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'JOHN RUSSELL, THE FOURTH DUKE OF BEDFORD, AND POLITICS, 1745-1751'

submitted to the Faculty of Modern History
University of Oxford
as requirement for D.Phil.

Karen Philp
Lincoln College

Trinity 1991 [ie 1994]

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ABSTRACT

Karen Philp
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'JOHN RUSSELL, THE FOURTH DUKE OF BEDFORD, AND POLITICS, 1745-1751'

This dissertation on the fourth duke of Bedford examines the political activities of a member of the House of Lords. It documents the activities of the members of the Pelham Administration, using Bedford's correspondence to provide an outline for the narrative. The aim is to provide a greater understanding of Bedford's political career, and also to illustrate the influence this individual had in determining ministerial policy.

A discussion of Bedford's social connections leads into an overview of the events culminating in his inclusion in the Administration in 1745. Initially First Lord of the Admiralty, Bedford was promoted in 1748 to the office of Secretary of State for the Southern Department. In both offices, his concern was the promotion and protection of trade. He advocated the 'Country' Whig view that the protection of British merchants and their overseas markets by the navy was in the country's best interest. Bedford recognized the importance of securing and expanding American markets, and implemented measures, such as the proposed 'reduction' of Canada, to promote this aim. Bedford also lead the negotiations for the commercial treaty with Spain, signed at Madrid in 1750, that gave special trade status to Britain.

Bedford sought to increase his political influence in various constituencies during the 1747 General Election. The local influence he wielded, however, did not enable him to carry through private turnpike legislation in Parliament. His legislation was defeated on 13 February 1750, at third reading, in an unusually high vote (154-208). Newcastle, whose relationship with Bedford had grown increasingly acrimonious, played a role in the defeat of this bill. The deterioration in this relationship contributed to Bedford's resignation from office on 14 June 1751.

ABSTRACT

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'JOHN RUSSELL, THE FOURTH DUKE OF BEDFORD, AND POLITICS, 1745-1751'

This dissertation on John Russell, the fourth duke of Bedford, examines the political activities of a member of the House of Lords while a member of the Administration. It studies the Pelham Administration, using Bedford's career as an outline for the narrative.

This study challenges the view that Bedford was an 'ineffectual' member of the Pelham Administration by discussing his activities as First Lord of the Admiralty, and as Secretary of State for the Southern Department. The aim is to provide a greater understanding of Bedford's political career. Previous studies have not examined, in as much detail, his activities in office. Generally, historians have argued that Bedford was incompetent in his duties, and as a result of this inattention to his office, Newcastle sought his removal from office. This study changes that view by asking why Pelham kept Bedford in office against Newcastle's wishes for several years. It attempts to show that Bedford's deteriorating relationship with Newcastle was countenanced by Pelham because of his perception that Bedford would be a strong opponent in Parliament. Therefore Bedford's position in the Pelham Administration has greater significance than historians have generally assigned it. Additionally, this thesis attempts to illustrate the influence this individual held in determining policy decisions within the Administration, particularly in relation to North America and trade.

A discussion of Bedford's personal history and social connections leads into an overview of the events culminating in his inclusion in the Administration in 1745. His friends, the opposition Whigs and Tories, had demanded his appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty, much to the surprise of Newcastle and Pelham. They were unable to refuse this request because of Bedford's social standing and wealth. Newcastle was initially pleased with Bedford's appointment, and used him as a counter-balance in the Cabinet discussions over the continuation of British involvement in the War of Austrian Succession. Bedford was not interested in the 'balance of power' on the continent, but his views on North America prompted him to support the continuation of the war.

Initially First Lord of the Admiralty, Bedford was promoted in 1748 to the office of Secretary of State for the Southern Department. In both offices, his concern

was the promotion and protection of trade. He advocated the 'Country' Whig view that the protection of British merchants and their overseas markets by the navy was in the country's best interest. He had held this view since 1739 when he presented the petitions from the London merchants against the Convention of Pardo, to the House of Lords. Bedford had long recognized the importance of securing and expanding American markets. To that end, in his office he sought to implement measures, such as the proposed 'reduction' of Canada, to promote this aim.

The Canada expedition was to remove the French from North America, and thereby establish British hegemony in the region. The capture of Louisbourg by the British colonial forces in 1745 had inspired this project. But by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the fortress was returned to French control. Bedford continued to seek ways to protect the interests of the inhabitants of the eastern seaboard of America. To that end, he sought to promote the establishment of new colonies in Nova Scotia. Trade routes and fishing rights needed protection, in Bedford's view, from French encroachments. The new colonies, inhabited partially by ex-soldiers from the War of Austrian Succession, would provide the necessary protection, without adding to British defence expenditures in North America.

Bedford also lead the negotiations for the commercial treaty with Spain, signed at Madrid in 1750, that gave special trade status to Britain. He took the interests of the South Sea Company and their claim against the Spanish Crown seriously. He ordered the British representative at Madrid, Benjamin Keene, to seek a settlement for the Company during the negotiations for special trade status for Britain. Newcastle saw these negotiations as an opportunity to separate the Spanish Court from the French, and advocated the abandonment of the claims of the South Sea Company in order to achieve this wider objective. Bedford refused to countenance this proposal, and was able to nullify Newcastle's interference in his office.

While Bedford held the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, the Jacobite invasion of 1745 created a scare. Bedford showed his loyalty to the Hanoverian Succession by proposing the creation of 'Noble Regiments' to assist the professional troops. Bedford was the first to raise his regiment, and also raised a regiment of horse, and provided a war ship, to assist in the defence of his King and country.

Bedford sought to increase his political influence in various constituencies during the 1747 General Election, and subsequent by-elections. His electoral activities encouraged contemporaries to call him the 'the terrour of the West'. Bedford sought to establish his power in constituencies where he owned property through the use of his influence as a member of the

Administration. His tactics were not usually subtle, and his activities incurred a great deal of expense. He did, however, increase his local influence.

The local influence he wielded, however, did not enable him to carry through private turnpike legislation in Parliament. The individuals proposing a turnpike proposed between Market Harborough and Kettering sought his assistance in steering the legislation through Parliament. This legislation met with defeat at third reading, on 13 February 1750. The intriguing aspect of this episode was that an unusually high number of Members of Parliament turned out to vote on this private measure. The final vote was 154-208.

Newcastle, whose relationship with Bedford had grown increasingly acrimonious, played a role in the defeat of this proposed bill. Bedford's relationship with him had been deteriorating since the signing of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Pelham was unwilling to remove Bedford from his Administration for fear of him joining with the opposition. Bedford was considered able to supplement the talents of the Whig opposition, and thereby provide the King with an alternative ministry. Fortunately for Newcastle, the demise of the Prince of Wales in March 1751 created a major realignment of the domestic political world, and this factor contributed to Bedford's resignation from office on 14 June 1751.

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. In chapter one, a discussion of Bedford's personal life, including the influence of his wife, and political friends, leads up to an overview of the events resulting in his inclusion in the Administration. In chapter two, an examination of Bedford's activities as First Lord of the Admiralty highlights his proposal for the conquest of Canada, but also describes Bedford's contribution to defence of the Hanoverian Succession during the Jacobite Rebellion. Chapter three concentrates on Bedford's electioneering activities, and on his failed turnpike proposal in the House of Commons, in an attempt to illustrate the involvement of a member of the House of Lords in local issues. Also, this chapter shows how a local issue became entangled in the personal vendetta Newcastle waged against Bedford. Bedford's commitment to trade policy is explored again in the study of his term of office as Secretary of State for the South, in chapter five. His actions on behalf of the South Sea Company in their disputes with the Court of Spain highlighted his different attitude towards trade from the view held by Newcastle. Finally, his resignation was directly connected with his relationship with Newcastle, and chapter six explores the ups and downs of their friendship leading up to Bedford's resignation on 14 June 1751.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

John Russell, the fourth duke of Bedford, entered government in 1745 interested in the promotion and protection of British trade. This concern made him unique amongst the Ministers in the Pelham Administration. Henry Pelham, and his brother, the duke of Newcastle, concentrated on British domestic and continental strategies during the War of Austrian Succession.[1] Pelham, First Lord of the Treasury, viewed this conflict in domestic and fiscal terms, while Newcastle, the Secretary of State for the South, concentrated on European foreign policy. The Secretary of State for the Northern Department was also engrossed in the immediate questions concerning the continental war in consultation with the King.[2] The preoccupation of the leading Ministers in the Pelham Administration with these areas of foreign and domestic policy, allowed Bedford to promote his Country 'Whig' views from his new position, as First Lord of the Admiralty. He believed that the protection of British merchants and their overseas markets by the Royal Navy was in the country's best interest.[3] Arthur D. Innes argued in 1895 that,

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[1] See William Coxe, ed., Memoirs of the Administration of the Rt. Hon. Henry Pelham, (2 vols.)(London, 1829), and J. B. Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams (London, 1957).

[2] Lord Harrington held this office until October 1746 when Lord Chesterfield took over.

[3] The mercantilist theory that foreign trade was of chief importance to the national economy has been discounted in recent historical analysis. (See Horn, D.B. and M Ransome, eds., English Historical Documents, 1714-1783, (London, 1957), 25.) This thesis did not attempt to

> The rivalry in oceanic commerce and colonial expansion is the true key to the political history of the century...Till Pitt came into power, no single statesman appears to have realized it.[4]

In the mid-1740s, however, Bedford did recognize the importance of securing and expanding the North American markets for British merchants. While he was a member of the Ministry, he sought to implement measures to promote these aims. Although young and inexperienced, Bedford's political colleagues had insisted upon his appointment to the office of First Lord of the Admiralty in late 1744.[5] Pelham and Newcastle were surprised by their demand, but Bedford's wealth, social status, and heritage, made it difficult for them to refuse. Daniel Baugh, in his work, British Naval Administration, described the result of their demand as "[t]he greatest change in naval administration during the war..."[6] Bedford did not introduce significant reforms within the department, but he - along with his new colleagues at the Admiralty Board, Lord Anson and Lord Sandwich - "...was part of a new 'broad-bottomed' administration, one willing to prosecute the war vigorously..."[7]

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argue in favour of the mercantilist theory. Bedford believed in the importance of foreign trade, and would be classed as a mercantilist.

[4] Innes, Arthur D., Britain and Her Rivals in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1789, (London, 1895), 2.

[5] T. J. McCann, The Correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and Newcastle, 1724-1750, (Sussex Record Society, 1984), 160.

[6] D. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, (Princeton, 1965), 503-4.

[7] Baugh, 503-4.

Newcastle, in particular, saw personal advantage in Bedford's inclusion in the Ministry. His reiteration of the need to continue British involvement in the war until 'the balance of power' was restored to Britain's European allies, clashed with Pelham's desire for a quick end to any participation.[8] Pelham, as the leading Minister in the House of Commons, had to negotiate the loans, and to persuade Members of Parliament to pass the necessary money bills in order to finance the war. Pelham preferred peace and low taxes.[9] He believed the financial situation in Britain created difficulties for him as the Minister responsible for fiscal matters in Parliament. John Wilkes noted in A Whig in Power,

> For 1745 the indications are that money was very tight. Pelham had difficulty producing the money necessary to pay some of the ordinary costs of government and the interest rates were high...By 1747 Pelham was insisting that there was no money to continue fighting and the war must be stopped.[10]

Newcastle viewed the situation in a different light. He believed that a restoration of the 'Old System' of foreign alliances on the continent would be the best check on French aggression. Bedford, therefore, increased Newcastle's leverage in this brotherly struggle over the prosecution of the European war. Bedford's stated desire to continue fighting until the French were

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[8] J. Wilkes, A Whig in Power: The Political Career of Henry Pelham, (Chicago, 1964), 15. Newcastle had earlier headed a faction within the Walpole Ministry that demanded strong action against Spain in 1739, similar to Bedford's position while in opposition.

[9] Innes believed that Pelham inherited Sir Robert Walpole's timidity in prosecuting wars. Innes, 73.

[10] Wilkes, 106.

removed from North America, or at least until the French fort at Louisbourg was dismantled, complemented Newcastle's own wish to see the war through for the sake of the 'Old System' of foreign policy.[11] Their ends were quite different; so their personal views diverged as the war progressed. Bedford's wish to secure British trade routes from North America was not dependant upon the restoration of a balance of power in Europe. When Bedford altered his position on the retention of Cape Breton in 1748, Newcastle felt personally slighted. No longer allies within the Cabinet, Bedford became the victim of Newcastle's jealousies.

Yet Bedford and Newcastle remained intimate colleagues until the autumn of 1748. Together with Lord Sandwich, who was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to the Hague in 1746, they corresponded without the knowledge of Lord Harrington, and then Lord Chesterfield, who were the Secretaries of State for the Northern Department.[12] Newcastle considered Sandwich to be his protegee. When Chesterfield resigned the seals of his office in 1748, Newcastle sincerely wanted Sandwich to become his brother Secretary.[13] Opposition from his Ministerial colleagues to this promotion worked to Bedford's advantage. He became the Secretary of State

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11 Horn & Ransome, 61. They claimed commercial and colonial expansion and the balance of power shaped British foreign policy in the eighteenth century.
12 See Chapter 6. Sandwich was Minister Plenipotentiary at the Conference of Breda, 1746, at the Hague, 1746-8, and at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.
13 McCann, 267.

for the South in February 1748, while Newcastle took over in the Northern Department. Newcastle was initially pleased to be working with Bedford. Sandwich was consoled with promotion to the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, and with Bedford's promise to resign the Secretary's office in his favour in six months' time.[14] Newcastle's influence helped Sandwich to obtain his position in the Admiralty office, and he believed himself to be Sandwich's patron.[15] Bedford considered Sandwich a personal friend, if not a political colleague after they had entered office together in 1745. Bedford worked well with both Newcastle and Sandwich, and the relationship between the three was amicable until August 1748.

The animosity that grew up between Bedford and Newcastle from the autumn of 1748, overshadowed Bedford's achievements in the office of Secretary of State for the South. Bedford directed the negotiations for the Treaty of Madrid, signed with Spain in 1750. He also, unsuccessfully, sought the protection of British inhabitants and merchants in America, through continued negotiations with the Ministers at the French Court. Unfortunately for Bedford, the domestic political scene altered in March 1751, and he was forced to resign the

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[14] Add. MS 32,714, ff. 450-1. Bedford-Sandwich, 8 April 1748.

[15] See A. Ballantyne, Lord Carteret: A political biography, 1690-1763, (London, 1887) 326, for the view that Bedford alone secured the Admiralty appointment for Sandwich.

seals of his office before any return on his efforts to settle the boundary disputes with the French accrued.

While Bedford was in the Administration, however, he cultivated his own political influence during the various local elections, and during the General Election of 1747. Nicholas Rogers noted in his article 'Aristocratic Clientage, Trade and Independency' that "...the main task of co-ordinating the ministerial interest [in Westminster] in 1747 and 1749 fell to Bedford House..."[16] James Haas commented in 1960, that "The general election of 1747 was the first that Bedford fought with Treasury support."[17] Through his personal efforts, and with the help of his chief steward, Robert Butcher, Bedford was able to use his position within the Administration to increase his influence in the corporation of Bedford, as well as in various constituencies, particularly in the West Country. This increased political influence did not help, however, when Bedford attempted to steer a private bill for a local turnpike through the House of Commons in 1750. Despite being a private piece of legislation, the debate on this bill attracted an unusually high number of Members of Parliament to vote during its third reading in the House of Commons.[18] Bedford's deteriorating relationship with Newcastle played a role in the defeat

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[16] N. Rogers, 'Aristocratic Clientage, Trade and Independency: Popular Politics in Pre-radical Westminster', Past and Present, 61(November 1973) 85.
[17] James M. Haas, 'The Rise of the Bedfords; 1747-1757: A Study in the Politics of the Reign of George II', (D.Phil., University of Illinois, 1960), 153.
[18] See Chapter 4.

of this legislation, but Bedford did not leave the Administration as a result. His determination to retain his office irritated Newcastle. Pelham's willingness to accept the discord between the two, suggested that Bedford could have had a longer run in office, if the domestic political situation had not changed. The demise of the Prince of Wales in March 1751 resulted in the decimation of the opposition to Pelham's Ministry. Pelham's fear that Bedford in opposition was a potential threat to his position, was reduced.

One of the aims of this thesis is to illustrate, through an examination of Bedford's career from 1745 until 1751, that his relationship with Newcastle contributed to an instability within the Pelham Administration. Owen's conclusion in The Rise of the Pelhams that "[f]or seven years after 1747, the stability characteristic of Walpole's ministry at its zenith was again the salient feature of English Government..." did not take into account the internal cabinet difficulties from 1748 until 1751.[19] Owen noted in The Eighteenth Century, 1714-1815, that "...most Cabinets of the early Hanoverian period, esp. during 1739-44 and 1754-6 were rent by bitter disputes, and individual members had no hesitation in making their differences public..."[20] Yet, he did not address the internal problems besetting the Pelham Ministry from 1748 to 1751 in The Rise of the

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19 J. B. Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams, 320.
20 J. B. Owen, The Eighteenth Century, 1714-1815, (Totowa, 1975) 99.

Pelhams. The dispute between Bedford and Newcastle was important because it promoted the question why Pelham preferred to tolerate the instability it created within the Ministry for two years, rather than face Bedford and his friends in opposition. Owen's argument in The Rise of the Pelhams that the failure in February 1746 of Lord Granville to replace the Pelhams in the Ministry consolidated Pelham's control of the Commons remains valid. Owen did not, however, take into account Pelham's continual fear that Bedford and his colleagues, in conjunction with the opposition Whigs, could provide the King with an alternative Ministry. This study attempts to show that Bedford's policy proposals, and his deteriorating relationship with Newcastle, were partially countenanced by Pelham because of his perception that Bedford would be a strong opponent in Parliament. Therefore Bedford's role in the Administration has greater significance than historians have generally assigned it. An example of the dismissive attitude generally held towards Bedford was seen in Wilkes, A Whig in Power.

> There can be no doubt that Bedford was the least able of any of the Secretaries. From the beginning of his four year term of office, Bedford was criticized for lack of attention to the duties of his office...He must be considered one of the poorest of the Cabinet Officers of the Pelham administration, for his only assets were great wealth, social position, and political influence...[21]

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[21] Wilkes, 88.

While wealth, social position, and a measure of political influence were important, these three factors alone would not have brought Bedford into ministerial office, particularly two working ones. His parliamentary or political abilities must have played some role in his promotion to the Secretary of State's office, and in his retaining office for five years. Bedford's career in the Pelham Ministry has not been examined closely to reveal whether negative comments, like Wilkes' noted above, have provided accurate assessments of his abilities.

This thesis does not attempt to disentangle the messy story of the War of Austrian Succession.[22] Rather it examines the activities of the members of the Pelham Administration, and their reaction to the events arising out of that conflict. Bedford's correspondence is used to provide the outline for this narrative of the period 1745 to 1751 when the war ended with the signing of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Jeremy Black commented in December 1986, that the War of Austrian Succession,

> ...was of great importance in European International relations, and its role in the development of British foreign policy has never been investigated. In domestic politics it was of great significance, a vital element in ministerial and parliamentary politics and in the crucial issue of the relationship between the Crown and the rest of the political system.[23]

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[22] See R. Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, 1740-48 (London, 1930) and Alastair W. Massie, 'Great Britain and the Defence of the Low Countries, 1744-1748', (Oxford: D.Phil. thesis, 1987).

[23] J. Black, 'British Foreign Policy and the War of Austrian Succession, 1740-48: A Research Priority', Canadian Journal of History, (December 1986), 331.

This thesis attempts to investigate some of these points raised for the period 1745 to 1751. 'The relationship between the Crown and the rest of the political system' is not examined, but Bedford's role in the development of British foreign policy, and in domestic politics, is investigated. There are other aims as well. First, this study contributes to a greater understanding of Bedford's personal political career. Previous studies have not examined, in as much detail, his activities in office.[24] Secondly, it attempts to illustrate the influence an individual held in determining policy decisions within the Administration. Bedford's interest in North America was pursued through his proposals for the reduction of Canada, the protection of Nova Scotia, and in his negotiations for the settlement of boundary disputes after October 1748. As well, this study tries to shed light on the diverse political activities of a member of the House of Lords in the mid-eighteenth century. Bedford's interest in elections and local turnpike measures was important, if he wished to increase his political influence at Westminster.

In chapter one, a discussion of Bedford's personal life, including the influence of his wife, and political friends, leads up to an overview of the events resulting

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[24] See James Haas, 'The Rise of the Bedfords; 1747-1757:...', and Edward Johnson, 'The Bedford Connection: The Fourth Duke of Bedford's Political Influence between 1732 and 1771', (Ph.D. Cambridge, 1979). Johnson studied the relationship of Bedford with land, and the political influence that arose as a result.

in his inclusion in the Administration. In chapter two, an examination of Bedford's activities as First Lord of the Admiralty highlights his proposal for the conquest of Canada, but also describes Bedford's contribution to defence of the Hanoverian Succession during the Jacobite Rebellion. Chapter three concentrates on Bedford's electioneering activities, and on his failed turnpike proposal in the House of Commons, in an attempt to illustrate the involvement of a member of the House of Lords in local issues. Also, this chapter shows how a local issue became entangled in the personal vendetta Newcastle waged against Bedford. Bedford's commitment to trade policy is explored again in the study of his term of office as Secretary of State for the South, in chapter five. His actions on behalf of the South Sea Company in their disputes with the Court of Spain highlighted his different attitude towards trade from the view held by Newcastle. Finally, his resignation was directly connected with his relationship with Newcastle, and chapter six explores the ups and downs of their friendship leading up to Bedford's resignation on 14 June 1751.

Although this thesis extends our knowledge of the Pelham Ministry up to June 1751, it points out areas for further research. A detailed examination of the Administration up to Pelham's death in 1754 would be interesting. A continuation of this present study would not, however, provide the necessary illumination of the

internal workings of the Ministry: Bedford goes into opposition until 1756. Also, a larger study of Bedford's entire political career would provide an interesting contrast to recent works that have concentrated on Members of the House of Commons.[25] Bedford was operating from the House of Lords, and as a result, his influence, while enhanced in some ways, was also greatly constrained. The convention that the First Lord of the Treasury needed to sit in the House of Commons, in order to direct the King's business efficiently, excluded Bedford from that office. Still, it is hoped that this study provides a revealing glimpse of the character of Bedford, of his political activities and beliefs, and of the nature of the Pelham Administration.

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25 See Marie Peters, Pitt and Popularity, (Oxford, 1980), for one example.

CHAPTER 2: BEDFORD AND HIS 'BLOOMSBURY GANG'

John Russell, the fourth duke of Bedford was described by Horace Walpole, the diarist, in his Memoirs of King George II, as:

> ...a man of inflexible honesty, and goodwill to his country: his great economy was called avarice; if it was so, it was blended with more generosity and goodness than that passion will commonly unite with. His parts were certainly far from shining, and yet he spoke readily, and upon trade, well: his foible was speaking upon every subject, and imagining he understood it, as he must have done, by inspiration. He was always governed, generally by the Duchess, though unmeasurably obstinate, when once he had formed or had an opinion instilled into him. His manner was impetuous, of which he was so little sensible...If the Duke of Bedford could have thought less well of himself, the world would probably have thought better of him.[1]

Bedford was not well liked by a number of his contemporaries, particularly those individuals whose political and social advancement depended upon activities at Westminster. His wealth and social status, however, guaranteed he could move easily within the highest political circles. His political abilities ensured he could influence a small squadron of friends, sometimes referred to as the 'Bloomsbury Gang'. Bedford's political personality had been shaped during the period when he thought he would be required to make his own way in the House of Commons, but his elevation to the Lords

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[1] H. Walpole, Memoirs of King George II, (J. Brooke, ed.) (London, 1985) i, 124.

changed the House in which his future political career at Westminster would evolve.

John Russell, born 30 September 1710, was the second surviving son of Wriothesley, the second duke of Bedford (1680-1711) and Elizabeth Howland (1695-1724). His mother was the only child and heir of John Howland of Streatham and his wife, Elizabeth Child, daughter of Sir Josiah Child, Bart., of Wanstead, Essex.[2] She brought a 100,000 pounds dowry with her into the marriage with the second duke. John's elder brother, Wriothesley (1708-1732), became the third duke of Bedford at the tender age of three when their father died on 30 May 1711. Along with their two sisters, Rachel and Elizabeth, they were raised by their mother at her home in Streatham. Elizabeth was assisted by a private tutor, Mr. Hetherington, in educating her children within the family circle. His sister, Rachel, married Scroop Egerton, the duke of Bridgewater (1681-1745) on 4 August 1722.[3] Bridgewater proved to be a significant influence on John. The marriage of Bridgewater's only daughter from a previous marriage, Lady Anne Egerton, to Wriothesley, the third duke of Bedford, on 22 April 1724, cemented the Bridgewater connection with the Bedford family.[4] Bridgewater was only a year younger than their father

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[2] Owen, Eighteenth Century, 142. Owen claims that this marriage was the foundation of the Bedford family prosperity in the eighteenth century.

[3] After his death, Rachel married Sir Richard Lyttelton, K.B., on 14 December 1745.

[4] Bridgewater's first wife was Elizabeth Churchill, the second daughter of John Churchill, the duke of Marlborough. She died from smallpox on 29 March 1714.

would have been, and his personal influence upon Wriothesley and John increased after the demise of their mother, Elizabeth, from small pox on 29 July 1724. William Capel, earl of Essex (1697-1743), who married John's sister, Elizabeth, on 3 February 1726, appeared to influence the two brothers less than Bridgewater.

Neither Wriothesley nor John went up to university as their father had done.[5] Both were educated at home by their tutor, Mr. Hetherington, and when the third duke took charge of the family estates, John went on the Grand Tour of Europe from 1728 to 1731. Despite their similar upbringings, Wriothesley adopted an extravagant and undisciplined lifestyle, while John carefully cultivated his future financial security. In 1734, John, Lord Hervey (1696-1743), noted in his diary that John was "...covetous and the best economist in the world. [John] The Duke of Bedford was of such a turn as to have been able to live within his fortune if it had been fifty times less..."[6] As the second son, John had to be careful with his income if he wished to live prosperously. Horace Walpole, the diarist, described John's manner as "...shy, untractable, ungracious, ungenerous..."[7] He also referred to him as "...the hot little Duke..." when discussing Bedford's tempestuous nature in the 1750s.[8] Walpole also believed that he

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[5] The second duke of Bedford had gone up to Magdalen College, Oxford in 1696.
[6] Sedgewick, Hervey, i, 246-7.
[7] Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 285.
[8] Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 29.

"...was not only apt to forget what he did not care to hear, and even to forget his own change of opinion, but would and did often believe the very reverse."[9] The earl of Egremont described him as a "...head strong, silly wretch...".[10] Lord Charlemont in his Memoirs described Bedford as:

> ...a man of excellent parts, though deficient in common sense, in the highest degree passionate, but perfectly good-natured...He possessed much quickness of parts, real goodness of disposition, great warmth, and great facility of temper, which rendered him to some who were totally unworthy of his confidence.[11]

Finally, in the Royal Register, Bedford was depicted as:

> ...haughty, imperious and insolent in his general demeanour, hasty in forming his resolutions, and generally injudicious in the execution of them. He possessed very exalted ideas of his rank, and no very humble ones of his abilities...The great object of his life was popularity; and he never obtained it for an hour...[12]

Although considered quick-tempered and opinionated, descriptions of John's character generally pointed out his good-nature too. He was an Elder brother of Trinity House from 1745, and later in 1756, became the Master. He was also the President of the Foundling Hospital from 1747 to 1771. He was the trustee of several schools, charities, and hospitals for the care of poor and deserted children.[13] In the summer of 1749, Bedford's

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[9] Walpole, Memoirs, i, 49.
[10] cited in Johnson, 13.
[11] cited in V. Gibbs, The Complete Peerage of England... (London, 1912), 83.
[12] cited in Gibbs, 83.
[13] Johnson, 18.

interest in the case of Susanna Tracey, the wife of Robert Tracey, was indicative of his concern for disadvantaged individuals. Susanna Tracey's family had written to him at the Secretary of State's office asking for his assistance in obtaining her release from a convent in France. Her husband, Robert, had placed her in the Convent L'Abbaye Royalle d'Arcisse while they were touring Europe, and then returned home alone to their children. Her family were unable to obtain her release from the convent despite Susanna's wish to return to England, as the Abbess demanded Robert Tracey's personal approval. Bedford, with the assistance of Lord Albemarle in Paris, negotiated with the French Court to obtain a King's Warrant ordering Susanna's release from the convent.[14] The King's Warrant was obtained, but was not required when Robert Tracey arrived in France to take his wife back home. Apparently Susanna had just inherited some property from an uncle, and that was enough of an incentive for Robert.[15]

Another indication of Bedford's concern for the welfare of those individuals confronting unforeseen difficulties was seen in his reaction to a distemper virus that affected the cattle in Bedfordshire in the late 1740s. Bedford supplemented the King's bounty to encourage his own tenants to destroy their cattle, when

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[14] Add. MS 32,817, ff. 300-1. Bedford-Albemarle, 24 June 1749.

[15] Add. MS 32,817, ff. 391-2. Bedford-Albemarle, 7 August 1749. Add. MS 32,817, ff. 406-7. Bedford-Albemarle, 10 August 1749.

he discovered that they were unwilling to slaughter their animals if it resulted in their personal financial loss.[16] Despite his good qualities, Bedford's sense of self-importance, combined with his hot temper, appeared to have inhibited his personal popularity amongst his less familiar contemporaries at Westminster.

John learned to manage his personal affairs early in his life out of necessity. He inherited property from his mother when he was fourteen, and had been able to parlay this inheritance into a tidy estate by 1730. Elizabeth left him property in several counties, and with the money from her, he purchased the family estates in Hampshire, including a house and park at East Stratton, from his brother. John also inherited a small estate in Surrey, with a house at Cheam, in 1730. The Rev. Robert Lloyd bequeathed the estate to John upon the condition that John pay the rents to his surviving sisters during their lifetime. The Rev. Lloyd had been the incumbent of the Bedford family avowdson at St. Paul's, Covent Garden, and that appeared to be the reason for this bequest.[17]

John Russell's financial future was therefore bright when he married Lady Diana Spencer, the youngest daughter of the Earl of Sunderland, and the favourite grand-daughter of Sarah, the duchess of Marlborough, on 11 October 1731. Diana's mother Anne had been Sarah's

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16 Johnson, 37.
17 T.L. Ingram, 'John, fourth Duke of Bedford, 1710-1771' and Marie P.G. Draper, 'The Houses of the Russell Family', Apollo (June 1988), 382-392.

favourite daughter until her death in 1716. Anne had asked her mother to help her children, and Diana became Sarah's favourite.[18] Diana's dowry included an immediate 30,000 pounds payment with the promise of 100,000 pounds upon the death of the duchess of Marlborough (1660-1744).[19] John and his new wife decided to settle into the house at Cheam, southwest of London, and as well, started renovations on the estate at East Stratton, near Winchester. The question of what John was going to do with his life was also decided at this time. The duke of Bridgewater encouraged John to enter politics as a Member of Parliament. William Egerton, the sitting Member of Parliament for Brackley, died unexpectedly in 1732, and Bridgewater, who influenced the Corporation's members, suggested John as a possible candidate to replace him. The death of the third duke of Bedford on 23 October 1732 at Corunna, Spain, however, amended the direction of John's political career. Wriothesley's health had been visibly failing for some time, and since he had no children with his wife Anne, John inherited the family estate.

Bedford settled his brother's gambling debts of nearly 70,000 pounds through a partial payment agreement concerning the interest, as he took stock of his newly

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18 V. Cowles, The Great Marlborough and His Duchess, (London, 1983), 413.

19 The duchess of Marlborough left 20,000 pounds to Lord Chesterfield and 10,000 pounds to William Pitt, when she died.

inherited estate.[20] Bedford House in Bloomsbury, the Streatham estate, and Woburn Abbey were additions to his family homes at Cheam and East Stratton. Bedford inherited property in the West Country at Tavistock, Barnstaple, Launceston, Okehampton, Kingston Russell, Exeter, Camelford, Newport, and some small land holdings at Plymstock and Werrington.[21] In Bedfordshire, he held the Woburn estates, as well as property at Oakley, property in the town of Bedford, and Houghton House near Ampthill. He later purchased Ampthill House and park from the earl of Upper Ossory in 1738, and expanded his interest in Bedfordshire by purchasing the Steppingley estate of the Abbot family.[22] His small estate holdings in Buckinghamshire included Chenies, Chesham, Chesham Bois, and Clifton Reynes. Thornhaugh, Sibson, Wansford, and Stibbington constituted his interest in Northamptonshire and Huntingdonshire. In Berkshire, he held title to the Levinz family property at Riseley. In London, aside from Bedford House, he owned No. 51 Grosvenor Street, property in Covent Gardens, and Thanet House on Great Russell Street. In Cambridgeshire, his holdings at Thorney introduced him to the Fen Corporation. He was elected the President of the Fen Corporation in 1733, and remained concerned with their activities until the late 1760s. In 1739, the rental

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[20] I would like to thank Mrs. M. Draper, of the Bedford Estate Office, for this information.

[21] L. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, (London, 1957), 299-357.

[22] Joyce Godber, The Story of Bedford (Luton, 1978). See also Guide to the Russell Estate Collections for Bedfordshire and Devon to 1910, (1966).

income from his property was approximately 39,467 pounds and 8.02, and by 1751, it had increased to 48,495 pounds and 17.11 & 1/2.[23] Bedford left a great deal of the management of his estates to his agents.[24] Robert Butcher was his chief agent based in London. He received 1,150 pounds per annum, plus expenses for managing the whole Bedford estate. He advised Thomas Wilson in 1746, that

> ...my Lord Duke expects in all cases to have his property absolutely secured...and leave the manner of doing it to the direction of his Agents who in point of humanity as well as prudence he takes for granted always choose with every person they have business with in the most friendly manner but that at the same time in point of justice they owe to his Grace...they will ask nothing that is imp. to be made certain.[25]

Bedford's inheritance had brought him the property necessary to advance more readily his political influence at Westminster.[26] His personal interest in the coal trade from King's Lynn, in brewing, timber, and lace manufacture arose from his property holdings.[27] His involvement in merchant shipping likely contributed to his public calls for compensation for the injuries and insults to British merchants by the Spanish Guarda Costas in the late 1730s. Bedford owned the Rotherhithe docks which had formed part of his mother's dowry in 1695. The

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23 Johnson, 46.
24 See Appendix C.
25 Cited in H. Wellenreuther, Reprasentation und Grosgrundbesitz in England, 1730-1770 (Stuttgart, 1979) 83n. R. Butcher-T. Wilson, 28 September 1746.
26 See Johnson, 'The Bedford Connection:...' (Ph.D. Cambridge 1979), for more information about Bedford's property affairs.
27 Johnson, 49-50.

dry docks were leased to the Wells Brothers, shipbuilders, while the Howland Dock, a wet dock, was used by the East India Company. Bedford also had shares ranging from 1/16th to 1/8th in at least nine ships trading to India, and participating in the whaling trade in Greenland. The ships included *The Bedford*, *The Tavistock*, *The Russell*, *The Howland*, *The Tonqueen*, *The Houghton*, *The Denham*, *The Henrietta*, and *The Duke of Bedford*.[28] The Russell family fortune was initially begun in the fifteenth century by Stephen and Henry Russell, two merchant squires.[29] Bedford, with his concern for economy and profit, and his interest in trade, built upon the foundations of the estate, and increased not only the land holdings, but also the mercantile interests of the family. Bedford inherited an association with the East India Company through his maternal great-grandfather, Sir Josiah Child.[30] The accounts showed that Bedford had shares in the East India Company that provided him with an income of 3,500 pounds in the period 1746 to 1750, as well as shares in the South Sea Company.[31] Other sources of income included rents, salaries, lotteries, and annuities.[32] In the West Country where John Wynne, his local agent, managed his interests at Tavistock from 1743 until 1756, Bedford's investments in the English cloth trade

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28 G. S. Thomson, Family Background, (London, 1949).
29 G. S. Thomson, The Russells in Bloomsbury, 1669-1771, (London, 1940), 191, 314.
30 Sir Josiah Child (1630-99), merchant and chairperson of the East India Company. Also a writer on economics. G.S. Thomson, Family Background, 12.
31 Johnson, 48.
32 G. S. Thomson, The Russells in Bloomsbury, 1669-1771.

encouraged him to take an interest in the fortunes of the merchant community. At Tavistock from 1741 to 1753, Bedford invested 3,700 pounds to develop textile production in a move to participate in the cloth trade to Cadiz.[33] His annual income amounted to approximately 56,300 pounds per annum.[34]

John, the fourth duke of Bedford, took his seat in the House of Lords on 16 January 1733, and was immediately appointed to a committee assigned to prepare an Address thanking the King for his speech from the Throne. Bedford attended the House of Lords regularly until the session was prorogued on 13 June 1733. Whilst Bedford had attended Parliament throughout the whole Excise crisis, he never spoke on that issue.[35] The House of Lords met 84 times in 1733, and Bedford was there for 49 (58%) sittings. His attendance dropped from this introductory high; for example, in 1739, he only attended 30 of the 96 days, or 31% of the time, the House was in session. By the 1740s, his attendance dropped even more. In 1742, he attended 29 times. In 1746, of the 122 days the House met, Bedford was there on 16 days, or 13% of the time. During the 1733 session Bedford was appointed to six Lords committees formed to consider private legislation. These committees were in a sense apolitical, and those peers with any interest in the

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33 Johnson, 49. 650 pounds went to build a dyeing house.
34 Johnson, 51. This is Johnson's estimate, and cannot be accurately assessed due to the destruction of records in a fire at Child's Bank.
35 Lords Journal, xxiv, April 1733.

matters to be addressed were usually included. Most issues were of a limited concern, and a number of the Lords were assigned to these committees simply because they were in attendance on the day. At least five individuals were required to form a quorum to consider the matter. For example,

> An Act for vesting Part of the settled estates of Anthony Henley, Esquire in Trustees, to be sold, for Discharge of Several Debts and Incumbrances affecting the same; and for making a further separate Provision for the Lady Elizabeth, his wife, during their Joint Lives...[36]

was the first of many such committees to which Bedford was assigned. These committees were ordered to meet at the Prince's Lodgings near the House of Lords, to review the contents of the proposed bill. If no objections were raised by the Lords present, and no amendments proposed when the committee reported back to the House, then the bill went through to third reading usually without any further ado. This was the case in Bedford's first committee assignment. Private legislation committees were generally dealt with expeditiously. Bedford was appointed to at least 47 committees to examine private legislation, not including road bills, from 1733 to 1744. Other bills, particularly road and enclosure proposals, generated greater interest amongst the peers. Those who had personal connections, or political, or economic, concerns in the regions affected by the proposed legislation were usually assigned to the committee.

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36 Lords Journal, xxiv, 20 April 1733.

During the committee stage, the nitty-gritty details were worked out, and amendments frequently proposed in order to reach a compromise satisfactory to all parties. Bedford had been nominated to numerous committees considering turnpike or road improvement legislation since 1733. His first such appointment was to examine a bill for the repair of the roads around Fyfield in Berkshire on 23 April 1733. His interests were not immediately affected by this proposed bill, but he did own property at Chesham and Chenies just to the north of Fyfield, and at Riseley and East Stratton to the south. Bedford's attendance in the House of Lords during all stages of this bill's progress would suggest he was somewhat interested in the proposal, yet cannot guarantee his attendance at the Committee's meetings. Sitting on these committees provided Bedford with the experience and knowledge needed to steer future private legislation on similar matters that interested him through Parliament. An example of his personal involvement was seen on 26 January 1743, when he reported from the Committee examining the Hockliffe and Woburn Road Bill, that there were no amendments, and the bill went through its third reading. In 1750, he tried unsuccessfully to guide a bill for the creation of a new turnpike from Kettering to Market Harborough. It's defeat at third reading was not due to his lack of experience.[37]

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[37] See Chapter 4.

Bedford adopted a patriarchal role in Parliament. He believed peers and Parliament were bound by duty to promote the general good of the nation. This belief came out strongly during the debates in the Lords on the Spiritous Liquors Bill on 25 February 1743.

> I am very far from conceiving the Commons to be an assembly of men deaf to reason, or imagining them so void of all regard for the happiness of the public, as that they will sacrifice it to an obstinate adherence to claims which they cannot but know to be in themselves disputable, and of which they must, at least, allow that they are only so far just as they contribute to the great end of government, the general good.[38]

Bedford's concept of the duty of parliamentarians was reflected again in the protest against the passage of this same bill signed by Bedford and nine other peers.

> Because it is the inherent Duty of every Legislature, to be watchful in protecting the Lives and preserving the Morals of the People so the availing itself of the Vices, Debaucheries, and consequential Misery and Destruction of Millions, is a Manifest Inversion of the fundamental Principles of National Polity, and contrarient to those social emoluments for which government alone is instituted.[39]

He believed that the security of the British constitution required respect and affection between the King and his subjects. Bedford was a zealot for liberty and the security of personal property, but he also thought obedience to superiors was necessary to attain these ends. But Bedford also believed this obedience was earned by affection and popularity, and that it was his

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38 Parliamentary History, xii, 1378-9.
39 Lords Journal, xxv, 25 February 1742/3.

duty "...to preserve the government from the greatest of all evils, the loss of popularity..."[40] With these ends always in mind, Bedford saw his role as that of adviser to the King, via the Ministers in Cabinet.

During his first session, Bedford joined the opposition in the House of Lords to the Administration led by Sir Robert Walpole.[41] The duke of Bridgewater was a member of this diverse group of opposition politicians, and Bedford, at that time, was personally influenced by his brother-in-law. Bedford joined these disaffected Whigs in active opposition to Walpole's government. Successful challenges to the Ministry in the House of Lords was difficult, since the majority of peers supported the Whig Administration. Bedford himself had inherited a long-standing Whig reputation from his great-grandfather whose involvement in the Rye House Plot resulted in his execution in 1683.[42] The Russell family were rewarded for his martyrdom to the Whig cause when William and Mary established themselves securely on the British throne. Bedford's grandfather was awarded the title 'duke of Bedford' in honour of Lord Russell's personal sacrifice. Bedford used this family history during the debates on an amendment to a bill introduced after France formally declared war on Great Britain, on 20 March 1744. The original bill made it treasonable to

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40 Parliamentary History, xiii, 795.
41 Sir Robert Walpole (1676-1745), MP for Castle Rising (1701-2), then King's Lynn (1702-42). In 1742, after his resignation from office, he became the earl of Orford.
42 William Russell, Lord Russell (1639-83).

correspond with the sons of the Pretender. The amendments proposed by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in the Lords were to attaint the Pretender's sons if they landed in Britain, and secondly, to make the penalty for corresponding with them the forfeiture of the writer's family estate.[43] During the debate in the House of Lords, Bedford attempted to rouse the members of the opposition against the amendments proposed by Hardwicke. He stated that

> ...in all absolute and tyrannical governments, their punishments, esp. those inflicted upon crimes against the state, are severe and cruel; whereas in limited and free governments their punishments are mild and humane.[44]

Bedford recalled the previously successful arguments of the 1730s in order to persuade both Whigs and Tories in the Lords that this was once again an issue concerning the abuse of power by the executive over individual subjects. He used his own family history to illustrate his point.

> My lords, I have more reason than most of your lordships, to consider the severity of the punishment inflicted upon treason, and the danger to which our constitution may be thereby exposed. My family has suffered, my grandfather lost his life, and his progeny their birth-right, for his opposing the designs of an arbitrary court. He suffered, it is true, and was condemned by the judges of those days, for what the lawyers still call treason; but his example may shew your lordships how easily it is for an arbitrary and tyrannical court to buckle treason upon the back of any man, that has honesty and courage enough to oppose their measures; for as soon as people had leave to declare their sentiments freely, his innocence...was so generally

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43 Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, 211.
44 Parliamentary History, xiii, 713.

> acknowledged, that...his Attainder was declared null and void, and his family thereby restored, by which I have now the honour of having a seat in this august assembly...[45]

Despite his impassioned efforts to persuade the peers that children should not be forced to pay for the sins of their fathers, the members of the House of Lords passed this bill and its amendments.

In the 1730s Bedford's views coincided with the 'Country' platform of the opposition Whigs rather than with the opinions of the Old Corps Whigs who dominated the Administration. The 'Country' platform traditionally asked for the reduction of the army, an effective militia, the reduction of public expenditure, the retrenchment of pensions and salaries, a place act, and the adoption of a blue-water foreign policy. The Tories, while advocating these reforms, also demanded the repeal of the Septennial Act, the Riot Act, the Waltham-Black Act, the Smuggling Act, and as well, certain clauses in Acts relating to the excise.[46] The fact that Bedford's social and political connections were with Bridgewater, who was in the opposition Whig camp rather than with the Tories or with the Old Corps Whigs, likely contributed to his attachment to these 'Country' opinions. John, Lord Hervey, scribbled in his diary for 1734 that Bedford and his brother-in-law, the duke of Marlborough, were under the influence of Lord Carteret in parliamentary

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45 Parliamentary History, xiii, 717.
46 A.S. Foord, His Majesty's Opposition, 1714-1830, (Oxford, 1964), 234.

affairs.[47] But it was Bedford's participation with Bridgewater on various opposition protests throughout the 1730s that suggested his close political relationship with Bridgewater. From May 1733 until April 1744, there were 46 Lords Protests, signed by more than five peers, presented in the House of Lords. Bedford signed 26 (56%) of these protests, was absent from the House during 9 (20%), and was in the Lords, but not a signatory on 11 (24%) protests. In comparison, his brother-in-law, Bridgewater, signed 30 (65%) of these protests. Their signatures appeared together on 18 (69%) of the 26 protests Bedford signed. Bridgewater supported 4 of those 11 protests Bedford did not sign while in attendance at Westminster. In total, 37 protests were presented when Bedford was in attendance, and 18 (49%) were signed by both Bedford and Bridgewater. This was at least an indication of their relatively similar political beliefs held at this time. Carteret signed only 19 (41%) of the protests until 1740, and Bedford's and his signatures appeared jointly on 12 (26%). Bedford may have appeared to Hervey to be guided by Carteret, but the early influence of Bridgewater on Bedford's political activities should not be dismissed.

These Lords Protests were generally concerned with matters of a national interest that appealed to both 'Country' Whigs and Tories, such as the use of the Sinking Fund, or the question of British trade. Bedford

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[47] Sedgewick, Hervey, i, 246-7.

supported the 'Country' view that British interests lay in American and overseas trade, and in the naval protection of those mercantile concerns.[48] And his activities in support of British merchants in Parliament contributed to the favourable opinion held by opposition leaders about his views on that matter. "...[H]is bright little Grace, as Chesterfield called him, with his small voice, clear blue eye, and brow unruffled as a boy's..."[49] joined the 'cry for war' in 1739 when he presented the London Merchants' Petition to Parliament. Bedford had been in the Chamber when Newcastle delivered the papers relating to the Convention, and again on 22 February when Arthur Stert attended the Lords with his account of the events leading up to the signing of the Convention of Pardo. On 23 February 1739, Bedford presented to the House of Lords the petition from the London Merchants stating that "...the trade from our colonies in America, is now almost the only profitable trade which this nation enjoys..."[50]

Bedford combined his attendance at the House of Lords with touring his numerous estates during the recesses. Parliament, for example, was prorogued from 14 May 1734 to 14 January 1735, and he spent that summer

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[48] Lords Journal, xxiv, 26 March 1733/4 - Motion to encourage and secure all trade and manufacture from America. Parliamentary History x, 1039-40, 23 February 1739 - Petition from the City of London re: American trade presented by Bedford to House of Lords. Lords Journal, xxv, 1 March 1739 - Convention of Pardo.

[49] W. M. Torrens, History of Cabinets, (London, 1894), i, 49-50.

[50] Parliamentary History, x, 1039-40.

touring with his wife, Diana, before returning to London where she died from consumption in September 1734. Bedford, who was only 24 years old, had lost his father, his mother, his brother, and his wife during his lifetime. His relationship with his brother-in-law, George Spencer, the fourth duke of Marlborough, continued after Diana's death. For example, in late August 1751, after Bedford had left office, he wrote to Bedford.

> I fully intended to write to you at Woburn but was prevented by the Duke of St. Albans making a vacancy of the Constable of Windsor Castle, which I intended to ask for without much hopes of success, in that or anything else in the power of the two brothers, neither of whom are yett come to town. Mr. Butcher tells me there is to be a meeting at Bedford about a county bill, when some people propose a tax on the tenants, we had just such an affair last year at Oxford, where I gott a good deal of popularity by opposing any tax on the freeholders & proposing a subscription, which I should think much the properest method for Bedfordshire but shall do in that & everything else exactly as you would have me...[51]

Marlborough, after his sister's death, appeared to remain a close friend of Bedford's. In the mid-1750s, Marlborough owed Bedford nearly 60,000 pounds.[52] By 1765, Marlborough was considered a consistent member of the 'Bloomsbury Gang'.[53] In the late 1740s, however, it was not certain that Marlborough could be considered a dedicated follower of Bedford.

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51 Bedford Micro, xxvii 1751, ff. 115-6. Marlborough-Bedford, 22 August 1751.
52 Johnson, 33.
53 See K. Philp, 'Voyage to Power: the Bedfords, 1765-67', (M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1985).

Bedford resumed his political activities at Westminster when Parliament opened on 14 January 1735, after a short period of mourning. He adhered to the 'Country' Whig ideological platform in the House of Lords even after marrying, in 1737, Gertrude Leveson Gower (1715-94). She was the eldest daughter of a Tory - John, Lord Gower. Their marriage, which lasted until Bedford's death in 1771, brought her 27 year old husband more than just a dowry worth 10,000 pounds.[54] Gertrude was the member of a large, respectable Staffordshire family. During the early years of her marriage, she devoted her time to raising their family. She bore three children. The eldest died in infancy. Francis, the marquess of Tavistock, was born on 26 September 1739.[55] Caroline was born on 6 January 1743. Bedford was fond of his children, and wrote letters to his son when he was away. In June 1746, while waiting at Yarmouth to sail north to Scotland, Bedford wrote to Tavistock, who was six years old, that he was angry that the bad winds kept him longer from his 'dearest child'.[56] Bedford also stayed with Caroline at Woburn during her severe illness in September 1750. His attachment to Gertrude and their children appeared genuine. In June 1746, he told the duchess that

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[54] Johnson pointed out that Bedford had transferred 18,500 pounds to her father before their marriage, and it remains unclear whether this money was repaid. Johnson, 48.

[55] Francis Russell, marquess of Tavistock (1739-67), MP Tavistock (1761-67).

[56] Bedford Micro xii 1746, f. 44. Bedford-Tavistock, 10 June 1746. See also Bedford Micro xii 1746, f. 46. Tavistock-Bedford, June 1746.

he missed her and the children.[57] She missed him when he was away, but also, when she went to visit friends while he remained with the children.[58]

The duchess received few favourable compliments about her personality from her contemporaries. In April 1743, Lord Orrery wrote to his wife that

> The Duke and Dss of Bedford are here. Her Behaviour is very agreeable, polite, decent, and amiable. They appear very happy together. I imagine her immense Fortune raises envy and inventive Malice rear its Head, which the poor Lady perhaps knows nothing of and so continues in innocence to give room for Malice...[59]

In contrast, Walpole, the diarist, sniped that in 1754 in Ireland, "The Duchess pleased universally; she had all her life been practising the part of a queen; dignity and dissimulation were natural to her..."[60] Although intelligent, ambitious, and from a politically involved family, the duchess did not personally contribute to her husband's political activities in the early years.[61] During 1745, while Bedford was away, the duchess tried to keep him informed of the political developments and gossip in London. Initially her efforts were confined to

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57 Bedford Micro xii 1746, f. 50. Bedford-Duchess, 12 June 1746.
58 Bedford Micro xiii 1746, f. 13. Duchess-Bedford, Tues. 1744/5. Bedford Micro xiii 1746, f. 15. Duchess-Bedford, n.d., Thursday.
59 Countess of Cork & Orrery, ed., The Orrery Papers, (2 vols)(London, 1903), ii, 189-90.
60 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 285.
61 Bedford Micro xiii 1746, f. 5. Duchess-Bedford, n.d. In this letter she asked Bedford to order their steward to bring a copy of Voltaire's 'Histoire de la dernier Guerre' to London.

the news she could pick up from her family and close friends. These titbits, interspersed with domestic news, were related to Bedford, usually in undated letters. For example, on a Tuesday, she wrote to Bedford.

> I cannot help flattering myself my Dear Duke you will be here to morrow but as you bid me write I do tho' I am in a hurry. the Child is very well to day & so she was on Sunday but yesterday morning she had a high fever again but not so much as before so I am in hopes she will have no return. Lord Rock: has been a little better these two days but this morn: they send word he is worse again I fancy you guess'd right there was nothing done at the conference but the great man will not explain but seems vastly angry at the peevish Marshal. I met the Orator yesterday at my Lords & he enquir'd with a very significant air when you was to come back so I flatter my self he repents. I know nothing of the Rebels but what will be in the Gazette Princess Emilie told me she hoped Mr Wade would fight them for she was not half so much concern'd for that army, as the other Adieu my Dearest Duke I hope to see you to morrow.[62]

Although undated, the letter related to events in the autumn of 1745. The 'Orator' could possibly have been William Pitt, who in December 1745, asked Bedford to negotiate with Pelham for a position in the Ministry. William Pitt relied on Bedford in the 1740s for his parliamentary qualification. On 20 June 1747, Bedford wrote Lord Anson concerning a qualification note for Sir Peter Warren.

> Mr William Pitt gave me two years agoe [pounds]4800 for an annuity of [pounds]300 Per Ann: during his life to be issuing out of hand and not determinable on a Term of years, which is allowed to be a good Parliamentary Qualification. Now if you give me your note for the above Sum of [pounds]4800 on

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62 Bedford Micro x 1745, f. 90. Duchess-Bedford, Tuesday.

> account of Sr Peter Warren, I will grant him a like Qualification with Mr Pitt's...[63]

In late April and early May 1746 Bedford journeyed to Bath in an attempt to cure himself of a recurrent gout problem in both feet, and of rheumatism.[64] He spent a further month and a half in Bath in October and November 1746, when these medical problems seriously flared up again. Periodic attacks of gout and rheumatism from 1747 to 1751, confined Bedford to Woburn Abbey, but these were health problems he suffered from for the rest of his life. The quality of the duchess's correspondence improved during 1746. On 26 April she advised that "I don't know any news but what you will hear from better hands about ships and rebels..." and then relayed some gossip she had picked up from her friends.[65] An example of the improved information she gave Bedford at this time was seen in her subsequent letter.

> I forgot in my last to tell you that my Lds told me the Elder Brother had given up his pretentions to the Treas__y in the handsomest manner that was possible. Ld Bury is made Aid de Camp to the King and when the Parliament has made a settlement upon the Duke he is to carry him the news. Mr. Rich is quite out of danger his Father has had a letter signed by himself I mention this because perhaps you may have heard (as it has been the report here) that he had lost the use of his other arm as I have not been at Cashioberry yet I intend going there on Thursday & to be at Woburn on Friday by dinner.[66]

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[63] Add. MS 15,955, ff. 141-2. Bedford-Anson, 20 June 1747.
[64] Bedford Micro xi 1745/6, f. 74. Bedford-Duchess, 26 April 1746.
[65] Bedford Micro xi 1745-6, f. 76. Duchess-Bedford, 26 April.
[66] Bedford Micro xi 1745-6, f. 89. Duchess-Bedford, n.d.

The duchess was meeting socially the people Bedford acted with politically. She was picking up information already, more or less, public. Her visit to Cashioberry was to see Bedford's sister, Elizabeth, the Countess of Essex.

Bedford responded with letters to her outlining his daily routine at Bath, which culminated in his evening meals with Lord Fane, whom he greatly admired. He would also chastise the duchess when she forgot to send him news on some event. For example, in April he demanded "Why did not you send me word the D of Q had all her windows broke?"[67] Bedford generally, however, entrusted his wife with news of his political activities. On 29 April when advising her that he would remain in Bath for a further two weeks in an effort to improve his gout condition, he added,

> ...This is not to be spoken of except to Lord Sandwich. The D___ of New_____ tells me in his letter I rec'd today, that the King had been prevailed on to make Mr Pitt paymaster of the army. My words to the D___ of New_____ in answer to this are these: I am glad his Majesty has consented to appoint Mr Pitt Paymaster, and hope now that something may be obtained for my friend Halifax, more agreeable to him than that he now has.[68]

Bedford's decision to remain in Bath a further two weeks possibly irritated the duchess. She complained that the weather in London was hot and the opera boring, but

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67 Bedford Micro xi 1745-6, f. 81. Bedford-Duchess, 28 April 1746.
68 Bedford Micro xi 1745-6, f. 81. Bedford-Duchess, 28 April 1746.

Bedford advised against her coming to Bath because of the dangerousness of the roads, and the shortness of his stay.[69] She responded in early May 1746 that,

> ...in the meantime I am improving my self in Politicks. I have had your two Admiralty Friends with me this morning and have told them my fears that the fat man is endeavouring to make mischief by causing jealousy between the Brethern, and his brother-in-law, who exposing himself more and more everyday; as the Pier and I agreed (after the junior Brother was gone). He tells me that he has had a most terrible time between the warmth of his Counsin and the coldness of my relation he went from hence in a great fright for fear his cousen should have given up as he has threatened, but I cannot say I have much fear of it for tho' he is excessively wrongheaded I think he knows his own interest too well for that I am glad to find the Peers eyes are a little open'd...[70]

Her letter contained more family news for Bedford, but degenerated into incoherent babble towards the end. The duchess was obviously in social contact with Sandwich and Lord Anson, the two 'Admiralty' friends, but how seriously they took her voiced concern about the 'fat man' and the 'Brethern', (possibly Newcastle and Pelham,) is unknown. Her assessment of Sandwich's 'Cousen', Lord Halifax, and his concern for his own interest was intelligent.[71] In light of Bedford's previous letter to her, she would have known about the problem with Halifax concerning his ambition for a better place in the

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69 Bedford Micro xi 1745-6, f. 96. Duchess-Bedford, 3 May 1746.

70 Bedford Letters MS, xi, 1745-6, f. 98. Duchess-Bedford, n.d.

71 George Montagu, 2nd earl of Halifax (1716-71), a colonel in 1745, President of the Board of Trade (1748-61), Viceroy of Ireland (1761-63), First Lord of the Admiralty (1762), Secretary of State (North) (1762-3, 1771), and Secretary of State (South) (1763-65).

Ministry. Yet any assertion that the duchess governed Bedford in political matters as claimed by some of her contemporaries, particularly Walpole, the diarist, cannot be supported by her early correspondence. Even her letters to Bedford when he went north to Scotland in June 1746 simply relayed information. Bedford went north to be with his regiment when they were officially disbanded from service after the Jacobite Rebellion. The duchess wrote to him regularly.

