeeze out a representation bound for Delphi.

Two unrestored sons of Philokrates of Tarentum. Granted *proxenia* in the mid-late third century; dated by the script and by the guarantors Dorimachos and Agemachos¹⁹. The list, fragmentary though it is, also contains honours to men from Mitylene, Athens, Magnesia-Maiandros, Kyzikos and Sidon²⁰. The listing of these honorands together implies only a connection of synchronicity rather than a communal service; however, the concentration of men from such prominent trading nations in the one year may reflect upon the status of the Tarentines. Yet the date is irrecoverable. The boundaries of chronology place the brothers in the vicinity of Xeneas and the 230s. Thus the possibility that they performed a commercial service might place them among the *emporoi* of Polybios; however they may equally well postdate the First Illyrian War.

These honours suggest two things. First, that Aitolia used Delphi as the source of her information concerning international affairs and as a medium of communication with foreign powers. The extension of that is surely that she would have taken a dim view of any interruption of the

flow of traffic to and from the sanctuary that might have jeopardised her position as a major power in Greece, both by cutting the lines of communication and by exposing her as a second-rate guardian of the sanctuary. Second, the issue of Aitolia's own material well-being; at all times in the third century there were significant representations from eastern trading nations in her *proxenia* lists such as Athens, Eresos, Karystos, Mitylene, Eretria, Rhodes, Kalchedon, Thasos, Kyzikos, Korinth, Krete and Seleukeia. The implication is that Aitolia depended quite heavily on the import trade for her own survival. Therefore any interruption of commercial traffic plying the Gulf of Korinth in either direction would have affected quite badly her economy. This dual interest in the freedom of the waterways puts Aitolia in the forefront of any thinking about the Illyrian depredations of the 230s; her own connections with Rome's allies are most important in this respect²¹.

(vii). OTHER TRAFFIC.

Let us briefly tidy up the other westerners who are found in the east in the first seventy years of the third century. The majority of these occur in isolation and so cannot be taken to represent a regular and substantial flow of traffic; others will be discussed in greater detail elsewhere.

Kleon of Gela. Mercenary at Elephantine in 311/0.

Aischrion of Messana; Bacchios, Leon and Leukon of Lucania. Mercenaries in Athens around 300.

Hieron son of Timokrates of Syracuse. Mercenary in the army of Ptolemy Philadelphos at Karthaia, Kos, around 265.

Dinnus Rhomaios. Mercenary in the army of Ptolemy Philadelphos at Philadelphia, Egypt, in 252/1.

Dionysodoros and Hermogenes sons of Antilochos, Sikeloi. Military colonists in Arsinoë around 250.

Lysanias of Tarentum. Military colonist in Arsinoë in 247.

Theodotos of Syracuse. *Taktomisthos* in Arsinoë in 237/6.

Unrestored Syracusan. Mercenary in Arsinoë in 236/5.

Metrodoros Tyrrhenos and Maraios son of Ptolemaios. Military colonists in Arsinoë in the third century.

Kyros of Neapolis. Mercenary in the Thebaid in the third century.

Antikrates of Tarentum. Epitaph of mercenary in Eretria in mid-late third century.

These men were all mercenaries; owing to their peripatetic brief and

lowly profession, they bear little significance for our enquiry¹. Southern Italy and Sicily were fruitful recruiting grounds for the major hellenistic powers because of their proximity to Greece². Also the early spread of the *pax Romana* deprived the more warlike and ambitious of the natives of the opportunity to pursue profitable warmongering for themselves and their own states³; the lure of a foreign wage was no doubt attractive to those who were otherwise bound to the service of Rome, especially such able militarists as Hieron. However, Launey's conclusion is that the numbers of these men were small and had little impact abroad, apart from the Tarentines discussed above who lent their name to an élite cavalry corps⁴.

There is, however, the suggestion that the presence in Egypt of the majority of those listed reflects the terms of an agreement between Rome and Ptolemy that facilitated the latter's recruitment policy in Southern Italy and Sicily. The idea is primarily Reinach's⁵; however, he attributes it to a late embassy, that of Eutropius, which he dates just prior to the Second Punic War in 219. Thus, as a result of Rome venturing into the sphere of the Kyklades over the Second Illyrian War, this facility was exchanged for a guarantee of Egypt's benevolent neutrality in the approaching war with Carthage. Reinach then extends the agreement to cover the liberation of any Italian prisoners-of-war who should fall into Ptolemy's hands; he uses the case of the Capuan Magius Decius to explain the presence of his immediate subject, Lucius C. f. Rhomaios, in the army of Ptolemy on Krete between 216 and 206⁶. However, the liberation of Magius owes more to the scurrilous nature of

his capture by Hannibal and to his status as a suppliant in Egypt. Reinach's argument is tenuous and improbable; yet in terms of the 273 rapprochement between Rome and Egypt, neither Neatby nor Launey dismiss with finality the notion that there was established some loose arrangement concerning the recruiting ground of Italy and Sicily⁷. However, the numbers of attested western mercenaries, as compared with those of a different provenance, are sufficiently small to adduce the argument that these were merely rogues plying the main chance.

Hephaistion son of Demeas of Tarentum. Victor in the Egyptian Basileia of 267, along with his relay partner, Ptolemaios the Thracian. Hephaistion appears after the surrender of Tarentum to Rome and the Ptolemaic embassy that established the Romano-Egyptian accord of 273. It would be easy to push him down the lines of communication thereby opened, but this may not be the case; he may have been a mercenary, an exile or a transitory athlete seeking out competition after competition. He was one of only two Italian victors in the Basileia in the whole period; either the others won nothing, or Egypt was a very distant place to visit for a mere agonistic festival⁸.

Leon son of Pantaleon of Tarentum and Archippos son of Euxenos of Syracuse. Granted *proxenia* in Histiaia Oreus in 266. There is little to add to Robert's conclusive and adept treatment of this decree and its implications⁹. He believes that this extraordinarily large collection of grants from the one year was an attempt to consolidate and expand the commercial contacts of the town, as corroborated by the spread of

Histiaian currency and the variety of different coinages found in her own repositories. For Histiaia was ideally placed geographically on the routes north-east and north-west of the Euripos bound for Makedon, Propontis and the Hellespont¹⁰; Robert points out that Delphi saw Histiaia's links as closer to Phthiotis and Lokris by sending to her those *theoroi* bound for Thessaly, rather than those bound for the rest of Euboia and the Kyklades¹¹.

It is significant that both Syracuse and Tarentum are deemed part of this commercial circle¹², the one on the eve of the First Punic War wherein she initially sided with Carthage and the other still relatively recently subordinated to Rome. The trading potential of Syracuse was considerable; whilst she stayed in cahoots with Carthage, this potential extended to the demesnes which Carthage had jealously protected throughout the fourth century against the encroachments of Rome¹³. Tarentum remained the major port of Southern Italy, busy in both import and export trades; the grant here shows that her subordination to Rome did not impair that status¹⁴.

The honours herein voted to two Aitolians who sat on the Amphiktyonic council which granted the privileges to Aristarchos of Camerina are used by Robert merely to secure the date of the decree¹⁵. However, here were two men prominent in the running of their own state and deeply involved in the affairs of Delphi in the 260s, perhaps continually from 264/3 through to the Pythia of 262/1; these men were also aware of the commercial currents running through the Greek world,

with specific reference to their own confederacy in relation to Histiaia. Thus their interests and activities ran all the way from Sicily across the Greek mainland to Histiaia and the trade routes beyond, at a time when events were developing that would change the face of the political west and so affect the stance of Aitolia herself. The state of their knowledge of western affairs in 262, as garnered from their involvement with Aristarchos and also possibly Leon and Archippos, may have a very definite effect on the final judgement on Volceius.

Mikion son of Nikeratos of Syracuse. Sculptor working for the people of Talaria at Olympia, 263-41, who built a monument to Hieron II¹⁶. This may mean little more than that the work of Mikion was exported to Olympia rather than that the sculptor was working abroad; this is supported by his service to the sons of Hieron in production of a similar statue recorded at Olympia by Pausanias¹⁷. This relationship, political and artistic, between Syracuse and Olympia should not be neglected.

L. Mr. Folius (or L. Mr.f. Olius). Dedicant to Athene Lindia on Rhodes around 260. In context, we have noted that Rome's early accord with Ptolemy in 273 opened lines of communication across the Aigaian if they did not exist before; there was also a nascent presence in the Kyklades by the 240s, of which this might be some kind of prefiguration. How Folius' presence reflects on Romano-Rhodian relations by this stage will be discussed below. The approximate timing of the inscription need not cause any problems since in the 260s, the First Punic War was still

confined to Sicily and there was no great threat to shipping heading east from Italy.

We have noted that there is a dispute whether the name is Olius or Folius. The latter was a well-attested patrician name at Rome in the fifth and fourth centuries, with one M. Folius C.f.M.n. Flaccinator being *magister equitum* in 320 and 314/3, and consul in 318¹⁸. However, the Ollii are equally well-attested around Picenum and Pompeii in republican times¹⁹; the name Maraeus was Oscan, as was the feature of the patronymic directly after the praenomen²⁰. If he was a lesser Italian light from out of Rome, then he showed a remarkable bilingual and cross-cultural facility; he could not only make his dedication in both Latin and Greek, but also draw a direct parallel between his own native goddess Minerva and the Greek Athene. His failure to inscribe his ethnic is surely deliberate, perhaps in the expectation that the language of half of his dedication would have given him away. If true, then this is surprisingly early evidence for the Rhodians' ability at least to recognise the origin of the script, even if they could not understand it²¹. In general, however, since Olius/Folius features in isolation in Rhodes, it is impossible to identify his purpose, status and permanence with any certainty.

Serdon the *thaumatopoios*, 259; Novius the artisan, 250; Quintus, a dedicant around 244; Bouzos son of Orteira of Canusium, granted *proxenia* between 240 and 232. See section E, Delos.

Ariston and Philemon of Syracuse. Competitors in the Dionysia at Athens in 256 and 251 respectively. See section B. It should be noted here, however, that Ariston may be an erroneous restoration as the result of a speculative conflation of Livy XXIV.24²².

Nikokles son of Ariston of Tarentum. Victor at Isthmia, Athens, Argos, Makedon, Alexandria, Rhodes, Lebadeia and Epidauros in the mid-third century. See section B.

Tarentines, Rhegians, Crotoniates and Syracusans. Granted *proxenia* on Tenos in the mid-third century. The fragmentary nature of the list makes it impossible to use; it is dangerous even to attach the ethnics to the names which survive in the lists since so much has been lost. The impossibility of an accurate date prevents more than a remark upon the presence of such men from such cities on such an island during such a period, in terms of the general appearance of westerners in the Aigaian with some consistency from around 260. Tenos' position in the Kyklades made it an inevitable passing-point for travellers heading due east; that there was a considerable degree of commercial activity on the island is demonstrated by the offices of the Syracusan banker, Timon son of Nymphodoros, there around the turn of the century²³. Yet these *proxenoi* should not be seen merely as the forerunners of Timon and his like; they needed their own motivation to be there, most probably following the lines of communication into Rhodian and Egyptian trading circles which were recognised by both Hieron and Rome.

Significant here is the presence of Rhegians and Crotoniates, hitherto absent from our survey. Both featured on the fourth century *thearodokos* list from Epidauros, and Rhegium survived the Hannibalic War to make the second century Delphic list²⁴. Yet the history of both in the third century was badly interrupted by the Pyrrhic War; Rhegium's ultimately disastrous occupation by a Campanian garrison was terminated by a duplicitous Rome only in 270²⁵, whilst Croton's treachery was rewarded with a crippling price in terms of population and size²⁶. Although both were subsequently accepted within the Roman federation as *socii navales*, one would be forgiven for assuming that their absence from the third century religious scene was no mere accident of epigraphy, were it not for this decree. It is dangerous to attempt too much with this inscription; yet perhaps it was similar to that from Histiaia in its efforts to consolidate Tenos' contacts in the west, especially after the Chremonideian War had disrupted trade from Central Greece²⁷. If so, then the claims of Rhegium and Croton to merit a position in this circle add a further layer to the ties of Rome's allies with the east.

Chresimos the Italiote. Inscription from Akarnania from the mid-late third century. The bald nature of this funerary stele allows little scope for interpretation. The adjectival nature of the name implies servile status, and the language from which it derives implies a Southern Italian origin²⁸. How he came to be buried in Akarnania is a mystery; we can only note that the route into Central Greece passed by there.

(viii). ROME: INFLUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS.

We have explored as fully as possible the nature and extent of the traffic crossing the Adriatic to Greece from Italy and Sicily in the first seventy years of the third century. From that we have drawn certain conclusions concerning the lines of communication between east and west; these are less than entirely complete since only those who left some mark of their passing are known to us, and so we are faced with a caveat behind those records of whose dimensions we cannot know. Yet it is largely those who were on official state business or who were deemed officially important by the states they visited who were recorded in this manner; thus they comprise a sufficiently elevated stratum on which to base our enquiry. Therefore any conclusions drawn thence concerning relations between states are likely to be accurate, because they are based upon the activities of prominent individuals within those states who were capable of directing state affairs in accordance with their own preferences. Let us take those conclusions and apply them to Rome's involvement in Southern Italian, Sicilian and Greek affairs. For it was her relations with her allies and her *emporoi* that caused her to step outside Italy and Sicily for the first time in 230; so we should attempt to create a background by assessment of the nature and strength of those relations in light of Rome's own direct communication with Greece.

The earliest embassies from Rome to Greece are well-attested and need little further discussion. In 454, Sp. Postumius Albus, A. Manlius

Vulso and Ser. Sulpicius Camerinus were sent to Athens and other Greek cities to study their laws as the basis for the establishment of a legislative procedure in Rome¹. Then, in 398 and 394, embassies were sent to Delphi to consult the god on the issue of the portentous rise of the Alban lake and to give thanks for success at Veii. The first of these was of disputed composition, a Cossus, a Licinius, a Valerius Potitus and a Fabius Ambustus; the identity of the first two and the praenomina of the last two accept no firm resolution². The second, composed of L. Valerius Potitus, L. Sergius Fidenas and A. Manlius Vulso, was intercepted by Liparaean pirates but sent on their way by the pirate leader Timasitheos once he realised the solemn purpose of their mission³. The fourth century also presents the possibility of an embassy to Alexander the Great in 324/3 and from Demetrios Poliorketes on the issue of Antiata piracy⁴. That aside, there ^{were} over one hundred years between official communications by embassy between Rome and the Greek world; the gap is sufficiently large and subsequent developments sufficiently great to see Rome shelving these contacts for the majority of the fourth century in order to immerse herself in intra-Italian affairs. These early embassies have been used by prosopographers who would see a consistent "Greek lobby" at Rome descending from those Valerii, Manlii and Postumii and extending down into the second century⁵. Such a line is now largely discredited and unfashionable when considered against the variegation of the political scene in Rome; however, the truism that particular senators had particular interests which they represented in particular ways should never be neglected.

The next time an official Roman embassy headed east was 292, when Q. Ogulnius Gallus was sent to Epidauros to summon the serpent of Asklepios in response to the pestilence that was afflicting the city. The story of the importation was told in varying lengths and with varying details by Livy, Valerius Maximus, Ovid, Orosius and Strabo⁶. Besnier accuses Ovid of conflation with the account of the Magna Mater's importation to Rome in 204 and so discounts his version of the request for Amphiktyonic approval prior to Ogulnius' departure⁷. All the sources are united on the deliberations at Epidauros and the good-natured acceptance of the proposal, and also on the mysterious passage of the serpent itself onto the ship of Ogulnius⁸. Ovid and Valerius Maximus believed that the return journey entailed a stopover at Antium, whereupon the serpent temporarily disembarked. However, Besnier again has Ovid tainted by hints of 204 and Valerius gulled by his Antiate namesake; however, his belief that the story was an aetiological explanation of the cult of Asklepios at Antium is countered by Degrassi's that Antium lent the cult to Rome rather than *vice versa*⁹. On arrival at Rome, the serpent slid ashore on the Tiber island which was henceforth the site of the temple precinct for the god. Plutarch explained this position outside the *pomerium* with the three banal alternatives that it was more sanitary there, that the Asklepieion in Epidauros was similarly outside the town or that the serpent itself preferred it there; Besnier remarked that it was simply not Roman practice to embrace foreign deities so closely to their bosom whilst the island lay conveniently close to the temple of Apollo Medicus on the Campus Martius¹⁰. There the cult remained predominantly Greek in form and primarily concerned with its therapeutic

purpose; there seems to have been an active oracle administered, initially at least, by Greek priests¹¹.

Rome was obviously in dire need of a totem in face of the pestilence that was afflicting them, but the importation of the serpent of Asklepios was a less than obvious one. There are two proposed reasons for choosing this god, by Frank and Besnier¹². Frank believes that the choice was in line with Rome's general policy around the turn of the century of seeking contact with those states in the rear of her immediate enemy in order to make common cause and so apply pressure in a pincer movement from two directions. Thus in the late 290s she had reached the coast of the Adriatic and the horizons of those Greeks in the toe of Italy who were in the rear of the Lucani; for all the previous usefulness of the Lucani to Rome, they were to be the next victims of the southward expansion¹³. Frank's point, then, rests on the Greeks of Southern Italy seeing Rome's embrace of Asklepios as a gesture of friendship towards them in particular. For the use of the Epidaurian medium would establish communication with those states who appeared on the fourth century *theorodokos* list, all of whom were likely to be represented at the quadrennial Epidaurian Asklepieia to hear the news then at the latest¹⁴. Indeed, Ovid's account of the return journey around Italy begins at the Lacinian promontory¹⁵; since Roman traffic was barred from the Tarentine Gulf, it is probable that, poetic licence apart, the embassy kicked off thence on the crossing to Greece as well as heading thither on the way home¹⁶. If so, then the coastlines of Croton, Locri, Rhegium, Terina and Pandosia would be grazed by Ogulnius

in person. It is undeniable that there was virtue in an initiative designed to discourage the Greeks of Italy from assuming that they would merely be the next victims of Rome's expansion.

Besnier suggests that there were two reasons why Rome imported foreign deities to their city. First, as spiritual cures for specific crises; second, and in no way exclusive of the first:

"les Romains avaient coutume de promettre des temples aux dieux protecteurs des cités qu'ils combattaient; ils les attiraient à eux, ils les faisaient passer pour ainsi dire dans leur propre camp"¹⁷.

Asklepios concorded well with the first, yet as the only cult nominally recruited from Greece proper as opposed to Etruria or Magna Graecia, he hardly fulfilled the criteria for the second. Yet the Samnites, the Marsi in particular, worshipped a serpent-goddess concerned with healing and security by the name of Angitia¹⁸. Although the Marsi and the home of the cult around Lake Fucinus¹⁹ were never deeply involved in this conflict, it bordered on their region between 293 and 291 as Cominium changed hands three times²⁰. The inscription *anagtiai diiviai* on a ring from Aesernia shows that the cult was not confined to that central area, but extended further afield into Samnium, especially those areas under contention during these years. Perhaps, then, the importation of Asklepios was a combination of all three theories. Rome, in need of divine assistance against the crisis caused by the pestilence, chose a god that would not only solicit the favour of the Italiote Greeks, whose goodwill they craved with a view to future expansion, but also subvert the moral confidence of their immediate opponents, the Samnites, by his similarity to their own native deity.

As for the mechanics of the exercise, Parke sees the measure as a development stretching from the fifth century onwards, and explicable by the Greek nature and origin of the Sibylline books²¹. For they first recommended the hellenisation of a Roman god, Apollo Medicus in 433²²; then the adoption of the hellenistic ritual of *lectisternium* in 399²³; and then this importation of a hellenistic god in 292, all in response to the same affliction. Yet Degrassi sees the books rather as the reference point for a senate desiring not just the importation of a tutelary deity, but also a sufficiently portentous gesture in which to couch the move²⁴. The precedent they found was thus that of Athens in 420, who similarly imported Asklepios from Epidauros²⁵. Degrassi believes that, by following this precedent, the Romans successfully obfuscated the fact that their god came from a less numinous source, perhaps Fregellae or Antium; better to import from a major panhellenic sanctuary than from a minor Latin colony.

It is not certain which route Ogulnius chose to Epidauros after leaving the Lacinian promontory, yet it was inevitable that he became acquainted with the warring factions in Greece. If he rounded Maleia, then he would pass Sparta and Messenia, whereafter his approach to Epidauros would bring him into the Makedonian-held Saronic Gulf. If he plied the Gulf of Korinth, then he would be reliant on the goodwill of the Epirotes, Akarnanians and Aitolians for his coastal passage before he arrived at the Makedonian-controlled Isthmus for the crossing at Korinth²⁶. The detail of the serpent sliding onto Ogulnius' ship does not imply one route or the other; Ogulnius could have retained his own

ship at the crossing at Korinth simply by having it rolled across the *diolkos*.

Ovid's suggestion of the visit to Delphi must be seriously discussed²⁷. What might militate against it is Flacelière's reconstruction of events in Central Greece in the late 290s and the holding of the Pythia of 290/89 at Athens²⁸. It seems that there was a hiatus in normal Amphiktyonic activities in the year in question. Yet there was nothing to prevent an ad hoc executive being formed of representatives from Aitolia, Boiotia, Phokis, Lokris and even Sparta. The next time we see the Amphiktyony operating was in a similarly limited form in 278, with two Aitolians, two Thessalians, two Boiotians and two Phokians²⁹; the honours voted by Delphi to Zopyros in 293/2 show that sanctuary business continued with some, but not excessive disruption during these years. The arguments from this angle are inconclusive. If Ogulnius did visit Delphi, he would have come before an Amphiktyony that was loosely synonymous with the Aitolian alliance³⁰; yet there is no very good evidence that he did.

There is a distinct possibility that Ogulnius' arrival actually coincided with the holding of the quadrennial Asklepieia, held nine days after the biennial Isthmia³¹. If true, then the propagandist impact of the mission would have been so much greater, as would the opportunity to absorb information from the variety of representatives of the Greek states. The effect of hearing Ogulnius' request at first hand on the representatives of the western Greeks can only be imagined; equally,

Ogulnius himself could witness the effect of the settlement of the issue of the Makedonian succession as a whole, not to mention the upsurge in fortunes of a nearer neighbour in Aitolia. The restive Pythia of 295/4 might well have reached Rome's ears by the agency of such as Neapolis; freshly installed on the shores of the Adriatic, it might have seemed but a short distance across the water to a strong and expanding Aitolia and a new and ambitious king of Makedon. The time was ripe for ἐπίσκεψις³².

The significance of Ogulnius' mission, and of other similar diplomatic initiatives between Greece and Rome in the third century, is belittled since there was no formal diplomatic follow-up in the shape of a treaty or alliance. Indeed, the subsequent ignominy of Asklepios' career in Rome and the need to find a further remedy for pestilence in 273 might be seen as corroboration of the ineffectuality of the exercise³³. Once esconced on the Tiber island, Asklepios' effect on the spiritual life of Rome was negligible. Epidauros continued to appeal to the Greeks of Italy and Sicily for festival purposes; there was seemingly no attempt to assert the claims of the Tiber island as a superior site to Epidauros, Trikka or Kos in any sense other than geographical convenience. It is probable that the ripples caused by the appearance of a Roman embassy south and east of the Bay of Naples disappeared fairly rapidly after 292, at least in Greece. But Rome got what she wanted in terms of a swift end to both the Samnite War and the pestilence, an introduction to the Greeks in the rear of her enemy and satisfaction with news of the situation elsewhere; since this news did

not concern her excessively, she could return to her immediate task of subduing the remainder of the Italian peninsula.

Unfortunately, the loss of Livy's account of the years following the initiative of 292 prohibits a detailed analysis of its effects. This is particularly frustrating in that it was six years at most until Thurii appealed to Rome against the incursions of the Lucani and Bruttii; if there was more documentation than that which records Thurian gratitude towards C. Aelius, it might tell us whether the Thurians, registered attenders at Epidauros, were influenced in their appeal by Ogulnius' activities³⁴. Rome's response to the appeal was crucial, with regard to both her expansion within Italy and her early indirect relations with Greece. Primarily, it necessitated the transgression of the Romano-Tarentine treaty; this need not have been an aggressive move against Tarentum, merely the practical application of the agreement to provide a garrison for Thurii. Yet the hostility of Tarentum was not difficult to foresee; the senate's decision to take Thurii on board must have taken full account of the potential consequences of the action, and so placed the expansion of Rome's influence above the pacification of Tarentum³⁵. The direct result was of course the Pyrrhic War as the Tarentines in turn appealed to Epiros; much was made of Thurii betraying her birthright by seeking refuge with a non-Greek state³⁶.

Yet Thurii's antipathy towards Tarentum was no recent phenomenon, but extended back into the fourth century, when the two states vied for the Italian *promanteia* at Delphi. The precise facts of this are

difficult enough to recover, let alone interpret; the evidence is a fragmentary decree recording the apparent restoration of the privilege to Thurii following its usurpation at some prior date by Tarentum, after Thurii had initially been accorded it on foundation in 443³⁷. Pouilloux's interpretation of the mechanics of the privilege is the most persuasive; there were a number of states who held it and so had precedence in consultation of the oracle, but amongst these, some, including Thurii by dint of this decree, were more equal than others³⁸. The implication of this in the 280s was this; by accepting the Thurian appeal, Rome became the protector of the Italiote-Greek state most favoured by Delphi, at that state's own request. However, the moral high ground which this might have presented was soon swept away by the actions of the Tarentines in forcibly expelling the Roman influence and those who had favoured it, to replace it with their own protection; that protection meant Pyrrhos. In terms of communication with Delphi, then, the Tarentines held their own and the Thurian *promanteia*, whilst the alignment of states that supported Pyrrhos in Greece monopolised the Amphiktyony as it was in 282³⁹. Nevertheless, the dispute in the sources over whether Pyrrhos consulted Delphi or Dodona or both before departure may be telling⁴⁰; the *proxenia* grants from Delphi to Megakles of Neapolis in 275/4 and to the Tarentines and Sokrates of Metapontum in 272/1 rather suggest that the Delphoi felt that they had backed the wrong horse⁴¹. The Thurian coup of 282 may have been a false dawn for Romano-Greek relations, but the precedent was set and the line of communication sighted.

The next appearance of an official Roman embassy east of the Adriatic was in 273, to the court of Ptolemy Philadelphos in Alexandria. The embassy comprised Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges, veteran of the Samnite Wars and consul in 292 (the year of the mission of Ogulnius); N. Fabius Pictor and Q. Ogulnius Gallus himself. It was sent in response to a Ptolemaic initiative on receipt of the news of Pyrrhos' downfall and the growth of Rome's strength; his offer of gifts and a compact was gratefully received by a Rome seemingly in awe of the king, although Gurges' offer of the gifts to the treasury was rejected by the suspicious people⁴². Neatby effectively demolished the theories of the political and military nature of the consequent Romano-Egyptian compact; for example, that of Lehmann-Haupt concerning Ptolemy's supposed fear of a Syro-Epirote coalition. Yet his own conclusion was that the agreement led to a joint Romano-Egyptian coinage minted on silver from Egypt and established in the year of Ogulnius' consulship, 269; this will not stand in the face of Crawford's version of the origins of Roman silver coinage⁴³.

The embassy no doubt favoured the direct open-sea crossing as the crow flies to Alexandria; the alternative, via the African shoreline, was prohibited by the residual terms of the treaties with Carthage⁴⁴. Yet Casson's suggestion for the route home, via Asia Minor, Krete, Malta and Sicily, renders the places that Gurges and company visited on the second leg of their voyage just as significant as their primary destination. The most tangible result of their peregrinations is the ornamental covering for a waggon's shaft-head, in the shape of a bull's

head, that Ogulnius inscribed and dedicated on Delos⁴⁵. Robert fails to comment on this, stating only that the reading was Froehner's and not his; thus the interpretation of the mysterious '-----steinos' in the second line remains unfathomable. Neither has the peculiar form of the dedication ever acquired an attempted explanation. The former is obscure. If it was Ogulnius' cognomen, commonly Gallus, it goes against all other written evidence, including the *Fasti Capitolini*. If it was a freedman or a relative who made the dedication, it is strange that he did not make it himself. If it was an unattested member of the embassy who joined him in making the dedication, the formula seems peculiarly terse, not to mention the difficulty of finding a name to fit the available spaces and letters. The form of the bull's head might be a motif picked up from Thurii, on whose coinage alone it features around this time⁴⁶; yet the precise significance of the animal remains open to interpretation. The propaganda value of the dedication was much as it would have been at Delphi or Epidauros, but for the benefit of an Aigaian audience. Since Philadelphos exercised a thalassocracy of greater or lesser security over the Kyklades at this time, it is unsurprising that the Roman embassy should have taken advantage of his goodwill and the scope of his influence to mark their presence whilst in that part of the world⁴⁷.

This visit to Delos revives the line of Droysen, derided by Holleaux, that the embassy of 273 was as much an introduction for Rome to the hellenistic world and an advertisement of her achievement in Italy as the initiation of a commercial compact with Ptolemy

Philadelphos⁴⁸. This advertisement having been made at the common centre, Delos, further peregrinations were superfluous; the news doubtless disseminated thence at a rate of knots, whilst the awareness of mainland Greece is attested by the Delphic *proxenia* grants of 275/4 and 272/1. Yet this calls into question the state of Rome's relations with Rhodes, disputedly established in 306. For, if at least part of the intent of the embassy was to spread the word of the alteration in the status quo in Southern Italy, was it not discourteous to neglect to communicate this to the only state in the area with whom Rome had a prior relationship of greater or lesser intensity ?

The case for a rapprochement between Rome and Rhodes relies heavily upon the acceptance of Polybios XXX.5.6, the claim of the Rhodians in 167 that for some 140 years they had shared with Rome in the greatest and finest deeds without ever contracting an alliance. The case against this was put most notably by Holleaux who, on the evidence of two passages of Livy relating to the First Makedonian War, argued that such a relationship, *qua foedus amicitiae*, was not acceptable. Thus he emended the text to the exclusion of πρὸς τοῖς ἑκατόν; yet even then he had to subtract a further seven years on the basis of Polybios' σχεδόν so that the initiation of Romano-Rhodian relations could fit his context of the preliminaries of the Second Makedonian War. This principle of textual emendation to suit theoretical context was similarly pursued by De Sanctis and Manni, the former to open the great deeds to all the Greeks and the latter to separate the prosecution of a definite and independent Rhodian policy from any association with Rome⁴⁹.

The arguments marshalled against Holleaux are collated by Schmitt and have been deemed conclusive⁵⁰. There was some form of rapprochement between Rome and Rhodes in 306, although the initiators and the effects are largely obscure; Schmitt's theory of a most informal relationship interpretable as *amicitia* is probable, although Walbank's consideration that the statement of 140 years of great deeds in partnership is a "blatant untruth" must not be neglected⁵¹. The evidence for this rapprochement is largely circumstantial. Schmitt stresses the archaeological evidence, Rhodian vase handles in Southern Italy, which suggest a trade agreement⁵²; Fraser adds the unusual intimacy of the Rhodian Xenagoras with Roman mythistory⁵³ and the presence of Folius on Rhodes in the 260s. The year 306 was an important time for diplomacy, with the negotiation of the crucial Romano-Punic treaty that delineated respective spheres of influence; this in turn prompted the Tarentines to seek to secure their own position within Italy by means of their own treaty with Rome. That this was so owed much to the naval activities of the surrounding years. The capture of Antium in 338 and alliance with Neapolis in 326 were important staging posts on the road to the appointment of Roman *duoviri navales classis ornandae reficiendaeque causa* in 311⁵⁴; it is this development that is held to be the cause of Demetrios Poliorketes' complaint to Rome concerning the Antiatic pirates whom he had captured, since Rome's command of Italy gave her responsibility for the raids of her allies⁵⁵. Cary and Schmitt believe that the agreement of 306 was based at least in part on such a responsibility; Rome and Rhodes declared themselves protectors and

peace-makers respectively in west and east, their particular brief being the reduction of piracy⁵⁶.

However, given the absence of positive evidence, the safest conclusion is that of Walbank; although there can be no sound reason for tampering with Polybios' text, "we are obliged to confess ignorance of what [Polybios] had in mind when he wrote of close on 140 years of collaboration between Rome and Rhodes"⁵⁷. Whatever the truth of the matter, the doubts surrounding the agreement surely imply that it was of lesser importance. If so, it is unlikely that the Roman embassy of 273 considered that their relationship with Rhodes obliged them to visit the island to inform their friends of developments in Italy; the news would reach Rhodes, as the rest of the Aigaian, from Delos.

In 269, according to Dio, Valerius Maximus, Zonaras and Livy's epitomator, an embassy from Apollonia at Rome was insulted by the aediles Q. Fabius and Cn. Apronius; the culprits were surrendered to the Apolloniates who exacted no more punishment than to take their prisoners back to Apollonia with them before releasing them⁵⁸. It is a peculiar episode; it has surely lost something in transcription, not least the nature and cause of the embassy itself. The modern consensus is that when Rome appeared on the Adriatic coast, especially at Brundisium, the Apolloniates sought recognition of their own position on the routes across the Adriatic, especially for trading purposes⁵⁹. The context is that of Livy's epitomator; Tarentum and Picenum fell under the *pax Romana*, the Umbri and Sallentini surrendered *in deditionem*, Rhegium was

freed from the Mamertines, colonies were sent to Ariminum and Beneventum and the Roman people got to grips with their new issue of silver coinage. This stamping of Roman political, economic and social authority on Italy might well have brought one whose interests were affected via the traffic passing through her to make an official representation to Rome to test the water; the principle was no doubt similar to that of the *démarche* of Ptolemy. The reason why it incurred the wrath of the aediles is utterly obscure; the nature of the punishment might suggest that they simply did not believe that Apollonia's interests were so closely tied in with traffic in and around Italy and so were taken to see for themselves⁶⁰. For the embassies of 292 and 273 did not utilise the short crossing to Greece from the tip of the Sallentine promontory; those with horizons less expansive than Ogulnius might have been sceptical of the credibility of an embassy from a small colony on a largely deserted coastline.

Apollonia's claim to Rome's attention was thus based on her position in a chain of mutual interests which extended across the Adriatic to Western Greece. However, the potential for development of this chain was arrested, temporarily at least, by developments in the south-west of the peninsula in a parallel chain of interests for Rome. This chain led via Campania to the Mamertine garrison of Messana, hard-pressed by Syracuse and so prompted to appeal to Rome as well as to Carthage⁶¹. Again, as with Thurii, Rome was caught between scruples, whether to reject an appeal to her *fides* or to break the existing treaty with Carthage; again, as with Thurii, the appeal won⁶². Thereafter, Rome's attention

was focussed on this quarter until 241; presumably the Greeks of South-East Italy were left to continue their business as normal. Yet the important development of the First Punic War was Hieron's volte-face from Carthage in 262; as a result of this, Syracuse and the majority of Sicily joined the Roman alliance⁶³. Thus, although Rome's energies were directed against Carthage, she subsumed a network of alliances that was orientated not only towards Africa, but also towards the Greek East; although Rome had temporarily shelved the chain of interests that had brought Apollonia to her, Hieron's alliance meant only that that chain was renewed and strengthened. For Syracuse's connections with Delphi, Epidauros, Histiaia and the Aigaian were at least as strong as those of Tarentum; those of her fellow Sicilian states similarly so. As for the eastern end of that chain, if Rome's reduction of the Italian peninsula caused others such as Ptolemy and Apollonia to reassess their relationships with the Italian states and their new mistress, then there is reason to expect that the reduction of Sicily proved likewise.

In the light of this and of the above concerning the Syracusan and the Metapontines who also feature in the Aitolian *proxenia* lists of 262, there is every reason to believe that the honours conferred upon L. Volceius by the Aitolian League were in recognition both of the growing strength of Rome and her position on the opposite end of the chain of mutual interests. We have already seen how the Pythia of 262/1 was a melting-pot of issues such as the First Punic War and the Chremonideian War, and how the constitution of the Amphiktyony and the Akarnanian alliance reflected the growth of Aitolia's position within Greece, qua

both her tutelage of Delphi and her individual federation. It seems likely, then, that Volceius was in attendance at that Pythia. It seems equally likely that his presence there was taken to represent a show of goodwill towards Syracuse and Sicily as well as providing due advertisement of Rome's subsumption of Hieron's alliance. Yet it cannot be determined whether he was there on his own account, as an Etruscan naturally sympathetic to Greek religion, or as an official representative of Rome; the fact that he was called 'Ρωμαῖος, although not from Rome, is the only hint of the latter capacity. As it was, the manifestation on this level of *proxenia* of a Romano-Aitolian relationship suited the ambitions of both parties. Rome was committed to Sicily and Africa; she did not need an obligation that tied her to Greek affairs via her southern allies. This minor acknowledgement of her mutuality of interests was a token gesture of sufficiency in recognition of her responsibilities towards the east⁴. Aitolia followed the line of Delphi, seen in connection with Neapolis, Tarentum and Metapontum in the 270s; this provided for a *proxenos* as representative of her affairs in the foreign state without formal agreement or commitment. Her priority was Central Greece, in which case it was similarly unlikely that she would have sought any official rapprochement that might draw her into Pyrrhos' footsteps; she also had the Apolloniate embassy as an example of the reception accorded Greek envoys at Rome. What Volceius represents, then, is not so much the establishment of an *amicitia* of any kind as the reflection of the regular interchange between the monkeys in a nod of recognition between the organ-grinders.

Rome's preoccupation with Carthage kept her attention away from the east for the next twenty or so years. However, in Eutropius there is mention of Roman legates visiting Ptolemy at the end of the First Punic War with a promise of aid for the king in the war which he was fighting against Antiochos. This is taken to refer to the war against Antiochos Hierax around the late 240s; Ptolemy, thus Euergetes, declined the offer since the fighting had already ceased⁶⁵. The embassy was no doubt concerned with the renewal of the Egyptian agreement, even though it took place five years after the accession of Euergetes; the consensus is that Rome sent their envoys as soon as they were able towards the end of the First Punic War⁶⁶. It also provided a further opportunity to meander through the islands on the return route, as in 273. Yet this time Delos produces no explicit evidence; there is the offering of a Quintus that dates to the 240s, but the *terminus ante quem* of 244 seems too high for this embassy⁶⁷. The news which they bore, that of victory over Carthage, came at a time when their allies were sending a steady stream of citizens into the Kyklades, Delos and Tenos in particular. Thus it seems probable that some part of the purpose of the mission was to inform Ptolemy of the result of the First Punic War and to advertise the terms of the final settlement of Sicily; this was at least an obvious side-effect of the embassy.

If any shock waves reverberated around the Aigaian from this, they may have rebounded back to Rome in the shape of a representation from either Seleukos or Ilium or both. Suetonius in his life of the Divine Claudius refers to the remission of tribute in perpetuity for the

Ilians; this was based on an ancient Greek letter in which the senate and people of Rome offered "amicitiam et societatem" to Seleukos, recognised as Seleukos II, if he freed Ilium from all imposts on the grounds of their being blood-relations of the Roman people⁶⁸. The currency of the Trojan myth has already been remarked upon with the renewal of the Locrian tribute and the son of Dardanos as a Koan *theoros* in Italy; the blossoming of the theme in the 240s must be a result of Roman activity in Sicily prompting the adoption and development of their own local myth with a view to cultural hegemonism⁶⁹. The letter must have been written around the time of, and perhaps even before the embassy to Ptolemy; yet the two were mutually contradictory given Ptolemy's stance against Syria in the Laodikeian War⁷⁰. Crucial here was Antiochos Hierax, in schism with his brother with whom he went to war as soon as he had failed in Egypt against Ptolemy. ~~It seems,~~ ^{Perhaps,} then, ^{the letter dealt} ~~that it~~ ^{with} Seleukos' appeal to Rome, made with an eye to his own position on the Syrian throne; he hoped to present himself as the more acceptable candidate and so win the support of Rome against Antiochos. However, the appeal served only to embarrass Rome, associated as they were with Ptolemy, with whom Seleukos was or had recently been at war. Thus the senate hedged by issuing the only proviso that they could, that concerning Ilium. For it was their only real interest in the area, and that by virtue of an inchoate foundation myth; and it was a request that Seleukos could not fulfil, since his brother was currently in control of the town⁷¹. The Romans thus extricated themselves from an awkward situation by turning down Seleukos and holding good to the *amicitia* with Ptolemy. The respective dates of the Roman embassy and Seleukos'

representation are crucial to the infrastructure of this scenario. If the embassy came first, then it provided vital information on which Rome could then draw in its judgement of Seleukos' case. If Seleukos came first, the embassy to Ptolemy might have represented a degree of favour towards Seleukos, aimed as it was against Antiochos⁷²; Ptolemy's polite refusal of aid might have concealed a distinct suspicion of Rome's motives in regard of her dealings with Seleukos. Perhaps both issues were dealt with by one and the same embassy, acting with a great degree of authority and quick-mindedness in situ in the east; however, this hypothesis does not clarify the issue of the priority of that embassy, be it Egypt or Syria.

Rome subsequently reaped the whirlwind of this diplomacy in Iustinus' story of the Akarnanian embassy that arrived in Rome, perhaps in the early-mid 230s⁷³. The story is widely discredited, not least by Holleaux, as a confusion with elements of the Aitolian war in the late 190s⁷⁴. However, in the words of Errington;

"as long as we do not attribute political aims to the Senate, it seems at least conceivable that Justin may have preserved a real event which was not mentioned by Fabius Pictor...because of its relative triviality, because of the lack of success for the Romans, and because, in a critical phase of political developments in 212, Rome allied with Aetolia at the cost of Acarnania"⁷⁵.

The episode involved the Akarnanians, mistrustful of the Epirotes, appealing to Rome for assistance against the hostile Aitolians, this after the Epirote princess Phthia had married Demetrios of Makedon following his divorce of the Seleukid Stratonike. The Akarnanians based their appeal on the fact that they, alone of the Greeks had not sent forces against Troy. This was efficacious in that Roman envoys proceeded

to bid the Aitolians remove their garrisons from Akarnanian cities and allow their people to be free. The Aitolian reply was scornful of the temerity of the Romans, fearful of both Gauls and Carthaginians, in challenging the leaders of Greece who alone had dared to face the Gauls and take arms against Makedon. They accused Rome of being a nation of fratricides and parricides, shepherds who steal the lands and wives of others. Having dismissed the envoys, they straightway devastated Epiros and Akarnania.

Iustinus' account doubtless feels the benefit of rhetorical garnish, but there is no reason to reject it out of hand. The Akarnanians' appeal was out of desperation at ever finding a guardian who would not subsequently encroach upon ^{their} ~~her~~ liberty. For the alliance of 262 with Aitolia had given way to a summary division of the country between Epiros and Aitolia; the Aitolian half had subsequently sunk without trace into the framework of the Aitolian confederacy⁷⁶. So it was now that Aitolian pressure was being exerted not only against the Epirote half of Akarnania, but also against Epiros herself, in some disarray following the death of Alexander. Thus it was this Epirote half of Akarnania that appealed to Rome. The chronology of the episode is impossible to reconstruct; we do not know where this appeal stood in relation to the Epirote efforts to shore up their own edifice by the marriage of Phthia to Demetrios. However, it is the suggestion of Hammond and Walbank that the Epirote initiative was sufficient to combat the advance of the Aitolians in Akarnania; they use the evidence of Strabo to demonstrate that Demetrios led a campaign against Kalydon to

free the inhabitants of Pleuron. Thus the logical conclusion of Demetrios' alliance with Epiros was this military action in defence of Akarnania⁷⁷.

Prima facie, this would seem to add substance to the arguments against the validity of Iustinus' account of the appeal to Rome; but this is not necessarily so. For the Akarnanians in Iustinus are said to be "diffisi Epirotis"; that is, they did not hold out much hope for the success of Epiros' initiative. Thus they made their own venture, to Rome, as insurance against the failure of the Epirotes. That they used the Trojan connection says much for the impact of Roman diplomacy in the aftermath of the defeat of Carthage; the envoys of Kos and Locri may have advertised the motifs in Central Greece on Rome's behalf, even if the Seleukos-initiative did not. Perhaps the Akarnanians also relied on Rome's ultimate responsibility for the Italian and Sicilian traffic that passed through their territorial waters; this may have been an early, tentative effort to establish a politically recognised mutuality of interests. Furthermore, the marriage of Phthia to Demetrios may have evoked the senate's sense of loyalty towards Ptolemy; for it involved the rejection of the Seleukid Stratonike. Further sympathy with this cause was demonstrated by the marriage of Hieron's son Gelon to the princess Nereis around 233/2⁷⁸.

In this respect, Rome's acceptance of the appeal was no different from that of Campania in 343, Lucania in 299, Thurii in the 280s or Messana in 264. For this was a small state submitting to Roman *fides*

with the hope of drawing Rome into a fresh field of commitment against larger, aggressive neighbours. That the result was not the same was no doubt the result of the scale and nature of the rebuff and the fact that Demetrios' efforts meant that there was no war to be fought. The rebuff appears as the result of an advanced Aitolian intimacy with Rome's foundation mythology; hoist by their own petard, the Romans were compelled to retire the Trojan motif after this brief *floruit*, not to revive it until more favourable circumstances presented themselves⁷⁹. It is this blow allied to the alignments in which Rome found herself that account for the expunging of the incident from the record⁸⁰. For a Roman diplomatic effort taking its place alongside a Makedonian military effort and aimed against Aitolia was a bad precedent for the subsequent events of the First Illyrian War; this was especially true since it was Demetrios who brought the Illyrians against the Aitolians at Medeon to add vital impetus to Agron's expansionist urge⁸¹. The perpetuation of the story of Rome's intervention in Akarnania would have seriously undermined the credibility of her stance in Greece thereafter.

By contrast, the circumstances which motivated the ἐπίσκεψις of the Coruncanii in 230 were secure. The senate was primarily defending the interests of their own, the traffic frequenting the western environs of Greece. That which we have hitherto identified was most definitely plying Delphi and probably also Epidauros and Kos, without consideration of the *emporoi*; those concerned with this sanctuary traffic were of sufficient status to make effective protest concerning its disruption. It is surely not coincidental that two of the powers on the receiving

end of that traffic, Aitolia and Achaia, were similarly opposed to Agron and Teuta, so isolating the Illyrians along with the Epirotes and Akarnanians; although this latter alliance was sufficient to defeat the Achaians off Paxos⁸², it represented the prospect of a limited war for the senate, one which would not draw them further than the areas of their immediate concern.

