The Intentionality, Causality and Metaphysics of Naming

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DAVID FREEDMAN

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THE INTENTIONALITY, CAUSALITY AND METAPHYSICS OF NAMING

D.Phil. Thesis - David Freedman

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This thesis is supposed to be a development of work done for the B.Phil. in 1985. To some extent both the scope and content of that work have been left behind - little of it has been incorporated without substantial revision. The main reason for this modification was the realisation that the complexities of singular reference demand a considerably more fundamental re-working than that afforded by the narrow perspective of my earlier work. Consequently the substance of my B.Phil. work now forms a fraction of chapters 3, 8 and 9.

What there is of merit in this work must reflect on those directly responsible for my philosophical upbringing - Gordon Baker, David Charles, John Dupré, Peter Hacker, David Pears, Bede Rundle, Tim Sutton, Kathleen Wilkes, and Michael Woods. I am fortunate to have had so able a contemporary as John Preston with whom to disagree. I also thank Gregory McCulloch, John McDowell and John Tienson for providing inaccessible typescripts, Shelagh Jameson and Margaret-Anne Hutton for their unflagging though 'blind' confidence in my academic potential, and Fiona Cairney for incessant but sometimes welcome distractions.

My greatest intellectual debts are to supervisors David Bostock and Paul Snowdon, whose sustained interest was matched only by the quality of their perceptive and thorough criticisms of my shakier arguments. The outstanding deficiencies of this work can only be attributed to my failure to respond to the genial influence of those named above.

St John's College, Oxford - August 1988
ABSTRACT

David Freedman D.Phil.
St. John's College, Oxford
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The Intentionality, Causality and Metaphysics of Naming

This thesis delineates the boundaries of theories of naming, placing particular emphasis on the demarcation of the semantic function of referring expressions from the pragmatics of referential usage. The need for such emphasis derives from frequent confusions in work on singular reference where pragmatic phenomena are used to refute semantic theories and vice versa.

Part One of the thesis examines various conceptions of the semantic function of names. Frege's notion of 'Sinn' is shown to be incoherent as are its reincarnations by modern, neo-Fregean commentators: a more modest role for sense is suggested. Kripke's intuitions about scope-insensitivity in modal contexts are amplified and criticised. An investigation of singular thought yields a discussion of Evans' views and the removal of the apparent impasse that substitutivity failure causes for Millian theories.

Part Two of the thesis concentrates on the mechanism of name-reference, which works by connecting a contemporary use of a name via a causal umbilicus to some (or no) supposed referent. A number of anomalies are examined, from which the notion of a name-using practice and an elucidation of the criteria in virtue of which we judge a term to be a name are developed.

In Part Three of the thesis the artificial superimposition of logical structure onto natural language is explored. The argument hinges on a plausible generalization of Donnellan's referential-attributive distinction. From this there emerges a picture of the complex network of intentions that surround the referring process. The role of definite descriptions in grounding the use of names is explained.

Both the semantic and pragmatic pictures of name-reference are applied to the perennial puzzles of substitutivity failure and existential statements. The results underline the fact that a great deal of work needs to be done by those who subscribe to the growing orthodoxy of Millian theories, but that this is work in pragmatic areas that are too often ignored by those studying 'pure' semantics.
After some painstaking deliberation and investigation of available word-processing facilities, I have been obliged to adopt the following logical notation for the few formulae of the predicate calculus occurring in this thesis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This volume</th>
<th>OU Standard (Hodges)</th>
<th>'Logical English'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>~(\alpha)</td>
<td>~(\alpha)</td>
<td>Not (\alpha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((\alpha &amp; \beta))</td>
<td>((\alpha &amp; \beta))</td>
<td>(\alpha) and (\beta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((\alpha \vee \beta))</td>
<td>((\alpha \vee \beta))</td>
<td>(\alpha) or (\beta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((\alpha \rightarrow \beta))</td>
<td>((\alpha \rightarrow \beta))</td>
<td>If (\alpha), then (\beta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((\alpha \equiv \beta))</td>
<td>((\alpha \equiv \beta))</td>
<td>(\alpha) if, and only if, (\beta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((\exists x)(\phi(...x...)))</td>
<td>((\exists x)(\phi(...x...)))</td>
<td>For some (x), (\phi(...x...)))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((x)(\phi(...x...)))</td>
<td>((x)(\phi(...x...)))</td>
<td>For all (x), (\phi(...x...)))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta \alpha)</td>
<td>(\Diamond \alpha)</td>
<td>It is possible that (\alpha) (i.e. there is some possible world in which it is the case that (\alpha) is true)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reader is thus warned to attend carefully to such "unfamiliar" yet well-formed formulae of the predicate calculus as

\[(\exists x)(y)((Fy = x=y) \& \Delta \neg Fx)\]

or \((\Delta \alpha \rightarrow \Delta P)\)
The following abbreviations are introduced for theses and terms:

SRE:- Singular Referring Expression

GST:- Genuinely Singular Term - i.e. a SRE whose sole semantic function is to stand for its referent.

RDT:- The Rigid Designation Thesis that names (of individuals and of kinds) are rigid designators.

TCS:- Truth-Conditional Semantics - any theory of meaning for a language founded on the contributions that parts of that language make to the truth-conditions of truth-evaluable sentences.

DQ:- The Disquotational principle that a normal speaker (of a language L) who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to a sentence 'p' (of L) iff they believe that p.

GC:- Evans' Generality Constraint.

RP:- Russell's Principle that in order to have a thought about a particular object, one must know which object it is about which one is thinking.

CI:- A Canonical Intention to use a SRE to refer to its canonical referent.

DI:- A Deferential Intention to use a SRE to corefer with some other use(s) of a SRE.

PI:- A Particular Intention to use a SRE to refer to a particular object such that the utterer can but be referring to that object in using the SRE.

PB:- Plato's Beard: to predicate something of X, X must exist.
INTRODUCTION
As far as I am concerned, even the most detailed conversations about meanings belong in the gossip columns and have no place in the theory of knowledge. This is true even in those cases where meanings are invoked to force a decision about some different matter. For even here their only function is to conceal some dogmatic statement which would not be accepted, if presented by itself, and without the chatter of semantic discussion.

Paul Feyerabend.
CHAPTER 1:
BASIC ISSUES

The fundamental objective for any theory of singular reference is to explain the relation holding between a token referring expression and that to which it refers - a trivial and inauspicious desideratum to which far too few philosophers have paid attention. As a result we have witnessed a proliferation of densely technical writings which concentrate on minutiae and fail to accord with the plain facts of natural language use. The aim of this thesis is to afford this fundamental objective the attention it deserves and consolidate results from both semantic and pragmatic theories of reference. I regret that there is little to salvage that is of value to both types of theory.

Natural language functions primarily to describe aspects of the environment which those who speak the language inhabit, i.e. to describe situations commonly taken to involve items, properties (and relations) and spatiotemporal locations. There seems nothing more natural than to say of items that they have certain properties or stand in certain relations to one another, relativizing such assertions to specific times and places. For example, one may say 'Fido chases cats', 'All swans are white' or 'On Tuesday I read Wuthering Heights'. All these are statements about the world in which the speakers of language find themselves. Avoiding too detailed a digression on linguistic structure, we may distinguish two broad classes of statement: (i) quantified statements about the world that make assertions about non-specific (groups of) items (e.g. 'There is a green
hill far away', 'Every hour a train goes by' or 'Many philosophers smoke pipes') and; (ii) particular statements about the world that make assertions about specific items (e.g. 'Thatcher is incompetent', 'The teacher of Alexander was a pupil of Plato' and 'That man is raking leaves'). This work examines the latter class of statements and, consequently, the category of singular referring expressions, i.e. expressions that are coupled with predicates to describe situations or make assertions about one particular item which are true or false according as to whether that particular item exhibits the relevant properties (so 'Fido chases cats' is true iff the particular singled out by 'Fido' instantiates the cat-chasing property, i.e. satisfies the predicate '____ chases cats').

The class of singular referring expressions (hereafter SREs) is commonly taken to include proper names and definite descriptions, as well as demonstrative expressions and certain pronouns. Of obvious importance is the relation that holds between any (use of a) SRE and whatever item it designates, for the role of that SRE is to indicate to the audience which item it is whose status is relevant to (the truth of) a speaker's assertion. The questions that are to concern us require detailed scrutiny of this referring function: How do SREs perform this function and to what extent are they to be taken as performing it in different ways? To what extent are the speakers of

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*Strictly speaking it is wrong to follow tradition in excluding non singular terms: bear in mind that pluralised definite descriptions (e.g. 'the pens in my pocket', 'the sons of Katie Elder') and plural demonstratives and pronouns (e.g. 'these', 'those', 'they') also pick out specific particulars and might be amenable to some of what follows as multiple designators.*
natural languages aware of the variety of ways in which SREs function? How are we to assess the significance of sentences in which they occur? These questions are not new, but it is only in the last century that philosophers have pursued them with any vigour. Consequently, certain questions are popularly approached from a historical perspective - this preliminary chapter sketches the insights and intuitions of Frege, Russell and Kripke in sufficient detail to depict what the contemporary study of the semantics of SREs presupposes.

The notion of 'meaning' is central to our investigation of semantics. One may ask of any given sentence, "What does it mean?". In particular, symptomatic of the analytical inclination to ask for the contribution of the parts to the whole, one may look at the SREs in that sentence and ask what they mean. For example, were the meaning of a sentence taken to be a function of the truth-conditions of that sentence, the meaning of a SRE would be the contribution it makes to the truth-conditions of sentences in which it occurs. Such an approach receives attention in later chapters.

Ostensibly, names and descriptions seem quite different in such respects: proper names simply stand for their bearers without indicating any condition they must satisfy, whereas descriptions have meanings as well as referents in that they attribute properties to whatever they designate - they mean that their referent uniquely instantiates such and such a property. As intuitively obvious as these points seem, philosophers in the past century have not been reluctant to attack them. It is the reliability of the relevant historical intuitions that deserve scrutiny.
§1.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF REFERENCE

The idea that proper names lack a meaning and that their sole function is to denote the item they name, in contrast to descriptions, was first heavily attacked by Gottlob Frege. The main argument he advanced against this notion is that if it were so, identity statements involving names would not be truly informative. They could never represent a substantial discovery to someone who understood both names, because that understanding would have to consist in knowing which item the names referred to and, since proper names indicate no properties of their referent, in being able to identify that item directly. But this is far from true. For example, scholars might have believed that Cicero and Tully were distinct persons: hence, the discovery that they are identical would be genuinely informative. If it were the case that in understanding 'Cicero' and 'Tully' one had some form of direct knowledge of what they denoted then one should realise immediately that they were merely distinct labels for the same entity. Frege's conclusion was that names have sense (Sinn) as well as denotation or reference (Bedeutung). Does this show that names also have meanings

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2 This demand is closely related to Russell's demand for knowledge by acquaintance - though Russell was much more restrictive about which items we are 'acquainted with' (i.e. sense-data). However, even acquaintance with everyday items allows for the informative identities. For example, I might be acquainted with Clark Kent and acquainted with Superman but fail to realise that the objects of my acquaintance are identical, so that the discovery of the identity would inform me.

3 In fact Frege's use of 'proper name' (Eigennname) covers all sorts of linguistic entities that have various semantic properties (e.g. proper names, definite descriptions, demonstratives and even sentences). Consequently, it is not surprising that the notion of sense has become confused, sometimes regarded as a semantic notion, sometimes as an epistemic notion. This confusion is unravelled in chapter 2.
in the way that common nouns do?

Frege's argument is extremely persuasive. Perhaps all the more so because after some reflection the requirement for acquaintance with a name's referent is highly implausible. To claim that a name lacks the descriptive content of a description is not equivalent to claiming that to understand a name one requires 'unmediated' knowledge of its referent. It seems intuitively acceptable that the reader understands the above use of 'Cicero' and knows that being picked out by 'Cicero' says nothing about Cicero (other than trivially that he bears that name): notwithstanding this, they cannot be said to have direct knowledge of its bearer. However, the genuine informativeness of some identity statements shows that names have at least some epistemic function, for the notion of informativeness brings us away from pure semantics and into the realm of the epistemological. With this in mind, we shall examine, in chapter 2, conceptions of the sense of a SRE to see what conclusions it is proper to draw from the persuasiveness of the Fregean argument.

Bertrand Russell apparently interpreted the Fregean argument as purely semantic. He maintained that genuine names had no sense (taken as a semantic property) and that proper names only exhibited a sense because they were not what they seemed to be.

As far as his early semantic theory goes, Russell held that ordinary proper names were in fact (thinly) concealed descriptions:

* It is, of course, decidedly unclear what counts as 'knowing the referent' of a proper name - see §4.4 below.
the name 'Romulus' is not really a [logically proper] name but a sort of truncated description. It stands for a person who did such-and-such things, who killed Remus, and founded Rome and so on.\(^5\)

When I say, e.g., "Homer existed", I am meaning by 'Homer' some description, say 'the author of the Homeric poems'.\(^6\)

When we use a name Russell believed that our thought could be expressed using some description. He associated with the use of a name some description which it abbreviates: the same thing would be said by a sentence containing the name as by the sentence obtained by substitution therein of the associated description for the name. The idea that names are disguised descriptions is consistent with Frege's intuition: certain identity statements are informative because different names for the same item may well abbreviate different descriptions.

Modifications to the description theory have been suggested by John Searle whereby descriptions are retained as criteria for identifying the referent of a name in a more complicated manner:

Suppose we ask the users of the name 'Aristotle' to state what they would regard as certain essential and established facts about him. Their answers would be a set of uniquely referring descriptive statements. Now what I am arguing is that the descriptive force of 'This is Aristotle' is to assert that a sufficient but so far unspecified number of these statements are true of this object.\(^7\)

We need not commit ourselves on the extent to which this quotation


\(^6\) Russell [1918] p.252.

\(^7\) Searle [1958] p.171.
advances a semantic theory, but if it is taken as such it clearly is a
departure from the simple Russellian view. Searle allows for the
(plausible) possibility of, say, discovering that Aristotle was not
the teacher of Alexander - only a "sufficient number" of the things
that we believe about Aristotle have to be true of some item for it to
be Aristotle. But the vagueness of the notion of "sufficient number"
does nothing to remove the dependence of the semantic function of names
on some cluster or set of descriptions. And, whichever the
descriptions in question are, this still accords names semantic
content, i.e. some function of that of the associated descriptions.

The spirit of this enterprise has been challenged if not broken in
a series of influential articles by Saul Kripke, whose insights and
intuitions have shown the fundamental implausibilities of such
theories. Even to assume with Searle the basically implausible nature
of a descriptive theory that claims a proper name has a single definite
description or clearly defined set of descriptions associated with it
and say that for each user of a name there must be a cluster of
descriptions associated with that name by the user such that the name
is used to refer to whoever satisfies a sufficient number of those
descriptions, we deny the possibility that the name picks out someone
who did none of the things he is commonly believed to have done. For
example, if 'Aristotle' is taken as equivalent to a suitable cluster of
descriptions, 'the F', (e.g. one including 'the teacher of Alexander',
'the most famous pupil of Plato' and 'the inventor of syllogistic

---

* It becomes much more plausible as a theory of referential intentions. See chapters 7 and 8.
logic') we deny the possibility that he might have done none of these things but rather died as an infant in Stagira. Not only does this line of reasoning work with *metaphysical* possibilities (e.g. "It might have been the case that P (but isn't).") but it also works with *epistemic* possibilities (e.g. "It might be the case that P (even though we believe otherwise)."), since it is quite possible that Aristotle in fact did none of the things we attribute to him but lived quietly in Stagira, and that our false beliefs about him are the result of some retrospective publicity campaign that has as yet eluded the watchful eyes of classical scholars. The very facts that we can entertain such possibilities (e.g. "It might be the case that N is not the F" and "It might have been the case that N is not the F") and that we can use a name 'N' normally in expressing these possibilities show that the semantic function of 'N' is not that of 'the F' and, given that to have the same meaning entails having the same semantic function, that 'N' does not mean 'the F' for any description, 'the F', assumed to stand in this privileged relation to 'N'. I shall devote a third chapter to discussion of Kripke's modal intuitions, for they have applications beyond the scope of merely semantic theories: surprisingly, Kripke's work is, like Frege's, a major source of the confusion between the semantic and pragmatic theories of reference that I wish to disentangle.

§1.2 THOUGHTS, PROPOSITIONS AND GENUINELY SINGULAR TERMS

A naive yet systematic way of looking at referring expressions that explains the rationale behind these arguments is given by the
'Fido'-Fido theory of reference,® which holds that the function definitive of what we may call a genuinely singular term (hereafter GST) is to introduce its referent into the proposition expressed by a sentence containing that term. Hence, no proposition is expressed by a sentence containing a GST that fails to refer. 10

In accordance with our intuitions about reference and truth, we may clarify this by appeal to the notion of a singular proposition, viewed as an ordered pair

\[ \langle F_n, <x_1, \ldots, x_n> \rangle \]

where 'F_n' is an n-place concept expression and \(<x_1, \ldots, x_n>\) is a sequence of n items. In the spirit of Tarskian semantics, the proposition is true with respect to a possible situation iff in that situation the n-sequence satisfies the n-ary relation. The 'Fido'-Fido theory can be restated as follows:

If 't' is a referring expression and S(t) is a sentence in which it occurs then 't' is a GST only if

(i) an utterance of S(t) expresses a singular proposition, \(<S( ), <t>\rangle\) and, hence,

(ii) a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition expressed by an utterance of S(t) is that the referent of t satisfies the condition expressed by S( ).

So, a GST simply introduces an object that serves as argument for the function yielded for a concept-expression S( ) - a function which maps all and only objects which satisfy the condition expressed by S( ) onto the value True. If one utters a sentence containing a GST that lacks

® The theory was given this name by Gilbert Ryle, who was "very good at giving abusive nicknames to philosophical theories that he thought were silly." Schiffer [1978] p.171.

10 This explanation follows the discussions of Schiffer [1978] and Evans [1982].

11
a referent, then no proposition is expressed by one's utterance.\footnote{On this definition of a GST, there is clearly something amiss in the idea of a GST that fails to refer - if a GST is a term whose sole semantic function is to introduce its referent into a proposition, how can there be such a thing as a GST that fails to refer? See §6.4.}

On this theory, we can see that names and definite descriptions are quite different: the former are GSTs whereas the latter are not. To justify this assertion, suppose we look at the sentences formed from the concatenation of predicate expression '_ is G' and the SREs 'N' and 'The F'. We can contrast

(1) N is G

with

(2) The F is G

If 'N' and 'the F' fail to refer, then what propositions will be expressed by (1) and (2)? It is intuitively plausible to assume that an utterance of a sentence, S, expresses a proposition if there are conditions whose satisfaction with respect to a possible situation are necessary and sufficient for the truth of what is literally meant by that utterance of S. On this view (1) will express no proposition because 'N' has no referent, there is no way of picking out a prospective referent with respect to any possible situation and, hence, no necessary and sufficient condition for its truth with respect to a possible situation. On the other hand there are perfectly clear conditions for the truth or falsity of (2) with respect to a possible situation, i.e. that there is a G that is uniquely F with respect to that situation. Evans says of this that

the absence of a satisfier of the description is no obstacle to someone's correctly understanding an utterance of the sentence as having these truth-conditions. A thought may be conveyed; and a belief (that the conditions are satisfied)
may be induced.\textsuperscript{12}

If 'N' and 'the F' both refer to \( \alpha \), then we still note a substantial difference. For then the singular proposition

\[(3) \text{<is G, } \alpha \text{>}\]

is expressed by (1) but not by (2), for, with respect to any situation, the truth-condition of the proposition expressed by (1) is the truth-condition of (3) (i.e. that \( \alpha \) is G), but need not be the truth-condition of the proposition expressed by (2), because it is not a necessary condition for the truth of (2) that \( \alpha \) be G (e.g. not with respect to situations where some other item is the unique F). And this will, of course, apply to any description that only contingently holds of an item: a sentence containing any description will not express a singular proposition, but, rather, a quantification. So the semantic roles played by 'N' and 'The F' are quite distinct.\textsuperscript{13}

A major fault with the 'Fido'-Fido theory explains the dissatisfaction of Frege and Russell (and Ryle) with such speculation. As it stands it would seem to suggest that if 'u' and 'v' are coreferential GSTs then the same thought is expressed by \( S(u) \) and \( S(v) \), since the sole function of a GST is to introduce an object and \( u \) and \( v \) are the same object. Both Frege and Russell would deem this explanation inadequate if we were led to maintain the identity of the

\textsuperscript{12} Evans [1982] p.43.

\textsuperscript{13} Of course, Russell would have it that only logically proper names are GSTs and hence that only sentences containing logically proper names express singular propositions. What appear to be GSTs (e.g. proper names, 'impure' demonstratives) are actually complex denoting phrases - disguised quantifier expressions - and so in a sentence like (1) the denotation of 'N' does not occur as a constituent of the proposition expressed.
thoughts expressed by 'Clark Kent is mild-mannered' and 'Superman is mild-mannered'.

We must be careful to judge correctly the force of the 'Fido'-Fido theory. We may claim that (i) if t is a GST that fails to refer then S(t) expresses no proposition, without it being forced on us that (ii) if u and v are coreferential GSTs then S(u) and S(v) express the same thought. The singular proposition expressed by both S(u) and S(v) is

$$<\text{S( ),}<\alpha>>$$

where $\alpha$ is the common referent of u and v, but the thought expressed by S(u) and S(v) need not be identical since we also need to identify the information value of the sentences and, hence, of the terms u and v. That is, we must maintain (iii) that an individual should be able to perceive that the truth-conditions of the propositions expressed by S(u) and S(v) are identical (i.e. that $\alpha$ satisfy S( )) in order to say that they express the same thought to that individual and (iv) that this should hold true for every individual who is said to understand those terms in order to say that they express the same thought tout court. So it appears quite plausible to maintain (i) whilst denying (ii), for all the 'Fido'-Fido theory forces on us is that the sole semantic function of a GST is to introduce its referent. Obviously this concession undermines the unqualified 'Fido'-Fido theory. We should have to abandon the idea that 'S thinks that u is F' and 'S thinks that v is F' express the same singular proposition

$$<\text{S thinks that }_\text{is F, }<\alpha>>$$

since they patently have distinct truth-conditions. The line adopted in chapter 4 is that the semantics of propositional attitudes
effectively subordinates the semantic structure of sentences in 'that'-clauses. Nonetheless the 'Fido'-Fido theory rests on sound principles, and I shall concentrate for now on its application to transparent occurrences of SREs.

The above motivates an explicit separation of quite distinct semantic and cognitive concerns. A more cluttered but less brusque ontology allows semantic and cognitive entities much deserved independence. The 'Fido'-Fido theory of reference is a semantic theory, which deals with the proposition expressed by a sentence or, standardly, by every token of a given sentence-type, whereas any theory of (singular) thought must give a further account of the richer cognitive picture in which different speakers are differently informed by sentence-tokens, and draw different inferences from them. The thought thus entertained will have two distinct components: (i) the proposition representing the state of affairs which would make that sentence true and (ii) the epistemic perspective on that proposition had by the thinker. This stems from a familiar problem about specifying the content of thought. Even for a simple sentence like

\[(4) \text{ Freedman is bald} \]

there is no way that for two speakers, Ralph and Pierre (protagonists famed for their attitudes to propositions), who think that Freedman is bald, (4) or the singular proposition \((4)\) expresses,

\[(5) \langle __ \text{ is bald, } \langle \text{Freedman}\rangle \rangle, \]

give a complete characterization of the complex content of their thought, for that mental state will vary with their familiarity with Freedman, with their knowledge of his past actions and philosophical
acumen, and with their emotional attitudes towards him (to name but a few factors). Ralph might be thinking that his close academic rival is showing his senility in losing his hair, whereas Pierre might think that his former tutor is gaining a physical characteristic to compliment the maturity of his philosophical insight. They will be thinking different thoughts, but both their thoughts will share a common core in that they will both be thinking of Freedman that he is bald and will both agree that what they are thinking is true or false in exactly the same situation, i.e. according as to whether Freedman falls under the extension of the predicate '_ is bald' with respect to a given situation. Naturally there is an overspill into the treatment of SREs themselves. Even though terms make the same contribution to the semantics of a sentence (e.g. coreferential GSTs), the cognitive roles they play will vary. The separation of these semantic and cognitive roles suggests a plausible solution to Frege's puzzle about the informativeness of identities, avoiding the error of running together the semantic and cognitive contributions to singular thought as does Russell: proper names, seemingly lacking semantic function, make just the right contribution to the informativeness of a sentence to display the worth of this distinction to its full.

§1.3 THE INTUITIVE PICTURE OF REFERENCE

Much of what has been said thus far is philosophically educated reflection on the intuitive 'feel' that we, as competent speakers, have for using referring expressions. Before closing this chapter, I want to discuss a few of the assumptions I have made to carry on the
discussion at this level and examine some of the residual intuitions about names to which one might appeal.

It seems that we may take it for granted that names are actually part of languages in which they feature rather than mere interjections or verbal 'accidents', but they are part of languages in a very loose way: they are merely 'the transitory contributions of speakers to the business of speech.' Repeated use of a name involves an intention to say things about one and the same item. As will become apparent in chapters 7 and 8 of this work, such uses also involve many other kinds of intentions. (Although it is not always clear what kind of thing is being referred to, many names conventionally carry with them a range of applicability and make it clear what kinds of things they denote: one would neither call a shopping precinct 'Mount Clarendon' nor dub an ocean 'Balliol College'. Often enough these conventions are flouted or discarded when certain items are named, as a brief inspection of the runners in this afternoon's horse-racing would reveal. What it is proper to conclude from this phenomenon vis-à-vis semantics remains unclear.)

It would appear that names are unlike other particles of language in being mere labels, that a speaker learns that 'N' functions as a name (for N) and in so doing learns what 'N' stands for. This is in sharp contrast to, say, the definite description 'the F': to understand and learn this one has not only to learn what it denotes and what it would denote with respect to a given situation, but also to appreciate why it picks out the item that it does, i.e. in virtue of

what characteristics the indicated object is F. Though there may be
reasons for a certain item being the bearer of a certain name (e.g.
Smith is denoted by 'Smith' because his parents bore that surname), it
is clear that names unlike common nouns or definite descriptions have
no explicit or enduring descriptive condition for determining their
referents. This indicates

the uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper
names [which] lies precisely in the fact that they enable us
to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise
issues and come to an agreement as to which descriptive
characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the
object. They function not as descriptions but as pegs on
which to hang descriptions,...the looseness of the criteria
for proper names is a necessary condition for isolating the
referring function from the describing function of
language. 15

A speaker acquiring the use of 'N' continues to assimilate
information about N on the assumption that people (and other sources of
information such as the written word) use 'N' to refer consistently to
the same object. This is the way that the use of most names is
acquired: names of characters with which direct acquaintance is not (or
no longer) possible are learnt while building up a store of information
about their putative referents. When asked who or what one is talking
about, one selectively regurgitates pieces of information until the
questioner realises who or what the information is about. Much of this
information is given in terms of definite descriptions that are
supposed to pick out the bearer of the name, and so there arise the
myriad problems observed above: the philosophy of reference of this
century is littered with them and with slogans like "A name introduced

via description is nothing but an abbreviated description", which miss the semantic point of names altogether. Names are labels in a way descriptions are not. 'A name is a fixed point in a turning world.'

There are theories that relate names to definite descriptions, since the acquisition of the use of a name licenses replies to questions about the meaning of 'N' such as "By 'N' I mean the F, the G, the H" and so on. I detect here an uneasy conflation of word-meaning (semantics) and speaker-meaning (pragmatics): descriptional theories of word-meaning strike me as intuitively incorrect because names and definite descriptions exhibit quite distinct semantic behaviour. You don't have to be Kripke to hold such a view - in fact, if he's correct, no-one else could be Kripke! However, a causal version of a descriptional theory of speaker-meaning seems to give the best explanation of the phenomenon of naming and name use: such a theory of the dissemination of name-use will eventually emerge in chapters 5-8.

It is useful to form some preliminary ideas of the practice of using a name. 'N' is used first by one speaker (uttering 'N') and then by another (using the same name) who intends that his use corefer with the former speaker's use of 'N'. It is not the case that there is but one such name-using practice per name: for example, there are (at least) two practices of using 'Jethro Tull', one for the eighteenth century inventor of the seed drill and one for the 1970s pop group. One could maintain that these distinct practices define different names, but there seems little merit in such a policy, for it would become unnecessarily pedantic to discuss names as each homophonic

string would have to be disambiguated by indexing it to a particular practice. Geach's apt description of the situation is that:

Names get used and re-used, like trousers in a numerous and indigent family. A set of equiform names gets used for a man, a dog, a river, etc.; and even if a name is a name only for a man, equiform names get used for different men. All the same, in the discourse of our fellows, we manage to sort out different intended references for equiform names; we do this, we cannot say how, but with few errors, just as we recognise people's faces or voices, we do not know how. Discriminating a given intended reference, a given use, of a name for an A is of course not the same thing as recognising that A of which this name is there being used as a name. There may be no such A, or we may have no opportunity of finding out whether the name is being used emptily or not; and in any case our recognising that on all of certain occasions there was an intention to use a name for one and the same A does not depend on any cognitive contact with a particular A.27

As Geach notes, using a name when we have no 'cognitive contact' with the putative referent but merely second-hand knowledge thereof is ontologically noncommittal: we don't know whether the name is empty or not, but we standardly assume that it is not.

Before becoming too critical of the notion of the meaning of names, it is wise to concede that in some sense names certainly do mean something to the people that use them, or else questions like "Who do you mean (by 'N')?" would have no purchase. Such questions can only mean "How are you using 'N'?" rather than "What does 'N' mean?": it would be hasty to infer that the well-formedness of such questions confers on names the kind of meaning that one grasps in acquiring the use of common nouns. Equally, the concession that names mean something to those using them merely amounts to the observation that, in being used by a speaker, names acquire cognitive values, which are determined

27 Geach [1980] p.84.
by the name-using practice which the token uses of that name exemplify in the contexts in which they occur. For example, if the uses of 'Aristotle' I encounter are part of the practice of using it as a name for a well-known philosopher rather than a well-known shipping magnate, the conversations in which they occur will likely lead me to form beliefs that are commonly associated with Aristotle the philosopher. So the cognitive role 'Aristotle' plays for me will be similar to that it plays for those I overheard.

It is because names play these roles that there develop 'metaphorical' uses of a name. For example, I may use a name to which a quite definite piece of information is commonly attached in order to give my opinion of somebody (i.e. when there is a widespread belief that the bearer of such and such a name has a certain characteristic): thus I might call a pretty girl 'Helen of Troy' or an arrogant, bossy individual 'Arthur Scargill'. So a name may acquire semantic significance on the basis of the common association of certain pieces of information with its bearer - a name is normally used in this way in a context where it is clear that the speaker does not wish to refer to N, but rather wishes to indicate that some other item has such and such properties. It would seem misguided to conclude from this kind of usage that names do indeed have a semantic function even though some of them have made the transition to common nouns (e.g. 'quisling', 'colossus', 'maverick', 'Judas' etc.) and their bearers are lost to sight behind their newfound semantic significance.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The shift from proper name to proper noun is well-characterised by Ziff's notion of appreciative pregnancy. ([1972] p.74.)
Names may be chosen to reflect characteristics of their bearers. It is common practice to confer an *ekename* on the basis of descriptive characteristics: there is normally some characteristic behind the acquisition of a name like 'Tiny', 'Tubby' or 'Ginger' even though the characteristic might not be the obvious one. For example, 'Little' John of Sherwood Forest is so-called because of his size, but not because he is small: size-words are notorious for this kind of inversion. The selection of names to fit their bearers is a common enough device in literature: humorous examples of eponymy are common in the works of Dickens. It is also noteworthy that some surnames were chosen to reflect the characteristics of their bearers. The original bearers of names like 'Cooper', 'Jackson' or 'Smith' satisfied certain conditions (e.g. they made barrels, had fathers called 'Jack' or worked in metal), but as names pass through the generations the surnames no longer appropriately describe their bearers. (Other cultures do not observe this custom of an invariable surname being passed from one generation to another, but other indications of pedigree are observable, e.g. the patronymic names of Russian males.) Also the names of computer programs are chosen to reflect their function and/or content. But in such cases it is important not to be misled by the means and methods of selection or by excessive philological speculation, because as names (rather than descriptions) a speaker can use them perfectly correctly without realising their semantic significance. And that, as Searle has said, is exactly where their immense pragmatic convenience lies!
PART ONE:

MAKING SENSE OF MARKS
CHAPTER 2:

FORGIVING FREGE'S Sinnen

In the enquiry that follows I have kept to three fundamental principles: always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective; never to ask for the meaning [Bedeutung!] of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition; never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object.

Gottlob Frege.
In this chapter we examine the notion of sense or Fregean Sinn which has suffered from target practice for sharpshooting philosophers of language: sense has been expected to play many roles that it is plainly incapable of fulfilling. We shall salvage what we can from Frege's original Sinn, discuss various contemporary interpretations of the notion and show that there is room for some viable version thereof which may explain the Fregean paradoxes and yet is an easy bedfellow for more recent theories of direct reference.

§2.1 FREGE'S PUZZLE - A FAMILIAR STARTING POINT

Frege first presents the notion of Sinn as an attribute of a SRE that explains the difference in cognitive value between the sentences

(a) a=a
and
(b) a=b.

He observes that (a) is trivially uninformative, whereas (b) is genuinely informative. That (a) and (b), if true, have different cognitive values can be seen by observing the possible difference in truth-value between the sentences obtained by substituting (a) or (b) for P in sentence-functors such as 'It is uninformative that P', 'It is commonly known that P' or 'Gottlob Frege believes that P'. A familiar example of such an embedding gives

(2a) George IV knows Scott is Scott

Frege says ([1892b]) that it expresses wirkliche Erkenntnis.
and (2b) George IV knows Scott is the author of Waverley.

The only difference between (1a) and (1b) is the substitution of 'b' for 'a'. So that is where the difference must lie - i.e. in the SREs 'a' and 'b' themselves. After all, the difference can hardly reside in the object a and the object b, for they are one and the same. Whatever the attribute of a SRE that explains this is, we can call it sense. The above I shall dub the Fregean argument.

Although the identity of a and b and hence the coreferentiality of 'a' and 'b' play an important role, it strikes me that this need not reduce to a puzzle about the informativeness of identity statements per se, as some commentators have thought, but rather about the way sentences convey and contain information in general. For if we considered pairs of sentences such as

(3a) If a is F then a is F
and (3b) If a is F then b is F
or (4a) The author of Waverley wrote Waverley
and (4b) Scott wrote Waverley

we would encounter the same phenomenon, i.e. (3a) and (4a) are trivial but (3b) and (4b) are genuinely informative.

It is plainly desirable to bring this difference into sharper focus. When we say that (1a) and (1b) or (3a) and (3b) differ in cognitive value what do we mean? This is by no means a straightforward question (although some might think it so) and it requires a lengthy and considerably cautious discussion to provide an adequate answer.

2 I shall endeavour to maintain the use 'sense' for whatever explains this puzzle and 'Sinn' for the notion as presented by Frege.
When we observe the difference in cognitive value between (1a) and (1b) we might reasonably maintain that a speaker competent in the use of SREs 'a' and 'b' might be informed differently by (1a) and (3a) than, respectively, by (1b) and (3b). Moreover we could say that he would not be genuinely informed by (1a) and (3a) at all, but that is to some extent a misleading feature. For one thing (1a) and (3a) are not only a priori and analytic, but also logical truths, whereas (1b) and (3b) are not. That fact would explain one difference in cognitive value, precisely because the trivial analyticity and a prioricity of (1a) and of (3a) hinges on the repetition of 'a'. If, however, we had a three-way identification (a=b=c) for distinct SREs 'a', 'b' and 'c' we might well consider the difference between (1b) and

(1c) a=c

or between (3b) and

(3c) If a is F then c is F

for a speaker competent in the use of these three terms might be informed differently by (1a), (1b) and (1c). Even though (1b) and (1c) have the same broad cognitive classification (i.e. 'genuinely informative' as opposed to 'trivial') they might have a different cognitive content - the speaker might take them to express different pieces of information. Correspondingly we may observe the possible difference in truth-value between (2b) and a sentence

(2c) George IV knows that Scott is Secretary to the 1807 parliamentary commission on Scottish jurisprudence.

Other reasons for distrusting sentences of the form 't=t' are broached in §2.4.
The difference in cognitive content can only be explained by the difference in the terms 'b' and 'c', but now we need to make plain not only that there is a difference in cognitive value, but also what the difference in cognitive content is. Simply enough, we might regard the sense of a term as its cognitive content, i.e. the contribution it makes to the cognitive content of the sentences in which it appears. So, whereas Frege merely wishes to explain difference in cognitive value between sentences of the form of (1a) and (1b) by appeal to sense, to avoid a retreat to consideration of trivial analyticity, a prioricity and logical truth, we may regard sense as that attribute of a term that explains the difference in cognitive content between (1b) and (1c) or, in the general case, between a sentence in which 'a' occurs, and the sentence obtained by substituting 'b' for one or more occurrences of 'a' in that sentence.

The suggestion that SREs have not only referents (Bedeutungen) but also senses (Sinne) is immediately intriguing. What kind of entity is the sense of a singular term? What roles does it play? How does it do whatever it does? Does it consist in knowing how to use the SRE correctly? Would knowledge of the criteria of identity for the referent of a SRE in some way yield its sense?

These latter questions highlight a widespread and dangerously misleading assumption that for a SRE to have sense is for there to be a certain body of information describing its referent that is grasped by any speaker competent in its use. It is important to observe that such a view completely misrepresents the semantic function of some SREs. Proper names are, for example, unlike definite descriptions in this
respect. Clearly one semantic function that the expression 'the F' has is to indicate that (within certain parameters determined by context) its referent is whatever is uniquely F, whereas a proper name does not inform us about its referent in this fashion.* There are compelling arguments for this conclusion that have been advanced by Saul Kripke: I shall rehearse them in chapter 3.

§2.2 CLOSER SCRUTINY

A quasi-Fregean argument can now be schematised as follows

(prem.1) The cognitive content of a sentence depends on the cognitive content of its constituents.
(prem.2) 'a=a' and 'a=b' differ in cognitive content.
(concl.) 'a' and 'b' differ in cognitive content (sense).

As I observed above, premise (prem.2) is perhaps most readily explained by appeal to trivial a prioricity and analyticity, and since we do not wish to restrict ourselves to the phenomenon as it occurs in identity statements, let us introduce a revised premise

(prem.2') For some S<>, the sentences S<a> and S<b> (a sentence obtained by replacing one or more occurrences of 'a' in S<a> by 'b') differ in cognitive content.

Such talk of information is decidedly loose. I am all too aware of the potential incoherence in talking about the cognitive content of

* It is, of course perfectly defensible to say e.g. 'N' literally means that within certain parameters determined by context its referent is whatever is uniquely N. It is arguable that this is a far more trivial and far less useful reply than that provided below.

29
proper parts of sentences, yet, intuitive qualms notwithstanding, Frege wanted his notion of Sinn to apply across the board according to the following diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proper Name</th>
<th>Predicate</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Proper Name</td>
<td>Sense of Predicate</td>
<td>Sense of Sentence (Thought)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent of Proper Name (Object)</td>
<td>Referent of Predicate (Concept)</td>
<td>Referent of Sentence (Truth-value)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig.1

Naturally we can be and are informed by sentences - that seems to be their primary function - and hence it is not inappropriate to talk of the cognitive content of a sentence (if by that we mean to speak of the information conveyed to a speaker) - but what of the cognitive content of proper names or predicates? Can we say what information is contained in proper names or predicates or what knowledge they express?

Doesn't understanding only start with a proposition, with a whole proposition? Can we understand half a proposition?".

Wittgenstein's bemusing aphorisms suggest that while the significance of the whole might be clear, the contribution made to that significance by its parts might be less so. (I later refer to this as 'synergy'.)

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" Abstracted from that given in a letter to Husserl in 1891 (see Frege [1980] pp.61-64).

... Wittgenstein [1974] p.39. This point is reiterated by David Bell [1979] who also adopts a strikingly dismissive attitude to the idea that proper parts of sentences might have Sinne.
The sense of a genuine proper name, for example, may be difficult to express: would we expect an answer to the question 'What is the sense of "David Pears"?' No, we would not. And in general we find it difficult if not impossible to say what constitutes the sense of an expression. Geach has a good analogy for us here:

I think that we have to acknowledge that when our fellows use names, we can identify, reidentify and discriminate from one another the senses of these names. How do we do this? Is there some form of words that will spell out for us what is a given sense of a given name? I do not think there is: but senses do not thus become mysterious and unidentifiable. Most of us can identify, reidentify and discriminate human voices: but we could not put into words wherein the individuality of the human voice consists. It is the same way with the senses of names. 7

There seems no insuperable difficulty in conceding that it is often impossible to articulate the sense of an expression: We can still deduce that such an attribute of expressions exists from the fact that there is some contribution that each and every expression in a sentence makes to the information expressed by that sentence. The Fregean argument is essentially an existence proof: it shows there must be senses rather than yielding (a way of obtaining) the sense of any given expression.

The difference in cognitive content might be readily misinterpreted as a matter of semantic function in some cases. For example, S<Scott> and S<the author of Waverley> inform in different ways because 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverley' designate in different ways - they exemplify different semantic modes of presentation, picking out their referents by distinct semantic routes (proper-name-mode and

7 Geach [1980] p.87.
definite-description-mode respectively). However, it is philosophical
commonplace that distinct signs might inform differently, even though
they be of the same category of SREs (e.g. both proper names, both
definite descriptions, both indexicals). So the difference in
cognitive content between S<a> and S<b> might indicate a difference in
cognitive content between 'a' and 'b' even when they are, say, both
proper names seemingly lacking explicit meaning. Indeed, it is the
case of proper names that gives us the greatest difficulties and which
has received the lion's share of the attention in the heyday of the new
theory of reference, because it appears that proper names, unlike
definite descriptions, do not wear their senses 'on their faces'.

Frege offers 'mode of presentation' (Art des Gegebenseins) as an
explanation of sense:

I should like to call the sense of a sign [that] wherein the
mode of presentation is contained'.

The sense of a SRE is merely a way of presenting its referent. That in
itself is not a good way of introducing the notion of sense, for it
remains unclear as to what should count as the referent of expressions
such as predicates. (Frege evidently considered 'mode of presentation'
a self-explanatory phrase, but it adds little by way of explanation
here. It is unlikely that the lack of explanatory value of the

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I want to avoid importing an unhelpful distinction here: As
neatly expounded by Baker and Hacker ([1984a] p.285) terms like 'four',
'IV', 'vier' and 'quatre' will not differ in sense because they only
differ in mode of designation not in mode of presentation. So 'four =
vier' and presumably non-numeric translation counterparts such as
'London = Londres' or 'beech = huitre' will not express genuine
information. That this is both implausible and inconvenient is clear.
Kripke [1979] supplies further details.

Frege [1892b] p.58.
paraphrase 'mode of presentation' is completely unrelated to the previous observation that we arguably never have the language to express the sense of an expression.) There comes to mind Searle's picture of referring as a game with marbles rolling down pipes (senses) to bowls (referents): we cannot refer to the pipes because every time a marble gets to a pipe it drops through into the corresponding bowl.¹⁰

Following Geach's intuition that the identification and discrimination of senses is something that is commonly carried out, let us see if this sheds any light on the notion of sense. Frege dwells on the idea of two SREs differing in sense, but how would we judge that two distinct terms had coincident senses? That is, is there a general principle by which one observes that certain SREs have coincident senses? The most obvious principle would rule that any two (singular) expressions differing either lexically or phonetically also differ in sense. Such a criterion seems too strong: there seems to be intuitive support for maintaining that both members of each of the following pairs of expressions have the same sense even though lexically or phonetically distinct:

(5a) 'the bachelor'
(5b) 'the unmarried man'
(6a) 'the day before Monday'
(6b) 'the day after Saturday'
(7a) 'the man over there drinking gin'
(7b) 'the man drinking gin over there'.

¹⁰ Searle [1958] p.140. This analogy does mislead with regard to the idea of sense determining reference.
Would a speaker of English competent in the use of any of these pairs of singular terms say that there was a difference in sense between either member of that pair? Probably not, because the statement that the referents of each pair of expressions were one and the same item would be deemed uninformative. It is unclear as to what relation has to hold between two SREs for them to have the same sense, but we must rest content for now with Frege's intuitive test, i.e. that it seems a necessary and sufficient condition for terms 'a' and 'b' to coincide in sense that (1b) intuitively fails to express genuine information.