> I dont know any news I believe their is none about yr publick affairs...The Prince of Hesse has been to see you & I fancy you may return the Visit for I dont hear of his going.[72]

Three days later she wrote to him at Berwick.

> The good news that is come from Italy to day makes the Duke of Newcastle very happy, and Mns Puisieux being sent back to Paris without having concluded any Treats with the Dutch. the Troops they say are to embark this week. my Lords Clinton Brook and Gower are to be made Earls.[73]

Walpole had damned Bedford with faint praise in his memoirs, before concluding "He was always governed, generally by the Duchess..."[74] Yet there was little written evidence that this was indeed the case. In 1750, Pelham noted to Lord Hardwicke that even the duchess wished Bedford would take another office rather than remain Secretary of State.[75] The fact that Bedford

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72 Bedford Micro xii 1746, f. 52. Duchess-Bedford, 14 June 1746.
73 Bedford Micro xii 1746, f. 54. Duchess-Bedford, 17 June 1746.
74 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 124.
75 Yorke, ii, 102. Pelham-Hardwicke, 8 September 1750.

subsequently resigned from the Administration called into question any view that the duchess 'governed' his actions at all. Her preference that he take a ceremonial office in order to remain in the Ministry was never seriously considered by Bedford in any of his correspondence, and was certainly not reflected in his subsequent actions.[76]

The duchess was intelligent, and she had social access to Bedford's political colleagues. She passed along information she heard from them without any overt attempt to direct Bedford's actions. Bedford would ask her for specific information. In essence, Bedford was training her to be his political assistant. His response to a previously noted letter of early May 1746, was to criticise his wife for not sending any news about the rising of Parliament, or about the rebel peers in Scotland. He then asked her to send him word about the debates in Parliament.[77] The duchess was encouraged by Bedford to participate actively in the social world of London in order to supply him with political news and gossip when he was away. Her 'influence' consisted, at this time, of passing news and gossip between their small circle of friends and Bedford. Any claims that she 'governed' Bedford's political actions, at least during the 1740s, needs to be carefully considered. Her influence, if any, was subtle. Her correspondence indicated a willingness to learn about politics, but also

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76 See Chapter 6.
77 Bedford Correspondence, i, 91. Bedford Micro xi 1745-6, f. 100. Bedford-Duchess, 4 May 1746.

an inability to articulate in a coherent written fashion during this early period in his career. As she aged, she undoubtedly improved her skills under Bedford's guidance, and became a valuable political assistant to him.

Family, however, was the more important contribution the duchess brought into her marriage to Bedford. When Bridgewater died in 1745, Bedford turned to his wife's family who were actively involved in politics at Westminster. Her father, Lord Gower, (1694-1754), was a Tory, but his connection to that party weakened as the possibility of his entering the Administration strengthened. Walpole, the diarist, described Gower as

> ...a comely man of form, had never had any sense, and was now superannuated. He had been educated a stiff Jacobite, elected their chief on his first coming into the King's service, and had twice taken the Privy Seal before he could determine to change his principles.[78]

Gower's loose political relationship with Bedford ended more or less in 1751. Bedford had assisted one of the earl's daughters, Lady Elizabeth Leveson-Gower, to marry Colonel John Waldegrave, against Gower's wishes. Sandwich had provided his Admiralty office for their wedding ceremony, and even gave away the bride.[79] When Bedford resigned to protest Sandwich's dismissal in 1751, Gower decided to remain in the Administration as Lord Privy Seal. Bedford's 'Country' views had, however, initially coincided with Gower's opinions, and although

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78 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 125.
79 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 125.

Bedford had not joined him in the Administration in July 1742, they were in close social, if not political, contact at that time. Bedford's marriage to Gertrude in 1737 increased the level of his social connection with Gower and his family. Meanwhile, the furore in 1739 over the Convention of Pardo, and the depredations of the Spaniards on British merchant ships, had been instrumental in levering Gower into the Ministry, and on that political issue, both men had been in total agreement.

Bedford's personal and political relationship with Gower in the 1740s was therefore founded upon marriage to Gertrude, and a commitment to the protection of British merchant interests, particularly overseas. These were the ties that helped carry Bedford into office in 1745. His mentor, Bridgewater, died in 1745, and his role was partially filled by Gower, who supported his son-in-law's pretensions to office. When in 1744, George II had looked for political support for Lord Granville, whom the Old Corps Whigs had determined to remove, Gower, Chesterfield, and Cobham refused to treat.[80] They believed that the opposition had been ill-treated by Lord Granville (then Carteret) in 1742, and they thought that his public policies were not any more palpable than his

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80 They were approached on behalf of the King by the Prince of Wales in November. Frederick was only for a brief time in agreement with his father about the employment of Lord Granville.

personal qualities.[81] As a result, the King accepted Granville's resignation on 24 November 1744.[82] Without political support, particularly in the House of Commons, Lord Granville could not adequately carry out the business necessary for the King's Administration. Granville had fallen into a trap that snared a number of Secretaries of State while in Hanover with the King. He neglected to keep his colleagues in London informed about foreign policy decisions and activities occurring in the King's Hanoverian Court. He forgot that a successful politician needed the favour of both the King and his colleagues. Unfortunately for his personal political career, he drew closer to the King, and more estranged from his colleagues. Granville lost touch, if he had ever really been concerned, with the domestic concerns of Britain as he was seduced by the excitement of international politics. "...[T]he Coffee House joke is that Ld C. was looking over the map and by some accident the ink fell down and blotted out England, since which he has never thought of it."[83] His neglect of domestic politics ultimately cost him his office. As a long-time parliamentarian, experienced in high politics and ministerial office, it was remarkable that Lord Granville had not learned more from the political activities of Sir Robert Walpole, whose constant attention to domestic

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81 Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams, 236. Carteret became Lord Granville upon the death of his mother in October 1744.
82 Wilkes, A Whig in Power, 56.
83 cited in J. Black 'British Foreign Policy in the War of Austrian Succession, 1740-48: A Research Priority', Canadian Journal of History (December, 1986) 321.

politics, and particularly to the Members of Parliament, provided him with the necessary political support to remain in office for decades. The King's favour was beneficial for any politician in the eighteenth century, but it was no longer the prime consideration for obtaining, or retaining, office as Sir Robert Walpole's long career had shown. Parliamentary support provided the opportunity to get the King's business done quickly, and that factor encouraged his favour in the long run. Pelham had learned this lesson, and therefore, was able to remain in power in 1744 when Lord Granville was forced out of office.[84] This lesson also guided the future actions of Pelham, although his brother, Newcastle, would frequently forget it during his later struggles to remove Bedford from the Ministry.

The reconstruction of the Administration formally began in earnest, after Granville resigned on 24 November. The Pelhams guaranteed the overall dominance of the Old Corps Whigs in the Ministry to ensure their continued support in Parliament. Only those places vacated by the New Whigs, associated with Lord Granville, would be distributed to those individuals invited to supplement the strength of the Administration. Lord Hardwicke outlined his personal reflections upon the question of whom to invite into the Cabinet to his close friends, Pelham and Newcastle.[85] Their main problem, in

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84 Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams, 238.
85 Add. MS 35,408, ff. 80-4; printed in part in Yorke, Hardwicke, i, 373-7; cited in Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, 239.

his opinion, was the Minister's need to cultivate broad popular support for the war in Europe until a reasonable peace could be achieved through negotiations. A broad-based Ministry, with support in the House of Commons, was the ideal solution in his view. The Tories applauded the removal of Lord Granville from office, but to bring them into the Administration would definitely frighten the Old Corps Whigs. Since these Whigs were the parliamentary base of the Pelhams' support, alienating them would be a grave mistake. To avoid that end, Hardwicke suggested giving some fringe benefits to the Tories in exchange for their support of the war effort, while ensuring that the Old Corps network understood that no Court power or influence was actually being given to the Tories at their expense. The opposition Whig benches could provide the necessary bodies to be slotted into the offices vacated by the departure of Granville and his crew.

The desire of the opposition Whigs to join the Administration once Lord Granville was removed was well-known to the Pelhams. Unofficial talks between them had been occurring sporadically long before Granville resigned. The response to the King's overtures in search of support for Lord Granville in November simply confirmed the Pelhams in their belief that the opposition Whigs would be willing to support them in exchange for places in the Ministry.[86] On 1 December, Lord Chesterfield advised the Pelhams that in response to

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[86] Coxe, Memoirs, i, 188.

their queries, "...Lord Cobham, Lord Gower, and myself, have prepar'd...a list, which we are ready to give..."[87] The list outlined those they desired to place in the Administration in exchange for their parliamentary support. The following Monday, Pelham, Newcastle, Hardwicke, Harrington, Chesterfield, and Gower met at Hardwicke's home to negotiate specific terms for their support of the Pelhams.[88] On 8 December, Newcastle advised Richmond:

> We have had several Meetings with our new friends. In the main, they are very reasonable in their Recommendations, both as to their Numbers, & their Persons. The Tories are but few, & they not at all obnoxious, so that as to that, we might easily agree with them. But they surprised us the other night, by insisting absolutely, that the Duke of Bedford & Ld. Sandwich, should be in the Admiralty. They were so peremptory in this, that we have been forced to yield...[89]

These negotiations were publicly known, and to some extent, a successful agreement of terms was guaranteed as a result. To fail so publicly at such an arrangement would have created severe difficulties for the Pelhams in Parliament. Even the provincial press speculated in December about the possible changes to occur in the Administration.

> We hear, that besides the Vacancies now to fill up, there will speedily be some Removes from the office of Axxxy; so that almost a new B___d may be there expected...We hear the 4 vacant blue Garters will be given to the Prince Royal of Denmark, the Duke of

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[87] Add. MS 32,703, f. 447. Chesterfield-Newcastle, 1 December 1744. cited in Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, 243.
[88] Add. MS 32,703, ff. 454-5. Newcastle-Chesterfield, 3 December 1744.
[89] McCann, 160.

> Bedford, and the Earls of Granville and Bath...A great many Alterations in the Ministry are talk'd of, and 'tis said the chief Business in P_____t will not be undertaken till that is effect.[90]

Bedford was generally not perceived as a man of principle when contemporaries commented on the negotiations in 1745. Bedford and Gower were seen as 'Place at any Price' men who concurred with Chesterfield and Pitt "...to join the Pelhams, without stipulation...", forcing the more principled individuals to acquiesce.[91] The announcement that Bedford would head the Admiralty Office was not universally greeted with pleasure. However, the insistence of the 'Broad Bottoms' that the place of First Lord of the Admiralty be given to Bedford had to be accepted by the Pelhams. Bedford's previous commitment to trade and a 'blue water' foreign policy, as well as his relations with Gower and Chesterfield, likely promoted his claim. To force someone like William Pitt on the King would not have been possible, but Bedford's appointment was a viable option.[92] While both Pitt and Sandwich had irritated the King with their insulting comments during the debate on the Hanoverian Troops, Bedford's equally tough language was rarely recalled. This was likely a result of his social position and wealth. Although Bedford's language during his speeches on the Hanoverian Troop question in 1743 had been strong, and verged on the point of insulting George II, Bedford

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90 The Reading Mercury or Weekly Post, No. 366, Monday, 10 December 1744.
91 Coxe, Memoirs, i, 188.
92 Bedford Correspondence, i, Introduction, xxxvii.

never questioned the right of the King and his ministers to hire foreign mercenaries. His arguments on this "...*pernicious & Detestable Measure*..." had centred on the expense of hiring the Hanoverians compared to cheaper mercenaries.[93] This was not to say that Bedford's speeches were lightweight. On 1 February 1743, regarding the debate on the question of Hanoverian troops being taken into British pay, Bedford said that "...we are a nation exhausted by a long war, and impoverished by the diminuation of our commerce...", in no danger of invasion from either France or Spain. He then asked "...why...is the nation condemned to support at once a double burthen, to pay at home an army which can be of no use, and to hire auxiliaries, perhaps equally inactive..."? In response to his own question, Bedford suggested the answer: "What, but an inclination to aggrandize and enrich a contemptible province, and to deck with the plunder of Great Britain the electorate of Hanover?"[94] Bedford added to his insult of George II by suggesting that since the Hanoverian accession, Hanover had increased its affluence while Britain's commerce and honour had been woefully neglected. The question was raised again on 9 December 1743 when Bedford argued during the debate in the House of Lords that "...the Hanoverians cannot be employed without the utmost injury to the English nation."[95] Bedford complained that the Hanoverian troops had been shamefully preferred over

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93 McCann, 96.
94 Parliamentary History, xii, 1089-90.
95 Parliamentary History, xiii, 320.

British troops, that the Hanoverians were disobedient and disrespectful to British officers, as well as more expensive than any other mercenaries available on the open market. The Hanoverians, Bedford claimed, had cost the British taxpayer 700,000 pounds. He recommended that the government immediately hire cheaper replacements. Twenty-five Lords signed the Protest that followed the rejection of the motion against the employment of the Hanoverian Troops. In their concluding remarks, these Lords flew their Patriot colours, by stating that the Royal Family "...which we will always support, with true English hearts..." should accept their advice, and that they hoped "...that as our Votes have...proved us to the present Age, our names in the Books may transmit us to Posterity Englishmen."[96] Bedford's wealth and social position cushioned him from any retaliation by the King for his behaviour during these debates. William Pitt had much less social standing with which to counter his comments during debates on the same topic in the House of Commons, and the King was less generous with his forgiveness as a result. But Bedford had consistently promoted the opposition viewpoint during these debates, and so retained the favour of his opposition colleagues.

Bedford was also interested in naval affairs, particularly in relation to the protection of the merchant trade to the Americas. His speeches on the

96 Lords Journal, xxvi, 9 December 1743.

Convention of Pardo in 1739, on trade and navigation in 1742, and again in 1744, were indicative of his long-standing interest in these issues. Bedford knew more about the business of the Admiralty Office than many of his colleagues, and was in a way, as appropriate for the position as any one of them.

> The Duke of Bedford was not yet First Lord, but attended cabinet meetings in a private capacity; he fancied himself an expert on sea affairs...[97]

His opposition colleagues were certain that he would pursue their interests in the Admiralty Office, and so their demand for his inclusion was rational. A deal was struck by Christmas. Lord Gower replaced Cholmondeley as Lord Privy Seal, Lord Chesterfield took over from the duke of Devonshire as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Devonshire replaced Lord Dorset as Lord Steward, while Dorset became Lord President in Harrington's place. Lord Harrington took the seals of office of Secretary of State for the North from Lord Granville, mainly because the King could tolerate his presence in the Closet. At the Admiralty Office, Bedford replaced Lord Winchelsea as First Lord of the Admiralty, Sandwich replaced Dr. Lee, and George Grenville was appointed to a vacant seat on the Admiralty Board. Lord Vere Beauclerk and Admiral George Anson were also appointed during this changeover period. George Lyttelton and Richard Arundell replaced Compton and Gybbon at the Treasury Board. At the Board

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97 cited in Baugh, British Naval Administration, 65. Add. MS 32,700, f. 321, July 1742.

of Trade, John Pitt and Sir John Phillips were appointed to vacant seats. Finally, Sir John Hinde Cotton was made Treasurer of the Chamber, and the second earl of Halifax, Sandwich's cousin, became Master of the Buckhounds, to complete the changes in membership of the Administration.[98]

This experiment in creating a 'Broad-Bottom' Administration brought thirteen opposition members directly into government office to replace those members of the Granville crew who had returned to the backbenches.[99] Opposition politicians not immediately favoured with a place, like William Pitt, agreed to support the reconstructed Ministry at least for the time being.[100] Pitt's colleagues, George Grenville and George Lyttelton, were given places as representatives of 'Cobham's Cubs' in exchange for Pitt's acquiescence in the House of Commons. Clearly, the Pelham triumverate had retained control over the major offices in the Cabinet, but the 'Broad-Bottom' negotiators had gained a significant number of places for their friends. By placing a number of their colleagues in the lesser offices, the 'Broad-Bottom' members, or 'New Allies' as the Whigs were called, provided an opportunity for their young members to gain some first-hand experience of Administration. The opportunity to cultivate future political influence via the 'perks' of office came with

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98 See Table B.
99 See Chapter 3.
100 Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments 22/12/1744, ff. 188-9. Fitzwilliam the Earl-Earl of Malton.

this agreement. Bedford was to take full advantage of this opportunity at the general election in 1747. For the Pelhams, the accession of these new partners ensured that Granville and his followers could no longer threaten their position as leaders of the Administration. Secondly, the Pelhams faced less opposition to their measures in the Commons because those MPs remaining in opposition were muted by the loss of leadership once provided by the 'New Allies'. Contemporary observers recognised this consequence of the new arrangement. Sir Andrew Mitchell noted that

> The managers for the Whig part of the opposition were, Lord Chesterfield, Cobham, Mr. Waller, & Mr. Pitt; and for the other, Lord Gower & Sir Watkin Williams Wynn...Upon the whole, I believe, the Gentlemen who have come into place will have credit enough with their party to prevent any considerable opposition during this Session of Parlt.[101]

The members of the 'Broad Bottom' Administration were generally content with the new arrangements. Pelham and Newcastle were finally able to pursue measures in their own fashion without fear of Granville's intervention in the Closet. The 'New Allies' hoped for a more 'English' attitude towards the prosecution of the war in Europe, and the Pelhams were willing to let them pursue that aim.

Bedford's inclusion in the Administration during this reorganization was a result of his wealth, his

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101 Duncan G. Forbes, Culloden Papers, (London, 1815), No. CCXL, Mitchell-Ld President, 29 January 1744-5.

political connections, and his small coterie of followers. What later developed into the 'Bloomsbury Gang' began with a small nucleus of constant political supporters, and a fringe of friends whose political activities were more independent. During his time in the Administration, Bedford cultivated even more supporters. In 1749, Mr. Owen Brereton referred to the friends of Bedford as "The Capulets (for so they call the Duke of B's freinds)..."[102] In the general election of 1747, Bedford worked diligently to return MPs who would support him in Parliament. Yet Bedford's in-laws remained the core of the 'Bloomsbury Gang'. They included Baptist Leveson-Gower (1703-82), Bedford's wife's uncle, a Member of Parliament for Newcastle-under-Lyme from 1727 to 1761. He joined the Administration in 1745 as Lord Commissioner for Trade and Plantations, and left the Ministry with Bedford in June 1751. To affirm his connection with Bedford, he joined White's, a Whig club, in 1751. William Leveson-Gower (1696-1756), was the Member of Parliament for Staffordshire. He supported the Administration while Bedford was in office, but entered opposition with him in 1751, rather than following his brother, Gower. Granville Leveson-Gower, Viscount Trentham (1721-1803), was Gower's eldest son. He represented Bishop's Castle in the House of Commons until 1747. In 1747, with Bedford's full support, he stood with Sir Peter Warren, as the Ministerial candidate in

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102 A. L. Cust, Chronicles of Erthig on the Dyke, (London, 1914) i, 306.

the constituency of Westminster.[103] His subsequent appointment to the Admiralty Board resulted in a fierce by-election contest at Westminster in 1749.[104] This episode required Bedford's personal and financial support, and as a result strengthened Trentham's relationship with Bedford. In 1751, Trentham restated his political commitment to Bedford by resigning with him in protest at the dismissal of Sandwich from the Admiralty Office. Richard Leveson-Gower (1726-53) was the youngest son in the Gower family, and he entered the House of Commons in 1747 as the Member of Parliament for Lichfield. He was loyal to Bedford from the beginning of his short political career. His notoriety arose from his love affair in 1750 with Grace Pelham, the third daughter of Henry Pelham.[105] Bedford could count on the support of these in-laws in the House of Commons, even if he could not rely on Gower's assistance in the Lords. Although the Leveson-Gowers formed the core of the 'Bloomsbury Gang', there were other politicians who were associated with Bedford. For example, George Spencer, the fourth duke of Marlborough, was Bedford's former brother-in-law.[106] His political connection with Bedford had grown out of their family relationship, and although not yet a member of the inner core of the 'Bloomsbury Gang', Marlborough maintained close ties with Bedford throughout the 1740s.

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103 Sir Peter Warren (1703-52).
104 See Chapter 4.
105 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 2.
106 See page 32, this chapter.

In contrast to these family connections, John Montagu, the fourth earl of Sandwich, was not related by marriage to Bedford, and he was considered a Bedford 'friend' in the 1740s.[107] Born in November 1718, Sandwich was eight years younger than Bedford. He succeeded to his peerage in 1729, attended Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1735, and went on the Grand Tour in 1737. He took his seat in the House of Lords in 1739. He held little interest outside of Huntingdonshire, and was certainly less wealthy than Bedford. Sandwich had, however, according to Walpole, gained Bedford's personal favour, "...by intrigues, cricket matches, and acting plays..."[108] Sandwich also introduced Bedford to his wife's brother, Charles, second viscount Fane of Reading. Bedford thought Lord Fane to be "...the honestest man in the world..."[109] whose integrity he valued.[110] Sandwich's integrity was not openly admired by Bedford. He was "...a typical Whig aristocrat, wealthy and pleasure-loving..." whose personal interests included cricket, classics, music, astronomy, navigation, and members of the opposite sex.[111] Sandwich was quite ambitious in the 1740s, and his relationships with Newcastle, and then with the duke of Cumberland, called into question the depth of his political friendship with Bedford. He was considered the dominant partner in their

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107 M.J. Williams, 'The Naval Administration of the Fourth Earl of Sandwich, 1791-82', (Oxford D.Phil,1962) 6.
108 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 1.
109 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 65.
110 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 7.
111 Williams, 7.

relationship, who sought his own success and prosperity through the use of Bedford's assets.[112] Bedford and Sandwich had acted together in opposition during the Hanoverian Troop debates, and came into the Admiralty together upon the request of their mutual friends. Yet, in September 1750, Pelham advised Hardwicke that Sandwich "...wishes him [Bedford] therefore out of the way of business, that he may not fall with him."[113] Walpole, the diarist, commented that in June 1751

> When Lord Sandwich found his disgrace unavoidable, and had even got intelligence of the day on which he was to be dismissed, he endeavoured by his own solicitations, and by the interposition of the Duke to prevail on the Duke of Bedford to throw up the seals first. This finesse, which did not succeed, was calculated to prevent the appearance of the Duke of Bedford's resigning upon his account, and consequently the new obligations to be laid upon him by that measure...[114]

If Walpole was correct in this assessment of Sandwich's activities prior to his dismissal in June 1751, Bedford foiled Sandwich's plot by resigning the day after in protest over Sandwich's treatment. Any sense of obligation felt by Sandwich was short-lived. Bedford went into opposition with Sandwich at his side in 1751, and although personal friends, they immediately began to disagree on issues in Parliament. The question of the Saxon subsidies in 1752, openly divided them. Bedford came out strongly opposed to the Saxon treaty in late

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112 J. M. Spendlove, 'Government and the House of Commons, 1741-54', (B.Litt., Oxford, 1956), 138.
113 Cited in Walpole, Memoirs, i, 2n. Add. MS 35,423, f. 107.
114 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 125.

January, and concluded his speech in the Lords on 28 January "...with a motion for an address, to represent that subsidiary treaties ought never to be concluded in time of peace, especially after a long war, and that they are neither necessary at present, nor likely to procure any real advantage."[115] Sandwich decided to vote for the Saxon treaty after discussing the issue with the duke of Cumberland. Sandwich, according to Walpole, "...lamented his misfortune of differing with his friend the Duke of Bedford..."[116] but despite this followed the inclinations of the duke of Cumberland. The duke of Cumberland, until the Regency Bill was passed in May 1751, could have cultivated an alternative political grouping under his personal banner.[117] Although Newcastle believed in 1750 that Cumberland and his sister, the Princess Amelia, were supporting Bedford and Sandwich in political opposition to himself, it was not seriously promoted.[118] This idea sprang from Newcastle's insecurities and jealousies. Aside from attending cricket matches and summer parties at Woburn, Cumberland did not appear to be openly advocating Bedford's political opposition to the Pelham Administration. Bedford was still, after all, a member of the Ministry. Sandwich was the link between Cumberland and Bedford. He was Bedford's colleague and friend while

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115 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 169.
116 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 171-2.
117 See Peter A. Luff, 'Henry Fox, the Duke of Cumberland, and Pelhamite Politics, 1748-57', (D.Phil., Oxford, 1981) for more detail about Cumberland's career.
118 Add. MS 32,721, ff. 75-6. Newcastle-Pelham, 9 June 1750.

they worked together in the Pelham Administration from 1744 to 1751, but Bedford's sense of duty towards Sandwich appeared to outweigh Sandwich's sense of political obligation. Sandwich acted with Bedford when it was in his personal interest to do so throughout the 1740s.

Other members of the 'Bloomsbury Gang' in the House of Commons were slightly more willing to place their political fortunes with Bedford.[119] For example, Thomas Gore, a Tory MP since 1722, was one of Gower's followers who, in 1744, transferred his allegiance to Bedford. He was returned with Bedford's assistance in 1747, and sat for the town of Bedford until 1754.[120] Another MP, Thomas Brand, was married to the duchess of Bedford's aunt, Lady Caroline Pierrepont. He had been elected for New Shoreham in 1741, and voted consistently with the Administration before Bedford joined. In 1747, Bedford used his interest to return Brand for Tavistock, and Brand subsequently followed Bedford's direction in the House of Commons.[121] The general election of 1747 gave Bedford the opportunity to increase the number of his supporters in the Commons. John Offley was brought in at Bedford in 1747 with Bedford's assistance.[122] Charles Taylor, MP for Totnes, 1747 to 1754, also supported

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119 See J. M. Spendlove, 'Government and the House of Commons, 1747-54', (B.Litt, Oxford, 1956), for her list of Bedford's followers.
120 R. R. Sedgewick, The House of Commons, 1715-54, (2 vols)(London, 1970), ii, 71.
121 Sedgewick, The House of Commons, 1715-54, i, 483.
122 Sedgewick, The House of Commons, 1715-54, ii, 304.

Bedford in the Commons.[123] John Waldegrave, married to another sister-in-law, was brought in as a ministerial candidate for Orford in 1747, and followed Bedford's directives in the House.[124] Individuals like Sir Chaloner Ogle, were brought into office through Bedford's influence, but were not strictly members of the 'Bloomsbury Gang'. Ogle was returned in a by-election at Rochester in 1746 upon the death of Admiral Haddock. Pelham acquiesced in Bedford's choice of Ogle despite his own preference for another candidate.♣ Ogle remained a ministerial supporter, and did not follow Bedford into opposition in 1751.

Sir Peter Warren, whose success at Cape Breton Bedford rewarded by supporting his political aspirations, was returned at Westminster on Bedford's interest.[126] They disagreed on the question of the court martial of half-pay officers in 1750, and Warren joined the opposition benches until he left the political arena in 1754. Bedford could sometimes influence MPs whose ties to him were looser still. Theobald Taafe represented Arundel from 1747 to 1754, and started out as an opposition Whig. By 1750, he became a close friend of Bedford's, and spent a great deal of money and time, gaming and partying with Bedford and Sandwich.[127]

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123 Sedgewick, The House of Commons, 1715-54, ii, 463.
124 Sedgewick, The House of Commons, 1715-54, ii, 505.
125 Sedgewick, The House of Commons, 1715-54, ii, 305.
126 Sedgewick, The House of Commons, 1715-54, ii, 522-3.
See also J. Gwyn, 'The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren', (Oxford D.Phil. 1971).
127 Sedgewick, The House of Commons, 1715-54, ii, 460-1.

Taafe's closest friendship was with Edward Wortley Montague, who along with Edward Montagu and John Montagu were related to Sandwich. Sandwich's relations should definitely not be considered members of the 'Bloomsbury Gang'. Sandwich, let alone Bedford, lacked influence over their actions in Parliament, and their support for Bedford's activities depended upon his ability to convince them with discussion and argument. Coulson Fellowes, who Sandwich supported as the Huntingdonshire MP in 1741, opposed Bedford and Sandwich after the general election in 1747. Sandwich's connection with Lord Fane, however, provided Bedford with one strong follower. Lord Fane supported Richard Neville Aldworth's election as MP at Reading in 1747. Aldworth became Bedford's secretary, and remained a solid member of the 'Bloomsbury Gang' until Bedford's death in 1771.

Finally, Richard Rigby (1722-88), who subsequently became a well-known Bedfordite, met Bedford during the Litchfield races in September 1747. Rigby's relationship with Bedford did not figure prominently during the period from 1745 to 1751. Rigby was loosely attached to the Leicester House group led by the Prince of Wales. Rigby sat for Castle Rising from 1745 to 1747, and for Sudbury from 1747 to 1754, before representing Tavistock with Bedford's assistance. He was described by Walpole in his Memoirs.

> Rigby had an advantageous and manly person, recommended by a spirited jollity that was very pleasing, though sometimes roughened into brutality:

> of most insinuating good breeding when he wished to be agreeable. His passions were turbulent and overbearing; his courage bold and fond of exerting itself...In short, he was a man, who was seldom loved or hated with moderation;...His amiable qualities were all natural...[128]

The naturalness of Rigby's character endeared him to Bedford who grew to 'love' this man enough to lend him money in 1756.[129] During the period under study here, however, they were relative strangers.

Bedford's political connections in Parliament were important because they added to his political stature. His wealth and social status guaranteed he could move within the highest political circles, but the number of individuals he could sway in the Commons persuaded Pelham that Bedford could not be left in opposition. Bedford's ability to persuade other groups of individuals like 'Cobham's Cubs' to act in conjunction with his followers was as important in Pelham's equation, as the actual number of Bedford supporters. The 'Bloomsbury Gang', although small and informal, was the base from which Bedford could pursue his policies, first in the Admiralty Office, and then in the Southern Department of the Secretary of State's office. While his personality created problems for him, particularly with Newcastle, the potential political strength he could wield if pushed into opposition, encouraged Pelham to retain his services

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128 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 285-6.
129 Johnson, 33.

after being coerced into including Bedford in his Administration.

CHAPTER 3: THE ADMIRALTY OFFICE AND A PROPOSAL FOR THE REDUCTION OF CANADA.

When Granville resigned from the Administration on 24 November 1744, Pelham took the opportunity to consolidate his political power. By the end of December the 'Broad Bottomers' from the opposition benches had been incorporated into the Administration led by Pelham and Newcastle. Gower had been given the office of Lord Privy Seal, Chesterfield became the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and Bedford was made First Lord of the Admiralty. While superficially their inclusion in the Ministry did not appear to alter the complexion of the Administration, the positions their political 'friends' gained in the lower offices indicated that more than minor concessions had been made by the Pelhams during the negotiations. The Admiralty Board, in particular, radically changed its composition with the addition of Lord Sandwich, George Grenville, Lord Vere Beauclerk and George Anson.[1] The Admiralty Board, headed by Bedford, was not responsible for the overall strategy and implementation of British foreign policy. Yet it interested these new members in the 'Broad Bottom' experiment because of the Admiralty's potential role in any 'blue water' strategy. Since 1739 at least, opposition Whigs had been proposing changes to British naval and trade policy. These five appointments to the office of First Lord, and to the Board of Admiralty, satisfied their 'Country' colleagues in

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[1] Baugh, 503-4.

Parliament, who hoped that government policy would, in the future, complement their views. Despite their hopes to influence British foreign policy, Newcastle, an Old Court Whig, retained overall control of foreign affairs in the offices of the Secretaries of State for the Northern and Southern Departments.

Seventeen places were reassigned during the December 1744 negotiations; 12 of these places were given to the opposition, or 'New Allies'. Pelham and Newcastle had retained their control over the important cabinet offices by allocating only three places to their new cohorts. The 'New Allies' were compensated with a number of places at the lower levels in the Ministry. They now had the opportunity to learn 'the ropes' of office necessary if they wished to move up in the Administration. All members of the 'Broad-Bottom' appeared satisfied with this arrangement. Hardwicke, the Lord Chancellor, noted in a Minute in early December 1744, that the aim of the Pelham Administration was to fight on in Europe until a reasonable peace could be negotiated. He also suggested that by removing Granville from office, the Tories and opposition Whigs would be willing to support the Pelhams in this affair. Hardwicke commented that their support could be purchased with some places in the coalition, but recommended the protection of any important positions in the Ministry. "By such a scheme all divisions of men will be united, and the carrying on the war become a national measure."[2] In co-opting the

[2] Wilkes, A Whig in Power, 241n.

'New Allies' and providing their supporters with places, Pelham ensured there would be little opposition in Parliament to his measures. In all these arrangements, Pelham sought stability for his Ministry. Those politicians who joined him in office, however, did not entirely abandon their earlier criticisms, and Pelham needed to address their concerns on an *ad hoc* basis. Bedford's appointment to the office of First Lord of the Admiralty in 1744 tested Pelham's managerial skills in his search for stability. Bedford was determined to pursue his own views as far as possible within the Administration.

As early as July 1743, Bedford had attended cabinet meetings in a private capacity as an adviser on naval affairs.[3] His interest in the navy was linked to his belief in the 'mercantilist' theories of his day.[4] He thought British commercial interests were best served by protection of overseas investments. Bedford's attitude towards trade, and the use of the navy to protect and encourage its development, mimicked the popular platitudes expressed in the press during the late 1730s and early 1740s. In 1739, he had openly advocated war to protest against Spanish attacks on British merchant ships in the

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[3] Baugh, 65. See chapter 2 of this thesis.
[4] J. R. McNeil, Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana, 1700-1763, (Chapel Hill, 1985), 46. His definition of mercantilism claimed (1) it was the idea that trade and production were proper concerns of the state; (2) a belief in the justice and efficacy of intervention; (3) the state to regulate trade to ensure an excess of export over import; (4) a belief in the fixed amount of world trade; (5) the colonies were to provide raw materials, and were to be markets for manufactured goods, all to benefit the balance of trade.

American seas.[5] Bedford presented petitions from London merchants to Parliament. These merchants demanded ministerial and naval retaliation for these Spanish insults.[6] Bedford concurred with their sentiments. In 1742, when Bedford spoke in the House of Lords on a bill for securing British trade and navigation, one of his arguments was that British interests were better served by concentrating resources on the navy, to attain the necessary sea supremacy to protect trade routes to America, India, the Mediterranean, and Europe.[7] He advised the members in the House that "...we may always, while we are careful to preserve our maritime superiority, protect our merchants so powerfully, that none of our enemies shall be incited to attack them..."[8] Bedford's advocacy of this `blue water' strategy in foreign policy was supported by the 'Country' Whigs and Tories in parliamentary opposition, and was, favoured by some merchants outside Westminster as well.

Newcastle initially expressed surprise that the Tories, during the December negotiations, had insisted upon the appointment of Bedford to the office of the First Lord of the Admiralty.[9] Despite Newcastle's surprise, Bedford was the ideal choice for the Tories, who supported a 'Broad

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5 Bedford Correspondence, i, xviii.
6 W.M. Torrens, History of Cabinets, 49-50. See also MS Carte 180, ff. 614-6. An Exact List of the Lords...who Voted for and Against the late Convention (with Spain), (London, 1739). Bedford voted against the Convention. See chapter 2.
7 See J. Black, Natural and Necessary Enemies; Anglo-French Relations in the eighteenth century, (London, 1986), 58, for view that the influence of commercial factors on foreign policy decisions has been over-emphasised.
8 Parliamentary History, xii, 767-8.
9 McCann, 160.

Bottom' coalition. He was a clearly identified member of the opposition Whigs, who had consistently supported opposition measures since he entered the Lords in 1733. Bedford held social and political influence based on his wealth and family heritage.[10] In addition, he was related by marriage to Gower, who was still considered to be a Tory at this time. Finally, he had criticized the Walpole and Carteret Administrations for their emphasis on Europe and Hanover in foreign policy.[11]

Bedford tenaciously adhered to 'Country' Whig views throughout the 1730s and 1740s, and by so doing, he indicated to the Tories that he was unlikely to abandon them once in office. While the backbench Tories were concerned about the lack of alteration to measures, the leading Tories recognized that their pretensions to major roles in the Administration would never readily be fulfilled. Bedford, on the other hand, would be accepted. The 'Old Corps Whigs', the backbone of the Pelham Ministry, could not object to Bedford given his wealth, social standing and long-standing Whig heritage.[12] Despite his adherence to 'Country' policies, Bedford was a Whig through and through. Therefore his nomination to the Admiralty was an intelligent move adopted by the 'Broad Bottomers' during these negotiations.[13]

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10 See E. Johnson, 'The Bedford Connection'.
11 P.A. Luff, 'Mathews v. Lestock; Parliament, Politics and the Navy in Mid-Eighteenth Century England', Parliamentary History, x, 1 (1991), 57.
12 Bedford Correspondence, i, xxiii.
13 See Chapter 2.

A few openly voiced concerns about Bedford's appointment to the Admiralty position, among them, the duke of Richmond, Master of the Horse.[14] He warned his friend Newcastle of potential difficulties with Bedford's inclusion in the Cabinet.

> As for His Grace of Bedford's being at the head of the Admiralty, I own I am sorry for it, for I look upon him to be vain, proud & wrong-headed, & I fear you will have a great deal of plaque with him.[15]

At 35, Bedford was young, inexperienced, determined, idealistic, and proud. The leaders in the Administration were from an earlier generation: the three major figures, Pelham, Newcastle, and Hardwicke were, respectively 15, 17 and 20 years older than Bedford. Pembroke, the Groom of the Stole, was the youngest of his new colleagues at 39; Chesterfield and Gower were both 51, and the Archbishop of Canterbury was the eldest at 71. In contrast to this group, Bedford's fellow colleagues at the Admiralty Board were relatively young. Sandwich was 27, Grenville 33, Vere Beauclerk 46, and Anson was the eldest at 48.[16] This generational difference may not have caused obvious problems within the Administration; however it should be considered that the experience of the elder gentlemen with previous wars would have influenced their attitudes in discussions concerning Europe. As well, Bedford and his cohorts would not have an immediate memory of the political upheaval that

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14 See Chapter 2, 39-40.
15 McCann, 161.
16 Luff argues in favour of a generational division amongst politicians in 'Mathews v. Lestock; Parliament, Politics and the Navy in Mid-Eighteenth Century England', Parliamentary History, x, 1 (1991), 58.

ensued after George I became King in 1714. Concern for ministerial stability did not concern the younger set. This age difference later exacerbated tensions between Bedford and Newcastle, although Bedford appeared to remain on reasonable terms with his father-in-law, Gower. The Admiralty Board members also faced particular problems when dealing with their subordinates on the Navy Board.[17] There, two aged survivors of the previous war held court, and when faced with an order from the members of the Admiralty Board with which they disagreed, these two individuals would defer taking any action until Bedford or his colleagues inquired about the delay.[18] Problems also arose between Bedford and Thomas Corbett, the Secretary of the Admiralty Board. In August 1745, for example, the nomination of the Collector of the Six Penny Duty at Bristol caused confusion. Thomas Corbett had appointed his own fellow, but withdrew the nomination after Lord Vere Beauclerk discussed the matter with him.[19] Bedford, who had been solicited by Henry Legge in July, wanted to appoint his own nominee.[20] Bedford recapped the whole incident in his letter to Vere Beauclerk, and concluded,

> I think myself justified in what I have now laid down, as I think by my Post, I am answerable both to the King and the Publick for the conduct of the inferior Boards, and as long as I continue in this station, I shall expect that my Nomination of proper persons to fill those Boards shall be accepted of.[21]

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17 Baugh, 88.
18 Baugh, 91.
19 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 41. Vere Beauclerk-Bedford, 8 August 1745.
20 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 25. Legge-Bedford, 11 July 1745.
21 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 43. Bedford-Vere Beauclerk, 15 August 1745. Baugh, 85-6.

Bedford ultimately got his way in such matters, but it was sometimes weeks before orders were implemented. Bedford's reaction to these initial delays may have contributed to subsequent complaints about his obstinate behaviour. Differing views on British objectives in foreign policy may also have coupled with Bedford's youthful enthusiasm for new ideas and projects, to alienate his elder colleagues at the Navy Board.[22] Initially in the Admiralty Office there was little that Bedford could do to forward his own ideas for promoting a strong naval strategy to protect and increase the commercial interests of Great Britain around the world. During the first six months in office, Bedford had to acquaint himself with the various personnel, correspondents, and departmental duties he had become responsible for, without having any previous ministerial experience to use as a guideline. That he ultimately succeeded in attaining control of his office was reflected in Lord Marchmont's comment that: "The Duke of Bedford governed the Admiralty absolutely, was very obstinate, and would not be spoken to..."[23] Yet Bedford still had to go through Newcastle in order to obtain the King's approval for certain Admiralty measures. In January 1745, he had appointed Captain Richard Edwards of the Princess Mary to be commander-in-chief of the ships protecting the Newfoundland fisheries. Bedford, as First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to Newcastle requesting that he ask the King if he would be

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22 Baugh, 88.
23 cited in Bedford Correspondence, i, xl. Marchmont Papers, i, 213.

pleased to appoint Edwards as Governor of Newfoundland.[24] Bedford did not have regular access to the King, and had to rely on Pelham, Newcastle, or Hardwicke to act as intermediaries for him.

During Bedford's breaking-in period in the Admiralty Office, events outside his control captured the interest of the leading Ministers. The four major cabinet ministers - Newcastle, Hardwicke, Harrington and Pelham - who had taken over the direction of foreign policy from Granville, were struggling within the Closet to obtain the King's confidence. He had not yet forgiven them for forcing the departure of his political favourite, Granville. Foreign policy considerations determined the ministerial agenda throughout the first few months of 1745. Granville's official advice was missed by the King, although their unofficial discussions continued. Events in Europe were affecting all involvement in the war. On 20 January 1745, the Emperor Charles VII of Bavaria died at Munich, and his son, Maximillian Joseph, renounced his support for France, and his claim to the Imperial Crown in favour of Maria Theresa's husband in the treaty of Fuessen on 20 April. In addition, George II sailed for his Hanoverian sojourn on 7 May 1745. Meanwhile, the duke of Cumberland and Marshal Konigsegg were defeated by Marshal Saxe at Fontenoy on 11 May.[25]

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24 SP 42/28, f. 12. Bedford-Newcastle, 14 January 1745.
25 Alexander Massie, `Defence of the Low Countries, 1744-1748' (Oxford, D.Phil., 1987)

Concerns about the French success in Flanders preoccupied the thoughts of the Ministers in London, and dominated their private discussions during these months. At this time, Bedford was not included in these inner Cabinet discussions. He was, however, aware of the major outlines of the European conflict. In early July 1745, he, along with Stair and Wade, advised the Lords Justice in London of the necessary steps to be taken to avoid an immediate defeat at Ostend.[26] In a postscript to their memoranda, Bedford and Wade, on their own initiative, recommended the immediate evacuation of Ostend by British troops.[27] Their advice was not taken by Pelham, who despite supporting the pacific section in the Cabinet, was not keen on losing control of Britain's main communication link with the Low Countries. Neither was his brother, Newcastle, impressed with this proposal. The triumvirate of Newcastle, Hardwicke, and Pelham, controlled European policy, and Bedford's contribution in that arena was not encouraged.

For Bedford, events in Europe were by necessity less important than the news he received from North America. As First Lord of the Admiralty, he had no official responsibility for the pursuit of a land war on the European continent. The preoccupation of the Secretaries of State with European events, combined with the lack of interest in colonial affairs by Lord Monson, the President of the Board of Trade, allowed Bedford the opportunity to consider

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[26] The Lords Justice constituted a Regency Council that met twice weekly while the King was away from Britain. See Wilkes, 103, for a fuller discussion.

[27] Bedford Correspondence, i, 25-8.

British military strategy in the American arena of the war against France. In January 1745, William Shirley, the Governor of Massachussetts, wrote to Newcastle that opinion in Boston favoured the seizure of the island of Cape Breton, and the fortress at Louisbourg, prior to the arrival of supplies and new recruits from France in the spring.[28]

At the end of January, Shirley sent his 'Scheme for Attacking Louisbourg' to the Lords of the Admiralty, and his subsequent letters on this subject were addressed to Bedford. The fear that the French would toss the English out of Nova Scotia, and as a result be able to invade English settlements further south, prompted the Americans to plan an attack on Louisbourg.[29] Shirley appeared to be directing the affair in America, although on 14 March 1745, Bedford signed instructions for Charles Knowles to proceed with a detachment of 300 soldiers from General Frampton's regiment to Louisbourg.[30] On the same day, Bedford sent Instructions to Isaac Townsend, and/or Peter Warren, to strengthen the fortifications at Louisbourg, as well as to harass French ships, protect the British fisheries, and to obtain new conquests in the region.[31] On 22 March 1745, Bedford and his Admiralty Board colleagues ordered the Navy

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[28] C. H. Lincoln, ed. Correspondence of William Shirley...1731-60, (2 vols.)(New York, 1912), i, 161. Shirley-Newcastle, 14 January 1744.
[29] Shirley Correspondence, i, 177. Shirley-Wentworth, 31 January 1744.
[30] Adm 2/66, ff. 335-7. Instructions, 14 March 1745.
[31] Adm 2/66, f. 338. Instructions, 14 March 1745.

Board to prepare transports to carry General Frampton's troops to Louisbourg.[32]

In May 1745, Bedford received an account of an expedition organized by William Shirley and General Pepperell from New England to Louisbourg, and he was advised to expect the surrender of the French to the American colonists.[33] After receiving that letter, Bedford did not appear to have responded immediately, nor to have informed his colleagues of this news. Perhaps Bedford did not anticipate victory. Alternatively, perhaps he decided against taking any action when the letter arrived because the French victories in Flanders were dominating discussions at Westminster. As disillusionment grew at Westminster over the prospect of continuing British military involvement on the European continent, the capture of Louisbourg from the French alleviated the general gloom. In June, reports were printed that Cape Breton had been taken by Commodore Warren. A commonly expressed opinion regarding the capture argued "...that no Acquisition in America could be more advantageous to Great Britain as it would not only secure our Northern Colonies, but enable us to render useless those of the French..."[34]

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[32] Adm 2/209, f. 6. Bedford, et al-Navy Board, 22 March 1745.

[33] Cited in Descriptive List of the State Papers Portugal in the Public Record Office, London, 250.

[34] Reading Mercury, No. 394, 24 June 1745. See also London Gazette, No. 8466, 10 September 1745, and The Daily Advertiser, No. 4606, 28 September 1745.

Any war in North America was perceived to be a British war. Victory was believed to be possible, if British troops were unencumbered by obstructive continental allies. One result of this opinion was that the euphoria greeting the news of the conquest in North America intermingled with national pride. The recent lack of military success in Flanders was briefly forgotten. Louisbourg, because of this public approbation, became a more important strategic acquisition for the British than it was worth in actual economic terms.

Louisbourg was not the valuable fortress that the wishful thinking of British contemporaries tried to make it. Writers described in detail the conquest, and outlined its geographical location in newspapers and pamphlets. These accounts were partially responsible for encouraging the belief that the conquest was important if the French were to be pushed out of North America.[35] Both Bedford and Newcastle agreed that this 'prize' must be retained in any peace negotiations with the French.[36] As a fortress, however, Louisbourg could barely defend itself due to numerous defects. These included its poor construction, its inadequate location for defensive and offensive strategy, and its isolation from both Quebec and France, which hindered reinforcement of the post when it was under siege.[37] The French used Louisbourg to participate in the

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[35] Wm. Bollan, The Importance and Advantage of Cape Breton, Truly Stated and Impartially Considered. With Proper Maps. (London, 1746), 139-40.

[36] Reading Mercury., No. 395, 1 July 1745, and No. 399, 29 July 1745.

[37] Baugh, 95.

cod fisheries, and to harass British trade between America and Great Britain. These activities provided in turn a nursery for inexperienced French sailors.[38] William Shirley, the Governor of Massachussets, in his reports to London, exaggerated the military importance of Louisbourg to France in order to ensure the British government retained the fort in any peace negotiations. Shirley wrote to Newcastle

> ...that the Harbour of Louisbourg is most commodiously situated for a place of Retreat for the Enemy's Ships of War navigating these Seas to refit in, and also for a Rendezvous for 'em to form Expeditions from against his Majesty's Northern Colonies...and as we have had a late Instance of its being made use of as a place of Shelter and Refreshment for their East India Fleet in their Return home...it seems to be a proof of what further Service it may be to 'em in time of War. But what seems a much more considerable Advantage arising to the Enemy from their possession of Cape Breton is that it is the principal Settlement of their growing Fishery, from which alone during the Fishing Season they employ seven thousand men...[39]

Shirley really wanted to remove French competition from the cod fisheries, and to eliminate harassment of shipping off the American coast. For the French, Louisbourg was important only in the sense that if the British stationed a naval squadron there, and cruised the seas between Cape Breton and Newfoundland, the French could be prevented from supplying Canada, and ultimately that country would fall under British economic control.[40] The restitution of Louisbourg became a concern for the two parties immediately interested in North America. It was important for France to

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[38] J. R. McNeill, Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana, 1700-1763, (Chapel Hill, 1985), 205.
[39] Shirley Correspondence, i, 162.
[40] McNeill, 95.

ensure that the British did not use it as a naval station to control access to the St. Lawrence River, and the American colonists thought its retention was required in order to improve their own security.[41]

For Bedford and his ministerial colleagues in July 1745, the retention of Louisbourg was a prerequisite for possible peace negotiations with France. The British American military success at Louisbourg was the only bright prospect in an otherwise gloomy summer. Bedford basked in its reflected glory for several months. William Pitt, for example, congratulated him on this great national success, attained through his personal efforts.[42] Since Bedford had little to do with the actual planning and execution of this colonial expedition, Pitt was most likely pandering to Bedford's personal vanity. Pitt not only relied on Bedford to pay him an annuity, but Bedford had greater political influence at this time. As well, Bedford's friends continued to cooperate with Pitt's family, the Cobham Cubs, in Parliament, and reciprocal support was expected. Pitt was not alone, however, in congratulating Bedford on his 'personal' efforts in the national success at Louisbourg. The earl of Leicester sent word of his approval on 2 August 1745, and John Martin forwarded his congratulations on 7 August.[43] On 31 August, Lord Hardwicke noted his personal satisfaction with the successful event in a letter to the

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41 McNeill, 92-7, 205.
42 Bedford Correspondence, i, 34.
43 Bedford Correspondence, i, 30-3. Leicester-Bedford 2 August 1745. Add. MS 34523, ff. 31-2. Martin-Bedford, 7 August 1745.

Archbishop of York.[44] Bedford was not used to receiving compliments, particularly less than altruistic ones. His appointment to the Admiralty Office had provided him with the power to provide patronage favours. As a result, Bedford began receiving numerous complimentary letters requesting his assistance in various matters.[45] Bedford attempted to handle all requests. For example, Hoadly, the Bishop of Winchester, while writing to Bedford on 19 February to congratulate him on his advancement, also mentioned that William Grey, then employed as overseer of the ship *The Advice*, would be a good candidate for a vacant position at the Chatham yard.[46] In July 1745, Hoadly thanked Bedford for fulfilling this recommendation, and also thanked Bedford for helping his son with the loan of some money.[47] Some requests were less specific. The Archbishop of York recommended John Rowzier to Bedford as suitable for any position in the Navy.[48] Most writers asked for specific assistance, however. Bedford attempted personally to attend to all these requests. In September 1746, he gave his support to Mr. Burrard at Lymington during the next general election, and as well, apologized for not being able to fulfil the other preferments Burrard had requested.[49]

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44 York, Life of Hardwicke, i, 442-3.
45 See for example, Bedford Micro, ix 1745, f. 88. De Boetzelaer-Bedford, 16/27 January 1745.
46 Bedford Micro, ix 1745, f. 102. Hoadly-Bedford, 19 February 1745.
47 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 31. Hoadly-Bedford, 27 July 1745.
48 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 3. Archbishop of York-Bedford, 16 June 1745. See also Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 15. Hylton-Bedford 16 June 1745. Hylton recommended George Tew as someone who wants to go to sea.
49 Harry Burrard (1707-91) was a government supporter and received a secret service pension of 500 pounds. He was MP for Lymington from 1741-48. His request for Bedford's

> It has been impossible as yet for me to do any thing for him [Stephen Kneller, looking for a place at Portsmouth] but shall be very ready upon finding him a staunch friend of yours and Colonel Paulets to do whatever shall lye in my power to serve him, consistent with the rules of the Navy, and the good of the King's service. With regard to Mr. Benjamin Bevis, I should likewise be very happy in obliging him, as he is a friend of yours & Colonel Paulet's, but cannot possibly do it in the manner requested in your letter, as it is contrary to a rule we have laid down at the Board of Admiralty...[50]

Bedford was willing to reject, or alter, any requests that went against the Board of Admiralty rules, or his personal views. Benjamin Bevis would not be promoted as warrant officer to a large ship until he had worked several years in that position on a smaller ship.[51] When Lord Stair asked Bedford for favours for William Macdowall and William Dalrymple in February 1746, the result was not exactly what Stair requested. Dalrymple wanted the purser's job on a larger ship, while Macdowall requested a transfer from Captain Boscawen's ship to a larger vessel. Bedford's complete response is not known, however he wrote on the bottom of Stair's letter "Mr M'dowall is discharged."[52] A further example of Bedford's willingness to disappoint supplicants for office occurred in April 1746. Bedford refused to recommend the promotion of Captain Mead to Flag Officer (Admiral) in a letter to the Captain himself.[53]

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support in the election was likely a way to introduce his other requests. (History of Parliament, i, 508)

[50] Bedford Micro, xiii 1746, f. 56. Bedford-Burrard, September 1746.

[51] Bedford Micro, xiii 1746, f. 56. Bedford-Burrard, September 1746.

[52] Bedford Micro, ix 1745, f. 106. Stair-Bedford, 23 February 1745.

[53] Bedford Micro, xi 1745/6, f. 48. Bedford-Mead, 4 April 1746.

Earlier in August 1745, Bedford had outlined his reasons for refusing to include Mead in the next round of promotions, and he never changed his decision.[54]

While most requests concerned naval favours, an Exeter Justice of the Peace complained to Bedford about the lack of a convoy for the west coast of England. He claimed that this had hindered, if not stopped trade, and that people in the region cursed the war in Germany for taking money which would never be returned. The JP asked Bedford to alleviate the local miseries.[55] A rather tall order, even for the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Bedford's response is not known. Bedford, in his capacity as First Lord, was also asked by members of communities to suggest candidates for vacant parliamentary seats. In February 1745, Edward Levzee, John Carter, and William Bickman wrote to Bedford on the death of their MP, Colonel Bladen:

> ...we being sincerely desirous that some worthy Gentleman a true friend to the laws and liberties of England & to his present Majesty & Family may be elected, do out of the great regard we have for the very long [line] of Patriots in your Grace's Family & an entire confidence that you Grace inherits the same unshaken glorious spirit of True Patriotism make it our humble request that yr. G. will please to recommend to us such a Gentleman to represent this borough as it ought to be.[56]

Bedford nominated Thomas Gore, who was then duly returned to Parliament by the freemen of Portsmouth on 3 March 1746.

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54 Bedford Correspondence, i, 41-2.
55 Bedford Micro, xi 1745/6. Exeter JP-Bedford, n.d.
56 Levzee, Carter, Bickman-Bedford, February 1745/6.

The requests Bedford received were varied, and numerous. An example of the numbers was suggested in Lord Vere Beauclerk's letter to Bedford concerning the serious illness of Mr. Cooper, the Agent Victualler and Contractor for Victualling the Sick and Wounded Seamen.

> Since I writt this I am told an Express is come that he is dead,...should it be so must beg Your Grace's favour to answer me three words, as I shall have a thousand sollicitations.[57]

Bedford, initially at least, attempted to handle all these appointments and requests personally. He even replied to anonymous letters he received concerning 'the problems' of the navy.[58] "MJ", one of these correspondents, wrote to Bedford in March 1745.

> ...as your Grace has encouraged me to communicate my further observations on Naval Affairs by the lines I had the honour of receiving by your Graces order, Dated the 21st, of last month...[59]

"MJ" then presented his reasons why the present Admirals were ill chosen, before discussing other problems with the navy in general. In addition to these private suggestions, Bedford had pamphlets dedicated to him that recommended improvements to the Navy. In 1745, for example, a 70 page pamphlet entitled Observations and Proposals Concerning the Navy was dedicated to Bedford. The author's main points concerned the problem of the navy being too weak in

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[57] Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 19. Vere Beauclerk-Bedford, 25 July 1745.
[58] Bedford Micro, ix 1745, ff. 98-100. MJ(anon)-Bedford, 7 February 1745.
[59] Bedford Micro, ix 1745, ff. 108-110. MJ-Bedford, 16 March 1745.

peacetime, and warned of the dangers of defencelessness, particularly in British trading regions. The author also addressed the inefficiency and expense of manning fleets, and recommended keeping a greater number of sailors in constant pay. While commenting on ways to improve the moral attitude of the sailors, the author suggested no changes to the navy or admiralty board structure.[60] Bedford's personal commitment to the 'country' view that the navy was the bulwark of national prosperity coincided with this advice. His correspondence with MJ, in particular, suggested that Bedford agreed with these points of view. He believed in the need for a strong, efficient navy in order to protect British commercial interests abroad, particularly in North America.

Widespread approbation for the capture of Louisbourg provided Bedford with the opportunity to concentrate and expand his interest in North American colonial defence and trade. His 'Country' Whig views encouraged his participation in this area of ministerial policy. During this time, the ineffectiveness of Lord Monson as President of the Board of Trade created a gap in the direction of colonial affairs. Bedford readily stepped into the direction of North American affairs without noticeable opposition from either of the Pelhams.[61] After settling into his office, Bedford focused his efforts on American naval and trade questions, the policy areas he had

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60 Observations and Proposals Concerning the Navy (London, 1745).
61 Wilkes, 133-7.

previously followed as a 'Country' Whig in the opposition. The Jacobite rebellion in Scotland, however, diverted some of his attention away from America.

The landing of the Young Pretender in Scotland during July, was confirmed in London by the end of August 1745.[62] Any serious threat to the King and the rest of the country was not initially comprehended. On 12 September 1745, Fox wrote his brother, Lord Ilchester, that Pelham,

> ...believ'd His M. would hardly hear the Rebellion mention'd...in the meantime these Rebels, in whom neither part of Court or Country believe, do actually advance increasing in Numbers...We hope for the Dutch every Hour, & our own ten Battalions ev'ry Day. Till they are here there is no Safety so says Pelham...[63]

The problem was finally addressed seriously by the King in early September. George II issued a Proclamation reinstating six former laws against Papists and Nonjurors. Newcastle requested the northern counties to call out their militias to defend the country. Reports conflicted about the size of the rebel forces in the north, and the direction of their attack, although reports of individuals who had joined the rebels indicated increasing numbers to the correspondents.[64] The northern Lords Lieutenant advised the Ministers in London that the militia would be unable to provide any reasonable defence against the rebels, and

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62 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 56. Sandwich-Bedford, 27 August 1745.
63 Add. MS 51,417, ff. 138-9. Fox-Ilchester, 12 September 1745.
64 Add. MS 51,417, ff. 138-9. Fox-Ilchester, 12 September 1745. Add. MS 51,417, f. 140. Fox-Ilchester, 19 September 1745.

complained about the difficulties of raising money to pay for the militia.[65] As a result, the ministerial response to the crisis was slow. The continuing interference of Granville in the King's Closet, and his counter-influence on George II's opinions contributed to further delay in the ministers' response to the Jacobite threat. The King's advisers were unable to counter the rising panic about the invasion, particularly after the 21 September Jacobite victory at Prestonpans.