Yet this situation was different from that encountered earlier in the 230s; for then Akarnania had sought Rome's friendship and Aitolia her hostility, whilst Epiros was deemed sufficiently valuable to merit continued consideration via the favour of Syracuse. With no intermediate communication, the consuls of 229 would have crossed the Adriatic in suspicion of Aitolia and friendship for Epiros and Akarnania; equally, Aitolia and Achaia might have feared the imminence of such a major expeditionary force lest Rome's ambitions be less limited than merely the subduing of Illyrian piracy. Herein the role of the Coruncanii must have been crucial, both as recipients and sources of information⁸³. The court of Teuta was surely not their only port of call; a staging-post such as Apollonia would have been an apt site both for the absorption of the scale and identity of the opposition and for the dissemination of Rome's intent via the regular traffic through the city. If any corroboration of the alignments of Greece was required by the consuls in 229 on their arrival in Greek waters, it came immediately from Demetrios of Pharos; in fear of Teuta, his capitulation was instantaneous, whereupon he ushered the Romans into Kerkyra as the base for the subsequent campaign⁸⁴.

The events of the war were straightforward; it is the results that are more significant. Polybios says that of the embassies sent by Rome to Aitolia, Achaia, Korinth and Athens in 228/7, the latter pair were the first ἐπίπλοχη μετὰ πρεσβείας with Greece⁸⁵. To justify this, Walbank discounts the Akarnanian incident as "vague and inaccurate...the arguments against its validity are strong". Yet he must also discount the embassies of 454 and, indeed, 292; his criteria, that 228/7 saw the first political contacts, are indistinct. He sees the embassies to Aitolia and Achaia as common courtesy, those to Korinth and Athens as drawn by the prestige and commercial power of the once-great cities. He stresses that there was no stance against Makedon in these embassies, since the recent accession of Antigonos Doson was marked by the double threat of a Dardanian invasion and the loss of Thessaly to Aitolia; here, for the moment, was no worthy opponent for Rome⁸⁶.

What the embassies of 228/7 communicated to the states they visited were the αἰτίαι of the war and of Rome's crossing of the Adriatic, τὰ πεπραγμένα and the συνθήκαι imposed upon the Illyrians; these were received by Aitolia and Achaia with φιλανθρωπία⁸⁷. To these states, τὰ πεπραγμένα could not but be an object lesson after their own resistance had failed; it was also a vauntful demonstration of the might of Rome, guaranteed to impress any new acquaintances. The iteration of the causes of the crossing and the terms imposed, however, inevitably enunciated the mutuality of interests between the states. For both were concerned with trans-Adriatic traffic, be it the Polybian *emporoi* or Appian's Issaeans; Rome presented herself in a political manner as the protector

of those who plied Greek waters and these states to whom she presented herself were those who not only had received Apollonia's appeal against the Illyrians⁸⁸, but also were the demonstrable beneficiaries of the traffic concerned, most notably at Delphi and Epidauros. Furthermore, the συνθήκαι involved a clause which Polybios highlights as the one most relevant to the Greeks, that which barred the Illyrians from sailing south of the Lissos under force⁸⁹. To Walbank, this "secured the freedom of the Ionian Sea for Italian and Greek shipping"⁹⁰. This is not to say that the Northern Adriatic was abandoned to the Illyrians; Demetrios of Pharos and the severity of Rome's example were sufficient protection there⁹¹. The Lissos clause was Rome's overt acknowledgement of her responsibility for the interests of her allies as regards the channels of communication into Greece; that these channels led specifically to Aitolia and Achaia is significant both for what came before and especially what came after.

If the embassies to Aitolia and Achaia were primarily concerned with the issue of access, then those to Athens and Korinth were undoubtedly concerned with other details of the settlement. Zonaras records that the Korinthians, on receipt of the embassy, admitted the Romans to the Isthmia, which a Plautus promptly won; at Athens, the ambassadors were admitted to both the Eleusinian mysteries and the citizenship⁹². On Walbank's reckoning, this might be counted as the gratitude of two old stagers simply for being remembered⁹³. Yet there is more sense in the implications of Derow's interpretation of the second century decree of Paros for Pharos to establish that Pharos had an alliance with Rome from

the period of the First Illyrian War⁹⁴; that being so, he concludes from subsequent events that the other cities of the so-called Roman protectorate, Issa, Epidamnos, Kerkyra and Apollonia, also held alliances with Rome instead of a "loose relationship of *amicitia*, which applied the Roman concept of *clientela* in the sphere of foreign policy"⁹⁵. It is the assumption of these alliances that surely provides the *raison d'être* for the embassies of 227. For Korinth was the mother-city of the colonies of Apollonia, Kerkyra and Epidamnos, whilst Athens was the grandmother-city of Pharos by her responsibility for the colony on Paros⁹⁶. Thus the relation of τὰ πεπραγμένα was closely tied to the συνθήκαι. Rome was performing the courtesy of informing these cities of the causation and nature of her fresh relations with their associate-dependents⁹⁷; it was perhaps too far to Paros, in which case Athens was a suitable substitute, whilst Hieron was no doubt similarly informed of the subsumption of Syracusan Issa by a less ground-breaking embassy⁹⁸. The implication again is that Rome was acknowledging her mutuality of interests with Athens and Korinth via the media of their respective allies; the relationship at this level was not formalised, but it was quantifiable. There were, of course, sundry considerations; Strabo notes that Korinth had a port, Lechaion, for the processing of Italian trade⁹⁹, whilst the aforementioned development of western interests in the Kyklades might have had a definite effect on Athens¹⁰⁰. Yet this courtesy was surely the prime motivation for the embassy, one which corroborates both the thesis of Derow and much of the above.

* * * * *

The scenario hitherto constructed for Rome and Greece in the third century is as follows. Rome's first initiative, in 292, was designed primarily to counter the threats of pestilence and the Samnites; yet this came at a time when the Greeks of Southern Italy were in a state of schism second only to that between Aitolia and the Hellenic League in Greece itself. This initiative indirectly led to the appeal of Thurii and the sequence of events which brought about the Pyrrhic War and the Roman conquest of Southern Italy by 272; in this, Pyrrhos forfeited to Rome the role of protector and liberator of the Italiote Greeks that had formerly lain with the Greeks. Thus the lines that were drawn between these Greeks and the east, via their attendance at Delphi above all, were fundamentally altered to accommodate Rome, a fact acknowledged both by Ptolemy and by Apollonia. The process was completed when a further vested interest, that of Messana, drew Rome into the reduction of all Sicily by 262. It was then that Aitolia, guardian of Delphi, acknowledged the contribution of Rome to her well-being via the medium of their respective dependents, by the *proxenia* grant to Volceius. The continued, nay, increased traffic to the Pythia and Soteria in subsequent years would surely have consolidated that connection had Rome's attention not been concentrated elsewhere. Yet as soon as the war with Carthage neared completion, Rome again broadened her horizons in the east with regard to Ptolemy, Seleukos and Akarnania. Akarnania followed a well-worn trail of external appeals. Yet not only was Rome's diplomacy ill-starred in this respect, but she ran the added risk of alienating the states who lay on the opposite ends of the chains of mutual interest than ran from herself via her allies to Delphi and

Epidauros; this would surely have also alienated her allies. The attested traffic of the 230s bears this out and provides an introduction to the First Illyrian War which neither confirms nor denies Polybios' causes; there was high-level religious traffic vulnerable to the Illyrians in the area at the requisite time, yet it is impossible to say whether there was a corresponding amount of commercial traffic as well. Yet the epitaph provided by Rome's settlement emphasises how important that traffic was in senatorial thinking. That being the case, the extension of the lines between the peninsulae throughout the third century can be seen to be an important factor in the dictation of Roman foreign policy; she demonstrably followed the appeals of her allies, which led first to the domination of Italy, then of Sicily and finally to Greece, more specifically Aitolia, Achaia, Athens, Korinth and Egypt.

B. EARLY LATIN LITERATURE.

Hitherto, much has been made both of the frequency with which Italian and Sicilian performers crossed to Greece to participate in the panhellenic festivals, and of the temporarily abortive attempt by the senate to incorporate a hellenistic foundation myth in their official diplomacy. The former reflects the drawing power of the Greek sanctuaries even at this comparatively late stage. Nikokles of Tarentum was fêted by Pausanias as the finest *kitharôdos* of his generation for his victories in ten different festivals, yet all were in the proving ground of Greece. Drakon of Tarentum plied his trade in Delos and Delphi, more lauded there than in Tarentum. Philemon of Syracuse was a well-respected playwright whose *Phasma* was the model for Plautus' *Mostellaria*; yet most of his works were performed in Athens¹. This flow of talent to the east is combined with the second of the above points to convey a deep-seated sense of the cultural superiority of the east; that Rome propagated the Trojan myth in her contacts with Greece supposedly demonstrates a need to conform and belong, rather than to dictate or bypass². How this might be quantified is by a study of the development of the earliest Latin literature, most especially from 240; for that was the year when the *ludi Romani* were established as a scenic festival and so a potential rival to the panhellenic festivals for the attentions of the performers of the west³. What Rome adopted from Greece, and how it was utilised in this cultural sense, will be a reliable parameter for her genuine relationship with hellenism.

The *ludi Romani* had featured various Italian entertainments since 364 in the shape of Etruscan dancers and flautists exhibiting the kind of crude boisterousness that could liberally be interpreted as comic drama⁴. Yet before 240, Greek-style drama was confined to the Greek cities of Southern Italy, Sicily and Campania; what the festival of 240 celebrated was the completion of Rome's pan-Italian settlement by the incorporation of the Greek elements encountered in Sicily and perhaps also Egypt⁵. Thus the Romanised Tarentine Livius Andronicus assumed the symbolic position of first Roman dramatist; perhaps he was summoned from Tarentum for that very purpose⁶. Thereafter the translation of Greek originals became standard practice, eclipsing alternative forms of drama such as the *fabula praetexta* by sheer volume⁷; the translations themselves were never literal or slavish, comedy in particular imposing a distinctive Italianising aspect on more sober New Comedy⁸. Because of the extended contacts with Southern Italy and Sicily and the apparent bilingualism of the majority of Roman society, from aristocracy to tradesmen, it is presumed that the variety of social milieux who attended the dramatic festivals comprised a discerning audience⁹.

The development of Latin drama was thus a logical progression; as more Greek elements were subsumed in the expansion of Rome, so her drama reflected the influence of those elements, because of the need to provide a reference point for those elements within Rome and because their drama was better than Roman drama. Yet the nature of the dramas of Rome's earliest playwrights, Livius and Naevius, suggests something other than that the aediles of 240 commissioned Livius in particular

merely to "write something Greek", something other than that Rome admitted the cultural superiority of the Greeks and so bought into their culture wholesale. For there were many Greek originals available to the Latin dramatists, spanning the entire mythological spectrum from Troy to Thebes to the Argonautica to the individual, localised myths that defied contiguous categorisation. We do not possess the full text of any of Livius' or Naevius' dramas, but we do retain the titles of a selection of their tragedies; of these, six of Livius' nine plays and four of Naevius' six were concerned with the Trojan cycle¹⁰.

Beare applauded Livius' judgment "which led him to choose these tragedies as the drama...which (was) to thrill and instruct the people of Rome"; Sandbach noted that, as war rolled over the Italian peninsula, these spectacles would offer Rome a cheering distraction along with the moral edification to be drawn from the tragic tenets and didacticisms¹¹. Yet it was surely not the vibrant action and cautionary morals of the Trojan cycle that prompted this bias in its favour, assuming that this is no accident of preservation. It was rather the particular relevance of the figures of that cycle to Rome and Italy, so that the Latin tragic genre began at the crossroads of its greatest influence, Greek tragedy, and its native mythistory. In terms of Italy, these figures were responsible for the foundation of several cities, particularly in the south, Apulia and Messapia, in their *nostoi* traditions; thus Diomedes founded Canusium and Argyrippa, Nestor and the Pylians Metapontum, Philoktetes Petelia and Crimissa, Epeios Lagaria and so on¹². Odysseus' western wanderings to the shadowlands were reflected in several shadowy

traditions, especially in Campania, and even in some misdirected Roman foundation myths¹³. Yet, as we have already seen, the most relevant aspect of the cycle for Rome herself was the story of her foundation by Aineias, perhaps at its acme in 240 having first been used detrimentally by Pyrrhos, then complimentarily by Segesta and gaining currency in this period at the hands of the Koans, the Locrians and the Romans themselves in regard to Seleukos¹⁴.

Rome's links with Aineias were at issue in the east from the sixth century, if anything can be made of the tangential reference of Stesichoros' *Iliou Persis*. Thereafter the theme was developed and refined by Hellanikos in the fifth century, Alkimos in the fourth and Kallias, Agathokles and Eratosthenes in the third¹⁵. Since these writers were of dubious familiarity with Rome, their versions admit considerable fluctuations in detail and consistency. There developed further confusion when the indigenous Italian myths came to light in the east. Antiochos of Syracuse wrote of the pre-Aineias rule of Morges, son of Italos, whose brother Sikelos sought refuge away from Rome; Dionysios of Chalkis assumed that Rhomos, son of Italos, Emathion or Askanios, must have founded Rome¹⁶. It was Alkimos in the fourth century, around 350, who first attempted a cogent correlation of the two ultimately contradictory traditions; to him, Aineias begat Romulus who begat Alba who bore Rhomos, the founder of Rome¹⁷.

From these early faltering Greek attempts at synthesis, it is clear that Romulus *et al* were a mystery to the hellenistic world; thus they

preferred the product of their own mythology, Aeneias, who, although he had no cult at Rome, had been embedded in Etruria since the sixth century and Latium since the fourth¹⁹. This confusion over the indigenous Italian tradition is understandable; the essence of the Romulus myth was incorporated in the aetiology of Rome herself, her topography and institutions, many of which were bastardised to fit the story¹⁹. The name Romulus itself seems to have been a fiction; the suffix *-ulus* is Etruscan and denoted a founder, as with Caeculus at Praeneste, whilst the name as a whole seems to have superseded Amulius as a similar, more etymologically satisfying alternative²⁰. Perhaps the most eloquent attestation of the myth was the statue of the wolf at Rome, augmented in 296 by the addition of *simulacra* of the twin foundling fathers at the instigation of the Ogulnii; it was perhaps this which was the source of Lykophron's enigmatic verses on the twin brood of the son of Aphrodite, born of the information garnered by the Ptolemaic embassy of 273 rather than from any definitive literary version²¹. Whilst this remained true and there was no definitive version of the Romulus myth available and accessible to a Greek audience, this status quo remained untroubled; there were Greek attempts to define the tradition, which faltered due to their lack of authority, and there were Latin productions which pandered to the Greeks who were either subject to Rome or diplomatically linked to her.

When we discuss the synthesis of the Aeneias-myth and the Romulus-myth, we presume much of the conscious assimilation of the Romans, themselves a diverse ensemble from a variegated area, in that the

various elements of their native myths imploded in the spiritual equivalent of the Big Bang. What the discussion lacks is the definition of an authoritative source for that synthesis. For it cannot be that a Greek writer, geographically and culturally detached from Rome, can ever be admitted as a true source; it makes no sense that the views of such a man could either be imposed upon Rome or held to represent the situation in Rome, if only because they were expressed in a language which was not Roman by a man who was not Roman. Indeed, such inchoate issues as myth and religion are never crystallised until a definitive literary version is produced by a participant or an involved and authoritative party in the language of that myth or religion; for only then can reference and citation be made and developments admitted²². For our purposes, we seek literature written within Rome by Romans in Latin; there is no source so good as these. Yet even this will not place an accurate date on the synthesis; inasmuch as the evocation of foreign gods will only record a fixed moment in time in the progression of a religion, so the recording of a definitive version provides only a *terminus post quem* for the discussion of the subject. Since the earliest Latin literature that survives for us is the plays of Livius and Naevius, the extent of our knowledge is that, before 240, there was no such authoritative version in Rome and, indeed, there were no urgent efforts made to produce one in the ensuing period. All Greek efforts before this time must therefore be dismissed as insecure; yet this does not mean that, when a Latin source was composed, it did not have a Greek influence.

The need to define the tradition may well be reflected in the appeal of Akarnania to Rome in the early 230s. We have already discussed the question-mark over Iustinus' account of this event in historical terms²³. Yet whatever the truth of it, the terms of the Aitolians' dismissal of the Roman envoys, on the grounds of the incompatibility of the Aineias-myth with the Romulus-myth, surely reflect a stage in the development of the two parallel myths at which they could no longer independently co-exist. The differences between the two traditions are striking. Romulus was a fratricide, even a parricide, a son of Mars whose rule was marked by aggression and violence²⁴; Aineias was the son of Venus, a model of filial piety, the perfect counterbalance. To favour one above the other, as did the dramatists' plying of the Trojan cycle, was to distort the truth by economy. However, a synthesis presented an attractive prospect; the antagonistic elements would cancel each other out and Romulus' crime would be assuaged by Aineias' goodness. Equally, the Italy of Romulus would embrace the hellenism of Aineias and so Southern Italy and Sicily; the Trojan nature of that hellenism was both Italian and Aigalan, Greek and barbarian, so as to retain a sense of individualism and detachment²⁵. How best, then, to effect that synthesis ?

It is acknowledged that Naevius, the creator of the genre *praetexta*, was the author of the *Alimonium Remi et Romuli*, otherwise known as the *Lupus*; the only fragment to survive concerns a meeting between Vibia the king of Veii and Amulius the king of Alba²⁶. Given our almost complete lack of knowledge concerning the play, it is impossible to say whether

it was in part responsible for the crisis between the myths or an attempt to define the tradition to avert that crisis; whether it was catalyst or cure. Yet a single play would never have been sufficient to create a balance between the myths, if only because of the respective backgrounds against which they were set. For Aineias was the product of Homeric epic, which also gave rise to an independent social, political and religious framework for its heroic environment; mortal deeds were inexplicable but for their position within that framework²⁷. Romulus on the other hand accorded to the rules of the Italy that produced him; his association with criminals and murderers and the rape of the Sabines had no parallel in Greek tradition, whilst many of the rites he instituted could be assimilated to the Greek only by tenuous means²⁸. It was not merely a question of working out the time lag between Aineias and Romulus and then filling in the missing generations; the task was to square up cultures and ethics from top to bottom, and it was best done by the medium of epic.

Epic has always been the vehicle of the κλέα ἀνδρῶν, the chief means of recording the great deeds of great men so that posterity might know of them. The propagandist value of the genre was, in the third century, realised to the full by the hellenistic dynasties of Attalos, Seleukos and Ptolemy, via the medium of Leschides and Musaios of Ephesos, Simonides of Magnesia and the court poets of the Alexandrine Mouseion²⁹. The works of these men linked mythistory with contemporary events, in order to glorify the achievements of their royal patrons and sponsors by association. It was a trick unknown at Rome before Naevius, although the

theories behind it were well exploited; both Cicero and Livy warned of the dangers of believing the bogus family trees, embroidered statue titles and mendacious funerary orations that represented the aristocracy's perpetuation of their own valour and status³⁰. Thus when epic first appeared in Latin literature, it had a variety of roles to fulfil; to advertise the κλέα of the Roman people, to clarify Rome's foundation myths, to establish points of reference for hellenistic mythology and to lay down in canonical form the religion of Rome. These are admittedly roles which are imposed upon it from our own historical standpoint, rather than any intents transplanted into the heads of Livius and Naevius as they picked up their pens; yet they are roles which the tradition of the epic genre demands from Rome and her literature, since it is only by the creation of a native source that these issues can coagulate.

In the light of these observations, it is a surprise that the first work to appear (depending on comparative chronology) was no synthesis, but a translation of the *Odyssey* into Latin. We are handicapped by the fragmentary nature of its survival, but not so completely as many modern critics would think; the original survives in full, and it is fair to assume that Livius' translation ran from start to finish³¹. Yet Beare's assessment of the work points rather to Suetonius' rare titbit of information on Livius' position as the teacher of the children of Livius Salinator, and to Horace's later grumblings on the compulsion to read the "carmina Livii" in the schoolroom³²; he pronounces that "his translation of the *Odyssey* reads like what it certainly became, a school

text-book" and that "the position of tutor to the family of Livius Salinator would suit him admirably, and the need for a school text-book may have led to his translation of the *Odyssey*"³³. It cannot be doubted that the *Odissia Latina* was a more tolerable alternative to the jejune *XII Tables* as the basis of the school syllabus; the paucity of Latin literature would almost certainly mean that, in this initial period, every available text would be utilised in this fashion. Yet this does not mean that the work was originally intended solely for that purpose. There may be a scholastic feel to the text, but this is no more than the result of the novelty of the experiment with Greek poetry in the native Saturnian metre³⁴; in any case, that feel is in the touch of the student rather than in the intent of the poet. This discrepancy between our expectations of the work and the result scorned by Beare, can only be made up by an assessment of what Livius did write, what he might have written and the problems with which he would have had to deal.

The first point to be addressed is the relevance of the work. We have seen that Rome's association with Odysseus was as old as Hesiod, and that the wanderings of Odysseus up the western coast were embedded in the topography of, particularly, Campania. Etruria possessed a native tradition of the exile and death of the hero, somewhere between the name Utuse attested on vases and the inventive dwarf Nanos mentioned by Lykophron; Phillips concedes, however, that there is no conscious connection between the two, Utuse and Nanos, in Etruscan minds³⁵. The point is that Odysseus was not a fresh importation to the immediate environs of Rome³⁶. To set boundaries in time and space for myth and

religion is like plaiting blancmange; for our purpose, it is sufficient to say that Livius started from aⁿ established platform.

Important for the general theme of Rome relating to hellenistic myth and culture, is the mode of translation, the actual nomenclature used for Greek deities and characters; did Livius accept that Greece's gods are Rome's gods, or did he separate their domains and so also the destinies of the respective nations ? The answer is a qualifying one. Livius admitted the same divine scheme of things, with his gods familiarly interrelated, as indeed he was bound to by his presumed acceptance of the plot as a whole; thus Athena addresses Jupiter "Pater noster, Saturni Filie", and he replies "mea puer, quid verbi ex tuo ore supra fugit ?"³⁷ This quotation reveals two aspects of Livius' translation; first, that he used peculiarly Italian terms for his gods, and second, that he adopted and developed the original formulaic structure of Homer. This first point elsewhere renders the Muse Camena³⁸, Hermes Mercurius, Moira Morta³⁹, Apollo the son of Latona (not Leto)⁴⁰, the Muse the daughter of Moneta (not Mnemosyne) and here, the father of Jupiter Saturn, not Kronos. Perhaps most interestingly, the hero himself suffered a change of name, from Odysseus to Ulixes; this fate did not befall other mortal characters (Laertes, Patroclus). The obvious explanation for this is that the latter were fixed in Italian tradition in a way that Odysseus was not; the cults of the Atreidai, Tydeidai, Aiakidai and Laertiadai in Tarentum lent more stability to the nomenclature than did the variant forms of Odysseus, Utuse, Nanos and Ulixes⁴¹. By fixing his hero under this appellation, Livius formalised

the tradition for the Latin-speaking world by a deliberate Italianisation. Unfortunately, this positive move away from the Greek would ruin the translation of *Od.* XIX.407-9, Odysseus' own etymology; thus to Livius, Ulixes was not 'the hated one', but at worst neutral. He surely understood the significance of his destruction of the context of his hero's trials as the object of divine hatred; to him, then, the claiming of the hero by the Latin world in recognisable form was the more important thing. Further to this, it is strange that this Latinisation of a Greek appellation admits no Latin etymology; this was not so with Asklepios-Aesculapius, Kybele-Magna Mater and Herakles-Hercules. Surely, then, the destruction and the departure from practice was for deliberate effect.

The retention of the formulae in the translation creates a number of problems. As indicated above, this was a prime means of communicating the divine genealogy in the work, via such modes of address and description as the aforementioned "mea puer", "filius Latonas" and "sancta puer Saturni...regina". It has long been a commonplace in the study of native Italian religion that it was primarily daemonic or numinous, with a pronounced avoidance of anthropomorphism⁴². In this context, the issue of Livius' translation of formulaic epithets such as ἀντίθεος for Odysseus and γλαυκῶπις for Athene is crucial; did he admit that mortals can aspire to the status of gods and that the gods themselves have human aspects? The one example we have, the translation of *Od.* VIII.322-3, suggests not; for here, the ἑκάργος Apollo is reduced to the 'filius Latonas'⁴³. Here, then, Livius admitted the

genealogy of the gods, but not their utter anthropomorphism; yet the text of Homer and the progression of the story calls for the gods to move as humans, to act as humans, to smile, to frown, to make love, even though the terms of that story were expressed by a human being. It has already been said that the first appearance of Rome's gods in a major literary work must provide the rules to which they thereafter conform, and the point from which they thereafter develop. Since that is as true for Livius as it was for Homer himself, then his criteria were probably defined somewhere between hellenistic and Italian religion; lack of evidence prevents further comment.

The extension of this issue of formulae is the direction of the tone of the translation on a word-for-word basis. The classical example is the opening lines of the work. Homer's words were as follows:

ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε

This presented the potential for Livius to enunciate the sanctity (ἱερὸν) of the city of Troy, whence sprung the stock of Rome. Yet more thorny is the question of how the ἐπεὶ was translated. The obvious parallel was 'cum'; but this begs the question of the sense and therefore of the tone of the whole work. If Livius took it in a temporal sense, then Ulixes' travels were merely the aftermath, in chronological terms, of the fall of Troy. Yet if he took it in a causal sense, then Ulixes' trials were the direct result of his part in the sacking of Rome's motherland, a divine punishment for that specific crime, in addition to the rather more personal vendetta of Poseidon/Neptune. A similar problem was Livius' translation of the Homeric Ἀχαιοί, the

catch-all description for his Greeks, used without any real distinction⁴⁴. To Livius and the Rome of the mid-third century, the Achaians were a definite, self-contained political entity; the alternative Danaoi constituted an anachronism. Also the term for the country as a whole; Homer called it Hellas five times, but never Graecia, nor its inhabitants Graeci or Grai⁴⁵. As for political terminology, Homer's world was ruled by διοτρεφεῖς βασιλεῖς, the only division being between good, liberal rulers and oppressive tyrants⁴⁶. That these βασιλεῖς are numerous in Ithaka suggests aristocracy; the weighting given to the assembly ἐν ἀγορᾷ approaches the Rome of Livius, as outlined (nominally for a later period) by Polybios, yet the terminology used by the poet would have been crucial. Tyrant, monarch and king were still reasonably dirty words at Rome; yet by setting these political terms down in perpetuity, Livius was fixing them as absolutes in the Roman/Latin conception of Greece, her inhabitants and her political institutions⁴⁷.

As well as establishing these socio-religious criteria, Livius introduced his readership to a wide range of geographical and mythical τοποι; the dramas which he and others were producing could then amplify these. On the mythical side, the *Odissia* included allusions to the stories of Aigisthos, Klytaimnestra and Orestes' revenge (also in the *Aigisthus*); the fall of Troy via the Trojan horse (also in the *Equus Troianus*); the various fates of Achilles and Aias (also in the *Achilles* and the *Aias Mastigophorus*) and Pyrrhos/Neoptolemos (as in the *Hermiona*) and Teucer (as perhaps in a *Teucer* or *Telamo*, hinted at by Varro); the

various *nostoi* of Menelaus and company; Tyro, Alkmene and Mykene; Orion and Artemis, Demeter and Iasion, and Autolykos, Philomela and Prokne; the Lapiths and Centaurs, Herakles and Iphitos; the afterlife and the legendary punishments for the sinners of mythology. Again, it is the standardisation of myth by definite composition, perhaps also its introduction to an (otherwise unlettered ?) audience⁴⁸. Here too were problems for Livius, most especially in the lay of Demodokos in book VIII. For this involved the tutelary deities of Rome herself, Aphrodite/Venus and Ares/Mars, in an adulterous relationship eventually exposed in humiliation by the slighted husband Hephaistos, Craft personified. If Livius did indeed translate the whole *Odyssey*, then this was a thorny predicament; did he implicate his city's gods thus, following Homer's cavalier example, or did the dictates of piety inside his own, semi-anthropomorphised religion prevent him depicting this scenario ? Although the fragment which survives, concerning Hermes/Mercury and Apollo, is tangential to the scene, the only place in the *Odyssey* at which they arrive simultaneously is Hephaistos' bedroom; the theory of inclusion must stand⁴⁹. Perhaps, then, there was not such shame in the adultery as might initially appear. The implication of the mother of Aineias and the father of Romulus in this somewhat torrid affair was a fitting emblem for the synthesis of the twin foundation myths of Rome.

Geographically, Livius described or referred to a host of places, ranging from the familiar to the obscure, from west to east. The focus of attention was, quite naturally, Ithaka and her environs; the place of

these in the margins between the Greek and Italian worlds hardly needs emphasis, particularly given their centrality for the trans-Adriatic crossing which is seminal to the study of Graeco-Roman relations during the early third century. There is also mention of Krete and her ninety cities and racial mix, Pylos, Sparta, Pherae, Argos, Orchomenos, Ephyre, Dodona and its oracle of Zeus, Athens, Epeian Elis, Messene, Thesprotia and Parnassos; Skyros, Eubolia, Lesbos, Chios, Tenedos, Ethiopia and Egypt; and the Taphians and Phoinikians who ply their trade from Asia Minor and the Black Sea to Sicily and Bruttium (Temesa ?)⁵⁰. There is a list of stars by which to travel from west to east, and a warning against the storms of the Aigaian, especially those off Cape Maleia⁵¹. This is the definite world of Homer. Aside of that, the attempts of Bérard Snr., discussed by Phillips, to reconstruct the wanderings in Italy and Sicily are not without point or relevance⁵². For the Italians knew of the myths on their own doorstep; Livius needed to put them in a broader context, to delimit their topography and tie them together in terms that related more to their contemporary manifestations than to their ancient epic origins, so that the earliest mythistory of Italy was expressed inside a contiguous Romanocentric geography. Thus to his readership, the lurid picture of the wide world of Greece served either as a valuable introduction to an unfamiliar world, or an equally valuable mythological background to places of which they already knew through trade, diplomacy or independent fable. As such, the *Odissia* should not be underestimated as a source of information for the Latin-speaking population, even though its author may never have witnessed these places for himself.

Socially and ethically, the *Odyssey* was a mine of information for the customs and *mores* of at least the heroic world of Homer; this is less stable ground, as there is no saying either that Livius was attempting to exhort his audience to a more civilised way of life, or that this was necessarily the Greek way of doing things which then needed to be adapted for Rome. Suffice it to say that the *Odyssey* is an epic of communication, of civilised human interaction, as parodied by the Kyklopes and exemplified by the Phaiakians⁵³; the flaw in the case of the latter is that they do not fulfil the final criterion, that is, accordance with the will of the gods in alignment with *δίκη* and *τὰ αἵσιμα*⁵⁴. Scrupulous observance of ritual, acknowledgement of divine will as expressed in *auspicia* and portent, ungrudging extension of hospitality, moderation within the bounds of mortality, the practice of agriculture in harmony with nature, the use of the *agora* as a public centre⁵⁵, all these are elements conducive to civilisation, whilst their antitheses are the fundament of the primitive, barbaric, impious world of prehistory. Dangerous ground for the critic, then. Yet Rome was a society still capable of ritual inhumation⁵⁶; there may indeed be reasons to see Livius' work as a kind of exorcism of the cruder elements in favour of a rationalism and a concept of right and wrong, albeit with the proviso of divine caprice to account for the vagaries of fortune. In these terms, it may not be excessive to claim that in a literary sense, Livius was imposing order on the previously amorphous and chaotic culture of myth and tradition, tying up the links between present and past dictates, in much the same way as his hero bestrode east and west as a genuine citizen of the world; that Ulixes is a Latinised/

Italianised Greek inhabitant of the margins between Italy and Greece is most significant for that purpose.

It remains to be asked why Livius chose the *Odyssey* rather than the *Iliad* for this purpose⁵⁷. That question has already been answered in part by the recognition of the residual Odyssean myths in Italy, especially in Etruria and Campania, but there is more to it than that. For all the quiet virtues of Hector, coupled to his obvious martial valour, in the *Iliad*, "Trojans are seen, as soon as they appear in the poem, as gorgeous, frivolous, noisy; Achaeans, by contrast, are serious and grim"⁵⁸. The sense of arrogance in the Trojans' behaviour on the battlefield, and the retribution suffered for it, is brought out well by Griffin; by contrast, in *Od.* XVIII.261-4, the Trojans receive a good write-up in the words of Penelope. Equally, in the *Iliad*, the gods are seen as a level of light relief to offset the suffering on the mortal level, and so display a less advanced concept of divine justice than we find in the *Odyssey*; if Livius sought the finished article for presentation to the Latin-speaking world, then he would be better advised to use that in the *Odyssey* rather than the warring gods and distracted Zeus of the *Iliad*⁵⁹.

* * * * *

Thus the *Odissia* was a work of crucial sociological importance, in that it laid down in canonical form for the Latin-speaking world the precepts of their religion and of their culture, and demarcated the

terms of their relationship with the Greek world in myth and cult. What it did not do was perpetuate the κλέα ἄνδρῶν of the Roman people, a task thereafter assumed by Naevius. Naevius' career was dogged by controversy, apparently ending in exile and disgrace; certainly he never won the plaudits associated with Livius and the traditions of his abrasiveness may well be telling⁶⁰. Yet he certainly composed the second great epic of Latin literature in such a way as to take up where Livius left off, choosing to tell the story of the Punic Wars, in which he himself had fought as a native Capuan from a well-attested plebeian family⁶¹. Yet his theme was not restricted to the years 264-241, but stretched back to the destruction of Troy, the escape of Aeneas to Italy and the subsequent foundation of Rome by Romulus.

As aforementioned, this knitting together of the separate traditions of Aeneas and Romulus over Rome's foundation was something in need of fulfilment by an authoritative source; once set down on paper by an insider, it could put to an end the speculative accounts of the various Greek poets. Although Naevius did not take account of the chronological problems later addressed by Cato⁶², he settled the problem initially by making Romulus the grandson of Aeneas, born to his daughter Ilia⁶³. By tying in also Latinus and Amulius in some obscure manner, he made sure that every loose end in the equation had a point of reference⁶⁴; so was born the basis of the tradition of the foundation of Rome, upon which various refinements could subsequently be imposed by Cato, Ennius, Virgil *et al.* What Naevius also strove to do was to ascribe a mythical *casus belli* to the conflict with Carthage, assuming that he took his

Trojans on the same route to Italy as did Virgil. For this issue there are well-rehearsed arguments to confirm the probability that Naevius would be bound to set the Punic War in the context of Rome's "iusta bella"⁶⁵. For there would be little thematic justification for the inclusion of Aeneas were this not the case; a poem on the Punic War without mention of Carthage for two whole books would be a strange proposition.

Any assessment of Naevius' achievement is fundamentally different from that of Livius', not least because there is no original for either Naevius or the critic from which to work. Although the *Bellum Punicum* ties the Roman tradition into that of the Greeks at its starting point, it then diverges towards native Italian tradition and, latterly, contemporary history, so as to stand as a work of virtually free composition. Naevius' sources and influences are important; he himself had lived through and experienced the events of the First Punic War, and so was his own source for that, but what of the mythological foundation of the city? Greek parallels for the substance of the myth in this form, with the feature of the twins as opposed to Romulus alone, are the works of Lykophron, Diokles of Peparethos and Timaios, three who may well have preceded the composition of the *Bellum Punicum*⁶⁶. Plutarch accredits Diokles with the status of first historian of the foundation of Rome and the major source for the work of Fabius Pictor, although his work included much that was dramatic and artificial; thus, by this reckoning, he may also have been a source for Naevius. The question is whether Naevius' material came from an intra-Roman tradition, as has

seemed immediately probable from the nature of his task; or from the cycle of Greek tradition, notably from an author from a historically anonymous Aigaian island. If the latter is true, then our picture of an independent Rome developing its own traditions will be badly damaged.

The first place of enquiry is Naevius' text itself. This demonstrates the same divine schema codified for Rome by Livius, as suggested by Naevius' reference to the Muses as "novem Iovis concordēs filiae sorores", to Neptune as "summi deum regis fratrem Neptunum regnatorem marum", to Proserpine as "Cereris...puer", to Apollo as "sanctusque Delphis prognatus Pythius Apollo" and to Athena's plea to Jupiter "summe deum regnator, quianam me genuisti ?"⁶⁷ These fragments depict a world of interrelated gods inside a family that held sway over Roman and hellenistic myth alike, just as in the *Odissia*; if there is any development, it is in the role of Venus as protectress of Rome qua her role as mother of Aeneias. The gods hold Latin, rather than Greek appellations again; since there is no original, however, there is no further hint of their roles and aspects. To these are added the Penates as the gods of Troy turned household deities of Rome; more distinctly Italianised than the remainder of Livius' pantheon, these admit identification with the Dioskouroi, be it via the Cabeiri of Samothrace or the Spartan-Tarentine tradition, whence they reached Lavinium and then Rome⁶⁸. Religious practices also are defined; Anchises' taking of the auspices, the 'res divas' and 'castus' laid down by Romulus, the ritual declarations of war, the consultation of the entrails of sacrificial victims *et al*⁶⁹. These are underlined by homespun Latin

philosophy, most notably the disgrace of surrender in battle and the ignorance of brutish men⁷⁰. Geography too, but this time a peculiarly relevant one; the aetiology of the western coast of Italy, as manifested in the wanderings of Aeneias past especially Procida and Cimmeria⁷¹; the topography of Rome, in the aetiologies of the Aventine and Palatine⁷²; and of course the scenes of the warfare in the First Punic War, in Malta and Sicily⁷³. This is, then, a development from, almost an addendum to Livius' work; cults, *mores* and ethics are specified in terms of Roman practice, and the geographical details take up where the *Odissia* left off, on the hitherto shadowy lands of Western Italy. Be this accident or design, it is remarkable that in these terms, the first two major works of Latin literature cover so much ground concerning Rome's mythology and mythistory and its place within both Italian and hellenistic society, culture and mythology.

The *Bellum Punicum* was thus, by its language and by the parameters of content and theme, designed for internal consumption. It would be strange then to find that Naevius' source material was hellenistic, in the sense that he merely transcribed or translated material from a Greek original. This relates particularly to Lykophron, whose material is no clearer than any other contemporary pre-Naevian Greek source; his mention of the place of the twins, Romulus and Remus, in the Roman tradition may be no more than the most basic reflection of information garnered from the Romano-Egyptian political exchanges of 273 and 241⁷⁴. Certainly, there is little in the *Alexandra* to aid Naevius' synthesis of Rome's two traditions. The question of Diokles is of a different water,

particularly given Plutarch's testimony that he was the forerunner of Fabius Pictor. Naevius and Fabius Pictor wrote complementary works, the one Latin poetry and the other Greek prose, yet both covering much the same ground⁷⁵; the assumption has therefore been that, if Diokles directed Fabius' thinking, then he was also inspirational to Naevius. However, this is to misread and misinterpret Plutarch, who actually says that Diokles was the first to *publish* (ἐκδοῦναι) the story of the Roman tradition to the Greeks, and it was this which Fabius seems to have followed⁷⁶. It is the publication, not the establishment of the tradition, which is relevant to Plutarch, and more specifically publication to a Greek readership. In this, Diokles' version was the first to be disseminated in Greece proper; when Fabius' version was disseminated, it was found to be largely similar and so deemed derivative. Yet this does not necessarily follow; Diokles' version was bound to be disseminated more rapidly than Fabius' given his geographical proximity to the cultural centres of Greece, but this does not mean that it was written first⁷⁷. Plutarch's account of primacy is therefore confused by his Greek aspect, in terms not only of geography, but also of culture; it would doubtless seem natural that the parvenus Romans should have succumbed to the influence of the Greeks given the depth, status and quality of the latter's traditions. However, there is little of this which applies to Naevius; Plutarch's term of reference is εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, inadmissible of the Latin of the *Bellum Punicum*. Naevius is therefore free of Plutarch's comparative chronology, dubious as it is; given the lack of alternative evidence, our assumption that his influence was internal can stand. He was doubtless aware of previous

Greek versions of his tradition; yet this does not mean that he followed them. The Latin version for Rome must surely have preceded the Greek version for Greece.

The issue of Naevius' influences, when combined with the importance of his work, projects the enquiry onto a quasi-political level. We know that Livius had a powerful political ally in the shape of his patron Salinator; this man was consul in 219 and 207, legate on the crucial embassy to Carthage in 218, proconsul investigating Etrurian defections in 206/5 and censor in 204⁷⁸. He was also probably the son of the *decemvir sacris faciundis* of 236, charged with holding the *ludi Saeculares* along with M'. Aemilius Lepidus Numida; since these *ludi* were an importation from Tarentum, it has been held that their initiation now was under the influence of Livius Andronicus, who was therefore able to perform his own plays in one of his native festivals⁷⁹. The insecurity of this discourages interpretation. A more concrete indication of Livius' relationship with the establishment was his commission in 207 to compose a hymn to Juno for the propitiation of the gods in the months before the climactic battle of the Metaurus; the success of the gesture, reflected in the victory over the Carthaginians, was rewarded by the establishment of the Aedes Minervae/Athenaeum on the Aventine as a common centre for writers and actors⁸⁰. Festus' account of this is ambiguous; either the temple was established "quia prosperius respublica populi Romani geri coepta est", or Livius composed the *carmen* "quia prosperius etc.", in which case there were two *carmina* and the honour was much the greater. Livius' stake in the success against Carthage is

amplified by the attested friendship and support of Scipio Africanus for Salinator; the links of the two are perhaps strengthened by the suggestion of Salinator's adoption after Cannae of the son of L. Aemilius Paullus, whose daughter Scipio married²¹.

If Livius was seen as the poet laureate of Rome by those in power there, Naevius' status was the more unstable. The bottom line of the contrast between the two was that of genres; Livius' surviving fragments are predominantly tragic and epic, whilst Naevius' show a predilection for comedy and also the novelty of the *fabula praetexta*. The contemporaneity of the latter and the number of Naevian fragments subsequently placed in political contexts have given rise to a maverick reputation for the poet; a line in Plautus and a passage in Gellius have been interpreted as references to his imprisonment as a result of his poetry, whilst cases have been constructed for his vigorous opposition to both Scipiones and Metelli and support for Marcellus, for whom he wrote the *Clastidium*²². Such interpretations have been effectively demolished by Gruen, who admits that the waspish quality of many of the fragments had definite targets, but denies that the intent was political instead of jocularly satirical²³. Naevius' comedy, closest of all Roman dramatists' to Old Comedy, was deemed disgraceful for that very reason, but by its critics, not its targets; the balance was provided by the nationalistic and celebratory *Bellum Punicum*. Because of this balance, there is no reason to see antipathy between him and the establishment, or between him and Livius. Whatever service this does for Naevius' good name, it nonetheless deprives us of a vital context into which to slot

his work; for thus there is no history to which to attach him.

Hence Livius' influence and intentions are perhaps more easily defined than Naevius'; that being the case, a comparative chronological argument can be constructed for the composition of the *Odissia Latina*. The explicit intimations of chronology for the two poets, that Livius died in 204 and Naevius wrote the *Bellum Punicum* in his old age before dying in exile at Utica in 202/1, have been discredited by sundry considerations⁸⁴. Porcius Licinus' couplet on the origins of Latin literature ("Poenico bello secundo Musa pinnato gradu / intulit se bellicosam in Romuli gentem feram") is ambiguous, enigmatic and obtuse; this cannot be admitted as certain grounds for any theory⁸⁵. So, in addition to the various other theories which have been propounded by scholars, let us highlight the following circumstance as suitable for the commissioning and/or composition of the *Odissia Latina*; the assumption must be that the composition and subsequent dissemination of both epics was a matter of years rather than weeks and that the *Odissia* pre-dated its counterpart the *Bellum Punicum*, if not by much.

In 213, the senate legislated against the spread of excessive superstition amongst the multitudes of Rome; Livy's account speaks of the amount of "libros vaticinos precationesve aut artem sacrificandi conscriptam" in circulation at the time, of which "eos libros omnes litterasque" were to be destroyed by the Kalends of April⁸⁶. This was a reaction to a situation that had been fermenting for some considerable time, throughout all the years of failure in the field against Hannibal.

The senate had long sought a ritual panacea for the ills of Rome by appeals to deities Roman, Latin, Italian, Greek and barbarian. Livy's accounts of the reactions to the annual prodigies show the *decemviri* trying to combine ritual with religious/diplomatic propaganda, with the epitome of this in 217 as the Roman Mars, the Greek Venus Erycina, the abstracts *Mens* and *Concordia* and the Samnite *ver sacrum* combined against the march of Hannibal, but to no avail²⁷. Equally striking was the ritual inhumation of the Gauls and Greeks in the *Forum Boarium* in 225 and 216²⁸. The latter is the year in which Fabius Pictor was despatched to Delphi to enquire of Apollo precisely who had it in for Rome. The list of gods with which he returned, "iis omnibus divis", can be seen in the light of the above considerations of the Italianisation of the Greek pantheon conducted by Livius; yet it does not indicate whether Livius' work was instrumental in sponsoring this venture (thus dating the *Odissia* pre-216) or whether it was a later reaction in order to codify these gods brought back by Fabius (thus dating the *Odissia* post-216)²⁹. Yet the quest continued after 216; these years reveal a frantic and compulsive exploration of state religion and its boundaries wherein no-one quite knew where to draw the line between the acceptable/relevant/effective and the unacceptable/tabu/ineffective. That this resulted in a wave of pamphleteering and superstition shows the potentially dangerous willingness of the people to try anything in an atmosphere of hysteria and lawlessness.

Livy's transcribers provide the option of attributing the clean-up campaign to either M. Aemilius Lepidus, the praetor peregrinus, or M.

Atilius Regulus, the praetor urbanus; the latter had demonstrable links with the diplomacy of religion, as in his dedication of the temple of *Concordia* in 216, whilst the former made a name for himself by exposing the publican fraud of Postumius Pyrgensis in 213⁹⁰. If we read Aemilius, then we are straight into the familial connections suggested above; this is assisted by the subsequent elevation of Aemilius to the ranks of the *decemviri sacris faciundis* in 211, to succeed M'. Aemilius Numida, the colleague of Salinator in the arranging of the *ludi Saeculares* in 236⁹¹. The removal of so much literature from the streets of Rome and the uncertainty surrounding the boundaries of the state religion made this the ideal time for the propagation of an authorised version of Rome's spiritual horizons and contacts, to fill the literary vacuum and to stabilise the experimentation in ritual practices. The didacticism of the *Odissia*, both cultural and moral, would have been ideal for the purpose. If we assume that it was commissioned (and the circumstance which we are discussing suggests that very strongly as a motivation), then we should remark upon the elevation of Scipio to the Salii and C. Livius Salinator to the pontificate, both in 211, at the same time as Aemilius Lepidus' cooptation into the decemvirate. It may also be significant that M. Livius Salinator was pardoned by the censors of 210 and welcomed back into the political fold following his temporary fall from grace⁹². Thus the implication is that there were very definite moves from within the priesthoods and sacred offices of Rome to give a spiritual lead to the city in the confusion that had arisen during the events of 218-213; these moves took the form of the commission or encouragement of the *Odissia* of Livius, so that it might function in the

ways highlighted above, providing a reference point for the internal consumption of Romans and Latins. Unsurprising, then, that Livius was acknowledged as poet laureate in 207 when the efficacy of his talisman was revealed; no coincidence that his *carmina* fêted the departure of his patron, M. Livius Salinator, for the battle of the Metaurus, and even feasible that the *Odissia* itself was one of those *carmina*⁹³.