As Frege presents his puzzle, it would seem that for any distinct 'a' and 'b' we observe that (1a) is trivially true whereas (1b), if true, is genuinely informative. If (1b) were trivially true, we would have to note that 'a' and 'b' had the same sense. For certain SREs, as just observed, (1b) might be analytic (and hence trivial). By this I mean, in the time-honoured vagueness of the analytic-synthetic distinction, that consideration of the meanings of those SREs is sufficient to determine the truth of (1b). So the case of a substitution instance of (1b), such as

\( (8) \) the oldest bachelor in the room = the oldest unmarried man in the room

is one where we have a trivial identity, because it is analytic (i.e. because of the literal meanings of 'the oldest bachelor in the room' and 'the oldest unmarried man in the room') and competence in the use of the terms would make it trivially uninformative to any speaker. Literal meaning of this kind is the subject matter of semantics: it
represents information about its purported referent that is semantically encoded in an expression and necessarily grasped by any speaker competent in its use. Following the tradition of Mill, we shall dub this attribute the connotation of a singular term. But that some identity statement is not trivial need not be because of a difference in literal meaning: for some singular terms (e.g. proper names) we have genuinely informative identity statements where the difference between terms cannot be one of literal meaning since the terms seem to have no literal meaning. For the familiar examples of a posteriori identity are

\[(9) \text{Cicero} = \text{Tully}\]

and \[(10) \text{Hesperus} = \text{Phosphorus}\]

where there is a difference in sense, ex hypothesi, but no difference

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22 The phrase 'semantically encoded' is Salmon's ([1986]). It should be made clear that the information semantically encoded in a term is its contribution to the information semantically encoded in the sentences in which it appears, and the information encoded in a sentence is simply given by prefixing the sentence by the operator 'The information that _'. For example, any information semantically encoded by the SRE 'McGinn' would be that common to both 'McGinn is short' and 'McGinn hates spaghetti', and that encoded by 'the tallest man in Oxford' would be that common to both 'The tallest man in Oxford is a philosopher' and 'The tallest man in Oxford loves lasagna'. A declarative sentence will normally encode one and only one piece of information in any given context. See §4.2 for further elaboration.

22 I do not intend to let this choice of term cloud issues. I am aware that as it is commonly used, 'connotation' denotes a pragmatic rather than a semantic notion: we say that there is a difference in connotation between 'dead' and 'deceased', 'maiden' and 'girl', or 'children' and 'offspring' even though we would not say that this was due to a difference of information semantically encoded in the terms. It is rather a matter of the contexts in which one term is chosen in favour of another and the social attitudes to the choice of one term rather than another that explain such associations. My use of 'connotation' would likely not distinguish any of the above pairs of terms \((5a)/(5b), (6a)/(6b), (7a)/(7b))\), although they clearly exhibit varying pragmatic associations!
in literal meaning. Hence intuition dictates that sense (that which explains informativeness) is not connotation! And with a few important caveats that is exactly the line I wish to pursue.

However, once conclusions are drawn, matters are seldom settled without further question. The reader must wonder about my use of the word 'content': how am I to distinguish information cognitively contained by a term (that which I call sense) from information semantically encoded in a term (connotation)? This is a common difficulty: there is a long tradition of confusion in the translation of words like 'Sinn', 'Inhalt' and their counterparts 'sense', 'meaning', 'content', 'significance' and the like. How do we characterise the philosophical use of these words - do they express semantic or epistemic attributes of terms? Because of this confusion and because of the arguably radical departure from the post-Fregean tradition that my own distinction makes, it is essential to confront these issues.

It is wise to concede that sense and connotation must be closely related. In fact information contained in sense is a superset of that in connotation, for if a SRE literally means something then that connotation or literal meaning can hardly fail to thereby make a contribution to the sum total of information expressed by the sentences in which it occurs and hence to its sense.

But before presenting a distinction between sense and connotation and attempting to relocate the notion of sense within the framework of contemporary referential theory, there are a number of matters on which to dwell. The first and most intriguing of these is finding a reason
for the common supposition that the notion of Sinn as presented by Frege\textsuperscript{23} should have anything to do with connotation. Many of Frege's commentators have assumed just that: that is, they have assumed that the sense of a singular term is some objectively agreed 'corpus of information' that any speaker competent in the use of that term will associate with its referent. They do not make this assumption without good reason - much of what Frege wrote was confused on this matter, and, in the words of Tyler Burge, I am not planning to make a virtue out of Frege's Sinn!

Partly responsible for the conflation of sense and connotation must be the coarse Fregean dichotomy between saturated and unsaturated expressions: every expression is either an Eigenname (saturated) or a Funktionsname (unsaturated), Frege's criteria for making this classification, for judging whether a symbol is saturated or not, being primarily grammatical: declarative sentences, proper names and definite descriptions (noun phrases beginning with the definite article 'the') are saturated, whereas pluralised expressions or ones beginning with 'some', 'a', 'one', 'every' etc. are not saturated.\textsuperscript{24} With the idée fixe that all expressions have not only reference but also sense (that which they express) it is neither surprising nor unreasonable to assume that the senses of all saturated expressions are of the same kind. When some saturated noun phrases such as definite descriptions have such obvious literal meaning whereby the way in which they denote their

\textsuperscript{23} In Frege [1892b].

\textsuperscript{24} Frege conceded that his grammatical criteria were rough and ready ([1892a] p.45), but decided they would serve adequately enough.
referents is made explicit, it is equally reasonable to suppose that it is this literal meaning which constitutes sense, even if a similar semantic property is not apparent for other saturated expressions. Frege explains that the significance of saying that a=b comes from the fact that the Eigennamen 'a' and 'b' have different Sinne. And, of course, the fact that 'Eigennamen' translates into English most readily as 'proper name' has far from impeded philosophers in their rush to equate Fregean Sinn with conventional linguistic meaning.

A useful corollary of such a view is that certain referring expressions can have senses even though they lack referents, and this explains the significance of sentences like

(11) Clouseau is a famous detective
or

(12) The philosopher who first refuted Wittgenstein's private language argument is dead

despite the fact that 'Clouseau' and 'the philosopher who first refuted Wittgenstein's private language argument' do not refer and that we might be unsure which truth-values to assign to (utterances of) such sentences. To pursue the matter of empty SREs here would, I feel, merely lead to even greater confusion - again I postpone further consideration to later chapters.

The heart of the matter is that Frege's initial investigation of language is epistemic in character: the function of Sinn is to explain informativeness. This is quite different in character to much contemporary investigation - especially that which goes on in the post-
Fregean Anglo-American analytic tradition. As Dummett specifically warns in the case of Frege, it is unwise to consider any philosopher's ideas static, even though their evolution involves the withdrawal of previously held views - One might cite Russell and Wittgenstein as pre-eminent examples of recent changes of heart and of mind. Consequently, it is unwise to succumb to the orthodox judgement of Frege's Sinn on the basis of a single well-known article, or by the standards of contemporary interests. But from this logico-philosophical minefield we can abstract at least the three following seminal theses:

(Frege\(x\)) Sinn is that attribute of a term that explains the informativeness of identities and wherein its mode of presentation of its referent is contained;

(Frege\(2\)) Sinn is that attribute of a (singular) term that determines its referent (Bedeutung); and

(Frege\(3\)) Sinn is that attribute of a (singular) term to which reference is made in oblique contexts.

The attribute described in (Frege\(x\)) is what I have identified as sense. However, what does the work of the attribute described in (Frege\(2\)) appears to be connotation.\(^{16}\)

The main fault with Frege’s conception of Sinn is that he expects too much of it. His expectation has been turned into stipulation by modern commentators. It is from those unhappy interpretations that the

\(^{13}\) A probable exception to this is Michael Dummett, who seems quite ready to run together the semantic and the epistemological.

\(^{16}\) This naïve view is further revised in §4.2.
conflation of sense and connotation has sprung.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, whereas Frege's work itself was breaking new ground, it would seem a failing on the part of commentators to ignore the separability and logical non-equivalence of these attributes: In ninety years of Frege scholarship all but a handful of philosophers have either accepted or rejected Fregean Sinn lock, stock and barrel. It seems myopic to treat matters in a similar fashion. Although there are persuasive arguments for the non-connotative nature of genuine proper names, there is merit in allowing them to retain some aspects of Fregean Sinn!

The confusion is intensified by Frege's apparent anticipation of Russell's descriptionism. The following popular quotation represents Frege at his most opaque:

> In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions as to the sense may differ. It might for instance be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence "Aristotle was born in Stagira" than will a man who takes as the sense of the name: the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect language.\textsuperscript{3-8}

What does Frege's claim here amount to? There are a variety of ways in which to interpret the claim that the Sinn of an actual proper name, 'N', might be: the F for one speaker but: the G for another

\textsuperscript{27} Dummett's interpretation of Frege is an outstanding example of this: even on second thoughts ([1982]) he insists that Fregean sense is to be equated with conventional linguistic significance and practically reprimands Frege for not taking it as such.

\textsuperscript{38} Frege [1892b] p.58n.
Most naturally of all, the claim might be taken as a claim about identifying Sinne - a speaker who associates with 'N' the Sinn: the F, might be identifying the Sinn of 'N' with that of 'the F'. There are at least two sub-options here: firstly, one might take this to mean that the semantic function of 'N' is that of 'the F'; secondly, one might take it to mean that the cognitive role played by 'N' for the speaker is the same as that played by 'the F'. On the first of these options, 'N' more or less abbreviates 'the F', very much along the lines of Russell's theory of names. This decimates the claim of objective communication: speakers who use the same name (or tokens of the same name-type) to abbreviate different descriptions would be saying different things and would only appear to be communicating. It seems strange that for Frege such variations should be tolerated 'as long as reference remains the same', for it is (i) often unclear to a speaker exactly which description (if any) would represent the Sinn of a proper name to him (Can you say what description 'David Wiggins' abbreviates for you?) and (ii) often unclear whether a description so associated with a name does in fact pick out the referent of that

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20 One interpretation we may exclude immediately is that the Sinn of 'Aristotle' is some object, e.g. the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. Note how the omission of quasi-quotes exacerbates the exegetical problem.

20 This seems to be the standard preliminary analysis of the cited passage, but it has been suggested that Frege would not agree with this (Bell [1979]): names and descriptions exemplify different modes of presentation since names are not true of their bearers and descriptions are not arbitrarily correlated with an object. See Frege [1918] p.359.
name. If it turned out that Aristotle had neither studied under Plato, taught Alexander the Great nor been born in Stagira, to whom would the speakers in the cited passage be referring when they used the name 'Aristotle'?

Although *prima facie* more attractive, the second option is equally unappealing to the devout Fregean. Not only does the above caveat about failure to communicate apply, but there is an additional worry about making coherent the notion of two distinct terms playing the same cognitive role: what would this mean and how would the competent speaker distinguish it from the former option? This option may be adopted, but it requires a far more detailed conception of 'cognitive role' than is currently available to us. If Frege held either of these views, he certainly abandoned them, for his later discussion of the name 'Lauben' shows that he believes it can be used perfectly standardly by members of a community who in fact associate distinct (sets of) descriptions with it. His qualms about subjectivity notwithstanding, it is plausible to suggest that Frege felt the association of name with description was done by the speaker on an individual basis according to the beliefs the speaker held about the name's referent.

To push this point further we may indulge ourselves with the following thought-experiment. Imagine two speakers, Melvyn and Maggie.

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21 Frege retreats later [1918] by saying that speakers who associate different senses with the same name are 'speaking different languages'. Here I simply concentrate on his earlier [1892b] view.

who use the SRE 'Ronald Reagan'. Melvyn (a film buff) uses the name quite correctly to refer to an individual of whom he knows only that he was a film star in the 1940s and 1950s who starred in a number of mediocre 'Westerns'. Maggie (a political activist) uses the name quite correctly to refer to an individual of whom she knows only that he is currently President of the United States and has enjoyed political success since the late 1960s. Melvyn knows nothing of Reagan's political career; Maggie knows nothing of Reagan's screen career. We can generously suppose that suitable causal relations hold between their stock of beliefs about Reagan and the individual himself, i.e. that their holding these true beliefs about Reagan is partially causally explained by their truth. When these two characters talk about him, they do so perfectly standardly, yet the only information they commonly associate with 'Reagan' is that it denotes Reagan. They might learn more about Reagan, but they equally might conclude that they are talking about two distinct individuals, a politician and a film star, as might a pair of speakers talking about two Aristotles-the philosopher and the shipping magnate. But whatever the information Melvyn and Maggie associate with Reagan and, hence, with the name 'Reagan' the aspect of that association that yields the Sinn of an expression does not satisfy all Frege's requirements: (i) Melvyn and Maggie both use 'Reagan' correctly, but (ii) there is no common cognitive factor that they both grasp that could be said to satisfy (Frege_1), (Frege_2) or (Frege_3) for 'Reagan'. No interpretation of Fregean Sinn escapes the problems posed by ordinary proper names.
Frege's comments on 'Aristotle' come as a caveat to his general comments supporting (Frege$_2$). His 'tolerance' suggests that he dismisses natural languages as failing to match up to theoretical ideals: the essential point is that he wants to dismiss mental imagery for being subjective,$^{23}$ yet he cannot dismiss cognitive variation in the same fashion because such subjectivity is inseparable from standard uses of genuine proper names. So Frege is forced to condemn natural language in toto for manifesting this phenomenon and failing to match up to the high standard of 'theoretical' language.

§2.3 CONNOTATION, CONTENT AND COMPETENCE

As I have noted above, Frege insists that his Sinn plays at least three distinct roles. We must now attempt to sort out the confusion that failure to take note of this has caused. Taking his cue from Tyler Burge, Nathan Salmon has distinguished the following three conceptions of the 'sense' of a SRE:$^{24}$

SENSE$_1$: The purely conceptual representation of an object which a fully competent speaker associates in a particular way with his or her use of the term. Sense$_1$ is a psychological or conceptual notion. It includes only purely qualitative properties (ones that do not involve any direct reference to any individual); external things cannot 'occur as constituents' of sense$_1$. Instead there are only conceptual representations thereof.

SENSE$_2$: The mechanism by which the reference of a term (with respect to a possible world and time) is secured and semantically determined. Sense$_2$ is a semantic notion.

$^{23}$ [1892b] p.59 quoted below.

SENSE₃: The information value of the term; the contribution made by the term to the information content of sentences containing that term. Sense₃ is a cognitive or epistemic notion. The sense₃ of a term forms part of any belief expressed by means of the term, and is relevant to the epistemological status (a priori, a posteriori, trivial, informative) of sentences containing the term.

Salmon's trifurcative distinction stresses the following differences. Sense₁ is a psychological notion corresponding to the Putnamesque stereotype or 'meaning-in-the-head' common to competent speakers of a language: the sense₁ of a SRE is a conceptual representation mentally 'grasped' or 'apprehended' by any speaker competent in the use of that SRE. Obviously it does not give a full description of the contemporary mental state of a speaker, for this will vary from one speaker to the next with beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. The sense₂ of a SRE coincides with what I have called its 'connotation': the notion coincides with the information semantically encoded in an expression and, in some way as yet unexplained, determines the sense₁ of that SRE. Sense₃ is that attribute of a SRE that solves the Fregean identity puzzle. As they stand, these are clearly distinct attributes of any referring expression. Salmon argues that the common interpretation of Fregean theories results in a three-way identification of these aspects (i.e. sense₁=sense₂=sense₃) for proper names: whether or not this is unfair to Frege, it is as unsurprising as many other theses attributed to him.

²₅ I must confess a bemused incomprehension of this notion: Salmon's explanation of sense₁ leaves it unclear as to whether it is meant to be a 'mental representation' of a SRE's sense₂, its sense₃, or some other attribute. Nor does Salmon provide an adequate explanation of what he means by 'mental representation'. I leave this notion in its primitive and confused state only because I intend to make no further use of it.
as a result of his comments on the name 'Aristotle'. Salmon is correct in holding that none of these components should be identified with any other, but maintains that there are some types of SRE where the three may be identified; for example, definite descriptions have a literal meaning that may be taken as the sense$_2$ (determining their denotation in attributive usage) and be identified with the information such an expression conveys to a competent speaker of the language (sense$_3$) and, if the description contains no direct reference, also with the conceptual representation of the expression (sense$_1$). Salmon claims that such a description would be 'the shortest spy'. I need not bother with the details of Salmon's claim to say that I do not endorse his view on this matter. If his distinction does apply, it must surely be a category mistake to identify these attributes in certain cases: even for some privileged class of definite descriptions it seems erroneous to claim that a psychological entity, a semantic entity and a cognitive entity are identical. What we can say is that it is prima facie plausible to suggest that for certain SREs there is a structural similarity between these three attributes.

I do not intend to adopt Salmon's distinctions without modification. It is useful to agree with him that sense$_3$ is whatever solves the Fregean identity puzzle (and, of course, that this is distinct from sense$_2$), but I would suggest that it also covers the notion of a set or cluster of properties (achievements, identifying


\[27\] Even the suggestion that 'the same attribute' might play the same roles seems to have something of this flavour.
characteristics, emotional attitudes etc.) which a speaker contingently associates with his or her use of a referring expression, the notion which Salmon calls 'sense_2'. Contra Salmon, it is surely to some very close relation of this 'mental file' that we appeal to explain the Fregean puzzle, i.e. that different subjects might believe or disbelieve an identity statement asserting that one and the same item is designated by two distinct referring expressions according to the mental files they associate with those expressions.

Salmon suggests that to show sense_3 is not the same thing as sense_1 (or sense_2) we may generalise Frege's strategy for showing sense_3 is not the same thing as reference, i.e. by finding terms that differ in sense_3 but not in sense_1. It is quite unclear how this might be done, for if the mental files an individual associates with distinct terms are identical, how can there be a difference in what I have called cognitive content? Salmon's dismissal of sense_2 is, perhaps, because he feels that it, like sense_1, lies in the mental or psychological realm of ideas and images. That is a valid criticism, but we might then turn to the cognitive counterpart of a term's mental file rather than to that mental representation itself: we can observe the difference between subjective cognitive content and subjective unshareable mental imagery. As I mentioned above, even Frege wants to dismiss the latter notion;

The sense (Sinn) of a sign is to be distinguished from the associated idea.. the same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective:

[1982] p.12n. The reader's attention is drawn to the minute typographic difference between 'sense_1' and 'sense_2', which nonetheless distinguishes quite distinct attributes.
one man's idea is not that of another.29

In a similarly confused fashion Salmon claims that in the case of (attributive uses of) descriptions we can identify sense₂ and sense₃: I would suggest that, for any definite description and any speaker competent in the use thereof, the sense₂ of the description certainly contributes to the cognitive content of the description, but that it also conveys other information according to the various beliefs the speaker might have about the referent of the description. For example, a sentence containing the definite description 'the author of Insight and Illusion' would probably convey different information to someone who additionally knows of him only that he is co-author of Language, Sense and Nonsense than to someone who additionally knows of him only that he is the figure he sees wandering around the quad, though to both it conveys the information that he wrote Insight and Illusion. So 'sense', as we shall use it, is substantially different to Salmon's use of 'sense₃', for it is speaker-relative: different competent speakers, having different beliefs, will be differently informed by sentences in which a SRE occurs.

How are genuine proper names to be treated on this distinction of 'senses'? The Fregean puzzle shows the need to acknowledge that names have sense₃. It is not a corollary of his discussion that names have either sense₁ or sense₂. Sense₃ is that which speakers attach to terms and individuates them in such a way as to explain the fact that in some contexts coreferential terms may not be substituted one for another salva veritate - that is, in contexts assessing the information

29 Frege [1892b] p.59.
conveyed to a speaker by some sentence in which they appear. That a SRE has a sense\textsubscript{3} does not generally entail that it has a sense\textsubscript{2}, and it is the latter that seems \textit{prima facie} identifiable with the literal meaning of a term, which genuine names seem to lack. It is crucial to contrast sense\textsubscript{2} as a property of a term but sense\textsubscript{3} as data associated pragmatically to a term by a speaker. This indicates one way in which to avoid a conflation of the notions of sense and connotation.

Here we may observe that the association of a description with a name (when they are said to corefer) by a speaker will clearly give the name the sense\textsubscript{3} of that description for that speaker for as long as (s)he makes that association: the similar association of two descriptions will equally well change the sense\textsubscript{3} of the terms. But such an association will not change the sense\textsubscript{2} of the SREs. If a speaker believes that $a=b$, where \textit{a} and \textit{b} are SREs, then he believes that when he refers with \textit{a} he is also referring to \textit{b} and that anything he holds to be true of \textit{a} is true of \textit{b}, but he does not claim that \textit{a} means \textit{b}; e.g. I do not believe that \textit{Scott} means the same as \textit{the author of Waverley} even though I do believe I refer to the author of Waverley when I refer with \textit{Scott}. Discoveries of such identities do not affect the semantic functions of the terms: Frege's work clearly focuses on the cognitive roles of the terms, merely showing that coreferential but distinct terms need not have the same cognitive content even though lacking literal meaning.

This is the crux of the matter. It is precisely because of this capacity for the pragmatic storage of information that SREs generate the problems that they do. A SRE used by a speaker is an ideal
repository for data. We might look on these as data in a computer file. It is possible to erase the pragmatic content of any SRE but not its semantic content: that is, the information that is merely pragmatically and so contingently attached to a SRE may be abandoned at liberty. So if I've always believed that Peacocke wrote a doctoral thesis on aesthetic theory or that the inventor of bifocals was over 6'6" it wouldn't affect my use of 'Peacocke' or 'the inventor of bifocals' to discover that my beliefs were false; I would simply have erased those pieces of information from the data-files labelled 'Peacocke' and 'the inventor of bifocals'. And, of course, everyone is at liberty to put completely different data in these files if it does not prevent their competence in the use of those terms.

This subjective variance is of paramount importance. The fact that an identity is non-trivial is not because each SRE has an objectively defined Sinn and that the SREs flanking the identity sign have non-identical Sinne. Rather, it is because an individual could use those SREs perfectly correctly and be unaware that they corefer or even be convinced that they denote distinct items, because they associate distinct information with them. Only if any speaker competent in the use of the SREs and of the identity sign would be expected to observe that they corefer is the identity universally trivial, and only the information semantically encoded in the SRE is every speaker competent in its use expected to grasp.

The pragmatically attached information is, as I have suggested, of varying sorts. It can be descriptive information (the kind semantically encoded in definite descriptions) or recognition-based
information (that the item I recognise in such and such a fashion is the referent of this SRE) or even emotional attitudes (e.g. someone I hate, something of which I'm proud). All this is to be covered by the term 'sense'. With this rich variety of contents to our mental files, it is not surprising that there is such subjective variation.

All this seems to provide very good reason to suppose that the sense (unlike the connotation) of a SRE is not immutable. Someone who would be genuinely informed by (1b) is someone who associates distinct and disjoint data with the SREs 'a' and 'b'. Someone who has been (genuinely) informed that (1b) is someone who has come to associate the same sense with 'a' and 'b': what they previously held to be true only of a they will now hold to be true also of b and vice versa. This dissemination of information - certainly a common enough conversational phenomenon - leads to a change in sense. This change is very much like the merging of two data files: instead of two files with disjoint collections of data, the informed individual has two files with identical contents. To accept an identity statement is to combine and consolidate the stores of information associated with the relata of that identity statement. That true identity statements involving distinct names are informative is simply a consequence of this merging procedure: even though the semantic functions of the two names are trivially (but contingently) identical (to refer directly and rigidly to one and the same object), the merging of the information stores a speaker associates with them may represent a genuine increase in knowledge.
Frege's criterion for the identity of sense of two SREs is that the statement of their identity is trivial. By suitable relativization we may now read this as the slightly more satisfactory criterion that a speaker competent in the use of two SREs will associate with them the same sense if and only if the statement of their identity is trivial to him. As we have defined sense, if the identity (1b) is not trivial to him, a speaker competent in the use of 'a' and 'b' must associate a different sense with 'a' than with 'b'. (Since their connotations do not demonstrably coincide.) Conversely, if (1b) is trivial to him, then a speaker competent in the use of 'a' and 'b' must make the same associations with both 'a' and 'b', and hence the same sense. This explains why our intuitions favour saying that pairs of expressions (e.g. (5a)/(5b), (6a)/(6b) or (7a)/(7b)) have the same sense: we ought to say is that their connotations demonstrably coincide a priori and hence that any competent speaker will associate with them the same sense even though there is not a single sense that all competent speakers will associate with them. Connotation is a property of SREs whereas sense is something that individual speakers assign to them.  

I am wary of making assertions to the effect that expressions with which a speaker associates the same sense play the same 'conceptual role' for him, although their conceptual roles will be related with respect to the inferences the speaker will be prepared to support. If for no other reason, because it is uncertain that two SREs with different connotations may play the same cognitive role for a speaker: obviously the information semantically encoded yields a privileged portion of the information contained in a speaker's use of a term, i.e. that which must be apprehended by anyone competent in the use of that SRE. Hence, if the SREs 'a' and 'b' semantically encode different data but I associate the same sense with both, it is doubtful whether they play the same conceptual role tout court, for it will be of some importance that I grasp that they differ in connotation (e.g. for when I wish to explain what they mean to someone!). Whether we may say that two SREs play the same conceptual role for someone if they
§2.4 INFORMATION AND ILLUSION

Armed with the sense/connotation distinction we can observe a corresponding divide with regard to the informativeness of identities. An identity may be either semantically or cognitively informative. An identity such as

(13) Cicero = Cicero

strikes us as both semantically and cognitively trivial: it tells us nothing. An identity such as

(13) The author of Henry V = the author of Macbeth

is semantically non-trivial: the SREs flanking the identity sign semantically inform us about their referents in such a way that not everyone who grasps the semantic content of the SREs would be able to judge a priori that they corefer. Yet cognitive triviality is not a question of such 'across-the-board' classification. An identity that is semantically non-trivial might be completely cognitively trivial to some individuals. For example, (13) might be trivial to a Shakespeare scholar. This would be because the SREs 'the author of Henry V' and 'the author of Macbeth' have become so intimately linked in the scholar's mind. They haven't come to mean the same thing to him (if they had, he'd be using one of them non-standardly and wouldn't appreciate its semantic content), but he has come to associate the same stock of information with both. This is not a mark of his competence at using the SREs in question (he doesn't use them more correctly than

associate the same information with them and ignore the type of association (e.g. semantically encoded rather than pragmatically associated) remains obscure. A type-token distinction may help here. See §8.1.
anyone else), but rather indicates his familiarity with using them in a certain way, i.e. to corefer. So the cognitive triviality of an identity is something that may vary from one speaker to the next and for one speaker over a period of time.

This separation of semantic and cognitive issues naturally becomes bound up with the notion of a theory of meaning. Contemporary speculation has transformed the theory of meaning into a grimly pervasive and complex spectre that haunts the unwary philosopher of language. Dissecting or constructing a theory of meaning requires tools of considerable precision. Even though the assessment of a theory of meaning is beyond the narrow scope of the present work (it receives but a cursory glance in chapter 4), it is vital to recognise the distinction between the semantic and cognitive roles of expressions in language. We should aim to make their definitions as sharp as possible so that if we seek to blur them we are bound to provide some reason for so doing. In view of the vagueness of the terms 'semantic' and 'cognitive', it is far from settled how the distinction is to be developed, but it is most certainly one that we must acknowledge.

Let us offer more rigorous definitions of sense and connotation.

SENSE: is an epistemic attribute of an expression that consists in the totality of epistemic data that a speaker holds to be true of the referent of that expression. With the exception of data that is part of the connotation (q.v.) of the expression, this data is merely contingently associated with the expression (and its putative referent) and may vary from speaker to speaker.
CONNOTATION: is a semantic attribute of an expression that consists in the totality of data semantically encoded in that expression. This data must be apprehended by anyone considered competent in the use of the expression and who is aware of the context in which it is used.31

One way in which the sense/connotation distinction sheds light on the flawed Fregean argument involves the interpretation of the phrase 'information content'. For it seems that if the information contained in a sentence is taken to be a function of the information contained in its constituents, we can see that understanding 'information content' of a SRE as its connotation, or as wholly dependent on its connotation, would demonstrate that, despite appearances to the contrary, there is no difference in information content between (la) and (lb) when 'a' and 'b' are proper names and, therefore, lack connotation. To draw the Fregean conclusion that 'a' and 'b' differ in Sinn (and thus in literal meaning) would require that there be some semantic difference between (la) and (lb).

One flaw to discuss is the supposition that terms with coincident senses must corefer. If we accept that Sinn is the determiner of Bedeutung (in accordance with principle (Frege2)) we cannot avoid this consequence. Nonetheless, we can easily envisage a case where two SREs have coincident Sinne but do not corefer if we take Sinn as representative of cognitive content and merely pragmatic associations.

31 The second of these definitions advert to the fact that the information semantically encoded in an expression may be such that it varies from one context of utterance to another or simply gives a rule for determining further information. A fuller description of this phenomenon is given in §4.2.
In that case we can use any two SREs, 'a' and 'b', such that the identity (1b) is not semantically trivial where a speaker competent in the use of 'a' and 'b' associates the same cognitive content with both 'a' and 'b': the association he makes is quite independent of their referential function and, if he is mistaken, he could quite easily assign the same sense to SREs that fail to corefer. The English scholar who takes (13) to be cognitively trivial and assigns the same cognitive content to 'the author of Henry V' and 'the author of Macbeth' does so even if (unbeknownst to him) those descriptions are not jointly satisfied. If we accept that Sinn is not the determiner of Bedeutung but merely what I have called sense, we remain in tune with our intuitions on the matter.

A second flaw involves the claim that all identities of the form 't=t' express the same information. This is not so clearly refutable: the problem is that all such identities are trivial. Again we look to an interpretation of 'information content' for an answer. There is an obvious difficulty here: if we say that every identity of the form 't=t' expresses the same information then every SRE must express the same information. A solution might be to insist that in fact each identity of the form 't=t' does convey different information - it plainly conveys whatever information is semantically encoded in the term 't' - but it conveys it twice over so that it becomes a trivial statement. Since it is a logical truth, anyone who is competent in the use of 't' receives no additional information from 't=t'. But this  

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32 Since 't=t' is the value of the self-identity function for the argument 't'.
phenomenon is restricted to analytic and a priori identities. If we take the information content of a SRE to be a function of its semantic content, then we retain the following difficulty: if we have an identity involving SREs that have no semantic content then it expresses no information. In particular, this means that there is no difference in information content between, say,

(9) Cicero = Tully
and
(13) Cicero = Cicero.

Neither of the SREs 'Cicero' or 'Tully' has a literal meaning and hence neither (9) nor (13) is genuinely informative (contrary to appearances). Conversely if we take the information content of a term to be its cognitive content, neither (9) nor (13) expresses no information: (9) expresses information associated with the SREs 'Cicero' and 'Tully', and (13) expresses information associated with the SRE 'Cicero'. Now, it is true that (9) imparts more (and more useful) information than (13), but if we strip the terms of their senses, their pragmatic associations (the data in the mental files of a speaker who uses those terms), it is not at all clear (9) and (13) do not semantically represent exactly the same information. If we focus on sense rather than connotation, we can maintain that 'a=a' and 'b=b' are semantically trivial but do not contain or express the same information (despite their triviality). It is not that 't' in some way loses its sense in the trivial identity 't=t', but rather that it is axiomatic of the identity relation that 't=t' is trivial. So (9) and (13) would semantically encode exactly the same necessary truth (that Cicero is self-identical) but present it in different ways, the
pragmatic associations of the two sentences being at most contingently identifiable. That such identities conceal from competent speakers properties of the propositions they express (such as their necessary truth) does not remove such properties.

We should not pretend that this is the only way to reduce the potency of a quasi-Fregean semantic argument, but the solution considered demonstrates one use to which the semantic/cognitive distinction may be put. More importantly it also demonstrates that the sense (cognitive content) of a SRE is neither determined by its connotation (or its literal meaning - for it may have none) nor is it the determiner of its reference. With that much salvaged from the notion of Fregean Sinn we may proceed to examine the stated semantic function of names, their lack of connotation, Kripke's treatment thereof, and, in particular, the direct reference theories of naming.
What is the true picture of what's going on? Maybe reference doesn't really take place at all! After all, we don't really know that any of the properties we use to the man are right. We don't know that they pick out a unique object. So what does make my use of 'Cicero' into a name of him?

Saul Kripke.
In this chapter we examine theories of naming that view names as in some way abbreviating, disguising, truncating or going proxy for definite descriptions. Among such are semantic theories that produce 'out of thin air' a connotation for a given name that is a simple function of the connotation of whichever definite descriptions the theory takes to be a semantic correlate of (any given) uses of that name. Such theories I shall call Russellian, because, without being too critically exegetical, it might be assumed that Russell once held such a view. With slightly more license one might ascribe similar views to the class, cluster or collection theories of Wittgenstein, Quine and Searle, but the accuracy of such exegesis need not concern us. The important aspects of Russellian theories are two: (i) that there is some misguided motivation for adopting such an explanation of the nature of names, provided especially by Russell's comments and; (ii) that there are types of descriptonal theory that are not Russellian.

Russell's theory arose in order to explain a number of puzzles provided by names; the problem of negative existentials, opaque contexts, and informative identities. What seems intuitive evidence for the inadequacy of Russellian theories is that, whatever descriptions you take a name to abbreviate, you get the semantic properties of some sentences completely wrong! Kripke levels a variety of arguments against Russellianism, and intuitively we can predict his
results. If we suppose that 'N' means 'the F', how can it be that N bears the name if he is not the F? Does 'Scott' mean 'the author of Waverley'? If so, did it mean 'the author of Waverley' before Waverley was written? Presumably not, unless, say, it was the case that his mother used his name but in some way failed to grasp its meaning. And presumably all the other people called 'Scott' in this family were similarly misnamed. Even given this implausibility, we can notice a difference in modal properties of certain sentences that on such a theory should be synonymous. One might claim that 'N is not the F' and 'the F is not the F' are synonymous, but by prefixing them suitably to ensure that the singular terms have widest scope relative to that of 'not' we note that

(1) Someone is N and N is not the F

and

(1a) Someone is the F and the F is not the F

differ in truth-conditions and hence in truth-value as we range across possible worlds, even though it might be the case that N is the F in reality. This is the starting point for Kripkean arguments.

If there are good reasons for adopting a Russellian theory in its solution to various puzzles, there are problems in its counter-intuitive semantic linkage of name and definite description. This is something mentioned in the previous chapter, amplified by Fregean comments on the name 'Lauben' \(^2\) and motivating Russell's own comments below concerning the thought in the mind of one using a name:

The description required to express the thought will vary for different people, or for the same person at different times. The only thing constant (so long as the name is rightly used)

\(^2\) Frege [1918].
is the object to which the name applies.²

Such comments emphasise the difficulty in maintaining that there is some information semantically encoded in a name-type. If there is such information it must surely be plain to every speaker deemed competent in the use of the name that the information is about its bearer. Since it is perfectly consistent to suppose a speaker competent in the use of a name but ignorant of such information, there is something suspect in Russellianism. But if Russellianism merely concerns name-tokens (i.e. specific uses of names by language-users) how can we maintain that effective communication is anything more than illusory if different tokens are, as Russell concedes, taken to abbreviate distinct information?

This suggests a different type of descriptional theory. Suppose that we form the idea that N is the F in acquiring the use of the name 'N'. In the name-using practice in which we are taking part 'the F' may be an identifying description that is linked commonly if not universally with 'N', e.g. it may be held by all speakers involved in a certain name-using practice that Scott is the author of Waverley and that in using 'Scott' one is standardly talking about the author of Waverley. So we may intend to refer to the F in using 'N' even though it might turn out that N is not the F. This admits the contingent relation between name and description that Russellian theories strengthen: a description in terms of which a name is held to be Russellian is 'welded' to that name in such a way as to represent the

meaning (= semantically encoded information) of the name in terms of
the meaning of the description. If it is merely maintained that one
intends to refer to the F when using 'N' the thesis is light enough to
avoid the counter-intuitive consequences of names exhibiting
non-standard semantic properties, but substantial enough to explain the
link between names and descriptions in terms of the sense that a name
acquires from being used in a given fashion.

If Russell's semantic theory is so obviously faulty, it is perhaps
ill-advised to dwell thereon. But what other solutions are there to
our puzzles? And do our intuitive qualms about Russellianism
conclusively refute it? In this chapter we shall be concerned with
Kripke's 'intuitively acceptable' picture of proper names as rigid
designators. It will be seen that on the whole his picture of names is
unobjectionable as a refutation of Russellian theories (construed as
theories of the meaning of name-types) but misrepresents the pragmatics
of name-use.

§3.1 RIGIDITY AND SCOPE

Saul Kripke offers no theory of names. At least he says that he
hopes no-one will suspect him of so doing because he is sure that any
theory is wrong. ³ What he does offer is a 'picture' of names, though
I confess that I do not know what significance should be attached to
this distinction. It is possible that Kripke at first doubted the
accuracy of some parts of his picture. Or perhaps he was merely
claiming that none of the existing theories of proper names were

³ Kripke [1972] p.64.
correct. Or perhaps he was as unsure about the scope of an adequate theory as were his predecessors. For now let us simply note that in offering a mere 'picture', Kripke's ideas have probably had more impact on the philosophy of singular reference than those of any other philosopher in the past fifty years.

In a series of influential and critically acclaimed writings Kripke has argued for the Rigid Designation Thesis that

(RDT) Names (of individuals and of kinds) are rigid designators.

He offers two accounts of what it is for a term, 't', to be a rigid designator:

(R1) 't' is a rigid designator iff 't might not have been t' is false; and

(R2) 't' is a rigid designator iff 't' picks out the same individual with respect to every possible world in which that individual exists (and never picks out anything else).

For brevity's sake I shall assume that the reader is familiar with these ideas and that definitions (R1) and (R2) are equivalent.

(R2) promises that Kripkean rigid designators thrive on the notion of scope-insensitivity in modal contexts. (RDT) claims that names, unlike, say, definite descriptions, are such that certain sentences involving them and modal operators remain constant in truth-value whether the name is taken as having wide or narrow scope with respect to the modal operator. An example is given by the sentence

(2) Heath might not have been Prime Minister
which may be read either as

(2a) Concerning Heath: he might not have been Prime Minister
or
(2b) It might have been the case that: Heath is not Prime
Minister.°

These do not differ in respect of truth conditions although in (2a) 'Heath' has wide scope with respect to the modal operator while in (2b) it has narrow scope. However, there is a difference in truth-value between

(3a) Concerning the Prime Minister: (s)he might not have been
the Prime Minister
and
(3b) It might have been the case that: the Prime Minister is
not the Prime Minister

which are analogous readings of

(3) The Prime Minister might not have been the Prime
Minister.

(3a) is (contingently) true, of logical form

\( (\exists x)((y)(Fy = x=y) & \Delta-Fx) \)

whereas (3b) has logical form

\( \Delta(\exists x)((y)(Fy = x=y) & \neg Fx) \)

which makes it false.° Peacocke offers a third explanation of


° Peacocke adds the plausible suggestion that this 'scopeless' nature extends to other non-modal contexts: for example, consider the identical truth-conditions of

(i) Concerning Heath: in the past, he edited The Church Times
and (ii) In the past: Heath edited The Church Times.

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(R3) 't' is a rigid designator iff there is an object, x, such that for any sentence G(t) in which 't' occurs, the truth (falsity) condition for G(t) is that <x> satisfy (respectively fail to satisfy) G( ).

This definition demonstrates the non-rigidity of most definite descriptions, for there is no object, x, such that one can give the truth-conditions of G(the F) as that <x> satisfy G( ) because - for most F - it would be possible that x was not the F in which case it would be irrelevant to the truth-conditions of G(the F) that <x> satisfy G( ). Less formally (R3) might read: "'t' is rigid iff every statement containing 't', whether modal or not, is to be assessed for truth or falsity by reference, at least in part, to a single individual". For example, the fact that Heath was well-mannered would be irrelevant to the truth or falsity of "The Prime Minister in 1973 was well-mannered" for someone else might then have been the Prime Minister. The qualification that needs to be observed is that some definite descriptions express properties that are essential to the designated item and are such that no other individual could exhibit them. Such terms are de facto rigid designators as opposed to designators that are rigid de jure (i.e. in virtue of their semantic function) such as names: the former are rigid because of the nature of their referents whereas the latter are rigid because of the nature of their semantic mechanism.

However, (R3) does not prove satisfactory, since propositional attitudes give a prima facie reason for supposing that proper names are


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not rigid designators. Supposing 'Bill' and 'Ben' are coreferential names, and rigid, it should be the case that the truth-condition of both

(4) Ralph believes that Bill is well-mannered
and
(5) Ralph believes that Ben is well-mannered
is that <Bill> satisfy the condition expressed by 'Ralph believes that ( ) is well-mannered'. Yet received philosophical opinion has it that (4) and (5) might differ in truth-value. They cannot thus have the same truth-condition.

What does one conclude? Generally Peacocke's criterion only functions correctly if the place marked by '( )' in the schema 'G( )' is transparent, which in the case of 'Ralph believes that ( ) is well-mannered' is false. Peacocke's rejoinder is a refusal to believe that contrary to its surface syntax a belief sentence like (4) has the logical form 'G(Bill)'. If this constitutes a disturbing lack of homogeneity in sentential analysis, it is something that bothers Kripke no less, for the claim that such transparent contexts might arise for any two coreferential names would provide a problem for any theory of reference, not just the theory of rigidity.7 Neither would one want to claim that the occurrence of 'Heath* in (4) was not one of a rigid designator - surely it rigidly designates Heath?

The point to be abstracted from Peacocke's amplification of Kripke's comments is that it is the scope-insensitive nature of names that indicates that they are dissimilar to definite descriptions. As

7 Kripke [1979]. The general problem of opaque contexts in propositional attitude sentences is discussed in §4.2. See also Sainsbury [1979] pp.60-63 on Peacocke's notion of rigidity.
(R2) suggests this is best illustrated by consideration of sentences of the form

\[(6) \text{t might have existed but not have been t}\]

for any SRE, 't'. It is clear that if the occurrences of 't' in (5) are either both given wide scope relative to the modal operator, vis.

\[(6w) \text{Concerning t: it might have existed but not have been it.}\]

or else both given narrow scope relative to the modal operator, vis.

\[(6n) \text{It might have been the case that: t exists but is not t}\]

the generated sentences are false. Only on a 'mixed scope' reading, surely the reading Kripke intends us to take, where the first occurrence of 't' is given wide scope relative to the modal operator and the second narrow scope, vis.

\[(6m) \text{Concerning t: it might have existed but not have been t}\]

do we see differences: 't' is rigid iff (6m) is false and, hence, insensitive to scope shifting by this modal operator. For any nonrigid 't' (6m) is true - there is some world with respect to which the designatum of 't' is not the same as it is in the actual world. Similar phenomena arise with other sentence operators.

It might be said that the charm of (RDT) is that it conclusively dispels any illusions one might have about the viability of Russellian theories. If names are rigid designators they designate items independently of any contingent properties such items might have. Whatever we think of possible worlds talk, we have to concede that Kripke's view has substantial intuitive appeal. The question that remains is whether these intuitions yield a satisfactory semantic account of names.

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The line Kripke advocates supposedly follows that taken by J. S. Mill, i.e. that proper names are connotationless and that their sole semantic function is to designate their referents. A Millian term is one that satisfies these conditions.

Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to these individuals. When we name a child by the name Paul, or a dog by the name Caesar, these names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be subjects of discourse....proper names are attached to the objects themselves and are not dependent on the continuance of any attribute of the object.*

However, Kripke maintains that names are rigid designators, and it seems to have escaped the watchful eyes of the philosophical public that these two notions are neither synonymous nor coextensive. For example the SREs 'the least prime number greater than 437' or 'the number of zeroes of the Riemann-Zeta function' are both rigid but not Millian. They certainly have connotation, but it is a fact of the necessary truths of arithmetic that they rigidly designate whatever it is that they designate. Two further points are generated by this observation.

The first point is rather tongue-in-cheek: to make the above observation we've had to produce a rigid definite description (what Kripke would call a de facto rigid designator). It is not easy to do this without resorting to the realms of the ontologically uncertain: arithmetic provides a good example of subject matter where the caveat

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* Mill [1843] p.33 (Bk.I, ch.2 sect.5). Mill arguably weakens this by maintaining in the very same section that names stand not for objects but for associated ideas. The important intuition is, however, that they lack connotation.

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in (R1) about a rigid designator designating the same individual with respect to every world in which it exists is redundant. I neither know nor need worry what would count as a world in which the least prime greater than 437 failed to exist: existence is not something we feel contingently applies to arithmetical entities. Now try to find a rigid definite description that picks out a contingent existent! It is very difficult to do this without the wisdom of the hideous complexity of modern analytic philosophy. In fact, I can think of no such expression that is commonly used outside philosophical circles.*

This leads on to our second point, which is that Kripke demarcates a semantic category on the basis of a metaphysical criterion. The class of rigid designators is best demarcated by common intuitions about transworld identity ((R2)). It is not at all clear that Kripke plays fair with such intuitions. It seems to beg the question to claim that some SRE is rigid precisely because with respect to any possible situation it picks out either the same individual or else nothing at all: are our intuitions about transworld identity as trivial as Kripke would like? Some of the necessary truths with which Kripke peppers his work take considerable effort to swallow. There are a large number of transworld identity relations to consider (each for a different kind of item - how readily we observe that 'being the same ship' differs from

* Some have suggested that the facts of biology ensure that SREs like 'the father of Elizabeth II' are rigid, i.e. denote the same individual with respect to every world in which that individual exists. This is false. One may make the strong claim that only one person could possibly satisfy that description (i.e. George VI), but there are clearly possible worlds where George VI exists but with respect to which no-one satisfies the description (e.g. worlds in which he exists but is sterile).
'being the same person') that may be used to generate a correspondingly large number of sorites-like paradoxes involving gradation and vagueness, and supporting or undermining essentialist hypotheses of origin or composition. Do we really intuitively feel that Elizabeth II necessarily had the parents she actually had? Or that a given sperm and egg will produce one and the same item with respect to any world in which they produce anything at all? Does it really go against the grain to challenge the identity of water and H₂O? Or to suppose that tigers don't qualify as such solely on the basis of some shared internal structure? I would suggest that these metaphysical intuitions run nowhere near as deep as Kripke would like. This seems to reflect a discrepancy between the notions of imaginability, conceivability and metaphysical possibility; e.g. I can conceive of time-travel even though many think it a metaphysical impossibility. Certainly our basic intuitions do not involve the manipulation of notions like possible worlds, transworld identities and rigid designators.