Previously, in early September, Bedford had proposed sending two regiments from Gibraltar to garrison Louisbourg against any possible attempt by the French to regain the fortress from the British colonists.[66] The invasion of the Young Pretender did not cause the cancellation of his proposal. Rather the lateness of the season, and the poor weather conditions, delayed the despatch of the Gibraltar troops. The weakened condition of Louisbourg's defences worried Bedford more than any threat in Scotland during the early months of the domestic crisis in 1745. By late September, however, Bedford recognised the seriousness of this invasion, and he concentrated on finding a way to deal with this internal threat.

Bedford proposed, to the King, a plan for the raising of regiments by noble Lords to defend Hanoverian Britain

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[65] W.A. Speck, The Butcher: The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the '45, (Oxford, 1981), 38-9.
[66] McNeill, 181-2.

against the invasion of the Young Pretender.[67] His proposal prefigured the call for the personal commitment of all British subjects, made by various writers in the press. In early October 1745, one writer called for the personal involvement of all able-bodied individuals to defend the country.

> For not only our Lives and Properties, but the Birthright of every Man, the inestimable Privilege of human Nature, Liberty of Conscience, and the open and undisturbed Profession of our Religion in the Method we like best...is at Stake, and ready to fall a Prey to Superstition and Tyranny.
>
> To agree in preventing this is the great Interest and Concern of all Ranks and Degrees, of all Parties and Denominations of Men; and not if at any Time, he (even a Preacher of the Gospel) who has not a Sword should sell his Garment, and buy one...[68]

As a descendant of one of the great Whig families, Bedford was personally committed to the defence of the Hanoverian succession against any return of the Stuart line. His personal views about tyranny and arbitrary government encouraged his allegiance to the Hanoverian succession as much as his heritage. In the debate on a bill concerning correspondence with the Pretender's son in 1744, Bedford stated that in Charles I's time, the measures of his court

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[67] The press supported this proposal for recruitment of locals for the national defence, and reported regularly on the progress of the regiments to their readers. See for examples: The Daily Advertiser, No. 4606, 28 September 1745; Reading Mercury, No. 408, 30 September 1745, No. 410, 14 October 1745; Northampton Mercury, 7 October 1745, 28 October 1745.

[68] The Daily Advertiser, October 1745. I would like to thank Austin Gee for pointing out that this was a biblical quote, often used in the 1790s.

dissuaded the noblemen from taking up arms and removing him long before 1642. As a result, he argued,

> ...that army against the government was composed, I may say, for the most part, of the lowest scum of the nation, notwithstanding being raised by the authority of parliament. What was the consequence? This army, that was raised in favour of liberty, at last destroyed it...[69]

Bedford believed that if the nobility had joined, and led, the Parliamentary army, then Oliver Cromwell and the whole sorry business of the Interregnum would have been avoided. Bedford was convinced that the nobility were the guardians of British liberty, and this conception formed the basis of his proposals for regiments to be raised by nobles in Britain. But any idea that these regiments were to provide great military service was dismissed by his colleagues and contemporaries. Rather they thought the value of the regiments lay in raising the `...spirit and zeal for the Government...' and convincing foreign powers that the subjects of Britain would defend themselves against any foreign encroachments.[70] Philip Yorke subscribed to Bedford's regiment for these reasons on the recommendation of his father, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. Other contemporaries, such as the duke of Queensberry, recommended William Scott to Bedford's attention, not only for his potential value to Bedford as a captain in the Bedfordshire regiment, but also because of the opportunity for the

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69 Parliament History, xiii, 720-2.
70 Yorke, Life of Hardwicke, i, 456. See also J. R. Western, The English Militia in the 18th Century, (London, 1965).

cultivation of future political favours.[71] Sandwich personally recruited men and money in his county of Huntingdonshire for Bedford's regiment.[72] The variety of reasons for supporting Bedford's project was, at least in a few instances, closely tied to political motivations rather than to any strong belief that these regiments would be usefully employed in the defence of the country. Whatever the rationale of his contemporaries, however, Bedford believed that these regiments could play a useful role in the crisis, and he threw himself wholeheartedly into the preparations for his own regiment. In a letter to Admiral Vernon, Bedford noted that,

> I am favour'd with your's of Yesterday's Date, by Mr. How, and am truly sorry the Business I am engaged in here, prevents my having the satisfaction of presenting to his Majesty, in my own Person, the Loyal and Seasonable Address you have now forwarded to me: Nothing but my being actually employ'd, at this present, in his Majesty's service, should have prevented my carrying the Address up myself, but the Task I have undertaken of raising a Regiment in this Country, requiring my Immediate Presence here...[73]

Bedford sent his Admiralty Office work up to Lord Sandwich in Whitehall while he personally recruited and trained his regiment. On 26 September 1745, "...six waggons loaded with musquets, were lent from the minories, for Wooburn in Bedfordshire, for the service of the Duke of Bedford, whose Regiment of 1000 men will be compleat in a

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[71] Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 92. Queensberry-Bedford, 1 October 1745.
[72] Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 88. Sandwich-Bedford, 26 September 1745.
[73] Original Letters to an Honest Sailor, (London, 1746), 81. Bedford-Vernon, 19 October 1745.

few days."[74] Bedford worked diligently to raise his regiment in Bedfordshire to its full complement.

The Jacobite Rebellion in Scotland dominated political discussion in London from the end of September throughout October and November. Many of these conversations centred on the question of the appropriateness of calling out the militia.[75] Bedford's proposal that the Lords Lieutenant raise personal regiments in their respective counties under the King's Warrant had been endorsed by George II. The Pelhams, however, were sceptical of this proposition, and they focused their attention initially on calling up the militia. The duke of Devonshire claimed that "...it will be right to have the militia put in readiness tho' I believe they will not be of much use."[76] Following through on this idea, Newcastle requested the Lords Lieutenants in the north of England put their counties in ready defence against possible encroachments by the Young Pretender.[77] Lord Ancaster summoned a meeting in Lincoln after Newcastle's circular, but had to advise Newcastle that things had "...been laid aside so long as to be rendered incapable of service without the assistance of arms, ammunition, and some few disciplined men."[78] The militia system had withered

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74 Add. MS 23821, f. 146. Anon. 27 September 1745.
75 Smith, Grenville Papers, 42-4.
76 SP 36/67, Pt. 2, f. 90. Devonshire-Newcastle, 11 September 1745.
77 SP 36/68, Pt. 1, ff. 27-8. Newcastle-anon, 14 September 1745.
78 HMC Ancaster, 443.

due to disuse, and could not be easily re-activated to respond to the Jacobite threat.[79]

Newcastle, in recognition of this problem, acquiesced somewhat in Bedford's proposal for regiments. He empowered the Lords Lieutenant of the northern counties who could not activate the militia in their counties, to raise men and grant commissions along similar lines to those Bedford had outlined to the King.[80] Pelham referred to these as the 'Provincial Regiments' that he understood "...to be paid out of the subscription money of the rural countys, to have their Commissions from the Lord Lieutenants, and are proposed only for the defence of the respective Countys, and of course under no obligation to stir out of 'em..."[81] The fifteen noble regiments proposed by Bedford would be used if the British troops ran into difficulties containing the rebels. In recognition of the impracticality of using the existing militia system for local defence purposes, there were 13 foot and two horse regiments proposed. There are doubts about how many were in fact raised to full complement. Horace Walpole suggested that six were raised, and four employed. Contemporaries claimed that nine were created, but do not indicate in their correspondence how many were actually employed in the north. The noblemen who raised regiments were Bedford, Cholmondeley (in Cheshire),

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79 See Speck, 37-9, 55-60, 71-2, for a discussion of the differences between the militia, associations, and noble regiments. All three were used during the 1745 rebellion. A few individuals like Lord Malton of Yorkshire, formed personal defence regiments without financial support or sanction from the government.

80 HMC Ancaster, 444.

81 Devonshire MS. Pelham-Devonshire, 5 October 1745.

Gower (in Staffordshire), Falmouth (in Cornwall), Edgecombe (also in Cornwall), Halifax (in Northamptonshire), Montague (in Berkshire), Bolton and Fitzwaller (in Essex).[82]

There were problems in the actual recruitment of men necessary for some of the regiments. Bedford's success in raising his regiment so quickly was a result of the time, and the money, he threw into his commitment. Others were less dedicated to the proposal, and so worked less devotedly. There were further problems. Some members of the regiments, like the one raised in Berkshire, and the two in Cornwall, refused to leave their counties.[83] This was a minor dilemma confronting the individuals who raised regiments. There were reasons for the men to want to remain in their county for defence purposes, particularly after rumours of a successful campaign by the rebels in the north spread to the south of England. And there were official suggestions that the troops "...may be of great use in their respective Counties to prevent any insurrection."[84] Bedford's regiment, however, did not object to leaving Bedfordshire for the north, and by 17 October, his regiment was completely prepared to depart for training exercises. Newcastle sent his compliments to Bedford on his personal efforts that resulted in the Bedfordshire regiment being 'the first in all of England' prepared to defend the King against the Jacobites.[85] Problems of mobility coincided

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82 Devonshire MS. Duncannon-Hartington, 28 September 1745. Duncannon mentions eight regiments.
83 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 108. Fane-Bedford, 17 October 1745. Speck, 71.
84 Devonshire MS. Duncannon-Devonshire, 3 October 1745.
85 Bedford Correspondence, i, 53-4.

with questions about the ability of these regiments to fight well in the midst of battle. There was no one issue, in this whole debate, that dominated the discussions. Charles Cavendish outlined to Devonshire the scheme as he understood things from Lord Duncannon in early October 1745.

> The Dukes...& several others have undertaken to raise each a Regiment, which as soon as raised is to be paid by the public upon the same foot as the other troops. The inlisting money to be paid by those that raise the Regiments, & the money for cloathing to be advanced by them but repaid out of the soldiers pay if subaltern Officers are to be appointed by them, the others by the King but at their recommendation. There has been a long contest whether they should have rank in the Army according to their new Commissions which has been consented to. But when reduced they are to receive half pay only according to their former commissions.[86]

Pelham gave Devonshire his personal opinion of the regiments on 5 October.

> ...the conditions are, they are att their own expences to raise these Corps, and to recommend their own Officers, some of which are out of the Army, the others of Gentlemen of figure in the Countys. Whey they are certified to be about half compleat, then an establishment is to be made for them, and they are to be paid by the Publick, these Regiments are to [serve] in any part of the island, to be reduced as soon as the Rebellion is over, and the Officers and men...to have half pay, excepting such as were in the Army before...[87]

Other politicians raised questions about the motives of the Lords who recruited these regiments in their counties. Bedford's apparently altruistic motives in forming his regiment came under close scrutiny by some opposition MPs, who insinuated that the scheme was all a camouflage for

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[86] Devonshire MS. Charles Cavendish-Devonshire, 3 October 1745.
[87] Devonshire MS. Pelham-Devonshire, 5 October 1745.

military ribbons and pensions. In the House of Commons, Sir John Hind Cotton asked why nobles alone were entitled to this privilege, when the House of Commons had the honour to raise the public money to pay for these regiments.[88] Bedford was determined, according to Fox, to ensure that the nobles' regiments were fully supported by Pelham. Fox wrote to Ilchester that,

> ...I am this day told that the D. of Bedford says Mr Pelham must not only defend this measure himself but make all the Servants of the Crown join with him in it, or there is no going on.[89]

Pelham himself noted in a letter to Devonshire in early October that

> ...the Duke of Bedford has push'd this thing on...Many others crowd for Regiments where this will end I don't know, a great expence will be incur'd for the Publick, the service I hope will answer, but I doubt.[90]

In the Commons on 4 November 1745, Sir John Phillips, a Tory, opposed the motion granting the sum of 64,360 pounds and 13s.1/2d. to pay the troops for 122 days.[91] First, he argued, the proposed regiments were lucrative schemes by which noblemen could sell commissions for profit rather than

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[88] Western, 119, suggested that "There was a tinge of class conflict reinforcing opposition to the courtiers on this issue. It was a grievance against the noble regiments that they were the preserve of the nobility alone." Parliamentary Register, 1745-50, ii (1804), 70.

[89] Add. MS 51,417, ff. 153-5. Fox-Ilchester, 1 November 1745.

[90] Devonshire MS. Pelham-Devonshire, 7 October 1745.

[91] Commons Journal, xxv, 4 November 1745. Motions to grant pay of 64,360 pounds and 13s1/2d. for foot troops, and 13,165 pounds and 10s. for two regiments of horse for 122 days. The men were paid 1s.6d per diem. Reading Mercury, No. 410, 14 October 1745.

a serious proposal for the defence of Britain. Secondly, these regiments, and the appointment of commissions by the peers in charge of raising them, would create dissent in the army. The oldest lieutenant-colonels in the regular army had the legitimate right to command any new troops, and any design to allow Lords to appoint whomsoever bought a commission would upset the ranks. Thirdly, the privilege of raising regiments and appointing officers was a dangerous precedent encroaching upon the prerogative of the Crown.[92] Phillips warned Members of the House:

> That this measure of giving noblemen commissions to raise regiments, with a privilege to chuse and appoint all their inferior officers, is one of the most dangerous incroachments that was ever made upon the prerogative of the Crown. Such regiments must always be more at the devotion of their Colonel than their Sovereign...[93]

Pelham defended the motion, and not surprisingly these complaints were dismissed by the majority of Whig MPs who applauded the well-meaning efforts of the Lords to defend their counties against the rebel forces.[94] Lord Vere Beauclerk, one of the Lords of the Admiralty Board, commented to Admiral Vernon that:

> I doubt we shall have another long Day upon the New Regiments raised by the Duke of Bedford, and others, which People are now extremely divided in Opinion, though at the Time they were ordered, which was when we had few or no Troops here, I believe no one but thought it a prudent Measure, and that when the Names of so many great Men were of Use to the Cause of this Country, I hope to God we shall never want them, but I

92 Parliamentary Register, 1745-50, ii (1804), 65-7.
93 Parliamentary Register, 1745-50, ii (1804), 67.
94 Yorke, Life of Hardwicke, i, 464-5.

> think we are equally obliged to those who so readily engaged to defend us...[95]

The country was perceived to be in imminent danger. The Administration held numerical advantage in any Commons vote. Tory motions against the regiments were therefore unsuccessful. Pelham, although initially sceptical of Bedford's proposal, defended the raising of the regiments to the House. He argued that the regiments as proposed to, and approved by, the King, were the cheapest method of augmenting Britain's home defence. The nobles had undertaken the expenses to recruit, clothe, train and arm the men. This point was possibly overstated since in September 1745, Lord Duncannon wrote to Lord Hartington,

> I must acquaint your Lordship for His Grace's information that all the Noblemen who are going to raise troops, are to have their Firelocks and Bayonets, from the ordnance...Mr. Pelham...agreed that the Secretary at War should issue an order to the out Pensioners of Chelsea who are fit for service to the Number of 30 to attend at such place, as the respective Noblemen should desire them to meet and that the said men should be upon Full pay from the time of their meeting...[96]

The peers, Pelham announced, would be unable to sell commissions in these regiments since the regiments would be disbanded at the end of 122 days. Secondly, because of this limited lifespan, he argued, no officer in the regular army could be angered by the appointment of commissions by the Lords, since once the regiments were disbanded, these officers would be reduced to half-pay, and in effect,

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95 Original Letters to an Honest Sailor, 84-5. Vere Beauclerk-Vernon, 4 November 1745.
96 Devonshire MS. Duncannon-Hartington, 28 September 1745.

dismissed from the army and future promotions. He did not comment on the fact that these appointees would be placed on half-pay for the rest of their lives. Thirdly, Pelham stressed that only if the regiments were to be kept standing would the precedent pose a potential danger to the Crown. Nor, in his opinion, could it be a precedent of any consequence to the regular army because of the special circumstances, and the limited life-span of the regiments.[97] The question of the rank of the officers in these newly formed regiments preoccupied the Members of Parliament, and this point was the cause of the only recorded division in the debate. The House of Commons divided on the motion 'That an humble Address be presented to his Majesty...that the Officers in the new Regiments...may not be allowed any Rank from their commissions in the said Regiments, after these Regiments are broke'. Lord Guernsey and Mr. Nugent were the tellers for the yeas - 132; and Lord Dupplin and Mr. Grenville were the tellers for the noes - 155. The motion was defeated in favour of the Administration. If Bedford had demanded Pelham's full support for this measure, he was not disappointed with his efforts in the House of Commons.

Although a pamphlet arguing against the formation of the fifteen regiments circulated immediately after this debate in Parliament on 4 November, there appeared favourable comments on the formation of the regiments in newspapers and pamphlets.[98] For example, in the

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97 Parliamentary Register, 1745-50, ii (1804), 68-9.
98 A Letter to William Pitt, Esq. (London, 1746)

Northampton Mercury, a report on 25 November 1745 commented that

> ...the Earl of Halifax's new-raised Regiment of Foot march'd from this Town for Shrewsbury, by way of Southam, Warwick, Bromsgrove, Kidderminster, and Bridgnorth. They made a very fine Appearance and left the Town with loud Huzza's, all seeming to be in high Spirits, zealous to serve their King and Country, and 'tis remarkable that not one Man has deserted from that Regiment...[99]

The relative speed of raising men for the regiments in some of the counties was indicative of a measure of support for the defence of the country against the rebels in Scotland. A desire to defend the country from these rebels was also seen in the creation of county associations and the collection of subscriptions during the autumn of 1745. The residents of York, for example, collected 32,844 pounds in subscriptions for the defence of their county.[100] The press reported a generally enthusiastic response from the provincial inhabitants when the regiments passed through town on their way to the north. For example, when Bedford's regiment was in Oxford, The Oxford Gazette and Reading Mercury printed that,

> ...the Duke of Bedford, with his whole Regiment, attended by the Mayor and Corporation of that Town, went to Divine Service, where a most excellent Sermon was preach'd by the Rev. Mr. Tucke, one of the senior Fellows of Clare Hall, Cambridge, from these words: We will not have this Man to reign over us, Luke xix.14. The next Day his Grace's Regiment, all in their proper Cloathing, pass'd in Review, before him, and on Tuesday, set out to join...Sir John Ligonier.[101]

99 Northampton Mercury, 25 November 1745.
100 Speck, 56-7.
101 The Oxford Gazette and Reading Mercury, No. 2, 24 November 1745.

Total disapproval of any attempt to defend the country would have been difficult to voice under these circumstances, and the perceived external influence of France in this affair confirmed the sentiment. The printed reports on Bedford's regiments were generally favourable as a result. Individual criticisms of the hastily raised regiments were of a more practical and personal nature. The duke of Richmond described to Newcastle his personal opinion of the regiments.

> The Duke of Bedford's Regiment march'd out here today & wee are not at all pleas'd with it, the men are pretty good; & mighty well cloth'd, the grenadier comp'y indeed a very fine one, butt they don't yett know a ranke from a file; & if wee have action, I should be sorry to have them with us, `tho they may very likely stand their ground, butt if they are ever broke, I am very sure they can never form again...[102]

Richmond's assessment was most likely accurate; however, these regiments were never meant for fighting on the front lines. The only realistic use of these amateur troops was as support for the professional regiments. Bedford's regiment joined Montagu's, Halifax's and Gower's in Staffordshire, to follow Sir John Ligonier's seven professional regiments brought over from Flanders, into Lancashire and then north.[103] Generally, morale, as well as troop numbers, was raised by the presence of these newly formed regiments. Whig politicians were careful to frame their criticisms against certain gentlemen, rather than at

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102 McCann, 192-3.
103 Original Letters to an Honest Sailor, 85. Vere Beauclerk-Vernon, 8 November 1745.

their endeavours to defend the King and country. Horace Walpole, for example, ridiculed Bedford and Gower for their personal behaviour, and thereby avoided appearing to be against the defence of Britain.

> The Duke of Bedford goes in his little round person with his regiment; he now takes to the land, and says he is tired of being a pen and ink man. Lord Gower insisted too upon going with his regiment, but is laid up with the gout.[104]

Walpole's caustic descriptions of individuals were his trademark, and his comments on Bedford and Gower were typical of his style of wit. Criticisms of Bedford's actual proposal for the regiments were rarely voiced by Whig politicians. The foot regiments, particularly Bedford's, were not engaged in front-line military action as their appearance and ability did not inspire great confidence amongst the professional military officers.

> Your famous regiment makes (entre nous) a sad appearance but it is, Thank God, out of the 1st line. I am glad the fate of the nation don't depend on the new raised, for they are very poor. Lord Halifax himself was rather ashamed of them.[105]

However considering that the men were recruited in late September and early October, trained in November, and on the battle field in early December, contemporary expectation for their potential military prowess should have been tempered. These troops were not career soldiers, but subjects hoping

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104 Lewis, Walpole Correspondence, xix, 158-61. Speck, 71, cites Walpole as stating in a letter that the greatest grievance against the Regiments was that the colonels named only their dependants to be officers.
105 Yorke, Life of Hardwicke, i, 473.

to protect their King and their country from the Jacobite invaders. If the regiments had ever been designed to provide more than supplementary military service, greater training and expence would have been the first prerequisite before sending them north. The most realistic expectation was that these regiments encouraged the King and his subjects to believe that the country was wholly committed to the defeat of the supporters of the Young Pretender.

Bedford committed his personal resources to the defence of the kingdom from the Jacobites in other ways. In late September 1745, the Mayor of Newcastle commented that

> The Dukes of Bedford, Rutland, Kingston, Bolton, Lord Halifax, Malton, Irwin, Herbert, & several other Ld Lieut'ts have Commissions, & are raising Regiments of Horse, at their own Expence, to be employed as occasion shall require.[106]

In addition to raising a foot regiment, and a regiment of horse for the Hanoverian cause, Bedford apparently provided a private war ship. Edward Vernon noted in November:

> ...I am glad I can acquaint you, I am out of Pain for Captain Gregory, by his arrival here, and the Duke of Bedford private Ship of War; from his account of her, I am persuaded she is only driven to the Northward, which makes her return here a Cruize against any Running Vessels stealing to the Northward...[107]

Bedford's loyalty to the Hanoverian Succession was, without a doubt, strong. Serious threats from the Jacobite rebels

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106 Forbes, Culloden Papers, 223-4. No. CCLXX, Mayor of Newcastle-Lord President, 26 September 1745.
107 Original Letters to an Honest Sailor, 90-1. Vernon-Vere Beauclerk, 21 November 1745.

did not fully disappear until George II's son, the duke of Cumberland, subdued the rebel forces in the spring of 1746.[108] The nobles' regiments were not disbanded until June and July 1746, long after the 122 days initially promised by Pelham in his arguments for their existence. In late January 1746, the Members of the House of Commons had extended, without much comment, their enlistment for four more months. In July 1746, Bedford's regiment, which was stationed at Berwick, was given its notice to disband.[109]

Meanwhile, throughout this domestic crisis, the North Americans agitated for greater protection against possible French attacks on Louisbourg and Cape Breton. In August 1745, The Reading Mercury, reported that a new 'English' name was to be given to Louisbourg, that military equipment and two regiments were being sent to reinforce the garrison, and that "The Gov't will give Encouragement of [pound]10 a piece to such Women as are inclined to go to be married, and live at Cape Breton, and a piece of Ground to such Children as may be born in the said Wedlock..."[110] Except for the idea of sending two regiments to reinforce the garrison, there was no evidence in Bedford's correspondence to support the other assertions. Five years later, however, Bedford did offer similar incentives during his attempt to encourage settlers in the region in 1750.[111]

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108 Ilchester, Henry Fox, First Lord Holland, (London, 1919), i, 126-7.
109 Bedford Micro xii 1746, ff. 42, 48 & 74. Fox-Bedford, 10 June, 10 June & 18 July 1746.
110 The Reading Mercury, No. 402, August 1745.
111 See this chapter, pp. 133-138.

Bedford's first task after the successful conquest of Louisbourg in 1745 was to find a governor for the garrison. Admiral Sir Peter Warren, who had been knighted for his role in the defeat of the French at Louisbourg, declined remaining governor in early October.[112] Commodore Henry Osborne (1694-1771) let his reluctance for this post be known in advance to Bedford via Sandwich. He most likely made his decision in light of the circulating rumours about the physical state of the 2000 men left at the garrison in the autumn of 1745. According to these reports, 500 of the 2000 men had died, 1100 were sick, and the remaining so weak that they would not be able to defend against any French attack.[113] Governor Knowles ultimately agreed to take up this appointment.

While the protection of Louisbourg concerned Bedford, the status of possible negotiations for a peace with France preoccupied the other ministers.[114] Three groups were operating within the Ministry: one headed by Pelham, who wanted peace, one headed by Bedford, who demanded the retention of Cape Breton in any negotiation, and one headed by Newcastle, who followed whichever course would ensure British involvement in 'balancing the powers' in Europe. Newcastle wanted to obtain better terms for Britain and her

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112 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 94. Warren-Bedford, 4 October 1745. Rumours about the appointment of Warburton or Knowles to be the governor of Louisbourg were printed in The Oxford Gazette and Reading Mercury, No. 16, 3 March 1745/6, and No. 17, 10 March 1745/6.

113 Bedford Micro, xi 1745/6, ff. 27-8. Sandwich-Bedford, 4 March 1745/6.

114 Buffington, 'The Canada Expedition of 1746', American Historical Review, xlv, 3(April 1940), 564-5.

allies at the negotiating table after a few military successes against France. He wished to restore the `balance of power' in Europe, even if it was contrary to the views of Britain's allies. Bedford's desire to retain Cape Breton in any negotiated settlement assisted Newcastle in his schemes.[115] He supplied the necessary counter-weight for Newcastle to use against Pelham's pacific arguments in Cabinet. In early October, Newcastle noted to Chesterfield that,

> ...the great point of all will be the restitution of Cape Breton in return for the restitution of all, or the greater part of, the towns in Flanders. There the Pensionary and the Dutch will strongly attack us; and there the Duke of Bedford and his friends will be immovable.[116]

But as George Grenville of the Admiralty Board noted "[t]his cursed rebellion has overthrown all our schemes,..."[117] and until the rebellion in Scotland was under control, the question of Louisbourg received scant attention from the leading Ministers, although Bedford retained his interest. Despite his involvement in raising regiments to assist in the fight against the Jacobites, Bedford was able to pursue his own schemes in the North American policy arena. In late October 1745, the transports to carry the two Gibraltar regiments to Louisbourg had finally left Dover. The impracticality of sending the two regiments to arrive in America during the winter was acknowledged by Bedford. He had hoped to send these troops for a winter rest in Ireland

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115 Lodge, Studies..., 170.
116 R. Lodge, ed., Chesterfield and Newcastle, (London, 1930), 73-6.
117 Smith, Grenville Papers, i, 44-6.

first, and then ship them to Nova Scotia in the early spring. Bedford asked Newcastle to advise the King to order General Oglethorpe's regiment at Georgia and Carolina, and the four independent companies at New York, to reinforce the garrison at Cape Breton until these refreshed Gibraltar forces arrived.[118] Bedford and his colleagues at the Admiralty Board were determined to keep Louisbourg under British control. Bedford supported Newcastle's position in Cabinet meetings in order to meet that commitment. He thought Louisbourg was a valuable commercial and military possession for Britain that would lead to total British control of the eastern seaboard in America. Pelham, however, worried that the possession of Cape Breton would simply create the same difficulties with France that Britain had encountered with Spain regarding the possession of Gibraltar and Minorca. With the Jacobite Rebellion unresolved, and British involvement in the continental war continuing unabated, Pelham had no immediate inclination to alter Bedford's policy on Cape Breton.[119] In addition, the King continued to deal secretly in his Closet with Granville. To counter Granville's threat, Pelham needed to consolidate his political support in Parliament. Bedford and his political friends had been acting correctly with the Administration throughout this period. Pelham had no wish to jeopardize their support prior to forcing a showdown with George II over Granville's unofficial role in the Closet. The question of British retention of Cape Breton was one

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118 SP 24/29, ii, f. 348. Sandwich, Legge, *et al.*- Newcastle, 29 October 1745.
119 Coxe, Memoirs, i, 284.

that Pelham willingly compromised upon, for the moment, in order to retain a measure of ministerial solidarity until he confronted George II on the 'secret influence' issue. The memories of the dissension in the 1742-3 Granville Cabinet, and the advice of his former mentor, Sir Robert Walpole, encouraged Pelham to seek an equilibrium in his Ministry above almost anything else.

Pelham also declined altering Bedford's proposals because the retention of Cape Breton appeared to be regarded favourably. A pamphlet extolled that "...the Possession of Cape Breton is the thing, and the only thing that can enable us effectually to destroy the Power of France, and turn it to our own Benefit..."[120] A letter to the London Courant dated 4 September 1745 argued that the conquest of Louisbourg was the first step in removing the French from Canada, and capturing all the fisheries and fur trade for Britain's commercial benefit.[121] Another letter in the General Evening Post on 21 January 1746 stated that British possession of Cape Breton ensured the ruin of French trade and the establishment of British hegemony in that area of North America.[122] These views echoed the sentiments of William Shirley, the Governor of Massachussetts, with which Bedford concurred. Even if Pelham believed the retention of Louisbourg would only cause problems in the long run, in the

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120 Wm. Bollan, The Importance and Advantage of Cape Breton, (1746), 117. A similar refrain was reported in The Great Importance of Cape Breton Demonstrated and Exemplified, and in 'The Importance of Cape Breton to the British Nation by Robert Auckmuty', Reading Mercury, No. 399, 29 July 1745.
121 cited in Bollan, 95-6.
122 cited in Bollan, 116.

short term he needed Bedford's parliamentary support. Pelham required a fairly solid phalanx of parliamentary support in order to confront the threat to his Administration posed by Granville at this time.

In his speech to Parliament on 14 January 1746, the King promoted the 'blue water' ideas expounded by Bedford, to the upper echelons of ministerial policy discussions.

> The great Advantages which we have received from our Naval Strength, in protecting the Commerce of my Subjects, and intercepting and distressing that of our Enemies, have been happily experienced by the former, and severely felt by the latter. I am therefore determined to be particularly attentive to this important Service; as may be sufficient to defend ourselves, and effectually to annoy our Enemies.[123]

The platitudes expressed in this speech were linked to Bedford's specific area of interest in the Administration. Bedford wanted to destroy French trade, but also to remove any possible maritime advantage the French could gain.[124] Bedford's views were partially adopted by the Pelhams in their attempt to persuade the independent 'Country' Members to swing their support behind the Ministers in the Commons. Pelham hoped the King's speech would entice the 'Country' independents away from possibly backing Granville by emphasising the encouragement and protection of Britain's commerce through the auspices of the navy. Pelham provided the MPs with a clear choice of policy. Members of Parliament were being offered a choice between the European-

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123 Commons Journal, xxv, 27.
124 H. W. Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-48, (3 vols)(Cambridge, 1920) i, 22.

centred policies pursued by Granville in 1742, and his Minister's moderately different view. Pelham needed the support of parliamentarians in the upcoming showdown with Granville. The King's former 'favourite' was hindered in this battle for political supremacy by several factors. First, Granville was not popular with MPs because of his emphasis on Europe and Hanover in 1742. Also he was at a disadvantage because he sat in the House of Lords, and did not have an effective lieutenant in the Commons. Granville had not yet acknowledged the dramatic change in the style of Administrations after twenty years of Sir Robert Walpole at the helm. Pelham, by remaining in the Commons, held a parliamentary advantage that the King would not be able to ignore in the long run. Despite Pelham's personal fears about being replaced by Granville, there was no real political alternative to his Administration at this time. Yet Pelham perceived these matters differently.

For Pelham and his colleagues in the Administration, the domestic situation with Granville had become unbearable throughout the autumn. The King had openly favoured Granville's advice in the Closet rather than that of his legitimate Ministers. In November, matters reached a breaking point for the Ministry. They failed to agree on further measures during their negotiations with Pitt, and his fellow Cobham Cubs, to continue supporting their regime. Pitt wanted a place in the Administration with his colleagues. When the King refused to countenance any such suggestion, Pitt for a short time joined the opposition in

the Commons. Bedford, Gower and Chesterfield had immediately reaffirmed their support for the Pelham brothers, but still Pelham worried about an opposition junction of Pitt and the Cobham Cubs, with the Prince of Wales' supporters and the adherents of Granville. Pelham believed that such an alliance could provide George II with an alternative choice of Ministers to serve him as the Administration. In late December, Granville strategically slipped up by promising George II that he would never oppose the King's business regarding the War of Austrian Succession. Yet Pelham still cautiously completed his plans before confronting the King over this 'secret influence' problem in February.

William Pitt approached Bedford just after Christmas, and expressed his desire once more to join the Pelham Administration.[125] Newcastle consulted directly with Cobham about possible preferments, and an agreement was informally reached. By late December, the Pelhams had succeeded in co-opting all the best orators from the opposition.[126] Bedford and Gower were committed to Pitt's inclusion in the Administration. Their commitment, combined with the Old Corps Whig's support of Pelham and Newcastle, created a united stance on this matter. Bedford was pleased with the renewed emphasis on naval policy in the King's speech, and Pitt had been promised a place by the Pelhams. The members of the Administration agreed to resign 'en masse', if required, during the upcoming confrontation with

125 Lodge, Chesterfield and Newcastle, xxxiii.
126 Coxe, Memoirs, i, 292-6. Wilkes, 141.

the King. The Pelhams would win any showdown with Granville, although no one, Newcastle in particular, thought that resigning would be necessary. The King's speech in January, therefore, also signalled the beginning of Pelham's move against Granville's political influence in the King's Closet. The next step taken by the Pelhams was to request once again that the King make William Pitt, the Secretary at War. As expected, George II refused outright. The King had barred Pitt from his Closet because of his vehement attacks in the Commons during the debates on the question of the employment of Hanoverian troops in 1743. But now, in late January, the King's legitimate Ministers were demanding his appointment. Pitt himself publicly renounced any pretensions to the position.[127] George II, taking the advice of Granville and Bath, refused to acquiesce in this demand. Events began to gain momentum, and the outcome was uncertain for a few weeks. Newcastle wrote in a panic to his friend, Richmond, on 5 February 1746.

> But on Monday last, Lord Bath got into the Closet, exclaimed against the King's being forced to take Mr. P____ contrary to his will, promised to stand by Him, if He would resist it, that He would act with us, etc & the consequence of that has been, that Lord Granville has sent His Emissaries to endeavour to detach some of our Old Corps, & His Majesty has taken a bold Resolution, not to make P Secretary at War...The D. of Bedford & Gower will infallibly quitt;...[128]

The seriousness of Bedford and Gower's possible resignation from the Administration was the cause of Newcastle's panic. Newcastle did not want to be out of office, and he

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127 McCann, 203-4.
128 McCann, 203.

acknowledged that the Pelhams could not retain control of the Ministry without their Parliamentary support. Richmond responded on 6 February 1746.

> Wee certa[i]nly can not go on without Totty [Bedford], Gowr & Pitt, I own I wish wee could, tho I love the two first very well...[129]

Totty was Richmond's nickname for Bedford. His recognition of Newcastle's assessment that the Pelhams needed Bedford's, Gower's and Pitt's support in Parliament, indicated the perception amongst the Pelhams of the importance of Bedford and his friends to the coalition. They were necessary allies in the Administration. When the Tories left the Ministry in 1746, Pelham was not as worried. Bedford and Gower did not disappoint Pelham with their subsequent actions. On 10 and 11 February, the resignations of all the Ministers of the Administration were individually offered up to the King in private meetings.[130] On 12 February, George II advised Thomas Winnington, Member of Parliament for Worcester and the Paymaster General, that he would accept no further resignations, and would like the Pelhams to return to their offices. Granville had attempted to find Parliamentary support for his Ministry, but Pelham had guaranteed he would find little in Parliament. Granville admitted his defeat to the King quite quickly. His capitulation in this gamble to form an alternative Ministry amused contemporaries.

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129 McCann, 204.
130 Wilkes, 139-45. Yorke, i, 498-500.

> The history of the week is a surprizing one, it was fortunate, however, that the distraction was of so short a duration. It lasted long enough to admit of a most extraordinary testimony from the people of their approbation of the King's old ministers, and yet ceased in good time to save the honour of our royal Master...If some private anecdotes are true,...the affair looks more like a midnight project from the fumes of Burgundy than the digested scheme of a wise man...[131]

Pelham however did not push his success against Granville by forcing the King to accept Pitt's appointment to the position of Secretary at War. The removal of the Granville influence in the Closet had been his primary goal, and once that had been achieved, Pelham consolidated his political position by requesting the dismissal of all Granville's remaining cronies from office. Lord Bath, the duke of Bolton, Lord Berkeley of Stratton, and a few other supporters were immediately ejected, although William Finch, the vice-chamberlain and the groom of the bedchamber, an appointment still made by the King alone, remained. The Ministers did not wish to antagonize George II unnecessarily by infringing upon his prerogative to appoint to his private household. William Pitt, Lord Barrington, James Grenville and Thomas Gore were brought into their places. These changes satisfied the 'New Allies' in the Ministry, and by the end of February, the stability in Parliament that Pelham so craved had once again returned to his Administration.

Bedford played a minor, but crucial role during this 'storm in a teacup', and his personal conduct throughout the resignations and returns to office elicited satisfaction

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[131] Yorke, i, 505.

from Newcastle, who praised Bedford and his father-in-law in letters to Chesterfield.

> Gower is perfectly well with us, and in the utmost confidence, and he is equally so with our whole party; and anything for him or any friend of his would go as easily as he himself could wish. The same as to the Duke of Bedford, who has no faults to us, the party, or the publick.[132]

Bedford was in Newcastle's favour because of his constant support for the Pelham Administration. Without his political assistance, Newcastle recognized that the Pelhams would have lost their predominant position. Bedford did not brag about his participation in the whole episode.[133] By March, Bedford returned his attention to the business at the Admiralty Office.

Bedford's duties at the Admiralty Office included disciplining the members of the navy. A parliamentary inquiry into the affair of Toulon attempting to apportion blame for the disaster between Admiral Thomas Mathews and Vice-Admiral Richard Lestock, was underway in the House of Commons when Bedford took office in 1745. His role in that quasi-judicial procedure was minimal.[134] In response to their decision to acquit Lestock and condemn Mathews,

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[132] Lodge, Chesterfield and Newcastle, 116-121.
[133] The duke of Bedford looked back on this experience in 1765 when George III attempted to remove the Bedford/Grenville Administration. The 'secret influence' of Lord Bute, another royal favourite, in the Closet, was again criticized, but unfortunately George III was able to recruit the Rockinghams as his ministers, and the Bedfords and Grenvilles went into opposition.
[134] See P. A. Luff, 'Mathews v. Lestock; Parliament, Politics and the Navy in Mid-Eighteenth Century England', Parliamentary History, x, 1 (1991).

Bedford attempted to improve naval practices, and looked for opportunities to distinguish the best officers.[135] The Vernon incident in 1746 was quite different. On Thursday, 11 April 1746, Bedford laid before the King two pamphlets entitled A Specimen of Naked Truth, from a British Sailor and Some Seasonable Advice from an honest sailor to whom it might have concerned, for the service of the C__n and C____y. The first pamphlet contained letters from Vernon to Bedford concerning the appointment of Officers.

> That is in my Opinion, that when the Admiralty is ordered by the Crown to fit out a Fleet for the Service of the Government...and the Admiralty has commissioned them out of the Sea Officers on Shore, and appointed the Admiral to Command in Chief...that to support the necessary Command...it was the Government's Interest that the Commander in Chief should name all Officers that fell vacant, and has not been denied while the depending Service was essential; but Pretences from the Admiralty...have contradicted it, though always to the prejudice of the Crown's Service.[136]

Bedford, and the rest of the members of the Admiralty Board, were not pleased that their correspondence was being published without their permission.

Admiral Edward Vernon had been sent out into the English Channel with a squadron of men of war to watch the French in April 1745. Initially, Bedford and Vernon held similar views. Vernon advised Bedford in the summer of 1745 that,

> I have always looked upon Squadrons in Port, as neither a Defence for the Kingdom, nor a security for our

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135 Bedford Correspondence, i, xl.
136 E. Vernon, A Specimen of Naked Truth, from a British Sailor, (London, 1746), 25.

> Commerce; and that the surest means for the preservation of Both; was keeping a strong Squadron in Soundings which may answer both those Purposes, as covering both Chanels and Ireland, at the same time it secures our Commerce.[137]

Their relationship altered, however, by December 1745. On 26 December, Bedford ordered Vernon to give up the command of his vessels to Vice Admiral Martin.[138] Vernon's response to Bedford was to complain about the vindictiveness shown by some in the Admiralty Office to him, but his letter also reminded Bedford that,

> ...as I may say it is a sort of hereditary inclination in our family to have entertained an honour for your Grace, from the memory of that glorious martyr for the liberties of his country, my Lord William Russell, the memory of which has in some manner been transmitted to posterity with my father's hand, whom I think was the draftsman of the ducal patent in your Grace's family...[139]

Bedford was not convinced by these arguments to support Vernon's cause, and the complaints against him proceeded. It was shortly after his return to England in January, that complaints were voiced openly about Vernon's appointment of a 'gunner' in opposition to the one recommended by the Lords of the Admiralty.[140] Vernon decided to respond publicly in order to defend himself against these charges. The production of the two pamphlets, however, irritated Bedford far more than the initial complaints. He advised the King

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137 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 35. Vernon-Bedford, n.d.
138 J. Barrow, The Life of George, Lord Anson, (London, 1839), 131-2.
139 Bedford Correspondence, i, 55-60.
140 The Life of Admiral (Edward) Vernon by an Impartial Hand, (London, 1758), 245.

that the members of the Admiralty Board, including Sandwich, Anson, Grenville, Legge, Barrington and himself, had interviewed Admiral Vernon concerning the authorship of these pamphlets. During their meeting on the evening of 10 April, Vernon refused to answer the question, claiming it was a private, not a naval, matter. Vernon, therefore, concluded that the Lords of the Admiralty had no right to ask him the questions in the first place. The Lords disagreed, and it was this point, rather than the question of appointments, that resulted in his dismissal. After listening to Bedford's report of the interview, the King directed the Lords of the Admiralty to strike Vernon's name off the list of Flag Officers.[141] The national hero, whose success at Porto Bello in 1740 complemented the 'Country' platform promoted by Bedford while in opposition, was no longer supported by Bedford now that he was in office.[142]

Bedford's activities in the Admiralty remained generally sympathetic to the 'Country' aims of his former opposition colleagues. In early 1745, the fifth of nine Tory demands delivered to Gower by Somerset and Sir Watkin Williams Wynn was rejected by the Ministers.[143] But this demand for 'An Enquiry into the State & Management of the Navy' was somewhat addressed by Bedford's personal actions

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141 E. Vernon, Original Letters to an Honest Sailor, (London, 1746), 92-4. B. McL. Ranft, Vernon Papers, (London, 1958), 586-7. Barrow, 134-6.

142 See K. Wilson, 'Empire, Trade and Popular Politics in Mid-Hanoverian Britain: The Case of Admiral Vernon' Past & Present, 121 (November 1988), 74-109, for a discussion of Vernon's popularity amongst opposition 'Patriot' Whigs.

143 Luff, 'Mathews v Lestock...', 49.

to rectify the mismanagement of the dockyards.[144] For example, he attempted to standardize the building proportions of men-of-war. In the past, no two ships had been built to a fixed standard. Bedford and his Board members also investigated the dockyards with a view to eliminating inefficiency, but decided to leave any alterations until after the war.[145] Bedford also attempted to recommend promotion on the basis of merit rather than patronage.[146] His response to Harry Burrard, concerning the promotion of Benjamin Bevis in September 1746 indicated that he would not support any requests that did not agree with the rules of the Admiralty Board, or that were not in the best interests of the King.[147] Bedford's continual rejection of Captain Mead's requests to be made an Admiral were unconnected with patronage.[148] In light of these actions, Edward Vernon's accusations of interference are likely to have stung Bedford's personal pride. On the whole, Bedford prosecuted his official duties with a good deal of common sense, and with the full support of his colleagues at the Board, particularly Lord Anson.[149] Some matters were difficult to resolve however. Bedford, for example, was unable to redress the Navy Debt problem.[150]

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144 Bedford Correspondence, i, xli.
145 Baugh, 503-4.
146 Baugh, 503-4.
147 Bedford Micro, xiii 1746, f. 56. Bedford-Burrard, September 1746. See also Bedford Micro, ix 1745, f. 106. Stair-Bedford, 23 February 1745.
148 Bedford Micro, xi 1745/6, f. 48. Bedford-Mead, 4 April 1746. Bedford Correspondence, i, 41-2.
149 Bedford Correspondence, i, xlix.
150 See Baugh, 455-7, 471-2, for a full discussion of the whole naval debt problem. The situation had reached the point where the market in navy bills had grown unsteady. The only way to restore navy credit was for Parliament to provide an additional grant in order to resume regular

He wrote from Bath to George Grenville in November 1746, that,

> With regard to the Navy Debt, I think that nothing can stand in competition with it, as I fear that, if a considerable sum of money is not granted this year towards the lessening of it, His Majesty's Naval Service must entirely stand still, or, which is worse, be overturned. I doubt not but that Mr Pelham, upon this being stated to him, will be very ready to do what lies in his power to supply the necessities of the Navy, and enable us to keep our credit till the next sessions of Parliament. If it can be done in no other way, I fear it will be necessary to raise another half million more than was first intended, as I cannot think it possible that, during a French and Spanish war, the public can be induced to suffer the Navy to be neglected. I do not write to Mr Pelham on this subject for the same reason you have till now deferred speaking to him about it, I mean the adding supernumerary distresses to those he must now necessarily labour under. But as I think it is absolutely necessary that something should be done immediately in this affair, and as I think it would be both better done by you by word of mouth and with less trouble to Mr Pelham, than it could be done by me in a letter to him, I would beg the favour of you to mention it to him, both as from me and yourself, and by his answer we shall be able to judge what it is possible (considering the present exigencies of the public) may be granted to us.[151]

Bedford was in Bath while the Navy Debt was being debated in Parliament, yet his colleagues kept him well informed. Henry Legge wrote to Bedford on 28 November.

> Your 40,000 seamen for the service of the fleet were moved and granted yesterday; something, more in the nature of discourse than debate or opposition, passed upon the occasion, during the course of which your Grace's administration of the navy was not only treated civilly, but even commended on all sides...[152]

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payments on the bills owned by the public. In 1749 the navy debt was more or less discharged with 4,000,000 pounds.

151 Smith, Grenville Papers, 55-8.

152 Bedford Correspondence, i, 196-8.

Despite the commendations of Members of Parliament, a date was appointed to consider the cause of the navy debt, and to consider whether it was owing to maladministration, or to the expense of the war. Legge reported on Pelham's apprehensions in this matter, and on his suggestion that

> ...the only expedient which can have any considerable effect; which is, to get a part of it taken into the S. S. Company by way of increase to their capital, as has been practised heretofore.[153]

George Grenville, in his letter of 1 December 1746, advised Bedford differently.

> I spoke to Mr Pelham upon the subject of navy debts, and...He seemed very sensible of the difficulties that part of the service laboured under, and said that he...had turned his thoughts to a remedy which, he said, he would explain to us when your Grace comes to town, and which I fancy, by what he threw out, is to make a fund for part of the debt, as by that means the going to market to borrow so much more money, which I find is what is he very apprehensive of, will be prevented.[154]

The Navy Debt was far beyond Bedford's ability to solve, and in January a Committee was appointed in the House of Commons to inquire into the state of the debt of the Navy.[155] Eleven months later, in November 1747, a report from the Admiralty Office on an estimate of the actual debt of the navy was presented to the House.[156] The Navy Debt was not being examined quickly, and Bedford did little more than interest himself briefly in the problem before returning to his major preoccupation - Louisbourg.

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153 Bedford Correspondence, i, 196-8.
154 Bedford Correspondence, i, 199-201.
155 Commons Journal, xxv, 256. 22 January 1746/7.
156 Commons Journal, xxv, 447. 26 November 1747.

Bedford's reverted to questioning the need to fortify Cape Breton, and the security of the fort at Louisbourg. William Shirley, the governor of Massachusetts, had written to the Admiralty Board outlining the benefits to Britain if the defences of Cape Breton were reinforced. The three main points he stressed were, firstly, that the cod fisheries would stop French competition in those markets, and end its use as a nursery for French sailors. Secondly, that the colonies would secure their trade routes to Britain, and thirdly, that the navigation routes to Canada could be controlled by the British, resulting in the eventual reduction of Canada, and the subsequent expansion of Britain's trading empire. It would also result in the pacification of the Indians, and in the control of the entire sea coast of North America by Britain.[157] Bedford wholeheartedly supported Shirley's recommendations, and sent his own proposal to the Administration requesting an expedition for the reduction of Canada.[158] Pelham and his brother referred the proposal back to Bedford, Marshall Wade and Lieutenant General St. Clair to study the feasibility of an attempted reduction of Canada, and to recommend the resources required for such a proposal.[159] On 30 March 1746, the committee forwarded its report to Newcastle.

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157 SP 42/28, ff. 363-8. Shirley-Lords of Admiralty, 27 March 1745.

158 Bedford Correspondence, i, 64. See J.H. Plumb, Chatham, (London, 1953), 37, for the view that William Pitt tried to persuade Bedford to propose an attack on Quebec, but was unsuccessful because Bedford was fearful of the cost of the expedition.

159 Bedford Micro, xi 1745/6, f.42. Montague-Bedford, 28 March 1746. Montague declined reviewing the proposals because he was in the country.

Their main recommendations were: first, that 3500 regular troops be sent with the two Gibraltar regiments, and Major General Frampton's regiments to Louisbourg in order to create a force of 5000 men sufficient to conquer Canada. Secondly, that since the Gibraltar forces could not be used for garrisoning Louisbourg if they were off conquering Canada, another regiment should be recruited in America to supplement the troops of Sir William Pepperell and Governor Shirley in protecting the fortress during the summer. Thirdly, that a naval force of 20 ships of war, plus bomb-vessels and fire-ships be sent to assist in the expedition. Finally, with regard to ordnance stores, the committee's members recommended that since there were already enough stores in place for the garrison, that only the equivalent to the stores sent during the 1711 Canada expedition would be required for this attempt. Bedford, and his two colleagues, optimistically thought that the expedition, with its troop transports, ordnance, and victualling stores, could be despatched by the beginning of May, and the reduction of Canada completed before the onset of winter in 1746.[160] With the approval of the King and the rest of the Ministers, Bedford set out to implement the report's proposals. Lieutenant General St. Clair was ordered to go with five regiments of foot to Cape Breton. Bedford worked 'night and day' throughout April, according to Newcastle, in order to prepare the project for Britain's conquest of the

[160] Bedford Correspondence, i, 65-9. Oxford Gazette and Reading Mercury, No. 22, 14 April 1746. The paper did not report on this Committee's report or Bedford's proposed project, but stated that they believed the people of New England would capture Quebec, and complete the British Empire in North America.

French in Canada.[161] He directed the Navy Board to ready bomb vessels, troop transports, and hospital ships for the expedition.[162] He even ordered vinegar to be supplied to all vessels in case of possible sickness amongst the sailors during the voyage.[163]

Bedford's enthusiasm for this American project never waned, but a painful case of gout in both feet forced him to retire to Bath, after the orders for the provisioning and despatching of the ships were completed. Although he stayed in Bath until late May 1746, Bedford corresponded closely with the members of the Admiralty Board, particularly Lord Anson.[164] Bedford, in essence, retained direction of the preparations for the expedition, but acted <u>in absentia</u>. For example, later in the year, Bedford was confined once again in Bath, but carried out his official duties. On 22 October 1746, he wrote to Newcastle:

> Having received your Grace's commands by Lord Vise, about sending a Sea Officer of some weight immediately to Genoa I have wrote my Sentiments thereupon to his Lordship, wch I have desired him to communicate to your Grace, if I had time, I could mention many more reasons than are contained in that Postscript why I should prefer Adml Byng to Mr. Osborn. I cannot help troubling your Grace with my thoughts of the necessity of reinforcing General St Clair, with the 3 Battalions that were destined for him, and which without doubt, he is in daily expectation of, and which will be so

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161 Lodge, <u>Chesterfield and Newcastle</u>, 131-5.
162 Adm 2/209, f. 49. Bedford-Navy Board, 1 April 1746. Adm 2/209, f. 73. Bedford-Navy Board, 8 April 1746. Adm 2/209, f. 74, Bedford-Navy Board, 4 April 1746. Adm 2/209, f. 75. Bedford-Navy Board, 4 April 1746. Adm 2/209, f. 90. Bedford-Navy Board, 11 April 1746.
163 Adm 2/209, f. 120. Bedford-Navy Board, 19 April 1746.
164 <u>Bedford Correspondence</u>, i, 91-3.

> necessary in case he should have attempted, and succeeded in the Conquest of Belle Isle...[165]

Newcastle accepted Bedford's recommendation of appointing Admiral Byng to the Mediterranean squadron, even though Bedford was in Bath, and not in his Westminster office.[166] Bedford appeared to enjoy working away from Westminster, but this habit irritated some of his colleagues, particularly Newcastle, who were working in their offices at Westminster.[167] But there was little more that Bedford could do in his capacity as First Lord of the Admiralty, for this expedition, than he was doing from his sick bed in Bath. The members of the Admiralty Board, particularly Anson and Sandwich, held similar opinions, and sent Bedford regular information about French naval activities, particularly in the area around Brest. These French ships were rumoured to be destined for America, and in all likelihood, Louisbourg.[168] During Bedford's recovery from gout, the members of the Admiralty Board had little else to do but discuss these rumours, and receive reports on the British preparations for departure. Bedford could easily direct these activities from Bath. Ultimately, bad winds delayed the despatch of the expedition from England. Bedford's absence from London was not the cause

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165 Add. MS 32,713, f. 303-4. Bedford-Newcastle, 22 October 1746.
166 Add. MS 32,713, f. 346-7. Bedford-Newcastle, 28 October 1746.
167 Baugh, 72, considers "He was not indolent, for his correspondence with the other members of the Board, often written in his own hand, shows clearly that he never released his grip on the powers of his office.
168 Bedford Correspondence, i, 69-72, 77-79, 85-87, 88-91.

of any delay.[169] By late May, when the weather conditions had still not improved to permit sailing from Portsmouth, the future of the expedition was called into question.

Bedford still hoped that if the transports could sail by mid-June, then the expedition would be able to remove the French from Canada before the winter season. By 1 July however the winds confined the British ships in port, and the French fleet had sailed from Brest.[170] The French ships were not stopped by the British navy before reaching open seas. As a result, the Members of the Cabinet ordered St. Clair's fleet to remain in port, until the French ships no longer posed any possible danger to the country. Bedford was forced to reconsider his naval strategy. In a letter to Anson, he observed that,

> ...we ought to unite all the Ships cruizing to the Westward, whether in the Bay, off the Isle of Bas and St. Malo, or off Cape Clear, into one Squadron, and I am the more strongly confirmed in that Opinion at present, because, by the sending away so great a force, to America, as is now designed to be put under the command of Admiral Lestock, we are incapacitated from dividing our Force to the Westward, which when collected together, is not more than sufficient to withstand the Brest and Rochefort Fleets if united with that of Ferrol.[171]

Bedford agreed with Pelham and Newcastle about the necessity of countering any possible French naval encroachments by relying on strategic use of the navy in the seas between England and France. Admiral Vernon's personal comments to

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169 Bedford Micro, xiii 1746, f.9. Vere Beauclerk-Bedford, 15 May 1746.
170 McCann, 228-9.
171 Add. MS 15955, ff. 133-4. Bedford-Anson, 18 July 1746.

Bedford, and the experience of cruizing the English Chanel during the Jacobite rebellion, had convinced Bedford of the need to protect the British coast. His 'Country' views on the importance of protecting and expanding the British presence in North America, did not blind him to the need to protect the country from any potential attacks by the French. Still, until mid-August, Bedford hoped that the squadron to America would be launched. If Bedford had any doubts about the viability of this expedition, in light of the Brest fleet's successful departure, he did not reveal them. Lord Anson's report from Portsmouth on 11 August 1746, however, sealed the fate of the expedition. Anson, a member of the Admiralty Board, reported to Bedford that,

> [t]he season is very late for a convoy of ships to get to the Northern part of America. Colonel Frampton's regiment...is at present afflicted very much with the scurvy: all the men and officers, except the General, are sick of the expedition...[172]

Bedford ordered the postponement of the American expedition, much to Anson's relief. Anson applauded Bedford's decision to avoid the disaster that could have happened if the ships had reached Louisbourg or Nova Scotia in October.[173]

Bedford's postponement of the expedition did not mean its immediate cancellation. In September the expedition's

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172 Bedford Correspondence, i, 136-7.
173 Bedford Micro, xiii 1746, f. 29. Anson-Bedford, 24 August 1746. On 25 August 1746, The Oxford Gazette and Reading Mercury, No. 41, questioned the practicality of attempting any reduction of Canada while the British fleet was still in port, and then asked why there had been a delay in setting out, and who was responsible for it.

leaders, Lestock and St. Clair, were ordered to proceed to the French coast to attack L'Orient. The aim of their order was to irritate the French, and to keep the British regiments active.[174] When rumours of the duc d'Anville's attack on Louisbourg were circulating in London, Bedford still believed the expedition to remove the French from America would depart England in the early spring.[175] Bedford's main worry was not whether the expedition would be cancelled by Pelham and Newcastle, but whether the French could re-establish themselves in Cape Breton, before the British reinforcements arrived to protect the fort. French forces would be more difficult to remove from Louisbourg a second time, thus increasing the time, and funds, necessary for the British to remove the French from all of North America. At the end of October, Bedford advised Newcastle,

> ...that I am under no apprehensions at all with regard to Louisbourg and but very little for Accadie, considering how late in the Season, and in how bad a condition, Duke d'Anville's must have arrived...I entirely agree with your Grace of the expediency of concerting a Plan of Operation, and the measures which will be necessary to be taken early next Spring...for the future Reduction of Canada...[176]

Bedford thought that Newcastle still concurred with his project to despatch the transports for a North American expedition. In Bedford's plans, the troops were to leave in the early spring from Ireland, where he had ordered them to

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174 The expedition was unsuccessful in any event, and its contribution to tying the French navy in port was minimal.
175 Bedford Correspondence, i, 153-5, 155-9.
176 Add. MS 32713, ff. 346-7. Bedford-Newcastle, 28 October 1746.

rest through the winter after their return from the L'Orient expedition.