Since Naevius' allies and influences are unknown, it is impossible to tie the *Bellum Punicum* into this circumstance by means other than thematicism; however, the nature of the complement outlined above is strong enough to bind the two together, in a spiritual and cultural overhaul that began around 212 and was completed by 210 or 209. Thus when Rome sponsored further diplomatic initiatives towards the Greek world, especially to Olympia, Delphi and Pergamon, she had defined her position vis-à-vis both Italy and Greece to give a more secure base to the settlement of her confederacy⁹⁴. The full advertisement of this to the Greek world had to wait for Fabius Pictor and Diokles; yet at least their mission can be seen in a definite light with a definite motivational influence. The epic composition was thus the culmination of a process which began in 240 when those parts of hellenistic myth relevant to Rome were dramatised by an Italiote-Greek for an internal celebration of the city's achievement in the essentially Greek sphere of Sicily. That myth was Trojan and had been used in diplomatic circles concerning Rome since Pyrrhos had led his crusade in 282. Thus there was sense in Rome adopting and developing the myth to her own advantage; the predominance of Trojan themes in the works of her dramatists reflects

the conferral of favour on the cycle and the acceptance of its relevance. Since Segesta had used that context for an approach to Rome in 263, it applied perhaps more to the Greeks in the west after Pyrrhos than it did to those on the mainland; indeed, the comparative efficacy within this dual application is illustrated by the appeal of Akarnania in the early 230s. For Rome's propagation of her Trojan origins in international relations was effectively refuted by Aitolia; yet the result seems not to have been an immediate overhaul of the tradition, but merely the retirement of the motif from the diplomatic stage, since it played no part in the Illyrian Wars or, indeed, in the First Makedonian War. If the circumstantial argument outlined above is correct, it was not until Rome's settlement of Italy and Sicily was under threat in 213 that steps were taken to redefine the tradition, first by the establishment of the spiritual and social boundaries of the Italian world and then by the iteration of Rome's history within that world.

Yet this was no assertion of one tradition above another, of Rome above Italy or Greece; this was the ultimate synthesis designed to draw all Italy and Sicily together within the definitive framework that first looked inwards towards Rome and then radiated outwards towards the rest of the hellenistic world. It is true that much of the source material, both for the overall structure of the epic world and for the Trojan origins, was hellenistic; but this was carefully selected and so interwoven with Italian elements of myth, nomenclature, religion, metre and above all language as to destroy the notion of an inferior Rome.

struggling to come up to scratch with her cultural superiors across the Adriatic. The two epics of Livius and Naevius extracted only what they wanted from the Greek traditions, processed it thoroughly for internal purposes and finally sold it back to the Greeks in the writings of Fabius Pictor. Yet this latter gesture was secondary to the real purpose of the epics; the *Odissia Latina* and the *Bellum Punicum* were designed to define and open Rome first to Italy and then to Greece, rather than to open Greece to Rome. The reflection of this should be seen in the likes of Philemon and Nikokles in the aftermath of the Second Punic War. For they had been sharing in an exclusively hellenistic cultural milieu prior to 240, and the influence which they brought back from Greece can be seen in the nature of the earliest Latin dramas. But from 207, when they had a sanctuary-centre in Rome and an independent tradition from which to draw, the influence which they then conveyed back to Greece should not be neglected; it was the diffusion of hellenism through a Roman prism that rebounded upon the Greeks after the turn of the century.

C. TRAFFIC DURING THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.

We have seen how traffic between Italy and Sicily and Greece in the first seventy years of the third century prefigured the sympathies that Rome formally adopted when she joined the struggle against the Illyrians in 230. We have also considered the arrangements which Rome imposed upon Western Greece on her departure in 228, and the significance of those whom she took into her diplomatic confidence. For thus Rome advertised her concern for the traffic from Italy and Sicily in a protective and liberatory manner, and demonstrated how that concern extended across the Adriatic to the passing places situated on the western coastline of Greece. We must now assess the impact that this had on subsequent traffic down to the end of the century, most especially in line with the ebb and flow of political developments on either side of the Adriatic; for the one can only be seen in the context of the other, and their interrelation will form a definite stage in the advancement of our enquiry.

For the years immediately after 228, when Rome's attention was diverted against the Gauls, there is the proviso that Herakleides and company at Delphi and Leon of Messana, the Pythian victor, may date to this period; so might any of those who could not be dated more accurately than the mid-late third century'. However, there is no inscription which can be securely dated to the 220s which records the presence of an Italian or Sicilian in Greece; Rome's decisive action was followed by a deafening silence. Yet surely epigraphy is

unrepresentative here. *Proxenia* stelai in general declined in number from around 250, a trend remarked upon for Delphi above; failure to leave a mark does not necessarily imply absence². That consistent stream of traffic from Apollonia down into the Gulf of Korinth surely continued, at least to Delphi for religious and agonistic purposes. There is also the evidence from Epiros; in the theatre established at Bouthrotos after 232, manumissions were carried out in the names of Aulus, Lucius and Marcus. Cabanes sees this as a longstanding slave trade which only now coalesced with the foundation of the theatre, and which continued for some time thereafter; elsewhere, he adds to the picture of trade with Western Greece by describing the unusual amount of Apulian pottery on Issa during this period³. The routes hither would be unhindered by the Makedonian conflict with Sparta which came to a head at Sellasia in 222⁴; if impetus was provided to any aspect of trans-Adriatic traffic by the 228 settlement, it was surely to this. Perhaps the quiescence in epigraphical evidence shows that prosperity and peace continued uninterrupted; there were no crises in which a prospective *proxenos* could show his mettle, and no changing political circumstances in the west in which a fresh representative must be found.

This situation changed with the second coming of the Romans in response to the increased activity of Demetrios of Pharos. There is no reason to disbelieve Dell's thesis on how the Second Illyrian War was bound up with the Istrian War of 221/0, mentioned by Livy, Eutropius, Orosius, Zonaras and Appian⁵. For thus Rome's forces in Cisalpine Gaul were being supplied by grain ships travelling north through the Adriatic

along the coastline of Western Greece; it was the depredations conducted against these by the Istrians on the advance warning of Demetrios that led to Rome's forcible intervention in North-West Greece, first against the Istrians and then against Demetrios. Demetrios' fate was thus a result of his threat to Rome's settlement of affairs in the Adriatic. However, Polybios implies that this was not the whole story⁶. He says that Rome's intent was to secure the eastern end of her affairs, with particular reference to the ἀνθρώσῃ Μακεδόνων οἰκία, before facing Carthage. The mention of Makedon was doubtless because Demetrios had fought alongside Antigonos Doson at Sellasia in 222, and because by 219, the Illyrian Skerdilaidas was allied to both Demetrios and the newly-acceded Philip⁷. Demetrios' further crimes were assaults on τὰς πόλεις τὰς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίους τακτομένας, crossing the Lissos line and pillaging the Kyklades⁸.

The most recent assessment of Rome's motivation in 219 is that of Errington⁹; he is forced to conclude that "the precise reasons why...the Senate decided to send both consuls...to Illyria, why it was decided now and not later (or earlier) the moment had come to chastise Demetrius, we shall never know". He assumes that the senate interpreted Demetrios' succession of Teuta as the regent of Pinnes as rendering him the ruler of the Ardiaei and therefore debarred from crossing the Lissos line¹⁰. Thus the decision was taken that he had abused his position as a friend of Rome; the senate also had a weather eye open for Carthage and appreciated the value of a safe Adriatic in this context¹¹. Errington rejects Polybios' intimations on the grounds that the crises, internal

and external, that faced Philip on his accession to the Makedonian throne made his house look anything but flourishing¹². His final suggestion, that this was the only sphere in which L. Aemilius Paullus and M. Livius Salinator could manufacture a war for their own purposes of prestige, suffers from the dubiety of all such theories.

Errington's mish-mash of theories has since been superseded by the study of Derow, discussed above, which established the point that the settlement of 228 included the formalisation of alliances between Rome and each of Pharos, Apollonia, Epidamnos, Kerkyra and Issa¹³. The terms of these alliances were apparently similar to that struck with Maroneia in the 160s; that is, each party was not strictly obliged to render assistance in case of attack, but was obliged not to assist the enemies of the other¹⁴. Thus, when Demetrios assaulted those states subordinated to Rome, the senate was not strictly bound to take action. However, his technical offence was to bring about coups d'état in the states which he attacked, so that their governments thereafter favoured him. Once this was achieved, these states were assisting the enemy of Rome and so breaking their treaties¹⁵. For Demetrios was counted as an enemy of Rome for his role in the depredations of the Istrians against the Roman grain ships, against which action had already been taken; since he had subsequently induced the rupture of Rome's treaties, his crime was compounded. His conceptual offence may well have been that highlighted by Polybios. If Demetrios lay in the camp of Philip after Sellasia in 222, then his seduction of the allies of Rome into that same camp might well have shown the house of Makedon in flower.

Demetrios' pillaging of the Kyklades is generally ignored by scholars as a *casus belli*, since Rome had no interests in the Kyklades; his crossing of the Lissos line might be seen as a breach of treaty, but his activities thereafter not so. However, our enquiry thus far reveals this as myopic. Not only did Rome have associations with Egypt and Rhodes, into whose sphere these depredations fringed; by 219 she herself and her allies constituted a definite presence in the Kyklades by their involvement in the business communities on Tenos and Delos and the sanctuaries on Delos and Kos. Demetrios' threat to the routes hither fell into the same category as Teuta's threat against the *emporoi* in 230. Rome was protecting her own traffic by a realistic war against a neighbouring foe, yet she was also performing a favour for her long-distant allies/friends by ridding their territory of a noisome pest¹⁶.

The Second Illyrian War was thus more selfishly motivated than was the First; Rome was defending her settlement, not only in the fringes of Greece, but also in the Northern Adriatic. In this, there was no overt common cause with either her own allies or any of the Greek powers. Indeed, the loose coalition with whom Rome had conducted exchanges in 228/7 had fragmented; Achaia split with Aitolia almost immediately to join the Symmarchy of Antigonos Doson, an alliance aimed primarily against Kleomenes of Sparta, but which "was through no mere stroke of chance to find its new role in a war against the Aitolian League"¹⁷. Korinth was abandoned to the Achaians by Kleomenes in 224 and Athens attempted to maintain a dignified neutrality¹⁸. It might be deemed significant that Demetrios and Skerdilaidas chose different directions

after the parting of their ways at Pylos in 220. For Skerdilaidas entered a compact with Aitolia to raid Achaia, whilst Demetrios' return from the Kyklades across the Isthmus saw him hired by Taurion to attack the Aitolians'¹⁹. Perhaps this latter move away from Aitolia towards Makedon queered Demetrios' pitch in Rome's eyes; Skerdilaidas, friend of Aitolia the friend of Rome, escaped scot-free in the settlement of Aemilius Paullus and ended up as the most powerful dynast in Illyria²⁰. Yet this schematisation is destroyed by Skerdilaidas' alliance with Makedon, struck in the winter following the depredations, before Rome's forces arrived in 219²¹. If Rome's motivation in 219 can be carried forward from 228, that is, the defence of her and her allies' traffic in the Adriatic, then the ruptures within the unity of the states that comprised the destination of that traffic mean that the defence was unilateral and one-dimensional; if the senate learnt anything from the war, it was that her interests were no longer so identifiable with those of Central Greece. Yet the connection with Aitolia, via Delphi, surely remained for as long as Rome's allies patronised the Pythia and Soteria and supplied the Aitolian markets; in the aftermath of the Soteria of 221/0, as the storm clouds gathered against Aitolia, it may merely be that Rome deemed the reiteration of that connection to be politically undesirable.

It is surely testament to the continued and frequent interchanges between Italy and Greece that Philip was able to ^{point out to} ~~urge~~ the citizens of Larisa ~~to follow~~ the Roman practice of boosting their citizenship figures by including in them enfranchised slaves; thus, he said, Rome had been

able to increase the size of their own city and to send out some seventy colonies²². His letter, dated some time ~~after September 210~~ ^{around late 215, after} and the Larisaian decree which precedes it in the inscription, may even feel the benefit of Rome's settlement of her Greek allies in 219; details of this are lacking, other than its accordance with Aemilius Paullus' whim²³. However, if Philip gleaned nothing from this settlement, then this information was the kind of thing he could have picked up from any traveller or diplomat familiar with Italy or Italians; the inaccuracy of his terms are sufficient proof of that. It is certainly no sign of bias or intimacy on the king's part, merely that he thought it was a good idea.

If the Second Illyrian War was designed to clear the sea-routes both across the Adriatic and around the Peloponnese into the Aegaian, the fulfilment of that purpose was swiftly overtaken by events. Very soon after Rome's departure from Illyria, Hannibal led his army over the Alps and the Second Punic War began on Rome's own doorstep. One of the immediate results of this was the passing in Rome of the *lex Claudia*, designed to concentrate senatorial minds on the political task in hand by debarring them from possessing cargo vessels of over 300 *amphorae*'s capacity²⁴. The effect of this measure on the organisation of Italian maritime trade has already been mentioned, and the divisions caused within senatorial circles on the one hand brought forth violent opposition to the proposal and on the other helped to propel Flaminius into a second consulship on the popular ticket²⁵. The absence of any direct evidence for an impact of the measure, immediate or otherwise, on

the status and number of individuals taking part in extra-Italian traffic militates against the forming of any valid conclusions concerning the law for the moment; however, we should note that it may well have made a difference between the early traffic already assessed and those characters who appear in Greece hereafter.

Two years later, after Rome had suffered near-disastrous defeats at the Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae, Fabius Pictor, the future historian, was despatched to Delphi to seek a spiritual cure for the immediate crisis²⁶. Rome's religion was in turmoil, largely because it was not working; the hunt was now on to find one that did work. Thus in 217 a *lectisternium* was vowed by the praetor C. Atilius Serranus, followed by a traditional Italian *ver sacrum* under A. Cornelius Mammula; these gestures, aimed at Rome's allies in a mood of fellowship and attempted reconciliation, were supported by the vowing of temples to *Mens* and *Concordia* in the same year²⁷. By 216 the situation was desperate, as was shown by the primitive ritual of the live burial of a pair of Gauls and a pair of Greeks in the *Forum Boarium*; the significance of this is not immediately clear, although it shows Rome's willingness to run the gamut of religious experiences in an attempt to find an effective talisman or, indeed, a scapegoat²⁸. Thus, after a particularly vivid Vestal scandal, Fabius was sent to Delphi to ask the oracle for a form of prayer and supplication that might placate the obviously vengeful gods. His journey would take him past the endangered Sicily and Southern Italy²⁹; yet whatever support Rome may have intended to garner both from the god himself and from those who patronised the oracle, it was the first time

in the third century that such an embassy had advertised news of a Roman defeat. The effect of this was tangible.

If Fabius' venture was designed 'pour encourager les autres' in Southern Italy and Sicily, then it failed miserably. The states there did not need official notification of the result of Cannae, but the sight of an official Roman embassy heading east in some confusion surely undermined their faith in Rome's protective capabilities; neither can the recent memory of the sacrifice of the Greeks have been a pleasant one. The difference between this mission and that of 292 was that between the unknown aspirant protector and the familiar and ailing master. Out of this arose the situation which Livy describes as follows: "unus velut morbus invaserat omnes Italiae civitates ut plebes ab optimatibus dissentirent, senatus Romanis faveret, plebs ad Poenos rem traheret"³⁰. Hence much of Campania defected, including most notably Capua, although Neapolis held out along with Nola³¹. In the south, Croton and Locri went over to Carthage; although Rome mounted a minor recovery in 214/3, a roll-on effect had been created by which Hannibal took Tarentum in 212 and rapidly thereafter also Metapontum and Thurii³². In Syracuse the death of Hieron in 215 produced a decisive turn away from Rome. His son Hieronymos and then, after his assassination and the foundation of a republic, the elected Carthaginian-Syracusans Hippokrates and Epikydes turned the reluctant aristocracy towards Hannibal; yet this change of heart soon brought M. Claudius Marcellus against the city and she fell under siege from spring 213³³. The point of this passage of the war is that Rome's interests

were, temporarily at least, sundered from those of Southern Italy and Sicily; considerations of compatible culture and mutual prosperity, such as had existed in the earlier reaches of the third century, were now subordinate to force majeure. If any allied traffic crossed the Adriatic now, then it would have considered Hannibal and by extension Philip, as its guardians.

Fabius' crossing of the Adriatic would take him into a Greece where Philip had ended the Social War after the receipt of the news from Trasimene, and had diverted his attentions against Illyria with a view to securing a facility on the Adriatic³⁴. His early ventures there came in spring 216 with a fleet of *lemboi* against Apollonia; they were, however, scared off by the reported approach of ten Roman ships from Lilybaeum in response to the appeal of Skerdilaidas, newly seceded from Philip on the grounds of non-payment of dues³⁵. This attempt surely realised the fears of Rome that had prompted her to send envoys to Makedon over the winter 217/6 to demand the surrender of Demetrios³⁶; these envoys might have learnt of Philip's intent to add to their native mistrust of Demetrios and, conversely, may even have encouraged Philip to push through his attempt by this show of weakness and concern. If Philip was merely making test of Rome's resources and commitment to Greece at Apollonia, then Fabius' embassy might well have encouraged him further by its conveyance of the news of Cannae.

The upshot of Fabius' mission for Central Greece was the unholy alliance between Philip and Hannibal in 215³⁷. The terms were that both

parties should have the same friends and enemies; yet the weighting was towards Philip helping Hannibal in Italy in any desirable capacity . rather than the Carthaginian crossing the Adriatic to help in Makedon³⁹. What Philip was to receive for his efforts was a share in the terms to be imposed on a defeated Rome; these would prohibit Rome from making war on Makedon, terminate Roman influence over Kerkyra, Apollonia, Epidamnos, Pharos, Dimallum, the Parthini and Atintania and return to Demetrios of Pharos those friends of his who were hostages in Italy³⁹. The most striking features are the potential for a Makedonian invasion of Italy to assist Hannibal, and the manifest dislike of the Roman presence in Western Greece. It seems that the emissary Xenophanes took great pains to be captured by the Romans whilst in possession of the treaty⁴⁰; the conclusion must be that, however much Philip stood to gain from the ultimate success of Carthage in the Second Punic War, the immediate benefit lay with Hannibal in the division of Rome's forces to oppose this manufactured Makedonian threat. So it was that, late in 215, the Roman squadron patrolling the Calabrian coast was strengthened and placed under the command of the praetor M. Valerius Laevinus, "ut Philippum in regno contineret"⁴¹.

In short, the treaty between Philip and Hannibal sought to ratify by military achievement the alternative mutuality of interests to which they both aspired, that is, by Hannibal replacing Rome as master of Italy and Philip displacing Rome as strategic controller of the western coast of Greece. By 215/4, they were well on the way to achieving their ambitions. For Rome to go to war in Greece, then, was a defensive

measure, designed, as Livy says, to keep Philip out of Italy and inside his own territory; once again, the emphasis has changed. For in 229, Rome crossed to Greece to protect the interests of her own allies and of the Greeks who saw the benefit (nominally Aitolia and Achaia); in 219 she crossed to protect the interests of her own allies, with perhaps more suspicion than concern for the Greeks; now in 215/4 she crossed entirely on her own account, to protect her own interests within a confederacy that was struggling to warrant the name. It is dangerous to use the *argumentum e silentio*; yet it seems reasonable to assume that, in the reverse conclusion to that which saw the silence of the 220s as a time of prosperity in trans-Adriatic traffic, the silence of these years implies a shortage of traffic under the hardship of warfare. Thus not only could Rome not claim to represent her allies in Greece, there was little or no allied traffic for her to represent in the first place.

The further irony of Rome's position in Greece, after her defence of interests that were no longer hers, was that the campaign which she was initially called upon to conduct was of the type which she had sought to repress during her previous manifestations across the Adriatic. Laevinus was supplied with a modest fleet⁴² and his early campaigns in 214 were conducted in piratical vein in partnership with the similarly minded Skerdilaidas; thus they relieved Apollonia and Orikos and hassled Philip into scuppering his fleet and withdrawing by land⁴³. Irony again existed in the partnership with Skerdilaidas, an enemy in 219 but since transformed into a colleague by force of circumstance; the mutuality of interest with him was based on a shared antipathy to Makedon, as each

fought for little other than the maintenance of their own power. However, Philip's next assault in 213 came from the landward side, wherein he took possession of Rome's inland allies, the Parthini, Atintania, Dimallum, Bargyllum and Eugenium⁴⁴; the seaborne Roman pirates were powerless to resist.

It is indubitably true that, when Laevinus decided that he needed an ally to support his efforts by land, the political alignments within Greece meant that Aitolia was the only Central Greek state available to him. It is equally true that Aitolia was suitable precisely because she harboured a grudge against Makedon from the Social War and sought a means of recouping the territories she had lost. It is true also that Laevinus needed a land-based state with a military capacity and a geographical location that would facilitate her baulking of Philip. Yet it is not true that these ingredients were put into a bag and shaken to produce the Romano-Aitolian alliance of 212/1; this was certainly not created in a vacuum⁴⁵. For a relationship had been established on quasi-pious lines in 228, primarily concerned with traffic to and from Delphi; it had been implied in 219, when Rome's intervention was angled, if not directly pointed, against Aitolia's oppressors in the Social War. This alliance was thus the final fulfilment of a drift that had begun in 262, when the *proxenia* grant to Volceius represented Aitolia's recognition of her mutuality of interests with Rome. Yet now, as with Skerdilaidas, the relationship was to be more pragmatic, without consideration of philanthropy or paternalism; the mutuality of interest was hostility to Philip, and each party stood to gain from conflict.

The terms of the treaty reflect the nature of the arrangement, the necessity of the war. Thus the first and foremost was that the Aitolians should wage war on Philip by land, with naval assistance from Rome. The second dealt with the division of the spoils. Whilst preserving the sanctity of the Roman protectorate north of Kerkyra, the Romans sought only the moveable property of any captured city; the substance of those cities went to the Aitolians. Third and last was the provision for peace; neither side should effect a peace with Philip which did not secure the other from aggression. In this form, it was perfect for Rome. It facilitated the conflict which would distract Philip from Italy in such a way that would minimise the Roman war effort and render it self-supporting by the booty provision; perhaps more importantly, it presented a finite obligation which could be terminated as soon as circumstances were favourable⁴⁶. Although the Aitolians bore the brunt of the workload, the rewards were tangible, catering for their "*spes potiundae Acarnaniae*"⁴⁷. The treaty describes a '*bellum gratia belli*', regardless of innocent bystanders; since it was the first time that Rome had signed a document formally committing her to taking an active side in internal Greek politics, it was not without significance.

Pelops son of Dexias of Neapolis. Granted *proxenia* and *euergesia*, with associated *enktesis*, *isoteleia*, *asylia* and *asphaleia* in peace and war, land and sea, in both Tanagra and Oropos in the last quarter of the third century.

Unrestored Neapolitan. Granted the same honours at Tanagra at the same time.

Pyllos and Platyris, sons of Dazos of unrestored provenance, perhaps Daunia.⁴⁸ Granted *proxenia*, *enktesis*, *isoteleia*, *asylia* and *asphaleia* at Oropos in the last quarter of the century. Pelops' date is largely corroborated by the presence alongside him of Sosibios of Alexandria, a prominent figure in the court of Ptolemy Philopator in the last twenty years of the century⁴⁹. The inaccuracy of the dating, however, causes a variety of problems; the only certainty is that Pelops and company's circumstances were affected in some measure by the Second Punic and First Makedonian Wars.

These westerners stand out in batches of grants otherwise dominated by characters from Central Greece and the east⁵⁰. This weighting fits well with Strabo's assessment that the southern approaches of the Euripos, to which coast both Oropos and Tanagra had access, was the accepted route into Greece for traffic from Egypt, Kypros and the islands. Similarly, the northern approaches gave access to those from Makedonia, Propontis and the Hellespont. It is rather the western parts of Boiotia that are exposed to traffic from the west, via the Korinthian and Krisaian Gulfs. Thus Pelops and company have come the wrong way; they have either undertaken the long and hazardous route round Maleia to the Euripos, or they have battled across Boiotia by land to reach her eastern coast⁵¹. Their motivation is not apparent from the terms of their decrees; the associated privileges won by them are standard in the grants of the two cities, although *isoteleia* seems discretionary⁵².

If the decrees dated between 215 and 211, it seems improbable that Pelops was a mere civilian going about sacred or secular business; the pressures of the Second Punic War surely militated too strongly against that⁵³. There is a chance that he and his fellows were either refugees from a war-torn Italy or prisoners-of-war sold into bondage by Hannibal in Greece and then released; if true, then their grants of *enktesis* and *isoteleia* were practical rather than merely formulaic, and they would then have returned home at the end of the Second Punic War. Boiotia would have been a good place to settle during these years⁵⁴; she achieved some considerable degree of neutrality in the period from Sellasia down to the turn of the century, despite her alliance with Philip⁵⁵. This seems to have been encouraged by Ptolemy in order to restore the balance of power in Greece with a view to peace⁵⁶. In this neutrality, Boiotia was accompanied by Athens, in the different circumstances of her own revival around this time; she too won the friendship of Ptolemy, and so the concentration of Athenian *proxenoi* at Oropos and Tanagra need not be coincidental to their geographical and political proximity⁵⁷. If the decrees date to the period of the First Makedonian War, it is least probable that Pelops and company were members of Laevinus' fleet operating off Greece, for obvious reasons.

Given the broader band of dating, however, there is the further possibility that these honorands were part of a particular economic phenomenon that afflicted Boiotia, especially Oropos and Tanagra, in the last third of the third century. It is noticeable that the number of *proxenia* decrees granted between 250 and 205 is much greater than that

for the subsequent period, but also that the geographical spread covered by the former is greater than that of the latter. The former extends from Asia Minor and Anatolia to Magna Graecia, Makedon to Egypt, with a notable concentration of commercially active states; the latter is largely confined to Central Greece⁵⁸. This period admits an improvement on the preceding years which, although themselves offering a broad geographical span of *proxenoi*, still suffer by comparison⁵⁹. Feyel attributes this boom to the reform of the Boiotian currency in 245 which facilitated both internal services and, by its accordance with the Aiginetan standard, external exchanges too. It was the latter facility which contributed to the increased interchange with a wide range of foreign states, more particularly in conjunction with the feverish agonistic activity of the 220s which gave birth to the Agrionia, the Ptoia and the Mouseia. Yet hereafter the peak became a trough; Boiotia had sold herself so dearly for this boom that the debts incurred dragged her into an inexorable downward spiral⁶⁰.

If this construct is defensible, as it seems to be, then there can be no doubt that Pelops and company were a part of it, as representatives at the festivals, traders utilising the twin advantages of opportunity and currency, or any other of Casson's categories. The inaccuracy of the datings prevents any firm conclusion as to context. Yet if the Neapolitans were part of a regular traffic through Boiotia, particularly from the Aigalean, which was built up especially in the 220s, then Boiotia's unwillingness to undertake the rigours of the Social War is set in definite context; if the country was ravaged by

war, there was little hope of attracting pilgrims and diplomats to a lucrative festival. The interesting point is that Boiotia continued to be largely unaffected by martial considerations throughout the First Makedonian War; this can be seen as coincidental, or as a reflection of the amount of interested parties who held a stake in the country.

The joint campaigns of the Romans, Aitolians and Attalos between 211 and 208 were primarily designed to keep Philip hopping around in Greece and to restore Aitolian influence in the south-west corner of the mainland. Yet they also seem designed to close or at least regulate the major approaches to Central Greece. Thus Laevinus, already in station at Kerkyra, attempted to increase his command over the approaches to the Gulf of Korinth by assaults on Zakynthos, Nasos and Oiniada⁶¹; the next year he complemented this by the seizure of Antikyra⁶². The years 210 and 209 were engaged in unsuccessful defensive actions against Philip's siege of Echinon and invasion of the Peloponnese⁶³, but nonetheless produced a positive gain in the capture of Aigina; the sale of this to Attalos not only cemented the involvement of Pergamon in the war, it also closed off the Saronic Gulf⁶⁴. The next positive campaign was launched in 208; the Aitolians blocked Philip at Thermopylai, whilst the combined fleet made efforts against Leukas, Peparethos and Euboia, seizing Histiaia Oreus and Opous⁶⁵. The campaign failed, as Philip struck back at Thermopylai and Opous and Attalos was called home to repel Prousius of Bithynia⁶⁶. Yet the intent was clear, to gain control of the northerly reaches of the Euripos to close yet another channel of communication. Had the allies succeeded in all their objectives and been

able to preserve their gains, then an effective blockade would have been placed around Central Greece⁶⁷; the sole exception was the Southern Euripos, running into Boiotia at Oropos and Tanagra.

The neglect of this final routeway into Greece lies open to interpretation. It may be that, had the assault on the north-eastern end of the Euripos been successful, then the southern end would have been the next target. It may be that neither Laevinus nor Sulpicius could find a suitable location to afford control over these approaches. It may be that, so long as Aitolia retained her geographical location in Central Greece, there was no need to patrol the area since Philip had only restricted access to it⁶⁸. Yet it may also be that the Romans had respect for those states, Egypt, Rhodes and even Neapolis, who were plying this channel to good and profitable effect. For the campaigns were synchronous with the Roman embassy to Egypt, recorded variously by Livy and Polybios, for the renewal of the *amicitia* and the procurement of grain⁶⁹. It would be strange to see the senate on the one hand making these attempts to secure Ptolemaic goodwill, and the fleet on the other campaigning contrary to both Ptolemaic efforts for peace within Greece and Egyptian commercial interests in the south-east of the mainland. Again, one would remark that the return of Acilius and Atilius from Alexandria would have encompassed the Aigaian islands and the southerly regions of Greece proper; they at least had the potential to visit the fleet with advice on the diplomatic repercussions of their campaigning.

Deliberate or not, the Roman policy in the First Makedonian War militated towards those states who plied the South-East Euripos for their commercial, sacred and secular business; according to Strabo, these were Egypt, Kypros and the islands. It may also have exerted a temporary compulsion on those states who normally plied the Northern Euripos, the Propontid and Hellespontine states, to use the southerly approaches instead. In so doing, the fleet no doubt contributed in some small way to the economic situation in Boiotia, particularly Oropos and Tanagra, again deliberately or not. The bottom line is that they did not disrupt the lines of communication that already existed or were now established between Boiotia and the list of states highlighted above. That these states included her Italian allies, Neapolis, and her eastern *amici*, Egypt and Rhodes, opens the potential for this mutuality of interests to be a motivational factor for the activities of the fleet.

The issues on the agenda in the interchanges between Rome and Egypt in 211/0 are crucial to the understanding of events between then and the end of the war in 205. Livy's version reads as follows: "et Alexandream ad Ptolemaeum et Cleopatram reges M. Atilius et M'. Acilius legati, ad commemorandam renovandamque amicitiam missi, dona tulere, regi togam et tunicam purpuream cum sella eburnea reginae pallam pictam cum amiculo purpureo". This is discredited by the fact that Philopator's queen was Arsinoe, not Kleopatra, and that she was never co-regent; yet the mission is generally accepted and identified with that of Polybios which deals solely with an economically throttled Rome seeking an alternative source of grain⁷⁰. If this is true, then there is more significance in

Livy's remarks than in Polybios'. The question of the friendship had perhaps been queered by the secession of Syracuse, whose relationship with Alexandria pre-dated that of Rome and who had attempted rapprochement with Ptolemy after that secession with the despatch of Hieronymos' brothers⁷¹. If Rome feared that this represented a parallel and independent establishment of mutual interests, then the mission of 211/0 could restore the status quo with news of the capture of Capua and Syracuse, the re-establishment of Rome at the opposite end of the chain of communication⁷².

It is generally assumed that the gifts mentioned by Livy are in the nature of a bribe, an insurance policy for the acceptance of these propositions. Yet the significance surely goes further than that. For these gifts, the toga, the tunic and the curule chair, are the trappings of magisterial power; only the *fascēs* are missing. The nature of the gifts is surely not without point, and allows a parallel to be constructed between Ptolemy and Attalos. For Attalos was included in the Romano-Aitolian treaty as a potential combatant, in line with his previous association with Aitolia⁷³. His entry to the war was facilitated not only by the sale of Aigina to him for a naval base⁷⁴, but also by his election to the *strategia* of the Aitolian League for 209⁷⁵. This latter act is a peculiar means of acknowledging alliance, but seems to have been common for the Aitolians; they repeated the gesture for Antiochos when he invaded Europe in 192⁷⁶. The intent seems to be to bind Attalos more securely to the Aitolian war effort by the

conferral of this quasi-honorary command; the question is, how does this correspond to the Roman gifts to Ptolemy, conferred simultaneously ?

The connection is surely more than synchronicity. Rome, by these gifts, effectively conferred upon Ptolemy the title of honorary consul; the assumption must be that this gesture was identifiable with that of Aitolia and thus for similar effect. However, the gesture was fundamentally different from that of Aitolia, not least because Ptolemy was not included in the Romano-Aitolian treaty. This does not ruin the connection, but rather strengthens it. It must be emphasised that the treaty was specifically concerned with the fighting of a war against Philip; those states who were adjunct to it, Pergamon included, were there for their potential to assist the war effort. Ptolemy's exclusion was no doubt because there was no prospect of him joining the war in Greece; yet this does not remove him from the scheme of things⁷⁷. The gesture of Rome in 211/0 was thus the counterpart of the treaty for war; as Attalos was requested by Aitolia to help fight that war for as long as it continued, so Ptolemy was requested by Rome to help bring about a peace that was favourable to Rome⁷⁸. The two monarchs were thus elected to office, as it were, to reach the same conclusion (a hamstrung Philip, a prosperous Aitolia and a secure Rome), but by opposing methods. The notion that Rome should have favoured this pacific policy is not as outrageous as some might suggest; for the treaty with Aitolia, strong on the *modus operandi* for the war, was equally strong on the envisaged peace, one which would keep Philip out of the territories of the respective parties. For the war was an obvious burden to Rome, one which

she sought to shift onto the shoulders of others; hence the treaty, hence the development of a small, self-supporting Roman force within that treaty. The alternative to a war fought by others was no war at all, so long as Philip was baulked and the terms were right.

This latter point is one which is largely occluded by Rich's discussion of the mediation attempts of 209 onwards and his distinction between a "separate peace" for Aitolia and Philip, and a peace which included Rome⁷⁹. The distinction is misleading. The terms of the Romano-Aitolian treaty in Livy state that a peace may be instigated by either partner ("si Aetoli pacem cum Philippo facerent...si populus Romanus foedere iungeretur regi")⁸⁰, but that it must include the other, in such a manner as to keep Philip from attacking them. Thus when the negotiations broke down, it was not because the mediation had been aimed either at Rome or at Aitolia, as Rich suggests; it was rather that the peace terms which were proposed were unacceptable to one of the three parties. In 209, it was Philip, outraged by the Aitolians' territorial claims⁸¹. In 208, again it was Philip, diverted by events in the Peloponnese⁸². In 207, it was Sulpicius. Appian says that this was in the belief that war between Aitolia and Philip was expedient to Rome; yet this need not be as uncompromising as it sounds, that war was expedient under all conditions⁸³. Sulpicius opposed the next attempt at mediation, in 207/6, opposition which proved successful when allied to the promise of further military assistance from Rome⁸⁴. But Philip's invasion of Aitolia and the sack of Thermon exerted an inordinate amount

of pressure upon the Aitolians, who were compelled to sign "on the same terms as he [Philip] had offered before"⁸⁵.

Why, then, did Sulpicius oppose these terms ? The answer surely lies in the Roman reaction to the peace of 206, a peace dictated by Philip "quibus voluit condicionibus"; they were "irati quod sine auctoritate sua adversus foedus cum rege pacem [Aetoli] fecissent"⁸⁶. The Aitolians had broken the treaty; yet it was not contrary to the treaty to make a peace, but to make a peace that did not provide that "Philippus arma ab Romanis sociisque quique eorum dicionis essent abstinuisset"⁸⁷. The intimation is that the 206 terms did not make that provision; it may thus be reasonably assumed that the proposed terms of 207 and 207/6 did not make that provision either, hence Sulpicius' opposition. The reason for this omission was quite simple; Philip was in possession of some of those parts of Illyria which Rome considered her protectorate, and to comply with that provision would have meant a surrender of acquisitions that would have left him worse off than the worsted Aitolians⁸⁸. This status quo was acceptable to Aitolia given her current plight, but unacceptable to Sulpicius and Rome precisely because of this concession of "quique eorum dicionis essent", in addition to the failure of the peace to hamstring the king. The direction of Sempronius' campaign in 206 was accordingly to recover those places; his claims on the Parthini, Dimallum, Bargyllum and Eugenium in the Peace of Phoinike represented the success of this mission, and identify the places under consideration⁸⁹. It does not appear that Sempronius intended much more than this; his refusal of battle with Philip at Apollonia shows a more

compromising intent, especially since his forces were sufficiently large to undertake the engagement without Aitolian assistance. Laetorius' mission to Aitolia, "ad visendas res pacemque, si posset, turbendam", does not readily lead to the conclusion that he was attempting to bring the Aitolians back into the fray; it could as easily imply that he sought to persuade the Aitolians merely to abandon their peace terms in favour of those approved by Rome⁹⁰. The absence of the Aitolians from the Peace of Phoinike implies that he failed. The terms of this peace are surely the preferred ones of the senate, that the majority of the protectorate was restored to Rome and that neither party should injure the friends of the other⁹¹; the campaign of 206 was not continued wanton aggression, but a desire to negotiate from a position of strength for a peace that would surely have come about earlier had the terms been right.

This is a picture of a pragmatic Rome doing just what was necessary in Greece under the circumstances and working in partnership with the mediators rather than against them. The opposite picture of conflict between Rome and the mediators springs largely from the speech of the Rhodian Thrasykrates in Polybios, addressed to the Aitolians at the third attempted mediation in spring 207⁹². Thrasykrates berates the Aitolians for conducting a shameful and dishonorable war for the enslavement of the Greeks via the terms of their treaty with Rome; for this was a treaty only nominally against Philip, but in reality designed for the sale of their fellow Greeks to barbarians, in the form of the terms regarding Rome's disposal of the moveable property of captured

cities. The ultimate extension of this would be Rome's conquest of the whole country on the pretext of helping the Aitolians against Philip. His words are held to convey, if not hostility to Rome, then at least opposition to her intervention⁹³; if this is true, then it might be seen as contrary to our picture of Rome having inspired the peace initiative via the medium of Ptolemy⁹⁴.

Yet opposition to Rome's intervention was not opposition to Rome *per se*; indeed, our theory is that Rome herself was opposed to her intervention since she was beset by more pressing concerns, but that she considered it a temporary necessity to baulk Philip. What is perhaps more telling is the nature of the treaty and the enthusiasm of the Aitolians to embrace it in their eagerness to regain supremacy within Greece and control Akarnania⁹⁵. Thrasykrates must therefore persuade the Aitolians to abandon these ambitions and therefore also the war; his line of argument is tailored accordingly and directed primarily against the treaty rather than against those who had brought it about⁹⁶. This brings into focus the direction of Roman policy in the First Makedonian War. On the one hand they were taking advantage of their previous entente with Aitolia and Aitolia's ambitions, in order to give themselves some breathing-space in the Second Punic War. On the other, they were simultaneously manipulating the likelihood of Ptolemy repeating the mediation which he had conducted during the Social War by offering the trappings of office that might encourage him to do that. Thus they hoped that the commitment to Aitolia might be as finite as the terms of the treaty suggested, limited by the length of the war for

which it was forged. For Rome, these were two equally acceptable alternatives given her current plight; the use of the alternative of mediation was particularly apposite as a response to the hostility to the alliance in Greece which was quick to set in. Both the words of Thrasykrates and the attitude of the Aitolians suggest that these were separate initiatives on Rome's part, that she allowed both to continue without informing either party of her full intent. The confusion which this caused was reflected in the preliminaries to the Second Makedonian War. The Aitolians considered that their *amicitia* with Rome was still in force despite the peace of 206; thus it stood independent of the war described by the rest of the treaty. Yet the senate, particularly Flamininus, considered that the two were coterminous; the *amicitia* ended with the Aitolian peace, especially since the terms of that peace broke the treaty⁹⁷.

Theodoros son of Kleostratos (or Neostratos) of Syracuse. Granted *proxenia* by the Aitolian League in 210/09. Listed in a catalogue of similar grants made during the same year, each honorand being followed by the name of his guarantor, Theodoros is dated by the third generalship of Pyrrhias⁹⁸. The catalogue is a bald statement of a block grant providing no subsidiary details of minor privileges and so no hint of Theodoros' purpose.

It is remarkable that, after some twenty years of silence over trans-Adriatic traffic, Theodoros appears as an honorand from a city reduced not eighteen months earlier in a state at the heart of the war

in Greece. The immediate probability is that the Aitolians honoured Theodoros as the representative of the new order in Syracuse following Laevinus' settlement there, in order to retain a diplomatic facility when a new executive was formed⁹⁹. It is feasible that Skopas, the guarantor of Theodoros, acquired the information to make the grant from his old associate Laevinus, who was instrumental in the forming of that executive¹⁰⁰. An alternative is that, once Laevinus had redirected Sicily to a life of agriculture, Theodoros plied his trade in Aitolia, for which the confederacy, under some economic pressure from the war, were extremely grateful¹⁰¹.

However, a supportable scenario would be this. Skopas is found elsewhere in the catalogue as guarantor for an Aiginetan, restoration permitting¹⁰². The previous year, Aigina had been captured by Sulpicius and its affairs handed over to the Aitolians; having no fleet and therefore no conceivable use for the island, the Aitolians negotiated the sale of Aigina to Attalos¹⁰³. Since the population remained in bondage and Attalos was responsible for their affairs at this time, the securing of a diplomatic facility in Aigina was a pointless exercise for Aitolia¹⁰⁴; there must be an alternative motivation for the honours. Livy records that, when the Aitolians attacked Lamia in 209, they did so in the company of "et ab Attalo auxilia secum et mille ferme ex Romana classe a P. Sulpicio missos"¹⁰⁵. It would be no surprise if Attalos' first actions in Aigina included a levy from the manpower there, in which case the "auxilia" might be in the sense of auxiliary troops rather than mere military assistance. Skopas, able general that he

was¹⁰⁶, was probably involved in the Thessalian operations and would thus have witnessed any deeds of valour that were perpetrated; hence his proposal of honours to the Aiginetan.

The same criteria might apply to the Syracusan Theodoros. He might have been a long-serving member of the Roman fleet from before Hieron's death, a loyalist from the time of *stasis* or an involuntary conscript following Marcellus' sack of Syracuse. Thus he too might be seen as a creditable participant in the Thessalian campaign attracting the attention of Skopas for his activities there. We can only speculate whether or how the privileges of *proxenia* transferred back to Syracuse with Theodoros; if they did, then a diplomatic facility and bond based on an alliance for a war that was shortly to become an embarrassment for Rome is an interesting concept.

Aristophamos son of Lykon of Tarentum. Granted *proxenia* by the Aitolian League at the end of the third century. The date of the grant is more loosely attested by a series of *termini ante* and *post quos*, although the implication is that it is from the last decade of the century. Although the boularch Dorimachos is not the famous general of the same name, the secretary Phaineas is the hipparch of 205/4 and the hipparch Alexander of Kalydon was general in 204/3¹⁰⁷. Other *termini* discussed by Klaffenbach, such as the presence of Ambrakia in the confederacy providing a *terminus post quem* of 229, are less informative.

Aristophamos seems to be the grandson of Drakon, who won a victory in the Delphic Soteria of 255/4 and who performed on Delos in 279. Drakon's profession, tragedian, colours our interpretation of Aristophamos' role, although it is by no means certain that the muse was hereditary. The Soteria seems to have continued throughout the First Makedonian War¹⁰⁸; yet Aristophamos' presence there in any capacity, if he came from Tarentum and not elsewhere, might be difficult to see. The festival of 209/8 came round in the turmoil surrounding Fabius' sack of the city, whilst that of 213/2 came at the time of the fall of the city to Hannibal. It would be no surprise if Tarentum had no representation, diplomatic or artistic, at the festival in either of these years. Furthermore, we have already remarked that it was the role of the Delphoi, not the Aitolians, to offer hortatory honours to such artists in connection with their performances.

The following might help to explain away Aristophamos' presence. In 208, L. Manlius Acidin¹⁰⁹us was despatched by the senate to Greece to inform himself of conditions there and to attend the Olympic Games if it were safe for him to do so¹⁰⁹. Since the festival would, as usual, be attended by vast crowds from all over the country, Manlius was to encourage all Sicilian refugees and all Tarentines banished by Hannibal to return home. If they did, they would find that the Roman people would restore all their former possessions to them. Thus the exiles would have a prominent part to play in the new orders at Tarentum and Syracuse. Therefore, if Aristophamos fell into this category, he would be a valuable friend for Aitolia, tying her more closely to Rome and

following on from the tradition of Tarentine *proxenoi* from earlier in the century. This is perhaps the most plausible of several potential *raisons d'être* for Aristophamos in Aitolia.

The timing and effect of Manlius' gesture are important. In Greece, Attalos' withdrawal gave way to a period of Roman inactivity which ended in the Aitolian peace of 206 after protracted negotiations. It was during this period of passivity that Manlius' message was broadcast, not in the limited and Aitolian-dominated medium of Delphi but in the broader neutrality of the Olympics¹¹⁰. This was an advertisement of the re-establishment of the lines of communication that had first brought Rome to Greece; her recovery of Tarentum and Sicily once more meant that their interests were her interests. Furthermore, the philanthropy of the statement contrasted with everything that the Aitolian treaty represented; this benevolent hegemonism foreshadowed the terms imposed upon Thisbai and Koroneia in 170, wherein favour was shown to those who favoured Rome in a mutually back-scratching settlement¹¹¹. This use of the Southern Italian and Sicilian medium both to prepare policy for Greece and to influence popular opinion within Greece seems deliberate, and so takes its place in our revised scenario for the First Makedonian War.

There is a faint possibility that Myrtilos and Soteas, sons of Ktesippos of Pyrgi may be from Italy; they were similarly honoured with *proxenia* by the Aitolian League in 205/4, in the generalship of Skopas, alongside a man from Herakleia-Pontos. However, it is more probable that

these brothers are from Pyrgoi near Kyparissia in Triphylia. For the use of the ethnic Pyrgitai thence is corroborated by Strabo, whilst Aitolia's links with that part of Greece continued in 205/4 even after her relations with Rome and Italy had begun to turn cold¹¹².