However, if we are to see what Kripke's 'pro-intuition' approach has to offer we must give him some ground. A point in Kripke's favour is that his discussion of possible worlds does stress that they are stipulated not discovered. We discuss possible worlds by specifying important items and qualitative restrictions and constructing worlds around them. We do not first find worlds that satisfy qualitative restrictions and then hunt around in them to locate certain items. We don't seek out possible worlds with a telescope, but we construct them out of the furniture of the actual world.

A typical example of this is Kripke's discussion of the various
fates of Richard Nixon:

it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications' are unproblematic in such cases.\footnote{Kripke [1972] p.49.}

In discussing various situations, Kripke suggests that we will use 'Nixon' to designate some individual rigidly. The fact that we can use locutions like 'If Nixon had bribed such and such a Senator, he would have gotten Carswell through', 'If Nixon had lost the election...', 'If Nixon had been killed in a road accident at the age of three...' or 'If Nixon had never been born...' confers respectability on the idea that 'Nixon' is standardly used to designate some individual who actually did X, Y and Z, but who need have done no such things. After all, if we don't draw that conclusion, we lose track of the significance of the above hypotheticals - if we're not talking about Nixon (that guy who happened to win the 1972 Presidential election) when we say something like 'If Nixon had never been born, America's fiscal policy in the mid-seventies would have been even more suicidal', then just who are we talking about and just what counterfactual situation are we trying to consider? In Wittgensteinian terms, we might wonder, if we're not playing the normal language-game with 'Nixon', what game are we playing?\footnote{But the problem that cannot be solved is that although we must be playing the 'standard' language-game when we use 'Nixon' we don't know whether that game is one that permits the referent of 'Nixon' to vary as we range across possible worlds. Kripke simply has nothing to refute this view, but this will not affect his argument that names like 'Nixon' do not have the semantic function of definite descriptions.}

As far as this goes, it is difficult not to be mightily impressed
by Kripke's thought. We simply must be talking about Nixon when we use 'Nixon' irrespective of what he did. And this supposedly deals a death-blow to the Russellian thesis that names like 'Nixon' semantically abbreviate definite descriptions. Of course, this thesis might be disposed of with greater finesse in other ways, but Kripke is nonetheless right to point out that simple intuitions about such hypothetical clauses support its denial.\textsuperscript{12}

Kripke's main ploy against the semantic thesis that names abbreviate or in some way encode information that describes their referent hinges on consideration of the following three types of modal argument:

(A) The 'metaphysical' type -

(a1) If 'N' meant 'the F' then 'N might not have been the F' would be false.

(a2) 'N might not have been the F' is true.

So (a3) 'N' does not mean 'the F';

(B) The 'epistemic' type -

(b1) If 'N' meant 'the F' then 'N is the F (if anything is)' would be true a priori, analytically or by definition.

(b2) It might be discovered that N is not the F.

\textsuperscript{12} It is plainly absurd to think that there is in any way a psychological process of abbreviation in operation when a speaker uses a proper name. But Kripke's theory devastates the weaker claim that names are semantically equivalent to a description or a body of contingently identifying descriptive information. Arguably 'abbreviate' and 'semantically encode' represent distinct notions. A term might be used to abbreviate a more complex expression without, strictly speaking, encoding the same information. I have more to say on this matter in my discussion of descriptive names (e.g. 'Julius' as used to abbreviate 'the inventor of the zip') in §6.3.
Hence (b3) 'N is the F' conveys genuinely a posteriori information. So (b4) 'N' does not mean 'the F'; and

(C) The 'semantic' type -

(c1) Suppose that 'N' means 'the F' to a speaker (i.e. that the sole identifying characteristic which that speaker attributes to N is that he is the unique F).

(c2) If it is discovered that M, not N, is the F then the speaker refers to N not to M by his use of 'N'.

(c3) If the speaker might use 'N' to refer to something that is not the F then 'N' does not mean 'the F' to that speaker.

(c4) It might be discovered that M, not N, is the F.

So (c5) 'N' does not mean 'the F'.

(A) and (B) are effective arguments against Russellian theories, theories of semantics. However, (C) introduces speakers of the language, i.e. people who use 'N' referentially. Despite the label given it, the premises of (C) give an inaccurate picture of speaker-reference. The ensuing discussion sketches a broader theory of referring of which rigidity is a consequence and which admits and explains many of the problems facing Kripke. The question then shall be: does (RDT) tell us anything about the nature of referring as an activity of speakers rather than a property of linguistic tokens?

(RDT) has gained its popular appeal not so much on its own positive merits as on the deficiencies of Russellianism that it makes

Kripke's first modal argument, (A), does this well. Simply put, the fact that 'N' and 'the F' do not corefer with respect to every possible situation demonstrates that the semantic function of 'N' cannot be the same as that of 'the F' - there will be stipulative possible worlds where N is not the F yet where we still seem to be using 'N' and 'the F' perfectly standardly. This emphasis on standard usage is made by Kripke himself, in order to avoid a fairly simplistic misinterpretation.

When I say that a designator is rigid, and designates the same thing in all possible worlds, I mean that, as used in our language, it stands for that thing, when we talk about counterfactual situations. I don’t mean, of course, that there might not be counterfactual situations in which in the other possible worlds people actually spoke a different language ... when we speak of a counterfactual situation, we speak of it in English even if it is part of the description of that counterfactual situation that we were all speaking German in that counterfactual situation....In describing that world we use English with our meanings and our references.¹⁵

We don't want to say that 'Nixon might not have been Nixon' is true simply because in some possible world 'Nixon' might have been used differently. It is this linguistic constraint that explains the cachet of 'with respect to': we talk about a SRE designating something with respect to a possible world to stress that we are using our language and contrast it with possible worlds in which the SRE is used to designate something else.

The demonstrable non-equivalence of semantic function between a name and a definite description provides a prima facie compelling

¹⁴ For we have yet to ascertain how it will provide a solution to the puzzles of informative identities, opaque contexts, negative existentials - all the problems that fuel the Russellian view.


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reason for adopting the view that names are Millian. But on second thoughts all the argument (A) does is to demonstrate that names are not equivalent to non-rigid descriptions (or any other non-rigid SREs). In particular, (A) shows that names are not semantically equivalent to any nonrigid SREs. If we don't like the idea of maintaining that names are Millian (perhaps because we are impressed by evidence of negative existentials, substitutivity failure, or informative identities that there is information semantically encoded in proper names) we might look for a third, alternative semantic theory that accommodates our intuition that names are not disguised non-rigid descriptions.

It has been suggested that conceiving of the form that any such tertium quid might take has been the major stumbling block for the development of such a conciliatory theory. If we claim that names are not Millian, there seems little alternative but to claim that they are Russellian.

If a name is not a semantically simple, unstructured individual constant at the level of logical form, then it must be some combination of constants, variables and predicates; the only type of combination that seems at all appropriate is a Russellized description.\(^{16}\)

Kripke's modal intuitions, if slightly more refined than those of homo claphamomnibus, are clearly set to dispose of any such tertium quid. Consider proposed semantic theories that straddle the line between Millianism and Russellianism: one line we might try to advance here is to deny that (A) is sound. In particular, one might consider what happens to the truth of (a2) by making 'the F' a (de facto) rigid designator. Would it still be possible to deny that 'N' is Russellian

\(^{16}\) Lycan [1985a] p.83.
in terms of such an expression which, although rigid, appears to have
some inherent semantic reference determining mechanism? No, because
true identity statements with rigid designators flanking the identity
sign express truths that hold with respect to every possible world.
Various types of rigid description have been suggested as candidates
for such a role.\textsuperscript{27}

Plantinga's Boethian compromise\textsuperscript{18} is to introduce world-indexed
definite descriptions. That is, he suggests that 'N' abbreviates not
'the F', but rather something like 'the F at $\Theta$' where '$\Theta$' has its
"customary" reference - the actual world. For example, if we use
'Nixon' in such a way that it is intimately connected with the
description 'the winner of the 1972 Presidential election' (a non-rigid
description), Plantinga considers that we may be viewed as making an
association between 'Nixon' and 'the winner of the 1972 Presidential
election at $\Theta$' (a rigid description): with respect to a possible world,
w, the latter description picks out, not whoever won the 1972
Presidential election in w, but whoever actually won that election here

\textsuperscript{27} It is no doubt to be predicted that such theories are
outrageously counterintuitive: the scarcity of useful (non-
mathematical) rigid SREs ensures that!

\textsuperscript{18} Plantinga [1978]. The 'Dthat' operator achieves a similar
effect - see Kaplan [1978]. At this point I would certainly press home
my impression that descriptions such as 'the actual F' are not rigid
per se, but that the presence of the word 'actual' serves to emphasize
the fact that they are more likely to be used referentially than
attributively. If one were to insist that all such descriptions are
rigid, they are certainly rigid de jure, since the content of the
predicate F is irrelevant. Moreover, the logic of 'actually' generates
implausible modal results generally - for instance, prefixing any
contingent truth with 'Actually,....' turns it into a necessary truth
(true in all possible worlds since everywhere evaluated with respect to
$\Theta$)! See the discussion of 'deep necessity' in Davies [1980], Dummett
[1981] (appendix to ch.5), and Bostock [1988].
in @. If 'Nixon' and 'the winner of the 1972 Presidential election at @' corefer, we cannot use argument (A) to deny that they might have the same semantic function.¹⁰

Although immune to argument (A), Plantinga's compromise is patently outlandish. The notion of a world-indexed description is conspicuously alien to common intuitions about the semantic function of names. It requires a generous stretch of anyone's imagination to envisage a semantic equivalence between 'Nixon' and 'the winner of the 1972 Presidential election at @'.²⁰ A more likely, though more irksome, natural language candidate would be a description such as 'the actual winner of the 1972 Presidential election'. Perhaps the best way to show such theories to be faulty is by the use of argument (B).

Argument (B) shows that although the information contained in a description makes it de facto rigid (in which case if N is the F, N is

¹⁰ I presume that this must be what Smith speaks of as an 'intrinsically wide scope description' ([1984] p.182f.): he gives no examples of what one might be, save that 'THE G might not have been F' has logical form

(Ex)(y)(Gy = x=y) & Δ¬Fx

"it is a formula containing a variable that is assessed at [possible but non-actual] worlds, the referent of the variable being determined antecedently to the modal operator via the satisfaction relation at the actual world." ibid. p.185. I find it difficult to conceive of descriptions that carry with them the instruction(!) that they must always be read as having wide scope with respect to modal operators, and conclude that what Smith means is an actualised description (i.e. one rigidified in Plantinga's fashion), the point being that with such descriptions one considers whatever the referent of the description is at @ when one evaluates the truth of a sentence containing it, which entails, in terms of truth-value, there is no difference between wide and narrow scope readings, just as in the case of names. Smith's subsequent argument provides no further clarification.

²⁰ Of course there's nothing wrong with claiming that there might be some other kind of equivalence between name and description—perhaps an association made by a particular speaker—but that would not concern us as part of a semantic theory.
necessarily the F), it does not upset our uses of 'N' and 'the F' if we
tell a story about confusion and deception in θ to the effect that,
contrary to our beliefs, N is not the F. This involves epistemic
possibility. It is possible that we're mistaken in thinking that N is
the F - even if 'the F' is world-indexed selon Plantinga or otherwise
rigidified - and it doesn't disrupt the notion of the correct way to
use 'N' to conceive of this possibility, even if we're conceiving of
something that is metaphysically impossible (i.e. false in every
possible world). The association between 'N' and 'the F' is
epipistemically contingent. Hence 'N' simply cannot semantically encode
the same information as (even) a rigid description. In simple terms,
even if 'a' and 'b' are rigid and a=b is (necessarily) true, it doesn't
follow that 'a' and 'b' mean the same thing. As for Plantinga, perhaps
we should insist that he tries to disprove the semantic equivalence of
'the author of Hamlet at θ' and 'the author of Macbeth at θ' - if he
can do that, which he surely can, he should be able to do the same for
'Shakespeare' and 'the author of Hamlet at θ'.

It seems no more than common sense to agree with Kripke about the
semantics of proper names and conclude that all but the most trivial
Russellian theories are wrong. Kripke's arguments can hardly be said
to have proven anything, but in a sense a proof is not required for
anything as blindingly obvious as the semantic rigidity of proper

23 For it would have to be judged that 'N' and 'the F' corefer by
any speaker competent in the use of those terms, i.e. analytically true
that N is the F.
The task that remains now is to see how, if at all, Kripke's constant appeals to intuition affect other types of theory that link names with descriptions.

§3.3 POSSIBILITY AND PRAGMATICS

Some descriptional theories of naming are unaffected by Kripke's argument (B). Bernard Harrison has proposed that some form of description theory accurately explains the relation between reference and intention. He considers that standard description theories hold that to refer with a name

a speaker must know – or at least have a good reason to suppose that somebody knows – a description that satisfies the following two conditions:

1. The description in question must be about the individual in question; it must ascribe properties to him, and not merely or primarily to the name by which he is known;
2. The description in question must enable the individual in question to be singled out; must enable one, that is, to say not merely that some individual uniquely satisfies the description, but which individual satisfies it.23

Harrison suggests that there are involved in any speaker's use of a name actually designating descriptions (A-identifications) which meet both of these conditions and also referentially identifying descriptions (R-identifications) which meet neither of these conditions. Moreover Harrison maintains that these R-identifications (i) are capable of "bearing the full weight of guaranteeing successful reference by means of proper names to uniquely specified real

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22 Here I finally agree with Smith ([1984] pp.180-1).

individuals, and the possibility of speakers having the correlative intentions to refer" and (ii) "do bear the full weight of guaranteeing these possibilities, even in cases where A-identification is also available."2a

An example of an R-identification is generated by the following situation. The ubiquitous Ralph overhears someone in a public house talking about Howard Brown and claiming that Howard Brown lives in Penge and is giving away vast sums of money to any charity he hears of. Suppose additionally that (for Ralph) the following two descriptions uniquely designate Howard Brown:

(7) The person who lives in Penge and is giving away vast sums of money to any charity he hears of
and
(8) The person whose name Ralph heard in the pub.

(7) is an A-identification, whereas (8) is an R-identification, the important factor being that (8) picks out Brown in virtue of some token-occurrences of the name 'Howard Brown'.

Harrison's arguments run roughly as follows. We can distinguish between secondary and indirect properties that hold of an individual only in virtue of the truth of certain statements about their names, or about the occurrences of tokens of their names, from direct or primary properties that characterise them independently of any such truths. R-identification involves such indirect properties. The bearer of 'N' is R-identified as the unique object having some secondary property that arises as a result of the way 'N' has been used, i.e. as a result of the development of some actual practice of using 'N'. That a token-use

2a ibid. p.328.
of a name is rigid is explained by the fact that for an R-
identification no direct information about the individual is conveyed:
hence there is no element of direct description capable of denoting
different items with respect to different possible worlds. It might,
of course, be objected that some different possible world might have
been the actual one, but then the R-identification should merely have
identified some (possibly different) object equally rigidly.
Discussing an R-identification of Pamela Andrews, Harrison says

The point is that it does not matter, for the purposes of R-
identification, what properties directly characterise Pamela
Andrews, since we are not trying to keep track of her by
keeping track of her properties, but by keeping track of the
circumstances of occurrence of her name - which is not a
property she happens to possess, but a mere arbitrary label
affixed to her. 25

When Ralph uses 'Howard Brown' with respect to some (possibly
counterfactual) situation then Ralph clearly intends to refer to the
person whose name he overheard in the pub. The actual occurrence of
the name-token fixes the reference of Ralph's subsequent uses of
'Howard Brown'. It has been argued that we deny this precisely because
(8) isn't rigid, 26 but it is not at all clear that if we play by
Kripke's rules and use language with our references and our meanings we
shouldn't insist that (8) be read as such.

What consequences would this have for the potency of the Kripkean
arguments (A) and (B)? What seems most clear is notwithstanding the
truth of metaphysical possibilities like

25 ibid. p.333.

26 Ryckmann [1984].
(9) Howard Brown might not have been the person whose name Ralph heard in the pub.

and epistemic possibilities like

(10) Howard Brown might not be the person whose name Ralph heard in the pub.

we must maintain that Ralph uses 'Howard Brown' with the intention of referring to the person whose name he heard in the pub. If Ralph's use of 'Howard Brown' might pick out someone whose name wasn't actually mentioned in the pub, then it must either do so in spite of Ralph's intention or else Ralph must intend to refer to the F for some other R-identification 'the F'. Neither of these seem plausible in the described situation: if Howard Brown, the person Ralph is referring to, isn't the man whose name Ralph overheard in the pub, who is he? 27 Since there needs to be an answer to the question "Well, who is Ralph talking about?" and the description, (8), is the only plausible candidate, then (10) must be denied, even though Ralph might in principle be unable to supply that answer. 28 To put this point another way, if a description (such as (8)) is uniquely satisfied and is an R-

27 Of course it might happen that in some more complex cases Ralph acquires lots of R-identifications of Howard Brown and that he gets a few crossed lines: perhaps Ralph hears reports of several different people called Howard but takes them to be about the same person: perhaps Ralph meets someone whom he believes to be Howard Brown, but turns out to be impersonating him: perhaps Ralph might meet (and acknowledge the distinctness of) another Howard Brown thus depriving the stated R-identification of its uniqueness. All these possibilities are ones that the complicated process of actual name-use permits, and lay a heavy burden on the shoulders of any causal theory of names. Such theories are examined in §5.3.

28 The denial is to the effect that (10) is not an epistemic possibility for Ralph though it might be for those with other ways of identifying Howard Brown than as the person Ralph is talking about.
identification that explains and grounds the acquisition of the use of a name, then in some important sense it cannot be separated from that name - its satisfier and the bearer of the name must be identical.

An intriguing feature of Harrison's theory is our potential inability to dispose of R-identifications as candidates for the underlying Russellian structure of names using Kripke's arguments (A) and (B) (as the possibilities described in the premises (a2) and (b2) are arguably inadmissible for R-identifications). On the other hand, A-identifications specify direct, primary properties of individuals, that they possess not merely in virtue of bearing some name. These descriptions indicate either contingent properties (eliminated by argument (A)) or else necessary properties, which are nonetheless not indicative of the identity criteria of the bearer of a given name (eliminated by argument (B)). We may strip away A-identifications as irrelevant to the semantic function of the name, but we cannot dispose of R-identifications similarly. 29 Or can we?

By way of solution, I think there may be better intuitive arguments against Russellianism than those presented by Kripke, which appeal to

29 It has been suggested that a speaker's abandoning of all A-identification (i.e. of all directly identifying descriptions) would be impossible in practice because it would no longer license the standard use of a proper name. For example, if I lose all A-identifications for Howard Brown, I cannot presume to say that I overhear Ralph and Pierre talking about Howard Brown, but would rather say that I hear them talking about some person called 'Howard Brown'. Perhaps it is only when I have a certain amount of A-identifications of Howard Brown that I can presume to talk about him, or use 'Howard Brown' as a grammatical subject. How substantial or accurate such A-identification might have to be remains unclear. In any case, such a pragmatic observation about the propriety of name-use doesn't seem to have any direct purchase on the intuition that one might turn out to be totally misinformed about all the A-identifications one associates with the bearer of a name.
nothing more than the type/token distinction. A Russellian theory says something about the information semantically encoded in a SRE; i.e. that a name semantically encodes (at least) the same information as some definite description. Such a theory is about name types, not merely token-uses thereof. So any truly Russellian theory will take a name 'N' to semantically encode the information semantically encoded in 'the F'. This has the following counterintuitive corollaries: if 'N' is Russellian in terms of 'the F':

(C1) ideally any speaker competent in the use of the name 'N' must realise that N is the F;
(C2) any instance of 'N' uttered by a competent speaker is replaceable salva veritate by an instance of 'the F';
(C3) all speakers competent in the use of the name 'N' must associate with it exactly the same information, i.e. that its bearer is the F.

So if 'Karl Marx' is supposed to be Russellian in terms of, say, 'the author of Das Kapital', we have these counterintuitive phenomena to deal with: Marx was christened with a name that means 'the author of Das Kapital'; Marx didn't deserve that name until shortly before the publication of Das Kapital in 1867; most of the people who knew Marx before, say, 1865 weren't truly competent in the use of his name; anyone who intends to refer using 'Karl Marx' intends to refer to 'the author of Das Kapital'; anyone who doesn't believe Karl Marx wrote Das Kapital doesn't use 'Marx' correctly. The generation of further

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30 This supposedly eliminates problem sentences such as 'Non-ideal speakers of English sometimes fail to grasp that N is the F'.
examples is no difficulty for the trained philosopher of language. All these provide good reason to reject Russellianism as a theory of name-types. Names (most names, anyway) do not semantically encode a complex quantificational structure, and to suppose that they do will completely misrepresent their function and the grammatical, logical and syntactical structure of the sentences in which they appear. The structure of 'N is G' is simply unlike that of 'The F is G'; to suppose that it is makes a demand on the speakers of our language that they patently cannot satisfy. No matter how privileged or intimate the relation holding between token use of a name and definite description, it is counter-intuitive in the extreme to hold that the relation is the semantic one suggested to hold between name-type and definite description by Russellianism. Even Harrison's R-identifications fall prey to this; no-one could reasonably contend that the semantic function of the name-type 'Howard Brown' is the same as that of 'the person whose name Ralph heard mentioned in the pub' even though it's reasonable to assume that in a large number of cases (including those standardly opaque contexts generated by Ralph's propositional attitudes) the two SREs are intersubstitutible salve veritate.

Harrison's suggestions represent realistic intuitions about speakers' behaviour nonetheless. The crux of the matter lies in the interpretation of sentences like

(11) 'N' means 'the F'.

On the Russellian view, (11) ought to be read as making a type-type claim to the effect that

(11a) 'N' semantically encodes the information semantically
encoded in 'the F'.

A plausible alternative is that

(11b) (on some occasion) a speaker, s, uses 'N' with the
intention of referring to the F; s means to refer to the
F with 'N'.

It is central to Harrison's argument to assert that for every token-use
of a name, there is some R-identification such that that use (and any
other made with the intention of coreferring with it) can refer to
nothing but the item picked out by the R-identification. Such is the
case with Ralph's use of 'Howard Brown' and (8). Subsequent uses may
require alternative R-identifications.

Such theories yield a much more accurate representation of the
complex nature of name use. A detailed discussion of the severe
difficulties in correctly analyzing speakers' intentions and their
complex interrelations is found in Part Three.\(^{31}\) Kripke's arguments do
not immediately have any relevance to such theories of token-uses of
names: if we interpret the occurrences of (11) in the premises of (A)
and (B) as (11b), it is not at all clear that they remain sound.
Moreover, it seems that the point made by Harrison's argument is that,
pace Kripke, it is unrealistic to suppose that the sum total of
information that a speaker associates with a name may be abandoned-
something (an R-identification) must remain, or else we lose track of
the object of our intended reference!

\(^{31}\) Donnellan's 'Aston-Martin' example ([1972] pp.370-372)
testifies to this complexity: it seems that distinct token uses of one
and the same name may be made with the same referential intentions and
yet pick out distinct items.
There is patently something worrying about this kind of claim: are we faced with a Neurath's boat of a description theory whereby we can abandon any of our privileged descriptions, but not all of them simultaneously? Kripke would claim that this is an extremely counterintuitive claim for a Russellian theory, especially when none of those descriptions indicate essential properties of the name's bearer. This is the crowning glory of Kripke's achievement: precisely because one can separate uses of name and description there can be no semantic relation holding between them that entails that the name encodes the same information as the description. However, as an observation about speakers' intentions the point is well-taken: an individual's use of a name often has to be grounded in some way by appeal to descriptive content, or else the game he plays in using that name manifestly alters. Completely dropping the descriptive grounding of the use of a name will affect its use. Yet Kripke's writings do not clearly acknowledge these difficulties: the argument (C) fails to consider the distinction between Russellian and intentional descriptionism.

§3.4 THE 'GÖDEL' ARGUMENT

Kripke presents argument (C) in the comments on the use of the name 'Gödel'. An extended quotation is necessary:

Let's take a simple case. In the case of Gödel ... practically the only thing many people have heard about him [is] that he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. Does it follow that whoever discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is the referent of 'Gödel'?

Imagine the following blatantly fictional situation. (I hope Professor Gödel is not present.) Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of this theorem. A man named 'Schmidt', whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in
question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Gödel. On the view in question, then, when our ordinary man uses the name 'Gödel', he really means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the description, 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Of course you might try changing it to 'the man who published the discovery of the incompleteness of arithmetic'. By changing the story a little further one can make even this formulation false. Anyway most people might not even know whether the thing was published or got around by word of mouth. Let's stick to 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. So, since the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about 'Gödel', are in fact always referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not. We simply are not.32

What does Kripke's example purport to disprove? The thesis that 'N' is used by a speaker to refer to the F (for some cluster of properties, F, such that he believes N is the F), or that the speaker's use of 'N' refers to the F. Kripke's example simplifies this phenomenon. Suppose we can find a single description, 'the F', that does the job of this cluster. If we use 'N' to refer to the F and M, not N, is/was the F, to whom do we refer? "To N, of course!" says Kripke, but it is not at all clear that we must accept his intuition.

We must contrast two interpretations of Kripke's claims here. The first is semantic, the kind of thing a Russellian theory would offer:

(12) 'Gödel' semantically encodes the information semantically encoded in 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'

which argument (A) and all the intuitive qualms listed above disprove. The second is

(13) a speaker, s, uses 'Gödel' with the sole intention of

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referring to the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic; s simply means to refer to the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic with 'Gödel' which seems a more accurate account of any situation Kripke wants to describe. There are two questions to be raised here - (i) is (13) paradigmatic of actual name use as Kripke claims? and (ii) if it is, does Kripke give us the correct answer? Contrary to popular opinion, the answer to both these questions is 'no'.

The 'Gödel' situation, Kripke concedes, is a simplification of normal occurrence. Often speakers have a huge store of information about the referents of their uses of names. This includes the variety of information contained in the notion of sense: I might intend to refer to an item of which I believe that it is the F, to an item that I recognise in such-and-such a fashion, to the item I regard with such and such an emotional attitude, and so on. Yet we can grant to Kripke that all this richly intensional structure of intention might be squashed down into a single definite description. Nonetheless it seems plainly false to maintain that Kripke's story resembles actual practice in any relevant way. Consider the following alternative narrative:

Suppose I frequently want to refer to the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, whoever that was. I have tired of uttering or writing the description 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic' and have chosen a name, arbitrarily, with which to refer to its satisfier. Thus when I use the chosen name, 'Gert Curdle', I intend to refer to the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic.

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With this example it might turn out, highly improbably, that the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic actually bore the name 'Gert Curdle', i.e. that he was christened with that name, was called by that name by his contemporaries, regarded that as his own name, etc. More likely it was someone who didn't bear the name 'Gert Curdle' - Gödel, or Schmidt, or, perhaps, no-one at all. In my case my use of 'Curdle', made with the sole intention of referring to the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, picks out Curdle, i.e. the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic (whether it be Gödel, Schmidt or no-one at all), and effectively abbreviates (an attributive use of) the definite description 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Note that, unlike Kripke's example, my choice of name is not influenced by any opinions about the way that name is already used, though I might have chosen to use a name that I believed to be unused: although it looks like a name, I don't choose to use 'Curdle' because it is used as a name by anyone else. Certainly I don't choose it because it is the name of someone who is believed to have been the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. I am stipulating a use of 'Curdle' rather than deferring

33 Such a procedure explains, say, the use of labels like 'John Doe' to refer to the body dragged out of the Cherwell last Thursday. The police don't pick names like 'Immanuel Kant', 'John Locke' or 'John Lucas' for this function because they don't want their subsequent use of the name to conflict with existing practice - they want to refer to the body rather than any individuals who actually bear or bore that name.

34 Or, at least, with the intention of referring to whatever any other speakers' uses of 'Curdle' designate. I might, of course, have chosen a name because I know that it is (used as) a name, or because I feel it would be witty to use such a name for such a purpose - But had I chosen 'Thatcher', say, I certainly wouldn't have intended to refer to Thatcher when I used it!
to a prior usage. If I did defer to prior usage, I wouldn't satisfy the premise of Kripke's example, i.e. that the sole referential intention I have is to refer to the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. The 'Curdle' example does satisfy Kripke's constraints, but it doesn't yield the answer that Kripke contends our intuitions demand, i.e. that, with respect to any situation (including those merely epistemically or metaphysically possible), 'Curdle' refers rigidly to some individual (Curdle? who's he?) regardless of the identity of the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic in that situation.

Kripke's example simply isn't paradigmatic of everyday name-usage, precisely because we do standardly intend to refer to Gödel by using 'Gödel'. So our uses of 'Gödel' are standardly traced back to our initial use of 'Gödel' and to the use of that name by those from whom we acquired it and so on until we reach Gödel himself.33 If we used 'Gödel', as Kripke suggested, with the sole intention of referring to the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, our use of it would be causally insulated from any existing practice of using that name. And no-one could pretend that such a situation would represent a paradigm of any kind of name use, except that of the baptism or conferral of a name.

The point that Kripke should have made is that every use of a SRE is made with the intention of picking out some particular object. I

33 If we do. In the case of an empty name, we won't reach anything at all save something of the wrong ontological type - our use of 'Sherlock Holmes', say, might reach the fictional detective Sherlock Holmes, but wouldn't reach the real Sherlock Holmes, because there wasn't one!
use 'Gödel' to refer to Gödel, 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic' to refer to the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, 'you' to refer to you, 'that' to refer to that, and so on. The referent of some SREs might change according to the context in which they are used (e.g. 'you', as I use it, picks out different items in different contexts, the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic' picks out different items with respect to different possible worlds), but the intention to refer standardly remains invariant. For every SRE, 't', there is a semantic reference rule

\[(R_t) \text{ 't' refers to } t\]

which generates a pragmatic speaker-reference rule

\[(R_{t^*}) \text{ A speaker, } s, \text{ standardly uses 't' with the intention of referring to } t.\]

Thus the standard function of 't' is to refer to what we shall call its canonical referent, i.e. t. The only times where such an intention is absent are at a so-called baptismal usage, where a new (use of) a SRE is introduced into the speaker's idiolect, or, arguably, when one intends to report truly that N does not exist. 37

Harrison's R-identifications fit into this picture quite snugly. Names, like demonstratives or indexicals, have to have their reference fixed in some fashion. If there is not that kind of grounding, the

\[36\text{ Kaplan correctly points out that this is due to the unstable character of token reflexives and indexicals. It is unsurprising that young children find it difficult to grasp this kind of reference-rule-they find names much easier to deal with and consequently choose them in favour of personal pronouns.}\]

\[37\text{ See §8.2.}\]
rule (R_{t^*}) loses significance, for we should be able to continue asking exactly what intention s has until we reach some description thereof involving a R-identification. The notion of a referential intention is not easily manipulable: unless we hold that referential intentions are distinguished solely on the basis of being about certain items (i.e. that they are essentially intentions to refer to such and such an item), it is difficult to categorise them. But what they, in turn characterise, is the nature of any token use of a name. I can certainly envisage situations in which a name is used non-standardly with additional intentions that override those to refer to the name's canonical referent. One might consider the case of two scholars examining a sixteenth century manuscript and saying 'Shakespeare was clearly left-handed'. 'Shakespeare' is used here with the intention of referring to the person who wrote out the manuscript. The scholars may, and indeed probably do, intend to refer to Shakespeare, because they feel that the author of the manuscript satisfies the conditions for being the canonical referent of 'Shakespeare'. If it turned out to have been written by the hand of Bacon, then, notwithstanding their choice of SRE, it strikes us that they would be referring to Bacon. Nonetheless it also seems correct that the semantical analysis of the sentence-type

\[3a\] This inverts standard procedure. One standardly chooses 't' (rather than any other SRE) because one believes that what one wishes to refer to satisfies the conditions for being the canonical referent of 't' and that any other way of identifying it happens to also pick out that same item. Standardly one would be talking about Shakespeare when using 'Shakespeare' and not worry if he turned out not to be responsible for the handwriting: here the scholars talk about whoever it is that is responsible for the handwriting when they use 'Shakespeare' even though it might turn out that he wasn't Shakespeare.
(14) Shakespeare was left-handed

represents 'Shakespeare' as rigidly designating Shakespeare not Bacon.

I feel that here we have reached the crux of the matter. (RDT) gives an idea about semantics and semantic rules like \((R_e)\). Names are rigid de jure in virtue of being governed by that kind of rule (and not one of the form: 'N' refers to the F) and that is a claim about certain SRE-types. 'Queen Elizabeth II', 'Richard Nixon', 'Muffin the Mule', 'Dancing Brave', 'Balliol College' are all semantically explicable by rules like \((R_e)\) which generate a conventional speaker-reference rule like \((R_e^*)\) that explains why, in general, a use of a name should be separable from contingent information about the name's bearer. (RDT) doesn't cope with the myriad uses to which names may be put - for example it cannot account for the essentially non-semantic distinction made by Keith Donnellan between referential and attributive uses of SREs - but simply stresses that the rule \((R_e)\) differs in the case where 't' is a name and where 't' is a definite description.

So what is the substance of (RDT)? I think it would be misguided to maintain that token-occurrences of names are rigid - unless that were to mean that 't' was a token-occurrence of a rigid type. But Kripke does seem to maintain just this when he claims that words like 'this', 'you' and 'I' are rigid designators in spite of their unstable characters. There seems no way to construe 'this', say, as being a rigid designator: how on earth can a token-occurrence of a SRE be rigid? Every time I consider an isolated token-occurrence in a context

\(^{30}\) In this I agree with Sommers [1981] and Ebersole [1982].

\(^{40}\) Kripke [1972] p.49n. For more on character, see §4.2.
it naturally will remain constant in designation. But if that is all it takes, any SRE-token will be rigid. Alternatively, I cannot see how one can apply to some token-use of a SRE the formula it should satisfy to count as rigid: how do I make a token-use refer with respect to any possible world other than the one it actually does? I suspect that the point is that, once anchored by a contextual utterance, indexicals remain constant in their designation regardless of the counterfactual situation under discussion."¹ This property is shared by genuine names, but for different reasons.

These points demonstrate the need for caution in the demarcation of the subject matter of semantics and the importance of rigidity. Although (RDT) does not tell us how names semantically function, Kripke's work shows that the semantic function of a name is not explicable in terms of any contingently associated information that it might be thought to encode. What (RDT) says about the sense of a proper name (interpreted as the information contingently associated with it by speakers) or the referential roles it may play (depending on speakers' intentions) is negligible. Frankly it seems that it is not the business of semantics to impinge on these pragmatic matters. What we have to do instead is reconcile these semantic results with an acceptable general theory of semantics for natural languages and some account of singular thought. This we consider in the next chapter.

¹ Consider phrases 'In the possible world where you are President,...' or 'Of course, there are worlds in which I do not exist,...' the truth of which requires that the designation of the indexicals remain constant. Once the referent is fixed there is no condition which that item has to satisfy in any world save €.
CHAPTER 4:

SINGULAR THOUGHT

Language is the dress of thought.

Dr Johnson.

Thought is nothing but a tissue of signs.

Charles Sanders Pierce.
One of the morals of 'Naming and Necessity' was that someone could believe that Quine was a great philosopher without having enough descriptive information to distinguish Quine from anyone else (or, indeed, while having information that would lead him or her to misidentify Quine).¹

In this chapter we conclude the examination of the semantics of naming by discussing singular thought. Although there is much to be said about the character of thought that is tangential to the narrow perspective of this discussion and must, therefore, be neglected, I shall advance an account of the semantics of thought-ascriptions that is consistent with our current semantic theory for names yet which avoids the prima facie implausibility of the 'Fido'-Fido theory.

§4.1 PROPOSITIONS AND MEANING

Our first questions will concern propositions, entities generally called on to perform a number of tasks in philosophies of language. First, propositions are considered to be that which declarative sentences of a language express. Second, propositions are considered to be the bearers of truth and falsity, i.e. those items to which we make reference in propositional logics (and modal extensions thereof). Third, propositions are the objects of propositional attitude locutions - we need something to stand for that which two individuals who believe

¹ Papineau [1986] p.62. In this chapter formal terminology is invoked to improve clarity and concision, although I remain skeptical about the possibility of implementing formal devices without generating pseudo-problems.
the same thing both believe, which two individuals who doubt the same thing both doubt or which two sentences that say the same thing both say and so on. Moreover propositions lie embedded in 'that'-clauses in truth ascriptions ('it is true that p'), modal ascriptions ('it is necessary that p') and propositional attitude ascriptions ('Thatcher believes that Scargill is a nuisance', 'Peacocke doubts that perception is to be explained by reference to a priori principles', 'Hornsby thinks that actions are transitive bodily movements' etc.); the proposition is that to which the believer stands in the relation of "believing", to which the doubter stands in the relation of "doubting" and so forth.3

These three roles of propositions suggest that sentences and statements relate closely to propositions, but in fact neither play the role that propositions are required to play. Although Ralph may believe that p it is neither the sentence 'p' nor a tokening thereof to which he stands in the relation of believing. Familiar examples of indexical usage illustrate this. Consider the sentence

(1) He is bald.

If Ralph believes that Davidson is bald and Pierre believes that Donnellan is bald then they might both be said, in different contexts,

These ideas may seem straightforward, yet difficulties persist: would the item that two people who wonder, ask or command the same thing both wonder, ask or command be a proposition? That is, are there non-declarative or non-truth-evaluable propositions? Such entities are certainly not permitted on many standard theories.

Fitch [1987] has the good sense to indicate these several tasks, but he is driven to severely counter-intuitive conclusions. (I discuss these in my [1988a].) A far more perceptive and cautious account is given by Dennett [1982].
to believe that he is bald. Yet the sentence (1) cannot be what they both believe, for they believe different things. Equally, an utterance of (1) might express to Ralph the proposition that Davidson is bald in one context and an utterance of (1) (perhaps even the same utterance in the same context) might express to Pierre the proposition that Donnellan is bald. But that utterance would fail to be the common object of their belief for the same reason. Since sentences can be used to express a variety of different thoughts in different contexts and a statement might express a variety of different propositions to different language users, we want propositions to be identified neither as sentences nor as statements. This phenomenon is not limited to sentences with indexical expressions. Many sentences contain referential expressions that are indeterminate and fail to denote outside a particular context of utterance or without background assumptions. These observations could equally be made of

(2) The boy is happy

where the definite description 'the boy' does not provide a uniquely identifying characteristic. Not only a context of utterance, but also some background assumptions about a speaker's intentions are needed to disambiguate a token of such a sentence. To make what is thought independent of thinkers and solely dependent on language, would be to ignore the complexities of natural language with which we are so familiar. (Similar arguments apply to the roles of propositions as truth-bearers or the objects of modal operators.) Propositions are person- and context-independent, unlike the sentences and statements expressing them.
One immediate worry about propositions concerns their ontology. I rest content that talk of propositions need merely be taken as a mere façon de parler. Natural languages countenance the formation of a proper noun to cover shared features, as Blackburn has observed: a disposition is what people who are similarly disposed share; a direction is what parallel lines share; relations of similarity produce nouns to denote that which is similar. It is, perhaps, simple convenience that allows talk of entities such as propositions. An analogous phenomenon exists with the notion of possible worlds; from the turn of phrase 'there are ways the world might have been' one can extract the paraphrase 'there are many possible worlds', but this act of paraphrase should produce like so many rabbits from a hat neither strange new entities called 'possible worlds' nor new 'worlds' that are like the actual world but merely possible rather than actual. Accurate paraphrasing should neither add nor subtract anything from what is said - certainly it should not create items of whose ontological status we are unsure. The terminology of 'possible worlds' is a natural extension of talk about counterfactual situations and contingencies; talk of propositions arises equally innocuously. Consequently there seems at first blush little to complain about in the use of propositions. However, there are quite widespread ontological qualms;


3 This is just the kind of conjuring trick done by David Lewis (esp. [1973], [1985]). What intuitive appeal such a move might have is diminished by the observation that one can similarly produce impossible worlds from the claim that there are many ways the world might not have been. These entities (impossibilia) would be unacceptable to even the staunchest modal realists like Lewis. However, such objections do not affect the abbreviatory convenience of possible worlds talk.
in fact it is quite orthodox to be suspicious of propositions. The received view (shared e.g. by Quine and others hostile to propositions) is that it would be perfectly permissible to introduce propositions if one could give clear identity conditions for them. One of the aims of my construal of propositions is to sidestep this objection.

To take propositions, in the simplest terms, as objects of thought, requires careful use of the expression 'object of thought'.\(^6\) Propositions taken thus should be what a thinker is thinking rather than what a thinker is thinking about; e.g. if Ralph thinks that Davidson is bald we want to examine what Ralph thinks (i.e. 'that Davidson is bald') rather than what he is thinking about (i.e. Davidson or baldness). On accepting this, a question that fairly readily springs to mind is "Does every thought clearly involve a proposition?". One negative reply to this comes in the claim that genuine thought is unlike merely cognitive or 'sub-doxastic' processes - much of the informational content of the mind seems to defy propositional formulation. This contention clearly deserves more articulation than can be spared here.\(^7\) More important is the common assumption that if a

\(^6\) Prior [1971] p.3.

\(^7\) Davies [1985], Stich [1978], [1983] and Schiffer [1987] provide some discussion of this, but little of what they offer is either conclusive or relevant to the present topic. More interestingly, not every genuine thought need have a sentential representation: "many of our beliefs have the form: 'The colour of her hair is _' or 'The song he was singing went _', where the blanks have to be filled in with images, sensory impressions, or what have you, but certainly not with words. If we cannot even say it with words but have to paint or sing it, we certainly cannot believe it with words." Kaplan [1968] p.208. Such "unspeakable" thoughts also resurface in L.R.Baker [1987].
thought is expressed (to a thinker) by some declarative sentence of a natural language then there must be a proposition corresponding to it, which is what he is thinking. In at least one case, this is open to contention. But it indicates modifications to the 'Fido'-Fido theory (still utilising singular propositions) that accommodate the quasi-Fregean sense/connotation distinction of chapter 2 for sentences as well as singular terms by introducing mediating epistemic perspectives to do the job that sense does for SREs.

But instead I shall take as fundamental the idea that propositions are bearers of truth; with respect to any given context, a proposition is said to be true or false and a sentence-token is said to express a true or false proposition. So how are we to construe propositions? In keeping with the intended quasi-Fregean approach, perhaps as the

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* Since one can arguably entertain a thought without it being a thought about anything, as in uses of sentences with empty names discussed below and in §6.4. Here I am explicitly at variance with Evans [1982].

* Parenthetical mention of relativizing propositions and thoughts to individual thinkers is imperative for the accurate assessment of this claim. In fact (utterances of) some declarative sentences are in themselves insufficient to express what is thought by a thinker and, consequently, to express a thought. Background assumptions of contextual reference and the thinker's intentions must be made if we are to adjudge which token of such a sentence genuinely expresses. Failure to do so results in the generation of (often humorously) ambiguous sentences. On the other hand it is precisely because of our background assumptions about intended references that we find it difficult to grasp the potential ambiguities of sentence-tokens and, hence, difficult to accept that they might be used to express different propositions to the ones we take them to express; e.g. the sentences 'I left my raincoat in the bathtub because it was still wet' and 'Although her blouse draped stylishly, her pants seemed painted on' are ambiguous, but it can take quite an effort to see how! These examples are given by Haugeland ([1979] p.621.) who makes the point that such phenomena of ambiguity and intentionality provide grave conceptual problems for proponents of 'strong' AI.
referents (Bedeutungen?) of thoughts, though not as truth-values, but as extensional complexes, made up of the referents of singular terms, predicates, quantifiers, logical connectives and so on. There are two stumbling blocks here.

The first concerns whether such a complex entity would correctly be identified as an object of thought. For example, would an entity composed in some way from (the referent of) the binary predicate 'loves' and the (ordered pair of) individuals Andy and Fergie be what is thought by someone who is thinking that Andy loves Fergie? Intuitively not, because extracranial objects (e.g. the Duke of York) are not readily accepted as the constituents of mental phenomena; concrete items just aren't part of thought. Nor do they slip into my head and come into contact with my brain whilst thought is occurring. However, it would seem permissible to view propositions as non-spatiotemporal constructions of concrete items (among other entities), if we avoid being seduced by a naïve quasi-Russellian interpretation of items being part of what is in the head.