By November, Bedford and Newcastle disagreed on where the troops would winter. Bedford wanted them to remain at Cork and Kinsale in Ireland where they had initially settled with full Ministerial approval. Newcastle subsequently decided that these men should return to England immediately. One reason for this change of opinion was that as Secretary of State, Newcastle had received secret intelligence that the French were planning to attack Britain during that winter. An invasion attempt through Scotland was rumoured.[177] Bedford responded angrily to Newcastle's decision to recall the men in a lengthy letter. He clearly outlined his reasons against Newcastle's proposal to remove the regiments from Ireland, and reinforced his arguments for continuing support for the Canada expedition. Bedford thought any delay in sending the troops to Cape Breton would dampen the spirits of the American colonists who had made great personal sacrifices to expel the French from Cape Breton. The French presence in Cape Breton directly threatened the security of the colonists along the eastern seaboard. Any decrease in their security compromised British maritime power in the sense that any increase of the French presence in North America allowed them to build up their naval strength in the region. Secondly, Bedford believed that a recall of the troops to England would give the impression in America that the British Ministers had

177 Bedford Correspondence, i, 180-1.

laid aside the Canada expedition for good, thus damaging long-term relations with the colonists. As well, Bedford argued that to bring the troops back would give an unnecessary countenance to any rumours that the French were planning to invade England. Bedford discounted the French invasion story. He claimed it was simply a French ploy to keep the British in a defensive posture, similar to the plans the British Ministers pursued in attacking L'Orient earlier. Finally, Bedford suggested that the removal of the troops from Ireland would incapacitate them from service by demoralizing the men, who would be tired from the first move to Ireland, and then exhausted by the subsequent transfer. In short, Bedford vehemently opposed Newcastle on this point.[178] He hoped that his arguments would sway Newcastle's opinion. The quartering of the troops in Ireland throughout the winter until they were despatched to America, would preserve Bedford's plans for the removal of the French presence in Canada.[179]

Bedford was defeated on this point by Newcastle, who persuaded the members of the Cabinet Council during Bedford's absence in Bath, to support the secondment of the troops to English soil.[180] Bedford's bitterness at this ministerial decision was immediately apparent. He advised George Grenville that

> ...it was determined unanimously in the cabinet council to order the troops...in Ireland, to return immediately

178 Bedford Correspondence, i, 182-5.
179 Smith, Grenville Papers, i, 54.
180 Add. MS 32713, ff. 470. Newcastle-Bedford, 20 November 1746.

> to England. I must own this has thoroughly convinced me that the intended expedition is entirely laid aside.[181]

In January 1747, Newcastle wrote to Richmond.

> You will be glad to hear, that in all probability the Expedition to North America...will not go forward...we shall probably only send two or three Regiments to fortifie & secure Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton. But as nothing is yet determined I beg you would say nothing of it.[182]

The writing was on the wall, and Bedford read it. His efforts to promote this plan had been predicated upon the view that without reinforcements, Louisbourg and Nova Scotia would fall back into French control. Now, he abandoned his project for the reduction of Canada.[183]

Bedford's reasons for abandoning the expedition to remove the French presence in North America are found in the domestic political events that occurred between the spring of 1746 and the winter of 1747. Pitt, and the rest of the Cobham Cubs, had thrown their support behind the Pelham Ministry. Gower deserted the Tories when they left the 'Broad-Bottom' coalition in 1746, and Pelham successfully removed Granville's secret influence in the closet of George II. By consolidating his political power, Pelham had removed all external challenges to his control.[184] Pelham

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181 Bedford Correspondence, i, 194-6.
182 McCann, 238.
183 Add. MS 32717, ff. 311-2. Bedford-Newcastle, 3 August 1747. Add. MS 15955, ff. 135-6. Bedford-Anson, 3 August 1747.
184 Lodge, Chesterfield and Newcastle, 116-21.

no longer expected opposition in the Commons because no large grouping of politicians would cooperate together. The only material debate in Parliament, expected by Newcastle, was on the motion made by Lord Oxford in the House of Lords in late April for the papers relative to the conduct of the war in Flanders.[185] The final dispersal of the rebels in Scotland in late April strengthened the Pelham Ministry's image as well. The appointment of William Pitt, as Paymaster General, on 6 May confirmed publicly that the King was supporting the Administration, thereby increasing Pelham's managerial control in the Commons.[186]

Pitt's appointment, however, in the wake of Sir John Hinde Cotton's resignation and Lord Winnington's demise in April, disturbed the internal equilibrium of the Administration.[187] As early as 26 April, Sandwich complained to Bedford about the omission of his cousin, Lord Halifax, from any discussions for offices, while Pitt's friends, Henry Legge and George Grenville, were promoted as possible members of the Treasury Board. Sandwich stated that "[i]f this measure is taken, I own it will appear to me great ingratitude in the ministers to give way to Pitt, who only did not desert them because he had no refuge with any other set of people..."[188] From Bath, Bedford addressed Sandwich's complaints in this postscript to his wife.

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185 Bedford Correspondence, i, 74. Coxe, Memoirs, i, 313-4. This motion was defeated 81-26 on 2 May 1746.
186 Bedford Correspondence, i, 75-7, 82-3. The King still refused to put Pitt in any office with access to the Closet.
187 Lodge, Chesterfield and Newcastle, xxxv.
188 Bedford Correspondence, i, 77-9.

> My words to the Duke of Newcastle in answer to this are these: I am glad his Majesty has consented to appoint Mr. Pitt Paymaster, and hope now that something may be obtained for my friend Halifax, more agreeable to him than that he now has.[189]

For Bedford and Sandwich, the satisfaction of Halifax's demands, was a political issue, since his resignation would bring on Gower's, and then they would be obliged to follow. Gower had warned Newcastle personally that if Halifax wasn't provided for, then his personal honour would determine him to quit.[190] On 1 May, Chesterfield begged Newcastle "...to make up that matter quietly because Gower's and Halifax's resigning necessarily brings on the Duke of Bedford's and Sandwich's, in which case I shall be in a situation utterly incompatible with character or quiet."[191] Within the Pelham Administration, Bedford, Sandwich, Gower and Chesterfield continued to act together on certain issues, at this time.[192] They had entered the Ministry together, and on this particular point, they agreed to exit together. In effect, Pelham was faced with the potential loss of five prominent politicians from his Ministry, along with their supporters from the ministerial side in the House of Commons. Sandwich successfully removed the tension between Halifax and the Pelhams by negotiating a solid promise of future considerations of place for Halifax. By early May, Bedford still warned Pelham that if he gave in any further to the Cobham Cubs at the expense of his friends, the

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189 Bedford Correspondence, i, 83-4. See Chapter 2.
190 Bedford Correspondence, i, 85-7.
191 Lodge, Chesterfield and Newcastle, 136-7.
192 Bedford and Sandwich were also developing an intimate relationship with Newcastle at this time. See Chapter 6.

stability of the Administration would be threatened.[193] Although Bedford and the Cobham Cubs acted together when it suited them both, they were distinct groupings in Parliament, and Bedford was not prepared to see them favoured over his own friends.

This domestic threat to the Administration was an important factor in Pelham's support for Bedford's Canada proposals during the spring and early summer of 1746. Pelham thought that the capture of Cape Breton created an obstacle to obtaining a peace settlement in Europe. Any reduction of Canada would, he believed, increase the difficulties in getting France to the bargaining table. But Pelham appeared to be willing to subsume these qualms about Bedford's North America proposals in order to alleviate the tensions in the domestic political arena. The incorporation of the Cobham Cubs into his Administration had depleted the opposition ranks of potential leaders. But Bedford's attitude to their inclusion warned Pelham that Bedford was not willing to see the influence of his friends within the Administration diluted. To persuade Bedford that his influence would not be diminished, Pelham paid lip-service to North American policy. This decision worked in two ways. First, it provided Bedford and his friends with an outlet for their own policy initiatives, while leaving the Pelhams to dominate the domestic and European policy arenas. Secondly, the North American policy brought in the support of the 'Country' Whigs, as well as the Cobhams, in

193 Bedford Correspondence, i, 91-3, 94-5, 102-3.

Parliament. These were significant political benefits for the Pelhams. Pelham knew that if he lost the support of Bedford as a result of the incorporation of too many 'Cubs' into office, then these political benefits would be affected. Pelham, therefore, likely supported Bedford's proposals for the Canada expedition during this period in order to keep him 'sweet'. Pelham attempted to persuade Bedford that he could pursue his North American objectives within the Administration, in order to discourage him from returning to the opposition. He worried, however inaccurately, that Bedford and his friends could link together enough of the remaining opposition Members of Parliament to provide the King with an alternative to his own Ministry. The difficulties with the weather encountered by the Canadian expedition, therefore, pleased Pelham because he did not want to upset the equilibrium of the Administration by opposing Bedford on this issue, particularly while Halifax was kicking up such a small fuss.

The decision of Bedford, Gower, Sandwich, Chesterfield, and the rest of their colleagues to remain in the Administration was re-affirmed by late October 1746 when Harrington resigned his seals of office for the Northern Secretaryship of State.[194] The immediate reason for his resignation was the discovery of a secret correspondence between Sandwich and Newcastle regarding continental foreign policy.[195] The disagreement between Newcastle and

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194 Lodge, Studies..., 187. See also A. Massie 'Defence of the Low Countries...'
195 See Chapter 6.

Harrington over Dutch involvement in the war, and Harrington's wish to press for a peace negotiation, underlay his decision. Chesterfield received the seals of office from the King. With this appointment, Chesterfield and his political colleagues within the Ministry, were given input into the future direction of Northern European policy. Additionally, Sandwich was sent to the United Provinces to begin informal discussions with the French, and to maintain relations with the Dutch. It was during the announcements of these appointments that Bedford downgraded his demands to the 'retention of Cape Breton in any potential peace agreement with the French'. Bedford ascertained that Pelham would not agree to the expense of a full Canadian expedition at this time, and so he abandoned that specific proposal. The appointment of Chesterfield, and Sandwich, was a promise of greater influence in the Ministry, in the long run. Bedford's new position on Cape Breton pleased Newcastle, who still opposed Pelham on the question of a negotiation for peace with the French.[196] Pelham wanted to negotiate for peace because the costs to the British taxpayer of maintaining a continental involvement were escalating rapidly. Newcastle could use Bedford's request for the retention of Cape Breton in the negotiation, to prevent Pelham from rushing into any agreement with the French. Bedford was used as a counter-balance in arguments during Cabinet meetings.[197] Bedford could also logically defend his change of opinion concerning the reduction of Canada. He argued that he had only ever demanded the

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196 See Chapter 6.
197 Lodge, Studies..., 282-3.

retention of Cape Breton. The reduction of Canada was something to hope for in the future, not necessarily immediately. As a result of the change in the domestic arrangements in 1746, the project for the reduction of Canada was abandoned by Bedford.

Bedford eventually gave up his demands even for the retention of Cape Breton. By July 1747, he was prepared to return the fort to France, if Louisbourg was dismantled as Dunkirk had been previously.[198] Bedford's reason for dismantling the fort, and returning it to the French was simply pragmatic. Governor Knowles had advised Bedford of the situation in Nova Scotia in late June 1747. Bedford knew from him that the French were able to pour into Nova Scotia through Bay Vert, and attack the English whenever they wanted. The governor expected the French to be successful in this project, and Bedford warned Newcastle that there was great danger of losing both Louisbourg and Nova Scotia by the next summer unless more British troops were sent out to the garrison. Bedford recognized the impossibility of this proposal being met, in light of the ships and troops being sent out that summer to the East Indies. He acknowledged the lack of any ministerial support, particularly from Pelham, for a military expedition to protect Cape Breton. Although a Minister, Bedford was still not in the inner circle of Ministers who settled important issues.[199] Therefore recommending the immediate

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198 Lodge, Studies..., 271-2. Add. MS 32809, ff. 111-2. Newcastle-Sandwich, 28 July 1747.
199 Lodge, Studies..., 271-2.

dismantling of Louisbourg was his best option at this juncture. The dismantling of the fort, according to Bedford, would at least preserve the security of the inhabitants of Nova Scotia. Bedford hoped that this suggestion would also protect an expedition proposed for the following winter against the French islands in the West Indies.[200] Despite his change of policy towards Canada and Cape Breton, Bedford continued to support Newcastle's policies in Cabinet for prosecuting the European war until the most advantageous peace could be attained. Bedford, while giving up on British retention of Louisbourg in July, argued in August in favour of preparing British troops for a further campaign on the continent.[201] Bedford had been corresponding regularly with Sandwich and Newcastle regarding war strategy, and for the first time in his career was closely involved in the cabinet discussions about European policy.[202] Until early 1747, Bedford had not been consulted about European considerations, but with Sandwich in a key position at the Hague, and Newcastle's increasing reliance on his support to counter Pelham in the Cabinet, Bedford's understanding of all foreign policy considerations increased considerably. Although Bedford had supported hiring Russians to prepare for another campaign in the Low Countries in August 1747, by January 1748, he began questioning the advantages of a campaign which would prove

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200 Add. MS 32717, ff. 311-2. Bedford-Newcastle, 3 August 1747.

201 Add. MS 15955, ff. 143-4. Bedford-Anson, 13 August 1747. See Lodge, Studies..., 301, for the standard view that Bedford joined the pacific section of the Ministry once all hope of retaining Cape Breton had evaporated.

202 See Chapter 6.

costly to taxpayers, and would not guarantee improvements in the terms of peace. Bedford stressed he was not an advocate of 'peace at any price'.[203] In fact, had he been advocating peace at any price in early 1748, Newcastle would not have approved Bedford's appointment as Secretary of State for the Southern Department in February 1748. Bedford was simply broadening his knowledge of British interests, and growing to understand the economic constraints hindering British involvement in the war.

Bedford did not abandon his interest in North American affairs when he retreated on the question of Cape Breton. Once the preliminaries for the peace to end the hostilities on the European continent had been published in July 1748, Bedford promoted a scheme for the resettlement of returning military personnel in Nova Scotia. The plan was supported in the Universal Magazine in July 1748.

> It is computed, that if a peace be concluded there will be discharged from the royal navy and privateers, 50,000 men...By the paying off several men of war lately, the seamen's wages are fallen in the merchant service from 50s to 27s per month.[204]

Bedford believed that if these men were settled in Nova Scotia, the Administration could avoid possible public disorders, while at the same time, their military experience would secure the colonists in Nova Scotia.[205] The duke of Cumberland supported Bedford's suggestions, particularly the

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203 Bedford Correspondence, i, 314-7.
204 Universal Magazine, July 1748, 85.
205 Bedford Micro, xxii 1748, ff. 46-7. Bedford-Cumberland, 11 October 1748.

possibility of settling Lord Loudon's regiment in Nova Scotia with public funds.

> ...it is much to be wished that these people may be disposed of in such a manner as to be of service to the government, instead of a detriment to it, I should most heartily join any endeavours of mine for the success of such an undertaking.[206]

Pelham also agreed with Bedford's proposed scheme, if it was voluntary, as one way to deal with the potential problem of unemployed troops returning to Britain.[207]

The Americans, particularly William Shirley, Governor of Massachussetts, also supported the plan. Previously, the encroachments and harassment by local French Canadians in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, were more of a threat to the colonists than any possible invasion attempt from France.[208] Newcastle had arranged for regiments to be raised in the American colonies, then sent out to garrison the settlement, but by late 1747, the inefficiency of this design became apparent. Shirley could not find the necessary manpower to supply adequate protection for the colonists in Nova Scotia.[209] Once Louisbourg was returned to French control, the colonists in Nova Scotia, as well as those along the eastern seaboard, grew fearful for their security.[210] Bedford's proposal to settle unemployed soldiers in Nova Scotia would provide the security, while also alleviating the cost of defence for the Americans.

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206 Bedford Correspondence, i, 563-4.
207 Bedford Correspondence, i, 572-4.
208 Shirley Correspondence, i, 401.
209 Shirley Correspondence, i, 412-23.
210 Shirley Correspondence, i, 386-9.

In February 1749, Halifax, as President of the Board of Trade,[211] worked closely with Bedford on this proposed scheme. He asked Bedford to determine with Pelham and Newcastle whether an advertisement for disbanded soldiers and seamen could be inserted into the London Gazette.[212] On 6 March, Bedford forwarded the approved advertisement to Halifax, requesting that it be published in the public papers.[213] The advert encouraged officers and private men dismissed from military service to settle, with or without families, in Nova Scotia. The offer was also open to carpenters, shipwrights, smiths, masons, joiners, brickmakers, bricklayers, and surgeons. The advert promised private men 50 acres of land free from Quit Rent for 10 years, with 10 additional acres provided for each family member. Ensigns were to receive 200 acres, Lieutenants 300, Captains 400, and offers above the rank of Captain 600, and all were to receive 30 additional acres per family member. All volunteers for the expedition were provided free passage, arms and ammunition for defence, and implements for clearing and cultivating. The government promised to parcel out the land, and to establish a civil government in Nova Scotia, as soon as possible. The boarding date was set for 10 April, and the transport vessels were to leave port on 20 April 1749. With these inducements, Bedford hoped to settle

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211 See Chapter 5.
212 Bedford Micro, xxiii 1748/9, ff. 2-4. Halifax-Bedford, February 1748/9.
213 Bedford Micro, xxiii 1748/9, ff. 49-53. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 6 March 1748/9. SP 44.129, ff. 506-7. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 6 March 1748/9.

3000 individuals in Nova Scotia.[214] After Parliament voted 40,000 pounds for the cost of transportation to Nova Scotia, Bedford organized the purchase of provisions for the settlers.[215] He asked the Treasury to pay 3,540 pounds for farming implements to give to the 3000 settlers. He also requested 600 pounds for 3000 blankets, and arranged for all sundries to be placed on board the transport vessels before 10 April.[216] Bedford convinced the Ministers to support the settlers financially for one year after their arrival in Nova Scotia at the rate of 4 pence per day, per person.[217] Bedford worked diligently to ensure the success of this venture despite his other official business. He corresponded with William Shirley in February, and in late April, about the importance of this settlement, and about proposals for the creation of a civil government similar to the charter of Massachussetts.[218] In mid-April, he remembered that bibles and prayer books should be provided to the settlers, and arranged through Halifax for 'The Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge' to supply them.[219] Two clergymen and two schoolmasters were also sent to the colony by the Society, and four more of each were to follow shortly.[220] Bedford also persuaded Lord Edward Cornwallis to become the Captain-General and

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214 Bedford Micro, xxiii 1748/9, ff. 49-53. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 6 March 1748/9. SP 44.129, ff. 506-7. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 6 March 1748/9.
215 Universal Magazine, March 1749, 143.
216 SP 44/129, ff. 507-9. Bedford-Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 8 March 1748/9.
217 SP 44/129, f. 510. Bedford-Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 13 March 1748/9.
218 Shirley Correspondence, i, 470-80.
219 Bedford Micro, xxiii 1748/9, f. 79. Halifax-Bedford, 15 April 1749.
220 Universal Magazine, March 1749, 236.

Governor-in-Chief of Nova Scotia.[221] The King agreed to the proposal for the new settlement in Nova Scotia, and Cornwallis' appointment as Governor-in-Chief on 2 May 1749.[222] Bedford wanted to ensure the expedition would leave England in the early spring so that the settlers would arrive well before the onset of winter. Despite all his efforts, however, the settlers did not leave port until 17 May. At Portsmouth, the captains of the transport vessels quarrelled over the assignment of passengers.[223] The ship's departure from Liverpool was delayed even longer. Bedford's secretary, Richard Neville Aldworth, finally ordered the settlers to board the ships on 3 June 1749, despite the Captain's protestations about poor weather.[224] Leaving so late in the year guaranteed difficulties upon their arrival, but at least the settlers would be in Nova Scotia, and not in an English port town. Bedford would not have to worry about people slipping away, or about Ministers changing their decision to fund the expedition.

The press reports favoured Bedford's proposal, and commented frequently on the settlers' progress throughout 1749. These reports indicated that the intention of the expedition was to settle in the province of Nova Scotia, and to extend British fisheries in the region. The descriptions of the countryside were extremely favourable.

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221 SP 44/129, f. 518. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 28 April 1749.
222 CO 217/9, ff. 57-58. Order, 2 May 1749.
223 Bedford Micro, xxiv 1749, f. 8. Halifax-Bedford, 17 May 1749.
224 SP 44/129, f. 522. Aldworth-Hill, 3 June 1749.

> Nova Scotia or New Scotland, in which is comprehended that part of North America, called by the French, Acadia, is bounded on the N.E. and N.W. by the river St. Laurence, and E. and S. by the Atlantic ocean, and W. by Canada and New England...most of it is uncultivated; for except for a few settlements made by the French and English on the sea-coast...The soil is fruitful, the air seldom intemperate, it abounds with fish, cattle, and the best of furs; affords several excellent harbours...is capable by its situation to be made not only a barrier against all the schemes and forces of the French in those parts, for extending their trade, but a key to their fur trade and cod fishery, and to counteract any attempts against our settlements...by the greatest power France is able to equip at Cape Breton...[225]

Bedford remained concerned about North American security, and trade. When the French erected a fort at the mouth of the St. John River, he worried that the French inhabitants would disrupt the implementation of a civil government at Annapolis.[226] He also unsuccessfully attempted to find a solution to the problem of the Indians, who, encouraged by the French inhabitants, were molesting the British colonists. The Indians were covered under the 18th article of the Treaty of Utrecht. This article stipulated that the natives of America were not to be hindered by either the French or the British in their liberty, particularly in relation to trade.[227] Bedford complained to the French Court, through Lord Albemarle, the British ambassador in Paris, that the French Canadians were encroaching upon disputed territory, and should stop.[228] He demanded the removal of their fort until after the

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225 Universal Magazine, March 1749, 142-3.
226 Bedford Micro, xxiv 1749, f. 97. Halifax-Bedford, 13 August 1749.
227 CO 217/9, ff. 63-4. Bedford-Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 20 July 1749.
228 Add. MS 32,818, ff. 9-12. Bedford-Albemarle, 17 August 1749.

boundary was settled. Bedford's actions with regard to the French fortress on the River St. John was reported in the press, where it was also noted that Governor Cornwallis was ordered to send out a force to stop the French settlement.[229] Bedford relied on William Shirley, who had been appointed as one of Britain's commissioners in the boundary dispute, to protect British interests in the region.[230] Governor Cornwallis kept Bedford informed of the progress of the settlers, and of the correspondence he maintained with Monsieur de la Jonquiere, the Governor of Quebec, and Monsieur du Briel de Pontbriand, the Bishop of Quebec.[231] Bedford was, therefore, well informed on the conditions in Nova Scotia.

In February 1750, William Shirley visited Bedford in London. He advised him that the French Canadians had remained on the River St. John, and had expanded to Shepody and Memroncook, on the isthmus of Bay Vert. This was the area selected for the new British settlement. The King approved the site between this region and Chignecto on 29 March 1750.[232] The French interlopers claimed that they would await the Boundary Commission's conclusions before settling permanently in the area, but Shirley stressed in

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229 Universal Magazine, September 1749, 140. London Gazette, No. 8910, December 1749.

230 Add. MS 32,819, ff. 85-6. Bedford-Albemarle, 9 November 1749. EG 3416, ff. 86-7. Bedford-Albemarle, 9 November 1749.

231 Journal of the Commission for Trade and Plantations, 1749-53. 9 January 1749/50. See also CO 217/9, ff. 240-3. Cornwallis-Bedford, 1 May 1750, and CO 217/9-11, for more letters Cornwallis sent to the Lords of Trade.

232 CO 217/9, ff. 162-3. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 29 March 1750.

his letters to Bedford that these Canadians were, in the meantime, inciting the Indians against the British colonists. Shirley asked Bedford to increase the military presence in the colony.[233] Bedford agreed, and persuaded Pelham and Newcastle to send Harrington's regiment from Ireland to Nova Scotia.[234] This action resulted in public rumours that a new expedition to remove the French from Canada was being prepared.[235] Bedford, also at this time, discussed the question of ecclesiastical matters in North America with the Bishop of London.[236] Bedford's policies resulted in further intimidation activities by the French in Quebec. Governor Cornwallis catalogued them for Bedford's information.[237] The French Court disputed this list of attacks. Despite their response, Bedford ordered Cornwallis to act as he judged expedient, if the French Canadians continued their encroachments into Nova Scotia.[238] The events in this region threatened the peace between Britain and France throughout the summer of 1750, although Bedford was certain that Jonquiere, the Governor of Quebec, was acting without the approval of the French Court.[239] These problems in Nova Scotia were discussed clearly in the press. For example, at the beginning of September 1750, Cornwallis

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233 Bedford Estate Office, Box marked 'A'. Shirley-Bedford, 9 February 1749/50.
234 SP 43/120. Bedford-Newcastle, 22 May 1750.
235 Universal Magazine, March 1750, 140.
236 Bedford Estate Office, Box of Letters. Bishop of London-Bedford, 27 March 1750. (22 pages)
237 SP 43/120. Bedford-Newcastle, 3 June 1750.
238 Bedford Micro, xxvi 1750, ff. 8-9. Bedford-Newcastle, 3 July 1750.
239 Bedford Micro, xxvi 1750, ff. 29-30. Bedford-Cornwallis, 19 July 1750.

had sent a large force to Chignecto to remove the Indians intimidating the British settlers in the area.

> On the arrival of the forces...the Indians, mingled with the neutral French, who, to the number of 7 or 800, had intrenched themselves behind strong banks and pallisadoes, that were cannon proof...Major Laurence, therefore...at the head of about 100 chosen men, landed a mile and a half from this intrenchment, where the enemy were ready to receive him...he lost only five or six of his men...he killed a great number of them [Indians]; the rest fled with great precipitation and passed the river to the other side on the French ground, where a French officer with about 100 regular troops stood and was witness of the action.[240]

The problem lay with the French Canadians who encouraged the Indians to harass the British settlers. The problem would not be solved easily through negotiations with the French Court in Paris. Bedford attempted to counter their activities by supplying Cornwallis with soldiers from Ireland, and by encouraging the settlement of 1000 foreign protestants and 300 Swiss protestants in the colony.[241] This last suggestion was discussed as early as December 1749, when Bedford advised the Lords of Trade that Mr. Dick, a merchant at Rotterdam, was willing to act as the agent for the settlement of foreign protestants in Nova Scotia.[242] In March 1749, Bedford asked the Lords of Trade whether it was advisable to send the 400 French Protestants who had just arrived in Jersey, to Nova Scotia. Bedford worried that despite their religious prosecution in France, their language and national sentiment might prove detrimental to

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240 Universal Magazine, November 1750, 234.
241 Journal of the Commission for Trade and Plantations, 1749-53, 457. 31 January 1750/1.
242 CO 217/9, f. 126. Bedford-Lords Commissioners of trade and Plantations, 20 December 1749.

the colony.[243] He bowed to their decision in the matter, and advised that Parliament would pay the money necessary to settle them in Nova Scotia.[244] In late January 1751, the settlement of foreign protestants in the colony was still being pursued by Bedford, who advised the Lords of Trade that the King approved the idea of settling,

> Three hundred industrious labouring Foreign Protestants from the age of 20 to 40 years, whose Passage and subsistence are to be defrayed by their being employed as labourers in the Public Works, at the Rate of one Shilling p. Day p. Person...[245]

Expenses had been approved by Parliament in 1751 for up to 57,582 pounds and 19.3 & 1/2 for the total project, and Pelham did not want to provide more funds if possible. Bedford and the Lords of Trade began to consider ways of economising, and this was one example. Bedford's other suggestion for sending further troops to Nova Scotia was deemed unnecessary after he was replaced as the ministerial guardian of the colony by Halifax.[246] On 28 March, the Cabinet Council met with the Lords of Trade at the Cockpit to consider the points concerning the colony raised in their letter to Bedford of 7 March.[247] Halifax was given leave to pursue his own plans for the colony. Parliament approved a further 53,927 pounds and 14.4 for Nova Scotia in 1751.[248]

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243 CO 217/9, ff. 152-3. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 1 March 1749/50.
244 CO 217/9, f. 154. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 20 March 1749/50.
245 CO 217/11, ff. 24-5. Bedford-Lords of Trade, 30 January 1750/1.
246 Add. MS 32,724, ff. 165-6. Halifax-Newcastle, 6 March 1750/1.
247 CO 217/11, f. 65. Aldworth-Hill, 26 March 1751.
248 Universal Magazine, March 1751, 62.

Halifax continued Bedford's protection of the colony, and in March 1751, the Lords of Trade advised Bedford of their commitment to the protection of British fisheries and settlers in the region.[249] Bedford's actual personal involvement in the colonisation of Nova Scotia ended in March 1751.

Although extremely interested in North American affairs, Bedford's interest in these particular issues did not occupy all his time. His knowledge of all commercial matters grew while he was First Lord of the Admiralty. The letters Bedford received from consuls in various countries, like John B. Parker in Oporto, Portugal, and the appointment of his friend, Baptist Leveson-Gower, to the Commission for Trade and Plantations in May 1746, provided Bedford with more immediate information about British commercial interests.[250] John Parker wrote to congratulate Bedford immediately upon his appointment and gave him news of ships going to the West Indies, and information on the English prisoners in Portugal.[251] British trade with Portugal remained stable throughout the 1740s, but more importantly, Parker kept Bedford informed about the movements of the Spanish fleet, and about the position of French troops.[252]

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[249] Add. MS 35,913, ff. 16-20. Lords of Trade-Bedford, 7 March 1750/1.

[250] Journal of the Commission for Trade and Plantations, 1741-9, 166.

[251] Bedford Micro, ix 1745, f. 104. Parker-Bedford, 21 February 1745.

[252] Bedford Micro, ix 1745, f. 86. Parker-Bedford, 23 January 1745. Bedford Micro, ix 1745, f. 114. Parker-Bedford, 10 April 1745. Bedford Micro, ix 1745, ff. 124-6. Parker-Bedford, 22 May 1745. See H.E.S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade: A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce, 1700-1770, (London, 1971), 39.

From Rotterdam, R. Wolters congratulated Bedford on his appointment, and asked if he should continue sending his advice to Thomas Corbett, the Secretary of the Admiralty Board.[253] William Beckford supplied him with news from the West Indies.[254] William Shirley provided information from Massachussetts. Bedford had couched his reasons for proposing the reduction of the French in Canada in terms reflecting his concern for British merchants. To Bedford, their protection and promotion was a prime concern. This desire to improve the concessions available to British traders led Bedford to propose at one point giving up Gibraltar to Spain in return for trading rights in the West Indies. Bedford saw little or no utility in this Mediterranean possession, and he thought its cession would be less dangerous for Britain in the long-term than the restoration of Louisbourg to the French.[255] Bedford believed British trading interests lay overseas in the Indies and America, and were no longer served in the Mediterranean. In an early debate on the Levant Trade in 1744, he had outlined his pragmatic reasons for no longer supporting the merchants in this region. Trading problems with Spain, particularly the outrages committed by their Guarda Costas on British sailors in the merchant navy, had been the initial reason for Bedford advocating war against them in 1739.

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253 Bedford Micro, ix 1745, ff. 83-5. Wolters-Bedford, 8/28 January 1745.

254 Bedford Micro, x 1745, f. 29. Beckford-Bedford, 26 July 1745. Beckford helped Bedford back the Protestor in 1753 until he went over to the Administration in November. Bedford Correspondence, ii, 150.

255 Bedford Correspondence, i, 314-7.

Throughout his term as First Lord of the Admiralty, numerous petitions from merchants were presented to Parliament requesting protection by the navy. As an inexperienced, young politician in office, Bedford latched onto them because he was predisposed to their cause. It helped that no other Minister was immediately interested in this policy area. European foreign policy was not within his sphere of influence, and the actual strategy of the war was decided by the Secretaries of State and the King. Bedford had looked for a niche in the Administration, and fixed upon trade and North America. His perception of the popularity of this issue promoted his interest in the commercial pursuits of the colonists in America, and consequently, he advocated the removal of the French from Canada in order to protect these interests.

Once he was provided with greater information about a wider range of topics, Bedford re-examined his policies. His step-by-step retreat on his demands concerning Canada, and Cape Breton, were taken in light of the changing circumstances, both in the Ministry, and on the continent of Europe. Bedford's pragmatic stance created the appearance of an ineffectual policy-maker, when he was actually a realist. His concern for the colonists in Nova Scotia was genuine. After he left the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, his interest in British trade and North America never completely disappeared. Before Bedford left this office, however, Pelham called the general election of 1747.

CHAPTER 4: ELECTIONS, LOCAL ISSUES AND WESTMINSTER POLITICS

The general election of 1747 was Bedford's first extensive foray into local campaigning. By 1748, Thomas Pitt, the electoral manager for the Prince of Wales, referred to Bedford as 'the terrour of the West' because of his political activism in the west county.[1] Bedford sought to increase his political influence at the constituency level in order to boost his personal profile at Westminster. When Pelham announced that the general election for the early summer, the opposition was unprepared for a political battle. The conduct of the Ministers during, and immediately after, the Jacobite scare of 1745, helped consolidate the power of the Pelham Administration. These two factors provided the impetus for an early election call. Pelham caught the opposition off-guard with his announcement. Fortunately for the Ministers, the Jacobite issue continued to divide them. The opposition ranks were split between Prince of Wales followers, Tories, and Independent Whigs. Pelham, and his ministerial colleagues, anticipated their electoral victory in 1747, when they fixed on the twin issues of patriotism and support of the Hanoverian succession as the focus of their forthcoming campaign. The hope was that the opposition would be unable to join together on these issues. The Ministers were concerned that waiting another year would only increase the ammunition available for opposition members to use against

[1] Namier, Structure of Politics..., 336.

them. A conclusion to the War of Austrian Succession could not be predicted, and whatever the peace terms, a certain segment of the population was guaranteed to be unhappy with the results. In 1747, however, the war was more or less at a stalemate, and yet the opposition were unable to coordinate an attack in Parliament about ministerial conduct of the war. Additionally, Lord George Anson's naval squadron had captured six French warships and three French East India Company ships at sea, with little loss to the British fleet in May. The Ministers were able to take great pleasure with this success, and George II provided public illuminations to celebrate this British naval victory.[2] Pelham, in particular, hoped that a snap election call would increase the number of government supporters elected to the House of Commons, without any of the concomitant expenditure if the opposition were more prepared for the campaign. Under the regulations of the Septennial Act the Ministers would have to go to the polls in 1748. In the late spring of 1747, however, Pelham and his colleagues concluded that if they went to the polls immediately, the number of their supporters returned would be increased, at a very reasonable cost.

Bedford seized this moment to increase his personal political influence both on the local and national stage. Electoral success against his opponents appeared certain, given their lack of readiness for a campaign when Pelham announced the poll. Bedford poured his money into election

[2]London Gazette, 16 May 1747. Add. MS 15955, ff. 139-40. Bedford-Anson, 16 May 1747.

campaigns at the constituency level. The contests in Bedford and Westminster were examples of his actions. Bedford also sought to consolidate his influence in constituencies where his interests were not immediately challenged by the opposition. Additionally, he supplemented his own money, with the Treasury's assistance, in order to campaign against the Prince of Wales' supporters in the West Country. Only two constituencies, Honiton and Totnes, of the thirteen in Devonshire, went to a poll during the election. Yet a great deal of effort and expense was spent by Bedford to reach the point where he could avoid electoral contests.[3] Bedford was assisted by the Treasury because Pelham wished to limit the influence of the Prince of Wales in this region. Bedford agreed to campaign vigourously in the area because he wanted to increase his personal fortunes in an area of the country where he owned property.[4] Like most politicians of his day, Bedford's aim was to have a measure of local influence that reflected the amount of property he owned in the region. His social, as well as his political, reputation was linked to the public's perception of his influence in the counties.[5]

In the 1747 General Election, contests were fought in 25 of the 40 English counties. The largest concentration of contested polls occurred in the south where the majority of

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[3] J. Haas, 'The Rise of the Bedfords, 1747-1757...' (D.Phil. University of Illinois, 1960), 153. Rogers, 'Aristocratic Clientage...' Past & Present, lxi(November 1973), 85.
[4] Bedford had property near Newport, Camelford, Okehampton, and Tavistock in Devonshire. See Chapter 2.
[5] See Johnson for a fuller discussion of the relationship between property and influence.

Bedford's property interests lay.[6] Bedford was not concerned, nor limited by, any attempts to limit expenses during this campaign. He decided to press aggressively for his nominees during the campaigns in targeted constituencies. Bedford's decision to force a poll in certain constituencies rather than to compromise raised some concern about his political acumen. The advancing age of George II, who was 64 years old, introduced an element of uncertainty about the security of a parliamentary seat as a financial investment. Whether George II would live for the full seven years was a serious calculation when a new parliament had to be called within six months of the accession of a new King. If Frederick, the Prince of Wales, acceded to the throne, the advantage at the hustings could swing back to favour Bedford's opponents. In his analysis of the risk, Bedford decided that even if he ended up out of pocket, he would have at least increased his profile in the constituencies. The more common pattern of political compromise usually sought by local magnates in the mid-eighteenth century was seen in Yorkshire. There the members of the local elite avoided unnecessary expense during the election canvas by judging in advance the outcome. For example, George Fox, a Tory representing York since 1742, and Godfrey Wentworth, a Tory Member of Parliament since 1741, were challenged by two Whigs, Henry Ibbetson and William Thornton. The Tory incumbents had a fairly positive assessment of their electoral strength in the town. Yet

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[6] The south was favoured in the distribution of seats. Of the 489 MPs who sat for England in the House of Commons, 305 (62%) were from this region.

when Ibbetson asked the Administration to support their campaign in York financially, these local Tories proposed a compromise. Ibbetson and Wentworth withdrew from the contest, and a Whig and a Tory were returned to the House of Commons.[7] In practical financial terms, a similar compromise would have benefited Bedford. Bedford, however, had determined to pursue an aggressive election campaign in 1747. This might have been due to his recent move into the Administration, and to his personal wealth. It is also possible that he wished to increase his influence in the House of Commons. Bedford had been groomed to become a Member of Parliament for Brackley, but fate intervened and he was elevated to the House of Lords in 1733.[8] Two elections, 1734 and 1741, had been fought while he was a member of the opposition. The general election of 1747 was his first opportunity to participate unreservedly in the campaign with the full strength of Ministerial backing. Bedford recognized the need to increase his political influence in the House of Commons, in order to strengthen his personal position within the Cabinet. Whatever the reasons, Bedford aggressively campaigned throughout this election. Although financial considerations generally encouraged conciliation at an early stage in a contest, during the general election of 1747, Bedford was prepared to use his financial clout to achieve his political aims.

An uncontested election generally cost less in expense and time commitment, for the local magnate, than an

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[7] Sedgewick, House of Commons, i, 365.
[8] See Chapter 2.

contested poll. In the Tavistock campaign, for example, Bedford spent 273 pounds and 12 shillings mainly on liquor and transport. He also gave the portreeve 6 pounds and 6 shillings, the poor 21 pounds, and the undersheriff 2 pounds and 2 shillings. In addition to this 302 pounds, Robert Butcher, Bedford's chief steward, arranged for a dinner in Tavistock for the burgesses, and provided a ball for their wives and daughters. Tavistock was Bedford's pocket borough, and no opposition presented itself throughout the 1747 election. Yet, in Tavistock, Robert Butcher diligently attended to the management of the electors for Bedford. One voter was advised that

> ...if he hopes for my Lord Duke's friendship hereafter he must be a Vote...if he refuses it he will repent his foolish obstinacy the longest day he has to live.[9]

Neither Butcher, nor Bedford, appeared concerned about bullying voters, although bribing was their preferred method of convincing their supporters. Even though Bedford was the local lord of the manor who owned the majority of the property in Tavistock, and nominated the returning officer, he needed to spend a considerable sum of money to ensure that both of his nominees, Thomas Brand and Sir Richard Wrottesley, were endorsed by the 154 freeholders voting at Tavistock.[10] Bedford's influence was strong enough for him to nominate both candidates in Tavistock without opposition, but he recognized that careful management of that influence by Butcher was required to ensure the tradition continued.

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[9] BEO, Butcher Papers. Box 1747(a). 13 June 1747.
[10] BEO, Butcher Papers. Box 1747(b).

Bedford paid a great deal less to obtain votes in this uncontested constituency than he did in a contested one, but the price for consolidating his political influence was still nonetheless considerable.

The electoral contest in the town of Bedford, for example, required a greater financial contribution from Bedford. Despite a long-standing family interest in the town, and in spite of Bedford's appointment in 1745 as Lord Lieutenant of the county, he could not nominate both the Members of Parliament for Bedford. Although his property holdings in the town were as great as those he held at Tavistock, the presence of a number of active Tories in local government, ensured he could not control enough of the votes in this two-member constituency. Bedford wanted to take advantage of his rising importance within the Administration in order to increase his political influence in Bedford and Bedfordshire. He also knew that any increase in the number of his followers returned to the House of Commons, would consolidate his position within the Ministry. Bedford seized the opportunity to attack the Tory opposition centred in the Common Council of Bedford, while memories of the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion remained fresh, and while the Ministers were generally using the Jacobite taint to good effect nationally. Sir Boteler Chernook and John Hynde Cotton were proposed as parliamentary candidates in the 1747 general election by the local Tories who dominated the Bedford Common Council. Bedford nominated Thomas Gore and John Offley. Gore had been returned as a Tory for Cricklade

in 1722, but had followed Gower into the Pelham-Newcastle Administration in 1744. Shortly thereafter, he became identified as a member of the 'Bloomsbury Gang'. Offley was a novice politician, and a personal friend of Bedford.[11] Thomas Yorke, Bedford's local agent, and Robert Butcher, Bedford's chief steward who worked out of London, diligently sought to promote Gore and Offley in the constituency. Their personal endeavours at managing the voters, combined with Bedford's financial contributions, to elect Gore and Offley as the Members of Parliament for Bedford. Management and money were the underpinnings of the successful campaign. Bedford campaigned personally for Gore and Offley in the constituency. He advised Butcher of his willingness to 'walk' the town if necessary as he "...would not upon any acct by any Sloth of mine lose the Election..."[12] Their combined efforts ultimately paid off. On 26 June 1747, three days before the poll opened, Chernook and Cotton advised Bedford that they would no longer contest the election. Bedford told Butcher of their concession, but also warned him not to let down his guard, just in case some sort of opposition was attempted before the Monday poll.[13] Bedford's expenses increased on Monday when he undertook the traditional 'treating' of voters. His greatest expense, however, involved the recruitment of 70 eligible voters from London and other towns in England to vote in the Bedford

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11 Thomas Gore of Inner Temple, London and Dunstan Park, Berkshire, and John Offley of St. James', Westminster.
12 BCRO, R. Box 770(1). Bedford-Butcher, June 1747.
13 BCRO, R. Box 770(1). Bedford-Butcher, 26 June 1747.

contest.[14] The election of Gore and Offley, even with the informal concession of their opponents prior to the opening of the polls, cost Bedford 1290 pounds and 18.10 & 1/2, excluding the expenses and wages paid to his permanent employees.[15]

This election spilled over into Bedford's attempt in September 1747 to seize control of the corporation of Bedford, during the election of members for the Common Council. A Tory faction, who dominated the Common Council, had been behind Cotton's and Chernook's nomination in the June general election.[16] Bedford considered these Tories to be Jacobites, and he was determined to bring the Council under his personal control. To that end, he spent 649 pounds and 5.3 & 1/2 during the September election for the Common Council.[17] He paid eight men 4 pounds and 4 shillings, plus their expenses in going to vote, on Tuesday, 15 September. They signed a note promising their support for Bedford's interest in the election, upon receipt of the money.[18] Fifteen men signed up at four guineas each promising to vote in Bedford's favour in a similar contract.[19] John Becuda, another of Bedford's agents in

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[14] BCRO, R. Box 770(5). According to Butcher's list, 70 electors were brought into vote for Gore and Offley, while 67 were 'no shows'.
[15] BCRO, R. Box 770(2). An Account of the Expences of the election for members to serve in Parliament for Bedford in June 1747.
[16] Add. MS 32713, ff. 163-4. Bedford-Newcastle, 28 September 1747.
[17] BCRO, R. Box 770(3). An Account of expenses paid at the Election of Mayor and Common Councillmen at Bedford 16 & 22 September 1747.
[18] BCRO, R. Box 770(1). 15 September 1747.
[19] BCRO, R. Box 770(1). September 1747.

London, paid out 172 pounds and 18.9 & 1/2 to bring 24 Freemen who were eligible to vote during the election up to Bedford from London.[20] The venality of this election campaign was not the only concern.

There were other important issues during the campaign for the Common Council positions, as well. Bedford argued that the members of the Common Council had mismanaged funds of up to 700 pounds in relation to the Harpur trust. He questioned, in particular, their payment of large fees from that trust to a local schoolmaster. In addition, Bedford accused the Mayor and Councillors of illegally creating a number of freemen. He argued that they were ensuring their continued predominance in the Common Council by increasing the number of possible votes that would favour of their candidates.[21] Benjamin Rogers, the Rector of Carlton from 1720 to 1771, and a Tory, confirmed Bedford's last assertion in his diary entry of 16 September 1747. He noted that Bedford's efforts to bring the Corporation under his power had failed because the Mayor and Common Councillors had created 129 "...Burgesses and Freemen the Week before to secure themselves against the Duke, who, they knew, was like to bribe high, having the Election so much at Heart."[22] In October, after spending nearly 2000 pounds, Bedford was unable to bring the Common Council under his personal

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[20] BCRO, R. Box 770(3). J. Becuda's disbursements...16 September 1747.
[21] BCRO, R. Box 770(2). Points during election of Council...
[22] C.D. Linnell, ed., 'The Diary of Benjamin Rogers, Rector of Carlton, 1720-71', The Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, xxxi, Streatly, 1950.

political control. Although he had successfully returned his nominees as Members of Parliament for the town, the Tory opposition in the Council Chamber continued to restrict his ability to wield influence in the town of Bedford, as well as in the county. Bedford instigated proceedings to have the Bedford Common Council election set aside at Westminster, but he never pursued the matter through the House of Commons.[23]

Another contest in which Bedford took a personal interest was Westminster. His agent, John M. Becuda, managed the large amount of property that Bedford owned in this constituency, and he reported to Bedford the activities of the constituents during the 1747 campaign. The election contest was fiercely fought between two camps in the constituency. Granville Leveson-Gower, Viscount Trentham, and Sir Peter Warren, as the government candidates, were endorsed by Bedford.[24] The Independent Electors of Westminster promoted Sir Thomas Clarges and Sir Thomas Dyke. Trentham, the heir to the Gower family estates in Staffordshire, and the brother-in-law of Bedford, actively

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[23] Add. MS 32173, ff. 163-4. Bedford-Newcastle, 28 September 1747.

[24] Add. MS 15955, ff. 141-2. Bedford-Anson, 20 June 1747. Sir Peter Warren required a qualification note in order to stand as a candidate for the House of Commons, but he was at sea. Bedford and his colleague at the Admiralty Office, Lord Anson, provided him with the necessary qualification in June 1747. Bedford had arranged with William Pitt in 1745 for a lifetime annuity of 300 pounds per annum to be issued out of a 4,800 pound investment, and offered to provide the same arrangement for Warren. Anson was to advance Bedford the 4,800 pounds until Warren returned to England and repaid Anson, or made other arrangements for the qualification. Bedford could then provide the necessary document for Warren's nomination to proceed without complications. See Chapter 2.

campaigned in the constituency for his election. Becuda noted in a letter to Butcher on 23 June 1747 that

> ...Lord Trentham was yesterday at St. Martin's vestry, and today at those of St. Clement's and Covent Garden; and tonight his Lordship has a meeting with the Managers of the several Parishes, in order to consider the Measures most proper to be taken for the effectual carrying on the Election...[25]

Sir Peter Warren was unable to participate personally in the campaign, but Trentham worked diligently in the constituency to cultivate support for both of them.

Earlier, in June 1747, Bedford had sent a draft from Child & Co., for 900 pounds to help Trentham's cause in the Westminster campaign, and along with the duke of Marlborough, contributed a brace of bucks to the treating. No one expected Warren, who was popular with the public, and Trentham, who had money and the Administration's backing, to lose the race in Westminster. The voters' sentiment appeared to favour the ministerial candidate, particularly, in light of the recent events during the Jacobite scare of 'Forty-Five.[26] The opposition - the Independent Electors of Westminster - attempted unsuccessfully to attack the Ministers over their conduct of the War of Austrian Succession. In a pamphlet they distributed throughout Westminster, they argued that

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25 BCRO, R. Box 770(1). Becuda-Butcher, 23 June 1747.
26 Add. MS 15946, ff. 44-5. Sandwich-Dayrolles, 23 June 1747. See also Rogers, 'Aristocratic Clientage...', 75-7, for a discussion of how the administration used public sentiment about the Jacobite rebellion in their campaigns.

> We are now deeply involved in the Wars of all Kings; but the worst of all is that dismal, expensive one on the Continent with the French King's Country; who...but we pay Three Hundred Thousand Pounds a Year to the Queen of Hungary; Two Hundred Thousand a Year to the King of Sardinia; we pay for Hessians, Hanoverians, and others; and also large sums to several little petit Electors of the Empire; and to Lord knows who, and what...[27]

Their efforts, however, were overshadowed by the Ministers' ability to divert public attention away from their conduct of the war. Trentham and Warren focused on the twin issues of patriotism and the support of the Hanoverian Succession. Pelham and Newcastle had learnt this trick from their former mentor, Sir Robert Walpole, who had perfected the tactic to his own political advantage. Fortunately for the ministerial candidates, in early 1747 during Lord Lovat's trial as a Scottish traitor, some individuals associated with the Independent Electors of Westminster were linked with the Jacobite rebels of the 'Forty-Five. The Ministers pressed home this public relations advantage in March, by holding an inquiry into an incident at the Independent Electors' anniversary dinner. An innkeeper, who was keeping one of the Crown witnesses in the Lovat trial, claimed he had been assaulted for doing so by some of the diners at this anniversary celebration. The Commons inquiry did not reach any conclusions, but during the campaign, the Ministers were able to pump out the propaganda portraying the Independent Electors of Westminster as a group of

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[27] Cry Aloud and Spare Not; or Plain Useful Facts and Remarks as a Preparative to the present sudden and General Election, London, 1747, 7-8.

unpatriotic rabble-rousers.[28] Even with all these apparent advantages, however, the election of Trentham and Warren as Members of Parliament for Westminster cost Bedford 4,400 pounds.[29]

Bedford did not appear to be concerned about the cost of the contested elections in 1747. He spent a minimum of 6,200 pounds to elect his nominees in the constituencies of Tavistock, Okehampton, Bedford, and Westminster. Most of the expense accrued because Bedford was unwilling to reach any compromise with opposition Tories in the respective constituencies. Throughout this period, he was determined to nominate both candidates in the constituencies where he held some personal influence. Why he felt that he could pursue this course of action, without ruffling more than a few feathers, is not known. In the county of Devon, for example, no electoral contest had been held since 1715, because the three leading families were Tories, who agreed on the two MPs for the county. No Whig with any property interest in that region attempted to obstruct this tradition. Bedford received somewhat similar respect at Tavistock. He knew that he would not be given the same

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[28] Rogers, 'Aristocratic Clientage...', 75-6. Add. MS 32810, ff. 162-9. The Jacobites were still believed to be a threat by Newcastle on 20 October 1747 when he wrote a private letter to the earl of Sandwich in Europe. "It is certainly true, that the Jacobites are uppish, and stirring, everywhere. In Scotland, there are great Signs of their Expecting some fresh Disturbances; and the considerable People of the Jacobites, in many parts of England, are assembling and Distinguishing Themselves by Plaid Waistcoats, which is to be a description of Them, and I suppose, an indication, and Proof to France, of the Numbers that would join them for the Pretender, if they make an attempt this winter for Him..."

[29] Sedgewick, House of Commons, i, 286.

consideration at Bedford, and particularly at Westminster, in 1747. Yet he attempted to push for the election of his two candidates. Perhaps he believed that his stature as First Lord of the Admiralty provided him with greater influence than he actually had. Granted, he did have more influence than he held during the two previous general elections. The Admiralty boroughs, like Plymouth for example, asked Bedford for his suggestions regarding nominees, but in his capacity as the First Lord of the Admiralty. The 200 freemen at Plymouth generally returned any individual nominated by the First Lord because of their economic dependence on the Admiralty. John Rogers wrote to Bedford on behalf these electors in 1747, promising their support for the government's nominees. He requested, however, that Arthur Stert not be proposed again. Bedford ignored their wishes.[30] Arthur Stert was returned unopposed, with Lord Vere Beauclerk, as the Members of Parliament for Plymouth, on 3 July 1747. Bedford may have been misled by such acquiesence to his wishes to believe that his personal influence was greater than it was in fact. He had the money and ambition, as well as the rudimentary experience, to attempt increasing his political power. No doubt being a Minister translated into some local support, but Bedford forgot that this did not necessarily mean personal support, and that the opposition had its own means of influence.

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[30] Add. MS 34,523, ff. 41-2. Rogers-Bedford, 25 June 1747.

Bedford faced a major opposition player during this general election. Frederick, the Prince of Wales, whose followers campaigned against government candidates, particularly in the West Country, was active in the 1747 general election. Thomas Pitt, the electoral manager for the Prince of Wales, and his brother-in-law, George Lyttelton, had been returned for Okehampton in 1741. Before the 1747 general election, however, Lyttelton had joined the Administration upon his appointment to the Treasury Board in 1744. Thomas Pitt, therefore, deemed him an inappropriate candidate to stand at Okehampton. Early in the election campaign, Thomas Pitt thought that the distribution of 1000 pounds would secure the return of his new nominee, Charles Montague, in Lyttelton's place. By mid-June, after talking with John Luxmore of Okehampton, Pitt complained to the Rev. Dr. Ayscough, one of the Prince's advisors in London, that Lyttelton would be returned because his Treasury appointment pleased the electors. Pitt believed that more money would persuade the electors of Okehampton to support Charles Montagu, the Prince of Wales' candidate.[31] Montague, after a private interview with George Lyttelton in London, personally concluded that since Lyttelton would not promise to stay out of the election, he personally could not afford this contest at Okehampton.[32] Montague refused to journey to the constituency to present himself to the electors. Lyttelton, when defending himself against Pitt's accusations, then claimed that Montagu never put himself forward as an official candidate at Okehampton. Ayscough,

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31 HMC Fortescue I, 114.
32 HMC Fortescue I, 117.

his brother-in-law, berated him for going against Pitt's wishes in the constituency.

> ...what you know as well as I do, the management that Mr. Pitt always made use of at Okehampton, where he was never to appear to chuse two members. But after his own election was settled, he used to mention another person's name to John Luxmore, who afterwards proposed him to the freemen of the borough for their choice...in this very way was Mr. Montagu recommended this time...[33]

Luxmore, the apparent villain of this whole episode, conspired with the other members of the Corporation to return Lyttelton, inspite of Pitt's recommendation in favour of Montagu. Lyttelton, therefore, with the Corporation's encouragement and Bedford's financial support, journeyed to Okehampton to meet the members of the Corporation. The presentation of the candidate to the local electors was important enough for Bedford to pay the 200 pounds and 5.7 for this trip to Okehampton in order for Lyttelton to present himself formally to the Corporation members. Bedford had willingly assisted Lyttelton in this campaign after Pelham personally asked for his help.[34] On 21 July 1747 Lyttelton was returned with Thomas Pitt as the Members of Parliament for the constituency of Okehampton. Although Pitt was openly disappointed that his recommendation had not secured Montagu's return as the representative, Okehampton was not his pocket borough, and he should have anticipated the end result. Charles Montagu never bothered to present himself to the electors of Okehampton. His decision to drop out of the race was made in London without any consultation

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[33] HMC Fortescue I, 123.
[34] BEO, Butcher Papers. Box 1747(b).

with the Corporation's members. According to Ayscough, there had been no need for him to do so, since Pitt had personally recommended him to the Corporation's members. On the other hand, Lyttelton, with Bedford's help, put some effort into being selected by the members of the Okehampton Corporation. Bedford's involvement in Okehampton was minimal, but contributed to Pitt's personal assessment that Bedford's participation in the West Country was irritating.

Another contest where Bedford's political involvement appeared to irritate some individuals was Lichfield. Traditionally, the Lichfield electors split their support between the Gowers and the Bagots. While both families were Tories, an agreement was usually reached without the need for a poll. When Gower remained in the Pelham-Newcastle Administration after the Tory party had formally removed their support in 1745, this electoral peace was broken in Staffordshire. In addition, Lord George Anson, one of the Lords of the Admiralty Board, had recently purchased a number of freeholds and burgages in the constituency. During the 1747 general election a violent contest ensued between the government candidates supported by Anson and Gower, and the Tory nominees. Anson and Gower nominated Thomas Anson and Richard Leveson Gower to run against Sir Lister Holte and George Venables Vernon. Pelham believed Anson and Gower's candidates would win.

> Lord Anson says Gower will carry it for both, I am heartily glad of it, he owes his success almost entirely to the Whigs, who are indefatigable in his

> service. I understand the Litchfield election has been a most monstrous expences to 'em both.[35]

After spending 20,000 pounds, Gower and Anson's nominees finally won the election in a tightly fought campaign.[36] They won by a slim majority of approximately 40 votes.[37] The frustration of the county's Tories over this narrow result festered throughout the summer until the Lichfield races, held in late September. On 23 September, a group of people dressed in plaid, and some supporters of Sir Lister Holte from Birmingham, along with Sir Walter Bagot, met together in the town. They caused no real mischief other than drinking publicly to the Pretender's health, and breaking the arm of an unfortunate soldier who openly blessed the Hanoverians![38] Later that same evening at their Ball, they collected 100 pounds and 5.6 for a subscription being raised during the Lichfield races to support a challenge against the recent Staffordshire county election results. The next day, a group of these individuals drank beer at Lord Uxbridges', warmed themselves crying 'No Gower', and then departed for home in rather low spirits.[39]

Bedford's actual involvement during this electoral campaign and subsequent incidents, was minimal. Bedford sustained a personal attack during the Lichfield horse races from a member of this rowdy group. Richard Rigby, who had

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35 Devonshire MS. Pelham-Hartington, June 1747.
36 Sedgewick, House of Commons, i, 320.
37 Gower received 278, Anson 272, Holte 237 and Vernon 229.
38 Sedgewick, House of Commons, i, 320.
39 J.C. Wedgwood, Staffordshire Parliamentary History...(3 vols.), London, 1922, 252-54.

been elected at Sudbury with the judicial use of bullies and cash, came to his aid.[40] Walpole, the diarist, wrote an account of the whole incident, and as a result, Bedford's involvement achieved notoriety. A further consequence of Rigby's intervention to aid Bedford, was a lifelong friendship between the two men. In the main, however, this whole incident at Lichfield simply reinforced Gower's and Anson's determination to gain political ascendancy over their rivals in that county. To that end, they developed a rudimentary political organization whereby freemen were signed up in clubs, first time electors were interviewed and instructed, voting records were kept and money was judiciously spent.[41] Bedford was not personally involved in this organizational aspect of Staffordshire politics, but as the son-in-law of Gower, he would have been kept informed of all developments in this attempt to gain local electoral strength.