Sopolis son of Noumenios of Syracuse. Victor in the flute contest at the Delphic Soteria some time between 225 and 205/4; the catalogue also includes an unidentifiable Syracusan tragedian. The insoluble problems of dating hamstring any assessment of circumstance. Nachtergaeel at least provides a choice of three Soteria, 213/2, 209/8 or 205/4, whereas Flacelière contradicted himself twice in arriving at a date around 225¹¹³. Of Nachtergaeel's three dates, the latter two were more conducive to trans-Adriatic travel, 209/8 because of the operations of Sulpicius' fleet and 205/4 because of the relative quiescence in Central Greece following the Peace of Phoinike.

Andronikos son of Philippos, Philippides son of ?Hippas of Tarentum. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and the other privileges of *proxenoi* and *evergetai* at Delphi in 205/4 or 203/2¹¹⁴.

Neon son of Leon, a Roman from Syracuse. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and the other privileges of *proxenoi* and *evergetai* at Delphi in 205/4 or 203/2, the same year as the Tarentines above. That he is a *Rhomaïos* is the result of a substantial, but acceptable restoration¹¹⁵. Hatzfeld warned of the abuse of the

ethnic, often used to convey status by association¹¹⁶; however, it seems that the double ethnic here denotes dual citizenship, and so Neon was either a loyalist, an exile recalled by Manlius or a distinguished servant of Rome, and he was obviously proud of it.

What these three honorands represent is a renewal of the Italiote- and Sikeliote-Greek presence at the Delphic Soteria in 205/4. This seems to have been an auspicious occasion, witnessing also the recognition of the *asylia* of Teios¹¹⁷. More significantly, it would also have been conducted in the aftermath of two Roman gestures, made in 205 straight after their peace with Philip. In that year, M. Pomponius Matho and Q. Catius were sent to redeem the promises made to Delphi in 216 by the dedication of the spoils won from Hannibal at the battle of the Metaurus; the significance of the victory was not lost upon the oracle, which forecast additional and still greater victories to come¹¹⁸. The return of this prognostication to Rome fortuitously coincided with the advice of the Sibylline books to seek out and embrace the Magna Mater; the embassy despatched for the purpose accordingly visited Delphi and received the blessing of the god on their enterprise¹¹⁹. This latter mission was blatantly propagandist; Livy reports that the ambassadors were given five quinqueremes "ut ex dignitate populi Romani adirent eas terras ad quas concilianda maiestas nomini Romano esset"¹²⁰. That this is the case suggests that Pergamon was not their only port of call, but that much of the Aegaian and perhaps also Eastern Greece saw a lot of their quinqueremes. The purpose of it was surely to show Rome in a favourable light following the disgrace of her association with Aitolia,

and to establish communication with Attalos by means other than that association; for this was a valuable *amicitia* with Pergamon, but one initiated by discreditable means¹²¹. The senate was no doubt keen to advertise their position as a strong, victorious but philanthropic hegemon to as wide an audience as possible, both to eastern and western Greeks, at the forthcoming Soteria of 205/4. This surely corroborates our theory of a non-aggressive Sempronius in early 205 seeking only a more favourable peace; for otherwise the two attitudes could scarcely co-exist within the one senate.

Andronikos, Philippides and Neon can thus be seen to reap the harvest of this initiative. For they were surely honoured as representatives of the new orders in their respective states, via whom Rome now intended once more to conduct her dealings with Greece on the old mutuality of interests. That these honours were conveyed now rather than in 209/8 suggests that the political situation did preclude western participation in the Soteria of that year; our tentative estimate would be to date Sopolis also to 205/4, although he might equally have been an itinerant musician resident in Greece. The melting-pot of issues and developments at this Soteria made it a highly-charged event; the success of Rome's propaganda can only be assessed in the light of the origins of the Second Makedonian War¹²².

Paseas of Cumae. Envoy to Athens in the second half of the third century. Dated by the letter forms, this fragmentary decree remarks upon the good services that Cumae has fulfilled for Athens in terms of σπουδή

εὐεργεσία;
and ~~εὐεργεσία~~ in return for this, Paseas was permitted to address the assembly. However, the chance that it was Italian rather than Aiolian Kumai seems outweighed by the probability that the eastern city is at issue here¹²³.

----ios son of Lucius Rhomaios. Victor in a chariot race at Lebadeia, apparently between 220 and 205. This inscription was dated by Vollgraff almost exclusively on the basis of the mention of Ptolemy Philopator in 11.18-19; he further qualified this by his reluctance to date a Roman presence after 216 and the outbreak of the First Makedonian War. This he supported by the homonymity of Xenarchos the agonothete with the Xenarchos of an ephebic inscription dated c.246; equally, the Thespiaian victor of 1.7 seems to be either the brother or the nephew of that Nikareta who was the creditor of Orchomenos around 200¹²⁴. His arguments, however, were met by Holleaux who, reliant on his own epigraphical criteria and his sense of outrage at such an early Roman, preferred the homonym of Mnesarchos at a first century Pamboiotia and the identification of Ptolemy with either Ptolemy IX (νέος Φιλοπάτωρ) or Ptolemy XIII (Φιλοπάτωρ καὶ Φιλάδελφος); this he supported by the novelty of the numerals used and the use of the υἱὸς with Lucius¹²⁵. Yet he left the epigraphical loophole of the 170s unconsidered, by the similarity of the script to that of IG VII.3073-6, decrees for the construction of the temple of Zeus Basileus; this will be discussed in detail below in connection with SEG III.367.

Lucius son of Caius Rhomaios. Phrourarch in the service of Ptolemy at Itanos, Krete, between 216 and 206. It is probable that Lucius was a prisoner-of-war, either ransomed or bought from Carthage by Ptolemy during the Second Punic War and subsequently used in his own forces until the end of that war. See above, Section A ch. VII n. 5-6.

Herakleides of Tarentum. In a letter dated 209 granting *ateleia* to Abai in Phokis, Philip concluded with the promise that he had written to Herakleides to inform him of their inviolability. There were two Herakleideis in Philip's employ, one from Gortyn and one from Tarentum; the latter is generally assumed to be the recipient of Philip's letter here¹²⁶. Thus, if he was already Philip's military representative in Phokis by 209, then the chequered career that Polybios outlines for him in Italy must have taken place at some compressed time before that¹²⁷. For he was an inventive character of artisan stock who was expelled from Tarentum for allegedly preparing to betray the city to the Romans; this betrayal was to be the creation of physical access rather than any major political coup. Having fled thence to Rome, he was there suspected of liaising with both Hannibal and the Tarentines; before action could be taken against him, he fled to the court of Philip. Walbank hypothesises that he had worked for Marcellus during the siege of Syracuse, inventing the *sambuca* there, and that this was the source of the opprobrium he experienced in Tarentum; yet the objections to this are readily acknowledged. His main role in Polybios' narrative thereafter was as the agent of Kretan hostility towards Rhodes in 206/5, a suitable vehicle for his mischievous talents; however, Diodoros and Livy record the

tradition that he was disliked in the Makedonian court for his influence with the king, perhaps for the same backroom role in Philip's policy after the Peace of Phoinike that Demetrios of Pharos had played before it¹²⁸. Herakleides is an interesting maverick, an example of the role of mercenaries at the time, their statelessness and their ambition; since he was no politician at Tarentum, his motivation can only have been as Polybios says.

The period of the Second Punic War, then, is important for our enquiry in that it saw subtle reassessments of the mutuality of interests that sparked off the First Illyrian War. There is no epigraphical evidence for any traffic in the decade after that first intervention. The presumed peaceful prosperity behind this quiet was disrupted by Demetrios in such a way as to confine Rome's interests to the locality of her protectorate, since his crimes affected no-one as much as herself. Thereafter Italy and Sicily became deeply introspective under the Carthaginian presence; the continued absence of evidence for traffic is perhaps a stronger indication of its diminution than one might infer, *pace* the *argumentum e silentio*. Yet Rome kept in touch with Greek affairs. When Philip and Hannibal threatened coalition, it did not take long for her to abandon her allies as a medium of approach, since this was clogged by the events of the Second Punic War; she headed straight for the opposite end of the old chain of interests, Aitolia, via a more pragmatic identity of concerns. Yet she also plied longstanding channels of communication, with Egypt and perhaps also Rhodes and Athens, to establish a parallel initiative which offered a

more creditable and respectful alternative to the Aitolian alliance. When Aitolia finally outlived her usefulness, then bridges were rebuilt between Rome and Greece and relationships cast in different lights; yet the implications were to embroil the senate still deeper in Greek affairs.

The effect of these events on trans-Adriatic traffic cannot but have been pronounced. The complexion of trade was undoubtedly altered, by everything from the *lex Claudia* to the effect that Hannibal had on the Italian agricultural economy. Attendance at festivals and sanctuaries would have been severely curtailed; although Delphi does produce honorands from this period, it is not until the relative quiet of 205/4. Actors from this far afield were most probably deterred, as were pilgrims and sight-seers. What would offset this slightly was the increase in governmental representative traffic, especially from Rome, and the apparently considerable numbers of exiles who fled from Syracuse and Tarentum at the advent of Hannibal. It is these last who might be of most interest, especially at a time when Rome's armed forces were scarcely covering themselves with glory in Greek eyes. For these men were at best pro-Roman, at very worst neutral; their presence in Greece at this crucial time and the bonds they established with which to return home, are a much neglected element in Graeco-Roman relations of this period. For, under the terms to which Syracuse and Tarentum submitted, they returned to the restoration of their former property and the elevation of their status within these two leading western Greek cities; this was because of their pro-Romanism. The chain of interests is thus

more clearly defined between Rome, her allies and her allies' friends.

The same is similarly true on a higher diplomatic level between Rome and her friends, especially Ptolemy, Attalos and Rhodes, in the east.

D. THE SECOND CENTURY PRESENCE.

(i). CAUSES OF THE SECOND MAKEDONIAN WAR.

The issues surrounding the outbreak of the Second Makedonian War provide an indication of the stage at which Rome's relations with the east had arrived by the turn of the century. For we have outlined a development throughout the third century, whereby Rome built up and finally activated these relations via the auspices of her friends and allies in Italy and Sicily, but was then forced to abandon this framework through the pragmatic necessity of the First Makedonian War. We saw the end of that war prefiguring a reconstruction of the bridges that linked Rome to Central Greece, whilst the links that existed with Egypt and Rhodes remained unaffected and well utilised during this period. The events of the years between the Peace of Phoinike and Sulpicius' invasion of Greece in late 200 are crucial to the understanding of the depths of these links.

Motivation and method have been the key-notes for scholars addressing this subject¹. The classical theory is that of Holleaux, pursued by McDonald and Walbank, that Rome's hand was forced by the coalition between Philip and Antiochos for the partitioning of the ailing empire of Ptolemy². This was brought to the senate's attention by Rhodes, by which time it had caused consternation throughout Greece³; mindful of this addition of naval power to Philip's undoubted strength by land, the senate conducted a pre-emptive strike to prevent this power

sweeping west across the Adriatic into Italy. The theory has been attacked on a variety of grounds: Appian admits that the pact was merely a rumour⁴; it was undoubtedly in the interests of both Rhodians and Alexandrines to invent or embroider such an association to win the intervention of Rome⁵; there was little active co-operation between the monarchs, who found themselves operating against each other's interests⁶; when the news reached Rome, Philip was blockaded in Bargylia and could hardly have been considered a threat⁷. However, it has never been demolished; both Polybios and Livy were aware of its contribution⁸, whilst its importance to our enquiry lies in its suggestion of an influential propagation of Romano-Egyptian or Romano-Rhodian concerns.

A secondary, but no less important factor has been the attitude of the senate. McDonald and Walbank saw them as "militaristic in spirit", imperialist after the example of Scipio Africanus and opportunistic following the disappearance of the Carthaginian danger; although there were justifiable outlets for their aggression in the west, the threat of the Syro-Makedonian alliance brought their purpose to fulfilment in the east⁹. More recently, Briscoe and Errington have propounded the theory that, within a divided senate, there were those who had long harboured eastern ambitions and who only now had the opportunity to counterbalance the achievements of others in the west and Africa with commands that would win triumphs to justify their policy¹⁰. This is a development from earlier theories that see the senate bereft of ambition and intent in the east until they were finally kicked off the fence by the Rhodian appeal; these theories support themselves most notably by use of the

rebuff handed to the Aitolians in 203 when they sought assistance against Philip¹¹. Yet the development urges that this was the opinion of the majority of senators, whose priority lay with Hannibal and Africa; Zama was thus as much a watershed for foreign policy with Greece as for that with Africa, and when Rome's hands were freed of that commitment, the minority who had watched the east were able to expand their influence¹². Having carried their way in the senate, however, they then met the protestations of the people, especially the timocratic *comitia centuriata*; the Second Punic War had been so costly and exhausting that few were willing to perpetuate the experience¹³. Yet this is where the theory of senatorial attitude meets that of motivational forethought; the consul Sulpicius was able to convince the people that the threat of Philip was real and that his military strength, his geographical proximity and his previous association with Hannibal made him a potential Pyrrhos¹⁴. That being the case, it seems cynical to believe that Sulpicius did not himself believe that, but was merely basking in his moment of power.

The question of method has been satisfactorily settled by Rich. McDonald and Walbank had largely confused the issue by their assumption that modifications in fetial procedure had run the *rerum repetitio* and the *indictio belli* into one action. Thus to them, the *legati* who left Rome for Alexandria in autumn 201 did not have full authority to issue the full ultimatum since the *rogatio* for war had not been put to the *comitia centuriata*; that they then delivered that ultimatum to Nikanor at Athens was a mistake which needed to be corrected by the second

representation at Abydos, conducted by the junior Lepidus in accordance with senatorial instructions¹⁵. However, this depends on regular communication between senate and envoys, also on the brief of the envoys being identifiable as an ultimatum which, if Philip overtly rejected it, would mean war. Rich denies that the progression of the embassy was affected by events in Rome; what they proclaim is a *senatus consultum*, an entity described as such to Philip and so not adjusted in the light of information received from home¹⁶. Both the envoys and Philip realised the force of this and its cosmetic purpose; it can only have been to advertise Rome's good intentions in rallying the Greeks against Makedon. The second presentation of it to Philip owed much to his static presence at Abydos; otherwise the envoys would have been content with its presentation at second-hand via Nikanor¹⁷. The more important *indictio belli* was conducted by Sulpicius on arrival in Illyria, probably at a border post in Philip's territory; the argument against the construct for Lepidus' presentation of the ultimatum at Abydos is compounded by the proof that he was almost certainly a senator in 200¹⁸.

This, then, is the state of the theories concerning the origins of the Second Makedonian War. Yet it is undoubtedly affected by the thesis of Derow that Rome did indeed hold formal alliances with the states who comprised her protectorate in and around Illyria¹⁹. For this affords a context for the events of 203, formerly dismissed as an annalistic invention. In that year, Livy records the complaints of "legati sociarum urbium ex Graecia" concerning their "vastatos agros ab regis praesidiis"; furthermore, they knew that Philip had sent money and men

to Hannibal in Carthage. The senate considered that this was "adversus foedus" and despatched a delegation with three quinqueremes to inform the king²⁰. Makedonian envoys later arrived in Rome to respond to these accusations. They accused M. Aurelius, whom the envoys had left behind, of breaking the treaty by making war against Makedon. However, M. Furius, on Aurelius' behalf, stated that the envoy had remained so that the allies should not be driven to defection by the depredations conducted against them; he had not transgressed the boundaries of allied territory, but had merely ensured that the plunderers did not enter allied fields with impunity. Aurelius was congratulated by the senate, "quod socios populi Romani, quando iure foederis non possit, armis tueatur"; the Makedonians were told "bellum quaerere regem et si pergat propedem inventurum; dupliciter ab eo foedus violatum et quod sociis populi Romani iniurias fecerit ac bello armisque laccessiverit, et quod hostes auxiliis et pecunia iuverit"²¹.

The message is clear: Philip had broken the Peace of Phoinike, under the clause which dictated that neither party should harm the friends of the other. The theme was repeated in Livy's assessment of the causes of the war, in Sulpicius' *rogatio* to the *comitia centuriata*, in the causes of the war announced to Massanassa and by L. Furius Purpurio before the Aitolian assembly²². It is true that Livy serves to confuse the issue by the use of the term "socii" to refer to the unallied Athenians, Rhodians and Attalos²³; however, there can be little doubt that the states defended by Aurelius were those accepted into alliance in 228. That being the case, Aurelius' actions were justifiable under the terms of

the individual alliances of these states with Rome. Although the senate was not technically obliged to assist them in case of attack, the fear of their defection to Philip activated the clause concerned with not assisting the enemies of the other; since Philip had breached the Peace of Phoinike by authorising attacks on these states, he could be considered an enemy and so Aurelius was acting to prevent the repetition of the situation which caused the Second Illyrian War²⁴. Yet this causes problems: why did Rome not go to war with Philip immediately on the breach of the treaty; why were the Aitolians rebuffed when they offered the facility for an immediate war with Philip; and why, when war finally came about, were these events not part of the official propaganda concerning the aetiology of the war ?

The first of these questions admits a straightforward circumstantial answer, but also bears hints of the issues which surround the other two questions. In 203, Rome was not in a position to renew the war effort in Greece because of her massive commitment to the African campaign against Carthage²⁵. She had been against the fighting of a war on two fronts since the prospect was raised after 216; having recently secured the favourable settlement that she had been seeking in order to concentrate her efforts on Africa, she was not likely to divide her forces so readily on such a trivial and manageable pretext. Thus the issue was effectively settled by Aurelius' actions and the senate's edict; for the moment at least, it was abandoned as a self-contained local difficulty, although the senate made it clear that a breach had occurred and they needed little further provocation²⁶. It is fair to assume that Philip

desisted from these attacks on the allies of Rome's protectorate, and possible that this determined him to pursue his ambitions elsewhere²⁷.

Yet Philip's campaigns against Lysimacheia, Chalkedon and Kios in 202 brought the Aitolians to Rome in defence of their dependent allies²⁸; the rebuff issued to this appeal for help has been marked above as support for the theory that, when Rome left Greece in 205, she had no intention of going back. McDonald and Walbank in particular argue that Aitolia was strategically vital for a campaign against Makedon; when Rome had declared war in 199, she made "most urgent attempts to repair the breach with the Aitolians"²⁹. Yet the rebuff does not mean that the senate did not intend to fight another war in Greece, but that they did not intend to fight another war in the company of and at the invitation of Aitolia. For they knew well that a Romano-Aitolian association excited the general odium of the Greeks, and that it could never be free from the shameful connotations of the infamous treaty of 212/1³⁰. Furthermore, they were implacable concerning the breaking of that treaty as regards peace with Philip; for the Peace of Naupaktos of 206 threatened to sell Rome down the river, exposing her to an attack by Philip that the 212/1 treaty was specifically designed to prevent³¹. The combination of these two elements is manifest in the Roman response to the Aitolian appeal, but in no way precluded thoughts of a war born of alternative motivation.

Following the rejection of these two potential pretexts for war with Philip, the action of the Romans in 201 in the build-up to war can be

informative for their line of policy as regards Greece. Livy reports that envoys from Rhodes and Attalos arrived in Rome "nuntiantes Asiae quoque civitates sollicitari". The senate responded that "curae eam rem senatui fore" and referred the matter to the consuls in the field concerning a fresh war with Makedon. In the meantime, however, they took the not immediately relevant step of despatching C. Claudius Nero, P. Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Aemilius Lepidus to Ptolemy in Egypt; these envoys were to announce the victory over Hannibal, thank the king for his loyalty during the war and request that it be maintained should war break out with Philip³². The shortfall in logic between appeal and response can be made up by inserting Appian's version of the Rhodians informing Rome at this meeting of the Syro-Makedonian pact against Egypt³³; there may even be a sliver of truth in Iustinus' account of the Alexandrines making a similar appeal to Rome for a tutelary guardian for the young Ptolemy, in which case the brief of the envoys regarding Egypt was more inquisitive than merely courteous³⁴. Indeed, both Polybios and Appian include the intent to visit Antiochos, the former with a view to negotiating terms, the latter to warn him off Egypt; the Syrian embassy sent later to Rome suggests that a conciliatory rapprochement was effected³⁵.

Yet the route followed by the envoys was not the traditional one, direct to Alexandria or along the African coast. Where Livy leaves them, Polybios picks them up and sets them in Athens where they communicated their intent to Attalos and the Rhodians; when Nikanor invaded Attika on Philip's behalf, they issued their message to him, a message which was

similarly broadcast to the Epirotes, Amynder of Athamania, the Aitolians and the Achaïans³⁶. That message was that they charged the king not to make war on any of the Greeks and to submit to arbitration the question of compensation for the damage suffered by Attalos; were he to accept, then there would be peace, but if not, war. Polybios next presents the envoys at Rhodes, where they were informed of Philip's presence at Abydos. Deferring their project of visiting Ptolemy and Antiochos, they sent Lepidus to Philip. He recited the terms of a *senatus consultum* that called on Philip to make war on none of the Greeks, to refrain from attacking the possessions of Ptolemy and to submit to arbitration the question of compensation for the damage suffered by Attalos and Rhodes; again, the question of peace or war depended on his reply³⁷.

The difference between the two encounters was the addition of clauses concerning Ptolemy and Rhodes to the terms of the second. This is generally ascribed to advancing circumstance. Rich believed that they were added "in the light of the events of the summer", whilst there was "no reason to suppose that [the envoys] had sought or obtained any authorisation from the senate for this"³⁸. Errington saw a specifically Rhodian motivation, Rhodes being "a trading state who always suspected military activity in the Hellespont"; therefore "pressure from Greek allies...rather than fulfilment of senatorial instructions, seems likely to have been primarily responsible for the duty-visit of Lepidus"³⁹. Yet these assessments ignore the words of Polybios. For it is the second *démarche* which relays the terms of the *senatus consultum* (δεδοχται τη

σύγκλητῳ παρακαλεῖν αὐτόν); the first démarche to Nikanor merely represents the declaration of a παράκλησις. Clearly, then, it is the second which is the authoritative version of the instructions with which the envoys left Rome; it is not that the second added on clauses, but that the first omitted them.

The reasons why Rome should want to be associated with Attalos, Rhodes and Ptolemy in this venture seem straightforward. These were the positive associations of the First Makedonian War. Rhodes and Ptolemy had been active and respected mediators, seekers after peace⁴⁰; this association would check any charges of aggression against Rome. Although Attalos had been part of that regrettable treaty with Aitolia, his relationship with Rome had since been put on an acceptable basis by the religious exchanges that marked the exportation of the Magna Mater from Pergamon to Rome; maximum publicity had been afforded this gesture, in which case Rome could rely on its having had the desired effect⁴¹. Furthermore, all three were *amici* of Rome; there was no question of this being an unjustifiable war, to which Rome came without prior obligation. The extension of Rome's protection against Philip to "the Greeks" performed two purposes. First, it presented a good, positive banner under which Rome could enter Greece, to obviate the charges of conquest and enslavement that had been formerly levelled against her; this time her intent was to be protective from the outset⁴². Second, it allowed her access to those cities with whom she had no contact, the "Asiae...civitates" whom Attalos and Rhodes sought to protect. For, although we know of Rome's and her allies' interests in the Kyklades,

these associations were taking her to a distant sphere, an extended area of mutual interests with which she had little connection other than her *amicitiae* with its protectors. By taking this stance, then, Rome delimited both the area whom she represented and the knock-on effect which her actions might have. It was an open invitation for support to rally round her banner, and one which began with the friends of her friends; her envoys were despatched in 201 to give maximum publicity to that invitation, and to ensure that Philip knew the scale of the opposition.

That being the case, it might seem strange that Rome's representatives chose to obfuscate two of these associations during their peregrinations through Central Greece, particularly since it was the two mediators. The only explanation to offer for the omission of Rhodes is that Rome was playing by the book of the Peace of Phoinike, at least in the eyes of the mainland Greeks. Attalos was *adscriptus* to the peace, whilst Rhodes and Ptolemy were not⁴³; hardly surprising since they were the neutral powers who held the negotiations. That being the case, Rome could hardly then appear as the protector of the interests of her two longstanding *amici*; for an overt acknowledgement of that *amicitia* in Central Greece so soon after the peace would mean that the neutral arbitrators would be revealed as less than neutral. If Rome was to base her case for a "bellum iustum" on Philip's rupture of the Peace of Phoinike, then it was tactless to reveal the precepts of that peace as biased. Better to be seen defending the interests of an *adscriptus*; as Errington points out, the terms did not prevent *adscriptus* fighting

adscriptus, as with Nabis and Achaia, but this does not mean that Philip was free to conduct a campaign of aggression directed against Attalos' interests⁴⁴.

The omission of Ptolemy of course admits the same rationale, but perhaps has a further dimension. We mentioned earlier the nominal reasons for the despatch of this embassy, to inform Egypt of the defeat of Hannibal and thank them for their loyalty; there was also the hint of an appeal for help against Antiochos in the form of arbitration and a tutelary presence. Yet this largely occludes the earlier events in the court at Alexandria following the death of Ptolemy Philopator in 204 and the accession of the minor Epiphanes⁴⁵. If we give Polybios precedence over other sources, then the succession was marked by division and intrigue amongst the regents Agathokles, Sosibios and Tlepolemos⁴⁶. In the midst of this, envoys were despatched, to Antiochos to implore his friendship; to Philip to seek a match with his daughter and request his help against Antiochos; and to Rome, although this man was to tarry in Greece for as long as possible to keep him away from Egypt⁴⁷. This second approach would be a particular source of concern to Rome; thus the whole scope of the intent behind the embassy to Egypt can be revealed, as can the reason for the omission of Ptolemy from the earlier *démarche* with Nikanor. The envoys, uncertain of Egypt's stance, were to make pointed reference to Rome's current position and Ptolemy's past loyalty, whilst observing the situation in Alexandria. The desired effect was to pressure the Egyptians into a promise of future goodwill; when, and only when, this had been achieved, a protective arbitration

could be conducted between Egypt and Syria. Yet the envoys did not want to commit themselves to the defence of Egypt whilst in transit, lest Ptolemy's advisors chose to side with Makedon. We must assume that Lepidus and company learnt something to their advantage en route to the effect that they could ultimately reveal the full scope of the *senatus consultum* to Philip. It is perhaps possible that they met the envoys mentioned in Livy who sought Rome's permission to assist Athens' war effort, as they were travelling the other way. For this mission would remove any doubt of Egyptian fidelity by its submission to Roman authority; the circumstances suggest that this was no mere accidental side-effect⁴⁸.

This adumbration of the purposes and activities of the envoys who left Rome in autumn 201 reveals a very definite and carefully calculated line of diplomacy being propagated by the senate in advance. They wished to re-state Rome's position as regards Greece in such a way as to erase the bad odour that lingered from the First Makedonian War; thus they were prepared to wait until the circumstances were favourable and were deliberate in their choice and enunciation of the pretexts and sympathies which brought them now to war⁴⁹. It is this which must direct our answer to the question of the allies of Rome attacked in 203 by Philip's garrisons. For it was the defence of these places which had brought about the Second Illyrian and First Makedonian Wars, a defence which had seen Rome progress from benign protectress to self-interested aggressor. Equally significant was that those defences had sided her with Aitolia, an association which could not be seen to continue.

Philip's breach of the Peace of Phoinike in 203 was therefore important enough to be checked, lest allies be lost to him; but it was not important enough to cause a further outbreak of a continuing, niggling and discredited war. The war was indeed destined to result from a breach of the Peace of Phoinike, a breach which Rome assiduously cultivated and honed for her own purposes; but the breach of 203 was simply the wrong one. Thus not only was the timing wrong for Rome, but so was the tone. She proceeded to dispense with her previous declaration of interests, that which had been marked by the embassies of 228/7 and centred around the traffic across the Adriatic into Central Greece. This time she chose to defend the interests of the Aigaian, of Attalos, Rhodes and Ptolemy and all of their dependents, and so made an overt declaration of this fact which cancelled out and updated the declaration of 228/7; yet even this declaration was selective, each state being told only what they were wanted to know. How this affected subsequent dealings with Greece, both on an official and on a general Italian level, can best be seen by assessment of those characters who appeared across the Adriatic hereafter: do they continue to conform to the older acknowledged lines of communication or are they redirected by Rome's change of policy; do they conform to the official channels of communication or do they appear in other spheres; do they lead Roman policy or are they led by it; do they impose their presence upon Greece or do they integrate peacefully ?

(11). T. QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS AND P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS.

The relationship between these two generals and their respective policies in the east has long been an issue for scholarly debate'. This has centred around the degree of Scipionian support for the initial appointment of Flamininus to the Greek command, and the nature of the seam that divided Flamininus' departure from the scene in 194 and Scipio's arrival in 190. Badian's excellent monograph on Flamininus shows that Scipio's acceptance was vital to the former's election for the consulship for 198; Scullard agrees up to the point where Flamininus displayed at Nikaia a degree of ambition that hardened Scipio's attitude towards him. The policy difference is seen to crystallise around the advance of Antiochos. Scipio displayed true *Realpolitik* by his realisation of the threat of a Hannibal-inspired Syria and the consequent pressing need to maintain a physical presence in Greece, lest it become a vacuum into which Antiochos might be drawn. Flamininus, however, was in a cleft stick. The credibility of his achievement in Greece depended on his evacuation in 194, yet his reliance on what Ferrary calls his *philodoxia* policy might seem ingenuous in the face of the Syrian menace; the weakness of his situation was revealed by the breakdown of his negotiations with Antiochos' envoys in Rome in 193. The ball was then in Scipio's court. His ultimate goal was the defeat of Antiochos in his own country and the reduction of his status as a great power, to such a degree that he skipped the issue of the Aitolian settlement in his haste to reach Asia Minor. However, Scullard's conclusion is that the ultimate policies of the two were never

fundamentally at variance; the aim was to free the Greeks, to crush or bring into alliance the barbarians, to humble but not necessarily dethrone the monarchs, to use client princes as a check on these monarchs and, in short, to create a system out of the existing units in which the balance depended on Rome herself. In this, the particular skills of Flamininus, sympathetic but never sentimental, were suited to the organisation of the city-states; those of Scipio lent themselves more favourably to negotiation with monarchs and princes².

Thus the schematisation. We must examine the evidence for Flamininus and Scipio in the east as an adumbration of their foreign policies; once this has been constructed, it can be used as a rough framework on which to base the assessment of the early second century presence in Greece as a whole. For this, Flamininus is obviously and demonstrably earlier than Scipio; let us start with him, whereafter examination of Scipio's evidence will permit consideration of the true nature of the seam that divided them.

T. Quinctius T.f. Flamininus

(i). Delphi (a). Dedicant of a gold crown and a silver shield after the battle of Kynoskephalai

(b). *Proxenos* and recipient of an equestrian statue, Jan-Jul. 188

(ii). Panopeus, Phokis. Honoured with a statue in 198/7

(iii). Korinth. Honoured with a statue in 196/5

(iv). Kos. Honoured with a statue around 196/5

- (v). Gytheion. Honoured with a statue as σωτηρ in 195
- (vi). Chyretiai. Author of a letter written in 195/4
- (vii). Chalkis. Honoured in an inscription and with the dedication of both a gymnasium to himself and Herakles, and a Delphinion to himself and Apollo, and the institution of a paian in his name; dated 191
- (viii). Skotoussa. Honoured with a statue in 189/8
- (ix). Gonnoi. *Proxenia* decree perhaps relating to Flamininus; dated early second century
- (x). Megara. Inscription perhaps relating to Flamininus; dated early second century
- (xi). Delos. Dedicant of a gold crown and silver shield; dated some time prior to 179.

Prima facie, the majority of these honours are concerned with Flamininus' achievements in the field. The honours from Panopeus are attributed by Klaffenbach to the general's fair treatment of the town on its surrender "sine certamine"³, whilst Korinth's gratitude for being chosen as the site of the famous proclamation need hardly be stressed⁴. Although the Koan connection is not immediately apparent, Paton and Hicks construct a plausible scenario wherein the Koans provided a contingent to the Rhodian fleet which served under the general; this statue was then either the result of the consul showing some special favour to the Koans in return, or more generally, an upshot of L. Quinctius Flamininus' propaganda cruises after Kynoskephalai⁵. If the inscription from Megara can be restored thus, then this might also be

counted in the euphoria subsequent to the Isthmian declaration; Flamininus' presidency of the Nemeia in 195 bears adequate testimony to his effect generally on Achaia⁶. The inscription from Gytheion, hailing him as σωτήρ, belongs to the period of the war against Nabis, after which the Lakonian coastal towns were "freed" and placed under the tutelage of the Achaian League; gratitude was again the order of the day, even if Gytheion was merely a pawn in a greater game concerning the balance of power in the Peloponnese between Sparta and Achaia⁷. As for Chalkis, Plutarch says that these honours were the result of Flamininus' intervention in 191 when Glabrio would have exacted due retribution for their support of Antiochos and their sponsorship of the monarch's marriage. The paian in his honour coupled him with Zeus Sôter, Rome and Roman *Pistis* or *Fides*; these bedfellows are important for the line of diplomacy that Flamininus was following⁸.

The letter to Chyretiai is concerned with the reorganisation of Thessalian society following its liberation from Philip. That Flamininus should have liberated the country suggests nothing more sinister than that he, quite rightly, saw Thessaly as a major strut in Philip's overall power structure; there is no need to see him defending previous Italian interests in the area, whatever the tangential effects of that reorganisation may have been⁹. For an independent Thessaly, freed from the machinations of both Philip and Aitolia, promised an important buffer area in Central Greece, in consideration of its strategic value alone. Yet Flamininus went further than this, as Livy describes. In the winter of 195/4,

"pergit ire in Thessaliam, ubi non liberandae modo civitates erant

sed ex omni conluvione et confusione in aliquam tolerabilem formam redigendae. Nec enim temporum modo vitiis ac violentia et licentia regia turbati erant sed inquieto etiam ingenio gentis nec comitium nec conventum nec concilium ullum non per seditionem ac tumultum iam inde a principio ad nostram usque aetatem reducentis. A censu maxime et senatum et iudices legit potentiolemque eam partem civitatum fecit cui salva et tranquilla omnia esse magis expediebat¹⁰.

Briscoe sees this settlement as a true expression of Rome's timocratic preferences in the government of her allies and her dependents, preferences that were often limited by expediency or practicality¹¹. However, there is some doubt whether Flamininus imposed a fresh system which he himself preferred to the benefit of Rome, or the settlement was merely a restoration of the traditional form of aristocratic government¹². The four tetrads continued to be supervised by a *strategos* and a moderately sized *synedrion*, chosen on a basis of census; the individual cities were administered by annually elected magistrates, perhaps a *boule* and a restricted primary assembly. Helly's excellent study of Gonnoi shows that the magistracies continued to be held by the same aristocratic families as had held sway under Philip's regime; so Makedon's favoured aristocracy now became Rome's favoured aristocracy¹³.

If there was no overhaul, then the bulk of Flamininus' work was concerned with minor disputes such as that at Chyretiai, for which there is this direct and pointed evidence. The suggestion that Gonnoi honoured the general implies that they too received a similar benevolence around the same time. This is concerned with the restoration to the city of all κτήσεις ἑγγεῖοι καὶ τῶν καθήκουσῶν which the Romans had confiscated

during the war; this was a demonstration of Flamininus' καλοκαγαθία, recognition of χάρις and φιλοδοξία, and denial of φιλαργυρία. The depth and scale of this is again open to scholarly dispute. Larsen believes that legal experts, perhaps from Sicily, assisted him in his work, given the complexities of cross-cultural law; Armstrong and Walsh believe that the general situation was much the same as that which had confronted him at Tarentum, in which case his shortfall would not be experience, but time and manpower¹⁴. However, this was not so much an exploration of legal niceties as an external arbitration; Flamininus was empowered to make a judgment, Greek or Roman. The important issue is that of his relationship with Chyretiai as a result of that judgment; this will dictate our assessment of the nature and direction of his policy towards Greece as a whole.

Sherk sees Flamininus demonstrating benevolence to the property owners of Chyretiai in the manner of a master to a subordinate; thus he showed them the benefits of a client-patron relationship, so that they would continue their regime mindful of the circumstances of their government and so remove the need for Rome to commit a military or administrative presence to the area¹⁵. To Armstrong and Walsh, however, "the idea of *clientela* has nothing to do with the purpose of the letter...the political affiliations of the owners of the property can have nothing whatever to do with its return". Ferrary sees the previous owners of the property as Makedonians rather than pro-Makedonian Chyretiaians; thus Flamininus' φιλοδοξία was the establishment of an egalitarian relationship of mutual χάρις between himself and Chyretiai,

and thus somewhat different from a *clientela* pure and simple¹⁶. Of these, the first and last seem most cogent, insofar as they deal with the terminology used by Flamininus to describe his relationship with Chyretiai. Sherk's opinion applies to Flamininus' Roman mind; this is perhaps how he himself conceived the words he used. Ferrary's opinion applies to the Greek mind of the Chyretiaians; Flamininus' words may well have meant something different to them from what they meant to him¹⁷. Yet whatever the respective understanding of these concepts, by declaring himself the author of καλοκαγαθία and τὸ δίκαιον and by using these particular words, χάρις, φιλοδοξία, καλοκαγαθία, Flamininus created a relationship between himself and Chyretiai which depended on the debt of gratitude which they owed to him. No matter that he was not the true author of their constitution, but had merely tinkered with their property arrangements; he had performed a service for them consequent to which they held an obligation towards him. This principle surely extends to the rest of mainland Greece via the Isthmian proclamation. There Flamininus informed the Greeks that he freed them, thereby imposing a similar obligation upon them; the statues which comprise half of the aforementioned honours to Flamininus can be seen as attempts to repay at least a part of that debt. That debt was thus a individual thing, applying to each state for their own sake, be it by the general weight of the Isthmian declaration or by the more specific services of such as the Chyretiai settlement. Badian says that Flamininus' settlement embodied "the free ally regarded as a client, the control over an ally's policy without administrative commitment or the odium of a conqueror's presence"¹⁸; thus he meets Sherk on the

intimation that to the Roman mind, the debt implied subordination. It is undoubtedly that principle which lay at the heart of Flamininus' intent in Greece.

Further to this consideration of general policy, an assessment of the implications of Flamininus' dedications at the sanctuaries of Delphi and Delos will assist the delineation of the seam that divided this policy from that of Scipio in the east. To take the Delian dedications first, it appears that Flamininus made two separate offerings, the first a gold crown in the temple of Apollo and the second a silver shield in the temple of the Seven Statues. The only definite dating criterion is that they are recorded in the temple inventories of the archonship of Demares, thus providing a *terminus ante quem* of 179¹⁹. The obvious opportunities for Flamininus to make these dedications were his magistracies in Greece; his spell there as consul and proconsul between 198 and 194 and his legateships of 192/1 and 183.

However, in the first of these periods, it seems that he never set foot away from the Greek mainland²⁰. His landfall in 198 was Epiros, whence he forced the passes into Thessaly before turning south to winter in Boiotia at Elateia. In spring 197 he attended the Boiotian council in Thebes before heading north to attend the council of the Aitolians in Herakleia-on-Oita; he then pressed into Phthiotis and further into Thessaly in a shadow of Philip's manoeuvres. After the battle of Kynoskephalai in May/June, he retired to Larisa to preside over the negotiations which took place there and in the vale of Tempe. He then

wintered again at Elateia, during which time he attempted to intervene in Boiotian politics, with less than spectacular success. Having spent the early part of 196 clearing up the mess that he had created in Boiotia, he then proceeded to Antikyra to respond to Aitolian complaints before crossing to Korinth for the Isthmian games and the proclamation of independence. He spent the rest of the year there, receiving delegates and completing the settlement of Greece. In 195 he declared war on Sparta and set off from Korinth into the Peloponnese to drive Nabis from Argos. This done, he attended the Nemean games and returned to Elateia. There he spent the winter "iure dicundo...mutandisque iis quae aut ipsius Philippi aut praefectorum eius licentia in civitatibus facta erant"²¹. At the start of spring 194, he held a *contio* at Korinth in preparation for his evacuation of Greece; this took place after the ransoming of Romans enslaved by Hannibal, the removal of garrisons from Akrokorinth, Chalkis, Oreus, Eretria and Demetrias, and the settlement of Thessalian affairs.

Flamininus returned to Greece in 192 in company with Cn. Servilius, Cn. Octavius and P. Villius "ad tenendos sociorum animos" in the face of the threat of a Syrian invasion²². They wasted little time on the loyal Achaians, but visited instead Athens, Chalkis and Thessaly. They met and swayed the council of the Magnetes at Demetrias before making approaches to the Aitolians, initially via the Athenians but ultimately in person. They returned thence to Korinth, whence they took ship to the Chalkidian Euripos to meet with Eumenes. From there they returned to the Magnetes at Demetrias, to no effect. They then proceeded via Korinth to Aigeion

to meet with the representatives of the Aitolians and Antiochos. After visiting Athens for the winter to quell an outbreak of *stasis*, Flamininus met Messenian ambassadors at Chalkis in early 191, on whose behalf he proceeded via Megalopolis to Andania, to bid the Achaians refer all business to him at Korinth. There he met Philip, to direct his campaigns in the north, before crossing to Naupaktos to save the city from utter destruction by Glabrio. He then returned with the consul to Aigeion to hold court over the Eleians, Spartans, Epirotes and Makedonians. Thereafter we know only of his defence of Chalkis against Glabrio's vengeful intent, before the sources resume their interest in his career with his election to the censorship in 189.

After that, the only opportunity for Flamininus to visit Delos came on his embassy to Prousius in Bithynia in 183, which ended discredibly with the death of Hannibal. It is more probable, however, that his outward route took him along the Thracian coastline, as was the standard and most direct route to Bithynia²³. Yet, since the embassy also saw activity in the Peloponnese, presumably on the return leg, it is quite possible that Flamininus sailed back through the islands and visited Delos en route. Of Flamininus' three sojourns in Greece, this last one is thus the only chance that the general had to visit the island in person, since the itineraries outlined above afford no apparent opportunity for him to leave the mainland; this rests on the not unworkable assumption that Flamininus did not in either of the earlier magistracies make detours on which the sources are silent. Are we then to assume that the dedications on Delos were not made until 183 ?

There are two feasible escape routes from this conclusion, both of which involve a middle-man making the dedication on his behalf. For this appears to have been the case with the dedications of Q. Fabius Labeo and L. Aemilius Regillus, whose offerings were made respectively by Polybos son of Menyllos, and the ἐπιμεληταὶ Tlepolemos and Xenokleides²⁴. However, were that to be the case with Flamininus, then surely the fact would have merited mention, as it did with his fellow generals. Yet we have already observed that Flamininus was honoured on Kos as *strategos hypatos*; given the itinerary outlined above for 198-194, this is evidence of his fame being transmitted to the Aigaian islands independently of his presence there. Further to this, there is in the Delian inventories an unqualified Lucius, for whom there is also a *terminus ante quem* of 179²⁵. Dittenberger and Holleaux assumed this to be the younger Flamininus, largely on the evidence of his proximity to Titus in the catalogue; might he be a potential middle-man²⁶? However, Durrbach dissented, with good reason²⁷. For he noted the frugality of Lucius' offering, a meagre golden brooch; considering it unworthy of such an eminent magistrate, he ascribed it instead to some unknown minor Italian resident of the island. His point is valid when one considers the unreliability of an interpretation of the inventories on the grounds of dating by proximity of entries. For the cataloguing procedure used by the clerks of the temple was based on a topographical survey of the temples (i.e. offerings found on the left of the hall, then offerings found on the right, and so on). All it needed was for more than one clerk to be involved in stock-taking, for offerings on steps and hooks to be moved repeatedly and so on, for dedications to be well and truly

mixed up²⁸. Further, the crossover between Delian and Athenian records, with their different criteria, weights and measures and phraseology, caused more problems of interpretation. Thus what the Delians recorded as merely the offering of Τίτος Ῥωμαῖος is revealed in the Athenian catalogues to be that of Τίτος Κοϊγκτιος ὕπατος Ῥωμαῖος; why, then, did the Delians not record the full inscription if that was what it said? did the Athenians then record the full inscription, or was there something more? or were the Athenians making an assumption on the grounds of subsidiary evidence²⁹? These difficulties are only compounded by the discovery that neither Delians nor Athenians could interpret Latin inscriptions; for where these were found, both sets of cataloguers incomprehendingly put them down as ρωμαῖχα γράμματα³⁰.

So far, then, there is no positive evidence to clarify the date and circumstances of Flamininus' Delian dedications. Let us turn to the Delphian dedications, as outlined by Plutarch. These, he says, were made in celebration of the victory at Kynoskephalai in 197 and consisted of a silver shield and a gold crown; the form is identical to the Delian offerings found in the inventories³¹. Plutarch adds that the dedications were inscribed with epigrammatic verses on the subject of that victory. On the shield was:-

Ζηνὸς ἰὼ κραιπναῖσι γεγαθότες ἵπποσύναισι
κοῦροι, ἰὼ Σπάρτας Τυνδαρίδαι βασιλεῖς.
Αἰνεάδας Τίτος ὕμνιν ὑπέρτατον ὤπασε δῶρον
Ἑλλάνων τεύξας παισὶν ἐλευθερίαν.

On the crown was: -

Τόνδε τοι ἄμβροσίοισιν ἐπὶ πλοκάμοισιν ἔθηκε
κεῖσθαι Λατοῖδα χρυσοφαῖ στέφανον
ὃν πόρεν Αἰνεαδᾶν ταγὸς μέγας. ἀλλ' Ἐκάεργε
ἀλκᾶς τῷ θεῷ κῦδος ὄπαζε Τίτῳ.

Plutarch's context for these dedications is that of the post-Isthmian embassies of 196, although there is no firm chronology established by the narrative. What he says three chapters earlier is that the Aitolians, immediately after Kynoskephalai, issued epigrams lauding their own role in the struggle, to which Philip responded in kind and Flamininus with impotent rage³². This led Rawson to believe that the verses on these offerings were not of Flamininus' own hand, but were some time in gestation and commission³³. The question is, how much time ?

In his commentary on the Delphic *proxenia* list of the second century, Dittenberger writes of Q. Veturius and Blattus of Canusium, who are honoured between January and July 194, that "hi Romani...cum Flaminio Delphos venisse videntur"³⁴. Circumstantially, he may have a point; yet the itinerary for Flamininus above shows no scheduled stop at Delphi, and it seems strange that, if there was such a stop, the Delphoi should choose to honour members of his staff rather than the general himself. Equally, Flamininus' differences with the Aitolians at this time make it seem that there must be a fairly strong reason for Romans

to be honoured at the sanctuary. With this in mind, Flacelière makes the following suggestion: - "peut-être ces deux personnages étaient-ils venus à Delphes précisément pour apporter les offrandes de Flaminius ?"³⁵ If he is correct, it took some time for Flaminius to respond to the Aitolian vaunts and to commemorate his victory at Kynoskephalai. Yet the moment was also a significant one. For, on the eve of his departure for Rome, whilst he was spending the winter sorting out his affairs, he made a gesture at the heart of the opposition in mainland Greece that was guaranteed to have most propaganda effect³⁶. It would be even more significant if this offering could be tied into the Delian dedications.