The second hurdle concerns the nature of these complexes. It is clearly incorrect to advance a totally extensional view of

10 I confess to an unhealthy worry about ordered n-tuples of items and a similar worry about classes of items. Logically these entities are easily manipulable, but ontologically they are rather difficult to comprehend. How does a class of objects compare spatially to the objects it contains? How does a singleton set compare with its sole member? These questions are highly relevant: if we are to dismiss as nonsensical the idea of the Radcliffe Camera itself being part of what is thought by someone who thinks that the Radcliffe Camera looks like a jelly-mould, can we equally dismiss the singleton set or 1-tuple whose sole element is the Radcliffe Camera? To feel suspicious of classes of items being constituents of propositions because 'they wouldn't fit inside her head' requires some reliable intuitions about their nature. I have no such intuitions and am not sure that they are to be had!

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propositional form if, for example, the account of predicates is of their extensions (i.e. one that would identify contingently co-extensional predicates and play havoc with our modal speculation). Although hardly satisfactory from the point of view of a general account of propositions (I doubt such is available), for our coming treatment of thoughts and the specific problems of opacity in propositional attitudes involving SREs we must leave predicate and quantifier expressions untouched by our analysis.\footnote{11} Such a complex is constructed to satisfy the following desiderata: (Σ1) it will within its structure of (unanalyzed) predicates and quantifiers represent the literal meaning of a sentence, i.e. that information semantically encoded within a sentence, which any speaker competent in the use of that sentence must grasp; (Σ2) that structured information will correspond to how it is in the actual world just in case the sentence is true; (Σ3) it represents the referents of GSTs as occurring (transparently) in ordered n-tuples so that one and the same proposition is expressed by (utterances of) pairs of sentences where one is obtained from the other by the substitution of transparent occurrences of one GST by a coreferential GST.

To this end the propositional representation we may use is the one

\footnote{11} Obviously we can consider analogous opacity problems, e.g. for predicates if, say, we considered Ralph having distinct attitudes to sentences 'X is F' and 'X is G' (where 'X' is some quantification) and '_ is F' and '_ is G' actually expressed the same property, but this would require an account of the identity conditions of predicates which we do not have and I can scarcely elaborate. I would, for example, adhere to the view that two predicate expressions express the same property only if any speaker deemed competent in their use would realise it (appeal to analyticity) which would upset natural kind theorists wishing to identify '_ is water' and '_ is H\textsubscript{2}O'.
given in chapter 1:

\[
<F_n, <t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n>>
\]

where \(t_1, \ldots, t_n\) are the referents of GSTs 'to.', \ldots, 'tn' and 'F_n' is an n-place concept expression, the proposition being true with respect to a possible situation iff in that situation the n-sequence satisfies the concept expression.\(^{22}\) Propositions need be viewed as little more than the way the world has to be if the information encoded by the sentence holds true. If a sentence, S, conventionally declares in a given context that things are thus and so, then the proposition S expresses represents their being that way. By way of a partial rejoinder to Quine, in saying that two sentences express the same proposition, we are at least committed to the claim that with respect to any possible situation, they are identically true.\(^{33}\)

Must it be, say, that if S thinks that p, the conditions that we seek are those that make S's thought true? If so, a simple theory that attempts to give the truth-conditions of sentence-types will not be

\(^{22}\) Hence the occurrences of 't_1', ..., 't_n' must be transparent. A singular proposition conceived thus admits the possibility that the predicate expression 'F_n' may contain more complex quantifications. Thus 'Paddy gave the dog a bone' expresses a singular proposition (with respect to 'Paddy')

\[
<gave the dog a bone, <Paddy>>
\]
even though it contains a description as a candidate for the Russellian treatment. Note also that this merely represents the proposition - it should not be assumed that I take ordered pairs as truth-bearers.

\(^{33}\) Moreover, this is a necessary but insufficient condition for two sentences to express the same proposition. See (Σ1) and (Σ2) above. I wish to avoid the complication inherent in treating a proposition as the set of all possible worlds in which it is true, so as to avoid the result that, say, 'Bostock is not happy' and 'Bostock is happy just in case there is a barber who shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves' express the same proposition. See Cresswell [1985] and Gupta and Savion [1987] for further comments.
sufficiently fine-grained for our purposes: our discussion of (1) and (2) revealed that token-utterances of one and the same sentence can express different thoughts to different speakers. This creates some tension with the claims that (i) sentences have meanings, (ii) the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions under which it is true and (iii) understanding a sentence consists in apprehending its meaning and, hence, its truth-conditions. All these tenets seem to be part of a theory of meaning that confers an objective significance on a sentence, p, entailing that if S thinks that p he must be thinking that the truth-conditions of p obtain, and hence all thinkers who think that p must be thinking the same thing.

That view is false. This is the stumbling block for semantics as a theory of thought-contents. We may correlate sentences and propositions in the following fashion. Token sentences are of the same type in virtue of exhibiting a certain grammatical and syntactic form and encoding the same information. That information needs to be fleshed out on occasion by reference to context of utterance in order to determine the conditions under which that utterance will be reporting something as true. A semantic theory must account for the potential of all tokens of the same sentence-type to express the propositions they do express: it must elucidate the conventional significance of language and the conditions which a token utterance of a sentence reports as obtaining. A competent user of language must grasp this. He will realise that conditions must be thus and so if a token utterance of that sentence is to report a truth. But he may also believe (truly) that certain other conditions obtain and (falsely) that
they are (or entail) those that make a token-utterance of the sentence true. I see no way to get past this, and it seems that it is not the job of a semantic theory to account for such potential error. So our theory of thought is immediately hamstrung by the following restriction: it can but account for the thoughts had by people who do not err in this way.

Working within this restriction we might suppose that some account of the meaning of a sentence will yield an account of what is thought by a thinker entertaining a token of that sentence. In particular, it might be that a truth-conditional semantics (TCS) yields what we desire, since truth bearers should also be objects of thought.

At the heart of the hostilities surrounding TCS lies the question of the kind of theory that it suggests. More than one hostile approach seems tainted by an excess of Wittgensteinian fervour, the overwhelming impression being that an adequate theory of meaning is one in which the expressions used technically (e.g. 'giving the meaning', 'explanation') are used in ways that accord very closely with pre-theoretic usage—and thus a theory of meaning is deemed inadequate if it doesn't yield a 'meaning' for a sentence that would explain the significance of a token of that sentence to someone who asked for its meaning.14 Davidson's T-sentences, for instance, just don't do this and consequently the

14 Compare Bogen [1985]. Along similar lines one supposes that such a theory would at least have to explain what was thought by some thinker who claimed that a sentence expressed his thought. (In fact T-sentences or something very close to them are frequently used to explain meaning. For example, to English monoglots the meaning of 'Der Schnee ist weiß' will be in a most important sense the same as that of 'Snow is white'; they will be given the meaning by the T-sentence "Der Schnee ist weiß" is true just in case snow is white'.)
progeny of Davidson's theory have little claim to adequacy.

Inevitably there are grave problems with so unqualified a dictum as 'to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions under which it is true'. It is often objected that early Davidsonian TCS is inadequate as a meaning theory precisely because it is a merely extensional truth-theory. That is, because it yields axioms

$$S \text{ is true in } L \iff p$$

where $p$ need not be equivalent in meaning to $S$.\textsuperscript{15} Given some way of remedying this defect, there remains the problem that knowing the conditions under which certain sentences will express true propositions is not really sufficient to constitute a grasp of their meaning.\textsuperscript{16} We also require the computational capacity to evaluate the truth-value of atomic constituents and generate a truth-value Tarski-style using rules for their truth-functional combinations (although one need not in general carry out the computation consciously) - some such tacit knowledge of a compositional semantics is needed to account for our success in grasping the meaning of novel utterances.

Moreover, there is the type-token problem mentioned earlier. Meanings apply primarily to sentence-types whereas it is token-uses of sentences that may succeed or fail in the statement of truths. There is some quite ordinary sense in which the meaning of (1) did not change as I considered different situations. The sentence (1) retains certain

\textsuperscript{15} See Kripke [1976], Foster [1976] and, on such generalities, Schiffer [1987] ch.5.

\textsuperscript{16} See concise but effective comments by Wright [1985], [1986] and Davies [1985], [1987]. Suitable counter-examples are provided by Lycan [1979].

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semantic characteristics, such as those which rule that its grammatical subject is assumed to be male and to have little or no cranial hair-characteristics that demarcate the kind of information that sentence might encode. Indeed these characteristics would be shared by a putative T-sentence

(3) 'He is bald' is true iff he is bald.
Yet (1) (and, indeed, the right-hand side of the biconditional (3)) express different propositions when uttered in different contexts (e.g. as by Ralph or Pierre). Surely no-one would require or even countenance the formation of contextually relativized T-sentences such as

(4) 'He is bald' as uttered by Ralph at \( t_1 \) is true iff Davidson is bald at \( t_1 \)

or

(5) 'He is bald' as uttered by Pierre at \( t_2 \) is true iff Donnellan is bald at \( t_2 \)
as part of a theory of meaning for a language. Davidson is correct in maintaining that they might be correct for a theory of truth and accommodates them in such a theory - one that takes truth to be a property not of sentence-types, but of ordered 4-tuples of sentences, times, speakers and locations\(^2\) - but this misses the constancy of meaning which all tokens of the same (possibly indexical) sentence-type share (modulo ambiguity), and its relevance to determining these context-relativized truth-conditions.

It is unclear to many what form a solution to these puzzles might take, but their relevance to the discussion of singular thought is

\(^2\) Davidson [1967].
immediate. An account of the significance of those parts of language used to express such thought is wanting. (I believe that TCS has a much more modest contribution to make than is commonly assumed.) The type-token problem will be discussed below, but the enigma of tacit knowledge is comparatively recalcitrant. It is not at all obvious that we would be wrong to credit speakers of a language with intentions which they cannot consciously recognise and articulate; as philosophers have noticed for some time, rational behaviour is explained by appeal to often implicit attribution of such intentions (the adoption of 'principles of charity'), and it seems that the possession of tacit knowledge (though not necessarily that of semantic rules) is the only way to make sense of certain performances. Such an account is eventually exploited in chapter 7.

§4.2 THOUGHT, OPACITY AND CHARACTER

Returning to the idea (presented in chapter 3) that ordinary names are Millian, making no further semantic contribution to the truth conditions of sentences in which they appear than introducing their referents, a problem arises with coreferential names - the problem that Frege happened upon - since if we have two names, 'N₁' and 'N₂' that are names of the same thing, then sentences

\[(6) \ N₁ \text{ is } F\]

and \[(7) \ N₂ \text{ is } F\]

ought to express the same proposition. It would equally seem that

\[(8) \ \text{Ralph believes that } N₁ \text{ is } F\]

and \[(9) \ \text{Ralph believes that } N₂ \text{ is } F.\]
attribute belief in the same proposition to Ralph - they 'ought' to have the same truth-value, but, in general, do not. In the following I argue for the view that (6) and (7) do express the same proposition, but not the same thought, and hence that (8) and (9) do not express the same proposition.

Much is made of this phenomenon. Schiffer has claimed that the Millian theory

has been cavalier in the way it has ignored the connection between semantics and psychology. Not one of these [Millian] theorists has ventured a theory of thought in the mind of a person using a singular term as a rigid designator.\(^1\) Let us suppose that it strikes Ralph and us (in virtue of Ralph's sincere assertions, for example) that (8) is true yet (9) is false. What options are open to proponents of the view that names are Millian?

It might be said, appearances notwithstanding, that failure of substitutivity of 'N₂' for 'N₁' is an illusion and that names of the same thing are generally substitutable salva veritate in belief contexts. Kripke has raised this point in observing that the phenomenon of failure of substitutivity salva veritate is generally taken as obvious and is scarcely argued for, yet turns upon a disquotational principle such as

\[(DQ)\] A normal speaker (of a language L) who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to a sentence 'p' (of L) iff they believe that p which may lead to contradictions when applied to quite ordinary

\[^1\] Schiffer [1978] pp.174-175.
looking examples that seem to have nothing to do with substitutivity.\textsuperscript{20} Hence the principle is in general unreliable, and we cannot take for granted what is derived from it, e.g. the failure of substitutivity of names in belief contexts. It is not at all clear that Kripke's argument holds water, since it is far from obvious that (DQ) plays the role he would have it play.\textsuperscript{20} But let us follow his suggestion. If names of the same thing are always interchangeable \textit{salva veritate}, then (8) and (9) must be identical in truth value. The view that (for any 'N\textsubscript{1}' and 'N\textsubscript{2}' satisfying the hypothesis) they are both false or truth-valueless would, one presumes, simply be too much for our intuitions to bear, involving a wholesale rejection of an immense proportion of our apparently true beliefs and belief attributions.

Some have argued for the view that (8) and (9) might both be true.\textsuperscript{21} If (6) and (7) express the same thought or proposition, then so must (8) and (9), since they say of one and the same person that he

\textsuperscript{20} Kripke [1979], relates the tale of a speaker who gives his sincere reflective assent to both 'Paderewski is a politician' and 'Paderewski is not a politician' and by (DQ) would consequently both believe a proposition and its negation. (Although one might object that the 'translational' problem invokes substitutivity, Pierre's 'London'/"Londres" confusion might also support this.)

\textsuperscript{21} Our belief ascriptions are normally based not merely on (DQ) but also on the reasoning and behaviour of agents. We might have good grounds for judging (8) to be true and (9) false that are quite non-disquotational. In addition, as we will later see, Kripke's (DQ) might well not generate the Paderewski paradox, since the back implication may be called into question.

\textsuperscript{21} This is the 'Sophisticated View' discussed in Tienson [1984]. See also Fitch [1976], MacKay [1981], and Plantinga [1974]. All three would explain the apparent substitutivity failure by claiming that Ralph did not know what proposition (7) expressed. Plantinga's views later changed ([1978]) since he then claimed that 'N\textsubscript{1}' and 'N\textsubscript{2}' abbreviate distinct actualised descriptions (see §3.2).
believes one and the same thought or proposition. Possibly we might maintain that Ralph does not know what thought or proposition is expressed by (7) since he is supposed to have believed it, yet denies (7) in all sincerity. The same considerations would apply to indefinitely many other sentence-pairs S(N₁) and S(N₂) where in S(N₂) 'N₂' replaces one or more occurrences of 'N₁' in S(N₁) - Ralph would accept the sentence S(N₁) whilst rejecting the sentence S(N₂). So Ralph would not know what thoughts or propositions were expressed by S(N₂), yet since he would understand the rest of the sentence (by knowing what thought or proposition S(N₁) expresses) it would have to be because of the name 'N₂'. But since it was simply because of the presence of 'N₂', one would have to conclude that Ralph did not know what thoughts or propositions were expressed by any sentences containing the name 'N₂'. Symmetrically, for some G, Ralph would also sincerely assert and hence believe that

(10) N₂ is G

but sincerely deny and disbelieve that

(11) N₁ is G

It is not difficult to see that by a similar argument (this time 'N₁' is the culprit rather than 'N₂') Ralph would not know what thoughts or propositions were expressed by any sentences containing the name 'N₁', either. In particular Ralph would not know what thought or proposition is expressed by (6). So what would be the point of claiming that he did believe (6) when he did not know what he was believing - perhaps as in the case of the English monoglot who learns to assent parrot-fashion to 'Der Schnee ist weiß'? Also would there be any point in
maintaining that he knows what thought or proposition is expressed by any sentence involving any name? (After all the existence of a co-designative name which fails to substitute salva veritate is at best an accidental feature of Ralph's use of a name.) And would not the same apply not only to Ralph, but to us all?

It is, I think, legitimate to view this reductio as sound support for the phenomenon of substitutivity failure, consistent with our intuitions. However, even if we preserve our initial hypothesis and maintain that (8) is true whilst (9) is false we still have a problem. Even though (8) is true, Ralph does not simply believe the proposition that \(N_1\) is \(F\), for that is the same as the proposition that \(N_2\) is \(F\) and, as (9) testifies, Ralph never believed that. Do we have to conclude that thoughts or propositions must drop out of the picture as irrelevant? That they are useless, confusing fictions? Or has this convoluted line of reasoning produced a more positive result?

I shall argue that there need be no contradiction with the Millian construal of names in acknowledging the opacity of their occurrences in the scope of propositional attitudes, although an additional element is needed to account for the semantics of such sentences. What characterises the kind of thought we have been discussing here is a thinker's perspective on a proposition. That is, in just the same way as different names present the same item different ways, so different sentences present the same proposition in different ways. Yet the 'ways of presentation' are not semantic but epistemic in nature. If

\[22\] From the supposition that substitutivity is valid and (8) and (9) are both true (contrary to appearances), we may deduce that (8) and (9) are both false, an option we have rejected.
there were any difference in the semantic properties of two sentences then they would not generally - i.e. with respect to every possible world - express the same proposition. Nor would it seem counter-intuitive or irrational to adopt different views towards them.

At this juncture TCS makes its modest contribution. It is through relations to thought and shared communicative intentions that language gains its conventional significance. And though this is at best a contingent association, it underpins all of our speculations about the function of (parts of) language. The conventional significance of language is what a full-blooded TCS would deliver as the means to determining what proposition is being expressed by an utterance of a sentence in a certain context. A TCS should identify sentence-tokens as belonging to a certain sentence-type and in so doing indicate the standard semantic function of (any tokens of) that sentence-type.

Sometimes information is insufficient, as in the case of sentences like (1) where there is an indexical element or (2) where the literal meaning (that there is one and only one boy and he is happy) is other than what actually is intended to be said, and then contextual features of an utterance are used to flesh out an explanation of what is being said. That is, occasionally the semantic reference rule

\[(R_c) 't' \text{ refers to } t\]

dictates that the referent of 't' is acknowledged to be whoever satisfies certain conditions relative to the context. This is what Perry, Burge and Kaplan have indicated as the context-sensitive or unstable character of some SREs.\(^{23}\) Character is a high-level semantic

\(^{23}\) See Perry [1977],[1979], Burge [1979], Kaplan [1980].
property of a SRE-type that determines with respect to any possible situation (i) what information is semantically encoded in a SRE-token, and (ii) a simple function determinative of the extension or referent of the expression. The picture of word-world referential semantics generated is:

Fig. 2

This picture of the semantics of SREs identifies their constant referential role in terms of character; one understands the role of that SRE if one grasps its character and, thereby, is in a position to apprehend its connotation as it used in a certain circumstance. The central features of this picture are as follows.

I) Some expressions encode different information about their canonical referent according as to who utters them, when, where, and with what intention. Examples include indexicals

24 My account is restricted to SREs although earlier comments on context and ambiguity should suggest that it extends to a general semantic theory of the significance of type-expressions.
such as 'I', 'he', 'now', and 'that', and indeterminate definite descriptions (such as 'the boy' in (2)). The need to account for such indexical or under-determined elements in our conventional use of language generates the higher-level semantic property of character - a function that assigns a connotation to a token-expression for any possible context. It is the character of an expression that is grasped by any speaker competent in the use of that expression, and shown in understanding the rule, \((R_c)\), for using the expression.

II) The connotation is that information (factual information, if you will) about the putative referent of a token utterance that any speaker competent in the use of an SRE must grasp. It is, particularly in the case of proper names, distinct from the intension of an SRE, which is simply the reference function - that which determines the extension of a token-occurrence of the expression with respect to any possible world and time. Definite descriptions are good examples of SREs that wear their intensions on their faces - the descriptive condition yielded as the connotation of 'the F' in a given context supplies the means of determining the referent. Names or demonstratives, for example, do not - for them the intension depends on speakers' intentions, deictic gestures, socially defined practices and so forth. The intension might be hidden from the speaker as in the case of the causal network of uses for a proper name. But simply because a SRE lacks a connotation does not mean there is no
function determining its referent.\textsuperscript{25}

A crucial element of this picture is the fact that the information contained as the connotation of an SRE-token is an integral constituent of the proposition in which it occurs - the information semantically encoded in a SRE is relevant to the truth-condition of the proposition expressed by any token-sentence in which it occurs.\textsuperscript{26} Hence, only terms lacking a connotation will act as GSTs and a sentence containing no GSTs will not express a singular proposition.

The propositions expressed by (token-utterances of) two distinct sentences in a given context may be identical if they both lack a connotation. If, say, 'N₁' and 'N₂' both refer to α, then the proposition expressed by (6) and (7) will be the same, viz.

\begin{equation}
(12) \quad \langle \text{is F, } \alpha \rangle
\end{equation}

The identity of this proposition is determined by the conventional significance of (6) and (7), the character of the parts of those sentences. Other terms, such as indexicals, arguably function in the same way given a context.

\begin{equation}
(13) \quad \text{I am clever}
\end{equation}

said in a certain context, c (i.e. by someone at a certain place and time), expresses the proposition

\textsuperscript{25} See the discussion by Schiffer [1981]. It should be noted that we have yet to discuss intension for the case of proper names! Our observation to this point is that names, being Millian, refer directly without informing us about their bearers (save for the trivial information that he/she/it is the referent), but have as yet no explanation of how that reference is achieved. Nor should we fall into the Fregean trap of regarding connotation rather than character as determinative of reference.

\textsuperscript{26} This supports the rejection of taking sets of possible worlds as propositions. See the example in footnote 13 above.
(13a) \(_{I}^{c}\) clever, \(_{I}^{c}>

where the superscript, \(c\), relates the utterance of \(I\) to the context \(c\). So if, in \(c\), it is \(N_1\) doing the uttering, (13a) is the same proposition as (12). Similarly an utterance of

(14) He is clever

would, in an appropriate context, \(d\), express the proposition

(14a) \(_{I}^{d}\) clever, \(_{I}^{d}>

and, if the speaker were talking about \(N_1\), this would again be the same proposition as (12).\(^{27}\) This is not so with the 'classic' case of Russellized descriptions, where the referent must be the individual which satisfies familiar uniqueness and existence conditions in the possible world about which we speak. As observed in §3.1, the proposition standardly expressed by

(15) The \(F\) is \(G\).

should not be cast as

(15a) \(_{I}^{G}\) \(_{F}\)

a singular proposition. SREs that introduce disguised quantifications and explicit predicates introduce information that the propositional representation must capture, because it describes conditions that the

\(^{27}\) Some might object that I am omitting fairly vital information when I construct the propositions corresponding to (13) and (14), such as the information in (13) that the referent of \(I\) is the producer of the token-occurrence. This information is, I think, correctly viewed not as information about its referent (part of its connotation), but as part of the rule or recipe for using \(I\) - it has an unstable character, just as all genuine names have a stable or rigid one. Centrally, the context in which it occurs stabilizes the referent of \(I\) - if we start going through possible worlds, the \(I\) or 'he' must remain constant, rigidly designating such and such an item, regardless of the properties he might have in any of these possible worlds. The indexical is anchored by the context in which it is used.
designatum must satisfy in every possible world in which it appears. Again, some SREs stand between the two clear paradigms of name and description - certain demonstrative expressions (such as 'that car') seem to function simply to rigidly refer to an item yet they also clearly inform us about how that item is (e.g. it is a car). It would seem an equally plausible intuition that it is an essential component of the proposition expressed by

(16) That F is G

that the object of which we speak is said to be an F.²⁹ The difference in the information contained here is that it is not merely the context of utterance that determines the referent, but also the way the referent is said to be in that context.²⁹ The same would not hold of the function of the pure demonstrative 'that' in

(16a) That is G

since there would clearly be no restriction on the type of entity referred to in any given context save pragmatic features - who said it, where, when and of what - and the proposition expressed would simply be

(16b) <is G, <that>>

²⁹ One might wish to infer from (16) that a certain F, which I call 'N₁' is G, which would be difficult if one represented it as

<is G, <N₁>>

which makes no reference to N₁ being a G. On the other hand, some might assume that this is completely correct because one would wish to refer rigidly to N₁ with respect to possible worlds in which N₁ is not a G.

²⁹ Usually in the actual world. For example, I could use 'That policeman' to refer to someone with respect to another possible world in which he was not a policeman.
rather than a more complex quantificational formulation.  

What (6) and (7) report to be true is that (12) is true - i.e. that $\alpha$ satisfies the predicate 'is F'. Yet Ralph may stand in two different relations to (6) and (7). This does not lead us to the paradoxical inferences that from (8)

(17) Believes $<$Ralph, $\langle_\text{is } F, \langle_\alpha \rangle \rangle$ 

yet from (9)

(18) Does not believe $<$Ralph, $\langle_\text{is } F, \langle_\alpha \rangle \rangle$ 

if we regard (8) and (9) as saying (or, better, showing) something about how Ralph believes.

While I have little time for Frege's ploy of indirect references in belief-contexts, there is obviously something in talking about attitudes towards extensional entities relative to how they are presented. Hence, rather than representing propositional attitudes as simple binary relations (between thinker and proposition), we represent them as ternary relations (between thinker, proposition, and mode of presentation of the proposition). What is a mode of presentation of a proposition? Something very similar to the sense of an expression. An epistemic perspective on a proposition is needed to fill the gap in the theory. An expression introduces a contextually-defined epistemic perspective that is (possibly necessarily) distinct for two distinct speakers/thinkers. Hence the epistemic perspective consists of a contingent association except for the accommodation of any semantically

30 The import of indexicals 'he' and 'she' is again a nagging problem. Are the gender-specifications inherent in the use of these pronouns part of the information semantically encoded in the sentences in which they appear? What about the gender-specifications of 'John' and 'Mary'?
encoded information. As we shall soon see, this epistemic perspective has a major role to play.

Such a theory is a potentially lethal firework in the hands of philosophers. To dig in one's heels and maintain that the 'that'-clauses in (8) and (9) express the same proposition is one thing, but to further develop a theory of identification and discrimination for thoughts requires caution. Consider the following example:

In a moment of vanity Ralph sincerely asserts "I am good-looking." Peering through a doorway into the next room he sees a chap whom he feels is less appealing. "He is not good-looking." Yet what Ralph does not know is that by a complex trick with mirrors - favoured by stage-magicians and epistemologists - what he sees in the next room is in fact his own image reflected.

In the example Ralph has simultaneous beliefs of the contradictory propositions <_is good-looking, <Ralph>> and <_is not good-looking, <Ralph>>. He is saved from inconsistency or irrationality - as our intuitions dictate - by believing contradictory propositions in different ways, by having distinct epistemic perspectives on one and the same situation.

Let us indulge in a little more formalization. If Ralph behaves thus and so with regard to a sentence-token s that in a given context expresses the singular proposition

(19) <F_n,<t_1,t_2,.....,t_m>>

then let us express his attitude to that proposition as a ternary relation, 'Att'. The proposition expressed in that context by the
(20) Ralph stands in the attitude that $F_n(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n)$
is analyzable as

\[(21) \text{Att}<\text{Ralph}, \mu, <F_n, <t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n>>\]

where $\mu$ is Ralph's epistemic perspective in context $c$ on the
proposition reported by the sentence $F_n(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$. (We might have
expanded this by letting $\mu$ be an explicit function, $EP$, of thinker,
sentence and context:

\[\mu = EP(\text{Ralph, } "F_n(t_1, \ldots, t_n)"), c)\]

The choice of $c$ would be bound up with another peripheral topic - the
nature of the reidentification of 'episodic' or 'occurrent' beliefs.)

Does this make thoughts essentially private? Will there be a problem
about the identification and discrimination of thought when $\mu$ is
essentially unshareable? The answer is, I believe, no.

Why not? Because thoughts already are identified or discriminated
by perfectly competent, non-philosophers - our philosophical reworking
of these conditions must conform to such public criteria. If Ralph and
Pierre both behave in a similar fashion with regard to the same
sentence-token and there is no reason to assume that the contexts of
utterance signifies otherwise, then they can be ascribed the same
thought.\(^{31}\) TCS and DQ demonstrate that the conventional significance
of a sentence and the relation of speaker to quoted sentence-token are
of paramount importance in identifying that speaker's belief.
Reporting someone as believing a sentence which, while expressing the

\(^{31}\) If they both sincerely lend their assent to 'Strawson is a
philosopher' then, modulo context, they may both be said to believe the
same thing - as DQ would predict!
proposition he believes, misrepresents the utterances to which he would lend his sincere assent, misrepresents his beliefs.

Yet so naïve a theory is inconclusive. Quite often we do report a belief perfectly adequately in such a way that the sentence in the that-clause is not one to which a speaker would assent, which underspecifies his belief and which even fails to express the same proposition. This involves so-called de re interpretation. An example would be when I say to Pierre "Ralph believes I am clever". Does Ralph believe that Freedman is clever? that David is clever? that the author of this thesis on naming is clever? Standard cases of anaphora provide analogous examples. In the context of a conversation with Pierre the 'he' in "Ralph believes he is clever" might correctly be taken quite naturally to corefer with 'Dummett', even though Ralph believes in fact that whoever wrote the book *Elements of Intuitionism* is clever and is unaware that this person was Dummett - the sentences "He is clever" or even "Dummett is clever" would not accurately represent what Ralph believes. And, of course, even in the case of (6) and (7) it would be deemed adequate though philosophically unsatisfactory to report (8) by uttering (9) to Pierre given that we both understand that No. is N 2 . Simply put, we often choose the singular terms in 'that' clauses to suit the speaker and the audience rather than the believer: we regard it as more important to indicate who the belief is about rather than how it is believed. Is either layman or philosopher right?

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32 A point driven home to me in intensive discussions by Bede Rundle. See also concise accounts in Urmson [1974] and Leonardi [1986]. Again this point may be applied to the choice of predicates ("He believes this glass contains H_2O." said of someone ignorant of chemistry), not just of SREs. Compare related comments on (33) below.
Wholly accurate thought-reporting is about trying to recreate (or best duplicate) qualities of a particular epistemic perspective. But there is necessarily a tolerance of audiences to the 'inaccuracy' of thought-ascriptions, because those incorrupted by theory regard reports such as (17) as expressing a simple relation between thinker (Ralph) and object (α). Hence we choose to use a sentence that plays the relevant conceptual role with regard to the demands of the situation.

If there is any mileage in maintaining identity of beliefs, doubts, thoughts etc. modulo (potential) sentence-utterances in the face of such objections, we need a more perspicuous account of the relation between belief and sentence-tokens. The most successful version of that kind of relation has been advanced by Davidson, although his theory fails to satisfy in many respects.

Davidson gives us an example of the kind of subject-sentence relation we will need by analyzing

(22) Galileo said that the earth moves.

as

(23) Galileo said that. The earth moves.

where (23) is not a conjunction, but rather where (an interpreted utterance of the) sentence

(24) The earth moves.

functions as the object referred to by the demonstrative 'that' in

(25) Galileo said that.

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33 See especially [1968] and [1975]. The advantages of such sententialist theories is that the resultant analysis doesn't yield irreducible predicates '_believes that p', but allows us to dissect p itself. This permits representation of the inferential links between, say, 'Ralph believes that p' and 'Ralph believes that q' where q is a logical consequence of p.
What Galileo said is claimed to be (a token-utterance of) 'The earth moves.' To avoid difficulties, Davidson attempts to view (23) as a definitional equivalent of (or at least reformulate it as) the following:

(26) The earth moves. There is an \( x \) such that Galileo's utterance of \( x \) and my last utterance make us samesayers.\(^3\)

Should we wish to use it, the analogue of (26) for, say, belief is far from trivial\(^3\)

(27) The earth moves. There is an \( x \) such that Galileo's utterance(?) of \( x \) and my last utterance(?) make us samebelievers.

Although it is clear that it is on the basis of (potential) sentential utterances that we discriminate and identify propositional attitudes, Davidson's account is not immediately sympathetic. Davidson's error is in assuming that his paratactic account adds anything to the paraphrase of (22) as

(28) Galileo said (something tantamount to) "The earth moves."

Davidson is, in effect, attempting to write (28) without inverted commas, and although this move from oratio recta to oratio obliqua is commonly deemed a desirable extension of TCS, a far more suitable account is one that sidesteps these issues by simply analyzing (22) in

\(^3\) Davidson [1968] p.105.

\(^3\) By existential generalization, it is a logical consequence of (26) (and (27)) that there is something that is my last utterance. As Lycan has suggested ([1973]), this fact, here about 1988 utterances, is clearly not entailed by (22), if true. Thus the analysis of (22) as (23) must be wanting in some respect.
terms of (a) subject + attitude ascription and (b) sample token-sentence of a class of sentences indicated by 'that'.\(^{36}\) The same paratactic representation of (22) as (23) might do, but without the recourse to samesaying. The advantage of this view is that we need neither worry about identifying or reproducing actual token-sentences nor grapple with contextualisation. (It would be extremely charitable to interpret the original Davidsonian account in this fashion.) The burden of this theory lies in identifying the class of sentences all of whose members must play the same key role - we must attempt to pin down the sameness relation that underlies such a facile account.

The inherent vagueness of this account presses home the main point of the early parts of this thesis. Much of the quasi-Fregean motivation for semantic theory lies in a confusion between semantic and conceptual roles. The account of character, semantically encoded information, connotation and so forth represents truth-theoretic speculation on the nature of language. This speculation determines the conditions under which a sentence will standardly be true, the kind of information possession of which entails competence in the use of language, information which might be factual (e.g. knowing how some item has to be if it is a cat or the inventor of bifocals) or normative (knowing the character of a SRE so as to be able to follow its semantic

\(^{36}\) This type of deferred ostension to a kind is mentioned by Boër and Lycan [1986] ch.3, and Lycan [1985a]. The analogy given is of the deferred referent of 'that' in "That's what I want!* as uttered by John pointing to a passing Rolls Royce, the car being a sample of the kind of thing one of which he wants. I suspect Geach has something like this in mind in [1972] §4.6. It also seems vaguely unhealthy to insist that 'that' functions as a simple demonstrative - here we are concerned with instantiation rather than demonstration.
reference rule correctly). That kind of information is the proper
domain of semantics. Two sentences will be playing the same semantic
role if they express the same proposition with respect to a given
situation. However we also have to relate shared, public language (for
which we may generate a semantic theory) to the roles that parts of
that language play for a particular speaker in practical and
theoretical reasoning and action. The sense of SREs and epistemic
perspectives (such as μ in (21) above) contribute to this latter role.

[A] sentence S plays for a speaker x the same conceptual role
that a sentence S' plays for a speaker y just in case x and y
mobilize S and S', respectively, in closely similar ways in
practical and theoretical reasoning (i.e. the pattern of
'moves' associated with S in x's public or internal language
game is functionally equivalent to that associated with S' in
y's language game).\textsuperscript{37}

Clearly an epistemic difference is precisely that which makes 'N\textsubscript{1}' and
'N\textsubscript{2}' play different conceptual roles for Ralph even though they play
the same semantic ones.

The sameness relation that we are seeking for our account of
attitudes is, I think, parasitic on conceptual roles as well as
semantic roles. That is, to report to Pierre that Ralph believes that
S (that is, the fact that Ralph sincerely assents to S) we choose a
sentence S' that plays the same conceptual role for Pierre (our
audience) and (standardly) ourselves as does S for Ralph, and we are
thus referring to the class of sentences that play the same functional

\textsuperscript{37} Boër and Lycan [1986] p.53. I emphasize that I wish neither to
embrace any particular reductive analysis of conceptual role (contrast
Harman [1982], [1986] and Fodor [1986]) nor to identify it with what I
have called epistemic perspective. Moreover, when I speak of the
conceptual role of a tokened piece of English, say, I mean the causal
role the thought represented by that sentence plays in the thinker's
internal reasoning.
role for Pierre as does S for Ralph. We assume that 'The Earth moves' plays the same conceptual role for you or me as did Galileo's original utterance for him - that is why (23) approximates to (22).

Again, an immediate objection to this account involves its weakness vis-à-vis the subjectivity of conceptual role. Since the epistemic sense of an expression is private - insofar as it is largely inassessible and inaccessible - we may never be able to choose a sentence that plays the same conceptual role for Pierre as does S for Ralph, since there might be no such sentence. On the whole this result seems bizarre - we surely have no problem in recounting someone's beliefs? But the caveat is that there are always factors that are irrelevant. We never want a complete conceptual 'fit' - only a partial one. In fact, we only ever want a fit that is accurate with respect to certain parameters dictated by our motives and purposes in recounting Ralph's belief - there may only be an insignificant role that our sentence-token has to play. Sometimes we only want the fit to be extensionally accurate (hence de re belief reports), sometimes we additionally wish the fit to be semantically accurate (e.g. such that our token sentence and Ralph's express the same proposition), epistemically accurate (so that our token-sentence is one to which Ralph would assent), emotionally accurate (so that it provokes in Pierre the same emotional response as evoked in Ralph)... and so forth. We cannot interpret epistemic perspectives so as to make their content plain - hence, in keeping with Grice's maxims of conversational implicature, we make the best choice given the context in which the report must be given. Certainly when we turn to the fine
discrimination of an individual's beliefs compared one with another something like this emerges as the best account of the attitude relation (21). In observing the truth of (8) and falsity of (9) we have to give some account of belief that is super-propositional - i.e. that discriminates beliefs more accurately than merely assessing the proposition they express - in tandem with a propositional account of their truth - Ralph's belief being true if the proposition expressed by the sentence to which he is disposed to sincerely assent (the third component of the attitude triad (21)) corresponds with the relevant section of space-time. 38

Purely sentential accounts of belief give us a condition that many believe to be sufficient for belief-identity - that is, Ralph and Pierre share a belief, if they both sincerely assent to exactly the same sentence (in sufficiently similar contexts) as reporting that belief. But as it stands, it would seem wise to be skeptical about beliefs - in the sense of positing the existence of well-defined, discrete entities to which the thinker stands in a dyadic relation and which correspond one-one with asserted sentence-tokens - and simply give an account of propositional attitudes in terms of context-dependent dispositions towards sentential assertions. 39 That would be

38 I assume a trivial and modest correspondence theory of truth, allowing, for example, that the correspondence necessary for truth might be with some counterfactual situation rather than actuality - e.g. 'Ralph believes that Kennedy might have solved the four-colour problem' - and that degrees of truth are admitted with respect to vague predicates such as the ill-chosen "_ is pretty" in Kripke [1979].

39 The unanswered question "What goes to decide which report of a thinker's belief is used?" at least indicates that an account based purely on propositions fails to cohere with actual practice.

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consistent with (a) a theory giving an account of the semantic contribution of sentence-tokens to propositional attitude ascriptions, (b) the analysis of the semantic function of names (and other parts of language) in terms of their character, (c) a conceptual or epistemic account of the non-linguistic content of thought, leading to (d) a non-truth-conditional analysis of beliefs in terms of their causal roles in inferential procedures, and (e) any attempt to distinguish one propositional attitude from another (e.g. distinguishing suspicion from belief - such an account being absent from the present work).

What this analysis achieves is an explanation of Frege's paradox, to which philosophers have too often sought to offer a solution. But there is no theory, formal or otherwise, that will make the bald statements of (17) and (18) appear anything but contradictory, for there is no plausible means of extending our everyday notion of belief such that we can discriminate (17) and (18). Our analysis shows how the beliefs can be held, but not that our everyday ascriptions of belief are substandard because insufficiently fine-grained to articulate the difference between (17) and (18).

§4.3 CONTENTS OF THOUGHTS

Before proceeding to matters more germane to proper names, I wish to comment on a number of apparent omissions.*° First a few broad philosophical brushstrokes of familiar hue.

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Meanings ain't (just) in the head - nor are thoughts entirely described by what goes on in the head. Consider Ralph and his twin-earthling Doppelgänger, Ralph*, who find themselves in qualitatively identical environments and qualitatively identical mental states. If, per impossibile, we were to exchange them instantaneously then neither would detect the difference.\textsuperscript{1} Notwithstanding this they cannot be said to have the same belief - the conditions that would make their beliefs true are distinct - for they have epistemic perspectives (albeit qualitatively indistinguishable ones) on distinct propositions. If, as seems plausible, identical truth is a consequence of identity of belief, Ralph and Ralph* cannot be said to have the same belief - they have beliefs about different items and different situations.

Thoughts are not wholly characterised extensionally. As we have seen the same proposition can be believed and disbelieved from different epistemic perspectives by one and the same person.

Thoughts are standardly (though by no means universally) discriminated by outward, public signs. Ralph and Pierre would be said to have the same belief if they both sincerely

\textsuperscript{1} This example serves merely to stress the importance of the extensional component of thought vis-à-vis the discrimination of qualitatively identical belief-states. See Putnam [1974], Burge [1978], [1986], Lycan [1984] ch.10 or McCulloch [1986]. Burge's twist on the story emphasizes the problem of finding a suitable conceptual analog sentence with which to report a belief when none seems available - e.g. reporting a belief from a Twin Earth community where 'arthritis' has a decidedly non-standard use.
assented to the same sentence, s, and that sentence as asserted by both of them would express one and the same proposition. This turns on conceptual role - given such similar assent, we would expect Ralph and Pierre to make exactly the same deductions on the basis of accepting s. There are, of course, other discriminatory criteria that are used in certain circumstances, such as the de re belief reports mentioned above.\(^\text{a2}\)

GSTs simply introduce their referents into the propositional representation. Ipso facto, they satisfy, in part, Evans' constraint on truly Russellian propositions - if the referent of a name, 't\(_j\)' say, does not exist, then no proposition is expressed, since

\[
(29) \langle F_n, <t_1, \ldots, t_{j-1}, t_{j+1}, \ldots, t_n>\rangle
\]

fails to indicate any way for the world to be that makes S true.

Allied to this semantic account is the epistemic perspective each speaker associates with part of language. In some cases this is dominated by the information semantically encoded in the term, but often there is a substantial contribution made by other factors as indicated above in chapter 2. An account of the epistemic perspective a speaker has on a sentence would be agreeably grounded in a structural

\(^{a2}\) I allowed a wide variety of discriminatory criteria rather than countenance a standard de re/de dicto dichotomy. Kripke has shown that this does not work exhaustively in the case of sentences involving modal operators ([1977] p.10) - take the sentence 'It is possible that the number of the planets might have been necessarily even' - nor does it seem to be exhaustive, well-defined (see Forbes [1985] p.48 for a good attempt) or sufficiently fine-grained for propositional attitudes. There are not distinct de re or de dicto propositional attitudes, but rather ways of reporting propositional attitudes that may be characterised as broadly de re or de dicto.
isomorphism; if we have a compositional account of meaning - as yielded by many versions of TCS - that gives a semantic structure to a sentence represented by the generalised proposition (19) then it would be convenient to think of a 1-1 structural correspondence between terms 't' and a speaker's epistemic perspective thereon, ^t^, to generate a structurally similar epistemic entity representable as

(30) <^[F_n]^, <^[t_1]^, ...,^[t_n]^>

where, naturally enough, the previously transparent places occupied by the t_k correspond to opaque occurrences of ^t_k^, since in general ^t_k^ and ^t_j^ are distinct even if 't_k' and 't_j' corefer. Is there any evidence supporting this, or any advantage to be had by it?

Broadly speaking, the answer is yes. Theories of language acquisition augur well for some compositional account of 'internal' conceptual role: our understanding of language seems to be founded on the capacity to construct novel sentences, so it would seem plausible to accept that the way individuals manipulate linguistic entities mirrors this, and that internal representations belong to a similarly structured system - a language of thought. Moreover, such structure plausibly explains the inner inferential processes mirrored in the logical analysis of natural language utterances. However, there seems no reason to suppose that the Mentalese items playing these conceptual roles might not be somewhat more complex. Those who find TCS and/or Mentalese repugnant might opt for a more holistic view, concentrating on the way in which language is used and the restrictions that lie on the conceptual roles it plays. That these conceptual roles cohere in some way - without generating patent inconsistencies - is a desirable
concomitant of linguistic mastery, but does not entail the isomorphism described above. The structure is neither obvious nor obviously there.

Some theories of thought would exploit this compositionality. I might have represented (8) as

\[(31) \text{Believes} <\text{Ralph, }<'N_1',\alpha'>, \alpha \text{ is } F>\]

which says that Ralph believes of \(\alpha\) as \(N_1\) that it is \(F\), the ordered pair \(<'N_1',\alpha'>\) representing the way in which Ralph conceives of \(\alpha\) in using '\(N_1'\). This fragments Ralph's epistemic perspective on '\(N_1\) is \(F'\), the important part being \(<'N_1',\alpha'>\), which differentiates (8) from the representation of (9) as

\[(31a) \text{Believes} <\text{Ralph, }<'N_2',\alpha'>, \alpha \text{ is } F>\]

Yet the same phenomenon is described equally well by simply positing an unstructured epistemic or conceptual intermediary for each sentence. It is in this fashion, avoiding conflict with Wittgensteinian synergy, that senses can play suitable explanatory roles for proper names without requiring further articulation. Thus my theory can remain neutral with respect to the superimposition of compositional structure onto the epistemic component of belief.\(^3\)

To some it may seem that my account remains deliberately lacking with regard to an account of the content of thought. Why? Because nothing such as singular propositions can express the full content of an individual's thought - not because the sentences involved fail to express singular propositions (for they often do), nor because thoughts

\(^3\) Compare the piecemeal theory advanced by Burdick [1982]. The doubts advanced by Schiffer ([1985a],[1986a],[1987a]) as to the coherence of considering modes of presentation of concepts in isolation count against such structure. See also footnote 11, p.105 above.
cannot be individuated by public linguistic expressions, but because no specific account of an individual's epistemic perspective towards such a sentence need be given.\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{4} I am much less optimistic about what accounts of the content of thought (i.e. that cached in epistemic perspectives and conceptual roles) can achieve. In effect I agree with Schiffer that there is no completion of the schema

\[ S \text{ believes that } p \text{ iff ...} \]

that is both true and non-trivial.\textsuperscript{5}

Such "irreducibility" of the mental need not interfere with a semantic theory for public language. I do not pretend that there is no room for an account of psychological or conceptual representations, be it phenomenal or (as I doubt) physicalist, but there seems little reason to annex any such account to an adequate account of language, even if such requires an account of sentential thought. This grounds an account of the discrimination of thought in tune with what Evans calls the intuitive criterion of difference, accommodating the intuition that thoughts outnumber facts.\textsuperscript{6}

So a thinker may fail to recognise that the propositions he has accepted are contradictory because he fails to realise that the two

\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{4} One cannot help but feel that Evans, for example, is seduced by the idea that those sympathetic to Kripke's "photograph model" will view the singular propositions as the thoughts themselves ([1982] ch.3.4), whereas the postulation of epistemic intermediaries actually does little to disrupt Kripke's account.