The general election of 1747 had fewer polls (62) than any contest since 1715.[42] This was an indication of the increasing tendency of parliamentarians to avoid costly election campaigns, if at all possible. In the 1747 general election, the members of the Adminsitration were not under

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[40] J. Haas, 'The Rise of the Bedfords, 1747-57...', 98. Rigby was believed to have purchased his votes to win the Sudbury election for a guinea each, and those votes which could not be bought were coerced by 'Boxers and Prize Fighters' imported from London for the occasion.

[41] Haas, 161. The fruits of these efforts were not borne until the 1760s.

[42] In 1715 there were 119 contested polls; 1722, 154; 1727, 114; 1734, 133; and in 1741, 94 contests went to a vote. In 1754 the number of contests remained at 62, but then declined to 53 in 1761, the year that George III acceded the throne.

serious attack from their opposition colleagues. Prior to the dissolution of Parliament on 17 June 1747, the Ministers had faced two divisions in the House of Commons. One concerned a motion to discuss the navy debt, and the second a motion to enquire into the quartering of army officers. Encouraged by the division numbers, the group associated with Leicester House and the Prince of Wales, approached the Tories. They outlined their promises to establish a militia, to end all party distinctions, to end the proscription of Tories as Commissioners of the Peace, and to reform all the other abuses in government perpetuated by the Pelham-Newcastle Administration.[44] This 'Carleton House Manifesto' was a deliberate attempt by the group supporting the Prince of Wales, to cooperate with the Tories in opposition. The Tories, however, were not as cohesive a group as perceived by the Prince of Wales' followers. Additionally, the Ministers had been able to provide blocks against any possible union of these two groups after the Jacobite Rebellion in 1745. During the 1747 general election, the issue of patriotism enabled Pelham and his colleagues to paint the Tory opposition with the broad Jacobite brush, borrowed from Sir Robert Walpole. The Prince of Wales' supporters were not tainted, but neither could they ally themselves with known Jacobites. Therein lay the split in the Tory party. In any event, the Carlton

[44] A. Ford, His Majesty's Opposition, 264-6. L. Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy, 247. On 22 January 1747 a motion to create a select committee to discuss the navy debt was defeated 184 to 143, and on 17 February the Prince of Wales's faction proposed a motion for a committee to enquire into the quartering of army officers which was rejected 197 to 150.

House manifesto did not significantly encourage the opposition to act cohesively in the House of Commons. This attempt to link the opposition failed.

Another flaw in the election campaign of the Prince of Wales' supporters, was their lack of criticism for the ministerial conduct during the War of Austrian Succession. Their efforts had been hindered partly by the early election call. The electoral plans of Leicester House were therefore underdeveloped. The resignation of three members from the Prince's circle of advisors also inhibited their electioneering efforts.[44] The supporters of the Prince of Wales were able to secure the return of 18 individuals to the House of Commons in 1747. Even if they had been able to cultivate the support of the independent country gentlemen in the Commons, numbering approximately 79, as well as gaining the votes of the 117 Tories with the promise of the Carlton House manifesto, they still did not have the numerical strength to wrest control from the Pelham Ministry in the House.[45] To achieve office, the Prince of Wales' followers needed the assistance of an individual from the ministerial side of the House. Pelham's great fear was that Bedford, for example, would join this opposition, and provide the King with a viable alternative to his own Ministry. At this point in time, there was no reason for Bedford to consider leaving the Administration. He was

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44 Coxe, Memoirs, i, 379.
45 Sedgewick, House of Commons, i, 57. Colley, 247 & 255. Colley gives the figures as 110 Tories, 74 Independents and 48 supporters of the Prince of Wales.

focusing his efforts on increasing government support in the Commons.

The Ministers, particularly Pelham, Newcastle, Hardwicke, Gower, and Bedford, expended a great deal of energy during the 1747 campaign to obtain favourable numbers for the ensuing parliamentary session.[46] The Administration had a clear majority of 124 supporters in the Commons, and although Pelham constantly worried about the possibility of his being displaced from office by the opposition, his Administration was reasonably secure after the 1747 general election. Pelham commented: "If our Affairs abroad succeeded as well as our Elections att home, the Publick service would be to me compleat..."[47] The Prince of Wales' chief agent, Thomas Pitt, clearly expressed the disappointment of the opposition over their results in this general election when he said "...my success has been far short of the expence of money and trouble..."[48] The Ministers, on the other hand, were well pleased with their results. Bedford, for example, basked in the glow of his success resulting from his efforts. He could point to 17 individuals in the House of Commons, after the general election, who owed him some measure of allegiance. As well, he could expect support from Gower's three supporters, and Sandwich's six friends. This core squadron of 27 Members of Parliament gave Bedford a greater level of influence within the Cabinet than he held previously. He had secured the

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46 Add. MS 32712, ff. 23-5. Newcastle-Cumberland, 3 July 1747

47 Devonshire MS. Pelham-Hartington, June 1747.

48 HMC Fortescue I, 120.

selection of the two Members of Parliament for Bedfordshire, Bedford, Tavistock, and Westminster. He had used government influence in conjunction with his own money, at Okehampton, Saltash, Bridport, Sandwich, and Weymouth/Melcombe Regis in Dorset, to return candidates supporting either the Administration, or him personally. Bedford only failed in three constituencies, all in Cornwall. At Camelford, Launceston, and Newport, Bedford's property was not great enough to remove the entrenched power of the Prince of Wales, or of the Tories.[49]

Bedford's electoral efforts continued into November, 1749. A a by-election in Westminster was called when his brother-in-law, Trentham, accepted an appointment to the Admiralty Board. This by-election was "...one of the most violent and vituperative struggles in the first half of the century..."[50] Bedford was publicly identified with Trentham in this re-election bid, and received numerous abuses in the press coverage of the campaign. The 1749 by-election was a confrontation between Trentham, the government candidate, and Sir George Vandeput, supported by the Independent Electors of Westminster. The violence of this election campaign was shocking to some contemporaries.[51] Newspaper stories recounted the "...redoubled animosity on both sides and numberless advertisements, both ludicrous and serious..." that appeared

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[49] Bedford purchased the Manaton estates at Newport and at Camelford, and used them as a base to launch his attacks on the influence of Thomas Pitt and the Morice family.
[50] Rogers, 'Aristocratic Clientage...', 77.
[51] Earl of Malmesbury, ed., A Series of Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury...(2 vols.), London, 1870, i, 75-6.

daily in the press.[52] Trentham and Robert Butcher, Bedford's chief steward, attempted to manage the election in the same manner pursued by John Becuda in 1747. Their local poll managers, particularly in the St. Margaret's and St. John's vestries, were, however, less amenable to Bedford's wishes this time round. On 1 December in the midst of the poll, Butcher was forced to pay for local housekeepers to open their public houses in order to influence some voters from the surrounding vestries. The Sun Tavern was paid, on behalf of Bedford, for their alcohol expenses of 3 pounds and 7 shillings on the day by Butcher.[53] More problems for Bedford in the management of the voters were created. The Independents' organizers stole Trentham's voters as they journeyed between the public houses and Butcher's office in Covent Garden.[54] Loyalty was easily swayed by all appearances. Bedford personally complained to Newcastle about this illegal tactic of the Independents, and he accused them of bringing in people to vote who had no right since they did not live in the constituency.[55] No mention was made of Bedford's earlier activities in 1747 of transporting voters from regions outside of constituencies. Even before the last poll closed at Westminster in 1749, a public scrutiny of all activities was guaranteed. The squabbles between the two candidates and their supporters continued throughout early 1750. Trentham was finally declared the winner by 170 votes in May 1750.

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52 London Magazine, 1749, 574-75, 8 December 1749.
53 BEO, Butcher Papers. 1749(c). Sun Tavern Bill
54 BEO, Butcher Papers. 1749(c). Proceedings...at the Westminster Election, December 1749.
55 Add. MS 35590, f. 442. Bedford-Newcastle, 4 December 1749.

The national and provincial press reported regularly on the proceedings of this by-election, and on the subsequent scrutiny until Trentham was declared the winner. The Independent, Sir George Vandeput, had demanded an election scrutiny immediately after the declaration of the ballot. Peter Leigh, the High Bailiff for Westminster, began this arduous task on 25 December 1749. Newspapers, advertisements and pamphlets were regularly published throughout the period of the scrutiny, until Leigh finally presented the results of his investigation to the House of Commons in May 1750. The Covent Garden Journal, for example, was published once every month throughout the period of Leigh's investigation. There were also pamphlets produced like the The Dying Groans and Last Farewell to the World of the H[igh] B[ailiff] of the City of Westminster, and The First Chapter of Tear'em, the son of Gore'am. The Independents used these pamphlets to seek support in their fight against Trentham's re-election to the House of Commons.[56] Contemporaries were well aware of these scurrilous tactics. The Countess of Shaftesbury, for example, noted that

> Sure there never was any election carried on with so much violence on both sides; the scandal and dirt flung upon Lord Gower's family, and the Duke of Bedford's, is shocking, and enough to terrify anybody, and make them have some regard, great as they are, how they exasperate an English mob.[57]

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[56] See A.T. Hazen and W.S. Lewis, eds., Catalogue of Horace Walpole's Library, (3 vols.), London, 1969, for a list of pamphlets Walpole collected on this Westminster by-election.
[57] Malmesbury, Letters, i, 75-6.

Trentham and Bedford were vehemently attacked in the printed broadsides for their electoral bullying and corrupt tactics in this by-election. At the end of January 1750, the Northampton Mercury reported to its readers that:

> 'Tis said the Country Gentlemen of Several Counties of England, after the Example of Westminster, have come to a Resolution of Opening a Small Annual Subscription the better to defray the charges of Elections against any corrupt Min_____l influence.[58]

This by-election at Westminster in 1749, indicated that Bedford was unworried about criticisms of his electoral activities. He appeared unconcerned about any negative opinions that his actions provoked during the 1747 general election, or during subsequent by-elections.

The by-election at Westminster was in marked contrast to the tone of the election at the same constituency in 1747. What had changed since the 1747 general election? In 1747, Trentham received 2873 votes, Warren 2858, Clarges 544 and Dyke 514. In 1749, Trentham after the scrutiny had 4103 to Vandeput's 3933 votes. In less than two years, the opposition had apparently recouped its political appeal to the electors of Westminster. The Jacobite connection was no longer an effective tag to hang on the opponents of the Administration four years after the rebellion. Yet, the money and organization, Trentham and Bedford poured into the 1749 by-election greatly exceeded their 1747 campaign. Despite all their efforts, the opposition was able to campaign vigorously and encouraged electors to vote against

58 Northampton Mercury, xxx, xliv, 29 January 1749/50.

the government candidate. The defection of Trentham's father, Gower, from the Tories to the Administration contributed a small amount to the swing of public opinion against Trentham, although that issue was from the same period as the '45. The peace signed to end of the War of Austrian Succession may have played a minor role, as it had not been a great British victory. The fact that Trentham did not observe the custom of presenting himself to the inhabitants of Westminster before announcing his renomination was more likely a factor working against his campaign. Since the 1747 victory had been so large, an initial complacency by Trentham about the by-election campaign was possibly understandable. The vehemence of the opposition campaign was therefore unexpected. Bedford, for example, initially attempted to minimize his financial investment in this by-election by simply ordering his tenants to vote for Trentham, rather than attempting to bribe their favour. This was a major miscalculation on his part, particularly in a historically independent constituency. Although he subsequently paid out for their votes, this initial ill-will created a large obstacle in the way of Trentham's success. Initial complacency also gave the Independents the opportunity to recruit support early on in the campaign, thereby gaining the momentum to make the race a close one.

Two issues contributed to the vehemence of the campaign in 1749. The Independents were able to use these issues in their campaign's favour. The first issue concerned the

intervention by Trentham on behalf of a group of French strollers acting in London. Trentham's defence of this theatre group antagonized two groups: those who had difficulty in accepting that France was now Britain's friend and no longer the enemy; and those individuals who were unhappy that Sir Robert Walpole's playhouse regulations were not applicable to visiting theatrical companies.[59] The second issue concerned the Penlez riot. In this incident a sailor, Penlez, was implicated with six others in an attack on a bawdy house, and condemned to hang. He pleaded his innocence, and won over general sympathy from the inhabitants of Westminster. Trentham and Bedford, despite increasing clamour, refused to intervene in this matter.[60] The Independents were able to manipulate these two issues for their own benefit during the by-election.

With hindsight, however, the by-election of 1749 illustrated the 'normal' pattern of elections in Westminster. The contests in 1722 and 1741 had also been tumultuous, and elicited a wide public participation level. In 1722, the four candidates received 4024, 3853, 2215 and 2197 votes respectively. In a by-election later the same year after that contest had been declared void, the voting figures were 4835, 4515, 3485 and 2827. In 1741, the votes tallied up as 3686, 3533, 3290 and 3161. In the final count after the scrutiny in 1750, the figures for Trentham and Vandeput were 4103 and 3933. In contrast to these figures,

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59 Sedgewick, House of Commons, i, 287.
60 See Rogers, 'Aristocratic Clientage...' for a fuller discussion of these issues involved in the 1749 by-election at Westminster.

in 1747, Trentham had obtained 2873 votes, Warren 2858, Clarges 544 and Dyke 514. The electoral participation rate in the 1747 general election was nearly half the usual rate of participation in Westminster. Pelham's decision to bring the general election forward one year because the opposition would be unprepared, and consequently unable to rally their supporters, was possibly vindicated by the results in the Westminster election. On the other hand, the Ministry's supporters did not participate fully in the 1749 by-election either. Bedford's activities at Westminster in 1747 were helped by Pelham and Newcastle's ability to associate the Independent Electors of Westminster with the Jacobite rebels of the Forty-Five. This was no longer a viable ploy by 1749, when the numbers of electors who turned out to vote increased. The twin issues of patriotism and loyalty to the Hanoverian Succession did not elicit as much interest amongst the electors of Westminster as the issues of French Strollers and the Penlez affair. The 1747 general election in Westminster was therefore 'abnormal', while the 1749 by-election saw a return to a 'normal' election state. Bedford, buoyed by his success in 1747, was taken by surprise with the tumultuous state of the campaign during the 1749 by-election.

Bedford's overall success in 1747 likely contributed to his mistaken belief that the same formula of bribing and bullying would provide similar results in 1749. Unfortunately for Bedford, his personal reputation grew more negative as he pursued his aims. This negative reputation

increased again during the Launceston by-election, called for 23 January 1750. Bedford supported Captain George Brydges Rodney, a personal friend and a candidate from outside that constituency, against the Cornwall-born nominee, Humphrey Morice, nominated by the members of the Corporation. Humphrey, the son of Sir William Morice, the incumbent, was nominated to replace to replace his deceased father. Sir William Morice and Bedford had been arguing since 1744 over their respective hunting rights on land near Werrington. Sir Morice had also consistently supported the Tory party in the Commons, and was therefore against the Pelham Administration. Bedford decided the time was ripe for flexing his political muscle at Launceston. His campaign failed for two reasons. First, Humphrey Morice eliminated any potential Whig opposition within the constituency to his nomination. He agreed publicly to support the Pelham Administration. Secondly, Captain Rodney failed to reach Launceston before the polling date due to the poor road conditions. He never went out of his way to introduce or promote himself with the electors at Launceston. The experience of Thomas Pitt at Okehampton went unnoticed by Bedford. This incident contributed to Bedford's unflattering public image amongst his contemporaries, particularly the independent country gentlemen. One contemporary recorded that "[t]his bustling little Duke has just had another miscarriage in Cornwall where he attacked a family borough of the Morices."[61] Family boroughs were generally respected by Bedford's

[61] Walpole Correspondence, xx, 111-14.

contemporaries, and his actions during this by-election once again illustrated his aggressive electioneering tactics.

Bedford aggressively sought electoral success because he recognized the link between local influence and national power. He appeared to understand that without the numerical support in the House of Commons his influence with Pelham, or with any other leading member of the Administration, would be signficantly less. He knew that his office in the Ministry would be reassigned to someone able to support the government's policies in divisions on the floor of the House of Commons, and less importantly, in the Lords. Bedford's personal alliance with Gower and Sandwich was not enough for Pelham to take account of his policy proposals. Members of Parliament, who were identified with Bedford, needed to support the Pelham Administration with votes in the Commons. Bedford had been made First Lord of the Admiralty upon the insistence of his friends and the Tories in 1745. Once the Tories left the Pelham Ministry, Bedford remained in his office because of his political connections and because of his hard work at the Admiralty. His diligence in building up his own power base - the 'Bloomsbury Gang' - in the Commons, and his political links with the 'Country' Whigs, helped him to retain his position. Bedford's successful efforts at cultivating political connections contributed a small amount to Newcastle's increasingly jealous behaviour. Bedford's relationship with the duke of Cumberland and the Princess Amelia were part and parcel of his attempt to increase his political standing. Newcastle, angered over

the events surrounding the peace negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle, and at Bedford's perceived switch of allegiance to Pelham, decided to force Bedford out of the Ministry.[62] Provoking a confrontation with Bedford over national policy was not a possibility he could openly pursue as a leading member of the same Ministry. The danger to the stability of the Administration was too great for a cautious individual like his brother, Pelham, to countenance. Pelham continued to demand Bedford's inclusion in the Administration, and to keep Bedford interested in remaining in office, he supported his efforts to increase Britain's mercantile interests overseas. Newcastle was left with only one possible opportunity to vent his frustration with Bedford. He could oppose Bedford's proposal for an insignificant local turnpike bill.

The Bedford turnpike bill captured the attention of the majority of Members of Parliament, if not exactly of the whole nation. A division of 362 MPs was significant in the House of Commons in the eighteenth century even during February, the peak of the London social season.[63] The House only seated 300 in comfort. Unless there was a national crisis or some controversial issue, attendance rarely exceeded that number throughout the mid-eighteenth century period.[64] A division on a proposed turnpike bill

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[62] See Chapter 5.

[63] The Convention of Pardo in 1739 brought 500 MPs into the Chamber to vote while the 1744 vote on Hanoverian troops brought in 487 MPs. These were controversial issues of wide public interest, and the conflicting opinion regarding these matters was believed to have the potential to bring down the Administration.

[64] P.D.G. Thomas, The House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century, Oxford, 1971, 127.

in the Commons was also unusual. From 1665 to 1750 only five bills, or petitions for bills, were defeated in division in the House.[65] Three bills for turnpikes met defeat in the 1690s, one request for a renewal of a turnpike trust was denied by MPs in 1726, and the turnpike proposal supported by Bedford was tossed out of the Commons twenty-four years later on 13 January 1750. Although in the late seventeenth, and early eighteenth century, there had been some parliamentary opposition to turnpike legislation, by 1750, recorded divisions in the Commons on turnpike proposals were few. A bill generally passed if it reached third stage in the legislation process. Problems over the proposal or the wording of the actual bill were resolved in Committee. If opposition to the proposed legislation was quite strong, the measure was referred until the session had been prorogued. In essence, this meant the defeat of it. A contentious proposal rarely made it to third reading in the House of Commons if there had been strong opposition voiced in committee. The proposed turnpike from Westwood Gate to Market Harborough sponsored by Bedford was an exception to this convention.

In January 1750, Bedford and his chief steward, Robert Butcher, lobbied Members of Parliament for their vote in favour of the turnpike legislation Bedford had agreed to steer through the House of Commons at the request of the inhabitants of Kettering.[66] Kettering was in

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[65] E. Pawson, Transport and Economy: The Turnpike Roads of 18th Century Britain, London, 1977, 117.
[66] BEO, Butcher Papers. Brooke-Butcher, 7 January 1749/50.

Northamptonshire, and part of the turnpike passed through Bedfordshire. Coulson Fellowes, MP for Huntingdonshire, immediately agreed, in writing, to support the proposal, as did William Mellish, MP for East Retford, Henry Bankes, MP for Corfe Castle, and Alexander Brodie, MP for Nairnshire.[67] Sandwich advised Butcher in January 1750 that he had engaged Sir James Lowther, Mr. Barber, Mr. Surman, Charles Knowles and Sir Edward Hawke in support of the turnpike proposal. He also hoped that James Abercromby would favour the motion.[68] Theobald Taaffe told Butcher that the Prince of Wales' faction, and the Tories, were strongly against the proposed legislation. He also noted that Henry Fox was strongly in favour, and that the Cavendish family were still deciding who to support in consequence of the petition supporting the turnpike from Derby. Taaffe suggested that Sandwich, Richard Leveson-Gower, and Sir Peter Warren attend the House of Commons early on Monday so that the four of them could act as a 'flying squadron' to cultivate more support amongst the MPs for the bill.[69] On 29 January, Bedford and his colleagues, were just barely successful in their lobbying efforts as the second reading of the Westwood Gate to Market Harborough turnpike bill passed 197 to 186. The closeness of the division indicated there were likely problems from some quarter with the proposal.

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[67] BEO, Butcher Papers. Fellowes-Butcher, 21 January 1749/50. Mellish-Butcher, 26 January 1749/50. Bankes-Butcher, 27 January 1749/50. Taafe-Butcher, 27 January 1749/50. Brodie-Butcher, 28 January 1749/50.

[68] BEO, Butcher Papers. Sandwich-Butcher, 28 January 1749/50. BCRO, Calendar of Butcher Correspondence, 193.

[69] BCRO, Calendar of Butcher Correspondence, 184.

The news of the division numbers was immediately relayed to Bedford and Butcher. They were advised to arrange for an experienced person to provide the cost estimates for the road repair work to the Committee considering the legislation. Meanwhile Thomas Gore, the chairman of the Committee that considered the proposal, sent Bedford a list of MPs whom he would "...apprize of every step taken throughout the whole course of the Bill..."[70] Requests for support were sent to the Scottish MPs at the British Coffeehouse, a step alienating rather than winning their approval for Bedford's proposal. Mr Owen Brerton noted that Bedford's methods offended the Scottish MPs because it insinuated that "...they were vagabonds and had no certain habitations."[71] A similar approach later offended the Scottish Lords.[72] The Scottish peers were insulted when Bedford

> ...in case it [the turnpike bill] should have come into the Lords, had writ to the 16 peers [of Scotland] to solicit their votes; but with so little deference, that he enclosed all the letters under one cover, directed to the British Coffeehouse![73]

Argyll, a friend of Newcastle, considered himself the Lord Lieutenant of Scotland. He resented these affronts to his political influence in that region. He subsequently encouraged the Scottish MPs and peers to vote against Bedford's proposed bill. Bedford was aware of Argyll's tactics, when Richard Lyttelton advised him on 5 February,

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70 BEO, Butcher Papers. Harper-Butcher, 30 January 1749/50.
71 A.L. Cust, Chronicles of Erthig, i, 306-7.
72 Cust, i, 306-7.
73 Walpole Correspondence, xx, 124.

> I take the liberty to Trouble you with the enclosed note which I received in answer to one I wrote to G. Grenville to desire him to endeavour to get Sir Hugh Dalrymple to vote with us, that your Grace may see the part the Duke of Argyll takes upon this occasion.[74]

Bedford continued to court assistance, however, and wrote to the Bishop of Winchester, Lord Exeter, and the Earl of Albemarle requesting their support when the proposed bill moved to the House of Lords.[75] Bedford believed that this legislation would pass third reading despite the strong opposition showing at second reading. He thought the main attack would come in the House of Lords. The three main figures openly opposing the motion were peers. On 3 February 1750, Sir Charles Hanbury Williams was advised that "The Duke of Bedford is very warm about...a turnpike road...and Lord Northampton and Lord Halifax strongly oppose him..."[76] Although Bedford had personally persuaded Halifax to join the Pelham-Newcastle Ministry as President of the Board of Trade, their friendship did not extend to their regional areas of influence. Lord Northampton's opposition was less surprising since he was a Tory, and that his interests were intertwined with the fortunes of Northampton and the existing turnpike through that town. A third peer who openly opposed the turnpike proposal, Lord Rockingham, wanted the road to go through Higham Ferrers, where he owned some property. The strength of his opposition was minimal and specific. The inhabitants of Kettering had written to Lord Rockingham requesting his

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74 Bedford MS xxv. Lyttelton-Bedford, 5 February 1749/50.
75 Bedford MS xxv. Winchester-Bedford, 1 February 1749/50.
76 Cited in Walpole Correspondence, xx, 112.

support prior to submitting their petition to Parliament. They received no response until Rockingham offered 1000 pounds for road repairs if the Higham Bridge was used rather than the Ditchford Bridge. The residents of Kettering rejected this offer. They advised Butcher, Bedford's steward, that "...if the Road was to go thro' Higham Ferrers...it will not be then the nearest, cheapest and easiest road to be repaired into the north of England..."[77] Bedford appeared to assume that the opposition from these peers would wait until the bill was sent up to the House of Lords.

Bedford's assumption after 29 January that the motion would pass its third reading was perhaps based on his knowledge of the 1748 Buckingham assizes dispute. After an arduous journey through the Commons, the proposed bill to move the summer assizes from Aylesbury to Buckingham was sent to the House of Lords, where it was amended, and duly passed into law.[78] Bedford may have believed that the next round of the fight over this turnpike legislation would be held in the House of Lords.

Bedford's belief that the turnpike proposal would ultimately pass third reading in the House of Commons was based on the Administration's performance in Parliament during the session that commenced on 16 November 1749. Up to, and including, the division on the 13th of February, there were eight questions recording divisions in the

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77 BEO, Butcher Papers. Brooke-Butcher, 7 January 1749/50.
78 Commons Journal, xxv, 512-620.

House.[79] Those divisions, generally proposed by members of the opposition, consistently favoured the government. For example, a bill for limiting army service was defeated 99 to 192 on 17 January 1750. A motion for an address to the King about the port and harbour at Dunkirk was defeated 115 to 242 on 5 February 1750. The second reading of Bedford's turnpike legislation attracted 383 MPs to the House, and its third reading drew 362. In contrast, the motion for an address to the King on the port and harbour at Dunkirk enticed 357 MPs to vote, and a proposed amendment to a bill for punishing mutiny and desertions drew 287 members to the House. The eight other divisions suggested that the general trend of attendance in the House during this period was for less than 300 MPs. The four other divisions drew in 291, 250, 214, and 278 MPs to cast their vote. Although Bedford's proposed turnpike bill was not government sponsored legislation, Bedford likely thought his influence as a leading member of the Administration would help carry this piece of private legislation through its three stages. Even so, once the division at second reading on 29 January passed by only 11 votes, Bedford should have noted the warning signs. Third reading was the last opportunity for opponents of the proposal to register their disapproval.

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[79] Commons Journal, xxv. Bill for limiting army service (99-192), 17 January 1750. Bill for committing Bedford's Turnpike Bill (197-186), 29 January 1750. Bill for punishing mutiny and desertions (89-161), 29 January 1750. Address to the King on Master General of Ordnance Commission (63-151), 1 February 1750. Address to King on port and harbour at Dunkirk (115-242), 5 February 1750. Call of the House (176-102), 5 February 1750. Amendment to Bill for punishing mutiny and desertions (109-178), 7 February 1750. Bedford's Turnpike Bill, third reading (154-208), 13 February 1750. There were no other divisions on 13 February 1750.

Bedford should have known that this slim margin of victory on 29 January 1750 would encourage them to redouble their efforts. Unfortunately for Bedford, Butcher fell ill in early February, and Sandwich assumed his role as chief lobbyist in this matter. Butcher, although not a Member of Parliament, was better skilled in this practice than Sandwich. Even though the lobbying was made easier by the unusually warm weather that brought more MPs to London than normal, Sandwich failed. Sixty-five percent of the Members of Parliament attended the House on 13 February 1750. Sandwich, however, was unable to rally the necessary support from amongst these MPs for the bill to avoid defeat by 154 to 208 votes in the House.

A list of the Members of Parliament who voted in favour of the bill was compiled by Bedford.[80] The 154 names he noted comprised 29 percent of the 558 MPs eligible to vote on the measure. He did not note the names of the 208 (37%) MPs who voted against the bill, nor did he give any indication of the 196 (35%) who were absent. In effect, if an abstention is, in essence, a negative vote, 72 percent of MPs were not in favour of this turnpike proposal. Bedford had encouraged his eligible friends and supporters to attend the House to vote in favour of the proposal. Bedford, unfortunately, was unaware of the true size, or the actual leaders, of the opposition to his private legislation.

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[80] See Table A. BEO, Box marked 'Letters' 1749-50. This partial division list is not mentioned in M. Ransome, 'Division Lists of the House of Commons, 1715-60', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xix(1941), 1-8, nor in A.N. Newman, 'Division Lists of the House of Commons, 1715-60', BIHR, xxx(1957), 101-2.

Who supported the proposal? Of those members listed, 85 (55%) were considered Court Supporters like John Arscott, MP for Ashburton, and Alexander Brodie, MP for Nairnshire. These were men who rarely voted against any legislation proposed by any Administration. The second largest category of MPs on Bedford's list were the Pelham and Newcastle coterie. This group numbered 26 (17%), and included MPs like Andrew Stone, MP for Hastings, and personal secretary to Newcastle, and Sir William Calvert, MP for London and a follower of Pelham. Bedford's supporters accounted for 18 (12%) of the names listed. These individuals included Thomas Brand, MP for Tavistock, and Robert Nugent, MP for St. Mawes. Thirteen MPs (8%) belonged to the Leicester House group who included Edward Eliot, MP for St. Germans, and Ridgeway Pitt, third earl of Londonderry, MP for Camelford. Another group included the friends of Gower who had remained in the Administration after the departure of the Tories. Robert Barbour, MP for Stamford, and Henry Bankes, MP for Corfe Castle, were two of 'Gower's Creatures' recorded on Bedford's list. The 'Cobham Cubs' mustered three friends to vote on the bill, and the duke of Cumberland raised two votes for his friend Bedford's proposal.[82] The 'Cobham Cubs' may have supported Bedford in this instance, to reciprocate for his assistance in their proposal for the Buckingham summer assizes. In February and March 1748, a petition requesting the restoration of the summer assizes to Buckingham from Aylesbury began a

[82] Commons Journal, xxv, 512-620.

difficult passage through the House, and recorded four divisions prior to passing 155 to 108 on 15 March 1748. In the House of Lords, the bill was amended and passed 131 to 98, on 6 April 1748. Thomas Gore, MP for Bedford, chaired the House of Commons' committee, and several of Bedford's followers acted as tellers for the yeas during the divisions in the Commons.[83] The 'Cobham Cubs' inclusion on the list of names supporting the turnpike legislation may be a result of this episode. Only one Tory, Henry Pye, MP for Berkshire, voted in favour of the bill, and was named as one of the Trustees of the proposed turnpike.

Despite the fact that the two largest groups voting in favour of the bill were the Court supporters and the Pelham-Newcastle group, an analysis of the large number of the names not recorded by Bedford indicated the Court and the Pelham/Newcastle followers were not supporting this turnpike proposal. A survey of the Cinque Ports indicated that of a possible 16 MPs, 13 of whom were dependent on the government, only five (31%), Lord George Sackville, MP for Dover, Andrew Stone, MP for Hastings, John Clevland, MP for Sandwich, John Mordaunt, and Thomas Orby Hunter, MPs for Winchelsea, voted in favour of the proposed turnpike. Those MPs from the Cinque Ports who voted against the bill or did not vote at all included James Pelham, MP for Hastings, a cousin of Pelham and Newcastle, and Secretary to the Lord Chamberlain as well as Deputy Cofferer of the Household, and William Hay, MP for Seaford, a relative by marriage and

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83 Commons Journal, xxv, 512-620.

follower of Newcastle. Another region where the government retained a number of seats for their supporters was Cornwall. Of the 44 MPs from this area, 25 were government supporters. Of these 25 MPs, only seven were recorded on Bedford's list. The Prince of Wales had 13 supporters from Cornwall of whom six voted in favour. There were also five Tory MPs and one opposition Whig from Cornwall, who did not support the proposal. The seven Administration followers who voted 'yea' included: George Edgcumbe, MP for Fowey, Francis Gashry, MP for East Looe, James Edward Colleton, MP for Lostwithiel, Thomas Clark, MP for Mitchell, and Thomas Corbett and Stamp Brooksbank, MPs for Saltash. The MPs from Saltash were admittedly close to Bedford, and would have voted as he suggested. Examples of the 18 government adherents who did not vote in favour included: Humphrey Morice, MP for Launceston, Richard Edgcumbe, MP for Lostwithiel, a Pelham supporter, Nicholas Herbert, MP for Newport, a Courtier and Morice's brother-in-law, George Boscawen, MP for Penryn and aide-de-campe to George II, and Claudius Amyand, MP for Tregony and a Newcastle follower. Out of a possible 44 votes from Cornwall, only 13 (30%) voted in favour of the Bedford turnpike bill. This level of interest in a private bill not directly concerning Cornwall was not surprising. The fact that in Cornwall 46 percent of the followers of the Prince of Wales voted in favour of Bedford's proposal, while only 28 percent of the Administration's supporters did, was more surprising. The Prince of Wales was openly against the proposed turnpike legislation, while Pelham and Newcastle were not advocating

any open opposition. The proposal for a turnpike from Market Harborough in Leicestershire to Westwood Gate in Bedfordshire, did not directly concern the representatives in Cornwall and the Cinque Ports, although the benefits to the wool trade in central England could possibly be seen as increasing the competition for wool merchants of Cornwall. The main point seemed to be that this turnpike proposal was not identified as a government measure requiring MPs reliant upon the Ministry, to support its passage through the House.

Where did the proposal receive its support? A quick geographical survey indicated that the regions of Leicestershire, Cheshire, Warwickshire, Northumberland and Durham, did not supply one yes vote on Bedford's recorded division list. Only Huntingdonshire and Bedfordshire MPs voted wholeheartedly for the motion, while 50 to 60 percent of Staffordshire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland, and Hertfordshire representatives voted in favour of the proposal. Hampshire with only 46 percent of their MPs supporting the bill, yielded 12 actual votes, while Cornwall supplied 13, Devonshire 10, Yorkshire 10, and Scotland 12 'yes' votes. This uneven distribution of MPs who Bedford recorded as supporters, made any analysis of the numbers difficult. Generally, however, the percentages indicated that the area to the east of Northamptonshire (Huntingdonshire, Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, and Cambridgeshire), an area that would benefit from the proposed turnpike and an area where Bedford owned property and held some influence, was in favour of the proposal. To

the west of Northamptonshire, the counties of Leicestershire, Derbyshire, and Warwickshire would also benefit by the proposed turnpike. Yet they had access to an alternative route, and the MPs were not in favour of the motion. These MPs may have opposed the turnpike legislation, and through their arguments in the House, persuaded their colleagues to defeat the bill. In order to add weight to their arguments however, petitions against the proposal from the region concerned would have been solicited. A study of the 16 petitions received in Parliament regarding this turnpike proposal indicated that the local inhabitants of the regions affected by the proposal were, for the most part, in favour of this measure.

Eleven petitions in favour of the turnpike were received from the counties of Bedford, Northampton, Nottingham, and Derby, and from the towns of Kettering, Sheffield, and Rotherham, Yorkshire, Chesterfield and Derby, Leicester and Market Harborough, Mansfield, Nottinghamshire, and Luton, Bedfordshire. The initial petition from the counties of Bedford and Northampton requested the turnpike because the existing road between Market Harborough and Westwood Gate was impassable, and could not be repaired adequately by the parish and repair system then in effect. The second petition in favour of the proposed legislation on 25 January came from the town of Kettering, Northamptonshire, and stated their preference for a new turnpike rather than repair of the old route because it was too expensive for them to repair and carry out their wool

trade profitably.[83] Generally, the petitions in favour of the turnpike proposal stressed the advantages to local trade if this bill was passed. Five petitions against the proposal were received by Parliament from the Borough of Derby, the towns of Northampton, Dunstable in Bedfordshire, Newport-Pagnell in Buckinghamshire, and one from the Rev. Stephen Langham of Cottesbrooke, who had lent money to the Trustees of the existing turnpike through Northampton. These petitions against the turnpike stressed the possible loss of profits from the tolls on the Northampton turnpike. All the petitions against the Bedford turnpike proposal recognized that the existing Northampton turnpike required major improvements. It might have been possible to mute the opposition to the new turnpike by improving the old route, but worry about the loss of trade would have remained, and the cost was quite high.

The counties of Bedfordshire, Northamptonshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, and West Yorkshire formed an interior corridor in an area better served by good land transport than by river.[84] Roads provided the necessary links to London markets, and were generally encouraged by Members of Parliament. The total number of MPs from this region was 73. Twenty-four (33%) voted in favour of the turnpike, and 49 (67%) did not vote or voted against the measure. This percentage of 33 percent voting in favour is slightly higher than the national average of 28 percent. This regional support did not

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83 Commons Journal, xxv, 948-9.
84 Pawson, 187.

reflect the percentage of petitions (69%) in favour of the turnpike from the region. In fact, the inverse was true, 67 percent of MPs voted no or abstained from the vote while 69 percent of petitions were in favour of the proposal. For example, the town of York sent two petitons in favour of the turnpike proposal and no petitions against it, yet only 33 percent of Yorkshire MPs voted in favour of the bill. The town and county of Derby sent a petition in favour, as did the town of Chesterfield. Only the borough of Derby petitioned against the measure. While one-third of the petitions favoured the proposed turnpike, not one of their four representatives in Parliament voted in favour at the third reading of the bill.[85] These MPs did not represent pocket boroughs. If the opposition to the turnpike proposal was coordinated by the Members of Parliament from these areas because there was strong local opposition to the proposed bill, they would easily have been able to provide more than five petitions against the motion to the House of Commons. If they hoped to persuade other MPs that their region vehemently opposed the motion, they would have numerically matched the supporting petitions.

Superficially, then, the fact that these Members of Parliament did not vote in favour of the motion, would suggest that this proposal was opposed locally. An argument in support of this contention would propose that the 17 MPs for the three counties concerned were unable to hammer out

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85 William Cavendish, Marquis of Hartington (Court Supporters), Sir Nathanial Curzon (Tory), William Ponsonby, Viscount Duncannon (a Lord of the Admiralty) and Thomas Rivett (Court Supporters).

their disagreements with Bedford about the proposed turnpike. The result of this disagreement in the committee was seen in the percentage of the committee members who voted yes at third reading. The first committee, formed 18 December, to consider the initial petition and to report their findings to Parliament had 60 named members. Twenty-two (37%) of these individuals voted yes at the third reading. The second committee formed on 29 January to draft the actual bill had 135 named members of whom 60 (44%) voted in favour on 13 February. Bedford decided at this stage to push the legislation through the Commons despite the open conflict in the committee. The Leicestershire and Northamptonshire MPs were able to secure more votes against the legislation by accusing Bedford, a leading member of the Administration not sitting in the House of Commons, of using the bully tactics he had perfected during the general election on the honourable Members of the House. Convinced of the need to oppose Bedford, 208 MPs journeyed to the House on 13 February to register their opposition to the bully by defeating his private legislation.

The ability of these Leicestershire and Northamptonshire MPs to recruit such sizeable political support in the House of Commons on their own must seriously be questioned. No doubt they were able to capitalize on Bedford's personal reputation as a bully, but the number of Members who showed up suggest that other reasons were necesary factors in drawing that number of MPs into the Chamber. The Tories, for example, were strongly against the

motion. Edward Smith, MP for Leicestershire, was a Tory "...who does not love attendance..."[86] Wrightson Mundy, MP for Leicestershire, was a Tory with old Jacobite connections. James Wigley, MP for Leicester was "...a good natured Tory who does not love attendance..."[87] George Wrighte, MP for Leicester since 1727 was also a known Tory. The MPs from Northamptonshire were weakly identified with the Tory party, Valentine Knightley and Sir Edmund Isham of Northamptonshire were the only identifiable Tories. Edward Wortley Montagu, MP for Peterborough was an independent Whig, and George Compton, MP for Northampton, was returned by his brother the fifth earl of Northampton, and also connected with the Opposition Whigs. John Hill, MP for Higham Ferrers, supported Lord Rockingham. George Montagu, MP for Northampton, was a Court Supporter, returned on Lord Halifax's interest, and Matthew Lamb, MP for Peterborough, was legal counsel for the Board of Trade from 1746. The political affiliations of these 11 MPs, divided into six Tories, three Opposition Whigs and two Court Supporters. The Tories would oppose Bedford simply because he was an Administration Whig. They would also remember Bedford's concerted effort to attack the Tory influence in Bedfordshire during the general election and afterwards during the election of Mayor and Councillors for Bedford in 1747. But even if six Tory MPs were able to persuade a large segment of their 110 Tory colleagues not to vote on this private legislation, a possibility considering that only one of the Members of Parliament solidly classified as

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86 Sedgewick, House of Commons, ii, 427.
87 Sedgewick, House of Commons, ii, 538.

a Tory voted yes, a further 80 votes had to be found from elsewhere to reach 208. The probability of George Montagu or Matthew Lamb or any of their colleagues whipping in a further 80 votes is as remote as the possibility that the opposition to the bill in Leicestershire and Northamptonshire could deliver 208 votes without reference to issues of a wider national concern. The differences between members of the opposition had not yet been patched over, and it was unlikely they would act in a concerted effort over this legislation. Thirteen of the Prince of Wales supporters voted 'yea' on this motion even though the Prince openly opposed the proposal. Therefore a concerted opposition to the proposal mounted by the MPs from the region directly affected, appears unlikely to have been the sole source of defeat for Bedford's turnpike bill.

Additionally, any local opposition to the turnpike was not reported in the provincial press. Surely if this proposal was hotly debated locally, there would have been indications of the criticism of Bedford's proposal in the local press. The national press could have used Bedford's activities to supplement the negative comments against his involvement during the Westminster by-election, and subsequent scrutiny. The Northampton Mercury ignored the turnpike issue until 22 January 1750 when it simply informed its readers that a bill was brought in to the Commons for repairing the road from Westwood Gate to Market Harborough.[88] On 12 February an advertisement from T.

[88] Northampton Mercury, xxx, xlii, 22 January 1749/50.

Yeoman and W. Butlin, informed the public that the road between St. Albans through Luton and Kettering to Market Harborough was 2 miles, 24 furloughs and 24 poles longer than the road from St. Albans through Dunstable and Northampton.[89] Any effect this information had on the vote in the Commons was minimal since the reports were published only the day before the vote. A final story appeared in the Northampton Mercury on Monday, 19 February.

> Last Wednesday evening we received the agreeable News, that the Bill for repairing the highways from Brampton Bridge to Welford Bridge in this County, and the Great Post Road from Mortar Pit Hill to Chain Bridge, leading into Market Harborough, in the County of Leicester, and for repairing the roads from Mortar Pit Hill and Brampton Bridge to this Town, had on Tuesday passed the Hon. House of Commons, by a majority of 54, in Opposition to a Bill, then depending for repairing the Roads from Market Harborough through Kettering etc., to St. Albans, which was thrown out: On which occasion the Bells at all our Churches were rung, Fireworks play'd off, and many companies of Tradesmen met to drink to the Healths of those Noblemen and Gentlemen who interested themselves in this affair.[90]

The misinformation reported in this story indicated the probability that the local inhabitants of Northampton did not understand the true nature of the arguments in the debate about this proposal. The Westwood Gate to Market Harborough turnpike was defeated, but the decision to repair the other road was not consequently passed. Whether the subsequent celebrations were in anticipation of the possibility of their own improved road and the potential influx of capital and trade, or whether they were solely to celebrate the defeat of the Bedford turnpike bill should be

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89 Northampton Mercury, xxx, xliv, 12 February 1749/50.
90 Northampton Mercury, xxx, xlvii, 19 February 1749/50.

carefully considered. The London papers, such as the Whitehall Evening Post, only noted that the bill was thrown out on a day when there was a large sitting of Members in the House.[91] No other information about the proposal or the vehement opposition to it in the Commons was reported. Other than one pamphlet distributed by the Indepdendent Electors of Westminster during the Westminster by-election scrutiny, national coverage of this issue was minimal. The British public were widely not informed of the turnpike proposal via the newspapers, yet Bedford's colleagues in Parliament were keenly interested in the motion. Large numbers of them turned out to vote.

On 13 February 1750 the earl of Shaftesbury wrote to James Harris, MP for Ashburton.

> It is shocking to see how coldly things the most beneficial to the public are treated, when unconnected with what is called political views; nay sordid, pitiful, sneaking, dirty, lucrative considerations weigh excessively. However, as the grand affair of the nation (I don't mean the National Debt or such a trifling matter), the Bedford Turnpike Bill is over, I hope people may attend a little to the general advantage of the community. The Duke of Bedford has received a total defeat this afternoon in the House of Commons; the numbers on dividing being, for engrossing the Bill, 154; against it, 208.[92]

Bedford, had met with total defeat on his turnpike bill that proposed to repair the existing road from Market Harborough in Leicestershire through Kettering in Northamptonshire, to Westwood Gate, Knotting in Bedfordshire. On the surface this proposal appeared for the common good of the public.

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91 Whitehall Evening Post, Feburary 1749/50.
92 Malmesbury, Letters, i, 77.

On 18 February John Bromsall of Bedford wrote to Robert Butcher.

> We are all sorry for the Disappointment of the Bill in general...pray sir cannot a motion be made to recomit the Bill and a clause added by the Committee to carry the road through Higham Ferrers and accept Lord Rockingham's 1000 [pounds] which he offered to give gratis to amend the Road...it would not signifie one shilling to us if the road is made good whither [it] come by Higham or Ditchford Bridge...[93]

Bromsall suggested that this whole issue was a local one concerning Bedford and Lord Rockingham, unconnected with politics at Westminster. With hindsight, this simple cause of failure of the proposal appeared unlikely. From the perspective of the inhabitants of Kettering, however, no other possible reason seemed possible. Another letter from Saul Wallis and Thomas Collis of Kettering strongly suggested that while local interests played a role in opposing this proposal, national issues defeated it in the House. They claimed that because the parish of Kettering sent 200 men to fight against the rebels in 1745, their enemies, the Tories "...would even deny this Town any thing that might be of Service to it..."[94] This suggestion was closer to the mark. The Tories openly opposed this measure, and only one of their rank voted for it. The numbers meant that they were not able to defeat the bill without wider support.

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[93] BEO, Butcher Papers. Bromsall-Butcher, 18 February 1749/50.
[94] BCRO, Calendar of Butcher Corespondence, 193-4.

The proposed turnpike was finally in place by 1754. By the mid-eighteenth century, Members of Parliament were caught up in the turnpike mania of that era. Opposition to turnpikes in general, or this one in particular, was not the specific issue in 1750. Horace Walpole, the diarist, sugggested that Newcastle openly orchestrated an attack on Bedford, his fellow Secretary of State.

> The Bedford turnpike...is thrown out by a majority of 52 against the Duke of Bedford. The Pelhams who lent their own persons to him, had set up the duke of Grafton, to list their own dependents under, against their rival...The Newcastle is at open war, and has left off waiting on the Duke [of Cumberland], who espouses the Bedfords. Mr. Pelham tries to patch it up...but their are scarce any terms kept.[95]

Newcastle was a dangerous enemy for a young politician like Bedford. Newcastle preferred his fellow Ministers to be ingratiating and subordinate. Bedford was too independent to be either. Unfortunately for Bedford, he naively believed the proposal to be a beneficial for the public good.[96] He did not see that Newcastle would use it as a vehicle for achieving his own vindictive ends.

Why was Bedford's turnpike proposal defeated in the House of Commons on 13 February 1750? Indirect evidence suggested that Newcastle had enlisted the dukes of Grafton and Argyll to encourage their supporters to abstain from voting, or to vote against the motion, in order to embarrass his brother Secretary of State on an issue that was not a government measure. This factor combined with the open

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95 Walpole Correspondence, xx, 119-27.
96 Bedford MS xxv. Bedford-Albemarle, 19 February 1749/50.

opposition of the Tories and the Prince of Wales ensured that the numbers in attendance in the House would be high. Bedford's negative public image continued to grow as a direct result of his insensitive electoral tactics during the general election and subsequent by-elections. Public opinion was not favourable to Bedford in a society where traditions, particularly in constituency election matters were respected. Bedford lacked political acumen. After the second reading of the bill, he transferred his lobbying efforts to the House of Lords, rather than concentrating on the votes required to pass third reading in the Commons. In all likelihood, he misread who his opposition was. If he had understood that in addition to the Tories and the Prince of Wales, Newcastle was opposing the matter, he might have reacted differently. Bedford and his colleagues never indicated that Newcastle was the source of any opposition. To them, the narrowness of the division at second reading indicated that a redoubling of lobbying efforts would not go amiss. Bedford's belief in the proposal as a matter for the public good, combined with his sense of the local support for the turnpike, personally convinced him that the opposition would stop after the second reading. He thought that the opposition made its point on second reading, and that the next hurdle would occur in the House of Lords. There the opportunity for Lord Rockingham, and the other two Lords intimately concerned with the turnpike, to amend the bill would present itself.[97] This belief proved to be

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[97] Wentworth MS, Sheffield Record Office. Rockingham's papers do not contain reference to this issue.

Bedford's downfall. Newcastle wanted the proposal defeated in the House of Commons, where his direct involvement could be hidden discreetly. Bedford's lobbying continued into the third reading, but he did not have the experience to battle against a seasoned veteran of politics like Newcastle. Newcastle was well versed in the political manoeuverings required to stay on top of the hierarchy at Westminster. This turnpike proposal was therefore fodder for Newcastle's personal vendetta against Bedford. He perhaps hoped to convince Pelham that Bedford was weaker in the Commons than he believed. Thus strengthening Newcastle's attempts to remove Bedford from office immeasurably. As for Pelham, he was prepared by early 1750 to re-establish some form of a peaceful relationship with his brother. Their divorce from one another was tiring not only Pelham, but also for Hardwicke who acted as their personal go-between. Newcastle's widely recognized jealousy of Bedford after the his promotion to the office of Secretary of State for the Southern Department, was growing increasingly dangerous to the stability of the Ministry. It was greater than any possible opposition threat in the House of Commons. Before, Bedford's pursuit of a 'blue-water' foreign policy had enabled Pelham to counter his brother's continental European aims. Now that peace had been negotiated with France and the other European powers in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Pelham no longer required Bedford to perform this counterbalance act within the Administration. Bedford was not yet expendable, however. Pelham believed that Bedford could pose a potentially serious threat to his power if he

and his followers joined the opposition Whigs in the Commons. Therefore Pelham had no serious intention of dismissing Bedford from the Administration in early 1750. Newcastle was likely encouraged to pursue his personal vendetta in this local matter because it would not destroy the Administration, yet allow him to release some of his increasing venom. Pelham did not believe Bedford would quit over the issue. Bedford's possible disappointment at this treatment was soothed by Pelham. In a conciliatory, albeit calculated gesture, Pelham offered Bedford's friend, the duke of Cumberland, the plum post of Master General of the Ordnance immediately after this episode. The 'Grand Affair of the Nation' was not about a turnpike. It concerned the relationship between two Secretaries of State within the same apparently stable Administration.

Local issues and elections had an impact on politics in Westminster. The relationship between local influence and power on the national stage was discernable to eighteenth century politicians. Cultivating local influence at election time provided support in the House of Commons that could then be traded for influence in the public policy arena. Bedford's importance in the Pelham-Newcastle Administration was directly linked to Pelham's perception of his support in the Commons. Without the ability to provide supporters in the Commons for Pelham's legislation, Bedford would have been removed from his office. He recognized that remaining in power had little to do with his ability to perform an office. Bedford knew that his numerical strength

in the House of Commons determined whether he was to be given the opportunity to participate fully in the Administration. To that end, he actively managed local matters, and attempted to increase his political influence at every opportunity. By all accounts he deserved Thomas Pitt's epitaph 'terrour of the West'. His election tactics were straightforward, if not brutal. He cajoled support if possible, bought it when needed, and coerced it if necessary. Unfortunately for Bedford, he could not adopt the same tactics in the House of Commons. His numerical strength would guarantee him a certain degree of influence with Members of Parliament, and with the Cabinet when the opposition in the Commons was strong. His electoral strength, however, could not protect him from the petty vendettas of his fellow Minister who was able to use his influence behind the scenes at Westminster to embarrass Bedford on an insignificant matter.

CHAPTER 5: THE END OF THE WAR, AND THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT.

Bedford became Secretary of State for the Southern Department in February 1748. He agreed to accept the office for 'six months' as a favour to his friends, particularly Lord Sandwich, who replaced him as First Lord of the Admiralty.[1] Bedford remained in the Secretary's office until June 1751, when he resigned. Newcastle complained about Bedford's lack of diligence in his work. Historians have generally agreed with Newcastle's view that Bedford was ineffectual in the office of Secretary of State.[2] Yet, an examination of Bedford's performance during the negotiations for a peaceful end to the War of Austrian Succession, and his subsequent involvement in the negotiations for a commercial treaty with Spain, provides a different opinion of his abilities.

When Bedford was still First Lord of the Admiralty, and not yet a member of the inner cabinet, he forwarded any correspondence he received at that office concerning the war to Newcastle, then the Secretary of State for the

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[1] Add. MS 32,714, ff. 450-1. Bedford-Sandwich, 8 April 1748.

[2] Wilkes, A Whig in Power. Yorke, ii, 39. J. Haas, 'Rise of the Bedfords....', 121-2. Lodge, Studies..., 271-2. Lodge calls him 'the sluggish but influential Duke of Bedford'.

Southern Department. On 23 July 1747, Bedford gave Newcastle his honest opinion about the state of affairs on the continent in light of the Allied success against the French in Italy.

> I hope a good use will be made of the Turn of our Affairs in that Country, and should Bergen op Zoom be defended as it ought to be, I hope to see such a turn of affairs even in Flanders itself, as to induce the French to offer us terms wch we may with honour accept. The bad opinion I have of the Austrians as Allies confirms me in my desire of peace, and I must own this last Action has not taken off the bad impression...[3]

British success in the war had been limited since the capture of Cape Breton. The Allied troops were in a desperate situation by February 1746. Any victories had been won at sea or in the colonies. On 3 May 1747, Admiral Edward Anson captured six French ships off Finisterre, and on 25 October 1747, Admiral Hawke captured six French battleships off Belleisle. The British land forces, acting with their Allies, the Austrian and Dutch troops, were not nearly as successful against the French army. Although the campaign in Italy had gone in favour of the Allies, British troops had not been immediately involved in that success. The death of Philip V, King of Spain, in July 1746, had prompted the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Italy, and, as a result, the Austrian and Sardinian forces made territorial gains sufficient to prepare for attacks in southern France. In Saxony, the Austrians were steadily

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[3] Add. MS 32,712, ff. 197-8. Bedford-Newcastle, 23 July 1747.

losing ground to Prussian troops. In the Low Countries, the French army dominated the battlefield. They had been able to take advantage of the recall of British troops led by the duke of Cumberland during the Jacobite Rebellion in Scotland: Brussels, Antwerp and Namur were captured. The return of the duke of Cumberland to lead the British regiments in Flanders renewed the hopes of the Ministers in London for some military success to counter the growing dominance of the French in the Low Countries.[4] Their aspirations for ending the war on a more successful footing were crushed however when French troops marched into Holland in the spring of 1747. The Allied troops numbered 112,000, but the British, Hanoverian, Austrian and Dutch generals quarrelled over the strategic direction of the Allied efforts and the military initiative was lost. The Allied defeat at Lauffeld on 25 June 1747 resulted in 6,000 casualties and 2,000 prisoners, including Sir John Ligonier of the British forces.[5] The Ministers in London were disillusioned with the turn of events. Their commitment to support Austria was questioned.

Bedford never believed in the importance of maintaining the 'balance of power' in Europe, and therefore did not place as much value on the Austrian alliance as did Newcastle. Bedford did not advocate

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[4] William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, second son of George II was the Commander of the Army in Flanders and Captain General of the Army since 1745.
[5] Sir John Ligonier (1680-1770) was an army officer and Member of Parliament from 1748-63.

'peace at any price' either. As befitted the First Lord of the Admiralty, he demanded the retention of Cape Breton, his first 'victory' in office, in any possible European peace settlement.[6] Yet Bedford was willing to consider any 'tolerable' peace negotiated with France. Newcastle was the strongest supporter in the Cabinet Council of the 'Old System' of foreign policy: the 'balance of power' in Europe. He endorsed Austrian ambitions against France to perpetuate this style of foreign policy. Most cabinet members were willing to abandon Austria after the unsuccessful attempt in 1745 to negotiate a peace between Austria and Prussia. When the treaty of Hanover had been signed on 15 August, the Austrians refused to ratify it, and the opinion of the majority of Ministers in London hardened against that Court.[7] Although he did not share Bedford's 'bad opinion' of Austria, Newcastle needed Bedford and his friend, Sandwich, to support him in cabinet discussions against his brother's increasing demands for an end to British involvement in continental entanglements. Pelham led the group willing to change the diplomatic alignment if acceptable terms of peace with France could be reached. Newcastle would not accept the idea.[8] An indication of his dependence on Bedford to counter Pelham's opinion was seen in his letter to Sandwich on 28 July 1747.

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6 Lodge, Studies..., 170, 271-2, 282-3.
7 Wilkes, 118-9.
8 Wilkes, 105-29.

> Our Friend, the Duke of Bedford was violently against the giving up Cap Breton, on any account, in the State, It now is...The impracticality of carrying on the war was insisted upon, by Every Body, last night, but myself...[9]

Bedford refused to give up Cape Breton in the summer of 1747, but he was not averse to seeking a peace settlement with France. Newcastle, however, used Bedford's demands for the retention of Cape Breton as a means to attain his own ends: the continuation of the European war until Austrian demands were satisfied. Pelham believed that the British could no longer finance the huge costs associated with continuing the continental war. When Marshal de Saxe approached the captured General Ligonier with plans for a negotiated peace, Pelham thought that an end was in sight.[10] However, a peace negotiated by generals on the battlefield proved difficult to attain, particularly when the King's son, the duke of Cumberland, was opposed to the proposal. The discussions ended.[11] The French had not been serious in their approach to this conference, and the general consensus amongst the British Ministers after this episode was that the French objective had been to divert the Allies from preparing for the next military campaign.[12] The subsequent capture of Bergen-op-Zoom, a fortress manned with 10,000 men, on 3 September 1747, demoralized the Ministers in London even further.

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[9] Add. MS 32,809, ff. 111-2. Newcastle-Sandwich, 28 July 1747.
[10] Hermann-Maurice, Comte de Saxe (1696-1750), was Marshal of France.
[11] Lodge, Studies..., 269-272.
[12] Lodge, Studies..., 287-9.

Holland was at the mercy of the French forces. Peace grew into a more serious objective for Pelham as he was forced to find the money to finance the 64,966 troops stationed in Britain, Flanders and the colonies.[13] Bedford and Newcastle however, still felt that more favourable terms could be achieved if the British Ministers continued to support their ally, Austria, in the continental struggle.

After the continued success of the French forces throughout the summer of 1747, Bedford believed that they would soon control the continent, and that the British would be forced to continue the conflict at sea.