Flaminius would know that, in Rome, Scipio had stood for and won election to the consulship for 194 on the basis of the threat from the Hannibal-inspired Syria. He would also know the concern that his decision to evacuate Greece had caused, and the grounds for that concern; that is, the potential vacuum that would suck Antiochos into Greece. His response in mainland Greece was to despatch a delegation to make a highly significant offering in a major sanctuary; the fact that the dedications at Delos are of an identical form, a crown and a silver shield, would suggest that this was a complementary gesture, aimed at a similarly major sanctuary with intent to disseminate the same impression throughout the Aigaian and its environs. For in much the same way as Delphi was a mecca for mainland Greece, so Delos was likewise for Eastern Greece, as the prosopography of the temple inventories conclusively proves; here there are dedications from all the monarchs and princes whose interests were embedded in the Eastern Aigaian (the

Makedonians Ptolemy Lagides, Antigonos, Demetrios, Philip, Perseus and the young Demetrios, the Attalids, Seleukos and the Egyptian Ptolemies) as well as lesser lights from the Pontos, Kolophon, Rhethymna, Kos, Rhodes, Mytilene, Chios, Klazomenai, Seriphos, Kyrene, Naxos, Tenos, Sinope and even Baktria, with Athens the sole representative of the cities of mainland Greece³⁷. The potential was there, then, for any dedication of a propagandist intent to reach a broad audience and, in the context of Antiochos' advances in 195/4, a significant one.

Our assumption must be that, if the Delian dedications took the same shape as the Delphian ones, they were contemporaneous; that being the case, we must also assume that they were of exactly the same form, that is, that they too included the inscriptions related by Plutarch. This would perhaps explain why the Delians initially recorded the offerings as those of Τίτος 'Ρωμαῖος; the praenomen is all that appears in the inscriptions³⁸. The Athenians' ability to identify these with Flamininus would be a result of their frequent attendance at Delphi, their own relationship with the general and the amount of water that had passed under the bridge by 167³⁹. We do not know whether the separate offerings were in separate sanctuaries at Delphi, but they certainly were at Delos; the shield was in the temple of the Seven Statues and the crown in the great temple of Apollo⁴⁰. That being the case, the inscriptions may permit a furtherance of the enquiry into Flamininus' motivation and policy.

As regards the crown, the inscription referred specifically to Apollo, whilst the crown at Delos was in the temple of Apollo; this surely reinforces the argument that Delphian and Delian offerings were identical. Yet it is not so much the eulogy of Apollo that is of interest here as Flamininus' plugging of his and Rome's descent from Aineias⁴¹. We have already explored the period around the end of the First Punic War when Rome attempted to gain diplomatic capital from this connection in their embryonic relations with hellenistic states, but were forced to retire the motif when it became clear that the Aitolians in particular had little respect for it⁴². The revival of it now, when it rooted Rome's origins very firmly in Asia Minor, was exquisitely timed if Flamininus did have an eye to the advancing Antiochos. Indeed, now that Rome had revealed herself as a benign and liberating power, it was unlikely that the Greeks would resume the Aitolian line against it, since it was as much in their interests as it was in Rome's to advocate its promotion; yet the mere fact of its likelihood to succeed can hardly be seen as a valid motive for its resurrection. What seems more important for its causation, particularly given the timing of the dedications, is the embassy sent by Lampsakos to Rome in 196.

This embassy is described in an honorific decree for Hegesias, the Lampsakene envoy, who undertook to secure the inclusion of Lampsakos in the terms of the treaty that concluded the Second Makedonian War⁴³; this he did primarily by using the medium of the Massaliotes, blood relations of the Lampsakenes, in his approach to the senate, but also secondarily and crucially, on the basis of Lampsakos' own συγγένεια and οἰκειότης

with Rome. What seems strange is that, if the Lampsakenes were confident in their relationship with Rome, they should still seek the mediation of the Massaliotes; the answer, diplomatic niceties apart, must be that they had no real faith in the connection⁴⁴. Thus, from the terms of the decree, it seems that the psephism originally passed at Lampsakos was concerned entirely with securing the favour of the Massaliotes to guarantee an introduction at Rome; Holleaux's exposé of that issue concentrates on Hegesias' extemporisation concerning the Tolostoagian Galatians, but surely also relates to the issue of the ultimate destination, Rome. For, by the time Hegesias reached Massalia, he had already encountered two Roman magistrates en route, both apparently by pure chance⁴⁵. The first of these was L. Quinctius Flamininus, the general's brother, with whom Hegesias held a colloquy based almost entirely on the issue of Lampsakos' *συγγένεια* with Rome. It is noticeable that the same verb, *ἄξιόν*, is used of Hegesias' words here as it is for those concerning the Tolostoagian Galatians in Massalia; thus here, as there, he is extemporising, in response to stimuli provided to him during the congress. The crucial phrase, in Dittenberger's restoration, comes in l.25; Hegesias stated here that Rome accepted the substance of the *συγγένεια*, before mentioning the mediation of the Massaliotes almost as an afterthought⁴⁶. For his part, Lucius promised that any terms with Philip would include the Lampsakenes and that Rome would play true to her kinship bonds in the defence of Lampsakene democracy, freedom and peace; he himself would strive to be of some use to them and to protect them. However, he did not commit himself to writing and so provided no formal documentation of Rome's

acceptance of the συγγενεία connection. The communication which was forthcoming was received from the quaestor of the fleet when Hegesias encountered him; this, however, related to no such issues of kinship, but was merely an undertaking always to be of some service to the Lampsakenes⁴⁷. Thereafter Hegesias fulfilled the terms of the original psephism at Massalia and was so introduced to Rome, where his representation was much more subdued on the kinship issue than it was to Lucius; for here he stressed rather the φιλία, the φιλανθρώπα and the σύστασις of Lampsakos, making only brief mention of the συγγένεια. The senate agreed to include Lampsakos in the terms of the συνθήκαι, thereafter referring Hegesias to Flamininus and the decemvirs from whom ~~the~~ secured a δόγμα φιλανθρώπων backed by letters to Eumenes and Prousius.

What stands out from this is that Hegesias' encounter with Lucius and their discussion of Roman-Lampsakene συγγένεια was entirely unofficial. Hegesias was extemporising outside the scope of his brief, whilst Lucius either could not or would not express his sentiments in a formal communication. For, had the conversation any official basis, then Hegesias could have saved himself a long, arduous and expensive journey to Massalia; for Lucius had in effect assured him of an introduction to the senate by this rubber-stamping of his kinship credentials. That Hegesias then made representation to the quaestor and continued on his journey to Massalia rather suggests that the acceptance by Lucius of his propagation of the link had no validity. However, the implication for our enquiry is that the conversation had a most significant consequence

for Lucius. However the matter had occurred in the conversation, he had learnt that the Aineias-link was very much current coin in Asia Minor, and so ripe for exploitation; if Hegesias thought it worth exploring the potential of the link on an unofficial level, then the Flaminini stood in an excellent position to clarify, formalise and propagate that link so that more states such as Lampsakos should feel sufficiently confident to approach Rome via that medium. Thus the suggestion is that the line ran from Hegesias' polite enquiry to Lucius to Titus; he, seeking both a valid riposte to the epigrams of Aitolia and Philip and, in 195/4, a tie into Asia Minor to counteract Antiochos, processed the information and returned it in the form of the Delian dedications. If this is so, then he must have made the dedications via the medium of Lucius, whose brief, the "classis cura maritimaeque orae imperium", was sufficiently elastic to permit his wandering to Delos, perhaps also to Kos and to other significant parts of the Aigaian⁴⁸; if the Delphian dedications were also made by middle-men, then this suggestion might be underlined. This may or may not mean that the golden brooch of Lucius in the Delian catalogues was dedicated by the younger Flamininus; for the implication that he was there on his brother's behalf does not necessarily mean that he too made a dedication⁴⁹.

The silver shield is remarkable for both the content of its inscription and its place of dedication. As we have seen, the former is primarily concerned with the Dioskouroi, with a firm conclusion detailing Flamininus' responsibility for the ἐλευθερία of Greece. The exposition of this settlement can be seen as a further pointer to the

dedications dating late-195; for then Flamininus was fresh from his victory over the home of the Dioskouroi, Sparta, for which he had been placed in the same bracket as the saviour-gods by his status at Gytheion as σωτηρ⁵⁰. Indeed, the parallel of the twins who saved men by land and sea with the brothers Flamininus, general and admiral respectively, was surely not far from Titus' mind, not least in the atmosphere which lifted him to near-divine status in Greece⁵¹. The motif was an apt one, for it was around this time that the Romans began to adopt the Dioskouroi as patrons of their cause on the battlefield, assuming that the epiphany at Lake Regillus was a late attribution in the aftermath of these developments⁵². For their intervention became more frequent, as they subsequently sided with Rome at Myonnesos and Pydna; the context was that of an *exoratio*, as Rome claimed the patronage of the gods who were generally claimed by their opponents⁵³. Thus now, especially in the aftermath of the Spartan victory, Rome could claim the spiritual and moral supremacy, by the agency of their godlike general.

That this is found in the temple of the Seven Statues, as distinct from the great temple of Apollo, might also be significant. The temple was an Athenian foundation, which might suggest that Flamininus' gesture was in deference to the Athenian claim to the tutelage of both island and sanctuary; perhaps the Athenians were in some way responsible for his knowledge of Delos' potential as a propaganda centre, or it was an Athenian whom he commissioned to compose the verses⁵⁴. He may even have been tacitly encouraging the Athenians to follow Kephisodoros' example in the espousal of the Roman cause by this espousal of theirs; perhaps,

equally, he was adumbrating the consideration for Athens which appears to have played at least a minor role in the senate's aetiology of the Second Makedonian War⁵⁵. Yet the content of the inscription adds a fresh dimension to the gesture. The sons of Aineias are seen championing the cause of the Dorian saviour-gods in the context of an Ionian temple; the whole Greek world is encompassed here in a welter of mythological cross-references that open the message to any Greek who might witness it⁵⁶.

The force of these dedications at Delos and Delphi, then, sent out with middle-men as the Roman army prepared for evacuation in late-195, is to narrow the gap between what has been portrayed as Scipio's prescience and Flamininus' blind faith in the framework of his settlement. What the timing, situation and content of these dedications show is an understanding of Antiochos' threat and Aitolia's unreliability; they therefore comprise an effort to facilitate the counteracting of that threat by the creation of a widespread context within which the eastern Greeks especially could relate to Rome rather than to Syria. The efficacy of this for Rome's policy as a whole can only be assessed by consideration of what came after; Delphi's subsequent attitude to Rome and the development of Scipio's relationship with Delos must surely be seen as direct results of Flamininus' gestures. For Flamininus himself, the nature of its impact might be judged by the fact that, when he next appeared in Greece, he was treated with religious awe.

There remains the matter of the later inscriptions which confer honours upon Flamininus after his departure from Greece in 190; these emanated from Delphi and Skotoussa. The reason for the Delphian *proxenia* grant of early 188 seems reasonably straightforward. In the aftermath of Glabrio's settlement of 191, the Delphoi sent an embassy to Rome to have this settlement confirmed; when the envoys were murdered on the return journey, a second embassy was sent to confirm this confirmation and to appeal against this outrage. The letters despatched concerning these embassies date to 189/8, thus also providing a date for the embassies themselves⁵⁷. Since Flamininus was censor in Rome from 189, the logical conclusion is that he, along with the others also honoured at the same time, was responsible for the good reception afforded the Delphian envoys, and thus he won his *proxenia*; that he was honoured no earlier by the Delphoi is merely the result of their never having previously dealt with him in person⁵⁸. That he acted in this capacity for the Delphoi might be seen in the light of the above concerning his status as patron for Greece as a whole after the Isthmian proclamation; it might equally be seen as the fulfilment of the chain of events at Delphi that he had set in motion by his dedication of 195, events which will be considered in full in the next chapter.

This Delphic context also pervades the issue of the honours from Skotoussa. For the inscription there was erected by Praulos, *strategos* of the Thessalian confederation in 190/89 and *proxenos* at Delphi at the same time as Flamininus. On the grounds that the reference to Flamininus lacks all indication of rank, Mastrokostas concludes that the

inscription must post-date 194 and Flamininus' retirement from the pro-consulate; equally, since Praulos mentioned no title of his own, it cannot date to 190/89. His general conclusion is that the honour was the result of some private benefaction, perhaps either an agrarian or property arbitration as at Chyretiai or some assistance in Praulos' election to office⁵⁹. Daux, however, picks up on the synchronicity of the Delphic *proxenia* grants to the two to conclude:

"il est fort probable que les deux decrets honorifiques ont été pris dans une même séance de l'assemblée delphique, en une occasion commune, qui ne doit pas être sans rapports avec l'erection de la statue de Scotoussa"⁶⁰.

However, if we are right concerning Flamininus' Delphic honours, this cannot be directly correct; yet it may have some significance in the triangle linking Rome, Delphi and Thessaly which will be discussed below.

P. Cornelius P.f. Scipio Africanus.

- (i). Delphi. Dedicant of statue, either 194/3 or 190
- (ii). Delos. (a). *Proxenos* and *evergetes*, at some stage prior to (b)
 - (b). Honoured with a gold crown
 - (c). Dedicant of a gold crown when *strategos hypatos*
- (iii). Krete. *Proxenos* and *evergetes* at Aptera, 189
- (iv). Kolophon. Co-author of a letter concerning its status after the battle of Magnesia, 190/89
- (v). Herakleia-Latmos. Co-author of a letter concerning its status after the battle of Magnesia, 190/89

If Flaminius prepared the ground for Rome's response to the advance of Antiochos, then the nature and timing of the parallel offerings of Scipio at Delphi and Delos will say much about the respective policies of the two in the east; thus the contrasts that have been drawn between them can be reassessed. The problem of dating is the most significant, as Holleaux realised in his comprehensive and considered assault on the issues arising from Scipio's supposed eastern venture to encounter Hannibal at Ephesos in late-194 or early-193⁶¹. This reconstruction of Scipio's movements, which no scholar has since seen fit to contradict, has the consul hastening to Africa almost immediately after laying down his office, to arbitrate a boundary dispute between Carthage and Massanassa. After leaving this issue undecided, he either attached himself to the embassy of Sulpicius Galba bound for Apamea and Antiochos, or attempted a follow-up mission when Sulpicius fell ill and the embassy failed in its objectives. Thus Holleaux creates an itinerary that allows Scipio to visit Delos on either the outward or the return leg of the journey; so he dates the dedication of the gold crown to this period. The offering was styled *strategos hypatos* as Scipio had had the inscription done prior to his departure on the embassy, before his consulship had expired. Holleaux also dates the first of L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus' dedications, on which he is styled *strategos*, to this year, 193, when he was *praetor Siciliae*; this offering must therefore have been made by Scipio Africanus on his behalf⁶². That Scipio Africanus made this double dedication now seems good enough reason for the *proxenia* grant; this clears the way for the gold crown to be awarded when Scipio visited the island on his way back from the battle of

Magnesia in 189, the occasion of the dedication of the second of Asiaticus' crowns⁶³.

Holleaux's picture accords well with that of Scullard outlined at the beginning of this chapter. For it involves some degree of prior intent before Scipio's departure from Rome for him to have carried with him an inscribed crown and to have collected another from his brother in Sicily en route; thus he must have had it in his mind to visit Delos for this purpose for quite some time. However, Holleaux's primary purpose is to create a construct by which Scipio might feasibly have met Hannibal at Ephesos, on evidence which he himself admits is tenuous. It is equally possible, he says, that the meeting never took place, but was merely a nice story cooked up by the pro-Cornelian annalistic tradition. Should that be the case, then the Delian construct will also fall; if Scipio's embassy took him only to Carthage, then it would have been a considerable and time-consuming detour that took him through the Kyklades, which cannot conceivably have been en route for either the outward or the return journey⁶⁴. By the same token, if the Delian construct falls independently, then a considerable part of the evidence for the encounter with Hannibal is removed. Unfortunately for Holleaux, the Delian construct can be seen, if not to fall, then at least to totter.

In the inventory of Demares from Delos, Scipio's dedication is recorded as presented by Sosistratos son of Amphios to Mnesikleides and Polyboulos during their archonship; it was a gold crown bearing the

inscription 'P. P.f. Cornelius *strategos hypatos* of the Romans'⁶⁵. The fact is explicitly stated; Scipio did not make the dedication in person, but via the medium of this man Sosistratos⁶⁶. It is noticeable also that the second of Asiaticus' praetorian offerings was made in absentia; this was made by a chorus of Delian women, who themselves had been crowned by Lucius⁶⁷. The chronological parameters for Scipio's dedication, however, are not fundamentally altered by this observation. He is still styled consul, and so 205-1 or 194; the lower limit is still that of Demares' inventory, 179. Sosistratos, the middle-man, was *choregos* on Delos in 215 and archon in 200; the dates are not unusually high since it was only six years thence to 194. Polyboulos son of Parmenion was *hieropoios* in 197 and treasurer in 184; a distinct Polyboulos was *hieropoios* together with a Mnesikleides in 186. There are also Mnesikleideis as treasurer in 170 (the son of Eudemos) and in 180 (the son of Kallias)⁶⁸. Since a joint archonship is not attested by the inscriptions, this spread of magistracies is insufficient to define the date of Scipio's dedication more distinctly than it already is.

The question is then, how far from Delos was he when the dedication was made on his behalf ? It is possible that Holleaux's construct is valid, and that Scipio was not many miles from Delos on his return from Ephesos; yet why so close without making that final short step onto the island in person ? It is also possible that the offerings were despatched from his station in Africa, either as triumphant consul or as arbitrational legate. Yet in 201, Scipio's horizons were concentrated no further abroad than the Syrtis, and in 194 he was determined to quell

the threat of a Syro-Carthaginian pact which arose from Hannibal's personal link with Antiochos⁶⁹. Neither of these presents a Greek context; Massanassa's own association with Delos is commonly deemed late and so a result of Scipio's own orientation rather than a cause of it⁷⁰.

What can be revealed as a more cogent suggestion is that Scipio made his offering from as far away as Rome herself, a scenario that can be constructed by the use of the *proxenia* grant and the gold crown that were awarded him by Delos. For, at the very start of 193, Flamininus, freshly returned from Greece and fêted with a spectacular triumph, turned the mind of the senate to the settlement that he and the *decemviri* had imposed on Greece, in order to secure its ratification;

"id eos facilius facturos si legatorum verba qui ex universa Graecia et magna parte Asiae quique ab regibus venissent audissent. Eae legationes a C. Scribonio praetore urbano in senatum introductae sunt benigneque omnibus responsum"⁷¹.

Of the inscriptions which Homolle published as part of his groundbreaking survey of the Roman presence on Delos, perhaps the least discussed is that fragment concerning a proposal of Telemnestos son of Aristides on the subject of an embassy that had proceeded to Rome for the purpose of renewing the existing friendship between the two⁷². Homolle, on the grounds of epigraphical similarity and presumed historical context, dated the inscription to 193; thus Delos seized the first opportunity to throw off the shackles of Makedon and run into Rome's arms. However, he does not suggest a parallel context for the establishment of that friendship, if this was merely the renewal; in any case the arguments outlined above suggest that Flamininus was the first

to recognise Delos' potential in the second century, in which case the idea would only return to Rome when he did⁷³. The orator who proposed the decree, Telemnestos, causes no epigraphical problems; Vial notes that he was the author of a number of decrees and attested in other contexts between 193 and 179⁷⁴. Therefore we would suggest that this decree was passed rather in 189, after Magnesia, when embassies proceeded to Rome from Antiochos, Eumenes, Rhodes and τῶν ἄλλῶν to seek a settlement⁷⁵; this leaves 193, and the context cited by Livy above, available for the initial establishment of this friendship.

Our theory thus runs that the Delian envoys who followed Flamininus back to Rome to make their representation in 193 arrived early, before the year end, the change of magistrates and the subsequent hearing of foreign embassies in the senate. Whilst kicking their heels in Rome, they made contact with Scipio Africanus, or perhaps he with them given his apparent willingness to oppose Antiochos at this time; news of Flamininus' gesture would have flown swiftly to the consul's ears. That he was still consul then is significant, as it was then that we presume him to have promised his dedication to the Delians; more specifically, to Sosistratos who, as an ex-archon, would be an appropriate figure to head the Delian embassy. Also significant to the Delians, in view of their hopes of success in front of the senate, was Scipio's recent reappointment as *princeps senatus* by the censors of 194, Sex. Aelius Paetus and C. Cornelius Cethegus⁷⁶. Now too would be the time for Scipio Asiaticus to make a similar gesture as praetor-elect, with the second of his offerings being dedicated later in 193, when he had assumed his

province⁷⁷. The success of the Delian embassy in securing the friendship of Rome would then be reflected on their return home, when they offered the crowns of the Scipiones to the god and made their chief benefactor in the senate their *proxenos*. Therefore it was Flamininus who set the ball rolling by instigating the magisterial dedication policy on Delos and so drawing a Delian representation to Rome; that he facilitated Scipio's subsequent patronage of Delos thus demonstrates his awareness of the limitations of his settlement, but also of the manner in which it might be extended.

There is no surviving *proxenia* decree for Scipio. Instead, the decree which awards him a gold crown for his ἐπιμέλεια refers to the fact that he is already *proxenos* and *evergetes*⁷⁸. It is this second act of gratitude from the Delians which we would couple with the decree of Telemnestos and the dedication made by Asiaticus as consul. The Scipiones, latterly in the company of L. Aemilius Regillus, seem to have made a meandering journey back to Rome after Magnesia in 190/89, taking in Krete and Delos at least on their way. The stopover at Delos allowed Asiaticus to make his mandatory dedication as a trans-Aigaian magistrate⁷⁹. It also provided the Delians with an opportunity to flatter their *proxenos*, foreseeing the need they would have of him when they came to Rome in the spring of the following year; hence the gold crown. This second honour was thus little more than a bribe, but one which Scipio was happy to accept since it signalled the success of Rome's policy against Antiochos.

The visit to Krete adumbrates a further aspect of Scipionian policy which was revealed in the development of the Syro-Aitolian War. Scullard makes comprehensive discussion of the motives behind this visit⁸⁰: it was (i) a break in the journey after Africanus' illness in Asia Minor; (ii) a response to the internal disturbances of the island; (iii) an attempt to rescue the prisoners-of-war said to be in slavery throughout the island⁸¹; (iv) a quest for the fugitive Hannibal; and (v) a propagandist show of power by Antiochos' conquerors. In these aims, they were only partly successful, if more so than Labeo in the follow-up operation⁸². Yet the fifth of these aims, the personal executive approach of the brothers to their eastern settlement, opens the discussion of the letters sent by the Scipiones in 190/89, and so also of their policy difference with Flamininus.

Although the letter to Kolophon is too fragmentary for serious restoration, it appears to be of similar content and intent to that to Herakleia-Latmos⁸³; there is also literary evidence of a similar letter sent to Herakleia-Pontos concerned with the same issues⁸⁴. Ferrary believes that those issues were the changing of allegiance from Antiochos to Rome before the battle of Magnesia⁸⁵. Although in contradiction of the opinions of Scullard, Briscoe, Holleaux, De Sanctis *et al*⁸⁶, this is supported by *SIG*⁸.633; this clearly shows that, in 180, Herakleia was a non-tributary ally of Rhodes and so belonging to the fourth of Livy's categories in the peace terms, "ea...pars Cariae...quae propior Rhodum insulam trans Maeandrum amnem est...eorum oppida in libertate fuissent pridie, quam cum Antiocho rege in Asia pugnatum

est"⁸⁷. The Scipiones swore their εὐνοία towards the Kolophonians and Herakleiotas and, in granting their ἐλευθερία and αὐτονομία, they undertook always to be the authors of some good for these people; yet the crucial admission is that they received φιλανθρώπα from the cities in the form of their surrender and so were themselves bound by the χάρις-debt to seek an effective method of repayment⁸⁸.

The interesting implication of the letter to Herakleia comes when it is juxtaposed to that sent to Prousius of Bithynia around the same time, promising not to diminish in any way his principate or holdings should he choose to side with Rome; the Scipiones cited a series of examples of princes friendly to Rome to corroborate this⁸⁹. Equally relevant are the words of the Rhodians in the post-Magnesia deliberations, claiming their due reward for their political and military support during the recent wars under the relationship of χάρις which was consequently established; as with Herakleia and Kolophon, Rome was in debt for their services, and payment here was to be in the form of tribute from and tutelage of those cities within the Rhodian sphere of influence⁹⁰. What this reveals is the true substance of the difference between Flamininus and Scipio in the fulfilment of their policies towards Greece. For the former had created a considerable debt amongst the individual cities of Greece both by giving them their freedom and by settling their affairs; the relationship was a simple, two-tier affair between benefactor and recipient, patron and client. Yet the Scipiones reaped the whirlwind of this φιλοδοξία; as events developed, Flamininus' χάρις was repaid with interest, particularly by those allies and friends whose interests were

not affected by the settlement of 195/4. The major problem for the brothers was their inheritance of Flaminius' promises of liberation, which they needed to transfer to the territories of their allies; yet if they fulfilled those promises, then they would diminish the properties of the very powers who were supporting them. What the letters to Kolophon and Herakleia-Latmos, alongside that to Prouusias, reveal is how they interpreted this problem. For they were swift to reward those who showed their sympathy to Rome, in a construct similar to that of Flaminius, so long as the context was right. Yet in other cases, they were almost compelled by their debt to construct a three-storey vertical relationship, wherein they themselves dealt with allied princes and powers, who in turn dealt with their own spheres of influence on Rome's behalf. To Ferrary, this was true *Realpolitik*; the Scipiones were faced with a much more complicated situation than was Flaminius, wherein their repayment of their debt sacrificed some of the principles of their predecessor whilst losing none of the stability of his settlement.

"La *philodoxia* avait pu tempérer les considérations de pure *Realpolitik*, mais les Romains n'étaient pas prêts, et beaucoup moins encore en 189 qu'en 196, à oublier totalement ces dernières pour ne considérer que la première"⁹¹.

This leaves the dedication at Delphi, a statue base inscribed as the gift to Apollo of P. Cornelius P.f. The identification of this with Scipio is, as Daux says, "séduisante et vraisemblable, mais...étant donné le nombre des Cornélii, hypothétique"; for there is no indication of familial, no statement of rank⁹². Yet it is likely that the identification is valid; the Scipiones arrived in Greece in April 190 at Amphissa, from where it was only 10½ km to Delphi⁹³. Their short stay in

Central Greece surely required a visit to Delphi, marked by this almost anonymous and unostentatious offering. Yet Polybios stresses that Aitolia was not a concern of the Scipiones; their object was the war in Asia⁹⁴. That this was the case, and that the offering at Delphi was so low-key, suggests that Africanus tacitly acknowledged the precedence of Flamininus and his successor Glabrio in this sphere; there was more mileage in Delos for the development and propagation of his particular eastern intent.

What we have seen, then, is the demolition of the seam that apparently divided Flamininus and Scipio into their respective theatres of Central Greece and Asia Minor. For the nature and timing of Flamininus' dedication at Delos suggests that he knew well what would be the sequel to his settlement; the verses on his offerings prepared the ground and provided a context inside which the Greeks could approach Rome, and so facilitated Scipio's assumption of his mantle in the east⁹⁵. This in turn allowed a succession of Roman magistrates to follow the line into the Eastern Aigaian until Scipio was able to define the nature of the 189 settlement as much as Flamininus had defined the 196 one. That the Delphoi and the Thessalians submitted their cases to Flamininus in 189, however, suggests that the spheres of influence of the two generals did exist; an assessment of the Italian presence at Delphi after 195 will bring out the truth of this and the full impact of Flamininus' dedication there. Yet the point must surely be that, whatever delineation is imposed upon those spheres, they cannot but have been mutually interdependent.

(iii). DELPHI.

Once again, in the second century, the weight of evidence for the presence of Italians and Sicilians in Greece comes from Delphi, in the shape of a catalogue of *proxenoi* stretching from 197 to 170, and a comprehensive *thearodokos* list roughly dated to the first quarter of the century. The scarcity of subsidiary evidence does not seem to be a problem; for the *proxenoi* at least, it seems that all grants in this period were recorded in this catalogue, as the individual grants which also survive can demonstrate. From this evidence can be divined the developments of the relations between Rome, her allies and the sanctuary, most especially in the aftermath of the collapse of Romano-Aitolian relations. For this is a period in which Daux sees Rome progressing in stature from the nervous applicant of the Second Punic War to the moral guardian of Delphi and Greece, all in the space of twenty-five years¹. Further, Rawson opines that Rome's subsequent neglect of the sanctuary and preference for her own, Etruscan methods of divination were in some way responsible for the decline of Delphi². We must assess to what degree these judgments are borne out by the ground evidence, and what effects the advance of Rome and the decline of Aitolia had on the traffic between their respective dependents.

Let us begin with the catalogue of *proxenoi*³. In this, it is noticeable that the absence of Roman honorands which marked the entire third century continued to 194 and so included the whole of the Second Makedonian War and its aftermath; the only hint of any Roman impact is

the statue head of Flamininus which may date to the statue-fever of 196, but equally possibly to a later date⁴. Delphi's reticence is open to interpretation: perhaps it reflected the frosty mood of the Aitolians, keen to press their own role at Kynoskephalai and wounded by Flamininus' hostility around the negotiating table⁵; perhaps it reflected the absence of westerners from the sanctuary. It was the Massaliotes who were the first of Rome's allies to appear in the catalogue, in a fourfold grant dated 196/5 that was echoed in the *theorodokos* list⁶. We know that when a Roman embassy visited Delphi in 394, they made their dedication in the Massaliote treasury; we also know that as recently as 196, the Lampsakenes saw their kinship with the Massaliotes as a valid introduction to Rome⁷. The intimation that Delphi followed up this initiative by the recognition of Massalia as an important hinge between Greece and Rome might well reflect well upon the following, and also upon the comparative status of the likes of Syracuse and Tarentum; a free and equal ally might be a better medium for Greeks seeking Rome than might a reduced, subservient one. The suggestion, then, that Delphi followed Rome's example of 201/0 in seeking a new context for the trans-Adriatic relationship is one which should be borne very much in mind.

Q. Veturius Q. f. Rhomaios

Blattus son of Maturus of Canusium. Granted *proxenia* in the archonship of Diodoros, Jan-Jul. 194. As with all the grants in the catalogue, no subsidiary privileges are recorded; unless separate inscriptions survive, as for Lepidus below, the assumption is that these were standard. The identification of Veturius is from the Greek Ῥομαιος,

strictly *Votorios* and so *Veturius*; it is clear that the Greeks had trouble with names of this nature, as the recording of *Valerius Muttines* and *Volceius* demonstrate⁹. As for *Blattus*, there was a celebrated *Blatius*, a pro-Roman from *Salapia*, *Iapygia*, who fought to save his town from *Carthage*; the numerous Latin *Blassi*, *Blassii*, *Blattii* and *Blasti* do not, however, appear to be related to this Messapian *Blattus*⁹.

As aforementioned, *Dittenberger* and *Flacelière* conjectured that these two were envoys of *Flamininus*, perhaps concerned with the dedication of his offerings¹⁰. That there should be any doubt about this fulfils the dictum of *Colin*: "à Delphes, parmi les Romains qui y sont cités on rencontre à la fois des personnages officiels et de simples trafiquants. La distinction n'est pas toujours sûre entre eux..."¹¹. Our working assumption has been that of *Dittenberger* and *Flacelière*; yet it is not an automatic conclusion to draw that, since there are Romans at *Delphi* in 195/4 and *Flamininus* made a dedication around that time, the two are inextricably related. It might be useful, then, to explore other aspects of the grants.

What the timing and nature of the honours suggest is that the *Delphoi* held *Veturius* to be of sufficient status to represent their interests at *Rome*. For the grant was made on the eve of *Rome's* evacuation of *Greece*, when all was settled under the patronage of *Flamininus*; all, that is, except *Aitolia*, whose lingering claims to super-power status had received short shrift from the general. What the honours to *Veturius* surely represent is *Delphian* recognition of the

status quo, that the Aitolian star was in terminal decline and the Roman one was in the ascendant; time to find a friend in the city, a route paved by their recognition of the Massaliotes a year earlier. That Veturius was suitable can be inferred from his possible relationship to the Veturii Philones, prominent in Rome at this time; although the magistrates from the family are Lucii and Tiberii, this need not exclude the Quinti from the ranks¹². Further, Starr sees the adoption of the cognomen as an indication of philhellenism; even better for Delphi¹³.

Blattus would have made an ideal companion for Veturius given his origins in the bilingual, Greek-orientated Canusium. The city had well-attested contacts with the east, based largely on the wool trade associated with much of surrounding Apulia; it was also a staunch ally of Rome, having remained loyal throughout the Second Punic War, and an important staging post on the Appian Way¹⁴. For the purposes of Flamininus' embassy, if such it was, Blattus would present a similar aspect to the Massaliotes, a Greek-speaking Italian who could bear witness to the benefits of the Roman alliance¹⁵. Thus by honouring him, the Delphoi saw their relationship with Rome presented via a suitable medium, that of a free and equal ally rather than via the subdued Italiote-Greeks. They also spread the scope of their connections with Rome's allies in a way that bound them closer to Rome herself by the multiplication of mutual interests; at the same time, these interests were different from those which had brought Rome into alliance with Aitolia.

For Rome, then, the significance of these two grants lies in Foucart's observation: "celui qui dominait dans la ville (de Delphes) n'y gagnait aucune puissance réelle, mais il paraissait montrer qu'il était le maître de la Grèce"¹⁶. For Delphi, Flacelière's judgment:

"il ne faisait donc pas de doute que, si la lutte qui s'annonçait entre Rome et l'Aitolie venait à éclater, la ville sainte n'aurait rien à perdre et probablement tout à gagner, à la défaite de ses maîtres actuels"¹⁷.

The shift from old masters to new thus began now, in 195/4.

M'. Acilius Glabrio. Honoured with an equestrian statue; author of a letter to the Delphoi concerning his settlement of their affairs, and dedicant in the sanctuary. Glabrio's intervention is well documented, and summed up thus by Daux:

"en 191, à la suite de l'intervention romaine, la ville, la sanctuaire et l'Amphictionie échappent à l'hégémonie étolienne...au moment où l'armée de M'. Acilius s'établit dans la Grèce centrale, après la victoire des Thermopyles, les faits sont acquis, les causes n'important plus"¹⁸.

The town appears to have been a priority issue for him, and his dealings there were swift, considered and comprehensive. The main force of this was to rid the town of the presence of those who had infiltrated her territory during the period of Aitolian domination to act as tax-paying metics but who had gradually accumulated more and more privileges until they held effective *isopoliteia*; the majority of these were from Western Lokris. Since the arbitration of an Aitolian *epimeletes* had merely exacerbated the situation, Glabrio now handed jurisdiction of such cases regarding foreigners back to the Delphoi themselves, with a tribunal being established to deal with this first set of evictions. He also seems to establish a lodging-house for Roman citizens, such as was

found at Sparta somewhat later; it is obvious that Glabrio foresaw sufficient traffic between Rome and Delphi to warrant the provision of such a facility¹⁹. He seems to speak some high-minded words concerning the autonomy of the town, particularly in face of the Thessalians, but these are unfortunately lost.

Given that Glabrio freed the town and the sanctuary in such a way, and that the Delphoi themselves can be seen to have invited this since 194, it is hardly surprising that the general was accorded this statue by the town. The impression is compounded if Plutarch is correct concerning his having not only spared the sanctuary, but also greatly added to it. Guarducci acknowledges that there is no subsidiary evidence to support this, but sees no reason to doubt it²⁰. His motivation was straightforward; he realised the obvious, that Delphi did indeed hold the key to the heart of Greece, and that she must be freed from the hostile Aitolian influence. The senate's sympathy with his realisation is shown by their confirmation of his deeds and their efforts to take revenge on the murderers of the Delphian envoys who conveyed this news from Rome. For Spurius Postumius penned letters both to the Delphoi and to the Amphiktyony confirming Delphi's status of ἀσυλία, αὐτονομία, ἐλευθερία and ἀνεισφορία, and her rights to govern herself and to possess the sanctuary and the sacred harbour²¹. When this initial letter was lost when the envoys were murdered, Livius Salinator wrote a further letter condemning the murderers, enjoining Fulvius Nobilior to track them down, and confirming the right of the Delphoi to eject any undesirables from their town²². He also made reference to the festival

held by the Delphoi ὑπὲρ ῥωμαίων, that is, the Rhomaia; if there is any doubt that the Delphoi were earnest in their acceptance of the inevitable and their quest for Rome's favour, then this gesture must remove it²³. For now, the garden could not be rosier for the sanctuary and its new protectors; to Ferrary, Glabrio's was "un acte non pas de clémence mais de pure munificence"²⁴.

Salsius Tagyllius son of Tagilus of Argyrippa

C. Statorius C.f. of Brundisium. Granted *proxenia* in the archonship of Phainis, Jan-Jul 190. Dittenberger saw most problems in the name of the Argyrippan, since Salsius is unknown in Apulia and paralleled only by Salisius or Sallius; the orthographical variant, however, is not unworkable²⁵. The origin of the name Tagyllius is utterly obscure, the only clues being the place Tagylis on the North African costline and an allusive inscription from Luceria²⁶. Statorius is better attested, there being a legate of that name in Scipio's army who was seconded to Syphax in 213 to instruct the Numidians in Roman military tactics²⁷.

Dittenberger's pronouncement on these two was that "fortasse hi Romani cum M'. Acilio consule liberatore Delphorum qui hoc tempore ibi versabatur, huc pervenerunt". Circumstantially, again, he may be correct; yet again this does not explain why the Delphoi chose to honour apparently insignificant members of Glabrio's army. There is, of course, the potential of these men to have performed unrecorded services to the town or to the sanctuary; the commercial nature of their cities of origin should be noted in this consideration. Perhaps the two were legal

experts, seconded by Glabrio to assist in the complex eviction and resettlement programme that he had initiated in Delphi²⁹. These two men, springing from predominantly Greek cities, would be well-versed in Greek law and so able to oversee the dealings of the Delphic tribunal from Glabrio's point of view; the potential is there, yet cannot be proven. As for their being civic representatives of their respective states, Daux voiced very real doubts over whether the Amphiktyony could have been reconstituted in 190 for the holding of the Pythia²⁹. However, this does not rule out the chance of a visitation, perhaps for the oracle or for the Rhomaia³⁰.

Yet again, it is the cities of provenance that seem more significant. Brundisium's loyalty to Rome and her strategical value in trans-Adriatic affairs was unquestioned and, whilst Argyrippa did temporarily succumb to the wiles of Hannibal in the aftermath of Cannae, this was a unpopular aberration on the urging of one man and she was otherwise a worthy and valued ally³¹. Both were important trading centres in the south-east of Italy. Brundisium especially was an almost inevitable disembarkation point for traffic to Greece, in which case the Delphoi would no doubt have been keen to secure favour in such a crucial hinge. Similarly, their own envoys en route to Rome in 189 would benefit both from this friendship and indeed from Salsius', if they were to travel by the former of Strabo's two routes from Brundisium to Beneventum on their way to Campania and Rome³². But more importantly, they were new friends for Delphi, in much the same way as was Canusium; so they added to the fresh establishment of mutual interests with Rome,

parallel to those which had preceded the First Illyrian War and the Aitolian alliance.

Orthon son of Zopyros of Rhegium

M. Valerius Muttines and his sons Publius, Caius, Marcus and Quintus, Rhomaioi

Leontis son of Sosikrates of Agrigentum. Granted *proxenia* in the archonship of Kallikrates, Jul-Dec 190. Of the three grants, only the Valerii admit positive identification; the two Greeks could fall on either side of Colin's dilemma³³. Muttines had been a rogue Hannibalic commander in Sicily during the Second Punic War in charge of a plunderous force of Numidians who wreaked havoc against Rome's allies in operations conducted out of Agrigentum. However, once Hanno had demoted him out of jealousy at his success, he promptly betrayed Agrigentum to Laevinus, whereafter the other recalcitrant Sicilian states immediately capitulated. Consequent to this good deed, Muttines was honoured with Roman citizenship under the auspices of Laevinus (hence the adopted gentilicial here) and remained in Sicily thereafter as a cavalry commander under Messalla³⁴.

Dittenberger's explanation of Muttines' presence this time has documentary support:

"a. 190 in exercitu L. Scipionis ad Amphissam versantis equitibus Numidis praeerat ac tunc ei una cum filiis (ex quibus unus sub patris imperio militans apud Livium commemoratur) Delphi proxeniam decreverunt (in reditu exercitus ex Asia a. 188 rem bene gessit in Thracia, L. XXXVIII.41.12ff.)"³⁵.

That his sons are all mentioned by name implies that they were all there and not merely the one mentioned by Livy; otherwise they were

surely covered by the formulae (αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑγγονοῖς) suppressed in the catalogue. The motivation for the honours is not immediately obvious; Muttines did not demand recognition by seniority over any of the other Roman military commanders in Greece at the time, in which case the argument concerning an unrecorded service is a strong one. Yet it surely remained true that the sanctuary had a considerable appeal for the casual pilgrim, for all the protestations of Daux that the town was "ni une place de commerce ni un centre intellectuel"³⁶. A pilgrim bearing such impressive connections as the client of Laevinus would have been a big fish for the Delphoi to net.

There is a further possibility for Muttines, by connection with Leontis and perhaps also Orthon. There is a strong case for these two being conscripts to the Roman army who were pursuing established lines of Greek religious sympathy; but again this does not establish a reason for their honours. Although Rhegium had supplied a steady stream of traffic across the Adriatic in the fourth century, she left no such traces in the third; despite her experiences under the Mamertines, this is largely inexplicable³⁷. However, her loyalty during the Second Punic War was not unrewarded by Rome; her reappearance in Greece, especially at Delphi, in the person of Orthon fits well into the pattern of a parallel line of interests being established from Delphi to Rome³⁸. It is possible that Orthon and Leontis were official representatives of their respective states, in which case Muttines' presence might be further clarified. For his role in the liberation/betrayal of Agrigentum to the Romans gave him definite ties with the city, not least with the

pro-Romans who would benefit from that and who would now be the governing party³⁹. It is a safe assumption that Leontis was a member of this ensemble; perhaps he either introduced Muttines to Delphi when he arrived on his civic business, or travelled for security under Muttines' auspices, or both. Either way, he presented the right profile for the Delphoi, who would see him as an opportunity to clarify their links with Agrigentum in an appropriately pro-Roman context. There is a possibility that these men were coincidental with the Rhomaia, perhaps more so than for those honorands mentioned above⁴⁰.

L. Acilius Caesonis f. Rhomaios

M. Aemilius Lepidus Rhomaios

Lykos son of Phileas of Tarentum. Granted *proxenia* in the archonship of Xenon, Jan-Jul 188. For Lepidus, there survives a full and independent decree recording the honours, which include *euergesia*, *promanteia*, [*prodikia*, *ateleia*], *asylia*, *proedria* and other associated privileges; the decree was apparently proposed by Herys and Demosthenes, the Delphian envoys to Rome in mid-late 189⁴¹. Pomtow also suggests that an extremely fragmentary statue base was the offering of Lepidus, either as the youngest member of Sempronius' embassy in 200 or now in 188 to mark his *proxenia*. However, Pomtow admits that it could equally be L. Aemilius Regillus who is the subject, as *praetor classis* in 190; since to our eyes, it need not be any particular kind of Aemilius, but is only certainly an M.f., the point should not be pressed⁴².

The consensus is that the honorand Lepidus is indeed the ambassador

of 200, the consul of 187⁴³. Dittenberger believes that he and Acilius were honoured for the same reasons as Flamininus, that is, for services rendered to the Delphian envoys in 189; support for this comes from the restoration of the proposers of Lepidus' honours, that is, those same envoys. Dittenberger also suggests that Lepidus was perhaps honoured for his notable opposition to Fulvius Nobilior, concurrently besieging Kephallenia⁴⁴. Despite the evidence provided by the proposers of the decree, it is possible that the honours might equally relate to the son of the consul of 187, who was prefect of the camp at Magnesia in 190⁴⁵. On his return in 189, it would not have taken him far out of his way to make a dedication at Delphi; that he was the son of his father would have been sufficient reason for honours. However, probability does suggest that the honorand was Lepidus Senior. His role on the embassy of 200 made his face familiar to many Greek confederacies and monarchs, overtly the Athamanians, Epirotes, Aitolians, Achaians, Athenians and Rhodians. His supposed regency of the young Epiphanes in Alexandria and his subsequent praetorship in Sicily from 191-0 meant that, by the time he returned to Rome in late 190 to stand for office, the majority of his diplomatic career had been spent in hellenistic circles. Of all the senators that the Delphoi could have approached in 189, Flamininus apart, Lepidus was perhaps the obvious candidate for the affections of the envoys. It is interesting, then, to note the contrast between Delphi and Delos in 189/8. Delos sought to secure the favour of Scipio Africanus, already their *proxenos*, by the grant of a crown in advance of their embassy⁴⁶; the Delphoi approached those whom they knew to be favourable to their cause, but conferred honours only when good services

had been performed on their behalf. Delos sought the favour of only one man, reliant on his strength of position within the senate; by adding Lepidus and Acilius to Flamininus and Glabrio, the Delphoi constructed an influential cabal of friends to represent their interests within the senate.

The only observation Dittenberger offered for Acilius was that he was the father of the consul of 150, M'. Acilius L.f. K.n. Balbus. This was picked up by Badian, who pointed out the young Acilius' collegality in 150 with the son of Flamininus. He traced the connection back through these synchronous honours of 188, through the fathers of the honorands, T. Quinctius and K. Acilius, to the offspring of the consul of 271, Caeso Quinctius Claudus; these offspring were L. Quinctius and a Quinctia who married an Acilius⁴⁷. Although this rests heavily on the unusualness of the praenomen Kaeso, it is not unworkable. Thus the Acilius of 188 was a cousin of Flamininus; the suggestion that he assisted Flamininus in his treatment of the Delphian envoys gains strength accordingly. It is perhaps also possible that he was related at some distance to M'. Acilius Glabrio; if not, it is not impossible that the Delphoi believed him to be. Thus in reality or in the conception of Delphi, Acilius built an important bridge between the two great benefactors of Central Greece⁴⁸.