\textsuperscript{5} Schiffer [1986b] (esp. pp.54-55), [1987] passim. Cited in §2.2, Geach's analogy of sense with the timbre of voices applies here - we are capable of some (defeasible) differentiation of conceptual roles, yet cannot articulate what the conceptual role of (the mental correlate of) a piece of language is.

sentences he has accepted (to which he will sincerely assent, etc.) express contradictory propositions.*7 Faced with this, many require explanation of how

a minimally rational person could understand the two sentences (given the names within them denote directly, so that to understand the names is to know what they denote) without noticing that they express contradictory propositions... [or] ... how the person could entertain the two propositions without recognising that they directly contradict one another.*8

To this I have supplied a perfectly acceptable solution; a theory that offers (at least) an elucidation of propositional ascriptions that rescues thinkers from straightforward inconsistency whilst remaining neutral with respect to an inferential or structural analysis of "narrow" psychological content. The solution thrives on the explicit distinction between semantic properties of SREs (the information semantically encoded within them - names telling us nothing about their referents save that they bear the name) and epistemic properties of SREs (the associations they assume that also affect the conceptual role the expression plays for a particular speaker and explains its role in theoretical reasoning and what the speaker says and does). This is extended to an analogous treatment of sentences; semantics yields the conditions under which a sentence is true and knowledge of which is necessitated by competence in the use of that sentence, while the subjective epistemic perspective had on a proposition via a token of that sentence consists in whatever further contingent associations form a consistent extension of that knowledge.


The major fault with the 'Fido'-Fido theory is that substitutivity failure will occur within the scope of non-truth-functional sentence-forming operators that utilise epistemic notions - intensional operators such as 'Ralph believes that..' or 'It is obvious that..' - and hence the truth-condition of such sentences will not be as represented in (19) but as

\[(32) \Phi(z_1, \ldots, z_m, \langle F_n, \langle t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n \rangle \rangle)\]

where \(\Phi\) is some (possibly iterated) truth-function of not only a singular proposition but also of other entities \(z_1, \ldots, z_m\), at least one of which is an epistemic item.\(^\text{43}\) (21) exemplifies this form as would a representation of an iterated report such as

\[(33) \text{Ralph doubts that Pierre believes that Quentin smokes}\]

which might be

\[(33a) \text{Doubts<Ralph, \mu, Believes<Pierre, \mu*, <_smokes, <Quentin>>>}\]

In (33a), as in general examples of (32), a GST (here 'Quentin') serves only to introduce its referent yet it does not follow that the substitution of 'Crisp' for 'Quentin' in (33) is equivalent to the same substitution in (33a)!\(^\text{50}\) It is also clear that if 'Quentin' is empty, then no matter how many more \(\Phi\)-operators we pile up in front of (33a), it will never express a proposition - a \textit{prima facie} unwelcome corollary

\(^\text{43}\) I assume (as a mere theoretic convenience) that any \(\Phi\) takes but a finite number of arguments.

\(^\text{50}\) It should be remembered that \(\mu\) and \(\mu^*\) are epistemic functions of thinker, sentence and context. Strictly

\[\mu = \text{EP(Ralph, 'Pierre believes Quentin smokes', c)}\]
\[\mu^* = \text{EP(Pierre, 'Quentin smokes', c*)}\]

although as we have seen that such reports allow some looseness with regard to \(\mu^*\) since the quoted sentence 'Quentin smokes' might well not be one Pierre would assert.
discussed further in §6.4.

Whatever account of content is given - construed as that shortfall between proposition and thought, and couched in terms of mental or internal representation - it seems that the above conception of semantics holds fast without any theoretical articulation of epistemic perspectives. Our semantics of names does not disturb the fact that it seems very easy to have a thought about N (where 'N' is a name). Hence the only outstanding question concerns the nature of the conditions one must satisfy to be competent in the use of Millian names, and hence to entertain such thoughts.

§4.4 KNOWING WHICH, WHAT OR WHO

A frequently pressing concern is the analysis of the 'knowing who' relation - to find some account of the relation of knowing who N is such that it comprises a necessary and sufficient condition for competence in the use of 'N'. Until now this question has been passed over: if one does not know who N is, can one truly be said to understand sentences in which 'N' occurs referentially? Something like this emanates from Russell's principle of acquaintance, liberated from its narrowly epistemic application to sense-data of the specious present and applied to the wider collection of singular propositions which now face us.

An interesting account of terms working 'in epistemic space' is given in Bencivenga [1985].

Comments on Russell's approach resurface in §§6.1, 6.4. I shall call the relation of knowing who that holds between the subject (e.g. Ralph) and the object (e.g. t) the K-relation - formalised hereafter as, e.g., Kn Ralph(t) or K(t) when the subject is either unspecified or
One plausible account emanates from the generally invalid argument schema

(B1) Ralph believes that N1 is F.
(B2) N1 is N2.

Therefore (B3) Ralph believes that N2 is F.

That is, there is some sense of 'Ralph believes that N is F' such that the inference of (B3) from (B1) and (B2) is not licensed - this is simply the phenomenon of substitutivity failure noted earlier. What additional premises would be needed to make this valid? One such set of premises might be {K(N1), K(N2)}, for it has been (naively) presumed axiomatic of the logic of the K-operator that knowing that N1=N2 follows from knowing who both N1 and N2 are, and that this knowledge would bridge the inferential lacuna between (B1) and (B3)

(B1) Ralph believes that N1 is F.
(B2) N1 is N2.
(K1) K(N1).
(K2) K(N2).

Therefore (B3) Ralph believes that N2 is F.

I disagree. Certainly there is some interpretation of the K-relation that intuitively coheres with this account,53 but it is not wanted here since there are certainly cases where we seem to have competence in the use of two names yet ignorance of the fact that they name the same thing. It also accords ill with the previous obvious from the context.

53 See Sellars [1969], and works by Hintikka, esp. [1962], [1979], [1981].
observation that it is at best a contingent feature of a name that there is another name that picks out the same item - it would seem perfectly plausible that $K(N_1)$ and $K(N_2)$ are independent properties of the subject and that there is no requirement that from them one may derive the conclusion that $N_1=N_2$.

A more plausible tenet of epistemic logics is that 'Ralph knows who $t$ is' (where '$t$' is some referring expression) should be paraphrased as

\[(34) \ (Ex) \text{ Ralph knows that } (t=x).\]

In this formula the quantified variable $x$ is the item such that Ralph knows of it that it is $t$. To rescue this from triviality it must be the item picked out by some means of identification other than identification as $t$. But how does one incorporate this constraint into $(34)$? And what means of identification would it have to be? If we identified $x$ as $u$, say, would we not require that Ralph knew who $u$ was, thus making the definition either circular or open to regress?

Incorporating the constraint that the variable $x$ must take a different 'way of identifying' the referent of '$t$' than does '$t$' might help us, but:

(i) although knowing who clearly has some existential import, it is not clear that knowing that this term corefers with another is sufficient for Ralph to know who $t$ is, for although we are often licensed to move from

\[(34a) \text{ Ralph knows that } (t=u)\]

to \[(34b) \text{ Ralph knows that } (Ex)(t=x)\]

we generally cannot move from $(34b)$ to $(34)$ or its natural language.
ancestor;\textsuperscript{54} and

(ii) it is arguably that bolstering a formal paraphrase is this fashion simply brings us no closer to the intuitive significance of the K-relation. I return to the former point presently and to the latter as a methodological critique in §9.3.

Perhaps a more modest starting point is required. A suitable candidate is Gareth Evans' Generality Constraint (GC):

If a subject can be credited with the thought that \(a\) is \(F\), then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that \(a\) is \(G\), for every property of being \(G\) of which he has a conception. We thus see the thought that \(a\) is \(F\) as lying at the intersection of two series of thoughts: on the one hand, the series of thoughts that \(a\) is \(F\), that \(b\) is \(F\), that \(c\) is \(F\),..., and, on the other hand, the series of thoughts that \(a\) is \(F\), that \(a\) is \(G\), that \(a\) is \(H\),...\textsuperscript{55}

The constraint amounts to the claim that understanding a language consists in the mastery of a whole network of concepts rather than of particular sentences.

\textsuperscript{54} Compare the inference from 'Ralph knows that \((Ex)(x\text{ is a spy})\)' to '\((Ex)\text{ Ralph knows that } (x\text{ is a spy})\)' which is generally held to be invalid. See Quine [1960] p.144ff. John Tienson suggests that whatever condition, \(Q(t)\), must hold in order for existential generalization of a term, \('t'\), within the scope of a propositional attitude operator licenses substitutivity; i.e. "If two terms that refer to the same thing both meet the conditions for (veridical) existential generalization in a [propositional attitude] context, then they are interchangeable \textit{salva veritate} in that context." ([1986] p.152). This generates a clear and counter-intuitive result in combination with the following, plausibly consistent set of four premises

\begin{align*}
N_1 &= N_2 \\
\text{Ralph believes } N_1 &= N_1 \\
Q(N_1) \\
Q(N_2)
\end{align*}

Hence Tienson denies any such \(Q\) exists. His argument is thankfully unsound, since so mundane an example as 'George IV knew Scott wrote Waverley' admits existential generalization but not substitutivity with respect to 'Scott'.

\textsuperscript{55} Evans [1982] p.104.
It seems reasonable that at least a necessary condition for competent name use is the capacity to form or grasp the significance of potential sentences involving that name. Someone who understood the sentence 'Socrates is wise' but not the sentence 'Socrates is considerate' or who was unable to comprehend the significance of 'Socrates is F' for any other predicate F in his linguistic repertoire would not count as understanding 'Socrates'.

GC emerges from Evans' consideration of a proto-language consisting of ten singular terms (a, b, c, ...) and ten one-place predicates (F, G, H, ...) with the single sentence-forming operation of predicate-term concatenation. The language therefore has only 100 possible sentences and admits of a finite truth theory - simply providing 100 T-sentences. It also admits of an axiomatic truth theory that is compositional in terms of 21 meaning-specifying axioms - ten for the singular terms, ten for the predicates and one for the sentence forming operation. Something like the second kind of theory is needed to account for our ability to understand tokens of sentences we have never before encountered.

Evans' contrasting sentential and axiomatic proto-languages seem ungainly because our primary considerations are (i) having a conception of what it is for some fragment of language to be a name and (ii) identifying a fragment of language as a name. Both these considerations are bound up in apparently non-redundant Tarskian satisfaction axioms, such as

(35) 'F(N)' is true iff

(Ex) ('N' denotes x and x satisfies 'F( )')
To be competent in the use of 'N', one requires a grasp of the concept of a name. Only in a finite proto-language might one think of sentential comprehension without the relevant subsentential comprehension. With a larger language, i.e. one with a finite but unwieldy vocabulary and a finitely defined number of ways of forming a potentially infinite number of sentences (i.e. more than allowed by the simple subject-predicate concatenation of the Evans axiomatic language), the absence of sub-sentential comprehension seems ridiculous. This alone provides intuitive grounds for GC, a required awareness of the sub-sentential significance of the similarity between 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates is considerate'. But we have not only to account for the notion that understanding the role of 'N' in 'N is F', 'N is G', 'N is H'...and so forth requires a compositional grasp of language, but also for the idea that, when one has such a grasp of names 'N₁', 'N₂', 'N₃'... and so forth, one realises what they all have in common, i.e that they are and that they behave as names. In a language with a rich variety of sentence-forming rules, predicate-types and grammatical constructions the question becomes less pressing—grasping that something is a name is simply a matter of its standard use conforming to a stereotype (e.g. in modal contexts). In the kind of mini-language that Evans envisages it would be a moot point as to whether the name 'Socrates' was functioning conceptually as a name (rather than as proxy for some definite description), if the vocabulary of that language consisted merely of names 'Socrates' and 'Plato' and the two predicates '_is wise' and '_is considerate'. Moreover, one

* How else would we judge something to be a name? See §6.2.
might consider whether the question was at all relevant if the notion of 'name' is interpreted as relative to the language in question. If a linguistic item is to count as a name for us and be used as a name by us, it (and its user) must satisfy criteria posed by the full, rich structure of our language. So the test of using the expression correctly becomes determined by the vast conceptual resources of our natural language - this is exactly the kind of test that Kripke has appealed to in his discussions of rigidity. Evans' mini-languages cannot meet this, since they would, for example, lack modal operators.

This procedure is familiar - one recalls the Wittgensteinian proto-languages. As ever there remains some doubt about the relevance and utility of such piecemeal speculations, even if the alternative, top-down approach seems far too complex.

The only general way to describe what is required for understanding a sentence, 'a is F', involving an ordinary proper name, 'a', is this: one must think of the referent, in whatever way one is accustomed to think of it, and take the remark to be true just in case that object is F.57

Unfortunately this advice is far too vague to be of help. It comes in preparation for Evans' extended argument for the Russellian status of singular thoughts (rather than of singular propositions).

Evans proposes that, in rejecting descriptionism, causal theories have presented conditions insufficient for genuine reference. Underpinning this are two theses: the first (negative) thesis is that a sentence containing what I have called a GST is nonsense if the term fails to refer and, analogously, there is nothing to be thought in entertaining such a sentence; the second (positive) thesis is that to

think about an object we must know which object is in question -

the subject must have a capacity to distinguish the object of
his judgment from all other things:... for example [one] can
perceive it at the present time;... recognize it if presented
with it;... knows distinguishing facts about it.\textsuperscript{58}

Evans promotes the view that having thoughts of various kinds
requires knowledge - to be having thoughts expressible by sentences
involving a term 't' requires that one knows which item t is (or, in
his terminology, that one has a mode of identification of t or an Idea
of t). Although Evans' argument seems persuasive for thoughts
expressed by certain parts of language - most successfully
demonstratives and demonstrative modes of identification - it rings
false for proper names. It would be grossly inaccurate to say of
thoughts expressed by sentences involving names that one must always
have a mode of identifying the referent of the name in order to be
genuinely having those thoughts, if, as Evans might argue, this is seen
as requiring a capacity for recognising, reidentifying or
discriminating the referent. (Evans seems to identify these
capacities, which I believe may be contested. It is plainly
conceivable that one might possess a suitable capacity and entertain
suitable thoughts. When a sufficiently similar item is introduced into
one's environment, one loses the capacity to recognise, reidentify or

\textsuperscript{58} [1982] p.89. A discussion of the negative thesis is found below
(§6.4) where the problems of this anti-Evans stance are investigated in
the context of seemingly singular thoughts about empty GSTs. Although I
agree that the identity of the thought depends on the identity of the
object it is putatively about, I would deny that, in one sense, the
existence of the thought need depend on the existence of that object.
Rather it depends on the ability to form the correct intentions, which
seems entailed by but not to entail the possession of Evans' modes of
identification of the object(s) in question.
discriminate, but arguably not the capacity to have the relevant thoughts.)

Even given his notion of communication-based modes of identification for proper-names, Evans falls foul of the counter-intuitive claim of one's inability to have singular thoughts in the absence of opportunity to have knowledge (of the relevant kind) of the item(s) which the thought is ostensibly about. This simply does not accord with our apparent ability to have thoughts about far-removed items or those about which we have very little knowledge when they are named.

A more satisfactory (for less confusing) view is that the K-relation is purpose-relative. That is, whatever the minimal constraints on name-using competence, the K-relation is satisfied independently and in relation to particular types of Who?-question. One will demonstrate that one knows who Aristotle is (or was, ignoring tense problems), i.e. that K(Aristotle), if one can give a satisfactory answer to "Who is Aristotle?". Whoever asks that question will have a vague range of suitable responses in which he is interested - demonstrative identifications, coreferential names, definite descriptions, etc. - that provides a rule of thumb by which one's responses are judged. I agree with Boër and Lycan that the primary demand in such questions is for a uniquely identifying description60 - these speculations may be behind the analysis of the K-relation given by (34). But this response is relative to the interests of the

59 See Evans' example of the identical steel balls ([1982] p.90f) where exactly this combination of capacity for thought but inability to discriminate seems to arise. (See also p.282.)

60 [1985] ch.2.

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questioner. Should we expect some more fundamental interpretation of the K-relation to ground our competent name-use?

My radically skeptical stance is that there is none - the K-relation is a red herring. How am I assured that I use a name competently? The complex solution turns upon what Putnam has called the division of linguistic labour (DLL).

Putnam's original speculation can be cast in the following light - it involves severing the equivalence of the notions of 'linguistic competence' and 'knowing the meaning of'. For a kind term like 'water', many ordinary speakers are competent in the use of it whilst remaining ignorant of both its true meaning - e.g. that it has chemical composition $H_2O$ - and how to determine decisively that a given sample is a sample of water. Putnam analyses meaning as a four element vector consisting of

- syntactic marker (grammatical category)
- semantic marker (sortal classification)
- stereotype (features commonly associated)
- extension (determination of all samples of the kind)

Only the first three of these need be apprehended by competent speakers. We defer to 'experts' in the community who are 'in the business of' knowing the fourth component - what these experts will say provides a norm for our application of the kind word. Although I have grave doubts about the efficacy of this line of thought as applied to kind terms, it has a genuine contribution to make in our assessment of the function of proper names.

DLL has intuitive merit in denying that competent speakers have to be in possession of certain information (e.g. Evans' modes of identification) about the referent of a name in order to be able to use
it correctly. However, this should not be taken as indicative of any covert semantic theory. For example, the claim should not be taken as providing a semantic equivalence between a name and a description that is hidden to all but a few experts, for even if it did Kripke's arguments against descriptionism construed as semantic equivalence would apply to the more limited community of the experts themselves.

Neither should DLL be seen as introducing an objective sense for a name (in any of the Fregean interpretations) which is known only to a few experts to whom we defer. (Michael Luntley has suggested that there might be such a phenomenon as a communally defined sense, a full grasp of which is had by no member of that community. The analogy he gives is with the phrase 'the theory of relativity'. It is arguable that (i) there is such a thing as the theory of relativity, notwithstanding the fact that (ii) no-one is in full possession of the theory in its entirety. If we maintain our stance on sense as an epistemic intermediary, there seems no need to adopt this ploy. Although the best one can offer is an appeal to Ockhamist economy, the notion of one 'correct' epistemic perspective attached to a name of which we all have to varying degrees imperfect copies seems unnecessarily abstruse.)(

What DLL does provide is an excuse for those who are not in possession of any mode of identification of the referent of a name. Let us put it thus: in one important sense of the $K$-relation neither you nor I know who Napoleon was. We never had direct or immediate epistemic access to the person (if indeed there was such a person) so

\footnote{Luntley has made these suggestions in lectures and in [1988].}
we must defer to the experts on the subject of Napoleon. These are not the historical scholars (though they may be the best informed left in our community) but rather those who had immediate acquaintance with Napoleon - those who met him when he lived (if he ever did). Even among these there will be relative experts - those who initiated the use of the name 'Napoleon' will have the last word on who and how Napoleon actually was. One immediate dissimilarity with Putnam's view is that his 'experts' are extant within the linguistic community. Is this an insuperable difficulty for the application of DLL to the case of proper names? I think not. There is surely symmetry of sorts in the fact that Napoleon, the referent himself, is no longer around - if we look at a name such as 'Thatcher' some experts are still with us.

At least two other worries reflect deficiencies in Putnam's original treatment. The first is insufficient emphasis on the essentially indexical element in thinking about something under a name. The fact that our thought latches onto N when we use 'N' is, of course, dependent on our having some way of thinking about N that is not dependent on descriptive content (which theoretically might not be uniquely individuating), but rather on N standing in a particular relationship to us. (I think Putnam fails to stress in the Twin Earth examples that this is exactly what happens with our relation to our immediate environment in giving ostensive definitions of the 'This is water' kind. Obviously we are tied down to a sameness relation defined

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62 See Strawson [1959] ch.1. A Strawsonian account of the metaphysics of object-directed thought permeates Evans' treatment of reference [1982]. It is not at all clear that this sits well with Tarski-style truth-theory.
in terms of the samples to which we have recourse as paradigms - this does involve some kind of indexical reference-fixing, but does not interfere with the 'experts' hypothesis.)

The second worry is far more pressing. Putnam simply fails to distinguish two kinds of expert. For kind terms there will be those that know the real essence of the kind (call this E-recognition) and those that, in tandem with the ostensive definitions, can reliably indicate paradigms of the kind (call this P-recognition). When Putnam talks about 'water' in 1750 he forgets that there were many who could P-recognise water; when his theory is turned to modern science there are many examples of E-recognition without P-recognition.\textsuperscript{63} Given the possibility of such a distinction, it seems a moot point that Putnam emphasises the wrong sort of recognition. When we turn to names, it is obviously excessive to demand E-recognition of N for mastery of 'N' if this requires some arcane essentialist insight. This kind of E-recognition is what we take for granted in transworld identifications: we assume it though we have no idea in what the scientific essence of an individual consists. For the historically far-removed such as Napoleon even P-recognition is absent. What we do is defer to those who have P-recognition or who in turn defer to others who did, and so forth until, according to the actual practices of these P-experts (not E-experts!), we reach whatever referent of the name there may be. Because there are no more 'samples' of the referent around, there can be no new P-experts. Thus a buck-passing theory accounts for our

\textsuperscript{63} Though I can E-recognise it, I cannot P-recognise gold so as to tell it from iron pyrites. I doubt anyone can P-recognise ytterbium or californium though scientists have charted their properties well.
ability to have thoughts about spatiotemporally far-distant entities.

There are a number of rough corners to clear up. Causal theories of name-reference are our topic in chapter 5. Even so, many will object to such an account on the grounds of insufficient knowledge—surely if you just hear the name 'N' mentioned once, you cannot have a thought about N? Kripke seems to find this relatively unobjectionable; he claims that standing in this kind of causal relation is sufficient to be having a thought about the referent of the name and that no further disambiguating information is needed for having thoughts. What this account misses is a broadly speaking intentional (not intensional) account of using names. Kripke's causal picture gestures towards the public availability of names, the ease with which their use may be acquired and their social character. What it lacks is an account of or suitable emphasis on the notion of intending to corefer with those from whom one learns the name, the intention to preserve reference. This account should be of a richly cognitive notion - what is it to have intention of the right kind? what is it for such an intention to succeed? what kind of information is required to have the right kind of intention? The answer is that we secondary thinkers, deferring to others' use of 'N', entertain what may or may not be thoughts according to what thoughts others entertain in a similar causal chain leading back to those primary thinkers that have direct epistemic access to (or have (or had) a mode of identification of) the referent of 'N'. That there exists a suitable causal history for a name is not enough for my thought expressed by 'Napoleon is dead' to be

"See [1972] p.95 where Kripke discusses the name 'Newton'.

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a thought about Napoleon - that merely grounds some communal significance for the term 'Napoleon'. It further requires that I intend it to be about Napoleon. This intentional model, rather than an account of knowledge, explains our mastery of names. It is fully described in chapter 7.
PART TWO:

THE MECHANICS OF NAMING
CHAPTER 5:

CAUSAL ANALYSES

The world was so recent that many things lacked names, and in order to indicate them it was necessary to point.

Gabriel García Márquez.
CHAPTER 5:
CAUSAL ANALYSES

Part One of this work dealt with the semantic function of names. We must now supplement the following results of our earlier labours: (i) that there is no reason to suppose that names have the same semantic function as definite descriptions; (ii) that names, unlike descriptions, are rigid designators; (iii) that names have a stable character; and (iv) that names encode no information about their referents, save, perhaps, for the trivial information that their bearer bears the name. These observations leave us unenlightened with regard to the actual naming relation (that relation that has to hold between a token-use of a name and its bearer), for we have still to ask how reference is determined by name-use. Kripkean speculation has merely told us that however that reference is determined, it remains constant as we consider different possible worlds. Following the intuition of §4.4, the solution I am going to sketch is essentially a causal theory of name-using practices (NUPs), and I shall define the bearer of a name in terms of such a causal theory.¹ Moreover, we still require some distinction between semantic reference and speaker reference. Our theory of NUPs acts as a foundation for the more prolonged pragmatic discussions in chapter 7.

¹ The most convincing accounts are given in Kripke [1972], Donnellan [1968], [1972], [1974], Evans [1973], Devitt [1974], [1981], Kroon [1982], [1983], [1987], and Vision [1982]. The bearer of a name must be distinguished from the item that is picked out or referred to by a token-use of a proper name, for we know from Donnellan [1966], [1968] and Kripke [1977] that the two need not coincide.
§5.1 NAME-USING PRACTICES AND THE TYPE-TOKEN RELATION

The 'other' half of Kripke's picture of naming involves historico-causal chains of name-use, which consist in the successful passing of the use of the name from one person to another (either directly by spoken word, or indirectly, e.g. by written word) over a period of time. At one end of the chain stands the contemporary user of the name; at the other lies the original or 'baptismal' user of the name. From the original user of a name emanates a tree-like structure of successful uses. For example, contemporary speakers use the name 'Napoleon' to refer to whatever item was referred to by those from whom they acquired the use of the name when they used 'Napoleon', who in turn used it to refer to whatever item was referred to by those from whom they acquired the use of the name when they used 'Napoleon'... and so forth until the referential 'buck' stops at the initiators of the practice of using the name 'Napoleon' and the item (by definition, Napoleon) to which they referred. It is that item (if indeed there is such an item) that is Napoleon and it is irrelevant to the matter of the determination of reference whether that item satisfies the descriptions commonly associated with the name or not. Such a theory of name-use is deferential in nature: at every link in the chain the new user defers to the old user of the name. Importantly this type of account is insensitive to the information the speaker possesses, since how I am using the name depends on who I have bumped into and from whom I have acquired its use, not what I know about its purported referent.

I can but agree with the picture sketched above. That is to say, it strikes me as an accurate if somewhat banal observation about the
use of names. Plainly in learning a language one seeks to conform to the standards of one's teachers. An exceptional feature of names is that there is no obvious meaning that needs to be communicated (there is no semantically encoded information that the new speaker has to grasp to acquire the use of a name), simply the use of the name. The problem comes when one attempts, as John Canfield has put it, "to elevate such a mundane fact into an answer to the philosophical (conceptual) question 'What is the relationship between a name and its object in virtue of which the one names the other?'." 2

The fundamental phenomenon of the causal theory is that of successfully passing on the use of a name from one individual to another. A notion prevalent in the literature of causal theories is that the link must be intentional in the following simple fashion: if Ralph is to acquire the use of 'N' from Pierre then he must intend to use it to refer to the same item as Pierre refers to. Kripke puts it thus:

An initial baptism takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is 'passed from link to link' the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as does the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the name 'Napoleon' and decide it would be a nice name for my pet aardvark I do not satisfy this condition. 3

Clearly Kripke requires that the learner "intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it." This

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2 Canfield [1979] p.79n.

3 Kripke [1972] p.96. This is preceded by some puzzling comments on the transmission of names that would seem to cloud the issue and to which we return in §5.3.
indicates the social character of meaning - that names are public property. It has been suggested that (the expression of) this condition is circular and neither necessary nor sufficient for the successful acquisition of name use. The circularity is difficult to assess. It is certainly true that any deferential theory might fall prey to mentioning the notion to be explained (e.g. reference) in the account of the simple step in terms of which it is to be explained (e.g. deferring in name-use). If these leaves a gap somewhere, it has not been proven to be a fatal error - I can see no reason to condemn the account of the link in the causal chain for its mention of the word 'reference'. However the claim that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for successful acquisition of the use of a name constitutes a somewhat more mordant criticism.

The first attack - that on sufficiency - is best made by Evans* in his example of the name 'Madagascar' modern use of which stems from Marco Polo. The picture Evans plausibly paints is one where the indigenous inhabitants of a certain part of the Africa used 'Madagascar' (or some suitably close phoneme) to refer to a part of the African mainland, whereas Polo (though intending to use the name as they did) used the name to refer to the African island we now know as Madagascar - because he believed that was what the natives were referring to with their use of the name.³ As it happens, Polo's intention to refer to the island ensured that subsequent European uses

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* Evans [1973].
³ For now we assume that Polo was clearly and indisputably referring to the island.

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of the name intended to and did use the name as he did. In effect he initiated a new practice of using a name already in use, but the causal buck-passing cannot get back over the obstacle of his misinterpretation to the indigenous speakers.

As Kripke notes of Napoleon the aardvark, the phenomenon of reusing names for which there are already existent practices is common. I might baptise my irritable bulldog 'Arthur Scargill' and there would be a fairly obvious causal link between my choice of that name and an existing practice of using it. However, subsequent users of 'Scargill' wouldn't have to go back further than my use to refer to the dog in order to determine the reference. The 'Madagascar' case is one where the user acquires the use of a name, intends to use it as others do, but uses it inaccurately. By the standards of the old, indigenous practice, Polo is incorrect; only by the standard of the subsequent practice (of using 'Madagascar' to refer to the island) is he correct. Indeed, if his new practice had not caught on, there would be no reason to suppose that he was not simply mistaken tout court. But, as it is, we see the development of a new practice of using the name 'Madagascar'. This has quite serious ramifications for any causal theory of name use and, in particular, for a theory that claims that intending when one learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom one heard it is sufficient for one to acquire the correct use of a name.

The attack on necessity is more esoteric in nature. Certainly it seems that name-use is transmitted by means of this kind of intention, but it does not follow that this is the only means of causally inducing
the capacity of name-use. The standard view will have it that 'Napoleon' is the name of Napoleon because some token-utterance of that name figures in a causal chain that produces in people the ability to refer to Napoleon with 'Napoleon'. Yet that ability might well arise in a completely different fashion - it seems conceivable that I might acquire the use of the name 'Napoleon' to refer to Napoleon even though I do not intend when I learn it to use it with the same reference as whoever I heard it from. The point of this objection is that it is not the causal history of the acquisition of the ability to use the name that is relevant, but rather the matter of how the name is being used - if my use of 'Napoleon' truly refers to Napoleon then it matters not how I came to use it that way. What matters is the implicit criteria governing the naming relation - in virtue of what does my use of 'Napoleon', however I acquired this use, pick out Bonaparte? The confusion is between how a skill is acquired and what it is that is thus acquired - in this case the ability to refer to Napoleon with the name 'Napoleon'.

If these objections indeed cast light on the phenomenon of reference, we must concede that an adequate causal theory of names must satisfy the following. (1) It must endeavour to explain and certainly accommodate the phenomenon of referential shifts. (2) It must provide an account of how reference is effected not merely of how the ability to refer is acquired.

* Canfield gives suitably exotic examples ([1979] pp.75-6), such as Bill's acquiring the ability to use 'Fred' as a name for Fred by being pinched in the back. The outstanding question is, of course, 'In virtue of what would Bill's use of 'Fred' count as naming Fred?
§5.2 'CANONICAL' USAGE, BORROWING, AND REFERENTIAL SHIFTS

Suppose Ralph first uses 'Napoleon' as a result of having heard Pierre use it. What is the denotation of 'Napoleon' as Ralph uses it? The simple causal theorist will say: it is whatever the denotation of Pierre's use of 'Napoleon' - a simple case of deferring. Yet what might be suppressed are the following elements. Suppose Pierre learns the name from, say Quentin and (like Polo) uses the name incorrectly - i.e., to refer to someone whom he believes to be Napoleon but who is not in fact the referent of Quentin's use of 'Napoleon'. (It might be that this individual is, say, simply a fierce and slightly bellicose cat.) Suppose also that Ralph knows this. His initial use of Napoleon might be in the question "Who was Napoleon?", and Quentin might even be on hand to supply the answer: "Napoleon was the famous leader of France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries who tried to unify Europe and was defeated at Waterloo." In this case Ralph clearly wants to know, and is being told, about Bonaparte (not the cat) - the standard causal theorist's reply is incorrect.

This phenomenon arises in other cases: perhaps Pierre merely mentions the name (e.g. "Isn't 'Napoleon' a great name?") or advertises the fact that there is an appropriate NUP (e.g. "The Napoleonic Code of Laws should have been adopted in England."). There may even be a long chain of uses intervening between Quentin and Ralph. Ralph's question always reaches back to prior usage - e.g., to Quentin's usage. We shall

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7 One important sense in which this is wrong will be examined in §7.2 - the problem of referential intentions alluded to by the general version of Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction.

8 See Kroon [1983] p.285 for a primitive version of this argument.
say that Ralph's use of 'Napoleon' indirectly defers to Quentin's. Most causal theories fail to accommodate this phenomenon, and its major contribution is that it casts doubt upon where the referential buck actually stops.

Consider the following general case. For some name, 'N', we have an established NUP, $U_1$, of using 'N' to refer to $\alpha_1$, and a subsequent NUP, $U_2$, (initiated by a Polo-like character?) that splits off using 'N' to refer to $\alpha_2$ (not $\alpha_1$). Even if $U_1$ dies out, when Ralph comes along and asks the question "But who actually was N?" the response will depend on (i) identifying the relevant NUP addressed by Ralph's question and (ii) distinguishing $U_1$ and $U_2$. Uttered with the right intention, Ralph's question might well reach out to $U_1$, searching for the practice from which the name 'N' was originally borrowed. Ralph would be indirectly deferring to the prior use of 'N' to refer to $\alpha_1$ rather than $\alpha_2$ and be joining in $U_1$ rather than $U_2$.

This admittedly non-standard case illustrates the great confusion and difficulty in isolating the 'right kind' of referential intentions. Causal theorists suggest quite rightly that most name-use is a result of direct rather than indirect borrowing and so when we wish to identify the referent of 'N' as we use it, we seek that object that was picked out by the use of 'N' that started the practice in which we now take part. The simple case of this is where some form of stipulative baptism lies at the origin of the NUP, as in the schema:

* This is of particular relevance to the problems of true negative existentials - see below and §8.2 - and also motivates the espousal of some form of causal descriptivism to supplement any simple causal theory - see §8.1.
(1) Let us call (........) 'N'.

where (........) is to be replaced by some means of indicating the intended referent of 'N' in the context in which (1) is uttered.\(^{10}\) The more complex case is one where there is no baptism but rather an unwitting borrowing of a name from an extant NUP, the emphasis being on the fact that the initiator of the new practice fails to realise his/her departure from standard use. Such is the case with Polo and 'Madagascar'. Polo fails to realise that his use of 'Madagascar' is a departure from indigenous usage. If he did realise it, he would either be consciously re-using the name as the name of a new object or have chosen another name for the island (to avoid potential confusion).

Evans' final examination of the social phenomenon of naming made use of the language of producers and consumers. Producers are those who produce names - those who frequently have epistemic (recognition-based) access to the bearer of a name. Consumers are those who use the names produced by producers.\(^ {11}\) Broadly similar to the appeal to DLL at the end of chapter 4, the producers are (P-recognitional) experts in the use of the name, the consumers are those who defer to them. (This

\(^{10}\) Arguably the most common substituend for (........) would be some demonstrative expression ('Let's call that 'Peter'') or some description uniquely identifying the referent in the context ('Let's call our newborn child 'Cuthbert Algernon'). Certain stipulations of this kind have been taken as generating non-standard, descriptive names - see §6.3 - even though there seems no reason to define a semantic equivalence between 'N' and '(... ... )'.

\(^{11}\) Evans [1982] ch.11. Of course, you and I could now invent (i.e. start to produce) a new name for Napoleon which would not require us to have recognition-based access. We would have to 'borrow' our experts from the NUP for 'Napoleon'. Or we could quite deliberately start producing an empty name.
rescues those who believe properties to hold of the supposed bearers of empty names from irrationality, since they merely consume, ignorant of the absence of any genuine referent.) A referential shift occurs when someone intends to consume - to join in an existing NUP - but actually produces - by inaugurating a novel NUP. His production of the name can then initiate a new NUP if there are consumers of his use, i.e. speakers who defer to his use. In the 'Madagascar' case, the eventual consumers of Polo's misuse of the name survived, whereas the consumers of the indigenous NUP (to my knowledge) died out. Exactly the same may be said of the NUPs - Polo's survived, but the natives' died out.

The main point of referential shift cases is not so much the problems that misuse causes as the fact that baptism is simply unnecessary at the origin of an NUP. Although there will have been an interstitial phase where both practices of using 'Madagascar' survived, the practice of using 'Madagascar' to refer to that island can be clearly traced back to Polo and, therefore, does not involve baptism. What it introduces is the possibility of indirect reference borrowing if such a reference shift is known to have occurred ('I wonder where the real Madagascar was?'). It is axiomatic that baptism does, of course, feature at the origin of all conscious decisions to introduce a new (use of a) name, yet not all distinct NUPs originate with baptisms.  

12 When a referential shift of the 'Madagascar' type occurs, there must already be a practice of using the name, which may originate in a baptism or in another referential shift, and so forth. Somewhere, at the origin of these practices, occurs a baptism, the initial conscious intention to use the name thus and so without deference to existing practices. This hierarchy of practices allows that phonetic, lexical or linguistic changes may occur as the name shifts from one NUP to the
Given this result we may stipulate that:

the bearer of a name is that individual (if any) that is the referent of the original use of the name in a particular NUP.

This highlights an ambiguity in 'reference' which I believe names share with other SREs. A name refers to its bearer, but may fail to refer to anything with respect to a counterfactual situation in which its bearer does not exist. With respect to the possible world in which Kripke never existed, 'Kripke' fails to pick out anything, even though we use it, standardly, to refer to Kripke. Analogously a definite description refers to that item that is uniquely thus and so, but may fail to refer with respect to a counterfactual situation in which nothing is uniquely thus and so. In both cases the difference is between standardly referring to an item and successfully picking it out. Many seek to put the wrong emphasis on this ambiguity.13

For every practice of using a name there is (at most) a single bearer - if there are two or more practices of using the same name to refer to different items then, even though one may have been borrowed from another, they count as quite distinct NUPs. For example, in the 'Madagascar' case Polo develops a new NUP to refer to the island - we look to what he was referring to in order identify the referent of next, so that the name 'Madagascar' as used by Polo might have been borrowed from a practice of using a subtly different African name.

13 A particularly painful example is Robert Steinman's [1985] insistence on some significant difference between terms that rigidly designate their referents with respect to every possible world in which they exist, and those that rigidly designate their referents with respect to every possible world (including those in which they do not exist). Although this deals well with some bizarre anomalies in formal semantics, Steinman appears to overlook the trivial ambiguity.
'Madagascar' as we now use it. That there is a causal chain of properly deferential uses of 'N' and that item α stands in this privileged position makes α the bearer of 'N'. (A properly deferential name use is one where speaker A acquires the use of 'N' from speaker B by intending to use it with the same reference as B, from whom he heard it, and where there is no other overriding referential intention that causes him to refer to, or to use the name as a name of, something other than that reference - see below.) When we use a name (unless we are introducing it) there should be some item to which 'N' already standardly refers. It is this which the semantic reference rule

\[ R_N \] 'N' refers to N

applies - N is the bearer of 'N' (as I have defined it). Sometimes the bearer and original producers of the NUP are long-dead and so we are using the name 'blind'. Many object to this aspect of causal theories of naming. The fact that reference is preserved down causal chains when we are so far-removed from the bearer of a name strikes them as counter-intuitive, especially when annexed to the Millian idea that the information about the bearer of the name that gets passed along with its use could be completely inaccurate - applying neither to the bearer nor to anyone else.

The phenomenon of referential shift can be used in a wider range of situations than Evans indicates. It requires two conditions, roughly: (i) a speaker, A, who attempts to defer to prior usage of 'N', but

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14 Or to check that we are still using it correctly? One feature of Evans' example is that Madagascar as a geographical item has not ceased to be as do the referents of most names (i.e. people) so there remains the chance to become a P-recognitional expert for 'Madagascar'.
actually picks out something other than N; and (ii) a community of subsequent users who in fact defer to A's misuse of 'N'. The second condition hides the fact that deference might be a messy and awkward phenomenon - e.g. in the case where one unknowingly attempts to defer to more than one practice of using the name 'N'. We shall look at this in §5.3. The first condition hides a multiplicity of referential intentions that may lead one to misuse the name 'N'. Before our main discussion of these in chapter 7, we must look to how they might initiate new NUPs.

Consider the following example adapted from Donnellan. At a party the ubiquitous Ralph meets an individual who leads him to believe falsely that he is J.L.Aston-Martin, eminent philosopher, author of Other Bodies and leading exponent of egocentric pluralism. (In fact it is Pierre!) In a subsequent conversation he utters

(2) "Last night I met J.L.Aston-Martin and talked to him for almost an hour"

and the rest of the party is of sufficient interest to generate several more stories about what went on:

(3) "...and then Robinson tripped over Aston-Martin's feet and fell flat on his face."

Donnellan suggests, to my mind quite correctly, that in (2) 'Aston-

\[1972\] pp.370-372. In fact the case is much more useful with the assumption that this constitutes Ralph's learning of the name 'Aston-Martin' as a name for the philosopher and as a name for Pierre. With prior use of the name we would not expect Ralph to introduce successfully a new NUP, since his subsequent uses, not misled by the demonstrative misidentification of Pierre as 'Aston-Martin', would put him (and probably those who deferred to him rather than one particular mis-use of his) back on the right track - deferring to normal uses of the name.
Martin' refers to Aston-Martin whereas in (3) 'Aston-Martin' refers to the individual at the party, Pierre. In either case the same referential intentions are present, but they are weighted differently. For example, in (2) and (3) Ralph both intends to defer to the common practice of using 'Aston-Martin' and refer to the man commonly attributed with the authorship of "Other Bodies" and also intends to refer to the man who actually tripped up Robinson. In (2) the former intention is satisfied and overrides the latter (he wishes to identify the subject of his story to those in the audience who share in the practice of using 'Aston-Martin' to refer to the author of "Other Bodies"): in (3) the latter intention is satisfied and overrides the former (he intends to refer to the individual at the party even if it turns out that he is not the man commonly supposed to have written "Other Bodies"). Perhaps the difference lies in (2) supposedly serving to identify the referent for the audience (which it fails to do) whereas (3) serves to report what happened in an actual context.

The phenomenon is interesting primarily because it indicates how easily reference can be effected by unintentionally severing the connection between a SRE and its canonical referent. As long as the speaker believes all his referential intentions to be jointly satisfied (e.g. that the guy at the party satisfies the conditions for being the canonical referent of the SRE used), there is no inconsistency or irrationality in what he is doing. He simply mistakes his intended object of reference as satisfying a condition that it does not satisfy. In the 'Aston-Martin' case Ralph believes Pierre to satisfy the conditions for being the canonical referent of 'Aston-
Martin' (i.e. that he is the bearer of 'Aston-Martin' for the NUP in which Ralph takes part): in other of Donnellan's well-known examples, the condition is being the canonical referent of 'the man drinking gin over there' or of 'Smith's murderer' (i.e. being the unique person currently drinking gin over there or who murdered Smith).

In the case of Millian names this augurs well for the development of a new NUP. If the old users of 'Aston-Martin' died out, or became submerged beneath the "social presence" of those who used 'Aston-Martin' to defer to Ralph's use in (3) then there would develop a new NUP where the practice was to refer to Pierre by the name 'Aston-Martin'. Fortunately for us there are often simply mistakes. Since Ralph has not just acquired the use of the name, we would expect his story about Aston-Martin to be corrected and we would not expect it to generate a new 'Aston-Martin' NUP. Nonetheless it might. And in such a way that it yields a general explanation of referential shift.

(RS) For some name, 'N', we have an established NUP, U₁, of using 'N' to refer to α₁. A referential shift may occur when

(i) a speaker, S, learns 'N' as a name for an object α₂ (≠ α₁), falsely believing that α₂ satisfies the conditions for being the standard semantic referent of 'N', and

(ii) a subsequent NUP, U₂, of using 'N' to refer to α₂ is generated by a community of speakers deferring to S's use of 'N' to refer to α₂.

Because of the absence of descriptive canons of correct name-use, we could not say as with descriptions that referential use rather than attributive use is literally semantically wrong: we could not envisage generating a new practice of using the expression 'the man over there drinking martini' to refer to Pierre.
The reference of 'N' will have shifted from $\alpha_1$ to $\alpha_2$ if $U_1$ dies out, while $U_2$ does not.

The extent to which we must be careful about picking up the use of a name (as assumed trivial in (ii)) will be examined in §5.3.