> I am truly concerned to find, that the fate of Bergen op Zoom is likely to be so soon determined, I fear the French after that, will have time left, enough to over run all Dutch Brabant this Campaign, and then what a terrible situation will you be in to begin a Campaign next Spring. If a peace can't be obtained, I forsee this must at last come to a Sea War, as we shall be absolutely unable to keep a force in the Low Countries...[14]

Despite his fears for the Allied ground forces in the Low Countries, Bedford did not abandon the concept of another campaign in order to put Britain in a better bargaining position at the negotiating table. As a 'Country' Whig, he believed in the need for Britain's superiority at sea, and when he compared British naval successes with the Allied land effort, he decided that a further campaign was necessary "...in order to obtain more advantageous

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13 Wilkes, 110.
14 Add. MS 15,955, ff. 143-4. Bedford-Anson, 13 August 1747.

terms..."[15] Although Newcastle was not as convinced as Bedford about British naval power being the nation's strength in the next campaign, he supported Bedford's promotion of a further season of fighting the French. Newcastle needed to counter Pelham's requests for an immediate cease-fire.

Discussions for some sort of solution to the war began tentatively at Liege and the Hague. Lord Sandwich had been sent to a secret conference at Breda in the spring of 1746, and remained in Holland as Britain's envoy to continue informal discussions. Newcastle had supported his initial appointment because Sandwich was against the return of Cape Breton to the French, and because he was willing to follow Newcastle's secret direction in spite of Lord Harrington's authority. Harrington resigned the seals as Secretary of State for the North in October 1746 to protest against this behaviour, and Lord Chesterfield replaced him in the office. Sandwich was unaffected by this change, and continued to meet with the French at Liege and the Hague in 1747. The high point of Bedford's relationship with Newcastle was reached at this time. These three politicians were in regular correspondence. Newcastle commented to Sandwich that "...The Duke of Bedford is every Thing I could wish..."[16] This good opinion was achieved because Bedford generally concurred with

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15 Add. MS 15,955, ff. 144. Bedford-Anson, 13 August 1747.

16 Add. MS 32,809, ff. 256-260. Newcastle-Sandwich, 27 August 1747.

Newcastle's directives to Sandwich, who was technically Chesterfield's subordinate. Newcastle liked people who agreed with his opinions in their letters to him. Bedford noted:

> I find myself exceeding happy, in agreeing so perfectly in opinion with your Grace in relation to all the Points treated in your last Dispatch to Lord Sandwich...[17]

Sandwich wrote by every post either to Newcastle or Bedford, even though Lord Chesterfield, as Secretary of State for the Northern Department, was his official superior.[18] Newcastle's interference in Chesterfield's department caused friction to grow between the two Secretaries of State. Newcastle advised Sandwich that:

> Great Jealousy, I understand, is taken at your correspondence with the Duke of Bedford and Me; and therefore I wish, it might be as seldom, as possible;...[19]

In order to avoid potential problems resulting from this burgeoning jealousy between the two Secretaries, Bedford agreed to become the intermediary between Sandwich and Newcastle. Newcastle most likely wished to avoid confrontation with his brother over his behaviour with his colleagues. Newcastle confirmed this arrangement with Sandwich: "The Channel of the Duke of

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[17] Add. MS 32,713, ff. 163-4. Bedford-Newcastle, 28 September 1747.
[18] Add. MS 32810, ff. 116-127. Sandwich-Newcastle, 17 October 1747.
[19] Add. MS 32,810, ff. 162-9. Newcastle-Sandwich, 20 October 1747.

Bedford may be often, unattestedly, used..."[20] While Sandwich acknowledged the proposal: "...that I have wrote to the Duke of Bedford which is the same thing as if I wrote directly to your Grace."[21] Bedford was therefore at the centre of the correspondence between Newcastle and Sandwich that discussed the events on the continent. Bedford had greater access to information concerning the negotiations for peace than many other ministers. His opinions, as a result, were generally well-informed. He wrote to Newcastle when attempts to convince Prussia to stay off the battlefield were underway:

> I am most heartily glad to find that all endeavours will be used to convince the K. of Prussia, of the good intentions of the Maritime Powers towards him...It has long been my opinion, as your Grace can witness for me, that the only means we had left to extricate ourselves, out of the dangerous Situation we are now unhappily in, was to detach...the King of Prussia from French measures...I think this is a negotiation of so great consequence, that nothing should be ommitted, that may bring it to a happy conclusion...[22]

Bedford's comments about the 'dangerous negotiations' to detach the King of Prussia from France were directed to the marching of 10,000 Russian troops hired by Britain to assist in the campaigns in the Low Countries. Bedford worried that the Prussian King would see these negotiations simply as a measure to arrange safe passage

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[20] Add. MS 32,810, ff. 197-8. Newcastle-Sandwich, 23 October 1747 O.S.
[21] Add. MS 32,810, ff. 235-40. Sandwich-Newcastle, 10 November 1747 N.S.
[22] Add. MS 32,714. ff.42-3. Bedford-Newcastle, 10 January 1747/8 O.S.

for these mercenaries, and not a sincere endeavour to guarantee his position against future action. In any event, the war was almost over by the time the Russians arrived at the front.

Dissenting opinions concerning the war were being openly voiced within the Cabinet at this time. From the Hague, Sandwich advised Bedford that he would continue rejecting proposals for any peace while Britain and her allies remained in a strong naval and reasonable land position for the next campaign. He worried, though, about the impact of bringing the differences of ministerial opinion into the open.

> Upon the whole, I most earnestly hope you will not precipitate matters when they are less desperate than they have been. I can easily conceive the difficult part that your Grace, and the few who are still inclined to endeavour to resist the threatening danger for a bad peace, have to act...[23]

Sandwich would probably have to deal with the more favourable terms demanded by the French in any serious negotiations as a result of this open breach between the British Ministers. The dangers of a bad peace were increased when Pelham announced to the House of Commons:

> I have the honour to acquaint you, that by next March, England will have 51 thousand Men in her Pay in Flanders, Holland - the same number, & the Queen of Hungary 60 thousand, which will be joined in May by 30,000 Russians, making in all above 190,000 Men. Notwithstanding all that may be expected from so great Forces, I now declare, it is my Opinion, that We ought to make Peace, but I have reason to believe

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23 Bedford Correspondence, i, 309-313. Sandwich-Bedford, 16 January 1747/8 N.S.

> that certain Influences will prevail against my Opinion.[24]

Pelham acknowledged publicly that a peaceful solution to the war was required immediately for financial reasons. Since 1745, Pelham had difficulty raising the necessary money to finance the war effort and the ordinary costs of government. Interest rates were high, money scarce, and government revenue was declining. Pelham had developed a wartime policy of small tax increases, borrowing from friends on the London money markets, and running extra financial schemes like lotteries, but still could not meet all the costs of Britain's commitment on the continent. Subsidies for Britain's allies were bankrupting the country. Pelham wanted an immediate peace to alleviate the financial burden on the country and the political work for himself.[25] Bedford came to recognize the financial imperative for the British to find a settlement. He advised Sandwich that the government was "...in a state very little distant from bankruptcy."[26] But it was Pelham who brought the breach of opinion between the members of the Administration into the open, and Britain's enemies and partners speculated on the potential result of this action.

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[24] Add. MS 32,811, ff. 155-6. LeMan-Huescar, 13 February 1747/8.

[25] Wilkes, 105-14. C. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century, (Cambridge, 1966), 72. Wilson claims it was the influex of Dutch money into Britain that created the illusion that the National Debt was mainly owed to foreigners. This, he believes, helps to explain the 'phobia' against the National Debt.

[26] Bedford Correspondence, i, 340-5. Bedford-Sandwich, 6 April 1748.

> ...that the Ministry has resolved to continue the War, notwithstanding the inclination shewn by some of the Ministers for treating...My Ld Carteret is of Opinion, that the Parliament will come to know of the disunion in the Ministry & that probably a Party will be made, in order to Force the King to a Peace...The Duke of Newcastle is not pleased with this Harangue, & There is a possibility of further Discord...[27]

The events on the continent could not be controlled by Newcastle in his attempts to appease Pelham. Britain's allies seemed determined to obstruct any possible settlement and were unwilling to consider the difficulties faced by the British Ministers. Newcastle outlined his view of the whole disagreeable situation to his friend, the duke of Richmond:

> Abroad, the Queen of Hungary, & the King of Sar[dini]a are quarreling about the Command in Italy, the Statholder insisting upon a new Article obliging our Troops to take their turn in Garrison Duty, & our several Allies, flinging such difficulties in ye way of our Convention, which is to determine the Troops to be furnished by each power, so that everyone, will have some Pretence, not to have their Contingents ready in time. The States are by degrees, tho' slowly augmenting their Army, & the Prussians, by the most unjustifiable Delay in sending the Dutch Minister full power to conclude the Treaty, will not be with our Army before the end of May...[28]

Despite all these problems, it was Dutch intransigence that changed Newcastle's opinion towards continuing the war. "The next thing is to make Peace. I agree in it if it can be upon any tolerable Terms...", Newcastle

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[27] Add. MS 32,811, ff. 155-6. LeMan-Huescar, 13 February 1747/8.
[28] McCann, 262.

explained to Richmond on 1 January 1748.[29] On this point, Bedford and Newcastle were in complete agreement with Pelham. From the winter of 1747, only the actual particulars of any possible peace negotiation divided the opinions of the members of the Cabinet.

On 6 February 1747/8, Lord Chesterfield resigned the seals of the office of Secretary of State for the North.[30] Although Newcastle and Chesterfield fell out on the question of Dutch intransigence in prosecuting the war, his resignation surprised some of his colleagues.[31] Newcastle commented to Richmond:

> ...Lord Chesterfield resigned the Seals this day. I can't quite say surprised, for by some Appearances, I thought, it might be so, tho' my Brother, had no Notion that it would happen so soon. Everything has been done, that could be, to prevent it, but He was determined. Lord Gower seems thoroughly vexed with Him,...the D. of Bedford, is what we could wish Him, but I fear my Brother will feel it, and not enter into any Measures, or Scheme to supply the Vacancy...Who it will be, I know not.[32]

The vacancy was supplied by Newcastle himself who took the office of Northern Secretary of State. Bedford kissed the King's hand on 13 February 1748 for the office of Secretary of State for the Southern Province. Sandwich succeeded him as head of the Admiralty Board. Although Bedford had agreed initially to take the office for 'six months' until Sandwich returned from the signing

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29 McCann, 262.
30 Chesterfield was Secretary of State from October 1746 to February 1748.
31 Lodge, Studies..., 243.
32 McCann, 266.

of the peace treaty, some contemporaries questioned his true intentions.[33] Bedford retained Newcastle's personal confidence however, and their sentiments concerning the points to negotiate with the French still coincided. Bedford advised Sandwich on the points for the preliminary articles:

> ...we should depart from the point of keeping Final, in case the French will not conclude without our giving it up. As for the Affair of Dunkirk, so the Port and Harbour is left as stipulated by the Treaty of Utrecht, I see no great objection to our consenting to its being fortified towards the Land...[34]

Newcastle reiterated Bedford's points about Final and Dunkirk in his directives to Sandwich, and agreed that the British negotiators might be forced to yield to the French somewhat on these two points during discussions.[35] Bedford and Newcastle did not address the question of Cape Breton in these letters. Bedford's hope of retaining Louisbourg in order to improve the benefits for the North American trading community vanished when confronted with the political realities. Specifically, after Bedford had read the 'Memoire Instructif' prepared by the Stadtholder of Holland for his emissaries, he was convinced that the Dutch lacked the political will and

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[33] See J.D. Griffith Davies, A King in Toils, (London, 1938), 264, for view that while Newcastle and Pelham argued over the appointment, the King quietly nominated Bedford.

[34] Add. MS 32,714, ff. 450-1. Bedford-Sandwich, 8 April 1748.

[35] Add. MS 32,812, ff. 25-30. Newcastle-Sandwich, 8 April 1748.

financial resources necessary for any continuation of the war against France.

> By this you will easily judge how the state of our affairs must appear to me, after the Memoire Instructif came over, by which it did undoubtedly appear that the finances of Holland, by the confession of their own government, was, notwithstanding all their boastings of the immense sums they had raised by their centieme dernier and their lotteries, in a worse situation than those of England...[36]

The Dutch could not continue the war, but neither could the British afford to finance any further campaign, according to Pelham. Bedford concurred, and encouraged Sandwich to find some reasonable terms for a peaceful conclusion to the war with France.

> ...the absolute necessity, I must own I see, of coming to an immediate conclusion of the war upon the best terms we can get; and without this, I must own to you I do not see any hopes of salvation for us...[37]

Nor did Newcastle, who wrote to Sandwich that:

> ...our Situation grows every Day so much worse, That I must recommend it to you, to put Things in a Way of being concluded, before the French are quite Masters of the Maese, and the whole Republic of Holland...Get your preliminary Articles drawn, as soon as possible...[38]

Events on the continent continued to favour the French. The duke of Cumberland could only muster 35,000

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[36] Bedford Correspondence, i, 340-5. Bedford-Sandwich, 6 April 1748.
[37] Bedford Correspondence, i, 343. Bedford-Sandwich, 6 April 1748.
[38] Add. MS 32,812, ff. 19-20. Newcastle-Sandwich, 5 April 1748.

men to face the 80,000 troops led by Marshal Saxe for the French at Maestricht. If Maestricht fell, all of Holland would lie open for French occupation. From London, it seemed as if the whole French army was in motion against the Allies.[39] The signing of the Preliminaries would at least halt the French advance in Holland. French control of the entire coast would endanger British interests. Bedford agreed with Newcastle and Pelham on the instructions to Sandwich concerning the fortification of Dunkirk towards to the land and the return of Final to the French. No reference was made to Louisbourg.[40]

When Sandwich signed the Preliminaries in April 1748, he worried about doing so without due regard for Britain's allies. But approbation for his part in the negotiations was universal according to Newcastle who noted:

> Some pretend to be astonished that France would consent in her Circumstances. Others, who judge righter, attribute it, to the Interior Weakness of France, and Resolution to put an End to the War.[41]

Pelham was enthusiastic upon hearing the news. "I look upon it as almost a miraculous deliverance for this country and the Republic..."[42] Bedford concurred with

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[39] Bedford Correspondence, i, 338-9. Stone-Bedford, 5 April 1748.
[40] Add. MS 32,714, ff. 450-1. Bedford-Newcastle, 8 April 1748.
[41] Add. MS 32,812, ff. 126-7. Newcastle-Sandwich, 29 April 1748.
[42] Smith, Grenville Papers, i, 74-7.

Pelham's favourable view of these peace preliminaries. He advised his friend Sandwich that:

> ...your last despatches...[have]...I can assure you, been most universally, joyfully received by all well wishers to their country, and in a more especial manner by those who have the happiness of your friendship.[43]

Bedford also gave his personal approbation for Newcastle's role in this whole affair. If Chesterfield had been directing matters, Bedford did not believe the preliminary articles would have been achieved. He noted to Sandwich that the resignation of Lord Chesterfield had been fortunate because:

> ...had he continued in his office, and consequently had it been still in his department publicly to have instructed you, I fear it would have been (notwithstanding the good intimations you might have had privately from another quarter) impossible for you to have concluded in the manner you have now done with St. Severin.[44]

However Bedford noted that the results were not necessarily the ones he would have hoped for, but blamed Britain's allies for that fact, not Sandwich.

> I do not say that the preliminaries are what the nation ought to have expected at the conclusion of so long and expensive a war, nor what she would have had if all our allies had fulfilled their engagements; but this I will venture to say, and I promise you that I will be ready to enter the lists in any place in your justification, that, considering how things were circumstanced, and the great superiority of the French and their allies

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43 Bedford Correspondence, i, 356-9. Bedford-Sandwich, 28 April 1748.

44 Bedford Correspondence, i, 358. Bedford-Sandwich, 28 April 1748.

> anywhere but at sea, this nation and the republic of Holland are much obliged to you for the negotiating for them these very conditions they have obtained.[45]

Initially, Sandwich's efforts and the preliminary articles had been greeted with enthusiasm by all members of the Administration. The main point of the preliminary articles included the return of all French conquests in the Netherlands, the return of Cape Breton, the cession of Silesia and Glatz to Prussia, the cession of Parma and Placentia to Spain's Don Philip, and the giving of most of the Milanese lands to Sardinia. The Ministers in London were satisfied with these terms, and pushed for a speedy conclusion to the definitive treaty of peace. Newcastle remained friendly with Sandwich, and Bedford, after the signing of the preliminary articles. The friendship was to be severely tested throughout the summer. The King announced that he was going to Hanover for the summer, and Newcastle decided to accompany him. Henry Pelham commented to George Grenville: "I am sorry to tell you that His Majesty has determined his journey for Hanover as soon as the House is up. It is always best when he is amongst us..."[46] Problems between the Lords Justice of the Regency Council left in London to conduct the affairs of government, and the individual, usually one of the Secretaries of State, who accompanied the King to Hanover, generally arose over the direction of foreign policy. With Sandwich continuing the

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[45] Bedford Correspondence, i, 358. Bedford-Sandwich, 28 April 1748.
[46] Smith, Grenville Papers, i, 74-6.

negotiations for the definitive peace treaty at Aix-la-Chapelle, the potential for discord between the Ministers in London and Hanover was great. Even before Newcastle left for Hanover, his relations with Pelham were not thought by contemporaries to be easy. The elder Horace Walpole, wrote from the Cockpit on 24 May 1748:

> ...I would flatter myself with the nation being long happy under the present ministry; but as that depends upon an union among themselves, I think it very doubtful, unless the great man... (Hardwicke)...will exert his credit and influence to preserve the harmony between those, who by ties of blood and interest naturally ought to be inseparable in their thoughts and actions relating to the public...[47]

The relationship between the two brothers threatened the harmony of the Administration at this time: not any quarrel between Newcastle, Bedford and Sandwich.[48] Bedford was courted by both. Newcastle's trip to Hanover with George II in early June was viewed as a potential exacerbation of this family feud. Hardwicke had been solicited to act as Newcastle's source of information on events in London.[49] A long-standing friend since 1719 when Pelham worked to get him elected at Lewes, Hardwicke continually mediated between the two brothers, and held the confidence of both. Bedford ensured relevant correspondence was forwarded to Newcastle at the Hanoverian court. On 28 June 1748, seventeen letters and copies of papers were sent by Bedford to Hanover.[50] On

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47 Yorke, i, 665. Walpole-C. Yorke, 24 May 1748.
48 See Wilkes, 127, for a different view.
49 Yorke, i, 655.
50 SP 43/117. Bedford-Newcastle, 28 June 1748.

1 July, Bedford sent a letter and five enclosures.[51] These papers generally concerned the information Bedford had received relevant to the definitive peace treaty negotiations. In the early stages of Newcastle's sojourn in Hanover, Bedford diligently attended to his office duties. Yet Pelham wrote to Hardwicke that:

> My brother is certainly in the right to complain of the Duke of Bedford's great neglect of business. Your Lordship knows my thoughts of it, and the liberties I have taken to prevent it for the future.[52]

Newcastle's complaints to Pelham extended far beyond Bedford however, and in the remainder of this letter to Hardwicke, Pelham defended his own personal record of sending his brother a friendly letter with each post. If Newcastle chastised his brother for not writing enough, he would undoubtedly complain about the lack of attention shown by everyone else. Whatever Pelham 'arranged' to rectify Bedford's neglect of official duties, Bedford certainly appeared to correspond regularly with Newcastle throughout the summer of 1748.

The first difference of opinion between Bedford and Newcastle in the summer of 1748 arose over the difficulties Sandwich was experiencing with the Austrian negotiator at Aix-la-Chapelle. Count Kaunitz refused to participate fully in any discussions because the Austrian Court resented the loss of Silesia as well as Glatz,

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51 SP 43/117. Bedford-Newcastle, 1 July 1748.
52 Yorke, i, 660-2. Pelham-Hardwicke, 25 July 1748.

Parma, and Placentia. The Austrians viewed themselves as the only losers in the war and proceeded to hinder any negotiations.[53] The first hurdle concerned the Russian troops garrisoning Holland. They were in British pay, but the Court at Vienna gave them their orders. Upon the signing of the preliminaries, the members of the Administration in London decided to discharge these troops. The Austrian negotiators protested. These discussions were undermined by the Austrians' behaviour at Aix. In London, Pelham and Bedford supported Sandwich's decision to continue working towards a definitive treaty without the Austrians.[54] Newcastle at first agreed.

> You see I have no Difficulty in ordering you to sign the Definitive Treaty without Kaunitz...If Kaunitz stands out, I can think of no Way, but putting the Austrian Netherlands for the present into the Possession of the Maritime Powers. We have Troops enough to garrison Them, and then the Court of Vienna would soon come in...[55]

Within one week, Newcastle had changed this view. His fear of losing the 'Old System' in Europe reasserted itself while isolated in Hanover from his colleagues in London. He believed that the support of the Austrian Court was necessary in the long run if Britain wished to avoid adding to the power of the French. Newcastle did

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53 Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz Reitburg, Count and Prince Kaunitz (1711-94) was the Austrian negotiator.
54 Bedford Correspondence, i, 402-3. Pelham-Bedford, 7/18 July 1748.
55 Add. MS 32,813, ff. 71-3. Newcastle-Sandwich, 7/18 July 1748.

not believe that his colleagues concurred with his view. He wrote to Sandwich:

> Our Friends in England wish Things, but sometimes are against the only means to bring them about. They want to preserve the Old System, and yet They won't humour the Court of Vienna, in some of Her unreasonable Demands...The Basis of my Politicks is to maintain the Old System, From That I will not depart...[56]

Newcastle was emphatic in his orders to Sandwich. He wanted him to obtain the restitution of the Low Countries to Austria first because he believed that everything else would then fall into place. He reiterated that if the Austrians refused to sign the definitive treaty when every other point benefited the Alliance, then, and only then, Sandwich could sign without Kaunitz. Sandwich interpreted Newcastle's orders to mean that while doing everything possible to encourage the Court of Vienna to join with her Allies, he could in the end, sign without them. Sandwich believed that this principle alone would persuade the Austrians to cooperate.[57] From London, Bedford notified Newcastle that Hardwicke and Pelham agreed with Sandwich on this step to induce the Austrians to bring the negotiations for the final treaty to a speedy conclusion.[58] After a meeting with Pelham, Hardwicke, Gower, and Argyll,

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[56] Add. MS 32,813, ff. 135-6. Newcastle-Sandwich, 15/26 July 1748.
[57] Add. MS 32,813, ff. 137-9. Sandwich-Newcastle, 26 July 1748.
[58] SP 43/117. Bedford-Newcastle, 26 July 1748. Bedford Correspondence, i, 424-5.

Bedford advised Newcastle that the ministers in London agreed:

> That, considering the present Critical Situation of Affairs, and the necessity of coming to a Speedy Conclusion of a Peace, if the Court of Vienna should still stand out after the pressing Remonstrances His Majesty has been pleased to make to Her; His Majesty should give Directions to my Lord Sandwich to conclude the Definitive Treaty with France & Her Allies, in Conjunction with the Republick of Holland, and the King of Sardinia...[59]

The Lords Justice in London decided that the definitive peace treaty should be signed with or without Austria. Bedford agreed with Pelham on the need for a rapid conclusion to the discussions, without due regard for Newcastle's 'Old System'. Bedford had left Newcastle's orbit of influence in the Cabinet, and during the summer, asserted his personal independence by agreeing on more issues with Pelham. Their opinions on foreign and domestic issues appeared to merge throughout the summer of 1748.[60]

At one point, Newcastle attempted to lure Bedford back into his camp by recalling the question of the retention of Cape Breton. Newcastle knew Bedford believed that the fortress at Louisbourg was important in determining the security of North American trade. Bedford had been willing to abandon this point in order

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[59] Add. MS 23,829, ff. 279-82. Bedford-Newcastle, 29 July 1748. Bedford Correspondence, i, 426-30. SP 43/118. Bedford-Newcastle, 29 July 1748.

[60] Bedford Correspondence, i, 423-4. Pelham-Bedford, July 1748.

to reach a settlement with France, but Newcastle hoped he could change his mind and suggested that:

> I am afraid we should be thought but bad legislators should we sign a definitive treaty with France, give up Cape Breton to them, and leave Flanders in their hands.[61]

But Bedford gracefully declined being drawn from his opinion that one general definitive treaty was an economic necessity for Great Britain.[62] Bedford agreed with Pelham that Britain's debt of around 60 million pounds made it impossible to pursue any further campaigns against the French army.[63] Both Bedford and Pelham were aware that increasing the fiscal burden would be unpopular. A pamphlet entitled The State of the Nation with a General Balance of Public Accounts noted in 1748,

> ...the People can never be esteemed happy and secure unless the Revenues that support the Government are well ordered and regulated. There is no Medium in this Branch of governing. The Art is, a perfect knowledge of what the Community can conveniently affort to raise, and in the least burthensome ways and never go beyond such Bounds, but in cases of Self-Defence...[64]

This same pamphlet argued that the visible cost of the war was 32,000,000 pounds, and that the total expense was closer to 49,000,000 pounds.[65] Other pamphleteers had

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61 Bedford Correspondence, i, 436-7. Newcastle-Bedford, 27 July/7 August 1748.
62 Bedford Correspondence, i, 440-3. Bedford-Newcastle, 11 August 1748.
63 Coxe, Memoirs, i, 148. In 1743, the national debt was 51,040,347 pounds exclusive of the unfunded part of the debt. Interest was 1,972,745 pounds.
64 State of the Nation, with a General Balance of Public Accounts, (London, 1748), 15.
65 State of the Nation, 6.

been suggesting that debt and taxes had strengthened the power of the King and his Ministers, to the detriment of the nation.[66] Newcastle was not able to change Bedford's opinion simply by referring to the retention of Cape Breton.[67]

Bedford was therefore not in Newcastle's good graces when Sandwich sent a letter to Hanover noting that the French negotiator:

> ...shewed me a paragraph in Puisieulz's letter which said that it had come round to him that several things that had passed between him & me had been told to Gen Wall by the d. of Bedford, & he desired he would caution me on that point, which as long as our affairs are undecided is to them a matter of very delicate nature...[68]

Sandwich duly wrote to Bedford suggesting he take note of this caution. Newcastle made no specific reference in his correspondence at this time to Bedford's slip of the tongue. Bedford's personal character was not mentioned by Sandwich or Newcastle again. Pelham, however, chastised Newcastle on 19 August 1748 for sending a personal letter to Bedford's office.

> If it had gone no further than amongst ourselves, I should have hoped, accidents and the Publick interest might hae set things right again; but now, that it is in the D. of B.'s office we don't know who sees it, or what will be said of it. His Commiss are new, and his Clerks have all of them

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66 National Oeconomy Recommended, (London, 1746), 6-7.
67 Bedford Correspondence, i, 437-43. Pelham-Bedford, 7 August 1748. Bedford-Newcastle, 11 August 1748.
68 Add. MS 32,813, ff. 184-7. Sandwich-Newcastle, 2 August 1748.

> serv'd many masters, some of which they are very partial to, and I believe with reason...[69]

The information sent to Bedford's office was not treated in the close confidence that the brothers would have preferred, particularly when it concerned their political interests. The problem appeared to lie in Bedford's choice of employees in the Secretary of State's office. Until Bedford's resignation in 1751, there appeared to be no further comments of this type criticizing his personal integrity.

Newcastle's complaints about Bedford's inattention to the duties of his office increased shortly after this minor episode. He moaned to Pelham:

> I cannot think, I expect more, than my Predecessors had. Whether I have obtained; what I have long wish'd For, I won't say. I am sure, I have not purchased it, as Some of Them did.[70]

Newcastle also began his tirade against his former protege, Sandwich. Sandwich's determination to proceed to a conclusion of the treaty without due attention to the concerns of the Austrian court annoyed Newcastle. To his brother, he complained:

> I am sorry, that you begin to be most pleased with Lord Sandwich, when I own, I am quite otherwise. I don't like quick Changes, in any Case; but abhor

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69 Add. MS 32,716, ff. 76-9. Pelham-Newcastle, 19 August 1748.

70 Add. MS 32,716, ff. 5-9. Newcastle-Pelham, 3/14 August 1748.

> them, when I think I see, They proceed From private views, & personal Consideration...[71]

To his friend, the Lord Chancellor, Newcastle wrote "Lord Sandwich is abominable."[72] Sandwich and his colleague at Aix were willing to consider concluding the negotiations without the approval of the Austrians, and without the full restoration of the Netherlands. Newcastle did not consider this policy as wise or necessary, and in August 1748 he ordered Sandwich to pursue a more conciliatory policy towards the Austrians, particularly Kaunitz. Horace Walpole suggested that Newcastle had ordered Sandwich to send Kaunitz copies of the latest British plan, but instead Sandwich had suspended the discussions and appealed to the King for a clarification of this proposal.[73] Newcastle was livid, and took this as a direct challenge to his personal authority. He complained that "Lord Sandwich has done all he could to spirit up England and Holland against me."[74] This was a serious breach between the two. Pelham advised Hardwicke that this misunderstanding could jeopardize the whole negotiation, but criticized his brother's actions, rather than Sandwich's:

> ...I see he acts in a passion upon the greatest points;...Everything is referred to us for opinion, and at the same time His Majesty's is not only sent to us and his orders too, previous to anything we could say upon this subject, but sent to the Greffier Fagel and the Prince of Orange also. How

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71 Add. MS 32,716, ff. 5-9. Newcastle-Pelham, 3/14 August 1748.
72 Yorke, i, 663. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 7/18 August 1748.
73 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 68.
74 Yorke, i, 664. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 7/18 August 1748.

> can my brother think men in their senses will give opinons contrary to these orders, and continue in the service of the Crown; and how can he think, supposing them to have any honour or conscience, that they will adopt the royal words if they are not consonant to their opinions, which I must with great truth tell you mine are not. I am most exceedingly concerned for my brother. He first drives all men of business out of office, and then, if those he substituted do not happen to act according to his mind in everything, he quarrels with them also.[75]

Pelham concluded his letter with a declaration that if things did not improve soon, and a definitive peace treaty signed before the next sitting of Parliament, he would resign from office.

Cut off from direct personal contact with the Ministers in London, Newcastle had to rely on their correspondence to keep him informed of their activities and opinions. Bedford inadvertently contributed to Newcastle's increasing sense of isolation in Hanover. Bedford reported the meetings he had with Pelham and Hardwicke, but did not inform Newcastle of the various opinions expressed at them. He generally noted the consensus reached, and to Newcastle it appeared that on the questions concerning the direction of the final peace negotiations, the Lords Justice all agreed. Unfortunately for Newcastle, he could only perceive himself as the sole dissenter in the Cabinet, and being in Hanover, he could not exploit the slight differences of opinion expressed on the issues by the Ministers in London. For example, Bedford reported a meeting in early

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[75] Yorke, i, 664-5. Pelham-Hardwicke, 8 August 1748.

August with Hardwicke and Pelham. He advised Newcastle they did not favour the Austrian Counter Proposal because

> ...it doth not seem to us to be at all adequate to the great point of view; which is, to restore a general peace to Europe after so long, bloody and expensive a war.[76]

Newcastle could not know the various smaller points that were likely to have been debated and resolved. Bedford only provided him with the final decision. In other letters, Bedford responded to Newcastle's dispatches:

> I have not failed taking the very first opportunity of communicating to the Chancellor and Mr Pelham their several contents, who have jointly with me, upon maturely considering the several points of business referred to us, concurred in submitting this our humble opinion to his Majesty.[77]

Bedford then succinctly laid out five decisions taken by the three active Ministers in London. Without any sense of the discussions leading up to these conclusions, Newcastle did not know the arguments which led to their formation. To him, with his tendency to paranoia, the Lords Justice in London were acting collectively against him.[78] Even his friend Hardwicke quoted from Bedford's letters!

> "You will observe in the Duke of Bedford's letter an Expression - "That this country cannot take upon

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[76] Bedford Correspondence, i, 431-6. Bedford-Newcastle, 5 August 1748.
[77] Bedford Correspondence, i, 454-8. Bedford-Newcastle, 12 August 1748.
[78] Walpole, Memoirs, i, 106-10.

> itself a perpetual onerous Engagement for maintaining the Barrier."[79]

Newcastle was able to persuade himself that the Ministers in London were acting in conjunction with each other against his interests. The opinion of the Ministers in London towards the Austrian counter-proposals for a peace settlement was firmly against Newcastle's support for the Court of Vienna. He was forced to accede, but not without throwing a minor temper tantrum in his correspondence to London. Pelham received numerous moaning letters from his brother. Hardwicke, a long-standing family friend, and a man of considerable conciliatory skills, tried to placate Newcastle. Newcastle had complained to the Lord Chancellor about not receiving a letter from him concerning the events in London. However, he went on to criticize Bedford for his advice:

> I less thought I should have received from my friends in my present difficult and delicate situation, so inconclusive, or, at the least, so uninforming an opinion as that contained in the Duke of Bedford's last letter. We all know peace is necessary. The question is, what peace will you take?[80]

Bedford was a safe person for Newcastle to attack openly because he was the only individual of the three who was unable to affect Newcastle's position in the Administration. Newcastle's anger over these

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[79] Add MS 32,716, ff. 46-50. Hardwicke-Newcastle, 12 August 1748.
[80] Yorke, i, 667-8. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 17/28 August 1748.

negotiations was vented on Bedford because he was unable to retaliate in any way to jeopardize Newcastle's tenure.

Pelham desired a definitive peace treaty as much as, if not more than, Bedford. Pelham did not want to face another session of Parliament without a conclusion to Britain's expensive involvement on the continent. The cost of war was simply too great. Pelham believed Newcastle was delaying the discussions at Aix in order "...to preserve a bigotted notion of Old System and the House of Austria..."[81] He tried to persuade his brother about the machinations of the Austrian negotiators.

> Dear Brother, are they mad att Vienna? or have they any subterfuge, which we cannot find out, and no one abroad has ever suggested?...I will venture to foretell this; we shall have a Peace, but not so good a one as we might have had the week after the Preliminarys were signed...[82]

Pelham laid the blame for all the delays in the discussions on the activities of the Austrians, particularly Count Kaunitz. Kaunitz steadfastly refused to participate in the discussions to transform the preliminary articles into a definitive treaty. The Ministers in London were adamant that a definitive peace treaty would be signed:

> ...great caution should be had not to leave the court of Vienna in an opinion that we either cannot or will not conclude without her, in case she continues obstinate, lest, upon that presumption,

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81 Yorke, i, 669. Pelham-Hardwicke, 21 August 1748.
82 Add. MS 32,716, ff. 76-9. Pelham-Newcastle, 19 August 1748.

> she should become more unreasonable and untractable.[83]

Newcastle was furious that his colleagues would agree to abandon Austria. He sent a passionate letter to London full of reproofs for his ill-treatment by the Lords Justice. Hardwicke responded in a conciliatory tone with 'hints of advice' concerning Newcastle's suspicions that the Lords Justice were acting in concert against him. Hardwicke first assured him that he had not personally seen Lords Harrington or Chesterfield since Newcastle left for Hanover.

> In the next place, though your Grace has combined in your answer, your brother's letter and mine, yet I assure you that there was no combination or concert in the writing of them. Neither have I so much as seen, or been privy to, any of Mr. Pelham's letters to your Grace, or he to any of mine...[84]

In response to Newcastle's complaint that the Lords Justice lacked confidence in his knowledge and abilities in business, Hardwicke went to the heart of Newcastle's fears:

> We all agree in the end: - to bring in the Court of Vienna. The difference of opinion is about the means of doing it...Your Grace's complaint of the conduct of your friends in England turns on two points:-
> 1. The not giving an express approbation of the measure taken to communicate to Count Kaunitz the projet, contreprojet and precis, and also the new projet of a definitive treaty.
> 2. The not giving you the satisfaction of concurring in censuring the behaviour of the King's

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83 Bedford Correspondence, i, 454-8. Bedford-Newcastle, 12 August 1748.
84 Yorke, i, 669-673. Hardwicke-Newcastle, 2 September 1748.

> minister at Aix in suspending the execution of, and representing against, his Majesty's orders.[85]

Hardwicke reiterated the opinion of Bedford and Pelham that if the Austrians refused to join with Britain in discussions of a treaty, then they could not expect to obtain uncensored information. Since their goal was to obstruct and defeat any proposals, the British plenipoteniaries would have an even greater difficulty in the negotiations. As for Sandwich's suspension of the discussions in order to clarify Newcastle's commands, Hardwicke pointed out that this was acceptable if the suspension did not inconvenience the King's service. However, he noted that Sandwich could have pursued matters in a better tone.

Newcastle digested this lengthy letter from Hardwicke and subsequently attempted to make up his disagreements with the Lords Justice at the end of August. He wrote to Bedford in early September that his problem with Sandwich was:

> ...now over; and Things seem to be going on, with all the Harmony, Cheerfulness and I hope, Success imaginable; and Your Grace knows I am not apt to remain long angry with My Friends.[86]

As a further inducement to re-instate their amicable relationship, Newcastle was pleased to advise Bedford

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[85] Yorke, i, 669-673. Hardwicke-Newcastle, 2 September 1748.
[86] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 96-7. Newcastle-Bedford, 21 August/1 September 1748.

that Halifax would be offered the seat as President of the Board of Trade. Newcastle was quick to point out that this appointment was through Bedford's personal efforts, and not Sandwich's.[87] Halifax was Sandwich's cousin, but Bedford had consistently lobbied for his appointment as President of the Board of Trade.[88] The Board of Trade was the committee of reference that examined and reported on the business of the colonies, while colonial affairs were directed by the King in Council. Bedford advised Halifax of this employment offer, and of his personal reasons for wishing Halifax to take up the place. First, on account of Halifax's 'application to and abilities in business', Bedford thought him to be the best person for the position. But also Bedford noted that "...I look upon it as a post of business, and useful business, and a good qualification for better and greater things; and the other..."[89] Bedford's success in arranging this appointment was an indication of his continuing favour with the King and with other members of the Administration.

Bedford worked diligently throughout September 1748 preparing the papers sent to London concerning the articles of peace. He wrote urgently to Hardwicke:

> Mr. Pelham and I are together, and having talked over the contents of the letters, I now send you, we have agreed to dispatch this Messenger immediately

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87 Add. MS 32,716, ff. 96-7. Newcastle-Bedford, 21 August/1 September 1748.
88 Bedford Micro, xxiii, ff. 49-53. Halifax-Bedford.
89 Bedford Correspondence, i, 497. Bedford-Halifax, 3 September 1748.

> to your Lordship to beg the favour of you to be in Town tomorrow...[90]

Hardwicke, Pelham and Bedford studied the voluminous materials sent in the dispatches from Holland and Hanover. French proposals, counter proposals, personal letters and various directives were read in order to form an opinion Bedford could transmit to Newcastle in the next post to Hanover. Bedford sent their detailed comments for Newcastle to present to the King.[91] Bedford, 'for the sake of Despatch', borrowed the habit of Lord Harrington by bringing the drafts of his proposed letters to the meetings of the Lords Justice at Powis House. This tactic facilitated general discussion, and alterations were immediately added to the text.[92] Bedford also maintained his interest in North America, and upon the appointment of Colonel E. Hopson as Governor of Nova Scotia, he directed Hopson to correspond officially with him.[93]

On 7/18 October 1748, France, England and Holland signed the Definitive Treaty of Peace. Spain signed it on 20 October, Austria on 23 October and Sardinia on 20 November. The British had to restore Louisbourg, but

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[90] Add. MS 35,590, ff. 145-6. Bedford-Hardwicke, 21 September 1748.

[91] Bedford Correspondence, i, 491-3. Bedford-Newcastle, 2 September 1748. SP 43/118. Bedford-Newcastle, 23 September 1748. Add. MS 32,716, ff. 335-6. Bedford Correspondence, i, 529-33.

[92] Add. MS 32,716, f. 341. Hardwicke-Newcastle, 23 September 1748.

[93] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 299-300. Hopson-Newcastle, 18 September 1748.

the French guaranteed the Protestant Succession in Britain. More importantly, however, the Netherlands were returned by France. As far as British interests were concerned, it was the best possible peace under the circumstances. Bedford wrote to Newcastle immediately upon receiving a copy of the text from his brother-in-law, Richard Leveson Gower, who had been dispatched with the news from Holland by Sandwich and his colleagues.

> As there appears to be very little variation between the treaty, as it is now signed, and the contre-projet of M. du Thiel, and as I have already informed your Grace of our opinions upon that in my despatch of 23d of September, I shall at present only take notice of those differences that have occurred to us in comparing the treaty and the projet together...[94]

Bedford outlined the main points as far as the Ministers in London were concerned. First they were worried that difficulties would arise concerning the Sardinians. The Austrians were not mentioned except in reference to the part of the 6th Article relating to the Dutch troops being placed in possession of towns in the Low Country which, before the war, belonged to Austria. The points with major alterations from the preliminary articles were relatively few. The fourth article regarding the exchange of prisoners of war within six weeks of ratification of the definitive treaty was in Britain's favour. In M. du Thiel's contre-projet,

> ...it was proposed that the prisoners should be sent back immediately upon the signature of the

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94 Bedford Correspondence, i, 558-64. Bedford-Newcastle, 14 October 1748.

definitive treaty, by which means they must have been all restored before the exchange of ratifications; whereas by the treaty...the sending back the prisoners is to keep pace with the making the restitutions and cessions, which seems to give good reason to think well of the sincerity of the French court, who doubtless are very desirous of getting home the great number of their seamen, of whom they stand in great need at present, and who are now prisoners of war in England.[95]

Bedford also informed Newcastle of the opinions of the Lords Justice regarding the secret article. The general concensus was a wish that it had not been insisted upon by the French, but that it was necessary to advise the King on his options. The sending of two hostages to the French Court to ensure the restitution of property in the colonies and other distant parts of the world was a serious consideration. Two peers of Great Britain who were also officers in the army, above the rank of lieutenant-colonel, were suggested as the most appropriate individuals to send in this undertaking. Bedford ended his comments about the treaty by congratulating Newcastle on his great work in concluding the peace.[96]

Newcastle accepted all accolades for this peace treaty. He wrote to Pelham:

> I have the secret comfort of thinking that I have not only greatly, not to say almost singly, brought it about, but that if I had not resolutely, & in a manner that has been disapproved by you all, taken upon me to overrule my Lord Sandwich in the way he

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95 Bedford Correspondence, i, 558-64. Bedford-Newcastle, 14 October 1748.

96 Bedford Correspondence, i, 558-64. Bedford-Newcastle, 14 October 1748.

> was going, things would, must have been now in the greatest confusion; perhaps no treaty signed at all, or at best, one that would have had no effect, but to destroy the old alliance...[97]

Pelham could hardly bear his brother's self-congratulatory nature. When writing to Bedford to advise that Lord Sussex and Lord Home were to be the hostages sent to the French Court, Pelham said "I wish to God my good brother would be satisfied with what will naturally fall to his share, if he will not call for it."[98] Newcastle would not follow such advice. He wrote Bedford thanking him for his 'most obliging' compliments on his endeavours to conclude the treaty. "I was too much honoured with your Grace's opinion not to show your letter to the King. I have endeavoured to do my duty in the best manner I was able."[99] The treaty of Aix la Chapelle was Newcastle's achievement when the compliments were flowing.

The definitive treaty of Aix la Chapelle was the realization of the goals of the advocates for peace within the Administration.[100] For the most part, its signing in the autumn of 1748 was greeted with joy by the members of the Ministry.[101] Even Newcastle

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97 Coxe, Memoirs, ii, 325.
98 Bedford Correspondence, i, 570-2. Pelham-Bedford, n.d.
99 Bedford Correspondence, i, 574-5. Newcastle-Bedford, 19/30 October 1748.
100 See British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689-1789, (7 vols), pt. 5, France, 1745-89, xi, for view that the peace settled nothing.
101 See State of the Nation, 38, for complaints about the treaty.

congratulated Sandwich on his efforts during the negotiations.

> ...it is impossible to be better pleased, or more gracious, than the King is upon the Occasion; and I hope & believe, we shall find the same in England, where their Joy will be, at least, equal to their Surprise, that we shall return home, with a general peace, almost to the Satisfaction of All Parties...[102]

Bedford also wrote Sandwich a private letter congratulating him on his ability to conclude a more favourable definitive treaty than had been anticipated in London.

> ...I congratulate you on having concluded the great work of peace, and that you have brought it about in such a manner, as not to leave the superiority the French have had over us in the field appear too glaringly in the treaty...There is nothing but the secret article that disturbs me: our submitting to that, however necessary, is undoubtedly mortifying...[103]

Bedford's reference to the secret article requiring two hostages to be sent to the French Court was the one immediately disagreeable point. That two British subjects were to remain at the French Court until all the articles relating to overseas possessions were fulfilled, was humiliating. Despite this article, however, the Ministers in London applauded Sandwich's signing of the definitive treaty.[104]

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[102] Add. MS 32,815, ff. 53-4. Newcastle-Sandwich, 11/22 October 1748.
[103] Bedford Correspondence, i, 565. Bedford-Sandwich, 17 October 1748.
[104] Coxe, Memoirs, ii, 330.

There were no initial complaints about the omission of articles addressing the question of trade between Spain and Britain.[105] The protection of commerce had been the impetus for the War of Jenkin's Ear in 1739. Bedford had been one of the leading advocates demanding the protection of British seamen, in particular the merchants of London, against the search and seizure methods of the Spanish Guarda Costas in American Seas.[106] The question of the right of 'free navigation' of the seas became important due to concerns that Britain's foreign trade was declining as a result of Spanish interference. Merchants as well as pamphleteers encouraged the Ministers to take military action in 1739 to redress the depredations affecting this perceived trade imbalance.[107]

In January 1746, the King's speech to Parliament had noted:

> ...The great advantages which we have received from our naval strength, in protecting the commerce of my subjects, and intercepting & distressing that of our enemies...I am therefore determined to be particularly attentive to this important service...[108]

During this session of Parliament a Bill to repeal the act prohibiting commerce with Spain was introduced, but

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105 Add. MS 35,354, ff. 395-6.
106 Wilkes, 15. Newcastle also advocated action, but from within the Walpole Administration.
107 The State of the Nation, 21-2. Sir M. Decker, An Essay on the Causes of the Decline of Foreign Trade...(Dublin, 1749), 7-10.
108 Debrett, Proceedings, ii, 14 January 1746.

did not reach its third reading. Two petitions from merchants trading to Portugal, Spain, Italy and the West Indies who claimed more than 150,000 pounds against unjust seizures by the Spanish were ordered to lie upon the table.[109] Despite paying lip-service to the interests of the American merchants, the Ministers were more concerned with the questions relating to the European conflict. The trade war with Spain had been subsumed by the 'diplomatic' engagements with Austria and France, and the attention of the Ministers was diverted as a result. Newcastle had authorized Benjamin Keene, the British envoy at the court in Lisbon, "...to try to negotiate a separate peace with Spain..." in May 1747, but Spain's close relationship with France blocked that plan.[110] Trade questions were considered quietly by Ministers but it was not until December 1748 that complaints from the opposition returned them to the top of the agenda. The lack of any articles redressing the problem with the Spanish Guarda Costas, in particular, was raised in the House of Commons.[111] Even then, however, the omission by Sandwich of any confirmation of Dodington's Treaty of 1715, a fact that materially affected Britain's commercial relationship with Spain,

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109 Commons Journal, xxv, 289, 297.
110 Descriptive List of the State Papers Portugal in the Public Record Office, London, ii, 1724-80, 269. SP 89/46, f. 114. Newcastle-Keene, 12 May 1747. See also Coxe, Memoirs, i, 363, for comment that Spain was also anxious to renew her commercial relations with Britain, and that the Spanish Court sent General Wall to London for secret negotiations.
111 R. Lodge, ed., Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, K.B., (Cambridge, 1933), 4.

was not discussed except by the members of the Administration.[112]

In 1713, the Utrecht treaty to end the war of Spanish Succession confirmed French commercial agreements with Britain, but a separate negotiation had to be carried out with Spain. Previously, the Asiento contract for the provision of slaves to America by Britain's South Sea Company had been signed on 26 March 1713, and was confirmed by the 12th article of the Utrecht treaty. In 1715, George Bubb Dodington negotiated a commercial agreement with Spain resulting in navigation and commercial access to Spanish markets for British merchants, including a lucrative annual ship licensed by the Spanish King, to sell merchandise to South American markets. This agreement was commonly referred to as Dodington's Treaty. Although Lord Chancellor Hardwicke argued that this treaty of 1715 was also covered by the 8th article of the 1713 Utrecht treaty, and was thereby renewed in the 1748 Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, there was doubt amongst the British ministers as to its renewal. When Spain claimed it was no longer valid, a new commercial agreement to clarify matters was deemed appropriate.

Bedford, as Secretary of State for the Southern Department, and not Pelham as has been suggested, took

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112 Add. MS 32,815, ff. 285-6. Newcastle-Robinson, 6 December 1748.

direction of this matter.[113] Bedford wrote to Benjamin Keene in early May 1748 advising that the King was going to Hanover, with Newcastle in attendance. He ordered Keene to direct his letters to Newcastle in Hanover "...and at the same time send Duplicates of Them to me..."[114] Keene was still in Lisbon at the time, and discussions concerning the Assiento between Sandwich and the Spanish representative at Aix resulted in the decision to send Keene to the Court at Madrid to negotiate this point separately from the definitive treaty.[115] Bedford was pleased to send Keene to Madrid. He advised Newcastle that "...I really know no other Person in England equally capable of it..."[116] Keene's previous experience at the Court in Madrid from 1727 to 1739 included the negotiations for the Treaty of Seville ratified in 1729. His term in Lisbon, from 1746 to 1748, allowed him to follow events at the Spanish Court, and therefore made him the ideal choice for Bedford to rely upon during these negotiations to reach an agreement on the points omitted from the definitive treaty.

The seriousness of these omissions concerned Sandwich. He justified his decision to omit the points relating to Britain's commercial relations with Spain to Newcastle before the signing of the definitive treaty.

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113 See Wilkes, 175.
114 Add. MS 32,812, f. 147. Bedford-Keene, 3 May 1748.
115 SP 43/117. Newcastle-Bedford, 9 June 1748. SP 43/117. Bedford-Newcastle, 14 June 1748. SP 43/117. Newcastle-Bedford 29 June/10 July 1748.
116 SP 43/118. Bedford-Newcastle, 20 July 1748.

> As to the affair of the assiento, I am sorry that any Difficulty should have arose upon that article, to be sure if the Circumstances that attended the Conclusion of the Preliminaries could have admitted a more explicit Explanation in our favour or the Renewal of Mr. Dodington's Treaty, that Matter would not have been left in its present State of Indecision. But it was a matter not to be touched at that time, & as Count Bentinck, who was present very well knows the Article itself as it stands in the Preliminaries, was very near preventing our Conclusion, after we imagined that everything had been agreed to.[117]

The French negotiators were well aware of the potential disadvantages to their own trade, and refused to include this article. Since the Dutch were willing to sign the treaty without any reference to this point, Sandwich decided to drop the article concerning the Asiento. He assured Bedford:

> I am sure the South Sea Company cannot complain of our having neglected their interests; for we were within a hair's breadth of breaking off the negotiation for having insisted too strongly upon the insertion of the explanation demanded in their favour by the renewal of Doddington's treaties...[118]

The Asiento, and the whole issue of trade with Spain, revolved around the South Sea Company. Even before the definitive treaty was ratified, Bedford was concerned with their case. Keene, upon accepting the appointment to the Court of Spain in August 1748, hoped that:

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117 PRO 30/50/45, f. 11. Sandwich-Newcastle, 11 August 1748.

118 Bedford Correspondence, i, 526-8. Bedford-Sandwich, 26 September 1748.

> ...the Directors of the South Sea Company will name as soon as they can some intelligent Person to be their Agent at Madrid, with documents and Instructions to enter into the detail of their accounts and Pretensions with the Court of Spain In which I will be as serviceable to him as I am able...[119]

Keene did not arrive in Madrid until 13 January 1748/9, but the Directors never appointed an individual to plead their case to the Spanish Ministers. Keene was left to negotiate on their behalf with directions from Bedford in London. Prior to arriving in Madrid, Keene had actively prepared himself for the achievement of the British objectives in the forthcoming negotiations. From Lisbon, he kept a close eye on the attitudes being expressed at the Spanish Court. Therefore he was able to advise Bedford of the joy of the King and his Ministers at the Madrid Court at the signing of the peace treaty.[120] Before he began his journey to Madrid, Bedford directed him on how to respond when the Spanish King would not acknowledge that the 1715 Treaty had been renewed by the 3rd article of the Aix treaty. Upon first meeting the members of the Court, Bedford advised Keene to

> ...show the greatest surprise at this idea of the Spanish ministry's having a design to impair the privileges of the British nation, grounded on the omission of this treaty in the enumeration of those renewed in the present...[121]

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[119] Add. MS 32,814, ff. 19. Keene-Bedford, 27 August 1748. Bedford Micro, xxiv. Keene-Bedford, 27 August 1748.

[120] Add. MS 32,815, f. 151. Keene-Bedford, 9 November 1748.

[121] Bedford Correspondence, i, 586-8. Bedford-Keene, 8 December 1748.

In order to give Keene clear directions, Bedford discussed the whole question of the renewal of the previous treaties with his colleagues. Newcastle was little help. He simply blamed Sandwich for not following his original orders. The faults of the Aix la Chapelle treaty were all Sandwich's.

> There is one pritty material omission, originally, by Inattention and Hurry. The not Confirming Doddington's Treaty of 1715, may...be an ugly Affair. To the best of my Remembrance, in my original Order to Lord Sandwich, Doddington's Treaties were amongst Those, that were to be renewed...(this omission)...will greatly affect our Trade, and create great uneasiness...[122]

Despite the minor inconvenience of having to negotiate a separate agreement, Newcastle hoped that Keene could detach the Court of Spain from the French. He thought that Keene should use these negotiations to obtain 'most favoured nation status' for Britain which would irritate the French. Hopefully the two nations would quit their alliance thereby reframing the 'Old System' of European diplomacy in Austria's favour.[123] The peace had signalled new conditions where previous theories about the European balance of power had been completely upset.[124] Newcastle did not see this point immediately, and continued to search in vain for the means to restore the 'Old System' of foreign policy.[125] Hardwicke provided Bedford with his more considered observations on

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122 Add. MS 32,815, ff. 285-6. Newcastle-Robinson, 6 December 1748. Lodge, Keene, 22.
123 Add. MS 32,815, ff. 289-90. Newcastle-Keene, 8 December 1748.
124 Innes, Britain and Her Rivals, 72.
125 Lodge, Studies..., 410-1.

the question of the various treaties of commerce with Spain, and with France. He concluded that the treaties of commerce with France were renewed, and that the treaties with Spain were 'understood' to be renewed by the present treaty.

> ...what Treaties of Commerce with France, and Spain, are virtually so renewed?...The Assiento Contract was made at Madrid the 26th of March 1713...The Treaty of Peace was made at Utrecht with Spain in July 1713...By the 12th Article, the Assiento Contract...is confirmed...By the 8th It is provided, "That there be a free Use of Navigation and Commerce, as it was in the Time of Peace...In the Treaty of Madrid 1721 The Three Explanatory Articles of the Treaty of Commerce at Utrecht are considered as having been annulled. At the breaking out of this War, Commerce, between the two Nations stood upon the Treaties of 1667, December: 1713, which the three Explantory Articles annulled, and 1715. No Complaint ever was made of an Infraction of these Commercial Treaties; No Question concerning Them was any Part of the Cause of the War; Therefore it is not to be supposed They were intended to be altered or derogated from, at the Peace.[126]

Therefore, Hardwicke advised Bedford, the 8th article of the Aix treaty renewed the commercial regulations in operation at the start of the war in 1739. Yet the British 'understanding' that commercial relations were restored to their pre-war existence was not adequate to counter the Court of Spain's assertion of the invalidity of Dodington's treaty. To emphasize their assertion, they laid additional duties upon British goods entering Spanish markets. Bedford complained to Keene:

> ...I have received the inclosed Papers relating to the additional Duties laid by the Court of Spain

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126 Add. MS 35,410, ff. 109-13. Observations on the Treaties of Commerce with France and Spain. January 1748/9.

upon all English Goods in that Kingdom. I shall constantly transmit to you any lights I shall receive in relation to this Affair, which may the better enable you to assert the Rights of His Majesty's Trading Subjects, & to insist that the Trade between the two Nations should be on the same Footing, as it was before the War.[127]

Keene's arrival in Madrid in January 1749 was welcomed by the members of the Spanish Court. The King gave him an audience on 17 February 1749, and the two Ministers of State greeted him warmly. Don Josef de Carvajal, the 'Ministro del Estado' was in charge of all foreign affairs, and was enthusiastically promoting Spanish commerce, with limited success. The other minister, the Marquis de Ensenada, was the Queen's favourite. She directed the King, according to Keene's sources of information. Ensenada therefore had pretensions to being master of all the Court offices, and this created intense jealousies with Carvajal. Keene anticipated their stormy relationship as one of the greatest difficulties facing him during the negotiations.[128] Bedford notified Keene that George II advised him to "...cultivate...the friendship and confidence of those Spanish Ministers, and transact your business with them...by word of mouth, rather than...in writing."[129] Keene however had a difficult time getting the Spanish Ministers to discuss the question seriously. Three months later in April 1749, Keene had not achieved

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127 Add. MS 43,423, ff. 26-7. Bedford-Keene, 19 January 1748/9.
128 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 5-10. Keene-Bedford, 25 February 1749.
129 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 27-9. Bedford-Keene, 11 May 1749.

much in the way of a possible commercial treaty between the two nations.

Bedford, in an attempt to move the negotiations along, referred Keene to the declaration signed by Sandwich and the Spanish minister at Aix la Chapelle in the previous June. That declaration, according to Bedford, indicated that the question of the four years of the Asiento and the annual ship suspended because of the war, would be negotiated by the Spanish prior to deciding compensation for the South Sea Company. If these negotiations were not successful, or if the Company was not satisfied with the compensation offered, "...the company is then undoubtedly entitled to demand the usual cedulas for the carrying on their trade for the four years that are yet to come."[130] The immediate problem for Bedford was that he did not have the South Sea Company's opinion on the points for negotiation. A year earlier the Directors of the Company had outlined their demands on the Spanish Court for compensation. They asked Bedford to request payment of 1,367,387 pounds and 3.0 & 1/2, from the King, as well as demanding their right to carry merchandise up to a weight of 4950 Spanish tons to South America.[131] During these negotiations, however, they kept a low profile. They appeared to want Bedford to find out what the Court of Spain was willing to offer before announcing their own position. Bedford

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130 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 29-30. Bedford-Keene, 11 May 1749.