Information concerning Lykos revolves more around his father than around the honorand himself. According to Livy, Phileas was the Tarentine ambassador to Rome who hastened on the advent of the Tarentine

secession by inducing the escape of both Tarentine and Thurian hostages; when these were recaptured at Tarracina and summarily executed back in Rome, a conspiracy of Tarentine noblemen opened the city to Hannibal⁴⁹. Despite this aberration on his father's part, Lykos was perhaps in a similar position in Rome's favour; he was undoubtedly prominent in the reconstituted Tarentine state. His honours perhaps also reflect on the route chosen by the second embassy of 189, via the Appian Way and so also Tarentum⁵⁰. If so, this pragmatism explains the anomaly of this reiteration of an old channel of communication with Rome by the Delphoi; they were still seeking fresh conduits in Rome's Italian allies, but Lykos' honours were performance-related and thus justifiable.

Charopinas son of Antallos, Eudoxos son of Aischron of Velia. Granted *proxenia* in the archonship of Kleodamos, Jul-Dec 188. These men are, quite simply, obscure. They coincide with no festival, and so cannot be civic representatives or agonistic competitors. They may have been with the tail-end of the Roman army in Greece as conscripts of greater or lesser seniority. It is equally possible that they came to Delphi to consult the oracle, or as businessmen seeking to fill the void created by the expulsion of the Lokrian metics. Yet again they provided the Delphoi with a chance to establish links with a member of Rome's confederacy so as to tighten the bonds between them. In the case of Velia, a Greek foundation, this did not stretch the point too far⁵¹.

By the end of the war in Greece in 187, Delphi was in a position where she could believe that the liberation she had sought since 194 was

not only achieved, but had been securely bolstered by the solicitation of the favours of the influential within Rome herself, and of those of her allies who were untainted by the previous associations that had brought about the Aitolian alliance of 212/1. She was connected to both the Scipionian and the Flaminian circles at Rome, and had Glabrio's assurance that he would defend her αὐτονομία even against the incursions of the Thessalians. This general intent had been supported by a formal *senatus consultum* and also by Livius Salinator's formulaic promise always to be the author of some good to Delphi and to respect those of a similar purpose. Yet as soon as the Romans left, the Pythia of 186 saw a combined Thessalo-Athenian attempt to hijack the Amphiktyony, an attempt which was referred to Rome.

The evidence for this is in the form of an honorific decree issued by the Amphiktyony for Nikostratos of Thessaly in 184⁵². As *hieromnemon* of the Thessalian confederacy, he presided over the reconstituted Amphiktyony at the Pythia of 186, an assembly which he coordinated with the representatives of Athens. Having conducted the sacrifices for the Amphiktyony at the festival, he was then sent to Rome by the council along with Menedemos of Athens to negotiate περὶ ὧν εἶχεν τὰς ἐντολάς. This achieved, he returned to address the Delphoi at the Pylaia of 184; he bade them retain their goodwill towards the Greeks, make no deal contrary to the ancient assessment of affairs and submit to the will of the Amphiktyony. The key words are those concerned with the states whom Nikostratos represents, variously described as τῶν αὐτονομῶν ἔθνων καὶ δημοκρατουμένων πολεῶν and τοῖς αἰρουμένοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ

δημοκρατίαν. As an adjunct to this decree, there is a fragmentary letter of a Roman magistrate addressed to the Delphoi and concerned with those things granted to πᾶσι τοῖς δημοκρατουμένοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

Giovannini believes that the senate wanted from Nikostratos an undertaking that the Amphiktyony would henceforth be rid of Aitolian influence and so orientated towards Rome. Nikostratos returned to Greece in the knowledge that, if he could define the scope of the Amphiktyony thus, then Rome would sanction their resumption of control over the sacred affairs of Delphi. Thus the terminology of the decree was designed to demonstrate accordance with Rome's preferences as outlined in the settlements of 196 and 189; the freedom, autonomy and democracy referred to was that granted by Rome. The magisterial letter reflects the success of this demonstration and the subsequent return of control of Delphi to the council⁵³. Although the issue in 185/4 depended on the Amphiktyony revising their position, the principle of Nikostratos' approach to the senate seems to represent the backlash of Scipio's developmental settlement in Asia Minor, as it subsequently applied to that of Flamininus in Central Greece⁵⁴. Thus Nikostratos came to Rome as a client to present Thessaly's claims to patronage of the Amphiktyony, whose client in turn was Delphi; this is Flamininus' construct governed by Scipio's principles, the three-tier system of vertical χάρις invading the area of the two-tier system⁵⁴. The response of the senate cut across the obligations of those such as Glabrio, Flamininus and Aemilius Lepidus to the Delphoi. It is probable that the majority were indifferent to such localised sensitivities once Greece had been settled

to their liking; yet the theory that political expediency coincided with senatorial factionalism should not be rejected out of hand⁵⁵.

It is likely that the unassigned letter of a Licinius, too fragmentary to be of much assistance, but dated tentatively to 186 and the praetorship of M. Licinius Lucullus, is connected with this affair⁵⁶. The issue, the Amphiktyonic *χρηρία* is obscure, but surely means that Rome did not intend to interfere with the workings of the league ([οὐ]τε ἀφαιρῆσθαι οὔτε δίδοναι νομίζομε[ν] δεῖν). This provides a further clue to the senatorial attitude; it is one of delegation and assumed indifference, the main point being that Rome must be a point of reference for consultation in all such matters. Whatever the machinations between those for and against behind the scenes, this was the image conveyed to the Greeks⁵⁷. The victims of this were the Delphoi. They consequently fell silent in regard of Roman and Italian honorands and once more revealed sympathy towards the emasculated Aitolians⁵⁸. Was this silence merely a reflection of the Roman absence from Greece hereafter, or is it rather a mark of disgust at their betrayal by those whom they trusted ?

Dionysios son of Legetes of Velia. Granted *proxenia* in the archonship of Euangelos, Jul-Dec 179; also listed as *thearodokos* in the great catalogue discussed below. As one of the few *thearodokoi* to be either independently identified or granted *proxenia*, Dionysios stands with the four aforementioned Massaliotes as a indication of Delphi's policy and of the date of the *thearodokos* list⁵⁹. The *proxenia* grant is seen by

Nachtergaeel to be entirely related to the *thearodokeia* for the Pythia and Soteria; this appears to be correct⁶⁰. What is interesting is that Dionysios, the first to rupture the silence of the Delphoi over the west, had his honours inscribed on the base of the statue of Glabrio⁶¹. Perhaps there is ironic point in this; the Delphoi were prepared to continue their relationship with Italy, but only on the resurrection of the spirit of Glabrio's promise. Thus although Dionysios deserved his status as a worthy and consistent pilgrim, the grant was used by Delphi to make political capital.

Thearodokos list from Delphi; dated to the first quarter of the second century. Although fragmentary and the subject of considerable restoration which still cannot plug all the lacunae, this list is invaluable evidence for those states whom Delphi still considered friends (or *vice versa*) after the judgment of 185/4 and the subsequent silence in trans-Adriatic honours⁶². This particular part of the list outlines the route of the *theoroi* by recording the places in which they made representations and were accepted in order of geographical progression. Thus they crossed from Kerkyra and made first call at Tarentum before following the coastline to Heraclea, Petelia, Locri, the unknown Taisia⁶³ and Rhegium. Thence they crossed to Messana and headed south-east via Abacaenum, Tyndaris, Tauromenium and then inland to Aetna and Centuripa before returning to Catana; they proceeded clockwise around the coast to Syracuse, Helorus, Tyracium, Camerina, Hybla, the obscure Ergetium, Noai and Assorus and then to four places which cannot be restored⁶⁴. They are found again at Alaesa and Thermum before taking

ship to Lipara, whereafter they are lost for the last time.

That this should be the cut-off point is most disappointing; that Dionysios of Velia and the Massaliotes are listed suggests that this or another *theoria* did indeed penetrate further north, although the degree of their success can only be estimated⁶⁵. Indeed, Nachtergaeel's assumption is that the likes of Argyrippa, Canusium and Brundisium, holders of pre-existing relations with Delphi, were the province of another *theoria*, and so lie in one of the list's lacunae⁶⁶. Yet the *argumentum e silentio* might go either way. The list only recorded visitations which were successful in securing a favourable reception; these three cities might have snubbed the *theoroi*. Of the other Greek cities, Metapontum was now so much *ager publicus* following its sack by Hannibal⁶⁷, whilst the Latin colony at Thurii and the Roman colony at Croton presumably offered no encouragement if the *theoroi* stopped there⁶⁸. Rhegium, notable amongst those approached during the Syrian War, remained pious, as did the majority of the *liberae atque immunes* in Sicily alongside those who were *foederatae* (Centuripae on the one hand, Messana and Tauromenium on the other); since Agrigentum lies in the lacuna, we must suspend judgment on her case, although Manganaro believes that the *theoroi* cut across country and so left the city to the west of their route⁶⁹. Of the longstanding third century links, Gela has completely disappeared, whilst the Lipari link reflects well upon the story of the Roman embassy of 394 and the Liparean respect for their destination⁷⁰.

The list demonstrates that, although Delphi's range of contacts in the Greek cities of Southern Italy and Sicily had suffered somewhat during the Second Punic War and its political aftermath, the sanctuary still retained the sympathy of a good many western states. These relationships continued independently of that between Rome and Delphi or Rome and the Amphiktyony; if the Delphoi held a grudge against Rome for her decision of 184, they were not about to commit suicide by extending that grudge to the allies of Rome who presented a valuable attendance at their festivals. That being the case, it seems probable that the silence that followed the rash of western grants from Delphi was more the result of lack of exposure to new states and powerful benefactors than it was to any fit of pique at the senate's decision⁷¹. It is fair to assume that the Delphoi were disappointed; yet they had been pawns in someone else's game for too long to harbour any genuine or lasting hostility. The next game was that of Perseus. Represented on the Amphiktyony in 178, he chose the sanctuary as the site of his declaration of amnesty and property restorations for debtors and of his symbolic sacrifice of 174⁷².

Nikandros son of Menekrates Rhomaïos. Granted *proxenia*, with *enktesis*, during the archonship of Aiakides, Jan-Jul 172⁷³. Both the timingⁿg of the grant and the identity of the honorand appear to be crucial. This six-month period was catalytic in the initiation of the Third Makedonian War, in that it brought Eumenes to the senate with his complaints, his return via Delphi and the plot on his life, and C. Valerius Laevinus back to Rome with the plotters and the final denunciation of Perseus⁷⁴.

That the Delphoi chose to honour a Roman citizen of Greek origin in the midst of such a maelstrom cannot but be significant; as in 194, they went directly against the orientation of the Amphiktyony in so doing. For it was less than two years since Perseus dedicated the pillars at Delphi which Aemilius Paullus was to transform into his victory monument, whilst the votes and support accorded to the king on the council show that there was a definite sympathy towards Makedon⁷⁶. For Delphi to make such a departure during such a tense period shows that they were aware of the strength of the currents emanating from Rome, but also that they were alive to the significance of their own position within Greece.

The senate had been concerned with the advance of Perseus since 178. Significant embassies had travelled the well-worn routes to Makedon, Aitolia, Krete, Rhodes, Thessaly, Perrhaebia, Achaia, Egypt, Asia and the islands and, finally, to all of Central Greece in 172⁷⁶. The general effect of these was to compose factional strife in such a way as would favour Rome or, if there was only opposition to Rome, to initiate factional strife which could then be settled in this way⁷⁷. It seems probable that Nikandros was a junior member of one of these embassies, perhaps that of Valerius Laevinus; perhaps he was a legal expert who could assist in the settlement of the debt crises being suffered especially in Aitolia, Thessaly and Perrhaebia, or perhaps he was included in the delegations for the propaganda value of his dual nationality. Yet it is with Eumenes that the motivation of Nikandros' honours may well lie. For, given the stance of the Amphiktyony and the

obvious disapproval of Rome as expressed by their ambassadors, it was extremely embarrassing for Delphi to find herself the site of a plot to murder Eumenes, with Perseus the instigator and one of her own citizens cited in Rome as accomplice⁷⁸. The obvious reaction was to make a sign of goodwill towards Rome to obviate the blame; hence this grant. Yet the Delphoi were not so panic-stricken as to seize upon the first Roman they found, who in this case was surely Valerius Laevinus. With typical deliberation, they picked out a Greek citizen of Rome; this demonstrated to the rest of Greece that the way forward was in cooperation with Rome, yet that the sanctuary was not advocating a slavish submission to the senate. This message was also directed at Rome, that they sought the senate's goodwill but not to the detriment of their own nationality. It is a most specific gesture under most specific circumstances, and is surely part of the procedure that demands the specific response from the senate.

For despite the underhand methods of some of her representatives, the senate were careful to launch or to continue the diplomatic offensive against Perseus even after her forces had crossed the Adriatic. This took the form of a letter addressed to the Amphiktyony, now commonly dated 171/0, outlining the complaints against Perseus; its similarity to the speech of Eumenes in Rome in 172, as expressed by Livy, is striking⁷⁹. Considerable restoration work reveals an appeal to τὸ δίκαιον and to ἐλευθερία, and the denunciation of Perseus' καταδούλωσις, ἀπόνοια and νεωτερισμός, his invocation of βάρβαροι and obstruction of alliances. The language here is emotive and propagandist,

harking back to the issues with which Flamininus both entered and left Greece in the 190s. That this was aimed at the Amphiktyony now in the early months of the war suggests that their attitude was softened, their sympathies ripe for exploitation by such an initiative; one of the most reliable outward signs of this swing were the Delphic honours to Nikandros. Thus the senate was content to employ the velvet glove of diplomatic compromise for those who would comply with her wishes and accept the validity of her stance; the Delphoi in turn were prepared to demonstrate compliance to encourage this approach in order to safeguard their own position, but not without a definite statement of that position.

Agatharchos son of Menon of Tauromenium. Granted *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and *proedria*, in Jul-Dec 168. Agatharchos, as with Hortensius and Nikostratos below, benefits from not being part of the catalogue used above, but has his own separate decree recorded in full. The influence of the man and his family in Tauromenium is known from IG XIV.421-6, which show him and his two sons as archons and a variety of other relatives as holders of sundry magisterial offices. The purpose of the grant is thus obvious, to secure a high-ranking foothold in Tauromenium in the aftermath of Pydna. Agatharchos' services to Delphi must remain obscure; it is unlikely that he was part of the Roman military effort in Greece if his son was of an age to be archon in the 160s, although it is not inconceivable that he was employed in some ambassadorial context⁸⁰.

L. Hortensius of Brundisium. Granted *proxenia*, *thearodokeia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* in all things and other privileges; dated Jul-Dec 168. Hortensius revived the links with Brundisium that were established with C. Statorius in 190, this time in a context of *thearodokeia*; although Brundisium is missing from the *thearodokos* list of the early second century, it seems probable that it was included in one of the lacunae, along with Ancona⁸¹. Thus Hortensius was surely part of Delphi's recovery act in Italy, a well-appointed advocate of her cause of sufficient resource to be able to entertain her *theoroi*; again, whether his prime *raison d'être* is military, diplomatic, agonistic or commercial can only be the subject of hypothesis.

Much interest surrounds the issue of this man's homonymity with the *praetor classis* of 170. Both Pomtow and Nachtergaele considered the possibility of kinship before rejecting it on the apparently certain grounds of the ethnic; in the absence of alternative evidence, this ought to be correct⁸².

Nikostratos son of Sotikos of Ancona. Granted *proxenia*, *thearodokeia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia* and other privileges of *proxenoi* and *evergetai* in 167. What the provenance of Nikostratos suggests is that Delphi was once again opening her horizons to all of Rome's allies and dependents; Nikostratos may represent a parallel expansion on behalf of those allies into the Greek world exposed by Rome's conquests. Further than that, we cannot say; the freeing of Delos might well have drawn a wave of interest across Greece from further

afield, especially from the trading cities of the Northern Adriatic which might equally have drawn a nod of recognition from the opportunistic Delphoi.

Our conclusions must be phrased in terms of the questions of Daux and Rawson with which we started. We have indeed seen how Rome recognised the primacy of Delphi in Greek thinking and so directed diplomatic efforts thither, especially when in direct conflict with the Aitolians. Yet the period prior to that shows only the dedications of Flamininus. The influence of the Aitolians was no doubt repressive in view of their grudge against Flamininus, and it was not until the general himself broke the ice that events gathered pace. Delphi herself seems then to have taken the initiative by approaching first Rome's allies the Massaliotes and then Rome herself, as early as 194. This was as much an acceptance of the inevitability of Rome's coming as an invitation to remove from the sanctuary the Aitolian dead wood. Glabrio's arrival was the fruition of Daux's forecast, and Delphi then set about placing all her eggs in the Roman basket. However, this confidence in the tutelage of the senate was based on a miscalculation of the intent of that body; Delphi was once more betrayed to the whim of the Amphiktyony after 185/4. Yet her presumed honorific reticence hereafter is undermined by her retention of admittedly diminished links with those Italians and Sicilians who had long been faithful to her god. In this, then, Rawson must be wrong; Delphi did not wax in the west in this period, but her influence undoubtedly continued to be strong amongst her traditional adherents to the extent that the sanctuary and

Amphiktyony still played an important part in the preliminaries to the Third Makedonian War, not least in the progression of Rome's diplomacy. In much the same way as Perseus used the sanctuary and council for the dissemination of his propaganda, Rome replied in kind, albeit not until she had established the basis of force majeure. Thus she revived the tutelage of sanctuary and sanctuary-goers which she had offered as early as 230 and reminded the council of the issues which the instigator Flamininus had represented, for which the χάρις now swung into their court. Delphi's role in this was again catalytic; long-suffering and practical, she again acknowledged inevitability and so changed horses one last time. The period ends with her again establishing new bonds with Rome via her allies; this was a gesture undoubtedly based on self-interest but hardly an indication of decline.

(iv). THESSALY.

It has been stressed above that Flamininus' liberation and reorganisation of Thessaly was born of a simple desire to hamstring Philip. It has also been mooted that the senatorial decision to commit the affairs of Delphi to a Thessalian-dominated Amphiktyony, contrary to the promises of Glabrio, was born of a majority desire for a policy of indirect control, a detached interventionism. Both of these theories involve a mark of favour being shown to Thessaly, but not for the sake of Thessaly. A full investigation of the depth of Romano-Thessalian relations is therefore necessary both to validate these conclusions and to rebuff the charge that the senate was defending pre-existing or nascent interests in the socio-economic affairs of Thessaly.

Such a charge might easily spring from Hatzfeld's conclusion that at Larisa, "il y existait au début du II^e siècle, une communauté d'Italiens"¹. This is based on an inscription from 191 in honour of Quinctus T.f. *Rhomaïos*²; according to Arvanitopoulos' restoration, the decree records the advance of Antiochos' army and the flight from Larisa of all the *τηβεννοφοροῦντες* save Quinctus, who remained and endured the siege until the town was relieved by Ap. Claudius³. The term *τηβεννοφοροῦντες* thus implies *togati*, a nickname for the Romans resident in the town derived from their peculiar dress; the intimation thence is that this was a sufficiently long-established community for it to have developed this place in Larisaian slang. Yet Arvanitopoulos admits that his restoration is hypothetical, that the phrase could as easily read

the τηβεννοφοροῦντες, besieging the town; thus they would be soldiers of Antiochos, similarly distinguishable by their mode of dress⁴. This seems by far the better restoration; it also removes the Italian community from Larisa and renders Quinctus in isolation. Thus he may well have been a merchant, as implied by the commercial nature of the honours he won (*proxenia*, *epigamia*, *enktesis*, *ateleia*, *asylia*). Yet he may equally have been commander of a detachment sent in advance by the praetor Baebius from his station in Epiros⁵, so as to bear comparison with the next man.

Sextus Orfidienus M. f. Rhomaios. Granted *proxenia*, *epigamia*, *enktesis*, *asphaleia* and other privileges at Chyretiai in 191. For Shackleton Bailey, the name stands comparison with Q. Salvius Salvidienus, who appears in literary sources as Q. Salvidienus Rufus, but on coins as Q. Salvius⁶. Syme wonders whether this represented a latinising of an alien gentilicium, or if Salvius was a cognomen; perhaps, alternatively, this was a Salvidienus adopted into the Salvii, whose gentilicium could not be satisfactorily adopted⁷. Parallel considerations might stand for Orfidienus, but with similar inconclusivity.

That this decree comes from Chyretiai, as does Flamininus' letter, may be a mere epigraphical coincidence, or it may reflect the enthusiasm with which this town in particular embraced the Roman cause. The town was sacked arbitrarily by the Aitolians in 200, "inopia praedae"⁸; given that vulnerability, liberation from Philip would create a pressing need for a new protector, which may account for her comparative prominence in

espousing Roman individuals. It is the idea of Arvanitopoulos that, far from being a merchant, Orfidienus was the commander of a skeleton garrison left in Chyretiai by Baebius on his march against Antiochos⁹; he was awarded *proxenia* rather than *euergesia* because of his unusually long stay there during Baebius' siege of Herakleia. This is surely accurate. The implications of the grant for the diplomatic contacts of Chyretiai, given the lowliness of Orfidienus' status, were surely not significant.

Demetrios son of Demetrios of Syracuse. Victor in the Eleutheria at Larisa, tentatively dated to 189; Demetrios won the *παιδας παγκρατιον*. It would be tempting to connect this Demetrios with that Syracusan Demetrios who represented Agrigentum and Melitaia at Rome around 211/0; but the name is not exactly rare, not to mention the chronological disparity¹⁰.

The Eleutheria seems to have been instituted at Larisa after the Isthmian declaration of Flamininus as a vivid symbol of Thessalian gratitude for the favours of the general¹¹. Larisa in particular followed her unbending allegiance to Rome during the Antiochos war by acting as temporary headquarters for Glabrio¹². That Demetrios is victorious in a boys' competition suggests that he was part of an independent delegation sent from Syracuse specifically for the games, since they rapidly became established as a major hellenistic event attracting competitors across the Aigaian from Italy to Asia Minor¹³. That being the case, the traffic travelling to Larisa for this festival

trod a significant route. For, whether Rome, Italy and Sicily had commercial interests in Larisa or not, there was definite traffic between the two points at definite regular intervals by presumably definite routes for a purpose that would stimulate commercial activity in the area, as all festivals did.

The delineation of the route to Larisa was both helped and hindered by the senate's decision to impose upon Ambrakia in 187 a state of *ateleia* for all Romans and *socii Latini nominis* who passed through the country. The decision was supposedly the result of a dispute between Fulvius Nobilior and Aemilius Lepidus, although the connection between cause and effect seems somewhat petty¹⁴. The strategic value of Ambrakia was considerable; it provided access to Central Greece for the harbourless Epiros, to Akarnania and to Thessaly via Athamania and Gomphi. The opening of the latter route was an obvious boon to the traveller; the alternatives, via Itea and Amphiassa to Thermopylai, or by sea to the Isthmus and then north through the Euripos, were longer and more expensive¹⁵. Yet the route was only selectively opened to Romans and their closest allies; other travellers from the west would be liable to imposts that would make the route no more attractive than the alternatives. For the privileged few, then, the route to Thessaly would be relatively cheap and direct, whisked across Greece to the north of Delphi. This perhaps adds a further dimension to the picture of honorific reticence as displayed by the Delphoi after 188; they could not honour these men as they did not see them any more. However, the *theorodokos* list and the maintained contacts therein with the Greeks of

Southern Italy and Sicily suggests that these men continued to ply the route through Itea, close by the sanctuary. Thus there was a commercial as well as a political aspect to the post-188 silence; it was economically more viable for those who could to travel for free through Ambrakia, and so the consequent de-emphasis of Delphi was reflected in the partial decline of her *proxenia* list.

Thus, when Nikostratos the Thessalian went to Rome in 185/4, he could point to the senate as a definite influence over the developments in traffic to and from his country; for Flamininus had reorganised their economy and made a declaration that led to a festival that drew attested competitors, whilst Lepidus had sponsored a *senatus consultum* that facilitated a section of that traffic in its crossing of Greece. Yet both of these men were *proxenoi* of Delphi. This more than compensated for the draw that Chyretiai and Skotoussa in particular had on Flamininus, not to mention the fact that Delphi herself had honoured Praulos in 189/8 and Thrasylochos in 187/6; the honours to both of these Thessalian generals were blatant attempts to shore up Glabrio's promise by importuning the leaders of the would-be leaders of the Amphiktyony¹⁶. Nominally, however, it was higher considerations of political expediency that overrode these individual sympathies and handed Delphi back to the Amphiktyony so long as the council conformed to Rome's will. It remains to be assessed whether this was the full story.

The key to this is provided by the embassy of Q. Caecilius Metellus, M. Baebius Tamphilus and Ti. Sempronius to Greece in 185, in answer to

the complaints of Eumenes, Thessaly, Perrhaebia and Athamania against the encroachment of Philip on their territories¹⁷. This information had caused great wrath in the senate against this restructuring of Philip's power base with a view to restarting the war with Rome; hence the departure of these envoys to demand the withdrawal of Philip's garrisons from the towns under issue. In the ensuing "trial" at Tempe, the Thessalians complained that their former possessions had been devastated by the king, in both property and manpower; further, their previously thriving maritime emporium at Phthiotic Thebes had been brought low by Philip's rival attraction at Demetrias¹⁸. The Thessalians got their wish and the advance of Philip was baulked, presumably leading to the revival of Phthiotic Thebes and the recovery of their possessions. Yet these private initiatives were entirely coincidental; Livy has already stated at this stage in his narrative that Ainos and Maroneia, due to their strategic value to Philip, were of prior concern to the senate, who "minus Thessalos curabant"¹⁹.

Thus it seems that the restoration of their former possessions and their acceptance as head of the reconstituted Amphiktyony was no mark of special favour for the Thessalians, but merely the result of being in the right place at the right time. The senate wished to weaken Philip both by stripping him of his acquisitions and by ranging against him a loose coalition of states favourable to herself in the form of the Amphiktyony. This overriding desire worked to the detriment of Delphi, but to the absolute advantage of Thessaly; that Lepidus' *senatus consultum* concerning Ambrakia worked similarly seems to be similarly

coincidental. This also explains the outcome of the pressures put on Flamininus, Glabrio and company by their association with these states; they were quite simply overridden by greater concerns²⁰. Thus the situation in 185/4 was born of Rome's political desires for her settlement in Greece rather than of any pre-existing individual sympathies with Italian interests in Thessaly. The state of affairs after that point as a result of that happy coincidence can only be assessed by a study of those Italian interests thereafter.

C. Flavius C.f. Apollonius and C. Flavius C.f. Bucco. Granted *proxenia*, *enktesis*, *epigamia*, *asphaleia* and other associated privileges at Gonnoi between 180 and 160. That the two are Roman citizens led Helly to dispute Arvanitopoullos' belief that they are freedmen attached to the imperial family²¹. He also noted that the transcription of the names, especially in the order of the patronymic, gave the secretary a few problems; once again, the spread of Latinity can be seen to be slow²². Although the former's cognomen is Greek, the latter's, "the chatterer", is pure Plautine Latin²³.

Both Helly and Arvanitopoullos believed that the Flavii were members of the community of *negotiatores*, either bankers or merchants, which was operating in Greece at this time. Although Hatzfeld's examples of this community are markedly later than this decree, this may well be the case. If the Flavii were of the Praenestine branch of the *gens*, then their passage to Thessaly would have been by the Ambrakiote route, their purpose facilitated by the commercial timocracy created by Flamininus

and their contribution to the local community deserving of such a reward²⁴. There is, however, nothing in the formulae to suggest this. It is improbable that they were arbiters summoned, or utilised according to their availability, to judge a local dispute. For, although such arbitration was frequent in the aftermath of Flamininus' settlement, decrees concerning such external arbiters were generally designated thus by the formulae²⁵.

Two unrestored *proxenia* decrees from Gonnoi. The first one, fragmentary in the extreme, awarded a gold crown along with *proxenia*, *euergesia*, citizenship, *enktesis* and further unrestored honours to a *Rhomaïos* who is generally assumed to be Flamininus²⁶. Given the unparalleled breadth of the privileges and honours, this seems probable and so the grant fits into the pattern of a grateful Thessaly embracing its benefactor to its bosom. In this case, Helly's dating criteria of post-202/1 might be further defined to between 196 and 188.

The second decree, retaining none of its honours and privileges, is concerned with a *Rhomaïos* variously restored as Galeius, Agaleius or Ataleius by various editors, with limited justification²⁷. The date, taken from the letter forms and the identity of the state treasurer, is put again between 180 and 160²⁸. Given this uncertainty of date and name, it is dangerous to venture much other than to remark upon the plurality of Roman citizens in Gonnoi during this period. For this, the site of the city in the vale of Tempe, with the natural and geographical

advantages noted by Helly, may well be significant as regards the potential routes for Romans across Greece²⁹.

M. L.f. Perpenna, M. C.f. Popillius, Q. M.f. Pactumeius and L. Plau. (?) Rhomaioi. Granted *proxenia* and associated privileges at Kierion in the early-mid second century. Although the formulae are laconic and uninformative, editors from Fougères onwards have identified Perpenna as the senatorial legate of 168, sent to Illyria with L. Petillius, imprisoned and then released by Genthios, whose surrender they then received³⁰. Fougères supports the antiquity of the inscription on the grounds of the letter forms and the absence of cognomina, although only the former carries any weight³¹. Popillius cannot be that legate to Makedon in 174 since the patronymic is C.f., not P.f., although there is little to prevent him being a son of the maverick consul of 172³². Although the Pactumeii boast no historical references, epigraphy suggests that they were a flourishing family of Campanian merchants who are later found on Delos³³. Kern suggests that the inscription be restored to include the offspring of Pactumeius and to render L. Plau. his brother, although the former is more likely than the latter³⁴. The orthography of L. Plau. seems too obscure or faulty for any valid conclusions to be drawn.

Since the consensus dating is the period of the Third Makedonian War, there is little doubt that these honours refer to the ambassador and his staff around 168. However, Kierion is some way off his recognised track to Illyria; the honours should come forward a couple of

years to 170 when Ap. Claudius Centho, Perpenna's commanding officer, was serving under the consul Hostilius in Epiros³⁵. Reasons for the detachment of this deputation then to Thessaly are potentially numerous and strategically-based; it is not impossible that they were seconded to the town to continue the work of Ap. Claudius Pulcher in 173 concerned with the arbitration of debt disputes³⁶. In such times of wavering between haves and have-nots, pro-Perseans and pro-Romans, such a gesture might have been as valid as the imposition of a garrison for the maintenance of loyalty inside a town as important as Kierion. For whilst residual sympathies were still pro-Roman in Thessaly, the socio-economic crisis was a powerful incentive for change. If this crisis could be settled and the status quo maintained, then there was reason for gratitude on the part of the ruling timocracy in the perpetuation of their influence as granted by Rome³⁷.

Cn. Octavius Cn.f. Rhomaios. Honoured at Echinus in 168/7. The dates are fixed by the precise reference to Octavius in the decree as *praetor classis*. Already honoured at Argos for his role in the embassy of 170/69 which declared Rome's philanthropic intent to much of Central Greece³⁸, Octavius received his statue in Echinus in the year that he captured Perseus at Samothrace during operations from a base at Histiaia Oreus³⁹. It is Robert's theory that the honours were in some way connected with his stay in Oreus⁴⁰. This fits well with Octavius' image; Paullus' interpreter at Amphipolis in 168/7, he also made a dedication at Delos and was honoured with a statue at Olympia, and seems to have used his time in Greece wisely and profitably in forging contacts which show

enterprise and philhellenism in equal shares⁴¹. Given this wide range of activity, it is unsurprising that Echinus should have chosen to commemorate his passing, not least at a time when a well-placed friend in Rome's camp might seem a valuable ally.

P. Sextilius. Letter to Trikkala, dating to the second century. That Sherck lets this go without comment reflects upon the difficulties of dealing with this most fragmentary of documents⁴². All that can be garnered is that Sextilius conveyed a *senatus consultum* to the Trikkalans, although the subject and date are impossible to restore.

It would be easy, then, to divide our characters in Thessaly between two categories; first, those military commanders whom it was deemed expedient to flatter, and second, those *negotiatores* who rode into the country on the coat-tails of Flamininus' settlement and the fortuitous circumstances of 185/4. Easy, but not entirely justifiable; there is no genuine hint that the assumed mercantile community at Larisa existed or was imitated elsewhere. If such a thing existed at Gonnoi, then it post-dated the events of 185/4 and so was an effect rather than a cause⁴³. What our characters suggest is that Thessaly was allowed to live very much as she pleased, so long as she pleased to respect her patrons when the circumstances dictated; when there was wavering, as in 191 and around the Third Makedonian War, action was taken by Rome and the Thessalians responded with the correct gestures.

(v). AITOLIA.

That there are only three western honorands in the Aitolian lists for the early second century is no surprise, in the light of the frosty and ultimately explosive atmosphere that existed between her and Rome in these years'. We must also take into account the general poverty of Aitolia, although it did not prevent her from making costly gestures at Delphi to woo the likes of Eumenes and Prousius 'once again' ². However, let us examine these three honorands and their circumstances in an attempt to exemplify Aitolian policy in its varying stages.

Leon son of Antallos of Thurii. Granted *proxenia* by the Aitolian League; his guarantor was Pyrrhias son of Timagoras of Herakleia, and Klaffenbach calculated the date to be around 196/5³. If he is correct, the date is inevitably significant. It falls in the aftermath of Flamininus' Isthmian declaration when the hostility of the Aitolians was approaching a peak; yet they still honoured a representative of one of Rome's oldest and most loyal allies. There are the usual provisos concerning a maverick, exile or mercenary. However, if the Aitolians can be credited with any initiative, the honours may be finely calculated. For this was an approach to the state which held the *promanteia* at Delphi over all the western Greeks, the state which was first to embrace Rome in the third century to begin the chain of mutual interests⁴. Surely the Aitolians were attempting to resurrect the full breadth of the chain that ran from her via Delphi and Magna Graecia to Rome, to put their relationship with Rome in an acceptable context once more via the

person of Leon. It is impossible to divine how the Aitolians came into contact with Leon, be he merchant, pilgrim or legate; our interpretation suggests that his priority was Delphi whence he was waylaid by the Aitolians, in a similar manner to that in which we suggest Volceius reached Aitolia in 262. Yet, however bold and enterprising the gesture may have been, it was destined for failure under the wheels of Flamininus' implacability.

Euthios son of Euthios of Neapolis. Granted *proxenia* by the Aitolian League in 186/5; his guarantor was Kydrion son of Dorimachos (not the pro-Roman magistrate) of Trichonion⁵. Again, the timing is crucial; Aitolia had now been firmly put in her place by Rome and machinations were afoot to reconstitute the Amphiktyony on a basis of Thessalian, rather than Aitolian hegemony⁶. Rome's sanction was deemed vital for this; thus it was between Nikostratos' venture at the Pythia of 186 and his moves to have it ratified at Rome that Aitolia made this grant to a representative of a major ally of Rome. It is probable that Euthios' prime purpose was the Pythia of 186, or Delphi in some other capacity, and that the Aitolians took advantage of his passing⁷; yet whatever his purpose and service, the status with which he left Thermon is the more important. For he was empowered thence to represent the interests of the Aitolians in Neapolis, a city capable of influencing both individual Romans and the political outlook of Rome herself⁸. Perhaps, then, the Aitolians sought an indirect means of preserving their position on the Amphiktyony by this demonstration of goodwill; if so, it failed. Yet that was not the end of the gesture; Neapolis' political and commercial

standing could still benefit the Aitolians were the city to look favourably upon them, and so Euthios' honours, perhaps designed for a set of particular circumstances, were never so myopic as that.

Perses son of Dionysios of Syracuse. Granted *proxenia* and *euergesia* by the Aitolian League in 182. This, however, is not so straightforward as it sounds; Perses was honoured, along with an Aiginetan and a Pergamene, as a *theoros* announcing the Nikephoria and requesting *asylia* for the shrine of Athene Nikephoros⁹. This was an excuse for the Aitolians to lavish honours upon the Attalids, with whom they had previously been in close consort before the relationship had been commandeered by Rome¹⁰. There is a marked difference between this decree and that of the Amphiktyony, passed for a similar purpose but effusive in its praise for Attalos' and Eumenes' partnership with Rome¹¹. Thus the two bodies expressed their individual espousal of Eumenes' appeal, but in very different contexts; the Aitolians sought their old friendship with Pergamon alone, the Amphiktyony were keen to see the kingdom continuing to work with Rome for the benefit of Greece.

Thus the honours to Perses reflected no more upon Syracuse than did his presence in the court of Eumenes in the first place. We do not know if he was mercenary, exile or maverick, although there is a temptation to see him as part of a strong chain linking Pergamon and Rome, a diplomat seconded to Eumenes by one of Rome's principal allies¹². If true, then this is a further, positive indication of how Rome allowed

her allies and dependents to conduct her business on her behalf; this was recognised by Aitolia in the two aforementioned grants.

(vi). THRACE.

Earlier, we decided that Rome's moves against the expansion of Philip in 185 were primarily intended to secure their political settlement within Central Greece, but that this coincided with the interests of the Thessalians, with whom Italians and Sicilians had dealings on a further individual level. We must now consider whether the same is true of Thrace, whom the senate similarly defends in 185 on the lines of the complaints of Eumenes¹; was there any subsidiary interest they were protecting, deliberately or incidentally, and what was the result of this intervention at all levels ?

M. Vallius M. f. Rhomaios. Honoured at Abdera with an *elogium*, *epodos* to the *boulé* and *demos*; *proedria* at the annual Dionysia along with a gold crown and an announcement there of his services; *ateleia* on imports and exports for his own personal use, but not for trade, and the right to export one hundred *medimnai* of corn per annum for his own personal use. Avezou and Picard note that the letter forms point to a date around 200. Yet since the Abderitans refer to what is worthy of a Roman citizen, they date the decree after the establishment of relations between the cities; to them this is 189 at the end of the war with Antiochos. Thus "M. Vallius serait un des commerçants Romains qui, après 189, commencèrent à s'établir sur les côtes de Thrace"².

The decree is one of four found on a single marble block, originating in the temple of Dionysos in Abdera; the others are a

slightly earlier *proxenia* decree for Philon of Akanthos and the two honorific decrees for the Romans below. Thus there is the possibility of comparison. The most striking feature is that, whilst Philon was made *proxenos*, none of the Romans received the same privilege³. Avezou and Picard explain this away by remarking upon the general scarcity of *proxenia* grants issued by Thracian states, supposedly a consequence of their habitual subordination to the whim of greater powers⁴. Yet, in Vallius' case in particular, this was a false economy. For in 166, the Abderitans honoured the Teians by whose auspices they had secured favour at Rome in the face of the expansion of Kotys; they themselves had no *patroni* at Rome, but depended on those of the Teians for the defence of their interests⁵. Strange, then, that the relationship with Teios should be on a political footing, but that that with Rome should not⁶; especially strange, since Vallius presented the opportunity for a relationship in such a context, but was rather downgraded.

The difference between the services of Philon and those of Vallius remains frustratingly obscure; the only hint is the mention of *evergesia* in Philon's decree which is absent from Vallius'⁷. Otherwise, the two receive largely similar privileges; the only significant difference is over the privileges facilitating their coming and going to and from Abdera. Philon was granted merely the rights of safe *eisplous* and *ekplous*, whilst Vallius was granted immunity from dues on his personal provisions and the right to take away from the city this fixed amount of grain for his personal use⁸. The discrepancy here is surely based on practicality. For Vallius to frequent Abdera, he would have had to

undertake a long, arduous and expensive journey from Italy, one which Philon would not have had to undertake from the Chalkidike. Thus to encourage Vallius to continue his attendance, the Abderitans made it much cheaper for him to travel by waiving their claims on his provisions; to encourage Philon, they merely guaranteed his immediate safety, a promise unnecessary and unworkable for the Roman. To this end, Philon's receipt of citizenship facilitated his financial benefits within Abdera; the withholding of this from Vallius underlines the above concerning the apolitical nature of his honours.

It would be difficult to understand Vallius' presence in Abdera unless he had something to gain from it as either a primary or a secondary destination. Although Rostovtzeff assumed that, like Ainos and Maroneia, the city was a great trade conduit for the produce of South Russia, Casson found it on an unnavigable river from the interior with the coastal passage badly hampered by shoals, lagoons and estuaries. The absence of a harbour and all the disadvantages of a headland drew ^{him to} the conclusion that the city must be more land-orientated than sea-orientated; if its wealth was trade-based, then it must have come down via the passes from the interior, with secondary sources of wealth being fishing and agriculture⁹. That Vallius was prohibited from using his privileges κατ'ἐμπορίαν suggests that there was a likelihood that he would otherwise have done so; we would suggest that Avezou and Picard are correct concerning his vocation, but would express caution over Thrace being his primary destination. For, if he eagerly sought Abdera as a captive attendant, then there was little motivation for the miserly

Abderitans to have extended their privileges to him. But if his attentions focussed elsewhere, there was more reason to seduce him by appeal to his materialistic instincts. The evidence for Avezou and Picard's ensemble of merchants in the area at this early time is not apparent¹⁰; yet the implication that the relationship between Vallius and Abdera was based on the spread of Roman arms is a significant one.

C. Apustius M. f. Rhomaios and his son M. Apustius C. f. Honoured at Abdera with an *elogium*; *proedria* at the annual Dionysia along with gold crowns and an announcement of their services; a statue to be erected of 200 Alexandrine *drachmai*'s worth; perhaps also *politeia*; *eisplous* and *ekplous* under guarantee of safety and immunity; *ephodos* to the *boulé* and *demos* first after sacred and state business; the decree to be recorded in a document sealed with the state seal.

Prima facie, to Avezou and Picard, the Apustii have done more for Abdera than the average honorand. Thus the decree is restored to read that they have demonstrated πλειστήν...[ἀπόδειξιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ διαληψεως; that in both peace and war they have each been εὐεργετην; that they have visited many times and have always made their stay [καλήν καὶ εὐτακτιον καὶ σωφρονα; and that their ultimate service is the αἴρεσις of which the Abderitans hope to see continuation¹¹. These points are acceptable; the editors are most probably correct in their context, around the time of the Teian decree of 166. Thus, to them, the Apustii played a similar role to the Teians, intervening in the senate in Abdera's interests when the city was pillaged by Hortensius, and then

again over the claims of Kotys¹². Thus their services were indeed in peace and war, and the inscription on their statue related well to their role in the ἐλευθερία of Abdera¹³. Thus also they were granted *eisplous* and *ekplous* rather than Vallius' more serviceable privileges; they may have visited Abdera in the past, but were unlikely to do so in person in the future¹⁴. The grant of *politeia* might be seen as a progression towards a political relationship with Rome, but still the honours stopped short of *proxenia*. Under the circumstances, with the Apustii having already performed a political service and being in a position to repeat it, the reticence of the Abderitans seems gauche to the point of insolence¹⁵.

Publius Rhomaios. The fourth of the honorands on this block, he is the one about whom least can be said. His services were in the form of some kind of ἐργασία, perhaps also προνοία and διαληψις; the editors are not sure whether this was performed [ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκηχαιοῖς or [ἐν τοῖς δειληχαιοῖς; it was certainly in peace-time. His honours, granted for the continuation of his αἵρεσις and his seemly visits, are unrestorable; so is his full name¹⁶. Thus, although the implication is that he has excelled in some quiet virtue some short time after the Apustii, there is little to be said other than to remark upon the persistence of this apolitical link between Rome and Abdera.

L. Iuventius M. f. Thalna. Initiate in the mysteries of Samothrace in the second century; the inscription is in a Latin hand. Fraser feels unable to be more precise about the date, but conjectures an identification

with the legate of 185/4. This, however, he rejects as "unlikely, though not impossible", largely on the grounds of the rarity of Latin inscriptions this early. He believes that Thalna may instead have been among the numerous Roman officials who visited the island after the battle of Pydna and Perseus' flight to Samothrace¹⁷. Yet the field is opened by our prior considerations of the *ρώμαϊκα γράμματα* in the Delian catalogues of pre-179, and of the bilingual dedication of Folius at Lindos in the mid-third century; because the inscription is in Latin does not mean that it must post-date 167¹⁸.

The links of Rome and Italy with the mysteries of Samothrace comprise a complex nexus, largely hingeing on the identification of the Kabeiroi with the Dioskouroi in later Roman thinking. There is also a Dardanian connection, the island being the origin of the hero before his emigration to Asia Minor to found Troy; it was also a staging post for the journey of the Palladium from Troy to Rome, and held some place in the mythography of the Salii. Yet these are inchoate connections, impossible to quantify¹⁹. We know that Marcellus' sack of Syracuse yielded spoils that eventually appeared on the island, yet we do not know who took them there or when²⁰. The probability of there being any great degree of traffic from the west to the island must be weighed against the overall picture of traffic to Thrace and the North-east Aigaian in the whole period; the truth appears to be that, before the Third Makedonian War, this did not amount to much. The presence and affiliations of Thalna must remain obscure.

Cn. Domitius Cn. f. Ahenobarbus. Honoured by Amphipolis as their *evergetes* in 167. Originally believed by Perdrizet to be late republican, this inscription was brought forward by Schuler to refer to the praetor of 170 who was part of the decemvirate sent to Greece in 167 to assist in and ratify the settlement of Aemilius Paullus after Pydna. The presence of the commission in Amphipolis at the time of Paullus' speech is attested by Livy; Schuler conjectures that all ten were similarly honoured, but that only the decree of Ahenobarbus survives²¹.

This survey of the presence in Thrace and its environs has shown that much depended on the movement of Rome's armies, both to motivate the smaller fry such as Vallius and to lead the recalcitrant natives into dispensing their honours. This parsimony with honours may or may not be significant; it may mean that there were no westerners, or that the Thracians chose not to honour them until they were convinced that there was to be lasting benefit from flattering Rome, that is, after Pydna. This proviso can be partially eluded by the consideration of the post-187 split between those who plied Ambrakia and those who did not. For the latter, Thrace might seem a long way distant with little to offer in return for the effort; for the former, comparative ease of access might not have seemed enough. Strategically, the area was vital for a squeeze on Makedon and for the land route to the Hellespont and Asia Minor, involving as it did a broad overview of the Northern Aegean; yet as with Thessaly, the incidental benefit received from the senatorial judgment of 183 seems to have had but limited effect on relations with Rome before the Third Makedonian War.

(vii). THE AIGAIAN.

Our enquiry so far has looked at Central Greece to assess the impact of Rome's political settlements on the traffic thither from Rome, Italy and Sicily. Before we assess the particular problems of Boiotia, let us extend our survey further east along the lines of communication that were established by the events of the third century. These ran to Kos, Rhodes, Tenos and Euboia; Delos will be examined in detail below. For we have seen how Rome's ambassadors to Egypt could not but return via the Kyklades owing to the currents involved in the crossing; we also know of Syracuse's involvement in Rhodian trading circles and suspect something similar between Rome and each of Rhodes and Egypt. We know that the Second Illyrian War was at least tangentially concerned with Demetrios of Pharos' depredations in the Kyklades; also that the cause of Rhodes, adopted in the preliminaries to the Second Makedonian War, involved the interests of all the islands allied to her barring those three garrisoned by Philip'. How this situation developed must be seen in the purposes and identities of those characters who make up our enquiry.