RS (i) gives us a golden opportunity to account for a major problem in the philosophy of naming - how a name may lose its bearer! Imagine Ralph's tale to be of more heroic proportions. Instead of relating Pierre's bumbling around the party under an assumed identity, imagine Ralph gave vent to a flight of fancy about kings and princesses, dragons and demons. (If necessary, we may assume he sincerely believed it.) Then, just as in the party case, those acquiring the use of 'Aston-Martin' from Ralph would surely wish to refer to the hero who played such and such a role in the story - because they wished to use the name as Ralph was using it. Of course, it would not be necessary that they passed down that story as they passed on the use of the name, but they would certainly be inclined so to do. If this generated a referential shift, then the name 'Aston-Martin' could become empty-not by its referent ceasing to be, but rather by its reference shifting to whoever satisfied such and such a description (in this case no-one). It seems quite compelling to regard this as the basis of an adequate social characterization of the generation of myths (as opposed to explicit fictions), one which fortunately allows indirect reference-borrowing back to a previous NUP in order to say things like "Of course, there might have been a King Arthur, but he's not the one we

\[ \text{17 Consonant with Wittgenstein's comments that the destruction of their bearers fails to disturb the semantic features of names.} \]
talk about here" when the NUP under consideration lacks a bearer. The explanation thrives on the fact that the referential intention that overrides the intention to defer in RS(i) may be an intention to refer to the satisfier of a (de facto empty) description.

A fair criticism of this hypothesis is that referential shift is rather uncommon. Normally people get back to the 'right' NUP. This is because they make a mistake with a particular use of a name but subsequently resume using it correctly. Only when this confusion coincides with the (mis-)learning of a name or the practical impossibility of returning to the accepted NUP is there potential for RS. An example of the latter would be where Twin-Earth Doppelgängers, \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \), exchange places. No-one can tell there is a difference and gradually speakers will come to use 'N' as a name for \( \alpha_2 \) rather than \( \alpha_1 \) simply because many have close contact with and come to identify \( \alpha_2 \) as N rather than \( \alpha_1 \).

These problems should not conceal the importance of referential shifts. Generally, few causal theorists have paid attention to how a name is introduced - rather there has been an emphasis on how the use is passed from one user to the next. The point is not that there is a particular type of origin for a NUP (a baptism, borrowing or whatever) but rather that there is required an actual connection between the bearer of the name and the circumstances of the origin of the NUP. The name must be introduced as a name for its bearer (if it has one). I might introduce a name for an explicitly empty description, with a view to a reductio - "Let's call the greatest prime number 'Fermat'". I might introduce a name for an explicitly fictional character. I might
introduce a name for whoever uniquely did, does or will satisfy any predicate, even though there (necessarily) be no such item. As a name it will refer rigidly to whatever item is picked out by such occurrences as introduce its use, once it is understood that those occurrences are the ones relevant to its use. This can happen, in the case of referential shift, even when there is no explicit awareness of the initiation of a new practice but simply ignorance and error.

§5.3 'DEFERENTIAL' USAGE AND DIVIDED REFERENCE

Let us now turn to the problem of accounting for legitimate name acquisition. Once it is established that the name is used as a name for its bearer, we must move on to our more esoteric speculations about potential ways of passing on the use of that name.

The most obvious line to pursue is that I only acquire the use of 'N' as a name for $\alpha$ (rather than for anyone else) if either (i) I am introducing the name as a name for $\alpha$ or (ii) there is already a practice of using 'N' as a name for $\alpha$ in virtue of which my use of 'N' also refers to $\alpha$. If I genuinely want to question the necessity of properly deferential reference to name acquisition, I must consider a case where, say, I come to use 'Napoleon' as a name for Bonaparte without such explicit deferential intention. There are only a number of possible alternatives:

(C1) I simply elect to use 'Napoleon' as a name for Bonaparte, identifying Bonaparte as the intended referent of my use of 'Napoleon' in some other way (accidentally doing the same as others do);
(C2) An existing practice of using 'Napoleon' as a name for Bonaparte is deemed to cause me to do so, in which case either

(C2a) I have intentionally instituted a practice of using 'Napoleon' to refer to Bonaparte because of an existing one (though without consciously deferring to that practice), or

(C2b) I am taking up the standard use of 'Napoleon' without realising that it's current use (i.e. without realising there is a practice of using it as a name).

Although there are plainly fanciful variants on option (C2b), the fact is that either (as in (C1) cases) I am introducing a new practice of using 'Napoleon' or (as in (C2) cases) I am referring to Bonaparte by that name because of an existing practice of so doing, either initiating or taking part in an NUP. If bizarre causal stories might be told that identify my use of 'Napoleon' as a name for Bonaparte, there must be something in virtue of which my use of the name is a use as a name for that individual. In fact the 'causal link' admits of no more helpful an articulation than this: one's use of a name as a name for an item is caused by others using it in the same way. As a

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18 In practice we would be hard-pressed to account for a causal story not based on properly deferential reference. If someone suitably far-removed from the established NUP, a Martian say, suddenly developed the use of the name 'Napoleon' there would be difficulty in assessing that it was used as a name for Bonaparte without recourse to a large backdrop of information about Bonaparte that would accord ill with the Martian's ignorance of the established NUP. Deceit, rather than chance or some recondite causal link would seem the best explanation.
matter of course, name-acquisition is caused by intentional deference to the uses of others.

How straightforward is the phenomenon of deferring? Sometimes it seems perfectly so. You use a name to refer to someone, I take an interest in doing likewise and start to use the name intending to use it with the same reference as the person from whom I heard it. Yet in more complex but more likely social environments there may arise problems. Most of these stem from the fact that deferring is not a one-one relationship. It is quite likely that in the course of acquiring the use of a name (a prominent question concerns how long that might take) one will defer to more than one speaker. Problem: if speakers do not uniformly corefer, one can hardly be joining in any single NUP in attempting to defer to them all. Moreover: there must be room for an account of RS(ii) whereby a misuse generates a novel NUP by being unambiguously adopted by the linguistic community.

The latter of these problems is easily handled. Name-use subsequent to RS(i) may accidentally exclude any participants in the original NUP or consciously elect to ignore their use. (Had Polo's audience been concerned with indigenous use, rather than simply attaching a label to hitherto uncharted regions, his error might well have been corrected and made to conform to the earlier practice.)

The former of these problems emanates from the perfectly plausible principle that for two speakers to understand one another when they use the same name all that is necessary is that they know who they are referring to (even if only in the minimal sense of §4.4) and know that
they are referring to the same thing, and the fact that a principle of charity operates whereby two speakers normally assume they are talking about the same item when using the same name, 'N'. Only when suspicions arise is there any dispute about the reference of 'N'. Then more information about N is produced by the speakers until either (i) they are satisfied that their initial assumption of coreferentiality is justifiably true, or (ii) they decide that assumption was mistaken (in which case further adjustments to their use of 'N' may be made).

Although option (i) seems to indicate shared information about N, we should not take it as entailing the existence of a reference-determining sense for 'N'. First we know from Kripke's arguments that the information might fail to identify N; second, the information supporting coreferentiality produced by one speaker might be known to the other as a common misattribution to N - as long as the second speaker realises the first is in fact taking part in the same NUP (e.g. by making that same common misattribution) then the accuracy of the supposedly identifying information is irrelevant; third, the absence of any suitable information (as in the Maggie and Melvyn example) indicates a potential disagreement about reference but neither fails to arbitrate on the notion of co-referentiality nor entails incompetence in the use of the name. Hence their attempted articulation of the sense of the name for each of the speakers provides clearly defeasible evidence for the assumption that they have learnt and, indeed, use 'N' as a name for one and the same item.

The possibility of speakers being mistaken about coreference

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10 This is an elaboration of Carruthers' account [1983] p.27.
generates the following dilemma for name-acquisition: if a novice, Quentin, attempts to learn the name 'N' in a three-way conversation with experienced users, Ralph and Pierre, who unfortunately use it as a name for two different individuals, he will be put in an awkward situation. With the principle of charity in operation we may suppose that Quentin has the mistaken belief that Ralph and Pierre are in fact coreferring. Will Quentin acquire the use of 'N'? If so, will he use it as Ralph does or as Pierre does? Who will he refer to by it? Will it be ambiguous? Would the injection of several more participants each of whom used 'N' as a name for a different individual affect matters? Would the solution be a matter of there being a clear majority taking part in one NUP rather than another?

This is a gruesome tangle. Deferring is intending to use a name as another uses it. The causal paradigm thrives on the fact that one is introduced into a NUP by deferring to a particular use and then being surrounded by a community who use it in the same way. In this fashion we have an idealised image of the NUP forming a simple tree-like network. What I suspect goes on is something like this: not only does one defer in the sense of using the name intending to use it with the same reference as those from whom one first heard it (i.e. from whom one learnt it), but also one defers in the sense of using it as those around one use it. If there were actually two NUPs for a name that were mingled, widespread and such that their bearers were lost to us, we could quite readily conclude that the name lacks a unique bearer. Only if there is a clear causal link back to a single item is there a well-defined bearer for a combination of name and NUP.
This lacuna has been thought to turn on the insufficiency of the information that is transmitted in a mere causal handing-down of a name to ground correct use. In particular cases of name-learning there has been suggested a related problem revolving around famous names. Is it easier to learn the use of a name, to start referring and having thoughts about the referent if the name is a 'famous' name? Is it that in the case of a 'famous' name there is a large stock of information which permits one to have thoughts about the name's referent whereas in the case of other names the causal link is insufficient to get a thought about N 'off the ground'? I cannot agree with this - the fame or otherwise of the supposed bearer of the name should have little to do with how easy it is to learn to use it (save trivially that one is (i) more likely to encounter uses of the name and (ii) less likely to run into other NUPs for it). But the point is supposed to be that it is this kind of information that licenses having the right kind of referential intention (i.e. an intention to refer to N), and that this is denied us without the relevant information.

A misleading example is presented by Kripke where

...a teacher tells his class that Newton was famous for being the first man to think there's a force pulling things to earth; ...we may suppose that just being told ...[this] gives the students a false belief about Newton, even though they have never heard of him before. If, on the other hand, the teacher uses the name 'George Smith' - a man by that name is actually his next door neighbour - and says that George Smith first squared the circle, does it follow from this that the students have a false belief about the teacher's neighbour? The teacher doesn't tell them that Smith is his neighbour, nor does he believe Smith first squared the circle. He isn't particularly trying to get any belief about the neighbour into the students' heads. He tries to inculcate the belief that there was a man who squared the circle, but not a belief about any particular man - he just pulls out the first name that occurs to him - as it happens, he uses his neighbour's name.
It doesn't seem clear in this case that the students have a false belief about the neighbour, even though there is a causal chain going back to the neighbour.\(^{20}\)

The patent irrelevancy of 'fame' notwithstanding, isn't that a strange thing for the teacher to do? Not to try to con his students into believing someone has squared the circle, I mean, but to use a name for this man without intending to put across the idea that the name's bearer did so? I find it very strange. But assuming that this is a correct description of the teacher's intentions and performance, we could easily replace the occurrence of 'George Smith' with any other name - even a 'famous' one - without substantially modifying the example. The students will not form a belief about George Smith because the teacher's assertion is, contrary to appearances, not a statement about George Smith. The students would not be picking up the ability to use 'George Smith' intending to use it as the teacher normally used it. (All this would naturally fit very awkwardly with any subsequent use of the name by the teacher - "Tell us, sir, what else did George Smith do? Do you know him?") On the contrary, they will succeed in using 'Newton' correctly, not because it is a 'famous' name but because in the example the teacher intends to use it standardly, i.e. as a name for Newton.

Introducing fame, Kripke annexes the following:

Further, the George Smith case casts some doubt as to the sufficiency of the conditions [of intending to use a name]... Even if the teacher does refer to his neighbour [N.B. the change of hypothesis. D.F.], is it clear that he has passed on his reference to the pupils? Why shouldn't their belief be about any other man named 'George Smith'? If he says that Newton was hit by an apple, somehow his task of transmitting a

which completely alters the picture. It heaps the burden of successful transmission of reference on the fact that Newton's exploits, even if misattributions, are more well-known and that the name does not have many bearers. This seems lamentably off-target.

It is doubtless true that we are more likely to be accurate in our use of a name that has but one bearer. If there is only one NUP for the name, there will be less chance of confusion or ambiguity. This would likely be the case if I acquired the use of 'Sebastian Ebeneezer Gigglesthwaite' rather than 'Smith', but would have no bearing on my competence in the use of the name since exactly the same story of my acquisition of the name could be told replacing one name with the other. We are also more likely to be accurate in our use of the name if we use a famous name, since our audience will correctly interpret our use of 'N' as being about the famous N. Both these points hinge on the charitable assumption of coreferentiality mentioned above. One learns a name, intending when one learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it. One also intends to use it subsequently with the same reference as those who use it around one. Often one simply assumes one is so doing (the charitable assumption) and in cases where the name is uncommon or famous one's assumption is more likely to be accurate. But the fame or rarity of the name is not what confers competence in its use: rather, one is successful in using the name as a name for such and such an individual because one's

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21 ibid. p.97.
charitable assumption is correct, and because one is, in fact, taking part in a particular NUP.

When I simply overhear a name, 'N', that is new to me, I start to use it perfectly competently. I need not know about the bearer of the name, save that he is the referent of the token-use which I overheard. (If I overhear lots of facts about the purported referent of the name, I become no more competent since I am still deferring to the same source!) To reiterate Harrison's analysis, described in §3.3, there is some R-identification of the referent of the name as I use it such that my use of the name can only refer to the satisfier of that description. As I use it subsequently and encounter others who use that name I intend to use it as I first used it, and only if my charitable assumption of coreferentiality goes astray does my use become confused. Normally causal theorists have looked on this as a first-come, first-served theory, my initial encounter with the name providing an immutable paradigm of how I use the name and from the perspective of which subsequent deviations count as misuses. But it is surely more proper to look on name-use as permitting slippage between one NUP and another. The referent of 'N' as one uses it may vary with the intentions of those surrounding one, from one discourse to the next. If Quentin learns the use of 'N' from Ralph, who uses it as a name for α₁, but then goes out into a community where the name is used as a name for α₂, he will likely come to use it as a name for α₂ instead - he would not be wrong to do this, but simply consistent with

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22 Subsequent information will enable me to produce answers to questions such as "Which N are you talking about?" that work according to the picture described in §8.1.

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the NUP in the society in which he finds himself. If this slippage from one NUP is unnoticed, it coincides with a move from one grounding R-identification to another for Quentin's use of 'N'. If it is noticed (i.e. Quentin is aware of becoming immersed in a distinct NUP for 'N') there is no such problem, for names with multiple bearers are a linguistic hazard we deal with frequently.23

Famous names minimise the possibility of error, but do not indicate any disambiguating information in possession of which we need to be for competent use. The existence of the right kind of intention is sufficient to be using 'N' correctly, and to be having a thought about N. In fact it is easy to have a thought about N when one hears the name mentioned just once or twice (i.e. in a context where one is sure that all the occurrences co-refer). The problems arise when one has a whole range of deferential intentions that cannot jointly be satisfied and where a decision has to be made about (i) who the referent of your use of 'N' is and (ii) who the referent of 'N' tout court is. The causal theory attemptst supply standards for this, but has to appeal to some diverse and potentially unreliable intuitions.24

The failure of causal theories to convince stems from the fact that 'learning the use of a name' is a somewhat misleading notion. It implies acquisition of some skill or knowledge and a fixed norm for name-use, whereas it is plain that name-use is flexible because of the

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23 My three friends called 'Michael Smith' augur well for potential ambiguity not incompetence.

24 To see how shaky these are, one can compare the clash between Strawson's and Kripke's views ([1972] pp.92f) or Devitt's ideas on divided reference ([1981]).
Millian nature of names. NUPs may spring up, becoming hopelessly confused, undergoing referential shifts, and dying out, without the users of the name quite realising what is transpiring. What we may glean from the causal theory advanced here are the following tenets:

(T1) The canonical referent of a name is its bearer. The function of a name, rather than a token-use thereof, as used by a particular community of speakers is to introduce its bearer.

(T2) The standard referent of a token-use of a name is determined by the intentions of the producer of that token-utterance, chief among which will be the intention to defer to and be consistent with previous uses of the name. These deferential intentions may nonetheless be either impossible to jointly satisfy or overridden by other referential intentions.

(T3) Names admit of much more variety in their use since they do not semantically encode information and, hence, it is easy to believe falsely of an individual that it satisfies the conditions to be the canonical referent of the name.

(T4) A NUP is a pattern of behaviour comprising the uttering of a name in contexts and to audiences. Some practitioners will come into contact with the bearer of the name, others will simply defer and thus acquire the means to perpetuate the NUP. (Once one has acquired the use of a name, there seems no reason that 'distant' objects should be any more problematic than 'nearby' ones.)

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25 Names are standardly used in the absence of their bearers, an absence that we happily admit can go on for centuries and span arbitrarily large distances.
CHAPTER 6:

WHAT'S IN A NAME?

For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game - any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name, except in the language-game.

Ludwig Wittgenstein.
CHAPTER 6:
WHAT'S IN A NAME?

At this point the reader stands armed with two extensively defended theses about names: the first is a semantic thesis - the sole semantic function of a name is to stand for its referent without encoding or indicating any property that the referent may have; the second a causal thesis - that the canonical referent of a name is its bearer, i.e. that item determined by a causally defined name-using practice (NUP). Attending to four specific categories of SRE, we now proceed to answer the question "What is it for an expression to be a name?", by looking for their use rather than their meaning.

§6.1 LOGICALLY PROPER NAMES

Dissatisfied with ordinary denoting expressions, Russell posited the existence of logically proper names. These are paradigmatically GSTs:

if one thing has two [logically proper] names, you make exactly the same assertion whichever of the two names you use, provided they are really names and not truncated descriptions.\(^2\)

Construed as a semantic paradox, Frege's problem of information values would simply not occur for logically proper names.

What led Russell to this conclusion was a quite proper respect for the notion of having thoughts about nothing. Russell would have it that a sentence containing a term (a GST) that simply introduces its

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\(^2\) Russell [1918] p.245.
referent would be 'nonsense' in the absence of a referent. Since sentences containing descriptions plainly are not nonsensical even in the absence of a satisfier, descriptions are not GSTs. Neither are ordinary names GSTs - equally well we may be misled about the existence of their referents. They must function in some way similar to Russellized descriptions - ordinary names must contribute some hidden predication and quantification to sentences containing them so that they express the same proposition even in the absence of a referent. Similar considerations led Russell to dismiss many expressions that we should normally consider to be GSTs as disguised quantifications.

Russell's characterization of the thoughts expressed by these sentences is understandably internal, relying in general not on the way the external world is, but rather on an inner grasp of the intelligibility of the sentence. This standard is not met when we use referring expressions where some form of acquaintance with and the existence of their putative referents supervene on understanding - in that case there is no thought without reference. The sense-data of immediate perceptual experience form the limited class of referents of logically proper names that Russell first considered. He has, one supposes, a fairly good epistemic argument for foisting upon us the notion of acquaintance with these simples. Rather more dubious is the idea that we must have 'names' for them - although we are required to

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3 Hintikka ([1981] p.181) claims, rather unfairly, that "it is clear that Russell felt the advantage of the elimination of apparently denoting phrases in favour of quantifiers was that the latter carry no ontological commitment," and concludes that Russell was not working with a fully-fledged conception of quantification.
keep track of them, their immediacy would seem not to require linguistic labels. A broader discussion might take both of these to task - we merely wish to investigate the semantic function of logically proper names.

Logically proper names are thin on the ground, and consequently there is little to investigate. Russell's models were the 'reusable' demonstratives, 'this' and 'that', constrained by a highly implausible 'specious present', and used of sense-data of immediate experience. These expressions were plainly (to Russell at any rate) not disguised descriptions and plainly could not fail to refer: hence he identified their meaning with their reference. This should not mislead us.* Ordinary names are on Russell's view entirely dissimilar to logically proper names and hence, "there is no trusting our untutored intuitions about naming as a guide to what features Russell took to define this function." Even if logically proper names exhibit the non-connotative nature of ordinary proper names, their semantic nature need not be taken as paradigmatic of that of ordinary names. There seems little reason to insist that an ordinary name must have a bearer (as we shall see below) and hence little reason to insist that the meaning of a name

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* 'This' and 'that' arguably fare badly by Russell's very own standards; a logically proper name should have no more function than to refer, but 'this' and 'that' are clearly used to individuate items that are indicated by distinct acts of ostension - a function of 'this' is to contrast with 'that'. Certainly we might criticise Russell with respect to the following: (i) an equally plain intuition disregarding the specious present is that the meaning of 'this' and 'that' remain constant but their referent does not; (ii) the sense-data are denoted differently by expressions than are putatively concrete items (tables, chairs, etc.); (iii) people rarely, if ever, refer to sense-data.

* Sainsbury [1979] p.57, my emphasis.
is its bearer. Empty or not, all names are semantically on a par with regard to reference-fixing.

§6.2 BOGUS NAMES

What is it about the sentences

(1) The fiddler on the roof loves spaghetti
and
(2) William loves spaghetti

that makes you think 'William' is a name, but 'the fiddler on the roof' is not? Their semantic structure? Possibly. Rather more likely you are more familiar with 'William' being used as a name than 'The fiddler on the roof'. If I spun a story about having baptised my pet cat 'The fiddler on the roof' you might think differently, given generous assumptions about feline diets. Expressions that are grammatically descriptions often function as names, especially in the cases of ships and racehorses. In fact we undeniably have clues from grammatical structure and the way we hear expressions being used that they are or are not names. Lycan cites examples like

(3) Flork loves Glork

in contrast with (2).* He observes that one is inclined to accept 'William' as a name because of its familiar function, whereas so unlikely a lexical string as 'Glork' is more likely to be dismissed as gibberish - a nonsense expression.

The force of the last comment should not be misconstrued. In the face of our semantic thesis about names, (3) is gibberish not because it lacks a meaning, but rather because there is no established practice

of using 'Flork' or 'Glork' as names. If there were then there would, perforce, be a truth-condition associated with many sentences containing them (such as (3)) on the charitable assumption that, as used, they had bearers.

All this indicates a rather special fact that many philosophers of naming have neglected. To be a name is to be used as a name. It is not to stand in a particular causal link to an item, as staunch historico-causalists have maintained, but rather to be used as a name for that item. Even when the bearer of the name is far-removed the important feature of the name (as a linguistic entity) is that its use is determined in a name-like way; that, for example, it has the stable character associated with names. There is a particular and unique language-game that we play with certain expressions - for want of a better label we might call this the game of the name.\(^7\)

To use an expression as a name requires (i) that it is being used in accordance with the general semantic principles for names and (ii) that it confers on sentences in which it occurs the standard semantic properties one would expect of such sentences. It is a corollary of this behaviour that (i) the name is Millian (and rigid) and (ii) there exists some causal chain of events tying contemporary use of the name to its bearer. Moreover, the game of the name, just like the game played with any other parts of language, is best evaluated by the intentions of the user of the name when using it - thereby demonstrating the understanding of the associated semantic criteria of its use.

\(^7\) With apologies to Greg McCulloch for the use of his pun.
We should note that the semantic characteristics of names are had de jure not de facto, and, hence, that a name will have these properties independently of what (kind of thing) it is used as a name of (whence the error in relying on a class of logically proper names demarcated by epistemic measures as paradigmatic of genuine names). The picture is not, for example, as follows: a name is not a name unless it is a name of something. To claim this is to ignore the more plausible picture: to be a name is to be used as a name. If we discover a name to be empty, we do not say "That is not a name." Rather we say "There is no such person" or such like, because its use identifies the lexical unit as a name.

§6.3 DESCRIPTIVE NAMES

Gareth Evans offers us yet another class of SREs. Descriptive names are SREs explicitly introduced by means of definite descriptions. Evans seeks to assimilate these to the category of ordinary non-descriptive names. I believe his argument is flawed and rests on an unfortunate misjudgment of actual linguistic practice.

In his discussion of semantic theory Evans strikes upon the example of using 'Julius' as a descriptive name:

Obvious clauses suitable for Russellian singular terms, like
(1) The referent of 'Aphla' = Aphla, use the relation of reference in the most direct possible way, so that we are assured not only that 'Aphla' is a referring expression, but also that 'Aphla' refers to Aphla. But it is equally true that a clause of a different kind, like
(2) (x)(The referent of 'Julius' = x iff x uniquely invented the zip)

* Evans [1979] and [1982].

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...uses only the relation of reference to state the semantic contribution to sentences of the expression 'Julius'. From (2),... taken together with the normal satisfaction clauses for atomic concept-expressions, and principle (P), we shall be able to derive truth-conditions for sentences containing 'Julius' of the form

(4) 'Julius is F' is true iff the inventor of the zip is F;

...Consequently... if there is a unique inventor of the zip, then 'Julius' refers to that person, and in exactly the same way in which a Russellian name refers to its bearer.®

The principle (P) simply states the intuitive principle connecting reference with truth:

(P) If S is an atomic sentence in which the n-place concept-expression R is combined with n singular terms t₁,...,tₙ, then S is true iff <the referent of t₁,... the referent of tₙ> satisfies R.¹⁰

'Singular terms' are here what I have called GSTs. Evans also relies on the plausible premise that two terms belong to the same semantic category (e.g. they are both names) iff the same semantic relation (e.g. the relation of direct reference and nothing more) is invoked in assessing their semantic contribution to the sentences in which they appear. What I would take to task is the claim that 'Julius' and 'the inventor of the zip' actually function in this way, and in particular that 'Julius' refers to the actual inventor of the zip in exactly the same way in which a Russellian name refers to its bearer.

Evans is, of course, well aware of the non-equivalence of names and descriptions in the face of scope considerations with respect to modal and temporal operators. In fact he follows the cited passage with an account of how this non-equivalence is described. He adds that

¹⁰ ibid. p.49.
descriptions may be treated as GSTs if one relativizes the reference relation in an appropriate fashion - this is most plausibly done by merely indexing the referent of a definite description to one possible world, time, place and so forth so as to anchor reference and account for different scope readings. But Evans rejects this ploy in favour of the more simple account of definite descriptions; treat them as quantifier expressions, perhaps without 'butchering surface structure' as Russell did, so that they do not function as GSTs (i.e. their semantic contribution cannot be analyzed by (P)) and the difference between names and descriptions is preserved.

Similar considerations prompt him to assimilate descriptive names to the same semantic category as names. Mere semantic economy in itself seems no better justification for grouping descriptive names with proper names rather than descriptions. On scrutinizing the relation between descriptive name and description there seems at least one interpretation where it is not even intelligible to suppose that 'Julius' functions as a name. This interprets the stipulative definition

(4) Let us call the inventor of the zip 'Julius'

as simply introducing 'Julius' as an abbreviation for 'the inventor of the zip', supporting the truth of

If an expression is relativized in this fashion, there will be no variation in truth-value whether the expression falls within or without the scope of quantifications of worlds, times, places ..and so forth.

ibid. p.57.

See McCulloch [1985] for critical comment on Evans' rationale here. I address more fundamental discrepancies than does he.
(5) If you had invented the zip, you would be Julius.
Fortunately Evans maintains that (5) is false even though replacing the occurrence of 'Julius' in (5) by 'the inventor of the zip' generates a truth and, hence, denies the straightforward 'abbreviatory' equivalence of name and description.

What leads Evans, quite reasonably, to regard 'Julius' as a genuine name is that 'Julius' refers rigidly to whoever actually invented the zip with respect to all possible worlds in which he exists (if there are any) including the uncountably many in which he did not invent the zip. This, he claims, flows intuitively from our stipulative definition (4). Thus it is a metaphysical possibility that

(6) Julius might not have invented the zip
(i.e. in some possible situation he did not). I agree. However, what persuades me that Evans is mistaken is the distinct epistemic possibility

(7) Julius might not be the inventor of the zip
(i.e. it might turn out that Julius did not invent the zip after all). Given the way the name is introduced - by the stipulation (4) rather than a more conventional baptismal process - it is clear that (7) must be false. But whether all speakers deemed competent in the use of 'Julius' need realise the falsity of (7) is doubtful.

Let us put the point this way. 'Julius' is introduced as a rigid designator. Additionally 'Julius' is introduced as a name for the actual inventor of the zip (the description being interpreted rigidly, i.e. in such a way as to protect from scope ambiguities with respect to modal sentence operators). (4) fixes the reference of the name. But
is this so unlike standard baptism? Is it unlike "Let's call the newborn child of Mr and Mrs Jones 'Julius'" or "Let's call our first child 'Julius'?" If so, how? The occurrence of 't' in the stipulation-schema

(8) Let us call t 'N'
is arguably transparent - if true "we decided to call t 'N'" is on at least one natural reading equivalent to "we decided to call s 'N'" if s=t. Yet even if the transparency claim is surrendered, we are at least left with the intuitions that (i) standard cases of name introduction allow formulation along the lines of (8) and (ii) it is not necessary to know which term was used as 't' (or which way of picking out N was used) in order to use 'N' successfully and correctly. For example, if unknown to us a certain couple introduced a NUP with a stipulative definition "Let's call the noisy little so-and-so in our cradle 'Neil'", we are in no way incompetent in the use of 'Neil Kinnock' years later for not knowing of the content of this stipulation.24

Perhaps there are features of the Julius case that make it exceptional. The occurrence of 'the inventor of the zip' in (4) is attributive - the speaker intends to refer solely to whoever invented the zip and there are no additional overriding intentional factors.25 But this meagre intentional 'recipe' in no way entails that the

24 To make this similar to the case of Julius we might insist that the speaker had but this one way to identify Neil, that the description in question is uniquely identifying and that little Neil was not present at this 'baptismal' act.

25 The ramifications of such a simple picture of referential intentions are considered in chapter 7.
defining description need be passed on to each and every competent user of the name. As we have noted in §6.2, the hallmark of a name is not some particular surface structure but rather that it is used as such. A Millian name, 'N', is used canonically with the intention of referring to its bearer (i.e. N). An intention to refer to 'the F' (even though that be a rigidified description) is not part of an account of standard name use - it is a best a contingent feature of a particular token-use of a name. Even when there is community-wide association between name and description (as is the case with 'Homer' and 'the author of the Odyssey') we take the association to represent a datum contingently inherited from earlier users of the name. To assume more (as Evans insists of 'Julius') seems to require us to deny it functions as a name.

I am grateful for the clear perspective on this matter provided by Michael Woods' steadfast insistence in conversation that this line of reasoning is erroneous. He maintained that after a stipulative definition of 'Julius' such as (4), the use of the expression cannot be successfully handed on to another unless he knows that it refers to the actual inventor of the zip. The error is plain; either this knowledge condition (KC) is necessary but 'Julius' is not a name or else (KC) is not necessary and Julius does function as a name. Evans presumes to be conforming to common sense

[i]n saying that the thought expressed by 'Julius is F' may equivalently be expressed by 'The inventor of the zip is F'... Someone who accepts and understands the one sentence as true gets himself into exactly the same belief state as someone who accepts the other. Belief states are distinguished by the evidence which gives rise to them, and the expectations, behaviour and further beliefs which may be derived from them (in conjunction with other beliefs); and in
all these respects, the belief states associated with the two sentences are indistinguishable. We do not produce new thoughts (new beliefs) simply by a 'stroke of the pen' (in Grice's phrase) - simply by introducing a name into the language.14

Though we do not introduce new thoughts into our own heads with the stroke of a pen - that is, if we ourselves pronounce (4) - the general significance of these remarks is lost to me. The belief states associated with these sentences for a new user of 'Julius' would standardly diverge as he considered distinct possible worlds. Evans' insistence on this point indicates that he reads 'Julius' as "being associated with a clear descriptive criterion"17 for something being its referent. That is the hallmark of something behaving as a description. Although he feels the scope ambiguities are notably absent,18 and 'Julius' seems to satisfy the scope condition for being a name, it simply abbreviates a description that is suitably relativized.19 We can indicate this relativization with respect to all scope shifting sentence operators by the insertion of the word 'actual'.20

I suspect the argument should not focus on the satisfaction of (KC), which depends on a number of vague details that, to my mind,

17 ibid. p.61.
18 See (5) above. Also Evans' 'Deep Throat' examples on pp.60-61.
19 If the stroke of a pen is simply abbreviation, then (KC) must hold, since questions like "Do you know what 'Julius' stands for?" would have some purchase.
20 Comparisons with the quasi-demonstrative 'That inventor of the zip' are suggested. This functions exactly as Evans would have 'Julius' function, yet we would not be inclined to treat this as a name.
Evans fails to articulate, but rather on the claim that (KC) is inconsistent with 'Julius' being a name. As the epistemic argument of §3.3 shows, being a rigid designator is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a name, and the seeming semantic equivalence between 'Julius' and the rigid designator 'the actual inventor of the zip' entailed by (KC) bodes ill for its Millian status.

This prejudice in no way militates against the existence of descriptive names. I suspect that there are more descriptive names in our linguistic ancestry than Evans suspects - certainly there seems to be no intuitive reason to dismiss the idea of descriptive stipulation lying at the terminus of an extant NUP. A descriptive name may devolve into a proper name quite naturally - that is, it can come to be used as a name. The first stage would be where those learning the use of the expression realise that it is a descriptive name, but fail to grasp the description fixing it - as though deferring to the knowledge of the initiators of the practice. 21 A subsequent stage would be where no-one at all in the community realises the descriptive significance of the expression. At this stage there seems nothing to choose between the descriptive name and a perfectly standard name. Contra Evans, intuitions favour the idea that it is still being used correctly, though the assessment of such a claim is virtually irrelevant - we simply don't have a hard and fast enough set of 'rules' for descriptive names to be able to arbitrate on such matters.

21 Again redolent of Putnam's division of linguistic labour, it seems to be the case with contemporary use of 'Jack the Ripper' that neither I nor most readers of this work will know the individuating description fixing the referent of the 'name' yet we will all be happy in using it (deferring to authorities on the 'Ripper' murders).
I am inclined to believe the introduction of 'Julius' seems perfectly coherent as a means for generating a legitimate NUP. For example, we could think of schoolboys deciding to victimise whoever first falls for a certain practical joke with an unpleasant nickname—subsequent use of that nickname would certainly not require knowledge of how it was conferred! (Doubtless the victim would prefer it to remain that way.) Such a name would intuitively function as a proper name. Particularly interesting is the forward-looking aspect of this example. The name may be planned in advance of the relevant 'baptismal' event and the referent may never come to be. We frequently encounter similar usage - e.g. in naming predicted hurricanes. (this is of interest in the context of arguments forthcoming in §§6.4,8.2.) Backward-looking examples along the lines of 'Jack the Ripper' or 'Deutero-Isaiah' are more common. Again it would seem perfectly proper to maintain that later generations of name-users could use these without knowing their associated descriptions. The only extent to which we would be ignorant would relate to answers to the question "Why did they call him that?".

The main problem with descriptive names seems to be not their peculiar semantic make-up, but rather the fact that the description with which they are stipulated to corefer may often be empty. Evans is concerned that they manifestly have sense without reference, which disturbs the view that they are GSTs and generate what he calls Russellian thoughts - i.e. thoughts of such a kind that they simply

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22 The latter being used to denote whoever wrote the second biblical book of Isaiah. It should be noted that these examples are ones where the reference-fixing description is known to most users.
could not exist in the absence of the objects or objects which they are about. This returns us to more general existential problems and the discussion of Evans' negative thesis.\textsuperscript{23}

§6.4 EMPTY NAMES

The picture of names painted above provides some uneasy moments. Not the least of these is the semantic characterization of a name serving solely to introduce its referent into the proposition expressed by token-utterances of sentences in which it occurs, the tension here being with the natural enough claim that some names may turn out not to refer - they may lack a semantic referent. What title do they have to be considered names? One face-saving move involves the judicious insertion of the parenthesis 'if it has one' in our semantic theory; some will prefer a more brutal approach such as insisting that all names that are empty refer to some null-entity. On either view the problem is frequently seen to hinge on the facts (F1) that we may be using sentences that fail to express a thought because they fail to express a proposition and thus the notions of truth and falsity are not applicable to them and (F2) that we are hence committed to thinking and

\textsuperscript{23} Compare §4.4. Evans' original interest [1979] was, of course, with constructing contingent a priori truths. Judging 'Julius invented the zip' to be knowable a priori (since a competent speaker would grasp the sense of 'Julius') yet contingent (since it merely abbreviates a rigidified description and hence supports the truth of (6)) seems to be playing fast and loose with our modal intuitions. David Bostock ([1988] esp. pp.366-370) considers this plainly inconsistent practice and adduces doubts about the intuitive correctness of judging necessary (on a somewhat more stringent definition than 'true in all possible worlds') the true identity between true coreferential descriptive names, since its truth hinges on the contingent co-satisfaction of two descriptions in @. Compare chapter 3, footnote 18, p.77 above.
uttering the absurd or meaningless. This line of reasoning will be seen to turn on a mere terminological confusion.

The worry that prompted Russell's descriptionist analysis of most referring expressions fuels this - it seems to impugn our rationality to say that we often falsely believe we entertain singular propositions. It is so much safer to rely on Russell's homogenous account of the content of (seemingly) singular thought.

In driving Russellianism 'out of the closet' and extending the range of application from sense-data to ordinary material objects we seem obliged to assess Russell's Principle. There is one sense in which RP is certainly and incontrovertibly true: to have a thought about something (i.e. an object in the external world) that thing must exist. No more need be said. But in what way will this disrupt one's thought simpliciter? Imagine that we discover that, after all, Ronald Reagan has never existed. Surely we could not conclude that Melvyn and Maggie (§2.2) have not had thoughts? Not thoughts about Reagan perhaps, but no thoughts at all?

The point here is that the "narrow" psychological component of thought simply might not vary - as with Ralph and Ralph* - as we contemplate alternative externalities. What will change is, of course, the proposition expressed by the sentences purportedly representing our thought and the truth thereof. In the case of empty names there is no-one who can be having a thought about the referent of the empty name because there is no such item. 24 Is this truly problematic?

24 That fact that there might be an environment lacking the actual bearer for the name would be irrelevant to assessing our use - to think otherwise is to confuse the two senses of 'refer' mentioned in §5.2-
Certainly it is problematic for the analysis given in Chapter 4. And thus we must concede that on that interpretation there can be no thought without a referent. However, alternative interpretations are available. The ambiguity inherent in thought-ascriptions allows us three viable analyses of 'S believes that p': (Ω1) sensitive only to the truth-conditional or propositional content of p; (Ω2) sensitive only to the conceptual role or phenomenological character of the epistemic perspective S attaches to p; or (Ω3) sensitive to both. (There are clearly many subspecies of (Ω2).) The account given in chapter 4 is Ω3-type.

Consider an analogy with perceptual delusion. If we naively consider Ralph and Ralph* to have qualitatively identical perceptual experiences then as far as they are concerned they are seeing the same thing even though one of them might be having a visual experience of something while his Doppelgänger was having a visual experience of something else or nothing at all. Suppose a name as used in a certain NUP turns out to be empty. All speakers who attempt to use it in sentences that supposedly express a thought are not having thoughts about anything at all. They stand in the relation to those having genuine thoughts as those having delusions or hallucinations stand in to those having veridical perceptions. The analogy is weak in one respect: those percipients having delusions are often deemed inferior to their peers. In the case of thought this is not the case precisely because in the case of the 'deluded' thinker there is no actual norm

but of course we can consider the qualitatively identical "narrow" psychological state of Ralph in a possible world where the practice of using 'Hercules', say, actually does have a bearer.
for having thoughts about N, only a general paradigm for thinking about
the referent of the name - there is no such activity as thinking about
N in which our 'deluded' thinker falsely believes himself to be
engaging!

Some might feel this point of disanalogy sufficient to render the
appeal to perception worthless. In one sense they would be correct.
There simply is no account of this type of thought in terms of
understandable mistake when there is no normative account with which to
compare that error. The positive aspect of the analogy is: we may
simply maintain that having a thought about something need not impinge
on our canons of correctness for having a thought simpliciter. The
naive justification for this is, as we have already seen, that having a
thought about the referent of a name 'N' (i.e. having a thought about
N) consists in thinking that such and such is true of N. This accounts
for thought about the referents of all sorts of names (famous,
familiar, unusual, unfamiliar). It is part of the game of the name
that we tacitly assume the name to have a referent - since more often
than not it is the name's bearer to which we wish to refer and that
item may be far-removed from us - and so it can also be played with
empty names. Moreover, we can see that whilst such assumptions are
held, the mental correlate of the sentence will play one and the same
conceptual role in our inner reasoning independently of whether or not
it has a truth-condition.

This accords ill with Evans' speculations about discriminating
knowledge of the referent of the names in the use of which we are
competent. Yet the appeal to some form of causal theory must be what
grounds having the right kind of thoughts. The discriminatory knowledge of the name's referent cannot be based on acquaintance, given the huge stock of names whose supposed bearers are no longer candidates for acquaintance. A name might have a particularly rich store of the right kind of associations for discriminatory knowledge even though it is empty.

The simplest solution is surely that we are having thoughts about N iff (i) we intend to think about N (or simply intend to refer to N by using 'N'), (ii) that these intentions are not overridden by other referential intentions, and (iii) our assumption that 'N' actually refers is correct. This third condition will be met, I suggest, precisely when 'N' as I use it has a bearer, e.g. if I am unambiguously deferring to speakers using it in a NUP where it has a bearer. As far as I am concerned I meet conditions (i) and (ii) when I use a name standardly, but the additional satisfaction of condition (iii) is more or less out of my hands. If I overhear a conversation about 'N', identify 'N' as a name, and so forth, when surely the subsequent question in foro interno represented outwardly as "I wonder whether N is F?" is a question about N precisely when, in the NUP which I have joined, 'N' has a bearer. I am having a thought about N if that particular fragment of language relates to the world as I suppose it to. I can even have the grossly inaccurate thoughts Evans would wish to condemn (such as wondering if N was a particularly severe earthquake when 'N' is the name of a person, such as 'Aristotle') about the right

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25 If, contrary to my beliefs, I am attempting to defer to distinct NUPs (as did Quentin in §5.3) the name is ambiguous. Again I will not be having a thought about anything.
entity as long as the name actually does have a bearer, for I may simply reply on being told of my error "Oh! What was N then?" - a question about N.

Broadly speaking, Evans' disillusionment with such ideas stems from his anti-Cartesian outlook; we should avoid insisting that we are thinking singular thoughts independently of how the world might be. Of course, one must agree with this skepticism prima facie; the incorrigibility of our judgments should be called into question simply because they supposedly represent externality. But Evans' demands are far too stringent. No matter what kind of justification Evans might demand for our having thoughts about Aristotle today, it will be insufficient if, contrary to our assumption, 'Aristotle' lacks a bearer as we use it. Thus the sentence

(9) Aristotle was fond of dogs.

will fail to express a proposition, lack a truth-condition and hence a truth-value and so forth. (9) will simply fail to function as its grammar would dictate. Will our thought whose outward expression would be (9) be similarly disrupted? Arguably not, since the fact that 'Aristotle' lacks a bearer is far beyond our recognitional capacities. (Not so the referents of Russell's logically proper names and the thoughts they expressed.) That such possibilities exist (there might not ever have been an Aristotle) seems not to disrupt our thought phenomenally - whilst failing to express a proposition and so forth, our "narrow" psychological state and the semantic character of the

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More biting general criticisms of Evans' approach are offered in Devitt [1985], Noonan [1986], and Carruthers [1987].

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sentence which we take to represent our belief function in our theoretical and practical reasoning just as they would if 'Aristotle' did have a bearer. The fact that, if you like, there is no way of stating the propositional content of the apparent thought (since it has none) stimulates exactly the wrong kind of emphasis on this matter.27

Evans' argument naturally turns on the idea that it is not "narrow" but "wide" psychology that accords with the pre-theoretic notions of thought. The identity conditions of thoughts become problematic if we appeal to a purely "narrow" notion of content-thoughts about N (with 'N' empty) cannot be identified as being about the same thing. Yet even when we explicitly acknowledge the emptiness of a name, we do ascribe identity. Those who assent to

(10) Pegasus has wings

are having the same thought in a sense allied closely to the conceptual role (10) would play for them. We would say (10) expressed their common belief if they were talking about the same Pegasus (taking part in the same NUP) and understood the predicate '-has wings'. The fact that the name is empty, that (10) fails to express a proposition simply wouldn't matter. If that kind of intuition generates a theory of content that is not "narrow", it certainly is not "wide" either.

The confusion appears terminological. We may claim innocently that either a name has a bearer or it does not. Correspondingly the sentence (9) expresses a proposition iff 'Aristotle' has a bearer. In which circumstances will an utterance of (9) represent a thinker having a thought? A first guess might be simply whenever he believes (9) to

27 See, e.g., Evans [1982] pp.139-140, 200-205.
report conditions which he, as a competent user of (9), entertains. An enhancement might be that it is when there are indeed such conditions (e.g. that there is indeed a referent of 'Aristotle'). A further wrinkle, surely favoured by Evans, might be that it is when the thinker can recognise that there are such conditions. I have no doubt that intermediary interpretations might be found. But at what stage, if any, does the correct notion of thought surface, that philosophically educated elucidation of the pre-theoretic usage of the verb 'to think'?