131 Add. MS 25,561, ff. 103-7. Add. MS 32,718, ff. 86-90. South Sea Company-Bedford, 16 February 1748.

carefully acknowledged in his letters to Keene that he would consult with the Directors of the Company on any points concerning their interests. By mid-May, he was able to give Keene some general directions. The four main points Bedford believed Keene should be discussing with the Spanish Ministers were:

> 1. the demand of the South Sea Company of the cedulas for the re-establishment of the asiento;
> 2. the increase of the evaluation of British commodities brought into the ports of Spain;
> 3. the omission of the specific treaty; and
> 4. the hint thrown out...by M. Ensenada, that it was now time to talk of the points depending between the two nations particularly freedom of navigation.[132]

On the first point, Bedford postponed giving further direction until he had talked fully with the Directors of the Company. As to the second point, Bedford explained that the Ministers in London hoped to return British trade with Spain to the same footing it was before the war. The recent imposition of higher duties on British commodities was framed in such a way as to allow arbitrary decisions by the Spanish to prohibit British merchandise altogether, and therefore could not be accepted by the British. Bedford advised Keene that as he was well-acquainted with the Court and the arguments to be used to persuade them to change, Bedford would not presume to give him advice on that matter. However he did outline the general framework for Keene to operate within.

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132 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 29-30. Bedford-Keene, 11 May 1749.

> ...the shewing the Spanish ministers that in case they really mean what they profess to do, that is, the uniting the two courts in the same degree of harmony and friendship as formerly subsisted betwixt them, and which is so necessary for them both, they should follow the same maxims, wtih regard to commerce, as their predecessors did...there are at present under the consideration of...[the King's]...servants, some advantages...for the easier introduction of some Spanish commodities into the British dominions, as well in Europe as in America.[133]

Concerning point three, the omission of the specific renewal of Doddington's Treaty, Bedford addressed the 'hint' thrown out by Ensenada. Since Spain had omitted the guarantee of the Italian possessions, the Minister suggested an arrangement could be reached to rectify the omissions to the satisfaction of both nations. Bedford cautioned Keene against pursuing this further. It would generate great difficulties because all the signatories to the definitive treaty would need to be included. Bedford encouraged Keene to judge for himself whether following up this hint would bring benefits to Britain, but warned that:

> ...France, our great rival in trade, shall see it in the light of obtaining the renewal of an advantageous commercial treaty to us, from that power over whom they have so long had an ascendant, and which they are at present so jealous of losing...[134]

Finally Bedford told Keene that if the Spanish ministers would not acknowledge the 'actual or virtual' existence

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[133] Bedford Correspondence, ii, 30-5. Bedford-Keene, 11 May 1749

[134] Bedford Correspondence, ii, 30-5. Bedford-Keene, 11 May 1749.

of Doddington's treaty of 1715, then he should set about obtaining a similar new treaty of 'friendship and commerce'. This would hopefully resolve point four and the question of the freedom of navigation. Bedford confided that this would remove a 'great bone of contention' and would eliminate "...the Spaniards taking such violent measures, by means of their guarda costas, in searching our ships and committing such depredations on our merchants as were the causes of the last war."[135]

Depredations against British merchant ships continued throughout these negotiations. Bedford reported an incident to Keene where an English merchant vessel had been searched by a commander calling himself a guarda costa from a ship under Spanish colours ten to eleven leagues southwest of the island of Nevis in the West Indies. Bedford didn't believe that his orders came from the Spanish Court; however, he wanted Keene to find out who was responsible for this transgression.

> But however as it is scarcely probable, that he would ever have dared to have acted So insolent a Part without doing it under some Superior Authority; by enquiring into the Affair you will soon find from whence that Authority came & from whomsoever it did come whether from the Governor of Porto Rico, or any other Spanish Governor or Commander in those Parts.[136]

The problem of controlling the activities of agents acting in the Americas needed to be addressed. Bedford

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135 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 30-5. Bedford-Keene, 11 May 1749.

136 Bedford Micro, xxiv, ff. 48-50. Bedford-Keene, 6 July 1749.

demanded that whoever ordered the search of the British vessel should be immediately reprimanded by the Spanish Court for the insult because:

> You know how extremely jealous this Nation is of the least Encroachment of this Nature, & the Spaniards know it too; the least Spark of this sort, may, if not timely prevent, kindle a Flame it will be impossible to extinguish, without great Loss & danger to both Kingdoms.[137]

There were no repercussions in Britain from this specific incident. Affairs in Madrid continued to proceed slowly, and at times 'frivolously and childishly' according to Bedford, who regularly corresponded with Keene. In July, the Spanish Ministers suggested 'a treaty by connivance' without anything actually being signed.[138] Bedford laughed off this preposterous suggestion. But the Spanish Ministers were not the only individuals unwilling to commit themselves to a proposal at this stage of the negotiations.

The Asiento agreement, signed in 1713, allowed the South Sea Company to transport 4,800 slaves each year to the Spanish West Indies. The agreement was to run for 30 years, and the Company agreed to pay the King of Spain a duty of 33 1/3 Pessos Excudos de Platta for each individual sold. According to one article in that treaty, if the Company paid the duty promptly, they would only be required to pay duty on 4,000 of the 4,800

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[137] Bedford Micro, xxiv, ff. 48-50. Bedford-Keene, 6 July 1749.

[138] Bedford Correspondence, ii, ff. 36-9. Bedford-Keene, 13 July 1749.

slaves. Aside from the Company's demands for reimbursement of the four years remaining of the agreement, suspended during the war from 1739 to 1743, and for the payment of various debts owed by the King of Spain, there was confusion over the actual amount of duty owed to the King of Spain. He claimed the duty of the additional 800 slaves because the Company was not paying enough duty and thereby nullifying the relevant article. Their disagreement arose over the value of coins. The Pesso Excudo de Platta still existed in Spain in 1748/9, but confusion arose when the Real de Platta, eight of which equalled one Pesso Excudo de Platta, was recalled from use in Old Spain in 1725. This 'Piece of Eight' as it was called in England, remained legal tender in the American colonies, and the Company received payment for the slaves in this coinage. So they paid the duty in this tender at the rate of eight for each of the Pessos Excudos de Platta. In 1726, the Spanish King minted a new small coin to replace the old Reales de Platta. This coin was valued at 10 to one Pesso Excudo de Platta. The South Sea Company, since 1726, had paid the required duty, but in the old Reales de Platta at the rate of eight per Pesso Excudo de Platta. The King demanded 10 in light of the new rate for the new coin. The South Sea Company protested that they still received the same value for the slaves they sold in the West Indies, in the same old coins, and therefore would only remit the eight Reales de Platta per Pesso Excudo de Platta for the 4,000 slaves as duty. The King considered this to violate the

article concerning prompt payment, and demanded the duty on the remaining 800 slaves sold for every year from 1726. The Directors of the South Sea Company protested against this decision, and would not pay.[139]

Bedford met Peter Burrell, a Sub-Governor of the South Sea Company, several times to discuss their accounts with the Spanish King without being able to obtain any formal proposals to submit to Keene. The South Sea Company Directors wanted Keene to have the Spanish Ministers formulate a proposal to send to England so that they could judge what compensation the Spanish were willing to give for the four years remaining of the Asiento "...and what proposals they would have made for the payment of the vast debt undoubtedly due to the company."[140] Bedford met Bristow and Burrell again on 27 July 1749, but they still refused to provide any proposal without going first to a General Court of the Company. Bedford decided that he 'understood the ideas of the gentlemen in the direction of the Company's affairs' enough to provide Keene with a brief sketch to take the lead in the initial discussions with the Spanish ministers.

Bedford said the liquidation of the debt owed to the Company by the Court of Spain was the base upon which any

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[139] Add. MS 19,034, ff. 82-3. Memorandum South Sea Company, n.d.

[140] Bedford Correspondence, ii, 36-9. Bedford-Keene, 13 July 1749.

agreement 'must be built'. He suggested Keene ascertain whether the King was willing to meet that debt first.

> When the Debt shall be so liquidated it is very certain the amount of it will be very considerable and more than it is expected the King of Spain will be willing, or perhaps able to acquit at once. It is therefore suggested, as an ease to the Spanish Court...that the present Assiento of Negroes be extended to the Company free from any payment of duties for such a Term of Years...to extinguish the whole debt.[141]

The South Sea Company also wanted the renewal of the 'cedulas' or licences for the annual ship, but was less concerned with this point than the question of reimbursement of past debts. Finally, the Directors, according to Bedford, requested that the approbation of the Crown, as well as the Court of the proprietors of the South Sea Company be received before ratification of any agreement.[142] Bedford was sympathetic to the aims of the South Sea Company, and ensured that Keene knew their concerns and demands. Commercial interests lay at the heart of Bedford's policies. Newcastle was less willing to consider these interests. His preoccupations centred on the diplomatic issues of the Courts of Europe. He saw the possible commercial agreement between Britain and Spain as an opportunity to split the close relationship between France and Spain. Newcastle wanted Keene to bring things to a quick and successful end. He demanded

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[141] Bedford Micro, xxv, ff. 10-11. Bedford-Keene, 17 August 1749.
[142] Bedford Micro, xxv, ff. 12-3. Enclosure, 17 August 1749.

the renewal of the treaty of 1715, or the signing of a similar agreement as soon as possible. He thought

> ...The Affair of the South Sea Company is...a mere Trifle, & ought to be treated as Such. If it can help us, in the Other; That is the best, and only, use, that can be made of it...[143]

To Newcastle the terms were unimportant if an agreement achieved the alienation of Spain from France. He could only see that such a fracture would strengthen Britain's European allies. Any constitutional considerations arising as a result of his recommendation escaped Newcastle's notice.

Therefore when the Spanish Court advised that they would consent to sign a new Treaty, based on 'all the advantages' of the 1715 treaty, in exchange for the British giving up the annual ship for four years, and for the cancellation of the respective demands of the South Sea Company and the King of Spain, Newcastle was enthusiastic. He advised Hardwicke that the Spanish Ministers

> ...would then own, Their having granted us Privileges which <u>no other Nation</u> should enjoy; but that we had purchased Them by our Annual Ship &c This in Effect, comes up to the use, which Yr lordship, and I, always hoped to make of the South Sea Company's affair; For Nobody could expect really to gain any Thing by the Adjustment of their long perplex'd account with Spain; and if this Scheme is really, and soon brought into Execution, I think it must lay a Foundation for a real Disunion,

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[143] Add. MS 35,410, ff. 140-57. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 2, 6, 10 September 1749.

> and Separation, of the Court of Spain from France;...[144]

Newcastle could not foresee that the directors or proprietors of the South Sea Company would not readily agree to such a plan unless their debts were compensated by the British Ministers for claims given up for the 'National Advantage'.[145] Bedford advised Keene to continue discussing the terms of the treaty, but suggested he might try to find some terms with which to buy off the South Sea Company.[146] He did not want to abandon the Company's case. Newcastle wrote to Keene on the same day, advising that:

> ...Any Douceur for the South Sea Company; or any clear, demonstrable, Advantage, in Commerce, to the exclusion of France & any other Nation; would in my Opinion, justify your going great Lengths...For, in reality, I don't apprehend, The Company will ever get much, either by their long, old, stale Demands, or by their Annual Ship, for Four years only.[147]

Despite Newcastle's pleas for an immediate agreement, the discussions continued slowly into a second year. In February 1749/50, Bedford advised Keene that the London ministers could not rightly accept a renunciation of the demands of the South Sea Company without compensation from the Spanish. However Bedford suggested that the accounts needed to be settled 'once and for all'. He

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144 Add. MS 32,719, ff. 193-8. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 29 September 1749.
145 Add. MS 32,719, ff. 205-6. Hardwicke-Newcastle, 2 October 1749.
146 SP 44/130, f.381. Bedford-Keene, 26 October 1749.
147 Add. MS 32,819, ff. 37-9. Newcastle-Keene, 26 October 1749.

recommended a demand for reimbursement for losses, while dropping the question of a restitution of the four years for the annual ship.[148] Pelham had noted in the fo of Commons that he doubted the Company would find it worth their while to re-enter that trade for only four years:

> ...because they must at first be at a great expense in sending out factors, and establishing factories, at the several Spanish ports in America, where the trade is to be carried on, and this expence could not probably be made good by a trade which was to last but 4 years.[149]

The Directors of the Company had given earlier indications that their major concern was the settlement of the debts, rather than the guarantee of four more years trading. The British Ministers were willing to give up the four years of the annual ship to reach an agreement with the Spanish court, but, as Bedford advised Keene, they could not legally renounce the debts owed to the South Sea Company without their agreement. Bedford noted that the sum required was so trifling, a matter of 200,000 pounds or 300,000 pounds, and argued that the Spanish Ministers were "...absurd to suppose that general National Advantages can be gained...by sacrificing the particular Interests of Individuals, esp. without making Them a compensation for it."[150] But the Spanish Ministers remained obstinate, and the negotiations slowed

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148 Add. MS 43,424, ff. 30-3. Bedford-Keene, 12 February 49/50.
149 Debrett, Proceedings, i, 398.
150 Add. MS 43,424, ff. 34-8. Bedford-Keene, 12 February 1749/50.

once again. In a further effort to prod things along, Bedford wrote to Keene that 38 million pounds was subscribed in Britain for the reduction of the interest on the National Debt. He predicted that soon the interest on the whole 57 million pounds would be reduced to 3 1/2 percent per annum, and noted hopefully that "This is such an Addition to the Credit and Strength of this Nation...and must greatly tend to increase his Majesty's Weight and Influence abroad..."[151] Although hoping to hear that this news positively affected the Spanish attitude towards the negotiations, Bedford did not receive any reaction from Madrid. He did however receive an unexpected favourable response to this news from the British Factory at Lisbon where it impressed the Portuguese.[152] It was also through the Court at Lisbon that Bedford heard that a secret treaty had been negotiated between Spain and Portugal in January 1750. It concerned the surrender of Nova Colonia to the Spanish in return for territory in South America. As well it settled various disputes between the two nations that had arisen since the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494.[153] The British negotiations with Spain throughout 1749 may have been of secondary importance for the Spanish Ministers until this treaty was ratified.

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[151] Add. MS 43424, ff. 76-7. Bedford-Keene, 5 March 1749/50.
[152] Descriptive List of the State Papers Portugal in the Public Record Office, London, ii, 1724-80, 281. SP 89/47, f. 91. Russell-Bedford, 10 April 1750.
[153] Descriptive List..., ii, 1724-80, 281. SP 89/47, f. 85. Castres-Bedford, 13 March 1750. Descriptive List..., ii, 282. SP 89/47, f. 101. Castres-Bedford, 27 April 1750.

The pace of negotiations picked up somewhat throughout the summer of 1750, but little progress was visible. Newcastle still wished Keene would give up the demands of the South Sea Company so that a special trade status for Britain could be obtained.[154] Newcastle wanted a commercial agreement to be reached quickly because it would help him attain his personal goals in the diplomatic arena. It is also possible that the state of British commerce concerned him. A pamphlet on the causes of the decline of foreign trade published in 1749 outlined the symptoms indicating the decline of British trade in the author's opinion. These symptoms included the decay of the woollen manufacturing, the condition of the poor, the number of bankruptcies, as well as the exchange rate and scarcity of money.[155] In the 4th of August edition of The Bristol Weekly Intelligencer, a report from Amsterdam complained of the stagnation of trade in Europe. The writer blamed the French for glutting the markets in Flanders, Brabant, and Hamburg with their American commodities. "The principal trading towns of France are in great distress, on account of the bad condition of their West India Trade, as well as by reason of the unprofitable dealings they have with us."[156] With widely circulating reports of 18 to 20

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[154] Add. MS 43,424, ff. 204-9. Newcastle-Keene, 22 August/2 September 1750.
[155] Sir Matthew Decker, An Essay on the Causes of the Decline of Foreign Trade, Consequently of the Value of the Lands of Britain, and on the Means to Restore Both, begun in the year 1739, (Dublin, 1749), 9-10.
[156] Bristol Weekly Intelligencer, No. 45, 4 August 1750.

bankruptcies alone at Bordeaux, Newcastle, who was again in Hanover with the King for the summer, most likely promoted a 'special trade status' with Spain to help British merchants. The possibility that he wished to add to the difficulties of the French economy should also be considered. Bedford wanted an agreement to improve British commercial prospects as well, but he refused to abandon the South Sea Company's demands so easily.

In August 1750, Bedford sent directions to Keene to "...bring things to a final adjustment between the two nations..."[157] The Spanish Ministers wanted to limit to six years the 'most favoured nation' status they were willing to give Britain. Bedford argued that this amounted to pretending that the treaty of 1715 never existed, and would therefore result in putting British merchants in a worse, rather than better, position. He iterated that

> The treaty of 1687, the foot our commerce was upon in the time of Charles II of Spain, which is confirmed to us by the 8th article of the treaty of Utrecht, all which treaties are specifically confirmed in the last, of Aix la Chapelle, leave the commerce of this country with Spain in a situation much preferable to that now proposed to us by M. de Carvajal.[158]

Bedford advised Keene to offer Carvajal the option of limiting the number of years for the further compensation such as:

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157 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 51-7. Add. MS 43,424, f. 212. Bedford-Keene, 30 August 1750.

158 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 51-7. Add. MS 43,424, f. 212. Bedford-Keene, 30 August 1750.

> ...some farther gratias and indulgences in commerce than what has ever been before granted to this or any other nation. Those it might not be unreasonable to limit...but I can assure you his Majesty will never consent to the limitation for a term of years of privileges which his subjects have a right to enjoy in perpetuity.[159]

Bedford then turned his attention to the secret article suggested by Carvajal proposing the debts owed to and by the South Sea Company be paid sub silentio. In this secret article, George II would agree not to use his royal authority to support the company in their applications to the Court of Madrid. Bedford and the Lords Justice in London thought this article would be improper, and would deprive the King's subjects of necessary protection with regard to foreign powers. Bedford rejected this proposal outright, and argued that it was better to give up the South Sea Company openly rather than in such a secret manner. Since both of Carvajal's proposals were rejected outright by the Lords Justice in London, Bedford suggested that Keene propose that the Spanish Ministers proceed to an agreement based on his own counter-proposal. Bedford's counter-proposal confirmed all the privileges granted to the British under the treaty of 1667, and the treaties of Utrecht and 1715. He recommended a compensation of 200,000 pounds for the South Sea Company to give up their right to four more years of an annual ship and the Asiento contract, as well the debt owed by the King. In exchange for these terms,

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159 Bedford Correspondence, ii. Add. MS 43,424, f. 212. Bedford-Keene, 30 August 1750.

Bedford informed Keene that the Ministers in London would consent to the omission of any article excluding other nations from 'most favoured nation trade status'.[160] The Spanish had complained about the appearance of having to pay Britain for the privilege of granting them special trade status. Bedford was willing to give up the special status for Britain in exchange for the satisfaction of the South Sea Company claims. But if the negotiations with the Spanish Court continued to meet with difficulties, Bedford told Keene, in strict confidence, "...that you are hereby authorized to reduce...the compensation to be given by the court of Spain to the South Sea Company as low as 100,000 [pounds]."[161] Bedford believed that such a reduction would bring about a quick settlement. He also provided Keene with the authority to follow a third course of action if the Spanish remained obstinate. He said:

> ...that the King should give up all the claims and demands of any of his subjects arising from seizures, reprisals, &c, which it is certain is all that his Majesty can do consistent with the laws and constitution of this country, unless the court of Spain will enable him to give up the debts of the company by granting a compensation to them.[162]

On 5 October 1750, the Treaty of Madrid was finally concluded. Bedford's second option in his counter-project was accepted with Keene's improvements. Britain

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160 Bedford Correspondence, ii. Add. MS 43,424, f. 212. Bedford-Keene, 30 August 1750.
161 Bedford Correspondence, ii. Add. MS 43,424, f. 212. Bedford-Keene, 30 August 1750.
162 Bedford Correspondence, ii. Add. MS 43,424, f. 212. Bedford-Keene, 30 August 1750.

regained the 'most favoured nation' status with Spain, the right for British subjects to gather salt on the island of Tortudos in the West Indies, and a guarantee of no higher duties on British merchandise entering Spain. The South Sea Company gave up the right to the four years and their claim on the King of Spain for debts, in exchange for 100,000 pounds.

Bedford was pleased with the outcome, and complimented Keene on bringing it to such 'perfection'. The length and difficulty of the negotiations had subdued most expectations.[163] Pelham thought that the treaty "...answers almost all our great national points..."[164] Horace Walpole, the diarist, commented that everyone welcomed the treaty because no one believed it would ever be signed. "What does look well for the treaty is, that stocks rise to high water mark..."[165] The Bristol Weekly Intelligencer reported that upon the first news of the treaty being signed, the stocks of the South Sea Company rose quite high, but not for long. The Treaty turned out to be less advantageous, particularly to the Company, than initially expected. The Company lost the annual ship as well as their financial demands upon the Court of Spain in exchange for 100,000 pounds. The newspaper report ended:

> ...The most intelligent People judge that it is only a Provisional Convention, and that the grand point,

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163 W.M. Torrens, History of Cabinets, (2 vols), London, 1894, i, 131.
164 Cited in Bedford Correspondence, ii, 60.
165 Cited in Bedford Correspondence, ii, 60.

> relating to a free Navigation in the West Indies, claimed by the English, is far from being settled...[166]

The question of free navigation of the open seas had been Bedford's prime concern in 1739, but the final treaty with Spain did not address the problem. The South Sea Company, disgruntled with the settlement, accepted the 100,000 pounds, but voted during the meeting of the General Court on 10 January, to send a Memorial to the King protesting their great loss for the public good.[167] The King's response to their complaint was given verbally by Bedford to Mr. Bristow and Mr. Gashry, one of the Directors:

> ...H. Maj'ty has, and shall always have the greatest regard for the interest of that Company, and that he has particularly in the late Treaty concluded at Madrid, consulted their interest in as effectual a manner as was possible, consistently with that of the Nation, and that therefore he did not think it necessary to give any farther answer to the memorial of the Company, than by this verbal Declaration...I can at present add nothing farther to this, than to inform the Gentlemen...that I can on no account presume...to trouble H. Maj'ty with any farther sollicitation on this head...[168]

Despite the lack of an article addressing the 'navigation' question and despite the dissatisfaction of the South Sea Company, the members of the Administration were generally pleased. The treaty of Madrid re-

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166 Bristol Weekly Intelligencer, No. 60. 17 November 1750.
167 Add. MS 25,545, ff. 134-6. General Court Meeting, 10 January 1750/1.
168 Bedford Micro, xxvii, f. 37. Answer of His Majesty to the Memorial of the South Sea Company, 16 January 1750/1.

established commercial relations between Spain and Britain on an amicable footing.[169] The question of search and seizure by the Spanish in American seas was disturbing, and the Ministers continued in secret to look for a solution to this long-standing problem. Bedford directed Keene in February 1750/1 to find a happy conclusion to these disputes between the two nations. He worried that unless things were better managed in the West Indies, the depredations committed by the Spanish, and the illicit trade carried on by the British, would soon put an end to the mutual goodwill existing between the two nations. He advised Keene that the Ministers in London were not aware of any illicit trade being carried on from Britain, but that the reports of the Spanish guarda costas "...begin to give uneasiness in this country, which faction is daily endeavouring to increase; you must therefore seriously remonstrate to the Spanish ministers..."[170] The problem of controlling the activities of subjects in the West Indies was not easily solved.

Bedford directed Keene's activities in Madrid until he resigned as Secretary of State in June 1751. This question of the right of 'free navigation' and the Spanish guarda costas was not resolved before he left. The problem lay in the West Indies, where the Ministers in London, and in Madrid, had little direct influence.

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169 Commons Journal, xxvi. King's Speech, 17 January 1750.

170 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 70-3. Bedford-Keene, 11/17 February 1750/1.

The West Indies commanded Bedford's attention for other reasons too.

During the War of Austrian Succession, the French occupied four islands in the West Indies from which they were to evacuate forces under the terms in the definitive treaty signed at Aix la Chapelle. Also under the treaty, Louisbourg and the former boundaries between the English and the French settlements in North America were to be restored. Despite France falling within the terms of Newcastle's Northern Department, Bedford handled this issue because the American colonies were in his jurisdiction.

Bedford also knew a little about both areas from his term in the Admiralty Office. The British and American conquest of Cape Breton and his proposals for the reduction of the French in Canada, introduced him to the concerns of the colonists in the north. He also received detailed letters from Governors in Barbados, the Leeward Islands and Jamaica, discussing protection measures for their sugar trade.[171] Finally the question of the free navigation of British merchant ships threatened by the Spanish guarda costas in that region had been a long-standing concern for Bedford. He therefore accepted the direction of these problems in July 1748.

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171 Add. MS 34,523, ff. 31-2. Martin-Bedford, 7 August 1745.

In July he ordered the Lords Commissioner of the Board of Trade and Plantations:

> ...that a Copy of the Convention, or Agreement, that was made with the French Court, for the mutual evacuation of the Islands of Sta. Lucia & St. Vincent should be transmitted to...Sandwich, together with any Particulars relating to that Transaction...I am to desire you will Cause copies of the said Convention, or Agreement, & of other Papers relating to that Transaction to be sent to my office...[172]

On 21 July 1748, the Board members complied with Bedford's request.[173] No further action was taken until after the signing of the definitive treaty in October when 'article ix' confirmed the appointment of a joint French/British commission to discuss the question of boundaries in America. In December, the Board members sent Bedford a copy of the Governor of Barbadoes' report with enclosures "...relating to the settlements intended to be made by the French upon the Island of Tobago."[174] This report stated that the French had been settling inhabitants on Tobago since October. George II claimed title to that island. By an agreement made with France in 1730, Santa Lucia, Dominica and St. Vincent were to be neutral until possession was determined by a commission whose members were appointed by the French and British Courts. Under this agreement, the French had agreed to the evacuation by both countries of the first three

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[172] SP 44/129, f. 481. Bedford-Board of Trade, 18 July 1748.
[173] Journal of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, (1741-9), 331.
[174] Journal of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, (1741-9), 354.

islands. Their settlement on Tobago was not however covered by this 1730 agreement. It became the primary issue addressed by Bedford during the discussions concerning British and French possessions in the West Indies.[175]

Bedford sent instructions to Joseph Yorke in Paris concerning Tobago and the problem of the French settlement on the island. He advised Yorke to inform the French Ministers that George II held indisputable title to the island, and to request the rectification of any encroachments by French subjects. George II held title to the island through the ownership of the duke of Courland, who was given the rights to the island, by the Crown. The French claimed the island from their right of conquest from the Dutch, subsequently confirmed by the Treaty of Nimeguen. Bedford argued that the Dutch had illegally removed the duke of Courland from Tobago, and then held the island a 'very short time' before the French took it. Bedford concluded that since the article in the Treaty of Nimeguen concerning this possession gave the French the right to land that the Dutch 'legally' held; Tobago was not included because it was 'illegally' usurped. As for the other three islands, Bedford referred to the mutual agreement in 1730 that neither nation would settle those islands until their respective rights of possession were confirmed in further

175 Journal of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, (1741-9), 366-8.

discussions.[176] He ordered Yorke to advise the French Ministers that:

> ...the King doth expect, the agreement subsisting between the two Crowns in relation to the Islands of St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica, as well as all other of the uninhabited Charribee Islands be strictly and religiously carried into execution...[177]

The Ministers at the French Court denied that they were transgressing at all in the West Indies, and declared that no orders were sent to settle the island of Tobago in particular. Bedford found it difficult to reconcile their denials with the reports he, and the Board of Trade and Plantations, were receiving from the West Indies. According to one report, the officers of a French Man of War declared they were authorized by the French Court "...to drive all English from the Coasts of Tobago..."[178] To Bedford the question of Tobago was "...too important & too National a Point..." for any negotiation.[179] The French simply had to evacuate the island immediately.

The French Ministers sent word to Yorke that the problem with Tobago was simply a 'storm in a teacup', and they had no wish to quarrel with England over it. They turned to the related issue of the three neutral islands. They insisted that their settlements on Santa Lucia

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[176] Bedford Micro, xxiii, ff. 62-4. Bedford-Yorke, 23 March 1748/9.
[177] Bedford Micro, xxiii, ff. 62-4. Bedford-Yorke, 23 March 1748/9.
[178] Bedford Micro, xxiii, ff. 62-4. Bedford-Yorke, 23 March 1748/9.
[179] Add. MS 32,815, ff. 354-5. Bedford-Yorke, 10 April 1749.

remained because the British had not evacuated Dominica. The solution, they advised, was for both Courts to send orders requesting immediate evacuation of the neutral islands directly from Europe, with 'duplicates' being reciprocally given to the respective Courts.[180]

Bedford saw through this French ploy to delay acting on the problem. He assured Yorke that he noted two very different responses to Britain's demand for the evacuation of Tobago from the French Court. On the one hand, the Court assured that they had not sent orders for any settlements on Tobago, while on the other hand, they tied the problem to the evacuation and then determination of the rightful ownership of the neutral islands. Bedford advised Yorke that these variations created uneasiness in London about French designs in this matter.[181] In a cyphered letter, Bedford directed Yorke to sound out French opinion on the whole dispute to see whether they would be willing to put the question of all four of the islands to a convention, since he believed that would put an end to all the disputes between the two nations.[182] In effect, Tobago would become one of the neutral islands, and commissioners appointed by each nation would determine ownership. Bedford had not advised his colleagues in London of this proposal, and Newcastle, in particular, reacted adversely. Fortunately

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[180] Bedford Micro, xxiii, ff. 81-2. Yorke-Bedford, 12/23 April 1749.
[181] Add. MS 32,817, ff. 19-22. Bedford-Yorke, 8 May 1749.
[182] Add. MS 32,817, ff. 23-4. Bedford-Yorke, 8 May 1749.

for Bedford, the French only wanted Tobago because it was detrimental to the British trade in the West Indies, not because it improved their own. As Yorke advised Bedford in late May:

> ...I do not believe they really lay any Stress upon Tobago, but as more things are depending than that, and the Colony of Nova Scotia, is looked upon as prejudicial to the Trade and Navigation of this Country, they are willing...to hold by Something we lay a stress upon...[183]

Yorke therefore did not give any hint to the French Ministers that Bedford suggested the British might be willing to give up their claim to Tobago, and make it one of the neutral islands. Bedford's action in this instance did not result in any serious repercussions, and he was able to extract himself from the inclusion of Tobago as one of the neutral islands.[184] The question of appointing commissioners to decide the matters under dispute was accepted by the British, but only upon the condition that the French ordered the immediate evacuation of the neutral islands and Tobago within 15 days of nominating the commissioners.

The disputes between the two nations widened to include North America. Previously in January 1749, Bedford had demanded the demolition of a fort the French erected in British North America. He had advised Yorke that:

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183 Add. MS 32,817, ff. 89-90. Yorke-Bedford, 20/31 May 1749.
184 Add. MS 32,817, ff. 122-3. Bedford-Yorke, 10 June 1749.

> ...the French have lately erected a Fort at Crown Point in North America, within the limits of His Majesty's Territories to the great detriment of his Subjects in those Parts...[185]

French encroachments continued, and in July 1749, the French Ministers laid claim to the islands of Cangeaux off the coast of Nova Scotia. The British had held possession of the islands since 1718, and Bedford argued that British possession was confirmed by the 12th article of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. He advised Yorke that the French, by prohibiting fishing within 30 leagues of Sable Island, off the coast of Nova Scotia, were in effect confirming the 12th article, and thereby affirming British possession of the islands of Cangeaux.[186] The French appeared to use these minor disputes in the colonies to irritate the British.

For much the same reason, at the conclusion of the war in 1748, the French laid 'exorbitant' duties on British ships trading with France, contravening the Treaty of Utrecht. Bedford advised Yorke to insist upon the French continuing to honour the points of the Treaty of Commerce signed the same day as the Utrecht treaty. The French Ministers did not deny the existence of the agreement, yet acted as though it were repealed. Bedford demanded commercial relations between the two nations be restored to their pre-war footing. He outlined the

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185 Bedford Micro, xxiii, ff. 18-9. Bedford-Yorke, 17 January 1748/9.
186 Bedford Micro, xxiv, ff. 54-6. Bedford-Yorke, 6 July 1749.

possible French arguments against the existence of the treaty of commerce to Yorke.

> 1st That the Treaty of Commerce concluded at Utrecht, is not nominally expressed to be renewed by the last definitive Treaty of Aix la Chapell and consequently by the general rule observed in the construction of Treaties must, on acct of that Omission, be considered as entirely laid aside.
> 2nd That it is an allowed rule in the Construction of Treaties, that where any one part of a Treaty, thro' the failure of one of the Parties, cannot be carried into execution, the remaining part of that Treaty must necessarily fall to the Ground, and consequently that the Treaty in question, the 8th & 9th Articles of it, not being carry'd into execution, by the Parl't of G. Britain refusing to pass an Act for that purpose, doth come within that description.[187]

Bedford told Yorke to dismiss the first point. The 7th article of the Utrecht peace treaty confirmed the Treaty of Commerce, and this 7th article was renewed by the Treaty of Aix in Bedford's opinion. He continued:

> As to the second argument...it is right to observe in this Place that it must necessarily appear to the Compilers of this Treaty, that the obtaining an Act of Parliament to answer the purpose of these two Articles, must of course, considering the form of government in this Country be uncertain, and it is not to be believed that either Party would have concluded a Treaty of so extensive a nature, the execution of which should wholly depend on the uncertain prospect of obtaining an Act of Parliament, w'ch Act when it was passed into a Law could only effect the two Articles abovementioned.[188]

Bedford provided Yorke with papers and correspondence from the Secretary of State's office relating to the

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[187] Bedford Micro, xxiv, ff. 51-3. Bedford-Yorke, 6 July 1749.
[188] Bedford Micro, xxiv, ff. 51-3. Bedford-Yorke, 6 July 1749.

discussions of 1713 in order to persuade the French Ministers to stop their infractions of the treaty, and in particular, to remove the new duties on British shipping. If the French removed their 'droit de Fret', he advised Yorke, the British would agree to take off their duty on French shipping to England. In September 1749, the French King ordered the removal of "...the Droit de Fret...hoping that some Method would be soon found out, for putting Trade in general upon the Same Footing between the two Nations..."[189] Once this minor commercial dispute was settled, Bedford returned to study the problems in the Amercian colonies.

The French continued to stall on the question of appointing commissioners to discuss the points of dispute between the two nations. The French Ministers argued that the principal issues proposed for the commissioners to discuss should not be outlined in any plan of instruction decided upon at the British or French Court prior to the meeting. If the two Courts decided on the points, the French thought that the meeting of the commissioners would be pointless. Bedford disagreed.

> ...it appears to me, that unless those Points are actually settled by The Two Courts, the Commissaries will not be able to do anything at all, as Their sole Business must be to judge & determine, according to the Rules previously agreed to, by Their respective Masters; For Instance, how can They possibly settle, whether such a Ship was taken within such a Time or such a limit, unless it be

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189 Bedford Micro, xxv, ff. 39-40. Aldworth-Bedford, 13 September 1749.

previously adjusted, what the Time or Limit should be?[190]

Bedford wanted things to proceed quickly to reach a settlement to the disputes of the respective nations. Bedford was ready to start the discussions, and the British commissioner was nominated. The French followed, although not enthusiastically. They agreed to evacuation of the four islands in the West Indies, however the first question that the French wanted the commissioners to address was the exchange of American Indian prisoners. Duplicate orders for the transfer of the prisoners were sent from both Courts.[191] The French Ministers then altered their position slightly, and requested that the American prisoners be considered in three classes: Europeans, Savages and Slaves. The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Albemarle, thought this unnecessary, and the exchange orders were postponed to January 1749/50. The French were determined to delay action at every possible point.

The question of the limits of Nova Scotia and the four disputed islands in the West Indies were not considered by the commissioners until late April 1750. Bedford asked the lords of the Board of Trade and Plantations to prepare instructions for Britain's

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190 EG. 3416, ff. 103-4. Bedford-Albemarle, 7 December 1749.

191 EG. 3416, ff. 103-4. Bedford-Albemarle, 7 December 1749.

commissioners on 7 April 1750.[192] The Board members considered three separate reports relating to Britain's title to St. Vincent, Santa Lucia and Dominica. Their conclusion was the Britain had a full and clear title to Santa Lucia, but they could not provide any directive on the other two islands to the commissioners because

> ...the French have not yet made known upon what grounds they found their right to the other two islands, the representation of the Bd relating to them contains a clear proof of his Majesty's right, so far as it is hitherto uncontroverted, and that nothing further can be added, till the grounds of the French claim be known.[193]

The French Ministers were not anxious to address the question of the evacuation of the four islands in the West Indies. Any attempts by Bedford to push the discussions in that direction were rebuffed. Hardwicke entirely agreed with Bedford's complaints about the French Ministers' unpromising disposition in this matter. He believed

> That they want a handle or pretext to delay the evacuation of Sta Lucia, in which the subjects of the Most Christian King have made considerable settlements.[194]

The French were not thought to be serious about settling the various boundary disputes in America. In addition to their continued obstinance in relation to the West

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192 Journal of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, (1749-53), 56-7.
193 Journal of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, (1749-53), 56-7.
194 Bedford Micro, xxvi, ff. 63-5. Hardwicke-Bedford, 3 September 1750.

Indies, the French in North America adopted intimidation tactics to harass the British in Nova Scotia.[195] Bedford refused to countenance this behaviour, and directed the Governor of Nova Scotia that

> ...in case he should think it absolutely necessary to augment the force now with him, he is at liberty to add such a number of private men, to the Regiment now lately embarked from Ireland, as will bring it up...[196]

Bedford was determined that the undisputed territories in America would be defended against any possible encroachments from the French. Neither the British nor the French really wanted a war, but the French were willing to harass the British settlers, and to hinder any serious discussions to solve outstanding disputes between the two countries. Irritation of the British Ministers was their aim, not war. Bedford knew that these harassments in North America had to be dealt with delicately because Pelham would not support a colonial war so soon after the end of the war of Austrian Succession. In a response to the French actions, Bedford sent a regiment from Ireland to reassert the British right to Nova Scotia, not to expand Britain's claims to territory. Bedford did acknowledge that the sending of troops from France would result in Britain providing a greater number of men to reinforce the garrisons in Nova Scotia.[197]

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195 SP 43/120. Bedford-Newcastle, 3 June 1750.
196 Bedford Micro, xxvi, ff. 8-9. Bedford-Newcastle, 3 July 1750.
197 Bedford Micro, xxvi, ff. 29-30. Bedford-Cornwallis, 11 July 1750.

At this point, the French Ministers again changed their strategy. They suggested to Bedford that the questions of Nova Scotia and the four islands in the West Indies be considered separately. Bedford was alarmed at this development.

> ...I very much apprehend the consequences that may result from the agreeing to this Proposal made by the French Commissaries, tho' at the same time, I fear that if it is not acquiesced in, the French will break off all the negotiations...[198]

The treaty of commerce with Spain was signed in October, and announced to the French Court in November 1750.

By late January, the evacuation of Santa Lucia was underway according to a report from Governor Grenville of Barbadoes.[199] Tobago had been evacuated by the terms of a provisional treaty between the governors of Barbadoes and Martinico, but St. Vincent and Dominica were still in dispute. Bedford worried that the French were looking for an opportunity to 'squabble' with the Barbadoes governor in order to defer the evacuations. He believed that the French had deliberately sent a French Man of War to harass the English settlers to provide the required 'opportunity' to stop evacuation plans.[200]

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[198] Add. MS 35,591, ff. 112-3. Bedford-Hardwicke, 3 September 1750.
[199] Bedford Micro, xxvii, ff. 12-3. Bedford-Albemarle, 21 January 1750/1.
[200] Bedford Micro, xxvii, ff. 10-1. Bedford-Albemarle, 21 January 1750/1.

In March 1751, Bedford was prepared to take a definitive stand in the discussions in order to push the French into seriously acting on these issues. If a satisfactory answer concerning the limits of Nova Scotia was not reached immediately, the British commissioners were to walk away from the discussions with the French. According to the Spanish Ambassador in London,

> ...things will remain as they are; which is, very much embroiled, and the more so, as the French now pretend that England ought to evacuate the island which is to the east of Puerto Rico, called St. Martin...[201]

Bedford did not break off the negotiations with the French commissioners however. In fact, he ordered the evacuation of British settlers from the island of St. Martin as proof of "H. Maj'ty's readiness to comply with any just demands the French Court may have for any injuries done during the war."[202] This was Bedford's last directive to Yorke in Paris. His resignation as Secretary of State occurred long before these American disputes were resolved between the two countries.

The lack of sincerity on behalf of the French confounded Bedford's efforts to find solutions to the problems between the two nations in the Americas. He had greater success in reaching an agreement with the

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201 Bedford Correspondence, ii, 74-7. Wall-Carvajal, 11 March 1751.
202 Bedford Micro, xxvii, f. 50. Bedford-Albemarle, 14 March 1750/1.

Ministers of the Spanish Court concerning trade relations, but a resolution to the problem of 'search and seizure' eluded him. While this question of the 'free navigation' of the seas had not been adequately answered, Bedford did address the important trade issues during the negotiations with the Spanish Court. His actions throughout these negotiations, and his understanding of the issues surrounding the search for a peaceful settlement to the War of the Austrian Succession countered comments that he "...neglected ostentatiously the business of his office..."[203] On the contrary, it was Bedford's informed opinion about a wide range of issues that led him to alter his opinion concerning the importance of retaining Cape Breton. Bedford never abandoned his commitment to all trade questions. For example, hardware merchants, cutlery manufacturers, and participants in the toy trade had sought his assistance in March 1748, after the King had announced the prohibition of trade with France on 19 February 1748. Bedford wrote to the Attorney General in support of their trade with France via Germany.

> It is in the Administration's power to hinder the importation of any articles prejudicial to the Nation or any Trade that may be so.
>
> But surely by the Exporting these Manufactures of Birmingham, Staffordshire, etc., is not prejudicial, but on the contrary is most exceedingly beneficial & advantagious to the Nation...[204]

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203 Yorke, ii, 39.
204 SP 44/129, ff. 455-6. Bedford-Attorney-General, 31 March 1748.

Bedford's determination to support British trade was also seen in his role of negotiating the South Sea Company's claims against the Court of Spain. Bedford was swayed by the arguments of his colleagues, but he did not follow any one individual. He was his own man in the Pelham Administration.

CHAPTER 6: RESIGNATION

Bedford had been brought into the Administration at the behest of his opposition Whig friends, and the Tories in 1745.[1] Newcastle initially considered Bedford an agreeable colleague, and willingly joined forces with him to achieve their individual policy aims in advocating the continued participation of British troops in the War of Austrian Succession. By 1748, however, they no longer required the support of each other in the Cabinet. Their relationship grew increasingly more acrimonious, and threatened to destabilize the Ministry from within.[2] Sandwich was at the centre of the initial disagreement between Bedford and Newcastle. Soon after this dispute, Bedford appeared to delight in antagonizing Newcastle, and flaunted his growing friendship with the duke of Cumberland and the Princess Amelia. He also began to neglect his official duties, seemingly to spite Newcastle. This behaviour worked against him. The reasons why Pelham countenanced the behaviour of Bedford and Newcastle even though it threatened the stability of his Administration, are difficult to prove. Essentially,

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[1] Add. MS 32,703, f. 447. Chesterfield-Newcastle, 1 December 1744. Add. MS 32,703, ff. 454-5. Newcastle-Chesterfield, 3 December 1744. McCann, 160. See also Chapter 2.

[2] W.M. Torrens, History of Cabinets, (London, 1894), 131. Torrens claims that Newcastle disliked Bedford because he had made the fatal mistake of '...showing he could go alone...'

their behaviour did not affect Pelham's ability to lead in the House of Commons.[3] The General Election of 1747 had consolidated his follower's dominance in Parliament, and subsequently the opposition centred at Leicester House was no longer a viable threat in the Commons. Pelham remained somewhat concerned about Bedford and his supporters joining with the Prince of Wales and his colleagues, if they returned to the opposition benches. He thought the 'Bloomsbury Gang' could cause future difficulties for him in the House of Commons. Additionally, Pelham's personal relationship with his brother was poor, and Bedford proved a convenient scapegoat for their disputes over policy. As Newcastle later commented, Bedford was the counterballast in the ship of state. In the spring of 1751, however, the status quo changed. Frederick, the Prince of Wales, unexpectedly died. Bedford, through his personal friendship with the duke of Cumberland and the Princess Amelia, was now considered as a potential threat to the continuation of Pelham's Ministry. The brothers, despite their personal arguments, closed family ranks, and collaborated on the introduction of a Regency Bill in May 1751.

This Bill firmly secured their positions within the Administration, and emasculated Bedford's potential as a threat to their positions. Bedford, through the auspices of the King's son, the duke of Cumberland, might have

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[3] Coxe, Memoirs, i, 298.

exercised greater influence over the future direction of the Administration, if Cumberland had been named Regent. The appointment of the Princess of Wales with a Regency Council to advise her, in case of a minority, meant victory for the Pelhams over Bedford, and Cumberland. Bedford had lost the initiative, and was forced to resign his office as Secretary of State for the Southern Department on 14 June 1751. At long last Newcastle had achieved his personal wish for the removal of Bedford from the Secretaryship. Bedford, however, ensured that his leaving caused a great deal of discomfort to this particular colleague.

Bedford had been welcomed by Newcastle in 1745, when his views on the continuation of British involvement in the war, concurred with Newcastle's position on European policy.[4] Newcastle ignored his friend Richmond's opinion that Bedford was "...vain, proud & wrong headed, &...you will have a great deal of plaque with him."[5] Indeed, Bedford's actions were praised by Newcastle. In his letters to Chesterfield in the autumn of 1745, Newcastle noted,

> The Duke of Bedford and Lord Gower have all the good disposition we can wish, act entirely in concert with us, and approve of all we do; and we will do nothing without them.[6]

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[4] Lodge, Chesterfield and Newcastle, 73-6.
[5] McCann, 161.
[6] Lodge, Chesterfield and Newcastle, 90-1 & also 73-6. Add. MS 32,706, ff. 17-30. Newcastle-Chesterfield, 6 January 1745/6.

Newcastle believed that without Bedford's and Gower's support in Parliament, the Pelhams would be forced to resign their seals of office. He commented, during an unsuccessful attempt to bring William Pitt into office in late 1745 and early 1746, that,

> The D. of Bedford & Gower will infallibly quitt; we, I suppose, shall follow, & Ld Bath, & Ld Granville govern, or rather, destroy the King's Affairs.[7]

Bath and Granville were perceived by the Ministers as credible threats to their positions in the King's counsel. The Pelhams had decided that they would never serve in any Administration with Bath, and in particular, with Granville. Richmond acknowledged Newcastle's assessment of the political situation in 1745, and supported Newcastle's proposition that all the Ministers would need to resign if Totty, his nickname for Bedford, and his friends left office.

> Wee certanly can not go on without Totty, Gowr & Pitt, I own I wish wee could, tho I love the two first very well particularly Gowr,...[8]

Not everyone `loved' Bedford at this time. Walpole, the diarist, for example, caustically commented to a friend during the Jacobite Rebellion, that "The Duke of Bedford goes in his little round person with his regiment, he now takes to the land, and says he is tired of being a pen and ink man."[9]

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[7] McCann, 203.
[8] McCann, 204.
[9] Walpole Correspondence, xviv, 158.

William Pitt and the Grenvilles were thought to be nominally allied with Bedford during this period. Although they followed the lead of their relative, Cobham, in political matters, in early 1746, they appeared anxious to enter office. Newcastle advised Chesterfield that Gower,

> ...has been perfectly satisfied with the conduct of Mr Pitt & His Friends; is convinced that My Friend, Cobham, has only a nominal Credit with them, and has been strongly assured of Their Adherence to the Duke of Bedford, and Him.[10]

William Pitt's relationship with Bedford was based on the payment by Bedford of a cash annuity to Pitt for his parliamentary qualification.[11] The Grenvilles' adherence to Bedford and Gower was perhaps predicated on their wish to enter office without giving the appearance of selling out the ideals they had expressed while in opposition. Bedford benefited from the appearance of having greater political weight in Parliament, and from acting as the intermediary between Pitt and the Pelhams during December 1745, in particular. Their political connection was not solid, however. Gower indicated a willingness to drop Pitt and his friends if necessity dictated it. Newcastle noted to Chesterfield,

> The Duke of Bedford, & My Lord Gower, act, Hand & Heart, with us; & My Lord Gower told me, the other day He really thought we could form an

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[10] Add. MS 32,706, ff. 247-56. Newcastle-Chesterfield, 5 March 1745/6. Lodge, 116-21.

[11] Bedford Correspondence, i, 34. See Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of this qualification note.

> Administration, if the King desired we should; exclusively of Those, whom we wish'd to have; but could not have; Mr. Pitt, etc.[12]

When the Tories left the Broad Bottom Administration in 1746, Gower's decision to remain in office, and Pitt's admission into the Ministry, consolidated the Pelhams' position.[13] Bedford and Gower were perceived by Newcastle, at least, as essential to this successful result. He publicly praised Bedford and his father-in-law.

> Gower is perfectly well with us, and in the utmost confidence, and he is equally so with our whole party; and anything for him or any friend of his would go as easily as he himself could wish. The same as to the Duke of Bedford, who has no faults to us, the party, or the publick.[14]

Bedford received no criticism from Newcastle throughout the first half of his term in the Admiralty Office. When Bedford proposed the reduction of Canada in 1746, Newcastle noted that "...the Duke of Bedford works night and day, and so must every body do that would be well with him."[15] Newcastle 'loved' Bedford at this time because Bedford demanded the retention of Cape Breton in any peace settlement negotiated with the French.[16] Newcastle was against any ministerial consideration of a possible end to the war because it

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12 Add. MS 32,706, ff. 17-30. Newcastle-Chesterfield, 6 January 1745/6.
13 Add. MS 32,706, ff. 247-56. Newcastle-Chesterfield, 5 March 1745/6.
14 Lodge, Studies..., 116-121.
15 Lodge, Studies..., 131-5.
16 See chapter 3.

threatened his 'Old System' of foreign policy. Bedford was his strongest ally in Cabinet discussions on the question of continuing British involvement in the European war.[17] Newcastle frequently told Sandwich that "...The Duke of Bedford is every Thing I could wish..."[18]

Bedford continued in Newcastle's favour when Sandwich undertook the official business at the Hague, to seek a potential peace solution with the antagonists in the war, in 1747. These three colleagues conspired together against Chesterfield, the Northern Secretary of State, who was responsible for Sandwich's orders at the Hague. Chesterfield had initially been one of the advocates for Bedford's inclusion in office. In 1746, he had advised Newcastle that a minor dispute with Gower and Halifax would cause him great difficulty.

> ...I beg of you to make up that matter quietly, because Gower's and Halifax's resigning necessarily brings on the Duke of Bedford's and Sandwich's, in which case I shall be in a station utterly incompatible with character or quiet.[19]

His relationship with his two friends altered when Bedford disagreed with the direction of Chesterfield's foreign policy. In particular, the question of Holland's participation in the war separated them. Bedford agreed with Newcastle about the need for British ministers to encourage the Dutch to prosecute the war until a better

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[17] Add. MS 32,809, ff. 111-2. Newcastle-Sandwich, 28 July 1747.
[18] Add. MS 32,809, ff. 256-60. Newcastle-Sandwich, 27 August 1747.
[19] Lodge, Studies..., 136-7.

deal could be obtained in any negotiations.[20] In additon, Chesterfield started cultivating a personal relationship with the King and his mistress, Lady Yarmouth. He would never discuss their private confidences, particularly with Newcastle. Newcastle retaliated by pursuing the private correspondence between Bedford, Sandwich, and himself. When Chesterfield subsequently resigned, and Bedford received the seals of office for the Southern Department, the three conspirators had developed an excellent working relationship.[21]

Bedford agreed with Newcastle that he would take the seals of office for six months until Newcastle's first choice for the position, Sandwich, could take them up.[22] Although Sandwich was Newcastle's nomination for the Secretaryship, his lack of experience, and the opposition of Pitt and Lyttelton, in particular, made Sandwich's acceptance of the post untenable.[23] Other individuals were suggested, but not considered seriously because Pelham would never consider having a Secretary from the Commons.[24] Bedford, therefore, provided an acceptable alternative for everyone by accepting that office.[25] The main factor in his favour was "...his dignity and weight from his property..." according to Hardwicke.[26]

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20 Lodge, Studies..., 243. See also Massie, 'Defence of the Low Countries...'
21 See Chapter 5.
22 McCann, 268.
23 Lodge, Studies..., 307-8.
24 Yorke, i, 630.
25 Coxe, Memoirs, i, 389-91.
26 Yorke, i, 630.

Newcastle and Bedford were working closely together with Sandwich, and they personally foresaw no difficulties in continuing that relationship. Others, however, commented on the potential for problems. Richmond wrote Newcastle,

> Since I find it is all your own doing, I will strive to like what is done & I wish it may last, butt I cant help thinking it looks like a tottering scheme. not butt that you know I have allways stood up for the Duke of Bedfords being as honest, & as well meaning a man as ever was born...[27]

Fox commented to Charles Hanbury Williams that Newcastle only wanted Bedford to act as a 'shoe-horn' to fit Sandwich into the office of Secretary of State. He remarked that Bedford said he only wanted the position for six months, but Sandwich would not find it easy to remove Bedford from that place. He concluded with his assessment of the situation.

> All I can believe from that resolution is, that, knowing that ever body fixes, as the period of their agreement, six weeks at farthest, they, by force of resolution, may make it last three months;...[28]

Lord Hardwicke's assessment of Bedford's appointment to the Secretary's office was succinct.

> ...the world will stare at it, an unwieldy machine; he has parts, but no temper, proud of his quality and estate; chief argument in his favour is his dignity and weight from his property.[29]

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[27] Add. MS 32,714, f. 223, Richmond-Newcastle, 13 February 1747/8. See also McCann, 269, for second letter on same topic.
[28] Coxe, Memoirs, i, 389-92.
[29] Yorke, i, 630.

Newcastle was, however, delighted with his new brother Secretary, and he remarked to his friend the duke of Grafton,

> I am just come from introducing your cousin, and now my Brother, to kiss The King's Hand; and I shall think it a personal affront to me, if you ever call Him Totty again...Every Thing has passed as well as possible; and our Master in high Joy...[30]

Bedford's relationship with his brother Secretary of State started out friendly, although contemporaries prognosticated a rupture due to their personalities.[31]

In early 1748, the good relationship between Newcastle and Bedford was easily maintained.[32] The two Secretaries were gracious in their correspondence, and Bedford frequently acted upon Newcastle's advice.[33] This point alone guaranteed a good personal relationship with Newcastle. In return, Newcastle looked out for Bedford's interest. He would caution Bedford against certain individuals who were intending 'mischief'.[34] Newcastle mentioned to Sandwich that "My new Brother, and I, agree

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[30] Add. MS 32,714, f. 217. Newcastle-Grafton, 12 February 1747/8.
[31] Wm. Coxe, ed., Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole, (London, 1802), 350-1.
[32] See Lodge, Studies..., 301, for the view that Newcastle had been fighting 'singlehandedly' against an immediate peace since the autumn when Bedford abandoned his demand for the retention of Cape Breton.
[33] Add. MS 32,714, ff. 401-2. Bedford-Newcastle, 28 March 1748.
[34] Add. MS 32,714, ff. 304-6. Newcastle-Cumberland, 4 March 1747/8.

prodigiously well together."[35] Newcastle, in fact, even acted as mediator during the small spat between Bedford and Sandwich in May 1748. Sandwich had written to Bedford complaining about his personal displeasure with Henry Legge. Charles Clarke, MP for Huntingdonshire, a friend and chief source of gossip for Sandwich, had told him about the events surrounding Bedford's appointment as Secretary of State. According to Clarke, when Sandwich was suggested as a candidate, and then opposed by Pitt and Lyttelton, "Henry Legge was the greatest agent and the most zealous..." in the scheme to promote Bedford.[36] Bedford had been helping Legge politically and socially since 1742, and he was irritated by Sandwich's comments on Legge's character. Sandwich asked Newcastle if he could return to England to sort the matter out because,

> ...I should never forgive myself if I had been capable of disobliging the d. of Bedford, because it is impossible any man can have stronger tyes of gratitude to another than I have to him...[37]

Newcastle straightened the matter out between the two, while Sandwich remained at his office in the Hague.[38] Newcastle grew, however, increasingly disconcerted with Sandwich's behaviour during the negotiations for peace. He noted to the duke of Cumberland in May 1748 that,

> ...I find my Friend Sandwich still more variable in His Notions, than I could wish. He is fond of what He thinks His <u>own work</u>, and does not consider who

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[35] Add. MS 32,812, ff. 19-20. Newcastle-Sandwich, 5 April 1748.
[36] Lodge, <u>Studies...</u>, cited in 309n.
[37] Add. MS 32,812, ff. 135-8. Sandwich-Newcastle, 12 May 1748.
[38] <u>Bedford Correspondence</u>, i, 400-2.

> make it his work, and what were the Reasons for so doing.[39]

This initial displeasure was exacerbated by Newcastle's isolation from his colleagues in London during the summer of 1748. Newcastle undertook his first journey to Hanover with the King in June. Bedford remained in London, and although working diligently, could not satisfy Newcastle's need to be totally involved in all the small details of decisions taken by the Lords Justice of the Regency.[40]

An indication of Bedford's initial enthusiasm for his tasks was seen in Pelham's comments to Hardwicke in June 1748 that "...the Duke of Bedford intends to lay too much before the Board of Regency..."[41] But in July, Pelham also commented,

> My Brother is certainly in the right to complain of the Duke of Bedford's great neglect of business, your Lordship knows my thoughts of it, and the libertys I have taken to prevent it for the future.[42]

Bedford's relationship with Pelham improved throughout the summer that Newcastle was in Hanover.

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[39] Add. MS 32,715, f. 99. Newcastle-Cumberland, 21 May 1748.
[40] See Chapter 5. Also see Haas, 'Rise of the Bedfords...', 71-4, for the view that "Newcastle saw Bedford and Sandwich a dangerous party directed against himself and dedicated to the frustrations of his policies."(73).
[41] Add. MS 35,423, ff. 42-3. Pelham-Hardwicke, 19 June 1748.
[42] Add. MS 35,423, f. 46. Pelham-Hardwicke, 25 July 1748.

Perhaps as a result of Pelham's action to force Bedford to attend to business, the two men grew closer in their opinion of foreign policy, until Newcastle could no longer rely on Bedford as his ally in cabinet discussions. At that point, Pelham appeared to recognize the advantages of having Bedford as a counterweight in policy disputes. When Pelham received a bundle of letters from Newcastle in early August, he wrote to Newcastle that he would need to delay responding until he had seen Hardwicke and Bedford. He commented that "...the Duke of Bedford...is almost his whole time att Woburn..."[43] His comment was not applicable in this instance, at least, since Bedford was in London from 5 August until 10 August 1748.

Pelham was seriously ill in August 1748, and Bedford wrote to Newcastle on two occasions to advise him that the other Lords Justice were absent from London, and therefore no business could be transacted in London at that moment.[44] As well, Pelham wrote Newcastle on 16 August 1748,

> There is no body in town but the Duke of Bedford, the Archbishop and Lord Harrington, you cannot therefore expect any instructive letters from hence, His Grace don't love much writing, and the other two are not call'd to give their opinions;...[45]

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[43] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 28-31. Pelham-Newcastle, 9 August 1748.
[44] Wilkes, 81.
[45] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 65-6. Pelham-Newcastle, 16 August 1748.