Timon son of Nymphodoros of Syracuse. (i). *Proxenos* on Tenos around the end of the third century, with associated *euergesia*, *politeia*, *enktesis*, enrolment into *phyle* and *phratry*, *proedria* and *prosodos*; (ii). honoured by the Nesiotic League a little before 188, with a gold crown, *proxenia*, *euergesia*, *prosodos* and an invitation to all league sacrifices; (iii). honoured at Delos around 180 in a fragmentary decree, and also banker and dedicant in the temple accounts of the same date.

Timon featured in the earlier assessment of the problems faced by the Italian traveller in the Greek world; we also know that Timon's son, Nymphodoros followed in his father's footsteps as a banker on Delos². His career pattern seems to have taken him first to Tenos, then to Delos, where Bogaert conjectures that he was a slave-dealer on the side feeding the needs of his city of origin³. Given the comparatively late *floruit* of the Delian slave mart to be argued below, this seems unlikely; however, his move was no doubt sponsored by the prospects of improved economic opportunity on Delos⁴. The date of his move seems to be prior to 192, when his name appears for the first time on banking jars in the Delian temple of Apollo⁵. Thus he seems to have been synchronous with the launch of official Roman contacts with the island and the establishment of friendship⁶; his opportunism will be a contrast with those who awaited further developments before exploiting the island. The motivation that drew him to Tenos in the first place remains obscure. There survives a fragmentary *proxenia* decree from the island which appears to date roughly to the mid-third century and makes mention of Tarentines, Syracusans, Rhegians and Crotoniates, yet the absence of true criteria for dating and interpretation render this merely a vague hint of Italian and Sicilian interest in the island⁷. Yet Timon was following established lines of communication and trade into the Aigaian, especially those which had bound Hieron to both Rhodes and Egypt⁸. His arrival may have been around the time the preliminaries of the Second Makedonian War, although this is far from certain. What seems clear, however, is that the honours conferred upon him did not reflect back to Syracuse, in that he took up permanent residence in his centre of

business here in the Kyklades⁹.

M. Valerius M. f. Messalla. Author of a letter to the Teians in 193 in response to an embassy led by Menippos which requested that their city and sanctuary, home of the Ionian and Hellespontine Dionysiac guild¹⁰, should be deemed holy, inviolable and immune from taxation. Valerius praises the ambassador for his services; keen to assert Rome's piety, especially longstanding in the case of Dionysos, and their εὐνοία towards Τεῖος, he communicates the goodwill of the Roman people for the request.

The letter is remarkable for two things. First, it is in response to an appeal made some ten years after the initial initiative on behalf of the Teian Dionysia¹¹. Holleaux explains this delay simply by the fact of Rome's withdrawal from Greece in 205, their diplomatic incapacity in the Aigaian at this time and Τεῖος' dependence on Makedon from 201 to 196; further, he points to the prevarication of Lampsakos in seeking a means of approach to Rome as an example of the reticence of the eastern states in approaching without introduction. Yet by 193, Rome had accepted Lampsakos, Smyrna and Alexandria-Troas into her orbit on receipt of their embassies, and was showing her interest in the east in her negotiations, both friendly and hostile, with Antiochos following the defeat of Philip and the liberation of Greece. Thus the time was ripe for Menippos, nominally in Rome on Antiochos' business, to approach the senate on Τεῖος' behalf¹². Holleaux is undoubtedly right in the substance of his theory; this was the session at which we argued that

Delos established her friendship with Rome and, with war in the air, it would have befitted Menippos to seek this guarantee for his country whilst the time was ripe¹³. Subsequent events, including the embassy of Sulpicius, Villius and Aelius passing within touching distance of Teios in summer 193 with Villius' visit to Ephesos, no doubt made this seem a very wise precaution¹⁴. Even so, Valerius' message to Teios was significant in its final proviso; Rome would extend their philanthropy to Teios only if Teios maintained her εὐνοία towards Rome¹⁵.

The second point is in terms of the aforementioned Abderitan decree for the Teians in 166 on account of their using their influence at Rome to prevent Kotys' claims on Abdera being ratified¹⁶. This influence is realised by the seduction of the foremost Romans and by attendance on the Teians' own πάτρωνες. This is the earliest attested use of the Graecised word and so demonstrates an advanced conception of their own position on the part of the Teians; the implication is that, by 166, they had had ample time to appreciate it¹⁷. The obvious assumption is that it was M. Valerius Messalla and the *demarchoi* mentioned in the letter who were the patrons of the Teians, perhaps among others¹⁸. For the terms of the letter declare these men the authors of εὐνοία and φιλανθρωπία for Teios, the holders of εὐσέβεια, εὐμένεια and προτιμία for her god. In addition to this, it was Valerius whose name was inscribed as a permanent point of reference for the Teians in the temple of Dionysos. Thus the Teians possessed a permanent affidavit of those who were their friends; when it was to their advantage to translate this relationship into real terms, it was that between clients and patrons¹⁹.

This is particularly true of all Roman magistrates who put their names to dedications or letters or were granted honours by a Greek state; there was always the chance that their decree or inscription would be resurrected as an example of an ongoing relationship of mutual χάρις. That this Teian example appears to have lain dormant for twenty-seven years underscores much of the above concerning especially the grants of *proxenia* and *euergesia*; the obligation as a potential servant was held by the *proxenos ad infinitum*, whether it was ever fulfilled or not. What the Abderitan use of Τεῖος illustrates is the potential we have drawn for those allies of Rome honoured by the Greeks to be conduits for relations between Greece and Rome. It was fulfilled by Massalia for Lampsakos, and now here by Τεῖος for Abdera, but there may have been many times when it was not fulfilled; yet this does not in any way devalue the potential. The only fly in this ointment is Vallius; why could the Abderitans not use him in 166 ? The answer must lie somewhere in his death, absence or obscurity; if the Abderitans sought him, they must have found either nothing, or nothing of any use.

Cn. Cornelius Cn. f. Hispallus. (i). Granted *proxenia* and *euergesia* along with Scipio Africanus, Scipio Asiaticus and Aemilius Regillus at Aptera, Krete, in late summer/early autumn 189; (ii). granted *euergesia* and honoured with a statue at Polyrrhenia, Krete, around the same time. Guarducci remarks upon the placing of Africanus' patronymic between gentilicium and cognomen in the first inscription, whilst the others are before their respective gentilicia²⁰. The restoration of Hispallus in the first inscription depends somewhat on his presence in the second,

but is more acceptable than Cavaignac's alternative, the decemvir Cn. Cornelius Merenda, for reasons of chronology²¹. For Guarducci reasons that the date of the Apera decree is shortly after Magnesia, when the Scipiones were returning home after wintering at Ephesos and being replaced by Manlius Vulso; their journey took them via Delos, where Asiaticus made his offering and now to Krete²². That Scipio Asiaticus' command was over obviously did not prevent him using his full title. Aemilius Regillus must have joined them at some stage between Delos and Krete, since his offering was made in absentia, precluding any visit to the island²³.

As Guarducci admits, the presence of Hispallus on Krete is difficult to explain. That he is honoured with the Scipiones, his cousins, and Regillus suggests that he was a junior member of staff returning to Rome with them; however, this cannot explain his position as sole benefactor of Polyrrhenia, unless his acquaintance with the city was more personal and tangential to the progression of the main party. Other reasons for the stopover have been discussed in full above; that Labeo felt the need to follow up this initiative the next year suggests that Hispallus was on Krete no longer than his cousins²⁴.

Epigonos son of Damokrates of Tarentum. Granted at Aiolian Kyme an *elogium*, a gold crown, *proxenia* and also perhaps *euergesia* with associated privileges. Epigonos was in the service of Attalos of Pergamon; unfortunately, no editor has been able to determine which one, and so the date of the decree is either the late third/early second

century, or the mid-second century²⁵. This proviso is a major handicap, as is the absence of any information on Epigonos' services. Petzl and Pleket attributed some commercial activity to him; however, Robert remarks that this will not explain why he left Italy to join the king in the first place, and his conclusion thence is that Epigonos is most probably an exile²⁶. Yet there may be a parallel between him and the aforementioned Syracusan, Perses son of Dionysios, who was honoured in Aitolia in 182 for his representations on Eumenes' behalf; Epigonos might similarly suggest that the Pergamene civil service contained western Greeks as a bond between the Attalids, Rome's allies and ultimately Rome herself²⁷. That there is the dating proviso, however, prevents the establishment of a *terminus post quem* for this practice.

Dekmos Cossutius P. f. Rhomaios. Architect used by Antiochos Epiphanes to complete the Olympieion at Athens some time between 175 and 164, as corroborated by an inscription from the edifice itself. There is little to add to Rawson's reconstruction of Cossutius' career: possibly educated in Campania where his freedmen are *magistri* in the later second century, possibly domiciled at Athens from a surprisingly early stage, possibly employed extensively by Antiochos on further building projects²⁸. The subsequent prominence of members of the family on Delos, Ios, Euboia, Erythrai and Kos is well-attested, showing how Italy came to draw heavily on the Kyklades for much of its building stone²⁹; that this was the area where Italian entrepreneurialism met Greek facilities will be important for our study of Delos below. The precise date of Dekmos' contract with Antiochos would be significant in determining

whether the propagation of Roman commerce in the Greek east had any real footing before the Third Makedonian War and the freeing of Delos; but this cannot be defined.

What this study reveals is that there was little obvious exploitation of the Aigaian in the early second century aside of Delos, this despite the longstanding and well-worn lines of communication that existed between Rome and Pergamon, Rhodes and Egypt. What seems most significant is Timon's migration from Tenos to Delos at roughly the same time as the establishment of Rome's friendship with the island after Flamininus' dedication there; it is easy to connect these events to conclude that, once Rome had expressed an interest in and a preference for Delos, there was little incentive for Romans or their allies to look elsewhere in the Aigaian for hospitality. What the gestures towards Krete and Tenos suggest is an infringement on the intellectual property of Rhodes by means of this casual interventionism; although Rome had no formal interest in the Aigaian, she can again be seen insisting on her claims as a reference point for Greek affairs.

(viii). BOIOTIA.

Earlier, we suggested from the nature of the *proxenia* lists from Oropos and Tanagra that the Roman campaigns in the First Makedonian War contributed in no small way to the economic boom and subsequent recession in Boiotia. Polybios is adamant that by 192/1, Boiotia had been driven into the arms of Antiochos by Flamininus' attempts to interfere with her internal politics and his punitive campaign following the murder of the exploitative Romans in the aftermath of the assassination of Brachylles¹. Although this aberration was shortlived, Flamininus' further machinations on behalf of Zeuxippos in 187/6 sponsored further strife; the fragile balance between pro-Romans and anti-Romans was finally tipped in 173 when the confederacy entered alliance with Perseus². Given this impression of a harmful intervention and a hostile reaction, we must analyse those characters who are found in Boiotia to assess the effects of this political situation on the traffic from the west. For, if Rome's military campaigns of the late third century could affect the fortunes of the state so vividly, then the presence or absence of her generals and businessmen had the potential to wreak a similar effect.

C. Octavius T.f. Rhomaios. Granted *proxenia* and *euergesia* and other associated privileges by Akraiphiai. Given the difficulties of comparative dating from the magistrates heading the decree, Holleaux assumed a date of between 200 and 175 on the grounds of dialect and letter forms³. He acknowledged that Octavius was the first Roman to

appear on a decree of this kind from Boiotia, but was unable to identify him from those Octavii who achieved prominence around this time⁴; the stumbling block is the patronymic, Titus, a praenomen without historical parallel amongst the Octavii. The novelty of the formula concerning the archons and *synedrion* of Akraiphiai suggested to Holleaux a newly-instituted oligarchic regime; he therefore concluded that the change of government and these honours to Octavius show Akraiphiai striving hard to accord with the wishes of Rome in the immediate aftermath of the Antiochos war. Holleaux's conclusion is most plausible, but admits the following remarks. Unfamiliar praenomina were often used in cases of *polypaidia* when other names were ruled out by usage on other offspring or branches of the family; perhaps the multiplicity of Caius' uncles made it improbable that his own father could give him much of a start in life⁵. Yet it is also true that

"praenomina are severely restricted in noble families...but non-noble members of noble gentes show much more latitude, and in the republican period are not as a rule recorded in numbers large enough to justify hard and fast conclusions"⁶.

Octavius' purpose and connections, although probably military and/or diplomatic, remain obscure.

M. Norcinus L.f. Rhomaios. Granted *proxenia* and *euergesia* and other associated privileges by Akraiphiai; dated to the beginning of the second century by Perdrizet, owing to its dialect and letter forms. Perdrizet offers no word of explanation for the presence of Norcinus, although he does remark on the presence of a Norceianus in an inscription from Puteoli⁷. Hatzfeld immediately made the connection, seeing Norcinus as a merchant frequenting Boiotia, taking advantage of

the constant trouble there that always meant that there would be a demand for incoming trade⁹.

It should be noted that the formula concerning the *syndrion* and the *demos* seems to denote a different period to that of Octavius; however, it cannot be divined whether that period was earlier or later, or by how much. The discrepancy may be small as well as great; thus Octavius and Norcinius may share the same motivation and circumstance, as Rome's forces were in Boiotia for more than one year in both the war against Antiochos and that against Perseus. Yet both may well have had a quieter motivation. Akraiphiai had little to recommend itself other than the temple of Apollo Ptoios, whilst its isolated, mountainous situation was not conducive to agriculture⁹. Potential motivations for visits, then, can be extended from the militaristic to the religious and the commercial. What seems certain is that the pro-Roman element was the predominant one in the town; whatever the direction of the rest of Boiotia, these honours were both indication and guarantee of the position of Akraiphiai.

P. Cornelius L.f. Lentulus. Honoured by Akraiphiai as their saviour and benefactor some time during the Third Makedonian War. The dating is based on the dialect and letter forms and a comparison with the decree for Norcinius¹⁰. Lentulus was the consul of 162, sent in 172/1 to observe the situation in Boiotia and to support the anti-Makedonian elements; to this end, he was besieging Haliartos in the company of the pro-Roman party in Boiotia when the praetor Lucretius arrived to relieve

him¹¹. Feyel sees these honours as Lentulus' reward for further work in Boiotia, perhaps for the protection of Akraiphiai from either Lucretius or the senate; they may well be associated with some representation of the town's case on his return to Rome to assume the aedileship of 169¹². A further opportunity was provided by his return to Greece in 168 with Aemilius Paullus; it would certainly befit Akraiphiai's case to secure their position in the eyes of Rome when the final reckoning was called in Greece¹³. The inscription sets the seal on Akraiphiai's seduction of Rome's favours in the second century; the fawning use of the word *σώτεις* to flatter the magistrate bears distinct echoes of Flamininus.

P. Licinius P. f. and -. Cornelius M. f. Victors in the Basileia at Lebadeia of uncertain date.

Q. Mucius Q. f. Scaevola. Honoured by Koroneia, some time during the Third Makedonian War.

The first of these inscriptions, edited by Pappadakis, is a fragmentary catalogue of victors accompanied by the sacerdotal commentary on the dealings of the agonotheses¹⁴. The former lists the five-fold victory of Licinius in the equestrian events, and the victory of Cornelius in the boys' wrestling. The commentary consists of a letter from the agonothete, Prokles of Thespiai, complaining that his predecessor in the office, Tryphon of Plataia, had failed to hand over his accounts; a protest had been lodged with the *naopoioi*, and Prokles was keen to punish Tryphon with a fine. The second part of the commentary is a letter from the civic authorities of Thespiai to those of Lebadeia detailing the replacement of Prokles as agonothete with his

son, Thebangelos. The problems of dating, however, are immense, and strongly linked to those concerning the similar inscription edited by Vollgraff and discussed above¹⁵. As we have seen, Holleaux's instinct was to date this latter as late as possible, although he did leave the loophole of its similarity in script to IG VII.3073-6, decrees on the construction of the temple of Zeus Basileus at Lebadeia between 175 and 171.

Pappadakis' inscription is similar in script to that of Vollgraff, although the criteria employed by Holleaux lead to different conclusions. The absence of the qualifying *υῖος* from the patronymic separates it from Vollgraff's inscription, supposedly according to earlier custom; yet both feature the use of the ethnic *Rhomaïos*, also an early element¹⁶. However, the script struck Pappadakis as comparatively late; he supported this by the homonym of Prokles in IG VII.1764, a catalogue of victors from the Erotideia of the second/first century. However, he admitted links between ll.13 and 17 and IG VII.1750 and 3292, both of which date to the third/second century. The epigraphical evidence is thus inconclusive; we must admit other considerations to our enquiry.

On the workable assumption that these men were neither unattested freedmen nor minor nobles, we might profitably turn to prosopography to assist our progress. The known P. Licinii P.f. are Crassus Dives, the consul of 205 and his great-grandson, Crassus Dives Mucianus, the consul of 131¹⁷. With these, the working framework is that a man's agonistic

prime was around his early twenties; his child-siring age was between twenty and thirty; and that, from the *lex Villia annalis* of 180, the age at which he might hold the consulship was around thirty five to forty¹⁸. Thus the consul of 205 would have a son who peaked around 185-180, a grandson who peaked around 160 and the great-grandson Mucianus; both of these missing generations, obscure in terms of office-holding for whatever reason, would thus be P. Licinius P.f. There can also be a case for the cousins of these men, following the line of the brother of the consul of 205, who did not assume the second cognomen Dives, but remained Licinii Crassi simple¹⁹; the obvious candidate here would be a son of the consul of 171, of agonistic age around the time of his father's magistracy²⁰. Aside of the Crassi, the only other attested Licinii who bear the praenomen Publius are the Licinii Vari; however, the family becomes obscure following the occupation of the praetorship of 208²¹. Of these candidates, the consul of 205 and the praetor of 208 can immediately be discounted; their shared agonistic prime, around 220, would surely necessitate an excessively adventurous wrench of the epigraphical argument.

Of the Cornelii to consider, the only branches to bear the praenomen Marcus are the Cethegi, the Mammulae and the Maluginenses. Of the Cethegi, M. Cornelius M.f. was consul in 204, whilst M. Cornelius C.f. was consul in 160²²; the former must be discounted, although a son of the latter might be a valid candidate given the youthfulness of the victor. This latter point might also apply to sons of both M. Cornelius Mammula, legate to Makedon and Alexandria in 173, and M. Cornelius

Scipio Maluginensis, praetor in 176²³. Of these men, Cethegus, the consul of 160 and especially Mammula found themselves in Greece in and around the Third Makedonian War. Cethegus was despatched as a legate to Makedon and Illyria in 171 to keep Cassius in his own province; although not assigned to Boiotia itself, he was at least close enough to bear consideration²⁴. Mammula, on the other hand, was almost bound to visit Boiotia; for, if he ever actually proceeded to Alexandria (and the variegated fate of the "quinque legati" make this a fair proviso), his obvious point of embarkation would have been Tanagra or Athens²⁵. Further to these men, we should also consider the presence of a M. Cornelius C.f. in the list of Delphic *thearodokoi* of around 175 as representative of Samé, Kephallenia²⁶.

What is noticeable about this prosopographical list is that there is a major concentration of candidates around the time of the Third Makedonian War. This period embraces the grandsons of P. Licinius Crassus Dives the consul of 205, of P. Licinius Varus the praetor of 208 and perhaps also of M. Cornelius Cethegus the consul of 204; also the sons of P. Licinius Crassus the consul of 171, of M. Cornelius Cethegus the consul of 160, M. Cornelius Mammula the legate of 173 and M. Cornelius Maluginensis the praetor of 176. The first three of these four sons have the advantage of their fathers all having served in Greece at the appropriate time. Further candidates from a later period are all Licinii, the son of Mucianus, the praetor of 58 and Iunianus, the tribune of 53²⁷. What militates against these otherwise epigraphically acceptable characters is the apparent absence of M. Corneli of whatever

identity in the late-second and early-first centuries. On sheer weight of numbers, then, our enquiry should centre upon the 170s; however, this might seem flimsy enough to require corroboration.

The second of our inscriptions is restored by Lauffer to read honours to P. Mucius Q.f. Scaevola, the consul of 175, from Koroneia in the aftermath of the reduction of the city in 171. Lauffer believes that these were in response to the services of Publius in securing favourable terms for the city from the senate; his justification for this is the presence of Publius among the witnesses to the *senatus consultum de Thisbensibus*, the terms of which were undoubtedly similar to those for Koroneia²⁸. However, the more likely restoration would seem to be of Publius' brother, Quintus, legate to Greece in 171 and commander of "delectis equitibus extraordinariis" in the skirmish at Kallinikos²⁹. For this man would surely be better placed to perform a service for Koroneia given the vulnerable position in which she found herself in 170. Of interest here is the association of the Mucii Scaevolae with the command of the Licinii Crassi, especially at Kallinikos where the consul's brother Caius was also in charge of a cavalry detachment³⁰. That a son of the Mucii, the consul of 131, was subsequently adopted into the lineage of the cousins of these commanders is a connection which should be borne very much in mind.

In terms of an historical context for the inscription concerning the Basileia, to link up with the prosopographical one, much depends on the mention of the *koinon* in l.30. For the embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus

in 172/1, hot on the heels of that of M. Cornelius Mammula and company, had the dissolution of that entity as one of its priorities: to stall Perseus by means of an artificial armistice; to give the senate time to make adequate preparations for invasion; and to weaken substantially Perseus' position in Greece³¹. The development of this intent saw the ambassadors issue the veiled threat from Thessaly to "singulis enim civitatibus de se ipsis consulendi potestatem facturos", that is, to destroy the unity of the Boiotian *koinon* by treating with the states on an individual basis³². As the ambassadors moved from Larisa to Chalkis, they received two different forms of representation from the Boiotians: the first was in compliance with their wishes, from the likes of Chaironeia and Lebadeia who replied κατὰ πόλιν; the second, although concessive to the Roman call to allegiance, was issued by the anti-Roman boiotarch Ismenias κατὰ κοινὸν³³. Philippus made it clear that this was unacceptable; at the subsequent federal gathering at Thebes, Ismenias was frozen out and, with the exception of the recalcitrant Koroneia, Haliartos and Thisbai, the Boiotians swung behind the Roman standard³⁴. To Polybios, the significance of this was enormous; Rome's goal was fulfilled and each city could be brought powerless and divided inside the framework of *fides*³⁵.

Scholars are divided, however, on the extent of the dissolution of the *koinon* at this juncture. Some believe that it was officially disbanded here and now, not to be resurrected in any form until the 140s, when "Rome eut 'pitié de la Grèce' et rendit à chaque 'Communauté' ses anciennes assemblées communes"³⁷. Others subscribe to the theory

that, although political life was effectively curtailed in the *koinon* by Philippos, the confederacy lived on to supervise the day-to-day running of the country in such activities as minting coins and the like. Roesch, for example, propounds the second theory; yet his admittedly brief discussion of our inscription opines that it must date after 146 for its mention of the *koinon* in an active capacity³⁸.

The *koinon* in our inscription is, in Prokles' letter, a body charged with organising the festival of the Basileia. This was one of the ἀγῶνες ἑννομοί of Boiotia, instituted in 371 in celebration of the victory over the Spartans at the battle of Leuktra³⁹. Given the economic crisis that was afflicting Greece in the 170s, Aitolia and Thessaly especially but surely also Boiotia, there was some strong compulsion to inspire the commissioning of a temple as large, grand and expensive as that described by IG VII.3073-6. The inadvisability of this project is underlined by Pausanias' remark that it was never finished; presumably this was due as much to the shortage of resources as to the intervention of the war⁴⁰. It was perhaps the prospect of such an auspicious occasion as the bicentenary celebrations that would justify such wanton expenditure in such an economic climate, a spectacular edifice to grace a spectacular event; yet there is no evidence to suggest that the anniversary was of much importance to the Greeks.

One would expect the *koinon* to be a maelstrom of activity in the preparations for the festival; if Roussel is correct in believing that the Basileia was quadrennial or quinquennial rather than annual, then

these would surely have been of a sustainedly high profile⁴¹. However, there are no such indications in our inscription. The *koinon* is mentioned only by Prokles in passing as the presiding body; it made no decisions or proclamations in this apparent crisis of organisation, but remained utterly silent. The communication cited was between individual states, Thespiai and Lebadeia, κατὰ πόλιν; this seems to contradict Roesch's opinion of the *koinon* acting here in a formulative capacity, also what Prokles says of the *koinon* carrying overall responsibility⁴². This is a picture of chaos in the organisation of a regular and well-established festival⁴³; there must surely be some external factor to cause such disruption, which might well find its place in the years running up to the Third Makedonian War.

It goes without saying that the financial strain placed on the festival organisation by the commissioning of this new temple might well have caused significant disruption in the preparations; that much would explain the rapid turnover of agonothetes as each was squashed by the economic burden upon them⁴⁴. However, the contrast between Prokles' espousal of the primacy of the *koinon* and the subsequent private exchange between Thespiai and Lebadeia adds a further dimension to the scenario. The political shenanigans of 172/1 provide a positive reason for the resignation of successive agonothetes, other than natural wastage or financial shortcomings; the conflict between government and exiles, pro-Romans and anti-Romans, rich and poor, was bound to have incurred casualties at all levels⁴⁵. It is reasonable to suggest that Tryphon was the original agonothete, elected around 175 when Boiotia was

still reasonably happy to accept the tutelage of Rome. Two years later, the status quo had altered sufficiently to have undermined his position, perhaps politically as much as financially; it would be no surprise to see a number of pro-Romans finding themselves outmanoeuvred by the decision to accept Perseus' alliance in 173⁴⁶. Prokles' stance is then prefigured by his defiant mention of a sinking *koinon*, defending its position as a living political entity in a denunciation of his predecessor's position; his pursuit of Tryphon was therefore political, although Tryphon's failure to submit accounts would be no surprise were he in exile. However, when Philippus arrived to do down that institution, Prokles disappeared from office, be it by violence or by self-expediency⁴⁷. His succession by his son in a private arrangement by Thespiai (κατὰ πόλιν) was designed to brush Prokles' embarrassment under the carpet; the assumption must be that the gap in generations was enough to reveal the error of Prokles' ways and the wisdom of compliance with Rome's wishes⁴⁸. Having worked in proximity to Prokles, Thebangelos would be able to step smartly into his shoes to complete the job without disturbing the continuity. It was presumably too late to cancel the festival; thus Thespiai, as the home-town of the previous incumbent of the *agonothesia*, simply assumed the role of the collapsed *koinon* and business was continued as normal⁴⁹.

If these historical and political contexts fit the terms of our inscription in this way, then the prosopographical argument can complete the picture as the story continues. If the sacerdotal commentary describes the events that unfolded over the winter 172/1, then the

subsequent year, ravaged by war and an invading army, was scarcely the time to hold a major festival, least of all one with Romans and Boiotians competing side by side. However, by the end of the summer, the situation was resolved in Boiotia, with only Koroneia holding out under siege⁵⁰. Expediency now dictated the attitudes of the separate, divided cities towards Rome, and the pro-Roman factions were in control of all of them; the terms imposed upon Thisbai and later upon Koroneia demonstrate how Rome wished her subjects to be governed and how recidivists could expect to be treated⁵¹. Acknowledgement of these facts of life followed swiftly upon the arrival of Philippus, and the honours subsequently awarded to Lentulus and Mucius Scaevola are ample attestation to this fact. Indeed, the stability of the settlement is marked by Crassus' decision to return to Boiotia at the end of the campaigning season, "quia hibernis aptior regio quam Magnesia erat"⁵²; presumably the likelihood of armed resistance played as much part in his decision as did factors of provisioning and climate. With Koroneia a manageable threat, devoid of support from her neighbours, Boiotia would be as quiet over the winter months for the natives as it was for the Roman army.

The time, then, was ripe during the late autumn or winter of 171 for the Boiotians to hold the Basileia as scheduled, temple or no temple⁵³. About the same time, it seems from the Roberts' restoration of an agonistic inscription from Thessaly that Larisa instituted a festival in the aftermath of the battle of Kallinikos in celebration of their role in holding the defiles in face of Perseus' onslaught. Given the Romans'

stake in Larisa's success, they were of course invited to participate in these games⁵⁴. If the natives in Thessaly showed their enthusiasm thus for the Roman cause, by including them in their own rites and customs and festivals, then there is no reason to believe that Boiotia was any different. Boiotia had much ground to regain in Rome's estimation following their espousal of Perseus' cause. Thus the Basileia of our inscription was an opportunity to fulfil religious obligations and strengthen political ties. For Rome's part, the army's participation could show approval of the regime that ultimately presided over the festival, that loose affiliation of states that now acted individually rather than corporately. It could also recover some of the prestige lost at Kallinikos by matching its best horseman, Licinius, against the best of the locals; one wonders how much the Roman's success owed to skill, and how much to the diplomacy of his opponents.

This historical context accords well with the prosopography highlighted above. It is probable that the Licinius in our inscription is a son of the consul of 171, perhaps around twenty years of age, in his agonistic prime and old enough to accompany his father on campaign. This does not rule out the grandsons of Crassus Dives or Varus; yet the fact that the consul was in Boiotia at the time adds a certain physical presence to the candidacy of his son. It is then a reasonable conclusion to draw that M. Cornelius Mammula was still in Greece at this time. His original mission was possessed of an amorphous brief; the leader of the delegation, C. Valerius Laevinus never reached Alexandria, but returned to Rome, having arrested Praxo of Delphi and Rammius of Brundisium for

plotting against the life of Eumenes⁵⁵. That this took place in 172 suggests that the embassy has taken an awfully long time to "respicere", and casts some doubt over the activities of Laevinus' colleagues; they may have continued to Alexandria, they may also have returned to Rome or, given the need to have Philippus machinating on the spot in 172/1, they may well have remained in Greece to add weight to the operations aimed at weakening Perseus' position⁵⁶. Perhaps, then, M. Cornelius Mammula was also in the right place at the right time for his son to have taken part in the Basileia of 171/0.

Of the other victors in the catalogue, the presence of a Koroneian need not be a handicap to our interpretation, even given Koroneia's continued resistance to Rome throughout the winter of 171/0. That there was a strong pro-Roman or at least neutral faction in the town is demonstrated both by the presumed terms of the *senatus consultum de Koronaeis* and by the role of Olympichos of Koroneia in the deliberations in the *koinon* in 172/1⁵⁷; if these were exiles outside the walls of the city awaiting the end of the siege, there would be nothing to prevent their participation in the Basileia as representatives of Koroneia. The Bargylian could be either a member of the Rhodian fleet, the representative of a Boiotian trading partner or merely a professional athlete⁵⁸. The Thessalian is no surprise in light of the above concerning their reaction to the battle of Kallinikos and their opposition to Perseus; all other victors were Boiotians from friendly cities.

A final word concerning Mucius Scaevola. The Mucii in the 170s were enjoying a period of unparalleled political success; the Licinii Crassi Divites, almost immediately after the adoption of the second cognomen, had been in obscurity for some thirty years⁵⁹. The question must be, why should the one then hand over a son for adoption into the other ? Reasons for the obscurity of two generations of Licinii Crassi fall into two potential categories: first, that their interests lay elsewhere, which, given their apparent wealth and the implications of the *lex Claudia*, might not be far from the truth⁶⁰; and second, untimely death. Should the latter have occurred in successive generations, then the line would have reached crisis point in the 170s; thus the first missing generation, born around 215-210, died between producing the second missing generation and either siring further offspring or starting on the *cursus honorum*. This second missing generation, born around 190, would have reached maturity around the time of the Third Makedonian War and so cannot be discounted as a candidate for restoration in our inscription. Yet if he too died during the course of this war, the line of Crassi Divites would be ended; it would have been incumbent on his cousins to perform reparation, which is where their current subordinate and/or associate Mucius Scaevola came in. Perhaps he had commanded the young Crassus Dives; the lad would almost certainly have been qualified as an *eques* by his social status. It is certain that there was contact between Mucius and the Licinii Crassi, since one was his commanding officer and the other his colleague at Kallinikos⁶¹. That being the case, it might have seemed both comradely and politically expedient to have a child adopted into the Crassi Divites. The calculation of

Mucianus' career accords well with this; consul in 131 after first holding the quaestorship in 152, he would have been no more than a baby in the late 170s, a good age for adoption⁶².

Thus out of the inconclusive epigraphical argument, we have constructed a prosopographical and historical case for Pappadakis' inscription to date 171, which stands as securely as any other. In so doing, we have revealed the Roman policy of the Third Makedonian War as ultimately gracious and rewarding to those who would comply with her wishes. We have perhaps also added something to the arguments concerning the state of the Boiotian *koinon* after 172/1. By our argument, it was shelved temporarily as a hot potato in the face of aggressive diplomacy, whilst still being championed vigorously by its supporters. Yet this is not to say that it could not and did not recover some kind of status, such as it held after 140, some short time after the events of 172-170⁶³.

Cn. Pandusinus. Holder of a *χοινωρία* with Thisbai that became liable to arbitration under the terms of the *senatus consultum de Thisbensibus* of 170. Perhaps the best discussed of all our characters, Pandusinus is also the subject of a divergence of opinion; that the *χοινωρία* is explicitly stated to be concerned with grain and olive oil has only confused the issue. Hatzfeld initially marked him down as either part of the requisitioning arm of Lucretius' army or an agricultural exploiter; he also remarked upon the presence of Pandusinus' son on Tenos around 100, part of the supposedly long line of *negotiatores* on the island⁶⁴.

Having said that, he later qualified his remarks by saying that it was unlikely that Pandusinus Senior would export grain to Rome given contemporary prices, in which case it is more probable that he was selling his stock in Thisbai's market⁶⁵. Mommsen founded the now prevalent belief that Pandusinus took his name from Pandosia in Bruttium⁶⁶. He used both later and earlier evidence to suggest that Pandusinus was little more than a migrant *arator*, farming land hired from the people of Thisbai on payment of a prearranged tithe of grain and oil; hence the *κοινωνία* and hence the terms of the *senatus consultum*, since Rome's assumption of the property of the vanquished Thisbaisians meant that the senate was now the holder of his contract⁶⁷. Nicolet affords this hypothesis his due consideration, yet concludes that this is the most ancient document we possess that appertains to a *publicanus*⁶⁸.

To take these arguments individually, it seems absurd that Pandusinus should be seen as a requisitioning agent whose contract was yet to be fulfilled. Thisbai's secession from Rome's cause had been instant in 172/1, in which case it was hardly the door on which to knock for supplies to support the besieging army; less likely still that a general such as Lucretius should then submit such a dispute to arbitration⁶⁹. Mommsen's theory seems equally tendentious, hingeing heavily as it does on his interpretation of the *κοινωνία/societas*; surely it is improbable that a town with a premium of cultivable land, and one whose prevailing tendency was ultimately anti-Roman, should consign its fields to an Italian farmer for the payment of a mere

tithe⁷⁰. It is more probable that contracts of the nature of Pandusinus' would be geared towards imports rather than exports, in accordance with the latter thoughts of Hatzfeld and with Nicolet. For, if Pandusinus was contracted to supply Thisbai with oil and grain, then his position would be badly compromised by Thisbai's initial stance against Rome; he would thus find himself having aided and abetted the enemies of Rome and so under suspicion of treason. The legal niceties of this situation might well demand the services of an external arbiter to separate the dutiful Pandusinus from the wrathful Lucretius. The alternative is that he had fulfilled his side of the bargain and found his payment blocked by the crisis⁷¹. This was thus an essentially private dispute concerning the completion and perhaps also renewal of the arrangement; that it made its way into the terms of a *senatus consultum* might suggest that there were some powerful vested interests involved with Pandusinus⁷².

A. Castricius A. f. Victor in the Pamboiotian games at Koroneia in the early second century. The issues concerning Castricius are nominally similar to those of Licinius and Cornelius above; in this case, the arguments are aided and abetted by the presence of Aulus' son or freedman, Heras, in a later inscription from Koroneia⁷³. Dittenberger's dating criteria, the absence of the ethnic and the presence of the qualifying *υἱός* to the patronymic, are complicated; these have already been seen to be unreliable. He tends to an argument of circumstance based on the fact that the catalogue is headed by an archon ἐν Ἀρχαιφίλοις; this he equates with the period following 146, when the

Boiotian confederacy was formally dissolved, but continuing to function for the organisation of such as these games⁷⁴.

Again there seems a strong argument for shifting this circumstance forward to the years of the Third Makedonian War. For the Boiotian *koinon* then again was in a state of limbo, but managed to stage the Basileia at Lebadeia in 171. At that time, Koroneia was still under siege, not to fall until the following summer of 170; however, the city was not unified in its resistance to Rome, but there was a strong party of exiles who re-entered the city and assumed control under the terms of the *senatus consultum de Koronaeis* issued in the aftermath of its fall⁷⁵. Once Hostilius' army had won this victory and imposed these terms, they moved on to winter quarters at Larisa; the attitude of the Greeks behind them, however, was very much influenced by the embassy of C. Popillius and Cn. Octavius that passed through all the major states that winter⁷⁶. Thus, as life returned to normal in Koroneia and Boiotia in general, perhaps the dues owed to the gods were fulfilled, but in a very definite way. The archon ἐν Ἀκραίφῳις may reflect a Koroneian magistrate elected in exile; a stand-in magistrate, given that Koroneia would not have had time for elections; or, more probably, a shift of the federal capital to the notably pro-Roman Akraiphiai, now that the *koinon* had settled into its state of emasculation⁷⁷. If the city was recovering still from its capture by Hostilius, it might well have felt able only to stage a restricted festival; hence the narrow range of tournaments and small number of cities who entered⁷⁸. If the city equally felt the need to show remorse for its recalcitrance and enthusiasm for its new

masters, it might well have invited members of the Roman army to participate; hence the victory of Castricius. The probability of this construct is affected by the chronological and constitutional uncertainties; but it again stands by the considerations of context and the elasticity of the epigraphy.

What these inscriptions demonstrate above all is the full scope of Rome's military impact on Boiotia during the Third Makedonian War. As the embassy of Popillius and Octavius suggests, the ideal was the iron fist in the velvet glove; Rome would provide a string of *φιλάνθρωπα* for the Greeks, but only if they complied with her wishes. Thus the army was as willing to be embraced in the bosom of the local communities as those communities were to secure their future by showing themselves to be friends of Rome and, specifically, individual Romans. The presence of Pandusinus adds a further dimension to this, and opens possibilities for interpretation of the otherwise obscure Octavius and Norcinus. If we are correct, he was taking advantage of the economic crisis which Rome, amongst others, exacerbated back in the third century, from which Central Greece never adequately recovered; he himself was also exacerbating that crisis by establishing a balance of trade deficit in the Thisbaian economy which became subject to a Roman arbitration which would presumably favour him. We cannot say for sure whether this situation also existed in Akraiphiai; the general economic climate of the time might suggest so. Yet whatever purpose Octavius and Norcinus fulfilled there, the attitude of the town revealed is enlightening for contemporary Boiotian studies.

(ix). MISCELLANEOUS.

Having observed these concentrations of individuals within significant geographical areas, let us now tidy up the sprinkling of characters found elsewhere in the east. These may hint at a broader, more variegated presence and so might corroborate or provide background to much of the above.

Philokrates son of Pythios of Cumae. Victor in the Panathenaia, Athens, some time after 180. Philokrates is included here on the possibility that he is from Italy and so follows the distinguished line of the likes of Nikokles, Aristokles and Philemon in competition at Athens; however, the greater likelihood is that his home was in Aiolis¹.

Caius son of Dazos Polphennius of Brundisium. Granted *proxenia* by the Epirote *koinon* at Dodona, with *ateleia*, *enteleia*, *asphaleia*, *enktesis* and other associated privileges; dated 175-170. Cabanes denounces Münzer's tortured efforts to restore the decree to read C. Dazoupos Rennaius and thus one of the Herennii; this is corroborated by mention of the Pulfennii listed by Dessau and the occurrence of the Illyrian name Dazos with some frequency in Messapia². The date of the decree comes from the general Antinoos, the opponent of Charops in Polybios' narrative; thus, although it is obviously late 170s, Cabanes is reluctant to place it after Epiros' secession to Perseus in 170³.

Polphennius' services are unfortunately obscure. Cabanes postulates that, since the honours were federal, they were related to some assistance afforded by Polphennius to Epirote officials en route to Rome; Hammond seems to support this by his observation that "an occasion for diplomatic relations with a citizen of Brundisium might well have arisen in the opening decades of the second century BC"⁴. Yet the interpretation of Hatzfeld seems as good as any. He sees Polphennius as one of those who took advantage of the Ambrakia treaty of 187 for easy access to Central Greece, whereupon his service was commercial; hence the specific nature of the privileges extended to him⁵. If this is correct, then Brundisium's absence from the Delphic *thearodokeia* list discussed above may be more significant than Nachtergaele imagined⁶.

P. Cornelius P.f. Blasio. Author of a letter to Kerkyra concerning a decree issued to the envoys of Athamania and Ambrakia on request; dated 175-160. The prime account of this inscription is Holleaux's, as are the *raison d'être* and the dating⁷. To him, the decree concerns a border dispute between Ambrakia and Athamania, which they submitted to Rome for arbitration; the senate in turn handed the matter over to Kerkyra. The letter and decree are to inform and to empower the Kerkyraians to this effect; their judgment also seems to survive, to corroborate this thesis⁸. Holleaux's dating criteria are rigorously prosopographical, epigraphical and historical.

The decree highlights the degree of dependence upon Rome established in the states of Ambrakia and Athamania in the aftermath of the

Antiochos war. We know of Ambrakia's virtual transformation into a "free" conduit for Roman traffic into Central Greece, whilst Athamania was deemed similarly important as a route into and buffer zone for Thessaly and Makedon, with or without the cooperation of Amynder⁹. The imprecision of the dating makes it impossible to put this into context, be it before or after the watershed of the Third Makedonian War; yet the decree represents a stage when the situation was well-developed and virtually ideal for Rome. The imposition of obligation upon Kerkyra is similarly significant in that it encourages the requisite degree of dependence combined with independence.

M. Cornelius C.f. Listed as *thearodokos* for Samé, Kephallenia, at Delphi around 175. Cornelius has been mentioned above in our discussion of the agonistic inscriptions from Boiotia, and the *thearodokos* list was discussed in our survey of Delphi in the early second century. We decided then that the list was compiled according to the geographical progression of the *theoroi* in the field; the implication thence is that the *thearodokoi* were appointed by their own states, rather than by Delphi, which lessened the honour somewhat. Yet Cornelius was listed out of sequence, in an appended section compiled at a later or separate occasion; he was one of four *thearodokoi* appointed by Samé, which may be explicable either by the apparently wide time span of the list or by the desire to lessen the burden of the obligation¹⁰. That he was a man of substantial private means need not be reiterated. That he was resident on Kephallenia seems similarly likely, otherwise the discharge of his duties would have been impossible. The alternative is that the status

was honorary and bestowed upon Cornelius as the absentee landlord of some property or facility which might perform the function on his behalf. Either way, his presence on the island was considerable, and recognised as such by the Kephallenians who bestowed upon him this honour. This was surely one of the results of Rome's annexation of the island in 189, following Fulvius Nobilior's siege of Samé. Walbank said that this decision was taken "to enable the Romans to overlook Greece from the west and to control the sea-crossing to and from Italy"; Cornelius' presence is perhaps the practical application of that¹¹. Whether Cornelius' presence was commercial or quasi-official, he would have provided a core for the Roman presence on the island, so enabling Lucretius and company to find there a reliable naval base in the Third Makedonian War¹².

There are no clues in the inscription as to whether Cornelius was attested nobleman or obscure bourgeois; if the former, then the families to which he might belong are listed above. The Cethegus who was legate in 171 and consul in 160 was M. C.f., but this connection should not be overstretched¹³. It is interesting to note that a further Roman, L. Octavius also features in the list, but since the city he represents and the date are both irrecoverable, his significance can only be viewed in the most general terms¹⁴.

P. Volusius C.f. Rhomaios; Secunda Nona and Elpis Rhomaia, daughter of Caius and wife of A. Granius; Merope Stertina L.f. Rhomaia. Sepulchral monuments from Zakynthos, dated to the second century. The vagueness of

the dating is a major problem here, preventing development of the above on Cornelius with corroboration by a definite Roman presence on neighbouring Zakynthos, surrendered to Rome in 191/0¹⁵. The stones show that a Roman community did develop on Zakynthos, attracted as at Kephallenia by its position at the very gateway to Central Greece; what they do not show is how early this developed. The Volusii were a major gens at Rome with a Latin or Etruscan name of some antiquity; their presence was noted on Delos in the later second century, including amongst others L. Cossutius¹⁶.

Dazos son of Dazos of Canusium in Italy. Dedicant at shrine of Asklepios in Epidauros, in early-mid second century. See above, Section A ch. v n. 5.

Cn. Octavius Cn. f. Rhomaios. (i). Granted *proxenia* by Argos with associated *euergesia*, *asphaleia*, *ateleia*, *asylia* and other privileges, dated 170/69; (ii). honoured with a statue by the people of Elis at around the same time; (iii). honoured with a statue at Echinus, 168/7, for which see above, ch. iv n. 40; (iv). dedicant of a gold crown on Delos, probably in 163, for which see below, Section E. The first of these honours is obviously occasioned by Octavius' progress on the embassy of the winter of 170/69 in company with C. Popillius on the bidding of the consul, A. Hostilius Mancinus, from his winter quarters at Larisa¹⁷. The intent of this was to offer both carrot and stick to the Greeks. The legates informed the various league assemblies of the kindness and philanthropy of Rome, citing in their justification the

decrees concerning Abdera, Chalkis *et al.* Yet they also made it clear that they knew precisely who stood for them and who against them¹⁸. Polybios reports that the legates were on the verge of open accusations against their opponents amongst the Achaians, but lacked only the opportunity¹⁹; this caused the Achaians to think long and hard about their next move. The subsequent debate in Polybios has Apollonidas and Stratios recommending no action against Rome, but the reining in of those states τοὺς δ' ὑπερκυβιστῶντας καὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων ἰδίαν χάριν ἀποτιθέμενους παρὰ Ῥωμαίους καὶ τοῦτο πράττοντας παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ παρὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον²⁰. Those states surely include Argos and Elis; this is apparent from Argos' listing of Octavius' services to them. What they sought to gain is apparent from Polybios' narrative; insurance against the wrath of Rome by securing the good favour of a powerful advocate for their case and by positively demonstrating their position in the struggle against Perseus²¹. However, that he was the junior member of this embassy suggests that the two cities might have been hedging their bets should events have turned the other way; the counterbalance of this would be Charneux's belief that Popillius was also honoured, but that these honours have since been lost²².