Might it not be, as in classical de dicto readings, we are looking for a notion of thought dependent on conceptual roles rather than truth-conditions? Evans is at liberty to insist that thoughts apparently about objects are only genuinely thoughts if they are in fact thoughts about objects. Equally one might insist that the only genuine visual experiences are experiences of objects. But these stipulations are arbitrary. We are equally at liberty to report thoughts as Russellian in themselves if we allow that the proposition a thought expresses (if it does) or the proposition it would have expressed (in other circumstances) would be Russellian, i.e. precisely when it involves a term, 't', that functions as a GST and expresses a proposition representable as

\[(11) \langle \_ \rangle \text{ is } F, <t>\].

"What makes a thought concern one object rather than another, or concern any object at all, is the causal relationship between the thinker and his environment."\(^2\) Intrinsically a thought or sentence will be Russellian if it would standardly express a Russellian

proposition (even though it might fail to do so). Whether or not the thought expressed by (9) is about an object or expresses a proposition such as (11) depends on something entirely extrinsic which Evans attempts to package as essential to thought. 'Russellian' is surely descriptive of sentence utterances insofar as they express Russellian propositions and our thoughts ought to be classified as Russellian precisely if they would standardly do likewise. We may condemn thoughts for failing to express such propositions because there is nothing they are about, but to deny that they are thoughts at all turns on a fairly arbitrary use of 'thought'. Indeed Evans himself seems to allow the above characterization when he allows that for a person who attempts but fails to have a Russellian thought it is just as if he were having one.

Evans' attachment to RP surely reflects the healthy semantic insight we already have. SREs such as names can be considered Russellian because they would standardly do nothing more than introduce their referents, in sharp contrast to, say, definite descriptions. From the point of view of inferential processes and conceptual role we simply assume that sentences involving them function as they appear to - by expressing Russellian propositions - and Evans' subsequent battle to disarm the anomalies generated leaves that charitable assumption high and dry. I agree with Dummett

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Clearly, in order to know the use of the name 'Homer' in our language, it is not necessary to know whether or not it has a denotation, ... for the obvious reason that this knowledge is not possessed by the speakers of the language. 30

As suggested above (§4.4), having the right kind of thoughts, or seeming to, is a matter of forming and acting on the right kind of referential intentions, all of which is part of playing the game of the name. This need not entail the existence of a mode of identification of the referent of the name. Thoughts about the bearers of names are, as I have suggested, easy to have. What is not so easy is to accommodate is some form of justification for the common assumption that a given name indeed has a bearer and that a mental phenomenon is indeed a thought about an object. It is because sentences involving empty names are used thus and so (as though those names were not empty) that there is entirely no problem about regarding empty names as names. To be a name is simply to be used as a name, i.e. with the relevant referential intentions, by some part of the linguistic community.

PART THREE:

PRAGMATICS AND INTENTIONS
[Karataev] did not, and could not, understand the meaning of words apart from their context. Every word and every action of his was the manifestation of an activity unknown to him, which was his life. But his life, as he regarded it, had no meaning as a separate thing. It had meaning only as part of a whole of which he was always conscious.

Leo Tolstoy.
Thus far we have scrutinised the semantics of referring expressions, distinguished the semantic mechanisms of names and descriptions, compared the relation of singular terms to singular thought, and considered how names actually do attach to their bearers. However, it is not enough to look at referring expressions simpliciter. On the contrary, it is enlightening, if not mandatory, to look at token occurrences of referring expressions and to categorise the intentions of those responsible for those occurrences.

In what follows we quantify over more than merely spoken utterances of referring expressions, so that, for example, if discussing a book involving token written occurrences of referring expressions I should ask what the intentions of the author were rather than what the intentions of the typesetter were. Despite the terminological bias towards spoken occurrences of SREs to simplify the expression of my theses, it should be borne in mind that the comments I make apply to this larger class of occurrences. In general I shall use 'speaker' or 'utterer' to refer to the relevant entities.

Why proceed thus? Because I am in eminent company in arguing that some form of causal theory of reference best explains the occurrence and use of names, as was indicated in chapter 5. Yet the obvious lacuna is that a simple causal theory does not always accurately describe the situation as the 'Madagascar' example shows. We shall attempt to remedy these deficiencies by appeal to the utterer's
referential intentions (remembering always that our main aim is to explain the relation that holds between the (use of a) name and its denotation), and argue for a three-fold classification of typical referential intentions. Most, if not all, of our pressing problems should be explained by this tripartite theory.

The ascription of intentions, referential or otherwise, is always an awkward affair, primarily because it is difficult to judge the conditions that an individual must satisfy in order to be said to have such and such an intention. Though far from commonplace (because outside courts of law and philosophy classes, intentions rarely require full articulation) the intuitive acceptability of such a phrase as "I suppose I must have intended to F, though I didn't realise it at the time..." leads us to suppose that there are both conscious and tacit (unconscious?) intentions (i.e. both intentions where the agent is aware of the content of his intention at the time of having it and intentions where he will (would) only ascribe it to himself retrospectively). As Grice says, there are cases where some act is accompanied or preceded by a conscious 'plan' or explicit formulation of intention, but we must not be led to assume that the absence of such conclusively determines that the intention is absent.

Explicitly formulated linguistic (or quasi-linguistic) intentions are no doubt comparatively rare. In their absence we would seem to rely on the kind of criteria as we do in the case of non-linguistic intentions where there is a general usage. An utterer is held to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally intended to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting that a particular use diverges from the general usage (e.g. that he never knew or had forgotten the general usage). Similarly in non-linguistic cases: we are
presumed to intend the normal consequences of our actions.¹

The exact force of this will become obvious below. In effect, we are about to explain the act of utterance in terms of a whole spectrum of intention-types. The relevance of Kripkean arguments against description theories to this enterprise will enable us to identify a class of grounding intentions which accounts for a generalization of Donnellan's infamous referential/attributive distinction. Our first task must be to effect a three-pronged classification of intentions.

§7.1 ASCRITION AND CATEGORIZATION OF INTENTIONS

The first class of intentions consists of canonical intentions (CIs). These are intentions to refer to the canonical referent of a SRE, e.g. the intention to refer to the inventor of bifocals when using 'the inventor of bifocals' or the intention to refer to Napoleon when using 'Napoleon'. Such intentions were indicated in chapter 3 by the pragmatic speaker reference rule

(Rt*) A speaker, s, standardly uses 't' with the intention of referring to t.

There is nothing very remarkable about such intentions save that a necessary condition of having such an intention is that the utterer understand that SRE: that is, if the SRE has some connotation, the utterer must apprehend it, thereby understanding what conditions the canonical referent of that expression must satisfy, in order to have the intention to refer to that canonical referent. A CI will be common to every correct use of a SRE: all and only uses of 't' by utterers who

intend to use it standardly involve a CI to refer to t.

The second class of intentions consists of deferential intentions (DIs). Such intentions are intentions to refer with a token-use of a SRE to what was referred to by some previous uses of a SRE, as exploited in chapter 5. This is only reasonable in a discourse situation: one intends to use a SRE in the way others use it and intend to refer to the same items with it as others refer to with their uses of it. For example, if I overhear someone talking about t, I might use 't' with the intention that my use of 't' corefer with his or her use: if I did not understand the description 'Saul Kripke’s favourite antimacassar' used by my supervisor, I might use it myself, perhaps hoping to conceal my ignorance, with the intention of using it as he used it.²

The final class of intentions consists of particular intentions (PIs). A particular intention is an intention to refer to one particular item: the utterer has some particular item in mind such that he believes it to be the canonical referent of the referring expression he uses. The particular intention has the peculiar quality that it will always win out over any other referential intention the utterer might have, unless they be jointly fulfillable: that is, the particular intention always determines the referent of a token-utterance for the utterer. For what would it be like for the particular intention to fail to dominate? That would be a case where the utterer has some object in mind to which he wishes to refer yet inadvertently refers to something

² The analysis also applies to anaphora. I may use a pronoun with the DI of referring to whoever another speaker was referring to with, say, a proper name.
else (or nothing) to which he also intended to refer. In some cases the particular intention is nothing over and above the canonical intention, because the particular item to which the utterer wishes to refer is simply (whatever is) the canonical referent of the SRE, but often, when the utterer has some mode of identification of that object other than as the canonical referent of the expression, it consists in some other intention. It should be noted here that I do not insist that a particular intention always be successful: otherwise we could never fail to refer. In using 'Pegasus', say, I arguably have a PI to refer to Pegasus since no other referential intention overrides this, yet I do not succeed in actually referring to Pegasus but rather ensure that whatever I do refer to it could only be Pegasus (if anything is). It is often difficult to see how "trying to refer but failing" describes anything at all. However, there are plainly SREs (such as 'the person now reading this thesis over your shoulder') that will fail to refer despite my attempts to the contrary. I think the distinction should be drawn between unsuccessful attempts to refer to real things and successful attempts to refer to unreal things. An example of Howard Wettstein's illustrates this: ³

Ralph (hallucinating): "Look at that beautiful woman!"

Dr Himmelfarb (his psychotherapist): "What is she like?"

Ralph's intention to refer to a real woman fails but the lack of a real referent poses no problem for Himmelfarb. He refers to the hallucination successfully. It would clearly be wrong to have non-

³ Adapted from Wettstein [1984]. See also Kaplan's brief comments in [1968] Appendix XI and Stampe [1979].
existents as the 'booby-prizes' for unsuccessful reference, but they can act as objects for PIs.

Should we assume that there is always a unique PI involved in the referential use of a SRE? Probably so, for even if it is not obvious what that intention is, we can weigh up any candidates by telling the utterer who intended to refer to both X and Y that they are not one and the same item and seeing whether he will stick with 'I was talking about X' or 'I was talking about Y'. The utterer will abandon one of these in order to maintain that they actually succeeded in referring at all - the alternative conclusion that they weren't talking about any single item is normally eschewed.*

Problematic phenomena in the philosophy of singular reference arise when these three intentions cannot be jointly fulfilled, i.e. when they are intentions to refer to distinct items. There are cases where all three intentions are jointly fulfilled, but also:

(81) cases where PI and DI are fulfilled but CI is not - e.g. in a use deferring to Donnellan's 'referential' usage of 'the man drinking gin' - where the item denoted is that denoted by a suitable previous utterance of the expression but fails to satisfy the conditions for being the canonical referent of the expression;

* Peacocke acknowledges the need for something like PIs ([1983] pp.107-8) when he notes the hierarchical irreducibility of demonstrative to merely descriptive thought and the immunity to error of certain demonstrative thoughts. Though I am not happy with the tenor of his arguments (or those of Evans [1982]), they illustrate the fact that some referential intentions are always immune to retrospective correction and always win out over other intentions.

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(82) cases where PI and CI are fulfilled but DI is not - e.g. in an 'attributive' use subsequent to Donnellan's 'referential' usage of 'the man drinking gin' - where the item denoted is whatever item satisfies the conditions for being the canonical referent of the expression but is not the item denoted by some previous use of the expression with which one is attempting to co-refer; and

(83) cases where PI is fulfilled but neither CI nor DI is - e.g. in Evans' 'Madagascar' case - where Polo's use of 'Madagascar' is to refer to some object of which he is perceptually aware, but which is not the referent of any token-utterances with which he wishes to corefer nor the canonical referent of the expression.

It should not be forgotten that other intentions may also be present - the tripartite classification is not supposed to be exhaustive. I might use 'N' with the intention of referring to the F (among other intentions) yet this need be neither a CI (that's not the way names work), a DI nor a PI (I might later be willing to deny that I had referred to the F if I were reliably informed that, contrary to my belief, N was not the F).

The problems of proper names translate well with this kind of approach. A typical use of a proper name is one where the PI is nothing over and above the CI. So, as we have seen in §3.4, a typical use of 'Gödel' is one where the PI is to refer to the canonical referent of 'Gödel'. Even if the utterer has the additional intention to refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic, he will
refer to the canonical referent of 'Gödel'. If this intention to refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic is his PI (in which case this would be an atypical name-use), then his choice of 'Gödel' as a referring expression with which to so do hinges on his (possibly mistaken) belief that Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic - if it turns out that Schmidt did so, then his token use of 'Gödel' refers to Schmidt. And if the utterer had no intentions other than to refer to the discoverer of arithmetic his choice of 'Gödel' would be totally arbitrary - not intending to refer to Gödel or to corefer with any previous use of the term, his use would be totally causally insulated from any previous use or practice of using a name.

§7.2 CANONICAL INTENTIONS AGAINST PARTICULAR INTENTIONS

What benefits does this tripartite intentional analysis of referring yield? Although not in itself a semantic theory, it sheds light on where previous theories have gone astray. To illustrate this, let us return to Donnellan's 'Aston-Martin example' discussed briefly in chapter 5. After the party Ralph utters

(1) "Last night I met J.L.Aston-Martin and talked to him for almost an hour"

and

(2) "...and then Robinson tripped over Aston-Martin's feet and fell flat on his face."

If we agree with Donnellan's intuition that in (1) 'Aston-Martin' refers to Aston-Martin whereas in (2) 'Aston-Martin' refers to Pierre, the individual at the party, we are obliged to accommodate the fact that in both cases Ralph's intentions would be the same. For each F
such that Ralph believes that 'the F' identifies the referent of his utterance of 'Aston-Martin', we can say that he intends to refer to the F. I have suggested (§5.2) that perhaps the difference lies in (1) serving to identify the referent for the audience whereas (2) serves to report what happened to him. But the problem is that Ralph's set of identifying descriptions, and hence his referential intentions, are identical when he utters (1) and (2): how do we explain the difference in intentional weighting in these two token utterances without appealing to some further factor in the disambiguation of token name-uses?

It cannot be pretended that the use of 'Aston-Martin' in (2) is in any way 'non-standard'. It is perfectly consistent with the canons of normal conversational discourse. Donnellan's example, like Evans' and Kripke's, focuses on quite legitimate utterances where some token of a name-type, 'N', is used as a name for N even though it refers to some other item. The truth conditions of (1) and (2) are arguably different to those of

(1a) Last night Ralph met J.L.Aston-Martin and talked to him for almost an hour

(2a) Robinson tripped over Aston-Martin's feet and fell flat on his face

for these are unuttered sentences and are supposedly true iff the bearer of 'Aston-Martin' is some individual, α, such that last night Ralph met α and talked to him for almost an hour and Robinson tripped over α's feet and fell flat on his face. Unlike the truth of (1) and (2), the truth of these sentences will depend on the fact that 'Aston
Martin' semantically refers to Aston-Martin, its bearer, and completely ignores the circumstances of an utterance of (1a) or (2a) which allow that name-tokens may be used to designate items that are not the canonical referent of tokens of their type.

This mirrors a familiar distinction between the truth of token- and type-sentences. Why need we stray from the semantics of the situation? The reply would be simply that referring is something that speakers do with SREs and that the pragmatics of referential activity helps to define the semantics: that is, the fact that a name is used in such and such a way determines what its canonical referent is and how its canonical referent might change over a period of time (a referential shift). If we concede that what we are looking for is a theory of speaker reference, is the best course to admit with Donnellan that there are circumstances where the use of a SRE generates a statement whose truth condition is independent of the standard semantic mechanism of that expression? Donnellan's example would resemble

(3) The man over there drinking martini looks interesting

a token utterance of which might be true even though there was no-one over there drinking martini. Evans might use

(4) Madagascar is far away

which could be truthfully uttered by Marco Polo even though the location of the then canonical referent of 'Madagascar' is irrelevant to the speaker's concerns.\(^5\)

\(^5\) This matter is quite complex. If we agree Polo referred to an island in his tokening of (4) and that the island was indeed far away, there is still a problem about what it is that is true as a consequence. Aware of the widely divergent opinions held on such matters, I return to this in §7.3.
Seemingly remote from the initial spirit of the investigation of names, we might surmise that, as with definite descriptions, there are both referential and attributive uses of proper names: because the semantic character of names is as it is, the distinction between the 'referential' and 'attributive' uses of names would not be so easily characterised (and because Donnellan likens the referential use of definite descriptions to the use of names). In fact it turns out that this is the case. To explain this, I want to appeal to the particular intentions mentioned above.

When Ralph uses the name 'Aston-Martin' in (2), he can be said to be intending to refer to the man at the party last night and intending to defer to the practice of using 'Aston-Martin' (i.e. intending to refer to Aston-Martin, the person we commonly refer to by 'Aston-Martin' etc.). The former intention wins out because his utterance (1) has set the context of his conversation - it cannot turn out that in (2) he is not talking about whoever it was at the party, but it can turn out that he was not talking to Aston-Martin. In (2) Ralph may be said to have a particular intention to refer to the individual at the party, for the doings of the canonical referent of the SRE by which he picks him out are irrelevant to what he wishes to report in uttering (2). The practice of using 'Aston-Martin' explains why he uses that name, i.e. on each occasion he refers to the individual at the party he uses 'Aston-Martin' just because it is a name for the person he thought Pierre to be (his utterance of (1) assures of this, though our intuitions equally dictate that in (1) his PI is a CI to refer to Aston-Martin), but his PI is to refer to the man
at the party. It might happen that Ralph also subsequently wishes to use 'Aston-Martin' in an attempt to tell someone about the eminent philosopher, but it seems plausible that thereafter his use of 'Aston-Martin' is ambiguous if he attempts to defer both to his use with regard to the events of the party and to the common practice of using the name: does Ralph mean the man at the party or the eminent philosopher when he asks

(5) "Have you ever met Aston-Martin? I have!"

The problem in its clearest form is that, because the occurrences of name-tokens may have their reference secured by PIs rather than CIs, any name may be used to refer to any individual given a suitable situation and (mistaken) belief. Consider a variant of an example from §3.4, where it turns out that Shakespeare wrote all the plays commonly attributed to him except The Tempest. Ralph examines the original manuscript of this work, assured that it is the Bard's own handwriting, and says

(6) "We can see that Shakespeare was left-handed"

referring with 'Shakespeare' to the author of The Tempest even though Shakespeare didn't write it. He has a PI to refer to whoever wrote out the play - quite different from the normal association of 'the author of The Tempest' with 'Shakespeare'! And when we focus on referential intentions it appears that the semantic function of a SRE is irrelevant to what is reported by a statement containing a token of that expression-type (e.g. (3), (4), (6)). We will examine this below. Nonetheless, when it happens that a name is used standardly to denote an item and the PI picks out the canonical referent of the name (as it
would have done if the individual at the party had been Aston-Martin rather than Pierre masquerading) then nothing overrides the standard deferential concerns and thus the referent is the name's bearer.

Kripke has himself suggested something like an extension of Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction to accommodate this phenomenon. We can define the speaker's referent of a token referring expression to be the object the speaker wishes to talk about on a given occasion and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic (or canonical) referent of the referring expression (e.g. the occurrence of 'Aston-Martin' in (2) is one where speaker's referent and semantic referent do not coincide).

In a given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator...is given by a general intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever the designator is used. The speaker's referent is given by a specific intention, on a given occasion, to refer to a certain object. If the speaker believes that the object he wants to talk about, on a given occasion, fulfills the conditions for being the canonical referent, then he believes there is no clash between his general intentions and his specific intentions. My hypothesis is that Donnellan's referential-attributive distinction should be generalised in this light.  

In what Kripke calls the 'complex' case of reference, the speaker has a PI, distinct from CIs or DIs, but which he believes, as a matter of fact, to determine the same object as his CIs and DIs. By contrast, in the 'simple' case of reference the speaker's PIs, DIs and CIs coincide. In the 'simple' case the speaker's referent is the canonical referent, whereas in the 'complex' case they may coincide, if the speaker's belief is correct, but they need not.

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* [1977] p.15. See also [1973] lectures 4-5.
Donnellan's "attributive" use is nothing but the "simple" case, specialised to definite descriptions, and...the "referential" use is, similarly, the complex case. If such a conjecture is correct, it would be wrong to take Donnellan's "referential" use, as he does, to be a use of a definite description as if it were a proper name. For the distinction of simple and complex cases will apply to proper names just as much as to definite descriptions.

Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction simply is not semantic in nature - it is about speakers' intentions and how they may plausibly break with standard conventions. (It would correspondingly be inaccurate to consider the distinction as providing grounds for the view that Russell's analysis of the semantics of definite descriptions is wanting with respect to 'referential' usage.) Some, such as Devitt, have upheld the semantic significance of Donnellan's distinction. However such disputes appear to stem from disagreement about the relevant intuitions.

The stipulation given above that a PI is always satisfied is often contested - when CI and PI cannot be jointly satisfied, it is argued that the utterer refers partly to the semantic referent and partially to the speaker's referent. So their utterance is partially true and partially false. What can we make of this?

The generalised case of the phenomenon at hand is this. A speaker, s, utters a sentence involving a SRE, 't', in context c with the intention (CI) of referring to t (and by having such an intention grasping: the connotation of 't' if there be such; the semantic

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* Devitt [1981a], [1981b]. See also Bertolet [1980].

* Or as Kripke would say - when semantic and speaker's referents differ.
category into which 't' falls; the conventional rules for the use of 't' and so on - s is competent in the use of 't') and with the intention (PI) of referring to some item, β, which s falsely believes to satisfy the conditions for being t; i.e. s believes of β that it is t. (We may also assume that the canonical referent of 't' is α and that β≠α - although the absence of a canonical referent of 't' would in no way disrupt the example.) The reference of the PI is identified by appeal to intuition - it is the item s 'wishes to talk about', 'had in mind', 'meant' and so forth - the simple intuition being that it is β rather than α that s is referring to in c. Does this intuition demand further articulation?

Devitt, for one, requires some. Consider Kripke's case where Ralph points to Smith, who is seen at work in the garden, and utters

(7) 'Jones is raking the leaves.'

mistaking Smith for Jones. Devitt comments

My intuitions about what ...(Ralph).... meant are as follows... The belief... comes with two others, the true one that man (pointing to Smith) is raking the leaves, and the false one that that man (pointing to Smith) is Jones. The speaker is confusing two people. As a result we have no determinate matter of fact which he meant to refer to... It may be objected that Kripke's intuitions about ..{(7)}.. are supported by the fact that the speaker would argue that he "referred to" that man (pointing to Smith). But, of course, he would also agree that he "referred to Jones". If we have evidence of anything here, it is that the speaker meant more than what he said, a view that supports my intuitions rather

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10 It should be noted that having an object in mind, wishing to talk about it and so forth in no way requires a mode of identifying it that generates discriminating knowledge of it. If we consider a present in a gift-wrapped box we can certainly direct our (or others') attention to it without needing the capacity to identify that item or pick it out from a broad selection of others. Bertolet [1986] gives a sound account of this (pp.202-3).
than Kripke's.\textsuperscript{11}

I should expect most would be satisfied by the following reasoning. We may characterize an assertion as robust with respect to the disclosure of a piece of information iff an utterer will continue sincerely to affirm it (or will sincerely refuse to dissent from it) as an accurate report (possibly retrospectively).\textsuperscript{12} If Ralph is confronted with the information that that man, the one raking leaves, is not Jones, then he will discard

(8) I was talking about Jones

but not

(9) I was talking about that man

as accurate descriptions of his action (or performance) in uttering (7). Thus (9) but not (8) is robust with respect to the information that Jones is not that man. This does not imply that Ralph never had the intention correlated with (8) after all. The crux of the matter is that Ralph regards (9) as a central description of his utterance of (7) because (9) will be robust with respect to most pieces of information (excluding, perhaps, the information that he is hallucinating) and with respect to all pieces of information with respect to which (8) is robust, the above demonstrating that the converse does not hold.

\textsuperscript{11} Devitt [1981b] p.514, commenting on Kripke [1977]. In fact Devitt is more concerned about the multiplicity of intentions than what was achieved and fails to distinguish these two concerns.

\textsuperscript{12} This is borrowed from work on the assertibility conditions of indicative conditionals by Adams and Jackson. I believe Castañeda [1971] has dealt with a similar analysis. He dubs an intention derivative if one's having it is explained by one's having other intentions, but not vice versa. Otherwise it is primary. A PI is always primary whereas CI and DI will either be derivative of or identical to the PI.

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Surely it is on the basis of these inferences that we complete the story thus: PI must win out over CI since Ralph will retrospectively insist that he was talking about that man, Smith.

Extrapolation from this single case must be undertaken with care. I could tell a slightly different 'leaf-raking' story wherein Ralph, instead of assuming Smith to be Jones by dint of faulty eyesight, is given a head-start by Pierre asking 'I wonder what Jones is doing?' If (7) were uttered in response to Pierre's question then Ralph's PI might well be taken as a DI to corefer with Pierre: it is, after all, a reply, albeit a mistaken one! Hence Ralph might give up (9) rather than (8). Surely there are many more examples where our intuition goes the other way, i.e. where an obvious accompanying act of deixis is embellished by a story that suggests a different PI. That theory stresses not that a certain type of intention will always be a PI but that in any given situation there will always be some intention that "wins out" as a PI and that this need not coincide with a CI.

Robustness will not satisfy the likes of Devitt's skepticism, though it is surely worthy of note that his subsequent argument relies dubiously on the idea that such retrospective reflection is simply irrelevant to the determination of what Ralph was doing at the time. Devitt has likely confused what Ralph was doing with an assessment of a possible audience's interpretation of what Ralph was doing. Otherwise we would have no meaningful appreciation of "Well I thought I was talking about Jones at the time, but it turns out that I wasn't" and similar referential escape clauses which seem applicable to other popular cases. That we should be driven to accept the display
utterances such as (7) as involving partial or divided reference (and hence partial truth and falsity) seems paradoxical. If we rest secure with semantics as primarily a function of sentence-types then (7) is a false token of that type - what it literally reports is not (or need not be) the case - whereas what Ralph attempts to say in uttering (7) is true - the referent of his use of 'Jones' (Smith) is in fact raking the grass rather than looking for truffles. We must surely wish to avoid the task of constructing "an enormously more complex semantics (sensitive to speakers' intentions)" allowing that the sentence-type of which (7) is a token might be true when it is false that Jones is raking the leaves (or at least not a cause of Ralph's utterance of (7)).

On the basis of the above it becomes apparent that speakers cannot make certain types of claim. Ralph, for example, might claim (8) but not

(8a) I said that that man was raking the leaves

which is plainly false, as is

(8b) I said that Smith was raking the leaves.

If we were to accept such reports we would be hard pressed to develop a plausible semantics for "...says that..." and its tensed cognates, since we would intuitively feel obliged to appeal to the standard semantic role of (7) which is to report a situation that was in one important sense irrelevant to what Ralph wished to describe. Perhaps

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See Bertolet [1980] esp. pp.282-284. It is left as an exercise to account for more esoteric causal tales where Jones actually is raking leaves elsewhere yet his doing so causes Ralph to utter (7) on seeing Smith at his activity in the garden.
it would be better to use some quasi-formal paraphrase such as

(8c) I speaker-said that that man was raking the leaves

or simply focus on the activity of thought, leaving problems of performances in natural language to one side. This we do in the following section.

The moral of our story thus far is that PIs can unobtrusively sever the link between a SRE and its canonical referent. This is reminiscent of Grice's separation of natural and non-natural meaning. The PI schema might be formulated as

Speaker S has a PI to refer to α in uttering 't' iff there is some utterance p such that
(i) S utters p
(ii) 't' occurs in p
(iii) S intends to direct the attention of any audience to α by uttering 't' in p
(iv) S intends that the audience recognise that (iii)
(v) etc.1*

Yet the complexity of such a theoretic formulation hardly does justice to its intuitive simplicity: clause (iii) neither necessitates nor precludes that α be the canonical referent of 't'. The analysis fails to elucidate the notion of 'having α in mind' or of the relevant intentions: it also imports an unwelcome problem - can a speaker not have a PI to refer to one item but an intention that his audience believe him to have a PI to refer to something else? Yes, but we must

1* Those impressed by Grice's program would wish to flesh out this analysis to insulate it from the apparent counter-examples to Grice's original theory. See Martinich [1979] and Bertolet [1986].
§7.3 THE ROLE OF DEFERRING AND SECOND THOUGHTS ON THOUGHT

The moral to be drawn from this kind of speculation is that for isolated cases like 'Aston-Martin' we should not be blinkered in confining our attention to contexts as single uses of SREs in sentences but rather to whole conversations. Indeed, Burge correctly ... takes not sentences but discourses as units of reference, and adopts a network view of reference thereby making the plausible point that often occurrences of SREs do not refer individually to objects but constitute networks of cross-references that plug into the appropriate subject matter through the application of their first terms. Pronominal 'back-reference' within a single sentence functions in this way, e.g. the use of 'he' in

(10) Ralph knows that Pierre believes that he is crazy

Similarly, deferential expressions within the context of a single discourse (e.g. 'Aston-Martin' in (1) and (2)) may enable one use of a SRE to cross-refer with another (usually though not invariably the first use of that SRE in the particular discourse). Ralph's audience would likely respond to (5) by deferring to his misuse of 'Aston-Martin' in (2).

Such semantic anomalies are commonly generated by DIs. In discourse situations we naturally enough intend to use language as do

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Obviously these problems deserve attention. Yet the problem is not with communication, but with successful reference by the speaker, which plausibly requires no audience.

those around us. Thus intending to use 't' as it is used around one becomes not only DI but also PI. Hence semantic anomalies spread through entire discourses. This is surely fuelled by the most basic intuition of all: whatever their particular semantic character, all SREs are used primarily to single out some particular object.

I suggested earlier that the de re/de dicto distinction is misleading as applied to thoughts. Rather a complete report of a thought must indicate the epistemic perspective being had (supposedly of a particular proposition). Even when confined to the "hamstrung" theory of thought-ascriptions tied to a semantic theory, we observed that a speaker could adopt different attitudes to sentences that expressed one and the same proposition. Our reports of such attitudes are sensitive to various factors according to motivation, whence the common acceptance of substitutivity in belief reports that contradicts DQ.\(^1\) Now we have a more serious critique. Thoughts, as such, may be about objects and reported by utterances of sentences that not only fail to express the right proposition (i.e. fail to have the right truth-condition with respect to every possible world) but also fail to report something causally relevant to the situation under consideration.

The classification of referential intentions given above is cast in the form of speculation on thoughts about objects. This 'aboutness' (to coin an awkward phrase) is a subject of much investigation. I have given reason to support the intuition that Ralph's report in (7) is

\(^1\) De re reports allow substitution of coreferential SREs and are not sensitive to epistemic perspective or conceptual role. De dicto reports do not allow such substitutions and are sensitive.
about Smith not Jones. Yet the sentence

(7a) Jones is raking the leaves

is certainly not about Smith at all. Why should we take the utterance (7) to be about him? The reply to this (couched above in terms of robustness) turns on the intuition that objects which thoughts are about are identified in some determinate way (such that only something identified thus is the object in question). Coupled to this may be false beliefs that the object identified satisfies the conditions for being the canonical referent of 't' with respect to the context in question. If the thought is to the effect that the object has the property F then the sentence 't is F' is the one with which the thinker will report his thought.

In the case of Ralph and (7) there is fairly strong evidence to suggest that the perceptual or demonstrative identification of the leaf-raker singles him out as the referent of Ralph's use of 'Jones'. Even if an object has less immediate contact, our intuitions may be equally clear - in the 'Tempest' example Ralph uses 'Shakespeare' to refer to someone other than its bearer through indirect deixis. Whatever our intuitions dictate we can often identify the reference of a token-use of a SRE as being other than its canonical referent. If Ralph is talking about Smith by using 'Jones' in (7), what of the sentence as a whole?

With semantics and canonical referents we have a simple recipe: if, in context c, 't' has α as its canonical referent and the sole function of 't' is to denote α (i.e. it is a GST), then a sentence-type containing 't' is true in c just in case α instantiates some property 233
(and other constraints are satisfied, e.g. when 't' falls within the scope of an intensional operator). This we might suppose was the lesson that the 'Fido'-Fido theory was to teach us - the intuitive relation between reference and truth. However, token-sentences present us with a problem. If, in context c, a speaker utters a sentence S, which contains 't', and speaker-refers to β in uttering 't' then there is no obvious natural language candidate for what might be true in this context. I have suggested above that we cannot say that Ralph said that Smith was raking leaves - he plainly said something else, i.e. that Jones was raking leaves. But what else may we cull from the variety of speech acts performed in Ralph's utterance of (7) that is suitably related to the truth-evaluable singular proposition

\[(11) \langle_\_\rangle \text{ is raking leaves, } <\text{Smith}>\]

rather than

\[(12) \langle_\_\rangle \text{ is raking leaves, } <\text{Jones}>?\]

That is, having determined one object of his thought we need to ascertain the truth-conditions thereof and relate them to his external utterance, with a truth-ascriptional attitude-verb that is intersubstitutable with '...says that...' neither salva veritate nor salva congruitate.

I doubt such a resolution is possible, primarily because of the absence of a suitable vocabulary. We concede that Ralph is referring to Smith not Jones but we may not ascribe truth or falsity to what he said (for that was that Jones was raking leaves), meant (for he meant a whole variety of things, including and much more than he said, as Devitt emphasized) or intended. The contents of Ralph's mind fail to
enlighten us precisely because thoughts, beliefs and so forth come in ill-defined bundles, rather than as discrete particulars. Any attempt to ascribe a truth-value to some single thought of Ralph's in uttering (7) seems fruitless since we have no noun to pick out the right belief.

I don't regard this as an insurmountable obstacle to a theory of reference, since reference does not come in bundles: plausibly we take Ralph to have referred to one and only one thing in uttering (7). However, there seems a common problem in the assumption that a theory of semantics of language, based on a notion of truth must accommodate such phenomena. It is not difficult to see that however we think of this pragmatic phenomenon, it has no place in a theory of the semantics of singular terms. Hence, counter-examples to semantic theories that are parasitic on such pragmatic phenomena simply miss the mark - it would be wrong to criticise a theory insisting, say, that 'Jones' is a rigid designator on the grounds that not every use of 'Jones' (such as Ralph's utterance in (7)) refers to the same individual. "Aboutness", as applied to token occurrences of SREs, concerns utterers' intentions which do not invariably reduce to a matter of semantics.

In chapter 4 and §6.4 it was suggested that an analysis of thought must attempt to explain conceptual role. Clearly there is a great similarity between the case described by (7) and the situation, qualitatively identical for Ralph, in which it actually is Jones out there raking the leaves. The similarity is a matter of Ralph's mental state and the roles (7a) and its mental correlates play in his reasoning. I suggest this underlines the divide between truth-conditional and conceptual role analyses. Clearly, with regard to

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reasoning, Ralph's mental correlate of (7a) will play the same causal role, ceteris paribus, in both cases. Yet it is equally clear - given the qualitative similarity and our assumption that in both cases Ralph would rather discard (8) than (9) - that Ralph is talking about Jones in one case and Smith in the other, whence there is a great difference in truth-condition.

A related point on "aboutness" is that, unnoticed by many philosophers, sentences involving definite descriptions are not about their satisfiers at all, and hence referring with definite descriptions need not involve having a particular item in mind.\(^{1a}\) This should be obvious from close scrutiny of Russell (they are not denoting phrases) or from the realization that they are not GSTs. That is not to say that their satisfiers are not relevant to the truth-conditions of sentences such as

\[(13) \text{The } F \text{ is } G\]

which will be made true by any individual that is F provided it is the only such individual and is also G. However,

\[(14) \text{N is } G\]

would genuinely be about N. Yet (13) might be used to report a thought about a particular object only with some PI other than the CI. The kind of PI that permits 'the F' to operate canonically might be that associated with 'attributive' usage - the utterer has no specific

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\(^{1a}\) See Kaplan [1966] and latterly Yourgrau [1985] for exegesis of Russell's stance. Bach ([1987] esp. ch.3) notes that with an attributive use of a definite description one might not have any particular object in mind at all, e.g. with a description that involves a forward-looking predicate that has yet to have a satisfier such as 'the winner of the 1992 Olympic 100m sprint'.
object in mind such that his utterance is about it, but rather intends
that his utterance be made true only by whoever or whatever is uniquely
F. *Pace* Russell, it seems that standard English is rarely like this.
Normally our intentions in using 'the F' are more complex and admit of a
standardised use whereby the CI is overridden. (For example, if I say
"The milkman is at the door", I mean to denote our regular milkman and
claim that he is at the door, but not to insist that there exists but
one milkman.) This standardised but non-literal usage forms another
way of classifying referential intentions and has been developed into a
fuller account of the pragmatics of reference and thought by Kent
Bach.²⁰ Such uses are uncontroversially uses as denoting phrases. (I
suspect critics could turn this into an argument against Russell's
theory of descriptions. The onus is on the semantic theorist to
reconcile the phenomenon with their claim that the content and truth-
condition of a sentence-type containing what would appear to be a
description are unaffected by whether that description is used
'referentially' or 'attributively'. Alternative accounts would enable
us to maintain the argument of this chapter, so I have not been obliged
to accept Russell's logical analysis of 'the F'.)

As though this were not bad enough, the general grammatical form of
an utterance may be misleading. Normally an indefinite description,
'an F', will not be an SRE - it doesn't pick out a unique item. Yet it

²⁰ Bach [1987]. Compare Freedman [1988d]. Bach uses this to
illustrate that speaker-reference is a more fundamental notion than
linguistic reference, since, to reiterate Strawson's point ([1959]),
referring is not something that words do, but something that speakers
do with words. He takes his cue from Kripke [1977] (esp. pp.6-7),
Donnellan [1977] and Wettstein [1981]. See also Salmon [1981].
certainly might be used to do so in an utterance of

(15) Yesterday an SCR member invited me to dine with him.

Moreover one might hold that the function of 'an SCR member' in (18) was to act as a GST and that the proposition expressed was singular. Sentences can be used to express propositions that are singular with respect to expressions that are not normally GSTs or even SREs syntactically. This depends on grounding the use of the expressions—when our intention is to refer to something we do so in virtue having a PI. In one sense this undercuts the contributions of TCS, because the truth-conditions of a thought, utterance or use of a sentence are frequently dictated by what it is most plausible to commit the thinker/utterer to in the circumstances of its thought/utterance. Reference is not about identifying an object for one's audience, it seems, as long as it is successful reference: if the audience succeeds in singling out the object one refers to, then it matters not whether one gives uniquely identifying information about it in referring. A perfectly acceptable conversation using anaphoric pronominal reference might follow on from an utterance of (15) (using 'he' or 'she' to corefer with the use of 'an SCR member'). Both the pronoun and the indefinite description fail to carry with them the information needed to single out the item in question, but the reference is successful since the audience relies on (and the utterer intends him to rely on) context-relative constraints (including an estimation of the utterer's own intentions) in order to corefer. The data used is that which fuels our intuitions about robustness and our intuitive feel for what a language user actually does.
We have seen that giving the proposition expressed by (or truth-conditions of) a sentence in a context fails to describe completely what is thought as an accompaniment to its assertion. We now see how speakers' referential intentions can devastate the supposed consequences of even a relatively sophisticated semantic theory purporting to accommodate thought ascriptions and propositional attitudes. For even an account that respects sense-sensitive and sense-insensitive thought-reports does not begin to address the disambiguation of thoughts via their external descriptions when a speaker's PIs begin to stray from semantic norms. Although there are conventions governing such behaviour, they appear to transcend the limits of (formal) semantic theory.\textsuperscript{20} In our final chapter we shall attend to the consequences of this negative thesis for any semantics purporting to cope with singular terms.

\textsuperscript{20} There is, however, no need to recoil towards the 'Humpty-Dumpty' view of language (most recently aired by Davidson [1985]). Acknowledgement of the need for speaker-relativization does not render language or reference totally subjective, but rather necessitates attention to these hazily-defined social practices.
CHAPTER 8:
DESCRIPTIONISM AND EXISTENTIALS

Whether the referent of a word really (in the sense of 'demonstrably') exists is no concern of ours... A hypothesis may have a mental existence and the ginger-and-white cat that sits by me at this moment of writing a physical one: to the users of words they inhabit the same area of reference.

Anthony Burgess.
In this chapter, armed with the account of naming given above, we can turn to two phenomena that weigh heavily against RDT and which Kripke and his followers are open to criticism for not considering—the residual intuitive appeal of descriptionism and the nagging problem of the semantics of existential statements.

§8.1 DESCRIPTIONISM AND NAMING

It is apparent that the semantics of proper names have led us quite rapidly and readily to challenge descriptionism. If it is unreasonable to suppose that a proper name is a semantic abbreviation for, or semantically encodes, some information that is relevant to the determination of its referent, is there another explanation for Russell's stance on names and descriptions? I believe that there is, but that it is equally inadequate as a complete picture of what is going on in the process of using a name.

One alternative account of the relation between names and descriptions is simply this:

When a speaker, S, uses a name, 'N', he intends to refer to the F for some suitable description, 'the F'.

This account remains open to the criticisms levelled against theories making explicit appeal to some sort of semantic relation - if it is read as supporting a type-type correlation of intention between name-use and description (to the effect that whenever any speaker
tokens a use of 'N' he intends to refer to the F) then it falls prey to
the criticism that some putatively competent speaker might believe what
is contrary to fact and maybe even necessarily so (ie. that N is not
the F). To gain credibility, the intentional account must accommodate
some intersubjective variation. For example, the variation might be
that some speakers always intend to refer to the F when they use 'N'
while other speakers always intend to refer to the G. Perhaps it might
be that every speaker, S, intends to refer to the F when he uses 'N'
and where for no two speakers, A and B are the descriptions 'the F_A'
and 'the F_B' the same. It might even be that at every token use of 'N'
a speaker, S, intends to refer to the F for some description, 'the F',
but that even though we consider the uses of a single speaker this
description will vary from one token-use to the next. We may consider
the final, weakest of these three interpretations - 'weakest' in the
sense that it admits of the greatest amount of variation.

To some extent this theory seems immune to the Kripkean argument:
for some token-use of a name the speaker meant to refer to the F, and
hence we cannot pose the 'what if..?' questions since they will,
necessarily, introduce other token-uses of the name which might well go
proxy for other descriptions. However in chapter 7 we deduced that an
intention to refer to the F is certainly not the CI for the use of a
name 'N' since having the latter intention requires no particular way
of thinking of its referent (other than as the bearer of 'N').

1 Hence Peacocke's view that "there are words in the language,
most particularly proper names and natural kind terms, for which there
is no way of thinking such that in order to understand the word, one
must think of its referent (object or kind) in that particular way." [1986] p.102.
Although it might be that some token-uses of proper names conceal PIs to refer to the F, it seems equally true that most merely conceal PIs to use the name to refer to its canonical referent (i.e. uses where PI and CI coincide). There seems little to object to in this version of descriptionism unless we identify the intention to refer to the F as always being the PI, which seems demonstrably false. The data from actual name-use is somewhat confusing, but, as the notion of robustness given in chapter 7 might suggest, it is likely that the descriptions commonly associated with names operate in a more subtle fashion. Let us consider an alternative explanation of their role.

With regard to the reliability of the descriptionist intuition, I have been impressed by what William Lycan calls the "spot-check test":

Suppose we overhear Jones using a certain name, say, "Wilfrid Sellars," and we want to test his grasp of his own ideolect. Whipping around, we demand, "Who do you mean by 'Wilfrid Sellars'? Quick, now!" Subjected to this test, Jones will doubtless produce a description, as in "Oh, I mean the famous philosopher at Pittsburgh who wrote 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'."

This phenomenon suggests that at any given utterance of a proper name by a speaker some definite description is of relevance. But I would be loathe to infer either that the name abbreviates the description or, as Lycan would have it, that the name plays the same computational role as the description for the person. The spot-check test certainly


3 Lycan actually says that such a token-use of a name "can be equivalent to the description modulo the computational individuative scheme, and two of the subject's beliefs, alike except that one involves the name while the other involves the description, will be computationally and hence causally similar for the subject at the time---the two beliefs will be functionally equivalent for all practical purposes without being semantically equivalent at all." p.93. The
provides intuitive appeal for descriptionism - it would be rare for a speaker to use a name and be unable to provide some kind of description that he felt explained his use of the name, even if it only a "buck-passing" one like 'the guy I overheard Parfit ranting on about last Tuesday'. But the semantic consequences of this intuition are far from clear.

What does seem clear from the spot-check idea is that any speaker who uses a name has a whole store of pieces of information about the supposed referent of a proper name 'N'. As the Melvyn/Maggie example showed, for a given name this store may vary completely from one speaker to the next. Equally any speaker who uses a definite description has a store of pieces of information about the supposed referent of that expression, but - because a (truly Russellized) definite description, 'the F', semantically encodes the information that its referent is uniquely F - the common denominator is that all speakers competent in the use of 'the F' realise that it supposedly refers to an item that is uniquely F. For this reason the spot-check test is irrelevant for uses of descriptions - asked by someone clearly competent in the use of 'the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic', the question "Who do you mean by 'the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic'? Quick, now!" might be met with what David Lewis has called an incredulous stare, unless something like the case described at the end of §7.1 were suspected. The description carries with it exactly the information the question

emphasis should be on the phrase 'at the time' since the equivalence must be of tokens rather than types.
would seem to demand, i.e. uniquely identifying information. Names, on the other hand, do not have this property. The viability of the spot-check reveals that it is not taken for granted that it is clear why a name is relevantly used in a certain context. If we are talking about well-known American philosophers I may have to explain who Wilfrid Sellars is and why he is relevant to the conversation at hand.