Pelham conveniently used Bedford as the scapegoat when he wanted the time to consider Newcastle's correspondence. Hardwicke was as absent from London as Pelham and Bedford were, throughout the summer. His time was taken up with legal business and court sittings.[46] Pelham did not appear truly upset by Bedford's attendance record. Their reasonable working relationship could be seen in July, when Pelham concurred with Bedford's reasonings on the question of the employment of Russian troops.[47] That Pelham and Bedford came to agree on the question of peace, and that Bedford began advocating an early peace treaty, was an irritant for Newcastle. This factor was not, however, the cause of his open hostility to Bedford.

The Ministers in London encouraged Sandwich to pursue the signing of a definitive peace treaty, if necessary, without the consent of the Austrian Ministers. Newcastle was horrified by this proposition, particularly when he realized that he was the odd man out in Cabinet opinion. Bedford advised him of the opinion of the Lords Justice,

> That, considering the present Critical Situation of Affairs, and the necessity of coming to a Speedy Conclusion of a Peace, if the Court of Vienna should still stand out after the pressing Remonstrances His Majesy has been pleased to make to Her; His Majesty should give Directions to My Lord Sandwich to conclude the Definitive Treaty with France & Her Allies...[48]

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[46] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 28-31. Pelham-Newcastle, 9 August 1748.
[47] Bedford Correspondence, i, 402-3.
[48] Add. MS 23,829, ff. 279-82. Bedford-Newcastle, 29 July 1748.

Bedford was seen as abandoning Newcastle. At least this was how Newcastle perceived things when Bedford had joined the members of the pacific section led by Pelham within the Administration. Newcastle felt he was left alone to fight for the 'Old System' of foreign policy. Newcastle initially turned to Sandwich. Instead of asking for support, however, he chastized Sandwich for going too fast during the negotiations, and warned him of the dangers to British interests of concluding a peace without the Court of Vienna.[49] By warning Sandwich of danger, Newcastle intended to slow down the negotiations and reassert his control over the discussions. He thought Sandwich would obey his directions because of their close relationship. He was, therefore, shocked by Sandwich's response. Sandwich wrote a private letter to Pelham on the problem of the Austrian negotiators, disagreeing with Newcastle's directions to include them.[50] Meanwhile, Newcastle began to complain to Pelham about Bedford's inattention to his personal service.

> I am now to return you Thanks for your scolding Letter, (for such, I am sure, it was,) of the 28th, which I received, on Monday, by Bill, who did not bring one Line from the Duke of Bedford or His Office. I cannot think I expect more, than my Predecessors had. Whether <u>I have obtain'd, what I</u>

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[49] Add. MS 32,813, ff. 274-7. Newcastle-Sandwich, 2/13 August 1748.

[50] Add. MS 32,813, ff. 228-9. Newcastle-Sandwich, 26 July/6 August 1748. See also Add. MS 32,813, ff. 188-9. Sandwich-Pelham, 22 July/2 August 1748.

> have long wish'd For, I won't say: I am sure, I have not purchased it, as some of Them did...[51]

Bedford's decision to support the signing of a definitive treaty, even if the Austrian negotiators withheld consent, did not herald the beginning of his personal war with Newcastle. In fact, Newcastle attempted to bring Bedford back into his circle with arguments against pursuing the definitive treaty without the Austrians.[52] The breach in their friendship was not serious until late August 1748.

Sandwich's disobedience in following Newcastle's directives in August 1748 sparked the flames of animosity that could not be extinguished. Bedford's continuing support for Sandwich after this episode encouraged Newcastle's nastiness. Newcastle, in a thinly veiled attempt to cause trouble between the Ministers in London, wrote to Pelham.

> Thus much of this Letter, you may, if you think proper read to the D of B, but the rest is for yourself, & My Lord Chancellor...I now send you two private Letters...the last of which you will see, The D. of B. must not be acquainted with...I have no Objection to the Shewing Every Thing to The Duke of Bedford, if you think proper, Except My Ld Sandwich's Letter, which immediately concerns His Grace.[53]

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[51] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 5-9. Newcastle-Pelham, 3/14 August 1748.
[52] Bedford Correspondence, i, 436-7.
[53] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 53-8. Newcastle-Pelham, 14/25 August 1748.

Newcastle attempted to separate Bedford from Pelham and Hardwicke, with secrets, innuendos, and personal complaints. Pelham and Hardwicke refused to take up Newcastle's cause. Pelham grew annoyed at Newcastle's inability to get along for any length of time with his colleagues, and at his constant complaints about his personal treatment. Hardwicke was forced to adopt the position of mediator between the two brothers.

Although Bedford irritated Newcastle in the autumn of 1748, Sandwich initially bore the brunt of Newcastle's anger.

> I am in a cruel Situation; unassisted, unadvised, unsupported; and yet Rectitude in measures, and some knowledge in my Business, has, (and I trust in God, will) carry me through. never was man used, as I have been, by the Folly, Vanity, & Ignorance, of My Lord Sandwich...[54]

Newcastle also lashed out against his brother. In a letter to the duke of Cumberland he wrote,

> I must trouble YRH also, with some very angry & (I think) very unkind letters from my Brother. The Affair of Legge has put Him out of Humour, and He is just taking Sandwich's Part when He is doing, sillily & wrong in the Opinion of all sensible People.[55]

Bedford and Sandwich were saved from immediate dismissal from their offices by the support of Pelham and Hardwicke for their actions during the peace negotiations in

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[54] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 69-71. Newcastle-Pelham, 17/28 August 1748.
[55] Add. MS 32,716, f. 80-1. Newcastle-Cumberland, 19/30 August 1748.

1748.[56] Newcastle recognized that he would not succeed in any open demands for the removal of Bedford and Sandwich from office, when even his loyal friend Hardwicke wrote in support of Bedford's position concerning the negotiations.[57] The Ministers in London were in agreement on the question of a peace treaty, and Newcastle was unable to divide them on this question, at least from Hanover. He switched tactics. Newcastle advised the duke of Cumberland that no time could be wasted in the matter of the negotiations. He noted that Sandwich had tried to frighten him on the question of the possession of Flanders. Newcastle urged the duke of Cumberland to use all his influence with Sandwich to avoid the dreadful mistake of leaving French troops in the Netherlands while the British evacuated Flanders.[58] In a personal letter to Bedford, Newcastle advised that his problems with Sandwich were

> ...now over, and Things seem to be going on, with all the Harmony, Cheerfulness, and, I hope, Success imaginable; and Your Grace knows I am not apt to remain long angry with My Friends.[59]

The appointment of Lord Halifax to the Presidency of the Board of Trade was Newcastle's small show of

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[56] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 40-5. Pelham-Newcastle, 11 August 1748.
[57] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 46-50. Hardwicke-Newcastle, 12 August 1748.
[58] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 51-2. Newcastle-Cumberland, 13/24 August 1748.
[59] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 96-7. Newcastle-Bedford, 21 August/1 September 1748. Bedford Correspondence, i, 488-90.

generosity towards Bedford.[60] But Newcastle's actions in this instance were for show only. In August 1748, the duke of Richmond was invited to head a new Paris embassy. Before leaving his home at Goodwood, he asked Newcastle to clarify that Bedford had been notified of the arrangements. In September, Richmond arrived in London where he found that Bedford knew nothing about the situation.

> The King said I should go &c; & that I was to <u>prepare</u> <u>accordingly</u>. butt finding the Duke of Bedford had not been inform'd of it, I did nothing, butt come to town to receive H:R:Hss commands, & talke to My Lord Chancellor & Coll. Yorke, & I found them in the same awkward situation with myself, as they found the Duke of Bedford had had not account of it, at least none that he has communicated to any body.[61]

Newcastle apparently withheld information from Bedford, while creating an image that his disagreements with Bedford were over. However, the real reason behind his actions, was to placate Pelham and Hardwicke, and not to appease Bedford.

> I am so far from coming to a Breach with Sandwich, and <u>B</u>, That I have wrote (as you will see) most friendly Letters to the Latter; and am resuming my old correspondence with the Former: But It was not a right Part.[62]

Bedford's, and Sandwich's, position had been supported by Pelham and Hardwicke. Newcastle had no

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[60] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 99-100. Newcastle-Pelham, 21 August/1September 1748.
[61] McCann, 274.
[62] Add. MS 32,716, ff. 101-110. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 21 August/1 September 1748.

option but to back down from his attacks, at least for the immediate future. That the dispute had been settled to a superficial degree was reflected in Bedford's four letters of business from Whitehall to Hanover on 2 September 1748.[63] Bedford took the opportunity to leave London for Woburn Abbey at the end of September. He advised Newcastle that he was ordering the Southern office to forward all material matters to him at Woburn, so that the official business would not suffer by his absence.[64] Newcastle took full advantage of these seemingly trivial instances. Although Newcastle had made public overtures to mend his relationship with Bedford, he continued to critically comment on Bedford's attention to business in his letters to his brother.

> I have a Letter from My Friend, The Duke of Bedford, upon His Absence, this week. He seems to think, He has been a most constant, & diligent attender; you know That best.[65]

Pelham's response was pragmatic.

> I am not surpriz'd that the Duke of Bedford writes you word, that he has attended here constantly, because he tells me so, who am upon the spot; but I can assure you, he has not been above forty-eight hours any week but one in London, since you went, and some weeks he has not been in town at all, as for instance that at this present writing; however I don't complain, being resolv'd to keep well with him, which I know to be necessary, and is not to be done by contradiction.[66]

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63 SP 43/118. Bedford-Newcastle, 2 September 1748.
64 SP 43/118. Bedford-Newcastle, 27 September 1748.
65 Add. MS 32,716, ff. 318. Newcastle-Pelham, 21 September/2 October 1748.
66 Add. MS 32,716, ff. 395-8. Pelham-Newcastle, 30 September 1748.

Newcastle was not going to get anywhere with Pelham on this matter, and instead turned to Thomas Robinson, another British negotiator at Aix-la-Chapelle. He asked him if Bedford carried on a private correspondence with Sandwich. Robinson replied that he was not "...the confident of any private correspondence..."[67] Robinson did, however, show his allegiance to Newcastle by criticizing Sandwich for ranting, lying, and judging too freely in favour of the Dutch. Newcastle at least had a willing source of information about Sandwich's activities. Yet he still could not find evidence to help him persuade Pelham and Hardwicke of the need to remove his foes from their offices.

Newcastle continued his superficial efforts at reconciling with Bedford and Sandwich. In October, he congratulated Sandwich for his efforts in achieving the signing of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle. He forwarded the King's compliments to Sandwich at the Hague,

> ...It is impossible to be better pleased, or more gracious, than the King is upon the Occasion, and I hope & believe, we shall find the same in England, where their Joy will be, at least, equal to their Surprise, that we shall return home, with a general peace, almost to the Satisfaction of all Parties...[68]

The Austrians had signed the final treaty. Newcastle no longer had any reason to withhold publicly his own

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[67] Add. MS 32,815, ff. 29-32. Robinson-Newcastle, 10 October 1748.
[68] Add. MS 32,815, ff. 53-4. Newcastle-Sandwich, 11/22 October 1748.

approval of the agreement negotiated by Sandwich. In fact, Newcastle initially took the signing of the definitive peace treaty as his personal victory, and basked in the glow of compliments sent by his colleagues. Bedford's compliments were shown to George II in Hanover, as Newcastle "...was too much honoured with your Grace's opinion not to show your letter to the King."[69] These polite pleasantries did not continue for long, however. Despite his comment to Bedford that he could not hold a grudge, the relationship between the three former friends had soured. Bedford and Sandwich were now the focus of Newcastle's frequent complaints, while Hardwicke and Pelham were chastized for not supporting him in his disputes with them.[70] Pelham had finally taken enough personal abuse from his brother, and responded angrily to Newcastle's accusations.

> I don't know, nor do I believe, if you look over all my Letters, you will find, any material mention, made by me, upon the Difference of opinion, between you & your Friends abroad. I did not look upon it, as any concern of mine. I had no Share in the Advice of either Side;...I must own to you freely; I am tired of your complaining Letters. I know, I don't deserve them; and, if others do, Let them feel your Resentment. I have no knowledge of anyone's having acted wrong by you. Letters of Flattery, especially when they are call'd for, I can't write.[71]

Pelham clearly stated his intention to remain outside of Newcastle's intrigues, and by so doing,

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69 Bedford Correspondence, i, 574-5.
70 Add. MS 32,717, ff. 12-3. Newcastle-Pelham, 1/12 October 1748. Wilkes, 84.
71 Add. MS 35,410, ff. 72-3. Pelham-Newcastle, 21 October 1748.

cemented his personal breach with his brother. Newcastle turned to Hardwicke. He complained of his ill-treatment, but promised he would not let his personal feelings interfere with his professional relations.

> ...your Lordship's absolute and long silence upon the most material part of my long letter, viz; the necessity of my having ministers in my own province, who would not think, or say, they were wiser than myself; and, as I am now the responsible Secretary, I had almost said the successful one, that I should have the support of my friends in that situation;...I shall certainly give Lord Sandwich no reason to complain of me. I shall not want only ever talk of the part he has acted. I shall support and encourage him in the great employment which, Imay say, I procured him. But I can never, as an honest man, say he made the Peace; because I am in my conscience convinced that, if his measures had been taken, they would have defeated it; and because I think the talking that language is injurious to one poor man at least...[72]

Any slight Newcastle could inflict on his former friends, he did wholeheartedly. When Sandwich was returning from Holland in late November, the King and the rest of the Hanoverian party was also en route to London. Newcastle refused to allow Sandwich to travel on board the yacht with the royal entourage. Sandwich told Bedford that he wasn't willing to push the issue because Newcastle was "...but too apt to form suspicions when there is no appearance of a foundation..."[73] Sandwich had not yet thrown all his political eggs into Bedford's basket. He still hoped to reconcile Newcastle to his favour despite the fall out in August. He wrote to Bedford,

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[72] Yorke, ii, 13.
[73] Bedford Correspondence, i, 582-5.

> I had an audience yesterday morning of his Majesty, and I think I was very well received, at least I was very well satisfied with my reception, as I did not expect a tolerable one after the impressions that I know have been made at Hanover to my disadvantage. As to the Duke of Newcastle, we have not had a single word about any of our differences of opinion, and outwardly everything has gone on between us very properly and well; so that I am in hopes that, with coolness on my side and the protection of my friends at home, all will end as it ought to do.[74]

Bedford and Sandwich were able to distance themselves from Newcastle throughout 1749. Newcastle concentrated on his proposals for a system of European subsidies to create an alliance strong enough to uphold the peace signed at Aix. His personal complaints about Sandwich and Bedford declined in his letters. As events progressed peacefully throughout the spring, Bedford was installed as a Knight of the Garter in June 1749.[75] Bedford appeared to have achieved a level of acceptance with the King, and with his colleagues in the Administration. In August 1749, Newcastle even ventured to visit Bedford, who was ill at Woburn Abbey.[76] During Bedford's confinement throughout August and September 1749, Newcastle attended to his correspondence in the office of Secretary of State for the South. The negotiations for a treaty with the Court at Madrid were in progress, and in September, Newcastle expressed his hopes to Hardwicke for the separation of the Spanish Court from the French one.

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74 Bedford Correspondence, i, 582-5.
75 McCann, 284.
76 Add. MS 32,719, ff. 89-90. Bedford-Newcastle, 31 August 1749.

> ...if We can once settle our Commercial Disputes; I should think, We had a good Chance, for their taking a right Part, in general Affairs. If They (the Spanish) are govern'd by France, They will not do right in Our Affairs. If They are not influenced by France, They will probably do right, in general Politicks.[77]

Newcastle embraced the idea that the Spanish Court would sign a commercial agreement giving the British most favoured nation status. He believed this action would result in the effectual separation of the courts of France and Spain.[78] Even after Bedford returned to his duties in London, Newcastle continued to inform Benjamin Keene of his desire to reach an agreement, no matter what the cost.

> You will receive by this Messenger such full Instructions from the Duke of Bedford...That I can add nothing...a Treaty...would be a glorious Work; fully make amends for any Omission in our Treaty of Aix; and establish the antient friendship, and Union, between the Two nations, which has been interrupted, only by Their Dependance upon France...Any Douceur for the S.S. Company; or any clear, demonstrable, Advantage, in Commerce, to the exclusion of France...Would in my humble Opinion, justify your going great Lengths...in reality, I don't apprehend, The Company will ever get much...I send you This, only as my private Opinion...I look upon it in a political as well as commercial light...[79]

Newcastle had moved from the less important office of Secretary of State for the South to the more prestigious Northern Department, but he had not lost his meddlesome

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[77] Add. MS 35,410, ff. 140-57. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 2, 6 & 10 September 1749.
[78] Bedford Correspondence, ii, 45-7.
[79] Add. MS 32,819, ff. 37-9. Newcastle-Keene, 26 October 1749.

habits. Bedford was confronted with similar intrusions by Newcastle into his sphere of command, that Lords Harrington and Chesterfield had faced earlier. While they resigned from their posts in protest, Bedford stubbornly remained in his office.

Bedford was protected somewhat from Newcastle's interference by Pelham. Pelham remained angry with Newcastle for his personal tirades against himself, and as a consequence, refused to countenance any of Newcastle's demands, particularly for changes in the Administration. In December, Newcastle complained to Richmond,

> As to our Ministerial Situation, things remain just as they did, & worse they cannot well be. Nobody can tell what I go thro' except they were to be as happily coupled as I am, and their agreable Colleague, for His Significance or Insignificance supported by those who should be their best Friends.[80]

By January 1750, however, through Hardwicke's mediation, the brothers appeared to reach a level of mutual agreement. The brothers needed each other politically, and Newcastle was searching for a reconciliation. Hardwicke wanted to bring the Pelhams back together, and would encourage Newcastle with favourable news from his meetings with Pelham.

> I think him [Pelham] in good disposition in general, & ready to cncur in putting an end to the

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[80] McCann, 294.

> disagreeable disputes between you two; but it is impossible to enter into this relation here.[81]

During this time, the turnpike bill supported by Bedford was introduced into the House of Commons. Bedford was publicly humiliated by its defeat at third reading.[82] Horace Walpole, the diarist, noted to his friend Sir Thomas Mann, that the Pelhams had set up the duke of Grafton with their own supporters, to oppose Bedford's motion. He gave Mann his analysis of the situation.

> The Newcastle is at open war, and has left off waiting on the Duke [of Cumberland], who espouses the Bedfords. Mr. Pelham tries to patch it up, and is getting the Ordnance for the Duke; but there are scarce any terms kept. Lord Sandwich, who governs the little Duke through the Duchess, is the chief object of Newcastle's hatred.[83]

Newcastle wanted the removal of Bedford, and his colleague Sandwich, from the Administration. Newcastle's attacks on Bedford's personal integrity were renewed by this success during the turnpike divisions. In a letter to Hardwicke, Newcastle criticized Bedford's personality - "The D. of B. [has] grown the greatest Prussian Courtier..."[84] Bedford was certainly no longer in Newcastle's favour, but Pelham still refused to consider his removal from office. In light of Newcastle's vehement objections to his two former friends, it was

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81 Add. MS 32,724, f. 51. Hardwicke-Newcastle, 7 January 1750.
82 See Chapter 4.
83 Walpole v.? 119-27. Walpole-Mann, 25 February 1750 os.
84 Add. MS 35,410, ff. 116-7. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 26 March 1749/50.

unlikely that Sandwich would have been promoted to the office of Secretary of State for the Southern Department at this time. However, The Bristol Weekly Intelligencer reported in April 1750 that

> We are well informed...That his Grace the Duke of Bedford will be appointed President of the Council;...That the Earl of Sandwich will be made Secretary of State...[85]

The base of this rumour was undoubtedly Bedford's earlier agreement with Newcastle to resign the seals in favour of Sandwich in 'six months' time. But all consideration of this plan was dropped when Sandwich and Newcastle fell out in August 1748. Bedford would not have been so foolhardy as to resign his place to someone who would have been dismissed immediately. Secondly, Bedford would have greatly reduced his political influence by retiring to an office where his contact with the King, and his political leverage would have been severely curtailed.

The summer of 1750 raised Bedford's difficulties in his relationship with Newcastle to new heights.[86] Newcastle journeyed once again with the King to Hanover in May 1750. There, the isolation from events in London, fed his paranoia. Newcastle believed that Bedford had persuaded the duke of Cumberland and the Princess Amelia to take a prejudice against him.[87] Bedford appeared to enjoy antagonizing Newcastle by hosting cricket matches

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85 Bristol Weekly Intelligencer No. 31. 28 April 1750.
86 Haas, 'Rise of the Bedfords...', 83.
87 Add. MS 34,524, ff. 91-3. Newcastle-Hardwicke, 9/20 June 1750.

and summer parties for the duke of Cumberland and the Princess Amelia at Woburn. Newcastle received brief references to, or accounts of, these parties from his correspondents, and their reports more than anything else inflamed his passionate jealousies. Richmond, for example, wrote to Newcastle from Whitehall on 31 May 1750.

> I suppose you know there has been a grand party at Wooburn, the Duke & princess Emily &c. I had not the honor to be invited...[88]

Bedford appeared to be cultivating his friendship with the duke of Cumberland while Newcastle was in Hanover. Meanwhile Newcastle resorted to his old tactic of sending secret information to his friends that they were obliged not to reveal. Richmond commented in this same letter that he "...pleaded ignorance to one part of your letter, as I promis'd you never to own I knew anything of it. I mean the French affair."[89] Pelham also went out of his way to avoid giving possible offence to his brother. When the duke of Cumberland and the Princess Amelia dined with him at Esher, he insisted that Richmond be of the party, for

> ...I shall with prudence and choice avoid any jealousies from abroad, but notwithstanding all I can do or say, that will now and then arise, but your presence and the Dutchess of Richmond's will be my protection.[90]

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88 McCann, 299.
89 McCann, 299.
90 McCann, 302.

Richmond did his part to placate Newcastle for not being included in this small party at Esher by relating in exact detail the events of the evening, including the seating plan. A couple of disapproving comments about Sandwich and Bedford completed his report to Newcastle. On 26 June 1750, Pelham noted to Newcastle that,

> Ld. Waldegrave, One of my Fellow-Travellers, is gone to Woburn; where there is to be a famous Cricket Match; I don't know the Parties, and can, therefore say no more to you about it...[91]

Pelham included some criticisms about Newcastle's behaviour, and Newcastle replied immediately to these comments.

> The experience of this summer must convince everyman, that has seen it, how totally unfit on all accounts, The D. of B. is for His present Employment: and The Experience of this Summer, and the last Winter, sufficiently convinces me, how totally I am unfit, to be joined with Him, in it...But That, if means could be found, (which, indeed, in the present Humour, Every Body is in, I think it idle to imagine,) to dispose the Duke of Bedford, to accept, in good Humour, the President's Office; and His Majesty would be pleased to appoint a Secretary of State, upon whom I could entirely depend; and who would have a proper Deference, for one, who has been in that Office, above 6, & 20 years; I should, then, very readily, continue, where I am: But that, without it, it was impossible...And if there had ever been a Possibility of going on, in the present Shape; The Intrigues, carrying on, by men & women, great & small; The Publick Demonstrations of Resentment & Irreconciliable Hatred; make it altogether impracticable. Those Things should have been stop'd sooner, by Those, who think the Remedy dangerous...I most solemnly declare, I had much rather be <u>President</u>, than be, as I am; and as solemnly, rather than be the sole instrument of removing the Duke of

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[91] Add. MS 35,410, ff. 257-9. Pelham-Newcastle, 26 June 1750.

> Bedford; and be daily pelted, from different Quarters, for so doing.[92]

Newcastle then turned to Hardwicke for consolation.

> ...'Tis now I summon all your friendship: and, as a mark of my firm dependence upon it, I shall acquaint you with some circumstances...which confirm me in my present resolution...[93]

The behaviour of the King, and his mistress, Lady Yarmouth, had grown reserved in Newcastle's mind, and the solution to this, as well as to all of Newcastle's other problems, was the removal of Bedford from the office of Secretary of State. Bedford, however, did not necessarily have to be dismissed, according to Newcastle, because he did not wish to be blamed for that action. Bedford was to be simply reassigned to the office of Lord President. If Newcastle could not have a new brother Secretary with whom he could comfortably work, he would retire to the President's office himself.[94]

Newcastle did not confine his criticisms of Bedford to his correspondence to his brother and Hardwicke. He wrote to William Pitt, for instance, about Pelham's attitude towards the problem, and attributed it to,

> ...a confidential letter I wrote to him, wherein I expressed my thoughts upon the late public demonstrations which have been given by a part of the Royal Family, of preference, countenance, and <u>offensive</u> support of that part of the administration

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92 Add. MS 35,410, ff. 263-7. Newcastle-Pelham, 4/15 July 1750.
93 Yorke, ii, 93-4.
94 Yorke, ii, 93-4.

> which is so universally thought to be in opposition to me; and I could not but lament the weakness and unkindness of my particular friends, who had been drawn in to make part of the <u>show</u>: - and is <u>this</u> sufficient to give a different turn to all I am doing, and all I profess?...[95]

The whole matter was widely known amongst the political circles of Westminster, and individuals added fuel to the fire by relaying gossip to Newcastle in Hanover. Once the information was received, Newcastle would fire off a 'scolding letter' to his friends in Britain. Hardwicke defended himself in advance against any such attack,

> 'Tis easy to guess from whence the stories of the parties, which have been echoed to you, come. I have not heard of any new ones. Possibly your Grace may hear that I have been at Woburn, and that you may know the truth, I will tell you myself...[96]

The whole dispute between Bedford and Newcastle had gone beyond repair. Pelham finally began to consider the possibility of a change in the Administration's composition. He was entirely against the idea of Newcastle's 'retirement' to the office of Lord President. Hardwicke noted to Newcastle that "I find him every day more and more dissatisfied with the Duke of Bedford..."[97]

Hardwicke encouraged Newcastle to bide his time as

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[95] W.S. Taylor & S.H. Pringle, eds., <u>The Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham</u>, (4 vols)(London, 1838-40), i, 34-42. Newcastle-Pitt, 4/15 July 1750.
[96] Yorke, ii, 99.
[97] Yorke, ii, 95.

> ...I really think that the Duke of Bedford's manner of executing his office, whatever it may be for the public, is the luckiest circumstance for you <u>personally</u> that possibly can be. I am thoroughl convinced that your brother is now heartily tired of him, and would be glad to find a method to get rid of him, consistent with his own way of thinking.[98]

Hardwicke cautioned Newcastle against prematurely engaging in any proposed scheme.

Pelham's letter of 19 August was contrary to Hardwicke's expressed view to Newcastle about Pelham's willingness to dismiss Bedford. He advised Hardwicke that the King's perceived coolness to his brother was likely due to his aversion to any proposals for ministerial changes, and to differences of opinion concerning Electoral affairs in Europe. He concluded,

> You see I am att present very well with His Grace, but I doubt it is all founded upon an expectation of my being for certain changes; which your Lordship knows I am not, if they can be possibly avoided. One would think he had never heard of this country, when he can seriously name such Colleagues, as he does. I hope however and believe nothing will be done 'till the King comes over.[99]

Although Bedford was at the centre of these discussions, Pelham refused to settle things during the summer of 1750. In response to Bedford's request for a meeting with him and Hardwicke, Pelham put him off in a note.

> There are undoubtedly things that would have been proper for us to have talked upon, but we have been so separated this summer that we have had no

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98 Yorke, ii, 98.
99 Add. MS 35,423, ff. 102-3. Pelham-Hardwicke, 19 August 1750.

> opportunity but at the Regency and that I cannot think a proper place to talk upon any business excepting matters of form. But as Lord Chancellor is now gone to Wimple, I do not see how we can, without giving him an unreasonable trouble, expect a meeting soon...[100]

Pelham put the whole matter on hold until the King returned from Hanover. Newcastle, however, doggedly pursued his goal without delay. In September, he told Pelham that the King believed Lord Holderness was suitable successor to Bedford, and suggested Granville as a possible Lord President of the Council.[101] Pelham could barely contain his anger in the letter he sent to Hardwicke on the subject.

> He [Newcastle] tells me everything is, as I desire, postponed till they come to England; and yet shows me plainly that all employments are provisionally agreed to, as far as His Majesty and my brother think necessary. Who will then burn their fingers with giving other advice? I am sure I will not...he desires to get rid of the Duke of Bedford in the Secretary's office...if it is not so, I am the cause of it...He says in another paragraph he could have done it two years ago, and even two weeks ago, if he had pleased, but out of regard to me he did not. What can one make of all this?[102]

Pelham concluded that he wished to have nothing further to do with the whole matter.

> I look upon the affair of the Duke of Bedford to be over; they see all to wish it <u>abroad</u>, and I have some reason to believe it is not less desired <u>at home</u>. His Grace grows impracticable, even to his

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100 Bedford Micro, xxvi 1750, ff. 41-2. Pelham-Bedford, 21 August 1750.
101 Yorke, ii, 100. See also E.N. Williams, <u>The Eighteenth Century Constitution, 1688-1815</u>, (Cambridge, 1977), 81-3. Newcastle-Pelham, 2-13 September 1750.
102 Yorke, ii, 100-3. Add. MS 35,423, ff. 105-8. Pelham-Hardwicke, 8 September 1750.

> most intimate friends, and I believe my Lady Duchess [of Bedford] and Lord Sandwich both wish him in another office...[103]

Pelham concluded that Sandwich wished Bedford out of the was so that he would not fall with him. He cautioned Hardwicke that although no one was looking at Sandwich at present, he believed that Sandwich was potentially more dangerous than Bedford. However, the question of what to do with Bedford was not readily solved. Although Newcastle obtained favourable comments from William Pitt on the arrangement for Bedford to become Master of the Horse, or Lord President of the Council, Bedford himself would not jump at the opportunity.[104] In a letter advising Hardwicke that the King was not leaving Hanover until 30 October, Pelham said

> ...I am assured from good hands that nothing will persuade a certain person to change his office, but his naming the successor to what he now has. I own my fears are great, that when we meet, all will be confusion...[105]

Bedford was not going to accept an appointment to the Lord President's office without ensuring the continuation of his access to the political influence available to a leading member of the Ministry. He was still a young man of 40, and was not willing to give up all the business and power, as well as access to the King's closet, by retiring to the office of Lord President. Pelham,

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103 Yorke, ii, 100-3. Add. MS 35,423, ff. 105-8. Pelham-Hardwicke, 8 September 1750.
104 Taylor & Pringle, eds., i, 48-9.
105 Add. MS 35,423, ff. 113-4. Pelham-Hardwicke, 4 October 1750.

despite his requests to be left out of the matter, was berated in his brother's letters for not fixing the problem. His patience was wearing out when he commented to Hardwicke,

> I don't know what will become of us; I heartily wish I was a private man; though the folly of my conduct, during the time I have been in a public station, very little qualifies me for a comfortable retreat. Anything is better than the life I lead...[106]

The matter of Bedford's removal from, or change of, office was not settled immediately after the King's and Newcastle's return from Hanover in November 1750. Newcastle outlined his view of the situation on 17 November in a letter to William Pitt.

> ...the notion of removing the Duke of Bedford came originally and solely from the King without any condition or restriction of his Grace's consent to take any other place and at first, without even the condition of the consent of the Council, which was added afterwards. Secondly, that my good brother was always afraid lest it should take place, even though both the King and the Duke of Bedford should agree to it. And yet I am so unhappy, that his Majesty now is pleased to say he never meant any thing further than that the Duke of Bedford should exchange his employment, if it was agreeable to him and <u>not</u> <u>otherwise</u>, and my brother now affirms he wishes the exchange upon that condition.[107]

In late November, rumours of great differences between members of the Administration, pitted Bedford, Cumberland, Fox and Legge against Pelham, Newcastle, Pitt and Lyttelton.[108] But Newcastle in December was

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106 Yorke, ii, 104-5.
107 Taylor & Pringle, eds., i, 54-6.
108 A.N. Newman, <u>Leicester House Politics, 1750-60</u>, (London, 1969), 193.

complaining again about the treatment he was receiving from his friends in the Ministry. "...I find myself in a condition where no man ever was before; nobody but yourself in [the] ministry avowing me; some getting off at my expense..."[109] Bedford was not moving from his office, and Newcastle grew increasingly exasperated about this state of affairs. Pelham, through Hardwicke, would acknowledge his agreement for the need to find a solution, but would do nothing to solve the deadlock. Walpole believed in February 1751 that,

> At this time all was faction, and splitting into little factions. The Pelhams were ill with one another, and ill with the Bedfords. The latter Duke would have set up Fox against Mr. Pelham; and the former Duke [Newcastle] was countenancing Pitt against all.[110]

Newcastle cast about for support, and in mid-March 1751, Andrew Stone, his personal secretary, soothed him with gossip on the subject.

> Mr. P. told her [Lady Yarmouth], What the K___ had said to him, upon the subject of the Duke of B_____ more than a fortnight ago; and she then said, that it would certainly be agreeable to the King if the D. of B_____ would changer ou quitter: (Tho' Mr. P. is not quite sure, whether she put that, as an alternative; or, whether by quitter, she might mean only, leaving his present office)...L.. said a good deal, & with great freedom, upon the subject of Ld. Sandwich - & seemed to think, that the D. of B_____ strict attachment, to him, was one great reason of the King's dislike for the D___ of B_____.[111]

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109 Yorke, ii, 111.
110 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 32.
111 Add. MS 32,724, ff. 196-9. Stone-Newcastle, 18 March 1750/1.

Two days later, Frederick, the Prince of Wales, died unexpectedly. Matters at Westminster changed quickly. As George Bubb Doddington commented in his diary, the Bedfords gained strength from this new political situation.

> ...it appeared to me that, if the Pelham party did not, instantly, drive out the Bedford interest, they must be driven out by that, though now the weakest party, but that the Bedford party woud become the strongest, having the King's favourite, and now, only son at their head, and at the head of the army; that he would, by their interest, small as it might be, and by the military interest, force the regency, and then, where are the Pelhams?[112]

The question of a Regency in case the King should die before young George was of age dominated discussions.

> The Publick is in a great Consternation on account of the Death of the Prince of Wales, because the Nation may be exposed to a Minority, by reason of the King's advanced Age, & the tender Age of the Successor, which is always dangerous unless They provide against the Inconvenience by naming a Regency...I observe, They are thinking about it, & tho' the Duke of Cumberland has a right to be Sole Regent, which the Duke of Bedford would not be sorry For, because He is His Friend, I believe the Duke of Newcastle will oppose it & propose the Princess Dowager with the Assistance of a Council.[113]

Bedford wanted the duke of Cumberland named sole Regent because it would enable him to influence the future direction of the Administration to a much greater degree. Despite all Newcastle's comments to the contrary, George II was not averse to Bedford.[114] An indication of his

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112 Doddington's Diary, 100, 22 March 1750/1.
113 PRO 30/50/42, ff. 49-50. Wall-Ensenada, 8 April 1751.
114 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 42.

acceptance of Bedford's status was seen in the appointment of Bedford to the Lord Lieutenancy of the county of Devon in the midst of the turmoil.[115] Yet Bedford knew by 14 April 1751, that the Pelhams were winning the battle in the question of the Regency. His secretary, Richard Neville Aldworth, notified him that,

> I have just heard that my Lord Ashburnham is to be appointed Master of the Horse, my Lord Sussex, Lord of the Bed Chamber, and Mr. Pelham (Turkey Pelham) Groom of the Bed Chamber, to Prince George. The person from whom this intelligence originally comes only mentionned these three, as instances of the arts and power of the Pelhams...[116]

The Pelhams worked together to ensure their dominance in the new political order. Rumours about Bedford's and Sandwich's dismissal from office, and their replacement by the earl of Holderness and Lord Anson began circulating.[117] Bedford continued working although in early May he advised Keen that home affairs were taking precedent over questions concerning relations with the Court of Spain.[118] Bedford and his colleagues were searching for support from other Whigs to provide an alternative for the King's Administration. Granville, the former favourite of the King in the early 1740s with whom nearly everyone swore they would never work, was approached. The Pelhams, however, had already engaged his support, despite the determination of Pelham never to

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115 Add. MS 32,724, ff. 227-8. Newcastle-Sandwich, April 1751. See also Yorke, ii, 41. Bedford Micro, xxvii 1751, f. 56 & f. 58. Bedford-King, 4 April & 5 April 1750/1.
116 Bedford Correspondence ii, 93.
117 Doddington's Diary, 113. 16 April 1751.
118 Add. MS 43,425, ff. 85-6. Bedford-Keene, 9 May 1751.

serve with the man.[119] Newcastle had first proposed the suggestion of Granville's inclusion while in Hanover during the previous summer. Pelham was initially horrified by the proposal, but the pressing needs in the spring of 1751 to counter Bedford's threat, forced him to reconsider the option.

On 20 May 1751, the Regency Bill was passed by Parliament. There had been two divisions during the debate in the House of Lords on the bill. In the first division, Earl Stanhope objected to the clause for appointing the Council, but it passed 98-12. The second division was on the question of Parliament's continuance, and again it passed 106-12. Bedford was not one of the twelve Lords who opposed the Administration on this bill.[120] The duke of Cumberland was made President of the board that would advise the Princess of Wales, who was named as Regent in case of a minority. The Pelhams had succeeded in excluding Cumberland from the position of influence that would have given Bedford the opportunity to threatened their position seriously.

Their next step was not clear. Newcastle wanted Bedford removed from office, but Pelham continued to be averse to any direct confrontation. The King still liked Bedford, but his disapproval of Sandwich provided Newcastle with a possible angle.[121] Both the King and

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119 Yorke, ii, 114.
120 Add. MS 32,724, ff. 280-1. Newcastle-King, 10 May 1751.
121 Coxe, Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole, 381-2.

Pelham had never been supportive of Sandwich, and his dismissal would be readily agreed upon. Newcastle hoped that Bedford's loyalty to his friend would encourage his resignation. On 13 June 1751, Newcastle advised Sandwich that the King no longer had need of his service as First Lord of the Admiralty.[122] Sandwich had arranged to receive this letter in the presence of the duke of Cumberland, and he immediately informed Bedford of the event from Windsor Lodge.[123]

Bedford had already decided to resign his seals of office in protest. Richard Neville Aldworth informed Lord Albemarle on 14 June that Bedford would be resigning the seals in the morning. Bedford took personal note of his Resignation:

> June 13th, 1751 - This morning just before I went out Mr. Legge brought me a message from the Duke of Newcastle that he had yesterday received the King's orders to acquaint the Earl of Sandwich that H.M. had no farther Occasion for his Services. This Morning the Marquess of Hartington kissed the King's hand on being called up to the House of Peers in order to his being appointed Master of the Horse. These two Circumstances happening in the same day & being done without any previous communication to me as likewise The notoriety of the Earl of Granville's coming into the Ministry without its being communicated to me gave me an opportunity of explaining to H.M., that the many grievances of this kind I had suffered since my being in the Office of Secretary of State had determined me to beg H.M.'s permission to resign the Seals which the K. in the most gracious & kind manner was pleased to grant but at the same time offered me the Post of President of the Council which I declined.

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122 Add. MS 32,724, f. 358. Newcastle-Sandwich, 13 June 1751.

123 Bedford Micro, xxvii 1751, ff. 72-3. Sandwich-Bedford, 13 June 1751. Bedford Correspondence, ii, 94.

14 June, I resigned the Seals into H.M.'s hands.[124]

Before he left however, the King granted Bedford reversions in the West Indies for his undersecretaries and steward.[125] The next day Lord Trentham resigned from his seat on the Admiralty Board. The younger Leveson-Gowers followed their brother-in-law into opposition, but Lord Gower remained in office. On the surface, Newcastle had achieved his goal of removing Bedford from office without too much disruption. Bedford however did not leave quietly. The King who was not amused by all the events, relayed Bedford's parting comments to Pelham. Newcastle was astonished that Bedford had been so cruel as to accuse him of ill-treating his fellow Secretaries of State, and to tell the King that his jealousy of his colleagues was the root of all the Ministerial problems. He wrote Hardwicke immediately.

> Mr. Pelham went in [the King's Closet], and then the whole mystery came out; that the duke of Bedford had quitted his service in the handsomest manner imaginable. It was all laid upon my treatment of him;...that I was of a temper to live with nobody, that I had forced out three...Secretaries of State; that for himself he had bore everything...His Majesty...was...pleased to adopt all the Duke of Bedford's reasonings and complaints, and to add to Mr. Pelham of himself, "Your brother will be jealous of Lord Holderness, if he continues to be of my parties at Richmond of Saturdays, and if he goes to my son and my daughter."[126]

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[124] Add. MS 34,523, f. 40. Notes by John Duke of Bedford on his Resignation in 1751 copied from his own Handwriting. Bedford Correspondence, ii, 89-90.
[125] Yorke, ii, 112-3. Horn, 94.
[126] Yorke, ii, 112-4.

Newcastle believed that these words originated from the Princess Amelia who told Pelham that the King was pleased with Bedford.[127] Newcastle urged Hardwicke to advise Lord Granville, who had just been made Lord president, to instruct the King as to the 'insignificancy of Bedford and his followers'. Granville was approached with the news from Bedford's resignation speech, and "...he laughed at it, as an effort of impotent malice, that could have no lasting effect..."[128]

Bedford's resignation had a short term impact on Newcastle that he had not anticipated. The King, although gracious, excluded Newcastle from close confidences in the Closet. He was consulted on foreign policy matters, but all other business was conducted by the King through Pelham. The duke of Cumberland and the Princess Amelia continued their resentment, and Newcastle believed that part of the King's behaviour could be attributed to their influence.[129] As for his brother, Newcastle had hoped for a reconciliation, but it was not to be achieved. Pelham accepted the situation with the King, and in Newcastle's opinion, approved, or even promoted, the system.[130] Pelham's fear that Bedford and his colleagues would oppose him in the Commons came to fuition, but the Pelham Ministry's position was unassailable when Bedford went into opposition.[131]

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127 Yorke,ii, 114.
128 Add. MS 32,724, ff. 362-3. Stone-Newcastle, June 1751.
129 Yorke, ii, 116-7.
130 Yorke, ii, 117.
131 Yorke, ii, 41.

Newcastle obtained the removal of Bedford from his office, but Bedford ensured his victory would not be sweet.

Bedford's resignation from the office of Secretary of State for the Southern Department was not noted by the Board of Trade and Plantations. Benjamin Keene, however, wrote a small testimonial from Madrid:

> I hope not many words are necessary to express my concern at yr Grace's Resigning the Seals, and none I am sure can reach the reality of it. The Power which that employment gave you to be Beneficial to me, scarce ever merit itself with the Many other Motives of my Respect for you. It proceeded from a Treatment [which] your goodness intitles me to call a Friendly one and as I am most thoroughly sensible of the honour of it I never shall be less so of the gratitude that is so justly due to you from me.[132]

Bedford was not forced out of office because he was incapable of managing the business of the Secretary of State for the Southern Department. His colleagues liked his 'hands-off' managerial approach. He did not resign because he was ineffectual in business. Bedford quit because he recognized that the political situation had changed dramatically in March 1751. He gambled, and lost in the scramble for political influence in the period leading up to the introduction of the Regency Act. Sandwich's dismissal was the signal that the Pelhams were no longer willing to countenance Bedford's actions in the Ministry. Bedford was not a sychophant, and he decided

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[132] Add. MS 43,425, f. 149. Keene-Bedford, 12 July 1751.

to go into opposition, rather than accept retirement to the office of Master of the Horse.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Bedford entered office in 1745 on the insistence of his political friends. He left office in 1751 in an act of solidarity with his friend, Sandwich. During his term in the Admiralty office, and the Southern Department of the Secretary of State's office, Bedford consistently acted in accordance with his own political views. His independence within the Ministry from the influence of both Henry Pelham and the duke of Newcastle, contributed to his decision to resign in protest over Sandwich's dismissal in June 1751. Once the Leicester House opposition had been splintered as a consequence of the demise of Frederick, the Prince of Wales, Pelham no longer worried about Bedford's potential threat to his Ministry from the opposition. Newcastle, agonizing over personal jealousies, simply wanted Bedford out of the office of Secretary of State. In June 1751, with their decision to dismiss Sandwich without prior consultation with Bedford, Pelham and Newcastle forced Bedford to make a decision. Pelham and the King wished Bedford to stay within the Administration. They suggested a ceremonial office that would eliminate his direct involvement with policy, and would alleviate the antagonism between Bedford and Newcastle. Gower, Bedford's father-in-law, was remaining in the Administration, and according to the diarist, Walpole, the duchess of Bedford was eager for

Bedford to take a ceremonial office. Yet when Bedford was offered the office of Master of the Horse during his audience with the King, he declined the invitation. Bedford had decided to remain an active politician, and refused to join the ranks of the toadies in the Pelham Ministry.

Bedford's desire to strengthen his political position at Westminster was reflected in his actions during the general election in 1747. He recognized that the number of individuals he could sway to vote according to his direction, increased his political value to any individual wishing to form an Administration. That contemporaries could refer to a 'Bloomsbury Gang' indicated that Bedford was somewhat successful in this matter. The 'Bloomsbury Gang' was a very fluid grouping of individuals until 1751, and Bedford could not always count on their support in parliamentary matters. Although the 'Bloomsbury Gang' was a proprietory party or faction, they were, generally speaking, in agreement with Bedford's 'Country' Whig position on policy matters. This 'Country' Whig ideology had contributed to the decision of the opposition leaders to demand Bedford's inclusion in the ministerial reorganization in 1745.

Bedford pursued his view that Britain's interests were best served by concentrating on the naval protection of overseas trade, rather than by reliance on the 'Old System' of continental alliances in Europe. Bedford

believed that the protection of trade and the encouragement of overseas markets provided the British with the best bulwark against French encroachments. His original proposal for the removal of the French presence in North America illustrated this belief. Even when Bedford finally agreed to the abandonment of British demands for the retention of Cape Breton during the peace negotiations in July 1747, he sought security for the inhabitants of the eastern seaboard of America. Bedford, when he finally acknowledged the lack of his colleagues' support for the retention of Cape Breton, argued with them unsuccessfully for the dismantling of the French fort at Louisbourg. By proposing the removal of the French military presence in the region, Bedford anticipated greater protection of the inhabitants of Nova Scotia, and for the security of the North American merchants using the region's trading routes, from French encroachments. He quickly recognized that ministerial support for a reinforcement of the security in this region was also lacking. The political reality in 1748 was acknowledged by Bedford. He knew that the Dutch no longer had the resources to continue waging a war against France. Bedford became convinced, partially through Pelham's instruction, that Britain could no longer finance any further campaigns either. With this decision, Bedford effectively left Newcastle to 'continue the European campaign' camp, and joined the pacific section of the Ministry led by Pelham. This decision was

the foundation of Newcastle's irritation with Bedford, although not the immediate cause of their split.

Despite joining the pacific section of the Administration, Bedford remained interested in British trade issues. Once the Definitive Peace had been signed in October 1748 at Aix-la-Chapelle, Bedford, in his capacity as Secretary of State for the Southern Province, took overall charge of the negotiations with the Court of Spain for a commercial treaty between Spain and Britain, and for the settlement of the disputes concerning the Asiento agreement between the Spanish King and the South Sea Company. In this matter, Bedford's actions were heavily weighted in favour of British merchants' interests. Although Newcastle saw the discussions leading up to the Treaty of Madrid (1750) as an opportunity to divide the Spanish and French Courts, Bedford was never motivated by this issue during the negotiations. While Newcastle was willing to abandon the South Sea Company's interests in order to gain 'most favoured' nation status for Britain because it would alienate the French Court from the Spanish, Bedford perceived the unconstitutionality of a King abandoning his subjects' legal claims, and therefore sought as good a deal for the Company as possible. Under the circumstances, the South Sea Company was fortunate that Bedford was directing these discussions rather than Newcastle.

Bedford's successes in trade policy were overshadowed by his dispute with Newcastle. Newcastle's irrational behaviour seriously began to undermine Bedford's actions after August 1748. Sandwich challenged Newcastle's authority during the negotiations for peace, and although Newcastle claimed he never held a grudge, he never forgave Sandwich for this insult. Bedford's continuing friendship with Sandwich increased Newcastle's irritation with him over his earlier decision to support Pelham's pacific aims in the Ministry. This sense of Bedford's abandonment was compounded not only by Sandwich's insult. Newcastle's journey to Hanover with the King increased exponentially Newcastle's feeling of isolation. Bedford was not a man to write copious notes about events occurring in London. Newcastle, who devoured every tidbit of gossip, and misinterpreted every little omission, demanded full reports on a daily basis. Bedford would not flatter Newcastle, nor would he write in lengthy detail about the discussions held in London concerning all events, and Newcastle grew dissatisfied. Initially his complaints about Bedford's inattention to business were unjustified. Pelham inadvertently contributed to Newcastle's misperception about Bedford, by using Bedford's inattendance as an excuse for the delay in transmitting the opinions and directions of the Lords Justice in London to Hanover. Pelham used Bedford as a convenient scapegoat to divert his brother's irritation. As Bedford grew increasingly tired of Newcastle's irrational behaviour, and he came to

recognize that Pelham would not dismiss him from office, he appeared to delight in arousing Newcastle's wrath. Inattendance to his official duties as they interacted with Newcastle's office increased. He hosted summer parties for the duke of Cumberland and the Princess Amelia when Newcastle was in Hanover. Bedford knew full well that the news would reach Newcastle via the usual gossip conduits, and that Newcastle would be annoyed. Although Newcastle bragged to Pelham that he could have had Bedford dismissed from office in 1748, the fact of the matter was that he could not, and Pelham would not. Newcastle argued that Bedford was acting in conjunction with Cumberland to replace the Pelhams in the Administration. Although the duke of Cumberland appeared superficially to be cultivating a political friendship with Bedford through Sandwich, there was not real evidence to support Newcastle's contentions. Pelham did not appear to take the matter seriously. From the evidence, it appeared that Pelham would have accommodated Bedford within the Ministry, despite Newcastle's complaints, if the Prince of Wales had not died in March 1751. His demise altered the political situation dramatically.

Bedford attempted to retain his position by supporting the duke of Cumberland's pretensions to be named Regent in case of a minority kingship. He lost to the Pelhams who consolidated their ascendancy in Parliament with the passage of the Regency Bill in May

1751. With the creation of a Council to advise the Princess of Wales, who was named Regent, Pelham ensured his own continuation in the Administration. Bedford was no longer a potential threat to him from the opposition. Pelham could afford to repair the breach with his brother by satisfying his demands for the removal of Sandwich, and Bedford, from the Ministry. Bedford was therefore not removed from office because of his incompetence as a Minister. He was encouraged to resign because Pelham no longer needed him to counterbalance his brother's weight within the Ministry, and no longer feared his political opposition in Parliament. Newcastle's animosity towards Bedford created an instability within the Administration from 1748. Pelham decided to redress this problem only when he could guarantee that his control of the Ministry would not be adversely affected.

Bedford's first experience in ministerial office was positive, despite the unhappy ending. He was able to pursue his interest in trade issues, as well as improve his personal and political influence, and electioneering abilities. He entered office with no grand political design. His concern was, and remained, the promotion and protection of British trade. In that respect, he was successful. He was pragmatic in his support for the colonists in North America. He realistically supported, and protected, the South Sea Company's claims against the Court of Spain. Historians have viewed this period of his career through the correspondence of Newcastle, and

the writings of Horace Walpole, and have reached a rather negative opinion about Bedford's abilities. Bedford was not the greatest First Lord of the Admiralty, or the best Secretary of State for the Southern Department, in the eighteenth century. He was, however, reasonably competent for a novice administrator, and more than a match for the domineering Newcastle.

TABLE A

A LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
WHO VOTED FOR THE BEDFORD BILL
FEBRUARY 1749/50

"D" means doubtful as noted by Bedford

AISLABIE, Wm.
ALDWORTH, Rich'd Nevil
ALSTON, Thos.
ANSTRUTHER, Phil
ANCRAM, Earl of
ARSCOTT, John
ASHE, W. Wyndham

BARBOR, Robt.
BANKES, Henry
BATEMAN, Lord
BAYTON, Rolt Edw.
BENSON, Thos.
BRISTOW, Robt.
BRODIE, Alex.
BROOKSBANK, Stamp
BROWNE, Isa Hawk
BURGHLEY, Lord
BURRELL, Merrick
BURRELL, Peter
BURRARD, Henry

CALVERT, Sir Wm.
CAMPBELL, Al. Hume
CAMPBELL, L. G. John
CAREY, Walter
CHETWYND, Wm. Junr.
CLARKE, Thos.
CLEVLAND, John
COCKS, Chas.
COLLETON, J. Edw.
CORBETT, Thos.
COBHAM, Lord
COLEBROOKE, Robt. "D"
DALSTON, J. "D"
D'ARCY, Sir Conyers
DRAKE, Sir Fra. Hen.
DUMMER, T. Lee "D"

EDGECUMBE, Geo.
ELIOT, Edwd.
ELLIS, Welbore
ERSKINE, Thos. Ld.

FARRINGTON, Thos.
FELLOWES, Coulson
FOX, Rt. Hon. Henry
FRANKLAND, Thos.
FREDERICK, Chas.

GASHRY, Fra.
GALLWAY, Ld. Visct.
GILDART, Richd
GORE, Chas
GORE, Cap. John
GORE, Thos.
GORE, John
GOUGH, Cap. Har.
GOWER, Hon. W. Levison
GOWER, Hon. B. Levison
GOWER, Hon. Richd Levison
GRANBY, Marquis of
GRANT, Sir Ludovick
GRENVILLE, James
GRENVILLE, Geo.
GRIFFIN, Col.

HANBURY, Capel
HARDINGE, Nichs.
HARRIS, John
HAWKE, Sir Edwd.
HENLEY, Robt.
HERBERT, Col. Wm.
HODGKINSON, R. Banks
HOLMES, Thos.
HOWE, Ld. Geo. Aug.
HUME, Alex
HUME, Abra.
HUNTER, Thos. Orby

JENYNS, (Soame)

KNOWLES, Charles

LEGGE, Hon. Henry
LESLIE, Hon. Thos.
LONDONDERRY, Earl of
LYTTELTON, Col. Richd
LYTTELTON, Wm.

MACKYE, John
MANNERS, Ld. Wm.
MARTIN, Saml. **"D"**
MEDDLYCOTT, Thos.
MELLISH, Wm.
MITCHELL, Andrew
MONCKTON, Hon. W. **"D"**
MONTAGU, E. Wort. Junr.
MONTAGU, Hon. Edwd.
MONTAGU, Cap. John
MORDAUNT, Maj. Gen.

MONROE, Sir Harry
MORTON, John
MOSTYN, Savage
MYDDLETON, Richd

NASSAU, Richd. Savage
NEWNHAM, Nath. Junr.
NUGENT, Robt

OFFLEY, John
OGLE, Sir Chaloner
ONSLOW, Maj. Gen.
OSBORN, Sir Danvers
OSWALD, James

PARKER, Lord
PEIRSE, Henry
PELHAM, Rt. Hon. Henry
PLUMPTRE, John
POTTER, Thos.
POWLETT, Hon. C. Ar.
POWLETT, Chas.
PROBY, John Junr.
PYE, Henry

RYDER, Sir Dudley
ROBINSON, Sir Thos.
ROBINSON, Mat. Junr.

SACKVILLE, Ld. Geo.
SALUSBURY, Thos.
SANDYS, Edwin
ST. CLAIR, Lt. Gen.
SAVILE, John
SELWIN, Geo. Aug.
SELWIN, John
SELWIN, John Junr.
SHIRLEY, Seawallis
SLOPER, Wm.
SOUTHWELL, Edwd.
STANWIX, John
STERT, Arthur
STONE, Adrew

TAAFE, Theobald
TALBOT, Hon. John
TAYLOR, Chas.
THOMPSON, Sir Petr
THORNTON, Wm.
THORNHAGH, John "D"
TOWNSEND, Admiral
TOWNSHEND, Hon. Geo.
TRENCHARD, Geo.
TREVANION, Wm.
TREVOR, Hon. John

WALDEGRAVE, Colonel
WALLOP, Hon. Chas.

WEBB, Robt.
WEST, Hon. James
WHICHCOT, Thos.
WHITE, John
WHITWORTH, Chas.
WILBRAHAM, Randal
WILLES, Edwd.
WINNINGTON, Fra.
WROTTESLEY, Sir Richd.

YORKE, Hon. Philip
YORKE, John
YORKE, Charles

(Source: Bedford Estate Office, Box marked "A", uncatalogued papers.)

TABLE B

THE 'NEW ALLIES' IN THE PELHAM MINISTRY, 1744/45

Office	Office Holder
Archbishop of Canterbury	Potter
Lord Chancellor	Hardwicke
Lord President	Dorset (replaced Harrington)
Lord Privy Seal	Gower (replaced Cholmondeley)
Master of the Horse	Richmond
Lord Chamberlain	Grafton
Lord Steward	Devonshire (replaced Dorset)
Lord Lt. of Ireland	Chesterfield (replaced Devonshire)
Lord Keeper of Scotland	Argyll
Secretary of State (South)	Newcastle
Secretary of State (North)	Harrington (replaced Granville)
Secretary of State (Scotland)	Tweeddale
Groom of the Stole	Pembroke
Master of Ordnance	Montagu
First Lord of the Admiralty	Bedford (replaced Winchelsea)
First Lord of the Treasury & Chancellor of the Exchequer	Pelham
Treasurer of Chamber	Cotton
Master of the Buckhounds	Halifax
Admiralty Board	Sandwich George Grenville Vere Beauclerk George Anson
Treasury Board	George Lyttelton Richard Arundell

TABLE C

AGENTS OF THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

Robert Butcher, based in London

John Becuda
John Branson
John Bromsall

James Butcher, Rotherhite
Thomas Butcher, Bedford
John Davis, Chenies
Samuel Davis, Bedford
Benjamin Eastabrooke, Okehampton
Prothersia Edgcumbe, Cambridge
Langley Edwards
Robert Harris, Chenies
Nicholas Hayne
John Herring, Tavistock
Thomas Holte, Tavistock
Richard Holte, Tavistock
Henry Hurst, Bedford
Thomas Jones, Bailiff, Bedford
Jarvis Knight, Tavistock
John Luxmoore, Okehampton
Sam Miller
Thomas York, Dry Dayton

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Add. MS 15870-15873. Dayrolle Official Correspondence.

Add. MS 47584, 47589. Fox Papers.

Add. MS 35354-35355, 35409-35410, 35423-35424, 35464-35470, 35503, 35590-35591, 35595, 35602-35603, 35605, 35637, 36120-36124. Hardwicke Correspondence.

Add. MS 51337, 51417. Holland House Papers.

Add. MS 43423-43425. Keene Papers.

Eg. 3416. Leeds Papers.

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Add. MS 34523-34524. Mackintosh Collections.

Add. MS 32703, 32705-32706, 32709-32724, 32809-32821, 32871, 32898-32899, 32913, 32924, 32931, 32942, 33029, 33032, 33037, 33052, 33054, 33074. Newcastle Papers.

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CAM 1
Petition to Isham & Knightley, 1749/50.
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