It might be worth reiterating that Octavius would return to Rome after the Third Makedonian War as the holder of some considerable influence in Greece, not only from these honours, but also from his service as Aemilius Paullus' interpreter²³. As embassies arrived in Rome from Greece to make representations in the aftermath of Pydna, he would be a busy man, catapulted to the forefront of the political scene; it

would be a surprise if this status did not in some way contribute to his election to the consulship of 165²⁴.

Q. Marcius L.f. Philippus. Honoured with a statue by the Achaian *koinon* at Olympia in return for his ἀρετή and καλοκαγαθία towards them and the other Greeks. Since Philippus is styled *strategos hypatos*, this must postdate his election to the consulship for 169. The statue is most probably related to his declining the offer of the Achaians to send help to him against Perseus, and his preventing them sending help to Ap. Claudius Centho in Epiros in response to his request²⁵. Polybios in his narrative adds the rider that Philippus may have sought either good for the Achaians or ill for Centho²⁶; yet as a politician, Polybios managed to persuade the League that the consul was hereby saving them 120T of unnecessary expenditure²⁷. Even a man less perspicacious than Polybios would have realised the precarious position of the Achaians at this time, discouraged from proving their support for the Roman effort and instead charged with the thankless and largely hopeless task of mediating between Antiochos and the Ptolemies²⁸. Caught thus between a rock and a hard place, the obvious way out for Polybios and company was to importune the good favour of the consul by the granting of this honour, to show that they were grateful for his recommendations; what this of course established was a mutual bond, by which they too could call upon Philippus to reciprocate, should the need arise. Ironical, then, that Philippus, the dissolver of confederacies and divider of Greece, should find himself guardian of the last major confederacy in the

peninsula; whether or not he felt bound by this, it is difficult to tell from subsequent events²⁹.

E. DELOS.

To judge from the temple accounts from Delos assembled by Durrbach, latterly in partnership with Roussel, in the volumes entitled "Inscriptions de Délos", there are two distinct categories of Italian dedicant on the island during our period. The first and most notable consists of historically identifiable Roman magistrates, who appear largely around the time of the Antiochos War in the late 190s/early 180s, and conform to a regular pattern of official dedications in the temple of Apollo. The second and rather more obscure category consists of more parsimonious dedicants; the consensus concerning these is that they are members of a petite bourgeoisie, the forerunners of the Italian mercantile community that would develop on the island after its elevation to the status of free port under Athenian tutelage in 166¹. Hatzfeld drew a picture of *negotiatores* from the Italian *municipia* choosing to dissociate themselves from Roman politics and rather to enrich themselves in business far away; to him, they were parasites on rather than pilots of Roman foreign policy². Laidlaw tacitly accepts this datum of Italian merchants, traders and bankers riding on the wave of Roman militarism³. Zalesskij, in an impressive if not altogether progressive economic dissertation, places these characters in a well-structured system of capitalists, usurers and agents reflective of the economy of Italy that developed after the *lex Claudia* of 218⁴.

Naturally, a number of questions are raised by these assessments and by a closer examination of the temple accounts themselves. These questions are on the lines of why Roman magistrates felt the need to put in at Delos and leave souvenirs of their presence; to whom the dedications were directed and to what effect; how many offerings they made in comparison to other Hellenistic powers and kingdoms; what were the diplomatic connotations of this ratio; what were their antecedents in the dedication game; what followed after, in terms of both their magisterial successors and their fellow countrymen of lesser status and wealth; was this a manifestation of official policy, or was it a subject of personal whim; and so on. The accounts themselves, repetitive and tralatician, but also not infrequently contradictory and problematic, present questions of their own in terms of ancient listing criteria, dating and chronology and infrastructure^s. We must begin with them to quantify the Romans and Italians on the island in the years before 167 and to define the two categories more succinctly. For this, we must square the accounts with each other, particularly those recorded before 167 with those recorded after; thus Durrbach's volume of nos. 372-509, engraved before the freeing of the port in 166, must be matched with Durrbach and Roussel's volume of nos. 1400-1496, engraved during the period of Athenian domination after 166. It is important to remember that it is rare for a dedication to be recorded only once, but more frequent that it is re-recorded under each new catalogue for as long as it remains in the sanctuary.

Let us begin with the more easily quantifiable historical figures that occur in the pre-166 catalogues, using the post-166 catalogues only for verification where duplication is apparent from a comparison of offerings⁶. The most complete accounts are assembled under those two catalogues nos. 439 and 442; the two are largely duplicative, the latter the more comprehensive version in terms of deposits by temple bankers, temple and state expenditure and, most importantly, individual dedications. A positive *terminus ante quem* is provided by the fact that the latter list was compiled during the archonship of Demares, that is, 179⁷. The following Roman magistrates occur in these and, where mentioned, other lists during the first twenty years of the second century; the dates are provided by Broughton for their relevant periods of office. Unless otherwise mentioned, the dedications are gold crowns in the Great Temple of Apollo:-

T. Quinctius Flaminius (i) 439A. 77; 442B. 85-6; 443Bb. 13; 448B. 7; 1429A. 21-2; ?1441A. 105-6; 1443A. 93.

(ii) Silver shield in temple of Seven Statues. 442B. 178; 443Bb. 102; 444B. 17; ?457. 27; 1443BII. 44; 1446. 15; 1449D. 7. Consul/proconsul in 198-4; legate to Greece in 192/1 and 183.

P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus ?428. 13-4; 442B. 102; 443Bb. 27-8; 454A. 1-2; 455Bd. 1-2; 468. 8; 1429AI. 25-6; 1450A. 68 Consul in 194.

A. Atilius Serranus 439A. 78; 442B. 86; 443Bb. 13; 1429A. 19-20; 1450A. 66
Praetor classis in 192.

C. Livius Salinator 439A.78; 442B.86; 443Bb.13; 448B.8; 1429A.29-30;
1450A.68-9 *Praetor classis* in 191.

L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus (i) 428.13; 439A.81; 442B.89-90; 443Bb.16-
7; 448B.12-3; 1429AII.15-6; 1432AbI.42; 1441AI.106; 1443AI.130
(ii) 427.12; 439A.81-2; 442B.90-1; 443Bb.17-8; 448B.12-3; 1429A.27-8;
?1443AI.94; 1450A.68; 1458.15
(iii) 442B.99-100; 443Bb.26-7; 1450A.67; 1458.15 *Praetor Siciliae* in
193 and consul/proconsul in 190-89.

Cn. Manlius (Μαέλλιος) Vulso 439A.89-90; 442B.99-100; 443Bb.26; 448B.24;
1429A.23-5; 1441AI.104-7; 1450A.67 Consul in 189.

Q. Fabius Labeo 442B.102-3; 443Bb.28; ?454A.2-3; 455Bd.2-3; 1429B.18-9;
1441AI.104; ?1443AI.93; 1450A.66; 1458.10-11 *Praetor classis* in 189.

L. Aemilius Regillus 442B.103-4; 443Bb.28-9; ??468.10 *Praetor classis*
in 190.

Before considering these men in detail, let us tabulate the lesser individuals who appear in these earlier lists. These entries admit considerably more variety both in shape and size of offering and in the site of dedication; it is often the poverty of these offerings which separates them from the magisterial offerings when only a praenomen is recorded by the cataloguers. These offerings, with the points of interest which they raise, are as follows:-

Titus Mentius 427.11, identified with the Titi of 439A.80, 442B.89 and 443Bb.16. Gold crown worth only two obols, in temple of Apollo. His proximity to Scipio Asiaticus in the former list may encourage identification of some association between the two, yet there are hazards in this approach⁸.

Quintus (i) 296B.48, 399B141, 442B.202, 443Bb.125, 444B.44-5, ?461Bb.33-4, 1443BI.110. Three gold pieces on a wooden base, in the Artemision. The first of these catalogues is dated shortly after 244, and is thus the earliest Roman offering on Delos other than that purported to be of Ogulnius Gallus⁹. Its approximate synchronicity with the disputed Roman embassy to Alexandria around 240 may conceivably be significant¹⁰.

Quintus (ii) 439A.32, 442B.33-4, 461Ba.40-1, 465e.25, 1443AII.48, 1450A.196. μυσσαβαί/ποτηριον ὀνυχινον in the temple of Apollo.

Quintus (iii) 1429AII.4-5, 1432AbI.34, 1450A.87. A wreathed crown in the temple of Apollo. Although this is found only in the post-166 lists, Durrbach and Roussel posited an identification with the Q. Plinius mentioned below¹¹. It is improbable that all these three Quinti are one and the same man; although repetitions of dedications do often take different forms, the time span from 244 to 180 is too great¹².

Publius 439A.57, 442B.61-2, ?461Ba.67-8, 465f.12. Φιάλη in temple of Apollo. This may or may not be identifiable with that of 1439AbcI.31, 1441Ai.55 and 1450A.42. The dedication in the first two inscriptions

cited bears no satisfactory distinction from the flute of Satyros which follows it¹³.

Lucius 439A.77, 442B.85, 443Bb.12, 448B.7, 1404.20. A golden brooch in the temple of Apollo. This dedication perhaps belonged to the younger Flamininus¹⁴.

Trebius Bibius 442B.130, 443Bb.52, 1441AII.65, 1449AabII.143, 1450A.161-2 (Bibius *Rhomaïos*); 440A.87 (Trebius, the supplier of materials for the building of the *oikos* of Theorrhetos); ?454B.2-3, 1432AbII.17-8 (Trebius Bibius *Rhomaïos*). Silver statuette of Apollo with *kithara* and crown, in temple of Apollo. This identification of the one individual in a variety of guises is vigorously opposed by Hatzfeld; he takes the pre-166 lists separately from the post-166 lists and concludes that "la différence des dates et des offrandes rend peu vraisemblable l'identification"¹⁵. Yet surely the similarity of offerings and names suggests precisely the opposite. Hatzfeld's primary error is to assume that a list compiled after 166 includes only offerings made after that date; he also fails to pick up on the eccentricities of a cataloguing procedure that obviously does not comprehend the interconnections of Roman and Italian nomenclature and so oscillates between the recording of either the praenomen or the gentilicial or both. Livy attests to the Bruttian origin of the name Bibius/Vibius¹⁶, whilst the inscription 440A.87 suggests that our man has some primary interest in the building trade, either as contractor, supplier or some other breed of middle-man.

Minatus Teius 442B. 147-8, 443Bb. 64-5, 1431. 24, 1432AbI. 30, 1443AI. 123, 1450A. 85. Gold crown in the temple of Apollo. Minatus', Oppius' and Plinius' offerings are all dated positively to the archonship of Telesarchides, 181¹⁷. Minatus styles himself a *Rhomaïos* from Cumae; his precise name is the subject of dispute, Durrbach restoring it as Teius and Hatzfeld as Staios¹⁸. He is, however, clearly the son of that Minatus who is listed as a dedicant some time before 220¹⁹. Frederiksen believes that father and son were Capuans who remained loyal to Rome in 215 and were rewarded with citizenship of Cumae, hence the ethnic; for Minatus is a "very common Capuan name"²⁰.

L. Oppius 442Bb. 65, 443Bb. 65, 468. 2, 1404. 17. Small crown in temple of Apollo. Frederiksen notes that the name figures prominently in Capuan bronze-working lists of the second century, but since Cato can be seen railing against a contractor and wine-supplier called Oppius, it would seem that the name was not uncommon²¹. The identification with the tribune of 197 is dismissed by Durrbach, without conviction²².

Q. Plinius 442B. 148, 443Bb. 65, 1432AbI. 34. Small crown in temple of Apollo. The name is restored as Quintus from the Kintos of the original, whilst the post-166 listing is, as aforementioned, a reasonably adventurous assumption on the part of Durrbach. The name Plinius is also among those remarked by Frederiksen in the second century bronze-working lists of Capua.

Dazos son of Daziskos Azantinos 439A.50, 442B.53, 455Bb.17, 1432AbII.74-5. Φιάλη in temple of Apollo. Durrbach and Hatzfeld, although differing on the precise spelling of the ethnic, consider him an aboriginal Italian from the south of the peninsula, most probably from Azetium in Apulia²³. Zaleskij picks up on a number of Delian *amphorae* inscribed ΔAZ to quantify him as an oil exporter active in her system of usury²⁴.

?Amphikleides of Naxos, Sicily 442B.51-2, 461Ba.57. Φιάλη in temple of Apollo. Why Amphikleides should appear in the dative is unclear; it may rather be that Νάξιοι is plural, and this is a state dedication. Durrbach's reading of the latter part of the dedication ἐξικελίας is mysterious; it should surely be ἐκ Σικελίας to qualify the Naxus.

Timon son of Nymphodoros of Syracuse 399A.10-64 (as banker making deposit in temple bank); 439A.68, 442B.74, ?465f.25, ?472.10, 1429A.13, 1450A.65. Gold crown, in temple of Apollo. cf. 1450A.57, wherein a Timon dedicates a δακτυλῖος πλατὺς λίθον ἔχων. Timon also received a grant of *proxenia* from the Delians to go with similar grants from the Nesiotic League around 188 and from Tenos in the late third century. Timon's role as banker and his move from Tenos to Delos after the Antiochos war are discussed elsewhere²⁵.

Aside of these dedicants catalogued in the temple accounts, the following Romans and Italians also feature in Delian epigraphy before

Drakon son of Lykon of Tarentum A tragedian who performed for the god and made a dedication of torches in 279. Drakon has already been mentioned for his performance at Delphi in 255/4 and the presence of his son Aristophamos in Aitolia.

Serdon Rhomaios A *thaumatopoiος* in a list of those appearing before the god in 259, along with one Aristion, perhaps his assistant or sidekick. Durrbach comments that the name is not a Roman one, unless it was Herdo or Herdonius, deriving from that Herdonia in Apulia that was the site of Hannibal's victory over Fulvius Flaccus in 212²⁶. There is a consideration that *Rhomaios* refers to a member of a *genus histrionum* who spoke in Latin, perhaps reflected in the recording of a ῥωμαιστης in similar circumstances²⁷; but *Rhomaios* is more likely to be an ethnic.

Novius Paid by the sanctuary for συνκαυσαντι τα κτηνη. Thus he appears to be an artisan working either full- or part-time for the sanctuary. The name is common enough on Delos after the freeing of the port and the establishment of the Italian community, and appears to have deep roots in Campania²⁸.

Bouzos Orteira of Canusium *Proxenos* and *evergetes* some time between 240 and 232, with additional rights of *enktesis*, *proedria* and *prosodos* to *demos* and *boulé*; the dating is supported by letter forms²⁹. The name appears to be Oscan, although whether Orteira is a patronymic, a gentilicial or a cognomen is not clear³⁰.

Sotion son of Theodoros Rhomaïos Proxenos dated by the letter forms to the hellenistic period. The inscription is too fragmentary to provide any further details, apart from that the proposer of the decree was one Tles-----³¹.

Agathon son of Numpsios of Petelia Dedicant of an altar to the Egyptian deities Serapis, Anubis and Isis at the turn of the century. Hatzfeld remarks that the name is probably derived from Numisius, and on the novelty of the terminology, but not on the choice of gods³².

Unknown son of Dexiobatos of Tarentum Honoured, presumably with *proxenia*, in a fragmentary decree of the late-third/early second century, so dated by the restoration of the sponsor to be Menyllos son of Polybos. Menyllos was similarly a sponsor around 201, a treasurer of the sanctuary recorded in the inventory of Demares of 179, and either the father or the son of the Polybos who conveyed the crown of Q. Fabius Labeo to Delos³³.

Marcus son of Publius Rhomaïos Proxenos and *evergetes*, with sundry rights of *enktesis* and *prosodos* to *demos* and *boulé*. The context is obscured by the loss of the early lines of the inscription; yet no official capacity is indicated for Marcus and there was no Marcus P.f. known to have been operative in the Aigaian before 166 on the service of Rome. Homolle spotlights a P. Aimulius M.f. who appears on Delos between 166 and 156; the suggestion of Durrbach and Jardé is that Marcus was the father of this Aimulius, yet he might equally well be unconnected³⁴. The

date can be estimated from the proposer of the decree, Teisikles, who is also found in the inventory of Demares³⁵.

M. Sextius M. f. of Fregellae *Proxenos* and *euergetes* with associated *enktesis* and *prosodos* around 180, at the same time as Timon the Syracusan banker; however, any suggestions of a connection based on synchronicity are most probably unfounded³⁶.

From these sundry inscriptions, it seems that a grant of Delian *proxenia* was inextricably bound to the status of *euergesia*; it also included as a matter of course the expensive business of *enktesis*, inside a reasonably standard formula making provision for *proedria* and/or *prosodos*. On the *euergesia*, it would seem natural that the two should walk hand in hand. Delos existed almost entirely as a sanctuary to Apollo and an associated harbour-market, in which case the majority of visitors would be there for the specific purposes of either homage or commerce³⁷. With this purpose revealed and fulfilled, the dedication performed or the business transacted, the service to Delos was no longer a potential; all that the Delians could do was encourage the repetition of that service with a view to the increase of their own material wealth. The interesting thing is that this incentive was provided by *enktesis*. Either the Delians were confident that the offer would not be taken up, or they were genuinely keen to increase the size of their overall population in this way with men of this calibre. It seems that smaller states were characteristically generous in making such grants, since they were relatively few³⁸. Yet the Delians were still maintaining

this generosity in 179, when many believe that the island was awash with traders and businessmen hot on the heels of the Roman armies. The implications of this will be revealed as we progress.

After the appearance of the peripatetic tragedian Drakon, the first official Roman presence in the Kyklades was that of the embassy of Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges, N. Fabius Pictor and Q. Ogulnius Gallus to Alexandria in 273. As they weaved through the islands on the return route, they made a stopover on Delos, resulting in Ogulnius' dedication in celebration of the victory over Pyrrhos. However, this in no way precipitated an Italian rush to take advantage of this news of the rise of Rome as it spread far and wide. The next twenty years saw only the low-life of the roving prestidigitator Serdon, the performer Agathodoros and the artisan Novius appearing on Delos, the former pair no doubt for their novelty value and the latter by the sheer chance of his working for a body that kept inscribed accounts. Novius' motivation for leaving Campania, be it voluntary or enforced, and his presence either in isolation or as part of a number of mobile artisans, can only be matters for speculation.

A fresh period might well be heralded by what Schulhof edited as the fragmentary remains of a Roman state dedication dated between 250-240³⁹. The timing would suggest that this was in honour of, and indeed announcement of Rome's victory over Carthage; perhaps it was the loosening of Carthage's shackles on the trade routes around the Ionian Sea off Sicily that gave way to something of a burst of activity in the

Kyklades. Thus a Quintus made a dedication in the Delian sanctuary shortly after 244; although the date is somewhat early, he might have been associated with the official dedication in some way⁴⁰. The Canusian Bouzos also found his way east in the 230s, at roughly the same time as the Koan Asklepieiaia and the beginning of the Illyrian depredations; it is no straightforward conclusion that Bouzos became a resident of Delos due to the formulaic nature of the grant of *enktesis*, yet his service to sanctuary or market was obviously substantial. Perhaps this minor concentration on the Kyklades represented their convenience as halfway-houses between land masses for trade and for the simple traveller; Tenos was a thriving corn market in the early second century, and it is probable that neutral territory such as this with its less complex and oppressive regulations and taxes made it the ideal medium for business transactions⁴¹. This extends to cover the Campanian Minatus in the late 220s, especially given his origin in the hotbed of Central Italian trade⁴². Given the comparative sparseness of this western presence on Delos in the third century, it is dangerous to assume too much; it is an occupational hazard that we cannot tell whether our subjects were the tip of the iceberg or the sum total of all western travellers.

If the third century traffic to and from Delos is shrouded in doubt and conjecture, then the second century admits more certainty, particularly the Roman magisterial presence and dedication policy of the early years. As aforementioned, the initiation of that policy came from Flamininus and was followed swiftly by Scipio Africanus with a view to counteracting Antiochos' influence in the Eastern Aigaian⁴³. Thus, for

the course of the war with Antiochos, it was standard practice for Roman magistrates travelling to Asia Minor to make a dedication to Apollo, be it in person or not. Thus Homolle saw the magisterial offerings as "trop régulières, trop uniformes pour être attribuées à la seule piété des magistrats", but that they represent "un hommage officiel, rendu au nom de l'Etat, et en vertu des conventions qui lient Rome et Délos"⁴⁴. For his part, Holleaux asked

"est-il besoin d'ajouter que Délos était, à l'aller comme au retour, une escale indiquée et presque nécessaire sur la route qu'il parcourut; que les magistrats romains avaient accoutumé d'y faire arrêt; et qu'ils laissaient volontiers au trésor du dieu le souvenir généreux de leur passage ?"⁴⁵.

Thus both consuls who journeyed east, Scipio Asiaticus and Manlius Vulso, recorded their passage, both presumably on the return journey⁴⁶. All four *praetores classis* who were active in the Aigaian from 192-189 made dedications. The fact that Fabius Labeo and Aemilius Regillus made theirs in absentia creates the impression that the fact of representation by the dedication was more important than the dedication itself or the act of dedication⁴⁷. This was the most utilitarian diplomacy; as soon as Antiochos was defeated, the policy was apparently terminated. For none of the legates who were sent to Asia Minor to assist in Manlius Vulso's settlement appear in the temple inventories, although the consul himself took time out on his return journey to mark his achievement⁴⁸. Thereafter it was not until the period of the Third Makedonian War that there was any further concentration of magisterial dedications; the renewal of the friendship with Delos was a sure indication that Rome had clearly achieved her ends by 189⁴⁹. That being

the case, it seems most likely that the dedication policy was centrally authorised after the example of Flamininus, and was for definite propaganda effect; when the balance had swung and Rome had won the east, the policy was redundant.

Following this settlement, Homolle opines that "de telles circonstances étaient favorables à la reprise des relations commerciales entre l'Italie et Délos; les émigrants arrivent avec ou derrière les armées; après les généraux, les marchands"⁵⁰. This interpretation places the likes of Minatus Junior, Oppius and Plinius soon after 189, as merely the tip of a whole iceberg of Italian merchants that drifted into Delos on the coat-tails of the conquering Roman army, to exploit the goodwill created on the island by the magisterial dedications. This, however, is difficult to prove. The Minati had frequented Delos since the 220s; Rome's forces were hardly catalytic in opening their horizons in the 180s. We remember that Timon of Syracuse apparently moved from Tenos to Delos in the immediate aftermath of Flamininus' dedication; he may not have been alone in following Roman diplomacy rather than awaiting the march of Rome's armies. Furthermore, Minatus Junior, Oppius and Plinius seem not to have appeared until 181; it could hardly be said that the victory of 189 had immediate results⁵¹. *Proxenia* grants still included *enktesis*, when there was only so much property to offer. Numbers are still small, especially when compared to those who arrived after the freeing of the port in 166; our enquiry into other regions of Greece has shown that it was the developments of 185-3, rather than the Antiochos war itself, which made a difference to east-west relations,

but that this did not match up to the effects of the Third Makedonian War. Thus although 189 provided a certain impetus to the progression of the Italian colony on Delos, one cannot say that the roots of the colony were founded here rather than in the earlier period. If there is a point to be made here, it is probably that of Zaleskij. For the post-Hannibalic period in Italy saw the reorganisation and development of the Italian economy along the lines prefigured by the *lex Claudia* of 218 to produce a boom in the export market administered by a similarly flourishing network of usury. Thus, as Puteoli developed as the major emporium of the peninsula, the expansion followed established lines between Southern Italy, Sicily and the Greek East; Rome's military expansion along similar lines was rather coincidental, and thus facilitative rather than causal for this economic development⁵². That Delos lay on one of these lines was to its advantage; yet the comparison between the respective impetuses of 189 and 166 is not favourable.

Following the dateable inventory of Demares, it becomes more difficult to delineate those in the Athenian catalogues who date before the freeing of the port in 166 and those who date after it; with those historically unidentifiable characters, it is impossible. However, those historically identifiable characters can be isolated with a view to assessing the magisterial presence during the Third Makedonian War. The characters, patterns and motivations of those men can reveal much about Rome's relations with Delos in the build-up to the decision to free the port.

Cn. Octavius 1429AI.11-2, 1450A.64, 1459.4. His activities in Greece, both as legate of Hostilius in 170 and as *praetor classis* in 168, have been discussed elsewhere and provided the ideal opportunity for such a dedication⁵³. However, the first inscription recorded him as *hypatos*, which refers to his consulship of 165; Roussel and Holleaux believe that the crown was dedicated on the embassy to the east of 163 on which Octavius was murdered, in which case the title was retrospective⁵⁴.

Q. Marcius Philippus 1429AI.30-2, ?1443AI.94-5, 1450A.69, 1458.21-2. Also mentioned above, his legateship of 172 and 171 would seem to provide more opportunity to visit Delos than would his consulship of 169. Since he is styled *hypatos* in the first inscription, Broughton assumed that the dedication was made in connection with his Rhodian dealings, although he seems to have ventured no further than the coast of Makedonia. Yet the title can be deemed retrospective, as with Octavius; since he was also consul in 186, his legateship or his place on the decemviral commission of 167 might have seen the dedication⁵⁵.

M. Decimius 1427.3. This is a somewhat tentative reading of Δεξιόμιος. Yet it might clear Livy of the charge of duplication of the embassy to Asia and the islands in 172, since Decimius is cited as part of the first embassy⁵⁶. Furthermore, of the six Decimii who feature in republican history, three appear as legates to the east between 172 and 168, one of whom became *praetor peregrinus* in the meantime⁵⁷. That not one, but three were selected as proponents of Roman diplomacy in this direction, largely without previous magisterial experience, suggests

some degree of local knowledge, especially when their appearances elsewhere are so sparse.

A. Postumius 1449AabII.55, 1450A.116.

C. Postumius 1432AaII.26, 1450A.136: ἡθμος ἐμ πλαισίωι. Although Aulus is absent from the earlier post-166 lists, there are strong arguments for his being the consul of 180, who was sent with one of the Decimii to Krete in 171 to levy troops⁵⁸. Caius might equally be the *tribunus militum* under Octavius who received the surrender of the royal pages of Perseus at Samothrace⁵⁹. Both these briefs would afford ample opportunities for dedication.

Popillius 1439AbcII.45, ?1450A.110. Less certain given the fragmentary evidence, this dedicant might well be the companion of Octavius in the mission of 170; for both to have offered to Apollo would have been a fitting epitaph to their achievement⁶⁰. However, since Octavius probably did not dedicate until 163, Popillius' mission to Egypt in 168 with one of the Decimii to order the withdrawal of Antiochos IV is the greater probability; his return journey would inevitably pass by Delos⁶¹.

C. Lucretius Gallus 460e.19

L. Hortensius 461Aa.83. *Praetores classis* respectively in 171 and 170 who did not dedicate at Delos, but were awarded gold crowns by the temple administration⁶².

If most of these men can be reasonably assumed to be magistrates during the Third Makedonian War, then there is an obvious contrast with the consistency of magisterial dedications of the Antiochos war. The diplomatic necessities of the situations were much the same; Perseus had made his presence felt at Delos and so lessened Rome's grip on the island to the extent that, in 168, he felt able to moor his fleet there alongside the Roman ships⁶³. The war similarly stretched into, if not across the Aigaian by its involvement of Pergamon and Rhodes. Yet Rome's reaction was wholly different to the coordinated dedication policy we saw earlier; now irregular and *ad hoc* dedications were made apparently on the whim of a random selection of magistrates. Reasons must be sought first for this change of policy, especially since Rome made strenuous diplomatic efforts to secure the moral advantage at Delphi⁶⁴; and second, for the motivation of those who did choose to visit and to dedicate.

The answer to the first of these lies partly in the differing political situations in Greece of the respective wars. In 191, Rome came as liberator, offering to spread her benevolence from mainland Greece across the whole Aigaian; thus she was careful to strike the right tone and establish a moral authority that would keep her military achievements in the right context. Since this initiative was aimed against the discredited Aitolians and the predatory Antiochos, such a supremacy was comparatively simple to attain and then maintain; dedications at Delos showed pious generals proceeding from a sympathetic senate with respect for the Greeks uppermost in their minds⁶⁵. By 172,

however, the true span of Rome's interpretation of "liberty" had been revealed to Greece, and the political scene in the cities and confederacies had disintegrated along the lines of Polybios' tripartite schematisation⁶⁶. Further, Perseus presented an opposite polarity for Greek sympathies by his careful preparation of the moral forum and his native Greek appeal⁶⁷. Rome's answer was to shoot first and ask questions later; thus they spend much time machinating a pretext for war and then precious little time implementing it⁶⁸. This bull-at-a-gate approach (if that is not an oversimplification) is marked by the impression that the document delivered to Delphi detailing the crimes of Perseus against which Rome fought does not date until 171/0; by this time, much military ground had been gained and the Amphiktyony were bound to accept the moral argument under force majeure⁶⁹. Thus, if Rome sought to override a complex political situation by brute force and did not risk a diplomatic offensive until the victory was nigh, it is unlikely that she would have set much store by a policy of dedication in the Delian temple of Apollo as a major vote-winning exercise.

Thus it seems unlikely that the gestures of these magistrates are designed for moralistic point-scoring; the validity of such an exercise had long been exhausted. Why, then, did those who chose to dedicate make that choice? It is possible that they were merely exceptionally pious men or ingenuous diplomats; yet it is equally possible that they saw something to gain from the practice. This latter arises indirectly from the fact that the Delians offered crowns to the two rogue *praetores*

classis, Lucretius and Hortensius; hardly the most philhellenic of Roman magistrates.

Strangely for a *praetor classis*, Lucretius' first assignment in Greece was the undertaking of the siege of Haliartos, a land-locked city, whilst his brother sailed the fleet around the Peloponnese from Kephallenia to Chalkis. Having captured the city and enslaved its inhabitants, he moved on to Thisbai to receive its surrender, place it under the control of the pro-Romans and sell the pro-Makedonians into slavery. His successor Hortensius achieved notoriety by his treatment of Abdera. Having demanded both money and corn from the city, he sacked it, executed the leading citizens and sold the rest into slavery; this because the Abderitans sought confirmation of his authority. Chalkis too complained to the senate that he had plundered the town and enslaved many of its inhabitants whilst billeting his sailors there; Lucretius was accused of the same. The senate were forced to acknowledge that their magistrates were out of control; Lucretius was tried and condemned, Hortensius severely reprimanded and envoys despatched to ransom the slaves and make suitable reparations to the communities of Abdera and Chalkis⁷⁰. Yet, condemned by their own people and by Greek popular opinion, Lucretius and Hortensius received honours from Delos on a par with those awarded to the most beneficent hellenistic monarch; this is more than a touch incongruous.

The key element in the activities of both praetors appears to be slaves. Both were keen to take them, the one from the accepted source of

a capitulated enemy, the other from the not so acceptable friends of Rome; both could find an immediate mart in which to dispose of them. When the senate despatched envoys to ransom these slaves, it was presumably to this mart that they proceeded. The issue of slaves is a seminal one for this period, as Ziolkowski's exploration of the uniqueness of Paullus' mass enslavement of the Molossi in 167 demonstrates⁷¹. For he points to the pestilence that swept through Italy from 175-173 as the single greatest factor in the creation of a need for such a supply of manpower. For this pestilence wiped out both cattle and slaves to create a workforce crisis in the agricultural economy that had developed in Italy since the Second Punic War⁷². At the same time, however, there was a policy disagreement in the senate over the measures to be taken. There were those such as M. Popillius Laenas and C. Cassius Longinus who had the foresight to attempt a remedy by summary action in Gaul and Liguria⁷³; and those who saw the solution of the Makedonian problem of the utmost importance, and thus the enslavement of friends and allies as the worst diplomatic tabu under the circumstances. However, when the effects of the pestilence were felt by all, the senate was forced to come to the drastic decision to enslave a nation of the most convenient geographical proximity to Italy, to facilitate the transportation of the slaves across the Adriatic and their subsequent distribution throughout the Italian estates. The senate never had cause to make a similar decision again; the subsequent diversification of the slave supply and the development of slave breeding insured against further shortages⁷⁴.

Strabo remarks upon the immunity of the sanctuary and the convenience of the harbour at Delos as a major draw-card for merchants and traders; he also says that the Romans were the most frequent attenders at the markets accompanying the festivals of Apollo, καὶ ὅτε συνειστήκει ἡ Κόρινθος. He says that the fame of the island grew rapidly consequent to the fall of Korinth; this he qualifies elsewhere by the fact that the Romans' wealth from Korinth was spent largely on slaves, οἰχέται⁷⁵. Strabo's point is thus that this *luxuria* from Korinth gave a fillip to the market in domestic slaves, as distinct from agricultural or industrial slaves. When the demand for the latter rose so dramatically in the 170s in view of the Italian pestilence, how did it affect Delos then ? The island had apparently long been a slave mart, although the date and origins of its *floruit* are not easy to ascertain; Strabo claimed that the slave trade was the biggest inducement for Cilician piracy in the Aigaian, whilst Laidlaw conversely concluded that "it was largely due to the pirates that Delos became a centre of slave-trading"⁷⁶. Thus, if the slave trade was well established on Delos by 171, of a greater or lesser magnitude, the questions of supply and demand might well surround the mart there. The demand came from Italy; the most convenient supply was those pirates who comprised the Roman fleet.

We have already remarked how strange it was that Lucretius, an admiral, should be called on to conduct a siege in the middle of a land mass. It is less strange if the siege was seen as a slaving mission with the need of a ready means of transport for the proceeds. Thus the

sending of the fleet to Chalkis is significant for the following reasons. This would have been the obvious transport for the slaves back to Italy; but the fleet was needed for more pressing work around the fringes of Greece. Thus, instead of assuming a position in the Gulf of Corinth, whence it could convey the slaves directly westwards, it waited at the head of the Euripos, whence it could make the short run to Delos; after depositing the slaves there for disposal via the machinery of the mart, it could return to business⁷⁷. The consequent boost to the Delian economy would be sufficient to warrant the award of a gold crown to Lucretius for his services in 171; to be acknowledged as the official repository of the Roman slave trade offered the prospect of a roll-on effect that would continue to grow once the pre-existing lines between the island and Italy had been transformed in this way. So also the crown to Hortensius in 169, perhaps a little prematurely. The second boost to the Delian mart was soon undercut by the senate's reparations to Abdera and Chalkis, although the fact that the envoys knew exactly where to find Hortensius' victims adds substance to this quasi-official status for Delos⁷⁸. Perhaps the crowns prepared for the senate and people of Rome in 465c.20 expressed a similar gratitude; as the Third Makedonian War developed, such a gesture was undoubtedly politically desirable, but it is not inconceivable that it was economically motivated as well. For, ignorant of the split in the senate over the slave issue, the Delians might well have interpreted the blind eye turned to Lucretius' activities in Boiotia as official condoning of the mission, and so saw fit to thank the whole Roman people⁷⁹.

This reconstruction casts Hortensius and Lucretius into the ranks of Ziolkowski's far-sighted pragmatists who were prepared to sacrifice the goodwill of friends and neighbours for the sake of a solution to the workforce crisis in Italy. However, the development of their programme in Greece was interrupted by the senatorial majority, shocked at the brutality of their methods; after the honours to Hortensius early in 169, there was quiet regarding Delos, no slaving missions passing through her, no honours or dedications for another two years at least. This quiet was surely due to the disgrace attached to the medium; in combatting Perseus, the senate could not be seen to condone the plundering and enslavement of free Greeks, and so the island was temporarily abandoned. It was not until after the defeat of Perseus, when public opinion fell subject to force majeure, that the senate felt able to sanction the slaving operation of Aemilius Paullus⁸⁰. As Ziolkowski says, that the decision was the last of its kind was

"a consequence of the diversification of sources of slave supply in the following period... thanks to that diversification, the influx of slaves became more regular and Italy never experienced so drastic a shortage of slaves as in the years 174-168"⁸¹.

It was in the immediate aftermath of that decision that the senate created a free port at Delos; the coincidence is striking⁸².

Explanations of the decision to create this free port are numerous and multi-faceted⁸³. That it was an Athenian appeal which brought about the decision may imply that it was a mark of favour to Athens for her friendliness⁸⁴. That Delos was consistently favoured by the Makedonian kings and harboured the Makedonian fleet may imply that she was being punished for her treachery⁸⁵. That such expensive efforts had been made

to gain diplomatic capital out of Delos and Delphi in the past twenty-five years may imply that the senate wished to secure such a manipulable forum. That Rhodes was subsequently crippled economically by the decision may imply that she was being punished for her temerity in remaining neutral and seeking arbitration in the Third Makedonian War^{ee}. That Rome's commercial expansion was undoubtedly facilitated by the decision may imply that the covert commercialism of a senatorial majority was a significant factor in the equation^{e7}. It is impossible to disentangle any one of these threads from the others to define a dominant line of reasoning; no doubt they all had some part to play in the decision. Yet it is surely a logical conclusion of the thesis of Ziolkowski that the decision to free Delos was taken at least in part as a means of diversifying the sources of slave supply in order to obviate the threat of future shortages. For not only had Lucretius and Hortensius experienced the advantages of the island in this respect during the prosecution of their policy; those whom the senate despatched to remedy the damage would also have witnessed those advantages in their ability to locate the victims of praetorian rapacity^{ee}. If the senate wished to avoid the moral turpitude of a second Molossi-type decision, then an obvious outlet was the encouragement of the development of the facilities to which her magistrates had given such a tremendous if temporary fillip in the early years of the war. That the freeing of the port had these sundry other implications as regards Athens, Rhodes and Delos herself, was much to the senate's advantage; yet it cannot be denied that it also boosted the activity for which above all Strabo knew Delos^{ee}.

What, then, of the magisterial dedications of this period ? That these were piecemeal and individualistic might imply that their bearers had much to gain from putting their name in a prominent position in Delos. If our identification of A. Postumius is correct, the consul of 180, then he was most closely bound to the relevant events of the 170s in order to make a significant dedication in 171. In 175 he was sent to Greece to investigate Dardanian complaints regarding an agreement between Perseus and the Bastarnae and to report on the war in Dardania⁹⁰. In 173 he was chosen as *decemvir sacris faciundis*. This led to his appointment under a *lex Plaetoria* as duovir for the dedication of an altar to Verminus to appease the vengeful deity who had sent the pestilence; archaeologists believe that this was in conjunction with a *lectisternium* and the erection of a temple to Hercules in the *Largo Argentina*⁹¹. Thus Postumius was intimately acquainted with both the nature of the crisis in Italy and the development of the war which was to alleviate that crisis. If his dedication does date to 171, then he was an integral part of the setting up of Delos as the recipient of the slave traffic; perhaps Decimius played a similar role. Yet he and his fellow dedicants Philippus and Labeo were on the decemviral commission which aided and abetted Aemilius Paullus' settlement of Greece in 167, Labeo indeed extending his brief some distance into the Aigaian⁹²; their knowledge would have been a significant factor in the senatorial decision to free the port in 166. C. Postumius and Popillius perhaps sensed the direction of the wind following the defeat of Perseus. If all these dedications dated to 167/6, the implication is commercial opportunism on an individual level, the taking of a chance to seize a

stake in the market before it exploded into life; it cannot be proven, but its circumstances are powerful. If true, the contrast with the period of the Antiochos war is striking, that between a unified and coherent policy designed purely for the good of the state, and a more personally expedient outlook seeking individual capital from a series of political developments.

Delos had always been geographically and ideologically advantaged as regards the commercial and diplomatic exploitation of the Aigaian. In the third century, this was sporadically realised by Roman embassies bound for greater destinations, whilst her allies and subjects followed lines of commerce that had linked Southern Italy and Sicily with the east for generations. When Rome's military expansion was necessarily drawn beyond the land mass of Central Greece, then Delos was thrust into the harsh diplomatic spotlight as the battleground for moral supremacy. This magisterial predilection sponsored a minor boom for westerners on the island; yet there was no material inducement for them to increase their involvement there, no *asylia*, no *ateleia*, no *asphaleia*. It was not until Delos proved herself a useful hinge for the slave trade during the Third Makedonian War that Rome's interest waxed again, yet there was nothing aesthetic or ideological about the interest now; it was the interest of pragmatism and expediency, at whose hands Delos finally succumbed to the tide of commercialism.

CONCLUSION

Our survey of the Italian presence in Greece from the third century to 167 falls into two complementary halves. The first, down to the end of the Second Punic War, is the extension of the picture of Beaumont concerning the lines of communication that had developed by the fourth century. These show a consistent religious traffic between the Greek cities in the south of the Italian peninsula and in Sicily, and the major hellenistic sanctuaries, particularly Delphi, Epidauros and Kos. As Rome established her influence over Italy and Sicily, so Delphi and her guardian Aitolia acknowledged the crucial phases of that development by reassessments of their own relationships with the western states, most notably in the late 270s and in 262. These relationships are necessarily high-profile and influential, given the nature of the bond; equally, the civic rights that comprise the majority of our evidence were not such as to be squandered on undeserving individuals. Yet aside of these links, it is difficult to assess the depth of low-profile, specifically commercial traffic, in that it was not prone to advertising its presence. We can reconstruct to a degree the activities of traders and merchants, but the precise routes which they plied are difficult to recover. They appear to have followed the longstanding lines into the Kyklades, as is suggested by the meagre evidence from Delos and Tenos; yet we have only vague hints of their presence in Central Greece.

Rome's priority for the first half of the century was her settlement in Italy and Sicily; yet she was not blind to the interest which this

attracted from the friends and associates of those whom she overran. Hence the missions to Epidauros and Alexandria served to advertise her cause in a favourable manner, and found eventual result in the Aitolian *proxenia* lists of 262. By 230, she had reached her natural boundaries in the west, and so was drawn into affairs east of the Adriatic by the interests of those whom she protected. That being the case, it was not surprising that the states to whom she represented herself were those with whom her allies had most intercourse. Yet this simple scenario was not to last. In the last quarter of the century, Rome's protectorate in Western Greece came under threat from the rising house of Makedon; her efforts to maintain that protectorate were undermined first by the fragmentation of her support in Greece and then by the desertion of those whose interests had brought her east in the first place. Compelled to fight a discreditable war in defence of her allies in Western Greece, she struck an alliance with Aitolia on a purely pragmatic basis; yet this link was no coincidence given the direction of western traffic into Greece during previous years. The war was always viewed as a temporary contingency by Rome, as her efforts to encourage mediation demonstrate. As hostilities became superfluous, she made strenuous efforts to regain her good name in Greece, efforts which were rewarded by Delphi's recognition in 205/4 of the shifted orientation of her allies as they returned to the fold.

What undercut this progression was Rome's hunt for a term of reference under which Italians, Italiote-Greeks and eventually mainland Greeks could relate to her. This was initially handed to her after the Pyrrhic Wars in the shape of her Trojan foundation myth, and utilised with some success in the mid-third century. Thus it prompted initiatives from Segesta and

towards Seleukos, and provided the theme for much of the early drama of Rome. Yet it met its match with the Aitolians in the 230s, who were aware of its irreconcilability with the indigenous Romulus myth. Thus the theme was retired for reconstruction by the epic poets of Rome, Livius Andronicus and Naevius; they produced respectively a standard work of Roman culture and society and a picture of Roman mythistory that lay inside that newly-defined world. This was particularly apposite during the testing time of the Second Punic War, when Roman religion was in crisis. Yet it earned its true corn when Rome ventured east once more in the Second Makedonian War, when the Trojan theme was revived by Flamininus to help combat the onset of Antiochos by giving the Greeks a pretext under which to side with Rome. Furthermore, it ended the cultural hold of Greece over Italy and Sicily, as is attested by the almost complete absence of evidence for western artists and performers in Greece after the turn of the century; the implication is that there was work aplenty for them in Rome, and no shame in undertaking it.

The second half of our study defines the early influence over trans-Adriatic traffic of Rome's policy towards Greece, once Rome had finally worked her way along the pre-existing lines of communication into a position of strength in the east. The policy itself saw a definite progression, from Flamininus' personal relationship with his clients the Greeks to Scipio's more distant relationship with the Greeks via those intermediate powers whom he saw as his clients. In response to this, Delphi again showed herself to be the style-leader in Greece, reacting to the shifting currents of events more rapidly than her fellows in both Syro-Aitolian and Third Makedonian Wars; she seems even to have responded to

Roman policy which declared the contacts of the third century to be outmoded and discredited. Yet her political awareness does not seem to have been typical of the Greeks. It was not until the mid-180s, as Rome's policies in the east developed, that the Greeks of the mainland and the islands began to see an increase in western traffic for commercial purposes; after all, there was no definite incentive to change existing patterns other than the conduit into Central Greece provided for the favoured few through Ambrakia. Equally, it was not until the Third Makedonian War that the Greeks realised how pervasive the Roman influence really was. It was then that there was a rash of honours for Roman generals and commanders, as the value of a friend in Rome became apparent. The prime example of this is the Teians, who seem to have recalled a relationship which had lain dormant for some twenty-five years in order to claim representation. The Roman reaction to this was pragmatically philanthropic; she favoured those who favoured herself, in a settlement which had been painstakingly rehearsed in the medium of Southern Italy and Sicily in the latter years of the third century. It was then that the final and most conclusive incentive was provided for those westerners who would ply the east with the decision to free the port of Delos in 166. Yet even this was politically motivated, not least because of the potential of the island to become a major source of slaves for a beleaguered Italy. That potential had not been realised before the late-170s; previously the island had been merely a moderately prosperous trading centre and a convenient site for the dissemination of Roman propaganda. But thereafter its freedom was the key to unlock the floodgates of the Italian presence in the east, an incentive which had not previously existed.

The core of this study is, then, the relationships which Rome assumes when she completes her conquest of Italy and Sicily. It is this network of mutual interests which first takes her out of Italy and this which directs her sympathies thereafter, if only because the Greeks preferred to relate to her via the medium of her allies with whom they had longstanding ties. For Rome, to alienate those with whom her allies consorted was to alienate those allies themselves; the settlement of Italy and Sicily, at least in the third century, was too valuable for that. It is one of the ironies of the study that, as those allies turned more and more towards Rome, so Rome used the ties they had in the other direction with Greece to her own advantage; this is particularly true as regards Delphi and Delos, the directors of Greek political thinking and expediency. As Rome grew more powerful, her allies ought to have repaid the compliment by responding to her initiatives and following her armies with their traders and diplomats; yet this does not seem to have been the case, aside of those who appear in the court of Pergamon. Those who do follow the lines opened by Roman arms and politics, the Flavii in Thessaly and Vallius in Abdera, are Romans themselves; they do not seem to constitute a substantial presence at this stage.

The Italian presence in Greece during this period has many implications, both for a study of Roman policy towards Greece at this comparatively early stage and for the subsequent expansion of political and commercial horizons across the Adriatic and Aigaian. The characters with whom we have dealt should no longer be written off merely as the precursors of that expansion, but demand a place in both Roman and Greek history in their own right.