Why should we think that any of a term's information store is reference-determining? Unless that information is semantically encoded in the term, Kripke has observed that we are ready to give up most if not all of a name's information store. The name 'Gödel' doesn't semantically encode the same information as 'the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic' so, as Kripke suggests, we are ready to abandon the idea that Gödel is the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic (or, indeed, that anyone was the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic) and thus remove the information that Gödel is the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic from the store of information we attach to the name 'Gödel'. The individual senses that names acquire through their use consist of this contingently associated data.

However, different speakers' epistemic perspectives, away from hypothetical cases advanced above, commonly overlap. Contingent associations are shared because individuals are introduced into NUPs where there are widely disseminated beliefs about the general character of the world and its recent history. This information is, naturally enough, best encapsulated in the form of definite descriptions. In turn this reflects what is right about description theories that claim
that the referent of a name is fixed by the clusters of associated beliefs and descriptions. We need something like this to latch onto the right NUP. Knowing this (i.e. which NUP) is simply to be suitably informed about the contingent associations a speaker makes with the name.

Where descriptionists go wrong is in extrapolating semantic theories from these social phenomena. Names and (clusters of) descriptions are not semantic equivalents in the sense that

\begin{align*}
(1) \quad N \text{ is } G \\
(2) \quad \text{The } F \text{ is } G.
\end{align*}

Nor does it follow (from our modal speculation) that the descriptions fix the referent of the name insofar as the referent is necessarily whoever satisfies most of the descriptions. It is merely a matter of common beliefs. Once the relevant NUP has been latched onto, there seems no absurdity in supposing that someone might deny all the associated beliefs and, indeed, that they might all be false. Hence the descriptions cannot provide a covert semantic structure of the name. Moreover, the putative equivalence of name and description cannot even be explained at the level of thought and proposition. Although we might acknowledge that (1) and (2) express exactly the same proposition as uttered or thought on a particular occasion (in virtue of some accompanying PIs), they would fail to so do in general. Although this is similarly a restatement of Kripke's insights and the Frege-Evans' intuitive criterion of difference, there is simply no reason to anticipate a type-type equivalence between (1) and (2).
On the matter of connecting with the correct NUP, Harrison's R-identifications are a plausible form of what has been called causal descriptivism. This attractive gloss on causal theory insists that some reference-fixing description must be associated with any properly deferential use of a name such that: (i) the name can but refer to the satisfier of the description; (ii) the description picks out its referent in virtue of some prior use(s) of the name (i.e. in virtue of a particular history of using the name); (iii) the description is determined by though not determinative of the utterer's referential intentions. I am sensitive to the value of such a theory. In particular, some variant of this might be used to spell out the potential pitfalls in distinguishing direct from indirect reference-borrowing. Recall from §5.2 that potentially arbitrarily large numbers of successive indirect borrowings of the same name might occur, generating one NUP after another for that name. A credible illustration of a reasonably complex case would be of a 'pop' music fan who borrows a name for his child: 'Engelbert Humperdinck'. It is said that without appeal to causal descriptivism, a mere causal theory cannot rule out the child, the pop singer, the opera composer, the baron whose name the composer assumed, etc. as possible contenders for the referent of the name in 'Who was Engelbert Humperdinck'.

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* First by David Lewis [1984], subsequently by Kroon [1987]. McKinsey, Loar ([1976]) and, latterly, Searle ([1982], [1983]) might also subscribe to such a theory.

5 Consider NUPs $U_1, \ldots, U_m$ of a name 'N' with bearers $x_1, \ldots, x_m$ such that in $U_i$ 'N' has been borrowed from $U_{i-1}$ ($i < m$). Overhearing an utterance in $U_i$, the counterfactual conditional 'Had $x_j$ not been named 'N', then I should not have just heard that name' is thereby supported as true ($i < j < m$). This causal dependency of any $U_i$ on its ancestors
relevant causal description would help us to co-ordinate our referential interests in asking such a question with relevant prior usage of 'Engelbert Humperdinck'. An unadorned causal theory does not do this. It should be apparent that my favoured approach has been to couch the questioner's referential interests in terms of identifying his intentions (and particularly his PI) though since such might boil down to causal descriptivism for properly deferential usage, there seems little more to say.\(^6\)

One outstanding similarity between names and descriptions involving uniqueness deserves brief comment. The literal meaning of 'the F' is often that there is one and only one F. As used in most contexts, this is literally false and requires some relativization. Similarly names are also underspecified according to context: we often need to relativize the use of a name in order to avoid ambiguity. (Those who hold the modest semantic equivalence of 'N' and 'the bearer of "N"' would say that this is indeed the same phenomenon.) In such cases 'N' may function as a pseudo-demonstrative (roughly equivalent to 'that N').\(^7\) The spot-check test refines these intuitions - as well as fuels the potential ambiguity of the question-tokens "Who was N?".

\(^6\) For such uses, a PI that is an intention to refer to D will doubtless yield a suitable description as 'D'. For non-deferential uses - such as detailed in chapter 7 - causal descriptivism will still be hard-pressed to compete.

\(^7\) 'N' can often function as a demonstrative expression - with the force of 'that N' - in order to segregate the object named 'N' from any others named 'N' which are alluded to but not mentioned in a discourse, and to focus attention on that individual. That all referring uses of 'N' function in this way, as Burge would have it, is obviously wrong from the simple substitution of 'that N' for 'N' for all names 'N' in a suitably lengthy piece of normal English. See Burge [1973], [1974], [1981]. Castañeda [1982] pp.359-361 offers such a Burgese translation.
generating data which speaker and audience assume to be about the canonical referent of 'N', the audience is encouraged to latch onto a particular NUP for 'N' (wherein such data is commonly disseminated) and thereby fix on the idea that it is that N rather than any other that is under discussion. Naturally this will work for a token name-use even if none of the data is accurate, as long as the CI to latch onto the NUP is not overridden by some extraneous PI or DI.

§8.2 NEGATIVE EXISTENTIALS AND EMPTY NAMES

Let us now turn to ontological problems - How to talk about what is not and how to say of what is not that it is not.

People frequently refer to items that do not exist: this happens in the case of mythical or fictitious discourse, even when speakers don't realise that the subjects under discussion are non-existent. A plethora of true sentences arise:

[S]aid with the right intention, the following sentences would express true propositions: "The Green Hornet's car was called 'Black Beauty'", "Snow White lived with seven dwarves" and "To reach the underworld, one must first cross the river Styx." (By the "right intention" I mean that the speaker wishes to be taken as talking about fiction, mythology or legend.) At the same time I also believe it is true that neither the Green Hornet, his car, Snow White, nor the river Styx exists or ever has existed. These two beliefs, however, are entirely consistent. And therein lies the puzzle: how can there be true propositions that apparently involve predicating properties of what does not exist?

Negative existentials such as

(3) The greatest prime does not exist

or (4) Pegasus does not exist

---

apparently refer to something only to say of it that it does not exist. Let us call this the paradox arising from Plato's Beard (which dulls Ockham's Razor):

(PB) In order to predicate something of X, X must exist.

Holding (PB) true makes all negative existentials false, since they then assert (falsely) of something that exists that it does not exist.

In the case of (3) we have a logical analysis. Letting 'Px' abbreviate 'x is a prime', the natural reading of (3) is

$(3a) \neg(\exists x)(Px \land \forall y((Py \land \neg x=y) \rightarrow x>y))$

Statements of the form 'The P does not exist' are commonly read as 'there is no P', because the predicate P fails to hold true of any item. (Less commonly this is read as 'there is no unique P'.) Quine has suggested a similar analysis for (4): we should construct an 'artificial' predicate so that we interpret (4) as

$(4a) \neg(\exists x)(Pegasizes x )$

or

$(4b) \text{Nothing Pegasizes.}$

But what does (4) mean on such an interpretation? That nothing is called 'Pegasus' or that the way we use 'Pegasus' (with the intention of referring to the winged horse of Bellerophon) fails to pick out anything? Both views seem prima facie false: we do refer to items with that name (boats, cars or planes) and there is something (a mythical horse) that the common practice of using 'Pegasus' picks out. (In fact, something close to the second interpretation is the truth.) Moreover, sentences of the form

$(5) \text{N does not exist}$

admit of multiple analyses. By far the most popular (supporting (PB))
stems from the claim that existence is not a predicate, a claim that can be traced back through history via Kant at least as far as Aristotle. If existence is not a predicate then (5) does not contradict (PB) for we are not predicating some property of anything. The Fregean view is that existence is a second-level predicate, a predicate of predicates. It says of a predicate that it is instantiated. But what predicate does one use in the case of (4)? Does Quine have an analysis as

\[
(4c) \neg(\text{Ex})(x=\text{Pegasus})
\]

Surely not, for that formula is logically equivalent to

\[
(4d) \neg(\text{Pegasus}=\text{Pegasus})
\]

(unless we are committed to using Free Logic), yet (4d) is neither consonant with the intuition that 'Pegasus' is a name, nor with Quine's avowed intention to eliminate names in favour of predicables.\(^9\)

Perhaps it is preferable to admit a first-level predicative use of 'exists' that is roughly equivalent to 'is actual'.\(^{10}\) As we assume the Pegasus story to be myth, the truth of (4) consists in the fact that Pegasus, the winged horse of Bellerophon, was not an actual entity, but a mythical one. But this neither fits in with the Quinean analysis nor allows (PB). Taking the reading of 'exists' in (PB) as 'is actual' makes (PB) plainly false, for I can refer to non-actual items and

\(^9\) Note that (4a) and (4b), unlike (4), (4c) and (4d), do not seem to be about Pegasus, though both would be made false by him if he did exist. Quine's account gives the illusion of banishing individuals from the domain of discourse in favour of predicables or classes, yet it is plain that these notions would be unintelligible without the notion of an individual.

\(^{10}\) Intuitive support for this is provided by Strawson [1966].

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predicate properties of them.

In an earlier work,\textsuperscript{11} I considered a revision of (PB) as

\[(PB^*) \text{ In order to predicate something of } t, 't' \text{ must refer.} \]

which turned on the ambiguity in 'exists' (roughly, 'is actual' v. 'is quantifiable over') being parallel to the ambiguity in 'refers' mentioned in §5.2. The import of this was that in order legitimately to predicate something of N, 'N' must be used as a name - i.e. there must be an established NUP for 'N' - but that this led to no ontological commitment about N. Talking about the non-existent Pegasus was perfectly acceptable. A distinction was drawn between vacuously empty names - expressions for which there were simply no NUPs - and genuinely empty names - names for which there were NUPs but which failed to name anything actual. For the former kind of empty name (5) would be meaningless, whereas for the latter (5) would be true because N was not actual. Thus (5) should be read as reporting that N is non-actual, whereas 'exists' in (PB) should be read as reporting the second-level predicative type of existence, i.e. that 't' names something over which one can quantify. The tension resolved,\textsuperscript{12} I appended to this the analysis of (5) as

\[(5^*) \text{ The sense commonly attached to 'N' fails to pick out any actual individual} \]

\textsuperscript{11} Freedman [1985].

\textsuperscript{12} Since shifts between first-level and second-level predicative usage are generally invalid, as this tired example demonstrates:

Red Indians are disappearing.
Geronimo is a Red Indian.
Therefore, Geronimo is disappearing.

Some discussion of the restrictions on formal quantification needed to cope with non-existents is found in §9.3.

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to which I would not now adhere except with substantial qualification. Nor do I consider matters as straightforward, given more recent thought about NUPs. However, it is clear that the tension between the palpable truth of some instances of (5) and (PB) should be resolved by (i) questioning the rationale of (PB) in some way (perhaps demanding more of Quine's predicative analysis) and (ii) accepting that it is necessary to read 'exists' as 'is actual' in (5).

By way of elucidation, let us turn to another supposedly mythical figure of antiquity and to the other side of the coin. It seems to be a quite legitimate possibility that there was someone called 'Hercules'. Is it equally possible that Hercules did none of the things commonly associated with him? A simple Kripkean solution (as described in chapter 3) will support this hypothesis, but the question is not that simple. It is still required that we ask who this Hercules was and we have to find some sense to the claim 'Hercules does not exist' (read in the standard tenseless fashion). The idea will be that Hercules lies at the end of a certain NUP. Even if the NUP stems from the use of 'Hercules' to denote a particular individual, Hercules may not exist - there simply may be no Hercules as we use the name! How can this be?

One solution to these knotty problems lies in the following picture.¹³ Imagine that there developed a practice of using 'Hercules' to refer to the individual that performed the twelve labours of antiquity and so forth...and suppose also both that none of these

¹³ I am going to suppose that the sentence 'Hercules does not exist' is true and also that the following analysis will do equally well for (4) and other negative existentials with the form of (5).
descriptions were even remotely true of any individual and that this NUP had no actual individual at its terminus - the name 'Hercules' as we use it today has no actual bearer. This claim will be accurate in many cases. Let us consider two of the more interesting options.

Case 1: The name 'Hercules' (or its Greek equivalent) was used as an invented name. That is to say, it was the name of an explicit fiction, as are 'Paddington Bear' and 'Sherlock Holmes'. I am inclined to follow Kripke in the belief that there are two ways of construing these names:¹⁴ (i) as 'pretend' names - in the story we are led to believe that there is a suitable causal chain of name uses leading back to a real bear or detective - but (ii) in actuality, or outside the myth, we know that the name is used for the 'real' name of a fiction - in actuality there is a suitable causal chain of name uses leading back to an explicit fictitious creation. Thus there is no 'real' bearer of 'Hercules' as it is used by us rather than by the other characters in the myth.

Case 2: The name 'Hercules' (or its Greek equivalent) was borrowed from another NUP. Suppose there was an individual, α, called 'Hercules', i.e. there was a practice of referring to α with 'Hercules'. This NUP may be related to the modern day practice à la Madagascar - there may be a Polo-like character who, thinking he was talking about a real character, α, and imagining he was

¹⁴ Kripke [1973].

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joining in the prior NUP, initiated the practice of using 'Hercules' to refer to the person who supposedly performed the twelve labours of antiquity and so forth.\textsuperscript{15}

In a way, case 2 is by far the more interesting. Those who would accept that 'Hercules' is a borrowed name agree that the Hercules legend is a myth but might still claim that perhaps there was a Hercules. They are not committed to the idea that 'Hercules' as we currently use it has a bearer. Rather, the idea is that there was once an individual, α, called 'Hercules' (or its Greek equivalent) to whom we are able to refer by borrowing from the earlier NUP, by indirectly deferring to the previous users. This is at least suggested by the use of the indefinite article in the description of such situations.\textsuperscript{16}

It would be incorrect to view this as an open and shut case. Much of the weight of such an account of empty names falls on the shoulders of the 'messy' topology of NUPs described in §5.3, but there seems to be some agreeable elements of a solution here.

First; the case of explicitly fictitious (invented) names becomes trivial. There is a single NUP that leads back to an explicitly fictitious character - there is no borrowing from prior usage. Also, within the myth, there is every possibility of making statements about what is true in the fiction. Thus we can even admit the truth of

\textsuperscript{15} I actually find this a more credible explanation of the use of some 'historical' names than others. The names of the supernatural deities of the ancients are far less likely to have emanated from actual NUPs whose bearers were mere mortals. The names of Gods (if empty) were probably unintentionally invented ones.

\textsuperscript{16} "Of course, there might of been a Hercules" - but it is tacitly implied that he isn't the right one!
'Kripke admires Holmes' (empirical fact) or 'Holmes was smarter than Clouseau' (comparison of distinct fictions) simply because of the way the Holmes myth is and notwithstanding his fictionality.

Second; the case of names that have accommodated a referential shift from a genuine to a non-existent bearer may be treated like any other case of referential shift. We recall that the phenomenon of referential shift occurs when some referential intention overrides the deferential intention and introduces a new paradigm for use of the name. We then have potentially a 'producer-phase' for a new NUP - one where the name is unwittingly borrowed from the old NUP.

This brings us closer to a correct analysis of the truth-condition of (5). (5) might be sincerely asserted by a speaker with the standard CI, DI and PI to refer with 'N' to the bearer of 'N' (in such and such an NUP). This plausibly enough, is not self contradictory, because it is annexed to a denial that there is such an item - one's primary referential intentions are acknowledged to fail to latch onto an existent even though they do latch on to the usual NUP. In the same way one's primary referential intentions fail in a true utterance of

(6) The F does not exist.

It is important that this account also works for modal-ontological constructions:

(7) David Pears might not have existed is true (unless he is a necessary existent) because there is a tacit implication that David Pears does exist and, hence, that 'David Pears' is not empty as used in such and such an NUP. Equally

(8) Sherlock Holmes might have existed

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is false because there is a tacit implication that Sherlock Holmes does not exist and, because 'Sherlock Holmes' is empty, that there is no such item to qualify as Sherlock Holmes with respect to another possible world. Both 'David Pears' and 'Sherlock Holmes' are used in the customary manner, tied to an actual NUP. An analysis such as \((5^*)\) would have licensed

\[(7a) \text{ The sense of 'David Pears' might not have picked out anyone.}\]

\[(8a) \text{ The sense of 'Sherlock Holmes might have picked someone out.}\]

both of which seem to have the wrong truth-condition.\(^{27}\) Similar shortcomings apply to most modalized versions of metalinguistic analyses of \((5)\).

In all these cases the name is used standardly. What there is that is paradoxical in any account of \((5)\) doesn't spring from an inaccurate quasi-formal paraphrase but from the original English:

Ralph: Pegasus does not exist.

Pierre: Who doesn't exist?

Ralph: Pegasus.

Pierre: But who is that?

\(^{27}\) Especially considering the metaphysical underspecification of non-actual possible existents - no mere pseudo-Holmes is suitably related to our NUP for 'Sherlock Holmes'. See, e.g., Cook [1985], Miller [1985]. From this we may deduce that it is necessarily true that Sherlock Holmes does not exist. This seems counter-intuitive at first blush: surely if it were impossible that Holmes existed, the stories about him would fail to impress? could the English-speaking community truly be enthralled or excited by the exploits of something that necessarily failed to exist? After some reflection this is no more irrational than mistakenly thinking two persons are identical.
Ralph: The winged horse of Bellerophon.

Pierre: But I thought you were claiming there is no such thing...?

et seq.

Pierre’s stubbornness might be likened to the persistent repetition of

"And which statement is that?" in response to an initial utterance of

(9) This statement is false.

Any reductive analysis should at least preserve the flavour of such
paradoxes.

So much for the truth-condition of negative existentials. However,
many might object that the major problem is in identifying the logical
form of existentials. I doubt such is forthcoming. Sentences of the
form (5), in common with sentences of the form

(10) N exists

appear to be about N and, hence, to express singular propositions

(11) <_ does (not) exist, <N>>

Many would say that the problem is to be entirely explained by the
stupidity of treating "_ exists" as a first-level predicate when it is
nothing of the sort. Yet since what is predicated of a predicate must
differ from what is predicated of an individual, we seem obliged to
either (61) renounce the idea that (5) or (10) is about N or (62)
accept that "_ exists" is not univocal, having quite a different sense
in (5) than in (3), (6) or

(12) Unicorns do not exist.

(It is by now plain that I should prefer these alternatives rather than
acknowledge that "a general uniformity of treatment of both denoting
and non-denoting names .. is impossible.\(^{10}\) For one thing the emptiness or otherwise of a name is an empirical matter, which should not affect logical analysis: for another, ignorance of whether a name was empty or not would, perforce, affect our claim to linguistic competence, another result that squares badly with our intuitions.) We may observe the conception of existence as a second-level predicate is inadequate for a satisfactory account of 'tensed' existence whereby objects are said to begin or cease to exist. Some first-level predicative sense of 'exists' is needed to formalise

\[(16)\] Socrates no longer exists,

but it is clearly not the one we are looking for with regard to the analysis of (5).\(^{10}\)

A similar dilemma might have arisen with the opaque contexts generated in belief reports. As there, the solution seems to be to abandon the idea that there is some uniquely correct logical form underlying (5) and (10) and merely observe the inferential constraints

\(^{10}\) Peacocke [1975] p.129. Although this seems a consequence of his interpretation of RDT, which was earlier shown to be unable to account for opaque occurrences of names, the ensuing rhetorical question seems both independent of those theoretical shortcomings and wrong - "Why should we not say that there are some sentences such that only when we know whether the name in them denote do we know their logical form?" ibid. p.130.

\(^{10}\) I agree with Williams [1981] that the tense cannot be eliminated from reports such as (16). Perhaps the temporal sense of 'exists' is not a property which can be gained or lost since the ineliminability of tense requires the use of temporally relativized predicates such as 'exists at \(t_1\)'. N.B. the inadequate parsing of something 'ceasing to be' as

\[(Ex)(Fx at t_1 \& \neg(Fx at t_2))\]

for any predicate \(F\) except some first-level predicative use of 'exists', i.e.

\[(Ex)(x exists at t_1 \& \neg(x exists at t_2)).\]

For further elaboration see Godfrey-Smith [1977].
provided by (01) and (02). This manifests itself plausibly in the
denial that any analysis of (5) should be taken as a proposition that
is singular with respect to 'N'. The least accident-prone account I
have seen involves taking the negation of P as claiming that

(17) There is no true proposition expressed by P

and hence being ambiguously true - either if the proposition expressed
by P is false or if it expresses no proposition at all.²⁰ (A side-
effect is that even if P is singular, its negation is not.) Then (5)
simply denies that there is a true proposition, i.e. (10), attributing
the tenseless, 'is-actual', first-level property of existence to N.
Since this property is had by every existent, the proposition expressed
by (10) is always true. Hence (5) will be true just in case (10) fails
to express any proposition. This analysis still has shortcomings: I am
not enamoured of taking negation as this form of sentential operator
generally, and am unsure that it would work if, say, a negation occurs
twice in an atomic sentence with different scopes with respect to some
quantification; I also dislike the possibility of (5) being
determinately true whilst (10) is truth-valueless - the apparent
incoherence in (10) grounding this would arguably infect (5) as well;
moreover, I doubt there is provision for possible but non-actual
existents (what of the child produced from the sperm that actually
produced Kripke and the ovum that actually produced Quine...?). I
merely proffer the theory as the least problematic encountered to date.

²⁰ This can most easily be prised out of the debris left behind
Kripke's otherwise unconvincing account [1973]. Geach [1972], Haack
[1978], and Barwise and Etchemendy [1987] have critically examined such
approaches to negation.
The sole moral of this atrocious complexity is that (5) does not express a singular proposition and that taking it to do so generates a paradox even prior to formal paraphrase. The semantics of existential statements is not immediately obvious (though some of its unpalatable axioms might be), but there is at least an account of the truth-conditions of such statements that need not contradict our view of names as Millian.
CHAPTER 9:

CONCLUSIONS

She gave me some examples of the sort of things philosophers get up to. Like, how can you tell that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are really the same thing? I bounced back by saying that surely they weren't the same thing: even if they shared a parent company they were still two separate titles and would therefore be considered quite distinct for budgeting and tax purposes and so on...

Philosophy's a doddle, I thought.

Martin Amis.
CHAPTER 9:
CONCLUSIONS

This work will doubtless contain many omissions and shortcomings, either for want of space or out of fear of digression. In conclusion I wish briefly to provide some justification for the character of the theses advanced, convey my awareness of their fragmentary nature and highlight the thread of continuity underpinning them all.

§9.1 THE LIMITATIONS OF THEORY

A hallmark of intellectual endeavour is that it is undertaken from within a strict intellectual framework, either explicitly stated or tacitly assumed. When confronted with anomalous data two major options become available. Either one may question the veracity of the data (and one's assessment of it as anomalous) or one may question the credentials of the intellectual framework within which one works. In this work I have attempted to criticize the very intellectual framework from which the study of naming extends.

In such activity there is an ever-present danger of losing sight of the proper boundaries of one's subject. There is much data to consider in explaining the peculiar relation between name and bearer, and far too often an unwary philosopher will, say, make a sound proposal as part of a semantic theory only to have an unsympathetic audience show it to be absurd in light of pragmatic data that should have been irrelevant to its modest territory. Such criticisms gain weight because they address different problems than does the theory
itself. A fundamental objective has been carefully to demarcate my subject matter: hence I must conclude with a defence of the somewhat arbitrary partitioning thereby effected.

Many have ignored the heterogeneity of the data concerning names, and the resultant conflation, seen at its worst in Frege, Russell and their early commentators, has done little to resolve apparent paradoxes or discriminate an abstract semantics of language from a theory of language use. Only in the light of post-Austinian philosophy has a well-formed conception of the distinction arisen, and, even with the substantial contributions of Grice,¹ it has failed to achieve any degree of influence. As we have already had frequent occasion to remark, a semantic theory has an extremely limited scope, being a theory of the structure and conventional significance of a public tool, the users of which are bound merely by convention to use thus and so. Although a theory of naming might be developed to discern some order in the complex phenomena with which language-users have to deal, it seem fruitless to seek a regimentation of their erratic behaviour.

Names are particularly confounding in this respect. It takes little effort to see that they are mere labels and free from the semantic complexities had by other parts of language. Consequently the problems they generate ought to admit of simple solutions.² But none are forthcoming. It might be that the apparent complexity of attempted solutions is chimerical, but I suspect there need be very little

¹ Notably [1957].

² I have said elsewhere [1988d] that this superficial simplicity standardly embarrasses those obliged to confess an abiding interest in singular terms.
substance to an accurate account of naming. Although this would appear
to be a indictment of my own work, it has parallels in more banal
phenomena. For example, it might be easy to describe the function of
an electrical component (in terms of incoming and outgoing current,
say) which is nonetheless not replaceable by a functionally equivalent
component of a different construction and/or brand in a complex
circuit. This need not necessitate a more sophisticated theory of the
component's function but merely that some circuitry is sensitive to
other factors such as its construction. Incompatibilities of this kind
arise frequently - the fact that names performing one and the same
function (denoting one and the same item) fail to deliver the same
results in the 'complex circuit' of an intensional context need not
bode ill for their semantic (functional) simplicity.

It is also noteworthy that, in virtue of the banal behaviour of
names, a semantic theory of naming is simply of insufficient interest
to many philosophers - although the subject of so much attention, it
yields little by way of profound or incisive speculation. Only those
who feel the errors of our philosophical ancestors are attributable to
misapprehension of some underlying logical structure find such
endeavours of interest. They might be wrong for two reasons: (i) it
might be, as I have suggested above, that Frege, Russell et al.
nurtured the faulty assumption that some homogeneous theory (of

\[\text{With the substantial caveat that those interested in formal}
\text{semantics may be doing so in order to find some artificial model of the}
\text{inferential processes underlying natural language. Though the}
\text{applications of successful projects would be obvious, the means of}
\text{obtaining results is not: recent successes are still bounded above by}
\text{the 'frame problem' of AI.}\]
semantics?) accommodates all the various data and intuitions surrounding naming, or; (ii) it might be that there is no such underlying logical structure and that the assumption that there need be may be discarded. (I return to the latter point in §9.3.) Although the accommodation of pragmatic data is vital to any adequate explanation of the phenomenon of language, it has often been suggested further that speaker-meaning is central to word-meaning in that the former determines the latter. The simplification to be attacked here is, of course, in the assumption that what might be of decisive consideration as part of a pragmatic theory need carry equal weight as part of a semantic theory and vice versa. When two theories of either type conflict, we most naturally incline to side with whichever suits our present interests - such context-relative interest is a hallmark of all human activities - despite an obvious asymmetry in the inability of 'naive' semantics to deal with the kind of phenomena described in chapters 5 and 7.

It does not take much thought to see that these observations cut both ways. The advantage of rescuing Millian semantic theory from its pragmatic inadequacies is offset by the disadvantage of the inherent vagueness of the upper bound of semantic theory. In order to justify a charitable treatment of the shortcomings of this outlook, we must attend in detail to the ideas canvassed in earlier chapters.

* The program of intention-based semantics initiated by Grice [1957] and developed by Schiffer [1972] has this flavour. Though obliged to credit the intuition behind such an offensive on the monolith of 'pure' semantics - i.e. that languages develop as a result of shared conventions about communicative intentions - it seems gauche, in the light of more recent work, to suggest a suitable reduction of sentence-meaning to speaker-meaning. See Schiffer [1987].
§9.2 A FUNCTIONAL APPRAISAL OF OUR RESULTS

Since there is no substantial homogeneous theory of naming to be had, my description of the behaviour of names has been at best fragmentary. Yet each of these fragments has a potent contribution to make to the overall flavour of our theoretic speculation.

The problem of an upper bound for a semantic theory devolves, in the case of names, to an account of the semantic reference rules:

\[(R_t) 't' \text{ refers to } t\]

which construe reference as a binary relation between term and referent. Pragmatic theory deals with speaker-reference rules, where, even ignoring the role of a prospective audience, at least three more relata are imported: (i) speaker; (ii) context; and (iii) intentions. The binary construal has suffered from confusing the determiner of reference with information, i, somehow attached to a term 't' such that every individual competent in the use of 't' understands that i is uniquely about t. I have taken two steps to shown this to be mistaken: the first (negative) in denying that any version of Fregean Sinn will do the trick and the second (positive) in pursuing Kripke's argument that names are rigid and appending an account of the distinct information-encoding and reference-determining functions of a SRE.

In chapter 2 I set out my analysis of the sense of a term working as a cognitive value (or in a cognitive space, as you might put it). The sense of a term is speaker-relative, hence it cannot play all the roles Frege would have Sinn play. Even if this cognitive information fails to determine or secure the reference of a proper name contra the Frege-Russell view, there seems no conflict between this and the modern
theories of direct reference. Rather, sense is a measure of the momentary conceptual role played by a SRE in internal reasoning and deliberation. A more elaborate, hierarchical theory of senses stemming from, perhaps, attention to the set of descriptions, \( \{ \text{the } F \} \), such that \( s \) intends to refer to the \( F \) when uttering '\( N \)′ at time \( t \) and such that none of them are overridden by intentions to refer to other items, might be developed to explain the roles traditional Fregean senses supposedly play in opaque contexts, as modes of presentation, as indirect references and so on. (How this might be done and, indeed, what form of theory it might be is beyond my powers of conception. I can but wish well those who feel that sufficient attention to neural events and empirical correlative data will yield results.)

Chapter 3 hinted at the fact that there is a confusion between metaphysical and referential concerns underpinning the binding of reference to transworld identity. Plainly our intentions are not robust (nor would we expect them to be) with respect to all of the tinkerings of some essentialists.\(^3\) Yet by dint of attention to that

\(^3\) Scope exists for entering into metaphysical speculation about transworld identity, particularly with regard to the sorites-like paradoxes popularly advanced for artifacts. The simplest formulation of these is of a sequence of worlds in which the 'same' artifact differs slightly in adjacent worlds but is made of completely different parts at either end of the sequence. This produces a contradiction if we allow ourselves the luxury of the claim that an object might have been composed of slightly different parts but not of completely different parts. By denying the unrestricted S4 axiom,

\[
(\Delta \Delta P \rightarrow \Delta P),
\]

we may instead develop a theory of vague transworld identity, one that permits infinitely many degrees of possibility, i.e. a continuous measure of the degree to which one world in the sequence is possible with regard to another. Salmon [1982] errs here by admitting only three classes of world relative to \( w \): (1) definitely possible relative to \( w \); (2) definitely impossible relative to \( w \) and; (3) neither. This does not provide a satisfactory solution, for the same problem re-emerges at,
commonplace faux pas of the binary construal of names, I have refined Kripke's intuitions about naming: we may rest assured that the only conception of the semantics of names consistent with the intuitions grounding our modal speculations is one where names are Millian (and hence modally rigid) designators. The type-type encoding of information in a name misrepresents the semantic properties of that name, and hence Russell's naïve descriptionism cannot be upheld as a semantic thesis. The only retreat left for descriptionism is to a non-semantic thesis, whereby a token-use of a name is tied to a description entailing deference to some previous use of a name. In §4.2 the semantics of SREs was shown to involve distinct attributes (connotation, intension) respectively relating to encoded information and reference-determination. Not withstanding the tenuous link to spatiotemporally distant entities, some causal theory of reference must be invoked to account for the intension of a name.

It would be foolish to view chapter 5 as offering any substantial causal theory of reference. One can but describe the function of such a creature - its internal organs are far too complex to admit of a simple description. There is, for example, no way of saying how one latches on to one NUP rather than another, unless one can isolate and ascribe certain referential intentions (i.e. the kind of PI given by causal descriptivism whereby the speaker is committed to deferring to some particular prior use(s) of a name). The historico-causal theory of names is about their bearers, so the person-to-person reference-

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say, the threshold between (1) and (3): worlds on either side of the threshold do not differ significantly in relation to w, so the division seems ad hoc unless the borders of these classes are themselves fuzzy.
preserving chain thereby described is different from a theory of name-reference - it does not (attempt to) tell us what a speaker succeeds in referring to in uttering a name-token. Intentions help to determine reference construed as the n-ary relation of speaker-reference.

The move to a pragmatic theory relies strongly on the accurate assessment of referential intentions. It would be convenient if such an operation were both elegant and immune to error. I suggested earlier that we often ascribe intentions on the basis of that to which it is rational to commit the agent, both in contemporary and retrospective analysis, even though the best available description of such an intention might transcend the linguistic capacity of the subject to whom it is ascribed. This is bound up with the notion of conceptual roles and inner inferential processes: the assessment of the agent's goals and aims is made in terms of the beliefs he would or would not give up when presented with various (reliably true) data. More often than not such assessments fail to convince, because the behavioural criteria we exploit in making them are defeasible - one has only to think of the possible elaborations to the leaf-raking example. A semantic analysis of a token-utterance does not share this uncertainty. In chapter 7 the observation of the relevant phenomena indicated both the relative modesty of the claims of pragmatic theories of speaker-reference and the impracticability of constructing a semantic theory of linguistic types to deal with those phenomena.

Let us consider an example. It will not have escaped the reader's notice that recent philosophy of propositional attitudes is theoretically uneven, semantic smörgåsbord. Discussions in chapters 4
and 7 have shown that there is unlikely to be a single conception of content of sufficient calibre to accommodate all our intuitions concerning sameness of belief. At best we must acknowledge a division between two notions: (i) a truth-conditional notion of proposition-expressed and (ii) an inner notion of conceptual role explaining or predicting the external utterances and reasoning of the subject. The dissatisfaction with the Millian view of names stems from the failure to realise that epistemic perspectives exists but figure in inferential roles rather than the determination of truth-conditions - the fact that 'Na' and 'N₂' play different conceptual roles, having different senses, does not affect the fact that their semantic role is to denote one and the same item. When our reports of beliefs are insensitive to sense and hence to inferential role, we naturally fail to report anything from which we may reliably infer the believer's future utterances or behaviour with any precision. In particular, so-called de re belief-reports fail to support such inferences.

The fact that the semantics of names would seem to entail substitutivity salva veritate and hence that it precludes a solution to the problem of opacity is therefore a red herring. Since the ideas about substitutivity rest on a mistake, the analysis of propositional attitudes is an unsuitable venue for a confrontation between Fregean and Kripkean semantics. Any theory of propositional attitudes worth its salt turns at least in part on the conceptual roles of those sentences housed in that-clauses (and the forward implication of DQ). Though disturbing for the naïve semanticist who would wish to characterize the entire language in terms of truth-conditions, statable
in a finite basis of axioms and rules, it should not affect those who maintain that names are Millian. A great deal of work needs to be done by those who subscribe to the growing orthodoxy of Millian theories, but this is work in pragmatic areas that are too often ignored by those who do work in semantics.

§9.3 IS LOGIC TOO STRONG FOR LANGUAGE?

Were it not for this semantical clarity of formal languages, a favourite strategy of many theorists of language would not make sense. This is the strategy of elucidating the phenomena of natural languages by trying to translate their sentences into a formal logician's 'canonical notation'. For, if the latter were not semantically superior to the former, what would be gained by such translations?*  

A residual intuition of appeal to the naïve semanticist is that there is some underlying logical form to any given sentence, apprehension of which is our goal as philosophers of language. I now wish to cast around for evidence to refute this view. By way of example, let us commence with empty names.

Given comments in §6.4 about admitting expressions as names, even if they refer to non-existents (as it seems we must), some might feel a methodological advantage in disallowing the equivalence of 't=t' and 't has the property of being identical to t', distinguishing the former as a referential claim (i.e. that 't' is not a vacuously empty name) and the latter a metaphysical claim (i.e. that t has one and the same metaphysical essence as t - something that does not hold if 't' is, say, the name of a fictional rather than a real man). This would, in turn, be in keeping with the revision of (PB) as well as suggesting

arguments against the relevance of haecctities and individual essence with regard to theories of reference such as those advanced by Plantinga.

The suggestions of the preceding paragraph are intended to be slightly offbeat, if not eclectic. Such suggestions exemplify a dogma infecting singular reference. There in no obvious virtue in forcing one's philosophical speculation to conform to formal models or adjusting one's intuitive views likewise. Empty names and individual essences are part of our philosophical menagerie, but there is no reason to be suspicious of them for their conspicuous unresponsiveness to formalization. The temptation is to infer that philosophical problems are caused by imperfections in natural language that are eradicable by formal paraphrase, as though there were a single determinate structure underlying every English sentence that simply waits to be discovered. This view, dubbed logical form monism by Susan Haack, is a decidedly unhealthy aspect of contemporary philosophical logic.⁷

The problems of empty SREs persist. It is undeniable that non-existents awkwardly flout fundamental principles of classical logics. They may violate the law of non-contradiction (the existent round square) or the law of the excluded middle (both the present King of France and Sherlock Holmes neither have nor lack kidney stones) and in some sense even fail to have properties. Although I wouldn't go so far

⁷ Haack [1978] pp.221-222. Haack's chapter 12 presents some searching questions to logical theorists. On her classification the tenor of the current section comes "dangerously" close to logical form instrumentalism. See also Sommers [1981] passim. and the excellent critique by Moody [1986].
as to deny them the property of self-identity as did Russell, their identification also causes problems - consider the cases of explicit fictions for which there is no 'set text' (e.g. Snow White) or who pop up in more than one literary context (Faust, Don Quixote, Falstaff). Since they figure in our reasoning we arguably need some means of dealing with them. It has been suggested that a Free Logic will do this.

Free Logics hold that non-denoting terms are legitimate expressions (e.g.

1. \((x) \neg (x=d)\)

and

2. \(\neg (Ex)(x=d)\)

need not be self-contradictory) but not admissible as substituends for bound variables of quantification, quantification always being existential, since they contribute no referents to discourse and, a fortiori, no values for those variables. (In particular the theorem:

3. \((Fa \rightarrow (Ex)Fx)\)

is invalidated.) The former part of this seems defensibly in tune with earlier intuitions - names being commonly used for non-existents - but there seems little plausible support for the latter.

It is often claimed that non-denoting terms can be quantified over as long as this occurs in the scope of an operator such as 'According to the fiction...', but surely quantification about fictitious entities does occur outside the scope of such operators? For example, we have to find some plausible interpretation of

4. All fictional creations of Conan Doyle are admired by Kripke
which we may assume true for the purposes of this argument. We could (i) deny that this is a quantification or (ii) resolutely insist that this is indeed a quantification over actual objects. Both options seem counter-intuitive. Free Logics would allow us to infer from (4) and

(5) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional creation of Conan Doyle merely that

(6a) If Sherlock Holmes exists, he is admired by Kripke rather than

(6b) Sherlock Holmes is admired by Kripke.

If we do need a separate logic for non-existents, it must meet the constraints formed by natural language use of explicitly and covertly empty names, since quantification is frequently over a large class of items only some of which exist. (Though non-existents pose severe metaphysical problems, is there any reason to let these concerns impinge on a syntactic or semantic theory that should remain neutral with regard to such matters?)

Although there are further formal manoeuvres to improve these systems, it strikes me that we will not find a logic to cope with non-existents. A telling reason for this is that such a logic will have to deal univocally with both empty and non-empty names (since any name’s being empty is at best an empirically contingent matter) and, hence, will either deprive us of useful inferences or gorge us with

* The predicate '_ admired by Kripke' is indicative of a merely 'Cambridge' property. Nor is it an E-predicate.

* Save, perhaps, 'God', if that is a name: I assume that God, at least by repute, is either necessarily existent or necessarily non-existent.
ontological excesses. (Consider the denial or acceptance of the theoremhood of (3).) Moreover, such attempts at formalization surely move us away from our subject matter. A problem that at first seems to be a difficulty facing formal logicians attempting to adjust their formalization to cater for full-blooded natural languages, is given an ontological twist. For example, the insistence of Hintikka et al. to parse

(7) S knows who t is
as
(8) (Ex)(S knows that t=x)
generates a problem: moving to (8) from

(9) S knows that t=t
is valid ((9) guarantees that 't' refers (since 't=t' is a *fortiori* true) and hence licenses exportation) yet (9) does not seem to entail (7). Is this generally a problem of language? of epistemology? of ontology? Should the fact that a formal paraphrase at present eludes us prove worrying?

At the risk of iconoclasm, I suggest it should not. There seems no good reason to cling to formal semantics save concision of expression and emphasis of certain features pertinent to the determination of their truth-conditions. Yet by way of reply I could be criticised for excessive adherence to theses justified by nothing more than intuitive appeal. Though pejorative, this is essentially correct - often we do have no evidence except our intuitions. Much philosophy thrives on this (I am thinking here of thought-experimentation in the philosophy of mind), yet loses impetus with the realization that after a certain point intuitions are neither sufficiently uniform nor sufficiently keen
to provide anything like a normative account of the subject at hand. Recourse to 'hard', empirical data provides momentary solace elsewhere, but in the philosophy of language all we retain is such generalizations as "When a speaker says 'p' he generally means that such and such...". Although there is nothing objectionable in this, it does not augur well for regimentation by a formal theory.

Attempting to systematize the heterogeneous canons of correctness for, say, belief reports leads us rapidly into advancing ungainly formal paraphrases that ignore the obscurities of natural language. Yet in perpetuating the looseness of natural language it is very difficult to say anything of philosophical interest. Consequently, speculation is often limited to knocking down formal systems, of interest in itself, but lamentably detached from the various uses of natural language.

This should not be construed as a condemnation of logical theory. Logical analysis still has a use in representing those truth-functional features of (English) sentences in virtue of which they form (in)consistent sets or valid arguments. But such analyses thrive on the indication of mere similarities: they do not yield absolutely a determinate logical form for a sentence. We need not be seduced by the apparent amenability of some sentences to formalization into believing that all truth-evaluable sentences of English have some covert logical structure. Even the hopelessly convoluted offerings of chapter 4 that purport to yield a formal account of the truth-conditions of propositional attitudes do not give an unambiguously correct logical form. This view is at best a species of logical form pluralism - the
view that any number of correct logical forms for a sentence exist. I prefer to advance the view that no such forms need exist and that the apparent candidates (however many may appear) are simply formal conveniences for making certain truth-conditional attributes of those sentences apparent, in order the better to see how valid inferential patterns work. Thus they satisfy a functional constraint and need not be taken as simultaneously proffering some constitutive analysis of English sentences.

§9.4 OVERVIEW

We are now in a position to see how the perspective adopted in this thesis disturbs the theoretical framework of naming. The emphasis has been on the lack of attention paid to the scope of semantic theory. Although exposed (albeit inadvertently) to such conceptual distinctions as Saussure's langue et parole, formal theorists evince curiously recidivistic tendencies, returning to the bosom of the Frege-Russell methodology, and indulging in petty squabbling. Those who look down on them might be equally biased in their outlook - semantic nihilists schooled in the best Wittgensteinian tradition - but they make the valid point that little conceptual advance can be made by such a stale approach.

What paradoxes and problems there are in the phenomenon of naming are not rendered more intelligible by formal paraphrase. It is in virtue of the fact that our language has remained static (or at least without major conceptual upheaval) that the same problems present themselves again and again. Names are trivial labels and there is not
much to be discovered about their nature by an Übersicht of their grammar. There are two inviting routes that lead from such a lofty pronouncement: either one may drop the subject as trivial or one may descend into the pit and dirty one’s hands sorting out the minute conceptual imprecisions of those who remain fascinated by names-playing by their rules before abandoning the game. I have taken the latter course if only to demonstrate the unappealing complexity of such artifice. As Wittgenstein said, our disease is one of wanting to explain, since we are constantly instilled with the belief that there is something more profound beneath the surface. The negative conclusion of this thesis is that there is nothing lurking below in the case of names, and that further advance requires attention to other paradoxes and other forms of analysis.

We are left with the more general methodological problem of the reconciliation of psychologism and formal semantics. One gets the impression that much contemporary philosophy of language brings to bear excessively severe and potent instruments of analysis when considering structures within language. While there is work of merit to be done on the purely semantic side of linguistic analysis, it is imperative to remember that language is made a flexible and imprecise structure by those who speak it. To superimpose inflexible structures on it, by appeal to either logic or essentialism, runs the risk of creating an extremely distorted picture of language, a model that does not function as it should, replete with mechanisms that are otiose or redundant.

A telling analogy here is one that I was given when I first encountered philosophical analysis: if you are attempting to dissect a cobweb with a sledgehammer, all is well and good, but any subsequent attempt to resurrect that cobweb with the same implement is hopeless. The problem is not only one of finesse and precision - it is one of compatibility. I hope my probings into the cobweb of language have recreated something as near to the original as to be virtually indistinguishable and demonstrated that the flies ensnared therein find themselves tangled in the strands of a needlessly conservative theoretic framework.
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